



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SCIENCES

Master Thesis

Political Crisis Management in the Middle East
After the Cold War

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Nicosia
2007

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Near East University
Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences
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JURY REPORT
ACADEMIC YEAR: 2006-2007

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


Thesis

Title	Political Crisis Management after the Cold War in the Middle East
Description	<p>This study is considering the Middle East area, in the time of post-cold war. This area has experienced too much wars and conflicts, starting from the Arab-Israeli conflict until the American invasion to Iraq. Many peace proposals have been applied in the region to solve the crisis, and many wars also happened to end some crisis but instead they increased the crisis.</p> <p>The Middle East region is a very complex place, with many races, religions, beliefs, and many conflicts. To deal with this kind of crisis or conflicts, the decision makers need a methodology such as crisis management to apply instead of military solutions and wars.</p> <p>Crisis management methodology is widely explained in this study. And many examples have been given about the use of crisis management. The crisis management many times has failed and many times gained success, but at the end crisis management is the positive way to be used in the Middle East crises.</p>
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Jury's Decision

<p>The Jury has decided to accept the student's thesis. The decision has been taken unanimously.</p>
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AKNOWLEDGEMENT

FOR MY FAMILY.....

At first of all, I want to say thanks to my family, Dr. Walid, Rita, Raad, and Nisreen, who supported me and motivated me to finish this important study about Middle East crisis management. Without their help and support this study would not have seen the light.

Secondly, I want to thank Professor Dr. Jouni Suistola for his cooperation and help, he is a great academic and cultural person, having important values and ideas.

Thanks for all the teachers in the International Relations Department, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zaliha Khashman, Dr. Ejdan Sadrazam, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sabine Dreher, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Dayio lu, and Dr. Dilek Latif.

ABSTRACT

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Key words: Middle East, Political Crisis, Crisis Management.

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Introduction

The Middle East is a geographic and cultural region which is located in southwestern Asia and northeastern Africa. The geopolitical term The Middle East, was first coined in 1902 by United States naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, it originally referred to the Asian region south of the Black Sea between the Mediterranean Sea to the west and India to the east. In modern scholarship, the term refers collectively to the Asian countries of Bahrain, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Israel (and the Israeli-occupied West Bank), Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen, and the African country of Egypt. A broader, more cultural definition might include the Muslim countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.¹

The area is mostly arid with hot, dry summers and cool winters. It contains about 65 percent of the world's oil reserves, primarily in the states bordering the Persian Gulf. Oil is the region's main export. Some Middle Eastern countries are extremely rich because of their oil reserves. Others with high populations and no significant oil resources (notably Egypt and Yemen) are considerably poorer.

The first civilizations of the Middle East, which grew in the valleys of the Nile, Tigris, and Euphrates rivers, are among the oldest in the world. Alphabets, law codes, and cities all began in the Middle East, as did the world's three great monotheistic religions, Judaism (13th century be), Christianity (1st century to 4th century ad) and Islam (7th century ad). Of the three, Islam continues to mark the region most profoundly. More than 90 percent of the people of the Middle East are Muslims.

¹ Peter Sluglett, Middle East, Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2006.

The Middle East is an area of frequent conflict, largely for reasons embedded in its recent past. For example, the conflict between Arabs and Israelis over the land in Palestine (present-day Israel and the Israeli-occupied territories) is more a product of 20th-century developments rather than any age-old hostility between Muslims and Jews. Likewise, although there have been tensions between Persians and Arabs in the past, the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 was more a result of political tensions and border disputes in the second half of the 20th century. Islamic militancy, which has produced deadly results in Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon, is a consequence of late 20th-century problems such as widespread unemployment, political and socioeconomic turmoil, and an overarching sense of despair rather than a result of any violent or extremist characteristics inherent to Islam.

There is a political crisis which results from this conflict (the Arab-Israeli conflict) and the decision makers need a methodology to know how to manage these crises, and solve the problems that the state faces.

The Arab-Israeli conflict spans about a century of political tensions and open hostilities. It involves the establishment of the modern State of Israel as a Jewish nation state, as well as the relationship between the Arab nations and the state of Israel. Some uses of the term Middle East conflict refer to this matter; however, the region has been host to other conflicts not involving Israel. Since 1979, the conflict involves the Islamic Republic of Iran (a non-Arab state, not highlighted on the map) as well.²

² Yaacov Bar-Simon-Tov, "From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation," Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 45.

Despite involving a relatively small land area and number of casualties, the conflict has been the focus of worldwide media and diplomatic attention for decades. Many countries, individuals and non-governmental organizations elsewhere in the world feel involved in this conflict for reasons such as cultural and religious ties with Islam, Arab culture, Christianity, Judaism, Jewish culture or for ideological, human rights, or strategic reasons. While some consider the Arab-Israeli conflict a part of (or a precursor to) a wider clash of civilizations between the Western World and the Arab or Muslim world,³ others oppose this view. Animosity emanating from this conflict has caused numerous attacks on supporters (or perceived supporters) of one side by supporters of the other side in many countries around the world.

According to mainstream Israeli viewpoint, Zionism has been a legitimate Jewish national liberation movement, which can be beneficial for Arabs as well, at least economically; it has been non-violent except for self-defense against Arab attacks. The elimination of the state of Israel as a mostly Jewish state will inevitably bring about a second Holocaust for the Jewish people. The Palestinians should accept a division of the Holy Land between a mostly Jewish state (Israel) and an Arab state (Palestine).

According to mainstream Arab viewpoint, Zionism is a racist and violent colonial movement used by western powers as means of controlling the Middle East. The elimination of the state of Israel as a mostly Jewish state is a necessary step for restoring Arab (and in particular Palestinian) rights and freeing the Muslim world from oppression by the west. Jews

³ Abdel Mahdi Abdallah, "Causes of Anti-American in the Arab World: a Socio-Political Perspective," MERIA Journal. Volume 7, No. 4 - December 2003.

should either return to their ancestors' homelands (in Europe and Muslim countries) or remain as a part of a mostly-Arab state, either secular or under Islamic law.

Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended: For the first time, Arab states commit to a collective offer to end the conflict with Israel. This is probably one of the most important demands of the average Israeli citizen-the knowledge that the conflict is terminated, and that no further claims on Israel or its territory will be put forward by Arabs-all Arabs. "Enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all states of the region": The security of Israel, would be guaranteed through one collective peace agreement with full security provisions, and would be assured not only by neighboring Arab states, but by all Arab states, none excluded. This has always been a key Israeli demand. Despite Arab fears of Israel, brought about by Israel's occupation of parts of three Arab states, one cannot deny the existence of a genuine fear on part of the average Israeli regarding his or her own safety. It assures Israel that its security fears are understood, and will be addressed by All Arab States. "Establish normal relations with Israel": This signals full recognition of Israel and the establishment of normal relations, such as those between an Arab state and any other state in the world. "Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194": For the first time, the Arab world commits itself to an AGREED solution to the refugee problem, thus addressing Israel's concern that the demographic character of the Jewish state not be threatened. To be sure, the initiative calls for achieving a just solution of the problem in accordance with UNGA Resolution 194, but it points out that the implementation of that resolution has to be agreed.

⁴ Marwan Muasher, *The Ministry of Foreign Affairs* (Jordan), 25/11/2002.

The key point here is that Arabs understand well that the implementation has to be both fair and realistic, and certainly agreed upon. In other words, there is no possibility of a solution that will lead to the changing of the character of the Jewish state. Fortunately, there have been many suggested solutions, at Taba and elsewhere between Palestinian and Israeli interlocutors that point to the possibility of reaching a pragmatic settlement to this problem.

At the end of the late 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century many ongoing issues continued to affect relations between the Middle East and the rest of the world. In Iraq, economic sanctions, imposed after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990, remained in effect. These sanctions, which included an embargo on Iraqi oil, were intended to force Iraq to pay war reparations and destroy its nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In December 1998 Hussein's decision to expel international weapons inspectors who were sent to Iraq to ensure that these conditions were met drew renewed criticism and threats of military action from several Western nations. UN member nations, many of whom rely heavily on Middle Eastern oil, often failed to agree on the extent and duration of the sanctions and on an appropriate response to Hussein's noncompliance. Following a UN resolution in October 2002, Hussein agreed to readmit weapons inspectors. The government of U.S. president George W. Bush, however, insisted that Hussein possessed chemical and biological weapons and was actively planning to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program.⁵ In March 2003 U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq and overthrew the Hussein regime. Following the war, however, no evidence was found that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction or the production facilities needed to manufacture them. Despite some steps toward peace, the continuing conflict between Israelis and Arabs continued to play a significant role in regional and worldwide relations.

⁵ Tareq Y. Ismael, *"Middle East Politics Today: Government and Civil Society,"* University Press of Florida, 2001, p. 20.

Negotiations beginning in 1993 between Israel and the PLO resulted in limited Palestinian self-rule under the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in some parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This initial progress in negotiations improved relations between Israel and many Arab countries, including Jordan, which signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994. However, terrorist attacks continued on both sides. An Israeli student opposed to the peace process assassinated Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in 1995. The peace process stalled once again, especially after the election of a right-wing government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, which called for the adoption of a much more uncompromising stance toward the Palestinians. Ehud Barak took office in July 1999 and created a broad center-left coalition government in Israel. Barak pledged to take "bold steps" to help forge a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. He focused his attention on negotiations with the Palestinians and promised to withdraw Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, which Israel had occupied since 1982, within one year. The withdrawal was completed by June 2000.

In an effort to move the Israeli-Palestinian peace process forward, the United States convened a summit at Camp David, Maryland, in the summer of 2000, at which U.S. president Bill Clinton, Barak, and PNA president Yasir Arafat focused on a comprehensive peace agreement. Despite intense efforts and some areas of accord, no agreement was reached, and violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis ensued. Barak suddenly resigned as prime minister in December 2000.⁶

Barak was succeeded by Ariel Sharon, who announced in 2003 that Israel would unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005. Sharon argued that the peace process

⁶ Elie Podeh et al, *"Arab-Jewish Relations:~!!Conflict to Resolutions,"* Sussex Academic Press, 2006, p. 64.

could not go forward until the PNA demonstrated that it could control terrorism by groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Israel completed the evacuation of Gaza in August 2005. However, the PNA, now headed by Mahmoud Abbas, who succeeded Arafat following Arafat's death in 2004, continued to seek a more wide-ranging negotiated settlement which would include Israeli withdrawal from all or most of the West Bank and perhaps from East Jerusalem.

Politically motivated Islamic groups continued to operate in many Middle Eastern countries in the early 21st century. In general, these groups express anger and frustration against what they regard as corrupt and illegitimate regimes, against U.S. activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against continuing U.S. support for Israel. However, violence has not been confined to the struggle against tyranny and injustice, but has also been directed against individual advocates of tolerance and democracy. Most Middle Eastern governments have responded with varying degrees of repression, both against Islamists and those urging respect for human rights.

It is also widely believed in the Middle East that the West, and especially the United States, largely controls the affairs of the region, and that the corrupt governments of the Middle East survive because the West needs them in order to protect its interests there. These beliefs have caused considerable anti-Western sentiment and widespread feelings of cynicism and disempowerment, which in turn have led many to conclude that Islam is the only solution⁷.

⁷ Peter Sluglett, *Middle East*, Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2006. visited in 30 October, 2006.

The Middle East area has been chosen for this study, because it is an area full with crisis, from the Arab Israeli conflict and other political crisis. But the political history of crisis is long in the Middle East, so in this study the Post-Cold War era has been chosen, from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War II. The political crisis is too much in the era of post cold war, and Middle East definition is including many countries, but in this study not all the Middle East countries have discussed, so just the most important political crisis has been discussed and analyzed in the study.

In chapter one the methodology of crisis management has been explained, the definition of the word crisis and the meaning of crisis management itself. In chapter two the role of some actors such as, United Nation, European Union, peace agreements and peace proposals explained well. In chapter three there are many crises analyzed according to the crisis management methodology.

Many ways has used to deal with the crisis in the Middle East, the Force, Wars, and diplomacy. As everybody can see, the best way to deal with the crisis is to manage them and deal with them in diplomatic way, without force or making wars. The history of Middle East is full of wars and force and it didn't work either.

The objectives of this study are at first, to explain the crisis management methodology, and how it can be applied in the Middle East to limit and to end the crises, and avoiding wars and disasters. Second, analyzing the solutions that had been used, such as the peace process and the reasons of failing, the United Nations roles, European Union, and the peace agreements between Israel and the Arabic countries.

Introduction

At the end many crises will be discussed and analyzed, the main concern will be how these crises has been managed and what has been the crisis management role in limiting and resolving them. Finally, we try to evaluate if the crisis management was successful or not, and try to explain it.

1- The systematic approach

2- The decision-making approach

3- A combination of the two approaches

First, the systematic definition of crisis. It is a crisis at changes in critical patterns of interaction between a dynamic and the environment. Charles A. Lindberg observes that "crisis is a period in which the system is in a state of disequilibrium of the system" and he also "the international crisis is a period of disequilibrium of the system" and he also "the international crisis is a period of disequilibrium of the system" and he also "the international crisis is a period of disequilibrium of the system".

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CHAPTER ONE

Crisis Management Methodology

1.1 The Definitions of Crisis

While much has been written on crisis, there are no universally agreed definitions. However, it is possible to identify three different approaches to the definition of crisis:

- 1- The systematic approach;
- 2- The decision-making approach; and
- 3- A combination of the two approaches.

First, the systematic definition of crisis identifies a crisis as changes in existing patterns of interaction between countries and in the international system. Charles A. McClelland observes that " crisis interaction is likely to be in terms of effects on the stability or equilibrium of the system"¹ and he sees an international crisis occurring "when...a succession of extraordinary inputs begetting new outputs begetting new inputs, etc., passes some point in volume and intensity..."²

Oran R. Young concurs that an international crisis, is a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general system or any of its subsystems substantially above "normal" levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system.³

¹ Yoon Taeyoung, *"Between Peace and War: South Korea's Crisis Management Strategies Towards North Korea"*, East Asia Review, Vol. 15, No.3, 2003, p. 5.

² *Ibid*, p. 6.

³ Oran R. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crisis*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 10.

Micheal Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda further develop the systematic definition as follows:

A systematic crisis may be defined as a situational change characterized by two necessary and sufficient conditions:

- 1- An increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions among system actors, and
- 2- Incipient change within the structure of an international system, more precisely, in one or more structural attributes-power distribution, actors/regimes, rules and alliance configuration.⁴

Secondly, the decision-making approach focuses on the perception of threat and behavior, usually from the perspective of a single country. James A. Robinson suggests a three-fold concept of crisis which consists of the identification of the origins of the event, decision time, and important values. Based on Robinson's definition, Charles F. Hermann has developed one of the most widely accepted decision-making definitions of crisis. He writes; Crisis is a situation that threatens the high-priority goals of the decision-making unit; restricts the amount of time available for response before the situation is transformed; and surprises the members of the decision-making unit when it occurs.⁵

The third "combined" approach criticises 'the conceptual problems of the first two approaches and argues the necessity of synthesizing them. As Raymond Tanter strongly argues, "one could discover which of the aggregate of changes that constitute a definition of

⁴ Micheal Brecher and Hemda Ben Yehuda, *"System and Crisis in International Politics,"* Review of International Studies, Vol.I 1, No. 1, 1985, p. 23.

⁵ Taeyoung, p. 7.

crisis at the system level are perceived by decision-makers as crisis at the individual level, answers to such queries would begin the process of synthesizing the two levels of analysis."⁶

There is also a combined definition offered by Oran R. Tanter, which says that a crisis in international politics is a process of interaction occurring at higher levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of events and characterized by: a sharp break from the ordinary flow of politics; shortness of duration; a rise in the perceived prospects that violence will break out; and significant implications for the stability of some system or subsystem in international politics.⁷

Phil Williams observes that "an international crisis is a confrontation of two or more states, usually occupying a short time period, in which the probability of an outbreak of war between the participants is perceived to increase significantly, the very fact that an international crisis involves a high threat to important values and objectives of the participants is of the utmost significance."⁸

1.2 The Definition of Crisis Management

There are two major schools of thought for analyzing crisis management. One school regards the objective of crisis management as the avoidance of war and the "peaceful resolution of

⁶ Raymond Tanter, "Crisis Management: A critical Review of Academic Literature," The Jerusalem Journal of International Crises, Princeton University Press, 1968, p.15.

⁷ Young, p. 15.

⁸ Phil Williams, "Crisis Management", 1991, p. 11.

confrontation.⁹ Management of crisis consists of reaching a solution acceptable to both sides to limit the use of force.

The other school considers crisis management as "an exercise in winning" it has been defined as "winning a crisis while at the same time keeping it within tolerable limits of danger and risk to both sides."¹⁰

The most widely accepted definition of crisis management is that of Phil Williams; he argues that "crisis management is concerned on the one hand with the procedure for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand (either through miscalculations and mistakes by participants or because events take on a logic and momentum of their own) and lead to war, and on the other with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected. The other aspect will almost invariably necessitate vigorous actions carrying substantial risks. One task of crisis management, therefore, is to temper these risks, to keep them as low and controllable as possible, while the other is to ensure that the coercive diplomacy and risk-taking tactics are as effective as possible in gaining concessions from the adversary and maintaining one's own position relatively intact."¹¹

The essence of skilful crisis management lies in the reconciliation of the competing pressures which are inherent in the dual nature of crises, crisis management requires that

⁹ Taeyoung, p. 10.

¹⁰ Williams R. Kintner and David C. Schwarz, *A Study on Crisis Management*", University of Pennsylvania, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1965, P.: 1.

¹¹ Williams, p. 240.

policy-makers not only recognize the inherent dilemmas, but that they are willing and able to make the difficult trade-offs that are required.¹²

1.3 Crisis Management in Political Systems

The crisis management in the political systems includes five leadership challenges which are:-

1.3.1 Crisis Management and Public Leadership

Crises come in many shapes and forms. Conflicts, man-made accidents, and natural disasters chronically shatter the peace and order of societies. The new century has brought an upsurge of international terrorism, but also a creeping awareness of new types of contingencies breakdowns in information and communication systems, emerging natural threats, and bio-nuclear terrorism that lurk beyond the horizon.¹³ At the same time, age-old threats (as floods, earthquakes, and tsunamis) continue to expose the vulnerabilities of modern society.

In times of crisis, citizens look at their leaders: presidents and mayors, local politicians and elected administrators, public managers and top civil servants. And it is expected that these policy makers will avert the threat or at least minimize the damage of the crisis at hand. They should lead their citizens out of the crisis; they must explain what went wrong and convince us that it will not happen again. But in general in the crisis the people usually rally

¹² *Ibid*, p. 146.

¹³ U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin, and L. K. Corbitt, *Managing Crisis*, 2001, p. 200-15.

around their leaders, whatever they thought about them before. This offers the leaders a great opportunity either to good or to bad.

Crisis management bears directly upon the lives of citizens and wellbeing of societies. Misperception and negligence, however, allow crises to occur. When policy makers respond well to a crisis, the damage is limited; when they fail, the crisis impact increases. In extreme cases, crisis management makes the difference between life and death.

The management of a crisis is often a big, complex, and drawn-out operation, which involves many organizations, both public and private. The mass media continuously scrutinize and assess leaders and their leadership. It is in this context that policy makers must supervise operational aspects of the crisis management operation, communicate with stakeholders, discover what went wrong, account for their actions, initiate ways of improvement, and establish a sense of normalcy.

1.3.2 The Nature of Crisis

The term crisis refers to an undesirable, an unexpected situation. Crisis usually means that something bad is to befall a person, group, organization, culture, society which something must be done, urgently, to make sure that this threat will not materialize or that the impact will be limited.¹⁴

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 217.

A crisis marks a phase of disorder in the seemingly normal development of a system. An economic crisis, for instance, refers to an interval of decline in a long period of steady growth and development. A personal crisis denotes a period of turmoil, preceded and followed by mental stability. A revolution pertains to the abyss between dictatorial order and democratic order. Crises are transitional phases, during which the normal ways of operating no longer work.

Most people experience such transitions as an urgent threat, which policy makers must address. The definition of crisis reflects its subjective nature as construed threat; it is speaking about a crisis when policy makers experience a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.

There are three key components; threat, uncertainty, urgency. Crises occur when core values or life-sustaining systems of a community come under threat and the more lives are governed by values under threat, the deeper the crisis goes. That explains why a looming natural disaster (flood, earthquake, hurricane, extreme heat or cold) never fails to evoke a deep sense of crisis, the threat of death, damage, destruction, or bodily mutilation clearly violates the deeply embedded values of safety and security for oneself and one's loved ones.

The core idea of the interdisciplinary subfield of crisis studies is that in a crisis the modus operandi of a political system or community differs markedly from the functioning in normal times.

The threat of mass destruction is, of course, but one path to crisis.¹⁶ A financial scandal in a large corporation may touch off a crisis in a society if it threatens the job security of many and undermines the trust in the economic system. In public organizations, routine incidents as an indication of inherent flaws and threaten to withdraw their support for the organization. A crisis does not automatically entail victims or damages.

Crises typically and understandably induce a sense of urgency; serious threats that do not pose immediate problems do not induce a widespread sense of crisis. Some experts may be worried and rightly so, but most policy makers do not lose sleep over problems with a horizon that exceeds their political life expectancy. Time compression is a defining element of crisis: the threat is here, it is real, and it must be dealt with as soon as possible.

There is big difference how people react to natural and man-made disasters. In natural disasters there is nobody to accuse or to revenge, whereas in man-made disasters there is. Time compression is especially relevant for understanding leadership at the operational level, where decisions on matters of life and death must sometimes be made within a few hours, minutes, or even a split second. Leaders at the strategic level rarely experience this sense of extreme urgency, but their time horizon does become much shorter during crises.

In crisis, the perception of threat is accompanied by a high degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty pertains both to the nature and the potential consequences of the threat, what is happening and how did it happen? What is next? How bad will it be? More importantly, if uncertainty clouds the search for solutions, what can we do? What happens if we select this

¹⁶ Arjen Boin, *Et al*, "The Politics of Crisis Management", Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 3.

ion? Uncertainty typically applies to other factors in the crisis process as well, such as people's initial and emergent responses to the crisis.

3 The Ubiquity of Crisis

Disruptions of societal and political order are as old as life itself.³ Crises will continue to challenge leaders for a simple reason, and the disruption that cause crises in the systems cannot be prevented. This bold assertion arises from recent thinking about the causes of crises. It is clear now to most people that crises are not due to bad luck or god's punishment. Recent thinking "big events must have big causes" has given way to a more subtle perspective that emphasizes the unintended consequences of increased complexity. Crises, then, are usually the result of multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a threat with devastating potential. But the cause of the crisis lies in the inability of a system to deal with disturbances.

The causes of crises thus seem to reside within the system. The causes typically remain unnoticed, or key policy makers fail to attend to them. In the process leading up to a crisis, seemingly innocent factors combine and transform into disruptive forces that come to present an undeniable threat to the system. These factors are sometimes referred to as *pathogens*, as they are typically present long before the crisis becomes manifest.

The very qualities of complex systems that drive progress lie at the heart of most if not all technological crises. As socio-technical systems become more complex and increasingly

3. A. Turner and N. Pidgeon, *"Man made Disasters"*, London: Butterworth Heinemann, 1997, p. 122.

connected to other (sub) systems, their vulnerability for disturbances increases exponentially. The more complex a system becomes, the harder it is for anyone to understand it in its entirety. Tight coupling between a system's component parts and with those of other systems allows for the rapid proliferation of interactions and errors throughout the system. Non-linear dynamics and complexity make a crisis hard to detect. As complex systems cannot be simply understood, it is hard to qualify the manifold activities and processes that take place in these systems.

Growing vulnerability go unrecognized and ineffective attempts to deal with seemingly minor disturbances continue. The system thus "fuels" the lurking crisis. Only a minor "trigger" is needed to initiate a destructive cycle of escalation, which may then rapidly spread throughout the system. Crises may have their roots far away (in a geographical sense) but rapidly snowball through the global networks, jumping from system to another, gathering destructive potential along the way.¹⁸ It is in many times impossible to predict crises, there is no clear "moment X" and "factor Y" that can be pinpointed as the root of the problem. Quite sophisticated early-warning systems exist in certain areas, such as hurricane and flood prediction, and some pioneering efforts are under way to develop early-warning models for ethnic and international conflict. These systems may constitute the best available shot at crisis prediction, but they are far from flawless. They cannot predict exactly when and where a hurricane or flash flood will emerge. In fact, the systems in place can be dangerously wrong.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 124.

4 Crisis Management: Leadership Perspective

Crisis that beset the public domain this may happen at the local, regional, national, or transnational level are occasions for public leadership. Citizens whose lives are affected by critical contingencies expect governments and public agencies to do their utmost to keep them out of harm's way.

They expect the people in charge to make critical decisions and provide direction even in the most difficult circumstances. So do the journalists who produce the stories that help to shape the crisis in the minds of the public. And so do members of parliament, public interest groups, institutional watchdogs, and other voices on the political stage that monitor and influence the behavior of leaders.

However misplaced, unfair, or illusory these expectations may be, it hardly matters. These expectations are real in their political consequences. When events or episodes are widely experienced as a crisis, leadership is expected. If incumbent elites fail to step forward, others might well seize the opportunity to fill the gap.

In a liberal democracy, public leaders must change a crisis in the context of a delicate political, legal, and moral order that forces them to trade off considerations of effectiveness and efficiency against other embedded values - something leaders of non-democratic do not have to worry about as much.¹⁹

U. Beck, *"Risk Society: Toward a new modernity"* Sage Publications, 1992, p. 80.

If crisis management was hard, it is only getting harder. The democratic context has changed over the past decades. Analysts agree, for instance, that citizens and politicians alike have become at once more fearful and less tolerant of major hazards to public health, safety, and prosperity. The modern Western citizen has little patience for imperfections; he has come to fear glitches and has learned to see more of what he fears. In this culture of fear - sometimes referred to as the "risk society" - the role of the modern mass media is crucial.

A crisis sets in motion extensive follow-up reporting, investigations by political groups, as well as civil and criminal juridical proceedings. It is not uncommon for public officials and agencies to be singled out as the responsible actors for prevention, preparedness, and response in the crisis at hand. The crisis aftermath then turns into a morality play. Leaders must defend themselves against seemingly incontrovertible evidence of their incompetence, ignorance, or insensitivity. When their strategies fail, they come under severe pressure to atone for past sins. If they refuse to bow, the crisis will not end (at least not any time soon).²⁰ Leadership can be defined as a set of strategic tasks that encompasses all activities associated with the stages of crisis management. This perspective does not presume that these tasks are exclusively reserved for leaders only. On the contrary: these tasks are often performed throughout the crisis response network. In fact, during a crisis one may find situational leadership, which diverges from regular, formal leadership arrangements. We do believe, however, that the formal leaders carry a special responsibility for making sure that these tasks are properly addressed and executed (if not by the leaders then by others).

Ibid, p. 81

There is not just a suggestion that the performance of a set of tasks will provide fool-proof relief from crises (of whatever kind). This would be both a presumptuous claim and one-sidedly instrumental. It would deny the pivotal, yet highly volatile and complex political dimensions of crises and crisis management. In all fairness, one could criticize the field of crisis management studies for its overtly instrumental orientation. There is a large and fast-growing pile of self-help, how-to books that promise to make organizations crisis free.

1.3.5 Leadership in Crisis: Five Critical Tasks

Public leaders have a special responsibility to help safeguard society from the adverse consequences of crisis. Leaders who take this responsibility seriously would have to concern themselves with all crisis phases: the incubation stage, the onset, and the aftermath. In practice, policy makers have defined the activities of crisis management in accordance with these stages- they talk about prevention, mitigation, critical decision making, and a return to normalcy. Crisis management then involves five critical tasks: sense making, decision making, and meaning making, terminating, and learning.²¹

1.4 Sense Making: Grasping Crises as They Unfold

The acute crisis phase seems to pose a straightforward challenge: once a crisis becomes manifest, public leadership must take measures to deal with the consequences.

²¹Williams R. Kinter et al, "A study on Crisis Management", University of Pennsylvania, Inc. New York, 2002, p. 57.

Reality is much more complex, however. Most crises do not materialize with a big bang; they are the product of escalation. Policy makers must recognize from vague, ambivalent, and contradictory signals that sometimes out of the ordinary is developing. The critical nature of these developments is not self-evident; yet policy makers have to "make sense" of them.²²

Leaders must appraise the threat and decide what the crisis is about. However, penetrating the events that trigger a crisis - jet plane hitting skyscrapers, thousands of people found dead in mass graves a uniform picture of the events rarely emerges: do they constitute a tragedy, an outrage, perhaps a punishment, or, inconceivably, a blessing in disguise?

Leaders will have to determine how threatening the events are, to what or whom, what their operational and strategic parameters are, and how the situation will develop in the period to come. Signals come from all kinds of sources: some loud, some soft, some accurate, some widely off the mark.

1.4.1 Barriers to Crisis Recognition: Organizational Limitations

The driving mechanisms of crisis are often concealed behind and embedded within the complexities of the modern systems. Timely crisis recognition, then, depends crucially on both the capacity of individuals operating these systems and the organizational "designs" for early crisis detection. The research findings are quite sobering: most individuals and organizations are ill equipped to detect impending crises. Many public organizations lack so-

²² Bøhm, p. 10.

called "reliability experts": professionals with a well-developed antenna for detecting and coping intelligently with latent safety and security threats.²³

Operators often fail to observe that their system is failing. This is partly due to system characteristics. Destructive interactions between components are shielded by the complex technology of these systems. The tight coupling between components allows for a rapid proliferation of destructive interactions throughout the system. However, problems of inadequate error detection are also due to pervasive human tendencies in dealing with ill-structured problems. It turns out that humans have developed a surprising ability to explain aberrations in such a way that they conform to their established way of thinking. Most people have great trouble thinking "out of the box," yet this is precisely what is needed to detect impending crises.²⁴

To a large extent, what goes for individuals also goes for the organizations and institutions in which they tend to be embedded. Even in the most simple incubation process with few factors, interacting according to standard patterns and taking a long lead time, the organizations involved were unable to detect the impending disaster.

1.4.2 Psychological Dimensions of Sense Making: Stress and Performance

The pace of events sets the acute phase of crisis apart from the incubation phase. In a dynamic and volatile situation, windows of opportunity to intervene are often fleeting.

²³ C. Perrow, *"Normal Accidents: Living with high-risk Technologies,"* New York, Basic Books, 1984, 212.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 213.

Decisions as to whether how to act or not must be made rapidly, or the possibility to affect the course of events may be lost. Furthermore, there are fundamental uncertainties about the nature of the threat, contextual parameters, and the efficacy of alternative courses of action.

Politicians and bureaucrats in many countries, however hectic their everyday life may be, rarely have to gauge unfamiliar situations under these extreme pressures. Their normal modes of situation assessment and policy deliberation are thus sometimes overwhelmed by the bewildering pace, ambiguity, and complexity of crisis. Routines for coping with the torrent of information are usually not in place. As a result, policy makers easily become distressed and distracted. Crucial bits of intelligence get lost in the steady stream of briefings, phone calls, faxes, emails, wire service reports, cables, and rumors. Since crises tend to generate high levels of pressure on key policymakers and operational staff, the literature on information processing under stress is particularly relevant to the study of problem framing and sense making under crisis conditions. Stress entails a relationship between a task load and the coping capacity of an individual or collective.²⁵

Stress need not necessarily degrade performance, if the task load is balanced by a high degree of coping capacity. Experience appears to be a key factor: seasoned experts are usually far more at maintaining performance under pressure than novices.²⁶

The relationship between stress and most people's performance takes the form of an inverted "U". Absence of stress is associated with lower motivation and performance,

²⁵ Stress has been conceptualized in a number of ways; this definition is adopted from Mann (1977) and Janis (1966).

²⁶ Eric Stern et al, *"The Politics of Crisis Management,"* Cambridge University, 2005, p. 28.

moderate stress with high performance, and excessive stress with declining performance once leaving the optimum zone of the curve.

There are different kinds of stress, may have rather different psychological consequences for policy makers. Stress deriving from overload and lack of time has different psychological consequences than stress deriving from values tradeoffs, fear of loss, internal dissent, or external conflict. A combination of this stress types-likely in crisis- will thus have serious consequences for the performance of decision makers.

Coping with several crises at once is particularly tough. Stress is likely to be cumulative, in the sense that an individual's ability to cope may be impaired by lingering effects of previous stress loads a "stress hangover". Stress associated with other professional tasks or from someone's personal life adds to the total load during a crisis episode.

Some do better than others at compartmentalizing stress: they isolate stress arising in one domain and prevent it from contaminating others. For instance, President Clinton demonstrated a remarkable capacity to compartmentalize stress and maintain composure and focus during the Monica Lewinski scandal, at least in his public performances. President Nixon, however, was unable to cope with the stress when he found himself confronted simultaneously with a critical phase in the Watergate scandal and the 1973 Middle East war. He consumed large quantities of alcohol and behaved in such an erratic manner that his aides took steps to limit his ability to launch a nuclear strike.

ere are a wide range of specific stress effects, for example, under heavy stress, individuals thought to:²⁷

- Focus on the short term, to the neglect of longer-term considerations;
- Fall back on and rigidly cling to old and deeply rooted behavioral patterns (often forgetting more recent ones);
- Narrow and deepen their span of attention, scrutinizing "central" issues while neglecting "peripheral" ones;
- Be more likely to rely on stereotypes or lapse into fantasies;
- Be more easily irritable.

4.3 Precarious Reality-Testing: Constraints

Virtually all crises generate an energetic search for information among all the actors involved. Once the vast intelligence and expert resources of modern government have been brought to bear on the crisis, a huge quantity of raw data and processed "intelligence" is generated. Without mechanisms for coping with this flow of data, policy makers may become paralyzed and indiscriminately attentive to particular items of information, which may unduly affect their judgments.²⁸

Ibid., p. 29.

M. Brecher, *"Crisis in World Politics: Theory and Reality,"* Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993, p. 172.

1.4.3.1 Individual Constraints

A half century of cognitive research supports the view that experience mentally coded into what psychologists call a system of stored representations which is the basis for human sense making, in everyday life as well as in extreme situations. In addition to their memory, people's expectations are highly significant. Under conditions of ambiguity humans tend to "see" what they expect to occur. People use encoded experience; they take a scrap of information (a cue, as cognitive psychologists call it) and weave a scenario around it, using encoded experience as mental yarn. Sometimes this kind of cue enlargement points policy makers in the right direction. Yet it may just as easily lead them down the proverbial garden path to misperception.²⁹ The tendency to focus on circumstantial cues or merely cosmetic similarities between current events and previous ones can be particularly pernicious, especially if a person is overconfident that his or her interpretation is accurate.

Psychologists now recognize the fundamental limitations of the human ability to acquire and process information. Individuals tend to be attentive to a certain "set" of issue while ignoring others. What is on one's mind, the content of the cognitive "agenda" at any given time, heavily affects the way a person monitors and sorts signals from the environment, and how he interprets them.

While the human mind is capable of great intellectual feats, it is beset with limitations when it comes to monitoring and analyzing complex and volatile situations. Individuals are constantly bombarded with stimuli to such an extent that the stream threatens to overwhelm

²⁹ K. E. Weik, *"Organizing for high reliability: if > a; v: ess of collective mindfulness,"* 1999, p. 81.

their capacity to absorb it all. As a result, it is necessary to selectively monitor the environment and "tune out" much of the incoming data in order to reserve the capacity to attend to the most pressing issues at any given time. Of course, even the most skillful experts are liable to miss important information from time to time. Even when an issue is identified as important and attention is devoted to it, crucial information may be missing or uncertain, and it is necessary to go beyond the information given in making sense of the world.

Human brains collect, organize, store, and recall information by making use of packaging and organizing devices, which are generically called cognitive structures. These cognitive structures, alternatively referred to by researchers as schemas, scripts, analogies, metaphors, or stories, enable people to draw upon encoded and selectively recalled experience to interpret the present and prepare for the future. In the face of numerous, complex, and mutually contradictory cues, people also use mental tricks to facilitate classification, interpretation, and judgment. These "heuristic" short cuts in processing information introduce biases in our assessment of situations. Sometimes these shortcuts point us in the right direction; often they lead us astray. Decades of meticulous laboratory research have detailed many different patterns by which people overemphasize some bits of information, and ignore or underestimate others. There is a difference between cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric, rules of thumb that decision makers resort to under high levels of stress.³⁰ Cognitive heuristics and biases amount to parsimonious but dangerously simplistic ways of "making sense" of complex situations in such a way as to facilitate the making of quick, straightforward choices. Once made, these choices will be "bolstered" by a highly selective treatment of any

Janis Irving, *Crucial Decisions: Leadership in policy and crisis management*, New York: The Free Press, 1989, p. 88.

subsequence information that reaches decisions makers. In extreme cases, they will actively seek out information that contains negative feedback about these choices.

One of the most frequently used short cuts is the reliance on historical analogies to make sense of the challenges posed by a contemporary crisis.³¹ Use of analogies may be a more or less spontaneous cognitive attempt to make sense of highly uncertain situations. It may also spring from calculated moves to "frame" crises publicly in politically convenient ways. In both these circumstances, there is a clear pitfall associated with applying the presumed "lessons" of one crisis to another: crises might look similar, but they are unique by definition.

Affiliative rules refer to modes of sense making where "policy makers are likely to seek a solution that will avert threats to important values in a way that will not adversely affect their relationships with any important people within the organization, especially those to whom they are accountable, and that will not be opposed by subordinates who are expected to implement the new policy decision."³² Behavioral tendencies of this kind include the "avoid punishment rule," which is a propensity to favor conservative options that don't rock the boat, and the "preserve harmony rule" that may give rise to the rigid concurrence-seeking in group-level sense making that has become known as groupthink.

Egocentric rules include both self-serving rules that are invoked to satisfy strong personal motives, and emotive rules that are directed toward satisfying strong emotional

³¹ R. N. Neustadt, *"Thinking in Time: The uses of history for decision-making,"* New York: The Free Press, 1986, p. 63.

³² Irving, p. 45.

needs. Such motives include the need for power and control, or a desire for personal aggrandizement. In many instances these motives are essentially efforts to compensate for deep-seated feelings of insecurity and incompetence. Leaders with a very high need for power and control are likely to harden under stress, and take hawkish positions in conflicts.

The affiliative and egocentric rules of thumb are highly relevant to sense making in crises. Under normal circumstances, a senior policy maker should be seen "not as cold fish, but a warm-blooded mammal, not as a rational calculator always ready to work out the best solution but as a reluctant decision maker - beset by conflict, doubts, and worry, struggling with incongruous longings, antipathies, and loyalties." This is all the more true during crisis episodes.³³ As urgent threats to key societal values and interest appear to be on the rise, so do the stakes for the responsible political leaders, up to the point of affecting their personal self-esteem and sense of identity.

When he first saw the pictures of Soviet missile installations under construction in Cuba, John F. Kennedy took it personally and exclaimed: "He [Kruschev] can't do that to ~!" Kennedy's anger at what he saw as betrayal by Soviet leader was so strong that it impaired his ability to speak and reason dispassionately for several hours.³⁴ Leaders may also identify strongly with the plight of victims. After meeting that the American hostages in Lebanon should be freed. He gave the impression that he would condone any means to achieve that end short of overt surrender to the hostage-takers' political demands. He created

³³ Janis and Mann, *Decision Making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choices and commitment.* New York, 1977, p. 96.

³⁴ McCauley, "The nature of social influence in group think: compliance and internalization," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1989, p. 2~ ~."

climate in which National Security Council staffers felt sanctioned to trade arms for hostages, thus setting up the Reagan administration for the Iran-Contra affairs.

1.4.3.2 Organizational Constraints

One may expect these individual vulnerabilities and errors in crisis sense making to be corrected by someone else's vigilant processing of information in the organization in which all these individuals are embedded. Unfortunately, the problems of organizational information processing sketched above the pre-crisis stage do not evaporate once a crisis has become manifest. On the contrary, they are often aggravated.

People within organizations tend to perceive the world differently. This is an inevitable by-product of differences in tasks, jurisdictions, education, geographical location, and experience. Moreover, various organizations are often drawn into the crisis at different moments in its development: some have mandates to be the first respondents, whereas others may not come into play until much later.³⁵ The various participating actors tend to focus on different aspects of the situation, and assess conflicting situations reports differently. They draw upon different analogies and metaphors, make different inferences and prognoses, and see different interests at stake—each from their own organizational vantage points. Not unimportantly, they are well aware that information is a critical resource in the ongoingockeying for position that goes on within and between public organizations. To put it euphemistically, sharing information with others is not necessarily their first concern or reflex when something extraordinary has happened.

³⁵ U. Rosenthal et al, "Coping with Crisis: The Mt. Fuji of disaster riots and terrorism", 1989, p. 22.

Furthermore, -since information is a key currency of power in governmental and other political settings, officials typically receive information in a relatively arbitrary fashion. Sometimes it is provided as reward or sign of favor; other times it is withheld as punishment or to neutralize a potential adversary. Such practices may result in distorted sense making in crisis situations, sometimes with tragic consequences.

Poor information sharing in crisis situations is not necessarily a result of organizational dysfunctions or deficient information technology. Often, it is the result of deliberate policy such as compartmentalizing information for security reasons. Sensitive issues are often handled on a so-called needed-to-know basis. This makes good sense from a security perspective- the fewer people who are in the know, the fewer who can leak the press, to political (or bureaucratic) rivals, or to foreign governments, in practice, however, it is often difficult to figure out who "needs to know" what.

1.4.3.3 Conditions for Reliable Reality-Testing

There is another side to the crisis sense making story, to begin with, some categories of people are known for their ability to remain cool and to stay clear-headed under pressure- take veteran military officers, journalists, and fire and police commanders, for instance. Senior politicians and bureaucrats are generally veterans too - veterans of countless political and bureaucrats battles during the rise to power. Those who make it all the way to the top of the hill in competitive political-administrative systems tend to have relatively well-developed mechanisms for coping with stress. Some researchers also point to organizations that have a

proactive culture of looking for problems" in their environment. These so-called high reliability organizations have somehow developed a capacity for thorough yet fast-paced information processing under stressful conditions.

A) Mental Slides

Aspiring to adequate, if not always instantly accurate, understanding of the problems triggered by a crisis is not unrealistic. A growing body of research in the so-called naturalistic decision-making tradition has transformed the thinking about how operational decisions are made in crises and other critical incidents.³⁶ Experienced incident commanders rarely arrive at situational assessments through an explicit conscious process of deliberation, as researchers of many strips and colors were long wont to assume.

Professional commanders of this kind have developed a rich store of experience and repertoire of tactics upon which they draw when confronting a critical incident. The minds of these crisis commanders work like a mental slide carousal containing snapshots of a wide variety of contingencies that they have encountered or learned about. When they find themselves in a new situation, this is immediately compared with their stored experiences. This mental slide contains not only an image of the situation but also a recipe for action. In order to double check that the tactic in question is appropriate for this situation, the commander may perform a mental simulation to make sure that there isn't some contextual factor that might prevent that tactic from producing the desired outcome. If not, it is time to

³⁶ R. Flin, "Sitting in the Hot Seat: Leaders and their role for critical incidents," 1996, p. 54.

issue orders and begin implementing the tactic. Thus once the specific type of situation is identified, the commander knows what to do.

This mode of information processing, though not infallible, enables competent performance under difficult, dynamic conditions and peak work loads. Clearly, this tactic works best when the new contingency closely resembles at least one of the experiences captured on the commander's mental slides. If the situation is radically different from those stored in memory, a somewhat different kind of sense-making process will be necessary. But even then, stored experience is resource that can be used to develop a fairly accurate assessment.³⁷

A key question is to what extent one can transfer these ideas from the realm of "uniforms" and operational agencies to the world of high-level policy making. One possible difference between these two types of leadership settings is the time frames involved. While politicians and bureaucrats are sometimes called upon to make crucial decisions with a few moments' notice, like the incident commanders, they usually have much more time than the latter for consultation. Situational assessments in crises often arise over a period of hours or days rather than seconds and minutes. This creates a somewhat greater potential for leaders to interact with advisers and draw upon a wider range of organizational information resources than field commanders typically have at their disposal.

However, critical-incident commanders probably have more opportunities than policy makers to practice sense making under extreme conditions. By contrast, top-level policy

³⁷ R. Flin, "Decision making in crisis: The P-r Alpha disaster," 2001, p. 103-18.

makers though carrying a heavy everyday stress load-do not see major crises all that often, yet the potential variety of crises they might have to deal with is much larger than that of the average operational service commander. It should be expected that most senior policy makers to be able to count their personal experience of full-blown crises on the fingers of one hand or in the case of those with long and turbulent careers, both hands. Most leaders enter office as comparative amateurs in the realm of crisis management and may well remain so unless they experience a major crisis during their tenure.

B) Resilient Organizations

Some organizations develop an impressive capacity to grasp crisis dynamics. These organizations often work in extremely fast-paced and potentially deadly environments - think of military, police, and rescue service organizations - but they also exist in high-technology environments (nuclear power and chemical plants). These organizations have routines for using provisional information to create a provisional situational assessment and member that it is just that: provisional. They resist tendencies to adopt and cling to an interpretation based on limited information and hasty analysis. They force themselves to continuously probe their situational assessment - identifying indicators that can be monitored or "tests" devised to provide warning bells to go off should the initial assessment be off the mark. As new information becomes available, assessments are updated or even abandoned if the balance of available evidence begins pointing in a difference direction.³⁸

³⁸ K. E. Weick et, "Organization for high reliability!,-Process of collective mindfulness," 1999, p. 81-123..

The secret of their success lies in three characteristics: safety awareness, decentralization, and training. Resilient organizations have created a culture of awareness: all employees consider safety the overriding concern in everything they do. They expect crises to happen. They look for them because employees know they are expected to do that - even when it comes at the cost of task efficiency. A high degree of decentralization empowers employees to act upon their intuition: when they suspect "something is brewing," they can take it "upstairs" in the knowledge that their surveillance will be noted and appreciated. These organizations do not expect employees to rely on their intuition alone (even though leaders of these organizations understand the importance of expert intuition); employees are constantly trained to look for glitches and troubling signs of escalation. All this suggests that organizational blind spots should not be seen as inherent defaults of organization but rather as the outcome of suboptimal leadership efforts.

1

1.5 Decision Making

In most if not all crises, the moment arrives when single man or woman must make faithful choices about the government's course of action. They may seek and obtain counsel from others, such as professional advisors, political associates, spouses, friends, and academic experts. But in the end, the leader must decide.

It is important to recapitulate the distinctive nature of the decisional challenges that crises entail for leaders. Regardless of whether they are inherent in the situation or

Subjectively perceived as such by the person in charge, crises present leaders with choice opportunities that combine a number of characteristics:

- They are highly consequential: they affect core values and interests of communities and the price of both "right" and "wrong" choices is high-socially, politically, economically, and in human terms;
- They are more likely than non-crisis situations to contain genuine dilemmas that can be resolved only through trade-off choices, or "tragic choices," where all the options open to the decision maker entail net losses;
- they are baffling in that they present leaders with major uncertainties about the nature of the issues, the likelihood of future developments, and the possible impact of various policy options;
- Choices have to be made relatively quickly: there is time pressure-regardless of whether it is real, perceived, or self-imposed-which means that some of the tried-and-tested methods of preparing, delaying, and politically anchoring difficult decisions cannot be applied.

This combination of characteristics puts leaders in a difficult spot: everybody is looking to them for direction, yet a crisis makes it very difficult and painful to provide just that. In choosing leaders have to somehow discount the uncertainties, overcome any anxieties they may feel, control their impulses, and commit the government's resources to a course of action that they can only hope is both effective and appropriate in the political context they are in.

Leaders vary greatly in this respect, as a brief comparison of US presidents show. Some leaders tell themselves that making tough calls is part of their job. They accept that they can get it wrong sometimes, but they feel that office-holding mounts to more than retaining one's popularity.

Other leaders are less comfortable with making decision under pressure. Their personality and style may predispose them to consider all sides of a problem and therefore insist upon extensive analysis, multiple sources of advice, and extensive deliberation with and among advisors before making a decision. Yet other leaders experience crisis decision making as an excruciating predicament. This applies to leaders who dread the idea that their decisions may disappoint or even damage others, who are afraid to fail, or who become paralyzed by the need to make a choice in the face of conflicting advice.

Jimmy Carter succumbed to the cumulative pressures brought upon him by the second world oil crisis, these complex and dynamic events shattered key components of his world view. Perhaps more importantly, the Iranian hostage crisis wore him down psychologically. A micromanager by inclination, he met with his innermost advisors almost every day at breakfast for over a year to discuss the crisis. Eventually, the frustrating lack of progress, the increasingly bitter disagreements between his state department and national security staff advisors, the failures of the military rescue operation, and the increasingly public humiliation of his presidency which the hostage crisis elicited, got to him.³⁹

³⁹ B. Glad, *"Jimmy Carter: In research of the White House,"* 1980, p. 143.

However eager or reluctant choosers they might be, there are occasions when leaders firmly believe that a decision simply has to be made and fast. But fast decisions are not necessarily good decisions. In one comprehensive meta-analysis of US presidential decision making during international crisis, the quality of crisis decision making was low in seven, high in eight, and medium in four out of nineteen cases studied. These mixed results are mirrored by many single or comparative case studies of international crisis management.

1.5.1 Leaders and their Crisis Teams: Group Dynamics

As a rule, crisis decision making takes place in some type of small-group setting in which political and bureaucratic leaders interact and reach some sort of collective decision-whether by unanimity or majority rule. The small group appears to be an institutionally sanctioned forum for crisis leadership: most crisis contingency plans make provision for collegial bodies to gather and start coordinating the crisis response effort. These crisis teams become the critical nodes of what often are vast quite a bit in composition, size, and other relevant characteristics, even within the course of a single crisis.⁴⁰

Small groups have virtues in crisis decision making, but they can just as easily become a liability. In the high-pressure, high-consequence context of crises, the potential advantages of groups-increased intellectual and cognitive capacity- are easily off-set by pathological group dynamics.

⁴⁰ K. Roberts, , *"Decision making during international crisis*. London: MacMillan," 1988, p. 78.

The main problem, borne out by historical and laboratory studies alike, is that individuals in groups often do not share and use information effectively in advising leaders or reaching collective decisions. Two extreme forms of group behavior impede the quality of group deliberation and choice: conflict and conformity. Some groups fall apart under crisis pressure. In other groups, loyalty to the leader and the preservation of unity become the name of the game: "criticism, dissent and mutual recrimination literally must wait the crisis is over."⁴¹

Both extremes typically produce underperformance: too much conflict will paralyze the decision-making process; too much conformity removes useful obstacles to ill-considered actions and blunt adventurism. The possibility for extremes is enhanced by the high degree of informality that characterizes the interaction within crisis groups: procedural rules and institutional safeguards that stabilize regular modes of policy making tend to disappear. While this may stimulate innovative and creative practices, it also leaves groups fully exposed to a number of vulnerabilities.

A) Newness and Conformity

In many cases, the members of top-level coordination groups or crisis teams are relatively unfamiliar with what is expected of them and the rules of the game that apply. Especially in settings where crises are rare occurrences, chances are high that many top executives have. Moreover, since a crisis never conforms fully to the ones foreseen in the

⁴¹ H. Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-taking and Crisis Behavior: A theoretical and empirical analysis," 1982, p. 36.

manuals; there is a high likelihood that the people gathering around the table will not always be familiar to one another, let alone have experience of working together as a group.

This likelihood is increased by the often-observed tendency for officials and agencies to "converge upon" the localities of crisis coordination centers in their effort to take part in the action. There are symbolic rewards to be reaped from being present at the core of the government response effort: participation demonstrates that one is deemed relevant. And for all problems they cause, many also experience crises as adrenaline-enhancing breaks from the daily grind of politics and bureaucracy.⁴²

These new group settings are vulnerable to what some of us in earlier work have termed "new group syndrome." Particularly during the first, and often critical, stages of an acute crisis, "group members are uncertain about their roles and status and thus are concerned about the possibility of being made a scapegoat, hence they are likely to avoid expressing opinions that are different from those proposed by the leader or other powerful persons in the group, to avoid conflict by failing to criticize one another's ideas, and even to agree overtly with other people's suggestions while disagreeing covertly." These behaviors may partly be a product of what has been called "false cohesion," which is grounded in group member motivations to maintain their position within the inner circle of power and prestige. This renders the group process vulnerable to the kind of collective ignorance, illusory unanimity, self-censorship, and other propensities for ill-considered decision making commonly associated with groupthink.

U. Rosenthal et al. *"Complexity in Urban Crisis Management,"* 1994, p. 65.

Not all new groups develop new group syndrome. A critical factor is whether or not leaders intervene actively in order to set roles, norms, and ground rules that suspend extra-group status considerations and encourage broad and forthright participation from the very start.

8) Excessive Cordiality and Conformity

Laboring under intense pressure and in relative isolation from "life as usual" in the world outside, crisis teams may easily become more to their members than functional units for deliberation or political arenas for managing intragovernmental conflict. They can become "sanctuaries" for a leader and his associates: a place of refuge from pressures of a crisis and the dilemmas of the responsibilities for dealing with the crisis. Embattled policy makers find shelter among their peers in a relatively intimate and shielded environment. This helps them to reduce the anxiety and stress that many of them experience during a crisis.

Such collective stress reduction may come at the price of a diminished capacity for reality-testing.⁴³ The widely cited "groupthink" tendency, which refers to excessive concurrence seeking among members of relatively closed elite groups, has been put forward in a score of case studies and experimental research as an explanation of policy fiascos and mismanaged crisis. Members of groups affected by groupthink fall prey to groundless but infectious optimism about their ability to see through a crisis successfully. Members who do not share this "illusion of invulnerability," will feel constrained to speak frankly about doubts

⁴³ *ibid.*, p. 80.

and misgivings they may have about the course of action preferred by the group and/or its leaders.

In more protracted crises, crisis teams of the more closed-knit kind may fall prey to "bunker syndrome," i.e. the tendency for members of the crisis group to stick together in relative isolation from their regular organizational and external constituencies, and for the group as a whole to reify its own view of the crisis even though more and more actors in the outside world are shifting perspectives and priorities.

Whether excessive conformity or destructive infighting is likely to affect a crisis team is not a matter of chance. It has, of course, to do with the nature of the interpersonal and interagency relations prior to the crisis: do they know, respect, and trust each other fully, or not at all? Is the group considered a "safe" or a "dangerous" place? Do the group members understand that they depend on each other to achieve their aims? The accountability structure under which a crisis team operates is also an important factor. When group members feel they are not accountable at all, or will be held accountable as members of the group as a whole, they are more likely to display conformity behavior in the groupthink and new group mould. When they know they have to answer individually for what they said and did during the crisis, the likelihood of more vigilant and possibly also more trident postures increases sharply."

C) Centrifugality and Politicking

Groupthink and new group syndrome produce excessive conformity and consensus seeking in crisis teams. But crisis may also give rise to intense internal conflict. This should

¹ Boin, p. 23.

Come as no surprise: the high-stakes circumstances of crises constitute a pressure cooker for pre-existing tensions between officials or the organizations they represent. Crisis groups may become political arenas, where strategic behavior is the norm. Group members will, for example, use their information and expertise as a weapon or shield in their ongoing internecine struggles rather than use their potential assets to help the group as a whole reach sensible decisions. Rumors, leaks, silences, and misrepresentations are part and parcel of this process, as are attempts to form or break up cliques within the group. There will be fierce competition for the leader's ear, and attempts to destroy the credibility of competitors for the leader's attention. And when members of these politicized crisis groups begin to lose confidence that a successful resolution of the crisis can be achieved, they will focus on saving themselves rather than keeping the group afloat.

On paper, the constitution of crisis teams is usually clear and governed by procedures and functional requirements. In reality, other considerations enter the picture, and may foster imbalances or incorporate conflict into the group process. A leader's personal needs, sentiments, and calculations typically affect who is in and who is out of the loop during a crisis. Many leaders surround themselves with trusted and liked sources of information and advice. Agencies that traditionally are low in the bureaucratic pecking order may simply be overlooked or ignored regardless of their real importance to effective crisis response. The "non-favored" and "forgotten ones" are thus precluded from airing their perspective in the top-level group.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ *ibid*, p. 27

In short, leaders or other group members may deliberately attempt to reduce, widen, or otherwise "rig" the composition of the inner circle to gain acceptance for their preferred courses of action and deny proponents of competing views a platform.⁴⁶

D) Success Factor

It's good to know that crisis teams, whether they are emergency operations centers at the tactical level or inner circles and war cabinets at the senior political level, can actually work quite well, provided certain conditions are met. Admittedly, this is more the case in theory than in observed crisis practice, but at least the thrust of research is unequivocal. It shows that crisis teams are more likely to perform effectively in communities or governments where certain types of crises are recurring rather than rare phenomena. The key policy makers and agencies are thus more likely to have meaningful experience in working together.⁴⁷ Moreover, team performance is enhanced if the pre-existing interpersonal and inter-organizational relationships among the chief actors represented in the crisis group are marked by a reasonable degree of mutual trust. At the very least, entrenched competition, rivalry, and conflict among the people or organizations involved must be avoided; there needs to be a modicum of what sociologists call "domain consensus," i.e. a certain shared understandings of the purposes of the group or center, their own roles in it, and those of others.⁴⁸ Also, it helps if there is general acceptance of the different roles and responsibilities among group members: it must be clear who lead-and thus make the final choices- and who advise-and thus have a duty

⁴⁶ P. D. Hoyt and J. A. Garisson, "Political manipulation within the small group of foreign advisers in the Carter administration," 1997, p. 249.

⁴⁷ Wenger et al, 1986.

⁴⁸ T.E. Drabek, "Managing the emergency response," *Public Administration Review*, 1985, p. 92.

to "speak truth to power" to the best of their professional ability, even if this truth is unpleasant.

The institutionalization of procedures for group composition and deliberation is particularly important. These procedures help leaders of crisis groups to use their authority wisely to create the conditions for optimal information sharing, collaboration, and frank discussion, and not succumb to the temptation of dominating or even manipulating the group process.

The best-known procedure is called multiple advocacy. It directs leaders to create and maintain a courtroom like setting where proponents of different policy proposals get an opportunity to argue their case before an as yet uncommitted "magistrate-leader." A neutral "custodian-manager" guides the process; his only objective is to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders and experts are present, that all relevant information and viewpoints are laid on the table, and that effective debate advocacy method seems eminently appropriate for the management of crisis coordination units, where so much is riding on charting a cogent policy line and dealing with decisional dilemmas in a responsible fashion.

The characteristics of crises place constraints upon the viability of this procedure. For one, the sheer pace of events during the acute stages of a crisis makes it exceedingly difficult for groups to adopt such a highly proceduralized, reflective, and time-consuming mode of collective deliberation. When faced with exogenous pressures to act fast and to be seen to take

charge, leaders often feel forced to discount the requirements for optimal group deliberation and choice procedures.

Perhaps more importantly, given the high personal and political stakes that top officials have in crisis management, it may be too much to expect that they stick to the self-imposed limitations of the various roles accorded to them by the multiple advocacy models. The purely procedural role of the custodian requires an almost superhuman effort on the part of an official who is more likely than not to have been selected on the basis of substantive expertise and profile, and who will find it impossible not to get drawn into interagency pulling and hauling.⁴⁹ In crises, officials and agencies look to the top-level office holders for clear sense of purpose and direction, but the precepts of multiple advocacy prohibit these same top officials from taking positions and expressing policy preferences until there has been ample opportunity for group discussion.

This creates a double bind for leaders: they must commit and not commit at the same time. Meltsner put it well when he argued that "there is a delicate balance between the need for the ruler to be strong minded (in responding to crisis) and the need for openness in presenting problems and receiving advice."⁵⁰ What is required is a ruler who appears to the external world to be in charge but who, within the inner circle, has created norms of equality to promote the discussion, dissent, and multiple perspectives.⁵¹ Even in the best of circumstances, however, the shadow of hierarchy is always present in groups with a clear

⁴⁹ A. L. George and E. K. Stern, "Harnessing conflict in foreign policy making: From devil's to multiple advocacy," *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 2002, p. 484.

⁵⁰ Arjen Boin, "The politics of crisis management," Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 50.

⁵¹ George and Stern, p. 485.

authority structure, some group members will second-guess the leader's preferences and tell him what they think he will want to hear, or at least avoid telling him what they think he does not want to know.

CHAPTER TWO

The Role of Some Actors in Resolving Crises in the Middle East

2.1 Conflict Resolution

The development and implementation of peaceful strategies for settling conflicts are known by the general term conflict resolution. These methods are at work, competing with violent methods, in virtually all-international conflicts. The use of conflict resolution has been increasing, becoming more sophisticated and succeeding more often.¹

Most conflict resolution attempts use a third party whose role is mediation between two conflicting parties. Most of today's international conflicts have one or more mediating parties working regularly to resolve the conflict short of violence. There is no hard-and-fast rule saying what kind of third parties mediate what kind of conflicts. Presently the UN is the most important mediator on the world scene. Some regional conflicts are mediated through regional organizations, single states, NGOs or even private individuals. For instance, the former president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, won the 1987 Nobel peace prize for mediating a multilateral agreement among Central American presidents to end several brutal wars in the region.

In the mid-1990s, former president Jimmy Carter emerged as a virtual one-man band for international mediation. He closed agreements on nuclear proliferation in North Korea, on domestic transition in Haiti, and on cease-fire in Bosnia and in Sudan. Although each agreement was criticized, Carter has clearly become a specialized instrument of diplomacy

¹ Ho-Won Jeong, *"Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process, and Structure,"* Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 2000, p. 29.

that can be brought into play in international bargaining, and in some cases as a genuine alternative to military options.

The involvement of the mediator can vary. Some mediation is strictly technical; a mediator may take an active but strictly neutral role in channeling communication between two states that lack other channels of communications.² For instance, Pakistan secretly passed messages between China and the United States before the breakthrough in U.S.-Chinese relations in 1971. Such a role is sometimes referred to as offering the mediator's good offices to a negotiating process. In facilitating communication, a mediator works to change each side's view of difficult issues. In these roles, the mediator is like the translator between the two sides, or a therapist helping them work out psychological problems in their relationship.

Mediators may also actively propose solutions based on an assessment of each side's demands and interests. Such solutions may be compromises, may recognize the greater validity of one side's position (or power), or may be creative ideas that meet the needs of both parties. A fifty-fifty compromise is not always the best or fairest solution; it may simply reward the side with the more extreme starting position.[†]

If both sides agree in advance to abide by a solution devised by a mediator, the process is arbitration. In that case, both sides present their arguments to the arbitrator, who decides on a fair solution. For example, the Israelis and Egyptians submitted their border dispute over the hotel at Taba to arbitration when they could not come to an agreement on their own, Chile and

²Joshua S. Goldstein, *"International Relations,"* Sixth Edition, Priscilla McGeehan, 2005, p. 130.

[†]Yaacov Bar-Sirnon-Tov, *From "Conflict Resolution" to Reconciliation,* Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 23.

Argentina gave their border problems to a panel of Latin America judges in the 1980s and 1990s. When Serbian and Bosnian negotiators could not agree on who should get the city of Brcko, they turned the issue over to arbitration rather than hold up the entire 1995 Dayton agreement. Arbitration often uses a panel of three people, one chosen by each side unilaterally and a third on whom both sides agree.

In many situations, two conflicting parties could benefit from a solution other than war but lack the trust and communication channels to find such a solution. Neutral mediation with various degree of involvement can bring about awareness of the two parties' common interests. For example, Egypt and Israel had a common interest in making peace in the late 1970s, but they also had a high level of mistrust. U.S president Jimmy Carter invited the two heads of state to private and relaxed setting his Camp David retreat where they could go through the issues without the restriction of formal negotiations.

When heads of state do not see their common interests, ordinary citizens might try to raise awareness of such mutual interests on both sides. Travel and discussion by private individuals and groups toward this end has been called citizen diplomacy, and it occurs fairly regularly when conflicting states are stuck in a cycle of hostility, track two diplomacy or unofficial diplomacy.

Conflicting parties and mediators can also work to restructure the terms of bargaining, in effect extends the possible solutions for one or both sides so that their interests overlap. Often a mediator can come up with a win-win solution. This may be as simple as providing

means for one or both parties to save face when giving up some demand. In other cases, creative solutions may satisfy both parties.⁴ For instance, at the Camp David negotiations, Egypt insisted on regaining sovereignty over all its territory in the Sinai desert. Israel insisted on security against the threat of attack from the Sinai. The win-win solution was a return of the territory to Egyptian sovereignty but with most of it demilitarized so that Egypt could not use it to stage an attack. A win-win solution often trades off two disputed items on which the states place different priorities. Each side can then prevail on the issue that it considers important while yielding on an issue it does not care about as much.

Another way to create mutual interests is to break a conflict into pieces and start with those pieces in which a common interest and workable solution can be found. These may be largely symbolic confidence-building measures at first but can gather momentum as the process proceeds. A gradual increase in trust reduces the risks of nonviolent settlements relative to their costs and creates an expectation that the issues at stake can be resolved nonviolently.

A mediator who is in a position to apply positive or negative leverage to the two parties can use that leverage to influence each side's calculation of interests. For instance, the promise of future U.S. aid to both Israel and Egypt was an important sweetener in bringing them to substantive agreement at Camp David. Likewise, the reluctance of states in the Middle East to incur U.S. displeasure played a role in bringing parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict into peace talks in 1991-2000.

⁴ Track two diplomacy often involves a third party, which organizes unofficial meetings between the conflicting parties. The participants are usually not top politicians but other influential persons. Like journalists, teachers, academicians etc. the goal is to get them committed to the peace process.

2.1.1 The Madrid Peace Conference

President Bush and James Baker, his secretary of state, thought that the time was ripe for improvements in the Middle East and that the meeting of the former enemies, in the Spanish capital would signal to the world that time had come for a solution, however difficult it might appear. Bush wanted a solution to the Middle East problem because it had taken up too much of Washington's time, creating problems with the US-Arab relationship and with the Jewish lobby in the United States. He therefore suggested a peace conference, together with the USSR and other concerned state, such as those of the area and the EU.⁵ Arab countries that had participated in the anti-Iraq alliance especially Syria, which was about to lose the support from its long time protector, the USSR realized that they had better to follow the proposals of the sole superpower. Jordan was also eager to help the Americans forget its lack of co-operation, which had angered Washington during the Gulf War.⁶ Also the end of the cold war and the collapse of USSR changed the political balance in the Middle East.⁷

An agreement was reached on Madrid as the meeting place, and although this conference gave some impetus to progress in the Middle East, it was not much to speak of, again considered in hindsight. This time it was the Jerusalem government led by Shamir, rather than the Arab states, which created a problem. Bush employed a great deal of

⁵ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 2001, p. 120.

⁶ Lars Blinkenberg, *The Middle East Conflict From Bad to Worse to War*, University Press of Southern Denmark, 2006, p. 175.

⁷ After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States became the only big superpower in the world, and this situation changed the balance of power in the international system.

persuasion and even some arm-twisting to get Shamir to the conference table. The intentions of the Israeli Prime Minister, an angry hawk, were those of obstructing, not of collaborating with Washington or showing any goodwill with regard to peace process settlement. Shamir would not accept a separate Palestinian delegation, but only a common Jordanian-Palestinian one. Eventually the two delegations acted on an individual basis and this must be seen as a limited, but important, diplomatic victory for the Palestinian Liberation organization (PLO).

The conference was held in late October 1991 in the Spanish capital, under the joint chairmanship of George Bush and, in his eleventh hour, Mikhail Gorbachev, who would soon disappear from the scene of world politics. There was participation from the following Arab countries: Lebanon, Syria and combined Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Israel was there, of course, on the other side of the table, and there were the two co-sponsors, the superpower(s), the EU and several other countries.⁸

An agreement was reached fairly soon to begin peace negotiations, and at the same time it was also decided that these should follow both bilateral and multilateral paths. With regard to the latter, the plan was that questions of common interest should be negotiated, but the Syrians and the Lebanese objected to starting such negotiations until there was progress in the bilateral paths.

Notwithstanding Shamir's indirect boycott of the talks, and in spite of the reservations, the Madrid result was the most important first step towards a genuine, comprehensive and just peace arrangement for the area that had ever seen the light of day.

⁸ In October 1990, there were two superpowers in the world, which are the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

It took time for positive negotiations to begin; they had to wait until a new and more understanding leadership was in place in Israel under Rabin's second government, from June 1992. It was certainly not easy for the parties to initiate negotiations after so many years of bitterness and fighting, punctuated by some attempts at rapprochement. It would be expected that the most difficult country to convince would be Syria, but President Hafez Assad spoke of the need for a "peace of the brave". With its fairly large-scale participation in the allied war effort against Iraq, Syria could feel that it had come in from the cold. The Lebanese were surely skeptical for various reasons, especially because of their complicated situation haunted by memories of the brutal Israeli occupation in 1982-83, which was still felt in large areas of their country. But having just concluded their long civil war, they were weak and had to follow in the path of the Syrians, their new masters with regard to foreign politics. The long-time former (and later) Prime Minister, Selim Hoss, directly advised against Lebanese participation. The Palestinians, who had to work within the Jordanian delegation, were happy because it was the first time they could act on the international scene almost on a par with the Israelis. No one knew yet that they were not far from the direct negotiations with the Israelis leading to the *Oslo Accord*, and the same was the case for the Jordanians. Eventually each of these countries or entities negotiated individually. The improving atmosphere in the area resulting from the Madrid meeting certainly had its positive effects.

Shalim argues that, "The Madrid peace conference was carefully stage-managed by the Americans, with James Baker acting as the chief puppeteer. It was he and his aides, who came to be known as the peace processors and stipulated that the basis for the negotiations would be SC solutions 242 and 338 and the principle of exchanging territory for peace.

Shalim also stresses the degree to which the Israeli Prime Minister was an obstacle to progress in Madrid, and that this fact explains the intervention of Farouk Shaara (the foreign Minister of Syria); in his address to the conference, Shaara alluded to the fact that Prime Minister Shamir had assassinated the UN representative, Bernadotte, in 1948: "Here stands the man who killed a peace mediator", said Shaara.⁹

Five rounds of bilateral talks in Washington under American supervision soon followed the Madrid meeting. Not unexpectedly did they almost become abortive because of the Shamir government's obstructive policy, and soon the US election campaign was taking up most of the attention of the Washington administration.

Only two negotiation rounds, which were carried out in secret to begin with, led to positive results. They will be dealt with separately because of their importance in the overall conflict pattern: first, the Oslo Process, begun in late 1992 and early 1993, and secondly, the bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan in 1994 leading to a peace treaty.

It has seen here that the Madrid Conference was the first step in crisis management in the Middle East; the US was the sponsor of the process (manger), which tried to manage the crisis and deal with them in a diplomatic way, to end the long conflict between the parties. The objective was the avoidance of war and the peaceful resolution of confrontation between the parties and this is the most important object in crisis management to gain at the end an acceptable solution between the conflicting parties.

⁹ Avi Shalim, "The Iron Wall," Peoguin, Londo), 2000, p. 492-501.

2.1.2 The Oslo Talks and Agreements

The second step in crisis management was Oslo Accords, officially called the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements or Declaration of Principles (DOP), were finalized in Oslo, Norway on August 20, 1993, and subsequently officially signed at a public ceremony in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993, with Yasser Arafat signing for the Palestine Liberation Organization and Shimon Peres signing for the State of Israel. It was witnessed by Warren Christopher for the United States and Andrei Kozyrev for Russia, in the presence of US President Bill Clinton and Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin with the PLO's Chairman Yasser Arafat.¹¹

The Oslo Accords were a culmination of a series of secret and public agreements, dating particularly from the Madrid Conference of 1991 onwards, and negotiated between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (acting as the representative of the Palestinian people) in 1993 as part of a peace process trying to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Despite the high hopes expressed in the Accords and in the subsequent agreements, which also promised the normalization of Israel's relations with the Arab world, the conflict has not been resolved.

¹¹ <http://www.memritv.org!franscript.asp?Pl=1205>, Oslo Accords between Israelis and Palestinians, visited in 30 October 2006.

The accords aroused in the two peoples, the Israeli and the Palestinian, a wave of hope for an end to the violence, but not everyone participated in this hope.¹¹ In Israel, a strong debate over the accords took place; the left wing supported them, while the right wing opposed them. After a two day discussion in the Knesset on the government proclamation in the issue of the accord and the exchange of the letters, on September 23, 1993 a vote of confidence was held in which 61 Knesset members voted for the decision, 50 voted against and 8 abstained. The Palestinian reactions to the accords were not homogeneous, either. The Fatah accepted the accords, but the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which were known as the "refusal organizations", objected to the accords since the groups completely denounce Israel's right to exist. On both sides there were fears of the other side's intentions. Israelis suspected that the Palestinians were not sincere in their desire to reach peace and coexistence with Israel, but relate to that as part of the Ten Point Program (which is called in Israel *Tokhnit HaSHlavini* or *Torat HaSHlavim*). For evidence they brought statements of Arafat's in Palestinian forums in which he compared the accord to the Khodeyba agreement that the prophet Muhammad signed with the sons of the tribe of Quraish. Those statements could be understood also as an attempt to justify the signing of the accords in accordance with historical-religious precedent. The Israelis trust in the accord was undermined also by the fact that after the signing of the accord the terrorist attacks against Israel did not cease and even intensified, which could be explained as an attempt by the terror organizations to thwart the peace process. Others believed that the Palestinian Authority had no interest in ceasing these attacks and was instead endorsing them. Hundreds of Israeli civilians died in attacks by suicide bombers and others by Palestinian organizations during the time of the Oslo Accords. Important sections of Israeli public opposed the process; notably,

¹¹ Because of the deep rooted enmity between the two parties, some people didn't believe in the peace process, and the right of Israel exist and the conflict will continue, for example Hamas in Palestine.

the Jewish settlers feared that it would lead to them losing their homes. This process eventually resulted in the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by the Israeli right wing activist Yigal Amir.¹² Israeli suspicions were confirmed by Ziyad Abu'Ein of Fatah during an interview on Alam TV July 4, 2006: "The Oslo Accords were not what the Palestinian people dreamt of. The dream of the Palestinian people is the return, self-determination, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and the liberation of its land. However, there would have been no resistance in Palestine if not for Oslo. It was Oslo that strongly embraced the Palestinian resistance. All the occupied territories - and I was one of the activists in the first and second Intifada, and I was arrested by Israel several times... If not for Oslo, there would have been no resistance. Throughout the occupied territories, we could not move a single pistol from one place to another. If not for Oslo, the weapons we got through Oslo, and if not for the "A" areas of the Palestinian Authority, if not for the training, the camps, the protection provided by Oslo, and if not for the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners through Oslo - this Palestinian resistance could not have carried out this great Palestinian Intifada, with which we confronted the Israeli occupation."

The Cave of the Patriarchs massacre is often blamed for destabilizing the Palestinians' trust in the process. Also, the expansion of the settlements and blockades which caused the deterioration of economic conditions caused frustration and a corresponding drop in support for the accord and those who stood behind its ratification.

¹² Eran Oded, "Arab-Israel Peacemaking." *The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East.* Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2001. p. 40.

There were two major structural problems in the Oslo Accords:-13

- 1- By definition they did not include even the basis of the final solution.
- 2- There was no follow up mechanism for the process.

This means that from the perspective of the crisis management two most important elements were missing: The target and observation mechanism to know what is going on in the process. One of the most important issues that has not been solved is the refugees, and Jerusalem (historical and religious palaces), the political borders, Oslo Process had no clear goals or mechanism that can finish the conflict, and the main important factor in crisis management is to have a clear mechanism, a clear objectives or goals that the two parties will accept so they can have a solution acceptable from all the conflicting parties. As it's seen now, the peace process has stopped and the crisis increased specially in Gaza and West Bank and the crisis management couldn't success, until a clear goals and mechanism will be establish.

2.1.3 The New Middle East

The New Middle East concept with regional framework is a typical crisis management structure. The plan for the new Middle East was formulated in 1993 following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Shimon Peres, who was the foreign minister, authored the plan, presenting its principal ideas in the book *The New Middle East*. Progress in the peace process between Israel and Palestinians, complemented by the peace agreement with Jordan, and accelerated the attempt to implement some parts of the plan for the new Middle East. The concept of a new Middle East is based on the premise that only by establishing a regional framework that

Dr. Jouni Suistola.


includes all of the countries in the Middle East, will it be possible to bring to an end the conflict between Israel and Arab states.¹⁴ Such a framework would encourage the countries of the region to work together to resolve regional problems; this cooperation would in turn promote regional economic development. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly, Peres stressed that the concept of a new Middle East was not designed to lead to Israeli economic domination in the Middle East, but rather was designed to aid economic development in all the countries of the region. Peres claimed that the Arab states were faced with two options: the first, to support the program for the new Middle East, and thereby join the developed world; the second, to reject the program, and thereby remain poor, internally unstable nations

The plan for the new Middle East was formulated to achieve four goals, the achievement of which would help attain regional stability.¹⁵ These goals were: halting the spread of radical Islamic fundamentalism, raising the standard of living, improving the sense of the national security in each country by means of arms control, and fostering democratization in the nations of the region. Four "belts" for regional action were defined for the first stage of the implementation: the green belt, concentrating on combating desertification and contending with water problems in the region; the blue belt, focusing on the development of regional tourism; the gray belt, to create a transportation and communications network among countries in the region; and the white belt, to limit the arms race. In practice, Israel and the world invested most of their efforts in realizing the economic and commercial aspects of the plan, for example, the Casablanca Conference of 1994, and the

¹⁴ Awartani Hisham and Kleiman Ephraim, "Economic integration among participants in the Middle East peace process", Middle East journal, Vol.51, 1995, p. 2}.5-29.

¹⁵ Shimon Peres, "the New Middle East" New York: J.F. Holt., 1993, p. 61.

Amman Conference 1995, and the establishment of offices of trade and commerce contributed to easing the commercial ties between Israel and Arabic states¹⁶.



Map 1: The Middle East

Source: Armed Forces Journal But the unjust borders in the Middle East— to borrow from Churchill ... To new British Army chief, Gen. Richard Dannatt, Posted 1/11/2006 by Administrator.
www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899.

When Benjamin Netanyahu came to power in 1996, his foreign policy did nothing to promote the idea of a new Middle East. Under Netanyahu's leadership, governmental support for cooperative projects like joint industrial zones diminished. The foreign policy of the Netanyahu government led to a boycott of the economic conference in Doha by some of the Arab states; this in turn seriously damaged the chances of carrying out plans for New Middle

¹⁶ Ohad Leslau, "The New Middle East from the perspective of the old Middle East," MERIA Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2006, p. 7.

East. The outbreak of the second intifadah precipitated the closure of most of the trade offices maintained in Israel by states like Qatar and Bahrain, and a freeze on construction of joint industrial zones. This effectively put the final nail in the coffin of plans for a New Middle East. Even during the most promising period of progress, when a multitude of plans appeared interwoven into a vision for the New Middle East, only a tiny fraction of these projects were carried out.

One possible explanation for the failure of conflict resolution generally, and of resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, is the deep-rooted enmity between the two hostile parties in the conflict. Consequently, the means of the crisis management have not become sufficient to maintain the peace in the Middle East. The last examples from this respect are the war in Lebanon in 2006 and the continued crisis of violence between the Israelis and Palestinians.

Washington and Tel Aviv introduced the "New Middle East" project separately with the

2.1.4 The other New Middle East

and thereby introducing the issues of "constructive share". This "constructive share" which

The term "New Middle East" was reintroduced to the world in June 2006 in Tel Aviv by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (who was credited by the Western media for coining the term) in replacement of the older and more imposing term, the "Greater Middle East."¹⁷

New Middle East Map

¹⁷ Richard N. Haass, "The New Middle East", Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006.

This shift in foreign policy phraseology coincided with the inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) Oil Terminal in the Turkish Eastern Mediterranean. The U.S. Secretary of State, subsequently heralded the term and conceptualization of the "New Middle East," and the Israeli Prime Minister at the height of the Anglo-American sponsored Israeli siege of Lebanon. Prime Minister Olmert and Secretary Rice had informed the international media that a project for a "New Middle East" was being launched from Lebanon.

This announcement was a confirmation of an Anglo-American-Israeli "military roadmap" in the Middle East. This project, which has been in the planning stages for several years, consists of creating an arc of instability, chaos, and violence extending from Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria to Iraq, the Persian Gulf, Iran, and the borders of NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan.

Washington and Tel Aviv introduced the "New Middle East" project publicly with the expectation that Lebanon would be the pressure point for realigning the whole Middle East and thereby unleashing the forces of "constructive chaos." This "constructive chaos" -which generates conditions of violence and warfare throughout the region- would in turn be used so that the United States, Britain, and Israel could redraw the map of the Middle East in accordance with their geo-strategic needs and objectives.

A) **New Middle East Map**

Secretary Condoleezza Rice stated during a press conference that "what we're seeing here [in regard to the destruction of Lebanon and the Israeli attacks on Lebanon, in a sense, is

the growing-the 'birth pangs'-of a 'New Middle East' and whatever we do we (meaning the United States) have to be certain that we're pushing forward to the New Middle East and not going back to the old one."¹⁸ Secretary Rice was immediately criticized for her statements both within Lebanon and internationally for expressing indifference to the suffering of an entire nation, which was being bombed indiscriminately by the Israeli Air Force.

B) The Anglo-American Military Roadmap in the Middle East and Central Asia

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's speech on the "New Middle East" had set the stage. The Israeli attacks on Lebanon -which had been fully endorsed by Washington and London- have further compromised and validated the existence of the geo-strategic objectives of the United States, Britain, and Israel. According to Professor Mark Levine the "neo-liberal Globalizes and neo-conservatives, and ultimately the Bush Administration, would latch on to creative destruction as a way of describing the process by which they hoped to create their new world orders," and that "creative destruction [in] the United States was, in the words of neo-conservative philosopher and Bush adviser Michael Ledeen, 'an awesome revolutionary force' for creative destruction..."¹⁹

¹⁸ U.S. State Department; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, What the Secretary Has Been Saying; Special Briefing on the Travel to the Middle East and Europe of Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Washington, DC. July 21, 2006. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm>, visited in 15 November, 2006.

¹⁹ Professor Mark LeVine, The New Creative Destruction, Asia Times, August 22, 2006. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HH22Ak01.html, visited in 15 November, 2006.

Anglo-American occupied Iraq, particularly Iraqi Kurdistan, seems to be the preparatory ground for the balkanization (division) and finlandization¹⁰ (pacification) of the Middle East. Already the legislative framework, under the Iraqi Parliament and the name of Iraqi federalization, for the partition of Iraq into three portions is being drawn out. Moreover, the Anglo-American military roadmap appears to be vying an entry into Central Asia via the Middle East. The Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are stepping stones for extending U.S. influence into the former Soviet Union and the ex-Soviet Republics of Central Asia. The Middle East is to some extent the southern tier of Central Asia. Central Asia in turn is also termed as "Russia's Southern Tier" or the Russian "Near Abroad."

Many Russian and Central Asian scholars, military planners, strategists, security advisors, economists, and politicians consider Central Asia ("Russia's Southern Tier") to be the vulnerable and "soft under-belly" of the Russian Federation.²¹

It should be noted that in his book, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geo-strategic Imperatives*, Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former U.S. National Security Advisor, alluded to the modern Middle East as a control lever of an area he, Brzezinski, calls the Eurasian Balkans. The Eurasian Balkans consists of the Caucasus (Georgia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, and Armenia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan) and to some extent both Iran and Turkey. Iran and

¹⁰ Finlandization means an increase influence of a great power over another state.

²¹ Professor Andrej K. Reutz; The Geopolitics of post-Soviet Russia and the Middle East, *Arab Studies Quarterly* (ASQ), Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Washington D.C., January 2002.
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2501/is_1_24/ai_93458168/pg_1, visited in 16 November, 2006.


Turkey both form the northernmost tiers of the Middle East (excluding the Caucasus²³) that edge into Europe and the former Soviet Union.²³

C) The Map of the "New Middle East"

A relatively unknown map of the Middle East, NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan, and Pakistan has been circulating around strategic, governmental, NATO, policy and military circles since mid-2006. It has been causally allowed to surface in public, maybe in an attempt to build consensus and to slowly prepare the general public for possible, maybe even cataclysmic, changes in the Middle East. This is a map of a redrawn and restructured Middle East identified as the "New Middle East."

This map of the "New Middle East" seems to be based on several other maps, including older maps of potential boundaries in the Middle East extending back to the era of U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and World War I. This map is showcased and presented as the brainchild of retired Lieutenant-Colonel (U.S. Army) Ralph Peters, who believes the redesigned borders contained in the map will fundamentally solve the problems of the contemporary Middle East.

²³ The Caucasus or Caucasia can be considered as part of the Middle East or as a separate region.



Map 2: The New Middle East

Source: Armed Forces Journal. But the unjust borders in the Middle East — to borrow from Churchill ... To new British Army chief.²⁴
 Gen. Richard Dannatt, Posted 1/11/2006 by Administrator. www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899.

The plan for a new Middle East depending on religious or ethnic perspectives will increase the crisis in the Middle East region. Because most states or people didn't accept this map, and in crisis management perspective, Crises occur when core values or life-sustaining systems of a community come under threat and the more lives are governed by values under threat, the deeper the crisis goes. To decrease the crisis in the Middle East, the best way is to use diplomatic way not by force, as happened in Iraq in 2003.

²⁴ Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters prepared the following map. It was published in the Armed Forces Journal in June 2006, Peters is a retired colonel of the U.S. National War Academy. (Map Copyright Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Peters 2006). Although the map does not officially reflect Pentagon doctrine, it has been used in a training program at NATO's Defense College for senior military officers. This map, as well as other similar maps, has most probably been used at the National War Academy as well as in military planning circles.

2.2 The UN's Activity in Middle East: Resolutions and Crisis management

The United Nations has been concerned with the question of the Middle East from its earliest days. It has formulated principles for peaceful settlement and dispatched various peacekeeping operations, and continues to support efforts towards a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the underlying political problems.

The question has its origin in the issue of the status of Palestine. In 1947, Palestine was a Territory administered by the United Kingdom under a mandate from the League of Nations: it had a population of some 2 million, two thirds Arabs and one third Jews. The General Assembly in 1947 endorsed a plan, prepared by the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, for the partition of the Territory: it provided for creating an Arab and Jewish state, with Jerusalem under international status. The Palestinian Arabs, the Arab states and some other states rejected the plan.²⁵

On 14 May 1948, the United Kingdom relinquished its mandate and the Jewish Agency proclaimed the state of Israel.²⁶ The following day, the Palestinian Arabs, assisted by Arab States, opened hostilities against the new state. The hostilities were halted through a truce called for by the Security Council and supervised by a mediator appointed by the General Assembly, assisted by a group of military observers which came to be known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)- the first United Nations observer mission.

²⁵ http://www.palestine-un.org/mission/3f_role.html, the role of United Nations organizations in Palestine, visited in 20 November, 2006.

²⁶ UN Resolution in 1948 gave birth to Israel.

As a result of the conflict and the fail of crisis management, some 750,000 Palestinian Arabs lost their homes and livelihoods and became refugees. To assist them, the General Assembly in 1949 established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has since been a major provider of assistance and a force for stability in the region. Unresolved, Arab-Israeli hostilities led again to warfare in 1956, 1967 and 1973, each conflict leading Member States to call for United Nations mediation and peacekeeping missions. The 1956 conflict saw the deployment of the first full-fledged peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Forces (UUNEF), which oversaw troop withdrawals and contributed to peace and stability.

The 1967 war involved fighting between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, during which Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem, and part of Syria's Golan Heights. The Security Council called for a ceasefire, and subsequently dispatched observers to supervise the ceasefire in the Egypt-Israel sector.

From crisis management perspective, the Council, by resolution 242 (1967), defined principles for a just and lasting peace. These are:

- 1. "Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict"; and
- 2. "Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts

of force". The resolution also affirmed the need for "a just settlement of the refugee problem".²⁷

After the 1973 ceasefire, the Security Council established two peacekeeping forces. One of them, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established to supervise the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria, is still in place on the Golan Heights. The other operation was UNEF II in the Sinai.

In the following years, the General Assembly called for an international peace conference on the Middle East, under United Nations auspices. In 1974, the Assembly invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its work as an observer. In 1975, it established the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestine people.

Bilateral negotiations between Egypt and Israel, mediated by the United States, led to the Camp David accords (1978) and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty (1979): Israel withdrew from the Sinai, which was returned to Egypt. Israel and Jordan concluded a peace treaty in 1994.

2.2.1 United Nations and the Middle East Peace Process

In 1987, the Palestinian uprising (the first intifada) began in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a call for Palestinian independence and statehood. The Palestine National Council proclaimed in 1988 the state of Palestine. The General Assembly

²⁷ UN Publication, "Basic Facts about the UN", ~.Xork, 2000. p. 34.

acknowledged that proclamation and decided to designate the Palestine Liberation Organization as "Palestine", without prejudice to its observer status.

Following talks in Madrid, and subsequently Norwegian-mediated negotiations, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization established mutual recognition on 10 September 1993. Three days later, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed in Washington, D.C., the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. The agreement opened the way to an interim Palestine self-government and to successive Israeli withdrawals from the occupied Palestine territory.²⁸

Welcoming the agreement, the Secretary-General pledged the assistance of United Nations agencies and programs. The United Nations created a task force on the social and economic development of Gaza and Jericho, and appointed a special coordinator for United Nations assistance, who has been overseeing the work of the programs and agencies involved. The transfer of powers from Israel to the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho began in 1994. In 1995, Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed an agreement on Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank, providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and the handover of civil authority to an elected Palestinian Council.²⁹

Elections for the Council and presidency of the Palestinian Authority were held in 1996. Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was elected President of the Authority.

²⁸ Joseph Ginat et al, *"The Middle East Peace Process"*, Sussex Academic Press, 2002, p. 21.
²⁹ <http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/45140.htm>, visited in 1 December, 2006.

The peace process was reactivated with the signing of a 1999 interim agreement leading to further redeployment of Israeli troops from the West Bank, agreements on prisoners, the opening of safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza, and resumption of negotiations on permanent status issue.

Major problems between Israel and Palestinian remained unresolved. At the end of September 2000, a new wave of protests and violence began in the occupied Palestine territory. International efforts were directed at claiming the situation on the ground and bringing the two parties back to the negotiating table to resume the peace process. A few months before the outbreak of this second Palestinian *intifada*, high-level peace talks, under United States auspices, had taken place at Camp David. These talks ended inconclusively. Among the unresolved issues remained the status of Jerusalem; a resolution to the Palestinian refugee question; security; borders; and Israeli settlements. As in previous years, the General Assembly in 2000 reaffirmed the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the option of a state.

From crisis management perspective, if the questions of refugees; security; borders; and Israeli settlements will be solved in a clear mechanism, the crisis can be finished and a real peace can be achieved, and the United Nation can have a big role to achieve this.³⁰

2.3 EU's Crisis Management in the Middle East and Peace Process

The achievement of lasting peace in the Middle East is a central aim of the EU, whose main objective is:³¹

³⁰ UN Resolution in 1948 gave birth to Isrd.-...

1. a two-State solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict based on implementation of the Road Map, with Israel and a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign Palestinian State living side-by-side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors in accordance with UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1402, and 1515 and on the principles of the Madrid Conference;

This includes:

- A fair solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem and a just, viable, realistic and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees.
- A solution in the Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese tracks;

The EU sees a need to address political, economic/humanitarian and security issues simultaneously, wherever necessary via negotiations between the Parties. It recognizes that continued and comprehensive Palestinian reforms are necessary. The EU stresses the need, however, for Palestinians to be confident that their institution-building efforts will lead to a viable and functioning state. A significant positive step was Israeli/Palestinian agreement on issues of movement and access reached in November 2005, which the EU wishes to see implemented in full. The EU calls for further steps, including the freezing of settlement activities and dismantling of settlement outposts and Israeli abstention from measures which

³¹ http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/miipp/index.htm, visited in 1 December, 2006.

are not in accordance with international law, including extra-judicial killings and collective punishment.³²

The EU unreservedly condemns terrorism, violence or incitement, which cannot be allowed to hold the peace process or stability in the region hostage. Terrorist attacks against Israel have no justification whatsoever and the EU has included Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other armed Palestinian groups in its list of banned terrorist organizations. The EU recognizes Israel's right to protect its citizens from these attacks, but emphasizes that the Israeli Government, in exercising this right, should act within international law and take no action that aggravates the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians. The assumption of full control of security by the PA in areas under its authority is a key test for the Palestinian Authority and the EU urges it to show determination in the fight against extremist violence and to confront individuals and groups conducting and planning terrorist attacks.³³

2.3.1 EU's Support to the Middle East Peace Process

The role of the EU in the Middle East Peace Process has increased over the years. It actively contributes via:³⁴

- EU participation in the Quartet, including the political, financial and human resources support provided by the Community in 2005 and 2006 to the Quartet Special Envoy for Disengagement, James Wolfensohn;

³² *Ibid*

³³ <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp418.htm>, visited in 1 December, 2006.

³⁴ http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/mepp/faq/index.htm, the role of European Union in the Middle East, visited in 1 December, 2006.

The Role of Some Actors in Resolving Crises in the Middle East

- EU bilateral relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (on behalf of the PLO), which are underpinned by Association or Interim Agreements and by European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans adopted in 2005;
- The facilitation of regional dialogue through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process), which remains the only multilateral forum outside the United Nations where all the conflict parties meet;
- Confidence-building measures, including electoral observation activities funded by the European Commission: free and fair elections are an essential step to guarantee the success of the Road Map. Further confidence-building measures include EU monitoring of the proper implementation of the Israeli/Palestinian agreement on operation of the Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and Community assistance to help build up PA border control capacities.
- The organization of trilateral policy dialogues with participation of the European Commission and the Parties on transport, energy and trade.
- Assistance aimed at creating the conditions for peace, stability and prosperity in the region:
 - To promote Palestinian economic, social, political and security sector reforms, which includes tackling governance issues;
 - To provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and to bring together civil society actors from Israel, the occupied territories and neighboring countries via the EU Partnership for Peace programme;

The EU is the largest donor to the Palestinians and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Since the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000, EU assistance reflects a mix of emergency support, more medium term institution building measures and support to the reform process. In this context, the conditions attached to EU financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority have led to vastly improved public finance management.³⁵

In 2005, the Commission in addition established an infrastructure facility to assist the Palestinian Authority in the context of the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The EU is also since 2005 actively engaged in security sector reform, inter alia via efforts to reform Palestinian civil policing (EUCOPPS). The Commission recently launched a € 7m assistance programme to support judicial reform and promote the Rule of Law, which complements work on civil policing.

Together with Norway, the EU co-chairs meetings of the international donor mechanism, the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee for Assistance to the Palestinians (AHLIC). The EU is also closely involved in reviewing international and local donor coordination structures, and in local donor co-ordination on issues of electoral reform, financial accountability, judicial reform and humanitarian assistance, working with the PA to advance the reform plans, monitor implementation and identify appropriate benchmarks and barriers that impede

³⁵ <http://www.eupolitix.com/EN/News/200607/59c9ebc2-8e15-46dd-be4c-d18e2e0b7126.htm>, visited in 23 December, 2006.

reform. The EU focus on governance issues will continue under the reformed local donor coordination structures put in place in December 2005.

The EU is the biggest trading partner and a major economic, scientific and research partner of Israel. The Union is also a major political and economic partner of Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

13.2 Who is Involved and How?

As the main body of the Union the European Council (Heads of State of the twenty seven Member States and President of the European Commission accompanied by the Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Commissioner for External Relations and assisted by the High Representative for CFSP) determines the policy principles and general guidelines in the Common Foreign and Security Policy field.³⁶

The European Union's basic position on the Middle East Peace Process was first formulated by the European Council in its 1980 Venice Declaration and has been repeatedly reaffirmed by subsequent Summit and General Affairs and External Relations Council meetings. Some of the European Union declarations and ideas are regarded as milestones in the peace process and in developing relations with the Parties:

The Venice declaration of 13 June 1980 established the right to existence and to security of all States in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which

³⁶ http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/enlafCicle_6115_en.htm, visited 3 December, 2006.

implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The Essen declaration of December 1994 stated that Israel should enjoy special status in its relations with the EU on the basis of reciprocity and common interest.

The Berlin declaration of 24 March 1999 introduced the notion of a viable Palestinian state by saying that the European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region.

The Seville declaration of 22 June 2002 is explicit on the expected solution to the conflict: A settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation. The objective is an end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end result should be two States living side by side within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. In this context, a fair solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.

In June 2000, the European Council adopted a Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region, committing itself to support the efforts of the parties to conclude and implement peace agreements and to consider what support the Barcelona Process can lend to stability in the Middle East.

On the basis of these guidelines and Common Strategy, the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), composed of ministerial representatives (Foreign Ministers in the case of CFSP, together with the European Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for CFSP) formulate and implement political decisions concerning implementation of the CFSP. The GAERC regularly adopts conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process and can also adopt common positions and joint actions. Examples of Joint Actions include in 2005 the EU monitoring mission to oversee implementation of the Israeli/Palestinian agreement on operation of the Rafah border crossing point between the Gaza Strip and Egypt.

The EU troika (6-month rotating Presidency, Commission, High Representative for CFSP and incoming Presidency) conducts dialogue with third countries on the Middle East Peace Process on behalf of the Union. Starting in 1996, the Council has appointed a Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (EUSR), whose role is inter alia to support actions and initiatives leading to a final settlement of the conflict; to facilitate cooperation on security issues; to contribute to the implementation of agreements reached between the parties and to represent the EU in the Quartet at envoys level. Since 2003, Marc Otte has occupied this post.

The European Commission is fully associated with the formulation and implementation of the CFSP and supports the EU's position in the Middle East Peace Process via its participation in the Quartet (consisting of representatives of the USA, the UN, Russia

and the EU) at Ministerial and experts level and via its efforts to promote full implementation of the Road Map.

The European Commission is responsible for the preparation and implementation of assistance programmes to the region. Humanitarian aid is managed by the Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). Together with the Presidency, the Commission takes a leading role in the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of international donors to the Palestinian authority and in international donors' conferences for the Peace Process.

The EC Delegation to Israel is responsible for managing official relations between Israel and the European Commission. The EC Technical Assistance Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip (ECTAO) manages the donor assistance programme to the Palestinians and plays its role in the diplomatic community associated with the West Bank and Gaza Strip along with Member States represented locally and the EUSR.

The European Parliament has an important role to play when it comes to the determination of the foreign policy position with regard to the allocation of the major technical assistance and financial support programmes to third countries. Parliament also monitors the implementation of current expenditure for which it has responsibility, on the basis of periodic reports provided by the Commission.

2./ The Role of Arabic Countries in Crisis Management

The peace agreements were the only way to finish the crisis between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, for years there was a war and enmity between these countries, and the diplomatic way was the best to end the crisis, there were clear objectives, and a real mechanism to follow which is the important factor in crisis management.

2.1.1 The Role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Israel-Jordan Treaty of Peace)

The relationship between Jewish leaders in Palestine and the Hashemite dynasty in the area was characterized by ambivalence as both parties' prominence grew in the area. Jordan consistently subscribed to the anti-Zionist policy of the Arab world, but made specific decisions in keeping with a pragmatic point of view.

Several factors are cited for their relative pragmatism towards Israel: Their close geographic proximity, King Hussein's pro-Western orientation and modest territorial aspirations, and Israel's continuing efforts to establish lasting peace with its neighbors. Nevertheless, a state of war existed between the two countries from 1948 until the treaty was signed.³⁷

³⁷ <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/isrjor.htm>J. "Treaty Of Peace Between The State Of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan, Octob~r 26, 1994, visited in 5 December, 2006.

Memoir writers and political analysts have identified a number of "back-channel" and at times clandestine communications between the two countries, often resulting in limited accommodations even during times of war.

After the Fedayeen attacks from Jordan decreased as a result of the victory of Israel in the Suez War of 1956, the tense relations between Israel and Jordan following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war started to ease off. In the 1967 Six Day War, Jordan aligned itself with Nasser's Egypt despite an Israeli warning not to get involved in the war. This resulted in the fall of East Jerusalem and the West Bank to Israel. Besides the loss of territory, this was also an economic loss to the kingdom since much of the kingdom's economy was based in the West Bank.


In 1970 King Hussein waged the war of Black September against the PLO, ejecting the organization, which was in real danger of usurping Hussein's rule over his country. During the events of Black September, Syrian troops invaded the kingdom, threatening to further destabilize the King's situation. In response, the Jordanian air force virtually destroyed the Syrian force of 200 tanks that came to the aid of the encircled Palestinians.³⁸

The war against the PLO terrorist factions may have strengthened the connections between Israel and Jordan. Hussein's intention was to stay out of the war; however, he did eventually send a force consisting of two of his best units to the aid of Syria when the latter found itself in a dire situation when the Israeli counter-offensive on the Golan Heights threatened a collapse of the Syrian front. It was only with the arrival of this Jordanian as well

³⁸ Tareq Y. Ismael, *"Middle East Politics Today"*, University Press of Florida, 2001, p. 286.

as an Iraqi expeditionary force that the Syrians finally managed to stop the advancing Israeli army, only 35 km from the Syrian capital.

In 1987 Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister Shimon Peres and King Hussein tried to secretly promote a peace agreement in which Israel would concede control over the West Bank to Jordan. The two signed an agreement defining a framework for a Middle Eastern peace conference, however the proposal was not consummated due to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's objection. The following year Jordan abandoned its claim for the West Bank in favor of a peaceful resolution between Israel and the PLO.



Map 3 the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The Negotiation of the Agreement

During 1994 the ice was broken. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres informed King Hussein that after the Oslo Accords with the PLO, Jordan may be "left out of the game". Hussein consulted with the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and the Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Mubarak encouraged him, but Assad told him only to "talk" with Israel and not sign any accord. U.S. President Bill Clinton pressured Hussein to start peace negotiations and to sign a peace treaty with Israel and promised him that Jordan's debts would be forgiven. The efforts succeeded and Jordan signed a non-aggression agreement with Israel. Rabin, Hussein and Clinton signed the Washington Declaration in Washington, DC, on July 25, 1994. The Declaration says that Israel and Jordan could end the official state of enmity and would start negotiations in order to achieve an "end to bloodshed and sorrow" and a just and lasting peace.³⁹

Negotiations started soon after the Washington Declaration. The main points of the dispute were a 400 square-kilometer area in the Arava, which Jordan claimed Israel annexed over the years, and the dividing of the water resources of the Jordan River - which is water flowing from the Sea of Galilee and held in the Degania dam and diverted to the National Water Carrier.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel-Jordan_Treaty_of_Peace (Treaty of Peace Between The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan And The State of Israel October 26, 1994), visited in 15 November, 2006.

Eventually, these problems were solved when Israel agreed to hand back most of the territory to Jordan and give it 50 millions cubes of water each year.⁴⁰

The 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty had bad consequences for the environment of the Jordan River. According to Friends of the Earth Middle East in Amman, Israel, Jordan and Syria "simply did not implement what came in the agreement." With Jordan, Israel, and Syria all taking water from the river without regard for the water-sharing agreement, almost no fresh water flows down the Jordan River anymore. There are springs along the way which replenish it a little bit, but unfortunately it has become the "dumping yard of the countries," according to Friends of the Earth Middle East.

B) The Signing of the Agreement

In July 1994 the Prime Minister of Jordan Abdelsalam al-Majali declared an "end to the age of wars" and Shimon Peres declared that "the moment of peace has arrived". Rabin and King Hussein held a public meeting with Clinton at the White House.

On October 26, 1994 Jordan and Israel then signed the historic peace treaty in a ceremony held in the Arava valley of Israel, north of Eilat and near the Jordanian border. Prime Minister Rabin and Prime Minister Abdelsalam al-Majali signed the treaty and the President of Israel Ezer Weizman shook hands with King Hussein. It was witnessed by President Bill Clinton, accompanied by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The Israeli

⁴⁰ Ministry of foreign affairs, *main points of Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty, 26 October, 1994*. <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Main%20Points%20of%20Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty>, y_isited in 15 November, 2006.

public fully supported the agreement and was very excited about such an historic moment. Egypt welcomed the agreement and Syria ignored it. However, the Lebanese militia group Hezbollah resisted the treaty and 20 minutes prior to the signature ceremony shelled the northern Galilee settlements with mortar shells and rockets. The Israeli residents, who were forced to evacuate into shelters, took with them radio transistors and mobile TVs in order not to miss the historical moment of signing a second peace treaty with an Arab state. Following the agreements, Israel and Jordan opened their borders as borders of peace. Several border-crossings were erected across the border, allowing tourists, merchants and workers to travel between the two states. Israeli tourists started to visit Jordan, many of them traveled especially to see the *sela ha'adom* ("Red Rock") of Petra - a stone-carved Nabatean city which fascinated Israelis during the 50's and the 60's, often luring adventurers to visit it secretly. By signing the agreement between the two countries, a new page was opened in their relations after long wars and crisis between them.

2.4.2 The role of Egypt (The Egyptian Peace Opening 1977-78)

Sadat had shown his will to enter into peace negotiations on the basis of UN resolution 242, granting land for peace. His good relationship with the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, had gradually helped him to prepare the way and convince Washington to help Egypt, but the Israelis had perhaps not understood this new situation fully.

On November 19, 1977 Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel when he met with Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin, and spoke before the Knesset in

Anwar Sadat about his views on how to achieve a comprehensive peace to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which included the full implementation of U.N. Resolution 242 and Resolution 338. He made the visit after receiving an invitation from Begin and once again sought a permanent settlement (much of the Arab world was outraged by the visit, due to their widespread view of Israel as a rogue state, and a tyrannical symbol of imperialism).

This visit went against the U.S. and Soviet Union's intentions, which were to revive the international Geneva Conference. In 1978, this resulted in the Camp David Peace Agreement, for which Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize. However, the action was extremely unpopular in the Arab and Muslim World. Egypt was at that time the most powerful of the Arab nations and an icon of Arab nationalism. Many hopes were placed on Egypt to help extract concessions from Israel for the displaced Palestinians and others in the Arab world. By signing the accords, Sadat left the other Arab nations (who were reluctant to engage into such détente politics towards Israel) hanging by themselves, and steered Egypt toward Israel and the United States. This was seen as a betrayal of his predecessor Nasser's pan-Arabism, destroying visions of a united Arab front."

A) The Camp David Meeting and Peace Agreement

The Carter government was very eager to explore all possibilities of pursuing the initial opening between the two leaders in order to promote a peaceful settlement. A peace conference had been arranged in Geneva in the aftermath of the 1973 war but had led only to

⁴¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anwar_Sadat, visited in 10 January, 2007.

cease-fire between Egypt and Israel; a bilateral arrangement with Syria was also achieved with regard to the Golan, even if it took more time. The bilateral talks between Egypt and Israel after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem were only a beginning, and the final peace agreement was still something distant and had to be carefully worked out.

The US President, Jimmy Carter, therefore invited the two parties to serious talks in Camp David, and Washington eventually announced that the two leaders would join the US President in Camp David on 5 September 1978, "in order to seek a common framework for peace in the Middle East". It had not been easy to convene the opposing sides, and particularly Begin remained suspicious of the outcome of what was expected to become an American imposed arrangement. Even many American observers admitted that it was a dangerous gamble for Carter, who was investing and "his views proved to be partly correct and partly wrong" as qualified by Quandt in his book on the peace process.⁴² "Partly right because he sensed that the best avenue for real progress lay in getting a detailed understanding between Begin and Sadat on Sinai, partly wrong in believing that the talks could be concluded quickly". In his conclusive remarks, Quandt somewhat euphemistically mentions that this remarkable adventure in summit diplomacy achieved more than its detractors had been willing to acknowledge.⁴³ It may conclude that the tenacity of the morally high-standing President of the USA succeeded, and the White House could triumphantly announce on 17 September 1978 that the

⁴² Lars Blinkenberg, p.162.

⁴³ William B. Quandt, "Peace Process," The-Illo_2pngs Institution, Washington, 2001, p. 261.

parties had reached an agreement in Camp David. It was indeed a great surprise to the world, but the final agreements still had to be worked out and could only be signed after yet another round of talks and heavy pressure from President Carter.⁴⁴

One of the difficult questions had again been the linkage of the Palestinian problem. For the Israeli Prime Minister, Begin, it was important to exclude any commitment in this regard, for Sadat equally essential that the problem should be discussed with a view to the opening up of later negotiations. In this way he hoped to avoid Arab criticism that he had abandoned the Palestinians. He had not had any preliminary discussion on the subject with the PLO leader, probably because of a lack of time on both sides; in the case of Sadat, since he seems to have acted very suddenly, and in the case of the PLO leader, since he had his hands full inside war-torn Lebanon, in order merely to survive. But we have to stress that Arafat was, at any rate, very sceptical with regard to any accommodation of the enemy, the Israeli government. Sadat certainly did not avoid criticism, however, and his primary aim was of course the Egyptian national interest that - in the President's final consideration - concerned first and foremost his own country.

All the participation in Camp David were exhausted afterwards, especially Sadat, whose Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Kadil, had decided to resign before the final result was announced. So Sadat was a solitary man but would not give up before the agreement was realized. He had perhaps less reason to be happy than the other two leaders, according to Sadat's main biographers. And he openly admitted that Carter had won, because the latter showed more persistent patience than the other two participants. But while the American

⁴⁴ Blinkenberg, p. 164.

President won political prestige, Begin and Sadat reached a peaceful solution to a long drawn-out conflict; for Egypt, there were the very tangible results that the Sinai (including its oil revenue) would return to Egypt after more than ten years, and that the control over and opening of the Suez Canal could finally be realized. The Camp David agreement stipulated that the final texts would have to be signed within a three-month period, but here again new hurdles arose.⁴⁵

Announcing the battle of liberation is over, the Egyptian President returned home to a hero's welcome. The volatile masses probably felt relieved, as their leader did, because of the positive result, but in many ways the triumph was orchestrated by the government press and by Sadat's collaborators. No free opinion polls to express the truth of public feelings were permitted. The reaction of the remaining Arab world was utterly in general, and the long-term isolation of Egypt would soon begin.

The Camp David Agreement involved a later signing ceremony, but it was no easy task to persuade the parties, especially Begin, to come to Washington. According to the agreed-upon document, the deadline was 17 December 1978, but the date passed without rapprochement. Begin had just a week before collected his share of the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, while Sadat had refused to go. The Egyptian press indicated that he alone should have had the prize, not sharing it with anyone, least of all Begin, who had not been very forthcoming. President Carter tried to persuade Begin to come to Washington for the final signing ceremony, but had to make many attempts in vain before finally attaining Israel's acceptance. In order to get it, Carter personally visited both Jerusalem and Cairo in March

⁴⁵ Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman, *"Arab-Jewish Relations: from Conflict to Resolution"*. Sussex Academic Press, 2006, p. 126.

1970, and only after a dramatic last minute intervention by the American delegation, (promising oil guarantees to the Israeli government to smooth the way) did Israel's Prime Minister agree to come to Washington and sign the treaty. The signing took place on a wintry afternoon, 26 March 1979, in front of the White House, where both leaders signed, as did Carter, in his capacity as witness. His government's and especially his own personal diplomatic efforts and skills had finally broken the ice and proven to be fruitful.

A new chapter in the Arab-Israeli relationship could begin after so many wars and almost permanent crisis up to that time. The peace treaty followed the main lines of the Security Council resolution 242 mentioned above, which established the formula *land for peace*. It thus stipulated that the Israeli forces must be withdrawn from the Sinai, and that almost the entire occupied zone should be returned.⁴⁶ Egypt must then recognize Israel and establish normal diplomatic relations with Jerusalem, as the first Arab power to do so - no small concession to the rightwing government in Israel.

As already pointed out, one of the odd aspects of the Camp David agreements was the fact that they tried to include an arrangement for the Palestinians without consulting the PLO leader, already recognized by most Arab nations as the sole representative of the Palestinians. But the agreements envisaged an autonomous status for the West Bank and Jerusalem, and if this did not work, Sadat promised that a solution to these issues could begin with Gaza, formerly under Egyptian administration.

⁴⁶ Israeli tried to obtain a small piece of land around Taba, but eventually lost the legal battle on the issue at the International Court at the Hague.

CHAPTER THREE

Post Cold War Crises in the Middle East

1.1 Gulf War II 1991

To understand the war from the perspective of crisis management, we have first to take a short look at the events and political actions as such. The Gulf War (16 January 1991-3 March 1991) was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 30 nations led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations in order to liberate Kuwait.¹

The conflict is known by numerous alternative names that reflect the historical, political, and journalistic views of different groups and regions. These include Gulf War, Persian Gulf War, War in the Gulf, 1990 Gulf War, Gulf War Sr. or First Gulf War (to distinguish it from the ongoing Iraq War), Second Gulf War (to distinguish it from the Iran-Iraq War), Liberation of Kuwait, War of Kuwait and Mother of Battles. Operation Desert Storm was the US name of the air land operations and is often used to refer to the conflict.²

The air and land conflict began with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, following Iraqi contentions that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling petroleum across Iraq's border. The invasion was met with immediate economic sanctions by the United Nations against Iraq. Hostilities commenced in January 1991, resulting in a decisive victory for the coalition forces, which drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait with minimal coalition deaths (totally

¹The reported number of countries participating in the Coalition varies according to source. These variations may be in part be due to uncertainty over what level of participation constitutes being a Coalition member, and vagueness over the organization timeline of the Coalition. Examples of count variations include: an Arab anti-Gulf War essay - 31; CNN - 34; an Arab media site - 36; the Heritage Foundation (a US conservative thinktank citing a 1991 Department of Defense report) - 38; US Institute of Medicine report on Gulf War Veterans' Health - 39. The number of Coalition members has been reported to be as low as 19 at the beginning of the air campaign. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War, 30 Dec 2006.

11 killed on the battle field, whereas on the Iraqi side the number was maybe 60000). Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait and bordering areas of Saudi Arabia. Iraq also launched missiles against targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Since coming to power, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein had been a leader of the rejectionist Arab states and one of the most belligerent foes of Israel. On April 2, 1990, Saddam's rhetoric became more threatening: "I swear to God we will let our fire eat half of Israel if it tries to wage anything against Iraq." Saddam said his nation's chemical weapons capability was matched only by that of the United States and the Soviet Union, and that he could annihilate anyone who threatened Iraq with an atomic bomb by the "double chemical".³ Several days later, Saddam said that war with Israel would not end until all Israeli-held territory was restored to Arab hands. He added that Iraq could launch chemical weapons at Israel from several different sites. The Iraqi leader also made the alarming disclosure that his commanders had the freedom to launch attacks against Israel without consulting the high command if Israel attacked Iraq. The head of the Iraqi Air Force subsequently said he had orders to strike Israel if the Jewish State launched a raid against Iraq or any other Arab country.⁴

On June 18, 1990, Saddam told an Islamic Conference meeting in Baghdad: "We will strike at the Israelis with all the arms in our possession if they attack Iraq or the Arabs." He

Reuters, April 2, 1990.

Tareq Y. Ismael, *"Middle East Politics Today"*, University Press of Florida, 2001, p. 218.

clared "Palestine has been stolen," and exhorted the Arab world to "recover the usurped
lands in Palestine and free Jerusalem from Zionist captivity".⁵

Saddam's threat came in the wake of revelations that Britain and the United States
had learned of an attempt to smuggle American-made "krytron" nuclear triggers to Iraq. Britain's MI6
intelligence service prepared a secret assessment three years earlier that Hussein had ordered
a full-out effort to develop nuclear weapons. After Saddam used chemical weapons against
his own Kurdish population in Halabja in 1988, few people doubted his willingness to use
nuclear weapons against Jews in Israel if he had the opportunity.

Israeli fears were further raised by reports in the Arabic press, beginning in January
1990, that Jordan and Iraq had formed "joint military battalions" drawn from the various
army, air and naval units. "These battalions will serve as emergency forces to confront any
foreign challenge or threat to either of the two countries," one newspaper said (Alittihad,
January 26, 1990). In addition, the two countries were said to have formed a joint air
squadron. This was to be the first step toward a unified Arab corps, Jordanian columnist
Jamal al-Razzaz disclosed. "If we do not hurry up and start forming a unified military Arab
force, we will not be able to confront the Zionist ambitions supported by U.S. aid," he said.
Given the history of Arab alliances forming as a prelude to planning an attack, Israel found
these developments worrisome.⁶

In April 1990, British customs officers found tubes about to be loaded onto an Iraqi-
owned ship that were believed to be part of a giant cannon that would enable Baghdad to

f.p.219.

load nuclear or chemical missiles into Israel or Iran. Iraq denied it was building a "supergun," but, after the war, it was learned that Iraq had built such a weapon.⁷

Iraq emerged from its war with Iran with one of the largest and best-equipped military forces in the world. In fact, Iraq had one million battle-tested troops, more than 700 combat aircraft, 6,000 tanks, ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. Although the U.S. and its allies won a quick victory, the magnitude of Hussein's arsenal only became clear after the war when UN investigators found evidence of a vast program to build chemical and nuclear weapons. Iraq also served as a base for several terrorist groups that menaced Israel, including the PLO and Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein consistently threatened to strike Israel if his country was attacked. If the U.S. moves against Iraq, he said in December 1990, "then Tel Aviv will receive the next attack, whether or not Israel takes part". At a press conference, following his January 9, 1991, meeting with Secretary of State James Baker, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz was asked if the war starts, would Iraq attack Israel. He replied bluntly: "Yes. Absolutely, yes."

3.1.1 Crisis Management and UN Resolution

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and US delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding

⁷ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/index.html>, visited in 8 January, 2007.

a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On August 3, the Arab League passed its own resolution demanding a withdrawal. The resolution also called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against foreign intervention. On August 6, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, placing economic sanctions on Iraq.⁸

A long series of UN Security Council and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the conflict. One of the most important was UN Resolution 678, passed on November 29, giving Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15, 1991, and authorizing "all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660," a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force.

The United States, especially Secretary of State James Baker, assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Honduras, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Syria, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself. US troops represented 74% of the coalition's 660,000 troops in Iraq. Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join; some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or feared increasing American influence in Kuwait. In the end, many nations were persuaded by Iraq's belligerence towards other Arab states, and offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness.⁹

⁸ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_War, visited in 30 December, 2006.

⁹ <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsourc/H~tQ,1:y/GulfWar.html>, visited in 5 January, 2007.

Various peace proposals were floated to finish the crisis, but none were agreed to. The United States insisted that the only acceptable terms for peace were Iraq's full, unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraq insisted that withdrawal from Kuwait must be "linked" to a simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon and Israeli troops from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon. Morocco and Jordan were persuaded by this proposal, but Syria, Israel, and the anti-Iraq coalition denied that there was any connection to the Kuwait issue. Syria joined the coalition to expel Saddam but Israel remained officially neutral despite rocket attacks on Israeli civilians. The Bush administration persuaded Israel to remain outside the conflict with promises of increased aid, while the PLO under Yasser Arafat openly supported Saddam Hussein, leading to a later rupture in Palestinian-Kuwaiti ties and the expulsion of many Palestinians from Kuwait.

On January 12, 1991 the United States Congress authorized the use of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. The votes were 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House. These were the closest margins in authorizing force by the Congress since the War of 1812. Soon after, the other states in the coalition also authorized force.¹⁰

From crisis management perspective, the time frame was short, because USA wanted Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait as soon as possible without any conditions, so USA had to take urgent decision to declare the war after all the peace proposals failed with the Iraqi regime and Saddam Hussein.

¹⁰ <http://www.fsmitha.com/h2/ch36.htm>, visitedjn 5 January, 2007.

3.1.2 King Hussein and Failed Crisis Management in Gulf War

Jordan, which traditionally enjoyed privileged relationships with the West, and which had been displaced by Egypt's rise as the chief supporter of a western-oriented politico-strategic alliance, saw the crisis looming. Jordanian officials expressed surprise with Kuwaiti defiance during negotiations and were told by Kuwaiti officials that Kuwait had received assurance from Washington that the United States would intervene militarily to back up the Kuwaitis in any confrontation with Iraq. At the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference in Tunis in July, the Iraqi foreign minister accused Kuwait of collusion with foreign powers to undermine the national security of Iraq. Soon thereafter Iraq troops were moved toward the Kuwait-Iraq border.¹¹ On 25 July, Saddam Hussein told the American ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, that Washington must choose between friendly relations with Iraq and support for Kuwait economic warfare against Iraq. Glaspie replied, "We have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."¹² During the same week, state Department officials repeated the position that the United States had no security commitments to Kuwait. Saddam must have concluded, as the New York Times put it, that "he had the green light" from Washington.¹³

King Hussein, Hosni Mubarak and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, agreed to reassure Saddam Hussein and work to hold off an impending censure by the Islamic Conference Organization, which was then meeting in Cairo. They also agreed to convene a limited Arab summit in Jedda with Saddam Hussein and the emir of Kuwait to resolve the crisis peacefully.

¹¹ Tareq Y. Ismael, *"Middle East Politics Today"*, University Press of Florida, 2001, p. 34.

¹² Tareq, p. 35 (Manchester Guardian Weekly, 23 September, 1990).

¹³ http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june99/hussein_2-5.html, visited in 6 January, 2007.

King Hussein then flew to Baghdad and obtained Saddam Hussein's approval for a negotiated settlement resulting from the planned Jeddah Conference. From crisis management perspective, prevention of war and mitigation between the conflicting parties is one the most important tasks for crisis management.

The Conference never took place, and King Hussein failed to discuss with Saddam Mubarak's condition that Iraq promise to withdraw before the negotiations began. King Hussein however, gave a different version.¹⁴ After returning from Baghdad, Hussein was shocked to learn that Egypt had already condemned the Iraqi invasion. Hussein phoned Mubarak in Alexandria to find out why Egypt had acted unilaterally and undermined the agreed-upon plan. Mubarak explained that he had "come under intense pressure," presumably from Washington.¹⁵ As it can be seen, King Hussein and other Arab leaders, tried to mitigate the crisis, and return the situation to normalcy, but all the proposals failed.

3.2 Political Crisis in Israel and Al-Aksa Intifadah 2000

On September 28, 2000, the leader of Israel's conservative Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount, known to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif, a site holy to both Jews and Muslims.¹⁶ The visit spurred Palestinian anger and there were serious clashes the next day, when Muslims worshippers began stoning Jews praying at the adjacent Western Wall.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Instead being crisis management, this visit should be considered as a full-scale crisis provocation.

Attempting to quell the violence, Israeli police forces stormed the compound. By day's end, four Palestinians were killed and over 200 were wounded.¹⁷

In the aftermath of the September events, violence spread across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and within Israel for several days. The violence at first seemed to concentrate on Palestinian youngsters throwing rocks at Israeli civilians and the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), which respond with gunfire. Soon, there was also a growing use of gunfire by armed Palestinians against the IDF and against Israeli settlements, leading to Israeli counterattacks that included the use of non-lethal weapons, heavy weaponry, and snipers targeting Palestinians gunmen. The scope of the violence is indicated by IDF statistics showing 793 incidents of fire against the IDF and Israeli civilians in the seven years leading to September 28, 2000, compared to over 1,300 such incidents in the first six weeks after September 28 alone.¹⁸

The violence in the West Bank and Gaza had almost immediate repercussions in the international arena. Throughout the Arab and Islamic world, anti-Israel and sometimes anti-American demonstrations emerged. In Amman and Cairo, angry marchers attempted to storm the Israeli embassies, but were thwarted by the local security forces.

As a first step in crisis management, On October 4 in Paris, the United States brokered the first attempts to mediate between the parties and end the violence. The talks failed when Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasir Arafat (according to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's adviser Danny Yatom) failed to sign an accord reached verbally

¹⁷ The New York Times, "Battle at Jerusalem Holy Site Leaves 4 dead and 200 Hurt," September 30, 2000, p.1.

¹⁸ http://www.idf.il/english/news/background_zof_Q_00.stm visited in 6 January, 2007.

between the parties that their respective commanders be given orders to withdraw troops and restore calm to flash points under their control.¹⁹ From the most important things in crisis management is that the management of crisis should reach a solution acceptable to both sides, or the crisis management will fail.

In the meantime, Barak, in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on the same day, said that a cessation of violence would be a precondition for further negotiations between his government and the Palestinian leadership.²⁰

In the days following the Paris talks, the major Israeli-Palestinian crisis threatened to spread across Israel's borders. In the afternoon of October 7, Hezbollah guerrillas abducted three Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side of the Lebanese border. Under immense pressure to respond, Barak then issued a 48-hour ultimatum for the Palestinians to halt their assaults on Israeli military outposts and civilian settlements, threatening to "direct the IDF and the security forces to use all means at their disposal to halt the violence" should the PA fail to comply.²¹ A side effect of the sudden escalation was increased pressure on Barak to form a national unity government.

Within the first two months of the crisis, tensions came to a peak on October 10, when two Israeli army reservists were killed by a mob in Ramallah after apparently taking a wrong turn with their car. The lynching, caught on live camera by an Italian film crew and subsequently televised internationally, led the IDF to retaliate by attacking five targets

¹⁹ William Orme, Jr., *"Barak and Arafat Order Their Forces to Pull Back,"* New York Times, October 6, 2000, p.1.

²⁰ <http://www.mfa.gov.il/>, visited 8 January, 2007.

²¹ Statement by Prime Minister Ehud Barak in Jerusalem on October 7, 2000, available on the website of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/go.asp>, visited in 8 January, 2007.

associated with the Palestinian Security Services with helicopter gunship, wounding some thirty Palestinians.

Another serious attempt to deescalate the crisis occurred during the October 16-17 summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, hosted by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and attended by Clinton, Barak and Arafat. The summit produced a communique according to which Israel and the PA would "issue public statements unequivocally calling for an end to the violence and agreed to take immediate concrete measures to end the confrontation."²² It was further agreed that the three sides (the United States included) would develop, "in consultation with the UN Secretary-General, a committee of fact-finding on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence."²³ This represented a compromise solution between Palestinian attempts at "internationalizing" the conflict by means of a commission composed of countries to the Palestinian's liking, and Israel's attempt at avoiding an international commission of inquiry it insisted would be biased against it. The fact-finding commission, led by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, began its inquiries on December 11, 2000.

On October 20, the UN General Assembly (as it continued its tenth "emergency special session on illegal Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied Palestinian territory") condemned the violence that had taken place in Jerusalem, West Bank and Gaza since September 28. In a resolution introduced by the representative of Egypt, the assembly condemned acts of violence, especially the "excessive use of force by Israeli forces

²² Statement by President Clinton at Sharm al-Sheikh, October 17, 2000, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/go.asp>.

²³ *Ibid.*

against Palestinian citizens.²⁴ This resolution would be followed by the similar UN Security Council Resolution 1322 on October 7, after the Clinton Administration decided not to veto it. On October 22, after a two-day meeting of Arab heads of state in Cairo, the communique announced full support to the Palestinian uprising and encouraged the suspension of further political and economic links with Israel, while failing to endorse the U.S.-brokered Sharm al-Sheikh ceasefire. The Arab leaders also echoed what had been one of the main Palestinian objectives since the beginning of the violence, namely the internationalization of the conflict beyond the confines of U.S.-led diplomacy. In the communique, the leaders called upon the UN Security Council to "assume responsibility of providing the necessary protection for the Palestinian people ...by considering the establishment of an international force or presence for this purpose."²⁵

Israel, in response, issued a statement in which it expressed its rejection of the "language of threats used at the Arab summit in Cairo" and condemned the call for continued violence. It further called on the Palestinians to honor their commitments to halt the violence and incitement and to restore calm and order immediately. Reacting to the outcome of the Arab summit and to what Barak termed the failure of the Palestinian side to uphold the Sharm al-Sheikh understandings, the Israeli prime minister, on the same day, called for a "time-out, the goal of which would be to reassess the diplomatic process in light of the events of recent weeks."

Barak's call for a "time-out," however, did not seem unequivocal, and by November, Israeli government representatives reiterated a willingness to resume talks with their

²⁴ <http://www.un.org/> website of the United Nations, visited in 3 January, 2007.
²⁵ <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/>, visited in 3 January, 2007.

Palestinian counterparts, acknowledging that, as Deputy Minister of Defense Ephraim Sneh put it, "there is no other solution besides diplomacy."

On November 1, hopes for an end to the violence briefly rose when Regional Cooperation Minister Shimon Peres met the PA Chairman at the Gaza-Israel border. After the two-hour meeting, Barak issued a statement according to which Peres and Arafat reached "agreement" on a series of steps on the basis of the Sharm understanding that are due to lead to the renewal of security cooperation and a halt to the violence and incitement,¹ this meeting can be considered as mutual crisis management.

Despite the Peres-Arafat meeting, however, Arafat did not order an end to the violence. During November, shooting incidents directed at the IDF as well as against Israeli civilians, especially in the Gilo area on the outskirts of Jerusalem, increased, with the Israeli army retaliating systematically, often using heavy weapons.

The situation seemed to escalate further when on November 22, a car bomb detonated near a bus in the coastal city of Hadera, killing two Israelis and wounding sixty. In contrast to the aftermath of other recent attacks, however, the IDF chose not to retaliate.

Israeli strategy was indeed changing as a result of the government's new political initiatives. In late November, Barak brought forward new proposals in which he seemed to abandon his quest for an all-inclusive, end-of-conflict agreement between Israelis and

¹ Deborah Sontag and Joel Greenberg, "The New Steps are Set on Ending Violence in the Middle East," New York Times, November 2, 2000, p. 1.

Palestinians, such as was discussed at Camp David. Barak now seemed to opt for an interim agreement based on the declaration of a Palestinian state.²⁷

At the same time, under increasing domestic criticism and feeling his chances were better in a straight race for prime minister without parliamentary elections, Barak decided on a bold gambit. On December 9, he unexpectedly announced his resignation and pushed forward new prime ministerial elections to February 6, 2001.

Meanwhile, violence continued unabatedly, with hour-long gun battles between Israelis and Palestinians becoming a frequent occurrence. By then, Israel had been accused of (and had in fact admitted) having adopted a policy of systematic killing of Palestinian instigators of the violence, although it refrained from eliminating leaders within the higher political echelons. As Israeli leaders described a new strategy of "striking at those who are leading the shooting cells and their deputies," their Palestinian counterparts referred to Israel's new policy as "state terrorism."²⁸ From crisis management perspective, when policy makers respond well to a crisis, the damage is limited; when they fail, the crisis impact increases.

In mid-December, efforts to revive peace talks between Palestinians and Israelis were renewed. Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami indicated that Israel had dropped its precondition for restarting talks with the Palestinians and would now be willing to negotiate as long as it saw an effort on the Palestinian side to re-arrest Islamic militants, clamp down on

²⁷ Aluf Ben and David Landau, "Barak Optsfors In.terimAgreement," Ha'aretz (on-line edition), November 28, 2000, p. 73.

²⁸ Joel Greenberg, "Five Pelesinians are killed in Qaza and the West Bank," New York Times, December 14, 2000, p. 12.

gunmen, and halt incitement against Israel.²⁹ Initial meetings in Gaza between Ben-Ami and Gilad Sher, Barak's chief of staff, and Arafat remained fruitless, but a new round of talks was held in Washington.

On December 23, a five-day discussion at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC, between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators came to a close. Though the sides failed to inch closer towards a peace deal, Clinton put forward a comprehensive framework and asked the parties to respond by December 27. Reportedly, this plan included a fundamental trade-off between Palestinian sovereignty on the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in return for giving up the demand that Palestinian refugees could return to Israel. While Israel accepted the Clinton proposals as a basis for discussion "provided that they become the basis for discussion also for the Palestinians,"³⁰ the Palestinians failed to provide the Americans with an unequivocal answer by the time the third month of the crisis came to a close.

3.2.1 Israeli Crisis Management

In its reaction to the violence that began in late September 2000 in the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper, Israel's government appears to have set for itself three strategic objectives: to bring about an end to the violence; prevent escalation into a regional war; and limit the "internationalization" of the conflict.³¹

²⁹ Deborah Sontag, *"The Israelis and Arafat get Together,"* New York Times, December 15, 2000, p. 19
³⁰ <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=829/>, January 14, 2001.

³¹ From the important tasks for crisis management: ending wars, and limit the crisis.

In order to achieve these strategic goals, Israel adopted a number of tactical objectives: to restore deterrence while signaling a willingness to renew negotiations; to minimize Israeli casualties on both sides; and to deny the Palestinians a victory in the court of world opinion.³² The tactical objective of minimizing Israeli casualties had two values. In addition to the intrinsic value, the Barak government recognizes that a rising death toll of Israelis could have the effect that domestic public opinion would pressure the government toward escalating the conflict.³³ Israel's goal of limiting Palestinian casualties had several reasons. First, Palestinian funerals lead to mass demonstrations and riots. Second, Israel was sensitive to the reaction of international public opinion. Third, it attempted to limit Palestinian anger due to the belief that the two parties will eventually have to negotiate and come to an agreement with one another.

Indeed, the Barak government's conviction that Israelis and Palestinians needed to return to the negotiating table and reach a political settlement largely shaped Israel's crisis objectives. Further, this factor's impact on the Barak government's crisis objectives and management strategies seemed to grow stronger the longer the crisis continued. This linkage helps explain Israel's return to negotiations with the Palestinians by mid-December despite the ongoing violence in stark contrast to earlier Israeli statements that an end to the violence must precede any renewed diplomatic contacts. In this respect, it could be argued that by mid-December, a return to negotiations became an Israeli objective in itself. Certainly, this linkage affected Israeli crisis management.

³² Micheal Eisenstadt, "The Battle for Jerusalem: Strategy and Tactics," Peace Watch# 282, October 5, 2000.

³³ Shai Feldman, "The October Violence: An Interim Assessment," Strategic Assessment, November 2000.

3.3 September Eleven 2001 and "War on Terrorism"

The September 11, 2001 attacks (often referred to as 9/11 pronounced "nine eleven") consisted of a series of coordinated terrorist suicide attacks by Islamic extremists on the United States on September 11, 2001. The victims were predominantly civilians. In the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. Each team of hijackers included a trained pilot. The hijackers crashed two of the airliners (United Airlines Flight 175 and American Airlines Flight 11) into the World Trade Center in New York City, one plane into each tower (1 WTC and 2 WTC), resulting in the collapse of both buildings soon afterward. A nearby church and the rest of the World Trade Center complex's 7 buildings were also destroyed or damaged beyond repair. A third airliner (American Airlines Flight 77) was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia. Passengers and members of the flight crew on the fourth aircraft (United Airlines Flight 93) attempted to retake control of their plane from the hijackers; that plane crashed into a field near the town of Shanksville in rural Somerset County, Pennsylvania. In addition to the 19 hijackers, 2,973 people died; another 24 are missing and presumed dead.³⁴

3.3.1 "The War on Terrorism"

In the aftermath of the attacks, many U.S. citizens held the view that the attacks had "changed the world forever." The Bush administration declared a war on terrorism, with the stated goals of bringing Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda to justice and preventing the

³⁴ Grunwald, Michael (2001). Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World Trade Center, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead. *Remembering September 11*. Washington Post/Newsweek Interactive. Retrieved on 2006-09-11.

emergence of other terrorist networks. These goals would be accomplished by means including economic and military sanctions against states perceived as harboring terrorists and increasing global surveillance and intelligence sharing. Immediately after the September 11 attacks U.S. officials speculated on possible involvement by Saddam Hussein; although unfounded, the association contributed to public acceptance for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The second-biggest operation of the U.S. Global War on Terrorism outside of the United States, and the largest directly connected to terrorism, was the overthrow of the oppressive Taliban regime from Afghanistan, by a U.S.-led coalition. The U.S. was not the only nation to increase military readiness, with other notable examples being the Philippines and Indonesia, countries that have their own internal conflicts with Islamic extremist terrorism.

Because the attacks on the United States were judged to be within the parameters of its charter, NATO declared that Article 5 of the NATO agreement was satisfied on September 12, 2001, making the US war on terror the first time since its inception that NATO would actually participate in a "hot" war. War on terror can be considered as crisis management; at least it is not a war in a conventional meaning. You can fight against terrorists or countries but not against terror.

3.2 Terrorism and US Middle East Policy

Meanwhile, the US case against the attackers of the US installation in Saudi Arabia fell apart when Hani Abdel Rahim Hussein Sayegh, a Saudi dissident linked to that bombing, rejected the plea agreement that was the basis of his deportation from Canada to the United States. US officials believed Sayegh to be an Iranian-trained terrorist who was a driver and

lookout during the bombing. Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi dissident whose citizenship had been taken away, said that if US troops did not withdraw from Saudi Arabia, a battle against them would begin, "If someone can kill an American soldier, it is better than wasting his energy on other matters," Omar Bin Ladin said. "We have focused our declaration of jihad on striking at the US soldiers inside Saudi Arabia." Threats of attack were reported against US personnel in Saudi Arabia and the 1,000 Americans stationed in Bahrain.³⁵

The State Department's annual report on terrorism labeled Iran "the primary state sponsor" of this problem. Specifically, US and Saudi intelligence linked a senior Iranian government official to a group of Shiite Muslims suspected of the 1996 bombing in Saudi Arabia. State Department officials said there was "credible evidence that a small group of Bahraini militants with a stated aim of overthrowing the Bahraini government had received assistance and training from Iran."

FBI Director Louis J. Freeh told Congress that he had tripled the bureau's counter-terrorism efforts in the past three years to 2,600 positions. He warned that Middle East terrorist groups (including Barnas and Hezbollah) had established cells in the US and that during 1997, two US embassies had been targets of bomb plots. The US also sought to deport Hamas leader Musa Abu Marzouk. On 4 May, Marzouk gave up his US residency permit and was deported to Jordan. He had been detained in July 1995 as a suspect of involvement with planning terrorist attacks against Israel. Barnas threatened to attack Americans if he were sent to Israel and 'Arafat asked that he not be deported. In May, US District Judge Kevin Duffy ruled, "There is more than sufficient evidence to show he was a member of the conspiracy

Barry Rubin, "The Politics of the new Middle East", MERIA Journal, Volume 1, No. 3 - September 1997.

known as Barnas" and could be extradited to Israel. Israel withdrew its extradition request for reasons linked to security and the prevention of terrorism."³⁶

In July, the Clinton Administration lifted a 10-year-old ban on the travel of US citizens to Lebanon, to avoid their being taken hostage, after receiving assurances from Lebanon's government that it would cooperate "across the board" to fight terrorism. Albright warned, however, that it was still unsafe for Americans to travel to Lebanon. On 10 November, Clinton announced that he had dropped Syria and Lebanon from the US list of major drug trafficking countries.

Despite the administration's strong stand against terrorism, there was no counter-terrorism coordinator appointed at the State Department for most of 1997. Two laws passed in 1996--the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act--gave the White House more tools but these were not actually used. No sanctions were imposed on foreign companies for making deals with Iran. The Administration exempted Syria and Sudan from the ban on financial transactions with state-sponsors of international terrorism.

The US attitude to Syria was conditioned by that country's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Between 1992 and 1997, US companies sold Syria nearly \$1b in goods, including \$250m in 1997, making the US the sixth largest exporter to Syria. The part of this

³⁶ Scott Lasensky, "Underwriting Peace in the Middle East: U.S. Foreign Policy and the limits of economic inducements", MERIA Journal, Volume 6, No. 1, March 2002, p. 13.

commerce involving "dual use" goods, generally prohibited to countries which sponsor terrorism, rose from \$1m in 1991 to \$81m in 1997.³⁷

The exemption to Sudan allowed Occidental Oil, a contributor to Clinton's campaign, to take a \$930m stake in a Sudanese oilfield project in August, though the deal fell through. The US, however, gave military aid to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda to aid Sudanese rebels. Albright described Sudan as a "viper's nest" of international terrorism but the State Department announced an intention to return diplomats to Khartoum, then reversed the decision. Meanwhile, Libya circumvented the embargo against it by buying US goods--including some with military applications--through the US's NATO allies.

The US encouraged its European allies to maintain pressure on radical states. For example, Albright told European leaders she was disturbed by the policy of maintaining trade and political links with Iran and Libya. "Supporting states that support terrorism," said Albright, creates genuine problems for us.

A brighter spot in US strategic efforts was the resignation of the Turkish government of Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns remarked, "We trust that the secular democratic foundation of the Turkish Government will continue." He also endorsed Israel-Turkish military cooperation as a US "strategic objective....If certain Arab countries don't like that, that's just tough."³⁸

³⁷ Scott, p. 14.

³⁸ <http://cosmos.ucc.ie/cs1064/jabowen/IPSC/php/topic.php?tid=98>, visited in 12 December, 2006.

3.3 Iraq, Alliances, and Crisis Management

Crisis management as it affects alliance stability, Washington's management of the Iraq crisis in the months leading up to the war must appear at first sight a series of self-inflicted wounds on its own alliance structure. The sympathy which had been generated by the US in almost the entire world (except a few radical Islamic circles) had been substantially dissipated a year later. The political leaderships in France and Germany appeared alienated. War-resistance protests had been generated even in the US. The European press tended to picture Bush as just a trigger-happy cowboy, and Colin Powell as the one dove in an administration of predatory hawks. Left-wing opinion, the protesters in the streets and the conspiracy-theorists in general were largely convinced that the oil lobby, led by Dick Cheney, had masterminded the whole conflict, with the sole purpose of taking over the Iraqi oil-fields.³⁹

Recognizing the decisive signal in an episode of crisis management is easier in retrospect, but an initial interpretation can be made by looking for the primary objective of the protagonist, in this case Washington. At optimum, for the primary policy-makers, it was regime change without war (i.e. via coup), and at minimum deterring the acquisition of nuclear weapons by minor powers (North Korea and Iran as well as Iraq). Obviously other interpretations are possible, but developments since September 2002 seem to confirm that view. The decisive signal would (on that assumption) be just one sentence in Bush's 12 September speech at the UN: 'If the Iraq regime wishes peace, it will immediately and

³⁹ C. Bell, "Iraq, alliances, and crisis management," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, July 2003, vol. 57, no. 2, p. 223-233.

unconditionally forswear, disclose and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles and all related material'. The immediacy of Iraq's agreement that the arms inspectors could return was an indication that they knew a thing or two about crisis-management themselves, since they thus precluded the possibility of an instant casus belli and reduced the chance of an 'automatic trigger' in the eventual Council resolution.

During the same period, the signal to Baghdad was softened by the sudden and surprising discovery that 'regime change' could be interpreted as just Saddam's decision to allow the arms inspectors back in to continue their work of eliminating weapons of mass destruction. The Security Council resolution as finally formulated could thus in Iraq be presented as 'the international community' uniting to save the Iraqi people from the ferocious war-plans of 'the US imperialists'. Any plausibility in that interpretation rested mostly on the requirement that any report by the arms inspectors of an Iraqi breach of the resolution must go back to the Security Council for debate, and no UN action would become possible, before a new resolution. As the President made clear, that did not preclude unilateral action by the US, but certainly delayed it. That Security Council resolution is a point at which it seems useful to look back at the crisis-management which produced it.⁴⁰

Coercion is a repellent notion, but war is a great deal worse, and Saddam was never likely to yield to anything but convincing threat or actual war. Though Saddam was of course the obvious target, his possible ambitions were not the only US concern. North Korea and Iran were the other two governments mentioned in the initial 'axis of evil' speech. The one factor that links the three of them is that each had apparently made some progress towards the

⁴⁰ <http://www.aiaa.asn.au/news/iraqalliances.htm> visited in 8 January, 2007.

construction of nuclear weapons, and each was suspected, at least in Washington, of possibly being erratic enough (North Korea) or fanatical enough (Iran) to allow such weapons, (or the underlying technology) to fall into the hands of the jihadists.⁴¹

The timing of the anti-Iraq campaign, which otherwise would have seemed an odd distraction from the pursuit of bin Laden, confirms that view. Bush's 'axis of evil' speech came four months after 9/11: time for the Administration to have recovered from the first shock, and to be concentrating its minds towards the problem that if the jihadists had been able to acquire a nuclear weapon they might have killed not three thousand Americans, but three hundred thousand. Or even three million, if by some means that weapon could have been got to the centre of New York. Nuclear rather than chemical or biological weapons had to be the criterion, because any country with pesticide or pharmaceutical factories can produce chemical and biological weapons.

The oil lobby is always being considered as a factor in US policy in the Gulf, especially given that both the President and Vice-President have been involved in the oil industry. Left-wing opinion inevitably casts it as the villain of the peace, the power behind the push for war. However, it is difficult to square that view with the evidence of the past ten years or so. The people assumed to have been plotting the take-over of the Iraqi oil-fields in the past few months were equally influential in Washington in the first President Bush's time. Yet after the Gulf war of 1990-91, US policy insisted on the sanctions which have allowed French, Russian and Chinese oil interests to dominate the Iraqi fields. If Washington had

wanted the flow of Iraqi oil to increase, in order to push the price down, all it needed to do was lift the sanctions, which should have been done on humanitarian grounds anyway.⁴² The

The West's dependence on the Gulf as a source of oil is obviously a source also of vulnerability and conflict. Investment directed instead to the oil fields of Russia and Central Asia, and the Atlantic basin, would lessen that dangerous dependence. Moreover, the really far-sighted money in 'big oil' is already looking to a time when energy will no longer be dependent on fossil fuels, with their inevitable side-effects of pollution and global warming. Hydrogen is the fuel of the future: BP is already interpreting its name as 'beyond petroleum', and Bush asked for the allocation of more than a billion dollars to research along those lines in the 2003 State of the Union address.

A long-term 'cost-benefit' analysis of this patch of crisis-management will have to await more historical retrospect. The inspectors went back to Iraq with a much tougher and more comprehensive mandate. North Korea was rattled enough to confess to its continued effort towards nuclear weapons, in breach of the 1994 agreement. Iran may have taken note of the evidence that small or middle powers who aspire nuclear weapons are apt to incur heavy diplomatic and economic pressures. Most middle and small powers have acquiesced, in policy as well as words, to the inhibitions of the nuclear non-proliferation agreement, and could argue that all three of the governments that Washington has been targeting should do the same. So on that aspect of policy there is not much dissent.

⁴² Bell, p. 223-233.

What remained in doubt until March 2003 was whether Washington had mastered the final part of Dulles's 'necessary art'-to get to the brink without getting into the war. The Administration conducted, so to speak, a rather vigorous war-dance along the brink during 2002, but that could still be seen as declaratory signalling in the cause of crisis-management. The reasons for avoiding-or at least postponing-war remained powerful. Afghanistan was far from stable. The top echelon of al-Qaeda was still in hiding, probably in the mountainous border-lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, but still easily able to signal to their 'true believers' everywhere. The Israel-Palestine conflict was still at fever-pitch. Saudi Arabia, the essential ally of 1990-91 was still deeply conflicted. Turkey, the alternative provider of essentials bases was in a rather ambivalent process of political change. The costs of invasion and occupation were estimated at about \$132 billion, and Germany and Japan were not willing or able to help fund those costs as they had been in 1991. Even with the new weaponry, fighting street-by-street through Baghdad might impose US casualties that could still be coming home as the Presidential campaign for re-election gets under way.

3.4 Israel/Palestine/Lebanon Crisis 2006

The Middle East is immersed in its worst crisis in years following the capture of three Israeli soldiers by the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and Lebanese Party of God (Hezbollah) in late June 2006 and early July, Israel's comprehensive offensive throughout the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, and the daily firing of rockets deep into Israel. And horrific as it is, the toll of death and destruction could reach entirely different proportions should a new threshold be crossed - a Hezbollah rocket that strikes a chemical plant or a heavily populated area in Tel Aviv or Haifa, an Israeli bombing raid resulting in massive

casualties, a major ground offensive, or the expansion of the war to Syria or Iran. A political solution to the twin crises of Lebanon and Palestine must be the international community's urgent priority. Using military action to achieve its purported goals will have not only devastating humanitarian consequences: it will make it much harder to pick up the political pieces when the guns fall silent.⁴³

The multi-headed crisis in Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, Lebanon and elsewhere, based on talks with officials and others, including Hamas and Hezbollah representatives. There are many dimensions to the explanation of why the capture of three soldiers has, so suddenly and so intensely, escalated at an extraordinary pace into a deep and widespread conflict: local ones like Hamas's struggle to govern and Hezbollah's desire to maintain its special status in Lebanon; regional ones, notably the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria's interests in Lebanon, and the growing Sunni-Shiite divide; and wider international ones, especially the confrontation between Washington and Tehran.⁴⁴

3.4.1 How the UN deals with Hezbollah/Israeli Crisis

UN Security Council Resolution 1701 halted the month-long fighting between Israel and Hezbollah but did little to resolve the underlying conflict and, if poorly handled, could help reignite it. The resolution has held remarkably well, with only limited violations. However, the temptation by either party to overreach could trigger renewed fighting. The greatest threats would be attempts by Israel or UN forces (UNIFIL) to use 1701 as a blunt

⁴³ <http://www.crisisgroup.org>, visited in 5 January, 2007.

⁴⁴ <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4282&1=I>, visited in 5 January, 2007.

means of disarming Hezbollah in the south or by Hezbollah to test UNIFIL's resolve. 1701 should be seen as a transitory instrument that can stabilize the border by containing both sides' military impulses until bolder action is taken to address both domestic Lebanese matters (reforming and democratizing the political and electoral systems; building a strong sovereign state and army; resolving the question of Hezbollah's armaments) and, especially, regional issues (in particular re-launching the Syrian track and engaging Iran). In short the international community must be modest in implementing 1701 for as long as it is not prepared to be ambitious in its regional diplomatic efforts.⁴⁵

Resolution 1701 achieved a surprising degree of consensus. All relevant parties - Israel, Hezbollah and the Lebanese government, as well as key regional and other international actors - accepted the Security Council as the arbiter of the conflict while agreeing to the extensive deployment of Lebanon's army (LAF) south of the Litani River, the expansion of UNIFIL with a strengthened mandate in the same area and the need to build up Lebanese sovereignty over its own territory. Core stumbling blocks (e.g., releasing the abducted Israeli soldiers; ending Hezbollah's armed presence in the south) were mentioned in the resolution, but as strong aspirations, not immediate prerequisites. All in all, this is not negligible, nor was it pre-ordained. 1701 came about at a time of high tension, after a fierce diplomatic battle, and was accepted only because all sides needed a face-saving solution. Collective exhaustion produced an ambiguous outcome that nobody whole-heartedly endorsed but all reluctantly accepted.

<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052306.html> middle east report, visited 7 January, 2007.

After more than a month of violent conflict, Israel and Hezbollah were chastened, conscious of the limits of their military power and reluctant to continue hostilities. Israel had insisted both that it would not stop fighting until its soldiers were returned and Hezbollah was disarmed; 1701's ambiguity notwithstanding, it achieved neither. Israel had limited appetite for continued confrontation and now, in the wake of a war that reawakened and reinforced anxiety about a Lebanese quagmire has little stomach for resuming it. Rather, Israelis chose to invest cautious hope in the presence of international and Lebanese forces in the south to rein Hezbollah and in UN mediation to free the abducted soldiers.

In Lebanon situation, the crisis management is different little bit, because we have Hezbollah the Islamic resistance group in south Lebanon, and Hezbollah was behaving as an independent state within Lebanon, so the government of Lebanon was weak, and couldn't take any decisions to stop the crisis. And from crisis management perspective, there five important tasks, sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating and learning. So the Lebanese government couldn't do one of these tasks, because of Hezbollah independent situation. So there was need for international invention to stop this crisis, such United Nation or European Union and other Arab countries.

4.2 Lebanon crisis after the Hezbollah/Israeli War

Lebanon's latest crisis may be the terminal illness of Lebanese democracy. A Hezbollah led, Syrian-supported demonstration has paralyzed the government for six days. Lebanese loyal to the government, as well as Western and Arab nations, seem to be paralyzed like deer in the headlights of an oncoming vehicle. Everyone deplores the crisis and offers

alm, but nobody is doing anything to resolve it or to help the Seniora government face down the Hezbollah. Commentary on the crisis has focused mostly on the need to avoid violence and civil war. The stakes and the background and the issues are evaded rather studiously.⁴⁶

Lebanon has not apparently completely coalesced into a nation. It is a coalition of sects and clans. Its constitution is based on sectarian apportionment of representation, giving Maronite Christians disproportionate power, according to their share of the population in the 1940s. Since then, the Shi'a "minority" has grown steadily. Since no census has been taken in a long time, nobody knows how many Shi'as there really are in Lebanon, but it is probable that their claim to be a majority is based on reality.⁴⁷

Lebanese governments have largely ignored the Shi'a south and the Beq'a valley, which remain extremely poor. The poverty is exacerbated by the high birthrates, which are what brought about the Shi'a demographic revolution. Hezbollah took advantage of this situation, offering the Shi'a both political champions and social programs to offset the government neglect. The concern of the West to promote democracy in Lebanon did not, unfortunately, extend to offering massive economic and social programs to provide an alternative to the Hezbollah.

The sectarian constitution was to have been dissolved under the Taif accords, but it never happened. If the sectarian constitution is dissolved, there is a danger of total domination by the Shi'ites. On the other hand, the current sectarian constitution cannot continue as it is

⁴⁶ www.financialtimesft.com.

⁴⁷ <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/00009/40.htm>. 6 January, 2007.

cause it is manifestly unfair, and a source of bitter discontent. The problem is how to make Lebanon a representative democracy without empowering the Hezbollah and the allies of Syria.

The weakness and division at home have been exploited by foreign countries, especially Syria and Iran. It resulted in a long Syrian occupation, culminating in the murder of popular politician Rafiq Hariri, an opponent of Syrian puppet president Emile Lahoud. International indignation and Lebanese outrage forced the Syrians to withdraw. However, the Hezbollah movement and others have become proxies for Syria. The long tribulations of Lebanon and the complexities of the political alliances are often thought to be uniquely Lebanese features. In fact, they are remarkably reminiscent of the Thirty Years War that took place in Germany in the 17th century. Like modern Lebanon, Germany was weak and divided. What began as a quarrel over succession and a religious war, ended as a power struggle between several foreign powers, which used Germany as a battle ground to settle the future of Europe and to get some tasty bits of German land for themselves. Typical of this war, the peace conference that ended the war sat for eleven months before it was discovered that nobody knew what issues needed to be settled. In Lebanon, the issues are often similarly complex and obscure, and are cleverly hidden.

Opposition to Syrian and Hezbollah policies is hazardous to the health of prominent Lebanese. Political leader Pierre Gemayel and newspaper editor Gebran Tueni are among the many casualties of these Lebanese crises.

The current act of the Lebanese tragedy began when the government of Fuad Seniora approved a plan for an international tribunal to bring the murderers of Rafiq Hariri to justice. Manifestly, the murderers of Hariri would not think that is a good plan. Hezbollah ministers tried to block the decision. When they failed, they walked out of the government, and Hezbollah, with Syrian help, initiated this demonstration. It is no secret that there were Syrians among the demonstrators. The demonstration did not even pretend to be "spontaneous." Hezbollah first Secretary Nasrallah announced he would bring down the government with a demonstration, and then he went ahead with his plan. The demonstrators said they were for a democratic government and against "foreign meddling." They were motivated by the old ills of unrepresentative government and poverty.

For instance, the crowds who supported the 1917 Soviet revolution wanted "Bread, Land, and Peace." They wanted an end to the incompetent Kerensky government, they wanted democracy and an end to the war. What they got was forced collectivization, purges and gulags, because that was the program of the Bolshevik party. The crowds who supported the 1979 revolution of Khomeini in Iran for the most part wanted democracy and an end to the terror rule of the Shah. Instead, they got a new set of secret police, and a government that has murdered more and different dissidents and pursues a dangerous foreign policy. The Lebanese demonstrators did not learn from the lesson of Iran. In ten years they may be very surprised and very sorry to see the result of their efforts.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ <http://www.mideastweb.org/log/archives/OOQQ0540.htm>, visited in 4 January, 2007.

3.5 The Internal Palestinian Crisis

As Hamas and Fatah supporters took to the streets to protest at or support Mahmoud Abbas's decision to call for early presidential elections, congratulatory gestures landed at Abbas's door from the three major international players that have imposed the sanctions regime against the Palestinians. The White House, Tony Blair and the Israeli government urged the world community to support Abbas in his latest bid to rid them of a Hamas-led government. These three carry the burden of Palestinian blood shed as a result of the crisis.⁴⁹

Despite months of sanctions, the grip of the "international community" could not prevent Hamas from bringing in enough money to maintain basic health and educational services. The hardship did little to convince Palestinians that Hamas was responsible; polls conducted in the West Bank and Gaza pointed to a rise in the popularity of Hamas, countered by an erosion of respect for Fatah.

For several months the Palestinian Hamas movement has resisted domestic and international pressure to choose between governing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as it was elected to do in January, and continuing military and terrorist attacks against Israel. Now its own armed wing has forced a decision. Its brazen attack on military positions inside Israel, and its capture and continued detention of a wounded Israeli serviceman, appeared to offer only two likely outcomes. Either Hamas's more moderate civilian leaders will, along with

⁴⁹ Azzam Tamimi, The Guardian, Tuesday December 19, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/comment/O,1975124,00.html>, visited in 30 December, 2007.

President Mahmoud Abbas, assert their authority and obtain the release of Israeli Cpl. Gilad Shalit, or they will prompt Israel to launch military operations that could topple the government. All those who favor a two-state solution in the Middle East should hope the moderates prevail.

The militants who spent months tunneling from Gaza into Israel and then launched an attack, which killed two soldiers and seriously injured Cpl. Shalit, predictably claimed to be retaliating for recent Israeli air and artillery strikes. But Israel was targeting terrorists who have fired hundreds of crude rockets from Gaza at Israeli towns. What really precipitated the raid was an imminent agreement between Hamas politicians and Mr. Abbas's Fatah movement. The two parties would pledge not to stage further attacks inside Israel and to aim for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.⁵⁰

Following the failure to form a Palestinian national unity government to satisfy the international community's conditions to lift an economic blockade, factional violence has broken out in the Palestinian territories. On Sunday, 17 December, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas called for new elections, viewed by Hamas as a bid to undermine the government which it leads following last February's legislative elections and after which international sanctions were imposed.

President Abbas' call for new elections follows the attempt on Prime Minister Ismail Haniya's life, during which his one of his bodyguards was killed and his son Abd Elsalam Haniya and adviser Ahmad Yousef were wounded. Prime Minister Haniya was targeted when

⁵⁰<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/26/AR2006062601232.htm>, visited in 10 January, 2007.

he tried to return to Gaza via the Rafah border, where Israel had denied him entry as he carried millions of dollars in cash donations from Middle Eastern governments. Hamas accused Fatah heavyweight Mohammad Dahlan of orchestrating the attack, a claim rejected by Fatah, the party headed by President Abbas.

While infighting has plagued the Palestinian territories long before the election of the Hamas government in February, it took a turn for the worst when intelligence officer and Hamas antagonist Baha Baloushe's three young children and their driver were killed and four others wounded as they were traveling to school on 11 December. The killings were followed by armed demonstrations that have characterized the chaos that has broken out in cities in both Gaza and the West Bank. Calls to bring perpetrators to justice echo those to hold accountable the countless other vigilante attacks that have gone unpunished in the territories.

Many observers link the desperation underlying the demonstrations to the economic crisis that has transpired since the international blockade imposed on the Palestinians since the legislative elections. The economic blockade, intended to coerce the Hamas government into resigning, exacerbated the already dire food crisis caused by Israel's extended closures of the Gaza Strip. Frustration over these conditions had manifested in civil strikes that broke out throughout the occupied Palestinian territories over unpaid wages as the new Palestinian government inherited the previous one's deficit as well as confronted with the international blockade.⁵¹

Palestinian human rights organizations have long warned of the deterioration of the

<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/654.shtml>, visited in 10 January, 2007.

rule of law and the phenomenon of vigilantism in the Palestinian territories that leaves vulnerable ordinary Palestinians. The inability of the Palestinian Authority to enforce the rule of law is best understood in the context of Israel systematically undermining the functioning of the Palestinian government through such means as destroying governmental infrastructure and raiding Palestinian governmental institutions.

With a crippled government, and constantly under siege, average Palestinians find themselves in a veritable pressure cooker, squeezed between the pressures of Israel, the international community, and now the largest two Palestinian political parties, Fateh and Hamas. The question is how to change this situation and restore momentum to a process that leads the future at the end, to a situation where children can grow up here with some hope of prosperity and peace for the future.

3.6 Iran/USA Crisis and Nuclear Weapons

The two countries, both permanent veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council, were reacting to an announcement by Britain, France and Germany that they would call for an emergency meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran decided to restart its nuclear program after a two-year suspension while it conducted talks with the European countries.

The West said that Iran breached the Non-Proliferation Treaty by not divulging full details of its nuclear program and fears the Islamic nation wants to build a nuclear bomb.

Tehran said it only intends to develop civilian nuclear power plants. A senior Iranian official said that Tehran's decision to resume nuclear fuel research was legal and "irreversible." **But** while Washington and the three European countries say the IAEA should refer Iran to the U.N. Security Council for possible punitive action, such as sanctions, there appears to be division about the future steps. "Sanctions are not the best or the only way to solve international crisis," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told a news conference in Moscow. "The question of sanctions against Iran puts the cart before the horse."⁵²

⁵² <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/01/17/iran.nuclear/>, visited in 10 January, 2007.

Conclusion

The Middle East area is full of crises and the basic of these crises is the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the crisis that result from this conflict. From Belfair promise until these days the crisis didn't stop in the Middle East, for example 1948 war, 1967, and 1973, between Arab states and Israel. And after the cold war and after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, the Middle East had the Iraqi invasion for Kuwait and later the American invasion for Iraq 1991, 2003. And the September Eleven crisis in USA had a big effect on the Middle East states because the persons (terrorists) who done this are from the Middle East area, Arabs and Muslims.

The Middle East is an area of frequent conflict, largely for reasons embedded in its recent past. Such as the Arab-Israeli conflict over the land of Palestine, is more a product of 20th century developments rather than any age-old hostility between Muslims and Jews. Also there have tensions between Persians and Arabs in the past, the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 was more a result of political tensions and border disputes in the second half of the 20th century. Islamic militancy, which has produced deadly results in Egypt, Iran, Israel, and Lebanon, is a consequence of late 20th century problems such as widespread unemployment, political and socioeconomic turmoil, and an overarching sense of despair rather than a result of any violent or extremist characteristics inherent to Islam.

Politically motivated Islamic groups continued to operate in many Middle Eastern countries in the early 21st century. In general these groups express anger and frustration against what they regard as corrupt and illegitimate regimes, against U.S activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against continuing U.S support for Israel.

Conclusion

This Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East produced a political crisis for all the states; these crisis can be defined as a set of rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the general system or any of its subsystems substantially above normal levels and increases the likelihood of violence occurring in the system.

The using of force was not a convenience solution for the Middle East crisis, it increased the crisis more. So there is a need for a methodology to apply in resolving the crisis. Crisis management can be the best way to limit the crisis and find an acceptable solution between the conflicting parties. There are two major schools of thought for analyzing crisis management. One school regards the objective of crisis management as the avoidance of war and the peaceful resolution of confrontation. Management of crisis consisted of reaching acceptable solution to both conflicting parties.

The other school considers crisis management as an exercise in winning; it means winning crisis while at the same time keeping it within tolerable limits of danger and risk to both sides.

The essence of skillful crisis management lies in the reconciliation of the competing pressures which are inherent in the dual nature of crisis, crisis management requires that policy-makers not only recognize the inherent dilemmas, but that they are willing and able to make the difficult trade-offs that are required.

Conclusion

There are five important tasks for crisis management: sense making, decision making, meaning making, terminating, and learning. And also policy-makers defined the activities of crisis management in accordance to these stages, prevention, mitigation, critical decision making, and a return to normalcy.

There were many peace proposals applied in the Middle East, but it failed because it didn't include the most important factors of crisis management. For instance the Madrid Conference in Spain, and Oslo accords.

The Madrid conference was the first step to end the long conflict between the Arabs and Israel. The Madrid peace conference was carefully stage-managed by the Americans, with James Baker acting as the chief puppeteer. So the result was the Oslo accords, which begun in late 1992 and early 1993, and secondly, the bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan in 1994 leading to peace treaty. From crisis management perspective two most important elements were missing: The target and observation mechanism to know what is going on in the process. One of the most important issues that has not been solved is the refugees, and Jerusalem (historical and religious palaces), the political borders, Oslo Process had no clear goals or mechanism that can end the conflict, and the main important factor in crisis management is to have a clear mechanism, a clear objectives or goals that the two parties will accept so they can have a solution acceptable from all the conflicting parties. As it's seen now, the peace process has stopped and the crisis increased specially in Gaza and West Bank and the crisis management couldn't success, until a clear goals and mechanism will be establish.

Conclusion

One possible explanation for the failure of conflicts resolution generally, and of resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular, is the deep-rooted enmity between the two hostile parties in the conflict. The means of the crisis management have not been sufficient to maintain the peace in the Middle East. For instance, the war in Lebanon in July, 2006, and the continued circle of violence in Gaza Strip and West Bank.

The United Nations has been concerned with the question of the Middle East from its earliest days. It has formulated principles for peaceful settlement and dispatched various peacekeeping operations, and continues to support efforts toward a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to the political problems. The council, by resolution 242, defined principles for a just and lasting, which are; Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict, and Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. The resolution also affirmed the need for a just settlement of the refugee problem.

After Oslo, there were meetings and negotiations between Jordan and Israel, which resulted in a peace treaty between the two countries. The main points of the dispute were a 400 square-kilometer area in the Arava, which Jordan claimed Israel annexed over the years, and the dividing of the water resources of the Jordan River - which is water flowing from the Sea of Galilee and held in the Degania dam and diverted to the National Water Carrier. Eventually, these problems were solved when Israel agreed to hand back most of the territory

Jordan and give it 50 millions cubes of water each year. On October 26, 1994 Jordan and Israel then signed the historic peace treaty in a ceremony held in the Arava valley of Israel, south of Eilat and near the Jordanian border. Prime Minister Rabin and Prime Minister Arafat signed the treaty and the President of Israel Ezer Weizman shook hands with King Hussein. It was witnessed by President Bill Clinton, accompanied by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

In the morning of September 11, 2001, nineteen terrorists affiliated with al-Qaeda hijacked four commercial passenger jet airliners. Each team of hijackers included a trained pilot. The hijackers crashed two of the airliners (United Airlines Flight 175 and American Airlines Flight 11) into the World Trade Center in New York City, one plane into each tower (1 WTC and 2 WTC), resulting in the collapse of both buildings soon afterward. A nearby parking garage and the rest of the World Trade Center complex's 7 buildings were also destroyed or damaged beyond repair. A third airliner (American Airlines Flight 77) was crashed into the Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia. Passengers and members of the flight crew on the fourth aircraft (United Airlines Flight 93) attempted to retake control of their plane from the hijackers; that plane crashed into a field near the town of Shanksville in rural Somerset County, Pennsylvania. In addition to the 19 hijackers, 2,973 people died; another 24 are missing and presumed dead.

So after this event we had something called the war on terrorism starting in Afghanistan, Iraq, and maybe later Iran and its alliances (Syria, Hezbollah), this era which is called War on Terrorism, is a very important event in 21st century, it's the first time that the

Conclusion

United States of America had been attacked from outside, this reflect how much the enmity from Arabs or Muslim because of USA policies in the Middle East and the continuing support to Israel.

After September eleven, many crises increased in the Middle East, such as the situation in Israel and Palestinian territories, and the war in Afghanistan and later the 2003 war on Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, which increases the crisis inside Iraq, especially between Sunnis and Shi'as.

In 2006, we had the operation of kidnapping soldiers from Israel, one from Hamas and the other from Hezbollah in Lebanon. After this operations Israel and USA decided to finish Hezbollah and put limit for its operation, this operation came after 6 years from the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon!!

Israel used the military solution to return the 3 soldiers in Gaza trip and Lebanon. It results for destroying the Lebanese villages and bridges, and too much people had been killed. And Israeli government (Olmert Government) faces a political crisis because they couldn't destroy Hezbollah, and they couldn't free the two soldiers. Israelis lived under Hezbollah rockets for more than one month.

In same time Iraq still have crisis, between Shi'as and Sunnis, and other insurgents against the international forces in Iraq.

It is clear that in this area and to this complex ethnical and regional place, the best way is to end or avoid any crisis is crisis management. Using force and military solutions didn't work for years, and there were too much examples in this study.

The crisis management methodology, is concerned on the one hand with the procedure for controlling and regulating a crisis so that it does not get out of hand (either through miscalculations and mistakes by participants or because events take on a logic and momentum of their own) and lead to war, and on the other with ensuring that the crisis is resolved on a satisfactory basis in which the vital interests of the state are secured and protected.

There were a many proposals for peace in the Middle East between Israel and Palestinians, and between Israel and other Arabic states. For example, the Oslo Accords, Camp David with Egypt, and the treaty with Jordan. But the problem in Oslo, it did not include even the basis of the final solution. There was no follow up mechanism for the process. And from crisis management perspective there should be a clear goal and objectives and a mechanism to achieve them.

At the end, it can be said that the crisis management is the best way to end the crisis in the Middle East even if it didn't success many times. Force, wars, and violence will not bring peace to our world. The time proved that for everybody.

Appendix 1:

Press Statement
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
April 30, 2003

A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia]. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties

perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner (than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah - endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit - calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbor living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

Phase I: Ending Terror And Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian Institutions -- Present to May 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform

l preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 8, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.
- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

Security

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and

- dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- Gül takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.-Egypt-Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.
 - All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
 - Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
-

- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

Palestinian Institution-Building

- Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.
- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.
- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.

Appendix 1:

- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.

Humanitarian Response

- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.
- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.
- GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

Civil Society

- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

Settlements

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

Phase II: Transition -- June 2003-December 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal

establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- **International Conference:** Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- o Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.

- o Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).

- o Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.

- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.

- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.

- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.

- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference.

As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum

Appendix 1:

- territorial contiguity, including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

Phase III: Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict -- 2004-2005

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

- **Second International Conference:** Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.

- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

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