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FIREWALLS AND NETWORK SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

This paper is a proposal for graduation project in which network security and firewalls will be analyzed as a most effective way for addressing network security problems.

The proposal will include a discussion of the motives for research on firewalls as well as an overview of some firewall products. The project will be implementation oriented and will assist in understanding the nature of network security problems and what types of firewalls will solve or alleviate specific problems. The results from the project can be used in laboratory practice on firewalls for undergraduate level courses.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ARP – Address Resolution Protocol

BSD - Berkeley Software Distribution

DES - Data Encryption Standard

DNS – Domain Name Service

DSS - Digital Signature Standard

FTP - File Transfer Protocol

HTTP – Hyper Text Transfer Protocol

ICMP – Internet Control Message Protocol

IRC – Internet Relay Chat

ISN – Initial Sequence Number

LAN - Local Area Network

MAC - Message Authentication Code

MBONE - Multicast Backbone

NAT - Network Address Translator

NFS – Network File System

NIC – Network Interface Card

NIC – Network Information Center

NIS/YP- Network Information Service/Yellow Pages

NNTP - Network News Transfer Protocol

NTP - Network Time Protocol

NVT – Network Virtual Terminal

OSI – Open System Interconnection

RARP - Reverse Address resolution Protocol

RFC – Request for Comments

RPC - Remote Procedure Call

RSA – Rivest, Shamir, Adleman

SAH – Secure Hashing Algorithm

SMLI - Stateful Multi-Layer Inspection

SMTP – Simple Mail Transfer Protocol

SNMP – Simple Network Management Protocol

TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol

TFTP – Trivial File Transfer Protocol

UDP - User Datagram Protocol

WAIS – Wide Area Information Service

WAN – Wide Area Network

WWW – World Wide Web

1. THE INTERNET

1.1. Introduction

The Internet is one of the most important developments in the history of information systems. The Internet is not one network, but rather a worldwide collection of networks that all use a common protocol for communications. Use of a common protocol among incompatible network technologies opened the possibilities of shared resources in the computing industry, and has given rise to a whole new level of connectivity in the workplace. The Internet has become a common ground for information exchange.

Although many protocols have been adapted for use in an internet, one suite known as TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol), stands out as the most widely used for interconnection of many disparate physical networks. TCP/IP is the glue that holds the Internet together and makes universal service possible [24]. TCP/IP technology has made possible a global Internet that includes over 10,000 different networks in more than 100 different countries.

The Internet started out as U.S. Department of Defense network that connected research scientists and academics around the world. Originally, commercial traffic was forbidden on the Internet because the key portions of the network were funded by the U.S. government. Today the Internet is no longer maintained by the government, but rather by a private industry consortium, and everyone can join the Internet by paying a registration fee and agreeing to maintain certain communication standards. The benefits of connecting to the Internet range from lower communication cost and greatly improved communication to the vast variety of the Internet services and resources [29].

The Internet organization is based on a hierarchy at whose root lie providers. The Internet's providers connect their networks to form the worldwide backbone for the Internet. Individual provider networks may be limited to small geographic regions or they may span entire continents.

1.2. Internet services

There are a number of services associated with the Internet that users want to access. The most popular and commonly used Internet application services include electronic mail, file transfer, remote terminal access, and World Wide Web access. Beyond that, there are a number of services used for remote printing, transferring news, conferencing, management of distributed databases and information services. Following is a brief summary of the major Internet services that users may be interested in using [21], [12].

- Electronic mail is implemented using Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) which is Internet standard protocol for sending and receiving electronic mail.
- File transfer is the method designed for transferring files on request. File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is the Internet standard protocol for this purpose.
- Remote terminal access is used for connecting to remote systems connected via the network, as if they were directly attached. TELNET is the standard for remot terminal access on the Internet. There are other programs that are used for remote terminal access and remote execution of programs such as rlogin, rsh, and other "r" commands (rcp, rdump, rrestore, rdist).
- Name service is what translates between the host names that people use and the numerical IP addresses that machines use. Domain Name Service (DNS) is not a user level service, but it is used by TELNET, SMTP, FTP and every other service that a user needs.
- Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) is used to transfer news across the
- Internet. Information services such as
 - Gopher which is a menu-oriented tool that helps users find information on the Internet.
 - WAIS that stands for Wide Area Information Service and is used for indexing and searching with databases of files.
 - Archie which is an Internet service that searches indexes of anonymous FTP servers for file and directory names.
 - World Wide Web (WWW) is based in part on existing services, and in part on a new protocol, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP). Web servers are accessed by Mosaic, Netscape Navigator and other popular web browsers.

- Finger service which looks up information about a user who has an account on the machine being queried
- Whois service which is similar to finger, but it obtains publicly available information about hosts, networks, domains and their administrators.
- Real time conferencing services
 - Talk is the oldest real-time conferencing system used on the Internet which allows two people to hold a conversation.
 - Internet Relay Chat (IRC) involves lots of people talking to each other.
 - New set of services provided over Multicast Backbone (MBONE), which is focused on expending real-time conference services beyond text-based services,
 - o like talk and IRC, to include audio, video, and electronic whiteboard.
- Remote Procedure Call (RPC)-based services
 - Network File System (NFS) which allows systems to access files across the network on a remote system, as if the files were on directly attached disks.
 - Network Information Service / Yellow Pages (NIS/YP) is designed to provide distributed access to centralized administrative information shared by machines as a site.
- Network Management Services are services that most users don't use directly, but rather, they allow network managers to debug problems, control routing, and find computers that violate protocol standards. The most widely used is the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) which is designed to make it easy to centrally manage network equipment.
- Time service is implemented using Network Time Protocol (NTP). NTP is an Internet service that sets the clock on one's system with great precision.
- Printing service provides remote printing options. Bot the system V printing system and the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) printing system allow a computer to print to a printer that is physically connected to a different computer.

Because these services form an integral part of TCP/IP, we will defer more detailed description of the most popular to a later section (2.5) where the application layer of TCP/IP architecture is discussed.

1.3. Internet hosts

A host is a computer system that runs applications, is connected to an internet, and has one or more users. A host that supports TCP/IP can act as the endpoint of a communication. Because Personal Computers (PCs), workstations, minicomputers, and mainframes satisfy the above definition, and all can run TCP/IP, they all can be a host. Different literature refers to the host as a station, computer, or computer system.

Many hosts connected to the Internet run a version of the UNIX operating system. Although UNIX is the predominant Internet host operating system, many other types of operating systems and computers are connected to the Internet. This includes, for example, systems running VMS, other mainframe operating systems and personal computer operating systems such as DOS and Windows. Even more, some versions of UNIX for personal computers and other operating systems such as Microsoft Windows NT can provide, to the increasingly powerful PC, the same services and applications that were recently found only on larger systems. Internet hosts have not only a difference in operating systems they run, but also a host's CPU can be slow or fast, and the size of memory that a different host can have can be different. Fortunately, in spite of all these differences, the TCP/IP protocol allows for any pair of hosts on the Internet to communicate [12], [13].

2. TCP/IP OVERVIEW

2.1. Introduction

Although many protocols have been adapted for use in an internet 1, the Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite of data communications protocols is currently the most widely used set of protocols for internetwork communication. The name TCP/IP is derived from two of the protocols that belong to it: the Transmission Control Protocol and the Internet Protocol.

TCP/IP evolved from work done in the network research community, in particular the late '60s and early '70s work on packet switching that led to development of ARPANET(ARPA is an acronym for the Advanced Research Projects Agency). The ARPANET was at the beginning a research network sponsored by the DoD (U.S. Department of Defense), but eventually connected hundreds of universities, organizations, and government installations [25]. ARPANET was a packet switched network, but it was a single network and it used protocols not intended for internetworking. In the mid '70s network researchers realized that various LAN technologies (e.g. Ethernet) were starting to be widely deployed, as well as satellite and radio networks. The existing protocols had trouble with internetworking, so new a reference architecture with ability to connect multiple networks together in a seamless way was needed. TCP/IP, a true internetworking protocol suite, is the product of these changes in the networking environment.

Widespread deployment of TCP/IP occurred within the ARPANAET community in the early '80s. By 1983 the name Internet came into use as the official name of the community of interconnected networks using TCP/IP. The Internet demonstrates the viability of the TCP/IP technology and shows how it can accommodate a wide variety of underlying network technologies.

2.2. TCP/IP protocol architecture

Like any modern communication protocol, TCP/IP is a layered protocol. It is also called the Internet layering model or the Internet reference model. This model resembles, but is not the same as the Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model. Generally it has been composed of fewer layers than the OSI model, and most descriptions of TCP/IP define three to five functional layers in the protocol architecture [27]. Each layer on one machine carries on a conversation with a corresponding layer on another machine. The rules and conventions used in this conversation are known as the protocol of each separate layer. The five layer model is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below.




Figure 2.1. The five layers of the TCP/IP protocol architecture

Not only the number of layers differ from the OSI model, but also the name, the contents, and the function of each layer differ. However, in both networks, the purpose of each layer is to offer certain services to the higher layer, shielding those layers from the details of how the offered services are actually implemented. Thus each layer has its own independent data structure and its own terminology to describe that structure.

Data is passed down the stack when it is being sent to the network and up the sack when it is being received from the network. Each layer in the stack adds control information (header), placed in the front of the data to be transmitted, to ensure proper delivery. Each layer treats all of the information it receives from the layer above as data and places its own control information in front of it. When data is received, each layer strips off its header before passing the data on to the layer above.

2.3. Internet layer

2.3.1. Internet Protocol

The Internet Protocol (IP) is the heart of the TCP/IP suite and the most important protocol in the Internet layer. IP provides essential transmission services on which TCP/IP networks are built, and all the protocols above and below it depend on its services. IP provides many additional transmission services such as: enriched addressing, defining of packet format, performing fragmentation and reassembly in order to overcome any limitations placed by the data link upon the size of a frame [22].

It is also possible, using Internet layer services, to create internetworks of independent LANs and send packets from a node on one LAN to a node on another. This requires routers which forward packets based upon their destination IP address. IP is a connectionless protocol, which means that IP does not exchange control information to establish end-to-end connection before transmitting data. Its job is to permit hosts to inject packets into any network and have them travel independently to the destination. It is the job of higher layers to establish the connection if they require connection-oriented service and to rearrange the packets if they arrive in a different order. IP also relies on protocols above it to provide error detection and error recovery.

- IP packet format

IP defines a specific packet format and at this layer of the protocol stack they are called datagrams. An IP datagram consists of header followed by arbitrary data, as illustrated in Figure 2.2.

Bits

0	4	8	16	.3	1
Version	HLEN	ToS		Total length	
	Identi	fication	Flags	Fragmentation offset	
T	TL	Protocol	Header	· checksum	
		Sour	ce address		
		Destine	tion addres:	S	
		Option	5	Padd	ing
		Data b	egins here		

Notes:

HLENHeader lengthToSType of serviceTTLTime to live

Figure 2.2. IP datagram format

An IP header is five or six 4-byte words long and is padded if necessary. The header contains all the information needed to deliver the packet. Thus, a packet can be routed on an internet without reference to any other packet. This has some implications for the transport layer because IP does not guarantee delivery or the order of delivery. It is up to the transport layer to perform these tasks.

- Fragmentation and reassembly of datagrams

An IP datagram in transit may traverse different networks whose maximum packet size is smaller than the size of the datagram. To handle this, IP provides fragmentation and reassembly mechanisms. If the datagram received from one network is longer than what the other network can accommodate as a single packet, IP must divide the datagram into smaller fragments for transmission. This process is called fragmentation, and smaller pieces of a datagram are called datagram fragments.

The format of each fragment is the same as the format of any normal datagram. Severall fields in the datagram header contain information that identifies each datagram fragment. Because IP datagrams may be routed independently and fragmented datagrams may arrive at the destination out-of-order, all receiving hosts are required to support reassembly. IP will reassemble fragmented datagrams back into the original datagram based on the information contained in the datagram header. Fragmentation can be quite expensive, but it allows a great deal of independence from the underlying network layer protocol's limitations.

- Routing datagrams

Routing is usually performed by specialized routing nodes, referred to as IP routers because they use IP to route packets between networks. When a router receives an IP packet, it examines the destination IP address in the IP packet header. If the address is

one of the locally attached networks, the router just forwards the packet to the host on the local network. If the destination network number is not a locally attached network, the IP router consults a routing table to determine where to send the packet. This, of course, requires consistent routing tables to be maintained on all IP routers in the internet. This can be done statically and dynamically. Static routes are manually created routing table entries, while dynamic routing uses a routing update protocol to keep all routers aware of the topological changes or routing node failures. Routing issues are very complex and particularly in a large internetwork like the Internet. Routing authority itself can be distributed across the entire Internet.

2.3.2. Other protocol at the IP layer

There are three other important protocols available at the internet layer: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), and Reverse Address Resolution (RARP) [26].

- ICMP

Packet recipients use ICMP to inform the sender about some errors encountered, flow control problems, detection of unreachable destination and other perceived problems. This may be perceived by the destination host or an intermediate router. ICMP is a functional part of the IP layer, but it uses the IP datagram delivery facility to send its messages. An ICMP message travels in the data area of an IP datagram, and datagrams carrying ICMP messages are routed exactly like datagrams carrying information for users; there is no additional reliability or priority.

Although each ICMP message has its own format, all start with the same three fields: a type field - that identifies the message; a code field – that sometimes provides more specific description of the error; and a checksum field. The format of the rest of the message is determined by the type field. Technically ICMP is an error reporting\ mechanism. The gateway uses ICMP to inform the original source that a problem has occurred. ICMP includes echo request/reply messages, destination unreachable messages, source quench messages - that control the flow, and redirect messages - that request a host to change its routing tables. Echo request/reply is one of the most

network server. A station using the reverse ARP protocol, broadcasts a query to all machines on the local network stating its physical address, and requesting its IP address. One or more servers that are configured with a table of physical addresses and watching incoming IP addresses, reply to the sender.

2.4. Transport layer

The layer above the internet layer in the TCP/IP model is called the transport layer. The transport layer is designed to provide reliable and efficient end-to-end subnet independent connection and transaction services. The transport layer has two principal protocols: Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP). Both protocols deliver data between the application layer and the internet layer. Application programmers can choose whichever service is more appropriate for their specific applications [28].

2.4.1. TCP

TCP is designed to operate over a wide variety of networks and to provide reliable, connection-oriented transmission of user data. TCP allows a byte stream originating on one machine to be delivered without error on any other machine in the Internet. TCP is also responsible for passing data to and from the correct application. The application for which data are sent is identified by a 16-bit number called the port number. The source port and destination port are contained in the segment header.

Bits

0	4 8		16	31
Sequence port		Destination port		
		Sequen	ice number	
		Acknowled	gement number	
Offset	Reserved	Flags	Window	
	Checksum		Urgent pointer	
		Options	5	Paddin.
		Data be	egins here	

Figure 2.3. TCP segment format

frequently used debugging tools to determine whether destination can be reached. ICMP also can inform the sender of preferred routes or of network congestion.

- ARP

The Internet behaves like a virtual network, using only those addresses assigned by the IP addressing scheme when sending and receiving data. When a host or a router needs to transmit a frame across a physical network, it should map an IP address to the correct physical or hardware address. The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) provides a method for dynamically translating between IP addresses and physical addresses.

There are three groups of address resolution algorithms that depend on the type of physical address scheme used. In the first mechanism, hardware addresses may be obtained by looking at a table that contains address translation information. The second mechanism, called closed-form computation, establishes direct mapping by having the machine's physical address encoded in its IP address. In the third approach, mapping is performed dynamically, i.e. a computer that needs to resolve an address sends a message across a network and receives a reply. Table look up is usually used to map WAN addresses, closed-form computation method is used on the networks with configurable hardware addresses, and message exchange is used on LANs with static addressing. To reduce network traffic and make ARP efficient, each machine saves temporarily IP-to-physical address bindings in its ARP table.

When a host wants to start communication with another machine, it looks for that machines IP address in its ARP table of bindings in RAM memory first. If there is no entry for that IP address, the host broadcasts an ARP request containing the destination IP address. The target machine that recognize its IP address responds to the request by sending replies that contain its own hardware interface address.

- RARP

A variant of ARP called reverse ARP was designed to help a node to find out its own IP address before it could communicate using TCP/IP. Because a machine's IP address is usually kept on its secondary storage RARP, was intended for use by diskless workstations and other devices that need to get configuration information from a

TCP provides reliability by employing a Positive Acknowledgement with Retransmission (PAR) mechanism to recover from the loss of data by the lower layers. A system using PAR allows a sending host's TCP to retransmit data at timed intervals, unless a positive acknowledgement is returned. The unit of data exchanged between cooperating TCP modules is called a segment (see Figure 2.3.). Each segment contains a checksum that detects data segments damaged in transit. If the data segment is received damaged, the receiver discards it without acknowledgement. PAR, therefore, treats damaged segments the same as lost segments and compensates for their loss. The sequence numbers used by TCP extend the PAR mechanism by allowing a single acknowledgement to cover all previously received data.

TCP builds a virtual circuit on top of the unreliable packet-oriented service of IP, by initializing and synchronizing the connection information between the two communicating hosts. Control information, called a handshake, is exchanged between two endpoints to establish a dialogue before data is transmitted. The procedure used in TCP is called a three-way handshake because the two communicating hosts synchronize sequence numbers by exchanging three segments. The three-way handshake works on the basis that both machines, when attempting to open a communication channel, transmit sequence numbers (seq) and acknowledgement numbers (ack). This procedure reduces the possibility that a delayed packet will appear as a valid packet within the current connection.

TCP also incorporates a flow control algorithm that makes efficient use of available network bandwidth. This algorithm is based on a window which defines a contiguous range of acceptable sequence numbered data. The window indicates to the sender that it can continue sending segments as long as the total number of bytes that it sends is smaller than the window of bytes that the receiver can accept. A zero window tells the sender to stop transmission until it receives a non-zero window value.

2.4.2. UDP

The second protocol in this layer, User Datagram Protocol, is an unreliable, connectionless protocol for applications that do not want TCP's sequencing or flow control and wish to provide their own. UDP provides a minimum of protocol overhead to allow applications to exchange messages over the network. UDP is an unreliable

protocol, which means that there are no techniques in the protocol for verifying that the data reached the other end of the network. The only type of reliability is that UDP performs a simple checksum of each message. Like in TCP, UDP is responsible for delivering data to and from the application layer. It also uses 16-bit source port and destination port numbers in the message header (see Figure 2.4.), to deliver data to the correct application process. The UDP protocol is used in situations where the amount of data being transmitted is small. In such cases the overhead of creating connections and ensuring reliable delivery

Bits	0	16	31
	Source port	Destination por	t 🔺
	Length	Checksum	Header
1.000	Data l		

Figure 2.4. UDP datagram

may be greater than the work of retransmitting the entire data if it is received incorrectly. Thus UDP is widely used for one-shot, client-server type request-reply queries and applications in which prompt delivery is more important than accurate delivery, such as transmitting speech or video.

2.5. Application layer

Layer five of the TCP/IP protocol architecture is the application layer. The application layer consists of a number of applications and processes that use the network to deliver data. All of these are built on top of transport layer protocols, either TCP or UDP. In chapter 1.2 we already mentioned the number of user services and application protocols that support them, but the most widely known and implemented application protocols are Telnet, FTP, SMTP, and DNS.

2.5.1. Telnet

Telnet is one of the oldest of the TCP/IP protocols and was adapted from a protocol that had the same name and that was used in the original ARPANET. In comparison with some other remote terminal protocols, Telnet is not as sophisticated, but it is widely available, and it is standard on the Internet. Telnet allows a user from any Internet connected site to log into a server at another site.

A user establishes a TCP connection, which allow him to use a remote system as if it were directly attached. Telnet relies primarily on TCP to establish a connection with a remote machine that allows use of a remote system as if it were directly attached. Because of differences between computers and operating systems, Telnet defined a Network Virtual Terminal (NVT) as one which will provide a standard interface to remote systems. NVT actually maps the differences between various local terminals to a common convention [26]. Another important service that Telnet offers is options negotiation between the client and server. It provides a wide range of options such as transmit 8-bits data instead of 7, allows one side to echo data it receives, operates in half- or full-duplex mode, etc.

2.5.2. FTP

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) lets a user access a remote machine and transfer files to and from that machine. As for Telnet, standard file transfer protocol existed in the ARPANET, which eventually developed into FTP. Currently, FTP is probably among the most frequently used TCP/IP applications.

There are two types of FTP access: user FTP and anonymous FTP. User FTP requires an account on the server and users have to identify themselves by sending a login name and password to the server before requesting any file transfer. After that, the users can access any files they are allowed to access as if they were logged in. Anonymous FTP access means that the user does not need an account or password. Anonymous FTP is used by many sites to provide unrestricted access to specific files to the public. Anonymous FTP is the most common mechanism on the Internet to allow remote access to publicly available information and other files.

FTP uses two separate TCP connections: one to carry commands between client and server – which is usually called the control channel, and the other to carry any actual files – usually called the data channel. The control channel persists throughout the overall session, while data channels can be established dynamically for each new file

transfer. To open the control channel connection to the server, the client uses a locally assigned port for itself, but contacts the server at well-known port 21. The data channel normally uses port 20.

Besides FTP there is a simplified version of it, called Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP). TFTP is more restrictive and consequently TFTP software is much smaller than FTP. This small size enables TFTP to be built into hardware, so that diskless machines can use it to transfer information.

2.5.3. SMTP

Electronic mail is probably the most popular and the most fundamental network service. On the Internet, electronic mail exchange between client and server is handled with a standard transfer protocol known as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP). Communication between client and server consists of readable text. That means that although SMTP defines that messages sent begin with a command format, usually a 3digit number that the program uses, they are followed by text that humans can easily read to understand interaction.

To provide for interoperability across the widest range of computer systems and networks, this standard transfer protocol is divided into two sets. One set specifies the exact format for mail messages, while the other specifies how the underlying mail delivery system passes messages across a link from one machine to another.

Separation of the standard in two parts is extremely useful for providing connection among standard TCP/IP mail systems and other vendors' mail systems, or between TCP/IP networks and networks that do not support this protocol. In such cases it is possible to place a mail gateway which will accept mail messages from the private network and forward them to the Internet, using the same message format for both.

SMTP is the forwarding system. Whenever the user sends or receives a mail message, the system places a copy in its storage (spool) area: outgoing spool area for outgoing mail and mailboxes for incoming mail. But before an incoming or outgoing mail message is placed into one of a spool areas, it passes through the mail forwarder.

Delivery address is first recorded into the proper form, and then is examined to decide whether to deliver the mail locally i.e. to place the message in the incoming mailbox, or to forward it to some other machine, i.e. to place the message in the outgoing spool area.

2.5.4. DNS

Domain Name Service relies on simple protocol, which allow clients to send questions to the server, and servers to respond with answers. Users generally do not use this service directly, but it underlies Telnet, FTP, SMTP and every other service, by mapping the Internet host names to their corresponding IP addresses and vice versa. Thus this service allows users to identify systems with simple human-readable names.

But DNS provides more than a translation service. It also defines a hierarchical name space that allows distribution of naming authority and organizes the name servers that implement the DNS protocol. Consequently, DNS has two independent aspects. To efficiently map names to addresses DNS first, specifies the name syntax and rules for delegating authority over names, and second, it includes a set of servers operating at multiple sites [27].

The hierarchical naming scheme known as domain names consists of a sequence of subnames separated by a delimiter character, the period. The Internet domain name hierarchy is a tree-like structure, at the top of which are seven top-level domains. Figure 2.5 lists those domains and shows their meaning. The Internet also supports, as top-level domain names, two-letter country codes. Thus, the top-level names permit two completely different naming hierarchies: geographic and organizational. Domain names are written with the local label first and the top domain last. The DNS also organizes the name servers in a tree structure that corresponds to the naming hierarchy. At the top of this tree is the root server that has responsibility to supply name-to-address translation for the entire Internet. Given the name to resolve, the root can choose the correct name server, each of which translate names for one top-level domain, and thus delegates some of the responsibility. At each of the next levels, name servers can resolve subdomains under its domain. The hierarchy of names ensures their uniqueness of names, and the hierarchy of servers prevents every server from having to know every name.

DNS can use either UDP or TCP to communicate. Usually when some query arrives, the local name server responds using the same transport service as the request. Both queries and responses use the same message format. This format allows a client to ask multiple questions in a single message. Each question consists of a domain name for which the client seeks an IP address followed by the query type and query class.

СОМ	Commercial organization
ED	Educational institution
GOV	Government institution
MIL	Military groups
NET	Network providers
INT	International organizations
ORG	Other organizations

Figure 2.5. The top-level Internet domains and their meaning

2.6. The IP addresses

To deliver data between two Internet hosts it is necessary to have some kinds of addresses that contain sufficient information to uniquely identify every host on the Internet. TCP/IP uses a scheme in which each host is assigned a 32-bit address called its Internet address or IP address. IP addresses are usually written as four decimal numbers separated by dots, where each integer gives the value of one byte of the IP address.

An IP address contains a network part and a host part. The number of bits used to identify these parts depends on the class of address. There are three main address classes: class A, that devote first byte for network and the next three bytes for host address; class B which allocates first two bytes to identify the network and the last two bytes to indicate the host; and finally, class C which allocate the first three bytes for network addresses are available for use. Some of them, that include a combination of 0's and 1's, are reserved for special uses such as limited broadcast, loopback for testing purposes, etc. To insure

that the network portion of an Internet address is unique all Internet addresses are assigned by a central authority, the Network Information Center (NIC).

Unfortunately, this address format with fixed size of 32 bits on which IPv4 relies has placed a limit on the Internet's growth. IPv6 overcomes this limitation by increasing the size of network addresses. IPv6 are 128 bits long, and it is believed that this size will accommodate network addresses for even the most pessimistic estimates of the Internet growth [22], [28].

3. ELEMENTS OF NETWORK SECURITY

3.1. Why we need secure networks

In recent years organizations have become increasingly dependent on the Internet for communications and research. Regardless of the organization type, users on private networks are demanding access to Internet services such as Internet mail, Telnet and File Transfer Protocol. In addition, because of Internet's powerful and easy available medium, many organizations use it for business transactions. The Internet has also opened possibilities of efficient use and availability of shared resources across a multiplatform computing environment. The recent explosion of the World Wide Web is responsible, in large part, for further tremendous growth of the Internet and even bigger needs for accessing it.

With the spread of Internet protocols and applications, there has been a growth in their abuse as well. Dependence of an organization on the Internet has changed the potential vulnerability of the organization's assets, and security has become one of the primary concerns when an organization connects its private network to the Internet. Connection to the Internet exposes an organization's private data and networking infrastructure to Internet intruders. Many organizations have some of their most important data, such as their financial records, research results, design of new products, etc., on their computers which are attractive for attackers who are out there on the Internet.

A wide variety of threats face computer systems and the information they process which can result in significant financial and information losses. Threats vary considerably – from threats to data integrity resulting from unintentional errors and omissions, to threats to system availability from malicious hackers attempting to crash a system. Knowledge of the types of threats and vulnerabilities aids in the selection of the most cost-effective security measures [33]. Security is concerned with making sure that "nosy" people cannot break into the organization's private network, read or steal confidential data or worse yet, modify it in order to sabotage that organization. It also deals with other types of attacks. Examples include service interruption, interception of sensitive e-mail or data transmitted, use of computer's resources and so on.

3.1.1. Security problems

The Internet suffers from severe security-related problems. Some of the problems are a result of inherent vulnerabilities in the TCP/IP services, and the protocols that the services implement, while others are a result of the complexity of host configuration and vulnerabilities introduced in the software development process. These and a variety of other factors have all contributed to making unprepared sites open to the Internet attackers [34]. The Internet attacks range from simple probing to extremely sophisticated forms of information theft.

The TCP/IP protocol suite, which is very widely used today, has a number of serious security flaws. Some of these flaws exist because hosts rely on IP source address for authentication, while others exist because network control mechanisms have minimal or non-existent authentication [11], [31]. Unfortunately some individuals have taken advantage of potential weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol suite and have launched a variety of attacks based on these flaws. Some of these attacks are:

- TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) guessing: When a virtual circuit is created TCP environment, the two hosts need to synchronize the Initial Sequence Number (ISN). However, there is a way for an intruder to predict the ISN and construct a TCP packet sequence without ever receiving any responses from the server. This allowed an intruder to spoof a trusted host on a local network. Reply messages are received by the real host, which will attempt to reset the connection. Prediction of the random ISN is possible because in Berkeley systems, the ISN variable is incremented by a constant amount once per second, and by half that amount each time a connection is initiated. Thus, if one initiates a legitimate connection and observes the ISN used, one can calculate, with a high degree of confidence, ISN used on the next connection attempt.
- Source IP address spoofing attacks: Every IP packet contains the host address of the sender and intended receiver. Some applications only accept packets from 'trusted' hosts, a determination made by examining the source address carried in the packet. Unfortunately, there is little in most TCP/IP software implementation that would prevent someone from placing any address that they want in the packet's source

address field, thus fooling the target machine that packets are coming from a trusted machine.

- Source routing attacks: The source station can specify the route that a packet should take in a TCP open request for return traffic. In such cases the replies may not reach the source station if a different path is followed.
- TCP synchronization (SYN) flooding: In a SYN flooding attack, the attacking host continuously sends thousands of setup requests each second. The destination host responds with an acknowledgement for every request and waits for the confirmations that are never going to come in. The target host is essentially frozen; it is spending all of its processing time and resources trying to respond to those illegitimate requests, and could not effectively handle a legitimate connection.
- Tiny fragment attack: For this type of attack, the intruder uses the IP fragmentation feature to create extremely small fragments and force the TCP header information into a separate packet fragment. Because many router and firewall filters only act on the first part of a larger message, and take no actions on any fragments that contain the remainder of the message, if the first fragment is accepted all other fragments are also allowed to pass.

3.1.2. Attacker's motivation

Motivation behind attacks on a system can be different. Reasons for the stealing of data can be a desire to gain advantage in a competitive environment. Changing information to cripple the competitor's information system can be useful as well. Destroying or deleting data completely or even ruining someone's computer equipment can be an act of vandals who are out to do damage or destruction, either because they want to get revenge, or because they are annoyed and don't like a particular company. Fortunately, vandals are fairly rare.

Some other people can be purely curious. They will break in just to learn about an organization's computer system and data, or because they like the challenge of testing their skills and knowledge. Breaking into something well known and well defended is usually worth more to this kind of intruder. But also there are professional hackers, sometimes called crackers, whose breeches are much more serious and dangerous. They break into corporate or government computers for specific purposes such as espionage,

fraud, and theft. One study of a particular Internet site found that hackers attempted to break in once at least every other day [32].

Obviously, most security problems are intentionally caused by malicious people trying to gain some benefit or harm someone. Making a network secure involves a lot of effort. Developing a secure network means developing mechanisms that reduce or eliminate the treats to network security. The right approach to network security should include building firewalls to protect internal systems and networks, using strong authentication methods, and using encryption to protect particularly sensitive data as it transits the network.

3.2. Security policy

Before implementing any security tools, software, or hardware, an organization must have some security plan. A site security plan could be developed only after an organization has determined what it needs to protect and the level of protection that it needs. Request for Comments (RFC) 1244 is a site security handbook, that provides guidance to site administrators on how to deal with security issues on the Internet [31].

A security policy is an overall scheme needed to prevent unauthorized users from accessing resources on the private network, and to protect against unauthorized export of private information. A security policy must be part of an overall organization security scheme; that is, it must obey existing policies, regulations and laws that the organization is subjected to.

A site security policy is needed to establish how both internal and external users interact with a company's computer network, how the computer architecture topology within an organization will be implemented, and where computer equipment will be located. One of the goals of a security policy should be to define procedures to prevent and respond to security incidents. It is very important that once a security policy is developed and in place, it must be obeyed by everyone from that organization.

3.2.1. Stances of security policy

There are two opposed stances that a security policy can take to describe the fundamental security philosophy of the organization [18], [21]:

- That which is not specifically permitted is prohibited. This stance assumes that the security policy should start by denying all access to all network resources, and then each desired service should be implemented on a specific basis. This is the better approach.
- That which is not specifically prohibited is permitted. This stance assumes that the security policy should permit access to all network resources, and then each potentially dangerous service should be prohibited on a case-by-case basis. This approach provides for more services available to the users, but it makes it difficult to provide security to the private network.

3.2.2. Organizational assets

No single site security policy is best for any two organizations. Because different companies have different demands and can take different levels of risk, every security policy is developed for a particular organization. The security policy must be based on carefully conducted security analysis, organizational assets identification, risk analysis, and business risk analysis for that organization [1].

There are many factors in developing a security policy. Organizations must know what they are trying to protect, what they are protecting it from and what are possible threats against organizational assets. One of the most important decisions in developing a security policy is how much security to put up. This will depend on the importance of data being protected because data of different value for an organization will need different levels of protection. Also there is a trade off between how much security to put up on one hand and the expense of the security solution on the other.

Every organization needs to perform classification of data. This means it has to define the relative value of various types of data used within the company. This evaluation of information can range from low value for information made available to the public, to high value such as new research results, investment information and other sensitive information.

There are three characteristics that should be considered when trying to protect important data [16]:

- Secrecy which helps with keeping important data private
- Integrity ensures that only authorized personnel can make changes
- Availability is concerned with providing continual access to some data Besides data
 there are other resources of an organization that might also need protection.

These resources include company's hardware, software, documentation, etc. Intruders can often use computer time and disk space without making any damage to a company's data and other equipment. But an organization spends money on those resources and it has every right to use it whenever and however it wants. Thus, one of the first steps in developing security policy should be creating a list of all items that need to be protected, and then establishing procedures and rules for accessing resources located on the company's private network.

3.2.3. Development of a security policy

A security policy should be captured in a document that describes the organization's network security needs and concerns. Creation of this document is the first step in building an effective network security system. Policy creation must be a joint effort of many groups. It should be formulated with and have support from top management which will have the power to enforce the policy and technical personnel which will advise on the implementation of the policy [6]. It must be clear that every misunderstanding or conflict between groups that are included in producing the security policy can lead to security problems (so-called security holes).

This effort should end with an issued security policy that covers such things as:

• Network service access - defines services which will be allowed or disallowed from the private network, as well as ways in which these services will be used.

3.3.1. User identification and authentication

The first step in access control is for the individual to present identification and authentication of that identification. Users begin the authentication process every time they log in by entering their user ID. Once they are logged they have to prove their identity or to authenticate themselves. Passwords that must be presented to the system are the most common form of authentication.

The authentication information must be validated before the user identification is accepted. Passwords presented by users are compared with previously stored information associated with the user identification; a match results in acceptance of the identification. The stored information is commonly the user's encrypted password. This encryption protects the authentication information even if the password is disclosed.

A computer system may employ three different ways to verify a user's identity:

- By something they know. This is the most common method where the system requires the user to provide specific information to access the system.
- By something they have. In this case a system requires that a user possess a physic key to access the system.
- By something they are. The third type of identification is a biometric key, which uses the fact that no two human beings are the same [3], [7].

Authentication mechanisms must uniquely and unforgeably identify an individual. Possession of knowledge or a thing means that it could be lost, duplicated, or stolen by someone else. To prevent unauthorized users from gaining access by stealing one of the keys, a computer system can use more then one of these techniques. Of course, as we add more types of verification, certainty of authentication goes up, but so does the cost. In real life, a computer system heavily relies on knowledge and possession keys, while biometric keys are too expensive and hence are used only for extreme security requirements.

- Physical access physical security of the place where hardware, software or communication circuits reside must be adequate, and identification of authorized personnel that can enter those otherwise restricted areas.
- Limits of acceptable behavior effort should be made to inform the users about what is considered proper use of their accounts; this can be done by an educational campaign or by giving the users a policy statement.
- Specific responses to security violations security policy should establish a number of predefined responses that should be taken in case of violation, to ensure prompt and proper enforcement.
- Reviewing of the policy the policy should be reviewed on a regular basis; responsibility for maintenance and enforcement of the policy should also be defined this can be individual or committee responsibility.

Developing a security policy should be only one part of the overall security efforts. Equally important is education of users. The site security policy should include a formalized process, which communicates the security policy to all users. Personnel who are responsible for administering the network should make users advised of how computer and network systems are expected to be used. Users should understand how common security breaches are and how costly these breaches can be.

3.3. Authentication

One of the fundamental issues involved in network security is that access to valuable resources must be restricted to authorized people and processes. Authentication is the process of determining the accuracy of the user's claimed identity. The user authentication system attempts to prevent unauthorized users from gaining access by requiring users to validate their authorization to use the system [2].

A closely related concept is the authentication of objects such as messages. When the content of a message is important, the receiver may find it necessary to be sure of its source and integrity. Data integrity ensures that data have not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner along the way. Similarly, the sender may desire positive proof of delivery. Digital systems provide these necessary authentication mechanisms.

3.3.1.1. Informational keys

Informational keys are usually passwords, phrases, personal identification numbers (PIN numbers) that an authorized user knows and can provide to the system when requested. Many systems allow the user to create his own password so that it is more memorable. In general, a user's password should be easy to remember but difficult to guess. Unfortunately, there are a number of ways in which a password can be compromised [5]. For example, someone can see the username and password while the authorized user gains access, users can tell their password to a co-worker, or users can write a password down and leave it out in a public place where it can be easily accessed by casual observers or co-workers. To prevent unauthorized users from accessing a computer account a one-time password can be used. In this case a list of passwords which will work only one time for a given authorized user is generated. Of course, special care should be taken for protecting the password list from theft or duplication.

3.3.1.2. Physical keys

Physical keys are objects that users must have to gain access to the system. They are widely used because they provide a higher level of security than passwords alone. The commonly used physical keys are magnetic-strip cards, smartcards, and specialized calculators [1]. In order to use magnetic cards, a computer system must have card readers. The process of validation begins when the user enters both a card and access number and it has four stages: information input, encryption, comparison, and logging. The authentication system then encrypts the access number entered by the user and compares it to the expected value obtained from the system. If these values match, the authentication system grants the user access.

Smartcards also contain information about the identity of the card holder and are used in a similar manner. The difference is that smartcards contain a microprocessor, inputoutput ports, and a few kilobytes of non-volatile memory, instead of magnetic recording material, and can perform computations that may improve the security of the card [16].

A calculator looks very much like a simple calculator with a few additional functions. In addition to possessing a calculator, the user has to remember his user name and personal access number. When the user wants to access the computer system it has to provide his user name. The authentication system returns a challenge value back to the user, which then has to enter that value and his personal access number into his calculator. After performing some mathematical computation, the calculator returns a response value to the user. The user then presents the response value to the system, and if the number presented matches the value expected by the system, access is granted.

3.3.1.3. Biometric keys

Biometric keys provide many advantages over types of keys that were discussed so far. The three primary advantages of biometric keys are they are unique, they are difficult to duplicate or forge and they are always with a user. Biometric approach presents the higher technology solution to access control problems, but requires special hardware that effectively limits the applicability of biometric techniques. Commonly used biometric keys include voice prints, fingerprints, retinal prints, and hand geometry [9].

3.3.2. Message authentication

Message authentication is the ability of the receiver to verify that the received message is not altered by some attacker, is not a reply of an earlier message sent from an attacker, or is a message completely made up by an attacker. Verification of the source and original content of a message should be applied always when a new message is received. There are three different methods for message authentication:

- Message encryption, where ciphertext of entire message serves for authentication of Message
- Appending a MAC or cryptographic checksum to the message
- Hash function that maps a message of any length into a fixed-length hash value, which serves as the authenticator.

3.3.2.1. Message encryption

In *conventional encryption* or so-called symmetric encryption method, a message transmitted from source A to destination B is encrypted using a secret key K shared by A and B. So, if no other party knows the key, we may say that confidentiality as well as

some degree of authentication of the message is provided. Symmetric encryption does not provide a signature so the receiver could forge the message or the sender could deny the message [10]. In this method there is mainly the risk that an outsider will find out the secret key shared by the two communicants A and B. The most common symmetric encryption method is DES algorithm.

In the *public-key encryption* or so-called asymmetric encryption method, the source A uses the public key K_{B1} of the destination B to encrypt the message, and because only B has the corresponding private key K_{B2} only B can decrypt the message. This provides confidentiality but not authentication. To provide authentication, A uses its private key K_{A2} to encrypt the message, and B uses A's public key K_{A1} to decrypt the message. Because only A could have constructed the ciphertext, B has the means to prove that he message must have come from A. In effect, A has "signed" the message by using its private key, providing what is known as digital signature. To provide both confidentiality and authentication, A can encrypt the message first using its private key, which provides the digital signature, and then using B's public key, which provides confidentiality [4].

The most common method, though not a U.S. government standard, for public key encryption is the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) technique. In contrast, in 1994 the federal government approved its own standard developed by NSA called the Digital Signature Standard (DSS). DSS provides authentication and data integrity; it doesn't provide encryption [3]. In methods based on asymmetric encryption there is mainly the risk that an outsider makes the receiver B believe that he value of the public key of sender A is something other than KA1.

3.3.2.2. Cryptographic checksum

A cryptographic checksum, also known as a Message Authentication Code (MAC), involves the use of authentication function and secret key. MACs have been suggested as a means of providing confirmation of the authenticity of a document between two mutually trusting parties [8]. When A wants to send a message to B, A generates the fixed-size block of data, known as a cryptographic checksum or MAC, as a function of the message and the key. The MAC is then appended to the message and transmitted to

the intended recipient. The receiver then performs the same calculation on the received message to generate a new cryptographic checksum. If the received checksum matches the calculated checksum, the receiver can be sure that the message has not been altered.

One of the most widely used cryptographic checksums, refereed to as the Data Authentication Algorithm, makes use of traditional cryptographic algorithms such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), and relies on a secret authentication key to ensure that only authorized personnel could generate a message with the appropriate MAC. However, several technical difficulties have been identified with both the standard MAC and DES-based checksum approaches. In particular, it is shown that MAC checksum length is inadequate [8].

3.3.2.3. Hash function

Hash function is a form of message authentication that provides data integrity but not the authentication of the sender or receiver. Hash function accepts a variable size message as input and produces a fixed-size hash value. The function manipulates ("hashes") all the bits of the message in a carefully defined way and appends the hash value to the message at the source. The receiver authenticates that message by recomputing the hash value. It compares its own result to a table, and if the results match, the data have not been changed between sender and receiver. Depending what is required, hash code can be used in a variety of ways to provide message authentication and/or confidentiality [4]. Popular hashing algorithms include Kaliski's MD2 algorithm, Rivest's MD5 algorithm, and NIST's Secure Hashing Algorith (SAH). SAH is considered the most secure to date [3].

3.4. Encryption

Encryption plays an important role in the security of computer networks. It can be used to protect data in transit through the communication network as well as data in storage. Encryption or encipherment can be defined as the process of coding of plaintext through an algorithm or transform table into a form so that others cannot understand it effectively producing ciphertext or a cipher [7]. In order to read the original data, the receiver must convert it back through the process called decryption. To perform decryption, the receiver must possess the key. Encryption mechanisms rely on keys or passwords, and the longer the key the more difficult the encrypted data is to break. Also, because each of the encryption mechanisms depends on the security of the keys it uses, management of the keys requires special attention. Key management involves generation, distribution, storage, and regular changing of cryptographic keys.

There are basically two types of encryption methods: symmetric (conventional or onekey) and asymmetric (public or two-key) systems. As we already mentioned the most widely used symmetric method is Data Encryption Standard (DES) which has been adopted as a standard by the U.S. federal government [10]. The DES has been implemented in both a software form and hardware form. A public key system differs from symmetric in that it uses different keys for decryption and encryption. RSA encryption technique is the most widely used two-key system, although it is not an U.S. government standard. RSA has proven to be an extremely reliable algorithm used for both public key encryption and digital signatures [1].

3.4.1. Link encryption

Encryption can be performed link by link or end-to-end. So-called link encryption is described as providing protection for a line with no intermediate nodes. The link encryption is appropriate for point-to-point circuits. It functions at the physical level where the entire bit stream being transmitted is encrypted [15]. In the case of link encryption, link encryption devices are required between every node (could be a router, bridge, or x.25 switch) and the circuit connected to it (see Figure 3.1.a).




Figure 3.1. Internetwork encryption

In the case of a switched network model, the link encryption process may be repeated many times as a series of isolated transmissions as the message transverses a complex network. It is obvious that some of the protocol information, such as addresses or control information in X.25 or TCP/IP networks, must be available to the switch in plaintext in order that it can perform its function. Because information will be in plaintext while in the switch, there are potential security vulnerabilities in the switches such as source-routing attacks, RIP-spoofing, and other attacks [11].

3.4.2. End-to-end encryption

It certainly would be more secure to encrypt at one end, transport all encrypted data transparently to the other end, and then decrypt the information. Expanding encryption into higher protocol layers may be used to secure any conversation, regardless of the number of hops throughout the network. End-to-end encryption is described as encrypting only user data; network data must remain unaltered for intermediate network nodes. In this way, data do not exist in plaintext form at intermediate nodes. The end-to end information is thereby protected, while leaving necessary routing and control information in plaintext. This approach also saves tremendously on encryption devices and greatly simplifies key management (see Figure 3.1.b).

4. THE FIREWALL CONCEPT

A number of security problems with the Internet mentioned in section 3.1 could be reduced through the use of existing techniques and tools. The most widely known and widely used tool to provide protection against unwanted intruders into corporate networks is the firewall [30].

A firewall is not simply a set of hardware components such as a router, host computer, or some combination of these that provides security to a network, rather it is an approach to security. It helps implement a larger corporate security policy that defines the services and access to be permitted. Consequently, the various ways of configuring the equipment that compose a firewall system will depend upon a site's particular security policy, budget and overall operation.

There are a number of definitions of a firewall. For example, a firewall can be defined as "a barrier between two networks that is used as a mechanism to protect an internal, often called the trusted network, from an external network, called the untrusted network." A firewall system is usually located at a point at which protected internal network and a public network, such as the Internet, connect (see Figure 4.1.).

The main function of a firewall is to centralize access control at the Internet connection. With this in mind it is clear that a firewall simplifies security management, since network security is consolidated on the firewall system rather than being distributed to every host in the entire private network. It can also be used to completely 'hide' the users on the private network from the external network.

The firewall system is responsible for allowing access for authorized individuals and at the same time for shielding a site from protocols and services that can be abused from hosts outside the private network. Thus rules, specified by the private network administrator, defining authorized traffic should be defined to the firewall and enforced by it. Any traffic not specifically authorized according to these rules must be blocked by the firewall. Of course, for a firewall to be effective, all traffic to and from the Internet must pass through the firewall, where it can be examined. The firewall itself should also be secure and immune to penetration [35].




Figure 4.1. Schematic of firewall

Firewall systems can be deployed within private networks as well. In such cases the firewall will protect parts of the internal network from other parts of that same network, rather than from the Internet. This is very useful technology because not everyone in an organization needs access to the same services and data, and some subnets of an organization need a higher level of security. A firewall deployed within a corporate network will prevent unauthorized access to particular subnets, workgroups, or LANs, such as the accounting workgroup, research and development department, etc., from the rest of the network. This is particularly important because many sources claim that 70 percent of all security problems originate from inside an organization.

Today, most firewall systems use one or more of three types of firewall technology: packet filtering routers, proxy systems and stateful inspection [30]. Packet filters are inexpensive, and transparent to the users; proxy systems are more sophisticated and secure, but not transparent to the users; stateful inspection provides full application level awareness without requiring a separate proxy for every service. We will discuss all of them in more detail in the next chapter.

There are different implementations of firewalls that can be arranged in different ways. Historically there have been two approaches in the firewall security issues. One approach implied that adequate level of security could be achieved using packet filters available in most routers. The other, and more accepted approach in today's world, suggested that packet filtering could be used, but only in conjunction with proxy systems and proper authentication.

5. TYPES OF FIREWALLS

5.1. Packet filtering firewall

Packet filters are the earliest types of firewall. Filtering firewalls require that every packet pass through the firewall device. On the way through, the filtering firewall controls what data can flow to and from a network. It is well known that routers can be used as filtering firewalls.

This is a good way to establish a packet filtering firewall because a router is necessary to establish the local (LAN) to wide area network (WAN) connection, and it already dealing with the routing of packets [10]. A router may be a dedicated piece of hardware that has no other purpose, or it can be a piece of software that runs on general purpose UNIX or PC system. A normal router (router that doesn't act as a packet filter) has to make a routing decision about each packet it receives; it has determine how to forward a packet towards its destination. In addition to this, the packet filtering router also has to make a decision of whether it should forward that packet or not. The packet filtering router is able to make these decisions according to the security policy, which is implemented through packet filtering rules.

5.1.1. How packet filtering works

Packet filtering is done by setting up filtering rules on a router inserted between the local private and external untrusted network. A firewall implementing packet filtering on a router to operate at the network level is sometimes also referred to as a screening router.

A screening router works at the IP layer (which corresponds to the network layer of OSI protocol architecture). Each IP packet contains source and destination IP addresses, as well as TCP or UDP source and destination port numbers. The firewall checks each IP packet against the filter rules as they pass between the router's interfaces, and accordingly allows or blocks certain types of packets. The more attributes the filtering

rules can check on, the better. Usually a screening router can filter IP packets based on the following attributes [36]:

- Source IP address
- Destination IP address
- TCP/UDP source port
- TCP/UDP destination port
- TCP flagsThe IP protocol (whether the packet is a TCP, UDP, or ICMP packet)
- ICMP message type

Adding TCP or UDP port filtering to IP address filtering results in a great deal of flexibility because servers for different services usually reside at a specific port [37]. Not all packet filtering routers currently filter the source TCP/UDP port, but more vendors are starting to incorporate this capability. In addition, the router has knowledge of two more things that are not connected with the format of IP packet, but still can be used as an additional filtering criterion:

- The interface where the packet arrived (secure or insecure network interface)
- The interface where the packet will go out

Usually, the packet filtering routers allows users to build a table of permit/deny entries where each line in the table contains some or all of above-mentioned criteria. In addition each entry contains an indication of whether packets that match the description are to be allowed or dropped.

5.1.2. What services to filter?

There are two general forms of packet filtering: filtering by address and filtering by service. In the first case some sites might want to block connections from certain addresses such as from hosts or sites that it considers being untrustworthy. Packet filtering rules are then based on the source or destination address, and they don't have to consider what services are involved. This type of filtering is not in use as much, and it serves mainly in blocking incoming packets with forged source addresses.

To use the other form i.e. filtering by service, an organization first needs to decide what services it wants to allow or disallow. The decision to filter certain services should already have been defined and driven by the organization's own security policy. There are some services that are inherently vulnerable to abuse and should be blocked at a firewall [12], [21]. For example:

- Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) usually listens to port 69; TFTP is used for booting diskless workstation; there is no need for booting diskless systems across the Internet and consequently there is no reason to allow TFTP across the firewall.
- The BSD "r" commands such as rlogin port 513, and rsh port 514 are used for convenient remote access and if improperly configured can permit unauthorized access to accounts; it is safer to use alternative protocol such as Telnet, FTP, etc.
- Talk is a text-based real-time conferencing system between two people; talk servers use either port 517 or 518; it is not possible to safely filter talk
- Network File System (NFS) currently uses the port number 2049; NFS server relies on the IP address to check whether or not the client is allowed to access that filesystem making it vulnerable to address forgery; it is not recommended to allow NFS across the organization's firewall.
- Network Information Service / Yellow Pages (NIS/YP); NIS/YP servers do not use predictable port numbers so it cannot be adequately handled neither with the packet filtering system nor with proxies; it is not recommended to allow NFS across the organization's firewall.

Other services are usually allowed but restricted to only those systems that need them. Blocking all of these services would cripple the access to the Internet and its unlimited resources. These services are:

- SMTP server listen on port 25 for incoming SMTP connections; packet filtering rules should be used to restrict SMTP connections from external hosts to only bastion host, and from bastion host to a internal mail server, while all internal users should be allowed to send outgoing mail to the bastion host.
- FTP server uses port 21 for command channel, and port 20 for data channel. There are two modes of FTP connection supported by server and client: normal mode and passive mode. Packet filtering could be used to allow incoming FTP connections to

the organization's bastion host. If FTP client supports passive mode then outgoing FTP connections could be allowed via packet filtering as well, but if doesn't then it is better to use an FTP proxy server.

- Telnet server listens on port 23. It is recommended to permit incoming Telnet session only to specific hosts and all outgoing Telnet traffic, both of which can be allowed via packet filtering.
- NNTP port 119; packet filtering or proxying should be used to only allow connections from trusted external NNTP server to a local news server.
- NS port 53; it has some security problems such as revealing too much information that can be useful to attackers; there are two approaches to set up DNS services: with and without hiding information, depending upon the sensitivity of an organization's data.
- RIP port 520; it is the oldest routing protocol and it can be spoofed to redirect some packets.
- Gopher and HTTP ports 70 and 80; HTTP should be restricted to run on dedicated bastion host only [3].

5.1.3. A few rules for filtering by service

Once the decision about which services an organization wants to allow is made, it is very important how these services would be translated into a particular set of rules for the router, since the router works at the IP level and thus understands and works only with packets. In addition, the selected screening router should allow specification of those rules based on any of previously mentioned attributes. Also it is important that the router applies rules in a predictable order; the simplest order is order specified by the user.

When planning packet filtering rules, it should be kept in mind that protocols are usually bi-directional, which means that one side is sending a request, and the other side is sending a response. So in order to allow some service, the filter on the router should allow packets from that service in both directions. For example, if a user from the internal network wants to retrieve a file with FTP protocol from the external FTP server, it should be allowed to send the request to the external FTP server, but also it has to be allowed to accept a response from that server. As we said the router works with packets only, so it is important to distinguish between inbound and outbound service, and incoming and outgoing packets [21]. Our FTP example above was an outbound service, but contained both outgoing packet (request to the external server) and incoming packet (respond from the external server).

Also for all services that are based on the TCP protocol, rules for filtering of packets can be based on the TCP flags. As we recall from paragraph 2.4.1, TCP uses a three-way handshake to establish and close connection. The TCP flags are used in such procedure to indicate the type of TCP packet. Although screening routers have capabilities to filter on any of the TCP flag settings, the flags that are most frequently used are the SYN and ACK flags [20]. The three possible combination of SYN and ACK flag settings for opening of TCP connection are given in the table below:

SYN flag	ACK flag	Meaning
1	0	Open connection
1	1	Acknowledgement of open connection
0	1	Acknowledgement -connection has been established

5.1. Filtering based on the TCP flags

5.1.4. Protocol specific issues for filtering Telnet traffic

If an organization wants to allow outbound Telnet service from its internal network to the external network, packet filtering rules should specify which outgoing and incoming packets are permitted. In the example from Figure 5.2 outgoing packets for specific host with IP address 192.168.2.1 will contain:

- The IP source address (internal for private network) 192.168.2.1
- The IP destination address (external for private network) 192.168.1.2
- IP packet type TCP
- The TCP source port Telnet client uses random number greater than 1023
- The TCP destination port Telnet servers use well-known port 23
- First outgoing packet which will establish the connection will have SYN bit set, while all others will have ACK bit set




Figure 5.2. Representation of Packet filtering for Telnet traffic

The Telnet server will respond back to the client on a private network and incoming packets will have the following characteristics:

- The IP source address (external for private network) 192.168.1.2
- The IP destination address (internal for private network) 192.168.2.1
- IP packet type TCP
- The TCP source port port 23
- The TCP destination port same as source port for the outgoing packets (>1023)
- All incoming packets will have ACK bit set.

Thus, if outbound Telnet service is needed from any host on private network (192.168.2.0) to an external Telnet server, the characteristics can be summarized in the following table:

Packet direction	Source address	Destination address	Packet type	Source port	Destination port	Flags
Outgoing	192.168.2.0	192.168.1.2	TCP	>1023	23	SYN
Incoming	192.168.1.2	192.168.2.0	ТСР	23	>1023	ACK
Outgoing	192.168.2.0	192.168.1.2	TCP	>1023	23	ACK

Figure 5.3. Packet characteristics for outbound Telnet service	Figure	5.3.	Packet	characteristics	for	outbound	Telnet	service
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For the same organization to allow *inbound* Telnet service, in which users external to the private network communicate with a local Telnet server, packets in general should have the following characteristics:

Packet direction	Source address	Destination address	Packet type	Source port	Destination port	Flags
Incoming	External	Internal	TCP	>1023	23	SYN
Outgoing	Internal	External	TCP	23	>1023	ACK
Incoming	External	Internal	TCP	>1023	23	ACK

Figure 5.4. Packet characteristics for inbound Telnet service

5.1.5. IPRoute packet filtering

There are number of tools that allow us to add packet filtering to PC or UNIX systems. Many of these tools are available for free downloading from the Internet and resources can be found in [20], [21], [39]. The exact mechanism for specifying packet filtering rules varies from product to product. In order to provide a detailed example for setting up filtering rules we chose the IPRoute software package.

IPRoute is a program written by David F. Mischler that runs on a 286 or better CPU. It is intended to be useful for connecting a LAN to an Internet Service Provider, or for routing between LANs [38]. IPRoute has the capability to route IP packets between network interfaces on PC hardware, and besides others it provides IP packet filtering features.

A filtered interface has two separate lists of filtering rules: one for incoming packets, and one for outgoing packets. As packets enter or leave the router on a filtered interface they are checked against each filter rule in the order the rules were specified until a match occurs, or the end of the filter list is reached. When a match occurs the action specified in the filter rule is performed on that packet. Packets that do not match any filter rules will be silently dropped; this assumes that a default 'deny' stance from the security policy is in use.

Requirements to build IProute packet filter device are as follows:

- 286 or better PC computer
- two or more ethernet cards
- IPRoute software

IPRoute's commands for setting up packet filtering rules require specification of the interface on which the rule is to be applied, and whether the rule applies to incoming ('in' refers to packet entering the router from outside) or outgoing packets ('out' refers to packet leaving the router) on that interface. IPRoute also has the capability to drop

the matching packet and to send an ICMP destination unreachable message back to the packet's originator if action 'deny' is specified, or to silently drop the packet if 'drop' action is specified. Besides the possibility of filtering packets based on the source and destination IP addresses, subnetmask, and TCP/UDP port numbers, IPRoute allows us to filter on the protocol type and flags (SYN or ACK). For example, to allow outbound Telnet service from the above example with IPRoute we could specify:

filter en0 permit out tcp-syn 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.1.2/24:23 filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn 192.168.1.2/24:23 192.168.2.0/24 filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.1.2/24:23

where en0 is an external interface on which the rule is to be aplied, tcp-syn indicates an attempt to open a new connection (SYN bit is set), and tcp-xsyn indicates an existing connection (both SYN and ACK bits set or only ACK bit set); /24 indicates the width of the network mask in bits and :23 specifies port number which is separated from the address part by a colon. When we want a rule to match all addresses on a given network '*' character can be used. Our filtering rules will then be:

filter en0 permit out tcp-syn * 192.168.1.2/24:23 filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn 192.168.1.2/24:23 * filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn * 192.168.1.2/24:23

Appendix A contains example IPRoute configuration with a detailed description of how packet filtering rules should be specified using IPRoute software for two different policies:

- All inbound traffic is forbidden
- FTP, Telnet and Daytime services are, with some restriction, allowed

Contents of the script files, log files, and examples of FTP session for these two cases are also given in appendix A.

5.2 Proxy systems

A more secure and sophisticated type of firewall technology is the proxy system. The proxy system is usually used in order to impose more control on what is happening at the application layer and because of this proxies are sometimes referred to as application-level gateways [35]. The proxy system is a host running special purpose written code for specific applications. Sets of code are called proxy services and exist both as clients and servers within the physical gateway. The proxy system acts as a server to receive the incoming request and as a client when forwarding the request (see Figure 5.5). If a request is approved and the session is established, the proxy system contacts the real server on behalf of the client (thus the term "proxy") and provides relay of connection between the client and the real server.

Because a proxy firewall doesn't permit any IP packets from the Internet to show up directly on the internal network, a proxy system allows an organization to implement a much stricter security policy than with a packet filtering router [40]. The proxies can also support and perform some additional functions such as user authentication, extra verification, and logging before carrying out the user's intended connection to the application beyond the firewall. Because of these characteristics, the proxy system is considered as one of the most secure types of firewall.

The proxy firewall usually sits between the Internet and a private network. As in packet filtering firewalls there shouldn't be any other connections between a local network and the Internet except for the proxy server that runs user desired applications. Because the proxy server is a main point of contact for users on local networks, and is directly exposed to the possible attacks form the Internet, it has to be specifically secured against those attacks. Consequently, a proxy system is often referred to as a "bastion host". When configured with two network interface cards, one for each required network connection, the bastion host is also called a dual-homed host.

5.2.1. Bastion host features

Because a bastion host is especially vulnerable to attacks from the Internet it has to be specifically protected. There are a few features that can help in providing security for a bastion host [21]

- First of all it should be clear that users are allowed to access proxy services, but they should never be permitted to log in to the bastion host. If users are allowed to log in to the bastion host, security of the firewall could be threatened.
- As we mentioned above only services that are needed for local users are installed on the bastion host. If some service is not installed then it simply is not available and cannot be attacked.
- It is also necessary to have only a few services ported at the bastion host because complexity builds quickly as applications are added. Bastion hosts that have smaller number of services are simpler and hence more secure.
- Usually authentication is performed on the bastion host before the user is allowed access to the proxy service.
- Bastion hosts supports logging which is one useful tool for discovering attacks. Usually all information about connections are maintained by logging all traffic.
- It is also important to note that each proxy code is independent of all proxies on the bastion host, so that if one has some security related problems it can be removed without consequences to the other application.

5.2.2. How a proxy system works

Unlike packet filtering routers, where direct echange of packets between the internal and external network is allowed, the proxy server does not allow direct flow of IP packets between the two interfaces through the kernel. When users wants to access some service on the Internet they have to communicate with the proxy system rather than with the real server that offers the desired service. The proxy then acts as both server and client; when receiving an incoming request, it acts as a server, and when forwarding the request, acts as a client (see Figure 5.5). It is the same for the external users who want to connect to the internal servers; they would have to connect first to the proxy system, and then to the destination host [12].

For example, a user on the local network who wants to use Telnet to connect to a Telnet server on an external network would have to:

- First connect to the proxy, instead of connecting to the final destination computer, and to enter desired external server.
- The proxy will then check if the user is allowed access to the Internet or not based on the variety of criteria specified for that proxy, and accordingly, will make a decision to accept or reject the user connection.
- If the requirements are successfully met, the proxy makes a Telnet connection from the bastion host to the external host.
- Finally, the proxy passes the packets through the other network interface on the bastion host and on to the Internet




Figure 5.5. Proxy system

It is obvious that the proxy server allows through only those services for which there is a proxy code installed. If the proxy code for a particular application is not installed, the service is not supported by the proxy server and cannot be forwarded across the firewall. For the example above, if the proxy server didn't contain a proxy code for Telnet, that service would be completely blocked and users wouldn't be able to make connection to the Internet host.

5.2.3. Custom user procedures vs. custom client

As Figure 5.5 shows proxy service is composed of two components: a proxy server and a proxy client. Also, from the previous paragraph (5.2.2.) we can see that a proxy system requires a modified user behavior. The user has to connect to the proxy server

instead of connecting to the real host on the Internet. With this approach, users would still be able to use standard client software. This approach has a major drawback in that the users have to learn a custom procedure to follow. Moreover, when a user connects to the proxy server, it has to specify not only its user name, but also the name of the real server he wants to connect to. This could be a problem because not all clients allow the users to type both user name and host name. Obviously a custom client procedure places some limitation on which clients can be used. Usually, application level gateways use modified procedures.

Another approach is a modified proxy client. This proxy client is a special version of a normal client that is capable of talking to the proxy server. The custom client should be capable of specifying to the proxy server which real server it has to connect to. A modified proxy client can make the firewall transparent to the users by permitting them to specify the real server to which they want to connect. In this case the user will have the illusion that they are connected directly to the real server on the Internet. User behavior would stay the same, but a modified client is required on all internal machines that want to access the Internet through the proxy system. In addition some extra configuration may be necessary, because the proxy client needs to know how to contact the proxy server. Unfortunately, appropriate proxy clients are sometimes available only for certain platforms, so that the right software has to be chosen. In general, the circuit level gateways use modified clients.

5.2.4. Circuit-level gateway

Proxy systems generally fall into two types: application-level gateways and circuit-level gateways. So far we have been mostly concerned with the application-level gateway type of firewall which is a collection of application proxies for each of the separate services used. An application level gateway understands and interprets the commands in the application protocol.

The circuit-level gateway provides relay capabilities in a generalized form that is not limited to a specific application. A circuit gateway simply relays TCP connections (effectively creating a circuit) between the client on the local network and the server on the external network, without interpreting the application protocol, or performing any additional packet examination or filtering. Although the gateway will not typically examine the data, it can keep a log of the amount of data relayed and its intended destination.

The user requesting the service connects to a TCP port on the gateway. The gateway then connects to the destination on the other side of the gateway. After the session is established, the gateway's relay program copy the bytes back and forth: the gateway acts as a wire [3], [30]. For example, when a workstation on the internal network connects to the SMTP port on the gateway, the gateway opens a matching socket on the connection to the Internet and then just transports data between the two connections. When the connection request is made, the gateway either makes the connection if this is an allowable transaction, or if it is not the connection is not made and an error message can be returned. Sometimes, if used often, a circuit connection can be made automatic for specific network functions. At other times the gateway will need to be told the desired destination and service [30]. Although the circuit-level gateway is usually thought of as a relay for TCP traffic, it can also be used for some UDP applications where a virtual

circuit is assumed. In general, circuit-level proxies are often used for outbound traffic in the systems where the internal users are trusted.

A circuit level proxy is a more flexible and general approach to building a proxy server. Because a circuit level proxy can be adapted to serve multiple protocols, it is also called a generic proxy server. One of the disadvantages of the circuit level proxy servers is that it controls connections on the basis of their source and destination and cannot easily determine whether the commands going through it are safe [20]. The other big problem with circuit level gateways is the need to provide new client programs, which can be a difficult task because appropriate client programs are often available only for certain platforms.

5.3. SOCKS

One of the ways to do proxying is using the SOCKS protocol. SOCKS is an open, industry-standard protocol advanced by the Authenticated Firewall Traversal working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). SOCKS is a very robust circuit level gateway firewall. It was designed to allow TCP-based applications to traverse firewalls in a secure and controlled manner. SOCKS enables easy conversion of existing client/server applications into proxy versions of those same applications [3].

SOCKS establishes a secure proxy data channel between two computers in a client/server environment. The application client makes a request to SOCKS to communicate with the application server. SOCKS then establishes a proxy circuit to the application server and relays the application data between the client and the server. From the client's perspective

SOCKS is transparent, while from the server's perspective SOCKS is a client. With SOCKS there is no need for a special application server on the firewall, nor do the users need to perform double connections. However the user does have to use a specified version of the application client that is SOCKS aware, and there should be a generic SOCKS server to allow the user's intended access. SOCKS is an example of the proxy system that requires a custom client, because it requires a change to all existing client based software to use the SOCKS libraries, a process known as "socksifying" [41].

The SOCKS package includes the following components:

- The SOCKS server, which runs on UNIX system
- The SOCKS client library for UNIX system
- SOCKSified version of several standard UNIX client programs

The current SOCKS specification is version 5, which is a backward compatible with previous versions and has multiple enhancements. SOCKS 5 adds key features such as authentication and authentication method negotiation, message integrity and privacy, and UDP proxy to the old SOCKS functionality [42].

There are other excellent software packages publicly available for proxying. For example the Trusted Information Systems has an Internet Firewall Toolkit (TIS FWTK) that includes a set of individual proxies for the most common Internet services, such as FTP,

Telnet, rlogin, HTTP, and others. SOCKS and TISFWTK run on UNIX system, but there are proxy server tools for Windows 95/98/NT available as well, such as WinGate, Spaghetti Proxy Server, Internet Gate, NetProxy, SyGate, etc. Currently all of these packages are freely available on the Internet [43].

5.4. Stateful multi-layer inspection

Stateful multi-layer inspection (SMLI) is the "third generation" of firewall technology. It was invented and patented by Check Point Software Technologies. Stateful inspection architecture is unique in that it understands the state of any communication through the firewall machine, including packet, connection and application information. Packet filters do not track application or connection state, while application proxies track only application state, not packet or connection state. SMLI examines each packet and extracts relevant packet, communication, and application state information. Extracted state information is then compared against known states (i.e. bit patterns) of "friendly" packets [44].

The inspection module resides in the operating system kernel, below the network layer, at the lowest software level. By intercepting and inspecting communications at this level, the module can analyze all inbound and outbound packets before they enter the operating system of the gateway machine, ensuring that the operating system is protected from untrusted communication. Only packets that the inspection module verifies to comply with the organization's security policy are processed by the higher protocol layers. The inspection module understands any protocol and application.

In order to determine whether packets comply with the enterprise security policy, the inspection module examines IP addresses, port numbers, and other information. In addition, it analyzes state information from previous communication and other applications, and then stores these state and context information in dynamic state tables.

State tables are kept in the operating system kernel memory and cannot become corrupted like disk files. This way firewalls that use SMLI are capable of remembering the state of each ongoing conversation across it. Tables are continually updated, providing cumulative data against which the inspection module checks subsequent communications. If the system fails due to hardware or software error, new tables are allocated and no old or corrupted data is valid anymore.

The inspection module maintains complete security even for connectionless protocols such as UDP. For this protocol the inspection module extracts data from a packet's application content and stores it in the state connection tables, providing context in cases where the application does not provide it [14]. Stateful inspection provides full application-layer awareness without requiring a separate proxy for every service to be secured. This results in complete transparency to the users, scalability and the ability to support new and custom applications and services quickly and easily.

6. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF FIREWALLS

6.1. Benefits of firewalls

One of the main advantages of the Internet firewall is that it allows the organization to define a centralized "choke point", which means that it forces attackers to use only one access point to the protected network (of course the firewall has to be the only connection between the protected site and the Internet). Because all traffic has to go through the firewall, intrusions from the Internet have to come through the firewall as well, which should be specifically protected against such attacks. Without a firewall, each host on the private network would be exposed to attacks from the Internet [18].

A firewall simplifies security management because it offers a convenient point where the traffic from and to a protected network can be monitored, and if an attack occurs, an alarm can be generated. A firewall is the best place to audit or log Internet usage. Using this log, a system administrator can track down attempts to bypass security. Because the Internet doesn't have enough registered IP addresses to offer to users anymore, some organizations have to deploy Network Address Translator (NAT) that can help to overcome this problem. Many firewall products have the NAT feature already incorporated into them.

6.1.1. Benefits of packet filtering routers

The primary advantages of packet filtering are fast performance, flexibility, and transparency. The packet filtering router does not require specialized user training or cooperation. The end users are unaware of the presence of the firewall and they can use their standard client programs. Packet filtering routers offer minimum security but at very low cost. Low cost comes from the fact that packet filtering capabilities are available in many hardware and software routing products, both available commercially and freely over the Internet. They can be an appropriate choice for a low risk environment [17], [3].

6.1.2. Benefits of proxy systems

There are many benefits to the deployment of proxy systems as well. The system administrator has complete control over which services are allowed, since the absence of the proxy for a service means that the service is completely blocked. The firewall can be configured to hide host names and IP addresses behind the firewall, so that all hosts outside the local network see only the gateway. Proxy systems can be used to enforce authentication that will reside only on the gateway, lowering the importance of the internal host security [17]. Proxies provide superior logging capability at the application level. Finally, the filtering rules are much simpler for a proxy system than for a packet filtering router.

6.2. Limitations of firewalls

The fact that all the proposed security of the system is based on the security of the firewall is also its weakness. Because of that it is important to have the firewall correctly administrated. One open breach and an intruder can attack whatever system he wants.

Another limitation of the firewalls is that they cannot protect against attacks that do not pass the firewall. A centralized choke point that an organization had in mind to establish with the installation of the firewall is useless if there is an effective way for an attacker to go around it. For example, there can be dozens of unsecured dial-up lines from a protected network that can be attacked easily. These types of connections should be forbidden by the organization's security policy, and users should know that they are not allowed to get their own connection to the external world [18].

Firewall systems cannot protect an organization from traitors and inside spies that have their own passwords and access to private network resources, nor from outsiders who stole passwords from legitimate users. They can easily copy sensitive information onto floppy or zip disks and take them out from an organization.



6.2.1. Limitations of packet filtering routers

In addition to previously mentioned common limitations to all firewalls, packet filtering routers have a disadvantage that packet filtering rules become long and complex quickly, making it difficult to manage and thus reducing overall security [3]. Also packet filtering rules are very difficult to get right, because people do not usually think in terms of packets, IP addresses or port numbers. Not only are packet filters difficult to configure correctly, but also they are easy to get wrong allowing unintentional access to the private network. Once configured it is hard to test rule implementations. Another limitation is that some protocols are difficult or impossible to allow safely with packet filtering only. Packet filtering routers provide little or no useful logging, and strong user authentication is not supported with some packet filtering routers [45].

6.2.2. Limitations of proxy systems

Probably the greatest limitation of the proxy systems is that they either require users to use modified clients (for each of the services that users need separate software should be installed), or may force users to change their normal work pattern by adding steps when making the connection. Another difficulty is when a new service of interest for an organization is not supported by a proxy [17]. In such cases an organization has to deny the service until the firewall vendor develops a secure proxy for a particular service. Clearly, new services may not be introduced to an organization's users on a timely basis. Also the proxy systems are more expensive than packet filtering routers.

7. FIREWALL ARCHITECTURE

7.1. Introduction

Having introduced the principles underlying the packet filter and proxy systems, we can now observe how these components can be configured to build an effective Internet firewall system. Those components can be used either alone or together, and there is a lot of flexibility in how they can be combined. It is important, though, that potential benefits and drawbacks of possible architectures are explored before they are implemented. There is no single correct answer for the design and deployment of Internet firewalls for every organization. Only after making decisions about the security policy, the technical background of their staff, budget issues, and possible threat of attacks, can the organization make a decision about specific components of its firewall systems.

Although there is a lot of variation in architectures, the most common are:

- Dual-homed hosts
- Screened hosts, and
- Screened subnets

7.2. Dual-homed hosts

Dual-homed host is a TCP/IP term that refers to a host with two network interface cards (NICs), one for each required interface [20]. Each NIC is connected to a network and has its own IP address, as shown in Figure 7.1. The dual-homed host could act as a router between the networks these interfaces are attached to. However, to implement a dual-homed host type of firewall architecture, the host's IP routing capability should be disabled. If the IP forwarding capability is disabled, the host can provide network traffic isolation between these two networks it connects to. Systems on both side of the firewall can communicate with the dual-homed host, but there is no exchange of network traffic between these two systems. Because dual-homed hosts allow absolutely no access to internal networks, they provide a very high level of control.

A dual-homed host can provide access to network services only by proxying them or by having users log into the dual-homed host [12]. Dual-homed hosts that do not use proxy services require users to have accounts on the gateway for access to the Internet. This is not recommended and can present security problems by itself, as having multiple user accounts on a firewall can lead to users' mistakes and consequently to intruders' attacks.

Allowing access to the Internet services on the dual-homed host is less problematic and safer with setting up proxies. This type of firewall implements the following security stance 'all services that are not specifically permitted are prohibited', since no services can pass the dual-homed host except those for which proxies are established. This approach has the same disadvantages as proxy systems, i.e. proxies may not be available for all services an organization might be interested in.

To increase protection of the private network two-stage security can be established. In addition to an application-level gateway, a packet filtering router can be placed between the Internet and the private network. The network between the packet filtering router and the gateway is called a screened subnet. On the screened subnet are usually placed information servers such as e-mail, Gopher, or WWW machines that are open to outside users (Figure 7.1.). This ability of the screened subnet to isolate traffic concerned with an information server from the other traffic of the site, adds to security because the dual-homed host would prevent intruders from further attacking site systems, although they could possibly break into the information server.




Figure 7.1. Dual-homed host firewall with router.

7.3. Screened hosts

The screened host firewall combines a packet filtering router and an application gateway which has only one network interface [21]. The packet filtering router is placed between the internal and external network as a first line of defense. The application gateway is configured with only one network interface card that is connected to the internal network (Figure 7.2.). The packet filtering router is configured in such a way that it sends all received traffic from the external network to the application gateway first. Only traffic that passes filtering rules imposed by the screening router would be delivered to the application gateway.

However, the screened host firewall can be made more flexible by permitting the packet filtering router to pass certain trusted services directly to the internal network. Configured this way, the screened host firewall is more flexible than the dual-homed host firewall although at some expense to security [3]. The applications that may be considered trusted might be those for which proxy service does not exist or those for which the risk of using such services has been evaluated and found acceptable. For example services such as Network time Protocol, which is considered low-risk could be allowed. It is also fairly common to allow Domain Name Service so that hosts on the inside of the packet filter can access Internet services.

It is possible to combine these two approaches for different services. Some trusted services may be allowed directly via packet filtering as mentioned above, while others may be permitted only indirectly – they have to pass through the application gateway first. Implementation of a particular service depends on the organization's security policy. Consequently, the packet filtering router has to filter application traffic according to the following rules:

- Inbound traffic from the Internet hosts to the application gateway is passed
- Inbound trusted traffic is passes directly to the intended internal host
- All other inbound traffic is rejected
- Router rejects any outbound traffic that did not come from the application gateway

As we mentioned before rules for the packet filtering router can be complex and difficult to get right. However, in the case of the screened subnet architecture, the router only needs to limit traffic to the application gateway. Because of this, rules for the packet filtering router don't have to be as complex as if the packet filter were used alone.




Figure 7.2. A screened host architecture

7.4. Screened subnet

The screened subnet architecture employs two packet filtering routers and a bastion host. This firewall system creates the most secure firewall system architecture by adding an exterior router to the screened host architecture that further isolates the internal network from the Internet. To break into the internal network with this type of architecture, an attacker would have to get past both routers, meaning that even if the bastion host is breached, the intruder would have to break into the interior router (see Figure 7.3).

In figure 7.3 two routers are used to create an inner, screened subnet. The screened subnet functions as a small, isolated network positioned between the Internet and the private network. Although both the untrusted external network and the internal network can access the screened subnet, no network traffic can flow between them through the screened subnet [20]. This subnet is sometimes referred to as the 'demilitarized zone' (DMZ) network. This DMZ network houses the bastion host, information servers, modem pools, and other public servers.

The external router could be set up to advertise only the DMZ network to the Internet, i.e. the bastion host, information and other public servers would be the only systems known from the Internet. This ensures that the private network is 'invisible' and that it cannot be known to the Internet via routing table and DNS information exchange. Inside routers, on the other hand, advertise the DMZ network only to the private network. Because the systems on the private network do not have direct routes to the Internet, they can access the Internet only via the proxy services residing on the bastion host [12].

The exterior router protects both the DMZ network and the internal network from the incoming traffic. It protects against the standard attacks such as IP address spoofing, source routing attacks, etc., and manages Internet access to the DMZ network. The outer router permits inbound e-mail and application traffic to the bastion host only. It is possible though that FTP, WWW and other such information inqueries may go directly to the information server without going through the bastion host first. Any other inbound traffic is rejected. For the outbound traffic is just opposite; all outbound traffic to the Internet is routed, but any traffic intended to an inside host is rejected. The inside router provides a second line of defense, managing DMZ access to the private network. It permits inbound traffic that originates from the bastion host only. All other traffic, such as FTP and WWW, is directed by the external router to the bastion host or to the appropriate information server. Accordingly, all such traffic on the inside router will be rejected. The outbound traffic is directed only to the bastion host, or possibly to the information server [3].




Figure 7.3. Screened subnet architecture

Screened subnets are more secure than screened hosts because of the additional DMZ network. However, screened subnets can be made to allow the same 'trusted' application to bypass the bastion host, thereby subverting the policy. Another disadvantage of screened subnets is their dependence on routers for a large portion of the security provided. As noted earlier, packet filtering routers are sometimes complex to configure and potential mistakes can open security holes.

8. THE GUARDIAN FIREWALL

8.1. Product overview

The Guardian firewall is typically installed on a workstation situated between the router, which is connected to the Internet, and the network itself. All the network traffic between an organization's private network and the Internet has to pass through the Guardian firewall. This way each packet exchanged between these two networks can be verified to comply with the organization's security policy.

LanOptics refers to Guardian's architecture as MAC Layer stateful inspection, which is similar to Check Point FireWall-1's stateful-inspection architecture. In addition to doing the standard packet filtering by source and destination, the product looks for additional information or state, such as packet size, port address, and network protocol, to determine whether activity is secure. With positioning of the stateful inspection module at the MAC layer, all packets in the NIC driver must first be approved by the Guardian before they are allowed to pass to the operating systems. This way, potential security holes due to flaws in the operating system, are avoided [46].

The Guardian provides centralized network management and control of the corporate Internet connection. The network administrator controls the Guardian's filtering system by defining rules including source and destination addresses, day of the week, or even time of day and traffic load. Besides giving the ability to limit user access to the network, restrict general network access to certain times or restrict the use of certain services, Guardian also can monitor real time usage of the network and serves as a tool for network administration.

Two software components make up the firewall: Guardian agent and Guardian manager. Because the agent and manager are two separate modules, the network administrator can choose to install them on the same or different workstations if desired. The only condition for installing Guardian manager on the remote station is that that workstation should be reachable by the TCP/IP protocol. The Guardian agent could be installed on an NT Server or an NT Workstation. It is installed at every site between the Internet and the local network, and inspects every packet that passes through the Guardian gateway. The Guardian manager is the main user interface to the agent and operates under Windows 95 and Windows NT. The manager53 fills one of two functions, according to the corresponding agent. It could act as the controlling manager or as the observing manager.

The controlling manager performs all the functions of establishing temporary rules. The observing manager can only observe functions. In order to avoid conflicts in an organization only one person can have controlling privileges at a time, using a special password [46].

8.2. Guardian products

The following products are available in the Guardian system: firewall, Network Address Translation (NAT), remote user authentication, and Virtual Private Network (VPN)[46].

8.2.1. Firewall

A firewall is a software product that helps in securing a company's private network. Guardian provides wizard, which assists in building a firewall strategy based on an organization's security policy. The security policy determines which services will be allowed or prohibited and the actions to be taken. This security policy is then translated into the rules that comprise an organizations' firewall strategy.

8.2.2. Network Address Translation (NAT)

NAT is a Guardian application that enables an organization to maximize its assignment of network addresses by dynamically mapping official IP addresses to local addresses. This feature is particularly useful for avoiding reconfiguration of all internal Ip addresses for connection to the Internet, or when insufficient global IP addresses are available for all internal users. Guardian's NAT option provides three different methods for network address translation: static, dynamic, and single. Static address translation allows access to a public server from the Internet, even though the real IP address is unknown to the outside world. Dynamic translation enables the administrator to define a pool of official addresses to be shared among local hosts when there are more users than official IP addresses. Alternatively, the administrator can assign all users on the private network to have a single official IP address.

8.2.3. Remote user authentication

Remote user authentication provides a process that enables mobile or remote users to access a predefined source in a protected network for certain services on a temporary basis. The problem with connections of mobile users to the private network is that they do not have previously known IP addresses on which packet filtering rules can be based. Moreover, the user's IP address is changed each time the mobile user connects to the Internet service provider. Opening up a secured internal host to connections from any external IP addresses can create a serious security risk. To resolve these security issues, Guardian provides an authentication client. The authentication client that runs on the mobile user's computer and the authentication server which is part of the firewall software, participate in the authentication process. The authentication engine uses a one time password process, where each password is used only once on the network.

8.2.4. Virtual Private Network (VPN)

A VPN increases dramatically the security level of intra-company traffic via the Internet and in many cases may replace the use of expensive dedicated leased lines. To ensure privacy every connection between two agents that are part of the Guardian VPN strategy is automatically encrypted on one agent and decrypted on the other. The encryption transforms an insecure channel of information, such as the Internet, into a VPN. There are two types of encryption schemes: symmetric and asymmetric, the Guardian uses both schemes.

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8.3. Resource requirements

The following are the recommended hardware and software requirements for the Guardian 3.0 agent workstation (if different, requirements for manager are given in the parenthesis):

- Intel P5 120MHz based computer
- 32MB RAM
- 512MB hard disk (1GB hard disk recommended for Guardian manager workstation)
- Windows NT workstation/server 4.0 (the manager runs on either Windows 95 or Windows NT)
- Minimum of two Network adapters, of which one may optionally be a WAN adapter. In our example we use two LAN SMC Ethernet ISA network interface cards.

8.4. Installation and configuration

The Guardian firewall agent software is installed on a workstation situated between the router and the internal network. The agent workstation can be prepared and firewall software installed without disturbing the network. Once the installation is complete the firewall can be connected to the network. Usually, a separate LAN segment is created between the router and the Guardian firewall specifically for this purpose (network 192.168.22.0 in Figure 8.1). The sample network configuration that we will use is shown below.




Figure 8.1. Sample network configuration

The IP addresses on the auxiliary network must be separate from the network's IP addresses as shown in the configuration for the example network. As we said, in order to minimize interruption in the communication between the internal network and the Internet, the agent workstation should be prepared before inserting it into the network. This means that IP addresses should be assigned to the LAN adapters. From our example network above the IP address for the LAN adapter connecting the internal network is 192.168.21.55, while the IP address for the LAN adapter connecting auxiliary network is 192.168.22.1. All hosts on the internal network have the firewall defined as the default gateway (IP address 192.168.21.55), while the default gateway of the firewall is the router (IP address 192.168.22.254). The IP addresses are also assigned for router's adapters: 192.168.22.254 for NIC connected to the Guardian firewall and 192.168.20.254 for NIC connected to the outside network. The static route assignment for routing the incoming TCP/IP traffic destined for 192.168.21.0 network should be configured on the router as well.

When configuration of the agent workstation is finished, Guardian may be installed from a CD or downloaded from LanOptics Web site. Because the agent and management software are downloaded as separate modules they can be installed on the same workstation, or on separate workstations on a network that allows them to communicate with each other [47]. The Guardian agent and manager installation is performed by running the executable files, and is straightforward. After installing the agent, the IPCONFIG command in the Windows NT command prompt can be used to verify the installation. An example of the IPCONFIG screen that follows shows that we installed the Guardian agent on the adapter connected to the router.




Figure 8.2. Verifying agent installation

8.5. Installing a firewall strategy

The Guardian application is started by running the Guardian manager. From the Guardian main screen that appears, an adequate agent on which firewall strategy will be installed, should be selected (Figure 8.3). No traffic will be able to pass the Guardian gateway until a firewall strategy is installed. It is important to note that construction of a firewall strategy depends upon an internal network security policy. As we mentioned earlier an organization's security policy should be simple and limited to only those services that are necessary. Our example security policy for the network shown in Figure 8.1 is as follows

- permit incoming ftp session only to specific internal FTP server (IP address 192.168.21.51)
- permit incoming Telnet session only to one internal host (IP address 192.168.21.51), and only on standard days (Monday to Friday) and times (7:30am to 6:30pm)
- permit access to internal WWW server (IP address 192.168.21.52)
- allow all outbound traffic

Local agent							X
Pkts/ 30 sec.	Bandwi	dth allocat	ed (%)	0.0	Age: Firev	127.0.0.1	
Commands Agent settings	Connect Monito	ions 0	bit/sec) [64 Active user: Jumber of use Wize	ns 🖸	NAT Pollir	Strategy ng interval (sec vall will expire	s.) 30 Number of 29 days 1 hours.
User		Conn	Received	Sent		Bandwidth	Services
▲ Idle							•

Figure 8.3. Agent monitoring screen

To simplify the process of creating and installing a firewall strategy for firewall novices, Guardian provides a walk-through wizard that is unique to this product. The wizard enables creation of a basic firewall strategy for the servers on the internal network. The wizard also automatically defines network objects for servers on the internal network based on the supplied IP addresses. The wizard automatically assigns a name to the strategy [47].

With simple inserting of the IP addresses for the internal network and for the servers on that network the basic firewall strategy is created (Figure 8.4). Any time a new firewall strategy is created or the old one modified, it must be installed on the Guardian agent before it comes into effect. The name of the firewall strategy and date of creation then appears in the firewall strategy field in the agent dialog box (Figure 8.5). When the

firewall strategy is installed, the Guardian automatically updates the contents of the agent dialog box.

	?
Object Name	
Our FTP Server	-
	**
	-
	•
Cancel	T =
Lancel]

Figure 8.4. Guardian firewall strategy wizard screen

Local agent Pkts/30 sec. 17	Bandwi	dth allocati	ed (%)	0.2	Age	nt vall Strategy	127.0.0.1 STRATEG1 31/05
CommandsAgent settings	Connect Hide	tions 12	bit/sec) [64 Active users lumber of user Wiza	s 2	NAT Polli	Strategy ng interval (sec vall will expire	
User		Conn	Received 480	Sent 480	-	Bandwidth	Services ICMP
192.168.21.51		1	164	443		0.2 %	ftp
∢ I Idle	-						<u>}</u>

Figure 8.5. Updated agent dialog box

8.6. Monitoring user activity

Guardian has excellent real-time monitoring capabilities. In addition to providing information on our firewall status, Guardian can tell us the bandwidth usage of our link, a feature unique among the firewall products. This feature allows a network administrator to identify excessive bandwidth consumption by a user or user group and immediately suspend the session and apply access restrictions. Besides bandwidth consumption a monitor agent dialog box gives us information about the number of connections, number of active users, and total number of users (Figure 8.5).

The activity monitoring screen allows detection of active users (users 192.168.21.52 and 192.16821.51 in Figure 8.5). The activity monitoring screen can be configured to show additional user activity information such as: IP address, number of active connections, number of bytes received and sent, actual bandwidth allocation for each user, and type of service in use (Figure 8.5). In addition, by selecting a user icon on the activity monitoring screen, the network administrator can view detailed information about specific sessions.

Test ftp session from outside host 192.168.20.61 to our FTP server (IP address 192.168.21.51), and ICMP session from 192.168.21.52 to destination 192.168.20.62 are given in the Appendix B. Telnet session and retrieving of the web pages from the internal WWW server (IP address 192.168.21.52) have also been tested.

8.7. Network objects

Before we can edit basic firewall strategy and add rules and filters that are more specific to our security policy, we should define objects that are necessary for creation of firewall strategy.

Because we used wizard to create a basic firewall strategy, some network objects are already created. We can define new network objects that can be one of the following object types: host, network, range, user, group, and user group. As our security policy allows the Telnet session to only specific internal host we will define the new object – the Telnet server as shown below. Figure 8.7 shows the network object screen that can

be used to define, edit, or delete previously mentioned object types. Figure 8.6 shows the host dialog box for creation of the network hosts.

		_
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Telnet server		<u>D</u> K
Host address or IP name	·	
192.168.21.51		<u>C</u> ancel
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Second Contractor		
<u>Enable traffic control</u>		
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Objects IV H <u>o</u> st IV IV <u>R</u> ange IV	Network	Dbject groups <u>G</u> roup User group	? ×
ANY DNS Server First Network FTP Server	R H N H		
Global DNS addre Mail Server Our FTP Server Our Global Range	H H		
Our Network Teinet server Web Server	N H H		-
Select	New	Edit	

Figure 8.7. The Guardian network object screen

8.8. Internet services

Guardian allows us to control access to and from the Internet, not only based in the source and destination of each session, but also according to the service requested. Guardian comes pre-loaded with definitions for numerous services that include the following:

- Standard services: Telnet, FTP, SMTP, and so on.
- Internet search tools: HTTP, gopher
- IP services: ICMP, RIP
- Management services: SNMP

Service list		? X
	₩ <u>U</u> DP	✓ Others
portmap portmap printer print-srv rap rlp route rteinet shell shell SMTP snmp snmp-trap	TCP UDP TCP UDP UDP UDP TCP UDP TCP UDP TCP	
New	<u>E</u> dit	Delete
	<u>Close</u>	

Figure 8.8. The Guardian service dialog box

The service dialog box can be used to edit these existing services or to define a new service or protocol by selecting the service type (Figure 8.8). The service types include the following choices: TCP, UDP, and Others – that enables definition of other services and protocols that are not standard.

8.9. Generating rules and filters

After network objects and services are defined, we can then define the rules for implementing the security policy. When the rules are installed they act as a packet filter. The firewall strategy dialog box is used for creating new or making changes to the already installed packet filtering rules. Figure 8.9 shows Guardian's firewall strategy dialog box after we defined basic firewall strategy.

The figure shows that rules are given in a multicolumn table layout. A table has columns for source, destination, services, action, time definition, and comments. Each line represents one rule. The rules are numbered sequentially beginning with rule 1. It is important to note that the rules that will be used most frequently should be placed at the top of the firewall strategy. This will improve filter performance by reducing the number of rules that the packets are checked against. In Figure 8.9, the rule for allowing all outbound traffic is placed in front of the rule for allowing inbound FTP traffic because we are expecting rule number 1 to be used more frequently.

I didn't have any difficulties setting up rules for protocols and network services such as HTTP, FTP, and Telnet. Guardian's simple click-and-add screens let us add network objects, select services, and define actions. Traffic types can be tagged to allow, authenticate, or ignore activity and choose alert, log, or both for the notification method. Further rules can designate the time and day of the week.




Figure 8.10. Edited firewall strategy

Double clicking on the action button allows us to change the action and notification that will be taken on every packet that meets this rule as shown in Figure 8.11. Although the Guardian has alert and log capabilities, to see an alert, the network administrator has to be watching the particular console screen in which the alert is being generated. Guardian does not provide e-mail or pager alerts as some other firewall products. Because of this, Guardian is most appropriate for smaller networks.

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Figure 8.11. Action dialog box

9. ALTAVISTA FIREWALL97

9.1. Product overview

As with the Guardian firewall, the AltaVista Firewall 97 is typically installed on a workstation positioned between the router, which is connected to the Internet, and the private network itself. Once installed, the AltaVista firewall controls the information flow between the internal network and external network. The AltaVista firewall can also be used within a private network to isolate parts of the internal network that need more security.

The AltaVista firewall does not provide a direct connection between the internal and external networks, but rather it uses proxies for all services that require connection. With proxies, all users, internal and external, connect to a proxy on a firewall system, which then establishes appropriate connections according to the security policy in place. If the connection is permitted, the proxy relays the request to the adequate destination. Users can continue as though they are connected directly to the desired destination. Unfortunately, due to a reliance on proxies for examination of data that pass through the firewall, proxy firewalls are slower than packet filtering routers and not as transparent to the users. The proxies filter each connection in much more detail than is possible with packet filtering routers.

The proxy can check the system from which the request originates, the day of the week, and the time of day. Also proxies log all connections and attempted connections. Proxies for FTP and Telnet services support additional security measures if required. This security feature is individual user authentication, which involves the use of a hand held authenticator (HHA) [48].

The AltaVista firewall uses a graphical user interface (GUI) to make monitoring, controlling, and configuring the firewall easier. The AltaVista's management screen can be accessed by selecting the firewall icon from the Program Manager in Windows NT. Using the buttons on AltaVIsta's main graphical user interface, one can access further

windows to monitor and configure the firewall, as well as on-screen help on a number of firewall operations. The GUI allows us to start and stop proxy services, monitor the number of connections, set security policies, set up time restrictions, obtain logs and reports, etc.

The AltaVista firewall has remote management capability that allows the network administrator to manage a firewall from a remote host. Remote management establishes a secure connection between a remote host and the firewall. The security connection is known as a remote management channel, and is configured on the firewall so that only authorized remote clients can connect. Each remote management channel uses encryption to secure the connection.

9.2. AltaVista Firewall 97 proxies

The AltaVista firewall supports the following proxies [48]:

• World Wide Web

The proxy accepts connections from Web browsers on the internal network and establishes a connection to the target Web servers on the external network. Users in the internal network must configure their browsers to use the firewall system as a proxy.

• File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

With the FTP proxy, the network administrator can allow users on internal network to have full access to external FTP services, restrict access to users who can authorize themselves using hand held authenticators, or prevent users from exporting files from the internal network. Also the FTP service can be configured to allow authenticated users outside the firewall to connect to the internal network.

• Telnet

As for FTP service, the Telnet proxy can restrict access to users who can authorize themselves, or prevent users from establishing telnet sessions. When an internal user wishes to start a telnet session with an external service, the telnet proxy on the firewall system checks whether the connection is allowed, and if it is, the proxy acts as a rely for the session. The proxy also logs each connection that it establishes or denies in the telnetxd system data log.

Mail

The AltaVIsta firewall uses a Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) proxy to provide access between the external network and systems on the internal network.

• Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP)

The News proxy allows systems on the internal network to connect to News services on the external server.

RealAudio

The RealAudio enables users to access remote broadcast or sound files. The RealAudio proxy supplied with the AltaVista firewall is adapted from the RealAudio proxy provided by Progressive Networks.

• Generic

The Generic proxy can be used to create proxies to connect users to services for which the AltaVista firewall does not provide a specific proxy.

• SQL Net

The SQL Net proxy enables users to access remote databases. The network administrator can use the SQL Net gateway to allow authorized users on the Internet to connect securely to databases in the internal network, or to prevent unauthorized users from connecting to databases.

• Finger

The finger proxy allows users on the internal network to use the finger service to display information about other users on systems on the external network.

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9.3. Resource requirements

The following are the recommended hardware and software requirements for the AltaVista firewall:

- Alpha or Intel based computer
- 48MB RAM
- 2GB hard disk
- Windows NT v3.51 or 4.0 server or workstation
- The latest Microsoft service pack
- Two network interface cards. In our example we use two LAN SMC Ethernet ISA network interface cards.

9.4. Installation and configuration

The AltaVsita firewall software should be installed on a dedicated hardware system/ running Windows NT. Before installation the firewall system should be prepared and some IP addresses should be assigned. The firewall system needs two network interface cards: one for internal and one for external network connection. The IP addresses should be assigned for each network interface card of the firewall system. From our example network topology shown in Figure 9.1, the IP address for the firewall adapter connecting the internal network is 192.168.21.55, while the IP address for the adapter connecting auxiliary network is 192.168.22.1. The IP addresses are required for the router's adapters: the router's NIC connected to the AltaVista firewall has the IP address 192.168.22.254, and the IP address for the NIC connected to the outside network is 192.168.20.254 (see Figure 9.1).

For the external interface of the firewall system (IP address 192.168.22.1), which is connected to the router, the default gateway should be configured. For our sample network topology, the default gateway address of the firewall system will be the router IP address – 192.168.22.254. The internal interface of the firewall system doesn't have a default gateway configured. All hosts on the internal network have defined the firewall system as the default gateway (IP address 192.168.21.55).

The AltaVista firewall may be installed from a CD or downloaded from the web site [49]. The installation is performed by running a setup program. During the installation one of the screens allows us to select the network adapter for the external network (Figure 9.2). By defining the external and internal adapters the internal network list is automatically created. This internal network list is used by the firewall to determine whether a TCP/IP packet is originating internally or externally [49].




Figure 9.1. Sample network configuration with AltaVista firewall

Because we don't have an internal DNS server, our firewall example needs to be configured with open DNS. In the open DNS configuration, the firewall system acts as the primary name server for the internal network domain. It provides information about hosts on the internal network in response to requests from external and internal hosts.




Figure 9.2. Network screen

Besides the primary name server for our domain there is a secondary name server located externally (with IP address 192.168.20.3 in our sample network topology). The external name server responds to the queries for resolving an external name. If some internal system wants to resolve an external name it sends the request to the primary internal DNS, which then forwards the request to the external name server. The external name server has the answer, and the response is returned following the same path.

To configure domain name service for the AltaVista firewall, several tasks should be done. First, the firewall should be configured with open DNS. This can be done either when installing the firewall by selecting the open DNS configuration, or if the firewall is already installed, one can select the configure option under the network tab of the main firewall GUI (Figure 9.3). On the same place the internal name server address should be the firewall address, because the firewall is the primary name server which resolve all DNS queries for that domain.

Second, because we are using the firewall system as our primary name server, we need to edit the zone and reverse files by adding our internal hosts' names and addresses. Third, DNS clients on the internal network should be configured to point to the internal primary name server, which is the firewall in our example. This can be done through the network icon in the control panel. Once the DNS tab is selected, in the DNS service search order box should be IP address of the firewall – 192.168.21.55. And finally, the external DNS server should know that the firewall is the primary name server for the internal network domain and that all queries for resolving internal names should be sent to the firewall name server. This is done by setting the external name server to be secondary name sever for the internal network domain (domain Syslab5 in our example).

11 / // 1944	
een enables you to configure DN eans that your internal addresses For more information, click on t	
⊂ Hidden	Open
Domain Name	syslab5.it.rit.edu
Name of Firewall Host	syslab55
Internal Name Server Name	syslab55. syslab5.it.rit.edu
Internal Name Server Address	192.168.21.55
External Name Server Name	syslab03.syslab.it.rit.edu
Internal Mail Hub Name	mail.syslab5.it.rit.edu

Figure 9.3. DNS configuration screen

9.5. Installing a firewall strategy

The AltaVista firewall provides a set of predefined security policies that specify the type of access users can have to the supported services on the external network. For example, the security policy can specify: the type of access allowed, the time during which access is allowed, whether user authentication is required (for Telnet and FTP services only). For each external service supported by firewall software, we can choose one of predefined security policies.

The problem with this approach is that traffic cannot be limited to specific hosts on internal or external networks. This means that we cannot limit, for example, ftp traffic only to the specific internal FTP server. We can only prohibit or allow access to the whole internal network (Figure 9.5). If access is allowed, an ftp session could be established to any of the FTP servers on the internal network. The only kind of restriction is through authentication of users, i.e. only previously authenticated users can gain access to the internal FTP server (or servers, if there are more than one).

Because of this our sample security policy for the network shown in Figure 9.1 would be:

- Allow all outbound ftp traffic without any authentication, i.e. permitt full access from internal hosts to the external FTP servers.
- Permit inbound ftp traffic only for authenticated users.
- Permit all outbound telnet traffic without any authentication
- Permit inbound telnet traffic for authenticated users only, and with ddate restriction (on business days Monday to Friday) and time restriction (8:00 to 18:00) applied.
- Permit outbound web traffic

Another problem with the AltaVista firewall is that setting a time restriction for telnet access cannot be done separately for inbound an outbound traffic. This means that all changes on time restrictions for inbound telnet access will hold for outbound traffic as well.

A security policy is established through the configuration of FTP, Telnet, and Web proxies.

Set by Admin	istrator at	Thu Apr 09	12:17:18	6 1 9 9 8	Sej.
Service	State	Current	Total	Started	
Finger Proxy	running	0	0	04/09/98 11:44:56	
Ftp Proxy	running	0	1	04/09/98 11:58:39	
Web Proxy	running	0	0		
RealAudio Proxy	running	0	0	04/09/98 11:45:08	
Smtp Proxy	running	0	2	04/09/98 11:45:16	
SQL*Net Proxy	running	0	0	04/09/98 11:45:17	
Teinet Proxy	running	0	0	04/09/98 11:45:17	
<u>Enable</u>			ſ	Display Related Ser	vices
Setup	Start				

Figure 9.4. AltaVista Firewall 97 screen

9.5.1. Configuring the FTP proxy

To configure our FTP security policy we should first start AltaVista firewall GUI. The AltaVista's management screen can be accessed by selecting the firewall icon from the desktop (Figure 9.4). From the AltaVista firewall screen, setup button should be chosen first and then FTP tab from the Setup proxies dialog box that appears on the screen (Figure 9.5). By default no ftp traffic will be able to pass the AltaVista firewall until the proxy is configured.

Through the FTP proxy, the network administrator can allow file transfer requests to be relayed through the firewall. Besides the type of access, the network administrator can specify text of the welcome and deny messages, time restrictions, and blacklist of hosts that have forbidden access (Figure 9.5).

The FTP proxy setup dialog box contains two sets of radio buttons for specifying FTP access: one set for users on the internal network and the other set of users on the external network. To apply our security policy we will choose:

- For internal policy GETs and PUTs (Full access)
- For external policy Authenticated GETs and PUTs.

After the appropriate radio button is chosen, we should click on apply, and then stop and restart FTP proxy to activate the policy.

P telnet finger web	news RealAudio	SQL*Net] generic]			
Internal Policy		External Policy			
C No Access		C No Access			
C Authenticated GETs only		Authenticate	d GETs and PUTs		
C Authenticated GETs and.	Authenticated PUTs				
GETs and Authenticated	PUTs				
C GETs					
GETs and PUTs (Full Acc	ess)				
<u>W</u> elcome Text:					
Welcome to the FTP Gateway					
Welcome to the FTP Gateway		have consta			
Welcome to the FTP Gateway	ne galeway.				
Welcome to the FTP Gateway Deny Text You are not permitted to use th	ne galeway.				

Figure 9.5. FTP proxy setup dialog box

For FTP, and later for Telnet, we chose a security policy that grants certain types of access only to users who can authenticate their identity. Because of this we must configure the firewall's authentication service so that the required users are granted access. The AltaVista firewall provides software to support the use of either an NT domain or a Hand Held Authenticator (HHA) to control access on an individual basis through the firewall. In this example NT domain authentication was used. The FTP and Telnet proxy were configured to authenticate users and to require users to logon to the

domain in which the firewall system participates. The firewall system must be first configured as part of the NT domain. With the NT domain authentication mechanism, the user must provide a username and password.

9.5.2. Configuring the Telnet proxy

To configure our security policy for telnet traffic we should choose the Telnet tab from the setup proxies dialog box (Figure 9.7). The process is the same as for setting up the FTP security policy; appropriate buttons that correspond to our security policy are chosen, and then the Telnet proxy is stopped and restarted to activate the telnet policy. In addition, for the inbound telnet policy we should change the times that telnet access is allowed (Figure 9.6). As we said before these changes will be valid for outbound telnet traffic as well. This would mean that no telnet access (inbound and outbound) would be allowed Saturday and Sunday, and during the business days from 6:00pm to 8:00am

	×
Access Times Allowed	
 All the time Within business hours, Monday to Friday 	
 Outside busness hours, and on weekends Custom 	
Business Hours	
Erom (hhmm): 0800	
Io (hhmm): 1800	
OK Cancel <u>H</u> elp	

Figure 9.6. Telnet time restriction dialog box

				<u></u>
ftp telnet finger web ne	ws RealAudi	o SQL*Net g	eneric	
Internal Policy	<u>External</u> F	olicy		
C No Access	C No Ac	Cess		
C Allow Authenticated Access	C Allow/	Authenticated Ac	00688	
Allow Access				
Welcome Text:				
Welcome to the Telnet gateway.				<u>+</u>
i Deny Text:				
You are not permitted to use the gat Please contact your system administ				*
Lime Restrictions	Blacklist			been set of the set of
	DIGONISKI.			
	ок	Cancel	Apply	Help
		*******		J

Figure 9.7. Telnet proxy setup dialog box

9.5.3. Configuring the Web proxy

Through the Web proxy, the network administrator can allow or prevent users on internal network systems with Web browsers to access World Wide Web services on the external network. Initially, the Web proxy is configured to allow all clients on the internal network to browse Web sites outside the firewall. The Web proxy is configured not to allow users on the external network any access to the internal network. By default HTTP, FTP, and Gopher services are activated. Because the initial Web proxy configuration corresponds to our security policy we will not make any changes at this time (Figure 9.8).

For the users on the internal network to be able to browse Web servers on the external network, they must configure:

- The proxy setting of their Web browsers to point to the firewall
- The port on which the Web proxy listens for the request

ort: 8080	Permitte	d Client Addresses Fo	I
Pro <u>xy</u> -to-proxy	HTTP:	192.168.21.*	
	Gopher	192.168.21.×	
	 ETP:	192.168.21.*	
			Add
RL: (http://www.bad.com/*)			Ann

For Internet Explorer this can be set up as in Figure 9.9.

Figure 9.8. Web proxy setup dialog box

✓ Use Proxy Serve Settings	BI 			
Proxy Server:	syslab55	8080		
Bypass proxy on:				atta i
				and the

Figure 9.9. Configuring client browses

9.6 Controlling the AltaVista Firewall97

After the AltaVista firewall is installed and configured according to our requirements, it is best to verify that the policies work as we set them up with some test sessions. Some of these test sessions from both external and internal network are given in the Appendix C. For all these test sessions we need to be able to control the firewall operation. Controling the firewall operation consists of the following tasks:

- Overview of logging
- Overview of report configuration
- Overview of alarms

9.6.1. Overview of logging

Each proxy in the firewall logs all events affecting the firewall. The firewall places these events in separate files. To manage log files created by the AltaVista firewall, choose the logs tab from the AltaVista firewall main screen (figure 9.4). The log dialog box, which displays the activity that is happening on the firewall, appears (Figure 9.10). The log dialog box is divided into Today's Logs and Previous Logs lists.

Loday's Logs				3		Thu Apr
File	Size	Last Access	3			
FwAlarms.log	192	11:59:04				
🗐 [www-log]	576	11:45:27				
🗐 smtpxd.log	10426	11:45:28				
🗐 ftpxd.log	3943	11: 59:0 3				
🗐 dfw.log	1050	11:58:39				
fwmon.log	147	11:44:59				-
	n in hole of		r	ree Disk S	oace: 3!	51,286,2
Previous Logs (siz						
Date A	larms W	and the second s	Ftp Teine			udio S(
Date A	larms W	32 15992	Ftp Telno 1179			
Date A	larms W	and the second s	Ftp Teine			
Date A	larms W	32 15992	Ftp Telno 1179			
Date A	larms W	32 15992	Ftp Telno 1179			



			-9			_ 🗆 ×
<u>F</u> ile	Ed	it <u>Search H</u>	elp			
Apr	9	09:46:08	syslab55	Ftpxd[219]:	Log:	ACLACCEPTCONN: 1+
Apr	9	89:46:46	syslab55	Ftpxd[219]:	Log:	FTPLOG: receive
Apr	9	10:01:46	syslab55	Ftpxd[219]:	Log:	CONNTIMEOUT: CO
Apr	9	10:01:49	syslab55	Ftpxd[219]:	Log:	REPORTSTATS: US
Apr	9	11:48:12	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	ACLACCEPTCONN:
Apr	9	11:48:25	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	FTPLOG: receive
Apr	9	11:48:25	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	MESSAGE: Target
Apr	9	11:48:25	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	ACLACCEPT: user
Apr	9	11:48:25	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	CONNECTED: conn
Apr	9	11:48:38	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	MESSAGE: Target
Apr	9	11:48:38	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	ACLACCEPT: user
Apr	9	11:49:54	syslab55	Ftpxd[198]:	Log:	MESSAGE: Target
Apr	9	11:49:54	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	ACLACCEPT: user
Apr	9	11:49:54	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	FTPLOG: receive
Apr	9	11:49:54	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	MESSAGE: Target
Apr	9	11:49:54	syslab55	Ftpxd[190]:	Log:	ACLACCEPT: user
					-	*
4						+

Figure 9.11. Contents of the FTP log file

The Today's Logs list displays the size and last access time of log files for the current day. If there has been no activity for a given proxy, then no log file is listed for that proxy. The FwAlarms.log file contains a record of alarm activity. If this file is listed, the network administrator should check the file and look for the cause of alarm. Double click on the file name shows information about the activity that has occurred for that proxy (Figure 9.11). Contents of a log file include the time and date, the hosts involved, action taken (allowed or denied) and a short description.

The previous Logs list displays the listing of firewall activities that occurred in the past. At midnight each day, the log files for the previous day are closed and moved to a new directory. Those directories are named according to the date of the log files. Double click on the directory in the Previous Log list shows a summary report for the activity for that day.

9.6.2. Overview of report configuration

The AltaVista firewall has the capability to generate a summary report that summarizes the activities of the FTP, Telnet, Finger, Mail, News, and RealAudio proxies. Individual reports for these proxies could also be generated. Individual reports can indicate the ten largest transfers, longest transfers, most frequent users that access the firewall, and the ten days with most frequent connections.

To view and configure reports on firewall usage, reports tab from the AltaVista firewall screen should be chosen. The system then displays the Reports dialog box (Figure 9.12). Report configuration allows the network administrator to configure the firewall to generate reports on daily, weekly, or monthly basis, and to automatically mail firewall alactivity.




Figure 9.12. Reports dialog box

9.6.3. Overview of alarms

The firewall software continually monitors the firewall system. When it detects an unusual or potentially dangerous event, it checks the alarm system to see if any action should be taken. The firewall's alarm system uses a set of rules to determine what actions to take in response to given events. The actions can be: raise firewall status to higher level (yellow, orange, or red color of the background of the screen corresponds to different firewall status), send mail to the network administrator, execute command. Disable service, and disable firewall.

To view, modify, add, or delete an alarm for a service, the Alarm tab from the AltaVista firewall main screen should be chosen. (Figure 9.13). Each proxy has a list of rules and each rule consists of the event that triggers the rule, one or more actions to be taken when the event occurs, and a brief description.

oroxy:	Teln	et	-		
Status	Event	Action		Description	
	denytime	Yt Raise	state to: yellow	Telnet access d	enied due to re
	denyrule	Yt Raise	state to: yellow	Teinet access d	enied due to e
	dis able	Yt Raise	state to: yellow	Telnet access a	tempt on a dis
Y 🛛 📰	denytime	🖃 Mail t	o: postmaster	Telnet access d	enied due to re
Y	denyrule	🖃 Mail t	o: postmaster	Teinet access d	enied due to e
Y	denydfit	🖃 Mail t	o: postmaster	Teinet access d	enied due to la
4					•
Mail alarms	to: post	master			Set
Mail alarms	ł	Add	Modify	Delete	
		<u>4</u> 00			
		OK	Cancel	Apply	Help

Figure 9.13. Alarms service dialog box

When an alarm is triggered that caused a state change, the color of the background changes to call attention to the alarm, and the popup dialog box can be seen (Figure 9.14). If the alarm is triggered, the network administrator should check the log file for the indicated proxy for more information about the event that caused the alarm.

Service	Cinto	Ct	Total	Started	
	State		n n	04/13/98 10:17:33	
 Finger Proxy Ftp Proxy 	running	0	16	04/13/98 10:17:34	
 Web Proxy 	running	0	11	0421070010.11.04	
• Fall	ronening	0			×
C					
			rule] at i	14:07:07 on Apr 13, 19	398.
∎ງ (_•_) ເ	heck log file:	s for more i	nformatio	on.	
•] (<u>•</u>) l	Check log file:	s for more i	nformatio	on.	
• 1 (•) (Check log tile:	s for more in		on.	
• 1 (•) (Check log file:			on.	
• 1 (•) (Check log file:			0h.	
•] () (Check log file:			on.	

Figure 9.14. Firewall alarms popup dialog box

EXAMPLE IPROUTE CONFIGURATION

To give an example how packet filtering rules can be implemented using IPRoute we will observe an example network topology shown in Figure 1. The IPRoute is normally provided a script file at startup. All packet filtering commands to be executed in a particular order under specified conditions are contained in the script file. The log file specifies the file for the log data to be written to.




Figure 1. Example network topology

Policy 1: Deny all inbound traffic

A security policy which denies all traffic to the internal network (network address – 192.168.2.0) can be expressed as a simple filter rule given in the following script file:

```
; Script 1
2
; IPRoute script for example configuration.
; This example expects all necessary routing information
; to be learned via RIP.
; Start a command interpreter on the console
command
; Set up first network interface. Note that /24 specifies
 the
; network prefix width, i.e. the number of ones in the
 netmask.
; /24 corresponds to 255.255.255.0
packet en0 0x60 192.168.1.1/24
; Set up second network interface
 packet en1 0x61 192.168.2.254/24
; Control logging of script commands
 set trace on
; Log entire packet contents
  set log data
; Specifies a file for the log data to be written to
  set log file c:\logfile.txt
; Set up packet filtering.
```

filter en0 log deny in * * 192.168.2.0/24

; Broadcast RIP routes on the ethernet

```
rip en0
rip en1
```

exit

An example of anonymous FTP session from the external host (outside local network) to the internal host with IP 192.168.2.1:

Microsoft(R) Windows 95
(C)Copyright Microsoft Corp 1981-1995.
C:\WINDOWS>ftp 192.168.2.1
-> ftp: connect:Host is unreachable
ftp>

Because this FTP connection wasn't allowed according to our script, log data are recorded to specified log file: trace <set log data> trace <set log file c:\logfile.txt> trace <filter en0 log deny in * * 192.168.2.0/24> trace <rip en0> trace <rip enl> trace <exit> en0 - log deny in * * 192.168.2.0/24 IP Ver: 4, Hlen: 20, TOS: 0, Tlen: 44, ID: 26767, Frag: 0, Flags: DNF Ttl: 32, Proto: 6, IPchk: 28137, Src: 192.168.1.2, Dst: 192.168.2.1 TCP Src_port: 1038, Dst_port: 21, Seq: 1571787150, Ack: 0 Doff: 24, Flags: SYN Window: 8192, TCPchk: 114, Urg: 0 0028 02 04 05 b4

Policy 2: FTP, Telnet and Daytime services are allowed

This example uses same the network topology given in the Figure 1, but has the following security policy:

- Inbound FTP traffic is permitted only to specific internal host i.e. FTP server with IP address 192.168.2.2
- Outbound FTP sessions are allowed to trusted external FTP server with IP address 192.168.1.2
- All outbound Telnet and Daytime sessions are permitted
- Inbound Telnet and Daytime session are allowed to the specific internal host on which both Telnet and Daytime server reside (IP address 192.168.2.1).

Previous security policy could be expressed as a set of filtering rules for the screening router as it is given in the following script file:

```
; Script 2
;
; Example script to set up packet filtering rules.
; This example expects all necessary routing information
; to be learned via RIP.
```

- ; Start a command interpreter the console command
- ; Set up first network interface. Note that /24 specifies the
- ; network prefix width, i.e. the number of ones in the netmask.
- ; /24 corresponds to 255.255.255.0 packet en0 0x60 192.168.1.1/24
- ; Set up second network interface

packet en1 0x61 192.168.2.254/24

- ; Control logging of script commands set trace on
- ; Log entire packet contents set log data
- ; Specifies a file for the log data to be written to set log file c:\logfile.txt

; Set up packet filtering.

- ; Allow inbound FTP service only to specific internal host ; (i.e. FTP server) with IP address 192.168.2.2 filter en0 permit in tcp-syn * 192.168.2.2:21 filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn 192.168.2.2:21 * filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn * 192.168.2.2:21 filter en0 permit out tcp-syn 192.168.2.2 * filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn * 192.168.2.2 *
- ; Permit all outbound FTP session to the external FTP server
- ; with IP address 192.168.1.2

filter en0 permit out tcp-syn * *:21
filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn *:21 *
filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn * *:21
filter en0 permit in tcp-syn 192.168.1.2 *
filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn * 192.168.1.2
filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn 192.168.1.2 *

; Permit all inbound Telnet session (reside on port 23) to the

; internal Telnet server with IP address 192.168.2.1

```
filter en0 permit in tcp-syn * 192.168.2.1:23
 filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn 192.168.2.1:23 *
    filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn * 192.168.2.1:23
; Permit all outbound Telnet session (port 23)
     filter en0 permit out tcp-syn * *:23
   filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn *:23 *
   filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn * *:23
; Permit inbound Daytime service only to specific internal
host
; (i.e. Daytime server) with IP address 192.168.2.1
     filter en0 permit in tcp-syn * 192.168.2.1:13
 filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn 192.168.2.1:13 *
filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn * 192.168.2.1:13
; Permit all outbound Daytime session (port 13)
    filter en0 permit out tcp-syn * *:13
    filter en0 permit in tcp-xsyn *:13 *
filter en0 permit out tcp-xsyn * *:13
; Broadcast RIP routes on the ethernet
   rip en0
rip enl
   exit
```

An example of anonymous FTP session from the external host (outside local network) to the internal host with IP 192.168.2.2 is now allowed and looks like

```
Microsoft(R) Windows 95
(C)Copyright Microsoft Corp 1981-1995.
```

C:\WINDOWS>ftp 192.168.2.2 Connected to 192.168.2.2.

220 WFTPD 2.1 service (by Texas Imperial Software) ready for new user User (192.168.2.2:(none)): anonymous 331-Anonymous user access allowed - please enter your email 331-address as the password: 331 Give me your password, please Password: 230 Logged in successfully ftp> cd dragana 250 "C:/DRAGANA" is current directory ftp> get script.txt c:\script1.txt 200 PORT command okay 150 "C:/DRAGANA/SCRIPT.TXT" file ready to send (227 bytes) in ASCII mode 226 Transfer finished successfully. 227 bytes received in 0.05 seconds (4.54 Kbytes/sec) ftp> quit 221 Windows FTP Server (WFTPD, by Texas Imperial Software) says goodbye:

All other attempts for establishing an FTP session with some other host on the internal network are not permitted:

Microsoft(R) Windows 95 (C)Copyright Microsoft Corp 1981-1995.

C:\WINDOWS>ftp 192.168.2.3
-> ftp: connect:Connection timed out
ftp>

It should be noted that this time we have a different message than when we had *script 1* that denied all inbound traffic. The reason for this is because we followed the deny everything stance. The default deny stance means that all packets that do not match sets of packet filtering rules that we defined are silently dropped (in case of IPRoute software). In the previous *script 1* we had explicitly defined 'deny' action, which besides dropping the matching packet sends an ICMP destination unreachable message back to the packet's originator. Also no information is written to the log file because logging packets that are dropped do not provide a record of whether or not an intruder has attacked an application.

Network Security: Network Review and Firewalls

Secure Communications

- Alice can send message to Bob; only Bob can read
- Bob knows for sure that Alice sent it
- Alice can't deny she sent the message
- but the basic communication is insecure:
 - o wiretapping
 - o switches and routers
 - o redirection
 - o storage
 - 0 ...
- \leftrightarrow storage security

Security is analog, not binary...

- there is no perfect security
- cost of inconvenience vs. cost of breach
- how long does it have to stay secret?
- how sophisticated is the adversary?
- value of information + value of service (DOS)
- physical security + cryptographic
- difference: attack from anywhere, automated ("script kiddies")
- most problems are not crypto problems
- wire/fiber-tapping is hard

Terminology

Dramatis Personae

usually computers: Alice: first participant Bob, Carol, Dave: second, third, fourth participant Eve: evesdropper Mallory, Trudy: malicious active attacker Trent : trusted arbitrator Walter: warden; guarding Alice and Bob in some protocols Peggy: prover Victor: verifier

Kaufman Notation

ex-or, exclusive or j

concatenation (e.g., "joe" | "secret" = "joesecret"

K{message} encrypted with key

{message}Bob encrypted with public key of Bob [

[message]Bob signed by Bob = using his private key

Network Primer

la	yeı	name	who	e.g.,	PDU
	7	application	E-E	SMTP	message
	6	presentation	E-E	MIME	
	5	session	E-E	?	
	4	transport	E-E	ТСР	packet
	3	network	router	IP	packet
	2	data link	bridge, switch	Ethernet	frame
	1	physical	repeater	Ethernet over coax	bit stream

Network Services

encryption, authentication: obviously...

Directory Services

- need (network-layer) address to communicate
- more memorable, different assignment:
- unique identifier
- locator
- name (administrative, "John Smith", www.)
- directory service: translation between addresses
- scalability à tree, hierarchy
- e.g.,: clinton@whitehouse.gov
- needed for security: public key
- needs to be secured

Network Security Layers

Physical layer: blackening

Data link layer: wireless Ethernet encryption (802.11 WEP at 11 Mb/s),

PPP authentication

Network layer: IPsec

Transport layer: secure socket layer (TLS, "https:")

Application: email (PGP, S/MIME), x-over-TLS, HTTP authentication,

SHTTP,Kerberos

infrastructure: DNS, routing, resource reservations, ...



Security Approaches

- Application security
- OS security
- Network infrastructure security
- Procedural and operational security

Application Security

- application software security (e.g., buffer overruns)
- path encryption via secure application protocols (ssh)
- isolating critical applications on single-purpose hosts

Host/OS Security

- OS software integrity (most attacks on non-patched OS)
- ser-level access control (AAA, tokens)
- block unneeded services (finger, ftp, DNS)
- path encryption via IPsec
- device-level access control (MAC, IP, DNS) in servers, routers, Ethernet switches
- e.g., host firewalling (such as TCP wrappers, IP chains)

Network Infrastructure Security

- service-blocking perimeter (port)
- device-ID perimeter (IP address)
- path encryption perimeter
- path isolation via routers and switches
- path isolation via separate infrastructure ("air gap")

Procedural and Operational Security

- policies and education on safe computing practices
- desktop configuration management
- proactive probing for vulnerabilities
- intrusion detection

Top-level Domains

2 letters: countries

3 letters: independent of geography (except edu, gov, mil)								
domain	usage	example domains	(8/00)					
		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·						
com	business (global)	research.att.com	17,050,817					
edu	U.S. 4 yr colleges	cs.columbia.edu	5,673					
gov	U.S. non-military gov't	whitehouse.gov	730					
mil	U.S. military	arpa.mil						
org	non-profit orgs (global)	www.ietf.org	248,489					
net	network provider	nis.nsf.net	2,806,721					
us	U.S. geographical	ietf.cnri.reston.va.us						
uk	United Kingdom	cs.ucl.ac.uk	194,686					
de	Germany	fokus.gmd.de	262,708					

Replicated Services

- load sharing
- availability
- same information?
- replay: change password to different server

Packet Switching

- circuit switching: fixed-rate, reserved bit stream between parties for duration of communications ("wire")
- packet switching: chop application messages into packets (<few kB, with upper bound):
- interleaving from different sources
- error recovery on single unit0
- flexible bandwidth
- encryption on messages or packets

Network Components

link: connection between components, including wireless à point-to-point

(modem), multiple access (Ethernet) router, switch: forward packets


node: router (= intermediate system), host (= end system)

clients: access resources and services

servers: provide resources and services (may also be client)

dumb terminal : no local processing

Network Access and Interconnection



Destinations

- interconnect local networks (links) of different technology
- router:
- 1. get packet from source link, strip link layer header
- 2. find outgoing interface based on destination network address
- 3. find next link-layer address
- 4. wrap in link layer header and send

Tempest

- every device is a radio transmitter
- e.g., TV scanning
- Europe: find unlicensed TV receivers
- control zone

Threats for a Corporate/Campus Network

- unauthorized access to hosts (clients, servers)
- disclosure & modification of network data
- denial-of-service attacks

Threats for the Internet/ISP

- propagate false routing entries ("black holes", www.citibank.com
 →www.mybank.az)
- domain name hijacking
- link flooding
- configuration changes (SNMP)
- packet intercept

Application-Layer Threats

- only limited ability of network intervention possible
- shoulder-surfing
- rogue applications emailing out confidential files
- viruses, mail bombs, email attachments, ...

General Strategies

- hardening the OS and applications
- encrypting sensitive data
- reduce size of target \rightarrow disable unneeded services
- limit access of attacker to target systems

Network Infrastructure

ł	network infrastrucu	ure	
	Internet	enterprise network	
	border		edge
		interior	

Trust Model

- perimeter defense: defines trust zone
- most attacks are from the *inside*
- traveling users: virtual private networks danger!
- "extranets" for vendors, suppliers, ...
- internal hosts may not be managed or under control of network operator
- defense in depth

Firewalls

- computer between internal ("intranet") and external network
- = policy-based packet filtering
- watch single point rather than every PC
- limit in/out services, restrict incoming packets
- can't prevent people walking out with disks

POacket filter: restrict IP addresses (address filtering), ports

connection filter: only allow packets belonging to authorized (TCP)


connections

encrypted tunnel: tunnel = layer same layer inside itself à virtual network:


connect intranets across Internet

NA(P)T: network address (and port) translator are *not* firewalls, but can prevent all incoming connections

Network Address Translation



Application Gateway



- firewall *F*x: only to/from gateway
- may only allow email, file transfer
- hard to restrict large file transfers

Viruses

trojan horse: looks innocent, does something nasty
virus: inserts copy of itself into another program
worm: replicates across network
trapdoor: undocumented high-priviledge access to program
logic bomb: triggered at some time instant or event

Carriers:

- only programs \rightarrow "Good Times" hoax
- but: PostScript is program
- but: Word is a program

Virus Prevention

- signatures (\rightarrow hash)
- but: polymorphic viru
- checksum files securely
- limit activity (sandboxing) → Java
- run a non-Windows operating system . . .
- also: some may do physical damage (EEPROM, tape, video monitor, speaker)

TCP

)							16	i	31
16-bit source port number						port number 16-bit destination port number			
32-bit sequence number									
	32-bit a	ckno	wi	edg	gm	ent	numl	per (next byte expected)	
4-bit header length	reserved (6 bits)	R	A C K	Ś	R S T	S Y N	F 1 N	16-bit window size	20 by
16-bit TCP Checksum								16-bit urgent pointer	
					С	pti	ions (i	f any)	
						da	ta (if	any)	

Denial of Service (DOS) Attacks

Source: exploit legitimate behavior + bugs with "strange" packet formats.

mailbombing: send auto-generated email to victim

smurf: Perp sends ICMP echo (ping) traffic to IP broadcast address (directed broadcast), all of it having a spoofed source address of a victim. Prevention:

- disable directed broadcast;
- source address filtering on egress/ingress;
- compare source address of a packet against the routing table to ensure
- the return path of the packet is through the interface it was received on.
- "An ICMP Echo Request destined to an IP broadcast or IP multicast address MAY be silently discarded."

fraggle: same, UDP echo packets;

LAND attack: spoofed packet(s) with the SYN flag set – if they contain the same destination and source IP address as the host, the victim's machine could hang or reboot; **Tear drop:** overlapping (fragmented) packets; **SYN flood:** send lots of TCP SYN packets that occupy OS resources; **crash server:** large URLs, malformed packets, . . .

Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks

E.g.: Stacheldraht, Trinoo, Tribe Flood Network

- compromise victim system, typically via buffer overflow
- clients (control handlers via TCP), handlers (control agents via TPC or ICMP ECHO REPLY), agents (send data)
- handler-to-agent communication is encrypted
- handlers instruct agents to start DOS:
 - SYN flood
 - ICMP flood
 - UDP flood
 - Smurf

Military Security Model

Access controls:

discretionary: owner gives out rights

nondiscretionary: policy fixed

- security levels: unclassified <confidential<secret<top secret
- compartments \rightarrow "need to know"
- read up is illegal
- write down is illegal (\rightarrow root can't write to user!)

Covert Channels

- smuggle information without detection, but with noise "steganography"
- timing \rightarrow system loading
- (printer) queues
- create out-of-bounds file: can't read vs. doesn't exist
- error messages
- related application: additive "noise" in pictures, music, videos for fingerprinting (example: Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI), assumes trusted player)

Legal Issues

Patents:

- interesting things are patented (17 years)
- but some are royalty-free (DES), at least for non-commercial use (IDEA)
- public key requires license (until 2000) from RSA (4,405,829, issued September 29, 1983)

Export Controls

Modified policy as of Jan. 2000

- classically, encryption = munitions
- book ok, disk not
- export license: DOD à DOC for export to government
- no export to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan or Syria
- technical review for export to non-government
- "retail products" can now be exported to any end user
- open source do not need review, but deposit source code
- <64 bit encryption (including DES) mostly o.k. for export (Wassenaar agreement)
- USA, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Russia control export
- import always ok

Summary

This paper will provide an overview of the Internet and Internet security problems. A short summary of the TCP/IP protocol stack, on which the Internet is based, will also be given.

Particular attention will be on network security, because the attacks on the Internetconnected systems we are seeing today are more serious and more technically complex than those in the past.

Various firewalls types and architectures will be discussed as a highly effective way of protecting sites from these attacks. However, firewalls should not be seen as only one component in site's overall Internet security plan. It will be emphasized how vital establishing site's security policy is. Consideration of other security measures such as authentication and encryption that will work together with site's firewalls will be include.

Lastly, this paper will contain examples of commercial firewall products, currently available on the market. Products overviews and their evaluation based on security, ease of installation and ease of management will also be included.

The Internet

The Internet is a homogenous system of linked networks that use a common protocol (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) for communication. Many organizations have connected or want to connect their private LAN's (Local Area Networks) to the Internet so that their users can have the benefits of Internet services and resources. Many of these are using the Internet as a source of information and reference material, or relay on it for the transfer of information (messages and data files) via e-mail, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), Gopher sites, etc.

In addition, the Internet infrastructure and standards are becoming increasingly popular as means for companies to bring their geographically dispersed offices and personnel together. These companies are using Internet technologies to provide easy and widespread access to corporate information for internal use by company employees. Such private internal IP networks are known as 'intranets'.

Organizations are embracing the potential of the Internet as a powerful, established, easily available medium for business transaction. The benefits of adopting Internet technology range from lower communication cost, because transporting data across the Internet can cost much less than using a private network, to greatly improved communication.

Security

While Internet connectivity can offer enormous benefits in terms of increased access to information, it also brings many different risks. The Internet suffers from severe security-related problems, which needs to be major a consideration when planning an Internet connection.

Some of the problems with Internet security are a result of inherent problems with TCP/IP services, and the protocols that the services implement, while others are a result of the complexity of host configuration and access controls that are poorly implemented. These vulnerabilities could assist intruder breaches and unauthorized access from external sources into a private network.

Since the private network may contain sensitive data, network protection and protection of the data on the network is important for any organization. The use of the public Internet to create a 'Virtual Private Network' makes network security concerns even bigger, since the security system chosen must be flexible enough to meet the needs of both types of network connection while remaining completely transparent to the user.

Security elements

Optimum security starts with a site security policy. A security policy is the overall scheme by which resources are denied or allowed to the users. This scheme must be thought out, as conflict leads to security holes. The policy will limit acceptable behaviour and weigh possible threats and security violations, which need different levles of protection. Once the security policy is in place, a company can begin the search for the security measures best suited to their security policy.

Authentication is a security measure that is designed to eliminate (to ghether with encryption) the threat of eavesdropping and IP spoofing. Authentication is simply knowing someone is who he says he is. In the real world, authentication is provided by physical attributes, which do not exist, with computers. A person can be judged by their appearance, fingerprints, or signature on paper.

The most common method for authentication in the computer world is through the use of something, which is known or owned only by the person in question. Passwords and keys are a way of identifying users as they access the computer system.

Together with authentication, encryption is used as a security measure to eliminate capturing passwords and logging data from a server. Encryption is the coding of data through an algorithm or transform table into apparently unintelligible garbage. Encryption is a method of ensuring privacy of data so that only intended users may view the information. There are two kinds of encryption mechanisms used: private-key and public-key. Only with the correct decryption key can the original data be recovered.

Firewalls

Besides previously mentioned security measures that provide protection against unwanted intruders into a corporate network, the most common approach is to construct a firewall at the Internet connection. Firewalls are systems that control the flow of traffic between the Internet and a private company network. More extensive firewalls can completely 'hide' the participants on your network from the external network. Firewall systems can also be deployed within an enterprise network to prevent unauthorized access to particular subnets, workgroups or LANs within a corporate network. This is particularly important, because many sources claim that 70 percent of all security problems originate from inside an organization.

There are different implementations of firewalls, which can be divided into traditional and new firewalls. Under traditional firewalls we will consider packet filters and application-level gateways, while new generation of firewall technology bring us stateful multi-layer inspection (SMLI) and SOCKS.

These various firewall components can be configured in a number of different architectures. The most common firewall architectures are the dual-homed host, screened host, and screened subnet. However, there is a lot of variation in architectures, and a good deal of flexibility in how one can configure and combine firewall components depending on a corporation's hardware, budget, and security policy.

The Internet firewall needs to permit authorized and desirable operation to continue unimpeded. The more complicated firewall architectures have a cascaded set of security barriers that can make using the Internet so uncomfortable and burdensome that it becomes useless.

Virtual Private Network (VPN) is important feature provided by some firewalls. Virtual Private Network allows a trusted network to communicate with another trusted network over an untrusted network such as the Internet. Any connection between firewalls over public networks uses a technology known as an 'encrypted tunnel' to ensure privacy and integrity of the data passing over the public network. This technology uses technique known as IP 'wrapping', and encryption of all data between the private

and integrity of the data passing over the public network. This technology uses technique known as IP 'wrapping', and encryption of all data between the private network and the authorized user. In essence the encrypted data is decoded only when it reaches its destination.

Firewall product overview

Firewalls are by nature, complicated devices. The first generation of firewalls focused exclusively on security, generally using one of two methods: packet filtering or proxy services. The basic functions of firewalls have not changed, but most of them are much more sophisticated than old-style firewalls and place a new emphasis on easy administration.

Some of the most interesting features of new technology firewalls are transparent proxying, remote administration capability and Virtual Private Network integration.

'Firewall-1' Check Point Software Technology Inc.

Check Point Software Technology offers a comprehensive solution to meet new and extended security requirements. Firewall-1 is an enterprise security solution, which provides integrated Internet, intranet/extranet and remote access control, authentication, encryption, network address translation (NAT), and content screening. Firewall-1 also provides encryption of data traveling over the Internet between private networks, creating secure Virtual Private Networks.

It is based on stateful inspection technology, the new generation of firewall technology invented and patented by Check Point Software Technologies. Firewall-1 emplys a distributed, client/server architecture, providing scalability and centralized management. It was first to employ an easy to use graphical user interface. Check point Firewall-1 can be supported across multiple platforms, including NT and UNIX servers, routers, witches and many other internetworking devices.

'Eagle NT' Raptor System Inc.

Raptor's Eagle NT is the first application –level firewall for the Windows NT platform. Raptor's security solution provides optional software for full protection of remote sites (Eagle Remote) and intra-enterprise communication (Eagle Connect). Eagle NT acts as a proxy server for common TCP/IP applications including Telnet, FTP, Gopher, http, and SMTP. It has impressive features such as encryption capabilities (Raptor's Eagle Connect virtual private network technology uses encryption to secure communications and prevent address spoofing), increased authentication options, and RealAudio and Java protection. Eagle NT offers the most extensive notification options. Alerts can be sent by e-mail, fax, pager, and audio. Hawk the powerful GUI (Graphical User Interface) for all NT firewalls enables managing global networks from one location.

'SecurIT FIREWALL' Mikyway Networks Corp.

SecureIT FIREWALL is an application-level gateway (using proxy servers). SecureIT FIREWALL can connect a user trough the firewall without having to make a request through the proxies, thereby making access transparent. It offers a comprehensive management capability with a user friendly GUI and with drag and drop functionality for installation and administration. Extensive logging and auditing facilities and alarm features for critical events are another key features of SecurIT FIREWALL. SecurIT FIREWALL supports all Internet application either with its generic proxies or through the adoption of specific application proxies. Multiple private

SecurIT FIREWALL protected networks can be interconnected via encryption tunnels between SecurIT FIREWALL to create a VPN over the Internet. It runs on UNIX and WNT platforms.

CONCLUSION

Many private networks feel the need to connect to the Internet, so that they can use services and resources of the Internet. There are millions of people who are using the Internet for different purposes and some of then can attempt to break into private computer networks and access remote services that they are not authorized to use. Since the private networks can contain important and confidential data, network security is very important for any organization.

Firewalls are the best way to keep sits secure although one has to include other types of security in the site's overall security. For this reason, the major firewall vendors have incorporated additional security technologies into their firewall products and gone into a partnership with other security vendors to offer complete Internet security solution.

A good security solution should be powerful enough to support the features that the administrator needs, including the capability to inform the administrator of potential security back doors, automatic incident reporting to inform the administrator when a security breach has occurred, and secure management of the firewall itself so hackers cannot reconfigure the firewall and create security problems. Such security technology should also be inexpensive, easy to implement and transparent to end users.

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