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Values and Beliefs of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

MASTER THESIS

BY

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*We certify that this thesis is satisfactory for the award of a degree of Master of Arts in International Relations*

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Title:	Values and Beliefs of American Foreign Policy in the Middle East
Description:	This thesis is intended to portray how values and beliefs toward foreign affairs have changed over the course of the history of American Republic and how U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East has thus changed from the World War 1 years through the shock of September 11 attacks and beyond within values contexts.
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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this work to my late sister **Reewaida**

May God Bless Her Soul.

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INTRODUCTION

For two centuries, America has served the world as an inspiring example of freedom and democracy. For generations, America has led the struggle to preserve and extend the blessings of liberty. And, today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens and sacrifices. But we also know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans. We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works.

President George Bush, State of the Union Address, January 29 1991, 65.

The United State of America, unlike ordinary nations, has regulated foreign policy on the basis of distinctive values, beliefs, and the superiority of idealism since the birth of the nation. In the Declaration of independence, for instance, the values of life, liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness were explicitly stated as reasons for creating the United States. (1) These values, moreover, came to serve as guides to political actions in the earliest days of the nation. Indeed, such values and beliefs have remained important to this day. Liberty, or freedom, is emphasized again and again by American political leaders as one value that differentiates this nation from so many others.

As it is known that the United States was, and remains, largely "a country of immigrants", because of the large number of people who have moved to the country from other countries over the several hundred years of its history. Uniting such diverse people and their knowledge, abilities, dreams, physical characteristics, and culture were thrown together, just as metals might be in a metallurgist's melting pot. While they were not heated up the way metals are, they often worked and lived with each other and gradually formed a new United States culture.

The Uniqueness of American Nation:

The first immigration wave to America was relatively homogeneous because they were largely northern Europeans and Protestants. Roughly the same time Africans were brought in as slaves, and lastly Asian and Latin American. The early American settlers were motivated by visions of a utopia in the New World free from the constraints of the Old. This notion had rooted in the early immigrants minds who had escaped poverty, persecution, and cruelty that prevailed in much of Europe. Indeed, America's founders "did not just want to believe that they were involved in a sordid little revolt on the fingers of the British Empire or of European civilization" (2) (although more than 75 per cent of American people were from Europe). They wanted to believe that they were coming up with a better model, a better way for human beings to form a government that would be responsive to them" (3). They also shaped American foreign policy with the view that the United States is inherently different from and morally superior to other countries. Unlike other models, America was divinely chosen and set apart from the evil Europeans and others to be an example for the world to follow, where ascription and privilege were so important. It emerged as an essentially free society in a world that stressed authority and order. This new American state, to a large measure, was dynamic, classless, and free, in contrast to Europe, which was bound and restrictive. Thus, the American Revolution was fought in defiance of the very principles by which Europe was governed. In this sense, there developed a natural aversion to European values—and foreign polices—which further reinforced Americas beliefs in its own uniqueness.

The Principles of American Foreign Policy:

These values, ideas, and beliefs that the United States has claimed to stand for in the world are emphasis on principles which are rooted in Democratic Idealism. We find assertions of "American exceptionalism" throughout U.S. history. Thomas Jefferson, the country's first secretary and its third president, characterized the new United States of America as such "the solitary republic of the world, the only monument of human rights...the sole depository of the sacred fire of freedom and self-government, from hence it is to be lighted up in other regions of the earth, if other regions shall ever become susceptible to its benign influence". (4) And then there was President Woodrow Wilson's

famous declaration that U.S. entry into world 1 was intended "to make the world safe for democracy": "We shall fight for the things of which we have always carried nearest our hearts –for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of rights by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world in itself at last free". (5) Idealism was also claimed by many a Cold War president, from Democrats such as John Kennedy with his inaugural address to "bear any burden, pay any price" to defend democracy and fight communism, to Republicans such as Ronald Reagan and his crusade against "the evil empire."(6)

Ideologies, Myths and American Foreign Policy:

Several factors have been combined to perpetuate certain myths and ideologies in America's internal affairs as well as its relations with other countries. These myths include the belief that everyone is equal, that hard work automatically leads to success, and that America is inherently an exceptional country. The extraordinary success achieved by the United States which did not develop a rigid class system, its expansion rapidly enough to allow Americans, especially those of European descent, to amass large fortunes relatively quickly, and to perpetuate the myth that anyone with ambition and the determination to work hard could become wealthy.

Generally, Americans have subscribed to a common ideology of Lockean liberalism. John Locke, having articulated a direct connection between the possession of property and political and social freedom, was embraced by the Founding Fathers and subsequent generation of Americans. Adam Smith as the founding father of the economic liberalism also had a great impact.

Another important factor due to which many beliefs and values were developed by the early Americans retains remarkable power in contemporary society, despite revolutionary changes in science and technology. The myth of frontier and America as a City on a Hill continues to provide the foundation upon which many U.S. foreign polices is based as well as the justification of them. According to the myth of the frontier, the conquest of the wilderness of Native Americans have been the means to the achievement of a nation identity, a democratic polity, an ever—expanding economy, dynamic and

progressive civilization. Of course frontier was not only a myth but also a reality: the frontier was moving toward west over the North American continent until 1890.

The Shining city upon a hill, the phrase comes from the governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony John Winthrop in 1630, who wrote it to describe America he imagined; "For we must consider that we shall be as a City Upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are upon us." Winthrop's imagery of the model Christian society as a city on a hill, taken from Matthew 5:14 became a motif that has inspired American literary and political thought into the 20th century. From Winthrop and the Puritans, America inherited the idea that in some way this land was to be an example and beacon of light to the rest of the world. (7) America as a City on a Hill underscored the United States' separation from the rest of the world as well as its role as a unique model for other countries to emulate.

Further augmenting ideology's influence in society has been the remarkable political and social stability of the United States. Relatively isolated from the turbulence of European troubles, unthreatened by its neighbors, and enjoying widespread consensus, America has never been forced to seriously examine most of its fundamental values and beliefs. While the Civil War, the civil rights movement, the Great Depression, and other major upheavals have led to an examination of certain values and beliefs, adjustments have been made largely within the existing political and cultural framework. Growing prosperity has dampened desires for social revolutions. Consequently, virtue and institutions have become interchangeably. Most Americans believe that the extraordinary economic and political success of their country demonstrates the virtue of its institutions. (8) Such values and beliefs became to have important consequences for foreign policy action by this new nation. Because the United States adopted a democratic political system, developed strong libertarian and egalitarian values domestically, and believed in the primacy of domestic over foreign policy, domestically, and believed in the primacy of domestic over foreign policy, two important foreign policy traditions quickly emerged: an emphasis on isolationism in affecting whether to be involved abroad and an emphasis on moral principle in shaping that involvement. Both traditions, moreover, were surely viewed as complementary to one another and were intended to assist in perpetuating unique American values: the former by reducing U.S. involvement in world affairs, and

particularly; the latter by justifying U.S. involvement abroad only for ethical reasons. At times, these two traditions pulled in different direction, but both came to dominate the foreign policy action of the new state. In fact the US never fully pursued the policy of isolation. More likely she only tried to keep to European powers out from the area she could control. When her power increased also the controlled are grew parallelly, first South and Central America, 1898 already Philippines, in the end of WW2 half of Europe, after 1990 the whole world.

The Isolationism in American Foreign Policy:

A belief in the importance of foreign policy has not as obvious as it seems today. During the eighteenth century, Americans took comfort in Tom Paine's 1776 call in Common Sense for North American colonies to separate themselves from a Europe constantly embroiled in nonsense quarrels and wars. One of the mainstays American diplomacy in the nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine (1823), rested on a belief that the United States should have as little as possible to do with the great power game of nations. (9)Throughout the greatest part of the history of this nation, in fact, isolationism best describes American's foreign approach by some important practical considerations. Firstly, the United States was separated geographically from Europe---the main arena of international politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries---and from the rest of the world. Staying out of the affairs of other nations, therefore, seemed a practical course. Secondly, the United States was a young, weak country with a small army and a relatively large land mass, so seeking adversaries and potential conflicts abroad would hardly be prudent. Thirdly, domestic unity---a sense of nationalism ---was still limited and merited more attention than foreign policy. Finally, the overriding task of settling and modernizing the American continent provided reason enough to adopt an isolationist position. The Monroe Doctrine thus gave rise to the "two spheres" concept in American foreign policy by emphasizing the differences between the western and eastern hemispheres--- the New World versus the Old World. (10) As Washington had done earlier, Monroe's statement called for political noninvolvement in the affairs of Europe. But Monroe's message did more than Washington's; it specified that the U.S. policy of political noninvolvement in European affairs did not apply equally to Latin American

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affairs. The message can be a valuable guide in understanding this country's isolationist orientation toward global affairs. The principles articulated in them generally reflected the diplomatic practices of the united states throughout much of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, and his words became the basis of the nation's continuing foreign policy. (11)

Moral Principles in American Foreign Policy:

"The United States always wins the war and loses the Peace," runs a persistent popular complaint. The United States barely escaped the war of 1812 with its territory intact, and in Korea in the 1950s the nation was forced to settle for a stalemate on the battlefield. (12) At Paris in 1782, and again in 1898, American negotiators drove hard bargains to win notable diplomatic victories. Yet the myth persists, along with the equally erroneous American belief that they are a peaceful people. Their history is studded with conflict and violence. From the Revolution to the Cold War, Americans have been willing to fight for their interests, their beliefs, and their ambitions. The United States has gone to war for many objectives---- for independence in 1775, for honor and trade in 1812, for territory in 1846, for humanity and empire in 1898, for neutral human rights in 1917, and for national security in 1941. Since 1945 the nation has been engaged in two wars in Asia, a relatively brief but bloody struggle in Korea, and a longer and even more tragic encounter in Vietnam. And most recently, Americans fought against terrorism network in Afghanistan, and for both oil and the Wilsonian principles of collective security in the Persian Gulf. The most important two wars which led the United States as a superpower and committed itself to global involvement were the Spanish—American war, and World War2. Both wars were generally based on ethical standards and moral principles for humanity and national security. As a consequence, in the Spanish—American War of 1898, the United States had made its debut as a major power on the world stage, stripping Spain of its imperial holdings in the Caribbean and the Philippines. The United States grew even more assertive during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, who served from 1901 to 1909. Roosevelt asserted American power in ways that would have been unimaginable just a few years earlier.

On the other hand, the United States emerged from World War 2 in an extremely advantageous position. Unlike most other industrialized nations, which had been weakened and, in some cases, devastated by the war, the United States had become much more powerful and prosperous, capable of setting the postwar agenda in the United Nations and in other international bodies. The United States was also the sole possessor of the atom bomb, a monopoly it would retain until 1949. As these two instances and others demonstrate, the United States has been reluctant to give up its isolationism and did so only for identifiable moral reasons. That is, the United States traditionally agreed to international involvement only in response to perceived violations of clearly established principles of international law and not to respond to the requirements of power politics, as many other states have done.

American Foreign Policy in The Middle East: 1914 –9/11

Americans, despite their pre-1945 lack of interest in the Middle East, soon came to recognize the region's importance. World War II wrought a revolution in American foreign policy, with Pearl Harbor and its aftermath thoroughly discrediting the isolationists who had kept the United States on the sidelines of world affairs during the 1930s. By 1945, most Americans, and nearly all American policy makers, believed that the United States must take an active part in keeping the peace in areas previously beyond the pale of official American concern. The Middle East, where peace chronically needed keeping, was one of those areas.

A Meeting of Two Worlds:

U.S. relations with the nations of the Middle East, covering the period 1914-2001and its aftermath. We begin in 1914 because that year marked the start of World War I, the conflict that resulted in the collapse of the Turkish Ottoman Empire, and thus in the emergence of many of the present-day states in the Middle East. World War 1 also was the event that drew the United States, for the first time, into great-power deliberations over the political fate of Middle Eastern countries. To be sure, the United States soon returned to its previous position of aloofness from Middle Eastern affairs, but in the 1940s it again became vitally interested in the political life of the Middle East, a posture it has maintained ever since.

We end in 2001 and beyond because it was on September 11 of that year that the territory of the United States came under devastating attack, by a band of shadowy terrorists, most of them Saudis, presuming to act on behalf of an aggrieved Muslim world. This attack put an end to the sense of physical security and impregnability that American had experienced for most of the nation's history.

The eight and a half decades laying between these two milestones represent a remarkable transformation in America's role in the Middle East, from a rising power with enormous potential for world leadership, but with little official interest in the political fate of the Middle East, to a world colossus so prominent in the political, economic, and cultural life of the Middle East that it was the unquestioned target of those bent on attacking the west for its perceived offensive against Islam. Although the structure of the thesis is mainly chronological, four central themes recur throughout the thesis.

The first theme is the growing involvement of the United States in the of the affairs of the Middle East, a consequence of America's increasing global power. In the first four decades of the twentieth century, U.S. interests in the Middle East were almost entirely missionary, philanthropic, educational, and commercial. A brief exception to this rule was the flurry of activity immediately following World War 1, when President Woodrow Wilson became involved in the postwar political settlement in the Middle East. Wilson's vision was quickly rejected by the American body politic, and in the 1920s and 1930s, the United States reverted to a position of political aloofness from the affairs of most foreign countries, including those of the Middle East.

All this started to change with America's entry into World War 2, which caused U.S. officials, for the first time, to see the geopolitical orientation of the Middle East as vital to American national security. During the war, U.S. military forces occupied large portions of the Middle East, turning Iran into a corridor for supplying the Soviet Union, and North Africa into a staging area for invading fascist Italy. After 1945, the Middle East remained vital to U.S. security, both as a staging area for a possible war against the Soviet Union, America's new adversary, and as a source of oil for Western Europe and Japan, America's new Cold War allies.

The United States did not, however, begin the postwar period as the pre-eminent Western power in the Middle East; that distinction belonged to Great Britain, which had

long been an imperial power in the region. For the first decade of the Cold War era, the United States generally supported Britain's position as the Western standard-bearer in the Middle East. But following the Suez crisis of 1956 - which demonstrated that Britain was no longer up to the job—Washington stepped in to take London's place.

A far more hostile contender for Middle Eastern influence (at least as far as the United States was concerned) was the Soviet Union, whose territory was adjusted to that of several Middle Eastern states. For the Soviet Union vied for political and strategic advantage in the Middle East. In the mid-1970s, however, the Soviet position in the region began to decline, foreshadowing, and in a small way contributing to, the demise of the Soviet system in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, the United States has emerged as the sole remaining superpower, wielding unparalleled power and influence over Middle Eastern affairs.

The second theme is Middle Easterners' ongoing quest for political independence and self-mastery. In the early decades of the twentieth century, Turks, Arabs, Jews, Iranians, and Kurds sought to gain political control over portion of the region, often in opposition to the imperial agendas of European powers. By mid-century, most of these groups, with some important exceptions, had succeeded in establishing formal national independence, but Middle Easterners remained preoccupied with combating external domination, real and perceived.

After 1945, as the United States grew more involved in the region's affairs, it increasingly became the object of indigenous resentment. In Iran and the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s, secular nationalists' resisted American pressure to side with the West against the Soviet Union, insisting on their right to enjoy profitable relations with Cold War blocs. Arab nationalists, in particular, tried to defeat or contain Israel, which they saw as an instrument of Western power. By the 1970s, secular nationalism was a declining force in Arab and Iranian affairs, increasingly giving way to political Islam, whose rejection of Western influence was far more profound. In the decades since, Islamists have been generally unsuccessful at seizing state power (the Iranian revolution is the major exception to this rule), but they posed a formidable challenge both to the United States and to existing regimes in the region.

Of all the Middle Eastern nations, Israel and Turkey have enjoyed the closest relations to the United States with Jordan, Saudi Arabia too. Israel has long had a special relationship with the United States, a friendship borne of sentiment, cultural affinity, domestic politics, and strategic calculation. Turkey is the only Middle Eastern member of NATO, an alliance it joined in the early 1950s. Yet these countries, too, have sometimes chafed under Washington's restraints on their freedom of action. Israel's military operations against neighboring Arab countries, and its occupation of Arab lands taken in the Six-Day War of 1967, have frequently aroused Washington's ire, though such criticism has grown milder in recent years. Turkey's attempt to put down internal Kurdish rebellions, or to limit the activities of Kurds in neighboring countries like Iraq, have also elicited American criticism occasionally.

Both Jordan and Saudi Arabia have a special relation with the Western countries in general and the United States in particular. Saudi Arabia has a historic and strategic relations with Americans because the oil and geographical location in the Middle East, adding to its value to the Muslim world. On the other hand, Jordan also has special considerations to the Americans; it considers the geographical key for Gulf countries and its major role for protection Israeli borders.

The third theme is the difficulty the United States has experienced in balancing among diverse, and sometimes conflicting, interests and objectives in the Middle East. During World War 1, Woodrow Wilson championed the principle of national self-determination, showing little sympathy for Britain's and France's imperial ambitions in the Middle East. Once the war ended, however, Wilson found that he needed British and French cooperation on other matters, so he allowed those two countries to continue to dominate the Middle East under the guise of League of Nations mandates. During World War II, U.S. officials had genuine sympathy for the nationalist aspirations of colonial peoples throughout the world. But in the Middle East, as elsewhere, Washington invariably suppressed that sympathy when it conflicted with the successful prosecution of the war.

After 1945, America's primary objectives in the region were securing Western access to Middle Eastern oil, preventing the Soviet Union from reaping political or strategic advantages in the area, and ensuring Israel's security. Israel's security became

an American concern actually later, basically with the Six Days War of 1967. Pursuing the last of these objectives often complicated the pursuit of the other two. Washington's close relations with Israel generated anti-American sentiment in the Arab world, providing the Soviet Union with opportunities to increase its political influence in the region. A similar conflict of objectives occurred during the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, when President Richard M. Nixon airlifted military supplies to Israel to keep it from suffering a military defeat at the hands of Syria and Egypt. Nixon's airlift deeply angered the Arab World, and a number of oil-producing Arab states retaliated by imposing an embargo on oil shipments to the United States, causing major dislocations in the global economy.

As the Cold War drew to an end, the imperative of containing the Soviet Union gave way to two new objectives: combating international terrorism and preventing rogue states—like Libya, Iran, and Iraq—from challenging U.S. policies in the region. Both of these objectives acquired fresh urgency following the terrorist attack of September 11, but Americans disagreed over whether the two goals could, or should, be pursued simultaneously. While President George W. Bush argued that the necessity of disarming Iraq (and perhaps overthrowing its government as well) could not be separated from the effort to defeat Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida network, others insisted that Bush's preoccupation with Iraq was diverting precious energy and resources from the war against al-Qa'ida. As in previous decades, Washington could find no easy formulas for pursuing its diverse objectives in the Middle East.

The fourth and final theme is the ever-growing antagonism between Americans and Middle Easterners, one of the most striking —and tragic— transformations to have occurred in the first four decades of the twentieth century, the United States had a relatively benign reputation among Middle Easterners, who appreciated that the United States had no imperial ambitions in the Middle East, and who were grateful for the educational, philanthropic, and humanitarian services Americans provided in the region.

At mid-century, however, as the United States emerged as a global superpower, much of that goodwill began turning into resentment. The United States played a key role in bringing the state of Israel into being, a development that infuriated the Arab World, especially as it resulted in the uprooting of an existing Palestinian Arab society. America

never regained the Arab goodwill it had enjoyed prior to Israel's creation. In more recent decades, as Washington has enclosed Israel in an ever tighter embrace--essentially underwriting its continuing occupation of Arab lands — Arab anger has turned increasingly bitter, occasionally finding outlet in terrorist violence. Further to the east, U.S. support for the authoritarian Shah of Iran antagonized two generations of Iranians, fueling an anti—Western and anti—American revolution that would challenge and complicate U.S. policy for decades.

The attacks of September 11 served as a wake-up call, of course by alerting ordinary Americans to the existence of a shadowy network of terrorists — transnational, but largely emanating from the Middle East — committed to the destruction of the United States and its allies, and second by calling attention to a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, as documented by numerous public opinion surveys conducted in those regions in the months following 9/11. In explaining their negative views of the United States, respondents cited America's alliance with Israel, its support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, and its increasing willingness to use military force in the regions.

On the American side, one can also detect a rising tide of suspicion and anger directed at the dominant cultures of the Middle East. Orientalist stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims have long proliferated in American culture, but in the early years of the twentieth century those images were often benign, romanticizing Middle Easterners and their way of life as often as they vilified them. It was only in later years, as the substance of U.S.-Middle Eastern relations grew angrier and more violent, that popular images of Middle Easterners became uniformly threatening. For a quarter century prior to September 11, the figure of the Arabs or Muslims terrorist — bent on attacking American society at its most vulnerable points — was a stock character in American popular culture. One of the many secondary tragedies of September 11 was that the attacks so vividly confirmed this frightening image, making it harder for Americans to see Middle Easterners in anything but the most threatening light.

There are, of course, some important exceptions to the general rule of growing mutual antagonism between Americans and Middle Easterners. The state of Israel has always been popular among Americans, not just with American Jews, who see Israel as a

haven and homeland for their co-religionists the world over, but with many non-Jews as well, who see in the founding of the Jewish state a heroic re-enactment of America's own pioneer origins. It's also true that Washington enjoys close and cooperative relations with numerous other Middle Eastern governments, though increasingly, in many cases, that cooperation has flown in the face of popular opinion in the region.

There are numerous other ways, of course, in which Americans and Middle Easterners have moved closer to each other, achieving a level of mutual understanding that would have been impossible a few decades earlier. Tens of thousands of Americans have lived and worked in the Middle East, and hundreds of thousands of Middle Easterners have immigrated to the United States, altering the texture of American cultural life. Islam has become one of the major religions in the United States, and is routinely recognized as such in official functions and ceremonies. In Middle Eastern countries, meanwhile American popular culture is widely consumed, admired and emulated.

So perhaps it would more accurate to say that Americans and Middle Easterners have drawn ever closer to each other in recent years and that their increasing proximity has led to simultaneous increases in both conflict and cooperation, in both enmity and understanding. Yet it's hard to avoid the conclusion that, in the aftermath of September 11, the negative impressions significantly outweigh the positive ones. (13)

Those are the main themes that will be recurring throughout the parts and chapters of the thesis within values context .So; we'll see into the next first chapter, in what three issues forced Americans to pay closer attention to Middle Eastern affairs during World War 1.

The Structure of the Thesis:

This thesis consists of main three chapters, the first one analysis the effects of two important traditions on American foreign policy towards the Middle East: the commitment to isolationism and the reliance on moral principles as important foreign policy guides. In chapter two, we focus on the development of American globalism in the immediate post-World War 2 years and how America's beliefs about the events in the Middle East changed sharply. In the last chapter, we survey how the American people and leaders tried to adopt foreign policy values that would allow it to address the

significant transformations that had taken place since the collapse of the Communism till to the shock of September 11 and then the declaration war on terrorism.

The Aim of the Thesis:

The importance of the values and beliefs is useful only within the context of actual foreign policy behavior. Thus, as an aid in appreciating how values and beliefs have shaped American foreign policy, we provide a narrative of American foreign policy actions toward the Middle East area that reflect the underlying belief system during various periods of U.S. diplomatic history. This study, too, demonstrates that the American presidents' from Wilson to George W. Bush personalities help to determine which aspects of U.S. culture are emphasized, and, consequently, influence the choice of foreign policy instruments. Leaders such as Jimmy Carter who transcend racial and ethnic boundaries at home are generally empathetic toward countries that are culturally distant from America, and relatively predisposed to resolve conflicts with them through negotiations. Carter's ability to empathize with both the Israelis and the Arabs was a major factor in the success of the Camp David negotiations. Carter represents that component of the culture that downplays the of force. Ronald Regan and George Bush, on the other hand, reacted militarily to perceived Third World including the Middle East challenges to American interests, to demonstrate the country's resolve and to punish evil transgressors. Clinton, reflecting in part his generation's ambivalence toward war, has adopted policies which, while ambiguous, lean toward negotiations to settle problems. Despite their divergent approaches, Carter, Regan, Bush, Clinton, and Bush, the son, have appealed to different aspects of the nation's complex and inconsistent culture to obtain support for their methods of conflict resolution. But most policymakers are influenced by the dominant culture, which often favors using violence to protect U.S. interests. It is our hope that through illustrations of values, beliefs, and actions, the reader will come away better able to interpret the cultural effects in foreign policy of the United States towards the Middle East.

This thesis is also intended to portray how values and beliefs toward foreign affairs have changed over the course of the history of the American Republic and how

U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East within values contexts has thus changed from the World War 1 years through the shock of September 11 attacks and beyond.

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Chapter 1: America's Traditions In Foreign Policy: Isolationism And Moral Principles.

1.1. Wilson and The breakup of The Ottoman Empire

Throughout World War 1, the U.S. government saw events in the Middle East as a sideshow to the main action in Europe. But there were three main issues that forced the United States to pay close attention to the region. These were the Armenian question. Zionism, and European imperialism, each of these three issues would occupy the United States in the immediate postwar period as well.

Following World War I, both Democrats and Republicans give moral support to the independence movements throughout Europe. The Democrat platform of 1920 expresses support for Irish "national self-determination" support for efforts by the Armenians "to establish and maintain a government of their own," and "active sympathy with the people of China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Poland, Persia, Yugoslavia and others who have recently established representative governments and who are striving to develop the institutions of Democracy." The Democrats, under President Woodrow Wilson, seek a popular and congressional mandate for active intervention in Armenia. Republicans "sympathize" with the Armenians but oppose intervention, using their 1920 party platform to describe Wilson's efforts at intervention as disregard of the lives of American boys or of American interest." (1)

1.1.1 Armenian Cause:

Let's look at the Armenian question first. The Armenians were a Christian people whose ancient homeland had been swallowed up by Ottoman Empire and Russia. In 1914, about two million Armenians lived in Ottoman Empire, mostly in the east. The Turkish government's attack on its Armenian population was at least at first, a by – product of warfare on the Turco—Russia front. After entering the war in late 1914, the Ottoman Empire attempted to invade the Russian-controlled Caucasus. The offensive was a fiasco the Russian not only repelled the advance but launched an invasion of their own

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into eastern Anatolia. The Russian counter- offensive was aided by some of the Armenians living in eastern Anatolia. (2)

1.1.2. Armenians and the Ottoman Point of View:

There are two totally different views on the Armenian issue during the First World War. The first one stresses that the Turks had a brutal campaign against the Armenians. In the areas of eastern Anatolia still under government control, Turkish authorities rounded up all the Armenians they could find and forced them to march into the interior of Eastern Anatolian lands, where they could no longer assist the Russian invaders, In numerous instances, Ottoman soldiers and police summarily executed all Armenians males over fifteen years of age; women and girls were raped and sometimes murdered as well many others perished on the month-long trek into the interior, falling victim to disease, starvation, exposure, or attacks by roaming bandits. Reliable figures are elusive, but apparently over one million Armenians died as a result of Ottoman's anti-Armenian campaign. (3)

On the contrary, and according to the Ottoman Turkish and other neutral sources had claimed that not more than 300,000 Turkish Armenian casualties between 1914 to 1916 during the First World War. (4) Some of the deaths were due to epidemics, some were due to climatic factors, and some were due to the hardships suffered during the journey of their relocation by ottoman troops. The Ministry of the Interior decided to relocate the Armenians people, because they always start a rebellion where there are large Armenian communities, so if the Armenians could be relocated in such away that they would not from large communities, but would live in a small groups far frm ach other, then the chance of organizing a rebellion would disappear.(5) The Armenian rebellion against Ottoman in most of the Anatolia's areas which it caused bad effects on the efforts of Ottoman troops war's operations during the World War 1, which are designed for the benefit of protecting the state's security and existence. (6) Moreover, Some were due to attacks, because officials did not protect them or because some officials engaged in illegal acts. Also, many died during the rebellions or the band fights started in 1914 even before the war, and continued after the relocation decision was made until 1916. Many others died while fighting against the Turks in the Russian Army which

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they joined as volunteers. The Armenians were forced to emigrate because they had joined the ranks of the enemy. Turkey did not kill them, but relocated them, as it was impossible to adopt a better solution under the circumstances, it cannot be accepted that those who died because they were unable to resist the hardships of the journey were killed by the Turks. (7)

American missionaries in Ottoman Empire lands played a key role in addressing this humanitarian catastrophe, establishing temporary hospitals and shelters and distributing food among the starving refugees. In the United States, missionary organizations conducted a massive campaign to call attention to the Armenians' plight and solicit donations for their relief. From 1915 to 1919, the campaign raised over $30 million, a huge sum in those days. (8)

For the most part, missionaries focused on the plight of the suffering Armenians, rather than on the depravity of their Ottoman tormentors. Inevitably, however, the Armenian issue stirred up deep anti-Ottoman and anti-Muslim hostility in the United States, perpetuating long-standing stereotypes about oriental despotism. All too often Americans viewed the situation as the political dimension of the Armenian crisis, as well as the fact that the war had made victims of many Ottoman Muslim as well.

1.1.3. The Cause of Zionism

The second issue that drew the United States into Middle Eastern affairs was Zionism. Since the late-nineteenth century, European Jews had been settling in Palestine, pursuing the Zionist dream of building a homeland for the scattered Jews of the world. Although some early Zionist favored establishing a Jewish state in Uganda, which was then a British colony, most Zionists wished to establish their state in Palestine, the site of the ancient kingdom of Israel and the spiritual and cultural homeland for much of the Jewish Diaspora. In 1917, a Zionist leader named Chaim Weitzman lobbied the British government to make a public statement supporting the Zionist project in Palestine. Such a statement, Weitzman said, could greatly aid the British war effort. (9)

The British government accepted Weitzman's argument that supporting the Zionist program would aid the allied war effort. The British also calculated that sponsoring a Jewish homeland would serve their strategic interests in the postwar period.

A friendly Jewish state would provide the British with a foothold in the Middle East, helping them gain control over the communication and transportation lines between British-occupied Egypt and British-occupied India.

Accordingly, in November 1917, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour issued a public statement declaring that the British government viewed with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. The so-called Balfour Declaration did not give the Zionists everything they wanted. Instead of a Jewish state, it called for a national home, and what that precisely meant was unclear. The declaration also indicated that this national home would be in Palestine, rather than comprising the whole of it. Still, getting a power of Britain's stature to issue such a statement was a major achievement, and the Zionists were overjoyed. (10)

The U.S. government played a small role in the issuing of the Balfour Declaration. America entered the First World War in the spring of 1917, just about the time that Chaim Weitzman started lobbying the British government to issue a pro-Zionist statement. Now that the U.S. was a belligerent, Weitzman wanted an American endorsement of Zionism as well. He enlisted the help of the American lawyer Louis Brandeis, a past president of the Zionist organization of America who had recently become the first Jewish justice to sit in the U.S. Supreme Court. Brandeis, a friend and advisor to Woodrow Wilson, lobbied the president to give his support to the pro-Zionist statement that Balfour was preparing to deliver. (11)

In endorsing the Balfour Declaration, President Wilson, the son of a Presbyterian minister, was sympathetic to Zionism. "To think," he told a prominent American rabbi, "that I the son of the manse should be able to help restore the Holy Land to its people."{12} But the peacemakers postponed a decision. In 1920, at a separate conference, the British got the Palestinian mandate (a form of trusteeship) to carry out the Balfour Declaration. Palestinian Arabs were already rioting against the Jews Wilson apparently gave little consideration to the possibility that establishing a "national home for the Jewish people in Palestine" might conflict with the concept of national self-determination, the principle that Wilson would soon present to the world as an indispensable ingredient in a just and stable world order. (13)

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1.1.4. European Imperialism:

The third issue that drew the Wilson administration into Middle Eastern affairs was European imperialism. Disillusioned by the standard Old World power plays during and after the Great War, President Wilson began, writes Dr. LaFeber, to conspicuously formalize unilateralism as American policy. Wilson saw that the European Allies would not embrace his universal values of freedom and self-determination – his justification for entering the war. Instead they characteristically sought to exploit the vanquished powers' weakness to fashion geopolitical circumstances according to "their static economic and political systems." Consequently, Wilson believed that America should be prepared to "act on its own" if its exceptionalist principles were to "become universal." Otherwise U.S. foreign policy would be "compromised by a world that was considered old in more ways than one" (Lakebed 32).

The American people also became disillusioned in their own way with the Great War's aftermath, but did not embrace the Wilsonian dream of making the world 'safe for democracy.' America instead sought to wash its hands of the outside world altogether. Consequently, the U.S. retreated inward – playing little if any part in using the "reality of its growing power" to real effect internationally. Hope against hope, America pursued a return to a mythical era of insulation from outside entanglements. In so doing, the "United States contributed indirectly to the inevitability of World War II twenty years later" (Palliser 28). In the very same month that Balfour issued his declaration, November 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power in Moscow. The Bolsheviks denounced World War 1 as an imperialist conflict and, to prove their claim, published a document discovered in the Czech archives detailing a secret 1916 agreement between Britain and France, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a postwar plan whereby Britain and France would carve up the territory of the Ottoman Empire and add it to their own empires.

The revelation of Sykes-Picot posed a problem for Wilson, who, since taking America into the war, had been trying to portray the conflict as a struggle for freedom and democracy. In January 1918, Wilson made a speech to Congress in which he outlined his own terms for ending the war. These terms were known collectively as the Fourteen

Points to answer the Bolshevik critique. He hoped to convince the nations and peoples of the world that the war was about something other than imperialist spoils and had a higher political and moral purpose. Wilson said that Turkey proper should remain a sovereign state, but that the empire non-Turkish components should be assured "an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development." (13)

Immediately after the war, U.S. Policy toward the Middle East continued to be defined by the same three issues, European imperialism, Zionism, and the Armenian question. Each of these issues revealed both the power and the limitations of Wilson's conception of national self-determination. The issues of European imperialism and Zionism arose simultaneously in 1919, when Wilson sent a special commission to the Middle East, known as the King-Crane Commission, to ascertain the political aspirations of the native inhabitants. The King-Crane Commission reached two major conclusions. The first conclusion concerned Syria; it found that the people of Syria were implacably opposed to the establishment of French mandate over Syria. The Syrians first choice was immediate Syrian independence, failing that, they preferred an American mandate over Syria, with a British mandate coming in as a distant third choice. French mandate, however, was out of the question. (14)

The commission second finding concerned the fate of Palestine; it concluded that the Zionism program could not be implemented without resulting in the "complete disposition of the present non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine." This would be a "gross violation" of the principle of national self-determination. (15) At San Remo, the victorious European powers decided to give France a single mandate over Syria and Lebanon and to give Britain separate mandates over Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. Included in the British mandate was the obligation to implement the Balfour Declaration. These mandates would operate under the auspices of the League of Nations, the international organization created by the Treaty of Versailles. Of all Arab nations lying east of Egypt, only Saudi Arabia was to receive immediate independence.

The decisions made at San Remo caused shock and dismay throughout the Arab Middle East. To most politically conscious Arabs, San Remo represented a disgraceful reneging on previous Western pledges of support for Arab independence, be they Britain's promises to Sherif Hussein, or Woodrow Wilson's soaring rhetoric of national

self-determination. The Palestinians and the Syrians had clearly communicated their opposition to the Balfour Declaration and to French mandate over Syria, and yet both projects were being imposed on them anyway. Not for the last time, the Western powers were accused of thwarting the basic political aspirations of the Arab people.

Shortly after the mandate system was first proposed, Britain and France began pressuring the United States to assume two mandates in Turkish territory. The first over Constantinople and the Turkish straits, which serve as a passageway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the second over a separate Armenian republic to the east, which declared its independence during the war. Because both Britain and France were afraid that Russia, now under Bolshevik leadership, might take advantage of Turkey's weakened state and start encroaching on the Middle East, allied control over Armenia and the straits would help prevent such expansion. Giving the mandates to the United States, which assumed to be free of imperial ambition in this region, seemed to be the best way around the problem. (16)

Wilson steered clear of Constantinople and the straits, but he did request U.S. Senate approval for an Armenian mandate. The U.S. Senate rejected this proposal, along with Wilson's more general vision of active American involvement in world affairs. With the United States refusing to assume the Turkish mandates, the burden reverted to Britain and France. Yet neither Britain nor France had the stomach for the task, which could not be accomplished without an indefinite and draining commitment of forces. For although Turkey had accepted the loss of its empire, it was determined at all to resist any encroachments on Turkey proper. The allies abandoned the proposed Turkish mandates and, in late 1920, quietly stood by as Turkey defeated the forces of the Armenian republic, whose territory was absorbed by Turkey and the Soviet Union.

Britain and France continued to occupy Constantinople and the Turkish straits for another couple years, but their presence was strongly resisted by an uprising within the Turkish military led by a dynamic young officer named Mustafa Kemal. In 1923, the allies signed a new treaty with Turkey, the treaty of Lausanne, which finally freed Turkey of allied occupation. By now, Mustafa Kemal had become Turkey's de facto leader. In late 1923, a national assembly loyal to Kemal convened and formally abolished the

Ottoman Sultanate and declared Turkey a republic .Kemal later became president of Turkey, a position he would hold until his death in 1938. (17)

Also in 1922, the British and French mandates were formally established in the Middle East, under the auspices of the newly created League of Nations. As previously agreed, Britain got mandates over Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, while France was entrusted with Syria and Lebanon. In Palestine, the British began preparing the ground for an eventual Jewish homeland, facilitating the creation of Zionist state-building institutions and allowing a regular influx of European Jews to immigrate to the country. The postwar settlement that emerged in 1922 is of crucial importance since it established territorial boundaries that, with few exceptions, would become permanent frontiers. The European imperial powers would eventually relinquish their control over the Middle East, but the lines they drew remain with us today.

In all of these developments, the U.S. government had no official involvement, and not even much interest. For, by the start of the 1920s, the American body politics had rejected Wilson's vision of active U.S. involvement in international politics, returning to a posture of political aloofness. But, as we shall see in the next, this isolationist stance extended only to political matters. In an economic sense—and, to some extent, a cultural one—Americans would find themselves bound up as never before in the affairs of the Middle East. Also we'll look at the events of World War 11, which catapulted the United States into superpower status, with profound and lasting implications for U.S. relations with the Middle East.

1.2. The United States and the Middle East in the Interwar Period and During World War II

As we saw law in the last, World War I brought about the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The empire's non-Turkish holdings were stripped away, and Turkey emerged as a modern republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, who served as president until his death in 1938. Some years after taking office (1934), Kemal was given the surname Atatürk, which means "father of the Turks." In the 1920s and 1930s, Atatürk launched a remarkably ambitious campaign to recast Turkey as a modern, westernized nation. He

undertook social and educational programs aimed at de-emphasizing Turkey's Middle Eastern and Islamic heritage, in favor of secularism and Turkish nationalism. (19)

The Arab nations that were newly freed from Ottoman control found themselves under the authority of the League of Nations mandates. France got a single mandate over Syria and Lebanon that remained in place until World War 2, while Britain received separate mandates over Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine. Iraq was granted formal independence in 1932, though Britain continued to exercise de facto control over Iraqi decision-making. A similar sort of "independence" would have been arranged for Transjordan, though that wouldn't come to pass until 1946. In Palestine, Britain set about the task of implementing the Balfour Declaration, assisting with the establishment of Jewish state-building institutions and permitting a regular flow of European Jews to enter the country, except during the World War. Egypt had not been placed under a formal mandate, but it remained subject to military occupation by Britain. The British officially recognized Egypt as an independent nation but continued to exert de facto control over its government.

On the other side of the former Ottoman Empire was Iran. This was formally independent, but had long been dominated by Russia and Britain. In the early 1920s, an army officer named Reza Khan took power in a coup and shortly thereafter crowned himself the monarch of Iran, taking the name Reza Shah Pahlavi. Somewhat like Atatürk, though on a less ambitious scale, Reza Shah sought to modernize, Westernize, and secularize Iranian society. With that background out of the way, let's look at the United States during the interwar period, and how events and images from the Middle East helped shape American society and culture. (20)

1.2.1. National Origins Act:

The Republican administrations of the 1920s understood that the American public had a low tolerance for international activism. Washington refrained from taking bold actions in its own right and instead used the private sector as an instrument of policy If, for example, the U.S. government decided that a particular country was in need of financial aid, it would encourage American bankers to extend loans to that country, rather than asking Congress to appropriate foreign aid. Congress, too, reflected the public's

isolationist mood by passing the National Origins Act of 1924, which limited or prohibited immigration into the United States from places other than Northern and Western Europe. (21) This law was imposed restrictions on future immigration to the United States based on nationality. Each nationality was given a quota based on its percentage of the U.S. population back in 1890. Obviously, this strongly favored those ethnic groups that already comprised the largest percentage of the population, northern European Protestant, while discriminating against those of eastern or southern European origin. The National Origins Act was even harder on people from East Asia, who were barred from entering the country altogether. These restrictive immigration policies would remain substantially in place until the mid-1960s. (22)

For the purpose of the National Origins Act, Middle Easterners were officially regarded as white, so they were not excluded outright in the same way that East Asians were. Official whiteness did not, of course, spare Middle Easterners from the quota system, and because people of Middle Eastern origin represented such a small percentage of the U.S. population in 1980, immigration from that region was locked in at a very low level. Not until after the immigration reforms of the mid-1960s would the United States experience the massive influx of Middle Eastern immigrants that has done so much to alter the texture of American life. (23)

In the areas of technology and mass culture, however Americans were becoming more, not less, connected to the outside world. Radio and cinema made sounds and images from faraway lands accessible to Americans everywhere; another reason for the growing cosmopolitanism of American culture was the recent experience of the world war. For a brief but vivid period, hundreds of thousands of Americans—soldiers, sailors, engineers, diplomats, reporters—had traveled abroad for the first time, and American newspapers had been full of lively dispatches about battles, peace conferences, revolutions, epidemics, and famines in faraway lands. To be sure, the war and its aftermath caused millions of Americans to turn away in disgust, to want nothing to do with such a dangerous and messy world, but it also created a new awareness of international events that could be wiped away. (24)

1.2.2. Lawrence of Arabia Inside American Culture:

One part of the world that World War 1 opened up to ordinary Americans was the Middle East, especially the Arab world. During the war, a number of Arab tribes under the leadership of Sharif Hussein of Mecca had mounted an uprising against the Turks, mainly in the deserts of present-day Syria, Jordan, and northern Saudi Arabia. (25) Out of this uprising grew the romantic myth of Lawrence of Arabia. Colonel T.E. Lawrence was a British army intelligence officer sent by his government to the Arabian Desert to help train and advice the Arab tribes taking part to the revolt. In the latter stages of the war, Lawrence was discovered by an American publicist named Lowell Thomas, who traveled to Arabia and spent a few months in Lawrence's company. After the war, Thomas put together a multimedia presentation about Lawrence's exploits that was shown in theatres and lecture halls throughout the English-speaking world. (26)

Lawrence of Arabia became a huge celebrity in the United States, his fame rivaling that of Charles Lindbergh. Lawrence's celebrity was partly responsible for launching an Arabian craze in the 1920s, which had hip young Americans affecting Arab-style dress, crooning love ballads like "The Sheik of Araby," and gyrating to the "hootchie-cootchie,"a sexually suggestive dance meant to approximate Middle Easter belly-dancing. Americans also flocked to "sun and sand" movies, in which swashbuckling heroes rode, fought, and romanced their way across the deserts of Arabia and North Africa. In the 1920s, nearly 90 movies with Arabian themes were produced in the United States. The biggest star of this genre was an Italian-American actor named Rudolph Valentino, whose elegant gestures and smoldering good looks generated a huge, devoted following, consisting mainly of teenaged girls and young women. (27)

To be sure, during the interwar years, America's engagement with Middle Eastern themes was not entirely frivolous; it had its serious side as well. This was especially true in the 1930s, when some of the concerns that would define the post-World War 11 period began forcing Americans, once again, to pay attention to overseas events. As we'll see in future chapters, after World War II, U.S. policy toward the Middle East would often center on three major issues: Zionism, oil, and the Cold War. Two of those issues, Zionism and oil, began to impose themselves on American consciousness in the 1930s, promoting a re-engagement with international affairs. Let's look at Zionism first.

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1.2.3. The Balfour Declaration:

During World War 1, the Zionist movement had grown rapidly in the United States, after the war, however, American Zionism declined. The improvement of living conditions for Middle Eastern Jews following the end of the war, combined with the issuing of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, convinced many American Zionists that their work was done. The onset of the Great Depression in the early 1930s brought about a further decline in American Zionism. Few American Jews had the resources to devote to Zionist activities. (28)

All this started to change in 1933, when Hitler came to power and began persecuting German Jews. Like their counterparts in Europe and Palestine, American Zionist pressured Britain to increase the number of European Jews it allowed to enter Palestine each year. Initially, Britain responded favorably to this pressure, significantly increasing the annual quota of European immigrants into Palestine. Then, just as the plight of German Jews was becoming truly desperate, following the Kristallnacht attacks of 1938, Britain began to rethink the wisdom of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. (29)

1.2.4. White Paper:

In 1939, Britain issued a new policy statement known as the White Paper. This issue placed strict limits on the number of Jews admitted into Palestine each year and announced that Jewish immigration would end entirely in a few years' time. It also called for the regulation of land sales to Zionist institutions and individuals. Thus, just as the world was to plunge into another world war, the Zionist movement appeared to have suffered a crippling blow. During the ensuring war, even as it supported Britain in the struggle against the Nazis, the Zionist movement, whether in Palestine, Britain, or America, would bitterly oppose Britain's stance on Palestine. As David Ben-Gurion, the leader of the Zionist movement in Palestine and later the first prime minister of Israel, put it at the time, Zionist would "fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and fight the White paper as if there were no war. (30)

1.2. 4. Oil:

The second major issue that drew Americans into Middle Eastern affairs was oil. The growing importance of the automobile dramatically increased America's reliance on foreign oil. By the 1920s American oil companies were launched on an intensive search for reliable overseas reserves. In 1928, a consortium of American oil companies signed an agreement with other three oil companies—one British, one French, and one Dutch—whereby all four parties pledged to cooperate with one another in exploring for oil in the lands of the former Ottoman Empire. The Red Line Agreement made it possible for American oil companies to extract oil from Iraq, at that time, the only country in the former Ottoman Empire with large, proven oil reserves. (31)

In the early 1930s, King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia permitted a team of American geologists to conduct a survey of his kingdom. On the basis of this survey, an American oil company, Standard Oil of California (SOCAL), put in a bid with the Saudi government for an oil concession, which was granted in 1933.The American oil companies had the favored position and were able to enjoy a virtual monopoly on Saudi oil. Given the magnitude of Saudi reserves and their significance for American economic and strategic security, it was only a matter of time before the U.S. government stepped in to actively protect the American oil companies' concession.This would start to happen in a significant way during World War11. (32)

1.2.5. The Second World War:

The American involvement in the Middle East during the Second World War was during that conflict the pattern we still witness today. Formal U.S. involvement in World War 2 began, of course, with Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, to which Washington responded by declaring war on Japan. (The US put Japan in to an oil embargo in the summer of 1941, which, regarding the Japanese dependency on energy import, was a very serious action). A few days later, Nazi Germany declared war on the United States, bringing America into the European theater of the war as well. The enormous industrial capacity of the United States, allowed it to serve as "the great arsenal of democracy," (33) in the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. To make the most of America's industrial potential in the war, Roosevelt devised a policy known as Lend-

Lease, whereby the United States loaned its wartime allies military equipments without worrying too much about the timing or manner of repayment.

The biggest recipient of Lend-Lease aid was Britain, while the Soviet Union also received a huge amount of aid, about $ 11 billion worth over the course of the war. To ensure that the territory and resources of the Middle East would remain available to the United States and its allies, Washington took part in several wartime initiatives. It occupied together with Britain. The northern part of Iran was occupied by the Soviet Union, and used it as a corridor — the so-called Persian Corridor — for transporting war material from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union. So, Iran was important to the United States not only for its strategic location but also for its considerable oil reserves, which were crucial to the American war effort. Another Middle Easter country of crucial interest to the United States was Saudi Arabia. To ensure that Saudi Arabia's vast oil reserves would be available for the allied war effort (and beyond), the U.S. government established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia and extended economic aid to it. (34)

Turkey was also important to the U.S. and its allies during the war. The Anglo-Franco-Turkish treaty of mutual support was signed on 19 October 1939. With it the Turks got loans and credits for the purchase of military equipments. In a separate protocol attached to the treaty, Turkey was excused from any obligation which could involve her in a war with the Soviet Union. The treaty stipulated that Turkey would collaborate effectively with France and Britain in the event of an act of aggression of a European power leading in the Mediterranean by an Axis forces particularly Italy. By then, however, the collapse of France by Nazi German troops in 1940, had drastically changed the balance of power, and in spite of its obligations Turkey devoted all its energy to staying out of the war, invoking the separate protocol as a pretext. The ally governments saw Turkey as a valuable source of manpower and exerted pressure to get it to enter the war, but Turkey resisted and Britain had no choice but to accept. After the German occupation of Greece and Bulgaria's siding with the Axis in 1941, the war had reached Turkey's borders. As a consequence, in June 1941, almost simultaneously with the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it concluded a treaty of friendship with Germany. Throughout the next year and a half, the period of the greatest German

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expansion, Turkey kept up a scrupulously neutral position, pleading lack of preparation and the need for supplies with the Ally governments. (35)

Though primarily preoccupied with winning the war, the U.S. government also had to concern with the nationalist aspirations of Middle Easterners struggling to free themselves from European imperial domination. This was in keeping not just with the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination but with an even older American tradition of anti-colonialism, stemming from the fact that United States itself had gained its independence by staging a revolt against a colonial power. America also stood to benefit by decolonization, which would remove the tariff barriers the European powers had erected around their imperial holdings and dissolve their monopolies of industries in the countries they dominated. The United States wanted to differentiate itself starkly from Nazi doctrine of racial supremacy and could do so by distancing itself from the legacy of European imperialism, which had itself so often relied on supremacist doctrine. The imperative of defeating the Axis powers, however, usually trumped Washington's anti-colonial impulses. A case in point was a political crisis that occurred in Egypt in 1942. When Egypt's King Farouk tried to install a new, pro-German cabinet; British tanks surrounded the royal palace and forced the King to name a pro-British cabinet instead. The U.S. government supported this violation of Egyptian self-determination, reasoning that Egypt was strategically too valuable to be permitted to fall into Axis hands. (36) (as it was, because German/ Italian troops had advanced already to Egypt, about 150 km from Alexandria. Had Egypt fallen into their hands, it had meant that the allies had been blocked away from the Eastern Mediterranean totally).

When it came to U.S. attitudes toward the Middle East, however, there would have been important elements of continuity. In the new postwar era, as in World War II, the United States would continue to believe that its own security depended on keeping the Middle East in friendly hands. The global enemy would be different, but the geostrategic importance of the Middle East would be remarkably similar in American eyes. In this sense, we can identify World War II as the real turning point in American attitudes toward the Middle East, as the event that caused American policy makers, for the first time, to be vitally concerned about the political character and geopolitical orientation of

Middle Eastern states, and to devise deliberate and elaborate policies to protect their interests in that region.

1.3. American Values and the Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East:

World War 2 plunged the United States fully into global affairs. By the end of 1941, the country had fully committed itself to total victory, and its involvement was to prove crucial to the war effort. Because of its central importance to allied success, and its substantive involvement in international affairs, the United States found it difficult to change course in 1945 and revert to the isolationism of the past. To be sure, the first impulse was in this direction. Calls were heard for massive demobilization of the armed forces, cutbacks in the New Deal legislation of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and other efforts toward political and economic isolationism. (37) However, at least three sets of factors militated against such a course and propelled the United States in the direction of global power: (a) the global political and economic conditions of 1945 to 1947; (b) the decision of leading political figures within the United States to abandon isolationism after World War 2; and, most important, (c) the rise of an ideological challenge from the Soviet Union. (38)

1.3.1. The Beginning of American Involvement in the Middle East

During W.W.II in 1943 the Tehran Conference underlined the process of troop withdrawals from occupied areas in the oil rich Middle East. Later in 1946 British and American troops had withdrawn from these regions when Stalin decided to claim the Iranian republic as a Soviet client state. A second war almost ensued. Originally, it was the British who had created the partition of Persia into Iran and Iraq and now they along with the US were not about to allow the Soviet's to effectively install their own puppet regimes in order to nationalize those oil fields under Communist control. The US and its allies realized that nationalization of these oil fields would cause the price of oil world wide to skyrocket. The US response was an appeal to the United Nations and the UN

threatened invasion of Iran. This was forestalled when the pro- west faction of the Iranian government executed the Soviet puppet Iranian "Tudeh" party leaders.

The Tehran Conference also became pivotal with the notion of Turkey and its strategic position on the Bosphorous. During the Tehran conference Churchill had promised Stalin access through the straits as well as limited control. However, when that issue was brought before Truman, he maintained that any, ".island waterways bound by more than two states be placed under international control." It was at this point that Acheson's view on the necessity to deal with Stalin from "positions of strength" came to be characterized by Truman's new emerging containment doctrine, the Domino theory. Deterrence was the first measure of response when Truman ordered the US Navy aircraft carrier, the USS Roosevelt to remain permanently in the Mediterranean. Stalin responds to this by withdrawing from all overt participation in any Bretton Woods Agreements, and closed his borders to all western trade. Stalin then began a massive armament campaign and a policy of a coup entente in the Third World

The heritage of moral principle is more readily evident in the Cold War period and containment policy. The universal campaign that the United States initiated was highly consistent with its past. Moral accommodation with the values of Russian communism, and all communisms, was simply not acceptable. In fact, some even sought to "roll back" communism rather than just contain it. Like the efforts in America's past (the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, World War 1, and 2), then the containment strategy represented an all-out attempt, in this case, to confront the moral challenge from the Soviet Union and all it represented. Moral values, moreover, served as primary justification for American policy once again. (39)

The Cold War was the most important political issue of the early postwar period. It grew out of longstanding disagreements between the Soviet Union and the United States. In 1918 American troops participated in the Allied intervention in Russia on behalf of anti-Bolshevik forces. American diplomatic recognition of the Bolshevik regime did not come until 1933. Even then, suspicions persisted. During World War II, however, the two countries found themselves allied and thus ignored their differences to counter the Nazi threat.

At the war's end, antagonisms surfaced again. The United States hoped to share with other countries its conception of liberty, equality and democracy. With the rest of the world in turmoil, struggling with civil wars and disintegrating empires, the nation hoped to provide the stability to make peaceful reconstruction possible. Unable to forget the specter of the Great Depression (1929-1940), America now fostered its familiar position of free trade, and sought to eliminate trade barriers both to create markets for American agricultural and industrial products, and to ensure the ability of West European nations to export as a means to generate economic growth and rebuild their economies. Reduced trade barriers, it was believed, would promote economic growth at home and abroad, and bolster stability with U.S. friends and allies. (40)

Soon after the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, the Soviet Union emerged as America's new global adversary. In this new Cold War era, the United States continued to believe that its own security depended on keeping the Middle East in friendly hand. The United States was not itself dependent on Middle Eastern oil; but Western Europe and Japan were, and Washington needed those areas to be prosperous and stable. Economically, the U.S. officials understood that American prosperity depended on the existence of prosperous societies abroad, which could provide markets for American products and investment opportunities for American capital. Geographically, the U.S. government wanted to prevent communist parties from making political inroads into Western Europe; the best way to do that was to ensure that Western Europe was prosperous. Indeed, the U.S. government was so eager to achieve European prosperity that in 1947 it launched the Marshall Plan, which pumped billions of dollars from the U.S. treasury into the economies of Western Europe. Essential to success of the Marshall Plan was the easy availability of Middle Eastern oil. (41)

The United States also saw the Middle East as possessing great geostrategic value. Because the Middle East was adjacent to the Soviet Union, its territory could be used a staging area for land and air attacks on the Soviet Union in the event that the Cold War turned hot. (42)

1.3.2. Postwar America

Cold War struggles were also occurring in the Middle East. Strategically important as a supplier of oil, the region appeared vulnerable in 1946, when Soviet troops failed to leave Iran as promised, even after British and American forces had already withdrawn. The U.S. demanded a U.N. condemnation of Moscow's continued troop presence. When the United States observed Soviet tanks entering the region, Washington readied for a direct clash. Confronted by U.S. resolve, the Soviets withdrew their forces. Two years later, the United States officially recognized the new state of Israel 15 minutes after it was proclaimed -- a decision Truman made over strong resistance from Marshall and the State Department. While cultivating close ties with Israel, the United States still sought to keep the friendship of Arab states opposed to Israel. (43)

1.3.3. George Kennan and Containment Policy:

On February 22, 1946, just one day after Stalin informed the Iranian government that his troops would not be withdrawing from Iranian territory in early March as originally promised, an American Foreign Service officer named George Kennan, then serving as charge d'affaires at the U.S. embassy in Moscow, sent an 8,000-word cable to Washington outlining his thoughts on the emerging rivalry with the Soviet Union. Kennan's message, which became known as the *Long Telegram*, presented an alarming picture of Soviet aggressiveness and outlined a strategy — later dubbed "containment" — by which the United States and its allies could prevent the Soviets from achieving world domination. Kennan's Long Telegram caused a sensation in official Washington. (44) Its appeal lay in the fact that it offered both a plausible analysis of the Soviet phenomenon and an apparently realistic approach for dealing with it.

Three days after the deadline for Soviet withdrawal from Iran came and went — without any withdrawal — the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill gave a speech in Fulton, Missouri, warning that *"an iron curtain"* had descended across the continent of Europe. (45) In this case, however, the Soviet withdrawal appears to have had more to do with shrewd Iranian diplomacy than with American toughness.

1.3.4. Shared Values Between Americans And Middle Easterners:

Most of the Middle Eastern leaders supported the U.S. and the West against the Soviet Union bloc during the Cold War for ideological reasons. Because of the majority of the Middle Easterners are Muslims, The United States and its allies had to ensure that these nations were not influenced by the Soviet Union. There was no better way to impede the Soviets, then with Islam. Communism, which is influenced by Marxism, believes that religion is "the opiate of the masses," and Islam makes no room for the "Godless Communists." (Some leaned toward the Soviet Union, as Gamal Abdal Nasser, Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad). Also the Americans believe the same; As Stephen J.Whitfield argues materialism was viewed as "the special philosophical province of the enemy, respect for religion also became pervasive." In other words, the U.S., to differentiate itself from the communistic countries that adhered to the doctrine of economic determinism and rejected religious beliefs, the United States stressed its own religious foundations and belief in God. America's response in the Cold War did not radically alter underlying cultural values; it brought into sharper focus contradictions that are inherent in the society. (46)

1.4. Truman's Beliefs and the Creation of Israel

In the years 1945-1949, President Harry Truman played a key role in bringing Israel into being and securing its existence. It is safe that no other single American action has done more embitter the Arab world against the United States. Justified or not, that bitterness has become a basic fact of life in U.S.-Arab relations, one that American policy makers cannot afford to ignore.

As it is known that since the early 1920s, Britain had governed Palestine as a League of Nations mandate. On the question of Palestine's future political status, Britain had followed an inconsistent policy. In the 1920s and 1930s, Britain had worked to implement the Balfour Declaration, permitting a massive influx of European Jewish immigration into Palestine. This development deeply alarmed Palestinian Arabs, who feared that the Zionist movement would result in their dispossession. Their opposition to the Zionist program was so intense that Britain decided to reverse course by issuing the White Paper of 1939, which placed strict limits on the number of Jews admitted into

Palestine each year, and which announced that Jewish immigration would end entirely in a few years' time. It also called for the regulation of land sales to Zionist institutions and individuals. The Zionist bitterly opposed the White Paper and began an uprising of their own against the British in Palestine. This uprising remained muted during World War 11, mainly because the Zionists, for obvious reasons, supported the British war effort against Germany, but it would erupt in full fury in the immediate aftermath of the war. (47)

World War II had a profoundly transforming effect on the Palestine issue. First and foremost, the Nazi holocaust of the 1940s gave enormous impetus to the Zionist movement, convincing Jews throughout the Western world that they could never be fully secure without a state of their own. Therefore, Zionist activists began seeking the support of American Jews and the patronage of the American government. This shift in orientation was both symbolized and accelerated by the Biltmore Conference of 1942, named for the hotel in New York City where the main components of the international Zionist movement met to coordinate policy. At the Biltmore Conference the Zionist movement united behind a call for unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine, leading to the establishment in that territory of a fully sovereign Jewish state. (48)

Initially, Truman administration approached the Palestine issue as an extending of the crisis surrounding "displaced persons," or (DPs).,hundreds of thousands of Europeans—refugees, concentration camp survivors, former prisoners of war, and others—who were being housed in American military camps in Europe. The U.S State Department favored returning DPs to their countries of origin; for Jewish DPs, however, this would mean going back to live among the very societies that had victimized them during the war, or had acquiesced in their victimization. Immigrating to Britain or the United States was another conceivable option, but both countries had placed strict limits on the number of Jewish immigrants they would accept. In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Zionists intensified their demands that Britain allow increased Jewish immigration into Palestine. Britain, which was suffering severe postwar shortages of basic commodities, was reluctant to take any action that might destabilize the Middle East and jeopardize the flow of oil. Still, something had to be done about the DP camps, whose terrible conditions were becoming a public scandal in the United States. (49)

1.4.1. The Morrison-Grady Plan

In June 1945, President Truman, asked Earl G. Harrison, dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, to go to Europe to investigate the condition of the camps. Harrison was shocked by what he found, and he wrote a report in which he recommended that Britain be pressured to allow 100,000 Jewish DPs to immigrate to Palestine immediately. Truman accepted this recommendation and officially conveyed it to the British government. The British were not thrilled by the request, and they out Truman off by proposing instead that a special Anglo-American commission be informed to study the Palestine problem and recommend a solution. Truman agreed. The Morrison-Grady Plan, which called for the division of Palestine into semiautonomous Arab and Jewish cantons, loosely linked to each other in a bi-national federal state. The plan also proposed that any further Jewish immigration into Palestine be subject to approval by both Arabs and Jewish. The Morrison-Grady plan was immediately rejected by Zionists and Arabs alike. (50)

Zionists rejected the plan because it fell short of their objective: unlimited Jewish immigration into Palestine, resulting in the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in all or most of that territory. Arabs, on the other side, rejected the plan because they viewed Palestine as an integral part of the Arab world; it should either become an independent state or be attached to another independent Arab state. Asking Palestinians to share their lands with Jewish immigrants from Europe was asking them to pay the price for a tragedy from which they had not been responsible.

The Haganah, a military organization representing the Zionist mainstream in Palestine smuggled thousands of Jews out of DP camps and shipped them illegally to Palestine, in defiance of British restrictions. Meanwhile, the Irgun, a right-wing Zionist group, launched commando, and occasionally terrorist, attacks against British targets in Palestine. The most notorious of these attacks occurred in 1946, when the Irgun set off a bomb in Jerusalem's King David Hotel, which was then serving as Britain's military and diplomatic headquarters. Eight-eight people, many of them civilians, died in the blast. (51)

In early 1947, Britain gave up on trying governing Palestine and turned the matter over to the United Nations. The UN formed a special Palestine commission, which

recommended that Palestine be partitioned into a Jewish state and an Arab state. Although the U.S. State Department opposed the partition plan, Truman instructed his UN ambassador to vote in favor of it. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly approved the partition plan by a very narrow margin. (52)

1.4.2. The Israeli Declaration of Independence:

In May 1948, the Zionists declared the independence state of Israel. Against vigorous opposition from his secretary of state, George Marshall, Truman extended immediate recognition to the new state. Truman recognized Israel for much the same reasons that he supported the partition plan: humanitarianism, domestic politics, and inertia. An additional reason was worried that if he failed to recognize Israel immediately, and if the Soviet Union recognized it first, then the new state might not be so favorably inclined toward the United States. For although the Soviets would later side with the Arabs, in 1948 they supported the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, seeing it as a potential vehicle for the extension of Soviet influence in the Middle East. To beat Moscow to the punch, Truman recognized Israel just 11 minutes after it declared its independence. (53)

1.4.3. Truman's Inner Beliefs Toward Israel:

Most historians and political scientists who have written about the issue have claimed that the president recognized the new state in an effort to capture the Jewish vote in the upcoming election. Benson argues that this line of reasoning fails to account for Truman's actions adequately and that, instead, the decision was based primarily on personal characteristics, such as his upbringing and religious beliefs. Rather than the electoral concerns that most attribute to Truman, Benson contends that the president's motives can be divided into five categories: his dislike for discrimination, his emotional feelings for the displaced persons from World War 2, his emotional feelings for the victims of the Holocaust, his belief that the Balfour Declaration applied to the United States and his deeply-held belief in the Old Testament and the promises therein of a Jewish return to the holy land. (54)

1.4.4. The Cultural Links Between Americans And Israelis:

In addition to above reasons for that President Truman for supporting the creation of Israel, he actually wanted to express his nation's perceptions and cultural links with Jews. Since the Puritans who settled America strongly identified with the Israelites of the Old Testament. Fleeing religious persecution, determined to establish a New Jerusalem in the New World. Believing that they were a "chosen people," and that the United States was destined to be an exceptional country and a "light unto the nations," the early Americans compared their new nation to ancient Israel. Harvard, Yale, and other leading American universities were founded upon religious beliefs that emanated from Israelites' experiences. Hebrew was part of the curriculum at both Harvard and Yale, The religious roots of America's major universities and many of the scholars, political leaders, policymakers, and other influential citizens they produced reinforced America's identification with Israel. U.S. Leaders treat religion as a central component of national life and often refer to the impact of their religious education on their attitudes toward Israel. As President Lyndon Johnson put it, "the Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into my souls." So that Israel's creation in 1948 was seen by many Americans as a new Exodus, a return to the Promised Land, and the fulfillment of biblical prophecy. As a consequence what I have mentioned above that American people and leaders support and protect Israel's existence according to ethical and religious beliefs. (55)

Immediately following Israel's declaration of independence, the armies of the Surrounding Arab states invaded Palestine in an effort to prevent Israel from coming into being. But the Israeli forces, better armed and better organized, won a decisive military victory over the Arab states. By the time armistices were concluded in early 1949, the Israelis not only had successfully held on the area allotted to them by the UN but had managed to take over a large part of the projected Arab states as well. The independent Arab state never came into being, since its territory was taken over by neighboring Arab states. Jordan annexed the West Bank and the eastern part of Jerusalem, while Egypt took over the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, about 750,000 Palestinian civilians had either fled or been driven from their homes in the territory now held by Israel. (56)

Truman himself was unhappy with Israel's postwar attitude, especially regarding Palestinian refugees. Preoccupied with other foreign crisis, like the Korean War, which began in mid-1950, eventually gave up on trying to change Israel's position. Such passivity was in keeping with Truman's approach to the Palestine crisis. For all his passivity, however, the fact remained that Truman had played a key role in bringing Israel into being and displacing a preexisting Arab society. Consequently, America's reputation in the Arab world drastically declined. (57)

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Chapter 2: Into the Labyrinth: The U.S. Gets Committed To The Middle East:

2.1. The United State's Basic Values and the Suez Crisis

The Suez crisis is a crucial turning point in world history, because it marks Britain's demise as the preeminent Western power in the Middle East and the assumption of that role by the United States—a role Washington continues to play to this day. (1) Such crisis has demonstrated how the typical American values played a major role in foreign policy agendas. These values also have portrayed the major three American foreign policy during and after the crisis, these are anti-colonialism, anti-communism, and leadership which the Americans consider themselves as a nation with distinctive values which all other nations should follow them.

In March 1956, Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, adopting a much tougher line on Egyptian President Nasser than the one they had followed over the previous couple years. We recall that one way Eisenhower and Dulles decided to get tough was by stalling on negotiations over Western funding for the Aswan Dam project. The idea was to "keep Nasser guessing" about the status of the funding, in the hopes of making him more deferential in his dealings with the United States. (2) Over the next few months, a couple factors convinced Eisenhower and Dulles to withdraw funding for the project altogether.

First, Egypt established formal diplomatic relations with communist China, a huge no-no in American eyes. Second, Nasser hinted that he might turn to the Soviet Union for funding if the Western terms were unsatisfactory. (3) Nasser's response to funding withdrawal was totally unexpected and quite ingenious. On July 26, 1956, addressing a huge audience in the Egyptian city of Alexandria, Nasser announced that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which was mainly British owned, and would use the canal's toll revenues to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam. (4)

2.1.1. The Nationalization of the Suez Canal:

The nationalization of the Suez Canal Company was legal in that Egypt pledged to compensate the company's shareholders at prevailing market rates. Britain, however,

saw the act as politically, economically and strategically intolerable. Two-thirds of Western Europe's oil imports were shipped through the Suez Canal, and Britain saw itself as the guarantor of those oil shipments. For Britain to lose control of the canal meant that British could no longer be considered a global power. (5) So, the British government began advocating a military intervention to reverse Nasser's action. It began secretly conspiring with the French and the Israelis to achieve the overthrow of Nasser. The French government was already angered by Nasser's support for a nationalist rebellion then taking place against French colonial rule in Algeria. As for Israel, it feared that Nasser was building up his army in preparation for war against Israel. All three countries—Britain, France, and Israel –believed their situations would vastly improve if Nasser vanished from the world scene. (6)

The Americans were strongly opposed to military intervention, believing that attack on Egypt would enflame the entire Arab world against the West and perhaps cause the Arab nations to align with the Soviet bloc. (7) Instead, Eisenhower sponsored a series of diplomatic conferences aimed at finding a compromise solution to the crisis, one that respected Egypt's sovereignty but also placed some measure of international control over the canal. Both parties, however, were not buying the Eisenhower's approach which it turned out, a fatal miscalculation. In late October 1956, Israeli forces crossed into the Sinai Peninsula as planned, overwhelming Egyptian border posts and quickly advancing toward the Suez Canal. The next day Britain and France issued their ultimatum, demanding that Israel and Egypt withdraw to within ten miles of either side of the Suez Canal and permit Anglo-French forces to occupy the Canal Zone. (8)

2.1.2. The Suez War:

Britain and France ignored world opinion and pushed ahead with their ill-considered plan. They responded to Nasser's rejection by bombing Egyptian airfields near the Canal Zone, a few days' later British and French paratroops began landing in Egypt, and were soon followed by amphibious forces. Nasser was in a weak position to resist the attack, and his country was quickly occupied. But one thing Nasser was able to do was close the Suez Canal by clogging it up with old sunken ships. As I said, two-thirds of the oil Western Europe consumed passed through the canal. To get from the

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Persian Gulf to Europe, oil tankers now had to sail all the way around the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa, imposing major shortages and delays on the countries of Western Europe. The United States opposed this action of its NATO allies as a violation of the principle of self-determination. The American delegation at the United Nations voted in favor of a General Assembly resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of the invading troops. Great Britain, France, and Israel accepted these terms. In March 1957, under the supervision of a U.N. police force, the Suez Canal was cleared of wreckage and opened to shipping.(9)

2.1.3. American Reaction Against The War:

Eisenhower was shocked and outraged by the attack on Egypt, publicly condemned the attack and had his UN representative sponsor resolutions in the UN opposing the intervention. (10) The Soviets shared Eisenhower's outrage and voted with the United States in the UN, an odd spectacle indeed in those Cold War days. Eisenhower then placed extraordinary political and economic pressure on the attackers to cease their intervention and withdraw from Egypt. As we saw, Nasser's decision to block the Suez Canal caused a major oil shortage in Europe. Eisenhower refused to allow any oil from the Western Hemisphere to be sent to Western Europe until the British and French agreed to a cease-fire. (11) He also saw to it that Britain was unable to borrow gold reserves from the International Monetary Fund, causing a sudden devaluation of the British pound. Finally, Eisenhower threatened to impose economic sanctions against Israel unless it, too, pulled out of Egypt. These measures forced Britain, France, and Israel to end their attack on Egypt, Nasser's regime was saved.

2.1.4. America vs. Anti-Colonialism:

The Americans did not give their support to Britain or France when these two countries invaded Egypt. This was for two reasons. First, the Americans had been kept in the dark about what Britain and France was going to do (attack Egypt) which greatly angered them. The second reason is that America realized that world sympathy was with Egypt on this issue and that both Britain and France came across as world bullies and America - having preached about democracy etc. - could not be seen to be associating herself with the two 'bullies'. America was also very wary that the whole situation could

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easily get out of hand. (12) Furthermore, Eisenhower's opposition to the conduct of Israel, Great Britain, France-an anomaly in light of later U.S.' values of policy-is explained by his opposition to old-style Colonialism. Britain and France irritation with America anti-Colonialism was a source of problems among the leaders of the three nations.

The Sues crisis revealed that Britain could no longer be considered the primary Western power in the Middle East. This situation posed a serious problem for the United States. Although Eisenhower had strongly opposed Britain's attack on Egypt, he believed that the rapid erosion of British influence in the Middle East would create a political and strategic vacuum in the region and also enable the Soviet Union to increase its own influence in the region unless the United States took action. In other words, it would have to take Britain's place as the primary Western power in the Middle East. (13)

2.1.5. America vs. Anti-Communism, The Domino theory:

To prevent this from happening, in early 1957, Eisenhower launched an initiative that became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. (14) He got Congress to pass a resolution that authorized the executive branch to give more economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries. The resolution also declared the intention of the United States to intervene militarily to protect any Middle Eastern country that was the victim of "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism." (15)

In evaluating the success of the Eisenhower Doctrine, it's important to distinguish between the policy's ultimate objective and the strategy employed to achieve that objective. There was a time when the United States was not the main target of Arab nationalism or Islam extremism. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the biggest threat to western values and democracies was communism. The domino theory stated that unless communism was stopped, nations would collapse into communism like dominos. The United States was in a bitter struggle with the Soviet Union over allies and resources-the most important being black gold, oil. The objective was to prevent a Soviet takeover of the Middle East, and, since such a takeover never occurred, it has to be said that the objective was achieved. But the strategy to achieve the objective-discrediting Arab figures deemed "soft on communism" by promoting other Arab figures who were

conspicuously anticommunist-failed miserably. Fortunately for Eisenhower, that strategy was so ill-chosen in the first place that its failure did not compromise the ultimate objective. In other word, the Eisenhower administration was the beneficiary of its own prior miscalculation. (16)

This sort of irony was typical of the Eisenhower administration's performance in the Middle East, which was highly sophisticated in some ways and strikingly clumsy in others. The Eisenhower Doctrine was a work of considerable subtlety, intricacy, and internal coherence. Yet the whole edifice rested on a basic misreading of political realities in the Arab world, on an underestimation of the power and independence of Nasserism, and an overestimation of the political strength of the United States. Nasser himself was bemused by this contradiction. Once, when discussing the Eisenhower Doctrine with an American friend, he said, "The genius of you Americans is that you never made clear-cut stupid moves, only complicated stupid moves which make us wonder at the possibility that there may be something to them we were missing." (17)

One thing that was definitely accomplished under Eisenhower—though this was more by default than though any brilliance on Eisenhower's part—was that the United States became the dominant Western power in the Middle East. Britain had stumbled so badly in the Suez crisis that it was increasingly relegated to the margins of Middle Eastern politics. (18) We won't be hearing a great deal about the British: from now on the Middle East will be, at least as far as Western powers are concerned, an exclusively American stomping ground.

In post-Suez crisis, the Americans finally recognize that Nasser was a useful ally against Communist threat in Iraq and Syria after 1958, and they considered him in fact the only viable counterweight. However, the breakdown U.S.-Egyptian relations during the early 1960s on the receptivity of Presidents Kennedy and especially Johnson to lobbying by domestic supporters of Israel. Similarly, and like most American leaders and decision-makers always observe that the relationship between the United States and Israel is a special relationship for special reasons. It is based upon shared interests, shared values, and a shared commitment to democracy, pluralism and respect for the individual. We'll see of such attitudes during both Democrat Presidents Kennedy and Johnson in the following subject.

2.2. Kennedy — Engaging Middle Eastern Nationalism And Johnson — Taking Sides.

President John F. Kennedy made a remarkably serious effort to reach an accommodation with the forces of indigenous nationalism in the Middle East. He did so not for sentimental reasons but out of a conviction that victory in the Cold War would be impossible unless anti-Western grievances in the region could be successfully addressed. Paradoxically, Kennedy sought to win the Cold War in the Middle East by downplaying Cold War themes and stressing local concerns instead. (19)

In inter-Arab politics, Kennedy attempted to strike a balance between placating radical Arab nationalists and supporting conservative Arabs. He believed that Eisenhower had made a big mistake in pressuring Nasser and other nationalists to the side with the United States in the Cold War. These crude measures had succeeded only in alienating Arab nationalists, pushing them further into the Soviet embrace. Kennedy believed that the best way to deal with Arab nationalists was to treat them with respect, allow them to make their own foreign policy decisions, and offer them generous assistance in developing their countries internally. (20)

In some ways, Kennedy's approach to Arab nationalism resembled Eisenhower's treatment of Nasser in the mid-1950s. But he differed from Eisenhower in that he simultaneously tried to move much closer to Israel. Another difference was that Kennedy saw his approach to Arab nationalism as part of a broader effort to portray the United States as a friend and supporter of the emerging nations of the Third World. Like Eisenhower, Kennedy saw Nasser as the most important leader in the Arab world, and he placed extremely high priority on establishing cordial relations with Egypt: He began a private correspondence with Nasser in which he treated him with great deference. Also, he markedly increased U.S. economic aid. Such an extra aid had proved that the United States could help its both old and new allies in order to keep them out of the Godless communism, which had hold a strange ideologies and values systems. (21)

Kennedy's strategy of ingratiating Nasser began to come undone in September 1962, when a civil war broke out in Yemen, pitting a deposed conservative monarchy

against a new republican government. The Yemeni civil war quickly expanded into a proxy war between republican Egypt and monarchical Saudi Arabia. Such a proxy war over Yemen placed Kennedy in a bind. The Kennedy administration initially tried to draw a distinction between Arab nationalist and procommunist regimes. Seeking to improve relations with Egypt, President John F. Kennedy initiated a personal correspondence with that country's president Nasser. He needed to reassure Saudi Arabia that the United States was committed to its security, but he also wanted to maintain good relations with Nasser, by in corresponding the letter in May 1961 to the Egyptian president, "of mutual respect and confidence." (22) Kennedy's correspondences to Nasser had strongly reflected the values and beliefs of American nation in that time to support any friend, oppose any foes, to assure the survival and the success of liberty. (23)

Kennedy's balanced policy approach pleased neither Egypt nor Saudi government. Both countries accused the United Sates of siding with the other He also tried to strike a balance between ensuring Israel's security and pressuring Israel to make concessions to its Arab neighbors. There were two principle issues on which Kennedy hoped to influence Israeli behavior. He wanted Israel to permit the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, who wished to return to their homes in present-day Israel and who were willing to live peacefully under Israeli jurisdiction. Kennedy also wanted to prevent Israel from converting its civilian nuclear power program into a weapons program, realizing that Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons capability would further embitter Arab-Israeli relations. (24) Although that American policy toward Israel is mainly derived from "a broad cluster" of predisposition, sentiments, and attitudes toward Israel in American public opinion, which are permeated with sympathy, support and affection. Kennedy administration's values were also saw the other Middle East countries like Egypt and Gulf areas were primarily determined by vital security interests and strategic preferences that American policy makers have sought to maintain and implement throughout the region (such as trying to resolve or stabilize the Arab-Israeli conflict, maintaining access to Arab oil, and containing the Soviet Union). (25)

2.2.1. Kennedy's Values And Israeli-Arab Conflict:

Unfortunately for Kennedy, Israel refused to consider repatriation of Palestinian refugees on the grounds that this would result in the establishment of a hostile fifth column inside Israel. For their part, the Arab states showed little enthusiasm about Kennedy's repatriation scheme. On the nuclear question, Israel appeared to be cooperating with Kennedy, assuring him that the Dimona nuclear reactor was purely for civilian purposes. The members of the inspection team may have been fooled, but CIA remained convinced that something fishy was going on. Aerial photographs taken by American spy planes showed that the Dimona plant was much larger and more complex than what than what would be necessary for civilian purposes alone. (26) Kennedy, who of course had access to the CIA information, grew increasingly frustrated with Israel's evasiveness, and he began warning the Israelis that, unless they leveled with him about the nature of their nuclear program, relations between the two countries would be gravely jeopardized. He argued that Israel will not be the first country in the Middle East to produce nuclear weapons, claiming that the next peace initiatives would not be accomplished.   This was where matters stood at the time of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963. (27)

In U.S.-Iranian relations, Kennedy tried to strike a balance between pressuring the Shah to make internal reforms and shoring up his position within the country. President Kennedy invoked idealistic terms to encourage Shah of Iran to establish a real reforms to view the conflict there as one small part of the larger struggle between Freedom and Dictatorship. According to the President, the United States had to do whatever was necessary to defend freedom's world. Alternately, Kennedy explained that the situation in Iran was quiet unique because of that nation's particular history, government, logistics and legal relationship with the United States. In view of these complexities, the President held that the United States must pragmatically pursue very special policies in order to fulfill its mission in Iran. (28) Kennedy worried that the Shah's authoritarian methods were generating unmanageable opposition in Iran. Accordingly, Kennedy quietly urged the Shah to create more space for internal dissent and to institute land reform programs. (29) At the same time, Kennedy saw to it that Iran's internal security forces were well supplied, in case the reforms failed to prevent internal unrest. But the Conservative Shiite

clerics saw the reforms as too radical and joined the leftist students in protesting against the government. (30) Thus, by the time of Kennedy's death in late 1963, most of his Middle East initiatives were already stymied altogether under Lyndon B. Johnson.

2.2.2. Lyndon Johnson's Presidency:

When Johnson became president, that balancing act collapsed altogether, and Washington abandoned all pretense of even attempting a balanced approach. He instead assumed a frankly partisan stance, siding openly with the Shah of Iran against his internal opposition, with the conservative Arab regimes against Nasserist Egypt, with Israel against the Arab states as a whole. In addition, America assumed Israel's security doctrine: offensive defense on the basis of military superiority. In 1966, American military aid for Israel jumped from 168 million dollars in the previous years to 338 millions dollars. Johnson formulated the policy of his government in this way: "Israel will not be alone in any upcoming war." Consequently, helping the small state of Israel defend itself against less democratic, more numerous, and larger adversaries has been regarded as America's responsibilities. (31) This partisan approach to Middle Eastern politics would leave a legacy of bitterness and antagonism that remains with us to this day.

Johnson's partisan approach to Middle Eastern politics was the product of both personality and circumstance. Personally, Johnson was far more emotional and thin-skinned than his predecessor had been. Kennedy had possessed an ironic detachment that made it easier for him to deal with volatile and obstreperous foreign leaders. In Kennedy years, if foreign leader indulged in anti-American rhetoric, Kennedy tended not to take it personally, assuming instead that the leader in question was playing to his own constituency or engaging in some tactical maneuver. Johnson, by contrast, tended to take anti-American rhetoric at face value and, worse still, to see it as a personal affront to himself. Consequently, Johnson had far less patience with Middle Eastern leaders who criticized the United States. And he responded to them in ways that only increased their criticism. (32) This impatience of American administration against Arab nationalism because of the U.S. officials' political values looked with suspicion on populist third-world movements and ideologies, which took place in the second half of the 20th century.

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(33) U.S. policy advocates who mistrusted third world nationalists and suspected them of being allied with the Soviets in order to overthrow the existing regional order. (34)

The problem also had to do with the times in which Johnson served. The mid-to late 1960s were a period of revolutionary ferment throughout the world, and especially the Third World, who had gained independence after Western imperial domination. The tone of the Third World assertiveness was increasingly anti-Western and anti-American. The fact that this period also coincided with America's escalation of the war in Vietnam only intensified criticism directed at the United States.

In the Middle East, too, there was a rising of anti-U.S. criticism. Virtually all Arabs saw the United States as excessively partial to Israel. (35) Arab radicals in particular accused Washington of cozying up to reactionary Arab monarchs who mistreated their own people and hoarded their nations' wealth. In Iran, political dissidents blasted the United States for supporting the Shah, another authoritarian monarch who seemed out of touch with his own people. The more criticism Johnson received from Middle Eastern leaders and commentators, the more behaved in ways that generated further criticism, reinforcing his original inclination to give up on trying to win over his critics and to stick with leaders and government that supported him already. (36)

2.2.3. Realpolitik Policy:

U.S.-Iranian relations under Johnson, the American administration was supported the Shah against his internal opposition and geostrategic reasons as well. President Johnson gave the Shah full freedom to abandon the reforms and to fill the vacuum in the Gulf region instead of British protectorates on the Arabian Peninsula. (37) He preferred the Shah rather than Soviets, radical nationalists, or some pro-Western power. Johnson's administration had adopted the realpolitik policy rater than idealism, in the eyes of its advocates and practitioners, realism signifies a more orderly, clearheaded, and ruthless understanding of the formation of policy based on well-defined national interests. These national interests are closely identified with national security is the essence of this realism. (38) This agreement concluded that the United States and the Shah signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in 1964.Under SOFA, U.S. military personnel suspected of breaking Iranian laws were to be court-martialed by the U.S. military rather

than tried in Iranian court. Iran's internal security forces began arresting, jailing, and torturing suspected dissidents, a regime of repression that would continue for the remainder of Shah's rule. (39)

U.S.-Egyptian relations rapidly deteriorated after Kennedy's death. Johnson and Nasser had a visceral dislike for each other, and a serious of slights or perceived slights brought relations between the two countries to a new low. In 1964, after the United States participated in an operation to rescue white hostages in the Congo, Congolese students attacked and destroyed a U.S. Information Service library in Cairo. Nasser refused to condemn the attack or to apologize to the U.S. government. (40) Around the same time, the Egyptian air force shot down a private plane belonging to an American businessman who happened to be a close friend of Johnson. The resulting series of diplomatic "misunderstanding" culminated in Nasser's declaring that if Americans had a problem with Egypt they could "go and drink from the sea," the Egyptian equivalent of "go jump in a lake." (41)

In response to Nasser's verbal attack on the United States, the Johnson administration curtailed its food aid, further enraging Nasser. As U.S.-Egyptian relations deteriorated, the Johnson administration drew closer to the conservative Arab regimes. It sold tens of millions of dollars worth of military equipment to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The administration also became more supportive of Saudi Arabia in its proxy war against Egypt over Yemen. By 1966, the administration had committed itself to a "two pillars" (42) policy of beefing up support for both Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Another major beneficiary of Johnson's new approach to Middle East policy was Israel. "You have lost a very great friend," Johnson told to an Israeli diplomat soon after Kennedy's death. "But you have found a much better one." (43) Johnson saw Israelis as latter-day pioneers on the model of his own Texas forebears, and the Israeli government had little difficulty convincing him to turn up the spigot of military and economic aid.

During Johnson's administration, the United States first began selling Israel fighter aircraft and tanks, weapons with both offensive and defensive capabilities. Like Kennedy, however, Johnson was concerned about Israel's ongoing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. He, too, hoped to convince the Israelis to forego the nuclear option by providing them with state-of-the-art conventional weapons. (44) But Johnson was no

more successful than Kennedy had been at keeping Israel from developing the bomb. Although the Israeli government insisted that it had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. intelligence community learned otherwise. Shrewdly, Israel provided Washington with official assurance that made it easier for the Americans to evade the issue. Israel's standard statement on the question –"Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East" (45) –sounded definitive but actually contained significant loopholes.

It is believed that Israel acquired its first useable nuclear bomb sometime in early 1968. By that time, of course, the political and strategic landscape of the Middle East had been dramatically altered by the Six—Day War, and how such a war has led to the clash of cultures and then antagonism between the Americans and Middle Easterners that gradually reactivated and increased in post-September 11 attacks. The new conflict is going to be discussed in the following subject.

2.2.4. The American Cultural Response in the Six-Days War

"the Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modern Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into our souls."

President Lyndon Johnson, "Remarks at the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B'nai B'rith," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 4, no. 37 (September 1968):1343.

The Six-Day War dramatically altered the political and strategic landscape of the Middle East, creating a new situation "on the ground" with which the peoples of the Middle East, and the international community as a whole, continue to grapple to this day. (46) The war also helped bring about a profound transformation in the nature of Arab opposition to U.S. policy. To understand the causes of the Six-Day War, it is necessary to go back to the Suez War of 1956. On that occasion, Britain, France, and Israel launched an invasion of Egypt, only to be forced by international pressure, especially American pressure, to abandon the attack.

Although the Israelis were obliged to withdraw from Egypt, they got an important concession in return: the termination of an Egyptian blockade against their shipping, and an end to cross-border raids into Israeli territory. In the previous years, 1955, Egypt had tightened a blockade that had previously imposed against Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran, the passageway between the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea. The Egyptian blockade prevented Israel from using Eilat, its only southern port, and thus closed off Israel's most direct outlet to the Indian Ocean. (47)

Another problem the Israelis had faced prior to 1956 was repeated guerrilla and sudden attacks on their country from Palestinians in the Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, attacks that the Egyptian government either tolerated or sponsored. By the 1960s, the Arab world was divided into two mutually antagonistic camps: A conservative camp, consisting of such countries as Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, was strongly pro-American. A radical camp, consisting of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, was officially neutral in the Cold War but had a distinct pro-Soviet bias. (48) Each camp used the Arab-Israeli issue as a way of discrediting the other. This war of words intensified after a Syrian-Israeli aerial clash in

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April 1967; Nasser's failure to come to Syria's aid prompted Jordan's King Hussein to denounce Nasser as a cowardly fraud.

In May 1967, Nasser requested the removal of the UN peacekeepers from Sinai and Gaza. Nasser's motives appear to have been twofold; he wanted to pose a credible threat of retaliation in the event Israel launched an attack on Syria, which Nasser feared might be imminent. The peacekeepers stood in the way of a ground offensive against Israel. Nasser also wanted to silence critics in the Arab world who had accused him of using the presence of the UN peacekeepers as an excuse for avoiding conflict with Israel. Nasser realized, however, that a total withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force would leave a military vacuum in Gaza and Sharm al-Shaykh, a vacuum Nasser would have to fill with his own forces. (49) And, having occupied Sharm al-Shaykh, Nasser would face enormous pressure to reinstate the blockade on Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran. But if he blocked the strait, the Israelis would go to war against Egypt, because they had made it clear that free passage through the strait was a vital interest for which they were willing to fight.

After the peacekeepers departed, Nasser sent Egyptian forces into the Sinai, when his forces were in Sinai; Nasser faced enormous public pressure to reinstate the blockade against Israeli shipping through the Strait of Tiran. (50) In late May 1967, Nasser announced the closure of the straits to all Israeli shipping and to vessels of any nationality carrying strategic materials to Israel. Nasser's closure of the straits made it extremely likely that Israel would go to war against Egypt to reopen the straits. (51)

Meanwhile, Washington's efforts to organize an international flotilla to challenge Nasser's blockade were getting nowhere; few countries were willing to allow their navies to take part in an effort to force the Strait of Tiran. An alternative approach would be for the U.S. Navy to challenge the Egyptian blockade unilaterally, but Johnson knew that Congress would be unwilling to authorize such an operation, especially at a time when the war in Vietnam was losing popularity at home. So the U.S. government would not oppose Israel if it fire the first shot like the way Eisenhower did back in 1956. This time, the Israelis got a more encouraging condition, albeit through an unorthodox channel. (52)

2.2.5. The War:

As a result on June 5, 1967, Israel broke the impasse by launching a surprise attack on Egypt, destroying its air force on the ground. Deprived of air cover, confused and demoralized by conflicting orders issued by incompetent military leaders, the Egyptian army was all but defenseless against the Israeli ground assault in Sinai. (53) After Israel attacked Egypt, Jordan entered the war on Egypt's side. Israel quickly defeated the Jordanian army as well, taking control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Israel then turned its attention to Syria, from which it seized the strategic Golan Heights. By the time the war ended on June 11, 1967, Israel had tripled the amount of territory under its control, taking the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. (54)

Nasser greatly overstated Washington's support for Israel, but President Johnson's reaction to Israel's behavior in 1967 was markedly different from that of Eisenhower in 1956. (55) Whereas Eisenhower had forced Israel to withdraw from Egypt, Johnson merely called for, and achieved, a "cease-fire in place," which meant that fighting should stop and each country's forces should remain where they were. This allowed Israel to remain indefinitely in possession of the Arab territories it had seized. Early in the war, Nasser publicly charged that the U.S. Air Force had taken part in the attack, and Egypt broke diplomatic relations with the United States on that account. (56) The charge was false, but Nasser stuck to this story for several months thereafter, and U.S.-Egyptian relations would not be formally restored until 1974.

2.2.6. Americans Always Like Winners: Israel Becomes A Small Empire:

In the fall of 1967, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 242, which would become the basis for virtually all subsequent attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Resolution 242, which was accepted by Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, essentially called for a "land for peace" deal, whereby the Arab states recognized Israel's right to exist in security, and Israel withdraw from territories seized in the Six-Day War. (57)

Israel's speed victory against Arab troops was not only shocked the Arab world but also the Western world as well. It became like a small empire in the region and also more respectfully within the west Europeans in general and Americans in particular. For

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instance, in 1964, only 25 percent of Americans said that they sympathized with Israel and 7 percent with the Arabs. Still, two-thirds took neither side. But, everything changed after the 1967 Six Days War. Here was tiny Israel, bold and triumphant while the U.S. superpower was mired down in Vietnam. Public support for Israel nearly doubled. In the years after the Six Days War, large plurality, and often a majority, of Americans has expressed support for Israel over the Arabs in poll after poll. That suggests the American public's support for Israel is not based only on sympathy for persecuted Jews or pity for victims of the Holocaust. It also based on American values which considered admiration for Israel's success and determination. Americans always like Winners. (58)

2.2.7. The Consequences of the War:

The Six-Day War itself was also a devastating event and also came as a terrible shock for both Arab and Islamic worlds, especially for Palestinians and for Nasserist pan-Arabism. The fact that the war took only 6 days shows that Hashem is with Israel. It gained all of Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Sinai, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank. (59) Over a million Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza came under Israeli military occupation, while tens of thousands more were forced into exile in neighboring Arab countries, swelling the ranks of a previous generation of Palestinian refugees. (60) 1967 also had tended to downplay their separate identity in favor of Arab solidarity. The Arab states themselves had encouraged this tendency, telling the Palestinians that the only way for Palestine to be liberated was for the Arab states to band together and vanquish the Jewish state. (61) After 1967, Palestinians became increasingly convinced that collective Arab action was hopeless, and that the only way for them to regain Palestine was to take matters into their own hands and to seek liberation for them. (62) They created Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO, in 1964 with an independent political and military force, under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. For all of the previous Arab defeats to Israel, Nasserists and Arab nationalists had provided self-serving excuses. The defeat of 1948 was the fault not of the Arab people themselves, but of corrupt Arab monarch who had betrayed the Arab cause, (63) The military defeat of 1956 had occurred, not because Egypt was weaker than Israel, but because Britain and France had entered the war on Israel's side. But 1967 could not be explained away so easily.

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In short, there was a growing feeling in the Arab world, and in other Islamic countries as well, that secular nationalism had failed to deliver the goods, and that some alternative form of political organization had to be found. Many Arabs became convinced that their governments had gotten into trouble because they had abandoned their Islamic heritage and had turned instead to ideologies imported from the West, like liberalism, socialism, materialism, and secularism. Such ideologies, the argument went, had corroded Arab society from within, making it more vulnerable to Western domination. (64)

The Six-Days War also completed the reorientation of U.S. Middle East policy that Lyndon Johnson had begun shortly after taking office in late 1963. From the start, Johnson had moved away from the careful balancing act that John F. Kennedy had performed. Whereas Kennedy had both supported the Shah and pressured him to make internal reforms, Johnson had dropped the reform agenda and hailed the Shah as a staunch ally of the West. Whereas Kennedy had tried to improve relations with Arabs and Israelis simultaneously, Johnson had increasingly embraced the Israelis. Whereas Kennedy had tried to occupy a middle ground between supporting Arab radicals and supporting Arab conservatives, Johnson had openly sided with the conservatives. (65)

So, by the time Johnson left office in early 1969, three countries were emerging as Washington's primary allies in the Middle East: Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. In the administration of Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon, U.S. relations with each of these countries would become much closer and more extensive, with far-reaching consequences for the subsequent political history of the region.

2.3. Nixon's Realism Forming the American Foreign Policy in the Middle East

the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but...America cannot—and will not—conceive all plans, design all programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.

President Richard Nixon "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s" February 18, 1970

A general response to the 1960s, the Nixon Doctrine called for greater reliance on regional "cops on the beat"—powerful pro-Western governments that could protect American interests in various parts of the world, thus obviating the need for direct U.S military intervention. Two Middle Eastern nations, Iran, Israel, and to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia, quickly came to be seen as Washington's "cops on the beat." Although Nixon initially intended to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict on a separate policy track, by the early 1970, Israel had become an American strategic ally. These relationships were buttressed by a new policy formulation known as the Nixon Doctrine. (66)

2.3.1. Henry Kissinger and Nixon Doctrine:

Upon taking office in early 1969, Nixon was determined to control foreign policy from the White House. He ensured his control over U.S policy by appointing a highly secretive Harvard professor named Henry Kissinger as his national security advisor. Kissinger was a German Jew who, as a boy in the 1930s, had fled with his family to the United States to escape Nazi persecution. He had achieved prominence in the 1940s and 1960s as a political scientist and foreign policy analyst, occasionally serving as a consultant to the U.S government. Theoretically, Kissinger's function as Nixon's national security advisor was to receive input from all the executive departments concerned with foreign policy-State, Defense, the CIA, etc.-and then make recommendations to the president.(67)

The Nixon administration adopted a foreign policy approach more closely approaching the realist tradition than did earlier post-World War 11 presidents. Its approach was based upon the principles of the "balance of power" and was to be

anchored in a global equilibrium among the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (and later, Japan and Europe). (68) This realist perspective was to enable the United States to play a more limited global role and to utilize substantial amounts of regional power (and power centers) to foster American interests worldwide. At the same time, it would allow the United States to remain an important, even dominant, participant in global affairs. (69) This brings us now to U.S policy in the Middle East, and particularly U.S policy in the Persian Gulf area.

2.3.2. The Importance of the Middle East for Americans:

The principal Middle Eastern power to be cultivated under the Nixon Doctrine was Iran. In 1968, Britain had announced that it would withdraw its military forces from the Persian Gulf in three years' time, giving rise to speculation over who would fill the vacuum created by Britain's departure. The new Nixon administration was determined to prevent the Soviet Union from encroaching on that area. Moscow was already cultivating Iraq, one of the oil-rich states of the Gulf, as a client state, and the Americans were concerned about the further extension of Soviet Union. (70) Nixon's realism was assumed that the international environment determines a country's foreign policy. From his perspective, factors such as a state's position in the international system, its participation in alliances, and the balance of power after a huge vacuum in the rich oil of Persian Gulf., "are vastly more important than national variations in domestic political institutions and values" in determining that country's foreign policy in that time. (71)

At the same time, the Shah of Iran was growing more assertive in the Persian Gulf, seeking to turn Iran to succeed Britain as the next regional hegemony. The Shah's ambitions dovetailed with Nixon's foreign policy. By supporting Iran's claims to regional domination, Nixon could ensure that the Persian Gulf remained in pro-Western hands, without the necessity of direct U.S involvement. Nixon vastly increased the amount and quality of military aid to Iran, telling the Shah during his visit to Iran in 1972 that he could purchase from the United States any type of military equipment except the nuclear weapons. In thus embracing Iran, Nixon turned a blind eye to the Shah's brutal human rights records. To justify his attitude to support an authoritarian regimes, argued that Soviets and other pro-Soviets in the Middle East could not be trusted because once in

power, they would dispense with constitutional checks and balances and establish totalitarian regimes. The pro-Western governments like Iran and Saudi Arabia also warned the United States against expansion of communism which threat the regional stability, as well as to Western interests and values. (72)

Another Middle Eastern country to gain importance under the Nixon Doctrine, albeit to a lesser extent than Iran, was Saudi Arabia. In some formulation of Middle East policy, Iran and Saudi Arabia were described as the twin pillars on which Washington depended to ensure the status quo, though Iran was always the bigger pillar of the two. (73) By the late 1960s, the emergence of a seller's market for oil permitted Saudi Arabia to raise the price of oil substantially. One of the main beneficiaries of this development was the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC, an oil cartel consisting of the major oil-rich Middle Eastern states, along with some non-Middle Eastern states, such as Indonesia and Venezuela. With increased oil revenues, the Saudi government was able, in the 1970s, to purchase billions of dollars worth of arms from American contractors, especially in the area of air defense. (74) This arrangement, known as the "recycling of petrodollars," was highly favored by Washington and Riyadh, and American oil companies. (75)

2.3.3. Nixon's Values And Peace Plans:

Initially, Nixon intended to keep the Arab-Israeli conflict on a separate policy track from the Nixon Doctrine. The U.S State Department was alarmed by the escalating violence, and Secretary of State Rogers made the most of this opportunity. In December 1969, Rogers unveiled a major Arab-Israeli peace initiative that became known as the Rogers plan. (76) It called for an Israeli withdrawal from virtually all of the territories occupied in 1967 in exchange for peace and recognition from the Arab states. Israel immediately rejected the plan because it violated the principle of direct bilateral negotiation between Israel and the Arab states. The failure of the Rogers Plan, along with a subsequent increase in Arab-Israeli tensions, eroded Nixon's confidence in Rogers's stewardship of Middle East diplomacy. Consequently, America had to mediate between the Arabs and the Israelis, to diminish conflicts between them and quickly end the wars that erupted in order to achieve its own security objectives. Because the Arab-Israeli

dispute was perceived as part of the broader East-West struggle, and the Cold War was a dominant determinant of U.S. policy the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, America's commitment to protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (77)

2.3.4. The United States And Black September:

In September 1970, a radical faction of the (PLO) hijacked several commercial airplanes and forced them to land in Jordan. Seeing this as a challenge to his authority, (78) Jordan's King Hussein moved to crush the PLO, which had established a state-within-a-state in Jordan. A column of Syrian tanks crossed into northern Jordan, apparently in support of the PLO. Nixon and Kissinger believed that Moscow was behind the Syrian intervention. Hussein appealed to the United States for help but was willing, if necessary, to be bailed out by Israeli intervention. However, both logistically and politically, it would have been extremely difficult for the United States to intervene militarily in the Jordan crisis. Israel, however, was willing to intervene on Jordan's behalf. In a menacing gesture, a squadron of Israeli jets flew to northern Jordan and swooped low over the advancing Syrian tanks. The Syrian tanks withdrew, permitting Hussein to defeat and, eventually, expel the PLO.

The Black September crisis had a profound effect on U.S policymaking toward the Middle East. Nixon was extremely pleased with Israel's behavior in the Jordan crisis and gained a new appreciation for Israel's potential as a strategic ally of the United States. According to American perception of Palestinians' point of view, the Black September events heightened international awareness of the plight of the Palestinian people and their demands for a homeland. The link between Palestinian suffering and terrorism cited by policymakers, deepened America's determination to protect Israel and find the finest solution for Palestinian refugees as well. In his detailed report to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, President Richard Nixon observed that the Arab-Israeli conflict had condemned "to squalor and to soul-searing hatred the lives of Palestinian refugees, who include not only those who originally fled their homes upon the establishment of Israel, but a whole generation born and reared in the hopelessness and frustration of the refugee camps. They are the material from which history creates the tragedies of the

future." (79) Nixon's empathy for the Palestinians reflected a strong American cultural tendency to identify with victims and to offer them humanitarian assistance.

So Israel became, along with Iran and Saudi Arabia, a client state of the United States under the terms of the Nixon Doctrine, one of the "cops on the beat" that would discipline and thwart radical and pro-Soviet forces in the Middle East for the benefit of America's strategic and economic interests. But this new approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict would suffer a rude jolt during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which we'll look in the following issue.

2.4. American Cultural Reactions Toward The Yom Kippur War

The Yom Kippur War of October 1973, which is so named because it began on the Jewish Day of Atonement. The Yom Kippur War, which pitted Egypt and Syria against Israel, was a major turning point in America's relations with Middle Eastern states. The United States emerged from that crisis as the indispensable mediator in the Middle East, as the one nation on which both the Arabs and the Israelis would have to rely to achieve their political objectives in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (80)

The emergence of the United States as the indispensable mediator was related to another major result of the Yom Kippur War: a marked decrease in Soviet influence in the Middle East signified by Egypt's decision to move away from the Soviet orbit and to establish closer ties with the United States. (81) This shift in orientation reflected Egypt's growing realization that the United States, by virtue of its close ties to Israel, held the key to an acceptable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Soviet Union could provide arms to Egypt, but only the United States could use its political influence to change Israel's behavior, Because Egypt was such an important and influential player in Arab politics, its reorientation toward the United States was a major setback for the Soviets. (82) This decline in the Soviet position in the Middle East foreshadowed, and in a small way contributed to, the decline and the fall of the Soviet system a decade-and-a-half later.

2.4.1. America As A Great Power:

America's political victory in the Yom Kippur War was due partly to the enormous military, economic. And diplomatic power America had at its disposal, but it also reflected the skillful and occasionally devious handling of the crisis by Henry Kissinger, who by this time was the American secretary of state. His efforts were to gain control over the crisis while excluding the Soviet Union from Arab-Israeli peacekeeping. Kissinger's diplomacy in the immediate postwar period was to explore its legacy for future Middle East peacemaking efforts, especially the Camp David peace process of the late 1970s. (83)

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The first spark of the Yom Kippur war was when the Sadat inherited Nasser's utter determination to regain the territory that Egypt had lost in the Six-Day War of 1967, and to ensure the recovery of the other Arab territories lost in that war. Sadat unlike Nasser signaled his readiness for diplomacy in February 1971, when he announced that Egypt would be willing to conclude a peace treaty with Israel if it fully withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula and from all of the Arab territories taken in 1967. It was the first Arab leader had publicly contemplated peace with Israel. (84) But the Israelis rejected Sadat's initiative, insisting that any return of Arab lands would have to take place after the Arab states had made peace with Israel, not as a precondition for peace. The Israelis also insisted that they should not have to withdraw from all of the territories taken in 1967. A frustrated Sadat announced that 1971 would be "the year of decision." If Egypt could not regain its lost territory through negotiation, it would have to resume hostilities instead. Much to Sadat's embarrassment, 1971 passed into history without a decision for either peace or war. (85)

By now, Kissinger had finally wrested control of U.S Middle East policy from Rogers. Kissinger supported Israel's refusal to give back any territory without first getting full peace treaties with the Arab states. Both Kissinger and Nixon viewed the Arab-Israeli crisis through a Cold War lens, and by early 1972, both men were convinced that Israel could serve as a strategic asset in the Middle East, countering the influence of pro-Soviet governments and movements in the Arab world. (86) Neither Kissinger nor Nixon was inclined to give Sadat any help, nor Moscow giving him much assistance. Although the Soviets did supply Egypt with arms, they withheld their most advanced military equipment, which Sadat considered essential to a credible military option. So Sadat was unable, in 1971, to pursue either diplomacy or war. (87)

Over the next two years, Sadat repeatedly threatened that Egypt would go to war if it could not recover its lost territory by diplomacy, but the Nixon administration dismissed Sadat's threat. In the summer of 1972, Sadat expelled thousands of Soviet advisors from Egypt. He was, at once and the same time, clearing the way for war and making a bid for closer relations with the United States. (88) On one level, Sadat was trying to get Moscow's attention, to shock the Soviets into giving Egypt more military aid. On another level, he hoped to signal to Washington that he was prepared for closer

relations with the United States, it declined to exploit the opening provided by Sadat, making war all but inevitable.

In 1973, Sadat forged a military alliance with Hafiz al-Asad, the president of Syria; the two leaders planned a coordinated offensive against Israel, with Egypt attacking Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and Syria attacking Israeli forces in the Golan Heights. (89) Whereas Asad intended to regain the entire Golan Heights by force, Sadat's military objectives were confined to securing a narrow strip of land on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal. The rest of the Sinai was to be recovered by subsequent diplomacy. Sadat did not reveal to Asad how limited his military objectives were. He had his military commanders' draw up a two-part plan for the Sinai operation that could be shared with the Syrians. The first part called for the Egyptian army to cross the canal and secure a narrow strip on its eastern bank. The second part envisioned a subsequent advance to a series of mountain passes in the Sinai, about 25 miles east of the Suez Canal. Asad was not told that only the first part of the plan was to be implemented. Sadat's deception would fatally undermine the whole Arab operation, however, Egypt and Syria made an extremely impressive showing. Both armies were much better armed, better trained, and better led than in 1967, and both of them enjoyed the advantage that comes with striking the first blow. (90)

2.4.2. Americans And The Possibility Of The New Holocaust:

The Yom Kippur War began on the early afternoon of October 6. Under cover of a heavy artillery barrage, thousands of Egyptian troops crossed the canal in rubber dinghies, laying down pontoon bridges so that tanks and other heavy equipment could follow behind them. (91) By October 8, the Egyptians had advanced six miles east of the Suez Canal. Meanwhile, the Syrian army entered the occupied the Golan Heights; although the Syrian attack was blunted in the northern and central part of the Golan, two divisions to the south broke through the Israeli line and seemed in danger of crossing into Israel proper. Because they had assumed that the Arab states were too weak and ill prepared to go to war, the Israelis were taken completely by surprise. In a panic, the Israelis appealed to Washington for immediate assistance. (92) On the other side, American people also shared the Israelis into panic, fearful of a new Holocaust, this time

in the Middle East. Even those who had never felt very close to Israel became pro-Israel including the American anti-Zionist movements. With the Yom Kippur War, the subject of the Holocaust became current for Americans and American Jews particularly. In many places in the United States Holocaust museums and memorials were built. One swore never to forget, and even the younger Jews, whose families had been spared from the Holocaust, felt directly affected by the tragic history.

2.4.3. The Significance of Shared Values:

The Yom Kippur War also altered the individual and collective self-sense of the Americans who entered into a spiritual bond with Israel. The zeal to assimilate dropped; one was now consciously part of an ethnic and religious minority, one was proud to be Jew, coupled with a strengthened will to survive, to defy all opponents of the American society. Israel's victory symbolized the strength of similar values and beliefs, and the small nation became a fixed point in American-Jewish community work. In synagogues, the Israeli flag was hung next to the American Star-Spangled Banner; passages were inserted into the Sabbath and holy day prayers that dealt with Israel's welfare and security. As a result of this unique union among similar cultural nations, the American administration and other leaders had strongly promised to support Israel and pro-Israel campaigns by deeds not words more than before. (93)

It was Henry Kissinger, not Richard Nixon who dominated American policy making during the Yom Kippur War, by the fall of 1973, Nixon was almost entirely consumed by the Watergate scandal, which would force him from office less than a year later. For this reason Kissinger had enormous freedom of action on the foreign policy stage. Kissinger devised a three-part strategy for dealing with the crisis; he wanted to ensure that Israel was sufficiently powerful to repel the Egyptian-Syrian attack and even, to some extent, take the offensive. (94) Yet Kissinger also sought to avoid the total humiliation of Egypt and Syria. Now convinced that Arab grievances the option of a postwar diplomatic initiative. Kissinger was determined to prevent the Soviet Union from increasing its political influence in the Middle East—indeed, to reduce the influence it already had. (95) After the United States sent Israel a massive airlift of military equipment, the airlift helped to turn the tide of battle in Israel's favor.

When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in 1973, Kissinger and Nixon deliberately waited for Israel to suffer losses--despite pleading from Israeli ambassador Simcha Dinitz--before delivering aid; they hoped to equalize the region's balance of power and facilitate a peace settlement that would redound to their own glory. Only a week later, when the situation became truly dire, did the U.S. step in, and even then Nixon leveraged the assistance to keep American Jewish groups from lobbying for tougher measures on behalf of oppressed Soviet Jews. Anyway, the intervention stemmed not from any belief in the necessity of a Jewish homeland but from a realpolitik-based gambit to thwart Soviet allies. Such support was inherently fickle, resting as it did on geopolitical considerations that under different circumstances could easily dictate a different course of action. (96)

The U.S airlift to Israel caused deep anger in the Arab world, in mid-October, several oil-producing Arab states retaliated by imposing an embargo on oil shipment to the United States and parts of Western Europe. After stalling for time to allow the Israeli to consolidate their position, Kissinger worked out a cease-fire agreement with the Soviet government. On October 22, that agreement was passed in the UN Security Council as Resolution 338. Israel initially ignored the cease-fire and continued its offensive against Egypt, prompting Sadat to issue an appeal for a joint U.S.-Soviet military intervention on Egypt's behalf. (97)

Sadat finally broke the impasse by withdrawing his request for superpower intervention and declaring his willingness to negotiate with the Israeli directly over the disengagement of troops in the Sinai. Sadat also invited Kissinger to play a direct mediating role in any further negotiations between Egypt and Israel. This invitation reflected Sadat's assessment that the United States, on account of its close ties to Israel, held the key to a satisfactory Middle East settlement. (98)

Over the next two years, Kissinger brokered a series of bilateral agreements between Egypt and Israel, setting the stage for the Camp David peace process of the late 1970s. Syria, by contrast, got little more from Kissinger's diplomacy than a restoration of the pre-Yom Kippur War status quo. Israel had to give back the additional territory it had seized, but the Golan Heights themselves remained under Israeli occupation. (99) Kissinger saw little point in pushing the Israelis to give back more to the Syrians. After

all, Asad was refusing to make the crucial political concessions that Sadat himself was now making. (100)

This last point underscores the overriding objective of Kissinger's diplomacy throughout the Yom Kippur War: to limit or reduce Soviet influence in the Middle East. By this criterion, Kissinger's policies were a major success. Consequently, it also demonstrated America's ability to expand its cultural circle and to compromise. While dominant cultural values had induced Washington to adopt a pro-Israel policy, other American values influenced Nixon, Carter and others to try to understand Arab concerns and to work with them to secure peace under the distinctive the American value which is War brings Peace. (101) Whether they left a legacy that was conductive to resolving Arab-Israeli tensions is, of course, another question, one that we'll take up in the following the Democrat president Jimmy Carter and how he succeeded to use his own Christian and moral values to establish a special relations with both Arabs and Israelis.

2.5. Carter's Christian And Moral Values

we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear....It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy---a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.

President Jimmy Carter

Commencement Address at the University of Notre Dame May 1977

Jimmy Carter ran for president in 1976 on the theme of thinking American foreign policy compatible with the basic goodness of the American people; he came to office pledged to restore integrity and morality to American diplomacy. Carter, former governor of Georgia, was well suited to the public mood. He was born-again Christian who spoke of restoring morality to political life and who famously pledged to the American people, "I will never lie to you." What is particularly interesting about the public mood of 1976 which was the Watergate scandal that was fresh in people's minds.

The emphasis on morality was also combined with an upsurge in anti-materialist and peace-loving values. (102) With those fundamental concerns, President Carter introduced a policy approach that was closer to the idealist approach than that of earlier presidents after World War II. His approach sought to reorient the focus of America's foreign policy away from a singular emphasis on adversaries, and especially the Soviet Union toward a policy with a truly global emphasis. Four major policy areas would be highlighted: (A) emphasizing domestic values in foreign policy, (B) improving relations with allies and resolving regional conflict, (C) de-emphasizing the Soviet Union as the focus of U.S policy, and (D) promoting global human rights.(103)

2.5.1. The Principles of American Values:

From the outset, President Jimmy Carter highlighted the importance of democratic values as a guide to American foreign policy. In this sense, his approach was consistent with a reliance on moral principle so evident in America's historical past and

in sharp contrast with the previous two administrations. For his presidency, domestic values were to be preeminent in the shaping of American foreign policy; the United States must "stand for something" in the world. Even more, America should serve as a model for other nations.

In a similar vein, during his 1977 Notre Dame Commencement address, President Carter again emphasized the moral basis of American policy: "I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes." (104)

In addition to emphasizing this moral basis of policy, Carter also called for a different style of foreign policy—one that would be "open and candid," and not one that a "policy by manipulation" or based on "secret deals." Such references were apparently to what he saw as the style adopted during the years that Henry Kissinger was at the helm of American foreign policy.

Finally, while the president recognized that moral principle must guide foreign policy, he acknowledged that foreign policy cannot be "by moral maxims." The United States would have to try to produce change rather than impose it. In this sense, Carter believed that there were limits to what the United States could do in the world. Although these limits would need to be recognized, America could not stand idle. The United States should try to play a constructive and positive role in shaping a new world order. This role should be through an American policy "based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision. (105)

2.5.2. The United States And Camp David Accords:

In the Middle East Carter achieved his greatest diplomatic success by negotiating peace between Egypt and Israel. Since the founding of Israel in 1948, Egypt's foreign policy had been built around destroying the Jewish state. In 1977 Anwar el-Sadat, the practical and farsighted leader of Egypt, decided to seek peace with Israel. It was an act of rare political courage, for Sadat risked alienating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world without a firm commitment for a peace treaty with Israel. (106)

Although both countries wanted peace, major obstacles had to be overcome. Sadat wanted Israel to retreat from the West Bank of the Jordan River and from the Golan

Heights (which it had taken from Jordan in the 1967 war), recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), provide a homeland for the Palestinians, relinquish its unilateral hold on the city of Jerusalem, and return the Sinai to Egypt. Such conditions were unacceptable to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who refused to consider recognition of the PLO or the return of the West Bank. By the end of 1977 Sadat's peace mission had run aground. (107)

2.5.3. American Values Towards Peace Processes:

Jimmy Carter broke the deadlock by inviting both men to Camp David, the presidential retreat in Maryland, for face-to-face talks. Carter's own personal commitment to negotiation as a method of resolving conflicts enabled him to draw on that component of American culture which supports nonviolent solutions to problems. (108) For two weeks in September 1978 they hammered out peace accords. Although several important issues were left unresolved, Begin did agree to return the Sinai to Egypt. In return, Egypt promised to recognize Israel, and as a result became a staunch U.S. ally. For Carter it was a proud moment. . Although Carter realized that his direct participation carried high political risks in the United States, he became personally involved because, as he put it: "In conscience there is really no choice for me. We simply must continue to move away from war and stalemate to peace and to progress for the people of Israel and for the people of Egypt." (109)

Sadat's visit caused enormous excitement throughout the world, especially in the West. Carter himself was greatly encouraged by this development and he immediately dropped his plan for a Geneva settlement and threw his support behind Sadat's initiative to achieve peace through direct, bilateral negotiations. But although the Egyptians and the Israelis could agree on the need for peace, they could not agree on a formula for achieving it, but in the months following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, there was little substantive progress. The importance of this visit cannot be overstated. It broke the impasse that had set into the Middle East peace process since the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger; it established the precedent of face-to-face negotiations between Arabs and Israelis; and it raised hopes for real progress. "A Framework for Peace in the Middle

East" was agreed to by the two competing parties and witnessed by President Carter. (110)

Instead of stressing differences between Israelis and Egyptians, Carter emphasized similarities and common interests, and challenged both sides to face the problems together and avoid confronting each other. By so doing, Carter was embracing an important American cultural attitude. While Carter recognized that Jews, Muslims, and Christians held different beliefs, he noted that they worshiped the same God and that the message of Providence has always been the same. Emphasizing common beliefs, Carter quoted the Holy Koran, the Old Testament, and the New Testament to show how cultural and religious values supported peace. Quoting the Koran, Carter said: "If thine adversary inclines towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace and trust in God." He quoted the Old Testament passage that admonished Jews to "depart from evil and do good; seek peace, and pursue it." He ended with the New Testament's Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God." (111) While not ignoring the security concerns of Israelis and Egyptians, Carter focused on those fundamental values and beliefs upon which many Americans believe that concepts such as security and national interests are ultimately based. The fact that Carter also represented American cultural values high-lights the diversity and inconsistency within U.S. culture. (112)

The signing of the Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, was considered by most historians and commentators, and probably to most ordinary Americans as well. Camp David is one of the few clear successes in a presidency otherwise marked by failure and defeat. Camp David also has served as the blueprint for most subsequent American efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, the agreement reached at Camp David fell significantly short of what Carter himself had hoped to accomplish upon becoming president in early 1977.

Toward the end of the Camp David meeting between Sadat and Begin, there appeared to be little hope for a negotiated settlement. As they prepared to leave Camp David, Begin sent Carter some photographs of the three leaders and asked him to sign them for his grandchildren. Carter asked his secretary to find out the names of Begin's grandchildren, and wrote each name on a photograph and signed it. Instead of sending the

photographs to Begin, he delivered them himself. Later, Carter recalled how focusing on the future made the Camp David meetings successful: "And we stood there on the porch of one of those little cabins at Camp David, and he began to go through the photographs and told me about each one of his grandchildren, too. And we began to talk about the future and the fact that what we did at Camp David was not just to be looked upon as a political achievement that might bring accolades or congratulations on us. It was not just an investment in peace for our own generation; it was an investment in the future. Both adversaries attributed the success of the Camp David meetings to the personal efforts of Jimmy Carter. Unfortunately, the rest of the Arab Middle East denounced the Camp David accords, and in 1981 Sadat paid for his vision with his life when anti-Israeli Egyptian soldiers assassinated him. (113)

One of the tragic aspects of American foreign policy is that the United States historically has supported many countries that hold power through murder, torture, and other violations of human rights, practices that are an affront to basic American values. During the presidency of Jimmy Carter, the United States began to show a growing regard for the human rights practices of its allies. Carter was convinced that American foreign policy should embody the country's basic moral beliefs. In 1977 Congress began to require reports on human rights conditions in countries receiving American aid. (114)

2.5.4. The United States, Iranian Revolution, And Hostage Crisis:

Of the nations accused of practicing torture, one of the most frequently cited was Iran. Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Iran ranged from 25,000 to 100,000. It was widely believed that most of them had been tortured by SAVAK, the secret police.

Since the end of World War II, Iran had been a valuable friend of the United States in the troubled Middle East. In 1953 the CIA had worked to ensure the power of the young shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. During the next 25 years, the shah often repaid the debt. He allowed the United States to establish electronic listening posts in northern Iran along the border of the Soviet Union, and during the 1973- 1974 Arab oil embargo the shah continued to sell oil to the United States. The shah also bought arms

from the United States, which helped ease the American balance of payments problem. Few world leaders were more loyal to the United States. (115)

Like his predecessors, Carter was willing to overlook the shah's violations of human rights. To demonstrate American support, Carter visited Iran in late December 1977. He applauded Iran as "an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas of the world" and praised the shah as a great leader who had won "the respect and the admiration and love" of his people. (116)

The shah was indeed popular among wealthy Iranians, but in the slums of Teheran and in rural, poverty stricken villages, there was little respect, admiration, or love for his regime. Led by a fundamentalist Islamic clergy and emboldened by want, the masses of Iranians turned against the shah and his westernization policies. In the early fall of 1978 the revolutionary surges in Iran gained force. The shah, who had once seemed so powerful and secure, was paralyzed by indecision, alternating between ruthless suppression and attempts to liberalize his regime. In Washington, Carter also vacillated, uncertain whether to stand firmly behind the shah or to cut his losses and prepare to deal with a new government in Iran. (171)

In January 1979, the shah fled to Egypt. Exiled religious leader Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini returned to Iran, preaching the doctrine that the United States was the "Great Satan" behind the shah. Relations between the United States and the new Iranian government were terrible, but Iranian officials warned that they would become infinitely worse if the shah were granted asylum. Nevertheless, Carter permitted the shah to enter the United States for treatment of lymphoma. The reaction in Iran was severe.

On November 4, 1979, Iranian supporters of Khomeini invaded the American embassy in Teheran and captured 66 Americans, 13 of whom were freed several weeks later. The rest were held hostage for 444 days and were the objects of intense political interest and media coverage. Carter was helpless. Because Iran was not a stable country in any recognizable sense, its government was not susceptible to pressure. Iran's demands--the return of the shah to Iran and admission of U.S. guilt in supporting the shah--were unacceptable. Carter devoted far too much attention to the almost insoluble problem. The hostages stayed in the public spotlight in part because Carter kept them there. (118)

Carter's foreign policy problems mounted in December 1979, when the Soviet Union sent tanks into Afghanistan. In response, the Carter administration embargoed grain and high-technology exports to the Soviet Union and boycotted the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. (The Soviet Union gradually withdrew its troops a decade later.) As public disapproval of the president's handling of the Iran crisis increased, some Carter advisers advocated the use of force to free the hostages. At first, Carter disagreed, but eventually he authorized a rescue attempt. It failed, and Carter's position became even worse. Negotiations finally brought the hostages' release, but in a final humiliation for Carter, the hostages were held until minutes after Ronald Reagan, Carter's successor, had taken the oath of office as president. (119)

When Carter left office in January 1981 many Americans judged his presidency a failure. Instead of being remembered for the good he accomplished for the Middle East at Camp David, he was remembered for what he failed to accomplish. The Iranian hostage crisis had become emblematic of a perception that America's role in the world had declined. The Carter administration's relations with the Middle Eastern countries sought to encourage the peace process as a strategic measure. As we have discussed the dramatic events about peace process of Camp David, but it did not succeeded completely and faced challenges. In the next chapter, we shall survey yet another approach to American policy. The values and beliefs of the administration of Ronald Regan towards the Middle East. Such policy would continue the moral emphasis of the Carter administration; but it would seek to restore an American globalism more reminiscent of an earlier era than had its immediate predecessors.

2.6. Reaganism And The Middle East

What I am describing...is a plan and a hope for the long term—the march of freedom and democracy which will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.

President Ronald Reagan

Address to Members of the British Parliament

June 8, 1982

The President Ronald Reagan is an extremely puzzling figure, a politician who had both astonishing weaknesses and astonishing strengths. Among the weaknesses was the fact that Reagan was often extremely ignorant about the basic issues of American politics and seemed to have little interest in becoming better informed. Nor did he care to get to know many of the people he had working for him. Among Reagan's strengths, however, was uncanny ability to connect with the American people. Through his speeches and gestures, Reagan was able to instill in his audience powerful sense of reassurance and confidence; for this he was known as the "Great Communicator." Certainly Reagan's background as an actor assisted him in this performative aspect his presidency. Reagan also was a master at evoking the desired emotions in his audience. Once, when he was asked whether an acting career was suitable training for the presidency, Reagan replied that he did not see how anyone could do the job if he had not been an actor. (120)

2.6.1. Regan's Values And American Eceptionalism Toward Communism:

President Reagan's popularity was due to in part to his embodiment of those attributes that represent cornerstones of American culture. These include individualism, optimism, willingness to take risks, physical strength, a clear sense of personal identity, self-assurance, and a victorious reputation. He constantly referred to history and culture not only to marshal support but also to reassure Americans of their role in the world. In a

speech at the annual convention of the American Legion in Salt Lake City in 1984, Reagan pledged to "keep America a beacon of hope to the rest of the world and to return her to her rightful place as a champion of peace and freedom among the nations of the earth." Adding that he was not preaching manifest destiny, he declared that "we Americans cannot turn our backs on what history has asked of us. Keeping alive the hope of human freedom is America's mission, and we cannot shrink from the task or falter in the call of duty." (121) In his final radio address to the nation, Reagan reiterated many of the code words that resonate in the society: "Whether we seek it or not, whether we like it or not, we Americans are keepers of the miracles. We are asked to be guardians of a place to come to, a place to start again, a place to live in the dignity God meant for his children. May it ever be so. (122) These references to history and specific myths were designed to buttress America's self-image, reinvigorate its culture, and strengthen culture's role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies.

As far as foreign policy was concerned, Reagan came to office bearing a simple message: that the Soviet Union was the sole cause of America's trouble abroad. As he said in an interview during the 1980 election campaign, "the Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any lot spots in the world." At his first press conference as president, Reagan said that the Soviets reserved "the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat," and that the United States would no longer tolerate such an attitude. In a famous speech in 1983, Reagan called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and "the focus of evil in the modern world." (123) The Cold War's advent fostered an anti-communist consensus, a widespread and exaggerated fear of military conflict with the Soviet Union, suppression of domestic dissent, and visceral patriotism. Superpower competition for global dominance influenced Americans to interpret their history in a way that was consistent with perceived threat. American exceptionalism, the belief that the United States is unique and morally superior to other nations, was rejuvenated, and a stark simplicity of confrontation between good and evil was accepted by most Americans. (124)

Reagan saw the Middle East as no exception to this rule. When he first came into office in early 1981, he professed to believe that virtually all of the world's terrorist groups, including Middle Eastern ones, were being controlled from Moscow. It was

widely expected that Reagan's actions in the Middle East would be overwhelmingly focused on blocking Soviet Union moves. But Reagan's policies in the Middle East did not quite bear out this expectation. To be sure, many of Reagan's actions in the Middle East were directed against the Soviet Union. No new initiatives were proposed, nor was there much effort to proceed with the Camp David framework, inherited from the Carter administration. Instead, as elsewhere, the Reagan administration attempted to rally the Arab states against the Soviet Union and to engage the Israelis in a strategic understanding. (125)

2.6.2. The Fact of Israel in the American Values:

Like Most U.S. presidents have felt a certain kinship with the Jewish people because of their own Christian beliefs and values. Many cite their reading of the Bible for their feelings toward Israel Reagan as a Christian believer had a gut-level, emotional attachment to Israel. He viewed it as a nation with similar Judeo-Christian values, and as an opponent of Communism. Furthermore, the fact that Israel is a Jewish state is also important because it is not just another political entity. It is a nation based on faith. Unlike the Islamic states, which are also based on religion, however, Israel also shares Judeo-Christian and Western values with the United States. (126)

Reagan called upon Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab countries to compromise and to recognize the interdependence of their objectives. In his major policy statement on the Middle East shortly after Israel invaded Lebanon, President Regan proclaimed that "in the words of the Scripture, the time has come to follow after the things which make for peace. (127)

A new Persian Gulf command, with the Rapid Deployment Force as part of that structure, was announced. Negotiations were held with several Middle East states regarding American base and access rights in the regions. Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman, for example, agreed to joint military exercises with the United States during November 1981, (128) and the United States also obtained military cooperation from the Israelis. (129)

The most dramatic examples of using military assistance to bolster American influence against the Soviet Union also occurred in this region. The United States agreed

to sell technologically advanced aircraft equipment and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to Saudi Arabia in October 1981. (130) America's role in militarizing the Middle East by selling sophisticated weapons to its Arab allies undermined its own objective of achieving peace in the region, despite the strong opposition of pro-Israel lobby in Congress. (131) By the summer of 1982 — and wholly as a result of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its advance all the way to Beirut — the Reagan administration was fully immersed in local issues in the Middle East. The administration sought to negotiate a cease-fire between the Israelis and the surrounded Palestinian forces in West Beirut and a withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon itself. Moreover, even President Reagan moved into a mediator posture with a new policy initiative to serve as a follow-up to the Camp David framework. The initiative called for a Palestinian homeland federated with Jordan, an end to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and security for Israel. (132) Such initiative comes from American main principles which emphasized that negotiations are the only workable method, American presidents, whether they saw Israel as a Cold War ally or viewed it through the prism of culture and religion, endorsed this position. (133) However, despite its constant support for Israel, America also considered itself to be an honest broker for Palestinians in order to prove itself as a unique valuable nation that could bring peace and stability to whole world. Furthermore, the American administration would inform both the world and intended parties that it has a main key for resolving Arab-Israeli conflict.

2.6.3. The United States And Lebanese Civil War:

The depth of American involvement in the area even reached the point of deploying American military personnel on two different occasions. The administration sent a contingent of American Marines into Lebanon in August 1982, as part of effort to evacuate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) members from Beirut, where they had been surrounded by the Israelis. This mission was successfully completed without any major incident. Despite protests against military intervention abroad, many Americans, particularly fundamental groups strongly supported Regan's foreign policy agenda, especially his crusade in Lebanon or any area in the world against communism

and leftist regimes. (134) Both communism and radical regimes represented evil, in the fundamentalists' view.

However, the events in Lebanon turned upside down, when the following of September 1982 assassination of Lebanese president-elect Bashir Gemayal, a Christian warlord whom Israel had been secretly arming for years, Lebanese Christian militiamen allied with Israel entered two Palestinian camps, Sabra and Shatila, massacring hundreds of civilians. To prevent further such attacks and to maintain security in Lebanon generally, the Reagan administration stationed Marines in Beirut, in September 1982; the Marines were dispatched to Lebanon as part of a Multinational Force (MNF), composed of military personnel from several Western nations. When the disguise massacre took place, the United States immediately condemned the massacres as well as Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The humanitarian aspect of U.S. culture prevented many Americans from ignoring Israel's actions. (135)

While the MNF was to serve as a "peacekeeping" force between the various Lebanese factions and to facilitate a negotiated settlement among them, the task proved elusive and ultimately disastrous. (136) As factional feuding continued, the role of the MNF became increasingly unclear. In time, the American Marines, encamped at the Beirut airport, became identified with the central government and became the target for snipers from the other Lebanese factions. More than that, the Marines became the target of a suicide bomber on October 23, 1983, apparently a Shiite militant supported by Syria and Iran, drove a truck laden with explosives into the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, killing 241 Marines. (137)

It was a devastating blow to Reagan's Middle East policy, and Democrats in Congress began demanded that the Marines be pulled out of Lebanon. But Reagan initially refused to withdraw the Marines, saying there was still a chance to pacify the country and implement the peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. Reagan also insisted that withdrawing from Lebanon would be tantamount to giving in to the Soviet Union, since Syria, America's principal adversary in Lebanon, was a client of the Soviets. In early 1984, the Lebanese government, seeing the chaos that had resulted from the peace treaty with Israel, formally repudiated the treaty. Around the same time, the Reagan administration bowed to reality and withdraws the Marines from Lebanon, essentially

abandoning it to the Syrians and their radical Shiite allies. But this was not the end of Reagan administration's troubles in Lebanon. (138)

In the mid-1980s, there was a rash of kidnappings of Americans living in Beirut, some of whom would remain in captivity for several years, and a couple of whom would actually be killed. For the most part, the motivation for the kidnappings was achieving the release of Shiite militants who had been jailed by pro-American Arab governments. The hostage takers demanded that the Reagan administration pressure its Arab allies to let the militants go. The Reagan administration was under constant pressure from the hostages' families to do something about the situation, perhaps to negotiate some deal with the hostage takers. Publicly, however, the Reagan administration insisted that negotiating with the kidnappers was impossible, that it would merely encourage them to take more hostages. Secretly, however, the Reagan administration was indeed negotiating with the hostage-takers or, at least, with figures who were allied with them. (139)

2.6.4. Americans And Iran-Contra Scandal:

Consequently, someone in the Reagan administration — William Casey, the director of the CIA —came up with an ingenious scheme to kill two birds with one stone. The idea was to take the profits from the arms sales to Iran and divert them to the Contras in Nicaragua. The diversion of funds from Iran to the Contras was engineered by a young Marine lieutenant colonel named Oliver North, then working in obscurity in the National Security Agency. A little more a year later, the Reagan administration's secret dealings with Iran became public knowledge. In the fall of 1986, a Lebanese newspaper broke the story that U.S. officials had been negotiating with Iran over the release of American hostages in Lebanon. The American people were further shocked when it was revealed — this time by the Reagan administration itself, which knew that the story was about to come out anyway — that profits from the arms sales to Iran had been diverted to the Nicaraguan Contras, in defiance of Congress's ban on such aid. (140)

Over the ensuring months, Reagan repeatedly denied that he had knowingly sold arms for hostages or been aware of the diversion of funds to the Contras. All he had done, he said, was to authorize general contacts between members of his administration and so-called "moderates" in the Iranian government, to explore the possibility of improved

relations between the countries. The Reagan administration was never able to say, however, who those "moderates" were. In the summer of 1987, Congress held hearings on the Iran—Contra scandal, bringing a parade of colorful witnesses before American television audiences. For much of 1987, the country was consumed by the Iran-Contra scandal, and it even seemed that Reagan's presidency was in jeopardy. What saved Reagan's political hide was a dramatic improvement, in 1986 and 1987, in U.S.-Soviet relations, which allowed Reagan to end his presidency on a far more statesmanlike note. (141)

In the next chapter, we shall discuss another new approach to American policy. The values and beliefs of the administration of George Bush towards the Middle East. We shall also discuss the most important political events during his period such as; the first Palestinian Intifada (Uprising), The Gulf War, and The New World Order.

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Chapter 3: Un-American Values: From Communism To Islam

3.1. George H. Bush's Liberal Values And The New World Order.

"Today a new world is struggling to be born. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak."

President George Bush, "Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit," 1359.

In contrast to the Reagan administration's initial ideological approach, the Bush administration assumed office mainly seeking continuity but also willing to pursue modest change in foreign policy direction. Although the commitment to continuity was quickly challenged by the dramatic events in central Europe, (the collapse of the Soviet bloc) and the Middle East, (the first Palestinian uprising, and the Gulf War), the foreign policy values and beliefs of the Bush administration remained markedly unchanged throughout its four years in office.

"Pragmatic" and "prudent" were favorite terms used to describe the Bush administration's basic values in directing American foreign policy. (1) President Bush did not come to office with a grand design or with a "vision thing" for reshaping international politics. Instead, his administration's approach really reflected the values, beliefs, and temperament of Bush himself, a moderate, middle-of-the-road professional politician who was well trained in foreign affairs. After all, President Bush had a wealth of foreign policy experience — as director of the CIA, American representative to the People's Republic of China, ambassador to the United Nations, and vice president of the United States. He'd also acquired an impressive array of diplomatic skills and personal acquaintances, assets he would put to use in his handling of the diplomacy surrounding the Gulf War. Although at various times he claimed to be from Texas, Connecticut, or Maine, Bush had spent most of the twenty years prior to taking office deep within the establishment of Washington and was fully steeped in the foreign policy emanating from

the nation's capital. Thus, he was prepared for the "give and take" of Washington and global politics. (2)

3.1.1. AIPAC's Value in American Policy And Culture:

Activities of the pro- Israel lobby in general and AIPAC in particular, help perpetuate the politics of sentiment that under-gird the special relationship between Israel and the United States. The pro-Israel lobby is widely believed to be an extension of Israel itself, because of its tendency to publicly support positions and policies adopted by the Israeli government. Many members of Congress, diplomats, and ordinary Americans have quietly expressed concerns about AIPAC's power in Washington. When David Steiner, AIPAC's president, boasted about his organization's access to the incoming Clinton administration, the American Jewish community regarded his claims as exaggerated and called for his resignation. Steiner's successor, Steve Grossman, not only downplayed AIPAC's influence but adopted a more conciliatory approach to ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. Like many American Jewish leaders, Grossman supported territorial compromise in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for credible guarantees of peace, and criticized extremists within the Israeli government who were guided by "religious chauvinism". (3) This view was consistent with those of Secretary of State James Baker and other Bush administration officials.

Although conventional wisdom is that AIPAC and other pro-Israel groups are powerful because of their access to members of Congress and administration officials, perhaps a more compelling reason for their perceived influence is that shared cultural values and the affinity between the United States and Israel predispose policymakers and the general public to be generally supportive of and to empathize with Israel. Although difficult to measure, these cultural similarities undoubtedly helped to shape American perceptions and policies.

Like previous administrations, Bush administration saw the Middle East as one of the most important regions in the globe for U.S. National Security. There are two main issues that forced the United States to pay close attention to the region in that time. These were the oil and Israeli security. Since about 1970 (except for a brief interlude under President Carter), U.S. administrations regarded Israel as a strategic ally, engaged with

them in the effort to contain the Soviet Union and its regional clients. (4) One consequence of this strategic alliance was that United States had been extremely reluctant to take actions that Israel strongly opposed, like pressuring it to relinquish the occupied territories. So that the United States always resists the international consensus against Israel out of a mixture of strategic and domestic motives. Moreover, there were powerful domestic incentives to go easy on Israel. AIPAC is a roof or umbrella organization of all Jewish organizations in the United States, in particular, is pivotal in lobbying by the Jewish community, it is a highly sophisticated and influential pro-Israel lobby which had emerged in this country, and it had been extremely effective in convincing the national government, especially the Congress, to follow pro-Israel policies). One form these pro-Israeli policies had taken was a high level of U.S. economic and military aid, about $ 3 billion by the late 1980s.

Another was Washington's habit of protecting Israel diplomatically, such as by using its veto in the UN Security Council to block resolutions condemning Israel's actions in the region. (5) However, the American policy regarded the first Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, which began in late 1987 and continued until the early 1990s, as the transformation of the political dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and paved the way for an unprecedented political dialogue between the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization, or PLO. (6)

3.1.2. The United States and The First Palestinian Intifada:

For 20 years, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip had lived under direct occupation by the Israeli army, which controlled virtually every aspect of their lives. Palestinian frustration exploded in December 1987, when an Israeli army truck accidentally struck a car carrying four Palestinian laborers in Gaza, killing them all. A crowd of Palestinians gathered at the accident site, and a teenage boy threw stone at the Israeli soldiers. The soldiers responded with gunfire, killing the boy. The incident unleashed a spontaneous rebellion among Palestinians, spreading quickly from Gaza to the West Bank. The Palestinian uprising — or intifada, as it was called — took everyone by surprise, not just the Israelis but the PLO leadership as well, which scrambled to assert its leadership over the uprising. (7)

The local Palestinian committees were remarkably successful in banning the use of guns and knives, and restricting the uprising to demonstrations and stone throwing. The strategy was clearly to limit the scope of Palestinian violence; making attempts to suppress the rebellion seemed cruel and excessive. Breaking the bones of Palestinian demonstrations by Yitzhak Rabin's orders, the Israeli defense minister was not as bad as shooting them, but it still made for extremely disturbing news footage, and there was an international outcry against Israeli brutality. The American news media, which had previously been reluctant to find fault with Israel, were openly critical of Israel's tactics and began portraying the Palestinians in more favorable light. The suffering of Palestinian people and their children elicited a strong American humanitarian impulse. This component of American culture directly affected how American perceived Israel. However, public support for Israel declined from 61 percent before the Intifada to around 34 percent by 1990. (8) All factors are considered that cultural affinity between the United States and Israel appears to have been one of the most important determinants of Washington's approach to the Palestinian-Israeli problem. (9)

As a result there was increasing pressure on the Reagan administration, mainly from abroad but to some extent from within the United States as well, to start talking with the PLO and to encourage Israel to do the same. But Mr. George Shultz, Ronald Reagan's secretary of state, was unwilling to deal with the PLO until it first recognized Israel's "right to exist," renounced terrorism, and endorsed UN Security Council Resolution 242. At a special session of the UN convened in Geneva (it couldn't be held in New York because Shultz refused to issue Arafat a visa to come to the United States) Arafat made another speech, in which he condemned terrorism and recognized the right of all states in the region, including Israel, to live in peace. Shultz had no choice but to agree that the conditions had been met, and he announced that the United States would finally open a dialogue with the PLO. The Israeli government harshly criticized this decision and continued to refuse to have anything to do with the PLO, but an important milestone had been passed in Palestinian-American relations, and a surge of hope and euphoria swept through the Arab World. Little, however, would come of the breakthrough. (10)

The decision to open a dialogue with the PLO was made just as the Reagan administration was about to leave office and turn things over to his Vice President

George Herbert Walker Bush, who had been elected president in his own right. So any follow-through on this decision would have to be accomplished under the new administration. Unfortunately, both the Bush administration and the PLO squandered the opportunity presented by the dialogue, and it was not long before the talks came to an end. By the time, the intifada was starting to die down, a consequence of exhaustion and internal division among Palestinians. More and more, the Palestinians under occupation were turning their anger on each other, with secularists, battling Islamists, and militants of both stripes murdering fellow Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel. The exuberant spirit that had animated the intifada in 1988 and 1989 was starting to dissipate, giving way to a mood of bitterness and despair. (11)

3.1.3. The Emergence of the New World Order:

It was just at this moment, the summer of 1990, that the world's attention suddenly shifted to the Persian Gulf, where the brutal occupation of a tiny, oil-rich Arab sheikdom plunged the region, and indeed the world, into a new and urgent crisis. Before the Gulf crisis and the response of American administration for it, let me discuss the American values and beliefs of the search for a new world order.

With the international politics of the post-World War 2 period forever altered by the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Bush administration sought to devise a new rationale direction for U.S. foreign policy. President Bush described the new world order in January 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. (12) The phrase, "new world order" has been widely used since first coined by George Bush in his 1990 speech before a joint session of Congress. Although quickly adopted as the catch phrase of the 1990s, few people actually agree on what "new world order" really means. It has been used to describe such diverse contemporary issues as the post Cold War balance of power, economic interdependence, fragmentation and the rise of nationalism, and technology advancement and integration-basically any issue that appears new and different. The general feeling is that while elusive, this "new world order" is likely significant.

Since "new world order" is most frequently used to describe aspects of the post Cold War international scenario, understanding the true meaning of that phrase is critical to projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for the new millennium in

this way: "A new era freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace, an era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony." Such a world would be different from the one that had existed over the past forty-five years. It would be "a world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong respect the rights of the weak." (13) The four central world order values are: (A) The minimization of large-scale collective violence; (B) the maximization of social and economic well-being; (C) the realization of fundamental human rights and conditions of political justice; (D) the rehabilitation and maintenance of environmental quality, including the conservation of resources. In his State of the Union address, President Bush summarized this new world order as a condition "where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law." (14)

The new world order that the Bush administration envisioned, in effect, represented a reaffirmation of the traditional values that shaped the birth of the nation and its foreign policy actions in its earlier years that America as a Redeemer nation. In the tradition of Thomas Paine, Bush saw America as the instrument through which humankind would begin the world all over again. And, consistent with American cultural values, this new world would be governed by the principles of equality and the rule of law, and America would assume the leadership role. (15) Unlike the foreign policy at the beginning of the Republic, however, the emphasis on traditional values was coupled with a commitment to sustained American involvement. In both tone and emphasis, moreover, the new world order of the Bush administration had the ring of Wilsonian idealism, which emphasized the League of the Nations and collective security at the end of World War 1. With the demise of the old order, the Cold War system, the new world order of the Bush administration envisioned an order grounded in the cooperation of all states and based upon greater involvement of the collective security actions of the United Nations. Nonetheless, Bush did see his approach as an important departure from America's recent past Cold War behavior. His search to create a new world order quickly faced at least three major tests: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the formation of policy toward a post-

Communist Russia, and the new challenges from global disorder in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. We are going to discuss only the Persian Gulf crisis.

3.1.4. Post-Cold War Era: Consequences and Developments Within Value Contexts:

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union help make cultural conflicts among and within nations more obvious as well as more prevalent than was the case during the intense, ideological East-West struggle. Cultural differences, mobilized by leaders for political, economic, and social purposes, have literary determined life and death in places such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Middle East, and Somalia. The pervasive and increasing influence of cultural considerations in international politics is underscored by growing racial and religious problems throughout much of Europe, especially in France, Germany, and Britain; the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Israeli-Arab conflict and elsewhere; and increased attacks by some Islamic groups on Jewish and Western targets. Samuel P. Huntington observes that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. The principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. (16)

Are the dominant American cultural values more conductive to military confrontation with nations that are culturally distant than a to nonviolent strategies and negotiations to settle disputes with them? In the radically altered strategic international system, American cultural values are likely to play a more prominent role both in foreign affairs in general and in conflict resolution in particular Dramatic, unprecedented, and largely unpredicted changes in world politics in the post-Cold War period challenge American foreign policymakers to develop a clearer definition of national interests and to rethink how the United States has historically attempted to resolve conflicts. Given the growing influence of culture in post-Cold War conflicts, American policymakers might improve the effectiveness of U.S. policies by becoming more self-aware regarding the cultural biases implicit in many of their actions and statements. (17)

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3.1.5. The Main Three Political Events in Post-Cold War and American Foreign Policy:

The events of 1989 and 1990 can only be described as monumental in that they shook the foundations of U.S. foreign policy. As a result of these events Bush administration successfully met three challenges. First, the Bush administration ended the Cold War peacefully by dealing with several major crisis successfully—ranging from the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe, to the reunification of Germany, and to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Second, the administration dealt with "instabilities generated by the Cold War's demise" (e.g., the Persian Gulf War, and Yugoslavia). Third, and what some may overlook, the Bush administration started the process of reform of the global institutions in terms of paving the way for the future. The new international order would be based upon a shared set of global values, involve cooperation among nations, and be grounded in the leadership of the United States. While Bush administration surely achieved some success in uniting a coalition in the Persian Gulf War around this vision, its efforts in other areas of the world—whether toward Russia, Somalia, Haiti, or Bosnia—met with a more mixed reception from the American people. Any new order remained elusive and September 11 attacks proved such elusiveness. (18)

3.1.5. The First American-Arab War:

The event that sparked the effort to think about a new world order was Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Iraqi's action raises the question of whether the initial cooperation between the United States and the (then) Soviet Union could be sustained in another arena and whether the global community could rally around a common task. As events were to unfold, the first test of the new of the new world order appeared to succeed: Soviet-American cooperation was sustained; the global community was largely supportive of this effort as well; and aggression was reversed. (19)

In some respects, the vigorous response of the Bush administration to Iraq's action may have been unexpected. On the one hand, the United States had sought to better relations with Iraq during the 1980s: Diplomatic relations had been restored in 1984, after being ruptured since 1967, and the United States had "tilted" toward Iraq

during the Iran-Iraq War. Throughout the 1980s, therefore, the Reagan administration gave considerable assistance to Iraq. It provided Iraq with tens of millions of dollars in agricultural credits, that is, loans that enabled Iraq to buy agricultural products from American farmers. The CIA also gave Iraq satellite intelligence information on the position of Iranian forces, enabling Iraq to wage its war more effectively. A number of Western European countries, France in particular, went even further, directly selling Iraq sophisticated weapons systems. (20) On the other hand, the Reagan administration had its quarrels with Iraq: It had been displeased over Iraq's apparent mistaken attack upon the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf in May 1987, resulting in the death of thirty-seven American sailors, and it had protested to Iraq in 1988 over its use of chemical weapons against its Kurdish ethnic minority. (21)

In keeping with its realist principles, however, the Bush administration decided early on to try to foster better relations with Iraq for both strategic and economic reasons. Iraq's location in the Persian Gulf area was important in efforts at achieving stability in the region, and its considerable oil reserves made Iraq crucial for global energy concerns. When Congress sought in early 1990 to enact economic sanctions against the Iraqi government over its abysmal human rights policy and the apparent effort to develop weapons of mass destruction, the administration argued against such an option. (22) Later, in the summer of 1990, when Iraq complained that Kuwait was responsible for keeping oil prices low (and hence hurting the Iraqi economy) by overproducing its oil quota, called for an OPEC meeting to raise oil prices, and threatened an invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration's policy did not really change. Indeed, the American ambassador in Baghdad Mrs. April Glaspie, held a fateful meeting with the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein roughly one month before the invasion, she actually seemed to reassure Saddam Hussein of U.S. disinterest in these questions: "I have direct instructions from President Bush to seek better relations with Iraq," and that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your borders disagreement with Kuwait." (23) Glaspie was later harshly criticized for failing to warn Saddam that the United States would come to defense of Kuwait, thus giving him the impression that he could attack it with impunity. (24) Furthermore, in testimony on Capitol Hill only days before the intervention, the

administration did not issue any warning when asked about a possible Iraqi invasion into Kuwait. (25)

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops suddenly surged across the borders into Kuwait, quickly occupying the country and forcing the Kuwaiti ruling family into exile. Saddam announced that Kuwait was being permanently annexed to Iraq. The seizure of Kuwait now gave Saddam control over 20 percent of the world's oil reserves, and his forces seemed capable of moving on into Saudi Arabia, which contained an additional 20 percent of the world's oil.(26) Despite the Bush administration's equivocal attitude in the summer of 1990, its response to the Iraqi invasion was immediate: It condemned the Iraqi action and called for its withdrawal from Kuwait, froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States, and imposed a trade embargo on Iraq as well. The European Community and the Arab League condemned the invasion, too. Most important, the Soviet Union joined the United States in opposing the action in a joint statement issued by Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze. (27) Iraq had been a client state of the Soviet Union, but these were the waning days of the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, was far more interested in improving relations with the West, so as to save the Soviet system from collapse, than he was in maintaining influence with Iraq. (28) A few weeks later, President Bush and President Gorbachev arranged a meeting in Helsinki, Finland, to deal with this crisis and concluded by jointly stating that "Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated." (29) Within a matter of a few weeks, about 100 nations had condemned Iraqis invasion of Kuwait.

The first practical step, Bush himself called the Saudi king Fahd and asked if he could send the U.S. defense secretary, Dick Cheney, to Riyadh. The king had to be convinced before he would see such a high-level American official; even talking to Americans might prove dangerous. But in the end, he told Bush to send Cheney. (30) The Pentagon chief succeeded in persuading Fahd to invite U.S. troops into Saudi Arabia. Cheney conveyed Bush's assurance that the United States wouldn't employ half-measures in dealing with Hussein. If the Iraqi strongman wanted a fight, he'd get one. Fahd reportedly demanded a commitment that if war broke out, Hussein would "not get up again." Precisely what Cheney said in response, neither U.S. nor Saudi officials chose to divulge. (31)

On August 8, 1990, the Bush administration announced that it was sending about 150,000 American forces into Saudi Arabia and the surrounding region for the purpose of helping that country defends its homeland against possible Iraqi aggression. (32) President Bush outlined four policy goals that the United States sought to achieve in taking this action against Iraq: (1) "the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait"; (2) "the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government"; (3) the protection of American citizens in Iraq and Kuwait; and (4) the achievement of "security and stability" in the Persian Gulf. (33)

On November 29, 1990, the Security Council passed its most significant resolution. It authorized members states "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement" the previous UN resolutions unless Iraq left Kuwait by January 15, 1991. (34) When Iraq failed to leave Kuwait by the January 15 deadline and after the U.S. Congress had given the president the authority to use American forces to implement this last UN resolution, the anti-Iraq coalition, now totaling over a half million troops, initiated a massive bombing attack against Iraq. While it initially failed to budge the Iraqis, by mid-February, Iraq agreed to withdraw from Kuwait, albeit with conditions attached. The anti-Iraq coalition, led by the Bush administration, rejected that plan and imposed a twenty-four-hour ultimatum on February 22, 1991, for the Iraqis to begin to leave Kuwait. When the deadline passed unanswered, the allied coalition mounted a massive ground, air, and sea assault to drive Iraq out.

On February 27, 1991, President Bush declared that "Kuwait is liberated" and announced the suspension of hostilities beginning at midnight on February 28. On March 3, 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution ending the hostilities and placing responsibilities upon the Iraqis for their invasion of Kuwait; on the same day, military commanders met in southern Iraq to formalize the terms of the military cease-fire and to work out arrangements for the exchange of prisoners of war. (35) Finally, on April 3, 1991, the UN Security Council passed a resolution formally ending the war and requiring Iraq to (1) destroy all of its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile systems with a range of more than 150 kilometers, (2) pay reparations to Kuwait, (3) reject support for international terrorism, and (4) respect the sovereignty of Kuwait. (36)

The second Gulf War was perceived not only as a defining moment in history but also as a reaffirmation of America's fundamental beliefs and values. President Bush asserted that "in the life of a nation, we are called upon to define who we are and what we believe. Sometimes the choices are not easy. As today's president, I ask you for your support to stand up for what is right and condemn what's wrong all in the cause of peace." (37) The massive destruction of Iraq was perceived as symbolizing the triumph of good over evil, and as a reaffirmation of America's perception of itself as a redeemer nation. (38)

The conflict also was increasingly linked to America's self-perception, which is intertwined with culture. In his address to the country announcing the deployment of American troops to Saudi Arabia, Bush emphasized that "standing up for our principle is an American tradition," and that "America has never wavered when her purpose is driven by principle." (39) At the same time that Bush asserted that Operation Desert Storm had "good versus evil, right versus wrong, human dignity and freedom versus tyranny and oppression. The war in the Gulf is not a Christian war, a Jewish war, or a Muslim war—it is a just war." (40)

3.1.6. The Clash of Cultures during the War:

The concept of a just war is firmly established in both Western and Eastern cultures and is an integral component of both religions. America's leadership of the coalition forces was perceived by Bush and others as an inherent responsibility and as part of the national heritage. Only America had the "moral standing" and the means to back it up. As Bush put it: We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace. This is the burden of leadership and the strength that has made America the beacon of freedom in a searching world." (41) Most Americans (approximately 75 percent) believed that Operation Desert Storm met the criteria of a just war. More than seven out of ten Americans agreed that the good that would be achieved by war would outweigh to harm caused by the conflict. Despite that American public opinion was much afraid the Gulf War would be similar with the Vietnam War. Failure in Vietnam challenged many Americans cultural assumptions and national myths, especially the myth of the Frontier. Pledging that the Gulf War would not be another Vietnam,

President Bush allowed himself to hope that his nation would not be gun-shy in the future, that they would willingly support other U.S. interventions elsewhere. (39) As Bush exulted days after Kuwait was liberated, "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and after all." (42) President Bush was strongly supported by the majority of Americans because his actions were consistent with many fundamental cultural values.

Similarly, Saddam had used his own cultures and beliefs to manipulate public opinion. He also seemed to believe that Iraq and the "Arab nation" were blessed by God, and that the region was honored by God to be the "cradle of divine messages and prophecy throughout the ages" (43) The deployment of American and coalition forces in Saudi Arabia was seen in cultural terms, as challenging God, because Mecca and the tomb of the Prophet Mohammed were under the "spears of the foreigners or Crusaders." Hussein called upon Arabs to launch a holy war against the infidels, and assured Iraqis that God was with them. (44) Whether intentionally or not, Saddam evoked images of past clashes between Christianity and Islam. His aggressive words were ignored and strongly refused by both Christian and Muslim nations, and they accused him of trying to cast the conflict as a religious war instead of that such a conflict was only political conflict. (45)

Consequently, Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 set the stage for a war that would dramatically landscape of the Middle East. The Gulf War revealed the remarkable ability of the United States, in the dawning post-Cold War era, to act decisively in the Middle East. But the war also revealed America's commitment to the territorial status quo in the region. (46) In the immediate aftermath of the war two separate Iraqi rebellions, one by Shiites in the south and the other by Kurds in the north broke out against Hussein's regime. As Saddam moved to crush the two rebellions, Bush did nothing to come to their aid. To prevent the Iraqi army from further attacking the Kurds and Shiites, the U.S. government declared a "no-fly zone" in northern and southern Iraq. (47) In Baghdad, however, Saddam remained in power, a constant reminder of the limited nature of Bush's UN-backed mandate in the Persian Gulf. Saddam would continue to be a thorn in Washington's side, and it would remain for Bush's successors-presidential and filial-to deal with the unfinished business of 1991. (48)

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3.2. Clinton's Neo-Liberal Values and Islamists

There are those who insist that between America and the Middle East there are impassable religious and other obstacles to harmony; that our beliefs and our cultures must somehow inevitably clash. But I believe they are wrong. America refuses to accept that our civilizations must collide. We respect Islam. (49)

President Bill Clinton

Bill Clinton was both the first elected post-cold war president and the first 'new' Democrat to occupy the White House. More concerned with domestic issues than with international affairs, his most pressing task, as he perceived it, was to build upon and extend his base of support at home (50) One small part of the answer lies in the American experience and the widely shared belief that the United States was not just a successful democracy but a shining example for others to follow.(51) Clinton, in fact, was quite adamant that the character of a nation's foreign policy had to reflect its core values; and there was nothing more important in the American value system, he believed, than the principle of democracy.

This, in the words of the title of a famous study by the historian Daniel Boorstin, was an essential part of the American genius. (52) But this was not all. While theorists of a more realist persuasion might try to build neat conceptual walls between the international system and domestic politics, Clinton refused to. In his view there was a close, almost intimate, connection between the two spheres. They were, as he pointed out, two sides of the same coin. As he made clear in an early speech defining US strategy in the post-cold war era, in the new world where so much had changed it was absolutely vital 'to tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy'. This was necessary if America wanted to compete economically, and it was essential too if it wished to promote a more stable international system." (53)

In candidate Clinton's view, the Bush administration had failed on both on both counts: to articulate such a vision and to put into place a foreign policy strategy for the post-Cold War era. Indeed, he argued, Bush's leadership was "rudderless, reactive, and

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erratic," while the country needed leadership that was "strategic, vigorous, and grounded in America's democratic values." (54)

3.2.1. Policy Actions of the Clinton Administration in Post-Cold War: Promoting American Economic Security.

One principal area of policy consistency and policy success for the Clinton administration related to the commitment to promote "economic security" and to wed foreign policy and foreign economic policy. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the pact altering the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) went a long way to accomplishing those tasks. Two other initiatives were begun by the administration to free up global trade in other areas of the world: the initiation of greater economic cooperation and coordination among the members of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization, an organization composed primarily of Pacific Rim countries and the United States, and the initiation of an organization for expanded trade among the nations of the Western Hemisphere. In addition to these initiatives, the Clinton administration made a concerted effort to free up trade between the United States and Japan and between the United States and the European Union. Overall, these actions reflected significant strides by the Clinton administration to ensure greater economic security. (55)

3.2.2 Promoting Stability and Democracy Abroad: The Middle East.

In the Middle East, the Clinton administration continued the peace process (initiated after the Persian Gulf) between Israel and its Arab neighbors and here, too, some policy movement was achieved. In addition, the Clinton administration initiated an important policy change: It replaced the balance of power policy followed by the Bush administration against Iran and Iraq with a policy that it called "dual containment." The agreements between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization in September 1993 and between Israel and Jordan in October 1994 were important foreign policy accomplishments after the Cold War for the Clinton administration in furthering the peace process in the Middle East. For both pacts, the American administration served in a mediator role and facilitated the agreements. The Clinton administration has also sought to extend this role to include obtaining a peace settlement between Syria and Israel.

Indeed, President Clinton went to Syria as part of a Middle East trip in late 1994, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher held talks with both the Israelis and the Syrians as part of the effort to make this process work. No agreement, however, has yet been achieved, and the prospect for success appears to be at some distance in the future.

While the administration has committed the United States to continued global involvement, the shape and extent of that involvement has not been carefully spelled out. Further, the approach has not been fully embraced by the American people. Although the administration had initially proposed a rather expansive unilateral and multilateral involvement on several different fronts, more recent policy directions suggest a tilt toward a more selective involvement, especially on military issues (e.g., peacekeeping missions). On economic matters, global involvement will remain, with an emphasis on creating more open markets. On the question of democratic promotion and human rights, however, the administration appears headed toward a position more consonant with America's past actions: encouraging movement in that direction, but being less involved in nation-building state.

Clinton, in particular, seems to be much more concerned with "low," or domestic, politics, and he has essentially delegated foreign policy formulation to a select team of aides. "High" politics, including the Middle East and the larger Muslim world, is clearly not Clinton's passion. More than any other recent president, Clinton appears to be overly sensitive to internal ethnic politics, conducting foreign-policy on an ad hoc, short-term basis, often geared to satisfy certain domestic constituencies. The result is that American policy has been mostly reactive to crises as they unfold on the world stage. The U.S. approach to Islamic resurgence is a case in point. (56)

3.2.3. American Views to The Islamists:

U.S. policy during Clinton administration sees Islam in terms of two ends of a spectrum. According to Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern affairs Robert H. Pelletreau, "One end is represented by the faith of Islam. At the other end of the spectrum are a cluster of extremist groups...that practice violence and terrorism." (57) In practice, the faith side is ignored. Washington's definition of political Islam, or Islamism, tends to

equate all of its manifestations with terrorism; central to the policy is the fear of the emergence of an Islamist regime in a major Arab country, similar to that in Iran.

The U.S. views terrorist activities and Islamist militancy in the Middle East as an emerging force. Islamism is viewed solely as a security threat to the peace process, to pro-U.S. regimes in the Middle East, to the flow of oil, and to the security of the state of Israel. (58) American values and beliefs also had influence on the Oslo peace process, as the American culture plays an important role for American foreign policy particularly in the Arab-Israeli peace agreements. Since the Oslo Accords, two major principles have characterized U.S. policy towards the peace process:

Acceptance of Oslo's incremental approach of progressive movement toward ever larger areas of Palestinian self–governance that is matched by Palestinian efforts to prevent the impairment of Israel's security. Progress in this incremental process was expected to build sufficient confidence between the parties to enable them to tackle the more difficult final–status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees. And U.S. reliance on Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate their own agreements with minimal American intervention, except to help manage crises when they occur, provide moral and political support, and rally international backing.

The cornerstone of U.S. policy is to weaken the influence of Islamist forces in the region by offering a regional peace package, draining the Islamists' financial and political resources both at home and abroad, and erecting rigid military security measures. Dual containment of Iran and Iraq is central to U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Iran (in regard to its links with militant organizations such as Hezbullah in Lebanon, Hamas in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the Armed Islamic Group/GIA in Algeria) is considered a threat to the U.S.-sponsored regional peace process and to the security of Israel. In a speech to the Jordanian parliament in 1994, President Clinton described the contest in the Middle East as a struggle between "tyranny and freedom, terror and security, bigotry and tolerance, isolation and openness." (59) By clear implication, he equated Islamic activism with the negative choices and Western-style secularism with the positive ones.

The U.S. also uniformly views Islamist activists uniformly as zealots who use Islam to suppress the rights of minorities and women, and as Pelletreau put it, "anti-

western [elements who] aim not only to eradicate any Western influence in their societies [but] resist any form of cooperation with the West." The significance of Islamist organizations who use parliamentary or other legal forms of political mobilization is largely excluded from consideration. (60)

The U.S. has placed counterterrorism at the top of its international and domestic agendas, and much of the political mobilization to win support for antiterrorism measures has been focused on the need to confront and overcome "Muslim fundamentalism" or "Islamic terror." (61) Domestically, the U.S. government won support for sweeping new antiterrorism legislation through repeated references, both veiled and overt, to the threat posed by Islamic terrorists. In speeches before the United Nations General Assembly in both 1995 and 1996, Clinton urged greater international cooperation against terrorism.

The U.S. initiated a high-profile international conference on terrorism held in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt in response to the spate of suicide bombings in Israel in 1996, using the opportunity to call for the creation of a U.S.-led international campaign against any manifestation of terrorism. President Clinton promised that the CIA and other U.S. resources would be marshaled for the anti-terrorism campaign. Follow-up conferences continued the Sharm-el-Sheikh initiative in other places. The U.S. also signed new counterterrorism treaties with Israel. (62)

3.2.4. The United States And Political Islam:

In practice, U.S. makes no distinction between terrorism and Islamism as a legitimate political movement aimed at challenging Western, colonial, and sometimes modern influences in non-Western and traditional societies. Operationally, the U.S. views the Islamist movement as a military/security threat, and thus devises strategies to deal with it militarily: by gathering intelligence, by depleting its financial resources, by intimidating supportive popular environments, and by other covert counterterrorism operations. (63)

American foreign policy, stressed that Clinton administration officials, showed willingness to coexist with Islamists who reject violence and extremism and play by the rules of nation-state relations. Although some U.S. officials referred to the importance of values in the relationship between the United States and Islamists, they were basically

concerned with Islamists' foreign-policy orientation, not with their internal politics. In this context, the end of the Cold War has not brought about substantive changes in Washington's Middle East policy, which is still preoccupied with stability and with security and economic relationships, rather than with issues of democracy and human rights.

This leads me to another finding of the study: Contemporary security and strategic calculations, not just culture, ideology or history, appear to influence U.S. public and official thinking and discourse on Islamic resurgence. Although some official statements make a reference to culture, they mainly stress current security threats associated with the rise of "extremist" Islam to American vital interests. For as one policy maker noted, Clinton was not intrinsically interested in Islam per se; rather, they feared Islamists' potential to undermine the Arab-Israeli peace process and the stability of the pro-Western regimes, disrupt the West's access to Gulf oil, acquire non-conventional weapons, and undertake terrorist activities. Cultural considerations may unconsciously influence U.S. officials' private thinking on political Islam, but they hardly figure in their public pronouncements.

American policy makers have made it clear that they strongly disagree with confrontationalists' assertion that Islamic activism has replaced Soviet Communism as the new threat to the West. Far from viewing Islamic resurgence as part of an anti-Western Jihad, U.S. officials attribute the rise of Islamic sentiments to worsening socio-economic and political conditions. They have decisively rejected the clash-of-civilizations hypothesis, stressing, instead, the unique role of the United States as a bridge between various spiritual systems. The Clinton administration has conducted a well-organized public-relations campaign to allay Muslims' fears about the myth of confrontation that has become popular in some foreign-policy elite circles.

3.2.5. Arab People Views to Clinton:

Many Muslims throughout the Middle East, while impressed by Clinton's nuanced and sensitive pronouncements on Islam, are baffled by his apparent lack of sensitivity to Arab/Muslim concerns in regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process and the plight of Palestinians. The Middle Easterners portray Clinton as "the most pro-Israel

President in the history of this country." They lament the fact that, under Clinton, an almost complete identity of views exists between the United States and Israel over a host of regional issues, including the peace process, security, and terrorism. They feel that Clinton has abandoned Washington's previously advocated policy of evenhandedness in favor of a "total commitment" to Tel Aviv. Although tensions exist between the Clinton administration and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, U.S. officials have been reluctant to push the Israeli government hard enough to accept a reasonable compromise. (64) In April 1996 all of the Middle Eastern peoples and governments were outraged over Washington's perceived collusion with Israel's bloody military action in Lebanon that resulted in more than one hundred civilian casualties. Expressing the sentiment of many Arabs, the Syrian poet, Qabbani cried, "Does every American leader who dreams of winning the presidency have to kill us—we the Arabs?" (65)

Clearly, to the United States, militant Islam has replaced radical Arab nationalism as the major threat to American national interests in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf. Islamists groups are challenging Washington's conception of a desirable Arab-Israeli peace settlement, as well as its continuing dominance in the internal affairs of the oil-producing Gulf States. (66) According to a State Department official, the Clinton administration's dual containment policy toward Iran and Iraq—and, one might add, of Sudan—should be seen within this context. (67) The adoption of the dual containment policy singled the triumph of confrontation lists' view within the administration. (68)

3.2.6. Failure The Clinton's Policy Towards Islamists:

Judith Miller, a New York Times correspondent, has accused the Clinton administration of "fudging" its response to the threat posed by radical Islam in the Middle East. It dismisses the distinction between good and bad Islamists: to confrontationlists, all militant Islamist movements "are likely to remain anti-Western, anti-American and anti-Israeli. (69) Miller also accused American decision makers of hypocrisy for drawing a distinction between good and bad Islamists without concretely identifying any of the so-called moderates: The Clinton administration has not found a Muslim leader to "Crown" as a moderate. (70) Being politically correct-stressing the common bonds between Islam

and the Christian West—the U.S. stance presents the United States in a good light without having to commit it any concrete courses of action. As a consequence of such policy, the United States has played a major role in adding fuel to the fire. Either by direct or indirect means, it has permitted the growth of Islamic extremism. Osama bin Laden is one of these fires.

3.3. The United States and the Clash of Cultures – The Case of Osama bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden was largely unknown to the West prior to 2001, but became a household name as the man behind Al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks on the USA. This was the first major incident in the USA widely considered terrorist (other than those such as Oklahoma by Americans themselves). Usamah bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden, is the leader and head of al-Qaida, widely regarded as the most extensive terrorist organization in the world. He is a member of the immensely rich bin Laden family with intimate connections in the innermost circles of the Saudi royal family. Al-Qaida gained worldwide notoriety after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in the Washington, D.C. area. The group is ostensibly led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, although al-Qaida's true size and organizational structure are unknown. (71)

Al-Qaida (Arabic: "the foundation" or "the base") is a militant Islamist alliance founded by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1988 to expand the mujahideen resistance movement against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan into a pan-Islamic movement to defend, via military and terrorist tactics, other Islamic communities under siege, including those in Kashmir, Bosnia, Chechnya and Palestine. As a militant Islamist movement, the group places itself in confrontation with the United States, due to the United States' support for Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other regimes that al-Qaida perceives as oppressing Muslims. Another main reason for their conflict with the United States is their perception (shared by some other Muslims) that certain aspects of Western culture and values, typified by the same Hollywood output that is said to shock conservative Christians, are incompatible with Islam. (72)

To understand this, we need once again to take bin Laden's fanatical ideology and his hatred for the United States and the West for granted and concentrate on his situation and the purposive rationality behind his tactics. Consider his central goal - a Muslim world ruled by true Islamic law and teaching, purged of all evil, materialist, secular, infidel, and heretical influences. Of course he regards the West, especially the United

States, as the source of many of the evils corrupting and oppressing Islam and would like ideally to destroy it, but the immediate obstacles to achieving his vision and the main foes to be overcome have always lain within the Muslim world itself. Al-Qaeda has been involved in attacks against both civilian and military of Western targets around the world, and is regarded as a terrorist group by the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Australia and many other governments. (73)

3.3.1. Americans Perception of Osama bin Laden:

As a result of the 9/11 attacks, and fueled by patriotism, outrage and the media, perceptions in the West run somewhere in between strongly and virulently negative. This is fuelled by the manner in which he is portrayed by the media, which is usually quite one dimensional, in his role as the fanatic Islamic, almost demonized, and architect of the worst terrorist incident in U.S. history. It's not irrelevant to note that prior to 9/11, major disasters of this scale were virtually unknown to Americans, who were largely shielded from the immediacy of military attacks by the media. Up until that time such incidents were remote and occurred elsewhere. Since the 9/11 attacks struck out of the blue and with such devastation, the attacks hit hard psychologically on the U.S. population, and the response and perceptions are likewise very strong.

Amongst other views, some see him as a power-hungry man who is using religion as a motivator and an excuse to attack other countries. Probably, more see him as a religious fanatic who wantonly kills innocent people beyond number to achieve his political and religious goals, and is also a major threat to the peace and stability of the world and to their country and fellow citizens specifically. For some people, ridicule is seen as a means of expression, so Anti-Bin Laden merchandise, including toilet paper rolls and urinal cakes with his face on it, can be bought within the United States. Some Americans and Europeans do sympathize with him or his motives, accepting to some degree certain of his accusations and feeling there has been wrong on both sides.

In other word, Islam is seen by many Americans as a hostile culture and a threat to their interests and cultural values. Americans' views of Muslims may to some extend be rooted in the country's religious origins, and they may also be traced to the historical conflict between Christian and Muslims, a confrontation that has been transmitted and

popularized through generations by history, literature, folklore, media, and academic discourse. (74) Although that the underlying cultural values of Americans play a major role in shaping most policy makers' perceptions of Islamists, but they feel in proud of the Freedom of religion is the individual's right or freedom to hold whatever religious beliefs he or she wishes, or none at all. This freedom extends mere freedom of thought by adding the freedom of worship and the freedom of religious congregation, and became regarded in the 20th century as one of the basic human rights. (75) They look to bin Laden as a representative of political Islam, such kind of politics is unacceptable in American culture, since they do not pay close attention of any religion would be blended with politics. Americans are typically secular nation. (76)

3.3.2. The United States and Osama bin Laden, The Green Belt Theory:

Osama bin Laden made his debut on the world stage during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s, working loosely in tandem with the CIA. At that time, as we saw, the U.S. government was working closely with the Saudi and Pakistani governments to recruit tens of thousands of young men from across the Muslim world to come fight with the Afghan Mujahidin. These recruits became known as the "Afghan Arabs," even though many of them were from non-Arab Muslim countries. Bin Laden was one of those Afghan Arabs, serving mainly as a fundraiser for the Mujahidin and as an informal emissary of the Saudi government. Bin Laden was by no means a creation of the CIA — indeed, he seems to have hated the United States from the start — but he did share with the United States the overall objective of thwarting the Soviet invasion. This objective was achieved in 1989, when Moscow pulled its troops out of the country. (77)

In fact, the Afghanistan war in the 1980s was a proxy war between the United States and Soviet Union, the U.S. had strongly supported the Jihad term as a literal war against non-believers, who in this case were the godless Soviets, and Washington teamed up with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to recruit Muslim youth on this basis. (78) As the United States and its allies armed and ensured the spread of fundamentalist Islam across the Middle East to surround the Soviet Union with a green belt (green referring to the color of Islam). This green belt would not only stop the spread of communism, it also limits Soviet influence in the region. Because of Americans as a people share certain

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human and moan values with Islam. The first and foremost, deep faith in the one Supreme Being. Both are commanded by Him to faith, compassion and justice. Both have common respect and reverence for law. On the basis of both values and interests, the natural relationship between Islam and America is one of friendship. (79)

3.3.3. Islamic Fighters in American Movies And Values:

As a result of shared values the Afghanistan war finally entered this time in the American news and entertainment media, the Mujahidin were overwhelmingly portrayed as gallant and romantic freedom fighters, valiantly defending their homeland and way of life. The specter of a ragtag collection of mountain tribesmen resisting the army of a superpower captured the imagination of the American public. Dan Rather of CBS News had a sensational scoop when he sneaked into Afghanistan to do a story disguised as Afghan tribesmen, promoting critics to dub him "Gunga Dan." In Sylvester Stallone's movie Rambo 111, the hero goes to Afghanistan to free an old buddy from Soviet captivity, with the help of a loyal band of Mujahidin. Although Stallone hogs all the best scenes for himself—the highlight of the film is when Rambo shoots down a Soviet helicopter with a bow-and-arrow—the movie does give a nod to the Mujahidin's courage and piety, explicitly endorsing their call for a "holy war" against the Soviets. (80)

3.3.4. The United States Once Supported Bin Laden:

As America fought wars around the globe in the 20th century, one principle guided U.S. alliances: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. In the war against Hitler, the United States found common cause with Stalin. In the war against Japan, America aided Vietnamese rebel Ho Chi Minh. In Third World struggles, America helped Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein. And as Afghan rebels fought Soviet invaders During the 1980s, the United States gave aid from a far while Saudi exile Osama Bin Laden provided support from within Afghanistan. Americans were outraged at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 22 years ago. The United States boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics. President Jimmy Carter embargoed exports to the Soviet Union. And the CIA funneled arms and other support to the Mujahedeen, Afghanistan's "freedom fighters". (81)

Carter's successor, Ronald Reagan, saw Afghanistan as a potential Vietnam for the Soviets' "Evil Empire". Thousands of Muslim radicals joined the CIA and mujahedeen, including Bin Laden himself. Reagan praised the mujahadeen as freedom fighters battling an evil empire, stating, "To watch the courageous Afghan freedom fighters battle modern arsenals with simple hand-held weapons is an inspiration to those who love freedom. Their courage teaches us a great lesson—that there are things in this world worth defending. To the Afghan people, I say on behalf of all Americans that we admire your heroism, your devotion to freedom, and your relentless struggle against your oppressors." (82) During the Regan administration the religious component of America's foreign and domestic policies was pronounced. By emphasizing God and the country, traditional values, American morality, and Judeo-Christian ethic, fundamentalists strongly supported Regan's foreign policy agenda, especially his crusade against communism and leftist regimes. Both communism and radical regimes represented evil, in the fundamentalists' view. (83)

In order to oppose the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski started a $40 billion program of training Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In retrospect, this contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, but, ironically, is also often tied to the resulting instability of post-Soviet Afghani governments, which led to the rise of Islamic theocracy in the region. Some even tie the program to the 1996 coup that established the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and to the creation of violent Islamic terrorist groups. At the time, and continuing into the Reagan and G.H.W. Bush presidencies, Islamic fundamentalism as a political force was not well understood. (84)

3.3.5. Blowback:

This phenomenon of former CIA-backed guerrillas using their US training to attack American targets has become known as "blowback". Technically a 'blowback' (what we call a right stuff up) is the term that the CIA uses to describe a situation when some operative, a terrorist, or some situation that they've created gets out of their control and comes back to haunt them. It's a situation where the scientist creates a monster as (Frankenstein) that "blows back" on its creator. Manuel Noriega, Saddam Hussein,

Osama bin Laden are all pretty good examples of blowback. They were all nurtured for many years by the CIA, the US military or military intelligence. They all eventually "blew back." (85)

Al-Qaida also clearly benefited from the complacency of the U.S. government, whose response to the attacks had been sporadic and misdirected and whose component agencies were poorly organized for sharing information. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, some of these actions have been re-examined and become more controversial. Some say this support of radical Islamists led to the rise of the oppressive Taliban regime and Al-Qaida. It has also been alleged that Osama bin Laden, the future Al-Qaida leader, received training by the CIA or an allied intelligence agency. As a result of the demise of the Soviet Union, Islamic extremism in particular, has found a new enemy- The United States of America. Islamists from the Middle East and the rest of the world have a virulent hatred of the United States. They also brought the United States to a fundamental crossroads in its dealings with the Middle East—and indeed with the whole world— which has only grown after 9-11 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is vital that the "war on terrorism".

3.4. American Values Boosted: September 11 and Its Aftermath.

"Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorist. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." (86)

President George W.Bush.

September 11, 2001 - a day that shocked the entire world. For many people all over the globe this day will be remembered as one of the most terrible and unbelievable days ever, even if they were not directly involved. The attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, on the Pentagon in Washington D.C. by the fundamentalist Osama bin Laden and his organization al-Qaida. And the crash of an airplane in Somerset Country near Pittsburgh not just killed more than 3,056 people (87) and damaged or destroyed more than 30 buildings. (88) There were far reaching consequences.

3.4.1. American Values Are Preferable:

In a large opinion study conducted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, the PEW Global Attitudes Project (2002a) reported that Americans held increasingly stronger internationalist views, believing that the United States should actively intervene in international affairs. Many Americans believed that their values, beliefs, and ideologies should be imposed upon other nations, countries, and cultures. American values and beliefs are "right", and other systems are "wrong". (89)

In the aftermath of these attacks, many feelings have surfaced: fear of the reoccurrence of terrorism, sadness for the losses of the country, stronger patriotic and nationalistic attachments, anger at the people who planned such an attack, thankfulness for not losing a loved one, fear of and prejudice toward foreigners, and the desire for revenge. And of course, many people traumatized even the people who survived from W.T.C. can still be traumatized. Many of them suffer from so-called survivor syndrome – a feeling of kind of guiltiness: My friends died, why did I survive!!

After September 11, more than 85% of Americans supported military action against terrorism in the Middle East in a 2002 survey. Furthermore, polls indicated that a majority of Americans supported war even if it means there would be American casualties. Among those who say war is never morally justified, more than half (55%) supported the war on terrorism and preservation of national security interest. (90)

The events of September 11 have increased the power of the American president in making of foreign policy. According to the American society's dominant beliefs and values this change easier permits the U.S. government to use massive force against an enemy and walk away from the responsibilities that accompany victory. The United States, in search of total security, regarded what was now a new enemy as a danger to its life and interests. The enemy, according to most Americans, had to be destroyed. From the perspective of the dominant culture, there could be no compromise with evil. (91) Indeed, Laden's survival continued to be viewed by most Americans as evidence of a terrible nightmare. He and his terrorist network were not associated with any particular territory and were not synonymous with a nation state, which requires to lead redefinition of U.S. military strategy and tactics.

3.4.2. Bush, God's Will, And The Three Fs:

In the next days after the attacks, President W. Bush told his advisors gathered in the White House's emergency operations center that "nothing else," but war matters. He continued to pursue fraudulent crusade to "rid the world evil." He claimed that God "called" him to run for president and to strike al-Qa'ida and Saddam Hussein. He larded his speeches with religious rhetoric, talked repeatedly of "God's Will," "God's Master Plan," the American mission, "saving and destroying souls." (92) But the defense minister Rumsfeld noted that international law allowed the use of force only to prevent future attacks and not for retribution. Whereupon Bush yelled, "No, I don't care what the international lawyers say; we are going to kick some ass." (93) As a result, unfortunately, an illegal war has been declared against Afghanistan and later Iraq regardless of the possibility to create wide-spread conflict among civilizations. September 11 had many profound effects on U.S. domestic and foreign policy. In domestic matters, President Bush, demanded the American people to unify among themselves and stand up behind his

administration's declarations war on terror in both home and abroad. He also concentrated on the values and beliefs of his nation by reconfirming the three Fs, which are Faith (God), Family (Society), and Flag (nation). (94)

In his foreign policy, he led his country to overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan. He also led to what is called the "war on terror" and was a major factor leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and finally is establishing the Greater Middle East Plan. Bush saw the war on terror as a way to a new era that was free from threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. And, consistant with American cultural values, this new world would be governed by the principles of quality and the rule of law, and America would assume the leadership role. According to the myth of Frontier, as the Turner thesis which is the conclusion of Frederick Jackson Turner that the wellsprings of American exceptionalism and vitality have always been the American frontier, the region between urbanized, civilized society and the untamed wilderness. In the thesis, the frontier was seen as a region that created freedom, "breaking the bonds of custom, offering new experiences, and calling out new institutions and activities." Turner first announced his thesis in a paper entitled "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," delivered to the American Historical Association in 1893 at the World Columbian Exposition in Chicago.

3.4.3. The Significance of The Myth Of Frontier:

Turner's thesis quickly became popular, especially since the U.S. Census of 1890 had officially stated that the American frontier had ceased to exist and westward movement would no longer be discussed in census reports. The idea that the source of America's power and uniqueness was gone was a distressing concept. Many, including future president Theodore Roosevelt, believed that the end of the frontier represented the beginning of a new stage in American life and that the United States must expand overseas. For this reason, some see the Turner thesis as the impetus for a new wave in the history of United States imperialism. Consequently, Proponents of American exceptionalism often claim that the "American spirit" or the "American identity" was created at the frontier (following Frederick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis), where

rugged and untamed conditions gave birth to American national vitality. Therefore, the successive American administrations usually refer to this distinctive value to gain public support for their policies, American leaders often appeal to those cultural values that underscore America's culturally defined role as a redeemer nation. (95)

3.4.4. The Values of Hawks And Doves:

During the early Cold War, US foreign policy was based on a consensus between realists such as George Kennan who emphasized prudence, restraint, and the need to restore a stable balance of power, and liberals such as Dean Rusk, who emphasized a more idealistic policy based on American values and international law. In the George W. Bush administration, the two main factions appear to be the hard-line, neo-conservative "hawks" (led by Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld) and the internationalist "doves" (led by Colin Powell at the State Department).The doves are reluctant to go to war, which carries great risks and dangers and has unpredictable results. In their view, diplomacy-- that is, measures short of war, whether persuasion, compromise, or threats--is preferred. Prudence and restraint are vital. The hawks place much more emphasis on military power and the use of force, downplaying other factors such as diplomacy, alliances, and international treaties. (96)

In the view of the hawks, the problem is that the Middle East needs to be set on the road to modernity. The hawks want to bring liberal democracy to the Middle East by overthrowing Saddam Hussein and setting up a liberal democracy in Iraq; they're hoping for a chain reaction in the rest of the region. (97) The hawks believe - like many American people - that the compromise and diplomacy are unfamiliar matters or are not regarded as being very important. War is familiar. Whereas Americans think they can get their way through war, diplomacy, by contrast, is seen as risky and as no guarantee of objectives being achieved. War, more than diplomacy, is also consistent with democracy, partly because unlike diplomacy, which is conducted by an elite group, war is usually widely approved of, and people from across the nation are involved in specific sacrifices. (98)

Reference to the American dominant culture, the reliance of force as an instrument of foreign policy is influenced by the American quest for invulnerability.

Imposed security is generally seen as solving virtually any social ill. Separated from Europe's and Asia's wars by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, endowed with abundant resources, and unchallenged by its neighbors, the United States strongly believes that peace is its neutral condition. But to ensure tranquility the government has sought to acquire absolute immunity from external danger by building a strong national defense system. Although most nations share this objective, the United States believes that its security can be guaranteed only through the unilateral application of military power. (99)

In the wake of the September 11th attacks and the relative success of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Bush administration felt that it had sufficient public support in the United States for further operations against perceived threats in the Middle East. Many nations did not regard Iraq's violation of UN resolutions to be a valid case for the war, asserting that no single nation has the authority to judge Iraq's compliance to UN resolutions and to enforce them. Furthermore, critics argued that the US was applying double standards of justice, noting that other nations such as Israel are also in breach of UN resolutions and have nuclear weapons; this argument is not a black and white matter. (100)

3.4.5. Analysis of The Iraqi Crisis And Aftermath:

In order to contain the world opinion and during the crucial period prior to the launching of the war against Iraq, the U.S. government was able to confine the debate on the reasons for its invasion of Iraq to the issue of Saddam Hussein, his methods of rule and the weapons of mass destruction that he once possessed and was alleged still to possess. This was to the advantage of US policy makers in three ways:

1 - It enabled the US government to claim some moral justification for taking action that is contrary to international law and did not have the approval of the UN Security Council. One cannot dispute the fact that Saddam Hussein's methods of rule were brutal, and that Iraq is one of the countries where the worst violations of human rights have taken place in recent times. In addition, his regime was a major factor for regional instability which threatened neighboring countries and had waged wars of aggression against two of them, Iran and Kuwait. Since that Hussein was increasingly viewed as the "mad man" of the Middle East by the American administrations. He was portrayed as

being unpredictable, incomprehensible, extremely dangerous, the "butcher of Baghdad," crazy, and a distant other with whom negotiations would be impossible. His violations of human rights and following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Hussein was regarded as the epitome of evil, Hitler reincarnated. As a result, most Americans believe that compromise with evil is immoral and inconsistent with their basic cultural values. (101)

2- While the American Administration was making the preparations for its war against Iraq on both the military and political levels during the year of 2002, the issue of democracy suddenly emerged within the American political agenda towards the region. Statements, speeches and press releases of some American officials indicated that the American Administration was interested in liberating both the Arab and Islamic Worlds from the dictatorial regimes and promoting the values of democracy and liberty within both worlds. For the American government the democratization process required the development of the educational systems particularly religious ones. Moreover, mass media should develop to support the values and culture of democracy like political participation, respect for human rights, in addition to consolidating the power of civil society. Rather, one of fundamental justifications that were propagated to support war against Iraq is building a democratic regime on the remnant of Saddam Hussein's regime to be a raw model that can be followed and imitated by other States in the region. Building a democracy in Iraq may have a Domino effect on the region. (102)

3 - It also provided a smokescreen for the fact that those in US ruling circles who were pressing hardest for the invasion of Iraq are right-wing extremists who support the Israeli government of Ariel Sharon, and that they were primarily motivated by gains which the expect to accrue to Israel from the invasion of Iraq. (103)

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the move toward war with Iraq, Americans have once again turned to the just war tradition for moral guidance. To persuade the public opinion, the government played a crucial role in changing national priorities, and strongly influenced the emergence of cultural values that favored preparation for war. Besides, the American administration reminded its people that it will achieve guarantee speed victory against terrorism and despotic regimes because the God intervenes on their side. This view continues to dominate the United States' thinking when it engages in conflicts in which its victory is seen as a step toward building God's

kingdom on earth. Many Americans perceive themselves as that Kingdom's architects. (99) As a result of the administration's cultural efforts, the ascendancy of militaristic thinking was strengthened by the culture of violence. The government played a crucial role in changing national priorities, and strongly influenced the emergence of cultural values that favored preparation for war. Military expenditure grew significantly, and many leading universities and research institutes were awarded large grant to work on military-related projects. (104)

Discussions of what constitutes a morally justifiable war can be found in many religious traditions, but contemporary debate in the U.S. draws primarily on classic just war theory, which finds its origins in Christian theology and natural law theory. Augustine of Hippo (354-430) is generally acknowledged as the first to offer a sustained treatment of war and justice in his masterpiece The City of God. While loathing the destruction and loss of life caused by war, Augustine nonetheless believed that a "just war" might be preferable to an unjust peace. Drawing on the apostle Paul's New Testament injunction to submit to governing authorities, "who do not bear the sword for nothing" (cf. Romans 13:1-7), Augustine recognized biblical mandates for individuals to love their neighbors (to the point of renouncing self-defense) even while defending government's duty to preserve civic peace and to secure justice. He maintained that use of force is necessary — though always regrettable — in a fallen world in order to restrain evil, but that its ultimate goal must be to restore peace. (105)

3.4.6. American Public Reactions Towards Iraqi Resistance:

The ongoing resistance in Iraq was concentrated in, but not limit to, an area referred to by Western media and the occupying forces as the Sunni triangle and Baghdad. Critics point out that the regions where violence is most common are also the most populated regions. This resistance may be described as guerrilla warfare and partly as terrorism. The tactics included mortars, suicide bombers, roadside bombs, small arms fire, and RPGs, as well as sabotage against the oil infrastructure. There are also accusations, questioned by some, about attacks toward the power and water infrastructure. There is evidence that some of the resistance was organized, perhaps by the fedayeen and other Saddam Hussein or Ba'ath loyalists, religious radicals, Iraqis

angered by the occupation, and foreign fighters as the representative of al-Qaida network, the Jordanian origin Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, and others from several Arab and Muslim countries. (106)

American's opinion of Mr. Bush's handling of the economy is also at an all-time low, 34 percent, while 60 percent disapprove. Increasing employment is seemingly not affecting Americans' view of Mr. Bush's economic policy. Just as startling, the poll finds that for the first time a clear majority of Americans disapprove of Mr. Bush's handling of the war in Iraq, believe the United States is not in control of the country and think U.S. troops should turn over power to Iraq as soon as possible, even if the country is unstable. The highest figure ever recorded, 64 percent, say the result of the war in Iraq has not been worth the cost in lives or money. According to the latest U.S. military announcement that updated on Saturday 5 February 2005, the death raises to 1443 the number of US military personnel whose lives have been lost in Iraq since the US-led invasion in the spring of 2003. (107) Only 29 percent, the lowest figures yet, believe the war has been worth it. And just 31 percent of Americans now say the United States is winning the war.

"The public is just very unhappy with what has happened in the war," said Robert Shapiro, a professor of American politics and public opinion at Columbia University. "We are talking about perceptions of the war that are akin to the public's perception on Vietnam, or lower." (107) Elevated US death tolls mean that the antiwar groups are going to use those deaths as propaganda in their attempts to stop the war." (108)

These groups claim that the war on Iraq could not provide peace for American people; in contrast, it contributed the expanding of antagonism against American around the world. As David Le Page, editor of Johannesburg's liberal Daily Mail and Guardian, argued that "war of any kind is unlikely to make Americans much safer...The sins of the United States over the past half-century have been many." In order to fight terrorism "The United States must revolutionize its relations with much of the world." (109)

The lack of knowledge about the Middle Easterners values among most Americans both people and policy-makers, they could not realize the Arab Muslim world historical values and beliefs. There are people who adore life and still accept to die for their freedom for God's sake. The escalating Iraqi resistance seems to be setting the stage for another act which might usher in a new Arab world or set the clock ticking for the end

of yet another empire. (110) As Paul Wolfowitz, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense and a chief architect of war on Iraq has admitted, the Pentagon has been partially wrong in its post-war assumptions, saying; "Some conditions were worse that we anticipated." (111)

3.4.7. Greater Middle East And North Africa Project And American Culture:

The Bush administration has presented what is called the Greater Middle East and North Africa project initiative. The Bush administration has said it wants to make democracy-building a central part of the U.S.-led war on terrorism. After Introducing the plan a State Department official told the Washington Post, "There is a belief that (Helsinki) contributed to bringing Europe together and played a significant role in tearing down the Soviet Union. In the same way, this idea would tear down the attractiveness of (Islamic) extremism."

The United States has done well to scrap its much talked proposal of reforming what it calls the "Greater Middle East". Britain's Financial Times, on March 13, noted, "Under pressure from the Arab and European governments, the Bush administration has scrapped its draft proposal for a Greater Middle East Initiative but a revised and probably diluted plan is still expected to be launched in June (at the G-8 Summit) under a different name." Interestingly, the "Greater Middle East" includes the region, according to the American formulation, beginning from Mauritania and ending to Pakistan. It encompasses Iran, Turkey, Israel and Afghanistan, too. This area also happens to be the operational responsibility of the US Central Command, which is militarily spearheading the "war on terror".

According to a November 3, 2003 Secretary of State press release: To support this advance of freedom, U.S. policy rests upon eight "non-negotiable demands of human dignity": rule of law, limits on the power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for private property. "Dictators and despots can build walls high enough to keep out armies, but not high enough to keep those winds from blowing in," Powell said to students and faculty of City College of New York. In the 1960s, Americans were trying to promote the "American lifestyle" in a way that raises it to the status of the ideology that opposes the

Marxist theory and the regimes in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. In order to prepare the people to accept the "American lifestyle," there was a call to spread the knowledge about the "American values." In the 1970s, the promotion of these values became a sacred message with leftist symbols who, today, became the neo-conservatives; such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz and others. Those people represented the first generation of neo- cons. The second generation currently holds key positions in the American administration; Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and the "American lifestyle and values" were both elevated to a zenith of ideological importance to face the enemy. With time, the American values were transformed into a sacred message that should be imposed to the whole world as a lifestyle that reflects American supremacy. (112)

3.4.8. American Values In Bush's Last Speech:

Delivering his annual State of the Union address, Bush also said the elections in Iraq marked a "new phase" in US efforts to train Iraqi security forces and that both liberty and democracy were on the march in the region. "The goal of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace is within reach - and America will help them achieve that goal," Bush told the joint session of the US Congress and a televised audience of millions. With an eye on his place in history, Bush said spreading democratic reforms in the Middle East would help defeat "terrorists like those behind the September 11, 2001 attacks".

3.4.9. Appeal To Allies:

Exulting over elections in Iraq, the president said that Washington's campaign to build democracy there "will succeed because the Iraqi people value their own liberty - as they showed the world last Sunday". "Our generational commitment to the advance of freedom, especially in the Middle East, is now being tested and honored in Iraq," he said. "The new political situation in Iraq opens a new phase of our work in that country ... we will increasingly focus our efforts on helping prepare more capable Iraqi security forces - forces with skilled officers, and an effective command structure," he said. "In the end, Iraqis must be able to defend their own country - and we will help that proud, new nation secure its liberty," he promised. However, he refused to set a specific timetable for

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American withdrawal from Iraq. "We will not set an artificial timetable for leaving Iraq because that would embolden the terrorists and make them believe they can wait us out," he said.

Bush also made an unusual appeal to allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia to pursue political reforms while warning Syria and Iran to stop backing terrorism. "To the Iranian people, I say tonight: 'As you stand for your own liberty, America stands with you.' "The government of Saudi Arabia can demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining their future. And the great and proud nation of Egypt, which showed the way toward peace in the Middle East, can now show the way toward democracy in the Middle East," he said. (113)

These statements outlined the values and beliefs of American foreign policy in the Middle East with preemption and unilateralism regarding certain kinds of foreign threats. If nations hostile to the United States seemed poised to develop weapons of mass destructions or support any kind of terror, the United States would not hesitate to strike out at them first, and to do unilaterally if need be. This confrontation will be occur with nations who are culturally distant, because American cultural values are likely to play a more prominent role both in foreign affairs in general and in conflict resolution in particular.

It is clear that the United States had drastically lowered the threshold for military intervention in the Middle East (and perhaps other regions as well) and that an era of frequent military engagements for the purpose of eliminating threats before they could materialize was on the near horizon.

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CONCLUSION

This, as I mentioned, is beyond of this thesis, so what I would like to do for the reminder of this study is return to the four themes with which I began the series, and suggest how these themes continued to define the values and beliefs of American relations with the Middle East and would likely do so in the period following September 11.

The first theme of the study is that of growing American involvement in the Middle East. The fact that al-Qa'ida network chose to target the United States in the first place, mainly because of its deployment of troops on Saudi soil, was an indication of American prominence in the region by the end of the twentieth century. Such a troop would have been inconceivable in the era of Woodrow Wilson.

The second theme is Middle Easterners' ongoing quest for political independence and self-mastery. The emergence of Osama bin Laden in the 1990s bore out this theme, albeit in a complex way. On the one hand, bin Laden's rise was an extreme manifestation of Middle Easterners' drive for self-mastery. On the other hand, it was a conspicuous symbol of their failure to achieve it.

The third theme is the difficulty of balancing among diverse and, sometimes, conflicting interests and objectives in the Middle East. By 2002, the Bush administration was arguing that disarming Iraq could not be separated from the effort to defeat the al-Qa'ida network. The administration's critics, on the other hand, maintained that the preoccupation with Iraq was diverting precious energy and resources from the war

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against al-Qa'ida and, worse still, so alienating Muslim opinion as to provide al-Qa'ida with fresh opportunities for recruitment.

The final and most important theme is the increasing the cultural antagonism between Americans and the Middle Easterners. Public opinion surveys conducted in the months after 9/11 revealed high levels of resentment against the United States on the part of ordinary Arabs and Muslims, as well as a stubborn unwillingness to acknowledge bin Laden's complicity in the attacks, despite the mounting evidence for such complicity. For many Americans, meanwhile, the attacks of September 11 confirmed some of the most fearful stereotypes about Arab and Muslim terrorists. Most Americans' cultural perception of Arabs is that they are dangerous, untrustworthy, immoral, undemocratic, barbaric, and primitive. (2) These negative stereotypes are perpetuated by television cartoons, news stories, and movies. Relatively isolated from the Arab world, the majority of Americans have developed many negative stereotypes of the area's inhabitants. (3)

This general lack of understanding of, prejudice against Arabs, 9/11 events, and its aftermath was demonstrated by the widespread hostility many Americans evinced toward Arab-Americans. On day after September 11 attacks occurred, an even more radical tone, Mohammad Rashid, Palestinian demonstrator remarked, "This is the language that the United States understands and this is the way to stop America from helping the Zionist terrorists who are killing our children, men and women everyday. (4)

The increasingly angry rift between Americans and Middle Easterners has lent credence to scholarly interpretations, such as those by Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington that stress deep-seated cultural antagonism between the two peoples. For decades Bernard Lewis had argued that Arab and Muslim resentment against the West

had little to do with concrete political grievances over recent Western policies. Rather, Lewis insisted, such resentment was rooted in a rejection of Western culture itself, and in a feeling of chagrin that Arabs and Muslims experienced over the centuries-long decline of their once-glorious civilization. The phrase of Lewis came up with to describe this phenomenon was the "clash of civilizations." In the early 1990s, Samuel Huntington borrowed this phrase and used it as the title of a highly influential article in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Huntington, too, argued that Arabs and Muslims anger at the West was rooted in ancient cultural antipathies, not in modern political disagreements.

In the aftermath of 9/11, however, Lewis and Huntington enjoyed a remarkable popular revival. Although academics continued to dismiss their work as simplistic, journalists and politicians found and menacing Muslim world. Bernard Lewis in particular became a favorite of the Bush administration, making frequent visits to Washington to enlighten the administration on Middle Eastern affairs. The most appealing of Lewis's insights, from the Bush administration's perspective, was the observation that Arabs and Muslims had little use for Western values like, democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights, but did have a healthy respect for firmness and strength. While bin Laden himself may have had a "clash of civilization" agenda, he realized that the best way to sell that agenda was to package it in standard political rhetoric. The problem with Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington is that they talk as if the entire Arab and Muslim world think like Osama bin Laden. This is demonstrably not the case. (5)

Of course there are cultural differences; of course there are divergent value systems. But as I see it, the bitterest conflicts between Americans and Middle Easterners,

the ones that have led violent conflict, have actually taken place within a shared moral framework. Polls recently taken in the Middle East have indeed revealed a high- level antagonism toward the United States. But such antagonism seldom focuses on American values. To be sure, Middle Easterners are sometimes critical of what they see as Americans' excessive materialism, their self-absorbed individualism, and their lack of concern for the interests' society at large or even for their extended families. But Middle Easterners also express admiration for America's economic dynamism, its political openness, its technological innovation, and its educational excellence. (6)

What really angers Middle Easterners is not the values of American society but the policies of the U.S. government, which are often seen as violating the very values they profess to uphold, like human rights, democracy, national self-determination, and concern for the interests of poor and weak peoples. Arabs and Muslims will point to U.S. support for Israel, not just the support for Israel's existence and security but the financial underwriting of its ongoing occupation of Arab lands, and the frequent use of the UN Security Council veto to shield Israel from criticism for that continuing occupation. They will point to Washington's invasion of Iraq and committing mass murdering against Iraqi Arab civilians, like a massive strike the Falluja, Ramady, Shiite holy places in Najaf and other Iraqi cities, also Abu Garib prison's scandals. And they'll point to the U.S. government's long-standing support for authoritarian and corrupt regimes in the region, regimes that have mistreated their own citizens and hoarded their nations' wealth.

American officials can do much more to improve the image of the United States in the eyes of Arabs and Muslims, many of whom criticize what they perceive as a double standards in forming U.S. foreign political values, and they questions

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Washington's sincerity in speaking out on issues of human rights, democracy, and the prevention of proliferation of non-conventional weapons for all peoples.

Accordingly, first of all, The U.S. should turn interim governance of the country over to a United Nations administration that will pave the way for Iraqi self-rule. . The eventual Iraqi government would have far greater legitimacy in the eyes of both Iraqis and the international community if it developed under UN administration; otherwise, it would appear--rightly or wrongly--to be simply a puppet regime of the United States. The U.S. should support the establishment of weapons of mass destruction-free zone throughout the Middle East including Israel. U.S. security operations in the Middle East should be restricted to the real threat: the al Qa'ida network, not by invasion or threatening to use military intervention or strike a small city like Falluja.The U.S. needs to vigorously support a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians, the U.S. administration must also insist that Israel live up to its international obligations by withdrawing from its illegal settlements in the occupied territories, giving up control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to establish a viable Palestinian state, sharing Jerusalem as the co-capital of both countries, and negotiating a fair resolution to the plight of Palestinian refugees. The U.S. must support the establishment of democratic governments throughout the Middle East, which will require--among other things-- suspending military and economic aid to all countries that engage in gross and systematic violations of internationally recognized human rights. Although Washington should not try to impose its form of democracy on other countries, a natural evolution toward greater political pluralism in the region will far more likely emerge if the U.S. ends its current support for autocratic governments and occupation armies. As President John F. Kennedy

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warned, "Those who make peaceful evolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable." Finally, the U.S. administration must put an end for negative stereotypes against Arabs and Muslims, by making reformations in its media and literature to be considered that all human beings are equal regardless about their races, colors, nationalities, religions, doctrines, and geographical locations in the globe, as the American cultural values depend on.

For Muslims, too, it is time to stop wallowing in self-pity: Muslims are not helpless victims of conspiracies hatched by an all-powerful, malicious West. The fact is that the decline of Islamic greatness took place long before the age of mercantile imperialism. The causes were essentially internal. Therefore, Muslims must introspect and ask what went wrong. Muslims must recognize that their societies are far larger, more diverse and complex than the small homogenous tribal culture that existed in Arabia 1,400 years ago. It is therefore time to renounce the idea that Islam can survive and prosper only in an Islamic state run according to Islamic *Sharia* law. Muslims need a secular and democratic state that respects religious freedom and human dignity, founded on the principle that power belongs to the people. This means confronting and rejecting the claim by orthodox Islamic scholars that in an Islamic state sovereignty does not belong to the people but, instead, to the vice-regents of Allah (*Khilafat-al-Arz*) or Islamic jurists (*Vilayat-e-Faqih*). Muslims must not look towards the likes of bin Laden; such people have no real answer and can offer no real positive alternative. To glorify their terrorism is a hideous mistake—the unremitting slaughter of Shias, Christians, and Ahmadis in their places of worship in Pakistan, and of other minorities in other Muslim countries, is proof that all terrorism is not about the revolt of the dispossessed. The Arabs

and Muslims should also realize that most Americans are good and fair people, a lot of Americans do not support various aspects of the U.S. policy in the Middle East, whether relating to Iraq, or relates to the Israeli-Arab struggle.

As I conclude my thesis series, which I imagine has made for some pretty depressing listening, I'd like to leave you with this one small basis for optimism. Americans and Middle Easterners have much more in common than they themselves may realize. It is true that Americans and Middle Easterners are divided by important cultural differences, and that some of their conflicts stem from this fact. But the bitterest conflicts—over life and death, peace and war, freedom and coercion—occur within a common moral framework. It is tragic, of course, that Americans and Middle Easterners apply their shared values so selectively and have used them as weapons against one another. But the shared values endure, and with them a faint hope that these two peoples might someday achieve a mutually beneficial and respectful political friendship. This mutual respectful and cooperation are the only way to offer the hope of providing each other with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness instead of beating the drums of a cultural and civilizational war.

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