# NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

## GRADUATE SCHOOL OF APPLIED AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

**Peace is all we need, Non-conventional Approaches**

Master Thesis
**By**
Fahmi Khamis Shurrab

Department of International Relations

**Nicosia 2004**

**Fahmi Shurrab: Peace is all we need, Non-conventional Approaches**

Approval of the Director of the Graduate School of Applied and Social Sciences

**Prof. Dr Fakhraddin Mamedov**

*We certify that this thesis is satisfactory for the award of a degree of Master of Arts in International Relations*

**Examining Committee in Charge**

| | |
|---|---|
| **Prof. Dr. Jouni Suistola** | Chair of the Committee, Dean of the Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences (Supervisor) |
| **Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Dayioğlu,** | Department of International Relations |
| **Tayseer Alshanableh, MA**, | Department of International Relations |

**DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**   ACADEMIC YEAR: 2004-2005

## STUDENT INFORMATION

| Full Name | | Fahmi Khamis Fahmi Shurrab | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Institution | Near East University | CGPA | 3.56 |

## THESIS

| Title | Peace is all we need(Non-Conventional Approaches) | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description | | | |
| The aim of this thesis is to show how peacekeeping operations can work more effectively and successfully, furthermore, to show that there are vital non-conventional approaches can help in the field of crisis management and to achieve sustainable peace. | | | |
| Supervisor | Prof.Dr. Jouni Suistola | Department | IR |

## JURY'S DECISION

The Jury has decided to accept the student's thesis.
The Decision has been taken unanimously.

## JURY MEMBERS

| Number Attending | 3 | Date | 02-07-2004 |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Name** | | **Signature** | |
| Prof. Dr. Jouni Suistola, | | | |
| Assist. Prof. Dr. Ali Dayioğlu, | | | |
| Tayseer Alshanableh, MA | | | |
| | | | |

**Approvals**

| DATE | Chair of the Department |
|---|---|
| 02-07-2004 | **Assist. Prof. Dr. Zeliha Khashman** |

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# Acknowledgements

## Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AIDS | Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome |
| ANC | African National Congress |
| ASEAN | Association of South East Asian Nations |
| CFC | Chlorofluorocarbon |
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency (US) |
| CIS | Commonwealth of Independent States |
| CND | Commission on Narcotic Drugs |
| CSCE | Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (now OSCE) |
| CTB | Comprehensive Test Ban |
| CTBT | Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty |
| DND | Division of Narcotic Drugs |
| DOMREP | Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic |
| EC | European Community |
| ECOSOC | Economic and Social Council |
| EU | European Union, formerly EC (European Community) |
| EOKA | Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) |
| FAO | Food and Agriculture Organization |
| GATT | General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade |
| GEMS | Global Environment Monitoring System |
| GIEWS | Global International Emergency Warning System |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| GPA | Global Programme against AIDS |
| GRID | Global Resource Information Database |
| HIV | Human Immunodeficiency Virus |
| IAEA | International Atomic Energy Agency |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| ICJ | International Court of Justice |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organization |
| IMO | International Maritime Organization |
| INCB | International Narcotics Control Board |
| INFOTERRAI | International Referral System for Sources of     Environmental Information |
| INSTRAW | International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women |
| KPNLF | Kampuchean People's National Liberation Front |
| MINURSO | United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western  Sahara |
| MNC | Multinational Corporation |
| MNF | Multinational Force |
| MPLA | People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola |
| MTCR | Missile Technology Control Régime |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NFZ | Nuclear-free zone |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NNWS | Non-nuclear weapon states |
| NPT | Non-proliferation Treaty |
| NWS | Nuclear Weapon States |
| OAS | Organization of American States |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OEOA | Office of Emergency Operations Africa |
| ONIJC | United Nations Operation in the Congo |
| ONUCA | United Nations Observer Group in Central America |
| ONUMOZ | United Nations Operation in Mozambique |
| ONUSAL | United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador |
| OPEC | Organization Petroleum Exporting Countries |

| | |
|---|---|
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (previously CSCE) |
| P5 | The five Security Council Permanent Members (i.e. the us, the UK, Russia (USSR before December 1991), China and France) |
| PDPA | People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan |
| PLO | Palestine Liberation Organization |
| PNET | Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976) |
| PTBT | Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) |
| ROC | Republic of Cyprus |
| SADF | South Africa's Defence Force |
| SALT II | Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II |
| SEATO | South East Asia Treaty Organization |
| START | Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (1991) |
| STD | Sexually Transmitted Disease |
| SWAPO | South West Africa People's Organization |
| TRNC | Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus |
| TTBT | Threshold Test-Ban Treaty UK United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAMIC | United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia |
| UNAMIR | United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda |
| UNASOG | United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group |
| UNAVEM | United Nations Angola Verification Mission I |
| UNAVEM II | United Nations Angola Verification Mission II |
| UNCHE | United Nations Conference on the Human Environment |
| UNCTAD | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| UNDOF | United Nations Disengagement Observer Force |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNDRC | United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator |
| UNDRO | United Nations Disaster Relief Organization |
| UNEF | First United Nations Emergency Force |
| UNEF II | Second United Nations Emergency Force |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| UNFDAC | United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control |
| UNFICYP | United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus |
| UNGOMAP | United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNHUC | United Nations Humanitarian Centres |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNIFIL | United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon |
| UNIIMOG | United Nations Iran—Iraq Military Observer Group |
| UNIKOM | United Nations Iraq—Kuwait Observation Mission |
| UNIPOM | United Nations India—Pakistan Observation Mission |
| UNITA | National Union for the Total Independence of Angola |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force in Somalia |
| UNMIH | United Nations Mission in Haiti |
| UNMOGIP | United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan |
| UNOGIL | United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon |
| UNOMIG | United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia |
| UNOMIL | United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia |
| UNOMSA | United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa |
| UNOMUR | United Nations Observer Mission Uganda—Rwanda |
| UNOSOM I | United Nations Operation in Somalia I |
| UNOSOM II | United Nations Operation in Somalia II |
| IJNPAAERD | United Nations Programme for African Economic Recovery and |

| | Development |
|---|---|
| UNPROFOR | United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Administration |
| UNSCOP | United Nations Special Committee on Palestine |
| UNSF | United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian) |
| UNTAC | United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia |
| UNTAG | United Nations Transition Assistance Group |
| UNTEA | United Nations Temporary Executive Authority |
| UNTSO | United Nations Truce Supervision Organization |
| UNYOM | United Nations Yemen Observation Mission US United States |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| VOP | Vance—Owen Plan |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WHO | World Health Organization |

# Dedication

To the dearer than my eyes' light, whom endured much, and gave me the hope in life and without her and her prayers I may not have accomplished this effort, my lovely great mother *Dalal Shurrab*

I also would like to show respectfully my gratitude to my dear father -the martyred- ( God bless his soul ), *Khamis Shurrab* who I owe so much

# I. INTRODUCTION

*" Peace-keeping operation is not a job for*
*a soldier, but only a soldier can do it"*

Since the end of the Cold War and the consequences it caused in the global and regional power balances, the world has witnessed a proliferation of low-intensity conflicts. The international response, mainly through the United Nations, has increasingly been to promote preventive diplomacy and, in a number of cases, to implement peace-keeping operations. This new trend in world politics is obviously a most welcome and positive development. Through peace-keeping, armed forces which have been originally designed and deployed to destroy human life, are now being used, albeit in a limited scale, to prevent conflicts and to save lives. The peace-keeping "revolution" is a significant step towards increasing human co-operation and the development of a functional international society. Although peace-keeping operations may require significant commitments from participating states, specifically the willingness to accept financial costs and casualties, all governments should seriously consider taking part in these operations in the interest of promoting international and regional stability.(1)

Post-Cold War conflicts may be largely divided into two categories. The first category includes civil wars caused by long-standing historical differences. New nationalism took the form of decolonization process and started in 1940s in Asia with the liberation of India and Pakistan and in 1950s, when some nations witnessed waves of liberation struggles particularly in Africa (for example, Ghana, Kenya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia). The driving force was the growing feeling of nationalism or even patriotism. The nationalistic movements clashed with the reluctant European imperialistic powers which have been exploiting the nations and their wealth from the beginning of the Modern time (since 1500).

The second category, which dominates mostly the African continent, is conflicts based on ethnic (mainly cultural or religious) divisions. This is, for example, the case in Sudan nowadays, where the conflict is based on the religious differences - the

1

South is predominantly Christian (under the leadership of Gorge Garang) and the North Arab-Muslim.

Conflicts may also rise due to the failure of states. In such cases, the state simply collapses and its ability to provide law and order disappears leading consequently to an anarchical situation, where the power usually shifts to tribal gangs with their own militia. This has been the situation, for example, in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Furthermore, there are states which are not supported by its ethnic groups like in Afghanistan. There the government was formed in American taste and style, and it may face clashes again by the local tribes, warlords and even Taliban which is still popular and has many supporters and followers.

By the very definition, the "failed States" are almost incapable to function not only internally but also as a member of the international community. A list of such failed (or at least faltering) states today includes Haiti, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Liberia, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Zaire.

William Olson suggests that the list could be easily expanded if one were to include states facing serious "internal problems that threaten their continued coherence" or "significant internal challenges to their political order". No matter how one looks at the phenomenon, the fact is that it is growing both in scope and in the potential detrimental consequences it entails for stability and security in the post-Cold War world.

The fundamental problem of "failed states" is that they do not simply go away, they linger; the longer they persist, the greater the potential challenges to neighboring states, regional stability, and international peace. In 1992 Boutros Boutros-Ghali addressed the issue in his discussion about the reduced significance of sovereignty in the international relations of the post-Cold War world. He stressed the view that the U.N. would be compelled to intervene in the domestic affairs of member states. He suggested that such interventions would be appropriate in the face of a collapse of domestic governing authority, displaced populations or gross violations of human rights, or when developments within the "failed state" posed a threat to international peace and stability.

On the other hand, the kind of social and political situations or conditions can or can not play an obvious and effective role in the stability or instability of any regime. For example, the corrupted governments and the rotten bureaucracy in some states was the reason for the instability, for example, in Latin America.

Many problems can be traced back to colonialism, while other difficulties are part of the socio-political systems which have evolved in the post-colonial era. The specific nature of each dispute consequently requires appropriate responses in order to limit or to prevent conflict.

A great deal of efforts have been devoted to show the importance of both preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping, in addition to the conflict management through official and unofficial diplomacy, and the increasing number of conferences that have been held to address these issues in recent years. This intellectual process, while in some cases far removed from the reality of international diplomacy and military operational activity, is to be welcomed as a way of further promoting the use of diplomacy and war machinery to serve peaceful and positive ends.

Of course, there are some issues or keys which can definitely help to achieve more security, stability and positive peace, those important issues which may have not received adequate attention by studies of peace operations and which are of critical importance to any government contemplating involvement in preventive diplomacy or peace-keeping. Those issues which will be tackled in this thesis are:
1- Early warning and early response to a crisis – the key to preventive diplomacy;
2- Adequate financial support for peace-keeping;
3- Accurate assessment of casualty tolerance in peace-keeping operations; and
4- Sufficient information for successful peace-keeping.

The above issues are fundamental to any political leader's decision-making process. Without dealing adequately with these issues, no decision-maker can realistically be expected to make a major contribution to crisis diplomacy, or to undertake an even more risky peacekeeping operation.

Additionally, we will Not discuss only the functions and activities of the official representatives of states which can participate in an initiate conflict resolution, but also unofficial representatives of IGOs and NGOs can act in such roles. There we speak about the so-called "track two diplomacy" or the unofficial diplomacy.

There are some practical examples where it has become clear that some non-state actors can play a vital role in conflict resolution or crisis management, and can achieve goals that are sometimes beyond the abilities of governments. Moreover, they can help to pave the way to sustainable peace and can launch initiatives to end a conflict. It is the nature of their role and position and even their greater expertise in the methods of such activities and experience in putting them to practice. For example, the issues of dignity, honour and sovereignty can sometimes be of vital importance, and to avoid such traps one must have skills, knowledge and sensitivity.

As we are going to tackle the preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping operations issue we will definitely talk about the UN as the main organization working on such issues. However, the emergence of the Cold War and its outcome - the bloc politics - prevented the UN to perform its primary role in the maintenance of peace and security. In the hostile environment of the Cold War, the UN could not play its role to implement the charter provisions in many cases related to international peace and security matters. Consequently, in various cases we can say that the Cold War prevented the UN to function satisfactorily in the peace and security matters.

Also in many regional cases the UN could not function properly. Usually in such case one of the conflicting parties, for some reasons does not approve the role of the UN in the conflict. The disapproval can cover both actions demanded or sanctions set by Security Council Resolutions and the possible deployment of observers or peace-keeping troops. Even when such an operation has been launched the parties may continue their policy of disagreement causing harms to the peace-keepers and obstacles on the field. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an example of such a case. In the conflict Israel has ignored many Security Council Resolutions. Furthermore, the Israeli environment and atmosphere towards military observers and peace-keepers has been sometimes even hostile. There are cases where the peace-keepers have been the target of an Israeli artillery barrage. Also it should be stressed that the US has

prevented many times the security council from passing Resolutions not in favour of Israel by using its veto and by maneuvering behind curtains.

This thesis also assesses what the United Nations peacekeeping function can or can not be in to help promoting international peace and security. For example we will discuss the UNFICYP as an important case (in addition to other cases), because the international dispute in Cyprus also enlightens the relationship of the United Nations peace-keeping with the process of peace-making. Peace-keeping involves the deployment of military personnel by an outside party (often by the United Nations) to supervise and monitor a cease-fire between antagonists. The third-party forces may also engage in a variety of humanitarian activities in addition to their basic function of securing peace. Although third party personnel is often in day to day mediatory activities around particular incidents or situations, their role is not designed to move the parties toward a political settlement.(2)

On the other hand, without peacekeeping forces, more incidents would escalate, tensions would be higher and the peace would become even more distant. One problem which occurs sometimes is the suspicious attitude of a party in conflict to trust on the UN peace-keeping forces. For example, in the Israeli case their mistrust in such an operation is more than obvious. Yet, when we consider the peace-keeping missions we clearly see, for example, the stabilizing influence of the mission on the amount of violence and tension.

The UN has in some cases obviously gained relative success since the emerging of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956, which was hastily designed by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld under instructions from the General Assembly after the Security Council was ended in deadlock by the French and British vetoes. The conflict of 1956 started when the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to nationalize the Suez Canal which was followed by the joint attack by France, Israel and the United Kingdom. The attack was put on halt by the US and the troops were withdrawn (3)

The UN peace-keeping operations are seen almost universally as legitimate. The principle of impartiality has put the UN's peace-keeping operations in various cases in some kind of trouble. For example, if one of the conflicting parties launches a military

operation it is the duty of the peace-keeping troops to prevent it. In such a situation they, instead of being a stabilizing outside element, easily become involved in the conflict. Yet, it is commonly accepted that the UN peacekeeping forces would remain strictly neutral.

They would have the task of maintaining order, supervising compliance with the cease-fire, patrolling along the truce lines and observing the execution of the UN resolutions.

On the other hand, putting the concept of peace-keeping aside, maintaining peace has been dependent on the cooperation and the consent of the governments, that is, the conflicting parties in general. Consequently, the United Nations, in maintaining peace and security never attempted to use force in the first place.

The entire system is almost fully dependent on peace-keeping by consent.

While peace-keeping and peacemaking are required to end conflicts and preserve peace, preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out.

According to the former Secretary General Boutros Ghali, "if preventive diplomacy was to become successful, it had to strengthen its ability for post-conflict peace-building, which could then prevent the recurrence of violence among nations". (4)

My aim in this thesis is not to discuss the UN and its agencies or structure, but the function of the UN peace-keeping operations. Furthermore, the other actors in the field of peace-keeping and preventive diplomacy outside of the UN are considered as well. The NATO and the OSCE are such organizations and we can see that their role especially after the Cold War has clearly increased in such activities, Also we can see that the division of duties between the UN and such organizations has been developing after the Cold War.

Furthermore, my aim is to analyze the question of performance of the peace-keeping missions. What are the factors of a successful operation and what are the circumstances leading to a failure. The same approach can be also taken into the other means of non-violent conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Is there something we can call "best practice" in combining various means together as a well-functioning "engine of peace". The question how can we make the single means and their combinations more effective will be also tackled. Finally, there are some modest

proposals for practical solutions how to start with small steps building the confidence and returning the life back to normality in conflict situations. Thus, the above questions are tackled both from theoretical and practical perspectives.

In this thesis we based to a great length on literary (books and articles) and internet sources. Unfortunately, for some practical reasons it has not been possible to have some (and maybe useful) interviews made. we hope that the contribution of my thesis to the field of International Relations lays in my analysis of the reasons of a successful/ unsuccessful peace-keeping/ peace-making operation and in the possible new combination of the other means. Hopefully, there is also something original in my "small- steps-back-to-normality –strategy", which, as we shall see, is an application of Vamik Volkan Tree Model –approach.

We will start by giving some main and essential definitions of the peace-keeping operations and of relevant operations which are considered to be complementary to the peacekeeping operations.

## 2. Peace-keeping Operations

The term "peace-keeping" is not to be found in the Charter of the UN, yet every newspaper and the daily TV screen are filled with the pictures and the dramatic accounts of the UN peace-keepers, Blue Berets, at work. Currently there are 17 peace-keeping operations with 71,000 peace-keepers. Missions have been launched increasingly in recent years, with a total of 36 operations since 1948 at a cost of more than $ 10,400 million. Totally 650,000 men and women from 70 countries have donned the blue beret and launched into a score of arduous and imaginative enterprises – sad enough, over 1,000 have paid with their lives.(5)

The United Nations Charter envisages a system of collective security, in which member states would provide forces to defend countries against aggression. This has not been working, partly because of the Cold War, and partly because most conflicts since then have been civil wars within states. Peace-keeping, as we know it, grew up as a compromise, using minimal force and generally only being employed with the consent of the parties in wars. Military observers, usually unarmed, might monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement. Later, and to a great length in the context of the ethnic conflicts in Balkans in 1990s, the peace enforcement operations emerged, in which armed peace-keepers were authorized to use force to prevent further bloodshed. Today more complex peace-keeping operations use a great variety of specialist skills to give the shattered societies the space (and support) in which to rebuild themselves.
Recently, the International Community has been in a serious need of more cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations which must constantly adapt to an ever-changing world situation. The Charter of the UN itself anticipated this need for flexibility by not giving a precise definition of regional arrangements and organizations, thus enabling diverse organizations and structures to contribute, together with the United Nations, to the maintenance of peace and security.

Currently, such cooperation can take five different forms. First, there is consultation, which is practiced on a regular basis and, in some cases, is governed by formal agreements. Secondly, there is diplomatic support, by which a regional organization can participate in United Nations peace-making activities through diplomatic efforts

of its own. For instance, the OSCE provides technical support in constitutional issues relating to Abkhazia. Conversely, the United Nations can support a regional organization in its efforts, as it does for the OSCE over Nagorny Karabakh (a predominantly Armenian territory in Azerbaijan, occupied and expanded in the early 1990s by the Armenian army).. Thirdly, the United Nations and regional organizations can engage in operational support. A typical example is the provision by NATO of air support to UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in Bosnia, the former Yugoslavia. Fourthly, there is co-deployment: United Nations field missions have been deployed in conjunction with the Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS) in Liberia and with CIS in Georgia. Finally, there can be joint operations, such as the current human rights mission of the United Nations and the OAS in Haiti.

Not all peace-keeping is carried out by the United Nations. Politics may prevent the United Nations' involvement; a regional organization or a body like the Commonwealth may take charge; or the United Nations itself may give an individual country mandate and responsibility for leading a force.(6)

Nevertheless, as it was remarkably noticed in the changing nature of conflicts in the post- Cold War era, most of the conflicts we face now are domestic, rather than international and that the casualties are mainly innocent civilians. This unfortunate development is the very nature of the ethnic conflicts. While they may be triggered by various kinds of dispute, many are fed by underlying problems, such as the lack of credible political structures, an absence of mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power, human rights abuses, social inequalities, and competition for resources. In the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia the suppressive nature of those states kept the tensions low, but they laterally erupted when those multinational/ multiethnic states collapsed.

We know that strategies to address such conflicts must take a correspondingly broad approach, if they are to be successful. Peace-keeping must not only address immediate needs, but must also undertake many long-term tasks, to build the foundations for a sustainable peace. These include helping to forge viable political and civic

institutions, strengthening human rights mechanisms, promoting law and order, and supporting the creation of civilian jobs for demobilized combatants. (7)

Before we go any further, we have to distinguish between four main concepts which we are going to use in so many perspectives, to avoid any misunderstanding or misperception, keeping in mind that the job of giving comprehensive definitions is a genuine and arduous task. Perhaps because of this difficulty with definitions, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali in July 1992 described some different types of operations, in "Agenda for Peace", on the following way:

## 2.1 Peacekeeping

Peace-keeping is the "deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well".(8)

In another context we use "peacekeeping" to mean any military operation by an impartial multinational force which tries to prevent or end war or helps a society rebuild in the aftermath of war. Peacekeepers may be armed, but they should use the minimum level of force necessary to achieve their aims.(9)

Peacekeeping transformed rapidly after the end of the Cold War. Quantitatively, peace-keeping has attained a new magnitude. Qualitatively, the peace-keepers confront previously unknown issues of policy and practice. (10)

They have to deal with novel aspects of humanitarian affairs and to be comprehensive. After the end of the Cold War the UN was expected to authorize personnel to implement cease-fires; demobilize regular and irregular military forces; inspect arms control constrains, observe troop withdrawals, train and oversee police forces, provide administrative oversight of government ministries; plan, administer and monitor elections, watch for human rights violations, provide safe havens for

displaced persons; and protect personnel attempting to give humanitarian assistance in war-torn areas. Consequently, a mixture of classic peace-keeping operations and new enforcement tasks has begun to occur. Therefore, the aim of the "Agenda for Peace' in producing the concepts of preventive diplomacy, peace making and peace building was to support the peace-keeping operations.

It was learned from the new kind of peace-keeping operations of the UN that for peace-keeping to succeed (as also peace-making), the parties to a conflict must have the necessary political will.(11)

Peace-keeping even more than peace-making, requires the adherence of the conflicting parties to the principle of peaceful resolution of conflicts, in other words, to the Charter itself. The world community needs better-prepared forces to be used in UN peacekeeping operations in additional places, which is different from the traditional form. As mentioned as a motto in the beginning of the introduction, peace-keeping operation is not a job of a soldier, but only a soldier can do it. Yet, it is important to notice that the soldiers are basically trained for different kind of jobs. There are big differences for example in the aims, means, practices, equipments and attitudes between the ordinary soldiers and peace-keepers. Consequently, it needs a lot of training and experience to "transform" a good soldier to a good peace-keeper.

In formal terms it also needs a plan for a prudent extension of operations in the domain of enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter. To obtain this the Secretary General's office should not remain understaffed and short of resources. Its capacity for predeployment planning and general field support must be strengthened with the initiative, which can make enforcement much more effective.(12)

Agenda for Peace further mentioned the need for military support of the new kind of operations. This opens the way to enforcement element within peacekeeping operations, which we will further discuss in separate subdivisions to clarify the differences with other relevant and complementary approaches.

## 2.2. Peace-making

Peace-making is "using mediation, conciliation or diplomatic initiatives to peacefully resolve a conflict". Peace-making is usually the easiest and cheapest form of peace-keeping, because it has the smallest number of people engaged. It can involve as few as handful of people and can consist of mainly preventive diplomacy efforts by a special representative of the Secretary General. This type of operation can be initiated quickly once the potential for conflict is foreseen and the decision is made to try to avert it. Peace-making implies a mediator's role, although, as will be discussed, there is some question as to whether the UN can perform such a function effectively.(13)

Peace-making requires the use of the same diplomatic skills as the preventive diplomacy. The aim is to reduce the intensity of the conflict through negotiation, as a step on the path to a cease-fire. The responsibility here is to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. However, those idealistic phrases may not properly work in practice. For example, one party was highly critical of the peace-making process in the former Yugoslavia and felt that it set a grave precedent by allowing frontiers to be changed by force. It was noted that while impartiality is important in humanitarian efforts, it is not always correct in mediation efforts where principles of international law and norm must be maintained.

As a result, UN's capacity in peace-making should be developed, and the Security Council and the General Assembly should be asked to strengthen the capacity of the UN through co-coordinated planning and implementation.(14).

## 2.3.Peace-building

Peace-building, as described in An Agenda for Peace requires strengthening the institutions to consolidate a sense of confidence and well-being between people.(15) This category of operation involves the building of all kinds of "structures" (such as social services, a judiciary and responsive government) that strengthen peace and order.(16)
Peace-building can occur before or after a conflict, but is certain to be badly needed in the aftermath of war.

Post-conflict peace-building may take the form of concrete co-operative projects which link two or more nations and ethnic groups in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only contribute to economic and social development but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace. For example, various organizations, within and outside the United Nations system, and international community are concerned of common issues regarding the post-conflict reconstruction such as strategic issues, needs and capabilities, an integrated post-conflict reconstruction framework and mobilization of resources.

The UN has a favorable role to play in various operations from electoral assistance to mine clearance and most countries ask the UN to do so even more than once.(17) Fundamental elements of peace-building can be found in democracy and development. The Former Secretary General Boutros Ghali thinks that democracies almost never fight each other. Democratization supports the cause of peace and peace, in turn, is prerequisite to development. Thus, democracy is essential if development is to be sustained over time. He also thinks that societies that lack economic well-being tend to fall into conflict and ways should be found to develop their economies.

## 2.4. Peace-enforcement

"Peace-enforcement" was added later in the vocabulary of International Relations to refer to enforcement measures taken by the UN to restore peace, under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter. It involves peacekeeping activities, which do not necessarily involve the consent of all parties concerned.(18)

What differentiates peace-keeping from peace-enforcement is the level of violence and intensity of activity. Increasingly the distinction between the two concepts has been blurred after the end of the Cold War. The development was caused by the changing nature of the conflicts, where sometimes everything was in complete disorder.(19)

13

There was an intense use of violence among the parties of the conflict and where there was no willingness to end the conflicts and cease-fire agreements are not respected, the UN's Blue Helmets were obliged to use force.

Moreover, the UN Security Council decision to use force to make humanitarian aid available in Somalia has provoked a great debate. The Security Council's approach on Somalia caused confusion between traditional Chapter VI based peacekeeping operations and military enforcement based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The main problem, nevertheless in Somalia was, that in fact the US turned the UN as a tool to rebuild a failed state. It happened in the euphoria of the Gulf war, when the US was able to show its military might. The new perception was that the US is all-mighty and capable to change the world with military power to force the New World Order. In theory, UNOSOM in Somalia was an UN operation under the command of a Turkish General Cevik Bir. In practice, the American element of the mission, Task Force Ranger (under the command of Admiral Jonathan Howe), run the situation independently. Especially, when the Task Force Ranger put it as the main goal to kill or to arrest one of the warring clan leaders Mohammed Farah Aidid, the troops became a party in the conflict. It all ended to a great blunder in Fall 1993.

The problem from the perspective of the UN Charter is that when the Charter of UN was designed there was not that much ethnic conflicts and civil wars to provide theoretical distinctions and even if there were, their nature was different.

In fact, nothing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than the need to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny the capacity to do so. The logic of peace-keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and the dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace-keeping is intended to facilitate.(20)

Ethnic conflicts blur the line between domestic and international, state and non-state actors, as well as that between Chapter VI and VII. They have also changed the doctrine that only interstate conflicts can be a threat to international peace and security (Article 39). Such conflicts, where huge number of people get killed, are

forced to seek refuge and which create a danger for neighboring countries, are recently considered by many peace-keepers and academicians as a severe threat to international peace and security. They are of the opinion that it would be wise to include into the Charter a new Chapter dealing with such conflicts providing the guidelines for containing the conflicts, to take the necessary measures, to launch special operations etc

However, there was a general consensus regarding Bosnia and Somalia that limited enforcement actions (especially the misuse of them in Somalia) proved contradictory and ineffective and peacekeeping forces should use force only as a last resort.

Hence, the organization has come to realize that a mixture of peace-keeping and enforcement is not the answer to a lack of consent and co-operation of the parties of the conflict. Nevertheless, where the Security Council authorizes the use of force even to limited extent, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the composition, equipment and logistic support of such an operation must be commensurate with the task.(21)

It is worth mentioning here that even in Europe the operations have been heavily dependent on the American intelligence, surveillance and transportation capacity. This is partly because of the US military presence in Europe, partly simply because its overwhelming capabilities. From this perspective, the Bosnian operation in 1995 and Kosovon war in 1999 can not only be considered as peace-enforcement operations, but a show-off of the American military supremacy even in Europe.

## 3. Keys for Success

### 3.1. Early Warning

In recent years the United Nations system has been developing a valuable network of early warning systems concerning environmental threats. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency, (IAEA) deals with the risk of nuclear accidents, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) deals with the mass movements of the populations and refugees. Some other bodies are dealing with

natural disasters, the threat of famine and the spread of disease. There is a need, however, to strengthen the organizations and arrangements in such a manner that information from these sources can be synthetisized with political indicators to assess whether a threat to peace exists and to analyze what action might be taken by the United Nations to alleviate it.

In an "Agenda for Peace "Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali recommends that "in addition that the Security Council invites a reinvigorated and restructured Economic and Social Council to provide reports, in accordance with Article 65 of the Charter, on those economic and social developments that may, unless mitigated, threaten international peace and security". He also asserts that regional arrangements and organizations have an important role in early warning. Consequently, he asks regional organizations which have not yet sought observer status at the United Nations to do so and to be linked, through appropriate arrangements, with the security mechanisms of this Organization.(22)

The idea of 'early warning' as "information that can provide a timely alert to potential conflicts" has been emphasized by a number of scholars as an important component in conflict resolution.  In the African context, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has sought to develop an effective early warning system in an effort to deal with continental conflict. The OAU Secretary-General appears to favor a system which would provide sufficient information of an impending inter-state conflict, or internal political crisis. Once the problem has been tabled at the OAU, a high-level mediation mission can be mandated to initiate discussions with the objective of resolving the crisis.

Any successful early warning system should involve the synthesis of a range of information inputs from different sources, including governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), academic and research institutions.(23)

By implication, any early warning system or activity may be perceived to be infringing on a state's sovereignty and could be rejected as an unwelcome form of foreign intervention. Nevertheless, crisis management and resolution have the best chance of success if action is taken early. A continental early warning system, as

16

proposed by the OAU is extremely ambitious and is unlikely to be successful in the short term. The OAU's Conflict Management Center (CMC) in Addis Ababa is a major step towards the prevention of conflicts in Africa, but lacks the funding and resources to provide an effective continental service. Rather, individual African countries, armed with sufficient early warning information, should be able to initiate regional crisis diplomacy, while the OAU mobilizes broader support. The OAU's 1993 resolution on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution serves as the foundation and guiding light for preventive diplomacy on the African continent, but the difficulties in mobilizing sufficient support for speedy action necessitates a more streamlined procedure.(24)

## 3.2. The Financial Costs of Peacekeeping

Contrary to the general perception, not all UN peacekeeping operations are financed by special separate and distinct arrangements from the organization's ordinary expenses under its regular budget. Due to the lack of the contributions of the regular budget and the financial problems of the UN in peace-keeping operations, some cases were and are being financed by parties most directly concerned. For example, the UN Yemen Observation Mission(UNYOM), was financed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and another peace-keeping operation, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), has been financed 50 % by the Greek Cyprus together with the other voluntary contributions since its inception in 1964.(25)

Preventive diplomacy should always be the chosen option for resolving a crisis. However, if diplomacy is insufficient, a peace-keeping operation is the next best option. Peace-keeping presents a range of different problems, the first of which is finding the necessary funds to finance the operation. As a consequence of growing scepticism with regard to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, the UN has been forced to reduce its peace-keeping budget. This marks an unfortunate reversal of an earlier trend. The UN's peacekeeping budget increased from $379 million in 1990 to a high of $3,5 billion in 1994. However, 1995 saw a decrease to $3,2 billion, while 1996 recorded the lowest expenditure in five years at $1,3 billion. and according to the latest statistics, by the year 1.7.2003-30.6.2004 the UN peacekeeping budget was

$ 2.17 billion and with total expenses of the operations 1948-2003 have been $29 billion .

In addition, the number of UN peace-keepers have also shown a marked decrease from 65 000 in 1995 to 25 600 at the end of 1996. The number of peace-keeping missions have decreased from 22 in 1994 to only 16. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has suggested that "peace-keeping as a primary activity of the United Nations will not end." However, the negative trend in peace-keeping missions, deployment and spending suggests that a number of critical issues need to be reviewed before a new wave of hopefully more successful peace-keeping initiatives can be undertaken.(26) Therefore, one shall hope that the need for new missions does not increase in the nearest future. Also, there is a good reason to hope, that the situation in Iraq – difficult also from other angles – does not swallow the necessary capacities of the UN peace-keeping missions elsewhere.

As such ideas are debated, a stark fact remains: the financial foundations of the Organization grow weaker daily, debilitating its political will and practical capacity to undertake new and essential activities. This state of affairs must not continue. Whatever decisions are taken on financing the Organization, according to the former General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali, there is one inescapable necessity:
Member States must pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Failure to do so puts them in breach of their obligations under the Charter.
In these circumstances and on the assumption that Member States will be ready to finance operations for peace in a manner commensurate with their present, and welcome readiness to establish them, he recommends the following:

(a) Immediate establishment of a revolving peace-keeping reserve fund of
$50 million, (this recommendation has since been implemented).

(b) Agreement that one third of the estimated cost of each new peace-keeping operation should be appropriated by the General Assembly as soon as the Security Council decides to establish the operation; this would give the Secretary-General the necessary commitment authority and assure an adequate cash flow; the balance of the

costs would be appropriated after the General Assembly approved the operation's budget;

(c) Acknowledgement by the Member States that, under exceptional circumstances, political and operational considerations may make it necessary for the Secretary-General to employ his authority to place contracts without competitive bidding.(27)

## 3.3. Casualty Tolerance

The number of casualties (here we can maybe speak about the body-bag syndrome) any government can tolerate in a peace-keeping operation is a key issue that has to be decided before any deployment commences. A clear estimate of the number of casualties should be envisioned and then the acceptability of the number should be evaluated. This procedure is essential for any military operation, peace-keeping included. The Vietnam war indicated the limits of public support in the face of mounting casualties. Between 1961 and 1973, 47 244 American servicemen were killed and over 300 000 wounded. The unacceptable losses had a major impact on decision-makers and popular support for the war in general. The US Government discovered that public and congressional support for any military operation was essential.(28)

In general, there might be very strict limits on the number of casualties acceptable in a far-off peacekeeping operation which had no clear place on the national interest agenda. The ambush set by supporters of Mohammed Aidid caused the death of twenty-four Pakistani soldiers on 5 June 1993.
Immediately UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, demanding the immediate apprehension of those involved. (29)

It has become clear that USA can play a vital role if she remains impartial. What was noticeable in the case of the former Yugoslavia that, after heavy air attacks and the formation of a British-French-Dutch quick-response force in 1995, an intermediary (Richard Holbrooke) was sent from Washington. He obtained a cease-fire by dividing conquered territories among the parties. It was followed by the peace agreement under

heavy American pressure on the parties at a marathon negotiating session in Dayton, Ohio.

## 3.4. Information Support for Peacekeeping

Preventive steps must be based upon timely and accurate knowledge of the facts. Beyond this, an understanding of local to global (also here the old rule " think globally act locally" is valid) developments, based on sound analysis, is required. And the willingness to take appropriate preventive actions is essential. Given the economic and social roots of many potential conflicts, the information needed by the United Nations now must encompass economic and social trends as well as political developments that may lead to dangerous tensions.(30)

In addition an adequate preparation for a peace-keeping operation should include detailed and quality intelligence. This issue was emphasized in former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace. Peace-keeping forces need what NATO calls the 'Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR)' – the minimum information required for operational success. Information systems which provide instant battlefield awareness are essential for combat supremacy in any military operation. The blunder in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993 was based to a great length on the poor intelligence. Anyway, this was an obvious example of the importance of the information required and, consequently, the US started to plan to invest increasing amounts on information technologies. The Pentagon's 1995 request for new investment in information technology totaled almost $10 billion.

The problem here is that this information should primarily be provided by the UN, and only secondarily by participating states. The problem was clearly to be seen throughout the whole history of the UN weapons inspections in Iraq. All the time there was debate not only the accuracy of the information, but also about the possible double role of the American members of the inspection team – were they the American spies or UN inspectors. Anyway, without CCIR, peacekeeping operations are unlikely to succeed. The UN has acknowledged this point and has debated the launching of 'spy' satellites to support peacekeeping, but high costs have led to the idea being shelved.(31)

Actually, the UN depends on the USA in collecting important and sometimes secret information due to the technological capabilities that only the USA has got and can use. Consequently, there are several preventive and procedural steps which should be undertaken, such as:

(a) An increased resort to fact-finding is needed, in accordance with the Charter, initiated either by the Secretary-General, to enable him to meet his responsibilities under the Charter, including Article 99, or by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Various forms may be employed selectively as the situation requires. A request by a State for the sending of a United Nations fact-finding mission to its territory should be considered without undue delay.

(b) Contacts with the Governments of Member States can provide the Secretary-General with detailed information on issues of concern. According to the Secretary-General all Member States should be ready to provide the information needed for effective preventive diplomacy. Such contacts are essential to gain insight into a situation and to assess its potential ramifications.

(c) Formal fact-finding can be mandated by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, either of which may elect to send a mission under its immediate authority or may invite the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, including the designation of special envoy. In addition to collecting information on which a decision for further action can be taken, such a mission can in some instances help to defuse a dispute by its presence, indicating to the parties that the Organization, and in particular the Security Council, is actively seized of the matter as a present or potential threat to international security.

(d) In exceptional circumstances the Council may meet away from Headquarters as the Charter provides, in order not only to inform itself directly, but also to bring the authority of the Organization to bear on a given situation.(32)

## 3.5 Reform Proposals for Adapting and Enhancing the UN Peacekeeping Operations

The growing demand for the UN peace-keeping operations and the range of new tasks entrusted to multinational military forces in recent years have presented both the UN and troop-contributing countries with major operational and management challenges.(33) In many cases the states providing troops are even short of qualified peace-keepers simply, because their capacity has been overstretched. One working solution to overcome this problem might be that the UN effectively seeks for new countries willing to provide the troops. Secondly, the UN could finance a more systematic training system ("UN Peace-keeper Academy") provided by the member states with long traditions and experience in the peace-keeping operations.

Failures of UN missions after the Cold War have led to the re-examination of the basic principles and practices of its peace-keeping operations as a basis for initiating and conducting operations. Hence, the UN accelerated searching ways to improve its capacity to be an important actor in the world politics.

The emergence of co-operative spirit among the Council's permanent members motivated the Security Council meeting on 31 January 1992 for the first time at the levels of State and Government.(34) The members of the Council stressed the importance of strengthening and improving the UN to increase its effectiveness.

They declared their determination to assume fully their responsibilities within the UN organization in the framework of the Charter. At the end of that meeting, the Security Council adopted a declaration which called on the Secretary General to recommend ways to improve the UN capacity for preventive diplomacy , peace-keeping and peace-making.(35) On June 1992 the Secretary General submitted to the member states a report presenting integrated proposals for more effective United Nations activities.

In the report called as "An agenda for Peace", Secretary General Boutros Ghali, examined the changing context of international relations and searched for ways to improve the Organization's capacity in international peace and security. Although this

document emphasized new dimensions of security and an expanded UN role in the realm of international peace and security, it also reconfirmed the sovereign state as the fundamental actor of the international politics and did not go as for to challenge the principle of non-intervention.(36)

The Agenda for Peace aimed at to develop a new strategy for maintaining peace and security on peacekeeping, peace-making, peace-building, peace-enforcement and preventive diplomacy. Each of these stages were redefined with various goals. Specific proposals were made for new UN roles and new UN methods. Boutros Ghali recommended the increased use of confidence building measures and fact-finding activities as well as the establishment of an early-warning system for assessing possible threats to peace to promote preventive diplomacy. It is worth mentioning that the following year Boutros Ghali tried to achieve some progress in the Cyprus conflict by applying the very idea of confidence building measures as a way toward conflict resolution. Nevertheless, the propositions ("Ghali´s Set of Ideas"), the number of which was 100, were turned down by the parties on the island.

So far, we have tackled the question more from a theoretical perspective. The case of Ghali´s Set of Ideas leads us now more to the realities of the conflicts on the ground level..

## 4. CASES

### 4.1. Case of Cyprus

Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 with Zurich Agreement. However, the state confronted with a set of political and structural problems. The core of the Cyprus conflict is that there are two clashing nationalisms. Greek Cypriots in Cyprus feel cultural and national dependence on Greece, the Turkish Cypriots feel the same on Turkey. The strategic importance of Cyprus to Turkey, Turkey´s and Greece´s age-old enmity, and the presence of British military forces can be also given as the causes of the conflict.

In 1963 violence broke out, mainly caused by Greek Cypriots who began to demand constitutional amendments. After the rejection of the amendments by the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish government, communal fighting started on 21 December. On 27 December an agreement was reached by the three guarantor Powers and Cyprus, according to which a cease-fire would be implemented and supervised by all foreign military forces stationed on the island at the moment. In this way, a peace-keeping force was created, commanded by the British and politically assisted by the British Commissioner, the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors and representatives of both communities.

Following the constitutional breakdown and several months of intercommunal violence, on 4 March 1964 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission, to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions. The United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus remains to this day.(37)

The Force became operationally established on 27 March 1964. The mandate, which was conceived in the context of the confrontation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in 1964, has been periodically (usually for six months) extended by the Security Council.(38)

Next big step in the Cyprus conflict was taken in the 1974, when a coup d'état on 15 July 1974 by Greek Cypriot and Greek elements favoring union with Greece (enosis) was followed by military intervention by Turkey, whose troops established Turkish Cypriot control over the northern part of the island. The Security Council called for a cease-fire and laid the basis for negotiations between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. A de facto cease-fire came into effect on 16 August 1974. Following the hostilities of July and August 1974, the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions which have affected the functioning of UNFICYP and have required the Force to perform certain additional functions relating, in particular, to the maintenance of the cease-fire. Following the de facto cease-fire, UNFICYP inspected the deployment of the Cyprus National Guard and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot

forces, and cease-fire lines and a buffer zone were established between the areas controlled by the opposing forces. (39)

The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has continued to carry out effectively its mandate despite the reduction of its strength from originally about 6 000 men to the present 1 200 men.. However, the continuing quiet should not obscure the fact that there is merely a cease-fire not peace on the island.(40)

The task of UNFICYP is significantly complicated by the absence of a formal cease-fire agreement. As a result, UNFICYP is confronted with hundreds of incidents each year. The most serious incidents tend to occur in areas where the cease-fire lines are in close proximity, particularly in Nicosia and its suburbs. The Force investigates and acts upon all violations of the cease-fire and the military status quo. Its reaction in each case depends on the nature of the incident and may include the deployment of troops, verbal and written protests and follow-up action to ensure that the violation has been rectified or will not recur. In addition to maintaining the military status quo, UNFICYP must also preserve the integrity of the buffer zone from unauthorized entry or activities by civilians. As a result, UNFICYP has from time to time become involved in crowd control.(41)

The presence of the UNFICYP was very important for the stability and security of the region, it has been claimed that, removing the UNFICYP would actually help the cause of peace, but, the truth is that the withdrawal of UNFICYP would create trouble more than the possible benefits of the removal. One of the most important troubles would be the lack of authority in the buffer zone. Buffer zone constitutes 3% of the Cyprus' territory. The conflict between the two sides regarding the control of the buffer zone can lead to a war.

However, regarding the success of UNFICYP in its mission, it can be said that this success is partial and limited, because on one hand it has led to a peaceful situation (permanent cease-fire) following the partition, which has turned to status quo. On the other hand the conflict still remains unsolved.

On 10 February, 2004, following an invitation from the Secretary-General, the Greek Cypriot leader, Tassos Papadopoulos, and the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktaş, resumed negotiations on the basis of the Secretary-General's settlement plan, representatives of the guarantor nations of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom were also present. The objective of the negotiators was to reach a text ready to be put to referenda in April, in the hope that Cyprus could be reunited in time to accede to the European Union on 1 May 2004.(42)

The majority of the Turkish Cypriots have voted in the referendum "Yes" in the favor of the Annan Plan so that they could be reunited with the Greek Cypriots and go together into the EU, but the Greek Cypriots did not show good intensions and voted "No" for the Plan. (43)

This result really shocked the international community who was in the favor of the Annan Plan and was constantly encouraging both sides to vote Yes. Again attempts for the reunification and reconciliation have absolutely failed because of the Greek Cypriots, and the ambitions for a real peace and reunification have become a distant dream.

We think that that Annan plan failed because it did not address the psychological dimension of the conflict enough. The UNFICYP from the very beginning has also kept the two sides apart, this, has certainly obstructed the peacemaking process through its purposive severing of all links between the two sides.

More over, the reduction of the UNFICYP owing to the problems of funding has led the Greek side to toy with the dangerous idea of bringing the number of Greek troops in the island up to the level of Turkish troop strength, such an incident of course can undermine any negotiation process, and increase the hostility.

The solution for future settlement in Cyprus is: much effort has to be devoted for real conciliation through so many means, such as encouraging common projects, having mutual kindergartens, schools, projects to enhance the tourism between the nations, these are the primary steps which should be taken for future sustainable peace, these process can make big changes in the attitudes of both sides. In the age of globalization the 'interest' can be the best mediator and the gate to any good relation.

## 4.2. The War In Former Yugoslavia

Yugoslavia was carved out of remnants of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empire. After the Second World War. Yugoslavia contained of six federal states After the trauma of occupation by the Axis powers and internecine guerrilla fighting during the war when 10 % of the population was destroyed, Yugoslavia became unified under the strong hand of Marshal Josip Tito, partisan leader and communist who ruled until 1980.

Dominance was exerted by Serbia from the nation's capital, Belgrade. Tension and rivalries have taken on a more political complexion as the communist rule of four and a half decades has been modified from a one-party system to multiparty democracy. The economy has shifted from centralized command economy to a market economy. Serbia alone among the six republics has retained a strong communist party whose leaders have adopted nationalistic cloths. Their political pre-eminence monopolizes power in only one republic rather than five.(44)

There was a mission proclaimed by Serb leader Slobadan Milosevic to "rescue" those Serbians who are outside, not by bringing them home but by expanding to envelop them in areas that must be "cleansed" of non-Serb elements, to pave the way towards a Greater Serbia.(45)

After news reports gave a shocking views of fighting, atrocities, 'ethnic cleansing' and fleeing inhabitants within and outside the territories that had made up Yugoslavia, it eventually brought in the involvement of NATO, the organization for security and cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union and left the United Nations with a marginal task.

The Security Council began in1991 to approve a series of resolutions that eventually numbered far more than 100 to deal with an extraordinary complex, mercurial situation. Part of these envisaged a peace-keeping force with enlarged functions, while others fell under enforcement action of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Both the UN Secretary-General and the European Union negotiated with the parties. This led to the creation by the Security Council of a UN protection Force (UNPROFOR), first in Croatia and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It included as many as 14 000 soldiers. The Council also set up a complicated system of economic sanctions against the offending parties. In Bosnia, UNPROFOR was ordered to protect relief convoys on the roads but disposed of neither the authority nor the means to halt armed engagements.

As Slovenia and then Croatia had withdrawn from the former Yugoslavian federation, that left Bosnia-Herzegovina as a disputed territory in which Muslims, Croatian Catholics, Serbian Orthodox Christians and Jews lived side-by-side. The nationalistic tendencies in Croatia as well as Serbia, now the center of what was left of Yugoslavia, impelled communal fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as claims and counter-claims in the form of military action and the diplomatic demands.(46)

The UN involvement in Yugoslavia began with the Security Council Resolution, which adopted a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.(47)
It was completed with the delivery of aid to suffering people. The weapons embargo almost totally parallyzed the attempts of Bosnian Muslims for self-defence, Thus, the embargo did not solve the problem, but turned the situation of the Muslims from bad to worse. In 1993 the US tried to get the embargo lifted and asked the same time a military operation to be launched against the Serbs (the US proposition was called "Lift and Strike") , but no European country accepted it.

These issues raised by the disintegration of Yugoslavia go to the heart of the nature of international order and international law in the post-Cold War era, touching questions of self-determination, individual and group rights, and the exercise of limits of sovereignty.(48) Actually, the US could have played an effective role to stop the conflict but there was not a real willing or an interest to intervene, and James Baker was right when he said " the US does not have a dog in the fight", to describe to the attitude of US towards this issue.

Thus, the UN hesitated whether to intervene or not for a while. Then Security Council accepted the Secretary General's proposals for a peace-keeping operation and the UN

protection force (UNPROFOR) was established in 1992. Yet, throughout the conflict the impression increased that the UN was largely impotent, incapable of timely and decisive action.(49)

Divisions among the Security Council's members created unproductive means to resolve the conflict. One of the differences between Permanent members was about how the situation after the end of war would be supervised in case of a negotiated peace. Another deep division was about the extent of military intervention. Further difficulties were appearing about the structure and the chain of command of any peace-keeping operation. Especially, Russia was reluctant to operate under NATO command.

As fighting continued, the UN extended the UNPROFOR mandate to deter attack against "safe areas" established by the UN negotiators.(50) UNPROFOR was approved for a period, with its military and civilian personnel, especially in the regions where Serbs and Croats were living close to each other. In March 1992 the UN dispatched more than fourteen thousand peace-keepers to Yugoslavia, mostly to Croatia. The decision was criticized for allowing the Serbians to concentrate their efforts on Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its capital, Sarajevo. (51)

Later on, Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia. In 1994 the economic sanctions had been further tightened, the International Tribunal for Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia had been established, and peace plans and cease-fires had been negotiated. Unfortunately, the fighting continued and all sides were carrying on to prevent relief efforts. The Security Council has passed number of resolutions to end the conflict, trying to provide legitimacy for the military activities, but in this process its credibility has been eroded.

Despite Security Council authorization, the reluctance of governments to use force more extensively demonstrated the limitations of the UN's peace-enforcement role, except in cases where strong national interests are at stake, as in the Gulf War.(52) Therefore, after the Yugoslavian tragedy it is seen that international community is reluctant to intervene into conflicts, which are not threatening global stability. Many people were killed for ethnic reasons. The worst single incident was when more than

7000 Muslims of the UN "Safe haven" of Srebrenica were killed. The Safe haven was protected mainly by the Dutch peace-keepers, who totally failed their duty. The failure later on caused the resignation of the Dutch government.

It has also become clear that the peace-keeping operation in Former Yugoslavia did not work well, and the UN could have played more effective role, the UN was impotent and did not function satisfactorily. The UN failed in former Yugoslavia because there was not an early warning and early response system in place which is the key to preventive diplomacy.

The failures of the UN in the former Yugoslavia have meant that both military/policing interventions and subsequent protectorates have been carried out and mandated by the NATO, a regional security organization.(53)

In addition, the United Nations resolutions were ignored, its peace-keepers were attacked and there was a lack of support for UN efforts by the United States and other member states. On the other hand, the UN efforts, such as economic sanctions and peace-keeping operations at least somehow prevented the conflict spreading to its neighbors. It goes without saying that the humanitarian assistance was useful to some extent and it provided part of the framework for the final peace-negotiations and agreement.

## 4.3. South Lebanon (UNIFIL)

Israeli forces invaded Lebanon on the night of 14/15 March,1978 and in a few days occupied the entire southern part of the country except the city of Tyre and its surrounding area. Israel claimed that some Palestinian fighters were using the Lebanese border to carry out militant attacks to the Israeli territory, because they could not do so from the Palestinian territories where the Israelis had laid a heavy embargo and a tight closure.

The Israeli army and its allied Christian Lebanese militias occupied Lebanese territory south of the Litani river. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 425 in 1978 calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops. The Resolution was totally ignored by

Israel and the Lebanese guerillas continued fighting against the occupation. Since March of 1978, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has been deployed to oversee the withdrawal of Israeli troops.(54)

The UNIFIL was basically established on 15 March, when the Lebanese Government submitted a strong protest to the Security Council against the Israeli invasion, stating that it had no connection with the Palestinian commando operation. On 19 March, the Security Council adopted resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), in which it called upon Israel immediately to cease its military action and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory

Thus, the peacekeeping operation was dispatched by the Security Council. UNIFIL had 5187 peace-keepers provided by the following countries (figures of 30 November 1994):

Fiji, 646

Finland, 524

France, 411

Ghana, 788

Ireland, 733

Italy, 45

Nepal, 671

Norway, 806

Poland, 563

There, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) succeeded for the next four years in maintaining reasonable tranquility.(55). However, it has not been possible for UNIFIL to carry out in full its original mandate. From its inception, the Force had to operate under extremely difficult conditions. The Government of Israel never fully accepted the UNIFIL mandate with all its implications. Given these attitude, the Force was prevented from deploying fully in the area evacuated by the Israeli forces between April and June 1978. In fact, the enclave called a security zone by Israelis along the border was turned over to the "de facto forces" (Christian and associated militias supported and supplied by Israel). Israel thus retained a degree of military power in the area and continued its fight against the PLO and its Lebanese allies.

UNIFIL's efforts to implement its mandate in these conditions gained only partial success and caused the Force to suffer significant casualties.

In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon again. This invasion changed UNIFIL's situation drastically. For three years, UNIFIL in its entirety remained behind the Israeli lines, with its role limited to providing protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population to the extent possible. In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal, but it retained control of an area in southern Lebanon, manned by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and by Lebanese de facto forces (DFF), the "South Lebanon Army".(56)

Continuously Israel seemed to be reluctant more than any party with the presence of the UN peace-keeping operations in the region, especially, with UN forces in southern Lebanon. For example, on one occasion, Israeli forces have broken through UN lines to attack "enemies", and they allegedly have targeted UN outposts.(57)

The UNIFIL was created for three broadly defined purposes(58):
1. Confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces;
2. Restoring international peace and security;
3. Assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. UNIFIL's operations are based on a network of positions which are manned 24 hours a day. The Force maintains 45 checkpoints, whose function is to control movement on the principal roads in UNIFIL's area; 95 observation posts, whose function is to observe movement on and off the roads; and 29 checkpoints/observation posts which combine the functions of control and observation. Each post is assigned the responsibility for ensuring that hostile activities are not undertaken from the area surrounding it. This involves not only keeping watch from the position but also patrolling on foot or by vehicle in its vicinity.

In addition, unarmed military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) maintain five observation posts and operate five mobile teams in the area under Israeli control. The UNTSO observers are under the operational control of UNIFIL's Force Commander.

On 17 April 2000, the Secretary-General received formal notification from the Government of Israel that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 "in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)". He was further informed that in so doing the Government of Israel intended "to cooperate fully with the United Nations". The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of this notification on the same day, stating that he had initiated preparations to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities under those resolutions. On 20 April, the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's decision to initiate those preparations.

The fact remains that Israel did not withdraw from South Lebanon just because of the international calls and many resolutions that were issued by the Security Council. It withdrew mainly because of the resistance of Hizbollah which defended and still defends its territory against the occupation of the Israeli Army. Simply, the occupation of the South Lebanon became too costly for Israel. In his report dated 20 January 2004 and covering the period since 24 July 2003, the Secretary-General said that the relative calm that had prevailed in the first half of the year gave way to renewed exchanges of fire in the Shab'a farms area (an area between Israel and South Lebanon which is still occupied by the Israeli army and witnesses violent incidents from time to time). The persistent Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace and several instances of Hizbollah anti-aircraft fire directed towards Israeli villages contributed significantly to the tension. The Security Council, in its resolution 1525 of 30 January 2004 extended the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 July 2004.(59)

It has become so clear that UNIFIL has relatively been active and succeeded to some extent in attaining and restoring peace, it also has been patrolling the cease-fire lines which has been so risky, as the UN troops have been targeted and killed. The Israeli reluctance of accepting peacekeeping operations, prevented the mission to function successfully. Accepting the idea that the attacks of Hizbollah was a considerable reason for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from parts of South Lebanon should convince us that more efforts by the UN and leader countries such as US have to exert their real influence and convince and even force Israel to pull her soldiers out of Shab'a farms.

Actually, Israel's logic is very strange, it sounds preposterous when Israel claims that Shab'a farms belong to Syria not to Lebanon, that is one of Israel's reasons of not withdrawing. If this claim seemed acceptable, Syrians in many occasions have declared, if Shab'a farms belong to us, we assure with our full willingness Shab'a farms belong to the Lebanese.

## 4.3 Somalia

In 1991 and 1992 civil order collapsed in Somalia when warring clans took over control of the some parts of the country, and in fact the state of Somalia was divided to three autonomous states. Deaths, scarcity of food and famine accompanied the fighting and forced thousands of people to look for emergency humanitarian assistance. International relief was delayed for months because Security Council assumed that it had to have the consent of the Somali warlords to act. Finally,
Secretary General informed the Security Council that it should decide to adopt more effective measures. In response, a small mission formed by Pakistani troops was sent to Somalia (UNISOM I) to protect humanitarian relief workers.

Then, on December 3, 1992 Security Council Resolution 794 authorized a large US led military-humanitarian intervention ( unified Task Force in Somalia) or UNITAF, also known in the US as Operation Restore Hope) to secure ports and airfields, protect relief shipments and workers, and assist humanitarian relief efforts. However, the mission's scope was ambivalent. The US did not intend to commit its forces for a long period and the objective was limited to humanitarian issues.

In the midst of the chaos and fighting in much of the country, UN agencies and NGOs could not operate to help thousands of hungry and homeless people. Dismal reports and television pictures preceded a decision by the Security Council to send out a peace-keeping force which, as mentioned above, was named UNISOM and consisted of some 500 soldiers from Pakistan.

The local chieftain promptly shackled UNISOM to the harbor area of Mogadishu, the capital and principal port. After yet more television pictures of pitiable suffering, the United States government produced a new situation by sending a military force of 28 000 servicemen to Somalia. The Security Council endorsed this action as a means of bringing help. It decided to create UNISOM II to include the Americans and add another 10 000 soldiers from elsewhere. The new mission for dealing with Somalia no longer had the familiar character of a peace-keeping force.(60)

The Security Council chose peace-enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter as a means of reacting forcefully to breaches of a cease-fire by local Somali militia.

UNISOM II therefore differed sharply from the original peace-keeping mission. Despite its use of force to reply to violations of the peace, UNISOM II witnessed new outbreaks during 1993. Its soldiers came under fire and some died. This soon became a crisis after an American unit, acting explicitly outside the UN command structure, fell into an ambush where 18 men were killed. The United States then withdrew its troops, the largest component of the force. Discouraged by the American reversal, the Security Council ended the entire mission in summer 1994. After that, despite continuing hazardous conditions, some NGOs and UN agencies have continued to supply help to Somali civilians.(61)

The UN's mission in Somalia failed because of the lacking American impartiality. As mentioned before the elimination of General Aidid became the main target of the American Task Force Ranger. Departing from neutrality led to the negative image of UN operation. Above all, as also mentioned before, the number of casualties any government can tolerate in a peace-keeping operation is a key issue. Therefore, it has to be addressed before any deployment commences. A negative public response to high casualty figures in a peace-keeping operation, not considered to be of major importance, could obviously have very serious ramifications. Many casualties could have long term effects on a nation's willingness to participate in future operations. The UN experience in Somalia illustrates the importance of the casualty tolerance issue. The first announcement of US casualties in Somalia led to popular calls for an immediate withdrawal from UNOSOM II. Following the death of the first four US soldiers, Senator Robert Byrd suggested that the "operation was crumbling" and that it

was "not worth American lives lost and injuries sustained." The US public began to apply very strict limits on the number of acceptable casualties in a far-off peace-keeping operation which had no clear place on the national interest agenda.

On 5 June 1993, twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were killed in an ambush set up by supporters of Mohammed Aideed. The following day the UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, demanding the immediate apprehension of those responsible for the attack. Consequently, US forces were mobilised in a manhunt for Aidid. A few weeks later, a major clash occurred with Aidid's forces, leaving 18 American soldiers dead and 75 wounded as we have mentioned above. This event clearly surpassed the US casualty tolerance level and President Clinton immediately announced the phased withdrawal of US troops. American forces in Somalia were confined to force protection missions until the completion of the phased withdrawal. By all accounts, the US failure to capture Aideed was caused by "inaccurate and untimely intelligence."

It also took place in a state where there was no order, no government authority. Consequently, the concept of sovereignty lost its meaning. The UN in this operation violated one of its principles, namely that states in conflicts should request United Nations to intervene. It also showed the institutional weaknesses of the UN and impotence of leadership of the UN in cases in which the maintenance of impartiality is difficult.

The conclusion of the Somali operation of the UN is clearly, that the UN operations are fully dependent on the member states. In the cases when there is a need for a robust UN mission, there are only few states which can provide such a contingent. In Somalia, as in many other cases, it was only the USA with the sufficient capabilities and – in the end also – with the necessary political will. The failure was caused by the fact that during the mission the US started to adapt an independent policy line, which ended to a great blunder. As a result, the political will of the US to carry on the mission disappeared, and the mission was doomed.

## 5. Preventive Diplomacy

> *" In a world where war is everybody's tragedy and everybody's nightmare, diplomacy is everybody's business"... a former British diplomat*

If the United Nations has contributed anything new to the list of direct approaches to the problem of peace, it is in the development of the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy. This concept is irrevocably associated with Secretary General, the late Dag Hammarskjöld, as collective security is tied to Woodrow Wilson.(62)

The phrase "preventive diplomacy" emerged within the United Nations during the Cold War period. In the late 50's - early 60's, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld coined it to describe the residual function which, according to him, the UN could play in a bipolar international system. In this view, "preventive diplomacy" was not considered as an approach for the prevention of potential conflicts, but rather for the preservation of nascent conflicts from the magnetic attraction of the global East-West confrontation. Over time, the meaning of the phrase evolved to mean the management of potential conflicts, as demonstrated, for example, by the 1988 General Assembly special Declaration on conflict prevention and elimination. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, preventive diplomacy found a new lease on life: Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali included it in his Agenda for Peace (1992) on an equal footing with such concepts as peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and peace-enforcement. Since then, the United Nations has turned it into a major political priority. A number of regional organizations also followed suit: the Organization for African Unity, the European Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the OSCE.(63)

Preventive diplomacy is an "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".(64) Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peace-making and peace-keeping as we explained, are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they

strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.

The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease tensions before they result in conflict - or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly to contain it and resolve its underlying causes. Preventive diplomacy may be performed by the Secretary-General personally or through senior staff of the UN or specialized agencies and programmes, by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and by regional organizations in cooperation with the United Nations. Preventive diplomacy, like the peacekeeping operations, require measures to create confidence; it needs early warning based on information gathering and informal or formal fact-finding; it may also involve preventive deployment and, in some situations, demilitarized zones.

We have tackled some of the conditions or factors that certainly can help to make the preventive diplomacy and peace-keeping operations to function successfully such as the fact-finding and early warning, or preventive diplomacy, it much requires the concepts which we are going to discuss; preventive deployment and demilitarized zones.

## 5.1 Preventive Deployment

United Nations' operations in areas of crisis have generally been established after conflict has occurred. The time has come to plan for circumstances warranting preventive deployment, which could take place in a variety of instances and ways. For example, in conditions of national crisis there could be preventive deployment at the request of the Government or all parties concerned, or with their consent. In inter-State disputes such deployment could take place when two countries feel that the United Nations presence on both sides of their border can discourage hostilities; furthermore, preventive deployment could take place when a country feels threatened and requests the deployment of an appropriate United Nations' presence along its side of the border alone. In each situation, the mandate and composition of the United Nations presence would need to be carefully devised and it should be clear to all.

In conditions of crisis within a country, when the Government requests or all parties consent, preventive deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering

and to limit or control violence. Humanitarian assistance, impartially provided, could be of critical importance; assistance in maintaining security, whether through military police or civilian personnel, could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which negotiations can be held. The United Nations could also help in conciliation efforts if this should be the wish of the parties. In certain circumstances, the United Nations may well need to draw upon the specialized skills and resources of various parts of the United Nations system. Such operations may also on occasion require the participation of non-governmental organizations, which was the big change in the recent years especially in the way in which the NGOs have been able to take advantage, far more effectively than either governments or corporations, of the technology. For example, environmental NGOs like Green Peace prefer direct action combined with sophisticated press briefings, mailshots and networking via the internet and mobile telephone. If other NGOs such as Amnesty International are more cautious about direct action they still employ a combination of campaigning media and technologies to get their message across and influence the public opinion. (65)

In the situations of internal crisis the United Nations may need to respect the sovereignty of the State. To do otherwise would not be in accordance with the understanding of Member States in accepting the principles of the Charter. The Organization must remain mindful of the carefully negotiated balance of the guiding principles annexed to General Assembly resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991.
Those guidelines stress, inter alia, that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality; that the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of States must be fully respected in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and that, in this context, humanitarian assistance should be provided with the consent of the affected country and, in principle, on the basis of an appeal by that country.

The guidelines also stress the responsibility of States to take care of the victims of emergencies occurring on their territory and the need for access to those requiring humanitarian assistance. In the light of these guidelines, a Government's request for United Nations involvement, or consent to it, would not be an infringement of that State's sovereignty or be contrary to Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter which refers to matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

In inter-state disputes, when both parties agree, the General Secretary Boutros Ghali recommended that if the Security Council concludes that the likelihood of hostilities between neighboring countries could be removed by the preventive deployment of a United Nations presence on the territory of each State, such action should be taken. The nature of the tasks to be performed would determine the composition of the United Nations presence.

In cases where one nation fears a cross-border attack, if the Security Council concludes that a United Nations presence on one side of the border, with the consent only of the requesting country, would serve to deter conflict, he recommended that preventive deployment should take place. Here again, the specific nature of the situation would determine the mandate and the personnel required to fulfill it.(66)

So far we have tackled the question of preventive diplomacy on the level of principles, consequently, it might be enlightening to apply the other perspective, the concrete one. We are unfortunately not short of good examples to elaborate the question further. Yet, the complexity of the conflict and the inability of the international society to provide peace and security in Palestine, offer us a proper justification to use the Israeli- Palestinian conflict as our example, thus, the question is, why till now, no preventive measures or preventive diplomacy were undertaken in the continued Palestinian-Israeli conflict?

It is true that for sending UN peace-keeping troops or to any measures of preventive diplomacy, there must be a consent of both parties. In the case of the conflict of the Middle East, the Palestinian party has accepted and called for the UN troops to intervene. Nasser El Qodwa, the official and permanent representative of Palestine to the UN has in many occasions asked the UN to intervene and to send International Observers and International Peace-keepers to the region but unfortunately, all attempts have failed because of the American support to Israel.

Also these calls have been in vain, because of the Israeli objection or refusal. As a result, the core question is: why Israel does not accept the idea of deploying UN or

NATO peacekeepers in Palestine. Located between the parties and patrolling the buffer zone they could provide the security against for example Hizbullah's raids.

Israel does not accept and we believe will not accept in the near future international peacekeepers and international observers despite the recent Israeli declarations for accepting and welcoming UN peace-keeping operations. This reflects the main character of Israel and how Israelis try always to cover the facts and to wage the preventive propaganda war. For example, Israel has recently and according to the CNN and El Jazeera news on the 18th of May, 2004 demolished in less than one month more than 150 houses in Rafah city in Gaza strip, and killed hundreds of women, children and old people who can not defend themselves or escape the tanks. The Palestinian fighters who are armed only with light weapons and do not have helicopters or tanks are crushed by Israel - the most powerful military might in the region and with the capability and readiness to wage any war. One should also not forget the Israeli possession of nuclear weapons established a long time ago.

There must be flexibility in the term of the (consent of two parties).The Israeli army has been and still is committing massacres and genocides every day in different parts of the occupied territories but there is no international intervention. Israel has been launching missiles from Apache helicopters, assassinating the religious and political leaders of some movements, such as the spiritual leader sheikh Ahmed Yassin who was totally paralyzed in a wheelchair. Israel assassinated him when he was on his way home after he has prayed in the mosque. It was followed by the assassination of Dr. Abed El Aziz Rantisi, the political leader of Hamas Movement, both were killed in one month.

Israel is against any international intervention that may reveal the facts and work against her will. Thus, the most needed solution for this dilemma is to ask Israel to explain her constant rejection and refusal for accepting the UN or international troops and observers. Then the UN General Assembly or Security Council or even the International Court of Justice, may decide whether the answer is convincing and justified. The aim here is to avoid the American partiality towards Israel, which has rejected and voted against any Palestinian proposal. This is the description of the events in Palestine. The main question was: why not peacekeepers/ preventive diplomacy were?

Actually, Israel was and is unwilling to accept international peacekeepers for so several reasons. We can simply sum up these reasons as follows:

1. Israel's military supremacy: although a considerable number of Israeli soldiers are killed during the uprisings (especially the second one from September 2000 forwards) Israeli government still believes that Israel is powerful enough to defend herself against any attack.

2. Israel's military orientation: most of the Israeli political leaders originally come from military, for example, Ehud Barak is a retired general, and he was the defense minister before he became prime minister in 1999. The current prime minister Ariel Sharon is also a retired general, and he was the defense minister as well, when he invaded Lebanon in the summer of 1982 and committed many atrocities and genocides against innocent civilians.

So, leaders who come from military do not accept international peace-keepers, they just think of retaliation and how to suppress the other party, they do not believe in peaceful solutions.

3. Psychological reason: as the Israeli army occupied the Palestinian territories, eventually there always has been permanent armed conflict since the declaration of the establishment of Israel state. The war has become a normal situation, almost a part of the identity. Consequently, the Israelis trust only their arms and own power.

4. Finally, the holocaust: although the Jewish media intentionally continued to exaggerate the number of Jews who were killed in Europe particularly in Germany, it is true that this incident has caused psychological problems for Jews, who as a result turned from victims to victimizers. This time the victim has become the Palestinian people and in their own land.

## 5.2 Demilitarized zones

In the past, demilitarized zones have been established by an agreement of the parties at the conclusion of a conflict. In addition to the deployment of United Nations personnel in such zones as part of peace-keeping operations, consideration should

now be given to the usefulness of such zones as a form of preventive deployment, on both sides of a border, with the agreement of the two parties, as a means of separating potential belligerents, or on one side of the line, at the request of one party, for the purpose of removing any pretext for attack. Demilitarized zones would serve as symbols of the international community's concern that conflict should be prevented.(67)

In this respect the idea of demilitarized zones and areas is actually relatively old. Already in 1921 when the predecessor of the UN, the League of Nations resolved the dispute between Finland and Sweden regarding the Aland island, the island became a part of the Finnish sovereignty, but were declared as demilitarized zone. The same idea was also included to the conflict resolution attempt in Cyprus, called the Annan Plan. If the plan had been implemented it had meant the effective demilitarization of Cyprus.

## 5.3 The International Court of Justice and Confidence Building Measures

As mentioned above some institutions such as the International Court of Justice could be empowered and enhanced to help in settlement of conflicts and disputes. In so doing the Court could be able to play a decisive and crucial role. Greater reliance on the Court would be an important contribution to United Nations peace-making. In this context, the Secretary-General has called attention to the power of the Security Council under Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter to recommend to Member States the submission of a dispute to the International Court of Justice, arbitration or other dispute-settlement mechanisms. He recommended that the Secretary-General should be authorized, pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, to take advantage of the advisory competence of the Court and that other United Nations organs that already enjoy such authorization should turn to the Court more frequently for advisory opinions.

He also recommended the following steps to reinforce the role of the International Court of Justice:

(a) All Member States should accept the general jurisdiction of the International Court under Article 36 of its Statute, without any reservation, before the end of the United

Nations Decade of International Law in the year 2000. In instances where domestic structures prevent this, States should agree bilaterally or multilaterally to a comprehensive list of matters they are willing to submit to the Court and should withdraw their reservations to its jurisdiction in the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties; (as the Aegean dispute between Greece and Turkey)

(b) When submission of a dispute to the full Court is not practical, the Chambers jurisdiction should be used;

(c) States should support the Trust Fund established to assist countries unable to afford the cost involved in bringing a dispute to the Court, and such countries should take full advantage of the Fund in order to resolve their disputes

The United Nations has extensive experience not only in these fields, but in the wider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonization, on the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful world.

This wide experience must be taken into account in assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in its traditional sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead.

There are some vital measures to build confidence for instance; mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or sub-regional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples.(68)

However, there are certain tasks in conflict resolution as an element of preventive diplomacy that official, "track one" government representatives and diplomats are not yet able to carry out. These involve the fostering of relationships among adversaries in

ethnic and sectarian conflicts through mediated dialogue that go to the historic heart of the conflict. The exchanges are almost always emotionally painful, and the third party in these necessarily "unofficial" dialogues must be psychologically sensitive and profoundly informed of the historic losses both sides have imposed or sustained in the relationship to be effective in helping to transform it from enmity to peace.(69)

Generally, it is worth mentioning that, modern diplomacy has undergone a number of major changes in the recent years. It has become very clear that not only governments and their official representatives are involved to carry out missions regarding preventive diplomacy, but also, a wide range of others, which we will tackle in details later, including non-state actors and 'unofficial' diplomats that had brought variety, opened up new options and avenues of interaction.(70)

## 5.4 Cooperation with Regional Organizations as a successful Preventive Diplomacy

The growing interaction between the United Nations and regional organizations has its origins in Chapter VIII of the Charter. With this objective in mind, the Secretary-General met in August 1994 with the heads of several regional organizations with which the United Nations had recently cooperated in peace-making and peace-keeping efforts. In the January 1995 Supplement to "An Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60-S/1995/1), a typology of current modalities for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations was set forth. Such organizations could be the OSCE, OAU, NATO, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other regional organizations.

However, given the diversification of the forms of cooperation being established between regional organizations and the United Nations, the basic principles of the Charter should be borne in mind. Article 24 confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and Article 52 stipulates that the action of regional organizations must in all cases remain consistent with that principle.

In this regard the adoption by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/57 of 9 December 1994 of the Declaration on the Enhancement of Cooperation between the

United Nations and Regional Arrangements or Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security encourages regional arrangements and agencies to consider ways and means to promote closer cooperation and coordination with the United Nations, in particular in the fields of preventive diplomacy, peace-making and post-conflict peace-building, and, where appropriate, peace-keeping.(71)

## 5.5 The Limits of Preventive Diplomacy

A full-fledged preventive diplomacy process normally includes three stages (early warning, early action and peace-build measures). Although distinct in abstract terms, they actually form a continuum in practice. The collection of timely and reliable information for early warning purpose represents the starting point of preventive diplomacy. But early warning is barren if not accompanied by early diplomatic action and if necessary operational action conducive to the diffusion of the most direct or immediate causes of the emerging conflict. But such sedative measures targeting symptoms should be supported by curative measures aiming at the eradication of grass-root causes: peace-building is often an indispensable complement to preventive diplomacy.

Despite its widespread acceptance and growing public popularity since the end of the Cold War, preventive diplomacy has remained a rather woolly concept for two main reasons:

The first reason pertains to the open-ended interpretation given to the notion of "prevention" in the field of conflict management. The Agenda for Peace considers prevention not only in the perspective of defusing potential conflicts but also of stopping nascent conflicts at their earliest possible stage. Such an approach is not consistent with the basic meaning of prevention which is anticipation. It is generally admitted that conflict management includes four main and chronologically distinct sequences: anticipation (preventive diplomacy), stabilization (standard peace-keeping), resolution (peace-making or peace-enforcement) and consolidation (peace-building). By any standard, the halting of an actual conflict at an early stage does not represent an anticipatory move.

The second reason has to do with the abusive development of the notion of "prevention" (even taken in its anticipatory meaning) outside the field of conflict management. It is now fashionable to associate prevention to arms regulation ("preventive disarmament"), emergency aid ("preventive humanitarian assistance") or even (as in the case of the 1996 Commonwealth of Independent States' Concept for conflict prevention and resolution) to economic sanctions.

The recent decision taken by the United Nations to substitute "preventive action" for the standard formula "preventive diplomacy" provided no conceptual breakthrough. It has only emphasized the simple fact that the art of prevention requires the use of both diplomatic measure (good offices, mediation, etc.) and operational measures (troop deployment, Long-Term Missions ...).

In any event, although States and international security organizations regularly pay tribute to it, preventive diplomacy has visibly remained underused operationally. This is particularly true at the universal level: while the United Nations deployed (for the first time in its history) a preventive peace-keeping operation in Macedonia, it has been unable to do so elsewhere - in particular in Burundi or the Great Lakes region. Prevention has not yet become part of the political culture of the United Nations.

By contrast, within the OSCE, preventive diplomacy represents a routine activity performed by the Long-Term Missions (LTMs) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). Even though, preventive diplomacy within the OSCE suffers from three general weaknesses.

First, preventive diplomacy is a low profile activity. Being plainly allergic to publicity, preventive diplomacy requires full confidentiality at all stages of the process. Its successful outcome must to a large extent remain discrete. As a consequence, it is more often assessed against the background of failure than success.

Second, the main problem with preventive diplomacy is not related to a lack of timely information (early warning) or sophisticated settlement formulas, but rather to the current unwillingness of the direct parties to a potential conflict to accept a third party preventive intervention. In addition, the involvement of sub-State actors in most post-Cold War conflicts constitutes an aggravating factor.

Last, third party States are generally less than enthusiastic to invest in prevention in the absence of significant national interests, in addition to the main core problem which is, the Europeans do not have the necessary military capabilities. The LTMs to which the OSCE has specifically attributed a preventive diplomacy mandate are operating in places where the United States wishes to avoid a conflict detrimental to NATO's political cohesion (Macedonia) or to indulge Russia on the slippery slope of open intervention (Baltic States, Ukraine).

In sum, preventive diplomacy provides no panacea and its natural limits are those of any cooperative security endeavor.


## 6 The Role of NGOs in Preventive Diplomacy

During the middle decades of the 20th century, one of the most striking developments in world politics was the rise of powerful international organizations. The United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund reconfigured the terrain of international relations. These global organizations were soon followed by a set of regional bodies like the Organization for African Unity and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. But in recent years, the quest for better tools for managing world politics has taken a new twist: non-governmental organizations have begun to play a growing role on the international scene, most notably in seeking to defuse armed conflicts.

The presence of non-governmental organizations in war zones is hardly a new phenomenon. The International Committee of the Red Cross was founded in 1863 to care for the victims of modern warfare. More recently, a number of international relief organizations like Oxfam, CARE, and Catholic Relief Services have been highly visible players in coping with the great African famines of the past a few decades. What is different about the NGO activism during the 1990s in zones of conflict is that many groups are now playing a role in trying to defuse nascent or full blown wars, as opposed to just cleaning up the human suffering that results. NGOs like the International Crisis Group, International Alert, and the Center for Preventive Action have become involved in a wide range of conflict prevention and resolution activities,

including: monitoring conflict and providing early warning of new violence; opening dialogue between adversarial parties; playing a direct mediating role; strengthening local institutions for conflict resolution; and helping to strengthen the rule of law and democratic processes in countries with a history of political violence.

In the wake of the Cold War, in an era in which dozens of new conflicts have broken out around the world, these groups have emerged as important partners to both national governments and international organizations engaged in diplomacy and conflict resolution. Also, these NGOs have played a critical role in seeking to turn loose talk about "global civil society" into a concrete reality. Operating at a transnational level, often against great odds, they have taken the lead in proselytizing such norms as respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the need to resolve political and ethnic differences through political processes.

Like international relief agencies, NGOs focused on conflict resolution were created to respond to what their founders saw as major failures on the part of the international community to deal effectively with global problems. Too often, the United Nations and other multilateral international organizations prove slow and cumbersome in dealing with an emerging crisis situation. Also, both international organizations and governments often have institutional and political limitations that hamper their effectiveness in situations of enormous complexity and delicacy. NGOs, by contrast, are often able to operate in very difficult circumstances. As the final report by the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflicts stated, the year these groups often have legitimacy and operational access that do not raise concerns about sovereignty, as government activities sometimes do.

"The wars and disintegrative tendencies in the territories of many post-communist states have led to the creation of such diversity on the European soil, both in diplomatic abilities and in the status of the diplomatic actors, that it is now difficult to confine the realm of diplomacy to relations between sovereign states, for at least two reasons. First, most diplomatic decisions are made at multilateral decision-making tables, within large international organizations, and second, in countries that face isolation and a lack of official diplomatic contacts NGOs increasingly take the role of mediators and informal diplomatic actors.

To a considerable extent, the above has been the case in the former Yugoslavia over the past decade. NGOs have found themselves in a situation where they depended for a successful fulfillment of their mission on good informal diplomacy, because cooperation was the modus operandi that they always relied on, and cooperation was often in direct contrast with the official policies that prevailed in the societies around them. During military conflicts, with large numbers of casualties and extreme destruction raging around them, NGOs in Bosnia, Croatia and FRY struggled to maintain a vision that transcended the boundaries of concrete circumstances and strove to bring together the differing and contrasting views and aspirations." (72)

"The striking information is, that over 20,000 transnational non-governmental organization networks are already active on the world stage, of which 90 per cent were formed during the last thirty years. Those NGOs in many cases can do what governments can not do, for example: the Red Cross which was founded in the nineteenth century and was fundamental in the creation of rules for the treatment of prisoners war, is helping the Palestinian people and enabling the families to see theirs relatives, and even can appoint advocates to the prisoners.

Amnesty International has been active since the Second World War, as has PEN. Oxfam and less formal groupings such as Bandaid have repeatedly embarrassed governments into increasing emergency aid to crisis-hit regions of the developing world through media campaigns. (73)

In recent years, however, as they have taken advantage of the new media and technology, as well as the loosening of the grip of nation states on international affairs, the impact and role of NGOs has qualitatively changed. They are now major players on the world stage. In part this reflects the internationalization of domestic affairs, whereby Western publics are becoming more a ware of the interconnectedness of the world. But also it reflects the growth of generations in developed countries disillusioned with government and traditional political parties, who choose instead of channel their political activity through a series of single-(or limited-) issue NGOs". "Distinctions have to be drawn between different types of NGOs and different ways of interacting with international relations. At one extreme are nationally based lobby groups, whose sole aim is to influence the policy of their national government on a

particular limited issue. Such groups have proved particularly successful in the US. At the other extreme are humanitarian groups, whose major focus is on humanitarian projects, mainly in the developing world. For such groups, campaigning is mainly, if not solely, a case of raising funds for their humanitarian projects. In between are groups focused on lobbying, but on global issues and at a global level (e.g. environmental and human rights groups), and humanitarian groups who augment their humanitarian programmes with campaigns to change global economic or social policy". (74)

The classic case of a long-term lobby campaign with real political impact has been that of the pro-Israel lobby in the US. Its influence on US Middle East policy has been real enough, but possibly equally influential in policy formulation has been the perception of its influence by the policy machines of other governments.

International Alert and the Center for Preventive Action are two groups that exemplify the new NGO activism in the realm of conflict resolution and prevention. Formed in 1985 and based in London, International Alert was created to monitor nascent conflicts and find ways to prevent greater violence. The organization provides training for conflict negotiators, serves as a neutral mediator in conflict situations, and tries to raise the alarm within the international community when it sees a conflict rapidly growing. Like other NGOs in the conflict prevention business, International Alert has found itself badly overextended in the 1990s. Currently, it has efforts under way in Sri Lanka, in West Africa, where the situation in Liberia is still unstable; in the former Soviet Union, where several conflicts, including the Abkhazia situation, are still unresolved; and in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa, where there is much volatility in Burundi and Rwanda.

NGOs like to see themselves as the representatives of civil society, acting as a necessary check and balance on the actions of governments and multinationals. They undoubtedly offer a channel for the otherwise disenfranchised of the global economy. But their growth and role is far from unproblematic. Lobby NGOs have so far been significantly better at opposing what they do not like than proposing constructive alternatives. When successful, this can create dangerous policy vacuums. There are some signs that the more sophisticated groups are moving beyond this, but it is likely

51

to remain a problem for some time. Perhaps more serious are the problems of
legitimacy and accountability. No NGO can claim to speak for more than its
members.

Even in terms of their own members, few NGOs posses the internal democratic
structures expected of governments, or even political parties, in developed countries.
Similarly, it is difficult to see to whom NGOs are held to account when they get it
wrong. As their influence and role grows, there is an increasing risk of power without
responsibility.

## 6.1 The Role of Crisis Management NGOs in Promoting  Sustainable Peace

Official diplomacy by governments or IGOs is normally referred at as Track One
diplomacy. Track Two diplomacy which we will tackle in details refers at unofficial
efforts for finding peace between conflicting parties. Ideally, the two tracks could and
should complement each other. Although this is sometimes true, it has not always
been the case. Increasingly, however, IGOs are recognizing the more effective NGOs
and are beginning to find new ways to work with them.

These IGOs such as the UN, NATO, the OAU, and the EU are not any more the only
major players in international relations, particularly in crisis management.

## 6.2 NGOs as Third-Party Intermediaries

In some cases, NGOs have acted as the primary intermediary between conflicting
parties, to try to help them arrive at a negotiated solution in their conflict. Probably
the best-known recent example is the ''Oslo Channel,'' as it has come to be called. In
1991, a series of ''confidence building measures'' and ''academic contacts'' were
organized, leading to a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles. The
declaration was initialed in Oslo on 19 August 1993 by the heads of the two
negotiating teams in the presence of the Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of Israel and
Chairman Yasser Arafat. Since that time, the principles outlined in this document
have formed the basis for a period  of temporary peace from 1994 to 2000 in the

Middle East, until Sharon entered the holy al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in Fall of 2000 and eventually provoked the Palestinian feelings and caused another uprising "intifada" which is still continuing in the whole occupied Palestine.

The effort was jointly carried out by a non-governmental research organization, the Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Science, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (under two different foreign ministers, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Johan Jörgen Holst). A survey of living conditions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem provided the teams with the cover for its many visits to Tunis and Israel. Negotiation teams could devote 90 percent of their time in Norway to actual peace negotiations. The many provocations and counter-provocations in the field never derailed the back-channel, as was the case with the front channel in Washington.

Such kind of unofficial diplomacy, particularly in terms of negotiation, could provide so many important elements which ultimately help to reach a peaceful solution.

Those important elements are:

-   the atmosphere of confidence and trust can be created

-   the parties can address their psychological problems (usually during the two first days of the meetings they are going through such a process),

-   after the psychological process of mourning and accusations ("we have suffered more than you"; "you have done this and this and this to us" etc.) has been gone through the participants see the other party also as suffering, loving and feeling human beings, not only as enemies,

-   consequently, they can start looking at the problems also from the perspective of the opposite party,

-   there is no stress, pressure and timetable for a solution – usually the agendas of the meetings are very loose and flexible. Everything can be discussed and the atmosphere is often very relaxed. Also it is very typical that cross-party friendship relations are born. It is important that the parties do together other things than talk the conflict over and over again,

-   Furthermore, that the meetings are held secret, the members of the conflicting parties who oppose a negotiated solution can not destroy the process.

In the above situations, NGOs are seen as more acceptable or more suitable intermediaries than governments or even intergovernmental organizations. because

NGOs do not have "their own dog in the fight", whereas the mediating states (as the US) have often their own goals and benefits in the game.

Nevertheless, in most such cases, governments and IGOs are active in the background, urging, encouraging, and supporting the work of the NGOs. Indeed, in many cases, it is the synergetic effect of these actors working together that produces the results.

## 6.3 NGO Involvement in IGO Peace Building Efforts

Some NGOs have started to work with IGOs at the grassroot level, attempting to bring about reconciliation between community groups. The OAS (Organization of American States) Program for the Prevention and Resolution of Local Conflicts provides an interesting example (although it involves post-conflict peace-building).

The program was established in response to a request from the government of Guatemala, which asked the OAS to assist in dealing with local conflicts that it anticipated between returning refugees and those who had stayed behind during the civil war. Disputes centered on property tenure and titles, as well as more generally on enemy-image perceptions, with the refugees being accused of "pro-guerrilla" sympathies, and those who had stayed at home being viewed as being "pro-army." Since the OAS did not have adequate capacity to carry out such a program, it asked selected NGOs for assistance. Three target locations were chosen, and OAS staff members in the field were asked to identify local people who were particularly well respected (such as priests). These individuals were then offered training in mediation by three NGOs (two international and one Guatemala-based group). When this stage of the program was over, participants formed local Units for the Prevention of Conflict. Each unit then convened the disputing parties, provided them with an elemental understanding of problem solving, and tried to assist them in finding acceptable solutions to their individual problems. This program has not yet been evaluated, but it offers promise as a basis for future work in conflict prevention at the community level.(75)

## 6.4 NGOs and Funding

Finally, funding organizations are crucial to the work of NGOs in the area of conflict prevention. Institutions such as Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Ford Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the McKnight Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Soros Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, the Rockefeller Foundation, Jimmy Carter Foundation, Peace research institute of Oslo and a number of others have played a vital role in this area.
In some countries, governments provide the funding needed for NGOs to work in conflict prevention and resolution. Without their support, many efforts at developing both the theory and practice of conflict prevention and resolution would simply not materialize.(76)

## 7. The Role of Unofficial Diplomacy ('Track two' Diplomacy in Crisis Management

Track Two diplomacy - unofficial contacts and interaction aimed at resolving conflicts - is a growing field that not only can support Track One (government) efforts, but "can also play an important role in its own right." Conflict resolution and prevention efforts must involve both government officials and non-governmental participants, they contend, because "it is only through a collaborative effort among all societal sectors and power structures that real change is possible."(77)

## 7.1. Basic Definitions of the Unofficial Diplomacy in the Field of Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is a process by which parties attempt to settle disagreements. This process combines tangible resolution of specific disputed issues with the social and psychological transformation of a society in conflict. Tangible solutions are actual changes in the daily life of people, such as territorial changes, security measures, redistribution of resources, and relocation of population. Psychological change mainly concerns the members of the involved communities' perceptions of the conflict, the

'self', and the 'other'. It includes, for example, the building of trust, reconstruction of narratives, and reconciliation of issues of guilt and suffering.(78) On a very basic level the goal of conflict resolution is to achieve peace. Peace implies creating a reality in which mutuality exists, where no party is more deserving or more rewarded than the other. It does not necessarily imply the military, economic, or political equalization of all conflicting parties, but it does necessitate the mutual fulfillment of the various parties' needs, aspirations and rights. Working for peace means reducing the amount of hostility and violence, humanizing the 'other,' building trust, and answering real needs and interests of the parties involved. Peace is not the fulfillment of one party's vision; it is the product of a mutual and cooperative effort.

In order to reach a substantial peace settlement, the real needs and interests of all parties must be addressed, negotiated, and fulfilled. Reflecting on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Mark Heller wrote that a real settlement "requires a proper understanding by each side of its own real interests." Indeed, each side of a conflict at the negotiation table is motivated by its real interest. The real interest is the fundamental and psychological prism through which any side of a conflict perceives the various issues being raised on the negotiation table. While addressing legitimate material concerns, like water and land, is essential for reaching peace, these issues in a basic respect are cosmetic. Material aspects of conflict are an outcome of fundamental perceptions and are not the real interests themselves.

The core of the conflict that needs to be resolved is the real interest that resides behind the cosmetic issues. Solving a cosmetic problem (or only the political problem) without addressing the real interest provides an unsustainable solution. In the case of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, the real interests are security and freedom. While neither is mutually exclusive of the other, in practical analysis the Palestinian struggle is for freedom, and the Israeli quest is for security. Fulfilling these two interests is necessary to create a lasting peace agreement.

Conflict resolution is easier said than done. One of the biggest obstacles that a peace-builder faces is to bring two rival sides to a negotiation room with a clear conviction that an ongoing conflict must be resolved in peace. But how can it be done? How does peace prevail? How is a conflict resolved? What are the initial stages in conflict

56

resolution? One method of aiding conflict resolution is Second Track Diplomacy. Second track diplomacy is a relatively new term, and scholars still differ on its exact definition.(*) Track two is variously defined as unofficial, back-channel, or citizen diplomacy. Some scholars limit the boundaries of track two to grassroots level projects and workshops, while others insist on it being a form of interaction between professionals who are closely connected to policy makers.

According to Joseph Montville, track two diplomacy signifies "unofficial, nonstructural interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations that is directed toward conflict resolution through addressing psychological factors." The multiple understandings of this term ultimately diminish the ability to effectively utilize track two diplomacy as an essential part of an encompassing model for conflict resolution. (79)

The core of the Track Two Diplomacy is to try to change the psychological parameters of the conflict. At the first place, the process aims at changing the attitudes of a small group of (influential but not top political leaders) people among the conflicting parties. The next step is to get them committed to work for the peace process inside of their of (ethnic) group. The method works through a series of meetings where the same groups of people participate. Usually the idea is not only to try to get them to get over the psychological obstacles but to learn to know each other as human beings and to get them to do something concrete together. Usually the aim of the process also includes a development of a program for reducing the tension and to take some confidence building measures. The weakness of the method is that it can for a certain period of time create positive feelings among the participants, but in most times it does lead nowhere. The participants get tired, frustrated etc. and the whole project collapses without any results.

## 7.2 The Rise of Unofficial Diplomacy

Many aspects of diplomacy have enhanced in the last century, and some have not. In many ways diplomacy today barely resembles the craft practiced by statesmen at the end of the 19th century. As reasons for this we can count the efforts of the United Nations, the evolution of rapid communication and instant media coverage, concerns

for human rights wherever they are violated, and economic globalization. In the midst of the Cold War, Sir Harold Nicolson (1963) pointed out that through the rise of "democratic" concepts of international relations, small elite groups of men can no longer be the only players in diplomacy; leaders, statesmen, and high-level bureaucrats are now obliged to explain themselves to the public constituency within their states.

In the international environment, there are more meetings, more negotiations, and more treaties, as well as more public involvement and media coverage. Former Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban (1983) noted that the role of private individuals and organizations has encroached even further into diplomacy's once sacred territory. What has become to be known as "Unofficial Diplomacy" or "Track Two" Diplomacy has become more visible on the international scene. Eban writes, "Quakers, church leaders, heads of peace institutions, professors, members of parliaments and journalists have all attempted to solve or alleviate conflicts which have eluded the efforts of officially accredited emissaries". (80)

Before we go any further we should mention that, John McDonald[*] believed that Montville's basic concept of Track Two Diplomacy "was proliferating and thus creating confusion about its meaning and usage"; he then proceeded to design a model for "Multi-track Diplomacy." McDonald acknowledged track one as the area where diplomacy is practiced between official representatives and leaders of conflicting parties. Track Two, though, he subdivided into four different tracks, thereby creating a five-tracked model. According to the new model, "tracks two through five all involve unofficial or citizen diplomacy directed toward helping to de-escalate and resolve international conflict." While the tracks all share this basic goal, track two is limited to efforts made by professional, well-informed and involved private citizens. Track three is reserved for interactions by corporations or individuals of the business world. Track four denotes citizen-to-citizen exchange programs in all fields of interaction. Finally, track five refers to attempts by the media of conflicting countries to educate the public about the 'other'. McDonald specified that the role of track five is to humanize the enemy and reduce distrust and hostility so that other tracks can build on a new base of understanding." (81)

Although, such unofficial diplomacy has proliferated in the last two or three decades, in the United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower once remarked that private citizens who enjoyed the confidence of their governments might help prepare the way for official negotiations.

During the Cold War, economic entrepreneurs were involved in the diplomatic process as unofficial participants. For example, Armand Hammer, of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation, had ties with the Soviets dating back to the 1920s and functioned as a link between the two superpowers. There were also private negotiations, such as those involving Wolfgang Vogel, a German involved in the East-West spy swap that included the release of Anatoly Scharansky. Such private negotiations received a wider audience when they involved news media.

News reporting kept official diplomacy, especially in democratic countries, "out in the open" as much as possible. Some reporters themselves operated as unofficial diplomats. John Scali, a wire correspondent, was involved in "backstage" mediation during the Cuban missile crisis, as he later reported. On October 26, 1962, four days into the crisis, Scali received a telephone call from a man identifying himself as Mr. X, who was, in fact, a KGB colonel named Aleksander Fomin in the Soviet Embassy in Washington. This call made Scali a major player in the crisis since he became an intermediary in the exchange of proposals for its solution.

It was not only the Soviet-US or East-West relationships that attracted involvement by unofficial diplomats. Another noteworthy newsman, Columbia Broadcasting System's (CBS) Walter Cronkite, is credited with bringing together, by satellite, Israel's Menachim Begin and Egypt's Anwar el-Sadat.

By the late 1970s" unofficial diplomacy had become more organized. Representatives of peace institutions and "professors had gained actual experience in helping to shape policy." Herbert Kelman of Harvard University began discreetly bringing together high level Arabs and Israelis for dialogues which he called "interactive problem solving" workshops. From 1979 to 1986, a team from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) conducted a series of unofficial meetings between Arabs (mainly Egyptians and Palestinians) and Israelis. The process was guided by Prof. Dr. Vamik

D. Volkan. This was the first attempt in the field of unofficial diplomacy, where an in-depth psychological dimension was included. It was also the starting point for the development of the Tree Model discussed later.

We will focus in this part on the unofficial diplomacy, and we may use the term track two sometimes to mean unofficial diplomacy, but we still are going to offer some definitions and outlining the methods of several key practitioners in the field. We will present in detail the theory and methodology of one particular approach which is referred at as the "Tree Model"---developed by the Center for Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) at the University of Virginia's School of Medicine under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Vamik D. Volkan, originally a Cypriot Turkish scholar, psychiatrist and psychoanalyst. This comprehensive methodology describes a process undertaken by an interdisciplinary, neutral third party to address problems between antagonist groups. The facilitating team includes members from the fields of diplomacy, history, psychoanalysis, and others. Psychoanalytic insights about large-group issues are at the core of the Tree Model methodology.

## 7.3 The Tree Model

The Tree Model, is based on the assumption that group identity issues and rituals are involved in every aspect of the political, economic, social, legal, or military re-lationships between large (i.e. ethnic or national) groups, especially when the groups are under stress or engaged in protracted conflicts. In such situations, psychological issues contaminate the real world issues and create resistances to peaceful and adaptive solutions. These psychological "poisons," both conscious and unconscious, must be removed before constructive communication and negotiation can take place between opposing groups, and before the easing of tensions can be institutionalized and maintained for the long term.(82)

The evolution of the Tree Model was a slow process and grew out of the experiences of CSMHI faculty members individually and as a team in a variety of long-term projects in the field, actually it describes a process that grows over time and branches out like a tree. It is rooted in a diagnosis of the situation by the facilitating team, and continues through a series of psychopolitical dialogues between members of the

opposing groups (the trunk), first within the dialogue itself, and then in increasingly larger groups at the community, governmental, and societal levels. The aim of this stage is to reduce poisonous emotions and resistances to change (both conscious and, more importantly, unconscious), and thus allow more realistic discussions and strategy planning to take place by the members of the opposing groups. The last stage entails implementing practical projects and building institutions (branches of the tree) to be left behind when the facilitators depart, so that the insights and new attitudes gained from the dialogues will continue to grow and develop on their own.

The main differences between the Tree Model and the more "conventional" conflict resolution activities are:
1. Tree model has taken a more multi-disciplinary approach
2. It is based on a thorough analysis
3. It addresses more the psychological dimension of the conflict with special stress for the necessary mourning process
4. It aims at more long-term commitments and concrete results in terms of institution building
5. It tries to get the conflicting parties back to work and live together.

## 7.4 The Implication of the Tree Model, Cyprus as a Case Study

The Tree Model is considered as an interdisciplinary approach to conflict resolution carried out by a team includes psychoanalysts, diplomats, historians and other social scientists. The tree model according to the CSMHI and summarized by Assist. Prof. Dr. Zeliha Khashman* is:
1-psychological diagnosis (roots of the tree)
2-psychological dialogues (the trunk of the tree)
3-institution building (branches of the tree).

Dr. Khashman proceeds to imply these approaches in Cyprus conflict explaining that,

the first phase of the process is a 'diagnosis' to uncover every aspect of the conflict and the relationship between the two communities, during the unofficial attempts at a resolution the hidden psychological problems were almost completely left out.

These include for Turkish Cypriots the 'chosen glory' of 1974 and the 'chosen trauma' of 1963 – 1974 (how they were treated), and for the Greek Cypriots the 'chosen trauma' of 1974 (that they lost their properties in the North). These emotions of the two communities (hurt, humiliation and victimization) affected the decision-making apparatus of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot. Thus the official apparatus was never able to make the right conciliatory moves.

She explains in the second phase of the process, when the trunk of the tree is developed, mourning is realized with the help of expert 'facilitators'. It is during the phase that rigid and hostile attitudes of the people in the conflict start to change. One important step that can help the mourning process is taking both school children (and the adults) to the other sides' ('them') cemeteries or places where 'they' were killed in the hands of 'us' (83)

According to Montville: "the acceptance of past mistakes and their willingness to seek public forgiveness could also help the reconciliation process". Unless this phase is successful, institution building will not create the desired success. Finally, according to the explanation of Dr. Khashman, the goal is to create common projects, organizations or institutions (NGOs and working places for example) to support peaceful coexistence and develop working relations with each other. There are many projects, from education to trade to environment, to encourage intergroup contact and facilitate new cohabitation. These projects and institutions become the branches of the tree, thus, the seeds of an integrated state to grow. (84)

But the peace process in Cyprus has encountered obstacles because the psycho-social concerns of both parties have not been sufficiently addressed. In general it can be argued that the aim of unofficial diplomacy is to help communities in conflict to overcome mutual vulnerability through 'confidence-building' (which involves, to some extent, each recognizing the other's identity); in this way official diplomacy benefits.

First of all, there were difficulties in the execution of unofficial diplomacy. To end the 'cycle of hostility' and support the formal negotiation process, the involvement of the grass-roots into the process had to be regarded as vital.

## 7.5 Evaluation

In the case of Cyprus, the track two was not found, which in any way could have had a positive result. From 1974 until 1990, neither side was receptive to unofficial interventions. Secondly, there was no organic relation between the two communities: diplomats, UN representatives and Maronites only could commute freely back and forth across the border. Moreover, the contacts between Turkish and Greek Cypriots were subjected to the permission of Turkish and Greek governments.

The lack of such contacts, together with the missing cross-ethnic cleavages (existence of more than one split in a country, such as religion, nationality, or language), contributed to the non-resolution of the conflict as well. The existence of such cleavages might be expected to promote violence and instability; on the contrary, the existence of these different cleavages not only could have helped to break the intractability of the conflict but could have given unique success to a settlement.(85)

Unofficial diplomacy in Cyprus was restricted and inefficient because of the domestic and external reasons, but may be it could be successful and effective in another region.. The problem was also the lack of long term commitments from the side of the American and Norwegian organizations running the conflict resolution programs. The persons running the programs have come and gone. The projects started run to nowhere etc.

It is preferable and most beneficial to tackle the question how unofficial diplomacy was effective and to attempt to seek and attain workable and sustainable peace in another conflict which is to some extent similar to that in Cyprus. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most complicated and long-standing one. So many agreements were reached between the Palestinians and Israelis after eruption of uprisings (intifada) but no lasting and sustainable peace was attained. However the

63

activities and the efforts of the unofficial diplomacy were so vital to bring both sides together and negotiate and discuss even in the time of uprising.

It is worth to explore about some Practitioners of both sides of unofficial diplomacy "track two", and how they have worked and to what extent they have succeeded.

## 7.6. The Profile of a Track Two Practitioner—a Case Study

Dr. Ron Pundik and Dr. Manuel Hassassian are both track two practitioners, the first Israeli and the second Palestinian. Dr. Hassassian is the president of the Bethlehem University in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). He has been involved in numerous track two activities both as a representative of a conflicting party and as a mediator. He is currently involved in track one negotiations, as well as track two activities, focusing on the issue of Jerusalem. Pundik is currently the executive director of the Economic Cooperation Foundation — an NGO that promotes economic cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis. He has been involved in many conflict resolution activities, bringing together Palestinians and Israelis. Pundik is mostly known for his part in the Oslo negotiations that produced the Declaration of Principles (DOP) marking the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Pundik's and Hassassian's academic background, extensive conflict resolution experience, and close relationship held with policymakers made them key figures in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Examining their road to their present positions serves as an excellent example of the long training process required of track two practitioners.

While distinct from one another, the two scholars share fundamental perceptions of track two and reasons for their personal involvement. Pundik, defined track two diplomacy with a disclaimer that politics is not science. He claimed that track two is the interaction of academics with or without a mediator in order to advance mutual resolution of topics of dispute; it produces a paper that is accepted only by the participants themselves, with the purpose of presenting it to decision makers. The interaction is a focused effort, dealing with specific issues, by relevant professional people that are not policymakers. The process is not binding and both sides fully understand beforehand that, firstly, the purpose is to come up with a formula that

would be presented to those at the decision making level; secondly, there is no precondition that if the formula is accepted it commits either of the sides; and finally, that there is no precondition that if one of the sides accepts the formula, the other side is then obliged as well. The overall goal is to reach a concrete proposal, not a collection of academic formulas from which a decision maker should pick a preferable one. (86)

Hassassian defined track two diplomacy to be part of the overall theory of conflict resolution. He said that it brings hardcore issues of the conflict to an informal dialogue and negotiation, without any constraints that exist in the official track. Track two diplomacy is a confidential process in which the parties attempt to communicate to each other points of view. Hassassian stressed in his interview that track two "is an open ended exercise."(87)

The exact format of interaction is left to the people who interact, be it the mediator or the participants themselves. Hassassian claimed in his interview that second track diplomacy has its moments of total stalemate. The key, he said, is always to think about how to start with issues that are negotiable. Never start with issues that are too problematic, as in the case of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, like Jerusalem or refugees. It is better to start with issues that are more convenient to deal with for both sides; issues that serve as starting points to build trust and a personal relationship between the negotiators. Starting with icebreakers and establishing common grounds allows nonnegotiable issues to become negotiable. That is one of track two interaction's best contributions to the overall reconciliation process.

A facilitator's main responsibility in this respect is to structure an interaction that will start off with activities that build trust and allow joint and better processing of the issues of conflict. In addition, it is important in the early stage of interaction to be aware of personal tensions that derive from dealing with specific matters. When tensions arise, it is preferable to stop and move on to a different topic. Pundik argued that "track two is not activated for the sake of track two." He maintained that there has to be an analytical framework that identifies the ripeness of the process that makes track two diplomacy a suitable option. When track two is not a viable option, we must turn to track four. Pundik claimed that without the efforts of activists of track

four and three during the seventies and the eighties, the Oslo process would not have been conceived. When setting track two diplomacy as a long-term goal, it necessitates initial and immediate activation of tracks four and three. Pundik concluded: "I believe in the necessity and potential contribution of track two diplomacy, but I know that not every track two process is effective. Track two interaction is creative, it produces ideas, it can get to grounds that otherwise are not reachable, it allows people that are a bit 'crazy' to employ their abilities, and finally, it creates an adaptive atmosphere for its unique purpose. The bottom line is that each case is unique and stands on its own." (88)

Both Hassassian and Pundik worked hard and went a long way to reach their present positions as renowned track two practitioners. Hassassian did his undergraduate studies in the American University of Beirut in the early seventies during the prime of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) presence in Lebanon. He studied political science and public administration, and later on completed his Masters and PhD in International Relations. While in Beirut he was politically involved with the PLO. Upon his return to Palestine, he ceased his direct involvement.

Pundik finished his undergraduate studies in Middle Eastern History in the Tel Aviv University in Israel. He continued his studies in this field and received his PhD from the University of London in 1991. Pundik testified in his interview that he had gained much experience through his military service, political interactions, and work in conflict resolution. This experience helped him develop an extensive network of political contacts. Pundik has been involved in many track two interactions and in initiating grassroots and cooperation projects between Palestinians and Israelis.

Hassassian returned to Palestine in 1981 to teach in a university, and got a distinct political experience. His academic profession and daily life under occupation prompted him to write about the conflict and seek solutions. In his interview, Hassassian strongly claimed that he "never had inclinations of confrontations [and] always thought that there was a political solution to the conflict." Therefore, at the height of the Intifada, he accepted an invitation to be a fellow in the Truman Institute — a peace and research institute in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Hassassian was the first Palestinian scholar to be invited as a fellow to the Truman center. During his time there he was exposed to the Israeli side, especially the Israeli

academic circle; he gave lectures, talks, papers, and heard the other — Israeli — perspective. This was the first real peace Hassassian had made with the Israelis.

During the Intifada Hassassian became very much involved in the political arena. Hassassian has always been a local leader in the community; as a professor in the Bethlehem University he held administrative positions and was often asked by the diplomatic corps to give the Palestinian perspective. He met with European, American, and Israeli officials. The experience he gained in engaging with diplomats and being a professor of political science, as well as being invited internationally to give talks about the Palestinian perspective, prompted Hassassian to become more active in second track diplomacy. He has been doing extensive research on the Palestinian issue, the democratization process, and on the political transformation of the PLO.

Hassassian claimed to have learned the psychological position of the Palestinians; he also realized the maximalist and minimalist position of both Israelis and Palestinians. At any level of interaction he pursued a search for common ground. Following extensive interaction with Israelis he was able to relate to the Israeli point of view and report back to the Palestinians concerning the possible common ground for future interaction. He participated in many workshops dealing with psychological as well as political issues. Reflecting on the violent events that occurred throughout those years, Hassassian testified that "the more the outside was violent and threatening, the more intense the work became."(89)

### 7.7. The Oslo Process from the Israeli Perspective, a Case Study

In September 13th, 1993 a Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). The signing of the DOP marked the first of a series of agreements known as the Oslo accords. Leading to the first agreement was a secret negotiation between Israeli and Palestinian personnel under the auspices of the Norwegian government in Oslo, Norway. This negotiation process serves as a classic example for track two diplomacy. It involved practitioners, mediators, neutral settings, and a transformation of a track two interaction into a

binding track one product. Track two practitioners carried out the initial negotiation process as a third party played the hosting mediator. Representatives of both sides were track two practitioners with rich training experience. They have participated in numerous workshops, dialogues, seminars and other projects prior to reaching the negotiation phase. They had strong academic background and held close connection to policymakers. When sufficient progress was made in the negotiation, the interaction was presented to policymakers and then transformed into track one diplomacy. The final outcome was the signing of the DOP on the green lawn at the White House in Washington, DC.

The Oslo negotiation was a culmination of a process that began a few years before. In October 30th, 1991, following the Gulf war, a Middle East Peace Conference was conveyed in Madrid, Spain. Participants to the convention were most of the Middle East countries, including Israel, and the coalition countries of the war. Emerging from this conference were track one official teams that began peace negotiations. Four teams were established: Lebanese-Israeli, Syrian-Israeli, Jordanian-Israeli, and Palestinian-Israeli; the teams met in Washington, yet progress was slow. At that time Israel did not recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and in fact had a law that prohibited Israeli officials from meeting with PLO representatives.(14) The Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks was consisted of local leaders from the West Bank and the Gaza strip. While officially they were not PLO representatives, they maintained close contact with the PLO headquarters in Tunis and were in fact executing direct instructions.

While politicians and other track one diplomats were engaged in a frustrating slow pace negotiation in Washington, an alternative initiative emerged back in the region. Two academics, Dr. Ron Pundik and Dr. Yair Hirschfeld, initiated a dialogue with local Palestinian leadership in the West Bank. Pundik teamed up with Hirschfeld who already had strong connections with the leftist political leadership, namely Member of Parliament Yossi Beilin.

Pundik described the events that led to the Oslo agreements as divided into three stages. In the first stage, before Oslo during 1992, dialogues with the local leadership such as Faisal EL Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi were held in Jerusalem in an attempt to advance cooperation projects and activities between Palestinians and Israelis; the

underlying intent of the dialogue was to prepare the ground for future negotiations. The relationship was mostly initiated by Pundik and Hirschfeld, but at times by Palestinians or by Beilin. At that time Beilin was a member of parliament the opposition Labor Party. He became part of the decision making level in June 1992 when the leftist Labor Party won the Israeli elections.

While the meetings were taking place in Jerusalem, Pundik and Hirschfeld tried to advance other activities concerning issues of water, refugees, and economic cooperation. These interactions took place in China, Japan, and Turkey, and were attended by Israelis and Palestinians as well as by representatives from other countries involved. The purpose of these interactions was to communicate positions between Israel and Palestinian officials in order to create the necessary foundation for an official negotiation. At this stage Pundik was acting mostly as a mediator, conveying positions and suggesting his own, and eventually bringing together representatives from both sides in order to coordinate positions prior to upcoming meetings. Pundik's work here is an example of a track two initiative that creates a situation where track one representatives can interact in a back-channel setting. These interactions were taking place prior to the Oslo process.

Oslo began in January 1993. The Oslo process is divided into two stages: a track two phase and a track one negotiation. The track two phases began in January 1993 and lasted till May. In this interaction, Hirschfeld and Pundik were sent by Beilin to negotiate with Palestinian representatives the terms of a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO. Beilin, who at the time was a member of parliament of the ruling Labor Party, sent the two academics to Oslo without notifying Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres or the Prime Minister, Yitzchak Rabin. The Palestinians, at that point, did not know that Beilin was the sender. From the Israeli point of view, as long as the decision making level was not connected to the Oslo talks; it was a track two interaction. The Palestinian participants, however, were official representatives and got their orders directly form Arafat. They perceived the negotiation to be a back-channeled track one interaction and did not believe that the Israelis were not representing the government. The Palestinians were convinced that Hirschfeld was representing Shimon Peres and Pundik, Yitzchak Rabin.(90)

In May 1993 Rabin and Peres decided to send Uri Savir, the then chief of staff of the Israeli Foreign ministry, to join the Oslo negotiation and thus the interaction became a back-channeled track one diplomacy. The transition from track two to one was made once Beilin realized the negotiation as serious enough to interest Peres and Rabin. Peres took his time to analyze and verify the seriousness of the process and finally chose to accept it as a viable option and presented it to Rabin. Rabin eventually supported the Oslo channel, although throughout the Oslo process he never met with neither Pundik nor Hirschfeld. While these negotiations were going on, the official track one negotiation in Washington was taking place as well.

In August 1993, in Oslo, the two sides reached an agreement which they signed in a confidential ceremony. This signing led to the official ceremony a month later at the white house on September 13$^{th}$, 1993. At that point Pundik and Hirschfeld concluded their involvement and returned to their other track two activities in three parallel scenes. First, they turned to initiate track four activities, namely grassroots, people to people, dialogue, and other cooperation projects. Second, they engaged in track two interactions to explore options for the final settlement agreement. And lastly, they were sent by Beilin to negotiate in Stockholm with representatives of Abu-Mazen who was a PLO official in charge of the Israeli file, the terms for the final settlement. The purpose of this negotiation was to present its product to decision makers as a starting point for a track one process. This interaction was initiated by Beilin who personally approached PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on this matter. This initiative was carried out without informing Peres and Rabin. The product of this negotiation became known as the Beilin-Abu Mazen document.

The Beilin-Abu Mazen document was a proposal for a final settlement agreement. It suggested resolutions for topics such as Jerusalem, an independent demilitarized Palestine, and the Palestinian refugees. The joint team of academics completed this proposal on October 30$^{th}$. Five days later, on November 4$^{th}$, Yitzchak Rabin, Israel's Prime Minister, was assassinated by a Jewish Israeli. The murder reshuffled the peace cards altogether. The document was eventually presented to Arafat and Peres, who replaced Rabin as Prime Minister, but both rejected the agreement.(91)

This is a case where a track two product failed, unlike the Oslo accord, to be transformed into a track one process. Nevertheless, it is an example for an activation

of a track two process by a track one figure that has foreseen political obstacles and chose to initiate a safe alternative in the form of a track two negotiation. .(92)

Pundik identified in his interview two basic reasons that made the track two process in Oslo possible: the ripeness of a process and the leadership of the time. The ripeness that made the process feasible was created by a collection of world events such as: the collapse of the Berlin wall, the entry of the Americans to the region, the Gulf war, the Madrid peace conference, the weakening of the PLO, the Intifada* and finally, a social realization by both Palestinian and Israeli societies that the time has come to create something new. To top these factors, the formal track one system, due to its management and basic conceptions, was stuck in a ridiculous situation that made no sense or progress. The second reason was the specific personnel involved: track one leaders that had the political and diplomatic insights — Rabin, Peres, Beilin, Arafat, and Abu-Mazen, and competent track two practitioners — Pundik, Hirschfeld, Abu Ala, Maher Al-Kurd, and Hassan Asfur, all of whom worked decisively and with great courage to create a reality that forever changed the Middle East.(93)

Outside of Oslo, back in the Middle East, the conflict kept on its violent course. Some of the more violent events had grave consequences for the official track one negotiation in Washington and brought it to an actual halt. For the track two interaction in Oslo, however, these events were essentially incentives to work in full speed ahead. The atmosphere that was created in Oslo was founded on mutuality, respect, and a shared sense of a joint destiny; consequently, making it possible to create a coalition across conflict lines. Thus, events such as deportation, bombing, border closings, and suicide attacks all became one united enemy of peace. In Oslo, neither side felt it was sacrificing more than the other nor that it was more to blame; the 'us' and 'them' concepts became 'us' who work for peace and 'them' who seek to destroy it. There were talks about those events and there was personal reaction and opinion, but it was taken in perspective.

The bottom line was the sustained commitment to the process. The Oslo spirit that was created in the track two process was good preparations for reaching a solution. The track two atmosphere—the trust, the kind of dialogue, and the lack of formality, were practically enforced by Pundik and Hirschfeld who maintained these guiding

principles throughout the process till the final signing. Pundik himself concluded that the Oslo channel was "a direct antithesis to the Washington negotiation." Oslo was a unique atmosphere that, combined with the binding nature of a track one process, allowed a historical breakthrough in a long and bloody conflict.

The process itself was not all-smooth water. Naturally there were moments that we thought we are separating, that we are getting up and leaving the room, but that is the dynamic of a negotiation. The most problematic point of the Oslo process was when the Palestinians demanded that the negotiation would receive official confirmation at a time that Rabin was still not involved. Pundik and Hirschfeld were confronted at that point with a big dilemma. The Palestinians were not aware at that time that Rabin and Peres were not yet part of the process. The Palestinians believed that they were participating in a back channel track one process, whereas for the Israelis, it was a track two team that was engaging with track one representatives. The matter was eventually resolved with the assistance of the hosting third party — the Norwegians.

The Norwegians played a decisive role as a third party mediator to the whole Oslo process. The Israeli track two practitioners initiated the involvement of the Norwegians; however, at an advanced stage, the Norwegians pushed themselves to host the interactions. Pundik said that with the help of the third side, it was easier to implement fundamental guidelines of trust and the win-win concepts; the necessity of these perceptions was experienced after partaking in similar systems of dialogue. The Norwegians went to great efforts to create an atmosphere that was very calm, pleasant, informal, and warm. They did not separate the participants or put them in dark secluded places; instead, they combined them, accommodated them in private comfortable housing, and made them eat and interact together. The third party's main role was to facilitate to create the environment, to assist at all times, and to provide, when needed, a formal seal which gave official legitimacy of the Norwegian foreign ministry to an unofficial interaction. This helped build the credibility to the whole process. In addition, the Norwegians gave professional advice, as well as mediating and passing messages between the sides or to a fourth party such as the Americans.

One of the advantages of the Oslo process was its confidentiality. It was a back channel process that was kept under great secrecy, which at times of crisis kept the negotiation unexposed to external pressures and influences. The success of the

process was due to the combination of several contributing factors. These were elements such as knowing that there is a shared and common understanding, the ability to transform this interaction into an eye level negotiation, the fundamental perception based on the win-win paradigm as oppose to a zero sum game, and finally, a general innovation in the Israeli perception of the PLO. But the fact remains that Track One has the whole political will and has the last word.

On the personal level, contributing factors also included Pundik and Hirschfeld's ability to deal with the unthinkable without being afraid—based on prior experience in track two interactions, the strategic perception of the conflict, the leaders and actors involved, and lastly, the lack of other options—choosing the only option that actually worked.

The relationship with decision makers was strong throughout the process. The Israeli scholars kept close relation and contact with Beilin, prior to the involvement of Peres. Pundik and Hirschfeld used to initiate contact with Beilin whenever there was a need and upon their consideration. After Peres was brought into the picture the working relations remained extremely tight and Peres was updated on every little detail. In track two interactions there is sufficient freedom to state your personal opinion and explain that the political official negotiators will not agree to these personal views. With proper amount of disclosure this can actually help build one's credibility in the eyes of the negotiation partner.

Nevertheless, once it has become a track one process, the track two practitioners became messengers of guidelines and positions of the policymakers. Pundik and Hirschfeld were much disciplined. Pundik claimed that he had to present messages that came from Peres, whom he personally did not like. Referring to a Jewish settlement in the Gaza strip, Pundik said, "it would have been true to the agreement to evacuate at least Netzarim. It would have served as a good precedent. It hurt me that it was not done. I tried to convince…[Peres and Beilin] to do that."(94)

Any position presented by the Israelis at the track one negotiation was a product of debates between the policymakers and the practitioners. The two scholars have been an integral part of the discussions conducted by the policymakers; they argued their personal opinions, and delivered messages to and from the negotiation room.

Eventually, the practitioners were the ones who produced and actually wrote the Oslo agreements.

But Oslo was not all roses; it had its drawbacks. Analyzing the flaws of Oslo, Pundik recognized that the biggest setback was one concerning the marketing of peace and building a peace constituency. Pundik said: "We knew that we needed to work together for PPP — Peace Propaganda Plan. This was one of the tragedies of Oslo — that we did not engage at all with the marketing of the agreement, the understanding, and the basic conception of the Peace to the Israeli society. At the heat of the work we pushed this topic aside and the official system totally neglected it. Rabin chose to totally ignore it, and Peres went off to unreasonable heights of a new Middle East concept* that at that critical time was simply irrelevant."

### 7.8. Evaluation

Second track diplomacy has proved itself as an essential tool trying to bring about peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Oslo's major contribution was in providing an option for the leaders of both people to make peace. But, its major fault was that it failed to emphasize the importance of incorporating the people's peace into the whole process. Applying track two diplomacy to promote conflict resolution efforts has benefits as well as weaknesses.

The Oslo process serves as an example of an efficient application of a third party mediator. The Norwegians played the mediator's role to perfection. They created a secret and safe environment for negotiation between adversaries, bridged differences and communications, and provided an official ratification to the process. The Norwegians played an especially crucial role when the negotiation had been transformed from a track two interaction to a back channel track one negotiation.

On the other hand, and as was mentioned "Conflict resolution is easier said than done", the Israeli side did not implement what has signed in the Oslo agreement, that is why the entire region is witnessing again the 'second intifada' 2000 till now. And no third party or any binding power succeeded to make or force Israel to pull her soldiers out of the occupied territories in Palestine.

One can easily imagine that there could be cooperative relations and good ties between the two peoples, the Palestinian and Israeli people, particularly in the field of economy as Israel is considered as a developed country, the Palestinian people absolutely could benefit from the high technologies that Israel has got. Both sides could live peacefully and side by side, like any good neighbors, and also Palestinian workers might work again in Israel. That all could just happen if only Israel would implement the agreements signed by both sides such as Oslo. So the critical question which the Israeli people should answer it is: how can unofficial diplomacy work effectively in the occupied territories? How can both sides live peacefully with the existence of the Israeli army in the occupied territories, threatening the whole region?

There could be peaceful cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis if Israel would withdraw from the occupied territories in 1967, implement and respect the international resolutions taken by the UN. For example. In so many occasions, such as resolution No. 194 in 1948 which calls for establishing a UN conciliation commission resolving that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, and resolving that refugees should be permitted to return to their homes, this resolution has never been implemented. Or the resolution no. 242 (1967) stating the principles of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, which also emphasis the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in 1967.

Finally, if just Israel would respect her commitments and show her compliance to implement the Security Council Resolutions, then a new chapter could be opened for both sides and it would be so vital to apply the approach of the Tree Model with understanding the expected long-term results which eventually would establish relation between both sides based on peaceful coexistence and cooperation in so many fields, as we mentioned above such as in economics, technology, education etc...

The Tree Model is the best Solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict because it deals with the grassroots problems, it eradicates the hostility and the hatred, this psychological approach is workable and viable and it has worked successfully in Estonia.

# 8. CONCLUSION

The United Nations was set up in 1945, at the end of the World War II, and its charter envisaged a system of collective security, in which member states would provide forces to defend countries against aggression. This did not work, as we mentioned before; partly because of the Cold War, and partly because most conflicts since then have been civil wars within states.

In this point, we can assert that the permanent members of the Security Council failed to agree on the actions to maintain peace and order in the world due to the veto power, which was used increasingly by the superpowers to prevent any decision against their interests. In this environment, it was difficult for the UN to act as had been hoped, to prevent the use of force in the international affairs of states.

Some of the UN peacekeeping missions have been performed successfully to some extent, like UNFICYP in Cyprus (1964-). However, there is not a sustainable and viable peace in Cyprus, yet, but at least we can say that there is no violence at the moment. In formal terms it can be called a cease-fire. UN peacekeeping operation also worked satisfactorily in South Lebanon. But, on the other hand, there were some other cases, which can be considered as an obvious failure of the UN peacekeeping mission, like Somalia. In addition in the case of former Yugoslavia; the reluctance and the long hesitation of UN in sending peacekeeping mission caused disasters to the Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. The Christian Serbs killed brutally thousands of innocent Muslim citizens. NATO, the OSCE, and the EU have undertaken a peacekeeping mission, but it was impotent and could not even save the Muslims who fled to the "safe havens" declared by the UN. The UN was involved with the Security Council resolution, which adopted a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia. The embargo did not prevent the Serbs to smuggle weapons from the neighboring European countries, and the Muslims were left without any support.

However, the involvement of institutions other than the UN may be beneficial in the future for maintaining peace and order. As we have seen before, coordination and cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in peace operations have become an essential part of UN peace and security mechanism. Therefore proper coordination becomes an important issue. Thus; firstly, the UN should do much more to encourage the participation of regional organizations in peace missions, but should not let them do whatever they want without the UN control and supervision. Secondly, regional organizations should and can play an increasingly important role in peace operations, but without sacrificing the dignity and the authority of the UN.

To ensure the success of UN peace operations, a command and supervisory system must be set up and constantly improved. The UN Member States and relevant regional organizations must have more say and more supervisory power, so that peace operations can represent the will of the world community. It would be advisable to gain a Security Council resolution to mandate every peace-keeping operation. In addition, the mandate of every peace mission should be clearly defined and feasible; the rights and the obligations of the Security Council, the Secretary-General and those involved must be specifically defined, so that all may adhere to the principles of UN peace operations.

The number and range of peace-building tasks that international community has defined for itself should not eclipse the primary task of military in peace operations – ending civil wars and establishing a secure and safe environment. This is not to say that reform and enhancement of the wider peacekeeping/peace-building project are not important, but that it is time to merge the two seminal reports produced at the turn of the century (Lakhdar Brahimi and the Responsibility to project), and to produce a credible doctrine for 21st Century peace operations.

The military intervention which started in Iraq in March, 2003 was not by any means a peace-keeping or peace-building mission or even peace-enforcement operation, despite the American claim, that USA wanted to get rid of the dictator Saddam Hussein and build democratic regime. Whatever the claim is, it is preposterous that democracy can be reached through tanks, and the occupation of a country can bring freedom and democracy.

77

It would have been very wise and prudent if President George W. Bush from the first week of the American invasion to Iraq had retreated and pulled the troops from Iraq and replaced them by UN troops with the participation of troops from other regional organizations. This would have ultimately given a positive image and could have helped in operations of peace-building and establishing civic institutions.

The American occupation was an obvious proof of the weakness of the UN and showed that if there would not be effective international response to enhance and strengthen the UN against those who break its principles and charter. If this does not happen its fate would be the same as the League of Nations.

Moreover, the security challenges that emerged at the end of the 20th Century, as over-population, competition for scarce and over-exploited resources, and "globalization", required collective responses. The problems are so multifaceted and complicated that they are very hard to manage and overcome. While the roots of today's conflicts remain similarly complex, emergencies continue to rise from relatively simple human motives, such as greed, corruption, ethnocentrism, or desperation. They easily lead to violence, use of armed force and a total breakdown of law and order.

As a result there must be more efforts in the international community toward a more successful and effective preventive diplomacy. The whole area of preventive diplomacy is rather young. Consequently, the means and methods of preventive diplomacy are in serious need of development and deepening. There we need a multi-scientific approach starting from the better understanding of human mind and behavior. In most conflicts the hardest part is to get the relations between the conflicting parties back to normal. Therefore, the ways to rebuild confidence must be elaborated further. At the moment it looks that the best way to support confidence is to get the people of the parties to do something concrete together.

Also we need better and more efficient ways to alert us with the impending conflicts or even with the environmental problems, which might threaten the whole world. Nowadays in the age of globalization, and the age of high technologies and information every phenomenon eventually functions and affects globally. For

example, environmental problems and diseases do not recognize borders. Furthermore, these kinds of problems can easily trigger political problems and therefore they are a permanent threat for the security and stability. When they are addressed also the probability of political conflicts reduces. (95)

As a consequence, preventive diplomacy is the best response to growing regional low intensity conflict, especially in Africa where the political, social and geographical complexities make peace-keeping environment unattractive. At the same time, successful preventive diplomacy requires adequate early warning and instant response to a crisis. Early warning should be provided by national governments and international information networks, supported directly also by the developed countries. This is necessary at least until the capacity of the UN or the OAU are further enhanced. Moreover, individual states should be encouraged to initiate preventive diplomacy, in consultation with regional neighbors and organizations, and especially with the UN, in order to take the preventive measures as negotiations before conflicts escalate. When preventive diplomacy fails, peace-keeping may be the next best option. However, decision-makers need sufficient funding for successful peace-keeping. The funding problem should be solved before peace-keeping becomes a respected and successful element in global conflict resolution.

As the case of the peace-keeping/ enforcement operation in Somalia in 1992 – 1993 shows, especially in the cases when the operation takes place in a country which is not of vital interest of the country providing peace-keeping, the public opinion might be very sensitive for own casualties. Especially in the case of the USA we can speak about the so-called "bodybag syndrome". After 18 American soldiers were killed in Mogadishu the public opinion in the USA turned against the operation and the troops were pulled out. Therefore, an accurate calculation of casualty risk and tolerance and public support for a peacekeeping operation is critical, especially if a long-term involvement is envisaged. High casualties will erode popular support for peacekeeping and make this activity more difficult to implement.

Timing, then, is what distinguishes preventive diplomacy, and timing is its major obstacle as well. In his Supplement, the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stated, "Experience has shown that the greatest obstacle to success in preventive diplomacy

is not lack of information, analytical capacity or ideas for UN initiatives. Success is often blocked at the outset by the reluctance of one or other of the parties to accept UN help".

Not only the parties but also member states of the UN in general are often reluctant to authorize the Secretary-General or others to intervene at a relatively early stage in an unfolding conflict situation. This is particularly so in the case of internal conflicts, which now account for a majority of conflicts. The old concept of state sovereignty is here the biggest obstacle. As the Secretary-General noted and other UN declarations have confirmed, the UN can not impose its preventive and mediatory efforts on parties which do not want them.

One shall agree with the Secretary-General that the solution to this problem may take a long time. To start with it, is important to create a climate of optimism. Carrying out successful preventive diplomacy efforts and building on it will be important. It could create a global accumulation of positive activities.

Regional organizations and arrangements will enjoy special advantages, especially in internal conflicts, in overcoming reluctance and mistrust. They need to be encouraged and assisted by the UN to develop their capacity and to play more active roles.

Conflict resolution is a process through which parties attempt to put aside the mistrust and in the end resolve their conflict. The parties (teams) involved to the conflict resolution process could be official or unofficial. Nowadays, with the developed communications, professors, doctors, journalists, parliamentarians, think-tanks, religious leaders and others like NGOs have become major actors in halting conflicts, alleviating tensions, reaching agreements and building a real sustainable peace and order.

NGOs which have recently become deeply and effectively involved in conflict resolution, can facilitate the mission of humanitarian assistance in wartime, and establish civil democratic institutions through their programs. NGOs can reach major changes in the society instantly. Especially, when their social, cultural and political intervention is considered welcome by the conflicting parties, they can be successful.

Resolving deep-rooted social conflicts requires change - change in attitudes, change in structures, and change in political and legal relationships. Change at the political level is for the most part the domain of official diplomacy. True conflict resolution, however, is not sustainable through a single-track (track one) efforts. Unofficial Diplomacy or Track Two diplomacy is a growing and developing field, and with each new Track Two initiative there is an opportunity for coordination, cooperation and collaboration with Track One efforts. In the end, it is only through all those efforts that real change is possible.

Finally, the CSMHI's Tree Model which we tackled is an example of how other unofficial diplomacy share the responsibility of crisis management and provide the needed humanitarian assistance in the wartime.

The Tree Model is an interdisciplinary approach to reducing ethnic tensions and promoting peaceful coexistence between opposing large groups. The methodology is carried out by a team that includes psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, diplomats, historians, and other social scientists. The role of psychoanalytic insight is central, for it provides the lens through which the team seeks to understand the nature of the conflict at hand and the mechanisms and rituals through which large groups in conflict interact.

The importance of the Tree Model lies beyond developing programs and institutions that implement and encourage such new ways of interacting, what is experienced at first by a few can be spread and available to many more. With appropriate modifications, this Tree Model approach can be applied to a wide variety of situations to help alleviate tensions, prevent violent conflict, heal traumatized societies, and promote peaceful coexistence.

In the end, as the example of the Tree Model shows, there is the road to follow. At the same time we have still to confess, that there is a huge gap in our efforts for a more peaceful world. We do not understand enough the functioning (or disfunctioning) of the human mind, not to speak about the possibilities to influence or change the human mind (for example, to a more peaceful one). It takes more and more multidisciplinary

efforts to excavate the question deeper and deeper. And this may constitutes the main challenge for the studies of International Relations, together with the other disciplines.

# FOOTNOTES

(1) Garth Shelton, Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, Keys for Success. African Security Review. Vol 6 No 5, 1997), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No5.

(2) Jan, Allison Humanitarian Emergencies and the UN. International Affairs. Vol.4, No.2, 1994, p.22.

(3) Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations at the End of the 1990s. (Macmillan Press LTD, London, Third Edition, 1999), p.72.

(4) Boutros Boutros Ghali, 'Agenda for Peace: One Year Later'. ORBIS, Vol.37, no.3, Summer 1993,p.324.

(5) David J. Whittaker, United Nations in Actions. (UCL Press, London,1$^{st}$ edition 1995), p.27.

(6) Keeping the peace, stories of the Australian peacekeepers, history of peace, http://www.awm.gov.au/. Visited in 02/02/2004.

(7) Nassrine Azimi and Chang Li Lin, The Nexus between Peacekeeping and Peace-Building, debriefing and lessons, report of the 1999 Singapore Conference, the United Nations institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), (Kluwer Law International, 2000),                                                                                         p.27.

(8) Dennis C. Jett, Why peacekeeping fails (PALGRAVE. First edition, New York, 2001), p. 14.

(9) Stories of the Australian peacekeepers, http://www.awm.gov.au/ 02/02/2004.

(10) Boutros.Ghali, 1993, p.329.

(11) Ibid, p. 329.  02/02/2004.

(12) Saul H. Mendlovitz and Burns H. Weston, Preferred Futures for the United Nations, (New York.Transnational Publishers Inc., 1995) p.167.

(13) JETT, P. 16.

(14) Daniel Warner, New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, (Dodrech. Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 1995), p.19.

(15) Boutros Ghali, 1992 P.12 .

(16) Eric Fawcet, Henna Newcombe, United Nations Reform (Toronto. Science for Peace, 1995), p.125

(17)Post-conflict peace-building Strategies, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/intro.htm 05/02/2004.

 (18) Dimitris Bourantis, Jarrod Wienner, The UN in the New World Order, (London. MacMillan Press 1995), p.72.

(19) J.Taylor Wentges, 'Force Function and Phrase: Three dimensions of UN Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No.3, 1998, p.61.

(20) Boutros Boutros Ghali, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', A/50/60-S/1995/1http:www.un.or/web-cgi/idoc.pl, 3 January 1995, p.8. 05/02/2004.

(21) Ibid, p.8.

(22) Boutros Boutros Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace', A/47/277-S/2411 1,http://www.un.org/plwe, lweb-cgi/idoc.pl.17, June 1992,p.12. 05/02/2004.

(23) Garth Shelton.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Susan R. Mills, The Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for A sound Financing Basis,   Indar Jit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek, The United Nations and Peacekeeping , Macmillan in Association with the International Peace Academy, (first edition), 1990,p.91.

(26) Garth Shelton.

(27) Boutros Ghali, 1992, p.12.

(28) Garth Shelton.

(29) Ibid.

(30) Boutros Ghali, 1992 ,p.12..

(31) Garth Shelton.

(32) Boutrus Ghali, p.12.

(33) Mats R. Berdal, 'Wither UN Peacekeeping', Adelphi Paper 281,October I 993. p.26

(34) Bourantis, Wienner, p.12.

(35) Ibid, p.13.

(36) Keith Krause, W. Andy Knight. State Society and the UN System (Tokyo: UN University

Press, 1995), p. 5.

(37)Tugyan Atifsoy, The effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations In the light of UNFICYP Experience, Thesis submitted to the institute of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, July 2003,p.25. (38) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, background, http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/ index.html 20/03/2004.

(39) Ibid

(40) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, mandate,

http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/mandate.html 20/03/2004

(41) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, background,

http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/ index.html 20/03/2004.

(42) United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, background,

http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/ index.html 20/03/2004.

(43) Emine Davut Yitmen, Still time for Greek Cypriots to change their minds, Cyprus Today, TRNC, Issue Number 639, April, 17-23-2004,p.25.

(44) Whittaker, p.176.

(45) Ibid p.177.

(46) Baehr and Gordenker, p.84-85.

(47) Geoff Simons, UN Malaise: Power. Problems and Realpolitik. (New York: St. Martin Press. 1995), p.82.

(48) Karen A. Mingst, Margaret P. Karens, The UN in the Post Cold War Era, (Colorado: Westview, Press, 1995), p.85.

(49) Amos Yoder, Evolution of the UN System, (Washington: Taylor and Francis Pub. 1993), p.8

(50) Mingst and Karens, p.96.

(51) Ibid, p.99.

(52) Ibid, p.96.

(53) Ibid, p.99.

(54) The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/unifil_body.htm 01/05/2004.

(55) Baehr and Gordenker, p.73.

(56) The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon,

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/unifil_body.htm 01/05/2004.

(57) Joshua S. Goldstein, International Relations, Longman, USA, 5th edition, 2003,p.277.

(58) United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon-background

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/index.html 01/05/2004.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Baehr and Gordenker, p.83.

61) Ibid p.84

(62) Inis L. Claude, JR., Swords Into Plowshares, The Problems And Progress Of International Organization, (McGraw-Hill, Inc., USA, 4th edition, 1984), p. 312.

(63) Professor Victor-Yves Ghebali, Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 19 – 21 October 1998, Kongresshaus Zurich, Switzerland. http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/ 05/05/2004.

(64) Boutros Ghali,1992, p.12.

(65) Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, (UK, Polity Press, 1st edition, 2003), p.89.

(66) Boutros Ghali, p13.

(67) Ibid

(68) Ibid

(69) Center For Strategic & International Studies, Preventive Diplomacy Program, program overview, http://wwww.csis.org/prevedip/index.htm 16-05-2004

(70) R. P. Barston, Modern diplomacy, (Longman, London and New York, third edition, 1991), p. ix

(71) Cooperation with regional organizations, http://www.un.org/SG-Rpt 16/05/2004.

(72) The Management Center, NGOs and informal diplomacy, Belgrade, http://www.management.org.yu 19-05-2004.

(73) Shaun Riordan, pp.86-87.

(74) Ibid, pp.87-88.

(75) Connie Peck, Sustainable peace, the role of UN and regional organizations in preventing conflict, (Rowman and Littlefield publishing (via NBN),)2002, p.192.

(76) Ibid p.193.

James Notter, Track two diplomacy, nongovernmental strategies for peace, http://uninfo.state.gov/journals/itps/ 22/05/2004.

(78) Mark Heller and Sari Nusseiba, No Trumpets, No Drums. (Hill and Wand, 1993), P.20

(*) Joseph Montville coined the term in his essay "Foreign policy according to Freud" Foreign policy (winter 1981-1982).

Michael Bavly, Second Track Diplomacy, http://www.shalam.org/Second Track Diplomacy.htm 01/06/2004.

(80) Vamik D. Volkan, The Tree Model, A comprehensive Psychopolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension, Mind and Human Interaction, window
between history, culture, politics, and psychoanalysis, (International Universities Press, INC, Volume 10, number 3, 1999), p.142.

(*) Ambassador John McDonald served for 40 years in the Foreign Service as a diplomat with Service in Western Europe and the Middle East.

Michael Bavly.

Volkan, p.142.

(*)Zeliha Sezgin Khashman is an Assistant Professor and head of International Relations Department at Near East University, Lefkosa,TRNC.

According to Greek Cypriot lecturer, Dr. Cesar Mavratsas the Cypriot Greek

university students do not consider the 1963-1974 as a cause of Cyprus conflict but the Turkish intervention as the main cause of the problem, table meeting March 2003 in NEU.

Khashman, p. 158-159.

Ibid, p. 155

(86) Pundik, Ron, 21st May 1999, Personal Interview by Michael Bavly, Tel-Aviv, Israel. (87) Hassassian, Manuel. Personal Interview, by Michael Bavly, College Park, Maryland, July 1999.

(88) Ron.

(89) Hassassian.

(90) Yossi Beilin, Touching Peace. (Tel-Aviv, Israel: Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, 1997), pp. 28-29.

(91) In June 1992 the leftist Labor party won the elections in Israel. Yitzchak Rabin became Prime Minister and Shimon Peres Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(92) "Book Reveals Jerusalem's Future Almost Decided in 1995". The Jerusalem Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 11, April/May 1999.

* The Intifada is the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza strip began in December 8th, 1987.

(93) Ron.

(94) Ibid

* Following the signing of the DOP, Peres began speaking of visionary "new Middle East" in which peace and economic cooperation will prevail among all countries of the region. It was perceived by most of the Israeli public and political arena to be an utopist dream that was detached from reality. Many Israelis referred to Peres's vision as a hallucination.

(95) Jouni Suistola: 20th century world history, in Near East University Department of International Relations, TRNC, January 2004.

# APPENDIX:

## IMPORTANT CHAPTERS AND ARTICLES OF THE UN CHARTER

### Chapter VI

### PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

### Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

### *Article 34*

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to the maintenance of international peace and security.

### *Article 35*

I. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute. or any action of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Sec Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring the attention of the Security Council or of the General Asst dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes I dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the Present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters hr to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of and 12.

### *Article 36*

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend at ate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any pr for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

### *article 37*

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

### *Article 38*

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any disputes request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

## Chapter VII

## ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

### *Article 39*

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

### *Article 40*

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

### *Article 41*

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

### *Article 42*

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

### *Article 43*

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members, and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

### *Article 44*

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

## Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

## Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

## Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Control on all questions relating to the Security Council's

military requirements for the maintenance of peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

## Article 48

I. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall he taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.

2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members

## Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

## Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

## Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## Chapter VIII

## REGIONAL REQUIREMENTS

### Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

### Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph I of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

### Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 7:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdictions of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement

measures under Chapter VII.

## Charter V, Article 24:

1. in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. in discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VLL, VLLL, and XLL.
3. the Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration.

## Chapter X, Article 65

The Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request.

## Chapter XIV, Article 96

1. the General Assembly of the Security Council may request the international Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the Court on legal actions arising within the scope of their activities.

## Chapter XV, Article 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Allison, Jan, Humanitarian Emergencies and the UN. International Affairs. Vol.4, No.2, 1994.

Atifsoy, Tugyan, The effectiveness of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations In the light of UNFICYP Experience, Thesis submitted to the institute of graduate studies and research in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, July 2003.

Azimi, Nassrine, Li L. Chang, The Nexus between Peacekeeping and Peace-Building, debriefing and lessons, report of the 1999 Singapore Conference, the United Nations institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), (Kluwer Law International, 2000).

Baehr, Peter R., Gordenker, Leon, The United Nations at the End of the 1990s. (Macmillan Press LTD, London, Third Edition, 1999).

Barston, P. R., Modern Diplomacy, Longman, (London and New York, third edition, 1991).

Beilin, Yossi, Touching Peace. (Tel-Aviv, Israel: Miskal – Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books, 1997).
"Book Reveals Jerusalem's Future Almost Decided in 1995". The Jerusalem Monitor, Volume 2, Issue 11, April/May 1999

Bourantis, Dimitris, Wienner, Jarrod, The UN in the New World Order, (London. MacMillan Press 1995).

Berdal, R. Mats 'Wither UN Peacekeeping', Adelphi Paper 281,October I 993.

Claude, JR. Inis L., Swords Into Plowshares, The Problems And Progress Of International Organization, (McGraw-Hill, Inc., USA, 4th edition, 1984).

Fawcet, Eric Henna Newcombe, United Nations Reform (Toronto. Science for Peace, 1995).
Ghali B. Boutros, 'Agenda for Peace: One Year Later'. ORBIS, vol.37, no.3, summer 1993.

Goldstein, S., Joshua, International Relations, (Longman, USA, 5th edition, 2003).

Heller, Mark, Nusseiba, Sari, No Trumpets, No Drums. (Hill and Wand, 1993).

Jett, C. Dennis, Why peacekeeping fails (PALGRAVE. First edition, New York, 2001).

Khashman, Zeliha, creating conditions for peace-making: the Cyprus case, perceptions, Journal of international affairs, September-November 2003, volume VIII, number3.

Mendlovitz, H. Saul and Weston, Burns H. Preferred Futures for the United Nations, (New York.Transnational Publishers Inc., 1995).

Mills, R. Susan, The Financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Need for A sound Financing Basis, Indar Jit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsbaek, The United Nations and Peacekeeping, (Macmillan in Association with the International Peace Academy, 1$^{st}$ edition, 1990).

Mingst, A. Karen, Karens, P. Margaret, The UN in the Post Cold War Era, (Colorado: Westview, Press, 1995).

Peck, Connie, Sustainable Peace, the Role of UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict, (Rowman and Littlefield publishing (via NBN), 2002).

Riordan, Shaun, The New Diplomacy, (UK, Polity Press, 1$^{st}$ edition, 2003).

Simons, Geoff, UN Malaise: Power. Problems and Realpolitik. (New York: St. Martin Press. 1995).

Suistola, Jouni, 20$^{th}$ century world history, in Near East University Department of International Relations, TRNC, January 2004.

Volkan, D. Vamik, The Tree Model, A comprehensive Psycholpolitical Approach to Unofficial Diplomacy and the Reduction of Ethnic Tension, Mind and Human Interaction, window between history, culture, politics, and psychoanalysis, International Universities Press, INC, Volume 10, number 3, 1999.

Warner, Daniel, New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, (Dodrech. Martinus Nijhoff Publ.), 1995).

Wentges J.Taylor, 'Force Function and Phrase: Three dimensions of UN Peacekeeping. International Peacekeeping, Vol. 5, No.3, 1998.

Whittaker, J.David, United Nations in Actions. (UCL Press, London,1$^{st}$ edition 1995).

Yitmen, Davut. Emine, Still time for Greek Cypriots to change their minds, Cyprus Today, TRNC, Issue Number 639, April, 17-23-2004.

Yoder, Amos, Evolution of the UN System, (Washington: Taylor and Francis Pub. 1993).

OTHER DOCUMENTS:

Bavly, Michael Second Track Diplomacy, http://www.shalam.org/Second Track Diplomacy.htm 01/06/2004.

Center For Strategic & International Studies, Preventive Diplomacy Program, program overview, http://wwww.csis.org/prevedip/index.htm 16-05-2004.
Cooperation with regional organizations, http://www.un.org/SG-Rpt 16/05/2004.
Keeping the peace, stories of the Australian peacekeepers, history of peace, http://www.awm.gov.au/. Visited in 02/02/2004.

Ghali B. Boutros, 'An Agenda for Peace', A/47/277-S/2411
1,http://www.un.org/plwe, lweb-cgi/idoc.pl.17, June 1992,p.12. 05/02/2004.

Ghali, B. Boutros, 'Supplement to An Agenda for Peace', A/50/60-
S/1995/1http:www.un.or/web-cgi/idoc.pl, 3 January 1995, 05/02/2004.

Ghebali, Victor-Yves, Preventive Diplomacy as Visited from the OSCE, 3rd International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, 19 – 21 October 1998, Kongresshaus Zurich, Switzerland. http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/ 05/05/2004.

Hassassian, Manuel ,Personal Interview, by Michael Bavly, College Park, Maryland, July 1999. http://www.shalam.org/Second Track Diplomacy.htm 01/06/2004.

Notter, James, Track two diplomacy, nongovernmental strategies for peace, http://uninfo.state.gov/journals/itps/ 22/05/2004.

Post-conflict peace-building Strategies, http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/intro.htm 05/02/2004.

Ron Pundik, Personal Interview by Michael Bavly, Tel-Aviv, Israel. 21st, May 1999 . http://www.shalam.org/Second Track Diplomacy.htm. 01/06/2004.

Shelton, Garth ,Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping. Keys for Success.
African Security Review. Vol 6 No 5, 1997), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/6No5, 01/06/2004.

The Management Center, NGOs and informal diplomacy, Belgrade, http://www.management.org.yu 19-05-2004.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, background, http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/ index.html 20/03/2004.

United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, mandate, http://www.un.org/Dept/dpko/missions /unficyp/mandate.html 20/03/2004.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/unifil_body.htm 01/05/2004.

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon-background
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unifil/index.html01/05/2004.