CTP and AKEL
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES
ON
CYPRUS ISSUE

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## INTRODUCTION

CTP and AKEL-DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON CYPRUS ISSUE

### 1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ATTEMPTS TO FIND SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

1.1. The Zurich and London agreements  
1.2. The Treaty of guarantee  
1.3. Military agreement  
1.4. The founding and declaration of the Republic of Cyprus  
1.5. Developments from the founding of Cyprus Republic until December 1963  
1.6. Makarios proposals for constitutional amendments  
1.7. Start of 1963 events  
1.8. The Military Coup of the Greek Junta and the Turkish Peace Operation in Cyprus  
1.8.1. Military Coup on 15th July 1974  
1.8.2. First Peace Operation 20 of July, 1974  
1.9. The Geneva Talks  
1.10. The Second peace operation

### 2. THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AFTER 1974

2.1. Declaration of the Turkish Federated State  
2.2. The attitude of Turkey and Greece towards the declaration  
2.3. Denktash-Makarios meetings  
2.4. Inter communal Talks  
2.5. Denktash-Kyprianou summit meetings  
2.6. Establishing of TRNC

### 3. CTP and AKEL: Historical background

### 4. Difference and similarities between CTP-UBP-DP-TKP and AKEL-YKP-KKE-ODP & SYNASPISMOS

### 5. GENERAL OUTLOOK OF CTP AND AKEL ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

5.1. CTP's, view on the demographical structure of TRNC and its affects on the Cyprus problem  
5.2. CTP's view of the Cyprus problem in 2004

Pages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTP and AKEL-DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON CYPRUS ISSUE</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ATTEMPTS TO FIND SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE TURKISH COMMUNITY AFTER 1974</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CTP and AKEL: Historical background</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. GENERAL OUTLOOK OF CTP AND AKEL ON CYPRUS PROBLEM</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3. CTP's opinion on the policy of R.R. Denktash should in the international negotiations
5.4. The views of AKEL and CTP on the Cypriot Turks in the South

6. AKEL AND CTP: SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES

6.1. CTP's and AKEL's views on the Membership of Cyprus to the EU
6.2. Similarities and differences between CTP's and AKEL's views on the Confidence Building Measures and Ghali's Set of Ideas, 1992
6.3. Alternatives to unilateral membership of Greek Cypriots to the EU

CONCLUSION
Can CTP & AKEL unite into a single party in case of a settlement in Cyprus?

APPENDICES:

Appendix 1
Interview with Özker Özgür

Appendix 2
Interview with Mehmet Ali Talat

Appendix 3
Questions asked to Mehmet Ali Talat

Appendix 4
Questions asked to Özker Özgür

Appendix 5
Questions asked to AKEL

BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION:

CTP and AKEL-DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON CYPTUS ISSUE

The Cyprus question can be defined as a conflict between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots, which take its roots in history, involving Turkey and Greece, and emanating from the Greek and Greek Cypriot aspirations and actions, aiming at the annexation of island to Greece after the elimination of the Turkish Cypriot people (1).

On the other hand, a British historian and a journalist Nancy Crawshaw defined Cyprus as a “a complicated issue, a struggle for the union of Cyprus with Greece” (2).

Some Greek writers think that the Cyprus problem is related with the idea of Megali Idea which took its origin from the conquest of Constantinople-the capital city of a Byzantine Empire- by the Ottoman Empire on 29th of May 1453.

In this thesis the aim was to find an answer to this question: “Is it possible for CTP and AKEL to come together under same roof in a federal settlement with the aim of preserving the national interests of Cyprus?”.

This topic is chosen because no solution to the Cyprus Problem has been reached so far in the long lasting negotiations between governments.

I think that a settlement can only be achieved by a “federation” (The bi-zonal and bi-communal federation will be established by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.

All powers are not vested by them in the federal Government will rest with the two-federated state) as foreseen by Ghali’s set of ideas (1992).

The characteristic of federations is bringing together “similar views”. So the Cyprus question can be solved if parties sharing similar views come together under the same roof as, for example, the unification of CTP with AKEL.

Cyprus problem become more acute with the establishment of the Greek Kingdom in 1832 and it reached its peak with the occupation of Cyprus by the British in July 1878. It could be said that, the second reason of genesis of Cyprus problem was the growing of the Ottoman Empire since its second failure to capture Vienna in 1683. This event was encouraging its Christian neighbours to weaken Ottoman Empire or even destroy it utterly with the help of Christian minorities such as the Greeks and the Armenians.

Due to the fact that Turkey and Greece are members of NATO, the Cyprus question was carried into the international arena. Up to the present day both sides stubbornly kept their positions without much effort to approach each other.

The Greek side looked upon the Cyprus Republic of 1960 as a temporary arrangement towards Enosis, and the Turkish side considered it as a jumping board for partition.

The early days of the Republic were peaceful but the ideals were kept alive (3).

The Greek Cypriots did not feel strong enough to declare Enosis and Turkey supported the continuation of the Cyprus Republic because she was too busy with internal problems. The fight broke out when the Greek Cypriots tried to change the constitution in their favour and attacked the Turks in 1963. Upon this the Cypriot Turks formed their own cantons, a first step towards partition. The cease fire was broken at intervals by the Greeks and this caused Turkey to give a serious warning that she would “intervene” if such actions were repeated by the Cypriot Greeks (With the Cypriot Greeks and Turkish Cypriots we mean the people who lives in Cyprus. With the Greeks we mean the people who lives in Greece and with the Turks we mean people who lives in mainland Turkey)(4).

(3) Talat, interview, December 2001.
The Cyprus Problem went through various stages in history and became an international problem towards the end of the British reign on the island. At the time of the London Conference where Turkey was also a participant, the idea of "partition" emerged and the Cyprus problem became a problem between Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey and Greece.

In time these parties concerned began to define and take a firm stand on their policies on Cyprus and thus the question became deeper and more complex and gained an international identity since Turkey and Greece were members of NATO. For a certain period the Cyprus problem also entered the field of competition between socialist and capitalist systems. When the problem was solved in 1959 and the Republic of Cyprus was founded, the solution was not really the expected one. Especially the Greek Cypriot side found it very difficulty to sign the treaty because the settlement was very abrupt and unexpected from the point of view. Immediately before the agreement the Greek leader Makarios was fighting for Enosis and there was bloodshed.

From the Turkish side of view the settlement was more satisfactory.

There is a very important factor here which appeared as a detail at the time but was to determine the fate of Cyprus later on. And this is the fact that both sides remained loyal to their ideals and looked upon the Cyprus Republic as a temporary stage. The Greeks aimed to achieve Enosis through the new independent state and the Turkish side looked upon the Republic as a jumping board for partition.

It is seen that the period of the Cyprus Republic is full of this competition between the two parties trying to achieve their aim. For example the Greeks prevented the formation of separate municipalities in the five big towns according to the Constitution and the Turks vetoed the first tax law of the independent Cyprus Republic. The Turkish side hoped to create an economic crisis by this veto and in a way looked at it as a factor in their struggle for partition. As a result both sides defended loyally their old national aims and stands. The positions of the motherlands somewhat altered at times.
Turkey wanted the continuation of the Cyprus Republic in the period 1960-1962 and could not seriously be interested in external problems. In spite of this the Turkish government rejected the 13 amendments in the Constitution proposed by the Greek leader Makarios and upon this rejection the intercommunal fights erupted in December 1963.

The Greeks planned to exclude the Turks from the governmental system and realize Enosis in a short time. However they failed to achieve this. As a result of the Greek attacks, the Turks quickly moved into their own areas (enclaves). At this time Denktash again became the popular leader preferred by the Turkish community and managed to keep his strong position although Dr. Fazıl Küçük was the vice-president. By pulling into their separate regions (enclaves) the Turks aimed at laying the foundations for partition. This situation continued until 1968 when the Greeks embarked upon a new attack on the Turks. Immediately Turkey, now more prepared than before, threatened to intervene with the result that a Greek military force of 10,000 soldiers and the EOKA leader Grivas were forced to leave the island. Certain measures were also taken to help the Turks return to normal life (5).

Up to now the Turkish people coming to Nicosia from the other parts of Cyprus had to pass through barricades (check-points controlled by the Greeks). These barricades were lifted so that the Turks could travel more freely on the island, and intercommunal negotiations started. At that time the talks were held between Denktash and Clerides as heads of the Communal Chambers. These talks continued until 1974 until the Greek Junta in Athens staged a coup against Makarios. Following the coup, there were preparations to declare Enosis and Turkey, taking an advantage on this, intervened in Cyprus. At this time the Cyprus question entered a new phase with the marked change in the balance of powers. The previous military and economic superiority of the Greeks were reversed. The Turks were now very strong from the military point of view and the “status quo” changed, the island being divided into two (6).

The intervention by Turkey in 1974 was met by sympathy at the beginning by the big powers, because it was in accordance with international agreements. The treaty of Guarantees banned the unification of Cyprus with another country and there was Junta in Greece.

So the world powers looked upon the intervention with tolerance, the U.S approved it and the Soviet Union preferred to stay silent.

It was not possible for Turkey to intervene in Cyprus during 1963-1964 because she did not have the necessary landing-craft and the technical capacity. She acquired this overseas landing capacity after 1968. It is not certain how successful Turkey would be in such a short time in the intervention had the Greeks not staged a coup in 1974. The Greeks did not put up a big fight in this intervention and did not show much resistance as the Turkish troop moved from Nicosia to Famagusta. After this event Turkey asked for a federal settlement on the island.

Negotiations between the heads of the communal chambers, Denktash and Clerides, continued until 1974, when Greece staged a military coup on the island against Makarios to achieve Enosis. This changed the status quo in Cyprus and gave the chance to Turkey to intervene with the result of gathering the Turkish Cypriots in a Turkish controlled area in the north of Cyprus, and restoring Makarios to the leadership of Greeks again.

In a way “partition” was realized but the international community did not give recognition to the new situation. Further, with the efforts of the Greek side, political and economic sanctions were imposed on the Turkish side. Up to 1977, the Cypriot Greeks kept refusing Ecevit’s proposal’s for a federation. In the summit meeting of 1977 between Denktash and Makarios, the Cypriot Greeks appeared to accept a federal settlement and the idea continued to be discussed until 1990 with no change in the status quo of the island.

This was Ecevit’s idea and he put it on the table immediately. Denktash confessed later that he regretted the idea because what he wanted was for Turkey to occupy north of Cyprus and unite it with Turkey. In this way partition would become a reality. Ecevit’s opinion was somewhat different. The world could accept an intervention only in accordance with the Treaty of Guarantees and Alliance, and this treaty banned partition and unification of Cyprus with any other country. The Greek side rejected a federal settlement until 1977. At the summit meeting between Denktash and Makarios in 1977, the Greek side accepted the idea of a federation and this entered all U.N documents as agreed upon after that date.
After this Cyprus became a topic of political competition between Turkey, Greece, U.N., other world countries and the two parties concerned, a situation which continued up to 1990 when the Greek Cypriots said “We can’t resolve our problems with the Turks” and they applied to the E.U. for membership. The main aim was not to make use of the economic advantage but really to gain the support of this big alliance (7). They also wanted to take advantage from the EU becoming a political union. With this application they wanted to make Turkey a country which occupied part of the EU. So the application for EU was completely of a political nature.

The Greek Cypriots did not make an application earlier because they did not have the courage since the island was divided into two, but in 1990, during the term of Vassiliou, they made a courageous move and applied.

For two years the EU gave no reply and in 1993, during the chairmanship of Greece, it was decided to re-evaluate the application of the Greek Cypriots in 1995. At this time Turkey was trying to enter the Customs Union. During the term of Tansu Çiller in Turkey, entering the Customs Union was half entering the EU. During the chairmanship of France, Turkey accepted the fixing of a date of the EU with Cyprus to start negotiations. In return Greece agreed to lift her veto on Turkey’s admission to the Customs Union. On 6 March 1995, the EU Council met and approved Turkey’s membership to the Customs Union.

Also, six months after the conclusion of the Conference between governments in Cyprus, and with the approval of the European Parliament, it was decided to start negotiations between Cyprus and EU. According to the belief of CTP (Republican Turkish Party) this is a turning point in the history of Cyprus (8). In 1974 there was a sharp change in the status of Cyprus, with the division of the island into two and the existence of 30-40 thousand Turkish troops on the island.

The opening of the way of Cyprus for EU membership was the biggest challenge since 1974 which defied the Turkish side.

CTP foresaw this before and tried to warn the other Turkish political parties, Denktash and Turkey, but could not make its voice heard. Turkey's relationships with Europe deteriorated in 1997 with the Luxemburg decisions which annoyed Turkey.

Upon this the Turkish Cypriot side cut many ties with Europe. In the following years, with the support of U.S.A, Turkey become a candidate for membership to EU.

Now both the Greek side and Turkey were candidates and once more Turkish Cypriots were the losing side, becoming victims of Greek's hasty action.

As the Greek side prepared for full EU membership, the Turkish side increased efforts of strengthening ties with Turkey. Meanwhile certain changes took place in Turkish policy with the intention of speeding up entry to the EU and once more the Cyprus problem entered a new phase. After 1995 Cyprus had become completely an international question. Nowadays the Cyprus question has become a problem of the EU.

Greece being a full member and Turkey a candidate for membership, indicate that Cyprus will find its roots in Europe. The meaning of the EU is to create a safe zone in Europe where no wars will take place. Turkey may enter EU by solving her problems and since Greek Cyprus will become a full member before Turkey, the Turkish government will have to solve the Cyprus question before entering EU. If so the Turkish Cypriot side will have no strong case for agreement and will lose its bargaining power. Thus Cyprus will become a member of EU in accordance with the agreement signed by Klerides now. From the Turkish side of view, this is going back to the period before 1974 and the sharp change in the status quo in 1974 will be completely reversed owing to the EU. Thus a movement will start back to 1974 or the 1960 agreements.

Greek Cypriots become the most favoured candidate for membership. So the Cypriot Greek side increased their efforts for full membership and saw this as a settlement to the Cyprus problem while the Cyprus Turks kept strengthening their ties with Turkey.

With this development many questions come to mind:
1. What will the status of the Turkish Cypriots be if Cyprus is admitted to the EU before?

2. Is Turkey using the Cyprus problem as a bargain and opportunity to enter to the EU?

3. Does Turkey believe she can prevent or delay the admission of Greek Cyprus to the EU by pulling out of the negotiations on Cyprus and delaying a settlement? Does she worry that the doors of the EU will be closed to her once Cyprus enters EU?

This questions are relevant in the frame of my thesis because they help to find a possible solution to a Cyprus question in the basis of parties’ opinions like CTP and AKEL.

“CTP believes that the Cyprus problem must be solved. Otherwise the Turkish Cypriots will be faced with the most serious disaster in their history. With the existing economic and financial problems, how many Turkish Cypriots will chose to stay on the island? The Turkish Cypriots had an advantage in the negotiations in 1992 when Ghali’s set of ideas appeared to be acceptable to a great length to both sides” (9).

What were the contents of these ideas? Ghali’s set of ideas foresaw a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on the political equality of both sides. The best way to proceed in the negotiations is to return to Ghali’s suggestions once more and continue the talks under the auspices of the UN. Most probably the Greek side will enter the EU in 2004 and Turkey will meet with a big obstacle on her way to Europe since the Greek Cypriots will be in the European Council.

The Turkish Cypriots should join the Greek Cypriots as partners in the EU. In this way the Cypriot Turkish economy will gain momentum and make the necessary legal changes to suit the European standards. Turkey must contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus question if she wants to enter the EU. The Cypriot Turkish side will gain advantage if it can get what was proposed to them in 1992.

The settlement of the Cyprus problem is possible under a federal roof. In case of such a solution what will be the status of the political parties? Or what sort of adaptations should they make?

A federal settlement requires a high degree of cooperation between political parties over the national boundary between the Cypriot Turks and Greeks sharing common views. The main characteristic of a federation is that it necessitates the coalition of political parties with the similar views in order to promote the interests of the country (10).

In this thesis it has been emphasized that a settlement can be reached under a system based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality of both sides. In such an administrative system it will be necessary for a number of political parties, like CTP and AKEL, to come together in order to protect interests of Cyprus as a whole in the international arena. Will this be possible?

In the study of this topic, answers for the following questions were searched for:

1. What are the common views and differences between CTP and AKEL on the membership of Cyprus to the EU?

2. What are the similarities and differences of opinion between CTP and AKEL on the Confidence Building Measures? And what steps can be taken to build up confidence between the two communities?

3. Indications are that South Cyprus will be accepted to the EU in 2004. If there is no solution, what will be the future of the TRNC after this date?

4. What should the procedure be in the inter-communal negotiations in order to reach an agreement? In other words, what should be done to induce Turkey and South Cyprus to accept Ghali’s set of ideas?

5. Recently the general opinion is that South Cyprus will be admitted to the EU in 2004, whether or not a settlement is reached.

The reaction of Turkey to this might be that upon such a development, the TRNC can be integrated to Turkey. What is CTP’s opinion on this and what can happen in the Akel’s following years? On the membership of Cyprus to the European Union Should Cyprus be admitted with or without the Turkish Cypriots? Before or after a settlement? If before, how can the Turks be included in the membership?

6. Can CTP and AKEL unite into a single party in case of a settlement in Cyprus?

Consequently there is no definite ideas or a plan on a Cyprus settlement and it is not possible to evaluate what certainly it is possible common interests CTP and AKEL share on Cyprus due to ethnic differences. It is very difficult now to define “national gains and interests” because both Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks are not sure at the moment what their national interests (not those of Turkey and Greece) will be. First a definition of “common gains and interests” must be made. At present most of the gains of North Cyprus and South Cyprus are contradictory. In case of a settlement both communities will have to carry on very close relations in the international community and they will share common interests in the EU. Then a close alliance of CTP and AKEL will be more realistic. In future they may become sister parties and maybe they can come together in a party federation after many years.

Even though they may not unite, an alliance between political parties will be possible.
1. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM AND THE ATTEMPTS TO FIND A PERMANENT SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

1.1. The Zurich and London Agreements

The Zurich Agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece on 11th February 1959 in Zurich, Switzerland with the aim of bringing a solution to the Cyprus Problem. The London Agreement, complementary to the Zurich Agreement was signed in London on 19th February, 1959. These agreements include a total of 27 articles and clauses.

1.2. The Treaty of guarantee

In the constitution of the Zurich and London Agreements, the Treaty of Guarantee was signed between the Republic of Cyprus (to be declared), Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom. This treaty gave the guarantor states the right to interfere in case the Cyprus Republic was in jeopardy.

1.3. Military Agreement

The Military Agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece. According to this treaty:

1. “The Cyprus Republic, Turkey and Greece guarantee to cooperate for the joint defence of the island, to have meetings and consultations with each other on matters and problems that may arise from the joint defence.

2. Turkey, Greece and Britain guarantee to counteract any direct or indirect assault or aggression towards the independence or unity of Cyprus Republic.

3. A tripartite headquarters will be established” (11).

4. Turkey and Greece will participate in this headquarters (joint force) with units of 690 and 950 respectively.

5. Turkish and Greek military officers will undertake the training of the Cyprus army.

6. The command of the tripartite headquarters will be undertaken by a Cypriot, Greek and Cypriots general, to be jointly appointed by the President and the Vice President of the Cyprus Republic, in turn for a period of one year. Further, Britain will have two sovereign bases, one at Agrotiri-Episkopi-Paramel and the other at Dikhelia-Pergamos-Ay Nicolau. The British government agrees to hand over all its rights on the island of Cyprus, outside the two sovereign bases, to the Cyprus Republic and this is approved by the parties concerned.

1.4. The founding and declaration of the Republic of Cyprus

After the Zurich and London Agreements, the time had come for the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus. Two important events took place in 1959:

The Turkish leader, Dr. Fazil Küçük, was elected to be Vice President on 3rd December 1959 and Archbishop Makarios became President by election on 14th December 1959.

The Cyprus Constitution was signed on April 6, 1960. In the committee preparing the constitution, the Turkish Cypriot side was represented by R.R. Denktash. On July 4th 1960, the British Parliament passed the law of Independence of Cyprus and on the night of 5th August Cyprus was declared an independent republic. The last British governor, Sir Hugh Foot, left the island on 16th August.

As a result of later elections, Glafkos Clerides and Dr. Orhan Müderrisoğlu were elected as chairman and vice-chairman respectively to the House of Representatives. R.R. Denktash was elected as the chairman to the Turkish Communal Chamber, and Dr. G. Spindakis became chairman of the Greek Communal Chamber.
1.5. Developments from the founding of Cyprus Republic until December 1963

The Greeks could not achieve Enosis by applying brute force through the activities of EOKA founded on 1st April 1955. Failing to reach their aim by brutality, they decided to change their tactics and by apparently more peaceful methods. Politically ending the Cyprus problem would not be sufficient since there lived two communities on the island, enemies to each other, and eventually the behaviour of these communities would be the deciding factor in a permanent solution, especially that of the Greek community. The Cyprus Republic was declared on 16th August 1960 and soon the real aim of the Greeks became more evident. In October 1961, at the opening ceremony of the Gymnasium (Lycée) of Morphou (Güzelyurt), the Kyrenia Metropolitan Kyprianos, openly declared the aim of the Greek Cypriots by saying: “The solution to the Cyprus Problem is ENOSIS and only ENOSIS” (12).

1.6. Makarios proposals for constitutional amendments

In November 1963, the president of the Cyprus Republic, Archbishop Makarios, proposed 13 amendments on the constitution to the vice-president Dr. Fazil Küçük. The main aim in these amendments was to open the way for applying the Akritas’ Plan, hence disintegrating the Republic and paving the way for Enosis. Turkey rejected the 13-point proposals on December 16, 1963.

1.7. Start of 1963 events

The fighting broke out on 21st December in the Tahtakale district. This marked the beginning of the events by which the Cypriot Greeks put into effect the Akritas Plan. According to this plan the Cypriot Turks of the island would be killed, thus opening the way for Enosis. On Saturday, 21st December 1963, the target of the Cypriot Greek soldiers were the students of the Nicosia Turkish Lyceee.

More important is that the Cypriot Turks were pushed out from the government and administration. Also that they were forced to withdraw to enclaves.

(12) Vehbi Zeki Serter, Cyprus History, p.105.
1.8. The Military Coup of the Greek Junta and the Turkish Peace Operation in Cyprus

1.8.1. Military Coup on 15th July 1974

The strategy applied on the Cypriot Turks with the aim of bringing Enosis was directed and executed by mainly two leaders, namely President Makarios and General Grivas. They deviated only on the date of the final move. Makarios wished to delay certain actions until the time was ripe, while Grivas wanted to act immediately. In addition the Junta regime in Greece and Makarios did not agree in many ways and shared diversified ideas on the Cyprus issue. The Cypriot Greek population as thus divided up into two groups, those supporting Makarios and those favouring Grivas. The enmity between Makarios and Grivas grew so deep that two unsuccessful criminal attempts were made to kill Makarios. The Greek Junta was also unpopular on the mainland and in order to gain popularity the Greek generals decided to hasten Enosis. Thus by the order of the Greek Junta, a coup was organised on 15th July 1974, in order to ending the Makarios regime and to bring about Enosis. Sampson, a well known EOKA terrorist, was brought to the head of the new Cypriot Greek government and Makarios fled to Paphos, thus saving his life.

1.8.2. First Peace Operation 20th of July, 1974

Upon these events in Cyprus, the Turkish government asked Britain to organise a joint military operation in Cyprus, as two guarantor countries. The British refused this offer and Turkey decided to act on her own in accordance with article 7 of the Guarantee Agreements. The Turkish forces landed on the beach near Kyrenia in the early hours on 20th July, 1974. After gaining a foothold and securing a reasonable area for the safety of the troops, a route to Nicosia was opened. In the meantime the U.N Security Council adopted a resolution, calling for a ceasefire. On 22nd of July, Turkey announced that she accepted the ceasefire call of the Security Council.

1.9. The Geneva Talks

In accordance with the decision of the Security Council, the peace talks on the ceasefire in Cyprus started on 25th of July 1974 in Geneva. The negotiators were the Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain.
The U.S, the U.S.S.R and the U.N were represented in the talks as observers. The talks lasted till 31st of July 1974 and ended with the following agreed topics:

(i) The Greeks will move out of all Turkish Cypriot territory and these areas will come under control of U.N.

(ii) The constitutional government will be re-instituted.

(iii) All prisoners will be released.

"These talks were known as the First Geneva Talks. In the meantime Sampson was overthrown and Glafcos Clerides was brought to the head of the Cyprus Greek government. The Second Geneva Talks started on the 8th of August 1974 in a pessimistic atmosphere because the Greeks did not abide by the agreements reached in the first talks. Again delegations of Turkey, Greece and Britain, headed by the foreign ministers of the three countries, R.R. Denktash and G. Clerides took part in the talks which lasted for six days. The second round of talks ended with no agreement reached due to the negative approach of the Greek Cypriot, British and Greek delegations, and consequently Turkey decided to go on with the Second Peace Operation"(13).

1.10. The Second peace operation (14-16 August 1974)

The Second Peace Operation started on 14th of August 1974 and lasted for 3 days. The Turkish armed forces moved in two different directions, one to the east and the other to the west. The Greeks fled, burning Turkish villages on their way. Hundreds of civil ran Cypriot Turks mostly children and old people were massacred by the furious Greeks as they fled in front of the Turkish Forces. On the 16th of August, the Second Peace Operation ended with the Turkish troops reaching Famagusta in the east and Lefka in the west. The new frontiers of the Turkish controlled area were drawn at the end of this operation and still exist today(14).

2. THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY AFTER 1974

2.1. Declaration of the Turkish Federated State

The Cyprus Federated State was declared on 13th February 1975. International and external factors played an important role in this declaration. On 13th February 1975, the Cyprus Turkish Federated State was declared replacing the Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Rule. The decision was taken to establish a Founding Assembly, to draw up the constitution and laws of the new state. With the establishment of the Turkish Federated State, the Turkish population now had a federal government based on multi political parties, democratic and parliamentarian system.

The declaration of TFS was necessary for the Turkish people to strengthen its roots, to have a more democratic life and take brave decisions to solve its long term problems. Democratic parliamentarian regime was put into effect and two local elections were held before the declaration of the Republic, one in 1976 and other in 1981.

2.2. The attitude of Turkey and Greece towards the declaration

The declaration of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was looked upon as a positive move by Turkey but Greece's attitude was rather negative. The Turkish president and prime minister at that time, Fahri Koruturk and Sadi Irmak sent messages of congratulations to the newly declared state. The Greek prime minister Karamanlis, on the other hand argued that the declaration was a political step towards partition and made misleading statements to the press.

2.3. Denktash – Makarios meetings

Denktash and Makarios had last time met on 30th November 1963, when Makarios planned to make the 13 paragraph amendments to the constitution. The two leaders sat at the table again after 14 years, on 27th January 1977, but this time the Turkish side was participating as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.
The outcome of the meeting

This meeting laid in the foundation for the intercommunal talks which were planned to take place later on. The main items of the agreement were:

(i) “The two parties are willing to establish an independent non-aligned, bi-communal republic.

(ii) The land to come under control of each community will be decided by considering economical sufficiency, productivity and ownership of the land.

(iii) Freedom of movement, settlement and land ownership will be open for discussion.

(iv) The authority and duties of the Central Federal Government will take into account the unity and bi-communal character of the country” (15).

2.4. Intercommunal Talks

After the events of Summer 1974 the negotiations were restarted in 1975. The aim was to find a solution to Cyprus question.

The first practical issue was the exchange of populations - Cypriot Greeks to the South and Turks to the North. The meeting of the Turkish Leader R.R. Denktash with the Greek Community were two dimensional. The first round was held in April 1975 in Vienna.

a) The meetings with Makarios, the Archbishop and President of the Greek Community

b) The meetings with Clerides, leader of the Greek Community.

Second round of talks were held in June 1975 in Vienna. Third round took place in Vienna in August.

Fourth round was planned to be held in New York but did not take place due to the negative attitude of the Greek leader. Fifth round took place in Vienna in February. In these talks Klerides asked Denktash to give Varosha, Bay of Famagusta, Morphou and part of Karpasia to the Greeks. As a result the talks ended with no conclusion. Sixth round was held in Vienna in March 1977. The participants were:

Ümit Suleyman Orhan – Representative of the Turkish Community
Tasos Papadopoulos – Representative of the Greek Community.

These rounds of talks did not produce any results. While the Vienna talks were under way, the transfer of the Turkish Cypriots from south to the north of Cyprus was completed on 7th September 1975.

2.5. Denktash-Kyprianou summit meeting

The summit meeting took place on 18th May 1979 under the auspices of the U.N Peace Force in Nicosia. The participants were: Kurt Waldheim, R.R.Denktash, S.Kyprianou. At the end of the summit meeting it was decided to resume the inter-communal talks. In summary they agreed to pursue matters on land and constitution in the talks to follow. Thus the issue of Varosha would also be discussed. They also agreed that the two side would try to avoid moves which would affect the talks adversely. Most important of all, the unity and independence of Cyprus would be guaranteed. After intensive efforts of the U.N Secretary General, another series of inter-communal talks resumed on 9th August 1980 under the auspices of the new U.N special Cyprus representative, Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi. On 5th August 1980, the Turkish Cypriot side presented comprehensive proposals for the solution, which, for the first time offered specific territorial concessions.

In turn, they demanded the establishment of a bi-zonal federal republic in which the "equal co-founder partnership status" of the Turkish Cypriot community would be projected. Diplomatic observers welcomed this move, but the Greek Cypriot leadership did not share their enthusiasm. The Turkish Cypriot proposals were not regarded worth considering by the Greek Cypriot leadership, because their policy was not based on the internationalization of the issue by pursuing an "aggressive diplomacy".
2.6 Establishing of TRNC

The Greek side intensified its propaganda campaign in international arena to mislead world public opinion that the Cyprus Problem was a problem of ‘invasion and occupation’, rather than a problem between the island’s two communities. Accordingly instead of continuing intercommunal negotiations, they took the issue once more to the U.N and insisted that the matter be discussed not at the Political Committee but at the General Assembly, where the Turkish Cypriot side was barred from participating in the debate.

The General Assembly on 13th May 1983, passed a resolution for the immediate withdrawal of all the “occupation forces and the voluntary return of the refugees to their former homes”. It was also suggested that the Security Council should examine, within a specified time-frame, the question of implementation of various U.N resolutions on Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriots were especially concerned by paragraph 2 of this resolution, which affirmed “The rights of the Republic of Cyprus and its people to full and effective sovereignty and control over the territory of Cyprus and its natural and other resources, and called upon all states to support and help the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to exercise these rights” (16).

The May 1983 U.N resolution heightened awareness of Turkish Cypriots that they were being downgraded to the status of a minority. It had also eroded the negotiating status of the Turkish Cypriot side without having even listened to their case. Meanwhile the legislative assembly of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus reacted to the U.N resolution by adopting a motion on 17th June, by which it underlined the equal rights and status of Turkish Cypriots in an independent and sovereign Cyprus. This was based on the fact that when Britain ended its administration in the island, sovereignty was not transferred exclusively to one community but to both communities as co-founder partners of the republic (17). Kyprianou rejected the offer of Denktash for a high level meeting under the auspices of the U.N Secretary General.

(16) Necatigil p.164.
(17) Sabahattin Ismail; Why Independence PRO, Lefkoşa p.176-178.
Moreover, Perez de Cuellar’s efforts for the resumption of the international talks on the basis of his indicators failed, because Kyprianou was instructed by Athens to turn down this initiative. The Foreign Minister of Cypriot Greek side, Nicos Rolandis realized that Kyprianou was not serious about a bi-zonal federated state when he rejected the U.N Secretary General’s indicators, which were intended to give a new impetus to the inter-communal talks. On 15th November 1983, when Denktash addressed the Turkish Cypriot Assembly and read the declaration of independence. When Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was declared only Turkey recognised this country. Peace talks are continuing and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders are set to reconvene proximity talks in May in New York.

3. CTP and AKEL: Historical backround

AKEL was founded in 1926 right after the Soviet October revolution in 1917 with a great excitement and enthusiasm, with the wind of the Soviet reforms. Because the Soviet movement, communism, Marxism excluded radical or national policies, AKEL emerged as a communist party but not solely for the Greek Cypriots.

It was open to all Cypriots but failed to absorb the Cypriot Turks into it. When first founded it was called KKK (Kypriakon Kommunistikon Komman). Later it took the name of the Progressive Party of Labour People(19). Although it was not established as a Greek Party, eventually it become one. There are reasons for this. First of all it found its sources in the Greek community.

The people who become members and struggled for it came from the Greeks. Another reason was that the Turkish community followed an ideology which its sources in Turkey and looked upon communism as equivalent to betraying their country. So the Turks kept their distance from AKEL.

After 1945 communism was strictly forbidden in Turkey and many people were executed because they were communists. For example at the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa Suphi and his friends came to take part in the War of Independence but on their return their ship was sunk in the Black Sea and they were killed because they were communists.

During the War of Independence (1919-1922) Atatürk appeared neutral for some time in order to receive aid from the Soviets, but later he became an enemy of communism. The later stages of Atatürk’s rule was a period of despotism for communists in Turkey. This continued afterwards and because these ideas were transfered to the Turkish Cypriots, they too considered communism as an evil (20).

(19)http://www.akel.org.cy
(20)Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi, T.C.Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2002.
As a result AKEL emerged as a Greek party and very rarely it took in a Cypriot Turkish member. We can say that AKEL was a more Greek nationalist party rather than a communist one.

CTP (Republican Turkish Party) was founded in 1970 it is the oldest political party among the Cyprus Turkish parties at present. When first founded CTP was thought as an alternative to the racist, fascist and anti-democratic ideas of the day. “An independent Federal Cyprus, free of bases” is the slogan of CTP and leads as a policy in the line with a bi-communal, bi-zonal, independent and unified Cyprus free of bases, based on the political equality of the two communities.
4. Difference and similarities between CTP-UBP-DP-TKP and AKEL-YKP-KKE-ODP & SYNASPISMOS

CTP deviates from UBP, DP and TKP by some of its views on the Cyprus issue. According to CTP, the right parties UBP and DP are generally inclined to support non-settlement of the Cyprus Problem, integration with Turkey, continued separation from Greeks including unification with Turkey (21). Some party members like in TKP believe in the independence of TRNC and its survival in the world community.

In other words the right wing parties are not in favour of a federal settlement under U.N, or a solution which would unite Cyprus under a federation. As a result the difference of opinion between CTP and the other political parties is large.

CTP is in favour of a 'just settlement' acceptable to both sides. And again CTP thinks that federal solution is the best but is ready to accept any other solution which agreeable to both communities. For example, if the Cypriot Greeks agree on a confederation, then CTP has no objection.

What is important for this party is a settlement which will bring about a whole Cyprus once again. According to the CTP, the difference between a federation and a confederation is that there is a transition between the two. Mr. Talat thinks that starting with a federation, with a strong central government, gradually will mean a transition to a weak central government and finally a passage to a confederation (22).

There can be a federation close to a unitary state like for example the USA, Switzerland or Belgium. CTP thinks that Cyprus can be like one of these, and wishes to see a federation with a strong government. Anyway, a step further than this is a confederation. In a confederation, there is an agreement between sovereign states and at the moment there are few examples of functional confederations in practice.

(22) Talat, interview, July 2001.
In a confederal system, both states are independent, and confederated state may unilaterally put an end to the confederation. Separation of states is also possible in a federal system as well, however, a tension and dispute might grow between the states. For example Yugoslavia broke up with a war. On the other hand, the Soviet Republics (as in Czechoslovakia) separated with no dispute. Consequently, it is not very important to argue whether Cyprus should be a federation or confederation. What is important is to agree on how to share the powers and authorities in the system.

To discuss the difference of opinion between CTP and TKP is rather difficult. According to TKP, a federation or a confederation are acceptable but the recognition of an independent Turkish state will also constitute a settlement (23). TKP are of the opinion that the recognition of the TRNC is also a choice in settling the Cyprus problem. Another difference of view is in the procedure to membership to the EU. TKP argues that the Cyprus issue should be settled before Cyprus terms to the EU is negotiated. However, CTP thinks that the Turkish side should participate in the EU negotiations immediately on the basis of “political equality”, just like in talks under the auspices of the UN (24).

TKP, unlike UBP and DP, looks upon a settlement as a necessity considers the recognition of the TRNC as a solution. CTP does not accept this settlement. Actually there is a deeper divergence between CTP and TKP in principle. The governing body of CTP is of Marxist-Leninist origin. However, the guiding personnel of TKP comes from the Democratic Socialism movement in Turkey, the only social democratic movement in the world that does not originate from Marx.

All the social democrats in Europe, or even in the world, are the descendants of the Marxists, e.g. the Labour Party in Britain or the social democratic parties in France and Germany. Only the social democrats in Turkey are not the continuation of the Marxist movement but find their roots in the ideology of Atatürk (Kemalism). TKP is in line with this movement in Turkey and doesn’t have a traditional Marxist history. Many of the members of CTP are Marxists

Nowadays, even though this root is not very significant, they still refer to Marx’s theories when in difficulty, but members of TKP refer to Ecevit’s books. This difference between CTP and TKP is also the reason why the social democrats in Turkey cannot be significantly differentiated from the other parties.

All European socialists are against the fascists, but in Turkey the fascists (according to CTP the party referred to here is MHP) are in power in a coalition. Differences between political parties become more obvious when the historical roots are examined. Otherwise, if we ask ourselves, how much they differ now, the differences are less obvious. Now that both CTP and TKP are in opposition, TKP has joined in opposing Denktash’s policies.

AKEL argues that North Cyprus is under occupation and there can be no proper government in an occupied area. This can only be a satellite government. Indeed this is true. Memhet Ali Talat and his friends were careful not to express this fact openly even they were expelled from the government, i.e. they took care not to stir up a hornet’s nest because they hoped to come to power again some day. The present CTP administration is attacking Eroğlu and criticizing Denktash with this idea in mind, but they are careful not to anger the authorities behind Eroğlu and Denktash.

When CTP first entered the government, its first condition was that the Cyprus question should be solved by a settlement in accordance with the Summit Agreements. Denktash accepted this condition and DP-(Democratic Party-party of Denktash)- signed a protocol with CTP. After the DP-CTP coalition was formed, Denktash wanted to change the decision of the General Assembly on the issue in August 1994.

The change in policy from a federal solution to a confederal one was already decided behind closed doors, but Denktash wanted to support this as the Assembly’s decision to the outside world. CTP refused to give its consent, saying it was against the protocol of the coalition government.

(26)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
But in spite of CTP’s opposition, DP and UBP acted jointly in the Assembly and changed the national policy from a federal settlement to a confederal settlement of the Cyprus issue. During the voting in the Assembly, Özker Özgür said the following as chairman of CTP: “If the protocol is disregarded and this decision is taken in this assembly, the coalition government comes to an end.”

If so, one may ask why these two parties are not united, but when we analyse them deeper, we see that there are obvious ideological diversities down deep.

The Turkish foreign policy nowadays is based on daily decisions and it appears that the Turkish government will not be persuaded on this problem. Today the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem said in December 2001 “Without the membership of Turkey, or at least without the timetable towards the membership ataturkey is against the admission of TRNC into EU with the Greek Cypriots.”

There are many reasons for this:

1. According to the Treaty of Guarantees, Cyprus cannot have a political or economical union with any other international organisation. This is something accepted and defended by Turkey in international agreements where both Turkey and Greece are not members.

2. Turkey is using the Cyprus problem against her opponents and will continue to do so. Turkey looks upon Cyprus as a master-card in the bargain to enter EU and will continue to do so. She thinks that she can prevent the admission of Cyprus to the EU by pulling out of the negotiations and obstructing a settlement. The fear of Turkey is that if Cyprus becomes a full EU member before the Cyprus question has been settled, the EU doors will be shut for Turkey. Westernization and achieving modern civilization standards is the fancy of Turkey for the last 150 years. Turkey are still ruling the country. For example in 1976 the EU (then the EEC) asked Ecevit to join them but he said “no”.

(26) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
Ecevit could not see the future. This was an opportunity presented to Turkey in a golden tray and she refused it. However Greece acted wisely and became an EU member in 1981. Now Turkey is begging to enter EU and fears that the doors of Europe will be shut for her, because Cyprus insists that 37% of the island is under the occupation of Turkey. If Cyprus becomes a member before Turkey, she will probably not give her consent for the Turkish membership.

On the other hand, the Cyprus question is not the most crucial problem of Greece but it is so for the Greek Cypriots. So the Greek Cypriots will not even endure Greece promoting friendship with Turkey. For example the Greek sector openly declares its restlessness on the event of some Turkish municipalities becoming sister-cities with certain cities with Greece.

States, like living things, are born, grow, develop and collapse. Some states go through this evolution with little discomfort, some are dispersed and divided into smaller states during the process, i.e every state goes through a period of weakness. Today Turkey is at her weakest point because she is in need of aid from the IMF, U.S.A and EU. Consequently she is at the start of a new term with a number of impositions and it is uncertain what Turkey and TRNC will have to face in this new term. Representatives of AKEL, CTP, YKP, KKE, ODP and SYNASPISMOS met in Istanbul on 8-9 May 1998 and issued a declaration of 9 parts on the Cyprus issue (28) . This was a meeting of the rightist and leftist parties in Cyprus, Turkey and Greece. TKP was not represented even through it was invited. The main point where CTP differs in opinion from the Greek political parties is that all Greek leftists parties follow a policy in line with the Greek argument in Cyprus. This behaviour of acting in line with the Greek argument, in the end, brings them, unwillingly, to the point of recognising the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots and accepting a federation with a more unitary state. This is also close the policy of Greece. The leftist parties in Turkey are not deeply involved with this matter and are represented in what CTP says. In the same way, the parties in Greece are guided by the Greek Cypriot Parties.

CTP’s stand on the settlement of the Cyprus issue is the establishment of a federation based on the absolute political equality of both sides in the real sense. This leads to sharing of the independence with a not very strong central government where both sides are equally interested. This policy of CTP in a way was reflected in the meeting of Istanbul.

(28) http://www.akel.org.cy/permanent/turkish/index7-2.html

29
For example, when political equality was discussed there was mention to certain U.N decisions and 1977-1979 summit meeting agreements were mentioned. Ideas common to CTP were found and noted. As for differences of opinion, when we go down deep into it, there are quite a few. These differences usually don’t come out to the light because CTP is not actively in the negotiations. For example, the Greek parties insist on the right of all displaced people to return to their homes (28) but CTP doesn’t share the same opinion. This is a difference. CTP thinks that if all displaced people to go back to their homes this will create a chaos in the Cypriot Turkish areas (29). Of course, CTP is not against the right of ownership of immovable property and believes that this right should not be taken away from people, but the existing situation renders certain things unavoidable in order to bring peace to this country.

CTP agrees to a limited number of Greeks to return to areas which will be under Turkish control and also to a limited %7-8 amount of land to be returned to the Greek side. AKEL’s opinion on this subject is rather different. AKEL wants all immigrants to return to their homes.

Another difference of opinion between AKEL and CTP is the following: according to AKEL the Turkish side is the party preventing the settlement (30). Turkey and Mr.Denktash are the obstacles in front of Cyprus trying to enter to EU. They think that it is unjust to wait for a settlement in Cyprus before entering the EU. AKEL says that Cyprus must be admitted to the EU before a settlement (31). CTP, however, finds this unacceptable. The differences of opinion usually do not come out clearly because CTP and AKEL are not actually the negotiators. Yet another diversity comes in the subject of armaments. The Cypriot Greek political parties including AKEL said “yes” to the S-300 missiles in Cyprus but CTP said “no”. The Cypriot Greek parties bring forward that the Cyprus problem is the result of the expansionist policy of Turkey. CTP is not sure that Turkey has such a policy. Actually there are certain similarities in views of CTP and AKEL because of the Marxist ideology. This can not be denied. But because AKEL had the tendency of not to deviate from the general inclinations of the Greek community on the Cyprus issue and considered this as a strategical mistake, they failed to cooperate and coordinate knowledge and experience with CTP.

(28) e-mail, AKEL, July 2001.
(31) e-mail, AKEL, July 2001.
Delegations of AKEL, headed by the General Secretary of C.C. Demetris Christofics and the Republican Turkish Party headed by the President of the Party Mehmet Ali Talat met at Akel in January 1997. On some points they declar their common views.

First of all they agree that the constitution of the abeyance of the Cyprus Problem, the lack of communication between two communities and the absence of substantial talks and with the existing of status-quo in the island, couldn't help them to solve Cyprus Problem.

CTP and AKEL insist on that Cyprus Question must be a peaceful one and could be reached by the substantial talks under the headquarters of UN. They support that “Ghali’s Set of Ideas can constitute a good basis for a constructive dialogue and they believe that the Cyprus Problem can not be achieved by military means” (32).

According these two parties “the solution must guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of bi-communal, bi-zonal federal republic of Cyprus against Enosis, partition or session in any form”.

On the Cyprus problem, AKEL considers that this should be solved on the basis of the UN Resolutions and the High-level agreements, within the framework of the UN. Cyprus should be a bizonal, bicommmunal federation, with a single sovereignty, single international personality, and single citizenship, with the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots guaranteed.

AKEL supports the dismantling of the foreign bases in Cyprus and the demilitarization of the island, though the primary objective now is the end of the occupation.

From the wake of its foundation, AKEL has been and remains a fighter against nationalism and chauvinism, for friendship, cooperation, mutual understanding and respect among all Cypriots, irrespective of national origin. This consolidated the brotherhood of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the framework of the left movement.

(32)www.peace-cyprus.org/Declarations
5. GENERAL OUTLOOK OF CTP AND AKEL ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

5.1. CTP’s view on the demographical structure of TRNC affects the Cyprus Problem

CTP thinks that as time goes on the demographical structure in the Turkish part of Cyprus is changing. This change is causing discomfort for the Turkish Cypriots and diminishing their hopes for the future. This may be a new cause for immigration. For this reason the change in the demography of the Turkish part is a bad event and is a serious injustice for the Turkish Cypriots. This is also against the Geneva Convention according to which a state which occupies the land of another state cannot transfer its own people to that land. Turkey is acting against such a serious responsibility. At the moment very serious investigations are being carried out by the European Council. As the Cyprus settlement is delayed these interrogations will come more to the surface and Turkey will be blamed for the demographic changes.
5.2. CTP’s view of the Cyprus problem in 2004

According to CTP, it appears that in 2004 it is possible that the Greek Cypriots will enter the EU. If a settlement is not reached by then, the Turkish Cypriots on these lands will quickly melt away. Turkey will be a country occupying part of the EU. Due to the presence of the Greek Cypriots in European Council, Turkey’s position in the EU will be more difficult and in time Turkey will be obliged to pull her troops out of Cyprus.

In this way a solution to the Cyprus problem will be reached, just as the Greeks want. Maybe this will not happen within 5-10 years, but the entry of Greek Cyprus to EU before the settlement, and the persistence of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on walking away from negotiations, will lead to the position that existed before 1974. CTP wishes to see Turkey solve the Cyprus problem and enter the EU.

The Turkish Cypriots must participate, together with the Greek Cypriots, in efforts of entering the EU. In the UN the Turkish Cypriots sit at the table with Greeks as politically equal parts and have talks with the General Secretary as two parties. Turkish Cypriots should send their representatives to the EU under the same status and should join negotiations leading to EU membership.

CTP thinks that by doing this the Turks will raise their conditions, laws, economy and health to the EU norms, the Cyprus problem will be solved and entry to EU will be achieved.

But first the foundations must be laid and European norms must be attained. Turkey must solve the Cyprus problem in order to enter the EU. Cyprus is the key to the problems of Turkey with Greece. Turkey must return to the negotiation table before losing more power and weakening her cards. She must force Denktash to re-start the talks and reach a settlement based on the 1977-1979 Summit Agreements and in line with Gali’s set of ideas. There is no place for Turkey to hide. “If we can get back what was offered to us in 1992, it will be a big gain for us” (33).

(33) Talat interview, December 2002.
5.3 CTP’s opinion on what policy R.R. Denktash should adopt in the international negotiations

The opinion of CTP on Mr. Denktash and his position and policy in the inter communal talks is of significant importance. From CTP’s point of view, R.R. Denktash does not really want a settlement. His oath is to divide the island and unite the north with Turkey. Actually he prefers the whole island to join the Turkish mainland but knows that this is impossible after the emergence of the thesis “partition” in 1958.

He is a fanatic supporter of this and will do everything to refuse any settlement which brings the two communities together. According to CTP there must be a very radical change in the views and behaviour of R.R. Denktash in order to arrive at a positive result in the intercommunal talks. This change in Denktash must be permanent if a settlement acceptable to both sides is to be reached. Mr. Denktash appeared to be agreeable to Ghali’s set of ideas only artificially because down deep in his heart he was against them.

There were long negotiations in New York at that time but Denktash raised unnecessary difficulties on the map known as “non map”. He had really wanted a solution they could have reach a settlement with Vassiliou in New York, but he and of course the Turkish community missed an excellent opportunity. Later Mr. Clerides won the elections with his campaign against “Ghali’s set of ideas” and these proposals went down the drain.

Up on this Denktash tried to give the image that he supported the ideas because he knew Klerides couldn’t go back and accept them, but actually he rejected them. Ghali’s proposals foresaw the unification of the two communities, something Mr. Denktash could not accept. Since Klerides won an election with his propaganda against Ghali’s set of ideas, CTP thinks it will be rather difficult for him to return back to them.

So another package has to be prepared, using the essence of Ghali’s ideas and this is what De Soto is trying to do at the moment. A new phase in the settlement of the Cyprus problem must now be started.

From CTP's point of view, what is a “must” for the Turkish Cypriots is “political equality”, i.e. they should have the same communal rights as the Greek Cypriots, neglecting their minority in population (37).

The second important factor is the question of “security”. CTP believes that the problem of guarantorship is not important once Cyprus is a member of EU. The guarantee of Turkey or any other country will not be very significant for Cyprus within EU (38). In spite of this, due to experiences in the past, the people of Cyprus have fear and reservations on the security problem.

For this reason CTP wishes this problem to have inquired and a formula of guarantees befound in which Turkey’s guarantorship will also be present. In a possible settlement bizonality is also of great importance. With all of these in mind CTP argues that Cyprus should become a member of EU as a whole and not divided.

Membership to EU unfortunately developed in the wrong direction due to the faulty of the Turkish side and came to a stage where membership will cover only the Greek Cypriots. All this point is not possible to reverse this, so we have to find a new basis for a settlement, which will take into the membership to the EU. Time is running out for the Turks and also for a settlement.

(38) Talat, interview, December 2001.
5.4 The views of AKEL and CTP on the Cypriot Turks in the South

According to the CTP, the Greek Cypriots now have another political tactic which will take advantage of the economical crisis in North Cyprus (39). If more Turks move from North to South, and they are doing everything to encourage it, they may come to the point of giving some political rights in the constitution to the Turks living in the South, arguing that no Turkish Cypriots are left in the North. They may say that Turks of Cyprus origin have migrated and the population in the North consist of people coming from mainland Turkey.

Thus they will try to put Turkey into the position of an occupying country, occupying part of the EU. CTP has such a worry. If they can manage this, they may finally argue that they are not in a position to apply the presentation in the administration 30% right of to Cypriot Turks (present in the 1960 constitution) because their population is very low (say about 10,000 in the south) but they will appoint some of them as civil servants and choose a few as members of the Cyprus parliament. This is a possibility.

At present the number of Cypriot Turks moving to South Cyprus. People are passing over to the other side at Pyla and Ledra Palace. The Greek government is treating these families well in the South, giving them residence and jobs, thus trying to attract more. CTP finds this policy of the Greek government rather suspicious.

(39) alat, interview, December 2001.
6. AKEL AND CTP: SIMILARITIES AND DISSIMILARITIES

6.1 CTP's and AKEL's views on the Membership of Cyprus to the EU

CTP durates from AKEL in regard of the EU issue. Before 1990 CTP did not approve the EU because it looked upon it as a capitalist, imperialist block and rejected the entry of TRNC to such an organisation. Its views began to change in 1990 and CTP took EU into its programme and declared that Cyprus could become a member after a settlement.

In the early stages, AKEL was also against EU (then known as EEC). Much later, due to changed circumstances, it also said that the entry to EU could be possible after a solution. But AKEL was forced to change its policy due to the general movement and inclination in the Greek community and adopted a new approach to suit the political desires of the Greek Cypriots. Akel's view was changed because of the decline and the collapse of the Soviet Block and the Soviet Union and the movement of the European Communist parties-Akel and Ctp included towards socialism and even social democracy. Even though not very enthusiastic about it, AKEL now says that Cyprus can become an EU member before a settlement, though they prefer a whole Cyprus to enter EU.

CTP and AKEL differ at this point. A short while ago AKEL was saying that they agreed to an EU membership if this would lead to a settlement. But before the last general elections, in order not to lose votes, they expressed the views of unconditional entry to EU because this was the general public opinion in the Greek community.

The general secretary of AKEL visited Brussels in order to show its support to Cyprus' membership to EU. CTP always pointed out that the Turkish community should have a representation in the membership talks but AKEL was against this and even opposed the mentioning of Turkish Cypriots in the official scripts. At the summit meeting in Nice, it was decided to give Cyprus 6 seats in the Parliament and 4 votes in the Council.

How will a distribution of the seats be made between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots? CTP is not sure what the intentions are for the Turks. Will they save two seats for the Cypriot Turks?
Or will the Cypriot Greeks fill up all the seats until a possible settlement? And what will happen after that? Will they agree two seats to be given to Turks or will they say “you are in minority” and choose one Turkish Cypriot to sit in the European Parliament once every five years? CTP doesn’t know the answer to these questions. Akel thinks that Cypriot Turks must have a stand regarding the question of representation in the borders of the EU.
6.2 Similarities and differences between CTP's and AKEL's views on the Confidence Building Measures and Ghali's Set of Ideas, 1992

From the Talat's point of view there are certain differences of opinion between CTP and AKEL on the issue of CBM's. Both paries agree on the sentimental side of the packet i.e. they say how nice it would be to come together, eat and drink together, dance together etc. This kind of reconciliation acts and approaches are supported by both CTP and AKEL.

But when it comes to improving relations through business and trading with each other and improving economic relations, the two sides stay rather apart. This is because the Cypriot Greek side have fears that if the Turks gain economical strength, earn a lot and become financially self supporting, this may lead to the recognition of the TRNC.

However CTP finds this line of argument very absurd. There are cases where people are imprisoned because they have bought a kilogram of fish from a member of the other community in Pyla. Though AKEL is not very insistent on this matter, not as the Greek Administration anyway, unfortunately it did not exhibit a positive approach to the confidence building measures in 1993-1994, when Mr. Klerides had a tendency to accept them.

As this time CTP spent a lot of effort for the package to be accepted. Another reason why the confidence building package was turned down was the delay and unwillingness exhibit by Denktash.

Though parts of the package were accepted by Turkey and Çiller, the PM of Turkey at that time, Denktash took it very slowly and reluctantly. This package was prepared by technical people in Geneva with the initiative of the U.S.A. Mr. Denktash did not express openly his acceptance and the U.N. General Secretary prepared his report to the Security Council. Just one hour before the Council meeting Denktash sent a message to the General Secretary that he accepted the package but it was too late.

There cannot be last minute changes in such reports and the General Secretary was angry and did not listen to Denktash.
He reported to the Security Council that Denktash turned down the package although the 
Turks were ready to accept it with certain reservations.
Thus Denktash saved the Greeks and the confidence building measures went down the drain.

CTP still believes that had Denktash accepted the package in due time, the Cyprus problem 
could be solved for the benefit of the Turkish side and a federation could be formed just as 
TRNC wanted (40). The Cypriot Greeks would have to be more lenient about the recognition 
of the TRNC, for example the Nicosia International Airport would have two gates, one to the 
North and one to the South. Passengers would be able to go to the North or to the South and 
this would show that the Federation was functional. Further, tourists would be able to pass 
freely to TRNC at Varosha and the Turks would able to sell their goods there, whether they 
were produced in TRNC or imported from Turkey.

Unfortunately, Denktash turned this down as well. Denktash keeps shouting that he wants all 
embargos to be lifted, but CTP believes that all of this is not sincere but a show-off, because 
he had his chance in the past and he turned it down (41). He himself together with UBP 
provoked the International Court of Justice to take decisions against TRNC. The reason why 
they acted this way is:

With the decision of the International Court of Justice, TRNC would be unable to export its 
agricultural and textile goods to Europe, and thus Turkey would have to open all its doors to 
TRNC. This would lead to integration of North Cyprus to Turkey.

Here Denktash and UBP treated the Turkish Cypriots rather cruelly. So it is obvious that the 
approaches of Denktash towards the settlement of the Cyprus question at the confidence 
building measures are not sincere. As for AKEL’s views on these matters, it may appear on 
paper that AKEL and CTP do not differ much, but especially on the confidence building 
measures, the differences of opinion have been large in the past.

The main organs of the state are taking the wrong steps in the settlement of the Cyprus 
problem and as a result these are strongly criticised.

(40) Talat, interview, December 2001.
(41) Talat, interview, December 2001.
CTP is arguing that the problem must be solved, otherwise the Turkish Cypriots will come face to face with the most serious disaster in their history. If Cyprus becomes a member of EU before a settlement, the Turkish Cypriots will acquire the right of travel to any country of the Europe with the passport of the Cyprus Republic.

At this time when economic difficulties prevail in the Turkish quarter, it is interesting to find out how many Turkish Cypriots will leave the island.

The Turkish Cypriots are not in a bargaining position because they have lost their cards due to the new international atmosphere and the economic crisis (42).

They were in the strongest position in 1992, the period of Denktash-Vassiliou talks when Gali’s set of ideas were put on the table. The most desired form of settlement lies in Gali’s set of ideas presented in 1992, which iterated the agreements reached in the 1977-1979 Summit Meetings, namely a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal settlement based on the political equality of the two communities. For this to be achieved there is need to go back to the inter-communal talks under the auspices of the U.N. The Turkish Cypriots should not pull out of the negotiations because by doing so they have lost all their cards.

On the Cyprus Problem, AKEL considers that this should be solved on the basis of the UN Resolutions and the High-level agreements, within the framework of the UN. And about the Ghali’s set of ideas, AKEL pointed out that Cyprus should be a bizonal, bicommmunal federation, with a single sovereignty, single international personality, and a single citizenship, with the human rights and freedoms of all Cypriots guaranteed (43). AKEL supports the dismantling of the foreign bases in Cyprus and the demilitarization of the island, through the primary objective now is the end of occupation (28). AKEL has been and remains a fighter against nationalism and chauvinism, for friendship, cooperation mutual understanding and respect among all Cypriots, irrespective of national origin. This consolidated the brotherhood of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the framework of the left movement.

(42) e-mail, AKEL, December 2001.
(43) Talat, interview, December 2001.
5.3 Alternatives to unilateral membership of Greek Cypriots in the EU

It is said that Cyprus will become EU member whether or not there is a settlement, with or without the Turkish Cypriots. If this happens Turkish officials point out that North Cyprus may be integrated into Turkey. According to CTP such a development will be bad and unfortunate.

Cyprus will become a member of the EU, whether a settlement is reached or not. The wrong Turkish policies have contributed to this inevitable development. In 1995 Turkey did not raise objections to a calendar of discussion for Cyprus membership to the EU to be drawn, because of her own acceptance to the Custom's Union. When the negotiations for membership started in 1998, it was evident that somehow a conclusion would be reached and when the final decision was taken in Helsinki in 1999, Turkey had no choice but to give her consent to membership of Cyprus in the EU.

So there is no reason why Turkey should raise her voice now. Instead according to CTP she should evaluate well her international relations and see the dangers in her wrong external policies, and take measures accordingly. CTP still stresses that the Turkish Cypriots should express their willingness in participating in the EU talks as an equal partner in Cyprus.

A formula must be found to include Cypriot Turks in the EU talks, there is no other way to stop the present progress but alternations can be made to take into account the Turkish interventions to the EU membership. Suppose that nothing was done and Cyprus become an EU member without the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey annexed North Cyprus.

Will the world nations recognize such an act? Is it possible for a country to annex another country by military force in the 21st century?

This is out of question and against the UN charter. Especially after 1990 when the cold war was over, this sort of actions will not be accepted in the world community.

Turkey is against the formation of a Kurdish state in North Iraq with the fear that the Kurds of Turkey, Syria and Iran will try to follow in the same steps.
On the other hand she is talking of integrating North Cyprus as in case of Hatay. This is an illogical approach.

"If she annexes North Cyprus just as Israel annexed Golan Heights, Turkey will find herself in lots of trouble and will have to face the same fate as Israel. Furthermore when Hatay was annexed, the opposing country was Syria, but annexing part of Cyprus, a member of EU, will not be the same and will produce terrible results" (44).

Even though Mr. Ecevit, in a press conference said that if need be Turkey integrate North Cyprus. CTP believes that this is impossible because it would be a complete fiasco and disaster for Turkey. The U.S.A, Turkey’s strongest ally, will not tolerate this either, since such an act will set on an example to other countries in the world. This is a dream which will not realize.

CONCLUSION:

Can CTP & AKEL unite into a single party in case of a settlement in Cyprus?

Corresponding the view of federal solution lies the idea of common action of the political parties to suit the national interests. But before expanding this topic, it is necessary to define the “national common interest”. In Europe when we say “national”, this covers (applies to) the whole country. But when we say “national” here in Cyprus, the implication for Turkish Cypriots is “the Turkish nation” and for the Greek Cypriots it is “the Greek nation”.

When the Turks talk of “defending their national interests” they have in mind the national interests of motherland Turkey. This idea overshadows the “communal interests” of the Turkish Cypriots, The same thing applies to the Greek Cypriots. When the question arises: What are the “national common interests” for Cyprus as a whole that will make the political parties take common action in the foundation of a federal system?

Mehmet Ali Talat doubts that CTP and AKEL can unite in the near future(45). He believes there are many reasons for this. Firstly, in the Cypriot Turkish quarter also in the Cypriot Greek the “ethnic origin” is of utmost importance. We are “Turkish” Cypriots and they are “Greek” Cypriots. There is an intercommunal competition due to this discrimination.

In case of a union of AKEL and CTP, this discriminating attitude and competition will persist and so Talat does not consider such a union very plausible.

He goes on to support this idea by saying that the leftist parties (or even the right parties) which share similar political views (or many times identical views) prefer to stay separate due to “nuance”. So, according to CTP, it is not plausible for parties, having different views, to unite just because a “Federal Cyprus” is founded (46). Even though CTP and AKEL may defend the same views in Cyprus, there are other factors of ethnic origin which will continue keeping them separate. The Turkish Cypriots speak Turkish and the Greek Cypriots speak Greek and this plays an important part in the separation.

(45) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(46) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
Talat says that in future these parties may promote their relationships or may come together under a federal roof but it is not correct to make interpretations about the future like a fortune teller (47). Futher he believes that there are enough reasons to keep CTP and AKEL separate(48).

Every parts must be evaluated within its historical background. Both CTP and AKEL have different historical backgrounds. At first it appears as if there are similarities between them but at close look it can be seen that they act differently. For example, in the days when "communism" was banned among the Turkish Cypriots and even considered "disgraceful", AKEL existed in the South and could openly say "we are communists". It is quite natural in the South for labourers to be communists and if you ask them why they are communists, often they will not give ideological reasons because they are not deeply involved in the "ideology". They say "we are communists because we are workers". But at the same time they go to church. In the Marxist ideology "religion" has a different meaning—it is like "narcotics". Religion is of less importance in the north, so the leftist people are more at ease here.

Consequently there are basic differences of views arising from cultural differences between the two communities, in addition to ideological differences between CTP and AKEL. An example is how they look upon the EU. CTP began supporting the EU in 1990 but AKEL adopted a positive attitude only a few years ago. Further the administrative staff of AKEL have had their education in the Soviet Union or the Socialist countries like Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. "However on our side" says Talat, "those who have graduated from the USSR (now it is Russian Federation) are anti-communist like Doğan Harman and Şener Levent(49).

In the Greek quarter the graduates of the Soviet Union are the key staff of AKEL. It is just the opposite in the Turkish quarter. The Soviet graduates are neither on the staff of CTP nor they representatives in the assembly. So there are many differences between CTP and AKEL which makes one ask "is it really necessary for these two parties to unite?".

(47) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(48) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(49) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
In case of a solution in Cyprus there is no reason why, even though two separate parties, CTP and AKEL should share the same views on the topics concerning the whole of the island. May be it will be better for these parties to stay separate but continue to have a close communication and coordination.

There may be dangers of sharing different views, risks of separating again or efforts of one side trying to build up authority over the other if these parties were to unite. In addition there is the problem of “majority” and CTP finds it hard to understand why they should unite with AKEL (50). Many examples can be given in support of keeping these parties separate. A parallel example is that The prime minister Dr.Derviş Eroğlu’s views are not very different from those of Salih Coşar. These two worked together many years in the same party but are now lead of separate parties, mostly for personal reasons. Similarly CTP and YBH (Partiotic Unity Movement) have certain deviations most of which originate from the way they express themselves, but still they are separate. When compared with YBH, AKEL has many more differences with CTP. For example AKEL says “the way for a settlement passes through Kyrenia” (51) and promotes the argument that all immigrant should return to their homes. CTP, does not support this policy. Another political deviation of AKEL from CTP is that this party assumes the Cyprus problem started in 1974, even though it will admit when pressed hard that there were serious problems many years earlier. However CTP believes that the Cyprus problem was escalated by the Greeks in 1963 when they captured the administration and sovereignty, pushing the Turks out of the government. “CTP always supported this argument” says Mehmet Ali Talat and he continues:

“This is a fact. Do the Turkish Cypriots have a representation in the so called Cyprus Government? Do they have a “say ” in the assembly? Or did they have any participation or representation between 1963 and 1974? Of course not” (52). But the Greek Cypriots kept approving the expulsion of the Turks from the administration and even though AKEL had a few slightly different ideas, they too kept saying that “Turks have rebelled” and let us solve this problem(53).

(50) bbr news, december 2001.
(51) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(52) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(53) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
But they did not do much in the way of returning the Turkish Cypriots their rights in 1960. For these reasons Talat believes that CTP and AKEL deviate from each other in many ways and it will be very difficult to unite them under the same roof. He points out that he can not predict what will happen in the future or what the future generations will do, and he continues:

"Unification may realize in future" (54). For example there are unified European parties (they are not unified parties but parties have only found a common association of parties) in the EU at present, like the European Liberal Party and the European Christian Democratic Party. They represent groups in the European Parliament. In fact these are so-called parties with group leaders acting like party leaders but they don’t have party organs which continually function among the people. In every country they have their own activities which are, so to say, coordinated by the central group. But even then these parties are not completely uninvolved in ethnic topics. For example, the Greek members will follow a line which suits the state policy of Greece when a topic is discussed concerning Turkey but the other members of the same party may follow a different line.

According to Talat, members of these so-called parties behave in the same way as above when the Cyprus question is discussed. The European Socialist Party usually wants the parliament to be more rigid towards the Turks while the other side argues the opposite. So these parties are not yet a true party in the European sense. "May be" says Talat, "a federal party system is started after the Cyprus question is settled" (55). But CTP does not think this is very plausible. If in future the new Cyprus Constitution requires certain governmental posts to be elected jointly by the two communities, only then such a party federation may be possible. But there is a long time for this to realize and many obstacles must be overcome, according to CTP (56). At present there are certain items in the proposals of De Soto and the Cypriot Greeks, which may require the Turks and Greeks to decide jointly like the election of the president. If the president of Cyprus is to be elected by a general election in which both communities will participate, then a cooperation among Cypriot Turkish and Cypriot Greek parties will be necessary even if they unite. But even then the ethnic factor will play a role.

(54) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(55) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(56) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
For example, even though all the candidates for the presidency are Greeks, CTP and other Turkish parties will support the one they consider to be more close to the Turkish population. Such cooperations between the Greek and Turk political parties will be for short intervals in the opinion of CTP.

Though they differ in many ways, CTP and AKEL have certain common benefits. If they don’t unite how will they continue to promote and support these common benefits? “The way they are doing now” says Talat (57). In case of a solution the national interests of Cyprus will be determined by the two federal states which will draw up an external policy and represent Cyprus in the international arena. In a similar manner, the political parties will cooperate in promoting the national interests abroad. Even today, in the existing situation, political parties sometimes form alliances between them and come together in committees to discuss common problems and make plans for coordinated behaviour. For example CTP and AKEL organised activity recently. They formed an organising committee consisting of two CTP members and two AKEL members. This committee met and decided on the criteria of the activity. Mehmet Ali Talat believes that this kind of cooperation is likely to take place in future in a federal system to promote the national interests of Cyprus. But to think that one day CTP and AKEL will come together in a coalition to form a government, is only an exercise of the brain, because the exact of a solution is not known at the moment (58). It could be that the new cooperation will not provide for the election of any authority by the votes of both communities together.

Another question of interest is whether CTP and AKEL share the same views on the national interests of Cyprus. Do they agree on what these interests or benefits are? Today, there is no basis to evaluate and answer this question of “national benefits and interests”. First of all the national benefits of Cyprus must be identified and defined to cover the interests of both communities. At the moment there are two disagreeable elements trying to solve the Cyprus Problem. When the essence of a possible settlement is determined, the basis and the framework of “national benefits and interests” will officially be ready (59). At the moment there is no such basis. The benefits of North Cyprus do not overlap those of South.

(58) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(59) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
The Cypriot Greek side continue to buy heavy armaments for national defence-against the Turkish side, assumed to be the enemy. The same thin applies for the Turks. Or we can also mention the trade sanctions (embargoes) imposed on the Turkish side. So it is not possible to define a common “national benefit” at present. But in case of a settlement there will be marked changes in political views and interests. As a “united Cyprus” takes her place in the world family and especially in the EU, both communities will share the same benefits and interests. Maybe then we shall have common benefits and interests” in trade, industry, tourism etc., or even in international relations.

It may take some time to agree on mutual interests in international relations but when Cyprus enters the competition in the EU, it will not be possible for one side to be opposing efforts which will promote the interests of Cyprus as a whole. Any decision of the Greek Cypriots will also be against the Turks, or an action which will affect the Turkish side negatively will affect the Greek side in the same way.

So it is inevitable that both sides will have to act together in the EU and the world community. At present common interests and benefits cannot be defined because the Turkish Cypriots think that “what is good for Turkey is good for us”. The Greek Cypriots have the same opinion about Greece.

But these views will have to change in case of a federal solution. Today, Turkey and Greece are in dialogue and cooperation in certain areas, but in Cyprus we (60), the Cypriots of different ethnic origin, fail to do even this. If the Greek side is admitted to the EU as “Cyprus”, it will be very stiff towards Turkey and will probably do everything to make Turkey suffer. Further, Greece also will be uncomfortable because she will be under the close watch of Cyprus. Under the existing circumstances such behaviour in the EU will be inevitable. But if Cyprus is united in a Federal Republic, then the national interests and benefits of the Turkish Cypriots will be contradictory to those of Turkey. This is exactly what worries Turkey and this is why she doesn’t leave Turkish Cypriots alone. Even there are contradictory benefits e.g the economy of TRNC is in the hands of Turkey, almost all the hotels in the North are now owned by non-Cypriots or the Higher Education Council in Turkey (YÖK) is controlling all the universities in the North.

(60) Talat, interview, December 2002.
No one can argue that the benefits of Turkish Cypriots do not contradict with those of Turkey. It also cannot be denied that without the Turkish military presence the safety of the TRNC would be in jeopardy (61). So, for security reasons, the Turkish Cypriots apparently share the same benefits as those of Turkey.

Recently Şükrü Sina Gürel, the Turkish Minister of State responsible for Cyprus, paid a visit to TRNC and brought with him a member of Turkish businessmen. The aim was to induce these people and not the Turkish Cypriots to make investments in North Cyprus.

On the other hand, Turkey is still closed for Turkish Cypriot trade and goods of export from TRNC. Trade Agreement (Kıyı Ticareti Antlaşması) was signed with Turkey in 1996 when CTP was in the coalition government. But since then this agreement has not been properly put into practice. During its term in the government CTP had also made efforts to open the customs for TRNC goods but the Turkish ministers declined, giving the excuse that they did not wish to compel the businessmen of Mersin into unjust competition. One can go on giving more examples to show that the interests and benefits of the Turkish Cypriots are not exactly in parallel with those of Turkey, but these contradictions were never voiced loudly for a number of reasons, the main one being that of security.

So far the studies carried out about CTP and AKEL clearly point out the following:

In case of a federal settlement in Cyprus, i.e. a biz-onal, bi-communal, bi-communal solution based on the political equality of both communities, it appears that it is not absolutely essential for CTP and AKEL to unite under the same roof in order to promote the national interests of a united Cyprus. For these two parties, the chances of amalgamation are indeed very weak due to cultural, ethnic and religious differences between the people they represent. But isn’t there an alternative to this unification? Before 1960 the two communities lived together and by the sudden intercommunal fighting in 1963 they were compelled to separate.

Assuming that a settlement is reached, and they began to live together again, who can guarantee that such an agreement will be long lasting.

(61) Talat interview, December 2002.
The answer lies in the education of the young generations of both communities. Since political parties always have in mind elections, votes and public opinion, they may have a disadvantage in their efforts to bring the two communities together, education is the other choice which can be effective in bringing out into the open the common characteristics and cultures of the two communities, helping them to share things as they did half a century ago.

As the two people approach each other by cultural and social activities with the aid of a common education, it will be easier for political parties like CTP and AKEL to unite under a federation. It will not be very easy to built up a common educational system and it may not be necessary to choose as examples the bi-communal schools that existed before 1963. Pilot schools can be started under the auspices of the UN and Turkish and Greek teachers who are observe in these schools can be given special educational training to enable them acquire the necessary professional experience. These teachers will have a difficult task in promoting the relationship and mutual trust between youn oeople of the two communities.

Before the communal fighting started, there existed educational institutions in Cyprus which served both communities. Among these, the best known are the English School, The American Academy, Terra Santa, Saint Joseph and The Higher Technical Institute. Though some of these were missionary schools, both communities sent their children to these institutions and the graduates from these schools occupied the highest governmental positions in the country.

Mr. Denktash himself is an old boy of The English School. Most of these schools still exist in the Greek quarter, though their educational system and applications have somewhat changed. Institutions similar to these can play a very important role in narrowing the social and cultural gaps between the two communities.

Turkish and Greek children sharing the same education, competing with each other under the same conditions, living in the same dormitories, playing in the same teams and sports clubs will have so much in common that the social differences will diminish in time. Even though the schools listed here were private (except the Higher Technical Institute), new public schools can be established to serve both communities under the auspices of the U.N.
Also the syllabuses of all public schools of both communities can be revised, text books can be re-written in order to erase any antagonistic feelings between the Turkish and Greek young generations. I believe that the world community is ready to contribute towards this end. If we can manage to induce in the young people a common Cypriot ideology, a feeling of being Cypriots rather than Turks and Greeks, then a unified Cyprus will be long lived. Of course great care must be taken in this process not to hurt the national and religious feelings. The transition must be done smoothly and delicately.
APPENDICES:
Appendix 1
Interview with Özker Özgür
Özker Özgür was elected chairman of CTP in 1976 and he held this position for 20 years, until 1996 Mehmet Ali Talat pointed out that the dispute in Cyprus was agitated by the imperialist powers, but later the disputing sides were the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots. Özker Özgür shares this view with M.A.Talat. In the first place Greece requested that Cyprus should be given to her and she tried to achieve this end by organizing the underground EOKA, which started a guerilla fight against the British. While Greece and the Greek Cypriots were trying to achieve Enosis, the imperialist powers thought it would be to their advantage to pull the Turks into the dispute and they tried to include Turkey in the Cyprus problem. They were successful in their efforts because, though somewhat delayed, Turkey also realized that she had certain interests in Cyprus. In other words, behind the expansionist policy of Greece, there were other powers and the British took advantage of this policy and continued their existence in Cyprus by their traditional “divide and rule” policy. According to Özgür. The British preserved their existence on the island “by means of occupation” (63).

The Turkish and Greek Cypriots started fighting against each other and thus Turkey became a concerned party in Cyprus. The Americans were forced to intervene in the events in order to prevent a direct dispute between the two NATO powers. In order to prevent a war, they found a formula to suit both Greece and Turkey. Thus the Cyprus Republic came into existence. But with the formation of the Republic, the existence of the British on the island was also preserved (by the bases).

When the Cyprus Republic chose to follow a non-aligned policy by grouping with the non-aligned countries, the imperialist powers felt uncomfortable and decided to destabilize the new state. Thus they agitated a new dispute and caused the two communities to fight each other again.

They knew that the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the problem would be inevitable and military wise Cyprus would come under control of NATO.

(63) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
Powers again. Makarios was motivated by some means to change, unilaterally, the Constitution. This caused a new intercommunal dispute and brought Turkey and Greece face to face again.

From Özgür's point of view, the Turkish and Greek communities are induced to fight each other since 1963 (64). Meanwhile, with the inclusion of Turkey and Greece in the problem, the dispute became continuous. Because of this England managed to keep her gains in Cyprus, since due to the problem among themselves Greece and Turkey did not have time to be concerned with the British bases on the island and this was to the benefit of Britain. This situation suited Americans as well since the disputing sides would not come together to erase the imperialist interests on the island.

With the dispersion of USSR in 1990, a new situation came into existence, a situation where the expansion of the EU and the inclusion of Cyprus in the European community was on the agenda. The results of the negotiations in the new phase are not yet possible. According to Özgür, the non-alignment of Cyprus constituted a danger from the point of view of the West, because of the presence of a strong leftist party, AKEL.

During the period of non-alignment, in case AKEL came into power and called USSR to play a more active part in Cyprus, this would create a new danger in eastern Mediterranean similar to that caused by Cuba. For this reason an unstable situation had to be created at all costs in Cyprus, in order to enable the imperialists to interfere and this was done. At the moment no danger of Russia exists, but now, according to Özgür, instead of a Cyprus issue between West and East, there is a Cyprus problem between the EU and the USA. The EU is in the process of including Cyprus in its own community while it expands but the USA's attitude to this development is negative (65). The USA wishes to see Turkey in the EU together with Cyprus. But at present Turkey is not ready for the EU because she hasn't completed her homework, and if Cyprus is not admitted to the EU as "Cyprus Republic" at the scheduled date, the EU will face the veto of Greece and the expansion will come to a halt.

(64) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(65) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
However, due to its structure, the EU must expand at all costs. So the admission of Cyprus to the EU before Turkey is inevitable.

At present Özker Ö zgür is an active member of Yurtsever Birlik Hareketi (YBH), a recently established political party. YBH wants to see an early settlement in Cyprus and both North and South Cyprus to enter the EU. But this party believes that Ankara will not give consent for this kind of solution. According to YBH the strategists in Ankara depend that the balance between Turkey and Greece provided by the London and Zurich agreements on the Cyprus issue will be disturbed to the advantage of Athens (66). The London and Zurich Agreements have given to Turkey and Greece the status of guarantorship on Cyprus. To what extent have these countries permitted their duty as guarantors?

With these agreements both Turkey and Greece gained certain rights in Cyprus and Greece does not want to leave all her rights to Turkey. If these countries guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity, why did Greece try to annex the island by a military coup in 1974? Or why Turkey, taking the coup as an excuse, divide Cyprus into two? Both guarantor countries acted contrary to their duties of guarantorship with their acts in Cyprus. Both Turkey and Greece chose to behave in a way that suits their own interests.

Turkey now says that according to the London and Zurich Agreements, Cyprus cannot become a member of an organisation to which both Greece and Turkey are simultaneously members. This is stated in Article 50 of the constitution of the “Cyprus republic”. But the constitution does not consist of one article only. It has many articles which provide for the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. It is absurd to base the argument on a single article and say that “Cyprus cannot become a member of an organisation unless both Turkey and Greece of this organisation”.

Ö zgür states that the “existence of the TRNC” is also contrary to the whole of the Cyprus Constitution (67). If the admission of Cyprus to the EU is against article 50, than the status-quo in Cyprus (the de facto situation) is also against the Constitution.

(66) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(67) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
After Özker Özgür was elected chairmanto CTP in 1976, Denktash and Makarios met in February 1977 and signed a 4 paragraph high level (summit) agreement. According to this agreement, the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus would be preserved by a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal structure.

Up to date, AKEL has defended the high level agreements. After the death of Makarios another high level agreement was signed between Denktas and Kyprianou who replaced Makarios after his death. At that time CTP backed up a settlement in Cyprus in accordance with the high level agreements, just like AKEL.

According to Özgür, the CTP administration now appears to support a settlement within the framework of the high level agreements (68). However, it is well known that after 1977, Denktash has put forward his thesis based on two separate states. In other words, when Turkey was refused as a candidate member to the EU in 1997, the political endeavours of Turkey and Denktash in TRNC changed rails. They started to support confederation instead of federation. Özgür argues that Mehmet Ali Talat, in his speeches says that “for years they supported federation but now the name of the system in no longer important. Now there is a CTP leadership inclined to aid Denktash and motivated to speak with that inclination”(69).

Before the most recent general elections in TRNC, CTP experienced a partnership in the government. During this partnership in the government, Özgür and his friends came to a diversion ideas with the present CTP administrators. Özgür says that while they were in the government they were not really in power (70). He argues that the parties, which win the elections and form the government do not actually rule TRNC but they simply act as instruments of the Turkish Embassy and the Turkish Army-corps (71).

“Although the government’s administrative program was voted and passed by the Assembly, CTP found itself in an environment where it could not apply its governmental policies” says Özgür and continues: “We were constantly hindered. The government at our time was like a woman with seven husbands” (72).

(68)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(69)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(70)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(71)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(72)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
The government could not keep its promises to the people and Özgür was too proud to go on with this deceit. So he suggested to his friends to resign from the government and explain things to the people. His friends were of the opinion that CTP should continue in the government whatever happens and they refused Özgür’s proposals. So he resigned from the post of Deputy Prime Minister. Upon this CTP’s general assembly met where diverse groups appeared. So, Özgür and his friends continued in the government for some more time. Later the commander of the army-corps, General Kundakçı, asked the removal of CTP from the administration and thus Özgür’s friends themselves expelled from the government.

AKEL argues that North Cyprus is under occupation and there can be no proper government in an occupied area. This can only be a satellite government. Indeed this is true. Memhet Ali Talat and his friends were careful not to express this fact openly even they were expelled from the government, i.e. they took care not to stir up a hornet’s nest because they hoped to come to power again some day. The present CTP administration is attacking Eroğlu and criticizing Denktash with this idea in mind, but they are careful not to anger the authorities behind Eroğlu and Denktash.

According to Mr. Özgür: “I shoot those in front of the curtain, the ones behind are not my concern” (73).

Both Talat and Mr. Ferdi know that there is a superior Coordination Committee consisting of Denktash, Eroğlu, the Turkish Ambassador, the commander of the army-corps and the commander of the security forces. This committee is not legal and is against the constitution, unlike the National Security Committee in Turkey, which is constitutional. This Superior Coordination Committee in TRNC is a figurative existence which holds all the communal power in its hands. Özker Özgür characterizes this superior committee as a militarist regime (74). Mehmet Ali Talat and his friends are fighting not to see this military regime and they are falling behind the struggle for an honourable peace and democracy given by CTP for years.

(73) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(74) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
If you have certain expectations and you fail to disclose the authorities, administrative and power behind closed doors, you are declining your duties for peace and democracy in the name of the people, because the people are aware of the authority and pressure of the superior committee in daily life. The army canteens (markets) are a clear example to this. These places are selling duty free goods to people and this is illegal. But no government in TRNC had the courage to take preventive measures. The political parties also prefer not to interfere. When CTP was a partner in the government at the time of Özker Özgür, there was a protestation among the student of the Eastern Mediterranean University. They wanted to expel the leaders out of TRNC without the knowledge of CTP and actually they did expel one of them. The Council of Ministers met immediately and took a decision not to deport these students. However the government was unable to apply this decision.

In the opinion of Özker Özgür, Talat and his friends are feigning to see the authority of the Superior Committee and with this act they are serving the government.

Özgür says that he could not serve the people under these circumstances but Talat and his friends believe they can do so in spite of the Superior Committee. Naturally they are failing in the service of peace and democracy (75).

At this stage the authorities in Ankara are saying: “You can or enter EU before us even if there is a solution”(76). With such a mentality they are officially and actually preventing a settlement in Cyprus. “What can TRNC do under these circumstances? It appears that South Cyprus will definitely be admitted to the EU. We in the North, have to wait for Turkey to complete her homework. How long will this homework take, 15 years or 20 years? In the meantime what will happen to the Turkish Cypriots? YBH has called on the other parties to come together and find a solution for the Turkish Cypriots (77). At present the majority of the Turkish Cypriots live outside Cyprus, in England, Canada, Australia etc. It is a question of “to be or not to be?”. YBH is suggesting a joint action, to make the Turkish Cypriots’ voice heard outside Cyprus. They are arguing that the world will listen to this voice more seriously, especially if YBH and CTP come together.

(75) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(76) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(77) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
However CTP is refusing this call of YBH and is unwilling to participate in such organization, saying: “CTP is the biggest leftist party and we have no need of the support from YBH or TKP” (78). Özgür continues to express his views, saying that even though CTP may share the views of YBH, it is unwilling to take joint action because YBH has openly opposed the authorities behind closed doors. CTP doesn’t want to annoy the countries behind the curtain because it doesn’t want to lose votes and the chance to become a partner in the government, if such an opportunity arises. Volkán (a right wing newspaper) had in the past praised CTP in its articles. Again förån Harman, in his writings in the paper Kıbrıslı (Cypriot) has also complimented CTP’s actions. There are indications that this party is making concessions to the right wing.

Özgür believes that the time has come for the Turkish Cypriots to think of their future and act together for their common interests. When first founded, YBH gave the impression that it would grow into a successful party. Unfortunately it failed to become effective because YBH appeared as a continuation of YKP (Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi-New Cyprus Party)-because members of YKP said: “We changed our name. We are now YBH, not YKP” (79).

YKP’s image in the community is a small, limited party, without very large number of members. Alpay Durduran was the prominent figure in the organization and he did not have very much help from others. It will not be very easy to change this image in the community. Another reason why YBH could not become very effective is that it could not become organized from the base to the top of community. If a party wants to win votes, the party members must start organizing from the smallest units in the community. At this point Özgür gave information about the years of development of CTP during his time of service.

He pointed out that he served as a parliamentarian of CTP for seven years. During his term, the CTP votes kept increasing, rising to more than 30% in the 1994 general elections. “These people supporting CTP even in the smallest village” said Özgür and he stressed that no matter how correct the party’s policy is, there must be people at the base of the community, supporting the party.

(78) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(79) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
Leniency of CTP is its policy on the Cyprus question. When CTP become a partner in the
government, it began to follow a more flexible policy on the Cyprus issue. The leniency in the
attitude of CTP during this period can be explained as follows:

When CTP first entered the government, its first condition was that the Cyprus question
should be solved by a settlement in accordance with the Summit Agreements. Denktash
accepted this condition and DP-(Democratic Party-party of Denktash)- signed a protocol with
CTP. After the DP-CTP coalition was formed, Denktash wanted to change the decision of the
General Assembly on the issue in August 1994.

The change in policy from a federal solution to a confederal one was already decided behind
closed doors, but Denktash wanted to support this as the Assembly’s decision to the outside
world. CTP refused to give its consent, saying it was against the protocol of the coalition
government. But in spite of CTP’s oppositio, DP and UBP acted jointly in the Assembly and
changed the national policy from a federal settlement to a confederal settlement of the Cyprus
issue. During the voting in the Assembly, Özker Özgür said the following as chairman of
CTP: “If he protocol is disregarded and this decision is taken in this assembly, the coalition
government comes to an end”(80).

In spite of these words from CTP’s head, the decision for a confederal solution was taken with
the votes of DP and UBP. The members of CTP, other than Özgür, insisted on staying in the
government. At this point Özgür said he was now convinced that the young generation wing
in CTP, Mehmet Ali Tlat, Ferdi Sabit and their friends, were not insisted on a federal solution.

At the moment CTP is talking about a federation, talking about it is one thing but to stand
behind what you say, to really want it, to insist on it and struggle for it is another. Özgür
thinks that Talat and his friends are just talking of a federal solution but are not decisively
standing behind it. In Özgür’s opinion, Mehmet Ali Talat and his friends must stand by what
they say on the Cyprus Question in accordance with the Summit Agreements and thinks that
CTP must be insistent on this instead of saying “the name is unimportant”.

(80) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
In case of a settlement in Cyprus, Özgür does not think it is possible for CTP and AKEL to come together and form a single political party because he believes that CTP has deviated a lot from the original ideals. During the chairmanship of Özgür, CTP was insistent on a federal solution based on the sovereignty and integrity of the state. Further it was a genuine supporter of the rights of the working people. During Özgür’s term, CTP called itself the party of the labour class. Nowadays there is no mention of the working people in the statements of Talat and his friends. On the other hand AKEL is a labour party and it is not possible for it to join with CTP which is diverging considerably from its principles. A few weeks ago, Talat and his friends passed over to the Greek side for a meeting with AKEL and for the first time no mutual declaration was made after the meeting.

Özgür’s explanation to no declaration being made is that these is a recently huge deviation of views between the two parties and CTP declined to make a common statement which included a bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution. In the past the views of the two parties overlap but nowadays, with the diverge of CTP, AKEL’s policy is more parallel to YBH. After CTP’s meeting, YBH also had a meeting with AKEL and a common declaration was made.

According to Özgür, YBH is making good progress with its party meetings and organizations in different districts in the North. It also has a publicity called Yeniçag (New Age). As for the amalgamation of YBH with AKEL in case of a settlement in future, Özgür thinks that this depends on whether or not the agreements will render such a union possible. If the new agreements to be made are similar to those of Zurich and London, such a union will not be possible. However if an article, saying that Turks and Greeks can come together to form a common political party, is added in the constitution, then it is possible that AKEL and YBH may join in a single party (81).

Özker Özgür is of the opinion that UBP and DP are supporters for partition, envisaging a Cyprus with two separate, sovereign states. However YBH is stressing the unity and integrity of the country. In the past, Talat shared the views of YBH but he and his friends are now more lenient.

(81) Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
They still keep saying that “Cyprus is a common motherland for both communities”, but if they really believe this, says Özgür, they should not take of separate sovereignties. Akınçi, the chairman of the other leftist party TKP, argues that the recognition of TRNC is not contrary to a federal solution, but according to Özgür, since the Summit Agreements foresee a bi-zonal, bi-communal settlement based on political equality, the idea of two separate sovereign states must be abandoned.

YBH and Özker Özgür support Ghali’s Set of Ideas which are also supported by CTP. During Özgür’s period of service, CTP and AKEL used to invite each other, discussed various topics and issued common declaration, in the same way as CTP is doing now. Özgür says that at his time this was done not just with AKEL but with all the Greek political parties.

In Özker Özghür’s opinion, the Cyprus question can be settled by a process of inter-communal negotiations based on the Summit Agreements. But first Denktash must abandon the thesis of two sovereign states in Cyprus, which is also contrary to the high level agreement with his own signature. Only then a common ground will be created for a solution. During the period 1977-1979 the Turkish side asked for a federal settlement. The Greek side opposed this idea at first but were induced to accept it, and Makarios and later Kyprianou said “yes” to a federation. Later when the candidacy of Cyprus for EU membership was the topic of discussions- the Turkish side changed their stand and asked for a confederal settlement in order to raise difficulties and to enable Turkey to use the Cyprus question in her own negotiations with the EU.

So the federal settlement, which we supported for twenty years was abandoned, and we switched over to a confederal solution. In a confederation there are two sovereign states with a cooperation between them in agreed areas. This is very difficult from a federal system and there is no example of a confederal existence in the world. The closest example is the EU itself. The EU countries have separate votes in the UN but have close relationships and common administrative applications between them. If the Turkish side sincerely wants a solution, the negotiations must be based on the high level agreements and a federation. The Cyprus problem can only be solved with this approach in intercommunal talks.
Ozgür thinks that the reason why the votes of CTP and its number of representatives in the assembly have gone down is the large difference between what they say to the people and what they are obliged to do when they are in the government. The people believe they are being cheated.

CTP behaved contrary to what it promised the people when in opposition and the voters did not forget this. Ozgür continues to say he kept warning the other CTP members, that by behaving contrary to the promises they made to the voters, the party would find itself in a difficult position and be harmed.

But The others did not listen to him and consequently CTP votes and representatives dropped behind those of TKP. But TKP also weakened while in the coalition government with UBP and nowadays CTP is trying to inherit the votes of TKP. They think that YBH is a marginal party and don’t consider it as a rival But Özgür believes that CTP will continue losing votes if it gets into the mood of “we are the greatest”. CTP is exerting effort to succeed in politics without stating the facts in the TRNC regime, without saying openly that the army and the Turkish embassy are behind the regime and that the parties may form the government but they will not be in authority. The people now began asking CTP “What is your difference from UBP and DP? You, too, have become a party of the regime”. The people understand and believe in what they experience in real life more than the things said or promised to them.

If the Cyprus problem is not solved by 2004, Özgür says that the Cyprus Republic as it is now (representing only one community) will become an EU member. North will be in the waiting list until Turley completes her homework. A new status-quo may be arranged for the Turkish Cypriots to comfort a little. May be TRNC will be given some aid to help prepare it for EU while Turkey is also preparing herself. This status-quo will probably be given to TRNC by an agreement between EU, Turkey and South Cyprus, while the military existence of Turkey continues to exist in North Cyprus. How will this status-quo affect the Turkish Cypriot on the street?

If steps are taken to prepare North Cyprus to the EU, the embargoes are lifted and the besieged state of TRNC is ended, the people will somewhat be relieved. It may be possible for the Turkish Cypriots to receive EU passports.
At the moment there are efforts to pass a law to prevent people from obtaining passports of Cyprus Republic (and eventually EU passports). If such a law passed and a TRNC citizen takes the case to the European Court of Human Rights, he definitely wins the case because this is a right given to him by the 1960 London and Zurich Agreements. No Turkish Cypriots can be deprived of this right.

When the EU decided to start membership discussions with South Cyprus whether or not a settlement is reached, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, İsmail Cem, was asked to comment on this and he said: “If Cyprus Republic is accepted to EU before a solution, Turkey will take the necessary steps and is ready to pay for what it may cost” (82).

Özgür’s opinion on this statement is that it is a bluff and he continues: “If South Cyprus is accepted to the EU unilaterally will Turkey declare war on EU? Or will she annex North Cyprus?” According to Özgür, Turkey can neither go to war with EU or can she annex TRNC. This is why she is bluffing (83). The aim is to make the best bargain with EU while North Cyprus becomes a member. This is also one of the targets in the Denktash-Klerides talks. “Denktash is not negotiating for the independence, sovereignty and integrity of Cyprus in a federation of the two communities” (84) says Özgür.

He believes that Denktash is continuing the talks in order to minimize the losses or maximize the concessions to be made to Turkey while Cyprus is accepted as a full member to EU. “Turkey is using the TRNC to shorten her period of entry to EU and induce Europe to make concessions” (85) says Özgür and he shares the same views with Talat on this subject. He believes that Turkey is trying to gain advantage by holding TRNC as a hostage.

According to Mehmet Ali Talat, the main difference between CTP and TKP id in the ideology. “CTP is a real leftist party in the line with the Marxist and Leninist ideology. However TKP has no other example in the world but follows a line in parallel with CHP, Ecevit’s old party.

(82)İsmail Cem, TRT NEWS.
(83)İsmail Cem, TRT NEWS.
(84)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(85)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
TKP is a parallel party following in the footsteps of the Kemalist move (Ataturkism) in Turkey” says Talat (86). When Özgür was asked to comment on the difference between CTP and TKP, he gave the following explanation:

“Members of TKP say that they are a social democrat party. This implies that they are not banning capitalism but are trying to improve and reform it. On the other hand, CTP can be judged by the statements of Mehmet Ali Talat and his friends. They keep saying “they are the party of all people”. A Marxist party is the party of the working class (laborers). How can CTP be a Marxist party when they say that “they are the part of all-capitalist, laborers, proletariatians and the bourgeois all at once?” So CTP cannot be a Marxist party”(87).

The existing problems in the community may cause a party to make certain modifications in its policy. CTP may say that the Cyprus problem has priority and may ask the support of all classes in the community for a plan it has for the solution of the problem. However this does not give CTP the excuse not to raise its voice when the working class is facing so much injustice.

According to Özgür, when he was the head of CTP, this party was beside the workers whenever they had a strike or a protest meeting and in all their statements they voiced their support for the working class. However the new CTP policy shows that they have forgotten the laborers. On one side this party is calling for collective action to behave communal peace and on the other side it is turning its back to the calls of the other leftist parties to cooperate.

Özgür think that CTP is reluctant to join forces with the other leftist parties (TKP and YBH). It is diverging from the Marxist-Leninist ideology and is becoming more a social democrat party like TKP with the aim of getting votes from the right wing as well. Gradually it is moving from the left towards the centre. This was also the case when the votes of CTP increased 30%. These votes did not all come from the left but many from the right as well.

(86)Özgür, interview, 2.2.02.
(87)Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
Appendix 2

Interview with Mehmet Ali Talat

According to Talat, YBH is aimed at dividing up CTP (88). Previously there was YKP and a group from CTP joined this party to establish YBH. “At present YBH is a marginal part with no responsibilities” says Talat (89). They don’t have a large group of people behind them toward whom they are responsible. The difference between CTP and YBH is like the difference between a statesman and a terrorist. The statesman is responsible for the people he represents but the terrorist simply depends his own views and ideas. The statesman has to behave like a player, always taking into consideration the positives and negatives of each move he makes, because he is responsible for protecting the interests of the mass of people he represents.

The terrorist however is in an effort to spread his own ideology and there is no group of people for whom he is responsible or who will suffer harm as a result of his wrong actions. The terrorist’s actions are often provocative. Just like a statesman, CTP carries responsibilities towards the people it represents and tries to protect the interests and benefits of the mass of people behind it. CTP cannot act irresponsibly and jeopardize the advantages of its members i.e. it carries a basket of eggs on its back. However YBH has no such responsibilities, carries no basket of eggs on its back, does not have to be very careful and can afford to be provocative. So, it can make irresponsible statements, criticize everyone pitilessly and behave very freely because it has nothing to lose.

The majority of YBH’s accusations are directed towards CTP, accusing this party of making concessions to the right wing or the government, with the fear of losing votes. Referring to these accusations, Mehmet Ali Talat says: “CTP is a responsible party, just as it was in the past. It avoided radical moves because it knows that such moves will return back like a boomerang and harm the people it represents.” (90).

(88) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(89) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
(90) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
When mentioning moderate and less radical actions of CTP, Talat refers to the past of this party. He continues to say that in the past in order to maintain a radical image, CTP avoided very extreme moves and sometimes acted very moderately. He still criticizes the day when CTP gave “yes” vote to the declaration of the TRNC and adds: “CTP gave a “yes” vote because it was under a threat that any party which opposed the declaration of the TRNC would end its political existence and find itself out of the assembly. “It was under such a circumstance that CTP authorized the declaration, in order not to inflict harm on its members and sympathizers. At the time of this change in policy Mr. Özker Özgür lead the party and authorized and gave his consent to his act. Now he is accusing CTP of moving to the center, but Mehmet Ali Talat refuses this accusation and says: “Today CTP very openly declares to the public what it wants and what it thinks. But in doing so it has in mind the interests of the Turkish Cypriot people and party. CTP feels that its first aim is to protect the benefits of the people. If some people are going to call this “a modernization of CTP” let them do so. Isn’t the whole world moving towards a moderation? The circumstances of the 1990’s or the cold war conditions of the declaration of TRNC in 1983 are now non-existent. Has CTP been affected by these changes? Yes, it has. It would have been dead not to be affected. If this moderation is for the sake of a dialogue to promote a settlement, yes CTP has moderated.

The world is changing and so is CTP. But its spirit political line, conceptions and determination to protect the interests of its people are still have alive and unchanged. It is true that CTP has made certain variations in policy to suit the present conditions. This is the result of its past experiences as a partner in the coalition government. These experiences have caused CTP to adopt a more realistic approach. Before its participation in the government it was in opposition for twenty years, opposing almost everything, criticizing every fact. It was thought that when CTP become a partner in the administration, it would put right everything it criticized before. But CTP is not a magician. What a government can do is limited by what is included in its programme and it is not always possible to achieve everything that is written in this programme. In analyzing the political achievements one has to take these factors into consideration. Otherwise, as the Marxist experts in the past, this world have been a “pediatric illness”-childish way of thinking due to undeveloped brain, childish arguments. Social science is flexible, unlike Mathematics or Physics. Consequently it is a difficult art to shape, develop and improve the society.
In this process it may be necessary sometimes to be radical, moderate, flexible and even take a step backwards. This is politics and many philosophers of the past have clearly expressed it. Among those criticizing CTP, there are some who are well acquainted with the literature of Marx or Lenin. These may be sincere in their criticisms but they are making wrong interpretations. But there are also those who are provocators, their aim is to provoke. There is a leftist group outside CTP (and YBH) who are nearer to the right wing in the political spectrum. This is TKP and its sympathizers. These are not Marxist in origin and not universal. They follow an Atatürkist line, a policy developed by Atatürk for the Turkish nation. In a way TKP represents the reflections of Atatürk’s policies on to Cyprus (91).

(91) Talat, interview, 1.3.02.
Appendix 3
Questions asked to Mehmet Ali Talat

1. What is the aim in the founding of CTP?

2. Could you give information about the historical background of CTP?

3. What is the policy of CTP in the Cyprus problem?

4. What policy will CTP follow in the coming years on the Cyprus Problem?

5. What political changes have taken place in the policy of CTP in the Cyprus problem since the emergence of the problem?

6. From CTP’s point of view what ideology should the new generation adopt on the problem?

7. According to CTP, what is the policy of the present government on the Cyprus problem and what should this policy be?

8. Concerning the Cyprus problem, what are the differences of opinion between the existing government, Mr. Denktash or the government in Turkey?

9. According to CTP what steps should be taken to solve the Cyprus problem?

10. What are the similarities and differences between CTP and AKEL on the Cyprus Question?

11. According to you, what are the reasons behind the objection of Turkey to the membership of TRNC to the EU with the Cyprus Greek Administration?

12. In your opinion, is Turkey using the TRNC to enter the EU? Why?

13. What is your opinion on the demographic structure in the TRNC?
14. Indications are that South Cyprus will be accepted to the EU in 2004. Do you think a solution can be reached by that time? If there is no solution, what do you think about the future of the TRNC after this date?

15. On 8-9 May, AKEL, CTP, YKP, KKE, ODP and SYNASPISMOS met in Istanbul and issued a common declaration of nine articles on the Cyprus issue. In this meeting what differences of opinion emerged between these parties? What is the general opinion of CTP about these meeting?

16. Concerning the Cyprus problem, where does CTP diverge from UBP, DP and TKP? Can you answer this question having in mind the views of these parties?

17. What common views do AKEL and CTP share on the settlement of the Cyprus problem? Can you also point out the differences of opinion between them?

18. If CTP and AKEL are coordinating and cooperating their views on the Cyprus problem how are they doing this?

19. In your opinion, what changes are necessary in the views of R.R.Denktash on the problem, in order to arrive at a settlement in the Intercommunal negotiations? Can you answer the question having in mind the previous views of R.R.Denktash?

20. In your opinion, what should the procedure be in the intercommunal negotiations in order to reach an agreement? In other words, what should be done to induce Turkey and South Cyprus to accept Ghali’s set of ideas?

21. What are the similarities and differences of opinion between CTP and AKEL on the Confidence Building Measures? And what steps can be taken to build up confidence between the two communities?

22. What are the common views and differences between CTP and AKEL on the membership of Cyprus to the EU?
23. Recently the general opinion is that South Cyprus will be admitted to the EU at the end of 2002, whether or not a settlement is reached. The reaction of Turkey to this is that upon such a development, the TRNC can be integrated to Turkey. What is CTP’s opinion on this and what can happen in the following year?

24. It is aid that representatives of AKEL and other Greek political parties attended the most recent General Assembly of CTP. If so, what sort of exchange of views has taken place between CTP and these parties on the Cyprus issue?

25. Can CTP and AKEL unite into a single party in case of a settlement in Cyprus?
Appendix 4

Questions asked to Özker Özgür

1. Mehmet Ali Talat says that the imperialist states agitated the flame in Cyprus but in the end the fighting was between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. What do you think on this argument?

2. What are the similarities and differences of opinion between CTP and AKEL during your leadership? What differences have taken place in AKEL’s views up to now?

3. When do you think CTP’s stand on the Cyprus issue started becoming more lenient (on the subject of reaching an agreement with the Greek side)?

4. Do you approve or disapprove the present policy of CTP on the Cyprus issue and why? If you disapprove, what changes should take place in CTP’s views?

5. In case of settlement, do you think CTP and AKEL could unite in a single party? Can you answer this considering the present policies of the parties? Could this be easier with the old policies of the parties?

6. In what ways did CTP’s views on the Cyprus issue differed from those of UBP, TKP and DP during your leadership? What changes have taken place in views of these parties since then?

7. Talat says that Ghali’s set of ideas must be basis for a settlement and foresees a federal solution. Was this policy the of CTP during your leadership as well? (If the answer is negative, what are your own views? If you were head of CTP now, what policy would you follow?)

8. During your leadership how did CTP and AKEL cooperate and coordinate their policies?

9. In your opinion what should be the procedure in the intercommunal talks in order to reach a settlement?
10. What are your views on the membership of Cyprus to the EU?

11. Why do you think CTP is not in the coalition at present?

12. In case of a settlement what do you think about the guarantorship of Turkey?

13. It is expected that Cyprus will become an EU member by 2004. If a settlement is not reached by then, into what phase will the Cyprus question enter?

14. At which points in the Cyprus question did CTP and AKEL differ in your time?

15. If Cyprus Greek Side is admitted unilaterally to the EU under the title “Cyprus Republic”, what will be the future of North Cyprus? Will it integrate with Turkey?

*In a statement Ismail Cem said the necessary steps would be taken in case Greek Cyprus is admitted to the EU before a solution and Turkey was ready to pay for the consequences. What do you think about it?
Appendix 5

Questions asked to AKEL

1. A short historical background of AKEL.

2. AKEL’s views on Ghali’s set of ideas (1992).

3. AKEL’s views on the membership of Cyprus to the European Union. Should Cyprus be admitted with or without the Turkish Cypriots? Before or after a settlement? If before, how can the Turks be included in the membership?

4. AKEL’s views on CTP’s policy on the Cyprus issue.
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