

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study is to analyze the role of the European Union (EU) in the Middle East Peace Process. Since World War I, the Middle East has been one of the most problematic areas of the world. The biggest problem in the relations between the West and the Middle East is the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab-Israeli conflict has always been important in the foreign policies of the main EU member states. The USA and Russia have strengthened their role in the region, but probably the EU has not. The EU-Middle East relationship has been troubled by the conflict between Israel and Palestinians. Consequently, the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been always a central issue for the European Union.

This study is focusing on the changing role of the European Union in the peace-building process and its role in the international efforts of the Middle East peace process. The EU has got various instruments for sustainable settlement of Israel-Palestinian conflict. However the effectiveness of these instruments is questionable. There is no doubt that the EU's aim is peace in the region and peace in Europe. The European approach has been coloured by a fear that the conflict is now placing its own domestic stability and its regional security concerns under threat.¹ In this respect, the European Union is trying to change its role. The EU's role is slowly changing from 'payer to player' in the Middle East peace process. The EU could strengthen its role especially by solving the Israel-Palestinian Conflict.

The term of Middle East is not clear. It is not only a geographical term, but has got some hidden meanings. It can be claimed that the concept of the Middle East is more cultural and political than geographical. In chapter I, the study will focus on theoretical approaches to the concept of the Middle East. If we take a general look from the Pacific Ocean to the Middle East, the Middle East is not eastern at all. The Middle East is Europe's problematic neighbour and anything that happens there might have reflections in Europe. With the globalization and energy issues there is the growing interdependence between the European Union and the Middle East. France, United Kingdom and Italy had colonies, protectorates, and mandates in

¹ Joel Peters, Europe and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: the Urgency of Now, European Security, Vol-19:3, 511-529, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 512.

the region before. Thus, the British and French were the masters of the Middle East.² UK had a historical role in creating the Israel- Palestinian Problem. To start with, the Balfour Declaration of 1917 was calling for the establishment of a Jewish national home. Before the World War II most of the Jews were living in Europe. For them, Europe is a cultural reference point, the seat of a rich past, the repository of the memories of much of population and geography, its closest ally.³ The Jewish culture is a part of the European history and European culture. Several documents of the European Union are referring at the idea of a common heritage of both societies.

Europe's historical relationship with the Middle East was about only trade and commerce. The emergence of the Cold War and Arab nationalism affected the view of the European governments to the region. During the Cold War, the Middle East faced several troubles and the European governments started to develop to further their political, economic and security interests. There was a bi-polar system where enemies and allies were clear. In the Cold War era, the military guarantee of United States created an atmosphere for establishing the European integration. The European states focused on cooperation and partnership for better and peaceful Europe. Cold War was a chance to start the European integration. During the Cold War, European Community deepened its integration between its members and they accepted new members into the community. In this respect, Chapter I of the study also focuses on the theoretical perspectives of the European integration. .

The European Union was established for economic and security reasons. The European political leaders decided to secure Europe for possible conflicts which could occur in their neighbourhood. In this respect, Robert Schuman paid attention to the importance of regional peace in his famous declaration in 9 May 1950: “World Peace can not be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”.⁴ Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War affected European integration, and priorities started to change with the continuing integration. It took a long time for the Europeans to realize that economic integration was not enough to guarantee the security of the European continent. Then the EU became interested in having direct political role in the management of conflict and resolution

² Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. 2nd edition, Routledge, New York, 2000, p.10.

³ Emanuele Ottolenghi, *Squaring the Circle?, EU- Israel Relations and the Peace Process in the Middle East*, Debate Series, Center for European Studies, 2010, p.8.

⁴ The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950,
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm.

of the conflict. In the Chapter II, the study focuses on the evaluation of the main political integration part of the EU, known as Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The stability in the Middle East is important for Europe but its military capability is limited because of its unique structure. There has also been a problem in the Common Foreign and Security Policy which is the second pillar of European Union since 1993, because of the intergovernmental structure of its institutions. However, the EU had interest on political integration. In this respect, the common foreign and defence policy mechanism of the 2000s is the essential part of the discussion study in the Chapter III.

The study focuses on the beginning of the EU's Middle Eastern interest in the 1970s and the importance of the international peace efforts since 1970s. In the Chapter III, the study evaluates the peace efforts and peace summits or conferences sponsored by the international community. Six Days War in 1967 was one of the milestones in the relations between the EU and Israelis- Palestinians. In the 1970's, national positions to the Middle East of the EU member states were adopted in the external relations of the Community and the newly created European Political Cooperation, (EPC). After the establishment of the EPC system, the European leaders saw the illegality of Israel position in the 1967 war. They also recognized the UN Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in 1967 war. This recognition still is the main principle of Europe for the Middle East Process. The state of Palestine would be established along the pre-1967 borders. However, the lack of meaningful progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the two state solution, which has been a primary goal of the EU is a huge challenge to the credibility of the EU's international policy.⁵

The EU's view for external policies was about stability can spill over from Europe to the region by cooperation and starting point of this cooperation was economical: trade and commerce. The EU likes to be a sponsor of international interventions, mediations, programs projects for peace and etc. In chapter IV, the study examines the instruments of the EU for conflict resolution and their affectivity in the region. The declaratory diplomacy of the EU is the essential subject of the chapter IV. The EC mentioned about the rights of the Palestinian People for the first time within its declarations. The Palestinian question moved from a

⁵ Alvaro de Vasconcelos, *European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Ed. By Esra Bulut Aymat, EUISS, Paris, 2010, 7–11, p. 8.

refugee problem to a political issue after Brussels Declaration in 1973. Declarations had taken an important role for the rights of the Palestinian people but at the same time the EU had has bilateral relations with the Israeli government. These relations have roots in history and but on the other hand is also the economical and technological dependence.

The EU always recognizes Israel's right to exist but the Israel's should be living in peace and inside of recognized international boundaries. Bilateral relations started to grow with the Cooperation Agreement with Israel in 1975. In 1995, the Association Agreement was signed between Israel and the European Union. Israel has got a bigger economy than many EU member states. All the European Union documents about the solution of the Israel-Palestinian conflict are based on the right of self-determination of Palestinian people. Definitely, the EU has supported the two-state solution with respect for human rights and international law. Almost all the EU declarations about the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict have condemned the Palestinian violence and terrorism. The EU is the largest donor to the Palestinians and aid to the Middle East in terms of non-military aid.

Recently, the European Union has learned its energy dependency on Russia and Central Asia and the Middle East. The same time, these regions have got many problems which can directly affect the European stability. The European Union has focused on stability in the immediate neighbouring countries. If there is instability in those countries it affects the security of the European Union. Consequently, the economic and social conditions should be satisfactory in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. The goal of the European Union is to try to solve and prevent regional conflicts and problems where they occur, not only inside of the European Continent.

Since 1950s, the European Union has tried to pay attention to regional problems. The Mediterranean Region and the Middle East have been important for the stability of Europe because of the geographical proximity and historical ties between those regions. There is a large number of people in the EU who have their origins in the Mediterranean or in the Middle East. All these factors put pressure on the EU to deal with the Mediterranean with various foreign policy tools. Europe has been active in the Mediterranean region since the 1960s and especially since 1970s. After the association agreements, the relations between the EU and the Middle East were upgraded with some EU policies and programs. Policies, the European Neighbourhood Project and European Mediterranean Partnership, are the main tools

of the EU in their regional perspective to the Middle East. Chapter IV focuses on these policies of the EU.

The European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the ‘Barcelona Process’, tried to make politics in supranational and multilateral level. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, the European Union started to change its political structure. Here, the Maastricht Treaty was the key instrument with the aim of a common foreign and security policy. There are many problems in the ‘common’ foreign and security policies of the European Union but this does not mean that they do not understand the importance of implementing common policies of the Union. National foreign policies often diverge from the common European position when they are put under pressure by an external event.⁶ In order to act collectively on the international stage, the EU must combine the common foreign policy with national ones, and coordinate the different parts of its external actions. There is no doubt that the relative importance of the Middle East has grown after the end of Cold War. The EMP was a specific instrument to help in the Middle East peace process. The objectives of EMP are covering political, economic and cultural integration. This partnership has got the key role for Israel – Palestinian Conflict, because this is the only forum where the two sides are under one umbrella.

The aim of partnership was stabilization, peace and development in the region with promotion of democracy and respect for human rights. The EMP was launched after the period of Oslo Peace Process in the mid 1990s, when optimism was dominating the future of the Middle East. Within the peace process, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could not make meaningful developments to making sustainable peace in the region.⁷ Both sides benefited from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by bilateral agreements. It has promoted trade and intercultural dialogue.

Another regional initiative evaluated in the same section of the study is the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is for helping the peace-making in the Israeli – Palestinian Conflict. The EU has deepened its relations both with Israel and the Palestinian Authority under the umbrella of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The ENP was launched in 2004. It means

⁶ Fabien Terpan, EU-Israel Relations: in Search of Coherent and Consistent EU Foreign Policy Garnet Conference- The EU in International Affairs II, 22-24 April 2010, Brussels, p.13.

⁷ Nathalie Tocci, *Firm in Rhetoric, Compromising in Reality: The EU in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, *Ethnopolitics*, 8: 3, 387–401, Routledge, London, 2009. p. 392.

that the ENP is the most recent foreign policy instrument of regional initiative to help the peace process in the Middle East. The ENP supports the Barcelona Process and the ENP aims at more stable neighbours both in the East and in the South. The main difference between the EMP and the ENP is that the ENP is based on the bilateral relationships and cooperation but the Barcelona Process has the multilateral framework.

The EU has taken the role of donor with the average of 179 million euros per year over the period of 1998-2004 in direct support to the Palestinian Authority, refugees and regional peace process, as well as indirect support to Peace Process.⁸ The EU provided 3.3 billion Euros in assistance between 2000 and 2009.⁹ Since the 1980s, the European Union has worked on the Palestinian state-building. The EU funding for the Palestinian Authority and projects are generally for state-building of the Palestinian Authority. The humanitarian funds are not a priority of Europe, but they cooperate with humanitarian NGO's to some length. Furthermore, if we look on the basic aim of the Action Plan with Palestine, we see attempts toward the improved social-economic development of the Palestinian Authority and toward the better economic, commercial and trade cooperation between Europe and the Palestinian Authority (PA). This plan indicates the EU's response to the development of the Palestinian Authority both economically and politically. The economic aid to the Palestinian Authority increases the EU's role in the peace process. There is no doubt that the dominant mediator is the USA in the Middle East Quartet but the EU has started to gain power since the Second Intifada and the death of Arafat in 2004. After Yasser Arafat's death, the European Union has played an active role to support the elections for a new democratic government of the Palestinian Authority. It was a very important process for the legitimization of the PA and democratization of the region. Especially after the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU has tried to show its common position by joint actions. These actions have really helped the Palestinian Authority and people. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU added a new common strategy for her Middle East Policy and the support to the PA. The Chapter IV will end with joint actions of the EU in the region. These joint actions are the EU Police mission EUPOL-COPPS in Palestinian territories, and border assistance at Rafah the EU BAM Rafah. The EU is not only payer of the peace process. These joint actions and economic aid are directly affecting the peace process. The EU became a player in the peace

⁸ Stella Zervoudaki, *The EU, The Mediterranean and the Middle East. A longstanding partnership*, EUFOCUS No: 1 Volume: 1, New York, 2004, p.6.

⁹ Maria Gianniou, *The EU and Middle Eastern Conflict, Europe and the Israeli- Palestinian conflict: An Overview*, 2009.

process in 2000's by this kind of joint actions and role in the Quartet is the best evidence of this reality. But this is not enough to become a major political actor for peace process of the conflict. However, the USA still dominates the negotiations between the two sides. In Chapter IV, this study evaluates the role of the EU in the Middle East Quartet and new instrument of the EU in 2000s for the contribution in the Middle East peace process.

The EU has always been interested in having a political role but since the oil crisis in 1973, the EU has had a role in the management of the conflict. The EU can play a greater role for the both sides of the conflict. Another aim of this study is to determine the future role of the European Union in solving the Arab- Israel conflict. In the Chapter V, this study tries to offer recommendations about the future role of the EU in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The EU instruments and their influence on the conflict parties have not prevented violence in the region. But this does not mean that the EU has totally failed. The EU has helped to make some progress in the peace process and to develop the Palestinian Authority. The future of the European Union in the Middle East peace process is not easy because both sides frequently criticize the EU's political role. Since the Oslo process, the EU has increased its political role and moved away from its limited role in the peace process with new mechanisms, treaties and leaders.

Europe can play a constructive role in the Middle East. The EU should not pretend to be the equal with the US as a global power, but it can play a complementary role which could, in the long run, prove beneficial to both the Palestinians and the Israelis in the Middle East Process. In this respect, the Chapter V will focus on the EU's future relations with regional powers, as Turkey and global powers, as the USA.

1-THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND INTEGRATION OF EUROPE

1.1 – THE CONCEPT OF THE MIDDLE EAST

The concepts of the East, the Middle East and the Near East are established in the west. These concepts or terms are not fully objective. Especially, Eurocentrism was a key term and Britain and France were important actors for creating the concept of the ‘East’. They accepted that centre of the world was Europe, and they started to call the regions to the east of Europe the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East. Especially, the use of the term of the Middle East started to become common after the Second World War. It was firstly used by Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1902. He was an American historian and academician. He used the ‘Middle East’ in his important article which was published in *National Review* in 1902. The article was about Basra and its title was ‘The Persian Gulf and International Relations’. He used the concept of the Middle East for the description of the region between India and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰ Nevertheless, his definition was not clear and too general. The concept of the Middle East entered the official documents of the British Colonial Ministry; the British government established the ‘Middle Eastern Department’ in that ministry. The Near East defined by Permanent Commission on Geographical Names which was an institution in Britain included also Balkans. According to the institution, Turkey, Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf region, Iran and Iraq were parts of the Middle East.

After the Second World War, the term of the Middle East has been used by the Anglo-Saxon scholars and the Anglo-Saxon world. But there were many questions about the geographical location of the Middle East. According to Davutoğlu, the Middle East has not only geographical meanings; in fact it has got cultural more than geographical meanings. He argues that geo-cultural characteristic of the region constitutes the meanings to the Middle East term.¹¹ In the Western world, the "East"; (Oriental, Orient), or the "Near East" have also been used as a reference to the Ottoman Empire.

¹⁰ Bernard Lewis, *Orta Şarkın Tarihi Hüviyeti*, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, XII, 1964, p. 75.

¹¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik. Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu*. Küre Yayınları, 19. Basım, İstanbul 2004, p. 327–329.

These conceptualizations are not only a geographical but also political, cultural and religious. But where is the Middle East? For some scholars, Sudan is in the Middle-East and for others not. First of all, where are the East and west, where runs the division line? My definition of the Middle East covers the lands from the Arabian Peninsula to the Western North Africa. The perception of the Middle East from the Western perspective has not been stable over the centuries, but evolved in stages. In this respect, Middle East is a problematic concept for understand the region in objectively. Especially, its political and cultural meanings create differentiation between the West and East.

1.1.1 ORIENTALISM

The relations between the Middle Eastern and European societies have been shaped by power and inequality; Europe has put itself in a dominating position. The colonial or neo-colonial thinking has generally effected mutual perceptions and policies. This dominating history had effected the perceptions of the European societies of the East. Consequently, we can claim that the concept of the Middle East is a definitely orientalist concept.

The most comprehensive and systematic research about the Western ways to see what is 'outside of them' is made by Edward Said, in 1978. In his famous study 'Orientalism', he built his arguments on Michel Foucault's theoretical framework, and developed his study with Raymond Williams's and Antonio Gramsci's philosophical background. According to Said, the Orientalism is a reading comprehension about the history for legitimization of western cultural hegemony and to continue its cultural leadership over the rest of the world. The history of the modern world is established by the Western modernity with the 'others' who would like to become modern as well as 'Western'. The Orientalism is the vision of the Western societies on the others which they call the 'East' and it must be dealt with as an idea, a language and as an ideology. It is also an influential academic tradition, as well as an area of concern defined by travellers, commercial enterprises, governments, military expeditions, and readers of novels and accounts of exotic adventures, natural historians, pilgrims to whom the Orient is a specific kind of knowledge about specific places, peoples, and civilizations.¹² A quick look at eighteenth-century popular culture shows that Muslims, Jews and most other

¹² Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, Vintage Books Edition, Random House, New York 1979, p. 203.

peoples of the Middle East were ‘orientalized’ and depicted as backward, decadent and untrustworthy.¹³

However, the main factor in the formation of the orientalism was the belief on the underdeveloped structure of the region. It was based on thesis of the superior European culture. Especially American cultural hegemony creates misunderstandings and misapprehensions. Those ‘generally accepted truths’ create an Eastern character in the Western world by this kind of misapprehensions. The Anglo-Saxon racism and Social Darwinism have fused in the collective mind of America to generate powerful mental map in which, predictably, the ‘civilized’ powers – the United States and Western Europe controlled a descending array of underdeveloped, even ‘primitive’ Asians, Latinos, American Indians and Africans.¹⁴ It contributes to preserving the cultural heritage of the East today. The Western world does not greedy to understand and adopt these different cultures to inside of their cultural world.

After the 11 September, the perception of democracy has changed; there has been new type of threat against the liberal democracy. This new threat is terrorism. This paranoia has continued in the USA during the Afghan War and Iraqi War. These kind of excessive security policies have affected the point of view of the academic world in the USA, and the beginning of the 2000’s Neo-Orientalism was born there. Neo-Orientalists have built their arguments on the Orientalism. If we compare the arguments of these two theories about the perception of East, the Neo-orientalism is more prejudiced than Orientalism. As a cultural apparatus the Orientalism constitutes all aggression, activity, judgment, will-to-truth and knowledge.¹⁵ And its prejudiced perception continues with some phobias. It creates religious phobias to protect the Judeo Christian culture.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 suddenly brought the Islamic civilization to the focus of the Western word. Unfortunately, the recent developments have been exploited for the sake of a “cultural crusade” against Islam and for the creation of a new geo-strategic design according to which the West and its dominating power, the United States, has the right, even duty, to “pacify” the Muslim world according to the Western standards of humanity and

¹³ Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and The Middle East. Since 1945*. The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2004. p. 3.

¹⁴ Little, p. 10.

¹⁵ Said, p. 204.

secularism. At the beginning of the 20th century, the world has entered a new phase of the struggle for global hegemony, this time again centered around issues of religion and civilization.¹⁶ In the 21st century, the main source of the ideas against to East is religious differentiations. And these differentiations are creating socio-cultural polarization entire of the world.

1.1.2 EUROCENTRISM

Eurocentrism is a variant of Ethnocentrism. In general, ethnocentrism puts the own ethnic, national, religious or linguistic identity as the norm to judge other countries and cultures, or even subgroups in their own society and see the other cultures or societies as uncivilized, or as morally inferior. Thus, Eurocentrism is a way to perceive non-Europeans or the non-Westerners as less modern, less civilized, less developed and less equal than the Europeans. There is the idea of the European identity as superior to all the non-European peoples and cultures.

The Eurocentrism is the discursive residue or precipitation of the colonialism, the process by which the European powers reached economic, military, political and cultural hegemony in much of Asia, Africa and the Americas.¹⁷ In his essay, Euro-centrism, M.Shahid Alam argues that Euro-centrism is historically specific to capitalism; it constructed an ideology of racial superiority to support Europe's capitalist project of global domination.¹⁸ Euro-Centrism is not simple to understand and at the same time it is not pure discourse. But Europe has since about 1880 been an ideal for rest of the world. Europe is seen as the motor for progressive historical developments: democracy, democratic institutions, industrial revolution, capitalism, human rights and rule of law. But Euro-Centrism tries to hide western colonialism, slave trading, imperialism and fascist history of Europe. And according to Samir Amin, Euro-centrism is the

¹⁶ Hans Koechler, *Civilizations – Conflict or Dialogue?* Edited by Hans Koechler and Gudrun Grabher, International Progress Organisation, Vienna, 1999, p. 18.

¹⁷ Robert Stam and Ella Shohat, *Contested Histories: Euro-centrism, Multiculturalism and the Media*, Multiculturalism, A Critical Reader, Ed. By. David Theo Goldberg, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1994, p. 297.

¹⁸ M. Shahid Alam, *Through Racist Eyes, Is Euro-centrism Unique?* Counterpunch, 18 July 2002.
<http://www.counterpunch.org/alam0718.html>.

worldview established by the domination of the Western capitalism for the continuation of the European culture, and it is an ideological deception for the non-European civilization.¹⁹

The most recent and popular study of Euro-centrism is Samuel Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations'.²⁰ It is the latest product of the Western world for the legitimization of Western policies in the post-Cold War era. In the absence of a multi-polar order, the Euro-centrism of the old colonialist period is being replaced by the neo-colonialist rhetoric of the "New World Order" where the emphasis on cultural difference and the threats arising from it replace the earlier hegemonic paradigm of the undisputed imperial rule over the "inferior" nations and Euro-centrism is veiled in the robes of the defence of one's own identity and security, even one's right to exist vis-à-vis threats from other civilizations.²¹

With the coming of the Second World War and the Holocaust, and the founding of Israel, however, anti-Semitism abated somehow, and Jews were 'westernized' while Arabs and Muslims were 'demonized' as anti-Western terrorists.²² In the 21st century, Euro-centrism has turned itself to xenophobia and Islamophobia in the Western World. Especially, terrorist attacks in New York, London and Madrid helped to create xenophobia in Europe and the USA. The perception of Western societies for foreigners is especially related with Islam. Xenophobia is closely related to Islamophobia. The popular press in Europe exploits feelings of insecurity among sections of the host societies linked to changes resulting from globalization affecting their social and economic positioning proclaimed an 'immigrant crisis' and sought to portray illegal migrants, asylum seekers and especially Muslims as a security threat to European societies.²³ In many countries, neo-nationalist chauvinistic trends (As: Geert Wilders in the Netherlands) have emerged with a clear anti-immigrant and generally anti-Islam discourse. The Muslims became minority within minorities in the western world and this fact affects the views of the Western societies on the Middle East. For the Europeans, Europe is Europe and the Middle East and other regions are the areas where they apply their own ideals. But this is not helping the merger of the ideas and peoples of Europe and the

¹⁹ Samir Amin, *Avrupamerkezcilik, Bir İdolojinin Eleştirisi*. Chiviyazıları Yayınevi, 2. Basım, İstanbul, 2007, p. 130-131.

²⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, First Simon & Schuster edition, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2003.

²¹ Koechler, p. 20-21.

²² Little, p. 4.

²³ Ahmed Al-Shahi and Richard Lawless, *Middle East and North African Immigrants in Europe: Current Impact; Local and National Responses*. British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. Ed. by Ahmed Al-Shahi and Richard Lawless, Routledge, Oxon, 2005, Vol:1, 1-29, p. 1.

Middle East. The integration of these two different cultures is a new phenomenon in the 21st century.

1.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The European integration has a strong political direction, but the way of implementation has been primarily economic. It is common today, with the Western European integration proceeding apace, with democratic and market-based systems having been established throughout the Central and Eastern Europe, and with the two ‘halves’ of Europe scheduled to be united in the European Union, for commentators and observers of European affairs to emphasize the increasing unity and identity of the continent.²⁴ The national economic integration began to occur in the late 18th Century and since the middle of nineteenth century the achievement and success of internal economic and political integration, allied with an increasing interconnectedness in Europe that followed from technological change and economic advance, resulted in increasing inter-state cooperation to promote trade, competition and growth.²⁵ The aim of the integration of the European states was ‘desire for peace’. The Schuman Declaration is, indeed, a major milestone in the history European unification. It may be seen as the ‘birth certificate’ of the community of Europe. Just five years after the end of the Second World War, there were great hopes for peace and prosperity in Europe.²⁶ According to Schuman; World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it, ‘the contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.’²⁷ Based on the Schuman plan, six countries signed a treaty to run their heavy industries – coal and steel – under a common management.²⁸ The aim was to make another war in Europe materially impossible, and to co-operate in the post-war reconstruction process.

²⁴ Neill Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 4th edition, The Macmillan Press, London, 1999, p. 3.

²⁵ Nugent, p. 11.

²⁶ <http://www.ena.lu>.

²⁷ The Schuman Declaration of May 1950,
http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm.

²⁸ Official page of European Union,
http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_en.htm.

Nazism and Fascism had been defeated, but economies and political systems throughout Europe had been severely shaken, cities and towns had been destroyed and millions had been killed.²⁹ The aim was to eliminate trade barriers and increase cooperation between European States and this cooperation could open the way to perpetual peace in the European Continent. The six states (Belgium Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Germany) which signed Treaty of Paris in 1951, and it was followed by the Treaties of Rome to found the EEC and Euratom for the establishment of the peace in the Europe. After six enlargements, the European Union has got 27 members states. The enlargements are, in effect, the reunification of the European Continent, divided in 1945 after the Second World War, and inclusion of central and eastern Europe in the zone of peace, stability and prosperity that west Europeans have enjoyed for forty years.³⁰ This unification for peace has been based on some different theories, and the studies have been mostly concerned on European integration and Europeanization processes themselves. The concept of Europeanization, developed for communitized policy areas of the first pillar and for domestic changes in member states of the European Union (EU), has increasingly been applied to intergovernmental policy areas, such as foreign and security policies, and to candidate countries. Thus, the internalization of the EU norms regarding foreign and security policies can lead to a change in the security understanding of the candidate countries and ultimately contribute to the security of the EU and its neighbouring countries.³¹ Europeanization tries to answer the question of how the European integration affects the states responsible for integration in the first place. At this point, this study tries to focus on functionalism, neo-functionalism and their spill-over effects for the Europeanization of the region.

1.2.1 FUNCTIONALISM

The functionalism maintains that in the modern world, technical, economic, and social forces lead to interdependence and shared problems for nation states.³² The world has become increasingly integrated with respect to trade and finance since the end of World War II, due to

²⁹ Nugent, p. 6.

³⁰ Fraser Cameron, Widening and Deepening. The Future of Europe. Integration and Enlargement, Ed. By Fraser Cameron, Routledge, 2005, New York, p. 1.

³¹ Paula Sandrin, The European Union as a *vincolo esterno* and the transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy – ECPR Graduate Conference, Dublin 2010.

³² Susan Senior Nello, The European Union. Economics, policies and history. The McGraw-Hill Education, Berkshire, 2005, p. 5.

declining costs of transportation and communication and declining government barriers.³³ Functionalism is an attainment of economic integration. The increase in trans-national ties has led to the integration and interdependence which in turn has led many societies to share common problems. Many of these problems can be managed only through international cooperation and specialized agencies with technical experts. David Mitrany has given the example of the International Labour Organization, in giving a common direction to policies of social improvement without encroaching on State sovereignty.³⁴ International cooperation is needed to deal with such matters, and it is believed that this will ultimately lead to economic and political unity; political integration inevitably follows economic integration.³⁵

The precious step for functional theory is the ramification of policies. Economic integration is a step for political integration. Some scholars call the economic integration as a negative integration because of the elimination of barriers to the movements of products and factors of production between countries or regions, and they call political integration as a positive integration because it introduces common policies for the common relations and common interests. Mitrany supports the international unification, the emergence of many new national states will complicate politically our difficulties, but socially this multiplication might be put to serve the international unification.³⁶ Economic unification would build up the foundation for political agreement. And international organizations are formed because of the demand of jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. It refers to federalism. States or countries could not solve issues or problems such as environment, multinational trade etc. alone. The many policies can be an example for the functionalist character of the EU. If we analyze the starting point of the European integration, it rooted on the materially interdependence and functional/technical cooperation between six European states for production of coal and steel. Also, the Customs Union, common agriculture policy, environmental and energy policy can be another examples for which functionalism can explain easily.

³³ Jeffrey Frankel, *Globalization of the Economy. Governance in a Globalizing World*. Ed.by. Joseph Nye and John Donahue, Brookings Institution Press. 2000, p. 35.

³⁴ David Mitrany, *The Functional Approach to World Organization. A Working Peace System*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948, Volume 24, Issue: 3, 350–363, p. 357.

³⁵ Nello, p. 5.

³⁶ David Mitrany, *The Functional Approach to World Organization. A Working Peace System*. Quadrangle, Chicago, 1996, 149-166, p. 158.

1.2.2 NEO-FUNCTIONALISM

Neo-functionalism is a strategy that uses functionalist techniques to realize federalist objectives. In its classic formulation, neo-functionalism revolves largely around the concept of spill-over, which takes two main forms. These are functional spill-over and political spill-over. Functional spill-over arises from the interconnected nature of modern economies, which makes it difficult to confine integration to particular economic sectors, and political spill-over largely follows from economic integration and has a number of dimensions; supranational institutions and non-governmental actors become more influential in the integration process, while nation states and governmental actors become less influential.³⁷ According to neo-functionalism economic cooperation fosters political integration, as cooperation becomes institutionalized, intergovernmental organizations and specialized agencies can enter the supranational organizations like the European Union. The authority of the states would be displaced incrementally by the supranational institutions. These kinds of organisations become the most important instruments of the international system. Neo-functionalism has emphasizes on political integration and European Commission is can be best example for it. The Commission works for benefits of the EU citizens and it works like a guardian of the EU treaties. According to neo-functionalism, last phase might be political integration and the EU has got these kinds of politically supranational institutions.

The most obvious point of departure from functionalism was the neo-functionalists' emphasis on the inherently regional quality of institution-building, as opposed to Mitrany's insistence on the flexible and variegated character of post-national institutional forms.³⁸ The ECSC civil servants speaking for national governments have constantly found it necessary to 'harmonise' their separate policies in order to make it possible for the integrated sectors to function, without necessarily implying any ideological commitment to the European idea.³⁹ The European integration creates peace and prosperity in Europe, and there are many fields where economic cooperation can bring benefits for example, to the regional participants in the Middle East peace process.⁴⁰ The OEEC and Council of Europe have failed to create a

³⁷ Nello, p. 507.

³⁸ Ben Resmond, The Uniting of Europe and foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas. *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol: 12. No: 2, 237–254, p. 242.

³⁹ Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Standford University Press, Standford, CA. 1958. p. 297.

⁴⁰ Rodney Wilson, *Middle Eastern Trade and Financial Integration, Lessons from European Union's Experience. The Middle East and Europe, The Power Deficit*. Ed.By B.A Roberson. London, Routledge. 1998. p. 203.

supranational organisation as the EC did with adopting neo-functional approach, with a spill-over affect for increased political co-operation, as Commission and European Court of Justice. But I can not be optimistic about the role of the neo-functionalism or functionalism can explain the European integration in generally. Because the EU have so many problems for reach politically pure supranational identity. Sovereignty of nation states is main obstacle to create supranational character of it.

1.2.3 INTERDEPENDENCY

The concept of the interdependency was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970's. The modernization increases the interdependence among the states and translational actors become increasingly important. States are not unitary and rational actors of the international system. The international relations have a variety of actors. Recently the military force has obviously become a less useful instrument and today welfare issues rather than security are the dominant goal of states. International relations have a multiple agenda of issues. This is seen most obviously in the ways in which the post-Second World War international modernisation in its various forms, including growing wealth, vastly increasing world trade, the technological revolution and the transformation of communications has promoted many different forms of political and economic interdependency.⁴¹

The traditional preference of security over welfare and socio-economic issues was replaced by variable sets of main issues and priorities depending on the specific policy area. In other words, the range of issues on the international agenda has grown, with, in particular, traditional 'high' policy issues (those concerned with security and the defence of the state) connected with an array of 'low' policy issue (those concerned with the wealth and welfare of citizens).⁴² Peace can be established by soft power and cooperation of states. The explanatory power of the interdependency theory for European integration is smaller than that of functionalism and neo-functionalism, but it had helped to explain the establishing of the ECSC after World War II. The ECSC was an example for 'low' policy.

The economic interdependence has increased in the post-WWII period, because the World has focused on growth and the trade volume has increased. Here, the multinational

⁴¹ Nugent, p. 511.

⁴² Nugent, p. 512.

corporations have played an important role. But the most important object was the unstable and uncertain currency exchange rates and international monetary policies. States must consult, cooperate and integrate with one another in the interests of international and national economic stability and growth.⁴³ The European states were working with other states for stability and growth under the umbrella of the GATT, the WTO and the IMF but they needed a regional organisation to solve their own problems rapidly, practically and more efficiently than other international organisations. The creation of the Single European Act (SEA) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are examples of this aim.

The economic integration would help the peace process in confliction regions as the Middle East. Unfortunately, it is clear that the Middle East is not a coherent bloc, as the intra-regional trade is minimal and the regional conflicts are a barrier to the peace in the region. But the Middle Eastern countries are important markets for the European Union member states. Thus, the cooperation between the EU member states and Middle Eastern states in economical policies would help the integration between these two regions. The European experience of integration can be an example for the cooperation of the Middle Eastern states.

1.3 EUROPEANIZATION

The internalization of the EU norms regarding foreign and security policies can lead to a change in the security understanding of the candidate countries and neighbour countries, contribute to the security of the EU. Spreading of European values such as democracy, rule of law, human rights can help the stabilization of the Middle East. The promotion of stability and good governance to European periphery is directly relates with the security of the European Union. The term of Europeanization is generally used for candidate countries of the EU but in this study we use the term for European values which can help the stabilization and democratization of the Middle East.

The Europeanization consists of processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedure, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things'. They are also shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)

⁴³ Nugent, p. 18.

discourse, identity, political structure, and public policy.⁴⁴ Today, despite of the several meanings of the term, the Europeanization is usually associated with domestic adaptation to the pressure emanating directly from the EU membership.⁴⁵

The Europeanization and integration processes as a natural development rooted in a specific European set of values as, consolidated democracy, rule of law, human rights, mutual trust and civil society. And the EU has created several policies and mechanisms towards its neighbouring countries to foster Europeanization outside the European territory as well. Since the mid-1990s the EU has been emphasizing, in its statements and partnership programmes in the Mediterranean, the need to restore peace, stability, democracy and good governance in the region. The EU's actions have not been sufficient for bringing the Middle East to the level of the European standards. In this respect the European performance had certainly been stronger without the problems in the common foreign policy of the Union. Consequently, the Middle Easterners have problems in seeing. The EU as a strong partner in the democratization of the region. In the Middle East, the Europeanization does not mean the EU-ization. It means the process for the more democratic Middle East under the values of the EU. Also the EU can be an example for establishing regional peace the Middle East and it can tries to contribute to the MEPP by promoting its norms and values. In its relationship with MENA countries, the EU have to seeks to export its principles, normative standards and its unique model of regional integration in the Southern Mediterranean. This can be a helpful for the increase of the EU's influence in the region by exporting its political and governance type. That role can relate with normative spill-over effects from the EU to Middle Eastern states. It is important for promote regionalism and spread of the European values.

⁴⁴ Heather Grabbe, *Europeanization Goes East: Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process*, The Politics of Europeanization. Ed.By Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, Oxford University Press, New York. 2003. 303–327, p. 309.

⁴⁵ Kevin Featherstone, *In the name of Europe , The Politics of Europeanization*. Ed.By Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, Oxford University Press, New York. 2003, p. 7

2- THE MILESTONES TO THE CREATION OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

2.1- THE EVALUATION OF THE CFSP

The European Union has essentially changed its structure since the Treaty of Rome. The EU has enlarged in 1973, 1981, 1986, 1995, 2004 and 2007. The number of member states increased from 6 to 27. Consequently, the EU now covers also areas in Central, Eastern, South-eastern Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁴⁶ These changes have also affected the structure of the organisation. The EU has also become a neighbour of the Middle East. Although the CFSP of the EU is not the core subject of this study it is still the framework for the EU efforts in the Middle East. Consequently we have to take a look at than its development.

The Treaty of Rome emphasised the social and economic progress of the European countries and protection of ideals of peace and liberty. Accordingly the member states tried to establish the common foreign security policies. European Defence Community (EDC) and European Political Community were set up in the early years of the European Integration. But in the field of the political integration there was a great disappointment. After those failures in the political integration, the European leaders concentrated on economic issues. In 1960s and 1970s, the European Community achieved a great success in economic integration and became an essential economic power in the world. Because of this successful experience, the other international actors faced some expectations from the EU in the political issues. The European Political Cooperation was set up in 1970 by the Luxembourg Report and it was recognized by the Single European Act in 1986. Nevertheless, the EPC continued to cause disappointment in the common foreign security policy of the EU. Although the SEA signalled the increasing importance of the EU foreign policy and facilitated its further development, until the early 1990s the EU's international standing was that of an economic giant on the one hand and political pygmy on the other.⁴⁷ The EPC could not help to reach a common position in the Middle East as in the Arab-Israel wars, hostage crisis in Iran in 1979 and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the same year. The EU could not reach decisions within the

⁴⁶ Birgül Demirtaş-Çoşkun, EU's New Position in the International Order: From Regional to Global Power? *Perceptions*, Vol: XI No: 1, Ankara. 2006. 49–75, p. 49.

⁴⁷ Neill, p. 447.

framework of the EPC. Each member state had its own point of view the Middle East included.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Bloc have affected the international order. Central Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East became important problematic questions for the EU. The 1990-1 Gulf War was another important crisis for the common foreign policy of the European Union. In 1990 the Western European Union was responsible for the coordination of the military response of the Western European countries in the Gulf Crisis.⁴⁸

The EPC had no effect for the defence and security policy of the EU and it had very limited functions. The Community's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was to coordinate diplomatic action and jointly impose economic sanctions, but on the key issue of the appropriate military response and national contributions to the response, the member states reacted in a piecemeal and uncoordinated fashion.⁴⁹ This kind of un-common and unsuccessful experiences of the EU's foreign policy led to the necessity to re-design the EU's foreign policy structure. The SEA in 1986 provided some improvements in the structure of the EPC; however, the most important milestone in the development of the European political cooperation came with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.⁵⁰ There the European Union was divided in three sections. The CFSP was the second pillar of this division, in inter-governmental level. The pillar of CFSP had following objectives:

1. The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;

⁴⁸ Nello, p. 402.

⁴⁹ Nugent, p. 448.

⁵⁰ Demirtaş-Çoşkun, p. 66.

- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms'.⁵¹

By the Maastricht Treaty, the EU tried to adapt itself to the new world order. With the Treaty's entry into force in 1993, the CFSP replaced EPC and a separate inter-Governmental pillar was created in the Community structure.⁵² Like EPC, CFSP was still to be based on intergovernmental co-operation. Yet, there was an increased obligation for the member states to develop joint actions, and the CFSP was also extended to cover the defence issues.⁵³ The common foreign and security policy includes all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.⁵⁴ The EPC did not help to create unisono in the foreign policy of the EU. Henry Kissinger's famous saying 'Who shall I phone, if I phone Europe' hit the core of the problem. Some scholars have argument about the common foreign policy, that the EU was not created for solving the international problems but to prevent international problems from disrupting the EU and to a lesser extent, to make sure that a common European voice was heard in international affairs.⁵⁵

Both the EU itself and other international actors had great expectations from the CFSP; it was the 'hour of the EU'. But in the 1990s, the EU could not prevent the conflict in the ex-Yugoslavia; it is an example of the failure of the CFSP and the EU's foreign policy strategy. The EU's role in Bosnian crisis is an example for the ineffective peace-maker and unsuccessful mediator. It was the terrible and expensive lesson for the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) was an important step for the EU's foreign policy after the failure of the EU in the Balkans. This treaty established a High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy for a five years period. The first 'Mr.CFSP' was Javier Solana. He was the former Secretary General of NATO. The Amsterdam Treaty also tried to establish close

⁵¹ Treaty on European Union (The Maastricht Treaty), Maastricht, 7 February 1992; Title V: Provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy. Article 11.

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Treaty%20on%20European%20Union%20-%20Title%20V.pdf>

⁵² The Amsterdam Treaty

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/a19000_en.htm

⁵³ Nello, p. 400.

⁵⁴ Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.4.

⁵⁵ Michael E. Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation". Cambridge University Press, UK, 2004, p. 4.

relations between the WEU and the EU. “The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide”.⁵⁶

2.1.1 THE ESDP

The increasing relationship between the EU and WEU did not mean that the EU had a defence capability. In December 1998 the French and British governments signed an agreement at St. Malo, which paved the political path for the EU governments to launch the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council summit in June 1999.⁵⁷ The main aim of the ESDP was that by the year 2003 the EU should create a military force of 60000 soldiers within 60 days for one year. This force could work only under the Petersberg tasks which were explicitly included in the Treaty on the European Union (Article 17) and cover:

- Humanitarian and rescue tasks;
- Peacekeeping tasks ;
- Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.⁵⁸

After the establishment of the ESDP, there have been 23 EU operations from BiH to Palestinian Authority and from Somalia to Georgia. It has channelled and fostered co-operation between the EU Member States in the sensitive domains of security and defence and it has helped to generate an original, comprehensive strategic approach to crisis management, and it has set in place some of the tools to implement it.⁵⁹

The 9/11 attacks dramatically changed the threat perception and security priorities of the US and of the European countries. In the aftermath of the attacks, the EU prepared a list of terrorist organisations for the first time in its history and they declared the European Security Strategy. But the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq caused disputes in the EU. President Bush’s policies were supported by Britain, Spain, Portugal and Italy but not by France and

⁵⁶ Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 17. J-7.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html#0001010001>.

⁵⁷ Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly and Daniel Keohane, Introduction, European Security and Defence Policy, The First Ten Years (1999-2009), Ed. by Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly, Daniel Keohane, Director: Alvaro de Vasconcelos, The EU Institute Security Studies, 2010, Paris, p. 13.

⁵⁸ The official page of the European Union,

http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm.

⁵⁹ Grevi, Helly and Keohane, p. 403.

Germany. These countries preferred multilateral solutions under the umbrella of the UN. This was a second time a division occurred between the member states since 1970s. The main concern was that if the member states could not agree on such an important and historic action, what could be expected out of the European common foreign policy.⁶⁰ With the Lisbon Treaty, a new position of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/ Vice President of the Commission was created in order to promote the EU actions on the international stage and to be better able to defend its interests and values abroad.⁶¹ It is another version of ‘EU Minister of Foreign Affairs’ in Constitutional Treaty in 2004. By the Lisbon Treaty, the EU re-named the ESDP to Common Security and Defence Policy.



⁶¹ Your Guide to the Lisbon Treaty, European Commission, Brussels, 2009, p. 5.

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/december2010EN.pdf>.

The Lisbon Treaty has a number of important institutional changes but many of these changes do not challenge the intergovernmental structure of foreign and security policy institutions. The EU is still very far from speaking with one voice, but considering the historical process it is possible to recognise perceive the progress the Union has achieved.⁶³ The Union has developed common policies in a number of difficult areas, from the Middle East to North Korea but it does not mean that everything has been solved in the common foreign policy of the EU. However, this situation is proceeding very slowly. Sovereignty of nation states and intergovernmentalism are core problems for the common voice of the EU in the foreign relations.

The relationship between CFSP and one of the previous chapter's topic "Europeanization" might be understood in one combination. My understanding from Europeanization combines internal and external aspects of the European integration process and it is not limited only domestic policies of the EU. Promotion of European values, norms and creating consolidated democracies can identify with the EU's necessity for the creation and protection of both regional and international security order in the world. In other words, the EU can act for the non-Europeans in the aspects of benefits for both sides, as the mechanisms for the promotion of Europeanization in the EMP and the ENP.

⁶³ Demirtaş-Çoşkun, p. 71.

3- THE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND ATTEMPTS TO MAKE PEACE

It is not easy to write every step of the Arab-Israeli Peace process. The history of the conflict has so many turns and details. This study will focus on the evaluation of the peace process of the EU. In this study the conceptualization of the Middle East is limited in the Arab-Israeli conflict. When this study was in progress, the region of the Middle East had got other problems like the Iranian nuclear question, economic crisis and uprisings of the young population in the Arab states like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, the UN investigation about assassination of Rafiq Hariri and question of Hezbollah, problems in the Turkey-Israeli relations and problems of Iraq still continue.

The international community has been busy with the conflict in the Middle East since the creation of the state of Israel. The UN Security Council has several resolutions about the Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN Partition Plan in 1947, United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in 1967 and United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 are three examples until 1973. After the end of the Suez War in 1956, the UN peacekeeping forces started to control the border in Sinai between Egypt and Israel. The UN was guaranteeing the free movement of Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba. France and Britain were losers of the Suez War. They lost their power in the Middle East and Britain its role as a global power. The USA and the Soviet Union became more active in the Middle East. At the same time, the Suez crisis caused the rise of antagonism between Israel and the Arab world.

3.1- THE 1970S

3.1.1 THE 1973 WAR AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The dialogue between Europe and the Middle Eastern countries started after 1973 war and the 1973 oil crisis. The October 1973 war (known in Israel as the Yom Kippur War and in the Arab world as the Ramadan War) developed rapidly, and the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian

offensive caught Israel by surprise.⁶⁴ For the first three days, the Israelis were in troubles but then they pushed back the Arabian troops. With significant casualties and large quantities of military equipment disabled or destroyed, the war proved costly for Israel, Egypt, and Syria.⁶⁵ The war ended with the Sinai I and II agreements. The threat of a full scale Soviet intervention and pressure from the US, forced an end to the conflict.

3.1.2 THE OIL CRISIS OF 1973-74

Oil was also used a weapon first time by the Arabian states during and after the war when they introduced an oil boycott on Western world. They decreased the oil production from October 1973 to December 1973. As a result, there was a panic in the global market and price of oil rocketed from 3 to 12 dollars per barrel. After the establishment of the OPEC and continuation of instability in the Middle East, (Revolution in Iran, Iraq-Iran war), petroleum prices reached 40 dollars per barrel. This was an essential crisis for Europe and the USA, the main importers of the Middle Eastern oil. The boycott was a key moment for the West and the EC. The crisis turned the attention of the West to the Middle East and the European powers began to try creating a common foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. There should be no doubt that energy and trade relations had significant role in shaping EC policy towards the Middle East in the 1970s. When the oil embargo was lifted, the members of the EC changed their former pro-Israeli policy. In addition, the Euro-Arab dialogue was initiated right after the Oil crisis. However, the interests were different in that dialogue; the European states focused on the energy security, the Arab countries were searching for the European political support in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

3.1.3 THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

By the end of the 1970s, military spending has become an increasing burden for the Egyptian economy. This was the reason for the economic distress of the Egypt. In this respect, For President Sadat the development of Egypt could be reached only with peace with Israel and he started peace talks with Israel in 1977. He made an historic speech in *Knesset*^{*} and

⁶⁴ Wars of the World, Yom Kippur War, <http://www.onwar.com/aced/data/yankee/yomkippur1973.htm>.

⁶⁵ Yom Kippur War, <http://www.history.com/topics/yom-kippur-war>.

* The Israeli Parliament.

offered the peace agreement. Menachem Begin and Sadat signed agreements in Camp David under the sponsorship of Jimmy Carter's initiative opened the way to the peace treaty in 1979. The Camp David Agreement was the first peace treaty signed between Israel and an Arab state, bringing an end to the conflict between Israel and Egypt. Egypt became the first Arab country to officially recognize Israel and started the diplomatic mission.

3.2 THE ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS AND ATTITUDE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The first Palestinian *intifada* began in December 1987 as a purely local Palestinian response to the unbearable local conditions and was not inspired by the PLO leadership in Tunisia.⁶⁶ It came as a surprise to almost everyone because it was a spontaneous revolt. The main reasons of intifada were: the continued occupation of Gaza and the West Bank by Israel, strict operations of the Israeli army, expanding of the Israeli settlements and the control of the water resources by Israel. The intifada not only placed the Middle East in the forefront of world attention, it also aroused a wave of international sympathy for the Palestinian cause along.⁶⁷ Furthermore Arafat changed the PLO's position for peace. In fall 1988 he made a historic announcement with the following major points: The PLO accepted the Israel's right to exist as a state (with its pre-1967 borders), renounced the use of terrorism and agreed that UN Resolutions 242 and 338 should serve as the basis for an international peace conference; the PLO proclaimed an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital.⁶⁸ But its policies did not achieve essential gains for Palestinians. Israel continued its occupation of the Palestinian territories. After the First Intifada, Arafat led the PLO to the negotiations with Israel and this was an improvement for the Middle East Peace Process.

3.2.1. PEACE TALKS IN 1990S

3.2.2 THE MADRID CONFERENCE

⁶⁶ William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd Edition, Westview Press. Oxford, 2000, p. 462.

⁶⁷ Ivan Minnis, Arab- Israeli Conflict, Heinemann Library books, Oxford, 2001, p. 49.

⁶⁸ Cleveland, p. 462.

The PLO supported Iraq during Gulf war. This was an important decision for the PLO because Jordan and PLO were only Arabian organizations or states which supported Iraq and Saddam Hussein. They were excluded from the international system and Saudi Arabia stopped the economic aid to the PLO. Thus, they were in economical and political crisis after the first intifada and during the Gulf War.

Israelis were politically divided in two parts, one side supported the 'land for peace' solution and the others not. The effect of the intifada on Israel, the dominance of the U.S, and the election of a Labour Party government in Israel contributed to a stunning breakthrough in Palestinian Israeli relations.⁶⁹ The PLO and Israel, adopted a more positive approach to talks for the Middle East peace. After the Gulf War, the US focused on the Arab-Israeli peace. Consequently, the US suggested a peace conference. The conferences began in late October 1991. From the Arab countries Lebanon, Syria and combined Jordanian-Palestinian delegation participated. The EC's role in the peace process began with the Madrid Peace Conference. Europe did not participate in the direct bilateral negotiations, but the EU attended the signing ceremony. Snubbed by the USA when it chose Moscow as co-sponsor of the Madrid Conference of November 1991, Europe played only a marginal role at the conference itself and focused more on the multilateral talks set up by the conference.⁷⁰

*In short term, the Madrid Conference was more about public gestures than substantive discussions, and subsequent events have tended to relegate it to the background. However gathering at Madrid should not be overlooked; it was a significant step bringing Israelis and Palestinians to a new level of contact.*⁷¹

3.2.3 THE OSLO ACCORDS

During the period of 1991 and 1993, the sides met several times in Washington and Moscow but the Israeli settlements became an important obstacle for peace. The Oslo Accords were a group of agreements signed in 1993 between Israel and the PLO. From

⁶⁹ Cleveland, p. 484.

⁷⁰ Peters, p. 514.

⁷¹ Cleveland, p. 484.

January secret talks were held in Oslo. Israel and the PLO signed the agreement on 13 September in Washington. Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton had pumped hope for peace to world. The agreements required the recognition of one party by the other and as a result Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and, in return, the PLO unequivocally recognized Israel's right to exist in peace and security, renounced the use of terror and violence, and pledged to remove the clauses in the PLO Charter that called for the elimination of the state of Israel.⁷² Oslo II was signed two years later than Oslo I on 24 September 1995. It was about the stages of Israeli military redeployment in the West Bank.

In the beginning, when Oslo Declaration of Principles was signed in 1993, the Palestinians expected the peace process to lead to the end of the occupation. These accords opened a new era in the Arab-Israeli relations with opening discussions toward a permanent bilateral agreement. The Oslo process brought an historical change in the Israeli-Arab conflict, including the peace agreement with Jordan and a process of recognizing Israel's legitimacy by the Arab world.⁷³ But to the Palestinians who had applauded Oslo I and the promise it had seemed to hold, Oslo II looked more like a step toward the creation of Palestinian *bantustans** on the West Bank. Hamas was established and they started to increase terrorist attacks against Israel. Since 1995, following the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the Oslo peace process faced obstacles.

In the Oslo peace process, the EU had provided economic and technical assistance to the parties directly involved to strengthen the peace agreements. Europe became directly engaged in promoting this vision through its offer of financial support to the Palestinians and by building the institutional capacity of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.⁷⁴ However, the countries of the EU played no influential role in the bilateral negotiations that led to those treaties.

⁷² Cleveland, p. 487.

⁷³ Ron Pundak, From Oslo to Taba: What Went Wrong? The Israeli- Palestinian Peace Process, Oslo and The Lessons of Failure. Ed. By Robert L. Rothstein, Moshe Ma'oz, Khalil Shikaki, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton and Portland, 2002, 88–114, p. 112.

* Bantustan was a territory set aside for black inhabitants of South Africa and South West Africa (now Namibia), as a part of the policy of apartheid. For further information : <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bantustan>

⁷⁴ Peters p. 515.

3.2.4 THE CAMP DAVID SUMMIT

The Clinton government had already invested a great deal of energy in promoting solution to the Middle East conflict.⁷⁵ Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian President Yasser Arafat started the secret negotiations in Camp David under the auspices observation of President Clinton in July 2000. It was the first major attempt to negotiate a comprehensive final status agreement between the Palestinian and Israel. The negotiations were secret but according the mainstream media in the US, Barak made concessions which passed the previous red lines of Israel. (For example: withdrawal from more than 90 percent of the occupied territories). However, Arafat did not feel the offer was not enough and he rejected the deal. When the summit ended in deadlock, both the United States and Israel blamed the Palestinians. For Palestinians the summit at Camp David was meant to produce a blueprint for the final stages in the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (according to Resolutions 242 and 338 of the UN) and prepare the ground for new negotiations over a fair settlement on the basis of the UN Resolution 194- the turn of the refugees, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the fully sovereign Palestinian state.⁷⁶ The aim of the summit was to create peace with the two state solution but it failed and created one of the reasons of the Al-Aqsa Intifada for the Palestinians.

3.3. DURING THE 2000S

3.3.1 PERIOD FROM AL-AQSA INTIFADA TO 2011

The Al-Aqsa Intifada began on 29 September 2000, the day after Ariel Sharon's provoked visit to Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount and Al-Aqsa Mosque with about thousand soldiers. This intifada brought in hard struggling and suffering to both sides. The Palestinian suicide bombers killed Israeli civilians and Israeli army made military operations in the West Bank. The second intifada lasted for four and a half years, and Mahmoud Abbas became the Chairman of the PA on January 9, 2005. Terrorist of both sides (State terrorism by Israel) have not stopped completely their activities.

⁷⁵Lars Blinkenberg, *The Middle East Conflict, From Bad to Worse to War*, University Press of Southern Denmark, Odense, 2006. p. 207.

⁷⁶ Ilan Pappé, *The Process That Never Was, Missed Opportunities in the Israeli- Palestinian Conflict, 1948-2000, Arab-Jewish Relation, From Conflict to Resolution?* Ed.By Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman, Sussex Academic Press, Brighton and Portland, 2006, 233–250, p. 238.

In the beginning of 2001, Sharon was elected as the leader of Likud party and he became the Prime Minister of Israel. His main aim was to reject the negotiations with the Palestinians. And in 2002, Israel started to build the security barrier (separation barrier) and continued occupation of Palestinian lands. In the same year the Middle East Quartet was established in Madrid. The members of Quartet are the UN, the EU, the US and Russia. The Quartet proposed a plan which is known as the 'Road Map for Peace'. The main goal of the Road Map is to establish an independent Palestinian State with secure Israel.

In August 2005 Israel carried out its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. The withdrawal was welcomed within the EU. The Community viewed it as the first stage of a complete Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied during the 1967 War, as well as the first real opportunity for the Palestinians to govern themselves, free from Israeli military intervention or settlements, since the 1994 Cairo Agreement established Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho.⁷⁷ The EU also insisted that any disengagement process had to be a step towards a two state solution; and must be accompanied by Israel's facilitation of the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Gaza.⁷⁸ However, after the withdrawal of Israel from Gaza in 2005, Hamas won the elections in Palestine in 2006. As a result, many Western states had cut aid to the PA because of Hamas's point of view to Israel's right to exist. Hamas rejects the right to exist of the State of Israel. This is the main difference between Fatah and Hamas. The West considers in peace talks with Taliban in Afghanistan while still claiming Hamas elaiming that they are terrorists.⁷⁹ The Western World should find the way to engage Hamas.

In 2006, Israel attacked Lebanon. The reason was Hezbollah bases in the Southern Lebanon and rise of terrorist attacks from the Southern Lebanon. Hezbollah had really effective resistance to Israeli forces during 33 days of the war. One year later, the Battle of Gaza between Hamas and Fatah emerged in 2007. It ended with the victory of Hamas. Hamas has controlled Gaza, and Fatah the West Bank.

⁷⁷ Rory Miller, *Troubled Neighbours: The EU and Isral*, in the *Israel Affairs*, Vol.12, No.4, Israel's National Security in the Twenty-First Century , Taylor & Francis, Routledge, London, October 2006, 642-664, p.649.

⁷⁸ Miller, p. 649.

⁷⁹ *Just and Durable Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Summary report from regional seminars, Ed.By Karin Aggestam. Layout, Emma Danielsson, Jerusalem and Ramallah, 23-25 May 2009.

At the end of his administration George W. Bush focused on the Middle East Peace in Annapolis process. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice organized a conference between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. It also was attended by many Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia and Syria. Annapolis process established on “West Bank first” approach. Thus, Annapolis did not reach successful results. The Gaza War in the winter of 2008-2009 was most essential for public opinion in the entire world. About 1400 thousands civilians were killed by the Israeli army. Then Barack Obama became the hope for peace in the conflict. However, there has been no improvement and the negotiations collapsed after Israel refused to extend the freeze of settlement construction in the West Bank.

Lately Al-Jazeera has published secret documents about the negotiations which showed that many Palestinian negotiators have begun to look toward a one-state solution. They have also been ready for many vital concessions. This is a main evidence of the frail position of Abbas in the Palestinian Authority.

4-INSTRUMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS IN THE ISRAEL - PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

4.1 BEGINNING OF THE EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT INTO THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND DECLARATORY DIPLOMACY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The EU has involved into the Middle East Peace Process since 1970s. From its beginning the EU has placed a priority on creating close relations with its neighbours from the Middle East, North Africa and Mediterranean region. The Middle East is in many ways becoming important for global strategic policies. The geopolitical turbulence and instability in these regions have widely preoccupied the European states, because their main aim is the achievement of secure, developed and stable conditions in their neighbourhood. As I have mentioned in the previous chapter, France and Britain were two major powers in the Middle East before the Suez crisis. After the Suez Crisis, the USA and the Soviet Union became the major powers in the Middle East. In this respect, after the creation of the ECSC, the Europeans tried to focus on the Middle East for regaining their historical in the Middle East. The EU's foreign policy rules on intergovernmental level and community level. The community's foreign policy instruments are:

- political declarations,
- regional initiatives,
- CFSP level,
- economic aid.

The cooperation agreements with the Middle East and the Mediterranean states have been signed since 1960s. But European states had no common view on the Arab-Israel conflict because their different historical ties with Israel and the Palestinians. Another problem was the lack of mechanism for common foreign policy of the EC. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six Days War each of the six member states had taken different positions in terms of who they would support, exposing the wide areas of political disagreement between them and their

lack of a common foreign policy.⁸⁰ The Netherlands and Luxembourg supported Israel and Italy and France did not. The failure of the EC about common voice on 1967 war, led them to build a mechanism for coordination of foreign policies. The Arab-Israeli conflict and the subsequent peace process have been one of the most strongly debated issues by the EU Member States since the establishment of EPC in early 1970s.

The EU had declarations and joint actions on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1971 the Europeans agreed, for the first time, on a common document, the Schumann Document, which reaffirmed the central character of Resolutions of 242 and 338 of the UN Security Council as a basis for the settlement of the conflict.⁸¹ The status of Schuman Document was unclear. In the beginning of the 1970s, I can argue that the EU's position on peace process did not include any words to the Palestinians as an independent entity. The important step was the first declaration within the framework of the EPC published on 6 November 1973 in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War. The Brussels Declaration called for peace between nations. This was the first time the EC called "Palestinians" in place of "Arab refugees" and recognized the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and right to express a national identity. The Euro-Arab dialogue was founded in the same year. The Europeans wanted to create a forum for addressing the future economic relations and cooperation between Europe and the Arab world. The EC's focus was on economic issues but, yet the Arab aim with the EC was to reach an acknowledgement for the Palestinian cause as much as to improve the trade links. As most of the EC member states were anyway more inclined than the United States to consider both Arab and Israeli claims for the US, the process of involvement, seemed to take the Europeans further away from the United States and more towards an independent foreign policy.⁸²

Between 1973 and 1980, the Arab political pressure on EC Member States had been one of the reasons in their gradual adoption of a pro-Arab stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The London Declaration of 1977 had taken the Palestinian problem as the conflict's core subject. And the EC recognized the right for the Palestinian homeland. Declaration also called for the representation of the Palestinian people in the peace talks.

⁸⁰ Hazel Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy, What it is and What it does?* Pluto Press, London and Sterling Virginia, 2002, p. 168.

⁸¹ Maria Gianniou, *The European Union's involvement in the Israel-Palestinian conflict: an active paradigm of European foreign Policy?* Prepared for the European Consortium for Political Research, 3rd Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Bilgi University, Istanbul, 21-23 September 2006.

⁸² Smith, p. 131.

Three years after the London Declaration, the EC produced another important document about the Middle East. It was the Venice Declaration in 1980. There the EC recognized the security and self-determination rights of the Palestinian people. With the 1980 Venice Declaration, the European Community called for the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the peace negotiations. The EC's support for the self-determination implicitly recognised the Palestinian right to a state alongside Israel and it was the basis for the EU's support for a negotiated two-state solution.⁸³ Article 4 of the declaration says: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.⁸⁴ The Venice Declaration also asked Israel to end the occupation it had continued since 1967 and identified the Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories as a serious obstacle to the peace process and as illegal under the international law. The Declaration was dismissed by Israel and essentially ignored by the United States. Yet its core principles were adopted in the Oslo Accords signed in Washington by the Israeli Government and the PLO in 1993.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the Venice Declaration did not offer great expectations to the PLO.

This declaration was a milestone in the EU's Middle East Policy. During 1980s the Middle East had become more unstable because by the Islamic Fundamentalism had risen after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. The Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were other essential events which directly effected the stability in the region. These declarations were the inception steps for the common Middle East Policy of the EC in the 1970s and 1980s. After the Venice Declaration, the EC member states also tried to build their own Middle East peace policies. In this respect, they had two missions to help the Middle East process. These two missions (Thorn mission and Van der Klaauw mission) failed. Another important fact was that France started to change its Middle East policy. Mitterrand did not support any European peace initiative in the Middle East. Especially, after the Camp David, the US was the driver of the Middle East Peace process. During that period, some member states (as France and UK) individually carried on their Middle East initiatives but they made no progress.

⁸³ The EU and the Middle East Peace Process, European Union Committee 26th report of Session 2006-2007, Volume I: Report, House of Lords Papers 132-I. The Authority of the House of Lords, London, 2007, p. 9.

⁸⁴ The Venice Declaration;

http://www.eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declaration_1980_en.pdf

⁸⁵ Rosemary Hollis, *The Basic Stakes and Strategy of the EU and Member States. European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict* Ed. By Esra Bulut Aymat, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2010, 31-42, p. 35.

The declaratory diplomacy of the EU had always stressed on the European values such as, human rights, rule of law, democracy and mutual trust. And many of the most important EU statements criticized to Israel for their un-legal behaviour against international law. However it had only an advisory role. In the Venice Declaration, the EC had mentioned the self-determination right of the Palestinian People and the invitation of the PLO into peace negotiations but there were no proposals to put these arguments into action. During 1980s, the EC's Middle East policy was based in declarations. Their role was secondary behind the US in 1980s. The EU's policies on the Middle East were complementary for the Middle East policy of the US. The EU lack of military capabilities and sufficient political instruments induced the Union mostly to focus on economic issues during the 1990s.⁸⁶ The other reasons behind the EU's complementary role were the Israeli and the American objection against the EU's participation in the negotiation process as an active political player. Because Israel feared from the EU's pro-Arab manner and the US wanted to be the only dominator in the peace process and excluded the EU from the negotiation process.

4.2 MORE ACTIVE EUROPE IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS IN THE 1990S

The developments in this period showed that the EU started to become more active in the Middle Peace Process. The EU became directly involved in parallel with the US in the 1990s. During the Cold War period, the EU had a declaratory diplomacy in Arab-Israeli peace process. The European threat perceptions had changed after the falling of the Berlin Wall. The political and economic instability in the Middle East and in the South East Mediterranean have been the reason for the EU's involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process in the post-Cold War period.

By the early 1990s, however, the EC/EU was started in its role towards the South by its inability to act as anything other than a junior partner to the United States in the Gulf War of 1990/91 and the subsequent Middle East peace process.⁸⁷ In the period of 1970s and 1980 declarations of the EU supported the Palestinian people. In this respect, the perception of the

⁸⁶ Mesut Özcan, European Union's Middle East Policy and Turkey, *Avrasya Etüdleri*, No: 27-28, 153-173, TİKA, Ankara, p. 156.

⁸⁷ Smith, p. 13.

EU was negative in the Israeli public opinion. After the essential negotiations with Israel, the EC could participate in the Madrid peace process in 1991. During the Madrid Peace process, the EC focused on the importance of international law and forced to Israel to accept the 'land for peace' solution. But the Palestinian diplomats accepted that the EU did not have a political role in the peace process. The EU did not participate in the bilateral talks in Washington. Nevertheless, the EU became the chair of the Regional Development Working Group which was established in Madrid Peace process. The REDWG was the most essential instrument of the Madrid Peace process on the multilateral and economical level. It helped the political ties and cooperation between the Arabs and the Israelis; it was the forum for coming together of both sides. After the creation of the REDWG and signing of the Oslo Agreements, the EU was the most important donor to the peace process.

With the Treaty on the European Union, the EU started to build common foreign policy mechanisms. After the pillarization process, the EU aimed to increase its influence in the world politics. The Middle East problem was the essential stage to succeed in this aim. During that period the EU supported financially and monitored the Palestinian elections in January 1996 and appointed the Spanish diplomat Miguel Angel Moratinos as the special envoy of the EU for the peace process in the 1996. This new envoy was mandated to report back to the EU opportunities for involvement in political aspects of the peace process and to assist Israel and the PA in their negotiations, as well as to monitor violations of the existing agreements.⁸⁸

4.2.1 EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP

Since 1972, the EU had tried to develop a common Mediterranean policy. In this respect, the first common European policy towards the MENA region was Global Mediterranean Policy. The EC launched its program at the Paris Summit of October 1972. It modified in 1990 after the end of Cold War. However, the most essential policy of the EU towards the Middle East was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also known, Barcelona Process, was launched in November 1995 at the Barcelona Conference. The conference brought together the European Member states with twelve states from the North Africa and the Middle East for maintain peace, prosperity and cooperation. These twelve partners were: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the

⁸⁸ Miller, p. 645

Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Two of them, Cyprus and Malta became members of the EU on 1 May 2004, and Turkey is also a candidate for full membership. In the Barcelona Declaration, the main policy document adopted by the Conference, the Euro-Mediterranean partners established the three main objectives of the Partnership:

- The definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue (Political and Security Chapter),
- The construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free trade zone (Economic and Financial Chapter),
- The rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, Cultural and Human Chapter).⁸⁹

In the beginning of 1990s, the EU needed a new Mediterranean policy because of the enlargement of the EU to the East, the civil war in Algeria, the Gulf War 1990/91, unstable conditions in the Middle East, and illegal immigration from the MENA countries. The continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a major obstacle to the south's ability to create its own regional cooperation network or to bring its own agenda or vision to the Euro-Med dialogue. The aim of the EMP is also to encourage 'horizontal' or 'South –South' integration through the creation of free trade areas among the Mediterranean Partners.⁹⁰ The Euro-Med's political focus stopped short of entering into the details of the continuing conflict, but sought to support peace-building efforts by building regional integration, including the promotion of a Mediterranean Free Trade Zone by the year 2010.⁹¹ The EU would support the private sector in the Mediterranean states and encourage private European direct investment in the region. And the EMP seeks to facilitate exchanges between civil society and ordinary citizens (particularly women and youth), and increase the level of reciprocal tolerance and respect for pluralism.⁹² The EMP could be an example for logic of neo-functional behaviour for the EU's Mediterranean and Middle East policy with soft power instruments. Because it aimed to

⁸⁹ Zervoudaki, p. 2.

⁹⁰ Nello, p. 384.

⁹¹ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 26th Report of session 2006-7, 'The EU and the Middle East Peace Process, London, 2007, p. 49.

⁹² Rouba Al-Fattal, The Foreign Policy of the EU in the Palestinian Authority, CEPS Working Document No:328, Brussels, 2010, p. 41

promote economical re-construction of the region with encourage norms and political dialogue for foster integration between the MENA countries and the EU.

The Mediterranean Partnership consists of a series of bilateral association agreements as well as Barcelona Declaration, which provides for a broad multilateral cooperation in sectors such as agriculture, energy, tourism and youth.⁹³ And multilateralism is an important policy for the Europeanization for other regions in the European periphery. The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements were the documentary bases of the Partnership. The MEDA Programme is the main financial instrument of the EU for the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Programme, and it allocated 5.3 billion euros for the 2000-06 period.⁹⁴ It was the same for period of 1995-2001. The MEDA accounted for 5.1 billion euros of the total 6.4 billion euros of budgetary resources allocated for financial cooperation between the European Union and its Mediterranean Partners.⁹⁵ The EU trade with the Mediterranean Partner Countries (billion euros) during the period of 1990-2001 was:

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Imports	26.6	27.8	28.2	28.0	30.5	32.1	35.3	41.3	42.5	47.2	64.7	67.4
Exports	33.5	35.0	36.6	43.5	43.9	50.6	56.9	65.3	68.0	69.4	87.0	75.3
Balance	6.9	7.2	8.4	15.5	13.4	18.5	21.6	23.9	25.5	22.2	22.2	7.9

Source: Eurostat⁹⁶

The EU signed the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreement with Israel on 20 November 1995; it came into force in 2000. The cooperation agreement with the Palestinian Authority was signed on 24 February 1997. By these agreements, the EU tried to help political interaction between the Palestinians and Israelis. But the Middle East Peace process is not the main aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

The Barcelona Process, with its hybrid multi and bilateral structure bringing together Israelis, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese, and with a political and security basket of cooperation became a forum where the Middle East Peace Process has been debated despite

⁹³ Dağcı, p. 181.

⁹⁴ Nello, p. 384.

⁹⁵ Zervoudaki, p. 2.

⁹⁶ http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/6-14032002-AP/EN/6-14032002-AP-EN.HTML.

*the fact of not having been designed with this purpose. In fact, the founding stone of this partnership, the Barcelona Declaration stated that ‘ Euro-Mediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that will contribute to their success’ implying that Middle East peace process is not the aim of the Barcelona Process.*⁹⁷

According to the Palestinian Development Plan four priorities were determined for distribution of the European aid. These priorities were:

- The development of infrastructure
- The creation of stable institutions
- The development of social and human resources and economic sector.

The EMP was independent from the MEPP but it was only a mechanism of the EU in the Middle East without the USA. Discussions were about security issues in the EMP built within the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group. The EMP tried to help peace-building and conflict resolution process by foundations and regional economical integration. But the Barcelona Process directly affected the Arab-Israeli conflict. The main gain of the Barcelona Process was to increase the mutual trust between the Middle Eastern countries and the European Union's member states and it helped the socio – economic conditions in the Middle Eastern societies. However, the difficulties and the eventual collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process are frequently highlighted as the main element in the failing of the Barcelona Process, and in particular the lack of any real determination of the parties to draw up a security charter for the region.⁹⁸ The process entered into uncertain situation after the outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada. The Marseilles conference of foreign ministers in 15-16 November 2000 was cancelled because Syria and Lebanon did not want to sit around the same table with Israel. They protested the military reaction of the Israeli army during the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The main weakness of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁹⁷ Eduard Soler i Lecha, The EU and the Arab Peace Initiative: Promoting a regional approach, Isreali Policy Network and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Herzilya and Tel-Aviv, 2010, p. 4.

⁹⁸ Peters, p. 518.

The Barcelona Process did not achieve peace in the region. Because it was not designed as a political instrument; it is the most important handicap of it. The main intention was the economical integration of the region. The creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 was the aim of the Partnership, but we are in 2011 and there is no Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area. The strong asymmetry between the EU and MENA countries is an important weakness of the Barcelona Process.

4.2.2 THE EU'S DIPLOMACY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1990S AND THE BERLIN DECLARATION

In the second half of the 1990s, the core subject of the Middle East Peace process was the Oslo peace process. The Oslo agreement and the US diplomatic hesitation in the Clinton administration's first year – together with the active Israeli diplomatic efforts and the Arab calls for the European involvement – led the European governments, not content with being the largest financial contributors to the peace process, to seek for a larger political role in that process.⁹⁹ In the 1990s the EU was able to pursue economic development of the Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza, under the Oslo process, in tandem with the US leadership on negotiations.¹⁰⁰ The Appointment of the EU Special Envoy for the MEPP was the signal to the region about the changes the EU policy in the Middle East.

The EU started to play a political role with the USA which was the major actor in the Middle East peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The United States and the European Union signed 'A New Transatlantic Agenda' agreement in 1995. By this agreement both sides became committed to joint political and economical. The priorities for joint action in the area of security to included the implementing of the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the supporting of the Middle East peace process, the supporting democratic institutions and the development of market economies in Central and Eastern Europe, improving the joint preventive and crisis diplomacy, defending the human rights, reforming the United Nations, promoting the nuclear non-proliferation, the international disarmament

⁹⁹ Ghassan Salame, *Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Europe and the Middle East in the post Cold War era*. The Middle East and Europe. Ed. By B.A Roberson, Routledge, London, 20–44, p. 25.

¹⁰⁰ Rosemary Hills, *The Basic Stakes and Strategy of the EU and Member States, European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, EUISS, Paris, 2010, 31-42, p. 36.

and controls on arms transfers.¹⁰¹ But the EU never had been a major mediator in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Israel and Palestinian Authority Wye River Memorandum on 23 October 1998 in Maryland was about the withdrawal of the Israeli troops from West Bank. In Maryland, President Clinton and the US were the main negotiators and the EU was excluded.

As mentioned the Venice Declaration was the most important document in the EU's Middle East policy. The EU's position was based on this declaration and it was connected with the recognition of the self-determination right and legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. When Yasser Arafat tried in 1999 unilaterally to declare the creation of a Palestinian state, the EU leaders declared their "readiness to consider the recognition of the Palestinian State in due course".¹⁰² The Part IV of the Berlin Declaration says:

*The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfilment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region.*¹⁰³

This was a historic moment for the EU because member states declared their readiness to recognise the Palestinian state which would be established on the international law and the agreements through negotiations. The EU had tried to improve its political role in the Middle East during the 1990s. At the end of 1999, Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative of the CFSP. He was a respected personality in the international community because of his former duties in NATO. He had a positive effect on the EU's external relations and improvements on the Middle East policy. The EU was represented by Javier Solana in the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit on 17 October 2000 in Egypt. They decided to establish so-called

¹⁰¹ Smith, p. 138.

¹⁰² Maria Gianniou, The EU and the Middle Eastern Conflict, Europe and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: an Overview, The Hellenic Center for European Studies, (EKEM), December 2009, online publication: <http://www.ekem.gr/component/content/article/129-2010-01-04-13-53-02/1001--the-eu-and-the-middle-eastern-conflict>.

¹⁰³ The Berlin Declaration: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFB2.html.

Mitchell Committee* and one of the members of the committee was Javier Solana. This was an evidence of the increasing role of the EU's political involvement in the Middle East peace process. Also, the EU's special envoy Miguel Angel Moratinos attended the Taba peace talks on January 2001. It was the time to start a more active role for the EU in the negotiations. The declaratory diplomacy is the main mechanism for the EU in the peace process since 1970s. The Political role of the EU increased and the EU changed its foreign policy role from payer to player. This role has continued in the beginning of new millennium.

4.3 PERFORMANCE OF THE EU IN THE POST-9/11 PERIOD, NEW DECLARATORY DIPLOMACY DOCUMENTS AND NEW INSTRUMENTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

The EU's increasing political role was picking up in the beginning of the 2000s at the Taba Talks and Sharm el-Sheikh Summit. The efforts of the EU's Special Envoy of the Middle East Peace Process had created a positive atmosphere for the re-start of the negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. But the elections in Israel on the 6 February 2001 resulted in victory of the right wing party, Likud. The leader of the Likud Party Ariel Sharon declared that he refused the negotiations with Yasser Arafat. The developments in this period, enthusiasm to accept the EU role in the Middle East peace process was negative in Israel. With the assistance of the government of Greece, on 4 April 2001, the EU's high representative for CFSP (Javier Solana) and the EU special representative managed to broker the first high-level meeting in Athens between the Israelis and the Palestinians, after Sharon became the Israeli prime minister.¹⁰⁴

The negative Israeli view on the EU's political initiatives was the most essential obstacle for the political role of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The declaratory diplomacy of the EU continued with the Seville Declaration of the June 2002, and the EU underlined its determination on the two state solution. The Seville Declaration says:

* Former US Senator George Mitchell, the former President of Turkey Suleyman Demirel and Javier Solana declared the need of 'cease-fire, stop of terrorism, end of violence, restart of negotiations' for Middle East peace by this report.

¹⁰⁴ Al-Fattal, p. 19.

*‘A settlement can be achieved through negotiation, and only through negotiation. The objective is an end to occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor adjustments agreed by the parties. The end result should be two States living side by side within secure and recognised borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbours’.*¹⁰⁵

The EU’s position on the MEPP has demonstrated continuity and consistency on the two state solution. This consistency continued within the new mechanism for the MEPP where the EU is one of the members. Terrorism took a new dimension in the world after the shocking attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, which not only confronted the American government with a challenge of huge proportions, but also had serious repercussions in the Arab world.¹⁰⁶ In that period, the active Saudi diplomacy led to the adoption by the Arab League of the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002. Arab leaders collectively offered Israel the recognition of its right to exist and the normalisation of diplomatic ties in exchange for its complete withdrawal from Arab lands captured since 1967.¹⁰⁷ In the case of the Arab Peace Initiative the EU has been united in welcoming the proposal of the positions and priorities of the EU (two state solution, multilateralism and engagement of regional actors) and as it is widely seen as a positive step forward to a long-lasting peace.¹⁰⁸ But for the Israelis it was not an acceptable basis for the peace talks, especially because of the difficult issue of the ‘right of return’ of refugees.

4.3.1 THE MIDDLE EAST QUARTET

The creation of the Quartet in 2002 the peace process strengthened the political role of the EU. The Quartet included the US, the EU, the UN and Russia. On 9 April 2002, the Chairman of the EU Foreign Ministers Jose Pique, suggested the introduction of sanctions against Israel if the Israeli Defence Forces were not pulled out from the occupied territories a meeting in Madrid the following day with representatives from the UN, the EU, the USA and Russia, he also announced a new peace plan, of fairly modest ambitions, to be launched by Russia, the

¹⁰⁵ The Seville Declaration:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72638.pdf#page=36.

¹⁰⁶ Blinkenberg, p. 219.

¹⁰⁷ Al-Fattal, p. 20.

¹⁰⁸ Lecha, p. 2

USA and the UN together.¹⁰⁹ This was an essential step for the legitimacy of the EU's involvement as a main component to fund the peace-building process in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The EU's acceptance as a member of the Quartet was supposed to facilitate the relations between the EU and Israel. Israel now accepted the EU as a mediator in the peace process. The creation of the Quartet helped in the institutionalization of the EU-US transatlantic cooperation in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In theory the four partners are equal within the group, each playing a complementary role but the other partners of the Quartet were not as active as the two transatlantic actors.

The EU and the US played the leading roles in the Quartet. The EU's relationship with the US concerning the Middle East Peace Process is conditioned by their joint membership of the Quartet.¹¹⁰ They began to assume similar views about the resolution of the conflict and the MEPP. They always reaffirmed in the Quartet Statements that negotiations should lead to an end of the occupation and resolve all permanent status issues, in order to end the conflict and to achieve a two-state solution based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242(1967) and 338(1973).

In 2002, in the wake of the failure of the Oslo Process, the Danish Presidency of the EU drafted and gained the EU-wide support for a new 'Road Map' approach as a framework for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations towards the goal of a two-state solution.¹¹¹ A major success of the EU was the 'Road Map' that the Quartet officially presented to the Palestinian and Israeli leaders in April 2003. Since 2003 the official position of the EU has been to support the implementation of the Road Map, working within the Quartet for a political settlement and, as a major financier, mounting assistance and state-building operations in the Palestinian territories.¹¹² It was a 'performance-based' and 'goal-driven' plan, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet; in short, "a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian

¹⁰⁹ Blinkenberg, p. 229.

¹¹⁰ Carolin Gorezig, Transforming the Quartet principles: Hamas and the Peace Process, Occasional Paper 85, EUISS, 2010, Paris, p. 7

¹¹¹ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 26th Report of session 2006-7, 'The EU and the Middle East Peace Process, London, 2007, p. 11.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 30.

conflict.”¹¹³ The objective of the plan was to achieve a final and detailed reconciliation of the conflict by 2005 on the basis of the three phases of the Quartet. These phases were;

- The first phase ends Palestinian- Israeli violence, freezing the settlements in the occupied territories, helping the Palestinians in their state-building and the normalization of Palestinian life in their lands. (by May 2003)
- The second phase leads to the creation of an independent and democratic Palestinian state with the provisional borders and new constitution. (by June/Dec 2003)
- As the third phase, the final negotiations will be held on pre-1967 borders, on Jerusalem as the capital city of two states, and on the solution of refugee problem. (by 2004/5)

The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations began after the acceptance of the Road Map by the Palestinians and Israelis. The Palestinians had some doubts about the Road Map but the geopolitical conditions forced them to accept it. The Israeli government accepted it with some reservations after the guarantees of the US. In response to the election of the Palestinian Hamas-led government in 2006, the Quartet broke off contact with the government (though not with the President) and drew up three principles, (which have been widely interpreted as conditions) for a resumption of direct contacts and aid.¹¹⁴ The Quartet has posed three conditions that have to be fulfilled by the Palestinians parties before a Palestinian government will be recognised by the international community: the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of violence and adherence to the previous diplomatic agreements.¹¹⁵ The financial and political isolation of Hamas, as well as the fact that Fatah’s security forces are bolstered and assisted by the international donors, directly contributed to Hamas refusal to accept the Quartet principles.¹¹⁶ In June 2006, the European Commission and the World Bank established the Temporary International Mechanism to help the socio-economic conditions which continued to deteriorate in the Palestinian territories. This mechanism was developed by the EU at the request of the Quartet and endorsed by the European Council in order to facilitate the direct delivery of assistance to the Palestinian people, thus avoiding any financial links with the PA government.¹¹⁷ The aim of this mechanism is to bypass the Hamas

¹¹³ The Roadmap: Full text

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/2989783.stm>.

¹¹⁴ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 26th Report of session 2006-7, ‘The EU and the Middle East Peace Process, London, 2007, p. 33.

¹¹⁵ Goerzig, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Goerzig, p. 13.

¹¹⁷ EU Commission Official Web Page about the TIM:

administration by giving aid directly to the Palestinian People. By the end of 2010, the EU is expected to donate 455 million Euros. But the political pressure on Hamas is a dilemma in the name of the democratic values and standards. Hamas was elected by the Palestinians but the EU had cut the dialogue with it. The EU has seriously weakened its leverage on the Hamas government in Gaza, which has become more authoritarian and conservative.¹¹⁸

The EU membership in the Quartet has enabled it to extend its access and influence to policy-makers in the region, particularly as the EU is now also perceived as having a more unified voice than in the past.¹¹⁹ In this respect, the EU should be more active and its exertions should be more effective to continue to increase its political role in Middle East. In the Israeli-Palestinian problem the characteristic role of the EU -the economic contribution- became obvious during the initiative of the Quartet.¹²⁰ The structural limitations of the CFSP and its intergovernmental conformation negatively affect this role. The EU had another regional mechanism to help the friends in reconstruction of the region as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and namely the European Neighbourhood Project.

4.3.2 THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

The EU has been trying to create regional and intra-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean region. It furthers peace between the Israelis and Palestinians and it has indirectly contributed to the promotion of peace, security and stability in the region. The European Neighbourhood Policy was launched in 2003 for preparing the Union and its foreign policy for relations with Europe's new eastern and southern neighbours following the 2004 enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy is for the countries in the Eastern Europe and Southern Mediterranean with no prospect of the EU membership. The ENP covers Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Russia is not a part of the ENP because it has another programme with the EU called the 'Strategic Partnership'. Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan are in the ENP because of Turkey's candidacy for the EU membership. The ENP is designed as a soft power instrument to support partners in

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/countrycooperation/occupied_palestinian_territory/tim/index_en.htm

¹¹⁸ Tocci, p. 395.

¹¹⁹ House of Lords, Select Committee on the European Union, 26th Report of session 2006-7, The EU and the Middle East Peace Process, London, 2007, p. 34.

¹²⁰ Mesut Özcan, Harmonizing Foreign Policy, Turkey, the EU and Middle East, Ashgate, Cornwall, 2008, p. 68.

conflict resolution efforts and based on shared values such as the rule of law, good governance, respect for the human rights, minority rights, establishing of market economy and sustainable development. The European Neighbourhood Policy seeks to support the political and economic reforms of neighbouring countries on the basis of partnership and shared values.¹²¹ Until 31 December 2006, EU assistance to the countries of the ENP and to Russia was provided under various geographical programmes including TACIS (for Eastern neighbours and Russia) and MEDA (for Southern Mediterranean neighbours), as well as thematic programmes such as EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights).¹²² There is a discussion about political developments but its role is limited. The common dialogues are about the ‘management’ of the Association Agreements. The ENP does not replace the multilateral framework of the EMP but the main difference between the EMP and the ENP is that the new one is based on the bilateral relations as a contrast to the multilateral structure of the EMP.

To stabilize of the EU’s neighbourhood in the East and South, the ENP and European Security Strategy are in accordance. It was pointed out in the European Security Strategy:

*“Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European Interest that countries on our borders are well governed. Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe... Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved.”*¹²³

If the partner country of the ENP agrees, it would define a set of jointly agreed priorities in an Action Plan aimed at bringing the partner country as close as possible to the EU.¹²⁴ These Action Plans under the ENP replaced the existing bilateral agreements.

¹²¹ Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 10633/1/06 REV 1, Conc 2, 17 July 2006.

¹²² Official Page of the EU Commission: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/funding_en.htm.

¹²³ European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 2003, p. 35-6 : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/librairie/PDF/QC7809568ENC.pdf.

¹²⁴ Nello, p. 383.

Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have been included in the ENP, when the ENP action plans with the two parties were published in 2004.¹²⁵ The Plans included political dialogue between two sides, governance reforms and preparing them to enter the EU's internal market. In the Action Plan with Israel, the EU and Israel agreed on some priorities which are related with peaceful settlement of the Arab Israeli conflict. The EU and Israel agreed on: their cooperation furthers the comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to the Road Map, supports the Palestinian Authority to stop terrorist activities and violence, facilitates the secure and safe movement of civilians and goods in occupied territories in Gaza and the West Bank, respect to the international law, improves the socio-economic standards of both the Israelis and the Palestinians, helps improving access of international assistance, supports the reforms for transparency, accountability and democratic governance in the Palestinian Authority and consolidation of security mechanism in the region. All this kind of priorities are in accordance with the Road Map. As a result, the EU-Israeli Action Plan offers a greater access for the Israeli firms to the EU in exchange for the Israeli recognition of the EU as a mediator in the Middle East Peace Process.¹²⁶

However, the interpretations about the EU-Israeli Action plan were different in the EU and Israel. For the EU, the Action Plan represented Israel's official welcome of the EU's involvement in the peace process with the principles of the Road Map. But for Israel, the Action Plan was primarily to the increase the bilateral economic relations and economic integration of Israel in the EU's internal market. Thus, it is not an instrument for solving the conflict. The Israelis have been successful in excluding the conflict talks from bilateral talks with the EU.

Unlike Israel, the EU has used the ENP as an effective tool for the Road Map objectives set in the Palestinian side. The Action Plan with Palestinian Authority states:

“Enlargement offers the opportunity for the EU and the Palestinian Authority to create the conditions for developing an increasingly close relationship in preparation for a future

¹²⁵ Tocci, p. 389.

¹²⁶ Roland Dannreuther, Developing the Alternative to Enlargement: The Neighbourhood Policy, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol:11, 183-201, Wolters Kluwer, Montreal, p. 200.

*Palestinian State, going beyond co-operation, to involve a significant measure of economic integration and deepening of political cooperation’’.*¹²⁷

Also the EU and the Palestinian Authority agreed on some priorities which are directly or indirectly related with the Middle East Peace process. The first priority is to speed up the peace process for a fair solution. The second priority is to increase the socio-economic standards of the Palestinians and support the political reforms in the PA toward the creation of an independent, sovereign and democratic state determined in the Road Map. These priorities are directly related with the reforms process in the PA. In this respect the EU and the Authority agreed on several actions. The Action Plan supports the reforms for establishment of democracy, good governance and economic development. These plans also have a supportive role for the MEDA programs. It is important that the Action Plans, the EU/ Israel Action Plan and the EU/PA Action Plan clearly state that the EU-Israel and the EU/PA relationship will depend on the joint implementation of the priorities. However, Hamas victory in 2006 and the division to Hamas controlled Gaza and Fatah controlled West Bank have blurred the role of the ENP.

4.4 THE EUROPEAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY

Since the 1993 Oslo Agreement the EU has been interested in technical and financial assistance to support the peace process. The political and cultural institutions in the Palestinian Authority benefited from the EU aid and assistance. In recent years the EU has increasingly turned its attention to the Palestinian security sector, pursuing a twin track approach of, first, rebuilding institutions and capacities largely destroyed during the Second Intifada, and second, enhancing the effectiveness of the security organs by reforming the highly fragmented, opaque and unaccountable structures inherited from the Arafat era.¹²⁸ In this respect, the EU carried out two civilian crisis management operations under the umbrella

¹²⁷ EU/Palestinian Authority Action Plan:

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/pa_enp_ap_final_en.pdf.

¹²⁸ Muriel Asseburg, EU Crisis Management in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Ed.By Esra Bulut Aymat, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2010, 75–87, p. 78.

of the European Security and Defence Policy in the Palestinian Authority. These two security missions are directly related with the EU's assisting role in the Quartet.

4.4.1 EUBAM RAFAH

After the unilateral disengagement of Israel from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the Palestinian-Egyptian border has been one of the essential problems of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In this respect, the Special Envoy prepared the November 2005 Israeli-Palestinian Agreement on Movement and Access including the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing.¹²⁹

<u>Time Period</u> : November 2005 to date. Operations suspended since June 2007.
<u>Budget</u> : 2005: €1.7 million; 2006-mid 2007: €5.9 million; mid-2007-24 November 2008: €7 million; 25 November 2008-24 November 2009: €2.5 million.
<u>Mission strength</u> : 24 international staff and 8 local staff (August 2009); 72 international staff and 11 local staff (June 2007)
<u>Contributing states</u> : 21 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)

The Rafah crossing point is the only crossing between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. The European Union Border Assistance Mission – code name EUBAM Rafah – was launched on 24 November 2005, to monitor the operations of the crossing point after Israel and the Palestinian Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access on 15 November 2005.¹³⁰ The EU EUBAM Rafah is the first ESDP operations of the EU. The 30 policeman started to help the monitoring of the Rafah border in November 2005.

¹²⁹ Asseburg, p. 80.

¹³⁰ Official page of the EUBAM Rafah,
<http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/node/2296>.

The EUBAM Rafah enabled the EU to play an important role in the security dimension of the peace process. For the first time, the EU police personal had taken a role for security dimension. About 75 Police officers have been worked in this mission. These officers were coming from 17 different member states of the EU. The EUBAM Rafah had a significant role for the Palestinian people in the Gaze Strip. In 2005-2007, approximately 450.000 passengers used the EUBAM Rafah. It helped to obtain the freedom of movement for the Palestinian people and goods in and out of the Gaza Strip and improve their life standards. It also contributed to the Israeli security against threats which would come through the Rafah Crossing Point including possible weapon transfers. The EUBAM Rafah mission also helped the other ESDP operations in the region. However, the border transactions were restricted due to the political conditions after the June 2006 capturing of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by Hamas. The EUBAM Rafah mission was temporarily suspended in June 2007 by political pressure of Israel on the EU. The EUBAM Rafah staff was located in Ashkelon for re-engage in 24 hours. The border has been closed since 2007. After the May 2010 flotilla crisis with Turkey, and following international pressure, the Israeli government decided to relax about the closing of the Rafah Border crossing. The Egyptian Authorities decided to reopen the border crossing after the amazing uprising in Egypt which ousted of President Hosni Mubarak on February 2011.

4.4.2 EUPOL COPPS

The second mission under the structure of the ESDP is EUPOL COPPS. In January 2006, the EU started the EU Police Coordinating Office for the Palestinian Police Support to develop the Palestinian police forces. The mission's headquarters is in Ramallah, and 42 unarmed personal has worked in Ramallah, the West Bank and in Gaza.

<u>Time Period</u> : November 2005 to date
<u>Budget</u> : 2005: €2.5 million; 2006: €6.1 million; 1 January 2007- 29 February 2008: €2.8 million; 1 March 2008-31 December 2008: €6 million ; 1 January-31 December 2009: €6.2 million
<u>Mission strength</u> : 42 international staff and 19 local staff (September 2009).

Contributing states: 21 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom)

The aim is to establish sustainable and effective policing arrangements and to advise the Palestinians on criminal justice and rule of law in accordance with the best international standards and in co-operation with the EU institution-building programmes conducted by the European Commission.¹³¹ However, it very quickly found itself struggling with a radical change in circumstances following the victory of Hamas in 2006 elections and its formation of a government in March.¹³²

During its duty with the Palestinian Authority, the EUPOL COPPS mission has been interested in the development of the Palestinian infrastructure standards of technological equipments. It has focused on training of the Palestinian police to improve their standards more democratic, accountable and transparent. The Europeans cooperating closely with their American counterparts engaged in training and equipping the more robust security forces, were especially concerned with enabling the Palestinian Authority to fulfil its obligations under the 2003 Roadmap of restoring order and fighting terrorism effectively. In addition to equipping and training the Palestinian police, EUPOL COPPS has coordinated financial assistance from the EU countries and the other international donors to the Palestinian Civil Police.

In order to reform the Palestinian Criminal Justice System, the rule of law section of the EUPOL COPSS was established in October 2007. This section focused on advising, program planning and project facilitation for the Palestinian Justice Sector. The main aim of the EU was the development of the instruments on prosecution and investigation, together with judicial level. In this respect, Mission acts in a close co-operation with the European Community's institution building programmes as well as other international efforts in the security sector including criminal justice reform.¹³³ However, the EUPOLL COPPS refuses to

¹³¹ The official web page of the EUPOL COPPS: <http://www.eupolcopps.eu/content/what-eupol-copps>.

¹³² Assenburg, p. 78.

¹³³ European Council Factsheet, EUPOL COPPS/02, 9 February 2006.
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/051222-EUPOL-COPPS.pdf>.

work with Hamas and took only a limited effect on the reform of Fatah's police forces. This has indirectly strengthened the territorial separation. In this respect EUPOLL COPPS mission has not been effective in increasing the Palestinians security standards.

4.4.3 THE EU IN UNIFIL MISSION AND AS AN OBSERVER IN THE PALESTINIAN ELECTIONS

These two ESDP missions boosted in a very positive way the position of the EU in making peace, security and stability under the aim of the MEPP. The EU has supported efforts for the stability in Lebanon since 2006 summer war. The Europeans have sought to support the Lebanese sovereignty, including the central government's control over the state's territory and borders, and to strengthen the governing institutions.¹³⁴ The EU is not an official member of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; half of its members are members of the UNIFIL. The EU member states and Turkey have a significant role in peace-building efforts and reconstruction of Lebanon after the 2006 summer war. Germany has helped to re-build the Lebanese navy and has played an important mediating role on indirect negotiations between Israel and Hezbollah. At the same time, the UNIFIL is very critical for the Israeli security. The UNIFIL could establish the peace at the northern borders of Israel and EUBAM Rafah could support the stability of the southern borders of Israel.

The EU has strongly supported the democratic elections everywhere in the world. In this respect the EU had the missions for monitoring the 2005 and 2006 elections of the Palestinian Authority. Before the elections, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Commissioner for External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy from 2004 to 2009, visited the region. She now continues her responsibilities in the ENP, and she declared that there were three objectives for her trip:

- to lend support to democracy building in the run-up to the Palestinian legislative elections;
- to underline the importance of the EU financial support;

¹³⁴ Assenburg, p. 81.

- to raise the visibility of a number of EU projects, notably in Gaza.¹³⁵

The EU has deployed 185 observers from the member states with Norway and Switzerland. The aim of the EUEOM was monitoring the election process in the light of the international norms and standards for democratic elections and they declared that elections were fair and transparent. This monitoring mission absolutely related with the European values and norms. Consolidated democracy can only built on free and fairly elections.

Also, the Delegation of the European Union to Israel is working in Ramat Gan. The Delegation is responsible for coordinating and managing official relations between Israel and the European Union. The Delegation has an essential duty for implementing the regional and bilateral relations of the EU, as the ENP, the EMP and the Action Plan with Israel.

The EU has been given a significant role in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East. They work for 4.8 million refugees in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The EU is the largest donor to the organisation, and provides 38% of the budget.

4.5 UNION FOR MEDITERRANEAN AS A NEW REGIONAL DIMENSION OR THE RE-START OF BARCELONA PROCESS

The EU has several regional policies for helping the Middle East Peace process. The EMP has provided a wide framework for political, economic and social relations between EU Member States and the partner countries in the Southern Mediterranean, based on democracy and human rights. Definitely, the EMP has contributed to the social and economic aspects of the peace process but not same to the political issues. In this respect, President Nicolas Sarkozy focused on the necessity to re-launch the Mediterranean policies of the EU. Under the auspices of the six-month French presidency of the EU, Sarkozy reinitiated the Barcelona process: The Union for the Mediterranean on 13 July 2008 – previously known as the Mediterranean Union. The launch of the UfM was a very French endeavour and resembled the

¹³⁵ European Commission 'Middle East Peace Process' Speech by Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 19 January 2006 in the Michelle Pace, *The End of EU democracy promotion and of the two-state solution? on the European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Ed.By Esra Bulut Aymat, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2010, 87–95, p. 92.

French behaviour leading to the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972.¹³⁶ The UfM must be analysed together with EMP and the ENP. It includes new members, like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro and has a new structure. The increased number of the participants and the weaknesses the EU's common foreign policies are reasons for the institutional structure of this new initiative. The institutional setting of the Euro-Mediterranean relations has shifted from 'regionalism + politicization' in the EMP, to 'bilateralism + functionalism' with the ENP, to 'bilateralism + politicization' in the UfM.¹³⁷

Both Israel and the Palestinian Authority have been included in the UfM.¹³⁸ The headquarter of this new institution is in Barcelona and 27 EU states and 16 Mediterranean states are members of this new community. These 16 states are: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia, Turkey, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The Central and northern EU states, first and foremost Germany, as well as the Commission, protested against the intergovernmentalization of the EU policy that the UfM entailed, shifting the EU decision-making to the southern Mediterranean coastal states.¹³⁹ Spain and Italy were concerned about the French domination in the Mediterranean policies of the EU. Also, Turkey rejected this plan rapidly. Turkey was not optimistic about this new community, because it could be an alternative platform to replace Turkey's full membership in the EU. The other EU states also rejected Sarkozy's proposal, with the view that it would be for only French interests in the region and it might create a division among the member states. The opposition to Sarkozy's new project caused the dissociation of the EU. Because of the rejection Sarkozy modified his project and guaranteed that Turkey's involvement in that project would not be an obstacle to full membership.

This new mechanism was formally started on 18 July 2008. The UfM intends to promote cooperation projects between the two shores of the Mediterranean in specific soft policy domains such as infrastructure, energy, environment and education.¹⁴⁰ It is focused on six specific projects, including the cleaning up of Mediterranean pollution, the development of

¹³⁶ Federica Bicchì, *The Union for the Mediterranean, or the Changing Context of Euro-Mediterranean Relations*, Mediterranean Politics, Vol – 16:1, 3-19, Routledge, London, 2011, p. 5.

¹³⁷ Bicchì, p.7.

¹³⁸ Al-Fattal, p. 85.

¹³⁹ Nathalie Tocci and Jean-Pierre Cassarino, *Rethinking the EU's Mediterranean Policies Post-1/11*, Working Papers 1106, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 2011, p. 7.

¹⁴⁰ Tocci, p. 392.

maritime fairways and land highways and the setting up of a joint civil protection program on prevention and response to disasters. Somehow, energy, migration and terrorism were missing from on the agenda. Yet, they are the main problems of the region.

Many Arabian countries and also the Arab League itself had were concerned for the Union for Mediterranean project. Notably, Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, argued that regional problems in the Middle East must be sincerely addressed before any other Mediterranean institution, organisation or platform. Muammar Gaddafi was the only leader who refused to attend the launch of the Mediterranean Union in Paris in July. In this respect, Libya has only an observer position in the UfM. According to Gaddafi, the UfM could harm 53 nations of the African Union. However, it offered a forum to Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Lebanon for engage their diplomacy. Ehud Olmert, Mahmoud Abbas and Bashar Al-Assad shared the same table.

This could have been successful for Sarkozy's diplomatic efforts but nothing more for the Arab-Israeli Peace process. Israel's military action of 2009, Operation Cast Lead is the main reason for freezing of the UfM's summit in 2009. As a result of the Gaza War, the EU put hold the discussions about advanced relations with Israel. During the Czech Presidency, the EU – Israel high level summit was cancelled because of the Gaza War. Also as a consequence of the war, a rightwing government was elected and it did not support a two state solution. Also, the Middle East–EU relations are further suffering from the refusal of the Arab members of the UfM to hold meetings with Avigdor Lieberman, who would represent Israel as its foreign minister. Lieberman has dismissed these boycott threats of the Arab States.¹⁴¹

A summit meeting scheduled for June 2010 was cancelled again because of the lack of any positive improvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and conditions in occupied territories. The evaluation of the MENA region's geopolitics is so important for the level of cooperation with the EU. Also, it is same for problems of the EU. The international financial crisis was another obstacle for the possible development of the UfM, because the EU member states focused now on their economic/financial crisis. And the EU should interest on the Mediterranean politics by two different approaches because of the Mashrek and Maghreb

¹⁴¹ Hareetz, 11–05–2010.

<http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/lieberman-dismisses-arab-threat-to-boycott-mediterranean-summit-1.289534>.

countries can have different problems and priorities. As Israel-Palestinian can be an important policy priority for Egypt but it is not same for Morocco. In this respect, the EU should be revised two different policies to the region.

The EU's unique structure, strong economic influence rather than weak military strength and scepticism of many Arab countries to the EU's policies in the region are main essential facts for the lack of capacity of the EU in the MEPP. Also, the lack of institutionalize relations is the main problem of the EU's long term relations with Middle East. A long term strategy should include support establishing the effective political and civil institutions. The economic side was the main tool of the process supports the EMP, ENP and UfM, but these are not enough for Europeanization process, and it is directly connected with MEPP.

4.6 - THE EU'S MAIN POSITIONS IN THE CORE PROBLEMS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

Over the past 40 years, the member states of the EU have defined with increasing clarity a common position concerning the parameters of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a firm support for Israel's right to security matched by an unwavering support for the right of the Palestinians to national self-determination.¹⁴² According to the EU, the Israeli settlement policy is unacceptable and settlement building anywhere in the Palestinian Authority and East Jerusalem, is illegal under the international law. The European Union urges the Government of Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and including natural growth, and to dismantle all outposts erected since March 2001.¹⁴³ This is a dilemma for the EU's policy on the settlements. This means that, according to the EU pre-2001 settlements can be legal under the international law.


The EU supports the right back of the Palestinian refugees to return back and all the international organizations, mechanism and policies towards the solution of refugee question. Since 1971, the EU has been supporting the work of the UNRWA. The European Union is ready to step up its already substantial emergency aid contribution and it will continue to

¹⁴² Joel Peters, *Europe and the Israel-Palestinian Peace Process: the Urgency of Now*, European Security, Vol-19:3, 511-529, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 511.

¹⁴³ Council statement on Israel's decision regarding settlements, Brussels, 18.12.2009.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/cfsp/112007.pdf.

strongly support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and other international agencies in their efforts.¹⁴⁴ However, the European Union has not stated specific declarations on the solutions for Palestinian refugees. The only document explicitly recognizing the right of Palestinian refugees to choose to return to their homes is a 1971 French document known as the ‘Schuman Paper’, which was never published. According to the EU, peace negotiations should include the resolution of all issues of the status of Jerusalem. The European Union on 8 December 2009 urged Israel to share Jerusalem with the Palestinians as a part of a Middle East peace agreement and make the holy city the capital of two states.¹⁴⁵ The EU supports a two-state solution with an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state living side by side with Israel and its neighbours. This state would be established along the 1967 borders.

The expansion of the Israeli occupation:¹⁴⁶



¹⁴⁴ Council Conclusions on Middle East Peace Process , Brussels,, 26-27 January 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/105545.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ EU says Jerusalem should be capital of the two states, Euroactiv, 08 December 2009, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/foreign-affairs/eu-jerusalem-capital-states/article-188141>.

¹⁴⁶ Pierre Tristan's blog: <http://middleeast.about.com/b/2009/07/24/israel-bans-al-naqba-from-textbooks.htm>.

And, the EU historically recognized Israel's right to protect its citizen and statehood, but the State of Israel should respect international law and its boundaries.

4.7 PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE PEACE PROCESS

Lack of internal unity is the main problem of the EU in the Arab-Israel Peace process. The member states can have their own Middle East policies. Italy in 2003, declared that it supported the Separation Wall. For Italy, the Wall was legitimate under the self-defence right. This was completely opposite to the view of the EU. These kind of independent policies are the obstacle to a clear position towards Israel.

The other essential problem is the negative attitude of Israel to the EU's mediator role in the peace process. General view in Israel that the Europeans sympathize the Palestinians is decreasing the chances to achieve peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Many of the important EU statements on the MEPP have criticized to Israel last past 40 years. According to Israeli governments, this partial approach should be changed, if the EU wants to become one of the major players in the peace process.

The deep-rooted anti-Europeanism stems from the history. The Holocaust could not be removed from the memories of the Jews. Close to 50 percent of Israel's population are Ashkenazi Jews whose background is in Central and Eastern Europe. These Jews have prejudices about the EU's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. They think that the EU's policies are unbalanced between the Israelis and Palestinians. This is reflected in the anti-European statements of the political leaders and in the anti-European articles in the media (as Jerusalem Post). The Anti-Europeanism is rising in Israel with the Netanyahu - Lieberman right wing coalition government. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has shown this attitude in several times. He told the foreign Ministers of Spain and France on their visit to Jerusalem: *'Solve your own problems (like the crisis in Kosovo and the Cyprus Problem) in Europe before you come to us with complaints. Maybe then I will be open to accepting your suggestions'*.¹⁴⁷ There is a conflict in the Middle East and the EU can not be "a true friend" of


¹⁴⁷ Harearetz, 11.10.10,
<http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/lieberman-israel-will-not-be-the-czechoslovakia-of-2010-1.318283>.

Israel - and Palestine. The EU should present itself as “a true friend” of Israel to change the general anti-Europeanism problem to reach the peace.

5- FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

The European Union's actions towards the peace process have always depended on the developments in the region. Europe saw breakthroughs between Israelis and the Palestinians as opportunities not only to end but also to create new regional cooperative structures to promote economic development in the Middle East.¹⁴⁸ The EU's cooperation with other parties is another essential factor to increase its capability in peace process. In this respect, the EU started to play a significant role in the conflict management, crisis mediation and conflict resolution with its partners, the UN and the USA. The Lisbon treaty might help the EU's future role in the cooperation with the other international organisations or states in the peace process. The EU's foreign policy machinery should get more coherent with the Lisbon Treaty. However, the member states need to develop on a consensus in the foreign policy of the EU.

The EU should continue its aid to support the Palestinians and find the way to engage Hamas and focus on reconstruction efforts in the Gaza Strip. Disorder and radicalization are spreading in the Gaza Strip, where the social conditions have been severely weekend by the humanitarian crisis caused by Israel's border policy and military conflict between Hamas and the Israeli army. The EU should continue its work in establishing a visible Palestinian state with neo-functional policies, as deepen financial and political commitments. These financial and political commitments must be to enable Palestinian Authority institutions to govern effectively. However, the social and economic conditions and violence create a vicious circle:



Bad social conditions in the Middle East bring about religious extremism, excessive nationalism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, islamophobia and so on. The EU should continue emergency aid to the Palestinians but it only helps in a short term. The EU should step up its efforts in the C area to enable the Palestinian farmers to work in their lands. In the long term,

¹⁴⁸ Peters, p. 515.

the EU should deliver the EU financial assistance connected with the Palestinian political change as well in areas that are critical to the advancement of the peace agenda-including education and media.¹⁴⁹ Education of the young population (65% of the Palestinians are 25 years old or younger) is the most essential point toward. For the younger Palestinian generation, the EU's engagement with summer camps and exchange programs are essential to offer young people a chance too see an alternative reality without occupation and beyond the occupied territories.¹⁵⁰ There should be real improvement of human development and socio-cultural conditions in Gaza and the West Bank. Education of the young population is so important if the EU wants to see implementation of the European norms as, human rights, rule of law, consolidated democracy, mutual trust etc.

The EU should also focus on intra-Palestinian reconciliation. A stable and permanent peace can be negotiated only with a united partner. Hamas's ambivalent stance in the peace process does not help to achieve the permanent solution. The Palestinian reconciliation might not happen without Hamas. The EU could push the two-state solution, but firstly they need to put pressure on building Palestinian national unity government under the international standards of liberal democracy. The establishment of a National Unity government in March 2007 did bring about any positive changes in Hamas's position in Gaza. If Hamas would move towards a more moderate position this would have a positive impact on the current uncertain situation. The EU can have important role for increase the mutual trust of the Palestinians. Also, the EU should have closer relations with the Israelis in security discussions. If the EU talks with Hamas, anti-Europeanism increases in Israel. And the EU should re-establish the position of the special envoy for the MEPP and he or she should work out of an office in the region because the EU cannot solve the problems of the region in the heart of Europe.

To make progress in the peace process the EU needs to cooperate with the major actors of the region. To support economic integration across MENA, the EU could extend some of the funding projects and measures that have proved most effective in its relations with Mediterranean countries, namely those relative to economic basket, coordination of regulatory and legal reform, building standards and capacity, judicial training and reform, bureaucratic reform, technical cooperation ,capacity building in cross-border projects, and administrative

¹⁴⁹ Ottolenghi, p. 35.

¹⁵⁰ Karin Aggestam, Just & Durable Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Summary Report from Regional seminars held in Jerusalem and Ramallah 23-25 May 2009, Seventh Framework Program of the European Commission.

secondments.¹⁵¹ In this respect, the EU should develop its ties with the US and the ‘regional powers’, especially with Turkey. Turkey would be a bridge between the EU and the Middle East because of its historical ties with the Middle Eastern countries and its present foreign policy. Furthermore, Turkey’s strengthening economic ties with its Middle Eastern neighbours are interconnecting it more strongly with the region, making political cooperation more likely.¹⁵²

5.1 TURKEY’S EU MEMBERSHIP AND ITS EFFECT ON THE EU’S ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Turkey is a Muslim/Eastern country from a perspective of cultural/ demographic character and a Western/ European country from the perspective of political establishment and membership in international organizations like NATO, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Turkey’s special position is a key issue for the EU’s foreign policy.¹⁵³ Turkey and the EU have common goals in the Middle East. Turkey’s proximity to the Middle East and Caucasus gives it an essential advantage as an energy transfer route to Europe. Turkey will have a vital role in the steady and secure flow of energy that the EU will require in the 21st century.¹⁵⁴ There is no doubt that its geographical location and predominantly Muslim population of 75 million mean that Turkey can offer EU foreign policy something that no other existing member can deliver in the Middle East.¹⁵⁵ Also, the European security is closely associated with Turkey. Crises in the Middle East affect the EU and Turkey. A successful end to the Arab-Israeli peace process is the main target of both.

The Europeanization of the Turkish foreign policy has a positive impact on the EU’s capability in the former Ottoman areas. Here, Turkey’s EU membership might grant the EU

¹⁵¹ Richard Youngs and Ana Echagüe, Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Need for Triangulation, *The International Spectator*, Italian Journal of International Affairs, Volume 45:3, 27-29. Routledge, London, 2010, p. 32.

¹⁵² Johanna Nykänen, Turkey’s Middle East Policy, *Hard Choices, The EU’s Options in a Changing Middle East*, Ed.By Timo Behr, Finnish Institute of International Relations Report 28, Helsinki, 2011, 13-15, p. 13.

¹⁵³ Özcan, p. 81.

¹⁵⁴ Sedat Laçiner, Possible Impacts of Turkey’s Full Membership to the EU’s Foreign Policy, *European Union With Turkey*, Ed.By Sedat Laçiner, Mehmet Özcan and İhsan Bal. ISRO Publication, Ankara, 2005, 15–86, p. 78.

¹⁵⁵ Gareth Jenkins, Turkey and the EU in the Middle East, *Hard Choices, The EU’s Options in a Changing Middle East*, Ed.By Timo Behr, Finnish Institute of International Relations Report 28, Helsinki, 2011, 15-20, p. 15.

the most effective instrument.¹⁵⁶ Turkey's military capacity and its historical background in the Middle East and with the Jewish world are also important assets. Turkey has a long history of relationship with both the Palestinians and Israelis. The Ottoman Empire opened its doors for Jews several times as in 1492 from Spain, in 1881 from Russia, and in 1933 from Germany. Turkey did not pursue anti-Semitic policies in the history. The Ottomans also ruled the Arabs for more than 400 years, but they did not lose their language and ethnicity.

The road to membership created incentive to Turkey to follow a more harmonized policy with the EU on international issues.¹⁵⁷ Turkey's advantages are based on maintaining good relations with both the EU and the Middle East, an ability to have a foot in both camps.¹⁵⁸ Turkey's approach is to promote peace and integration in the Middle East includes three levels:

- 1- National Integration: To preserve the national integrity of the region's countries within the framework of democracy, human rights, minority rights and free market principle
- 2- Regional Integration: To improve relations and lines of communication between the region's countries, to be followed by cooperation and regional integration.
- 3- Global Integration: The Middle East's failure to integrate with the global system adversely affects regional stability as much as the World. One of Turkey's basic objectives is to fully integrate the Middle East to the global system.¹⁵⁹

With Turkey's EU membership, the EU would be a part of these integrations and gain new markets. In the long run, the aim should be to further integrate the Eastern Mediterranean and to liberalize and democratize the lands from Eastern Europe to North Africa.¹⁶⁰ According to this possible integration between the EU and Middle East, the EU needs help from Turkey which is a new regional power in the Middle East. During the Justice and Development Party government, Turkey has invested heavily to mediate between Israel-Syria and Syria-Lebanon. Turkey has also mediated between Israel and Hamas. Furthermore, in 2010, Turkey had a significant role in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program in cooperation with Brazil. Of course, the Israeli Operation Cast Lead affected the Turkish-sponsored negotiations

¹⁵⁶Laçiner, p. 50.

¹⁵⁷ Özcan, p. 77.

¹⁵⁸ Jenkins, p. 16.

¹⁵⁹ Laçiner, p. 45.

¹⁶⁰ Laçiner, p. 56.

between Israel and Syria. These examples show the Turkish increased capacity within the Davutoğlu's vision of 'strategic depth' and 'zero problems' with neighbours. Some scholars have called his vision a new type of Ottomanism. Davutoğlu's foreign policy is much focused in the Middle Eastern issues. The Turkish Islamist movement has always been informed by a strong sense of Ottoman nostalgia; albeit for a highly idealized vision of the Ottoman Empire in which peoples of different religions and races lived together in peace and mutual tolerance before the paradigm of harmony was destroyed by Western interventionism and the fissiparous forces of ethnic nationalism.¹⁶¹ The AKP government tries to build its Middle East policy on the idea of new Ottomanism. The new vision should be coordinated with the Western allies of Turkey. Economically, increased ties with the Middle East could prove an important supplement to, but never replace, Turkey's relationship with the EU.¹⁶² Turkey can not turn its back to the West; and its national target is to become a member of the EU. With Turkey's membership, Turkey and Europe can clearly demonstrate that organizations like Al-Qaeda cannot represent Islam and Moslems, and gradually replace the sense of despair and hopelessness by peaceful means and process.¹⁶³ In this respect, the cooperation between the EU and Turkey would have a very positive impact on the way to EU's harmonization.

In addition, the most essential contribution of the Turkish membership will be in the EU's foreign policy agenda. The EU's relations with the Middle Eastern states will then become a more central topic on the agenda. The Turkish contribution to the EU's Middle Eastern programs will increase. The role of Turkey in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was very limited. Turkey was not a part of the European Neighbourhood Policy because of the Turkish candidate status. With its membership Turkey will become a participant of the ENP. Turkey has seen that these programs are an alternative way for the full membership. In this respect, Turkey's contribution to the EU's Middle East policy is very limited. In contrary, Turkey's membership would reassure Turkey and its assisting role would strengthen the EU's Middle East strategy. The EU would benefit from Turkey's participation in the Middle Eastern and Mediterranean programs. If Turkey's increased trade and movement of people does indeed contribute to greater integration, and hence greater stability and peace in the Middle East,

¹⁶¹ Jenkins, p. 17.

¹⁶² Jenkins, p. 19.

¹⁶³ Laçiner, p. 31.

Turkey would indeed have to be seen as an asset for the EU, not least in terms of the EMP and the ENP.¹⁶⁴

However, the Turkish-Israeli relations have been in crisis since the Gaza War and Erdoğan's brush with Shimon Peres in January 2009 at the Davos World Economic Forum. The crisis worsened increased in June 2010, when the Israeli Defence Forces killed nine Turkish citizens on a Turkish vessel in the international flotilla to Gaza. Turkey's policy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in has much common with the EU. The crisis between Israel and Turkey has negatively effected negotiations in the region. Turkey can play a useful role between the West and the regional actors such as Hamas, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon with whom the US and the EU have no relations or problematic relations. Turkey would enhance the EU's ability to deal with those problems. For the continuation of Turkey's mediation role, the Israeli -Turkey crisis should to come to an end. The EU and the US should engage Turkey and Israel to end the diplomatic problem after the flotilla crisis. The EU would be a mediator between Israel and Turkey for the stability of the region. The strong relations between Israel and Turkey would help the US in the peace process. Also, it can be argued that Turkey's membership would affect the US-EU relations in very positive ways because of the strong historical background of the US-Turkey relations.

5.2 COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU AND THE USA IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS AND ITS FUTURE EFFECTS

The transatlantic relations of the US and the EU are a key factor for the EU's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Advancing sustainable and meaningful political reform and building peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict will require the efforts of governments on both sides of the Atlantic. The EU and the US look at different security maps, the EU focuses on more regional issues and the US thinks globally. The cooperation in the EU-US relations is essential for the global security. Since 1990, the Middle East is on the top of the transatlantic agenda and the Arab-Israeli peace is the core. The Europeans strongly supported the US

¹⁶⁴ Kemal Kirişçi, Turkey's Middle Eastern Assets, Hard Choices, The EU's Options in a Changing Middle East, Ed.By Timo Behr, Finnish Institute of International Relations Report 28, Helsinki, 2011, 21-30, p. 30.

efforts for the Madrid Conference of 1991 although the EC did not have a seat at the table.¹⁶⁵ Also, during the US-sponsored Oslo process, the EU was not in a central role.

Although the US and the EU sometimes disagree in such issues, it is wrong to see them antagonistic the EU's offers carrots where Washington wields sticks, emphasizes process where Washington focuses on outcome and relies on multilateral mechanisms where Washington works unilaterally.¹⁶⁶ However, during Clinton administration the EU and the US were closer than during Bush Sn. administration in ideas for the solutions and peaceful Middle East. The EU and the US signed the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) in 1995. Its targets were:

- Promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world
- Responding the global challenges
- Contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations
- And building bridges across the Atlantic¹⁶⁷

The Quartet's main target is to promote peace and stability in the Middle East. After the eruption of the second Intifada and Arafat's demonization by Israel and the USA in the context of the 'War on Terror' the EU felt emboldened to take up the dossier of the Palestinian reform in 2002-2005.¹⁶⁸ For the EU, the membership in the Quartet in 2002 was an important step in its position in the peace process. The European participation in the Quartet increased its power in the Middle East. It also had a positive impact on the coordination of the EU's and the US's Middle East Policy. However, at the same time, during the Bush Jr. administration, the Middle East became more complicated in the context of 'War on Terror'.

The EU actively supported the Bush-sponsored Annapolis Process which introduced the Israelis and Palestinians the Road Map to reach a settlement by 2008. The Road Map was adopted with the European contribution; it has many European points about the conflict and

¹⁶⁵ Daniel Möckli, The Middle East conflict, Transatlantic ties and the Quartet. European Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Ed. By Ezra Bulut Aymat. EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2010, 65-75, p. 67.

¹⁶⁶ Tamara Cofman Wittes and Richard Youngs, Europe, The United States, and Middle Eastern Democracy: Repairing the Breach. Analysis Paper, Number 18. The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, January, Washington, 2009, p. 11.

¹⁶⁷ Delegation of the European Commission to the USA

<http://www.eurunion.org/partner/agenda.htm>.

¹⁶⁸ Tocci, p. 398.

its resolution. The most essential improvement happened in the US opinion about the two state-solution. The Bush Administration subscribed the two-state solution as well as institutionalised consultations with the EU and other external actors.¹⁶⁹ Paradigm can shift with the Obama administration. He may lead to a greater convergence between the EU and US in the aspects of promoting a two-state solution. Hopes were high when Barack Obama became the president of the USA. In his Cairo Speech, he said:

'I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world: one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based on the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive'

The radical departure from the confrontational foreign policy of Bush era opened a window of opportunity wide open for the EU ambition of a world governed by effective multilateralism – a notion that echoes the ‘assertive multilateralism’ of the Clinton years.¹⁷⁰ Globalisation has brought about not only greater economic, but also security interdependence: Global challenges know no borders, and regional challenges increasingly transcend national boundaries: what happens inside the borders of one state is scrutinised by international public opinion.¹⁷¹ In this respect, the EU and the US work together in the MEPP. Obama’s speeches in an EU tune could mean a chance for the region. Previous attempts from Oslo in 1990s to Geneva and Annapolis in 2007 have failed. The aim of Obama’s foreign policy is the peace settlement between the Israelis and Palestinians. His speech placed the Arab-Israeli conflict at the top of the US foreign policy priorities. One of his promises to the restore balance between freedom and security in international relations – a goal to which the Europeans have been committed but taken very little risk to attain.¹⁷² On the one hand, Obama supports Israeli’s security concerns on the other hand the Palestinian self-determination right. He pushed Israel to stop the illegal settlements in the West Bank but failed. Generally speaking, the right wing Israeli coalition government causes difficulties for Obama and does not accept his position in peace process.

¹⁶⁹ Möckli, p. 68.

¹⁷⁰ Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Responding the Obama moment: the EU and the US in a multi-polar world, The Obama Moment, European and American Perspectives, Ed. By Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski, EUISS, Paris, 2009, 11-24, p.11.

¹⁷¹ De Vasconcelos, p. 13.

¹⁷² Ibrahim Kalin, Israel and Palestine: Trauma, Truth and Politics. The Obama Moment, European and American Perspectives, Ed. By Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski, EUISS, Paris, 2009, 167-185, p. 172.

Obama's failure is due to the strong influence of the Jewish lobby in the United States. On 18 January 2011, the US has vetoed an Arab resolution at the UN Security Council condemning Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territories as an obstacle to peace. In the Tenth Meeting of the EU-Israel Association Council Statement of the European Union on 22.02.2011, the EU noted with regret that Israel has not extended settlements the moratorium and reiterated that settlements, East Jerusalem included, are illegal and an obstacle to peace.¹⁷³ The re-starting of the talks is the main aim for the HR of the EU.

After the Lisbon treaty, the EU has a single foreign policy representation. This would be an essential step to increase the cooperation between two Atlantic allies. In this respect, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has suggested several times that the MEPP needs closer partnership with the US in the Quartet. Thus, there are six major issues concerning the Middle East diplomacy that the US and the EU will have to address with some urgency: the scope for more robust mediation; Palestinian reconciliation and relations with Hamas; the EU-US position on a potential Palestinian declaration of statehood; the credibility of their policies on the settlement issue; relations with Syria; the future role of the Quartet.¹⁷⁴ The European Union and the United States need each other. They should take the time to assess their achievements and determine the ways to deeper cooperation in the Middle East. The HR/VP of the EU Lady Ashton sees the importance of cooperation with the US. In her speech in Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers in Budapest, 25.02.2011, she said:

*'There are many discussions going on, there are initiatives that have already taken place but it is important that we do that and in that collaborative approach too we are also discussing with our obvious partner NATO on the back of the strategic concept which talks about the links between the EU and NATO to ensure that we are also developing our capabilities with them and with the United Nations'*¹⁷⁵.

The US and the EU can create other mechanisms without the Quartet and they can complement each others in soft and hard power mechanisms. Especially, they can make new

¹⁷³ Council Statement of the European Union on 22.02.2011
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/israel/press_corner/all_news/news/2011/20110222_01_en.htm.

¹⁷⁴ Möckli, p. 70.

¹⁷⁵ The Speech of Catherine Ashton in Budapest, 25.02.2011,
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119506.pdf.

aid policies under the umbrella of the EMP, the ENP and UfM. The EU has traditionally been defined as a ‘civilian power’, a power short of military muscle but strong on economy.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the EU needs the financial contribution of the US in the Arab-Israeli peace process after the financial crisis in 2008. The US and the EU should build their Middle East policy on soft power and they should support joint to re-start the direct negotiation process. The EU and the US should also move from conflict management to conflict resolution. The EU should take advantage of Obama’s peace efforts. However, the expectations generated by Obama in his Cairo speech slowly dwindle in the face of weak follow-up and outright inconsistencies; the EU should pick up the slack.¹⁷⁷

The most essential issue is that they should find a way to talk with Hamas. By supporting the ‘West Bank First’ policy, the US and the EU increased the Palestinian separation. This is another problem to solve in the Middle East in near future. As a result, a two state solution has become more difficult because of the polarization of the Palestinian political scene.

¹⁷⁶ M.Gülce Kumrulu, Can the EU Become A Normative Power In The South?: The Egyptian Case. Perceptions, Vol: XIII, Number: 3, Ankara, 2008, 1-17, p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Youngs and Echagüe, p. 34.

6- CONCLUSION

The main aim of the thesis was to explain and understand the role of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor in the Arab-Israeli peace process. As a result of the integration the EU has essentially furthered peace in Europe after WW II. There has been no war between the EU member states since 1951. However, the end of the Cold War and six enlargements of the EU have changed the regional and international relations system in Europe. The concept of the security has also changed. The European security has become related with security and stability of its neighbours. The conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s showed the weakness of the EU in conflict resolution and peacemaking efforts. The authoritarian governments of the Middle East have been tolerated. In 1990s the EU started to develop its policies in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East with these authoritarian leaders. Especially, in the second half of the 1990s, the EU tried to increase its capability in the MENA region after its failure in the Balkans. It has placed democracy promotion as a priority in its foreign policy in the Mediterranean Region and Middle East. However, the EU was not capable in changing these regimes toward democratic standards.

The resolution of the Israeli- Palestinian conflict has always been essential for the Union. The EU has focused on the MEPP for several reasons, above all the stability in its neighbourhood and internationalization of peace. The EU fears for the spill-over of the conflict into Europe.

The concept of the Middle East might be problematic but one fact is clear: the problems of the Middle East have global reflections, as 1973 oil crisis. Thus, the peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been the EU main target in the Middle East.

Firstly, the study excavated the Western perceptions on the Middle East. The Eurocentric perspective has determined the Western perceptions on the Middle East. Eurocentrism is the same thing as Orientalism, and to say that Western perspective has defined the Western perceptions is a tautology. Also, the “Western World” and Europe are (almost) the same and, anyway, the Western World includes Europe. The relations of the European states with the Middle East have been different, and so are their views on the region. This orientalist approach increased in after 9/11. Also, the socio-cultural differences between the West and the Middle East and the Muslim world have been deepened. In Europe, Xenophobia has got a

more Islamophobic colour. Radical Islam is easily related with Islamic terrorism. And recent developments in the Middle East showed to us, this Eurocentric and orientalist view to Middle East is continuing.

In Europe, the EU succeeded in consolidation of democratic government, rule of law, prosperity and mutual trust. The EU accession process has helped to spread of these kinds of norms and values to the Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The functionalism, neo-functionalism, interdependency and europeanization have been the main theories of this thesis to explain the integration and foreign policy of the EU. Since the Schuman Declaration, the EU has worked for peace in Europe and in the world. It has been successful in Europe with economic cooperation. Cooperation could also be the main instrument for creating peace in the world. Especially in the early years of the European integration, the debate was largely dominated by neo-functionalist theory and intergovernmental theory in second half of 1960s. It can be argued that the European integration has then been coloured by neo-functionalist and interdependency approaches.

Firstly functionalism explains the aim of the European integration because it discusses the cooperation in the international relations. The thesis offers some examples of David Mitrany's views, (The Functional Approach to World Organization): international cooperation and ramification of policies are most essential things for bringing peace in the world. Mitrany also stresses the shift of sovereignty and political authority from national to supranational authorities. Furthermore, he supports the international economical cooperation. The main argument of neo-functionalism is that the integration should start with limited economic cooperation and then spill over to other policy areas to create a common foreign policy and security with a complete transfer of national sovereignty to the supranational or high authority. This could be impossible in the Middle East for now but the European integration might serve as a role model. Cooperation might become easier in the 21st century. At the moment we can see the cooperation of the young population in the Middle East in the popular uprisings. The thesis also focused on the interdependency theory of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Cooperation and integration of Europe with Middle East should help to bring peace in the region within the contexts of interdependency and europeanization. The EU needs security and stable markets in the Middle East. Also, the Middle East needs the EU norms and values such as democracy, rule of law and human rights. The Europeanization of the Middle

East can be beneficial for both sides. Of course only means the norms and values but not the EU membership.

The third topic of the thesis was about a brief history of the EU's common foreign security policy and its weaknesses. The analysis of CFSP's history showed that the most important thing is the sovereignty of the member states. The CFSP is in inter-governmental level and this is an obstacle for making a foreign policy of the EU. If we analyze the foreign policy structure of the EU from EPC to CSDP, it is always problematic. In the Cold War period, the Western European security was provided by NATO. The sovereignty of the member states and the role of the nation states are still important in international order. In this respect the EU has no effective foreign policy in the security aspects of the global system. Because of its unique structure the EU is still away from the common foreign policy but its role is changing, especially after the Lisbon Treaty. On CSDP level the EU's role is limited but it is in economic aids. Especially, the EU is the largest donor of its periphery from the Middle East to North Africa and Mediterranean region. The EU tries to create a common foreign policy and here the Middle East is one of the most important regions.

The actors of the international system have focused on the creating peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Especially, 1973 War and oil boycott were the key factors for the international involvement in the MEPP. This thesis also focused on the 1973 oil crisis and its effects on the European involvement in the MEPP. The Western World and the EU could not be indifferent to the developments in the region. The EU's interest in the region increased as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. However, since 1970s the US has dominated the peace efforts. Thus the role of the EU has been limited in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The declaratory diplomacy of the EU focused on the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, as the right to homeland, representation in the peace negotiations and security and self-determination. In 1970s and 1980s, the EC's main diplomatic tool was declarations. The situation started to change in the second half of the 1990s. The EU started to become more active with its regional policies related with the Middle East. The position of the EU in 1970s and 1980s was denoted by a normative and rights-based framework. However, it started to change in the 1990s. It had moved from rights-based to security-based framework. Securitization of the region started to become its main target after Oslo. The EU became increasingly critical of Israeli policies and restrictions imposed on the West Bank and Gaza. The EU was not a party in the bilateral

peace talks in the 1990s but became the chair of some international programs, like the REDWG.

The EU's role began to increase with the 1991 Madrid Conference. The appointment of the special envoy for the Middle East process was the best evidence of the EU's new diversified role. The EMP was a significant upgrade for the EU's interest in the process. The EMP could have been a multilateral forum for the Middle Eastern problems. By the EMP, the EU became the largest donor in the peace process. Indeed, the EMP was not created for the Arab-Israeli peace process but it was the only forum to engage with Palestinians and Israelis independently of the US efforts. Economic integration and its potential spill-over effect to different political areas was the core of the EMP. However, it has not been successful. The deadlock, the continuation of conflict, and slow advance in the peace process have been the most important handicaps of the EMP.

The collapse of the Oslo peace process and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada led to some changes in the EU's policy in the peace process. The EU's role has increased with the joint EU-US involvement. In 1990s, the EU became directly involved in the MEPP in parallel with the US. The failure of the EU in BiH was the reason for this new complementary role of the EU. The problems in creating a common foreign policy of the EU were continuing in the end second half of the 1990s. However, the EU's support to the two state solution, to the basis of the 1967 borders and to end of the occupation has continued. Also, the EU's political role increased within the Middle East Quartet. Participation of the EU in the Quartet East and the promotion of the Road Map could be essential to influence American policy in the peace process. The thesis puts forward the idea that there is an important relation between the Israel-Palestinian peace process and the regional institutional initiatives of the EU.

Furthermore, the thesis focused on the ENP another EU initiative related to the Middle East. The ENP was designed for the east and it is on the bilateral level. The priorities of the ENP in accordance with the MEPP are: to increase the socio-economic standards, to support the political reforms and to speed up the peace process. The ENP has improved the first two priorities. However, the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections of 2006, caused havoc in peace process in the first years of the ENP. In the crisis management and security of the Palestinian Authority, the EU has two important missions and has a significant role with the UN in the Middle East. The EU started two crisis management operations under the umbrella

of the ESDP. These operations are EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS to help Palestinians and PA's National Security Forces. However, Palestinian division was main essential obstacle of these two operations. The EU member states also have a significant role in the UNIFIL. Finally, the EU monitored the 2005 and 2006 elections of the PA.

With the European Security Strategy in 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict became an essential priority in the EU's foreign policy. In this respect, the thesis analyzed the post-2003 period policies of the EU. The UfM is the latest policy in the history of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The UfM must be evaluated in relation to the EMP and the ENP. However, the UfM does not offer new developments and economic and political integration. The future of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the EU's policy towards Middle East needs re-thinking the EU's Mediterranean policy. The EU was not been able to defend the Arab human rights.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most important obstacle the common Euro-Mediterranean partnership. For example, many UfM meetings have been cancelled because of the conflict. The EU should develop its Mediterranean policy within the regional and international powers as Turkey and US. The historical ties of Turkey in the Middle East and Turkey's membership in the Union could help the role of the EU in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Turkey can be a model for transition of the Arab world. Also, cooperation with the US would have a positive impact on the peace process and the EU's position. However, the Israeli-Palestinian peace could not happen without Hamas. In this respect, recent developments in the Middle East could affect the role of Hamas in the peace process.

The EU is not played an active role during the Arab Spring of 2011. The unrest in the Middle East has demonstrated the weakness of the EU policy towards the MENA region. The EU's reaction to the Arab uprising was still a mixture of confusion and anxiety because of deep and long-standing ties between several EU member states as Italy and France, and some of the countries affected by the crisis predictably undermined European cohesion. However, it has shown the situation in the Middle East – it is not only EU's fault. Of course, if the partners do not solve the problems, nobody does. Their shorter term plan was only about the stability of the region and the interests in the trade, energy, anti-terrorism and migration. The EU's role for promotion of democratic values and standards was not enough to topple the authoritarian regimes and to stop the violations of human rights. The democratic changes in the Middle East might increase the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. Radicalism is

not desirable for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is strongly anti-Israel and anti-Semitic. They have also historical ties with Hamas in Gaza. The EU should be more active to reconstruct the region with the democratic transformation, institution-building and economic stability in the post-Arab Spring of 2011. The downfall of dictators of the Middle East makes it to rethink the strategy for MENA countries. Maybe this is the window of opportunities for the EU to push harder to reconstruct the Middle East and to solve Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

**UNITED
NATIONS**

S



Security Council

S/RES/242 (1967)
22 November 1967

Resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.



Security Council

S/RES/338 (1973)
22 October 1973

Resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of [Security Council resolution 242 \(1967\)](#) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted at the 1747th meeting

by 14 votes to none. 1/

1/ One member (China) did not participate in the voting.

APPENDIX III

Venice Declaration of the European Communities

June 13, 1980

1. The heads of state and government and the ministers of foreign affairs held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreement signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever.
2. The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.
3. In this regard, the nine countries of the community base themselves on (UN) Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 10 September 1970, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish minister of foreign affairs at the 34th UN General Assembly.
4. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
5. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including (guarantees) on the ground.

6. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.

7. The achievement of these objectives requires the involvement and support of all the parties concerned in the peace settlement which the nine are endeavouring to promote in keeping with the principles formulated in the declaration referred to above. These principles apply to all the parties concerned, and thus to the Palestinian people, and to the PLO, which will have to be associated with the negotiations.

8. The nine recognize the special importance of the role played by the question of Jerusalem for all the parties concerned. The nine stress that they will not accept any unilateral initiative designed to change the status of Jerusalem and that any agreement on the city's status should guarantee freedom of access for everyone to the holy places.

9. The nine stress the need for Israel to put an end to the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967, as it has done for part of Sinai. They are deeply convinced that the Israeli settlements constitute a serious obstacle to the peace process in the Middle East. The nine consider that these settlements, as well as modifications in population and property in the occupied Arab territories, are illegal under international law.

10. Concerned as they are to put an end to violence, the nine consider that only the renunciation of force or the threatened use of force by all the parties can create a climate of confidence in the area, and constitute a basic element for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East.

11. The nine have decided to make the necessary contacts with all the parties concerned. The objective of these contacts would be to ascertain the position of the various parties with respect to the principles set out in this declaration and in the light of the results of this consultation process to determine the form which such an initiative on their part could take.

APPENDIX IV

PRESIDENCY CONCLUSIONS

BERLIN EUROPEAN COUNCIL

24 AND 25 MARCH 1999

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The European Council met in Berlin on 24 and 25 March 1999. Proceedings opened with an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament, Mr. José-María Gil-Robles.

2. The European Council:

- reached an overall agreement on Agenda 2000 (see Part I);
- agreed a declaration on the appointment of the President of the Commission (see Part II);
- adopted two statements on Kosovo (see Part III);
- agreed three other statements on the Middle East Peace Process, the successful conclusion of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with South Africa and on enlargement (see Part IV).

PART IV - OTHER DECLARATIONS

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

The Heads of State or Government of the European Union reaffirm its support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East, to reflect the principles of "land for peace" and ensure the security both collective and individual of the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. In this context, the European Union welcomes the decision by the Palestinian National Council and associated bodies to reaffirm the nullification of the provisions in the Palestinian National Charter which called for the destruction of Israel and to reaffirm their commitment to

recognize and live in peace with Israel. However, the European Union remains concerned at the current deadlock in the peace process and calls upon the parties to implement fully and immediately the Wye River Memorandum.

The European Union also calls upon the parties to reaffirm their commitments to the basic principles established within the framework of Madrid, Oslo and subsequent agreements, in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. It urges the parties to agree on an extension of the transitional period established by the Oslo agreements.

The European Union calls in particular for an early resumption of final status negotiations in the coming months on an accelerated basis, and for these to be brought to a prompt conclusion and not prolonged indefinitely. The European Union believes that it should be possible to conclude the negotiations within a target period of one year. It expresses its readiness to work to facilitate an early conclusion to the negotiations.

The European Union urges both parties to refrain from activities which prejudice the outcome of those final status negotiations and from any activity contrary to international law, including all settlement activity, and to fight incitement and violence.

The European Union reaffirms the continuing and unqualified Palestinian right to self-determination including the option of a state and looks forward to the early fulfilment of this right. It appeals to the parties to strive in good faith for a negotiated solution on the basis of the existing agreements, without prejudice to this right, which is not subject to any veto. The European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations would be the best guarantee of Israel's security and Israel's acceptance as an equal partner in the region. The European Union declares its readiness to consider the recognition of a Palestinian State in due course in accordance with the basic principles referred to above.

The European Union also calls for an early resumption of negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the Middle East Peace Process, leading to the implementation of UNSCRs 242, 338 and 425.

APPENDIX V

A PERFORMANCE-BASED ROADMAP TO A PERMANENT TWO-STATE SOLUTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT, April 30, 2003

Press Statement
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
April 30, 2003

The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet. The destination is a final and comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict by 2005, as presented in President Bush's speech of 24 June, and welcomed by the EU, Russia and the UN in the 16 July and 17 September Quartet Ministerial statements.

A two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty, and through Israel's readiness to do what is necessary for a democratic Palestinian state to be established, and a clear, unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement as described below. The Quartet will assist and facilitate implementation of the plan, starting in Phase I, including direct discussions between the parties as required. The plan establishes a realistic timeline for implementation. However, as a performance-based plan, progress will require and depend upon the good faith efforts of the parties, and their compliance with each of the obligations outlined below. Should the parties perform their obligations rapidly, progress within and through the phases may come sooner than indicated in the plan. Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.

A settlement, negotiated between the parties, will result in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours. The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the

principle of land for peace, UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement. This initiative is a vital element of international efforts to promote a comprehensive peace on all tracks, including the Syrian-Israeli and Lebanese-Israeli tracks.

The Quartet will meet regularly at senior levels to evaluate the parties' performance on implementation of the plan. In each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated.

PHASE I:

ENDING TERROR AND VIOLENCE, NORMALIZING PALESTINIAN LIFE, AND BUILDING PALESTINIAN INSTITUTIONS PRESENT TO MAY 2003

In Phase I, the Palestinians immediately undertake an unconditional cessation of violence according to the steps outlined below; such action should be accompanied by supportive measures undertaken by Israel. Palestinians and Israelis resume security cooperation based on the Tenet work plan to end violence, terrorism, and incitement through restructured and effective Palestinian security services. Palestinians undertake comprehensive political reform in preparation for statehood, including drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures. Israel takes all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life. Israel withdraws from Palestinian areas occupied from September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed at that time, as security performance and cooperation progress. Israel also freezes all settlement activity, consistent with the Mitchell report.

At the outset of Phase I:

- Palestinian leadership issues unequivocal statement reiterating Israel's right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel.

- Israeli leadership issues unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions end incitement against Palestinians.

SECURITY

- Palestinians declare an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere.
- Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.
- GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan.
- Relying on existing mechanisms and on-the-ground resources, Quartet representatives begin informal monitoring and consult with the parties on establishment of a formal monitoring mechanism and its implementation.
- Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.–Egypt–Jordan). Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire.

- All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister.
- Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.
- Arab states cut off public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaging in violence and terror.
- All donors providing budgetary support for the Palestinians channel these funds through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance's Single Treasury Account.
- As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF.

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PALESTINIAN INSTITUTION-BUILDING

- Immediate action on credible process to produce draft constitution for Palestinian statehood. As rapidly as possible, constitutional committee circulates draft Palestinian constitution, based on strong parliamentary democracy and cabinet with empowered prime minister, for public comment/debate. Constitutional committee proposes draft document for submission after elections for approval by appropriate Palestinian institutions.
- Appointment of interim prime minister or cabinet with empowered executive authority/decision-making body.
- GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other supportive measures related to the reform efforts.

- Continued appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform. Completion of further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose.
- Establishment of independent Palestinian election commission. PLC reviews and revises election law.
- Palestinian performance on judicial, administrative, and economic benchmarks, as established by the International Task Force on Palestinian Reform.
- As early as possible, and based upon the above measures and in the context of open debate and transparent candidate selection/electoral campaign based on a free, multi-party process, Palestinians hold free, open, and fair elections.
- GOI facilitates Task Force election assistance, registration of voters, movement of candidates and voting officials. Support for NGOs involved in the election process.
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- GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem based on a commitment that these institutions operate strictly in accordance with prior agreements between the parties.
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HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE

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- Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.
- AHLC reviews the humanitarian situation and prospects for economic development in the West Bank and Gaza and launches a major donor assistance effort, including to the reform effort.

- GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.

CIVIL SOCIETY

- Continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.

SETTLEMENTS

- GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001.
- Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements).

PHASE II: TRANSITION

JUNE 2003-DECEMBER 2003

In the second phase, efforts are focused on the option of creating an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty, based on the new constitution, as a way station to a permanent status settlement. As has been noted, this goal can be achieved when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror, willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty. With such a leadership, reformed civil institutions and security structures, the Palestinians will have the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state.

Progress into Phase II will be based upon the consensus judgment of the Quartet of whether conditions are appropriate to proceed, taking into account performance of both parties. Furthering and sustaining efforts to normalize Palestinian lives and build Palestinian

institutions, Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building, further building on and sustaining of the goals outlined in Phase I, ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.

- **INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:** Convened by the Quartet, in consultation with the parties, immediately after the successful conclusion of Palestinian elections, to support Palestinian economic recovery and launch a process, leading to establishment of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders.
 - Such a meeting would be inclusive, based on the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace (including between Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon), and based on the principles described in the preamble to this document.
 - Arab states restore pre-intifada links to Israel (trade offices, etc.).
 - Revival of multilateral engagement on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control issues.
- New constitution for democratic, independent Palestinian state is finalized and approved by appropriate Palestinian institutions. Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution.
- Empowered reform cabinet with office of prime minister formally established, consistent with draft constitution.
- Continued comprehensive security performance, including effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.

- Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity, includes further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.
- Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet.
- Quartet members promote international recognition of Palestinian state, including possible UN membership.

**PHASE III:
PERMANENT STATUS AGREEMENT
AND END OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
2004 – 2005**

Progress into Phase III, based on consensus judgment of Quartet, and taking into account actions of both parties and Quartet monitoring. Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed at a permanent status agreement in 2005.

- **SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:** Convened by Quartet, in consultation with the parties, at beginning of 2004 to endorse agreement reached on an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and formally to launch a process with the active, sustained, and operational support of the Quartet, leading to a final, permanent status resolution in 2005, including on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements; and, to support progress toward a comprehensive Middle East settlement between Israel and Lebanon and Israel and Syria, to be achieved as soon as possible.
- Continued comprehensive, effective progress on the reform agenda laid out by the Task Force in preparation for final status agreement.

- Continued sustained and effective security performance, and sustained, effective security cooperation on the bases laid out in Phase I.
- International efforts to facilitate reform and stabilize Palestinian institutions and the Palestinian economy, in preparation for final status agreement.
- Parties reach final and comprehensive permanent status agreement that ends the Israel-Palestinian conflict in 2005, through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides, and protects the religious interests of Jews, Christians, and Muslims worldwide, and fulfills the vision of two states, Israel and sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine, living side-by-side in peace and security.
- Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.

APPENDIX VI

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Council Conclusions on Middle East Peace Process

2921st EXTERNAL RELATIONS Council meeting

Brussels, 26–27 January 2009

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"1. The Council welcomes the cessation of hostilities in the Gaza Strip and calls on all parties to make the current ceasefire permanent through the full implementation of the UNSC Resolution 1860. Noting the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, the issues which should be addressed without any delay include a sustained halt of rocket launches towards Israel, the urgent opening of the Gaza crossings on a regular and predictable basis and an effective mechanism to prevent arms and ammunition smuggling to the Gaza Strip.

2. The Council fully supports the Egyptian initiative and efforts to achieve a lasting ceasefire. The European Union, in close coordination with Egypt and other partners, is examining options and intends to support the sustainability of the ceasefire including through assistance on border management. At the same time the Council expresses the European Union's readiness to reactivate the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah), as soon as conditions allow, and to examine the possibility of extending its assistance to other crossing points as part of the overall EU engagement in the region. The EU welcomes the commitment of the United States to contribute to stopping arms smuggling to Gaza and is prepared to identify ways to cooperate in such efforts.

3. The European Union deeply deplores the loss of life during this conflict, particularly the civilian casualties. The Council reminds all parties to the conflict to fully respect human rights and comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and will follow closely investigations into alleged violations of international humanitarian law. In this regard it takes careful note of the statement by UNSG Ban Ki-moon to the Security Council on 21 January.

4. Gravely concerned by the critical humanitarian situation on the ground, the EU calls for the unimpeded provision and distribution of humanitarian assistance to the suffering people of Gaza. The European Union is ready to step up its already substantial emergency aid contribution and it will continue to strongly support the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and other international agencies in their efforts. The Council condemns the shelling of UNRWA infrastructure in Gaza. The EU is also prepared to work towards rehabilitation, reconstruction, the sustainable economic recovery and future economic development of the Gaza Strip. This will only be possible if the Gaza crossings are open for humanitarian assistance, commercial goods and persons. The EU supports the idea of convening an international donors' conference in Egypt. Donor efforts need to be closely coordinated with the AHLC. All future assistance will be carried out on the basis of a specific needs assessment.

5. In response to the current crisis the European Union will focus its support and assistance on the following : immediate humanitarian relief for the population of Gaza, prevention of illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition, sustained re-opening of crossing points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, rehabilitation and reconstruction and the resumption of the peace process. The EU will take forward this agenda in close cooperation with its Quartet partners and regional actors and in line with its wider approach to the region including its state building efforts. To this end the EU is developing a Work Plan.

6. The Council strongly encourages inter-Palestinian reconciliation behind President Mahmoud Abbas which is key for peace, stability, and development and supports the mediation efforts of Egypt and the Arab League in this respect.

7. Reaffirming its conclusions of 8 December 2008, the European Union is convinced that an end to the current crisis must be followed by renewed and urgent efforts by the Israeli and Palestinian parties as well as the international community to establish an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, living side by side with Israel in peace and security. This can only be brought about by the urgent and successful conclusion of the peace process. The European Union reiterates its commitment to work vigorously with the other Quartet members and Arab partners and looks forward to a strong and committed participation and cooperation of the new US Administration. The EU reiterates its commitment to a comprehensive and regional approach to the resolution of the

Israeli-Arab conflict. It supports all efforts deployed to achieve stability, peace and security in the region. The Council reiterates that the Arab Peace Initiative offers a solid and appropriate basis for progress in this direction."

APPENDIX VII

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Council conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process

2985th FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting

Brussels, 8 December 2009

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council of the European Union is seriously concerned about the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process. The European Union calls for the urgent resumption of negotiations that will lead, within an agreed time-frame, to a two-state solution with the State of Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. A comprehensive peace, which is a fundamental interest of the parties in the region and the EU, must be achieved on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, the Madrid principles including land for peace, the Roadmap, the agreements previously reached by the parties and the Arab Peace Initiative.

2. The Council reconfirms its support for the United States' efforts to resume negotiations on all final status issues, including borders, Jerusalem, refugees, security and water, respecting previous agreements and understandings. The European Union will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties. The Council reiterates the EU's readiness to contribute substantially to post-conflict arrangements, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of peace agreements, and will continue the work undertaken on EU contributions on state-building, regional issues, refugees, security and Jerusalem. The Council underlines the need for a reinvigorated Quartet engagement and notes the crucial importance of an active Arab contribution building on the Arab Peace Initiative.

3. The EU stands ready to further develop its bilateral relations with the Palestinian Authority reflecting shared interests, including in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Recalling the Berlin declaration, the Council also reiterates its support for negotiations leading to Palestinian statehood, all efforts and steps to that end and its readiness, when

appropriate, to recognise a Palestinian state. It will continue to assist Palestinian statebuilding, including through its CSDP missions and within the Quartet. The EU fully supports the implementation of the Palestinian Authority's Government Plan "Palestine, Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State" as an important contribution to this end and will work for enhanced international support for this plan.

4. Recalling the EU's position as expressed at the Association Council in June 2009, the Council reaffirms its readiness to further develop its bilateral relations with Israel within the framework of the ENP. The EU reiterates its commitment towards the security of Israel and its full integration into the region, which is best guaranteed through peace between Israel and its neighbours.

5. Encouraging further concrete confidence building measures, the Council takes positive note of the recent decision of the Government of Israel on a partial and temporary settlement freeze as a first step in the right direction and hopes that it will contribute towards a resumption of meaningful negotiations.

6. Developments on the ground play a crucial part in creating the context for successful negotiations. The Council reiterates that settlements, the separation barrier where built on occupied land, demolition of homes and evictions are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible. The Council urges the government of Israel to immediately end all settlement activities, in East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and including natural growth, and to dismantle all outposts erected since March 2001.

7. The EU welcomes Israel's steps to ease restrictions of movement in the West Bank which have made a contribution to economic growth. The Council calls for further and sustained improvements of movement and access, noting that many check points and road blocks remain in place. The Council also calls on the Palestinian Authority to build on its efforts to improve law and order.

8. The Council is deeply concerned about the situation in East Jerusalem. In view of recent incidents, it calls on all parties to refrain from provocative actions. The Council recalls that it has never recognised the annexation of East Jerusalem. If there is to be a genuine peace, a

way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states. The Council calls for the reopening of Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem in accordance with the Roadmap. It also calls on the Israeli government to cease all discriminatory treatment of Palestinians in East Jerusalem.

9. Gravely concerned about the situation in Gaza, the Council urges the full implementation of UNSCR 1860 and the full respect of international humanitarian law. In this context, the continued policy of closure is unacceptable and politically counterproductive. It has devastated the private sector economy and damaged the natural environment, notably water and other natural resources. The EU again reiterates its calls for an immediate, sustained and unconditional opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and persons to and from Gaza. In this context, the Council calls for the full implementation of the Agreement on Movement and Access. While extremists stand to gain from the current situation, the civilian population, half of which are under the age of 18, suffers. Fully recognising Israel's legitimate security needs, the Council continues to call for a complete stop to all violence and arms smuggling into Gaza. The Council calls on those holding the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit to release him without delay.

10. The Council calls on all Palestinians to promote reconciliation behind President Mahmoud Abbas, support for the mediation efforts by Egypt and the Arab League and the prevention of a permanent division between the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza. The Council would welcome the organisation of free and fair Palestinian elections when conditions permit.

11. A comprehensive peace must include a settlement between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon. Concerning the Syrian track, the EU welcomes recent statements by Israel and Syria confirming their willingness to advance towards peace and supports all efforts aimed at the reactivation of the talks between the two countries.

12. The EU recalls that a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict requires a regional approach and will continue its work on this in line with the June 2009 Council Conclusions using all its instruments to this effect. The EU also calls on all regional actors to take confidence building measures in order to stimulate mutual trust and encourages Arab

countries to be forthcoming, both politically and financially, in assisting the Palestinian Authority and to Palestinian refugees through UNRWA.

APPENDIX VIII

Middle East Quartet Statement

Munich, February 5, 2011

The Quartet -- United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, United States Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, United States Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell, and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union Catherine Ashton -- met in Munich on 05 February 2011. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair. The Quartet took note of dramatic developments in Egypt and elsewhere in the region in recent days.

The Quartet members considered the implications of these events for Arab-Israeli peace and agreed to discuss this further in upcoming meetings as a matter of high priority.

The Quartet reiterated its statements related to the Middle East, and in particular to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It strongly urged the parties on that basis to overcome current obstacles in the peace process.

The Quartet reaffirmed that negotiations should lead to an outcome that ends the occupation that began in 1967 and resolves all permanent status issues, in order to end the conflict and achieve a two-state solution. The Quartet reiterates its support for concluding these negotiations by September 2011. The Quartet agreed to meet again at the level of Principals in mid-March on the way ahead. In advance, and as a matter of priority, it will seek via its envoys to meet separately with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Brussels, as well as with representatives of the Arab Peace Initiative Committee. In its discussions with the parties, the Quartet is giving serious consideration to their views on how to bring about resumed negotiations on all core issues, including borders and security.

The Quartet commended President Abbas' leadership of the Palestinian Authority, and continued Palestinian statebuilding efforts. It welcomed the package of measures announced by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Quartet Representative Blair for both the West Bank and Gaza and encourages full implementation and additional steps.

The Quartet regrets the discontinuation of Israel's ten month moratorium on settlement activity and strongly reaffirms that unilateral actions by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations and will not be recognized by the international community.

The Quartet condemned rocket fire from Gaza and stressed the need for calm and security for both peoples.

In view of the developments in the Middle East, the Quartet expressed its belief that further delay in the resumption of negotiations is detrimental to prospects for regional peace and security. The Quartet emphasized the need for the parties and others concerned to undertake urgently the efforts to expedite Israeli-Palestinian and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, which is imperative to avoiding outcomes detrimental to the region.

APPENDIX IX

Middle East Quartet Statement New York, March 13, 2011

The following statement was issued today in New York by the Middle East Quartet (United Nations, European Union, Russian Federation, and the United States):

“The Quartet condemns in the strongest possible terms the violent murder of an Israeli family of five, including three young children, in the West Bank today. The Quartet offers their condolences to the loved ones of the victims and to the Israeli people. Attacks on any civilians are completely unacceptable in any circumstance. The Quartet calls on those responsible to be brought to justice and welcome the strong condemnation of this attack by President Abbas and the Palestinian leadership.

The Quartet emphasized the need to expedite efforts to achieve Israeli-Palestinian and comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.”

APPENDIX X

EUROPEAN UNION

Brussels, 23 March 2011
A 123/11

Statement by the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on the attacks in Jerusalem and Gaza

Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, made today the following statement:

"I condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attack in Jerusalem this afternoon. I express my condolences to the family of the deceased, and extend my sincere wishes to the persons injured for their full and speedy recovery.

I deeply regret yesterday's loss of life in Gaza and express my most serious concern at the escalating violence in the Strip. I condemn the recent mortar and rocket attacks out of the Gaza strip against Israeli civilian population. Attacks on any civilians are completely unacceptable in any circumstance. I urge all parties to show restraint and to avoid further escalation of violence. I call for the establishment of a lasting truce in Gaza.

I reiterate the EU's position and my personal conviction that the only way forward in resolving the conflict in the Middle East is through peaceful negotiations."
