

**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MASTER'S PROGRAM**

MASTER'S THESIS

**RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY AFTER 2003: ITS
REFLECTIONS ON IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION**

REBAZ RAZZAQ MOHAMMED

NICOSIA

2016

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**PREPARED BY
REBAZ RAZZAQ MOHAMMED**

20145068

**SUPERVISOR
ASST. PROF. DR. NUR KÖPRÜLÜ**

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Thesis Defence

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We certify the thesis is satisfactory for the award of degree of
Master of **INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

PREPARED BY
REBAZ RAZZAQ MOHAMMED

Examining Committee in charge

Asst. Prof. Dr. NUR KÖPRÜLÜ

Near East University
Thesis Supervisor
International Relations
Department

Asst. Prof. Dr. ALİ DAYIOĞLU

Near East University
International Relations
Department

Asst. Prof. Dr. SİNAN EVCAN

Cyprus International
University, International
Relations Department

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Assoc. Prof. Dr. MUSTAFA SAĞSAN

Director

ABSTRACT

RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND TURKEY AFTER 2003: ITS REFLECTIONS ON IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION

Mohammed, Rebaz

M. Sc. Department International Relations

Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü

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This thesis aims to study the relations between Iraq and Turkey after US strike against Iraq in 2003 and its implications on Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). The relations between two neighbouring countries will be analyzed by referring to the roles of regional politics and stability as well as sectarian affiliations in constructing economic interdependence between two countries. Through focusing on the historical background, Shiite-Sunni sectarian affiliations, terrorism, energy, water and trade issues will be addressed and the interaction between the political and economic factors in shaping relations among Iraq, Turkey as well as Iraqi Kurdistan Region will be explored.

In this first part of the thesis, Turkish-Iraqi bilateral relations will be examined from a historical point of view covering the period from the end of the Ottoman Empire to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003. In the second and the third part of the thesis, economic and political bilateral ties between two countries will be addressed and the interaction of these ties will be explored via referring to AKP government in Turkey and Nuri Al-Maliki and Haydar Al-Abadi governments in Iraq. The ups and downs in shaping Iraqi-Turkish relations will be the main area of focus and its reflections on IKR.

KEY WORDS: Iraq, Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan Region, 2003 US intervention, economic and political relations, sectarian affiliations

ÖZ

2003 SONRASI IRAK-TÜRKİYE İLİŞKİLERİ VE BU İLİŞKİLERİN IRAK KÜRT BÖLGESİ ÜZERİNE YANSIMALARI

Muhammed, Rebaz

M.Sc. Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Danışman: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Nur Köprülü

2016, 83 sayfa

Bu çalışma, ABD'nin Irak'a müdahalesi sonrası dönemde Türkiye-Irak ilişkilerini ve bu ilişkilerin Irak Kürt Bölgesini ve Yönetimini nasıl etkilediği üzerine hazırlanmıştır. Özellikle mezhepsel ayrışmaların ve bölgesel siyasetin - istikrarın etkisi altında şekillenen ikili ilişkiler, siyasi ve ekonomik alanda 2003 dönemi sonrasında pekişmeye başlamıştır. Irak'ta Saddam Huseyin rejiminin devrilmesi ile beraber siyasal coğrafyada ortaya çıkan yeni dinamikler ışığında hazırlanan elinizdeki tez çalışması; tarihsel bir perspektif ile Irak -Türkiye ilişkilerini Şii-Sunni ayrışması, terörizm, su, enerji kaynakları gibi siyasal ve ekonomik alanlar üzerinden değerlendirerek, bu dinamiklerin iki ülke arasında nasıl bir etkileşim ve sonuç yarattığı noktasına odaklanmıştır. Bu bağlamda, söz konusu etkileşimin Irak Kürt Bölgesine nasıl yansıdığı tezin ikincil amacını oluşturmaktadır.

Bu çerçevede, tezin ilk bölümünde Irak-Türkiye ilişkilerine tarihsel bir bakış açısı getirilerek, Osmanlı dönemi ile 2003 yılında Irak'taki Saddam Hüseyin döneminin yıkılmasına kadar olan sürede ikili ilişkiler ele alınmıştır. İkinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde ise ABD müdahalesi sonrası dönemde siyasal ve ekonomik alanlarda yürütülen politikalar ve bu politikaların her iki ülke üzerinde yaptığı etkileşim irdelenmeye çalışılmıştır. Türkiye'de AKP yönetimi ve Irak'ta Nuri el-Maliki ve Haydar el-İbadi dönemlerinin mercek altına alındığı bu bölümlerde, ilişkilerdeki iniş ve çıkışların sebepleri ve sonuçları analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Irak, Türkiye, Irak Kürt Bölgesi, 2003 ABD müdahalesi, ekonomik ve siyasi ilişkiler, mezhepsel ayrışmalar

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DEDICATION

TO MY HOMETLAND AND MY FAMILY

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
EU	European Union
G20	Group 20
GAP	South-eastern Anatolia Development Project
HDP	People' Democratic Party
HEPP	Hydroelectric Power Plants
IKR	Iraqi Kurdistan Region
IOC	International Oil Company
ISI	Islamic State of Iraq
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
ITF	Iraq Turkmen Front
ITP	Iraq-Turkey Pipeline
KCK	Group of Communities in Kurdistan
KRP	Kurdistan Region Pipeline
KRG	Kurdistan Regional Government
KTFA	Kurdish and Turkish Friendship Association
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPEC	Countries Organization of Petroleum Exporting
PDK	Kurdistan Democratic Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
TPAO	Turkish Petroleum Corporation
U.K	United Kingdom
U.S	United States
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
YPG	People's Protection Units

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Introduction

The bilateral relations between Iraq and Turkey have entered a new era in the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, which then led both countries to develop ties in political and economic realms. In fact, this new form of relationship has historically been shaped with economic and political relations between two countries. Thus, the aim of this paper is to analyze the relations between Iraq and Turkey particularly after 2003 and its impact on Iraqi Kurdistan region (IKR) by focusing on the rapid increase in cooperation between two neighbours in the areas of economy, security and stability of the region. The impact of sectarian/ religious affiliations as well as political dynamics in constructing relations of both states will also be examined.

1.2. Scope and Objective

The purpose of this thesis is to study the determinants constructing the relations between Iraq and Turkey. In line with this aim, the impact of these bilateral relations on Iraqi Kurdistan region after the U.S led invasion Iraq in 2003 will be analyzed. With the aim of understanding the relations between Iraq and Turkey, it is crucial to overview the historical connections between the two countries. The emergence of both countries traces back to the beginning of the twentieth century when the Ottoman Empire was defeated. In addition, Iraqi state was created under British rule consisting of three provinces in the 1920s; Baghdad in the middle of Iraq comprising of Sunni Muslims; Basrah in the south dominated by Shiite Muslim population, and Mosul in the northern Iraq where the majority of the population were Kurdish. Turkey was founded as a secular state by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1923. The formation of these states had a negative result on the Kurdish area because it was divided into four parts and distributed among Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran states. The northern part was attached to Turkey and Mosul province, the southern part was

attached to Iraq. During the World Wars (World War I and World War II), bilateral treaties were signed between Baghdad and Ankara based on their mutual interest. This policy continued during the Cold War as well, due to common security, economic concerns.

Although, during and after the Gulf war relations between Turkey and Iraq increased, the United Nations (UN) resolutions and sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq led to a decline in two neighbours' relations. Moreover, in April 1991, after the Gulf War, a mass migration happened through Saddam's oppression against Kurds. The U.S, U.K, France, and the Netherlands created safe haven for Kurds in Northern Iraq with the support of Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal. In this respect, The Kurds were then able to build a crucial autonomous – *de facto* state - in the 1990s until the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The invasion of Iraq had an effect upon Iraq, Turkey, and IKR. In the early days of the US strike, Shiite and Kurdish people (the opposition with the exception of Sunni Arabs) supported intervention of the U.S to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Saddam's regime used chemical weapons, and mass murder against their people, and in return they wanted to be rescued. Therefore, opposing groups supported U.S intervention in order to establish new Iraq on the basis of democracy and human rights as well as a federal government. Yet some of regional and international actors disagreed to intervention. For instance, France vetoed the decision making in the Security Council of UN, and China and Russia remained Calm.

Meanwhile, Turkey also opposed to US intervention in Iraq and did not approve the legislation to send troops to Iraq in March 2003 (*March 1Tezkeresi*). At the beginning, Turkey believed that the Iraqi issues would be resolved by negotiation without using force, and thus Ankara tried to convince the Iraqi government to re-observe changes in the balance of powers at the international level and to make a build good ties with the Middle East and global actors and to reunite Iraqi people regardless of their ethnic and religious background. Therefore, when the U.S. decided to intervene in Iraq, the Turkish parliament decided not to allow the use of the Turkish İncirlik Airbase by U.S. military on March 1, 2003.

In this sense, the relations between Turkey and U.S. were getting worse. This caused a change to Turkish policy in the Middle East particularly towards Iraq in the aftermath of the strike. On the other hand, the relations between U.S. and IKR have begun to grow rapidly. It can be argued that, the IKR has benefited from the international system and it has appeared on the international political map that will cause a drastic shift in Turkish foreign policy. After 2003, Turkey begun supports Iraqi Kurdistan economically and attempted to engage in rebuilding and reconstructing the region through marketing its oil as well. Turkey also advanced its interest in Iraq; one of them was to protect and support Turkmen-most of them living in Kirkuk province. Nevertheless, Ankara opposed to the establishment of a Kurdistan state or independent IKR for Iraqi Kurds, Turkey did not let Kirkuk region to be a part of this Kurdish state. The second reason behind Turkey's policy towards IKR was economic interest. Turkey tried to improve its economic crisis through rebuilding Iraq, exchanging trade, and importing of oil from Iraq. The last reason is associated with the historical ties with the Ottoman Empire and the role of Turkey in the region. Turkey has lately attempted to be a regional power in the Middle East, and to contain and keep the balance of power vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq.

Although Iraq wanted to build cordial political, economic, and security relations with Turkey, Ankara also is also in need of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Iraqi state. As long as Iraq keeps its national unity among Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, Christian, and Turkmen people, Turkey can help the Iraqi government to protect Iraq as 'an Iraqi federation and united'. But contrary to Iraqi plans, Turkey and Iran have involved in Iraqi internal affairs due to sectarian affiliations in the form of supporting groups in Iraqi general elections. Given that the new political system still lacks democratic norms and values and Iraqi politics is under the dominance of the Shiites particularly during the second term of Prime Minister NuriAl-Maliki; the radical Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) dramatically emerged in the region. The insurgences of ISIS and political cleavages in Baghdad have created ups and downs in Iraq and Turkey relations, which also had implications on IKR.

In order to analyze the ups and downs regarding the relations between Iraq and Turkey as well as its effect on the Iraqi Kurdistan region, it is, in this regard, crucial to refer to three research objectives:

Firstly, the nature of the factors shaping relations between Iraq and Turkey during and after division of Ottoman Empire will be analyzed from a historical perspective and the relations between these two countries during the Cold War, and in the post- Gulf war era until 2003 will be explored by referring to its impact on IKR.

Within this context, another research objective of this thesis is to focus on the period after 2003 through focusing on the cooperation between Iraq and Turkey in areas of security and regional stability. The role of sectarian affiliations in constructing relations between two neighbours and the reflections on the Iraqi Kurdistan region, as well as the role of Iran and Turkey in the rise of sectarian competition will be emphasized.

Last research objective is to analyze the impacts of the economic factors on Iraq-Turkey relations and its spillover effects on Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)–which is the government of IKR–impact of oil, water and the commercial effects as such.

1.3. Methodology

In order to analyze Iraq-Turkey relations after 2003 within the limitation of its effect on Iraqi Kurdistan Region previously the historical background should be assessed. Limits of political, sectarian affiliations, and economics in line with the relations in the role of security and policy; sectarian affiliations in constructing relations; the role of Iran and Turkey in the rise of sectarian competition; fighting the terrorists; the impact of oil; the impact of water, and commercial effects, became the most important element indicators of the possibility of concern among Iraq, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan Regions.

In that sense, in order to analyze Iraq-Turkey relations and its effect on IKR within the concern among them Library resources, online data bases, academic studies, and organizational researches, Encyclopaedia, governmental data,

Newspapers, Reports, and Statistics made by professional organizations are used for research of this thesis.

1.4. The Literature Review

1.4.1. Historical Roots of Iraqi Kurdistan Region

For four centuries, the region now known as Iraqi Kurdistan Region was ruled Ottoman Empire until the 1920s. That area was a major part of Mosul Wilayet (ولاية), and then Mosul became a part of Iraq by agreement among Iraq, Britain and Turkey under pressure of the UN resolution in 1926.¹ In addition, the other of parts of Kurdish lands was under the control of Iran and Syria. The northern Kurdish area also became a part of Turkey that is known as Anatolia, as a result of Sykes-Picot treaty Between Great Britain, France and Soviet Union in 1916, to determine the borders between independent state in the Middle East specially Ottoman Empire soil. At that time Kurds tried to create their own independent state, therefore, the treaty of Sevres encouraged Kurds to create a Kurdish state in 1920² as an autonomous or independent state. This led Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to create the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and created Iraqi monarchy under the governance of King Faisal in 1921.³ The bilateral Turkey and Iraq attempted to become involved in the Kurdish separation that Turkey and Iraq got benefit from Kurdish humane and natural sources, not to issues for their security as well, to protect border between them. As a result of this policy some of the Kurdish movements made uprisings against Turkey and Iraq to get their rights. But their dreams died due to the Luzon treaty between Turkish and Iraqi governments in 1923.⁴

¹ Hasan Afrakh, *Kurds*, First Edition, copyright Minare, Erbil public library, Erbil, 2007, p. 179, (Translated by Hamid Gewhary, Persian to Kurdish).

² Saman Hussein Ahmed and Bextyar Said Mohammed, *Kurdish Contemporary History*, First Edition, copyright Nareen, Erbil, 2014, p. 49. www.nareenpub.com.

³ Chress Kochera, *Kurds in 19 and 20th century*, Fourth edition, copyright Awder, Erbil, 2006, p. 45, (Translated by Hama Kareem Arif, English to Kurdish).

⁴ Aso Germiany, "An independent Kurdish state or federation system", Research of Political History, copyright Sardam, Suleimany, 2004, p. 50. www.Sardam.info.

During the foundation of the Turkish Republic, Atatürk had pursued a military policy against Kurds, and after his death the Turkish parliament continued to perform the same policy. Also Mariana Charoutaki said; “Kurd and Islam always have had attitude against Turkish military and policy, whose they said Kurds and Islam were the two biggest threats for Turkey”.⁵ As well as in Iraq, Kurds were uprising against Iraqi Governance to get their rights, but the same as Turkey, Iraq had performed military force against Kurds. Therefore Iraq and Turkey thought to make some treaty against Kurds between their borders. For instance, in 1930, 1931 the Iraqi foreign minister twice visited Ankara, in these meeting Turkish leaders required the Iraqi state "to end of rebel's activities in Barzan's area in Northern Erbil, that a number of Turkish Kurds sit there, they defeated stability and security of the region, Iraq should do the military activities".⁶ Also, Nawzad Abdulla in his research refers to the Saadabad Pact in 1937 that it was signed between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, also Baghdad pact was signed in 1955 between Iraq and Turkey, then Iran, Britain, and Pakistan became members, and U.S. became supervisor member. He said "these treaty and pact have been signed between them, they had directly and indirectly influence on Kurdish issues, against Kurdish revolution and uprising".⁷

After the success of the Iraqi revolution on 14 July, 1958, led by Abdulkarim Al-Qasim he promised Kurds autonomy in Iraq, but because of the disagreement of Turkey and Iran, Al-Qasim broke his promise in the midst of 1959. In addition, Al-Qasim started to fight against Kurds; Turkey and Iran tried to decline the Kurds ability and risks. It seemed when the Turkish ambassador went back to his country (Fuat Bayramoğlu) on 10 August, 1960 from Bagdad to Ankara he said "Qasim wants to fight against communism and the Kurds he wants to protect a united Iraq,

⁵ Mariana Charoutaki, *Kurd and U.S Foreign Policy: International relations in the Middle East since 1945*, First Edition, copyright Aras, Erbil, 2011, p. 237. (Translated by Mamkak, English to Kurdish). www.araspublisher.com.

⁶ Kochere, op. cit., p. 128.

⁷ Newzad Abdulla Hetuti, *Kurdish issues in Iraq and the Mechanisms of Resolve after 2003*, First Edition, copyright Mukiryani, Kurdistan-Duhok, 2009, pp. 75-77. www.mukiryani.com.

and he needs our support for this".⁸ Nevertheless, Iraq had always tried to make good relations with Turkey during the 1960s-1980s, because of Kurdish issues to protect Iraq and Turkish borders, allocations on Tigris and Euphrates water, to transport oil and Iraqi dependence on Turkey for land and sea transport routes. During those times the national aspirations of the Kurds in Iraq had always been a source of grave concern for Baghdad, as Alon Liel said, "Iraq needed Turkish cooperation to curb Kurdish activities between their borders".⁹

After the collapse of the communist regime in Iraq in 1963 and the Baath party became powerful and the Soviet Union's threats increased against the Iraqi regime, in that sense U.S and Britain declared that they would support Iraq instead of the Soviet Union. They arranged a gentleman's treaty between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. According to this treaty "Turkey and Iran promised to defeat the Kurdish movement",¹⁰ Kochere said. Therefore, after the treaty, the Turkish government arrested some Iraqi Kurdistan students. In addition, Kurds started negotiations with Iraq during 1970-1974¹¹ to resolve Kurdish issues and to create autonomy for Kurds in Iraq. Although the case of oil became a subject between Turkey and Iraq due to agreement between Ankara and Baghdad in 1973 in the context of including the Kirkuk oil fields in export, but as Ali Balci said, "Kurds lived outside of energy politics".¹²

Nevertheless, due to Turkey's disagreement with Kurdish demands and the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey in 1974, both countries became at odds with the Kurds in their countries. Because of the violations of Kurds' rights, a revolution was started in Iraq in 1974 by the Kurds, led by Mustafa Barzani and the first war against the Turkish government was led by Abdulla Qasim in 1984.

⁸ N. Lazarif, *Kurdistan History*, copyright Rojhalat, Erbil, 2008, pp. 454-456. (Translated by Wshiar Abdulla Sangawy, English to Kurdish).

⁹ Alon Liel, *Turkey in the Middle East: Oil, Islam, and Politics*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 2001, p. 156.

¹⁰ Kochere, op. cit., p.308.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 360.

¹² Ali Balci, *'Energized' Neighborliness: Relations between Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government*, SETA, Printed in Turkey, Istanbul, Sep 2014, p. 11.

Therefore Turkey and Iraq signed a security treaty to protect the border between them and defeat the Kurdish revolution. An International Crisis group referred to the treaty in its Report "in 1983 Ankara and Baghdad signed a frontier security and cooperation agreement".¹³ As a result of this treaty Turkey and Iraq arranged several threats on Kurds until the Gulf war, especially during the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s.

1.4.2. Turkey and Setting up a Safe-Haven in Northern Iraq

Due to Gulf War, the cooperation between Iraq and Turkey was unfriendly in the early 1990s because of a UN resolution embargo on Iraq. Turkey was a member of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952; therefore Turkey became a part of the International coalition to push the Iraqi Army in Kuwait. It caused "the concern between Iraq and Turkey were going to a cold phase",¹⁴ as Hersh Hemekerim said. In addition, Turkey permitted U.S to use İncirlik Airbase for military force against Saddam's regime, and Turkey spread troops between Iraqi and Turkish border. Dr. Marianna Charoutaki stated, "Troops along Iraqi and Turkish border and the approval of the U.S's plans to attack Saddam's regime from Turkey's İncirlik Airbase on 18 January, 1991".¹⁵ However, the crisis developed more than President Bush and President Turgut Özal expected because of rebellion and it turned to the opposite that both presidents predicted in Iraq, when Kurds rose up against the Iraqi regime to withdraw from the northern part of Iraq. As a result Saddam was not overthrown, and then he attacked the Kurdish area and drove around 500,000 destitute refugees to the Turkish border, with a number of innocent people going to

¹³ International Crisis Group working to prevent conflict Worldwide, "Turkey and Iraqi Kurds or Cooperation", Istanbul/Brussels, Middle East Report, N*81, 13 November 2008, p. 1.

¹⁴ Hersh Abdulla Hemekerim, *the political relations among Kurdistan region and their Neighbors countries Iran, Turkey, and Syria 1991-2003*, First Edition, Tehran-Iran, copyright Endeshe, 2013, p. 136. www.endeshe.org.

¹⁵ Dr. Mariana Charoutaki, "Turkey foreign policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government", perception, winter 2012, Volume XVII, Number 4, PP.185-208, UK 2010, p.186.

Iran, but Turkish government did not want to let the refugees on to Turkey's soil, at that time Özal said that; “we do not want another Palestinian's camp on our border”.¹⁶

The U.S and other Gulf War allies then created a safe haven to protect Kurdish people, with support from Turgut Özal in 1992. "The aim was to deter a new attack of the Iraqi central Government on the Kurds and to enforce a northern no-fly zone. Turkey was playing a central role in all of these developments as the operations were being conducted from the İncirlik Airbase in southern Turkey".¹⁷ Although, ties between Turkey and Iraq were going to be unfriendly, Turkey has always been against division of Iraq and creating Kurdistan state. But for twelve years Northern Iraq became almost an independent entity under the protection of Western countries forces, in addition the PKK had already established itself in the region due to using the power vacuum in Northern Iraq and their activities were increasing in Turkey. Thus, as Meliha Altunışık said "Ankara started to consider Iraqi Kurdistan Region as a national security issue".¹⁸

Turkey wanted to intervene in Iraq due to support from Turkmen in Iraq and protect them,¹⁹ but could not because of United States policy, as Bülent Aras said; Turkey “attempted to re-involve in 2003 over the status of Kirkuk”.²⁰ However, Turkey’s indirect attempts continued until the Bush administration failures, and then Turkey ruled in Iraq due to a political vacuum in Iraq. According to Henri Barky, “Failures of the Bush administration made a vacuum of influence and leadership in

¹⁶ William Hale, *Turkey, the U.S and Iraq*, London Middle East Institute at SOAS, 2007.p. 49. <https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=LzkhBQAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>, 1 August, 2015.

¹⁷ Meliha Benli Altunışık, "Turkey culture and policy towards Iraq", *Perceptions*, Spring 2007, p. 73. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/MelihaAltunisik.pdf>, 4 August, 2015.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Bulent Aras, “Turkey, Northern Iraq and Kirkuk”, Isik University, Istanbul, p.6. https://www.google.iq/search?q=baras.pdf.Turkey%2C+Northern+Iraq+and+Kirkuk&oq=baras.pdf.Turkey%2C+Northern+Iraq+and+Kirkuk&aqs=chrome..69i57.14701j0j4&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=122&ie=UTF-8, 5 April, 2015.

Iraq. This vacuum helped Turkey itself into Iraq's internal politics".²¹ After U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, the relations between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurdistan region have dramatically started to improve. Turkey also attempted to maintain stability in Iraq and encourage Iraq to be a strong country in the region, especially in the Kurdistan region government in order to decrease Iranian influence in the country.²²

1.4.3. Turkey's Relations with IKR and Iraq after 2003

During the first term of Nuri Al-Maliki as the Iraqi Prime Minister, the relations between Ankara and Baghdad were constructed on good ties, and the economic trade and political relations grew between them. This strategy affected the Kurdistan region government as well. As Bill Park argued, "At the beginning, Turkey attempted toward stability, good governance, economic reconstruction, and encourage power-sharing in Iraq".²³ For instance, a high-level visit from Ankara to Baghdad was held in 2009. The foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, Prime Minister Rajab Tayyip Erdoğan, and President Abdullah Gül paid visits to Iraq. Gül arrived on an official visit to Baghdad on March 23, 2009. During his visit, Gül discussed the issues of mutual concern with Iraqi leaders, especially Iraqi president Jalal al-Talabani and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki,²⁴ and they also discussed important matters between the two countries. In addition, the Turkish Prime Minister met with the Prime Minister of the KRG Nechirvan Barzani, as Mesut Özlan said "issues of politics, economics, and security topped the agenda".²⁵ One of the key issues on the

²¹ Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey's New Engagement in Iraq Embracing Iraqi Kurdistan," special report, the United States Institute of Peace, May 2014, p. 4, <http://www.usip.org/publications/turkey-s-new-engagement-in-iraq-embracing-iraqi-kurdistan-arabic-edition>, 30 April, 2015.

²² Ibid.

²³ Bill Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, Strategic Studies Institute and Army War College Press, March 2014, pp. 15-17.

²⁴ Ahmed Hussein, "Turkish president in Baghdad on Landmark Visit", Iraqinews, Mar 23, 2009, <http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/turkish-president-in-baghdad-on-landmark-visit/>, 30 April, 2015.

²⁵ Mesut Özlan, "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iraq in 2009", perception, Autumn-winter 2010, Volume Xv, Number 3-4, pp.113-132, p. 115.

agenda also included the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Given that Turkey fears from the Kurdish influential role in the southern parts of Turkey, Ankara government pursued a reluctant policy towards Kurdish independence.²⁶

After Nuri al-Maliki's consolidation of power in 2010, the sectarian connection between Sunni and Shiites became deeper and the relations between Ankara and Baghdad were undermined. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan called Al-Maliki and accused him of stirring sectarian conflict. It seems that in September 2012, the Turkish prime minister invited the Iraqi Prime Minister to his party's upcoming convention. However, the invite was rejected by Baghdad, whereas Erbil participated in the convention. Thus, contrary to Iraq, Turkey and Kurdistan region government's relations were going better. Turkey supported Kurds and Sunni Arabs due to Al-Maliki's authoritarian policy. Shiites dominated the Iraqi government in Baghdad and it caused a cooling of the Ankara and Baghdad relations.²⁷ Also the Iraqi government and Iraqi Kurdistan region went bad, and the Iraqi government did not send the budget to Kurdistan Regional Government since 2014 and some of the Sunni leaders were displaced. Journalist, Oral Çalışlar, said that; "the concerns between the Turkish and Iraqi Shiite government were complex, Tariq al-Hashimy a leader of the Sunnis was homeless and he went to Turkey. At that time Iran and Syria relations were friendly due to the Shiite sectarian Iraqi Government being a part of this front. Iraq has been separate between Shiite, Sunni, and Kurd, the concerns between Kurds and Sunnis were friendly, it seems that Turkey helped the Sunni front specially the KRG".²⁸

Nevertheless, Turkey is interested in Kurdistan oil; therefore the Turkish government signed agreements with Kurdistan Regional Government, following a

²⁶ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁷ Soner Cagaptay and Tyler Evans, "Turkey's Changing Relations with Iraq: Kurdistan Up and Baghdad Down", from journal, the Washington institute for Middle East policy focus 122, (October 2012): pp. 3-4.

²⁸ Journal of Turkeynasi, *Asoy Strategy*, Öral Chalshlar, "Barzani is True: PKK should be remove their weapon (Kurds are True: their idea be continues)", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), (Jon 2009): p. 24

visit to Ankara by KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani without acknowledging Baghdad in May 2012. As Bill Park indicated, "Maliki blamed Turkey that Turkey signed treaties with Kurdistan Regional Government as an independent state".²⁹ Similarly, a Turkish journalist, Cengiz Çandar, said that; "President Masud Barzani with Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani removed the biggest challenge in front of their independence. They developed political and economical relations with Turkey, and made the oil industry to improve the Kurdistan financial independence and encourage the international capitalist. They showed that Kurdistan in Iraq and the region is the only democratic allies and they are believers for the U.S..."³⁰ Even earlier in 2008, the Kurdistan Region Government announced that agreements had been signed with about 20 international oil companies.³¹ Also Çandar said, "Turkey, after World War One was a major centre that rejected Kurd and Kurd's Identity, now turned 180 degrees, and Turkey seems to look like Kurdistan's mother ".³² On the other hand, as the result Baghdad did not permit Turkish petroleum corporation (TPAO) to work in the south of Iraq and Baghdad rejected the private jet of Turkish Energy Minister Tanar Yildiz to land at Erbil-Airport.

Moreover, the role of sectarian affiliations is one of the reasons of the emerging Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 'questionable performance on Nuri Al- Maliki' from the Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Iraq; it caused the emergence of ISIS in the region.³³ ISIS took over Mosul Province on 9 June, 2014; two months later they attacked northern Iraq. It created more challenges for the established states of the region; at the top of the list is Turkey, because after ISIS took over the province of Mosul, they captured Turkish the consulate and took 49 people hostage, including

²⁹ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit.

³⁰ Cengiz Çandar, "Kurdistan Oil, Turkey, Geopolitics of Middle East", *Journal of Turkeynasi*, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), No 31, (2013): p. 19.

³¹ Balic, op. cit., P. 11.

³² Çandar, "Kurdistan Oil, Turkey, Geopolitics of Middle East", op. cit., p. 19.

³³ Saeid Jafari, "Five Major Reasons Leading to ISIS Emergence", *Iran Review*, October 25, 2014. <http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Five-Major-Reasons-Leading-to-ISIS-Emergence.htm>, 9 April, 2015.

the Consul General, children, and 31 Turkish truck drivers.³⁴ Therefore, Turkey could not do anything directly for their allies Kurds, Turcoman, and Sunni Arabs in Iraq.

In addition, the U.S. supported anything to improve relations between Turkey and Iraq. The Turkish Prime Minister was the first foreign leader to visit Baghdad since a new Iraqi government was formed in early September 2014, to renew the relations between them, after that he went to Kurdistan region he showed KRG Turkish support against (ISIS).³⁵ In addition Ankara took over the G20 presidency,³⁶ Turkish relations with Washington and Europe strained by its reluctance to take a frontline role against Islamic State militants in Syria and Iraq, therefore Turkey supported the EU and USA interest in region. But it caused that Turkey move against Sunni countries that supported (ISIS) in the Middle East, thus, it will affect Turkish policy in the region.

After all, Turkey shifted its attitude to help Kurds in the area against ISIS; Turkey said that they will help Iraqi Kurdish fighters cross its border to fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, thus Turkish foreign minister, Mevlut Cavuşoğlu, said, “we are helping Peshmarga forces cross into Kobane”,³⁷ after a very strong push of the United States and the presidency of IKR, the Turkish government agreed to let 150 Peshmarga fighters enter into Kobane through a corridor in Turkey to support YPG and Kurdish fighters in Kobane. After the huge success of Kurds in Iraq and Syria against ISIS, Western countries emphasis was to support Kurds against ISIS, as U.S secretary of defence, Ash Carter wrote on Barzani's notebook "to

³⁴ Yigal Schleifer, "Turkey: ISIS advance in Iraq creates new troubles for Ankara", Eurasianet.org, 11June, 2014, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68546>, 9April, 2015.

³⁵ Tim Arango, “Amid Mutual Suspicion, Turkish Prime Minister Visits Iraq”, New York Times, Nov. 20, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/turkey-iraq-isis-ahmet-davutoglu.html?_r=0, 10April, 2015.

³⁶ Turkey G20, "Deputy Prime minister Babacan hosted G20 Ambassador in Ankara at working lunch", <https://g20.org/deputy-prime-minister-babacan-hosted-g20-ambassadors-ankara-working-lunch/>, 28October, 2015.

³⁷ Naina Bajekal, “Turkey will help Iraqi Kurds join fight against ISIS in Syria”, Oct. 20, 2014, <http://time.com/3524194/isil-isis-turkey-kurdish-iraq-syria-kobani/10April>, 10April, 2015.

president Barzani and colleagues-with great admiration for the KRG, and the friendship with the U.S we look toward to continuing... partnership, July24, 2015".³⁸

1.5. Organization of the Thesis

The thesis consists of five chapters; Chapter one of this thesis including; a short introduction, Scope and Objective, Literature review, Research Methodology, and the Organization of this thesis.

The second chapter offers the historical background of the relations between Iraq and Turkey, and how impacts on the Iraqi Kurdistan areas will be presented substantially. The factors of the creation of Iraq-Turkey political and economical relations are classified with time periods during World War One when the Ottoman Empire was defeated until the Cold War, during Cold War, and during and after Gulf War until 2003.

The third chapter analyzes Iraq-Turkey relations and its effect on the KRG after 2003, focusing on the relations of policy and security in terms of Kurds in the circle of U.S, Iraq, and Turkey relations; Kirkuk and the PKK issue; sectarian affiliations in constructing relations; the role of Iran and Turkey in the rise of sectarian competition; Kurdish participation in this race, and emerged radical Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

The fourth chapter analyzes Iraq-Turkey relations within limits of economics and their impact on IKR after 2003, focusing on the relations in the phases of oil and water. Commerce is taken into consideration and the limits of economics are assessed in terms of Iraq, Turkey, and Kurdish Regional Government relations.

In the fifth chapter lie concluding remarks, keeping in mind the political and security role of sectarian affiliations, economic policy of Iraq Turkey and IKR relations under the heading of Shiite, Sunni, PKK, ISIS, Kirkuk, oil, trade, and water.

³⁸ Rudaw, "Kurdish President Masoud Barzani and U.S defense chief Charter in Erbil", Rudaw 24/7/2015. <http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/240720152>.

CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the relations between Iraq and Turkey during and after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the impact of World War One on the area especially in the Kurdish regions from a historical point of view. It also discusses Iraq-Turkey relations during the Cold War years and the effects of the Iraq-Iran War on the relations among Iraq, Turkey, and Kurds in particular. It explains how the relations between Iraqi and Turkish governments were not friendly during and after the Gulf War. Furthermore, it discusses Turkish foreign policy towards the Kurdish region in Iraq since its creation, and describes the phases determining Ankara and Erbil relations during and after the Gulf War.

2.2. The era after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Iraqi Kurdish Areas (Mosul Wilayet)

Iraqi-Turkish relations historically trace back to 1534,³⁹ when the army of Sultan Suleiman captured Baghdad, and for four centuries the Kurdish areas known as Mosul Wilayet and Anatolia were ruled by the Ottoman Empire. The Chaldean's war between the Ottoman Empire was led by Sultan Suleiman and Saffarid Empire was led by Shah Ismail in 1514. This war caused some of the worst situations for Kurds. Additionally, there were other wars that happened between the Ottoman's Sunni and the Saffarid Shiite that had a negative impact on Kurds' political, economical, and cultural situations. It caused the division of Kurds land between Ottoman and Saffarid Empire for the first time. The biggest was part attached to the Ottoman Empire,⁴⁰ until the Empire was defeated at the end of World War One in 1918.

³⁹ Hale, op.cit.,p. 1.

⁴⁰ Dr. Fraidun Nuri, *Barzani's Movement*, first edition, Aras Press, Kurdistan- Erbil, 2007, p. 86.

Because of the allies' emphasis to defeat the Ottoman Empire and divide Ottoman's soil among them in 1914,⁴¹ the Ottoman Empire became an area of conflict between allies (Britain, France, and Russia) and Ottoman Empire and Germany. During World War One several secret treaties were signed among Britain, France, and Russia, the most important was Sykes–Picot on 16 May, 1916 to decide on making new borders between countries in the region and allocate control of these areas among themselves. As a result Britain was allocated control of Iraq, the region of modern day Jordan and Israel; Syria was given to France, and Russia was in charge of Erzurum, Trabzon, and Beadles. Britain then captured Baghdad, led by General Mord in May 1917 and also controlled Mosul province in October 1918.

At the beginning, the Iraqi population did not show any opposition against this invasion due to their deep hatred towards the Ottoman Empire, thinking that Britain came to rescue them from the Empire. Eventually though, they saw that Britain wanted to invade the region and as a result, the population rose up against Britain in 1920; although Britain tried to spread stability across the region then Britain thought to put the Iraqi government under its control.⁴² Once the victorious Britain created an Iraqi government with a central council of ministers, the central council included 21 prominent Iraqis, chosen from all three provinces; they consisted of Shiite, Sunni, Kurds, Turkmen, Christian, Jewish, Armani, Kildan, Ashore, and Yazidi, and were dominated by Sunni Arabs.⁴³ The government formed under the mandate of Britain, maintained a monarchy constitution of parliament and king, and then Britain chose Prince Faisal Bin Hussein who was a member of Sharif of Mecca's family. He was chosen at the conference of Cairo in March 1921, and then in June the central council of ministers formally declared him as the king.⁴⁴

Meanwhile, Turkish state became anew country on the map, while Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as a leader of the Turkish nationalist movement rose up against

⁴¹ Ahmad and Mahmud, op. cit., p. 27.

⁴² Nuri, op. cit., p. 97.

⁴³ Shalmo Necdimon, *Mosad in Iraq and countries neighbors: distraction the hop of Israel and Kurds*, First Edition, Erbil, 2011, p. 30. (Translated Rahend Abdulla, Arabic to Kurdish).

⁴⁴ The Law Library of Congress, "Global Legal research center, Iraq: Legal history and traditions", June 2004, p. 11. <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/legal-history/iraq-legal-history.pdf>, 30April, 2015.

colonialism in June 1919;⁴⁵ he was able to create a Turkish Nationalist state (Turkish Republic) in 1923.⁴⁶ He gave Turks a new life, thus a new phase started in Turkey that was different from Turkish history, therefore several shifts have happened from the evolution of economic and political society in Turkey; thus a big shift was made on the international relations in the region due to creating these two countries. However, it also made the biggest issues for Kurds; once again Kurdish areas were divided into four parts, the two parts attached to Iran and Syria and southern Kurdistan (Mosul Wilayet) attached to Iraq and the northern part attached to Turkey, as a result of the Sykes-Picot treaty.

Although, after the victories of allies and defeat of Ottoman Empire Kurdish leaders tried to create Kurdistan state, at that time the top of those leaders Sheikh Mahmud Al-Hafid tried to create the state in southern Kurdistan (Mosul Wilayet),⁴⁷ most of the Mosul's population were Kurds, as it appeared in the formal census of Iraq in 1922-1924, Kurds were 494007, 166941 Arab, 38652 Turk, 62336 Nsary, 11897 Jewish, 26257 Yazidiin numbers.⁴⁸ They were different from Baghdad and Basra's population. For the first time, Kurdish leaders immediately participated in diplomatic affairs and Kurds took the opportunity to take part in a peace conference in Paris; they demanded their rights to create the Kurdistan state as other nations. Thus, the U.S president Wilson advised Great Britain and France "that it is time for Kurds to be free".⁴⁹ Therefore they supported Kurds in the League of Nations that Kurds should create own state due to of referendum and free election. Then Sevres treaty have been signed which was based on Sykes-Picot and convention of San Remo on 10 August, 1920,⁵⁰ it rejuvenated hope of the Kurds for founding a Kurdish state, according to articles 62, 63, and 64 they had decided to create Kurdistan independent state.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Ahmed and Mahmud, op. cit., p. 28.

⁴⁶ Kochere, op. cit., p. 45.

⁴⁷ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 23.

⁴⁸ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁹ Kochere, op. cit., p. 24.

⁵⁰ Lazarif, op. cit., p. 322.

⁵¹ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 28.

Unfortunately, without referring to the Treaty of Sevres to resolve Kurdish issues, the Lausanne Treaty between Iraq and Turkey was issued on 24 July 1923;⁵² again these two countries and Britain could not solve Kurdish issues. Therefore, according to article two and three of the Lausanne Treaty this case was transferred to League of Nations and then in October 1926 the League of Nations decided to determine the border's line between Iraq and Turkey, thus they made a committee to research the issues, which consisted of E. Fersen (فيرسن) a Swedish leader, B. Tileky (تيلكي) former Prime Minister of Meger, and A. Bawlis a Belgium general in 1925.⁵³ The committee made a report and then gave it to the League of Nations; in addition they criticized them for not using the Kurdish issues and rights but League of Nations accepted that Mosul province become a part of Iraq. Eventually Turkey accepted the Brussels' line between Iraq and Turkey and Mosul became a part of Iraq in a treaty that was signed between Iraq, Turkey, and Britain on 5 June, 1926,⁵⁴ but on one condition: Iraq should be mandated to League of Nations for 25 years and should give Kurds their rights such as having administration, their employees, and mother tongue in the Kurdish areas.

Moreover, the main issue of the Lausanne Treaty was Kurds and Islam. The creation of a Turkish secular state was to prevent Islam and initially veto the Kurds rights by using military policy against them, to change their identities to secular and Turkish because in the Turkish constitution in 1924 article 88 that said "all of the Turkey's population without deference to race and religion are Turk".⁵⁵ On the other hand, after Mosul became part of Iraq, the Iraqi Government ignored the condition that demanded by the League of Nations to resolve Kurdish issues.⁵⁶ Due to the violating of Kurdish rights by the Iraqi and Turkish governments, Kurds started a revolution and uprising in their regions against those two countries. Therefore, Baghdad and Ankara thought to make some treaty to decline the Kurdish revolution

⁵² Bayar Mustafa Sayfaldin, *British Policy toward Turkey and its effect on Kurdistan*, First Edition, the Mukiryani Institute for research and publisher, Kurdistan-Erbil 2010, p.127.

⁵³ Lazarif, op. cit., p. 351.

⁵⁴ Shaaban Ali Shaaban, *Some knowledge: Political and Historical*, Third Edition, Erbil 2013, p. 70.

⁵⁵ Ahmed and Mahmud, op. cit., P. 69.

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 101.

between their borders. For instance, Sheikh Mahmud's revolution that started in 1919 against Britain for Kurdish independence but it was defeated in 1931 by Iraqi government; and Barzan's revolution in the 1930s, when the Iraqi foreign minister visited Ankara twice. In these meetings, the Turkish leader required Iraqi state to end rebel's activities in Barzan's area. A number of Turkish Kurds sat there, and they distorted stability and security of the region and Iraq attempted to use military force, it caused the defeat of Barzani's revolution in 1934.⁵⁷

Saadabad Pact was signed among Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan from Saadabad's Palace in Iran on July, 1937 as friendship and non-aggression;⁵⁸ it had a direct influence on Kurdish issues to defeat the Kurdish revolutions. Then another mutual agreement was signed between Iraq and Turkey for friendship and good neighbourly reasons in 1942. According to Article 11, parties are under an obligation to take any necessary action to prevent any activity being carried out in this border region which is against another party's security and territorial integrity.⁵⁹ Therefore, again the Barzani's revolution defeat, and then Mustafa Barzani and more than two thousand of his family went to Iran in 1945, and they had an important role of creating the Kurdistan republic on 22 January 1946, he became general commander of the republic with two thousand fighters.

2.3. Relations during the Cold War

After the World Wars and beginning of the Cold War, Turkey made an ordinary cooperation with other western's allies in the Middle East such as Israel,

⁵⁷ Goran Ibrahim Selah, *Kurdish issues in the circle of American and Iraq relations on 6 may, 1975- 2 August, 1990*, copyright Rojhalat, First Edition, Kurdistan-Erbil, 2013, p. 151. www.endeshe.org.

⁵⁸ Lawrence G. Potter and Gary G. Sick, *Iran, Iraq, and legacies of War*, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 14, <https://books.google.com.cy/books?id=7SzIAAAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>, 1 August, 2015.

⁵⁹ Funda Keskin, "Turkey's trans-border operation in northern Iraq: before and after the invasion of Iraq", Thesis, International Relations Department, University of Ankara, p. 63. <https://ais.ku.edu.tr/course/18873/OPTIONAL%20READING-%20cross-border%20operations.pdf>, 25 April, 2015.

Iran, and Jordan to contain the influences of the Soviet Union in the region.⁶⁰ And Turkish Kurds did not have activities because of Turkish militant policy they were ready to defeat Kurdish liberations movement, but a number of them have had contact with Kurdish leaders in South and East of Kurdistan spatially with (Kurd Life Party) in Iran and (Hiwa Council) in Iraq. To defeat their hazards, Turkey signed a treaty with Iraq to transport Kurds on the borders of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran to enter their cities in 1946.⁶¹ Then they started to apply the plan and attack Kurdish fighters in these countries especially in Iran; it caused the collapse of the republic of Kurdistan in 1946. And then after the collapse of the republic of Kurdistan, Barzani with 502 his friends went to the Soviet Union in 1947, because they were not allowed to stay on Kurdish grounds of Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, until the Iraqi revolution on 14 July, 1958. When Mustafa Barzani sent a message to Abdulkerim Al-Qasim in which he required him to permit Barzani and his friends to come back to Iraq to support the revolution. Thus, after 12 years, Barzani with 460 his friends, 108 Soviet women, and 220 children went back to Iraq.⁶²

Additionally, as the result of containment of the growth of communist ideology and the spread of Kurdish movements in the region, the Baghdad Pact was signed between Iraq, Turkey, as mutual-defence on 24 February, 1955, then Iran, Britain, and Pakistan became members and U.S became supervisor member. But particularly of Kurdish position in the pact, there was not any article concerning the Kurdish situation directly, as everything was indirect; it was the main resource to defeat Kurdish Movements in the Iraq, Iran, and Turkey on the basis of Saadabad's items that referred in the Baghdad Pact.⁶³ The success of the Iraqi revolution in 1958 the system of Iraqi governance shifted from monarchy to republic, and made a temporary constitution on 27 June 1958, in the item of three emphases that Kurd and Arab were

⁶⁰ Hasan Turunc, "Turkey and Iraq", p. 40. <http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR007/iraq.pdf>, 5 April, 2015.

⁶¹ Lazarif, op. cit., p. 46.

⁶² Shawket Shex Yazdin, *Barzani from Mohabat to Aras*, Aras press, Kurdistan-Erbil, 2001, p. 376.

⁶³ Ali Kundy, *Encyclopedia of Histography: 1/1/1951-31/12/2000*, Second Edition, copyright Kurdchap, Kurdistan-Erbil 2009, p. 46.

equal in Iraq,⁶⁴ Iraqi oppositions were also required to withdraw from Baghdad Pact including them was Kurds special PDK sought to drop in the Pact.⁶⁵ Therefore, Iraq and other countries members of Baghdad Pact resigned another Pact and the name was changed to CENTO, it was more developed than the Baghdad Pact.⁶⁶

After all these, again Iran and Turkey demanded Abdulkarim Al-Qasim not to keep his promise that he allow Kurds to participate in Iraqi government as Arabs. Therefore in the second half of 1959 Al-Qasim broken these promise clearly and even he ignored the third item in the Iraqi constitution that said Kurds and Arabs are participating in Iraq equally.⁶⁷ Thus ties between Barzani and Al-Qasim were turning unfriendly. It seemed when the Turkish ambassador Foatuoğlo went back Turkey in 1960 he said to Ankara "Al-Qasim emphasis against communism and Kurds, but he needs our support to do it".⁶⁸ After that the Soviet Union spread propaganda against the Iraqi state, and Kurds again started a revolution in northern Iraq on 11 September, 1961 known as (Aylul Revolution) led Mustafa Barzani. Then U.S and Britain declared that they wanted to support Iraq instead of the Soviet Union, therefore Britain was permitted to negotiate between Turkey and Iran to sign the Gentleman's treaty in 1963, then Turkey and Iran promised that they wanted to stand against the Kurds. After the agreement Turkey arrested some of Iraqi Kurds students in Turkey, and Iran watched borders among Iraq, Turkey, and Iran.⁶⁹ Likewise, the western countries were happy due to Baath's coup d'état against Al-Qasim in 1963 because they thought the Iraqi regime was communist; it caused the end of Al-Qasim's authority.⁷⁰ The Kurdish issues were not resolved after Abdul Al-Rahman Al Arif came to power therefore the Aylul revolution had elaborated and was led by Mustafa Barzani.

⁶⁴ Salah, op. cit., p. 49.

⁶⁵ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 78.

⁶⁶ Kandi, op. cit., p. 91.

⁶⁷ Sardar M. Abdul-Rahman and Hoshyar M. Rashid, "Atlas of Kurdistan Liberation Movement", First Edition, copyright Tenüs, Kurdistan-Erbil, p. 116.

⁶⁸ Lazarif, op. cit., p. 456.

⁶⁹ Nuri, op. cit., p. 308.

⁷⁰ Afrakh, op. cit., p. 220.

After the mid 1960s, the relations between Iraq and Turkey were rapidly growing, economic and strategic interests were driven by political collaboration, there are some challenges remaining to be solved, especially water security and energy. Turkey had become more active in Iraqi affairs, including deals with trade and investment relations, and safe Iraqi-Turkish borders due to liberation movements.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the Iraqi government and Kurds started negotiations with each other; this led to making an agreement between them, as known as the treaty of 11 March, 1970, and in this treaty Iraq gave Kurds autonomy in northern Iraq but without Kirkuk province due to the reason that they could not perform the treaty. On the other hand Turkey had a negative reaction against Kurds being separate from Iraq as Lazarif said, "The 11 March of 1970 particular Kurdish autonomy in the northern Iraq had a negative reaction in the central of Turkish authority to create Kurdish autonomy".⁷² Therefore, the president of Turkey declared publicly in June 1970 that "we are against separate Kurds from Iraq because it will be cause to create Kurdish state".⁷³

In addition, the Iraqi government and Kurds disagreed over the treaty due to Kirkuk province and Iraq once again decided to defeat Kurds. On the other hand Iran tried to sign a treaty with Iraq by helping Turkey about Persian Gulf in October 1972.⁷⁴ After several meetings between Iraq and Iran in Istanbul on 16-20 January 1975, and in an OPEC meeting, Iraq and Iran agreed to negotiate on their dispute over borders and water. As a result both countries signed the Algiers accord on 13 June and 26 December, 1975, this treaty led to the defeat of the Kurdish Liberation Movement (Aylul Revolution), as the Shah of Iran withdrew Iranian support for Kurds,⁷⁵ Turkey was happy as well after the treaty. And then when clashes happened between Iraq and Iraqi Kurds, Turkish aircrafts attacked Kurdish fighters, in this

⁷¹ Liec, op. cit., p. 156.

⁷² Saaban, op. cit., p. 71.

⁷³ Lazarif, op. cit., p. 526.

⁷⁴ Kochere, op. cit. p. 415.

⁷⁵ Daris Kadivar, "Diplomatic History: Shah and Saddam sign 1975 Algiers Agreement", 3 Jan 2009, www.Iranian.com/main/blog/darius-kadivar/diplomati.agreement.htm, 30 April, 2015.

since all of Iraqi Kurds who were refugees in Turkey were sent out from the country, Iraqi and Turkish Kurds once again became refugees in Iran.⁷⁶

Nevertheless, Iraq and Turkey still elaborated their relations, particularly when Islamic leaders gained power in the Republic of Iran in 1979 the relations between them were going better, even during the Iran and Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, and on the other hand after the militant coup d'état on September 1980 in Turkey led by commander Kenan Evren a number of PKK's members moved to northern Iraq and Syria.⁷⁷ Therefore, the mutual policy and military interests between Iraq and Turkey were improving; both countries agreed a united policy against the Kurdish liberation movement in Northern Iraq. At the beginning Taha Yasin Ramadan visited Ankara; they signed a secret treaty known as (hot hunting) to contain the Kurdish movements and communism. Thus, the Turkish troops went into northern Iraq soil by agreement with U.S to attack PDK's bases. However, they did not succeed and they went back to Turkish land.⁷⁸ Once again, Iraq allowed Turkey to enter the Iraqi soil. Because Iraq was busy with Iraq-Iran War, according to the treaty signed between Ankara and Baghdad in 1983, Iraq gave Turkey all of the cost that Turkey spent against Kurdish fighters in northern Iraq.⁷⁹

For the second time Turkish aircraft and ground forces attacked the Kurdish Liberations Movement on 6September, 1984 again they did not succeed, and then for the first time the PKK attacked Turkey. Therefore, based on the 1983 treaty, Turkey and Iraq signed another treaty to attack Kurdish nationalists on 6October, 1984; at that time, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talebani declared that they were ready to help PDK against Turkey to send their fighters to Badinan (Duhok province). His recommendations were accepted by Masud Barzani, then Turkey attacked their bases more than before therefore Iran's leaders Hashim Al-Resfanchany Spokesman and Ali Chimney known leader in Iran Islamic revolution said to Ali Tania that Iran could not stand against Turkish attitudes in northern Iraq

⁷⁶ Kandy, op. cit., p. 278.

⁷⁷ Sulah, op. cit., p. 223.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 227.

⁷⁹ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 78.

and he said "any support for Saddam's regime would be against the demands of the Iraqi people".⁸⁰

However, Turkey completely ignored Iran's demands, once again Turkish aircraft attacked Zaxo city in northern Iraq in 1986. That time Resfanchany blamed Turkey to be involved in northern Iraq specially Kirkuk. As well as Turkish newspaper Milliyet and other western countries newspapers declared "Turkey attacked northern Iraq by supporting U.S to control Kirkuk and Mosul province".⁸¹ Then, at the beginning of 1988, Kurdish forces went into northern Iraq with Iran's force in Halabje city; it caused a challenge for Iraqi forces in the region. Then Iraqi aircraft attacked there by chemical bombings, as a result, 5000 innocent people lost their lives and more than 7000 were injured and many others were displaced.⁸²

2.4. The Gulf War its Reflections on Iraqi Kurdistan realms

These two countries have had several treaties between them such as political, trade, economy, security relations, but after the Saddam's raid on Kuwait on 2 August, 1990,⁸³ the ties between Iraq and Turkey were getting weak. Consequently, the nature of the Turkish operations had changed in 1990s and then Erbil and Ankara were gradually getting friendly. At the time, the Iraq, Turkey, and IKR relations were division into three phases "in the first step there was no contact between Iraq and turkey from 1990-1993 during Özal authority; in second phase Iraq-Turkey relations had contact without any outcomes between 1993-1997, and the third phases Iraq-Turkey relations were getting normal in 1997-2002".⁸⁴ As Hirsh Abdulla said.

⁸⁰ Sardar and Mohmud, op. cit., p. 318.

⁸¹ Goran.op. cit., p. 260.

⁸² BBC news, "1988: thousands die in Halabga Gas attack", BBC news on this day: 16 March, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/16/newsid_4304000/4304853.stm, 1 October, 2015.

⁸³ James M. Mcgorick, *American foreign policy and Process*, Fifth Edition, U.S, Iowa state university, printed in U.S.A., 2010, p. 169.

⁸⁴ Hemekeirim, *the political relations among Kurdistan region and their neighbors countries Iran, Turkey, and Syria 1991-2003*, op. cit., p. 136.

With the strategy of the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, Ankara was playing an important role in all of these developments, as the operations were being conducted from the İncirlik Airbase.⁸⁵ However, at first Turkey did not allow the use of the İncirlik Airbase to attack Iraq, because according to a treaty between Turkey and NATO allies only NATO's forces could use this base to attack other countries, but after the UN decided the 660 resolution on 2 August, 1990 to drop Iraqi troops in Kuwait without condition and UN 661 resolution on 16 August, 1990 to economic embargo on Iraq.⁸⁶ Gradually, the Turkish manners towards Iraq were getting worse and as a result Iraqi attitude seemed harsh against Turkey when the Turkish president went to Iraq to resolve Iraqi issues with Kuwait on 16 October 1990, therefore the concerns between Iraq and Turkey were going through the worst phase.

Therefore, Turgut Özal visited Washington to meet President George H.W. Bush to argue an attack Iraqi regime on 24 September, 1990, and he suggested to U.S that Turkey wanted participate in allies' threats on Iraq. On the other hand, another convene was held among Turkish president Özal, Turkish Prime Minister Yıldırım Akbulut, and commander of Turkish troop general Necip Torumtay, that Özal suggested when U.S attack Iraq at that time Turkey will attack northern Iraq to capture Mosul and Kirkuk, and he suggested federation for Iraq specially in northern Iraq into two regions: one of them consist of Erbil, Suleimani, and Duhok, the other one was Kirkuk and Mosul. The main point of his target was to control Kurds and Turkmens, capture the Kirkuk oil, to have power in the Middle East and recover their old dreams in 1920-1925. But it was rejected in this meeting due to their thought of Arab attitude.⁸⁷

After several threats on Iraqi army by allies, Iraq dropped in Kuwait on 28 February, 1991. The crisis developed more than what president Bush and Özal expected, because of rebellion, Iraqi troops turned to country that both presidents predicted in Iraq and Kurdish uprising. When Kurds were uprising against the Iraqi regime to withdraw from northern Iraq on March 1991, the regime left Suleimani,

⁸⁵ Altunişki, op. cit., p. 73.

⁸⁶ Hemekerim, op. cit., p. 137.

⁸⁷ Kandy, op. cit. p. 450.

Erbil, Kirkuk, and Dohuk.⁸⁸ But because U.S ignored its promise that they gave Kurds, once again Saddam's regime come back to northern Iraq on 31 March, 1991. And he drove Kurds along Iran and Turkish border and mountains; around 500,000 destitute refugees were brought to Turkish border, with one million innocent people went to Iran's borders. At that time Turkey did not want to allow the refugees to enter into its country, and Özal said, "We do not want to create another Palestine camp in our border".⁸⁹

After that, as more than one million Kurds became refugees, UNSC decided to protect Kurds in northern Iraq from Saddam's threats by 688 resolutions on April, 1991,⁹⁰ and then decided to create safe havens⁹¹ (parallel 36) in northern Iraq on 16 April, 1991. Turkey also agreed to using İncirlik Airbase led U.S in 1991, one of them the U.S should use the base on the basis of the UN criteria, U.S must emphasize on Turkish militant process against PKK, allies should not help Kurds to create independent state, and Iraq should remain united. After the Turkish agreement, a no fly-zone was created supported by Turgut Özal and Western countries confirmed Kurdish protection. This, in return, led Turkey to oppose Iraqi Kurdistan being independent because of the critical effect it might have on own Kurds. Equally, as the U.S was now recorded as opposing independence because of the supporting instability would create in the Middle East. But Kurds were able to build an important autonomy in the 1990s.⁹²

Thus, Kurdistan Parliament election was held on 19 May, 1991, it followed by the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan Government on 5 July, 1991. Parliament also decided to a federation united for Iraq and then Kurds with Iraqi opposition and delegation of Arab political organizations participated in a conference at Salahaddin

⁸⁸ Lazarif, op. cit. p. 572.

⁸⁹ Hale, op. cit. p. 46.

⁹⁰ Shakhawan Shorsh, "Iraqi Kurdistan's election under undemocratic circumstances and control", 5 October, 2013, www.Kadirshorsh.com/P=744#VetIa9LBzGc, 27 September, 2015.

⁹¹ John Baylis and other, *The Globalization of World Politics*, Fifth Edition, Oxford university press, 2011, p. 513.

⁹² Keskin, op. cit., p. 68.

city; i.e. Salahaddin's Conference from 27 to 31 October, 1992.⁹³ On the other hand, although Turkey, Iran, and Syria relations were not going too friendly, yet due to the Kurdish issue the foreign minister of "those three countries had the same attitude; they were against division of Iraq and Kurdish independence due to the Gulf War".⁹⁴ They elaborated their attitude against the division of Iraq and Kurdish issues, as the result they did two convene one of them in Damascus in August 1994, the other one in Tehran on 8 September, 1995.

Nevertheless, the biggest issue had been made for Iraqi Kurds due to civil war between PDK and PUK due to gaining authority in March 1994. Several treaties were held to resolve this issue organized by France and Turkey, this continued then Turkey and Iran were involved in the war, Turkey supported PDK and Iran supported PUK, and then PKK started war against PDK on 25 August, 1995. Iraq also demanded Turkey to resolve this problem in the northern Iraq and tried to remove PKK in the region on 21 September, 1996. Indeed, PKK used the power vacuum in Iraqi Kurdistan to fight against PDK and make its roots deep in the region to attack Turkey, thus Turkey started to consider Kurdistan region as a national security issue. Until on 17 October, 1997 the war was stopped due to U.S, UK, and Turkey then a treaty was signed between PDK and PUK leaders and U.S in Washington on 17 September, 1998.⁹⁵

After Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister in April, 1996; he pursued a policy of bringing Turkey back to the East and strengthening Turkey's ties with the Islamic world and Middle East countries especially with neighbour countries. At the first sight, Erbakan declared that Turkey lifted the embargo on Iraq in September 1996. Because Turkey was most at risk due to weakening of the oil transportation from Iraq. Moreover, Turkish policy during his period against PKK seemed like before and his attitude against PKK continued. In other words, his policy against Iraqi Kurdistan was different from that in Özal's period, he tried to remove the no

⁹³ Charountaki, *Kurds and U.S foreign policy: International relations in the Middle East since 1945*, op. cit., p. 309.

⁹⁴ Abdulla, op. cit., p. 80.

⁹⁵ Kenneth Katzman, "The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq", CRS Report for Congress, Specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, October 2010, p. 2. www.fas.org/sgp/mideast/RS22079.pdf, 30 April, 2015.

fly-zone on IKR and Iraq came back to northern Iraq. Thus this policy opposed the U.S policy in the region.⁹⁶

Also, when Bülent Ecevit first became Prime Minister he indicated that Turkey needed to normalize its ties with Iraq and he also thought that U.S policy became harmful for Turkish economic interests and it then led to the creation of IKR. Thus his relations with Saddam were good, and his attitude was opposed to the U.S and IKR. He was also against using İncirlik Airbase by U.S. as well as he believed that the treaty between PDK and PUK supervised by the U.S caused the division of Iraq. In addition, the U.S tried to convince Turkey on its policy in the region; therefore the U.S and Kenya intelligence and law-enforcement team in Nairobi to capture the leader of PKK Abdullah Öcalan and deported him to Turkey; until now he lives in İmralı in Turkey.⁹⁷ Then the ties between Turkey and U.S were getting stronger, after that Turkish attitude with Iraq shifted, it seemed when Tariq Aziz visited Turkish President Süleiman Demirel he did not let him enter into the Republican Palace, even Bülent Ecevit accepted the U.S threat on 36 parallel against Iraq from İncirlik airbase.

Thus, Taha Yasin Ramadan declared that, "after this, our target will be attacking İncirlik airbase".⁹⁸ On top of that, the relations between Iraq and Turkey were getting worse, Turkey sent an economic delegation to Iraq in the early 2000, then Turkish agent foreign minister Farok Ouğlo went to Iraq to sign an economic treaty, and Taha Yasin demanded him to agree on strategic relations between the two countries on 5 May 2000, Turkey also required Iraq to make a gas pipeline next to the oil pipeline to Turkey. Likewise, Bülent Ecevit tried to resolve issues between Kurds and the Iraqi regime, as such Iraq suggested negotiations with Kurds.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Alan Makovsky, "U.S. relations with Erbakan's Turkey", 8 August 1996, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/U.S.-relation-with-erbakans-Turkey, 28 October, 2015.

⁹⁷ Tim Weiner, "U.S. Helped Turkey finds and capture Kurd rebel", the New York Times, February 20, 1999, www.nytimes.com/1999/20/world/US..rebel.html, 30 April, 2015.

⁹⁸ Hemekerim, op. cit., pp. 138-139.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

CHAPTER THREE

IRAQI-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER 2003: ITS REFLECTIONS ON IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION

3.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the terms of political and security relations between Iraq and Turkey in terms of Kurds in the circle of U.S, Iraq, and Turkey; the Kirkuk issue, and the PKK issue. It also discusses the role of sectarian affiliations between them after the U.S. led Iraq invasion in 2003. Moreover, it attempts to shed a light on how the relations between Iraq and Turkey were becoming unfriendly due to sectarian affiliations and its impact on the KRG. It also discusses the reasons for the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its effects on the Middle East in general and Turkey, Iraq, and IKR relations in particular.

3.2. Political and Security Relations

Iraq and Turkey signed several important agreements to strengthen their ties in political and security realms, especially after the general election in Turkey that was held on 3 November, 2002. The elections brought the newly founded Justice and Development party (the AKP) to power in Turkey, and some analysts described this development as a political earthquake.¹⁰⁰ Then, Turkey tried to resolve the problems between Ankara and their neighbouring countries on the basis of the principle of ‘zero problem with the neighbours’ under Ahmet Davutoğlu’s strategy. The idea behind this strategy of Davutoğlu was to resolve Turkey’s problems with its neighbouring countries. According to Turkish politicians the main cause of complexity and instability for Turkey was having PKK in Kandil Mountains.

Kurds attempted to recover Kirkuk and other Kurdish areas in Mosul and Dyala provinces in IKR, and better Kurd-U.S relations after 2003. In addition to the events that had happened in northern Iraq, the U.S tried to convince Turkey to

¹⁰⁰ Yücel Bozdoğulu, "Modernity, Identity and Turkey's foreign policy", *Insight Turkey* Vol.10, No.1, 2008, pp.55-76, p. 67.

support U.S military strategy to overthrow Saddam's regime in Iraq. Washington requested permission for their forces to enter into northern Iraq from Turkish soil. But Turkey, at the beginning, disagreed with the U.S intervention in Iraq, because Ankara thought it would cause change in the Middle East map. Thus, Turkey had concerns regarding Kurdish independence. For instance, Bülent Ecevit declared that, "Turkey could not accept this intervention, because each of these attempts can break Turkey's stability, and it may destroy the balance of power in the Middle East today. We disagree with any military intervention in Iraq, as we said it may also bring risks at international level".¹⁰¹

Contrary to Turkish leaders and those countries that had the same idea with Turkey, once again the U.S invasion Iraq after the Gulf War in 2003 using the justification that Iraq had chemical weapons and Iraq supported terrorism. When the U.S decided to intervene in Iraq, Turkey again became involved in that process, on the other hand after the official communication that would have permitted the U.S to use Turkish soil during its occupation of Iraq was denied in the Turkish National Assembly on 1 March, 2003, because Turkey, the same as France, China, Russia, Germany and Iran had another idea to resolve Iraqi problems. Their idea was different from U.S, U.S allies, and Iraqi opposition. They believed that the Iraqi issues could be resolved by negotiations without war. Therefore, Turkey tried to convince the Iraqi government to agree with these shifts that had happened among the balance of world powers, to make a good policy climate in Iraq in order for all of the ethnic and religious groups to live peacefully in a united Iraqi. In this sense, Turkey and U.S relations were unfriendly; therefore when Turkey wanted to enter Northern Iraq on 20 March 2003, the U.S did not let Turkey go there.¹⁰² Thus, Turkish military activities stopped in northern Iraq and the U.S military activities reached Baghdad due to having disagreement between them about Iraqi intervention and Kurdish issues in Iraq. Turkey also lost the possibility of having an active role in Iraq reconstruction stages after the end of war.

¹⁰¹ Dr. Bill Park, *Turkish policy toward on northern Iraq*, First Edition, copyright Charchra, Kurdistan-Suleimany, 2010, p. 55, (Translated Barzan Mola Taha, from Arabic to Kurdish)

¹⁰² Charountaki, *Kurds and U.S foreign policy: International relations in the Middle East since 1945*, op. cit., p. 382.

On the other hand, apart from the Sunnis, the opposition of the Iraqi regime Shiite, and Kurds supported the U.S to destroy the regime. They wanted to be rescued from being oppressed; they also wanted to create a new Iraq. Thus, the U.S and IKR relations grew better. As a result, Kurds were advantaged in the international system and they appeared on the universal political map. Eventually Turkish policy changed in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. Turkey also changed its policy towards IKR and Ankara showed its support to Erbil with economic growth, rebuilding provinces, and trading the oil of IKR. Additionally, Turkey tried to elaborate its interest in Iraq; one interest was that Turkey wanted to recreate anew Iraq so that it became a counterweight with Iran.¹⁰³ Turkey also attempted to achieve stability in Iraq and made it one of the stronger countries in the region to decrease Iran's influence in the Middle East.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, Iraq wanted to provide good political, security, and economic relations with Turkey, and Iraq required Turkey to help the government to protect a united Iraq and the federation of Iraq should not differentiate among the ethnic and religious groups. But the opposite happened; Turkey and Iran became involved in Iraq due to sectarian and supporting pursuits in the general election of Iraq in 2005. Apart from Shiite, Turkey encouraged the Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen to make a list for taking part in the general election against the Shiite that Iran supported them. But Kurds participated in the election as an independent list under the title of Kurdistan allies. Then the Iraqi united government was established, and Jalal Talabani became President, Nuri Al-Maliki became Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Al-Mashadani became chief of Parliament.¹⁰⁵ After Al-Maliki became Prime Minister, the relations between Iraq and Turkey became friendly. At the beginning Ankara attempted toward stability, rebuilding, economic reconstruction, good governance, and encourage power sharing in Iraq.¹⁰⁶ This strategy influenced IKR in

¹⁰³ Aras, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Barkey, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Fadi Muneeb Al-Asadi, "the Electoral System in Iraq", V.I.P. article submitted, Rice University, p. 2. <https://oiss.rice.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=668>, 30April, 2015.

¹⁰⁶ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 15.

the Iraq state framework as well, this could be seen when Turkish Prime Minister Racab Tayyip Ardoğan declared in 2007 that "I meet with the Iraqi President and Prime Minister, I won't meet with any tribes leader, I won't meet Barzani or someone else".¹⁰⁷

After the U.S decided to withdraw from Iraq early in 2007 due to pressure caused by Sunni and Shiite as they required that U.S should leave Iraq, the UN changed its resolution about Iraqi intervention from freedom to invasion; therefore, gradually U.S forces went back to the USA. Then Iraq, Turkey, and IKR relations changed dramatically for the better, due to U.S failures that created a policy vacuum and it had influence on leadership in the region, and this vacuum helped Ankara to interfere into the arena's politics in Iraq. Nevertheless, the relations between Turkey and IKR in late of 2008 developed when President Barzani visited Turkey to open any way forward in the relations between them, and Iraq-Turkey relations got stronger when the high-level visited Baghdad from Ankara in 2009 including their Prime Minister with nine Ministers. The most important development that impacted on Turkey and Iraq relations was established at the "High-level strategic cooperation council" meeting and was realized on 15 October 2009 in Baghdad, they signed 48 agreements and protocols.¹⁰⁸ Then Ahmet Davutoğlu visited Erbil to make a strong diplomacy between Ankara and Erbil as the 'quasi-states'. Following these events, Turkey opened the consulate in Erbil on 26 January, 2010.¹⁰⁹

After the second term, Al-Maliki was elected as Prime Minister. The relations between Turkey and Iraq weakened due to sectarian affiliations when the Shiite dominated the Iraqi government. Erdoğan called Al-Maliki and stated he was stirring sectarian conflict. And it caused the decline of the Ankara and Baghdad

¹⁰⁷ Charountaki, "Turkey foreign policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government", op. cit., p. 191.

¹⁰⁸ Ufuk Ulutas, "Turkish foreign policy in 2009: A year of Pro-activity", insight Turkey Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010, pp. 1-12, p. 3. http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/insight_turkey_vol_12_no_1_2010_ulutas.pdf, 28 May 2015.

¹⁰⁹ Thomas Strouse, "The oil policies of the Kurdistan Regional Government", the other Iraq/research trip to Iraqi Kurdistan, Opening of the Turkish consulate in Erbil, <https://theotheriraq.wordpress.com/2010/03/18/opening-of-the-turkish-consulate-in-erbil>, 10 April, 2015.

relations.¹¹⁰ It has been seen when Turkish Prime Minister invited Iraqi Prime Minister to his party's upcoming convention that the invitation was rejected from Baghdad, but from Erbil, Barzani with a delegation participated in September, 2012. Erdoğan has reflected against Al-Maliki and he was the first Turkish Prime Minister who visited Erbil since Iraq was created. This has made strong ties between Turkey and IKR. On the contrary, Iraq-Turkey relations were stepping into a worst phase. The IKR Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, visited Ankara in May 2012, he signed some agreements with the Turkish government about economy, oil, and investment, (for more information please see next chapter). As a result, Nuri Al-Maliki accused Turkey of treating the KRG as an independent state. And his reactions against the Turkish government were that Baghdad did not let Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) work in southern Iraq and they rejected a private jet carrying Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz to land at Erbil Airport.¹¹¹

3.2.1. Kirkuk Issue

In 2003 Ankara attempted to re-involve over the status of Kirkuk and some cities in Nineveh and Diyala provinces that Iraqi Kurds insisted they must be integrated into the KRG which has become the primary source of tension with the Iraqi government.¹¹² Turkey also wanted to support Turkmen who mostly lived in Kirkuk province tried to make a front in Iraq among the Turkmen as Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF). Around 1.5 million ethnic Turkmen were living in Iraq as they consisted the third ethnic group of Iraq-majority of the population living in Kirkuk, that Turkey could not ignore them.¹¹³ In addition, Turkey wanted to acquire control the Kirkuk oil. In addition, Turkey had a good economic and trade agreement with northern Iraq. Once again Turkey declared that the establishment of a Kurdish state in the northern

¹¹⁰ Cagaptay, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

¹¹¹ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 17.

¹¹² Kenneth Katzman, "the Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq", Congressional Research Service, report for Congress, specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, October 1, 2010, p. 7. <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22079.pdf>, 30April, 2015.

¹¹³ Leic, op. cit.

Iraq is redlining¹¹⁴ because Turkey disagreed with the idea that Kirkuk became a part of this Kurdish state, Turkey also feared the IKR's independence due to Turkish Kurds hopes that they thought after independence in northern Iraq, its Kurds will require to make own state in Eastern Turkey.¹¹⁵ But contrary to the Turkish leaders, Peter Galbres stated that "I do not believe that Kurds will require separating from Turkey if Turkey presents their demands and rights in the Turkish constitution".¹¹⁶

Given the fact that Kirkuk has always been one of the most important provinces in Iraq, Turkey has always been involved in Iraq due to Turkmens well as due to the historical roots dates back to the division of the Ottoman Empire. When Mosul province became a part of Iraq by the Brussels Treaty (that was signed between Iraq and Turkey) Iraq should send oil to Turkey for 25 years without Kurdish participation. Thus, these factors that have been mentioned then have become problems between Iraq, Turkey and Kurds. There are three scenarios to resolve the Kirkuk issues; one, according to item 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, that it has had accepted by Iraqi people in 2005, these issues should be resolved through referendum and Kurds support this scenario to resolve Kirkuk's issues and other areas that have the same problem in Iraq. Second, Kirkuk province remains as an Iraqi province by the referendum in the region. The third scenario is that Kirkuk becomes an independent region that most of the Turkmen, Arabs, and apart of the Kurds in the PUK party are required to be an independent region in Iraq that is supported by Turkey.¹¹⁷

But this issue has not been resolved between the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders when they negotiated about Kurdish issues in Iraq, at those times Kirkuk's issues became an obstacle between them. The Iraqi government were not convinced

¹¹⁴ Balic, op. cit., p. 10.

¹¹⁵ Ali Kandy, *Encyclopedia of Hstography 1/1/2001-3/10/2007*, Second Edition, copyright Kurdchap, Southern of Kurdistan, Erbil, 2009, p. 68. www.Kurdchap.com.

¹¹⁶ Peter Gabres, "Kurdish state will be create and U.S will Support it", *Journal of Turkeynasi*, No. 28, Erbil, February 2013, conversation between Gabres (U.S ambassador) with radical Journal, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 60.

¹¹⁷ Arsalan Umer, "Kirkuk's future between recovery to Kurdistan and independent region", *Journal of Chrka*, No. 129, 30May 2015, p. 18-19. www.chrka.net.

that Kirkuk belongs to Kurdistan.¹¹⁸ Until ISIS attacked Iraq especially those regions that have issues between Iraq and IKR and then Kurdish fighters (Peshmarga) controlled those regions particularly Kirkuk and some of Mosul's cities, and then those regions have been governed by IKR and sent Kirkuk's oil from KR pipeline to Ceyhan based in Turkey. Thus Kirkuk's oil import by IKG is one of Baghdad's known to Kirkuk's province as a Kurdistan's province indirectly. As a result of Baghdad and Erbil's dispute, they tried to resolve the problem between them; they signed an agreement that KRG should send 300000 barrels of Kirkuk's oil from SOMO and KR pipelines per day to Turkey.¹¹⁹

3.2.2. PKK's Issue

Turkey's policies towards Iraq, determined mainly by security issues, were still important factors in Turkey-Iraq relations,¹²⁰ therefore Turkey, U.S, and Iraq signed an agreement to establish a trilateral mechanism to combat terrorism, and then Iraq and Turkey agreed to establish a "command centre" in Erbil. The important organization that was a problem was the PKK as most of them were living in northern Iraq after the Gulf war they went there in 1990s. Turkey estimates that most of approximately 5000 PKK militants are located in northern Iraq, including some top PKK leaders.¹²¹ After 2003, the situation became complicated in the borders between Iraq and Turkey in September 2004. When the PKK renounced the unilateral cease-fire it had declared in February 2000, then PKK's activities and violence in Turkey escalated.¹²² When PKK attacked Turkish troops and 25 Turkish soldiers were killed and 20 of them were injured in 2007. Therefore, Turkey decided to attack PKK's bases in northern Iraq with more than a hundred thousand soldiers sent to the Iraqi border to enter IKR's soil. However, the U.S disagreed with the

¹¹⁸ Father's Mir, "Kurds future in Kirkuk where is gone", Journal of 140, No. 619, 6October, 2009, p. 23.

¹¹⁹ Sangar Qubad, "Import the Kirkuk oil by IKR and Baghdad's known of Kirkuk's province as a Kurdistan's province", Hewlir newspaper, no. 2039, 14Desember, 2014, p. 4.

¹²⁰ Özlan, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

¹²¹ Altunışık, op. cit., p. 78.

¹²² Ibid, p. 76.

Turkish plan because it would be danger for Iraqi security and it would be an issue for U.S security in the region especially in Iraq. Then the U.S promised Turkey that they would give Turkish military knowledge for Turkish help, instead of Turkey attacking the PKK in northern Iraq.¹²³

The U.S, Turkey, and Kurds attempted to increase stability within the region especially in the borders between Iraq and Turkey. Consequently, Turkish leaders and Kurdish leaders suggested a peace process between them, and Erbil performed an important role to resolve these issues. Thus to solve this issue AKP, PKK, PDK, PUK should be included into any kind of dialogue; in addition similarly Prime-Minister Erdoğan, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalanas well as Talabani, Masud Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani should also take part in this process.¹²⁴ This process started practically between them with the support of Talabani in 2007, it was called Oslo's phase. Then the Turkish MP and PKK's delegate met each other. The confidential negotiations started between them in Oslo in 2008. When the PKK went to Oslo they went there from Erbil and at the time when they came back they visited Erbil, due to KRG's role in this process. On the other hand we can say that Nechirvan Barzani had the role of Talabani. He visited Kandil mountain to meet PKK's leader especially Murat Qarailan and also visited Erdoğan. He gave him the peace process notes, the Turkish and PKK's leaders several times visited Erbil to meet Nechirvan Barzani.¹²⁵

When the high ranked politicians visited Iraq from Turkey in 2009, Masud Barzani told them that he supported the process and that resolution was possible through peaceful and legal methods. Iraqi president Talabani also supported the Turkish concerns on security and he said there were two options for PKK; they should lay down their arms or leave Iraq.¹²⁶ Likewise, Iraqi government was

¹²³ Dr. sardar Aziz, "Incirlick Airbase: Turkey, U.S, and Kurds", Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 31, May2005, Erbil, Published by Kurdish and Turkish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 5.

¹²⁴ Turkeynasi, "Erbil stare from peace process future", Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 53-54, 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 4-5. www.kurd.turk.org.

¹²⁵ Cangis Çandar, "Behind the curtain of events after Oslo's phase: Qarailan, Nechirvan, and peace process", Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 31, May 2005, Erbil, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 10-17.

¹²⁶ Özlan, op. cit., p. 116.

concerned about the issue of the PKK coming to northern Iraq as Zagros Hiwa member of Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KÇK) said "Iraqi government have been afraid of the PKK entering in Iraq, but how can they go back to Turkey and not use PKK against Iraq",¹²⁷ he also said, "this process will have a positive effect on the Middle East particularly in the region".¹²⁸ In addition to opening the Turkish consulate in Erbil in 2010 and the relations between IKR and Turkey were going from strength to strength, Barzani was known as a judge between PKK and Turkey to elaborate the peace process, because of that Turkey stopped their oppressions against PKK and Barzani played an important role between Turkey and PKK, he could keep the balance of power.¹²⁹

Barzani also referred to "the time of gun movements was over, and because of guns anything has not been resolved",¹³⁰ Barzani meant Turkey and PKK should try to resolve their problems between them by negotiation without guns. They agreed to the statement that Barzani supported, but both sides proposed some conditions for each other. The Turkish condition was that PKK should remove and lay down their guns, and then Turkey would stop their operation against PKK.¹³¹ PKK also did not lay down their guns but they made their weapons silent and then some of them went to northern Iraq because they thought there is not any guarantee for resolving Kurdish issues inside Turkey, but they have had attempted it and this continued between them until ISIS emerged. When Erdoğan gave a speech about ISIS he declared that there was no difference between ISIS and PKK, they are both terrorists.

The new Turkey argued about PKK as a Terrorism Organization. President Erdoğan declared about PKK's issue he said "Turkey known what the result of

¹²⁷ Journal of Çam, "the meeting between cam and Zagros Hiwa", No. 4, 4Jun 2013, p. 14.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Turkeynasi, *Asoy strategy*, Amberin Zaman, "the glows star of Middle East Masud Barzani", Journal of Turkeynasi, Firs Edition, Istanbul, 2011, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 9.

¹³⁰ Ibid, p. 13.

¹³¹ Turkeynasi, *Asoy Strategy*, Öral Calşlar, "Barzani is True: PKK should down their gun: Kurds are True: their idea is continue", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p.20.

terrorism is, Turkish attitude was clear against terrorist organization in the region because Turkey battled against PKK for 32 years, and Turkey more clearly known what the result of terrorism is".¹³² And NATO's advisor Jay Do Hop Shafer in a conference from Ankara declared on 20 December, 2005 that PKK is a terrorist organization, and Iraq in 2004, Iran in 2002 from their consulate in Ankara announced that PKK is a terrorist group. But PKK and its followers did not consider themselves as a terrorist organization. On the contrary, they thought they are protectors that get Kurdish rights as Demhat Agid head of PKK's foreign affair relations referred "we have not ever known us as a terrorism organization, we are fighting for freedom and to protect our life, as other nations in the world, we want to get our rights, now is the time parliament again amended its resolution because they saw our fighters were fighting against the terrorist organization that caused destruction of humankind life".¹³³

Due to the Turkish president's attitude we can see that the peace process was stopped. After the cease-fire and negotiation between Turkey and İmralı by participated HDP and PDK in the early 2013, the Gorilla of PKK started to drop from Turkish soil to northern Iraq. Turkey always discussed about removing the PKK's guns but PKK have had a condition for it, the same way as İmralı had conditions for removing the PKK's gun such as this article that Abdulla Öcalan wrote for Turkey and public opinion, the main conditions are; public apology, mother tongue, autonomy....".¹³⁴ But there was not any result to resolve the problem between them and they attacked each other. On writing about the unsuccessful peace process we need to research more and more because the issues in the region increase day after day and the international level involved in these issues in the Middle East we cannot determine the peace process between them what is going on. But when these struggle stops, it should be a starting point to resolve these issues between them peacefully.

¹³² Karimsemko, "what is terrorism and how PKK become a terrorist part?" Journal of Chrke, No. 128, 30 November 2014, www.chrke.net.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ali Bairemoğlo, "where is going the peace process?" Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 51-52, 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 35.

3.3. Role of Sectarian Affiliations

The big issues on sectarian discourse vis-à-vis deference between Shiite and Sunni Islamic discourse remind us of the long lasting rivalry between the Ottoman and Saffarid Empire that seem to be coming to the forefront once again. Although Turkey at the beginning of creating Iraq and Turkey did not have any sectarian ideological issues with Iraq the same as Turkey have had with Iran and Syria, because the authority were Shiite. The Iraqi authority were Sunni during King Faisal's time, after the Iraqi revolution of 14 July, 1958, and then Baath Party came to power until the collapse of Saddam's regime in 2003, and the Turkish state governance was secular and a democratic system. But after the Iraq invasion, the role of sectarian changed the basic characteristics of Iraq, especially in northern Iraq, when Shiites gained power and they were authorities in Iraq against the Iraq constitution, it would be caused to reflect Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, in which Kurds had a major role in devising and Sunni Arabs almost none, undertook to *normalize* the disputed areas by reversing earlier *Arabization* programs. Tensions between Kurds, local Arabs, Turkmen, and other ethnic groups in Kirkuk, the Kurds had the best opportunity to seize Kirkuk and other disputed territories after 2003. But they want to resolve these areas between Iraq and IKR by the Iraqi constitution as a consequence of these factors the referendum has not held it has caused tension between them.

Nevertheless, Iraq's Sunni provinces might also edge towards greater autonomy from a Shiite dominated and centralizing Baghdad. When added to the persisting sectarian violence in Iraq, the omens for the consolidation of Iraq democracy and the establishment of stable governance were not good.¹³⁵ In addition, Turkey thought that the consequence of the war would lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish state, but Turkey was always against it and tried to make Iraq remain as a united state. In addition Turkey tried to make a policy front among Sunni Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen in Iraq. Turkey encouraged them to make allies with some Shiite parties, to establish the Iraqi government. It was seen in the election in 2005, which Turkey supported Sunni and Iran supported Shiite in Iraq. Thus the central of

¹³⁵ Balci, op. cit., p.29.

Arabian Sunni wanted to dominant on all of Iraqi region again, and it will be benefit for Turkey.

However, after the Shiite got the majority of Iraqi parliament's seats, and Iraqi government were created by unity among the success lists of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds, Al-Maliki became Prime Minister and he agreed to the establishment of a high level strategy cooperation council with Turkey, bilateral trade and political dialogue between these two capitals grew apace.¹³⁶ Turkey were involved indirectly in the Iraqi government on the diplomatic front, Erdoğan's presidency will face even bigger challenges. In recent years, Turkey's foreign policy has been a complex mix of rush, hubris, strong religious underpinnings and a distinct tendency to forget fundamentals, such as the countries of NATO affiliation or memories of the Ottoman Empire in the region. Ambitions of a self-standing foreign policy were frequently contradicted by hard relations, for example Turkey's security is nothing less than fully dependent on NATO.¹³⁷

On the other hand, Iran's view of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East is not always positive. There are indications that Iran officials are unhappy with Turkey's policies in the Middle East, one major issue is Syria. Iran has criticized Turkey's position in Syria and Turkey's criticism of Bashar Al-Assad, Iran perceives Turkey to have aided the downfall of the Syrian regime. Turkey and Iran are two countries that extend competitions in Iraq, during the last parliamentary election Iran backed the Shea parties while Turkey backed the Sunni parties.¹³⁸ Combined with Erdoğan's preference for a Sunni leadership against Tehran and Damascus, can all effectively explicate Turkish foreign policy's positive reorientation towards the KRG while showing its importance for Turkish politics.

¹³⁶ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 15.

¹³⁷ Marc Pierini, "The west and President Erdoğan", visits scholar Carnegie Europe, Carnegie Europe. , August14, 2014. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/08/14/west-and-president-erdo%C4%9Fan/hku6>, 17May, 2015.

¹³⁸ Ali Nader, et.at., "Policy debate, Arab spring and its Effect on Turkey's regional policy", October 2011, SETA, No. 3, <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/arab-spring-and-its-effect-on-turkey%E2%80%99s-regional-policy.pdf>, 10April, 2015.

After Al-Maliki again became Prime Minister in 2010, the sectarian issue got deeper between Sunni and Shiite; Maliki opened two sided war against Kurds and Sunni,¹³⁹ because he did not perform the Iraqi constitution. When the constitution has not performed by the Iraqi government, the unity of Iraq was going towards destruction. The majority of Shiite under the role of law displaced the Sunni even most of the Sunni's leaders were blamed for helping terrorism. For instance, Tariq Al-Hashimy deputy of president, on the other hand Maliki's government made some issues for KRG such as budget, they made issues for item 140 of Iraqi Constitution, and they sent more forces to the region that have problem between central and Kurdistan regional government. They made issues about sending oil and ideologically, Shiite also became dominant, thus the sectarian issues have been made more and more. Al-Maliki and his party also demand alterations to the Iraqi constitution, so as Iraq becomes a central state instead of federation state.¹⁴⁰

Due to sectarian issues in Iraq the Ankara and Baghdad relations were getting weak, while Erdoğan called Al-Maliki that he is stirring sectarian conflict.¹⁴¹ Yet the political domination of the bilateral relationship was already showing signs of deterioration by the time Maliki sought reaction in 2010. Over the previous four years, his Shiite aligned government had pushed for centralization- a policy Ankara had supported in principle until Maliki's rule began to take on a troubling authoritarian bent with sectarian overtones.¹⁴² Moreover, nowadays Turkey and Iran have a major role to determine the future of Iraq and they have the goals more than before. Still they tried to choose the authority for Iraqi governance that it will be beneficial among Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds.¹⁴³ Iran tried to be a superpower in the Middle East due to gathering Shiite around itself and to make a confederation among

¹³⁹ Hisam Despesh, "region and Miliki the tactic of defeat", Journal of civil, No. 222, 8March, 2014, p. 15.

¹⁴⁰ Khailan Bakhtiar, "Shea, further the Iraqi from united: Sunni were displace and they made issues for Kurds", Journal of Shaqam, No. 266, 5February, 2014, p. 18. www.shaqam.net.

¹⁴¹ Charountaki, "Turkey foreign policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government", op. cit., p. 200.

¹⁴² Cagaptay, op. cit., pp.3-4.

¹⁴³ Arezo Ylmaz, "who and how governance Kurdistan", Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 53-54, 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 8.

Shiite. Allowed in the region as the Gulf countries that Sunni performance in the area, they wanted to make it by uniting Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon as how Ahmet celaby suggested this method to those countries. Iran gave Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut the draft of this project in 2012 and told them "if Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon united in the framework of confederation model, it will be basis of a united middle East".¹⁴⁴ The main aims of this project are unity of economy, cooperation of trade, and to provide the political and administration together.

In September 2012, when Erdoğan invited Al-Maliki to his party's upcoming convention, his invitation was rejected from Baghdad, but not from Erbil. Thus, Turkey and KRG relations got better, Turkey supported Kurds and Sunni due to Al-Maliki's authoritarian policy and Shiite dominated Iraqi government in Bagdad it caused a decrease of the Ankara and Baghdad relations.¹⁴⁵ In addition, Al-Maliki lost the support of IKR; he also lost support of Sunnis, even he lost the support of Shiite policies in the middle and southern Iraq. They also did not believe Al-Maliki's authority. As well as in December 2011, when Baghdad issued an arrest warrant for Sunni vice president Tariq Al-Hashimy on terrorism charges¹⁴⁶ arrest or marginalization of other leading Sunni politicians, appeared in Ankara as a challenge to power and pluralism in Iraq, which Ankara saw as offering the best hope for political stability in the country, and as a Shiite and perhaps indirectly Iranian-bid for power and predominance in Iraq. Ankara had long been anxious about Maliki's centralizing, authoritarian, and seemingly sectarian inclinations. And that time Al-Hashimy went to Turkey, and he got support from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey.¹⁴⁷ Then when Masud Barzani visited Ankara Kurd-Sunni relations became

¹⁴⁴ Journal of civil, "Confederations of Shiite and Allowed: the project of Ahmet Chalaby", Journal of Civil, No. 199, 21September, 2013, p.18.

¹⁴⁵ Cagptag, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁴⁶ Charountaki, *Kurds and U.S foreign policy: International relations in the Middle East since 1945*, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁴⁷ Turkeynasi, *Asoy Strategy*, Rawshan Chakr, "The Özals dream will be true", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 126.

stronger than before, gradually the links between Kurds and Sunni with Turkey were going strong.¹⁴⁸

The Maliki authoritarian attitude in Baghdad and Iraqi troops could not protect the Iraqi constitution therefore the new Iraq is divided practically,¹⁴⁹ as Joshua Landis said. On one hand Maliki's attitude was one of the factors that made Erbil to become uncertain, on the other hand it caused Turkey to become uncertain. Thus Turkey-IKR relations were getting friendly; these relations were almost getting them closer to each other in a way that the red line shifted to red rug for Kurds. Additionally, Al-Maliki tried to make issues for Kurds and Sunni to cover his failures in Iraq, thus he caused oil and budget issues for Kurdistan that Kurds tried several times to resolve those problems with Baghdad but during Maliki's power they could not resolve them. Even Maliki's government did not send the IKR's budget at the early of 2014, at that time both leaders President Masud Barzani and Prime Minister Al-Maliki stood against each other. In the early March 2014, Al-Maliki in the meeting on NRT.TV declared that Barzani tried to bring Turkey into Iraq to capture the Iraqi resources and oil, and Masud Barzani declared during his speech for Nawroz celebration on 21March, 2014, he criticized Al-Maliki that Iraq was becoming authoritarian because of Maliki.¹⁵⁰ When Haider Al-Ibadi became Prime Minister, then for the several times both sides tried to resolve those issues after several negotiations and treaties they almost found same ways to resolve them. Thus IKR could send and sell its oil and Kirkuk oil from IKR's oil pipeline to ceyhan's base in Turkey, IKR could send 300000 barrel of Kirkuk oil per day, 150000 from SOMO company their money going to Baghdad and 150000 from Kurdistan region

¹⁴⁸ Turkeynasi, *Asoy Strategy*, Ibrahim Karlgol, "Turk, Kurd, and Sunni", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 127.

¹⁴⁹ Journal of Gulan, "Meeting between Prof. of Oklahoma university Joshua Landis with Journal of Gulan", No. 1015, 2March, 2015, p.40.

¹⁵⁰ Arsalan Rahman, *the sociology war of ISIS and reflection on Kurdish Media*, copyright Rojhalat, Kurdistan-Erbil, 2015, p. 79.

oil pipeline their money going to Erbil, and Erbil should provide its budget for IKG.¹⁵¹

Also after the blood war rising between Shiite and Sunny, and most of the Iraqi cities had bloodshed between them more than a thousand people were ransomed, gradually Iraqi political and geographical relations were going to separate. Turkey and Iran were involved more and more. When ISIS attacked Iraqi cities Iran allowed Qasim Suleiman enter into Iraq to defeat ISIS, as a reflect Acil Al-Nojaifi a leader of Sunny and province of Mosul said "we will be bringing the Turkish consultants into Iraq to train our forces that they were training outside of Mosul".¹⁵² Then the deputy of Iran president said: "we do not want Iraq to be controlled under a new Ottoman, because our people have been killed due to rescues of Iraq, and we will continue".¹⁵³ He also said, "Except of ISIS, the new Ottoman will be dangerous for the Middle East".¹⁵⁴

IKR did not far from Turkey and Iran competition, such as how they encouraged Kurdish parties to start civil war in 1990s. However, after 2003 things got different. Both countries had an important role in development policy, economy, and governing IKR. And nowadays they try to administrate IKR in a way that will not be a threat on their security. Unlike earlier times, Turkey wants Kurdistan to be an independent state, but Iran will prefer Kurdistan to be an autonomous region and should remain in Iraq,¹⁵⁵ because they want to drop IKR into the sectarian competition. But Kurds always did not want to be a part of this race, especially Barzani has always emphasised on this nation that "Kurd will not be a part of this sectarian conflict that it has in the region", as well as Flep Gorden special vice

¹⁵¹ Journal of Shaqm, "Al-Maliki want made issues for IKR to covered his unsuccessful", No. 267, 20February, 2014, p. 6.

¹⁵² Helkewt Zahir, "leaders fighting, it divisions Iraq", Hewler newspaper, No. 2108, 2 April 2015, p.4.

¹⁵³ Avro newspaper, "The deputy of Iran's president: Iraq is part of Iran, we do not want to be under control of new Ottoman", Avro newspaper, No. 1905, 10March, 2015, p. 3.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Arazo Dilman, "how and who governance Kurdistan", Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 53-54, 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 8.

president, Obama and White House as an order of Middle East and Africa said "only Kurd and Kurdistan did not bring any issues for Middle East, as how they did not resource of issues between the Shiite and Sunni's war in Iraq".¹⁵⁶

In addition, the U.S. supports anything by pressure that improves relations between Turkey and Iraq. The Turkish Prime Minister is the first foreign leader to visit Baghdad since a new Iraqi government was formed in early September 2014, to renew the relations between them; after, he went to Kurdistan region he showed Turkish support against (ISIS).¹⁵⁷ There was a sudden and quick expansionism of the radical Islamic State in Iraq and Syria heralding the beginning of a new downward spiral in the Middle East, with significant political and security challenges for the established states of the region. At the top of the list is Turkey. The fear now is that this benign neglect has allowed the Islamic State to embed itself in Turkey and build the capacity to conduct terrorist activities on Turkish soil, and thus to retaliate for Turkish participation in the U.S-led coalition.¹⁵⁸

At the second term of Al-Maliki became Prime Minister, he pushed Iraqi future to disappear, he opened all of the doors for Iraqi future, all of the Iraqi politicians and leaders special Sunni and Kurds agreed that the Iraqi issues rose due to Al-Maliki's mistakes, particularly after U.S withdrawal in Iraq. He tried to control Iraq and dominate Shiite in government and he tried to change Iraqi government of Shiite from federation to centralization. This led to the destruction of the political process in Iraq and it made a big political vacuum in the Middle of Iraq. It also caused to raise terrorism and ISIS could control Anbar, Mosul, Tikrit, a part of Kirkuk, and Makhmour. Then Iraqi security were going to get complicated and it had an effect on the region and worldwide especially for Kurds in northern Iraq. As Hussein Alwan the Iraqi parliamentary said "during the 10 years of Jaafer Ibrahimi and Al-Maliki's

¹⁵⁶ Journal of Gulan, "Kurd and U.S the obligation allies", Journal of Gulan, No. 1029, 8Jun 2015, p. 14.

¹⁵⁷ Arango, op. cit.

¹⁵⁸ Sinan Ulgen, "Turkey's ISIS crisis", October 2, 2014. <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/turkey-and-coalition-against-isis-by-sinan-ulgen-2014-10>, 10April, 2015.

Prime Ministers the stability of security and services of people were destroyed",¹⁵⁹ the role of sectarian affiliations is one of the reasons that led to the emergence of Islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), "questionable performance on Nuri Al-Maliki" from the Kurds and Sunni Arabs in Iraq, it caused for emergence of ISIS in the region.

3.4. Emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

Before analyzing the emergence of ISIS, it is better to refer to the terrorism definition. According to the U.S Army Manual "Calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, it is intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, political, religious, or ideological goals".¹⁶⁰ Therefore, we can say emerged terrorist organizations were getting these aims in the world especially emerged ISIS in Iraq and Levant. The early creation of the Tawhid and Al-Jihadist group led Eiman Al-Zawahri as a part of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and then they created the Islamic State of Iraq, they grew in Mosul and some other regions they took taxes from ordinary people in early 2006, but Iraqi forces could almost defeat them. When the crisis of Syria arose during the Arab uprising in 2011 due to conflict between Sunni with Assad and Al-Maliki's authority, Al-Qaeda could rise and become strengthened as an Islamic ideology in the region, particularly in Syria like opposition. At the beginning the some of the international community countries especially Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Al-Arabia, and U.S supported them in order to collapse Assad's regime. These countries saw these Islamic groups as allies that they could defeat Assad's regime therefore they supported them. At the early stages Islamic groups have been accepting against regime, but when they became stronger they started to establish the Caliphate that the capital city was Raqqa in Syria.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Journal of Gulan, "the Iraqi government destroy and uprising the terrorism affair", No. 956, 9January, 2013, p.31.

¹⁶⁰ Us Army, "A military Guide to Terrorism in the twenty-first Century", August15, 2005, p. 5, www.survivablebooks.com, 17May, 2015.

¹⁶¹ Fahim Tashtakin, "The conversation between Fahim and Journal of Turkeynasi", No. 51-52, February 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 9.

Then due to conflict between Zawahri and Abu Baker Al-Baghdadi, the links between them were getting worse in April 2013, therefore Al-Zawahri decided to disintegrate the unity between Islamic state of Iraq (ISI) and Nusra's Front on 9 July, 2013. And then Al-Baghdadi could make some effect on Islamic groups in Iraq, for a short period of time, as for Syria, and other Islamic countries, he established Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). After ISIS split with Al-Qaeda in 2013, growing out of Al-Qaeda and the group's goal has been remarkably consistent as Zack Beauckamp said "founded a hardliner Sunni Islamic state".¹⁶² Then they tried to establish an Islamic Caliphate in Iraq and Levant. Today ISIS holds a fair amount of territory in both Iraq and Syria, when ISIS split from Al-Qaeda they gradually tried to develop their human resource, economic, and financial authority and they captured Mosul province because Mosul was the best place for them to get their goals.¹⁶³

Then, they attacked the Iraqi air force training base that known (COB Speicher) they captured it without war on 12 July, 2014, around 4000 students were there, about 1700 of them were killed by ISIS all of them were Shiite. After ISIS controlled most of the Sunni's areas in the middle of Iraq and Syria, and they got their goals, they changed its name from ISIS to Islamic Caliphate then they elected Al-Baghdadi as Caliphate in July 2014, and they tried to remove the borders in the region.¹⁶⁴ ISIS has made significant territorial gains in Iraq. The ambitions in that region do suggest that ISIS finds oil as an important part of its future development. The Iraqi army is much stronger than ISIS; they want to capture the weapons. Nevertheless, Iraq and Syria are multiple nations and religious countries, because of different nation and religions; we find the difference between the people. Politicians are using this disunity of people for their purpose and politicians create the political terrorism.¹⁶⁵ As Masud Abdulla said "ISIS holds the political religious message, they did not hold any other aspect, but the intelligence agencies in the world are using

¹⁶² Zack Beauckamp, "How ISIS could fall apart-and Iraq's war could get even worse", VOX, 18 June, 2014, <http://www.vox.com/2014/6/18/5821088/how-isis-could-lose-in-iraq>, 30 April, 2015.

¹⁶³ Tashtekin, op. cit., p.9.

¹⁶⁴ Rahman, *the sociology war of ISIS and reflect on Kurdish Media*, op. cit., p.15.

¹⁶⁵ Concepts of terrorism, "analysis of the rise-declim-trends-and risk", desember, 2008, deliverable 5, pp. 11-12, www.transnationalterrorism.eu, 29 October, 2015.

every radical movement and they are benefitting from those movements that they have a weak rationale".¹⁶⁶

The main factors of the emerged ISIS was deeper than the sectarian relations between Shiite and Sunni in Iraq and Syria due to of Shiite control over the Sunni and the mistakes of Shiite because of violation of constitution rights of Sunny in Iraq. Also, during the Arab uprising Syria raised against Assad's regime, there are many ideas about the emergence of ISIS and those who supported them, some people thought that ISIS emerged as the result of sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria.¹⁶⁷ And ISIS emerged as the result of Maliki and Shiite's mistakes that they performed against Sunni and Sunnis became a part of ISIS and they supported ISIS. Many leaders and members of Iraqi's troops supported ISIS, as General Denis Chapman led the U.S consultation in Iraq from 2007-2011 said "the high people in troop, security, and government in Iraq supported these groups".¹⁶⁸ The emergence of ISIS in the Sunni's areas reveals that ISIS appeared due to the sectarian conflicts. Some other people believed that the main goals emerging ISIS were to keep the Shiite authority in the region especially to keep Bassar Al-Assad in Syria and to weaken the Syrian opposition. Other aims were keeping Al-Maliki for the third term that he could announce the unusual situation in Iraq in order to arrest the Sunni people. The emerged terrorist group in Syria and their desire to get power gave more chance to keep Assad in authority.¹⁶⁹

Furthermore, other analysts believe that the emergence of ISIS was against the Kurdish demands and some countries supported ISIS against Kurdish independence in northern Iraq. As Masud Barzani answered a question on Sky News Arabia that Zeynab asked him, "do you have doubt that any countries did this policy and encourage them?" President Barzani replied "May be they encouraged them, it is difficult to understand ISIS's hope, but it could be, but I am sure the ISIS's hope was

¹⁶⁶ Rahman Shaabani, "how against the radical ideological of ISIS", Journal of Sat, No. 37, 8March, 2015, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ Sami Kohan, "why Iraq cannot control ISIS?" Journal of Turkeynasi, No. 53-54, 2015, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), p. 15.

¹⁶⁸ Journal of Bizav, "meeting between Denis with Journal", No. 8, 10October, 2014, p. 17.

¹⁶⁹ Rahman, *the sociology war of ISIS and reflect on Kurdish Media*, op. cit., p. 77.

Kurdish issues, in the four parts of Kurdistan, but who encouraged them and participation in this big plan, for that we should research this".¹⁷⁰ Other researchers say that Turkey and other Islamic Sunni countries supported ISIS to performance their goals in Syria and Iraq, due to sectarian conflict and to defeat Assad's regime as one of the ISIS member when Peshmarga arrested him, he said "Our weapons unofficially came from Turkey, Saudi Al-Arabia, and Lebanon".¹⁷¹ It seems that the emergence ISIS in Iraq and Syria was a consequence of the violation of the Shiite authority and other leaders against Sunni people and the Sunni leaders used ISIS for their goals. The radical terrorists also came into the region as a result of a policy vacuum; they used them to their aims. Also the World Intelligence Agency used ISIS as a company for their own interests and to defeat radical Islamic groups. And all of these opinions that above concerning emerging ISIS were true, but all of them used ISIS for their goals.

Indeed, ISIS has impacted on Iraq's external relations, with specific reference to the Turkey and IKR relations. They also have caused many issues for many countries in the world especially in the Middle East countries, on the top of them Turkey. This is because after ISIS took over Mosul Province, they captured the Turkish consulate and took 49 people as a hostage, including the General Consul, children, and 31 Turkish truck drivers.¹⁷² Therefore, Turkey could not do anything directly for their allies Kurds, Turkmen, and Sunni Arabs in Iraq. As Sinan Ulgensaid "Turkey at the beginning supported the opposition of Syria, particularly Islamic groups against Bashar Al-Assad's regime".¹⁷³ Following the attack on its consulate, Ankara came under fear for its past policies of non-discriminatory assistance to a wide range of opposition groups in Syria, including militant Islamic groups such as ISIS. Critics claimed that Turkey had decided to support these groups believing that they would be instrumental in achieving the objective of regime change. Over time, however it became clear that despite the assistance Syrian military opposition received from friendly governments such as those of Turkey and

¹⁷⁰ xabat newspaper, "Meeting between Barzani and Zeynab Yazje", No. 466, 14October, 2014, p. 3.

¹⁷¹ Rudaw newspaper, "one of the ISIS's member speech to Rudaw", No. 353, 6 April 2015, p. 6.

¹⁷² Schleifer, "Turkey: ISIS advance in Iraq creates new troubles for Ankara", op. cit.

¹⁷³ Ulgeg, op. cit.

the Gulf Monarchies, the opposition proved too fractured and too ineffectual to unseat the regime of Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad.¹⁷⁴

In addition, the development of Turkey and IKR relations especially economic and political, both of them signed many commercial treaties together, when Ankara and Erbil had more hopes about their association relations in the future. At the beginning the ISIS threat on Middle of Iraq, then on Kurdistan caused more fear on the Turkey and IKR relations. The ally's aircraft, Peshmarga's forces, PKK's forces, and a part of Iranian soldiers participated in the threat on ISIS to rescue Makhmour and Gower and to further ISIS's fear on Erbil. Although the KRG expected from Turkey, Turkey could not offer help to Erbil, as Masud Barzani in the meeting with Sky News said: "The IKR expected more help from Turkey, especially when ISIS was a threat Kurdistan two months ago".¹⁷⁵ As well as Susan Rice, the security consultant of U.S, declared "Turkey to use the Incirlik Airbase by U.S to threaten ISIS in Iraq and Syria, at the beginning of the control of Mosul by ISIS Turkey have not had a clear attitude against ISIS".¹⁷⁶ After ISIS freed the Turkish hostage, Turkey and IKR again started their debate about Turkey-IKR relations.

Ankara also took over the G20 presidency in December 2014, its relations with Washington and Europe strained by its reluctance to take a frontline role against ISIS militants in Syria and Iraq. President Erdoğan's tightening grip on power has also raised concern in Europe and the United States.¹⁷⁷ Turkey is in a tough spot, it has ISIS militants threatening the Syrian border town of Kobane, inching ever closer to confronting Turkish security forces. In addition thousands of Syrian Kurds, fleeing ISIS attacks, have massed along its border, adding further to Ankara's troubles.¹⁷⁸ On the other hand, after United State and President of IKR obligated Turkey, Turkey

¹⁷⁴ Schleifer, op. cit., June22, 2014.

¹⁷⁵ Hewlir newspaper, "Barzani's meeting with Sky news", No. 1995, 14October, 2014, p. 2.

¹⁷⁶ Hewlir newspaper, "Turkey will permit", No. 1405, 14March, 2014, p. 8.

¹⁷⁷ Nick Tattersall and Orhan Coskun, "Turkey seeks to bolster global influence with G20 role", Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/13/turkey-g-idUSL6N0T34D920141113#IPk8Z4IBBDKUXpct.99>, 9April, 2015.

¹⁷⁸ Gönül Tol, "Turkey's tough choice: takes on ISIS or the PKK", Middle East Institute, October7, 2014. <http://www.mei.edu/content/article/turkeys-tough-choice-take-isis-or-pkk>, 17May, 2015.

agreed to permit 150 Peshmarga go to Kobane through a corridor in Turkey to support the YPG. Still Turkey and IKR relations were not going as they had before, although they tried to have strong relations.

As a result of ISIS's threat on the cities in the middle of Iraq and Syria they captured those and then they attacked Kurdistan areas in the northern part of those two countries. Consequently, Kobane in Syria, and those areas that Kurds have issues in Iraq that were in item 140 such as Sinjar, Rabiae, Zomar, Makhmour, Kirkuk, and Jalawla. It caused the western countries to attack ISIS by aircraft and they gave Peshmarga as weapons, they also offered the military and humanitarian help and then Peshmarga forces were sent to Kobane. Kurdish Peshmarga could control the entire region and they could destroy ISIS in the region. IKR also became central for refugees in these years, around 2 million refugees entered there from Syria and other Iraqi provinces and they are living in the cities and camps due to the Syrian war and ISIS. As the head of IKR's emigration said, "two million two hundred and fifty thousand refugees are living in IKR, even after ISIS came to Iraq, two million and seventy thousand refugees came into the IKR's cities, and it will be increasing day by day".¹⁷⁹ Because IKR is one of the Middle East safest regions, as Barzani answered the Sky News Chanel he said "we have created value and belief in the IKR, living together, democracy, liberations, and protection of the ordinary people who have been oppressed by regimes in the region, those are the factors that U.S and EU countries decided to support in Kurdistan".¹⁸⁰

It seems that the emergence of groups like ISIS is the outcome of failures in democracy due to none performance of the Iraqi constitution and the authoritarianism of the Shiite government. It was caused partly by Sunni Arabs who tried to escape from Shiite authority and they attacked those regions that undertook to "normalize" the disputed areas by reversing earlier *Arabization* programs. Although the trade between Middle East countries particularly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan had been growing at a good pace, driven mainly by Turkey but with the rise of ISIS this

¹⁷⁹ Hewlir newspaper, "IKR central of refugee", No. 2150, 3June, 2015, p. 5.

¹⁸⁰ Xabat newspaper, "the meeting of President Barzani with SKY news", No. 4660, October14, 2014, p. 3.

is likely to slow down. The conflict has already damaged the oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey, stopping the oil flow.¹⁸¹ The next chapter will discuss the impact of economy in Turkey-Iraq relations and its impact on IKR.

¹⁸¹ Ravi Srikant, "Oil and Terror: ISIS and Middle East economies", October22, 2014, <http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102214/oil-and-terror-isis-and-middle-east-economies.asp>, 10May, 2015.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter analyses the economic relationship between KRG, Iraq, and Turkish government. The turning point of changing relations between Iraq-Turkey is truly due to economic reasons. It has shown its effects in increasing trade and infrastructure rebuilding. Therefore, this chapter discusses the impact of economic and energy issues on reshaping Turkish-Iraqi relations and its effect on KRG after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The issue of water is likely to become the cause of conflict between Iraq and Turkey nowadays which then will be an issue for IKR as well.

4.2. Energy Relations

The large energy resource of Iraqis regarded as a part of Iraq-Turkey relations. The fact that Kirkuk province is located in the heart of Iraq, and more interestingly it was well-known for Iraq's largest oil and gas territory but has been extremely exploited ever since its discovery in the 1920s and export in 1935. Iraq relied on Kirkuk's oil up to 1960. After that further oil fields were found which made Iraq to focus less on Kirkuk, the province was ignored even more when conflicts and sanctions occurred. It nevertheless continues to hold considerable reserves; the federal Iraqi government controls the twin pipelines that transport oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish Mediterranean port at Ceyhan.¹⁸² Ankara has long regarded Iraq as an energy partner and during the 1980s, up to 1.6 million barrels per day of crude oil transited the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP) between Kirkuk and the Turkish port of Ceyhan. That trade was discontinued under sanctions stemming from the 1991 Gulf War, however, and has only come back online in the past few years. Today, the pipeline is in great need of repair, and Kirkuk has 10-12 milliards barrels rest and it

¹⁸² Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 24.

has four oil fields such as Kirkuk (it has 420 wells), oil field Byhassan (consist of 161 wells), oil field Cambour (62 wells), and oil field Khobaze(35 wells).¹⁸³ These struggles have already harmed the oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey, consequently blocking the oil flow.

Turkey has always been an area of interest for the East and the West in terms of both geography and national identity. Nonetheless, Turkey will continue being a country booming with a bright future in its region and across the world. Memories of the Ottoman Empire in addition, it is slowly emerging as a power broker in the Middle East, with an increasingly assertive foreign policy, Also the impact of the conflict has not been as bad as expected, since oil prices have not escalated as rapidly as initially projected, which has put Turkey's finances under control, and thus the trade between Iraq and Turkey tends to undergo hardship. Meanwhile, Turkey is carrying out a huge trade surplus with Iraq. This is expected to slow down significantly because of lower demand from Iraq. Trade routes between the two have also been impacted due to the conflict, giving trucks from Turkey no option but to take the longer route through Iran to reach southern Iraq, and this brings the profitability down to zero or even below.¹⁸⁴

After the Iraqi invasion in 2003 the Iraqi embargo was removed by UN resolution during and after the Gulf War on the part of Iraq governed by Baghdad. And given Turkey's need to variety its resources; Iraq is of strategic importance.¹⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the obvious distraction faced by oil companies is that Iraq's lack of power to produce an extensive hydrocarbons law. In response, and because it found a draft presented by the ministry of oil not acceptable, the KRG passed its own oil and gas law in August 2007. Iraq's oil minister, Husain Al-Shahristani, has announced all

¹⁸³ Sanger Qubad, "Kirkuk's exports from KRG's pipeline was known that Kirkuk is a Kurdistan's Province", *Hewler newspaper*, No. 2039, 14September, 2014. p. 4.

¹⁸⁴ Srikant, *op. cit.*

¹⁸⁵ Till Paasche and Howri Mansubeg, "Kurdistan regional government-Turkish energy relations: a complex partnership", *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, published online: 26Aug, 2014. p. 7, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15387216.2014.942339>, 19October, 2015.

contracts signed by the Kurds are invalid, a move denounced by both the KRG and the foreign companies with which it has signed production- sharing contracts.¹⁸⁶

On 1 May 2008, where KRG's Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani and Turkey's Special Representative for Iraq Murat Özcelik, together with then chief foreign policy adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu, decided to forget about their differences. Both sides discussed areas of cooperation in both economic and political fields, including a contract to resolve the PKK issue in a peaceful way,¹⁸⁷ as part of the effort to establish the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council in 2009. The authority of oil contracts was awarded by the Kurdish government to major oil companies, such as ExxonMobil, Chevron, the English Gulf Keystone, Total of France, Gazprom of Russia, and Turkish Genel Energy, which Baghdad disregarded as being illegal, has brought Ankara closer to Erbil.¹⁸⁸

In 2011, under the great influence of the International Monetary Fund, Baghdad approved the export between 100,000 and 175,000 barrel per day of KRG oil in the ITP, but this was little more than a temporary solution. The parties still argue on how to find suitable way to make up for the Kurds and thus the IOCs their production prices. The continuing payment debate that had restrained deliveries for several months was partially resolved after Washington's low-profile advances. Consequently, oil from Iraqi Kurdistan has begun to flow to Baghdad, with deliveries planned to reach 200,000 barrel a day by prior to 2013. Nonetheless, these preparations may not yet continue in the difficult political conditions that continue to occur.¹⁸⁹ For constitutional and geostrategic reasons, Baghdad declared the contracts in the north illegal and threatened action against the IOCs involved, including Exxon-Mobil, Chevron, Total, and Gazprom. The Iraqi constitution requires passing some new laws to regulate oil incomes and hydrocarbons in general. It is more likely that and such legislations could decrease the disputes between Baghdad and Erbil. To date, however, the two have not come to a final decision on the specific matters.

¹⁸⁶ International crisis Group working to prevent conflict worldwide, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁸⁷ Charountaki, "Turkey foreign policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government", op. cit., p. 192.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 193.

¹⁸⁹ Cagaptay, op. cit., p. 12.

On the hand Turkey was interested in the KRG's Energy Resources. Therefore, during Masud and Nechirvan Barzani visit to Turkey, they signed growing cooperation matters related to the economy in May 2012. Likewise, several energy contracts were signed in the energy conference in Erbil without of the Iraqi government between Turkish Minister of Energy, Taner Yildiz, and KRG Minister of Natural Resources, Ashti Hawrami, on 20 May, 2012, whereby IKR's oil and gas will be transferred to Turkey straightaway. Then in Hawrami's declaration, it has been announced that side by side the newly scheduled pipeline, it plans to transfer one million barrels of oil.¹⁹⁰ According to this treaty, KRG will start another pipeline to transfer Kurdistan's oil and gas to Ceyhan base with Turkey's support.

GenelEnergy is the largest company among a number of Turkey-based Company's involved in the KRG's energy sector.¹⁹¹ It has been assumed that the exports oil is increasing to more than 2 million barrels per day in the future. It will be helpful for KRG to get a developed independent economy, and to make KRG wash hands of Baghdad and it will be helpful to KRG to get rid of Baghdad's policy. On the other hand Turkey wants to get the political and economical target itself, Turkey will depend of Kurdistan's energy in 2023 and Turkey will be central for spreading Kurdistan's energy to world countries.¹⁹² Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz appeared in public forums with his KRG counterpart. In their meetings, KRG's minister of Energy laid out ambitious plans for pipeline construction to Turkey. Moreover, those two new pipelines could be constructed to carry gas and oil directly across the border into Turkey.

As a result Iraqi reactions to develop Kurdish-Turkish energy partnership is hostile, yet, as a part of the Iraqi government is concerned over the growing autonomy that this policy brings for the IKR. Turkey still aims at elaborating the relationship and working with Iraq as part of their various strategies. However,

¹⁹⁰ Gallia Lindenstrauss and Furkan Aksoy, "Turkey and Northern Iraq: Tightening relations in a volatile Environment", Strategic Assessment, Volume 15, No. 3, October 2012, p. 53.

¹⁹¹ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op.cit., p. 27.

¹⁹² Shwan Tavieng, "Crisis diplomacy: Erbil and Ankara relations ties!", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), No. 51-52, March 2015, p. 4.

Baghdad's government made that very difficult, they did not permit Turkish petroleum corporation (TPAO) working in southern Iraq and Baghdad and even rejected the private jet carrying Turkish energy minister, Taner Yildiz, to land at Erbil-Airport. To pursue following policy with Turkey, almost impossible, and most recently, international oil companies (IOC), should have decided whether to make deals with central government or Erbil government. In late 2013 the Ankara and Baghdad relationship was therefore characterized by going through hard times, with efforts to fix damaged connections by new allegations.¹⁹³

On the other hand, the Turkey and IKR energy relations continued, as in June 2013, Hawrami announced that an oil pipeline from the KRG to Turkey would be completed by September 2013, that the Anglo-Turkish company Genel Energy would begin exporting oil via the pipeline in 2014, and that gas exports to Turkey would begin in 2016.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, the recent oil and gas pipeline agreements signed in May 2012 between Ankara and the KRG have led to a immediate exchange with Turkey for the first time that were targeted at building a dedicated oil pipeline with the capacity to transmit 1 million barrels per day of oil between Kurdistan region and Turkey governments by August 2013. Yet, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline was standing due to captured ISIS on the region that this pipeline going to Turkey from Iraq. Only Kurdistan oil is leaving Iraq through its Kurdish border with Turkey, and Peshmarga forces took control of Kirkuk and its oilfield and then this pipeline connecting the new pipeline (KR pipeline) that it is sending KRG oil field to Ceyhan. Thus, developing IKR's oil export to Turkey continues and sometimes this pipeline had taken PKK's threats but it still goes on.

4.3. Commercial Relations

During the Iran and Iraq War in the 1980s, Turkey remained on the side-lines. Yet, Iraq turned into a crucial market for its goods and services especially when the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline became the main export channel for Baghdad's oil.

¹⁹³ Paasche and Mansurbeg, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁹⁴ Park, *Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations after the U.S Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map*, op. cit., p. 28.

Contrarily, between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 U.S invasion, Turkey witnessed major economic damages led by UN embargo against Iraq. Though, Turkey relations with IKR were started at the beginning of the post-Cold War era. Despite growing economic relationships, bilateral engagements have been hindered by Turkey's rejection of rising Kurdish autonomy that Masud Barzani over the years has continuously referred to his ambition of an independent Kurdish state,¹⁹⁵ and having PKK bases in IKR but still Turkey's close cooperation with the KRG appears to be an important phase of Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG from 2003 to 2007.

In fact, Kurdistan region is a major market for Turkish exports. As reported by the Turkish consul General in Erbil; there are nearly five Turkish Banks, 17 Turkish schools, 600 Turkish construction companies, and 17,000 Turkish citizens' permanent residents in Erbil. Moreover, direct flights are also available on a daily basis between the IKR and Turkey, and this has incredibly enhanced tourism. Meanwhile, the overall trade volume between Turkey and Iraq is about U.S \$12 billion, and more than 70% is with the IKR, not to mention that among the foreign companies registered in the IKR, more than half of are regarded as Turkish.¹⁹⁶ Similarly, the sectors of visits and flights increased between Turkey and IKR, thus the number of Turkish citizens entering Iraq from Habur Gate was around half million in 2006. This figure increased to more than one million and two thousand citizens in 2010 and it remained the same in 2013. Also, the amount of flights between them further reveals the increased exchange of people between Turkey (Istanbul and Ankara) over the past decade. One should also bear in mind that six airlines fly between Turkey and IKR; Iraqi Airways, Pegasus Airlines, Turkish Airlines, Zagros Air, Atlas Global, and Onur Air.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁵ Bill Park, "Turkey, the U.S and the KRG: Moving parts and the Geopolitical Realities", insight Turkey, volume 14, No. 3, 19October, 2015, <http://insightturkey.com/turkey-the-us-and-the-krg-moving-parts-and-the-geopolitical-realities/articles/196>, 24August, 2015.

¹⁹⁶ Charountaki, "Turkey foreign policy and the Kurdistan Regional Government", op. cit., p. 194.

¹⁹⁷ Soner Cagaptay and other, "Turkey and the KRG: an undeclared Economic commonwealth", the Washington Institute for Near East policy, March16, 2015, p. 2/3. <Http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/Turkey-and-the-KRG-an-undeclared-economic-commonwealth>, 24August, 2015.

Ankara's ties with Baghdad and Erbil were maintained directly and institutionally from 2008. Consequently, they constructed a very solid bridge in bilateral relations between Turkey and Iraq (and KRG). Yet, when Turkish high level visited Iraq and KRG, Turkey aimed at Economic issues in bilateral Turkey and IKR relations. In addition, Ankara needed Masud Barzani's support to develop its strategies, Barzani also needed Turkey's political support more than economic and he achieved this support through economy.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, Barzani said that they are planning to make a free trade zone on the Turkish border at Habur in Zakho.¹⁹⁹ The trading scope is expanding and more than one hundred Turkish companies are operating in northern Iraq and Turkey is one of the main electricity suppliers to northern Iraq.²⁰⁰ According to Dara Jalil Al Khayat head of its Chamber of commerce, more than 2,200 Turkish companies registered in Erbil.²⁰¹

The Turkish trade minister estimates that trading between Turkey and Iraq exceeded \$6 billion in 2010 up from only \$940 million in 2003, growing Iraq's position from Turkey's tenth largest trade partner to the fifth largest. Turkey is second only to China among the countries that have companies doing business in Iraq, with 117 companies working on energy, agriculture and industrial projects.²⁰² As reported by Turkish officials, Turkey is the KRG's main business partner trade volume is \$7.7 billion, and 80 percent of IKR consumer imports come from Turkey. Needless to say that, these statistics are reflected in the widespread presence of Turkish shops and goods in Erbil, where Turkey is reportedly mentioned widely in business and retail circles. The economic relation has taken a sharp growth turn since 2010, when an estimated 730 Turkish firms were operating in IKR.²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ Yalcin Düğan, "Erbil lost our wish", Journal of Turkeynasi, Published by Turkish and Kurdish Friendship Association (KTFA), No. 31, May2005, p. 20.

¹⁹⁹ Özlan, op. cit., p. 118.

²⁰⁰ Altünişik, op. cit., p. 81.

²⁰¹ Piotr Zalewski, "ISIS tests KRG alliance with Turkey", September 21, 2014, p. 12, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b46942ae-10fa-11e4-b116-00144feabdc0.html#axzzfYCGKjzU>, 10April, 2015.

²⁰² Turunc, op. cit., p.42.

²⁰³ Cagaptay, op. cit., p. 9.

Nevertheless, for the long term Ankara and Erbil elaborated their strong interests, since the U.S has decided to withdraw its military forces by the end 2011, the Kurds are also trying to arrange their forces to stand against possible clashes with the Iraqi central government, getting benefit from using the extensive diplomatic. Their ties were extended significantly in the aftermath of the U.S withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011. Although the Iraqi government created a committee to develop business and economic ties with Turkey with estimates for bilateral commercial exchange reaching \$12 billion by the end of 2011.²⁰⁴ According to 2011 statistical data, Iraq was the second largest export destination for Turkish goods, and it was estimated that at least 50 percent of this trade is with KRG.²⁰⁵ Eventually, by April 2012, KRG trade minister Sinan Celebi counted 1,023 such firms, more than from any other country.²⁰⁶

On top of the Turkish exports to Iraq, the Turkish exports to IKR became the third largest exports market over the last decade. According to estimates based on total Turkish exports to KRG stood at \$1.4 billion, the Turkish exports to IKR were the nineteenth largest export market in 2007. Similarly, the IKR became Turkey's sixth largest export market it has been increased to \$5.1 billion in 2011. Turkish exports to IKR had grown to become Turkey's third largest export market about \$8 billion in 2013. Furthermore, Turkish companies have dominated IKR's strategic business sectors over the last decade. As KRG minister of Trade and Industry Sinan Celebi during his visit to Turkey in 2012 said, "25 new Turkish companies were launched and registered every month in KRG, with more than half of foreign company's registered in the IKR being Turkish".²⁰⁷ Around 485 Turkish companies were working in the IKR in 2009, and that figure had risen to around 1500 Turkish companies in 2013. Those companies are involved in a wide range of transportation, construction, electrical power systems, banking and finance, agriculture, education,

²⁰⁴ Turunc, op. cit., p. 42.

²⁰⁵ Lindenstrauss and Aksoy, Turkey and northern Iraq, op. cit., p. 53.

²⁰⁶ Cagaptay, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁰⁷ Cagaptay and other, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

the water industry, health care, oil-gas extraction and services, telecommunication, and tourism.²⁰⁸

From a Turkish viewpoint, the advantages of a stronger relationship with the Middle East are continuing. Though the trade between Turkey, Middle East countries particularly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan had been growing vastly, encouraged mainly by Turkey, yet with the arrival of ISIS this is likely to slow down, it has impacted on trade between Ankara and Kurdistan as well.

4.4. Water Relations

Indeed, water has appeared problematic to forefront particularly in relations among Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Kurds in the recent years. As well as it occupies an important position on the agenda of several international organizations, it also is likely to become the cause of clashes among Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. Turkey's position relating to water sources, it has at present more water resources than Iraq and Syria, and it is also a country in the region that will regard itself in a position of shortage of water in the future. The fact that the Euphrates and Tigris are originating from Turkey flowing through Syria and Iraq; they are going to Shatt-Al-Arab waterway and then flow into the Persian Gulf. The Tigris main tributaries in Turkey are the Karpansu, Botan, Batmansu, and the Greater Zap rivers. Similarly, the Euphrates consists of two main tributaries, the Murat and the Karasu, both rivers springing from Eastern Anatolia and having numerous smaller tributaries.²⁰⁹

Those two rivers are used to irrigate Turkey, Syria, and Iraqi infertile lands at the expense of fertile lands. Consequently, Syria and Iraq ask for considerable amounts of water for their less fertile areas in the Euphrates river basin where a water security issue exists. In this regard, a water requirement will arise which is extremely

²⁰⁸ Kurdistan investor Union, "Turkish, Iranian goods compete in KRG market", 14August, 2013, http://www.kriu.org/2_t_detail.php?section=1&id=1852&subpage=1852&subsection=4.

²⁰⁹ A study by the Turkish ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of regional and Transboundary Water, "issues between Turkey, Syria and Iraq", pp. 2-3. <http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/water-issues-Between-Turkey-Syria-and-Iraq>, 28October, 2015.

higher than the river's rate annual flow of 31.58 billion M.²¹⁰ When this issue was brought to the attention of Syria and Iraq, they required that the amount of water that is lacking be decreased, proportional, from each states demand. Turkey, on the other hand, finds it difficult to agree with this suggestion that the average of water requirement for irrigation must be decided upon by applying the same criteria to all three countries, it would be more difficult for a country to explain to the public such as an arbitrary way of determining water needs, thus they need to negotiate and make an agreement to resolve this problem.

Turkey has performed unilaterally to construction of the dams under way on the last six dams of a 22-dam project in Turkey, mostly on the Euphrates and Tigris, which flows south from Turkey. Making part of its border on Syria and crossing the length of Iraq, water levels on the Euphrates River that flows 1,700 mile from Turkey to Shatt-Al-Arab through ancient Mesopotamia have dropped more than half in recent years, weakening farmer's crops. In addition to the lands around the Euphrates and Tigris rivers that rise in Eastern Anatolia region, Iraq is hugely desert these years arable land is steadily drying up.²¹¹ Due to the increasing the risk of a larger regional conflict, the irrigation and dam projects on the Euphrates and Tigris caused Iraq to criticize Turkey. And protests in Ankara were not by Syria because Turkey signed an agreement with Syria in 1987 to keep about a third of the Euphrates average flow, as reported by the food and agriculture organization. Also there has not been such an international accord with Iraq that Tigris exists at all.²¹²

However, Turkey's effective control over the water resources of its neighbours and their relations going to tensions in addition to political relations that have been problematic in the area for long a while. Moreover, a conflict did suddenly become a

²¹⁰ George E. Gruen, "International Regional Cooperation: Preconditions and Limits", April 1994, p. 273. <http://sam.gov.tv/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/water-issues-Between-Turkey-Syria-and-Iraq>, 30April, 2015.

²¹¹ Tammy L. Grider, "Water-Short Iraq faces new peril: the sea", p. 1. <http://www.upi.com/Energy-resources/2009/09/23/water-short-iraq>, 15,October, 2015.

²¹² Zaid Sabah and other, "Water Shortages Unite Iraq, Islamic state against Turkey", June 2, 2015, p. 2, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-01/water-shortages-unite-iraq-islamic-against-turkey>, 29October, 2015.

real possibility in 1990 when Syria and Iraq thought that Turkey had means to cut off their water supplies. As such, they simultaneously faced a serious decrease in suffering from serious water-supply shortages and sanctioned in the deadly embrace of some armed organizations striving for power. The conflicts between them were growing, in the midst of a critical water supply shortage in early 2009, on May 12 the Iraqi national assembly pressed its government to demand a greater share of water from Turkey.²¹³ Furthermore, Turkey relies on water for infertile lands, energy, food, and agriculture,²¹⁴ Turkey's dependence on water as policy means with neighbouring countries especially Iraq and Syria. Turkey views water as a means of facilitating for cooperation rather than of conflict for economic development and spreading of prosperity to all people in the region, and to create a peaceful atmosphere and decent neighbourly relations.²¹⁵

More importantly, the South Eastern Anatolia Development Project (GAP) in Turkey is considered as one of the world's most aspiring development projects. It aims to utilize the water of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers with the construction of 22 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants (HEPP). The GAP project has a great influence on Syria and Iraq specially due to of Euphrates River as Turkey contributes 98 percent of the water potentially carried by the Euphrates river and Syria contributes around 12 percent of the average 10 percent of the 12 percent originates from the northern tributaries the Khabur and the Balikh and both have their catchments in Turkey. Though, no other tributaries flow into the Euphrates after the Khabur, except in Iraq, where some of the Tigris' water is added to the Euphrates. Turkey also contributes around 51.8 percent of the Tigris flow and Iraq is contributing 49.2 percent, meanwhile Syria is contributing nothing at all.²¹⁶

²¹³ Joost Jongerden, "Dams and politics in Turkey utilizing water, Developing conflict", spring 2010, Volume XVII, No. 1, p. 1, <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/dams-and-politics-turkey-utilizing-water-developing-conflict>, 28 October, 2015.

²¹⁴ Republic of Turkey, minister of foreign affairs, "Turkey's policy on water issues", p. 1. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-policy-on-water-issues.en.mfa, 28 October, 2015.

²¹⁵ Ibid, p. 3.

²¹⁶ ICE case studies, "Tigris-Euphrates River Dispute", p. 4, <http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/tigris.htm>, 28 October, 2015.

Although the Euphrates River does not affect IKR and it is flowing through Syria and the middle of Iraq. Whereas Tigris also has affected IKR but not as much as Iraq and Syria until ISIS attacked Iraq, and the reason is that IKR only utilizes Mosul dam on the Tigris River and this dam used to be run by central government. But then ISIS took over Samarra barrage in western Baghdad on the Tigris River and places around the large Mosul dam. Due to a large amount of Kurdistan's area on the dam that KRG has dispute on with Baghdad, it is strongly protected by Kurdish Peshmarga forces and it is less likely to fall without a severe fight.²¹⁷ In addition to IKR's dependence on ground waters for food, IKR advantages from the waters that comes from South Eastern Anatolia that depart from Euphrates and Tigris rivers and those waters come from North Western Iran into IKR's areas and they are used for agriculture, food, energy, and irrigating infertile lands. There are many projects on those tributaries into IKR that they use to utilize for food, agriculture, energy, tourism, and infertile lands, such as Dokan and Duhok dam and Erbil project on the Great Zap. Nevertheless, Turkey and Iran are threatening IKR by cutting off the water that comes from their areas, but most IKR's main water, originates from IKR soil and borderline between IKR and Turkey (and Iran) as well. IKG can use its water for various projects and if they have planned appropriately, it will attract countries across the world, among those projects is IKR's energy.

Indeed, after Islamic State conflicts, the case has grown even more severe, Their holdings fall within the crisis, they also used a dam captured in Romadi and Mosul and tried to control those areas crossing Euphrates and Tigris in Syria and Iraq to block water to government areas and there is enough water to go around but the fight with ISIS has weakened it.²¹⁸ ISIS fighters in Fallujah took over the smaller Nuaimiyah dam on the Euphrates rates and deliberately diverted its water to drown government forces in the nearby region. Consequently, ISIS cut off the water from millions of people in the cities of Najaf, Karbala, Nasiriyah, and Babylon. As reported

²¹⁷ John Vidal, "Water supply key to outcome of conflicts in Iraq and Syria, experts warn", 2 July, 2014, p. 1. <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jul/02/water-key-conflict-iraq-syria-isis>, 28October, 2015.

²¹⁸ Sabah and other, op. cit., p. 4.

by the UN, around 12,000 families lost their homes; most of them are living in IKR as well.

To sum up, Turkish-Iraqi economic relations traced back to the years after World War One when they made Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey. Although having boundaries between them in Northern Iraq (IKR), they used to exchange their goods in Habur's Gate until the First Gulf War. While invading Kuwait by Iraq, the relations between Iraq and Turkey got worse because Turkey was a part of the alliance against Iraq. They did not contact each other until the collapse of Saddam's regime. On the other hand, the Turkish economic relations with north Iraq continued after creating a no fly-zone for IKR. Also Turkish relations with IKR continued after 2003 even as Turkey changed its policy with IKR to a new form after US withdrawal in Iraq.

Iraq-Turkey relations got a new form after 2003, it was going to normal, and getting friendly especially after 2009 when the high level visited Iraq from Turkey they made "high level strategic cooperation council" and signed 48 agreements and protocols, thus the economic relations between them got well. Turkey became the second largest export to Iraq, more than 50% of them to IKR. Although, the water relations between Iraq and Turkey were not the same as energy and commercial relations, but it is an important matter between them because the majority of the water flow in Iraq comes from the southeast of Anatolia, Euphrates and Tigris are originating from Turkey and flowing through Syria and Iraq, but the building of GAP project except other Turkish project becomes a problem for Iraq because it will be decreasing the Euphrates and Tigris water and it will affect relations between them. But this does not affect IKR the same as Iraq because IKR depends on its own underground waters and those water comes from borders between Turkey and IKR in the mountains region. Although, Tigris River flows in IKR but it does not affect IKR as much as Iraq.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This paper has mainly focused on examining the factors/dynamics hindering the rapprochement between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan. The political map of the Middle East has been constructed based on Sykes-Picot's treaty signed in 1916 in the aftermath of the division of the Ottoman Empire. With the founding of Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran in the newly emerging international system, the Kurdish areas were divided into four parts and attached to these countries. The main point that has been a matter of concern was the Mosul Wilayet (a Kurdish area in northern Iraq), which later will be a part of IKR.

The Mosul Wilayet was given to Iraq after the Brussels Agreement signed between Turkey, Iraq, and Great Britain in 1926. This matter became an important point in shaping Turkish and Iraqi relations due to the fact that Mosul Wilayet was a part of Ottoman Empire before and there is a Turkmen population here. Mosul is also rich for having natural resources and it occupied an important strategic position between Iraqi-Turkish borders. Therefore, several agreements have been signed between them in political, security, energy, and water areas. Yet, Kurds did not agree to be part of Iraq, same as other Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Iran. They took a position against these countries and they demanded to get their rights to create an independent Kurdistan state eventually.

Another significant point that has been discovered throughout this research was the reflections of ethnic and religious affiliations in constructing and re-constructing these relations. In the early years of Iraqi Emirate under British rule in 1921, there had been ethnic and religious conflicts due to consociation of Iraq by these three provinces (Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul). For instance, while Sunni Iraqis were dominating the region of Baghdad and its periphery; Basra region in the south is densely populated by Shiites and the Kurdish population is located in the northern part of Iraq including Mosul. Conflicts have arisen between Iraqi governments and the Kurdish population in Iraq for several times in history. Both sides tried to resolve those issues between themselves during the monarchical, republican, and federal

Iraqi systems. However, they could not bring a solution to the problem due to the deficiency of Iraqi system as well as the disagreement over the future status of Kirkuk. Thus, Kurds started successive movements to achieve their independence and acquire their rights, but they were defeated by the regime.

With the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy on 14 July 1958 led by the Socialist leader Abdulkerim Al Qasim, the new regime attempted to resolve Kurdish issues with Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader. Although, the relations between them were getting better, Turkey and Iran took a side in this process as they disagreed with them, thus Al Qasim did not keep the promise he gave to Kurdish population. Therefore, once again, the Kurdish revolution of 11 September 1961, which was led by Mustafa Barzani, started against Al Qasim's regime and it was continued until the treaty of 11 March 1970. The treaty led to many negotiations between both sides, and Kurdish people demanded their essential rights. In the result, Iraqi regime acknowledged all of the Kurdish rights and autonomy for Kurds in Iraq, excluding the status of Kirkuk province. Kurdish people agreed with the Iraqi treaty except with the separation of Kirkuk province from Kurdistan Region. Iraqi regime, leading by Saddam Hussein, began holding an agreement with Iran about Shatt-Al Arab in Algeria and with the participation of Turkey and The U.S. indirectly in 1975, due to this, Kurdish attempts failed to acquire the autonomy. Once again, it caused the activation of Kurdish movement in northern Iraq and spread into Turkey due to PKK's movement; thus, Turkey took its attitude against Kurds.

It is also obvious that Turkey has always involved in Iraqi affairs due to Turkey's interest in maintaining regional stability and to secure its borders with Iraq. The Turkmen community in northern part of Iraq has historically been another important concern for Turkey. Turkey has always conducted a policy opposing, *tacitly*, Kurdish independence due to the magnet of Turkey's Kurds to demand the same request. Hence, Turkey and Iraq signed an agreement to defeat the Kurdish movements in the region especially during the Iraq and Iran war, which then caused Iraq to rely on Turkey for defeating KDP and PKK's bases in Iraqi soil. Then the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) got involved into those movements to support the Kurdish movement, and then Iran also stood against Turkey to stop supporting and interfering Iraqi government, and also asked Turkey to stop fighting against Iraqi

people, and particularly Kurds. And then Iran, entered northern Iraq to attack Iraq via supporting Kurds, it caused Iraq to attack Kurds by dropping chemical weapons; especially in Halabja, around 5000 innocent people were killed.

Nonetheless, the economic relations between Iraq and Turkey were flourishing during the cold war, especially with the nationalization of Iraqi's firms. Iraq and Turkey signed an agreement in 1973 to export Kirkuk field's oil to Turkey by Kirkuk-Yumurtalık oil pipeline. Iraq also participated from increasing Turkish economy in the 1980s until the Gulf war. Thus, Ankara and Baghdad signed many mutual agreements to fight against Kurds, especially during the Iran and Iraq war.

However, Turkish foreign policy has dramatically shifted over Iraq immediately during and after the Gulf War in 1990-91. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the UN immediately after Iraqi violation of international law and UN Charter passed resolutions under Chapter VII to maintain international security. Turkey as a member of UN and NATO took an active role in the international coalition against Iraqi regime under the Desert Storm Operation led by the US. When Iraq attacked Kurdish and Shiites area again by UN, authorized alliances intervened in Iraqi status and created a safe haven to protect Kurdish people. Turkey permitted NATO to use the İncirlik bases and Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal supported the policy of "safe haven". Then, the contact between Ankara and Baghdad was stuck due to UN led sanctions against Iraqi regime. Moreover, Kurdistan regional government was built in 1992 with the support of international coalition and Turkey. This new era in Iraq-Turkey relations has reinforced both Ankara and Erbil to conduct cordial relations, especially in economic realm. All of these new developments have brought a direct impact on the Iraq-Turkey relations and Kurdish areas after 2003.

After 2003, Turkey and Iraq relations were going friendly especially in terms of political and security matters. Consequently, Turkey tried to resolve the entire problem with their neighbouring countries on the basis of Foreign Minister of the time, Ahmet Davutoğlu's strategy to resolve the 'problem with neighbours', i.e. policy of *zero problems with the neighbours*. Thus, in terms of Turkish relations with Iraq and IKR were going better until the second term of Nuri Al-Maliki who re-elected Prime Minister. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Al-

Maliki blamed each other for the ongoing sectarian conflicts in 2012. But Turkey-IKR relations were still conducted on cordial basis. Turkey knew that security relations between them and Iraq had more contact with northern Iraq (IKR) because IKR was one of Turkey's biggest fears for years. Because Iraqi northern mountains provided a safe haven for the PKK, but after 2003 almost all of the Turkish uncertainty with IKR changed, with Turkish money and concrete pouring into Erbil and with oil pumping in the other direction; IKR became one of Turkey's most trusted allies. Where business has led politicians have followed. Before 2003 Turkey viewed Masud Barzani as a sponsor of PKK terror, nowadays officials in Ankara fete him as a head of state. The fact that he appeared alongside Erdoğan in Diyarbakir in 2012, proved that Barzani was able to change the equation from confrontation to cooperation. They thought the best way to resolve Kurdish issues in Turkey was a peace process, but this process has been broken between Turkey and PKK after the Turkish election in July 2015. It seems that the best solution to start the peace process is to resolve their problem through negotiation.

Although the role of sectarian affiliations between Iraq-Turkey have been strongly felt after invasion Iraq in 2003, due to interventions from Iran and Turkey in Iraq affairs. These two regional powers rivalled to create Iraq, which Turkey wanted Sunni to be on power and Iran wanted Shiite to gain the power in Iraq. In the first election in January 30, 2005 Turkey supported the list of Al-Iraqia led of Ayad Allawi, Kurds, and other Sunnis party to make a front to construct first Iraqi government after invasion. Iran also supported the list of state of law and others Shiites list. Although Nuri Al-Maliki became Prime Minister, but the relations between Ankara and Baghdad were still good, the trade and politics developed between them as well. Also it effected Kurdistan regional government. Although this process appeared in the second election on 7 March, 2010, but the relation between Iraqi central government and Turkish government were going unfriendly; on the contrary, the relation between Turkish and Kurdistan region governments were going friendly. Moreover, Turkey-Iraq relations were expanding in 2012, this was revealed when Erdoğan invited Nuri Al-Maliki and Barzani to his convene party to Istanbul, but Maliki rejected and Barzani participated in convention, when Erdoğan called Maliki; you are encouraging the sectarian conflict. And Maliki led Erdoğan to

intervene in the Iraqi policy affair. So the sectarian affiliation was another crucial factor that caused unsuccessful consociation democracy in Iraq.

One cannot ignore the fact that the emergence of the group known as ISIS was an outcome of the failures democracy, sectarian affiliation, and unwillingness of political leaders in Iraq. These caused to divide Iraq unofficially to three parts: North (Kurds area), Middle of Iraq (Sunnis area) and south (Shiites area) as the previous provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Sunni Arabs seek to the federation of the region for themselves, Kurds also demand to be independent or have confederation of their own in Northern Iraq, and some of the Shiites seek to have a federation in their regions but some others demand a united Iraq. Despite this prevailing uncertainty, Turkey still believes that its basic interests are best served by a unified Iraq. And Masud Barzani, President of the IKR and leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), has over the years repeatedly referred to his aim of a fully independent Iraqi Kurdish state. All equations discussed it will be better if Iraqi system changes to full consociation democracy or Iraq to be divided into three-confederation state.

Nevertheless, ISIS has influenced external relations among Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and USA. At the beginning, Turkey supported oppositions including Islamic radical groups of Syria to defeat Assad's regime; then, after ISIS separated from them they could capture of Raqqa province in Syria then Mosul in Iraq. Then ISIS could control most of the Arabic Sunni's area in the middle of Iraq and Syria. Turkey could not fight against ISIS because they captured the Turkish embassy in Mosul, as Turkey could not help NATO and Kurdistan's Peshmarga. Both Iran and USA also fought against ISIS in the Kirkuk area. On the other hand after a very strong encouragement from the U.S and the presidency of IKR, Turkish government agreed to let 150 Peshmarga fighters into Kobane through a corridor in Turkey to support YPG that had the same ideological views with PKK. It has affected on the borders among the some Middle East countries mainly the ones between Iraq and Syria. They removed this border that once was created in a secret treaty (Sykes-Picot) between Great Britain and France with Russia acceptance.

Not to mention the aftermath of the downfall of Saddam's regime that was led by US that resulted in growing trade and economy. Many big companies came to

Iraq to reconstruct and produce of oil and gas, especially Turkish companies. The main goal of Ankara was accomplished by an economic interest to achieve the oil and gas sources from Iraq, but at the end of cold war the conflict has damaged the oil pipeline from Iraq to Turkey, stopping the oil flow. Therefore, in the 2000s the Turkish government achieved much less than previous, but the economic relations were continuing. Thus, the trade between Turkey and Iraq increased especially in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. And the rapprochement between the Turkey and KRG since 2007, initiated by the Kurds as a means of balancing Iranian influence in Iraq and countering Baghdad's centralizing tendencies. To implement his gradual but successful strategy, the Kurdistan regional government offered Turkey various enticements, such as granting major construction projects to Turkish companies in Erbil, Duhok, and Suleimani. Kurdish regions also brought the attention of the energy sector to the area. Even earlier in 2008 the Kurdistan Regional Government announced that agreements had been signed with about 20 international oil companies.

The most important development in Turkey-Iraq relations was established of the "high level strategic cooperation council" in 2009 when a Turkish delegation led by Erdoğan visited Iraq and signed 48 agreements and protocol, Iraq became the largest energy wealth as a part of Iraq-Turkey relations, and the legality of oil contracts awarded by the KRG to major oil companies such as Genel Energy has brought Turkey closer to Erbil. Then the energy and commercial sector between Turkey and Iraq (and IKR) were going up. Knowingly, over the last decade Turkish companies dominated Iraq's strategic energy and business sectors especially northern Iraq and 25 new Turkish companies were registered every month in KRG. And Turkish export to Iraq became the third largest export marketed most of them to IKR.

Significantly, Turkey-Iraq water relations were not as effective as energy and commercial relations. Therefore, there were not strategic treaties such as Turkey and Syria treaty. As the Euphrates River crossing into Syria it has relating by Syria before Turkey and then it come into Iraq, therefore sometimes there were tensions between Syria and Iraq. Also around 50% of the Tigris River contributes in Iraq soil and the borderline between Iraq and Turkey. But the GAP project that had an effect on Euphrates in Iraq was decreasing, and therefore Iraq warned Turkey several times.

Although Turkey uses the water matter as a political pressure ticked against Iraq and Syria. Indeed, Tigris River has an effect on some areas of IKR especially in Mosul and Duhok province. On the other hand IKR dependence on Turkish water that originates from the borders of South Eastern Turkey separating from Euphrates and Tigris. These all give us hints that KRG also depend largely on its ground water and the water that springs from its own soil.

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