

NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT  
MASTER OF ARTS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

MASTER THESIS

BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CONCEPT OF  
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE CASE OF RWANDA

MARIAMA BARRY

20133183

LEFKO A

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Master Program

Thesis Defense

Thesis Title: Between Sovereignty and Human Rights: The Concept of Humanitarian  
Intervention and the Case of Rwanda

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## **DEDICATION**

*This work is dedicated to my parents Boubacar Biro Barry and Dalanda Diallo  
All I have and will accomplish are only possible due to their love and sacrifices*

## ÖZ

Günümüz Uluslararası ilişkilerinde "insani müdahale" kavramının gündeme taşındığı konuların başında egemenlik unsuru ve müdahalede seçicilik gelmektedir. Bu tezin temel amacı, çatışmaların sebeplerini analiz etmek ve aynı zamanda uluslararası toplumun insani anlamda müdahale edemediği durumlardan biri olan Ruanda örneğini incelemektir.

Bu çerçevede elinizdeki çalışma, ilk olarak Ruanda'daki çatışmayı tarihsel bir perspektiften ele alacak, ardından da Birleşmiş Milletler barış gücü ve uluslararası toplumun bu örnek olaydaki rolü irdelenecektir. Soykırım yaşanan Ruanda'da Birleşmiş Milletler ve BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin insancıl müdahale konusunda etkili olmamasını mercek altına alan bu tez çalışması, uluslararası toplumun hangi durum ve koşullarda insancıl müdahalede bulunduğunu incelerken, Ruanda'nın bir noktada farkına varıyor. BM üyelerinin irade eksikliği bir yandan sorgulanırken, diğer yandan da Somali'deki müdahale deneyiminin başarıya ulaştığı güçlü üne vurgu yapılmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: insani müdahale, soykırım, Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem, Ruanda, uluslararası toplum, barışı-koruma, barışın aşılması, barış yapma.

## ABSTRACT

Among the key problems of "humanitarian intervention" in international relations are the dynamics of sovereignty and the question of selectivity in intervention. This thesis aims to analyze the causes of conflicts, where international community lacks the ability to implement humanitarian intervention with a case study of Rwanda.

This thesis, firstly, entails a historical background of genocide in Rwanda and examines the approach of United Nations peacekeepers and international community. Genocide is such a grave and well-known violation of human rights that the international community has a moral responsibility to intervene, using force as a last resort. After a comprehensive search, it is argued that there is no universal norm of humanitarian intervention that allows or obliges states to take military action to prevent or end genocide, except when force has been authorized by the United Nations Security Council. However, in the case of Rwanda, the international community had the moral obligation to intervene, but it hesitated to involve actively in the conflict. The reasons behind the unwillingness of the international community to intervene could be summarized as the experience of the failure in Somalia previously and the lack of political will among member states of the UN.

**Keywords:** Humanitarian intervention, genocide, post-Cold War era, Rwanda, international community, United Nations, peace-keeping, peace-building, peace-making.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I have to thank my parents for their love and support throughout my life. Thank you both for giving me strength to reach for the stars and chase my dreams.

I owe special gratitude to the Guinea government, the ministry of higher education via the national services of scholarships for sponsoring me throughout this program. My heartfelt appreciation goes to his Excellency Mr. Daouda Bangoura Guinea's ambassador to Turkey who has always encouraged me; he is sponsor to this program.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Assist. Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü for her excellent guidance, caring, patience, confidence, and providing me with an excellent atmosphere for doing thesis, I would never have been able to finish my work without the guidance.

My cordial gratitude goes to the director of social sciences Prof. Dr. Çelik Aruoba, the acting dean of the faculty Assoc. Prof. Dr. erife Eyupo lu, to all the academic and non-academic staff of International Relations Department, Near East University, especially Dr. lksoy Aslım, Dr. Bilge Azgın, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Zeliha Khashman, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sa san and Mrs. Tijen Özüğüney, for their precious helping hands towards the realization of this work.

My eternal appreciation is also to my best friend Adekunle Adeniyi Aderemi, who has been a constant source of support and encouragement during the challenges of this program and life. I am truly thankful for having you in my life. And to all my friends for their Jove, confidence, advices, prayers and motivations.

This work is also dedicated to my siblings, Ibrahima Sory Barry, Mamadou Dian Barry, Abdoulaye Yero Barry and Nene Aissatou Barry, who have always loved me unconditionally, and whose motivations have taught me to work hard for the things that I aspire to achieve.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
EU	European Union
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WFP	World Food Program
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
NGO's	Non Governmental Organizations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
KFOR	Kosovo Force
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
MSF	Doctors without Borders

## HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTERS

### INTRODUCTION

Humanitarian intervention is a well-known measure in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security where violence takes place. Humanitarian intervention for the purpose of this study, according to Allen Buchanan, is a treat or use of force across state borders by a state aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals beside its own citizens, without the consent of the state within whose territory force is applied.<sup>1</sup> In this definition, two types of behaviors is associated the forcible and the non-forcible humanitarian interventions. In this respects as stated by Fernando Teson, humanitarian intervention should be understood to embrace non-forcible methods, meaning intervention should take place without military force to relieve mass suffering within sovereign borders and forcible intervention refers to the use of military and armed forces within the territorial jurisdiction of a target state without the government's permission.<sup>2</sup>

Disputes surrounding humanitarian intervention turns around a central question: when is it permissible for international organizations to dominate state sovereignty to provide internationally recognized human rights? Intervention is defined here by Damrosch Lori Fisler, as a dictatorial interference, which makes it hard to make a distinction between impermissible and permissible political activities, because it includes both forcible and non-forcible measures. The former includes such measures as economic sanctions, withholding of aid, and the funding

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<sup>1</sup> Allen Buchanan, *Heart of Human rights*, Oxford Univeersity Press, 2003.

<sup>2</sup> Fernando R. Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into law and morality*, 3rd edition p, 173.



of opposition parties. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter comprises the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.<sup>3</sup>

The UN General Assembly in 1965 tried to clarify what non-intervention meant with resolution 2131:

No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever in the internal or external affairs of any other state. Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the state or against its political, economic, or cultural elements are condemned.<sup>4</sup>

This same interpretation of nonintervention in resolution 2625 contains that nothing in these sections shall be construed as affecting the UN charter provisions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>5</sup>

Rwanda shall be considered in the reason of this research, Rwanda is selected for analyses due to the nature of the conflict and the enforcement measures carried out there. Also the ineffectiveness of the international community and the UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda is worth reiterating in this study.

The thesis attempt is to evaluate to what extent humanitarian intervention is an effective tool for enforcing human rights where violations of fundamental human rights take place, and align it the provisions of The United Nations charter.

Humanitarian intervention in a sovereign state without the consent of its government or authorization by the United Nations Security Council undermines the prohibition on the use of force, principle of non-interference and sovereignty as articulated in Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the United Nations Charter.<sup>6</sup> There has been a lot of writing on the concepts of humanitarian

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<sup>3</sup> Damrosch, Lori Fisler. 1989. Politics accrossBorders: Noninterventions of Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs. *American Journal of International Law* 83 (January): 1-50.

<sup>4</sup> UN General Assembly, DocA/6014, December 21, 1965.

<sup>5</sup> UN General Assembly, Resolution 2625.

<sup>6</sup> UN, Article 2 (4), 2 (7).

interventions and human rights. However, the two most applicable provisions are article 2(4) and article 2 (7).

In this regard, Article 2 (4) requires that states refrain in their international relations, from the threat or use of force. It represents the most explicit charter provisions against intervention with the use of force. Consequently, its interpretation constitutes the basis for discussion of unilateral military interventions.

Articles 2(4) as follows:

"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations".<sup>7</sup>

According to Louis Henkin, Article 2(4) contracts a general prohibition of the use of force. More precisely, it extends the use of force beyond war to include other types of unilateral use and threat of force. For that reason, it favors the prohibition of force as a general and authoritative principle.<sup>8</sup> Article 2(4), according to Malcolm N. Shaw, contains *jus cogens* character. To start with, by providing for a collective security system, the charter limits the permissible basis for acts of self-help.

Article 2(7) with respect to the interference of the UN as an organization, within the internal affairs of the member states, article 2(7) directs the organs of the UN to respect domestic affairs of states and lays down a principle of non-intervention. It reads:

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<sup>7</sup> Art. 2(4), UN Charter.

<sup>8</sup> Louis Henkin, *Right v. Might: International law and use of force*, New York Council on Foreign Relations: Press. 1991.

"Nothing in the present charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."<sup>9</sup>

This limitation does not apply to the enforcement measures taken by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. The prohibition in this article is but one instance of a broader duty of international organizations and states not to intervene in matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states.<sup>10</sup> The word "intervene", according to Olivier Cohen and Pierre Klein, possibly means coercive action. Rather, the article merely prohibits any UN organ from discussing, examining, or issuing recommendations on matters that fall within the states domestic jurisdiction.<sup>11</sup> Much has not been said about the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention as a tool for enforcing human rights.

In the light of this study, it will be sought to contribute to the scholarly debate on humanitarian intervention and, in particular, by evaluating previous interventions and their outcomes, to ascertain whether or not humanitarian intervention is an effective tool to enforce human rights.

Intervention in the affairs of sovereign states without their authorization as noted Jeremy Sharking is a heavy load met by the intervening states.<sup>12</sup> The principle of the sovereignty of states is based on the norms of non-intervention that can be forcible or non-forcible. However sovereignty has experienced drastic changes on the international stage.<sup>13</sup> Where states are unwilling or unable to promote and protect fundamental human rights of its people in conflict

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<sup>9</sup> Art. 2(7), UN.Charter.

<sup>10</sup> The traditional Cold War view of nonintervention is reflected, inter alia, in the declaration of principles of international law concerning friendly relation and cooperations among states in accordance with Charter of the UN, U.N.GA.Res.2625(XXV) 25, U.N.G.A.O.R., Supp. No. 28, U.N.Doc.A/8028, 121(1970) (hereinafter Res 2625).

<sup>11</sup> Olivier Carten and Pierre Klein, *Droit d'ingerence ou obligation de reaction?* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1996) 17-41; Hersch Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights* (New York: Praeger, 1950), 166-73.

<sup>12</sup> Jeremy Sharking, *International law and forcible intervention: M- the challenge of military invention* P.74, See also article 2(4) of the charter.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

situations, the international community intervenes under the obligation *Erga Omnes* responsibility.<sup>14</sup>

Broadly speaking as noted Damrosch Lori Fisler, humanitarian intervention refers to "dictatorial interference" in the internal affairs of a sovereign state to secure and enforce human rights. Dictatorial interference includes both not forcible and forcible measures. The former includes such measures as economic sanctions, withholding of aid, and funding of opposition parties. The latter refers to the use of military units within the territorial jurisdiction of a targeted state without the governments consent. UN humanitarian actions in Iraq on behalf of Iraqi Kurdish, Somalia and Bosnia renew interest in the notion of "Humanitarian Intervention."<sup>15</sup>

As stated by Kelly Kate Pease, the first clearly identifiable, forcible UN intervention occurred during the Persian Gulf crisis. After the cessation of hostilities between UN and Iraqi forces, the Iraqi government began a brutal campaign to suppress rebelling Kurds in northern Iraq and Shit'ite Muslims in southern Iraq. In 1991, the Security Council explicitly linked human rights violations occurring materially within a sovereign state to international peace and security resolution 688.<sup>16</sup> Saddam Hussein did the similar before but nobody intervened.

For the purpose of this study were going to define so important concepts: Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peacemaking and its complications.

Since the end of the cold war (1948-1989), states and international organizations have constantly engaged in peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peacemaking to help for solving international problems. But despite the fact that conflict resolution has been a regular note of the international scene, these operations have achieved mixed result. Some such as the Afghanistan operation

<sup>14</sup> Under the auspices of the chapter VII powers of the UNSC also see Art 4 of the African Union Const. Act 2001.

<sup>15</sup> Damrosch. Lori Fisler. 1989. Politics across borders: Noninterventions of nonforcible influence over domestic affairs. *American Journal of International Law* 83 (January): 1-50.

<sup>16</sup> Kelly-Kate S. Pease, *International organizations: Perspectives on governance in twenty first century*. Pearson: Prentice Hall, 2008, 3rd edition p, 266.

commended by NATO, is making valuable contributions to stability. Haiti, which experienced a new internal crisis in 2004 after a decade of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, a less impressive case.

After considering definitions of each activity, it is apparent to see that they can be effectively employed by states in pursuit of international peace and stability.

During a UN meeting on November 4, 1956, Lester Pearson, a Canadian diplomat, proposed the idea of a peacekeeping force wearing blue helmets for identification. Their goal was to ensure peace in a conflict and monitor the events. Pearson came up with the idea that each country would assign soldiers to the UN peacekeeping force. This was the first UN peacekeeping mission and the concept of peacekeeping was born.<sup>17</sup>

Peacekeeping, like the other conflict resolution instruments, is hard to define and might mean different things from different users. Due to the diversity of operations being described, and the familiarity and favourable resonance of the word itself, "Peacekeeping" is used to embrace a wide range of missions that often includes peacebuilding and peacemaking.<sup>18</sup>

As stated by James Alan, the main function of peacekeeping was to facilitate the transition from a state of conflict to a state of peace; this has earned it the appellation "a halfway house between peace and war".<sup>19</sup>

Peacekeeping rests on three principles that are political. It requires that peacekeepers: maintain the consent of the host state (s) and immediate parties to the dispute, act impartially, and behave in a non-violent and non-threatening manner. These principles emerged during the cold war and have remained relevant. Cold War peacekeeping usually involved military forces under the

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<sup>17</sup> "Les Archives de Radio-Canada". *Casques bleus, soldats de la paix*. Radio-Canada. 1956-2003.

<sup>18</sup> Steven R. Ratner, *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*, St. Martins, New York, 1996, p.21; and Alan James, *Peacebuilding in international Politics*, St. Martins, New York, 1990, p.9.

<sup>19</sup> James, Alan. *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. New York: St.Martin's Press, 1990. 378pp. (JX4481 .J36 1990).

United Nations command who monitored forces separations or ceasefires. They were positioned between delinquents who had agreed to stop fighting and to accept the presence of the UN force.

Peacekeepers were deployed to stabilize hotspots, defuse tension, and help resolve disputes, but they risked being drawn into the conflict if the three (3) principles were not observed. Since the Cold War, the first two principles: Consent and impartiality have generally been respected by third-party interveners; but the third, non-threatening behaviour, has been less in evidence in more robust missions such as the NATO Stabilization Force (1996-present) in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the International Stabilization Assistance Force since 2002 in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup>

In the 1970s, Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung first created the term peacebuilding through his promotion of systems that would create sustainable peace. Such systems needed to address the root causes of conflict and support local capacity for peace management and conflict resolution.<sup>21</sup>

According to Boutros Boutros Ghali, contrary to peacekeeping, "post-conflict peacebuilding" is a new concept of which the UN first took note in 1992. It is widely accepted part of the most UN missions.<sup>22</sup> There are two basic types of peacebuilding writes Charles Philippe: it aims either to reinforce preventive diplomacy (remedying the root causes of conflict, such as environmental degradation, underdevelopment, and threats to the human security of individuals), or to sustain diplomatic peacekeeping (by institutionalizing peace after conflict).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Peacebuilding & The United Nations, United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations. Retrieved 18 March 2012.

<sup>22</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Introductory note to An Agenda for Peace," in UN, *Divided World: The UN's Role in International Relations*, ed. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, 2nd ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, p.469.

<sup>23</sup> Charles-Philippe David, "Does Peacebuilding Build Peace? (Mis)steps in the Peace Process," *Security Dialogue*, Vol.30, March 1999, p. 26.

Peacebuilding when Cold War ended consists of activities that, were considered the single purview of states. It can involve democratic institutions building, the design and monitoring of elections, training of security institutions and reconciliation and the human rights initiatives. Peacebuilding is linked to peacekeeping and must observe the same principles in order to be successful. Since the late 1980's, military peacekeepers and a growing number of civilian peacebuilders have been deployed inside states to try to maintain order, help implement agreements, and build peace. As a leading panel on UN peacekeeping reform noted in August 2000, "History has taught us that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations."<sup>24</sup>

This interrelationship is significant, because states and individual Canadian legislators want to consider the likelihood of success before moving to promote reconciliation. A positive contribution to peace is most likely if an operation maintains the consent of disputants.

Peacemaking is a practical conflict transformation focused on establishing equitable power relationships robust enough to forestall future conflict, often including the establishment of means of agreeing on ethical decisions within a community, or among parties, that had previously engaged in inappropriate (i.e. violent) responses to conflict. Peacemaking seeks to achieve full reconciliation among adversaries and new mutual understanding among parties and stakeholders. When applied in criminal justice matters, peacemaking is usually called restorative justice, but sometimes also transformative justice, a term coined by the late Canadian justice theorist and activist Ruth Morris. One popular example of peacemaking is the several types of mediation, usually between two parties and involving a third, a facilitator or mediator.<sup>25</sup>

With respect to the two types of peacemaking, the principles are much more important to the first, diplomatic peacemaking, which refers to political mediation, O the second, peace

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<sup>24</sup> Lakhdar Brahimi, "Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations," United Nations document A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000, p. 5.

<sup>25</sup> Ruth Morris, *Peacemaking*, May 2015. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peacemaking>

enforcement, which is the use of military muscle to compel disputants to stop fighting.<sup>26</sup> This is because diplomatic peacemaking often precedes or occurs in parallel with peacekeeping. And like peacekeeping, requires the consent of disputants.<sup>27</sup> It involves negotiations that aim to avoid conflict or bring combatants to the peace table.

Awareness of the principles upon which peacekeeping rests is not enough to guarantee success. A difficult conflict environment can cause an engagement to fail, as some of the UN's multifunctional missions did during the 1990s. UN operations in the in Rwanda, Kosovo, Angola, Yugoslavia and elsewhere all encountered considerable difficulty. The problem was not that these ambitious operations were incompatible with the principles of peacekeeping. They fail because the civil wars that have preoccupied the world community since the early 1990s are not well suited to the peacekeeping treatment.<sup>28</sup> Although the UN Charter does not explicitly make a principle of non-intervention applying to the relations between states, the principle is implicit in the general prohibition of the use of force in international relations and visible in the leading general assembly declaration. Article 2 (4) sets the illegality of any unilateral use of force not authorized by the UN. In this sense, it is the basis of the rule of non-intervention between states.

In sum, the UN strongly maintains that the norm of non-intervention as the main governing rule of states relations, and so demonstrates the international society's persisting conviction that the norm is the primary safeguard for the preservation of order and the peaceful coexistence among states.

Chapter one introduces the subject matter and provides a background to the study. Chapter two analyses and evaluates previous interventions as a case study of Rwanda. Chapter three examines

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<sup>26</sup> Peaceenforcement is not discussed in this document. For an example of diplomatic peacemaking, see Brahimi (2000), p. 2. For a work that favours the assertive understanding, see Nicholas Gammer, *From Peacekeeping to Peacemaking: Canada's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis*, McGill-Queen's University Press, Montreal, 2001, *Passim*.

<sup>27</sup> Ismat Kittani, "Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking: The UN Experience," in *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, ed. Olara A. Atunnu and Michael W. Doyle, Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 1998, pp.95, 101.

<sup>28</sup> Alan James, "Peacekeeping in the Cold War Era" *International Journal*, Vol. SO, Spring 1995, pp.248,260.



peace building and peacemaking in Rwanda. It goes further to discuss whether or not it was effective in enforcing fundamental human rights. Chapter five deals with conclusion and possibly, recommendations.

## CHAPTER ONE

### HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter examines the theoretical questions behind humanitarian intervention, the realist and the liberal theory of international relations will be an important example to see their various views of the world politics in the form of a comparative analysis.

Furthermore the chapter will portray a scholarly debate on humanitarian intervention. Finally the United Nations charter of humanitarian intervention resolution 688 and the various United Nations article: 12, 39, 42, and 25 will be examined.

#### 1.1 Realism, Neorealist versus liberalism in international politics.

The actions and the different relations between states have always been difficult to grasp, understand, and explain. Looking back at the historical events and comparing them to the current international issues, there are many parallels to be noted as well as many contradictions in the ever changing global arena.

Due to the complexity of the world, there have been many attempts at creating a system to be able to explain the way the international relations function. Many theories had been produced, many have failed and a few have been proven to be the closest to the truth.

This chapter will discuss the three most predominant theoretical systems currently existent realism, liberalism and neorealist. It will further compare the two schools of thought, examining

the gaps and the advantages of each one looking back at historical events, including the two World Wars and the Cold War, and the current global environment.<sup>29</sup>

In order to better examine each theory and to apply it to the past or current events, one must first understand the essential background and arguments behind each theory.

According to Buhbe Matthes and Iris Kempe, immediately after the World War two in Europe, interstate conflicts were occurring on regular basis, poverty was seen everywhere, there was little hope for the future and essentially violence was always a logical step in order to fulfill one's goal whether was being an individualistic goal or that of the state. Philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes painted a dark, pessimistic picture of the world with almost no hope for a peaceful future. While the two scholars lived in different times and in different places of Europe, both rationalized in a similar manner. Just like other realists, they saw human nature as being essentially evil and selfish, they believed that military readiness at all times was essential, and that peaceful cooperation between states was only possible through the balance of power on the global scale.<sup>30</sup>

Realists inspired from Machiavelli and Hobbes and many other followers supporting similar ideas and what is known now as realism was created. The key element behind this particular theoretical system lies in the belief in anarchy, evil human nature, military power and the importance and the power of a state. It's a theory based on the assumptions that the behavior between states is selfish and relies on a self-help system, thus cannot hope for a mutual cooperation and must only help you. It states that countries just look out for their own interests, which makes the state the most important actor or the ultimate power for this theory. Also it is essential for states to be prepared for any conflict or war, thus military power of the state is also one of the main goals, even more important than economic power. Realism looks at the world

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<sup>29</sup> UK Essays, "*Issues in World Politics*" Copyright© 2003-2015, <http://www.ukessays.com/essays/international-relations/issues-in-world-politics.php>.

<sup>30</sup> Buhbe Matthes, and Iris Kempe. "Russia, The ES and the Baltic States." *Enhancing the Potential for Cooperation*, 2005.

power as an anarchist and believes in relative gains, meaning some participant benefit more than others.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, the core points of concentration of realism are the anarchical state of the world (absence of government and absolute freedom of the individual, regarded as a political ideal), the brutality of human nature, and the importance of power of the state. In other words, realists do not look to change the world, they believe in seeing the world for what it is and working with it to create the best possible outcome to fulfill self-benefiting interests.<sup>32</sup>

According to Roviére Jack Helium, liberalism on the other hand, paints a completely different outlook on the world. It looks down on the pessimistic ways of the realists and argues for the possibility of a brighter future and more peaceful world. The pioneers of liberalism, such as Jean Jack Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, refused to believe that human nature was evil. Instead, they argued that it is in the nature of human beings to be cooperative and to be able to achieve solutions in a negotiating peaceful manner.<sup>33</sup>

Thus, war was not the next logical step to a conflict or disagreement; it was only a matter of providing the proper tools for the individuals and states to be able to come to a peaceful, mutually benefitting resolution to any conflicting situation. It is a theory based on the assumption that countries believe in progress, and it sets not only states, but also the individuals and international institutions as the most valuable actors in International Relations. This theory believes in the cooperation and unity of human kind, and so is extremely against military power.

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Roviére, Jack. Helium. 2008. [http://www.helium.com/items/204998-explaining-the-invisible-hand\\_theory](http://www.helium.com/items/204998-explaining-the-invisible-hand_theory) (accessed March 22, 2010).

Liberalism strongly believes in international institutions and institutionalized peace in the world.<sup>34</sup>

In other words, as noted Kegley, Charles W., and Shanon Blanton, liberals are very optimistic and believe that the use of military power is never justified. Also, this theory believes in absolute gains, meaning all participants become better off. Liberals state that there is no reason why a state or an individual shall not engage in a relationship or an exchange in which the other party will benefit more, due to the fact that both participants will be at an absolute gain. Further, liberals, unlike realists, do not support the idea of zero-sum game. In a conflicting situation, no party needs to be at a complete loss; the conflict can be resolved within a judicial way in which both parties could reach an agreement to benefit each other.<sup>35</sup>

As mentioned previously, liberals highly believe in cooperation with collective gains. This idea is followed by the belief in strong international institutions to provide not only conflict resolutions tools for the states, but also to create a complex international interdependence, which creates a strong global bond and further ensures international peace. Due to the fact that liberals put such importance on international institutions, the roles of the state could be seen as less when compared to the realists' view. Through the importance of institutions, the transnational bonds and dependence is created, which is also highly important to the liberal school of thought.<sup>36</sup>

While realists believe that the approach to peace shall be done through the balance of power and military readiness and strength, liberals have a complete opposite point of view. The amount of power and military control that the state achieves will not bring global or state peace. Rather, the liberals propose peace through democratization, in which citizens are given individual freedom

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Kegley, Charles W., and Shanon L. Blanton. *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*. Boston, MA: Wadsworth CENGAGE Learning, 2009-2010, 33.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. Page 34-36.

and the right to have a say in the state's actions; and through the establishment of international law, which would be enforced through the international institutions and organizations.<sup>37</sup>

Another approach to peace that the liberals suggest according to Jack Roviére is through the opening of the markets and the promotion of free international trade. One of the first advocates of these ideas was the philosopher and economist Adam Smith. He stated that if market is left untouched by the state, the "invisible hand" of the economy would guide them to the most productive and beneficial outcome. The term he used was "laissez-faire", which essentially means to leave the market untouched to function on its own.<sup>38</sup> A new version of liberalism was created, called the neo-liberalism. These particular liberals still held the same core beliefs as the classical liberals, however with a much stronger concentration on the international economy with a much weaker role of the states.<sup>39</sup>

Based on these two brief definitions, it is observed by Kegley Charles and Shanon Blanton, how much both theories contradict each other, in other-words, liberalism and realism has very different approaches in explaining and understanding the world and the way it functions. However, both theories have proven their points of view along the years with critical events that have already occurred in the past and that have drastically changed the world's history. Both theories have gaps and advantages to fulfill each other's gaps.<sup>40</sup>

Realism fails to explain the diminishing importance of the transnational connections, a world that is gradually becoming borderless. In addition, until the creation of neo-realism, realists did not give much importance or explanation to the ever growing number of international institutions and organizations. Liberals, on the other hand, provided a strong explanation of the factors mentioned above, however, fail to explain the occurrence of so many conflicts, even with

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. 32-34, 41.

<sup>38</sup> Roviére, Jack. Helium. 2008. <http://www.helium.com/items/204998-explaining-the-invisible-hand-theory> (accessed March 22, 2010).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Kegley, Charles W., and Shanon L. Blanton. *World Politics, Trends and Transformation*. Boston, MA: Wadsworth CENGAGE Learning, 2009-2010, 36.

peacemaking international organizations in place, nor are they able to explain the rise of poverty and the great inequality in the world.

Prior to discussing which theory best describes and explains the period of Cold War, it is crucial to comprehend the events leading up to the situation, which made the Cold War possible. Thus, the two World Wars must be looked at through both theoretical systems in order to conclude which theory was most prominent at the time.<sup>41</sup>

The devastation produced by World War I was evident to the entire world and left a horrific picture behind. It started when the Archduke Ferdinand from the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist seeking to free his ethnic group from the Austrian rule.<sup>42</sup>

According to Snyder Jack and Keir A. Lieber, World War I was the perfect event for the realists to prove their assumptions of the European states behavior. Germany, one of the most preponderant states at the time, strived for the success that England achieved with the Industrial Revolution. This led Germany to look for more power trying to expand their territory and becoming more predominant on the global scale.

For liberals, on the other hand, as noted Kegley and Shanon, World War I was just "the war to end all wars".<sup>43</sup> U.S. President Woodrow Wilson was also convinced that another devastating war could occur if the would states continue practicing power politics. As a result liberals tried to reform the global system by taking several actions. One of the actions was to create global institutions in order to contain the struggle for power. At the end of World War I, the League of Nations was created, which was the embodiment of this part of the liberal thought.<sup>44</sup> However,

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 90.

<sup>43</sup> Kegley, Charles W., and Shanon L. Blanton. *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*. Boston, MA: Wadsworth CENGAGE Learning, 2009-2010, 35, 94.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

the liberal thought diminished and the realist assumptions rose once again when World War II erupted.

When World War II started, it gave the opportunity to the realists to prove that war was inevitable and that human nature is evil and violent. After the First World War, the Germans were forced to look for an exit of the severe situation, probably the worst situation ever, which they were facing due to the consequences that this war brought upon them. After the First World War, most European states blamed Germany for all the disaster caused in Europe, and thus, they humiliated Germany under the Treaty of Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles in 1919 promoted international law, international institutions such as the League of Nations, and justice to all the damaged countries emphasizing stability and cooperation, which seemed to be an ideal move for the liberal thought. In theory, this was a liberal movement, but in practice, it turned out to be realist due to the fact that everyone was just looking for their own interest and using this as an excuse to obtain benefits for their own, for example, the division of Europe.

Once again, it was a state against another state fighting for gains in order to be at the top of the anarchical international system (absence of government and absolute freedom of the individual, regarded as a political ideal). The Cold War was the transition of power of the two global powers at the end of World War II, United States of America and later the Soviet Union.<sup>45</sup>

The Cold War was an event where both states fought to have the best power ratio of military capabilities without ending in a disastrous scenario such as what happened in the First and Second World Wars, where millions of lives were lost and cities were devastated. However, this war could have ended in the worst scenario that the world would have ever experienced, due to the technology and military research have been at the peak of world's history and also these two had exponentially raised due to the previous wars. In addition, not only Europe would have been involved the Cold War, since this war not only consisted of having the most military power, but also the most networking or the relationships with other countries.<sup>46</sup> In other words, if one

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p.101.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 102-104.



country would have attacked the other, then they would have been attacking the allied countries as well, which at the time not only involved European countries and strong Asian countries, but worldwide.

As stated by Cesa Marco, this war was also a fight between liberalism and realism, due to that all the disputes between both countries were fought with the intervention of international politics and international institutions, but, at the same time, each country was also preparing for war by the development and research of new weapons. However, firstly, this was a silent war since none of both states ever openly announced that the actions were taken in order to take precautions of the rival country's actions. Nevertheless, the world knew what was going on. Secondly, This war was an event that raised several critiques against the liberal thought, since the military concerns of both of these states, the will of the global power and the hostility shown between each other, were all clear signs of a Third World War. Thirdly, there was no reason to doubt it, since history was being repeated.<sup>47</sup>

As the League of Nations was created by the liberals in attempt to avoid another world war, Germany was gaining enough power in its realist way, dominating any international institution to start another world war. This time, following the disastrous events of the Second World War, another attempt by the liberals was made in creating the United Nations and yet again the two hostile blocs the Soviet Union and the United States were able to overcome the newly established international institution and started their own silent war recreating an anarchical global environment (absence of government and absolute freedom of the individual, regarded as a political ideal). Therefore, there was no reason why a war could not occur, if this previous event proved that no matter what actions were taken, a state could do whatever it wished. In other words, the United States of America or the Soviet Union could have easily gone over the United Nations' decisions, since there was no other state with the military and economic capacity that could conquer their wishes.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Cesa, Marco. *"Realist Visions of the End of the Cold War."* Morgenthau, Aron and Waltz, 2009.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

According to Rispman, Norrin M, the liberals, would argue that due to the existence of such institutions as the United Nations an actual war never occurred on the soil of either one of superpowers. In the liberal point of view, the UN was definitely a factor in avoiding the war. This was not known for a fact until the end of the Cold War in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. At this point, the global arena proved that peace could be achieved by international negotiations, international institutions regulating the disputes and most importantly making rational decisions. The world proved that human nature was not totally evil or violent and that there still exist some hope for the world to prove that liberal assumptions of the international relations are not entirely wrong. It is clear that the realist assumptions and predictions were predominant even throughout the Cold War, but it was also clear that the liberals had a point there was room for progress.<sup>49</sup>

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Cold War began to reshape international politics and relations. While through the century realism seemed to have been in the lead in its explanations and descriptions of the structure of the world, the global environment all of a sudden began to drastically change and liberalism began to make sense yet again.<sup>50</sup>

As noted Buhbe and Matthes, there are still many controversies about which theoretical system best describes the contemporary global politics and interstate relations. While realism was clearly much more accurate in the descriptions of the world throughout most of the 20th century, this piece will argue that liberalism is much more precise in the explanations and its understanding of the world when it comes to current issues.<sup>51</sup>

The first aspect that should be noted is the vast amount of international organizations and institutions that is currently existent and constantly on the rise. These organizations vary from

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<sup>49</sup> Rispman, Norrin M. "International Studies Quarterly." *Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance*, 2005. p.178-181.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Buhbe, Matthes, and Iris Kempe. "Russia, the EU and the Baltic States." *Enhancing the Potential for Cooperation*, 2005: 5-11.

international humanitarian aid, World Vision, to peace keeping and conflict resolution (ex. United Nations), to regulations of international trade (ex. WTO), and many more. These are perfect examples of transnational unifications, which are absolutely borderless and are extremely powerful on the global arena. Thus, the belief of realism that the state is the most important factor in the global system is disproven. There are other actors, that are equally, if not more important than the role of the state. These organizations believe in progress and in making a difference in the world, therefore human nature is not necessarily evil. In fact, there are more and more individuals that come together and dedicate their lives in order to help others.<sup>52</sup>

Another interesting phenomenon which has been happening is the decline of interstate conflicts but an outburst of intrastate conflicts. While these conflicts do prove that human beings are still capable of horrific crimes, it also proves that the state is no longer a central factor. These are groups of individuals that are bound by religion, society, a common goal or something other than being a part of the same state. Further in these cases, the state itself cannot control what is happening in its own country.<sup>53</sup> Such conflicts still exist and especially were numerous in the 1990's; such as the genocide in Rwanda, Somalia and the c former Yugoslavia. These conflicts bring another interesting factor the organizations and the individuals from all over the world, which come together to help the war-torn place; starting from conflict resolution, to peace keeping, to after the conflict humanitarian and developmental aid. These individuals not only dedicate their lives to such careers, but in most cases risk losing their own lives. This is a further proof that while global peace is not achieved, human nature is not evil in most cases. Thus, progress is not only possible, but also extremely achievable.<sup>54</sup>

Democracy is another aspect that liberals strongly promote. In the past two decade, more and more states have been trying to implement democratic ways of governing their states. Most of the former Soviet states have been moving towards achieving that goal, some have even

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

successfully transformed their political systems and have entered the European Union, such as the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia).<sup>55</sup>

In addition, Gauss Gerald and Shane O. Court agreed that liberals strongly believe in democratic peace thesis, which states democratic countries never fight each other. This theory (democratic peace theory) is greatly proven over time as most of the Western world is democratic and has not experienced great conflicts since World War II.<sup>56</sup>

While both theories provide strong and credible explanations of the way the global interactions occur and unfold, it is always crucial to keep in mind that these interactions change as does the global environment. This piece concludes that throughout most of the 20th century realism provided a clearer explanation than liberalism, including both World Wars and most of the Cold War. However, examining the current events and issues it is clear that the global political atmosphere has gone through a drastic transformation, precisely following the Cold War. Thus, considering this change it is only fair to conclude that liberalism provides a better explanation and description of the world today. That is not to say that realism is completely discredited nor does this suggest that there will be no room for the realists approach in the future, it still provides valuable lessons and explanations for humanity and perhaps will gain its dominance as the world experiences further transformations.<sup>57</sup>

In a neo-realist world, according to Kenneth Waltz the stronger the state, the less vulnerable it is on the international arena. Military and economic might are the major criteria for security and development, and achievement of these criteria is done by all possible means. War, in neo-realism, is inevitable. However, in a nuclear century, wars among the nuclear powers are

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Gauss, Gerald, and Shane O. Court. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. November 28, 1996.  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberalism/> (accessed March 21, 2010).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

unlikely to occur easily, since the states possessing nuclear weapons realize the consequences of such a war, and therefore, use nuclear arsenal as a means of deterrence and balance of powers.<sup>58</sup>

Neo-realism was born in a bipolar world, divided between the United States and the Soviet Union into two competing camps. According to Waltz, bipolar world was much safer for international peace than the multi-polar one. Both superpowers, although, competing and antagonizing each other, nevertheless, avoided the open 'hot war' by all means, anticipating that nuclear collision will damage both. Waltz, underlined the importance of bipolarity and nuclear deterrence: "Bipolarity offers a promise of peace; nuclear weapons reinforce the promise and make it a near guarantee."<sup>59</sup> Noticeably, neo-realism is a theory of Cold-War, it works with the Cold War world, it is a theory of bipolarity, resting upon its fundamental claims that multipolarity and unipolarity eventually lead to wars (World War I and World War II).


Neo-realism has endured multiple critiques and Waltz is ambiguous on the future of neo-realism in a unipolar world as he calls the current domination of the United States as the world's only superpower. It has been argued that neo-realism has never stated the 'reality', i.e., states in the post-Cold War world have never pursued to maximize their security via military buildup, instead most of the newly appeared states (after the collapse of Socialist bloc) are working to join international and regional organizations (European Union, NATO and World Trade Organization) rather than pursuing their optimal gains and competing with other states. Most of the developed democracies have long abandoned the development of defense policies and accumulation of arsenals.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Waltz, K, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979, p.8-15.

<sup>59</sup> Waltz, K, Guest Essay- Neorealism - Confusions and Criticisms, *Journal of Politics & Society*, vol. 15, 2004, pp. 2-6, p. 6.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.



## 1.2 Realist Liberal and Neorealist theories approach on the concepts of humanitarian interventions

According to Franck.T and Rodley.N, states almost always have different motives for intervening and are hardly prepared to sacrifice their own soldiers overseas unless they have self-interested reasons for doing so. For realists this means that genuine humanitarian intervention is not wise because it does not serve the national interest. This shows the idea that the powerful only intervene when it suits them to do so and that strategies of intervention are more likely to be guided by calculations of national interest than by what is best for the victims in whose name the intervention is supposedly being carried out.<sup>61</sup>

In the absence of an impartial mechanism for deciding when humanitarian intervention is permissible, states might espouse humanitarian motives as a pretext to cover pursuit of national interest.<sup>62</sup>

As stated by Chesterman.S, the classical case of abuse was Hitler's argument that it was necessary to invade Czechoslovakia to protect the life and liberty of that country's German population. Creating a right of humanitarian intervention would only make it easier for the powerful to justify interfering the affairs of the weak. Critics argue that a right to intervention would not create more genuine humanitarian action because self-interest not sovereignty has traditionally been the main barrier to intervention. However, it would make the world a more dangerous place by giving states more ways of justifying forces.<sup>63</sup>

In Cushman.T Writing, Fernando Teson predicted four claims focusing on liberals. First the invasion of Iraq had as its purpose the ending of tyranny. According to Teson humanitarian intervention requires humanitarian intent, not humanitarian motive (like realist Teson believes

<sup>61</sup> Franck,T.,and Rodley, N. (1973), After Bangladesh:The law of Humanitarian intervention by force, *American Journal of international law*, 67: 275-305.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Chesterman, S. (2001), *Just war or Just peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

that states will never act out of purely humanitarian motives). Even though the U.S. led coalition was not motivated by humanitarian impulses, it still had humanitarian intentions because only by removing tyranny and installing democracy would the threat posed by Iraq be removed. Secondly, Teson insisted that the abuse of civilians by the Iraqi government was severe enough to warrant intervention, saying that it makes no sense to argue that intervention should be reserved for ongoing mass-killing because that rule would have prohibited the removal of Hitler after the Holocaust. Thirdly, Teson pointed to the fact that the overwhelming majority of Iraqis welcomed the intervention as providing an important source of legitimacy. Finally, he argues that despite the fact that UN authorization is preferable, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, as in the case of Kosovo.<sup>64</sup>

To the casual eye it may appear that the neo-realist world of anarchic international structure with every state pursuing its maximal interests could be of little help in analyzing humanitarian action. However, the signs of neo-realist behavior can be traced in humanitarian actions conducted by states and international organizations in the post-World War II Cold War era. Although there were no wars between the two main superpowers, as neo-realism explains, due to bipolar power balance and nuclear deterrence, there was no lack in wars among developing states, as well as intra-state conflicts. Most of armed conflicts took place on the Cold War battlefields, areas where the two superpowers of that age clashed indirectly in small peripheral proxy 'hot' wars. Expectedly, almost always either one of the warring sides, whether that was a conflict between two states or a state and a rebel group, had a direct or covert support of either of superpowers. Humanitarian interventions, in such conflicts were exacerbated by a necessity to interfere into an area of interest of either one of superpowers, the United States or the Soviet Union. Few were willing to do so.<sup>65</sup>

Humanitarian crises largely had a life of their own: the majority of aid organizations entering proxy war areas had limited mandates. And some even had to work clandestinely, as it was the

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<sup>64</sup> Cushman, T. (ed) (2005), *A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press).

<sup>65</sup> Yanacopolos, H., Hanlon, J 2008, *Civil War, Civil Peace*, James Currey, Oxford, Ohio University Press, Open University UK, Milton Keynes, p. 50.

case with the Doctors without Borders (MSF) during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Hardly any state dared to intervene in superpowers' area of influence in order to protect civilian population or alleviate humanitarian emergency. The Soviet war in Afghanistan (1979-89) and the American war in Vietnam (1960-75) have both had multiple examples of human rights violations by the invading superpowers and humanitarian emergencies. However, no attempts were made by any sovereign state or international organization to intervene in force for the protection of civilian population.<sup>66</sup>

As stated by Grono Nick, the end of Cold War and the collapse of socialist bloc drastically changed political environment of the world. In a 'New World Order', the old tenets of neo-realism began to lose their explanatory power. There was no longer bipolar competition and humanitarian interventions began in earnest. However, even in a post-Cold war world we can easily trace neo-realist behavior of states in their patterns of intervening in conflicts. Examples of self-interested and individualistic behavior of states in humanitarian interventions are plenty: genocide in Rwanda has seen little action from international community as few had any stakes in intervening into the conflict, unwillingness to persecute the Iraqi regime for using chemical weapons against Kurds in 1980s (as long as Saddam was an American ally). International community failed to intervene in the Darfur genocide at its early stages.<sup>67</sup>

### 1.3 Scholarly debates on humanitarian intervention

At the heart of any analysis of the international response to the crisis in world lies the question why should anyone care about conflict zones? Whilst theories supporting just wars and humanitarian intervention from the likes of Caldor and Walker argue that there is a basic human morality that requires states that are able to intervene to stop the suffering of oppressed people, a realist perspective, one that represented the initial international response to crisis, is that the key value of national interest is independence and security. The question that has been at the heart of

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<sup>66</sup> MSF in Afghanistan, at <http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/events/exhibits/thephotographer/msf-afghanistan.cfm> (retrieved on 01.05.2011).

<sup>67</sup> Grono, Nick 2006, *Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect*, African Affairs, 30 Sept.



international relations for century's intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state is an issue that has generated much debate.

State sovereignty has long been a fundamental pillar of international society and non-intervention has ensured that individual states could maintain their political independence and territorial integrity. International organizations have generally supported this principle with; for example, Resolution 2131 of the UN General Assembly in 1965 stating:

"No state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly in the internal or external affairs of any other state.<sup>68</sup>

Consequently Caldor Mary agreed that, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its political, economic, or cultural elements are condemned. Regional organizations have taken a similar stance the Organization of American States totally prohibits direct or indirect intervention in the affairs of another state. A wide range of political theory also supports the view that sovereignty is all-important and one state should not interfere in the affairs of another.<sup>69</sup>

Nonetheless, international affairs since the establishment of the nation-state have seen intervention by states in the affairs of other for a number of reasons. The earliest interventions were for economic and strategic reasons and to secure territorial security nineteenth century European interventions in Africa and Asia to establish colonies serve as an example of this. In the early twentieth century the US began to utilize a different type of intervention, intervening in the affairs of Central American states such as Nicaragua to encourage domestic political order, reduce economic corruption and reinforce its own influence in the region.<sup>70</sup> Such action drew the attention of realist critics who have influence US foreign policy thinking more recently. Realists have alleged that the adherence to moral principles and the failure in the past to understand the "power essence" of interstate relations has led to unwise and unsuccessful policies, for example

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<sup>68</sup> Resolution 2131 of the UN General Assembly 1965.

<sup>69</sup> Caldor Mary, *new wars and old wars: organised violence in a global era*. Cambridge polity press: Cambridge 1999.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

to failed humanitarian intervention in Somalia. Certainly, the memories of Somalia will have affected thinking on a political and humanitarian response to Darfur."<sup>71</sup>

The Cold War regarded intervention across the globe by the two superpowers either to enhance their own strategic security or to advance ideological goals, for example the USSR moving to strengthen communism in Czechoslovakia in 1968 or the US challenging anti-democratic forces in Grenada in 1983. It is however, humanitarian intervention that is most relevant to the situation in Darfur, a type of intervention that according to Jack Donnelly is foreign intervention that seeks "to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic rights of foreign nationals by their government" The failure of states and subsequent abuses of human rights in the latter stages of the twentieth century have presented other governments with numerous scenarios where they have to make decisions as to whether military intervention for humanitarian reasons is justified. It is a complex issue that poses a number of legal and moral issues.<sup>72</sup>

In Michael Walzer's writing, Am Stutz argues that humanitarian intervention presents a legal challenge to the accepted systems of state sovereignty along with amoral challenge to the right of self-determination. Whilst the demand for order, justice, stability and human rights may override these concerns, politicians are also faced with the decision as to whether, how and when their country should instigate humanitarian intervention.<sup>73</sup>

Such interventions can generally be justified if two criteria are met: firstly that humanitarian intervention be in the interests of the intervening state, i.e. that it perceives the human rights abuses in the foreign state as a general threat to the order, legitimacy and morality of global society, or as a particular threat to its own economic prosperity; secondly that the intervention must be in the interests of the civilian population of the intervened state and that the legal and moral issues around military intervention can be justified by the overall good that is accomplished. NATO intervention in Bosnia can be seen as an example of a situation that met

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Walzer Michael, *just and unjust wars*. Allen lane publishing: London, 1978.

the former criteria, the situations in both Rwanda and Darfur would appear to meet the latter. Michael Walker who has written extensively on just war theory and intervention argues that humanitarian intervention should be seen as different from instigating a military conflict. As well as the legalist argument against intervention in the affairs of another state, there is also the difficulty of intervention in a country that has not committed aggression against another state there is a danger that intervening states can be seen as portraying the message treat your people the way we believe you should or be subject to the threat of armed punishment. Walker nonetheless believes that even if intervention threatens the territory and political independence of another state, there are times when it can be justified.

The onus of proof of justification however lies with the leader of the state that intervenes and this can be heavy burden, "not only because of the coercions and ravages that military intervention brings, but also because it is thought that the citizens of a sovereign state have a right, in so far as they are to be coerced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another's hands".<sup>74</sup>

Arguments that states should, regardless of how they are governed, should be left to deal with own affairs and influenced by the thoughts of John Stuart Mill who argued from a utilitarian viewpoint strongly for the right of a single political community to determine its own affairs whether or not its political arrangements are free is not an issue for other states members of any political society must cultivate their own freedom in the way that individuals must cultivate their own virtue, self-help rather than intervention from an external force must be the way towards a just society.

Such arguments do not stand up when applied to some of the systematic and well-documented human rights abuses of the twentieth century foreign governments make decisions based on a realist perspective not to intervene, but intervention based on the idea of self-determination is to avoid the issue and hide behind outdated ideas. There is a point at which realism has to be put aside and some form of moral stance must be taking. For Walker, there are three situations in which the international resistance to boundary crossings can be ignored:

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

1. When a particular set of boundaries clearly contains two or more political communities, one of which is already engaged in a large-scale military struggle for independence; that is, when what is at issue is secession or 'national liberation'
2. When the boundaries have already been crossed by the armies of foreign power, even if the crossing has been called for by one of the parties in a civil war, that is, when what is at issue is counter-intervention; and
3. When the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it makes talk of community or self-determination or 'arduous struggle' seem cynical or irrelevant, that is, in cases of enslavement or massacre.

His criteria present a realistic scope for intervention. For all the ideas of ethical foreign policies there has to be some realism in international relations in that states cannot simply intervene in every dispute between neighbors or outbreaks of political unrest in other states. Walker's criteria, particular his third, limit intervention when serious abuses of human rights appear to be taking place.<sup>75</sup>

At this point, political expediency and national self-interest should be put aside. Ultimately, Walker's thinking lead him towards an ethical theory of peace on the basis of sovereignty and other widely accepted states 'rights. His values form the basis of a legalist paradigm, which provide the moral and legal structure for maintaining international peace. His legal paradigm also outlines the criteria for use of force to intervene. Its six key principles are:

1. An international society of independent states exists;
2. The states comprising the international society have rights, including the rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty;
3. The use of force or threat of force by one state against another constitutes aggression and is a criminal act;
4. Aggression justifies two types of action: a war of self-defense by the victim and a war of law

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

enforcement by the victim and any other members of the international society;

5. Nothing but aggression justifies war;

6. After the aggressor state has been militarily repulsed, it can be punished.

Irrespective of the situation in a particular state and the legal or moral issues around any form of intervention, the realist view of international affairs can lead statesmen to decide against intervention. Realists from Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli through to the likes of Kissinger and Waltz remain strictly skeptical about moral concepts within international relations and assume that states going to war or engaging in any form of intervention are more motivated by power and their own national security than any moral issues.<sup>76</sup>

As argues Reynolds PA, The phrase "all's fair in love and war" is often applied to the realist perspective with Walker writing "referring specifically to war, realists believe that it is an intractable part of an anarchical world system, that it ought to be resorted to only if it makes sense in terms of national self-interest" in effect there are no moral consideration in regard to military intervention, the human rights abuses occurring in another state are of little importance to realists, intervention will only be considered if it is considered to be economically or strategically of value to the intervening state or its leaders.

This value can be political on occasions. There is little doubt of the power of modern media to put pressure on politicians. Thus intervention in Somalia and NATO action in Bosnia were to some extent related to public pressure on politicians to do something about scenes being broadcast into the homes of the electorate.<sup>77</sup>

Mary Caldor's view rightly challenges the realist assumption that states should not involve themselves in humanitarian intervention unless there is some advantage to be gained in a self-interested pursuit of power. What is required is a more political response to new wars and the attacks on human rights that accompany them. The international community should be looking

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> Reynolds PA, *an introduction to international Relations* .Longman Group. London 1994.

towards politics of inclusion that capture the hearts and minds of protagonists and any such political mobilization should override traditional geopolitics or short term domestic concerns. This type of thinking moves closer to a type one-realism which places more of an emphasis on the structural features of the international system and avoids the stress on the often anarchic striving for power that reflects traditional realism. The drawback of the neo realist approach is that its reliance on the determining impact of the structure of the international system allows policy makers relatively little discretion. This can be seen to some extent in Darfur as representative from various states struggled to find a solution to the crisis that met with consensus.<sup>78</sup>

#### 1.4 The notion of humanitarian intervention under the UN and NATO

Thinking on humanitarian intervention has had to adapt more recently to the new type of wars that have proliferated across the globe since the end of the Cold War, for example the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia driven by ancient ethnic hatreds. Certainly with the demise of the stand-off between two military superpowers there has been greater scope for the UN and individual states to become involved in conflict resolution and throughout the 1990s the UN has found itself constantly involved in providing humanitarian aid, establishing safe havens, disarmament and demobilization operations, monitoring and maintaining ceasefires.<sup>79</sup>

New wars have involved a blurring of the distinction between war (usually defined as violence between states or organized political groups), organized crime (violence undertaken by privately organized groups for private purposes, usually financial gain) and large-scale violations of human rights (violence undertaken by states or politically organized groups against individual).

Some of the ethnic hatred that has fuelled new wars has in particular led to terrible human rights abuses; events that put moral pressure on other states to consider intervention. Mary Calder suggests that there are two types of response to new wars one is to draw on the old war idea of

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<sup>78</sup> Calder Mary, *new wars and old wars: organised violence in a global era*. Cambridge polity press: Cambridge 1999.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid.

the nation state and look for solutions along the lines of intervention and peacekeeping whilst the other response is a more negative and fatalistic outlook: "because the wars cannot be understood in traditional terms, they are thought to represent a reversion to primitivism or anarchy and the most that can be done therefore is to ameliorate the symptoms. Another word, wars are treated as natural disasters."<sup>80</sup>

Caldor's view rightly challenges the realist assumption that states should not involve themselves in humanitarian intervention unless there is some advantage to be gained in a self-interested pursuit of power. What is required is a more political response to new wars and the attacks on human rights that accompany them. The international community should be looking towards politics of inclusion that capture the hearts and minds of protagonists and any such political mobilization should override traditional geopolitics or short term domestic concerns.

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There have of course been embarrassments for individual states and international organizations with attempts at humanitarian intervention in the 1990s, setbacks that will give weight to realist theory that sovereign states should on the whole be left well alone. Caldor concludes that humanitarian intervention has had mixed success:

"at best, people have been fed and fragile ceasefires have been agreed .... at worst the UN has been shamed and humiliated, as, for example, when it failed to prevent genocide in Rwanda, when the so-called safe haven of Srebrenica was overrun by Bosnian Serbs, or when the hunt for the Somali warlord ended in a mixture of farce and tragedy".

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

Nonetheless, the arguments for humanitarian intervention remain strong. Darfur is as good an example as any for this. "Why should foreign states, which themselves respect human rights, be barred in principle from intervening in such illegitimate regimes?"<sup>82</sup>

Rwanda in particular argues Ben Bradshaw, serves as an example of both foreign states and international organizations initially taking a realist stance only to eventually to be spurred into action by the sheer scale of the genocide taking place. In France's case, the links between the powerful elites in the two countries had long been established not only had France long supported the Hutu regime but Francois Mitterrand and Rwandan President Habyarimana were personal friends, whilst their sons, Jean Christopher and Jean-Pierre were also friends and business associates. The two countries had mutual economic interests and there is evidence that Jean Christopher was one of France's biggest arms dealers to Rwanda.<sup>83</sup>

The French response to the developing crisis, when it came, was far from glorious. Rather than intervene to provide further killings it decided to pull out its troops. In the previous week, the first of the genocide they had evacuated as many as 1361 people including 450 French nationals and 178 Rwandan officials and their families. No other Rwandan nationals were evacuated, not even Tutsi personnel from the French embassy or well-known opponents of the regime who had already been targeted by the militia.<sup>84</sup>

The role of the United Nations mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) argues Marc Lacey, has received considerable criticism in analyses of the genocide. The UN had its own internal politics to contend with and its policies on Rwanda were intern determined to some extent by realist self-interest. As an organization it was largely reliant on the support of its most powerful members on the Security Council.

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Ben Bradshaw, *Reforming the UN: The case of humanitarian intervention and Genocide-international Relations* viewed 27 February 2015.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.



These nations, mindful of the disastrous US intervention in Somalia were wary of investing troops and finances into another African conflict. Realism came to the forefront of the early decision making process. Human Rights Watch, in addition to criticism of the UN for not taking heed of Dallier's warnings, is also critical of the scale of the mandate itself. It describes the details of the mandate as follows:

"Not only was the UN slow, it was also stingy. The United States, which was assessed 31 per cent of UN peacekeeping costs, had suffered from the enormous 370 per cent increase in peacekeeping expenses from 1992 to 1993 and was in the process of reviewing its policy on such operations".<sup>85</sup>

Quite simply the UN was not equipped to keep the peace in Rwanda. Members on its influential Security Council did not have the political will to get involved, nor were they willing to take on the financial burden. The US and the UK, although less involved in Rwanda than France, were similarly guilty of happily ignoring warnings of possible genocide and working towards the maintenance of the status quo. Both had sold arms to the Hutu regime and had trading links with Rwanda. Both also had little desire to see their own troops caught up as part of an UN force in Rwanda.<sup>86</sup>

The theory of non-intervention, as opposed to realism is another view that opposes humanitarian intervention. The existing anarchic international system is morally legitimate people have a right to political self-determination states have a juridical right to sovereignty and territorial integrity states have an obligation to resolve conflicts peacefully force is an illegitimate instrument for altering the existing territorial boundaries.

Non-intervention theory argues in favor of an international legitimacy of states in which existing states are entitled to autonomy and domestic legitimacy which assumes that states are entitled to respect and support when they fulfill their core obligations as states. In terms of domestic legitimacy, in the light of the fact that there are wide disparities in conceptions of human rights,

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<sup>85</sup> Marc Lacey, "10 Years Later in Rwanda, The Dead Are Ever Present", *New York Times*. Published: February 26, 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/26/world/10-years-later-in-rwanda-the-dead-are-ever-present.html>.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

this can essentially be interpreted that whether a state is entitled on-intervention depends largely on its subject's approval of the regime itself.<sup>87</sup>

The counter-arguments of realism and moral intervention as argued Brown Lie continue to play a major role in international politics and are likely to continue to do so. It is a sad fact that the list of oppressive governments and massacred populations is lengthy. Walker points out that for every Nazi holocaust or Rwanda there will be a number of smaller examples of injustice and abuse so many that the international community cannot hope to deal with.

On a small scale at least, Walker's suggestion that "states don't send their soldiers into other states, it seems, only to save lives. The lives of foreigners don't weigh that heavily in the scales of domestic decision-making" rings true humanitarian intervention in smaller-scale situations is simply not realistic. Greater test for the moral resolve of NGOs and wealthier nations is their response in the face of large-scale humanitarian disasters and human rights abuses, again using Walker's words, when dealing with acts "that shock the moral conscience of mankind".<sup>88</sup>

Ethical questions around the issues of international moral obligations towards nations suffering from oppressive regimes and human rights abuses are not easily resolved. Whilst humanitarian aid or interventionist generally seen as a morally correct route of action, political expediency quite often takes precedence. Whilst it is generally accepted that, as Grotius believed, war ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of right and when once undertaken it should be carried on within the bounds of law and good faith, national self-interest does not always allow for a strategy led by such moral incentives.<sup>89</sup>

In Darfur, the action of the Khartoum Government could certainly not be described as driven by moral incentives whilst elsewhere early responses to the crisis were driven by political

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Brown lie M {1963} international law and the use of force by states. Clarendon.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

expediency Major states have to ask themselves which moral values should influence their foreign policies and which international values are more important sovereignty or human rights? The answer should be human rights, yet there is a fine line between using these values from moral perspective and manipulating them into a realist opportunity to indulge the national interest with intervention elsewhere.

There are other difficult questions, do human rights violations justify foreign intervention and at what scale? Does international political morality require the removal of illegal military regimes and the restoration of democracy? There are countless regimes around the world to which the world might turn its attention and ask itself these questions. For the most part, small conflicts and small-scale abuse of human rights are, rightly or wrongly, ignored. The situation in Darfur from 2003 onwards however gave the international community a scenario that it could not ignore. The world had to make decisions upon hundreds of thousands of lives would rest.

While actions arising out of UN Security Council authorization or in self-defense have been accepted as examples of modern, legitimate conflicts, the status of humanitarian intervention is subject to considerable debate. This study explored that even within use of force arising out of self-defense claims there have been instances of illegitimate actions. This shows that the law itself is secure and adaptable but its enforcement is weak or "illusory". Humanitarian intervention is one of those issues which add further fuel to this fire because of state practice.<sup>90</sup>

Support for humanitarian intervention relating to suffering of persons (not necessarily nationals of the intervening) situated within another state is permissible in "strictly defined situations". But it found more in the purview of customary law and not within the traditional interpretations of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Two most pertinent examples of state practice we find are Iraq and the Kosovo crisis. Immediately after the First Gulf War, Saddam Hussein turned his forces on the Kurdish and Shiite populations. The gravity of the situation was noted by the Security Council as well in Resolution 688 (1991). Even though there was no clear authorization from the UN, the U.S, along with UK and France imposed "no-fly zones" over the

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

country citing this Resolution. UK argued that such measures were justified because of "overwhelming humanitarian necessity".<sup>91</sup>

The Kosovo conflict in 1999 is cited as the first real humanitarian war. The justification used by NATO to intervene was humanitarian intervention even though there was no UN backing. UK Secretary of Defense George Robertson commented that in exceptional circumstances, military action can be taken to avoid "a humanitarian catastrophe". As Malcolm Shaw opines that it is not entirely possible to fully characterize the legal situation owing to the fact that the NATO actions were neither endorsed nor condemned, the status of humanitarian intervention with regards to use of force is still unclear. But Carlo Focarelli states that there are far too many ambiguities at the present moment to formally incorporate humanitarian intervention alongside self-defense and UN provisions. Furthermore, he lends credence to the oft-cited view that Responsibility to Protect Doctrine is furthered essentially by powerful states and there is increasing resentment over this among developing nations; he points to the fact that countries like Egypt, Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, Tanzania have asserted that this doctrine favors more powerful states while countries like France, Japan, Australia, Canada, Norway have upheld the doctrine. It can be concluded that the concerns of developing nations demonstrate the fear that acceptance of this doctrine may possibly make the law overly "illusory".<sup>92</sup>

However, the current intervention in Libya can be termed as the first UN Security Council backed humanitarian intervention. Resolution 1973 (2011) authorizes "a no-fly zone over Libya and to use all means necessary short of foreign occupation to protect civilians". Due to this the NATO members are employing air forces.

Empirical scholarly opinion with regards to international law is yet to emerge but the situation has certainly changed because the UN Security Council sanctioned this intervention. This does make the intervention legitimate but the legal status of humanitarian intervention with regards to use of force has surely moved towards a greater acceptance. Other possible issues and future

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<sup>91</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*

outlook. Ian Brown points to the question that under what conditions would the "obligations of the United Nations Charter cease to bind all members"? This is because he actually sees this as a weakness within the legal regime. The very credibility and functioning of the UN legal regime depends upon existence of widespread membership. So what will the legal situation be like in the case of non-members freely resorting to force? That would ultimately lead to the collapse of the organization. Brown also states that these provisions should be read in isolation from customary law. This would ensure that even in complete non-conformation of UN provisions, there will be customary law relating to use of force, so the law in itself will not collapse completely. But the unclear position as to the limits of UN provisions' general acceptance does lend more credence to the assertion that the law is "illusory".<sup>93</sup>

Based on the 2010 US National Security Strategy commonly known as the Obama Doctrine of "Necessary Force" to evaluate the kind of framework we can expect for the future. As noted earlier, it is ultimately state practice which dictates the trends in international legal enforcement. Christian Henderson notes that President Obama feels that the current framework is "buckling" under threat from new kinds of threats to world peace in form of non-state entities. President Obama, while criticizing the Bush Doctrine holds that the U.S. has always had a right to pre-emptive defense and sometimes this kind of defense would be "necessary". Obama gave no indications as to type of scenarios where the action would be "necessary". Henderson feels that President Obama's doctrine tilts towards the customary legal position emerging out of Caroline affair but by not actually defining what would constitute as "necessary" or "proportional", the doctrine is relying on a "sophisticated evasion".

As concerning the article 12 while the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendations with regard to the dispute or situation unless the Security Council requested. Secondly the Secretary-General, with the consent of the security Council, shall notify the General Assembly at each actions of any matters relatives to the maintenance of international peace and security which are being dealt with by the security council and shall similarly notify

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

the General Assembly or the members of the United Nations of the General Assembly is not session, immediate the security Council ceases to deal with such matter.

Article 39 stated that the Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42. According to article 42 should the security Council consider that measure provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate it may take such action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or operations by air, sea, or land forces of members of the United Nations. Moreover Article 25 stipulated that members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present charter.<sup>94</sup>

In order to analyze the UN peacekeeping failure and successes in Rwanda a link needs to be established between important theories Realist and the non-interventionist that explains better the case of Rwanda.

### 1.5 Realist perspective on Rwandan Genocide

Throughout the Cold War, the result of political and ethnic conflicts in Africa was of premeditated importance to the great powers in their ideological and defensive combat. The U.S, European states, and the former Soviet Union intruded in African wars of independence, each one trying to manipulate in their personal favor. That really reduced the strategic value of Africa and since then African state was abandoned to themselves to resolve their political and ethnic conflicts, Rwanda happened to be a victim.

Unluckily for Rwanda, what happened in Somalia in 1992 made the U.S, peacekeepers and UN were reluctant to sacrifice another of their soldiers again in any another African country, that made the US according to Forsythe to contain a policy not to interfere in Rwanda, for that reason the UN too did not interfere.<sup>95</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Brown lie M (1963) international law and the use of force by states. Clarendon.

<sup>95</sup> Forsythe, David. P. 2000. *Human rights in international relations*. Cambridge, UK; University Press.

As recorded by Frontline U.S, State Department officials were ordered not to employ the word Genocide despite the fact that it was obvious that genocide was taking place. Yet Rwanda had a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council but nobody bothered to ask Rwandan representative about what was happening.<sup>96</sup> Knowing that the word genocide demands a response at the same time the U.S, was faithful to nonintervention according to Lewis neither the U.S, nor the UN would make use of the word genocide, and that really made the international community and other NGO's not get a clue of what was happening in Rwanda.<sup>97</sup>

The truth of the matter is where were the European, the Belgians to be précised? At least Belgians historical and political ties to Rwanda advise that maybe they might have done something to stop or reduce the massacre, but rather the Belgian government was still reeling from the death of their peacekeepers. The government went on a widespread lobbying campaign to pull the UNMIR out of Rwanda. As noticed Frontline the Belgians did not want to tarnish their image in the face of the world by pulling only their troops out of Rwanda so they lobbied the security council members to pull out the entire peacekeeping forces, luckily for the Belgians and sadly for the Rwandans they found a very understanding ear from the U.S, who was still thinking it Somalia had wounds.<sup>98</sup>

The Tutsis put all their hope on the UN to protect them; but unfortunately it was RPF and it only 4000 troops that stopped the killings and they did so with virtual relieve. The UN peacekeepers were better armed than the RPF, yet it did nothing to stop the killings.

The Rwandan genocide of 1994 gives so far another clear example of U.S, interests taking priority over stopping genocide. Although having full information on the violence being committed against the Tutsis, according to Samantha the Clinton administration went beyond simple inaction:

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<sup>96</sup> Frontline. 1999. *The triumph of evil*. PBS, aired January 26.

<sup>97</sup> Lewis, Neil A. 2001. Papers show U.S knew of genocide in Rwanda. *New York Times*, August 23: AS.

<sup>98</sup> Frontline. 1999. *The triumph of evil*. PBS, aired January 26.

In reality, the United States did much more than fails to send troops. It led a successful effort to remove most of the UN peacekeepers that were already in Rwanda. It forcefully worked to block the following authorization of UN backups. It refused to make use of its technology to jam radio broadcasts that were a vital tool in the coordination and perpetuation of the genocide. And even as, on average, 8,000 Rwandans were being butchered each day, U.S. officials shunned the term "genocide," for fear of being obliged to act.<sup>99</sup>

Realism back from history according to Gilpin shares three main assumptions: 1) that the present international system is anarchic, 2) that states are the primary actors in this system, and 3) that these states are rational and power seeking.<sup>100</sup> The first assumption of an anarchic system, in which the state is the main source of authority, which has time after time lead realist thinkers to call attention to the norm of state sovereignty, which gives the state the right to use control over its people and territory. This gives more importance to state sovereignty; in turn this leads to lack of will between states to interfere in cases of genocide. In the name of sovereignty, states try to describe genocide as the problem of the state in which the genocide is happening, not as the responsibility of the rest of the international community.

The second assumption that states are the main actors in the international system, with their actions and decisions holding more importance than the actions of institutions and individuals, leads to a "ritual of diplomacy" with other states and their leaders, even with governments that have been accused of committing genocide. Heads of state engage in high-level diplomatic meetings, not considering the fact that some people present have been complicit in genocidal actions. In her expression on the Clinton administration's diplomatic efforts during the Rwandan genocide, Samantha Power explains:

Before and during the massacres U.S. diplomacy exposed its natural favoritism toward states and toward negotiations. Because most official contact occurs between representatives of states, U.S. officials were predisposed to trust the assurances of Rwandan officials, several of whom were plotting genocide behind

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<sup>99</sup> Power, Samantha, *"Bystanders to Genocide,"* The Atlantic Monthly Group Sept. 2001: 84-108, JSTOR, UCB Lib., Berkeley, 27 Feb. 2008. Page 84.

<sup>100</sup> Gilpin, Robert, *Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order*, Princeton University Press, 2001, Princeton University Press, 3 March 2008.  
<http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s7093.html>.



the scenes. Those in the U.S, government who knew Rwanda best viewed the escalating violence with a diplomatic prejudice that left them... institutionally oriented toward the Rwandan government.<sup>101</sup>

These state-to-state diplomatic efforts, in turn, further effect the idea that the state, as opposed to institutions or individuals, is the most important actor where matters of genocide are alarmed, resulting in a reproduction of realist beliefs, which wouldn't bring peace to the world.

The third assumption here is the existence of power-hungry, rational states embrace that states make decisions about foreign affairs only on the basis of their own interests. As Ronayne noted "The realist emphasis on the importance of power and self-interest helps us to understand and even predict that an American administration might show reluctance to intervene to stop genocide because of other geostrategic priorities and domestic political concerns".<sup>102</sup>

The nonintervention in Rwandan genocide showed that there was nothing they would benefit from, no doubt we could see self-interest in the part the great power especially the U.S, and the Belgian, because if there was anything that Rwanda has and could benefit them they would have intervened, at the same time Somalia was just used as pretext not to intervene because we cannot compare nineteen lives to millions of lives that perished in the massacre.

## 1.6 Theory of Noninterventionist

According to Henry Hodges non-interventionism is a foreign policy which holds that political rulers should avoid alliances with other nations, but still retain diplomacy, and avoid all wars not related to direct self-defense. An original more formal definition is that Non-intervention is a policy characterized by the absence of interference by a state or states in the external affairs of another state without its consent, or in its internal affairs with or without its consent.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>101</sup> Power, Samantha, "Bystanders to Genocide," *The Atlantic Monthly Group* Sept. 2001: 84-108, JSTOR, UCB Lib., Berkeley, 27 Feb. 2008. Page 90.

<sup>102</sup> Ronayne, Peter, *Never Again?: the United States and the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide Since the Holocaust*, Rowman & Littlefield, 2001: 15, Google Books, 27 Feb. 2008 Page 4.

<sup>103</sup> Henry G. Hodges. *The doctrine of intervention*, 1915.

This According to Carpenter Ted Galen is based on the grounds that a state should not interfere in the internal politics of another state, and the principles of state sovereignty and self-determination. A similar phrase is "strategic independence".<sup>104</sup> Historical examples of supporters of non-interventionism as stated by Robert Stalin are U.S, Presidents George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, who both favored nonintervention in European Wars while maintaining free trade. Other proponents include United States Senator Robert A. Taft and United States Congressman Ron Paul.<sup>105</sup>

On a concluding note, it is hereby submitted that the law around use of force still has an intact structure and ability to adapt to changing situations. Importantly, it also is has the ability to withstand serious breaches and maintain its position. But one facet which consistently makes the law seem as "illusory" is its lack of enforcement and inconsistent state practice.

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<sup>104</sup> Carpenter, Ted Galen. *The Libertarian Reader*. pp. 336-344. ISBN 0-684-83200-3.

<sup>105</sup> Conquest, Robert. *Stalin: Breaker of Nations*. Great Britain: George Weidenfeld & Nicholson Limited, 1991. Page. 122.

## CHAPTER TWO

### TOWARDS PEACE MAKING: THE CASE OF RWANDA

In evaluating the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention as a tool for enforcing human rights, it is relevant to examine states where interventions had taken place. Thus the intervention in Rwanda shall be considered in the cause of this study.

The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide has since caused many to question the international community's choice not to intervene. Much of the discussion has revolved around the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention.<sup>106</sup>

In this thesis, the case of Rwanda has been selected as a means of discussing international morality and the role of morality in international relations. In addition, Rwandan genocide still has unanswered questions; such as to evaluate of the U.N actorness in preventing violence, and focusing on to what extent the UN has undertaken an effective role in resolving the conflict.

#### 2.1 Rwanda

Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in Central Africa, with just 7 million people, and is comprised of two main ethnic groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Although the Hutus account for 90 percent of the population, in the past, the Tutsi minority was considered the aristocracy of Rwanda and dominated Hutu peasants for decades, especially while Rwanda was under Belgian colonial rule. Following independence from Belgium in 1962, the Hutu majority seized power and reversed the roles, oppressing the Tutsis through systematic discrimination and acts of

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<sup>106</sup> Joshua James Kassner, *"Rwanda and the moral obligation of humanitarian intervention," Doctor of Philosophy*, 2007.

violence. As a result, over 200,000 Tutsis fled to neighboring countries and formed a rebel guerrilla army, the Rwandan Patriotic Front.<sup>107</sup>

This was the biggest genocide of the 1990s with an estimate 800.000 deaths, there were only one-hundred days separating the beginning and the end of the killings. This massacre started with a plane shot down, killing the Rwandan president. Tensions had been growing between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda, the Tutsis and the Hutus.

There was a history of rivalry between the two, which was augmented by the Belgian colonization, and in 1994 the tensions reached its breaking point. All it needed was the assassination of the Hutu president which launched a wave of attacks from Hutu militants on Tutsi civilians. But why it was considered as genocide.

The word genocide was first defined by the UN convention in 1949 after the end of the Second World War. This convention was ratified by most of the UN members stating that if genocide occurs, they must act to stop it. For the purpose of this study genocide is the systematic killing of an ethnic group or race.<sup>108</sup>

Before talking about the genocide, it is necessary to elaborate the main causes of the genocide.

## 2.2 Causes of the Genocide

According to Prunier Gerard the conflict started when the western countries came into the country supported by the Rwandan King (Tutsi) colonized and created differences between the two ethnic groups. The difference was that the Tutsis were usually seen as a higher societal class than Hutus.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> The history place, *Genocide in the 21th century*, 1999.

<sup>108</sup> The United Nations. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, December, 9, 1948. [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p\\_genoci.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm)

<sup>109</sup> Prunier, Gerard. *The RwandaCrisis:History of Genocide*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Germany was the first colonizer in Rwanda, staying only a short period of time, leaving in 1916. Their presence was nonetheless important for two reasons; the first is that they categorized Hutu and Tutsi as genetically different; the second is that their indirect rule led to increase centralization of the government. By believing that the Tutsi were genetically superior, the Germans created a psychological effect that would continue with the Belgians and remain in Rwanda. The genetic superiority tied with keeping a centralized government left Tutsis solely in charge of the country with no representation of Hutus.<sup>110</sup>

When Belgium took the control over the country in 1916; they continued to portray Tutsi and Hutu's as two different ethnic groups. Like the Germans, they gave greater preference to the Tutsi and kept them in charge of the government. The Belgians were able to manipulate the government and the King in charge. In 1931, the Belgians successfully brought a new King that was more "westernized". Mutara III Rudahigwa, the new king, "dressed in Western<sup>111</sup> clothes ... drove his own car, was monogamous and in due course converted to Christianity".

He died the same year a Hutu revolt gained political power. Thousands of Tutsis fled the country in order to escape the violence and in 1962 Rwanda and Burundi gained independence from Belgium and split up right after.<sup>112</sup>

As stated Alain Destexhe by the end of colonization, there was a drastic change between the two ethnic groups. The younger generations which were educated during the colonial system believed that the Tutsi and Hutu were two different ethnic groups. Some Hutu radicals began to believe that the Tutsis were colonizers, the same as Belgians and by the "end of the 1950s, an ethnic awareness had without doubt developed between the Rwandan elite.<sup>113</sup> This believe continued to exist until the 1990s. Just as Durch Williams' said the four decades after colonization were difficult for Tutsi civilians as they "were held responsible for almost all

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Destexhe, Alain. *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press, 1995.

troubles the country faced.<sup>114</sup> That made a large percentage of the Tutsi populations to seek refuge in neighboring countries. It was the same year according to Mamdani Mahmood the Rwandan Patriotic front was created in Uganda in 1987 by Rwandan refugees. The first Tutsi refugees fled to Uganda to escape ethnic conflict in the beginning of 1959. These resulted from the "social revolution" of 1959, led by Gregoire Kayibanda (second president of Rwanda), that defeated the Tutsi led monarchy, and instability that continued through independence from Belgium in 1962. While 50,000 to 70,000 Tutsi arrived in the initial refugee entry, periodic ethnic violence resulted in a refugee population of about 200,000 by 1990, though only about 82,000 of these had registered as refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).<sup>115</sup>

In 1990, a civil war between the Hutu and the Rwandan Patriotic Front broke, but the truth of the matter is looking from history the massacres in Rwanda are not a result of a profound and ancient hatred between the two ethnic groups. Rather the colonizers were the first to put into practice a division between the two groups which unfortunately it continued after they left and this led to genocide. Speaking the same language, having the same culture and the same territory according to Destexhe should have qualified "Rwanda as a nation in the true sense".<sup>116</sup> This shows that failure of a state lies with the political elites and colonizers.

Historically, the conflict between Tutsis and Hutus was not ancient and the failure in the intervention did not originate from any profound hatred but rather the failure of elites to distinguish each other as brothers and sisters. There is no denial that people had emotional effects in this; both groups were under attack at one time and their education was damaged by false information on both Tutsis and Hutus. In addition, "the tendency of Hutu peasants to adapt collectively to the orders of their leaders has always been observed by those seeking to explain

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<sup>114</sup> Durch, William J. *UN Peacekeeping American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*. 1st ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

<sup>115</sup> Mamdani, Mahmood (2002). *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-10280-5.

<sup>116</sup> Destexhe, Alain. *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press, 1995.

the way in which they participated in the genocide". This pressure by elites proves that deeply rooted hatred was nonexistent. It is also important to know that 90% of the population was rural and had poor education. Therefore, it is much easier for elites to manipulate the population. Still, outside help might have prevented the ethnic conflict to take place because these attacks were provoked by elites and not true hatred.<sup>117</sup>

### 2.3 The Genocide

As previously pointed out, Rwanda's ethnic clash between the Hutus and Tutsis was predominately a product of European colonialism.<sup>118</sup> Germany, and later Belgium, colonized what is now known as Rwanda in the 19th century and made a class system based on skin tone and facial features.<sup>119</sup> The lighter skinned Tutsis were treated as being racially superior to the darker skinned Hutus. Over the years, this created a great deal of animosity towards the Tutsis, and the group was periodically attacked. After 200,000 Tutsis were forced to flee to Uganda, they regrouped into what was known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Their aim was to achieve political equality for the Tutsis and to counter the predominately Hutu government. Violence escalated throughout the early 1990's and erupted in 1994. In March of the same year, weapons were given to Hutu civilians.

A month later, In April 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down. The Tutsis, particularly the Rwandan Patriotic Front, were blamed for the attack. The Rwandan army and armed militia were deployed against the alleged perpetrators, and for the next 100 days, a genocidal fury swept the small African nation. Most of those killed were unarmed Tutsi civilians.

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<sup>117</sup> Moore, Jonathan. *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.

<sup>118</sup> Sarah Hymowitz and Amelia Parker, Group one, "The Hutus and the Tutsis," *American University Washington College of Law center for human rights and humanitarian intervention*, last visited April 27, 2011, <http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/center/rwanda/jigsawl.pdf?rd=l>.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

Nearly one million Rwandese were sought out and killed simply because they were Tutsi or Tutsi sympathizers. They were victims of genocide, they were murdered with machetes and small arms in just a few weeks. The ethnic majority Hutus consisting mostly of men; even women and children took part in the carnage.<sup>120</sup>

In this regard the role of the international community has been questioned during this period in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, the role of the United Nations in particular.

## 2.4 The role of the United Nations and the Security Council in Rwanda

In 1993, the UN Security Council created and deployed a small armed peacekeeping force namely the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). UNAMIR's mission was to help enforce the cease-fire between Hutu government and Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) as part of the Arusha peace agreement. UNAMIR 2500 blue helmets represented the international community's devotion to peace process and consisted of troops from Belgium, Ghana, and Pakistan. Hours after the president was murdered, the Rwanda presidential guard started hunting down the Tutsi and Hutu rivals of the president and killing them.<sup>121</sup>

When ten UN troops from Belgium were assigned to guard the Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwihingiyimana were brutally hacked to death and the prime minister was raped and killed, Belgium recalled its 440 troops and the remaining armed observers force in their barracks.<sup>122</sup> By April 18<sup>th</sup> the international committee of the Red Cross had reported that "tens of thousands" of Rwandans had already been killed.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> \*The chronology of the events in Rwanda was compiled by Reuters and distributed by Tribunal Watch [ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu](http://ubvm.cc.buffalo.edu).

<sup>121</sup> Kelly-Kate S. Pease, *International Organizations: Perspectives On Governance In Twenty First Century*. Pearson: Prentice Hall, 2008, 3rd edition, p. 268.

<sup>122</sup> Thomas W. Lippman, "US troop withdrawal ends frustrating mission to save Rwandan lives," *Washington Post*, Oct. 3, 1994, p. 11.

<sup>123</sup> See U.N. Security Council, Resolution 912, U.N.S.C.O.R. 49th Sess., 3368th.



According to Romeo Dallaire (Former commander of UNAMIR), by April of 1994, UNAMIR had received numerous warnings from an informant within the interahamwe, a civilian militia with close ties to the Hutu extremists in the Rwandan government, that a campaign of violence against the Tutsi was about to begin.<sup>124</sup> One particularly relevant piece of information provided by the informant was the identification of hidden caches of weapons. Romeo Dallaire contacted the United Nations and sought permission to raid the weapons caches, the very existence of which was a violation of the Arusha Accords (Accord signed between Rwanda government and the RPF). Instead of being given permission, Dallaire was reproached for "even thinking about invading the weapons caches."<sup>125</sup>

At the request of the United Nations, Dallaire outlined a plan to halt the killing. He claimed that if he were provided with a force of about 5000 well-equipped soldiers he would be able to provide safety and security to the Rwandan people, and get the implementation of the Arusha Accords back on track.<sup>126</sup> However, even after the killing had begun, the United Nations refused to give the peacekeepers the support necessary to protect the Rwandan people. Though many at the United Nations expressed shock at what was happening in Rwanda, they did nothing to halt the killing.<sup>127</sup>

Rwanda radio incited the violence by directing killers to where Tutsis were hiding and filling the airwaves with hateful propaganda. More moderate leaders were murdered, as UN peacekeepers stepped aside. Thousands of Tutsis, fleeing the machetes, went to UN camps for protection. The Tutsi rebel force, known as the RPF, launched an offensive to seize power and stop the killing.

The mass movements of Hutu and Tutsi created a humanitarian disaster in the border regions, especially in Tanzania. The UNHCR and the WFP struggled to avoid famine and disease. Several western countries also sent Special Forces to Rwanda; however, their mission was to

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<sup>124</sup> Dallaire, p. 96.

<sup>125</sup> See Dallaire, pp. 141-144, 146.

<sup>126</sup> See Dallaire., p. 359. See also, Powers, p. 378.

<sup>127</sup> Dallaire, pp. 374-376.

protect foreign nationals and send them out of Rwanda. Even the Tutsi employees of the western embassies were not evacuated despite that they faced certain death.

On April 22th the UN Security Council voted to reduce the number of UN personnel in Rwanda to 270 to prevent additional UN casualties. As the UN withdrew from Rwanda, Hutu extremists overran the camps and slaughtered the inhabitant.<sup>128</sup>

When the Security Council realized that the killing continued unabated, it began, to discuss sending UN force of 5500 African troops to Rwanda. The Security Council voted on May 1<sup>st</sup> to increase the authorized force level of UNAMIR to 5500 troops but as yet had obtained no commitments from member nations who have to provide forces.<sup>129</sup>

On May 31, UN secretary general Boutros-Boutros Ghali reported to the Security Council that a 250.000 to 500.000 Rwandan men, women, and children had already been killed.<sup>130</sup>

In a nation of approximately seven million persons, the secretary general pointed out that this would equate in proportional population terms to the killing of two-four million in France and nine-15 million to the U.S.A.<sup>131</sup>

The report concluded with a mix of revolt and anger over the incompetency of the UN to respond to the crisis:

The magnitude of the human calamity that has overflowed Rwanda might be unimaginable  
But for its having transpired. On the basis of the evidence that has emerged, there can be  
Little doubt that it constitutes genocide, since there have been large-scale killings of  
Communities and families belonging to a particular ethnic group ..... in the Meantime,

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<sup>128</sup> Kelly-Kate S. Pease, *International organizations: perspectives on governance in twenty first century*. Pearson: Prentice Hall, 2008, 3rd edition p 268.

<sup>129</sup> See U.N. Security Council, Resolution 918, U.N.S.C.O.R. 49th sess., 3385th. mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/923 (May 31, 1994), 2.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

It is unacceptable that, almost two months since violence exploded, Killings still continue.<sup>132</sup>

As reported by Richard Lyons a UN study later confirmed that Hutu militants were guilty of genocide against the Tutsi, but that no evidence was found that the Tutsi-led RPF committed systematic reprisals as the Hutu had alleged.<sup>133</sup>

Madeline Albright, the US ambassador at the UN, continued to resist using the term "Genocide" to refer to the massacre in Rwanda; at meetings of the Security Council and led demands within the council that term be dropped from the presidential statement of 30 April 1994. In failing to confront the reality head on, the U.S had showed the world that it was not prepared to take genocide seriously; as such a mark would have made the US inaction unjustifiable.,,

Death did not end at the Rwandan borders as refugee camps in Goma, Zaire were swept with outbreak of cholera taking as many as 200.000 additional lives.<sup>134</sup>

As stated by Thomas Weiss for several weeks the Security Council was unable to obtain commitments from member nations for the needed troops, equipments, logistics, and transportation. The United States, still reeling from unpredicted large military casualties in Somalia, totally rejected requests for U.S, participation in the UN force and generally opposed the idea of deploying any large UN peacekeeping force to Rwanda while fighting continued band without having secured solid commitments from member nations to supply troops and equipments. The U.S was concerned about potential costs of a large, extended UN mission in Rwanda since the U.S is required to pay over 30 percent of the costs of such mission, and about the lack of cooperation of other nations.<sup>135</sup>

<sup>132</sup> See U.N.Security Council, Resolution 923, U.N.S.C.O.R., 49th sess., 3385th. mtg., U.N.Doc.S/Res/923 (May 31,1994),10.

<sup>133</sup> Richard D. Lyons, "UN.StudyaccusesHutu in Hutu in Rwanda killings," New York times, Dec. 3, 1994, A1 7.

<sup>134</sup> U.N.Security Council, Resolution 924, U.N.S.C.O.R., 49th sess., 3385th. mtg., U.N.Doc.S/Res/924,June 1,1994, 3.

<sup>135</sup> See Thomas G.Weiss, "The United Nations and Civil Wars," Washington Quarterly 17 (1994): 137.

On June 19 UN Secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote to the Security Council denoting that it would take several additional weeks before increase UNAMIR troops and equipment would be available for deployment within Rwanda.<sup>136</sup> With evidence of the scale of the atrocities in Rwanda supporting a UN report on the crisis estimated that three million Rwandans were displaced internally and more than two million fled to neighboring countries,<sup>137</sup> the French government proposed to the security to intervene unilaterally to stop the bloodshed and to set up safe havens for the hundreds of thousands of fleeing refugees.<sup>138</sup> By June 22, three after Security Council approval of the French intervention, 2500 French troops were in Rwanda and neighboring Zaire, establishing safe havens for refugees near the border. The French troops helped distribute relief supplies and patrolled the countryside in tanks and armored vehicles.

While critics of the intervention had expected French forces to assist Rwandan government troops in the fight against the RPF, (as France had done during similar fighting in 1990), French troops instead stood aside as the RPF seized control of the capital city of Kigali on July 4. French forces also did nothing to prevent the fall of Butare, Rwanda's second largest city, to RPF forces on July 5, or the fall of Ruhenger, the Rwandan government stronghold, on July 14. On July 18 the RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire effectively ending the civil war. The next day the RPF formed a government of national unity in Kigali.<sup>139</sup> French forces withdrew from Rwanda after two months, encouraging the United Nations to send replacements as soon as possible.<sup>140</sup> By August, 1994 several thousand blue helmets UN troops from Ethiopia, Ghana, and Zimbabwe had replaced the French troops.

The ineffectual French mission was an example of legitimate collective humanitarian intervention, but the most important fact about this incident is not what happened but what did not happen. The inaction of the UN and the U.S during the horrifying events that occurred in

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<sup>136</sup> See U.N. Security Council, letter dated 19 June 1994 from secretary general addressed to the president of the security council, UN. Doc. S/1994/728.

<sup>137</sup> U.N. Resolution 924, 3.

<sup>138</sup> See United Nations, letter dated 20 June 1994 from the permanent representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the secretary-general, U.N. Doc. S/1994/734.

<sup>139</sup> U.N. Resolution 924, 1.

<sup>140</sup> Paul Lewis, "France calls Rwanda Mission a Success," New York Times, July 11, 1994, A8.

Rwanda in 1994 is simply unforgivable, and has been much discussed in the past 11 year.<sup>141</sup> The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda convicted various individuals of genocide and similar crimes.<sup>142</sup>

The Rwandan massacre was a catalyst for a change in world opinion about humanitarian intervention, and responsible leaders and observers finally understood the need to establish means to prevent and oppose these kinds of catastrophes. Most importantly, the Rwandan tragedy shows how offensive the principle of non-intervention is. That principle simply requires the international community to sit by while the slaughtering occurs. Deciding to intervene is certainly a normal decision. But deciding not to intervene when one can intervene and save lives is also a moral decision. Critics of humanitarian intervention trade on the horrors of war: we should not intervene because war is so destructive. But then, supporters of humanitarian intervention can trade on the horrors of genocide. As stated Kofi Annan, it is suggested that noninterventionists explain Rwanda.<sup>143</sup>

## 2.5 United Nations peacebuilding mission in Rwanda

In his 1992 report, "An Agenda for Peace," former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced the concept of peacebuilding to the UN as "action to identify and support structures, which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict."<sup>144</sup> Over the years, various efforts have been made to elaborate on this definition. The Brahimi Report from 2000 defined peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations

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<sup>141</sup> See, inter alia, Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The UN and Rwanda* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002); and Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 329-89.

<sup>142</sup> For these developments, see <http://www.icttr.org/>.

<sup>143</sup> In this sense, see Annan, the question of intervention.

<sup>144</sup> A/47/277 - S/24111, para. 21.

something that is more than just the absence of war."<sup>145</sup> In 2007, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee has described peacebuilding as:

"A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives."<sup>146</sup>

The end of the Cold War greatly diminished the strategic importance of the African continent, and African states were left to themselves to solve their political and ethnic conflicts that had been angered and worsened by years of cold war tensions.

That's because Africa has been dependent since their independence on outside aid. In short, by 1994 the great powers had no compelling national interest in Rwanda.

Unfortunately for the Rwandans in the genocide, the UN's first post-cold war invasion in Africa was a disaster for U.S. armed forces. The U.S. led UN intervention into Somalia in 1992 was to deliver food and medical aid to the millions of Somalis at risk. Once that mission was accomplished, U.S. forces began the difficult task of state-building by trying to create a coalition government among hostile warlords. U.S. forces had to track down defector warlords and attempt to disarm exceptionally well armed militias. Nineteen U.S. "peacekeepers" were brutally killed and their bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The U.S. peacekeepers were on the same kind of mission that UNAMIR initially requested to undertake in Rwanda as the genocide began to unfold. With that experience the United States was reluctant to expand UNAMIR's mission because it would likely have involved a commitment of U.S. troops in another remote region of Africa. As a result, UNAMIR was denied the authorization to take decisive steps to seize the weapons that could have at least delayed the genocide.

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<sup>145</sup> A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 13

<sup>146</sup> Decision of the Secretary-General, May 2007.

According to David Forsythe, the United States had a policy not to intervene in Rwanda and, so the UN did not intervene.<sup>147</sup> Rwanda already had a nonpermanent seat on the Security Council but none asked the Rwandan representative to explain what was happening or even assure security council members that the activities only amounted to a "breach of the peace". As reported by Lewis Neil neither the United States nor the UN would use the term "genocide" because genocide demands a response and the United States was committed to nonintervention.<sup>148</sup>

The colonial rule (Belgium) that created this conflict historical and political ties to Rwanda suggest that maybe they might have done something. The Belgian government instead was reeling from the death of their peacekeepers.

As stated in Frontline, the Belgian government went on an extensive lobbying campaign to pull the UNAMIR force out of Rwanda. The Belgians did not want to lose face by pulling only their troops out so they lobbied security council members behind the scenes to pull out the entire peacekeeping force. They found a very understanding ear from the United States, who was still licking its Somalian wounds.

The Hutus knew that after the lessons of Somalia "if you kill a few" they will leave and that is exactly what happened. After all, the conflict between the Tutsis and the Hutus was not a fight of the Americans, French, or Belgians. For that reason, it was not falling under the sphere of influences of the five permanent members of the council. The Tutsis were disappointed by the UN not being able to prevent their massacre. It was the Rwandan Patriotic Front and its only 400 troops that put an end to the genocide. The UN peacekeepers were better armed and trained than the RPF, yet they did nothing to stop the killings.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> Forsythe, David P. 2000. *Human Rights in International Relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>148</sup> Lewis, Neil A. 2001. Papers Show U.S. Knew of Genocide in Rwanda. *New York Times* (August 23): A5.

<sup>149</sup> *Frontline*. 1999. The Triumph of Evil. PBS, aired January 26.

The UN missed opportunities that have prevented the catastrophe or at least relieved it. First the UN could have authorized the seizure of weapon stores to keep them out of the hands of the Hutu extremists. However, seen the danger of what was happening on the ground it was difficult for the UN decision makers in New York to authorize a risky mission that could cost the lives of hundreds of peacekeepers and lead to further deterioration of the situation. Given conflicting reports and a lack of political will for expanded peacekeeping. The second missed opportunity on the part of the UN was failing to call the genocide, "genocide. The reluctance of UN officials to use the term allowed members to drag their feet and avoid taking action. By falling back on protocol and norms of diplomacy, the UN did not speak up against the slaughter.

According to an independent report commissioned by the Security Council (SC/6842 April 14, 200), the failure to stop or prevent the genocide in Rwanda was a failure of the UN system as a whole. "The fundamental failure was the lack of resources and political commitment devoted to developments in Rwanda and the UN presence there. There was persistent lack of political will by member states to act, which affected the secretariat's response, the security council decision making and the difficulties in getting troops for the UNAMIR".

Genocide and other horrors probably going to continue until the UN members find the political will and the resources for preventive action. The UN missions into tense areas need to have clear rules of engagement and must have a license to disarm militants, by force if really necessary, and to invade arms stores. Just because the UN failed in Rwanda does not mean it must be rejected. The UN and its members must learn hard lessons, make the necessary changes, and attempt not to allow such horror happen again.<sup>150</sup> The question still remains why the United Nations failed in Rwanda.

As noted by Linda Melven, the international community completely failed to prevent and stop the massacre. There are numerous solid and complex factors that led to international inaction, such as a wrong view of African conflicts, the bureaucratic nature of the United Nations and

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<sup>150</sup> UN Security Council. 2002. Press Release: Chairman of Independent Inquiry into UN Actions During 1994 Rwanda Genocide presents report to security council. April 14 (SC/6843).



peacekeeping weakness in general. There are three reasons believed to be the most important ones:

First, the "shadow of Somalia", was still there and made states as well as the UN reluctant to engage in another Peace Operation in Africa.<sup>151</sup> Unfortunately for Rwandan victims in the Genocide, the UN's first Post-Cold War into Africa was a disaster for the US armed forces. The U.S led UN intervention into Somalia in 1992 was to deliver humanitarian food and medical aid to the millions of Somalis at risk. Once that mission was accomplished, the U.S forces began to create a coalition government between hostile opponents. While the U.S tried to disarm the militia nineteen U.S peacekeepers were brutally killed and their bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. With the experience in Somalia, the U.S was reluctant to expand UNAMIR's mission because it would likely have involved a commitment of U.S troops in another remote region of Africa. As a result, the UNAMIR was not giving the authorization to take vital steps to get hold of the weapons that could have at least delayed the genocide. As reported by Forsythe, the U.S had a policy not to intervene in Rwanda so the UN did not intervene.<sup>152</sup>

Second, reason as stated Gerard Caplan was due to national interest: the United States decided not to intervene in Rwanda as there was no national interest. France, which had national interests, did not attempt to save Rwandan lives, but actively contributed to the genocide.<sup>153</sup>

Third, due to the media's failure to report on the genocide there was no internal pressure from citizens that could have influenced policy makers. The main actors Belgium, the UN Secretariat, the U.S and France knew that there was genocide happening in Rwanda; for that reason, they had a responsibility to prevent and stop the genocide but lacked political will.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Melvern, Linda. 2000. *A people betrayed: The role of the west in Rwanda's genocide*, London: Zed Books.

<sup>152</sup> Forsythe, David P. 2000. *Human Rights in International Relations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>153</sup> Caplan, Gerald. 2004. "Why we must never forget the Rwandan genocide", *Pambazuka News* 150. Available at <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/21165>. Accessed 16 September 2011.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

## 2.6 Rwandan crisis: Rethinking on the effectiveness of the international community

The outcome of the Rwandan genocide implies that the world has much to learn about responding to humanitarian crises. Only after the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) had took over did the genocide stop and it was then that the UN decided to intervene to prevent a genocide. Fearing killings by the Tutsi army, the UN Security Council passed Resolution No 929 authorizing Operation Turquoise, a french intervention force to stabilize the situation. The operation turquoise had the effect of allowing those who penetrated the genocide in Rwanda to escape into neighboring countries. French forces were deployed between fleeing Hutus and the RPF. As the Hutus, numbering over a million people, fled into neighboring countries the UN was faced with responding to the resulting humanitarian crisis that results from such mass movements, starvation, disease, and violence. In Goma, Zaire, alone cholera epidemic killed over 50,000 Rwandan refugees.

The UNHCR responded by establishing massive refugee camps especially in Zaire to provide safe haven, and working with many UN agencies and NGOs, set out to meet the basic needs of the refugees. While the UN was able to save the lives of innocent civilians, it UN was still unable to prevent the militarization of the camps.<sup>155</sup>

Finally, the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide was a political failure, those with power failed to protect the powerless. The world still lacks the international institutions and the political will to stop genocide. According to Gregory Stanton, a global movement is needed in the twenty-first century like the anti-slavery movement of the nineteenth century.<sup>156</sup> To launch that

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<sup>155</sup> Terry, Fiona. 2002. *The paradox of humanitarian action: condemned to repeat?* Cornell, NY: Cornell University press.

<sup>156</sup> Stanton Gregory, 2000. "How We Can Prevent Genocide?" London, 18 October 2000. at <http://www.genocidewatch.org/howpreventgenocide.html>.

movement is the reason of genocide watch, the international campaign to stop genocide. Knowing that there two main reasons why a genocide is still committed in the world.

First reason is because the world has not developed the international institutions needed to prevent it; second the world leaders do not have the political will to end it.

In order to create international institutions and political will Gregory Stanton advice that:

- 1- The U.N. Security Council needs a strong, independent Early Warning system to predict where and when ethnic conflict, genocide, and war are going to occur, and to present policy options to the Security Council on how to prevent or stop the conflicts.
- 2- The United Nations needs a standing, volunteer, professional rapid response force that does not depend on member governments' contributions of brigades from their own armies.
- 3- The world needs an International Criminal Court. Impunity for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity must end.<sup>157</sup>

These institutional changes according to Gregory may not be enough to end genocide in the twenty-first century. Sooner or later we have to return to the problem of political will. It was not for want of U.N peace-keepers in Rwanda that 800,000 people died. They died because of the total lack of political will by the world leaders to save them. Certainly, it was their political will to actually withdraw the U.N. peace-keepers and leave them to their executioners. Neither the U.S. nor any other member of the U.N. Security Council had the political will to risk one of their citizens to save 800,000 Tutsis from genocide.<sup>158</sup>

The International Campaign to End Genocide works to generate political will through:

1. Consciousness rising: maintaining close contact with key policy makers in governments of U.N. Security Council members, providing them with information about genocidal situations.

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<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

2. Coalition formation: working in international coalitions to respond to specific genocidal situations and involving members in campaigns to educate the public and political leaders about solutions.
3. Policy advocacy: preparing options papers for action to prevent genocide in specific situations, and presenting them to policy makers.<sup>159</sup>

As the nineteenth century was a century to abolish slavery and of independences, let make the twenty first century a century to end genocide, terrorism and all sort of organizations that violate human rights.

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER THREE

### PEACEBUILDING OR PEACEMAKING

For the last decade, peacekeeping has been a basic duty facing the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU) and the great world powers.<sup>160</sup> At the same time, there is a huge understanding that peacekeeping and, more recently peacebuilding are complex operations and in many cases may not support in conflict resolution. Cases such as Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia do not present victorious images. In many of these places violence continues and at times worsens despite the presence of the peacekeepers. In fact, there is evidence that in some cases peacekeeping is not only ineffective, but may by any chance worsen agonistic environment.<sup>161</sup>

As Arthur John Richard Groom argues that "Peacekeeping is only meaningful if it leads to conflict resolution", which remains relevant today.<sup>162</sup> Lately, the report of the panel on the U.N peace operations also known as the Brahimi Report called for changes in the administration of peacekeeping operation and acknowledged a decade of failure.<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Currently the UN is involved in 11 peacebuilding operations and 16 peacekeeping operations. NATO forces are engaged in Bosnia and Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Afghanistan. The EU is involved in four conflict prevention missions and 17 other peacebuilding and conflict resolution missions. ISSN 1360-0826 print=ISSN 1469-798X online=05=030267-22# 2005 University of Kent DOI: 10.1080=13600820500135320.

<sup>161</sup> Research on the success and failure of peacekeeping is controversial. For a discussion of the debate in the literature, see Virginia Page Fortna, "Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate War", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (2003), pp. 97-114; and Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, *External Interventions and the Duration of Civil Wars* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000), pp. 1-19.

<sup>162</sup> A. J. R. Groom, "Peacekeeping: Perspectives and Progress", *International Affairs*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (1971), pp. 340-352.

<sup>163</sup> David Last, "From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding", *The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2003), available: <[http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5\\_1last.pdf](http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/5_1last.pdf)> See also Lakhdar Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations* (New York: United Nations, 2000), A/55/305-S/2000/809.

### 3.1 The Brahimi Report

In March 2000, the Secretary-General appointed the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to evaluate the shortcomings of the then existing system and to make specific and realistic recommendations for change. The panel was composed of individuals experienced in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

The result, known as the "Brahimi Report", after Lakhdar Brahimi, the Chair of the Panel, called for:

- renewed political commitment on the part of Member States;
- significant institutional change;
- Increased financial support.

The Panel noted that in order to be effective, UN peacekeeping operations must be properly resourced and equipped, and operate under clear, credible and achievable mandates.<sup>164</sup>

In some respects, these failures are a function of the broadening ambitions of peacekeeping that are beyond the unique control of supervision of ceasefires. In the light of increasing calls for international assistance as well as changing norms of "New interventionism" there is a great need to explore where peacekeeping operations can go wrong.<sup>165</sup>

### 3.2 A lack of consensus

Within the scholarship on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is a little consensus about the potential for peacekeeping operations to demobilize domestic conflict.<sup>166</sup> As Fortna points out, "It is not at all self evident that peacekeeping works".<sup>167</sup> In fact, within the research on the

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<sup>164</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping, *Reform of Peacekeeping: Brahimi Report*. 2000.

<sup>165</sup> John N. Clarke, "Revisiting the New Interventionism", *Peace Review* Vol. 14, No. 1 (2002), p. 93.

<sup>166</sup> Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (1996), pp. 136-175.

<sup>167</sup> Fortna, op. cit., pp. 97-114.

effectiveness of peacekeeping there are clear contradictions. Some authors like Barbara Walter find that multilateral operations, particularly those under UN administration, do have a positive impact on the creation of durable peace.<sup>168</sup> However, Amitabh Dubey concludes that peacekeeping operations do not obviously contribute to lasting peace.<sup>169</sup>

Of those that do examine why there are failures, two approaches emerge: one that focuses on external factors, particularly the type and motivation of interventions, and one that focuses on domestic or internal factors. Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal focus on 'external' attributes as they divide outside interventions into two categories: those primarily motivated by self-interest (the product of Realpolitik concerns) and those of a more neutral, humanitarian nature.<sup>170</sup>

Another scholar Robert Johansen identifies several operational deficiencies: insufficient force size, lack of capacity for rapid response, lack of long-term commitment, patchy training, lack of command coordination, erratic and insufficient funding, understaffing and a general lack of institutional learning.<sup>171</sup>

From this perspective, the persistent problem is that peacekeeping missions are plagued by lack of political will, insufficient manpower, not enough money and uncertain long-term commitment.<sup>172</sup>

Below a similar case to Rwanda will be discussed to scrutinize the effectiveness/ ineffectiveness of peacekeeping missions in solving disputes in the cases of Rwanda and Kosovo.

<sup>168</sup> BarbaraWalter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement", *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1997), pp. 335-364; and Doyle and Sambanis, *op. cit.*, p. 779.

<sup>169</sup> Amitabh Dubey, *Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlements*, Conference paper presented at International Studies Association-Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2002.

<sup>170</sup> Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, "Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflict", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993), pp. 118-142.

<sup>171</sup> Robert Johansen, "Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping", in Chadwick F. Alger (ed.), *Enhancing United Nations Peace-Keeping* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), pp. 100-102.

<sup>172</sup> United Nations, "Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (21 December 2001), A/56/ 732, pp. 1-17.

The Rwandan situation in 1994 presents a case where many actors were on the ground prior to the outbreak of conflict and became paralysed in the face of genocide. The UN was ineffective in preventing the violence and was forced to flee from Rwanda during the slaughter. A similar, although still evolving situation is found in Kosovo, where the NATO is facing numerous challenges in its effort to bring stability to the Balkans, as violence continues despite the wide international commitment.

According to John Mueller, in Rwanda, the true cause of the genocide was the threat to political legitimacy that the Hutu elite was facing with the signing of the Arusha Accords. In an effort to maintain political control over Rwanda, Habyarimana and the Hutu elite recalled the period of colonization, at which time the Hutu had become an oppressed group under the Tutsi elite, and claimed that these structural differences and the subsequent power-relationship still persisted. Moreover, the regime depicted all Tutsis as affiliates with the RPF, based on common ethnic identity, and therefore portrayed the entire group as a threat to Hutu security.

Practically, while some of the supporters and participants of the genocide participated because of "ethnic hatred" many were forced under the system of punishments and rewards that was put in place. It is indeed necessary to analyze the role of ethnicity in the Rwanda Genocide as it proved to be an important factor in terms of mobilizing and categorizing the actors.

Yet, at the same time, by classifying the participants as either "Hutu" or "Tutsi", the fact that many Hutu in fact killed other Hutu and further the point that political and ideological divisions existed within the "Hutu" group at the time, are disregarded. In the end the reason that the Hutu regime initiated the genocide was not due to feelings of ancient hatred, or that the Tutsi as an ethnic group presented a threat to the Hutu ethnicity. Rather it was strategically planned massacre that was planned to also support the Hutu moderates with them or destroy them along with the Tutsi opposition in order to retain political power over Rwanda.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup> John Mueller. 2000, The Banality of "Ethnic War", International Security, Vol 25, no, L



As noted Barbara Walter the mission in Rwanda made no effort to disarm the Hutu extremists or to avert weapons coming in from outside sources. The model reveals similar patterns as NATO's operatives, even though campaigns like 'Essential Harvest' did not demilitarize or disarm rebels. These lessons are consistent with disarmament issues in most civil war situations where the level of commitment to disarmament may be very low on all sides.<sup>174</sup> Ethnic extremists took full advantage of the lack of international will and perceived support.

One must acknowledge that the obstacles peacekeepers face in bringing order to communities torn apart by civil war are very difficult to deal with. The outcome of the Rwandan genocide advocate that the international community has a lot to learn about responding to humanitarian issues, as seeing by all, it's only when it was too late the UN finally decided to interfere.

The question is why did the UN and its members wait till the last minute to intervene in Rwanda?

To sum up, as it is mentioned in this part of the thesis, the major powers of the international system had lack the ability and willingness to intervene in the case of Rwanda. The notion of humanitarian intervention which has become a new phenomenon of the UN and international community after the end of Cold War and the Gulf War of 1990-91, could not be enforced to end the massive human rights violations in Rwanda. The perception of the anarchic structure of the system played a crucial role and reveals the fact that states are still the most important actors constructing world politics.

In other words, the UN as an international organization could not act independently from its member states, the five permanent members of the Security Council in particular. The existence of the sovereignty of the states and interests in the UNSC clearly prevents the UN to implement humanitarian intervention when it deems necessary.

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<sup>174</sup> Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

International efforts to help, protect, and enforce human rights have met different levels of successes and failures. The issue of human rights both challenges and strengthens the status quo. In other words, human rights violations may challenge the structure of the world system or attempts to humanitarian intervention may change or maintain the prevailing international order.. In fact, human right violations as noted by the Security Council are a clear threat to international peace and security. Human rights violations have led to domestic instability and civil wars that led to genocide like the case of Rwanda. In the 21th century, the nature of international conflicts implies that human rights will remain controversial in international relations, because most of those conflicts are caused by the colonizers. That is why human rights and humanitarian interventions are important aspects in 21st century world politics.<sup>175</sup>

As stated in previous chapters the Security Council may authorize the use of force under chapter VII of the UN charter to oppose when it deems necessary. The Security Council is authorized by the UN to determine the existence of threat or breach of peace under the Charter. The Persian Gulf War during 1990-91 when Iraq invaded Kuwait represents the evolving idea that 'violations of human rights may cause threat to international peace and security'. As claimed by Teson under the UN Charter, in hard cases of humanitarian tragedy such as genocide, the Council has

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<sup>175</sup> Kelly Kate Pease, *International Organizations: Perspective on Governance in the Twenty First Century*, 3rd edition, 2008, p. 284. Pearson: Prentice Hall.

the obligation to act.<sup>176</sup> If the Security Council fails to act in such cases, whether because of veto or some other cause, it cedes the responsibilities to the international community to take care of it. Teson also stated that some reasons why the Council can authorize humanitarian intervention, that's it not that the council has limitless judgment to decide what threat to peace is. Instead, the council's power derives from, state and UN practice, and history, set in human freedom and peace, not sovereignty.<sup>177</sup>

In addition to that in case of Council incompetence, states can and may act to stop the killings. According to Kofi Annan the control of war requires that the Charter system be efficient enough to face humanitarian crises.

The failure in stopping the genocide in Rwanda failed not to from the beginning, not even to the UN but to foreign western countries that had the means to stop it (U.S, France, and Belgium). The genocide might have been avoided if countries were willing to act. Looking at the reasons why these countries didn't intervene, one can see that they are just using excuses in order not to intervene. There was not a deeply rooted hatred between the Hutus and the Tutsis, which mean that this whole slaughter was led by only a small amount of people. One can admit that UN was indeed on the ground but they had their hands tied down by the command. They would not use force expect to protect themselves and were only there to find a peaceful resolution between both parties. The only failure of the UN is the organization itself. As noticed earlier the failure to stop the genocide lies only with the countries that were unwilling to stop help the helpless, unwilling to stand and stop the brutal massacre. After the Holocaust argued Gregory Stanton, the whole stood up and said "never again"; but history has shows us that in the past fifty years, genocide happens time and time again.<sup>178</sup>

<sup>176</sup> Fernando R. Teson, *Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into law and morality*, 3rd edition.

<sup>177</sup> Fernando. R. Teson. *Humanitarian intervention: an inquiry into law and morality*, 3rd edition, 2005, p. 32. Transnational Publisher. ISBN 1-57105-248-8.

<sup>178</sup> Gregory Stanton, London, 18 October 2000. Sponsored by the Leo Kuper Foundation, London, England.

Questions remain on humanitarian intervention and what the international community should do. What are left of colonialism are great reasons for ethnic wars that transpires today, should it be the west to fix its mistake or would this be seen as an act of colonist power? The truth of the matter is the world cannot change its past, but it can learn from its mistakes; yet these mistakes happen time and time again. Self interest has played a powerful role in international politics, but maybe it is at least time to protect the people who need help.

In fact, peacemaking/ building works if it leads to conflict resolution. However it didn't in the case of Rwanda, because there was a total war between the Hutus and the Tutsis.

As noted Frontline the tribal conflict connecting Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda disobeyed national boundaries. This conflict has marked itself in broad violence in neighboring countries. Ethnic detestation may date back centuries; though they are property and labor. Historically, Rwanda was a Belgian colony from 1918 to 1962. As we noted earlier the Belgian government has always favored the Tutsi minority and even formed a Tutsi aristocracy to help them dominate the Hutu majority. But that aristocracy was based on the racial superiority of taller, leaner Tutsis and that notion of superiority was raised and promoted by the Belgium.<sup>179</sup>

The Tutsis received privileged treatment in education and employment and all other things. We could still notice traces of colonization because everything was done to separate the two ethnic groups for the interest of the Belgians. The radicalization of the Hutu-Tutsi difference according to Mamdani took place under colonialism and is at the source of the 1994 genocide. The feudal system formed under Belgian rule created a total dependence of the Hutu majority on the Tutsi minority. Hutus were extremely poor and uneducated, that created a huge inferiority complex. Tutsis cooperate with the colonial powers in digging out most of the precious metals from Rwanda. As the Tutsis were working with the Belgians they benefitted and got financial and political rewards. That made Rwanda one of the poorest countries in the world.<sup>180</sup>

<sup>179</sup> Frontline. 1999. *The triumph of evil*. PBS, aired January 26.

<sup>180</sup> Mamdani, Mahmood. 2001. *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton university press.

As reported by the BBC, the UN and its aid agencies is suspect of what happened in Rwanda, not the solution. Belgium till date has restricted economics ties to Rwanda and is the principal donor of foreign support, which makes Belgium a significant power, and even tried to jeopardize the leadership of the peacekeeping forces. For that reason the good intentions of the UN have cause nothing but calamity for Rwanda. The UN itself acknowledged the very incomplete credibility among Rwandans. That is why the UN apology for not stopping the massacre is meaningless, for the circumstances that gave rise to the genocide remain. Rwandans have indeed become sensitive to Belgium's failures and responsibility in the Rwandan genocide.

Many opportunities that could have affected the course of events in the Rwandan genocide remained untapped by policy makers. To quote former U.N. Secretary General Annan, who at the time headed the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

"In their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda".<sup>181</sup>

Here are the words of the Force Commander of the UN peacekeepers in Rwanda, Lt.General Romeo Dallaire, who with 470 volunteer soldiers mostly from Ghana stayed on during the genocide. He said:

"The Rwandan genocide and the reaction to it were expressions of the immaturity of the human race to recognise that every human is human".<sup>182</sup>

Theories of international relation defined the case of Rwanda mainly the realist, neorealist. Self-interested and individualistic behavior of states and the UN was abundant; they did nothing to prevent the genocide. Rwanda may not be the last genocide unfortunately genocidal violence continues to destroy certain African regions. One of the best examples here is the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda's neighbor that has been in a long civil war. Genocide can be

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<sup>181</sup> Secretary General, in 'am mission of healing to Rwanda, pledges support of United Nations for country's search for peace and progress. May 16<sup>th</sup> 1998, Press Release SG/SM/6552 AFR/56.

<sup>182</sup> See Dallaire. Page 245. Quoted from Fernando R. Teson (2008), Humanitarian Intervention: An inquiry into law and morality, 3rd edition.

abolished; the world has the capability to stop it right from the beginning. Now it is up to countries around the world to finally say "never again" and make it sure it never happens again.

#### 4.1 Recommendations for future prevention of such genocide.

A universal lobby group is needed in the twenty-first century like the other NGO's. To initiate that lobby group is the reason of genocide watch, the international cause to prevent genocide. Without that I think genocide and other violations of human rights will continue to happen.

The world lacks an established organization to prevent it. Though there are special advisers to the UN appointed in 2004 (Genocide Watch) on genocide prevention but I suggest there should be a separate independent institution that solely works on genocide prevention, analysis and intervention like United Nations Genocide Prevention Organization (U.N.G.P.O).

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