

**NATIONALISMS AND THE INTERNATIONAL  
CONJUNCTURE: THE CASE OF  
CYPRUS (1945-1964)**

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## **DEDICATION**

In this thesis, I dedicate to the people who are in the enthusiasm and desire of learning the truth.

## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis utilized a qualitative research design composed of a comparative historical analysis examining the Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus, with relevance to the international conjuncture. The thesis problematizes the influences of international conditions on the politics of nationalism in Cyprus. It explains the theoretical approaches accounting for nationalism as a socio-political phenomenon, and indicates that these approaches, despite their successes in illustrating the political and sociological aspects of nationalism, tend to neglect the international conjuncture as another factor shaping politics of nationalism. A noticeable amount of Cypriot scholars concerned on the nationalisms in Cyprus have conceptualized Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus as a socio-political development, however, they generally had the tendency to focus primarily on the domestic conditions generating the nationalisms and to overlook the roles played by the international developments (for instance Soviet de-Stalinization, the emergence of NAM, etc.). The analyzed period of time was the late-Colonial era and the early independence era (1945-1964). The thesis concluded that, the developments in the international politics had significant effects in shaping the nationalism politics of the two communities in Cyprus.

*Keywords:* Nationalism, Cyprus, International Conjuncture, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, de-Stalinization, Non-Aligned Movement.

## ÖZ

Bu tez, Kıbrıs'taki Rum ve Türk milliyetçiliğini, uluslararası konjonktür ile ilgilendirerek, karşılaştırmalı tarihsel analizden oluşan nitel bir araştırma modeli kullanılmıştır. Tez, uluslararası koşulların Kıbrıs'taki milliyetçi politikaların üzerine etkilerini sorunsallaştırmaktadır. Milliyetçiliği sosyo-siyasal bir olgu olarak ele alan teorik yaklaşımları açıklamakta ve bu yaklaşımların milliyetçiliğin siyasi ve sosyolojik yönlerini izah etmekteki başarılarına rağmen, siyaseti şekillendiren bir başka faktör olarak uluslararası konjonktürü ihmal etme eğilimleri olduğu ifade edilmiştir. Kayda değer oranda Kıbrıslı akademisyen, Kıbrıs'taki milliyetçilikler üzerinde, Rum ve Türk milliyetçilerini bir sosyo-siyasal gelişim süreci olarak kavramsallaştırmaktırlar. Ancak, bu çalışmalarda genellikle milliyetçiliği üreten yerli koşullara odaklanmakta eğilimi vardır. Bu tezin mevcut çalışmalardan ayrıştığı nokta, uluslararası konjonktürdeki gelişmelerin (örneğin Sovyet de-Stalinizasyonu ve Bağlantısızlar Hareketi'nin ortaya çıkması, vb.) Kıbrıs'taki milliyetçiliklere olan etkisini sorgulamasıdır. İncelenen zaman dilimi, sömürge döneminin son yılları ile bağımsızlık döneminin ilk yıllarını (1945-1964) kapsamaktadır. Çalışma, konjonktürün ve uluslararası siyasetin Kıbrıs'taki iki toplumun milliyetçilik siyasetlerini ciddi oranda etkilediği sonucuna ulaşmıştır.

*Anahtar sözcükler:* Milliyetçilik, Kıbrıs, Uluslararası Konjonktür, Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Kıbrıslı Türkler, de-Stalinizasyon, Bağlantısızlar Hareketi.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>AKEL</b>	Progressive Party of Working People
<b>CCP</b>	Communist Party of Cyprus
<b>CHP</b>	Republican People's Party
<b>EEC</b>	European Economic Community
<b>EOKA</b>	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>KATAK</b>	Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus
<b>KTKB</b>	Association of Turkish Cypriot Institutions
<b>KTKF</b>	Cyprus Turkish Institutions Federation
<b>KTMHP</b>	Cyprus Turkish National People's Party
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>NAM</b>	Non-Aligned Movement
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NPA</b>	Nationalist Peasant Association
<b>PEK</b>	Panagrarian Union of Cyprus
<b>PEO</b>	Pancyprian Federation of Labour
<b>TNA</b>	British National Archives
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WW II</b>	World War Two
<b>TMT</b>	Turkish Resistance Organization
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>USA</b>	United States of America

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Literature Review

Within the nationalism studies, three mainstream approaches prevail: Primordialism, Modernism and Ethno-symbolism. Primordialism is represented by mainly by Geertz (1973). According to the Primordialist thought, the contemporary nations are socio-biological extensions of their ancestors, and the nationality is “given” to a person with “primordial” ties by birth. Armstrong (1982) and Smith (2002; 2009) are the main representatives of Ethno-symbolism. According to them, the nations have “ethnic origins” and they are entities having secured their social values for centuries via ethno-symbols. On the other hand, Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1983), Breuilly (1993), Hroch (1995), Anderson (2006) and Vale (2014) are the scholars of Modernist School, arguing that the nations and nationalism are post-Modern concepts. That is to say, the nationhood is socially (or politically) constructed by the nation or the state. Hinsley (1973) and Suzman (2000), two scholars whose theoretical stances are rather close to Modernist School, argue that nationalism and nationalist movements should be conceptualized within the framework of international politics and international system and international power balances. This thesis follows the Modernist line and analyzes the nationalism in Cyprus (1945-1964). Additionally, it questions the relation between the nationalism in Cyprus and the global and regional international conjuncture in the relevant period of time.

A large number of Cypriot scholars such as Stavrinides (1975), Markides (1977), Salih (1978), Gazioğlu (1994), Mavratsas (2000), Kızılyürek (2002), Evre (2004), Bryant (2004), Nevzat (2005), Loizides (2007) and Kiralp (2015), analysed the domestic sociology and politics of nationalisms in Cyprus and accounted for their births and fluctuations successfully. These scholars indicated that, modernisation, literacy, intelligentsia, political leaders, socio-cultural attachments to Greece and Turkey and the ethnic violence in Cyprus, played significant roles in creation of national identities and nationalisms in Cyprus. This thesis differs from the existing scholarship by arguing that, all these factors played crucial roles in nationalisms and

politics of nationalism in Cyprus, and, the international conjuncture was another factor shaping the relevant politics and nationalism. Thus, when compared to the Cypriot literature on nationalisms in Cyprus, this thesis pays more attention to the effects of international conditions and actors in shaping the Cypriot nationalisms.

## **1.2 Methodology**

This thesis utilizes a qualitative research design and a comparative historical analysis model focused on the Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus. Analytically, this thesis conceptualizes the international conjuncture as the independent variable and the nationalism politics in Cyprus as dependent variables. Thus, it focuses on the way the international conditions affect the domestic nationalism. Its primary sources are the online archival databases of Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* and British National Archives (TNA). The literature was used as secondary source of data in this thesis. This thesis has concentrated on nationalism in Cyprus as a case-study. In its theoretical considerations, the thesis questions the relationship between domestic nationalism and international politics. It conducts a historical analysis focused particularly on the time period 1945-1964. The main goal of this thesis is to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theories of nationalism in accounting for the relationship between the nationalism in Cyprus, the international conjuncture and the international powers. The relevant time period was chosen since it constitutes the core of nationalist movements in Cyprus, the emergence of ethnic conflict between Greeks and Turks, the decolonization of the island, the beginning and the growth of bi-polar world order and the physical separation of the two communities from each other. On this basis, the relevant time period and the selected case (Cyprus) enable the research and the discussion to focus on many internal and external dynamics regarding nationalism and politics of nationalism. It is useful to note that, the analytical and theoretical model generated by this thesis, is particularly designed for the nationalisms in Cyprus. The author of this thesis does not assert that the model is generalizable to other cases of nationalisms in different countries.

### **1.3 Chapter Plan**

The first chapter of this thesis evaluates the mainstream theoretical approaches within the field of Nationalism Studies. It summarizes the essential points of view of Primordialism, Ethno-symbolism and Modernism. It also refers to the scholarship, suggesting that the concept of nationalism should be analyzed based on the international conjuncture. By the end of each section, also theories criticize with in the Cyprus special. The second chapter focuses on the historical development of nationalisms in Cyprus. It accounts for the Ottoman period, Cyprus's history as a British protectorate and the growth of nationalism and Communism in the island during the colonial era. The historical analysis focuses mainly on the nationalism politics of the two communities and the connections between the nationalisms in the island and the international conjuncture during the late colonial and early independence era (1945-1964). The third chapter provides a critique of nationalisms politic in Cyprus as a part of international conjuncture.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **DEFINING NATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONCEPT**

The main goal of this chapter is to evaluate the existing theoretical approaches in nationalism studies and explain the theoretical framework it used. It illustrates for primordialism, ethno-symbolism, and modernism and explains the way it connects the international conjuncture to the politics of nationalism in Cyprus. It might be stressed that, all the nationalism theories have their own strengths and weaknesses. When compared to the modernist approach, the primordialist and ethno-symbolist approaches are less advantageous in examining the political aspects of nationalism in Cyprus. On the other hand, despite all its strengths in accounting for the political aspects of nationalism, the modernist point of view does not pay sufficient attention on the relationship between the international actors and conditions in shaping the domestic nationalisms. Therefore, this thesis does not strictly follow the existing nationalism theories.

The Cyprus conflict; one of the most important inter-communal disputes of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that was shaped in 1950's between Turkish and Greek Cypriots and could not have been solved until today. The Cyprus case could be compared to any other inter-communal conflicts in the world with similarities or sharp differences. By addressing antagonistic nationalist ideologies to our cases we will realize that, there are many other aspects shaping the conflict apart from the nationalism. In Cyprus two main ethno-religious groups lived together for many years in the same geographical area but a unique Cypriot identity and attachment did not flourish. Instead of togetherness, their sense of attachment in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries was in a form of attachment to Greece and Turkey.

The national consciousness and antagonistic nationalisms of the two communities were shaped particularly in 1950's. However, in shaping those nationalisms, international antagonisms did also play significant roles. The thesis attempts to analyze the Cyprus dispute in relation to political preferences of domestic nationalist leaders and political preferences of international actors. The thesis essentially argues

that the British authorities reacted according to British interests in the Mediterranean region. Likewise, other international actors (NATO, USSR, NAM) as well, focused primarily on their state's interests. The nationalist actors (particularly political leaders) in Cyprus were fed by the interests of international actors, and the interests of international actors were fed by the policies of nationalist actors in Cyprus.

## **2.1 Nationalism**

Particularly in the last two centuries of human history the political map of the world dramatically changed. Some states were dissolved, some others were founded. Since the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, in Western Europe and elsewhere, nation-states became the primary political organization model for the mankind. In many cases, we witnessed intra-state and inter-state wars caused by nationalism. In 20<sup>th</sup> Century, with the collapse of Empires, the end of colonial era and the termination of communist regimes, additional nation-states were founded.

Since the last quarter of 20<sup>th</sup> Century, nation-states were challenged by globalization, Europeanization and separatist or exclusionist ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, even though it faces with important challengers, nationalism is still a central political concept for contemporary states and their citizens. Nowadays, discriminative attitudes and skepticism against immigrants is a typical form of clash between globalization and nationalism.

In nationalism studies, three main-stream approaches prevail: '*Primordialism*', arguing that nationality is "given" to an individual via the natural process dating back to ancient times, '*Modernism*', suggesting that nationality is socially constructed and nationalism is a product of post-industrial (modern) era, and '*Ethno-symbolism*', synthesizing the different approaches of Primordialism and Modernism. This section of the thesis analyzes the different theoretical approaches within the field.

### **2.1.1 Primordialism**

Clifford Geertz, one of the founders of the 'primordialist approach', described the term 'primordial' as follows:

among individual primary that binds and when these bonds and is not configured to interact with, or given in advance as being born in the community, natural and blood, language, beliefs, attitudes, argued that it has a quality that continue to exist in natural match point such traditions (Özkırmı, 2000, p. 65; Bacova, 1998, pp. 33-34).

According to Geertz, ethnic, religious and linguistic features of mankind constitute his or her “primordial identities” that are “acquired” by birth. The continuity of the primordial ties is a historical process and the modern society continues to exist as an organic and modern extension of its ancestors. Race, ethnicity and language are amongst the main characteristics of national identities reflecting the “primordial” ties of individuals with their ancestors. Thus, nationality is a “given” characteristic shaped by primordial ties (Hasanov, 2014, pp. 82-87).

Walker Connor, another representative of the primordialist approach, defines nation as “a community of people coming from common ancestors”. According to him, ethnic ties are stronger than civic ties. Connor notes that the most significant indicators of this are the continuing the cases of ethnic conflicts (Conversi, 2003; Erözden, 1997, 64-66). The school of Primordialism explains the nation as an entity which was created long before the nation-states. However, nationalism might be regarded as a post-modern concept. Özkırmı suggests that, our “ties” are thought to us by construction of knowledge (Özkırmı, 2000, p. 83).

Primordialists assert that the nationality and all its elements are “given” to the individual with birth. A scholar of nationalism, Roger Brubaker describes primordialism as “a long-dead horse that writers on ethnicity and nationalism continue to flog” (Özkırmı, 2010, p. 67). On the other hand, Brass (1991) criticizes primordialism by showing the people who live in foreign countries and do not teach their native language to their children as an example. In such cases, many children do not intend to learn their mother’s or father’s language. Thus, it appears rather difficult to regard nationality as a “given” feature. When it comes to the analyzed period of time in Cyprus, primordialism fails to account for socio-political aspects triggering the ethnic conflict in Cyprus and shaping the nationalisms of the two communities. Furthermore, since it characterizes nationalism as a “biological” phenomenon, pays no attention at all to the international conjuncture.



Even though the central analytical focus of this thesis was concentrated on the period of 1945-1964; it also explained that the Ottoman and British rulers identified the two communities as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. In the British era (as explained in Chapter III), the number of schools in the island, as well as the literacy, dramatically increased. This enabled the two communities to improve their nationalist awareness and construct their national identities. Within the scholarship focused on the nationalism in Cyprus, there is hardly anyone claiming him or her to be a ‘primordialist’. Mavratsas (2000) and Evre (2004) are amongst the scholars following the Modernist line arguing that Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus emerged particularly during the British era. According to the scholars, in the construction of such identities, the intelligentsia played a crucial role by cultivating the cultural aspects of Greek and Turkish national identities. Therefore, ‘nationalization’ of societies and the construction of their national identities is a socio-cultural process, which can hardly be limited to their alleged ‘primordial nationalities’.

### **2.1.2 Ethno-symbolist Approach**

Anthony D. Smith is the leader of ‘Ethno-symbolist’ school. According to him, ethnic groups have for centuries maintained their ethno-cultural values such as religion, language, culture, customs, traditions, dressing, collective myths, collective memories and the belief of coming from common ancestries. The ‘ethno-symbols’ helped the ethnic groups to remember and secure those values. Additionally, the scholar argues that the ethnic groups identify themselves with specific territories. This creates an attachment towards their “homeland”. Ethnic groups, even when separated from the “motherland”, maintain their loyalty to it. And, particularly during confrontation with foreigners, ethno-centric attachments of group members towards each other, as well as towards their homeland, becomes more powerful. If the “homeland” is occupied by a foreigner, the members of the same ethnicity might aim to liberate the “homeland” and all the groups of same ethnicity from foreign rule. The next step might be the attempts on uniting the members of the same ethnicity under one state. He also emphasizes that, in many contemporary nations, some groups are trying to render their own ethnic cultures against the other groups within the same state, and many ethnic groups are in the process of ‘ethnic revival’ (Smith, 2002).

The Ethno-symbolist approach is often criticized by scholars who claim that it “underestimates the differences between modern nations and earlier ethnic communities” (Özkırımlı, 2010, p. 158). As Gellner (1983) notes, in the pre-Industrial era, there had been many different sub-cultures identified with towns and villages. People in different places, even in the same state, could hardly standardize the national cultures without the increase in literacy and the development in communication technology. In defending his theoretical considerations, Smith (2002) notes that the modern technology, industrialization, democratization, urbanization and the era of nation-states have certain effects in shaping nations and national identities. However, the scholar notes that the ethnic cultures had long been created before the modern era, and they were protected by ethno-symbols.

Based on the scholarship focused on the nationalisms in Cyprus, there has been a significant amount of scholars disproving the validity of Smith’s model of “homeland nationalism”. According to Smith (2002), ethnic groups maintain their attachment to their ‘ethnic homelands’. Kızılyürek (2005) and Loizides (2007) are amongst the scholars arguing that the socio-political attachment of the two communities to their “homelands” Greece and Turkey were diminished due to political developments. According to the scholars, in post-1974 era, some circles within the Turkish Cypriot community embraced a form of Cyprus-centered, instead of Ankara-centered nationalism. They were motivated to question their attachment to Turkey, particularly because of her political impositions. The scholars note that, for Greek Cypriots, the form of Cyprus-centered nationalism started in 1964, when Makarios ignored Athens’s preferences and rejected the Acheson Plan. In 1964, Makarios declared that he would not accept territorial concessions damaging the territorial integrity of Cyprus (see Ker-Lindsay, 2011) and this constitutes evidence that the forms of attachment to “homelands” might be politically constructed.

Another factor diminishing the validity of ethno-symbolist approach in the Cyprus case was the Kemalist modernization followed by Turkish Cypriots. Kemalist revolutions led to fundamental changes in Turkish culture (e.g. the “hat revolution”). According to Smith, dressing is amongst the most dominant factors of ethno-symbolism; however the modern Turkish nationalism, as well as its version in

Cyprus, abandoned the traditional fez, a typical ethno-symbol of Ottomans. In 1925, Turkish Cypriot intelligentsia indicated the “European hat” as a new ethno-symbol for their community, simply because they were determined to follow the Kemalist revolutions (Evre, 2004, p.66). Therefore, one might claim that the post-modern national identity constructions might utilize new ethno-symbols by abandoning the traditional ones, and this appears to be an advantage of the Modernist approach.

### **2.1.3 Modernism**

According to Ernest Gellner, the founder of Modernist School, nationalism is a post-modern concept which provides intra-group solidarity (Gellner, 1983, p. 19). The scholar notes that the urbanization, industrialization and the standardization of education made it essential for mankind to formulate a new socio-political model. The technological development, as well as the termination of feudalism, “high cultures” were standardized amongst the members of nations. In Gellner’s words, “high culture occupies the entire society” and “it defines and ensures the continuity of the state” (Ibid., p. 18).

Benedict Anderson, another representative of the modernist approach, argues that nations and nationalism are socially constructed by the modern societies and modern nation-states. The scholar argues that, the contemporary individuals “imagine communities”. That is to say, no person knows every single member of his or her nation. However, the members of the nation have in their minds an “imaginary” but collective socio-political destiny. This motivates them to have a form of socio-political attachment towards each other, their state and their territory (Anderson, 2006, pp. 6-7).

Eric J. Hobsbawm is another scholar of Modernist School. He notes that the nations “invent traditions” and formulate the intra-group solidarity. The increase in literacy level, imprint technology and standardized education had been the most important elements shaping the modern nations (Hobsbawm, 1990, p. 10). The scholar argues that nations and nationalism are products of “social engineering”. According to him, the nation-states create a code of ceremonial and symbolic values and practices for their citizens. Festivals, monuments and ceremonies are examples of “invented traditions”. Moreover, the scholar asserts that nationalism is a contract legitimizing

the exchange of labor and capital between different social classes (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pp. 1-13).

Paul Brass, who is also a modernist, denies that the nations have ‘primordial’ ties. According to him, nations and national identities are products of the post-modern era. Brass notes that, the national identities are created by ruling elites. Therefore, nationality is not a ‘given’ phenomenon (Özkırımlı, 2000, p. 110). According Brass, ethnic identity and modern nationalism were formed as results of interactions or conflicts between the leaders of central governments and the leaders of the ethnic groups that are not dominant in governance. These interactions and conflicts led the leaders to impose nationalism and identity to their ethnic groups (Özkırımlı, 2000, 113-114).

John Breuilly is another representative of Modernist School and defines nationalism as “a form of politics”. According to him, nationalism is a device of mobilizing the “nation” to own a state and enjoy its power by utilizing its political and economic resources. Firstly, each nation requires a national identity, separating it from the other nations. Secondly, the nationalism is a political approach privileging the values and interests of the entity named as the “nation”. Thirdly, each nation requires a sovereign nation-state and a sovereign territory (Breuilly, 1982, pp. 334-351).

Breuilly asserts that the nationalism is a methodology which legitimizes the struggles for independence, social mobilizations to found nation-states and inter-ethnic competitions. The sense of “national interests” motivates the member of the nation to share their sources voluntarily. About the ex-colonial territories in post-1945 era, the scholar argues that the ethnic conflicts were not caused by ethnic differences. Instead, they were caused by power politics identified in ethnic or national terms. The scholar underlines that the nationalist mobilizations, as well as the ethnic conflicts, had been phases of democratization processes in ex-Colonial societies since they mostly appeared in late de-Colonization or early independence eras. In other words, the scholar asserts that the nationalism cannot be conceptualized without connection to state, and the state cannot be conceptualized without connection to power politics. Additionally, each nationalist movement is organized either “for” a state or “against” a state (Breuilly, 1993).

As in the international scholarship focused on nationalism, studies inspired by the Modernist dominate the studies on nationalism in Cyprus as well. Mavratsas (2000), Kızılyürek (2002), Evre (2004), Nevzat (2005), Loizides (2007) and Kiralp (2015) noted that the nationalism in Cyprus and the national identities of the two communities were socially (or politically) constructed in the post-Modern era. This thesis reached to a similar conclusion. Turkish and Greek nationalisms in the island emerged during the British era.

In evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of Modernism in accounting for the Cyprus case, Gellner's (1983) assertion that nationalism is a production of modern societies appears to be valid. The two communities constructed their sense of nationhood, in a period of time (post-1878) when the literacy was increasing and the national education was being standardized. Anderson's (2006) theory, asserting that the nation is an entity having a socio-political attachment to its territory, might be claimed to remain inefficient about Turkish Cypriots' secessionism. The Turkish Cypriots' support to *Taksim* (partition) hardly constituted an attachment to a specific territory. To achieve the partition, many Turkish Cypriots would be asked to change places without knowing that where they would go. On the other hand, as explained in Chapter III, Greek Cypriots identified Cyprus as a historical and cultural extension of Greek nation-state, and opposed to its division. In 1964, that was apparent in Makarios's policies rejecting territorial concessions from the integrity of the island. Ironically, Turkish Cypriots had formed enclave regions and this constituted another threat to the island's integrity. However, Makarios made a distinction between the *de jure* and *de facto* conditions. For him, a *de jure* challenge to the territorial integrity of Cyprus was far more dangerous than a *de facto* one.

In regards to Breuilly's (1993) approach, it can hardly be denied that the two communities in Cyprus, as well as their leaders, conceptualized nationalism with relation to the state. The two communities wanted to be united with two nation-states (Greece and Turkey). In 1945-1964, Greek Cypriots tried to render Cyprus a Greek-ruled under in order to be dominant in their own country with their own national identity. They struggled against British and Turkish Cypriots for this purpose. Likewise, in the same period of time, Turkish Cypriots struggled against Enosis, since they opposed to have the status of "ethnic minority". Few years after the

foundation of the Republic of Cyprus, both communities directed their nationalist mobilizations “against” it. Nationalists on both sides were dissatisfied with the Republic since its status quo was contradictory to the central nationalist ideas (Enosis for Greek Cypriots and partition for Turkish Cypriots). Additionally, Breuilly was largely right in his assumption that ethnic conflicts caused by nationalism happen in democratization eras. The inter-ethnic violence inflamed by Greek and Turkish nationalisms in Cyprus happened in late Colonial and early post-independence years.

As discussed and explained above, the modernist scholars’ approaches on nationalism was to a great extent successful in explaining the births, developments and fluctuations of nationalisms in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the modernist scholarship as well, overlooks the relationship between the international conjuncture and the domestic nationalism. Therefore, to fulfill the analytical and theoretical requirements of this thesis, additional approaches are essential.

#### **2.1.4 International Aspects of Nationalism**

Within the literature of nationalism studies, the “international” aspect of nationalism remained, and might be claimed to still remain, under-theorized. Hinsley (1973) was amongst the rare scholars drawing attention to this gap within the literature. According to the scholar, nationalism and nation-states are the two main infrastructures of the existing global political system. Each nation becomes an actor within the international arena by establishing a nation state and exercising its political power. On the other hand, Suzman (2000) argues that, each nationalist mobilization requires some foreign states to support it. And, when the nationalist mobilization manages to establish an independent state, it requires recognition. Therefore, since the ethnic groups depend on other states to support their nationalist mobilizations, the relationship between the international conjuncture and their movements is a vital concept. In no case, an ethnic group attains full-support from the rest of the world in its nationalist struggle. The clashes of interest amongst states shape the alliances. Nonetheless, the ethnic groups utilize the international actors and the international actors utilize the ethnic groups.

According to Kaufman (1996), in cases of ethnic nationalism, different ethnic groups do not trust each other and the lack of trust prevents inter-ethnic accommodation. Furthermore, the ethnic groups do not trust the global political system since there is no optimum well-operating norms solving the national questions. Thus, ethnic groups require external allies against each other. On the other hand, Ellingsen (2000) notes that, in ethnic conflicts during the Cold War, while one major power supported an ethnic group, the other major power supported the other ethnic group. Thus, the international balances in ethnic conflicts were, to a significant extent, shaped according to the bi-polar system of world politics. Moreover, according to Mearsheimer (1990), in the Cold War era, major powers, as well as global and regional balances, were keeping ethnic conflicts, to some extent, within the framework of East-West or Communist-Liberal confrontation. Therefore, some scholars note that, studies on nationalism should not be free of an analysis on the international conjuncture and regional or global politics.

In this thesis, not only the ethnic communities of Cyprus and their nationalist movements, but also the international actors are observed in relation to Cyprus politics. Whether the nationalist actors in Cyprus utilized the international conjuncture, or the international actors utilized the nationalism in Cyprus (or both utilized each other) is questioned by this. This thesis reached to the conclusion that the nationalist movements in Cyprus had been inspired by global politics. Additionally, the nationalist leaders of Cyprus were dependent on international actors and the international actors were dependent on nationalist leaders of Cyprus.

As Hinsley (1973) and Suzman (2000) note, politics are nationalism are greatly dependent of international actors and international conjuncture. As explained in Chapter 3, the analyzed period of time constitutes the first two decades of Cold War. In 1945-1959, Britain lost a significant amount of its colonies and independent states were founded in ex-colonial regions (in Asia and Africa). That was a junctural card played by Greek Cypriots and Greeks in the pro-*Enosis* struggle. However, in the relevant period of time, they did not struggle for an independent Cypriot state. They struggled for Enosis. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey demanded the partition as an anti-thesis to Enosis. It is important to stress that, their nationalist

policies were activated when UK encouraged Ankara to play a more active role (in 1955) and not before (see Mallinson, 2010).

In 1945-1959, the Turkish and Greek nationalists in Cyprus indicated AKEL and Communism as a threat to Western values and interests. While Grivas repeatedly expressed that Enosis would eliminate the Communist threat in Cyprus, Denktas many times noted that the partition would liberate at least the half of Cyprus from Communism (see Chapter 3). Thus, the anti-Communist character of the two nationalisms in Cyprus was designed by Cypriot leaders to gain the support of Western front. The inter-ethnic violence in the island, as well as the upraising tension between Turkey and Greece led the leading states of NATO to motivate the sides to find a peaceful solution, basically to provide intra-NATO stability (see Kızılyürek, 2015).

In 1959, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes, and particularly Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, urged their ethnic relatives to sign the Zurich-London Treaties. It was not because the Turkish and Greek governments were no more nationalists. Instead, it was because that they were under junctural pressure. The US government was dissatisfied with the instability threatening the southern flank of NATO. On the other hand, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders hardly lost their nationalist desires in post-1960 era. Greek Cypriot leaders and community still had the idea of Enosis in their minds. Likewise, Turkish Cypriot leaders and community were expecting an opportunity to re-launch the pro-partition mobilization (see Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

In post-independence, there had been dramatic changes in the international conjuncture. First, the USSR decided to support anti-American mobilizations in Third World and non-aligned states. Second, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged as an important actor within the bi-polar world order. With the emergence of inter-ethnic violence in 1963, Greek Cypriots demanded restrictions on Turkish Cypriot veto rights and Turkish Cypriots demanded the federalization of the island. The two communities and their leaders did not abandon the desires for *Enosis* and *Taksim*. However, these two nationalist goals were hardly feasible in 1959-1964. USA and UK favored the “double-Enosis” (over 80% of the island to be left to Greece and a relatively smaller area to be left to Turkey). NAM favored the independence and



integrity of Cyprus with restricted Turkish Cypriot veto rights. USSR favored the federalization of the island (see Mallinson 2010).

USA and UK were after providing stability in the southern flank and eliminate the anti-Western tendencies represented by Makarios and AKEL. Additionally, Cyprus was vital in geo-strategic plans of NATO. USSR aimed to minimize the NATO influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and keep the Cyprus Conflict unresolved to damage the intra-NATO relations. So, Moscow approached to Ankara when the *Johnson Letter* was received by Inonu. On the other hand, NAM was trying to keep NATO away from the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, the majority of NAM states had multi-ethnic characters and they were trying to discourage ethnic separatisms. So, they were motivated for many reasons to support the integrity and independence of Cyprus (see Gülen, 2012).

In post-independence, the Greek government had assured to UK and USA that they were ready to “supplant” Makarios and pursue the “double-Enosis” policies. On the other hand, Turkish Prime Minister Inonu had expressed to NATO leaders that he could accept “double-Enosis” as a solution (see section 3.7). However, since Turkey was disappointed with the *Johnson Letter*, she started establishing constructive relations with USSR and this gave Turks the opportunity to be less dependent on NATO. At the end of the day, Turkey could accept a solution safeguarding her strategic interests over the island by impeding the unification of entire Cypriot territory with Greece. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot leaders characterized the federal solution as an initial phase of partition, while Makarios identified the restriction of Turkish Cypriot veto rights and preservation of Cyprus’s territorial integrity as initial phases of Enosis. Thus, both sides adjusted their politics of nationalism based on the international conjuncture.

It is also important to note that, even though the USSR was amongst the very rare actors supporting federalism in Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot leaders exerted all kinds of pressures on Turkish Cypriot leftists to discourage them from cooperation with Greek Cypriot communists. They had in mind to separate the two communities and they regarded inter-communal cooperation as “dangerous” for *Taksim*. Since Turkey established positive relations with USSR in post-1963 era, Turkish Cypriot leaders did not require tolerating Turkish Cypriot leftists. On the other hand, Makarios was a

priest and a sharp anti-Communist before the independence. However he cooperated with AKEL, in order to enjoy greater popularity at domestic level and gain Soviet support against NATO in preserving the sovereignty and independence of Cyprus. Makarios's tolerance towards Cypriot Communism is another indicator of international conjuncture's effects on politics regarding nationalism.

It is a fact that, the international conditions hardly account for nationalism as a socio-cultural attachment. However, there is an undeniable connection between international conditions and politics of nationalism. Therefore, we should analyze the international conjuncture to understand the politics of nationalism, if not the nationalism itself. In the case of Cyprus, the nationalist desires Enosis and partition could not be achieved in 1945-1964. What restricted them to achieve their nationalist goals was not the lack of nationalism. Instead, it was the junctural facts. As Suzman (2000) argues, each nationalist movement requires external support. And, in achieving international support, the nationalist movement might be asked to align its policies and interests with the policies and interests of global (or regional) actors.

Consequently, this thesis conceptualizes nationalism as a post-modern phenomenon which is connected to the international conjuncture and politics international actors. The following chapters shall examine the historical roots of the two nationalisms in Cyprus and question their relationships with the international conjuncture. The historical analysis starts with the Ottoman period and focuses particularly on the period 1945-1964.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS

In the previous chapter, the theories and approaches on nationalism were explained. The main-stream approaches were encapsulated. This chapter, starts briefly as an introduction from Ottoman period with a number of outstanding historical thresholds. Then, it shifts to British era with the British policies and attitudes on the island between 1878 and 1945. The last historical period, 1945-1964, is divided into two sections as internal actors and external (international actors) shaping the nationalisms in Cyprus.

#### **3.1 The Ottoman Period: 1571-1878**

On 1 August 1571, Ottomans conquered Cyprus. This conquest had can be economic, religious and strategic motivations (Özkul, 2005, pp. 35-36). After the conquest, as usual, Ottomans harmonized the new territories by their *millet*<sup>1</sup> system. The role of the ‘millet’ system is crucial due to the categorization of the *tebaa* (subjects). Ottoman subjects were categorized into two as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. In this system, Muslims are superior and *Zimmis* (non-Muslims) were the ones who needed protection for their lives, properties and the right to practice their own religious beliefs. Therefore the non-Muslim communities in Ottoman Empire were paying taxes in return for political rights (Jennings, 1993, p. 132).

In accordance to these politics, with the need of population in order to make the newly conquered lands more functional and productive; *fermans*<sup>2</sup> were sent to Anatolian districts to prepare the population transfer (Gazıoğlu, 1994, p. 100). Once the expected number of transferred people remained inadequate, the second wave of transfer was held (Çevikel, 2006, p. 76). Another massive migration happened in the

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<sup>1</sup> “Ottoman nation system was a synthesis of Turco-Islamic values. It provided socio-cultural and political law-and order based on Sharia. It also enabled different ethnic and religious groups to preserve their identities and beliefs (Kurtaran, 2005, p. 57)”.

<sup>2</sup> During the Ottoman period, the written orders of the Sultan were named as “ferman”.

18<sup>th</sup> Century because of epidemic diseases, famine and earthquakes forced many Anatolian inhabitants to change places (Hill, 1952, p.80).

In 1754, Sublime Porte (*Bâb-ı Âli*)<sup>3</sup> gave the title of “*Ethnarch*” (Head of the nation) to the Archbishop of Cyprus. Additionally, the Archbishop was given the right to have a direct contact with the Sublime Porte without intervention of the domestic Ottoman governor (Çevikel, 2006, p. 112). These additional rights were reflected in extra taxes charged to Christian Community. Beside these granted rights, there had been power competitions between Ottoman governors and Bishops (Ibid, p. 118-123).

In 1804, a group of Muslims rebelled against the Orthodox Church. After some incidents, the Governor Küçük Mehmet took repressive measurements terminating the authority of the Christian Orthodox clergy (Luke, 1921, pp. 127-130). When Greek War of Independence or the Greek Revolt started in 1821, it had significant influences over Cyprus as well (Purcell, 1969, p.93). 1821 was a hard year for Orthodox Christians in the island. Archbishop Kyprianos and some bishops were executed. The execution of Archbishop made Church even more powerful and effective over Cypriot Christians (Nevzat, 2005, pp. 64-65).

In 1827, Greece gained independence with the support of Britain, France and Russia (Stavridines, 1999, p. 10). The statesmen of this fresh state dreamed of the unification of all Greeks under one state by their liberation from Ottomans. Accordingly, unifying Cyprus with Greece (*Enosis*) had been amongst the inspirations of Orthodox-Hellenism. Having been neglected for centuries by the Ottoman authorities, poverty, taxations and some other reasons had led the Christians of Cyprus to embrace Enosis as a nationalist inspiration. The first Enosis pamphlet was published in Rome by a group of Christian Cypriots (Tolgay, 1996, p. 11).

In 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Ottomans were ruling Cyprus with the *Meclis-i Kebir* (Grand Assembly) and the *Meclis-i İdare* (Administrative Assembly). In these assemblies, the participation of different cities, towns and rural areas were provided (Gazioğlu, 1994, pp. 128-135). In 1873 *The Greek Brotherhood of Cypriots in Egypt* was

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<sup>3</sup> *Building of the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, government building, pasha door; the Ottoman Government.* Retrieved from <http://www.sozlukanlaminidir.net/babiali-ne-demektir/>

formed in order to create Hellenic consciousness, even if the Church was against such missionary organizations. The reason was simple: The Ottomans used the power of Church to control the Greek Cypriot community, and the Church used the power of Ottomans to lead the community. It is noteworthy that, there were 6-7 newspapers making publications in the favor of Enosis and no measures were taken against them (Varnava, 2009, p. 153).

In 19<sup>th</sup> Century, Russia became another danger threatening Ottoman territories. Britain's policy was to help Ottomans defending their territorial integrity since Russians could have obtained direct access to seas by capturing Ottoman territories. The Ottoman-Russian war continued for 6 years. This war ended with the *Kuchuk Kainarji* Treaty (Küçük Kaynarca) (July 21 1774). This agreement started the decline of the Ottoman Empire (Sander, 2007, p. 203).

Major Western states were anxious about the possibility that a single state could increase its influence by abusing the internal cleavages in the Ottoman Empire. So, in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> Century, they adopted a policy aimed at protecting the existing strategic equilibrium. All of the Western states knew that the Ottoman Empire would no longer stand with his own power. However, its dissolution would lead to major conflicts between the superpowers of Western realm. As mentioned earlier, till its alignment with Russia, Great Britain had aimed to protect the integrity of Ottoman territories. We could name the Balkans and the Aegean as the first front of conflict between Russia and Britain, where the Asia could be named as the second front. The clash of interests in Asia, and particularly in India, led these two states into confrontation. Russia had strategic interests in Asia and Britain had in India. The third potential front was Ottoman Middle East. Here we should realize that, in 19<sup>th</sup> Century, one of the superpowers of the world was Great Britain. On the last part of the historical perspective which is 1945 and afterwards, where Russia was still on the agenda but Great Britain was outshined by United States. In world politics, USA had different approaches when compared to Great Britain (Marshall, 1996, p.29).

The Suez Channel in Egypt was completed after ten years construction on 17 November in 1869. However, in 1875, the debt crises forced *Isma'il Pasha* (Ismail the Magnificent, Wali of Egypt) to sell the Egyptian shares to the British Government. The British maintained their influence over Egypt till 26 July 1956

when Egyptian Government announced the nationalization of the Suez Channel (Briney, 2014).

The Balkan Crisis during 1875 and the failure of 1877 Shipyard Conference had led to Ottoman-Russian War. The defeated Ottoman Empire and the victorious Russia signed the *Treaty of Agios Stefanos* on 3 March 1878. But with this covenant, Russia became completely dominant in Balkans and this alerted the Western powers. Russians reached to the southern sea in Bulgaria and constituted a threat against the British. On the other hand, Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and became dominant in continental Europe. Ottomans utilized these interest clashes and managed to have a new negotiation basis (*Treaty of Berlin*). As an exchange for the British aid against Russians, Ottomans left Cyprus to Britain (Şimşir, 2001). Ottoman Empire, with the Treaty of Berlin, alleviated the hard conditions of the Agios Stefanos Treaty and its presence in Balkans continued for a few more decades. According to Solsten, Ottomans had offered Cyprus as a base to Britain in 1833, 1841 and 1845, but the British rejected (Solsten, 1993, 20).

### **3.2 Cyprus under *de facto* British rule: 1878-1914**

Against the Russian threat, Western powers became more motivated in helping Ottomans. On 4 June 1878 the *Cyprus Convention* was signed by Ottoman and British authorities. According to the Convention, the British Empire accepted to pay Istanbul 92,799 British Pounds to Istanbul annually (Solsten, 1993, 20). On 4 July 1878 Admiral John Hay came to Larnaca and 12 July, the last Ottoman governor Besim Pasha submitted the administration of the island, which legally belonged to Ottomans till 5 November 1914 (Cavendish, 1991, 9). On 22 July 1878, General Garnet Wolseley arrived to Cyprus as the British High Commissioner.

A Sultan edict was sent to Cyprus and the Muslims of the island was discouraged from resistance against the British officials. The 308-years Turkish dominance in Cyprus was indirectly decreased, not to mention “terminated” (Gazioğlu, 2003, pp.1-30). According to the orders issued by the Council for British Royal Colonies, the High Commissioner in Cyprus would be appointed by London and would rule the island in cooperation with the Legislative Assembly (*Kavanin Meclisi*). In 1882, the Assembly had seven members: Four British and three Cypriots. Afterwards, the

structure of the Assembly was changed and it had nine Greek, three Turkish and six British members (Osmanlı İdaresinde Kıbrıs, 2000, p. 8; Evre, 2004, p. 31).

The administrative reforms had led to chaos at the early British era in Cyprus. Ottoman *Millet* system was terminated and all Cypriots were given equal rights based on the constitution. The ruling-elite (e.g. bureaucrats and clergymen) had lost their power due to the constitutional order. In Ottoman era, Muslim civil servants and clergymen of both communities had important privileges including tax exemptions. However, the British rule had diminished their socio-political status (Katsiaounis, 1996, p. 65).

Another set of fundamental reforms was realized in education. The British launched a process of modernization in Cypriot education. Before the British era, the education was supervised by religious institution. The British aimed to increase the literacy. In addition to Greek and Turkish classes, the curriculums of primary and elementary schools include English classes as well. The British was after teaching its own language to Cypriots. Moreover, to reduce the education expenditures, the British allowed domestic organizations to intervene in education. In 1880, around 500 Greeks came to Cyprus as teachers and they tried to spread the idea of “*dream nation*”. Furthermore, the *Greek Brotherhood of Cypriots in Egypt* was another important organization influencing the education system of Orthodox people in Cyprus (Nevzat, 2005, p. 108; Varnava, 2009, pp. 163-164; Hill, 1952, p. 497; Katsiaounis, 1996, p. 51).

The heavy taxes and low investments had dissatisfied the two communities at the beginning of the British era. The modern institutions established by the British created a sense of civilization conflict. Most importantly, the Legislative Council remained dysfunctional. All these factors increased the popularity of Greek nationalism amongst the Orthodox people of Cyprus (Hogarth, 1889, pp. 249-253). In 1890, Muslims founded their first political organization with the name *Kıraathane-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman Club). Its members were loyal supporters of the Ottoman Empire. When it comes to the Muslim intelligentsia in Cyprus, it is important to stress that the publications of *Young Turks* who supported Ottomanism in that period of time enjoyed greater freedoms when compared to the rest of Ottoman territories (Evre, 2004, pp. 46-48).

In April 1897, the war between Greece and Ottomans led the British to take measures in order to impede nationalist clashes in Cyprus. It was the time that the British realized that both communities had nationalist sensitivities. In 1903, the Orthodox Christian members of the Legislative Council tried to pass a bill foreseeing the unification of Cyprus with Greece in the future. Nevertheless, with the help of the British members of the Council, Turkish Cypriots blocked the Greek Cypriot bill and passed a bill foreseeing that the island would be returned to the Ottoman Empire (Gürel, 1985, pp. 47-48).

The *Türk Teavün Cemiyeti* (Turkish Welfare Association) was the first association in Cyprus making a reference to the identity of “Turk” (Evre, 2004, 43-48). On the one hand, the idea of Enosis enjoyed significant popularity amongst Greek Cypriots. On the other, Young Turks’ shift from Ottomanism to Turkism became popular amongst Turkish Cypriots. In the following years, two pan-Turkist associations, the *Terakki Kulübü* (Progress Club) and the *Hürriyet Kulübü* (Freedom Club) were established. They were united in 1909 with the name “Freedom and Progress Club” (Evre, 2004, 48).

### **3.3 Cyprus as a British colony: 1914-1931**

In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I, the tension in Cyprus upraised. The Ottoman Empire, aligned with Germany and Austro-Hungarian Empire, became an enemy of Britain, France and Russia. On 5 November 1914, Britain unilaterally declared that it annexed Cyprus. The Ottoman Empire could not take action and remained silent. The annexed Cyprus was formally offered to Greece by Britain in 1915. Britain wanted to gain Greece’s support. However, King Constantine wanted to remain impartial and rejected the British offer. In 1917, Greece joined the war on Britain’s side. At the end of the First World War, Greece was on the winners’ and Greeks of Cyprus celebrated the victory enthusiastically. After the World War, Greece expected Britain to open the way for Enosis, however she was disappointed (Gazioğlu, 2003, pp.45-96). In the inter-war period, the disaster of *Asian Minor*<sup>4</sup> was

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<sup>4</sup> Μικρασιατική καταστροφή (Mikrasiatiki Katastrophe) is a national tragedy for Greeks. The Greek army was defeated by Turks during the Turkish war of independence (1919-1922). Not only the military defeat, but also the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey caused the migration of the Greek population from Anatolia to Greece.



a threshold in Greek, Turkish and Cypriot histories. It buried the irredentist claims and hopes of Greece aimed at the unification of all ethnic Greeks under one state (Mavrogordatos, 1983, pp. 28-29).

In 1919, a committee of the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council, led by *Archbishop Kryllios* visited London and asked for Enosis. After the visit, the Turkish Cypriot community established the *Türkiye'ye İlhak Partisi* (Annexation to Turkey Party) led by *Dr. Hüseyin Behiç*. During Turkish War of Independence, Turkish Cypriots had provided economic aid to mainland Turks. Turkish nationalism had reached to the peak. Greek Cypriots organized a referendum in the Omorfo (Güzelyurt) district on 25 March 1921 for the unification with Greece. However their attempts were impeded by British authorities (Evre, 2004, 50-58).

According to the 1921 census, the population of the island was 310,709 people and the Muslims were around one-fifth of this amount (Solsten, 1993, p. 249). The Ottoman Empire was dissolved after the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923) and the Lausanne Treaty was signed on 24 July 1923. According to the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> articles of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey gave up all her rights on Cyprus. On 10 March 1925, Britain officially made Cyprus a “crown Colony” (Debeş, 1993, p. 22).

In late-1910s and early-1920s, Marxist-Leninist ideologies were introduced to people of Cyprus. In 1926 *Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου* (Communist Party of Cyprus) was established. At the beginning, the Cypriot communism had a bi-communal character. However, the right-wings of both communities wanted to suppress the Cypriot communism. For instance, the rightists of both communities had opposed to the bi-communal strikes of mine workers in 1948 (An, 2005, 51). CCP was against Enosis. They supported common struggle with Turkish Cypriots for an independent and socialist Cyprus. Cypriot communists had indicated the Church as the “collaborator of bourgeoisie”. Furthermore, they argued that church-owned land had to be given to farmers. On 1929 communists organized a huge strike against British companies. British authorities could not tolerate a communist movement in Cyprus because it would endanger the economic activities over the island. On 15 August 1933, the High Commissioner Sir Richmond Palmer banned CCP (Kıralp, 2015, pp. 43-44; Önel, 2015).

In 1925, the Consulate of the Turkish Republic was opened in Cyprus (Cicioğlu & Göktürk, 2014, p. 4). With the establishment of the Turkish Consulate, the date of Turkish victory against Greeks, 29 October, was started to be celebrated annually in Cyprus as well (Evre, 2004, p. 64). On 1 February 1925 *Kıbrıs Türk Cemaat-i İslamiyesi* (Turkish Cypriot Islam Community) was established. On 10 March 1925, Cyprus was declared as a Crown Colony and a set of administrative reforms was made. The High Commissioner was replaced by the Governor. The Executive Council and the Legislative Council (Kavanin Meclisi) were established. The Executive Council had four official and three civil members. The Legislative Council was headed by the Governor who was the President of the Council. The Council had twenty four members: Nine British officials and fifteen elected members (three Muslims and twelve Christians). The Legislative Council was not authorized to legislate. Its decisions were identified as “suggestions”. The Attorney-general, under-secretary, head of the financial and police department were members of the Executive Council (Solsten, 1993, p. 21).

Against the nationalistic thoughts growing amongst Greeks and Turks in the island, the British administration constructed the word “*Cypriot*”. However, with the demands of both communities, Muslims were referred to as ‘*Ottoman Turks*’ and Orthodox Christians as ‘*Greeks*’ in the British legal papers (Hasgüler, 2008, p. 2). The *Kemalist* reforms were done voluntarily in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriot intellectuals were rather rapid in defending the “hat reform” adopted by Kemalist Turkey. On 17 October 1925, Mehmet Remzi Okan wrote an article in newspaper “*Söz*” (Word) and asserted that the hat was not anymore a symbol of non-Muslims. I was the symbol of Kemalist Turks, and Turkish Cypriots had to wear hat in order to “look like their brothers in Turkey” (Evre, 2004, p. 66).

In 1930, Kavanin Elections were held and Kemalist leader Mısırlızade Necati Özkan’s *Halkçı Cephe* (People’s Front), using the myrtle tree as a symbol, defeated *Evkaf Murahhasi* (Evkaf Envoy) which used olive tree as a symbol and was led by *Metin Münür*. In 1931, Metin Münür was given the title ‘*SIR*’ (loyal to British Empire). In 1931, in a meeting held in Legislative Council, the British members tried to pass a bill regarding the customs. The proposal was rejected by thirteen to twelve votes. Turkish Cypriot Mehmet Necati (Necati Özkan) and twelve Greek Cypriots

voted against since they believed that the relevant law was likely to cause higher taxes. The nine British members and the remaining two Turkish Cypriot members voted for (Mallinson, 2010, pp. 10-11).

### **3.4 The rise of nationalism and Communism in Cyprus: 1931-1945**

On 22 October 1931, Greek Cypriots organized massive protests against British authorities in Nicosia. The protestors burned the Government House. There had been several injuries and six people were killed. Before the British authorities take the situation under control, the tension spread all over the island, and similar incidents occurred in 598 villages. After these developments, the British authorities immediately dispatched military reinforcements in the island. The Legislative Council of Cyprus was abolished and its power was shifted to the Governor of the Colony of Cyprus. The constitution of Cyprus was abolished too (Solsten, 1993, p. 22).

In 21 October 1931-14 April 1941, Cyprus was dominated by prohibitions. Many Greek Cypriots, including bishops, were sent to exile. All kind of political activities, flags and even the church bells were banned. These measures provoked more and led to the radicalization of the enotist tendencies. The political parties were banned and the municipal elections were suspended for unknown date. As a result, an *Advisory Council* was established in 1933 (Solsten, 1993, pp. 22-23).

On the other hand, after the uprising tension in 1931, the Governor of Cyprus became nearly a dictator and began to rule the country by decree. Inherently, “*every suppressed desire grows*”. Neither Greek Cypriots’ Greek Cypriots Enosis desires, as well as Turkish Cypriots’ dissatisfactions kept alive. On the other hand, the British authorities noticed the importance of the Orthodox Church for the Greek Cypriots. They tried to decrease the influence of the Church and they did not allow the exiled bishops to return back until 1947. Additionally, they made a law putting intra-Church elections under Governor’s control. From 1937 till 1946, the Governor was authorized to approve the results of intra-Church elections. In other words, the Church was indirectly put under Governor’s control, since the Greek Cypriot clergymen were indirectly forced to vote for moderate or pro-British men. As a result of that, political fights and enotist movements shifted to London and in 1937 the

*Committee for Cyprus Autonomy* was formed but could not be as effective as expected (Solsten, 1993, pp. 22-23).

On 23 November 1936, the Ministry of Colonies realized that, for the British presence in Cyprus, it was essential to “delay the growth of the desire for Enosis” (Kızılyürek, 2011, p. 35). In September 1939, the destiny of humanity dramatically changed. The Nazi-ruled Germany attacked on Poland, and, United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany. Italy invaded Greece in October 1940 but they failed to defeat Greeks. After their failure, the German army took over the Balkans including Greece. The rapid ‘*lightning storm*’ tactics eliminated the entire defensive system of Greece by April 1941. In May 1941, Greece was occupied of three different states: Germany, Italy and Bulgaria. Greek civilians faced with difficult living conditions and the Greek economy collapsed. Guerrilla groups resisted against the occupation. However in short-term these groups directed their guns against each other. In 1943, the confrontations between Greek guerilla groups led to a civil war (Woodhouse, 2002, pp. 53-84).

After the defeat of Germany, Franklin Roosevelt, Josef Stalin and Winston Churchill met in Moscow and negotiated the future of the Europe. The three leaders detected the influence areas of the superpowers. Roosevelt and Churchill asked Stalin to leave Greece under Western hegemony. The Soviet leader fulfilled their demand. Soon after this agreement, known as the *Treaty of Percentages*, Britain sent troops to Greece. However, the military presence of Britain in Greece did not bring the expected peace and stability. In a few years, the country went into an extremely destructive civil war once again (Woodhouse, 2002, pp. 169-202).

To gain the support of Cypriots during the war, British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, made statements and expressed that the Cyprus Question could be resolved in case Britain and her allies won the war. During the first few years of World War II, the British kept on restricting Cypriots’ rights and liberties. After October 1941, they allowed political demonstrations and establishment of political parties. In 1941, *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú* (Progressive Party of Working People - *AKEL*) was established. The party had a Marxist-Leninist ideological basis. The Cypriot Orthodox clergymen, merchants, *Panagrarian Union of Cyprus* (PEK) and

*Nationalist Peasant Association* were dissatisfied with the rise of Communism via this new party. In 1943, AKEL won the municipal elections in major cities like Famagusta and Limassol. In short turn, AKEL became one of the most effective political actors in Cyprus (Solsten, 1993, p. 27).

Communism became dominant in trade-unions as well. *Παγκυπριακή Εργατική Ομοσπονδία* (Pancyprian Federation of Labour - PEO) was founded as the syndical organ of AKEL. It became one of the most powerful trade-unions in Cyprus. The rise of Cypriot Left was significantly reflected in the victory of AKEL in 1947 municipal elections. AKEL's candidate won in Nicosia (the capital-city of Cyprus).

On 21 March 1943, Dr. Küçük in *Halk Parti* (People Party), with a nationalist stance, and Kemalist M. Necati Özkan were candidates for being members of Nicosia Municipality Council. Dr. Küçük, Necmi Avkıran, Şükrü Veysi and Necati Özkan were elected. The political activities of the relevant people showed that, the Turkish Cypriot community required a political organization for its representation. Sir Münir called for a meeting and 76 people came together. They established the *Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu* (Association of the Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus - KATAK) in order to protect the rights and interests of Turkish Cypriots. The Association's constitution comprised 30 articles. The Greek Cypriot desire for Enosis led Turkish Cypriot to cooperate with the British (Pinar, 2013). Ironically, the one who organized an association on behalf of Turkism was a "Sir" (Öztoprak, 2007, pp. 10-11). However, when the members of KATAK faced with intra-community disputes and conflicts, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leader of KATAK, formed *Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi* (KTMHP - Cyprus Turkish National People's Party) on 23 April 1944. The party's symbol was a 'wolf head' (Pinar, 2013).

On 27 December 1942 "*Türk Amele Birliği* – led by Niyazi Dağlı" (Turkish Labor Union); and on 15 August 1944 "*Güneş Türk İşçi Birliği* – led by Hasan Şaşmaz" (Sun Turkish Labor Union) were established. These unions joined forces on 15 October 1944 and they established the "*Lefköşa Türk İşçiler Birliği*" (Turkish Labor Union of Nicosia). On 23 December 1945, "*Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Birliği*" (Association of Turkish Cypriot Institutions) was established. It was composed of *Kıbrıs Türk İşçiler Birlikleri Kurumu* (Unions of Turkish Cypriot Labor), KATAK, *Milli Party* (Dr. Küçük's National Party), *Çiftçiler Birliği* (Farmers Union), *İşçi*

*Birlikleri* (Labor Unions) and *Muallim Cemiyeti* (Teachers Community) (Pınar, 2013).

### **3.5 Enosis versus *Taksim*: 1945-1959**

At the end of WW II, the British government started considering the decolonization of Cyprus. First, the Cypriot people were invited to the *Consultative Assembly* to shape a new constitution. The British authorities showed their goodwill by allowing the return of the persons who had been exiled in 1931. The intra-Church elections were liberated from Governors' control by the abolishment of 1937 law. In 1946, leftist prisoners were released. The British tried to moderate the systemic pressures on Enosis desires in order to restore their relations with Greek Cypriots (Solsten, 1993, p. 25).

In October 1947, Archbishop Leontios died and the Bishop of Kyrenia, Makarios II, was elected as the Archbishop of Cyprus. In November 1947, the British opened the Consultative Assembly. Turkish Cypriots, Maronites (a small group of non-Orthodox Christians in Cyprus) and AKEL sent their representatives, however the Church and Greek Cypriot right-wing, announced that they would not accept an agreement that would exclude Enosis and boycotted the Assembly. Additionally, the AKEL representatives demanded independence for Cyprus and this attitude rendered the Assembly dysfunctional. The Assembly was gathered with participation of eight AKEL members, one Maronite representative, two independent Greek Cypriot representatives and six Turkish Cypriots. Regarding the future of the colonial status quo in the island, Attorney General, Edward Jackson, declared that no formula of independence or self-governance was negotiable. This dispute led the Governor to suspend the Assembly until May 1948. In May 1948, the members of the Assembly were composed of eight elected Greek Cypriots, four elected Turkish Cypriots, the Colonial Secretary, Attorney General, Treasurer, and Senior Commissioner (Solsten, 1993, p. 25).

According to a new bill, Greek and Turkish Cypriot voters would be elected from the general lists. For Turkish Cypriot side, just the male adults were given the right to vote (Solsten, 1993, pp. 25-26). Turkish Cypriot women's right to vote would be debated at the Assembly. According to the bill, the speaker of Assembly, appointed

by the governor, could not vote. Nevertheless, the Governor was given the right to veto Assembly's decisions (Solsten, 1993, p. 26). In addition to this, for the laws regarding defense, finance, foreign affairs, minorities, as well as constitutional amendments; the Governor's approval was required. In 1948, the British offered autonomy to Cypriots, however Turkish Cypriots opposed to this idea since it could open the way for a process leading to unification of Cyprus with Greece (Solsten, 1993).

In 1950, the future President of Cyprus, Bishop of Kitium (Larnaca) *Μιχαήλ Χριστοδούλου Μούσκος* (Mihail Christodoulou Muskos - Makarios III) was elected as the Cypriot Archbishop (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 413). Meanwhile, AKEL, in order to be effective in Cyprus, cooperated with the anti-communist right-wing and began to support Enosis by giving up the idea of full independence (Solsten, 1993, p. 26). Greek Cypriots were moving only in accordance with their wishes without considering other ethnic groups on the island. At the beginning, AKEL had Turkish Cypriot supporters. However, in late 1940s and early 1950s, when the party shifted to a pro-Enosis line, it lost Turkish Cypriots' support (İsmail, 1992, p. 9). Turkish Cypriots required a political organization since the Greek Cypriot majority was exerting pressure on them and the British authorities were not taking necessary measurements.

Cyprus's elites focused on mainland (Greece and Turkey) nationalities in order to eliminate domestic identity (Cypriotism). They used all the nationalist tools they could. In their minds, without the nationalist attachments to Greece and Turkey, Cyprus was a '*useless*' piece of land. In 1948, Turkish Cypriot leaders managed to gather thousands of people for anti-Enosis protests. On 29<sup>th</sup> October 1948 '*Selimiye Square meeting*' and on 28<sup>th</sup> of November 1948 '*Agia Sofia meeting*' witnessed demonstrations of thousands of Turkish Cypriots. The main slogan in these demonstrations was: "*Autonomy is enslavement, Enosis is death, and we are asking fair British administration's continuation*". The first Cyprus demonstration in Turkey was held in Ankara in 25 December 1948 by youth of university students (An, 2005, 71-74).

The electoral campaigns were dominated by nationalist discourses. The campaign became a "being more nationalist" competition. In 1948 Lord Winster (Consular)

brought a new constitution. The majority of Turks favored the new constitution while the majority of Greeks opposed to it and demanded Enosis. British decided to pay more attention to Turkish Cypriots' representation and Judge Mehmet Zeka became the president of "Turkish Affairs Committee." In 1949 elections were held again. Dr. Küçük used '*Halkın Sesi*' (Voice of People) and Necati Özkan used '*İstiklal*' (Independence) to write daily articles in favor of *Turancılık* (pan-Turkism) and *Kemalism*. Many Turkish Cypriots who studied in Turkey came back with a strong sense of Turkism. On the other hand, CHP's MP Hasane İgaz and newspaper owner İffet Halim Oruz (Mothers of the Cyprus) came to Cyprus. It was the years of Turkish groups to visit Cyprus. Naim Pınar explains the whole story in a series of article and gave a headline as "*Big fight, small reason* (Küçük)" (Pınar, 2013).

In 1946, with the initiative of the *Kıbrıs Okullarından Yetişenler Cemiyeti* (Association of Graduates of Cyprus Schools), Turkish associations in Cyprus were merged under the umbrella of the *Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* (Cyprus Turkish Institutions Federation) on 8 September of 1949. This federation had a passive stance and at the beginning it lacked organizational effectiveness. However, in the forthcoming years, it became a political center defending Turkish Cypriot rights against Greek Cypriots and the British. In late 1940s and early 1950s, Turkish Cypriots started to ask for support from Turkey in their national struggle.

On 17 December 1949, Turkey's Foreign Minister Necmettin Sadak, made a statement and expressed that the presence of Britain in Cyprus was justified by the Treaty of Lausanne and the British had no intention to leave Cyprus. On 23 January 1950, he made another statement and said that "*there [was] no Cyprus Question*". On 14<sup>th</sup> of May 1950 the results of the elections made the Democratic Party came to power and Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü, on 20 June 1950 made a statement on the Cyprus issue. "*There is no such issue*" he said (Özakman, 2012, p. 58). These speeches should be considered based on 1950s international conjuncture. Without taking pro-Western foreign policy into account, these speeches make no sense.

Meanwhile, the Church of Cyprus strengthened its control over the Greek Cypriot community and concentrated their activities on Enosis. It also directed the public opinion against AKEL and Communism. The Church's political position became even more powerful when Archbishop Makarios II died in 1950 and Makarios III



became the new Archbishop of Cyprus Church (Solsten, 1993, p. 27). Makarios III, with his good educational background, came to this position at a very young age (when he was 37 years old). In his time, the desire for the Enosis was at the highest level.

When he was the Bishop of Kitium, on 15 January 1950, he had launched a signature campaign (*plebiscite*) in churches for Enosis. The 96 % of the participants had voted for the Enosis. 215,108 out of 224,759 (95,70 %) had voted for unification with Greece (Solsten, 1993, pp. 26-27; An, 2005, p. 78). The results of the plebiscite at the Church and a petition written for Enosis, was taken to the Greek Parliament but because of the pressures from London, the Greek government could take no action. On 3 July 1950, the results of the plebiscite were unofficially delivered to Greek Parliament. According to Greek Politician George Papandreou, in that period of time Greece had two lungs to breath: UK and USA. Thus, she could not dare confronting the two main powers of the Western alliance (Drushotis, 2007, pp. 40-41). However, Greek Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos (son of ex-Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos) aimed to render Enosis a national policy of Greece, at least in long term (Solsten, 1993, p. 27). When Makarios III was elected, he sworn that it will not rest until Enosis was achieved and he did everything to keep this oath. The results of the plebiscite for Enosis were delivered to United Nations as well. The main argument was, Cyprus had to be given the Self-Determination right.

In February 1951, Makarios went to the UN to urge Britain to leave Cyprus. However, the British side expressed that the Cyprus issue was an internal issue and it did not interest the UN (Solsten, 1993, p. 27; Gürel, 1985, 62-68). Enosis found large support in Greece. The ultranationalist Greek Cypriot Colonel George Grivas, who had fought against Greek communists in the civil war and against Turks in Turkish War of Independence, took action. Grivas was the leader of the extreme nationalist and anti-Communist underground organization "X". He had previously fought against Turks and Communism. And, in mid 1950s, he found a new enemy to fight: The British. Grivas met Makarios and they discussed about the methodology of the Enosis struggle (Solsten, 1993, p. 27-28).

Makarios thought that the extremism of Grivas was unlikely to bring solution. Makarios wanted to activate UN with diplomatic efforts; however Grivas's

methodology was based primarily on violence. On the other hand, the growing tension in Cyprus created problems between the two NATO members Greece and Turkey. Meanwhile, in Athens a meeting under the name of '*Independence Committee*' showed that the Church of Cyprus and Greece would join forces for the pro-Enosis struggle. Grivas and Makarios were forced to have a reluctant cooperation, which actually constituted the basis of their never-ending rivalry (Solsten, 1993, pp. 27-28).

In July 1954, British Colonial Secretary Henry L. Hopkinson made a speech at the House of Commons and said that: "*There are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their peculiar circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent*". UK's reluctance to leave Cyprus angered the supporters of Enosis (Solsten, 1993, p. 28). On 17 December 1954, Greece wanted the UN General Assembly to negotiate the future of Cyprus. Britain rejected this demand by declaring that Cyprus was legally a part of Britain. Turkey also declared that Cyprus was legally under British rule, and, if the British had the intention to leave Cyprus, it had to be left to Turkey as the successor of Ottoman state. Consequently, the General Assembly refused to negotiate the Cyprus Question (Firat, 2007, pp. 597-598).

Greece's attempt to provide self-determination for Cyprus was rejected. In case of withdrawal of British, according to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, the island had to be returned to Turkey. This request contradicted to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne since Turkey had given up all her rights on Cyprus. After 1954, Turkey became an actor in Cyprus Question as well. She was led to involve in the issue particularly due to the Enosis demands. Meanwhile, the British Colonial administration tried to discourage the Enosis supporters by threatening them with five-year prison sentence. However, even the Archbishop did not take this treat into account and he kept of propagating for the Enosis. The British could not punish the supporters of Enosis. Meanwhile, Grivas arrived secretly to Cyprus and started organizing guerilla groups (Solsten, 1993). The failure of UN to take initiative led Greek Cypriots to rebel. When he came back to Cyprus after the UN General Assembly, Makarios reached to a settlement with Grivas for the pro-Enosis struggle. Grivas organized the EOKA (*Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών*- National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and the armed struggle began (Solsten, 1993, p. 30).

On 1 April 1955, EOKA launched the violent resistance against the British rule. Government buildings in Nicosia, Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol, as well as British military targets and the radio station in Nicosia were attacked by EOKA. It was also blown up a radio station in Nicosia. After 1958, EOKA attacked on British civilians, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots who helped the British. At the beginning, Grivas had invited Turkish Cypriots and AKEL to not to create troubles for the national struggle. He also issued an announcement by stressing that “Communism had no position in national struggle”. He mentioned that, no British, communist or Turk would be hurt by EOKA unless they created trouble for the national struggle. Additionally, he expressed that he characterized Turkish Cypriots as “compatriots” whose rights (actually minority rights) would have been respected once the island was unified with Greece (Solsten, 1993, p. 30).

Meanwhile, Britain made some regulations on the island. On 30 June 1955 assigned the administration of *Awqaf* (Evkaf) by fifteen Turkish Cypriots under the name “*High Council*”. The Council was headed by Dr. Fazıl Küçük who was as elected president (İsmail, 1992, p. 14). In 1954, Turkish Cypriots founded the organization ‘*Volkan*’ (Volcano) to defend themselves (Solsten, 1993, p. 28). On 30 June 1955, the British government invited Turkey and Greece for a conference about the defense of Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus Question. On 24 August 1955, against EOKA attacks, Prime Minister of Turkey, Adnan Menderes, gave a note to Britain. On 31 June 1955, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden made a speech at the British Parliament and declared that UK would invite Greece and Turkey to a tripartite conference to negotiate on the Cyprus Question (*Milliyet*, 1 July 1955, p.1). In August 1955, Turkey accepted to participate at the London Conference. Greece was reluctant to be present at the Conference due the opposition of Greek Cypriots. Makarios knew that the British were trying to push Turkey to be a part of the game. However, at the end, Greek Foreign Minister went to London (Solsten, 1993, p. 30).

On 6-7 September, while the Conference was ongoing, a bombing attack was made against Atatürk’s (the first President of Republic of Turkey) house in Thessaloniki. This attack inflamed the anti-Greek nationalism in Turkey, and, particularly in Istanbul, there had been massive attacks against Greeks’ properties. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes declared martial law and assigned the army to take the situation

under control. With the crisis in Turkey, the London Conference failed. Greece recalled her representatives at NATO headquarters in Turkey. This was a significant tension damaging the relations of two NATO states. It is essential to note that, the bombing attack had been organized by the Turkish government itself (Solsten, 1993, p. 31).

In October 1955, the ex-Commander-in-Chief of British Military Staff, Marshal John Harding, was appointed as the Governor of Cyprus. As soon as he arrived to Cyprus, he met with Makarios. He offered Makarios huge investment and development plans to motivate him to moderate the Self-Determination demands (Drushotis, 2007, pp. 173-178). Harding wanted to keep the internal order in Cyprus under control, whereas Grivas wanted a policy that would have no impact on the EOKA. Harding declared emergency in November and prohibited strikes and demonstrations. He announced that those carrying illegal weapons could be given death penalties. British troops took additional measures in their battle with EOKA (Solsten, 1993, p. 31).

In January 1956 talks between Harding and Archbishop Makarios began. Both accused each other. Makarios, Bishop of Kyrenia and two other priests were sent into exile to the *Seychelles Islands*. EOKA attacks continued in the absence of the Archbishop and the leadership of Enosis struggle was undertaken by Grivas (Solsten, 1993, p. 31). In July 1956, the British government appointed lawyer Lord Radcliffe to the constitutional reform office as a commissioner. Radcliffe's proposal was presented in December. His proposal foresaw legislative reforms and a set of measures protecting the rights of Turkish Cypriots. Turkey accepted the plan but Greece and Makarios opposed to it (Solsten, 1993, p. 31). While the UN committees were working for a resolution formula, USSR and Egypt made it clear that they were supporting Greece's self-determination demand for Cyprus (*Milliyet*, 15 November 1956, p.1). On 14 December 1956, at the meeting of NATO Prime Ministers in Paris, it was agreed that the alliance should provide mediation for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute (*Milliyet*, 15 December 1956, p.3).

During the negotiations, on 19 January 1957, Dr. Fazıl Küçük and Faiz Kaymak decided to prepare a counter proposal for the so-called "*Radcliffe Constitution*". With the request of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, a committee was established. Prof. Dr. Nihat Erim and Assoc. Dr. Suat Bilge came to Cyprus. The committee was led by

Nihat Erim (İsmail, 1992, p. 14). On 18 March 1957, the British government decided to release Makarios, if he made a statement discouraging the violent activities of EOKA and accepted to not to return to Cyprus for a while. At the Council of Ministers gathered on that day, there was an agreement to rise up partition as a solution formula and try to get rid of the Cyprus Problem before the forthcoming elections (CAB, 195-16-19).

After the British message was delivered to Makarios, he made a statement and invited the Colonial administration to terminate the emergency rule and asked EOKA to stop violence. That did not match exactly to what the British asked, but in April, Makarios was given permission to leave the Seychelles. Since he was not allowed to return to Cyprus, and he went to Athens (Drushotis, 2005, pp. 231-233; İsmail, 1992, p. 19). EOKA in Cyprus continued its terrorist activities while Makarios once again went to the UN to activate the auspices for negotiations on the Cyprus issue. Governor Harding retired and left the task to the new Governor Hugh Foot (Solsten, 1993, p. 31).

During the negotiations, EOKA accelerated its violent activities. In 1957, the British recruited additional Turkish Cypriot police officers to fight against EOKA. This caused inter-ethnic bloodshed (Kızılyürek, 2015). On 26-27 November 1957, Turkish Cypriots under the leadership of Rauf Denktaş, Kemal Tanrısevdi and Burhan Nalbantoğlu formed the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT- Turkish Resistance Organization) with the help of Turkey, as a reaction to the continuation of EOKA activities (Tolgay, 1996b, p. 25). TMT after that date, tried to ensure the security of the Turkish Cypriots and it became an important political actor. In the first days of 1958, the conflict between Greeks and Turks sharpened and inter-ethnic violence emerged. Additionally, the tension between Greece and Turkey increased. Grivas encouraged Greek Cypriots to boycott British goods all around Cyprus and EOKA made sabotages (Holland, 1998).

On 1 May 1958, at the Council of Ministers, the British government decided to offer a form of tripartite governance in Cyprus to Greece and Turkey. In the relevant meeting, the British leaders mentioned that they could “abandon Cyprus which was of declining strategic importance”. However, they also expressed that withdrawing from the island at such a critical international conjuncture would “gravely affect their

prestige in the Middle East” (CAB, 128-32-36). In June 1958, British Prime Minister *Harold Macmillan*, prepared a proposal known as the *Macmillan Plan*. According to the plan, the island’s administration would be shared by UK, Greece and Turkey. Greece and the Greek Cypriots rejected this proposal by asserting that it was a partitionist proposal. In actuality, Turkey and Turkish Cypriot leadership supported *Taksim* (the partition and share-out of the island by Greece and Turkey). On 16 June 1958, the Turkish Parliament passed a resolution and approved the pro-*Taksim* policies of Menderes government (Fırat, 2007, pp. 603-607). Turkish and Greek officials met in December 1958 to negotiate the future of the island (Solsten, 1993, p.32; Osmanlı İdaresinde Kıbrıs, 2000, p. 31). The two states negotiated formulas of an independent Cyprus, instead of Enosis and partition (*Taksim*).

### **3.6 Cyprus: “No one’s” Republic (1959-1964)**

The talks between the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey in Zurich in February 1959, created a perspective favoring independence. In 11 February 1959, the 27-point *Zurich Agreement* was signed between Great Britain, Greece and Turkey. The Republic of Cyprus was designed as a bi-communal power-sharing democracy. The three states became the guarantors of Republic of Cyprus. Makarios made certain objections to agreement in London but he was blackmailed by Constantine Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece, to sign the treaties. According to the Zurich and London agreements the establishment of the Republic was approved on 19 February 1959. Then the *Treaty of Establishment*, the *Treaty of the Guarantees* and the *Treaty of Alliance* were signed and these treaties constituted the basis of the Constitution of the *Republic of Cyprus* which was officially established on 16 August 1960 (Solsten, 1993, p.32).

After the treaties, Makarios returned to Cyprus and Grivas returned to Greece. During the last years of the British administration in Cyprus, there had been huge investments in infrastructure of Cyprus. Roads were modernized and access to cities, towns and villages were enabled. However, there had been no investments in industry and Cypriots were made dependent on British exports. Additionally, the separate educational institutions of the two communities constituted the central footholds of Turkish and Greek nationalisms in the island (Olsten 1993, p. 23).

After signing the agreement on 2 April 1959, a transitional government was established in Cyprus. According to the Constitution of Cyprus, a Greek President and a Turkish Vice-President were being the Chief-Executives. The Council of Ministers would have seven Greek and three Turkish members. The Greek President and the Turkish Vice-President would be elected separately by their own communities. The House of Representatives would have 50 members, 35 Greeks and 15 Turks. The Greek members would be elected by Greeks and the Turkish members by Turks (Solsten, 1993, pp. 32-33). In legislation, particularly on issues regarding taxation, two separate majorities were essential for the approval of bills. Thus, Turkish Cypriot members of the House were given the right to veto the Greek Cypriot majority (Kıralp, 2015, pp. 33-34, 65-68). According to the Treaty of Guarantees; Turkey, Greece and UK had the right (and the duty) to preserve the territorial integrity and constitutional order of Cyprus (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 415).

On 16 August 1959, the state of Republic of Cyprus was established by a formal ceremony. According to the constitution, Turkish Cypriots would comprise the 30% of civil servants, and the remaining 70% would be Greek Cypriots. Additionally the 40% of security forces would be Turkish Cypriots and the remaining would be 60% Greek Cypriots. The members of the House of Representatives of both communities were authorized to provide financial aid to their communities by utilizing the government budget. This constituted another source of conflict between the elites of the two ethnic groups. In accordance with the Zurich-London Treaties, Greece deployed 950 troops and Turkey deployed 650 troops in Cyprus. Based on the relevant treaties, UK was given two Sovereign Base Areas: One in *Dekelia* and the other in *Akrotiri* (İsmail, 1992, pp. 21-30).

According to Glafcos Clerides, ex-Greek Cypriot leader, the flag of Cyprus was the “most innocent flag” in the world “because no one died for it” (Loizides, 2007, p.172). While Greek Cypriots were mobilized to unify Cyprus with Greece, Turkish Cypriots struggled to unify a part of Cyprus to Turkey. Thus, the nationalisms in Cyprus were not inspired by the island. They were inspired by Greece and Turkey.

The Republic of Cyprus, for both communities, was nothing but a *modus vivendi*<sup>5</sup>. In post-independence, the two communities preserved their nationalist desires and the bi-communal structure of the Republic was destroyed in three years.

On 9 December 1959, Makarios was elected as the first President. Greek Cypriot nationalists accused him of betraying Enosis. Furthermore, AKEL was dissatisfied with the deployment of NATO soldiers in the island, as well as the base areas of UK. In Presidential elections, Giannis Clerides was the rival of Makarios. The first gained 33% of Greek Cypriot votes while the latter gained over 66% and won the elections. Clerides was supported by AKEL. Fazıl Küçük was elected Vice-President without any rival candidates. The first general election for the House of Representatives was held on 31 July 1961. Out of the 35 seats allocated to Greek Cypriots, 30 Makarios supporters and 5 AKEL candidates won. Turkish Cypriots' 15 representatives were supporters of Küçük (Solsten, 1993, p. 33).

The Constitution was officially put into force on 16 August 1960, on the day of establishment of the fresh state. A month later, the new republic became a member of the United Nations. In 1961, Cyprus joined the *British Commonwealth of Nations*, *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) and *World Bank* (Solsten, 1993, p. 33-34). Cyprus, after being a member to the UN, whenever a problems held between Turks and Greeks; the UN was involved in every issue.

President Makarios was dissatisfied with the veto rights granted to Turkish Cypriots. He knew that the NATO alliance was unlikely to support any constitutional amendment dissatisfying Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. He wanted to gain support of the Non-Aligned Movement for his future plans. In September 1961, he made Cyprus a member-part of NAM. Even though Küçük was totally against the Non-aligned stance in international politics, he tolerated Makarios's move since he knew that the NATO would be more skeptical against the Archbishop (Clerides, 1989, pp. 124-125). In October 1961, Makarios prepared a bill foreseeing the unification Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces in the army. Küçük vetoed him on 20 October 1961 and asked for separate military forces (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 415). The

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<sup>5</sup> An arrangement that helps people, groups, or countries work together peacefully even though they do not agree with each other. Retrieved from <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/modus%20vivendi>.



distribution of positions as civil servants (particularly the 7/3 ratio) and the contributions of the two communities to total tax revenues were other factors causing inter-ethnic disagreements (Kıralp, 2015, pp. 33-34, 65-68). More importantly, there was lack of consensus on municipalities as well. The Turkish Cypriot side demanded separate municipalities in large cities (as foreseen by the constitution) while the Greek Cypriot side refused to separate the local governance. In December 1962, the Turkish Communal Assembly prepared a bill foreseeing the establishment of Turkish municipalities in large cities. Makarios characterized this as a “partitionist” move. The issue was conveyed to the Constitutional Court. The Court decided that the Turkish Cypriots had the constitutional right to have their own municipalities in large cities. However, Makarios ignored the Constitutional Court and insisted on united municipalities (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 416).

The Constitutional Court decided in favor of Turkish Cypriots, but Greek Cypriots launched a campaign against its decision. The President of the Constitutional Court German Prof. Ernst Forsthoff and his Secretary Dr. Christian Heinze were forced to resign (Osmanlı İdaresinde Kıbrıs, 2000, p. 33; Manisalı, 2002, p. 41-43). During the constitutional crisis, the paramilitary organizations of the two communities were in preparation for armed confrontation. The paramilitary groups secretly imported weapons from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, the forces of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus supported these groups. Minister of Interior, Πολύκαρπος Γεωργιάδης (Polycarpus Georgadjis), prepared an action plan known as the ‘*Akritas Plan*’. According to the plan, Turkish Cypriots, as a minority, had obtained unacceptable advantages. So, the Greek Cypriot leadership needed to convince the world opinion that the government was dysfunctional. First, the constitution had to be amended and the Turkish Cypriot veto rights had to be restricted. Then the *Enosis* had to be proclaimed. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriots were likely to reject the changes on the constitution, and their potential resistance would be eliminated by Greek Cypriots in “one day or two”, without causing external intervention (Solsten, 1993, p. 34-35).

On 30 November 1963, Makarios demanded constitutional amendments at thirteen articles. The amendments foresaw the restriction of Turkish Cypriot veto rights. On Turkish Cypriots and Turkish government strongly opposed to his proposals. At the British Council of Ministers on 19 December 1963, there was a significant anxiety

about further deterioration of the situation in Cyprus (CAB, 128-38-14). On 21 December 1963, inter-ethnic violence broke out. Turkish armed group TMT took a number of Greek Cypriots as hostages. Paramilitary groups of Polycarpus Georgadjis, Nicos Sampson and Vasos Lyssarides (ex-leaders of EOKA) launched massive attacks against Turkish Cypriots. Turkish forces located in the island occupied the St. Hilarion Castle, a strategic point which enabled them to dominate the road to Kyrenia (Bölükbaşı, 1998, p. 416).

Turkey urged Britain to take forcible action for the restoration of the constitutional order. Turkish Government had no confidence in the British stance and threatened London to take independent action. Turkish officials told the British that they were planning to use military force in the island to materialize the partition. At the Council of Ministers gathered on 26 December 1963, the British leaders agreed on the potential inefficiencies of a tripartite (UK, Greece, Turkey) intervention was unlikely to restore the constitutional order. Therefore, a political solution was also essential (CAB, 129-115-34).

Turkish Cypriots, living in different parts of the island, worried about their lives and left their villages to settle in enclave areas where TMT provided security. In 1963-64, with the settlement of Turkish Cypriots in enclave regions, the two communities were psychically separated from each other. Vice President Fazıl Küçük, Turkish Cypriot ministers, Turkish Cypriot members of House of Representatives and Turkish Cypriot civil servants abandoned their positions. On 25 December 1963 Turkish Air Forces realized a warning exhibition over Cyprus and a ceasefire was declared. On 29 December 1963, the British forces entered the area today known as the *Green Line*<sup>6</sup>. The incidents in Nicosia signaled the beginning of the partition of Cyprus (Osmanlı İdaresinde Kıbrıs, 2000, p. 35).

On 15 January 1964 in London; UK, Greece, Turkey and representatives of the two communities in Cyprus met to negotiate the future of the island. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots demanded the federalization of the island by a territorial adjustment providing the security of Turkish Cypriots. However, they still had the *Taksim* as a nationalist inspiration in their minds. On the other hand, Greece and Greek Cypriots

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<sup>6</sup> British Major-General Peter Young had used a green pencil to draw the cease-fire line on the map of Nicosia.

demanded the restriction of Turkish Cypriot veto rights via a set of constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, they still had *Enosis* as a nationalist inspiration in their minds. The British offered the sides to deploy NATO peacekeeping forces (composed of Greek, Turkish and British troops) in Cyprus. Turkey, Turkish Cypriots and Greece accepted this offer but Makarios rejected. Consequently, the London Conference failed to produce any solution. On 18 February 1964, UN Secretary General U-Thant offered to deploy peacekeeping forces in Cyprus. On 4 March 1964, with the UN Security Council Resolution 186, the peacekeeping forces were sent to Cyprus. Additionally, Makarios government was recognized as the legitimate and official government of Cyprus, despite the absence of Turkish Cypriots in executive and legislative branches (Solsten, 1993, pp. 35-36).

In April and May 1964, even though the UN forces were operational, there had been violent clashes between two communities. Not only the members of armed groups killed each other, but also unarmed civilians were murdered. On 4 April 1964, Makarios unilaterally abolished the Treaty of Guarantees. However, the other states (UK, Turkey and Greece) did not follow his decision and his move remained ineffective (Vatansever, 2010, pp. 1507, 1510).

In June 1964, the House of Representatives, in the absence of its Turkish Cypriot members, passed a bill and formed the *Εθνική Φρουρά* (National Guard) as the official and national army. General Georgios Grivas was appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the army. The National Guard was composed of Greek Cypriot soldiers. Turkey was in preparation of a military intervention in Cyprus. They decided to launch the intervention on 7 June 1964. However, on 5 July 1964 the US President Lyndon Baines Johnson sent a letter to Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu. Johnson expressed to the Turkish leader that if USSR retaliated, NATO would have no responsibility to help Turkey. Additionally, Turkey could not launch such a military campaign without NATO's approval. The letter managed to discourage Ankara to proceed to the intervention (Gülen, 2012, pp. 409-413).

The famous Johnson Letter directed the Turkish public opinion against Washington and damaged the Turkish-American relations. The effects of the letter are discussed in the next section in broader details. However, Soviets were not late to declare that they would help Makarios to defend Cyprus in case of a foreign invasion (Hale,

2000, p. 156). On 10 July 1964, the former US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was appointed by the US government as a mediator to the Cyprus Conflict. On 14 July 1964, Acheson met Greek and Turkish representatives in Geneva and introduced them the plan he had prepared for the resolution of the conflict. According to the *Acheson Plan*, Turkey would be provided a base area in the peninsula of *Karpasia*, the Aegean island *Kastellorizo (Kızılhisar)* would be left to her and the remaining parts of Cyprus would be left to Greece. Turkish Cypriots living under Greek rule would be provided their fundamental human rights under supervision of UN committees. Makarios was the first person to oppose to the plan. In his statements, with reference to *Karpasia*, “no Greek land can be left to Turkey” he said (Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.39-40).

During the negotiations, on 6 August 1964, the National Guard attacked on the Turkish Cypriot village Erenköy (*Kokkina*) and the talks failed. On 8-9 August 1964, Turkish Jets attacked on the Greek Cypriot forces around Erenköy (*Kokkina*) and Morphou Bay. This led USA and UK to ask UN to provide a ceasefire (Gülen, 2012, pp. 416-417).

After the ceasefire, the sides met again in Geneva. On August 1964, the second version of Acheson plan was offered. The Turkish side rejected the plan and told to US Ambassador that the first version was more preferable to Turkey. On the other hand Greece accepted the plan. However, Makarios strongly opposed to “leave Greek lands to Turkey, even in sake of Enosis”. On 31 August 1964, the US representatives left Geneva and the talks failed once more. In 1964-65, NATO attempts to divide Cyprus was maintained. However, Makarios enjoyed overwhelming support from the NAM and managed to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus (Gülen, 2012, pp. 417-418).

### **3.7 Nationalism in clamp of international conjuncture: 1945-1964**

Hobsbawm (1990) notes that, the anti-colonial independence struggles in colonial societies after WW II constituted a “wave of nationalism”. At this point Cyprus was no exception. The people of the island, particularly Greek Cypriots, launched their pro-*Enosis* struggle in the era of de-Colonization. More importantly, the politics of

nationalism in Cyprus had been influenced, and to a great extent designed according to the politics of NATO, USSR, NAM, and the Cold War in general.

In World War II, the Nazi nightmare was suffocated by the Soviet-American alliance. After the war, the major-powers of the new era reshaped the world politics with a series of conferences beginning with the Tehran Conference in November-December 1943 (The Avalon Project, 2016). Turkey was amongst the states whose future was negotiated. The *Big Three*<sup>7</sup> discussed the last and final strategies for WW II. In Second Cairo Conference (4-6 December 1943), Turkish President Inonu managed to keep Turkey away from the war and avoided involvement in any battle. US President Roosevelt was pleased with Turkey's neutrality. On 9-18 October 1944, the 4<sup>th</sup> Moscow Conference was held and the postwar division of the Eastern Europe and Balkans was negotiated. In Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945), the *Big Three* completed the postwar designs and they prepared the general outline of *United Nations* (UN). One of the most crucial organs of UN, the '*Security Council*', established with its five permanent members: United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, China and France. The Council had ten additional temporary members (UN, 2015).

In WW II, Greece was under German occupation and she was suffering due to the civil war. Cyprus, as a British Colony, was involved in WW II. Around 30,000 Cypriot troops (Greek and Turk) joined the war as auxiliary forces on British side. Additionally, Cyprus was used as an "*unsinkable aircraft carrier*" (Solsten, 1993, pp. 23-24). In 1945, Turkey symbolically declared war on Germany and Japan. Turkey after WW II, met with the Soviet Union requests for land and military base. On 19 March 1945, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, told Turkish Embassy in Moscow that the 1925 Non-aggression Pact between the two states expired and Stalin had no intention to renew it. Stalin was planning to formulate a form of Soviet dominance over the Turkish Bosphorus to provide access to the seas. These plans were endangering Turkey. On the other hand, there was a civil war in Greece between communists and nationalists. Meanwhile, the US President, Harry Truman, proclaimed the *Truman Doctrine* on 12 March 1947. According to doctrine,

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<sup>7</sup> With the presence of Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt and United Kingdom Prime Minister, Winston Churchill.

the US government assured that it would provide military and financial aid to states struggling against Communism (Sander, 2016, pp. 257-259). At this point, USA decided to join forces with Greece and Turkey.

The Truman Doctrine was followed by the *Marshall Plan*, George C. Marshall (the state secretary of US) in June 1947. According to Marshall, the US government had to provide economic support to European countries for their economic recovery and survival. The war has severely damaged in all countries. The Soviet Union responded to the Marshall plan with the *Molotov Plan*, prepared by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. The Soviets discouraged the Communist states to receive financial and military support from Americans. This threshold signaled the sharp bi-polarity of World order. In 1947, India and Pakistan gained Independence from the British. This threshold accelerated the de-Colonization era (Freeland, 1972).

On 4 April 1949, NATO (Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization) was established. In these years, USSR was under Stalin's "*Socialism in one country*" doctrine's approach. The Soviet leader did not believe the peaceful co-existence of Liberalism and Socialism. According to him, the one would essentially destroy the other. This belief had motivated him to urge Yugoslavian leader Broz Tito to stop aiding Greek communists during the civil war. Thus, Stalin avoided interfering in Western bloc's influence areas. When Tito stopped aiding Greek communists, Greek nationalists backed by USA and UK easily defeated the opposing front (Fowkes, 1995, p. 29). With the suffocation of Communism in Greek Civil War (1949), it became a near certainty that Cyprus would also belong to the West.

Till 1964, there had been no significant Soviet intervention in the Cyprus Conflict. This gave the main nationalist actors of Cyprus, EOKA and TMT, the opportunity rely on the de-Colonization era to urge British to leave the island, on the condition that the island would be a part of NATO. Both organizations indicated the "Communist threat" in Cyprus. The two organizations exerted violent pressure on the communists of their own communities. While EOKA reflected Enosis as an effective formula of defeating Communism in Cyprus, TMT referred to partition as the methodology of liberating "at least one part" of Cyprus from Communism. Actually, Communist party AKEL enjoyed huge massive support, particularly from the Greek

Cypriot community. However, it hardly constituted a danger capable of destroying the socio-economic structure of Capitalism. Nevertheless, its existence gave a good card to the nationalists in Cyprus to try to convince the NATO to support their nationalist inspirations. The Republic of Cyprus itself was a NATO formula, aiming to balance the tension in the southern flank of NATO (Kızılyürek, 2015).

While the nationalists in Cyprus were trying to keep Cyprus in an anti-Communist and pro-Western character, the “motherlands” Greece and Turkey became member-parts of NATO. In 1950, the Korean War broke out and Turkey sent troops to fight on the American side. This enabled Turkey to join the Western bloc. On 18-19 September 1951, the Ottawa Council approved the Turkish and Greek accessions to NATO (*Milliyet*, 20 September 1951, p.1). On 18 February 1952, the two states officially became member-parts of NATO (Howard, 2001). On 14 May 1955, Warsaw Pact was established. With the death of Stalin in 1953, the Soviet foreign policy launched the process of *de-Stalinization*. Accordingly, the Soviets decided to support anti-American movements all around the world as much as possible. The Non-aligned Movement emerged as another threat against the Western alliance. In 1956, Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Channel and asked the British and French ships to pay taxes to Egypt to be allowed to use the Channel. UK and France joined forces with Israel and attacked on Egypt. Moscow threatened the Western bloc with a nuclear war and led UK, France and Israel to stop their military campaign against Egypt. This started the rise of Nasser and the NAM against the West (Sander, 2007).

In 1956, the Hungarian liberals rebelled against the Communist regime. To suffocate the rebellion, the Warsaw Pact states intervene in Hungary. To suffocate the rebellion, the Warsaw Pact states intervened in Hungary. In 1958, the US allies in Europe and Middle East established regional alliances; European Economic Community (EEC) in Europe and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East. In 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement was established. Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia) and Makarios (Cyprus) were amongst its leaders (Loth, 2002). In post-independence, Makarios’s plan was to gain the support of NAM and USSR in the Cyprus Question against NATO. Therefore, in post-

independence, the Cyprus Question no longer remained as an intra-NATO conflict (Mallinson, 2010).

As regards to Turkey and Greece, the two states experienced the growth of Left and anti-Americanism in their public opinion. In post-1960, Ismet Inonu embraced the idea of “Left of the Center”. During the 1964 crisis, Inonu told his British counterpart, Alec Douglas-Home, that the Greeks and Greek Cypriots were unlikely to accept the partition of the island, and Turkey was ready to use military force to achieve a form of “double-Enosis”. At the British Council of Ministers on 2 July 1964, the British leaders were anxious about the increasing number of Greek troops on the island (Papandreou had secretly deployed 10,000 soldiers in Cyprus) and the upraising tension between Greece and Turkey (CAB, 128-38-48).

What deterred Turkey from the military intervention was the *Johnson Letter*. The letter became a threshold and Turkey developed her relations with the USSR. In Greece, the Social Democrat leader George Papandreou was in power. Papandreou, during the electoral campaign, had accused the leader of center-right, Constantine Karamanlis of making concessions in the Cyprus Question. In 1964, even if he was satisfied with the *Acheson Plan*, due to the anti-American and nationalist transformation in the Greek public opinion, Papandreou could not urge Makarios to accept the plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2011).

On 18 August 1964, the British Council of Ministers agreed on the necessity to implement the Enosis, since an independent Cyprus led by Makarios was dangerous the British and NATO interests in the Mediterranean. The British leaders also noted that, Greece had assured them to pursue Enosis and, to that end, they could supplant Makarios. According to the British leaders, the relevant form of Enosis should also compensate Turkey by creation of a Turkish base on the island. The solution should also ensure life and property protection for Turkish Cypriots (CAB, 128-38-59).

In 1964, the UK and USA could not force the Cypriots and their “motherlands” to settle and adjust their nationalism policies according to the NATO interests. The main reason beyond this was the emergence of the NAM and the changes in the Soviet foreign policy. For 10 years, due to his relations with NAM and USSR, Makarios managed to preserve the integrity of Cyprus.



## **CHAPTER 4**

### **NATIONALIST POLITICS IN CYPRUS AS A PART OF INTERNATIONAL CONJUNCTURE**

The previous chapter indicated that the international conditions played significant roles in shaping and driving politics of nationalism in Cyprus. Within the literature, a broad range of scholars argue that, many nationalist movements, as well as politics of nationalism in various regions, were connected to international actors and conditions. According to Sander (2007), American struggle for independence, the very first nationalist movement in the contemporary era, became successful since France supported Americans against her primary rival in World politics, Britain. According to Lewis (2002), Mustapha Kemal Ataturk was motivated to transform Turkey from a theocratic state to a nation-state since Britain and France were determined to destroy the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, according to Prizel (1998) and Bukh (2010), each nationalist movement and each national identity is built based on the relations with other actors within the international scene.

In regards to the politics of nationalism in ethnic conflicts, according to Suhrke and Noble (1977), the ethnic groups aim to maximize the interventions of states that support their stance and minimize of those that support the rival ethnic group. During the Cold War, if one major power supported one ethnic group in an ethnic conflict, the other major power generally tended to support the opposing ethnic group. Likewise, Mearsheimer (1990) argues that the bi-polarity of the world order during the Cold War led the major powers to intervene in ethnic conflicts and the ethnic groups to align their politics with the will of one major power (or its allies). In the models of Gellner (1983), Brass (1991) and Anderson (2006), as well as in the studies of a significant amount of Cypriot scholars such as Salih (1978), Mavratsas (2000), Kızılyürek (2002), Evre (2004), Bryant (2004), Nevzat (2005), Loizides (2007) and Kiralp (2015), the domestic sociology and politics of nationalisms in Cyprus were successfully analysed and explained. As the scholars noted, modernisation, increase in literacy, intelligentsia, political elite and ethnic conflicts play significant roles in shaping national identities and nationalisms in Cyprus and elsewhere. This thesis argued that, all these factors played important roles in shaping

nationalisms and politics of nationalism in Cyprus. However, this thesis also claims that, another factor that shaped nationalisms and politics of nationalism in Cyprus was the international conjuncture.

According to Mallinson (2010), Turkish Cypriot nationalism was a product of British divide and rule politics. On the other hand, Chatterjee (1986) is another scholar who indicates Colonial politics as factors shaping nationalism in colonized territories. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that the nationalisms of the two communities in Cyprus were not only shaped by the British Colonialism, but also by other global and regional actors and political developments. This thesis does not deny the fact that nationalism is to a great extent a domestic phenomenon; it is not free of the influences of external actors. First of all, the nationalist actors (communities and leaders) design their nationalism politics in a way compatible to the interests of regional and global powers to gain their support (see Suzman 2000).

As Hinsley (1973) stressed, each nationalism movement is actually a project of adding another actor (nation-state) to the international scene<sup>8</sup>. In 1945-1959, Britain lost her Imperial power due to the era of decolonization. Even though the Greek Cypriot nationalism dates back to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the politics of decolonization (particularly the demands for self-determination) inspired the politics of Greek Cypriot nationalism. That was a junctural card played by Greek Cypriots and Greeks in the pro-*Enosis* struggle. On the other hand, in 1940s and 1950s, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots had two anti-theses against the *Enosis* demands: Cyprus should remain under British rule, and, if Britain decided to leave Cyprus, the island should be left to Turkey and not to Greece. Turkish Cypriots asked for *Taksim* when Britain offered the sides the partition of Cyprus (see Mallinson, 2010).

During the 1955-1959 incidents, Denktaş and Grivas labeled Cypriot Communism as jeopardy against the West's interests in Eastern Mediterranean. However, in post-independence era, Makarios tolerated AKEL's activities and cooperated with the party in his politics of nationalism. Therefore, one might argue that, not only the national identities, but also the nationalism politics are re-constructed. In 1959,

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<sup>8</sup> Rauf Denktaş did not pay attention to international recognition and this contradicts to Hinsley's argument.

Greek and Turkish governments, as well as the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, were urged by NATO leaders to sign the Zurich-London Treaties. Till that period of time, the Cyprus Conflict was largely an intra-NATO issue. However, with the de-Stalinization process in Soviet foreign policy, there had been important transformations in the international conjuncture. First, the USSR decided to support anti-American movements in ex-colonies. Second, the Non-Aligned Movement was created as an anti-Western actor. With the emergence of inter-ethnic violence in 1963, Greek Cypriots struggled for limitations on Turkish Cypriot veto rights and Turkish Cypriots struggled for a form of federalization based on geographical bases. One might assert that, the goals of Enosis and *Taksim* were not realistic due to the conjuncture in 1959-1964. The Anglo-American Imperialism supported the “double-Enosis”, the NAM supported Makarios’s leadership and constitutional amendments in Cyprus and USSR supported a federal solution.

On 14-25 February 1956, during the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Moscow decided to destroy Stalin’s “Socialism in one country” taboo. It was replaced by Lenin’s idea of “Socialism cannot survive if it remains in only one country”. This transformation encouraged Soviets to enlarge their influence areas. (Khrushchev, 1956). On 18 June 1956, British forces left Egypt after ouster of King Farouk. On 26 July President Jamal Abdel Nasser declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal. Until that day, Americans had good relations but when he recognized People's Republic of China, on 16 May, things dramatically changed. This angered the US government and the US foreign policy on Egypt was transformed into an anti-Nasser character. And, the de-Stalinization of Soviet foreign policy constituted the basis for the NAM-USSR cooperation against USA (Aburish, 2004, p. 54).

The Suez Channel operation was held by the British, French and Israeli forces against Egypt. Britain and her allies tried to control the Suez Channel, and strategic parts of Gaza and Sinai. The result from a military point of view was excellent but, politically, it was nothing but a catastrophe. The international arena raised criticisms and diplomatic pressure against the invasion of Egypt. There is a point of view that, the Suez crisis and Hungarian rebellion were connected to each other. Americans tried to balance the conditions created by these two events: On one side Middle-East and Arabs, and on the other side Eastern Europe and Soviets. Vice-President Richard

Nixon says “we could not on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve the British and the French intervention against Nasser (Borhi, 1999)”. Suez’s biggest impact in international relations was the emergence Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The rise of Nasser and the NAM, led some leaders to believe that, they could balance the US power by Soviet support (Aburish, 2004). Makarios was amongst those leaders, and the new power balances shaped by the rise of NAM and Soviet de-Stalinization significantly affected the post-1963 politics of nationalism in Cyprus. Not only the Americans, but also the Soviets understood that, their politics would never be free of counter-plans of the other side. Therefore, the ethnic conflict in Cyprus was also a part of the international power competition. In 1955-1959 it was an intra-NATO issue and in post-1963 era, it became a Cold War game played based on the rules of bipolarity. It is essential to note that, Makarios’s non-aligned stance in international politics and his relations with AKEL gave Soviets a trump card to balance the American power in Cyprus.

In post-1963 era, USA and UK aimed to attain stability in the southern flank and eliminate the anti-Western led by Makarios and AKEL. Additionally, Cyprus was an important part of the geo-strategic plans of NATO in Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, Moscow aimed to minimize the NATO influence in the region and shape the Cyprus Conflict unresolved in a way damaging the intra-NATO relations. So, Soviets developed their relations with Turkey just after the *Johnson’s Letter* was received by Inonu.

It was also a fact that, Makarios was “expendable” for Greece. The Greeks were ready to oust Makarios to achieve the “double-Enosis”. On the other hand, Turkish Prime Minister Inonu had expressed to NATO leaders that the “double-Enosis” was acceptable to Turkey as well. Turkey could accept a solution securing her interests in Cyprus by hindering the unification of the whole island with Greece. Additionally, Turkish Cypriot leaders could accept a federal solution since it could safeguard the essential conditions for *Taksim*. Likewise, for Makarios, restrictions on Turkish Cypriot veto rights and preservation of Cyprus’s territorial integrity would serve for the maximization of Greek Cypriot hegemony in the island. Thus, in 1964, all the actors redesigned their politics according to the transformations in the global and regional politics of Cold War. As argued by Wendt (1992), with whom an

international actor is allied actually shapes its identity and politics as well. As a NATO ally, Greece could have ousted Makarios if she reached to a settlement with Turkey. Likewise, Makarios was amongst the NAM leaders and he was rather unlikely to render Cyprus a NATO base. However, since the NAM and Third World aligned their stances in UN with Makarios, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots cooperated with each other to withstand the Greek Cypriot leader.

As conceptualized by Hinsley and concluded by this thesis, a nationalist actor is also an international actor since his or her politics essentially foresee some changes in the international system. Makarios's preference of independent and unitary state would change the Turco-Greek balance of power in Cyprus and minimize the NATO influence on the island. Likewise, his politics would terminate Turkish Cypriots *de jure* and *de facto* partnership. Not only Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, but also UK and USA opposed to Archbishop's politics. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots' federation demands were likely keep the Greco-Turkish balances in a way similar to 1960 conditions, however, such a change in Cyprus would constitute a threat for the other multi-ethnic Third World and NAM states. Thus, in 1964, not only the NATO states, but also the NAM and the USSR also weighted in and it became merely more difficult to balance the conflicting interests. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the politics of Makarios enjoyed broader popularity in international scene and Cyprus's political destiny were closer to his preferences when compared to Turkish Cypriots' preferences till 1974. In addition to this Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots changed their politics of nationalism according to the transformations in world politics. They did not demand Taksim and Enosis in 1964.

In the recent literature, nationalism is identified as the main challenger against the internationalism and globalization. For instance, the re-emergence of nationalism in European Union is perceived as a threat endangering the future of Europe (Holbraad, 2003). Likewise, as the traditional realist point of view in the discipline of IR, the international system is composed of 'selfish' states acting according to their self-interests (Donnelly, 2000). However, at least for the period of time analysed by this thesis, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms appeared as politics designing the future of Cyprus in the international arena. On the other hand, the international actors had their own preferences in integrating Cyprus to the

international system. Therefore, this thesis concludes that there had been an interaction between the domestic leaders in Cyprus and the external powers involved in the Cyprus Question. Once we consider the contemporary puzzle, the Republic of Cyprus, controlled by Greek Cypriots, is still recognized as the legitimate government representing the whole island in UN and EU. The TRNC is largely out of the international system since it is not recognized by any state but Turkey.

Currently, there exist two mono-ethnic states in Cyprus. If a federal solution is founded, Cyprus will become a bi-communal actor in international politics. Nevertheless, the solution of the conflict does not depend only on the two communities having different preferences in making Cyprus an integrated party of the international system. It only depends on the international actors such as Turkey, Greece, EU, UN, USA, and Russia (etc.) who have their own preferences in designing Cyprus's place in the international arena. Thus, the creation and emergence of the nationalisms in Cyprus and the Cyprus Conflict were developments shaped by Cypriot and foreign actors. So, it is not misleading to assert that the future of nationalisms of the two communities, as well as the political status-quo in the island will also depend on domestic and external powers. And, the future of the Cyprus Conflict is likely to be shaped by Akıncı-Anastasiades talks, the 'Brexit' and the future of EU, the EU's politics towards Cyprus, and the stances of Turkey, Greece, USA, Russia, Egypt, Israel<sup>9</sup> and other relevant actors.

Consequently, this thesis concludes that the international developments and international actors significantly affected the politics of nationalism of the two communities in Cyprus. First of all, in post-WW II period, the de-Colonization process affected Cyprus as well, and the Greek Cypriots demanded Enosis. Secondly, in 1950S, the "motherlands" Greece and Turkey became NATO members and in that period of time, USSR did not pay much attention to Cyprus and NAM had not yet been a deterministic actor of world politics. Thus, the nationalism politics of Enosis and Taksim were intra-NATO solution designs. Lastly, in 1960s, when the Soviets and the NAM states weighted in, Makarios insisted on independence and the unitary

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<sup>9</sup> Due to the energy politics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Egypt and Israel as well became actors in Cyprus Question as well. The might not be claimed to be as deterministic as Greece and Turkey, however they have a word at least on the energy politics of Cyprus.

state structure of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots demanded the federalization of the island. UK and USA tried to achieve the double-Enosis; however, Makarios was capable of balancing the NATO power thanks to the support he enjoyed from USSR and NAM. It is also important to stress that, the international conjuncture and the likelihood of Greece to accept the double-Enosis led Makarios to re-design his politics of nationalism and question his relations with his “motherland”. As one might witness, neither the international conjuncture, nor the politics of nationalism in Cyprus were static. The transformations in world politics were reflected in the politics of nationalism of the two communities.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

This thesis analyzed the mainstream theoretical approaches on nationalism and the history of nationalist movements in Cyprus. It encapsulated the essential arguments of Primordialism, Ethno-symbolism and Modernism. Furthermore, it was highlighted in this thesis that, there is another approach within the field and suggests that the nationalist movements should be analyzed based on the international conjuncture of the relevant period of time. The thesis evaluated the nationalism theories based on the history of Cyprus, and concluded that the emphasis on international conjuncture might be beneficial in understanding the nationalism politics.

The thesis focused on the history of Cyprus beginning briefly from the Ottoman era. Nonetheless, the thesis focused mainly on the era of 1945-1964. In this thesis, it was stated that the people of Cyprus in Ottoman era (as elsewhere within the Empire) were identified as “Muslims” and “non-Muslims”. The nationalist mobilizations in the name of Hellenism and Turkism were launched in the last decades of the British era. The increase in literacy (and in the number of communal schools) during the British era was an important factor preparing a socio-cultural background for the nationalism. Nevertheless, in 1945-1964, there had been fluctuations in politics of nationalism in both communities.

In 1945-1959, Greek Cypriots struggled to be unified with Greece (apart from some temporary pro-independence maneuvers of AKEL). In 1964 however, Greek Cypriot leader Makarios demanded the preservation of sovereignty, integrity and independence of Cyprus. Likewise, in 1945-1955, Turkish Cypriots tried to safeguard their ethnic identity and impede the Enosis. In 1955-1958, they demanded the unification of Cyprus with Turkey, in case the British would leave the island. In 1958, they demanded *Taksim* (partition). In 1964, they demanded the federalization of the island.

In evaluating the nationalism theories, this thesis expressed that the Primordialism is rather disadvantageous in accounting for the relevant fluctuations in nationalism politics of the two communities. The primordial point of view identifies nationhood



as a “given” and natural element. It therefore pays no attention to the construction of nationalism politics. Based on the history of Cyprus, this thesis concluded that not only the national identity, but also the understanding of “homeland” is socially constructed. Therefore, the Ethno-symbolist approach, arguing that the ethnic groups remain attached to their “homelands” was not found to be valid for the case of Cyprus, particularly due to the pro-independence transition of President Makarios. This thesis noted that, in 1964, the attachment to the independence and integrity of Cyprus was not less significant than the attachment to the “homeland” Greece in Makarios’ nationalism politics.

The Modernist theory, arguing that the nationalism and national identity are post-modern socially constructed phenomena was found to a great extent valid by this thesis. However, it also had some limitations in accounting for the connections between the international conjuncture and nationalism politics. Firstly, Anderson’s notion of “imagined communities” was to a noticeable extent invalid for Turkish Cypriots’ nationalism since their pro-partition politics were not based on a social attachment to Cyprus. To achieve the partition, many Turkish Cypriots voluntarily accepted to change places without even knowing where they would go. Secondly, Gellner’s and Hobsbawm’s approaches were successful in illustrating for the role of education in the emergence of nationalism. However, in their theoretical considerations, nationalism was conceptualized as a socio-cultural phenomenon and its political aspects were merely overlooked.

Breuilly’s theory was amongst the most compatible approach in illustrating for the theories of nationalism, since the scholar characterizes nationalism itself as “a form of politics”. However, his approach did not focus on the international conjuncture to the extent which Hinsley’s and Suzman’s approaches did. With its analysis on the fluctuations in nationalism politics of the two communities, this thesis concluded that the international conjuncture had had significant effects.

In 1945-1959, the politics of nationalism in Cyprus (Enosis and Taksim), as well as the imposition of independence to the two sides by NATO, were based totally on the Western framework, simply because the NAM was not established and the *de-Stalinization* of Soviet foreign policy was not completed. In addition to this, while EOKA drew attention to the alleged Communist threat in Cyprus and demanded

Enosis to eliminate this threat, TMT drew attention to the same danger and demanded *Taksim*. In 1964 however, while Greek Cypriot leaders demanded the maintenance of Cyprus's integrity, sovereignty and independence, Turkish Cypriots demanded the federalization of the island. In 1964, there were Soviet and Non-aligned factors changing the political balances.

With the growth of inter-ethnic violence in 1963-1964, UK and USA demanded the partition of Cyprus. Their plan was to leave the island to Greece by allocating a base area for Turkey. They regarded Makarios's pro-independence stance dangerous for the NATO interests in Eastern Mediterranean. USSR aimed to minimize the NATO influence over Cyprus and to damage the intra-NATO relations. On the one hand, it supported Makarios's pro-independence stance. However, it also supported Turkish Cypriots' federalism demand. The NAM wanted to keep NATO away from the Eastern Mediterranean. Additionally, the majority of Non-aligned states had multi-ethnic characters and they were anxious about the Turkish separatism in Cyprus, simply because such separatist demands could also be raised by ethnic minorities in their own territories as well. So, the NAM opposed to the partition of Cyprus.

Turkey and Greece were likely to accept the so-called "double-Enosis" proposed by the US government. However, due to the public opinions in both states, the Greek and Turkish governments had to support their ethnic relatives in Cyprus. When it comes to the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus, they apparently maintained their desires for Enosis and partition. However they adjusted their nationalism politics based on the international conjuncture. While Turkish Cypriot leaders demanded the federalization of Cyprus, Greek Cypriot leaders tried to preserve the independence of Cyprus by restricting Turkish Cypriots' political rights. Both sides found junctural bases for their politics, and the international actors' (NATO, USSR and NAM) preferences were also influent in shaping the positions of the two communities.

According to the conclusions reached by this thesis, nationalism is shaped by a huge range of socio-cultural elements. However, the politics of nationalism are driven mostly by the junctural developments. Nonetheless, it is beneficial for studies on nationalism to analyze the politics of nationalism on the basis of the international conjuncture.

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## **APPENDICES**

20.09.1951, Milliyet, Sayfa 1

Yunanistan'ın Türkiye ve Yunanistanın pakta alınma-  
nın kabul edilmesi hususunda aldığı karar Konseye dahil memle-  
ketler tarafından fevkalâde büyük bir memnuniyetle karşılandı.

## Karar Ankarada büyük memnuniyet uvarıldı

Orkney, 10 (A.A.) — Tjilid  
y-ile Yononstantin Xilantik  
Paktina fasil, as olarak kabul-  
leri bismimendeki katar gureti-  
leri karshi timsal edilmisler.

Pisak diges tarafati forma-  
lislerin perembiye katar do-  
vam cucegi anilgimlaktadir.  
Dinamika boyed sinetisi  
baryantta bulunarak demirler

Devletleri Bakımına, Gözetimine girer. Türkiye ve Yunanistan ambulları hakkındaki kararın amacı diğer iki taretardan kabul edileceği takdirde Kırati de hükümeti adını bir kararı kırıyız gartuz des-tokleyesatır.




Atlantik Okyanus kabuklarıyla büyük bir sıvaz sufer kazanan Hükümetimiz başkanı Mondros ve Dışişleri Bakanı Koçulu, Devlet Bankası, Celâl Beyazıt bir arada.

## Appendix 2

**British security forces separating Turkish Cypriot regions from Greek Cypriot regions in Nicosia. 5 June 1956.**

**Copyright: © Keystone Pictures USA / Alamy Stock Photo**





### **Appendix 3**

#### **THE CONSTITUTION - APPENDIX B: TREATY OF GUARANTEE**

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows:

##### **Article I**

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

##### **Article II**

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

### Article III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.

### Article IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

### Article V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## **Appendix 4**

### **THE CONSTITUTION - APPENDIX C: TREATY OF ALLIANCE**

Nicosia, 16 August 1960

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey,

I. In their common desire to uphold peace and to preserve the security of each of them,

II. Considering that their efforts for the preservation of peace and security are in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Have agreed as follows:

#### **Article I**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to co-operate for their common defense and to consult together on the problems raised by that defense.

#### **Article II**

The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

#### **Article III**

For the purpose of this alliance, and in order to achieve the object mentioned above, a Tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

#### **Article IV**

Greece and Turkey shall participate in the Tripartite Headquarters so established with the military contingents laid down in Additional Protocol No. 1 annexed to the present Treaty.

The said contingents shall provide for the training of the army of the Republic of Cyprus.

#### Article V

The Command of the Tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation, for a period of one year each, by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be appointed respectively by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

#### Article VI

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature.

The High Contracting Parties shall conclude additional agreements if the application of the present Treaty renders them necessary.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible with the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in conformity with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

#### ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 1

The Greek and Turkish contingents which are to participate in the Tripartite Headquarters shall comprise respectively 950 Greek officers, non-commissioned officers and men, and 650 Turkish officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may request the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

It is agreed that the sites of the cantonments for the Greek and Turkish contingents participating in the Tripartite Headquarters, their juridical status, facilities and exemptions in respect of customs and taxes, as well as other immunities and privileges and any other military and technical questions concerning the organization

and operation of the Headquarters mentioned above shall be determined by a Special Convention which shall come into force not later than the Treaty of Alliance.

It is likewise agreed that the Tripartite Headquarters shall be set up not later than three months after the completion of the tasks of the Mixed. Commission for the Cyprus Constitution and shall consist, in the initial period, of a limited number of officers charged with the training of the armed forces of the Republic of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish contingents mentioned above will arrive in Cyprus on the date of signature of the Treaty of Alliance.

## ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL No. 2

### Article I

A Committee shall be set up consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, It shall constitute the supreme political body of the Tripartite Alliance and may take cognizance of any question concerning the Alliance which the Governments of the three Allied countries shall agree to submit to it.

### Article II

The Committee of Ministers shall meet in ordinary session by its Chairman at the request of one of the members of the Alliance.

Decisions of the Committee of Ministers shall be unanimous.

### Article III

The Committee of Ministers shall be presided over in rotation and for a period of one year, by each of the three Foreign Ministers. It will hold its ordinary sessions, unless it is decided otherwise, in the capital of the Chairman's country. The Chairman shall, during the year in which he holds office, preside over sessions of the Committee of Ministers, both ordinary and special.

The Committee may set up subsidiary bodies whenever it shall judge it to be necessary for the fulfillment of its task.

#### Article IV

The Tripartite Headquarters established by the Treaty of Alliance shall be responsible to the Committee of Ministers in the performance of its functions. It shall submit to it, during the Committee's ordinary session, an annual report comprising a detailed account of the Headquarters' activities.

## Appendix 5

### CAB, 128/38/59. BRITISH CABINET MEETING (18.08.1964).

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<i>Printed for the Cabinet. August 1964</i>	
C.M. (64) 45th Conclusions	Copy No. 36
<b>CABINET</b>	
<i>CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Tuesday, 18th August, 1964, at 11.30 a.m.</i>	
Present:	
The Right Hon. Sir ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, M.P., Prime Minister	
The Right Hon. R. A. BUTLER, M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs	The Right Hon. LORD DILHORNE, Lord Chancellor
The Right Hon. HENRY BROOKE, M.P., Secretary of State for the Home Department	The Right Hon. DUNCAN SANDYS, M.P., Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies
The Right Hon. SELWYN LLOYD, Q.C., M.P., Lord Privy Seal	The Right Hon. VISCOUNT BLAKENHAM, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
The Right Hon. JOHN BOYD-CARPENTER, M.P., Chief Secretary to the Treasury and Paymaster General	The Right Hon. Sir EDWARD BOYLE, M.P., Minister of State for Education and Science
The Right Hon. JOSEPH GODBER, M.P., Minister of Labour	The Right Hon. Sir KEITH JOSEPH, M.P., Minister of Housing and Local Government and Minister for Welsh Affairs
The Right Hon. ANTHONY BARBER, M.P., Minister of Health	The Right Hon. FREDERICK ERROLL, M.P., Minister of Power
The Right Hon. GEOFFREY RIPON, M.P., Minister of Public Building and Works	The Right Hon. WILLIAM DEEDES, M.P., Minister without Portfolio
The Right Hon. LORD CARRINGTON, Minister without Portfolio	
The following were also present:	
The Right Hon. HUGH FRASER, M.P., Minister of Defence for the Royal Air Force	Air Chief Marshal Sir CHARLES ELWORTHY, Chief of the Air Staff
Secretariat:	
Sir BURKE TREND Miss J. J. NUNN	
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C.M. 45 (64)

**Cyprus**

(Previous

Reference:

C.M. (64) 42nd

Conclusions,

Minute 2)

1. *The Foreign Secretary* said that, after the recent attacks by Greek Cypriot forces on certain Turkish Cypriot strongholds in the Island, an uneasy truce had been re-established; elements of the United Nations peace-keeping force had been interposed between the Greek and Turkish troops; and there appeared to be some prospect that the Government of Cyprus would allow supplies of food and drink to be sent to the isolated Turkish communities. Meanwhile, the negotiations at Geneva continued; and the Greek and Turkish Governments were discussing alternative means whereby, if a political solution were found in the form of Enosis, Turkey might be compensated by the creation of a Turkish base on the Island. The prospects of ultimate agreement on this basis, however, were not bright. Moreover, the position had been complicated by the fact that the United Nations mediator, M. Tuomioja, had now been incapacitated by illness and was unlikely to resume his functions. The Secretary-General of the United Nations proposed that these should be assumed by Signor Spinelli; and we should acquiesce in this appointment.

In addition the Soviet Government had given certain public indications that they proposed to concern themselves with the problem of Cyprus. Her Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow did not consider that these were a prelude to physical intervention in Cyprus by the Soviet Union; but there were some signs that the Government of Cyprus were in active contact with the Soviet Government and this aspect of the situation would need to be kept under close review. The United States Government had suggested that the three Guarantor Powers should formally repudiate the Soviet statement. But it would appear to be wiser to seek to move the Secretary-General of the United Nations to remind the Soviet Government of the Security Council resolution of 9th August, deprecating the intervention of third parties in the Cypriot dispute; and, in agreement with the United States Government, we were proceeding accordingly.

It would also be desirable that we should now take some initiative in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in order to avert the growing risk of war between Greece and Turkey and the dangers to the North Atlantic Alliance which such a development would entail.

By these means we might hope to hold the position in the Island for a further period. But it was becoming increasingly urgent that some political solution should be found; and it was therefore very desirable to ascertain whether the Greek Government still adhered to the assurance, which they had recently given us, that their objective was to ensure Enosis and that they would be prepared, if necessary, to supplant Archbishop Makarios for this purpose or whether they had now capitulated in effect to the Archbishop's own view that Cyprus should become a unitary and independent State.

In discussion there was general agreement that an independent Cyprus would represent an unwelcome threat to our strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean and that we should therefore seek to secure a solution based on Enosis, coupled with some form of compensation to Turkey for the loss of her position in the Island and the provision of safeguards for those Turkish Cypriots who might choose to remain in Cyprus even after Enosis. These members of the Turkish community could not hope to enjoy, under any future settlement, the constitutional privileges which they had been accorded under the Zurich and London Agreements. But they must at least be assured of protection for their lives and property; and for this purpose it might be necessary to arrange for some form of international control over the police forces of Cyprus for some years after the settlement and also to ensure that whatever military bases in the

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Island might be reserved for Turkey would constitute an asylum for Turkish Cypriots in the event of renewed communal tension.

It was now urgent to reach a final settlement, whether on this basis or on the lines of some other acceptable solution. Otherwise Archbishop Makarios would be left free to pursue his objective, which was becoming increasingly clear, of deferring a solution until he could secure, at the forthcoming meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution in favour of a unitary and independent Cyprus. His determination to proceed in this manner would have been strengthened by the intervention of the Soviet Government; and, in so far as the Soviet action might have served to restrain the Turkish Government, it would also have reduced the sense of urgency with which the Greek Government had approached the problem at an earlier stage and would have disposed them to feel that it was less important to seek to hold Archbishop Makarios in check or even to supplant him. In these circumstances we should give all possible support to the negotiations in Geneva; and, in order to avoid creating any impression that, apart from our support for those negotiations, we were being inactive, we might well take an initiative in NATO on the lines proposed by the Foreign Secretary.

Discussion then turned to the position of United Kingdom nationals, including Service families, in Cyprus. The Cabinet were informed that, although the Commander, British Forces, Cyprus, had full authority to arrange for their evacuation by air from Nicosia airport whenever he judged it necessary to do so, it could no longer be assumed that, if renewed fighting broke out in the Island and the airport came under attack, we should be able to implement the plans for this purpose. In these circumstances it was for consideration whether we should now order the evacuation of the individuals concerned forthwith; or whether we should plan to evacuate them without further delay, if it became clear that the Geneva negotiations were about to break down; or whether we should take no immediate action but should keep the situation under daily review in the light of developments both in the Island itself and in the various centres of international negotiation about the problem. If we removed the families at once, we might increase tension in the Island and jeopardise the prospects of a political solution. Similarly, if we declared publicly that we should evacuate them if the Geneva discussions broke down, we might appear to cast doubt on the prospects of success for the discussions themselves. On balance it seemed unlikely that the Greek Government would risk attempting a landing to seize Nicosia airport, since the troops involved would be within striking distance of Turkish aircraft based on the mainland. It was perhaps equally unlikely that Turkish aircraft would attack the airport unless Greek forces, by trying to occupy it, presented themselves as a target. There was still some chance, therefore, that, even if renewed fighting broke out in the Island, we could hold the airport for a sufficient length of time to enable us to evacuate the United Kingdom families; and in these circumstances it would be wiser to refrain from any overt action at the present time but to keep the situation under close review and to be prepared to evacuate the families forthwith if the Geneva negotiations broke down. In addition arrangements should be made to ensure that an alternative plan for evacuation by road was available, even though it was unlikely that such a plan would prove practicable in the event.

The Cabinet—

- (1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to be guided by their discussion in seeking to provide full United Kingdom support for the current negotiations in Geneva about the future of Cyprus.

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- (2) Invited the Foreign Secretary to seek to arrange, at his discretion, a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Ministerial Council in order to discuss developments in relation to Cyprus.
- (3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to ascertain whether the Greek Government adhered to their earlier policy of seeking to promote a solution of the problem of Cyprus by means of Enosis.
- (4) Took note that the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Defence for the Royal Air Force, would keep under close review, in the light of their discussion, the arrangements for evacuating United Kingdom civilians from Cyprus.

Prison  
Administration  
Escape of a  
Prisoner from  
Winson Green  
Prison

2. *The Home Secretary* said that the Birmingham Police were conducting a thorough investigation into the escape from Winson Green Prison of Charles Wilson, who was serving a sentence of 30 years imprisonment for his part in the recent mail train robbery. The men convicted of complicity in the robbery had been dispersed, after the dismissal of their appeals, among several security prisons and were subject to the special precautions normally taken in the case of prisoners who were believed to be likely to attempt to escape. A preliminary investigation by a senior officer of the Prison Department of the Home Office had indicated that Wilson's escape had probably been procured by accomplices who had scaled the wall of the prison and unlocked both the external doors and the prison cell. This involved the use of a series of keys, one of which was kept under particularly stringent security safeguards. This suggested that there had been collusion between Wilson's accomplices and some individual within the prison. Apart from this possibility, there was no evidence of failure to take proper security precautions, although a certain weakness, possibly unconnected with the escape, had been found in the security arrangements. The other prisons at which persons convicted of offences connected with the robbery were detained had been instructed to review their security arrangements and to increase their precautions in consultation with the local Chief Constables.

In discussion it was suggested that escape might be rendered more difficult in future by the use of dogs to patrol prisons externally and of electronic devices such as closed-circuit television. Dogs could not be used, however, without handlers and a consequent call on scarce manpower; and, while various electronic devices were currently the subject of experiments, they were of limited value since, unless they could be brought to a high level of reliability, there was a risk that they would merely create a false sense of security. The imposition of more stringent restrictions on prisoners themselves, particularly as regards visits by relatives and friends, was liable to be criticised as unnecessarily harsh. It might be necessary, however, to consider building special prisons of a higher degree of security for prisoners serving very long sentences and those sentenced under the Homicide Act, 1957, to life imprisonment for murder.

The Cabinet—

Took note of the Home Secretary's statement.

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The Economic  
Situation

Trade Figures

3. The Cabinet were informed that the Trade statistics for July, which would be published on the following day, showed a reduction of £17 million in exports and £43 million in imports as compared with June. The adverse trade balance, although less than that for June, was higher than in the early months of the year. The three-monthly figures, which provided a more reliable indication of long-term trends, showed that the adverse trade balance was continuing to grow, although at a diminishing rate. There was reason to think that the figures for August would present a somewhat similar picture.

The Cabinet—

Took note of this statement.

*Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,  
18th August, 1964.*

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