#### NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES INTERNATIONAL LAW MASTERS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

(LL.M)

## DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

BY

**UKUNGOH JAMES AKIMS** 

NICOSIA, JANUARY2017

#### **GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES**

#### **INTERNATIONAL LAW**

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# GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES MASTER OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW PROGRAMME (LLM)

Thesis Defence

### DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION

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
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#### ABSTRACT

The matter of precedent in international commercial law has continued to draw a unique show of interest between the international courts and the defect in international institutions. This study will first review the procedures that come to light whenever settlement of disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is mentioned. The introductory parts will highlight the input of the Dispute Settlement Body on members of the World Trade Organization and the international trade operating system as a whole.

Analysis from various scholars and critics will also be made in the literature review section. So many scholars saw the Dispute Settlement Body as a means to an end for countries to air their grievances with the hope of getting justice. The dispute settlement body has been however criticized on its Orwellian nature where more powerful countries like Europe and the United States of America act and do as they wish a detriment to member countries that are less developed; and a violation of WTO laws.

The next chapters deal with precedent within the world trade organization (WTO), structural disposition of settlement of disputes, starting from consultations to panels and the features of an autograph appeal system. Aggrieved members are advised to first peruse and go for consultations as a first major to dispute settlement procedure. Where consultations fail, members can thereby resort to dispute settlement by a constituted panel, and for members who are dissatisfied, the Appellate Body is available for their service and further settlement. UluslararasıTicaretHukuku'nunUluslararasıMahkemelerveUluslararası irketler'inku surlarıarasındakiili kidefarklıbirrolüvardır.Bu çalı ma ilk olarakDünyaTicaretOrganizasyonu'nun (WTO) prosedürlerinielealacaktır.Giri kısımlarıDünyaTicaretOrganizasyonu'nunüyelerininT artı maTasfiyeGövdelerininiçerikleriniveuluslararasıticaretsisteminibütünüyleöneçık aracaktır.

Çe itliyetkilivebilgiliki ilerinyorumlarınınanalizi de KaynakTaramasıbölümündeyapılacaktır.Ço ubilirki i, Tartı maTasfiyeGövdelerini, ülkelerindertlerineadaletliçözümumudununsonuolarakgörmektedir.

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Sonrakibölümlergeçmi tengelenörneklerleDünyaTicaretOrganizasyonu'nu, tartı matasfiyelerininyapısalhalini,

panellerdeyapılandanı malarınba langıcınıveimzaba vurusistemininözellikleriniincel eyecektir.Ma durolanüyelereöncelikledurumudikkatliceinceleyip,

konuuzmanlarıolarakdanı manlarlagörü meleritavsiyeedilir.Danı manlarınba arısısz oldu udururmlarda,

üyelerkurulanbirpaneleba vurmahakkınasahiptirvetatminolmayanüyeleriçin Appellate Body yardım, servisvesonrakitasfiyeiçinhazırdır.

#### QUESTION

The dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organization is one of the most essential institutions of the World Trade Organization. Some authors and scholars have in fact described the dispute settlement body as the back bone of the World Trade Organization and the international Trade World as a whole. Despite its outstanding impact on the trade world, it is pertinent to ask the following questions in the course of this study.

(1) What is the purpose of this study?

(2) What pertinent role does the dispute settlement body play the international Trade World?

(3) Has the dispute settlement body been reasonable in its dealings with developingcountry members?

(4) What can be done to guarantee equity and equal participation between developed, least developed and developing- country members?

1. The purpose of this research work is to get a better perspective on how the dispute settlement body of the World Trade Organization functions. And to get informed on the principles of the dispute settlement body, the administering laws in WTO dispute settlement and establishments of the dispute settlement system body and of major significance the dispute settlement proceedings.

2. The dispute settlement body serves as an umpire in dispute settlement. It only attends to those countries who are members of the World Trade Organization. It arbitrate on those matters or trade that fall a within its understanding. Parties who are dissatisfied with a member's violation are opportune to go through consultations, the panel body and the Appellate body which the final arbiter.

3. The dispute settlement body has been tagged "Orwellian" where superpowers like the Europe and the United States of America get away with violations as most of their laws contravenes the provisions of the dispute settlement understanding; while developing country members like Mali suffer the inappropriateness of the so called superpowers. Developing country members have however been given the platform to air their grievances whenever and however 4. The solution to this unfairness lies in cases where standards set are adhered to no matter the party involved. Members who do not act accordingly should be suspended and subsequently expelled where changes are not made. This, I believe will go a long way in promoting equity and equality.

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#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ACWL Advisory Center on World Trade Organization Law
- **CSUSTL Committee to Support US Trade Laws**
- **EC** European Community
- **EU European Union**
- **DDR Doha Development Round**
- **DG Director General**
- **DSB Dispute Settlement Body**
- **DSM Dispute Settlement Mechanism**
- **DSU Dispute Settlement Understanding**
- FTA Free Trade Association
- **GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services**
- GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- **ICJ** International Court of Justice
- **ICSID International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes**
- **INTO International Trade Organization**
- ILCA –International Law Commission Article
- PG Page
- **TRIPS Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property**
- **UR Uruguay Round**
- **US United States**
- WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization
- WTO World Trade Organization

#### **CHAPTER 1**

#### INTRODUCTION

Precedent in international adjudication became a thing of interest right from the first standing judicial body. The WTO created a highly skilled adjudicatory system which consisted of appeals from ad- hoc panels to long-lasting Appellate bodies,saddled with making awards in investment disputation that happens with international financiers and member state under an adequate international agreement.

Dictionary.com defines precedent as, "a legal decision or form of proceedings serving as authoritative rue or pattern in future similar or analogous cases". It is also any act, decision, or case that serves as a guide or justification for subsequent situations.

Usually, courts below are bound by the decisions of superior courts in similar cases unless it can be noticeably stated that some point of significant fact or law are distinguishable.

In different circumstances, it will be treated as persuasive precedent, possibly a relevant analogy for the latter case to be described.<sup>1</sup>

Stare decisis- is the doctrine of precedent where courts cites, when an issue has been previously brought to court and ruling already issued.(In Latin, "to stand by things decided") Courts below in the hierarchy of the judicial system must always follow the superior courts.<sup>2</sup>

The Supreme court in the United States have averred that, in other to guarantee the necessity of the rule of law and continuity, precedent must continue to be given its place in the judicial system. As expected, the Supreme Court because of its authority and centralized position, it aims for consistency in its decision making.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Z. Bankowsi , N. Maccormick and G. Marshall, precedents in the United Kingdom, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS – A COMPARATIVE STUDY (N. Marccormick and R. Summers (eds), AshgateDarmouth, 1997, pg. 315.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Hutto V. Davis, 454 USA, 370 (1982) at 375.

They may, however, change their philosophy when they reflect that their own precedent deserves to be reconsidered and set aside.<sup>3</sup>

The international trade organization experienced a significant change in the 1980s and 1990s. The Uruguay Round has been an effective part of this change as it served as a convener of these meetings.

A new approach has been introduced to the Dispute Settlement Understanding for the settlement of dispute among members which is one of a kind in international agreements. The operation of the DSU has been considered as impartial and transparent, and so very appropriate for fostering business relations and implementation and application of the WTO agreements.

The proceedings of the Dispute Settlement Understanding are coded, it makes it easier for members to know what will become of their actions in a situation of breach or non- conformity and the likely outcome of the decisions of Appellate bodies. This has in essence, prepared members to improve in resolving their differences.

There has been opposing views in the history of GATT and now WTO as to the appropriate role of dispute settlement procedures. There have been appropriately, two view points;

The first approach prefers a discussion or international diplomacy which determines the approach where dispute settlement proceedings are expected to simply help negotiations to resolve the difference through negotiations and compromise.

The second approach expects the dispute settlement procedure as a judicial process which is relatively disciplined and which any impartial panel could make certain that the aims of such judgments and other operations is in conformity with the rules of the GATT.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The provisions to make decisions by a complete sitting of the highest court such as Grande chambers, i.e. decisions that are conflicting by individual chambers of a supreme court emphasizes the need for consistency but indicate that divergent jurisprudence may take place within a Supreme court itself.

WTO deals specifically with disputes that arise as a result of broken promises. Such dispute arises where a business stratagem taken by a member state of the WTO affects other members of the WTO Agreements, or where it fails to meet up the obligations that falls under such agreement.

The DSU procedure usually starts from consultations where member states try to settle their disputes between themselves in a period of 60 days before such matters can be transferred to a panel. There is no previous ruling in the WTO that binds panels as in other areas of international law.

Subsequently, a panel cannot be compelled to follow decided decisions found to have been created by the Appellate body or uncover a certain interpretation on liabilities that is before the panel. The Appellate body is not under an obligation to support the legal interpretations it created in previous cases. However, where a report supports a translation submitted by parties to the WTO, it should be convincing from the portrayal of the panel and the Appellate body in later cases. The Appellate body and the panel are not obliged to work with submissions. This is as a result of the guarantee and predictability of the many sides to the trading system which is a very important goal in dispute settlement.

In spite of the fact that panel reports do not have structural legal condition and the ratiocination included by the WTO, such reports can still stipulate for useful process in later cases which may overwhelm an identical and legitimate problem.<sup>4</sup>

#### **1.1. CRITICAL COMMENT**

The worldwide principles of trade among countries are set up by a universal association known as the WTO and these standards profoundly affect self-standing producers and consumers everywhere throughout the world. Building up a proficient component for settling disputes between individuals from the WTO has dependably been of key significance. Without a viable method for settling trade disputes, there would be no motivation to submit to universal trade rules.

According to Jeffrey Walters, in his article, "Power in WTO Dispute Settlement", International associations are tormented by poor power imbalances. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Japan- Alcoholic Beverages ii, para.6.10; Appellate Body Report, Japan Alcoholic Beverages ii DSR 1961, 97 at 108.

WTO was intended to be free of these power imbalances. At first glance, this has all the earmarks of being valid, given that the association works on the rule of "one nation, one vote". Decisions are made base on consensus, viably giving each party the opportunity to vote, paying little heed to control of a veto. In that capacity, all nations are hypothetically equal in the WTO field. Practically speaking, the WTO is not really the bastion of equity its defenders propose. Under the WTO guidelines, all member nations can initiate a case against another nation to challenge a particular principle or practice, generally on the premise of a contradiction with WTO standards and commitments.<sup>5</sup>

Both sides to the dispute are then directed to an independent body, a legally recognized panel, which renders decision members, must hold fast to. The legal way of dispute settlement is what its advocates refer to as the essential purpose behind correspondence. All individuals possibly taken to the dispute settlement panel and all members must comply with the decisions or encounter the hostility of the Appellate body.

Be that as it may, supporters of the WTO's rules based framework overlook huge hindrances to uniformity in the range of dispute settlement. Tragically to developing nations of the WTO, (the majority) equality in the WTO is Orwellian in nature. Everyone is equal yet some are more equal than others.<sup>6</sup>

In a similar opinion to that of Jeffrey Walters above, the author opined that, <sup>7</sup>the powerful requirement for great nations has been prejudicial to members of the least developed countries compared to what is acceptable for the developed countries. The author is disturbed about least developed countries and has brought up suggestions on how to curb these prejudices meted on these countries in international trade. An investigation recommends gravitation as the most significant influence in the start of dispute settlement. Bigger economies and greater merchants will probably get to be included in trade disputes principally because of the fact that their economies are more expanded, and more on the grounds that large scale business sector makes them more alluring and a focus of lawsuits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Jeffrey Walters, Power in WTO Dispute Settlement at p.g 169.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer, Gravitation or Discrimination?Determinants of Litigation in the World Trade Organization at p.g 143.

However, Michelle Sanson holds that under-developed countries in the WTO started initiating cases just of recent. The author holds that 40 percent of cases before the dispute settlement body are initiated by developing countries.

Gonzalo VillaltaPuig and Bader Al-Haddab criticized the absence of a see through policy in the dispute settlement body to the extent of the see-through and the authenticity and validity of the dispute settlement framework. Their research uncovered the hidden practices under GATT which are still prevailing despite the fact that the DSB has advanced from conciliatory dispute settlement to legal dispute settlement.

The proceedings of the panel and the Appellate body in the DSB acts as a worldwide trade court with a compelling authority. It applies legitimate standards in settling disputes, its decisions tie members to the dispute settlement body, and it punishes any failure of its members that is not compliant to its decisions.<sup>8</sup>

Kim Van Der Borght wrote to awaken the interest of other nations in the WTO. The WTO had to appraise not only trade opportunities but other promising and more attractive trading frameworks, guaranteeing the framework would advance subservient improvement and that positive persistence would be made for developing nations.<sup>9</sup>

The dispute settlement support beam is a critical component in the recognition of the goals of the WTO.

#### **1.2.LITERATURE REVIEW**

Following researches made by different scholars on dispute settlement, most authors have similar views on how the Dispute Settlement Body started, and of course, its current status. However, each and every one of them has a different opinion as to what is obtained in settlement of disputes in the WTO.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>GonzolaVillaltaPuig and Bader Al- Haddab, the Transparency Deficit of Dispute Settlement in the WTO, Manchester Journal of International Economics Law, Volume 8, issue 1: 2-17, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Kim Van Der Borght, Justice for All in the Dispute Settlement System of the WTO, Volume 39.787 at 788.

An author<sup>10</sup> was of the opinion that the invention of the World Wide Web and of internet browsers which enables the coming into being of an electronic market place for the order, purchase, and sometimes, even delivery of goods and services, andbusinesses are being conveyed faster and cheaper online than by telephone, fax and mail.

What is known as domain name was also introduced with the arrival of World Wide Web. Domain name<sup>11</sup> makes it easier for internet-based, digital electronic commerce by giving users the opportunity to locate the electronic source of information, goods, or services. Disputes arise amongst enterprises and organizations that crave for the same domain name because the value of domain name has also risen. They (those who want the same domain name)<sup>12</sup> started to challenge national courts to settle such disagreement and fomenting demands for alternative dispute settlement procedures.

According to Ryan, international law scholarship has devoted considerable energy to international dispute settlement. The technique has been categorized as follows;

- Coercion,
- Voluntary relinquishment,
- Chance,
- Voting,
- Negotiation,
- Inquiry/conciliation,
- Arbitration,
- Judicial settlement,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Michael P.Ryan knowledge, Legitimacy, Efficiency and the Institutionalization of Dispute Settlement Procedures at the World Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, Northwestern Journal of International Business 22: 389 at 390.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The future of the Electronic Market Place (Derek Leebaerted...1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> James Gillies and Robert Caillau, How the Web was Born. The Story of the World Wide Web 1 (2000).

#### Quasi- judicial tribunal.

All these techniques of international dispute settlement have been identified in the practice by members in international diplomacy and economy in the modern era<sup>13</sup>. Over and above all, Ryan talks about knowledge, legitimacy and efficiency as the achievable rules in dispute settlement situations.

Jeffrey Walters has a different opinion on dispute settlement. He wrote in his article, that the structure of participation in the WTO does not give members specific veto power over all other members, it also does not allow wealthier members to be in charge of activities of the organization through control of votes. Decisions are based on consensus, effectively giving every member, regardless of power of veto<sup>14</sup>.

Accordingly, the WTO's process of dispute settlement has been publicized as a great balance among the WTO members: starting from the al mighty United States down to small Benin and Mali; every member can be brought to a dispute settlement panel, where an impartial panel has the legal jurisdiction over all members. Under WTO rules, all member states are permitted to initiate against another country member to challenge some particular policies or practice, usually on the ground that such policy or practice is incompatible with WTO rules and obligations. Parties are then brought to an independent, third party judicial panel, which gives verdict that members must agree and work with. The judicial nature of dispute settlement, and what its advocates cite as the primary reason for equality.

Jeffrey Walters however argues that unfortunately for developing countries members,(who are majority) equality in the WTO is Orwellian in nature! "Everyone is equal but some are more equal than others" (George Orwell, Animal Farm).

United States V. Brazil<sup>15</sup> – is a case that has the economically and politically weak West African countries like Mali, Benin, and Burkina Faso contest with the United States over its cotton subsidy government. Brazil in this matter contended that the United States measures were inconsistent with the obligation of the SCM Agreement. If the WTO members were truly equal, these countries would be able to exercise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Introduction to Dispute Settlement in International Trade and Foreign Investment, 26 Law and POL'Y BUS, 613 (1995).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Kent Jones. Who's Afraid of the WTO? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Appellate Body Report, March 3, 2005, DS267.

some form of power over the U.S (assuming their case was strong) by making a ground laying change in the U.S's domestic cotton subsidy activities.

This unfortunately, has not been the case. The weak countries in West Africa cannot exercise power over the United States; the US was able to grant support on its domestic cotton industry at a level that other member countries could not match. This is because of the inequalities which exist in the international economy. Such issues which exist in the international economy are reversed because of the impediment discovered to have taken part between developing countries. The DSM has not been able to intimidate the U.S into changing its policies in spite of being found in violation of its WTO agreements and its economic influence ensures the West African countries will not fight back.<sup>16</sup>

Igor Abdallah Medina critiqued the reformed approach; according to him, liberal scholars see the DSU as a concept which is "highly legalized". As a matter of fact, and from experience, it has been shown that the DSU has made it difficult for members of developing countries. Because of poor countries infamous capacity when it comes to their rights, it has been adduced that responsibilities accrue to them instead of assistance. One of the under developed countries to have started any process of dispute settlement in the WTO was Bangladesh. There has not been initiation of any matter by any of the African member states from the start of the dispute settlement body to date.<sup>17</sup>

"Some authors have used the notion "legalization" in relation to the DSU to argue that the WTO agreement may have exceeded the ideal point in which liberalization is maximized, as the soar juridicalization will probably end in an outcry by the protectionist groups. Goldstein and Martin assumed that the DSU was started to bind powerful states to their legal duties, even to the point of suggesting that the absence of the de facto veto will restrain the advantages of powerful states" (Judith Goldstein and Lisa Martin (2000) ).

He further claims that the belief by other authors and members of the WTO that the DSU came into existence to force superpower countries to take

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Igor Abdallah Medina, The power of Law or the Law of Power, BoletimMeridiano 47 vol. 16, n 150, Jul- ago 2015 (p. 34 a 41).

responsibilities for their actions is a fallacy. However, Goldstein and Martin opined that whatever the case, the law must be obeyed and due process must be followed. "The powers of the US and EU in Dispute Settlement entails, "the power politics that created the WTO agreements also constrains their interpretation" (Steinberg 2004, p.274), the U.S and the E.U have exercised de facto veto power on the choice of members of the Appellate Body. The very fact that the Reform of the DSU kills an objective policy problem is a claim that has been made severally by developing countries from the WTO Seattle ministerial conferences in 1999, which implies that the empirical evidence goes in the opposite direction of Goldstein and Martin's suppositions" (Richard Steinberg ).<sup>18</sup>

In his article<sup>19</sup>, Hartmann talks about how scholars have acknowledged the conceptualization of disagreement that takes place in the relationship with members of the WTO and other trade agreements (FTA's). The continuous stagnation of negotiations between WTO members where many parties are involved as a ground has only motivated the increase of FTA's<sup>20</sup>. Subsequently, these two situations is an increased likelihood of reproduced arrangement of this procedure which requiresthat disputes should be settled by the panel and the Appellate body whenever there are disagreements within members of the WTO.

Hartmann categorized conflicts into two: conflicts within a territory and conflicts that comes with legal responsibilities and beliefs.

Territorial conflicts<sup>21</sup> are categorized into three: disputes that answer to clauses and the authority to choose, disputes that involves a unilateral agreement. Competing legal obligations arises, if there are responsibilities apart and agree on time, or where one government allows what the other does not allow. Different conflict situations may arise where the WTO may assume to be in conflict with the FTAs, requests are made to search for a territorial conflict. Panels have been effective in partaking in a discourse on the conflict head on.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Stephanie Hartmann, Recognizing the limitations of WTO Dispute Settlement – the Peru-Price Bands Dispute Sources of Authority for Applying non-WTO Disputes, vol.48.p.g 618.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.- Can. – Mex., art. 2005 (1), 2005(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> See Kyung Kwak and Gabrielle Marceau, Overlaps and Conflicts of Jurisdiction Between the world Trade Organization and Regional Trade Agreements, 41 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L.83, 86, 2003.

As is observed in every organization or institution, each and every author has a different opinion on what goes on in that organization/institution.

The US and EU are seen as the 'others are more equal' in the popular saying from Animal farm by George Orwell, where is it said that, "all animals are equal, but others are more equal". The United States conduct their business with other countries in the WTO to the detriment of those countries. Their policies on most occasions contravene what is obtainable in the rules of the governing body of the WTO. The most unfortunate thing is that nothing is being done about their excesses because they are seen as the superpowers.

The countries that suffer abuse most from the excesses of the superpowers are the countries under developing and the least developed countries in Africa and other countries. Example has been given of such instance in the Cotton subsidy case between Mali and the United States. African countries has been said to have initiated only one percent of the thousands of cases filed within Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.

This narrative must change; every country that is part of the WTO should be accorded same treatment with all other member countries. The WTO should put in place a disciplinary body and measures that must ensure strict adherence is given to such rules. Any member country that is not ready to play by the rules should be suspended and subsequently expelled where there is no change see.

#### CHAPTER 2

# THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN DISPUTESETTLEMENT 2.1. THE ASPIRATIONS AND ACHIEVEMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY.

Dispute settlement body of the WTO is said to be the foundation on which the stability of the international trade organization lies. The DSB of the WTO has been rated as the most thorough and operative jurisdiction in international public law. The DSB of the WTO act as an international trade court where the proceedings of panels and Appellate bodies are held, the DSB also has an enforceable jurisdiction by the use of legal principles in settling disputes which are just base on facts<sup>22</sup>. Its rulings are binding with penalty for defaulting parties.

It has been recognized that matters like the supply of raw materials, tariffs that have an absolute effect on the world is the rationale behind the introduction of the dispute settlement framework. The DSB of the World Trade Organization has been an essential principle that aided in the realization of the belief of the WTO and its objectives.

The most important institute in the WTO is the Dispute settlement body.<sup>23</sup>The DSB has been commended for the immediate settlement of disputes between member states.

Countries that were privileged to be participants and beneficiaries of the GATT are believed and concluded to be more perfunctory and plausible in dispute settlement procedures as is required. The same applies in the DSB of the WTO.

The DSB was established to settle their disputes with each other by means which are provided for by the dispute settlement body; instead of just listening to a side.

Members of the WTO are not allowed to take any undesirable measures alone where their rights are being violated and are expected to make a unilateral resolution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See generally Leo Gross (ed.), The Future of the International Court of Justice (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1976); Daniel G. Partan, 'Increasing the Effectiveness of the International Court', Harvard International Journal, 18 (1977): 559.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> See 1979 Understanding on Dispute Settlement; GATT, BISD 26 Supp. 216 (1979).

The US trade system has been of importance in the knowledge of international business. It was requested then (by GATT) to change its legislation which recognizes mostly, unilateral action. The United States put up a statement on the occurrence which is made up of just general agreements and obligation and which lacks the ability to protect its interest (US) effectively. However, other members made a proposal to initiate a new procedure which is firm in dispute settlement system that would meet the US dissatisfactionif the US agrees not to employ its section 301- type of trade restrictions.Following that, a compromise was come to on the current dispute settlement which gives room for settlement of disputes through diverse means.

Dispute resolved through consultations is usually cheap and it gives more satisfaction for long term trade relations between parties. However, whatever solution reached must be consistent with WTO law<sup>24</sup>.

"In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in line with their findings and recommendations, the Panel and Appellate Body cannot add to, or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements" (Article 19.2 of the DSB).

The DSU in the above quoted article caution against 'judicial activism' that is, playing the role of legislators.<sup>25</sup>All members with grievances are at all times expected to act in good faith and with genuine intentions.

In the US – FSC, the Appellate body discovered the intentions of the US which was not noble as it neglects and failed to bring procedural deficiencies to the attention of the complainant and the DSB for the sake of corrections since it is very essential.<sup>26</sup>

#### 2.2. PROCESSES OF SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Disputes can be settled through either of the following ways:

- Consultations
- Panels and Appellate Body;
- Arbitration; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Article 3.5 and 3.7 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>As directed by Article 19.2 as well as to the task of a Panel under Article 11 of the DSU, the Panel in India patents (EC) held that 'the Panel is required to base its findings on the language of the DSU'. <sup>26</sup>US-FSC, WT/DS108/R, para.166.

- Good offices, conciliation and mediation.

Consultation is the first dispute resolution process recommended by the DSU, where dispute happens between country members. It is an attempt by disputants to settle their differences out of court. If the dispute extended to 6odays without any progress to settle amicably, request maybe made for panel to be established to look into the matter. Consultation is a clear preference for settling of disputes under the DSU through negotiations. Consultation is therefore the first place parties must yield to, and thereafter the panels.

If consultations are unsuccessful, a complainant is advised to resort to the panel for adjudication. A dispute settlement panel shall<sup>27</sup> be established at the instant of the complainant. Three panelists are required for this purpose; unless parties agree to have five panelists on their matter. Citizens of disputing states may not serve on the panel unless otherwise agreed by both parties. And if either of the parties does not agree with the decision of the panel, the Appellate body is available for reviews and appeals.<sup>28</sup>All the seven members of the Appellate body are appointed by the DSB for a term which will not exceed four years. Members of the Appellate body are expected to be authoritative with a show of expertise in businessand international law. Such members should not be sympathetic to any government. Appeals made to the Appellate Body are not supposed to take less than two months and not more than three months.

The Understanding provides for an alternative use of arbitration.<sup>29</sup> The DSU gives room to parties to a dispute (whenever such disputes falls under covered agreements) to resort to arbitration, instead of staying put with the provision of Article 4 and 6 to 20 of the DSU. Parties must in this case give a clear definition of the issues they choose to refer to for arbitration, and must also agree on the procedures they will follow. <sup>30</sup> Where parties choose arbitration, they must agree to submit to any decision

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Article 6.1 of the DSU.

 $<sup>^{28}</sup>$ Article 6 to 20 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Article 25, DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup>Articles 25.1 and 25.2 of the DSU.

of the arbitrators.<sup>31</sup>The arbitration award on its own must be in accord with the WTO agreements.

In the case between the EUand the US<sup>32</sup>, the European Community did not agree with the result of the ruling/award since the US failed to comply with the Panel Report.

The DSU also provides for the use of good offices, conciliation or mediation in the settlement of disputes. The use of good offices, conciliation or mediation can be requested for by any party to the dispute. Such procedures can be used and terminated anytime. The Director- General in a bid to help in settling of disputes between members offers under Article 5 of the DSU good offices, conciliation or mediation.

#### 2.3. THE POWER OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM.

The Jurisdiction of the dispute settlement framework covers all subjects under the covered agreement. They include the WTO, the GATT<sup>33</sup> 1994 and other multiple agreements on trade;goods, the GATs, the TRIPs Agreement and the DSU.

The DSU makes it possible for a sole logical system of rules and proceedings for dispute settlement which pertain to disputes that occur under any of the covered agreements. Few of the items on the covered agreement nevertheless provide for special and additional rules and procedure created to deal with the peculiarity of dispute settlement which identifies with the moral tie/legal requirement arising under a unique covered agreement.

#### Article 1.2 of the DSU states;

"The rules and proceedings of this understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreement".

The special or additional rules provided above therefore, prevail over any DSU rules and procedure to a certain degree of difference.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Article 25.3 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>WT/DS174/R.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> See Long, n. 9 Law and its Limitations, P. 71, Citing Kenneth Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 335-6.

An aggrieved member as rightly stated in the above provision is under an obligation to present any matter which may arise under the covered agreement to the DSU, and the respondent is expected to also abide by the rules of the DSU and its absolute jurisdiction over such matters. Once you are a member of the WTO, you must be willing to accept the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system.

Members of the WTO under Article 23.1 have recourse to the WTO dispute settlement excluding any other system. Article 23.1 of the DSU guarantees the exclusivity of the WTO and its non- comparability nature to other international forum and shield the different methods of dispute settlement from just a single method.

#### 2.4. ACCESSIBILITY OF MEMBERS TO THE WTO DISPUTE

#### SETTLEMENT SYSTEM.

The Dispute Settlement System of the WTO gives only members the opportunity to approach it where it has grievances against another member state.

The dispute settlement body of the WTO is responsible for settling disputes between government to government on issues that bothers on rights and duties of members. Industry associations and international organizations do not have the authority to start or prosecute matters of breach before the DSB. The secretary of the DSB doesn't reserve that right also. <sup>34</sup>

Every part of the covered Agreement comprises of one or more consultation and dispute settlement provisions. Such provisions introduce members and when they can have access to the dispute settlement body.

A party's choice to begin WTO dispute settlement procedures is consequently generally past legal survey. Note, nonetheless, that it is clear from the achievement rate of complainants in WTO dispute settlement that individuals do have to be sure of appropriate practices in their judgment with reference to whether plan of action to WTO dispute settlement will be 'productive'. In 89 percent of all reports, panels concur with the complainant that the respondent acted conflictingly with WTO law.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> On 'indirect' access to the WTO dispute settlement.

For private activities to be credited to an administration – and along these lines possibly be liable to WTO dispute settlement – there must be sure level of government mediation in the private activity.<sup>35</sup>

Thusly, every case must be inspected in its feat to figure out if the level of government association in the activities of private gatherings is adequate to make these activities challengeable. The second class of "atypical" measures where the inquiry arises is whether they might be tested in WTO disputesettlement procedures is that whether such measures are no more in power. In Indonesia – Autos<sup>36</sup>, Indonesia advised the panel that it had ended its debate on National Car Program. All things considered, the Panel chose to inspect the cases with respect to the project. In the wake of specifying that Indonesia brought the matter to an end after the due date set for the accommodation of new actualities, the Panel stated:

"In any occasion, checking our terms of reference, and noticing that any denial of a tested measure could be pertinent to the usage phase of the dispute settlement process, we consider that it is fitting for us to make discoveries in appreciation of the National Car program. In this association, we take note of that in past GATT/WTO cases, where a measure incorporated into the terms of reference was generally ended or altered after the beginning of the panel procedures, panel have in any case made discoveries in appreciation of such a measure. We should hence continue to look at all of the cases of the complainants."

In US – Upland<sup>37</sup>, the Appellate Body expressly affirmed that measures that are no more in power can be the subject of meetings or examination by panels, in the event that they influence the operation of a covered Agreement. In any case, it noticed that the way that some measures ended may influence the suggestions a panel may make under Article 19.1 of the DSU. The current legitimate position on this matter was perfectly minified by the Panel in EC –. Selected Customs Matters .thus;

As a general rule, a panelmust have the ability to make discoveries and suggestions on measures at the inception of the panel, accepting that the solicitation for foundation of a panel covers those measures. In any case, a panel may likewise be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Take note of the fact that once adequate government interference by a member has been confirmed, the presence of some principle of private choice will not list the members of its responsibilities.
<sup>36</sup>WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>WT/DS267/R.

skillful to make discoveries and make proposals on measures that have lapsed or are not yet in existence, accepting again that the solicitation covers those measures. All the more particularly, we comprehend that, to the degree that terminated measures influence the functions of a covered Agreement at the beginning of a panel sitting, they may appropriately be the subject of finding and suggestions by a panel, especially if such discoveries and proposals are important to secure a positive answer for the question.<sup>38</sup> Further, measures that are not in concordance might be the subject of discoveries and suggestions by a panel when they appear that they don't change the crucial way of the whining Member's case as reflected in its solicitation for an establishment of a panel.

In US-Lead and Bismuth ii<sup>39</sup>, the Appellate Body ruled on its power to recognize and deliberate on amicus curiae briefs brought before it in investigative survey procedures.

The legitimate arrangement of a dispute of the WTO members expressly accommodates the likelihood for industry affiliations and organizations to bring a dispute of WTO commitments, by another WTO member, in consideration of their legislature and to cause their administration to begin a dispute settlement proceeding against that member<sup>40</sup>. In some ways, numerous members, found the way toward campaigning the legislature to bring cases that has not been presented in the same way; the procedure is however no less present. In this instance, industry and individual organizations have roundabout access to the WTO dispute settlement framework.

#### 2.5. THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES.

The Dispute settlement system of the WTO has four major steps within which every member must adhere to, where they seek redress to issues between them and other member states. These steps include:

- Consultations;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> WTO, Overview of the State-of- play of WTO Disputes,

http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm. See also Frances Williams, 'WTO Sets Up Panel to probe US shrimp Row', Financial Times (London), 26 February 1997; and WTO Focus. <sup>39</sup> WT/DS138, 5<sup>th</sup> July 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Jackson, 'The Legal Meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report', in NielsBlokker and Sam Muller (eds), Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organizations: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Vol. I (Boston, MA: Kluwer academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 149- 64.

- panel Proceedings;
- appellate review
- Implementation of decisions and enforcement.

The above procedure begins with consultations by the complainant to include the respondent in interviews, to ascertain the dispute genially. On the off chance that that is impracticable, the complainant can refer the matter to a panel for mediation. The panel procedures results into a panel report. This report can be appealed to the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body surveys the procedures and brings on an Appellate Body report maintaining, changing or turning around the panel report<sup>41</sup>. The panel report, the Appellate Body report will be enfolded by the Dispute Settlement Body. After the creation of the reports, the respondent, if seen to have broken the WTO law, will need to open the proposal and decisions received by the DSB.

A standout amongst the most impressive parts of the WTO dispute settlement procedure is the brief timeframe outlines in which the procedures of the panel and the Appellate Body must be completed. The time spans for discussion and usage are likewise entirely directed. On a basic level, the panel procedures ought not to surpass nine months. In any case, panel proceedings frequently surpass this time limit. By and large, panel procedures last around twelve months. Appellate Body procedures might not surpass ninety days. No other international court or tribunal works within such time limits. These time limits, have specifically been imposed for re-appraising reviews, and have been censured as unreasonably short for both the panel and the Appellate Body.

Additionally, it is significant to note that the dispute settlement procedure is short and goes to an assurance with respect to the WTO consistency measure at issue since the WTO dispute settlement framework does not accommodate remuneration of violations brought on by the measure at issue as at the time that the dispute settlement procedure is running.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Jackson (editorial comment), 'The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal Obligation', American Journal of International Law, 90(1997): 60;Jackson, n. 64, 'The Legal meaning of a GATT Dispute Settlement Report', pp. 149-64.

The duties of a mediator are to look at the provisions of the treaty to decide on the aims of the meeting. This is additionally the case as for individuals' timeline of concessions or responsibilities under the GATT<sup>42</sup> 1994 or GATs as these are a necessary part of the separate understanding, and also along these lines, they are subject to the same guidelines of interpretation.<sup>43</sup>

The DSU does not have a particular guideline on the weight of verification in the WTO dispute settlement framework. The burden of proof is usually on the party who asserts; that is either the complainant or the respondent. The burden of proof shift to the other party wheresufficient proof is shown to raise an assumption that what is asserted is valid.

Based on observed facts, a panel is responsible for harmonizing all confirmation on record and to choose whether the party bearing the first weight of evidence has made some persuasions regarding the legitimacy of its cases<sup>44</sup>.

In this way, the burden of proof on what the relevant tenet of the law is, and how that standard must be met, is not on the party but on the panel and the Appellate Body.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> See Hudec, 21, The GATT Legal System and the World Trade, pp. 66-96.

 $<sup>^{43}</sup>$  This was held for the first time, with regard to GATT timetable, by the Appellate Body in EC-computer equipment, para.84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International law (4<sup>th</sup> edition), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) p. 21; Art59, Statute of the ICJ signed 26 June 1945, 59 stat. 1055, TS 993.

#### **CHAPTER 3**

# THE ADMINISTERING LAWS AND THE ESTABLISHMENTS OF THE **DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM**

#### 3.1. CONFIDENTIALITY AND GUIDELINES ON MEMBER'S CONDUCT.

Discussions, panel proceedings and investigative review procedures are all confidential. The meeting of the DSB additionally happens away from plain view.<sup>45</sup>

Every single composed submittal to a panel or to the Appellate Body by complainants and third parties to a dispute are confidential. Parties can make their own entries accessible to the general public. In any case, this arrangement does not make it necessary for a due date by which such a non-secret rundown must be made accessible. In the few cases in which WTO individuals asked for such an outline, it was generally made accessible past the point where it is possible to be of any usefulness.

The provisional report by the panel and the last report issued to the parties to the dispute are likewise confidential. The last panel report only changed into an open record when it is circled to all WTO members. As a general rule, the in-between report and the last report given to the parties is frequently divulged to the media. In US-Gambling<sup>46</sup> the panel lamented the break of the obligation of secrecy prerequisite contained in the DSU influences the personal capital and the honesty of the WTO members and is, in this manner, unsatisfactory.<sup>47</sup>

Appellate reports are first issued to the parties and circulated to other members at the time when such reports will be at the disposal of the public. Panel reports are however not issued to parties until members get a hold on it.

In Canada- Aircraft and Brazil-<sup>48</sup> it was taken cognizance of the fact that parties have the legal right to withhold precise and confidential business information that has been submitted to the Panel. The panel in the above matter obtained a unique

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See Article 18.2 and 17.10 of the DSU.
 <sup>46</sup> WT/DS285/R, WT/DS285/AB/RW, 22<sup>nd</sup> may 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>Panel Report in US-Gambling. There were further interests put forward by panel where, according to the panel by the United States seem to suggest that a disclosure is a breach of confidence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> WT/DS70/AB/RW, DSR 2000: IX, 4315 576.

procedure, which takes care of business information to move beyond the provision of Article 18.2 of the DSU.

The suitability of confidential business knowledge, special procedures and its adoption defers from case to case. In EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar<sup>49</sup>, a petition for special procedure was denied by the Panel noting that in a standard DSU proceeding, confidentiality rule is adequate.

Meetings with parties to a dispute and hearings with the Appellate body usually take place out of hearing of the general public. It is a law that, unless parties and the administrative of the WTO agree for a third party to participate or be part of such meetings and hearings, such a third party can only attend base on invite and only the first essential session. Proceedings of the Appellate body are attended only by parties and members of the Appellate body.

The extent of confidentiality of the current DSB of the WTO was challenged in the 2004 Sutherland Report<sup>50</sup> as it was seen as too extreme and injurious to the WTO as a body. It was advised that the Panel hearings and Appellate body proceedings should be made public<sup>51</sup>.

The DSU is not in a position to decide for parties if they want to be represented by a private counsel or not. It is therefore up to a party to decide if it wants a private counsel to represent it in the proceedings. From time to time, private counsels appear in both the panel and Appellate body proceedings as a third party or a delegation. The parties take responsibilities for their actions during the cause of the proceedings. Parties are also expected to guide them on the rules and regulations of the dispute settlement proceedings most especially in relation to confidentiality.

To guarantee uniformity with the standards of behavior, all members to whom the guidelines apply must reveal the presence or advancement of any interest, association or matters that members could rely upon and which is likely to influence, or offer an elevation to reasonable questions on freedom and fairness. This revelation and duty incorporates knowledge on money related, proficient and other dynamic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>WT/DS265/R, WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Werner Zdouc, Preview.The Sutherland Report 2004.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>HaraldHohmann, In Particular the problem of Safeguarding Sound Implementation of DSB Decisions..38, JWT (2004) 795 at 798, 851.

premiums and in addition considered explanations of individual assessment on issues applicable to the dispute and occupation or family premiums.

#### 3.2. RELIEVES FOR NON- FULFILLMENT OF WTO LAWS.

The DSU accommodates three classes of remedy for breaking of WTO law: the last remedy, to be specific, deals with the measure of conflict that eventually gets withdrawn or amended, while the second and third remedy is relatively short and can be linked to the first which is all about suspension and concessions in different commitments also known as retaliation.

"The withdrawal or the correction of the WTO conflicting measures or components of such a measure are enough to put the measure into acquiesce with WTO law; it also signifies the withdrawal of that measure observed to be in conflict with WTO guideline" (Article 3.7 of the DSU). Speedy compliance with the DSB proposals and decisions and also prompt withdrawal or correction of the WTO-conflicting measures, as is also crucial to the successful working of the WTO and is the most important avenue for commitment<sup>52</sup>. Be that as it may, in the event that it is not practicable to agree with the proposals and decisions, the party concerned has a sensible timeframe for execution possibly dictated. This must be acknowledgedto parties to the dispute by whatever means possible (it could be through restriction and execution) and a proposal by any member.

The 'agreeable timeframe for execution' decided through arbitration goes between six months, a year and three months; while the period of procession of reports by the DSB does not surpass a week. The normal time conceded for consistence as a 'sensible period' under Article 21.3 interventions to date is just shy of twelve months, implying that members by and large have a year to agree to a DSB administration which begins from the day the panel and Appellate body report is collected.

For the purpose of compliance with the tested measures of the WTO laws, the responding party four out of five cases has been able to comply and act as expected by the 'sensible timeframe for execution'. Most of the time, the defending party executes the proposals and decisions received by the DSB in a convenient and right

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Jackson and Steven P. Croley, 'WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments', American Journal of International Law, 90 (1996): 193-213.

way. The general record of consistency and the proposals received by the DSB is not speculative but empowering.

Just the withdrawal or correction of the WTO-conflicting measure constitutes the ultimate solution for rupture of WTO law. Be that as it may, situations may arise which may warrant a party to a dispute to retreat or change a conflicting measure before the discontinuance of the agreeable timeframe for usage, the DSU accommodates the likelihood of plan of action to transitory remedy. They include; remuneration and suspension of concessions or different commitments.

The DSU leaves doubtlessly no room for remuneration as well as the discontinuance of concessions or various commitments which are not optional remedies and which individuals might need to apply as opposed to consenting to the proposals and decision. Restitution and temporary delay of concessions are remedies which are only connected until execution happens.

Compensation as defined by Article 22 of the DSU is willful and predictable. That is both sides need to acknowledge restitution and the restitution which has to do with claims that will be experienced later on. Compensation must be in harmony as stated in parts of the covered agreements.<sup>53</sup> To date, parties have possessed the capacity to concede to restitution in very few cases. The parties in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages ii<sup>54</sup>, agreed to employ restitution since it appeared as impermanent; and as supplemental market compromise for specific results of fare enthusiasm to the first complainants.

The suspension of concessions or different commitments generally alluded to as 'striking back'- is altogether dissimilar to remuneration. There is no requirement anywhere for the parties to agree. At the point when the 'agreeable timeframe for implementation' becomes invalid and the parties have not possessed the capacity to concede to remuneration, the injured party may ask for approval to temporarily put off any privilege previously granted to defaulting parties or different commitments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See Article 22.1 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> WT/DS58/R, WT/DS10/R, WT/DS11/R, 1<sup>st</sup> November 1996.

that has to do with the culpable party<sup>55</sup>. Since the DSB resolves such issues by going contrary, the conceding of approval is semi programmed.

Retaliation frequently appears as an exceptional increment in the custom of obligations on strategically chosen results of fare enthusiasm to the culpable party. Striking back in this way puts financial and political weight on the defaulting party to agree to the suggestions and decisions.

If by chance the infringement of WTO law concerns a commitment with respect to exchange of goods, or in regards to business and financial services, or in regards to the assurance of licenses, suspension of concessions or different commitments ought to first be looked for in the same division. On the off chance that this is not "practicable" or 'compelling', then suspension may perhaps be looked for in another area or under another understanding. This is known as 'cross-countering'. Cross countering is hardly asked for<sup>56</sup>. In EC-Bananas iii<sup>57</sup>, Ecuador demanded for and the DSB approved the suspension of concessions or different commitments under another contract (the TRIPS Agreement).

"An aggrieved party can lay claims for satisfactory compensation either through reimbursement, compensation, reparation and assurances & warranty" (ILCA Articles on State Responsibility).

For compensation to take its full course, the party in default must ascertain definitely the set up that existed before the unlawful deed was perpetrated. Where the compensation in kind is not accessible, restitution covers any financially assessable injury undergone by the injured state and may include a share, and furthermore, in specific situations lost benefits. The DSU does not unequivocally accommodate the compensation of injury undergone. Does the guideline of international law on state responsibility apply to violation of WTO law? Another question to ask is if the principal comprehensible answer in the violation of WTO law is the remedy expressly accommodated in the arrangements of the DSU provisions cited previously. And without a particular law in the WTO, the restitution is the law and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> See e.g. Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> Claus- Dieter Ehlermann, The European Community, its Law and Lawyers', The Second Wilberforce Lecture, London, 9<sup>th</sup> October 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> WT/DS27/R/ECU, 25<sup>th</sup> September 1997.

the specific guidelines in international law are still appropriate. It could be contended that by giving a contingent arrangement of principles with respect to the lawful results of a violation of the law, the DSU has agreed out of general global law on state obligations and that the law on compensation for breach suffered would therefore not make a difference.

## **3.3. UNIQUE RULES AND AIDS FOR DEVELOPING-COUNTRY**

#### **MEMBERS.**

In 1995 and till 2000 (except in 2006), developing-country members, as an ensemble, initiated a greater number of cases in the WTO than developed-country members.

Developing- country members have had the opportunity to pursue their matters with all practical purpose under the DSU. They have also used the Dispute settlement Body to settle matters between them and fellow developing-country members<sup>58</sup>. Developing-country members have nevertheless, instigated matters before the DSU only on few occasions. Because the DSU foresees the possibility of developing country members getting suppressed by the superpowers, it included some exclusive provisions in its understanding to exempt developing-countries from some principles.<sup>59</sup>Generally, these unique tenets have not been utilized much to date.

The WTO secretariat assists members equally in regard to dispute settlement whenever there is need. However, the DSU is aware that there might be a need to give extra counsel and assistance to developing-country members<sup>60</sup>.

The Geneva based Advisory center is responsible for legal support and assistance to developing-country members. The ACWL is autonomous, and works basically as a law office with specialty in WTO law. The ACWL gives support at all phases of WTO dispute settlement procedures at reduced rates. The ACWL currently has 37-members; ten developed-countries and 27 developing-countries and economies experiencing significant change. The administration of the ACWL is accessible to an average of 69 nations, speaking to roughly 40 percent of the WTO participation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> Chad P. Bown and Rachel McCulloh, Developing Countries, Dispute Settlement, and the Advisory Centre on WTO Law. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development.Vol. 19, No. 1 March 2010, 33- 63.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> See Article 4.10, Article 3.21, Article 8.10, Article 12.10, Article 12.11 and article 27 of the DSU. <sup>60</sup>See Article 27.2 of the DSU.

### **3.4. THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT BODY**

Amongst the establishments necessary in WTO dispute settlement, recognizable is political establishments, and free legal type of organizations. The WTO gives the dispute settlement panel the power to deal with matters at the start; the Appellate body is responsible for review of proceedings while the DSB continues to play its role as the director and most powerful in the WTO.

The General Council is directly in control of the DSU. It calls for general meetings and act in the capacity of the DSB.<sup>61</sup>"Where the DSU permits the DSB to take a decision, such is only realizable through votes" (Article 2.4 of the DSU).

The matter of consensus is in reality a turnaround or a negative consensus agreement. Article 17.14 of the DSU states, in significant part as follows:

"An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB....unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days following its circulation to the members".

Meetings are held on a daily basis by the DSB as part of its duty to the WTO. There is but a timeline for DSB meetings for each month and important members meet only when there is the need to. As at 2006, the DSB was able to meet 22 times<sup>62</sup>. Geneva hosts all meetings of the DSB, and such meetings are held for the duration of three to five hours. About fifty WTO members attend these meetings. Attendants are usually the most notable diplomats, the permanent Representative of other countries in Geneva.

#### **3.5. PANEL ACTIVITIES IN THE WTO SETTLEMENT BODY.**

The DSB panels are improvised and not a permanent tribunal whose purpose of being is to settle unique disputes and is thereafter broken up after they must have done their bit. The prayer for the establishment of a panel must be in a written form and should be made by the complainant. This composition by the complainant must show where consultations took place and the different measures in conflict within a concise outline of legitimate supposition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> See North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup>WTO secretariat, Annual Report 2007.

In any case, if a particular measure at issue is adequately recognized in the panel's prayer reliance is put on the capacity of the defaulting party to guide itself so far as it has to do with the violation of the measure.

Since it is a prerequisite that the panel demands must be made available, a brief outline of the legitimate base of the grievance should be made to adequately display the issue at hand.

Parties in a dispute must agree before a panel can be constituted on their behalf and they must make known their position in the matter. A norm emerged recently which makes it clear that once the DSB constitutes a panel, different members maybe admonished to bonds and their enthusiasm for the dispute settlement body to save their outsider rights.

"Situations where a third party makes a peculiar request and in the same matter, a single panel maybe established to examine these complaints and take into account the rights of all members concerned"(Article 9.1 of the DSU).

The WTO dispute settlement panel must be made up of competent members of a legislature or members of a government.<sup>63</sup>

The panel is expected to request for, and incorporate not less than one specialist from a developing-country member in case of a dispute between a developing-country member and another developing-country<sup>64</sup>. For an indefinite number of panelist managing and dealing with developing -country members, not less than one of the panelists must undoubtedly be a subject of one of the countries.

Members of the panel are mostly pensioners or members of a government who are qualified lawyers. Most of the panelists live in Geneva and they make negotiations on behalf of the WTO. The DSU unequivocally gives, the panel members the authority to serve in their individual capacity and not necessarily as government agents. Members should thus not try to manipulate or influence government authorities serving as panelists. The panel has of recent seen the influx

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> See Article 8.2 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> John P. Gaffney, Due Process in the World Trade Organization: The Need for Procedural Justice in the Dispute Settlement System... at 117 – 1195.

of experts and scholars serving as panelists. The panel must also consist of members who have once served in the GATT or WTO.

In the course of the establishment of a panel, parties should tryto achieve a concession to the arrangement of the panel. The secretariats can make proposals for the selection of panel members to the parties to the dispute. Parties to a dispute are required not to oppose designations unless they have convincing reasons.<sup>65</sup> Notwithstanding, parties frequently dismiss the selections at first proposed by the WTO secretariat without much support. The prevalent constitution of members of a panel is regularly burdensome and a petulant process, which may take several weeks. On the off chance that the parties can't concede to the makeup of the panel in two weeks and six days, any of the parties can request the Director- General to resolve the matter by selecting members of the panel. After ten days of making such demands, the Director-General might after advising disputants and the Chair of the DSB and the panel or council responsible, make selection of the panelists whom he considers generally fit. As of late, the Director - General decides the institution of about half of the panelists.

The secretariat keeps record of all members of government who are competent to be part of the panel. Parties submit names of members they would want as representatives in the panel. A break down is just the usual style and people excluded in this rundown might be chosen as panelists. Truth be told, most first-time panelists were not on the rundown at the season of their choice.

The panel may only assign those cases that are within its power and put it into consideration in its terms of reference. For that reason, a panel is held to account on its term of reference.<sup>66</sup>

Take note that, if there should be an occurrence of a comprehensively expressed panel's term of reference, it might be important to inspect the complainant's accommodation nearly to decide absolutely the type of demand made and where it falls in the panel's term of reference.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Appellate Body Report, India- Patents WT/DS79/R, 22<sup>nd</sup> September 1998.

A panel is maybe called upon to compare the contradictions in a tested measure with the provision of the WTO law. This is so because the tested measure and other significant undertakings fall under the term of reference of the panel.

One of most outstanding roles the panel plays as part of its duty to the DSB is to assist the DSB in the performance of its duties under the covered agreement.

The panel should be objective in the discharge of its duties by evaluating matters brought before it. Such matters may consist of facts, relevancy and conformity of measures with WTO laws.<sup>67</sup>

The Appellate Body administered in paragraph 185 of its report in the matter between Brazil- Retreaded Tyres<sup>68</sup>, that a goal evaluation within the definition of Article 11 infers, in addition to the fact that panel must look at all evidence exposed before it, reassess its authenticity, deliberate on its weight and make sure that all findings are exact and according to law as a confirmation.

The violation of rules shall remain without anyone else's input and be substantiated, in that capacity, and not as backup to another affirmed infringement. Most claims of irregularity are turned down by the Appellate body.<sup>69</sup>

The DSU makes provision for the recognized process of evaluation for panel members except some specific provisions in the covered agreement where a special approval is needed.<sup>70</sup>

An alternate circumstance is a situation where investigations are made by the panel on facts that are not within their term of reference. In such a case, the panel does not make a target appraisal of the matter before it, and in this way demonstration conflictingly with Article 11 of the DSU.

The panel is not prohibited from the unreserved use of propositions brought before it by parties to a dispute to create its own legal cause, complement its own research and come to a finish on a matter.<sup>71</sup>

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> See Article 11 of the DSU.
 <sup>68</sup> WT/DS332/R, 17<sup>th</sup> December 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> See Article 11 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> See Article 11 of the DSU, Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>EC- Hormones WT/DS26/AB/R, 1998.

A panel that makes use of debates or considerations that have not been brought before it for deliberation by parties does not act beyond that which it sought (ultra petita). Although panels have restrictions to work with matters that fall within their term of reference, they can extend their services to matters outside their jurisdiction if necessary.

A panel is obliged to submit its investigation to the Dispute Settlement Body in writing<sup>72</sup>. Such report or investigation must divulge what it found, its importance to the case, and the basic reasoning behind such investigations.<sup>73</sup>

Disputants have on occasions challenged reports of Appellate bodies for absence of a fundamental method of reasoning behind the Panel's discoveries and proposals.

In a dispute which involves members of a least-developed country, it must be proved by the panel its level of evaluation and any other differential treatment and arrangement that a developing-country member has made before the panel.

If a panel discovers that a party's measure conflicts with WTO laws, it would call such a party or member to order and asked that the party conforms to WTO laws. Overtures and choices of a panel are not lawfully official and independent from anyone else. They turn out to be legitimately restricting just when they are received by the DSB and in this way have turned into the proposals and decisions of the DSB. Notwithstanding making proposals and decisions, the panel may recommend routes in which the member affected could execute those suggestions. These proposals are not lawfully an authority on the member affected. Be that as it may, on the grounds that the panel that makes the proposition would be summoned to assess the sufficiency of such performance and its resultant effect. So far, only a small number of panel members have been able to use its authority to make proposals with respect to execution of their suggestions.

Decisions of panels are always made available to the general public in English, French, and Spanish. These reports are written in English and thereafter translated to Spanish and French.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> See Article 12.7, paragraph ii of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> Note the special requirements for panel reports in cases where parties have reached a mutually acceptable solution during the panel proceedings.

Contingent upon the agreement primarily at issue, professionals from different fields of study assist the panel in its finances and legal aspect in the secretariat of the WTO.

## **3.6. THE APPELLATE BODY**

The sole objective of the establishment of an Appellate body is to review appeals that come from the decisions of the panel.<sup>74</sup> The Dispute Settlement Body set up the Appellate Body in February of 1995. The permanence of The Appellate Body is undisputable unlike the panel that is broken up once matters brought to it are concluded<sup>75</sup>. The Appellate Body division consists of seven members who are also known as 'members'.

Every member state shall be represented in the Appellate Body.

Members of the Appellate Body as experts or specialists are expected to resolve such issues that bother on written law enclosed in the panel reports and fundamental laws advanced by the panel.

"Every country is represented and expected to be involved in the Appellate Body" (Article 17.3 of the DSU).

Geography, the level of directed change, and the legal system are the criteria considered in establishing membership of the Appellate Body.

Members of the Appellate Body are elected for a four year term and can be reappointed to serve for a second term. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Appellate body, announcements are made for interested members to apply in order for the vacant positions to be filled. Once a member of the Appellate Body leaves office before the expiration of his term, another member is elected to fill up the position for the remainder of the term.

Members of the Appellate Body must not reside in Geneva. However, they are expected to be able to avail themselves for work whenever the need arise; and to communicate the secretariat of their whereabouts at all times.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> See Article 17.1 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig and Sergio Puig, The Extensive (But Fragile) Authority of the WTO Appellate Body. Vol.79: 237- 273.

The commendation of members of the Appellate Body is based on widespread agreement among members. The commendation is subject to selection by a committee chaired by the General Council; while other members include the DSB, the TRIP Council, the council for goods and services and the Director General of the WTO. The option to choose members of the Appellate Body is done by the Appellate Body.

For whatever cause, members of the Appellate Body members should be found to be in contact with any government. They must hold such positions without accepting any orders from international, governmental organization or any private initiative.

Members of the Appellate Body are not employable nor are they permitted to practice any occupational activity which is not consistent with their obligations and responsibilities. The Appellate body members must perform their duties in line with stipulated laws and to identify the existence of any affiliation, and to significantly object or produce any acceptable question as to their self –standing and fairness. They may not be allowed to get involved in the thought process of any appeal that can cause a conflict of interest.

During appeals, the Appellate Body separates itself into three groups. It does not listen to appeals with its full members on sit.

In compliant with Rule 6 of the working procedure, members constituting the division are in this manner chosen on the premise of rotation, considering the standard of arbitrary determination and unusualness and advancement because every member can serve in the Appellate Body irrespective of which country you are a member of. The procedure for selection of Appellate body members is rid of a member's nationality as it is not an important factor. Appellate Body members sit in cases which their own countries are a part of.

Yearly, members of the Appellate Body elect a director between them. <sup>76</sup>The Appellate body has its secretariat which is far apart and free from the WTO secretariat. The Appellate Body secretariat is responsible for the Appellate Body. All activities of the Appellate body takes place in the Appellate Body secretariat.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> See Rule 5(1) of the working procedures.

Parties' directly involved in a matter can appeal a panel report. Other members or other do not have the authority to appeal a panel report. However, members who participated in the investigation level may be allowed to be part of the appeal process.

Parties in an appeal proceeding are referred to as members. The two parties in an appellate proceeding are known as the appellant and the appellee. Members are allowed to cross-appeal where a member has an interest in a specific part of the appeal. The cross-appellee is known as 'other appealing party'. Third parties taking part in the redrafting survey process are referred to as 'third members'.

The high rate of appeal does not really give an impression of the nature of panel reports but instead, it's a way of engaging an unfavorable panel report which will not cost the appealing party anything. Despite what might be expected in the long run, the appeal will be unsuccessful; it will give a member, who is discovered to have conflicted with WTO laws, although such laws can be altered to conform to WTO laws; and where the appeal clearly shows to the local voting public that a party has depleted every lawful means accessible.

As a panel's resolutions seems to be on a fundamental level, researches made can be re-evaluated by the Appellate body on appeal if the appellant agrees to the revelation made by the WTO provision.<sup>77</sup>

An accurate finding may be subject to appellate review when the appealing party affirms that this discovery was not put forth according to the provision of Article 11 of the DSU. The degree and substance of the civil law of a member as decided by a panel, with the end goal of finding out the party's consistence with WTO commitments, is an issue of law which the Appellate Body can review. Information need not be exhibited to the Appellate Body in decisively an indistinguishable way from before the panel. On the off chance that the information displayed on appeal can undoubtedly be tracked down to the information in the panel record and the path in which such information has been changed over can be promptly comprehended, the confirmation introduced add up to new proof barred by Article 17.6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> See Article 11 of the DSU.

The Appellate Body has held that new contentions on appeal can't be dismissed basically on the grounds that they are new.<sup>78</sup> Nonetheless, the Appellate Body recognized that the likelihood for the Appellate Body to decide on another contention that would include evaluating new truths is dispossessed by Article 17.6.

The Appellate body has upheld some panel reports and has given reasons and support on discoveries made. The Appellate body has in a few panel reports discovered some crucial mistakes but it couldn't but set back the entire report.<sup>79</sup> A few of the findings by the Appellate body has been appealed, others were upturned while some were reversed. In many appeals, the after come of the review were merged. The panel reports in some cases were revised.

A complainant frequently makes cases of infringement of numerous stipulationsbecause of inconsistency with WTO laws. Whenever, the panel discovers a break of WTO laws, the panel may decide not to produce discoveries for the cases of violation of different provisions. Where a panel report is upturned on the grounds of violation; the Appellate body can deal with the matter as a breach which it previously did not treat.

The Appellate Body can likewise refuse to finish the legitimate investigation when a panel is thought to have dishonorably kept out evidence, or made a mistake in its appraisal of evidence, and the Appellate Body would have to under see the proof so as to finish the lawful examination.<sup>80</sup> The Appellate Body will likewise not finish the lawful examination if the culmination won't be conclusive for the result of the dispute. The Appellate Body rejected in US- Steel Safeguards<sup>81</sup>, the substantive issue that emerged as an aftereffect of turning around a panel's reasoning on the grounds that tending to that issue would in no occasion have disturbed the panel's definitive finding.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> Canada- Aircraft WT/DS70/R, 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1999.
<sup>79</sup> Supra, John P. Gaffney at 117- 1195
<sup>80</sup> See Appellate Body reports, US – DRAMS WT/DS99/R, 19<sup>th</sup> march 1999.
<sup>81</sup> WT/DS248/R, 10<sup>th</sup> December 2003.

## **CHAPTER 4**

## **DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEEDINGS**

## **4.1. CONSULTATIONS**

The DSU expresses a distinct fore choice for determining disputes genially instead of through arbitration.<sup>82</sup> Keeping that in mind, WTO dispute settlement procedures dependably begin with conferences or if nothing else an endeavor to have discussions between disputing parties.

As in previous chapters, the determination of a dispute through discussions is clearly more economical and more acceptable for the long haul exchange between parties to a party compared to panel proceedings. Parties to a dispute tend to appreciate the incidence and legitimacy of demands made through consultations.<sup>83</sup>A circumstance as such enables parties to decide on consultation without the need to resort to other dispute settlement proceedings or the party may have to put into consideration the other parties' struggle with regards to established rules if the matter eventually goes to arbitration. Thus, discussions can serve as a casual pre-trial disclosure instrument. Their essential protest and reason, be that as it may, is to settle the dispute agreeably.

Members of the WTO who believe that the hindrance of a dole out to be incurred by them is as a result of another party's influence, the members affected may request for consultations with such a member. Members of World Trade Organization are required to be compassionate and manage the cost of sufficient progress for consultations. Request for consultations, with reasons behind such demands, must be submitted in composition and should recognize the following:

- The measure at hand and
- The conforming reason for the objection.<sup>84</sup>

All petitions by aggrieved parties are submitted to the appropriate body for consultations. The bodies responsible include; the Dispute Settlement, and the relevant chambers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup> See Article 4 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> Grant D. Aldonas, The WTO, Revolution in International Trade Disputes. July 1995, 73-79.

The relationship between the demand for a panel establishment has been celebrated in Brazil-Aircraft, where it was decided by the Appellate body on the standard expected from a measure and claims of WTO-irregularity that were the subject of counsels and the particular measures and claims of WTO-irregularity that were recognized in the demand for the establishment of a panel. What is imperative is that the quintessence of the tested measures and claims has not changed.<sup>85</sup>

Parties have wide circumspect as concerns the way in which discussions should be held. Principles that provide direction to action on consultations and how they should be handled are presented by the DSU.

Fundamentally, the procedure for consultation is governed by politics and conciliation, andthe predisposition of other members or parties in the proceeding is important.<sup>86</sup>

A party invited for consultation is expected to respond to the claim for consultation not later than a month after the request is made, except otherwise agreed by parties. The party must enter consultations in compliance and in appropriate with a view to achieving a common agreeable undertaking. Where the party does not react within ten days after the date of receipt of the demand, or does not go into consultations within thirty days or a period commonly agreed upon, then the party that asked for the consultations may ask that the DSB institute a panel.

Request made by members for consultation is presented to the DSB and put as a notice on the WTO sites as reports; the consultations themselves are done in private. The secretariat of the World Trade Organization is not involved in the any activity that is associated to consultations; and it also does not have any connections with consultations.

Despite the requirement for confidentiality, notifications gotten during consultations can still be used in panel proceedings if the parties are the same, and the case is the same. However, any member who is not a party to the proceeding may not be privy to the information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> Brazil – Aircraft WT/DS46/AB/R, 20<sup>th</sup> August, 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>86</sup>Proofs given as part of consultations in dispute settlement proceedings do not come with any influence subsequently.

Once in a while, arguments arose as to the sufficiency of consultations. The responding parties who are mostly responsible for these complaints have also argued that aggrieved parties do not have a satisfying cause in consultations.

On the off chance that consultations are fruitful and prompt to a commonly concurred answer for the dispute, this arrangement should be made known to the Dispute Settlement Body. Parties in a dispute are allowed to bring up any suggestions that that relates to the undertakings made to the DB. Whatever agreement parties may come to; must be compatible with WTO law. As often as possible, consultations have been effective in determining disputes.

Where consultations between the parties were unsuccessful after two months of start of consultations, the aggrieved party may resort to the DSB for the matter to be moved to the panel. By and large, the complainant will not, immediately upon the termination of the sixty-day time frame, ask for the institution of a panel until it takes into account more opportunities to settle the dispute through consultation.

#### **4.2. PANEL PROCEEDINGS**

Panels are established where the aggrieved parties realizes that consultations are not moving as expected. As a rule the Dispute Settlement Body builds up the panel by a return consensus at the assembly where the panel prayer first showed up on the DSB's plan. In this manner, the parties will concede to the structure of the panel or, in the event that they neglect to do as such, the Director- General of the WTO decides on the general make-up of the panel.

The fundamental tenets overseeing panel procedures are provided for in the DSU.<sup>87</sup>While the DSU only requires that the panel guides the parties; panels will be reluctant to change course from the working procedures contained in Appendix 3 without the consent of the parties. In addition, panels as a rule consent to demands on procedural issues tabled by the parties mutually.<sup>88</sup> The Appellate body noticed in EC-Hormones that panel understands the needof being attentive to bargains, as per due process, with the probability that a particular circumstances that may emerge in a specific case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> See Article 12 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Note, however, that the discretion of panels is limited in that panels cannot modify the rules set out in the DSU itself.

Panel techniques give adequate adaptability in order to guarantee great reports while not unnecessarily postponing panel procedure<sup>89</sup>. Most parties believe that the provision of Appendix 3 to the DSU is easy, stately, to incur a careful part of the working techniques.

In their first composed entries, the parties show actualities of the case as they see them and their contentions identifying with the claimed irregularities with WTO law. In their reply entries, they answer to the contention and confirmation put together by the other party.<sup>90</sup>Parties in a dispute have the legitimate right to present their reports to the Appellate body<sup>91</sup> and the Appellate body is constrained, to recognize and give due thought to these entries.

The panel may, whenever possible, question the parties and approach them for clarifications over the span of a meeting or its composition. The DSU gives panels' options to ask for and acquire information from either of the parties to the dispute it can be a strong party who was part of the disputes at the initial start.<sup>92</sup>Parties in the dispute are compelled to communicate the panel with all required information that the panel request for. A" party is expected to react quickly and completely any demand by a panel for such information the panel considers vital and suitable" (Article 13.1 of the DSU).

Their composed access to the panel is given to the parties to the dispute.

An outsider can obtain the principal composed entries of the meetings.<sup>93</sup> Plainly the privilege of outsiders to take an interest in the panel procedures are, when in doubt, entirely restricted.

Take note of the fact that only the panel has the authority to permit any other party to be part of the proceeding, albeit such optional power is obviously not boundless and is surrounded by the need for due process.

It is perceived by the Appellate body that the DSU obviously considers two recognizable procedures, the first in which the parties ought to present their case,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>SeeArticle 12.2 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> Submissions by the aggrieved party is filed and presented twenty one days after the party in default must have responded. Both of their submissions are filed at the same time. <sup>91</sup> US- Shrimp WT/DS58/R, 6<sup>th</sup> November 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> See Article 13.1 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> See Article 10.3 of the DSU.

which includes a satisfactory performance of the event with the proposition to support evidence, and a moment which is by and large intended to allow rejoinders by each of the contentions and confirmation put together by the other party. <sup>94</sup>By the by, unless there is a due date confirmed by the working procedures, adjustments are welcomed for parties to present their evidence during a second meeting with the panel.<sup>95</sup> Due process is very important in the activities of the panel, and may involve furnishing the parties with sufficient chance to react to the proof submitted. Panel activities have been adjusted to have emergency meetings that are also explained as part of evidence.

Concerning fleeting constraints on the proof presented, it was stated by the Appellate body in EC-Customs Matters, that although limitations may be set on measures that are inconsistent with the term of reference of the panel, impediments don't make a difference similar to evidence. The Appellate Body found that confirmation in support of a claim for a call out on a measure may have been made before or after the institution of a panel.

Disputes conveyed to panels for settlement frequently include complex authentic, specialized and logical issues. These issues every now and again assume a focal part in WTO dispute settlement procedures.

While a panel has the power to employ the assistance of experts and professionals in assessing evidence before it, it cannot assume the position of a defendant to any of the parties.

A panel may utilize the confirmation of its specialists to help it in surveying the cases of the grumbling member, as well as the affirmations of the reacting party. In doing so, it can't be said to surpass its power.

Panel procedures are secret. In any case, an honest enthusiasm for extra security and for delicate business data submitted to the panel must be authentic.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, exceptional strategies overseeing this data were received. Under the systems overseeing Business classified data received by the panel in some cases, information is kept in confidence in the Geneva secretariat with restrictions on asses

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> Argentina – Textiles and Apparel WT/DS56/R, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1998.
 <sup>95</sup> In EC- Selected Customs Matters WT/DS315/AB/R, 11<sup>th</sup> December 2006.
 <sup>96</sup> Canada- Aircraft WT/DS70/R, 20th August 1999.

to it. Strategies are additionally accommodated by either party to appear before the Geneva mission on the invitation of one party and reassess propositions and make suggestions. The strategies embraced in Canada-Aircraft by the panel, accommodated the arrival or the obliteration of the private business data after fruition of the panel procedure. Regardless of these techniques, Canada declined to present certain classified business data since they didn't, as indicated by Canada, give the essential level of security.

The party that has concerns about the assurance of business secret data must demand the panel to receive uncommon techniques to handle such data. At the end of the day, parties cannot simply conjure the business classified nature of certain data as legitimization for not presenting the data without having at any rate asked for the panel to receive exceptional strategies. In Turkey - Rice, Turkish authority educated the panel that they didn't feel great in gambling data releases and conceivable criminal allegations of infringement of Turkish law on privacy. The panel noted that Turkey neither asked for the reception of uncommon techniques for taking care of secret data through the panel procedures, nor was there such a demand from Turkey after the complainant, the United States, proposed this probability.

Whenever the panel completes a draft of the illustrative segments of its report, it issues this draft of statements and proposition for comments from the parties.<sup>97</sup>

Remarks made by the parties at the time to time survey arranged every offer ascent to amendments of specialized blunders or misty drafting. Up to this point panels from time to time replace the outcome of their appeal as soon as parties make any changes. In a couple of late cases, nonetheless, the panel altered its decisions in the light of remarks made by the parties. <sup>98</sup>

The panel had found in its between time report in the matter between EC-Approval<sup>99</sup>, that the European people group general ban on the endorsement of biotech items had stopped to exist and along these lines declined to make any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> The oral declaration made by the parties has been found affixed to written presentations by the panel, instead of presenting a separate report.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> Where reports have been submitted and no party comes with a counter, the report is considered final.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> WT/DS293/R, 21<sup>st</sup> November 2006.

suggestions on this issue. In its last report, the panel declined to decide on whether the ban had stopped to exist or not. The panel took after the contentions of the United States made at the early audit arrangement that the topic of whether the ban had stopped to exist post-institution of the panel, was not part of the panel's term of reference.<sup>100</sup>

On a practically basis, the panel procedure regularly surpasses this time frame. By and large, from when the panel is established to when it starts proceedings, it reports keeps going for 404 days. The explanations behind surpassing of nine months' time frame includes, the importance of the case, the need to counsel specialists, access to specialists, issues with parties, and the time taken to decipher the report. The longest panel report continuing to date has been EC-endorsement and Marketing of Biotech Products, which lasted for 161 weeks.

# 4.3. REVIEW BY THE APPELLATE BODY.

Right around 70 percent of the panel reports disseminated were appealed by members to the Appellate body. <sup>101</sup>

Where the panel does not have a consistent working procedure, the Appellate body has a recognized and distinct working procedure for the purpose of reviews of proceedings from the panel. The working procedures are written by the Appellate body with an understanding with the head of the DSB and the Director –General of the WTO.<sup>102</sup>If a challenge on proceedings emerges and a threat on the working procedure, the section listening to these ideas may in light of a legitimate concern for decency and methodical strategy in the lead of the interest, embrace a proper system with the end goal of that interest.

Judgments and prayers on the contemporary written documents of a formal notification of proposals made by the Appellate body begin with a notification by either of the parties.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> Eventually, the panel made the qualified recommendation for the EC to step up on its agreement with the SPS and to bring the general moratorium into consistency with the WTO laws.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> On 24, November 2007, exact percentage of panel reports appealed was 67.65 percent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> See Article 17.9 of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup> See Rule 20(1) of the working procedures.

Notices in advance should satisfactorily recognize the discoveries or legitimate elucidations of the panel which are being offered as incorrect.

It is vital that all cases proposed to be made on bid are explicitly and comprehensively shrouded in the notice of claim.

In light of a legitimate concern for all, and to ensure all legal concepts are followed, it is advised that parties bring up demands on matters in their notification for proposals. Offers made by parties to panel reports and the length of the report that has not yet been embraced by the DSB are legitimate. By and by, parties more often than not bid in on time before the meeting of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that would debate the selection of the report.

On the off chance that the other party to the dispute chooses to cross his interest with an announcement on interest in one week and five days of the principal notice, the notification of other interest must meet an indistinguishable prerequisite from the main notice.<sup>104</sup>

A party may not just start an appeal, or retract his interest at any phase of the re-appraising survey prepared. Such a withdrawal drives typically to the end of the investigative survey. This was the situation in India-Autos, where the Appellate Body issued, ensuing to the removal of a short narrative of the procedural history and the reason for not having finished its work because of India's withdrawal.<sup>105</sup>

In any case, now and again, parties pull back their interests with a specific end goal to submit new ones. This happened, for instance, in EC-Sardines. For this situation, Peru battled that the interest of the European people community was inadequately clear. Accordingly, the European people community pulled back its allure and recorded a more minutia one. The Appellate Body rejected Peru's claim that the withdrawal of the European people community's advance was invalid and cleared up that there was no sign in Rule 30 that the privilege of withdrawal just incorporates unrestricted withdrawal. Conditions are permitted as long as they don't undermine the reasonable, fast and successful determination of the dispute and as long as the disputing party included acts in accordance with some basic honesty.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup> See Rule 23(2) of the working procedures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup>Appellate Body report, India – Autos, WT/DS146/AB/R, 5<sup>th</sup> April 2002.

Within seven days in the wake of recording the notice of offer, the appealing party must document a composed submission.<sup>106</sup> This composed submission sets out an exact explanation of the grounds of offer, including the particular charges of legitimate blunders in the reports of panel, and the contentions in support of these claims. Within two weeks of notification of written documents and proposals made by parties that have recorded a notice of other interest before day 12 must record an 'other appealing party's accommodation'.

Within a quarter century of the recording of the notice of offer, any party that wants to react to claims of legitimate fluff, whether brought up in the accommodation of the appealing party or records of other appellants. Accommodation by the appellant gives details of the clarity and justification for disputing the affirmations of lawful mistakes brought up in the other appealing party's submission and incorporates legitimate contentions in support thereof. Should a member neglect to record an obeyance in the required time, the division, in the wake of listening to the perspectives of the members, issues such directives, including removal of the appeal, as seen to be proper.

The section in charge of choosing the interest holds an oral hearing.

During redrafting procedures, the division may deliver inquiries to, or ask for extra memoranda to be gotten. Any such inquiries, reactions or memoranda are made accessible at the same time to alternate members and third members in the interest who are then given a chance to react.

The privileges of outsiders in panel procedures are constrained. Typically, outsiders are heard at any time of the proceedings, specifically at the significant period in order to get the main composed entries of the parties as it were. Third parties, that is, outsiders taking an interest in re-appraising survey procedures, have much more extensive rights.

An outsider that has neither recorded a composed submission nor informed its aim to take an interest in the oral hearing within a quarter century may even take an interest in the proceedings. Permission is given by the panel for the due process for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup>See Rule 21(1) of the working procedures.

an oral hearing to take place in the course of the proceedings and questions are allowed by the panel.

The division in charge of choosing an interest will trade on issues brought up by the appeal with alternate members from the Appellate body, before it establishes its report. There is a trade depth and outlook that is in practice with the principle and authority detailed in the working methodology. Contingent upon the number and multifaceted nature of the issues under exchange, this procedure more often than not happens more than at least two days.

With the exchange of perspectives, the division proceeds with its consultation and drafts of reports. Whenever it is concluded, three members of the panel are obligated to sign the report. The report is thereafter deciphered with the goal that it is accessible in each of the three dialects of the WTO. After interpretation, the report is sent to the WTO members without any hindrance to the archive and made accessible to the general population. The Appellate Body report is put up as a notice on the WTO site as a WT/DS archive.

Practically speaking, the Appellate Body has, much of the time taken over sixty days to finish the investigative audit. The Appellate body is expected to conclude proceedings in ninety days except for some seven cases where the days had to be extended because of the nature of the cases. The purposes behind the deferral in the appealing survey procedures incorporated the unpredictability of the interest, an over-burden of work, a postponement in interpretation of the entries or the report, and the passing of an Appellate Body party with an interest.

## 4.4. PRACTICE AND EXECUTION OF APPELLATE REVIEWS

Instant compliancy with the suggestions and decisions received by the DSB, that is, instant or prompt withdrawal of the conflicting measures of the WTO, is important for the outcome of the WTO and the commitment of the party concerned.

Nonetheless, in the event that it is practicable to consent to the suggestions and decisions instantly the member interested must work according to the sensible timeframe is required for such.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup>See Article 21.3 of the DSU.

In the event that no understanding between the parties can be reached on the sensible timeframe for execution, the aggrieved party is required to initiate a proposition in forty-five days which shall be forwarded to mediators.<sup>108</sup>

Because of the sensible timeframe for usage, the DSB keeps the execution of embraced suggestions and decisions under observation. Whenever taking after selection of the proposals or decisions, any member may bring up the issue of execution at the Dispute Settlement Body. Starting six-months after institution of the sensible timeframe, the issue of execution is set upon as a plan of each DSB meeting and stays on as a motivation to the DSB until the issue is settled. The party involved must notify the DSB of their meetings with ten days with a satisfactory review and recommendations.

Prior to the expiry of the sensible timeframe, the respondent must pull back or alter the measure that was observed to be WTO-conflicting. As it were, the respondent must take the suitable actualizing measures. It is, in any case, normal for the first complainant and respondent to differ on whether any executing measure was taken or whether the actualizing measure is WTO-predictable.

The issue of which measures fall within the extent of purview of a consistent panel has been tended to in various cases. The question when a measure brought to agree to the suggestions and decisions was tended to in several cases.<sup>109</sup> With the US, all things considered, the measure at issue, the principal Assessment Review was not an executing measure. The panel, in this way, needed ward under Article21.5 to consider Canada's claim of irregularity as to this gauge. After a cautious examination of the Appellate body and the provisions of Article 21.5 of the DSU, notice is given that this arrangement should strikes a harmony between contending contemplations.

To sum things up, for a measure to be an actualizing measure, in the importance of Article 21.5 of the DSU, there must be adequately close connections between the first measure and the new measure so that the later can be portrayed as brought to agree to the proposals and decisions concerning the first measure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup>See Article21.3(c) of the DSU.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup>US- Softwood IV WT/DS257/AB/R, 17<sup>th</sup> February 2004, Article 21.5.

The panel has considered, as obiter dicta some cases  $^{110}$  with three conditions that should be met with a specific end goal to look at another claim of WTOirregularity with regards to provisions of the Understanding.

"First, that the claim is identified by the complainant in its request for the establishment of the compliance panel. Second, that the claim concerns a new measure, adopted by the respondent allegedly to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Thirdly, that the claim does not relate to aspects of the original proceedings or, if challenged, were addressed in those proceedings and not found to be WTO-inconsistent". (Article 21.5 of the DSU)

To date, thirty-six Article 21.5 consistence strategies have been started and twenty-four Article 21.5 panel reports have been circled. In three disputes, there were two progressive Article 21.5 consistence systems.<sup>111</sup> In most Article 21.5 processes up to this point, the first division of the panel with regards to the consistency of the panel.

In the event that the respondent neglects to actualize the suggestions and decisions embraced by the DSB effectively within a sensible timeframe agreed to by parties in the dispute, the defaulting party, if petitioned by the aggrieved party can go into agreements with the last party so as to get to a concession which will be an adequate remuneration. In the event that acceptable pay is not settled upon in twenty days of the expiry of the sensible timeframe, acknowledgement must be given by the DSB to the aggrieved party to terminate all agreements or other obligations to the defaulting party as stated in the covered agreements.<sup>112</sup> At the end of the day, it might look for approval to strike back. The DSB must settle on the approval to strike back in thirty days of the expiry of the sensible timeframe.

The assertion must be concluded within sixty days of expiry of the sensible timeframe, and a moment discretion or claim is unrealistic. The DSB is educated quickly of the choice of the arbitrator and allows, by turn around accord, the asked

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> Chile – Price Band System WT/DS207/AB/RW 22<sup>nd</sup> may 2007, Article 21.5 of the DSU. <sup>111</sup>Canada – Dairy WT/DS103/AB/R 27<sup>th</sup> October 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup>On the distinctiveness of the request for permission to suspend, it should be noted that such request must state explicitly the amount of concessions or other duties that a member proposes to suspend and sectors to which the retaliation will belong.

for approval to interrupt concessions or different commitments where the demand is reliable with the permission of the authority.

Take note that the DSU does not accommodate a practice for the withdrawal or disapproval to counter. The absence of such strategy is obviously not an issue when the first complainant is fulfilled that the respondent has pulled back or altered the WTO-conflicting measure. An issue emerges, in any case, when the first complainant is not fulfilled that the respondent has pulled back or changed the WTOconflicting measure and in this manner keeps up the striking back measure. This circumstance emerged in EC-Hormones, and drove the European people group to start new dispute settlement procedures against the United States and Canada with an end goal to secure the lifting of their countering measures.

On the off chance that the respondent neglects to actualize the proposals and decisions within the sensible timeframe and concurrence on remuneration cannot be achieved, the complainant may ask for the DSB approval to strike back. In any case, plainly such striking back is called for when the respondent has sure refused to realize the suggestions and decisions that is neglected to take a WTO-steady executing measure. The complainant and respondent may differ on whether it is WTO-predictable. To determine such differences, the DSU accommodates the Article 21.5 system.

#### CONCLUSION

The GATT is the result of the dispute settlement system. The dispute settlement is a continuation of the except for changes made as a result new developments. The GATT as a framework advanced from the 40s and the within the 90s from an institution that its fundamental authority was in the settlement of disputes through conciliations, and conclude with arbitration. The dispute settlement framework is a standout amongst the most notable accomplishments of the Uruguay Round. It is also a further accomplishment in the procedure of dynamic judicial administration of the settlement of worldwide trade dispute.

Beginning January of 1995 to date, the dispute settlement body has come to the aid of several countries by settling disputes impressively that amongst them. Advanced countries and developing- countrieshave regularly made use of the framework to determine their dispute, and these questions have concerned an exceptionally expansive scope of matters under WTO law.

The primary question and motivation behind the dispute settlement frameworks is the effective resolving of dispute through several methods. The framework leans towards WTO individuals to determine a debate through meetings as opposed to arbitration. The dispute settlement framework has been responsible for protecting the rights of members as stipulated in the covered agreements. The dispute settlement system is allowed to include or reduce the rights and commitments of members.

The dispute settlement body deciphers arrangements of the canvassed agreements as per the customary importance of the expressions of the arrangement taken in their specific situation and in the light of the question and motivation behind the understanding included. On the off chance that there are no fundamental and proper actions, they have plan of action to supplementary method for understanding. The weight of verification in dispute settlement procedures is on the party that asserts; it can be either the respondent or the applicant.

The dispute settlement proceedings are held in private. All written submissions, panel meetings and Appellate body proceedings are done in confidence. Proceedings of the Appellate are sovereign and fair, to maintain a strategic distance from

immediate and backhanded irreconcilable situations and to regard the secrecy of procedures.

The DSU accommodates three answers for breach of WTO law; a last remedy of withdrawal and replacement of conflicting measures, and two momentary remedies, to be specific, remuneration and suspension of concessions or different commitments generally alluded to as countering.

Consistence with the proposals or decisions of the DSB must be instantly, or, if that is impracticable, within a sensible timeframe. In many disputes, the party concerned follows the proposals and decisions in a convenient and right mold. If not, the DSB will, turn around accord, approve the first complainant to take striking back measures when asked.

Striking back measures put financial and political weight on individuals to pull back or change their WTO-conflicting measures. Be that as it may, questions exist with regards to the adequacy of striking back as a brief solution for break of WTO law.

The DSU has set out exceptional majors for members of countries under development for the sake of dispute settlement. A significant part of the guides and beliefs in these cases are of Majority of constrained noteworthiness. Powerful lawful help to developing- country members is given by the Geneva construct Advisory focus in light of WTO law, an autonomous worldwide association that offers lawful guidance stand for members of countries under development and least developed countries.

The dispute settlement framework is an extraordinary part of the WTO for its success in so many ways. The WTO has been on deck with proposals to be light and make significant modifications in the Doha Development Round. The primary test to the WTO dispute settlement framework is not its further change but rather the risky irregularity that takes place in the WTO's legal appendage and its political counterpart.

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