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CONSOLIDATION IN NIGERIA**

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Challenges of Federalism and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Federalism at all times and in places is work in progress. There has never been a perfect federal system anywhere in the world. But the fact still remains that federalism is widely acknowledged as a form of political arrangement that is most suitable for heterogeneous and diverse societies due to its ability and potential to foster and promote unity in diversity among the diverse groups in a country. By having the ability to accommodate diversity, federalism serves as a centripetal force to keep a state united. This essential potential of federalism has produced functional federal systems in countries like Canada, the United States of America (USA), Switzerland and African states like South Africa and Ethiopia. Therefore, the preoccupation of this study is to understand why Nigeria's federal system remains a sloppy, contested and conflict infested one, which from independence has been struggling to survive, not only in managing and accommodating its diversity but also in improving the lots of the Nigerian people. Driven by qualitative method, the study suggests that ethnic and religious factors resulted to a dearth of achieving the aspiration of federalism in Nigeria. Hence it is argued that for the Nigerian federal system to overcome its challenges, the various nationalities have to accept, tolerate and internalize the core values of federalism and also make for an environment where democracy can become fully consolidated.

Key words: Federalism, Conflict, Religion, Ethnicity, Democratic consolidation, Nigeria

ÖZ

Federalizm her zaman ve her yerde tartışılan bir konudur. Dünyanın hiçbir yerinde mükemmel federal bir sistem yoktur. Ancak gerçek şu ki, federalizm heterojen ve farklı toplumsal yapılar için en uygun siyasi düzenleme olarak Kabul edilir. Federalizmin farklı grupları bir araya getirip birlikteliği sağlayan bir siyasal düzen yapısını sağlar. Farklılıkları bağdaştırabilen yetisinden dolayı federalizm bir devleti bir arada tutan orta direk yapıdır. Federalizmin bu potansiyeli Kanada, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İsviçre, Güney Afrika ve Etiyopya gibi ülkelerde işlevsel federal sistemleri ortaya çıkardı. Bu çalışmanın esas amacı, Nijerya'nın federal sisteminin neden sorunlu, tartışmalı ve çatışma dolu olduğunun nedenleri üzerinde duracaktır. Gerçek şu ki, Nijerya'nın bağımsızlığı ilan etmesinden bugüne federal sistemi zar zor hayatta kalmaya devam ediyor ama vatandaşlarının hayat kalitesini ve farklılıkları bağdaştırmakta büyük zorluklarla karşılaşılıyor. Niteliksel metod ile yapılmış olan bu çalışma, özellikle etnik ve dini faktörlerin Nijerya'daki federalizmin potansiyelinde çok uzakta olmasına sebep olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma, Nijerya'daki federal siyasi yapının günümüzde karşılaştığı zorlukları aşabilmesi için farklı grupların federalizmin temel değerlerini içselleştirmesi, farklılıkları kabullenmeleri ve tolere etmeleri hususuna vurgu yapmaktadır. Ancak bu koşullar sağlanırsa, Nijerya'nın demokrasisi de tam anlamıyla konsalide olur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Federalizm, Çatışma, Din, Etnik Köken, Demokratik konsolidasyon, Nijerya

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APC:	All Progressives Congress
CAN:	Christian Association of Nigeria
EU:	European Union
IPOB:	Independent People of Biafra
MASSOB:	Movement of the Actualization of Biafra
MEND:	Movement of the Emancipation of the NigerDelta
MASSOB:	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra
MNOC's:	Multi-National Oil Companies
NDPVF:	Niger Delta Peoples Volunteers Force
PDP:	Peoples Democratic Party
SPCL:	Shari'ah Penal Code Law
UN:	United Nation
USA:	United State of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Social Republics

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the issue of unity and diversity in federal states has made researchers to progressively develop interest across wide range of issues (Moreno & Colino, 2010). This growing consideration and interest into federal states arise from three developments; (1) the acknowledgement that the state is no longer the space of a homogenous, sovereign country, but is presently a state of plurality and diversity (Caminal & Requejo, 2012); (2) the widespread of federalism in this 21st century, capturing more than half of the world's land mass and more than half its population (Watts, 2008); and (3) the reality of the incessant contestations of religious, ethnic and secessionist conflicts in many parts of the world today (Brancati, 2009). Consequently, the management of diversity is thought to be a basic test of state working in heterogeneous social orders. The implication is that since the core aim and motive of federalism is to foster unity in diversity, then it is to a large extent determined in the way and manner the state is able to device mechanisms for accommodating its diversities including religious, linguistic, ethnic and economic pluralism.

Federalism has become famous as an institutional political advancement for addressing the need for unity and harmony. It is generally hailed and viewed as being able to encourage unity in diversity, and at the same time promote and advance peaceful coexistence between and among the different sub-national groups in a state. The prestigious American researcher of federalism Daniel Elazar even inferred that federalism is the main shield for peace and steadiness in a quick evolving world (Hueglin & Fenna, 2010).

Numerous multinational states have accepted and adopted different models of federalism as a national solidarity enhancer and as an interstate clash relieving instrument (Brancati, 2009). Nigeria is among the countries that adopted a federal system. Federalism was embraced in Nigeria as a device for holding the country together to guarantee that the different ethnic and religious groups transfer their loyalties to the state (Ayoade, 1986; Gana & Egwu, 2003; Adibe, 2012). Adibe further stated that "federalism was embraced in Nigeria as a way of fashioning out 'unity in diversity' and managing the inevitable conflicts that result from the interaction of previously autonomous entities that were brought together into one state by the colonial order" (Adibe, 2012). In this simple description, Elaigwu and Garba summed up the rationale for Nigerian federalism;

“Federalism was adopted in Nigeria as a mechanism for managing conflicts associated with the process of national integration. The current Nigerian State is a creation of British colonialism following the Berlin Conference of 1884. The artificial boundaries created by the European partitioning of Africa created culturally diverse states as they brought together strange ethno-religious groups into one political territory regardless of geographical contiguity or even historical backgrounds of these groups”. (Elaiwu&Garba, 2014).

In this way, the fundamental reason behind Nigeria’s federalism is the aim to promote and foster national unity, solidarity and peaceful coexistence among the country’s diverse population. This is why Suberu posited that “Uniquely among African countries, Nigeria has consistently maintained a formal federal polity as a constitutional design for holding together this deeply divided society of three major ethnic groups, hundreds of smaller ethno-linguistic communities, and almost equal numbers of Muslims and Christians” (Suberu, 2009).

Despite this, ethnic and religious divides have continued to be sources for conflicts which have led to violence, hostility and bloodshed in the past and at present. Since the country’s move from military dictatorship to a civilian rule in 1999, ethnic and religious clashes have raged the country claiming thousands of lives and crippling the country’s federal survival (Lewis, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012). No less than 700 episodes of conflicts were recorded in different parts of the country within this period (Lewis, 2012), and most of this conflicts were either fought along ethnic or religious sentiments (Suberu, 2009; Lewis, 2012). The conflicts usually involve followers of the two religions in Nigeria, Islam and Christianity, and on the grounds that ethnic and religious identities crosscut each other, such conflicts usually snowball into ethnic and religious showdowns (Osaghae&Suberu, 2005). The situation has further been aggravated by the geographical dimensions of ethnic and religious convergences which divides the country into a Muslim overwhelmed North and an overwhelmingly Christian South.

Endemic ethnic and religious conflicts have had shocking outcomes on Nigeria and, combined with other dysfunctions, have crippled the country. Nigeria has the highest population in Africa and occupies a key place in the continents affairs (Popoola, 2005). However, most indexes have shown that Nigeria’s records of human development have either stagnated or

dropped to alarming levels in the previous couple of years. The country is placed among countries with low human advancement (153 out of 172 nations on the Human Development Report, 2013). As to peace and security, the situation is very worrisome. The country was positioned 16 out of 178 countries on the failed states index 2013, clearly a state of alert (Lewis, 2012). The quality of Nigeria's democracy was ranked 96 out of 104 countries. Similarly, on the Global Peace index 2014, the country was ranked 151 out of 162 and on the Global Terrorist Index 2013, the country was ranked 4 out of 162, a very alarming picture (Lewis, 2012).

Another worrisome issue is Nigeria's unhealthy democratic practice, the country received very low ranking, having a democracy ranking of 96 out 104 countries. Nigeria's democracy is confronted with such challenging issues of electoral malpractice, corruption, incumbency factor, lack of viable opposition, insecurity and political thuggery (Adeosun, 2014). These challenges often have negative effects on democratic stability and consolidation. The viewpoint here is that federalism and democracy are interconnected and compatible to each other. According to a 100 point index of democracy Schneider (2003), found that federal states and constitutions scored 69% points while unitary states and constitutions scored 31%. In another studies, it showed that federal constitutions have repeatedly displayed a better record of democracy than unitary constitutions. Hence Chhibber and Murali (2006) were of the view that since federalism promotes peaceful coexistence in a plural society, then democracy can facilitate the practice of federalism. In democratic regimes, federalism is established to limit state power and to augment citizen's opportunities to participate (Benz, 2015).

Africa like in other continents of the world started witnessing 'third wave of democratization' when military regimes were replaced by elected civilian administrations. Nigeria as one of the countries that experienced military dictatorship for over 30 years was caught in the snowballing effect of democratization process (Umaroho, 2006). Democracy in Nigeria was finally restored in the year 1999 and since then five general elections (1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015) were conducted.

However, the hopes and aspirations of Nigerians in the democratization process is gradually becoming a mirage and the expectations are becoming dashed. Disturbingly, eighteen years after the return to the present dispensation, the practice of democracy is yet to show clear evidence of good governance. Elections in Nigeria are subverted, there have been

political violence which had resulted to the death of many people in different parts of the country, electoral rigging, general insecurity, high profile acts of terrorism, kidnapping and bunkering of petroleum pipelines in the country.

The purpose of this research is to understand why Nigeria has remained deeply divided and the citizens continuously engage in either ethnic or religious conflicts, in spite of having set up in place a federal and democratic system adopted as a mechanism for achieving unity in diversity. Specifically, the study seeks to understand how the endemic ethnic and religious conflicts have hampered the integrative, unity, harmony and peace-promoting essence of federalism and achieving a democratic consolidation status.

Relevance of the Study

This research was proposed to add to a better understanding of why Nigeria has remained an intensely divided country and characterized by ethno-religious contestations and conflicts, despite put in place a federal system purposely adopted and drafted as a means of fostering unity in diversity and achieving peaceful co-existence. The study's normative approach would give an improved understanding of the relationship between the intended aim of the Nigerian federalism and the political culture as well as the application and practice of federalism among the population. It is aimed that the insights generated from the research would also be of use to Nigerians, particularly politicians, policy makers and the civil society as they continue to come to grips with the national integration conundrum and its devastating consequences on the country. The research would also add to the existing body of knowledge on the integrative role of federalism and the shared interdependence between the institutional and normative scope of federalism.

The research is going to be based on qualitative data. The aim of chapter 2, 3 and 4 of this research is to answer the following arguments below;

Arguments

1. Amalgamation was imposed on the various ethnic and religious groups by the colonial masters for their own economic and administrative advantage which is a crucial factor in the current trend of ethnic and religious conflicts.
2. There is an interrelated connection between federalism as a system and democratic consolidation.

3. Ethnic and religious conflicts are the biggest obstacles to the success of federalism and democratic consolidation.
4. There is a weak political culture of federalism in Nigeria which results to ethnic and religious conflicts.

In an effort to answer these questions, the research will explore on some ethnic and religious conflicts that have occurred in Nigeria so as to give explanatory arguments as to why federalism has not been able to promote unity in diversity and at the same time lead to democratic consolidation. In addition, Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria for democratic consolidation will be applied as a tool of analysis in the empirical chapters so as to answer the research questions.

The study will test the hypothesis raised in chapters two, three and four. Chapter two been the historical chapter is important because it explores how the diverse ethnic and religious groups were brought together by the colonial masters and also the trajectory of events that could be described as the genesis of the current ongoing conflicts in Nigeria. In chapter three, the hypothesis will be tested by exploring some ethnic conflicts that have occurred in Nigeria and as well analyzing the conflicts in relation to Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria. The same is also applied in chapter four which explores religious conflicts as factors that serve as obstacle to achieving a strong federal system in Nigeria and achieving democratic consolidation. This would help in finding the missing gap that would have assisted the country's federal system in achieving its aim.

In order to be able to come up with a comprehensive study, the research made use of scientific articles, books, journals and other publications including reports published on issues relating to the challenges of Nigerian federalism. Therefore, the methodology of this study will be based on secondary documents. Also, in an attempt to investigate the hypothesis, the findings from these secondary documents will be analyzed through content analysis. According to Holsti (1969), content analysis can be said to be any method or technique used in making inferences in an objective and systematic manner by identifying key important information in a message.

The research study will be designed as follows, apart from the general introduction and final conclusion; the first chapter will focus on literature review and theoretical framework in which the concept of federalism as the core topic of this study will be discussed followed by the

concept of democracy and democratic consolidation and the theoretical framework. In the second chapter, the historical background of Nigerian federalism will be discussed with some salient issues such as military rule in Nigeria and the Nigerian civil war. The third chapter will focus on ethnic conflicts as the obstacles to a successful federal system and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and highlighting some ethnic cases to showcase the danger they posed to Nigeria's survival as a federal united entity. The fourth chapter will focus on religious conflicts as obstacles to federalism and democratic consolidation as well as highlighting some of the deadliest religious conflicts Nigeria has faced. In both chapter 3 & 4, both conflicts will be analyzed using Linz and Stepan's 3 dimensional criteria for democratic consolidation (Behavioral, Attitudinal and Constitutional) in order to assess whether or not Nigeria's federal system and democracy can be considered as a consolidated democracy.

CHAPTER ONE: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter is aimed at reviewing relevant literature and the theoretical framework to inform the study. The literature review is divided into two parts. The first part delved into federalism and the focus was to gain a better understanding of federalism as the core theme of this thesis and the factors that shape the adoption of a federal system. The second part will be a brief review of the concept of democracy and democratic consolidation because of the strong correlation that exists between the concepts as argued in the introduction of this thesis.

1.2 Federalism

There are various definitions of federalism as there are so many conceptions and models. In fact, one can agree with Walker (1995) that as the history of federal system lengthens so do the variety and number of definitions (Cited in Habu, 2012). Federalism can be said to be basically a principle and idea that is so much concerned with the need and demands of the people and politics in a given society that chose to join and unite for common purposes yet remain separate, as well as to safeguard, maintain and preserve their integrity (Elazar, 1987). From Wheare's perspective, he sees federalism as a principle of organizing power and sharing responsibilities in a modern nation state. He further asserts that federalism provides an avenue for the coexistence of the centre and component units in such a way that the activities of the two governments are coordinate and at the same time each tier of the government is limited to its own sphere and should be independent of the other (Wheare, 1951: 15). Federalism is also seen as form of political and administrative arrangement in which the central government has some form of power that is separate from the component units in the federation. As a means and principle for organizing power, federalism helps in the separation of responsibilities amongst the various tiers of governments in plural societies. This view point has further been appreciated by Ricker (1964) and Walker (1995), whose major definitions dwell and centered on the autonomy of power and responsibilities of the different tiers of government in federating states. According to Ricker (1964) the authority of one tier of government to make decisions in its own sphere of jurisdictional powers independent of the other tiers of government is what makes a system federal. Walker also shares this view when he argues that one of the significant features of federalism is the provision of a written constitution in which substantive powers are given to major sub-national tier of governments (1995:20).

The system is primarily designed and intended to provide shared powers and resources between and among the various constituent units within a country. The concept of federalism has constitutional, legal, sociological, political and even administrative perspectives and connotations. What is more important in any federation is the ability of the system to provide an enabling environment for partnership and maintenance of unity in diversity for national integration through constitutionally delineated functions and roles of the federal, states and local governments. In a federal system, as K.C. Wheare (cited in Awa, 1976:4) noted, neither the central nor the regional component governments are subordinate to each other, but that each level of government is coordinate and independent to some degree. According to Tamuno's conception, federalism means powers and functions of the state are shared in a cooperative manner between the central government and its constituent units (Tamuno, 1988). This definition suggests that in plural societies federalism is a marriage of inconvenience and is designed to promote what Elazar says "creation and maintenance of unity and the diffusion of power in the name of diversity" (Elazar, 1985). This is to say that federalism is "usually a special approach to representation within the national government, and mechanisms, both legal and political to settle inter-level disparities" (Walker, 1995)

Thus, against the backdrop of what Tamuno (1988:13) called "center-seeking" and "centre-fleeing forces" in most federations, the aim of any federal state is to ensure maximum benefits to each of the component parts of the federating union through distributive justice, power sharing principle, political, religious and cultural tolerance, accommodation and consensus on issues that affect the viability of the system, and also guarantee peace and national unity. Federalism has to do with the questions of central and component unit relations. It represents the ways in which the various tiers of government are related and interconnected in order to carry out the expected functions. They further argued that a federal system is more than just the creation and establishment of separate tiers of government. It has to do with such issues as constitutional issues, laws, court interpretations and adjudications that can settle issues of authority between the central government and its various component units. The federal relationship that exists presently in the United States, for example, was created by the American Constitution, so with many other countries practicing a federal system (Smith, 1995).

On the other hand, Elazar stated that federalism is a powerful and complex concept, an arrangement of recognized constitutional divisions, suitable and proper institutions, well delineated patterns of political behavior, and ultimately a sound and strong political culture (Elazar, 1994). From the above, a federal system of government arises in the premise of the desire for power sharing between a central government and constituent units and as such the constitution is expected to play a meaningful, important and crucial role in the conduct of intergovernmental relations and how the provision of services are authoritatively delivered to various components that make up the federation. Similarly, Barton and Chappell (1985 cited in Hassan, 2014) say that federalism is a system of government in which there is a constitutional sharing of authority between a central government and its constituent parts. From the view point of Asmal (1994, cited in Hassan, 2014), the distinguishing factor between a federal constitution and a unitary constitution in relation to the capability of government is that the distribution and sharing of power between a federal and a regional government is defined in a federal constitution. Macmahon (1962) was of the view that federalism represents a notion and principle for the organization of decision-making processes in an association of groups of people with divergent interests within a nation state. The most important aspect of this association is that such groups are capable and endowed with a special and distinctive function in central decision making. In addition, the groups are able to have a relative sovereignty that is constitutionally recognized. Therefore, a Federal system of government recognizes and compliments the co-existence of sub-units with well-defined autonomy (ibid). Unlike in Unitary States, the central government plays a less dominating role in its relationship with the other units of governance.

Lukman (2004) stresses on the sharing and allocation of power in a political system with each level of government exercising its power within constitutionally approved and accepted sphere. It is viewed and accepted today that one of the important characteristic of American Federalism (widely regarded as the model of modern Orthodox federalism) is the relative dependence and autonomy of the state to govern them; but this autonomy itself, governed by Constitutional boundaries. Thus, a Federal arrangement in the American system, gives the constituents the ability to articulate their dependent political will and at the same time participate in an ordered, structured and permanent way in the arrangement of the central governments will. Essentially, the most important distinctive characteristics of federalism are

non-centralization (Hassan, 2014). American federal system of government is characterized by control and command, but it is famous for providing a condition of various structures that have reference to varied methods of problem solving (Ostrom, 1994). The methods in place permit the citizens within the society to achieve and attain peaceful conflict resolutions (ibid). Although, people have diverse interest, at the same time they pursue mutually dependent community interest. Ostrom argues from his American understanding that the “federal style is such that people govern through the institutions which they put in place and not that any government governs”. He further argued that this should be a “reflection of a true democratic society and a society that practice federal system of government” (ibid).

In its sociological view, William Livingston (1952) viewed federalism as a principle which attempts to provide a framework for the management of diversity in plural societies (cited in Burgess, 2006: 28). According to Livingston, the actual and true essence of federalism “lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in the society itself” (Quoted in Burgess, 2006:29). The fundamental aim of federalism is the promotion of unity, while also preserving the existing diversity of the nationalities that form the general union. This is to state that federalism is a system and framework which mediates and intercede the potential conflict that often arises from the heterogeneity within a particular community (Majekodunmi, 2015).

Federalism is also viewed as essentially a means of managing conflict in a multi-cultural state among two types of national self- determination which pledge security for all in the state on the one hand and self-determination of the constituent groups to maintain their identities on the other hand. It is also a method for managing and addressing conflict among heterogeneous group in a federation through a structure of constitutional sharing of power which grant for ‘shared rule’ while also allowing for ‘self-rule’ at the sub-national level (Ostrom, 1994). Ostrom further posits that federalism ensures for the delineation of powers between and among the various tiers of government that accordingly provide for ‘shared rule’ among the key significant units of the federation and at the same time make provision for autonomy and ‘self-rule’ at the sub-national level as groups seek to safeguard and defend their local identities (ibid).

Watts mentions that despite the fact that it is intricate and hard to set up a federal arrangement based on ethnicity, one among the distinctive feature of federalism is its aim and desire to preserve and generate unity and diversity altogether (Watts, 1999). According to Elazar,

federal systems function best in societies with enough homogeneity of deep-seated interests. He recognized Switzerland as the first modern federation that was built on indigenous and native ethnic and linguistic diversity and differences that were considered to be permanent and as such significant to be accommodated (Elazar, 1987). Elazar further noted that Political integration in a federal arrangement is liable to be more complex in places in which powerfully entrenched old primordial groups continue to dominate and exercise control on political and social life. Yet, he still maintained that federalism might be regarded as the finest form of political framework in the survival of permanent religious, cultural, ethnic or social groups in which political and economic life must be organized. Accordingly, territorial divisions of power can likewise be used to safeguard and protect the rights of minority communities by giving them better autonomy within their own deserved and merited political jurisdictions (ibid).

According to King, he postulated that in accommodating and preserving ethnic diversity, two forms of federal frameworks are ideal and should be considered. The first form is what he described as “the structure of a polity cutting across ethnic cleavages and thereby diluting them through the creation of a cross cutting civic community and, the second form is structuring a comprehensive polity to give each people a primary means of expression through one or more of its constituent polities”. Though, federalism should go beyond the recognition of differences by structuring relationships that can authorize the groups bearing those differences to operate together within that same political unit (King, 1982). Therefore, in some conditions, federalism offers the chance of establishing a community that goes beyond the divisions among ethnic collectivities and thereby makes it possible for the making of civil society and feasible political arrangement (ibid). Although, federal settings could be arranged on the root of territorially segmented ethnic, linguistic or religious divides, the danger is related with institutionalizing primordial entities in political union. As a result, “ethnic nationalism” becomes the strongest force against federalism, because ethnic ideology has the tendency to seriously weaken power sharing arrangements and as a result, ethnic federalism could lead into civil war. Hence, it is better to encourage political order based on non-primordial ties without disqualifying ethno-linguistic federal provisions (ibid).

According to Arendt Lijphart (2002), situations in which ethnic groups are geographically concentrated and intense, federalism could present an outstanding opportunity for group

autonomy. He therefore asserted that by accommodating the inevitability of drawing federal structures based on ethnic boundaries in case of geographically intense ethnic groups, the federal arrangement with somewhat many and small constituents could make the federal dividing lines coincide as much as possible with the ethnic boundaries. However, Lijphart, further recommends “convocational democracy” which has four important attributes, which are as: grand coalition, segmented autonomy, proportionality and minority veto. In cases where ethnic groups are geographically dispersed and coordinated, grand coalition is about power sharing of important groups in political power, mostly in executive power. Segmented autonomy on the other hand is about designation of decision making to every important group. Proportionality on the other hand holds that political representation, appointments into the civil service and allocation of funds should put in to consideration the proportion of each member group. And lastly, minority veto holds that power be given to minority groups to veto any decision that can put their key and important interest at stake as a result of majorities out votes (Lijphart, 2002). Lijphart further discusses some more or less useful power-sharing models in acutely divided and polarized societies. The models are executive power sharing which is in a form of grand coalition cabinet of ethnic parties found in Malaysia and South Africa, equal representation of ethno linguistic or groups in government example in the Belgian cabinets, and proportional shares and allocation of ministerial positions to the different and diverse linguistic groups which are found in countries like India and Nigeria (ibid).

Donald Horowitz on the other hand argues that federal organization based on ethnic homogeneity could be dangerous and unfavorable to the creation of inter-ethnic cooperation and collaboration (Horowitz, 1985). He recognizes the significance of power-sharing and regional devolution, as he claims that regional compartmentalization with devolution of some key imperative aspects of power can have tranquillizing impacts in countries with highly diverse and divided groups, sub-ethnic divisions and may pose undesirable conflict at the center (ibid). Furthermore, he said that a political structure that develops and legitimizes ethnic cleavages would be of inadequate usefulness to help achieve a compromised power-sharing arrangement in states with desperate and anxious ethnic groups, on the grounds that the elites of greater majority would not be so effortlessly moved as to give some of their political power, privileges some form of opportunity to the minority groups (ibid). Horowitz

further maintains and asserts that both ethnic dominant rule and ethnic minority control can be highly futile and destructive form of arrangement in ethnically divided and diverse societies. Majority rule permits the perpetual and continuous domination, subordination and subjugation of the majority group or the tyranny of the dominant and strongest ethnic group against the minority group (Horowitz, 1985).

Additionally, Horowitz still opined that in highly divided societies, issues of control of the state, the authorization of official languages, educational issues and policies, the content of curricula always tend to be very divisive and pose such question of which groups are not willing to concede; they usually are more worried and concerned about ‘who gets what’ in a kind of zero sum competition or game (ibid). Therefore, approaches, systems or models that could help encourage ethnic privilege and right may not be a possible option or alternative to bring about inter-ethnic cooperation, due to the fact that “divisive issues are not easy to compromise” and symbolic demands such as language seem to be less compromised than issues and claims that can be quantified (ibid).

In highly pluralized divided societies such as Nigeria, Malaysia and India, federalism as a model has helped ameliorate and reduce conflicts and tension at the center because lots of contested issues have become local-level issues within the various ethnic groups, it has helped dispersed the flow of conflict and clash in linguistically homogeneous states into sub-ethnic channels; it provides career opportunities for groups not properly represented at the center and it helps to reform institutions so as to modify ethnic balances and alignment (ibid). Furthermore, he observes that ethnic federalism has exacerbated minorities isolation and segregation, a group that is a minority at the central may be a majority in one state or more states and may likely be in a position to govern and rule these states, it may also likely at the same time produce other minority groups that may feel subordinated and dominated at the local areas (ibid).

According to Arowolo, federalism is a political theory that is conflicting in concept, varied in meaning and understanding as well dynamic in practice. The system involves how power is distributed or shared between and among territorially and functionally groups in a federation (Arowolo, 2011). Similarly, Okpanachi&Garba view federalism as a theoretical model to which a society can be brought into a state of harmony and conformity. He further says that it is a means and process of bringing people of different nationalities together through the use of

practical arrangements with the aim and intention of meeting both the common and diverse needs of the people (Okpanachi&Garba, 2010). Suffice to say, this implies that federalism is an institutional system of solving practical and imaginary problems in an ethnically divided society. Hence, the application of a political arrangement and model that would give room for harmonious relationship between and among the various groups becomes inevitable to maintain political stability which engenders socio-economic development (ibid).

Why do nations “federate” Why do people of a nation prefer to be in a federation than to secede? These are questions that are asked about the formation of all federations. In the past, most federations like Greek and Roman empires were formed as a result of military conquest and coercion: smaller independent empires were either powerfully assimilated to form a new larger and stronger empire or some decide to voluntarily join other empires to merge military force in order to prevent attacks and wars (Aziegbe, 2014). As a result, the threat or use of military force was the main unitary aspect binding sub-divisions together or used as a bargain (Ricker, 1964).

Apart from the use of military threat as a bargaining power, people of smaller units could come together due to economic reasons (Ricker, 1964). This is mostly voluntarily and federalism is viewed as one of the viable instrument to achieve this objective. This can be attributed to the formation of the European Union (EU) through the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992 (Hassan, 2014).

Most ethnically diverse societies found a federal arrangement as a means of mediating real or imaginary conflicts, states like Canada, Switzerland , USA, Australia, India have found there federal systems a veritable system designed for national integration and development. Therefore, one can be able to say that when Burgess noted federalism as “one of the most important historical innovations in modern government and politics” (2006), what he was trying to say is that federalism is to some extent elastic that it provides for decentralization, power sharing and the ability of the system to serve as a “shock absorber” to so many contestations, political schisms and social tensions in plural societies.

1.3 Democratic consolidation

It is important to attempt a clarification of the concept of democracy which is germane to the understanding of democratic consolidation. The concept of democracy has over the centuries

gained popularity and has become a household name because it is believed to be a sine-qua-non for growth and development (Adeosun, 2014). Democracy as a concept has become fascinating, interesting and attracting to people and governments, in fact even to the most authoritarian regimes. Recognized as being democratic has some soothing effect and relief on governments and makes for a sense of stability and legitimacy (Oni, 2014). What then is democracy? There is no universally accepted definition of democracy because different forms and patterns of democracy have emerged and existed. As such, as a concept it has gathered many definitions from different scholars. According to Almond, democracy could simply be seen as a political system and arrangement in which citizens of a particular nation or state enjoy a number of political and civil rights and also their most important key leaders and representatives are elected in a free and fair manner and are accountable under the rule of law as enshrined (Almond, 1974). Similarly, Lipset view and see democracy as a political system and arrangement which brings about regular constitutional privileges and opportunities for changing representatives and as well a mechanism which gives the larger population the ability to influence major decisions (Dada et al, 2013). For Robert Dahl, “democracy is a system of elected representative government operated under the rule of law, where the most significant groups in the population participate in the political process and have access to effective representation in the practice of making governmental decisions, that is of allocation of scarce resources” (Dahl, 1982). According to Moulin (1953), democracy stands for good ethics which involves the spirit of respect for human rights, fair play, and sense of humor, minority rights, tolerance and unselfishness (Moulin, 1953 cited in Oni, 2014).

Democratic consolidation on the other hand, as a concept has attracted the attention of scholars since the advent of the third wave of democratization. Scholars have used different understandings and conceptions to define democratic consolidation. Some of these definitions are based on two conceptions of democracy. The first one is a “minimalist conception” which is on procedural or formal democracy, while the second conception is the “maximalist conception” which focuses and emphasize on the outcomes of politics such as social justice, economic equality and institutionalization of political institutions (Lee, 2007). According to Diamond, democratic consolidation is the process of achieving extensive and wide legitimacy in such a way that all important and significant political actors within the state accept and

believe that popular democratic rule is by far better for their society than any other alternative they can think of. He further contends that democratic consolidation is a state whereby democratic rules become the legitimate means for the acquisition and exercise of political power (Diamond, 1999).

In another vein, democratic consolidation refers to a firm foundation and successful completion of the procedure of political democratization (Mansoh, 12 cited in Adeosun, 2014). It is also about democratic regime and system maintenance and about accepting and viewing democratic political institutions as the only legitimate structure for political contestation and a means of adherence to the democratic rules of the game (Ogundiya, 2009). Linz and Stepan were of the view that in a consolidated democracy, “democracy becomes the only game in town” and offered three dimensional criteria encompassing behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions of determining democratic consolidation. Behaviorally, there should be no significant political, institutional, socio-economic or national actors aiming to achieve their aims through unconstitutional means, violence or in any way trying to secede from the state. Attitudinally, they contend that democratic consolidation is achieved when a strong and majority public opinion views and accept democratic procedures as the only appropriate means of governing them. Constitutionally, democracy becomes consolidated when both state and non-state actors alike in the state become subjected and habituated to abiding by the laws and procedures put in place for conflict resolution (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Samuel Huntington in his own view postulates a “two-turn over” criterion as a determinant of democratic consolidation. He contends that democracy becomes consolidated when an incumbent regime conducts a free, fair and credible election by which the party that wins the election at the initial elections during the transition phase loses in subsequent elections and handover to the winning party and also, the winning party in turn hands over power peacefully to another party in subsequent elections (Huntington, 1993).

Therefore, the following research questions were raised;

1.3 Research Question

1. What necessitated the amalgamation of the different ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria?

2. Is there any link between federalism as a system and democratic consolidation?
3. What are the biggest challenges of federalism and democratic consolidation in Nigeria?
4. What does the current ethnic and religious conflict in Nigeria signify?

1.4 Theoretical framework

Some scholars have argued that federalism is not compatible with democracy or that federalism can be operated effectively under a totalitarian or military regime (Laski, 2005). However, the debatable line of argument on this assertion is obvious because, as the experience of some federal states such as Nigeria, Ethiopia and India have shown, when the attempted use of centralization of power to pacify or lessen the centrifugal problems arising from the multi - level diversities in these countries was plunged into serious political crisis that led to civil war in some of these countries (Abah, 2016). Federalism and democracy are wholly interconnected and jointly compatible and complement each other (ibid). In fact, some argue that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the successful practice of federalism under a non - democratic system. Federalism and democracy both support and promote pluralism and distribution of governmental powers in a state (Elaigwu, 2007). Right from the time of Baron de Montesque down to Madison, to contemporary times, theorists have always recommended that decentralized governance, as applied and exists in federal settings, hold many advantages which not only good for democratic participation, accountability and representation but as well for public policy and governmental effectiveness and efficiency as well as for the representation of religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences (Treisman, 2007 cited in Abah, 2016). Federalism as a system makes available to the society various points of access which enhance opportunities for open participation, rising the responsibility and openness of elected officials to local people and therefore providing incentives for further open democratic government (Abah, 2016). Proponents also think that the making and creation of decision making units at both local and regional levels also helps to strengthen public policy building which can help develop new initiatives to create solutions to societal problems (ibid).

In a 100 point index of democracy, Schneider (2003 cited in Abah, 2016), found that federal regimes scored 69% points while unitary regimes scored 31% points. In another research, a 30 year trend in the Freedom House scale revealed that federal states have always displayed a better trace of democracy compared to unitary states (ibid). Hence Chhibber and Murali(2006)

were of the opinion that federalism can promote multi-party contest and the politics of merger and alliance building as smaller parties can achieve credibility and increase electoral support within the federation.

Since federalism encourages and promotes the practice of democracy, so does democracy also promotes the practice of federalism. The description and features of a federal setup with its diverse groups paves the way for democracy because group competition and struggle coupled with the formation of coalition is one of the fundamental natures of democracy (Abah, 2016).

The main point of view therefore, is to connect federalism with democracy. True federalism, according to Wheare (1951), can exist only where there is the presence and practice of democracy; the absence of democracy is, “ipso facto”, the absence of federalism even if there is the provision of a constitution that describes the political system as being federal, because the component units must be involved in the policy making activity of the central government. So far this is achieved; it becomes a technique of representation (Abah, 2016). On this basis, federalism could be said to be a process of democratization in which the implicitness of the unifying theory contained by the units subsumes the parts contained by the whole (ibid). A federal arrangement presupposes aspiration and capacity to protect the component units against encroachment by the central government. Therefore, according to Duchacek (1970), “federalism and democracy are always found together; federalism is the territorial dimension of democracy; competition between parties is a condition of federalism”.

A very good example of a highly heterogeneous society is the ‘Dutch society’ which has religious and class differences. Despite the degree of ethnic, religious and social cleavages in Holland, it is described as a very good example of a successful democracy. A consociational democracy has been described as the key to the success in the Dutch society. Consociational democracy implies that the minority that exist in the society should be included and represented in the decision making process of the society. Since federalism is about the coming together of both the majority and minority, then consociational democracy provides the mechanisms that can be used to prevent disintegration, chaos and conflicts. One of such mechanisms according to Lijphart is federalism. Most, if not majority of countries practicing federalism today are democratic states. Federalism when applied with democracy leads to stability and the promotion of peaceful coexistence between and among the various components that make up the federation.

Since it is argued that true federalism can best thrive and function better in a democratic regime, then how can a true democratic regime be consolidated in a federal state? Even if a state is described or regarded as democratic, there are still many tasks that ought to be achieved, conditions that should be established, habits and attitudes that must be inculcated before democracy could be considered consolidated. Then what are the definitions or characteristics of a consolidated democracy? Thus, it is against this background that the research will adopt Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria (Behavioral, Attitudinal and Constitutional) for consolidated democracy as a theoretical model to assess whether or not Nigeria's democracy can be considered consolidated.

Many scholars in their effort to advance the definition and meaning of consolidated democracy have enumerated all the desirable characteristics that would help abet and improve the overall quality of democracy (Linz & Stepan, 1996). Linz and Stepan nonetheless combined behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional dimensions and they essentially mean that democratic consolidation is a situation in which democracy has become "the only game in town".

Behaviorally, democracy can become consolidated and achieved when no significant group/s attempt to overthrow or undermine the democratic system in a regime. Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when even in times of serious political, economic and social crisis; the larger part of the society still stand to believe that the democratic regime is favorable. Constitutionally, democracy becomes consolidated when all the citizens within the state become habituated to the fact that political stability and liberty can only be achieved when established norms are strictly adhered to and that the violation of these norms may likely be harmful and ineffective (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

In essence, when democracy becomes consolidated, it becomes well accustomed and highly internalized in social, institutional and even psychological life, as well as in calculations aimed at achieving progress and success for all. When these is achieved, then as argued by scholars, federalism can operate best in a consolidated democratic setting which enables the people to determine who leads them and in what direction. Therefore, the heart of the theoretical framework is combining Lijphart theory on democracy and Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria for democratic consolidation.

CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Nigeria is a large country with an approximate population of 180 million people (2006 census). It is the most populous country in Africa with over 250 ethnic groups (Madu et al., 2014; Suberu, 2009; Emmanuel, 2016). The most dominant ethnic groups include the Hausa/Fulani in the North which represent over 28% of the country's total population, Igbo in the East represent 19% and the Yoruba's in the West constitute 21% respectively. The North is predominantly Muslim while the East and West are mostly Christians. The ratio of Christians to Muslims is approximately 45:50 with some others been classified as animists or indigenous believers (Suberu, 2009). There are smaller ethnic groups of significance that cannot be undermined such as Ijaw; mostly Christians, Kanuri, mostly Muslims, Ibibio, mostly Christians etc. Generally, the northerners are classified as mostly Muslims and the westerners and easterners are grouped as southerners and Christians (Coleman, 1960).

Before the arrival of the colonial masters in the late eighteenth century, the Yoruba's in the west had already established a strong centralizing authority which was traced to the Ife kingdom. The Igbo's on the other hand were egalitarians, they were classified as a stateless society as a result of the absence of a single centralizing authority and as such, the largest political formation was the village group or clan. In the Northern part of Nigeria, there were already established states created by the middle of eleventh century and by the year 1800, Islam was the binding and unifying force amongst the various ethnic groups in the North. Before the arrival of the Europeans, the North was oriented towards North Africa (Oranika, 2004).

This background is important to show the multiplicity, distinctness, and independence of each of the major groups that make up Nigeria. This distinctness is still present and has become very much prominent in understanding Nigeria.

The objective of this chapter is to give a historical background of Nigerian federalism as well as the ethnic and religious composition of the country. In section one, the chapter provides an overview of the evolution of federalism during the colonial era. Section two gives an insight on the 1960 independence and the consolidation of the Nigerian state. Section three provides an insight on the first military coup and the civil war. In section four, an insight on federalism under military dictatorship (1966-1999) will be discussed. Section five focuses on the present structure of Nigerian federalism.

2.1 Evolution of federalism in Nigeria during Colonial Era

The origin, development and beginning of federalism in Nigeria could be traced back to the colonial period (Tella et al., 2014; Suberu, 2009; Emmanuel, 2016). The history of federalism in Nigeria could be said to be a product of the 1914 amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria by the then Governor general “Sir Lord Lugard” (Emmanuel, 2016). The two regions were amalgamated to form a British colonial administrative entity. Hence, governmental power in Nigeria at that time was shared between the central government headed by the Governor-General and the governments of the components of Northern and Southern protectorates (Tella et al, 2014). Therefore, with the existence and identification of the two component and autonomous parts of Northern and Southern protectorates, the governmental style of Nigeria at that period appeared in some way a federation (ibid).

The partitioning and division of Nigeria into three regional units by the then Governor of Nigeria Sir Arthur Mark Richards in the year 1946, under the Richard constitution of 1946 gave Nigeria a sense of federal state (Afigbo, 1981). Furthermore, Macpherson constitution of 1951 added solid concrete support in the sense that, it appointed lieutenant Governors to be in charge of these three regions and at the same time granted more legislative power to the legislative and executive councils that were established (ibid). Following a change of leadership from the colonial masters then came the Lyttleton constitution of 1954 which removed all forms of a unitary system of government from Nigeria and established a true federal state in the sense that it shared and allocated powers between the central and the component regional units (Umaroho, 2006). A Supreme Court was established as an institution to interpret and adjudicate in order to avoid any form of constitutional conflicts that might arise between the central and component union government (Emmanuel, 2016). After the attainment of independence in the year 1960, Nigerian has continued to keep and retain the federal system imposed by the departed colonial masters but however with a number of modifications over time (ibid).

According Afigbo (1981), the evolution and development of Nigerian federalism can be described on three fundamental reasons; first, he argued that the colonial masters purposely imposed the federal system on Nigeria to maintain and preserve a form of neocolonial control of the country after independence. He further said that since federalism is pretty much a proof

of some type of disunity, political shortcoming of uneven economic development, the colonial masters purposely wanted to maintain the federating regions together as possible so as to continue exercising influence and control in the affairs of Nigeria to their own economic, political and administrative advantage after they would have given Nigeria her independence (Afigbo, 1981). The second argument underscores the reality that geographical and historical factors are key issues that determined the political development of Nigeria (ibid). The large and diversified nature of Nigeria made it difficult to be controlled from one center. While the geographical and historical factors determined the constitutional advancement of Nigeria, these factors did not help decide the nature, type and form of the federation that the colonial masters helped to create in Nigeria (ibid). Finally, he argued that federation in Nigeria was not as a consequence of a country that was in the beginning unitary being made to switch to federation, but the case of absolutely free kingdoms, Empires, nations and self-representing groups being united, and winding up in a government union (ibid).

Going by the historical antecedents of Nigerian federalism, the choice of federalism as the favorite and suitable form of government for Nigeria was not accidental (Aba, 2006 cited in Hassan, 2012). As a result of the diversity and heterogeneity of Nigerian polity, the pioneer fathers of Nigeria adopted the federal structure as the most possible option and alternative of protecting and safeguarding the core interest of the various federating units. This was confirmed and entrenched in the federal constitution of 1963, where the powers and jurisdictions of the federating units were clearly defined. For instance, each federating unit had its own constitution which is one of the key elements of federalism (ibid).

Before the actualization of independence in 1960, the federating units were in all aims and purposes free independent entities. The attainment of independence by the three federating units in the year 1957 (Western and Eastern Nigeria) and 1959 (Northern Nigeria) further strengthened their respective sovereignty (Awolowo, 1968 cited in Hassan, 2012). This means that the federating units had an alternative of going their own separate ways as independent and autonomous states in the international community in the years 1957 and 1959 respectively. Therefore, it is a criticism to contemporary analysts of Nigerian government politics who continue to put the blame on the British amalgamation of the Northern and Southern people in 1914 as the source of Nigeria's problems. It is the Nigerian indigenous leaders that lost the opportunity to disengage from the forced amalgamation when they had the

choice in 1957 (Wender, 1997). Despite the introduction of federalism by the British and its continued practice after they have left, Nigerian federal democratic system has been characterized by series of instability and backwardness. It is on this premise that the study will reflect on some of the problems that bedevil the Nigerian federal system (ibid).

2.2 The 1960 Independence and the Consolidation of the Nigerian State

In the year 1958, delegates of the various ethnic groups attended a constitutional conference which was held in London to make all the necessary arrangements and final finishing to the independence constitution. At the conference, it was agreed that an office of the prime minister should be provided in the constitution, while all ex-officio members in the federal legislature were removed from the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives (Umaroho, 2006). Fundamental human rights were well defined and entrenched in the constitution. Judicial Service Commission was established and tasked with the responsibility of appointing judges of high and supreme courts respectively (ibid).

On 1 October, 1960, Nigeria was granted the status of independence by the British colonial masters. The independence constitution was federal in structure and model in the sense and manner that it shared and distributed power between the center and component units (Falola, 1999). Chapter 1 of the independence constitution states that “the federation of Nigeria shall consist of Regions and a Federal capital territory” (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1960, 1). The only force that binds the various ethnic groups was the constitution. It should however not be forgotten that it was an agreement between Nigerians and the colonial masters and not between the various ethnic groups (Suberu, 2009). The British handed over power and Nigerians took over the faulty union. The only difference between the colonial master’s government and the Nigerian people led government was that one was a foreigner and forceful invader while the other was indigenous (Aziegbe, 2014). The structure and pattern was still the same.

In 1963, a constitutional convention was held in Lagos, the then capital of Nigeria, in which Nigeria's political leaders chose that Nigeria ought to end up noticeably a republic inside the Commonwealth and a constitution was passed into law by the government parliament (Umaroho, 2006). Under the new constitution, the president took over the duties of the governor-general who represented the Queen of England as head of state of Nigeria (ibid). The president was also given the power to act as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria. Also the Judicial Service Commission was abolished and the president was given the power to appoint judges to the federal Supreme Court and the High Court on the recommendation and approval of the prime minister. Similarly, the privy council of London ceased to be the highest court, the Supreme Court of Nigeria therefore became the highest court of in Nigeria, and also the premier was mandated act as the head of the federal executive government at the component regional level. Additionally, emergency power was conferred on the federal government to declare where the need arises, a state of emergency throughout Nigeria or any part thereof (ibid).

The constitution also provided for the creation of additional regions. It further gave residual powers to the component regional governments and enacted a revenue allocation formula based on national interest, need and a balanced development (Elaigwu, 2005). A constitutional amendment procedure was entrenched and on the basis that a two-third majority of members of each house of the parliament of the three regions must sign to it (ibid).

The 1960 independence and 1963 republican constitutions of Nigeria typify some fundamentals and elements of a true federal system. A significant attribute of these constitutions was the powers given to the various regions which make them became effectively autonomous entities, with effective revenue formula, which ensured and promoted that the component regions had the resources to carry out governmental responsibilities (Emmanuel, 2016).

2.3 The First Coup (1966) and the Civil War

Nigeria was a “sleeping volcano” waiting to explode as a result of its diversity in geography and nation (Afigbo, 1991 cited in Aziegbe, 2014). After independence, the country was doing well economically, but problems started to surface due to lack of agreement between divergent people living under one country. The arrangement left behind by the colonial masters did not mirror the reality on ground (ibid). The burden of this instability was left for the indigenous Nigerian leaders who took over. There was agitation by minority groups for more autonomy that was not in the constitution because of the division into regions. As established in the beginning, there was never any platform for the constituent groups to determine their right and status in the union (Aziegbe, 2014).

Amidst confusion and crisis between the different ethnic nationalities, the first military coup took place in the year 1966 and it brought about a change in Nigeria’s political history

(Umaroho, 2006). The coup was led by five army officers from the eastern region and it resulted in the killings of the Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa a Northerner, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Northern premier, Chief S.L Akintola, premier of the Western region and other prominent army and political officers from the North and West. In their broadcast to tell Nigerians their reason for staging the coup, they stated that they did so in order to establish a strong and prosperous country free of corruption and internal strife (Umaroho, 2006). The new military leaders suspended the 1960 independence and 1963 republican constitutions replacing them with decrees and edicts and thereby substituting the federal structure with a unitary system (Nnoli, 1995).

As a result of the inclination of majority Nigerians for a federal system of government, the suspension and abolition of the federal structure was resisted and repulsion for the adoption of a unitary system of government led to a violent and bloody riot in the Northern part of the country (Emmanuel, 2016).

Tensions reached a peak in July, 1966 resulting in a total breakdown of law and order. This necessitated for a counter coup orchestrated by military officials from the Northern region in which the military leader and top officials from the Western region were killed. After the coup, a new military regime emerged headed by General Yakubu Gowon, a Northerner. He returned the country to its federal structure and at the same time appointed military governors to each region.

Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, from the east, claimed he was the most senior military officer at that time and therefore should be appointed head-of-state, and was also being pressurized by other Eastern military officers to demand for more regional autonomy and power from the central government. When they could not reach an agreement on issue, violent crisis started between the Igbos and Hausas in the northern and eastern parts of Nigeria. The military high command then summoned for a meeting with the various governors in Lagos to resolve the matter and find a lasting solution but, for fear of his life, Ojukwu, the governor of the eastern region refused to attend the meeting in Lagos (Aziegbe, 2014).

Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, not seeing any reason of being in a country where people of his region were killed with impunity decided to secede and proclaimed the Independent Republic of Biafra in the year 1967 (Umaroho, 2006). This led into a three-year bloodied civil

war. Many cities in the eastern part of Nigeria were captured in a heavy gun battle and high numbers of casualties were recorded on both sides.

On the international scene, “The Biafra was acknowledged by Gabon, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, and Zambia” (Oranika, 2004). Countries like France, Zimbabwe, Spain, Israel, Portugal, and South Africa did not officially recognize it but provided tactical support (Falola, 1999). The United Kingdom as the former colonial master supplied ammunitions to the Nigerian side and also more support came from the USSR who was seeking to gain a stronghold in Africa (Falola, 1999). The United States of America was however neutral but recognized the Nigerian government (ibid). The significance of foreign intervention should not be underscored on how they affect the stability of a diversified and multi-cultural country.

At the end of the three years battle, the Nigerian side was victorious and the war ended on January 12, 1970 resulting in the death of over one million people mostly from the east (BBC Africa, 2013). Once again, Nigeria was unified through the use of military force and international intervention and not based on treaty and agreement.

In view of the above, it is obvious that ethnic loyalty dominated all forms of political relationships in the quest for the control of the central government. The constitution that was inherited from the colonial masters and the constitutions written by the indigenous leaders did not create any significant platform to organize them based on willingness, compromise, desirability and agreement (Aziegbe, 2014). The international community promoted this by fueling one region of the union to the detriment of the others (ibid).

2.4 Nigerian Federalism under Military Dictatorship

In 1979, a new federal constitution was enacted and the constitution stated that “Nigeria shall be a federation consisting of states and a Federal Capital Territory: Section 2 (2)” (Tamuno, 1988). The new constitution recognized local government as the third tier of government. However, federalism in Nigeria under the military regime was a “military federalism: federalism with a Nigerian accent” (Tamuno, 1988). The structure inherited remained untouched and became more centralized as a result of the absence of a civil government. The military ruled by decrees/edicts and no law court could not challenge the decision of the federal military council (Falola, 1999). There was no regard for the constitution and governmental activities were over centralized.

The military government also opined that in order to solve the multi-ethnic conundrum and the perceived shortcomings in the federal structure, the military governments abolished the regions and created more unit states: twelve states in 1967, 19 in (3 Feb, 1976), 21 in (23 Sep, 1987), 30 states (27 August, 1991), and finally 36 states (1 October, 1996) (Ayau& Dakar, 2005). One of the reasons for the creation of more states was that of “a balanced federation” (Afigbo, 1991). However, this is a fallacy because the inherent instability highlighted by the lack of enabling pre-conditions remained. In the conditions, the central government was weak, but during the military era, power centered on the military head of state that possessed law-making powers and his decisions are unchallenged (ibid).

As regards to issues of fiscal relationship and revenue allocation, the share of the center was very much larger. The states and local governments had a very small sphere of influence and source from where to raise revenues and this led to over dependence on the central government for financial resources and policy formation (Emmanuel, 2016).

For thirty-six years of military oppression, “military federalism” was neither democratic nor consultative. The creation of states did not resolve the challenge of peaceful co-existence but fragmented the society. Instead, it increased the calls from other ethnic minorities to have their own state. Imagine if each ethnic group in Nigeria was to have a state, there would be more than 250 state units in the federal arrangement. This will lead to disorderliness and chaos and will further lead to fragmentation of the country.

With the attribute of tyranny, there was large scale corruption and no development. Political instability at its peak, incessant strikes in educational institutions became the order of the day, human right violations and abuses, clampdown on protesters and execution of human right activists were all the features of the regimes (Falola, 1999). “The military was discredited both as an institution and as an agency of governance” (ibid). It finally surrendered to pressure in 1999 by handing over to a democratic elected civil government. Contrary to the federal condition of desirability and partnership, there was no room for discussing grievances or negotiating the unity of the country.

2.5 Present Structure of Nigerian Federalism (1999 to date)

The present structure of Nigerian federalism is a product of the 1999 constitution which happens to be the fourth since the attainment of independence. The constitution was drafted by the military in its transition programme to hand over power to a democratically elected civilian

government in 1999 (Aziegbe, 2014). There was serious protest by Nigerians because they felt there was no consultation with the people of the various groups and the military did so without inputs from the various religious and ethnic groups in the country (Elaigwu, 2007).

The constitution begins with the preamble stating “We the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria”. Section 2 of it further adds that Nigeria shall be “a federation consisting of 36 states and a federal capital territory”. The 36 states are the component units of the central federal government and also with a number of 774 local government units serving as smaller component units (Elaigwu, 2007). The preamble therefore shows that the drafters of the constitution consulted the various nationalities of Nigeria, whereas it was drafted and documented by the military junta (Obinna, 2011).

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria’s federal arrangement has showed severe signs of weaknesses which have seriously derailed the process of achieving a true federal system and developing strong democratic institutions. Thus, throughout this period, Nigerian federalism witnessed intense frictions and challenges. Such of these challenges include; centralization/decentralization, weak federal and democratic culture, resource distribution between the central government and the component units, maintenance of law and order, citizenship crisis, economic deterioration, ethnic and religious rivalry, electoral malpractice, corruption, and lack of tolerance between and among the various ethnic and religious groups that make up the country.

Desirability and agreement are the most important elements that bind a federal state together in a democratic setting. When desirability is missing as a result of non-agreement or consensus on demands, constituent units might identify a “subordinate status and give vent to their frustrations through a wide variety of forceful means including violence” (Glass, 1977 cited in Aziegbe, 2014). In order to avoid an escalation of such crisis, all groups involved in the agreement must be able to “reduce their national consensus to a greatest common denominator” (Trudeau, 2005) despite the fact that it is difficult to rule out international interference today, it should however be minimal in order not to undermine the independence and autonomy of sub components.

Nigeria is characterized by such violent conflicts due to the lack of these enabling conditions for federalism. This has led to the increase in violent conflicts creating instability in the federal process.

CHAPTER THREE: ETHNIC CONFLICT AS AN OBSTACLE TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Conflict is widely acknowledged by specialist in peace and conflict studies and conflict resolution to have negative effect on governance and economic development (Habu, 2012). Over the years since return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has experienced intractable conflict of varying magnitude and consequences on lives and property and peaceful coexistence among her various ethnic groups (Suberu, 2009). Whether from the East, the west or the North of the country, conflict, arising from political, economic or social contestations has become one of the identifiable features of Nigeria's plural society, and has increasingly become a real, not imaginary, area that can be considered a weakest chain in the country's bid to build a virile democracy and uphold its existence as an indivisible entity (Habu, 2012).

In Nigeria's multi-ethnic federation, the phenomenon of conflict is rooted in the historical formation of the country as a modern nation state and this has been compounded by the trajectory of politics in the country's unbalanced federal set up (Odubajo, 2011). The prolonged period of military authoritarian rule with its attendant marginalization of society and insensitivity to inter-group relations has also widened the already existing contradictions of social relations in Nigeria (Abah, 2016; Emmanuel, 2016). It is these contradictions that breed social tension there by leading to social exclusion and identity politics; the ramifications of which often engender xenophobic social relationships among people of different nationalities in the country (ibid). As a result, the seeds of temptation, intolerance and insecurity among citizens of the same country are planted which eventually germinate and blossom into conflict (ibid). Similarly, even after the terminal end of the military rule in 1999, Nigeria continues to experience various conflicts with varying degree of consequences, threatening not only the survival of the country's nascent democracy but also its corporate existence as a political entity (Elaigwu, 2007).

The objective of this chapter is to examine the issues involved in ethnic conflicts, particularly the major ethnic conflicts and secessionist case in Nigeria's federalism that exacerbate the internal dynamics of tension and animosity among the various ethnic groups in Nigeria. The ethnic conflicts to be discussed are selected due to the degree and magnitude of threat and danger they posed to the survival of Nigeria as an indivisible united entity.

This chapter will also aim at making an empirical analysis in relation to the established theoretical framework in chapter two of this thesis, that is Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria (i.e. Behavioral, Attitudinal and Constitutional[see pages 16 & 19]) for consolidated democracy as a tool of analysis. As it was argued in the theoretical chapter [see page 19] that federalism and democracy are wholly interconnected and jointly compatible and complement each other and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the successful practice of federalism under a non-democratic system. It is on this premise that this research will adopt Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria as a tool of analysis, thereby applying these criterions in each of the cases of ethnic conflicts to see how each of these conflicts have derailed the process of achieving a successful federal system in Nigeria.

To this end, this chapter will be divided into four sections. Section one will focus on Biafra secessionist conflict which began in the year 1960 and resulted to a bloody civil war and also eventually led to the rise of armed groups such as the Movement of the Actualization of Biafra (MASSOB), Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) that are threatening the peace and stability of Nigeria's federal existence. Section two will discuss the Niger-Delta militancy and the Ijaw-Urhobo-Itsekiri conflicts with a view to highlighting the main issues that have continued to create more and more conflicts. In section three, Hausa-Fulani versus Beroms (Settler versus Indigene Conundrum) conflicts and see the factors that have continued to create tension and animosity between the two groups and as well highlight the demands of each group. Lastly, section four will discuss the Tiv-Jukun conflicts as one among the myriad of conflicts in Nigerian federation and how it has become politically and socially convulsive with attendant mayhem and atrocities. The analysis of every section in relation to the theoretical framework will come at the end of each section

3.1Biaran Secession Conflict

It is argued by many that it was the colonial masters that sowed the seed of the 30 months civil war of 1967-1970 in the amalgamation of the then separate Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria (Umaroho, 2006; Elaigwu, 2007; Emmanuel, 2016). This is as a result of the colonial policies that were not in line with the diverse nature of the colonies because some of the policies were skewed to favor one region against the others and also by bad governance from the immediate post-independence political leadership (Emmanuel, 2016). The fruits the seed of amalgamation bore were hostility, animosity, fear of domination,

regionalism, ethnic rivalry, greed, political discord, struggles for the control of the central government, socio-economic and political crisis which later metamorphosed into the unprecedented Nigerian civil war (1967-1970[see page 24-25, Chapter two]).

The Biafran secession is an attempt by the South Eastern states of Nigeria who are predominantly Igbo ethnic group to secede from Nigeria and create an independent state of Biafra (Okonta, 2012). Following series of political instabilities, civil war, coups and counter-coups, Biafra was finally defeated by the Nigerian government.

However, on 1 November 1999, five months after Nigeria returned to civilian rule, a group of people from the Eastern region led by Ralph Uwazurike resurfaced with a new violent group known as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) (Okonta, 2012). The group wrote a document titled 'Biafra Bill of Right' to the United Nations office in New York stating that the people of Biafra numbering about 30 million and among one of the major ethnic groups in Nigeria hereby seek the actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra (Okonta, 2012).

The biafran resurgence and the document sent to the UN in 1999 was the factor that culminated another phase of crisis in Nigeria to date because since then, the group has resorted to the use of violence on government officials and people from other ethnic groups living in their region. In addition, they have even introduced their currency, national flag, radio and TV stations both within Nigeria and abroad, they have continued to import arms and financial support from their members living in America and other European countries, and in the year 2012, the group introduced its international passport for its people (Onuoha, 2014).

The demand of the Biafran people can be categorically stated as according to Ugorji (2015);

- Declaration of their right to self-determination, outright independence from Nigeria; or
- Self-determination within Nigeria like in confederation as agreed at the Aburi meeting of 1967; or
- Dissolution of Nigeria along ethnic lines instead of allowing the country to break up in bloodshed.

This will reverse the amalgamation of 1914 so that every region or ethnic group would return to their ancestral homeland as they were before the coming of the colonial masters.

An important question that needs to be asked is,

- Is the right for secession or self-determination a legal or illegal in the current 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria?
- What are the implications of the actions of Biafra agitators, could their actions be considered as treason or treasonable felonies?

Sections 37, 38 and 41 of the 1999 constitution criminal code of Nigeria defines treason and treasonable felonies as “Any person or persons who levy war against the Nigerian government with the intention to intimidate or overthrow the president or governor, or conspires with any person either within or without Nigeria to levy war against Nigeria, or instigate a foreigner to invade Nigeria with an armed force is guilty of treason and is liable to the punishment of death upon conviction” (Ugorji, 2015).

Up till today, the group has continued to carry-out there violent acts especially in retaliation to the capture and detention of their key leaders such as Ralph Uwazuruike and Nnamdi Kanu who is still under detention by the Nigerian government. Of recent, on May 30, 2016; November 24, 2016; December 16, 2016, there were serious clashes between government forces and the group members which led to the death of over 300 people.

Analysis

The movement for the creation of the independent state of Biafra which led to the unprecedented Nigerian civil war [see page...] in later years metamorphosed to the group known as Movement of the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), formed in the year 1999 as a secessionist group by Ralph Uwazuruike with the aim objective of ensuring the resurgence of the defunct state of Biafra from Nigeria (Okonta, 2012).

Since 1999, the group has resorted to armed struggle against the Nigerian state with its aim to establish an independent state of Biafra in Southeastern part of Nigeria. The group strategies include attacks on people of other ethnic groups living in their region, armed confrontation with state security operatives and destruction of public properties (Okonta, 2012). The group members have also resorted to denouncing their Nigerian citizenship, hoisting Biafran flags, mass protest, re-introduction of the Biafran currency and passport and by the year 2005, the group had started receiving arms and financial support from its members living in the diaspora (Onuoha, 2014).

By May, 2013, former President Goodluck Jonathan declared that the group has become capable of disrupting the stability and survival of Nigerian federal democratic regime (Onuoha, 2014). Similarly, the Nigerian Department of Security Services also declared that the group posed the most challenging internal threat to the survival and unity of the Nigerian state (ibid).

Up till today, the group has continued to carryout there acts especially in retaliation to the capture and detention of their key leaders such as NnamdiKanu who is still under detention by the Nigerian government. Of recent, on May 30, 2016; November 24, 2016; December 16, 2016, there was a serious clash between government forces and the group members which led to the death of over 150 people.

Therefore, if one considers the objectives of the group, one can rightly say that the group has become a significant actor in Nigeria and as such its actions and behaviors completely violates Linz and Stepan's criteria for consolidated democracy because " Behaviorally, a regime is considered consolidated when no significant actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objective by creating a non-democratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state". This implies that as long as the group continues to carry out its activities in order to secede, Nigeria cannot satisfy the criteria for consolidated democracy according to Linz and Stepan.

3.2 The Niger-Delta Militancy and the Ijaw-Urhobo-Itsekiri Conflict

The Niger-Delta area is located in Southern part of Nigeria and is where crude oil is extracted in large commercial quantity. It is a home to many multinational oil companies (MNOCs) and as a result, oil production and exploration activities by these oil companies have made the life and living condition of the people miserable and difficult. It is also inhabited by diverse ethnic groups which includes the Ijaws, the Urhobos, and the Itsekiris. The people of the area are predominantly farmers and fishermen and as a result of the negative effects of oil production on the environment, it has led to a drastic decline in economic activities of the poor people living in the area. As a result, the people became impoverished despite the fact that it is there land that funds Nigeria's government from the sale of crude oil (Emmanuel, 2016).

The main spotlight of this section is the oil-inspired or triggered armed militancy in the Niger-Delta area of Nigeria. As Oyefusi (2007) noted, like other oil producing countries of the world, Nigeria has not been spared the woe of frequent violent conflicts. The armed militant

agitations of the people of this area have their roots in what could be explained as environment natural resources-conflict linkage pathways, which Phil-Eze's (2009, cited in Emmanuel,2016) explained as follows:

- i. Avoidance from control or foreswearing of access to rare or extractive common raw materials.
- ii. Use of stolen extractive assets to back arms and aggressors.
- iii. Undermining of peace prospects by recipients of contention circumstance who might somehow or another lose access to incomes picked up from asset abuse.

The link and connection between environment and violence is demonstrated by environmental degradation and pollution as a result of crude oil production multi-national oil companies (MNOCs), the federal government's trade-off of the welfare and wellbeing of the people of Niger-Delta by subordinating its primary responsibility to MNOCs activity and revenues accruing there from MNOCs' socially irresponsible activities, and the impoverishment of the people of this area, all of which combined led to the formation of armed militant groups who have resorted to violently agitating for fair, reasonable and equitable distribution of oil resources (Okpanachi&Garba, 2010; Aba, 2006). Thus, groups such as the Niger Delta People's Volunteers Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) were created, each of these militant armed groups represent one ethnic group or the other and they engage in violence with each other and sometimes with government security operatives. They are seen as militants fighting against environmental degradation, resource control, unemployment and marginalization. The activities of these militant groups range from the destruction of oil production, seizure and capture of transportation facilities and the kidnap of foreign oil workers (Arowolo, 2011). As a result, this has prompted the interruption of operations, oil streams and slices in oil income accumulating to the government. This has affected adversely on government's formative movement. The results of these were unemployment, impoverishment and further increment in militancy and other criminal acts.

Analysis

Unlike the Movement of the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) that are a secessionist group, the Niger-Delta militant groups such Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), Niger-Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The group's

cause of struggle is as a result of claim for environmental degradation, resource control and marginalization.

The tactics of these armed groups covers the destruction of oil production installations, kidnap of foreign oil workers, kidnap of government officials and recently bombings of important oil locations and gatherings (Emmanuel, 2016). Even though the federal government has for long approved a 13% revenue allocation formula to the oil producing states, yet the militants are still agitating for greater resource control. The group has been carrying out attacks on the state since the year 2006 to date.

Given their objective and tactics, it can be seen that the group has become a significant actor capable of disrupting Nigeria's democratic regime and as such, if it continues, then Nigeria does not satisfy Linz and Stepan's criteria for democratic consolidation because 'Behaviorally', no regime is consolidated when a particular actor or group is turning to violence in order to achieve its aim and also 'Constitutionally' a democratic regime is consolidated when all forces within the state become subjected and habituated to the instituted laws and procedures of conflict resolution within the state. As such, Nigeria can only achieve or satisfy these conditions when these groups cease to exist or embrace dialogue as the means of solving the conflict.

3.3 The Hausa-Fulani versus Beroms (Settler versus Indigene Conundrum) Conflicts

The conflict between the Hausa-Fulani and Berom minority ethnic group in Jos, Plateau state of Nigeria follows the Indigene-Settler paradigm and according to Emmanuel (2016) is centered on the determination of "who are the indigenes/the original owners of Jos or who settlers are? The Beroms or the Hausa/Fulani". A "native" of a specific ethnic group in a state in this context is synonymous with an "indigenous" that is a "son/daughter-of-the soil" and in local parlance it refers to "ascribed identity of being born in a particular location into a specific ethnic group considered to have a 'homeland' within the locality (Alubo, 2009). Thus, regardless of being a citizen of Nigeria, any person who has his/her ethnic genealogy elsewhere, even if he was born in a particular place or lived all his life there, is regarded a 'settler'. The Hausa-Fulani (settlers) are predominantly Muslims who constitute 12 per cent of the population, while the Berom (natives) are predominantly Christians and constitute 84 per cent of the population (Habu, 2012).

Inter-group relations between the two groups have changed dramatically following the 1994 Jos violence. Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Jos Plateau has been embroiled in violence in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 with dire consequences on corporate existence and unity of Nigeria (Africa Report, 2014). More importantly, conflict in Jos between the two groups is more than a local concern, but a national issue because it is embedded in citizenship right and its associated constitutional dilemma, which makes one a Nigerian citizen only in his state of origin, as a major criterion for appointment of citizens into federal civil service (Onifade&Ojukwu, 2010 cited in Habu, 2012).

The major reasons or areas of contestation on the conflict is the demand by the Beroms (natives) that the Hausa-Fulani (settlers) should not in any way compete with the indigenes for land, political appointments, employment into government agencies and access to equal rights because they feel (indigenes) are the real owners of the land, on the other hand, the Hausa-Fulani (settlers) claimed that they had settled in the area for more than a century and as such, they should be given equal opportunity (Odidi, 2014). The settlers also claim that they pay more tax, they contribute more to the governments generated revenue and also have a population that significantly contribute to the development of the state, as such, they feel they should not be marginalized (Krause, 2011). Another issue is that both the state and the indigenes jointly discriminate against the settlers, making it difficult for them to earn a means of livelihood and limiting their access to resources. The government has also denied the settlers access to basic social amenities such as health facilities, electricity, portable drinking water and good road network in areas that are dominated by the settlers because the state had already been polarized into settler/indigene areas of residency (Habu, 2012).

The 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria has provided for equal rights and treatment of all Nigerians irrespective of one's ethnic origin. Chapter 3 of the constitution clearly addressed citizenship, but it however failed to mention or explain indigene status in determining a person's citizenship rights (Odidi, 2012). Similarly, chapter 4 of the constitution clearly stated the fundamental rights of all Nigerian citizens, which include the right to be free from all sorts of discrimination and marginalization. Also, section 41(I) gives all Nigerian citizens the right to "move freely throughout Nigeria and to reside in any part thereof". Section 42 further stressed that "a citizen of Nigeria of a particular community, ethnic group, sex, place of origin, political opinion, religion shall not, by reason only that he is such a person, be

subjected either expressly by, or any executive or administrative action of the government, to disabilities or restrictions nor any privilege or advantage to which citizens of Nigeria of other communities, ethnic groups, sex, political opinions, places of origin are not made subject". Furthermore, in section 42, it was also stated that "no citizen of Nigeria shall be subjected to any disability or deprivation merely by reason of the circumstances of his birth". Finally, section 43 guarantees every Nigerian citizen "the right to acquire and own immovable property anywhere in Nigeria". There are no constitutional provisions that make these aforementioned rights dependent on one's indigene status (Krause, 2011).

Therefore, the constitution guarantees every citizen full residency rights and encourages every individual to pursue his legal and legitimate aspirations without any form of discrimination.

The case of Jos ethnic conflict suggests that, a power relation in a divided society is likely to snowball into perennial conflict among ethnic groups when the state scarcely used justice to settle this conflict. Furthermore, the amalgam of economic, religious and political interests have made ethnic identities a rallying point for contestation over who gets what, why and how (Aba, 2006). Reinforced by the constitution, the indigene/settler crisis has become an albatross in Nigeria's federal system; it threatens peace, derails the process of achieving democratic federalism and causes insecurity in the already polarized society (ibid).

The consequence of crisis in Jos is thousands of lives were lost and properties worth millions, both public and private properties, were destroyed. Businesses were destabilized, the Ultra-modern main market was burnt to ashes, schools were burnt and destroyed, female staff and students were raped.

3.4 Jukun-Tiv Conflicts

The Jukun-Tiv conflict in Taraba State is one of the myriad of conflicts in the Nigerian federation which has over the years become politically and socially convulsive with attendant mayhem, atrocities and huge losses in lives and property. The conflict has a long history which dates back to the 19th century. In short, interaction between the two antagonistic ethnic groups predates colonialism (Egwu, 1998). According to Avav (2002, cited in Habu, 2012), both the Tiv and Jukun migrated to the area where they currently reside, that is, Benue Valley. At that time, ethnic and administrative boundaries were absent. The Jukun particularly had no boundary with any other ethnic group apart from the Kanuri, Hausa and Igbo (Best *et al*, 2003). As a result, many groups who found themselves in a place cooperated with one another.

According to Shut (2007), the relationship that existed between the two ethnic groups was cordial and harmonious before the arrival of the colonial masters. The tide of that amiable coexistence changed from the 1960s due to factors that were directly related to the political economy of the two ethnic groups. The worsening relations from the 1990s and onward as characterized by frequent conflicts among the two nationalities mostly over land and political rivalry is a clear indication of the existence of an intractable, deep-rooted and fundamental disagreement between the two groups (Best et al, 2003).

Colonialism had a significant impact in defining the patterns of ethnic relations in Nigeria and her development process (Nnoli, 1995). In an attempt to understand the Tiv-Jukun conflict, it is very important to underscore the colonial historical linkage of the two ethnic groups and how this, right from the onset, prepared the ground for conflict-laden relations between the two groups. When the colonial masters came, their mode of interaction with the ethnic groups set the stage for ill-feeling between the groups (Anifowose, 1982). Most of the colonial policies were not premeditated by the desire to graft a permanent stint of unity between the two groups. In short, the colonialists laid the superstructure for the plethora of conflicts in Nigeria and other African countries today (Mazrui, 2008). For example, the Tiv were spread all over the country when the colonial masters discovered the potentials of the Tiv people in terms of providing the needed workforce and food for the colonialist to achieve their economic objective (Nnoli, 1995). The colonial masters were fully aware that the spread and expansion of the Tiv to other parts of the country will in the long run incur the wrath of other ethnic groups but still persisted with the policy.

The Jukun-Tiv conflict has gone through various epochs. The first conflict atmosphere was created in 1959 and by 1964; conflict and violent outburst were imminent between the two groups as violent confrontations continued to erupt in the years 1981, 1982, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2001 and lastly the 2014 conflicts (Emmanuel, 2016).

The conflicts had multidimensional consequences on the two groups, the government and the stability of the Nigerian federal system. These consequences were economic, social and political. The crisis shattered the local economic bases of the two ethnic groups and led to the destruction of infrastructure especially schools, health centers and houses. In terms of human loss, it is difficult to ascertain the number of casualties because of non-uniformity and conflicting figures documented by many sources (Alubo, 2006).

Also, the negative economic consequences of the conflict were not only felt by the two ethnic groups, but by the entire country. Given that the two ethnic groups are essentially farmers who cultivate nearly 65% of the country's food, the conflict affected the supply of major food items to mostly parts of the country thereby impinging directly on the national economy.

Analysis of Hausa-Fulani versus Beroms/ Tiv-Jukun Conflicts

The Jukun-Tiv/ Hausa-Fulani versus Berom conflicts could be described as two similar cases in the sense that they all follow the indigene-settler paradigm and according to Emmanuel (2016) is centered on the determination of “who are the indigenes/ the original owners of a particular area and who are settlers or immigrants”. It is quite apparent that Nigerians living or residing in other parts of the country other than their own feel less at home because of the *de facto* practices by the so-called indigenes that tend to alienate the ‘visitors’. Many Nigerians suffer discrimination and are denied certain rights where they live because their host communities see them as settlers and non-indigenes (Toure, 2009 cited in Habu, 2012). Paradoxically the *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999* in Section 42 abhors discrimination of Nigerians by virtue of their ethnic affiliation, sex, religion etc. The constitution also states the rights of Nigerian citizens in Chapter IV. Also Section II, Subsection 15 states that it is the duty of the state to provide for every Nigerian the right to;

- (a) Provide adequate facilities for and encourage free mobility of people, goods and services throughout the Federation.
- (b) Secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation.
- (c) Encourage inter-marriage among persons from different places of origin, or of different religious, ethnic or linguistic association or ties; and
- (d) Promote or encourage the formation of associations that cut across ethnic, linguistic, religious and or other sectional barriers.

Despite the constitutional provisions, conflict between these ethnic groups has become a recurrent feature. The eruption of violent conflicts between these ethnic groups as manifested in many forms and dimensions have wide range of implications on the Nigerian federation and the consolidation of democracy.

From the above, due to the incessant violent conflicts between these ethnic groups, to the extent that the stability of Nigeria is threatened makes Nigeria violate Linz and Stepan's criteria for consolidated democracy because ‘Constitutionally’, a democratic regime can be

consolidated when “the actors in a democratic regime obey the laws, the constitution and also the mutually accepted norms of political conduct”. Meaning that actors have to abide and act within the boundaries of constitutional democratic order. Failure to comply with the democratic paradigm and principle clearly means being disloyal to a democratic regime.

Table 3.1: Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria (1966 to Date)

Date	Location	Principal Actors
1966-1970	Nigerian Civil War	Nigerian government against the Biafrans who claimed to have seceded from Nigeria
1980, 1990, 1992, 2001, 2006, 2008	Taraba state	Violent conflicts between the Jukun and Tiv ethnic groups
1992, 1999, 2011, 2016	Kaduna State	Violent conflicts between Hausa-Fulani and the Katafs
1994, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2010 and 2011	Plateau State	Conflicts between Hausa-Fulani and Beroms over who is an indigene and who is a settler
1992, 1999	Lagos	Conflict between Hausa traders and Yorubas which led to the loss of many lives
1999	Bodija Market, Ibadan	Conflict between Hausa traders and Yorubas which led to the loss of many lives
July 1999	Lagos Shagamu	Long standing rivalry between the Yorubas and Hausas over land ownership
1999	Kano	Reprisal attack by the Hausa in retaliation of the killings of their people in Lagos state
2000, 2001, 2005	Osun State	An inter group conflict between the Ife and the Modakeke's which claimed many lives
1990's to date	Niger-Delta	The Ijaw-Itsekiri-Urhobo and the Militancy Conflicts
2010	Plateau State	Conflict between Fulani herdsmen and the Beroms
2015 to date	Kaduna State	Violence between Fulani herdsmen and the Katafs

Source: Elaigwu, 2006; Emmanuel, 2016.

This chapter has addressed ethnic conflicts and their implications to the survival of federalism and democratic consolidation in Nigeria. Regrettably, whenever conflicts erupt, many people become victims, as a result of loss of lives and property. The consequences of conflicts in the lives of the victims live with them for a long period of time. In several ways, victims

of conflicts develop mistrust and fear against their neighbors, and this in many ways affects the process of national integration and peaceful co-existence.

The cost of ethnic conflict is far expensive than the cost of post-conflict reconstruction, as such there must be a collective resolve to minimize conflict for a balanced federal system and the actualization of democratic consolidation.

As presented in this chapter, the secessionist activities of Biafra people and the militant activities of the Niger-Delta people are crucial obstacles to achieving a stable and durable democratic and federal system in Nigeria, it becomes clear that the extent to which these obstacles are overcome is imperative to achieving a strong and virile federal united Nigeria. Federalism and democracy can become fully habituated and internalized when no group of people becomes significantly powerful economically, politically and financially attempting to create an undemocratic and anti-system process. As such, Nigeria can overcome these when these groups cease to be significant actors employing violent methods and receiving foreign aid in order to secede.

Also, for democracy to be consolidated, the Nigerian state must be able to bring an end to the action of groups such as the secessionist group of Biafra (MASSOB), the militant groups of the Niger-Delta (MEND, NDPVF) through a nonviolent and peaceful means because the use of force has proved unsuccessful. In the case of the indigene/settler crisis, governmental and non-governmental forces alike must respect the federal model based on equal opportunity for everyone resident everywhere in the country irrespective of social differences.

CHAPTER FOUR: RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AS AN OBSTACLE TO NIGERIAN FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Nigeria as a country is inhabited by the adherents of Islam, Christianity and African traditional religion. However, the adherents of Islam and Christianity are the dominants with an equal distribution of both Muslims and Christians who are often engaged in violent conflicts (Suberu, 2009; Ushe, 2015). The result of these frequent conflicts has attracted the attention of scholars from different disciplines with various interpretations. The factors responsible for religious violence in Nigeria are many and varied, and these include state failure, poverty, unemployment and religious intolerance that are pervasive among the members of the two predominant religions (Habu, 2012; Emmanuel, 2016).

Currently, religious conflicts have become prevalent in the country with violence in the major cities of Jos, Maiduguri, Yobe, Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Adamawa, Taraba, etc. The occurrence of religious conflicts has revealed that hundreds and thousands of people are displaced and left at the whims of social life (Habu, 2012).

The objective of this chapter is to assess some of these religious conflicts, their causes and consequences to the survival of federalism in Nigeria and how they have hampered the process of democratic consolidation. The religious conflicts to be discussed are selected due to the degree and magnitude of threat and danger they posed to the survival of Nigeria as an indivisible united entity. Also, religion as a factor in the electoral process of Nigeria will be discussed because election is one of the key attributes of Nigeria's federal democratic system. This chapter will also aim at making an empirical analysis in relation to the established theoretical framework in chapter two of this thesis, that is Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria (i.e. Behavioral, Attitudinal and Constitutional[see pages 16 & 19]) for consolidated democracy as a tool of analysis. As it was argued in the theoretical chapter [see page 19] that federalism and democracy are wholly interconnected and jointly compatible and complement each other and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to imagine the successful practice of federalism under a non-democratic system. It is on this premise that this research will adopt Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria as a tool of analysis, thereby applying these criteria in each of the cases of religious conflicts to see how each of these conflicts have derailed the process of achieving a successful federal system in Nigeria.

To this end, this chapter will be divided into three sections. Section one will focus on the Shari'ah crisis which started in the year 1999 and led to other violent conflicts in other parts of Nigeria till date as it will be seen in table 4.1. Section two will discuss BokoHaram crisis and its implications to the survival of Nigeria's federal survival. Also, the level of damage and destruction the group has perpetuated will be shown in table 4.2. At the end of every section, the analysis in relation to the theoretical framework will follow. Section three will discuss how religion has affected the electoral process to the extent that some Nigerians only vote people they share the same religious belief with.

4.1The Shari'a Crisis (1999)

The adoption and implementation of the Shari'a Penal Code Law (SPCL) by twelve states in northern Nigeria generated serious debate and violent clashes between Muslims and Christians from 1999 onwards (Joseph, 2014). The application of Shari'a Islamic jurisprudence relating to civil matters involving questions of Islamic personal law is enshrined in the Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria. The Shari'a is an Islamic law which states that laws governing the affairs of the people should be based on the teaching and application of the Islamic holy book (Qur'an) all legal matters should be adjudicated using the Shari'a law (ibid).

Sharia'a was first implemented in Zamfara state in the year 1999 with full supplement security apparatus. Soon after, 11 northern states of Kano, Bauchi, Gombe, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kebbi, Jigawa, Katsina, Yobe, Borno and Gombe states follow states take after the way and actualized it too (Emmanuel,2016).

The introduction and implementation of shariah penal code in Kaduna state became shariah's Achilles' heel as the state witnessed outburst of violent and brutal confrontations between Muslims and Christians in the state. The conflict which broke out as a result of the anti-Shari'a demonstration organized by Christian Association Nigeria (CAN) against the adoption of the Shari'a legal system in Kaduna State. As a result of the diversity in Kaduna state, it should be expected that there could be an outbreak of violence as a result of the huge population of Muslims and Christians in the state and the intolerant attitude of both groups. For example, the approximate estimated percentage of Muslims in Kaduna state is 56%, while the Christians constitute 44% of the population in the 2006 census (Ostein, 2009).

The remote causes of the crisis could still be situated in the 1914 amalgamation which brought together people of different and diverse ethnic and religious affiliations. As a result of this

careless and poor political engineering, citizens find it difficult to practice their religion as they wish. Had the political heads being propelled by patriotic zeal and intent, they should have adopted and enforced the practice of a true constitutional federalism instead of the somewhat pseudo-federalism currently in practice and operation to take care of the differences that exist. As a result, the Muslim population who are interested in Shariah would have had it instituted without any opposition (Joseph, 2014).

Other causes of the Sharia'a crisis include high rates of illiteracy, religious intolerance, unemployment and poverty, religious extremism and fanaticism which created a large population of idle citizens who can be easily brainwashed and mobilized to engage in the killing and destruction of places of worships, schools, government buildings, markets et cetera (Babalola, 2015).

These consequences of religious conflict affect the society as a whole with terrible human and infrastructural damages. For example, a total of 609 deaths were recorded, a total of 746 vehicles of various descriptions were burnt and about 123 churches and 55 mosques were burnt in various locations. Similarly, the Kaduna religious violence led to reprisal conflicts in other states of the federation, living the country in total turmoil. As it would be seen in the table below, the entire crisis in the table were somewhat as a result of the Sharia crisis especially those from the year 2000.

Analysis

Having given a background on the two most devastating religious conflicts that have fuelled and generated other religious crisis in many parts of Nigeria, it is now important to analyze how these religious conflicts have derailed the success of federalism and consolidation of democracy in Nigeria. In doing so, Linz and Stepan's criteria for consolidated democracy will be applied in assessing whether or not Nigeria's federal system is a consolidated democracy. This is important because the consolidation of democracy in a diverse and religiously divided country like Nigeria depends on overcoming obstacles that hinder the success of federalism.

One may rightly argue that there are so many obstacles hindering the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria such as ethnic conflicts discussed in chapter three of this thesis, but also, religious crisis are also significant obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria's federal system.

Nigerian federal and democratic system faced an Islam-oriented movement when in the year 1999 after return to civilian rule, the Northern state of Zamfara and other twelve northern states adopted and implemented the Shari'ah Penal Code law. The implementation of Shari'ah in these states generated serious violent clashes between Christians and Muslims in many parts of the country. The first outburst of violent conflict started in Kaduna state when some Christian youths staged a protest against the implementation of Shari'ah and the crisis later escalated into full scale violent confrontation between Muslims and Christians.

The crisis could be said to be the cause of other religious crisis shown in table 4.1 above because it generated hatred and animosity between members of both religions in Nigeria. The crisis led to the emergence of radical and fundamentalist religious movements challenging the practice of democracy and federalism in Nigeria. As a result, many political analysts observed that the rise of fundamentalism posed even more serious threat than the other factors that create tension and undermine the survival of federalism in Nigeria. These forces of fundamentalism were calling for a shift away from a secular regime to a regime in which the state becomes subordinate to religion.

Therefore, for a democratic regime to fulfill Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria, support for anti-system must remain highly insignificant and the support for the established democratic system must remain stable and majority of the citizens must view, support and accept the system. Given the Constitutional dimension, a democratic regime can be consolidated when "the actors in a democratic regime obey the laws, the constitution and also the mutually accepted norms of political conduct. Meaning that actors have to abide and act within the boundaries of constitutional democratic order. Failure to comply with the democratic paradigm and principle clearly means being disloyal to a democratic regime. One may argue that so far as religious fundamentalism continue to exist and the operation of the Shari'ah legal system remains in practice, Nigerian democracy could not be considered as consolidated.

Table 4.1: Religious Conflicts in Nigeria (1980 –2010)

Date	Location	Principal Actors
May 1980	Kaduna State	Civil disturbance and unrest in the ancient city of Zaria inwhich property worth billions belonging to Christians living in the state were destroyed.
December 1980	Kano State	Riots by Maitatsine sect, which resulted to the lost of over 4, 177 people.

October 1982	Bornu State	Kala-Kato and Maitatsine in which over 118 were killed with huge damage to properties.
October 1982	Kano State	Some irate Muslim youths burnt churches.
February/ March 1984	Adamawa State	Maitatsine violence which resulted in the death of 586 people with wanton destruction of property.
April 1985	Pantami Ward, Gombe (Bauchi State)	Maitatsine conflict, 105 were killed, with properties destroyed.
March 1986	Kwara State	Muslims and Christians clashed and many lives were lost
May 1986	Ibadan, University of Ibadan (Oyo State)	Crisis between Christians and Muslim over places of worship
March 1987	Kafanchan (Kaduna State) Tafawa Balewa (Bauchi State)	Clashes between Muslims and Christians at the College of Education, Kafancha which led to loss of several lives and burning of Mosques by Christians.
February 1988	Kaduna State(Polytechnic)	Religious crisis between Christian and Muslim students
April 1991	Katsina State	Religious crisis spearheaded by fundamentalist Shiite sect in Katsina. Several lives were lost and properties worth millions were destroyed.
May 1991	Bauchi State	It started as a disagreement between a Fulani man and a Sayawa meat seller in Tafawa Balewa. Escalated into a full conflict and later took the dimension of a religious war in the state. Lives were lost and property worth billions was destroyed.
October 1991	Kano State	A peaceful demonstration initiated by the Izala sect to halt Rev. Reinherd Bonnke from having a crusade in Kano, later degenerated into very bloody religious conflict. Thousands of lives were lost
May 1992	Kaduna State	A communal dispute between the Katafs and the Hausas which later took the dimension of inter-religious war between Muslims and Christians. Several lives and property were destroyed.
January 1993	Katsina State	The Kalakato religious group assaulted a village Head and burnt down a Police vehicle. Many lives were lost.
February 2000	Kaduna State	Conflict engulfed the city between Christians and Moslems over the implementation of Sharia law.
February/ May 2000	Abia State	Religious violence in Aba and minor disturbances in Umahia. Over 450 persons were killed in what was called reprisal attack for the Kaduna crisis.

September 2000	Gombe State	Violence broke out over the implementation of the Shari'a legal system
Oct 2001	Kano State	A religious riot broke out in Kano In protest of US invasion of Afghanistan in search of Osama bin Laden, as a result over 150 persons were killed.
Nov. 2002	Kaduna	Violence erupted between Christians and Muslims over the hosting of the Miss beauty pageant
June 2008	Adamawa State	Muslims were attacked by Christians in a Friday prayer mosque
February 2006	Borno State	Violence between Christian and Muslim students over a place of worship
November 2008	Plateau State	Religious violence over the outcome of an election result
February 2009	Bauchi State	Ethno-religious conflict at the Makama New Extension. Over 1000 people were killed and more than 600 houses were burnt
June 11 2009	Bauchi State	BokoHaram attacked the police forces in the state.
July 2009	Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Yobe States	Violence unleashed by the Boko Haram sect. Over 1200 persons were killed, 3,500 internally displaced. Over 15000 children orphaned and over 2000 women turned widows and properties destroyed.
December 2009	Bauchi State	Religious violence unleashed by the Kala-kato group. More than 38 persons were killed
January 2009	Plateau State	Religious crisis between Muslims and Christians At least were 320 killed
March 2010	Plateau State	Reprisal attacks by Fulani Muslims on Christian – dominated villages of DogoNahawa, Shen and Fan in Jos. More than 1000 people were killed mainly women and children.
March 2010	Plateau State	Another reprisal attack by Fulani herdsmen.
April 2010	Plateau State	Attack on Muslim Fulani herdsmen by Christian which led to the killing of over 50 people.
May 2010	Plateau State	Murder of three (Muslim) Fulani herdsmen at Tusung village in BarkinLadi Local Government. The attacker was alleged to be a Christian Berom youth.
July 2010	Plateau State	Fulani herdsmen made an overnight reprisal attack on a Beromvillage living many dead.

July 2010	Plateau	Another attack by Fulani herdsmen.
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Source: J.I. Elaigwu, [cited by Emmanuel, 2016: 201-204]

4.2 The Boko Haram Crisis (2009 to date)

In an attempt to understand the Boko Haram crisis, it is important to reiterate that religion, if not well preached can provide a platform for the mobilization of the disgruntled elements of the society especially the youths, including the poor and the impoverished segment of the society who are highly frustrated by the alleged (real or imagined) divergence between the desired and the obtained basic needs of human survival (habu, 2012).

The Boko Haram as it is popularly known, though, the group refers to itself as *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* (literally translated as "Movement for call and striving in the Way of God") or simply *Yusufiyya* (referring to the group name adapted from the name of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf), is treated in this chapter because of the various contestations it has generated in the Nigerian federal system.

The Boko Haram members were indoctrinated with unorthodox Islamic doctrines, which main aim was the adoption and application of unorthodox Islamic doctrines and the hatred for Western values and educational system (Emmanuel, 2016). The word Boko Haram was derived from the Hausa and Arabic words, "Boko" in Hausa means "western education" and "Haram" an Arabic word means, "Sin" (Obinna, 2011; Sani, 2011). Therefore, the term means "western education is forbidden" as they believe that western education has corrupting influence on Muslims.

On the one hand, the group has been labeled as an Islamist terrorist group compromising of uneducated, impoverished and anti-status quo elements whose aim is to detonate bombs in public buildings and shoot security personnel and others. On the other hand, they are seen as revolutionaries opposed to the injustice in Nigeria whose objective is to replace the existing decay with an Islamic order.

From the foregoing, the causes of the Boko Haram crisis According to Emmanuel (2016) are as follows;

- Failure of intelligence and defense agencies, or intelligence compromise and sabotage
- Politicization of religion
- Lack of will and patriotism in the articulation and implementation of government policies

- The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram along with his key commanders and followers by the Nigerian security forces and the failure of the federal government to bring those responsible to justice
- The presence of factors that favor the nurturing and promotion of structural violence (i.e. unemployment, poverty, inequality, religious intolerance and bigotry, discriminatory practices in the political cum economic spheres of the country et cetera)
- Unregulated religious preaching
- Lack of political will on the side of the government to enforce constitutional provisions on secularism

The Boko Haram crisis had led to state of anarchy, fear and insecurity in the country. This was as a result of killings through its use of suicide bombing of places of worship, motor parks, shopping malls, Nigeria Police headquarters, and media houses and sensitive places such as the United Nations building in Abuja (Joseph, 2014). In addition, there were also targeted assassinations of those the group considered opposing their religious ideology or fundamentalism. The crisis had also led to internal displacement of people in the country. Furthermore, as a result of the sect's rejection of Western culture and values, particularly education, the group has been targeting schools in order to intimidate the people, especially the girl child so that they would abandon western education (ibid).

This is evident when the group abducted over 200 school girls in one of the secondary schools in Chibok town in Borno state and up till today, the where about of the girls is still unknown. Statistics has shown that from 2010 to 2014, over 16,000 lives had been lost, towns and villages scattered and another 100,000 people have been displaced (Yvonne & Azad, 2013 cited in Emmanuel, 2016).

Regrettably, whenever conflicts erupt, many people become victims, as a result of loss of lives and property. The consequences of conflicts in the lives of the victims live with them for a long period of time. In several ways, victims of conflicts develop mistrust and fear against their neighbors, and this in many respects affects the process of national integration and peaceful co-existence. The heightened level of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria has further deepened the state of insecurity in the country with serious consequences for the polity and economy. The cost of ethnic and religious conflict is far expensive than the cost of post-conflict reconstruction, as such there must be a collective resolve to minimize conflict for

better and promising future and stable federal system. The struggle to bequeath a more prosperous future for the generation yet unborn is a collective one, but it must be pursued in an environment that is conflict-free and democratically stable.

Table 4.2:Record of Boko Haram Menace across Nigeria (July, 2011 – November 2014)

Date	Location	Destruction
July, 2009	Bauchi State	Boko Haram members for the first time clashed with the police and left many police men dead.
27 July, 2009	Yobe State	An attack on the Police headquarters, killing many police officers and civilians.
29 July, 2009	Yobe State	Another similar attack by Boko Haram in which more police officers were killed.
29 July, 2009	Borno State	An all-out confrontation with the security agents which resulted in the killing of many security agents and a security outpost burnt down completely by the Boko Haram members.
September, 2010	Bauchi State	Boko Haram members set ablaze the central prison in Bauchi state and freed all inmates.
January, 2011	Borno State	Top political office holders were killed in the group and some other civilians.
2 March, 2011	Kaduna State	Attack on a police post and killed all the police officers on duty.
30 March, 2011	Yobe State	Bomb planted by the group killed many people.
April, 2011	Borno State	The group bombed a police unit and destroyed the area.
4 May, 2011	Borno State	Set ablaze the Borno prison and killed officers on duty.
5 May, 2011	Borno State	Shot the security officers at the gate of the state government house.
9 May, 2011	Borno State	The group killed two respected Islamic clerics.
9 May, 2011	Bauchi State	Killed many people at a bus station.
13 May, 2011	Borno State	The group detonated a bomb which killed so many people.
29 May, 2011	Bauchi State	The group reinforced its attack by attacking a military barracks.

29 May, 2011	Abuja, The Capital City of Nigeria	The group also for the first time attacked the capital city of Nigeria and killed so many people.
31 May, 2011	Borno State	An attack on the Emir of Borno in which he narrowly escaped, but his brother and guards were killed.
1 June, 2011	Borno State	Attack on a police post, 10 persons killed and several others injured.
12 June, 2011	Borno State	Four worshippers killed in a church.
16 June, 2011	Borno State	Bomb was detonated by the group which killed about 6 school children.
16 June, 2011	Abuja, The Capital City of Nigeria	A heavy bomb explosion at the Nigerian police headquarters which killed so many people.
27 June, 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram attacked a beer parlour and killed 35 people and left several injured.
3 August, 2011	Gombe State	A military convoy was attacked by the group.
25 August 2011	Adamawa State	Boko Haram attacked two police stations and also robbed 3 banks in Adamawa state.
26 August 2011	Abuja, The Capital City of Nigeria	A suicide bomb attack was carried out by Boko Haram at the UN building in Abuja.
12 September, 2011	Bauchi State	The group attacked a military base and also robbed a bank in Bauchi state.
13 September, 2011	Borno State	Soldiers conveying military equipment's were attacked, 10 soldiers were killed by the group and the equipment's were taken away by the group.
17 September, 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram attacked and killed government officials who went for a meeting with the president on how to tackle the issue.
1 October	Borno State	A military patrol vehicle delivering food items to soldiers at

,2011		their various units was attacked by the group; all soldiers on duty were killed.
23 October ,2011	Kaduna State	Bokom Haram opened fire in a market, killed dozens of people and left many injured.
25 October ,2011	Yobe State	A commissioner of police was attacked at his residence and killed by the group.
2 November ,2011	Borno State	Soldiers on atrol at the Maiduguri main market were killed by Boko Haram.
4 November ,2011	Borno State	The executive governor of Borno state was attacked by Boko Haram members but he escaped the attack.
9 November,2011	Borno State	A whole village was ransacked by Boko Haram.
4 December,2011	Borno State	Boko Haram opened fire at wedding ceremony killing the groom with his guests.
13 December ,2011	Kaduna Stae	A bomb attack at a military check point leaving 10 soldiers dead.
17 December ,2011	Kano State	Attack on the office of State Security Service, Police Zonal Headquarters and Immigration office by Boko Haram left many officers dead.
22 December ,2011	Yobe State	The group killed about 20 police officers and many civilians.
25 December ,2011	Plateau State	On Christmas day, the group bombed a church killing all worshippers and the security personnel at the church premises.
6 January ,2012	Adamawa State	10 Christian worshippers were killed in a church by Boko Haram.
9 January ,2012	Borno State	The group attacked a military convoy.
10 January 2012	Yobe State	The group attacked a cinema and left many people dead.
11 January,2012	Yobe State	Boko Haram attacked a group of Christian worshippers.
18 January ,2012	Abuja, The Capital City	A bomb blast killed many civilians in the capital city.

	of Nigeria	
May, 2012	Borno State	A mosque was attacked by Boko Haram killing many worshippers.
January, 2013	Borno State	A cattle market was attacked by Boko Haram.
March, 2013	Adamawa State	The whole town of Mubi was ransacked by Boko Haram.
September, 2013	Yobe State	50 students of the school of Agriculture were killed by Boko Haram.
April, 2014	Borno State	Over 196 Chibok secondary school girls were abducted by Boko Haram and up till today the girls are still missing.
April, 2014	Borno State	The palace of the emir of Biu was completely destroyed by the group.
May, 2014	Kaduna State	A bomb attack at the Nigerian No.1 Army division by Boko Haram.
April, 2014	Abuja	Boko Haram detonated a bomb at a passenger bus station killing over 100 people.
November, 2014	Kano State	A Friday prayer mosque was attacked in the ancient city of Kano, killing more than 500 worshippers.

Source: Emmanuel, 2016; Kalejaiye&Aliyu, 2013

Analysis

The Boko Haram conflict which started in the year 2009 has been labeled as an Islamist terrorist group compromising of uneducated, impoverished and anti-statusquo elements whose aim is to do away with the educational system of the Western world which is in practice in Nigeria. To them, western education should be forbidden because according to their believe, western education has corrupting influence on Muslims. They therefore stand to replace even the federal and democratic values practiced in Nigeria because they are all borrowed from the west and they therefore seek to establish an Islamic order.

Over the years, the group has resorted to the use of violence on civilians, government and security operatives. The group has unleashed the worst atrocity and damage in the history of Nigerian federal existence.

According to a report by the Nigerian State Security Service (2014) the group has a link with the Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabab and has been receiving financial and arms support from the groups.

Therefore, if one considers the objectives and activities of Boko Haram, it is clear that the group has become a significant political actor capable of disrupting the peace and stability of Nigeria's federal system. As such, its activities in Nigeria violates Linz and Stepan's criteria for consolidated democracy because 'Behaviorally', a democratic regime is consolidated when no any significant actors attempts to achieve their aims and objectives by creating an undemocratic atmosphere or turning to violence, getting foreign aid and support in order to achieve their aim. Also, 'Constitutionally' democracy is consolidated when all forces within the state, governmental and non-governmental alike become subjected and habituated to the resolution of conflict within the specified and enshrined laws and procedures sanctioned by the democratic processes.

This evidently implies that as long as Boko Haram continue to remain strong and significant in Nigeria and resort to terrorist acts and receives foreign support in order to achieve their aims, Nigeria cannot satisfy the criteria for consolidated democracy by Linz and Stepan. Nigeria can only achieve this when Boko Haram ceases to exist as a significant factor.

4.3 Religion as a Factor in the Electoral Process

The survival and success of any federal and democratic system has a very strong link with credible periodic election as a crucial and significant factor. This is because electoral activities become interesting and meaningful to all the electorates. Also, for electoral activities to be interesting, the method for selecting flag bearers should not be on basis of one's religious affiliation because doing so may lead to producing wrong and unqualified leaders (Familusi, 2012). In Nigeria, especially during the 2011 and the last 2015 general elections, it has shown that there are religious factors present in the electoral process. One of such factors is how a political party determines its flag bearer/running mate for the post of president or governor (ibid).

As a country that has large proportion of Christians and Muslims, it has become necessary that a political party must make either a Muslim/Christian or Christian/Muslim candidates, that is if a presidential candidate is a Muslim his vice must be a Christian and vice versa. So it is at state and local levels where such kind of population exists in Nigeria. This many people

claimed is done in other to ensure that the interests of both religious groups are represented and protected given the heterogeneous nature and sensitivity of religion in Nigeria (Ushe, 2015).

This issue has a long history in Nigeria's electoral system; in 1979 the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) produced Muslim/Christian contestants and won the election against the Unity Party of Nigeria that produced Christian/Christian contestants. Even during military era, religion was recognized as a factor. For instance, the military regimes of Murtala/Obasanjo in the year 1975-1978, Babangida military regime of 1985-1993, Abachas regime of 1993-1998 all recognized religious factors in governance (Familusi, 2012).

In the recent elections conducted in Nigeria, a survey conducted by Pew Forum on religion found that 80% of Christians and 90% of Muslims consider their religion as more important than their identity as Africans or Nigerians (Factsheet, 2015). In electoral context, if given a choice, Nigerian Muslims tend to vote a Muslim candidate and a Christian also tends to vote a Christian candidate (ibid). That is why political parties in Nigeria understand the importance of religious identity and are highlighting such in campaigns.

This scenario is evident as it could be seen in the present two powerful political parties in Nigeria, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC). The PDP had Christian/Muslim candidates while the APC had Muslim/Christian candidates. It was clear that in the elections that regions that have Christian majority voted for the PDP while regions that have Muslim majority voted for the APC (Factsheet, 2015). As a result, many see the PDP as Christian Party and the APC as a Muslim party.

Table 4.3:Presidential Election Results across the Zones of Nigeria (2015)

Geo- Zone	Political	Christians Population %	Muslims Population %	APC Result	PDP Result
North-Central		44%	56%	2,411,013	1,715,819
North-West		10%	90%	7,115,199	1,339,709
North-East		20%	80%	2,848,678	796,588
South-East		90%	10%	198,248	2,048,625
South-West		45%	55%	418,580	4,714,725
South-South		85%	15%	2,433,193	1,881,416

Source: Factsheet, 2015

As it can be seen from the table above, North-Central zone which has 44% of Christians and 56% of Muslims shows that Muslims have the highest population and as such the APC secured the highest number of votes in the zone. So also in the North-West, North-East and South-West zones where Muslims have highest population the APC got the highest number of votes while in the South-East and South-South been having high concentration of Christians, the PDP got the highest number of votes in the two regions.

The permeation of religion into the electoral process in Nigeria has hampered the federal structure and democratic consolidation process in Nigeria. This is evident because the negative functions religion plays in the system; it has become an instrument of manipulation by the political elites (Emmanuel, 2016). As it was noted earlier, selection of a party flag bearer base on religious affiliation has further deepened religious sentiments; moreover such factor cannot determine a candidate's credibility. This is why there have been so many cases of bad governance in Nigeria. The implementation of Shari'ah penal code in some states was not clearly understood and implemented on religious basis, but on political terms and as such they used religion to achieve their aim.

Another worrisome and devastating effect of the issue is the violence that followed after every election. This occurs when the outcome of the election does not favor a particular religious group as it was seen after the 2011 general elections in which many people in the states of Bauchi, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Borno that are predominantly Muslims took to the street in protest of the election that declared former president Goodluck Jonathan who was a Christian the winner. As a result, serious violence broke out between Muslims and Christians which led to the death of many people and property worth millions destroyed (Ushe, 2015).

It should not be denied that religion is often manipulated in Nigeria. But the fact is that those who are truly religious will not perpetuate violence under the guise of religion (Familusi, 2012). To this end, the fact remains that the permeation of religion into the system will continue to be a threat to Nigeria's federal system and democratic consolidation, thereby making the corporate existence and survival of Nigeria as a single indivisible entity a mirage.

This chapter has addressed the two worst religious conflicts in Nigeria that have derailed the process of nurturing a virile democratic regime on the basis of mutual social network, equity, political participation and tolerance as well as compromise and consociation.

Federalism being an agreement between units to remain under one umbrella irrespective of their differences indicates that the two religious groups in Nigeria have to learn to accommodate and tolerate each other for the principle of unity in diversity to prevail.

The implication of the Shari'ah penal code and its resultant effects shows that lack of understanding and intolerance ignited the conflict and as such, the government needs to checkmate religious activities of the citizens in order to avoid the growth of religious fanaticism.

The dynamic of the BokoHaram conflict which remains insufficiently explored by the Nigerian government suggest that power relation in a divided society is likely to breed perennial conflict among religious followers. The research narrowed the study of BokoHaram by reviewing their ideology, objectives and strategy network of operations in Nigeria.

The manifestations of religious conflicts in Nigeria have shown that it is safe to state that the achievement of a healthy federal system and sustainable democracy will be a mirage if these conflicts continue. This is true because no meaningful societal development can take place in an atmosphere of intolerance and violence.

Therefore, sound management strategies must be put in place by the government for the sustainability of Nigerian federalism and sustainable democratic regime.

CONCLUSION

The core aim of this study is to understand why Nigeria has remained divided and vulnerable to ethnic and religious conflicts despite adopting a federal system as a mechanism and instrument of promoting unity in diversity and peaceful coexistence between and among its religiously and ethnically divided population.

Federalism as a system is intended to unite people who are of different social, political, cultural and historical background. As a principle, federalism brings together these diverse groups of people and makes them surrender some of their sovereignty to a central government and they in turn form the constituent units. Since federalism is an agreement by the various units to remain under one umbrella irrespective of their differences, this indicates that the various diverse groups that make up the system must learn to accommodate and tolerate each other for the principle of unity in diversity to prevail.

In analyzing Nigeria's historical context, the study highlighted that the background and beginning of Nigerian federalism was in the year 1914 when the British colonial masters amalgamated the Northern and Southern protectorates which were composed of diverse nationalities and different cultural backgrounds. The study highlighted that federalism as a system is formed for various reasons; a prominent factor is the desire for some form of unity in diversity among the various nationalities in the federating union. Other factors may include strengthening military defense against external enemies, to provide an enabling environment for common market with a view to promoting economic activities of the federating units, to prevent economic and military strife by centrifugal forces and to promote a pattern of social and political life desirable by each member group of the union. Instead, the study identified that federalism in Nigeria was essentially stimulated by colonial masters, mainly for their own administrative convenience and economic interest of the colonial government. The amalgamation process failed to put into consideration the diversity of Nigeria's multi-ethnic and multi-religious divide comprising of over 250 ethnic nationalities and 2 principal religions of Islam and Christianity. The amalgamation of these diverse entities therefore became Nigeria's Achilles heel.

Right from inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced perennial conflicts of territorial or state legitimacy which has often challenged its effort at national cohesion, democratization, stability and economic transformation. The high point of crisis of the Nigerian federation after

independence came with the Nigerian civil war which occurred between 1967 and 1970. However, rather than for the experience of the war to decrease contestations and provide food for thought for the centrifugal forces in the system, conflict has become persistent and intense in the country. Coupled with the period of military rule which lasted for more three decades, the situation worsened as the military practiced what was described as “military federalism”.

Nigeria’s ethnic diversity unfortunately became a tool for continued disharmony; this was because since the return to civil rule in 1999, the country has experienced the most devastating ethnic conflicts since its formation from that period till today. Conflicts such as the Biafra secession, Niger Delta conflicts, Hausa-Fulani versus berom, Tiv-Jukun conflicts all explained in this study revealed that the country has been polarized along ethnic and regional lines of ethnic suspicion, mutual antagonism, distrust and aggression.

Similarly, the study identified religious conflicts as another serious dividing element which has hampered the federal system of Nigeria. Recurring religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims has become intense to the extent that it has affected the political and electoral system in the sense that people only vote for candidates that belong to their religious group without considering the candidates integrity. BokoHaram crisis, Shari’ah crisis put together have led to the loss of hundreds of thousand lives and properties worth billions were destroyed.

Also, the study finds out that the journey for a democratic regime which started in the year 1999 has suffered huge setbacks because of the lack of good governance, corruption, fraudulent electoral practices, economic mismanagement, lack of accountability and transparency, and as such these factors are the grave challenges and impediments to democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

The study also finds out that the present constitution of Nigeria was a product of a military junta which was drafted without consultation of the various nationalities in Nigeria. This clearly indicates that there are so many issues that have not been captured and fully addressed such as the issue of indigene/settler dichotomy conflicts that was highlighted in this research. This suggests that the constitution has some conflicting elements in it that need to be addressed.

All these ethnic and religious contestations reinforced by the Nigerian constitution is a signal to the Nigerian federal government that there is a need to revisit the constitution and assess

such issues which have become an albatross in Nigeria's federal system, which threatens its peace, derails the process of achieving democratic federalism and causes insecurity in the already polarized society.

As it was explained in chapter one that Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria (behavioral, attitudinal and constitutional) for democratic consolidation would be used as a theoretical model to assess whether or not Nigerian democracy can be considered consolidated. Linz and Stepan's three dimensional criteria for a consolidated democracy were:

Behaviorally, democracy can become consolidated and achieved when no significant group/s attempt to overthrow or undermine the democratic system in a regime.

Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when even in times of serious political, economic and social crisis; the larger part of the society still stand to believe that the democratic regime is favorable.

Constitutionally, democracy becomes consolidated when all the citizens within the state become habituated to the fact that political stability and liberty can only be achieved when established norms are strictly adhered to and that the violation of these norms may likely be harmful and ineffective (Linz & Stepan, 1996).

Therefore, in order to determine whether or not Nigeria is a consolidated democracy depends on whether or not Nigeria fulfills these dimensional criteria. According to Linz and Stepan's model, Nigeria can only satisfy the behavioral criteria when from the ethnic conflicts discussed in this study, groups such as the Movement of the Actualization of the Sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) which is a secessionist group, the Niger-Delta militant groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger-Delta (MEND), Niger-Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF) cease to be significant actors employing terrorist tactics and receiving foreign aid and support in order from Nigeria. To assess whether or not these groups are significant actors and capable of threatening the peace, stability and survival of Nigeria is a crucial factor since Nigeria can only satisfy the behavioral criteria when these groups remain insignificant. The activities of these groups also violate the constitutional dimension because the groups have failed to act within the orbit of the constituted laws of Nigeria. Therefore, if the present situation and activities of these groups are given careful understanding as

explained in chapter three, it reveals that up till today, the groups are still carrying out their aims and objectives.

Also, from the other ethnic conflicts analyzed in this study such as the Hausa/Fulani versus Beroms, Tiv-Jukun conflicts, it shows that Nigeria cannot satisfy the constitutional dimension because 'constitutionally' the actors in a democratic regime must obey the laws, the constitution and also the mutually accepted norms of good political conduct, meaning that they have to abide and act within the boundaries of constitutional democratic order. So long as this is not achieved, Nigeria cannot satisfy the constitutional criteria given the nature and dimension of these ethnic conflicts in this study because at present, such conflicts are still perpetuated and rendering many Nigerians in state of anarchy.

On the other hand, taking the religious conflicts discussed in chapter four which were also analyzed using Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria, the study find out that the activities of the dreaded terrorist group known as BokoHaram has continued to be a lingering problem hampering the survival of Nigeria. Therefore, for Nigeria to satisfy Linz and Stepan's behavioral criteria for democratic consolidation, the activities of BokoHaram must be brought to an end in order to fulfill and satisfy this criterion. The group also violates the constitutional criteria because the group does not recognize the constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria.

Similarly, the Shari'ah conflict which was a movement to establish and implement the Islamic penal code in a country that is composed of approximately equal number of Muslims and Christians is another issue that was discussed. For Nigeria to achieve democratic consolidation according to Linz and Stepan, the support and emancipation for the enactment of the Shari'ah penal code must cease and the idea must remain insignificant. If this should continue, then Nigeria cannot fulfill the constitutional dimension for democratic consolidation.

The study therefore analyzed Nigeria's federal survival in relation to democracy and democratic consolidation and given the nature of both ethnic and religious contestations concluded that for federalism to thrive and survive, Linz and Stepan's dimensional criteria (Behavioral, Attitudinal and Constitutional) must be achieved. It is only when these are achieved that Nigeria's federal system can become stable, strong and overcome its challenges.

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