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**REGIONALISATION AND A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH TO  
PEACEBUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE SADC REGION DRC  
AND ZIMBABWE.**

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## **ABSTRACT**

*The purpose of this thesis is to give an explanation to the DRC and Zimbabwe conflict, analyzing the methods employed by SADC in the conflict transformation in each case and give recommendations to SADC on how best to facilitate an end to conflict in Southern Africa. The SADC intervened with an agenda to bring the conflict to an immediate closure but unfortunately the various challenges that it met hindered the effectiveness of its mandate. Resource constraints, logistical challenges and negative legislature proved to stumbling blocks.*

**Key words: SADC, conflict resolution, facilitate**

## **ÖZET**

*Bu tezin amacı, DRC ve Zimbabwe çatışmalarının biraçıklamayarak, her durumda çatışma dönüşümünde SADC tarafından kullanılan yöntemleri analiz etmek ve Güney Afrika'daki ihtilafın sona erdirilmesini nasıl hale getirmek konusunda SADC'ye tavsiyeler vermektir. SADC çatışmanın derhalkapılmasını yönelik bir gündem müdahale etti ancak ne yazık ki karşılaştığı çeşitli zorluklar görev süresinin etkinliğini engelledi. Kaynak sınıtlamaları, lojistik zorluklar ve olumsuz yasama kutuları engelledi.*

**Anahtar kelimeler: SADC, çatışma çözümü,**

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my mother Mrs. V.E. Chitsa for the foundation she laid psychologically and financially which has paved the way for my current position and inspired me all the way.

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
To all my siblings and friends and also those who participated in the research Lena , Oscar, Mr and MrsRukasha thank you for your cooperation and everyone whom I have not mentioned specifically, your contribution is highly valued. I cherish your contributions and sincerely acknowledging your assistance.

MAP OF SADC MEMBER STATES



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## ACRONYMS

<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic Of Congo
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of Congo
<b>ECCAS</b>	Economic Community of Central African States
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EWS</b>	Early Warning System
<b>FAC</b>	Congolese Armed Forces
<b>FAZ</b>	Zairian Armed Forces
<b>FDD</b>	Forces for Defense of Democracy
<b>FDL</b>	Forces for Defense Local
<b>FDLR</b>	Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
<b>FLS</b>	Frontline States
<b>GPA</b>	Global Political Agreement
<b>HI</b>	Historical Institutionalism
<b>ICD</b>	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
<b>ISDSC</b>	Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
<b>ISPDC</b>	Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy
<b>JMC</b>	Joint Military Commission
<b>LCA</b>	Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement
<b>MDC</b>	Movement for Democratic Change
<b>MDP</b>	Mutual Defense Pact

<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NSA</b>	Non State Actors
<b>REC</b>	Regional Economic Organization
<b>RISDP</b>	Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
<b>RPTC</b>	Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre
<b>SA</b>	South Africa
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SADC</b>	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SADC</b>	Southern African Development Community
<b>SADC</b>	OPDS Organ on Politics, Defence and Security
<b>SADC-AAF</b>	SADC Allied Armed forces
<b>SADCBRIG</b>	SADC Standby Brigade
<b>SADCPOL</b>	SADC Police
<b>SI</b>	Sociological Institutionalism
<b>SIPO</b>	Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ
<b>SNC</b>	SADC National Committees
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>ZANU PF</b>	Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front

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## CHAPTER 1

### **Introduction.**

This study evaluates SADCs peace building conflict resolution strategies in response to the conflicts that challenge the region. As it is a case study based research the DRC and Zimbabwe will be put under spotlight during the course of the study.

The latest trends on the international arena have indirectly forced regional organization to evolve them from being predominantly regional economic communities (REC) <sup>1</sup> to accommodate political advances in order to respond the emerging demands of the current political affairs, in relation to their member states. traditionally it has been the preserve of International and Continental organization like the United Nations and African Union to safeguard peace around the globe but the post-cold war era has seen more intra state conflict which has called on for sub regional organization to step up their efforts and act as the focal point in resolving conflicts and maintaining peace In their regions. It is no secret that geographically oriented sub regional organization share a lot in common with conflicting parties and also have more to lose if conflicts spiral out of control as such they are the best candidates to take a lead role in resolving the conflict.

Regional organization previously created to cater for the economic side of their member states are evolving to accommodate a political approach in order to cater for the ever increasing political demands in their regions.

### **Historical Background.**

The Southern Africa Development Organization (SADC) is one such organization which was initially created as a countering block to the economic manipulation of apartheid south Africa but due to the sluggishness of the international community in response to the region conflicts which threatened the stability of the region, member states reacted by creating structures within the SADC organization to safeguard the peace and security of its member states and act as peace brokers through dialogue or humanitarian intervention as per need to the situation. Though the grouping has different colonial backgrounds they are bound together by common economic and of late political goals. Due to that the study probes SADCs efforts

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<sup>1</sup>The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are regional groupings of African states. The RECs have developed individually and have differing roles and structures., [www.au.int/en/organs/recs](http://www.au.int/en/organs/recs)

in conflict resolution peace and security in its sphere of influence how deep and effective they have reacted to this new responsibility.

The study is primarily desktop based as secondary data analysis is employed through the evaluation of existing literature. SADCs conflict resolution capabilities are analyzed under the conflict transformation theory as well as the regionalism and conflict resolution approach. This is a multidimensional approach whereby the theories are not academically pitted at each other but rather work in conjunction to achieve the objective.

An analysis done at two levels the institutional level which focuses on the structures and organs within SADC. As SADC is a multi-state organization the analysis is further broken down to the member state level to investigate how members have reacted to the organization peace obligations. Is there a respect of the SADC constitution or not. Which are the constraints to conflict resolution and is the SADC more theoretical than practical on its mediation efforts

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe provide the best scenario for an analysis of SADC methods on conflict resolution. The differing nurtures these conflicts warrants for special attention one is a fully fledged civil war whilst the other is politically motivated violence threatening to degenerate into a civil war. However these cases have a lot in common as they are both on the backdrop of despotism electoral fraud, State insinuated killings, disappearances, arbitrary arrest and violence, so the research investigates the approaches used to diffuse conflicts as well the flexibility of SADC policies and structures in contrasting situations.

After a thorough investigation on the current affairs in the region the research points out how best can the region utilize instruments and frameworks at their disposal for peace and security in their regions, courting special mention on the strengths, shortcomings and recommendations for the future.

**Hypothesis.**

- 1) Lack of adequate resources and cooperation within the SADC institution causes the SADC not to effectively facilitate the process of bringing conflict to an end.*
- 2) A reduction in red-tape and negative bureaucracy will lead to an increase in the SADC's responsiveness to conflict.*

- 3) *Co-operation from the United Nations and the African Union will aid the SADC's service delivery in conflict resolution.*
- 4) *International legislations causes the SADC to fail or delay its mandates, the United Nations should relax its legislation to accommodate effective regional organizations like the SADC.*

**Problem Statement.**

After the end of the of the second World War the International Community agreed to put an end to war through the creation of the United Nations and other regional and sub regional organizations like AU and SADC respectively. The goal was to ensure peace and stability in every part of the world. The United Nations (UN) is an assortment many countries with diverse and at times conflicting values and backgrounds. It has a far reaching jurisdiction but the geographical coverage does not match its effectiveness. Conflicts have occurred and spiraled into historical calamities right under the nose of the UN. There is the Rwandese genocide in Africa which could have been easily silenced in its infancy if regional structures had been well resourced to spearhead conflict resolution process. International recognition is well deserved but regionalism becomes crucial when it comes to achieving peace on some cases conflicts need those in touch with the sociopolitical and economic reality of conflicting parties to take the initiative that is where regionalism comes into play. The notion Regional solutions for regional problems should come into play in Southern Africa. The SADC has been involved in conflicts for three decades and its efforts need to be reviewed.

In relation to this background three points are arguably relevant to the choice of this topic for starters SADC is one of the most influential regional integration entities in Africa. , SADC constitutes one of Africa's prominent regional integration entities, boasting an experienced peacekeeping force the SADC brigade yet state parties like Angola and DRC have witnessed bursts of armed conflicts. Secondly the United Nations, African Union and SADC call for co-operation in peace building efforts and have legal statutes to support that, yet there has been minimal in peace building efforts the Zimbabwe situation is one area whereby conflict of interests hindered conflict resolution and produced substandard results which brought no closure to the situation but rather postponed the problem . The work of the SADC organization is examined thoroughly to evaluate whether the structures are theoretical

creations lacking substance or rather up there in the field offering a muscle to their ideas especially the organ for politics.

### **Research Question**

The primary objective of this research is to evaluate the SADC peace security and conflict resolution agenda. In this context, the conflict management and resolution strategies is used as a tool to assess the response of the regional body to the differing natures of conflict under its jurisdiction. The study examines SADC,s cooperation with other stakeholders in the peace building and conflict resolution field. To this end, the research will be guided by the following main questions:

How does the SADC respond to political crises and conflicts taking place in the region?

#### *Sub Questions*

1. How is SADC dealing with conflicts in its region?
2. What strategies are they using to diffuse conflicts?
3. Are there constraints and hindrances to its effectiveness, if so what are they?
4. How far SADC is connected to the UN and AU in its conflict resolution agenda?
5. How effective is the multidimensional approach in intra state peace building?

This research is predominantly quantitative<sup>2</sup> in nature; it is primarily desktop based as most data is gathered from preexisting literature like journals, websites, media and newspapers. However due to the need to be thorough and produce a validated study the researcher uses both independent and SADC personal data sources in order to reach common ground. In this respect it can be acknowledged that triangulation was mildly applied for a progressive outcome

Primary and secondary data analysis takes precedence though the later is more effective as it provides the study with large data sets to extract information from. The SADC archives

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<sup>2</sup> Quantitative methods emphasize objective **measurements** and the **statistical**, mathematical, or numerical analysis of data collected through polls, questionnaires, and surveys, or by manipulating pre-existing **statistical** data using computational techniques.



proved to be a reliable go to center for information both the soft and hard evidence which were crucial for the research.

### **Significance of the Study**

The study serves as agent for exposing the complexities and capabilities of regional organizations as vehicles for conflict transformation. The SADC case study showcases the importance of a flexibility in approach when dealing with different conflicts. The ways in which SADC responded to its intra state conflicts may not be the ultimate blueprint for conflict resolution, but may as well act as a skeletal structure on how to respond on similar cases around the world. Data gathered during the study is of importance for future studies and the international community in order to fully comprehend and understand the current and future political landscapes of Zimbabwe and the DRC.

### **Limitations of the study**

Given the significance and sensitivity of the study as well as the magnitude of the SADC organizations technical constraints, red tape and bureaucratic blockages<sup>3</sup> were encountered during the extraction of information. While the internet and the library always furnishes you with published information, there is that privy information which is not usually published for the public and needs security clearance first from responsible SADC officials.

Due to politicking and legalities some official held back information, which should have greatly aided the study. As the conflict resolution is largely political, patronage and political bias cannot be ruled out in both primary and secondary sources especially those derived from politically aligned sources. However the research pits the different sources of data in order to legitimize their veracity.

### **Literature Review**

Although they are termed in various ways on different circumstances conflict transformation, management, resolution and peace building all have a common goal, the achievement of

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<sup>3</sup>refers to excessive [regulation](#) or rigid conformity to formal rules that is considered redundant or [bureaucratic](#) and hinders or prevents action or decision-making. It is usually applied to [governments](#), [corporations](#), and other large organizations.

peace and stability different regions have their own special kinds of conflicts requiring specific attention in relation to their nurture. Southern Africa is no stranger to these destabilizing events in its region, but under the cover of SADC they have managed to attend to their conflicts.

For (Lippmann 1999: 195) “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes” to avoid conflict or war with the adversary. For (Wolfers :1995), security is “the absence of threats to acquired values..., and the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.” Bellamy (2002: 58) says that “Security itself is a relative freedom from war, coupled with relatively high expectation that defeat will be a consequence of any war that should occur

However, these definitions fail to acknowledge that the state itself can also be a threat to the peace and stability of their nations. Racialism, political repression, tribalism human rights abuse, nepotism, mismanagement of state and suppression of basic human right by those given the mandate to rule has often led to intra state conflicts in the SADC region and world over. (Makoa) the SADC was created by an elite group of rulers to protect their interest so it is largely possible that in the event that a member is facing internal civil strife no matter how justified the citizens are the SADC apparatus will tend to be invested in propping up the sitting government rather than the citizens. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke argue that self-preservation<sup>4</sup> does not only apply to the state but rather meant defending oneself against unjustified violence from the state or ruler, though this theory was advanced during the enlightenment years in the sixteenth century it applies during the late 19th And 21<sup>st</sup> century more than ever before as conflicts have been largely intra state than interstate. Jeremy Bentham and John S. Mill also stress that state parties can be a threat to the citizen’s liberties, because of that there ought to be a controlling mechanism to police. Preventing civil strife, wars and genocide that disrupt normal life and displace people admittedly minimizes insecurity, as the SADC Organ is supposed to do, creating a suitable climate for democratic transformation. But the SADC Organ is not only closed to participation by the civil society but also has to defend autocracies and other authoritarian repressive regimes within SADC membership. This is evident in SADC’s reluctance to lend support to struggles against such

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<sup>4</sup>a natural or instinctive tendency to act so as to **preserve** one's own existence.<https://www.merriam-webster.com>

regimes of which clear examples are Mugabe's authoritarian rule and King Mswati's autocratic feudalism. Governments can indeed cause and are often the prime factors behind conflict and insecurity. Conflict, insecurity and genocidal episodes that occurred at different times in Sudan's Darfour, Amin's Uganda, Siad Barre's Somalia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda also have to do with the conduct of governments or rulers in those countries. Therefore, normative theories and perspectives such as those briefly reviewed above, which simply assign government or the state a democracy and peace-building task should not be accepted uncritically. Unfortunately, SADC seems entrapped in and guided by such theoretical systems. Hence it has adopted a statist militarist one-track approach to Southern Africa's complex multi-causal/faceted security problem.

(J Mearshimer :2001) question the effectiveness of regional organization in conflict transformation as he regards them as mere pawns of hegemonic powers and only act according to the tune of major powers, implying that there are just a toned down version of the United Nations, Security Council whereby decision making is confined to major economic and military powers. (F Johnson Lekoti:2007) points out SADC intervention are also controlled by the regional powerhouses with South Africa taking on a lead role in the Lesotho conflict while Zimbabwe was influential in DRC due to the resource incentive, contrary to the Mozambique scenario which arguably neglected as the country has limited resources and economic incentives to offer. Robert Keoghan and Lisa Martin are from a different school which views regional institutions as tools for collective security<sup>5</sup> through the sharing of intelligence and provision of a large pool of manpower and resources when the need arises, there are no special members or privileges amongst member states.

Renowned IR scholars like (Ernest Haas: 1995) have an economic angle to conflict transformation through regional organizations as a high level of economic cooperation and growth in turn compliments, peace and stability as conflicts are mostly as result of poverty and unfair distribution of state resources. This goes with the new regionalism theories

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<sup>5</sup> Collective security is one type of coalition building strategy in which a group of nations agree not to attack each other and to defend each other against an attack from one of the others, if such an attack is made. The principal is that "an attack against one, is an attack against all." It differs from "collective defense" which is a coalition of nations which agree to defend its own group against *outside* attacks. [www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec.htm](http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/collsec.htm)

whereby security, conflict and peace building are integrated in post-cold war regional entities e.g. SADC the focal point of the research.

While most previous work has been state centric in nature and content little has been done in showing how regional organization are co-operating with Non State Actors (NSA)<sup>6</sup> and the civil society in conflict transformation . (Patterson and J Laker:2010) point out that NSA's role in conflict transformation is limited to perennial activities such as election observation and humanitarian aid while being sidelined in major activities like policy making and setting up of governance and administrative structures. (A Gwinyayi :2010) denotes that SADC is not exempt from this marginalization and closed door phenomenon as it has done more theoretical engagements than practical actions in its relation with NSA.

Makoa points out SADC and institutions like it are largely ineffective in conflict transformation as their mandates are largely paper tigers which hardly come to life when needed most. (Higgort R:2001) then points out a challenge in the assessment of the effectiveness of regional organizations, as it is hard to measure what the security situation would have been if the organization had not been present. (Williams: 2006) agrees on the difficulties in measurability but argues that in some instances, it is clear that without threats or use of military or diplomatic deterrence violence would have continued unabated especially intra state conflicts whereby it is the state against the civilians like the Zimbabwean post electoral violence in 2008 whereby SADC played a crucial hand in bringing the antagonized parties to the table in so doing bringing governance issues to function again. (Franke :2009) though choose to base the success of regional organization on its organizational structure and statutes like protocols, treaties and mechanisms for peace building .(Ngoma 2004) argues that the view point is too formalistic and is laden with the pre-rogatives of conflict prevention and peace building while ignoring the response in real life situations anyone can have ambition but it takes action for it to be success. (Heally 2009) argues that modern day conflicts require a multidimensional approach by international actor , regional and the NSA as policy mechanisms from a single grouping may not be enough to deal with these emerging complex conflicts. (M Millstein ;2015) each stakeholder has its part in the conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts, as witnessed in the DRC conflict the SADC were the first respondents but the UN and NSA came in to complement them.

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<sup>6</sup>State-centered theory (or state-centered federalism) is a political theory which stresses the role of the government on civil society. It holds that the state itself can structure political life to some degree independently of the way power is distributed between classes and other groups at a given time

The dilemma in identifying the impact of SADC'S conflict transformation machinery is complex as there are many underlying factors beyond the cessation of hostilities to fully reap the benefits of peace initiatives. (Bjørn Møller:2008) put the time factor analysis into perspective as he regards the effectiveness of regional efforts to be based on time as long time benefits need patience as society takes time to heal and fully recognize and work towards differences.

## CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

### Introduction

Theories are formulated to explain, predict, and understand phenomena and, in many cases, to challenge and extend existing knowledge within the limits of critical bounding assumptions. Theoretical frameworks are structures that hold or support a theory of a research study (RV Labaree 2009). Theoretical frameworks introduce and describe theories that explains why the research problem exist.

### Multidimensional Approach to Conflict.

Gives precedence to partnership and fostering of relations between regional organizations international actors, non-state actors and the grassroots organizations for peace conflict transformation. This is in accordance with the *Chapter VII* of the United Nations charter on supporting peacekeeping and peace building efforts through regional organizations<sup>7</sup>. The United Nations is state centric as it is more or less structural design favors diffusing international disputes involving nation states rather than civil conflicts, but post-cold war conflicts have become more complex and dynamic as the larger percentage is now intrastate than interstate conflicts (Max Roser 2016). Proponents of the multi-dimensional school of thought like the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, Jalil Abbas Jilan advocates for a change in attitude as far as international conflict transformation and peace building is concerned and challenges the international community to merge their ideologies, resources and personnel with the regional structures already in place for effective conflict resolution and peace building. Conflict has evolved so should the strategies of peace builders, The argument is that the multidimensional peace building and conflict resolution should manifest simultaneously with conflict evolution, as non-state actors are now actively involved in conflict or sponsoring terror, to counterbalance the situation those willing partners should be co-opted in peace processes<sup>8</sup>. In modernity, keeping peace is now at par with preservation, and achieving those twin goals calls for a calibrated effort on all societal levels.

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<sup>7</sup> See [www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peace.shtml)

<sup>8</sup>See: An individual or organization that has significant political influence but is not allied to any particular country or state. [www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo.../obo-9780199796953-0085](http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo.../obo-9780199796953-0085).

(Garcia et al 1993) argued that the conflict arena is diffuse and multi-centered, the path towards positive peace runs along multiple tracks, actions must be coordinated with their respective dimensions. There is the personal, local, national, regional and international dimension. Crucial aspect for positive results to occur is a necessity for each actor to intervene at appropriate intervals using appropriate tools as well as having coherence with different stakeholders involved.

The whole concept is based upon the notion of inclusivity with a public and private partnership at different political and social level sets up regulations and obligations upon themselves for self-governance, this can either be the bottom up approach or top down approach, but since Regional Organizations are not the supreme lawmakers in international law or the least, this is a mid-level approach to peace building through regional governance bringing different hierarchical members into one unit for conflict resolution. Central government functions are outsourced to the private sector or local authorities. Increased web-type cooperation between states, international organizations and private actors especially in post failed states, state building. The fragmentation of political authority gives a sense of belonging to the wider society and enhances sense of ownership thereby minimizing the risk of antagonism which is a precipitator of conflict. Amongst scholars of IR it is termed co-operative problem solving through governance.

Governance just like the dimensional approach has its distinct paradigms the horizontal and vertical shift, horizontally it refers to the ascendancy of non-state actors and private international actors in conflict resolution through material, humanitarian or knowledge based assistance in ongoing and post conflict zones. Vertically there is significant interaction amongst these actors at territorial, national, sub national and international level which is by the way encompassed in the concept of multilevel government, however as from a realist point of view states still remain the central authority. In other words state centric groupings still protect state interests above all the governance and co-operation rhetoric. They manipulate allies due to their ideologies who to co-opt and who alienate.

(Heiner Hänggi) takes the form of governance with (multiple) governments by way of rule based cooperation among governments, international organizations, as well as transnational private actors. The fact that rules are the backbone of their co-operation does not mean that they are religiously applied in every situation .At times they are manipulated and twisted as

per agreement to suit current needs. This can apply in the event of a failed state whereby the regional organizations coerce responsible authorities to compromises through economic or military threats “carrot and stick in mediation” if they are playing hardball and delaying a consensus. Unity Governments and imposed political figures are usually the end product of these processes, the United Nations and SADC have done that in Bolivia and Zimbabwe respectively. Undemocratic moves like this are not problem terminators but rather pave the way to build platforms for peace, though it comes at cost for democracy

### **Conflict Resolution, Transformation and Peace building**

Conflict transformation, resolution and management theories are so interwoven that without a critical analysis it’s challenging to point out the grey areas which set them apart. One common aspect though is that, they are all geared towards peace though their applicability differs depending on the nature and stage of conflict.

Multi-dimensional approach requires a structured response mechanism, with a chronological dimension (Featherstone, 1994) Studies have illustrated that protracted intra state conflicts possess a predictable cycle and with each stage of the cycle presenting an opportunity for intervention. Conflict formation, disagreements, early warning signs and symptoms, Conflict escalation, fighting, Crisis intervention, hurting stalemate, Conflict endurance Empowerment and mediation, humanitarian intervention, Conflict improvement Negotiation, problem solving, Conflict transformation new institutions and projects, peace building.

Resolution is the widely known and extensively used amongst its peers. Conflict resolution strategies are often applied at the height of violence and terror where the calamities can no longer be tolerated in any measure. Dialogue is the method of choice but, failure to reach a consensus will drive towards military intervention whether in support of one side or to separate the warring factions so that they reach a stalemate and make the conflict ripe for negotiations. The muscle has always been a good enforcer where dialogue is weak.

Conflict resolution can usefully be seen as a phased process. The phases in a conflict resolution process overlap, in time and substance. Yet, a phased approach makes sense analytically. Each phase has key characteristics and critical elements (Walter 2002), developments during one phase influences the conduct in the next one. Phase shifts are natural from one to the next, other phase shifts are more like a forked road the process arrives



at a crucial breakpoint calling for a choice between alternative courses of action (Zartman and Berman, 1982),(Zartman, 1983, 1985/ 1989),(Touval and Zartman:1985). Breakpoints may be characterized by a shift “or from fighting to talking and fighting” this is the hurting stalemate<sup>9</sup> whereby the parties warring factions have to find mutual ground to end the conflict. Mediators may also employ coercive measures like sanctions<sup>10</sup> and withdrawal of resources to reach a ceasefire both diplomatic and non-diplomatic methods maybe applied (John Barton). Administrative posts financial benefits are used as incentives in the deal. Finding that settlement terms are affected by original aims, (Werner 2002) points out that “belligerents generally use bargaining leverage to demand as much as possible and to concede as little as possible” (Werner 1998, 321). Jones also argues that conflict resolution is too elite biased and accuses it on only focusing on short benefits to the war as it is not inclusive of the ordinary citizen as most conflicts mediated through this approach tend to blow up. SADC has used this approach in most of its conflict zones and achieved relative success yet tension continue to boil underneath. Mozambique and DRC agreements presided over a stop to large scale violence, but this is just the surface psychologically the war is still raging, the cycle of breakaways from the government setups, due to politicking has seen violence emerge there and now again. Yes this can be blamed on the political immaturity of some leaders who fail to acknowledge defeat or compromise but also reveal the flawed concepts in this theory. (Lederach: 1995) school of thought argue that root causes of the conflict should be addressed first so that conflicts end once and for all. According to (Monica Toft: 2009) “civil wars should end in military victory rather than negotiated settlements as this provide a more liable environment for peace to progress”.

On the international arena conflict resolution can easily work as they there is a continuous shuffle of negotiating parties’ personnel but the same cannot be said for intra state conflicts especially if there is an ethnic dimension to the conflict, warring parties would need to be educated thoroughly on how best they can exploit their differences as result of their psychological divide. The education and awareness phase bodes well with the NSA armed

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<sup>9</sup>Mutually **Hurting Stalemate**. Share This. A situation in which neither party thinks it can win a given conflict without incurring excessive loss, and in which both are suffering from a continuation of fighting. The conflict is judged to have entered a period of ripeness, a propitious moment for third party mediation.

<https://www.usip.org/glossary/mutually-hurting-stalemate>

<sup>10</sup> See.<https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/information>

with impartiality, expertise and resources as happened post 1995 Rwandese genocide whereby a lot of NGOs made a mark in uniting the ethnically divided country into one unit.

(Anna K: 2000) from *war to democracy* says that the end of war does not necessarily mean the end of violence, war as we know may end conventionally but a lot will need to be done to avoid the aftershock from exploding into full blown war that is where conflict transformation comes into play.

Conflict transformation, as described by (Lederach: 1995) does not suggest that we simply eliminate or control conflict, but rather recognize and work with its "dialectic nature." By this he means that social conflict is naturally created by humans who are involved in relationships, yet once it occurs, it changes (i.e., transforms) those events, people, and relationships that created the initial conflict. Thus, the cause-and-effect relationship goes both ways--from the people and the relationships to the conflict and back to the people and relationships. In this sense, "conflict transformation" is a term that describes a natural occurrence. Conflicts change relationships in determinable ways, altering communication patterns of social organization, creating hate images of the self and of other. So conflict goes way beyond active conflict has subsidized, at state level compromises would have been made, agreement reached in some cases governments set up, but that does not translate to the wider community as the hurt and pain of losing human life property and other valuables still lingers and the hate is directed towards the perceived perpetrators of this activities who are usually the ex –combatants. Conflict transformation is responsible for transforming negative aspects in the maligned communities through a setup of various structures and institution after arms have been put down and depending on the root causes of the conflict address the economic, political or social in equalities. Rehabilitation, dis armament, are economic projects and infrastructural building are some of the key processes for conflict transformation as well as monitoring the progress at state level.

Conflict transformation is a prescriptive concept, left alone, conflict there are bound to be destructive consequences. However, the consequences can be modified or transformed so that self-images, relationships, and social structures improve as a result of conflict instead of being harmed by it. Usually this involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, and other people or groups. Since conflict usually transforms perceptions by accentuating the differences between people and positions, effective conflict transformation can work to

improve mutual understanding. Even when people's interests, values, and needs are different, even non-reconcilable, progress has been made if each group gains a relatively accurate understanding of the other.

(Gaitlung & Webel: 1995) propose the transcend approach<sup>11</sup> to conflict transformation, which is dealing with one group at a time engaging them in deep discussion to explore their grievances and finding solution. After the background investigations to conflict cause have been done a facilitator is then at liberty to conduct the traditional mediation dialogue with all stakeholders. This is followed by signing of the peace agreement and the subsequent; the implementation phase, when the stipulations of the peace agreement are carried out; and the consolidation phase, when consequences and changing circumstances resulting from the implementation of the agreement are to be internalized and accepted by peoples and elites.

Peace building reinforces the efforts of the above methods as it ensures the positive for ending conflict are long term, as most post conflict societies are on the brink of relapsing back into conflict if their situations are not monitored and managed well. In order to achieve sustainable peace multidimensional process from war to peace is put forward. Security dimension, political (governance) dimension and the socio-economic dimension.

**Table i.i:**

**Stages of peace building.**

<b>Security Dimension</b>	DDR of Ex-Combatants Mine Action Control of Weapons (particularly SALW) SSR
<b>Political Dimension</b>	Support for Political and Administrative Authorities and Structures Good Governance, Democracy and Human Rights Civil Society Empowerment Reconciliation Transitional Justice

<sup>11</sup> The Transcend method uses dialogues with all parties to identify their goals, to test the legitimacy of the goals, and to create visions of a new social reality meeting legitimate goals. Diagnoses focus on conflict and trauma; prognoses without or with intervention, therapy on visions with solution, conciliation.

<b>Socioeconomic Dimension</b>	Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees & Internally Displaced Persons Reconstruction of Infrastructure and Important Public Functions Development of Education and Health Private Sector Development, Employment, Trade and Investment
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The three dimensional approach has high pressure on the service providers, especially on the bilateral, multi-lateral and development sectors. In most cases their efforts are challenged by stakeholders in the peace agreements as they seek to violate or twist them to their advantage, Zimbabwe is one such case in point where one the domineering party intentionally manipulated the security sector to party use during the government of national unity from 2008 to 2010 despite the protestation of the SADC affiliated organs in monitoring the peace process. Scholars of this school of thought forwarded countermeasures for such scenarios through coordinating the three d formula signifying diplomacy defense and development. If correct pressure is applied on the stakeholders of the peace process all three dimensions would be met with little or no adversity.

(Mansfield: 2002) chips in with the dilemma theory in peace building which comprises of the horizontal, systematic and temporal. The horizontal dilemma is personal centered and concerns itself on the nurture of representatives of the peace process should it be the leadership/elite or decisions should come up from the lower echelons of society who are the most affected and vulnerable group, after all they constitute the larger percentage of the nation. (Paris 2004) adds weight to this theory by pointing out that for peace building to be successful all societal levels should be represented, though this may present a logistical and organizational problem it guarantees a longer life expectancy for peace agreements, rather than a top down imposition of elite principles upon the society. Referendums if the situations allows can act as vehicle for public carrying a public centered approach.

The second approach which is usually rare in the modern world or short lived due to sovereignty principles is the ownership of the peace building process. Who owns the process? Who is the responsible authority? Regional organization and their respective partners' efforts

are well recognized, but there needs to be a limit to their influence in the process as third party ownership of agreements and decisions which are not accounted for by the locals risk rejection and civil disobedience resulting into capitulation to conflict. The OHR did that in Bosnia and Herzegovina by dismissing elected officials but the results were disastrous. Without citizenry approval or voice, a treaty involving national matters is impotent. In Southern Africa a bloated government of national unity was imposed upon the people of Zimbabwe composed of imposed officials lacking an ounce of political credibility to the voters, this proved a major challenge in governance and policy issues and threatened to derail the whole process in its infancy. The other challenge comes with the risk of the leaderships political careers as radical moves from their ideologies may alienate their support base, so this in its own is a stumbling block as the incumbents will try as much as they can to safeguard their own interests even at the expense of a peace process.

Finally there is the temporal dilemma basically a tradeoff between short-term and long term effects of the democratization and peace building. Early efforts to garner for democratization, increases the risk of a spillover and violent conflict thereby undermining long term effects of democratization. (Consen and Snyder: 2002) are of the view that democratic necessities like election should be delayed up until a point when the environment is suitable and necessary institutions are in place. This may be said in the case of Africa whereby elections on their own are either a cause of conflict or act as divisive element upon society. So in this respect peace brokers cannot risk such a scenario in the infancy of an agreement.

(Timothy D Sisk: 2000) adds that peace building should not address the causes of the conflict but explore the ones which emerged during the conflict as they may be more damaging. (Lyon and Spear :2002) point out one prominent problem civilian armament, and re integration of ex combatants into society, as armed conflicts would have developed large amounts of military men psychologically conditioned for battle who may find it hard to fit back into the civilian community or the community to accept them, massive rehabilitation of the said parties is required. Experiences from Sudan and Somalia have shown that without proper rehabilitation and disarmament war will always relapse as small communities combine to form militias under local leadership usually named warlords who are the law unto themselves.

## **CHAPTER III DESIGN, MODELLING AND PROGRESSION OF SADC**

### **Introduction.**

This chapter is dedicated to SADC's organizational structure for peace, security and involvement of international actors like the AU and UN in ensuring that the region becomes a conflict free zone.

### **SADC Background.**

During its formation the founding fathers did not consider SADC as a security complex whereby a member's security is dependent on the stability of its regional peers (Buzan :1987) nor were there ties that bind in the socio-political and economic realms.

However with the passage of time the organization evolved into multi-tasking machinery tasked with a variety of responsibilities, including peace and security, which was formally introduced late 1992.

However the current position of SADC on conflict, peace and security challenges cannot be fully appreciated without going back along the historical lane. During its infancy in the 1980s the SADDCC which laid the foundation to present day SADC intentionally circumvented the explicit security hence peace issues within its agenda and framework and left it as a preserve of the Frontline States. The Front Line States' composition was almost identical to that of the SADCC, with the exception of apartheid South Africa which was still a fore and a threat at that point in history. With its formation in the 1980s after Zimbabwe's independence, the precursor to SADC, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), deliberately excluded explicitly political, and hence peace and security, issues from its agenda, concentrating on economic development. Security issues were the preserve of the Front Line States (FLS), an informal alliance of countries willing and able to counter South Africa's military hegemony and support the armed liberation movement. With the end of apartheid South Africa and the insolvency of the Frontline States new mechanisms were needed to cater for the emerging threats to security in the region which were now becoming largely intra state, and a dual approach by SADC to the region problems was inevitable as security finally became a matter of concern. The United Nations seemed overburdened with issues or was just plain complacent on the security threats on the African continent, as security issues were ignored or mismanaged.

However on its part SADC continued as a Regional Economic Committee up to 1996 on the pretext that the SADC should be a preserve for economic issues while regional security issues should be dealt with by the frontline states. With the fall of the frontline states in 1995, the long overdue change and necessary political inclusion came in 1995, ushering in a security oriented Organ for Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation reporting directly to the SADC summit head of states (Gavin C Thawra). Though not fully operationalised this setup the groundwork for OPSDC to identify security threats and come out with a framework for the problems through the strategic implementation.

### **SADC Contextual Background on Conflicts:**

The post-cold war and apartheid era were the most challenging for the SADC block as different kinds of conflicts erupted across the region. Incomplete disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Mozambique ,Namibia and Angola secession threats, socio economic equality Namibia and South Africa, economic collapse and state sponsored violence in Zimbabwe and Malawi ,unconstitutional change of government in Madagascar and Lesotho and finally rebel movements in the Democratic Republic of Congo are some of the challenges which the SADC had to deal with. These struggles had a common feature as there were confined inside state parties' borders, but at the same time different in their nurture especially the Zimbabwean and the DRC conflict which are the focal point of the study. Though the SADC has one security structure it remains flexible to deal with different kinds of conflict while at the same time adhering to the international standards on conflict resolution as advocated by the United Nations and African Union Protocols.

### **3.2: Subsidiary and Treaties**

The SADC Declaration Treaty sells the SADC dream of shared future and regional government pulling in oneness for a peaceful secure and stabilized relationship on the basis of equality, mutual outputs and solidarity. In addition to this the SADC is also in full adherence to ethics of the United Nations charter, the constitutive act of the African union and the protocol establishing the peace and Security Council of the African union.

To reach its goals and commitments to international charters and protocols, SADC Heads of State and Government went on to setup the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation in June 1996. Five years later it was operationalized through the Protocol on

Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation<sup>12</sup>. In 2004, the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO)<sup>13</sup> followed up as an enabling instrument on the implementation goals and objectives setup in the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation. The first version of the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ covered 2004-2009, while the updated revision termed the Harmonized Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO II)- covers the period 2010-2015.

Despite a number of successes in the area of politics, defense and security in recent years, SADC continue to face a number of political, economic and social challenge

### **SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security (2001)**

For a comprehensive understanding of protocol for politics and defense a precise brief of its instruments which affect intra state conflict resolution and the statutes involved is laid out, below with strong emphasis being exercised on the SADC relation with its international partners.

The protocol is responsible for upholding peace and security issues in Southern Africa, through a shared and common foreign policy amongst state parties, based on co-operation and mutual respect on conflict and security matters. The protocol sets out the ground rules and code of conduct for the organs appointments, jurisdiction, procedures and relationship with international partners.

The organ deals with both inter and intra state conflict on this particular study we analyze how the organ views intra state conflict. Article 11 :2 : The Organ shall seek to manage and resolve inter- and intra-state conflict by peaceful means and the particular conflict in question shall have the following features “large-scale violence between sections of the population or between the state and sections of the population, including genocide, ethnic cleansing and gross violation of human rights;” this bodes well for the 2008 Zimbabwean crises whereby it was the state versus the masses as post electoral violence destabilized the country and left thousands dead and injured . On this instance the OPDSC invoked Article 11:3:A which calls for the “Organ to prevent, manage and resolve conflict by peaceful means shall include preventive diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration and adjudication by an international tribunal”, when it moved in to engage the conflicting parties.

<sup>12</sup> See: [www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514\\_SADC\\_SIPO\\_En](http://www.sadc.int/files/6313/6880/3040/03514_SADC_SIPO_En).

<sup>13</sup> See:<https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/sadc-peace-security-stability-and-governance>



However if peaceful, methods are unfruitful the enforcement mechanisms are put into motion through article 11.3 which states that “Where peaceful means of resolving a conflict are unsuccessful, the Chairperson acting on the advice of the Ministerial Committee may recommend to the Summit that enforcement action be taken against one or more of the disputant parties” this method is usually applied in war zones where some parties may not be willing to come to the table seeking an outright military victory as in the case of DRC where the SADC was forced to go against the M23 rebels in order to bring them the negotiating table.

### **SADC Mutual Defense Pact**

The main agenda of this pact is to operationalize the protocol on defense act as vehicle to put into actions the theoretical consideration the OPSDC. In all its statutes the pact stresses the importance of collective action as all members are obligated to take part in the case of crises in a fellow member country as pronounced in Article 6 which pronounces that. “An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional security. Such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action by all State Parties. Collective action shall be mandated by the SADC Summit on the recommendation of the Organ”.

A multidimensional approach is also adopted when article 6 further stresses that “such armed attack, and measures taken in response thereto, shall immediately be reported to the Organization of African Unity/African Union and the Security Council of the United Nations”.

Though there is the notion of collective security article also respects the notion of state sovereignty as no state is allowed to interfere in the internal affairs other state parties, though this is theoretically progressive in practice the privilege is waived in the event of human rights abuse and violence. Collective action is taken against the perpetrating state party grouping. The SADC Mutual Defense Pact is accused of being state centric by some scholars but it is also of importance to note that it can be of importance in combating state parties involved in conflict perpetration in their countries. In 2008 Zimbabwe the SADC did not wait for an invite from the state party but rather heeded the call from the opposition and civil society who were bearing the brunt of the conflict and were at the receiving end of the brutal government militia.

Comment [t1]:

## **Institutional Framework on Conflict Resolution in SADC**

### **SADC Summit**

The summit is the ultimate uppermost decision making body of the SADC, it comprises of the heads of governments of state parties. Responsible for policy formulation, control of community functions and has the final say on all matters of importance to the SADC.

It operates at a troika level comprised of the present chairperson, deputy chair and outgoing chair respectively. The main reason being to familiarize and allow impartation of information of data between the three head of states concerned as the chair is only held for one year. As per policy the member states should meet once a year to elect the new chair of the summit and deputy but if there are pressing socioeconomic and security concerns extra ordinary summit are convened especially in conflict situation which threatening human security.

### **The Tribunal**

Ensures the adherence to the SADC protocols and interpretation of what is required for each member, it was established in Namibia 2000 ordinary summit and it is headquartered in the same country. 2010 was tragic for the organization as it was disbanded after making several rulings against the legitimacy of the Zimbabwean government which had been formed on a backdrop of violence and political manipulations by the reigning government.

The Tribunal had operated within its bounds and jurisdiction to hear human rights complaints, but this exercise led to a SADC-ordered review of the Tribunal's role and functions in 2010, resulting in the suspension of its activity. However in 2012 the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government agreed to create a new court with a mandate limited strictly to the adjudication of inter-State disputes arising from the SADC Treaty and its protocols, rather than international human rights norms. (SADC Tribunal. In 2014). Nine States signed the revised Protocol on the tribunal, which would explicitly limit the Tribunal's jurisdiction, but the instrument has not received the ratifications needed for its entry into force, despite the urging of the SADC Summit.

### **Council of ministers**

It is comprised of chosen minister from member countries and oversees the implementation SADC policies as well as putting forward recommendations to the summit for new policies to be formulated which are in the best interests of the organization on the SADC power ladder this is the junior level policy formulation group, which analyses and reviews ideas before putting them forward to the summit, it is comprised of ministers from foreign affairs and economic branches of state parties.

### **Panel of Elders**

The Panel of elders is SADC's most high-profile structure for preventing conflict, conducting on-the-ground fact-finding, presenting policy options, and brokering agreements. It is composed "highly respected former southern Africa leaders and influential nonpolitical personalities who draw upon their experience and moral persuasion to foster peace these can be drawn from any state party. It has undertaken several missions since it was established, mediating in DRC, Zimbabwe, Malawi and the Madagascar conflict. This branch also works closely with the panel of the wise from the African union which has the same structure with the council of elders though with a wider mandate.

### **SADC Mediation Reference Group**

The overall Strategic Goal of the SADC Mediation Reference Group is to "enhance the capacity of SADC for conflict prevention, management and resolution". In order to contribute to the achievement of that Goal, the main Expected Outcome of the Reference Group for the period 2015-2017, covered by the Strategic Plan is the "prevention, containment and resolution of inter and intra-State conflict by peaceful means"

This will be achieved through three outcomes Increased understanding of the root causes and potential causes of conflict in SADC Member States; Increased utilization of mediation by SADC Member States as a tool for the prevention, containment and resolution of conflict by peaceful means and Strengthened capacity for peace, security, stability and sustainable development in the SADC region

### **SADC Brigade.**

The SADC brigade is the military muscle behind the peace operations in the SADC region it operates under the auspices of the SADC standby force policy framework. It came into existence in August 2008. Its personnel comprises of civilians, military and police members drawn from various sectors in the member states.

Its functions derive from article 13 of the mandate for peace and security protocol, relating to observation and monitoring missions, peace support missions, interventions for peace and security restoration at the request of member states and actions to prevent the spread of conflict to neighboring states, or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached.

The SADC Brigade serves in peace-building efforts including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization and humanitarian assistance in conflict areas and areas impacted by major natural disasters. The SADC brigade receives its guidance and instructions from the SADC committee of chiefs of defense staff. The SADC regional training center is located in Zimbabwe, and is responsible for ensuring that the whole staff complement of the brigade is well equipped to tackle their required duties.

### **The SARPCCO**

The SARPCO was created during the SADC summit held in Maseru 2006 as a subsidiary of the SADC organ on politics, defense and security, it is led by the Southern Africa Regional Police Chiefs On Peace and Security. It is responsible on the terrorism sector and sharing intelligence on the activities of destabilizing elements in the region. Its jurisdiction knows no boundaries as far as the SADC region is concerned. Terror elements and groups can be brought to book if caught in any one of the member states.

SARPCO also has a strong working relationship with the Interpol's maintain its presence in post conflict zones, take an affirmative role in disarmament of ex combatants, ensure that there international standards of rule of law and democracy are exercised and make sure that stakeholders in peace processes stick to their word and agreements for peace maintenance. The SARPCO members have also ratified several agreements in relation to conflict prevention and management like the multilateral treaty extradition and arms trafficking where perpetrators are extradited to any member states. Violation of any law is proved, on

arms trafficking one can note that it is the proliferation and availability of arms that usually fuel the hunger armed conflicts in the region taking into the consideration the Democratic Republic of Congo whereby any political misunderstandings degenerates into a civil war due to the readily available ammunition in the country. In most cases arms dealers may take part in the creation of these conflicts as wars provide them with lucrative business opportunities

### **SADC memorandum Of Understanding with Non-Governmental Organizations**

SADC's obligations to engage NSAs are explicitly defined in Article 23 of the SADC Treaty. Article 23 of the Treaty provides that 'SADC shall seek to fully involve the people of the Region and non-governmental organizations in the process of regional integration. Further, SADC commits to cooperate with and support initiatives of the peoples of the Region and non-governmental organizations in order to foster closer relations among the communities, associations and peoples of the Region. Additionally, at a strategy level, the RISDP proposes a working relationship with NSAs and an annual consultation conference between the Secretariat and NSAs. There are other instruments that also highlight the need for engagement between SADC and NSAs. The SADC Windhoek Declaration, Article 9 also commits SADC states to "exercise leadership in developing, implementing and monitoring the regional development agenda through broad consultative processes (including the participation of civil society and the private sector). The Windhoek Declaration review called for increasing participation of civil society at the level of thematic groups, broader participation of CSOs in Windhoek Declaration Dialogue and inclusion of CSOs in the monitoring of the Windhoek Declaration. The review further suggests the development of a regional cooperation forum that includes civil society representatives, SADC Member States, and International Cooperating Partners (ICP) to identify opportunities for cooperation. The MOU serves as neutral linkage for the wider SADC community and its political leadership, SADC and NSA understanding diffuses any bias or exclusion on political grounds especially during the peace building stage in post conflict zones. Non state actors are also present in electoral mediation groups wherever elections are being held in the SADC territory this goes with the blessing of the SADC secretariat. This can be noted to have an effect in avoiding state centric bias in the event of a bias; NSA actors are like the representatives of the ordinary citizen. In ware torn

countries like DRC and Angola NSA provide the necessary structures for the re integration of ex combatants into the society as well setting up conflict resolution teams.

## **CHAPTER 4: SADC AND CONFLICTS WITHIN MEMBER STATES.**

### **Introduction**

This chapter provides an empirical analysis of the mediation principles of the SADC region through the DRC and Zimbabwe cases. Methods and tactics employed in the respective conflicts are scrutinized in their plural as well as monologue way. The conflicts differ in nurture, and SADC is the frontrunner in reigning in the conflicting parties but in so doing employ different conflict transformation strategies.

### **Background**

Since its independence the DRC was for 32 years under Mobutu Sese Seko's despotic regime, then it was called Zaire. The peak of Mobutu reign was during the cold war whereby the hegemonic powers largely turned a blind eye on his domestic issues and supported him financially. Then came the 90s when the cold war ended and all of sudden Mobutu powers waned and his grip on power became precarious. the dictator then decided to employ the colonial tactics of divide and rule, manipulating the ethnic and class differences amongst his subjects, but this was not to last for long as he made the mistake of harboring runaway Hutu genocidiaries from Rwanda who hoped that one day they would go attack the Tutsi led government and takeover power<sup>14</sup>. This did not go down well with the Rwanda who teamed up with Uganda a to form a loose coalition of rebels called the Alliance des forces Démocratiques de Libération du Congo (AFDL) to invade the DRC and topple the Mobutu led government Rwanda backed the rebels with ammunition and troops and in it took a little more than six months to seize control of the DRC.

In May 1997, the AFDL leader, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, was installed as the country's new President. However, relations between Kabila and his former allies rapidly deteriorated to the point in which Rwanda and Uganda attempted to mount a new rebellion against the leader. The 'Second Congolese War' started in August 1998.

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<sup>14</sup>See: [www.history.com/topics/rwandan-genocide](http://www.history.com/topics/rwandan-genocide)

## Democratic Republic of Congo and SADC

The SADC and DRC relationship dates back to 1998 just after DRC's civil war which had toppled the Mobutu Sese Seko led regime. From 1996 to 1997 Laurent Kabila led an insurgency in DRC against the Mobutu regime, with the assistance of Rwanda Uganda and Burundi. The goal of the coalition was successful, but no sooner had Mobutu attained power his relation with the kingmakers, who also doubled as his immediate neighbors turned sour, as the countries turned their guns towards Kabila government.

From prior experience Kabila realized it was an insurmountable task to outdo the coalition forces backing up rebel's against him. In 1998 the DRC joined the SADC region as an equal partner, and naturally as per its principal's SADC could not just stand by and watch its member state crumble under local and foreign aggression<sup>15</sup>. In 1998 SADC officially joined the DRC war to bring back peace and stability.

SADC employed a dual approach in dealing with the DRC conflict with as opinions were divided other members followed Zimbabwe's military strategy against South Africa dialogue approach. This consensus was only reached in Dar salaam after much deliberation and squabbling amongst the member states especially South Africa and Zimbabwe who are viewed as the regional powerhouse.

### Military Intervention.

Kabila requested for military assistance from the SADC as the rebels were gaining territorial ground and advancing towards his stronghold Kinshasa. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia led a SADC brigade into DRC initially to stall and defend strategic government institutions and prevent looming takeover by rebels. Meanwhile the Rwandese backed militia's had already claimed significant part of DRC and were now marching towards the capital Kinshasa. The SADC brigade came in the nick of time to salvage the Kabila government from a possibly inevitable defeat. The brigade respected the OPSDC principles on protection of civilians and state infrastructure during conflict in a member state. After one too many encounters with the overly aggressive rebel forces, the strategies quickly changed to strategic offensive, as they situation could no longer sustain the initial plan which made them look like sitting ducks.

<sup>15</sup>Article 6 states that "An armed attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action." [www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/defence](http://www.sadc.int/themes/politics-defence-security/defence)

**Comment [b2]:** Before start'ng to talk about the relationship with SADC/ G've bréf h'story of the conflct 'n Congo. Reason of the conflict\ actors\interventions of the International etc=peacekeep'ng+medátón efforts

They started launching attacks in coordination with the DRC national army upon the rebel strongholds.

Operation Sovereign Legitimacy's as it was codenamed lasted for four years, dubbed as Africa world war by the international community as it pitted countries from central and Southern Africa on DRC soil. 5.4 million died during the struggle and the United Nations for its part partially turned a blind eye on the proceedings on the pretext that regional organization were in a prime position to deal with the conflict citing the African union and SADC respectively.

Operation sovereign legitimacy as SADC maiden military engagement since the operationalization of the OPSDC, encountered logistical and financial challenges as war is expensive, the countries humanitarian intervention had to continuously call for logistical and financial backup to carry out their mandate. Response to the hindrances was either slow or never forthcoming at all as most SADC countries are not economic powerhouses who can excessively spend on foreign ventures.

Besides the issue of finance lack of experience in peacekeeping mission and training proved to be an obstacle in the regional force's operation in the DRC as military personnel, engaged in illegal mineral panning in the resource rich DRC. Not only did this affect the energy and focus to be channeled towards the peace process, but had adverse relational consequences between the SADC brigade and locals which hindered their operations. Unethical socio military behavior exhibited the armature troops brought animosity as they were now regarded as bonafide looters in an international uniform, so instead of getting assistance they got rebuttal. It should be noted however that the brigade was just loose coalition of military forces swiftly banded together after Laurent Kabila invoked Article 6 of the SADC Charter. Through calling for military assistance. They possessed no prior experience in joint military exercises nor had they taken any drills. Different military backgrounds, different codes of conducts and power hierarchies, and most importantly the linguistic background of the personnel did not help matters. Zimbabwe had English speakers, Namibia Afrikaans/Germany and finally Portuguese from the Angolans so it was really hard task to make these forces gel together into an instant formidable force.

For their part amidst such challenges they repealed rebel forces from the strategically important Kinshasa which has the airport. In most conflicts the capture of the international



airport signals a turning point in conflict as economic, administrative and political functions are hugely compromised.

While the war was raging the other members of the SADC organization were busy initiating dialogue as early as 1999. The SADC panel of elders led from this front in conjunction with the African Union panel of the wise as they sought was to bring the warring factions to the table. Sir Ketumire Masire the former president of Botswana led the Inter Congolese Dialogue mandated with engaging Laurent Kabila and the rebel force in a quest to find their grievances and how best to work upon them this can be attributed to the transcendence theory whereby groups are initially contacted and negotiated with separately before facilitating a joint meeting.

### **Dialogue.**

1998 was the most intense and violent phase of the DRC conflict and regional leaders decided to put an end to the conflict, that had now engulfed the entire region whether be it active battle engagement or humanitarian aid everyone was feeling the pinch. An extraordinary SADC summit was convened in August 1998 Pretoria targeting an immediate cessation of hostilities. On 13 September 1998 the Fredrick Chiluba the reigning Zambian president was given the mandate for the peace initiative by the SADC. Fredrick Chiluba the SADC appointed facilitator held Pre negotiations with the stakeholders in the DRC conflict and in January 1999 the leaders of Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola agreed to ceasefire on behalf of SADC while non SADC participants Rwanda, Uganda agreed to down weapons making the Lusaka peace agreement. Though this was good shot in the right direction what is notable is the absence of Laurent Kabila and the RCD from the signatories. Kabila was the leader of the government force and the RCD was the largest rebel group operating in the DRC this proved to be an imposed settlement lacking ownership from the main belligerents in the civil war and the locals. The United Nations weighed in with UN Security Council Resolution 1234 demanding an immediate halt to hostilities, with an all-inclusive agreement involving all the Congolese groups involved in the fighting. Laurent Kabila proved to be the stumbling block to the success of the agreement as he continuously haggled over issues of the personnel involved in the facilitation especially Sir Ketumile Masire who he had much distaste of and accused him of favoring the rebel factions. Kabila only agreed to the sign the agreement under extreme pressure from his allies who threatened withdrawal from the front if he insisted on

his hard line stance. Kabila signature was followed by Jean Piere Bemba 1 August 1999 leader of the MLC one of the larger rebel groups and later the RCD 31 August 1999 thus giving legitimacy and ownership to the peace agreement.

Resolutions adopted through this dialogue were binding to all signatories. Internal parties were supposed to integrate and form a new Congolese national army, hold democratic elections, draft a new constitution. Transparency in governance, disarmament of all combatants. A joint military commission was then established which included all signatories to regulate and monitor the goals set up in the agreement. The agreement was given 270 days to fully implement the resolutions from the date of signature and 30 days for the disarmament of combatants.

Though brought about with much pomp and fanfare the peace agreement was on the rocks as early as October as Kabila's forces began to push eastwards and the MLC and the RCD responded by tightening their grip on already acquired territorial gains, efforts to investigate the trigger to the conflict were futile as both parties blame the other for initiating conflict first thereby themselves only acting in self-defense to aggression. The short period given for disarmament of the various rebel groups littered across the vast geographical landscape of DRC was always going to be a challenge, let alone leaving the incumbents with the mandate to carry out the disarmament exercise by them was hoping for too much on an already fragile peace process, prone to manipulation. The resulting stalemate lasted almost a year and a half.

A change of dynamics came when Laurent Kabila largely viewed as a stumbling block to the peace process was assassinated on 16 January 2001, paving way for the peace process to resume as Joseph Kabila his son was upgraded to the presidency of DRC<sup>16</sup>. Joseph Kabila unlike his father came with a slightly different strategy to his father's conventional warfare and took a largely conservative stance, declaring that he was open for negotiation to halt the hostilities<sup>17</sup>.

The change of personnel ushered in the Sun City talks facilitated by the SADC lasting for 25 days. The SADC facilitation team was responsible for identifying influential rebel leadership

**Comment [b3]:** I donot understand the role of SADC in the mediation process/Role od SADC in the negotiations& what was the SADC aim?

<sup>16</sup> **Laurent Kabila**, in full **Laurent Desire Kabila** (born 1939, [Jadotville, Belgian Congo](#) [now Likasi, Democratic Republic of the Congo]—died January 18?, 2001), leader of a rebellion that overthrew President [Mobutu Sese Seko](#) of Zaire in May 1997. He subsequently became [president](#) and restored the country's former name, [Democratic Republic of the Congo](#).

<sup>17</sup> See also://www.forbes.com

in the DRC and ensures their logistical and security requirements were catered for during the course of the peace talks. Prior to the talks most rebel groups were paranoid and regarded any attempt to lure them from their safe political havens into foreign territory as a ploy to persecute them in so doing crippling their movements. However after thorough assurances by the SADC team for their safety and welfare they agreed to take part. It should also be noted that the task was never going to be easy considering the fact that the DRC was a member of the SADC and SADC was the lead facilitator, in order for the agreement to hold the SADC team had to exude an extra effort in impartiality to the other parties. It was not all smooth sailing for the talks as commencement was delayed by scuffles, accusation and counter accusation as to the legitimacy of then rebel representatives. The main rebel factions argued that some of the delegates present were just pawns of the Kabila government sent to turn the process into Kabila favor. The Sun City<sup>18</sup> talks were aimed at the formation of an all-inclusive transitional government, one of the burning questions was Kabila's role in the new system if it was established. During the course of the negotiation there was renewed fighting within the DRC which threatened to permanently scuttle the talks as government representatives quit the talks citing bad faith on the case of the rebel movements. Rebel groups had launched an offensive and gained considerable territory, the United Nations intervened on this particular case by ordering the rebels to withdraw from the gained territories during the negotiations, which the rebels grudgingly accepted giving room for talks to continue.

On the 18<sup>th</sup> of Kabila and Bemba struck a deal which was voted into motion by 70% of the delegates in the dialogue which had a bloated government and administrative structure accommodating and representing most of the warring factions, while it looked progressively aligned to peace it failed to take off as the third influential force RCD –Goma once again felt it had been played by Joseph Kabila and Bemba as they had alienated the group from the influential post of president and prime minister as well as strategically important government ministries.

The Kabila-Bemba agreement had progressive content, but its undoing was the undermining the power of the other groups both armed and unarmed. These groups under the guidance of

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<sup>18</sup> The Sun City I talks were part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) initiated under the Lusaka Agreement of 1999: <http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCthe-politics-of-conflict-resolution-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/>

RCD created the Alliance on Safeguarding the Inter Congolese Dialogue, in retrospect meaning there was not yet any closure to the DRC peace process.

With the death of the Sun City 1 talks, SADC introduced another peace process in Pretoria South Africa from October 2002. Inflated bigger and wide reaching the Pretoria process brought together the political, military, civil society, regional and international actors together to map the way forward to DRC peace process. The meeting was facilitated by the UN secretary general special representative Mustafa Niasse and SADC representative Sydney Mufamandi from South Africa. The Pretoria spirit was of mutual respect, inclusion, and state sovereignty of the DRC. The military environment prior to the negotiation was looking bleak for all the belligerents and favorable for the facilitators. Kabila's allies were facing unrest due to economic and political problems in their own backyards and could not tolerate any further financial war burdens, while the United Nations was applying pressure to the main rebel backers Rwanda. Rwanda was advised that any further military engagements in the DRC would mean a cut in financial aid from the World Bank and IMF, at this particular point Rwanda was not economically privileged to gamble with its domestic issues so the forced alternative was to withdraw with dignity and what a better way than from a treaty. Both internal sides to the conflict in DRC had been engaged in a stalemate for almost a year and the possibility of conventional military victory were becoming bleak an option for dialogue provided a dignified exit from warfare. The SADC military wing was also facing crippling financial challenges that it could no longer tolerate any further military engagement Zimbabwe the lead actor in the SADC brigade was facing strikes and demonstration from civilians who demanded that they withdraw from the war and redirect resources ton economic building activities in the country.

In September 17 2002 the SADC allied forces Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia withdrew from the DRC. September to December 2002 there was a series of conferences and agreements involving the peace agreement of DRC to Rwanda and Uganda respectively. This was followed up by the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement signed by the local fighting groups and the government in December 2002 under the watch of SADC. These agreements left no option to the multiple armed groups dotted around DRC but to take harbor under the Inter Congolese Dialogue and endorse the treaties.

The involvement of SADC in these mediation processes reflected a huge amount of political will by the leaders of this regional organization to decisively bring an end to the conflict in the DRC. It is from such SADC-mandated mediation efforts in the DRC that a report, written by Carayannis for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, observes that “despite deep regional divisions, regional actors can (and did) initiate and successfully negotiate agreements to end conflicts in which large and important portions of that region are participants in the conflict

The Pretoria agreement was handed over to the Inter-Congolese Dialogue facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, who organized a meeting in Sun City aimed at hammering out the final stages of the whole dialogue process (John Idriss Lahai, Tanya Lyons;2006). This meeting brought together all the parties to the Pretoria process, which culminated in the signing of the Sun City II agreement of 1 April 2003<sup>19</sup>.

The Sun City II agreement ushered in a new era in the DRC context which later brought about the 2006 electoral process whereby Joseph Kabila won by 60% of the vote in the run off (*Working Paper no. 81: Crisis States Research Centre*). These were the first election the country held since its independence from colonialism in 1960.

On the basis of conflict transformation it can be noted that the SADC oriented transitional inclusive governance concepts can be highly effective in transforming conflict (Heiner Hängg: 2012). From 2003 to 2006 former arch enemies were able to work together for the benefit of the country while preparing the structures for democratic elections, the importance of these transitional period of peace of peace cannot be underestimated considering war history of the country. Lessons were learnt across the social, political and economic spheres that peace is tolerable than war.

From 2003 the United Nations Security Council have maintained an effective presence in the country from 2003 acting as pacifiers and intermediaries in the peace process as aftershocks of the conflict have at times threatened to capitulate into war especially during the electoral seasons. In 2006 Jean Pierre Bemba supporters did not take defeat lightly and ended up initiating targeted attacks against government forces. This only subsided after the unwavering support afforded to the elected government by the UN Security Council as well as Bemba's arrest on war crimes in 2007. Relative peace and progress continued in the DRC up to 2011 whereby they held a general election and Joseph Kabila triumphed over Inzanguri who

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<sup>19</sup>See also: [reliefweb.int/.../drc-focus-results-inter-Congolese-dialogue](http://reliefweb.int/.../drc-focus-results-inter-Congolese-dialogue)

however refused to accept the electoral results and declared himself the winner of the whole electoral process claiming vote rigging and electoral fraud, but SADC, UN and other international observers had a different opinion and duly endorsed Joseph Kabila.

The only threat to date for the DRC peace process has been the M23 rebels who have been conducting militia attacks upon the civilians as well as government troops in eastern DRC. The m23 is a group of militants who mutinied from the government in 2012 protesting the government failure to live up to its political and economic welfare promises of 2009, to the concerned parties mainly on the issues of army positions as well as financial welfare. In 2013 they managed to run over the town of Goma despite the presence of United Nations security forces who the locals now regard as mere tourists who have no other use than sightseeing.

The UN has maintained the presence of over 18000 troops in the DRC but that has not managed to put a complete stop to the ever sprouting battles in DRC.

SADC continues to monitor the security and political situation in the eastern DRC, with a view to determining political and other courses of action. In July 2015, the ministers of SADC's Interstate Defense and Security Committee (ISDSC) met in Pretoria to review the security situation in the region, including the eastern part of the DRC

#### **Post Conflict Peace building Efforts by SADC**

The determination of Southern African leaders in bringing sustainable peace to the DRC is discerned from SADC role through, the ICGLR and the Force Interventions Brigade (FIB), operating under Chapter VII mandate under the main UN peacekeeping mission, the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). SADC spearheaded the institutions (including the UN, AU and the ICGLR) that made the call to deploy the FIB in eastern DRC in 2013.

The Force Interventions Brigade is a regional peacekeeping force, comprising troops from SADC countries, which seeks to stabilize the eastern DRC and prevent mass atrocities.

Essentially, "the FIB is a regional peacekeeping force, comprising 6 000 troops from SADC countries (Malawi, Tanzania and South Africa), which seeks to stabilize the eastern DRC and prevent mass atrocities. FIB was established in March 2013, following the signing of the Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region, and adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2098 of 2013". It is mandated to pursue

insurgents and negative forces in eastern DRC, helping the government regain control of its territory, the FIB made headway, particularly in the surrender of the M23 rebel movement this development resulted in the Kampala Dialogue and Declarations for Peace and the Nairobi Declaration for Peace in the Eastern DRC in December 2013.

The FIB's intervention has also resulted in a neutralization of the *Forces Démocratiques Pour la Liberation du Rwanda* (FDLR). These cumulative processes of securing the DRC have given a sense of optimism to that government – to the extent that in March 2015, the government called upon MONUSCO to begin withdrawing its peacekeeping troops from the country, citing the reason that the DRC is “ready to assume the responsibility of securing its state.” The role of SADC's Force in securing the DRC territory has led some observers to contend that “the east of the DRC, for the first time in many years, is no longer held hostage by rebel groups with significant links to neighboring governments, though these undoubtedly remain”. However, despite these initial successes, the FIB has not yet been able to completely disarm the FDLR. This is likely because of the significant size of this armed group, and the fact that the FDLR is spread and deeply embedded in local communities and is located in difficult-to-reach areas.

## **Zimbabwe Conflict 2000-2008**

### **Introduction**

In 2000 Zimbabwe held a referendum to draft a new constitution with the ruling ZANU PF party supporting the yes vote while the newly formed Movement for Democratic Change party was totally against it as they viewed it as ploy by ZANU PF to centralize power in Mugabe hands paving way for a one party state *the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI)*<sup>20</sup>. The draft constitution was rejected, but it came with consequences as the ZANU PF led government plotted retaliation upon the opposition. Urban citizens where the constitution had been overwhelmingly rejected were the primary targets. However as much as they were inclined to violence the government could not just go around beating up people trampling on human rights as that was bound to stem international community backlash. General election were only two years away giving the government ample time to

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<sup>20</sup>See also:<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/feb/09/zimbabwe>.

strategies and plot. “National Youth Service” was introduced and made compulsory albeit in a controversial manner. Instead of preparing the youth for serving the nation it was turned into a preparation school for the ZANU militia. Young men and women were ideologically brainwashed into the ZANU ideology and equipped with military skills pushed into believing that there was a bid by the western world USA, Britain and France to recolonize Zimbabwe through the recently formed movement for democratic change. Equipped with this hatred and acrimony they were strategically deployed into the military, intelligence, police and other various governments in preparations for the watershed elections in 2002. ZANU PF did not leave anything to chance those who were not initiated into the home affairs and secret service were integrated various parastatals to make easy the government agenda for persecuting political opponents as they acted as the eyes and ears of the party. Though this was supposed cross cutting national program devoid of political patronage ZANU PF personalized the largely militarized wing into a political militia to unleash violence against the citizenry starting from 2002 up to 2008 when the conflict reached its climax.

The 2002 election was the first real test of strength that ZANU PF<sup>21</sup> led government had to encounter after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980. Prior to this the opposition parties were either bought out divided along tribal lines to be fully effective against ZANU PF. With the Zimbabwean economy at its worst characterized by food shortages, galloping inflation and unemployment the era for change seemed more clearer than ever on the Zimbabwean political landscape. However ZANU PF was to have none of, the constitution rejection had given them the heads up to an impending defeat as well as the popularity of the opposition who had taken over the urban electorate by storm and most observers pointed to an overwhelming opposition victory. Instead of leveling the playing field and playing fair by selling their ideas to the public ZANU PF engaged in a largely violent drive land reform program which in lieu was a punishment to white commercial farmers for patronizing MDC what followed violence and counter violence as people massacred each other on political grounds, while the state turned a blind eye, in most instances when the opposition or civil society were the victims. Urban streets, farms and rural villages became battlefields between state security agents and opposition political militia. Rural areas particularly in the violence prone Manicaland region

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<sup>21</sup>Officially, **ZANU-PF** is conservative socialist in ideology. The party maintains a politburo and a Central Committee. African nationalism and anti-imperialism in the form of opposition to Western domination of the world and liberalism are other key elements in the party's ideology.



saw several petrol bombing and various arson attacks triggered by the conflict. The civil society led by Amnesty International ,Human Rights Watch and local actors petitioned the SADC organization take action on the conflict proved fruitless as the SADC patronized the Zimbabwean government and endorsed the electoral process as free and fair despite protestations from the civil society, European Union and other international players.

**Table II**

<b>Robert Mugabe</b>	ZANU-PF	1.685.212	56.2
<b>Morgan Tsvangirai</b>	Movement for Democratic Change	1,258,401	42.0
<b>Wilson Kumbula</b>	ZANU-Ndonga	31,368	1.0
<b>Shakespeare Maya</b>	National Alliance for Good Governance	11,906	0.4
<b>Paul Siwela</b>		11,871	0.4
<b>Registered voters/turnout</b>	5,647,812	55.4	

After 2002 the economic situation deteriorated abruptly with the Zimbabwean currency falling in value by double digits daily while international lenders avoided the Mugabe regime due to the humanitarian crisis triggered by political violence. Sanctions were imposed upon Zimbabwe by the European Union, United States coupled with the suspension from the Common Wealth worsened the already dire economic situation leading to chronic shortages of basic goods on the market. These events triggered mass demonstrations across the country, but the protesters were ruthlessly crushed by the state military apparatus which saw opposition leaders being persecuted and losing lives. All these grievances coupled with bouts of hunger across the country primed the country a collision in the upcoming 2008 elections as the opposition had now gained considerable political ground due to ZANU PF shortcomings.

**Height of the Conflict June 2008.**

2008 was historic in Zimbabwe’s political economy as ZANU PF lost for the first time since 1980. Unlike in the 2002 election the build up to the election was relatively mild in terms of violence. Pressure only started to build up when presidential results were withheld for six

weeks by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission citing logistical challenges in gathering the ballots from centers. The opposition had queries about *Zimbabwe Electoral Committee (ZEC)* standpoint as they pointed out that the delay was facilitating manipulation of results by the ZANU led government. MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai accused the *Zimbabwe Electoral Committee* of sympathizing with ZANU as prior to the election they had denied the voters 'role to the opposition despite reports citing irregularities in the role. The opposition protested hence diplomatically, to the SADC and AU on the context that ZANU was tampering with the electoral system to effect electoral fraud. Tensions anger political polarization were steered across the country as the opposition declared that it would accept nothing short of a victory. When the results came out Robert Mugabe of ZANU PF had lost to Morgan Tsvangirai Movement for Democratic Change. However with three contestants in the race the MDC fell short in garnering enough votes to swearing in the president.

**Table 111**

Candidate	Party	First round		Second round	
		Votes	%	Votes	%
Morgan Tsvangirai	Movementfordemocraticchange	1,195,562	47.9	233,000	9.3
Robert Mugabe	ZANU PF	1,079,730	43.2	2,150,269	85.5
SimbaMakoni	Mavambo	207,470	8.3		
LangtonTowungana	Independent	14,503	0.6		
Invalid/blankvotes		39,975	–	131,481	–
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,537,240</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>2,514,750</b>	<b>100</b>
Registeredvoters/turnout		5,934,768	42.8	5,934,768	42.4

As per constitution a runoff was called for June 27 between the leading parties which saw Tsvangirai being pitted against Mugabe. With the already negatively primed emotions across the nation the battle lines were already drawn in each and every community

After weeks of withholding election results a runoff was finally declared for the June 27 election pitting Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai. Typical of the Zimbabwean government since 1997 they declared war upon the people “while across Africa, violence against civilians’ averages at 30% of total political violence, in Zimbabwe, it accounts for 75% as an average from 1997-2015”. Rape, torture beatings, abductions, enforced disappearances were perpetrated by state militia with the feared state secret service falling fully under the ZANUPF military wing in the persecution of political opponents. Military personnel were deployed across the country to crush any form of resistance to the ZANU PF ideology be it passive or active resistance.

Morgan Tsvangirai petitioned the SADC block to take action against the conflict but the SADC security organ bided their time through tedious investigations on an already dire situation. Morgan Tsvangirai later withdrew from the June 27 elections citing the security of his followers as more important than the political office. This did not stem the violence in any way as civilians were beaten up and harassed up until the June 27 one man run off by Robert Mugabe.

### **Dialogue**

Timing of the Regional response can best be described as inadequate, the African union and SADC sat back speculating on the Zimbabwe conflict despite protestation and petitions from the civil society and the opposition. The OPSDC has got an early warning system which should allow them to detect a conflict before it becomes active, but on the Zimbabwean scenario it was either dormant or it was indifference on the part of the SADC leaders to react to the conflict. Realizing fully well ZANU PF knack for violent conduct in the event of losing political credibility the SADC and African Union should have taken preventative measures by either deploying personnel in advance or warning belligerents that violence would have serious repercussion on the credibility of the electoral process.

After the elections Jakaya Kikwete the then reigning *African Union* (AU) chair declared the Zimbabwe elections as historic on 30 July and duly endorsed them and the African Union

(AU) did not question Mugabe's right to assume Zimbabwe's seat at the AU summit in Egypt from June 30 to July 1, 2008. While the regional organization were busy glorifying Mugabe, victory conflict in the country had not subsided in any way as political persecution persisted as ZANU PF sought to legitimize its regime and impose it upon the people.

AU later condemned the post-election violence but it was untimely as the damage had already been done. Condemnation from the African Union can be credited from independent international actors and the UN who had partly forced the Africa Union to take a stance upon the situation, it can also be argued that the willingness of France to undertake military action against Zimbabwe shook the AU and SADC into action as they decided to take action in order to maintain credibility on the international scene. The SADC could not fathom the presence of an army in their territorial jurisdiction overriding their sovereignty, so they acted but not in the way expected by the locals affected by the conflict in general nor the international community. Thabo Mbeki the SADC appointed chief mediator on the Zimbabwean conflict and opened his account in 2008 taking the quiet diplomacy stance<sup>22</sup>.

Quiet diplomacy is not a problem solving theory per se, but rather repossess key characteristics of a problem solving model. Though SADC mediation model was not tailor specific to the quiet diplomacy model they are coherence with the model can be seen whether it was coincidence or design it remains to be proved. Mbeki diplomatically sidetracked anything he deemed a distraction to the pressing needs of ending the impasse and conflict. Definitely he chose to play down the prior abuse of human rights and state violence against the citizens as he anticipated it as a stumbling block to the peace process. Civil societies, NGOs and the international community continuously lobbied the Mbeki team to question the atrocities committed during the peak of the conflict and bring the culprits to book. As undemocratic as it seems the SADC led Mbeki team issued a media blackout on the important aspects of the talks as a lot of publicity may scuttle negotiation due to politicking and public stunting by politicians.

(Burgess & Burgess:2014) assert that "problem solving mediators are often highly directive in their attempts to reach a goal; they control not only the process but also the substance of the discussion focusing on areas of consensus and "resolvable" issues, while avoiding areas of

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<sup>22</sup>Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki; born 18 June 1942) is a South African politician who served as the second post-apartheid [President of South Africa](#) from 14 June 1999 to 24 September 2008. On 20 September 2008,

disagreement where consensus is less likely". Decisions are theoretically left in the hands of the disputants, mediators craft the settlement terms and disputants then endorse the terms. By consciously ignoring the violent part of Zimbabwean politics Mbeki was intentionally controlling the negotiations and the final outcome. The SADC quiet diplomacy and ignoring rampant trampling of democracy by the state agents has been seen as the widespread peer protection amongst African governments especially those with colonial liberation credentials history together. Mbeki the chief negotiator hailed from the African National Congress who share more or less the same political history the ZANU Government. The question is after so much propaganda about the western agenda to unseat the pan Africanist ZANU PF regime using the stooges MDC, was it overly possible for Mbeki to impartial in his dealings with ZANU PF and them MDC . African politics have at times failed to differentiate between the patronizing of dictators and sovereignty from neo colonialism. Undemocratic governments tend to be protected by the regional actors in the name of a Pan Africanist<sup>23</sup> approach to problems. Political Opposition is more or less treated as rebellion and is punished both regionally and locally.

However it can be said that Mbeki prioritized stability as a pressing need before the situation deteriorated into an unmanageable scenario. His narrow approach did not accommodate any trial and errors or theoretical bargaining's which would impede a rapid resolution. Through Mbeki's quiet diplomacy stance an agreement was reached in September 2008. The Global Political Agreement (GPA) committed its signatories to working together to create a sustainable and lasting solution to the Zimbabwean crisis. (Mlambo and Raftopolous: 2009). The Global Political Agreement came with it new posts for the Prime Minister and the House of Assembly which was previously absent in the Zimbabwean government. It accommodated even the less influential political parties who had garnered any percentage in the votes. The ministerial cabinet was divided amongst the parties. It is debatable to say this was a fair exercise. JOMIC was setup to ensure that the responsible parties abided by the terms and conditions of the GPA while awaiting the election scheduled for 2010. The Government of National Unity was accepted by the International Community as an outage out of conflict while preparations for a better deal were underway.

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<sup>23</sup>**Pan-Africanism** is a worldwide intellectual movement that aims to encourage and strengthen bonds of solidarity between all people of African descent. [www.padeap.net/the-history-of-pan-africanism](http://www.padeap.net/the-history-of-pan-africanism)

It should be remembered that though the easy option is to criticize Mbeki quiet diplomacy methods in Zimbabwe, military force and coercion only prolongs the conflicts resulting in more life losses and suffering of the very victims the mediation panel seeking to protect. Peace with sacrifices and compromises tops straightjacket principles which cause deadlocks and spillovers to conflict. Memories were still fresh from the four year military engagement the DRC conflict resolution. The after effects were still being felt in the country and region in general political, military and economic.

(Bhengu: 2010) Mbeki portrayed quiet diplomacy as a style of negotiating a crisis in foreign countries as opposed to military force or coercion. The principle behind quiet diplomacy is that, "it should be quiet and it should take place away from critical public and media scrutiny" (Graham: 2006). The notion of Quiet Diplomacy has three vital principles "the intervening party will not humiliate or attack in public either or any of the parties to the conflict and there is no moral grandstanding; secondly, punitive measures are taken off the table, and are not an option; and thirdly, talking and dialogue are used to seek an agreement between the warring parties" (Kennan: 2008).

However, it is argued here that what made quiet diplomacy really 'quiet' was Mbeki's decision not to offend Mugabe. Thus, Mbeki chose not to openly criticize the abuses of human rights. The GPA was signed in an assumedly violence-free void where coercion and intimidation were ignored because they were detrimental to the progress towards a settlement. Like the problem-solving model of mediation, everything which might jeopardize the settlement was ignored. The focus was on what the parties agreed upon. Ignoring what matters most to the crisis only serves to increase the chances of the implementation failure of that particular settlement.

Hence, while the GPA achieved some improvements and a measure of political progress (Mlambo and Raftopoulos: 2009); it did not provide a meaningful or long-term solution for a majority of Zimbabweans. An instructive point is raised by (Bhengu :2010), who observes that critics of quiet diplomacy maintain that Mbeki has failed extensively to enforce his own agenda of African Renaissance in regard to the Zimbabwean crisis. For example, ignoring gross human rights violations in Zimbabwe contradicts his notion of a peaceful and inclusive African Renaissance. In specific relation to violence in Zimbabwe, the ICG (2008:8) submit that Mbeki has refused to publicly criticize Mugabe or condemn increasing violence in

Zimbabwe, “to wide disbelief, Mbeki denied that Zimbabwe was in the throes of a crisis and urged patience.” In similar vein Murithi and Mawadza state that some observers have argued that Mbeki’s mediation strategy could best be defined by a propensity towards denials. “When Mbeki was accosted by journalists inquiring about the Zimbabwe crisis, he replied to them with a bemused expression and declared: crisis, what crisis?” (Murithi & Mawadza:2011). For them, whether this was a “politician’s way of dispersing the gaggle of journalists, or whether it was an internalized perception of the situation will remain a contested issue.” (2010). finally, in this section, it also is instructive to note that according to some scholars, Mbeki’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy’ is more illusory than real. For example, (Alden :2003) asserts that the policy of quiet diplomacy is a policy where rationality and truth have no meaning.

#### *Political Compromise*

In September 2008, President Mugabe and both heads of the MDC factions, Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA)<sup>24</sup>. South African President Thabo Mbeki became the guarantor of this agreement, which came into effect in February 2009 and established a unity government in which Mugabe remained as President and Tsvangirai assumed the position of Prime Minister

#### *International Response Zimbabwe*

The United Nations as the overreaching watchdog on conflict resolution watched as the Zimbabwean situation declined and did practically nothing. When petitioned to act by human rights groups its response was theoretical rather than practical. The UN condemned the violence in the country but offered no assistance to the oppressed masses who were at the mercy of the ZANU regime.

The noble act which can be credited to the United Nations is the delegation of the Zimbabwe crisis to the AU which in turn gave SADC the mediation mandate due to its comparative advantage to the conflict. However in dealing with seasoned political players like Mugabe the organization needed a united front working in unison, not delegating authority to the junior player in the field who can be easily manipulated. Observers argue that the lack of international input contributed in prolonging the conflict in Zimbabwe. The international response can best be described as passive mediation, which was definitely not enough as it

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<sup>24</sup>See also:[solidaritypeacetrust.org/category/global-political-agreement](http://solidaritypeacetrust.org/category/global-political-agreement)

was unarmed citizens 'against the state sponsored militia who had access to weapons of their choice as the state gallery had been opened to them. Peacekeeping forces could have been sufficient to stem the violence.

It should be noted that when the UN decided to delegate authority to the African Union it should have at least considered the kinship and sense of "brotherhood" these groups possessed. 90% of the African continent was still under former liberation groups who had worked as allies in the fight against colonialism, this alone clouded their judgement and impartiality when dealing with fellow parties. This alone should have alerted the United Nations on the need to send a representative as part of the negotiation team in order to balance the dynamics so that the movement for democratic change would not get a raw deal.

### **Civil Society, Reconciliation and Peace building.**

The civil society could only do as much as they were allowed by the ZANU PF government restrictions were imposed upon their movement in the country during the conflict. Visas were denied to high level members as there were considered to be threat to the ZANU PF dominance. Movement access to the public especially in the rural areas was either directly denied by the local authorities or the situation was so dire in the areas that an attempt to reach out could just be equated to suicide .according to the amnesty report " bus terminals were turned into investigative chambers by the ZANU PF militia whereby people were ordered off the buses and grilled as to their intended destination purpose of travel, it should also be noted that failure to produce satisfactory information resulted in torture or disappearances" this made it very difficult for the civil society to operate as they could mostly rely on second hand data which was prone to manipulation.

The much needed humanitarian assistance targeted for the starved communities as well as medical supplies were prone to abuse by the militia as they were either hijacked and turned for personal use or distributed along partisan lines while starving political opponents.

Civil society and NGOs have limited capabilities and their actions are directly pinned on the flexibility of political player's international, regional, state and local governments. The mandate and vision can require them to do so much but some of the visions will just vanish if they are not given a green light. A bottom up approach characterizes their modus operandi but such an approach was nipped in the bud in the Zimbabwean scenario. SADC should have



afforded the civil society more inclusivity in the peace process, but their narrow method did not have room for other actors. Reports show civil society activity is more effective in peace building initiatives as they have the necessary skills and resources for such scenarios, which means they should also be present in mediation process as they would be made aware of what their roles and responsibilities will be in the peace building efforts, while at the same time pointing out their capabilities and shortcomings. *Post conflict Zimbabwe: journal for peace studies* points out that civil society organization and the NGOs were targeted for initiating post conflict political reconciliation in Zimbabwe but this was minimally implemented as it only targeted urban areas whilst omitting the rural areas which had received the highest level of political polarization during the peak of the conflict. This can be mainly attributed to the alienation they received during the negotiating phase.

#### **Comparison of Mediation Procedures Zimbabwe and DRC.**

The DRC and Zimbabwe conflicts causes, conduct and nurture were divergent. While the DRC conflict had degenerated into armed clashes between the government troops and rebels in contrast Zimbabwe was still in the primary stages of government repression against citizens.

In the DRC many actors had already involved themselves in the struggle with the Rwanda and Uganda governments declaring their unwavering support to rebel factions due to fall out with the Laurent Kabila led government. This equaled to the invasion of a SADC state party by a foreign power, in international law and SADC statutes it was violation of state sovereignty and called upon other state parties to intervene and defend the nation state under threat. Unlike in Zimbabwe were belligerents were still willing to come to a negotiated peaceful settlement in DRC the rebels had gained territorial advantage and were on the brink of a conventional military victory. The tradition of military vanguardism by political opponents was still fresh in the people of DRC as Kabila himself had toppled Mobutu Sese Seko led government in that manner two years earlier.

SADC ideology on military engagement can be derived from a need to control the conflict first so as to provide a meaningful platform for negotiation which would be bit balanced if not fair. After the Mobutu vs Kabila military conflict the country was not fully de militarized and ammunition was still strewn all over the country, in away creating a variety of warlords meaning direct dialogue would have been difficult this is in stark contrast with the

Zimbabwean conflict were conflicting partner were clearly defined and were accessible for talks, making it easier for mediators. So while mediation through military combat is strongly denounced in the international scene it was the viable option for SADC to reign in the DRC situation while the other team led by south frantically searched for dialogue options to an end to the conflict. On another perspective as SADC maiden united military campaign they needed to show that they would not stand aside in the face of military aggression to its state parties it was a message both on the local and international arena.

SADC response to a crisis seems to be determined by who has issued the distress call, though these is not officially documented history has proven it. In Zimbabwe the opposition leader and Civil Society called for peacekeepers and were denied on the pretext that SADC should carry out “investigations” first while in DRC Laurent Kabila the head of state called for military intervention and it was sent abruptly without any reservation as per need to that or the any other enquiries it was treated as a matter of urgency inviting a marathon of extraordinary summits. While the SADC continuously maintains the DRC issue was a critical emergency political analyst’s claim that patronage played a major role in the difference in responses. Aspiring opposition are largely regarded as foes and their issues are treated with contempt and disregard. This calls into question the SADC bottom up approach to governance as they mostly seem to respond to elitist requirements rather than the international ordinary citizenry appeals.

The international political environment plays a bit in the course of action and mediation strategy. During the DRC conflict the international community was largely oblivious to the country’s problems and this left the SADC with leeway to as it pleases as it did not have to face critics from other players who in their capacity had failed to do anything. In 2008 during the Zimbabwe conflict various international actors had threatened to intervene military in the conflict if the government continued its war against the citizens, so SADC had to act fast and show that a diplomatic solution was possible as none of the SADC members wanted a war in their backyard due to its contagious nature.

Thabo Mbeki the chief negotiator with SADC knew how strategically important Zimbabwe was to the regional economy and his own nation economy so it can be argued he treaded carefully to avoid a military confrontation which would be detrimental to his own economy.

The choice of the mediation representatives and ideological background were pivotal in house the peace process in Zimbabwe and DRC were conducted by SADC. A look of the forerunners of military mediation in DRC reveals seasoned countries in the field of warfare for peace Zimbabwe and Angola who had fought long hard wars in their own countries. These particular countries believed that only after military engagement would force fighting parties to a settlement. In the Zimbabwean case however SADC representative a sworn Pan Africanist of Africa renaissance was not willing to send his ideologies into disrepute, he believed in the peaceful settlement of African problems by Africans .Mbeki surely knew his critics were waiting for him to trip on his own words so he had to play by the book which he did through quit diplomacy.

Resources may seem like very insignificant in a discussion about international mediation but they are rather a crucial determinant. In 2008 the world in general was undergoing an economic depression and each state and financial institutions had to cut costs where there were other alternative courses. The SADC region is mainly composed of third world countries who could at that time barely manage to keep their economies afloat. Engaging in a military mission was never an option as the bills to fund it were unavailable. During the military intervention in the DRC the SADC grouping still possessed two economic powerhouses who could manage to fund a prolonged peace process in the mold of South Africa and Zimbabwe, now the later was the agenda and its economy was as good as nonexistent.

## **CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.**

### **Conclusion**

In 1998 the SADC intervened in DRC a country which was on the verge of being run over by rebel forces in conjunction Rwanda and Uganda. Rebel forces were within striking distance of the capital but were driven off by the SADC forces .The intervention of SADC changed the power dynamics in the DRC war zone whereby Rwanda and Uganda acted as the kingmakers in DRC failure to abide by their principles could result in forced military removal. Through their intervention SADC did not only control the conflict but sent a message to the outside world that any form of aggression to a fellow state party would be met with force this virtually put a stop to a vicious cycle by Rwanda and Uganda state sponsored violence against the DRC .

On the dialogue front though it was long and tedious SADC facilitators eventually had a breakthrough and brokered an agreement between the rebel groups and the Joseph Kabila government. Kabila became the president of a coalition government from 2003 up to the historic elections in 2008. Though bringing about militants from different ideological settings to work together can be challenging and is usually marred in failure, the SADC propelled government survived for a good four years while the country was being readied for elections.

The 2006 elections were not just elections per ser but a historic moment for the DRC as these were their first elections since the country got its independence in 1960 from the Belgians. this were followed by the 2011 elections .This cycle of democratic transitions had been alien to a country with a strong affinity to violence if there are any political, social and economic misunderstandings amongst them. Though the country has been generally peaceful one cannot rule out a few spoilers here and there rebel's groups have come and gone without leaving any edible mark on the peace process mostly from mutineers who cite of lack of proper government welfare to them economically and politically. Problems like these were however inevitable considering the diversity of the rebel armies during the struggle the national army now became overburdened with over ambitious soldiers jostling for the highest and most privileged positions those who could not could not get them mutinied to try and force the government hand. However for threats from armed groups which came from elsewhere other than army the blame can be fully squared upon the SADC particularly for doing a half-baked job in its disarmament process, during the peace talks stakeholders were too concerned to see

if the deal will ever work in the first place that some of the crucial issues like disarmament were only mentioned without clearly stating the financiers and overseers of disarmament. DRC was now a relatively calm but highly armored nation and considering their cultural and ethnic diversity it's like sitting on a time bomb peace will only be peace as long as extremists from either side do not cross each other's lines. However the militarization of the ordinary cannot be solely put down to SADC shortcomings in the disarmament process, as the government in its own accord armed individuals as Village Defense Committees to defend their communities from cross boundary warlords who operate across the DRC and Rwandese territory in their own vein. Though this was a noble idea and had been done in good faith what the government failed to realize is what those arms will be used for if they have a different problem apart from the rebels.

From the DRC situation an ability for follow up and adjustment as per need by regional organization is shown. They can easily go with two conflict resolution mechanism with ease, the same cannot be said for international organization who sit down and choose between coercion by force or dialogue and negotiation. On the international arena it is difficult to recognize a rebel force and engage in dialogue with it but on the regional context the contact can be officially made if necessary to stop conflict, and open a pathway for negotiations. Even after the conflict has subsided they continue to make their presence felt in peace building efforts and post conflict societal construction so that a relapse is avoided

Zimbabwe showed SADC's adaptability to situation, when the Zimbabwean government unleashed terror on the people SADC was faced with a dilemma military intervention or dialogue .the international community called for military intervention to forcibly remove the government with the SADC spearheading the process. South Africa at that point Africa's representative in the Security Council vetoed against a direct attack upon Zimbabwe and opted for a peaceful dialogue. For its part SADC did not disappoint on the dialogue as within three months violence had subsided and a government of national unity had been established with shared responsibilities and privileges amongst different political parties, as part of the package to the agreement constitution was introduced and vetoed by the people which severely put checks and balances upon presidential powers as well as his term limits. This had been one of the main sources of conflict in 2008.

Through shunning militarism in conflict resolution SADC avoided a potential minefield considering the happenings later on in Egypt and Libya whereby instead of stemming conflict NATO led militaristic interventions started vicious cycle of chronic violence which have destabilized the countries ever since. If SADC had gone with the popular opinion up to the present day Zimbabwe could have been embroiled in conflict after conflict as once you have armed the population ideologically and materially it is difficult to demobilize and re habilitate them into a normal community again. Some thrive on war so taking back their source of income would be met with stiff resistance. At times dialogue with a lot of compromises may seem to be timid option in the eyes of those with burning egos, but from another angle it is more sustainable in the long run and saves on time and resources. Just like in the Democratic Republic of Congo after four years of inclusive rule elections were conducted in peaceful environment.

SADC main shortcoming in the Zimbabwean scenario was its slow response to the crisis after it had become so apparent that the Zimbabwean situation was getting out of hand only to be prodded into action by the African Union and United Nations who by virtue of comparative advantage should have reacted way after SADC was on the ground facilitating and managing the situation. A regional organization of that nature should not wait to be coerced into action whatsoever or be selective in responding to crisis situation it should just do its responsibilities as per its obligations.

With the exception of Botswana all the other SADC members patronized Robert Mugabe and negotiated for his part in the electoral fraud, as much as this saved the day by guaranteeing peace for the ordinary Zimbabwean. In the long run it strengthens the resolve of dictators use force to achieve their political prospects as their regional club peers will always have their back. Resolute binding decisions should be taken in the case that rule of law has been compromised and it should not be selective whether it is a sitting or opposition party. For all its merits this is one area whereby the SADC needs to revise its approach selective judgment and of cases brought before it.

However credit should be given when its due the DRC case was there for more than thirty eight years without elections but the United Nations and the African Union as the core guardians of peace on the African context failed to do anything progressive, yet the SADC only had less than twelve years to be involved in two elections and transitional government. It

is not like the other handlers of international conflict were not given a chance but it shows they had no willpower or their tactics were misplaced and in touch with reality. Of all the other unsolved challenges of the peace processes it is a known fact that for regional organizations there are always operational challenges related to funding. Imagine what they can do with little funding in such a small space of time what about with all the resources at their disposal.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS.**

The international law should revise its legislation on the actions of the regional organization on conflict. The current ruling states that regional organizations should first report to the United Nations Security Council upon their course of action. This is largely a diplomatic waste of time as red tape involved in the process will cost time while on the side conflict will be manifesting each day. Rather the United Nations should give the responsibility to judge and act to these organizations especially those with a proven track record in conflict resolution. Most if not all regional organizations have an emergency early warning system so the investigations which the United Nations will be purporting to take will be already fingertip knowledge for the regional parties.

Regional organizations have the power, willpower, personnel, comparative advantage but they are heavily under financed especially the once from Africa like SADC. a mechanism should be established to allow grants into regional parties in conflict resolution as per need from the United Nations this can come as direct aid from the United Nations ,if there is a risk of mismanagement of the funds material needs may be provided for the course of the conflict resolution and peace building, it can be noted how financial handicaps threatened the DRC conflict resolution as economies tumbled due to the effects of war in countries like Zimbabwe who had intervened militarily. For South Africa one cannot ignore the logistics involved in hosting such a diverse group of militant politicians for a long time while negotiations were underway

Regional organizations should be free of political patronization at the expense of the masses. For regional organization stock to rise they should exude impartiality and equality when dealing with conflict. The bottom up approach should take precedence for the organization to

gain credibility and respect in their programs. Instead of turning the organization into an elite club for manipulating the people it should rather act as the liberator and protector of the ordinary citizen. Responding to public grievances here and there may be seen as tolerating civil disobedience in the region but in actual fact the situation can be vetted and those in need of immediate response are easily vetted. Regional organization is usually too reluctant to punish their own directly and will find ways of sprucing up the situation to make it manageable.

Power hierarchy and level of influence may seem like a small issue in peace building and conflict resolution but if this is not clearly defined amongst regional organization and its fellows in conflict resolution may spell trouble. Belligerents will play them against each other at the slightest hint of miscommunication between the involved parties. Cooperation is needed at all levels and stages no matter who comes first into the conflict.

Lead mediators should be high profiled personalities with a renowned political record, so that they use their political leverage towards the belligerents. They may not have the financial or military clout to enforce backup their agendas, but experience and standing amongst political peers will get them a way through. The best candidates would be former leaders who transitioned from power democratically and even sitting presidents who have a democratic track record and integrity. It is challenging to put up a controversial figure as a front for negotiations when he/she already have controversial issues on his/her legacy.

For dialogue if the Regional Organization is chosen as the chief negotiator the International Community should complement them in all their capacity and come out in the open about their unwavering support for the chosen incumbent. Basically there should not be any discord amongst the conflict resolution stakeholders. By the International Community we do not only refer to the United Nations only but to the World Bank, International Monetary Fund whose financial power is reliable to bring most parties to the table.

Civil society involvement in mediation is crucial and efforts to fully integrate them in the peace processes should be heightened up, they usually have the first hand data on what the conflict is all about and how the society can be appeased to trade conflict for peace. The civil society can also act as the link for the mediators and leaders and convincing leaders to make necessary compromises for peace to endure. Peace agreement implementation has more



chance if public opinion is shaped by civil society and the risk of spoilers to the deal is reduced during and after the peace agreement.

Inclusivity should not be taken lightly in negotiation even the seemingly less influential parties should be given a chance. Though it may be impossible for everyone to get a seat at the dialogue table those who are not present physically should not be ignored. Their opinions and ideas should be discussed. This is the case for vast countries like DRC which is geographically enormous and in times of war it littered with various rebel groups. Failure to fully acknowledge them and respect their interest is liable to cause future conflicts as disgruntled leaders and individuals will use them as a platform to launch their rebellions this has happened in DRC.

Post conflict peace building is as important as dialogue and settlements, the issues discussed to preserve peace during peace building should not be neglected, like in a post war scenario like the DRC disarmament was discussed and it was agreed that it would be treated with the highest priority level, but what the SADC and other stakeholders did not point was the responsible authority to undertake the program. SADC assumed that the United Nations would take lead role in this mission but the United Nations could only do so little as they were not familiarized with the environment unlike the SADC representatives. This overlook left the eastern part of DRC largely weaponized and ungovernable as some new groups' unleashed terror on the local civilians.

Political reconciliation commissions are a must in intra state conflicts communities should be taught to forgive and forget and move forward. This department is usually neglected but is one of the major causes of a spillover into conflict again as the hatred suppressed within individuals from previous losses can be easily steered and manipulated by politicians for their benefit and manifest unto conflict. Though on face value it may seem as a trivial matter more resources need to be applied into these peace building missions and their handlers. One can always take a look at the Rwanda case where a country once devastated by ethnic clashes and tensions is now a symbol of peace and development on the African continent. This can mainly be accredited to the intensive peace and reconciliation commissions established in the country soon after the genocide they left no stone unturned to in their quest for a modern society which knows no ethnic boundaries. The ethnic composition of Rwanda is more or less the

same as that of the DRC with Hutu and Tutsi as the main ethnic groups so with enough resources and willpower into the DRC ethnic tensions can be a think of the past.

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