

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The introduction of Iran's nuclear program over the past years and its presentation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and then to the UN Security Council has been one of the most significant topics in Iran's foreign policy. This has faced Iran's foreign policy with a profusion of challenges for many years.

There is no denying that the international balance of power, policies and economies of many regional and cross-regional countries, not to mention Iran itself, have been at the mercy of this nuclear program. So much so that a variety of viewpoints regarding the application of nuclear energy has been assumed by politicians within and abroad some of whom have claimed Iran's absolute right to nuclear energy and others have deemed it a serious threat to international security and the political stability of other countries.

One paramount point is that, apart from divergent and conflicting approaches in the international realm, inside the country there have also been different stances taken towards the application of nuclear energy. Such has been the circumstances that during years of politically and diplomatically conflict-packed relations between Iran and other countries, some of the political masterminds of Iran have emphasized the absolute right of Iran to nuclear energy adumbrating that withdrawal from the nuclear program would mean withdrawal from the principles and tenets of Iran's Revolution against foreign domination.

This camp, known as Fundamentalists, maintains that should Iran takes a single step back with regard to the nuclear program, it will have to also compromise in other political aspects

particularly foreign policies and even domestic issues, which would mean a gradual drifting apart from the Revolution's principles and objectives.

This stance has prevailed during the eight-year tenure of the former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. However, against this stance, some political masterminds believe that insisting on Iran's absolute right to nuclear energy is in opposition to the interests and security of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This camp, known as the Reformists in the political-intellectual scene of Iran, strives towards eliminating tensions and building trust in order to prevent a political consensus against Iran; in so doing, they would even agree to the shutting down of the nuclear power plants, if needs be, so as to reach a level of interaction and tolerance with other countries, establish a real hegemony in the region, be actively involved in the international political scenes and gain the support of the proponent wings in the diplomatic scene. This will enable Iran to climb to a position which it has been separated from since 1979, believing that the efforts of the countries against Iran has been to politically isolate Iran in the world.

The results and the consequences of these two stances are among the issues which will be examined in this dissertation.

1.2 The Significance of the Research and General Objectives

Since the first atomic bomb explosion in 1945 in Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the US, the world came to know a new energy known as the Destructive Nuclear Power. Yet, in a very short amount of time, with the development of the technology and the human access to various aspects of the nuclear power, it was apparent that with necessitous management, this energy can serve the man in numerous constructive and developmental programs of countries. Therefore, most of the world countries, especially the ones rich in huge uranium mineral resources, determined to reach and possess the latest achievements of technology regarding this energy.

Relying on their facilities, political leverage, and the potential to sway the balance in strategic deals in the world, the US, Russia, the UK and France were the pioneering five countries to reach and export nuclear technology. Over the past years, some countries have moved towards having nuclear energy by establishing nuclear arsenals and nuclear power plants, most of whom had to procure the required technology from these five countries.

Obviously, due to the possession of this technology, these five countries have enjoyed the privilege to manipulate and impose their demands and act selectively with regard to different countries. Such were the circumstances that prior to 1990 and the dissolution of the USSR, only two politico-military groups were recognized in the world: the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc. The US and the USSR, in attempt to gain the upper hand in the arms race and nuclear power, tried to equip their allies with nuclear energy. Meanwhile, the countries in possession of nuclear technology prevented those countries who disagreed with their policies to access this technology.

Prior to 1979, and the US started building the nuclear power plant for the first time and contracted with France and Germany for this goal in 1972. But, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and the political-doctrinal situations emerging in its political system structure, there appeared opposition among the government and within the Iranian politicians over the application of the nuclear power. However, this belief did not last much and after a while, especially after the Iran-Iraq War, the political authorities of Iran felt a serious necessity for possessing the nuclear power. Needless to say that during the years of war between Iran and Iraq, many of the foundations and facilities of Boushehr nuclear power plant in the south of Iran had damaged by Iraq's air fighters.

After the war, there was an agreement signed between Iran and Russia concerning peaceful nuclear cooperation in 1992. Due to this convention, the nuclear power plant of Boushehr turns into a nuclear center in the years of 1994 and 1995. Since then, the crisis of nuclear Iran

began worldwide by media tensions of American government and it was shown in a way that Iran tends to have access to nuclear weapon by Russian support.

In 2002, the US by adducing to some data collected by satellites besides the information received from some Iranian dissidents, among which there was the NLA (The National Liberation Army of Iran/Mujahedin-e-khalq), accused Iran of secretly developing, producing, and extending nuclear weapons. Based on this allegation and enormous media advertising was able to take Iran's case to IAEA and the Security Council of the UN afterwards.

In the tenure of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Iran's nuclear case was shaped based on building trust and the framework determined by IAEA and its acts. The policy of building trust was meant to continue, but after the counsellorships and negotiations between the Iranian authorities and the authorities of the Nuclear Power Agency, the trust policy turned one way. Eventually, this led to the fact that Iran stipulates its nuclear activities based on the western negotiator's demands and The International Nuclear Power Agency as well and the fortifying process became suspended on behalf of Iran.

After Mohammad Khatami's tenure and the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for Iran's presidency, Iran's diplomacy towards nuclear energy changed and Ahmadinejad's government with its active diplomacy started to develop the nuclear technology very quickly and presented Iran's nuclear capabilities ceremonially. Such diplomacy which was based on the right to have access to the nuclear power on behalf of Iran and the resistance against the international pressures, caused Iran's nuclear activity seem critical to the whole world.

This very diplomacy which was based on Iran's right to achieve and possess nuclear energy and resist international pressure caused Iran's nuclear activities to crystalize as a crisis in the eyes of the world. The consequences of the transactions between Iranian political officials and the West as well as the reports delivered by the IAEA can be listed as follows: an increase in

the political pressures on Iran; issuing of several resolutions against Iran in the form of the UN Security Council sanctions and the global consensus to stand against Iran's claims to nuclear energy.

Meanwhile, although Iran could make a lot of technical achievements regarding nuclear energy, this nuclear program became an actual challenge in the political, diplomatic, economic and international scene. Among the contributing factors can be mentioned the Board of Governors of the IAEA having this case on their agenda; its presentation to the Security Council and the serious subsequent resolutions to sanction major commercial, financial, bank, military, logistic, communication, transit, insurance, aviation, etc. sectors; recalling of some European ambassadors from Iran or limiting diplomatic interactions with it; the UN Charter, Chapter VII against Iran; and finally the possibility of military tension between Iran, the US and its allies.

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the nuclear case has been by far the most critical issue that Iran and its political structure have been faced with. As Iran's nuclear case found its way to the UN and several severe sanctions by the Security Council and other countries were imposed to Iran. This led to political problems and turbulences abounded, which hindered economic, industrial and technical growth. In the international scene, this resulted in Iran's political isolation and some international concerns in that regard.

Needless to say, this disturbed the balance of power in the region. Emerging political movements such as the Arab Spring, terrorism, and the establishment of resistance line against Iran's influence among Muslim countries in particular in the Middle East are some of the remarkable consequences of this disturbance of the balance. Many countries enjoyed economic, political and strategic benefits in these circumstances and many others were inflicted by unpleasant consequences due to their agreement with Iran, the results of which were obvious in years to come as well.

1.3 Research Questions

Prior to the Islamic Revolution that is before 1979, the nuclear activities of Iran had not stumbled over any hindrances or restrictions. In fact it was also known as the police of the region because of its alliance with the US and its considerable leverage in the stability of the political equations in the Middle East. A powerful Iran, even if it meant equipping it with nuclear weapons, could be a stronghold against the USSR with which it had 1786 kilometers of shared borderline and thus to the benefit of the US. Iran, then, was considered a country with strategic objectives. Therefore, before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran was not deemed a threat to the world particularly the Western Bloc in terms of nuclear power.

Iran has undergone different cases of socio-political turmoil ranging from establishing a new political structure and delineating the major tenets of the state to the type and method of developing diplomatic ties with other countries and the policymaking based on the conviction of "neither Eastern, nor Western, just Islamic Republic".

The principles of the Islamic Republic state have been based upon independence, freedom, growth and the promulgation of the doctrine of resistance against dictatorship, imperialism and Zionism. Towards this goal, the dissemination of Islamic revolution to Muslim countries and struggling against the various forms of political dictatorship and dependent political systems has brought about a new definition in Iran's foreign policy and its international relations.

In the early years of the Islamic Republic state, this attitude created different camps in the international scene. As a result, many changes and events took place such as the Iran-Iraq war, fundamental enmity between Iran and the US and its allies as well as Israel and an atmosphere rife with tension between Iran and some Western countries and their allies. Undoubtedly, in these circumstances, the Islamic Republic of Iran, beside using its rights to defense, required offensive or at least preventive policies to determine and stabilize mutual relations with other

countries. It was this policymaking which emphasized the significance of countries with policies convergent with that led to an increase in relations with its backyard countries.

Iran needs to maintain its defensive and offensive political attitude to have influence in the structure of diplomacy. This requires Iran to be a model for Muslim countries with regard to technology, economy, army, science, culture and society; as well as that it requires Iran to be equipped with the latest technologies in order to protect the principles of the state and the sovereignty of the country. Iran's tendency towards nuclear energy has mostly been a result of this attitude. In addition to striving towards achieving cutting-edge technology in science, technology, medicine and agriculture, it tries to use nuclear energy to achieve such a level of defensive power and technology that it could ward threats off.

This period belongs to the tenures of the three presidents Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani. The main pillar of Sayyid Muhammad Khatami's government was transparency in international relations. He was tried to removal of doubts and ambiguities adhering to the policy of Dialogue Among Civilizations, mitigating tensions with other countries and bilateral and mutual cooperation with neighboring, regional and cross-regional countries. Apparently, interaction with the IAEA and the leasers of different European countries and the suspension of Iran's nuclear activities were rooted in this attitude.

Nevertheless, in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's tenure, an active and attack diplomacy in place of a persuasive diplomacy. The establishment of the P5+1 for nuclear talks and even challenging the stances of this group and the acceleration of Iran's nuclear program were among the major shifts in his tenure. In reaction to this attitude, more serious sanctions were imposed on Iran from the UN Security Council, the US and his allies. During Hassan Rouhani's tenure, having signed the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) also known as the Iran nuclear deal, Iran's nuclear case was finalized.

Having mentioned these three periods, this thesis is the critical period of the nuclear in which Iran's nuclear case was actualized. This study is an attempt to explore the diplomacies of Iran, the UN Security Council, and the IAEA, in the light of the doctrine of constructive interaction, and define crisis (actual or fake) and examine its existence in order to obtain the answer to the following crucial questions:

Is Iran's nuclear energy program peaceful? Is it a necessity or a military tool? What impact have the attitude of the fundamentalist and reformist on Iran's nuclear program and its international relation?

1.4 Hypotheses

Growth in the quality and the quantity of nuclear activities is known as "nuclear development". There are certain criteria which determine a country's advancement in nuclear science and technology which can be listed as follows: researches in the various nuclear science fields; variety of nuclear departments and groups in universities and research centers; existence of students and researchers in various nuclear fields; and the availability of nuclear facilities and equipment. (Gharibabadi, 2009, p.14)

One point to be considered is the distinction between technology and industry. Technology is mainly related to the soft science field which is achieved by gaining pure and comprehensive skill and science. Obviously, by integrating these elements and making them practical it is possible to successfully produce a substance or tool at laboratory or partially-industrial scales. Yet, industry, by applying the necessary hardware, can realize science and technology in their actual and material forms.

Thus, it is possible for a country to possess the technology in a field but not get involved in the industry of it. The reason is that in order to get involved in the industry of any field, certain economic, industrial, social and even cultural infrastructures and circumstances are required. Vice versa, the existence of an industry in a country does not necessarily mean that country

also possesses the related technology. Assembly industry in certain countries can be offered as an example to second this hypothesis.(Mousavian, 2008, p.404)

Therefore, a country can only be called nuclear-wise developed once it is in possession of both nuclear industry and nuclear technology. Of course, a distinction has to also be made between production and application. Needless to say, the realm of producing science and technology is not identical with the realm of applying science, technology and industry. Being developed nuclear-wise is realized when a country is actively involved in the production of nuclear science, technology and industry and not only its use.

With regard to the mentioned points, there are very few countries which have developed nuclear-wise, and have achieved advancement in the realms nuclear software and hardware alike. The Islamic Republic of Iran has developed in these two realms and has made certain achievements. Iran's move towards nuclear technology and industry does not belong to the present time only.

In fact, it dates back to even prior to the Islamic Revolution of Iran (1979). Iran's earliest attempts to gain nuclear energy can be traced back to the 1950s with the US being the first country to encourage Iran towards this goal and to transfer nuclear technology to it. Ironically, though, the US is now pioneering the objection to Iran's nuclear program.

The first major step in application of nuclear science and technology was taken in 1956. Later on the third of March, 1957, the first agreement of non-military use of nuclear energy was signed with the US. The agreement signed by the US President of Atomic Energy Commission consists of 1 introduction and 11 articles and it was authorized by The National Assembly in February 2, 1958. (Gharibabadi, 2009, p. 14)

According to the third Article of the signed agreement, both parties agreed to exchange the following: 1. Design, structure, functioning of the research reactors, and their application in

the form of research tools of development, engineering, and radiotherapy treatments. 2. Hygienic and shielding issues regarding the functioning and application of the research reactors. 3. The application of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological researches, radiotherapy, agricultural and industrial treatments.

As maintained in Article 10 of the agreement, both parties expected that this primary agreement should lead to more synergism in developing, designing, structuring, and running the power generating reactors. Thus, the parties will have more negotiations over the possibility of signing another agreement over cooperation concerning power generation from the atomic energy in Iran.

The first revision of the agreement was in Washington in June 8, 1964, then it was authorized by the National Assembly. The second amendment text was signed by both sides in Washington in March 19, 1969, followed by the National Assembly authorizing it in July 9, 1972. (Gharibabadi, 2009, p.13)

Along with the nuclear synergy agreement between Iran and America, the Nuclear Sciences Institute under the supervision of Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) was transferred from Bagdad to Tehran. Afterwards, The University of Tehran established a center titled The Atomic Center of Tehran University for nuclear education and studies. The establishment of the atomic reactor in Tehran University was a significant starting point in Iran's nuclear activities and practically during the construction of this reactor which was accompanied by Iranian experts at times, positive transformations in establishing nuclear industries took place.

In 1974, Iran and America agreed on forming a mutual commission with cooperative goals in all fields such as nuclear sciences, especially nuclear power generation. Meanwhile, they signed a primary contract in which The US government was supposed to provide the fortified fuel for the power nuclear reactors that were going to be made for Iran by America.

Furthermore, based on the agreement, it was suggested that the nuclear synergy between Iran and America become part of the mutual commission of Iran and America and the nuclear power be under the supervision of The US Energy Research and Development Office. At that time, the US Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Henry Kissinger, after a meeting with the members of the mutual commission of Iran and America, proclaimed that Iran is ready to build at least 4 electricity reactors with Kan factories of fresh water by America. Besides, Iranian authorities attempted to satisfy America for building the reproduction institutes. Subsequently, Iran announced to be ready to invest \$2/75 billion in an American private factory of fortifying. (Us- Iran Commission Comments, 1975)

After Carter's election as the US president, his negotiations with the Shah of Iran resulted in the agreement over the remaining issues to get to a new agreement for nuclear synergies. Iran's efforts in nuclear activities had such a great worldwide reflection in this pre-revolution period that the Financial Times newspaper, in an article titled "Shah has taken actions in purchasing nuclear reactors," wrote "Iran has been welcomed by public opinion in pursuing a big nuclear program. This is the first time that an oil-producing country is seeking such a program and considers depending on oil as a source of energy dangerous. (Financial Times, 2013)

Later on, Iran commenced such mutual contributions with other countries of the world, especially the European ones in the field of nuclear industry and technology that for the first time, a mutual agreement over scientific studies and technology development was signed between Iran and Germany in June 30, 1975. On the basis of this agreement which included 1 introduction and 11 Articles, mutual contributions between Iran and Germany provided and guaranteed the bed for the areas of technical knowledge development and nuclear researches and nuclear power utilization.

According to this agreement, it was decided that in a special agreement between The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and The Federal Minister of Research and Technology of Germany, broadening cooperation in the peaceful use of the nuclear energy take place.

However, earlier, the negotiation process and the economical, technical contributions between Iran and France had contrived the agreement over nuclear industry and technology in Iran. Iran -France's technical and scientific nuclear contributions dates back to 1969 year.

After that, in the first conference of joint commission of Iran and France's ministers for economic cooperation held in Paris in February 8, 1974, a protocol was signed between the Economy Minister of Iran and The French Minister of Economy and Finance. In this protocol, besides defining different areas of cooperation between two parties, they had referred to the issue of the mutual atomic energy contributions. This cooperation aimed at establishing an Atomic Research and Development Center in Iran along with upbringing and educating Iranian experts.

Iran had also signed some treaties for nuclear activities with other countries such as Canada, Australia, India, and England. However, all these activities and agreements took another trajectory after the Islamic Revolution occurred in Iran.

After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the formation of the Islamic Republic government, Iran maintained its relation with the International Atomic Agency and decided to continue its membership and adherence to PT, the Principles of Treaty. Despite such tendency on behalf of Iran, Iran's nuclear contracts were not supposed to have a brilliant destiny. Because after the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, western countries suspended executing their agreements and contracts such as building the power plant of Boushehr. Siemens refused to complete the power plant of Boushehr and other western countries and America avoided sending whatever nuclear equipment and technology to Iran.

Countries like Germany, France, England, etc., which had an agreement over peaceful nuclear technology of Iran before the Islamic Revolution, refused to execute the signed agreements that were legal and under the supervision of the Agency, despite the fact that they had received their fees.

These countries even didn't fail to put pressure on other countries like China and Russia which had started effective contributions in nuclear area with Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Apparently, the international community did not have a positive view over the occurrence of the Islamic Republic government and did not consider nuclear Iran in line with its benefits.

As the war between Iran and Iraq started, the infrastructures of Boushehr nuclear power point were damaged greatly and after the war ended, serious activities in nuclear energy and development in its industry began. The commencement of the nuclear research reactor's activity in Tehran, the initiation of Arak's heavy water research reactor, nuclear reactors of power generating in Boushehr with Iran-Russia cooperation, domesticizing nuclear technology and venturing to fortify uranium in order to produce nuclear fuel, establishing research centers of nuclear development for medical, industrial and agricultural goals, considering nuclear security and setting policies concerning nuclear waste brought about an exclusive view to this technology inland.

Parallel to these transformations, the anxious views of western countries especially America towards Iran's progress in nuclear industry and technological developments caused their opposition with this technical transformation and advancement.

The political viewpoint of the Islamic Republic of Iran resulted in the transformation of Iran's nuclear activity into a nuclear predicament and crisis. Therefore, Iran's nuclear case was formed and the confrontation and application of various political, economical and diplomatic mechanisms were actualized in order to isolate and even discourage this country to continue its nuclear activity.

Deriving from these points, this study is argues that Iran's nuclear energy program is a necessity and conducted upon peaceful aims. Furthermore, reformist in Iran made a positive contribution for this trend and objective. The JCPOA agreement that signed on July 14, 2015

made it clear and approves that Iran's nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes and not for military means.

1.5 Methodology

The researcher has used some research methods in addition to applying the published resources in the dissertation compilation. Alongside studying and analyzing the dissertation content, its quality has been taken into great consideration. In order to reach the best result and research, the latest documents, references, internet sources and interviews have been used. The researcher has also pointed out the remarks and stances of writers, political authorities of other countries such as the EU, the US, Russia, and the UN besides the Iranian political authorities' viewpoints.

In addition, domestic resources are important in the research. Because the issue is related to Iran, domestic documents, writings on sites and opinions of Iranian authorities are considered very important. Therefore, Persian sources have been taken into account in this research. Also speaking, reading and knowing Persian was very useful in the research process. The resources and documents handled are often considered first-rate. However, discourse analysis is also provided from the first hand.

In the descriptive method of the study, the researcher has attempted to make use of the realities apart from personal viewpoints. The historical resources and holistic information has been used to indicate the truths and logical conclusions. This research does not aim at siding or partiality towards a country's approaches and stance rather it focuses on the most significant contemporary crisis which has come to a conclusion by political dialogue and rational diplomatic approach. In this research the researcher has processed the historic chronology besides scrutinizing the evolutions during the nuclear case of Iran.

Additionally, the analysis method is used in this study. In this method, the researcher analyzed the occurrence and formation of the nuclear case, the position of the pros and cons among

Iranian political elites, The EU, the US, the UN and IAEA. Eventually, it points out the position of Iran's nuclear Memorandum of Understanding and P5+1 and the formation and process leading to the Memorandum of Understanding known as JCPOA.

It is worth stressing that in this dissertation. It has been attempted to analyze the subject logically and rationally. The researcher has avoided the interference of personal emotions and sidings with the philanthropic nature or national passions in this study. The researcher attempts to avoid biased analysis based on personal viewpoints and the position of Iranian politicians and other countries.

As the utilization of the nuclear energy in the contemporary century is one of the most suitable ways for environmental protection, prevention of natural erosions, impeding the improvidence of underground and fossil resources, the development of scientific and technical infrastructures in medical and agricultural fields for every country.

Having said all these, it should be also mentioned that this research argues in impartial way that Iran requires nuclear energy as a developing country. Therefore, Iran's right for benefiting this energy is identified through objective and analytic inquiry.

1.6 Literature Review

A philanthropic and peaceful view in consolidation of the world's security is one of the major axes in the review of the researcher attempts to besides pointing to social security, refer to the subject of multilateralism and the United Nation's role in the establishment and maintaining global security. In this regard, the most important issue in the review of the literature is that how much can the role of the global consensus in understanding the logic and finding appropriate solutions for the crisis be effective.

The following is pointed out in the study; a) the doctrine of constructive engagement, b) the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), c) preference of peaceful settlement of the differences, d) regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Naturally, since these global systems have a dynamic and active foreign policy and even overseas targets, the codification and approval of operational and strategic doctrine is necessary in order to get to foreign policy targets. Mainly, this doctrine is formed based on past experiences, the analysis of present global and regional conditions, and the ability of the political system in the administration of the adjusted programs. (Salamati, 2015, p.20)

The researcher aims to put the significant role of the IAEA both in the formation of the crisis and creating a roadmap to solve the crisis under consideration. The IAEA, being established in 1957, tries to encourage all countries in developing the atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Although the IAEA is not considered a specialized agency in terms of the structure, it is very similar to the United Nation's other 16 specialized agencies. The IAEA has performed effectively as a verifier and official source regarding Iran's nuclear activities. The reported issues from this institute have been valid and effective in the formation of nuclear negotiation conclusions between Iran and P5+1. Therefore, this issue will be also covered considering the review of the literature in this dissertation.

The settlement of the international differences without resorting to force and peaceful solutions for the differences requires applying ways and criteria that by their help the conflicts and tensions regarding the rights and basic functions of the countries can be settled. Peaceful solutions can be legal using law of nations related to the type and nature of the conflict. Or, it can be political which requires diplomatic efforts.

In resolving Iran's nuclear crisis and reaching the required result and signing the Nuclear Memorandum of Understanding, the political way was applied. Thus, diplomatic negotiations, comprehensive efforts of both parties, the intercession of the UN and IAEA and the political

will of the negotiators in achieving reconciliation and peace can be recognized very clearly in Iran's nuclear case.

From the beginning of Iran's tendency in the utilization of nuclear energy, it had declared its adherence to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This Treaty was signed by Britain, The Soviet Union and America in January 1, 1968 and has been in progress since 1960. Iran has signed NPT declaring adherence to this Treaty and continues its peaceful nuclear activities based on the provisions of the Treaty.

The strategy that Iran has pursued after resolving the nuclear crisis as a result of numerous rounds of diplomatic negotiations, is one of the other axes of the review of the literature that the researcher has taken into account, since the development of social security system is beneficial for both Iran and all the world. In this regard, political activists' approaches in nuclear negotiations of Iran and P5+1 have been considered. The ultimate role of the UN in removing sanctions and passing new Resolutions such as 2231 Resolution which could provide the operation of the UN's Security Council in keeping peace and grounding Iran's legitimate use of nuclear energy, should not be overlooked. This issue will be covered in the review of the literature of this dissertation as well.

1.7 Structure of the Chapters

The first chapter of the dissertation which is the introduction refers to the reason of the study and the related subject having an overall view to the structure of the dissertation. Afterwards, the necessary question regarding the reasons of the study is put forward. The theory and the hypothesis in writing the dissertation and its need considered.

The most significant point referred in the first chapter of the dissertation is the methodology. It consists of both descriptive study and fieldwork. In this methodology, the researcher has attempted to consider the position of the nuclear energy regarding political-leadership goals of

Iran. Also, besides the recognition of Iranian political authorities' approaches and other countries', the causes of the nuclear crisis are addressed.

In fact, the methodology has considered not only the important details, but also its qualitative nature. In the methodology, the researcher has applied the published domestic and foreign resources besides the experts' theories in the form of articles, Iranian political elites' approaches, and different countries involved in Iran's nuclear issues such as America, Russia, China, Germany, France, and England. Meanwhile, the available data in website, publications, and global social media have been applied and in some cases the sources have been mentioned. In the first chapter, considering the literary style and the expression thread in the dissertation, various approaches in resolving the nuclear crisis and also the solutions for this crisis have been scrutinized.

In Chapter Two of the dissertation, Iran's approach towards nuclear energy is studied. Iran's political authorities' view regarding the origin of national interest about Iran's nuclear program will be reviewed as well. Iran's nuclear energy-saving approaches will be discussed. In these approaches, Iran's government's motive and reasons for possessing nuclear energy have been taken into account. Also, a realistic view or defensive approaches and technical-scientific ones have not been apart from this study.

In expressing an incentive-based approach, classic realistic approach, liberal approach, and constructivism are studied. However, the outcome-oriented approach which is mostly focused on Iran's political and defensive goals is studied, too. In this regard, Iran and Israel's political-defensive actions and reactions, the advocates of Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Ban, and the advocates of America's hegemonic power are referred to.

Regarding the essential background in the goals of Iran's nuclear programs domestic approaches are considered, in this section, besides referring to two agreeing and disagreeing sides with possessing and achieving nuclear energy in Iran. In addition, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali

Khamenei, the Leader of Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, Iran's former President during 1996-2004, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran's previous President during 2004-2012, and Hassan Rouhani, Iran's actual President is discussed regarding their approaches towards Iran's nuclear case. Obviously, there are other domestic performers in the formation of Iran's nuclear case whom will be referred to before the required conclusion is achieved.

In Chapter Three, besides studying the introduction regarding nuclear crisis, the critics and opponents' viewpoints of Iran's nuclear development is studied. In this section, the researcher will refer to an overview of the viewpoints of domestic critics and opponents who are a significant party and their intellectual base which fundamentalist is taken into account. Meanwhile, foreign critics and opponents' approaches worldwide who have not been interested in Iran's possession of nuclear energy is reviewed. The international organizations and political entities' criticism and oppositions along with the United Nation's approaches are considered and explained.

In Chapter Four, there's an introduction regarding the history of the beginning of nuclear negotiations between Iran and important countries in resolving the crisis of Iran's nuclear case. Afterwards, Iran's inevitable approach and the countries of P5+1 in resolving Iran's nuclear crisis have been considered. Later, the need for the continuing diplomatic negotiations is explained. In this section of the dissertation, the preference of nuclear case sides for the continuation of negotiations in a political-legitimate way instead of military solutions and threats have been taken into consideration and the reasons of this selection is analyzed. The chronology of the negotiations during the past years from Moscow, Istanbul, Buenos Aires, Almaty, Vienna and Geneva, have been explained and their conclusions is stated. The result of the negotiations which ended in signing the Nuclear Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and P5+1 known as JCPOA is studied.

At the end of this chapter, the approaches and viewpoints of Iran, America, The EU and the UN towards JCPOA, the observance of obligations by two sides in the framework of JCPOA

be taken into account. The positive and negative outcomes of Nuclear Memorandum of Understanding between P5+1 and Iran be discussed in this chapter. At the end of this chapter has an overall conclusion again.

In Chapter Five which is the final conclusion and general assessment, the content of the dissertation and the trajectory of the study and the analysis of Iran's nuclear case is discussed.

CHAPTER2

IRAN'S THESIS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY

2.1 Introduction

For the past three decades, considering the economic and social development process in Iran, the exploitation strategy of fossil resources has been affected by few confining factors. On the one hand, improving life styles and the betterment of economic indexes requires supplying the procedure of ascending demand for energy in all domestic household and industrial sections, and on the other hand, the national economy depends on oil incomes that the extrication from these two antithetic factors has caused the creation of a long-term strategy and reconsideration in the process of wasteful use of fossil resources.

Among world countries few claim that because of rich resources of oil and gas, Iran does not need to utilize nuclear energy. By such logic, they accuse Iran of intending to use nuclear energy and regard its goals in possessing nuclear energy as suspicious. They claim that owning various energy utilities and the essential resources, Iran is definitely looking for military and weaponry abilities so that it can fulfill its goals in propagation of radical Islam and the political-ideological pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, it is crucial to consider Iran and different other authorities' approaches during the past years up to now, apart from any positive or negative ideas in rejecting or approving these claims.

Generally speaking, Iranian authorities both prior and after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, stated that Iran's purpose in pursuing nuclear technology is not producing nuclear weapon. Considering the following statements, it is implied that Islamic Republic of Iran cannot, merely because of possessing huge resources of oil and gas, depend on fossil fuels to provide energy and requires to be able to utilize nuclear energy technology. Analyzes evaluations and investigations carried out by public and private institutions are a reliable reference in this

regard. The general arguments for the support of nuclear energy could be summarized as follows:

- 1) The application of fossil resources in alternate industries such as petrochemical, is much more worthy and economically profitable for the country.
- 2) Iran's present need for electricity is much more than the predicted amount. Iran with the annual growth of 6 to 8 percent of electricity demand and the population growth which will be 100 million by 2025 cannot merely rely on its oil and gas resources for generating electricity.
- 3) The government has and is paying a lot of subsidy on fuel consumption in the country for the past years which cannot secure and supply the cost of the production and distribution of these petroleum products.¹
- 4) High costs of high energy consumption in Iran regarding the growing population and increasing the demand for electric energy in different sections, has led to an increase in the costs of energy carriers. In such a situation, it is not possible to cut the subsidies down. So, in order to balance the energy costs and supplying the percentage of civil subsidy, the government is obliged to pay a big amount of subsidy which has a negative effect on the government's annual budget. As a result, economically, using non-fossil resources especially nuclear energy for supplying power is more justifiable.
- 5) According to the researches, it is obvious that the cost of nuclear power generation is a lot less than the cost of power generating by fossil energy, regarding that fossil fuels cause environmental pollution as well.
- 6) Fossil energy consumption being irrational as it is and growing the decrease in energy supply which is somehow striking energy ability of Iran as the main section of its strategy goals, is away from political wisdom because the future generation of Iran will also need this significant ability.

¹The amount of government subsidies in the energy sector is the highest paid subsidy for public goods and services. According to the announced figures for the energy balance of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2006, the total energy sector subsidy this year was 401754 billion Rials, of which 22.6 % (equivalent to 1.90828 billion Rials) was allocated to the energy sector. It is necessary to know that the value of each dollar in 2006 was 987 Rials.

- 7) Iran as the holder of rich oil and gas resources in addition to mines and sources of Uranium can put itself next to the countries of the world applying nuclear energy. Despite having rich resources of fossil energy, the governments of America and Russia as the biggest fossil fuel producers, are seeking to develop their nuclear energy section and have attempted to store nuclear energy; therefore, Iran also believes in possessing nuclear technology and is trying to apply reproducible resources.
- 8) Nowadays, the critical environmental conditions have bound every country up in protecting the environment and preventing the pollution caused by fossil energy US. Thus, Iran as a developing country considers itself responsible for this duty and attempts to protect the environment and prevent the crisis caused by greenhouse gases and disturbing the ecosystem by cutting fossil energy US down.

It should be considered that oil as a source of energy and the origin of thousands of other commodities has limited resources all around the world. As a result, the axis of economic programming for developed countries is the optimization of oil such as storing for emergent situations as the main source of nonfuel and unreplaceable derivatives and turning to other sources of energy like nuclear energy. In the future world, the economic power belongs to those who possess the origins and sources of energy. (Gharibabadi, 2009, p.22)

Regarding the scientific studies and the achieved estimates, it is deducted that if Iran continues to consume fossil energy at the present rate, and does not find other solutions or a substitute for its fossil energy resources, it will not only find its resources decreasing, but will also be removed from the list of oil exporting countries in 15 years and be considered as one of the countries that requires to buy the sources of energy in order to meet domestic consumption demands. It seems that based on such presented standpoints regarding the documents and data, Iran's new approach to apply and utilize nuclear energy is an inevitable issue.

With all these theories and assumptions presented by Iran, it's been 14 years since Iran's nuclear case was formed in the international organizations such as IAEA and the Security

Council of the UN. This has been a significant domestic issue for Iran and an international one for the countries involved. Despite the Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and P5+1, it seems that although both parties are obliged to observe the provisions of JCPOA convention, some have not assumed their commitments yet and are challenging this convention. In this regard, the US is not observing their commitments towards Iran. They are obliged to provide psychological security in developing commercial relations between Iran and other countries of the world. However, such a thing has not happened and there are still some shortcomings.

Some of the Iranian analysts and theorists believe that the existence of nuclear energy itself can increase Iran's security internationally. To comprehend these issues and other essential standpoints regarding Iran's possession of nuclear energy technology in different sections are pointed out.

2.2 The Background of Nuclear Energy Program

Iran is a developing country with a positive population growth rate in the Middle East, so it is natural that with the increase in population in Iran, the need for energy consumption especially oil and gas resources will increase. Although oil production in Iran has been invariable in recent years, the growth in the standards of life and the rise in the need for comfort of Iranian people had led to paying more attention to infrastructures of other energies in Iran one of which is nuclear energy.

There are different standpoints in Iran's approach for utilizing nuclear technology that point should refer to many of them. Some believe that Iran's nuclear program is today's need and future's investment. Some have a more realistic viewpoint towards the present policy of Iran's government after the Islamic revolution and believe that political foundations and environmental factors have directed Iran towards the utilization of nuclear energy.

With this assumption, Iran's approach towards nuclear energy that was formed before the Islamic Revolution in Iran and has continued up to now should be divided in two parts: a) the realistic approach, b) the structural model approach or the estimated approach.

Considering the realistic approach various axis can be emphasized. For instance, in the present situation of Iran with a growing population which is estimated to be 100 million in 2025, obviously the life style and the need for comfort and also the living conditions will cause the need for energy to increase.

This more than half of Iran's lands within its borders lack the conditions for urban and rural living because of the existence of barren deserts. So, most of the population will develop in big cities. In this case, besides the extension of cities both vertically and horizontally, the domain of urban infrastructures will increase. As a result, the concentration of population in big cities and even the transformation of small cities to big ones will necessitate the supply of road and communicational system, means of transport, welfare facilities, healthcare facilities, training facilities, developing workshops and factories, etc.

It is evident, with the appearance of such situations, the framework of the society's look towards life is changed and better application of energy in fulfilling daily and inevitable needs will lead to an increase in the level of energy utilization in supplying daily needs. Parallel to this, the domain of consumer life will grow and so it is essential to avoid fossil energy and to adverts modern and up to date energies that among hydropower and wind energy to nuclear energy and technology.

Considering this condition, it seems that in the realistic approach goals like the programs of economic, agricultural, medical, environmental developments and alike are regarded as factors involved in Iran's authorities' standpoint from past to present. In other words, nuclear energy in Iran is considered as today's need, tomorrow's exigency.

On the other hand, Iran being co-border with countries like Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Kuwait and Turkmenistan has long borders with different countries. Besides, geopolitically, it is located in a specific geographical coordinates and is considered as a significant place in the world, especially in the Middle East. As a matter of fact, Iran is a pathway and connecting point for Middle Asia to Southwest Asia and the Middle East. Meanwhile, considering Iran's place next to the Persian Gulf (in the south) and the Caspian Sea (in the north) both of which are rich sources of oil and gas energy, strategically is very important. Nevertheless, Iran has always been a substantial country in the region which has determined the political-security balance regionally and even trans-regionally. Therefore, one of the other goals of Iran's approach towards nuclear energy should be considered as the defensive goal. Nuclear energy is a deterrent power for Iran in restraining threats.

During Iran's Cold War, because of being co-border with The Soviet Union, it played an important role for the West. So much so that its domestic stability was very crucial for the interests of the West because of Iran's strategic importance in blocking the Soviet Union's expansion. This country, next to Saudi Arabia, had turned to one of America's two-column pillars for maintaining stability in The Persian Gulf. Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979 changed Iran's geopolitical position and all of a sudden one of the most strategic allies of the US turned into one of their toughest enemies. (Salamati, 2015, p.27)

It is natural that in such a situation followed by the war between Iran and Iraq, Iran's comprehension of the threats and its foreign policy priorities considering the situations and the surrounding environment had altered and foreign policy and its parameters changed dramatically in the eyes of Iranian politicians.

Since Iran has specific demographic conditions, it is one of the countries which has presented its potentials after the Islamic Revolution internationally more than before. The existence of various ethnic groups in Iran such as Azerbaijani, Kurd, Lor, Gilaki, Balouch, Arab, etc. besides different religious followers like Christians, Jewish, Zoroastrian, Muslim with the

majority of Shia have been able to make Iran expectant of any kind of positive and negative evolution and change in social-political flow.

As this ethnic and religious multiplicity can be a rainbow of national cohesion, it can also be a threat in disturbing Iran's social-political security if the national and religious abilities are utilized. Therefore, security is the most important issue in actual dimension in Iran.

The occurrence of different political-security incidences on the sidelines of Iran's eastern and western borders (Afghanistan-Iraq) and the collapse of The Soviet Union and the appearance of several neighbors in the northern borders provided the grounds for maintaining the potential and even in the essential situations, actual security.

If we consider security as keeping values, interests and goals; and regard national foundations which form the values and the cabinet system as the national interest, it is essential to provide security in different areas such as military, economic, natural resources, political and cultural. In this connection counts the stated areas as major dimensions of national security. He believes that all countries need appropriate solutions and strategies fitting their political geography in order to stabilize their security. (Mandel, 1994, p.45)

Iran has taken the importance of national security dimension into account both before and after the Islamic Revolution. Therefore, it is not exaggerated to say that one of the goals of Iran's approach in possessing nuclear technology is the need for supplying security and having defensive abilities.

Iran's nationalism and independence issue in the past up to the present has resulted in its attempt for economic, political, military, cultural, and social development and improvement. All these motives are enough for Iran, both in Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's period and the governance of The Islamic Revolution, to turn to possessing nuclear energy technology. Naturally, the realistic and structural model approaches appeared in this situation. Considering

these approaches, it is possible to study and investigate the background of utilizing nuclear energy in Iran.

2.3 The Political Perspectives and the Opinions of Iranian Leaders

Iran's nuclear energy issue which has made the mentality of the world especially the politicians and economists' busy for about a decade and at times turns into a hot subject for the world's news and information media. However, what is most discussed in this regard is the cross sensitivity in the issue of Iran's nuclear energy between Iran and other countries especially the P5+1.

To comprehend this sensitivity, one should look at the issue from the point of Iranian leaders' view in order to determine the rightfulness or the legitimacy of this conflict. Therefore, preferably, in addition to the study of Iran's nuclear issue, it is needed to evaluate it from social-political pathology aspects and the economic results.

Regarding Iran's high-ranking political officials' approach considering the possession of nuclear energy must be attention to various sides and wings into consideration. Because Iran's political officials' approaches are derived from their political thoughts, their looking sponsor at the nuclear issues, influence of their political and party wings. So, it is divided Iran's domestic standpoints into the following categories.

- 1) The standpoint of the dissidents of accessing the nuclear energy.
- 2) The advocates of accessing the nuclear energy.
- 3) The supporters of utilizing the potential of producing nuclear armaments.
- 4) The supporters of accessing nuclear armaments.

By recognizing these standpoints, one can understand the mental and practical structure of Iran's political authorities regarding nuclear energy. Of course, it is necessary to pay attention to two major issues regarding Iran's nuclear energy tendency. First, they should look at the

issue from a religious perspective by the Iranian authorities. The second is the Iranian political, military and religious figures to look at the nuclear issue.

Naturally, all of these figures have been a major influence on the formation of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Utilizing nuclear energy in the direction of health, agriculture, technology and community development is considered appropriate by religious literature; but using nuclear weapons and using them in the direction of mass destruction are forbidden according to Islamic religious laws and Muslim religious laws (sharia) and fiqh laws.

In this context, it is not very rational to abuse nuclear energy because it is guided by the Iranian rules of religion. However, the situation changes with the political approaches.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear crisis, there is not much political commentary and thesis production. It is possible to see the changing approaches from Iranian politics from time to time. Sometimes very moderate, sometimes very radical, approach is seen by Iranian politicians. This approach is reflected in their political dialogue and negotiation style, and even in the political literature.

The nuclear issue in Iranian policy is a fundamental tale. This demand reflects the political understandings of the Iranian authorities. As a matter of fact Ali Akber Hashemi Rafsanjani, President of the Expediency Discernment Council of Iran, served as president between 1989-1997. Rafsanjani coincides with the presidential years following the Iran-Iraq war. His political, economic, political, social and cultural development politics in the period of his rule carried Iran far ahead. Because Rafsanjani has a liberal policy view.

New reform in Iranian public administration in 1989, it started with the arrival of Rafsanjani as President. In this year, general politics and methods have changed and the necessity of market economy has been adopted instead of the state's understanding of intervention in economic and social affairs. During this period, the shares of many companies, large and small, belonging to the public sector were offered for sale in the stock market. Until 1991, the number of such companies reached 82. By the end of 1991 the number had risen to 125.

The Rafsanjani political view overlapped with the liberal theory, and after the dissolution of the USSR, it adopted a neoliberal view on the economy. Therefore, the economic approach has also affected the political approach.

The liberal view that began with Rafsanjani continued in the period of Khatami and Rouhani. For this reason, the liberal approach to Iran's nuclear-minded view has harmonized. Fundamental issues such as having nuclear technology instead of weapons production, improving the economy, getting rid of the burden of selling fossil fuels and moving Iran forward in other fields and keeping up with the global system have always been and have been the pioneers of the liberal presidents.

Therefore, this kind of approach has also affected the nuclear issue. However, the preferred attack and active policy was found in the Ahmadinejad period, and the preferred policy view continued on the axis of realism-idealism. As is well known, the nuclear issue has been influenced by such approaches and has played an important role in Iran's successful and unsuccessful nuclear negotiations. In other words, the reason for the Iranian nuclear crisis to last for many years depends on the political approach and political views of the reformist and fundamentalists. Some were pursuing nuclear energy, others in radical views and in nuclear energy bombs at the same time.

2.3.1 The Dissidents Standpoints towards Accessing Nuclear Energy

The first team of political authorities who are as the opposing side towards accessing the nuclear energy have presented various issues and claim that based on these reasons, there's no need of having an approach towards nuclear energy. This group considers the environmental and economic reasons for not needing the nuclear energy.

Based on their views, in Iran's present climate conditions for generating pure energy like electricity from solar and wind energy and even using thermal mineral water being sufficient, having tendency towards nuclear power plants is in vain to some extent. For instance, the

nuclear power plant of Boushehr is able to generate a little bit more than 1000 megawatts power which is so little regarding the country's major need for power. On the other hand, considering the cost of almost \$12 billion for the nuclear power plant of Boushehr, it cannot be justified economically at all. In order to provide the power for the whole country, at least 22 nuclear reactors are needed. Now, based on the fact that Iran owns numerous uranium mines and has the potential to utilize this God-given resource, is it still rational to go after possessing nuclear energy which will lead to more sanctions from world countries? (Golkarian, 2013)

This group emphasizes that in order to get out of nuclear negotiations dead-ends and the existing world threats, it's better that Iran uses clarification and under the supervision of the IAEA and regarding the present safeguards continue its nuclear activities and make the world believe that it will not pursue producing nuclear weapons.

The standpoint of this group is remarkable from the political-economic aspect. Independent Nuclear Energy Group believes that Iran, without a clear policy and lack of familiarity with its commitments in this regard, has tried to get nuclear technology. The information obtained in the nuclear technology has not been made available.

Therefore, it has received different prices for its essential and advanced equipment from rich countries to high prices. On the other hand, they believe that Iran is trying to fulfill its demands, but other countries are preventing Iran from gaining some of the most important political-economic benefits.

The typical example of these tributes can be seen in the enfranchisement of using the resources and rights of the Caspian Sea. In order to satisfy Russia and gain its support in the Security Council and other international communities, Iran has explicitly overlooked its prerogatives in the Caspian Sea and has ignored its own rights with tolerance. Based on the

signed treaties between Iran and Russia in 1920 and 1941 which are still authoritative, Iran has 20 % of the right to use and benefit the Caspian Sea.

The dissidents of Iran's accessing nuclear energy believe that Iran has conceded determining the right to use the share of resources and energy in the Caspian Sea to Russia by retreating in the negotiations. Based on this action and giving the position of strength to Russia, Iran has caused countries like the Republic of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to announce precisely that Iran has the right to use only 11 % of the Caspian shore.

On the other hand, the earthquake in Boushehr in April 2013 caused the dissidents of accessing nuclear energy in Iran to mention environmental issues. It should be considered that Iran is located on the earthquake track and the major fault. As a result, in the past years, there have occurred more than 100 significant and less tangible earthquakes.

The quake and numerous aftershocks in April 10 and 11, 2013 in Boushehr and around with the smallest 3.6 Richter and the biggest 5.1 Richter caused many villages and counties around Boushehr feel it and bear damages. In addition to major property damages to different parts, some residents of deprived villages were the victims of this earthquake. On the same date, the CNN reported that Qatar and Bahrain had also been affected by the quake.

After this event, the dissidents of Iran's accessing nuclear energy claimed that if a big earthquake happened in Boushehr region, there would be a hell of nuclear fire and atomic explosion and there would be a phenomenon like Chernobyl. This issue had a wide coverage at the time even in Iranian media.

Although Iranian officials and Russian experts claim that the building of Boushehr power plant is earthquake resistant equaling 8 Richter, if an earthquake a little bit stronger or like Japan an earthquake around 9 Richter occurs, by fuel bars being heated and uranium being permeated around, not only the whole country, but also the neighboring countries especially

the countries in the Persian Gulf area will be affected by this plague and the Persian Gulf with all its inner properties and Iran will be cumbering and non-operational agriculturally for at least 40 years.

In this regard, Mohammad Hassan Aboutorabi, the former Vice President of the Islamic Parliament of Iran believed that investment in nuclear energy is not affordable economically. He declared: (Salamati, 2015, pp. 34-35)

“Here, I discuss an issue from my own point of view. Not as the vice president of the Parliament or the organization which I am a member of. In the present situation of our country in which our country is in the second place of gas supplies and enormous oil resources in the world, it doesn’t seem rational to be after producing nuclear energy. Nuclear energy should not be our priority because we have to invest a lot for its production. This is not logical economically. Generating a KW electricity by the present methods is less expensive. So, considering political and economic costs, accessing the nuclear energy is not a rational method. As we have invested in Boushehr reactors and devoted many resources to it prior to the Islamic Revolution, we have to complete it. Meanwhile, by signing an adjunct protocol and presenting the essential assurance to the international society, we should act wisely. A few university experts, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Oil Ministry support this theory.”

2.3.2 The Advocates of Iran’s Accessing Nuclear Energy

This group of political experts in Iran believe that although Iran possesses rich oil and gas supplies, in a not-very far future, it will be out of them for the growth in population and welfare, the establishment of urban infrastructures, and individual life facilities will lead to an increase in using energy carrier especially fossil energy. As a result of this increase in application, the oil and gas resources will come to an end.

Meanwhile, much the world is eager to apply the technology of using other sources of generating energy, still oil and gas will remain as two strategic mine products. Therefore, it should establish and provide new facilities to generate energy for common uses of power. On

the other hand, the essence of utilizing nuclear energy in various fields of medicine, agriculture, industry, pharmacy, etc. makes considering nuclear facilities inevitable.

Although the group has seen the dangers of the atomic bombing of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, it is likely that similar events may occur in Iran, but they are still insisting on building new nuclear power plants. The reasoning the advocates of using nuclear energy have is like a double edge sword. Although, against the present facts, the economic benefits of nuclear energy are praised, they assume the risks unimportant and even claim that technically such risks are avoidable. But, simultaneously, the renewable energies as non-economic sources are rejected and their capacities are neglected. In fact, they are showing the necessity of nuclear energy application justifiable.

This group believes that the process of developed and deterrent technologies will prevent phenomena like Chernobyl. They even define Chernobyl atomic disaster as common and inconsiderable and are in the same boat with some experts in using nuclear technology and support them.

Gerov Von Randow, the advocate of using nuclear energy wrote, in *GermanZeit Magazine* No. 31, published in 2004, that in Chernobyl accident only 45 people were killed and 2000 thyroid cancer cases were confirmed. These are the data collected by beneficiary institutes of Chernobyl. However, in the reports and studies of independent institutes victims were around 70 people some of whom had committed suicide because of disappointment and misery. It should be mentioned that ten thousands of people lost their lives later on because of the injuries. (Hamshahrionline, 2017)

The advocates of nuclear energy claim that it's one of the pure energies which has been taken into consideration by developed industrial countries for the past four decades. At present, based on the reported data from the IAEA, there are 422 atomic reactors all over the world the

accumulated capacity of which is 300 thousand megawatts. They will be doubled by 2030 and quadrupled by 2050.

Considering the increase in energy consumption worldwide, it is clear that countries won't be able to provide their energy mainly by relying on fossil fuels. So, they should be aware of other ways for supplying their energy.

There are various argumentations regarding the economic benefits and justification of applying nuclear energy. The advocates of peaceful use of nuclear technology believe that the advantages of using nuclear energy are much more than the disadvantages. Besides, with the exponential increase of energy consumption in the world, it is only the nuclear energy which can replace the present fuels to some extent.

One of the advantages of using nuclear energy is that it does not produce greenhouse gases from the production to consumption process. In the full chain of nuclear energy from harvesting uranium to the production of nuclear waste, only 2 to 6 gr of carbon is produced per kilowatt hour. This amount equals the carbon that wind and solar energy produce. If 422 nuclear power plants are closed all over the world and fossil fuels like oil and gas are used, there will be 600 million tons of carbon released into the atmosphere annually. It means that by using fossil fuels, the earth will be exposed to greenhouse gases two times more than the predicted amount.

According to Kyoto Protocol, different countries are obliged to prevent greenhouse gases by 2012. Most of the countries that have enacted the Kyoto Treaty for reducing greenhouse gases have taken some encouraging policies. At present, Europe is a major consumer of nuclear power in the world. The nuclear experts claim that the application of nuclear energy in Europe has prevented the production of 7 % greenhouse gases in this continent.

One of the other properties of nuclear energy is the stability in its total cost. This has become even more important by increasing price of gas and oil. Regarding the decrease in the world's gas and oil resources and the increase in energy consumption, the era of inexpensive energy is finished. Therefore, if the developing countries of the world intend to reach a stable economic growth, they need to provide energy from non-fossil resources.

The advocates of accessing nuclear energy believe that despite the high cost of building a nuclear power plant, it is worth being invested on because nuclear energy has numerous properties.

For instance, based on IAEA assessments, a one thousands megawatt nuclear power plant costs \$1.5 billion to \$2.5 billion. However, the cost of nuclear fuel in such a power plant is much cheaper than an equivalent power plant with fossil fuel. The essential fuel for a thousand megawatt nuclear power plant is about 30 tons of enriched Uranium per year which costs \$10 million in good situations and in the worst conditions it costs \$25 million. Considering the oil barrels as \$50 each, a nuclear power plant fuel costs 5 % of a power plant with oil fuel, that is, in long term, the high cost of building a nuclear power plant will be compensated with the inexpensive electricity it generates.

The majority of this group believes that Iran should merely access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and accessing any armament technology should be banned. Based on this thought, nuclear armaments not only can't promote Iran's national security, but they can also cause more tension and vulnerability for Iran. On the other hand, accessing nuclear armaments is violation against the international commitments and this can lead to an increase of nuclear armaments in the region and be harmful for Iran's relation with other countries.

2.3.2.1 The Advocates of using the Potential for Producing Nuclear Armaments.

Among these is a group that claims there is discrimination in using nuclear technology. In their opinion, although using nuclear technology has mainly been for human comfort, some

superpowers and developed countries attempt to monopolize it and even during history, they have misused nuclear energy in many cases and have entered the competitions for nuclear armament. Therefore, it is essential to reach nuclear armament capability in order to defend ourselves. Some Iranian fundamentalist authorities, regarding past experiences and being the victim of chemical weapons, consider the ugly background of the international community in helping Iraq and numerous threats against Iran as a criterion and reason for the essence of possessing nuclear armament capability.

Naturally, this standpoint has caused tension between Iran and superpowers that possess nuclear armaments. The main excuse of Western countries and even Russia and China in this regard is that if Iran possesses nuclear armaments, it will provide the ground for the expansion of nuclear armaments competitions in the region.

However, versus to this argumentation, Iranian fundamentalist political authorities believe that possessing the facilities of nuclear armaments. With this belief, they find themselves rightful to have nuclear facilities. They are also bringing forward the issue of defense in the direction of national interests and the thesis of nuclear weapons production. Of course, the discipline behind this thesis has also led to controversy in radicals. Defense thesis analysis of those who have realistic-idealistic political views is usually conducted through strategic interests. According to them, the Islamic Republic of Iran is always threatened by the US and its followers. It is logical to have all kinds of grief against the US regime change policy.

Therefore, the use of nuclear energy for militaristic purposes should not be unreliable. Meanwhile some countries possessing nuclear armaments like Israel have not even signed the NPT and do not follow the necessary protocols in IAEA. Their justification regarding the possession of nuclear weapons is based on the fact that superpowers exert a dual policy towards countries like Iran. It is natural that bitter incidents like the explosion of atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima by the US leading to the death of thousands of hundreds of

innocent people is another reason for not trusting countries that have nuclear armaments high-tech.

The reasonable justification of the advocates of having the capability of nuclear armaments is that the governments possessing nuclear weapon act discriminatory towards other countries. This group believes that countries owning nuclear weapons consider the actions of countries that perform honestly and under the IAEA supervision for scientific and peaceful use as false and try hard to prevent this, but countries that have policies in line with policies of America and Europe can easily perform in the area of nuclear technology and even get some help from Western countries.

In this context, France and the US have helped Tel Aviv's atomic bombing initiative over the past 50 years. Israel made the first atomic bomb towards the end of the 1960s and about Israeli atomic bomb activities no exact and enough information about their nuclear armaments production. The other reason presented by the supporters of accessing nuclear armaments is a reaction to the discrimination in peaceful use of nuclear technology. By relying on some documents, they claim that the IAEA acts under the shadow of superpowers' influence in the international communities.

The IAEA was established with the aim of not only preventing countries from accessing nuclear weapons, but also helping them in benefiting peaceful nuclear technology. However, the IAEA, being under the influence of Western powers, does not treat all members equally. Some countries have the possibility of utilizing the facilities of the agency and benefit the advantages of nuclear energy. Other countries, especially the Islamic countries or the US dissidents are facing serious problems in this case. These countries are continuously being accused of intending to make atomic bombs secretly. Such accusations from Western governments, especially from the US have political goals and intend to weaken these countries.

The supporters of possessing nuclear armaments facilities approach believe that having the capabilities of nuclear armaments can create political-military security. From their point of view, having this capability is a significant strategic deterrence which can be a positive help for the defensive and national security of Iran. It means that although having the capability of making nuclear armaments in Iran is not a threat for others, it can increase Iran's power very quickly. (Salamati, 2015, p.36)

2.3.2.2 The Supporters of Accessing Nuclear Armaments

Among the three mentioned groups there are some who tend to utilize nuclear energy and even produce and develop nuclear weapons and suggest that the government should exit from NPT. They believe that the animosity of Western countries especially the US and Israel is the main reason for overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran. They also maintain that in every opportunity, those countries would act against Iran and by the help of their allies they would make tension in the region and find various alibis to perform military action against Iran. In this regard, they assume Iraq and its overthrown government an outstanding example.

This group believes that Iran should start producing nuclear armaments as soon as possible and if necessary should bear different political and economic pressures but gain its stabilizing goals. Their justification about Iran's accessing nuclear armaments is that the international hostility against Iran has made a dangerous atmosphere for Iran and Western countries, especially the US are pursuing their strategic goals in the Middle East and trying to prevent a revolution. They believe that in the present situation, Iran with the dissident countries and even some of Iran's neighboring countries, despite having international relations, is acting in line with the political and security requirements of the West and if required, they will come to action.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's government who believed in such an approach was among the supporters of accessing nuclear armaments. They believed that although international sanctions had their own difficulties, in order to reach the ideal deterrence ability level, the

country had to bear them. As a result, during his 8year tenure, the development of atomic power plants and nuclear centers such as Natanz, Arak, etc. increased and the equipment for uranium enrichment and increasing centrifuges were to the extent that Iran could get to 20 %of uranium enrichment which was in fact a forward step for possessing the capability of nuclear armaments.

The advocates of possessing nuclear armaments have this approach that owning nuclear armaments and even the expansion of the production knowledge can maintain the territorial integrity of Iran and promote the country's position in the region and the world.

It should be mentioned that this group among other groups has less supporters and advocates. However, there are some among political and university elites, research institutes and even mass media who advocate such ideas. What should be said is the fact that the majority of Iranians, especially governmental officials and university faculties or outstanding political authorities support the second and third approaches. Besides explaining common approaches regarding using nuclear technology in Iran, it is essential to refer to the country's senior officials' standpoints in order to recognize the issue of nuclear crisis between Iran and other countries. Deriving from this point the next section focuses on the opinions of Iranian leaders namely: 1. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, 2. Dr. Mohammad Khatami, 3. Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 4. Dr. Hassan Rouhani.

2.3.3 Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei's Opinion

In order to recognize the approaches of political leaders especially Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei's point of view as the political and religious Leader of Iran, it is essential to know the intellectual backgrounds regarding the essence of possessing the technology and facilities of nuclear energy. One of the main points that has caused the political officials of Iran and especially the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be concerned about is the national security of the country.

During the post-revolutionary years in Iran and after more than 30 years, Iran has witnessed many political and security changes. These changes have caused the indicators of national security, hegemony power of the region and Iran's influence on the world and trans-regional power balance change. For instance, point to the phenomena like ethnic divisions and national uprisings in Kurdistan or the riots in Azerbaijan and Khouzestan in the early years of the Revolution, the uncalled-for war between Iran and Iraq for 8 years, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the appearance of newly independent countries in Iran's Northern borders, the beginning of insecurity and crisis in Afghanistan, the September 11 event, and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq and the resulted insecurity because of ethnic and religious tensions in this country in western borders of Iran. All these changes had major roles in the formation of Iran's authorities' political and security thoughts. Of course, the Revolution itself and the continuity of the Islamic Republic of Iran caused the domestic understanding of national issues and even of the world to change. It is evident that the standpoint of different countries including the politicians and the people in various countries alter towards Iran.

The political relation of Iran and the US was broken after the occupation of the US Embassy in Iran. Afterwards, the occurrence of the war between Iran and the US which was one of the most significant incidents after the Revolution caused Iran not to consider itself under the umbrella of the international political security and support. By the US support for Saddam Hussein during the war and political oppositions in various dimensions with Iran, as well as the convergence of America's confederates in the world especially in the region and the Middle East, Iran found itself facing a huge wall and felt the need for more self-supporting in security and military dimensions.

Despite being at war with Iraq during 1980-1988, Iran had weapon and equipment support of countries like America, the Soviet Union, China, France and England for Iraq beyond Iraq's military power. Some Arab governments also provided financial resources for Iraq at war and

satellite surveillance and sending delicate military pictures from American AWACS had made Iraq more dominant in the early years of the war.

The war between Iran and Iraq with all its destructive dimensions was considered a full-scale one. However, besides maintaining the territorial integrity and the fresh Revolution, there were other issues to be taken into consideration by Iran's government. Launching ballistic missiles to the cities, the mass killing resulted from the bombardment of cities and residential areas by Iraqi fighters had led to Iranians' unity and integration against the war. (Los Angeles Times, 2002)

“Iranians considered using the weapons of mass killing in the war as their red line which was not supposed to be passed over, but with the continuation of the war, they noticed that the utilization of chemical weapons against Iran was ignored and even supported by the international community and on top of it, the West.”

Having observed such events, the political statesmen of Iran especially the Leader decided that in order to maintain the security of the citizens, they had to rely on their own resources. They concluded that the leadership of powerful nations can easily cross the red line against their own benefits or merely because of a simple hostility with Iran.

As stated earlier, the collapse of the Soviet Union changed Iran's geo-political situation. The crash of September 11 altered Iran's regional atmosphere once more. (Salamati, 2015, p.38)

“First of all, America's former president, George W. Bush, by addressing Iran as the axis of the evil, started a new era of hostility against Iran. In addition, attacking Afghanistan and the lodgment of American military forces there, meant neighborhood with the US somehow and America could benefit new facilities against Iran. Along with this, attacking Iraq was also like neighborhood with America and it was a warning towards America's new policies which were accompanied with some degrees of unilateralism and overlooking some international standards.”

The Islamic Revolution relies on the ideals resulted from the Revolution and emphasizes on its independence. It is natural that Iran's political authorities have a specific assessment of their geo-political situation. Therefore, the new readout of Iran's strategic goals in the region was getting more important for Iran's political and military strategists and geo-political experts. This is in the situation that all the regional changes are related to Iran and the political equations for them are evaluated considering Iran.

From the contention between the Palestinian and Israel to issues like Al-Qaeda and ISIS, the consolidation of Iraq and Syria's territorial integrity and the discussions regarding energy transfer in the Persian Gulf and progression to Eastern Mediterranean, and also having the maritime laws in the Caspian Sea have been super important for Iran.

In Iran's political authorities' point of view and even in the Leader's feeling strategic loneliness is undeniable. When the west opposing side with America's leadership is being formed and managed, the unity of Arab countries and the Sunnis especially the cooperation council of the Persian Gulf area and Turkey's support and cooperation with them has caused insecurity for Iran.

In this case, Russia, despite the essential political support explain and mutual military, economic and political cooperation, is not considered as Iran's strategic partner. Although, all these items are congruous with the forth approach of political authorities towards possessing nuclear technology, the Leader's standpoint does not coincide with them. The lack of a strategic alliance between Russia and Iran is based on several reasons. Iranian political officials, though, regard the cooperation between Iran and Russia as strategic; but the commercial, economic and military exchanges are not of a strategic nature.

Admiral Ali Shamkhani, general secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, argues that there is a strategic alliance between the two countries, taking into account the factors based on the volume of trade and possibilities between Iran and Russia. In addition, Ali

Akbar Velayati, the chief advisor of the Iranian religious leader, strategically emphasizes the joint approach of Iran and Russia in the provision of international balances, especially those related to Syria. But the Russian authorities have different views on this issue.

Every year Moscow publishes a document entitled Foreign Policy Doctrine. Each word of this document is carefully and obsessively chosen and in general, it reflects its foreign policy. The latest version of this document, titled "The New Foreign Policy Doctrine of the Russian Federation," was signed by Vladimir Putin in November 2016. The study of this document shows that whereis the Islamic Republic and its regional rivals are in Russia's foreign policy. For example, while this document places India and China among the countries with which Russia has a "strategic partnership", it describes the EU as an "important economic-commercial partner" and not as a strategic partner for Russia. Article 94 of this document in relation to Iran states: (Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, MID, 2016)

" Russia is committed to the comprehensive development of cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and seeks to ensure the consistent implementation of the joint comprehensive agreement to settle the situation around the Iranian nuclear programme based on UN Security Council resolution 2231 of July 20, 2015 and relevant IAEA Board of Governors decisions, and assists this process in every possible way."

This point is more important when referred to in the next paragraph of the document (Paragraph 95) in the "Strategic Dialogue with the Gulf Cooperation Council". The difference between these two clauses is obvious. Russia is inclined to engage in strategic talks with the Co-operation Council, which members of the council, especially Saudi, are the rivals of the Islamic Republic of Iran. If Russia ever develops its strategic talks with Arab countries in the Gulf, it is obvious that it will re-examine its relations with Iran. Because, the Arabic countries in Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia are keen to have a strategic relationship with Russia, in such a situation, relations between Tehran and Moscow will be dimmed. Paragraph 95 of the same document states that: ((Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, MID, 2016)

“Russia intends to further expand bilateral relations with the States in the Middle East and North Africa, including by relying on the ministerial meeting of the Russian-Arab Cooperation Forum, and continuing strategic dialogue with the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf.”

Iran's politicians and strategists pay attention to the revenue of the changes more than considering the realistic considerations because Iran's politicians and Ayatollah Khamenei's advisors in foreign policies and military-defensive issues consider the results of the political equation revenues in the region and the world. They are certain that Iran is not only an effective country in the power balance of the region, but it is also as the determinant axis in regional and trans-regional political approaches.

Therefore, the authorities emphasize the essence of military and security self-reliance besides considering the insecure and risky atmosphere of the region. In this approach, it is emphasized that in the comprehension of Iran's security environment, two significant issues should not be ignored. First, the rationality derived from the imposed geo-strategic environment to Iran and second, the challenging security framework of Iran. This point is progressively summarized by Mohiaddin Mesbahi as: (Mesbahi, 2001, p.149)

“Iran has been able to both maintain its territorial and political integrity and make the major foundations of a stable society without foreign support and without nuclear weapon. Relying on this business means prescribing safer, cheaper ways and at the same time, leaving different options open.”

Though it should mention that in the formations of Iran's highest religious-political position both ideological orientations play roles: A) Revolutionary Islam, B) Iranian Nationalism. Iran's Religious Leader as the main leader and the preserver of national and ideological resources of the Islamic Republic of Iran adheres to these two orientations. As a result, in both ideologies, the security, supplying national resources and increasing Iran's power which relies on economic development are of great importance.

Ayatollah Khamenei's standpoint as Iran's political-religious Leader, regarding the possession of Iran's nuclear energy and his approach towards the related issues as well as the negotiations between Iran and P5+1 can be cited from his own website.

He believes that Iran's possession of nuclear technology is inevitable regarding the necessity of keeping and industrializing the nuclear technology. During the introduction of the nuclear energy issue, he has constantly and vividly addressed Iranian political officials that nuclear technology achievements are not brummagem and should not be considered unimportant. In his opinion, nuclear industry for our country is essential and undeniable.

The Leader's approach should be considered among to the supporter group of possessing nuclear energy. Because his view concerns both those who prefer nuclear technology and those who oppose it: (Khamenei view, 2014)

"some open-minded intellectuals have written that what do we want the nuclear industry for. This is like the time of Qajaryan when oil was discovered and the English had come and wanted to take it and a Qajar statesman had said what we want this stinking material for. Let them take it. The dissidents' claim of possessing nuclear energy is like that. The nuclear industry is necessary for our country. Both for the energy and the nuclear medicines are very important. Both for the conversion of salt water to fresh water and are important for other requirements in agricultural and non-agricultural areas. The nuclear industry is a significant and advanced industry. This has been achieved by our own children. This is the explosion of inner capacities and inner talents of the children of our own nation. The nuclear achievement is very important and pursuing this technology and industrializing our country with this science is vital and should be taken into consideration."

From the beginning of the introducing the essence of possessing nuclear technology, Ayatollah Khamenei has frequently emphasized on Iran's achieving the technology and knowledge of nuclear energy and its peaceful use in various areas considering it as Iran's inalienable and definite right. He believes that producing the weapons of mass killing is contrary to Islamic foundations and it is not compatible with human values.

In the view point of the Leader of the Islamic republic of Iran possessing nuclear technology is an undeniable issue and the nations' basic rights determine the destiny of each nation. Therefore, if Iran's nation has constantly defended possessing such knowledge for Iran from the beginning of nuclear crisis, it shows that they count it as their basic right.

In Iran's Leader's point of view, America and their confederates' resistance against Iran's possession of nuclear energy has various reasons. First, they attempt to keep this science and technology in their own control or at least have full control and observation over it. On the other hand, since they consider Iran as a dissenting country, they don't desire Iran to possess the latest nuclear technology and knowledge. In Ayatollah Khamenei's point of view, Iran's accessing nuclear technology would threaten Western governments' benefits especially America's in the Middle East area. America's fear of these activities is derived from Iran being a model for other countries and achieving the capability of producing and exporting this knowledge to the Middle East countries.

In addition to these, the standpoint of the highest religious-political position of Iran regarding the application of nuclear energy can be found in his comments during the years of presenting Iran's nuclear issue to the international communities. Ayatollah Khamenei, besides considering the possession of nuclear knowledge as one of Iran's strategic goals in economic political issues, also counts it as an inevitable issue in scientific development and the guarantee for many major foundations in our country's economic advancement.

The exploitation of nuclear energy in Iran's highest political-religious position is like a key for achieving other strategic goals. One of the main concerns of Iranian political authorities and the Leader is that enemies like Israel and their secret arsenals are beside other trans-regional dissidents. Therefore, the promotion of Iran's position as well as accessing and achieving nuclear energy even in a peaceful scale can help the emergence of power balance or a factor in deterrence and change and the adjustment of regional and trans-regional threats against Iran.

In a meeting with the Council of Experts in March 9, 2006, referring to different countries' attempt in producing nuclear energy, he emphasized that if our country does not have nuclear-relying electricity, it will face fundamental problems. So, producing nuclear energy is a real requirement and the officials are obliged to continue Iran's movement towards advanced technology including nuclear energy without surrendering to the pressures.(Khamenei Speech, 2015)

He believes that accessing nuclear energy based on NPT, is every country's right and considering that Iran has already signed NPT, so relying on the provisions of the Treaty, Iran as a country of the world and also a promisor to NPT, has the right to use nuclear energy.

Based on these standpoints of Iran's highest political-religious position that the advance and development of nuclear technology during the past years have become actual, and more developed centrifuges have been produced by Iranian scientists and specialists. In such a situation in which the world is benefitting the third and fourth generations of centrifuges in Uranium enrichment, Iranian scientists have succeeded in designing, producing and running more advanced equipment and depend on domestic knowledge in the stages of uranium extract to producing UF₆ and its enrichment.

In Islamic Republic of Iran's Leader's standpoint nuclear technology is considered as national benefit and Iran's redline. As a result, Iran's nuclear program is not negotiable and Western countries' rejection of designs and their suggestions regarding Iran's nuclear program will lead nowhere and will eventually make grounds for negotiations between Iran and P5+1.

Obviously, thanks to the outcomes of the negotiations of Lausanne, Geneva and Vienna, nuclear knowledge was constantly defended and discussed and ultimately, in April 2, 2015, the P5+1 countries were bound to compromise between Iran and themselves and the continuation of nuclear program including uranium enrichment inside JCPOA framework as Iran's de jure was taken into consideration. Thanks to this conclusion, the Leader's argument has been accompanied.

However, this should be noted that Ayatollah Khamenei's major and critical role in nuclear diplomacy is really outstanding. Perhaps few people thought that the change in Iran's foreign policies equations would take place by the Leader's role. Because during Khatami and Ahmadinejad's tenures and continuing the dull and inconclusive negotiations there was a belief inside and outside of Iran that the Leader is not willing to negotiate and come to a conclusion. But signing the nuclear Memorandum of Understanding called JCPOA between Iran and the countries of P5+1 accompanied with Ayatollah Khamenei's decisive support showed that he has a key role and major intervention in the process of nuclear diplomacy.

Another point to be mentioned regarding the intervention of Ayatollah Khamenei's viewpoint in the formation of the result of JCPOA is that he has looked at Iran's nuclear issue from political and religious points of view. The issuance of judgment (Fatwa) regarding the application of nuclear weapon being forbidden or that Iran doesn't need producing nuclear weapon could have a major role in the first years of negotiations in Brazil, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and even in Vienna and Geneva.

Ayatollah Khamenei's approach in nuclear issue should be interpreted that by entering religious and legal issues into political and international issues which was an incredible action by realist and neorealist analyzers, he opened a new window for analyzing and studying Iran's nuclear issue. Ayatollah Khamenei's standpoint regarding nuclear energy issue can be summarized in the following statements:

- The precious and honorable movement of Iranian youths in accessing indigenous nuclear knowledge is a history and civilization making one, and this movement should proceed firmly and strongly and develop in various dimensions.
- Every country's key to advance, power and felicity is science and technology and the nation seeking for its destiny should find this key.
- Iran doesn't need nuclear weapon. Iran's nuclear bombs are these young people and the nation who have stood faithfully and firmly in the most difficult situations.

- Iran's policy is clearly vivid. Progress, presenting bright logic and insisting on the nation's right without retreating.
- The production of nuclear energy is an actual and rightful requirement and Iran's movement towards advanced technology of nuclear energy is the epiphany of the nation's demand and an example of people's conscious presence in the scene.
- It is only science and research that can build and modify human infrastructures as the most significant infrastructures of our country.
- In Islamic thought, moving towards evolution and development in different areas of life and achieving new horizons of human knowledge is considered a value.

2.3.4 Mohammad Khatami's Opinion (1997-2005)

Before discussing the approach of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's government regarding nuclear issue between 1997 to 2005, it is better to consider his general approach. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami is considered as the president of the 7th and 8th governments of Iran who has risen after the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic government.

Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, researcher, clergyman, and reformist politician was elected as the 5th President of Iran and the first leader of domestic reformist movement in Iran with more than 20 million votes (70% of total votes) in the presidential elections of May 23, 1997. He is recognized as the leader of Iran's reforms by many. Khatami was also considered as the creator of "the Dialogue of Civilizations" which is world famous and known by his name. The UN named the year 2001, the "Dialogue of Civilizations Year" based on this plan. The Newsweek magazine declared Mohammad Khatami as Iran's 4th most powerful man for 2009.

Based on the idea behind the "Dialogue of Civilizations", he had founded his domestic and foreign policies on the basis of peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding in the shadow of political dialogue and had pictured the principles of foreign policies in the same framework. His standpoint towards the issue of nuclear energy was in line with this which could pave the

path for solving a lot of diplomatic problems and tensions between Iran and America if the negotiations came to a conclusion during his tenure with a suitable, logical and fair approach. But, the political destiny of his tenure especially mentioning Iran's secret nuclear activity and having tendency to possess nuclear weapons resulted in destroying bright horizons in the relations between Iran and Western countries.

Profiling against Iran and the commencement of nuclear crisis between Iran and Western countries with a new phase and the US approach against Iran's nuclear activities dates back to August 14, 2002. The mass media reporters, the press, and the representatives of world's news channels in Willard Hotel Washington are excited to announce a very important piece of news to the world. Someone called Alireza Jafarzadeh, Public Speaker of People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI), the public speaker of People's Mujahedin of Iran (a dissident group of the Islamic Republic of Iran) intends to reveal an important event which is significant for America and other countries of the world. He shows three pictures of Natanz, Isfahan and Arak in Iran and claims that Iran is secretly having nuclear activities and has started Uranium enrichment in Natanz and Isfahan and possesses a heavy water reactor in Arak.

The news is spread through the media world as quickly and provides the essential bed for the US to accuse Iran of attempting to produce nuclear armaments in December of that year. About 4 months later, in December 12, 2002, the CNN, in a program organized based on The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), pictures the terrifying and horrible visage of Iran's atomic activities claiming that Iran intends to have nuclear weapons capabilities which can lead the world towards nuclear competitions and causing insecurity in the Middle East.

In the remarks of the Speaker of Mujahedin of people of Iran and in a CNN report, it is claimed that nuclear activities of Iran are pursued with military orientations and the secret aim of accessing nuclear bomb. Tehran did not accept the adjunct 93+2 protocol and the subsidiary arrangements at the time. (Mousavian, 2012, p.6)

According to this report, the commencement of building Isfahan, Natanz and Arak installations dates back to 1999, because the council of new technologies had predicted the energy crisis for the future decades and emphasizing on the fact that the vast ground of nuclear energy application is an essential need, counted the beginning of nuclear activities in the country necessary along with other sciences.

Meanwhile, Iran is suspected and accused because of rejecting the adjunct protocol and non-membership in the sub-subsidiary arrangements at the same time with the beginning of its nuclear activities.

In December 13, 2002, Mohamed ElBaradei, the General Secretary of IAEA, says to the CNN that he is fully aware of Iran's nuclear installations and understands the aim of these installations. He believes that these installations are under peculiar control while being for peaceful utilizations. But the problem description doesn't remain like this and the pressures make El-Baradei set off for Tehran in May, 2002.

After a two-day visit to Natanz installations, the general secretary of the IAEA emphasized that "what has been seen in Iran's nuclear program has not been unexpected" But, 3 months later, in June 2003, after America's triumph over Iraq, Washington puts El-Baradei under pressure to have Iran's nuclear case in the order of the Board of Governors. Base on this, ElBaradei's reports to the Board of Governors of Iran's failure in executing some rules. This report was followed by the reaction of the Board of Governors and he precisely asks Tehran to accept the adjunct protocol. (Tasnimnews, Iran Nuclear Dossier, 2008)

The media advertisement and the statements of American authorities after winning the war with Iraq caused a new atmosphere against Iran. The American authorities had claimed that after Iraq's issue, facing Iran and North Korea would be one of the vital and significant issues. In that situation, some Western countries like France, Britain and Germany caused Iran's nuclear activities to be the headline of the news more than anything else. It appears that

America's presence in Iraq and the objection of some Muslim countries caused America to use the political parachute in order to distract the world's public opinion from the war and present Iran's nuclear issue as the most important security-political crisis of the world. Because even Russia threatened to stop cooperating in Boushehr and declared that if Iran didn't sign the adjunct protocol, an unpleasant situation would rise for Iran and Russia would not cooperate any more.

The international political pressures started when the IAEA Board of Governors in the meeting of Sep. 2003 ratified the suggested resolutions of 3 countries of Canada, Australia and Japan setting a 50-day deadline for Iran to act upon its commitments regarding controlling the nuclear program until the end of October. Also to remove all the inadequacies recognized by the agency and sign the adjunct protocol. In this meeting, the election of the new Board of Directors was discussed to be based on the discipline, the periodic presence of countries in the Board of Governors.

Iran had to be a member of the board, however, with the IAEA Speaker's claim, because of violating the rules of this organization, was not considered as a member of the Board and was substituted with Pakistan. In order to object and react to this decision, Iran declared that it won't review the cooperation styles with IAEA. Although, there was nothing mentioned in the resolutions against Iran regarding the outcomes of Iran's ignoring its commitments until the end of October, but according to unofficial reports, Iran's nuclear case would be sent to the UN Security Council and there would be new political-economic sanctions. (Hashemi, 2006, p.30)

In Tehran, the authorities worried about making the right decisions regarding the Resolution of the Board. Eventually, in October 6, 2003, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the president of the time, suggested Doctor Hassan Rouhani who was the Secretary of the National Security Council as the Chief Nuclear Negotiator and Ayatollah Khamenei chose him for this

responsibility. From then on, several rounds of negotiations between Iran and the Western partners began such as the negotiations of Tehran, Brussels and Paris.

Prior to Tehran negotiations, some reformist representatives signed the three-urgency plan for requiring the government to accept the adjunct protocol and they intended to offer it to the Parliament. Before the western negotiator entered Iran, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami had accepted the suspension of nuclear activities in the press interviews. According to some experts of international relations, such political actions in Iran caused Iran to be in a weak position in the negotiations over its actual right of using nuclear energy.

Tehran negotiations were attended by John Whitaker “Jack” Straw, the Foreign Minister of England; Dominique de Villepin, the Foreign Minister of France; and Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister of Federal Germany in October 21, 2003. The Iranian negotiators’ only aimed at preventing the referral of the nuclear case to the Security Council. After the negotiations a statement was issued and in that statement, Tehran accepted to answer all the questions of the agency, rectify all the shortcomings and sign the adjunct protocol voluntarily. But, meanwhile, the Western-European side attempted to make Iran suspend its nuclear activities however, Iran evaded todo so.

In the end, Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister of Germany, considered continuing the negotiations a waste of time and decided to leave. That way, the meeting was cancelled and Hassan Rouhani as the Chief Negotiator called Mohammad Khatami and asked for permission to make a conclusion from the negotiations.

Thanks to this decision making in the class of macro-country, the private negotiation between Rouhaniand El-Baradei took place and they defined suspension as only the suspension of fumigation in Natanz. They agreed that the concept of suspension be based on the definition which the agency would determine. However, Iran puts the word ‘voluntarily’ in the content

of the statement so that if the Western side did not align to its commitments, Tehran would have a return way.

The Western side accepted to resolve Iran's nuclear case in the agency and if America took it to the Security Council unilaterally, Iran would be able to use veto right. Besides, the Europeans committed to cooperate with Iran in technology areas.

Four months after Tehran negotiations, the negotiations between nuclear officials of Iran and the Western negotiators takes place in Brussels. These negotiations were in two rounds in February 23, 2004. In the first round, Iran accepts the suspension in the framework of the IAEA and the nuclear case gets out of the Board of Governors in June 2004.

Iran accepts to present the declarations in accordance with the adjunct protocol and their verification by the agency. The assembly suspension and testing the centrifuges, the suspension of making centrifuge components in Iran, and exerting suspension over enrichment activities regarding all the installations existing in Iran be based on the agency's observations for identifying Iran's attempts in the meetings of the Board of Governors in June 2004 in order to accustom the execution of the rules and the adjunct protocol in Iran.

Compared to Iran's vast commitments, accustoming Iran's nuclear issue in the agency could be one of the commitments of the European side, but none of the three countries had made definite commitments in this regard.

Hassan Rouhani, in the book titled "*National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy*" writes: (Rouhani, 2011, p.207)

"Prior to the suspension, Iran, in a month and a half opportunity, obliges the workshops of centrifuge making to work three shifts. Before the statement of Tehran, the authorities of the system agree with the suspension of fumigation in Natanz, but in the statement of Tehran, they put a step forward and the fumigation statement was declared voluntarily."

After this agreement, the European side does not act upon its commitments. Not only doesn't the nuclear issue of Iran get removed from the agenda in the meeting of June 2004, but also a tough statement is ratified against Iran even in the next two meetings of the Board of Governors in September and November 2004. That is when all the activities related to enrichment in Iran have become suspended and the adjunct protocol is in process.

The non-alignment of the European side caused Iran to declare that it won't assume its commitments any more after issuing the third statement in June 2004. This occurred in the situation when Iran suspends producing centrifuges voluntarily. However, the opposite side, substitutes assuming their commitments with putting more pressure on Iran. As a result, the high-ranking institutions of Iran require quick reaction to the opposite side's non-alignment. Iran restarts producing centrifuges in Natanz in July 2004 causing the Board of Governors to threaten Iran in a statement to refer its case to the Security Council of the UN.

In order to make Iran suspend all the enrichment activities, the Board of Governors considers a 3-month deadline. Based on this deadline, if Iran does not suspend the activities of Natanz installations by November 25, 2004, the case will be referred to the Security Council. This issue makes grounds for the upcoming negotiations.

After political changes in Tehran and Brussels' nuclear negotiations, finally, in October 28, 2004, further negotiations between the Iranian and European sides begin in Vienna. The EU insists on limitless or permanent suspension of all enrichment activities, however, Iran doesn't consider permanent suspension negotiable. Nevertheless, it declares that that is ready to negotiate and compromise regarding the manner of temporary and volunteer suspension.

In these negotiations, the last plan of the EU has less flaws compared with their previous plans, yet, they can't meet Iran's demands. In this regard, Hassan Rouhani, the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council of the time, writes in his book "Getting closer to November meetings of the Board of Governors required the essence of reaching an agreement

with the aim of reducing the crisis size. This issue caused that the four countries have another meeting in November 5, 2004. These negotiations lasted 23 hours and the aim was to compare all the details of Tehran and Brussels' suggestions and to bargain over the demands of both sides. Eventually, in Aban 24, the diplomats of the countries agreed on one single text. (Rouhani, 2011, p.227)

This agreement is formed in the situation when the EU side doesn't align to its commitment based on accustoming Iran's nuclear issue in the meeting of the Board of June 2004. On the other hand, EU3 are seeking to expand suspension to its highest extent. In this agreement, Iran, voluntarily and not as a legal commitment, agrees to stop all the activities related to enrichment and reprocessing such as manufacturing, production, installation, testing, botching, setting up gas centrifuges, and the activities related to separating Plutonium in order to build trust.

The EU3 in this agreement promise the Iranian negotiator team that after the suspension was verified, the negotiations with the EU about the trade agreement and cooperation will start over, and they support the beginning of incorporate negotiations to WTO actively. Besides, England, Germany and France promise Iran to battle terrorism and terrorist groups in partnership.

A week after the negotiations, Tehran suspends the activities of UCF nuclear installations. Meanwhile, uranium conversion activities based on the technical view of the IAEA is not considered as uranium enrichment activity. However, the EU countries seemed to enjoy this game.

A few days after the closure of Isfahan installations, regardless of Paris agreement, the IAEA based on the General Director's November 15 report, holds a meeting at the end of November and issues a resolution on November 29, 2004 which was very critical and disappointing for Iran. In the last minutes of the issuance of the resolution, Iran declared that it intends to bring

20 centrifuges out of suspension for research affairs, but this action did not operate with the insistency of the west.

After the Paris Agreement, the westerners posed the light water reactor's discussion telling Iran that the delivery of light water reactor is in return for the suspension of building heavy water reactor. In the next stages when the rudiments of purchasing heavy water reactor were discussed, the westerners declared to the Iranian officials that, "We don't have heavy water reactors! Our companies do and we cannot make them give you reactors. However, we'll tell them it's permitted, but negotiate with them by yourselves." (Tasnimnews, 2015)

It is natural that companies possessing the facilities and producing light water reactors, since they have large transactions with America, will not act without their agreement. Practically, Tehran cannot purchase any reactors.

Anyway, the negotiation process will last until the summer of 2005, the result of which will be executing the adjunct protocol and volunteer suspension of nuclear activities. This situation is considered unacceptable in Iran and is concurrent with the final days of Mohammad Khatami's government.

Ayatollah Khamenei, in a meeting with the officials of the system enters the nuclear discussion emphasizing on the fact that the Westerners constantly have demands and do not assume their commitments. He implies that the retreat process should transform to an advance process and the first step should be taken in the government in which the retreat took place. (Majaal, 2013)

Ultimately, in the last days of Khatami's tenure, the first steps towards progress are taken and it is decided that the UCF factory in Isfahan be launched. The conditions of nuclear issue in Khatami's tenure, was congruous with his government's standpoint. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's point of view matched the standpoint of the advocates of possessing nuclear energy

and knowledge. Considering Iran as a civilized, advanced and developed country, he wanted it to reach nuclear capabilities as well. However, it should be mentioned that the political conditions in his presidential period in the world especially in the Middle East region caused the agreements and negotiations to be criticized. All the eight-year efforts of Khatami's government were based on the following principles:

- a) Iran's nuclear case should not be referred to the Security Council at all. It means that the Security Council was similar to a red line in the nuclear negotiations between Iran and the Western sides.
- b) In the negotiations between Iran and the Western sides, it was attempted to have no relations and negotiations with America which was on top of all the countries putting limits on Iran's nuclear activities. Therefore, EU3 of France, Germany and England attended the negotiations. It should be said that America did not want Iran to have nuclear power at all and didn't look at the issue understandingly. On the other hand, the domestic political atmosphere of Iran did not have an optimistic context for having negotiations with America.
- c) Khatami's government preferred full and continuous cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency along with political negotiations. In fact, Khatami's government intended to resolve the ambiguous points and by executing the adjunct protocol prevent America from making excuses, and they also wished to strengthen Iran's legal position.

Based on this, the volunteer suspension of all activities related to enrichment, 1700 people inspecting Iran's nuclear activities and installations, signing the adjunct protocol, granting full and unlimited access to all nuclear materials and establishments and presenting more than 1000 pages of declaration based on the adjunct protocol and updating them for building trust and resolving the Agency's uncertainties were done.

However, the Western sides with America's measures did not take advantage of this negotiation opportunity and by emphasizing on decelerating and even stopping nuclear enrichment programs in Iran and issuing several resolutions, blocked the way to positive negotiation process in Khatami's government.

As said earlier, the West's aim of Iran negotiations was stopping nuclear activity and insisting on the suspension of all the activities related to enrichment, resulted in aborting the negotiations. With all this, in rational facet, shouldn't consider the nuclear diplomacy in Khatami's tenure unsuccessful. Because by using a team of outstanding diplomats in nuclear diplomacy, signing three nuclear agreements (Sa'dabad, Brussels, Paris), he provided many opportunities technically, actually, and security-politically for Iran and in return had imposed some costs for hard deployment and political insecurity of the Western side for Iran.

In the meantime, the unilateral and unfair view of the Westerners and the intolerance of the Iranian side in the negotiations and the additional pressure on Iran have caused serious difficulties in resolving the political and legal nuclear crisis in the Hatem government. In addition, the negotiations could continue fairly and logically if the commitments of the parties to the negotiating outcomes were to adhere to the content of the statements contained in the Sa'dabad, Brussels and Paris negotiations. Perhaps the Hatemi government would not have come under this nuclear crisis and the reformist movement developed by the presidency would not fail.

Paris negotiations remaining unfruitful, was the opening of a new chapter in nuclear crisis between Iran and European countries and America. That's because Ahmadinejad's government with a very different standpoint based on possessing nuclear knowledge as well as using nuclear weapons enters the political world, and is the beginning of serious political-economic and security crisis which involves both Iran and other countries in the region and even trans-regional ones.

2.3.5 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's Opinion (2005-2013)

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's becoming the President of the ninth government in the Islamic Republic of Iran made enormous changes regarding nuclear negotiations. His political goals were based on maintaining respect, wisdom and good intention. Therefore, Ahmadinejad's foreign policy followed fundamentalism.

The nuclear issue was defined as a goal not only as nuclear activity, but also as possessing nuclear energy and Ahmadinejad was to assign Iran's role in the international arena in a form of political pivot and strategic principle leaning on nuclear issues. This approach paved the way for the application of various tactics to reach the goal in Ahmadinejad's government and the execution of nuclear policy underwent an enormous change in his tenure.

Ahmadinejad, besides the negation of the passivity in foreign policy, believed that the Islamic Republic of Iran should follow an active diplomacy in foreign relations. Since passive policy and flexibility towards the West can cause this illusion that Iran faces problems from a weak position. The aforementioned approach specifically regarding nuclear diplomacy could make it possible for Iran to resort the right of accessing peaceful nuclear technology. (Salamati, 2015, p.189)

In order to achieve the essential opportunity in foreign policy, Ahmadinejad preferably, propelled Iran's political position in nuclear issue from the accused to the claimant. Therefore, during the negotiations with European countries, he made major changes in military tactics. According to Ahmadinejad and his government, the West and the European negotiators had put Iran in a position in which Iran not only didn't move forward regarding nuclear issues, but it had either preferred silence or was in a position considered of being accused of perpetration to nuclear standpoint.

Ahmadinejad believed that the right of nuclear energy possession and having knowledge in this area is not only Iran's actual right, but even accessing the facilities and capabilities of

developing nuclear weapons in order to defend the cabinet system and confronting the world's potential threats specially the dual approach of the world towards nuclear Israel are his governments political essence.

Ahmadinejad thinks that during the years prior to his presidential period, all the governments negotiating with European sides had missed many opportunities and weakened the country politically in the international arena. He pointed out that the West in nuclear negotiations doesn't only consider the legal dimensions of nuclear issue, and tries to make it a political-legal issue.

Therefore, presenting any moot point regarding human rights, terrorism, the Middle East peace, and Iran's support of militant groups against America's benefits was considered as having political aspects regarding the negotiations targeted; counted the negotiators as lacking good faith. In his standpoint, any retreat from the nuclear position against the West caused the negotiators address other domestic issues of Iran and tarnish Iran's position in the international relations especially among Islamic countries.

The maximum use of foreign policy brokers' capabilities all over the world on one hand and public defense and mobilizing public opinion inside the country defending the legitimacy of possessing nuclear knowledge and facilities are Ahmadinejad's government's serious approach.

Ahmadinejad's government created unity among the political groups and organizations of the country in issuing statements and declarations regarding nuclear issues and based on this standpoint presented a different approach to the negotiating countries.

Using all the capacities and capabilities, considering the balance of rights and duties in the international arena, the rebuilt look at Iran's foreign policy in the East and South and

emphasizing on people-oriented diplomacy were of the political standpoints of Ahmadinejad's government which affected the nuclear issue to a great extent.

Ahmadinejad's rise and declaring his policy towards Iran's nuclear issue lead to a doubt and suspicion atmosphere in reaching conclusions in the negotiations for the European sides. On one hand domestic conflicts over nuclear issue and on the other side clear positioning, determination and lack of compromise of Ahmadinejad's government policies in nuclear issue created a new atmosphere in Iran's nuclear crisis issue.

The West's not receiving Ahmadinejad's election and worrying about failure to achieve results in the negotiations and Iran's decision about exiting the agreement of Paris and setting up Isfahan complex led to putting too much political-economic pressure on Iran from the West.

With Ahmadinejad's rise, a new diplomacy in Iran's nuclear program was taken. The first transformation can be regarded as the nuclear case and negotiations exiting the hands of three European countries. The second transformation was Iran's nuclear case getting out of the political tract and being in legal frameworks and under the control and supervision of the IAEA and all the negotiations were based on the quadruple documents (*The NPT, the Statute of the Agency, Safeguards, and the Adjunct Protocol*).

The third evolution took place when Iran actualized the maintenance of nuclear fuel cycle and reactivated the parts of nuclear activities which were voluntarily suspended earlier. Ahmadinejad's government believed that the western negotiators intend to lengthen the nuclear case step by step and turn Iran to a passive state or lose the case between political lobbying guided by Israel and America. Therefore, Ahmadinejad's government tried to seize the initiation from European countries and enter it in a legal-political conversation fight.

Based on this, the number of participant governments in nuclear negotiations increased and with Russia and China joining the negotiating group between Iran and Western countries, the

east front was formed and based on this strategy and the look to the east, the negotiation tract changed from a passive state in favor of Iran.

Larijani, the Secretary of the National Security Council of the time, prior to the commencement of new nuclear negotiations regarding the European countries' standpoints stated that, "Two years ago, the Europeans declared that only if Iran signed the adjunct protocol would there be no obstacle on peaceful nuclear activities' way. But, in the agreement of Paris, they practically attempted to ignore Iran's nation's right of possessing nuclear technology by suspending all the atomic activities of Iran. (Ojaghlo, 2007, p.23)

2.3.6 Hassan Rouhani's Opinion (2013-2021)

Iran's President Hassan Rouhani, who has previously been responsible for the Iranian Supreme National Security Council and has been responsible at the international level since the beginning of Iran's nuclear issue, has a different view of the ninth and tenth administration of Iran and Ahmadinejad. Hassan Rouhani can be grouped into a group that wants Iran to have peaceful nuclear power and does not consider it as a weapon of war and defensive weaponry. Hence, with the election of Hassan Rouhani to Iran's presidency, it was felt that a new round of talks between Iran and Western countries would begin. Because he has consistently spoken out of resolving Iran's nuclear crisis during his selective campaign and his first objective was to make it clear.

In the opinion of Rouhani and his advisers, it is the logic that enrichment and nuclear technology for the production of solid Iranian fuel are fueling. In Rouhani's opinion, Western governments, rather than preferring to sell technology to Iran, would better provide a field of technical and scientific coordination and co-exist with Iran in various nuclear processes.

Western countries have directed Iran's nuclear issue to the political arena, and ultimately it has entered a new phase of the international crisis. With the onset of Hassan Rouhani's presidency

and reformist reforms in Iran and the efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis, he set new horizons in front of Iran and even Western countries.

In the pre-Rouhani era, Iran's power was weakened, because the sanctions created a serious economic crisis for Iran. One of the options discussed by Hassan Rouhani was the transition from the nuclear energy crisis. He did everything in his power, trying to draw the trust of the international community to Iran. In the same vein, serious consultations and expressions of opinion from political and even military officials in Iran that Iran's positions in nuclear power have no military dimension at all provided the necessary ground for the start of negotiations.

In this regard, Hassan Rouhani announced publicly after the presidential election that he is about to begin negotiations with his international community and the P5+1 as soon as possible. Therefore, the responsibility for continuing the talks was directly assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif was in charge of the continuation of negotiations with the P5+1.

At the same time, Rouhani has emphasized his principled stances and announced at ceremonies and speeches that Iran has, in any way, embraced and defended nuclear energy technology. At the same time, however, he announced that the way forward for achieving nuclear energy technology could not be reversed.

Hence, if Western countries expect Iran to abandon its nuclear capability and continuously become a consumer and consumer of nuclear knowledge from the West, then thinking is false, and this will never be feasible. Iran has reached a degree of nuclear capability that can even sell part of heavy water production and yellow cake to other countries. Therefore, Western countries should instead open the doors of dialogue and continue the rational way of negotiating instead of threatening or politicizing the issue.

According to Hassan Rouhani, Iran's withdrawal from its positions was not logical. In his view, the retreat was seen as crossing the red line. Hence, he tried to convince the negotiators and especially the P5+1 of confidence and confidence. He wanted Western negotiators to believe that Iran was not at all willing to have a nuclear weapon. As a result, during the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1, the Iranian foreign minister emphasized Iran's accession to the NPT and the admission of the Additional Protocol. Hassan Rouhani, wrote in the *"National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy"*, with the pessimism of those who believed in the year 2004 that the nuclear issue was an excuse for Europe to pressure Iran. (Rouhani, 2011, p. 154)

"There was another cynical mentality that the United States was always seeking to boycott Iran or even launch a military strike, and that the nuclear issue was an excuse to not abandon it ... But I thought it was with patience that we could We will resolve issues with the agency and we can agree with Europe somehow. "

Hassan Rouhani's second step in drawing up a global consensus on the nuclear energy crisis was that the negotiations should be dealt with politically and legally. He considered the views of the Western countries as a result of the provocations of the state of Israel and rivals of regional power. For this reason, he emphasized that the negotiators would think about the outcome of the win-win, and do not decide on a ransom of Iran.

In other words, Rouhani took the attention of the international community to Iran's nuclear energy crisis. He noted that the talks should be politically abolished and legally discussed. He saw the views of the Western countries as a consequence of Israeli provocations and some of the countries of the region. For this reason, he emphasized that the negotiators should not think about the win-win result and think about the ransom from Iran.

Hassan Rouhani said in a speech on the anniversary of the National Iranian Nuclear Technology Day: (Presidenttext, 2015)

"If you want to work with this nation, we will extend friendship to you within the framework of reconciliation. We are ready to cooperate with all the countries that want to be in law and respect each other's rights and interests. Our goal is a constructive participation and every constructive engagement will take care of it for everyone, for the benefit of the East and the West and the Middle East."

Hassan Rouhani's views on Iran's nuclear technology can be found in a book titled *"National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy"*. In this work, he expresses his general view of nuclear technology before he becomes President of Iran. The same beliefs persist during Rouhani's presidency, and he emphasized that previous approaches to joint talks with Western countries have not been successful and there is no honest dialogue between the parties and a wall of distrust between Iran and the P5+1 there is no access to understanding.

As a result, the negotiating team led by Zarif, with the legal and legal authority of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who has the highest decision-making power in the country, has continued to negotiate and ultimately, on July 14, 2015, negotiations between Iran and The EU and the P5+1 countries (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US, Germany) signed a comprehensive agreement on the JCPOA in Vienna, Austria.

Rouhani's policy on Iran's nuclear issue was to remove Iran's nuclear case from the Security Council and try to eliminate the sanctions. Meanwhile, Rouhani is keen to have nuclear technology in the country at his advanced level. During his presidency, the negotiator's quest was parallel to Rouhani's point of view. In Hassan Rouhani's view, the fact lies in the fact that the enjoyment of the advanced facilities and technologies in the world is the right of every country.

Therefore, Iran as the country in the world has the right to use this technology. Hassan Rouhani has consistently emphasized that dialogue and negotiation are the only way to solve the crisis between Iran and other countries, and this should be a model for solving other international crises in the world.

Rohani's attempt during the presidency until the outcome of the talks was to remove sanctions imposed by the Security Council and Western countries and threats to the US. In addition, he criticizes global order, believes in international engagement and cooperation. Because he knows that he will spend less on political equations and international competitions.

During the presidency of Hassan Rouhani, the type of discourse and literature used in international negotiations has changed. Hassan Rouhani is interested in solving existing crises in the country and, in the case of nuclear energy, to work together and find comprehensive and all-inclusive solutions. In the shadow of this view, during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani and his success in the nuclear talks and the achievement of a common understanding, Iran has been pushing for isolation in foreign policy and succeeds in finding friends around the world.

Of course, the political spirit and his views have been criticized for some of the political extremists in Iran. Some critics say Hassan Rouhani's presidency has shut down Iran's nuclear activities. But in the resolution of the nuclear crisis, he formed four economic committees, foreign policy, domestic politics and cultural and social issues that were under the auspices of the four committees of the 20 working groups.

Famous and well-educated experts of inside or outside of Iran along with scholars, successful academic staff was present in these working groups. In the light of the success of the committees, he was able to overcome many problems and now, after the treaty between Iran and the P5+1 countries, he has been able to receive many of his financial and monetary claims and, at the same time, to a degree of global trust. It will reach out to many of the sanctions countries in Iran to make foreign investments. In the same vein, the Washington Post wrote about Rouhani's success and his views that he was a "Sheikh Diplomat".

Hassan Rouhani's view of the nuclear case is to remove the threats from Iran and make them an opportunity. During his presidency, his attempt was made to assess the right of the

international community to use nuclear energy to Iran positively, while at the same time addressing the concerns of Iran's potential threats and possession of nuclear weapons.

He repeatedly stated that Iran was not and will not seek nuclear weapons. In his view, it is important to increase nuclear knowledge and technology development. Rouhani was trying to understand the world in the realities of Iran. So that in the negotiations it was noted that foreign policy is a positive game and the game is important.

Hassan Rouhani's view of having nuclear energy can be summarized as saying that nuclear weapons do not have a place in Iran's defense doctrine, and it is a threat, not an opportunity. In Hassan Rouhani's view of nuclear energy, it is emphasized that Iran does not deal in any way with regard to national rights and considers the withdrawal of its positions to be a big mistake. Given the fact that he is defending national rights, he also considers the importance of addressing international concerns about nuclear risks.

2.4 Opinion of External Supporting Actors

In the strongest days of Iran's nuclear crisis and the pressures of the US, some countries have been advocating Iran's views and positions. For example, three big European countries such as Germany, France and the UK (known as Three Big) can be mentioned. Unlike the US during the tense period and the nuclear crisis, they have consistently sought to pursue a policy of cooperation with Iran. A policy called "Safety Policy".

2.4.1 Supporting European Countries

The foreign ministers of the three countries, Germany, Britain and France, in several stages of nuclear talks with Iran, signing memorandum or issuing various statements, such as the Sa'adabad Declaration, the Brussels Agreement, the Paris Agreement and even the New York Negotiations during the Presidency Hassan Rouhani has consistently played the role of supporter and holds Iran right in terms of nuclear capability and technology.

In addition to the nuclear issue, the US is addressing issues such as human rights, terrorism and Iran's involvement in the stability of the Middle East. Despite the fact that the European countries are in line with the US on the issue of human rights and the fight against terrorism and the influence of Iran's power in the Middle East, they have a different stance in cooperating with Iran and defending Iran's right to have nuclear energy technology with the US.

Unlike the US, the EU does not seek to change the regime of Iran and defend Iran's position in the Middle East as a strong country with a historical background and a strategic position. Given the current status of Iranian politics, in which reformists are expanding, the EU is keen to expand its ties with Iran, supporting the new Iranian generation.

On the other hand, these countries prefer to continue to cooperate with Iran in trade and economic-trade agreements. Hence, Europe seems to be more willing to use more lenient mechanisms than Iran, preferring moderate behavior.

The EU and its three major countries are not interested in starting a war and intensifying the crisis in order to maintain their position in resolving regional and trans-regional crises. Because Europe has seen the aftermath of the Cold War that America's unconditional dominance of military crises has undeniably produced harmful effects for Europe. The Kosovo crisis and NATO's involvement in resolving its crisis have not been forgotten yet. Crising in Iraq and the failure of European opposition are examples that have led Europeans to censure American policies on Iran's nuclear energy. It seems that Europe is not interested in repeating these experiences again.

European foreign policy is in the pipeline, but its level of influence is still not measurable. However, the EU and its three major countries, each of which are considered as powers of the EU, have a supportive attitude towards other countries in their position on Iran's nuclear crisis.

Germany, as an economic power, France with political power and the UK with military power in the world, and in particular the Middle East, are trying to use the best opportunity to take advantage of Iran's nuclear issue and shape European foreign policy for future exploitation.

France's Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, after the Tehran Summit said: "This is an important day. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a major global challenge, and we find a solution today."

Resolving Iranian nuclear issues and initiating preliminary talks in the winter of 2003 for European foreign policy was considered a good day, and has been described as a test for multilateralism doctrine. Indeed, Europe, with its pragmatic behavior and politics, has been able to support Iran's "right to nuclear technology". Of course, the positive attitude of Europe towards Iran is based on mutual trust and within the framework of providing strategic needs. But this can not be permanent.

The EU has not had a tough stance on Iran's nuclear crisis. He plays a constant mediator role in the crisis. The EU against of Trump's attitude towards Iran is fully committed to maintaining the JCPOA. Also the EU has trying to get rid of the prints made by Trump. Nevertheless, the EU sometimes does not ignore the approach of Iranian political authorities. As a matter of fact, there are many differences between the approach of Ahmadinejad and the approach of Khatami and Rouhani.

The EU is still worried about issues that are on the agenda of its international policy. Europe is a continent that is much closer to the Middle East. Hence, any negative incident in the Middle East can add to the increasing sensitivities of the European community. Hence, resolving Iran's nuclear crisis for Europe would be a safety valve and Europe would be able to achieve positive results of stability and balance of power in the Middle East through Iran's political-security stability.

The reasons why three important European countries support Iran's position on nuclear technology are as follows:

1. Transparency of Iran's nuclear program and emphasis on non-use of nuclear energy in nuclear weapons production.
- 2) Iran has acted in accordance with the provisions of the NPT and the Additional Protocol, and the agreements with the negotiating countries have been based on their claims and do not harm the integrity of Iran.
- 3) The approval and approval of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for compliance with the principles of Iran following the memorandum of understanding signed in July 2015.
- 4) Change Europe's views on the US and its different approaches to Middle East issues.
- 5) Iran's ability to acquire nuclear technology and the use of indigenous knowledge that has led Iran to be a party to the nuclear deal. Although Europe does not have the desire to develop nuclear technology in third world countries, Iran has reached a degree of knowledge and technology, which, apart from interaction, is not a solution to European countries.

2.4.2 China's Support

The other countries that can be mentioned as Iran's supporters of nuclear energy are China. Iran has long been regarded as the main supplier of energy for China. Iran is currently the third largest energy supplier in the People's Republic of China, according to statistics. China is reluctant to hurt its relations with Iran. It may seem that China can choose alternative alternatives and benefit from Arab countries. But Arab countries, which are more closely associated with the US in various political, military, economic, and commercial dimensions, can not be trusted partners in China for the long term, and especially in the energy issue.

On the other hand, continuation of oil flow from the Persian Gulf is one of the main concerns of China. The oil is shipped to China via the sea, and the US Navy can at any moment stop it

for any excuse. China has a relatively short distance from the western borders of China, and if the US makes problems in the Persian Gulf, China can easily receive its oil supply from Iran, or by creating an oil pipeline from Iran Take oil. That's why China cares about Iran's political-security stability and comes to support Iran's positions. It is natural that the continuation of the sanctions and the ensuing problems can hit the interests of China in the long run. Therefore, it seems reasonable for China to support Iran in the Security Council. The reasons that persuade China to support Iran can be as follows:

- 1) China's economy depends on close business relations with the US and its European allies. China's position alongside France, Germany and Britain in support of Iran could add China's power to the US.
- 2) China needs energy in the Middle East, especially Iran and it is one of the main customers of Iran oil. The emergence of any type of crisis in relation to Iran could be detrimental to China's economic interests.
- 3) Saudi Arabia and Israel are moving in line with US goals to keep China's economic growth pace at risk. Hence, he has been moving with the US, but in retaliation for Iran, he rejects any serious sanctions on the Security Council against Iran.
- 4) China needs to maintain economic growth in order to curb its growing social instability within the country. Cooperation between Beijing and Tehran is very important from a geopolitical point of view.
- 5) China and Iran are two important regional powers that each stand in the US in the interests of the US. Although relations between the two countries are not in the form of strategic cooperation, China is in favor of maintaining its own economic interests and using the Iranian market to support Iran.
- 6) Chinese politicians do not see Iran as a business partner. Instead, Iran is a potential ally for them in creating a balance in the Middle East that can prevent the US influence in the region. Strong competition between China and the US has led China to support Iran and its positions.

As a result, China does not accept the risk of conflict with the US on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it can not stop its commercial, economic and political interests with Iran. That is why China's position on the nuclear energy crisis is always clear and stands next to Iran.

2.4.3Russia's Support

Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation began when Tehran sought to compensate for the damage caused by the eight-year war with Iraq and rebuilding the country, as well as strengthening its economic and security infrastructure to Russia. For this reason, the first step was the restoration and completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, which was important for Iran since the time of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and it was also important for the Iranian authorities after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In January 1995, Moscow and Tehran signed a contract worth \$ 800 million for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Although the Siemens company in Germany started the Bushehr project in 1974, its construction was stopped by the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. Initial measures taken at the site of the Bushehr nuclear power plant were seriously damaged by the Iraqi air strike on March 24, 1984, but after that, Iraq invaded the plant several times. Between 1985 and 1988 several times the air strikes of the Iraqi Air Force caused the plant to suffer technical and structural damage. However, significant steps were taken by concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia and starting the reconstruction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant. As it was announced in January 2000, more than 30-40% of the plant was completed at a cost of \$ 100 million.

Since the signing of a cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia on the reconstruction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the US has barred its public opposition.

As John R. Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control in 2004 during a trip to Moscow called on Russian authorities to have a re-commentary on nuclear cooperation with Iran. He openly appealed to the Russian authorities to cut off their cooperation with Iran.

Because Iran has failed to resolve international concerns about the possibility of developing nuclear programs; it also urged Russia to refrain from sending nuclear fuel to Bushehr. (Russia weekly, 2004)

But in response to Bolton's comments, Alexander Rumyantsev, chairman of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency, said Russia would not support international agreements that would stop the spread of nuclear technology. (Asia Times, 2004)

Russia has supported Iran's positions since the beginning of the nuclear crisis and supported and supported the development of nuclear technology in Iran. Russian officials have always said that nuclear cooperation with Iran is peaceful and carried out within the framework of global standards.

At the same time, Iran, relying on Article 4 of the NPT Treaty, which is a signatory, claimed that Iran has the right to participate in the exchange of materials, technical requirements, scientific and technological information with countries that own nuclear technology.

Although the US tried to cut off Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation over the past years, Russia has always been pushing for Iran's positions and vetoed several times the US requests to the Security Council. But on May 5, 2008, Vladimir Putin officially signed the UN Security Council sanctions on Iran. Under the decree, the transfer and supply of material or equipment related to nuclear or military-related material were banned, and the possibility of their export or transit through Russian territory to Iran was eliminated. This is the only thing Russia has joined with Iran's sanctions.

The Russians' ability to support Iran's access to nuclear technology can be considered in two parts. First, the Russians needed strong financial resources in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In those years of hard work, the reconstruction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant for Russia was a breakthrough in those years in order to overcome the severe

economic crisis. Secondly, during the period of Iran's nuclear crisis, Russia had always considered international interests and interests in its relations with Iran.

But despite the fact that Russia joined Iran's sanctions group in 2008, it continued to advocate Iran's interests and positions during the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 and in June 2015 managed to bring the negotiations to an end. In the talks between the foreign ministers of Iran, the US, the EU has always been the most important issue for military challenges, and the lack of convergence and reflection led to the negotiations being overcome.

One of the disputes between Iran and the P5+1 was that all sanctions would be lifted. But Western countries did not want to be sanctioned in the military sector. But Russia's move to take seriously the sale of S-300 missile contracts and weapons-related equipment, as well as supplies of spare parts for Russian-made weapons, prompted counterparts to resolve this problem.

Statement by Sergey Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, opened the way for lifting military sanctions. "If weapons sanctions are lifted, cooperation with Iran will grow and develop," he said in a statement. (Ryabkov, Mashregh News, 2015)

In this way, a memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the P5+1 military blockade was lifted, thus opening Russia to some sort of past in Iran.

The reasons that led Russia to support Iran's nuclear issue are as follows:

- 1) Russia benefits from strategic partnership with Iran, which benefits geopolitical and then economic reasons. Russia, in terms of cooperation with Iran, has more space to pursue its foreign policy. Iran's stable and advanced Iran is technologically important for Russia, and Iran is also in a position to have nuclear technology.
- 2) Russia benefits from comprehensive peace and stability throughout the Middle East.

- 3) The existence of nuclear facilities in Iran, based on Russia's nuclear knowledge, is of great value to the Russians and is considered as a source of income. Because Russia supplies fuel to Iran's nuclear power plants, and send Russian specialists to support and maintain Iran's nuclear facilities.
- 4) Since 1991, the Russians have not been able to gain significant profits in the export and sale of weapons. But they can make a huge contribution to the transfer of nuclear knowledge and its support, which Iran attaches to Russia in this regard.
- 5) Iran and Russia, other than the completion of the Bushehr power plant, have other agreements on the establishment of nuclear power plants. The two countries engagement in the construction of five other nuclear power plants since 2002, has forced Russia to support Iran's nuclear program.
- 6) Iran's adherence to its nuclear obligations and the safeguards and principles enshrined in the NPT will ensure that Russia's interests are also attained in other areas, and that Iran can develop in the economic sectors in accordance with the wishes of the IAEA. Which provide the basis for Russian economic and commercial investment.
- 7) Russia, India and Iran signed an agreement in September 2000 to develop the North-South Corridor. According to the agreement, the rail transit route between the two countries to the Red Sea could earn billions of dollars for Russia. This route can be serious rival for the Suez Canal.

It is natural for Russia to have the support of Iran to take advantage of all this. Continued nuclear cooperation with Iran could be one of the factors contributing to the continuation of relations between Iran and Russia, and Russia would thus achieve its economic, military and political demands.

Of course, the worrying increase in the US Military Presence in the Middle East and Central Asia which is considered Russia's backyard, has led Iran to play an important role in determining political-strategic equilibrium. A common concern of Iran and Russia over the US

military presence is another reason for Russia's cooperation and support from Iran, which has seen the emergence of this support in solving the nuclear energy crisis.

2.5 Conclusion

Various internal and external views have played a direct role in shaping Iran's strategy toward a nuclear issue. From the outset, discussions about Iran's nuclear energy have always been the subject of Iranian peaceful nuclear technology. Despite the presence of serious opponents and supporters in this regard, it is clear that Iran has not yet been seen as a sign of a nuclear weapons initiative and has not achieved a degree of enrichment of uranium that could be considered a serious threat to global security and stability.

Along with the positions of the sharp-fought faction in Iran against the positions of the US and Israel, the positions of the reformist wing are always indicative of the peaceful nature of nuclear technology in Iran. In addition, environmentalists have raised the dangers of radioactive emissions, suggesting that the cost-effective economic technology of nuclear technology does not care about its dangers. But what can be understood in the political sphere of Iran as well as public opinion is that having the technical knowledge and technology for all Iranians is a national pride and there is no possibility of returning and abandoning it and it is a red line. Neither the radical wing, nor the reformist factors has the power to cross it.

Having nuclear energy for Iran is a clean energy source, and new technologies in building reactor buildings are one of the most important sectors of social and governmental sensitivity in the development of nuclear technology. Despite the different perspectives on nuclear knowledge in Iran, there is a strong will to develop it. Because the Iranian people and the Iranian community believe that having nuclear technology along with other top-notch technologies such as Nanotechnology, aerospace, digital, etc. are among the criteria for infrastructure development in today's world.

CHAPTER 3

CRITICS AND OPPONENTS OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE OF IRAN

3.1 Introduction

Despite the different perspectives on nuclear technology in Iran, there were also opposing or favorable views outside Iran. What is known in the Iranian nuclear crisis is the subject of political roots that dissenters or advocates in various Western countries, especially the US.

Some Western experts or statesmen believe that over the past years, Iran has practically carried out covert policies in its nuclear activities. It is natural that the reason for this kind of attitude is to return to the positions of the US and the opponents of the Islamic Republic in Iran. They view the regime of the Islamic Republic with a negative attitude and consider any kind of physical and technological progress in the field of nuclear energy a potential danger to themselves. Of course, it is necessary to note that the anti-Israeli policy of the Iranian government and its attempt to harm the interests of Israel has made Israel sensitive to the Iranian nuclear issue by lobbying the world's public opinion and Western politicians. In fact, it can be said that the political roots on Iran's nuclear energy are about to create fears by Israel.

What looks at Iran's nuclear crisis is that the existence of a strong opposition at the international community. It is natural that in this formation and creating political positions various factors, such as the mass media, speeches and statements by political authorities, as well as the policy of depriving Iran of nuclear science are involved with the US.

3.2 Domestic Critics and Opposition

From the earliest days in which debates on the construction, production and use of peaceful nuclear energy began in Iran, this discussion had serious opponents and supporters, each with their own arguments and reasons. Opponents are economically reliant on the issue of the

environment, the risk of radioactive radiation, the lack of domestic security and external hazards, and the lack of nuclear energy. Examples include:

A) Limited fossil fuel resources

Opponents believe that justifying supporters of using nuclear energy inside Iran is not rational. Proponents of nuclear energy claim that fossil energy sources will eventually end, and nuclear energy will be used instead. But opponents believe that every fuel source is finally over. There is no difference between fossil or nuclear fuels. As the fossil resources on the planet are limited, nuclear fuel resources are also limited. The total amount of energy from uranium on the planet is about 15 %, and in the best condition, if the amount of radioactive material goes up, more than 20 % can not be provided. So the reality is that all energy sources on Earth are consuming and degrading. These sources do not include fossil fuels and include nuclear fuels.

B) Economic reasons

Some experts in the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran believe that the new generation of centrifuges has a life span of 50-60 years, but the creation of a Nuclear Power plant takes years to be used. For example, the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant has lasted about 40 years, and now Iran needs Russia for its fuel. This is a kind of dependency. If a lot of power plants are set up and there will be a lot of spending and investment to do this, it will not be cost-effective. Because, use of these plants, will require fuel which will increase the dependence of the country.

Some other economic experts have argued for costly production and maintenance of powerplants and are opposed to Iran's desire for nuclear energy. They believe that if the future horizon of rising uranium prices in the world is taken into account, the cost per kilogram of uranium is much more expensive than the cost of producing and maintaining nuclear power plants. According to this group of dissidents, Iran does not need to set up nuclear power plants, and should not pay for the high costs of the world in the world and put other countries in opposition and create hostility.

According to them, the use of nuclear energy should be in the medical, agricultural and other fields, and investing in the establishment of nuclear power plants is economically useless.

C) External threats

Some opponents of Iran's nuclear issue believe that the urge to have nuclear power, which is nowadays a hostile place in the world against Iran, threatens Iran's internal and external security. According to them, the issuance of international resolutions, nuclear apartheid and all-embracing sanctions, sabotage and disruption of nuclear facilities, a three-step Western effort to delay, stop and dismantle the nuclear fuel cycle, the production of a highly negative propaganda space against Iran in the American and Israeli lobbies, the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, political isolation, the imposition of harsh and costly nuclear negotiations on Iran, the use of Western instruments of nuclear threats to prevent the realization of the goals of the revolution on the international scene, the publication of political statements by powerful countries and production of political pressure against to Iran, an obstacle to the country and a charge the creation of a nuclear weapon to Iran, the launching of a wave of Iran-terror and Islamophobia, the impossibility of seizing the basic scientific information by monopolistic countries, the lack of access of Iranian nuclear activists to specialized and monopolistic information and the use of nuclear technology tools, the great powers are among the things that could seriously endanger Iran.

D) Internal weakness

In the context of internal weakness, the following are counted:

Spy on and depletion of nuclear facilities issues, information depletion of people working in the nuclear industry, lack of information and resources on science and technology on nuclear issues, scientific weakness of universities in the field of nuclear research, surrender to the atrocities of Western countries, acceptance of suspension And the signing of the Additional Protocol at the start of the talks, the differences in views among political groups on the nuclear issue, and the lack of a sense of urgent need for nuclear energy among the people.

E) Lack of security in nuclear energy and the threat to the environment

Looking at the dangers of nuclear power plants, it can be seen that oil and gas are still among the least dangerous in the world. The issue of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, which occurred in 1986, raised the alarm that revealed the risks of nuclear energy to the world.

The probability of leakage of nuclear radiation, besides being threatened by the environment near nuclear power plants, is also one of the unresolved issues of nuclear waste that many advanced countries are still involved with.

Opponents of Iran's thesis of nuclear energy point to the lack of security in this regard and consider the existence of nuclear radiation harmful to human beings and the environment in Iran. According to them, the community elites must make people aware of their dangers and stop the government from pursuing their nuclear energy goals.

According to this group of opponents, even in the current situation, many EU countries have problems with atomic waste, and governments whenever they intend to bury nuclear waste or build a new nuclear power plant, they face opposition and resistance to the people. Therefore, the Iranian people must stand against the demands of the government and oppose the nuclear energy that threatens the health of the community. Additionally, this group of opponents, the study of the development of nuclear power plants in the past two decades in the US and three countries, France, Germany and Britain, reveals how human beings acquire information about the realities of nuclear energy and understand the dangers of using it.

The share of nuclear energy in the generation of electricity in the US in 1970 was only 1.3 % of the total electricity generation. This share increased to 13.8% in 1980. In 1990, energy production in the country was 18.7 % from Nuclear Power Plants.

Regarding the growth trend, the share of nuclear power in total electricity generation was projected to reach 22 to 23 % in 2000, but this did not happen and no new power plant was built, and only the US government could increase the efficiency of existing power plants,

holds an 18.7 % share in nuclear energy. This figure is likely to decline sharply in the coming years, with the increase in total energy consumption and the withdrawal of some of the old power plants. According to the IAEA, the capacity of nuclear power plants in the US between 1990 and 2002 was negative at 0.26%. The number of the US power plants in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2002s was 20, 71, 112 and 104, respectively. Since the 1950s, the US has built 126 nuclear power plants, of which 22 have already been deployed. In the 1990s, only four new plants joined the production cycle. Among the countries in the world, France has the most dependence on nuclear energy for electricity production. The share of nuclear energy in total electricity production in 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2001 and 2002 was 3.9, 24, 71, 75, 75 and 75, respectively. (Dehghanpour, 2012)

As can be seen, the growth of the share of nuclear energy in electricity production has been virtually halted since the 1990s, and with the increase in annual consumption and the lack of construction of a new power plant, this share is projected to decline in the coming years.

France has been building a nuclear power plant since the mid-fifties, and has so far built 70 nuclear power plants, of which 11 are now closed, with 59 remaining active power plants. Below is the statistics of the country's nuclear power plants, based on the time of the start of the project and the current situation:

In the 1950s, 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s of the under construction projects, 4, 7, 40, 18 and 1; active project currently 0, 1, 39, 17, 1 and inactive projects currently 4, 6, 1 and 0.

The latest France project is scheduled for 91 years and has not started construction of a new power plant this year. Considering the useful life of 30 to 35 years for atomic power plants, it can be expected that in the coming years some other French power plants will be shut down. Although Britain supplies about 22 % of its electricity from nuclear power, the study of the status of its nuclear power plants shows that most nuclear power plants are very old and in the next few years most of them will be out of orbit.

The process of reducing the share of nuclear power production has begun with a very hasty song, due to a lack of investment in the construction of new power plants, in the coming years will be sloping. In 2007, the capacity of the British nuclear power plants declined by about 20 percent compared to 2002. The construction of a nuclear power plant in the UK has begun since the 1950s and in the last 30 years 45 power plants have been built. Of course, by the year 2002, 18 power plants were exhausted due to their age, and 27 plants continued to generate electricity, which dropped to 19 in 2007. The current status of the British nuclear power plants in the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s and the ongoing projects 20, 18, 2 and 5 and currently active projects 0, 12, 2, 5 and inactive projects Present 20, 6, 0 and 0. Since 1988, the British government has no new power plant and has focused more on new energies, especially winds. (Dehghanpour, 2012)

Germany began to build nuclear power plants a bit later than other European rivals. But it quickly followed the development plan for nuclear power plants, and the share of nuclear power generation in total electricity production in 2000 reached about 30%. The ratio of nuclear power to total electricity production in different years is as follows:

In 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000, 2001 and 2002 it was 1.1, 11.3, 27.3, 29.6, 29.4 and 28.3, respectively. Since 2000, the new power plant has not joined the orbit and the share of nuclear power production has declined. With the closure of two power plants in recent years, nuclear power capacity has fallen by about 10%. Given the lack of new investment in this area, the downward trend in the share of nuclear power is expected to continue at a slower pace in coming years.

Over the past years, Germany has completed a total of 36 power plants that shut down 19 power stations, with only 17 active power plants in the country. Germany has not started a new power plant since 1982.

In 2002, a law was passed in Germany, which allowed the maximum life span of nuclear power plants to be 32 years old and prevented the construction of new plants. According to the

resolution, the last German nuclear power plant will close in 2021, and Germany will join the nuclear-free countries. The Germans have been paying particular attention to offsetting energy shortages and increasing hydroelectricity by 36 percent over a decade. In the field of the development of new energies (wind, sun, biomass and geothermal), Germany has made significant progress. In 2002, about 6 % of the total electricity was supplied. While in 1990 this share was not 3 %. (Dehghanpour, 2012)

3.3 Foreign Critics and Opposition

Allegations by governments and Western media of Iran's nuclear activities are based on the fact that Iran is secretly seeking to acquire a nuclear weapon. This view stubbornly stood against Iran from international political institutions. Finally, the UN Security Council, along with the UN, the US and other European countries, took serious steps towards Iran. In the period from 2003 to 2008, the most severe economic-political sanctions against Iran led to the isolation of Iran and its impact on the economy. It was in a situation where oil prices were at its highest, and more than \$ 100 per barrel of oil was sold on world markets.

In this regard, independent American journalist Gareth Porter addresses this issue in his book and states that in examining Iran's nuclear issue that lasted eight years, it is clear that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not real and that the US and Israel has come into being and is referred to as a "Fake Crisis." He is making a statement in his book as follows: (Porter, 2014)

"Since the early 1990s, the US has been trying to show Iran's civilian nuclear program as a cover for nuclear weapons. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Pentagon wanted to put Iran at the heart of this threat. The claim that Iran was proliferating nuclear weapons was the best and most useful policy cover for American bureaucrats. In this way, the bureaucratic political problems of the high authorities of the CIA and the Pentagon were resolved."

Given the position of Western countries against the demands of Iran, it is questioned whether Iran really has a dangerous nuclear technology? Is the creation of a crisis called Iran's nuclear

crisis from the US and Western countries just because of the fear of producing a nuclear bomb?

The answer to this can be understood by examining the goals of the US, as well as continuing its hegemony in the Middle East and preventing Iran's influence on other Muslim countries. Unwillingness of the US to promote Iran's political and economic development, especially in the region, as well as the continuation of the US hegemony in the world and the Middle East, has led the US and its other allies to take steps to crush Iran.

Moreover, the isolation of Iran in the political world is the goal of the United States. Opponents of Iran's nuclear activities know that Iran is not a nuclear threat to the international community. Because countries like Israel do not enter the NPT protocol and do not want to enter the treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. There is still no definite information on the number and quantity of Israel's nuclear weapons. No country even knows where Israel hid its nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, the nuclear arms race and competition has been in the midst of the US and Russia for many years. Many countries like China, India, Pakistan and some European countries also have many nuclear weapons that can be threatened at any moment for global security and peace.

The existence of rich underground resources and energy (oil and gas), which is the most urgent need of the industrialized world, is located in the Middle East. Iran is also one of the countries that have the most important part of the amount of oil and gas reserves. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, many political equations in the Middle East collapsed. Iran, because of the geopolitical and geostrategic conditions in the Middle East, caused great concern to the countries of the US.

The Arab countries of the Middle East, because of the omnipotent system and the rule of the Arab kings in them, expressed their concern about the revolution in Iran and did not have any interest in Iran's advancement in areas such as technology and economic development. Because, Iran's success in various technical, scientific, political, economic and social fields can be dangerous for Muslim Arab societies; Iran will be a model for other Muslims. Hence, the likelihood of a popular and spontaneous uprising in Muslim countries in the Middle East was alarming both for the leaders of the Arab states and for the US.

The national awakening of the Middle East countries can be very harmful to the American interests. Hence, the fabricated crisis in Iran's nuclear energy is the best chance to put Iran in a hurry. Another reason why the US and other allies did not meet Iran's demands and are reluctant to achieve Iran's nuclear technology is the existence of a competition for uranium enrichment.

Western countries, as well as Russia and China, account for almost half of the world's uranium reserves, most of which are in Australia and Canada. The two countries are the main allies of the US. Attention into account the large amount of uranium reserves that are under control in new colonial countries, it is natural that the presence of nuclear technology in Iran could add to the number of global rivals and undermine the uranium enrichment market.

They know that in the coming years, nuclear energy will be the most affordable kind of energy. With full control of nuclear energy in the world, they will be able to impose their domination over the world for many years. Unfortunately, due to the lack of clarity and lack of political understanding in the Middle East, as well as the lack of unity among the leaders of the countries of the region, countries with rich energy resources can not use their resources and need advanced countries. This is where most of the underground reserves are available in those countries. Therefore, Iran is a serious threat to their continued domination.

In short, there are two fundamental issues in shaping the opposition of foreign countries against Iran's nuclear program:

- 1) Relationship between the issue of Iran's nuclear program and Iran's opposition to Iran's policy towards the West, and in particular the US.
- 2) The argument that the West disagrees with Iran's nuclear program to control all of Iran's practical and scientific activities in the uranium enrichment process.
- 3) Israeli Security

Of course, it is clear that with the advancement of nuclear power alone, it can not be claimed in other areas of the science, technology, and industry that the country has developed and developed. For example, North Korea and Pakistan have somewhat achieved good nuclear progress, but have these two countries developed equally in other industrial and industrial spheres?

Therefore, having nuclear technology is not a sign of absolute progress. Now, with this question, the question is raised why Westerners are heavily opposed to Iran's nuclear program and what is the main problem?

Western countries seem to have no problem with Iran's nuclear program. Their main concern is the uranium enrichment issue. In order for Iran to be able to complete the uranium enrichment cycle and fully master this advanced technology, and to some degree monopoly and possess such technology, it will be able to easily at any time and in a short time (for example, from 1 to 2 years) will increase uranium enrichment from 3.5 percent to a higher level, which can be sufficient in fuel for nuclear reactors and may be used to make nuclear weapons with changes. Of course, in the years between 2008 and 2010, during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the amount of uranium enrichment reached 20 %, which led to serious negotiations to resolve Iran's nuclear crisis.

Therefore, the main problem for Westerners is that they do not want to see such an upheaval and they are worried about Iran's advanced technology in the nuclear issue. But the reasons for Western worries about Iran's lack of nuclear technology can solve a lot of ambiguities. It is natural that Western countries, knowing the political goals of Iran and its anti-colonial ideas, are not very proud of the sovereignty of the political system in Iran and believe that they can not make Iran the same as they want to put in the ranks of other Middle Eastern allies and that country in line with their goals. Westerners are worried about this and believe that if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium, they will no longer be able to place that country at the mercy of their demands.

So, how can Western countries understand that Iran does not use nuclear technology against them? Will the prospect of future war threaten the western world? How does the Western world understand that Iran does not hate them? The lack of recognition of Western countries for religious beliefs in the political structure of Iran has made it unreliable for Iran. But the highest political-religious authority in Iran has given confidence in this.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a religious fatwa that the use of nuclear weapons is forbidden. On the other hand, making nuclear weapons has no economic, military or strategic justification for Iran. Iran is a country that is more than 25 years old a member of the NPT.

By signing the Additional Protocol, Iran has, in the past, left all its nuclear facilities open to the IAEA inspectors. So far, no evidence has been issued by the Agency that indicates that Iran intends to build a nuclear weapon. It thus becomes clear that the main reason for the opposition of Western countries, especially the US and Israel, to Iran is that they are concerned about Iran's ability to enrich and do not have a proper understanding of the religious-political will of the Iranian regime.

Therefore, the discussion on nuclear issues with Iran has been political rather than technical and legal. Looking at the political geography of the world, some countries have achieved this

technology globally, but other countries have not shown much sensitivity to them. Among them, there are Brazil and Argentina.

The answer to this is back to Iran itself. Because some of the political statements of Iranian officials that contain violent and hostile messages have prompted Western countries to act cautiously against Iran. It has never been seen among the views of political leaders in Brazil or Argentina, and like them, that there is a threat to the destruction of a third country.

But some Iranian officials have repeatedly spoken in a variety of literature, or have expressed a serious hostility. Given this background, there is a serious concern among Western leaders or their allies, and they believe that if Iran is able to make a nuclear bomb, what guarantees is there that the interests of those countries are not compromised? Or is it about destroying or eliminating a country like Israel from the geographic map of the world?

A study by the Center for Nuclear Weapon Studies found that US negotiations with Iran on nuclear activities are useless and seen as: (Golshanpazhouh, 2008, p.40-41)

"A failure for the US, the study notes that Iran's access to nuclear bombs is less than 12 to 48 months. Because, there is no technical and material barrier, that could prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb. Therefore, it seems Iran is determined to take this approach."

The same has led to widespread Western opposition to the Iranian nuclear program, and the issue has once again left the legal and technical aspect and entered the political arena. Of course, there are other reasons for creating a political dimension in the Iranian nuclear crisis. Lack of mutual trust is one of the most important reasons. Just as the responsible and rational behavior has not been seen in some cases by Iranian authorities, similar and unreasonable behaviors among American statesmen have also been observed. Of course, observance of rational and responsible behavior is relative.

When some Iranian officials, such as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, claim that Israel should be eliminated or military threats posed by military officials claiming to block the Strait of Hormuz in the wake of the global crisis, It is natural that the world's political consciousness sees this as a result of irresponsibility in international relations and does not consider it rational. But against this, the US repeatedly committed the same thing and announced that it was seeking to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran. Or, many times, Israel, as an alliance, claims to be willing to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

All irrational and irresponsible behaviors of Iranian or American officials and their allies have created a wall of distrust between Iran and the Western world. Accordingly, the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis to the present and in the political arena has never been solved and needs to be addressed in the legal and technical dimensions. Accordingly, this truth has been raised during several years of talks, and ultimately made it clearer by the common understanding of the way to sign a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the P5+1 in July 2015.

Of course, before signing a nuclear memorandum of Iran and the P5+1, the Center for Non-Proliferation Policy Studies in the US proposed a study: *"In order for nuclear talks to work with Iran, Israel should abandon its nuclear capability, and in the next step by Israel is to encourage the US to shut down the Damona nuclear reactor."*(IRNA, 2015)

Oppositional views in Western countries with regard to nuclear Iran, to some extent, seem logical, in terms of realistic analysis, it can be said to be exaggerated. As Green Guillain, an analyst at the British Guardian's political affairs blogger, claims that the US government's claims that if Iran once acquired a nuclear weapon against the US and Israel, it would only be a propaganda war against American statesmen. He believes that this is a way of justifying the world's public opinion to begin a war in the Middle East, and in this way he wants to make Iran an excuse. He writes:(IRNA, 2015)

"No wise man acknowledges that even if Iran obtains nuclear weapons, it will not use it against the US government, which considers nuclear warheads, because it will be suicidal for Iran. In fact, in this opinion some people in the US and Israel sometimes find themselves in the mainstream of the opposition to Iran's nuclear problem. This is the statement made by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham. He is one of the most belligerent American officials and thirsty for bloodthirsty."

The Guardian also points to the allegations that the US senator is trying to obtain Iran a nuclear weapon.

3.4 International Organizations and the UN Critics and Opposition

After the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years, Iran's nuclear activities were one of the most important debates of the day, which was continuously discussed among European countries, the US and even the Security Council.

The US and European countries began the most pressing efforts since 2003, and in all the various international scenes, Iran's nuclear activities and the security risks posed by this activity were raised. Their efforts were all aimed at preventing Iran's nuclear activities in any way. The issuance of various resolutions within the UN Security Council against Iran was also the result of the same international opposition.

Western claims were that Iran's nuclear activities were a serious threat to international security and peace. Since 2003, the subject of Iran's nuclear activities has been on the IAEA agenda for about 5 years, and the Security Council has approved a number of resolutions that will be referred to in the next section. Iran, however, has always claimed that there is no ambiguity in its nuclear activities and is willing to work with the IAEA to resolve the crisis. Even Iran's insistence has been to clarify the issue to resolve the crisis.

Since October 2003, France, Britain and Germany have been trying to get Europe's multilateral demands in their talks with Iran. In November 2004, with the arrival of Javier

Solana, the foreign policy chief of the EU, the talks between Iran and European countries changed. As the EU3, announced economic incentives to Tehran. But during the negotiations, European countries did not fulfill their obligations, and Iran continued to enrich uranium as well.

During this period, negotiations between Iran and European countries took place and the parties signed memoranda of understanding. In late October 2003, three German, French and British countries were invited to Tehran, and an agreement was signed on behalf of Saad Abad. Under this memorandum, Iran signed the Additional Protocol and suspended part of its enrichment activities at Natanz.

In contrast, European countries have pledged to close Iran's nuclear case and not be referred to the Security Council. Economic, trade and security cooperation with Iran will also be developed. The memorandum was a major step in the understanding between Iran and the Western countries, creating a climate of trust among them. But after some time, European countries did not fulfill their obligations and Iran continued to operate.

Until then, European countries once again entered into negotiations with the observation of Iran's enrichment activities, and a new memorandum of understanding was signed in Paris in 2004. In this memorandum, Iran pledged to carry out all its nuclear activities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency and IAEA inspectors could at any time be able to control Iran's nuclear sites. Even Iran, under the terms of the memorandum, was willing to suspend some of its activities. But some time later, American involvement and its insistence on its presence in nuclear talks with Iran led to the annulment of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding.

Iran has abolished this Memorandum of Understanding and offered a six-option plan to European countries. But in the Brussels negotiations, none of Iran's proposals was approved and agreed between the European countries and the US negotiator. Against this behavior, Iran

once again defeated plumb the UCF research center at Isfahan's nuclear facilities and exploited it.

With the continuation of Iran's nuclear activities and the failure of negotiations between Iran and Western countries, the crisis entered a new phase. Finally, on the proposal of Europe, members of the IAEA Board of Governors constituted an extraordinary meeting on Iran's nuclear case and the resolution was approved by EU3 against Iran.

Eventually, in March 2006, Iran's nuclear file was reported to the UN Security Council according to Mohammad Elbaradei, Director General of the IAEA. Meanwhile, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU issued a statement on Iran's nuclear issue this month. The statement read: (ISNA, 2015)

"The Council of Foreign Ministers of the EU on Iran's nuclear issue concluded that Iran's nuclear program should be reported to the UN Security Council. But this decision is still unknown."

This can be considered the end of talks between Tehran and European countries. Hence, the White House and the European Court of Human Rights have filed a lawsuit against the Security Council calling for pressure on Iran to continue with sanctions.

Eventually, on July 31, 2006, Resolution 1696 was passed against Iran's nuclear activities, asking Iran to abandon its enrichment and it will take over with serious sanctions. Iran did not care about the resolution and continued its enrichment activities by removing the plumbing off of nuclear plants. As a result, a new phase of the conflict between Iran and the Western countries began, and finally, in March 2006, resolution 1737 on Iran was once again approved by the Security Council.

According to this resolution, Iran's banking activities were blocked by the world, and some Iranian military leaders were banned as perpetrators of nuclear weapons. With the continuation of disagreements between Iran and the western countries, the Third Security

Council Resolution No. 1747 was issued on March 24, 2007 against Iran. Under this resolution, a new round of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iran began. Under the resolution, arms exports to Iran were banned. Iranian assets and accounts of individuals introduced in international banks and in the hands of governments were blocked.

Companies linked to Iran's nuclear or missile program were suspended or their activities stopped. International organizations stopped lending to Iran. It was also called on the UN member states to refrain from exporting heavy military equipment to Iran.

Although negotiations between Tehran and the West were open and talks were held in various countries between the two leaders of Iran and the Western countries, but the continuation of Iran's nuclear activities during the Ahmadinejad era and the existence of a dispute between Iran and Western countries and the failure to negotiate, Made the Security Council Resolution 480 final on March 3, 2008. The resolution was issued while Iran responded to all the Agency's ambiguities, according to the modality, and the IAEA announced its removal.

But what should be taken into consideration is that the issue of crisis is related to Iran's nuclear activities. While the sensitivities of Western countries to Iran and its nuclear enrichment activities are understandable, the root of opposition from Western countries to Iran is rooted in hostile space against Iran. In this space, the US has the goal of changing the Iranian regime, and part of the spying activities as well as the misinformation provided to the IAEA and other regulatory agencies have caused the crisis to peak.

The US calls on the Iranian government as a supporter of terrorism and presses Iran on four issues (terrorism, human rights, nuclear weapons, and disruptions to the Middle East peace process). Even though Iran's nuclear crisis has been resolved since the signing of the JCPOA, the US continues to emphasize four issues and tries to put Iran under political and international pressure. All of these activities are aimed at changing the government in Iran, and the US exploits these categories politically. (Gordon & Grant, 2005)

But Europe has been demanding and continuing to engage with Iran in trade and trade agreement while conducting critical human rights dialogues. In fact, according to European experts, the EU is not seeking to change the regime of Iran unlike the US and supports the promotion of the status of reformers and the new generation of Iran.

But regarding the efforts of anti-Iranian lobbyists and anti-Iranian opposition groups, which were responsible for the vast majority of political confrontation against Iran, it is possible to refer to a group called the “United Against to Nuclear Iran” (UANI).

The group is set up in New York with the aim of intensifying sanctions against Iran. Although the group's actions are transcendental and threatening, its efforts include sending letters, letters of correspondence or various reports, and even telephone calls and the creation of publicity panels that are of a purely political nature. The group in many countries of the world, and especially in Europe, is trying to connect with the institutions or political authorities of different countries, and urges them to persuade and encourage hostility with Iran. Of course, the intelligence and intelligence agents are directly or indirectly involved in this organization.

The group was created in 2008 under the leadership of the CIA and the Israeli lobby. Although apparently launched by director Mark Wallace and his entourage Dennis Ross, Richard Holbrooke, James Woolsey, most of the anti-government people in the organization are present. Using intelligence tools and horror against dozens of commercial and multinational corporations such as General Electric, Huntsman, Caterpillar, Porsche, Hyundai, Fiat, Siemens, etc., they have been able to prevent long-term trade between Iran and other countries over the years.

The main objective of the group is to introduce Iran as a global nuclear threat on the one hand to the general public and, on the other hand, to introduce the necessary political pressure on large international companies to dissuade their economic relations with Iran. Under the pretext of Iran's nuclear activities, the group is seeking to paralyze Iran's economy and business as a

whole through paralysis of the Iranian economy and business, as well as providing the necessary foundation for the fall of the Iranian government. Most of the reports sent to the IAEA and European countries have been made by the group and the most severe decisions against Iran have been based on claims from the US and Western countries.

Although UANI is introduced as an international non-governmental organization, it has a completely informational and security roots and its members and founders have all been serving the intelligence services. In spite of the lack of evidence, Iran has introduced global nuclear threats to global public opinion, and on the other hand, it tries to force Iran's economic sanctions on international companies that have economic ties with Iran. (Vaja, the Alliance Against, 2013)

Of course, while there were international disputes with the opposition of the Security Council and the US, Europe was more willing to use more modest mechanisms than Iran. The EU is not interested in starting a war in order to maintain its position in resolving crises. That is why the role of Europe in resolving Iran's nuclear crisis can be explained by the following reasons:

- 1) Preventing the diversion of Iran's nuclear activities to nuclear weapons.
- 2) Avoiding Iran's nuclear dispute becoming a full-fledged war in the region.
- (3) Effective and dynamic presence and role in the Middle East.
- 4) Attract Iran's trust and cooperation to create a platform for diplomatic discourse.
- 5) Prove the role of Europe in managing the resolution of international crises.

3.5 Conclusion

Although Iran's nuclear issue at the international level is very important from a political point of view, the opposition to Iran's nuclear activities are visual different by the US and the EU. It is natural that other political, legal, economic, intelligence and international security

institutions and even the IAEA have been influenced by the demands of the two and interacting with each other.

Iran's nuclear issue is a vital test for the US and the EU. First, after the US invasion of Iraq and the use of European facilities, the EU was dissatisfied with the US decisions. After this experience, will Europe again be against the US with Iran? Accordingly the EU has realized its mistake since the US and NATO invaded Iraq. Second, is it possible to keep Iran away from its nuclear activity? It is evident that Iran is determined to have this technology.

What has been seen to this day is that, despite the disagreement with the US in Iran's nuclear issue, the EU is still afraid of Iran's nuclear activities. But he does not think of a military option at all to solve the crisis. With the help of multilateral institutions, in particular the IAEA, Europe is trying to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis.

From the beginning of the negotiations to the conclusion of a nuclear agreement with the P5+1 in July 2015, the EU has tried to shape its relationship with Iran on the basis of the overall quality of political relations. He therefore calls for Iran's transparency in the nuclear program and emphasizes close cooperation with Iran.

While the EU is in line with the US to ban Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, there are disagreements over the perspective and strategy between the EU and the US. European countries are demanding a desirable outcome through political discourse and are willing to give Iran economic, political and security privileges so that Iran voluntarily abandons its nuclear activities.

Accordingly, the talks in Vienna and Geneva were able to come to a close, and the EU, unlike the US, was able to resolve Iran's nuclear activities through diplomatic mechanisms, which was the case.

CHAPTER 4

IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT

4.1 Introduction

Iran's nuclear talks, consultations and diplomatic efforts by the Iranian government and the P5+1 are very significant for a comprehensive agreement. Because the negotiating parties were trying to find a solution to come to a conclusion, the multilateral talks between Iran and the Western countries are one of the historical and exemplary efforts in world diplomacy. Because the results of several years of negotiations have shown that other political crises in the world can be resolved diplomatically and through dialogue.

In the previous negotiations, and in the absence of them, the parties eventually referred to the historical deadline. The final deadline for talks in the Geneva Agreement on the Iranian nuclear program was until November 2014 and then extended until July 1, 2015. Following the consensus of Lausanne on July 14, 2015, an agreement on a joint action plan in Vienna, between Iran, the EU and the P5+1 group, including the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, the US) and Germany.

But finding this result was not easy. The negotiators had a hard marathon. This marathon began in November 2013. In November 2013, the US and Five Permanent States UN Security Council signed an initial agreement with Iran on a nuclear program that was intended to provide an introduction to a comprehensive, long-term agreement. The agreement opened up a way out of a crisis. A crisis, that lasted more than a decade. In addition, various threats such as the US-Israeli military strike against Iran or attempts to paralyze the Iranian economy through intervention in international trade can be mentioned. (Porter, 2014)

Of course, it is clear that in the wake of sanctions imposed on Iran, Iran's financial and economic infrastructure was severely damaged. So that the depreciation of the rial against the dollar, the decrease in the purchasing power of people, the bankruptcy of factories and industrial-manufacturing factories because of the impossibility of purchasing raw materials for the production of goods, the recession in the market and the impossibility of exporting Iranian products, the lack of access to financial resources of Iran Itself and even lack of facilities to receive foreign currencies for transactions, hit the services of Iran, such as airline, naval, railways, as well as insecurity of Iranian products by global insurance companies, caused the Iranian economy to suffer serious damage in a short time.

The issuance of the Resolutions of 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984 was one of the levers of pressure imposed by the UN Security Council alongside unilateral sanctions on the part of the US and European countries. Iran was forced to continue to negotiate against these pressures and understanding of the unhealthy economic and financial situation inside the country, as well as fears that the social order would collapse. Because, the closure of factories and private sector workshop has led to an increase in unemployment in the country; the high migration of Iran's elite and educated people to other countries was another serious threat to Iran. Iran faced serious threats and threats with the countries involved in the nuclear energy crisis.

Over the course of several years of talks between Iran and European countries or the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran has never shown its resolve to withdraw from the crisis. On the other hand, Western countries have not taken any risk of Iran's threats until now. But when uranium enrichment increased to 20 % and Iran's will to continue enrichment, all parties involved in the Iranian nuclear crisis showed a willingness to continue constructive negotiations.

This tendency continued from the Geneva Interim Agreement to the Lausanne Covenant of Understanding, and ultimately resulted in the JCPOA Agreement and the issuance of UN

Security Council Resolution 2231. Bilateral and multilateral negotiations between Iran and the Western countries are chronologically as follows:

- 1) Iran negotiates with EU3 (France, Germany, England) in Saadabad on October 21, 2003
- 2) Brussels agreement between Iran and the EU3 and Javier Solana, EU Foreign Policy Chief on February 23, 2004
- 3) Paris Agreement between Iran and the EU3 on November 14, 2004
- 4) Madrid talks bilaterally, Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and Javier Solana, EU Foreign Policy Chief on May 30, 2007
- 5) Lisbon talks between Ali Larijani, Mohamed ElBaradei and Javier Solana on June 22, 2007
- 6) Geneva negotiations between Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and Javier Solana, EU Foreign Policy Chief on July 19, 2008
- 7) Geneva negotiations between Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and Javier Solana on October 2009
- 8) Tripartite talks between Iran, Turkey and Brazil on the exchange of fuel on May 17, 2010
- 9) Geneva negotiations bilaterally between Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and Catherine Ashton, EU Foreign Policy Chief on November 2010
- 10) Istanbul 1 talks bilaterally between Saeed Jalili and Catherine Ashton on February 2011
- 11) Istanbul 2 talks bilaterally between Saeed Jalili and Catherine Ashton on April 14, 2012
- 12) Baghdad talks bilaterally between Saeed Jalili and Catherine Ashton on May 23, 2012
- 13) Moscow talks bilaterally between Saeed Jalili and Catherine Ashton on June 18, 2012
- 14) Almaty multilateral negotiations between the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the UN (US, Britain, France, China, Russia), along with Germany, and Mrs. Catherine Ashton, the EU's foreign affairs commissioner, and

Saeed Jalili, Secretary-General of the Supreme Council National Security of Iran February 26, 2013

15) Almaty bilateral talks bilaterally between Saeed Jalili and Catherine Ashton on April 5, 2013

Due to the large number of bilateral and multilateral meetings between Iran and the Western countries, the negotiations finally came to an end in 2015. But what factors were involved in the formation of useful talks between Iran, the EU and the permanent members of the Security Council that could have reached the winning outcome?

In order to understand these issues, It will mention the most important events and negotiations.

4.2 Iran Nuclear Deal Negotiations

One of the major issues and factors needed to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis was a realistic recognition of the crisis. Negotiators and actors on both sides called for a more precise definition of the law, the identification of problems, the proving of the goals and the purposes of both the positive and the negative, the real understanding of the parties' actions. This kind of mutual understanding led Iran and other parties to the desired conclusion that all sides, by signing the JCPOA Agreement, considered it successful diplomacy and believed that they had won the negotiations in the negotiations.

During talks, Iran has always insisted that the US should pay attention to the following:

- The US knows that its policy towards Iran has not been achieved over the past 36 years and that it is imperative, rather than stubbornly, to prefer diplomacy.
- Unilateral sanctions, different charges and various forms of pressure and enforcement can not work.
- The US needs to cooperate with Europe and Russia to influence Iran's behavior.

- The US needs the cooperation and goodwill of the country in resolving other regional and trans-regional crises.

Other countries, including Russia and China, as well as Europe, have, along with the US, emphasized that Iran needs the following conditions to pass the nuclear crisis:

- Respect for international security and stability while supporting political-moral changes and promoting democratic reform in Iran.
- Iran needs international trust in using advanced technologies to develop its technology, and it must provide Western countries with confidence.
- Accepting technologies that are allowed under the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty).
- Suspend uranium enrichment and continue nuclear activities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
- Build trust between Europe and the US in the short term by providing clear reports and practices.

Of course, by understanding these points and re-thinking the past talks, the parties were able to determine the appropriate roadmap for achieving the result. As a result, mutual commitments between Iran and the other negotiating parties resulted. But the outcome of the July 2015 process has been the process of negotiation and bilateral or multilateral dialogue that it refers to.

4.2.1 Moscow Talks

Since the mid-1990s, Russia has practically been present in all parts of Iran's nuclear program. Indeed, Russia is the only nuclear-proliferating country openly cooperating with Iran and has been criticized by the US for its decades. While Russia, during the crisis in Iran's nuclear case, tried to largely ignore diplomatic activity, media speculation, and academic debate, it has always played a major role in the negotiations.

Some scholars believe that the marginal role of Russia is the result of domestic discussions about Moscow's major interests. Maintaining Russia's internal resources has made Russia partly marginalized in the nuclear talks. Also, political thinking in Russia since the beginning of the Vladimir Putin era has made the relationship between Iran and Russia coherent and inextricably linked. But this method continues to be cautious.

A closer look at the development of Russia's views and policies on Iran's nuclear program and the unusual interactions between Russia, the US and the EU illustrates the complexity of Russia's continued political and strategic concerns. On the one hand, he thinks of expanding his sphere of influence, on the other, he contemplates the strategic, economic, geopolitical and international challenges of the international community. The issue of the Iranian nuclear crisis is one of the new challenges facing the international community, which, in Russia's opinion, should solve such a crisis. (Golshanpazhouh, 2008, p.228)

Russian political leaders have repeatedly insisted that Russia considers itself a historic and stable counterpart of Iran, and would prefer to emphasize the recent history of Russia's pioneering cooperation with Iran. That's why Russia, during the nuclear talks between Iran and the Western countries, tried to help to resolve the crisis in spite of the lack of bias, while at the same time conducting a successful negotiating cycle.

Moscow talks took place after the last round of nuclear talks in Baghdad. Of course, the last round of nuclear talks in Baghdad was two accomplishments. First, the talks showed that the differences between Iran and the P5+1 are much higher. Secondly, a new date was set for the next round of talks in Moscow.

The significance of Moscow's negotiations from elsewhere is because of the harsh dialogue between the international community and Iran in Moscow to a decisive point. According to experts, at that time, only two ways were left to the negotiating parties. Or they should end the nuclear talks or set a definitive start to continue constructive talks. Negotiations took place in

Moscow on June 19-18, 2012, following Baghdad talks. Following Baghdad talks held on May 23, 2012, both sides made political and diplomatic maneuvers to hold more wins at the Moscow summit. The emphasis of Western and Israeli states on the cancellation of 20 percent enrichment and the withdrawal of about 150 Kg. of 20 % uranium from Iran is one of the major demands that the international community has been pursuing.

Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said at the time that Iran would not abandon its 20 % enrichment right. But Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, on the other hand, claimed that Western policy had led Iran to enrich its uranium enrichment of at least \$ 200,000 in Ford's nuclear facilities. Of course, according to international law, Iran had the right to enrich uranium, but Iran's secrecy on the nuclear program had made any trust in Western countries eroded. In talks in Moscow, Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and Catherine Ashton, the foreign policy chief of the EU, negotiated and proposed Iran's package to the west. After two days of talks between Jalili and Ashton over the five pillars of Iran's bid package, the result was not achieved.

The content of the Iran Proposal Package was as follows: "The principles to be reached between the two sides, the aims, theme, structure, subjects, dialectical quantities and qualities of the dialogue process, steps to be taken in order to provide mutual trust"

At the end of the first day of talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov said in a press release that the biggest obstacle to the negotiations is that the two sides do not retreat from each other and their distrust has made the issue more complicated. To be Of course, it's difficult to repair. Iran, in this round of talks, had appealed to the Western side to act without a precondition for lifting the sanctions. Mrs. Catherine Ashton also stated at the end of the Moscow talks that she had received a serious response from the Iranian negotiator for the first time. It will be able to draw the right direction and Iran is expected to show its willingness to solve the problem through diplomacy. Although at least Western countries expect Iran to hold

talks in the process of halting uranium enrichment at a level of 20 %, Iran's MP Saeed Jalili did not agree with it and declared "an excuse to stop the peaceful nuclear activities Iran does not exist. We announced that if talks are to succeed, expert meetings should be held, and these meetings can bring the views of Iran and the six countries closer together."(BBC: Iran Daily News, 2013)

At the same time, negotiations were announced that the next round of talks would take place at the level of technical experts, Deputy Assistant Directors in Istanbul.

4.2.2 Istanbul Talks

Istanbul's negotiations are important because Iran enjoyed good confidence in Turkey over the course of the economic sanctions. On May 17, 2010, the talks of Tehran were held in the presence of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the tripartite talks on the exchange of nuclear fuel. Tripartite meeting of foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Brazil agreed that Turkey would be the site for the exchange of Iranian nuclear fuel. If this agreement were accepted by the Vienna-based group of 5+1, the place for the maintenance of nuclear fuel was exercised with the right to monitor Iran and the IAEA and then exchange in Turkey. It was agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of its enriched uranium to the IAEA and instead of 120 Kg. of nuclear fuel used by Tehran's medical research reactor.

In the talks, the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey and Brazil signed a statement and announced that Iran had signed NPT and in this regard it would receive the right to have nuclear fuel cycle technology. Meanwhile, the Turkish Foreign Minister also said that the uranium shipped from Iran until the exchange would be the credibility of the Iranian people on the Turkish soil. But after agreeing on the talks in Tehran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that five permanent members of the UN Security Council agreed to draft a US resolution to tighten sanctions. Thus, Tehran's negotiations did not yield any results. The credibility and trust that exists between Iran and Turkey led to other nuclear negotiations in Turkey and Istanbul. The

first multilateral talks between Mrs. Catherine Ashton and EU Foreign Policy Chief were Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and members of the Vienna group of members from France, Russia and the US in February 2011.

During the talks, Ms. Ashton stated in a press release that "Iran set a deadline for abolishing international sanctions and for continuing the nuclear fuel cycle, but we could not accept these conditions because Iran must put our trust in abolition of sanctions. bring."Indeed, the negotiations in Istanbul 1 were very disappointing. But after some time on April 14, 2012, negotiations in Istanbul 2 were established that these negotiations are important in several respects. (BBC: Iran Daily News, 2013)

- 1) This round of bilateral negotiations led to the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the next round of talks in Baghdad.
- 2) Mrs. Catherine Ashton said the negotiations were satisfactory, and the result of her bilateral talks with Saeed Jalili was very useful and useful.
- 3) In these negotiations, the points that were previously identified between Iran and the members of the Vienna group as technical problems were resolved and agreements were reached between the parties.
- 4) In addition to multilateral and collective negotiations between Iran, EU Foreign Policy Chief and other members of the Vienna Group, special talks were held between the Iranian authorities and the P5+1.

Therefore, Istanbul has played an important role in achieving the goal and outcome.

4.2.3Almaty Talks

The Almaty talks also took place in two stages. The talks began after a eight-month hiatus on February 26, 2013 in Almaty's capital, Kazakhstan, and representatives of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the US, Britain, France, Russia and China), along with Germany, attended that summit with representatives of Iran. Of course, Under the leadership

of the delegation of Mrs. Catherine Ashton, the head of the delegation of the P5+1 negotiators was Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran.

Abbas Araghchi, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran, and Ali Bagheri, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Supreme National Security Council, were members of the Iranian delegation. Mrs. Wendy Ruth Sherman, US State Department Deputy Secretary of State, Simon Gass, Former British Ambassador to Iran, Ma Zhaoxu, Assistant Foreign Minister, Sergey Rybakov, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Jacques Odier, Director General of the Foreign Ministry, and Hans Dieter Lucas Senior German Foreign Ministry officials attended the summit on behalf of the P5+1 countries.

In the course of the talks, members of the P5+1 team tried to satisfy Iran to stop production and storage of 20% uranium. They also urged Iran to shut down Fordou's enrichment facility near Qom. The international powers propose that they reduce the amount of economic sanctions imposed on Iran. Iran presented its proposals in the talks, which it referred to in the Moscow talks.

An important point of the Almaty talks was that the P5+1 showed a sense of softness and praise to Iran's proposal. They promised to respond to the demands of Iran after the necessary review. The P5+1 also tried to bring its views closer to Iran's positions. As Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, commented on the assessment of the Almaty talks, "If this is a sign of strategic change and they want to pursue negotiations based on the right strategy." (Goshanpazhouh, 2008, (4), p.221)

Saeed Jalili had the following statement in this meeting: "They and the whole world understood that the embargoes they have imposed on our people are insufficient, and the way of approach between Moscow and Almaty shows that the negotiations continue on the strategic axis. This is a historical turning point. Now, it is not right to use the embargo and threat language." (Golshanpazhouh, 2008, (4), p.222)

According to him, for this reason, the other side has tried to bring his views closer to Iran's views.

Saeed Jalili, in a press briefing at the end of the Almaty talks, stated that "any suggestion for cooperation, transparency and confidence-building should be based on the acceptance of Iranian rights, including the right to enrich uranium and that various issues can be addressed in this regard. The framework is to be considered ... The decision to enrich 20 % of uranium was taken because the other party refused to deliver this type of fuel during the Geneva talks three years ago, and as a result, Iran itself Field action." (Golshanpazhouh, 2008(4), p.227)

The second round of Almaty talks, held on April 5, 2013 was the last stage in Iran's nuclear talks with the P5+1 during the presidency of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad regarded such a stage of negotiations as a way out of the Iranian nuclear crisis and tried to become a successful political figure in Iranian history at the end of his presidency.

Especially the resolution of the nuclear crisis that lasted for many years was considered to be a political success for Ahmadinejad. He could have opened the way for his political wing in the upcoming Iranian presidential elections with success in these talks, and would make those who nominate for president a long-term political success.

Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, at this stage of the talks, tried to get a good result and presented some concrete plans for Catherine Ashton. But most of his suggestions were similar to previous suggestions that were repeatedly denied by the P5+1 group.

On the first day of the talks, Saeed Jalili realized that Iran's proposals to counterparts are not acceptable. Before the second day of the meeting, it announced that talks could only go with a single letter. He demanded Iran's right to enrich uranium in particular.

While the Iranian side announced at the end of the negotiations that progress had been made in this period, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton said the two sides had not reached an agreement. At the press conference after the end of the negotiations, Ashton stated that "in two days of talks, we had a long and hard debate and it became clear that our positions are still far from the same." (Golshanpazhouh, 2014)

4.2.4 Vienna Talks

The Austrian capital Vienna, the headquarters of the IAEA, hosted at least seven nuclear talks for the final settlement of the Iranian nuclear case. The last round lasted nearly three weeks. Vienna is host to Iran's record-breaking nuclear negotiations. The negotiation were held with Mohammad Javad Zarif, Catherine Ashton and the senior members of the foreign ministry of the P5+1 group. Also, in the last round of talks the foreign ministers of the European countries of the P5+1 with the US Secretary of State joined the talks. (BBC: Iran Daily News. 2013)

Of course, negotiations in Vienna continued for a long time. However, since the conferences that have been held have not been concluded, they do not need detailed explanation. Nevertheless, the last meeting in Vienna has already constituted the substructure of the Geneva agreement. In this respect, it is necessary to explain the Vienna talks more clearly in the process narrative. Hence, this issue is addressed in chronological evaluation.

4.2.5 Geneva Talks

The beginning of Hassan Rouhani's presidency coincided with the tenth anniversary of Iran's nuclear talks with Western countries. Hassan Rouhani's entry into the role of the Iranian president comes at a time when no significant achievement has been achieved in these negotiations over the years and only the negotiating parties with Iran have been changed. Representatives from three countries, Germany, France and the UK, became representatives of five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany.

Political experts considered the fulfillment of economic promises by Hassan Rouhani as the reason for the lifting of international sanctions against Iran. That is, if the negotiations were to take place, Rouhani would be honest in the promised promises. (Irdiplomacy, 2013)

Hassan Rouhani after came to power as Iran's president, Iran's nuclear talks began with world powers. This period is considered a new era in negotiation with Iran and P5+1. As the first move, Mohammad Jawad zarif, Iranian Foreign Minister was appointed by Hassan Rouhani and named him the main negotiator.

During the visit of the Iranian delegation to New York to attend the UN General Assembly on 23 September 2013, the first 30-minute briefing of the Iranian delegation with the US took place. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and US Secretary of State John Kerry came together and this meeting was very popular. After all these negotiations, all the participants expressed their hope that Iran's nuclear issue would be resolved more quickly. Of course, to attention should look at the hosting of the city of Geneva. Over the past few years, the city has hosted delegations from Iran and the Western countries, hosting six negotiating parties and eventually reaching a historic settlement in the city.

For the first time on July 19, 2008, Saeed Jalili, an Iranian negotiator met with EU Foreign Policy Officer Javier Solana in Geneva to discuss the proposed package of the P5+1 countries to persuade Iran to stop uranium enrichment. This was the first time that Geneva was hosting the nuclear talks. After that, Geneva City hosted two negotiating delegations twice as Saeed Jalili as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and the P5+1.

The Geneva talks held on October 15 and 16, 2013, led Mohammad Javad Zarif, the head of Iran's negotiating team. During the meeting, the negotiating parties announced their resolve to resolve Iran's nuclear crisis. After a brief period of negotiations on Geneva 5 on November 24, 2013, negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 after 10 years gave their first fruit a diplomatic effort.

This history is a milestone in the history of Iran's nuclear talks with world powers. In the negotiations, the ultimate goal was to reach a mutually agreed and long-term solution. This agreement would have guaranteed Iran's nuclear program to be fully peaceful. In this agreement, Iran stated that it would not seek to achieve or extend nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

The agreement of November 2013 made the city of Geneva known as a major city in the history of nuclear talks in Iran. On the other hand, an initial and temporary agreement was signed with the aim of initiating talks to resolve the final nuclear dispute in Iran. Under the agreement reached between Iran and the international powers, part of the sanctions imposed on Iran were canceled after 10 years.

Though sensitive during the Geneva negotiating session, John Kerry met with reporters after 5 hours of talks with Mohammad Javad Zarif saying that the differences between the parties are still pending and that Iran should consider Israel's security in the proposed agreement. But the statements of the two sides led the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to return to Geneva with the Deputy Foreign Minister of China to reduce the disagreements.

During this period, the negotiations continued for 3 consecutive days and did not reach the result, and the deadline was 10 days. The failure to negotiate led to tensions in the last meeting of the talks, and even Mohammad Javad Zarif raised his protest a number of times, spoken by Seyed Abbas Araghchi, a member of the Negotiating Board of Iran in an interview with the Press TV network Stated.

Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters angrily after talks that a possible deal between Iran and the P5+1 is one of the most beneficial deals for Iran and a big mistake for the West. At the same time, it announced that if an agreement was reached

between Iran and the P5+1, Israel would not have an obligation to agree and would do anything to secure its country.

After the Geneva negotiations were held on November 20-24, 2013 in Geneva, Iran eventually reached a final agreement with the P5+1. The President of the US, Barack Obama, considered the agreement as historic and considered it an important began in the negotiations between Iran and the US.

Iran and the P5+1 extended the duration of the Geneva Interim Agreement until its anniversary to reach a final agreement. Of course, Mohammad Javad Zarif and John Kerry met in Vienna several times during the nuclear talks. As the negotiations progressed, Iran and the P5+1 agreed that the implementation of the Geneva Interim Agreement would be renewed for another six months.

4.3 Final Nuclear Deal

In February 2015, a new round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 took place in Switzerland. Iranian foreign ministers and the P5+1 stressed their determination to reach a final agreement. On March 29, 2015, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and Ernest Muniz, the US Energy Secretary and the expert boards of both sides joined the original negotiating body.

Earlier in the meeting, the US Secretary of State John Kerry in an interview stated that most of the disagreements with Iran were political issues, and optimistic about the negotiation process and made possible an agreement with Iran. That same day Republican Majority Mitch McConnell of the US Senate said in an interview that President Barack Obama had signed a very bad deal with Iran and could use it to protect Iran's nuclear infrastructure in the future. According to him, thanks to the agreement, Iran strengthened and voiced concern in this context. (DW: Regional News, 2015)

In the course of the initial talks, the French government wanted a controllable guarantee to make it impossible for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The French Foreign Minister said on March 21 in a webchat that France agreed to make Iran's access to nuclear energy possible, but not that it would be able to make a nuclear weapon, Reuters reported. According to the leaders of the US and France, the goal of the international community is to sign an agreement that Iran would be fully and convenient to the wishes of large countries, composed of five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany. (DW: Regional News, 2015)

In this round of negotiations, it was planned to reach a comprehensive agreement with Iran on the nuclear program by the end of March and by the end of June, an agreement on the details of the agreement would be reached. The parties seek to reach an agreement in which the right to Iran's access to peaceful nuclear technology will be verified, while Iran will not have the possibility of acquiring a nuclear weapon. The West accepts the lifting of sanctions against Iran. The phasing out of sanctions is gradual and may take up to 15 years to complete. (DW: Regional News, 2015)

It was also planned that these negotiations would continue in the ensuing days if both sides arrived at good progress in the negotiations.

Al-Hayat newspaper later revealed that Tehran would destroy its uranium and store its enriched uranium to 5%. Also, the issue of the Fordo nuclear facility has been resolved and the Arak facility has been redefined by mutual agreement. Instead, Western countries have agreed to release part of the blocked property to Iran for \$100 billion, allowing Tehran to export oil and use the global banking system. All of these agreements will be implemented over a period of 10 to 15 years. (DW: Regional News, 2015)

On March 23, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghaki spoke in a conversation with Iran's first network that Iran is prepared to do more to build confidence in its nuclear program. But he has demanded the lifting of sanctions. In his interview, he emphasized the balance of

the agreement, the false sanctions, the confidence of Iran and the peaceful nature of its nuclear program. (Hamshahronline, 2014)

In the meantime, Israel sent a delegation to France to prevent a bad deal with Iran. At the same time as Israeli delegation to France, Yuval Steinitz, the Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister, said that he should stop the deal that might be possible for Iran. He and Yossi Cohen, the head of the Israeli Security Council, were members of the delegation. Meanwhile, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman stated that his country was in danger, adding that "we will all be prevented from arming Iran atoms." (DW: Regional News, 2015)

During the talks, the gap between the US and Israel increased because of Israel's attempts to reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic. Following on from the US talks, Iran has offered a new deal on nuclear talks. According to this pinnacle, the US intends to allow Iran to maintain its thousands of centrifuges actively and, instead, Tehran will agree to restrict research on other nuclear sites. Based on the proposal, centrifuges operating in the center of Fordo will work instead of uranium to produce medical, pharmaceutical, scientific and industrial isotopes. Instead, Iran is more relaxed about centrifuges at the center of Natanz and agrees with inspections and some further restrictions.

On March 28, Deutsche Welle's German news agency Frank Walter Steinmeier wrote that he had reached the end of the nuclear talks with Iran. At the fourth day of this round of talks, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, independently of his China, France, German and the US counterparts, said that "the last steps are very difficult and therefore decisive."

The ministers of foreign affairs of Iran and the countries of the P5+1, along with EU foreign policy coordinator Federico Mogherini, have been preparing for a joint meeting, the first meeting in recent months, AFP reported. The sign of a two-party approach to signing a political memorandum They will evaluate a joint statement. (DW: Regional News, 2015)

Eventually, at the end of this round of negotiations, the duration of the agreements, as well as the achievement of a mechanism that could help to properly implement the provisions of the agreement, was carefully considered and consulted by the parties. At the first step, the IAEA announced the closure of the possible military dimension of Iran's nuclear program (PMD). Iran has accelerated the accumulation of its centrifuges, according to the JCPOA agreement, and began the exchange of uranium-enriched uranium stones with Russia.

Following this, on April 2, 2015, the two sides reached a common point. In this way, Lausanne's atomic understanding became real. This round of negotiations between the Iranian nuclear program and the P5+1 group on Saturday afternoon, June 27, 2015, at the Hotel Palais Coburg in Vienna, Austria, attended by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and the two sides Began. The finalized deadline for these talks was June 30, which was renewed three times, until July 3, July 10 and July 13, respectively.

Eventually, after 22 months of lengthy talks, Rouhani's government negotiated with P5+1 group and was able to reach a comprehensive agreement with his Iranian negotiating team on Tuesday, July 14, 2015. After 17 days very critical talks, the US, the EU and Iran rested all problems. This important historic event took place in Vienna's Austrian capital between Iran, P5+1 group and the parties succeeded in reaching a comprehensive and final agreement.

In this way, the opportunity to make decisions on the future of Iran's nuclear program was provided. EU Foreign Policy Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated at a press conference in Vienna to read a statement in English and Persian that a final agreement has been reached on Iran's nuclear program.

It is known as the JCPOA, which according to experts from international law, political science and theorists of international relations, is the best and most comprehensive international agreement that can be used to solve world political crises as a model that to be used. The

memorandum showed that many of the world's most difficult political crises could be resolved through diplomatic negotiations.

The JCPOA Memorandum of Understanding was signed in the framework of a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program and followed by the understanding of Lausanne, between Iran, the EU and the P5+1 group, including China, France, Britain, and the US.

Negotiations on Iran's nuclear program began by accepting the Geneva Interim Agreement on Iran's nuclear program in November 2013. The negotiating parties were negotiating for 20 months in Lausanne, a nuclear memorandum of April 2015.

Under this agreement, Iran will clear its medium-sized enriched uranium reserves and cut off low-enriched uranium storage to 98 %. Reduces the number of centrifuges by about two thirds and at least 15 years. 15 years later, Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium by more than 3.67 % or not create a new uranium enrichment facility or a new heavy water reactor.

Uranium enrichment activities will be limited to a building that uses first-generation centrifuges for 10 years. Other facilities will also be transformed into an IAEA's Supplementary Protocol to avoid dangers of proliferation. To monitor and verify the implementation of the agreement by Iran, the International Atomic Energy Agency will have regular access to all Iranian nuclear facilities.

As a result of this agreement, which has a sustained commitment from its sponsors, Iran will come out of existing sanctions, which were adopted by the UN Security Council, EU, and US resolutions.

4.3.1 The Obligations and Responsibilities of Iran

The JCPOA agreement, signed between Iran and P5+1 countries, has brought some responsibilities and commitments to all parties. Since the important part of this agreement is

Iran, most of the commitments depend on Iran. Therefore, it is necessary to briefly explain the commitments given by Iran in the context of the JCPOA agreement. Iran's commitments to the outcome are summarized as follows: (mfa: JCPOA text, 2015)

1. Iran must implement the NPT and even some transatlantic protocols, such as the IAEA's supervision of the development and concentration of uranium ore. Therefore, the Agency is allowed to inspect military installations that are dangerous to security. If Iran opposes the local inspection, if there is a majority of the joint commission votes for inspection, Iran will be required to issue an inspection permit. If Iran, on the assumption that China and Russia voted in favor of Iran, would have the right to inspect the facility, IAEA inspectors.
2. Over the course of 15 years, Iran has been gradually moving toward meeting international quality standards for Iranian fuel production, enriching its uranium resources to 300 kg enriched uranium hexafluoride to 3.67 % or equivalent in other limited forms of chemical will do. Additional quantities based on international prices and instead of receiving natural uranium hexafluoride delivered to Iran, will be sold and delivered to the international purchaser. All enriched uranium oxide from 5 to 20 percent will be converted into fuel for use in Tehran's research reactor.
3. The impossibility of producing nuclear fuel by Iran and the necessity of importing nuclear fuel for 10 years from other producing countries.
4. Iran does not have the right to reprocess the fuel consumed by the heavy water reactor of Arak and the rest of the power plants and should remove heavy water from the country and have no right to build another heavy water reactor for the next 15 years.
5. Iran should receive the approval of the P5+1 regarding the design process if needed and required to re-design the heavy water reactor in Arak. This open design is based on the use of enriched uranium rather than natural.
6. It is prohibited to conduct research on the metallurgy of uranium and plutonium for 15 years for Iran.
7. Iran undertakes that it will never produce or acquire nuclear weapons under any circumstances.

8. Iran will abandon its IR-1 centrifuge within 10 years of the implementation of the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding. During this period, its enrichment capacity at Natanz will be kept to a maximum of 5060 IR-1 centrifuge capacity. Additional centrifuges and related enrichment infrastructures will be under the continuous supervision of the IAEA.

9. Iran will continue to pursue enrichment research and development. But the use of these methods should not result in the accumulation of enriched uranium. Iran's uranium enrichment for 10 years will include IR-6, IR-5, IR-4, IR-8. Iran will not use other isotope separation technologies to enrich uranium. Iran will continue to test IR-6, IR-8 devices, and in the middle of the eighth year, will test up to thirty IR-6 machines, IR-8, as specified.

10. As Iran fires IR-1 centrifuges, it will not build or build another centrifuge. The replaced centrifuges will be replaced by the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines solely for the activities specified in the memorandum. From the end of the eighth year, Iran will be able to deploy a number of agreed devices (IR-6, IR-8) without rotors, along with other devices produced at Natanz, as long as they are required under the long-term plan of Iran. Provide continuous monitoring of the IAEA.

The commitments given by Iran in the framework of JCPOA have both positive and negative aspects. It would be right to evaluate this direction. The Iranian parliament has been criticized by some clear commitments of the deal, which has been assessed by the Foreign Policy Commission. But the agreement has been ratified in parliament since many of the technical and legal aspects of the agreement are in line with the national interests of the JCPOA does not have any legal or legal application requirements. Decision 2231, unanimously adopted only by the UN Security Council, has laid the groundwork for the fulfillment of commitments. In this context, they will completely forget the problem by making commitments to Iran and P5+1 countries for a period of 10 years. Though the IAEA has left Iran's right and peaceful activities, the control mechanism of the commitments under the agreement is not

clear. Obviously, no organization, institution or mechanism is being explained to control the fulfillment of commitments.country.

4.3.2The US Commitments and Responsibilities

In the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran, the EU and the P5+1, the US also has obligations against Iran to do.If we consider the US's commitment to Iran, in short, the following commitments have been made by the US to Iran under the JCPOA framework. (US States: JCPOA text, 2016)

1. Under this memorandum, sanctions imposed by the US, which are referred to as secondary sanctions, should be abolished on the day the JCPOA is launched. These sanctions are in the financial, banking, insurance, oil, gas, petrochemical, shipping, shipbuilding, transportation, gold and precious metals, banknotes, coins, permissible nuclear items, metals, software and weapons.
2. The US is committed to sanctioning the names of some Iranian companies and individuals related to Iran's nuclear program.
3. The US will abolish Iran's nuclear energy sanctions after the IAEA has confirmed that Iran has taken effective steps.
4. All US sanctions against Iran, which relate to human rights violations, rocket launch technologies and terrorist support, will not be lifted.
5. The US undertakes, in accordance with the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding, to suspend the continued sanctions imposed after the approval of the Agency's verification, and to suspend. The sanctions, including those related to banks, legal entities and individuals and entities, are listed in the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) list, will be lifted completely.
6. The US will take measures to provide the US dollar to the Iranian government, abolish restrictions on bilateral trade and transfer of income, purchase, acceptance or facilitation of transactions concerning Iran's sovereignty, inter-bank SWIFT services, and insurance services.

7. The US is committed to ending its efforts to reduce Iran's oil sales. In the field of investment of companies in the goods, services, information, technology and knowledge and technical assistance for gas and petrochemical sectors, the purchase and sale of oil, transportation or marketing of oil and petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran, export, sale and or supply of refined petrochemicals to Iran, transactions in the energy sector of Iran, transactions with shipping and shipbuilding companies and Iranian ports, buying and selling gold and other precious metals, selling and supplying or transferring goods and services in the sector. Cars do not stop.
8. The US undertakes to abrogate the executive orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and sections 5, 7, 15 of the Executive Order 13628.
9. The US allows and permits the sale of passenger airplanes and their parts and services. Non-US entities owned or controlled by American individuals will have the authority to cooperate with Iran in accordance with the principles and provisions of the JCPOA. The US will issue a license to import carpets and food from Iran to the US.
10. If a state or local law in the US prohibits the abolition of the sanctions specified in the JCPOA, the US will take all necessary steps, taking into account all available options and will actively work to lift the sanctions contained in the JCPOA. It will also encourage state and local officials to refrain from actions that do not conform to the nature of the JCPOA.

4.3.3 The EU Commitments and Responsibilities

In the implementation of JCPOA, European countries also have obligations towards Iran. Part of these commitments are decisions and actions to the P5+1 and another part of the EU. Therefore, the commitments given to Iran in the context of the JCPOA text include both the P5+1 commitments and the EU member states. The EU cancels all those sanctions. (mfa: JCPOA text, 2015)

- 1- Under the agreement and for eight years after its entry into force, some EU sanctions will be lifted against some Iranian companies and individuals.
2. According to Appendix 2 to the JCPOA, all the EU sanctions are abolished on the day the JCPOA is being implemented.

3. The ballistic missile technology sanctions will remain for 8 years. Similar sanctions against conventional arms sales to Iran will remain in place for five years.
4. The EU will continue to provide financial support for trade with Iran (credits, exports, guarantees, insurance).
5. The EU 8 years after the JCPOA agreement or when the Agency has come to a wider conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities. The EU will impose all its sanctions related to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons And subject to the provisions of the "EU Regulation", it will be abolished in favor of Iran.
6. The EU and the countries of Germany, the UK and France together with the US will abrogate the comprehensive list of nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures that they have already identified.
7. The EU refuses to reinstate or re-impose sanctions that have been abrogated by the JCPOA. There will also be no new nuclear bans on the Security Council and no new the EU sanctions.
8. The P5+1 will provide adequate administrative and enforcement procedures to ensure transparency and efficiency in relation to the lifting of sanctions. The EU and member states will issue related directives, and will publish publicly available statements on details of sanctions or restrictive measures abolished under the JCPOA. The EU and the member states are also committed to consult on the instructions and statements issued with Iran on a regular basis.
9. The P5+1 and Iran parties commit themselves to implement the JCPOA provisions in good faith and in a constructive space based on mutual respect and refrain from any action contrary to the nature and intention contained in the JCPOA that would impair its successful implementation. They do. Senior officials in the P5+1 and Iran will use their best endeavors to successfully implement the agreement, including in their public statements.
10. The P5+1 will take all necessary measures to abolish the sanctions as appropriate and refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory rules and formal requirements rather than sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.

11. The EU and the member states will, in accordance with their own laws, refrain from any policy of a specific purpose that has a hostile effect and will directly affect the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran. Also, they will not take any action that would hamper their commitments to successfully implement the provisions of the JCPOA.

12. The P5+1 will not impose any sanctions or restrictions on individuals or entities that may be subject to the sanction imposed by the JCPOA. Provided that these activities are in accordance with the other laws and regulations of the 5+1 group.

13. The EU and its member countries are engaged in joint projects in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including the construction of a nuclear power plant, research reactors, fuel production, jointly agreed advanced research and development, such as nuclear fusion, the establishment of a regional nuclear medicine center, advanced day technology, personal education, nuclear safety and security, environmental protection will be cooperate with Iran.

The US has to fulfill its contractual obligations. But Donald Trump has made statements for the cancellation of the deal since he began his presidency. Although the EU, the UN and even the IAEA emphasize that the agreement with Iran is the most robust and comprehensive agreement, the US's approach is now considered negative.

The US has not fulfilled some of its commitments. The main reason for this is the Iranian ballistic missile experiments and the production of the 2000 KM-wide fuzzers.

According to the US, Iran's missile development plans pose a threat to world peace. But Iran argues that missile production and testing are in the direction of a defensive system. The US has not yet fulfilled its commitments on banking, trade (except for civilian aircraft sales); it also implements new sanctions on some members of the Iranian Ministry of Defense and other companies.

Although such sanctions are only made by the US against Iran, it is considered an approach that is contrary to the JCPOA.

4.3.4The UN Commentiments and Responsibilities

Meanwhile, the UN Security Council, which was considered as the main and effective decision-maker in exerting pressure on Iran, signed a memorandum of understanding between Iran, the EU, the P5+1 and the US on the resolution of Iran's nuclear crisis, Removed the work steps. Although the decisions and actions of this international organization are considered as effective and immediate, they are not committed.

Decisions and actions of the UN on the JCPOA took effect on the day that the provisions of the agreement entered into force. Of course, these actions were taken following decisions made between the negotiating parties.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his satisfaction with the agreement reached between the parties to the negotiations to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis that the UN was ready to fully implement the agreement on a historic and important aspect. Has a partnership. After 12 years of talks on Iran's nuclear activities with members of the P5+1 and the agreement reached between the parties, the UN Security Council finally issued a resolution on July 20, 2015, according to which all six previous resolutions Which were approved against Iran were canceled. The Security Council, by the adoption of resolution 2231, with the majority of votes, canceled all sanctions against Iran.

Based on this decision, the previous Security Council resolutions on the nuclear issue of Iran were published in 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), 2224 (2015) were declared invalid at the same time as the JCPOA was launched. Of course, the cancellation of the cancellations is not final, and Iran will be subject to a permanent abolition by the International Atomic Energy Agency if verified by Iran.

Under Resolution 2231, when Iran fulfills its obligations, all previous Security Council resolutions on Iran's nuclear program are being abandoned, but restrictions on arms sales will remain for Iran for several years. The resolution foresees that if one of the countries reporting a violation agreement and approves the committee expected to agree to such an offense, the continuation of the repeal of previous resolutions should be voted on in the Security Council.

It should be noted that the opposition of each veto country to the repeal of previous resolutions will revert to any previous Security Council sanctions, for example, Russia or China will not be able to prevent the re-establishment of sanctions. The whole effort of Iran over the past 12 years was to have nuclear technology and be considered as national rights. The deal was successful in safeguarding Iran's peaceful nuclear rights and achievements. In addition, Iran's withdrawal from paragraph 7 of the UN Charter and the issuance of Resolution 2231, which led to the cancellation of previous sanctions, was one of the main achievements in the negotiations between Iran and the EU, the US and the P5+1.

Iran was subject to the provisions of paragraph 7 of the UN Charter before the JCPOA and on the basis of the UN Security Council resolutions. Iran was a threat to international security. The success of Iran in the realization of the JCPOA has been able to escape without war and bloodshed and conflicts and issues that have already happened to other countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Iraq and others. This success was due to the diplomacy negotiation and Iran was able to enjoy the right to a peaceful nuclear technology. The exclusion of Iran from the following paragraph 7 of the UN Charter is a success for Iran and other countries in the world. This success was gained in the wake of the Lausanne talks and the issuance of the 2231 resolution.

The UN Security Council, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, can take action in world peace-threats, violations of the principles of peace, violence and violence throughout the world. Under this paragraph, the Security Council may impose penalties against the perpetrator.

These penalties include: full or partial cessation of economic relations, land, air, maritime, postal and other communications, as well as suspension of diplomatic relations. In the event of the adoption of the Security Council and the application of this law, all UN member states are required to implement and adhere to the law. In the wake of the adoption of Security Council resolution 2231, Iran was able to escape such a crisis and problems.

Of course, if the Security Council determines that the actions envisaged in Article 41 (Economic Diplomatic Penalties) are not sufficient, it can take military, air and maritime forces or any other means against the perpetrator. Historically, countries that have been punished include North Korea (1955), Libya (1973), Angola (1991), Yugoslavia (1992), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994), Afghanistan (1999), Iraq (1990-1995,2004), Iran (2004).

In all these cases, military intervention was taking place, and these countries suffered heavy losses. The only thing that could end without a bloodshed or a war was Iran, which, in the shadow of the JCPOA, was able to withdraw from the UN Charter under the terms of article 7, and it was closed to a major and potentially widespread war. Therefore, the issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is the most significant event in the history of Iran's nuclear crisis.

4.4 Conclusion

The talks between Iran and the P5+1 began in 2006, according to the third pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to assure world powers of Iran's lack of production and development of nuclear weapons. As other countries wanted to reassure Iran, Iran also wanted to get the other countries' final and positive contributions to the development of peaceful nuclear enrichment technology. During the negotiations, the US, the EU and other organizations imposed sanctions against Iran, which Iran's President Dr. Hassan Rouhani called "crimes against humanity." (Golkarian, 2016, p.87)

For a while, the boundaries and red lines seemed to be clear. Hassan Rouhani was elected in the 2013 presidential election and his government was able to pave the way for resolving the nuclear crisis. Of course, the slogans of his electoral propaganda were indicative of the fact that he was running the path of moderation and portraying himself as a reformist. Perhaps this was the factor that some other countries that had been subject to sanctions and hostilities against Iran would somewhat hope and prepare themselves for serious talks with Hassan Rouhani's government. Of course, after President's election, Hassan Rouhani became president of Iran and described the media, especially the West, politically moderately.

After several rounds of talks, on November 24, 2013, Geneva's interim agreement was signed on Iran's nuclear program between the P5+1 countries and Iran in Geneva. As countries worked on a long-term agreement, this was accompanied by halting parts of Iran's nuclear program towards reducing economic sanctions against Iran. Settlement and implementation of an agreement between Iran and Western countries began on January 20, 2014, and the focus of negotiations was on the limitations that targeted Iran's nuclear facilities.

The key issues raised in the talks were on the IR-40's Arak reactor and the fuel production plant that Iran wanted to complete. But Iran agreed to build and implement a new plant as part of the Geneva Interim Agreement in November 2013 refusing nuclear reactor refueling. Bushehr's nuclear power plant, the en-Gatchinuranium mine, Fordou's nuclear center, the Isfahan uranium conversion plant, the Natanz uranium enrichment plant and the Parchin Military Development Complex have been one of the key issues for Western countries.

The JCPOA was the result of 12 years of talks between Iran and the international powers over the threat of nuclear weapons. With the responsibility of Hassan Rouhani as the Iranian president in 2013 and the responsibility of continuing the talks with Iran's Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, the historic agreement reached a conclusion, and Iran, while enjoying nuclear energy technology and related rights It will create a security context for the EU and the US countries.

Eventually, the world was released from the possibility of a bloody and dangerous war by abolishing the UN Security Council Resolutions in previous years, issuing a new resolution to No. 2231, and withdrawing Iran from the following paragraph 7 of the UN Charter. The lifting of sanctions against the EU and the US against Iran also provided new horizons for the development of Iran's economic, political, social and military bases.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Introduction

Iranian nuclear energy crisis began with Mohammad El-Baradei's report. The IAEA General Secretary has prepared his own report on Iran's nuclear program, which they have imposed on lobbies against Iran and are willing to do so. He transmitted his report to the world according to their goals. This is a fact that many international politicians and international experts point to after many years.

The same report marks the beginning of the formation of a nuclear crisis in Iran. Until now almost all US governments have tried to overthrow the regime of Islamic Republic of Iran since 1979. The same mentality and political inclination have caused the mentality of the American policy world to continue to be against Iran. Therefore, American politicians, and even the US allies, have been prepared to accept any kind of political game. The issuance of a strict and unequivocal resolution against Iran on the suspension of all nuclear activities and the unconditional and immediate signature of the Additional Protocol was issued after Mohammad El-Baradei's report.

In fact, after the 1979 revolution US, its opposition to Iran and its negative attitude began with the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran. The **Iran hostage crisis** was a diplomatic standoff between Iran and the US. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held hostage for 444 days from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981 after a group of Iranian students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, who supported the Iranian Revolution, took over the US Embassy in Tehran. (Köhler, 2000)

It stands as the longest hostage crisis in recorded history. Just as this event has enabled US politicians not to trust the new regime of Iran, the reason that Iran does not trust the US is hidden in the 1953 coup to against Mohammad Mosaddegh. Which later Barack Obama apologized for the incident. If look at the history of this incident in a nutshell, the reasons for the fact that the Iranian revolutionaries do not trust the US will be obvious.

By the 1950s, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was engaged in a power struggle with Iran's Prime Minister, Dr. Mohammad Mosaddegh, an immediate descendant of the preceding Qajar dynasty. Mosaddegh led a general strike on behalf of impoverished Iranians, demanding a share of the nation's petroleum revenue from Britain's Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. However, he overstepped in trying to get \$50 million in damages and lost revenue from the UK. In 1953, the UK and the US spy agencies helped Iranian royalists depose Mosaddegh in a military coup d'état codenamed Operation Ajax, allowing the Shah to extend his power. The Shah appointed himself an absolute monarch rather than a constitutional monarch, his position before the 1953 crisis, with the aim of assuming complete control of the government and purging the disloyal. The US continued to support and fund the Shah after the coup, with the Central Intelligence Agency training the government's SAVAK secret police.

In February 1979, less than a year before the Iran hostage crisis, the Pahlavi dynasty was overthrown during the Iranian Revolution. However, the political slogan and principle of the Islamic Republic of Iran continued on the "No East, No West, Only Islamic Republic" line, which frightened the US. The Iranian revolution, based on Islamic principles, was considered a threat to the US. He was also trying to prevent the unwilling spread of the Iranian revolution.

The success of the Iranian state after the revolution in economic, commercial, military, cultural, social, and even policy areas will have an impact on the Middle East and especially on Muslim societies. The possibility of Muslim communities in the Middle East uprising against their governments was in every way a threat to the US. The US has not looked at the new regime of Iran since the beginning. After the "Iran Hostage Crisis" incident, diplomatic relations seemed to be hard to move anymore.

That is why every area in the two countries began to create political tensions, conflicts, debates and even grounds for competition in mutually international arenas. The Iran-Iraq War lasted for 8 years and caused a sense of hostility towards the US among the Iranian people. Because, Iranians thought that the US was that fought and inspired the war and supported

Saddam Hussein. The missile, launched from the US Naval ship, caused the Airbus plane belonging to Iranian Airlines to fall on the Persian Gulf, with more than 130 passengers and crew lost their lives. In addition, the Tabas military withdrawal, the US backing of ethnic and political uprisings in various parts of Iran and finally the politicization of nuclear activities and the transformation of the legal elite into a political dispute; the US has now made the Iranian authorities insecure.

Shortly, there is historical mentality and perception in the formation of the negative attitude of the two sides. It is necessary to act with this rope in order to understand the nuclear crisis. The main emphasis in the thesis is to make the nuclear crisis transparent, unbiased, taking into account the interests of the parties, taking into account national and international interests. In this context, personal opinions about the parties have not been given. The causes of disturbance of the Western states are also explained.

In addition, personal or institutional views on domestic and international issues related to the request for Iran to possess nuclear enforcement technology were also included. Criticisms and positive opinions were disclosed. Explanations have been avoided in explaining who is right and who is wrong.

In the thesis, regarding the nuclear crisis, it was not allowed to ask whether Iran is right and whether the western countries are right. The aim is to see it as it is, evaluate it objectively and arrive at a rational result. It is always preferred to express the process explicitly. In this context not neglected comparative politics and attention to conclude by taking into account the opinions of the two sides and their regional and international interests.

5.2 Review of the Chapters and Findings

The First Chapter explains the methodological approach taken together with the reasons for writing the thesis. The point to be taken into account here is the importance of the thesis and the fact that it is on the agenda and why the Iranian nuclear crisis has emerged. As is known,

in the nuclear crisis, Iran has emphasized and emphasized that it has always preferred peaceful methods. However, the US and its allies have shown a very stern attitude towards Iran by looking at this issue with suspicion. In addition to the very heavy embargoes, the UN Security Council's decisions have kept Iran busy for years. The Iranian nuclear crisis is very important both in terms of international law and international relations theories.

The Iranian nuclear crisis is preoccupied with a multi-dimensional policy competition and diplomacy competition in itself. Long-term negotiations between Iran and P5+1 eventually led to win-win beliefs. These negotiations are crucial both in terms of methodology and in terms of the functioning of the dialogue and political literature of the parties, as well as the experience-based settlement of diplomatic actors. The result obtained from the negotiations is indeed exceptional in the history of diplomacy.

Various sources have been discussed in the writing of the thesis. The views of the researchers and authors of various countries as well as the works of Iranian researchers were taken into consideration. In the meantime, personal opinions are not included in the thesis as well as trying to avoid opinions that hold sides. The Iranian nuclear issue is being investigated as to why it has been transformed into a crime, Iran's claims for peace, and the use of nuclear enforcement technology for peaceful purposes.

It is also not forgotten why Western countries are suspicious of Iran's nuclear technology development. Does Iran really want to produce nuclear weapons or is this just a hypothesis? Tried to find answers to these questions is the best method in research.

Various sources have been discussed in the writing of the thesis. The views of the researchers and authors of various countries as well as the works of Iranian researchers were taken into consideration. In the meantime, personal opinions are not included in the thesis as well as trying to avoid opinions that hold sides.

As research questions, two issues were studied carefully and tried to find answers to the questions. Why does Iran need nuclear technology? The Iranian nuclear issue is being investigated as to why it has been transformed into a crisis? Iran's peaceful claims are right? Why did Western countries not use nuclear energy as a legal right of Iran? Which arguments do the suspects depend on? Are the claims based on facts?

Why do Western countries oppose the demand of Iran and why are they subjected to very heavy economic and political pressures for Iran? What is the subconscious of the sanction and the isolated politics? Why did P5+1 agree with Iran and eventually win-win both fronts? After the JCPOA agreement, what did the parties expect and did the parties fulfill their commitments?

The last thing to pay attention to is the shudder: what happened in the framework of the JCPOA agreement; what is the gain of Iran and western countries? Will the agreement continue strong or will the unexpected international changes and developments affect the agreement in the negative direction? The subjects he has been discussing from the beginning of the thesis are to answer these questions and try to find answers to the questions.

In *The SecondChapter*, to try explained that Iran's nuclear facilities were established in 1975 by the USA, Germany and even France. As it is known, Iran has preferred to have nuclear energy technology since the 1970s. This demand is not an emerging demand after the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since the time of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to take advantage of new technologies to be in front of the Middle Eastern countries; political, economic, social and even military and strategic strength; it found a special place in Iranian politics.

Therefore, it is necessary to see the Iranian nuclear crisis on a whole table. The main problem starts with the report of the El-Baradei, which was laid down by the IAEA. For this reason, the first episode marks the beginning of the year 2003.

Maybe June 2003 is the first official date for the international community to suspend its nuclear activities. In this statement, Tehran was urged to place on the agenda unconditionally the Additional Protocol 2+93. The statement also called on Iran to suspend the entry of nuclear material into centrifuges. But three months later, at the same time as the controversy between the US and EU3 against Iran's case, the secret report of the IAEA Board of Governors was made available to important American media.

This happened when the Board of Governors was not yet formed, and the report was supposed to be read by Mohamed ElBaradei, and then the council decided. With the disclosure, it turned out that the US has already convinced the Board of Governors and their votes are in line with American intentions against Iran.

The disclosure also led to the US failing to achieve the result of the IAEA Board of Governors. Therefore, a very sharp resolution was not issued. However, the September 2003 resolution began a dispute with Iran over the nuclear issue. With the American lobbying, the international community became relatively sensitive to Iran's nuclear activities. Serious concerns were raised about Iran's nuclear activities at the international level.

In the second chapter, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani's thoughts on the nuclear program were given. In this part of the thesis, the opinions of the Presidents who are in power since the beginning of the nuclear energy problem, especially Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, are taken into consideration. Along with Khamenei's attitude, the views of radical and ecumenical leaders are included in the second chapter based on their own explanations.

Since the beginning of the nuclear crisis, the influence of Iranian Presidents' views on negotiation is of importance. Which President has supported the negotiation process and has brought the mutual political negotiations closer? Which one has further deepened the problem and made it more difficult? When all these are taken into consideration, the route they follow,

the using method and using even the political literature are examined. In addition, internal and external sponsors and supporters are announced to have Iran's nuclear energy and technology.

These important political leaders' views on nuclear energy and technology possession are clear. Their role in the nuclear energy crisis is also explained. The approach and actions taken by the leader in increasing the problem and in resolving the problem are also taken into consideration.

In *The Third chapter* deals with the Iranian nuclear crisis, as well as the views of Iranian politicians, experts, MPs, party members and political leaders. As it turned out, the Iranian political structure and even the nuclear energy issue in the society are causing and causing serious debates. For some, having nuclear technology means getting national interests. Others do not find it reasonable to have this technology.

The front, which has a positive view on Iran's possession of nuclear technology, regards nuclear energy as "the definite right of the nation." Even those who have such thoughts are divided into two separate groups. The first group foresees the use of nuclear weapons in fields such as medicine, agriculture, electricity and industry; but the second group has radical views. According to them, there are some opposition countries against Iran and they can not accept Iran's regional and regional power. For this reason, it is necessary to have nuclear technology even in order to protect the interests of the country. They are also looking positively at producing nuclear weapons for defense purposes.

In addition, some groups know that Iran has no right to possess nuclear technology. According to them, Iran has underground resources, energy reserves, natural energy facilities (such as water, wind, hydrothermal and solar energy). For this reason, it is not appropriate to invest in the establishment of nuclear power plants and technology, and they believe that the country will incur costs. This group also emphasizes that nuclear power plants will pose a threat to public health.

The sanctions imposed by the US, the EU and the UN are also considered from another angle. According to them, Iran could really abandon nuclear technology and uranium enrichment plans, and there would certainly be no heavy sanctions.

Also this chapter describes the views of other actors, such as the US, EU and UN. Which countries in the international arena are critics or considering Iran's ideas about nuclear technology positively and which ones are opposition countries for Iran's nuclear ideas? Positive and negative view, also international organizations and the UN critics or oppositions angles and reasons are explained. Which is the status of Iran in nuclear energetic tendency?

The diplomat who does continue the negotiations is considered another subject of acting and actor's experience. As a matter of fact, political experience and diplomatic superiority help the negotiating parties reach their conclusion.

The Fourth Chapter follows the negotiation process. At the beginning of the crisis, the first critical views are being addressed. The process is followed from Sa'adabad to Vienna. As a result, the JCPOA agreement event is explained together with all the details. Within the framework of the agreement, Iran's commitments, the US and the EU commitments are determined according to the JCPOA text. The process is briefly described as follows:

5.2.1Sa'adabad Statement

After report of IAEA about Iran nuclear activities in November 2003, the Foreign Ministers of EU3 (UK, Germany and France) met with Iran in Tehran. In this meeting, Saadabad's statement was signed. This was an explanation of the acceptance of the 2+3 Protocol in accordance with the provisions of Iran.

Of course, according to the statement, Iran decided to show its goodwill to the European parties and promised to suspend its enrichment activities when it deemed it expedient. Later, it

was said that Iran's goal of this voluntary suspension was to break the American and Western pressures and reduce the global sensitivity to its peaceful nuclear activities. By this plan, Iran urged to reduce its global propaganda campaign. In the course of these meetings, the negotiating team managed to bring the scope of the suspension to a total and forced Iran to reduce gas injection into centrifuges. According to Saadabad, the European side accepted the following terms.

At First, he agreed to continue negotiations with Iran and pursue Iran's nuclear activities to reduce and reduce enrichment. The goal of the EU3 was not to stop Iran's nuclear activities completely. Second, consider the suspension as a voluntary measure by Iran. The decision would have forced Iran not to accept the legal requirement for a resolution and to interpret its dimensions based on the definition of the IAEA.

5.2.2 Brussels Agreement

But the conflicts of Tehran, Brussels, Washington and Moscow finally led to the signing of the second agreement between Iran and the European Troika on February 23, 2004, to form the Brussels agreement. Under the agreement, Iran agreed to suspend the assembly and assembly of centrifuges. The European Troika also pledged to use its best efforts at the June summit to return Iran's relations with the Agency to normal circumstances and to close the case. Iran for this reason in the words of the West retreated from its steep positions.

Meanwhile, in early March 2004, news of P-2 centrifuges, polonium, plutonium, pollution, mass spectrometry and some other aspects of Iran's activities were released. The publication of this news led to the emergence of a new and unexpected wave against Iran once again globally.

In the context of the earlier joint meeting between Iran and the IAEA Board of Governors in March 2004, the US once again strengthened the referral of the case to the Security Council and pushed the EU and the Eastern Bloc countries into relative passivity. In this situation, the Agency requested Tehran to extend the suspensions. In this situation, according to the

authorities, the project to convert uranium oxide (UO₂) into yellow cake and then convert it into uraniumtetrafluoride (UF₄) began with the launch of the UCF facility in Isfahan.

At the end of March 2004, Iranian scientists produced UF₄ material for the first time in Iran without the need for external potential, and this led Western countries to conclude that Iran could without the help of other countries that possess nuclear technology. At last Iran to achieved nuclear enrichment capability. It was very disturbing to understand this fact for Western countries. Although Iran continued to speak of peaceful nuclear power, it was not convincing and credible for European countries, especially the US and Israel.

In late summer 2004, Iranian scientists were able to launch and build UCF under their own success. In August 2004, taking another step, they could begin the process of converting 37 tonnes of yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride gas. The same thing led the Western media to the UN Board of Governors' remittance to the IAEA Board of Directors and was put on the agenda at the September 2004 summit, with the worrying public opinion of the world.

The intensification of the crisis while the IAEA Board of Governors in different time, again led to the issuance of a resolution on September 18, 2004, while expressing its deep concern about Iran's new decisions, urged verifiably all enrichment- related activities of Tehran. In early November of that year, the third round of talks between the Iranian authorities followed with officials from EU3 in Paris. Some Western diplomats have announced that Iran will accept a re-suspension and short-term multi-month suspension. Meanwhile, Europeans demanded an unlimited suspension (at least ten years) by Iran. Finally, on November 14, 2004, the negotiating team of Iran accepted the short-term suspension of the nuclear facilities and the UCF Complex in Isfahan.

5.2.3Paris Agreement

But in the summer of 2005, based on evidence from the Paris agreement and the intensive talks between Iran and the IAEA and three European countries, it became clear that Europeans were not satisfied with anything less than the permanent suspension of Iran's nuclear activities.

In August 2005, EU3 with a one week delay from the deadline provided their package to the Iranian authorities and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. They have repeatedly stressed the long-term suspension of Iran's nuclear facilities.

After proving Europe's inefficiency and the uselessness of the talks and confidence-building process, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a letter to the IAEA, announced its decision to continue the activities of the UCF facility in Esfahan. In this letter, a history of Iran's nuclear file was written. It has also been argued that Iran has done its best to build confidence and show its goodwill to Western countries. In addition, Iran was dead in a letter that was pursuing its rights and would operate within the framework of the NPT and will continue its nuclear technology activities.

But after some time the dispute between Iran and the Western countries continued, the pressure of the US made the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors issue a resolution with a majority vote. This happened while non-aligned countries abstained. The resolution made Iran's case for the first time referred to the UN Security Council. The same action led Tehran to respond in January 2006. Named Tehran, the Natanz and Arak facilities were reopened and continued to operate. In the spring of 2006 it was announced that Iran had reached the uranium enrichment cycle at Natanz. In fact, Iran could resist the decisions of the IAEA and the UN Security Council. Four months later, the Security Council issued its first resolution against Iran and provided the ultimatum for nuclear activities to Iran.

That was the background for the Security Council to issue a second resolution against Iran this year. In Resolution 1737, issued on the last day of December 2006, Iran was asked to shut down its nuclear activities. Under the umbrella of the same resolution, Iran's nuclear and missile industries were banned. But the response and reaction of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad regarding the second Security Council resolution was to call it a worthless paper. This same behavior led him to intensify media reactions against Iran.

5.2.4 Starting Natanz Nuclear Facilities

The spring of 2007 is the beginning of another incident in Iran's nuclear case. News reports in the news media indicate that Natanz's nuclear site has begun, and Iran's president Mohammad Ahmadinejad called it a national celebratory and a commemoration ceremony. While Europe, the US, and the international media did not believe such an incident and looked doubtful, Iran officially announced its successful experiments.

ElBaradei's report on the launch of thousands of centrifuge machines in Natanz was the beginning of all the doubts that the international community would once again be afraid of, to create an obstacle to peaceful nuclear activities in Iran.

In fact, the policy of the Iranian government was to create a game of intimidation and exasperation. But later, at a Vienna meeting in July 2007, the Iranian side voluntarily agreed with the IAEA's request to visit the Arak heavy water reactor, and the IAEA inspectors visited the Arak heavy water reactor on July 30, 2007.

Report August 30, 2007 Director General of the IAEA, Mohammad El-Baradei, presented the IAEA Board of Governors with a milestone in Iran's nuclear issue in the international arena. The report cites the rejection of the two-year the US claim to reprocess uranium in Iran, the successful inspection of Arak heavy water users, and the successful implementation of the Agency's ambitious plan for plutonium issue.

El-Baradei's report sparked the US and its allies dismay over the successful process of resolving Iran's nuclear issue. As the verbal conflicted between the authorities and Director General of IAEA went over the News Line and media. But inspectors and the IAEA delegation came to Iran on October 29, 2007 to hold three-day talks. This meeting and negotiation are the longest negotiations between Iran and the IAEA.

The talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency ended in addressing the issue of centrifuges as the second stage in the implementation of the plan of action in Tehran. The third stage was the talks on the source of uranium contamination, which stipulated that the talks should take place at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Tehran. Of course, this stage of the negotiations was postponed after the next meeting of the Board of Governors.

The clashes between Iran and the IAEA and the issuance of numerous resolutions against Iran continued. Of course, the US and the EU, while taking political measures against Iran, Israeli politicians, in co-operation with the US, planned ways to disrupt the system of nuclear sites. So, the Stuxnet virus caused Iran's nuclear activities to deteriorate for a while and reduced the speed of its activities.

In the wake of this destructive process in the summer of 2009, around a thousand centrifuges in Iran targeted a cyber attack. The computer virus, created by the Israeli-American security agencies, entered the Natanz Intranet via USB and the network of sites active at Natanz's nuclear facilities suffered a lot. Until the destruction of the virus, about one-fifth of the site's operating machines were down. Two years later, the UN Security Council again imposed its fourth round of sanctions on Iran. The new round of sanctions on Iran's military purchases, financial intelligence, security, military, and banking institutions was targeting them. The Security Council requested member states to inspect all ships and suspicious aircraft that are leaving or going to the Iranian border.

5.2.5 Assassination of Nuclear Scientists

A few months after the issuance of Resolution 1803 against Iran, another action was taken by the Israeli intelligence agency, and unidentified terrorists riding a motorcycle targeted two of Iran's top nuclear scientists on November 29, 2010.

Majid Shahriari was one of the prominent Iranian nuclear scientists who managed one of the major projects of the Atomic Energy Organization, and his wounded fellow, Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, played a more important role.

In December 2010, a new action was taken by Western countries against Iran, according to which Iran would withdraw from global financial networks. Following the same decision and sanctions in the US and Europe, the financial institutions and the Central Bank of Iran will be subject to sanctions. The US prohibits all companies and institutions related to Iran's oil and nuclear industry.

On January 11, 2012, Mustafa Ahmadi Roshan, a nuclear scientist in Iran, and a business vice president of Natanz's nuclear site, is being assassinated by motorcyclists after leaving home. The terrorist carries a magnetic bomb to his car door while he is passing by a bright Ahmadi car, killing Ahmadi Roshan by blasting the bomb.

Although the Iranian authorities knew such an incident to the US and Israel, and they considered those countries responsible for such a terrorist operation, the Israeli or American political authorities silenced such an incident without giving any explanation.

A few months after the incident, Iran announced that it was building 3,000 new generation centrifuges at the Natanz facility. Meanwhile, IAEA inspectors tried to access Parchin's military site. Inspectors believed that in the satellite images of the Parchin Nuclear Site showed that the Military Experiments were done. However, these images indicated that the areas were far from pollution. Meanwhile and continued pressure on Iran, this time the EU boycotted the purchase of oil from Iran. This led to a decrease in the number of Iranian oil customers. In response to the decision, Iran announced that it would apply tough restrictions and block the Strait of Hormuz. But this threat did not materialize at all.

The new round of the US sanctions began in the spring of 2012, and the White House announced that any country that would carry out oil deals with Iran would boycott the country. The money purchased from Iran should be transferred to unbanked bank accounts so that Iran can only replace its oil against the goods.

A week earlier, Iran announced that it will operate its new centrifuges, which are six times more powerful than the current generation. A few days later, the Almaty talks took place, and the dispute between the negotiators and the failure to achieve the desired result led Iran to move towards its goals.

In the meantime, President Barack Obama said that Iran is only one year away from joining the nuclear club. Because of these Western countries, they tried to use a two-way mechanism. On the one hand, negotiations with Iran will continue, on the other hand, pressure on Iran will continue. That's why the US later announces that the Navy will use new laser weapons in the Gulf.

Meanwhile, Iran has announced that American troopers will always be threatened by radar boats, and Iran's drone aircraft will also be inspected. The US was very scared and afraid of imagining that Iranian drone planes might have been armed.

5.2.6 Rouhani's Government Came to Power

An incident happens in September 2013 and the world seeks Obama's letter to Hassan Rouhani. The two sides in their correspondence express their desire to continue nuclear talks. Both want to resume talks at the level of foreign ministers and with the participation of the P5+1 group.

A month later, Rouhani and Obama on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, while the Iranian President was on his way to Tehran, speaks to Barack Obama for 15 minutes, and thus taboo the ban on dialogue between Iranian and the US leaders after Three decades break.

A few months later, the new round of talks begins in Geneva, and after the hopes of the two sides, it is foreseen to resume talks in November. Following on from the Geneva talks, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) states in a report that Iran has expressed its willingness to clarify its nuclear activities and answer the questions. However, Iran does not

comment on the inspection of the Parchin nuclear site and does not allow the IAEA inspectors to visit. While France is in the process of negotiating, negotiations are still ongoing.

The initial agreement between Iran, and the P5+1 will be reached on November 24, 2013, with a six-month deadline for negotiating a final agreement. Accordingly, Iran is committed to clarifying its nuclear program and global powers have pledged to suspend Iran sanctions during the implementation of this agreement and freeze Iran's blocked property in Western Banks.

On June 16, 2014, the final agreement will be reached. The provisions of the Geneva Nuclear Agreement are enforced despite the opposition of hardliners in Iran and the US. But little by little, Iran explains its plans for explosive detonators. Also, Iran's foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said in his speech that Iran is ready to keep its enrichment at the current level for several years and for further clarification. In front of Iran, it calls for the lifting of sanctions more quickly.

5.2.7 Joint or Mutual Action

Finally, the JCPOA in pursuit of a comprehensive agreement on Iran's nuclear program, following the consensus of Lausanne on July 14, 2015 in Vienna Austria between Iran, the EU and the P5+1 (including China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Germany).

Under this agreement, Iran cleared its medium-sized enriched uranium reserves and cut low-enriched uranium storage to 98 % reducing the number of centrifuges by about two-thirds and at least 15 years. For the next 15 years, Iran has agreed not to enrich uranium by more than 3.67 %, or not new uranium enrichment facility or new reactor reactor.

With the departure of the heart of the Arak reactor, the P5+1 statement and Iran was read by Foreign Minister of the EU, Federica Mogherini and Foreign Minister of Iran Mohammad Javad Zarif, and officially launched the JCPOA.

With the start of the JCPOA provisions, the Security Council's resolutions against Iran were abolished. The issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 has led Iran to withdraw from the UN Charter under paragraph 7.

Meanwhile, the UN, the EU and the US sanctions were abolished under the terms of the JCPOA, and many other countries freed Iran's previously blocked property and assets and deposited Iranian bank accounts. The proceeds from the liberation of Iranian assets made Iran economically and supply the infrastructure for the development of the country with a beneficial potential.

In the wake of the implementation of the JCPOA provisions, Iranian money was paid off with indemnities to Iranian accounts. New aircraft were purchased and new economic activities are under way. In the same vein, after the official launch of the JCPOA program, the Iranian president, while outlining the 11-year achievements of Iran in the nuclear, political, legal and economic fields, stated: "These achievements are consistent with the 12-year endurance of the Iranian people against all threats and sanctions and Leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership has been achieved."

It now seems that, if Iran engages with the world, a new horizon will be opened up in the relations between the two sides, and that many conflicting international equations and equilibrium will become necessary. It should be said that Iran's nuclear crisis is one of the most controversial international crises that have occurred throughout the country's political history. This crisis is remarkable in a number of ways:

- 1) In terms of duration
- 2) Operational and intelligent diplomacy
- 3) Winning the use and play

Iran's nuclear crisis, with its unique features, is unmatched in its kind and as a model, it can then be important in international relations and international law. The 12-year tumultuous negotiation between Iran and its Western countries is an example of intellectual growth and development in political science.

The experience of the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear crisis showed that common diplomacy in the countries' common relations is new and unique in its kind. Because the dialogue between Iran, the EU, the P5+1 showed that it could go beyond the theories contained in international relations and came to an end.

On the other hand, talks on Iran's nuclear crisis resolve that negotiating teams have been very experienced and efficient in terms of legal, political, diplomacy and awareness. Throughout the negotiations, the parties have acted aloud and aware of all their rights. Particularly in the Geneva-Vienna talks that eventually resulted in the JCPOA Memorandum, this can be seen clearly in the Iranian and Western teams. As a result of this awareness and experience, the negotiating parties have never felt a vacuum in their goals, and the game of diplomacy between Iran, the EU and the P5+1 is a win-win game.

5.3 Concluding Remarks and Further Research

Despite the fact that the Iranian nuclear crisis continues for years, the expected outcome has come to its end with the signing of the JCPOA agreement. In this context, there are important issues that are preemptive. After more than 10 years of negotiations and political dialogue, Iran tried to prove the theses. The strong aspects of the theses are thought to sign the JCPOA agreement. However, it is possible to describe Iran's thesis in the nuclear crisis briefly as follows:

1. The IAEA, as an 8000-hour-man, oversees all Iranian nuclear centers and has found no evidence of nuclear weapons production. Uranium enrichment has only reached 20

%, but can not be made ballistic missile and it is not possible to obtain nuclear weapons.

2. Since the day the Iranian crisis emerged, the nuclear crisis has been referred to the UN Security Council as a political approach. According to Iran, claims for nuclear weapons production stem from political opinion and antagonism. It is wrong to even think about the least possibility of this issue.
3. Iran believed that allegations of nuclear activities were made out of unreliable sources. The US with Western countries should not trust these sources and information. Iranian officials believe that all allegations against Iran were false and had no effect other than chaos. All claims have been rumors. If the allegations were correct against Iran, the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group would not be reached. The US could launch a military operation against Iran, along with its other allied nations, referring to paragraph 7 of the UN Charter.
4. Economic and political sanctions against Iran and the adoption of strict resolutions by the UN Security Council have not been effective at all. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists shows that Iran is determined to achieve nuclear technology. Enriching up to 20% indicates that Iran is able to achieve this ability. Transparency and announcement of the status of nuclear activities by Iran show that there is no vague point in Iranian activity. Iran seeks to reach its nuclear capability to use it in the fields of science, medicine, agriculture, and industry.
5. The disagreement between the IAEA and the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran's case shows that Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology is right. The same disagreement among members of the IAEA shows that Iran's nuclear file is being evaluated under political circumstances. However, it should be examined from a legal point of view. In addition, the signing of the JCPOA showed that Iran's nuclear file could be resolved in a legal way.
6. Iran, despite its commitment to the NPT, suffers from severe sanctions by the international community and through negative propaganda. But in the world, there are

countries that have nuclear technology and no country knows its nuclear production. This is a clear contradiction in dealing with different countries around the world.

7. Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, the Iranian Leader in a religious fatwa, has stated that the use of any means for mass murder is forbidden. His fatwa read out on August 30, 2012 at the 16th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit. Iran believes nuclear power is the right of everyone, but no one has the right to use or produce nuclear weapons. Iran's reluctance to operate and produce nuclear weapons has a religious and religious backgrounds.
8. Iran is negotiating with the P5+1, all of which has nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. If it is assumed that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, it will not be able to deal with nuclear countries that have more than 200,000 nuclear warheads. So cooperation is the best option for Iran. Western countries should also give Iran the right to have nuclear technology.
9. Nuclear technology can be devoted to the country as the basis for economic, scientific, and technological development. To manage nuclear power plants or to use atomic technology, it is necessary to educate the universities of prominent professionals. Considering the high safety and security standards, it can lead the country in various fields of development. In other words, nuclear technology is equal to the development of the country in various fields.
10. Iran has no obligation to the IAEA in the production of heavy water and the creation of a plant in this regard. But declaring its activities in this area to the IAEA shows that the country is transparent in its activities. Apart from this, with regard to the UCF is not obligated. But this activity was voluntarily reported to the IAEA in 2003.
11. Iran authorized the inspection of its military sites to the IAEA inspectors, as a result of reports in paragraphs 41 and 49 of GOV / 2005/67, paragraph 16 of GOV / 2005/87, paragraphs 32 and 55 of GOV / 2006/15 document. mentioned. Parchin facilities were also inspected and the IAEA investigators reported in 2003 and 2004 that Parchin, Lavizan and Shiyan are not involved in military nuclear activities. This information is contained in paragraph 41 of GOV / 2005/67. (Irannuc, 2009)

12. Over the past years, Iran has voluntarily implemented the NPT Protocols for a long time.
13. Accepting the necessary commitments to suspend uranium enrichment and export of uranium-enriched uranium to Iran outside of Iran after signing the JCPOA shows that Iran does not need to store enriched uranium and has no military intention to do so.

Given the reasons, it seems that Iran has strong theses in its claims. By relying on such theses, Iran claims that its nuclear activities were based on civilian targets. Due to the transparent positions and theses that were of a very strong nature, there was a major difference between the countries of the world about the Iranian nuclear case. Some countries in the international arena have clearly supported Iran. Russia and China repeatedly vetoed the Security Council, deterrent and punitive laws and regulations against Iran. They also voted in favor of Iran at the IAEA Board of Governors.

5.3.1 Fundamental Factors of International Support for Iran

The existence of political support from Iran at the international level has led to a negotiated solution to the crisis. Perhaps if all the countries of the world were convinced that Iran was indeed a potential danger, Iran's nuclear crisis could not be resolved by negotiation. Different countries around the world seem to have different views on Iran's nuclear crisis. If the international community believes that Iran really has a dangerous nuclear power; it threatens global security and peace; endangers political stability and international equilibrium by producing nuclear weapons; surely, all of the world continues to take severe and punitive action against Iran. The powerful countries of the world used punishment mechanisms instead of negotiating with Iran. Of course, there was legal support for this. The path to rigorous action was opened due to the adoption of the 1929 resolution on June 9, 2010, and the implementation of Article 41 of Chapter 7 of the UN.

In Article 41 of Chapter VII Charter of the UN written about Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression. (UN: last update, 2016)

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the UN to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

If the provisions of paragraph 41 could not be effective in the Iranian nuclear crisis, then the countries of the world would have been able to resort to Article 42 of Chapter VII Charter of the UN and implement it. In that case, it was natural for the US to carry out military strikes against Iran along with five permanent members of the Security Council and Israel. Article 42 of Chapter VII Charter of UN say: (UN: Last update, 2016)

“Güvenlik Konseyi, 41. Maddede öngörülen tedbirlerin yetersiz olacağını veya uygun olmadığını kanıtladığını düşünürse, uluslararası barış ve güvenliği sağlamak veya onarmak için gerekli olabilecek hava, deniz veya kara kuvvetleri tarafından böyle bir önlem alabilir. Bu tür eylem, Birleşmiş Milletler üyelerinin hava, deniz veya kara kuvvetleri tarafından gösteriler, ablukalar ve diğer işlemleri içerebilir.”

Regarding these issues, it seems that Iran's nuclear file has not been the same in the eyes of politicians from different countries of the world. This is the beginning of the inconsistency and interpretation of events. While insisting on its position, Iran insists that the nature of the Iranian case belongs to the International Atomic Energy Agency and wants the crisis to be judged in the legal direction. But the US and its allies are trying to make Iran's nuclear issue political. In this respect, even if some countries do not stand by Iran, they sometimes support its position and demand from the political side.

Over the past years, Iran's nuclear file has been adversaries and opponents of the global consensus. Meanwhile, some countries were considered to be Iran's main sponsors and supported Iran's positions. The views of these countries have a political, strategic or political interest in Iran's positions.

The most needed support from Iran's positions can be seen in the views of the political authorities of Russia and China. Of course, the implicit support of the NAMs should not be forgotten either. Of course, in many stages Turkey, India, Brazil and some Arab countries and Far East countries are also present.

In general, what comes from Russia is that the country has so far tried to moderate Western policies toward Iran. Russia reserves the right to use peaceful nuclear energy for Iran. That is, Russia does not oppose Iran, but accepts the issue of enrichment only at the research level, not at the industrial level. Since the Iranian nuclear case was referred to the Security Council, the most difficult resolution was the 1929 resolution. A serious threat to Iran arose. According to the resolution and the contents of chapter 7 of the UN Charter, the possibility of any military operation was foreseen. But Russia has tried to keep Iran's case under section 41 of the UN Charter and not allow the US and its other allies to enforce military action against Iran.

Countries try to establish their relations in international relations in order to create common interests in addition to national interests. Because, if all countries only are seeking to secure in own national interests, no common interests will be formed. As a result, mutual beneficial cooperation will not take shape. Thus, Russia can pursue its own interests in this regard, and has shown dual behavior where support for Iran has created a problem with its interests. Although Russia has had various policies over the past years and the rise of the Iranian nuclear crisis, it has tried to support Iran, rather than having a dual policy.

Russia's interests in the Middle East are exactly in line with Iran's policy in the region. On the other hand, cooperation between Iran and Russia will make Russia successful in its hegemony in the Middle East and its political geopolitics. Also, Iran's support for Syria is a cornerstone of Russia's goals in the Eastern Mediterranean. Most importantly, the Russian-Iranian alignment with China in East Asia and Eurasia also ends in favor of Russia.

The emergence of any tension in the Middle East and the possibility of a war between Iran and other countries in the world can change the balance of power against Russia. Therefore, Russia has no desire to distance itself from Iran and has continued its support. It is for these purposes that a memorandum of understanding has been signed between Iran and Russia on strategic cooperation.

Russia and India, from the economic and military standpoint, are two powerful and influential countries at the regional and international levels. Iran's nuclear crisis for India is also one of the most important regional issues. India and Russia, because of their common strategic interests, preferred to show a common stance toward Iran. Of course, India has similar positions with Russia in all regional affairs.

Both India and Russia are losing sanctions against Iran, given the interests they have in economic relations with Iran. Therefore, Iran's nuclear issue was opposed to imposing sanctions on Iran. But since resolutions issued by the Security Council against Iran were approved by other countries, Russia and India were forced to abide by it. Undoubtedly, Iran has an important role to play in the Middle East region and Iran's security is important for maintaining the security of the entire region. Russia and India, in addition to having economic and trade relations with Iran, have made economic exchanges support Iran. But preserving Iran's security can also maintain the political-economic security of Russia and India with other Middle Eastern countries. This is true of China, Turkey and Brazil.

Iran has long been regarded as the main supplier of energy for China. Iran is currently the third largest energy supplier in the People's Republic of China, according to statistics. China is reluctant to hurt its relations with Iran. It may seem that China can choose alternative alternatives and benefit from Arab countries. But Arab countries, which are more closely associated with the US in various political, military, economic, and commercial dimensions, can not be trusted partners in China for the long term, and especially in the energy issue.

On the other hand, continuation of oil flow from the Persian Gulf is one of the main concerns of China. The oil is shipped to China via the sea and the US Navy can at any moment stop it for any excuse. China has a relatively short distance from the western borders of China and if the US makes problems in the Persian Gulf, China can easily receive its oil supply from Iran, or by creating an oil pipeline from Iran Take oil.

China's support for Iran has been the security of the Middle East and the prevention of any kind of tension in the region. China does not want the US to take an adventure to achieve its goals in its outsiders, creating conditions that are detrimental to everyone. Closing the warp of war in the Middle East under the pretext of Iran's nuclear crisis will make China's trade and economic prosperity clear. With China's economic downturn, its successes and prosperity will be lost globally. China is in the current situation one of the rival countries of the US and is preparing for 2020 and beyond as the main pole of economic and political power.

Therefore, China's support for the US demands against Iran is a political suicide for China. China is pushing for the US influence in the Middle East and putting its feet on the American footprint, which is now empty with the rise of Iran. It is natural that the continuation of the sanctions and the ensuing problems can hit the interests of China in the long run. Therefore, it seems reasonable for China to support Iran in the Security Council.

5.3.2 Critics Post- JCPOA

The JCPOA agreement dated July 14, 2015 was signed between Iran and P5+1. According to this agreement, the parties claimed that they had achieved what they wanted after a long diplomatic talks marathon. In my opinion, the deal is win-win, and the parties have met expectations. Because from the beginning the lock on the target has been shown by both side have reached their aim almost. In the meantime, however, there are some criticisms both in Iranian politics and among the US politicians.

According to some, the Iranian side can not get what they want in the deal, according to some, the deal does not meet all the expectants but high demand many requests. This also applies to the US. Especially the Republican wing knows that it is insufficient to negotiate, and Barack accuses the Obama state of failing in negotiations.

Since the day that Donald Trump came to the US presidency, he has described the JCPOA deal as a "Political Disgrace" and he was saying he would cancel the deal. But the EU countries, Russia and other world countries consider the agreement to be a great achievement.

As a matter of fact, Federica Mogherini has repeatedly asked the US officials to emphasize that the JCPOA Agreement is robust and comprehensive. The UK prime minister, France President, German Prime Minister, Russia Foreign Minister, China, Japan and many other world leaders are continuing to support the JCPOA agreement.

Iran's critics believe that JCPOA do not any benefits for Iran in the political or ekconomical purchase and according to some senior government officials, w'th the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding has been of no avail. By signing this memorandum, Iran has lost its nuclear power and remains under the pressure of sanctions.

This group of critics believes that by fulfilling the Western commitments, P5+1 must open hundreds of billions of dollars of Iranian assets will be released. These sums were blocked at international banks and approved by the UN Security Council resolutions. The sale of aircraft and its parts will be out of the boycott, economic opening, trade relations and the opening of LC in Iranian banks.

It is possible that Iranian factories and merchants can continue their business through the opening of the LC. That is to say, banks should be pulled out of the impasse and appropriate platforms for the welfare of society should be provided. As the centrifuges turn around, the economic and livelihood wheel of the people also spins and flourishes. Inflation will be

eliminated and production will be out of recession. But the other side, the P5+1 and especially the US, have not fulfilled any of their obligations and this is a bitter fact in the history of Iranian politics.

In their opinion, not only are the existing sanctions already in place, even unprecedented, intense and new sanctions have been passed against the US since the memorandum. The sanctions were on the pretext of developing Iran's missile program. If sanctions were to continue with other titles, then why did they negotiate?!

Of course, some domestic criticisms of Iran also claim that in signing the memorandum, Iran has not fully achieved its goals and the loser is the negotiator. In their reports, executives from major global companies are still not confident about lifting sanctions in Iran and are confused about making decisions on investing in Iran. While half of the international companies are eager to trade with Iran, they do not dare to invest in Iran due to threats from the US and especially its president. They have not yet believed that the sanctions legislation has been removed in general.

News in foreign publications such as the Associated Press, the New York Times and Reuters also indicate that international banks and banks have called on the Treasury Department to explain the rules and rules for engagement with Iran by issuing a written statement. But the US government deliberately refuses to issue any written document in this regard.

A group of critics inside Iran, more radicals, claim that the JCPOA between Iran and the P5+1 is technically, legally and politically lacking in values. According to them, Iran has been passive for 10 years by signing an agreement. In the next 10 years, Iran will not have the right to develop nuclear technology. On the other hand, permitting continued inspections of Iran's nuclear facilities for IAEA inspectors will reveal many of Iran's technical information on nuclear technology.

The group that criticized the JCPOA of association claims that Iran will face severe restrictions over the coming years, and these restrictions are a barrier to research and development of nuclear technology. The change in the nature of the Fordou nuclear facility from the ability to enrich uranium to the research center is one of the major losses caused by the signing of the memorandum.

During the years to come, at least 8 years ahead, Iran will supply its nuclear fuel to Western countries and direct IAEA control, and will send it to other countries. Reactors that were able to produce heavy water now have fallen into a very low capacity and have to produce light water. There are very serious and dangerous gaps in the military and security spheres. Also, Western countries have pledged Iran to refrain from buying any new type of military equipment for up to 5 years and will reduce Iran's military-defense capability.

Along with a large number of advocates inside the US, some Donald Trump government officials, as well as a number of the US senators, are opposed to the nature of the JCPOA. These include Rex Tillerson, the US Secretary of State, James Mattis, the US Secretary of Defense, and McMaster, National Security Advisor. These people have hostile attitudes towards Iran and the rule of the Islamic Republic of Iran constitutes a barrier to the middle-term and long-term interests of the US in the Middle East. They fear the expansion of Iran's influence in the region. Although the US President Donald Trump has a negative thinks about JCPOA and knows JCPOA is badly, he's avoiding new crises.

What is described in the current situation from the perspective of the EU or the US critics is related to Iran's capabilities in the political and military arenas. Western countries critics claim that in the next 10 years, Iran will be able to reach a degree of nuclear technology in the shortest possible time, which would be dangerous for Iran. Iran will no longer be controlled and subject to bureaucratic pressure and strict political pressure for the next 10 years (trial period). Because all the P5+1 and the UN have emphasized this in the text.

Bad reading the nature of the JCPOA is rooted in the domestic and foreign issues of the US and beyond. Opposition to a memorandum by the Trump government is actually questioning Barack Obama's efforts. It seems that the support of some the US Republican senators has also been in line with party goals. Because questioning the nature and content of the JCPOA can also question the American Democrats and in the upcoming competitions, it is an effective field for pressure on the electoral contender.

On the other hand, the root of the US opposition to its allies is related. The impact of the views of the Israeli government and some of America's allies in the Arab world, especially Saudi Arabia, is one of the main reasons. All these movements and criticisms are in fact due to the fear of increasing Iran's influence and influence in the region.

In fact, even with regards to trying to reach an agreement with the Tehran regime, differences of opinion are very strong. Many people in Washington, for example, are opposed to any kind of deal with Iran and in fact want a regime change in Tehran. Criticizing the JCPOA, they argue that "No one should be mistaken that Iran has significantly changed its attitude toward nuclear program or its long-range nuclear targets."

Perhaps another of Donald Trump's motives to get out of the deal is to destroy the legacy of Barack Obama. During the electoral campaign as well as during the presidency, he was in a hurried position against many of the previous president's plans. So that some of Barack Obama's actions were canceled. Of course, the destruction of Obama's legacy may have other dimensions. During the presidency of Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu had a cool relationship with him. The root of this issue is also the backbone of Iran's nuclear talks.

In this regard, Obama was able to negotiate a deal, and the nuclear deal was approved despite the pressure from Israeli lobbyists in Congress. Trump and Netanyahu have many common features and goals. One of the clear and common points is the opposition to Iran's nuclear deal.

Despite all this, the JCPOA has clear and important aspects. While all internal and external dissent and criticism aside, it possible to hear rational political views from many EU political leaders and experts. The vast majority of experts in the fields of nuclear power and arms control say that diplomas have proved fruitful.

It is reasonable to always choose an agreement if these circles are choosing between a military strike and possibly a conflict and sanctions that seem to be less effective in the future. Accordingly, the JCPOA is not yet complete. In the years ahead, Iran's nuclear activities will be carried out within the framework of "verification control", which will certainly begin with a detailed drafting process. However, the agreement reached in Lausanne is a framework that all parties agree. Even this alone is an important result. But it is not a situation to be flown from happiness. No one should be mistaken that Iran has significantly changed its stance on the nuclear program or its long-range nuclear targets.

The US and the EU found Iran's nuclear activities to be objectionable for world peace and security. Despite all the criticism, the JCPOA gives the necessary assurance in many directions to the P5+1 countries. According to the agreement, international inspectors provide better insight into what Iran really is and contain important new elements. However, the purpose of regressing Iran's nuclear program initially adopted by the West has not materialized.

This may mean that it will be postponed from the prevention of a detachment crisis. But it is reassuring in many respects that it changes the quality of its nuclear facilities like Iran, Natanz and Fordou, and it also makes light water production instead of heavy water production by its reactors. Thanks to the JCPOA, the conflict between Iran and the superpower states has been prevented. Even if everything goes well, the nuclear deal will reduce one of the main sources of friction between Iran and the West. Talks with Tehran have not been easy and can be expected to become even more difficult after that. But it seems all parties have come to an agreement.

In terms of Iran, it is important to mitigate sanctions. The criticism of Tehran is that the country's nuclear activities will be severely restricted. Considering the Middle East region, which is full of crises, removing the issue of nuclear power from the chess board for a period of time is undoubtedly a positive development.

From Iran's point of view, JCPOA brings many benefits and benefits. Against the claims of all Iranian critics, Iran is profitable without this agreement. Therefore, the opinion of win-win may not be wrong.

In the deal, Iran seems to make some important concessions. But giving these compromises was unafraid. Because Iran claims to have always been peaceful and had to prove it. In any case, these issues have set the stage for the criticism of the solid opinion in Iran itself.

According to the agreement, Iran will be able to hold 6 thousand 104 of its current 19 thousand centrifuges. Only a little over 5 of these will have the quality of uranium enrichment. All working centrifuges will be older, less developed models. Everything left behind will be stored under the supervision of the IAEA inspectors. Iran will reduce enriched uranium stocks at low levels. These stocks are important in terms of being able to be further enriched and used in bomb production. Inspectors will not only be able to access major nuclear facilities, but also all sources of Iran's nuclear program, uranium deposits and mills. Iran will allow the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Authority to leave the premises where suspicious facilities or suspected activity of secret activity elsewhere in the country. Most of these restrictive measures will be implemented for 10 years, some for 15 years.

The US and the EU sanctions imposed on Iran due to its nuclear activities will be suspended. Iran will not have to shut down any nuclear facilities altogether. When the restrictions are lifted, Iran will have an important nuclear industry base. The details in the agreement are impressive.

Iran does not promise any defense - security. Even the JCPOA's paragraph "T" does not give the IAEA inspectors the right to enter defense systems development facilities. While the US has consistently argued that Iran's missile development issue is contrary to the nature of JCPOA, Yukio Amano, the IAEA's general director, finds this claim unfounded.

Iran has been freed from the battle of war that can be realized at any moment. The six sanction resolutions approved by the UN Security Council have been suspended until the time when the commitments are fully realized. In the coming years, Iran will develop its defense systems and will be able to begin buying and selling all types of weapons. Iran has acquired the right to have nuclear technology through the JCPOA and is now in the process of becoming a member of the "World Nuclear Club".

What is the future for Post- JCPOA?

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad J. Zarif said in his first comment on the elegant nuclear deal that the agreement is not perfect for anyone, but it is important for everyone. Attention to the words of Zarif. Because it is important: The agreement will affect everything in the Middle East and in relation to the region of the West.

Though the future of the JCPOA is not entirely clear, the nuclear deal will free the US policy from Israeli restrictions and make Washington as relaxed as ever since the millennium has never been.

The future of the JCPOA Agreement and its scenarios are one of the important issues that Iran and the world are researching institutions or political studying carefully about. It seems that the level of the EU, Chinese, and Russian alignment with the US nuclear strategy would affect geopolitical and security issues. A realistic understanding of the nuclear deal would also change the views of different countries on geo-economical and commercial issues, the

credibility of the US claims and the degree to which Iran and the US adhere to the spirit of the agreement.

The current the US policy strategy, especially during the Donald Trump era, has a direct impact on the post- JCPOA era. Therefore, the US strategic policy can be examined on four political axis. (1) The US intends to take a nuclear deal to bring the international community hostage to the US policies. In other words, the US is trying to maintain a nuclear deal with the international community and especially the EU, with its policies. Meanwhile, it is trying to create a new front against Iran and with them, compel Iran to negotiate on issues such as human rights, the development of missile systems and Iran's behavior in the Middle East. (2) The US wants to show off its opposition again by revising its opposition and adds to the text of the agreement once more, not already mentioned in the text. That is, the US seeks to develop the text, not its collapse. (3) New policy in the US is based on the fact that Obama's policies on the nuclear deal are restored. In the agreement, the US has not feared the development of Iran and did not consider the extent of its influence. But the Donald Trump government wants the nuclear deal to focus only on "Iran's nuclear policy". (4) Finally, the US is willing to take Iran's other concessions and limit the opportunities for Iran in the economic, political, financial and commercial fields.

Despite all this, there is no serious violation against the nature of JCPOA at present. The EU and the IAEA, and even the UN, prefer to support it. However, politics and the strategy must not ignore the possibility that will overtake everything in the future.

"The success of the agreement depends on the good intentions of both sides, and the Iranian deal should not be used to develop the nuclear program in secret, and the US should not exploit negotiations to weaken Iran."

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

TIMELINE OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR FILE

The nuclear activities of Iran and the international community's doubts over the nuclear program lasted for many years. Iran's nuclear case is one of the most important international issues in international affairs, and its assessment is politically and legally important. Western countries have accused Iran of trying to get nuclear weapons. But against this claim, Iran continued to defend its peaceful nuclear ambitions. In any case, the nuclear file is one of the most prominent examples of the political era of the Western countries as well as Iran, in terms of the nature of the case, its timing and trends, its solutions and its outcome. The timeline for the Iranian nuclear case is summarized as follows:

2001:

US intelligence officers told Seymour Hersh, a journalist and political analyst, that Iran's military nuclear facilities are not located in the "military places" at the Bushehr Light Water Plant.

2002:

In January 2002, President George W. Bush placed Iran alongside Iraq and North Korea in the "Axis of Evil." In August, an opponent of the Islamic Republic, Alireza Jafarzadeh, claimed Iran was enriching uranium at Natanz's nuclear facility. He also claimed that Iran made a heavy water reactor at Arak's nuclear site. In September of the same year, Russia launched a \$ 800 million reactor near Bushehr.

The plant was supposed to enter the circuit by the end of 2003. In December 2002, the US accused Iran of trying to produce nuclear weapons. Satellite imagery was used to prove its claim. In the screenshots shown, there were Natanz and Arak nuclear facilities, which were

not much hidden for the international community. But the US claimed that they had military applications.

2003:

In February, International Atomic Energy Agency director Mohamed ElBaradei traveled to Iran to examine Tehran's claims and to confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Of course, since May, IAEA inspectors have repeatedly inspected Iran's nuclear sites. In May, Iran confirmed that it will build facilities in Natanz and Arak. Iran insisted that existing sites such as the Bushehr nuclear power plant will operate and do not intend military activities.

But in June, Mohamed ElBaradei said that Iran has not reported some of its nuclear materials and activities to the inspectors. He called on Iran to cooperate more with the IAEA. Of course, Mohamed ElBaradei's report did not contain any material about Iran's willingness or action to develop nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, foreign ministers from the three countries asked Iran to allow more serious inspections.

Following this incident, White House spokesman Ari Fleisher announced that he would resort to a "military option" if needed, against the US. Following intense tensions between Iran and the Western countries, the IAEA has called on Iran to sign the NPT's Additional Protocol and allow inspectors to allow Iran's nuclear facilities to be unrestricted and intrusive.

In July, inspectors launched a new round of inspections. The Washington Post also said the inspectors found signs of enriched uranium in Natanz during their previous inspection. Following the news, the EU warned that if Iran did not cooperate fully with the inspectors, Brussels might revise its political and economic relations with the Islamic Republic. Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announced in August that there would be no use of nuclear weapons in Iran's military strategy. However, Iran will not at all succeed in technology of nuclear technology. Tehran, in response to the IAEA's announcement, announced that it would

allow IAEA inspectors to carry out intrusive inspections, provided that the inspectors did not disclose Iran's military capabilities.

In September of that year, Washington announced that Iran was not bound by the NPT's international agreements. But three European countries (Britain, Germany and France) have proposed that Iran be given the opportunity to expose its nuclear activities. Inspectors asked to visit Iran's nuclear sites at any time. Therefore, the IAEA, until October 31, allowed Iran to disclose its nuclear program, but the Islamic Republic did not accept this ultimatum.

In October, the PMOI(People's Mujahedin of Iran), one of the opposition groups of the Islamic Republic, claimed that a uranium enrichment plant would be constructed for military purposes in Isfahan. But that same month, Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi promised Iran to have "full transparency" in its talks with the three European countries. Following the same assertion, a Western diplomat later said that Iran has agreed to stop uranium enrichment and sign the Additional Protocol.

In November 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had acknowledged that it had produced plutonium. This material is used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. But the report said there was no evidence that Iran was going to produce a nuclear bomb. Although the US rejected the report, the IAEA defended its report. The report was eventually approved. Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran Representative in IAEA signed an Additional Protocol in December to expedite the unconditional inspection of Iran's nuclear facilities.

2004:

In April 2004, Iran denied the existence of secret nuclear facilities. However, he said that testing uranium enriched in Isfahan would not be in line with Iran's NPT obligations. Also, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced that the Islamic Republic "will voluntarily" stop the production of centrifuge. A few weeks later, in May, Iran announced its report to the IAEA and explained its nuclear activities. The report

was more than 1000 pages long. Although Iran denied claims against itself and wanted to be a member of the nuclear club, some diplomats claimed that Iran was seeking to procure and buy tens of thousands of technical pieces on the black atomic market, indicating that Iran had a tendency it produces atomic weapons.

Iran, after announcing that the EU3 did not fulfill their obligations, pulled the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in July 2004 from the centrifuges and engaged in the production of centrifuges at Natanz. Iran's claim was that it produced centrifuges to enrich uranium. But it has not started production yet.

In August, Israel threatened Iran with military strikes against Iran's nuclear facilities. In response to this threat, Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said that he would give Israel a definitive answer. With tensions rising between Iran and Western countries, Iran has declared that it will not stop producing centrifuges and will not accept an unlimited suspension of enrichment.

In September, the Agency once again allowed Iran to disclose its nuclear activities by November 25. In response to this request, Iran announced that it has resumed extensive processing of yellow cake, which is a step towards enrichment.

In October 2004, three European countries called on Tehran to stop all enrichment-related activities or its case would be referred to the Security Council. The EU3 offered incentives.

2005:

In the first month of the year, IAEA inspectors visited the Parchin Facility. Iran did not accept the offer of three European countries and continued the construction of a heavy water reactor. In May, European countries warned Iran to end the talks if nuclear activities continue. But Iran warned that its decision on uranium processing is irreversible.

In August 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the new president of Iran, announced that the set of incentives in Europe is not enough and that Iran will continue to work in the next few days. In the same month, Ali Larijani replaced Hassan Rouhani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic, and led the negotiations with Europeans. Larijani announced that he would continue negotiations.

Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for the elimination of nuclear fuel productions as illogical and declared that Europeans are bullying the demand for halting nuclear fuel production. He felt regrettable that the European countries affected by the US.

EU3 canceled their August 31 talks with Iran over the resumption of nuclear activities in the Isfahan Facility. A spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry said that the resumption of uranium processing is in contravention of the provisions of the Paris Agreement, which had been signed by the parties involved in the negotiations in November 2004.

EU Foreign Policy Chief, Javier Solana announced in September that Iran might be referred to the Security Council for its nuclear activities. Meanwhile, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the UN headquarters announced that some countries would prevent other countries from free access to technology, especially nuclear technology. He called for the formation of a committee at the UN to deal with "atomic apartheid." The US and the EU responded sharply to the words of the Iranian president and called on the Agency to refer the case to the Security Council.

Following such a request, the resolution of the Board of Governors was adopted by a majority of votes and called on Iran to resume negotiations with the three European countries, to ratify the Additional Protocol by the legislature and to stop the uranium enrichment program. But Iran's Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki has declared the IAEA to be illegal and unacceptable, saying Iran does not close the negotiation process. He threatened that his country would resume uranium enrichment if it did not reform or insist on its implementation, and would prevent more intrusive and widespread inspections of its nuclear facilities.

In October, John Bolton, the US ambassador to the UN, accused Iran of trying to produce Nuclear weapons for 18 years, and has reached a threatened level in the development of nuclear science, and has spared the world every day with several talks. Fools away. But Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, wrote to the European countries that the Islamic Republic was willing to resume talks.

Iranian parliamentarians voted in November that if Iran's nuclear case is referred to the Security Council, Iran should suspend voluntary activities, including the permissive inspection of nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol.

2006:

January 2006, was with the hottest news on Iran's nuclear file. Russia urged Iran to take an important part in Iran's enrichment activities, but Ali Larijani rejected the Russian plan. British, French and German foreign ministers said after a meeting in Berlin that nuclear talks had reached a deadlock with Iran and they want the Security Council to intervene in this case. Following this incident, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by announcing that Iran had the necessary leverage against Western threats.

Following this crisis, officials from Iran and the EU met in Brussels, the capital of Belgium. While the Iranians spoke of the success of the talks, European diplomats said the Iranian authorities did not have a new word, and the meeting was fruitless. The P5+1 group (US, UK, France, China, and Russia along with Germany) formed a meeting in London on this date. Attending the meeting was a representative of the EU. They requested a statement in the early hours of the morning. The IAEA Board of Governors reported on Iran's nuclear activities in its extraordinary meeting on February 2 to address the Security Council.

On the very first days of February, when the IAEA Board of Governors convened an emergency meeting, Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, warned in a letter to the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, that if the case was referred

to the Security Council, The Islamic Republic of Iran will "have no choice" but to stop all voluntary cooperation with the Agency. The agency's decision was postponed for one day, but finally, on February 4, the Board of Governors approved 27 reports of 35 member states (3 opposing and 5 abstentions), reporting Iran's nuclear file and referring to the UN Security Council. On the same day, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a letter to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, ordered that the NPT extension be suspended.

In March, the International Atomic Energy Agency's Board of Governors sent Iran's nuclear activities along with the IAEA Director-General's report to the UN Security Council. The council did not issue a new resolution on Iran, sending a report on Iran's nuclear activities to the Security Council on the basis of a resolution issued on February 4th. In a statement, the head of the Security Council called for a full and sustained suspension of Iran's nuclear activities.

In April 2006, Iran announced that its uranium enrichment was 3.5 percent for the first time. In response to Iran's claim, the UN Security Council (UN Security Council), in July, called for an end to the uranium enrichment program in Iran. In late 2006, the UN Security Council approved its second resolution on Iran. According to the resolution, no country had the right to sell or transfer nuclear and military equipment to Iran, and the first sanctions against Iran began.

2007:

In March 2007, the UN Security Council sanctioned for the third time in a resolution Iran. A few weeks later, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced his country's ability to produce nuclear fuel.

2008:

In March 2008, the Security Council issued new sanctions against Iran by issuing a fourth resolution. Following the same resolution in September, the Security Council recalled a

resolution on Iran's previous sanctions, calling for a fifth call for a stoppage of the uranium enrichment program in Iran.

2009:

In the spring of 2009, Iran announced the deployment of 7,000 centrifuge machines in Natanz. The equipment was considered as the main source of enriched uranium production. In September of the same year, the new Iranian nuclear facility was revealed at the site of Ford in the city of Qom. Iran had also built nuclear facilities in the area. Iran claimed that it would carry out its uranium enrichment program outside the country's borders, but in October 2009, Iran denied such a claim.

2010:

The UN Security Council in its sixth resolution on June 2010 imposed new sanctions on Iran. Russia, which was previously opposed to imposing new sanctions against Iran, eventually agreed to a new boycott of Iran. After a few weeks in July, Iran announced that it was ready to negotiate immediately with the P5+1 consisting of permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, America, France, China, Russia) along with Germany.

Meanwhile, in August 2010, Iran began using atomic fuel at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Following that, in September of the same year, Iran objected to the IAEA report. Director General of IAEA, Yukiya Amano, expressed regret at the lack of close cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister in October advised Iranian authorities to mediate between Iran and the US. He also said that Iran was not a nuclear threat to the world, and that it did not need nuclear weapons. In November 2010, the Stuxnet virus was reported to have infiltrated and overturned over 1,000 atomic computer sites through computer systems. The virus was a factor that delayed Iran's nuclear program. Iran accused countries such as the US and Israel of infecting Stuxnet worms. Following this incident, two Iranian nuclear scientists in the capital

of the country targeted an armed attack. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accused Israel and the US of plotting the assassination, but none of the states of the US and Israel showed a reaction to confirm or deny the claim.

Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, announced an increase in security measures to protect nuclear scientists from the country. That same month, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said sanctions imposed on Iran may create a gap between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

A few days after this remark, the Secretary of Defense rejected the remarks by the Israeli Prime Minister and said there was no need to use a military threat to stop Iran's nuclear program. Because the effectiveness of economic sanctions is more than anything else.

In December 2010, Russian and Indian leaders, in a joint statement emphasizing Iran's right to peaceful nuclear technology, urged the country to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. In the same month, two-day talks between Iran and the P5+1 and the EU representative in Geneva ended, and only the two sides agreed that the talks would continue. Meanwhile, Iran announced that the first yellow cake shipped at Bandar Abbas, Gatchin Complex was transferred to Isfahan's nuclear site, and the country has become self-sufficient in producing yellow cake.

2011:

With the start of the New Year, the negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 began in Istanbul for two days. Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and the Iranian nuclear case in charge of the talks. The last round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 in Istanbul was described as disappointing by Western countries. In such a situation, the New York Times wrote that the Worm Stuxnet virus was a joint US-Israeli project to dismantle Iran's uranium enrichment program.

In February, EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton said the union is considering abolishing the travel ban, Ali Akbar Salehi, the new Iranian foreign minister. Because Salehi must be out of sanctions because of the important role he plays in Iran's nuclear program. But at the same time, the British Foreign Secretary, on a trip to Abu Dhabi, called for tougher sanctions against Iran's nuclear program. He said holding talks is more likely to be impossible unless Iran abandons its condition.

In February, another news headline was announced. In its latest report, the atomic agency said Iran plans to deplete the Bushehr nuclear power plant at the heart of its reactor. Following this news, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's ambassador to the IAEA confirmed the report on the discharging of Bushehr's nuclear fuel.

In March, an IRGC(Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) official admitted that the Stuxnet virus has affected the country's industries, but major parts of it have been controlled and neutralized. At the same time, he also invited hackers who have good faith to collaborate. Following this comment, Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, also said that the organization has been damaged in recent years by the "area of management and human resources".

In May, EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton said she received a letter from the Iranian negotiator. He added that the letter of Saeed Jalili has no new features and does not justify the need for another meeting. Meanwhile, the EU and the US imposed new sanctions on Iran. EU foreign ministers at a Brussels summit boycotted a number of Iranian officials and companies suspected of communicating with the country's nuclear program. The sanctions included the blocking of assets and the travel ban for individuals. Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said that the UN International Atomic Energy Agency has stopped Iranian companies at some of the conferences and workshops.

In July, Iran announced the installation of new centrifuges that are used with higher quality and faster uranium enrichment. But the Associated Press quoted diplomatic sources as saying that Iran's nuclear program at the center of Fordou has fallen behind schedule. Iran has shown a reaction to this news and announced that it has transferred its centrifuges from the site of Natanz to Fordo in Qom.

In August, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov proposed a "step-by-step approach" to Iran's nuclear case. Accordingly, Iran should take steps to build trust and, in the face of the international community, gradually cut back on sanctions. Iran welcomed the Russian plan. Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi called for details of the Russian proposal. Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, vice president and chair of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Tehran would no longer negotiate with Iran about the non-production of nuclear fuel or exchange of nuclear fuel.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy warned that Iran's nuclear and missile ambitions could lead to a pre-emptive strike against the country.

In September of this year, the IAEA expressed concern about the possibility of Iran's nuclear program deviated over military objectives. The Agency announced that since February 2007, Iran has produced more than 4,500kg of uranium enriched at Natanz. But the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization did not respond to these statements and said that the opposition countries are constantly hurting nuclear facilities. He complained of the penetration of viruses into nuclear site systems and the sale of defective equipment.

In September, Bushehr's nuclear power plant network was connected to Iran's grid by power of 60 MW on September 3, 2011. Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced his readiness to stop nuclear enrichment if he receives enriched uranium at a concentration of 20 percent. The US rejects Iran's proposal to devalue Iran's enriched uranium. Brazilian Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota said there was a fear that Iran's nuclear program would not be

completely peaceful and that Tehran should reduce tensions through dialogue. China's Ambassador to the IAEA, Cheng Jinhaye, called for increased diplomatic moves to end Iran's nuclear dispute. Meanwhile, the US denounced it as a "propaganda maneuver", accusing it of ignoring its international obligations by rejecting Iran's new proposal to resume talks with the P5+1.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Mrs. Catherine Ashton said in October that Tehran would resume nuclear talks if Tehran was ready for useful talks. But the request was not yet answered by Israeli President Shimon Peres warning of a possible military attack on Iran.

In November 2011, the Office of the Representative of Iran to the UN stated that the discriminatory approach as well as the political motives of the developed countries made it hard to become a member of the NPT. The agency added that the IAEA's agreements not only do not facilitate nuclear cooperation, but will also prevent serious cooperation.

Earlier in November, US State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said the US had consulted with Israel on reports that Israeli military intervention was possible on Iran's nuclear facilities. But Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defense Minister, denied recent reports and speculation about Israel's intention to launch a military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev urged Iran to fulfill its obligations to the international community. Meanwhile, the Washington Post wrote in an article quoted by nuclear experts and Western diplomats. The IAEA's report shows that Iran, with the help of foreign scientists, has been able to overcome technical barriers and reach the threshold of nuclear capability.

In late November, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad strongly criticized Iran's announcement on the eve of a new report by the IAEA secretary general, Yukiya Amano, on Iran's nuclear program. Ahmadinejad said that Amano has no authority and repeats the words of the US.

In December, US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Iran would be able to produce a nuclear bomb for another year. He said the Iranians might have secret facilities to enrich uranium. The US House of Representatives voted to extend Iran's economic sanctions, including the boycott of its central bank, by approving the US defense budget. At the end of this month, Iran's top nuclear negotiator announced its country's bid to launch a new round of talks with the P5+1, and European officials also said they would welcome meaningful negotiations with Iran without preconditions. Iranian officials warned that Iran would prevent other countries from crossing the Strait of Hormuz, which would face the sharp reaction of the US in the event of sanctions on Iranian oil purchases by Western countries.

2012:

One day after Iran invited Iran to resume a new round of nuclear talks with the P5+1, the country's atomic energy agency announced that it had developed and tested the first prototype of a nuclear fuel containing uranium. The IAEA has confirmed that Iran has begun enriching uranium in Fordou Facility underground facilities. The US says that this decision will further intensify the process of violating Iran's international obligations. Fereydoun Abbasi Dawani, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, announced the opening of a Fordou enrichment facility near Qom in the near future. The Secretary of Defense said that Iran has not yet made a nuclear bomb despite the prospect of building nuclear weapons. At the same time, he said he should not miss any option. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed that Iran has begun enriching uranium in the Fordou underground facility. The US says that this decision will further intensify the process of violating Iran's international obligations.

In January, another bitter incident occurred in Iran. Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, business associate of Natanz's enrichment site, was killed in a terror blast in Tehran. Iran condemned Israel for involvement in this assassination. The UK and America condemned the assassination. In the same month, French President Nicolas Sarkozy warned that any military intervention in Iran to confront its nuclear program would cause wars and chaos throughout

the Middle East and even beyond. EU countries have officially agreed to stop buying and importing oil from Iran at a meeting in Brussels. The EU also announced that it will block the assets of the Central Bank of Iran.

A group of Democratic, Republican, and Independent Democrats in the US issued a report calling for increased political and military threats against Iran with the aim of stopping the country's nuclear program. Iran's foreign minister calls the threats of the Western countries unfounded. The possibility of a military attack on Iran is impossible. But he said that the country has plans for the worst scenarios and is ready in every way.

In February, Iran installed the first nuclear fuel plate in Iran using uranium with a 20% enriched uranium in Tehran's research reactor. At the same time, the use of the first generation of new generation Iranian centrifuges began in Natanz.

The IAEA inspectors led by Herman Negartes, deputy director of the IAEA, went to Tehran to continue talks with Iranian officials over the country's nuclear program. Following the visit of the IAEA inspectors to Tehran, the IAEA announced that the agency's visit to Iran had ended without achieving the result. Director General Yukiya Amano said Iran did not allow the Delegation to visit the Parchin Military district in eastern Tehran. The IAEA said in its report that it is concerned about Iran's nuclear program, and despite intensive talks with Iranian officials, ambiguities about the potential military dimension of Iran's nuclear program remain.

A White House spokeswoman said in March that Iran has not yet entered the nuclear-weapons phase openly, and sanctions against the nuclear program have the opportunity to pressure it. President Barack Obama has warned Iran not to question the use of force to prevent Iran from gaining access to nuclear weapons. Existing concerns have reached the point where Catherine Ashton, EU Foreign Policy Chief, announced on behalf of the P5+1 that they are once again ready to continue talks with Iran. In response to this comment, the Iranian Agency for IAEA

said in a statement that Iran would allow the visit of IAEA inspectors to the Parchin Military site. The P5+1 agreed to discuss with Iran's delegates in April on Iran's nuclear issue.

In the months of March, Barack Obama said the world is united against the Iranian government and the sanctions imposed on that country have been effective. He also said the US would not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, he said he believes diplomacy is still working on Iran.

In April, Iran and the P5+1 group announced after a few days that the talks would continue in Istanbul. Iran wanted the second round of talks in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq. Iran's Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi, one day before the start of the Istanbul talks, wrote in an article published in the Washington Post that if these talks were intended only to prevent a war and to delay more collisions, the wall of distrust It will not collapse and negotiations will not result in a result. The headline of Ali Akbar's article was: "We do not want nuclear weapons." He announced Iran's readiness to negotiate without any preconditions.

That same month, Saeed Jalili, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator and EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton, speaking on behalf of the P5+1, described the Istanbul negotiations as "constructive and positive" and described the negotiations on the next stage. In Baghdad, the capital of Iraq agreed. The US is delighted with the results of the Istanbul negotiations, saying that sanctions relief for Iran is not on the agenda of world powers. Meanwhile, Israeli officials criticized the weekly interruption of the Istanbul-Baghdad talks, making the five weeks an ideal occasion for Iran. In their view, Iran has had the opportunity to develop nuclear programs.

In May 2012, Vienna City of Austria saw two rounds of talks between Iran and the IAEA. The IAEA General Director, Yukiya Amano, met with officials from the Islamic Republic of Iran one day before the Iran summit and group five plus one in Tehran. Iran and the P5+1 met in Baghdad on May 23-24. Iran delivered its proposed package to the West, which had been

presented in previous years, with reloading to the P5+1. Diplomats talked about the difficulty of negotiating and negotiating. At the end of the second day of the nuclear talks, the two sides announced that they would meet for the third time in Moscow's capital of Russia at the end of the month. The members of the P5+1, after the end of the meeting, immediately left Iraq and the US ambassador left for Israel. Saeed Jalili, the Iranian nuclear case manager, told reporters at a meeting that the Iranian delegation was ready to continue talks for the third consecutive day in Baghdad.

A day after the talks in Baghdad, IAEA inspectors said they found signs of uranium enrichment with concentrations of more than 20 percent in the Fordou facility in Iran. In response, Iran responded to the IAEA, "Technical malfunction may have enriched 27 percent."

Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran's envoy to the IAEA, approved the Agency's report on the production of more than 6 tons of uranium to 5 percent and production of more than 140 kilograms of uranium to 20 percent by Iran. Iran's representative cited these statistics as a sign of scientific success.

The Moscow talks were held in June. On the eve of Iran's nuclear talks with the representatives of the P5+1 in Moscow, Iran's Vice President for International Affairs expressed his optimism about the outcome of the talks. A senior commander of the Iranian armed forces also said that the negotiations were based on Iran's interests and interests. But in July 2012, the EU imposed sanctions on Iranian oil and oil products from the beginning of July.

In September, Catherine Ashton met with EU Foreign Policy Chief, representing six world powers, and Saeed Jalili, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, representing the country in Istanbul, Turkey. The two sides, after a conversation at a hotel in Istanbul, went to a dinner party at the Iranian Consulate. The two sides expressed satisfaction, but details of the content of the conversation were not published.

In September, Fereydoun Abbasi was commended. He allegedly spy out of the country's nuclear program by accusing Western intelligence agencies, especially the MI-6 (British Foreign Intelligence Agency), that Iran sometimes provides inaccurate information to protect its nuclear facilities. In an interview with Al-Hayat, he claimed that Iran sometimes displays its weaknesses and sometimes exaggerates its abilities. This is because of the fact that other countries do not realize the real potential of Iran.

State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in response to the reporters' questions about the words of the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Fereidoun Abbasi Dawani: "These words are of concern to the international community." The US called on Abbasi Dawani to convey "misinformation to the IAEA" as a lie to the countries confession.

In October, the value of the Rial against foreign currencies is sharply reduced. The rise in exchange rates and protests in the Tehran market is driving government policies. The US once again introduces the Iranian government as responsible for the economic turmoil in Iran. Meanwhile, US Department of State Public Relations vice president Mike Hammer states that sanctions will be mitigated if the Iranian government contributes to the proposals offered seriously and comprehensively with the P5+1.

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, considers the massive sanctions against Iran "irrational and brutal" and lends the promise of Western countries to reduce sanctions.

2013:

In January 2013, the EU Foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton spokesman, declares that Iran has not accepted the offer of the P5+1 group to negotiate this month in Istanbul. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused Western powers of not having reached an agreement on the location of Iran's nuclear talks on having "childlike behaviors." Mr. Sergey Lavrov said: "We are ready to meet everywhere and as soon as possible."

In February, US Vice President Joe Biden said his country is ready to negotiate directly with Iran, and whenever Ayatollah Ali Khamenei seriously wants to negotiate, this dialogue will take place. Joe Biden added that his country would support bilateral talks that would reduce international disputes over Iran's nuclear program.

Ali Akbar Salehi, Iran's Foreign Minister, at the Munich Security Conference on the proposal of Vice President Joe Biden on a direct dialogue with Iran, said: "We look at these statements with a positive look."

Following the exchange of media messages between Iran and the US, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the offer to negotiate with the US and warned Iranian authorities to maintain the interests of the country and the negotiation would not solve the problem. In February, a new phase of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group was held in Almaty, Kazakhstan. But this stage of the negotiations did not yield any results.

During the second round of Iran's nuclear talks and six powers of power hosted by Kazakhstan, the Iranian delegates did not give a clear and definitive answer to the proposal of the great powers to resolve the nuclear dispute between the two sides. At the beginning of the talks, Iran had said that it would provide specific programs, but once again the old proposals were presented. The same proposals that were made in Russia a year ago and Western countries also rejected them.

In May 2013, pregnancy was a new occurrence. Iranian presidential candidate Hassan Rouhani announced that he would be prevented from taking sanctions if he became president, and would reduce the political and economic pressure of the international community.

In June, Hassan Rouhani came to victory with the slogan of moderation and détente of Iran's foreign policy, gaining a decisive majority, and became the seventh president of Iran. A month

later, the President of the US, British Prime Minister, President of China, Russia and France congratulated him.

In August, Mohammad Javad Zarif, a senior diplomat from Iran, became Iran's new foreign minister, Mohammad Khatami, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator. Hassan Rouhani gave the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responsibility for nuclear talks.

In October of that year, Mohammad Javad Zarif met with US Secretary of State John Kerry on sidelines to meet foreign ministers from the P5+1 countries and EU Foreign Policy Chief Catherine Ashton in New York on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. This was the first Iranian-American foreign ministers talks over the past 34 years.

Meanwhile, Hassan Rouhani and Barack Obama, Iranian and American presidents, spoke at the end of Rouhani's trip to New York, and emphasized the diplomacy of resolving the Iranian nuclear case. The first round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group was held in October during the presidency of Hassan Rouhani in Geneva, Switzerland. The two sides said satisfaction with the talks after the end of the two-day talks that the next phase will be in early November. The proposal for Iran, entitled "Ending an unnecessary crisis, starting a new horizons" was the focus of two-day talks in Geneva.

On November 7, the first day of the Iran- P5+1 talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Catherine Ashton began at the UN Headquarters in Geneva and continued with the negotiating team. The second day of the Iran- P5+1 talks in Geneva began when foreign ministers from the US, the UK, France and Germany were heading for Geneva to join the talks.

On November 24, Iran and the P5+1 agreed on an interim agreement on Iran's nuclear program and suspension of sanctions. Under the agreement, some of the sanctions were suspended from the standstill in some of Iran's nuclear activities, and the P5 + 1 pledged not to impose new sanctions against Iran during the upcoming negotiations.

2014:

In January 2014, the Geneva Interim Agreement was implemented. Therefore, during the implementation of the interim agreement, part of the blocked assets of Iran was released.

In July 2014, Iran and the P5+1 team extended the duration of the Geneva Interim Agreement for a number of years and until its anniversary to reach a final agreement.

In November, Mohammad Javad Zarif and John Kerry met several times during the atomic talks in Vienna. As the negotiations progressed, Iran and the P5+1 agreed that the implementation of the Geneva Interim Agreement would be renewed for another six months.

2015:

In February, a new round of talks between Iran and the P5+1 group took place in Switzerland. Iran's foreign ministers and the P5+1 team, with determination and determination, agreed to reach a final agreement.

In March, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and US Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz, joined the talks to resolve technical issues. With the approach to the Nowruz (the Persian Eid) and the prolongation of negotiations and the need for further consultations with the capitals, the negotiators decided to continue the talks after the new Iranian year to reach the conclusion.

In March, Iran and the P5+1 discussed the details of the deal and reached agreement on a final agreement in Lausanne, Switzerland. In May 2015, negotiations between Iranian and US foreign ministers began in Vienna. Chairman of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and US Secretary of Energy, and brother of the Iranian president, were also in talks.

On July 14, 2015, after a long deal, an agreement was reached between Iran and the P5+1 and the EU. Memorandum of Understanding JCPOA "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" was signed. This Memorandum of Understanding was unique in the history of international

diplomacy and international relations. The longest negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 were 18 days. The Security Council, by issuing a resolution, accepted Iran's agreement with the P5+1 and abolished its previous resolutions against Iran.

In October 2015, the Iranian Parliament passed a bill after the EU-US accepted the JCPOA. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a letter to Hassan Rouhani, approved the resolution of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, and this agreement was formally accepted by Iran.

On December 15, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) closed Iran's nuclear case which is likely to have military implications. In line with its commitments, Iran reduced existing centrifuges. Started the exchange of uranium-enriched uranium stones with Russia.

2016:

In January 2016, Iran was informed of the full exodus of the enriched reserves of uranium to the level of commitment made. Iran reportedly sent about 11 tons of its enriched uranium to Russia, receiving about 200 tons of yellow cake. Following this cooperation, European and American countries have blocked property and released Iranian bank deposits and sanctions have been lifted.

APPENDIX 2
JOINT COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION
Vienna, 14 July 2015

PREFACE

The E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) and the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome this historic Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which will ensure that Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful, and mark a fundamental shift in their approach to this issue. They anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

Iran envisions that this JCPOA will allow it to move forward with an exclusively peaceful, indigenous nuclear program, in line with scientific and economic considerations, in accordance with the JCPOA, and with a view to building confidence and encouraging international cooperation. In this context, the initial mutually determined limitations described in this JCPOA will be followed by a gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, of Iran's peaceful nuclear program, including its enrichment activities, to a commercial program for exclusively peaceful purposes, consistent with international non-proliferation norms.

The E3/EU+3 envision that the implementation of this JCPOA will progressively allow them to gain confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's program. The JCPOA reflects mutually determined parameters, consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on the scope of Iran's nuclear program, including enrichment activities and R&D. The JCPOA addresses the E3/EU+3's concerns, including through comprehensive measures providing for transparency and verification.

The JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.

PREAMBLE AND GENERAL PROVISIONS

i. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3/EU+3 (China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) have decided upon this long-term Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This JCPOA, reflecting a step-by-step approach, includes the reciprocal commitments as laid down in this document and the annexes hereto and is to be endorsed by the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

ii. The full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

iii. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons.

iv. Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in line with its obligations therein, and the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.

v. This JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy.

vi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations as set out in the UN Charter.

vii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran acknowledge that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

viii. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. The E3/EU+3 will refrain from imposing discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by this JCPOA. This JCPOA builds on the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) agreed in Geneva on 24 November 2013.

ix. A Joint Commission consisting of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA and will carry out the functions provided for in this JCPOA. This Joint Commission will address issues arising from the implementation of this JCPOA and will operate in accordance with the provisions as detailed in the relevant annex.

x. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be requested to monitor and verify the voluntary nuclear-related measures as detailed in this JCPOA. The IAEA will be requested to provide regular updates to the Board of Governors, and as provided for in this JCPOA, to the UN Security Council. All relevant rules and regulations of the IAEA with regard to the protection of information will be fully observed by all parties involved.

xi. All provisions and measures contained in this JCPOA are only for the purpose of its implementation between E3/EU+3 and Iran and should not be considered as setting precedents for any other state or for fundamental principles of international law and the rights and obligations under the NPT and other relevant instruments, as well as for internationally recognized principles and practices.

xii. Technical details of the implementation of this JCPOA are dealt with in the annexes to this document.

xiii. The EU and E3+3 countries and Iran, in the framework of the JCPOA, will cooperate, as appropriate, in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and engage in mutually determined civil nuclear cooperation projects as detailed in Annex III, including through IAEA involvement.

xiv. The E3+3 will submit a draft resolution to the UN Security Council endorsing this JCPOA affirming that conclusion of this JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this

issue and expressing its desire to build a new relationship with Iran. This UN Security Council resolution will also provide for the termination on Implementation Day of provisions imposed under previous resolutions; establishment of specific restrictions; and conclusion of consideration of the Iran nuclear issue by the UN Security Council 10 years after the Adoption Day.

xv. The provisions stipulated in this JCPOA will be implemented for their respective durations as set forth below and detailed in the annexes.

xvi. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will meet at the ministerial level every 2 years, or earlier if needed, in order to review and assess progress and to adopt appropriate decisions by consensus.

Iran and E3/EU+3 will take the following voluntary measures within the timeframe as detailed in this JCPOA and its Annexes.

NUCLEAR

A.ENRICHMENT, ENRICHMENT R&D, STOCKPILES

1. Iran's long term plan includes certain agreed limitations on all uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment-related activities including certain limitations on specific research and development (R&D) activities for the first 8 years, to be followed by gradual evolution, at a reasonable pace, to the next stage of its enrichment activities for exclusively peaceful purposes, as described in Annex I. Iran will abide by its voluntary commitments, as expressed in its own long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan to be submitted as part of the initial declaration for the Additional Protocol to Iran's Safeguards Agreement.

2. Iran will begin phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges in 10 years. During this period, Iran will keep its enrichment capacity at Natanz at up to a total installed uranium enrichment capacity of 5060 IR-1 centrifuges. Excess centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure at Natanz will be stored under IAEA continuous monitoring, as specified in Annex I.

3. Iran will continue to conduct enrichment R&D in a manner that does not accumulate enriched uranium. Iran's enrichment R&D with uranium for 10 years will only include IR-4,

IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges as laid out in Annex I, and Iran will not engage in other isotope separation technologies for enrichment of uranium as specified in Annex I. Iran will continue testing IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges, and will commence testing of up to 30 IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges after eight and a half years, as detailed in Annex I.

4. As Iran will be phasing out its IR-1 centrifuges, it will not manufacture or assemble other centrifuges, except as provided for in Annex I, and will replace failed centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type. Iran will manufacture advanced centrifuge machines only for the purposes specified in this JCPOA. From the end of the eighth year, and as described in Annex I, Iran will start to manufacture agreed numbers of IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge machines without rotors and will store all of the manufactured machines at Natanz, under IAEA continuous monitoring until they are needed under Iran's long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan.

5. Based on its own long-term plan, for 15 years, Iran will carry out its uranium enrichment-related activities, including safeguarded R&D exclusively in the Natanz Enrichment facility, keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67%, and, at Fordou, refrain from any uranium enrichment and uranium enrichment R&D and from keeping any nuclear material.

6. Iran will convert the Fordou facility into a nuclear, physics and technology centre. International collaboration including in the form of scientific joint partnerships will be established in agreed areas of research. 1044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain in one wing at Fordou. Two of these cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification, for stable isotope production. The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle. All other centrifuges and enrichment-related infrastructure will be removed and stored under IAEA continuous monitoring as specified in Annex I.

7. During the 15 year period and as Iran gradually moves to meet international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran, it will keep its uranium stockpile under 300 kg of

up to 3.67% enriched uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) or the equivalent in other chemical forms. The excess quantities are to be sold based on international prices and delivered to the international buyer in return for natural uranium delivered to Iran, or are to be down-blended to natural uranium level. Enriched uranium in fabricated fuel assemblies from Russia or other sources for use in Iran's nuclear reactors will not be counted against the above stated 300 kg UF₆ stockpile, if the criteria set out in Annex I are met with regard to other sources. The Joint Commission will support assistance to Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation as appropriate, in meeting international qualification standards for nuclear fuel produced in Iran. All remaining uranium oxide enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Any additional fuel needed for the TRR will be made available to Iran at international market prices.

B.ARAK, HEAVY WATER, REPROCESSING

8. Iran will redesign and rebuild a modernised heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on an agreed conceptual design, using fuel enriched up to 3.67 %, in a form of an international partnership which will certify the final design. The reactor will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production for medical and industrial purposes. The redesigned and rebuilt Arak reactor will not produce weapons grade plutonium. Except for the first core load, all of the activities for redesigning and manufacturing of the fuel assemblies for the redesigned reactor will be carried out in Iran. All spent fuel from Arak will be shipped out of Iran for the lifetime of the reactor. This international partnership will include participating E3/EU+3 parties, Iran and such other countries as may be mutually determined. Iran will take the leadership role as the owner and as the project manager and the E3/EU+3 and Iran will, before Implementation Day, conclude an official document which would define the responsibilities assumed by the E3/EU+3 participants.

9. Iran plans to keep pace with the trend of international technological advancement in relying on light water for its future power and research reactors with enhanced international cooperation, including assurance of supply of necessary fuel.

10. There will be no additional heavy water reactors or accumulation of heavy water in Iran for 15 years. All excess heavy water will be made available for export to the international market.

11. Iran intends to ship out all spent fuel for all future and present power and research nuclear reactors, for further treatment or disposition as provided for in relevant contracts to be duly concluded with the recipient party.

12. For 15 years Iran will not, and does not intend to thereafter, engage in any spent fuel reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of spent fuel reprocessing, or reprocessing R&D activities leading to a spent fuel reprocessing capability, with the sole exception of separation activities aimed exclusively at the production of medical and industrial radio-isotopes from irradiated enriched uranium targets.

C.TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

13. Consistent with the respective roles of the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V and fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

14. Iran will fully implement the "Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues" agreed with the IAEA, containing arrangements to address past and present issues of concern relating to its nuclear program as raised in the annex to the IAEA report of 8 November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). Full implementation of activities undertaken under the Roadmap by Iran will be completed by 15 October 2015, and subsequently the Director General will provide by 15 December 2015 the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues to the Board of Governors, and the E3+3, in their capacity as members of the Board of Governors, will submit a resolution to the Board of Governors for

taking necessary action, with a view to closing the issue, without prejudice to the competence of the Board of Governors.

15. Iran will allow the IAEA to monitor the implementation of the voluntary measures for their respective durations, as well as to implement transparency measures, as set out in this JCPOA and its Annexes. These measures include: a long-term IAEA presence in Iran; IAEA monitoring of uranium ore concentrate produced by Iran from all uranium ore concentrate plants for 25 years; containment and surveillance of centrifuge rotors and bellows for 20 years; use of IAEA approved and certified modern technologies including on-line enrichment measurement and electronic seals; and a reliable mechanism to ensure speedy resolution of IAEA access concerns for 15 years, as defined in Annex I.

16. Iran will not engage in activities, including at the R&D level, that could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including uranium or plutonium metallurgy activities, as specified in Annex I.

17. Iran will cooperate and act in accordance with the procurement channel in this JCPOA, as detailed in Annex IV, endorsed by the UN Security Council resolution.

SANCTIONS

18. The UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA will terminate all provisions of previous UN Security Council resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue - 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) – simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran and will establish specific restrictions, as specified in Annex V.1

19. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation, as subsequently amended, implementing all nuclear-related economic and financial sanctions, including related designations, simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related

measures by Iran as specified in Annex V, which cover all sanctions and restrictive measures in the following areas, as described in Annex II:

- i. Transfers of funds between EU persons and entities, including financial institutions, and Iranian persons and entities, including financial institutions;
- ii. Banking activities, including the establishment of new correspondent banking relationships and the opening of new branches and subsidiaries of Iranian banks in the territories of EU Member States;
- iii. Provision of insurance and reinsurance;
- iv. Supply of specialized financial messaging services, including SWIFT, for persons and entities set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions;
- v. Financial support for trade with Iran (export credit, guarantees or insurance);
- vi. Commitments for grants, financial assistance and concessional loans to the Government of Iran;
- vii. Transactions in public or public-guaranteed bonds;
- viii. Import and transport of Iranian oil, petroleum products, gas and petrochemical products;
- ix. Export of key equipment or technology for the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;
- x. Investment in the oil, gas and petrochemical sectors; xi. Export of key naval equipment and technology; the provisions of this Resolution do not constitute provisions of this JCPOA.
- xii. Design and construction of cargo vessels and oil tankers;
- xiii. Provision of flagging and classification services;
- xiv. Access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights;
- xv. Export of gold, precious metals and diamonds;
- xvi. Delivery of Iranian banknotes and coinage;
- xvii. Export of graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, and export or software for integrating industrial processes;
- xviii. Designation of persons, entities and bodies (asset freeze and visa ban) set out in Attachment 1 to Annex II; and
- xix. Associated services for each of the categories above.

20. The EU will terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation implementing all EU proliferation-related sanctions, including related designations, 8 years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier.

21. The United States will cease the application, and will continue to do so, in accordance with this JCPOA of the sanctions specified in Annex II to take effect simultaneously with the IAEA-verified implementation of the agreed nuclear-related measures by Iran as specified in Annex V. Such sanctions cover the following areas as described in Annex II:

- i. Financial and banking transactions with Iranian banks and financial institutions as specified in Annex II, including the Central Bank of Iran and specified individuals and entities identified as Government of Iran by the Office of Foreign Assets Control on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), as set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II (including the opening and maintenance of correspondent and payable through-accounts at non-U.S. financial institutions, investments, foreign exchange transactions and letters of credit);
- ii. Transactions in Iranian Rial;
- iii. Provision of U.S. banknotes to the Government of Iran;
- iv. Bilateral trade limitations on Iranian revenues abroad, including limitations on their transfer;
- v. Purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt, including governmental bonds;
- vi. Financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and Iranian financial institutions set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II;
- vii. Underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance;
- viii. Efforts to reduce Iran's crude oil sales;
- ix. Investment, including participation in joint ventures, goods, services, information, technology and technical expertise and support for Iran's oil, gas and petrochemical sectors;

- x. Purchase, acquisition, sale, transportation or marketing of petroleum, petrochemical products and natural gas from Iran;
- xi. Export, sale or provision of refined petroleum products and petrochemical products to Iran;
- xii. Transactions with Iran's energy sector;
- xiii. Transactions with Iran's shipping and shipbuilding sectors and port operators;
- xiv. Trade in gold and other precious metals;
- xv. Trade with Iran in graphite, raw or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
- xvi. Sale, supply or transfer of goods and services used in connection with Iran's automotive sector;
- xvii. Sanctions on associated services for each of the categories above;
- xviii. Remove individuals and entities set out in Attachment 3 to Annex II from the SDN List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List; and
- xix. Terminate Executive Orders 13574, 13590, 13622, and 13645, and Sections 5 – 7 and 15 of Executive Order 13628.

22. The United States will, as specified in Annex II and in accordance with Annex V, allow for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft and related parts and services to Iran; license non-U.S. persons that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with Iran consistent with this JCPOA; and license the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs.

23. Eight years after Adoption Day or when the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier, the United States will seek such legislative action as may be appropriate to terminate, or modify to effectuate the termination of, the sanctions specified in Annex II on the acquisition of nuclear-related commodities and services for nuclear activities contemplated in this JCPOA, to be consistent with the U.S. approach to other non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT.

24. The E3/EU and the United States specify in Annex II a full and complete list of all nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures and will lift them in accordance with Annex V. Annex II also specifies the effects of the lifting of sanctions beginning on "Implementation Day". If at any time following the Implementation Day, Iran believes that any other nuclear-related sanction or restrictive measure of the E3/EU+3 is preventing the full implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the JCPOA participant in question will consult with Iran with a view to resolving the issue and, if they concur that lifting of this sanction or restrictive measure is appropriate, the JCPOA participant in question will take appropriate action. If they are not able to resolve the issue, Iran or any member of the E3/EU+3 may refer the issue to the Joint Commission.

25. If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such implementation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.

26. The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has terminated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related

sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified in Annex II, or such an imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

27. The E3/EU+3 will take adequate administrative and regulatory measures to ensure clarity and effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States as well as the United States will issue relevant guidelines and make publicly accessible statements on the details of sanctions or restrictive measures which have been lifted under this JCPOA. The EU and its Member States and the United States commit to consult with Iran regarding the content of such guidelines and statements, on a regular basis and whenever appropriate.

28. The E3/EU+3 and Iran commit to implement this JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere, based on mutual respect, and to refrain from any action inconsistent with the letter, spirit and intent of this JCPOA that would undermine its successful implementation. Senior Government officials of the E3/EU+3 and Iran will make every effort to support the successful implementation of this JCPOA including in their public statements². The E3/EU+3 will take all measures required to lift sanctions and will refrain from imposing exceptional or discriminatory regulatory and procedural requirements in lieu of the sanctions and restrictive measures covered by the JCPOA.

29. The EU and its Member States and the United States, consistent with their respective laws, will refrain from any policy specifically intended to directly and adversely affect the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran inconsistent with their commitments not to undermine the successful implementation of this JCPOA.

30. The E3/EU+3 will not apply sanctions or restrictive measures to persons or entities for engaging in activities covered by the lifting of sanctions provided for in this JCPOA, provided that such activities are otherwise consistent with E3/EU+3 laws and regulations in effect.

Following the lifting of sanctions under this JCPOA as specified in Annex II, ongoing investigations on possible infringements of such sanctions may be reviewed in accordance with applicable national laws.

31. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the EU and its Member States will terminate the implementation of the measures applicable to designated entities and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and other Iranian banks and financial institutions, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto. 2 “Government officials” for the U.S. means senior officials of the U.S. Administration. Consistent with the timing specified in Annex V, the United States will remove designation of certain entities and individuals on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, and entities and individuals listed on the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, as detailed in Annex II and the attachments thereto.

32. EU and E3+3 countries and international participants will engage in joint projects with Iran, including through IAEA technical cooperation projects, in the field of peaceful nuclear technology, including nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel fabrication, agreed joint advanced R&D such as fusion, establishment of a state-of-the-art regional nuclear medical centre, personnel training, nuclear safety and security, and environmental protection, as detailed in Annex III. They will take necessary measures, as appropriate, for the implementation of these projects.

33. The E3/EU+3 and Iran will agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy. The EU will further explore possible areas for cooperation between the EU, its Member States and Iran, and in this context consider the use of available instruments such as export credits to facilitate trade, project financing and investment in Iran.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

34. Iran and the E3/EU+3 will implement their JCPOA commitments according to the sequence specified in Annex V. The milestones for implementation are as follows:

- i. Finalisation Day is the date on which negotiations of this JCPOA are concluded among the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to be followed promptly by submission of the resolution endorsing this JCPOA to the UN Security Council for adoption without delay.
 - ii. Adoption Day is the date 90 days after the endorsement of this JCPOA by the UN Security Council, or such earlier date as may be determined by mutual consent of the JCPOA participants, at which time this JCPOA and the commitments in this JCPOA come into effect. Beginning on that date, JCPOA participants will make necessary arrangements and preparations for the implementation of their JCPOA commitments.
 - iii. Implementation Day is the date on which, simultaneously with the IAEA report verifying implementation by Iran of the nuclear-related measures described in Sections 15.1. to 15.11 of Annex V, the EU and the United States take the actions described in Sections 16 and 17 of Annex V respectively and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution, the actions described in Section 18 of Annex V occur at the UN level.
 - iv. Transition Day is the date 8 years after Adoption Day or the date on which the Director General of the IAEA submits a report stating that the IAEA has reached the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever is earlier. On that date, the EU and the United States will take the actions described in Sections 20 and 21 of Annex V respectively and Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol.
 - v. UN Security Council resolution Termination Day is the date on which the UN Security Council resolution endorsing this JCPOA terminates according to its terms, which is to be 10 years from Adoption Day, provided that the provisions of previous resolutions have not been reinstated. On that date, the EU will take the actions described in Section 25 of Annex V.
35. The sequence and milestones set forth above and in Annex V are without prejudice to the duration of JCPOA commitments stated in this JCPOA.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM

36. If Iran believed that any or all of the E3/EU+3 were not meeting their commitments under this JCPOA, Iran could refer the issue to the Joint Commission for resolution; similarly, if any

of the E3/EU+3 believed that Iran was not meeting its commitments under this JCPOA, any of the E3/EU+3 could do the same. The Joint Commission would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration, any participant could refer the issue to Ministers of Foreign Affairs, if it believed the compliance issue had not been resolved. Ministers would have 15 days to resolve the issue, unless the time period was extended by consensus. After Joint Commission consideration – in parallel with (or in lieu of) review at the Ministerial level - either the complaining participant or the participant whose performance is in question could request that the issue be considered by an Advisory Board, which would consist of three members (one each appointed by the participants in the dispute and a third independent member). The Advisory Board should provide a non-binding opinion on the compliance issue within 15 days. If, after this 30-day process the issue is not resolved, the Joint Commission would consider the opinion of the Advisory Board for no more than 5 days in order to resolve the issue. If the issue still has not been resolved to the satisfaction of the complaining participant, and if the complaining participant deems the issue to constitute significant non-performance, then that participant could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance.

37. Upon receipt of the notification from the complaining participant, as described above, including a description of the good-faith efforts the participant made to exhaust the dispute resolution process specified in this JCPOA, the UN Security Council, in accordance with its procedures, shall vote on a resolution to continue the sanctions lifting. If the resolution described above has not been adopted within 30 days of the notification, then the provisions of the old UN Security Council resolutions would be re-imposed, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise. In such event, these provisions would not apply with retroactive effect to contracts signed between any party and Iran or Iranian individuals and entities prior to the date of application, provided that the activities contemplated under and execution of such contracts are consistent with this JCPOA and the previous and current UN Security Council resolutions.

The UN Security Council, expressing its intention to prevent the reapplication of the provisions if the issue giving rise to the notification is resolved within this period, intends to take into account the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue of the Advisory Board. Iran has stated that if sanctions are reinstated in whole or in part, Iran will treat that as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.

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GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES**

Date: 08 /01 /2018, Nicosia

2017 /2018 Academic Year, Fall Semester

DECLARATION

Type of Thesis: **Master** ☒ **PhD** ☐

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I GHADIR GOLKARIAN....., hereby declare that this dissertation entitled
“ **An Analysis of the Nuclear Energy in Iran: A Necessity or Military Tool?** ”
has been prepared myself under the guidance and supervision of
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Mark Twain, "In a person's life, some hopes are a historic turning point!" When I have review on it, it seems that Mark Twain summarizes my personal life story. In fact, a world full of excitement in science and politics was interesting to me. I am proud of taking care of politics and taking steps in this direction. Because I have do not learned only the many things around the world, but also the ability to analyze them from a realistic point of view.

Political science opens a new horizon for humanity and allows someone to analyze the events and developments around them. All these features are provided through political science studies. But on my way to learning, many people supported me, encouraged me and guided me. Without them, I certainly could not.

Political science and especially international relations, is one of the most important issues in individual and social life. Due to my work in this section, my life has changed positively in terms of material and spiritual life. For this reason, the key role of many people in writing this thesis must be expressed. I would like to thankAssis. Prof. Dr. Ozan ÖRMECİ, that provided both scientific possibilities and field of study for me. One of the most important issues in political science is the Middle East policy. Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hüseyin IŞIKSAL is one of the most experienced professors on this field. He was involved in research and study in the Middle East and political events. He is familiar at the experienced, scientist and Middle Eastern affairs that helped me write my thesis. His guidance is very valuable. I sincerely thank you for your honest guidance.

Thanks to all the friends who helped me and provided valuable documentation and resources. Of course it was not possible to write this thesis without authoritative sources.

To my wife and children...

ABSTRACT

Today, nuclear energy is widely used in the world. Many countries in the world have nuclear technology. In this respect, Iran also wants to use this technology since the country is considered one of the world's top 10 countries in terms of nuclear fuel production and uranium enrichment. Iran claims to use nuclear energy in terms of peaceful purposes. However this claim does not convince some of the Western countries and mainly the United States. The overall attitude towards Iran seems different than other countries. The main reason for this is Iran's political standing and in particular the country's harsh approach to Israel.

Deriving from these points, in this thesis it is tried to answer why Iran needs nuclear energy? Whether Iran wants to use this energy for peaceful purposes, and what are the contributions of Iranian leaders to Iran's nuclear energy program? The main methodology is discourse analysis primarily based on first hand sources. It is basically argued that nuclear energy technology is every country's right if it is used for peaceful purposes for the development of economy, technology, science, and natural resources. Finally, the JCPOA Agreement that is a crucial step for the world peace also proofed that the problems can be solved only through diplomatic approaches and negotiations, not by using the threat of violence.

Key words: Nuclear energy, Additional Protocol, Iran nuclear crisis, JCPOA,

ÖZ

Bugün nükleer enerji dünyada yaygın olarak kullanılmaktadır. Dünyadaki birçok ülke nükleer teknolojiye sahiptir. Bu bağlamda nükleer yakıt üretimi ve uranium zenginleştirilmesi açısından dünyanın en iyi 10 ülkesinden biri olan İran bu teknolojiyi barışçıl amaçlarla kullanmak istemektedir. Bu iddia başta Amerika Birleşik Devletleri olmak üzere bazı Batılı devletleri ikna etmemiştir. İran'a karşı diğer ülkelerin genel tutumu farklılıklar göstermektedir. Bunun ana sebebi, İran'ın genel siyasi duruşu ve İsrail'e karşı sert yaklaşımıdır.

Bu noktalardan hareketle bu tezde, İran'ın nükleer enerjiyi neden tercih ettiği, İran'ın nükleer enerjiyi barışçıl amaçlar için mi kullanmak istediği ve İran'lı liderlerin nükleer enerji programına ne tür katkılar yaptığı gibi soruların yanıtları aranmıştır. Tezin ana metodolojisi, birincil kaynaklara dayanan söylem analizidir. Temel olarak nükleer enerjinin barışçıl amaçlar ve ekonomi, teknoloji, bilim, ve doğal kaynakları geliştirmek amacıyla kullanıldığında her ülkenin yasal hakkı olduğu savunulmuştur. Son olarak dünya barışı adına çok önemli bir adım olarak değerlendirilen JCPOA antlaşması da sorunların tehdit dili ile değil yalnızca diplomatic yaklaşım ve müzakereler ile çözülebileceğini ıspatlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nükleer enerji, Ek Protokol, İran nükleer krizi, JCPOA,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

EU:	European Union
EU3:	Three European Union Country (French, Germany, the UK)
GOV:	Government
GW:	Gigawatt
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
IR:	Iran
IRGC:	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
JCPOA:	Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Kg:	Kilogram
KW:	Kilowatt
LC/L.C:	Letter of Credit
MW:	Megawatt
NAM:	Non-Aligned Movement
NPT:	Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
PMD:	Possible Military Dimensions
PMOI:	People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
P5+1:	UN Security Council's Five Permanent Members
SNSC:	Supreme National Security Council
UANI:	United Againstto Nuclear Iran
UCF:	Uranium Conversion Facility
UF:	Uranium Hexafluoride
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
UO:	Uranium Oxide
US:	United States