



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**UNITED NATIONS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND
THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING TROOPS
TO CONFLICT AREAS IN AFRICA:
A CASE STUDY OF MALI**

MANJI JIBBA LADAN

MASTER'S THESIS

NICOSIA
2019

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THESIS SUPERVISOR
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2019

ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL

We as the jury members certify the 'UNITED NATIONS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO CONFLICT AREAS IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF MALI' prepared by Manji Jibba Ladan defended on 25/12/2018 has been found satisfactory for the award of degree of Master

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ABSTRACT

UNITED NATIONS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF PEACEKEEPING TROOPS TO CONFLICT AREAS IN AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF MALI

This research focuses on the United Nations (UN) Conflict Management and troops deployment in Mali and Africa at large. This research examined the impact and challenges of the United Nation peacekeeping mission in Mali. The research expanded the scope and inquiry of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). This was accomplished by examining how the UN Security Council objectives and mandates through MINUSMA impacted the mission in Mali. This research showed the key challenges faced by MINUSMA had to do with the lack of clear mandates, the late deployment of troops and the low number of troops deployed by the UN. It is noteworthy to state that, despite the challenges faced by the MINUSMA, it was able to conduct a successful election in 2013 and stabilize the crisis in Mali. The research recommends that there is an urgent need for the UN needs to deploy skilled troops with the capacity of protecting and ensuring the security of the civilians and the UN should have a transparent system of communication with the countries that have deployed their soldiers to the field. Also, before a peacekeeping mission should be authorized, adequate strategies and mechanisms should be organized by the UN which includes funding and how to handle unforeseen challenges during the peacekeeping mission.

Keywords: Conflict Management, Troops, Peacekeeping, Africa, United Nation, Mali, & MINUSMA.

Öz

BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER KRİZ YÖNETİMİ VE AFRIKADAKİ ÇATAŞMA ALANLARINA BARIŞ GÜCÜ GÖNDERİLMESİ: MALI VAKA ANALIZI

Bu çalışmanın amacı genelde Afrika özelde ise Malı çerçevesinde BM kriz yönetimini ve barış gücü rolünü irdelemektir. Çalışma BM barış koruma misyonunun Malı özelinde etkisini ve sorunlarını tartışmaktadır. Bu kapsamda BM Malı Misyonu MINUSMA nın BM barış koruma çabalarının ve uygulamalarının nasıl etkilendiği detaylandırılacaktır. Görev tanımlamasının net bir şekilde yapılmamasının yarattığı sıkıntılar, bunun geç görevlendirme, misyonun boyutu ve yetkinliği ile bağlantılı olduğu vurgulanacaktır. Tüm sıkıntılara rağmen MINUSMA nın Malı de 2013 seçimlerinin gerçekleştirilmesinde başarılı olduğu ve sınırlı bir istikrar sağlandığı söylenebilir. Çalışma, BM Barış Gücü nün sivillerin korunması konusunda daha iyi eğitilmiş ve yetkin askerlerden oluşturulması gerektiğini, Barış gücüne katkıda bulunan ülkelerle daha şeffaf ve güçlü bir iletişim sağlanması gerektiğini ortaya koyma çabası göstermiştir. Aynı zamanda, misyon oluşturulmadan önce yeterli stratejik çalışmanın ve mekanizmanın BM tarafından ortaya konulması gerektiği, özellikle misyonun maddi olarak desteklenmesi ve olası güçlüklerle karşı daha hazırlıklı olması gerektiği ifade edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz Yönetimi, barış Koruma, Afrika, Birleşmiş Milletler, Malı, MINUSMA.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFISMA	AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT MISSION IN MALI AFRICA
AGE	ADVISORY GROUP EXPERTS
AMIB	AFRICAN UNION MISSION BURUNDI AND PAKISTAN AND STATE SOVERIEGNTY
AQIM	ALQAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
ASF	AFRICAN STAND BY FORCE
AU	AFRICAN UNION
BBC	BRITISH BROADCASTING COOPERATION
CFR	COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
CNN	CABLE NEWS NETWORK
DPKO	DEPARTMENT OF PEACE KEEPING OPERATIONS
ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
HDI	HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
HIPPO	HIGH LEVEL INDEPENDENCE PANEL ON PEACE
ICC	INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ICISS	INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR INTERVENTION
ICJ	INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
MINUSMA	UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL INTERGRATED
MNLA	NATIONAL MOVENMENT FOR LIBERATION OF AZAWAD
MUJAJAO	MOVENMENT FOR UNITY AND JIHAD IN WEST
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
NGO	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
OAU	ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNION
OIOS	OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICE OPERATION
PCC	POLICE CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES
PKO	PEACE KEEPING OPERATION

PSC	PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
R2P	RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
	STABILIZATION MISSION IN MALI
TAM	TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT MISSION
TCC	TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNAMIR	UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
UNAVEM	UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION
UNCT	UNITED NATIONS COUNTRY TEAM
UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
UNEF	UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCES
UNIZOM	UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN MOZAMBIQUE
UNMOGIP	UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN INDIA
UNOSOM	UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA
UNSC	UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
UNSCOB	UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL MISSION TO THE BALKANS
UNTO	UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION
USIP	UNITED STATES INSTITUTE FOR PEACE

INTRODUCTION

The birth of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 was one surest manifestation of man's willingness to end the scourge of wars and converting "swords into plowshares" (Akindele, 1999, p. 1). It was the scourge of violence and the changing nature of the international system that necessitated the need for a body that will be able to effectively manage conflicts in nations in order to have sustainable peace in the world. The UN's involvement in conflict management in Africa cannot be overemphasized. This can be traced to the post-war era. Their role shows the importance of the instruments of peacebuilding towards ensuring global peace and security. Many scholars (mostly Liberals like Francis Fukuyama) believed that the end of the ideological rift between the East-West divides will eventually lead to a more stable global arena. These liberal optimists and their narrative of a stable international order were short-lived with the rise of "New Wars" as asserted by Mary Kaldor. These new threats which include insurgency, militancy, ethno-religious conflicts, and other forms of cross border and transnational conflicts have the potency to destabilize the stability of the global system. It is within this context of newly emergent threats that the conflict in Mali, as well as other conflicts in the region of Africa, prompted the need for multilateral engagements of the UN and other international agencies in order to manage and deal with all these conflicts. Thus, the UN's responsibility and capacity to manage conflict and maintain global peace has been one of the reasons that their participation in the management of conflict is always considered and justified in Africa. Although the UN has participated in conflict management and resolution mostly in African countries and other countries outside of Africa, there is a certain level of negligence in terms of their method of involvement in every country that has had conflict. Most of it has to do with the uniformity of the instruments they use in every country, thereby not taking into cognizance many factors peculiar to the geographical location as well as their political orientation. Some of the examples of the countries that the UN have intervened are Sierra Leone, Congo, and Darfur etc. This study will examine if there "a relationship between the success/failures of the

deployment of peacekeeping forces and conflict management in Africa” with a focus on the case study of Mali.

i. Statement Of The Research Problem

Conflict management in Africa has become a critical matter that needs serious and practical initiatives and measures. This was outlined by the UN’s committee on peacekeeping operations that was created 2013. The UN’s Security Council notes that it was aimed at finding better ways through which the conflict in the African region can be given better attention. What appears to be a selective response of the UN in peacekeeping needs especially in Africa has worried the international community for some time. It seems it is becoming increasingly difficult for an ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. Consequently, the UN’s response to the Malian conflict which forced France to intervene, further portrayed how incapable the African Union (AU) and Economic of West African States (ECOWAS) are in terms of managing conflict. Some of the reasons behind this includes the lack of good leadership and governance and the failure to implement strategies. The basic reasons for the failure in Mali was their inability to deploy troops or intervene when they were supposed to intervene. Therefore, it is within this matrix that this research study will try to investigate the deployment of forces by the UN to the Mali as part of her commitment and to the promotion of global peace and security through effective Conflict Management.

ii. Research Question

This research will attempt to answer the following research questions:

1. Is there a relationship between the deployment of peacekeeping forces and conflict management in Africa?

Sub Research Questions

1. What is the role of the UN in Conflict Management in Africa?
2. How has UN deployment of forces in conflict zones in Africa impacted the management of the conflicts?
3. What are the prospects and challenges of UN involvement in Conflict Management in Africa?

iii. Research Methodology

This research study intends to be both analytical and descriptive. It will be combined with triangular and qualitative research methodology to bring out a clear meaning. By triangulation, it is a method of data collection that is done through cross verification from two or more sources that are mostly done by the combination of data from different sources which adds dependability to the study. It focuses on creating a holistic and meaningful analysis of the UN as a global umpire in Peace Support Operations and Peacekeeping. A systematic assessment of how this role has played out in Africa and Mali, in particular, is carried out.

iv. Method Of Data Collection

For the purpose of this research, secondary sources are extensively used and data was collected through the analysis of various documents. Firstly, the identification and compilation of relevant documents in concert with the topic. Secondly, followed by a systematic screening and sorting out of the documents according to its relevance to the topic. Thirdly, synthesizing and analyzing the selected documents. Fourthly, establishing a meaningful, clear and defined pattern.

v. Instruments of Data Collection.

The research relied on data collected from secondary sources which include; books, magazines, journals, newspapers, and the internet. Other instruments used were, the electronic media, published and unpublished materials from libraries. Personal interviews and discussions with resource persons were of great help. In more specific terms, the main sources for this document-based research were:

1. United Nations website, for official documents: <http://www.un.org/en/index.html>; From where some databases on violent conflicts in Africa (past and present) are elicited and position documents from the UN with respect to debates on such conflicts, decisions reached and intervention actions/inaction as it relates to peacekeeping elsewhere and Mali were elicited.

2 The African Union and ECOWAS websites respectively, this is in addition to their respective commissions

3 The United Nations University for Peace in Addis Ababa.

4 The website of the African Union Commission

5 The Department of Peacekeeping Operations

It is the desire of the study that consulting this relevant source will help in addressing some of the inherent challenges of research especially the validity and reliability of the secondary sources, given that these agencies, tend to bring in some primary tool's element in the data collection process.

vi. Method Of Data Analysis

Information obtained was analyzed qualitatively by means of a systematic and logical pattern. The output is the current synthesis. However, in some instances, historical, descriptive and comparative approaches were adopted. A qualitative research method was used for its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how the UN over the decades has related to Africa and the AU (formerly OAU) in relation to peacekeeping operations. This methodology helps the reader to interpret and better understand its complex reality. Content analysis was used for systematic examination of written documents which is useful in examining the various protocols, treaties, declarations and policy frameworks relating to the AU Peace and Security Architecture in relation to the UN. Content and Discuss Analysis were used to systematically analyze the spade of violent conflicts in Africa and how the UN has acted over the decades. This general background of UN-Africa relations from the standpoint of Peacekeeping then provided the basis for a more specific and indebt analysis of the action of the UN in the wake of the Malian conflict beginning from 2011 to date.

vii. Objectives Of The Study

The key objectives of the research include:

- I. Examine the impact of the UN's deployment of peacekeeping troops in Conflict Management in Africa.
- II. Examine the prospects and challenges of UN peacekeeping in Conflict Management in Africa.

- III. To recommend ways in which the UN and the AU can effectively manage conflicts in Africa.

viii. Significance Of The Study

The study has both policy and academic significance in the sense that it is coming at a time that stakeholders as well as policy actors in the world are in the search for veritable alternatives or better still, improvements in running the affairs of the UN on matters of Peacekeeping or Peace Support Operations across the globe. The study is timely and apt given the state of devastation in Mali as occasioned by terror and insurgency. It is the desire of the study that the outcome, will add impetus to the many policy frameworks from the UN, AU, ECOWAS and other donor states in the joint effort to bringing back stability in Mali. The work by its findings, will also likely contribute to the many constructive critical voices that caution the UN's occasional deviation from its founding principles, acts that are incongruent to the presumed norms of equality of sovereign states and the universality of the dignity of the human life. It is the desire of the researcher that at the end of this research process, the study should contribute significantly by addressing the inherent questions of the research.

ix. Scope And Limitation

The study is tied to both spatial and temporal scope/limitation. For one, the geopolitical limit of the study is circumscribed around what remains the failing Republic of Mali. The 2009 Encarta Dictionary describes Mali as a country in northwest of Africa that is predominantly covered by the desert with less population while the south of Mali is mostly watered by the Niger river while the southern population mostly reside in the valleys, Agriculture is their major source of income mostly farming and fishing while the capital of Mali Bamako with a population of one million people (Encarta, 2009).

Timbuktu happens to be more popular compared to Bamako the capital city, Timbuktu is majorly like the commercial city its root can be traced back to the 11-century known for its camel caravans with gold and ivory, Timbuktu serves as the main connection of Africa to the Mediterranean.

The history of Mali in Africa be traced back to the 5th century when Mali was the main city known for its well-designed empire compared to other African countries before it was being colonized by France in the 19th century Mali then became French Sudan, Mali later became independent in the year 1960 with economic crisis from the 2000s which became more severe in 2007 ranked by the UN as 175th country out of the 178th countries with high rate of poverty and tagged by the world bank as the world's poorest country. (Encarta 2009).

French remains the official language of Mali, and Islam is by far the major religion. However, the people of Mali belong to several ethnic groups and speak a variety of African languages.

Although the most turbulent part of the country remains the Northern part, the study nonetheless focuses on Mali as a country as it attempts to highlight some of the negative foreign impacts external to Mali which might have contributed in no less measure, to the current feud.



Image 1: Map of West Africa showing Mali in Green (Source: Google maps)

Although the current hostility in Mali could be said to have begun in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring in 2011/2012, the study timeframe or temporal scope was, however, taken from 2010-2013 so as to provide a clear background to the problem under investigation.

CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 Theoretical Framework

Collective Security (Conflict Management)

Collective Security, as an approach will be used within the context of conflict management for the purpose of this study. Before delving into the reasons and justification for the applicability of this theory, it is necessary to understand the theoretical stance it represents. Conceptually, Kupchan & Kupchan (1991), defined Collective Security as a structural and institutional framework through which states and governments collectively unite and cooperate in order to maintain world peace and stability. Another definition by McLean (1996), Collective Security relates to a mechanism through which governments under an institution collectively come together through the establishment of a union with the sole purpose of guaranteeing and maintaining collective strategic and security interest through the maintenance of the balance of power and threat. As put forward by Buffoy (1993), Collective Security, as an approach is linked to the “Wilsonian 14 Points” policy guidelines after the end of World War 1. These fourteen points provided by Woodrow Wilson, serve as the background and foundation to the establishment of the League of Nations in 1920 with the sole intention and purpose of preventing the outbreak of another World War. The League of Nations was criticized by many scholars as being too idealistic in her prescription and adherence to Kantian philosophy of “Perpetual Peace”. It was this idealistic stance that ultimately led to the outbreak of World War 2 in 1938. (Wolfers, 1965).

As observed by Betts (1992); Keohane and Martin (1995); and other proponents of the theory of Collective Security, were of the view and belief that the existence and establishment of international institutions or organizations, would foster global peace, unity, and stability in the international system given the fact that, the organization will collectively and collaboratively unite and manage any action and behavior of member states that will threaten the peace, stability, and progress of the global system. It was this sentiment, that after World War II, and having learned from the mistakes and failures of the League of Nations, the UN was established in 1945 with the sole purpose and intention of maintaining global peace and stability. Consequently, as further noted by Naidu (1975) & Tsagourias (2013), that the establishment of international organizations like the UN, EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), NATO, etc. will help in the promotion of world peace and security. This is given that these institutions through the mandate of their establishments, are equipped with the necessary institutional, operational and legal frameworks in order to maintain order, maintain peace and collectively deal with any form of threat to the global system.

This collective security idea is aimed at ensuring the balance of power in which the entire international community agrees to oppose military aggression by any member. Another reason behind Collective Security is to monitor and prevent conflict and states individual attempts to go against the regulations established the UN Security Council but with the presence and increase of nuclear weapons, it makes this initiative difficult to practice. Collective security is very strict with tight regulations. This includes firstly, that all states must only use military force only in cases related to self-defense in the country and this entails their obedience to the status quo. Secondly, there must be a clear understanding of what aggression means by all the states so that the lack of understanding of what aggression means will not be tolerated as an excuse. Thirdly, all states and especially the large powers, must be willing to commit their own armed forces and/or funds (or to create, pay for, and find means of controlling, an international armed force) to prevent aggression even if it is remote from, or opposed to, their immediate interests.

Fourthly, all states must prevent actively any breaches of sanctions that might assist the declared outlaw. The League of Nations tried to impose the collective security initiative, but it couldn't work because of the failure to adhere to the regulations. Collective security is the main strategy used by the Security Council the 1991 Kuwait's invasion was one of the major successes of the UN's collective security (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2011).

Collective Security became popular in the year 1930 known as collective security by individual nations for individual security which entails that a state or an individual nation must be part of an international organizations which will ensure its security and safety with its security is been tempered with "Collective security" became strong from the year 1931 to 1939 this was with the mind of using aggression to contain and regulate the activities of Japan, Italy, and Germany.

Collective Security became popular from the year 1914 but its existence can be traced back to 1495 in the leagues of ancient Greek, Italy the holy league in renaissance it was tried implemented in China but the results was not successful, during the time of the 1306 War, an idea has been introduced by Pierre Dubois which included collective security also in the 17th century Maximilien de Bethune Duc de Sully came up with an idea for the status quo to adhere it which included the allegiance of different states which is a form of collective security. These continued in the 18th century with scholars and philosophers like Jeremy Bentham and Emmanuel Kant came up with the plans for perpetual peace other philosophers like Comte Henri de Saint-Simon. As indicated by Ruggie, (1996) conceptualized the term Collective security according to what Immanuel Kant opined:

is a "universal alliance" of all the states within a given international system (which in former times could embrace a particular area such as China, Greece, Italy, or Switzerland) is a basic, archetypal mode of international relations, lying somewhere between total state egoism (in which states may be allied with each other in hostile or "balance of power" groupings subject to alteration) and a federated or unitary super-state that has managed to absorb the lesser sovereignties.

In the modern era and with the ascendancy of liberalism, the more universal and perhaps acceptable mode of Collective Security lies in the idea fashioned along the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) which is premised upon the “Just War Theory”. It is based on the understanding that War, in this sense intervention by way of Peacekeeping becomes necessary when the alternative to doing so is seen to be more devastating than war itself. The Just War Theory comprises many traditions preceding its emergence. But most importantly, it is a cosmopolitan perspective that lends itself to the principle of the universality of man and the dignity of the human person as against the statist view/ the pluralist view of the Realist/Pluralist in the international system. Thus, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), appears to be an addendum to fill in the gap brought about by the short-sightedness of the founders of the UN hence they could not see ahead to phantom a milieu when sovereignty would change its meaning, when states will witness internal conflicts even a time when states will turn against their own people. The founders underestimated what would become a globalized world and how the nations would be caught in an inescapable network of mutuality with shared problems and prospects. It is very likely that the so-called ‘Big Three’ i.e. Sir Winston Churchill of Britain, Franklin Roosevelt of the US and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union never really conceived the possibility of shifting their respective nations much from their original doctrine of Isolationism to Collectivism/Internationalism. At least not beyond the alliance extend that defined ‘friends’ and ‘foes’ during the two World Wars. They probably underestimated the extent to which capitalism would grow and necessitate the expansion of markets for its mass production which would ultimately lead to globalization. The drivers of Globalization i.e. the Multinational Corporations and the IFIs have increasingly enhanced the interdependence of people across the globe. Having weakened the state, they have tended to make a case for common humanity and a collective response to a breach of the peace, thus paving way for state actors of the ‘North’ to embark on series of Peacekeeping Missions in the third world and elsewhere.

Today, the procedures and steps that would warrant a peacekeeping mission either by the UN and most often without it are totally different from what the founders articulated in the Charter over sixty years down the line, the rest, they say is history. The 'Responsibility to Protect' as issued by the ICISS, has become an extended part of the UN Charter to make up for the gap the founders left posterity with. We entered the 21st Century with a new meaning given to the concept of sovereignty and consequently, a new mandate for peacekeeping.

The Just War Tradition thus posits the following Principles:

Jus ad Bellum

- ✓ The cause must be Just
- ✓ Right Intention
- ✓ Proportionality of Ends, i.e. the cost-benefit analysis
- ✓ Last Resort
- ✓ A great likelihood of success
- ✓ Right Authority
- ✓ Proper Declaration

Jus in Bello

- ✓ Discrimination: force must only be directed at aggressors
- ✓ Minimal use of force: i.e. force must be equal to threats
- ✓ Just Conduct: strict adherence to international law

Jus post-Bellum

- ✓ Just Peace: the final settlement should be fair to all and made public
- ✓ Proportionality: rights violated should be reinstated
- ✓ Discrimination: violators must be separated as either civilians, leaders or military.

Responsibility: aggressors on all sides must be punished in a fair and accountable manner

- ✓ Compensation: Innocent victims on all sides must be compensated for their losses.
- ✓ It has been within that framework that seeks to explain and justifies UN involvement in societies plagued by conflicts and other security challenges under the institutional guidelines of strengthening collective

security, maintain world peace and also engage through certain legal principles of Humanitarian intervention and the popular mantra of “Responsibility to protect”.

Therefore, operationalizing this theory and contextualizing it within the framework of Conflict Management, it has been used to narrate and explain the foray and involvement of the UN, AU, and other transnational organizations with the sole purpose of managing the series of conflicts and insecurities that has characterized the politics of globalism and regionalism in the Post World War and Cold War period. This theoretical narrative is used as a panacea to explain the involvement of these institutions in the management and resolution of the conflicts in Africa with a specific focus on the Malian Conflict. Another theoretical reason for linking this theoretical paradigm to this study is the fact that the UN was created to solve war and issues between nation states and stabilizing the international system. In the year 1992, the UN’s concern was being extended to intra-state conflict by the then secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali in what is called the agenda for peace. This was done in strengthening the peacemaking, peace keeping, and peacebuilding and interfering and settling intra-state crisis and disputes. This study has to do with the effectiveness of the UN in peacekeeping and troop’s deployment in Africa. UN in the past years has not been consistent. In some cases, they have been swift to action, deployment of troops, humanitarian aid, good logistics, and better funding but it has not been swift, and this led to a lot of damages and casualties with cases like Rwanda, Somalia, and DRC etc. UN through collective security always is meant to be there to act fully because it is one of the main reasons why it was created.

1.2 Literature Review

Conflict Management in Africa

There are several kinds of literature by scholars explaining the nature and types of conflict management in Africa. In a book by Deng (2010) titled “Sovereignty as Responsibility”: Conflict Management in Africa was able to point out the fact that sovereignty of states is not feasible which explains the various conflict in the region. Therefore, for conflict management to take a

shift in the continent the state needs to have the political and legal capacity to manage the threats facing her. In another literature by Ranlods (1998) in his book titled "Election and Conflict Management in Africa". He pointed out that election is one of the key features in the political life on the African continent. For conflict management to be a success a free and fair election is to be held to have a stable government and the trust of the people to go hand in hand. He concluded by saying a UN peacekeeping is successful only after a free and fair successful election.

In a book by Taylor and Francis (2009) titled "The EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe". They pointed out that in the early 1990s the prevention of conflict and conflict management has been one of the main priorities of the EU in their agenda towards Africa. They stated that policies of the European Union conflict management towards Africa is all about the interest of EU and in other cases it is being motivated by concerns for Africa. Irobi (2005) in his book titled "Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa. He stated in his book that conflict management in Africa has been effective and has led to some countries not being able to maintain previous peace agreements. He states that ethnic conflicts are not like other conflicts and are easily ignited by little issues and spreads across boundaries like wildfire. He stated the issue of poverty and poor governance as major tools of conflict in Africa. His book tends to find/contribute towards findings of better means of managing ethnic conflicts in Africa.

Castro (2001) in his major work entitled "Indigenous People and Co-Management: Implication for Conflict Management. He pointed out that for conflict management to be successful, co-management regime should not be used because with the slightest issue a conflict will arise. He said the effect of co-management will not be power sharing but only strengthening the state. Reason for this is, there will not be local participation in the decision making of the state affairs and this will lead to an uproar from the bottom to top. Conclusively, Conflict Management is one important process in dealing with all the factors, conditions and issues that led to the emergence of conflict in

societies. This is because it helps prevent the re-emergence of such conflicts, strengthening social cohesion and smoothens the peacebuilding process. This aspect examined relevant literature regarding conflict management and tried to operationalize it to fit into the analysis of the case study of this study.

1.3 Background of the Study

Tadesse (2009) asserts that research shows there has been up to 16 interstate conflicts in Africa. This includes countries like: Liberia, Ethiopia, Chad, Algeria, Angola Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Congo, Uganda, Western Sahara although only few of the conflicts were interstate conflicts while a majority of the conflicts were internal conflicts. Tadesse (ibid), further notes with regrets that even though the end of the colonial regime in Africa was supposed to have been a good opportunity for most of the African countries to unite peacefully, it was rather the contrary. The declaration was being made by the former United States President George Bush in 1980 tagged as the New World era this was mainly aimed at developing the security in the world. This involved the open and intensive engagement of the United States in the UN's Security program. This was aimed at enforcing better methods of peacekeeping and peacebuilding. (Tadesse, 2009, p. 2). Tadesse argued that in analyzing how effective the UN have been in the management of conflict in Africa the result cannot be completely positive or negative one of the major challenges that is being faced is the diversity in the members of the Security Council this makes it more difficult for the management of the conflict to be effective. Some other scholars argue on the involvement of the UN in Africa one of the points is the intervention in Somalia in 1990 which was predominantly headed by the United States soldiers which were first sent in 1992. The mission which was tagged as the 'Operation Restore Hope'. One thing that can also be argued is how long it took the UN to deploy troops and another aspect is why the United States withdrew their soldiers. It can be argued that the US withdrew from the mission because 18 of their soldiers lost their lives in the conflict. This brought an end to the UN's management of conflict in Somalia of which it was being tagged as a major failure, not only in Africa but this can be seen

in European countries and in the middle east as well as. The result of the UN conflict management seems to have had mixed results. Some scholars argue that when a conflict is not effectively managed within a state or a region, it ends up escalating to other countries in the region, although lack of diligence might be reason for the failure.

Research has shown that the involvement of the UN in conflict management in the post-cold war era, shows that there has been a drastic decrease in the number of soldiers that are being sent to maintain peace by the UN in Africa between 2006 and 2007. This has been one of the limitations of the UN conflict management. Another important aspect that has been neglected is the reason behind the conflicts in Africa military forces might not be the key factor in the management of conflict of which the use of force has been the major method that has been used over the years some other scholars argue the point that peacebuilding and ceasefire has been the major area of concentration rather than understanding what brought about the conflict so that the conflict can be effectively managed. Some of the instruments that were aimed at resolving conflicts by the international community seem not to be strong enough to tackle the conflict (CFR, 2013). In reference to my case study Mali, just like the case of Somalia, there was a late deployment of troops at the heat of the crises. Some countries like the USA and Chad recalled their military troops as a result of the casualty rate. Troops deployment is a key factor in the conflict management in Mali because it was influenced by terrorist motives and they had a strong militia that was well equipped.

The committees that have been continuously created by the UN was mainly with the aim of eliminating future reoccurrence of the outbreak of war this association was initiated in the year 1945, the position of the UN in conflict management can be traced back to the cold war but its power in the domain of conflict management gained more ground at the end of the bipolar era, mainly in the 1990s during this period there was a lot of conflict between countries this led the former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali to create the Agenda of peace, this was with the aim of reconstructing methods

that can be used by the UN to be able to manage conflicts, prevent conflicts, new peacekeeping methods and as well as mediation. Other initiatives like the post-conflict methods with the perspective that includes peacebuilding this was with the purpose of eliminating further reoccurrence of war. It is evident that the UN's continuously developed its conflict management instruments which include the prevention of conflict, and how they can effectively attend to conflicts but over the years there has been a high reluctance by the UN to attend to the conflict in Africa. This led to some of the African countries to react to its reluctant intervention measures. (IRIN 1999). The reluctance to the conflicts in Africa can be seen in the case of Mali whereby at the start of the conflict the UN was not there to prevent and manage the conflict, but France was the first country to be there followed by the AU and the ECOWAS.

It has been noticed that the Security Council of the UN's task is in making sure that global peace is not being tampered with, this also includes their taking military preventive measures, making of sanctions, and peacekeeping initiatives, but because of the different countries that are part of the Security Council and having different ideologies as a challenge it has led the Security Council not to be able to make quick decisions towards conflicts an example is a genocide in Rwanda as well as Bosnia. In early 2005, the UN created the peacebuilding commission with the aim of being more effective in protecting the world peace and other measures to provide recovery facilities to countries that have been affected by conflicts, the UN has been successful in six countries since the peacebuilding commission was created, this commission for sees political recovery, security actors and development measures. Other organizations have single-handedly developed mechanisms to better conflict management in Africa some of these organizations include the North Treaty Organization (NATO) Africa Union, Organization of American States, the European Union. The African Union has been trying its best so as other organizations outside of Europe to stop the eruption of conflict not only in their region but in the world as well. One of the efforts of NATO can be seen in its involvement in Libya. Other organization like the EU, NATO, AU, where heavily involved in the conflict of Mali. They supported

the UN in the conflict management in Mali. This was done through the deployment of troops and through the process of reconciliation. The next paragraph will discuss the challenges the international community has encountered in preventing and managing conflict from escalating.

One of the most difficult challenges that are being encountered by the international community is in their ability to prevent conflict not only from happening but also escalating, there has been an estimated number of over 250,000 casualties as a result of internal conflicts in different countries, these conflicts affect every aspect of the society the economy, education, health facilities, the environment, law, and order. More than 100 million dollars is being spent and as well destroyed as a result of the internal crisis in the world. Some scholars argue that conflict is like a disease that is contagious meaning that its ability to cross over to other regional and neighboring countries. This can lead to terrorist activities an example is in the case of Mali, the Rwandan Genocide and the Bosnian conflict instigated new mechanisms by the international community to contain and as well prevent conflict one of which is in the UN's involvement in the domestic developmental plans in terms of the political environment the main reason is to prevent conflict. The African Union, European Union, Organization of American states are also on alert as regards to conflict-related issues. So much has been established by a different international organization which includes the UN's output has been positive and as well as negative one of the reasons is the lack of the understanding of the political orientation and institution of the conflicting countries and also the unavailability of the required resources which is mostly the finances. Another thing is the understanding of preventing conflict from starting by not taking for granted ignoring little signs that lead to serious conflict in the end, some other scholars mention the need for more trained field troops with essential facilities an equipment's to manage conflict, the return of refugees is another important factor if the refugees are coming back what are they coming back to. The UN should be able to effectively make plans for this (CFR, 2013). War-torn countries are left with nothing after the intervention because so much has been destroyed by the conflict. Measures are supposed to be

organized by the international community through the UN's for it to be reconstructed or renovated. There has been an argument on the point that the major reasons behind terrorism are in the urban-rural migration because of the scarcity of basic facilities which includes light, water, transport facilities, and other important amenities one of which is the dangerous impact of conflict between the political arena and the public. Relating this state of affairs to my case study Mali on how conflict management was difficult can be seen in the aspect of the issues at the bottom. Most of the conflict management programs were mostly from the top and the case of Mali has been inclined with terrorist groups and the major force that pushes terrorism are scarcity of basic facilities which are mostly found in the bottom and if those things are not being handled, they cannot gain the trust of the locals and the conflict will be difficult to stop. The next paragraph will discuss the role of the African Union in conflict management.

The African Union has played a role in the African conflict as a major regional power an example is in Burundi the African Union Mission (AMIB) were able to effectively contain the conflict as they await the UN's forces. another example is Sudan, despite the unavailability of adequate finances and as well as equipment's even though the UN was cold to responding to the conflict the African Union did a tremendous work the AU's logistical and financial inability with which to provide 'teeth' to the African Standby Force (ASF) – one of its most outstanding feats. (Tadesse, 2009). The architects of the UN Charter contemplated the settlement of disputes upon the application of four conflict resolution techniques, namely, peaceful negotiations (Chapter VI); enforcement action (Chapter VII); Regional cooperation on issues relating to peace and security (Chapter VIII); and finally resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Chapter XIV). Although the UN was intended to deal with inter-state warfare, it is increasingly required to respond to intrastate conflict. (Anan 1998: 239). It is very sad, Anan added, that in those conflicts, the main aim, increasingly is the destruction, not just of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups. The former UN scribe added that the measures that were created to manage conflicts does not only involve stopping wars from happening, but the consideration of the human race is a major factor that

cannot be neglected. This can be seen in the case of Mali where the troops that were deployed were not well equipped and they are not allowed to attack forcefully, only under self-defense. This rule by the UN, though it is good, it is good to a fault. Because this leads to a lot of casualties and lack of efficiency by the troops.

Similarly, the character of the wars in the post-Cold War era, especially from the early 1970s to 1998 shows that more than 30 wars have been fought in Africa, the vast majority of them being intra-state in origin (Anan 1998:239). Anan submits explains that African countries in the year 1996 of which 14 out of the 53 countries experienced various level of wars this resulted in 8 million refugees in Africa. This led the UN to question the capabilities of the African leaders to maintain peace in its region commenting on the UN MacQueen (2010: 81) notes, "there was certainly a huge surge in its peacekeeping activities from the early 1990s onwards. On the positive side, the UN could now intervene on the much wider field as the restriction of the Cold War relaxed. MacQueen added that peacekeeping has always been contingent on the space (in both geographical and political sense of the word) allowed to it, where powerful states see critical national interest at stake, multinational intervention whether by the UN or a coalition of states, will not be acceptable. There were, consequently, no suggestion of UN peacekeepers being sent to Vietnam from 1959 to 1975 or to Eastern Europe from the late 80s to the mid-90s. (MacQueen 2010). These areas were too close to the core interests of the superpowers and therefore off-limits. The end of the Cold War, however, hugely expanded the field within which the UN could intervene (Ibid 2010). At the end of the cold war so many international communities like the UN were looking for an opportunity to be able to experiment their strategies which includes decision making as well as skills this started with the peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiative by the Security Council mainly in Africa and other countries outside of Africa, there were arguments on its success and failures one which was on the spotlight was the Somalian case. It totally went out of control and at a point, the UN withdrew its intervention from the territory. Of importance to the subject of Peacekeeping is the changing meaning of Sovereignty over the Centuries from the time its

meaning came to the front burner and internationalized at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

Thus, the meaning of the term Peacekeeping as coined in Westphalia is not the same with its meaning during the peak of the Cold War (1945-1991). But most interestingly is the contemporary meaning in the Post-Cold War era and indeed in contemporary time. Following the end of the Cold War; states of sub-Saharan Africa, Mano River basin area and West Africa there has been continuous war between states this has become a matter of concern to the international community, this can be traced back to the genocide in Liberia this opened up other perspectives for the African leaders ECOWAS to consider integrating peace initiative which includes sustainable peace, preventive measures to avoiding conflict in the region. The initial understanding of the UN as far as peacekeeping is concerned, was rather myopic in that it fails to foresee the existence of conflicts within States and thereby without the subject of Sovereignty.

Current realities, however, show that the need to reinvent the wheel of Peace Support Operations is crucial and overdue. The increase apparent incapacity of the UN to curb with violent conflicts across the globe is no more evident elsewhere than on the continent of Africa. The UN has been faulted for many reasons ranging from the delayed response, poor logistic planning to what appears as indifference leading to inaction. The understanding of intervention is sometimes narrow because the results can either be positive, negative or even mixed one thing that has always been criticized is whether if there was an intervention or there wasn't any intervention.

The 1994 Rwandan conflict was being criticized and blamed on the international community for not intervening on time. As there were rumors at a time, concerning the fact that the UN was aware of the occurrence of the genocide right before it happened, there were field soldiers although they were few with the available skills and equipment to have intervened on time but absolutely nothing was being done by the UN, this negligence is still being seen not only in Rwanda but other countries as well. Humanitarian

intervention is greatly being neglected because human lives are no longer seen as the first priority but rather peacebuilding is more considered by the international community. The UN has over the years placed peacebuilding over humanitarian intervention like the case of Mali. A peace accord has been signed yes but there is still no peace in Mali there are still killings in the country.

The 1999 conflict in Kosovo raised so much attention to the place of sovereignty, legitimacy, military action because there were cases involving the abuse of human right mostly from the Belgrade soldiers, another key issue that was on ground at that time was whether the intervention from the international community was basically to further enhance human rights abuse or to work in hand with the internal political problem thereby increasing the power of the external powers, can force be the only way of resolving a conflict? Most of which the supposed UN's intervention in Kosovo was being done without the acceptance of the Security Council this can be said to be the reason behind the catastrophic intervention in Kosovo. The Bosnian intervention by the UN was mostly tagged to have been a failure because of the case of human rights abuse and the UN was not able to live up to the appropriate expectation of preventing the conflict from happening another case is that of 1995 in Srebrenica human lives were not well protected, the Somalian withdrawal 1992-1993 these are all failed missions the international community like the UN happen just to be a power base picture but when it comes down to real matters and reality the people and lives they are supposed to protect, get betrayed. Ultimately, the fate of Somalia was tied to the choices made by the big states that commandeer the affairs of the UN. It is difficult to find equity in the slow response to terror insurgency in Mali as compared with the swift involvement in the Libya which ended up eliminating Gadhafi.

Most of these conflicts happened at a critical time that was at the end of the Cold War the expectation was high on the UN to be able to live up to the required expectation these first few conflicts in Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo questioned the capacity of the international community. Over the last

decade, one of the major topics in the UN's headquarters in New York is on the topic that the UN is not intervening the way it should because most of the intervention creates more problems rather than fixing the problem, another argument is the UN is over intervening. Coercive preventive measures should be envisioned by the UN, topics concerning the trampling of human right and overstay of intervention troops. the size of a country should not be neglected in the implementation of conflict management strategies, different opinions from different countries concerning the effectiveness of the UN creates a kind of division because the basic argument is on the consequences of a failed mission.

The former UN's Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the year 1999 during his speech at the UN's 54th General Assembly emphasized on the need for more diligent attention to human right as well as humanitarian intervention using the Kosovo and Rwanda as an example to some of the failed Security Council missions, he further outlined the need for understanding and oneness from all the UN member states as well as the Security Council five member states in mentioning this he explained how much the UN is being looked upon as the main intervener in international conflict and if it fails to live up to its expectation the whole human race will be in danger and countries will then start looking for other mediums to safeguard themselves this will further threatening the world. The case of Mali still shows that the UN has to improve in a lot of things to make its conflict management more successful as rightly said by Kofi Annan in his speech. The deployment of troops being the key factor in other to correlate the success of conflict management.

The Rwandan and Srebrenica case has been the major area that has been argued by so many scholars on areas concerning the place of sovereignty, human rights and intervention (Anan, 1999) this has gone against humanity as well regardless if it was in Rwanda or not looking at the above-mentioned dilemma the UN's reaction and intervention in Libya and Mali needs to be questioned (Anan, 1999). In context, one wonders how the UN should respond to Libya, to the current feud in Mali and elsewhere. These questions have remained in the front burner of international discourse.

As much as the expectation on the UN is very high the output is also different in different territories in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia because the intervention was limited or to better say untimely of which most of it violated human right others expected the coercive actions of the international community to be more active which others view it as insensitive to the place of sovereignty (ICISS, 2001: 1). Looking at region as a prospect has been on the platform for a long time included in articles 52 and 53 of chapter VIII in the UN's Charter which was being initiated in the year 1945 this included the need for external actors involvement in regional conflicts and local misunderstandings with initiating preventive measures as outlined in the Security Council charter the cold war Bipolar era was a great negative effect of which the allies term has been a background epidemic that stills needs to be sorted out , the troop-contributing countries has been the UN's peacekeeping and conflict management strategies and initiative to be more complicated (TCC). The former UN's Secretary general Boutros-Ghali, he created the agenda for peace which included regional interventions in the bases of decentralization with a collective work with the UN this tends to make the management of the conflict less stressful "In his 1995 report on Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa, the Secretary-General was even more specific". The founders of the UN, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the UN in containing them. Besides this burden-sharing argument, the rationale behind a regional approach to conflict management is said to be the actors' familiarity with the problems at hand as well as their cultural, social and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict". Like in the case of Mali there was the assistance of regional groups like the AU and ECOWAS who supported the UN with troops and logistics.

It is within this framework of analysis that this study will try to explore the role of UN in their foray in conflict management in the African continent with a specific focus on the conflict in Mali. To do this, a cursory examination of the research problem is necessary which forms the next aspect of the thesis. An issue in contemporary times is how the UN in principle tends to have replaced the valid and conventional role of regional organization with that of colonial 'principals' or states with an economic interest in conflict-torn areas of the global South, as preferred partners on intervention matters. Some scholars argue that one of the reasons why conflict management, as well as intervention, has not been effective in the African region is because of both the UN's Security Council and the African Union work separately which portrays the lack of understanding and cooperation, this includes practical solutions that can be achieved through integration. One of the areas that has been argued to be lacking by the international community, UN is in its ability to open up to the ideas of the regional powers as most as there seem to be a certain level of communication between the regional power and the UN's Security Council this has in a way made the regional powers to send troops from various countries in the region to some of the countries encountering conflict, one of the things that the international community needs to initiate is a better way of integration and cooperation with the African regional power it is not without challenges, It appears the big players have gone ahead to reinvent the demands of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in practice without the consent of the 'underdogs' the apparent 'Teeth' of Colonial Principals appears to have replaced the rightful place of regional corporations. First, it was an outright violation of the UN charter for such intervention to have begun with France as a sole state. It is of great concern, the long silence of the UN on the insurgency in Mali until the situation almost got out of hand before it sent its African-led troops. This was almost a year after Mali opened an official discussion with the UN on the matter which was known to the UN anyway. Even at that, the nature of troop's deployment to Mali leaves much to be desired given the inconsistencies that characterized the exercise or process. When in - January 2013 France launches its operation Serval, aimed at halting the advance of armed Islamists and supporting Malian government troops. January 23rd, 2013 ECOWAS authorizes the immediate

deployment of troops to Mali under MISMA (International Mission for Support to Mali (Global Post, 2013). This was followed by the first contingent of the African Union's International Support Mission for Mali, code-named AFISMA. By April 2nd, notes the Global Post, The EU began an overhaul of Mali's army to help it take the place of foreign troops, training an initial 570 Malian soldiers. April 22: The French parliament authorizes the government to extend operation Serval but says its manpower should drop from around 4,000 to 1,000 by the end of the year. Not until - April 25: The UN Security Council backs sending up to 12,600 international troops and police to take over from French and African forces, aiming for a July 1st start. (Global Post, 2013).

The Agenda for Peace which was being initiated by the former UN's Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized on the need for collective cooperation from the regional powers in order to make the conflict management more effective and easier than what was in 1992 further on in 1995 he outlined that in order for peacekeeping and peacebuilding to be improved in Africa collaboration with the regional powers is highly needed in Africa

In Chapter VIII of the Charter of the UN, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the UN cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or sub-regional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the UN containing them.

However, one of the reasons behind the collaboration with regional powers is because they are more familiar with the African cultures as well as methods that can be more conducive in managing conflict in their region.

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter includes that there should be a cooperation in conflict management between the UN Security Council and the regional powers and this was expected to have been the case in the region of Africa but due to incompetence as being explained by the UN deputy secretary Jan

Eliasson, that because the charter indicates that before the use of force can be an option in a case whereby the peacekeepers are under threat and are being forced to defend themselves, these can be seen in the case of the democratic republic of Congo when the intervention brigades were being introduced this was also the same in Mali, this perspective has brought up so many arguments which entails the humanitarian perspective of the intervention and conflict management in other for this to be effective both parties need to cooperate Leijenaar (2013) posits that the UN has not yet organized a more pragmatic approach to the conflict management in the region of Africa and at the other side of the African region powers such as the AU political differences as well as ideologies which includes traditional and cultural differences must be laid aside and the Regional Communities (RECS) must be ready to open up to the ideas of the African Standby Force (ASF) although this group has over the years been neglected.

Although it can be said that some crucial issue such as the deployment of troops when and how to engage troops and what kind of troops, absence of resource which includes finances, this is some of the things that need to be restructured other aspects like the appointment of the AU police advisor is a broader way of making the peacekeeping by the regional powers to be more effective, this was being explained by the AU through which both the police and the military can have a saying and representation in the conflict management in the region.

Some scholars argue that the conflict in the region of Africa cannot be effectively managed if each party is working independently, there is a serious need for integration between the two parties the UN and the African Union, political ideologies have been seen to be a setback to the integration and of the major arguments in the area of incompetency and the lack of skills from some of the troops this can be seen in the areas of crucial intervention. Although this is being a real problem some of the UN's advisory that one of the major things affecting the integration is the political differences. (Leijenaar, 2013: 3). AU Commission chairperson Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's during the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) made a speech

and in the speech, he mentioned critical issues such as the need for better analyzing the peace and conflict management initiatives that have been made in the house, this included training for the troops in order to enhance their skills in the field. One of the things that can be understood in his speech is the need to better understand the decision that is being taken by the AU Security Council before it can be implemented because of how crucial the topic of conflict is in the region at the moment Leijenaar (2013) Ironically, the 20th African Union Ordinary Summit has without any reservation endorsed the French intervention in Mali.

From the standpoint of legitimacy in the eye of International Law, the UN is the sole source of authority in mandating a peacekeeping operation anywhere across the globe. It is worrisome, however, that it took so long before it waded into the prolonged Malian crisis occasioned by insurgent elements. It is of poignant concern what would have been the fate of Mali without the French intervention first, followed by the AU-led mission –code-named AFISMA. It is not too clear if the intervention of both the French troops and the AU were acting on behalf of the UN while buying time for it to come in fully. It would appear the UN is very swift in some cases and extremely slow in others. One wonders if western permutation could be at play. The swift response in Libya via NATO and the slow-to-act attitude in Mali leaves much to be desired.

The endorsement of the French Intervention by both AU and ECOWAS remains worrisome and at best, a contradiction of what they had condemned in the immediate past. Was this to cover up their incapacity or did their inability to manage the conflict which gave the French colony no option than to intervene in the conflict which has been argued by so many scholars as one of the reasons that escalated the conflict in Bamako this has lessen the confidence on both the AU and the ECOWAS in the management of conflict some scholars argue the point that although France intervention was being tagged as a failure the African regional powers are also to be held responsible for their negligence and inability to handle and manage conflicts

within their territories although they have mechanism but the lack effective ways of implementing them.

The UN's late response to the Malian conflict which forced France to intervene further portrayed how incapable the AU and ECOWAS were in terms of managing conflict some of the reasons behind this includes inactive in the implementation of strategies lack good leadership, the basic reasons in the failure in Mali was their inability to deploy troops or intervene when they were supposed to intervene.

The gap of technology, technical competence, and skills among African Peace Keepers has been an issue. The United Nations (UN) infantry Battalion manual created in the year 2012 by the DPKO this included advanced and more modernized ways of implementing conflict management strategies, training the peacekeeping forces and as well as methods of intervention on time regardless of the type of conflict modernized equipment's such as night vision equipment's, radar scanning, real-time machines, blue force trackers, air reconnaissance, unmanned aerial cars etc. This has been some of the challenges that are faced by the UN peacebuilding mechanism, the introduction of some of these instruments were first implemented in Congo (UAV) and it was very effective in monitoring and surveillance of the population as well as the peacekeeping forces. Sadly, however, is the fact that most African combatants and military personnel are yet to acquaint themselves with these technologies and a good portion of such men/women still lack the skills in the modern sense of the word.

The international regulation for private military security enterprises has mentioned as one of the areas that need to be improved because they provide security to the troops as well as personnel on the field. By doing this it will enhance the success level in any conflict management by the UN. Another question is what has these private security companies got to do with African Union peace initiative also known as African solutions for African

problems? The regulations need to include other foreign actors in the UN's conflict intervention.

1.4 United Nations And Conflict Management

The UN has the responsibility of ensuring and maintaining the global peace and security. The Security Council is bound to respond in instance where there is need to intervene and with the adequate strategies as well as skilled soldiers to be sent to the field (MacQueen, 2010). Intervention and conflict management by the UN is on the bases of the kind of conflict over the years. The Security Council makes efforts to responding to different types of crisis. As new techniques and conflict management strategies are being revisited more flexibility will be introduced mostly in cases of conflicts that may affect global peace. Regional and sub-regional organizations can be effectively used with the aim of having peace between the conflicting parties by the UN. Through this means, they ensure that peace is being initiated in the conflicting area under the participation of the political system to further strengthen the UN's mandate (United Nations DPKO 2008).

CHAPTER TWO

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT UNDER UNITED NATIONS IN AFRICA THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF TROOPS.

There has been a change in the methods and the strategies that are been used by the international organizations in the deployment of troops in Africa compared to the 1990s. Some of the factors contributing to these changes are;

- i. There has been a change in the nature conflicts.
- ii. There has been a rise in fiscal austerity in most of the countries that provide financial aids in the deployment of troops
- iii. The international community has understood that over the years, strategies that have been used in underdeveloped countries in conflict management has not been effective in successfully containing the conflicts and the understanding of the change in the causes and conflicts
- iv. High skills and technical know how

Mingst (2013, p. 1) notes that the above-mentioned factors have helped in the deployment of troops over the years. Secondly, Mingst sought to explain how effective politically held mission is being motivated by civilians, quick responses from regional powers as well as organizations will make troops deployment more effective. In other, for these to be successful there must be a transparent collaboration from all the different actors both the regional, internal government and other international organizations.

Mingst (2013, p. 2) notes that different factors and determinants bring about the changes in the strategies, conflict management has grown to be more pragmatic and realistic base on the strategies that are being used in the deployment of troops, countries that have been experiencing different series of conflicts these factors have in a way contained the conflict, there are also different challenges and impact of these factors a deeper understanding of these factors will further enhance conflict management in Africa.

Mingst (2013) argues that over the years conflict management in Africa has changed this can be seen in the approaches, goals, actors and the implementation of the strategies, explaining that in terms of the actors involved in the conflict different countries as well as the regional powers highly participate in the deployment of troops African Union (AU) economic countries of West African States (ECOWAS) other non-government organizations help out with humanitarian aids, Mingst (2013) further explains that as much as different actors from different levels are working together in the deployment of troops this doesn't eliminates the different differences among these different actors, considering the fact both civilians, military, police are all working together with different cultures and ideologies this can be the major challenge in the deployment of troops and in the management of conflict these can be seen in the cases of democratic republic of Congo, Sudan etc.

2.1 Troops Deployment within the context of conflict management

Traditionally, the UN deploy troops contributed to it by member states across the globe in line with certain criteria of equity across regions. Such men/women carry the insignia of the organization capped with the Blue helmet/beret which symbolizes the UN. But unlike the traditional conflict management which was an instrument of international regulation, a means of oiling the machinery of international state system, it sought to contain and defuse conflicts between states which might otherwise spin out of control and draw in other states. (MacQueen 2010:88) notes that the new conflict management is designed to confront conflicts in the world whatever its form and whoever the protagonist might be. MacQueen notes that in the

contemporary world, conflict is much more likely to be between groups (ethnic, cultural, religious, regional etc. than between states.) This intra-state dimension is, according to those who advocate a new formulation of the rules and purposes of intervention, a defining characteristic of contemporary action by the UN's forces. The Peacekeeper is not necessarily concerned directly with issues of global peace and security. The peacekeeper instead is engaged in a process of active conflict resolution and increasingly, post-conflict peace-building rather than mere interposition. (MacQueen 2010:88). This change in conflict and peacekeeping has far-reaching implications on troop's deployment by the UN.

As noted, the DPKO (2008:48), the security of the UN's officials that are being sent during the management of conflict in any country needs to be handled and taken as a priority and more official measures need to be undertaken in ensuring that it is successful. Each deployment of troops is been signed and approved by the secretariat as to whether the intervention is the best option as that moment and considering better options appropriate for each case. in each state of each conflict this has to do with the development as to whether it's been managed that is to say if it is responding to the conflict management or not the member states are been asked to contribute in the management process, these includes different parties, regional organizations and powers, and other countries that can be of help this is to ensure that a peace agreement is been signed. (United Nations DPKO 2008).

As this process is ongoing the situation of how the conflict is responding to the strategies that are being used by the UN will be under assessment and observation by the UN's secretary general, this is basically to see how the UN can further intervene in the conflict, all member states, internal government, regional powers, and other international organizations will be consulted. (DPKO 2008:48).

DPKO (2008:49) the consultations, assessment, and observations are with the aim of further finding strategies of peacebuilding, conflict management

that will better function for that conflict. The next step after the consultation and assessment is the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) is been sent to assess the situation on ground that includes the major domain of peacebuilding this has to do with: humanitarian, the military situation, human right and the rule of law, this is to know how the UN's can come in. TAM includes different sectors of the UN. Before conflict intervention is been deployed with the results from TAM the UN's secretary general now sends it to the UN's Security Council for them to go through it and gives a go-ahead for the UN's Security Council to intervene by sending troops. (DPKO 2008:49).

A modern definition of conflict management thus implies ensuring, putting strategies in place to make sure that conflicts are being managed and contained which includes external intervention with troops from different countries in making sure that the conflict is properly managed (Imohe, 2005: 21). The most apt meaning of the term could not have come from any other source than the (DPKO, 2008) in Macqueen (2010: 75) define Peacekeeping as a medium through which countries and societies that have been deeply affected by conflict different military personnel's, police, from different countries are been organized by the UN to maintain peace and ensuring that a peace agreement can be signed this includes how power can be shared, governance reform, security reform, human rights, and social and economic development. It is obvious that this definition takes into cognizance, the nature of the so-called 'New Wars', it is akin more to the intra-state wrangling without necessarily losing its meaning in the traditional sense. McQueen (2010) notes that the contending concepts of 'negative' and 'Positive' Peace come into the debate here. Traditional Peacekeeping could be said to have as its primary objective, the creation, and maintenance of negative peace- or simply the no war. The new peacekeeping in contrast

2.2 Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of the thesis gives a concise definition and clarification of what the researcher considers as key terms to the work. These are conflict management, Troops Deployment (in the context of

Peacekeeping). The researcher then went further to operationalize the concept of Mali to include the current conflict and terror insurgency that has plagued the Malian state.

2.2.1 Peacekeeping

According to Miller & King (2005:62), “can be defined as the maintenance of public security, civil services, and cease-fire agreements in war and conflict zones by UN or regional military, police, and civilian forces with the consent of the nation-state on whose territory these forces are deployed” Peacekeeping has to do with initiatives which include the use of peace enforcement and military involvement in other to bring about cease-fire between conflicting parties. Chapter VI of the UN Charter highlights the goals of peacekeeping and which serves as an international mandate. This mandate is being created with the objective of the peacekeeping, is not only effective but the conflict is being settled. Peacekeeping has developed over the years it is popularly known as the mission creep recently, the protection of civilians as well as the humanitarian assistance that is been provided the UN this includes: food, safe heavens, transportations to safe heavens, in other for this to be effective the military forces deployed for the peacekeeping must be neutral to the conflict.

Miller & King (2005:62), explained that peacekeeping activities are into different categories and types the first is posits that the activities of peacekeepers usually fall within four partially distinct spheres, or what is referred to as ‘types. The first, or type I, involves observance where a ceasefire has been brokered. Such symbolic missions are often sent to act as deterrents against renewed violent conflict, as troops are lightly armed and not mandated to retaliate in the event of an attack against them or civilians. Type II operations are conducted to aid or ensure political transitions. Such missions are most successful when the troops are deemed legitimate by the citizens of the society in which they are deployed and when they are provided adequate resources and scope of action. Where some form of military intervention is considered necessary, Type III peacekeeping operations are performed; these are more commonly categorized as ‘peace

enforcement'. Type IV operations are generally associated with 'peacebuilding', or 'post-conflict reconstruction'. (Miller & King 2005:62).

More arguments have been on concerning the practical and legal differences in these missions, another factor is as time goes the international community tends to take responsibilities for peacekeeping formulation of mandate, when and when not, peacekeeping is supposed to be initiated, development and reorganizing the structure, the sharing of responsibilities this has been debated and is still debated. The peacekeeping initiative can be traced back to the 1950s, missions like the UN's special mission to the Balkans (UNSCOB), UN truce supervision organization (UNTO) with the aim of ensuring that no conflict erupts in the Middle East also the observer group in Pakistan and India (UNMOGIP). From the year 1956 the term peacekeeping became popular from the UN's emergency forces (UNEF) from 1949-1988 the former UN's secretary general Dag Hammarskjold organized more than 7 peacekeeping missions with over 10,000 military personnel's, towards the end of 2000 was even to engage in more than 15 conflicts with over 38,000 military forces. (Miller & King 2005:62).

2.2.2 Conflict Management

Wang (2015) Conflict Management can be defined as the process of achieving a goal of controlling the negative impact of conflict and increasing the positive impact of peace resolution by using preferred strategies to handle conflict. Anderson (1990) states that conflict management has a broad application and Burton (1987) states that the main significance of conflict management is the process by which the status quo makes an attempt to avoid the escalation of the conflict and manage the dispute. The UN was formed on this basis of conflict management. To manage and end the conflict through peaceful resolutions. In the cases of intrastate conflict, the UN after the management of the conflict come in the state building and reforms to make the process conflict. Timely Troop deployment tends to make conflict management easier and faster because it stops major damages from happening, it stops a lot of killings.

2.2.3 Peace Enforcement and Conflict Management

In most cases according to the UN's Security Council military operations also known as a form of aggression must be done with the permission of the conflict parties it can be between states, military intervention is mainly to induce negative peace or what is known as a cease-fire intervention. This intervention in most cases includes the peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiative because peace enforcement mostly comes with the above-mentioned concepts although this has raised serious questions as to its effectiveness over the years, the use of peace enforcement is related to military intervention but in a more understandable way it entails a form of collective security intervention in a conflict the following are the aims and objectives for such operations:

- Forcible compliance of cease-fires
- Separation of belligerents
- Disarming the conflicting parties
- Creation of buffer zones
- Decommissioning of arms and demobilization of combatants
- Establishment of human rights
- Humanitarian initiatives

The only way these objectives can be achieved is through the deployment of troops to make the area of conflict suitable for peace enforcement and conflict management. And when these troops are late; the issues get critical and it takes time for conflict management to achieve its goal.

According to Chapter VII of the UN Charter is commonly cited as providing the legal provisions of peace enforcement operations. Scholars have argued this because of the mandates and the evaluations of its operations but of recent articles 42, 43, and 47 most of the military intervention has been carried out by some of the members of the UN's most joined military forces from different countries regulations in terms of neutrality of forces in the field just ensure that the forces don't make decisions for the interest of their government which can bring about problems between the various forces from different countries in the field.

As recalled by Miller & King, The 1990s have undergone growth in peace enforcement both in the theoretical aspect as well as its implementation some of these examples are in the military intervention in Zaire(1995-1996), Rwanda(1994-1996), Haiti (1993-1994), Somalia(1992-1995), Bosnia(1992-1995), Liberia(1992-1993), Angola(1991-1994) also in Iraq(1991) As a result, confusion, and deficiencies emerged in this expanded interpretation as well as perplexity over peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding. Nevertheless, the international community over the years have been able to effectively protect the civilians in any conflict which is the most important aspect of military intervention and peace enforcement in some cases like in Rwanda their inability to respond on time to the conflict led to a very great genocide of which the UN's capacity in peace enforcement issues was been questioned.(Miller & King 2005:62). In the sequel to my research question, with the example of Somalia and Rwanda, the late deployment of troops in conflict areas really do create a mark.

2.3 Historical Overview Of The Conflict In Mali

According to the New York Times, Mali is one of the few African countries that successfully transitioned to democracy from France. But in March 2012, militant soldiers majorly from the northern region of Mali started a coup to overthrow the government president Amadou Toumani Touré. This was based on the fact that the government has not been diligent inappropriately apprehending the suppose terrorist group which was known as Tuareg this group was mostly at the northern desert of Mali , after the first coup Tuareg successfully took country of the northern part of the country but this attempt only lasted for a while before the Islamist extremist dominated them, this coup that seemed at first as an attempt to restructure the government of the country ended up to be an open door for terrorist around the world, this further lead to France deciding to intervene in the situation in the country in 2013, this started with an attempt by the French troops to demolish the camps of the rebels in the north seeing that it was impossible the next option was the deployment of land soldiers into the country. The proximate reasons for the conflict in Mali have been linked to numerous factors including political, financial and social. Politically the country of Mali was formed by the

France who brought different neighboring tribes together and formed a country. This was Mali first issue and it has led to the up raw of the northerners wanting to have their own country named Azawad. The crossing over of terrorist groups who came and formed the Tuareg group in the north, this increased the tension between the north and south. The Islamic extremist kept on building forces which led to the coup d'état which started on 21st March 2012, where the Malian military was displaced by the Tuaregs militia. This led to the conflict in Mali. The nature of the conflict in Mali was a retaliation to the exploitation of the south to the northern part of the country and it was also based on ethnicity and religion. The north comprises of Islamist extremist group and terrorist groups included. They have built up militias in other to create their own nation. With the intervention of the UN, the country was able to get a balance and hold of its affairs but the crisis in Mali is still on till date. Though there is a stable government, there are still killings in Mali and attacks on the French troops. This crisis has resulted in killing and destruction. Nothing has been achieved by those who started the conflict the conflict which their main aim was to form another country which has not yet been possible.

Aspires more towards achieving positive peace, which is a much more comprehensive and multi-faceted idea. The ideal state of positive peace goes beyond the end of actual violence to a long-term harmony of social relations and the establishment of economic equity. The new peacekeeping, in other words, is not the surgical technique of the classic model, but one among a number of processes in a protracted therapy. (MacQueen 2010).

This has implications for the UN's attitude towards the sovereignty of its member states in several significant ways: For one, states no longer have the inherent right to dictate the social and political direction of the UN intervention in their territories. Secondly, Sovereignty is qualified and conditional i.e. it is not a legal absolute. Where a state fails to meet the minimum standards of behavior towards its own population, then its sovereignty is forfeited. Instead, the troops that have been deployed by the UN have the responsibility of ensuring that a cease-fire is been maintained. McQueen notes that the

underlying development which has helped drive this debate about the nature of contemporary peacekeeping is the deepening globalization of the world economy and consequently world politics. The traditional power of the state has been eroded by a global process which national politicians, however powerful, cannot control. The other very important factor is the revolution in the communication industry which spreads information almost at the time of occurrence to every part of the globe making the distance to become almost inconsequential.

2.4 Success of UN's Peacekeeping in Africa

The case of Libya. In the span of three weeks, the UN swiftly got into action and came to the aid of Libya to stabilize and protect the people. They had objectives like arms embargo and matters were being sent to the ICC for prosecution for crimes against humanity and war crimes. This was in the first revolution which took place in 1970. In the second revolution which took place in 1973, there was a historic military intervention in protecting the lives of the civilians in Libya. In the coming years after that, the UN has been quick to action concerning any crisis in Libya. There is the interest of member state in Libya because of its crude oil and other personal interest. In the case of Liberia in its first civil war (1989), the ECOWAS was the first to intervene, but the UN came through to support them. The support from the UN gave the ECOWAS a stronghold because the UN gave ECOWAS came in handy. These efforts gave the ECOWAS the initiative to create an ECOWAS observer group called ECOMOG and they got involved in the communication between ECOWAS and the other groups. In 1992 the Security Council imposed an arms embargo which reduced the impact of the conflict. UN was able to coordinate a successful election in 1997 which brought in Charles Taylor as the president. UN's Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was the first Peacekeeping Mission the UN had that was joint with another organization that was there before them. Through the new government, the principle of reconciliation was taking into action and peace was achieved. Within two years different groups formed again and there was tension once more. This brought in the second civil war in 2003. The UN through the UNOL was able to give support to the government, 15000 forces where

brought in the case was ended and by March 2018 all forces that were left there in case of emergency were withdrawn. The success of this United Nation intervention and conflict management, it's been made successful with the efficient deployment of troops and this has made the conflict management in these areas to be a success unlike the case of Mali, where the deployment of troops was slow and was not efficient among a lot of others. Below I have listed some failures of the UN's troop deployment.

2.5 Failure of UN's Peacekeeping in Africa

There are cases of the intrastate crisis in Africa that the peacekeeping tool being used by the UN and their approach did not fully work. Below I will list some countries and how this really affected the countries with the likes of authors and scholars like Michael w. Doyle c. Jett, Jane Boulden. The MONUC is a mission by the UN in DRC. It is one of the failures of the UN peacekeeping mission in Africa. Its failures are attributed to a shortage of resources, troop deployment, and logistical issues and there were weaknesses in the peace agreement and highly misconduct of UN peacekeepers. Most studies have centered mandate as the bone of contention in the problem of MONUC'S. MONUC was initiated with a weak mandate, they had limited authority to the use of force, and there was a law enforcement capacity. Paul D. Williams outline MONUC inability to protect civilians and found it hard to stabilize eastern Congo. He also stressed out the lack of clarity in the mandate which resulted to the weaknesses of the peace agreement. Another issue was not having efficient enforcement on the bottom level, it was a top to a bottom policy which made the micro level not to have not to have effective implementation of a solution. There is no way you can solve a problem by tackling it from the top. Issues like this you have to go down to the bottom and fight it from the root. Rwanda was not subjected to the politics of the cold war so why did the UNAMIR FAIL? There are lots of reasons and explanations to the reason why there was a failure for example lack of equipment, the forces were not fully equipped, and this led to the withdrawal of some countries from the forces. There are some military principles that were not coherent too, and this has been some of the explanation to its failure and the peacekeeping troops were not allowed to

use force the only way they could use force was for self-defense. On the case of weapons, the UNAMIR troops were not well equipped and when they were faced by two armies with highly sophisticated weapons, they were not able to defend themselves. Another issue was the size of the UN's army was small they were not able to contain the rebels. The main issue of the failure of the UN in Rwanda was the UN coming to the aid of Rwanda very late. If UN sent its troops to Rwanda at the early stage, it wouldn't have resulted to the genocide in Rwanda though it later had a good peacebuilding plan which normalized the country but still the country lost a lot and a lot of people died and this was the cause of UN not coming to their aid early. This has been one of the issues of the UN. The mission of the UN was named UNOSOM in Somalia. They were two missions in Somalia labeled UNOSOM1 and UNOSOM2. UNOSOM1 was not successful it caused an aggressive attack on the peacekeepers' troop in Mogadishu and civil riots. The UNOSOM2 was initiated in 1993. This two were not so successful like the UNOSOM1 this led to the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops in 1995. one of the failures of the UNOSOM was not able to bring about a stabilized solution to the political deadlock and aggravated violence in the country. Lack of early warning mechanism; The UN did not warn or interfere with the case of Somalia even at the state of Somalia being fragile after a failed civil war in 1991, if the UN at that time had interfered with an early warning, things wouldn't have gone out of hands. No coordination between the UN and the local actors and NGO's: before the UN peacekeeping troops the NGO'S were there helping with humanitarian aid and had a good connection with the local groups. The UN through UNOSOM was not able to connect with the local group and the NGO'S. They did not use the experience the NGO'S have in the field to conduct their operations, this led to its problems in handling humanitarian aid. They were not able to connect with the locals and their leaders, just like in Congo the UN used a top to the bottom concept. This approach did not get them to the root of the problems because the main people going through this crisis are the locals. The issue of the UN not having its own army but a conglomerate of soldiers from member states, this makes the chain of command impossible. They don't have their command from the UN but from their government which makes taking or making orders difficult like an

example of Somalia the Pakistan soldiers were under attack the Italian soldiers were close by and couldn't help because they were waiting on confirmation from their government. This led to the killing of about 30 Pakistani soldiers. Same with the case in Mali at the heat of the crisis the Chadian army got called back because of the rate of killings of their soldiers same with the American soldiers they got called back at a point. The chain of command is poor if the UN has its own personal army or have strong control over the TCC then they will be able to control the soldiers and give the right mandate to follow. Concluding, despite the successes recorded by the UN in conflict management in Africa, there are however certain challenges which hindered her from achieving significantly what she intended to achieve. This failures and challenges as discussed include, late deployment of troops, low number troops, lack of equipment's and clear mandate by Security Council. If these challenges are adequately addressed, it will go a long way in modifying the UN's conflict management mandate. With the failures in Rwanda and Somalia, they were still repeated in the case of Mali with the late deployment of troops, and nations pulling out their troops. The UN has to do better with the deployment of troops and increasing the number of TCC TO be able to have easy-going conflict management.

2.6 Peacekeeping and Conflict Management

According to Miller & King (2005:62), Peacekeeping is been done with the authorization to intervene by the country whose territory the UN is sending in troops from different countries both in the region and outside the region in order to ensure that violence ends this includes making a conducive atmosphere and grounds for a successful political system, peacekeeping is been regarded as the mission creep this incorporates both efforts by the troops to endure both humanitarian aids and the safety of the civilians. Safe havens are been made within it includes the adequate distribution of food and the transportation of the civilians to the safe heaven this troops mainly consist of countries that are neutral to the conflicts. Miller & King (2005:62), posits that conflict management includes different stages 1, the stage was its been passed and violence is being stopped, this is with the aim of ensuring that conflict doesn't erupt again 2, peaceful political transformation and

transition, this is only possible if resources and adequate skills and technology is available and the citizens of the country are opened hearted and warm to the Troops 4, the conflict management is being endorsed 5, the country is undergoing what is called a post-conflict restructuring and state building. (Miller & King 2005:62).

Some scholars argue that regional organizations are practically supposed to take responsibilities when it comes to the management of conflicts, some of these missions as much as different organizations are been held with the responsibilities of intervening but how and when to get involved needs to be outlined, in the year 1950 the UN brought up what is called the UN Truce supervision organization(UNTO) supervising the interventions and the conflict management in the middle eastern region, same was done in Pakistan and India in the cities of Jammu and Kashmir mostly in the UN's intervention in the Balkan regions(UNSCOB). In the late 1950s most of the activities of the UN was referred to as the UN's emergency force(UNEF1) with Dag Hammarskjold as the UN's secretary general with the total of 7 conflict management cases from the year 1949 to 1988 the number later increased in the year 1990 with over 10, 000 fields soldiers in the year 200 over 38, 000 troops were been sent to different countries with over 40 countries that the UN have intervened including the participation of some regional powers and organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS (Miller & King 2005:62).

2.7 Peace Enforcement and Conflict Management

The deployment of troops to conflicting societies are mostly done with the permission of some of the parties related to the conflict mostly to have a cease-fire and stop the violence. In trying to understand and compare the two terms peacebuilding and peacekeeping, peacekeeping is most likely related to the deployment of military troops to end violence activities in conflicting societies and to bring about a negative peace some of the goals include the following

- Using force to eliminate violence

- Separation of belligerents
- Creating a wide separation between the conflicting parties
- Creation of safe heavens
- Disarming the conflicting parties
- Protection of civilians and advocating human rights
- Humanitarian help

One of the reasons that make it difficult for peace enforcement to be defined is because of the practices and legal perspectives surrounding its mandate, how it's been done and the level of its evaluation in terms of the operations base on the UN's charter chapter VII, this states that it is with the duty to provide with effective peace enforcement in conflicting areas. In article 42, 43, and 47 have brought of some controversies considering that fact few members of the UN's in the Security Council give authorizations for any Peace Enforcement. As much as the soldiers that are been deployed to the field come from different countries in the world in line with these strategies have been organized in ensuring that the troops that are been deployed are neutral to the conflict.

As recalled by Miller & King (ibid), explained why there was a need for the peace enforcement operations to be reviewed both the theory and the practical aspects. Events from the 1990s like in Angola (1991) Iraq (1991) Liberia (1992) Somalia (1992) and so many other countries that have had troops been sent for peace enforcement over the years there have been arguments on the safety of civilians in times of peace enforcement and peacekeeping using Bosnia and Rwanda as an example. (Miller & King 2005:62). Although the UN's security responsibility is to intervene in intrastate conflicts over the year's conflicts are more internal in terms of sectarian, ethnic and religious differences (Anan 1998: 239). It is very sad, Anan added, that in those conflicts, the main aim, increasingly is the destruction, not just of armies but of civilians and entire ethnic groups. The former UN scribe added that preventing such wars is no longer a matter of defending states or protecting allies. It is a matter of defending humanity itself. The traditional and perhaps the ideal meaning of Peacekeeping as it

was known in the past (during the two World Wars and the Cold War era) is not what it means today. Key among the major shift in meaning is;

- It has increasingly de-emphasized state-centrism to Human centrism
- It is with or without UN backing
- It is largely with or without the consent of parties
- It is often incident on intra-state matters in tune with the changing nature of conflicts.
- It is aimed at shielding unarmed civilians who are the targets in the 'new wars'
- It entails much more than just the cessation of hostility or violence it is robust
- It is fashioned along the values of liberalism and thus enhanced by the forces of the free market.
- Non-State actors and private military/ security companies are involved economies thereby limiting the power of the state.
- Participants are drawn from all different fields of human endeavors as against just the military in the traditional approach.

The modern definition of peacekeeping thus implies the elimination of violence, containing it to spread, through the deployment of troops that are neutral to the conflict mostly with troops deployed from the international, regional powers to create a cease-fire known mostly as negative peace (Imohe, 2005: 21).

CHAPTER THREE

THE CASE STUDY OF MALI: ASSESSMENT AND FINDINGS

This study from the previous chapter has discussed the Peacekeeping Mission by the UN in Africa. How the UN has over the years functioned through collective security to see to the crisis and chaos and to bring and sustain peace and tranquility. Mostly in Africa, the UN has not been fully successful in most cases and this is because of the wide range of issues in most intrastate conflicts, unlike other nations. In the case of Mali, it's been recorded to be one of the deadliest peacekeeping the UN has embarked upon and it was the first conflict the UN had to deal with where there was an involvement of a terrorist group in intrastate conflict. This study discusses the history of the Malian crisis and what led to the crisis as will be stated in this chapter. With my points, you will see that everything boils down to mismanagement of resources and corruption, also from the colonial masters because they brought tribes together to create a nation and after independent came chaos and conflict. This chapter With the end goal to quantify the worldwide network's adequacy attending to the underlying drivers of Mali's intra-state strife, this contextual analysis on Mali will answer one question and this will lead to the understanding of the history of the crisis. Will also discuss the challenges of the UN in Africa and their continuity and changes in process of peacekeeping, will also recommend prospects of UN involvement in peace management diplomacy.

3.1 History of Crisis in Mali:

What are the fundamental and imminent reasons for struggle in Mali? Prior to noting the reasons for struggle in Mali, a framework's investigation on the country of Mali will be done. The arrangement for this examination will use the framework's reasoning from U.S. Armed force precept on interrelated operational factors. The accompanying operational factors will be utilized: political, military, financial, social, structural, and physical condition. Framework's reasoning gives a technique to comprehension on "What is happening in the state?" (U.S. Armed force 2015, 3-2). The interrelated variable appraisal will examine environs in Mali, as it existed at the start of threats in January 2012.

Political: Mali, a previous French province, got its independence on September 22, 1960. Its present constitution was endorsed on February 25, 1992: "Mali's Constitution accommodates a multi-party vote based system, with the main confinement being a denial against parties established on ethnic, religious, local, or sexual orientation lines" (U.S. Government office of the Republic of Mali 2017). Like the U.S., Mali's administration is separated into three arms of government which comprises of a judicial, an executive, and legislative branch. In contrast to the U.S., nonetheless, as opposed to a government republic, Mali is a majority rule unitary republic. it has a notional assembly comprising of 147 individuals which are being elected for a 5-year term. "Mali has about 8 regions which are ruled by a governor and each of these regions have 5 districts each under the care of a commandant". The capital of Mali is Bamako (U.S. Government office of the Republic of Mali 2017). Because of Mali's unitary structure of government, the governors are being appointed by the central government which is the capital. power in this system is concentrated in the central government, this makes the local government firstly, not to have the power to make decisions and, second, they do not have the power to generate revenue and this makes them lack basic amenity's and can't tend to some problems they have to wait for the central government.

Military: At the start of the northern distress in 2012, the Malian army, primarily armed force, totaled just 7,000 individuals and was divided internally, it did not have the ability to compel force, and it was also associated with the mishandling of human rights (Arieff 2013, 1). They were divisions being created within the army which were political and ethnical particularly between the green berets and the red beret these forces formed the guard of the previous president Amadou Toumani Touré" (Janes 2016). Notwithstanding inside divisions, the Malian Army, even at the "regional level, "it has a deficiency and ineffectively equipping its army with out of date chines and Soviet Union military equipment's (Janes 2016). Supplementing its military powers, the state security structure comprises of Gendarmerie and National Guard powers. The pragmatic connection between the armed force and the state security powers is vague. Although the 4,800-in number gendarmerie goes under the control of the MOD for activities, day by day control is employed by the Ministry of Internal Security and Civil Protection. MOD comprises of the National Guard and controls its affairs even though it is not formally a part of the military. (Janes 2016) At the time of the conflict, the Malian security structure comprised of the military, Gendarmerie, and National Guard. The command authority of these forces was poor they didn't have the expertise, there was a lack of local knowledge and they needed wide prevalent help. They were not well prepared, not fully equipped, inadequately prepared, and not well arranged to give security against the northern side. Insubordination and radical aggressors filling Mali through its unsecured borders.

Monetary: The World Bank depicts Mali as "a prevalent vast desert nation with a profoundly undiversified economy" that depends on subsistence cultivation (World Bank 2016. In the midst of desert conditions, this country due to its dry land has suffered drought which has resulted to famine, poverty and malnourishment and unsteadiness," and the conveyance of administrations in this extensive, inadequately populated region is exacting and influences geographic value and social union" (World Bank 2016). UN's development program (UNDP) 2013 Human Development Index (HDI) report highlights the unpredictable financial circumstance of Mali. The HDI "is an

outline measure for evaluating long haul advance in three essential components of human improvement: a long and solid life, access to learning, and a convenient way of life" (Malik 2013, 147). Among different components, the HDI considers future, acquiring power equality, and gross national salary. The UNDP's HDI record for 2012 positioned Mali 182 out of 187 nations (Malik 2013, 143). In a rundown, Mali's financial circumstance reflects "auxiliary shortage" that uplifts the rate of resource scourge and rivalry that will lead to vulnerability to famine and drought and end up with starvation.

Social: In 2012, the country of Mali had more than 15 million natives from a few countries. Mali comprises over twelve tribal group: the biggest of this tribe is the Bambara at 25 percent, trailed by, Sonoufo 12 percent, Songhay 10 percent, Fula 9 percent, Malinke 8 percent, Soninke 8 percent, Dogon 6 percent, Moor 5 percent, Tuareg 5 percent, Bozo 5 percent and a few others at 2 percent or underneath (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 35).the major causes of the conflict in Mali's government has been credited to the numerous ethnic groups because of the diversity and complexity. In any case, the biggest separation exists between the southern ethnic groups of conventional African plummet and the northern groups including those of itinerant Tuareg causes and Arab descent. Factually, the Malian and power and assets exist in the southern part of the country to the detriment of the north. Considerably, because of the high population of the northern side, several uprisings have occurred in the nation of Mali. For quite a long time, religion has intertwined its way into the texture of Mali's social cognizance. Conventional African tribes' ceremonies have met with Islam to make special conditions in Mali. The African tribes have upheld a religious resilience and Islamic fusion, bringing about a peaceful co-existence. "with the coming of radical Islam and its spread in West Africa, the southern has pointed fingers on the northerners and the Tuareg in developing and impacting radical Islamic ideology" (Chauzal and Van Dame 2015, 9). In outline, inside the social texture of the country territory of Mali exists a north-south division coming about because of ethnic and religious contrasts. This separation is exacerbated by rivalry for political power and rare common assets.

Infrastructure: "Mali is a country that is landlocked with a vast land. Most of the buildings and infrastructure are located in the southern part of the nation and most of the citizens reside there" (Janes 2016). Navigating in Mali can be a big problem because of its bad roads and has about 1,800 traversable waterways, but with the high rate of the population the level of waterways keeps dropping and this results to having water issues. Most of the investment and infrastructure are in the south. It's just a little of investment being done in the north, as meager interest in northern administrations has happened. This condition further partitions Mali along a north-south pivot.

Physical Environment: The country of Mali has a large land space it is situated in West Africa about double the extent of Texas. Mali is divided into two sections: A Savannah southwest and a steppe-desert north . . . The south of the nation is more prolific and mostly utilized for agribusiness and animals" (Janes 2016). The topography of Mali has been in high risk of desertification. The north has been affected by the Sahara desert and this has resulted in the displacement of semi-nomadic Tuareg, Fula and Muars , they have consistently been pushed out of the desert by famine and drought and into a struggle with the inactive populace" (Janes 2016). With the south having a tenable environment, there is a big gap between the north and south and the south having better living conditions. While incorporating the interrelated factors that existed in 2012 inside Mali's monetary, military, political, social, foundation and physical condition, there existed a biological community that, first, encouraged southern access to power and assets and, furthermore, this entrance to power and assets set up conditions for activation of northern countries challenging complaints along ethnic, religious, and partisan division lines.

With a comprehension of the mind-boggling condition that existed in Mali in 2012, this exploration will now address this question: "What are the fundamental and proximate reasons for struggle and crisis in Mali?" this question will be answered by using the level of analysis to find the main

causes of the crisis in Mali. Will be relating the international level, state level and then the individual level to conclude on the root causes of the crisis.

3.2 imminent Causes of Mali Crises

The basic global dimension reasons for the contention in Mali started from the creation of the state and its independence from France. At the time of its independence from France on September 22, 1960, it had not developed on its own, it had touches from Germany, France, and the English like country states in Europe. Mali is a vast land situated in West Africa with numerous ethnic groups, social practices, and societies. Even though Mali was perceived universally as a country state in 1960, in reality, it was a geographic territory with numerous countries and needed state organizations and governmental institution with the ability to administer.

Hannah Armstrong, scientist and researcher for the USIP, in *Crisis in Mali: Root Causes and Long-Term Solutions*, features that "Mali's Tuaregs who are situated in the north of Mali have been portrayed as 'a country without a state'"; also, she clarifies the French frontier specialists utilized a system in which exploited the north and caused a division between ethnic groups," and further depicts that Malian state authorities have proceeded with this training today (Armstrong 2013, 3). In this manner, Mali's globally perceived borders, these borders were there during the colonial period and it comprises of different nations and ethnic group thus making the country's building process to be difficult and with a lot of clash over political power, natural resources, assets, and social self-rule.

The imminent reasons of international level for strife in Mali were twofold, the spread of Islamic radicalism and the fall of the Libyan state. Alex Arieff, examiner in African Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, in his January 14, 2013 report for Congress titled, "Emergency in Mali," traces how the spread of state fracture in the midst of the Arab Spring, joined with "the spread of vicious fanatic belief system" encouraged the passage of three rough radical groups into Mali: The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Ansar al-Dine

(of Tuareg source). Every one of these groups had interfaces between radicals, sedate trafficking, and sneaking systems.

Besides, the fall of the Libyan state in 2011 made a vacuum with a large number of "fighters and combatants . . . [and] after this period of crises they were highly sophisticated weapons left unchecked and obtained from Libya, this led to the influx of Mali by these fighters and they dominated and idealized the citizens in the north of Mali and entered the south (Arieff 2013, 2). Powerless Malian state organizations couldn't deal with the assault of remote warriors and "Mali plunged into statelessness and lost control of 66% of its domain with confounding pace" (Armstrong 2013, 1). The hidden conditions for intra-state strife in Mali were sown by its development from frontier France—which brought about a north-south separation with frail establishments, particularly in the north. Therefore, delicate fundamental conditions were started by the "overflow impact" from the spread of Islamist radicalism and the fall of the Libyan state.

Thibault van Damme and Gregory Chauzal, from Institute of International relations of the Clingendael, in their research on "The Roots of Mali's Conflict: Moving Beyond the 2012 Crisis," they projected the reasons for conflict to the miss-appropriation of resources in Mali with unequal accessibility of political power and a corrupt institution. Subsequently, the implicit understanding between the Malian state and residents in the north had crumbled.

A course of events: How did Mali disentangle? "On January 17, 2012, three years after the last north-south harmony understanding in Mali, a fourth 'Tuareg' resistance was propelled through the assault on a Malian military army in the northeastern town of Menaka. The defiance was arranged and orchestrated by the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), an aggregate of Tuaregs recommending independence from Mali. the rebellious factions were all gathered by the MNLA, reinforced by "Tuareg banishes from Libya" By April 2012, under the MNLA with the rebellion of the Tuaregs, almost all of the northern cities were under their control." (Chauzal and Van

Damme 2015, 10). The MNLA announced autonomy of the Azawad locale On April 6, 2012, which incorporates the three northernmost districts of Mali, Tombouctou, Kidal, and Gao (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12). The strength and solidarity of the MNLA did not last for a long time it was cut short by vicious radical extremist. For example, Tuareg union disintegrated and Lyad ag Ghali, an unmistakable Tuareg pioneer, split far from the MNLA and made a more aggressor group Ansar Dine, which accordingly lined up with AQIM and MUJAO. The three activist groups pushed aside MNLA pioneers, spread bedlam, and authorized brutal types of Sharia law and accordingly and seized MNLA's control of northern Mali (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12).

The state of Mali did not have a good security system, and this resulted in its loss of territory and government to the terrorist. In the midst of disdain generated by the Malian military's poor execution, "On 21 March, low and center positioned officers mutinied. "The coup expelled President Amadou Toumani Touré was led by Captain Amadou Sanogo (ATT). "The whole government was in chaos the main political leaders were arrested, suspended all Mali's popularity based establishments this was being done by the putschists" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 12).the out raw and the military overthrow in Bamako, the government did little to build the adequacy of the Malian armed force against the terrorist as they continue to move to the south.

Gregory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme ask, "How did the political circumstance go down so rapidly?" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). Their exploration and research features root causes in the north included "joblessness, destitution, deliberate imbalances, geographic separation and isolation, and absence of politician" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). The Malian state "advanced . . . steady minimization in monetary and political terms, of the north." likewise, when the Malian state provided assets toward the north, it was through "gap and-guideline systems"; along these lines, "in light of the political and financial subordination of the north, the post-colonial elites established the frameworks for northern uprisings and future state

disappointment" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 13). For example, "when the 2012 emergency ejected, out of 147 delegates, just 12 Tuaregs were chosen to the National Assembly while not a solitary agent of the Arab people group (around 5 percent of the aggregate populace) possessed a seat" (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 18-19). Subsequently, the north had little portrayal in the local government. Also, the northern area they didn't have a participatory governance union at the local level. The Malian state used "support strategies" and "endeavored to singularly declare their quality all over nationals, particularly in the north, by selecting faithful (i.e., southern) with civil and military hirelings (officials, governors) (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 20). The Malian government had no good intentions towards the north, there were no proposals for development and funding's to building the north there were political rejections". So, little in the method for the foundation, fundamental administrations, or speculation happened in the northern areas (Chauzal and Van Damme 2015, 20). Given the writing survey in this examination on the basic reasons for intra-state struggle, which incorporate hypotheses on the disappointment of the "implicit agreement," "relative deprivation," "monetary shortage," and "Even Inequalities (HI)," it would not have been hard to anticipate a fourth uprising in northern Mali—complaints were flourished.

In addition, there are many situations where there are peace and harmony between ethnic groups in different nations; be that as it may, when basic, political, financial, and social variations exist, these basic conditions are helpless to proximate reasons for intra-state strife, for example, the fall of the Libyan state and a deluge of external warriors filling Mali. There are a few fundamental reasons for intra-state strife in Mali as comprehended through the systemic and state level-of-analysis. Moreover, Dr. Susanna D wing a professor of political science in the University of Harvard, she is the coordinator of the African studies program. She wrote a report for the united states institute for peace (USIP) titled "Mali's Precarious Democracy and the Causes of Conflict" inquired as to why past peaceful accords neglected to keep a fourth Tuareg uprising? DR Wing refers to a few reasons for strife like different researchers. Specifically, be that as it may, she basically

investigates past peace agreements. DR Susanna refers to that, Neither the National Pact (1992) nor the Algiers Accord (2006) understood the guarantee of expanded self-governance [for the north]. The two assertions were intended to address the absence of monetary improvement in the north and further increment restricted Tuareg participation in military and common state government establishments (Wing 2013, 4-5). The essence of this decentralization was breaking down the central government power down to the local governments. The agreement was to give a listening forum to the voicing of local affairs in the communities which it didn't (Wing 2013, 7). What was the deal? To start with, "huge numbers of the shortcomings of decentralization can be faulted for the need of asset streams from south to north." Second, the 2010 European Union's Special Program for Peace, Security, and Development in Northern Mali, (PSPSDN) fizzled. Why? The program was reserved \$22 million dollars for security and advancement. How were the assets used? DR Wing clarifies that the PSPSDN fizzled because "the task was propelled without appropriately asking those living in the north. [And] the main essence of this peace task was centered fundamentally on building strong security with the presence of police and the military in the north (Wing 2013, 7). Likewise, "this process initiated by the government without going through its ministers and executive body . . . [and] was delivered in a vertical form" (Wing 2013, 8). DR Wing portrays investigation from the International Crisis Group (ICG) as benefactors seeing the PSPSDN as a method for advancement, however, the GoM utilized the assets to "battle against the northern defiance" (Wing 2013, 8). "As one negotiator noticed, the PSPSDN did not cause the defiance in the north, 'but rather it obviously added to its heightening'" (Wing 2013, 8). As delineated in this current research's writing audit, specifically, Ben Ramalingam's Aid on the Edge of Chaos, it is said that the aid of international development projects tends to fail when they don't take caution on involving local participation and considering local grievances on their aid execution. In synopsis, one of the major reasons of conflict in Mali as stated earlier is the large partitioning between north and south. In a country there shouldn't be too many differences between tribes or ethnic groups because it will cause disunity and chaos, you can't have resources in one side and then the other side has

nothing? That is not a democracy. Imminent reasons for struggle surfaced when the Malian state neglected to live by affirmations made amid past peace agreements. Thus, it wouldn't have been long until another uprising started.

The individual level of analysis which is closer to the root causes of the crises, it gives us a sharp understanding of the reason behind the crises between the North and the South. From the South, President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) was once known to be a democratic patriot as an "Officer of majority rule government" when he toppled the degenerate military routine [in 1991] and after that moved to one side when Alpha Oumar Konare was chosen president" (Wing 2013, 3-4). A long time later, in 2002, Amadou Toumani Touré was chosen President of Mali. He managed what was named "agreement governmental issues"(consensus politics) DR Wing takes note of that the "the only way to have a healthy good democracy is when there is an opposition party" this was the system in the former president Konares regime in power. Be that as it may, Amadou Toumani Touré was a free and "was not lined up with any other political party," he prefers what was called a consensus politics where there are unity and agreement." What came about, in any case, was other parties supporting him for little government spoils to come to them and they were ok and did not challenge his governance. The "products of government were too sweet to oppose . . . While Mali held decisions routinely, the political class seemed, by all accounts, to be doing minimal more than enhancing themselves to the detriment of normal subjects" and Mali wound up a standout amongst the most corrupt nations in West Africa (Wing 2013, 5). Defilement prompted famous discontent that bubbled over and encouraged Captain Amadou Sango's ousted President Amadou Toumani Touré of —many normal natives bolstered the overthrow as "The political class was seen as profiting from international aid that was regularly connected to Mali's favored status as a democratic government" (Wing 2013, 6). As a result of "support" and individual eagerness in the south, Mali's vote-based system and organizations wavered, setting up fundamental reasons for the inner clash, between the north and south, as well as between the favored class and normal Malian nationals. From the

northern viewpoint, during a security vacuum, "an activist economy and the rise of local entrepreneurs of viciousness" turned into the standard (Chauzal and van Damme 2015, 29). Trafficking of drugs, human trafficking, and illegal trade prospered (Arieff 2013, 7). Personal agendas and supports were being propelled by military leaders through citizens with the Malian state and a backing of Sharia Islam against the general traditional government in Bamako. "There was fast growth of the militant Salafist group in the north of Mali and a rapid implementation of its laws were uncommon in the state of Mali" (Wing 2013, 1). This level of analysis highlights on the major causes of internal crises and chaos in Mali by depicting how politics was being personalized by individual and this weekend the central government and caused a military coup that destabilized the government. Weak institution leveraged the grievances of the people to promote their own personal agendas in the north against the Malian government.

With the end goal of answering the question on what the imminent causes of the crisis in Mali by means of the level of analysis structure. The outcomes are enlightening: Mali, in January 2012, was flooded with reasons for the crisis. From a global viewpoint, Mali's fringes were made with a few countries going after access to power and assets that happened along a north-south separation. Mali likewise turned into a casualty of the "overflow impact" from the crumple of Libya. From a country state viewpoint, auxiliary disparities, defilement, and feeble organizations reduced the capacity of the administration to satisfy its "implicit understanding." Lastly, from an individual focal point, leaders of the military in the north pushed individual plans by utilizing complaints of the populace. In the South, corruption grew rapidly because consensus politics was misunderstood and was turned to what was called a patronage politics and this made the system not to be efficient. All in all, the reasons for intra-state conflict in Mali in Mali were broad and extensive but can be narrowed down to ethnicity and corruption among others. The case of Mali has been a dicey one it was recorded to be the first mission of the UN peacekeeping mission to help a state regain control over areas from a terrorist group.

3.3 United Nations Deployment Of Troops To Mali

Expectedly, a lot of planning has to be in place for any successful deployment of troops to any UN intervention mission. The Nature of UN Troops Deployment to Mali comprise mainly of. Troop Contributing Countries and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) to UN's peacekeeping operations. Writing three years back about troop contributions to the UN missions Dike in Agbanbu (2010) notes that Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria are the top four TCC to the UN at the time of the case.

It may also include officials who are undergoing different training in order to be deployed by the UN's Security Council for peacekeeping. In the normative framework provides a brighter explanation of the guidelines of the UN conflict management operations, re the TCC/PCC, consisting of both regional and other inter-state organizations, different non-government organizations, participation from internal governments including all the different levels. (DPKO 2008). This explains the responsibilities of all the different actors involved in the deployment in terms of what they are expected to do this is included in 2000 report of the panel on the UN's conflict management and peace operations, this is to make sure that the deployment and the peacekeeping is successful, it improves on its experiences. Indeed, so dynamic is the standard of the DPKO that the Department is emphatic about its readiness for periodic review of the work.

This is to keep track of all the activities of conflict management by the UN and how it has improved, some reviews have been done in 2010 including the deployment of troops, other actors involved in the management of the conflict this includes the opinions of all the different actors that have been participating in the deployment of troops in and outside of the UN (2008). Very crucial for any UN deployment is the place of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC), Police Contributing Countries (PCC), Funding, Logistics, and Technical aid.

The donors conference in the January of 2009 headed by the former Ethiopian prime minister In Hailemariam Desalegn, during the African union

20th session the conflict in Mali was been deliberated this led to the African led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA) talks were made on how to strengthen the Malian military and the Malian defense and security forces MD57) was organized in the November of 2012, more has been done by the African Union in other to support the Malian defense and security forces together with the ECOWAS peacekeeping operation in Mali, the UN made efforts by organizing means through which the African regional powers can be supported through by raising funds to make the operation possible (AUC 2013). The Conflict in Mali led the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS) to make critical decisions concerning the conflict, in the year 2012 troops were being organized by the ECOWAS with the assistance of the African Union because the conflict has developed traits of spilling over to other territories efforts were being made to contain any traits of crisis in the country (Lori & Benoni, 2013) this decision has brought up arguments and challenges between the different actors involved in the management of the conflict both in the internal, regional and also with the UN (Lori & Benoni, 2013).

Speaking about the changing climate in Peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa, Vorrath (2013) contend that the change is significant from the year 1960-1964 during the war in conflict. There has been changes in the method and the strategies used in the management of conflict in Africa by the UN, Africa its self over the years has been on the spotlight in terms of the continuous outbreak of crisis and how it easily spill over to other territories easily, this paper brings up arguments on the fact that African regional powers have been able to intervene in conflicts in and outside of its region. The case of Somalia and the democratic republic of Congo was one case that included non-state armed groups (Vorrath 2013). Thus, in dealing with the insurgency in Mali, it is very important to also interrogate the question as to whether the terror groups are being financed by any sovereign state by any guise.

3.4 Successes Of United Nation's Role In The Conflict Management In Mali

The UN's Peacekeeping in Mali was named UN multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It came after France had intervened with a few about 11000 troops in 2013. When the UN came into Mali, the AU under AFISMA was there trying to keep control of the situation. The UN gave AU two options, one was to support AFISMA and the other was to replace it and ECOWAS advised the AU on taking the second option and it was also supported by the foreign minister of Mali. With the influence of France and giving more support to the UN, AFISMA had no choice but to give way. The UN's Security Council on April 25 under the chapter vii mandate approved the UN multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA). One of the major things MINUSMA was to attend to was political support in stabilizing the Malian government, protecting civilians, human rights monitoring and to see to the return of displaced persons. MINUSMA was formed mainly for peace settlements but because of the difficult situation in Mali the scope got wider, it had to provide security and humanitarian stabilization and a strong political structure to stabilize the system. With the support of the French troops who gave security and MINUSMA, there was a successful political election in August 2013. This mission was followed by a contribution of security personnel's (military troops) and it had a reserved battalion that was at alert to deploy to any place as when being called. There were about 1500 police personals. The MINUSMA main issue was in the north because that was the main issue herald from, on July about 6000 troops were being sent for security in the north, and in Bamako, the French supported the MINUSMA under the threats that were coming from the terrorist activities. After a year in 2014, the issue subsided and there was security control this led to France withdrawing its troops. The next issue MINUSMA was charged with was keeping security in check and stabilizing the civilians. The Algerian team who led the mediation of the peace agreement and reconciliation, it was a successful one and it was signed by the government of Mali and the Tuareg militant alliance of armed groups (June 2015). They were consequent reviews to this peace accord by the UN it was adopted in June 2015 and was in early 2016 that improvements were

being made to the accord. The first UN's intelligent cell was built up in Mali in Bamako, it had counter IED specialist.

Below is a drafted statistic of MINUSMA personnel's in February 2016.

Had a total of 12680 uniform personals

- ❖ Military personnel of 11240 with about 40 military observers
- ❖ Police personnel of 1440

They had a total strength of 12893 personnel distributed to different factors

- Uniform personnel of 11511
 - ❖ Military personnel of 10481
 - ❖ Police personnel 1030
 - ❖ Civilian personnel totaling about 1260
 - International civilian personnel totaling about 578
 - Local civilians totaling about 682
 - UN's Volunteers totaling about 122

Therefore, operationalizing this the UN's involvement in the conflict in Mali, these source(s) of funding and support to Peace Support operations and deployment, has set an important precedence for the regional actors whenever they want to involve themselves in any Peace Keeping efforts. The UN was able to manage the conflict to a limit and the "Algiers Peace Accord" was signed.

3.5 Failure Of United Nation's Role In The Conflict Management In Mali

The case of Mali has been one of the cases the UN did not find easy to settle because it was the first intrastate conflict that had terrorist affiliation and attacks. In this case what the UN was meant to do was to send in more troops, keep them fully equipped with better weapons and gear. But the UN still took the same strategy dealing with normal ethnic crises to deal with this sophisticated one. The UN never saw this threat coming because on normal bases the UN has always been neutral in this conflict but the case of Mali, the terrorist group were attacking the UN troops. Richard Gowan a researcher who is an expert on UN's peacekeeping, states that "there was a

lack of resources and counterterrorism doctrine in their peace mission". He said even the western army was outplayed in Iraq so what makes the UN think they can casually win over such a conflict. There was a lack of security force as we can see in the case of the bombing of an intelligent center in Gau by al-Qaida in January 2018 killing about 70 persons. The UN's troop lacked quality and consistency. The land mass of the north of Mali was about 800000 square kilometers with about 17 million people it was a large space for the UN troops to cover and protect from the terrorist groups. The UN failed in aspects of manpower, strategy, and equipment in their mission in Mali and even till this date the security in Mali is not still strong there are turmoil's here and there.

3.6 Challenges Of UN's Peace Keeping In Mali

In the UN packed working meeting of member states on the 14th and 15th November 2017 in Vancouver Canada, the peacekeeping chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operation stated the need for the member states to come together to support and help the UN to end this long peacekeeping mission in Mali. The UN has had over 170 soldiers killed in the peacekeeping mission in Mali, making it one of the dangerous cases it has ever dealt with. LACROIX stated that there is a need for equipment's to support on the peacekeeping like helicopters and weapons and urged and pleaded with the troop-contributing countries (TCC) to help with staffs to support the UN to function properly. Lacroix also stated the need for training the personnel and how to command them. The force commander of MINUSMA major general Jean Paul gave an honest overview of the case and said has difficulties in deploying of equipment's and blue helmets and at the end of the meeting he said to be frank and realistic if he was giving more tools and weapons he will see to a successful peacekeeping mission in Mali. The challenges in Mali many actors were involved in managing the conflict in Mali it became an issue most studies indicate the presence of African soldiers which happens to be more, Although the European Union partnered with other African countries in other to make it more effective for them to participate in the management of the conflict, some scholars argue that the reason why the international community like the UN

were not totally directly in the management of the conflict and they rather used African soldiers to the forefront of the war was because of the soldiers they lost in countries like Afghanistan and Iraq of which it was one of the things that were a challenge to the UN. (Boutellis, 2013)

This shows that African soldiers that were mostly at the forefront of the conflict were not totally trained with the appropriate knowledge to respond to situations like that, this was one of the reasons why the Malian conflict contained so much violence and military use of force this resulted to the killing of so many civilians, the UN's initiative in Mali through what was called the UN's multidimensional integrated stabilization and mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the number of military forces was estimated to be have been around 11, 000 as it has been mentioned earlier it was made up of mostly Africans from countries like Niger, Liberia, Burkina Faso etc. it's clear to notice that these different countries lack expertise in the conflict, and although the Malian conflict stated as an ethnic conflict which terrorist groups took advantage of the situation, and one thing that still stands unclear is whether the UN didn't understand that counter terrorism should have been effectively deployed into the country but rather the UN assigned France with the responsibility of deploying a counterterrorist group but France attitude in relation to the Malian conflict was based on obligation because they colonized Mali so it was like something they had to get involved in and they didn't want to deploy their soldiers to Mali, this made the counterterrorism initiative ineffective. (Shurkin, 2014) A clear challenge here is between the troops from different countries with different pieces of training and understanding of what or who they were fighting against, this must have contributed to the reason why the Islamic groups were spreading more as it has been argued by some scholars, because an understanding of the fact that they were fighting terrorist groups with no clear reasons behind their actions and thinking that they were fighting mere civilian militants with no much military training, this lack of understanding is the reasons why so many African soldiers were casualties in the Malian conflict (MINUSMA), out of 109 soldiers 91 were been reported dead 7 out of the 109 were Europeans. (Karlsrud, 2015) Another challenge that has been encountered by the UN

was the attitude of the Malian population this delayed the Algiers Accord because the initiative was being seen as a way of the westerners dominating the country with what they referred to as a peace accord, the MINUSMA was mostly been targeted by the combatants and they were mostly unequipped for the fight. (Albrecht, 2017).

3.7 Challenges of UN's Peacekeeping in Africa

Aside from few UN PKOs, like the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), United Nation Emergency Force (UNEF) and United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNIMOZ) most other UN missions in Africa were disappointments explicitly in the case of Somalia. UNAVEM one was fruitful in light of the fact that it had a straight forward command and got the full participation of contributing parties. UNEF was effective because SG Dag Hammarskjöld and his staff worked nonstop to build up this exceptional mission as fast as could be expected under the circumstances. Besides, the universal network gave firm support, and TCC showed its effectiveness upheld up their words with fast, powerful action. Nonetheless, the second mission of the UN in these same states which are UNAVEM II and III and UNOSOM II can't be praised like the first ones. They looked with various difficulties and subsequently failed below are listed few of the challenges the UN faced. This is a slow rate of un-deployment of troops and equipment, inadequacy in manpower, poor logistics, and have a zero synergy between the UN and warlords. Other challenges were ineffective mandates, there was no effective arm use and embargos, lack of quality approach to root causes of conflicts, troops from deployed nations not getting to participate. These challenges that blocked the adequacy of UN PKOs in Africa are not just associated with Africa but with other parts of the world. This study will examine the challenges of the UN and will give solutions that might reinforce the ability to oversee future PKOs in Africa. There are major strategies that are being proposed by the study which include understanding the affectability of the general population, duty, and collaboration of the warlords or those leading the conflicting parties and speedy deployment of troops and staff. Another operational mandate like logistics and fully funding the missions, getting troops from developed nations and enforcing an arms embargo.

3.7.1 Slow Rate of United Nation Peace Keeping Organization

Deployment

Most conflicts are unpredictable they can start at low intensity and rapidly go out of hand. Like in the case of Somalia the civil war started in 1991 and the UN did not intervene till 24th April 1992 with the establishment of UNISOM 1. At that time, it did not start with troop deployment the waited till the month of August 1992 to start with the troop deployment. This delay by the UN gave room for the combatants to settle down and prepare themselves effectively for the conflict. This slow deployment is one of the key challenges that make the UN peacekeeping mission unsuccessful. It has been investigated and the cause to this delay is being identified as excessive procedural bureaucracy and this has resulted in inefficiency. Amid the 1990s the US, presently the biggest supporter of the UN, they saw to the inefficiency of the UNs and they held back their dues the reimbursement of the levy was made only if the UN were to change some reforms. In 1994 the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was set up by a decision of the General Assembly to fill in as a proficiency watchdog. The United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) has been successful relating to missions but its foundation is a subject of another discourse. Another reason for this late deployment of troops it's being referred to the CNN factor which is the absence of enough inclusion of contentions in Africa by major worldwide media associations. When nations don't see what is happening in other nations it is difficult to help. It is said that image talks a thousand words and that is very valid. With the case of the Israeli and Lebanon war in 2006, there was an influx of troops from developed countries to sustain and keep peace during this conflict and the case was solved. Why did this happen rapidly? It was because of the coverage of the BBC and CNN who had an extensive 24 hours coverage of this conflict when it started. This contrasted with their incidental couple of minute's news cut on Darfur-Sudan and Somalia conflict in Africa which has not been attended to apart from Sudan which is a case in point. Other issues which have led to this lack of rapid action in troops deployment is being associated are lack of funds and slow bureaucracy. The perspectives of Brig Gen SY Bello on explanations behind slow and low deployment by the TCCs

agree to the reality of slow troop deployment for being a challenge for contemporary UN Peacekeeping operation in Africa. the delay that the UN has with troop deployment has resulted to harming a lot of nations, for example, the case of Darfur Sudan because of the late response to the deployment of troops the conflict went across its border to chap. the former secretary of state to the united states Condoleezza Rice in a conference that took place in France spoke about how the international community has failed in the case of conflict in Darfur. Mr. Nicolas who was the president of France at that time made this phrase "silence was killing" in Darfur Sudan. There are many cases where peacekeeping would have been successful 100 percent only of the UN was cautious of time. The phrase "time is everything" takes a toll in this challenge. The UN Security Council should take more action by fastening the process of mission deployment in troubled states it is very important because without this we cannot achieve Collective Security.

3.7.2 Lack of arms Enforcement embargo

Around 50 military observers (MILOBs) were conveyed in Somalia by June 1992 but did not have reinforcements till august with the deployment of about 500 Pakistan Soldiers. The Pakistani troops only had light weapons that could barely protect them, 8 General Aided had to carry his army with strong weapons and were able to confine the troops at the Mogadishu airport. Consequently, the Pakistani troops were working under the peacekeeping law (This included the monitoring of arms embargo and ceasefire violations) which states they are not meant to have heavy weapons and should not use force only in self-defense. In the end, these troops were not able to be effective in the mission with just light protective weapons working under the customary standard of assent and non-utilization of power. This is one of the reasons for the failure of the mission in Somalia. This among others have been one of the challenges in peacekeeping missions in Africa. Troops without good ammunitions this tends to make them fragile and not fully active.

3.7.3 Lack of Manpower and Logistics

This is some of the key components in peacekeeping missions if there is a shortage of manpower, equipment's, and other resources there cannot fully operate. This has been an issue in Africa and has led to a lot of failed missions in Africa. For example, with the case of UNISOM II, the shortage of troops deployment cost them almost everything this gave the militia the chance to try and frustrate the efforts of the mission. Because of the low level of manpower, the militia and other armed groups had space to fully function without any monitoring because there were no troops to look over their activities. For example, there were supplies that were being stolen and hijacked by these groups. How can a peace mission fully function when people who look up to you for protection, material, and resources are not fully protected and cared for? This is one of the reasons for a lot of failed missions in Africa.

To support this point, discussing difficulties the UN PKOs faced, in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia UNISOM II, Maj Gen Philip V Sibanda was in charge of in the mission in October 1995 he took over from a Maj Gen from Nigeria. He assumed office duty he had 3500 military and police personnel on the ground out of the 7000 that was approved by the UNSC. He said the first thing he asked his predecessor was why was the troop on ground few compared to the troop that was sent for a peacekeeping mission in Angola. The appropriate response I got was that although the mission had asked for about 15,000 troops, the UNSC had declined to approve this figure. The issues of this mission were stated in a report on November 25, 1992, by the UNSG that the disappointment on the process to achieve peace in that nation was due to lack of provision of means and equipment that was not being delivered for the peace accord. With the inclusion of a lack of weapons and the slow act of prepping the army.

3.7.4 Lack Of Cooperation Of Warlords

The only way to accomplish a successful mandate of peacekeeping though negotiations are long and difficult it is really needed. The experience in Somalia has shown us how the lack of full political commitment and lack of

cooperation by the aggressive warlords on a ceasefire agreement being a big challenge when it is not done well. The normal process done in peacekeeping is to be having a dialogue with the warlords in that case you will know what they want and how they want it. And these agreements are not fully binding like the case of Somalia the warlords did not hold on their own side of the agreement. The only way the warlords will stick to the agreement is only if it favors them and when it doesn't it can lead to a great danger like the case of the USA led intervention force in Somalia were no longer on friendly terms with the warlords, the warlords retaliated and started targeting the American soldiers by the militia and this led to the withdrawal of troops and the mission was not accomplished and this brought back chaos and hunger in the nation.

3.7.5 Non-Tackling of Root Causes of Conflicts

The African continent or region is said to be a cosmopolitan society given the fact that so many ethnic nationalities and tribes existed even before the advent of colonialism. This diverse ethnic group constitutes what is today known as a nation. It is no longer news that these diversities as a result of ethnic and cultural divisions tend to create the precondition for ethnic strives and clashes of values and interests which if not effectively micromanaged, it often leads to conflicts and insecurity. These conflicts are said to be precipitated by several factors ranging from socio-cultural, religious, economic and politically implemented. By their nature and context, these conflicts could be said to be protracted, deadly, vicious, bloody leading to wanton destruction of lives, properties and the foundation of the state system in most of these countries in Africa as witnessed with seemingly unending conflict in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic to say the few.

3.7.6 Lack of Participation of Troops from Developed Nations

Another issue challenging the UN peacekeeping in Africa is getting troops from developed western nations. Ghana and Nepal were the only two developing countries that were in the TCC top ten. But in the year 2006, there was a change in the TCC top ten contributors which was there were

more soldiers from developing countries. There are 9 developing countries of about 73000 and just a few from the western developed countries. France was listed as 22nd with just about 590 troops. This reasons for nations not contributing troops to the UN are having dangerous and complex conflicts in the post-cold war era. In the fourth committee that held on the 8th of November 2000, the case of the developed nations not participating in peacekeeping was brought up by several representatives from African countries. The representative from Zambia complained about the permanent members not sending a sizable number of military troops to peacekeeping missions in Africa and he also said four of the permanent members have sent troops to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for peacekeeping in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Kosovo. And, a representative from Egypt also stressed on the method the Security Council was using on the TCC he said they should put in more effort in order to have more troops.

3.8 Continuity and change in the case of Mali

The (HIPPO) High-Level Independent Panel on peace operation and the (AGE) Advisory Group of Experts have discussed on the review of the peacebuilding system on developing a bottom-up approach to peacebuilding. With this approach, the UN gets to deal with the issues from the root and come to the aid of the people at the local level because they are the ones really affected. In the Malian case the UN at the beginning of the intervention, The UN came with the MINUSMA strategies with the deployment of over 11, 000 soldiers into the country, this came with the 2100 resolution this included human right, in 2014 the Algiers peace agreement was been pursued by the UN this led to the extension of 2164 resolution in the country, this included the deployment of more soldiers, expansion of the UN's strategies leading to more patrols in the country, reconciliation initiative, political reconstruction, structuring of the state, reinforcement of the security in the country, creation of the rule of law to maintain law and order and to make sure that human rights are being respected (Shurkin, 2014). The UN was able to sign agreements with some of the conflicting militias both between themselves and also the government some of the ex-combatants were being integrated into the Malian military forces to help stop the violence, the UN was able to

organize a free and fair election in order to build the state, the military sector was also been restructured, most aspects of the country has been touched by the UN. In 2015, the UN finally successfully signed the peace agreement between the combatants and the Malian government. A back to school program was also organized by the UN through the UNICEF so many teachers and students resumed school, while in the health sector the world health organization played a vital role in ensuring that the injured and the sick where been attended to (Shurkin, 2014).

Capacity building of teacher training structures in Mali was being introduced by the UN through UNESCO to build and strengthen the educational system of Mali. This was done by teaching teachers through seminars on how to teach and developing schools and institutions so that children can go back to school. They were different stages to the capacity building in Mali which started in 2010 with the engagement of stakeholders, between 2010-2012 there was check for needs and capacity assessment, 2012 there was a formation of a capacity building plan and between 2014 to 2017 capacity building activities started fully.

Rehabilitation of the un in Mali though slow but was able to achieve a lot with the example of some cases like the cultural heritage (mausoleums) in Timbuktu which was the first stage of rehabilitation, it was launched in March 2014. this was done strictly under the supervision of Mali's Ministry of Culture and UNESCO. To achieve a strong rehabilitation framework in Mali, there had to be a joint force between MINUSMA and other UN agencies to provide a connection between itself and the technical financial partners (TFP) in order to bring a basic social service and a stable state authority among communities that were really destroyed mostly in the north of Mali. The rehabilitation and stabilization plan was divided into three main sections which are, 1 support to joint strategic planning which consisted of MINUSMA and its military forces in strategy and initiative in programs to help stabilize the case in Mali and the second one was financing and management mechanism for peace and security in Mali, this consisted of funding and getting resources for the development of peace and rehabilitation and

reviving productive activities in the country. There are financing mechanisms that were formed to help fund this process which: a trust fund was formed for Mali, the peacebuilding fund of the UN and the quick impact project (QIP). The third one is the support of international aid this was done by getting aids from international body to support the growth and development of the nation. Women and children are being prepared and educated in the process of achieving a great future for the country of Mali. Government reforms the UN where able to stabilize the government and they conducted election after the collected back the power from the rebels. The UN is still there supporting the government in handling matters because till date Mali is still under the due rest there are still clashes and fights and killings.

The United Nations Peacekeeping in Mali has not been successful to an extent though some parts have been successful, some parts have not. With this statement I will say the peacekeeping in Mali is still going on.

3.9 Prospects/Recommendation Of UN Involvement In Peacekeeping Mission Diplomacy

The UN's involvement in peacekeeping missions has been an area that has been and is being studied and analyzed by so many scholars on how the UN's peacekeeping methods are not effective enough. This includes the use of force as the major method with the idea of building a state and the liberal perspective of democracy, it's important to understand that each country regardless of its region encounters a specific and kind of conflict that needs special attention to be understood this includes the root causes of the conflict. Over the year's conflicts are more intrastate than an interstate, religious, sectarian, ethnic etc.

With the different causes of conflict, it is important that strategies and mechanisms are being organized particularly for each conflict regardless of how small the society is because over the year's conflicts have shown traits of spilling over to other territories and countries. Soldiers from over 100 countries with over 100, 000 troops have been deployed by the UN's Security Council all over the world managed by the department of peacekeeping

operations this figure can change in the nearest future, with the rise in the deployment of soldiers all over the world it calls out for the UN to better work on the peacekeeping strategies and mechanisms which will decrease the rate of failure and avoid the reoccurrences of past errors by the UN's peacekeeping.

Some of the important questions that the UN needs to always ask before deploying troops are; when is the conducive time to get involved in peacekeeping in a country? What is the proper method to be used to end a peacekeeping operation? How can the UN handle challenges in the field and contain the spillover of a conflict? This section aims at suggesting and recommending prospects that can be considered by the UN in order to make the UN's peacekeeping operations to be more effective.

Is the topic sovereignty still relevant in peacekeeping operation? When is the valid time or case for this topic to be crossed? Most peacekeeping operations are being done with the aim of not only stopping the violence Galtung refers to it as negative peace but also the escalation and the maintenance of peace in the world. Is the deployment of troops considering the place of human rights in creating an avenue for reconciliation and how it affects the security of the civilians? Pinar mentioned some arguments from scholars like Galtung he indicates that peace can not necessarily mean there is no war but rather an atmosphere that is conducive for the people and the society itself plays a vital role in terms of the economy and humanitarian issues. Other ways of security are by educating the masses about peace these include reconciliation and nonviolent communication (Galtung, 2001).

The UN need to focus more on both the societal and the individual level in understanding security because peace might be impossible if the society and the people in the society are not taken as the major priority, this has to do with their insecurities and their fears. The use of force has on the societal and the individual dimension, Pinar argued that any peace that is acquired through the use of violence or forces this peace should not be expected to be lasting. It is important to understand how effective a stable peace dialogue

can have in not only stopping the violence through the use of force but initiating a dialogue of reconciliation which contents healing in it both in the individual level and the societal structures.

- The UN needs to deploy skilled troops with the capacity of protecting and ensuring the security of the civilians and that of the troops also.
- The UN should have a transparent system of communication with the countries that have deployed their soldiers to the field.
- Before a peacekeeping mission should be authorized adequate strategies and mechanisms should be organized by the UN this includes funding and how to handle unforeseen challenges during the peacekeeping mission.
- Both the troops on the field and the personnel's supervising and monitoring the activities and the peacekeeping mission must have the required professional skills to operate.

CONCLUSION

This study aimed at analyzing the United Nations Conflict Management and troop's deployment in conflict areas in Mali, Using Mali as my case study. From my introduction, I analyzed how the UN's Conflict Management changed from the end of the Cold War and how interest became the main issue which slows the involvement of the Security Council in Conflict management mostly in Africa. In the chapter, the study discussed the background of the study and UN's involvement in Conflict Management in Africa and Mali. Through my research question, I was able to state the relationship between Conflict Management and deployment of troops, making it successful or a failure. The use of a qualitative method was used to collect data through secondary sources. The significance of the study discussed the issue of United Nations deviating from its founding principles.

In chapter 2, the theory of Collective Security in the context of Conflict Management was used in this study to show how the UN is supposed to function through the management of conflict. In this chapter, the study examined the UN and Peacekeeping methods, how these methods work to achieve its goals. The literature on Conflict Management was reviewed from different scholars through their books and articles on how it has affected change positively or negatively. Also states on recognizing the forces of conflict before intervening. I discussed on the peace enforcement of the UN through troop deployment, stabilization, reconciliation etc.

Chapter 3 of the study examined the role of UN in Africa their successes and failures were stated and explained briefly with cases like Rwanda, Somalia, and Congo. The UN was not quick to respond, and this led to a lot of casualties and this made conflict management to be difficult to achieve in these areas. In the case of Liberia and Libya, there was swift action of the UN in the conflict management and troop's deployment which made conflict management possible. With lessons learned from the failures and successes, the Security Council should be quick in making decisions and should have a

good relationship with the regional organizations like the case of Sudan on how the UN and AU worked together peacefully to achieve its goals in Darfur.

In Chapter 3, issues around Mali was analyzed given that Conflict in Mali served as the case study. In the chapter, the study discussed the history of the crisis and the main causes of its conflict. Through this brief history, root causes of the conflict were stated. I discussed the involvement of the UN, its troop deployment which was not efficient and did not have quality because most of their personnel were not fully qualified and well skilled. This led to a high rate of casualties of the troops and the citizens. The conflict has traits of terrorist groups and attacks and they had well-equipped weapons while the UN's troop was not well equipped, and the deployment of troops was late, and this led to the issues of the conflict management in Mali. With their success and failures in the conflict management in Mali, the UN is still in Mali with their troops are still handling issues of security in the countries.

Chapter 4 marks the concluding aspect of the thesis. This chapter deals with the findings and recommendations which stated that the UN must make better peacekeeping methods before any deployment are the engagement of troops, it should understand the root causes of the conflict first. They should also increase the TCC and the PCC. Technically, using professional personnel both on the field and off the field should be used. Through this analysis, my study concludes by answering the research question "is there a relationship between the success/failures of the deployment of peacekeeping forces and conflict management in Africa?" With these findings, through the challenges the United Nations had with member states not being able to participate efficient, this was seen the speech of chief Jean-Pierre Lacroix, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping operation stated the need for the member states to come together to support and help the United Nations to end this long peacekeeping mission in Mali. The case of Mali has been a deadly case, but the United Nations did not take drastic actions, and this led to the death of over 170 soldiers. Lacroix urges the United Nations to fund and supply the troops with good equipment's and professional staffs. The case in Mali must of the forces that were used were not professionals as

seen in the countries that supplied the forces. The countries that contributed troops were mostly countries from the third world which were low in skills and expertise. The case was affiliated with terrorist activities which made the conflict a different type. the MINUSMA was mostly being targeted by the combatants and they were mostly unequipped for the fight Albrecht (2017). This was meant to make the United Nations to have a different strategy though this was the first conflict that was connected to terrorist activities that the United Nations has ever dealt with. Countries like the United states and other big countries that are specialized in tackling terrorism are meant to be among the highest contributors of troops because they are specialized and well skilled. Most of these developed countries at the heat of the moment they had their troops pulled back like USA, France ETC. cases like Libya in 2011 which a lot of nations have interest like United States, the case was dealt with immensely why? Because there was interest. So, what happens to nations that don't have a lot to offer? There is no equality in the conflict management and troops deployment by nations. This making the sole aim of collective security to be Blake. Another challenge the United Nations has is the early deployment of troops. At the start of conflict in Mali in 2012 the United Nations was not there till 2013. The aspect of waiting on the Security Council to assign a peacekeeping mission before it starts makes this process difficult to start early, we can see this in case of Somalia, case of Rwanda. These cases had a high rate of genocide because there were no forces or troops to help stabilize the situation in the area and the rate of the killings wouldn't have reached that number. In the case of Mali also the United Nations was slow to action and when they got their AU and ECOWAS where there already trying to stabilize the issue and when the UN got there, they gave them two options to either continue and the UN will back them up or they should give away for the UN to act. AU gave way for UN to take control but at the end of the day the troops that were being used were the troops from the AU and ECOWAS. My issue with this scenario was why didn't the United Nations at the beginning dint start with a joint tax force instead of wanting to handle the issue on their own. The regional actors always know the issue of the regional it is always good if the United Nations can always work together with the regional actors this will make conflict management

easier to an extent. Another challenge is the policy of the United Nations is that troops are not supposed to attack and the only way they can attack is only through defense. With the case of Mali United Nations is always the neutral party in any conflict management but in this case the terrorist groups were going after the United Nations troops and the troops were not fully equipped unlike the terrorist group who had sophisticated weapons and were using it at will. This policy makes the United Nations troops vulnerable and not fully functional. Another challenge is the use of weapons that are not on the same level as those who they are after. This makes it difficult for the troops to attack well. Even with the case of low manpower this doesn't allow the United Nations to have a wide cover for example, with the case of UNISOM II, the shortage on troops deployment cost them almost everything this gave the militia the chance to toy and frustrate the efforts of the mission. Another challenge is relationship between the troops and the war lords. This is a key challenge and needs to be taken serious just like the case of the USA led intervention force in Somalia were no longer on friendly terms with the warlords, the warlords retaliated and started targeting the American soldiers and this led to the withdrawal of troops and the mission was not accomplished and this brought back chaos and hunger in the nation. The war lords are those who control this militia and if the relationship is not good then resolving the issue becomes impossible. In the case of Mali, the tackling of root causes of the conflict was not achieved it was a top to bottom policy and the main people that are affected are those at the bottom. Because the conflict was started base on the injustice suffered by the north from the southern part of Mali were all the countries good resources are. With the different causes of conflict, it is important that strategies and mechanisms are being organized particularly for each conflict regardless of how small the society is, because over the year's conflicts have shown traits of spilling over to other territories and countries. Soldiers from over 100 countries with over 100, 000 troops have been deployed by the United Nations Security Council all over the world managed by the department of peacekeeping operations, this figure can change in the nearest future, with the rise in the deployment of soldiers all over the world it calls out for the United Nations to better work on the peacekeeping strategies and mechanisms which will decrease the rate of

failure and avoid the reoccurrences of past errors by the United Nations peacekeeping. Some of the important questions that the United Nations needs to always ask before deploying troops are; when is the conducive time to get involved in peacekeeping in a country? What is the proper method to be used to end a peacekeeping operation? How can the United Nations handle challenges in the field and contain the spillover of a conflict? With my findings, it was able to show the extent of the relationship between Conflict Management and multilateral engagement through troop deployment in conflict and war-torn regions.

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PLAGIARISM REPORT

ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL



BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

08.01.2019

Dear Manji Jibba Ladan,

Your project **“United Nations Conflict Management And The Deployment Of Peacekeeping Troops To Conflict Areas In Africa: A Case Study Of Mali”** has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note:If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.