



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**KAZAKHSTAN:
NATION AND NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS**

KAMILLA YAYAZOVA

MASTER'S THESIS

NICOSIA
2019

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2019

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ABSTRACT

KAZAKHSTAN:

NATION AND NATIONAL SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

The major objective of this thesis is the social analysis which aims to find the reasons for which the Kazakh society, after gaining the independence was split into two parts – Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis. The thesis evaluates the nation-building policies of the Kazakh authority and their impact on the formation and perception of the national identity in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Numerous circumstances and factors like dominance of the Russian language, demographic structure as well as the presence of the various ethnic groups affect to the positive result in terms of all policies made by the Kazakh authorities. Thus, the variables mentioned above disable these efforts to be achievable within the short-term period. The thesis also explores the ethno-cultural and ethno-political aspects of the language as a main tool for nation-building. The separate attention is paid to the comprehension of the cultural, historical, ethno-national, educational and socio-psychological aspects of the language and its transformation of the Kazakh identity in the context of global and local intercultural interactions.

Keywords: Kazakhstan, Kazakh nation, national identity, Kazakh language

ÖZ

KAZAKİSTAN: MİLLET VE MİLLİ ÖZBİLİNÇ

Bu tezin esas amacı Kazak toplumunu bağımsızlığını kazanmasında sonra Kazak ve Kazakistanlı olarak iki farklı kısma bölünmesinin nedenlerini sosyal yönden analizini yapmaktır. Kazak yönetiminin ulus kurma politikaları ve bu politikaların Sovyetler Birliği sonrası Kazakistan kimliğinin biçimlenmesi ve algısının üzerinde olan etkileri bu araştırma tarafından değerlendirilmektedir. Rus dilinin baskın olmasının oluşturduğu şartlar ve faktörler, demografik yapının yanı sıra farklı etnik grupların da oluşu Kazak yönetiminin aldığı politik kararların olumlu bir şekilde uygulanmasını etkilemektedir. Sonuç olarak, yukarıda bahsedilen nedenlerden dolayı alınan kararların kısa bir sürede sonuca ulaştırmasını engellemektedir. Bu tez aynı zamanda, dilin etnik-kültürel ve etnik-politik yönünden ulus kurma aşamasında bir araç olarak faydalanabilmesini araştırmaktadır. Dilin kültürel, tarihsel, etnik-milliyet, eğitimsel ve sosyo-psikolojik yönlerinin ve Kazak kimliğinin evrensel ve yerli kültürlerarası etkileşimleri üzerine de ayrıca dikkat çekmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kazakistan, Kazak Milliyeti, Ulus Kimliği, Kazak Dili

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PLAGIARISM REPORT

ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

INTRODUCTION

After disintegration of the Soviet Union, one of the challenges that Kazakhstan had faced as an independent state was how to be a nation-state. Kazakhstan, as a multicultural and cosmopolitan state is composed of more than 130 ethnic groups, most of whom were deported or exiled during Stalin's regime (Likhachev, 2017). The Constitution of the Kazakhstan proclaims the equality of all people regardless of their nationality, which is very often emphasized by the current President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Nevertheless, such statement does not reflect the existing conditions in the country. For most people who inhabited the Soviet Union, the collapse of the USSR gave greater importance to nationality rather than to citizenship. Even in terms of self-consciousness, people preferred to be identified with their nationality since people lived too many years having no boundaries, having no citizenship other than the Soviet citizenship (Olcott M. , p. 111). People of Kazakhstan have feared as it was not clear what was awaiting them in terms of the nature of their new nation-state. They did not know what to expect from their new Kazakh Government which has formed after collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Thus, from the very beginning of independence, the multicultural environment of the population in Kazakhstan was split into two "camps" –Kazakhs and Kazakhstanis. The concept of "Kazakh" refers to the indigenous population of Kazakhstan, which are mostly Kazakh origins and bears ethno-cultural and ethno-national meanings. However, the concept of "Kazakhstanis" or "Kazakhstani" still expresses the territorial identity. This has remained from the Soviet times and it covers the administrative-political and ideological connotation which includes other ethnic groups who are in minority (Uzbeks, Tatars, Uygurs etc.) (Kaznetov, 2001).

According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 92) in everyday life, the minority ethnic groups, especially the Russian population, the second largest ethnic-group after the Kazakh ethnic-group, is constantly facing abuses, and the Kazakhs, in response, call it the natural costs of the state-building process.

One of such manifestations was the change in the spelling of the official name of the country from “Kazahstan” to “Kazakhstan” (in 1995) in order to better reflect the Kazakh pronunciation. Two years later, the government of Kazakhstan returned the spelling “Kazakhstan” for international circulation, but left a modified official name for domestic use (Ahonen, 2008). The already painful frictions are even more aggravated due to the transfer of Kazakh script from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet. But the biggest irritant from the point of view of Russians is that they are forced to learn the Kazakh language and speak it, since, according to the Constitution of the Kazakhstan, it must exist along with the Russian language and eventually replace it (Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995).

Meanwhile, according to Kadyrzhanov (2014), many Kazakhs like the idea that the Kazakh language should be privileged, since Kazakhstan is the home of the Kazakhs. The new laws on giving the Kazakh language the status of the state language and accordingly, compulsory use of it in various public spheres are clearer than any other legal provision indicate a shift towards the real and apparent strengthening of the economic and political positions of the Kazakhs.

National identity has a decisive influence on the self-identification and world perception of both the individual and society. For Kazakhstan with its multinational society, this problem, namely the construction of the civic identity and preservation of the Kazakh national identity, is the main one and comes to the fore. Kazakhstan today has all the attributes of sovereignty, but not all citizens associate themselves with the state.

Considering the history and failure of the Soviet model of identity, in today's multi-ethnic Kazakhstan it is impossible to consolidate society into a single ethnic community. Researcher Shomanov (Shomanov. A., 2005) considers it impossible to ignore such an important aspect of national statehood for Kazakhstan as the formation of a single political nation. He continues suggesting the solution for this task to consolidate the Kazakh nation around the Kazakh ethnic group. But this consolidation itself is possible only if the

Kazakhs can assume the duty and responsibility to strengthen all ethnic groups, considering the interests of these ethnic groups as much as possible.

As indicated by Marta Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 217) each post-Soviet state is faced difficulties to be identified as a nation. Kazakhstan, in this sense, was accompanied by the greatest controversy. The main contradiction is related to the fact that when Kazakhstan gained its own statehood it was very difficult to assimilate the two main ethnic groups- the Russians and the Kazakhs- because they perceived the world differently and thus set the government the difficult task of reconciling these differences.

It should be mentioned here that one of the main difficulties that comes as an obstacle is the language issue. Still, the common means of communication in Kazakhstan is the Russian language. The Soviet past did not leave chances (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2012) for the upgrade and improvement of the Kazakh language. Subsequently, the changes that occurred in the political and social agenda of the state complicated the situation in terms of the national self-identification. As such, the situation in Kazakhstan came to the fore that Kazakh language as a means of communication for the general population of Kazakhstan is not sustainable in the short-run.

The following chapters discuss the obstacles for the formation of a national identity in the Republic of Kazakhstan through the supra ethnic identity-building process, in terms of the socio-political processes and the procedure of rebuilding the language policy.

Methodology

The design of the study is made up of qualitative method of analysis. The documentary research is chosen as the method of analysis. The understanding and examination of the situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan in the terms of self-consciousness of national identity by people of Republic is impossible without using different sources such historical data, statistical researches, governmental records, the governmental E-library on history of Kazakhstan. The laws and administrative statements are utilized in this proposal as well. In this postulation, the 1993 Constitution of Kazakhstan

alongside the present Constitution of Kazakhstan of 1995 is utilized. Apart from the laws and decrees a variety of official state programs are also used and examined. The governmental programs in terms of language and cultural heritage are analysed and included in the thesis. Various articles and documents in Turkish, Russian and English language concerning language issue, nationalism, patriotism and nation-building are also inspected. Renowned researchers are embraced to give and bolster the argumentation of the postulation. The validity and reliability of any study strongly depends upon the appropriateness of the instruments used in the data collection. It is, however, a fact that whichever procedure a researcher uses in the collection of data is very important as it determines the accuracy of the research findings. While conducting this study, related documents from various sources including the E-library as part of the secondary sources are used, among which there are scientific articles, journals, newspapers and other academic publications.

Research questions

The study is guided by the following research questions:

1. What are the causes and reasons of invisible split in the Kazakh society in terms of the self-identification?
2. What are the measures adopted by the Kazakh government to modernize the national self-consciousness among multi-ethnic society in Kazakhstan?
3. Which obstacles Kazakhs government faces on the way of creation the civil society?
4. What are the problems and prospects of the Kazakh identity as a civil nation on the stage of globalization?

Significance of the thesis

The theoretical and scientific-practical significance of the work lies in the scientific analysis of the features of the ethno-political processes of the identities in the Republic of Kazakhstan. This thesis can serve as a

theoretical material for further research in the field of ethno-sociology, and can be used in the development of a methodology for comprehensive studies of national identity.

The methodological and factual material of the dissertation research, its main provisions, conclusions, scientific and practical recommendations are used to develop basic and elective courses in sociology, conflictology, ethnopoliology and political science, and to become the basis for future scientific research in this field. The practical significance of the study also lies in the fact that the results obtained can be used in studies of other nationalizing states especially in the post-Soviet nations.

Literature review

The analysis of the indicated problem implies the solution of the question of the essence of the ethnos and the nation, as well as their correlation. Over the decades of discussion of this problem, many diverse proposals have been made. Sadokhin (Sadokhin, 2001) reduced all the diverse concepts of ethnos and ethnicity to three main types: 1) primordialism (it is also called substantialism and essentialism), 2) instrumentalism (situationalism) and 3) constructivism.

Primordialism is based on the statement that ethnicity possesses such objective properties as language, traditions, religion, etc (p. 69). The decisive importance in the study of ethnicity ethnology gives to culture. Another methodological approach to the study of ethnicity is instrumentalism (situationism or mobilizationism). Instrumentalists emphasize that ethnicity is a means of mobilizing in the struggle for political resources and various forms of social capital in ethnic conflicts (p. 73). And finally, the third approach, constructivism, is based on the assertion that ethnic elites construct ethnicity, shaping it in the right direction for themselves (p. 74).

Sadokhin distinguishes natural and evolutionary-historical directions in primordialism (p. 25). He considers the sociobiological concept of an ethnos an example of this direction. In Soviet ethnography there were two mutually exclusive concepts of ethnos and ethnogenesis. One was developed by

Bromley, another by Gumilev (p. 11). If the first had many supporters, the second stood alone. The comparison of the the types distinguished by Sadokhin shows that the concept of Gumilyov coincides with the primordialist, and the instrumentalist and constructivist ones are unambiguously socio-cultural interpretations of the ethnos.

According to Gumilev (Gumilev), "the widespread belief that ethnic groups are reduced only to one or another social phenomenon, we consider the hypothesis unproved ..." (p. 18). He emphasizes that "it is necessary to consider ethnic and cultural interactions not as a whole, but as a permanent combination of two forms of development: natural and social" (1990, p. 18). Thus, it is clear that, according to Gumilev, ethnogenesis and sociogenesis are two parallel processes, subject to different laws. In other words, this concept stands on the positions of dualism, which makes it very vulnerable.

Bromley (Bromley, 1983), developing the sociocultural concept of ethnos and ethnogenesis, believed that ethnos "can be defined as a stable intergenerational collection of people historically established in a certain territory, having not only common features, but also relatively stable features of culture (including language) and psyche, as well as the consciousness of its unity and difference from all other similar entities (self-consciousness), fixed in the self-name (ethnonym) (pp. 57-58). This concept is indisputable advantage over Gumilev's one and is the recognition of the ethnos as a socio-cultural reality. Ethnos is a specific form of the human community, for "the formation of the Self and the formation of the Society should be viewed not as two different mutually complementary processes, but as a single process" (Khamidov, 1989, p. 23).

It is necessary to consider another debatable question - the question of the essence of the nation and the relationship between the ethnic group and the nation. According to the concept of the ethnos of Gumilev, this question will not make sense. Soviet science (ethnography, history, philosophy) was dominated by the definition of a nation given back in 1913 by Stalin (Stalin, 1951): "A nation is a historically established stable community of people that emerged on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and

mental structure, manifested in the community of culture" (p. 296). This definition was not revised until the collapse of the Soviet Union and only after it began to appear in other interpretations. Thus, Tereshkovich (Tereshkovich, 1998) writes that a nation is "a polysemantic concept used to characterize large sociocultural communities of the industrial era. There are two main approaches of understanding a nation: as a political community (political nations) of citizens of a particular state and as an ethnic community (ethnic nation) with a single language and self-consciousness" (p. 460).

Zdravomyslov (Zdravomyslov, 1996) notes: "Modern science proceeds from the fact that nations, unlike ethnic groups, are the result of a transition from an agrarian to an industrial culture" (p. 418). Thus, historically, the nation as a form of human community comes to replace the ethnos. But how does it relate to the ethnos?

Babakov and Semenov (1996) write: "Within the framework of some studies ... there is ... a steady desire to identify (or replace) the national with ethnic, national ethnic communities, national consciousness with ethnic self-consciousness" (p. 217). Gellner (Gellner, Nation and nationalism.) argues: "The definition of a nation is associated with much more serious difficulties than the definition of a state" (p. 32). In addition, he argues that "nations, like states, are just an accident, not a universal necessity (p. 34). A nation, in his opinion, is a very amorphous concept.

Zdravomyslov (Zdravomyslov, 1996) proposes a "relativistic theory of nations based on the thesis about the reference nature of each of the nations, as well as of any other ethnic group (p. 118)". On the one hand, a nation is really a certain community of individuals and in this sense, it is a phenomenon of collective consciousness. But it is in many respects the concept of a nation or ethnic group coincides with the concept of the main community, within which the individual's life cycle is carried out.

A nation is a social space in which it realizes itself through the means of culture provided to it by the community of people" (Zdravomyslov, p. 113). This definition of a nation is preferable to the definition of Gellner. However, it is also rather vague and contradictory. A nation, according to Zdravomyslov

(1996), it is a community of individuals. But then why is it a phenomenon of collective consciousness?

According to Boroday (Boroday, 1996): "Ethnos and a nation are related and at the same time fundamentally different" (p. 315). In his opinion, the moment of spontaneity prevails in the formation of the ethnos; a nation is formed more appropriately. He writes: "an ethnos in itself does not need statehood, since ethnic unity is initially based not on artificially constructed rational legal norms, but on original, spontaneously formed customs and unconscious concepts inherent in a given community - archetypes" (p. 317). "State self-determination, - he specifies, - is the holy right only and only of the nation. But unlike local closed ethnic groups, the first most important feature of a nation is that it is originally polyethnic by its nature, or more precisely, supra-ethnic" (p. 316). Thus, besides the fact that the nation is supra-ethnic, it is also more open in comparison with ethnic groups. But if in the first case this principle fulfills the function of protective-offensive, then in the second it is a stimulus for interaction, dialogue. In other words, the nation is essentially tolerant (although in practice there are refutations of this). Consequently, a nation cannot exist without its statehood. In the light of this understanding of the essence of a nation the definition of a nation given above by Stalin is in fact a definition of only an ethnos.

From the proposed by Boroday (Boroday, 1996), the interpretation of the essence of the nation and its relationship with the ethnos implies that the nation as a form of human community is more developed than the ethnos. But it does not appear immediately and is formed gradually. And this means that the ethnic groups from which a nation is born, until it has finally formed, continue to coexist within the framework of a certain whole. This whole is the state. Boroday writes that statehood is not obligatory for an ethnos or a group of coexisting ethnoses. But this is only in theory. Ethnic groups that had no statehood existed only during the Archaic period, and almost until the beginning of the 20th century. The defining trend of world history was the tendency of formation of state entities. And this coincides with the decomposition of the primitive system. These states were ethnic (both mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic) entities. Boroday writes about the emergence of the

state, which is exercised, as a rule, in the form of coercion. In ancient ethnic states, power was concentrated in the hands of the ruler and implemented through a fairly primitive state apparatus from top to bottom unilaterally. The separation of powers in the ethnic state formations did not exist. In the national-state formations, however, such a division exists to some extent, and the more developed a nation is, the more developed it is.

Since nations as supra-ethnic communities and nation-states have been formed for a long time, as long as they are ethno-national state entities. Some Western researchers also talk about ethnonational phenomena. So, Smith (Smith A. , 2000) believes that "all nations are characterized by the imprint of both territorial and ethnic principles and components, and they all represent a not quite harmonious blend of the later "civil" and more ancient "genealogical " models of social and cultural organization. No "future nation" can survive without a territorial fatherland or myth of common origin. And vice versa, "an ethnic group striving to become a nation" cannot achieve its goals, bypassing the general division of labor and territorial mobility or legal activity of general rights and obligations of all members of that nationality " (p. 93). Such a social education Smith calls dualistic and notes: "This dualism of the concept of a nation inevitably gives rise to a deep ambiguity in the present relations between the ethnic groups and the states in which they are included" (Smith A. , 2000, p. 93). And here the question of ethnic and national identity and identification come to the fore. By itself, the ethnocultural identity of a single person, firstly, is only one of the forms of his identity, which has for him different significance depending on historical or temporal conditions, and secondly, this identity may have several levels. In a fully formed nation, the individual positions himself as a representative and subject of the whole national culture in its integrity. He identifies himself and his national culture in relation to itself, in relation to other cultures and in relation to the type of culture to which it belongs. For him, these aspects-attributes of identity may have a tinge of value. In the same cultures that have not yet been synthesized into a common national culture, that is, in ethnonational cultures there are at least two levels of cultural identity and cultural identity of the individual. First, it is an ethnocultural identity in relation

to other ethnic cultures within a given ethnonational culture and, secondly, it is a common ethnonational and cultural identity, defined in relation to other national or ethnonational cultures. In pure ethnic formations (which occurred only in the early stages of the Archaic), an individual defined his ethnic identity through his belonging to this ethnic group and opposition to another ethnic group. Here the value principle of "us are them" reigns supreme. The structure of ethnic identity and identification indicators comprise the territory of a dislocation, language, main customs, norms, values, standards of behavior and some other indicators. People of this epoch have a naive eccentricity: they regard their customs and values as due and comparing them with the customs and values of another ethnic group and seeing discrepancies, they define the latter as false, deviant, etc., by presumption (Smith A. , 2000).

Nations historically begin to form from polyethnic state formations. In this process, there is a gradual convergence of ethnic groups, their release from the elements of opposition to each other, as well as the development of some common cultural norms and patterns, customs, values and even language. Not so much ethnic as national identity is becoming more and more significant. In a fully formed nation, of course, only national identity takes place. At the same time, it should be noted that nations, for all their openness to other nations, however, are also not free from ethnocentrism. The principle of "us - they" does not completely disappear, it is only weakened to some extent. And, as Zdravomyslov (1996) notes, "each national-ethnic group has its own circle of national or ethnic communities, with which there is a constant psychological comparison ... The second point related to the idea of the reference of national identity is that within each national identity fits its own hierarchy of "significant other" national-ethnic groups " (p. 118). This form takes the principle of "us - they", "their - not-their own".

There are not so many fully formed nations on the planet so far. All of them are mainly concentrated in Western Europe. About Americans (USA) this, most likely, cannot be said. It was impossible to say about the former USSR, where the state ideology declared the creation of a fundamentally new community - the Soviet people. The majority of modern state formations are

ethnonational states, in which the ratio of ethnic and private is in various proportions. This, in the first place, determines the nature of the ethno-and national-identification processes in these formations. It is clear that at different stages of the formation of a nation, the ratio of ethnic and national identities is different. More often than not, an ethnic group could hold a privileged position in the ethno-state formations of the past, while others were denounced as secondary. And among them could be established status of subordination. But such a situation could remain only in the early stages of the formation of a national state. Under these conditions, inter-ethnic tension is possible within this entity, and then for the individual his ethnic identity and self-identification becomes crucial compared to his other identities. Moreover, in such situations not only the sense of ethnic identity is exacerbated, but this identity is perceived in false forms. Representatives of this ethnos begin to extol their ethnos (its culture, customs, traditions, language, etc.), at the same time reducing or ignoring the merits of other ethnic groups. This phenomenon is called ethnocentrism. At the basis of ethnocentrism lies the rigid absolutized archaic principle "us are not us," "us are them". The study of precisely these principles underlies the constructivist theory of the Norwegian anthropologist F. Bart about the fundamental role of ethnic boundaries in the development and preservation of ethnic identity (Bart, 2006, p. 48). His works, along with the studies of another representative of constructivism B. Anderson (Anderson, 2001) undoubtedly changed traditional methodological approaches to the study of ethnicity and the theory of nationalism.

Modern philosophical and sociological theory seeks to resolve the dual confrontation between primordialism and constructivism in considering the nature of ethnicity. In the well-known work of sociologists and philosophers - P. Berger and T. Lukman (Berger P., 1995), an attempt was made to overcome the dichotomy of the subjective and objective, when subjective aspirations are constructed and structured into new social institutions, being realized in an objective system of ethno-cultural environment. The same methodological and ideological goals are pursued by the synthetic theory of the French sociologist P. Bourdieu (Bourdieu P. , 1993), who tries to reconcile the mutually repulsive currents of structuralism and constructivism

based on the introduction of their own concepts (“habitus”, “social space”). The same desire to integrate the ideas of constructivism and primordial soil of the Russian ethnocultural discourse is characteristic of the Russian ethnologist Tishkov (Tishkov), who believes that “the integration of the most significant aspects into a coherent theory of ethnicity is most promising on the basis of constructivist synthesis, which is sensitive to the context” (Tishkov, *Ethnicity or ethnicity?*).

The theoretical insight can be completed by saying of Huntington (Huntington, 2001, p. 43): “The significance of national identity, especially in comparison with other identities, never remains unchanged; it has varied many times throughout human history”. It varied for various reasons. And last but not least, depending on the level of stability of an ethno-national state formation, on the degree of equality of its ethnic groups, etc. In those nations that are entirely supra-ethnic entities (“pure nations”), for a member of the nation his ethnic and ethnosocial identity is not essential. In emerging nations only, as dualistic entities (ethnonations) for a member of this entity, both national and ethnosocial identities can be significant. At the same time between them there can be various ratios: from harmony to antagonism. The emphasis on the structure of identities (both in its objective and subjective substructures) of ethnic and ethnosocial identity is also due to the general crisis of personal identity.

The study of identity problems is gradually becoming one of the main methods of social and philosophical, sociological and sociopsychological analysis of modern political and sociocultural transformations in Kazakhstan. The materials of sociological surveys conducted by Kazakhstan sociologists (2009) can form an empirical basis for sketching a general picture and identifying the ideally-typical features of Kazakh identity. Considering the studies of the civil, religious and ethnic identity of the citizens of Kazakhstan it should be noted that presenting an undoubted informational interest, these studies indicate a certain imperfection of the methods used by Russian sociologists (Telebaev, 2006), insufficiently elaborated philosophical-ideological and logical-conceptual foundations of a sociological analysis of this kind of problematics. In the special literature (2006) seven main types of

ethnic identity are distinguished, each of which is characterized by stable features and characteristics. This typology of ethnic identity is not free from shortcomings. So, firstly, it is difficult to draw clear boundaries between such types of identity as ethnocentric and ethno-dominant. Secondly, the basis of typological divisions in the above classification is the scale graduated according to the degree of integration of the individual with the ethnic group. Meanwhile, the concept of "normal identity" implies an extremely wide range of integration of an individual with his ethnic group - from indifference to ethnodominational, i.e. the norm is also fixed in its extreme expressions, almost indistinguishable from anomalies. Such logical inconsistencies are caused by the fact that, thirdly, in the typology under consideration the requirement of a single basis of division is not met. All but one types of ethnic identity express some fixed degree of identity. But the term "normal identity" means a mobile, "drifting" identity, the intensity of which varies depending on the situation. A more compact and therefore more operational in a sociological analysis is the typology of ethnic identity proposed by Telebaev (Telebaev, 2006) where the author identifies 4 types of ethnic identity:

1. Ethnophobia - the negation of the value of the ethnic principle of identification (corresponds to "ethnic nihilism" in the typology of A. P. Sadokhin);
2. Ethnic nihilism - indifferent attitude to ethnic (corresponds to "ethnic indifference" in the typology of A. P. Sadokhin);
3. Ethnic tolerance - a positive attitude both to one's own and to other nationalities (corresponds to "normal" or "positive" ethnic identification);
4. Nationalism - recognition of the superiority of their ethnic community, the desire to ensure the interests of their nationality by any means, including by infringing the rights of other ethnic groups (corresponds to "ethnocentric" and "ethno-dominant" identity, and partly to "ethnic fanaticism" on a scale of Sadokhin).

Regarding this typology, it is worth noting the failure to designate one of the types of ethnic identification as "ethnic tolerance". Khamidov (Khamidov,

1989) notes that the imperative of tolerance imposes a ban on the external manifestation of intolerance to everything alien, other, without affecting, by definition, the internal bases and motives of behavior of individuals, nations, ethnic groups, and confessions (Khamidov, 1989, p. 41). Therefore, tolerance, being the optimal model of interethnic and intercultural interaction, cannot be considered - also by definition - as a type of identification. In this regard, it will be more accurate and more intelligent to refer to this type of ethnic identity as positive identity, as is customary in most typological scales. With these amendments, one can accept the typology of ethnic identity proposed by G.T. Telebaev. According to his assessment of the distribution of identity types of residents of Almaty, "the most common type of ethnic identification in the city is "ethnic tolerance": it is supported by 58.6% of respondents" (Telebaev, 2006, p. 17). At the same time, the Kazakhs were among those ethnic groups in which "nationalism" was most pronounced - 23.2% versus 16.2% in the general population. In this regard, one can also bring the results of studies of the Institute of Philosophy and Political Science of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which also revealed the special conservatism of the Kazakhs in relation to mixed marriages (2009, p. 250). To the question: Is it necessary to focus on the nationality of people when choosing a partner in marriage? The following answers were received: Yes: Kazakhs - 44.4%; Russians - 20.3%; other ethnic groups - 24.4%. Not always: Kazakhs - 24.2%; Russians - 31.5%; other ethnic groups - 34.4%. No: Kazakhs - 26.2%; Russians - 43.2%; other ethnic groups - 38.2%.

An analysis of the typology of ethnic identity scales used by sociologists shows that they are built on a single principle. The point of reference is the state of some normal or positive identity, from which two oppositely directed vectors are drawn: hyper-identity and hypo-identity. Scaling in this case can be carried out arbitrarily fractionally (depending on the objectives of the study and the methodology used in it), but the general principle of evaluation is to identify the extent of deviation from the norm for these vectors.

In accordance with this, the type of ethnic identity for modern Kazakhs can be unambiguously characterized as a fairly well-expressed hyperidentity. The

causes, factors and consequences of the formation of this type of ethnic identity of the Kazakhs are outside the competence of sociology. Their identification is a task of social-philosophical, political, cultural and other analysis. The given sociological data show that in the city of Almaty the processes of ethnic identification have a slightly different character than in the whole republic. In the former capital of Kazakhstan, cosmopolitan and civil tendencies of self-identification prevail. This is explained by the fact that Almaty residents have almost a century of experience in inter-ethnic interactions and much greater willingness to accept democratic values. As a result, almost 60% prefer ethnic types of other identities - ethnic tolerance. There are explanations to the fact that, in comparison with other ethnic groups among the Kazakhs in Almaty, "nationalism" is the most pronounced (G.T. Telebaev typology) (Telebaev, 2006). Migration processes, especially intensified in the years of independence and going in the same direction - from villages to cities, lead to the gradual numerical predominance of former villagers in the Kazakh ethnic community of the largest metropolis of Kazakhstan. It is in the midst of the latter-day citizens that the fears of losing their own ethnic identity are strongest, and as a result, the response in the form of manifestations of its ethnocentric and ethnomodominant types. The same concerns explain the conservatism of the Kazakhs regarding mixed marriages. As experience shows, they lead to a shift in the descendants of ethnic and cultural identities towards the parent - the heir of the sedentary cultures, or to the duality of self-consciousness. The duality of consciousness among descendants of mixed marriages leads to the marginalization of ethnocultural identifiers that determine certain cultural and civilizational preferences. This indicates that the Kazakh identity is still a rather amorphous formation, which is the result of contradictory processes of ethnocultural development over several centuries.

Within this research, the main reasons for the formation of a hyper-expressed type of ethno-identity characteristic of modern Kazakhs has been analyzed. This is due to the permanent crisis of the ethnic identity of the Kazakhs. The crisis of ethnic identity and, more importantly, self-identity, manifests itself primarily in the heightened importance of ethno-identity in the consciousness

of the individual and the ethnic community in comparison with other forms of individual and group identity. Increased attention to one's own ethnic identity and one's own ethnic culture exacerbates the feelings of "us – they" and increases (sometimes overestimating) self-esteem, i.e. evaluation of their customs, stereotypes, values, language, symbols. This focus on self is inevitably accompanied by opposition to other ethnic groups, whose stereotypes, lifestyle, values and symbols are explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously endowed with negative characteristics. Consequently, the beginning of the crisis of ethnocultural identity is a heightened focus, a "looping" on this identity. It grows on the basis of cultural, economic, socio-psychological and ideological factors. The emergence of this type of Kazakh ethno-identity, firstly, was influenced by gaps in the continuity of culture, including the genocide of the Kazakh people in the 18th century - during the Dzungarian invasions, in the 20th century - the years of violent sedentarization, famine and destruction by Stalin color mode of the Kazakh intelligentsia (Valikhanov C. , 1985). Secondly, at the end of the 19th – beginning of the 20th centuries, the Kazakh legal and administrative structures, tribal land tenure and the entire ethno-social structure of the Kazakh ethnic community were subject to gradual and planned destruction by the tsarist colonial administration. An ethnographer, an officer of the Russian army, an ethnic Kazakh, Chokan Valikhanov, was the first in Kazakh history to defend the culture of his people in the pages of the pre-revolutionary Russian press. Using examples from the life and court practice, he proved that the reforms carried out by the Russian tsarist government should reckon with the spiritual essence of the people, their mentality and way of life. Valikhanov (Valikhanov C. , 1985, p. 79) argued that "reforms forcibly implanted, based on abstract theories or taken from the life of another people, have so far constituted the greatest calamity for humanity". Thirdly, since the time of the "Charter on Siberian Kyrgyz", initiated by Speransky (1985), there has been a constant process of erosion of the national culture. It was an ongoing challenge to the traditional nomadic culture of the Kazakhs. The apotheosis of its destruction was national culture in form, socialist in content. And although in the soul of the people there was a constant process of unarticled rejection, the Kazakh culture and language

suffered irreparable damage, which is currently being pursued by the desire of the Kazakhs to preserve language, culture and traditions.

With independence, the transition from the Soviet, supra-ethnic identity to the identity of ethnic and national has begun. Unfortunately, the evolution of this controversial process is hampered by intra-ethnic disunity, the main criterion of which was the mastery of the native language. The problem of the Kazakh language, which became unclaimed during the years of Soviet power for almost half of ethnic Kazakhs, predetermined the stratification of the Kazakh ethnic group into three groups according to the degree of language proficiency (2009):

1. Kazakh soil scientists are fluent in their native language and have difficulty in communicating with Russian speakers.
2. Bilingual Kazakhs - fluent in both languages to the extent sufficient for full communication with all language groups.
3. Kazakhs are marginals who do not speak Kazakh, or who speak it exclusively at the household level. There was a division of the ethnos not only according to linguistic, but also according to the value criteria of identity, since Russian-speaking Kazakhs are in fact only urban residents in the second or third generations, with a psychology and value hierarchy that differs little from those of a large Russian megalopolis, while native speakers - these are Kazakhs who come from rural hinterlands, preferring traditional values. At the same time, the division according to the linguistic criterion is only the visible part of the more serious contradictions, the manifestation of which is the attitude towards ethnicity constructed in modern times.

The German researcher U. Altermatt (Altermatt, 2000, p. 63) asserts that ethnicity, on the one hand, "is rooted in common myths, memories, values and symbols - in an ensemble that is created by society and is constantly changing", but on the other hand, it does not so much "through common signs, as through representations that elevate any element of joint ownership to the level of collective solidarity". In the case of current research, the main marker (identifier) of ethnicity is language. It becomes the symbol on the

basis of which the intra-ethnic borders are constructed, which determine the process of the Kazakh intra-ethnic stratification. And these boundaries are consciously constructed by the elites. Undoubtedly, the resource of knowledge and ignorance of the state language is used for political and other purposes. In Kazakhstan there is such a situation when the definition of ethnicity is not limited to a set of primordial markers: parents' ethnicity, place of birth, degree of mastery of their native language, knowledge of customs and rituals of traditional culture. From everyday life, there are many examples where urban Kazakhs in the second and third generations continue to maintain close family ties and solve important issues, only by a community meeting. At the same time, many examples of orientation towards personal success at any cost among the Kazakhs who came from the provinces do not allow to single out the criteria by which the "degree of ethnicity" is determined. An educated Kazakh - marginal - can know a lot more about the religion, customs and traditions of the Kazakhs than a poet, moreover, consciously adhere to them and, perhaps, to a greater extent than the villagers. Which of these groups is more "ethnic"? Language is the most important symbol of ethnic identity, even regardless of its level of proficiency. For example, Kazakh Belarusians, Ukrainians, Germans, Koreans, etc. its national language is practically not used, but it retains a symbolic function in the structure of national identity. Therefore, the opinion of V. Shnirelman (Shnirelman, 2005) that "in the modern world, ethnicity generally appeals primarily to symbols" is very close to understand the real situation with the self-identification. In modern society, the traditional Kazakh culture loses its functionality and organic connection with the nomadic way of life, which no longer exists. "Therefore, losing its former functionality, traditional culture becomes the source of the most important symbols, and it itself turns into a symbolic sign" (Shnirelman, 2005). However, the values and ideals of modernization and globalization do not completely replace the previous social forms of life and the sociocultural codes of ethnic thinking, pushing them to the periphery of self-awareness. They coexist in the real structure of a marginalized society of syncretic thinking, along with tribal, traditionally patriarchal, agrarian, industrial, and urban identity matrices. In the modern globalizing world, the Kazakh ethnocultural identity is a bizarre symbiosis of

different kinds of intersecting and overlapping identities, which implies the absence of a rigid hierarchy of social connections, their amorphousness in the structure of its integral phenomenon. Depending on the specific historical situation, actualization of any of the identification grounds may occur, or a synchronous combination of them may arise, depending on the nature of the real or perceived challenge that threatens the integrity of the ethnic community. Moreover, the direction of its "drift" goes in the direction of constructivist transformations, which is undoubtedly a fundamental trend of today and tomorrow.

CHAPTER 1

CREATION OF THE KAZAKH NATION

1.1. Perceptions of Ethnic and National Identity in Kazakhstan

This chapter of the thesis is devoted to the description of the basic concepts of perceptions of ethnic and national identity in Kazakhstan. The general ethno-demographic situation in Kazakhstan is presented as well so that it is easier for the reader to understand the issue of the language-clash within the Kazakh society. The chapter describes the national-building process in independent Kazakhstan and why the second largest ethnic group – Russians – feel separated from the rest of the society.

It was not easy for each post-Soviet state to find its own definition of a nation, but in Kazakhstan these efforts were accompanied by the greatest contradictions. Kazakh leadership proudly declared in 1991 that the country is the most multi-national of the successors of the Soviet Union, but it seems that only a small part of its inhabitants shared this pride. There was tension in terms of ethnic diversity. According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003) the condition for the survival and prosperity of Kazakhstan should be based on the civil patriotism of its population towards a common homeland than the ethnically dependent dedication of the Kazakhs (or Russians) to their land. True, the leadership of the country, in which the Kazakhs are dominant, seems to find it harder to realize this truth.

When Kazakhstan gained its own statehood, the two main components of its population, the Russians and the Kazakhs perceived the world differently and thus set the government the difficult task of reconciling these differences into same political goals. Peace in the country was preserved, but it was not possible to fill its ethnic diversity with real content. As Olcott asserts (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 70), to pretend to express the opinions of all the people, the government actually puts the interests of the Kazakhs above. President Nazarbayev and the ruling elite left the population less opportunity to participate in the formation of norms and institutions that determine the nature of political life.

In a more democratic environment, a feeling of personal involvement in the political life of the country leads to the softening of the severity of interethnic contradictions, and, consequently, to the emergence of additional opportunities for interethnic harmony. Even under these conditions, the ethnic factor still takes a significant position in determining the preferred forms and methods of functioning of the state. However, *“those who govern Kazakhstan are trying to shape the nature of the state with minimal participation by the people, preferring to guess what he thinks and what feels instead of consulting him”* says Martha Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 71).

And although the same ruling elite have dominated the country for more than twenty years, its idea of how to balance the interests of the two main ethnic communities has changed. Continuing to talk about the need for inter-ethnic tolerance as a distinctive feature of a multi-ethnic state, the government is actively pursuing a policy today that strengthens the claims of the Kazakhs to cultural, political and economic hegemony. According to Zhumaly (Zhumaly, 2014), this policy is focused on the future in which the Kazakhs will become sufficiently well-off by a large majority in order to occupy a dominant position in the country.

President Nazarbayev and his closest associates initially believe that the change in demographic balance would be gradual. As Bokaev (Bokaev) has noted, it was expected that the higher natural growth rates of the Kazakh population would be accompanied by the arrival of Kazakhs from abroad and

the departure of those Russians who could not adapt the changing political situation. And although the government assumed the costs and efforts associated with the arrival of the Kazakhs, it also encouraged Russians to arrange their lives in Kazakhstan and regularly reaffirmed this position. One can only guess about the motives of the government, since the policy in this area has been mostly vaguely worded. Of course, there was a fear that the Russians living in ethnically cohesive enclaves would begin to advocate secession, not resettlement. According to Olcott (2003, p. 71) in fact, when the Russians began to leave Kazakhstan, demographic changes occurred quickly, mainly due to the fact that one in every four Russian left Kazakhstan. In addition, the population over the past ten years has become unusually mobile, and its composition began to change both locally and across the country. As the number of Russians leaving Kazakhstan has increased, the authorities began to rethink their strategy. As Alexeyenco explains, although the Russians were never persecuted, most government officials perceived their departure as a positive development. The government gradually changed its policy in this area, trying to extract maximum benefit from the Russians (Alexeyenco, 2008).

As time went on, Kazakhstan became an increasingly “Kazakh” state both in terms of population composition and ideology. However, the Russian language, whose legal status was only slightly shaken, is still widely used - more for practical than ideological reasons. The state cannot afford to lose an educated and technically literate population that still speaks and thinks almost exclusively in Russian regardless of ethnicity (Tuksaitova, 2005). At the same time, the introduction of one or another language requires not so much new legislation, as the allocation of serious budget funds, and this is not happening in Kazakhstan. Kazakh nationalists constantly put pressure on the government to restrict participation in public life of those who do not speak Kazakh (Zhumaly, 2014).

In fact, the low numbers that nationalist parties receive in the elections should not be seen as an indicator of public support for the nationalist platform. This is largely a consequence of favouritism of the political system in relation to pro-government parties and groups and, to a certain extent,

public distrust of the administrative abilities of Kazakh nationalist leaders. In fact, many of the provisions of the nationalist Kazakh platform are perceived sympathetically, including the ruling elite, while the majority of Kazakhs reject the idea that other ethnic communities can claim a political role in multinational Kazakhstan on equal terms with them. Kazakhstan is their homeland, even though there are wide differences among the Kazakh population about the exact meaning of this concept. The Kazakhs agree that for more than two centuries they have suffered enough from the Russians, and the rebirth of the Kazakh state should be compensation for this (Olcott M. , *Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise*, 2003).

The strategy that the government adheres to is still fraught with potential dangers. Narrowing the range of individual political activities and focusing on cultural and spiritual needs of the Kazakhs, the government is trying to prevent people dissatisfied with the economic and social situation from mobilizing. In addition, the government believes that it can prevent the mobilization of the population and on ethnic grounds. And although there is no obvious danger of ethnic conflict, the main source of instability is in Kazakhstan itself, whatever may be said about external threats.

1.2. Kazakh Nationalism and Ethnic Identity in Kazakhstan

1.2.1. Historical prerequisites to Kazakh nationalism

What is Kazakh nationalism as an ideology? The founders of the ideas of Kazakh nationalism are the Alashordin people - Kazakh intellectuals of the early 20th century, who for the first time declared the right of the Kazakh nation to self-determination (in the form of an autonomous state) (Kesici, 2011). In the Soviet period, Kazakh writers and the creative intelligentsia as a whole had a significant influence on the strengthening of national identity (Kudaibergenova, 2013). It is also necessary to note the significant role of the late Soviet social and political movements, such as Azat and Zheltoksan, which contributed to the design of Kazakh nationalism as a political ideology. At the same time, the nationalist idea had its own characteristics in different historical periods. If in the pre-Soviet period it evolved under the influence of colonial pressure from tsarist Russia against the Kazakhs (illegal seizure of

Kazakh lands by immigrants), then in Soviet times the formation of the social base of nationalism became possible due to socio-economic contradictions in the society along the lines of “Kazakh-non-Kazakhs” , "City-village" and "centre-region" (Kydyralina, 2008).

The mobilization and protest potential of Kazakh nationalism was vividly demonstrated during the “December events” in 1986. By its nature, this was the "nationalism of the periphery", which was directed against the abuses of the centre. The focus of the nationalist ideology was on those issues that felt the most infringement of the rights of the titular ethnic group: reducing the use of the Kazakh language, difficult socio-economic conditions for young people in the city and the Russification of all spheres of public life (Baisembayev, 2015).

With the collapse of the communist ideology, inter-ethnic divisions have suddenly emerged, which were latent during the Soviet times. The Soviet system required that every citizen have a nationality; this term denotes ethnic identity, which was recorded in the fifth column of the passport, which every adult citizen was obliged to have. At the same time, the totalitarian structure of the system demanded loyalty to the artificially created socio-political structure, which was the Soviet Union, and not the ethnic group or nationality that occupied a certain territory (Velichcko, 2016).

The infrastructure of terror — a legacy of the Stalinist state security system — collapsed along with the ideology of communism, and people began to more freely define their attachments. According to Velichcko (2016) many leaders have believed that rise of the national identity by transforming it from a simple indicator of ethnicity into a kind of ideological connection would help form a new kind of loyalty to the state. In the end, it was the nationalist desire for independence that played a conclusive point in undermining the stability of the economic and ideological bankruptcy that the USSR was. Even in Kazakhstan, where the Kazakhs were a minority before independence, the ruling elite considered them the only truly loyal and patriotic group of the population. All permanent residents were granted citizenship, which from the

very beginning has caused the appearance of actually two categories of citizens.

Following the economic and political practice carried out in Soviet times, all newly emerged states have faced a situation where a significant number of citizens were outside of their own "historical homeland". Under the Soviet planning system, more people were sent to certain areas of the USSR, therefore a number of new states (Armenia, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) found themselves as almost mono-national countries, in which the emphasis on ethnic identity could well become an attractive platform for national unity.

The transformation of nationalism into the basis of state ideology in most of the neighbouring countries created the problem of identity formation even more relevant for Kazakhstan. According to Olcott (2003, p. 73) Kazakhstan was purposefully created as a showcase of Soviet economic and social theories, and the demographic situation there was the result of just such a policy. Although Kazakh nationalists were convinced that the main goal of the metropolis was to ensure the numerical superiority of the Russians over the Kazakhs, in fact, Moscow had more complex motives that were economic and ideological. For example, in different periods (especially in the 20s and 30s) people were sent to Kazakhstan as punishment, which was also a punishment for the local population, among whom the newcomers were to live. It should be noted that the Russian and the Soviet politicians were not particularly worried about the problems that Kazakhs had to face as a result of various campaigns to relocate people.

Zhumaly (Zhumaly, 2014) believes that, if there was any other state in place of Soviet Kazakhstan, a new form of civic pride or geographically determined loyalty would have arisen as a factor in uniting all its inhabitants. But the omnipresent Soviet ideology firmly assigned a person's ethnic identity, while promoting and encouraging internationalism. Therefore, various national groups, including Russians, have always considered themselves to be the object of discrimination in Soviet times. Nationalism, as the belief in the superiority of one ethnic group over the others, was considered a crime for which they could receive a term of imprisonment, and even the death penalty

under Stalin. Such conditions made people super-sensitive to the struggle for the interests of their ethnic communities, and this led to the people of Kazakhstan being involved in a game in which victory of one ethnic group is perceived by the others as a defeat.

Since the middle of the 1970s, the leaders of Kazakhstan have realized that there was a split in the republic, and repeatedly tried to formulate a policy to create a propaganda system that would combine the identity of Russians and Kazakhs into one whole (Kunayev, 1994). Some successes on this path were achieved an era when the party leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who had long ruled the republic, managed to create a certain concept of loyalty to the concept of “Kazakhstanis” that is, the people inhabiting Kazakhstan (Gellner, 1983). This term did not have an ethnic nuance and was used to encourage a sense of pride in the Republic of Kazakhstan as an original and multinational part of the whole, together with everyone making an important contribution to the life of the Soviet Union. But as the USSR weakened, and the Republican elite entered the struggle for control over resources on its territory, nationalism became an important part of the vocabulary that is used to justify movement towards sovereignty. Moscow was accused of this, prevented the local ethnic community from exercising historic rights to the territory. For such a strategy to be successful, the leader of the Communist Party of the Republic had to support it, and those who refused to support it risked being expelled by an angry population.

In such a situation, Nursultan Nazarbayev found it difficult to find the right solution. According to Olcott (2003), he was aware of the economic price of further concessions to Moscow in controlling the resources of the Republic, but he also remembered the risks associated with the strengthening of ethno-national claims of statehood. As already mentioned, northern Kazakhstan is particularly distinguished by historical inconsistency: the Kazakhs believe that the Russians attacked the Russian lands, and the Russians view it as the historically established border of Russia, the “wasteland”, which their ancestors cultivated in their time (Solzhenitsyn, 1990).

In fact, it was not separatism, but citizenship was the main issue for all but a small Russian minority. Many considered themselves as a part of Russia to the same extent as Kazakhstan, and did not want their ethnic origin or citizenship to be fully defined. All residents of Kazakhstan received citizenship, and only citizens were granted the right to participate in the privatization process and become owners of their housing. Nevertheless, the Russians in Kazakhstan still felt that they were a part of Russia and, with the support of Moscow, tried to obtain Russian citizenship. It is not surprising that the government of Kazakhstan refused to give in to the increasing pressure on the issue of citizenship in 1993 and 1994 (Nazarbayev, 1994). Nazarbayev consistently rejected the idea of dual citizenship. In these years, Russia's policy ranged from tacitly supporting the goals set by ethnic Russians to decisively protecting the rights of Russians in countries that Moscow called near abroad (Olcott M. , *Central Asia's New States.*, 1996). Russia tried to involve the international community in defending Russians, and therefore the Organization's High Commissioner for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on National Minority Issues Max van der Stoel visited Kazakhstan several times during this period, and in April 1994 even published a letter expressing concern about the situation taking shape in Kazakhstan (Stoel, 1994).

Nevertheless, President Nazarbayev remained unshakable in his belief that Kazakhstan cannot be a nation if the loyalty of its citizens is constantly in question, and that is exactly what will happen if two different and potentially competing nationalities were granted citizenship at the same time. Nazarbayev was not alone in this conviction. All the leaders of the CIS, with the exception of the presidents of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, rejected Russia's demand for dual citizenship, and subsequently the government of Turkmenistan changed its position.

Nazarbayev did not want to let this matter take its course, since he understood that he needed to meet either the wishes of the Russian population or to risk destabilizing the country from inside (Pravda, 1995). He proposed that Russia and Kazakhstan simplify the procedure for changing the citizenship of one country to the citizenship of another, and Yeltsin

agreed in principle to this. In January 1995, both leaders signed agreements that defined the position of citizens of one state permanently residing in another, and simplified the procedure for changing citizenship. The Russian State –Duma - however, adopted relevant legislation only in 1998, when the Russian population of Kazakhstan began to feel uncomfortable. By 1994, the number of Russians leaving Kazakhstan increased to almost half a million people per year (483 thousand), after which it decreased to a certain stable level, but since 1997 there has been an increase in the number of Russians emigrating again (Olcott M. , 1996).

In Kazakhstan, as in other former Soviet republics, the ruling elite began to form mainly from people of indigenous nationality. This began from the time of the first major reorganization of the government in October 1994, when five of the six newly appointed deputy prime ministers were Kazakhs and almost all of the key ministerial posts were also occupied by Kazakhs. Since Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin brought a number of well-known Russian officials to key posts in his government, particularly in the field of finance and economics. Most of them left the government after leaving Kazhegeldin in October 1997, and the new administration reorganized Nurlan Balgimbaev again consisted mostly of Kazakhs. However, due to the deteriorating economic situation, many Russians have ceased to attach importance to the ethnic composition of the government.

Kazakhs and Russians have lived side by side for more than three hundred years. Throughout their common history, they got along peacefully. Until recently, the rules of such peaceful coexistence suggest that the Russians look after the Kazakhs, and thus given some freedom in matters of public self-government. But now the roles have changed. All the talk about the multi-nationality of Kazakhstan today leads to a point where it is dominated by the Kazakhs. It is to this people that the largest politicians and economic leaders of the country belong, and for the first time the Russians have to submit to the instructions. According to Alexeyenco (Alexeyenco, 2008), the former colonialists found themselves in a difficult situation, and the statistics of migration from the country eloquently shows how difficult it is for ethnic Russians to adapt to this new situation.

1.3. Order patriotism

It seems that those who live in Kazakhstan have not yet formed a sense of civic pride in their new state or loyalty to it. At the end of 1995, only 22.9% of respondents to a poll conducted by one of the newspapers responded that they were “proud to be Kazakhs”, while 40% said they were satisfied with their citizenship, and 30.6% said they were all equals (Karavan, 1995).

It is still too early to expect civic pride. On the other hand, one should not confuse patriotism with a sense of ethno-national pride. This feeling is just enough for the Kazakhs and other peoples inhabiting Kazakhstan. As Olcott (2003, p. 78) observes, despite the fact that the history of the Kazakhs was recently rewritten to emphasize the state aspirations of their distant ancestors, the titular nation of the country could not turn ethnic pride into a rational and generally accepted concept of the ideological defence of its unique national state. It was also not possible for the government to rise above the concept of ethnicity and provide all ethnic groups in the country with equal or almost equal opportunities to participate in the affairs and fate of the new state. And this goal, of course, was put by the authors of the 1995 Constitution (Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995), in which for the first-time reference was made to the “*people of Kazakhstan*” or “*united by a common historical destiny*”. It no longer refers to ethnic Kazakhs and special rights for them; instead, it refers to the rights of each citizen, including the preservation of their culture.

The government wants to achieve two goals at the same time: to turn Kazakhstan into a special place for the Kazakhs and to stimulate a sense of civic pride in all other nationalities. From time to time, one of these tasks receives more attention, and as the number of Russians leaving the country increases, the state ideology becomes more and more pro-Kazakh's. According to Delorme (Delorme, 1999, pp. 67—70), most of the symbols of statehood are taken from the history or culture of the Kazakhs. The flag is coloured blue it is associated with the Turkic Khaganate, which prevailed in the steppes before the arrival of the Mongols and Kazakhs. The flag depicts the sun and the eagle, and also has a border in the form of a traditional Kazakh ornament. In the centre of the state emblem there is a view of the

surrounding world through the upper vaulted part of the yurt, the traditional dwelling of the Kazakh nomads, bordered with a pattern in the form of a stylized shield. The national anthem, also oriented towards the Kazakh audience, tells of the Kazakh steppe and the need to preserve the native language. It is not easy to find his Russian translation in bookstores and newsstands in Kazakhstan (Delorme, 1999).

Olcott emphasizes this aspect (Olcott M. , 2003) stating that along with this, the government wants the ideology it forms to make sense for people of different nationalities inhabiting the country. According to Olcott (Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, 2003, p. 79) the country's leadership recognizes that there is an ideological vacuum in society that has remained after the discrediting of the omnipresent Soviet ideology. She believes that citizens of any state should have a belief system designed to outline the framework of social behaviour, explaining why some behaviour is forbidden, some reprehensible, and some should be encouraged, and allowing the state to look in the most favourable light. *“Criticism of the previously widely implanted belief system is dangerous because people begin to look for their own ideological or moral guidelines for the organization of life and the evaluation of their actions”* (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 79).

At the same time, Burova (Burova, 2013) believes that *they can make an “unacceptable” choice*, which, in turn, can lead to the formation of potentially powerful radical movements of a religious or nationalistic nature. The pervasive and universal character of the communist ideology made it even more urgent to have a different ideology that could come to replace it. In Soviet times, communism permeated all pores of state and private life, becoming something of a law of nature. In this sense, communism was akin to the state religion in a theocratic society; it was perceived as a true and indisputable explanation of the world around it. Because of this state of affairs, former Soviet citizens have become particularly susceptible to the effects of other overarching ideologies. Burova says, *“for many, the overthrow of the old ideology was to discredit the idea that human behaviour is based on the implementation of the intellectual and spiritual code, and led*

them to the idea that following the law of the jungle is the best survival strategy”.

In Kazakhstan, there are signs of both of these impulses. According to Olcott (p. 80) the country experienced an explosive growth of crime, which in part became an expression of contempt for everything except personal enrichment, and the growth of nationalism, cronyism, religious fanaticism and other extreme manifestations of exclusive social cohesion is explained by the desire to get some kind of intellectual structure that would identify those responsible for the current day and pointed out the only true way to get rid of these burdens in the day tomorrow. The long experience of life under the communist system made the inhabitants of the new states particularly susceptible to the conviction that there is only one truth, and that it must be sought.

Those who govern Kazakhstan have grown up in the Soviet Union and still believe in the state's capacity to form the outlook of the people living in it. They do not believe that social engineering is discredited as such, but simply carried out with inept Soviet hands. Therefore, they continue to produce doctrines and plans to create state ideologies designed to unite the various ethnic communities inhabiting the country. After the collapse of the universal communist ideology, the task of forming a comprehensive national identity has become a particularly complex situation, and the leadership of Kazakhstan devotes considerable effort to it (Artykbaev, 1993). The position of the country's leadership is most detailed in the official concept of the state ideology of Kazakhstan, published in Karavan newspaper (1996), or, as stated in this document, its state identity. According to this concept, the task of the state is as follows:

“To affirm in society the idea that Kazakhstan is our common homeland. The duty of every citizen, regardless of nationality, is to help create an atmosphere of friendship, peace and harmony. The spirit of patriotism cultivated in many countries contributes to: strengthening the state; consolidation of a society in which pride reigns in its state; strengthening the faith that the state is ready to defend at any time in the interests of any citizen, wherever he is; reverent attitude to the symbols of the state. In this and similar documents preceding it, it is recognized that such feelings have not yet arisen, and the current moment is defined as transitional, but then a definition of the state is proposed, which should guarantee the presence of patriotism in the future” (Karavan, 1996).

However, Olcott (2003) argues saying that there are several provisions in the document indicating that there are some contradictions in the country. According to her opinion, the most illustrative in this sense is the passage about the relationship between a citizen and the state.

“According to the first, a citizen is part of a whole, and his personality and social identity are realized only through common institutions and traditions; and in the second, a citizen is an individual who exists separately from the authorities, and he is supported by this authority because he sacrifices his freedoms in exchange for receiving certain services from the authorities” (2003, s. 81).

In the earlier concept of state ideology (Karavan, 1996), Nazarbayev left the state with the right to “regulate the information balance”, i.e., to limit the flow of information into the republic in order to minimize the impact of alien views on the population. In this formulation of 1994 (Kazakhstan's Truth, 1994), Nazarbayev expressed the opinion that *“young independent states often come under strong pressure of views imposed from the outside,”* which leads to *“complex internal processes, the specific logic of which is assessed by other's views and often interpreted superficially”*. Therefore, Nazarbayev said then that the domestic media should be defended and shaped until they themselves learn to *“support the interests of the republic and create their own information space on the world political arena.”*

1.4. Formation of the state ideology in the age of nationalism

In Kazakhstan, it is difficult to assess how well the government is coping with the task of awakening patriotic feelings. According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 89) the government of Kazakhstan is still valued for the material benefits it provides to citizens. Younger people are less ideologized and more cynically inclined than their parents, however, they also retain the peculiar expectations of parents that the state will satisfy the social needs of citizens. Not being a clearly expressed part of ideology, this division became a powerful hidden factor, especially against the background of the continuing weakening of Russia. The result is an acceleration of the departure of ethnic Russians and other Slavs, as well as the alienation of the Russianized Kazakh elite from the rest of the Kazakhs. And though, Olcott mentions that many see these two processes as positive, but they have obvious

implications for the political and economic development of the state. From this point of view, the actual policy of the government completely contradicts the officially declared goal of strengthening inter-ethnic harmony (Olcott M. , Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, 2003).

Along with this, efforts aimed at a transition to a different ideology also create a generation gap, which over time can result in mass support for the idea of a communist or socialist revival. According to Zhumaly (Zhumaly, 2014), at least at the moment, the support of movements that advocate a return to the Soviet past comes mainly from older people, whose number is decreasing every year.

The emergence of nationalism as the most common substitute for the ideology of communism in most neighbouring countries has complicated the task of finding national identity in such a multi-ethnic state as Kazakhstan, especially when the Kazakhs were completely open to pressure from Russia. As already noted, the leaders of Kazakhstan believe that the country should stop listening to Russia in the field of cultural and political development and that Kazakhstan's own economic and security needs should be the driving force in relations with its northern neighbour.

"Kazakhst" state has always been part of the official ideology. Just as the 1993 Constitution stated that *"the single source of state power was the Kazakh people"*, the ideology concept of 1996 states that "... in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan ... for centuries there were large empires and separate Khaghanate of the Turkic peoples, ancestors of the Kazakh people. From the XV century, it was an independently controlled territory of the Kazakh Khaghanate, the world's first Kazakh state formation" (1996). Thus, making the necessary overtures towards multiethnicity, for example, in the program article of Nazarbayev 1993, *"there is only one way to realize national interests, which is to ensure equality of all peoples the integrating role of the Kazakh nation"* (Nazarbayev, 1993).

It is difficult to say with certainty what is meant by the "integrating role of the Kazakh nation", because the same document rejects the political heritage of the Kazakh past, "based on the resuscitation of archaic forms of social order,

tribal mentality and the system of legal views characteristic of territorial organization of the Kazakh society of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries " (1993). In this case, we are talking about the traditional division of Kazakhs into three zhuz - Junior, Medium and Elder. Mainly it was the Elder Zhuz who was able to preserve the sub-ethnic identity to a greater degree and occupy most of the government posts in the Soviet period, which means that Representatives make up a large part of the current Republican elite.

In addition, the government makes a clear separation between clan and family. According to Olcott (2003, p. 85), although many believe that clan policies play an important role in the country, this is denied at the official level. The family is perceived completely differently. In a programmatic article by President Nazarbayev (1993), there was a call for support for *"the development of a national language, art, culture ... and family."* In his public incarnation, the president appears as a family man, and he is often photographed surrounded by his wife, children and grandchildren.

In the official social life of the family of the president plays a central role. The importance of the family is further enhanced by the fact that the country's leadership continues the Soviet practice of reinforcing the approved view of history by conducting carefully prepared public ceremonies. For this, there are completely new reasons designed to emphasize the continuity of Kazakh culture and the strengthening of the dynastic way of governing the country. An example is the Day of Unity of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, proclaimed on May 28, 1993 on Mount Ordabasy (near Shymkent city) in memory of the meeting of three Kazakh elders (biys) held in 1726, who joined forces to resist (unsuccessful) the Jungars who invaded to the Kazakh lands from the east. The celebration was attended by over 50 thousand people, including official representatives of the then nineteen regions of Kazakhstan, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the Kazakh akyn (folk singer), who sang a story about the history of the meeting of biys, crafts and sporting achievements. This event probably strengthened the feeling of unity between the Kazakh participants and, perhaps, even aroused some solidarity with the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks who were invited to the event, but it's hard to imagine that Russians, Germans and Ukrainians living in Kazakhstan were able to

associate themselves with the participants in the general glee (Olcott M. , Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, 2003).

In general, however, attempts by the leadership of Kazakhstan to create a new version of the history are a repetition of some unsuccessful experiments of the Soviet era, when, according to President Nazarbayev, “there was a discrepancy between ideological symbols and real national values” (Olcott M. , p. 87). The government of Kazakhstan has not fully realized that the formation of a strong Kazakh idea of national identity does not necessarily have to cause inter-ethnic contradictions. In this sense, the difference between the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks is striking. Uzbek nation always considered their culture and civilization not only equal to Russians, but also superior to them. Conversely, even nowadays, many Kazakhs will agree that Russian culture has served as a means of familiarizing Kazakhs with world culture. Some Kazakhs are close to Russian culturally. Kazakhs consider themselves a small nation, and small nations rarely get a chance for self-determination. According to Olcott (Olcott M. B., 1986), most Kazakhs believe that at one time they could have fallen under more cruel dominion (for example, Chinese or Mongolian) or even under the yoke of one of the Islamic despots who could conquer them from the south. This probably helps to explain why polls conducted in the country consistently confirm that the majority of Kazakhs still want to learn Russian and speak it, although they do not believe that Russian should completely replace their own language. According to Gudkov (Gudkov, 1995), a survey (The Kazakhs., 1986, pp. 118-126) conducted in 1994 showed that, according to about 78% of the Kazakhs surveyed, they should continue to learn Russian. Such statistics should not come as a surprise, since 51% of the Kazakhs interviewed still used Russian at work, 55% indicated that it was in Russian that they communicate with friends and neighbours, and only 26% said that they speak Russian at home.

This imbalance in the use of languages in public and private life is changing, and as the generation that got education after the country gained independence, the Kazakh language is replacing Russian. Young Kazakhs, to a lesser extent than older people, are convinced that they need Russian,

since independence has enabled them to choose a language through which they can communicate with the outside world. Currently, English is incredibly popular in Kazakhstan. Students who have rich parents or are distinguished by a high level of intellectual development can already dream of receiving education in the West, and studying in Moscow is becoming less and less an object of desire.

For the time being, Russian language remains the language of business, and most ordinary Kazakhs still navigate the surrounding world largely through Russian language and culture, while retaining in their souls a complex mix of gratitude for the advantages that the Kazakh people received when they came into contact with Russian civilization and deep insults for the pain and suffering caused by Russian colonialism, and later by the Soviet authorities (Olcott M. , p. 92).

1.5. Why Russians are against the official status of the Kazakh nation?

Local Russians do not agree that the dominant role of the Kazakhs is in the order of things (Olcott M. , 2003). It is difficult to judge who - Kazakhs or Russians - gained more from the socially-political system of society during the Soviet period, especially since each of these groups was confident that the advantage was not on its side. Continuing with Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003) it is important to say that from the very beginning, the national revival of the Kazakhs caused a feeling of discomfort among the Russians. Groups of Russian nationalists that emerged in the Gorbachev era along with Kazakh nationalists, and both communities in general, assigned the language a crucial role in protecting their culture. And although the law on language specified that government work in areas with a predominance of the Russian population would be carried out in Russian for another 15 years, the adoption of this law was a clear signal that political and cultural life in Kazakhstan began to change and that the Russians were in no way may affect these changes (Gudkov, 1995, p. 17). By the time the law was passed, most Russians did not speak Kazakh: in the census conducted in the USSR in 1989 (pp. 17-18), less than 1% of Russians living in the republic said that

they were fluent in Kazakh, and very few were interested in learning Kazakh. In a survey of local Russians conducted in 1994, two-thirds of the respondents were against compulsory learning of the Kazakh language, and only Russians living in the south of Kazakhstan agreed on the need to learn the language of the titular nationality (Gudkov, pp. 17-18).

Debates around the 1989 and 1997 legislation about the language, strengthened in the Russian belief that they are the object of discrimination (Monitor, 1997). Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003) explains this by asserting that *"they were particularly upset by the 1997 law, because now they could no longer ask Moscow for intercession"*. Olcott continues (p. 93) stating that the law claims to be almost equal to the status of the Russian and Kazakh languages and to deliver the Kazakh language on one level with Russian, demanding that it also become the language of command of the armed forces, the police and security services. Russian activists, according to Olcott, complain that the law actually turns Kazakh into the only state language, as it requires the executive branch to compile a list of positions in the administrative and service spheres, for which it is necessary to be proficient in the Kazakh language, and also contains a condition for confirming knowledge of language by taking the exam when applying for a job. The law also stipulates that at least half of all TV channels and radio programs should be broadcast in the Kazakh language, and this rule applies equally to private and state-owned media.

The wider use of the Kazakh language in the media only increased the sense of alienation among the Russians (p. 95). Over the past few years, the volume of broadcasting from Russia has steadily declined. At first, this was due to *"because Russian broadcasters refused to pay high tariffs for access to TV and the radio air of Kazakhstan"*. Now, according to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 95), the government uses high tariffs and the provisions of the language law to restrict transmissions of broadcasts that unfavourably affect the country's image and interpret events occurring in it, as well as to ensure full state control over broadcasting.

Shaykemelev (Shaykemelev, 2013) gives his reasons on the formed clash in the Kazakh society saying that in former times, residents of Kazakhstan could subscribe to the largest Moscow newspapers as easily and cheaply as residents of the capital of the USSR. Many of these publications remained available after independence, especially during the stay of Kazakhstan in the ruble zone. Now subscribing to them has become so expensive that only a few are interested in receiving the Moscow press. In Kazakhstan, there are still many books published in Russian language, and popular fiction published in Russia falls into Kazakhstan, but since its consumers are only about 10 million Russian-speaking readers, the quality and range of publications is significantly limited. The economic side of publishing creates more problems than political censorship. Nevertheless, political literature published in Russia by Kazakh and Russian opposition figures, from time to time becomes a subject of confiscation.

Unfamiliarity of the Kazakh language by the Russian-speaking population is the underlying reason for the tense inter-ethnic relations in the country. According to Uskenbaeva (Uskenbaeva, n.d.) most Russians are annoyed by their own misunderstanding of what is happening around them at the household level, when Kazakhs speak to them in their own language. They do not understand why some Kazakhs who speak Russian fluently speak Kazakhs and Kazakhs, in turn, are irritated by the fact that there are so many people in their country who are not able to exchange with them even polite greetings in the local language. Russians who study the Kazakh language in the context of their professional careers, as a rule, do so on their own.

However, that the Russians do not believe that the study of the Kazakh language will restore their former influence in the country. This is confirmed by studies carried out in Kazakhstan by Kazakh, Russian and Western specialists. David D. Laitin (Laitin D. , 1998), who studied the reaction of the Russian Diaspora in a number of post-Soviet states, argues that the economic benefits of learning Kazakh are unclear, and the colonial style of relations between Kazakhs and Russians only reduces incentives to study it. In the Soviet era, the Kazakhs had a high degree of linguistic assimilation and were practically not allowed to take important government posts outside

of their republic. According to Laitin (p. 105) the combination of these factors causes the Russians to not even achieve partial assimilation. He contrasts the situation in Kazakhstan and Estonia, where many ethnic Russians strive with all their might to learn Estonian and become full members of society (p. 157).

The influence of Russians began to diminish from the moment when semi-competitive elections were introduced in the republic. In the Supreme Council of Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs constituted the majority. This circumstance did not bother the Russians until the Supreme Soviet was a politically impotent body, but when it began to gain influence, the Kazakh elite took care to take the process of nominating and electing the candidates into their hands (Smaylov E. , 2014). Most, but not all, of those who were entrusted with becoming deputies were Kazakhs. The Supreme Council elected in March 1990 consisted of 52.4% Kazakhs and 28.8% Russians, compared with 46.7% and 41.8% in the previous composition elected in 1985 (Tishkov, 1990). Representatives of the Kazakh elite who formed the majority in this latest legislative body of the Soviet era, no longer behaved like obedient party functionaries, which they once were, and began to actively defend the interests of the Kazakhs on key issues. Tishkov continues (p. 50), in the period preceding independence, local Russians for the most part tolerated the nationalist aspirations of the Kazakhs, who echoed their own attempts to regain lost national rights. And although the Russians were not eager to learn the Kazakh language and were not happy when the familiar streets and settlements were named after the Kazakh heroes they did not know, the majority perceived it as part of the process of national revival. Figures of Russian culture were rehabilitated along with Kazakh figures - if not the government in Almaty, then the central government in Moscow. But after independence, the rejection of language laws and the associated shift of cultural priorities led the Russians to gradually stop supporting the national revival of the Kazakhs.

According to Gudkov (1995, pp. 17—18, 31—32.), in 1991, the Russians were confused by the almost complete ignorance of the local language; by 1994, this feeling was replaced by the conviction that the state was obliged to

protect both Russians and Kazakhs equally and should not allow the Russian language or culture to be translated in the second-grade category. The Russians began to see themselves as a minority that is struggling to determine the essence of their own state.

1.6. Debates of researches on identifying Kazakh identity

The correlation of the terms Kazakh and Kazakhstani, the uncertainty of their use in differentiating certain social and cultural phenomena reflect the duality of the situation created in the modern Kazakh ideology. According to Sadykov (Sadykov, 2001) the dualism of state identity stems from its watershed in Kazakhstan's society: *"On the one hand, national, different for different ethnic groups, on the other - civil, equally weakly expressed in all ethnic groups"* (Kazakhstan and the World: Socio-Cultural Transformation, p. 278). This is where the contradiction lies: in the multidirectional, socio-cultural interests of the two leading ethnic groups of Kazakhstan - the Kazakhs and Russians. The Kazakhs are faced with the task of reviving their national culture, preserving the language, the entire cultural complex, which was oppressed by the communist superstructure. The Russians, the second largest ethnic group of the republic, face other tasks — preservation of the functioning space of the Russian language and Russian culture, which is narrowing down.

Russian ethnos as a basic carrier of the Soviet thinking is accustomed to dominate the political sphere, is still unable to restructure or show interest in the Kazakh culture and language. It is quite difficult for the Russian-speaking population to accept the situation evolving around the changing role-playing status of the two largest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Shaykemelev (Shaykemelev, 2013) supports this idea saying that, the habit of thinking in terms of the "older brother" does not give many Russian compatriots the possibility of internal reconciliation within the processes of identifying the Kazakh national identity. This fact largely explains the different perceptions of the leading ethnic groups of the value status of ethnic and civic identities (p. 182).

For the past twenty years, processes of social and political modernization have been under way in Kazakhstan. The processes of democratization of the country, the formation of the new socio-economic foundations and the development of statehood are difficult and contradictory. The collapse of the USSR had a significant impact on the change in the identities of Kazakhstan. If for Kazakhs the identity with the new Kazakhstan was painless at first. Moreover, in the first years of independence, euphoria was observed, then the identity of other ethnic groups became difficult to sustain and sometimes was dramatic. As an example, the meetings of the Kazakh youth, which took place on December 17-18, 1986 in Alma-Ata, the former capital of the Kazakh SSR at that time, took the form of mass protests and popular uprisings against the communist government. According to the official version, the unrest began because of the decision of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, about the removal from the post of the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Kunaev, and replacing it with Gennady Kolbin, the first secretary of the Ulyanovsk regional party committee, who had never worked in Kazakhstan (Asautay, 2017).

Regarding this problem in Kazakhstan, as Kadyrjanov (Kadyrzhanov R. , Citizenship as a Factor of the Nation-Building in Modern Kazakhstan, 2012) also notes, today there are two national identities in Kazakhstan. It depends on how different groups of the society answer the question who we are? One of these identities can be defined as Kazakh, the other as Kazakhstani. The existence of the two identities is an established and tangible reality that determines the social, political, cultural life of modern Kazakhstan.

Kadyrzhanov (Kadyrzhanov R. , 1998, pp. 84-90) states: *"In the demographic and political spheres, ethnic competition proceeds with the quite obvious dominance of the Kazakh ethnic group, and this was especially clearly manifested in the sovereignty period. As for the cultural sphere, the situation is difficult, ambiguous and even controversial"*. Apart from Kadyrzhanov, this problem is posed by N. Sadykov (2001, p. 278) and V. Dunaev (Dunaev, 2001, p. 186).

However, in the nation-state of Kazakhstan, the status of national identity claims a Kazakh identity. Between the two identities there is competition, which arose immediately after sovereignty. Dugin (pp. 127-128) continues proclaiming that in the wake of the ethnic mobilization of the late 1980s and early 1990s, there was a transformation of the ethno-cultural Kazakh identity of the Soviet society into the ethno-national identity of the post-Soviet period.

But what does Kazakh identity mean? Urazaliyeva (2004, p. 130) believes that, the Kazakh identity is a type of ethnic identity of an individual and an ethnic group that experiences a new historical stage of the transaction.

National identity construction is a fundamental component of any state, a condition for its stability and prosperity. The emergence of a common identity and the spirit of patriotism, the separation by all citizens of the country of a sense of belonging to the fate of the fatherland mean that they are a nation on the basis of a single citizenship (Dugin, 2004).

Can we apply this basic definition to Kazakhstan? The answer of Zhumaly (Smaylov R. , 2014) to this question is: "I suppose not". Moreover, it is doubtful that the situation has improved since the 1990s. Rather, it became more complicated and aggravated. The existing state programs did not bring the desired result, because for the most part they were not aimed at resolving the issue, but, as a rule, at postponing it or diverting public opinion to the side. In Kazakhstan, the process of development of a national identity places individual above or alongside their ethnic identification (Kristoffer, 2017).

According to Shaykemelev (2013), if not by conviction, then at least by an urge, most of Kazakhs consider themselves to be Kazakhstani today, in the name of the country of residence. He questions whether this form of self-identification unites each other in Kazakhstan. He states: "What is its position in the hierarchy of other socially forming values, such as, for example, family, relatives, and colleagues, entourage, belonging to this or that people or denomination?" (Shaykemelev, 2013). To answer these questions, he suggests that one must first get rid of the myths, taboos, stereotypes and phobias that accompany the issues of nation-building in Kazakhstan. Hence the first conclusion is that the independence of Kazakhstan, the well-being of

its people is not needed by anyone except the citizens living on this land. Shaykemelev continues: *"Nobody will take care of us, except us. Consequently, the question of the national construction of Kazakhstan is the sovereign and exclusive prerogative of our people, where there should be no place for the intervention of outsiders* (Shaykemelev, 2013, p. 242).

One can often hear that Kazakhstan in terms of building a polytechnic state is almost the only country that pursues a competent policy. Perhaps, however, Zhumaly (Zhumaly, 2014) questioning these statements saying: *"...but why then are we fragmented by language, religion, property, ethnic, and other characteristics, but they are not?"*

According to the following stereotype, the concept of nationalism carries a negative connotation, almost evil. According to Artykbayev (Artykbaev, 1993) this is a rudiment of the Soviet brainwashing, which Kazakh people still have not got rid of. Nationalism as a concept is identical with statehood and patriotism, because it is impossible to love a country without love for its people. You cannot serve the state without the devotion of its citizens. At every opportunity we hear that Kazakhstan is a multi-ethnic society.

Zhumaly (2014) is saying that the nation is created through nationalism only. He asserts that not a single Kazakh patriot, unlike some neighbouring countries, put forward the slogan "Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs". According to his statement, Kazakhs are fundamentally in favour of the equal rights of all citizens before the law, regardless of national or religious affiliation, that includes the right to preserve and maintain their identity. Their position is that any patriot of Kazakhstan is a Kazakh. This means that from the point of view of the national state, Kazakhs are not born Kazakhs, they eventually become one. As for the priority development of the Kazakh language and culture, this is confirmed by global practice. For Kazakhs, the only such focus is Kazakhstan, like for the Chinese is China, the Ukrainians have Ukraine. From here comes another delusion. According to Smaylov (Smaylov R. , 2014) it is stated that the triumph of internationalism took place during the Soviet regime. In reality, however, there was a substitution of internationalism for Russification, the systematic narrowing of national cultures through the

replacement and absorption of Russian culture. *“How many ethnic groups, languages and cultures we were missing as a result of this experiment?”* Zhumaly (2014).

Bauman (Bauman, *Individualized society*, 2002) supports this statement saying that such internationalism has also touched Kazakhstan. For example, in the 1980s, only two Kazakh schools were located in Almaty. They would probably also be closed if it were not for the collapse of the USSR.

The outcome of this policy is still valid for the society today. Almost half of the Kazakhs do not know their native language. But over the past 28 years, the world has changed, and Kazakhstan has also changed in parallel. An entire generation of those who did not kneel and did not know repression grew up (Shaykemelev, 2013).

Shaykemelev (2013) asks the question: what makes people living within the same state? Of course, this is a general idea, feeling oneself as an inseparable part of the world, linking one's destiny with the rest of the country, knowledge of the language, respect for the history, culture and traditions of the state-forming nation, honouring state symbols - the flag, the coat of arms, and the hymn.

To understand the complexity in the cultural sphere, one must turn to the process of the formation and development of the country in the Soviet era. Social life in the USSR was cemented by the Soviet culture, which arose and developed on the basis of the culture of the country's leading ethnos — the Russian. The Soviet state supported the development of national cultures, first of all, cultures of indigenous ethnic groups, guided by the policy of "indigenization". The Kazakh culture of the Soviet period can undoubtedly be attributed to high cultures, because after the revolution, illiteracy of the population was eliminated, a national system of education, science, professional art, etc. was formed. At the same time, the Kazakh high culture of the Soviet period turned out to be assimilated with the Russian-Soviet culture, largely losing its national identity. Among the cultures of the titular ethnic groups of the former USSR, Kazakh culture turned out to be assimilated to the Russian-Soviet culture, one of the most Russified one

among all post-Soviet states. Kazakh Soviet culture was developed mainly with the cultural changes directed from Moscow. It concerned literature, ballet, music, television, etc. But this way of developing culture defined by ideology was not organically linked with the Kazakh national cultural tradition, the spirit of the people and therefore did not arouse its interest (Nysanbayev, 2011, p. 23).

The first years of reform were marked by the politicization of the ethno sphere: the desire of ethnic groups who are offended by the history to declare themselves, the use of ethnicity for personal and political purposes, the incitement of nationalism and chauvinism. Publicity and democratic change have politicized ethnic communities in the struggle for their rights, the interests of preserving identity, the revival of national culture and language. Many diasporas that did not have deep historical and cultural roots on the territory of Kazakhstan today are associations of people according to common characteristics (nationality, culture, religion, language), united to express collective feelings, ethno-political demands of rights and freedoms. For some national groups, ethno-political requirements were conditions for achieving political recognition, strengthening national statehood, for others - the possibility of extracting socio-economic benefits or creating conditions for ethno-cultural reproduction (Anastasiev, 2008, p. 35).

According to Abylhozhin (Abylhozhin, 1992), the law on the languages is still ambiguously perceived by both Russians and Kazakhs. The majority of Russians approve the state language of the titular ethnic group as an anti-democratic measure, putting them in an unequal position with the Kazakhs. The Kazakh population, especially in the face of the creative intelligentsia, sees in official bilingualism the neglect of the language of the indigenous nation (Abylhozhin, 1992, p. 100).

The announcement of the need for state support of the Kazakh language and endowing it with the status of the state language almost divided society into irreconcilable sides: the majority of the population is Russian-speaking. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Languages, adopted in 1997, secured the status of the state language to the Kazakh language and, at the same

time, legitimized the use of the Russian language on a par with the Kazakh language in state organizations and in local governments. Thus, in the present liberal model of the nation there are civil and linguistic components (Abylhozhin, 1992, p. 100).

Thus, despite the well-known tolerance of, first of all, the Kazakhs and other ethnic groups of Kazakhstan, their mutual relations do not provide an unambiguous favourable picture for the approval of the unhindered integration of ethnic groups into a single nation. As shown by the results of a sociological survey (Foundation for the Promotion of Social and Political Sciences, 1997, pp. 26-27), the cultural, psychological, socio-economic and political attitudes of Kazakhstan's people on the relationship of the main ethnic groups of Kazakhstan are ambiguous and contradictory. This cannot affect the nature of national integration and social consolidation in Kazakhstan.

CHAPTER 2

LANGUAGE SITUATION IN KAZAKHSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONALISM

In continuation with the explanation why does ethnic groups feel separated from the rest of the society, this chapter gives the information regarding the language policies of the pre-Soviet and Soviet times in Kazakhstan. This will provide a deeper understanding of the problem that impact on the self-identification of Kazakhs and other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. The language policies that were adopted after the independence are analysed as well as the official documents of the Kazakh government.

Among the people of Kazakhstan, the word “nationalism” often causes negative associations. Not only stamps imposed by Soviet propaganda, but also many negative manifestations of ethno-nationalism in neighbouring countries. The most vivid examples are the skinheads in Russia, the massacre in the south of Kyrgyzstan and now the Ukrainian conflict, in which mobilization of people on ethnic language has played a significant role.

These problems have become a reflection not only of the internal contradictions that exist in each of the states. It is obvious that aggressive types of nationalism developed, among other things, due to the ethno-oriented policies of the post-Soviet elites. They solved both political tasks - the struggle for power, support of the political regime, and ideological ones - the legitimating of state borders and the strengthening of new identity in the post-Soviet crisis.

In Kazakhstan, the situation was different: here nationalism was minimally represented in the public political sphere. According to Beysembayev (Beysembayev, 2014) the parties operating in the country were deliberately distanced from ethno-linguistic problems. The regime itself also rarely turned to nationalism as a resource to enhance its own legitimacy, more appealing to the personal authority of President Nazarbayev and socio-economic slogans. At the same time, the policy of preserving inter-ethnic peace and harmony was maintained. Balancing between the interests of two main ethnic groups has become an important characteristic of ethnopolitics in Kazakhstan.

As a result, Kazakhstan managed to avoid the politicization of national issues and the obvious confrontation of society on the basis of ethno-linguistic grounds. However, in the ideological and cultural spheres, Kazakhstan, like all post-Soviet countries, focused on the interests of the dominant ethnic majority. It is no coincidence that Kazakhstan is viewed by foreign researchers as a typical “nationalizing” state (as expressed by the famous American nationalism researcher Rogers Brubaker).

The key changes occurred in the early years of Independence, when the names of settlements and streets were renamed, the program for the repatriation of the Kazakhs was adopted, national history was rethought, and changes were made to the language policy. In the relations between citizens and the state, the ethnic identity of a person remained an important social and political category. For example, the “nationality” count on the identity card continued to exist, the repatriation program wore an exclusively ethnic bias, and quotas were introduced for ethnic minorities in parliament, etc.

Shestov (Shestov, 2015) identifies two main types of nationalism in Kazakhstan. The first is a Civil Nationalism. It lies in the vision of the state about the construction of the nation. This nationalism includes programs, regulatory documents, within which ideas are formulated. Here, as an example, one can cite examples of books by top state officials, primarily the president. There is no ethnic component in this kind of nationalism. However, the current regime from the first days turned to the symbols of Kazakh

ethnicity, was an appeal to the Kazakh identity as a sign of the legitimacy of power.

However, there are social groups of nationalists who Serik Beysembayev (Beysembayev, 2014) divided into liberals, traditionalists and nationalists who rely on Islam.

Liberal nationalism is represented by political and public figures, as well as educated youth. Their main ideals are the modernization and democratization of the country according to the Western type. They try to avoid explicit ethno-oriented formulations, they try to give a civil colour to nationalism.

The second group - the traditionalists - are represented mainly by the creative intelligentsia. Their main efforts are aimed at protecting the language, they glorify history, promote tradition. These are the most numerous nationalists. They form the agenda in the Kazakh-speaking media. Their main goal is the formation of a society with traditional Kazakh values. In addition to the intellectuals, according to the expert, rural youth and oralman adjoin traditionalists. "They will be united by the struggle against Russian-speaking Kazakhstan," the expert added (Beysembayev, 2014). Those nationalists who define their identity through religion are relative newcomers to this environment. "Islamists" are represented in various social layers. They are popular with young people. *"And they have a very serious potential,"* says Serik Beisembayev (Shestov, 2015).

After the collapse of the USSR and the independence of the former Soviet Republics, cultural and historical paradigms have changed for the post-Soviet World. Therefore, the problem of the language situation has become one of the most important and pressing issues at the present stage of development of the Russian and other languages.

In various countries, national language issues are resolved depending on the linguistic situation that has developed within their territories, which is the characteristic of a given country. Based on goals and content of the language policy, each state develops its own model of language.

The current linguistic situation in modern Kazakhstan has its own unique features: the functioning of a large number of genetically and typologically diverse languages, representatives of more than 130 nations living on the same territory, and nationalities with the functioning of two large partner languages - Kazakh and Russian. The realities of Kazakhstan today require a language policy that meets the needs of the multi-ethnic population of the country and considers the peculiarities of the language, demographic and political situation that is an important factor of the political stability of the Kazakhstani society. To solve these major problems, the government of Kazakhstan has chosen a course for bilingualism, recognition of the Kazakh language as the state language, and Russian language - the official language of common communication as part of the official language policy.

Analysis of the language situation would be incomplete without studying the Kazakh-Russian bilingualism, since one can only understand and appreciate the role of bilingualism in society by considering it as an integral part of the language situation in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

To study the language policies in the Republic of Kazakhstan, one should consider the regional aspect in Kazakhstan. Representation of the population of the Republic of Kazakhstan by ethnicity in general terms is as follows: the western, eastern parts of the republic are less polyethnic, whereas the north, southern and central parts of the republic is more polyethnic. In terms of language, the situation in these regions was as follows: in the west and south of Kazakhstan the Kazakh language predominates, while in the north, east and central part of the country the Russian language is dominant. Each of the regions have their own specific language features. The language development of the regions depends on these as well as a number of other factors.

2.1. Historical factors affecting the issue of language in Kazakhstan

The linguistic and ethno-cultural situation in Kazakhstan in the last decade is characterized by a certain "duality". Despite officialising the Kazakh language and raising the status of the Kazakh culture, the Russian language and

Russian culture have maintained a relatively high status and influence within the various aspects of public life both at the official and at the household level.

The situation with the dominance of the Russian language is clear since for a long time, Kazakhstan was part of the Russian Empire and then the USSR. At that time, the Russian language was fundamental throughout all post-Soviet states and until the mid-1980s, there was a discontinuity in the folding of Kazakh-language offices in the rural areas, as well as the closure of schools that instructed in the Kazakh language (Altynbekova, pp. 14-19).

In 1989, the law "On Languages in the Kazakh SSR" was passed, which determined the status of the Kazakh and Russian languages (Vdovina, 2008). In particular, it stated that "*the state language of the Kazakh SSR is the Kazakh language*", and Russian is the "*language of interethnic communication*" (Vdovina, 2008, p. 30).

To Vdovina (2008), such a definition of the status of the Russian language to some extent has contributed to the inter-ethnic tensions and was one of the main reasons for the mass emigration of the Russian-speaking population of the country. From 1990 to 1996, as a result of emigration, the Republic of Kazakhstan has lost tens of thousands of qualified specialists working in various fields of activity. This caused a change in the language policy of the state. In 1995, a new Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan was adopted. The Article 7 of the Constitution redefined the legal status of languages and the official language of the Republic of Kazakhstan became Kazakh. The Russian language has received the status of the secondary official one, which has the opportunity to be applied in state organizations and local self-government bodies along with the Kazakh language (Vdovina, 2008).

In 1997, the Law "On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan" was adopted (Bayzakova, 2013), emphasizing that the Russian language, along with the official Kazakh language could be used in proceedings, accounting, statistical, financial documentation, the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and legal proceedings. As Savin (Savin, 2001) has described,

particular attention of the public in the course of the new law was attracted by articles 18, 23, 24, which spoke about the scope of the Kazakh language. On November 20-21, 1996, a sharp discussion of the draft of the new law was held in the Majilis. The debate on some articles almost went into the inter-parliamentary inter-ethnic conflict. According to Vdovina (Vdovina, 2008), it was considered that the draft law has not emphasized the priority of the state language sufficiently and overestimated the status of the Russian language. Almost all articles where, along with the state language, the use of the Russian language was assumed and was put next to the state language, remarks were made that stipulate the use of the Russian language only *“if necessary”* (2008, p. 31).

Although in the early 1990s the Russian language had a certain degree of narration with the Kazakh, the part of the Russian-speaking population had concerns about a possible isolation of language and restrictions for themselves and their children in receiving education and work (Altynbekova, 2012, p. 62). This, in addition to economic studies, was one of the reasons for their outflow from Kazakhstan in the early 1990s.

On September 12, 2005, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev stated: *“We must jointly support the languages and cultural traditions of all the peoples of Kazakhstan. No one should deny the right to use native language and culture”* (Nikolsky, 2011, p. 324).

The Minister of Education and Science of Kazakhstan, Tuimebayev (Belikov, 2011, p. 332), responded to a question about translating office work into Kazakh language saying that: *“All of our official documentation is conducted in the state Kazakh and international Russian languages. No crowding is expected”*.

Thus, the language issue with the sovereignization of Kazakhstan has also changed the ethno-cultural situation. In all spheres of public life, the Kazakh national culture has acquired priority and support at the state level including the associated traditions and values.

2.2. Factors of preservation of the Russian language

The status of the Russian language that was enshrined in the Constitution 1995 and laws on the languages of the Republic of Kazakhstan, maintain their stability, since in many areas of public life, the Russian language functions on a par with the state Kazakh language and in reality, it functions as the medium of inter-ethnic communication. Despite the fact that in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the high status of the Russian language is enshrined in law, due to the small share of the Russian-speaking population in the overall ethnic landscape of these states and the significant outflow of Russian and other Slavic ethnic groups, the area of functioning of the Russian language is constantly decreasing. Thus, in the Uzbek language legislation, the Russian language belongs to the languages of national minorities, as a result of which, at the state level, the preservation of the Russian language in the educational space of the republic is not supported in Uzbekistan (Altynbekova, 2006, p. 392) .

If we consider the economic factors affecting the preservation of the positions of the Russian language in Kazakhstan, it would be worth noting the interpenetration and strong ties between the economies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan. The close relationship and dependence between the largest enterprises and entire sectors of countries, established business and technological processes are one of the many other factors strongly dictate the need for proficiency in the Russian language.

The total estimation of the Russian-speaking community according to the 1989 census is out of 16.2 million people (Smailov, 2000). Kazakhs made up 6.5 million people, Russians - 6 million. According to the last census (2000, p. 78), the population has decreased to 14.95 million people, of which Kazakhs made up almost 8 million people, and Russians - about 4.5 million people. Between the last two censuses of the population, in 10 years, there was an outflow of the Russian population, amounting to almost 1.6 million people (p. 79).

However, despite the outflow of population and migration, Russian language is traditionally the main medium of communication throughout the whole of Kazakhstan.

Due to historical circumstances, a large number of nationalities and ethnic groups live on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Regardless of nationality, for the overwhelming majority of the population, the Russian language has become the main language of the interethnic communication and interaction. This language is the connection between all ethnic groups and nationalities living in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The well-known Kazakhstani sociolinguist Khasanov (Khasanov, 2007) identifies 126 functioning languages in Kazakhstan. They are accepted as genetically and typologically diverse. In his analysis of the linguistic culture of Kazakhstan, he puts forward three parameters (Khasanov, 2007, p. 33). The first one is the number of functional units that are different in application, the second one is the linguistic nature of functioning languages (types and forms of bilingual and poly-lingual in the country, and the third one is the degree of the prevalence of languages in terms of the number of speakers and the volume of functions performed.

It is the current multi-ethnic diversity of the population that requires the formation of new mechanisms for coordinating the interests of various groups, creating conditions for the development of ethnic languages and cultures. It should be noted that the Russian language has become the main tool of communication and interaction not only for non-indigenous nationalities, but also for representatives of the titular nation - the Kazakhs.

Speaking at the XII Session of the Assembly of Peoples of Kazakhstan, N. A. Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan, 2006) noted that:

"...one can condemn the methods by which the Russian language was implanted in Kazakhstan for the entire twentieth century, the methods that led to the fact that millions of Kazakhs have forgotten their native language. But it is impossible because of this, to abandon the mass knowledge of the Russian language by the Kazakhs. The question is that mass proficiency in one of the international languages, which is Russian, by millions of Kazakhs, is a factor that expands the information horizons in the modern world. In the foreseeable future, the Russian

language will remain a factor in our competitiveness. There is no doubt about it. Therefore, the level of knowledge of the Russian language should remain high”.

Analysing the linguistic situation in Kazakhstan, it should be noted that despite the decline in the share of the Russian-speaking population and the declared support of the state of the Kazakh language, the scope of the Russian language remains quite broad: in some regions office work in government, in the private sector, the language of home use, scientific literature, cultural life is still conducted in Russian.

As also noted by Suleimenova, to assess the linguistic status in the Republic of Kazakhstan, it is fundamental, *“neither the functioning of the Kazakh, nor the functioning of the Russian languages can get an adequate description, if we consider these languages outside their joint functioning within a single communicative space”* (Suleimenova, 2003, p. 54)

The linguistic consciousness of Russians in Kazakhstan, according to Smagulova (Smagulova, 2009, p. 195), is a conglomerate, the formation of which was promoted by such factors as: 1) the accession of Kazakhstan to Russia; 2) demographic prerequisites in the Soviet Kazakhstan in the post-Soviet period; 3) the dispersive character of the settlement of Russians; 4) trade, economic and cultural contacts between the Russian and Kazakh peoples; 5) ethnocultural relations between peoples.

In the Republic of Kazakhstan there is a problem of the relationship between language and state, which has certain features. Russian language - the language of ethnic Russians continues to maintain its functions in the social communicative space of Kazakhstan. Its functions are legally enshrined in the legislative documents of the Republic of Kazakhstan as officially used in state organizations and local governments on an equal basis with the language of the state. However, as Smagulova states (2009, p. 196), *“the indicated equality in the application of the state Kazakh and officially used Russian languages does not mean endowing the latter with the status of a second state language”*. According to Ayupova (Ayupova, 2010), Russian language in Kazakhstan is also an organic language that performs threefold function: to serve both as a means of communication for the Russian-speaking diasporas in Kazakhstan, a language of communication for other

lingo-cultural communities in the country, and also a language of interaction with Russia.

In the functioning of the Russian language in the modern world there is a very serious question that confronts the state in the light of the idea of the country's President N. A. Nazarbayev about trilingualism - the command of citizens in the Kazakh, Russian and English languages. *“One of the three languages is Russian. The knowledge of the Kazakh people of the Russian language is our wealth. The Russian language plays a great role as the language of science, education, friendship. It is also a lever of the economy. Our main market is Russia”*(Kazakhstan, 2006, p. 4).

However, it is still too early to project such an approach as trilingualism to the entire population of the country, since the state will not immediately be able to provide the necessary resources and the corresponding need for this kind of knowledge. Considering the above, the Government should give serious importance to the formation and implementation of the language policy in the country, since the developing language situation in the near future can affect not only the stability of society, but also the competitiveness of the nation as a whole.

2.3. Language and Media in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan: Kazakhization vs Russification

2.3.1. Legislative aspects of the languages in Kazakhstan

According to the Constitution of August 30, 1995 (Art. 7) and the Law “On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan” of July 11, 1997 (Art. 4), the state language in the country is Kazakh language. It is said about the Russian language that it is *officially used* in state organizations and bodies of local self-government on a par with the Kazakh (Article 7, Section 2 of the Constitution, Article 5 of the Law on Languages). However, “officially used” status is increasingly devalued in subsequent regulatory documents governing the language policy in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

In the State Program for the Functioning and Development of Languages for 2001-2010 (considering the changes made over the years), three strategic

objectives in the field of language development were defined: expansion and strengthening of the social and communicative functions of the state language; preservation of the cultural functions of the Russian language; the development of languages of ethnic groups and the introduction of English in business communication. The initiative of Nursultan Nazarbayev was reflected here on the phased implementation of the cultural project “Trinity of Languages”. The program states that “it is necessary to consistently carry out work on the development of the Kazakh language as a state, Russian as the language of international communication and English - the language of successful integration into the global economy” (Nazarbayev, 2001).

It should be noted that the document sets the tasks of ensuring the functioning of the Russian language in state organizations and local self-governmental bodies, in the field of science and education, in the sphere of culture and the media, as well as the task of scientific and linguistic support for its use. However, of course, the priority is the expansion and strengthening of the socially communicative functions of the Kazakh language in all vital areas of public life: in government, legislation, legal proceedings, in the armed forces and law enforcement agencies, in the international activities of the country. It also marks the requirement of knowledge of the state language for holders of certain professions, specialties and positions: first of all, they are employed in the public service, in health care, education, science, culture, the service sector of the population, transport and communications.

In the subsequent State Program for the Functioning and Development of Languages for 2011–2020, the main goal is formulated: *“harmonious language policy ensuring the full-scale functioning of the state language as the most important factor in strengthening national unity while preserving the languages of all ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan”*. Here the course of the total “Kazakhization” of all spheres of public life (translation of the official documentation, alteration from Cyrillic to Latin alphabet, change languages in media etc), which has already been started, has been officially proclaimed.

2.3.2. Titular against non-titular: Battle of languages

One of the popular arguments why the Russian language should lower or completely lose its already vague constitutional status is a demographic argument. Indeed, for the period from 1970 to 2018, the share of Russians in Kazakhstan has halved (from 42.6% to 21.8%), while the share of Kazakhs has increased twice (from 32.5% to 65.2%). Only in the first seven years of independence, more than a million Russians left the country (14% of the population). At the same time, the Russian Diasporas is rapidly aging, and the titular ethnos is getting younger. Kazakhstan has ceased to be a republic, where the titular nation made up only about a third of the population. The strong trend towards a monoethnic society has been designated, and this gives the adherents of “Kazakh for Kazakhs” grounds to declare that the Russian language has lost its demographic base and its dominance in the communicative space of Kazakhstan completely unjustified (Kaznetov, 2001).

It would be correct to state the demographic capacity of the Russian language has noticeably weakened. But its communicative power is still great, primarily because the Kazakh language, the traditional language of the society, needs serious modernization. According to the Nim and Moroz (Zhuravel, 2014) this is an atavism of the Soviet era, when it was thought that the Kazakh language was archaic, that only the inhabitants of the villages speak it, that, unlike Russian, it is not the language of science, literature and politics. However, the Kazakh language in these areas cannot yet compete with the Russian. Therefore, even those who are fluent in the Kazakh language, often limit its use in many communicative situations. By the way, an objective assessment of the level of use of the state language among the population is quite a challenge. As Suleimenova has mentioned, the census and sociological surveys initiated by the state seem to be overstated. Thus, according to the 2009 census, 74% understand oral speech, 64.8% can read freely and 62% of the population of Kazakhstan write freely. Moreover, among the Kazakhs, all these figures are above 90% (Suleimenova, 2003, p. 28).

In such a remarkable scenario, it is not clear why the problem of language split among the Kazakhs is so urgent - so much so that it was touched upon

in the already mentioned Presidential Address of Nursultan Nazarbayev “Strategy Kazakhstan-2050” - a new political course of the established state”. In particular, the president expresses concern about the fact that the nation is artificially divided into “nagyz kazakhs” and “shala kazakhs” under the cover of holy ideas of love for the Kazakhstan motherland.

This sociocultural split is connected with the linguistic factor. The fact that the representatives of the title ethnos (Kazakh) themselves are poorly fluent in their native language is constantly being discussed by the Kazakh mass media in discussions on the topic “when will we speak Kazakh?” (Zhuravel, 2014). This confirms the doubts in the official figures, demonstrating the triumphant march of the state language throughout the country.

The data from cross-country sociological research within the framework of the Eurasian Monitor and the EDB Integration Barometer projects from 2006 to 2013 allow seeing the dynamics of the language situation in the context of household communication. Distribution of answers to the question “Tell me, in what language do you usually communicate in a family, at home?” are presented in Table 1.

Dynamics of use of the language of everyday communication in Kazakhstan: 2006-2013 / Table 1

What language do you usually communicate at home?	2006	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013
Kazakh	43,3	35,6	33,4	33	29,1	32,4
Russian	52,7	50,5	45,6	41,8	44,4	42,8
Equally Kazakh/Russian	0,2	8,9	17,9	23,4	23	22,7
Another	2,9	4,9	2,8	1,8	3,5	2,1
Hard to answer	0,9		0,3			

Source: The Eurasian Monitor (www.eurasiamonitor.org)

According to the given data, there is a negative dynamic in the number of speakers *only in Kazakh* or *only in Russian*. Accordingly, over these seven years, the share of using both languages in everyday communication has increased from almost zero to 23%. This indicates that in Kazakhstan there has been a tangible shift towards bilingualism. Whether and how soon after

the period of bilingualism the stage of Kazakh monolingual period will begin is quite difficult to predict.

In fact, a significant part of the population is becoming bilingual, and this is primarily due to the fact that under the pressure of the ongoing language policy, Russian and Russian-speaking Kazakhs started to learn the official language of the state. On the other hand, the Russian language maintains its strong position among the Kazakh urban population, and this trend is unlikely to change in the next decade. Therefore, the “real” Kazakhs who came from the villages to the cities, being a native speaker, are also forced to speak Russian, because Russian main remains to be the language of inter-ethnic communication. But if earlier the competitive advantage was precisely for the Russian language, now it is for both languages and the program of the state, "Trinity of Languages" also emphasizes the importance of fluency in English.

Nevertheless, 65% of the population of Kazakhstan speaks Russian, which continues to dominate in everyday, business, media, official and scientific communication. As for the Kazakh language, as Zhuravel has also states, *this diamond still needs to be polished and cut* (Zhuravel, 2014, p. 11). Only in such a capacity, the Kazakh language can fully compete with the Russian language and claim dominance in all vital areas of Kazakhstan’s society, including the media space.

2.3.3 Russian language media in Kazakhstan

In the long run, the Russian language needs media in its survival, including the “information body” of mass media. The Russian-language media, in turn, are a conductor of Russian cultural values and a means of constructing Russian identity in the post-Soviet space. It is necessary to clarify the structure and features of the media space of Kazakhstan. According to the data of the Ministry of Culture and Information (2014), in March 2013 there are 2111 mass media operating in Kazakhstan, of which 439 (20.8%) are state-owned, 1672 (79.2%) are non-state organisations. At the same time, the Kazakh-language segment of the media market of the Republic of Kazakhstan is 16.3%; Russian-speaking - 35.9%; bilingual (in Russian and Kazakh languages) - 34.4%; multilingual - 13.4% (see Table 2). It should be

noted that these are the statistics of the Kazakh media, and here the numerous Russian publications and TV channels that are distributed throughout the country are not considered.

Language of registered and existing Kazakhstani media (March 2013) / Table 2

Language of mass media	Newspapers	Magazines	TV companies	Radio	News agencies	Total
Kazakh	362	104	1			344
Russian	528	215			3	758
Kazakh and Russian	369	103	50	48	3	727
Multilingual	98	81			7	282
Total	1357	503	51	48	13	2111

Source: (Zhuravel, 2014)

Obviously, Russian-language mass media dominate Kazakhstan's media space. And this is not the media of the Russian diasporas - they have a national status. In particular, the official republican edition of *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* is published in Russian, as well as other influential and popular newspapers: *Vremya*, *Vecherny Almaty*, *Espress K*, *Karavan*, *Megapolis*. According to Akkuli (Akkuli, 2011) it is still difficult for the Kazakh-language press to compete with them, even though the Kazakh-language press receives government support. One of the important reasons for the "hegemony" of the Russian-speaking and Russian media is the Russian-speaking not only a wide audience, but also the ruling elite. As Akkuli mentions, representatives of the Kazakh press note with regret that *"power in Kazakhstan is a purely Russian-speaking power: Nazarbayev's entourage gives comments in Russian, he gives his interviews in Russian, and generally perceives the whole world in Russian. Therefore, Russian-language journalism in Kazakhstan seems to be the most sought-after"* (Akkuli, 2011).

As in other countries, a significant part of the readership of the Republic of Kazakhstan using the Internet: at present, the share of Internet users in Kazakhstan is 73.5% (Zhuravel, 2014). Very important is the fact that,

according to the media legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan (2009), all Internet resources are considered as mass media. Websites, chat rooms, blogs, online stores, electronic libraries, etc., are equated to media with the corresponding criminal, civil and administrative responsibility borne by traditional media. At the same time, web resources are limited in the right of access to information, since they do not have to be registered to the Ministry of Culture and Information, which is necessary, in particular, for accreditation of state bodies. Any resources that violate the laws of Kazakhstan may be disconnected from access within Kazakhstan, regardless of the country of location of the server and domain registration.

In the sphere of print and online media, there are no special legal requirements for the language of publications, although publications in the Kazakh language and the Kazakh interface of websites are highly desirable (and for the state-owned media in the long term are mandatory). In the broadcasting sector, the situation is different. According to the Law "On Languages in the Republic of Kazakhstan" dated July 11, 1997 and the Law "On Mass Media" dated July 23, 1999 (Zhuravel, 2014, p. 13), the weekly volume of television and radio programs in the Kazakh language should not be less than the total volume of television, radio programs in other languages. Thus, all Kazakhstan TV channels (except for the channel "Kazakhstan", which, on the instructions of the President, has been broadcasting only in Kazakh since 2012) are bilingual. Another thing is that many of them do not observe the language balance, and Russian-language content predominates in their programs. First of all, this refers to the commercial TV channels-leaders.

Kazakhstanis are actively using cable and satellite television services, thereby gaining access to foreign, primarily Russian, television channels. In fact, if we look at the "Register of foreign television and radio channels registered and distributed in the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan as of August 22, 2013" (Zhuravel, 2014, p. 15), we find out that of the 195 channels represented in it 129 are Russian (66 %). Apparently, in order to counter the informational expansion of the predominantly Russian, foreign media, in 2012, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan "On Television and

Radio Broadcasting” was adopted, which ordered all operators of terrestrial, cable and satellite television to include in their packages the so-called “mandatory TV channels”.

The formation of a list of mandatory channels pursues a clear goal: in the conditions of insufficient competitiveness of Kazakhstani media products (in which the state invests money), this is an effective way of “forced” delivery of domestic content to a wide audience. At the same time, this is a direct intervention in market relations - cable network operators themselves have the right to decide what to fill their software package considering user demand. The absence of the need to compete for your viewer will not encourage Kazakhstani television companies to create a quality media product, and therefore, open access to their programs will not yet entail an automatic increase in the audience.

The Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting has somewhat complicated the activity of foreign television and radio companies by the new requirement of mandatory registration with the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Article 19) (2014). Previously, the permission to broadcast foreign TV channels received cable networks, and not the TV channels themselves. This requirement may lead to the fact that some foreign TV companies may be denied the possibility of broadcasting for political reasons or they themselves consider this procedure too burdensome.

Actually, the authorities are fully aware of the lack of competitiveness of domestic content, clearly defining this as a threat to the country's information security: *“due to the openness of the national information space and the popularity of foreign media, including television and Internet resources <...>, there is a real threat of informational influence on the public consciousness of the population”* (RK, 2011). According to Zhuravel (Zhuravel, 2014) it is this “openness” that is declared to be the reason for the low demand for Kazakhstani media product and its unattractiveness for investment, which, again, does not allow improving its quality and multiplying the quantity. And

somehow it naturally suggests that this "vicious circle" can be broken only thanks to the restriction, even the ban of foreign media.

At the same time, as Nim has also notes (Zhuravel, 2014, p. 17) the situation prevailing in Kazakhstan's media space is hardly the result of purposeful efforts on the part of Russia, although it is certainly favourable for the realization of its geopolitical interests. The dominance of the Russian-speaking and Russian media here is largely due to factors such as the Russian-speaking power elite and target audiences, the insufficient production of high-quality national content and the need to modernize the Kazakh language. This is partly a consequence of a certain cultural and political inertia of the social order, which still retains the features of the Soviet one. However, as Nim continues, this situation is temporary: "Russian influence" in Kazakhstan is declining due to the reduction of the Russian Diasporas and the tendency of "Kazakhization".

2.4. Problems and prospects on language issue in Kazakhstan

Russians and other non-Kazakhs consider themselves victims of the government's discriminatory language policy, as a result of which their children are forced to learn the Kazakh language, and they themselves cannot become full participants in the public sector, since they do not speak fluent Kazakh. According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 207) while Kazakh nationalists believe that the government should harshly exclude those who do not speak Kazakh from participating in the activities of state bodies, including the Parliament, the majority of Kazakhstan's citizens do not object to the Russian language continuing to perform a public function, even in broader boundaries than those that the government is prepared to give. According to a public opinion poll (Alexeyenco, 2008) conducted in the mid-1990s, 56% of citizens thought that the state languages in Kazakhstan should be Russian and English, 29% called Kazakh language, giving Russian the status of means of international communication, only 4% thought that the only state language should be Kazakh, 4% thought that the only state language should be Russian, and 7% that *"There should be no state*

language at all". No one expects the Russian language to disappear from public life. As Alexeyenco states, the country is still dominated by people who speak Russian better than other languages: 76% of the population as a whole, including 64.7% in rural areas.

Russians fear that the significance of their language will be diminished by heightened attention to learning the Kazakh language. To some extent, these fears are justified. The number of schools in which instruction is conducted in the Kazakh language is growing, and the number of Russian schools are decreasing. Izdibayev (1998) gives the example showing that in 1991, there were only 2,768 Kazakh schools in the country (34%), but by September 1999 their number had reached 3,357. Over the same period, the number of Russian schools decreased from 3,641 to 2,412.

The language policy has led to real imbalances in the education system as well. There is already a requirement that textbooks, technical manuals and other materials should be translated or compiled in the Kazakh language. Olcotts (2003) asserts that much of the responsibility for compliance with the laws on language falls on the shoulders of local authorities, who hardly find people capable of teaching technical subjects in Kazakh, as the curriculum now requires. Teacher training is expensive, their salaries are low, so young people choose this profession reluctantly. According to the current requirements, mentions Olcott (2003, p. 207), in particular the order dated October 1, 1999, school teachers in the Western Kazakhstan, who do not speak the Kazakh language, are required to attend courses to learn it. Formally, these courses work, but, as a rule, they are ineffective. Heads of local schools, trying to provide a compulsory set of subjects appoint those who speak Kazakh to teach disciplines in which they do not have sufficient training. Even those who can speak Kazakh fluently do not have enough technical terms to go to teaching in the Kazakh language, since most Kazakhs were educated in Russian.

The Russian language still dominates in the higher education system. Thus, in 1999, 72% of students studied in Russian, 27% in Kazakh, and 1% each in Uzbek, English and German. According to Zakayeva (Zakaeva Z., 1998)

many of these groups face difficulties trying to get education - both primary and secondary - in the language they need. The survey of 1997 showed that three-quarters of the population of the northern regions of Kazakhstan and almost half of the predominantly Kazakh population in the southern and western regions of the country would like to receive education in the Russian language. And vice versa, less than 25% of the predominantly Russian population in the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan would like to receive education in the Kazakh language (1998).

As already mentioned, Russians often say that they do not see the point in learning the Kazakh language, because even if they master it, they still will not have real prospects in this country. Probably, the prevalence of such a point of view can serve as an answer to the question why the proportion of Russians who speak Kazakh did not increase in the mid-90s and they have decreased slightly from 8.5% in 1994 to 7.7% in 1996 (Kazakhstan's Truth, 1994).

As Olcott says (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 208), it is difficult for Russians living in Kazakhstan to gain a sense of emotional attachment to their new country. According to a survey conducted in 1998 by the Informational and Analytical Centre of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, approximately 46% of Russians still consider the former Soviet Union as their homeland, not Kazakhstan, and less than 15% believe in the possibility of adaptation in independent Kazakhstan (Mendybaev S., 2000). Another research that is conducted among students in Almaty and Astana, found out that only 33% and 39% of Russians in these cities respectively, plan to stay in Kazakhstan (Globe, 1998). It is less than 15% of Kazakh youth that are planning to leave the country.

While special attention to education in the Kazakh language can provide him with a future, it also leads to the emergence of a new generational conflict. By some estimates, up to 40% of the adult Kazakh population has not been able to fully master the Kazakh language. Such a generational conflict can cause controversy among members of the ruling elite.

Much depends on the definition of proficiency in language, therefore members of the Parliament are trying to develop an appropriate standard. According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 209) if language proficiency is the ability to be understood by others when using the oral form of the Kazakh language, in this case, it can be argued that 96.3% of ethnic Kazakhs can speak "Kazakh". However, if language proficiency is the ability to read, write and speak fluently on the "Kazakh" language, then only 74.7% of Kazakhs can be classified as people speaking "Kazakh".

In a number of cases, president Nazarbayev particularly emphasized that discrimination on the basis of language is prohibited in the Republic of Kazakhstan and that for the majority of citizens, the Russian language will continue to be the same as his 1993 statement, where, he called the channel for the flow of information to the republic (Nazarbayev, 1993). One day, shortly after Kazakhstan gained independence, Nazarbayev even said that adult Russian-speaking citizens of the country do not need to learn the Kazakh language. However, he soon abandoned this position, mainly because of the process of the modernisation of national consciousness has been started. As Olcott says, *"trying to reassure the Russian population, Nazarbayev nevertheless does almost nothing to slow down the tendency of the Kazakh language to become the dominant role"* (Olcott M. , p. 102). Contrary to the president's promises that the Kazakh language will be implemented at least for the upcoming generation and that this will be done through the education system, rather than by excluding people from public life, the current leadership seems to be firmly committed to making Kazakh the only official language.

The expediency of channelling resources to the expansion of the environment of the use of the Kazakh language at a time when the republic faces many other urgent tasks is doubtful and remains a topic of discussion. The Kazakhs themselves argue whether it is possible to transform their language into a modern technical language without extensive borrowing of non-Kazakh words and phrases, because as a result of discrimination during the years of the Soviet power, it was reduced to the role of "everyday language", in which, *"there are dozens of words to designate a camel ... but*

there are no words to designate concepts from the field of modern engineering and science " (Speaking of Camels, 1997, p. 34). Nevertheless, the language can be adapted to modern life, if the state is ready to allocate funds for this, and the Kazakh nationalists are ready to answer the question of how to do this. According to Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 210) in September 1998, the leaders of the Azat civil movement made a number of proposals to expand the scope of the Kazakh language, including by forcing commercial, private and foreign organizations to use it, as well as introducing a special tax on non-Kazakh speakers to cover the costs of services of Russian-Kazakh translators hired by the government. They also demanded that those who do not speak Kazakh would be hired only if they could learn Kazakh in the future.

According to Azat's proposals, since 1999, entrance examinations at colleges and higher educational institutions should be conducted only in Kazakh. According to Laitin (Laitin D. , 1998) such proposals, although impracticable in the current political climate of Kazakhstan, contribute to maintaining the feelings of deep estrangement from their new state and the fact that they are cut off from the Russian-language media (Smetanina, 1998).

Russians see the reason for this situation in their ethnic background. Studies show that non-Kazakhs more often than Kazakhs speak about the deterioration of interethnic relations (Masanov N., 1997). Russians consider that they are unjustly squeezed out of the government and even from private entrepreneurship, where there are no legislatively fixed restrictions on the use of the Russian language. Surveys showed that more than half of Russian students in Almaty and Astana believe that their ethnic origin is a determining factor in their future career, and only a quarter of Kazakh students gave a similar answer. The atmosphere of suspicion takes on such a scale, according to Olcott (2003) that the Russians living in Kazakhstan sometimes blame the government for providing secret assistance to the Kazakhs; For example, when pensions were not paid in the North Kazakhstan region for three months, it was rumoured that Kazakhs receive pensions in local mosques according to special lists.

The Russian population does not trust the government, which is dominated by the Kazakhs. According to a survey conducted in 1997, only 14% of Russian respondents expressed confidence in local authorities and 13.6% in republican ones. Among Kazakhs, these figures were significantly higher: 23.5% and 35.3%, respectively, which, of course, is also far from unanimous support (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 212). As it turned out, Kazakhs are more inclined to support the government's attitude to minorities and its cultural policy. A survey (May 26, 2000, p. 7) conducted in 1999 with funds from the US State Department showed that, according to 51% of Kazakhs, the government protects minorities, while only 31% of Russians agreed with this point of view; 67% of Kazakhs and 50% of Russians believed that the government copes well with the task of preserving national unity; According to 74% of Russians and 67% of Kazakhs, the government is doing well with the task of developing the Kazakh language and culture, which indicates that there is a vast base in the Kazakh nationalist lobby. Meanwhile, the Kazakhs themselves clearly demonstrate contradictions in these issues. Among them were fewer than those who believe that the government properly supports the Russian language; 72% of Kazakhs said that the government is doing well with the task of developing the Russian language and culture, and only 38% of Russians supported this view. On the other hand, despite all the complaints about discrimination, only 23% of Russians surveyed (and 9% of Kazakhs) reported that over the past three years they have been subject to discrimination based on ethnicity (May 26, 2000)

Olcott (Olcott M. , 2003, p. 213) believes that the Russians in Kazakhstan are saddened by the absence of anyone *"or who could stand up for their defence"*. Most Russian nationalist politicians left the country; some went to the civil service, while others took a passive stance, fearing responsibility. Olcott adds (p. 213) *"no less important was the sharp decline in Russia's interest in Russians living abroad. At the beginning of the 1990s, the support of "25 million Russians in the countries of the near abroad" was a very advantageous topic, but this issue faded into the background when it became clear how difficult the transition period would be for Russia itself"*.

Thus, in the absence of strong support from "overseas", as Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu P. , 2001) believes Russians in Kazakhstan have to stoically endure their ever-deteriorating political and economic situation (Bourdieu P. , 2001). In Russia, however, there remains a certain group of politicians, nationalists and human rights activists who are still "worried" about the fate of the Russians in Kazakhstan. They also hope that President Putin shares their anxiety. But it looks like he has other priorities, and the majority of ordinary Russian citizens are too immersed in their own lives and the problems of their country, to worry about the blood brothers living outside.

CHAPTER 3

KAZAKHSTAN IN THE GLOBAL WORLD: CHALLENGES AND PRESERVATION OF IDENTITY

“Modernization of the consciousness of all Kazakhstanis is the main step towards the adaptation of society to the changing global processes”. Nursultan Nazarbayev

This chapter is devoted to the problems and perspectives of the Kazakh identity in the global world. The chapter answers the question of how fast the consolidation process in the Kazakhstan among society finds the consent.

The attainment of state independence by the former Soviet republics became a catalyst for the actualization of the ethnic foundations of self-identification of a person and, accordingly, for the ethno-cultural and linguistic differentiation of societies, in which Russian Soviet culture and Russian language served as a unifying factor in the Soviet period of history. In many post-Soviet republics, these processes were accompanied by ethnic mobilization and inter-ethnic confrontation.

Kazakhstan managed to avoid the worst scenarios due to a moderate, evolutionary policy in the field of ethno cultural identification. In the era of globalization, the national and cultural identity of many nations is being seriously tested. On the one hand, globalization carries democratic values, on the other hand, it is the expansion of Western culture, the Western way of life and stereotypes, as a result of which the self-awareness of entire nations is changing. The negative effect of globalization is manifested in the crisis of moral foundations, the replacement of the former national value system with

the all-European one. According to scientists, westernization can lead to cultural unification, distortion and destruction of living diversity (Nysanbayev, 2011). Another consequence of globalization is the loss by many peoples of cultural identity, the decline in the role of national culture, traditions and their native language. The Russian researcher Ayupova supports this idea stating that, *"in the context of globalization, local identity is weakened, there is a loss of self-esteem, an increase in frustration with local characteristics, a loss of significance of their former local identity"* (Ayupova, 2010, p. 9). Thus, the crisis of national-cultural identity is one of the most characteristic features of modern times.

In many regions of the world, in response to global challenges, there is an upsurge of ethno-nationalism, a growing interest in historical roots and ethno cultural identity as the main values of spiritual existence. As Fishman (Fishman, 1972) has stated the growth of national identity is a kind of protective reaction of people to the standardization of social life. People want to be not representatives of a common faceless world, but carry and belong to the specific ethno cultural national community. The process of ethnic reunion, or, as it is also called, the ethnic paradox of modernity, runs parallel to the world processes of globalization (Shaikemelev, 2013). The Russian philosophers Dugin also do not see the contradiction between the modern processes of globalization and the desire of the peoples to preserve their national identity. He says, *"On the contrary, a pattern is noted: the more intensively the world is united, the deeper and more resilient are the national cultures."* (Dugin, 2004, p. 5). Thus, globalization provokes the topic of identification, being one of the reasons for the revival of cultural identity in many regions of the world.

3.1. IN SEARCH OF THE KAZAKH IDENTITY: GLOBALISATION AND THE OTHER FORCES

Globalization is the most powerful and significant global process. The Republic of Kazakhstan, as it enters the world community and gains its place in it, is increasingly experiencing the impact of globalization in all areas of social, political and economic life. The search for the national identity is not

an exception. The national identity of any national community is determined by a variety of factors - historical, political, cultural, linguistic, territorial, civilizational and others. As Ospanov (2014) has also stated, the issue of identification is complex because it means how much a person identifies himself or not identifies with society.

It is well known that each person belongs to a particular ethnic group. According to Koldybaev (Koldybaev, 2015), ethnic identity serves as the psychological basis of ethno political mobilization, which should be considered as the willingness of people united by ethnicity to realize ethnic interests. Koldybaev mentions that its content includes the established features of the national culture, ethnic characteristics, customs, beliefs, myths, moral imperatives, etc (Koldybaev, 2015, p. 62).

Ethnic self-identification is a conscious act of ethnic self-determination of a person, attributing oneself to a certain ethnic community. According to Ayagan (Ayagan, 2011) it is also important that national identity is a condition for the internal integration of any society. Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 2000) adds that there are four important elements of a political system that are relevant in any given country: history, language, culture and religion, all evoke strong feelings and are symbols of the identity of a country or a nation. Kazakhstan is still being under the process of the nation-building, and as a multicultural state all those features have to be considered as well.

Laitin (Laitin D. , 1998) asserts that recently, two main strategies of nation-building are used in the Republic of Kazakhstan and, accordingly, the dominant models of national identity are identified. The first strategy is aimed at forming a unified nation in Kazakhstan from a multi-ethnic society based on a common citizenship, the second strategy should be linked to the national identity of the Kazakhs themselves.

Ethnicity remains as the dominant form of social categorization in the structure of the individual and group identity of the population of Kazakhstan. In the development of a nationwide idea of Kazakhstan, as also explained by Smith (Smith cited in Schmid, 2001), it is necessary to use both concepts of the nation - civil and ethno-cultural, and relying only on one of them would

discarding the other. Anthony Smith calls this way of building a nation - the model of "the dominant ethnic group". Because in the process of nation-building the authority relies on the concept of building the civil nation with the predominance of the Kazakh ethnic group.

The Kazakhs, as an integral ethnic community, strive to preserve the identity, independence and ethnic identity in the face of globalization. At present, Kazakhstan is witnessing an ever-growing interest in the problem of the national and Kazakh national idea. This is because Kazakhstan is looking for its own way of development, trying to identify its national interests in domestic politics at the international arena. According to Kshibekov (Kshibekov, 2007) this process follows the formation of new theoretical approaches in the analysis of the cultural and historical self-identification of the peoples of Kazakhstan: the first one is the return of their historical memory and the second one is the search for a new, original model of state-building that would organically combine world experience and national specifics on the basis of conscious interests.

After independence, the society has matured for new tasks to fill the national idea with new content more than 20 years. Nysanbayev (Nysanbaev, 2004) explains this as: *"Now it becomes clear that the national idea means the Kazakh idea, which is designed to integrate, consolidate, and unite all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan into a single whole co-citizenship"* (2004, p. 49). As it is also told by the President Nazarbayev, the national policy has been to form a uniform nation, where the Kazakh language became cementing the nation together (In Kazakhstan any ethnos didn't lose the language, 2013).

As Nysanbayev (2004, p. 263) also notes, there is strange picture in Kazakhstan today, when "the main line of acquiring a culture of peace and co-existence of ethnic groups lies not only between Kazakhs and Russians or Kazakhs and other ethnic groups, but, paradoxically, inside the Kazakh ethnos itself". Now, when the role of Kazakhs in society is immeasurably increasing, intra-ethnic harmony and unity becomes the first condition of interethnic interaction and partnership.

To form a nationwide idea, it is necessary to further study the phenomenon of poly-ethnicity of the Kazakhstani society. And here it is difficult to overestimate the role of the political and intellectual elite, and their ability to sacrifice themselves for the sake of preserving and modernizing the national identity. According to Shaikemelev (1999), one, for instance, can not underestimate the role of the middle stratum of the intelligentsia - teachers, journalists, lawyers, who are called to be "foremen" of socio-cultural restructuring and the construction of a modernized identity. It is their share, as such authors as Benedict Anderson (2001, p. 288), Eric Hobsbaum, Terence Ranger (1983) have also explained, the main burden on the construction of a new national identity falls out. The case of the ruling national elites is the formation of ideology and the necessary moral and political climate for the successful implementation of reforms. For example, the level of interaction between Kazakh and Russian cultures, first of all, is mutual patience, not mutual interest. However, ethnic identity is still the most reliable and lasting sense of belonging to the group, as Shaikemelev (2013) also identifies, it is "*kind of a protection from global changes*" (Shaikemelev, 2013).

Valtonnen supports this idea with:

"Ethno-identity is more preferable than civil, because only in it a person feels his indivisible belonging to the group. It is human nature to strive for security. Ethno group gives such an opportunity. It gives a sense of stability and sustainability - it's not a party, not a subculture or even a religion, it cannot be changed. The instability of the modern world generates interest in its own history and the paradoxical phenomenon of modernity - endless interethnic contacts - actualizes ethnic identity" (Valtonnen, 2005, p. 68).

In a modern multicultural and multi-ethnic society, a citizen can feel his belonging (to a certain degree of identity) and to several ethnic cultures simultaneously, emphasizing the modalities of ethno-cultural identity, depending on the situation. In the developed West, especially in the multi-ethnic USA, people are more concerned about not recognizing a certain identity for themselves, but for the speed and accuracy of its change. The philosopher and sociologist Sigmund Bauman (2002) believes that global factors and the search for one's place in the society turns into a question for a person "*what kind of identity to choose and how to manage to make*

another choice in time if the previously chosen identity loses value" (Bauman, 2002, p. 185)

In Kazakhstan, the situation with choice is more traditional, when ethno-identity is inherited by blood. Because when it comes to identify the identity people clearly identify the ethnicity by their parents, and in case of mixed ethnicity, by the ethnicity of fathers. According to Berger (1996, p. 95), "in order to fix its own individual and collective ethno-identity, both the individual and the collective are in need of the image of the "other". A person cannot be a man without other people, as one cannot have an identity without society".

Bocharova (Bocharova, 2003) emphasizes that citizens of a modern democratic state must first of all observe the constitutionally enshrined norms of national legislation, should regard civil identity as a community of free and equal subjects of law as a fundamental form of identification, including religious-confessional, ethno cultural, social status, etc. In addition, civil identity implies not the political loyalty of a citizen of the state, but an ideological, emotional and spiritual-moral identity with national goals, values and interests. For civic identity, the key point is to emphasize the equality of all citizens before the law, to personify one with universal human and cosmopolitan values. For preservation of the ethnic identity, it is more important to reserve the language, religion, traditions and customs and introduce them into the socio-cultural field of interethnic interaction.

Sadykov states (2001), "*Kazakhstan's identity is a civic aspect of identity, and Kazakh identity is its ethnic aspect*".

The ratio of Kazakh and Kazakhstani terms, the uncertainty of their application in differentiating socio-cultural phenomena reflect the duality of the situation created in modern Kazakhstani ideology. The dualism of state identity follows from its watershed in the Kazakh society. According to Sadykov, "*On the one hand, national, and different ethnic groups, on the other - civil, equally weakly expressed in all ethnic groups*" (Sadykov, 2001, p. 278). This is the contradiction in different directions of socio-cultural interests of the two leading ethnic groups of Kazakhstan - Kazakhs and Russians.

Kazakhs stands in front of the task of reviving their national culture, preserving the language, the entire cultural complex, which was oppressed by the communist superstructure. In front of the Russians - the second largest ethnic group in the republic, there are other tasks - the preservation of the functioning space of the Russian language and Russian culture.

The Russian ethnos as the basic carrier of the Soviet thinking was accustomed to dominate the political sphere, is not yet able to show an interest in the Kazakh culture, and study the Kazakh language. It is rather difficult for the Russian-speaking population to accept the situation that is developing around changing the role-playing status of the two largest ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. The habit of thinking in terms of the "elder brother" does not allow the Russian compatriots the possibility of internal reconciliation with the processes of identifying with the Kazakh national identity.

A clear understanding of what the Kazakh society should become will encourage the development of collectivist forms of civil society organizations, in which all ethnic groups of the republic are interested. It is important to preserve the elements of collectivist psychology in everyday life to build a system for making corporate decisions against the backdrop of the growing individualization of the society. The task of civil society should be the preservation of the foundations of spirituality that are inherent in the traditional cultures of all ethno-groups, and to prevent its erosion and absorption by the market as well as to foster a political culture that brings closer to the prospect of creating a sphere of supra-ethnic communication. This also implements the nationwide idea of Kazakhstan. Since in Kazakhstan the interethnic relations have always been built on principles of parity and principles of tolerance, which became the basis of the original Kazakh model of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional consent.

3.2. National idea: civil or ethnic?

The national idea is today one of the most debated topics in Kazakhstani society. The national, or the term "national" used by Kadyrzhanov (Kadyrzhanov R. N., 2006) in a certain sense, has complex orientations,

values and ideals of an ideological nature, aimed at consolidating the people of Kazakhstan, sustainable socio-economic development of the society, strengthening security and independence of the state. One of the main questions in the development of the problem of a national idea is how can it be formed or found. Obviously, it is impossible to simply invent it. Its components are contained in the depths of national identity, reflecting the picture of national existence; it finds its expression in philosophy, history, science, poetry, literature, music, painting, dance, art, language.

The relevance and priority of research and development of a nationwide idea, as Gumilev (1994) has also stated, is determined by the fact that it is the backbone of the consolidation of Kazakhstan's society, the formation of an adequate level of national identity of citizens of the country, the spiritual foundation for raising public awareness and culture, and the basis for the ongoing social and economic development of Kazakhstan in the context of globalization.

It should be said that the above definition of a national idea lies in line with the concept, called "nation-building" the meaning of which is to form a single nation from a multi-ethnic society. However, the concept of nation-building is not welcomed by everyone. Tishkov (2002) believes that building a single nation in a multi-ethnic society is impossible, since the ethnic identity of people will always dominate their identity with the state and with representatives of other ethnic groups. According to Ilevova (Ilevova, 2002), in Kazakhstan there is only one nation, which is made up of Kazakhs, while all other communities living in the republic are diasporas. Therefore, the national idea of Kazakhstan is no other than the national idea of the Kazakhs, or the Kazakh national idea. Under this view, the national idea should be the basis for the revival of the Kazakhs as a nation. As a result of this approach, the indigenous ethnos received in public opinion, and then in science, the title of the titular nation. In the literature on the national question, this approach is called the "ethno-cultural understanding of the nation." As Nysanbayev (2006) has also mentions, this name stems from the fact that the elites of the indigenous ethnic group, speaking as defenders of the interests of the people, place ethnic culture, above all language, at the forefront. At the same

time, they impose a special role on the state, which should protect the culture of the indigenous ethnos from the influence of other cultures and build it into the status of the foundation of the culture of a multi-national society.

On fundamentally different positions are those who believe that the national idea cannot be the idea of just one people, in a multi-ethnic state. Kadyrzhanov (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2012) supports this and states that in Kazakhstan, the national idea should be essentially aimed at uniting all citizens of the country into one nation based on the commonality of their Kazakh citizenship, regardless of their ethnicity.

Today in Kazakhstan, as also supported by Kadyrzhanov (2014, p. 168), these two approaches are dominant to understand the national idea. Advocates of a different approach to the national idea are, representatives of non-indigenous ethnic groups, but there also are many Kazakhs with this perspective.

Adherents of the Kazakh national idea defends the special position of the Kazakhs among all the nationalities of Kazakhstan. From their perspective, they prioritise the interests of one ethnic group (2006). In contrast, supporters of the civic national idea, believe that the national idea should reflect the interests of all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (Borbasov, 2009, pp. 24-29). The basis of the national idea, from their point of view, should not be the priority of one, even the largest, indigenous ethnic group, but the equality of all of them as components of the single citizenship of Kazakhstan. The opposite of the two approaches to the national idea, the title and the civil one, gives rise to the ideological conflict of their adherents. It should be noted that such a contradiction is typical not only for Kazakhstan, today most of the post-Soviet societies, where the population is distinguished by ethnic heterogeneity, face this. Moreover, contradiction between the ethno-cultural and civil understanding of the national idea and the nation is a common characteristic of many states of the modern world (Kosichenko, 2011, pp. 68-73).

Practically in all the new independent states there is a task of national consolidation of the multi-ethnic population into a single community united by a high level of identity. According to Borbasov (2009, pp. 7-15) in many

states, various contradictions are persistent between the largest ethnic group and other, smaller ethnic groups.

As the real practice of national construction in various states of the modern world shows, the principle of “and - and”, and not “or - or”, dominates in resolving this contradiction. Consequently, as Sarsembayev (1999, p. 3) asserts, the point is that in the development of a nationwide idea of Kazakhstan, it is necessary to use both concepts of the nation - civil and ethno cultural, and not rely only on one of them, discarding the other.

How is this contradiction being resolved in Kazakhstan? The official method of the formation of a single nation as a civil society around the Kazakh ethnic group, was a planned development for Kazakhstan. One of the largest contemporary ethno-politologists and theorists of the nation, Anthony Smith, calls this way of building a nation one of the most widespread in the world, the model of the "dominant ethnic group." (Kadyrzhanov R. N., 2006).

In a situation when civil society is not ripe to such a level as to become the leading social force in the process of the formation of a civil nation in Kazakhstan, the state assumes the role of a leading actor in the national construction. Baidarov (pp. 45-50) argues that the state policy is merely trying to implement the model of a civil Kazakh nation based on the national-formation of the Kazakh ethnic group. Thus, the state is trying to resolve the contradiction of the civil and ethno cultural concepts of the nation in Kazakhstan on the basis of the principle “and - and” (Baidarov, 2011).

There is also economic, social, cultural, educational, and all other types of social relations in Kazakhstan that are determined by the state with little participation of non-state institutions as representatives of the emerging civil society. The state regulates inter-ethnic relations and processes in its national policy on the basis of the legal framework, including the Constitution of Kazakhstan, and relevant bodies and institutions operating at the level of both central and regional, and local authorities. At the same time, a significant role in the national policy of the state is played by compromises between the interests of the Kazakh part of the population and other ethnic groups of Kazakhstan (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2014).

Thus, the national sphere of Kazakhstan has the following configuration of the main actors. At the extreme poles are, on the one hand, the Kazakh elites adhere to the ideology of the titular understanding of the nation, and on the other hand, the Russian-speaking elites with the ideology of a civilian understanding of the nation. At the centre of this disposition is the state, which by its national policy tries to bring together and reconcile the extremes, seeks to prevent the confrontation of ideologies so that the conflict of values does not escalate into a conflict of interests and actions dangerous for society.

From the standpoint of the institutional analysis of the problem of the national idea in Kazakhstan, it is of interest not only to study the disposition of the main actors of the national sphere of Kazakhstan and their ideologies, but also the resources available to them. Of course, in Kazakhstan, like any other country, the state has the greatest resources for activities in the national sphere. Dunayev explains, *"If we keep in mind that civil society is at an early stage of its development in the republic, then there is no doubt that the importance of the state for regulating relations in the national sphere is significantly increasing"* (2012, p. 110).

If we talk about other factors of the national sphere - ethnic elites, then the resources at their disposal, primarily material ones, are small. Baidarov (2011, pp. 45-50) believes that perhaps the main one is the support of the ethnic groups on whose behalf they speak. If it is strong, it contributes to the ethnic mobilization of the masses, which is a serious challenge for a state striving to maintain political stability in society. Today, the level of ethnic mobilization of the masses in Kazakhstan's society is low. In other words, ethnic elites do not currently have a broad and stable social base in society.

Thus, according to Gumilev (Gumilev) in Kazakhstan as a multi-ethnic society, there is an objective need for the existence and realization of the titular, ethno cultural concept of a nation, and the civil concept. Ignoring any of them will have detrimental consequences for the overall situation in the national sphere. The inclusion of the ethno cultural component in the structure of the nationwide idea of Kazakhstan is of fundamental importance

for substantiating its historical and cultural continuity. It is, turning to Smith (2006), about such a reconstruction of the traditional culture of the Kazakhs, so that certain of its elements and symbols can organically fit into modern culture. Summing up it is important to note that the search and development of a national idea is a difficult problem for any nation. It is a product of the creativity of society, the elites and the state. For Kazakhstan, the synthesis of civic and ethno cultural concepts of the nation and the national idea is of fundamental importance. Add here the foreign investment, Westernisation policies and the scope of globalisation.

3.3. Prospects of civil identity among Kazakh Russians

With the acquisition of state independence of Kazakhstan, the issue of ethnicity took a special place. Ethnic Kazakhs gained political power and became a privileged group, while the second largest group - ethnic Russians turned into a "new minority" or even a "Diaspora". As a consequence, this division into categories of citizens of one country helped to strengthen their ethnic self-awareness, which in turn became a problem for the successful formation of a nationwide state-civil identity.

For the Russian and other non-titled groups, joining a new endo-group called "Kazakh nation" can mean the loss of important features of their native culture and language and a threat to their collective identity. Until now, many Kazakh Russians perceive their homeland as Russia, not Kazakhstan. Duvanov explains this fact as following:

"... the Russians, while living in new historical conditions, in fact, in another country, continue to perceive themselves primarily as Russians without reference to a new community called the Kazakh nation. And this is understandable. Psychologically, the majority of Russians still perceive themselves to be part of Russia, the will of fate to be outside of it. They became Kazakhstani by their own will, they did so, and in this sense, it is a tribute to circumstances - it happened so" (2011).

The same thought is expressed by Akhmedzhanov:

"Identification with another state is not necessarily a free choice of a person or groups of people. Causes may be external. Just such a rare case of geopolitical cataclysm, comparable to the collapse of the Roman Empire, took place in connection with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Millions of citizens of different nationalities found themselves within the borders of newly formed national states. People suddenly faced a painful choice - with which country to relate: the country of residence or the ethnic (historical) Homeland - the centre of their life in the national

sense ... In this unenviable position were millions of people of different nationalities, but especially it affected Russians as the most numerous nations, the former Soviet country" (2010).

However, the President Nazarbayev explains this situation asserting that civil identity should be based on Kazakh identity and Kazakh language as symbols of statehood. According to the President (Nazarbayev, 2000), *"Kazakh culture should be seriously assimilated by representatives of all other ethnoses, just as Kazakhs at one time seriously studied Russian culture"*. But such a national concept is considered by non-Kazakhs as ethnically assimilative. Thus, the consolidation of the people of the country largely depends on the adoption and support of the model of civil identity and this model has not yet been formed.

Ethnicity remains the dominant form of social categorization in the structure of individual and group identity of the population of Kazakhstan. For citizens of one country, the division into "us" and "they" means belonging to groups based on, above all, ethnic characteristics. Under these conditions, the categorization process enhances the identification and sense of belonging to the endo-group (Us), and at the same time enhances their differentiation from the exo-group (They). Thus, categorization accentuates the differences between categories in individuals, which affect their notions of civic identity.

According to the theory of social identity, Henri Tajfel (Stoel, 1994) argues that social categorization is a process of social comparison between groups, it allows to support or gain access to a positive social identity. Identity is associated with social categorization and the mechanism of social comparison. Social categorization serves to systematize and regulate the social environment of the individual, and especially its role in the formation of value orientations, determining the place of the individual in the society.

As a rule, inter-group relations assume the presence of a dominant and subordinate group, between which power and privileged position are distributed in an unequal degree. In other words, the relationship between Us and They are asymmetric already by definition. Ethno-group contradictions in Kazakhstan are associated primarily with elements of social competition in the northern and central regions of the country - between the title Kazakhs

and non-title Russians, in the southern regions - between the title Kazakhs and non-titular Uzbeks. In a similar situation, each ethnic group develops certain behavioural models - identity strategies. The French psychologist Edmond Marc Lipiansky (1992) characterizes the identity strategy as a system of coordinated operations and actions aimed at achieving the goal.

In Kazakhstan, as also observed by Mustafayev (Mustafayev, 2010), representatives of ethnic associations fear that the Kazakh nation will gradually erase the ethno-cultural differences, and, ultimately lead to the disappearance of ethnic groups.

After the independence of Kazakhstan, local Russians are forced to develop new identification strategies and a new attitude to the "other" through the recognition of Kazakh as the main language. The strained nature of intergroup relations is also explained by a rethinking of Russian identity itself. Rethinking means not only a new awareness of one's own group (Us), but also a reassessment of the image of another group (They).

Nevertheless, as Eric Hobsbaum (1983) also points out, "*many Russians remained convinced of the superiority of Russian culture and hardly accepted the fact that they now impose another language in the same capacity as their own*" (Hobsbaum, 1983, p. 26).

This negative attitude is strengthened by the lowering of the status of Russians in the post-Soviet period. Russians in Kazakhstan consider themselves the most affected as a result of the collapse of the USSR. Being socially and professionally a dominant group for several generations, now the Russians of Kazakhstan often experience psychological frustration because of the need to adapt to the new status of "minority" and "Diaspora". Therefore, it is more difficult for Russian Kazakhs to perceive post-Soviet Kazakhstan as a new country.

3.4. Language issue in the prospect of globalization

Being involved in global processes, Kazakhstan is also experiencing the influence of global socio-cultural trends. However, here the problem of interaction between the processes of globalization and identification is

particularly relevant, since in Kazakhstan compared to other Soviet republics, the most difficult situation with the language of the indigenous nation developed at the time of independence. Throughout the twentieth century, Russia's influence on Kazakhstan as a factor of globalization led to a change in the status of the Kazakh language. In the Soviet period, he lost the legal position of the language of the indigenous ethnic group, was removed from active circulation in all spheres of activity, becoming unprecedented and secondary. Russian-language media, education in Russian, Russian culture occupied a dominant position (Akkorda, 2013). As a result, Kazakhstan culturally and linguistically has become the most Russified among all the republics of Central Asia (Olcott M. , Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise, 2003). A number of factors contributed to this. First, Kazakhstan was the only republic in the former USSR, in which the indigenous population remained a minority for a long time for reasons of a socio-historical nature - civil war, death from starvation, mass deportation of people from other regions of the Soviet Union to Kazakh territory, the development of virgin lands, etc.

The second reason, which led to the loss of its legal status by the Kazakh language, is the peculiarity of the national character of the Kazakhs. According to the Shaykemelev (Shaykemelev, 2013) the study of cultural stereotypes of the social behaviour of the Kazakhs showed that their distinctive ethnicity is the individual openness and tolerance, which contributes to borrowing the standards of other cultures. The writer Kadyrzhanov (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2014) believes that this peculiarity, being the undoubted dignity of the Kazakhs, gives them significant advantages in the era of globalization, but in the twentieth century, excessive openness damaged their identity, contributed to the *dekazakhization* of the national consciousness and to the loss of many of their native language.

Russification most affected the urban Kazakhs. Among them, a stratum was formed that did not speak or poorly speak their native language. In 1989, less than 1% of urban Kazakhs were fluent in the Kazakh language (Kazakhstan's Truth, 1994). For them, there was a displacement of the native language in the domestic sphere. Currently, among the current 50, 40, and 30-year-old

Kazakh citizens, there are those who do not know their native language at the household level (Verjbickiy, 2012).

As Dugin writes, *“the value principles of the Russian-speaking Kazakhs have undergone and are undergoing, as the consciousness associated with the change of language of self-expression is transformed, significant changes unwittingly deprived of wealth, which belonged to us at birth by natural law.”* (Dugin, 2004, p. 85).

With the acquisition of independence for the Kazakh nation, a new page has opened in its ethno genesis. One of the main conditions for building statehood was the revival of national heritage and culture, since it is the culture of the nation that is the foundation of ethnicity. The formation of an independent state and the increase in the percentage ratio of the number of the title ethnos gave rise to such urgent problems as the revival and widespread use of the Kazakh language as a factor that preserves the unity of the people in historical continuity.

In Kazakhstan, over the years of independence, a great deal of work has been done to restore national identity, huge amounts of money are allocated for the development and implementation of the Kazakh language in all spheres of life - the media, office work, and education. Kearney (Kearney, 1996, pp. 3-6) underlines that now about 60% of school children across the country already receive education in the Kazakh language. For the normal functioning of the state language, almost all institutional conditions have been created. However, as Abylhozyn notes, despite the measures taken, the state status of the Kazakh language is still declarative in nature, which indicates the insufficiency of exclusively administrative methods for its development (Abylhozyn, 1992). Camels assert that the psychological state of society has changed, but so far there is no active desire to learn the language (1997). In the cities, there is a continuation of the trends of weakening of the local Kazakh identity and the growth of cosmopolitanism among the Kazakh youth, who are absorbing the Western mass culture.

All this requires the use of new technologies for teaching a non-standard approach to teaching the Kazakh language. Nauryzbay believes that in the

context of globalization, ethno cultural significance will take priority, the purpose of which is to create a *“system of training and education aimed at preserving ethno cultural identity by familiarizing with the native language and culture. However, in the context of globalization, ethnic culture in Kazakhstan is not given due attention”* (Shaikemelev, 2013, p. 231).

The idea of the ethno cultural education echoes the views of the Russian linguist Arinova, who believes that the further prosperity of the Kazakh language is based on *“the correct choice of those spheres of life that by their nature naturally nourish the Kazakh language and are its soil. Such a life-giving soil when learning a language is culture and morality: folk epic, music, literature, national holidays, traditions and customs. Language is a living organism. We must perceive language as one of the manifestations of the national mentality, national culture, history and tradition”* (Arinova, 2001, p. 15). Hence, the best condition for learning the Kazakh language is immersion in the natural cultural and linguistic environment.

3.5. Panturkism in Kazakhstan

The event that made analysts talk about the pan-Turkic tendencies in Kazakhstan's policy was the recent visit of the President Nursultan Nazarbayev to Ankara. During the flag raising ceremony of the Turkic Council on October 12, the President of Kazakhstan delivered a speech (Vasilyeva, 2011, p. 2) that immediately attracted the attention of the Russian media:

“As Ataturk said: “ The time will come when all the Turks will unite, ”said the Kazakh leader,“ Therefore, I want to greet all Turkic brothers. Between Altai and the Mediterranean Sea there are over 200 million of our brothers . If we all unite, we will be a very effective force in the world. ”

Hearing this from the most consistent supporter of the economic integration of the former Soviet republics was very unexpected, and many publications rushed to declare this performance sensational (NarodSabor, 2012). The speech of the President was sustained in the "anti-colonial" spirit:

“We live in the homeland of the entire Turkic people,” said the Kazakh president. After the last Kazakh Khan was killed in 1861, we were a colony of the Russian kingdom, then the Soviet Union. For 150 years, the Kazakhs almost lost their national traditions, customs, language, religion. With the help of the Almighty, we in 1991 declared our independence” (NarodSabor, 2012, p. 1).

Since the metropolis for Kazakhstan was Russia, the performance of the President turned out anti-Russian. The fact that Turkey became the first country in the world to recognize the sovereignty of Kazakhstan was not overlooked. After the parliament of Kazakhstan, at 4 pm on December 16, 1991, proclaimed the independence of the country, an hour later the Turkish President Turgut Ozal called and congratulated the Kazakh people. *"The Turkish state was the very first to be happy for our independence. Our people will never forget this"*, said President (Babayan, 2011, p. 5). Thus, the official *"Kazakhstanskaya Pravda"*, highlighting the results of the visit, states from the first lines that "... the Kazakh-Turkish relations are based on the common historical roots and cultural values of the two peoples, the coincidence of interests of Astana and Ankara on many issues of regional and international agenda, energy security and economic interaction" (Panturkism in Kazakhstan, 2013).

Ethnocultural cooperation of Turkic-speaking states has been developing since the beginning of the 1990s. The core of this collaboration has been education for a long time. During the two decades that have passed since the collapse of the USSR, Turkey has established an extensive network of secondary, special, and higher educational institutions in the countries of Central Asia, which have managed to take a strong position in national educational systems. In Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, a network of Anatolian lyceums has been established with in-depth study of Turkish and English languages (NarodSabor, 2012, p. 3).

Particularly noticeable cultural and political cooperation of the Turkic states has intensified in recent years. It is noteworthy that Kazakhstan, which had not previously shown particular Pan-Turkic sympathies, began to play an active role in this process. Thus, at the 9th Summit of Heads of Turkic-speaking States, held in October 2009 in Nakhichevan, the President of Kazakhstan proposed to create a Cooperation Council of Turkic States (Turkic Council), which should have "all the necessary attributes of a political regional association, legal status and certain organizational structures", that is, to be a full-fledged integration association (Vasilyeva, 2011). The main goal Nazarbayev has considered as *"The unity of the Turkic-speaking*

fraternal states of which Atatürk dreamed" (2012, p. 3). At the same time, Kazakhstan proposed to create a Center for the Study of the Turkic World and the Turkic Academy, and in its composition - the Center for Turkic History and Culture, the Center for the Study of the Turkic Language, the Turkic Library, as well as the general Turkic Museum (2012, p. 4).

In October 2013, the first summit of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking states was held, at which a bias towards trade and economic cooperation was clearly indicated. Apparently, this was due to the fact that the topic of cultural and humanitarian cooperation has largely exhausted itself, as well as the desire to fill the framework of this integration association with real economic content. Thanks to the decisions of the summit, the association of Turkic-speaking countries, according to Nazarbayeva, received a "real organizational component." In the economic sphere, the role of the organizational center was assigned to the Turkic Business Council, under which it is planned to create working groups on specific areas of cooperation. Their main task will be the elimination of barriers to the development of trade and economic relations (Vasilyeva, 2011).

Evaluating the outcome of the Almaty summit, Kazakhstani political analyst Dosym Satpayev noted that "Ankara, apparently, decided to revive the integration project more actively, and not only in the cultural and humanitarian sphere. For example, at the end of last year, Secretary General of the Council of Turkic-speaking states, Khalil Akinci, said that Turkic-speaking countries would create a customs union and visa-free space" (E-History, 2014).

According to Vasilyeva (Vasilyeva, 2011) to reduce criticism about the desire of Ankara to take on the role of the new "elder brother" as a formal leader of the union of Turkic-speaking states, Turkey seeks to make Kazakhstan. This, in particular, is indicated by the holding of the first summit of the Turkic Council in Almaty, as well as the announcement of Astana in 2012 as the capital of Turkic culture.

The participation of Kazakhstan in the Custom Union with Russia and Belarussia implementation of these projects, in the opinion of the Kazakh

elite, does not interfere (Babayan, 2011). On the contrary, the growth of commodity turnover between Turkey and Kazakhstan in 2011 compared with 2009 by 30% N.A. Nazarbayev considers it the merit of the Customs Union. Thanks to its creation, a single market was formed with a population of 170 million people and a gross domestic product of about one and a half trillion dollars, which is a fertile field for the activities of Turkish businessmen. The attractiveness of Kazakhstan itself is due to the fact that a favorable business climate has been created here that facilitates the work of investors. Thus, Kazakhstan seeks to assume the role of an economic bridge between Turkey and the countries of the Customs Union, hoping to extract the maximum benefits from this status (Babayan, 2011, p. 6).

According to Russian political scientist Stanislav Tarasov (Parubochaya, 2016), Turkey has its own integration project for creating in Eurasia an analogue of the European Union, which is a counter-project in relation to the Eurasian Economic Union of Russia. The prospects for its implementation are largely related to how Turkey's relations with the EU, which are currently in a deep financial and economic crisis, will develop. The possible participation of Kazakhstan in this project will eventually inevitably conflict with its membership in the Customs Union, which Kyrgyzstan plans to join in the foreseeable future. The compatibility of these projects is a big question, and the Kazakh elite will have to choose one of them. In the meantime, the balance is clearly leaning in favor of the Eurasian Union (Integration of the turkic world at present stage, 2016, p. 149).

3.6. Modernization of the public consciousness

"Modernization of the consciousness of all Kazakhstanis is the main step towards the adaptation of society to the changing global processes". Nursultan Nazarbayev

Modernization processes have covered all countries in the context of progressive globalization. The phenomenon of socio-economic transformations is the subject of close attention of the global scientific community. The priority task for sovereign Kazakhstan in the context of globalization has become structural modernization, considering national peculiarities. The idea of "adapted modernization", that is, the national development model, has become of strategic importance.

The President of Kazakhstan announced the launch of the state program on “modernization of public consciousness” - *“Rouhani zhangyru”*. President Nazarbayev invites Kazakhstanis to share his vision of *“how we together make a step towards the future, change the public consciousness to become a single nation of strong and responsible people”* (Nazarbayev, 2017, p. 6). The main point is that in order to achieve the goals of the Third Modernization of Kazakhstan, *it is necessary, first of all, to change the consciousness of the society, to modernize it in accordance with the requirements of modern world development on the foundation of the national culture* (Nazarbayev, 2017, p. 8) .

The sphere of social consciousness is also defined as the spiritual sphere of society. It is not by chance that Nursultan Nazarbayev, along with the term “modernization of public consciousness”, uses the term “spiritual modernization” equally (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2018). The concept of “Ruhani Zhangyru” is translated from Kazakh into Russian as “spiritual renewal” or as “spiritual modernization”. At the same time, As Kadyrzhanov mentions (2018, p. 39) the public consciousness, despite the diversity of its forms and manifestations, is distinguished by its internal unity. Social consciousness in this or that society is an integral whole that defines its parts. Various forms of social consciousness are permeated with unity, which gives it originality and distinguishes it from public consciousness in another country.

The integrity and unity of social consciousness is determined by the fact that it is a national consciousness. President Nazarbayev (Nazarbayev, 2013) asserts that in social and political terms, modern humanity is divided into nation states, which together constitute a global human society. In other words, the modern world is the world of nations and nation states. As nations, modern societies exist within nation states and are largely determined by them. Public consciousness in the nation states is nothing more than a national consciousness. It is not by chance that the first part of the article “Rouhani zhangyru” is entitled “On the National Consciousness in the 21st Century”. The concept of national consciousness is revealed through such concepts as “national culture”, “national identity”, and “national code” (Nurgaliyeva, 2009).

The presidential program “Rouhani zhangyru” is a program of spiritual modernization of Kazakhstan based on national culture and history. The program offers six main directions of modernization of public consciousness: “Tugan Jer”, sacred geography, modern Kazakhstani culture, the translation of 100 leading textbooks, 100 new faces and the transition to the Latin alphabet (Kadyrzhanov R. , 2018, p. 44).

3.6. Searching for a new ethnic identity as a nationalizing state

The term “nationalizing states” was proposed by the American scientist Brubaker (Brubaker, 2000). Chernyshevsky (Chernyshevsky, 2000) defines “nationalizing states” as political entities whose domestic policy is connected with the use of “national construction” rhetoric to single out certain groups of the population in order to manipulate them (for example, in the structure of relations such as “dominant nation - national minority – diaspora”).

The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the failure of the project to create a political nation called "Soviet people". On the territory of the collapsed multinational state under the slogan of a particular ethno cultural community emerged nationalizing states. The states of the former Soviet Union, which gained independence, faced the choice of a path of development.

The post-Soviet countries are at different stages of the “nationalization” process, therefore its manifestations and intensity vary significantly. Brubaker (2000, p. 77) used the grammatical form of “nationalizing,” meaning something that remains in its formation and development, in order to emphasize the dynamics of the political state.

The proclamation of independence and the strengthening of sovereignty in Kazakhstan took place under the slogan distinguished on the basis of features of cultural and historical origin and referred to as the “title” population. And since the independence, the existence of the states was attributed to nationalizing, the concept of the “titular ethnic group” as the basis of a political nation gradually took root and became part of official ideological doctrines. In the 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan,

the state was declared a form of self-determination exclusively for the Kazakh nation (Nurgaliyeva, 2009). Thus, the single "Kazakh people" was divided rhetorically into a "self-defined Kazakh nation" and other peoples inhabiting Kazakhstan. True, in the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the first line sounds differently: *"We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historical fate ..."* (2009, p. 80).

The nationalizing position of the new states was also expressed in the elaboration of a state strategy for the formation of a new identity, in declaring the language of the titular nation as the state language, in revising the historical past in order to restore historical justice, to which the practice of mass renaming is directed. According to Kapyshev (Kapyshev, 2015, p. 33) the current situation allows representatives of the indigenous population to perceive themselves as possessors of a special status in the system of relations with the authorities and the main recipient of the social and national policy measures of the state.

Tishkov (Tishkov) considers group ethnic identity as an operation of social constitution of "imaginary communities" based on the belief that they are naturally related. His position was decisive: *"There are, as it were, two competing forms of group identity: one in culture, the other in political loyalty, which reflect the existence of the most powerful forms of social groups of people - ethnic communities and state entities"*. (1990, p. 2). As Tishkov asserts identity is always a dynamic and not fully completed system of attitudes and beliefs, which are a series of social values, behavioural norms and collective symbols. One or the other dominant of individual identity, responding to the challenge of time, changes subject to environmental changes. The collapse of the once united institution of Soviet citizenship, the new realities of the independent political existence of Kazakhstan entailed other demands on its citizens. It turned out that it was not easy to change identity, go to the market and democracy, build a national state. It is the state that is purposefully engaged in the transformation of human consciousness into a citizen of the nation state. A civic nation is a constructed coalition, the essence of which is shared by individuals about the idea of belonging to a

community, or identity, as well as the solidarity arising on the basis of this common identity (Tishkov, 1990).

At present, Kazakhstan is a state in which a political nation is being formed, when the form of community can be described as “Kazakhstani people”, but with a dominant Russian and Kazakh component, which does not cause any fundamental objections from representatives of other ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. As Kapyshev says, there is a process of developing new national, supra-ethnic, civil ideas that unite all ethnic groups, which are designed to *"eliminate uncertainty in the life and value orientations of Kazakhstanis and promote the acquisition of a holistic public consciousness"* (Kapyshev, 2015, p. 33).

These common civil ideas include the idea of patriotism: a feeling of love for the Motherland, loyalty to the state, and also, the defence of state interests. According to Nurgaliyeva (Nurgaliyeva, 2009), the authorities are quite satisfied with this approach, since it is a guarantee of maintaining stability in systems with a multi-ethnic component. However, Nurgaliyeva (p. 81) continues, the very idea of patriotism is neutral, but the historical context, i.e., the tendency to level ethnic identity that existed since Soviet times, does not allow it to be perceived as a consolidating idea for all ethnic groups, and not only for the ethno-dominant group of Kazakhs. Thus, increasing the attractiveness of the image of Kazakhstan as a homeland in the eyes of the majority of the Russian-speaking population, including a certain part of its title component, remains problematic.

The main impetus for the transformation of society was given by the political elites, and it is they who make efforts to construct ethnic identity. Therefore, Martin (Martin, 2001) believes that the interests of the Kazakh elite can be attributed to the dynamic component of the process of formation of republican identity. However, large-scale social changes are impossible without a prepared social ground - the interests and moods of the majority of the population of the country. This is the inertial component of the process.

Attempts by the young state to combine the need for a revival of ethno-Kazakh identity with the need to create a new Kazakhstani identity on a civil

basis led to the emergence of problems related to the functioning of ethnic identity among the population and caused inter-ethnic discomfort.

Usually, people have very different ideas about their ethnic community. But not everything is simple with Kazakh identity. It has several levels and consists of several local Kazakh identities. Different status positions are determined by intra-ethnic social inequality, the type of settlement (city-village); the level of knowledge of the Kazakh language ("clean" and "unclean", "Shala-Kazakhs", i.e., not fully fluent in it), type of religiosity. Also, among the Kazakhs, a separate group consists of "Oralmans" - representatives of the former foreign diasporas, now living in Kazakhstan. The controversial process of actualization of historical memory, associated with *Zhuzs* (tribal) identification, has a certain impact on intra-ethnic identification. All this can be defined as the intra-ethnic borders between the Kazakhs (Urazalieva, n.d.). Another problem is the so-called alternating identity that children from inter-ethnic marriages possess. By it is understood the identity, possessing which the individual in different situations is aware of his belonging to different cultures, or rather to their parts that have not merged in his perception. Nurgaliyeva (Nurgaliyeva, 2009) believes that the viability of the nation as a whole, understood as the citizenship of all Kazakhstanis regardless of ethnicity, directly depends on the quality of ethnic identity and the ethno-social behaviour of the Kazakhs.

The political nation must have a strong ethno-cultural peg. According to Koroteeva (Koroteeva, 1997) it can be provided by imposing minorities of myths and symbols of the dominant ethnic group, i.e., through assimilation, or through the construction of a new myth-symbolic system. The President Nazarbayev notes: *"The state is not only a territory, but also a common culture of a people. The Kazakh culture should become the core around which the cultural community of the whole Kazakhstan will be built"* (Nazarbayev, 2000). However, according to Shalabayeva (Shalabayeva, 2001), the growth of ethnic and civilizational consciousness of non-titular peoples actively cultivating their own myths will not allow them to accept Kazakh myths as fundamental. Sociological studies (Kazakhstan's Truth, 1994) of different years have shown that all ethnic groups, except Kazakh,

have no desire to integrate around the core of Kazakh culture. Thus, according to surveys of the AIS (2001, p. 420), for the period from 1994 to 2003 inclusively, only from 3 to 5% of respondents, answering the question of which idea could become a national one, spoke in favour of the integrating role of the Kazakh nation. That is, the “Kazakh idea” did not become basic in the structure of civil identification. This is especially noticeable on the example of Russians.

In 2008, the draft law of the Republic of Kazakhstan “On the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan” was promulgated (Nurgaliyeva, 2009). The second paragraph of the section “Main goals and objectives of the Assembly’s activity” states that one of the main goals is “*the formation of Kazakh identity by consolidating ethnic groups based on Kazakh patriotism, civil and spiritual cultural community with the pivotal consolidating role of the Kazakh language and culture of the Kazakh people*” (p. 83).

This gave Veshnyakov (Veshnyakov, 2006) a reason to talk about the undemocratic formation of the Assembly and the legislative consolidation of the dominance of the Kazakh nation over all other national groups. “*The very Assembly of the people, turns into an effective tool for assimilating the impact and suppressing any national protests*” (p. 83). In his opinion, in their current law-making, the authorities went to the implementation of the requirements of the Kazakh nationalists.

Which model of ethno politics - aimed at ethnocracy or at the creation of a multinational Eurasian state - will prevail in Kazakhstan, the future will show. The concept of “ethnic diversity” can give the leadership of the Republic of Kazakhstan much more opportunities and prospects for the future. Ethnic identity does not contradict civil. The Kazakhstan model of ethno politics can be based on ethnic diversity, the identity of all ethnic groups represented in Kazakhstan, while at the same time strengthening civic identity. A reasonable combination of these identities is a difficult and long-term task, but quite solvable. Research data suggests that if national policies are successfully pursued, it is possible, while preserving the ethnic diversity of the country, to

accelerate the consolidation of the Kazakhs and to unite other ethnic groups around the idea of prosperity of the common homeland (Nurgaliyeva, 2009).

CONCLUSION

This thesis started with the idea of explaining what are the main reasons that affected on the split in the Kazakh society in term of the self-identification by the people of Kazakhstan after gaining the independence. Then research moved to the point how does the alteration of the language issue impact on the perception of self-identification by different ethnic groups in Kazakhstan. Thesis has moved to explore in the third chapter the Kazakh identity in the global world, what are the perspectives and problems might be faced before Kazakh authority will be able to construct one civil nation.

Independent Kazakhstan faced the problem of contradiction, multidirectional processes of liberalization and statehood building, the polyethnic nature of the state, in which representatives of more than 130 nationalities live, with the dominance of two ethnic groups - Kazakhs and Russians - and, as a result, different vectors of sources of self-identification of Kazakhstan's population. Nazarbayev believes that the solution to all these problems must be found within the limits of the ongoing modernization.

It seems that the core of the national idea can be the formation of a civil nation in Kazakhstan. In the last chapter I showed that civil society is the optimal form of social structuring of a free personal development space, institutional approval of the ideas of humanism, inalienable human rights and freedoms. But it cannot be formed and fully function in conditions when the society is divided along ethnic borders. It is recognition of each member of a civilian nation for each member of the country, regardless of their nationality, that creates a sense of unity, solidarity, common homeland, ownership and responsibility for its fate.

At the same time, it is not about the complete rejection of cultural distinctiveness. There are many states in the world that have successfully entered the civilized world community without denying it. But the starting point and at the same time the determination of this path are civil rights and human freedoms, the cultivation of civic self-consciousness, the orientation of the personality of any ethnicity on the hierarchy of common values, and not consolidation on the basis of a particular model of summation of partial ethnic identities.

Successful building of the Kazakh nation is possible on the recognition by all citizens of the country of the priority of civic identity over all others - national, religious, gender (sex), social role and many others. In the meantime, Kazakhstani society is, if not at the beginning, then halfway to this. This research and opinion polls show that for all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, civic identity has not yet become primary. Although, for example, for a significant part of the Russian respondents, it turns out to be more significant than the national (ethno cultural) or confessional-religious identity.

In the last chapter it has been discussed as well that there are prerequisites for the formation of the Kazakh nation, and one of them is the quite friendly, tolerant nature of relations between the ethnic communities inhabiting the country. Nevertheless, this alone is not enough to form a single Kazakhstan nation. In the domestic media almost every day there is new information about the violation of the law by the officials. But it is precisely this and bureaucratic arbitrariness that is one of the most important factors influencing the radicalization of public consciousness. The state should implement in practice the principle of the equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of their social or any other status. It is necessary that people believe in their security by the authorities. This requires public confidence in the institutions of government. And it arises only when the power personifies the rule of law and the inevitability of punishment for those who violate it. The lack of professionalism of various levels of management vertical leads to a severe deformation of the public consciousness, including national identity. For the formation of a civic nation, in fact, one strict rule is required - respect for human rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Note that various kinds of contradictions between ethnic groups exist in any state. In various regions of Kazakhstan - Shilike, Kazatkome, Tengiz, Mayatas - there were conflicts between Kazakhs and Uighurs, Chechens, Turks, Kurds. The reason for them was the hooligan or criminal actions of certain individuals. The majority of the population see their specific causes in each conflict, and conflicts on interethnic grounds are not recognized as the main causes of the events that have occurred. The absence of a dialogue between local authorities and ethnic groups in conflict zones always generates a misunderstanding between them.

If the situation of ordinary people of all ethnic groups in cities is about the same, then the financial situation in rural areas, where most of the representatives of the indigenous ethnic group live, is much lower. And this thesis points on the fact that therein lies the great threat to stability and peace in Kazakhstan's society. The situation of the villagers really requires urgent intervention by the highest authorities, especially since the lack of access to high-quality medical services, education, cultural activities, and most importantly, unemployment only helps to increase the critical mass of migrants in cities, creating new centres of tension.

In the last chapter it showed that a large role in this process is played by the activities of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. But with all the positive role of the APK in Kazakhstan's society, for certain reasons, it does not use all its capabilities. The Assembly needs preferences to neutralize negative trends, from which it is impossible to escape with the help of solemn meetings and conferences. It can become a tool for modelling political processes in conditions when the mechanisms of legal support for the realization of the interests of various social groups are poorly developed; there are no basic forms of self-expression and realization of their rights, including civil ones - local self-government that are natural for democratic countries; weak social base of parties, etc. The Assembly should reconsider how it approaches to the different ethnic communities in Kazakhstan, which can now be easily influenced through social networks.

A civic nation in Kazakhstan is formed in extremely difficult conditions. The first and second chapter particularly showed that on the one hand, the state supports various initiatives of social institutions and groups, on the other hand, it demonstrates the unwillingness to work with the population on dialogue platforms. It is necessary to develop diverse structures and institutions of civil society and to establish a clear mechanism for their connection with the system of government. The most important link in this mechanism is the leaders of mass socio-political movements, civil initiatives, etc., constructively cooperating with the official authorities.

One of the most urgent tasks facing the authorities is to develop a system of measures to form a “qualified citizenship” among the population of the republic of modern culture, which implies that a person acquires the status of a citizen responsible for his decisions and taking an active part in the development and collective decision-making.

The last chapter focuses on the present stage of development of Kazakhstani society, where the radical transformation of civil sense of justice that becomes the means by which the spiritual and ideological foundations of sociality can have a decisive impact on the democratization of the political system and the consolidation of all healthy forces of the state into a single civil nation. Under this condition, the development of democratic state-political, legal institutions and forms of self-government developed by the modern civilization is possible without losing the national-cultural identity.

It is obvious that the more developed and mature civil society is in Kazakhstan and, finally, the sooner a unified Kazakhstan nation is formed, the faster society will be able to regulate the contradictions that arise in the course of social development at the level of local communities. At the present stage of development of the country, the policy of reviving genuine citizenship, rooting in a person of spirituality, dignity (including national), its importance to society and social responsibility most accurately expresses the essential content of the national idea that can unite integral social organism - a nation, united in its diversity.

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