



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TURKEY AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH
POLITICS BETWEEN 1923 AND 2018**

CİHAN ACAR

MASTER'S THESIS

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THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. DR. ŞEVKİ KIRALP

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ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL

We as the jury members certify the "Political Islamism in Turkey and Its Effects On Turkish Politics Between 1923 And 2018" prepared Cihan ACAR defended on 17/06/2019. Has been found satisfactory for the award of degree of Master

JURY MEMBERS



.....
Associate Professor Şevki KIRALP (Supervisor)

Near East University/Political Science Department



.....
Assistant Professor Bilge AZGIN (Head of Jury)

Near East University/Political Science Department



.....
Assistant Professor Nusret Sinan EVCAN (Jury Member)

Cyprus International University/International Relations Department

.....
Prof. Dr. Mustafa SAĞSAN

Graduate School of Social Sciences

Director

BİLDİRİM

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ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'DE 1923 VE 2018 YILLARI ARASINDA SİYASAL İSLAMIN TÜRK SİYASETİNE ETKİSİ

Bu araştırma, Türkiye'de 1923 ve 2018 yılları arasında siyasal İslam'ın Türk siyasetine etkilerini değerlendirmektedir. İnsanlığın varoluş dönemlerinden itibaren din ve siyaset ilişkisi her daim iç içe olmuştur. Din ve siyaset arasındaki ilişki devlet yönetimi ve sosyal yaşamla çok yakından ilgili olmuş ve insan yaşamını her daim derinden etkilemiştir. Siyasal İslam olgusu, İslam'ın tarihsel birikiminden etkilenerek sosyal sorunlar ve sosyal gelişmeler ile şekil almıştır. Osmanlı döneminde yaygın bir ideoloji olmaya başlayan siyasal İslam, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kurulduktan sonraki dönemde politik bir ideoloji haline gelmiştir. Özellikle tek Partili dönemden Türkiye'deki olayların ve isyanların ortaya çıkmasında büyük etkisi olan siyasal İslam ideolojisi, çok Partili döneme geçildiğinde daha da yaygınlaşmış ve belli dönemlerde iktidara gelmiştir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tarihi boyunca, siyasal İslam ideolojisini belirleyen Partiler hem iktidarda hem de muhalefette oldukları dönemlerde Türkiye siyasal ve toplumsal yaşamını etkileyen derin izler bırakmışlardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Siyasal İslam, İslamcılık, Türkiye'de Siyasal İslam, Türkiye'de Siyasal İslam Partileri

ABSTRACT

POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TURKEY AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS BETWEEN 1923 AND 2018

This study on political Islam in Turkey assesses political Islam's effects on Turkish politics between 1923 and 2018. Throughout the history of mankind, the relationship between religion and politics has been closely related to state administration and social life, and has always influenced human life deeply. The phenomenon of political Islam was influenced by the historical accumulation of Islam and took shape with social problems and social developments. Political Islam began to be a widespread ideology in the Ottoman period. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, political Islamism has become a political ideology in subsequent periods. During the single-party (1923-1946), the ideology of political Islam had a crucial impact on the occurrence of riots in Turkey. In the multi-party era, there were many Parties established based on the ideology of political Islam. Not only the governing political Islamist Parties, but also the political Islamist Parties in opposition have played a crucial role in transforming the socio-political life in Turkey.

Keywords: Political Islam, Islamism, Political Islam in Turkey, Political Islamic Party in Turkey.

İÇİNDEKİLER

KABUL VE ONAY**ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..... iii****ÖZ..... iv****ABSTRACT..... v****İÇİNDEKİLER..... vi****ABBREVIATIONS..... viii****INTRODUCTION..... 1****CHAPTER 1****GENERAL INFORMATION****1.1 Methodology..... 2****1.2 Research Question and Key Findings..... 2****1.3 Literature Review..... 3****1.4 Purpose of the Study..... 4****1.5 The significance of the Study..... 4****1.6 Scope of Study..... 4****1.7 Limitations of the Study..... 4****CHAPTER 2****RELIGION AND POLITICS****2.1 The Relationship Between Politics, Ideology and Religion..... 5****2.2 Politics and Islam..... 10****2.3 Theoretical Bases of Islamic Ideology..... 12****2.4 The Conversion of Islam into Ideology..... 14****CHAPTER 3****POLITICAL ISLAM AND ISLAMISM****3.1 The Concept of Political Islam..... 19**

3.2 Characteristics of Islamism Politics.....	23
3.3 The Emergence of Political Islamism.....	25
3.4 Emergence of Political Islam in Turkey.....	26
3.5 Development of Political Islam in Turkey.....	27
3.6 The View of Political Islam and Formation of Political Islamic Parties in Turkey.....	29
3.7 Political Islam in the Single Party Period in Turkey.....	34
3.8 Political Islam and the Demokrat Party.....	36
3.9 Milli Nizam Party and Milli Selamet Party.....	37
3.10 Political Islam in Turkey Period of Refah Party (RP).....	40
3.11 Rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.....	41

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1923 AND 2018

4.1 The Birth of Turkish Republic:	
Secularism Versus Political Islam.....	43
4.2 Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party.....	45
4.3 Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, The Menemen Incident and Islamist Revolts.....	46
4.5 12 September and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis.....	57
4.6 The Political Understanding of The AKP and The Place of The AKP in Turkish Politics.....	59
4.7 AKP Fills the Gap in Centre-Right and Eliminates Kemalist Military and Judiciary.....	65

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

REFERENCES.....	75
İNTİHAL RAPORU.....	82
ETİK KURUL RAPORU.....	83

ABBREVIATIONS

- AKP:** Adalet ve Kalkınma Party (Justice and Development Party)
- ANAP:** Anavatan Party (Motherland Party)
- AP:** Adalet Party (Justice Party)
- CHF:** Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası (Republican People's Party)
- CHP:** Cumhuriyet Halk Party (Republican People's Party)
- DP:** Demokrat Party (Democratic Party)
- EU:** European Union
- FP:** Fazilet Party (Fertility Party)
- MNP:** Milli Nizam Party (National Order Party)
- MP:** Millet Party (Nation Party)
- MSP:** Millî Selamet Party
- MTTB:** Milli Türk Talebe Birliđi (The National Turkish Student Association)
- MUSIAD:** Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneđi (Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association)
- RP:** Refah Party (Wealth Party)
- SCF:** Serbest Cumhuriyet Party (Liberal Republican Party)
- SP:** Saadet Party (Happiness Party)
- TBMM:** Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
- TCF:** Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party (Progressive Republican Party)
- TCK:** Türk Ceza Kanunu (Turkish Penal Code)
- TOBB:** Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliđi (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)
- TSK:** Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (Turkish Armed Forces)
- TÜSİAD:** Türk Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneđi (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association)
- USA:** United States of America

INTRODUCTION

Islam was converted into a political ideology in late 19th and early 20th Centuries, in a timespan where Westernization and modernization largely overlapped. The political Islamism had a universal dimension. It represented not only anti-Western and anti-Modernist, but also anti-Imperialist attitudes (Axiarlis, 2012, 13). The relationship between religion and politics emerged with the development process of humanity and from the date of its emergence, religion was very closely related to individuals and societies (Er, 2016). In recent years, Turkey's ruling party is considered to be representative of political Islamism. As a matter of fact, there had been a constant cleavage between secularists and Islamists in the modern Turkey, and, AKP is accepted to be the current representative of Islamists (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 56). After the transition to multiparty politics in Turkey, political Islamism was generally identified with centre-right political Parties. The most important representative of Islamist traditional thought during 1945-1950 is the Millet Party. The MP was a serious opposition party backed by Islamists. DP and AP were not characterized as political Islamist Parties since both had liberal-democrat ideological orientations. However, as a matter of fact, these two Parties of Turkish centre-right challenged Kemalism, the official secularist state ideology of the single-party era (Fuller, 2016, 44).

From the destruction of DP by the Turkish military until the establishment of MNP, Islamists generally sided with the AP, however they were not satisfied at all with its leader's (Süleyman Demirel) understanding of secularism. While DP and AP refrained from challenging the Kemalist order in Turkey, MNP was a staunch supporter of political Islamism (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 112). Later on, MNP was converted into MSP and maintained its Islamist line. RP and AKP were among the most influential and powerful political Islamist Parties. Additionally, some other nationalist or liberal-conservative Parties including MHP and ANAP did not promote political Islamism at least to the extent which MP, MNP, MSP, RP and AKP did, however, they were manifestly not pro-secularism as CHP and Turkish left (Erkilet, 2015, 33).

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1 Methodology

This thesis historically examines the modern Turkish political life, with Particular emphasis on the political Islamism. Methodologically, it conducts a historical research by utilizing newspapers as the primary and the literature as the secondary sources. It utilizes a qualitative methodology. As there is no pre-prepared hypothetical consideration to be tested via the research, the study follows an inductive and not deductive approach. The main body of the thesis is composed of three chapters. In the first chapter, the relationship between religion and politics is examined with Particular focus on Islam. In the second chapter, the notional and ideological bases of Turkish political Islamism are discussed. In the third chapter, the political and historical roles played by political Islamism in Turkey are examined.

1.2 Research Question and Key Findings

The research question of this thesis is: "What were the main instruments decreasing and increasing political Islam's power in Turkey?" It tries to shed light on the antagonism between the Kemalist regime and political Islam in the political history of modern Turkey. The key findings of this thesis include the fact that, the Kemalist regime kept the growth of political Islam by utilizing the judiciary and the military. Political Islamist Parties were either overthrown by military interventions ore closed by the judiciary. Nevertheless, AKP constituted an exception and it took control of the military and the judiciary. Consequently, it managed to become the first and the only political Islamist party that continuously ruled the country in one-party governments.

1.3 Literature Review

Within the literature, a group of scholars including Rahman (1980), Türköne (1991), Akdoğan (2000), Vergin (2000), Bilici (2001), Demirağ (2006), Anthony (2010), El-Sayed (2016) and Osman (2017) evaluate political Islamism as an ideology. These scholars generally focus on the notional and ideological doctrines of political Islamism. The studies of these scholars indicated that, political Islamism was a conservative and reactionary ideology which was (and still is) opposed to modernity. Due to the fact that Islam has its own rules on state administration, economy and social life, the very essence of the Western democracy was contradictory to Islam.

Another group of scholars including Duran (2005), Erkilet (2005), Aydın (2005), Azgın (2012), Delibaş (2015) and Lord (2018) examined the phenomenon of political Islamism in Turkey with Particular attention to its antagonism with Kemalism. Based on these scholars, the antagonism between Kemalism and political Islamism in Turkey is largely an extension of the antagonism between the Islamist monarch Abdulhamid and the pro-secularist İttihat ve Terakki. As these scholars indicate, since the Ottoman Empire was an Islamic theocracy and its official and social institutions were driven by Islam, traditionalists all around Turkey hardly embraced the main principles of Kemalist revolution. This led to a form of state-religion cleavage in Turkey.

There is another group of scholars in the literature that focused Particularly on the AKP. This group includes Bakı-ezer & Demirer (2010), Yıldırım (2013), Sarvan (2013), Yankaya (2014) and Fuller (2016). These scholars tend that, the AKP had a form of political Islamism which was manifestly different from the traditional political Islamism. The party was not anti-Western and it was trying to establish good relations with USA and the EU. Additionally, it was a liberal party, compatible with the free market economy. As a matter of fact, these scholars do not neglect the fact that there were actually two AKP's. The "first AKP" made important attempts to resolve the Kurdish question, prevent the army from intervening in Turkish politics, enlarge rights and liberties and have good relations with the neighbouring states (2000's). The "second AKP" however, shifted towards a more authoritarian and nationalist stance and conducted hardliner policies towards the issues in neighbouring countries. As

this thesis does not attach special attention to AKP or to the notional basis of political Islam, it is closer to the second category of scholars. This thesis evaluates the political Islam throughout the history of Turkish Republic.

1.4 Purpose of the Study

The main goal of this study is to provide a historical and political evaluation of political Islamism in Turkey. It tries to shed light on the antagonism between political Islamism and secularism. It also compares the political Islamism in single-party era and the one in the multi-party era.

1.5 The significance of the Study

Turkey has since the foundation of the Republic in 1923 experienced a cleavage between secularism and political Islamism. Thus, political Islamism is one of the two opposing mainstream ideologies in Turkish politics. Therefore, understanding the rise and fall (or fall and rise) of political Islamist actors in Turkey is important in understanding Turkish politics.

1.6 Scope of Study

This study focus on the history and politics of political Islamist political actors as well as their antagonism with secularist ones. Reforms and transformations led by political Islamist Parties in power, ideological orientations of such Parties and their differences from each other will be scoped by this thesis. The analysis will cover a timespan starting with the establishment of Republic of Turkey (1923) and ceasing with the beginning of the Presidential regime in 2018.

1.7 Limitations of the Study

This thesis focuses on a country in its democratization process. Thus, it relies on electoral results. This constitute the main limitation of the study since what does the electorate understand from 'political Islamism' or secularism will remain in dark in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

RELIGION AND POLITICS

2.1 The Relationship Between Politics, Ideology and Religion

Since religions both reflect the social values of the societies they arose from and bear a claim of universality, they can survive even after some changes on the environments they arose (Akdoğan, 2000, 76). Although it is claimed that the abovementioned effect generally reflects on the political life in a conservative manner; instead of the rules and beliefs established by the religions, they are evaluated substantially in accordance with the behaviours of the people who speak for and comment about them (Akdoğan, 2000, 34). These comments and behaviours appropriated for the religions are determined by the current conditions of the related society. Accordingly, great divergences emerge between the political systems which bear the claim to follow the requirements of the same religion such as the differences between the political regimes which follow the same ideology (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 54). The main underlying reason is that the concept of religion has formed a basis for the people from lower class for self-identification and positioning against people from ruling class in various eras of the history of humanity. This aspect of the religions which can be named as their historical duty; become evident by undertaking an ideological function for the community at extraordinary times and by functioning as a power-legitimater generally.

Ideology consists of opinion clusters which are common amongst the ones who are governed but are also restricted and undetermined. It functions as an internal structure which directs and forms the human actions. In this sense, the twentieth century is an ideologically-intensive time (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 231). Comprehensive ideologies present their importance in terms of the relations between social actions and religion. Ideologies consist of two sub-

groups: tough- and tender-minded ideologies. The tough-minded ideology is a structure strong in content which depends on fundamental theoretical works manipulated systematically and which is restricted by the cultural phenomena of privileged people (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 78). Tender-minded ideology consists of less-formed dogmatic and epistemic systems for the human communities. Religious beliefs are included by tender-minded ideologies as important ones.

According to Andrew Heywood, the concept of ideology is very important. Ideology is a manifestation of power. According to Andrew Heywood, ideology was used as an attack weapon and tool for rival ideas or belief systems. Nevertheless, it is no doubt that ideologies contain the claim to reveal the truth. In this sense, ideologies can also be seen as truth regimes (Karam, 2003, 23). Ideologies; it constructs both our thought and the nature of our action, as it provides us with assumptions about how society works and how it operates, along with a language of political discourse. As a truth regime, ideology is always associated with power.

In a world where truth, value, and theory compete, ideologies seek to keep certain values superior to others, and to legitimize, and to load certain theories into sets of meaning. Since ideologies also provide mental maps of the social world, they establish relations between individuals and groups, while on the other hand they establish wider power structures (Gerges, 2014, 66). For all these reasons, ideologies can support the dominant power structure by portraying the existing power structure as just, natural and just, but on the one hand it may weaken the existing structure and even challenge the existing structure by shedding light on the evils of the power structure or the justice of the alternative power structures. In both cases, ideologies play a vital role (İşcan, 2011, 133).

Today, ideology is one of the important axes in which the political sciences gathered. That is to say, the beliefs have gained prominence with the arising society. The political science is a science for understanding the “pleasant” and “good” things amongst people and also making them dominant. Considering the beliefs and attitudes of the society as an inseparable part of the political

process is an attitude brought by “behavioural” political sciences progressed in the last two decades (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 165). This is because the behaviourism presents the behaviours the way they are. The political scientists have interpreted the ideologies as mainly “hybridized” degenerate forms of the ideas of Locke, Rousseau or Marx, etc. The way which Sabine approach Fascism is a classic instance for it. According to him Fascism is a degenerate form of the opinions of Hegel and Nietzsche. Sabine not only research on why some specific aspects of the movements of Mackinder, Nietzsche and Hegel were chosen by fascists and how this single combination provides a psychological agreement of form of a society (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 176). A modern political scientist’s approach for the issue would be like this.

According to Michel Foucault, the concept of ideology is inconvenient in three respects. The problem, however, is not the question of how scientific or correct knowledge is formed and how the ideological is to be defined as the illusion of it. Second, Foucault criticizes the concept of ideology that requires a concept of a humanist subject (Knudsen, 2003, 40). They produce theology according to its objective / class interests. Thus, the concept of ideology is based on the given conditions of a subject who has been pre-formed and aware of the ideological representations corresponding to their interests. That is, people produce ideology according to their own needs.

Foucault says that the concept of ideology requires an external determinant. Ideology is defined as the function of another key determinant. This definition makes it impossible to avoid identifying a decisive center like the substructure in classical Marxism. At this point, the concept of classical ideology and the concept of poststructuralist discourse are completely separated from each other (Küçükylmaz, 2009, 59). It is possible to grasp this difference better in the context of defining the concept of power. Foucault says that in a very similar way to Althusser, the process of discourse and power were the same, that power came to individuals as a discourse and turned them into subjects. Third and last, Foucault says that the concept of ideology requires an external determinant. Ideology is defined as the function of another fundamental

determinant: it is secondary and determined. This definition makes it impossible to avoid identifying a decisive center like the substructure in classical Marxism (Haenni, 2011, 29).

Jean Baudrillard's rejection of today's political and ideological movements has increased his reputation. He has signed many important works so far. Baudrillard, again following Nietzsche, states that such ideologies emerge as an attempt to prove, to justify, modern society (Karam, 2003, 89). After this point, Baudrillard has acted against all kinds of progressive currents, socialists, feminists, ecologists, because they themselves have become part of the modern consensus against the symbolic order.

From this point of view, religions function both as a consolidator the conventional power relations in the underdeveloped areas of a country, and as a way of protesting in the more-developed areas. Religion is function of a society and also expresses the functions of self-confirming, questioning or denying (Ete, 2003, 138). Religion is the strongest holistic powers on one hand, causes social resolution on the other, and also is a power which aims to unify the society on a new ground. The system operates under the minimum requirements of living for the conventional societies which religion has an important function for determinism and it also differs for each society (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 56). Religion and politics are functionally two fundamental inseparable establishments of the humanity. The fundamental characteristics of them always have lead one of them to the other and have keep them in an unbreakable relation. It is not hard to understand the relation between these two concepts if it is considered that the main function of religion is "legitimacy" and the main function of politics is "power". Each of them shows a tendency for the function of the other. In simple words, the religious circles have approached to politics to get a share of the power to be able to act easily at least for this life; and politics has approached to religion to obtain the legitimacy necessary for itself, thus an obligatory relation between them has arisen (Axiarlis, 2012, 43). So indeed it has been undoubtedly politics which religion has concerned from the beginning of the history of humanity. According to famous sociologist Durkheim, the sanctitude which is the subject

of religion is also a public phenomenon (Axiarlis, 2012, 44). As indicated above, politics is one of the most important developments of the publicity. Thus, it is possible to say that there is a relation between religion and politics arising from sharing the same platform.

The relation between religion and politics is a phenomenon which arose with the historical adventure of the humanity and acquired different dimensions within a long period of time. This is because religion is a phenomenon which inherently makes itself apparent in all the layers of society and all of the institutional structures constituted by the society in some way (Er, 2016, 95). Therefore, it is not quite possible to observe and evaluate politics, administrative areas and the activities of them as a phenomenon independently from religion. The political relations establishing by ignoring the relation with religion are insufficient. Likewise, the relation between religion and politics which is one of the fundamental concepts of political sociology such as family, education, economy and culture; makes them form an interaction with each other such as forming interactions between them and other concepts and phenomena (İşcan, 2011, 134). This is because both religion and politics are active as social phenomena in the society which is a network of social relations and interactions. Thus, it is not possible for them to exclude or ignore each other, keep absolutely away from each other.

In this regard, one of the most important political functions of religion which has various social functions should be "legitimization", in other words it should be "bringing legitimacy" for the political system in general and for the political power in Particular. Religion validates the status quo, current social regulation(s), institutions, and ways of operating the institutions etc. through its legitimization function by legitimating them (Tuğ, 2011, 149). The reason for religion to be such powerful legitimization source is because it is assigned by a sanctifying characteristic for politics. Therefore, it is possible to say that almost all of the political powers have used religion as a legitimization tool. According to Weber, religion is an important factor to create a common destiny and target for the society (El-Sayed, 2017, 104). The society use this common belief for destiny it has as a material or nonmaterial consolation source against

the difficulties. By this way, it creates rebirth and liberation myths for itself. Additionally, religion can be used as a social and political holistic tool. Accordingly, religion is an important factor for strengthening the economic and social structure determined by the political power, it also a legitimization tool which requires an absolute obedience from the political power (El-Sayed, 2017, 122). Hobbes has developed an interesting approach for the relation between political power, legitimation and religion. He has suggested that the dominant power can only answer for the God after declaring the government as a “Mortal God”.

Since the individuals started to be made political in today’s societies, they have been living with these two concepts. The individual who has met religion and undertake this responsibility also met politics at the same time and faced with some responsibilities and rights come with them (Serter, 2010, 85). Therefore a relation between religion and politics has always occupied the humanity throughout the history and it has been agreed as an important problem. Consequently, it is a historical and sociological fact that religion is an effective factor on the political beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of the individuals (Serter, 2010, 24). Correspondingly, it is possible to say that the religious opinions of the individuals constitute an important category of their political attitudes and behaviours although they decrease and increase under the effect of the cross dominance.

2.2 Politics and Islam

It is not quite possible to separate Islam and politics in Middle East where the three monotheistic religions arose. Except from Israel, the Muslim population of the Middle-eastern countries are more than 90%. Although Sunni people are high in number; Shia and druse people have made their presence felt despite their limited efficiency in denominational terms (Axiarlis, 2012, 55). Even though there are several regimes which are defined as secular ones in the Middle East, for the political life the power of religion, Particularly Islam has been perceived easily. It is possible to say that the impact of the Islam on politics has started to increase again within the period started from 2000s, in spite of some decrease and increases of the impact of religion on politics in

the Middle East in different times (Serter, 2010, 67). The democratization efforts of United States of America on some countries from the region after the attack carried out on the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001 have been had an influence in this matter. Within this process, Islam has become closer to politics through Islamic political Parties and formations. The political Islam started to gain important accomplishments in the Middle East through United States of America consciously or unconsciously and found an opportunity to become powerful within the process of democratization (Serter, 2010, 71).

The religion of Islam, especially after the Prophet's emigration to Medina, as a political movement to develop and Prophet Muhammad also held political power as well as religious and social power played an important role in the evaluation of the developments in politics together with religion (Serter, 2010, 72). The basic holy text of Islam, does not present definite and tangible forms of political governance and organization of societies, giving examples of past societies by using the historical method of giving up general principles and expanding the field of movement of Islamic thinkers and has given different opinions on this issue has been put forward on this subject.

According to the Qur'an, Allah is the true ruler of the universe. Human is his caliph on earth. The most important duties of the rulers he chooses among people are to act with Justice and not to be caught in his personal desires. While it is strongly recommended that those who have been given the power to keep up with justice, to maintain order and to prevent corruption, while there are various limiting barriers to the use of power (Kurtoğlu, 2013, 85).

In general, the use of power in certain measures and compliance, compulsory rules have been brought about the political power related to the work and activities within the framework of religion and this area is revealed religiosity, religious values can be evaluated as an area (Osman, 2017, 37). For this reason, Islamic thinkers consider politics not as a field independent of religion but as a reality of social life that must be studied within the scope of religion and in accordance with the basic principles of religion. Islam is basically a

holistic religion, and it organizes all areas of social and individual life and leaving no space independent of religion (Osman, 2017, 22). These arrangements have been formulated in the form of the identification of general lines in social areas, such as civil law. In the approach of the Islamic thinkers to the phenomenon of politics, religion's understanding of the universe and society plays a decisive role and the effort to evaluate this area as a field of moral actions comes to the fore (Delibaş, 2015, 47).

Islamic thinker Farabi, in his book "Census of Science", refers to science which deals with the work and movements of people who have established a city by force of natural needs, and considers political science within this category which will examine the behaviour of politicians (EI-Sayed, 2017, 68). Another Islamic thinker Gazali formed two main categories in the classification of his Sciences, those that are not related to religion and those that are related to religion, and placed political science in the category of Sciences that are related to religion, together with metaphysics, ethics, and psychology (EI-Sayed, 2017, 72).

2.3 Theoretical Bases of Islamic Ideology

The term "ideology" for the first time, during the French Revolution, Used by philosopher " A.-L.C. destutt de Tracy. The science of thought is an abbreviated form of the term. According to some philosophers, for example, John Locke and Etienne Bonnot De Condillac, all human knows is "knowledge of thoughts." (Karam, 2003, 92). According to Bacon, the purpose of science is not to increase human knowledge alone. At the same time, his life is to improve, correct and increase his value. The science of thought has these interesting tasks: "To serve man by purifying it from existing prejudices in his mind, even to save him from the difficulties which he may face in the future, and to prepare him for the rule of reason." (Karam, 2003, 106).

Destutt de Tracy and those who think like him have designed a broad system of national education which they believe would transform France into a rational and scientific society. Between 1795-1799, the beliefs of these thinkers were accepted as the official doctrine of the Republic of France. Napoleon first

supported Destutt de Tracy and his friends, but after the war began to lose, he blamed them. This unpretentious term, introduced by Destutt de Tracy, has gained a new and emotional dimension (Rahman, 1980). Napoleon stated his insecurity in this term and soon the word ideology became a term that symbolizes both praise and abuse in all the languages in which it was translated. It is possible to examine ideologies in the same category as religions. They both form a "kind of" total system. Both areas of interest can be summarized as "issues related to behaviour and facts". In general, there are the following differences between religions and ideologies;

- There is a divine order at the root of the religious approach to truth. This order covers the world and beyond. Ideologists only deal with earthly activities.
- Religions, like ideologies, try to implement the vision of fair society, but they lack practical political programs.
- Religions are more important to believe and pray. By addressing the human soul, they try to keep it clean or purify it.
- Ideology is mostly addressed to groups, countries, or classes. The domain of religions is much wider.
- Religions owe their existence to divine orders. Ideologies are the work of human logic.
- Both demands promise, want commitment, but the place of promise can be questioned in religions. People may not have a choice about religion. They can choose ideologies.

If we try to locate Islam in the face of these observations, we can clearly see that Islam is a system closer to ideology rather than a religion (Axialis, 2012, 70). Because Islam, like ideology and other religions, are different:

- It includes detailed theories about human experience and the outside world.
- Even though it is not exhaustive for the social organization, certain programs have been developed. It is possible to find them in the Qur'an.

- The difficulty of implementing these programs has been expressed in various ways in many parts of the Qur'an. Referring to the nature of more people, the Qur'an also points to the various difficulties Muslims face.
- Although Islam tried to gather everyone under its control at the beginning, it gave more importance to women and bondsman, to the poor and oppressed. They are loyal followers of Islam.
- Although Muhammad kept Islam open to the public, some celebrities (strong Arab figures, idealists) tried to gather under the same roof and invited them to join Islam. Even Muhammad preferred them.

Islam also:

- It is also a religion that deals with worldly activities such as ideologists.
- Islam is a religion with some practical programs. Some of them are in the Qur'an. Others were later designed based on the Qur'an.
- Islam is a religion that attaches importance to prayer and faith as well as materialism.
- Ideology is mostly addressed to the class and countries. Islam is as well. It's mostly addressed to the Arabs.

2.4 The Conversion of Islam into Ideology

Islamic ideology; it is an influx of Muslims who unite under one roof and play an active role in the international system as an effective political and economic power, who propose Islamic order against capitalist and communist ideologies and propose multidimensional cooperation among Muslim states (Antony, 2010, 112).

Historically, between 1867-1873, Islam was transformed into an ideology by the concerns of a group of Ottoman intellectuals in Istanbul to confront the challenges of the modern world (Akdoğan, 2000, 34). In the same period, efforts to transform Islam into an ideology in different regions are seen. These intellectuals who tried to bring democratic institutions to Ottoman society tried to justify the ideas they had advocated in order to gain the support of the people, and in doing so produced modern ideological interpretations of Islam

(Sucu, 2011, 53). These ideas have systematized Islam as an ideology in the western sense of Islam by reorienting society and politics and getting the answers of the universal ideas and institutions emerging from the West from Islam.

Since the 1930s, Hasan Al-Benna, the founder of the Organization of Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and Abu'l Ala Mawdudi, the founder of the Indian-Pakistan community of Islam, have been deposited in the 20th century, in the light of the great ideologies of the century, they have started a new thinking movement, which has begun to define Islam as a political system before everything else (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015). This innovation has been justified by a return to a self and by a return to the original inspirational sources of the first believer community. This also meant bankruptcy of many of the political models that Muslims have put forward in history (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 52).

In the second half of the 19th century and the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century, according to a common belief, ideas currents that can be gathered under the main headings of Ottomanism, Islamism, Westernism and Turkism are seen. The common point of these representatives is; It is the effort to save the empire from its current situation and to bring it to its former glory days. Moving on with the same purpose, these idea currents have moved away from each other as they differ in terms of management and sometimes they have entered conflict. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to distinguish the ideas in this period from each other. However, a distinction can be made by means of the broadcasting organs of their thinkers (Erkilet, 2005, 78).

Islamism is a thought movement that gained importance in the second half of the century. First, it emerged as a political thought, then it was defended by literature and thinkers. Its purpose is to unite and develop Muslims from different races, to make it a balance against the Christian world. It is also based on the aim of preventing the Muslim elements in the Balkans from breaking away from the state. In other words, the literary writers of this movement have generally suggested the idea of mating with non - Turkish Muslim peoples in

the Ottoman Empire. This trend was supported by Abdülhamithan and it was further developed after 1908. The development of the Islamist movement formed sympathetic groups in Ottoman politics (Lewis, 2007, 246).

One of the ideas that emerged to save and modernize the Ottoman Empire is Westernism. This current takes its origin from the Tanzimat and even from the previous reform movements. The first leaders of the Westernization movements were the sultans and the grand viziers they supported (Özdenören, 2005, 147). The leaders of Westernization are the Young Turks who are outside the management staff. They adopt an understanding of the state in accordance with the social, political, economic and philosophical views of the West. People with this view argue that the state can be saved only by Westernization. They want changes not only in the political field but also in the social and economic sphere (Mert 2005, 92). Therefore, those who gathered around the Western trend spread their ideas mostly with the *Ijtihad* magazine. According to Westerners, the biggest problem of the Ottoman State is the lack of Westernism. Thus, the only salvation is to be a Western-style civilized state and a nation in accordance with the ideas and needs of this century. The Westernization movement, which first started in the military field, was also influential in the state and society life (Knudsen, 2003, 25).

The Turkism movement emerged in the name of saving the state at a time when the ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism could not find an application. According to this thought flow state; however, he can stand on the basis of a society whose language, religion, descent and ideology are one (Gerges, 2014, 56). Turkism, language, history and literature, as a cultural movement, ie, began as a cultural movement, has gained a political character over time. In fact, the first studies began in the Tanzimat period.

Ottomanism: It has emerged as an idea movement against the westernization movement of the idea of Ottomanism along with the Tanzimat period. It was formed with the intention of maintaining the political unity of the state (Türköne, 1991, 68). Ottomanism is called Ottomanism, which accepts citizens living within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire without equal discrimination, race

and religion. According to this understanding, in order to preserve the integrity of the state, language, race and religion should not be taken into consideration; everyone should have the same rights and powers. If this is done, the Ottoman union takes place and the state can be saved from the destruction II. This thought, which dominated the first half of the Constitutional Monarchy, was weakened by the loss of the Balkan Wars and the declaration of independence of non-Turkish minorities in the Balkans (White, 2013).

Günaltay thinks that the defeats of the Ottomans and the Muslims in the backwardness of the Ottomans and the defeats of the Turks have a big share. Even in the time when he was the most Islamist, he showed the concept of Islam as a reason for the rise of Muslims and Muslims (Tekin, 2005, 172). Islamist Prime Minister Şemseddin Günaltay, who has a unique place in Islamist thought, reflects this general situation of Muslims with his writings and political life. This is a prototype for the portrayal of a classical Islamist. Günaltay collected all the theses of Islamists in their own body and evaluated the historical foundations. While suggesting Islamist theses, Günaltay did not examine the subjects such as working in the Islamic sense or economy with its contemporary structure, nor did it examine the economic culture of the West and modernity in a comprehensive evaluation (Savran, 2013, 142). The pragmatism caused by the effort of finding a solution to the lags of Muslims has been manifested in Günaltay as well as in all Islamists. Günaltay, who advocated secularism and coeducation, wrote articles in *Sebilürreşad* and the education he received caused him to be marked as Islamist. He has always been in multiple orientations in political and intellectual life (Şimşek, 2005, 263). As a result of the closeness of the closeness to the Committee of Union and Progress, it was influenced by the general political and intellectual atmosphere of the constitutional period and established a synthesis between modernity and Islam. Mehmet Akif Ersoy also advocated the view of Islamism (Yaşar, 2005, 86).

The development of intense ideas II. Constitutiona Islamism from the idea movements that emerged after the constitutional monarchy period, Akif is not separated from this line until the end of his life. In the 19th and 20th centuries,

he argued that Islam was a religion with adequate equipment in terms of politics, science, culture and society in order to get rid of the situation of the Islamic world and become dominant again (Savran, 2013, 83). Islamism, which envisages the change of the social structure of Muslims and the emergence of an idea that aims at the unification of all Muslims, constitutes the main line of Mehmet Akif's thoughts. Mehmet Akif, who also has the idea of Islamic Union, argues first of all that Muslims should have a clean belief in tawhid. He states that Muslims must learn to live together in order to unite the Islamic world (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015).

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL ISLAM AND ISLAMISM

3.1 The Concept of Political Islam

Political Islam started with the process of westernization of the Ottoman Empire and the state before the administration of the society as a result of their own dynamics of Islam and the state of the idea of saving the state seen as a period of reaction to modernity, but also showing itself as a state policy that uses all the tools and development process parallel to modernity the name of the social reaction (El-Sayed, 2017, 182). Islamism is an intellectual movement that has been influential in the central state after the 1870s, which gained its characteristics in the 19th century, in India and far from the center of the Ottoman Empire.

The definition of Islamism, the Muslims in the 19th and 20th centuries, the rational method of the Islamic world, the tyranny of the West, despotic and dictatorial rulers, exploitation, western egoism, false beliefs and the religion of Islam in a single piece to recover the most effective in the world It is defined as a form of struggle which involves the generality of the political, intellectual and scientific studies effective and eclectic with the modernism and the solutions developed in the axis of these ideas (Gerges, 2014,104).

According to Ali Bulaç, the political Islamism movement begins with Cemalettin Efgani and comes to this day. In the history of Islam, there is no political Islamism until the 19th century. According to him, there is already a Muslim society and a state structure that takes its legitimacy from it (Haenni, 2011, 93). Therefore, there is no reason for the emergence of a movement called Islamism. Political Islamism emerged in order to strengthen the Islamic world against the West. This has three objectives; First of all, to understand the Qur'an and to perform the circumcision as required. He defines ideology as nothing but the return of politics and the supremacy of politics against the traditional religious law (Erkilet, 2015, 49).

In the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, is being liquidated completely Ottoman order and bureaucracy squads, French-style secularism and adopts the reasoning made by the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the modernist movement have come from within the Union and Progress party, 1923, from

which manages up to countries with single-party system in 1950 and he tried to establish the entire state system on the axis of secularism (Can, 2016, 77). Religious established the Presidency of Religious Affairs in order to bring it into the control and surveillance area of the state, but the religion was taken out of the education system.

The new cadres who established the Republic have realized the most effective break in the life of Turkish society with a secular state project and tried to make secularism effective in all areas of social life (Erdoğan, 2006, 35). In this case, the practices that are contrary to the Islamic way of life have been reacted with the reaction of the society. As a result of these practices, various communities and groups have formed. The Islamic question which brings to mind that communities and groups defending political Islam by different methods and methods belong to the same religion but contradictory to each other in the way and method (Antony, 2010, 152).

Islam directly based on the Quran and the concept of Hazrat. It is a collection of divine messages transmitted to humanity by Muhammad. Islam, however, is expressed as the result of the transmission of this message by Muslims (Bilici, 2001, 123). In this sense, while Islam is the only one and the semai, Islam is a human being, but it is also diverse. In this sense, religious groups reporting that they act in the name of Islam are referred to as Muslim politics within the context of interpretations of politics based on religion instead of Islam (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 92). Political Islam generally functions as a movement that challenges the state and the status quo from floor to ceiling. However, it is also possible for him to assume the exact opposite role that would legitimize the state.

Political Islam is an ideology that can renew itself and shape according to the conditions of the period. This is an indication that it is a completely modern thought. Although it is a modern thought, this idea which takes its basis from Islam and wants Islam to dominate all worldly areas is an ideology that produces programs and creates political movements according to the agenda

of the society it is in (Axiarlis, 2012, 73). And there is the obligation to create and disseminate an identity.

Islamic identity is politicized and emphasized against other forms of national identities as a result of competition between different groups such as intellectuals in society, Sufi sects and political Parties. These groups express and disseminate their political identities by using modern forms of mass communication (Bulaç, 2005, 31). According to the current political and social context, Islamic groups and intellectuals can highlight a layer of identity more than others: the identities based on religion, gender, status or class, ethnic or regional origin, property, mother tongue and tribal ties.

In order to create an identity and to be effective in disseminating it to the society, political Islam attaches importance to the processes that are influenced by modernism. We see that the Islamic identity creation efforts of modernization perception open up new opportunity fields in politics by establishing a new social relations network to the intellectual processes of Political Islam (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, 75). Islamism is intertwined with cultural background as an essential element of society identity. If they do not know and if they add something to them from their lives, they are accepted as the basis of this belief that will affect every area of their lives and will lead their thoughts in the political field. It is natural for a political structure shaped around such a deep identity to interact with the intellectual and political movements of that period (Antony, 2010, 71).

Central Asian markets and the West that the Russian failed to penetrate due to religious differences. This advantage way to the rise of a rich traders' class among the Tatar community. On the other hand, when we look at the Turks living in the Empire, we can see that they did not have a special place within the millet system of the Empire and that they constituted the dominant millet with the other Muslims of the Empire (Arabs, Kurds, Albanians), that there were no ethnic barriers between them, and that the Ottoman Turks have adopted Islamic culture in full (Demirağ, 2006, 63). The main sign for this is the answer to the question of how they saw their own culture traditionalism. Ottoman historiography based basic any on two issues: the role assumed by

Muhammad the Prophet, and the rise of the Ottoman dynasty. The link between these two issues was provided by the Seljuks (Demirağ, 2006, 79). In other words, the pre-Islamic past of the Turks, their Asian roots were forgotten.

For this reason, while ideas of nationalism penetrated among other nations of the Empire, such as the Greek independence and Serbian autonomy, no signs of Turkish-Ottoman consciousness emerged at that time (Demirağ, 2006, 231). During the last quarter of the 19th century, to oppose the strengthening Pan-Slavist movement of Alexander III and the Russification movement, reforms were undertaken by the Tatar community.³⁸ After the seizure of the Russians, a big Tatar migration took place toward Ottoman Empire and this migration continued in great waves after the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877-1878, locating a large number of Tatars, Azerbaijanis, and Caucasian Turks to the Empire (Demirağ, 2006, 42). By the end of the same century, improvements in railroad making, an increase in naval transport, made the Turks in Russia become closer to both themselves and the Ottoman Empire. With the development of the means of communication and with the influence of Turkish intellectuals who had to give a fight of identity against the repressive Russian regime and who fled to Ottoman Empire, Pan Turkism began to find supporters among the Turks of the Ottoman Empire, too (Demirağ, 2006, 43).

3.2 Characteristics of Islamism Politics

The places where the idea of political Islam first emerged were colonized countries. The most important reason for this can be explained by the colonialization of Islamic societies (El-Sayed, 2017, 62). The political Islam that emerged under colonial oppression has been theorized, and on the other hand, it has had an extreme narrative to create a conscious people. The difference between them and the Ottoman political Islamists is in the framework of this discourse. The reason why this discourse is different in Ottoman political Islamists is that of a state in which they think they are connected and that they represent religion (Ete, 2003, 78). They think they can save Islam by saving the state.

The thinkers of this period are the people who know Islam who came from within the Islamic thought and who meet all aspects of modernity. The early political leaders of the political thinkers, political spokesmen belonged to the ulema class. These people have a great deal of knowledge about religious sciences and Islamic history. They also had a good education in the world of the world (Güzel, 2000, 53). Therefore, the administrative staff of the Ottoman Empire did not like the intellectuals.

When it first appeared, it was to understand the Qur'an and Sunnah, which is the basis and basis of the religion, to open the door of the case-law, to make a judgment based on the Qur'an based on the hadiths as well as to the judiciary. They have the idea of opening the door of jihad for the power of Islam (Fuller, 2016, 94). It is possible to see intellectual and discursive differences in the evolution of this thought, which emerged on the basis of Islam, into the Republic and its articulation. In their emergence, they regard their response to modern concepts and thought as strictly religious, and they regard religion as the only solution. The most important reason for this is the practice of Islam in the past, based on the position of modern Islamic thought against political and moral norms (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 35).

The changing political system and a form of state far away from religion have urged political Islamists to relate to modernity and to adopt existing discourses. This period was mostly based on a modern nation-state and its efforts to Islamize its western discourses. Rather than modernity, a proof of religion has been tried in the future (Gülalp, 1998, 67). Ideas were shaped by the idea that Islam was already a modern religion and that its instruments were already at the core of Islam. Many intellectuals discuss the idea that Islamism cannot be fully modern. This is explained by the fact that a movement that accepts all dimensions of modernity, on the one hand, rejects the ideals of enlightenment on the other (Erdoğan, 2006). It is thought that Islam will not regress with modernization process and will develop in contrast. This leads to the idea that Islam is not closed to modernity.

The thinkers of this period are people who know Islam more superficially than the previous period and are far from Islamic knowledge (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 80). The leading profile of the political Islamists during this period are the political leaders who are unaware of the knowledge of Islam, who do not fully know the history of Islam, and who have taken the western-style education and who are the leaders of the profession such as engineers, doctors and journalists. The integration of political Islamists with modernity is related to the modern concepts they use and add to their lives. Secularism, Liberalism, Democracy, Nationalism are the modern concepts that political Islamists think about (Berkes, 1984, 68). At this point, according to Jean Jacques Nancy, even in democracies the 'power' is sometimes exercised in a form of nationalist or religious pressure (Evcan, 2018, 337) and a barrier separating a religion and democracy hardly exists. From the very first moment when political Islamism began to take shape, the groups that represented it developed their ideas on the concepts of the western world, which they criticized and opposed (Bulaç, 2005, 293). They have been trying to save the state and religion by conveying the subjects they discussed and think about in the newspapers and magazines, which are the organs of that period, to the managerial positions of the state and to the different publishers. This effort, which they entered into, has led them to establish an integrity between the dogmas of religion and the concepts of modernity.

3.3 The Emergence of Political Islamism

The idea of Islamism was actually influenced by other modern intellectual movements such as Ottomanism and Turkism (Er, 2016, 63). These factors are the idea of the nation-state that emerged in Europe as a result of the 1789 French Revolution and the idea that this idea threatens the whole of Europe and the survival of the Ottoman Empire and the Ottoman constitution with the Tanzimat Edict (1839) and Reform Reform (1856). the non-Muslim elements in the way they are the rights against the Muslims. The idea of Islamism emerged from these two main factors. In addition, as a result of the Renaissance and Reformation movements, the new social structure, which emerged with the withdrawal of religion from social life in Europe, has been

effective on the development of the West in terms of development (Aydın, 2005, 112).

The continuation of the Ottomanism movement as an ideology of development and liberation, the idea of Islamism emerging in the Ottoman Empire, nationalism and in a sense before the period of Turkism are discussed (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 27). Islamism was used as an imperial ideological device by both Ottoman sultans and the rulers of Union and progress. Officially, Islamism was introduced in the form of unity-i Islam during the reign of Abdulaziz. The introduction of the second term as a significant political instrument, it happened during the reign of Abdülhamid II. After this period, the use of the word "caliph" has been expanded, especially at the level of rhetoric (Axiallis, 2012, 80). Political Islamism is a political movement that has been in the thought of the Ottoman state since 1870 by the name of unity-i Islam. The emergence of this thought in the social field was developed with the publication of the second constitutional monarchy and the publication of the magazine "Sırat-ı Müstakim".

Islamism emerged in the Tanzimat Era. As it is known, the Tanzimat refers to the period of modernization and renewal that began in the Ottoman Empire in 1839, known as the Tanzimat Edict of the Ottoman Empire (Akdoğan, 2000, 64). It is said that the Tanzimat Period ended with the 1st Constitutional Monarchy but it is obvious that the reforms continued continuously until the fall of the Ottoman Empire.

In Particular, the reforms made under the influence of ecnobians are of great importance. These reforms are caused by the withdrawal of religion from politics, the economy and the world of science (Berkes, 1984, 82). The integration into the new world is being discussed extensively. It can be said that in this discussion environment Islamism is shaped and found its roots. In this respect, Islamism can be called an integration ideology (Duran, 2005, 34).

3.4 Emergence of Political Islam in Turkey

The rise of political Islam has been one of the issues that have occupied the agenda of Turkish political life in recent years. On the basis of this tension shaped by the dilemma of "Islamist-secular", it is related to two different civilization projects (Erkilet, 2015, 40). The modernization project of the Republic, which is based on secularism, perceives Islam at the level of personal belief and worship, whereas the political Islam project aims to play a much more visible role in the public life of Islam.

During the War of Independence, Islamism was used as one of the main ignorant of the liberation struggle. It is a fact that, as a response to the plans for sharing and the reaction of the minorities, the self-defense organizations, as well as the sense of patriotism and nationalism, have religious factors (Fuller, 2016, 42). At the beginning of the struggle Mustafa Kemal addressed the religious feelings of the people and used a sheikh and religious leader. The alliance with the Islamists continued until the end of the War of Independence (Gerges, 2014, 66). The establishment of the Republic is a movement made directly into political Islam because it prohibits the political use of religion in a Muslim society. A state based on religion had become a state based on popular sovereignty. With the abolition of the sultanate and the caliphate in Particular, there was a definite disintegration between the revolutionary cadre and the Islamists. A radical change of the system taken from the Ottoman Empire was considered as a deviation from the religion in the Islamic environment and caused reactions (Duran, 2005, 102). The Islamist and conservative circles were gathered around the Progressive Republican Party. Turkey refused to open to the West and in a systematic way, step by step with the revolution made a shift away from the Islamic system, has caused an uproar among Islamists.

After the establishment of the Republic, Islam has been redefined, according to which religion is a relationship between man and God. For this reason, the religion was taken under the control and supervision of the state, and by the policy pursued, the state established a management mechanism that allowed the state to directly intervene in the Islamic institutions (Bilici, 2001, 131).

3.5 Development of Political Islam in Turkey

In a process from the 1950s to the present, the state has helped to foster political Islam. In Particular, the policies based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed against the left and minorities and the Kurds in the 12 March and 12 September period led to the rapid development and strengthening of political Islam (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, 155). In this process, Islamic capital made significant economic investments which contributed to the transfer of capital and political activity. Political Islam, which has placed its ideological orientation in all areas of state and social life, has been an important force in politics by making extraordinary use of the social impact of religion. The power of political Islam stems from state, society and politics relations, namely the system itself (Antony, 2010, 160).

It is an indisputable fact that Turkey has become a United States-oriented country since 1947. In this process, the use of religion as a tool of the US strategy of encircling communism was in question. The United States supported Islamist movements within the Green Belt doctrine (Berkes, 1984, 177). The use of religion against the Left movement resulted in the opening of political Islamists and Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Nizam Party emerged from such a need. The masses were deceived by the coming of Sharia and the danger of fundamentalism. However, a new project called 'moderate Islam' has been launched in Turkey in the last period and with this US-backed project, an Islamist party has come to power in the country and then succeeded in the hegemony struggle between the ideological views of the state and the moderate Islam has begun to make itself felt at state levels in every sense (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 43).

After the long one-party power in Turkey, with the multi-party life, the Islamic Movement and ideology turned to the right Parties due to its nature. The most important representative of the Islamic traditionalist thought during the period of 1945-1950 is the Millet Party (Aydın, 2005, 36). MP exhibited a serious opposition supported by Islamists. Islamists generally supported the EP until the Milli Nizam Party (MNP) was formed after the MP.

MNP was founded on January 26, 1970. Representing the interests of young tradesmen, MNP, despite being described as an Islamic party, did not hesitate to openly attack secularism by using a shy Islamic discourse from its foundation to its closure (Delibaş, 2015, 45). For secularism in the program of the party; We are opposed to any understanding that turns secularism into the form of anti-religionist. MNP is the first small but significant step towards the formation of an independent Islamic movement in Turkey. MNP, who refrained from presenting his Islamic identity due to the laws in force, stated that the Islamic system was supportive and which method to establish this system with implicit and unclear expressions (Güzel, 2000, 61).

MNP was closed on 20 May immediately after the 12 March intervention. President Necmettin Erbakan went to Switzerland. On 11 October 1972, the cadres of the closed MNP formed a party called the Millî Selamet Party (MSP). Süleyman Arif Emre was appointed as the chairman of the party (Er, 2016, 112). None of the founders of MNP were the founder of MSP. Necmettin Erbakan, who was a part of the establishment of the MSP, officially joined the party in May 1973 and became the party leader on 20 October 1973. In the October 14, 1973 elections, the MSP received 1.2 million votes, and with this 11 percent vote, it entered parliament with 48 deputies. As a result of the Senate elections, he won three senators (Karam, 2003, 134). On 26 January 1974 a CHP-MSP coalition was established. Deputy Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan received the ministries of state affairs, internal affairs, justice, trade, food, agriculture, animal husbandry, and industry technology. The MSP, which opposes the common market and advocates the opening to the Islamic world, stated its policy as 'national view' and its aims were to provide material and especially spiritual development (Mert 2005, 86).

Turkish Islam Synthesis, against the left movement that began to strengthen since the 1960s, Islamism and nationalism, bringing together as a result of the concern raised as a single block was a theory (Osman, 2017, 117). Aydınlar Ocağı, an advocate of theory, became one of the most prominent ideas after September 12.

3.6 The View of Political Islam and Formation of Political Islamic Parties in Turkey

The Islamists, who were under pressure until the 1950s, began to reorganize as communities, informal groups, magazines, publishing houses and radical political Parties (Haenni, 2011, 201). The Islamists came together at a mass party in the late 1960s. Turkey Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB), under the leadership of Secretary-General Necmettin Erbakan "National Vision" line, which is the beginning of the Milli Nizam Party (MNP) was established. MNP had started to represent the cultural incongruities of small businessmen, traders, peasants and artisans, mainly of Anatolian origin, along with their economic hardships (Knudsen, 2003). Since then, Islamic viewers have started a powerful challenge against secular hegemony, led by an Islamist party.

Import Substitution 1960 Turkey follow the model of capital accumulation entered into a crisis. The crisis deepened in the late 1970s. The 1970s were the scene of a strong opposition by the trade unions and leftist movements (Lewis, 2007, 19). The result was a hegemony crisis. In such an environment, the Islamists had promised an Islamic order in which poverty, income injustice, exploitation, and state oppression would not exist. For this to happen, a hegemonic culture was first tried to be created through the Islamization of society. This was followed by efforts to fully Islamism the economy and politics (İşcan, 2011 94).

In 1971, MNP was closed by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was against secularism. In 1972, the party's program was virtually rebuilt in the name of the National Salvation Party (MSP). In the early years, the Islamists tried to avoid confrontation with secular hegemony, as they knew well that they could not resist their power (Tuğ, 2011, 52). The mobilization initiatives of the Islamist party were supported by youth organizations such as the National Association of Turkish Students (MTTB) and the National Youth Foundation (MGV). As an alternative to the secular education system, it was aimed that religious people would gain a place in the state, especially in the

middle levels of the bureaucracy, through the state schools of Imam Hatip High Schools (Rahman, 1980, 41).

In the 1970s, the left and Socialists had developed a strong opposition to the Turkish ruling bloc. In addition, Socialists were active in the slum areas of the country as a result of the wave of migration to the city. During these periods, the state thought that the population in the slum areas could be absorbed by industrialization (Şimşek, 2005, 74). That is why the policies applied to these regions have shifted between repression and containment. The sense of cross-border solidarity provided by Muslim countries was one of the elements that nurtured the Islamist movement (White, 2013, 142). The base of the movement has been radicalized by the influence of the sources that have been translated from the leading Islamic movements in Egypt, Pakistan and Iran. So much so that when it came to September 1980, in the rally held in Konya, there were slogans such as Sharia death and the Constitution of the Koran (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 103).

Both the response to the current hegemony crisis of the 1970s and the military coup of 12 September 1980 as a result, initiated a new type of economic, social and class restructuring. The new equilibriums were to limit the possibilities of political democracy, to limit the opportunities of political democracy and to limit wages, including the direct reorganization of the relations of exploitation over all of the working class and other oppressed (Erkilet, 2015, 42). The 1982 constitution narrowed the boundaries of all basic laws and political Participation, and the executive was strengthened in Particular against legislation.

The effectiveness of the left and the unions was weakened and the social state model was abandoned and the state abandoned the employment fields and the privatization process was initiated (Güzel, 2000, 76). In short, Turkey also began to take shape with the neo-liberal parameters. The September 12 military intervention completely shut down the socialist organizations as well as the MSP with the other Parties, but the 12 September Islamist movement

was tangent because the Islamists founded the Refah Party (RP) in 1983 and rapidly increased (Axiarlis, 2012, 44).

In the 1980s, the power bloc institutionalized religion to expand the hegemonic scope of the neoliberal regime. A Turkish-Islamic synthesis was developed for the implementation of neoliberal policies. In the constitution which was held after September 12th, for the first time, besides the definition of Turkishness, religious references were included (Delibaş, 2015, 14). One type of religious education was put into the curriculum in public schools. Then the ANAP governments further expanded their religious education and the influence of the sects.

The way Islamist literature criticizes the notions of progressivism and development, and the way in which modernism and narratives of materialism are expressed, show striking similarities with the postmodernist literature (Sucu, 2011, 342). Although Islamists do not call themselves postmodernists, the parallelism of criticisms suggests that these currents have similar resources (Yücekök, 1997, 171). Of course, the Islamists have always criticized the values of modernism with qualifications such as materialistic idolatry and moral degeneration.

Islamism, as well as post-modernism, has led to significant criticism of modernism and has been widely accepted in the visible crisis environment in which modernist assumptions have fallen. Some Islamist writers emphasize that Islamism is not traditionalism or conservatism (Vergin, 2000, 40). According to them, Islamism is a response to contemporary questions. They point out that Muslims look at history not as a nostalgia, but as a source of accumulated knowledge in the search for appropriate solutions for the future. Increasing religious school graduates to combat with the left of the state had created an inflation in Islamic school graduates with imams, university students and young professionals. On the other hand, the fact that the state did not create good income positions for the graduates of Islamic schools caused this group to maintain their position on the side of Islamism against official Islam. In addition to the establishment of many Islamic TV, publishing houses,

magazines and newspapers from the 1980s onwards, Islamic dormitories have been developed where young people go through political education (Gerges, 2014, 22). All this created the necessary environment for the Islamists who had the opposite hegemonic aims.

After 1980, the political people under the control of the Islamic people have been able to direct them towards their radical targets (Güzel, 2000, 166). This was achieved by understanding the local networks and poor working people and establishing the relations accordingly. The RP won an overwhelming majority of the votes of the poor and the working class because of the agitation of capitalist exploitation and the abolition of the interest system (Lewis, 2007, 195). The social groups detrimental to the neoliberal policies were connected to political Islam by calling on alternative promises such as the Islamic economy and a call for salvation and struggle. Turkey has found increasingly reliable the working people of the Islamic capital offered through language, that utilizing developing holdings, dividend partnership organized as they were able to expand their capital (Güzel, 2000, 53). When the Islamists met with modern techniques after 1980, for example, when the propaganda success of television and radio was discovered, the production of culture produced through the production of religious commodities from religious cartoons to documentaries could be presented to the masses.

In the 1990s, Islamist mobilization became influential. The fair management utopia was expressed in some sections of the working class as anti-fair management (Knudsen, 2003). With the utmost fair management of utopia, especially among the urban poor, the Islamists took over the government and then the government. In addition, joint ventures such as Kombassan, Yimpaş and Jet-Pa, which had risen over religious relations, had increased their share capital (Osman, 2017, 123). In the 1990s, a group of businessmen, called green capital or Islamic capital, founded MUSIAD as an alternative to TÜSİAD, the country's largest business organization. In the 1990s, MUSIAD, in connection with the RP, has appeared in an effort to develop an economic model based on alternative quests such as Islamic economy, interest-free earnings. With the motto of fair order, it was tried to win the support of the working class (İşcan, 2011, 42).

In the 1990s, Islamist mobilization became influential. The fair order utopia was expressed in some sections of the working class as anti-order. Especially with the utmost order of utopia among the urban poor, the Islamists took over the municipalities first. In addition, the conglomerates in the form of profit share partnerships such as Kombassan, Yimpaş and Jet-Pa raised their capital (Yankaya, 2014, 56). In the 1990s, a group of businessmen, called green capital or Islamic capital, founded MUSIAD as an alternative to TÜSİAD, the country's largest business organization. In the 1990s, MUSIAD, in connection with the RP, has appeared in an effort to develop an economic model based on alternative quests such as Islamic economy, interest-free earnings (Yıldızoğlu, 2008, 64). With the motto of fair order, it was tried to win the support of the working class.

The Islamists' attempts to Islamize society were expressed in alternative mosques and sermons to the imams and sermons of the secular regime. In addition, the task of the clergy as a duty, Islamists in the workplace and in the municipalities seized by the Islamists had become a way to seek rights (Rahman, 1980, 132). Municipalities and workplaces question the regular worship of their workers and present daily worship as an integral part of life. In this way, the tone of the managers' instructions was softened, and the prayer times were the natural boundaries of the authorities.

The Islamist party of the 1990s, RP continued its practical and symbolic moves towards Islamizing the public sphere, putting religious symbols on the city's key places (Tuğ, 2011, 45). Islamic clothing stores, Islamic courses, Islamic parks and gardens with covered gazebo were built. The most striking ones among these initiatives were the attempts to turn the Hagia Sophia into a mosque and attempt to erect a mosque in Taksim Square. Now the people of the mosque after the street was doing the street actions (Şimşek, 2005, 152). Moreover, in addition to the actions towards Islamization in the public sphere, international Islamic alternatives have been expressed against the US and EU hegemony, both economically and politically. When the RP took over the government, it tried to rapprochement with the Islamic countries as an

alternative to the relations of the secular regime with the West (Özdalga, 2006, 89).

3.7 Political Islam in the Single Party Period in Turkey

The Republic of Turkey was founded on 29 October 1923. Eric Hobsbawm describes the inter-war era as an age of catastrophe emphasizing the dark period as a result of the economic and political problems. Turkey and establishing her staff, Hobsbawm Islamic world, non-Islamic pro-secular modernity, shows the real revolutionaries (White, 2013, 132). The Turkish state was founded based on a 'laic ethnocracy' and the political life was monopolized by the ruling-party CHP. Not only the conservative people, but also ethnic minorities (Particularly the Kurds) were urged by the regime to embrace this 'laic ethnocracy' which was based on two identities: Turkism and secularism. As Mustapha Kemal Atatürk had designed modern Turkey as a secular nation-state instead of an Islamic Empire, political Islam found itself in the opposition (Azgin, 2012, 84). According to Ernest Gellner, Atatürk's revolution was successful in Westernising the Turkish way of life exclusively at the elite level. The majority of Anatolian people were still reflecting features of Asian and Islamic societies (Kıralp, 2014, 65). The ruling party of this period was the Republican People's Party (CHP). The policies of secularization implemented against religion in the single party period (1923-1946) were challenged by radical and sometimes violent attitudes of Islamist circles (Yavuz, 2005, 116).

After the efforts to transition to democracy, which was tried during the single party period, did not yield results, it began to show the existence of a multi-party political process as a result of its efforts to integrate with the world system in the 1945's. Political Islam will try to get on the political stage with an effort to integrate itself into the system in this developing and transforming process (Vergin, 2000, 51).

The Republic of Turkey has passed a multi-party political life in 1946. However, this transition emerged as a result of the events that took place in and outside the world before 1946. İsmet İnönü who was elected President after Atatürk's

death on November 10, 1938, brought some of his close friends who were left out of politics to important political and administrative positions (Haenni, 2011, 70). However, since Atatürk's charismatic personality was not found in İsmet İnönü, some additional measures were taken in order to manage the country as before. These measures are mainly aimed at preventing the formation and development of any opposite political group (Serter, 2010, 92).

In terms of international policy, similar trends are observed in European states. For example, in Spain, Franco; In Portugal, Salazar managed similarly their country. These states II. After World War II, they did not change these administrative structures. However, it is known that it is possible to take part in the Western alliance after the war through a democratic system (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 97). Based on this fact, wanting to get involved in the management of the Republic of Turkey and the Western alliance has worked to fulfill the need for adopting a democratic environment by making certain administrative changes.

3.8 Political Islam and the Demokrat Party

After the Second World War in Turkey affected the social sectors in a changing world, and the apparent mobility had occurred (Bulaç, 2005, 37). Meanwhile, the trade and agriculture bourgeoisie, which had made a certain improvement, wanted to get rid of the narrow forms of the one party. The interests of the bourgeoisie, which were surrounded by land reform after the wealth tax, led to an increase in the demands for democracy. The changing world conditions forced the multi-party system (Er, 2016, 162).

In the period of these developments, the Demokrat Party (DP) was established on 7 January 1946. It can be said that liberal and democratic ideas dominate the party's program. In addition, free choice, not to be used in the politics of religion, to give special importance to the initiative, to encourage the establishment of unions were the main lines of the program of the party (Erkilet, 2005, 195). On the other hand, the commitment to Atatürk was shown by including six principles.

Celal Bayar draws attention to the fact that religious politics will be in harmony with the freedom of the future with the transition to multi-party life (El-Sayed, 2017, 84). He even argued that this air had already arrived in the country and signaled that the CHP had adopted a religious policy that was different from the one-party period. Celal Bayar, in the multi-party system, argued that no matter which party was in power, his attitude towards religion would be more flexible than that of a single-party period. However, he did not speak clearly about his party's religious policy.

This is the attitude adopted by Celal Bayar and his colleagues before the May 14, 1950 elections (Kurtoğlu, 2013, 66). With the transition to multi-party life, the traditionalist / religious group started to interpret all political events from their own perspective. In this period, one of the most influential writers of the religious circles, Sebilürreşad's co-author Eşref Edib stated that the CHP did not understand the influence of religion on society and that it crushed national conscience for twenty years by not attaching importance to religious lessons (Tekin, 2005, 67). He said that he had broken the order he had established between his works, weakened the spirituality under the curtain of secularism, and that this was the political reaction. In the process of these debates, Şemsettin Günaltay, a religious scholar who had grown up in the madrasa, was appointed as prime minister. According to religious circles, the DP seemed to be more liberal in religious matters compared to the CHP, but religious politics were not yet clear (Türkmen, 2008), 71. In the general elections of 1950, DP came into power by enjoying a clear and overwhelming victory against CHP (Milliyet, 13 October 1950, p.1).

3.9 Milli Nizam Party and Milli Selamet Party

The opinions on the establishment of a islamic party in Turkey were mature between 1965 and 1969. The Milli Nizam Party, the first truly Islamic party, was founded on January 26, 1970 (Cumhuriyet, 27 January 1970, p.1) with the sign of Nakshibendi Sheikh Mehmet Zahid Kotku. The emblem was a left fist that lifted his index finger. In the party where Necmettin Erbakan came to the presidency. There were names such as Tevfik Paksu, Süleyman Arif Emre, Hasan Aksay and Fehmi Cumalioğlu (Kurtoğlu, 2013). Two deputies were

transferred from the Adalet Party and started to be represented in the assembly with three members.

Milli Nizam Party's program was summarized as "National Opinion." Following the March 12, 1971 military coup, an investigation was opened against the party, which was declared pro-Sharia, and closed in 1972 (Knudsen, 2003, 32). While Erbakan was on his way to Switzerland, other party leaders also headed the companies they founded with important capitals. MNP was beginning to be independent for the first time in the political arena through the educated elites of the religious group, who had been used as a ballot for many years by the right-wing Parties (Mert 2005, 41).

Necmettin Erbakan was brought into the leadership seat of the party, which was claimed to have been established by a shura with the support of certain sects and communities, and the leaders of these organizations. He has frequently used religious discourse in explaining the projects of the Party that affect all areas of life. It is the emphasis of this party that it is decided by considering Islamic sensitivities in its existing programs (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 110). MNP was the bearer of an eclectic discourse which emphasized historical support, and which had a high level of Islamic sensibility but that sought to find a solution within the system.

MNP was closed with the Constitutional Court decision after 12 March coup. The Constitutional Court had justified the reason that the MNP had taken a stand against the principles of the regime and that it had been closed because it had moved towards the conflict (Güzel, 2000, 91). According to the administration, which took the decision of March 12, it is stated that the only way to save the nation from its worst situation is to stick to the principles of the regime and that MNP is closed because it contains a religious ideology. (White, 2013, 342).

The growing power of political Islam, which turned into an effective opposition ideology in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in the 1970s, led the National Opinion Movement to play an encouraging role. However, the

National Opinion Movement's historical background and ideological formation is difficult to keep outside of Turkey on the dynamics of the distinctive marks (Savran, 2013, 212). It is also interesting to note that the RP grew rapidly in the 1990s, when political Islam was significantly under control in the region, not in the early 1980s, when political Islam was transformed into a very important social-political power in the Middle East. Thus National Opinion Movement in the Middle East is not in the Islamic political development, to make sense of Turkey's dynamic is more accurate (Türköne, 1991, 130).

In Turkey in the 1970s, with the establishment of MNP, political Islamism managed to gather massive support. MNP was later banned and its cadres established the MSP. This process has gained considerable success even though the periods of its political history have survived. Because, because of the modernization efforts of the regime, the society has been tried to be removed from the religion and experienced great problems (Türköne, 1991, 67). According to modernists, the idea that a religion based religion that could not be integrated into modernism would not be successful in this way would be a party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan (Yaşar, 2005, 305).

Milli Nizam Party's fathers and the names involved in the establishment of many debates. One of these is the Naqshbandi Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku, whose name is also found in the MSP establishment. M. Zahit Kotku, the leader of the Iskender Pasha community affiliated with the Nakshibendi order, was interested in all the economic, political and social problems of the country and encouraged his students (Oruç, 2009, 150). Kotku, who is familiar with politics, thinks that the time has come for an Islamic party that da can stand on its feet ğ because of the hope of the Justice Party, it has established the name MNP, which it has established itself. M. Zahit Kotku was the person who determined Erbakan as the head of the party.

Necmettin Erbakan's political life as a member of parliament began when he applied for a candidate MP from the Justice Party before the MNP. However, this application was vetoed by Süleyman Demirel. This veto event can be considered as opening a new era in Turkish political life with Erbakan being

one of the factors that led to the establishment of MNP (Özdenören, 2005, 60). MNP was founded on January 26, 1970; Press and public were described as supportive of Islam in Turkey legally and managers of the new party. The main reason for the characterization of MNP is the political views and attitudes of the party founders.

MNP has taken its place in Turkish political life as a party where political Islamist accumulation is gathered under one roof. Within this party, there are political Islamic intellectuals, members of the religious sects and a social base that wants religion to dominate social life, the ethnic elements that the Republican regime excludes and fundamentalist religious organizations (Yıldızoğlu, 2008, 278). Although MNP did not play an important role in Turkish political life until it was closed, it took its place in history as the first experience of political Islamist Parties in terms of the following processes. The greatest misfortune of MNP is the fact that their cadres live under the umbrella of this party for their inexperience in terms of political accumulation. In 1971, it was decided to shut down about MNP, which is said to be pro-sharia (Yaşar, 2005, 121).

3.10 Political Islam in Turkey Period of Refah Party (RP)

When all the political Parties were closed after the coup, they sought the support needed by many politicians. Religious education was made a constitutional necessity and imam hatip graduates opened doors to universities other than theology (Şimşek, 2005, 194). Thus, religious education was removed from being a vocational school and became an alternative education system.

Founded in 1983, the Refah Party was not allowed to enter the elections, ANAP had an advantage. Turgut Özal, who evaluated this well, received the support of almost all Islamists. Özal, who was a Nakşi of the İskender Pasha lodge, was accepted from the MSP base (Yavuz, 2008, 366). ANAP's leader, Turgut Özal became successful in re-designing Turkey in an economically liberal and socially conservative manner. He enjoyed overwhelming support from various segments of the society, including the religious ones and he

became the leader of a significant transformation in Turkish politics (Sezal and Dağı, 2001, 103). With the referendum held in 1987, the ban on politics was abolished and the RP, which came to the point of recovery again, brought the Erbakan to the party presidency and the senior management to the MSP. In the 1989 local elections, Erbakan achieved great success (Yankaya, 2014, 412). From the early elections of 1991, sixteen percent of the vote came. The fact that the Sivas massacre in this period took place within the boundaries of the FP is that it was the result of the polarization of the secular-Muslim comparison put forward by the Islamist section. It was engraved in the memories by trying to kill the opposite group as an enemy of religion (Türkmen, 2008, 140).

1994 local elections became the victory of political Islam. The Refah Party, which won the mayor of 28 provinces, also received Ankara and Istanbul. The inhabitants of the big cities, who did not get used to the metropolitan cities and saw the moral values as corrupt and decayed, considered religion and RP as a refuge (White, 2013, 288). The intense propaganda, especially in shanty houses, has a great influence on this.

After September 12th, the RP made the main religion of Islam and thus made the political Islam a fundamental determinant in Turkish politics. And Erbakan became prime minister in 1995 elections. In January 1997, the 28 February process, which was described as a post-modern coup due to the Jerusalem night organized by the Sincan Municipality, took place (Türköne, 1991, 132). On 28 February 1997, the NSC met with military personnel, combat with resistance and eight-year uninterrupted training. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), which opposed to the cadre of the RP, maintained its insistence on eight years of basic education.

3.11 Rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The first political fracture in Milli Görüş was revealed in 2000. At the 1st Congress of FP held on 14 May 2000, the disagreement between traditionalist and innovative wings was very clear. The nominees of the island were Abdullah Gül, 521, while the traditionalist Recai Kutan received 633 votes

(Serter, 2010, 363). After the closure of the FP, the traditionalist deputies who supported Recai Kutan went through the Felicity Party. At the Fazilet Party congress, the innovators who supported Abdullah Gül were separated and then Abdullah Gül moved to the AKP under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Axiarlis, 2012, 50).

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) was founded in 2001 under the founding chairmanship of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current leader. The party's leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, stated that AKP's position in the political spectrum is Conservative Democracy (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 59). Although the party is seen as part of the national vision movement by some opponents, Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a speech that we have removed the shirt of the National Opinion. Erdoğan became rather popular among conservatives in Turkey as well as some liberal circles when he became a victim of Kemalist regime. He was imprisoned due to a poem when he was the major of Istanbul.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1923 AND 2018

4.1 The Birth of Turkish Republic: Secularism Versus Political Islam

During the war of independence and Republican period, promoting Islamism was actually no different at all from promoting the continuation of the Empire and the Caliphate (Yavuz, 2005, 289). It is possible to describe the political environment in this period as a projection of Ottoman politics after 1908. In the political environment of the Empire after 1908, the Ittihat and Terakki (Union and Progress) Party and the Hürriyet and İtilaf (Freedom and Agreement) Party were independent mass Parties represented in the Ottoman Assembly. Ittihat ve Terakki was a political party that emerged from the community that carried out the revolution (Vergin, 2000, 184). This party was very large and

had a different structure with different aspirations under the roof, which has the right and left wings in itself was a non-homogeneous structure.

The Hürriyet and Itilaf Party did not have a structure different from Ittihat and Terakki. The Freedom and Agreement Party was the largest and most powerful opposition party of the Second Constitutional Monarchy. As of November 1911, when it was founded, Fırka was rapidly growing as the focus of opposition to the Union and Progress, which had held a monopoly on the first day of the revolution (Tekin, 2005, 205). Because of this popularity, the illegivists, including the former Unionists, are a much more heterogeneous mass party than the one in which they oppose the ideas of a democratically opposing crowd, such as the Democratic and Socialist frigates. In the post-1908 period, despite the multi-party political order, political representation in the constituent assembly was carried out through groups (Tuğ, 2011, 136).

Kemalists, who were organized in Anatolia during the years of national struggle, had to struggle with a dispersed group led by members of the civil servants who had been removed from their posts and who were usually the party of peers. The majority of the latter group was Islamists and conservatives (Şimşek, 2005, 94). The second group, in its role in the parliament, was a strong opposition focus, especially in 1922, against Mustafa Kemal's personality and the national struggle. Şerif Mardin states that Islamic institutions play an important role in the continuation of the struggle during the independence war on the mobilization of Islamism on the masses during the independence war of Turkey. Şerif Mardin, who thought that the organization against the invasion in Anatolia was carried out by religious leaders in many places, argued that the Islamic leaders should take part in the assembly (Savran, 2013, 201).

The second main purpose of the Group liberation movement, they see salvation as liberation from the bondage of the authorities in the Islamic caliphate and Turkey's geography. However, the legitimacy perception of the Constitutionalism Islamism regarding the functioning of religion and state has

been carried to the second group (Yankaya, 2014, 160). On 1 November 1922, the second group voted in favor of the abolition of the Sultanate.

Discussions at the Turkish Parliament during the transition from the Empire to the Republic give an explicit example of the second group's concerns about Islamic legitimacy. The Islamic politics of that period can be defined by the liberation of the Khilafah authority and the view of jihad under the leadership of the Caliph. Because the political discourse of the first generation of Islamism in the period of occupation and national struggle is aimed at the Islamic symbols and their legitimacy (Axiarlis, 2012, 156). The ideas and works of Mehmet Akif Ersoy, himself a member of the second group, reflect the perspective of the second group. Mustafa Kemal and the other members of the first group, in the beginning of the national struggle for the purpose of the salvation of the caliphate authority showed; but the current discourse difference here is on the institution that will lead the war and the venue of this institution (Delibaş, 2015, 247).

4.2 Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party

Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party (Progressive Republican Party) is the first opposition party in the history of the Republic of Turkey. Kazim Karabekir who was the old gun and his case friends of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was founded on 17 November 1924 under the leadership of Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet Bele and Adnan Adivar (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 190). Due to the Sheikh Said Rebellion, which started in February 1925, the Progressive Republican Party was exposed to criticism by the ruling party. Ali Fethi Okyar, the prime minister of the period, resigned, and by taking the vote of confidence, İsmet Pasha, who was the prime minister, introduced the law of Takrir-i Sükun and paved the way for serious penalties for the press. In the meantime, the closure of the TCF is accelerated and the settlement is closed on 5 June 1925 (Güzel, 2000, 253). On June 14, 1926, some pashas were arrested after the Izmir Assassination and they were tried with the death sentence. However, these commanders, including Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Pasha, who Participated in the War of Independence, were rescued with the special amnesty of Gazi

Mustafa Kemal Pasha as a result of the protests of Turkish army officers (Lewis, 2007, 77).

The Sheikh Sait Rebellion began on 13 February. The government in the 15 riot zone has declared strict governance. It was claimed that TCF conducted religious propaganda in Elaziz, Genç, Muş, Ergani, Dersim, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Urfa, Siverek, Siirt, Bitlis, Van, Hakkari, Kiğı and Hınıs. Ali Fethi resigned from his office. CHF brought Ismet Pasha to head. Takrir-i Sükun Law was adopted on 4 March (Şentürk, 2011, 352). The reasons for the closure of the Progressive Republican Party are in fact a consequence of the party's causes and the structure that created it. The reasons for the closure of the party can be listed as follows:

- During the Sheikh Sait Rebellion, some party rulers established close relations with those involved in the uprising and provided material and moral support for the Republican regime.
- The motto of the Republic of Turkey establishing leadership "sovereignty belongs to the nation", respectively. However, TCF, which had many feudal elements in it, supported the Kurdish feudal lords in the East and showed that it was against it.
- It became a sanctuary for sultanate-caliphists and counter-revolutionaries.
- The leading staff of the CHF believed that the Turkish nation could be transformed not by evolution, but by revolution. the new new steps could slow down, even stop, the massive social transformation. They feared that the TCF would harm the new-born Republic.

4.3 Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, The Menemen Incident and Islamist Revolts

At the stage of the establishment of the Serbest Cumhuriyet (Liberal Republican Party), the only thing that Mustafa Kemal wanted was to remain faithful to the principles of the secular Republic. The reactionary circles, which benefited from the economic hardship of the world economic crisis of 1929-1930 in the Aegean region, gave the opportunity to this new party and saw that the secular principles of the Republic were in danger. Mustafa Kemal gave up

this multi-party trial (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 112). Thirty-five days after the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party decided to disperse, there was another uprising in Menemen on 23 December 1930 in Izmir.

Although the idea of Islamic religion was based on judgment and logic, the clergy became increasingly vicious and ignorant of their laziness about acquiring knowledge, and they made religious rules and duties a pile of meaningless figures. The fear that will be opened to innovations after this becoming, and the concessions to be made, can destroy this reactionary order of interests have clamped together (Can, 2016, 66). The ignorant ignorant so-called religious clergy, over the years, have developed the technique of refraining from and embracing the innovations and the direct escape of innovations and the hostility of the people to these ideas. The black-minded abhorrent clan who was always fed with these suggestions always had the opportunity to scatter their poisons even a small number (Axiarlis, 2012, 200). They have found a few people who think like them in a few places because of their ignorance, they think that the day they came, they rebelled.

With the proclamation of the Republic, the revolutionary movements in line with the secular order and worldview led to reactions of the environment bound by religious rules. The abolition of the caliphate, the closure of the madrasahs, the dervish lodges, the lodges and tombs, the unification of the teaching and the adoption of the Civil Code have revitalized those circles who defended the old order and wished to return to it at the earliest opportunity (Er, 2016, 114). However, because they did not want to come forward by expressing their thoughts, they started to prepare for secretly.

The Menemen Incident was prepared by members of the Naqshbandi tariqa. Sheikh Esat, the leader of the sect, retreated to the Erenköy mansion in Istanbul after the closure of the dervish lodges and lodges, but he continued his activities through the Caliph and his followers (Cumhuriyet, 26 December 1930, p.1; Can, 2016). Shaykh Esat is known as Kutbilaktab and this title, which means the pole of the poles, is given to the person, who is known by the religious order as the material and spiritual head of the religious community at

every period. The thing is Laz Ibrahim, one of the most trusted men of Esat. As Esad Ibrahim was appointed as the Caliphate in Manisa region, a great movement started in the activities of the tariqat in the region (Halk Dostu 28 December 1930; Aydın, 2005).

While Naqshibestis continue their activities with secret meetings, Ibrahim, who started to teach at Muradiye Mosque, has been trying to influence young people, tradesmen and apprentices. The idea is that the young people who cannot find work due to economic problems and who do not earn their livelihood will have great support if they enter the cult and the coins collected from Sheikh Esat for help from the environment are distributed to those entering the cult branch (Cumhuriyet, 29 December 1930, p.1, Erdoğan, 2006). The Naqshbandi, one of the most conservative sects of Islam, was also influential in the Sheikh Said rebellion, and it was understood that Sheikh Esat had a relationship with Sheikh Sait (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, 45). In the early 1930s, the troubles that started with social, political and economic reasons had enabled the establishment of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party and some individuals and groups who opposed the revolutions to enter this party or to appear alongside them and work according to their own thoughts. In the new party meetings, it was encouraged to openly denounce the government, to denounce religion, to open the face of women, to wear a hat and to return to the Sharia system (Knudsen, 2003, 39). In this environment where the government seems weak, the Naqshbandi tariq decided to take action with the Cretan Dervis Mehmet, who claimed that he was the Mahdi by finding supporters. In order to explain the caliphate coming back and the end of the Republican order, Menemen, a small town with a population of 4000 or 5000, was chosen in those years (Kurtoğlu, 2013, 132).

Cretan Mehmet, who declared himself the Mahdi, decided to take action with his six friends, saying that religion is going hand in hand. Cretan Mehmet and his men went to Pasakoy on 7 December and they were armed. Bozalan, a village of one of the disciples, is an area where migrants from Rumelia were settled in 1924. Although the people of the village is Muslim, most of them have no religious knowledge (İşcan, 2011, 41). Derviş Mehmet and his friends who

decided to take advantage of this situation decided to stay in the village. However, since they could not move in the village comfortably, they built a hut at Sünbüller Mountain near the village and continued their chanting for 15 days.

On the morning of 23 December 1930, Derviş Mehmet and his followers, who arrived early in Menemen, brought tekbirs and turned towards Mufti Mosque in the bazaar. Derviş Mehmet, who entered the mosque as an armed, introduced 8-10 elderly people to the morning prayer as the Mahdi, and claimed that he had come to the religious protection and that the army of 70 thousand caliphs would soon come and unite with him (Oruç, 2009, 130). Dervish, until noon under the banner of the sword to pass the threat of those who did not gather. Dervis and his followers, who headed to the Council Square from here, started to bring the flag, which is considered to be the symbol of the Sharia, to a pit and bring a tomb around it. Meanwhile, the people of the morning prayer came to open their shops and began to gather in the square (Özdalga, 2006, 243). Propaganda has been made here. It was claimed that those who were wearing hats would be infidels soon. Some of those who took part in this call began to join them and the people who joined Derviş soon reached 100 people.

In the meantime, some sensitive citizens to inform the police forces on the incident, the first place came to the event gendarmerie writer Ali Efendi. Fahri Okray came directly from his house to the scene of the incident and it was seen that he met with Derviş Mehmet and wanted to learn his purpose (Er, 2016, 302). Derviş Mehmet insulted Fahri Okray, the Commander of the squadron, on the grounds that he was Mahdi, disseminated religiously and threatened that he could not resist himself. Upon these developments, the commander of the region had to withdraw from the scene to take measures. Derviş Mehmet, who took courage from this event, has increased his influence on the public rapidly. The commander of the gendarmerie headquarters requested military assistance from the 43rd Regiment by telephone (Güzel, 2000, 114). The lieutenant Kubilay went to the scene with a detachment. Kubilay, who did not take his gun even when he was leaving the barracks and

who had only maneuver bullets on his team, moved quickly to the scene upon the duty given to him by the Regiment Command (Haenni, 2011, 153).

The lieutenant Kubilay, who came to the scene, left his soldiers with the crowd and went to the rebels alone and warned Derviş Mehmet to leave his weapons immediately and demand a surrender. This time Derviş Mehmet saw that the business was tight and fired his pistol and wounded the young subordinate (Er, 2016, 53). Seeing that their commanders were wounded, the soldiers opened fire with their maneuvering bullets, but Mehmet and his followers were even more encouraged to see that the bullets did not do anything to them. Kubilay, who was wounded in the event of an uproar, started to run from the ground to the nearby Gazez Mosque. However, when they reached there, they were stacked up again. Neither the military nor the public received any help. The disciples of Derviş Mehmet attacked Kubilay with a saw blade and attacked Kublai and separated his head from the trunk after a short struggle (Gerges, 2014, 63). Derviş Mehmet started to wander the Menemen by connecting Kubilay's cut head with a rope to the flagpole. Those who want to intervene in the incident by declaring the guns were only young neighborhood guards, Hasan and Şevki Bey. One of the rebels was killed in the confrontation of the rebels and the guards. But the two guards were martyred by the rebels (Gülalp, 1998, 142).

This incident in Menemen was a reactionary form of secular law and a reactionary uprising against the Republic. President Mustafa Kemal learned this reactionary incident in Edirne and got very angry (Knudsen, 2003, 142). On December 27th, the Speaker of the Grand National Assembly, Kazım Özalp, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya and Chief of General Staff Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Second Army Commander Fahrettin Altay went to İstanbul and gave detailed information to Mustafa Kemal about the incident in Dolmabahçe Palace. This reactionary event, starting with Atatürk in the government as well as the Parliament and the public gave rise to harsh reactions. The Council of Ministers, convened under the chairmanship of Prime Minister İsmet İnönü on 31 December 1930, saw the Menemen Incident as an insurrection against the social order (Mert, 2005, 144).

During this bitter event in Menemen, big rallies were organized in many cities and the young people gave incident the promise of preserving and living the Republic forever Men. Furthermore, in hundreds of telegrams from these provinces, the incident was condemned very strongly (Gülalp, 1998, 56). The Menemen Incident is considered to be a reactionary movement organized by exploiters and religious senses exploiters. As a matter of fact, in the court process, it was revealed that the event was not extensive and comprehensive and it was content to intimidate the practices. Criminals involved were punished but the Menemen was not evacuated and the punishment of all Menemen people was not used. In the memory of the martyrs who lost their lives in the negative developments, a memorial was built in Menemen with the initiative of Cumhuriyet newspaper (Erkilet, 2015, 64).

After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey for the transition to a multiparty democratic life in the second step it was realized with the establishment of the Free Republican Party (Gülalp, 1998, 112). This party, which was founded with the encouragement and indoctrination of President Mustafa Kemal, will cause a re-emergence of some debates in Turkish political life. 1930 has been a period of a number of difficulties and troubles in Turkey (Özdenören, 2005, 60). In Particular, the revolutions that took place very quickly after one another and the various measures taken in this regard, the reaction of the opposition group and increased the resistance against the government. In addition to this, in October 1929 and the outbreak of the economic crisis engulfed the entire world in a short time has been able to impress Turkey (Lewis, 2007, 321).

President Mustafa Kemal is concerned about the outbreak of growing discontent in the society, the press and the TBMM, and the loss of central control. Mustafa Kemal, who did not want to turn the economic and political crisis into a social explosion, considered the establishment of an opposition party to solve all these problems (Şentürk, 2011, 275). As a matter of fact, the revolution that has become an inseparable part of the Republic must be protected separately.

In 1930, such developments in the political environment, the Republican People's Party, a soft policy to allow the opposition to follow, will be the most important factor in the establishment of the Free Republic Party. The positive results of the Progressive Republican Party, founded in 1924, had its own reasons (Vergin, 2000, 342). The party was born without being aware of the political regime yet. The founders were early and did not dominate the party. In the past 5 years, every sector should have taken some lessons from that experience (Yavuz, 2005, 205). Consequently, it was thought that a second party to be established under the leadership of the most prominent and most reliable people of the Republic would eliminate some problems and that the government would be controlled more effectively.

Mustafa Kemal acted directly for the establishment of a new party with this thought and assumption. For the chairmanship of the organization against the CHF, the former Prime Minister Fethi Okyar, who is known for his moderation and being a very old friend, chose him (Türküne, 1991, 153). On August 16, 1930, the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party accelerated its efforts to organize and disseminate at the national level in its new building in Nazli Han.

The New Party was not very efficient in Parliament because it was established during the holiday period in the Grand National Assembly. However, the party, which can Participate in only 13 sessions of the Assembly from its foundation to its closure, has managed to have a part in the sessions (Yücekök, 1997, 117). Serbest Cumhuriyet Party criticized Cumhuriyet Halk Party and its government for very heavy charges and said to the press that Fethi Okyar told the press; He said that the construction of the railway had imposed taxes exceeding the power of a single generation, that the monopolies were too heavy for the people, that the value of money fell day by day, and therefore foreign capital did not come (El-Sayed, 2017, 70). These discourses have caused the tension between the two Parties to increase. In addition, Fethi Okyar, after his speech, suggested that Atatürk's words, which he wanted to come to power in the shortest time possible, came to power. Atatürk was the following; you are trying to take power in a few months immediately (Dabashi

and Sayyid, 2015, 204). You never tolerate waiting. If you fall down and replace what is in power today, will you be able to keep this country in confidence and peace? In these words, Atatürk both warned and expressed his concern.

While discussions continued, Serbest Cumhuriyet Party executives believed that they would come to power in the first election based on the support they found in the press and the public. The great interest of the people against his party, Fethi Okyar and his friends in Izmir trip has emerged with all the openness (Gerges, 2014, 80). On 3 September 1930, the leader of the party, Fethi Okyar, went to Izmir to form the party organization and was greeted by an unprecedented crowd of people. This great interest shown to the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party worried the Cumhuriyet Halk Party people's (Fuller, 2016, 112). In fact, the Governor of Izmir, Kazim Dirik, who wanted to prevent the speech of Fethi Okyar, became soft with Mustafa Kemal's intervention and the problem was solved. In the meantime, Denizli deputy Haydar Rüştü Anatolian newspaper against the Serbest Party has written the last drop in the glass (Karam, 2003, 50). People's Party members, who saw that there was no way to prevent the annulment of Fethi Okyar, began to take measures to ensure that the crowd was not large. The supporters of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party, who came to meet Fethi Okyar in Izmir, gathered in front of the İzmir Palas Hotel, and the supporters of the Cumhuriyet Halk Party gathered in the İkinci Beyler Street and Bahribaba Park and started to perform demonstrations and shout slogans.

The people of the Cumhuriyet Halk Party started to get excited after the stoning and dismantling of the central building. The stones thrown by the crowd during the events caused a commissioner and gendarmerie injured. As the incident worsened, the security forces opened fire into the air to disperse the angry crowd, and the demonstrators responded by throwing stones at the fire (Knudsen, 2003, 90). During the brawl, a teenage student named Necati Kemal died at the age of 14, and 7 people were wounded in various places. In the meantime, the angry crowd was not dispersed and Fethi Okyar was walking towards Izmir Palas Hotel where he stayed (Lewis, 2007, 134). The ideas of the leader of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party, Fethi Okyar, were not

enough to calm the angry crowd. The group was forced to intervene in the community for the second time, when the group called "blood to the blood". Meanwhile, a 12-year-old boy was shot dead as a result of the fire. These two events were dead and fifteen people were seriously injured (Savran, 2013, 30). A large crowd gathered in Izmir Alsancak Stadium on 7 September following the appeasement of the events. Under the great security measures, the President of the Free Republican Party, Fethi Okyar, who came to the podium at sixteen o'clock to make his speech, criticized the Cumhuriyet Halk Party on the basis of liberal understanding based on its own party programs (Knudsen, 2003). In the meantime, it is seen that some of the protesters removed the hats and threw them to the ground. At the opening of the party organization in İzmir and Karşıyaka, Fethi Okyar and his friends moved to Menemen, Manisa, Aydın and Balıkesir by train in order to establish a new organization in the Aegean region (Haenni, 2011, 45). On 13 September 1930, Fethi Okyar returned to Bandırma from Balıkesir and returned to İstanbul. Thus, the journey of the Serbest Party leader covering Izmir and the Aegean region was completed.

On the events of Izmir, Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat is also very important to resign his Ministry on 21 September 1930. Mahmut Esat, who stated that the incidents of resignation will be bad for the Turkish nation and the reforms, clearly demonstrates the extent of the incidents caused by the Serbest Party and the attitude of the government (Lewis, 2007, 152). In fact, it is noteworthy that the rulers of the Sultanate and the Caliphate had the opportunity to know the opportunity in a way that could not be abducted and immediately entered into reactionary activities.

The Participation of the Serbest Party in municipal elections after the eventful tour of Izmir has further exacerbated the discussions. The importance of these elections is that for the first time a single-ranking election system will be implemented and that women will vote in these elections (Türküne, 1991, 150). These elections are important both for Turkish women and for the settlement of democracy in society. Despite all the positive and negative opinions of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party, which he will attend the beginning of the end for

these elections and 1930 municipal elections, Turkey's political life is bad leave traces.

When the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party decided to Participate in the elections, it was seen that the candidates started to multiply. The municipal elections were not completed in one day despite the single-grade elections. But the days passed, but the number of people who came to use the game was very few (Tuğ, 2011, 153). The Serbest Party, on the other hand, placed itself in the position of representative of a whole group of dissatisfied and those who wanted to vote for the party were running into the polls with enthusiasm as if they were competing with each other. This unexpected interest, the people of the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party was concerned. The reason for all of this was to seek the influence of frustration and resentment in the people rather than the general program of the Serbest Party (Savran, 2013, 105). Because the common points in the large crowd gathered around the Serbest Party were generally economic troubles and reaction to the one-party system. There were various thoughts in this group of people who were relentless in their thoughts, eager to take revenge, to the detrimentists, to provocateurs, to the reactionaries, and to anyone who was in trouble. However, the only thing that could hold all these people together was freedom (Özdalga, 2006, 23).

The elections in the entire country are generally based on the results of the event and the completion of the 10-day period. SCF managers have never acknowledged that the results of these elections reflect the truth, according to which the results are obtained through corruption and oppression (Aydın, 2005, 142). As a matter of fact, these allegations will be brought to the agenda in the TBMM apart from the statements published in the press. Serbest Cumhuriyet Party, on October 2, 1930, the Assembly session by giving information about the subject, on October 15, the opening of a general meeting was established. The Cumhuriyet Halk Party voted against the difficulties of voting for the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party in the municipal elections (Bekele and Sookhdeo, 2015, 69). In fact, the basis of events in elections is based on earlier. On 5 September 1930, the Ministry of Interior sent a letter to all the governorships, and recently they demanded reactionary and destructive

activities against the Republic, and officials are required to take all measures. It can be said that these circulars contain measures to be taken against the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party. With this circular, the Ministry officially forces the officials to act politically and asks them to decide on the basis of their political ideas (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 63).

Konya Deputy Refik Koraltan said that Fethi Okyar was provoking provocations. He was distanced from being a protector of Republicanism and of revolutions. For the quick and easy success, the purity of the people was desired. For this reason, all kinds of remedies have been made and especially the taxes will be removed by saying that effective policies will be created (Bulaç, 2005, 205). In addition, it was said that the hat would be removed, the new Turkish letters would be thrown, the madrasahs would be reopened, the Qur'an courses would be put into schools and the caliphate would be brought back.

The people tried to explain that the Parties had won the elections by working serially and seriously, and that the free Parties had to take into account what they had done where they wanted to be accountable, and that they should be ashamed of it (Bilici, 2001, 61). They said that the Halk Party members had won the elections by working seriously and seriously. The Serbest Party tried to tell the government to take account of what they had done in the place they wanted to account for, giving examples that they should be ashamed (Axiarlis, 2012, 73). The Parties mutually accused each other of being away from seriousness, changing words, and demagoguery, and ultimately the proposals were submitted to the vote. Şükrü Kaya's comments were deemed sufficient and the rejection of Fethi Okyar was rejected by 222 votes. Fethi Okyar, who made a motion to discuss the corruption related to the elections, fell to the criminal case and, more specifically, to the defendant while he was a plaintiff. Fethi Okyar, who understood that he could not accept his justification in the negotiations, decided to close the party and sent the petition to the Ministry of Interior on 17 November 1930 for the dissolution of the party (Duran, 2005, 140).

The charges against the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party are primarily Islamist activities. Almost all Halk Party lawmakers, especially the government, have stated that the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party has been occupied by reactionary supporters and that this situation has fuelled the reactionary activities and that the only responsible for the events is the free party. However, some authors do not agree with the fact that the Serbest Cumhuriyet Party has been closed down or there are anti-revolutionary forces inside the party. Regardless of the views, as in the case of the 1925 Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party, it is a fact that in the Serbest Cumhuriyet party trial, the regime and revolutionary opponents are gathered in Parties. This situation is a threat to the future of the Republic and revolutions. As a matter of fact, both the Serbest Party and the Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Party experience have shown this clearly, and the reaction against Menemen on 23 December 1930 will prove this right (Akdoğan, 2000, 309).

During the 14-year period between 1924 and 1938, many separatist and reactionary activities took place in Turkey. Among these separatist activities, three are more conspicuous than the others. These are: Seyh Sait Uprising, Ağrı Uprising and Dersim Uprising. These three separatist activities have been effective both in large areas and for a long time. The other divisive activities of the period are small and short revolts which are shaped around these riots. Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia is the region where we look at the regions where divisive activities occur. During this period, the separatist activities in these regions, published by the General Staff Military History Department, the uprising in the Republic of Turkey (1924-1938) in the book are given in the following below;

4.4 From Millet Party to Milli Nizam Party

In a process from the 1950s to the present, the state institutions and Particularly the multi-party system has helped to foster political Islam. In Particular, policies based on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis developed against the left and minorities, Particularly Kurds in the period of 12 March and 12 September led to the rapid development and strengthening of political Islam (El-Sayed, 2017, 145). In this process, Islamic capital made significant

economic investments that contributed to capital transfers and political activity. Political Islam, which has placed its ideological orientation in all areas of state and social life, has been an important force in politics by making extraordinary use of the social impact of religion (Erdoğan, 2006, 111). The power of political Islam stems from state, society and politics relations the system itself.

Since 1947, Turkey has become an indisputable fact that a country should direct the United States. In this process, the use of religion as an instrument of the US's strategy of encircling communism (Berkes, 1984, 40). The US supported Islamist movements within the Green Belt Doctrine. The use of religion against the left movement as a result of the dialectics of these two elements resulted in the opening of the political Islamists and the National Order Party of Necmettin Erbakan was born of such a need (Can, 2016, 60). While the front of political Islam was opened, the masses were deceived by the coming of the Sharia and the danger of reaction. But in the last process reached in Turkey 'moderate Islam' it is set forth a new project and guided us have come to a party ruling Islamist in this project to the country and after the government Taking successfully the struggle for hegemony between their ideological views 'moderate Islam' began to make itself felt in every sense levels of government (Dabashi and Sayyid, 2015, 362).

After the one-party rule, Islamist movements and ideologies live together with the nature of the most important representatives of the Islamic traditionalists thought yöneldi. 1945-1950 during the right-wing Parties is the National Party (Aydın, 2005, 173). The MP was strongly opposed by the Islamists. After MP, Islamists generally supported AP until the National Order Party (MNP) was established. MNP was founded on 26 January 1970. Representing the interests of young tradesmen, MNP, despite being characterized as an Islamic party, did not hesitate to openly attack secularism by using a shy Islamic discourse until its closure (Ete, 2003, 56). For secularism in the program of the party; We are opposed to any understanding that transforms secularism into the form of anti-religionism.

MNP is the first small but significant step towards the formation of an independent Islamic movement in Turkey. MNP, who refrained from presenting its Islamic identity due to the laws in force, stated that the Islamic system was an advocate and which method to establish this system with implicit and unclear expressions (Haenni, 2011, 321).

4.5 12 September and Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

The economic crisis of the 1970s and decisions of January 24 by military coup in Turkey work to unravel the unprecedented human rights violations, has led to the shrinking of democratic and civic life (Ete, 2003, 329). While closing political Parties in parliament, rights such as labor unions and collective bargaining agreements were banned. Unlike a new hegemonic project in Turkey 70 broad sectors of society to articulate the dominant politics in the state and society he had developed.

This new ideology combines religious and national characteristics of the society in Turkey will be the simplest level Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The intellectual leadership of institutions such as Aydınlar Ocağı, which is the intellectual leadership of the movement, especially in pre-impact chaotic situation of foreign forces and deceived right-wing leftist groups in the activities of the nation's self, but self-return to the tradition was planned to ensure normalization (Erdoğan, 2006, 153).

The arrangements that would open the way for the integration of increasing religious budgets and the spreading Quranic courses and sects and communities from Saudi and Kuwaiti capital from abroad would be realized in time after 1983 by the ANAP governments of Özalp, who was of the origin of MSP (Güzel, 2000, 67). In the 1980-91 period, education policies, labor laws and labor markets regulations, agricultural policies and finally liberalization of financial capital will be the basic framework of the rise of political Islam.

4.6 The Political Understanding of The AKP and The Place of The AKP in Turkish Politics

Fazilet Party, which was established by the closure of the RP, was also closed because it was the continuation of a party closed by the Constitutional Court. With the closure of the Fazilet Party, the National Vision Movement was divided into the Saadet Party and the Adalet and Kalkınma Party. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who was the current leader of the Justice and Development Party at the same time, and the prime minister at the same time, was judged under Article 312 of TCK because of a poem he had read in Siirt during the time he was the Mayor of Istanbul (İşcan, 2011, 49). On June 21, 1998, the Diyarbakır State Security Court sentenced Erdoğan to one year's imprisonment and a heavy fine of 860,000 pounds. While Tayyip Erdoğan was in prison, preparations for the formation of a new party had begun in the innovative wing (Knudsen, 2003, 187). As a result of the traditionalist-innovative divide that started in the FP, the innovators were not established in the SP and were founded on 14 August 2001 by 66 founding members.

The staff, who had an important role in the construction of the RP and increased efficiency, criticized the Erbakan style of leadership over the party's internal organization and politics. The distinctive aspect of the AKP, which was founded under the leadership of Erdoğan, is that it rejected this kind of politics and its way of organizing. In terms of the organization and organization of the party, it has put itself at the forefront of the principles of teamwork, the common mind and the administration of the party with democracy (Kurtoğlu, 2013, 93). Away from the leader-oriented understanding of the party. As a political style, they stated that they would be a party whose principle and attitude was clear. In these aspects, they clarified the difference between Erbakan and his policy of surprise and evaluation of opportunities (Özdalga, 2006, 55).

On 3 November 2002, AKP come into power by winning 35% of votes and 363 out of 550 seats Not only did the conservative segments voted for AKP to lift the secularist prohibitions on religious practices (for instance the prohibitions on the hair craft), but also, the electorate was highly displeased by ANAP, DSP and MHP, the three Parties that ruled Turkey by a coalition government before

AKP (Milliyet, 4 November 2002, p.1). It can be said that it originated from their political Islamist consciousness. It can be said that the AKP's social political Islamism is used for public and social transformation plans by combining AKP with a nationalist and liberal understanding in a conservative ideology. Ak Party's current vote support and its reputation on the international stage are the reason for this (Tekin, 2005, 204). The cadres who founded the AKP saw the gap created by the February 28 process and aimed to fill it. The second generation of Islamists, who founded the AKP, developed their capacity to think of a new policy based on alliances with different segments of society, such as liberal, left, large capital, due to their different socialization based on a broader interaction framework (Küçükyılmaz, 2009, 193).

Overall, the AKP's conservative-democratic approach recognizes differences in society, but denies the power relations between them, arguing that these differences are in harmony (Mert, 2005, 144). When the starting point is the alleged harmony, the AKP's understanding of democracy is lacking more fundamentally. In addition to the conservative side of the AKP, it has a nationalist and pragmatist aspect. The AKP is a vivid, culturally conservative, nationalist vein, with strong authoritarian tendencies. patriarchal family tradition of authoritarian reflexes of the territory of Turkey, the AKP cadres were reflected in the values of conservatism and behaviour. The tendency that leads to the transformation of these patriarchal authoritarian reflexes into a nationalist-statist conservatism is represented in the AKP by cadres from the Turkish-Islamic synthesis tradition (Şentürk, 2011, 118). On the other hand, the aspirations of being a pragmatic middle class party have an important weight in this structure. This pragmatism coincides with the liberal economic values as entrepreneurship and realism. Mind of overwhelming majority of the people of Turkey, can lead to manifest tolerance as pragmatism.

Turkish political tradition is structured according to a largely communitarian nature. The meaning of the political community means politics based on the Participation of political actors who act on the basis of the demands of a Particular social sector. It therefore includes a political imagination that does not exceed the limits of a narrow group of politics (Sucu, 2011, 130). The AKP

clearly Turkey's new center-right party. If we ignore the circumstances in which it falls from time to time in terms of economic policies, it usually follows a liberal program; market-oriented and open to entrepreneurship. There is a culturally conservative, patriarchal and religious view. Politically, when compared to the CHP, globalization creates the impression that it is more open to the wind (Tuğ, 2011, 204). The close relations with the USA during the establishment phase of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and in the early years of its ruling are remarkable. Erdogan, who met with the president of the United States to discuss the Iraq War, gained the right to negotiate on behalf of Turkey and, in a sense, had the chance to prove his own corruption to the powers in his country and to European countries in the international context (Lewis, 2007, 163). In this context, compared to the AKP and the national opinion Parties, Erdogan has enabled the realization of the political vision that the RP has failed.

The AKP, which has been on its way with the discourse that we are not always Islamists since its foundation, describes itself as a conservative democrat. In terms of the party program, there is an opinion that is respectful to religion, does not accept religious oppression but also holds secularism among the musts. It is not possible for the AKP, which has been in a long period of power in terms of its place in Turkish political life, to forget the Islamist section, which is the base and the potential of the vote. The AKP gets the most votes from the Islamic electorate (Savran, 2013, 64).

In a Muslim society, it is one of the greatest mistakes that people make to live according to Islamic traditions and rules with political Islam or just politics (Yankaya, 2014, 58). The Islamist writer Hulusi Şentürk expresses this error today: "When the definitions of religion, ideology and Islam are examined, the attitude of a person belonging to the Islam religion according to their norms and values in the social, economic, cultural and political sphere is an attitude of the fact that he is already a Muslim (Vergin, 2000, 34). Claims such as the fact that an individual defending this understanding politicizes the religion and ideologies the religion may be the result of not knowing Islam."

The test of political Islam in Turkey is very different compared to other Muslim countries and communities. Many of the Islamic community except Turkey autocratic or oligarchic power by managing the sooner that; it can be said that this situation was just the opposite in Turkey. Because in Turkey, 99% exhibit an attitude of social and mass pro-democracy as a country with a Muslim population makes it quite remarkable in terms of the Turkish domestic politics and foreign authorities thought focus (Yıldırım, 2012, 146). Foreign-funded intellectuals of Turkey were subjected to a test in this direction. The right-wing and conservative-minded intellectuals perceived political Islam and the masses of people as organically connected; left-wing intellectuals explain the exact opposite of this situation. According to the Left thinks: Turkey special sympathy for the people in political Islam, is a pragmatist. In addition, political Islam, rather than a structure that makes decisions in the interests of the people in their interest, is benefiting from the situation of the society in the context of the power of power (Haenni, 2011, 205). Therefore, it is economically and politically legitimized poverty increased to the extent that political Islam in Turkey.

A number of circles look at the formation of political Islamic elements in society from a different perspective (Mert 2005, 135). For example, Şerif Mardin defines Islamist groups and communities as a mechanism for the state integration of the individual that the Republic cannot succeed. The masses of people, especially community and religious orders like a good way to evaluate the formation of belongingness needs of Islamic groups in Turkey, could be said to have a width so considerable. In view of the ideological superiority of political Islam in Turkish politics, it is possible to understand that this superiority does not come only from Islamic values. The ideological development and conceptualization of political Islam is provided by liberal intellectuals rather than by Islamic scholars (Bakırezer and Demirer, 2010, 124). This ideological development is provided in this way, as in the universal sense of politics in Turkey. For some, the development of political Islam is a social or cultural change, while according to some circles, this development is a step taken against secularism.

Political Islam is a concept that the AKP advocates to interpret the political rules and rules politically and to reflect these rules politically to the society. The AKP's policy understanding is shaped by political Islamic liberal and democratic concepts. AKP's political Islamic thought has been one of the most influential movements of Muslim societies in the 20th century (Duran, 2005, 60). Especially in Turkey, tried to place a democratic system based on political Islam, unlike other majority Muslim community has provided on the expendable quite some time. Examples of political Islam in Turkey, much of the political conflict in the country, the intellectual argument, which will improve the social and political level (Gerges, 2014, 183). Therefore, the political Islam debate in Turkish politics is not a loss or fear, but a kind of new political Participation thought movement.

During the 'Arab spring', AKP's foreign policy, Particularly on Syria, was far more assertive when compared to the overall Turkish foreign policy conducted since 1923. At the initial stages of the civil war in Syria, the AKP tried to establish alliances on the basis of political Islam politics and sectarianism with different groups in Syria. This attitudes of Turkey was not sympathized by Russia (Bakirezer and Demirer, 2010, 37) and when Washington decided to not to oust Assad, Turkey found itself in conflict with USA and Russia at the same time. On January 26, 2011, anti-government protests began to be held in Syria, one of the countries affected by the Arab Spring, which started in 2010. On March 15, the demonstrations spread throughout the country and threatened the power. Conflicts have started between Bashar al-Assad's opponents and Bashar al-Assad's power, which became an organized coalition with the support of Western countries (Aydın, 2005, 129).

The civil war period that started in Syria in 2011 and the ongoing conflicts to this day have become inevitable for the country. However, the reasons for this situation do not only arise from the political conditions of Syria in recent period but also contain many different dynamics (Antony, 2010, 81). From the beginning of the crisis, two opposite poles were formed and these poles were separated by sharp differences. The first is the pole of the Sunni supporters. This group represented by the Western countries, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar

and Jordan are also included. The other pole is Shiite supporter and is positioned as anti-Western. The main actors of this group are Iran, Russia, Iraq and Lebanon (Delibaş, 2015, 46).

The AKP government, which came to power in 2002 and has an Islamist identity, entered a completely different period. Between the AKP government and the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, there was an emerging friendship that was not seen until then. These relations have been moved to such a high degree that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressed his colleague Bashar al-Assad as "my brother." The Cabinet of Ministers of the two countries convened together and the removal of the borders between the two countries came to the fore (Berkes, 1984, 107). These developments, which were seen as the triumph of the zero problem policy before, were followed in a mixed mood with amazement and surprise. In 2011, the opposition of the Arab Spring in Syria against the Assad regime began a resistance movement against the opposition (Erkilet, 2015, 50). The AKP government, which calculated that the opposition would overthrow the Assad regime in a short period of three months, pushed its policies aside and started supporting the opposition in Syria.

4.7 AKP Fills the Gap in Centre-Right and Eliminates Kemalist Military and Judiciary

The closure of Refah Party by the constitutional court on 16 January 1998, the cadres of the party established the Fazilet Party (Miş and Aslan, 2017, 263). Abdullah Gül, as the representative of the reformist group became a candidate for party leadership against the traditionalist group. (Komşuoğlu ve Eskişar, 2009). The reformist group lost the party congress, however the amount of votes gained by Gül was satisfactory. Later on, FP was also closed. When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan came out of prison and joined the reformists, on 14 August 2001, the AKP was founded. In the general elections of 2002, the three Parties of the coalition government, DSP, ANAP and MHP could gain no seats. The economic conditions of Turkey were not satisfactory at all for the public. Additionally, the government was urged by Western states to abolish death penalty and Abdullah Öcalan, leader of PKK, could not be executed. This

became one of the most important disappointments leading Turkish nationalists to shift their votes from MHP to AKP. In Turkish centre-left, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was over 80 years old and he was suffering serious health problems. On the other hand, when Ecevit was receiving medical treatment, MHP asked for early elections and this increased the anti-MHP attitudes in right-wing voters.

As the right-wing voters were greatly dissatisfied with MHP and ANAP, AKP filled this very gap in Turkish centre-right. Furthermore, when Suleyman Demirel completed his turn in the office as the President of the Republic and Necmettin Erbakan was eliminated by the Turkish judiciary, there was a leadership gap in the “national vision” as well as the centre-right and Erdoğan successfully filled this gap as well. In 2002, AKP won 365 out of 550 seats by 34% of votes (Komşuoğlu and Eskişar, 2009, 159). Erdoğan was not a candidate for the Turkish Assembly due to the prohibitions exerted on him by the judiciary. With AKP in power, the Turkish Assembly passed a bill lifting these prohibitions. When Ahmet Necdet Sezer, the President of the Republic vetoed the bill, the assembly passed it once more and eliminated the presidential veto. So, Erdoğan had already grown into an anti-regime “hero” (Miş and Aslan, 2017, 72). Additionally, this became a practice of using electoral victory in struggling with the judiciary.

With the policies implemented by the state by restricting the areas that the state has affected, the AKP offers freedom to religion in every sector. Another aim is to enable the Islamic identity to move freely by opening certain areas. This line does not push the AKP out of the principle of secularism and does not contradict its own roots (Lewis, 2007). The AKP approaches political Islamism in the sense of conservatism, which is perceived as religiousness in society. The AKP’s evolving towards conservatism is an attempt to open another path in politics. The majority of the religious, conservative, classical right, liberal and nationalist votes have taken over and continue to be the center-right party of the AK Party (Şentürk, 2011, 51). The most important reason for this is the fact that all these groups have proved themselves with

the political practices of the AK Party and the past political experiences of the ruling cadres.

With Erdoğan as the Prime Minister, from 2003 to 2009, Turkish Gross Domestic Product recorded over 20% growth and Turkey managed to pay its IMF debts back to the full. In 2007, AKP launched some step by step actions to abolish the aircraft prohibitions and avoided provoking the army and the judiciary (Kartaloğlu, 2013, 62). On the other hand, AKP managed to balance the army's and the judiciary's power. Particularly thanks to the relations it established with EU and USA. In the Cyprus Question, AKP played a moderate role and urged nationalist Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş to abandon his hard-liner stance. In 2005, Turkey launched negotiations with EU for full membership. As regards NATO, AKP represented a form of "conservative democracy", and, in the eyes of Washington, this ideological stance made Turkey a "model country" for the rest of Middle East (Hale & Özbudun, 2009, 34). In 2007, AKP won the elections again and remained in power. Additionally, in 2007, during the Ergenekon investigations, a significant number of high-ranked Kemalist officers, accused of conspiring a coup against AKP were arrested. This enabled AKP to diminish the army's influence in Turkish politics. Nevertheless, the suspects of the Ergenekon investigations including army officers, journalists and politicians were years later found innocent (Martin, 2015, 88).

In 2008, AKP was accused of "violating secularism" and was challenged by a case of closure. The party's advocates asserted that this case lacked legal basis and it was driven by ideological motivations. Tactically, AKP declared that it would negotiate with the opposition and take some measurements to safeguard secularism. AKP was not closed but the state aid provided to it was ceased by the decision of constitutional court. As a matter of fact, in democracies a ruling party enjoying such public support rarely challenged by cases of closure (Kartaloğlu, 2013, 90). Two years later, in 2010, AKP prepared a set of constitutional amendments to reform the juridical structure. The amendment was coupled with a set of rights and liberties, however it also increased the number of high-level judges. Gülen Cemaati (Gülenist Community) manifestly supported the constitutional amendments and the

referendum held for the aforementioned amendments resulted in a clear (58% of votes) victory for “yes”. Right after the constitutional amendments, the Community leaked into judiciary and the Gulenist judges were directed against AKP. The removal of Kemalists from the army and the judiciary, paved the way for the growth of Gulenist Community and in 2016, the officers that had been infiltrated in the army made an attempt on seizure of power against AKP. The coup failed and with another constitutional reform materialized via the referendum in 2017, AKP transformed the regime in Turkey into a presidential system that maximized the President’s (Erdoğan’s) authority over the army and the judiciary (Baylan, 2018, 69).

In 2015, there had been as sharp increase in the terrorist attacks targeting Turkey and the country’s internal peace was dramatically challenged (Güneyli, Ersoy and Kıralp, 2017, 149). As a matter of fact, its involvement in the Syrian Civil War directed a broad range of internal and external threats against Turkey, and these developments played a significant role in shaping the authoritarian facet of AKP. Additionally, the Syrian civil war led Turkey to join forces with Russia and Iran instead of EU and USA. Nonetheless, AKP was successful in pacifying the military and the judiciary, the two main instruments of Kemalism in suffocating political Islam throughout the Turkish history. It is essential to stress that AKP was among the very rare political Parties in the world history that was challenged by a ‘closure case’. When AKP survived the case, it then re-designed the military and the judiciary. The cases of Ergenekon and Balyoz helped AKP to terminate Turkish Armed Forces’ involvement in Turkish politics. With the constitutional amendment in 2010, the influence of political elites over the judiciary increased the amendments paved the way for the appointment of some high-level judges by the political authorities. In 2013, the Gezi protests symbolized a resistance against AKP’s social, political and economic attitudes. However, there had been no noteworthy decline in AKP’s electoral power in the following years. In 2016, the Gülenist attempt on seizure of power failed and not only the armed forces, but also the ordinary citizens’ resistance led to the failure of the coup. In 2018, the regime in Turkey was transformed into a presidential regime devoting broad authorities to the president (Lord, 2018, 39).

AKP, before the Syrian civil war, had the intention to establish good relations with USA, EU and the Islamic world (Antony, 2010, 51). Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was expected to play the mediator role between the US and the Islamic countries. AKP's understanding of Political Islam, at least at the beginning, was sympathized by USA since AKP had abandoned Necmettin Erbakan's anti-Western and anti-liberal attitudes. Thus, AKP had no manifest objections to the capitalist system (Bulaç, 2005, 81). In the eyes of Americans, such 'moderate' form of Islam was more preferable since some Muslim countries (including Jordan and Saudi Arabia) had been among the most important trade partners of USA (Akdoğan, 2000, 112). In this sense, the United States had successfully implemented the Green Belt project and continued to implement the project it has revised according to the new developments. When unexpected and unwillingly results occur, they perform successfully in translating these new situations into their own interests based on their experience (Karam, 2003, 45). In this sense, what happened in the Arab Spring and beyond is a very instructive example.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In answering the research question: “what were the main instruments decreasing and increasing political Islam’s power in Turkey?”, this study reached to the conclusion that the Kemalist regime utilized institutions such as the military and the judiciary to diminish the political Islam. Nevertheless, elections were the main instruments of political Islamism that allowed it to grow and finally re-design the aforementioned institutions in the AKP era. DP was hardly a political Islamist party; however, a broad range of political Islamists supported DP against CHP. The DP was finally destroyed by the Turkish military. MNP, MSP and RP, clearly political Islamist Parties were banned by the Turkish judiciary. AKP suffered a case of closure and it survived the danger. Based on the reforms made by AKP governments, regardless of the extent to which this is compatible with the Western democracy or not, a significant number of high level judges are currently appointed directly or indirectly by the executive (President).

Religion has a significant impact on the political sphere in Turkey. The relationship between religion and politics emerged together with the development process of humanity and from the very beginning, human beings have been very interested and deeply influenced by individual, class and social. Political Islam was shaped by the deep historical accumulation of Islam in the framework of the political and social developments of the period. Political Islam, both in the political system and Turkey’s place in the political life of the effects is of great importance and a place.

It is seen that after the September 12, 1980 coup, Islamist politics increased. Turban actions are the most prominent examples of the rise of the National Vision movement, which became a party in 1970 with the MNP, and came to power in 1995. As a result of the February 28 process, the RP was decommissioned by the army. After the RP, the Fazilet Party and the Saadet Party continue to pursue politics in the historical sense of the National View movement. Although the AKP claims that it is not an Islamist party, it is

noteworthy that it has made significant studies on the religious base in its policies on religion.

Turkey has spent in special stage only has a history of over a century even thought that Islamism has led to quite unique and different from each composed of a rich acquis. the current regional versions of Islamism can be seen as original and thought in the last analysis, with different names emerged in the Islamic world cannot be ignored effects on Islamist tendencies in Turkey. However, in recent years, history and society research of increasingly Islamists Turkey directs attention to the investigation of local resources due to the deepening religion, society, history, philosophy, politics, the data they deem necessary in areas such as economics and the arts first tried to reach a motion from its own resources.

In Turkey's political life, the Islamist movement is a modern political ideology that emerged with the establishment of modern political space and continues to update its discourse according to the conjuncture and tries to achieve power through social support. In the process following the proclamation of the Republic, the Kemalist elite and political organization Cumhuriyet Halk Party, the architect and bearer of the Republican reforms, attempted to establish a secular state-society-individual sheet by solving radical secular politics and the social organization of Islam. The revolts against the cultural revolutions of the republic in Anatolia are originated from religion as a natural consequence of this process, and are generally organized in the local where the Naqshbandi sect is active. The attempt to reconstruct the Islamic perception of the one-party political party in the social dimension brought the first-generation Islamism and tariqat Islamism closer together in the medium term. The transition from a single-party model to multi-partyism after the Second World War resulted in the integration of the Democratic Party with the environmental elements and Islam in the populist discourse by instrumentalizing Islam.

The weakening of the secularism policy during the DP's rule led to an increase in Islamic and Islamic publications and the re-activation of religious radical groups. The DP, which was not classified as an Islamist party but included

Islam in its populist instrumentalization, received great support from Islamic journalists and intellectuals, Particularly in the sects. DP of the period ending with the 1960 military coup but also indicates the beginning of a period of separation of social classes in Turkey. Throughout the DP period, continued industrialization, mechanization in agriculture, and related urbanization have ensured the social classes to become evident and clustered around certain ideologies. From the transition of Turkey to multi-party life, the division in the DP and the AP, which represent the central right of the political spectrum, exemplifies the fact that the right movement cannot be housed under one roof, and the separation of the socio-economic classes to Islamist and nationalist factions in parallel with the specificity.

The second generation of political Islamism in Turkey starts with the initiation of the Milli Nizam Party. MNP, in its program, adopted the Islamic political discourse in Turkey and a certain socio-political, bears the distinction of being the first party capable of organizing the economic and cultural base around the electorate. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the movement from the foundation of second generation political Islamism to the end, played an important role in the long-term rise of the national vision and developed the discourse with his ideas and works. The moral development discourse of the national vision is the discourse that foresees Islam to be hegemonic in the perception of society and the individual. In the fiction of moral development discourse, culture includes the substitution of Islamic culture in place of the elements that exist in the Western cultural pattern, interest-free banking and trade on the basis of economic relations, and the union of Muslim countries fed by strong anti- racism in the international political process. The discourse of moral development is a modern social engineering project.

1980 military coup in Turkey's political life and thus constitutes the turning point in the course of the political Islamist movement. The goal of the 1980 coup was to prevent the leftist movement and radical Islamist movements as an alternative to the legitimacy perception of the Republican establishment. As a method of restoring the legitimacy and continuity of the established order of 1980; Under the ideology of Turkish-Islamic synthesis, it has adopted the

construction of re-identity and the de-politicization of society with constitutional restrictions. In this context, the new order propaganda of the coup staff was able to adopt more widely and effectively than the Islamic movement in the legitimate political process by referring to the many elements of the second generation political Islamist discourse that refer to conservatism and Islamic identity.

The fact that the Refah Party came to power in 1997 as the coalition leader is the first in terms of political Islamism. However, the arrival of the ruling National Opinion and Turkey's response to the hardening style living at the sharp rhetoric conversion between political actors, discourse` is traditionally secular Turkish Armed Forces. The paradigm shift created by the 1980 military coup in the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) created the process of 28 February with a step-by-step transformation of the political Islamism that emerged throughout the 90s. The ideology of Turkish Islam, which the 80 coup dictated under the guise of Kemalism, was officially abandoned with the decisions of the National Security Council dated February 28, 1998. The ongoing instability in the center-right and left wings, before and during RP's period, encouraged the emergence of the only opposing alternative as an army. Returning to the traditional character, the armed forces, with the decisions taken in the MGK, resigned the cabinet with the resignation and the preference of the voter base to lose confidence; finally realized both alternatives and the National Opinion, Turkey's political life has lost its effectiveness.

The political collapse of the second generation of political Islamism began with the external pressure groups such as the February 28th process and the organized public, but ended with the internal dynamics of this movement. The tense political climate and the controversial agenda created by RP during the rule of power has caused the industrialist voter base of Anatolia to attract the support of the voter base; The political collapse of the National View movement has resulted in the movement of the faction, which is called the innovative wing in the movement, before the leadership race and then to an independent political organization. The Justice and Development Party formed by the innovative wing is the product of this process. The AKP today represents the

third generation of political Islamism with its renewed political method and rhetoric.

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İNTİHAL RAPORU

POLITICAL ISLAMISM IN TURKEY AND ITS EFFECTS ON TURKISH POLITICS BETWEEN 1923 AND 2018

ORJİNALLİK RAPORU

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7	"Political Handbook of the World: 1998", Springer Nature, 1980 Yayın	<%1



YAKIN DOĐU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

23.07.2019

Dear Cihan Acar

Your project “Political Islamism in Turkey And Its Effects On Turkish Politics Between 1923 And 2018” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Direnç Kanol

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.