



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:
THE DARFUR CRISIS IN 2003 - 2018**

PETRONELLA BIRI

MASTER'S THESIS

NICOSIA
2019

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THESIS SUPERVISOR
ASSOC. PROF. DR. DILEK LATIF

NICOSIA
2019

ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL

We as the jury members certify the '.....' prepared by the
..... defended on/...../..... has been found satisfactory for the award of
degree of Master / Phd

JURY MEMBERS

.....
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek Latif (Supervisor)
Near East University
Department of International Relations

.....
Assist. Prof. Dr. Bilge Azgin (Head of Jury)
Near East University
Department of Political Science

.....
Dr. Zehra Azizbeyli
Near East University
Department of International Relations

.....
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sagsan
Graduate School of Social Sciences
Director

DECLARATION

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Mr. Stewart Biri and Mrs. Loveness Biri.

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ABSTRACT

AFRICAN UNION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE DARFUR CRISIS IN 2003 – 2018

The African Union (AU) which serves as the successor of OAU has undertaken numerous roles in the prevention of conflict, its management and also in the resolution of conflicts. The AU has also played vital roles in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. This work analyzed the role of AU in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. The study has therefore carried out the required investigation in analytical manner. This thesis is therefore committed to the examination of the causes and issues which surround the conflict in Darfur. In order to achieve this end, proper examination of the AU framework for resolving conflict in Africa was carried out with the several approaches used by the AU towards resolving the conflict in Darfur analyzed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of such approaches in the Darfur conflict resolution attempts.

The significance of this study is seen by making use of these analyses to conceive relevant strategies tailored towards a long-lasting resolution of the conflict in Darfur. The study therefore revealed that although the African Union has played important roles in managing the conflict in Darfur, it has been the AU/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) that has significantly assisted in stabilizing the region. Also, with the present-day occurrence in Darfur and Sudan as a whole, the UNAMID still need to remain for now, as the AU Peace and Security Council continue to acquire more skills and dynamism in managing and resolving conflicts on the continent.

Keywords: African Union; Conflict resolution; Sudan; Peacekeeping; Darfur.

ÖZ

AFRİKA BİRLİĞİ VE ÇATIŞMA ÇÖZÜMÜ: DARFUR KRİZİ 2003 – 2018

OAU'nun halefi olarak görev yapan Afrika Birliği (ab), çatışmanın önlenmesinde, yönetiminde ve çatışmaların çözümünde sayısız rol üstlenmiştir. AÜ ayrıca Afrika'da barışı koruma ve barış inşasında hayati bir rol oynamıştır. Bu çalışma Ab'nün Darfur çatışmasının çözümündeki rolünü incelemektedir. Bu nedenle çalışma, gerekli incelemeyi analitik bir şekilde gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu nedenle, bu tez, Darfur'daki çatışmayı çevreleyen nedenlerin ve sorunların incelenmesine adanmıştır. Bu amaca ulaşmak için, AU'nun Afrika'daki çatışmayı çözme çerçevesinin uygun bir şekilde incelenmesi, AU'nun Darfur çatışması çözümünde bu tür yaklaşımların etkinliğini değerlendirmek amacıyla analiz edilen Darfur'daki çatışmayı çözmek için kullandığı çeşitli yaklaşımlarla gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Bu çalışmanın önemi, Darfur'daki çatışmanın uzun süren çözümüne yönelik stratejiler geliştirmek için bu analizlerden yararlanılarak görülmektedir. Bu nedenle çalışma, Afrika Birliği'nin Darfur'daki çatışmanın yönetiminde önemli roller oynadığı halde, bölgenin istikrara kavuşturulmasında önemli ölçüde yardımcı olan AU / BM Hibrit Operasyonu (UNAMID) olduğunu ortaya koydu. Ayrıca, günümüzde Darfur ve Sudan'da bir bütün olarak ortaya çıkan UNAMID'in şu anda kalması gerekiyor, çünkü AU Barış ve Güvenlik Konseyi kıtadaki çatışmaları yönetme ve çözme konusunda daha fazla beceri ve dinamizm kazanmaya devam ediyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Afrika Birliği; Çatışma çözümü; Sudan; Barış; Darfur.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACHPR	African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
AFP	Africa Peace Facility
AHA	Africa Humanitarian Action
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CFC	Ceasefire Commission
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOCC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
EU	European Union
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community

RECAMP	Reinforcement of the African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program
RSF	Rapid Support Force
SADC	South African Development Community
SLA	Sudan Liberation Army
SLM	Sudanese Liberation Movement
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WHO	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

The African Union (AU) as the successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has played several roles in conflict prevention and resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding on the continent. This study intends to examine the role of African Union in resolving the conflict in Darfur. In order to achieve this, the thesis will have to carry on the following investigation in analytical manner upon: unravelling the causes and issues surrounding the Darfur conflict; examining the African Union framework for conflict resolution in the continent; studying the different approaches employed by the African Union towards the resolution of the Darfur conflict, evaluating the efficacy of these approaches in efforts at resolving the Darfur conflict and devising appropriate strategies geared towards a permanent resolution of the Darfur conflict.

The following hypotheses will direct the course of this study: (a) There exists a relationship between the African Union (AU) approach to resolving conflict and the high hostility level among the conflicting parties in the Darfur region. (b) African Union conflict resolution approach has contributed at a minimum level towards resolving permanently the conflict in Darfur.

The Darfur conflict which started in 2003 was a result of the denial of political and economic privileges to the people of Darfur by the Government of Sudan. There exist other strong elements in the escalation of the conflict, and these include oil discovery in the region and therefore control of the oil resources. Another vital factor in the escalation of the Darfur conflict is the non-inclusion of all the parties to the conflict, particularly the people of Western Darfur in negotiations that led to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

It is generally the non-Arab population of Darfur, that is people of black African heritage in Darfur that are persecuted and denied their privileges by the government of President Omar al-Bashir who is of Arab heritage. This government that depicts one of Arab supremacist has made use of the Arab tribes in Darfur to perpetrate violence against the non-Arab tribes through killings, property destruction by burning down residents, rape of women and girls and all sorts of violence that amount to human right abuse and wickedness. The government under President Omar al-Bashir often come up with policies which directly or indirectly result into segregation among the Arabs and non-Arab tribes of Darfur region.

The commencement of the Darfur crisis in the year 2003 happened to coincide with the period when the second Civil War between North and South Sudan was in the process of realizing a peaceful resolution of the crisis. This took most attention of the Sudanese government, whereas the marginalized people of Darfur felt neglected and desired the marginalization which they also faced is resolved and the issues in their region too is settled peacefully. These tribes that felt neglected by the Sudanese government, the Fur and Zaghawa tribes, started forming strong rebel groups around this period.

It was during the process of the Sudanese Government involvement in the North and South Sudan peace process that the Darfur rebels struck offensively in a surprise attack at government installations and establishment which included the airport at El Fasher. This in turn not only led to extreme response from the government through aerial operation, but also equipping the nomadic Arab militias which bears the name Janjaweed to face the rebels, and that was how the conflict became fully blown up in the year 2003.

This conflict in Darfur region of Sudan was finally considered to be a genocide and it has displaced over 2million persons internally and taken more than 300,000 lives. It was after the inadequacies of the various efforts of international actors to effectively tackle the devastating situation in Darfur that, the African leaders and Union inclusively, that a joint United Nations and African Union Mission (UNAMID) sent to Darfur in order to monitor the 2006

Darfur Peace Agreement and the subsequent ones. It was after the ratification of the January 2005 Peace Agreement between South Sudan and the Sudanese Government in Khartoum that the global community was able to effectively concentrate on the genocide occurring in Darfur, but many lives had already been claimed by the violence.

This study will therefore examine also the reason why the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) could not make significant impact in de-escalation of the conflict. This will require looking into the restricted mandate of AMIS and also the numerous logistics problems. The study will observe briefly how the UN has been able to play a vital role in restoring peace to the Darfur region and how the AU can endeavor in the sustenance of the peace and to prevent any relapse in the region which may lead into full blown war.

Statement of Research Problem

The African Union as a regional organization has the responsibility of restoring peace and stability in Darfur. Since the beginning of the peace mission in October 2004, the AMIS have made significant effort to stabilize the situation in Darfur, yet there has been less evidence to show for such efforts according to continuous grave situations in the region.

Consequently, and due to the lack of reasonable improvement in resolving the conflict despite the presence of AMIS, the African Union has to join with the United Nations to find a peaceful resolution to the Darfur conflict. In this regard, this work will analyze the role of the AU/UN performance at resolving the conflict in Darfur.

Research Questions

The work will make attempt to find appropriate solutions to the following questions:

1. How effective is the present conflict resolution mechanism of the African Union?
2. What are the challenges of the African Union in restoring peace in Darfur?

Objective of the Study

1. To look into the efforts of the African Union at finding a lasting solution to the Darfur conflict.
2. To examine the performance of the African Union and also the efficiency of the United Nations in ending the Darfur crisis.
3. To look for ways to address identified challenges of the African Union in bringing about stability and peace to the Darfur region.
4. To examine the African Union peace and security architecture through its Peace and Security Council (PSC).

Significance of the Study

This study possesses significance both in policy making and academia because it is being carried out in a period when government policy makers, diplomats and academics are in the lookout for more efficient alternatives for long-lasting mechanism to the various conflicts plaguing several nations on the African continent such as Darfur crisis in the Republic of Sudan, Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, ethnic conflict in South Sudan which led to the South Sudanese Civil War, violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic, and a few others. This study is therefore significant as a useful guide to African leaders and policy makers in formulating, reforming and strengthening the approaches to conflict resolution in Africa in general and Darfur in particular.

Scope and Limitation

This study covers the role of the African Union in conflict resolution with a particular focus on the Darfur crisis and also the mechanism for the Darfur crisis resolution from 2003 to 2010. As the focus of the study will be on Darfur region of Sudan, the root of the conflict and endeavors made to resolve it will be analyzed and evaluated. Furthermore, this study offers future recommendations and suggestions in finding a long-lasting solution to the Darfur crisis in Sudan.

A clear limitation in this study is the inability to undergo a personal visit to Sudan for a field survey, this was not possible for this research due to distance and also financial constraints. It is also impossible to visit to the Embassy of Sudan in order to obtain more materials. This is because there is no Sudanese embassy in Northern Cyprus. The Darfur crisis is still ongoing. It is a dynamic issue. There is therefore the possibility of new facts arising as this work progresses. Notwithstanding the stated constraints, the standard and the reliability of this study cannot be degraded.

Research Methodology

The focus of this study is to create a holistic and meaningful evaluation of the African Union responsibility in Peace keeping and conflict resolution with the Darfur crisis in Sudan as the focal point. In this research, secondary sources are mostly used and data is obtained through the examination and evaluation of various documents. The first step in this is to identify and compile the relevant documents which are in harmony with the topic This will be followed by a systematic sorting out of the documents obtained in accordance with its relevance to the research topic. After these, selected documents are synthesized and analyzed, finally, a defined and worthwhile pattern is established. The methodology used is qualitative. Qualitative methods are characterized by intensive approach instead of an extensive and numerical approach (Limb & Dwyer, 2001). The case study approach utilized in this work is one way of carrying out qualitative research. Document analysis is used to gather the relevant data.

The instruments utilized for data collection were therefore from secondary sources that include books, journals, magazines, newspapers and also the internet. Other instruments that are utilized are the electronic media and both published and unpublished materials from the libraries. During the period of this research, personal interviews and discussions with resource persons will also be a great help.

Relevant information obtained will be evaluated qualitatively in a systematic pattern. Although, in some instances and when required, historical, descriptive and comparative mechanism is employed. Any data gotten from discussions with resource persons is evaluated in a descriptive form.

Literature Review

It is obvious that the approaches of conflict management and resolution have different interpretations to different scholars. Under this segment, the analysis of literature on three subject matter that are relevant to this study is carried out. The first part examines the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), while the second part looks into the role of AU in conflict resolution. And the last part examines the Darfur conflict.

After the establishment of the African Union, the structure of conflict started to change from inter-state to more of intra-state conflict (Olympio, 2004). Also new elements of conflict are surfaced, like: ethnically influenced political and power conflicts, competing for insufficient resources and access to government power, violence fanned by growth of illegal arms possession, factions equipped with firearms are influenced upon through politico-religious doctrines, and separatist factions who desire to opt out of their nation states (Bujra, 2002).

All this shows the concealed issues of the incompetence of the African states to protect and cater for its people. The continent turned to one with several fragile states with no total control of its entire region. Rebel fighters flourish outside the main cities in locations around country sides which are sparsely populated. Although capital cities and big towns of African nations are heavily protected, outside of these cities are rebel groups and militia who strives with some level of freedom. Examples are the Taureg rebels in the Sahara Desert in Northern Mali, the Boko Haram militant group in Sambisa Forest, North-eastern Nigeria, and a few others. This makes several states to be more elitist, tribalistic, autocratic and militaristic, where they oppress and brutalize their citizens more than offering social and economic growth, or the provision of security for the citizens and building peace.

It is the presence of all these, which makes the African Union to refine the OAU and brings the needed expansion into its experience like the peace missions, in order to model its approach to peacebuilding. It has certainly been a progressive effort. African continent therefore has an institutional framework which implements the idea of an extensive peace, which covers conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. At the head of the peace structure lies the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC).

The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) was founded in the year 2004 and has ten members who are voted in for a 2 year period and 5 members for a 3 year period so as to be able to make provision for safety and security and also progress of the Council's leadership. The focal point of PSC has similarity with that of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Central Organ, which is the prevention and resolution of conflicts through the observation of possible security threats throughout the continent (Baregu, Landsberg, & International Peace Academy, 2003). It gets involved in fact-finding missions and is also able to authorize African Union interventions taking the appearance of observer missions, technical support teams, mediators, and armed forces in order to sustain goodwill and harmony following negotiations.

Article 7 (e) of the Protocol Relating to Establishment of the Peace and Security Council put into operation the African Union Constitutive Act's principle of non-indifference through its empowerment in recommending military involvement for permission by the African Union Assembly for instances like crimes against humankind, war crimes and genocide (Union, 2002). It serves as a progressive force in the continent's peace scheme – which serves as platform in Africa to make decision for peace building.

The African Union's Darfur peace intervention reveals a particular feature of the AU peace building strategy that is a little different from other peacebuilding mission of the AU. This is seen in the joint ownership of the

peace attempts between African Union and United Nations. This is due to the fact that without sufficient financial support and technical facility, there will be limitation to the effectiveness of the African Union peacebuilding models. This is possible due to the similarity between the African Union idea of peacebuilding and United Nations peace framework. The African Union views sustained political consultation, confidence building, and establishment building to be crucial from start to conclusion of any peace undertakings (Zondi, 2017). It therefore shows the reason partnership with the United Nations seems to occur long following the African Union commencement of peacebuilding.

Murithi (2008) in his paper pointed out the establishment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that was in the same year that the PSC was created, that is, year 2004. Its main purpose was to reduce the effect of the conflict between the different rebel factions and the government military force on the civilians of Darfur, and also to make the region safe the region for political peacemaking which is targeted at securing peace agreements between major political players. The Darfur conflict is mainly fought through proxy forces such as militia and armed bandits. It was a fierce and bitter ethnic conflict which pits the native Africans against the Arabic ones. It was the information of indiscriminate killings and of about 2 million people from western Darfur being displaced which made the African Union to intervene in September 2003 by the then Republic of Chad leader, Idris Deby. And this also led to the signing of Abeche Agreement by the leading rebel faction, Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), with the Sudanese government, and a ceasefire agreement was thereby observed, and engagement in the disarmament of irregular armed groups and also provision for a secured movement of humanitarian aid (Murithi, 2008).

Toga (2007) opines that although the AMIS was created with the hope of implementing the African Union peacebuilding approach, the approach has experienced limitations on the situations on the ground of the government unwillingness to be supportive of the African Union or enthusiastically supporting the United Nations involvement in the conflict. There also exists

several factions of the militia that are left out of the elaborate peace agreements. It was from March 2004, that the African Union became wholly involved in the effort to reduce the intensity of the conflict by engaging in a series of political negotiations that sought to make certain that every armed group was included within the peace agreements. Not only that, the AU also got engaged in confidence-building steps such as facilitating communications between the societies affected by the conflict. In order to give additional support to the urgency of a peaceful resolution of the conflict as a premise for a well-organized African Union peace building, President Alpha Konare, who happened to be the Chairperson of the AU Commission by then, got directly involved in the facilitation of dialogue together with other mediators. Again, another peace agreement that does not involved all primary parties in the conflict: The Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement which was signed by the government, Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The terms of the agreement had similarities with the terms of the previous peace agreements (Toga, 2007).

Fadul & Tanner (2007) explained the central role of the African Union in peace negotiations in Darfur which was structured to bring the previous actors that were excluded in the past peace agreements, like the negotiations which occurred in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria. The conclusion of every round was with a pronouncement of principles, that yielded to five agreements which came from different rounds of talks that took place in Abuja. This reveals the African Union's dedication to a persistent and tolerant promotion of shared perception as the foundation for understanding in situations that the conflict was not mature for a resolution. The final round which span five months of serious dialogue climaxed in the Darfur Agreement signed in May 2006. And again, the agreement involved only a single division of SLM, excluding JEM due to the fact that both and some other groups continued to hold the belief that an armed success would be more sensible and has a high possibility (Fadul & Tanner, 2007). The African Union structure on peacebuilding under situations like that just doesn't function. The structure must put mechanism in place to ensure the representation and presence of all factions of every party in a conflict.

The initial three stages of African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which ran from April–September 2004; October 2004–March 2005; and April 2005 onwards, was faced with obstacles, which was related to operational unpreparedness, inadequate planning, lingering deployment, poor delivery, and logistical inadequacy. Insufficient funding made it reliant upon Western financing for its crucial performance, thereby eroding the continental ideal which supports self-dependency. Between the year 2005 and 2007, relying on NATO for the transportation of African Union troops to Darfur signified the authorized existence accorded to Western military relations on the continent. Such actions continued with NATO playing an important part in the military push against Muammar Qaddafi's government in Libya in the year 2011 which finally resulted in his death and also threatened African foreign policy and diplomacy (Campbell, 2012). The African Union peacebuilding structure therefore is with this major defect: Insufficient funding. They therefore always have to approach the West for finance which clearly brings about various political visions and peace orientations.

Arvid Ekengard (2008), in his book maintained that, although peacekeepers were dying frequently in confrontation with militias which continued to discharge in Darfur, UNAMID has been trapped in the deadlock. Nonetheless, the holistic character of the AU-UN model in this conflict translates to the fact that the mission is still of value in that it assists in the avoidance of any further collapse of security in this region (Ekengard, 2008). The AU mission in Sudan also made provision for comprehensive training of its state security forces and police force. Although considering the critical part being played by the state in the conflict, such a mechanism was careless and would be unable to guarantee better security and peace for every segment of the population. UNAMID was more of a remarkable optimism for the population upset by the conflict than for the state. The mission therefore transformed to peace enforcement instead of the initially envisaged peacebuilding as defined by the African Union.

There is the obvious fact on the Darfur conflict that UNAMID has accomplished in 7 years not anything more significant than AMIS previous accomplishment. This, according to him was due to the fact that the requirements for peacebuilding just didn't undergo significant alteration and modification while in UNAMID's hand. The state, controlled by the government remained uncooperative in its attitude towards peace and the rebel groups also continued in their expectation of greater benefit in armed confrontation than negotiation. If the prevention of deteriorating security is seen as a success, then AMIS and UNAMID can be said to be a comparable and reasonable achievement. If not, there exists no substantial improvement on resolving the conflict and also on the peace building aspect. Matthew LeRiche (2015) in his paper made similar point about the sanctions placed on South Sudan by the West, which had turned into impediments to peace by the year 2015 (LeRiche, 2015).

Chapter one of this study examines briefly the conflict resolution theory as pertaining to the field of international relations. Subsequently, the role of the African Union regarding the resolution of conflicts in Africa was examined. In doing the latter, the framework of the African union was analyzed. Chapter two provides an analysis of the conflict in Sudan, by going through the history of the conflict. It proceeds and sheds light into proper understanding of the parties in the Darfur crisis. The key issues and interests in this conflict are also examined in this chapter. Finally, the current situation of the conflict in Sudan in the first four months of 2019 is revealed.

Chapter three concentrates on the role of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in Darfur. It analyzes its responsibilities as far as conflict management in Africa is concerned, concentrating on its involvement in the Darfur crisis. The chapter therefore touches issues such as addressing humanitarian crisis in Sudan and also mediation process to resolving the conflict. Matters relating to post-conflict reconstruction in Sudan and emerging issues regarding the AU PSC in managing and resolving conflicts were finally examined in this chapter. The conclusion reveals that the African Union's role in conflict management and resolution on the continent is

credible, but there remain constraints in its operation. One of the ways the AU has been able to limit these constraints is partnering with international institutions like the UN, as seen in the Darfur crisis. There is therefore the necessity for the African Union Peace and Security Council, which is the key organ of the AU that ensures peace and stability on the continent, to continue the partnership with the UN and other international organizations as it is doing in Darfur in order acquire more skills and dynamism to manage and resolve conflicts on the continent efficiently.

CHAPTER ONE

CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION REGARDING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

To examine and analyze the African Union under the theme of conflict management and resolution seems to be broad enough through the examination of different conflict case studies on the continent in which the organization has been involved. To approach this analysis from the perspective of African Union is achievement in conflict resolution limits the depth of this study since AU is still growing, therefore there exists numerous challenges in terms of managing conflict and in the complex post-cold war global environment where survival expectation for the organization is hopeful.

This chapter looks into the concept and methods of conflict resolution before proceeding to AU institutional framework from its inception, in the direction of examining the background to its mechanism to the extent that conflict management and resolution in Africa is examined.

Conflict resolution has come to become an important aspect in International Relations, and in theory, several papers relative to this concept have been rolled out by scholars and researchers. These papers have influenced the ways conflict is been prevented, managed and resolved by policy makers and also in the international arena. Conflict is seen to be international from two different perspectives. The first is when it occurs across the borders of states making the key players to be the nation-states. The second occurs

locally or it is internal to a particular nation state, but it has regional and maybe international effects also (Stern & Druckman, 2000).

This second type of international conflict always draw in external actors either for the purpose of negotiation or to be allies to one of the conflicting parties. The main objective of international conflict resolution is to make use of peaceful means to resolve both interstate and intrastate conflicts, and also to influence the mode of relationship between the conflicting groups in a way that will prevent going back to any violent acts will not be feasible in a long-term manner.

1.1 Methods of Conflict Resolution in International Relations

Conflict resolution as a concept and special area of study is applicable in different fields of studies which ranges from international relations to economics, psychology, and a few others. Since this work is deals with international relations, conflict resolution will therefore be seen in the light of international conflict resolution as earlier stated and defined above.

The presence of conflict within the international system has made nation-states to come up with different strategies in settling their disputes. These different techniques and methods have been functioning hundreds of years back (Sikander, 2011). The different methods which have been used for good numbers of years to resolve international conflict can be broadly grouped into three classifications namely:

- i) methods of pacific conflict resolution;
- ii) coercive procedures short of war; and
- iii) forcible procedures through war.

1.1.1 Methods of pacific conflict resolution

This method has presented different peaceful approach to resolving conflicts of international dimension instead of trailing the part of violence or war by the conflicting parties.

violence. This broad classification can in turn be grouped into diplomatic-political or judicial approach.

1.1.1.1 Making use of diplomacy

This method serves as a very peaceful means to solve international conflicts. It represents the process in which the rival in a conflict is approached and persuaded in order to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner. This instrument of diplomacy is also applicable in domestic or local politics. This method is an effective tool in settling disputes related to ethnic and religion differences and also regional conflicts in order to arrive at peaceful resolution. The diplomacy method entails direct government to government interrelations. Diplomacy can therefore be explained as applying intelligence with discretion to manner in which formal interactions and interrelations between the administrations of independent countries is been conducted (Peardon & Schuman, 1934). It is seen as a process in which communication between nations are conducted through representatives which are identified officially. There is generally a continual communication among nation-states, just as the states' representatives safeguard the national interest of their states and help in conflict reduction.

With the presence of diplomacy, nation states can still have obvious differences with conflicts intensifying, these differences can therefore be managed in an effective manner making use of the existing diplomatic channel.

Again, diplomatic approach to the resolution of disputes is possible by direct negotiations, mediation, inquiry, conciliation and good offices. These various type of diplomatic approach to conflict resolution depict less formality when compared to the judicial approach to conflict resolution or arbitration.

The disposition of the different rival groups in an international conflict to discussing the difference between them, instead of threatening each other or plan to go to war, will yield to the conflicting groups turning to negotiations as a means of resolving the conflict. Engaging in direct negotiation by different conflicting states may be between the leaders of governments of those states or their accredited diplomats who are appointed to smoothen relations

between them. Negotiation may also be through the channel of international conference when the leaders or diplomats of such conflicting nation states meet (Druckman, 1997).

The inability of any conflicting parties to come to agreement on their disputes which in turn strain their fragile relations the more always result to external actors getting involved in the conflict. The involvement of these external actors is to be able to bring about a settlement of their disputes with both side coming to agreement through necessary, if needed, concessions from all the conflicting parties. The approach of good offices can now be solicited. The tender of good office represents a respectful inquiry unto a third state to be involved as an external actor in order to facilitate the process for the restoration of peace between the conflicting parties. This always happen when one of the conflicting parties' requests for the service of the third state whose service must be mutually agreed to. The acceptance of this third actor by both conflicting parties will bring in the third actor as a "mediator." In international relations, most conflict resolutions are always done through a third party or third parties who mediate the conflicts (Pevehouse & Goldstein, n.d.).

Mediation represents the process through which apart from the provision of good offices, a third party maintains an active participation in the negotiations. It therefore represents a process in which an impartial actor, who is the mediator, assists in facilitating communication between the warring parties, therefore promoting reconciliation between them and therefore allowing the possibility of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation usually comes as the next line of action if negotiation fails. It is the work of the mediator to manage and engage in the facilitation of the negotiation process between the warring groups. It is not the responsibility of a mediator to make decision or to enforce an agreement. It is the warring groups who are also participating in the settlement process who have the responsibility to negotiate their own agreement during the mediation progress. One of the advantages of mediation is that it aids both sides in the

conflict to better comprehend each other's view in the conflict. At times the mediator has to separately meet with each group in the conflict. The mediation process usually take place at agreed location.

Mediation therefore attempts to bring together all the warring parties and defuse the tension fueling the conflict. The mediator despite not making agreement for the warring parties is able to take a strong initiative to propose the better, rightful and needed formulas in coming to an appropriate solution by the warring parties (Peardon & Schuman, 1934). Majority of the international conflicts in the world today are with a single or more mediators working hard to help settle the conflict without leading to violence or violence in its entirety. At the global level in the present international system, the United Nations is a very vital mediator. Some regional disputes and disagreements among nation states have their respective regional organizations take the role of mediator. Several examples can be found in the operations of the European Union, the African Union, the Organization of American States, and several others. Mediators must assess and know the demands and interests of all the warring parties in the dispute. This step is vital and can serve as a preliminary one to the additionally specific methods of inquiry and conciliation.

Inquiry assigns resolving the dispute by the creation of commission of inquiry. This commission will comprise equal members from both sides of the warring groups in addition to one or more from other states, and it duty is the facilitation of appropriate solution for the conflict in question. This commission of inquiry carries out objective and relevant investigation in order to find out the facts of a dispute.

Conciliation as a method of conflict resolution is the combination of inquiry and mediation. It denotes referral of a conflict to a commission which consists of committee which create a report containing recommendations to the warring groups for the resolution of the conflict. Any proposal made by the commission is not a binding one. Conciliation can therefore be seen as a process in which proposals on ways to settle a dispute are formulated after

investigating facts of the conflict when attempts are reconciliation of the warring groups have proved unsuccessful. These warring groups have the freedom to choose the path of acceptance or rejection of the formulated proposal (Alexandrowicz, n.d.). Conciliation can be a very effective technique of conflict resolution in the settlement of uncooperative disputes. It is more formal as a tool when diplomacy and politics is concerned in the resolution of international conflicts. It is flexible as compared to the rigid judicial methods at conflict resolution.

Bargaining represents another technique used in settling international disputes. It therefore represents adjusting or synthesizing different perceptions and goals of the warring states or parties with the key aim to retain primary self or national interests. Bargaining can therefore be seen as a strategic communication targeted towards reaching an agreement on an exchange of value by both parties, so that some sacrifices are made in terms of some values held dear to both of the warring parties (Snyder, 2015). It has proved to be an effective method at resolving conflicts between two or more states.

1.1.1.2 Judicial Methods

Judicial methods of settling conflicts represent effort made to officially established the conditions and measures which form the provision of the dispute's settlement. The judicial means of resolving conflicts are arbitration and adjudication. The resolutions are arrived at on the premise of rules and regulations and considering specific instances equity, while political understanding is clearly kept out due to the fact that only legal disputes can be judicially fixed or reconciled. Awarding arbitration and the verdicts of an international court are obligatory on the warring groups and these approaches are therefore referred to as decisional or binding.

Arbitration happens to be an old approach to conflict settlement which has been utilized by the western nations (Von Glahn & Taulbee, 2013). It denotes referring of a conflict which is between two states to a third party which is

selected independently by the warring parties, and the third actor makes an award. As far as the warring parties comes to agreement in advance to accept and uphold the resolution conceived by the third party, this approach is what is referred to as arbitration (Pevehouse & Goldstein, n.d.). Arbitration can therefore be summarized to denote when conflicting parties negotiate a bilateral treaty which is referred to as a compromise, and they declare in an obvious manner the issue that needs arbitration, name the chosen arbitrators and lay down the principles and the rules of law to follow.

In cases where the submission of disputes or conflicts is not to a sole arbitrator, as illustrated in the judgement or resolution by a single state, such issues are referred to a tribunal which consists of one or two citizens of each conflicting nations in addition to one or more citizens of external states. This is usually mentioned in the compromise. The decision is made through majority vote and a written declaration of the award is submitted to the parties involved. This award is a binding one to the conflicting groups.

Adjudication procedure is similar to that of arbitration, the difference being the process by which the judges are selected. International conflicts can therefore be adequately resolved through properly composed international judicial tribunal that applies the rules of law. The sole established agency of legal resolution currently operative within the global society happens to be the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

1.1.2 Coercive Procedures Short of War

Nations choose to utilize a form of threatful but non-violent approach to resolve conflicts if the pacific methods as outlined above are not successful in satisfying the warring parties. The non-violent coercive methods consist of recalling of diplomats by a particular state from the opponent state, repatriation of rival nations' diplomats, lack of acknowledgement or acceptance of a government or sovereign state, cutting off of diplomatic relations and the temporary or permanent withdrawal from treaty obligations.

Other methods of coercive approach short of war that are obviously unfriendly consist of blockade (an example is naval blockade), boycott, laying of embargo and also reprisal.

Blockade is a method of settling disputes and is hostile but short of war. It was utilized for the first time around the year 1827, and since then, it has also been utilized at several other instances (Morabito, 1991). It is though utilized during peace period at times for strategic reasons. During war, blocking an enemy country's port is a frequent naval operation. It is meant to force the nation that its ports are being blockaded to comply with any request the states engaging in the blockade are asking for.

Retortion represents another hostile tactic which is short of war and used for resolving conflicts. Retortion simply denotes an aggressive or unpleasant but lawful act by another nation. This has nothing to do with military. A good example of this is the ending of diplomatic ties, for example; the United States broke off diplomatic ties with the Iranians after its nationals overran the United States embassy in the capital city of Tehran in the year 1979. Some other forms of retorsion entail the official cancellation of diplomatic privileges or the removal of tariff reductions by a state.

Reprisals represent another hostile method that is short of war. These represent the strategies utilized by nations in order to secure redress from a second nation through retaliatory measures (Starke, 1989). It therefore denotes coercive methods utilized by one nation against another nation, the main aim being to settle dispute which exists as a result of the second's nation unlawful behavior and activities. Such coercion may be non-violent like capture or annexation of property or a naval blockade, and it can be also violent like an armed attack. Reprisals are generally seen as unlawful while retorsion comprises of reciprocating behavior to which no judicial argument can be brought against it. Reprisals are therefore taken to merit justification only if their goal is to affect an acceptable and convenient resolution of a dispute.

1.2 African Union Institutional Framework

The decision for the founding of African Union was arrived at in an extraordinary Organization of African Unity summit in Libya (Sirte) in September 1999, and it finally came into existence at a deliberation meeting of African leaders which took place in Durban, South Africa on the 9th of July 2002. The African Union envisions itself as a continental institution which concentrates upon the advancement of peace, security and safety as an essential requirement to achieve implementing the expected development and integration plan of the Union. It pursues the achievement of considerable harmony and cooperation among African nations and the citizens, advances democracy, human rights and sound governance, coordinate policies with different RECs and tackles the drawbacks of the continent in cooperation with other global and sub-continental allies.

All African nations are qualified to be members. There is probability for member suspension when there exists an obvious instance when a member works against the rules stipulated in African Union Charter. The African Union has the following principal organs:

1. The Assembly: which consists of Heads of State and Government or their delegates; it is the supreme organ.
2. The Executive Council: which consists of individuals appointed by the authorities in Members States.
3. The Commission which is similar to the United Nations Secretariat.
4. The Permanent Representatives' Committee of each Member States.
5. Peace and Security Council (PSC)
6. Pan African Parliament: This consists of 265 delegates who are voted for by the legislatures of the 53 African Union nations.
7. ECOSOCC: The Economic, Social and Cultural Council. This is a consultative branch of the African Union.

1.3 Peace and Security Council

Since this paper is on the AU and conflict resolution in Africa, taking the Darfur crisis as a case study, the PSC requires proper examination. The

primary mechanism of the African Union's structure for preventing and managing conflict is therefore PSC, and is been sustained by the Chair of the African Union Commission. Members ratified the protocol which relates to the founding of the PSC, in July 2002 at Durban. It took effect in December 2003. The protocol, in article 2(1), describes the PSC as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to enable prompt and productive answers to conflict, disasters and disputes on the continent. The PSC operates with five members voted in for duration of 3 years (with each member coming from each of the five official regions in Africa) and the remaining ten members are voted in for 2 years term.

The work of the PSC consists of the advancement of peace, security and stability on the continent; to anticipate and prevent conflicts; to promote and effect peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities; to coordinate and organize efforts on the continent in preventing and tackling international terrorism in every aspect; to develop of a joint or collective defense policy for the Union; and also the protection of human rights and basic freedoms.

The African Union and the RECs have made reasonable advancement in peacemaking by making use of mediation and preventive diplomacy and also through military interventions. African good offices, which is headed by Kenya under the auspices of IGAD, gave rise to the ratification of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan in the year 2005. Also, the Lusaka Accords, that were ratified by the DRC and five neighbors of hers, was possible due to the tenacity of African heads of states and significant aid from SADC.

The African Union's peacekeeping task is made more efficient and simplified with the establishment of African Standby Force that has been proposed to consist of five regional battalions organized by the RECs. The African Union is also in the business of founding a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) portal, that will connect the RECs using newly developed technology and will also allow for the provision of news briefs(Woodrow Wilson Centre Africa Program., 2008). The CEWS is very effective as it helps to forestall

disputes which would have led to serious conflict or armed uprising on the continent. It is also within the APSA. Its working principle is through the collection of data. The data are analyzed, working together with other relevant organizations such as the United Nations, educational institutions and also NGOs. The information obtained is then utilized by the leadership of the commission to give advice to the PSC on the possible conflicts and the danger to the stability and security on the continent, thereby recommending the optimal and perfect solution to the council.

The Peace and Security Council meetings are generally with good record of attendance. Both non-members and nations with continuous disputes have kept close observation over the Peace Security Council deliberations. The PSC tries to impacts its intended audiences, specifically the warring groups that are engaged in conflict or that are in crisis situations. One of the actions of the PSC which is consistent is the suspension of member nation which unconstitutionally changed a regime. Examples of these nations are Guinea and Niger. The PSC also exhorts member states to impose all the measures made provision for by the Algiers decision of July 1999, the Lomé Declaration of July 2000, the Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol which relates to the creation of the PSC, and also includes sanctions, on the perpetrators of the unconstitutional change and on other people that have contribution in the sustaining of such illegality.

1.4 Framework of the AU Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was founded after the conclusion arrived at by African leaders at the 29th session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government that took place in Cairo, Egypt in June 1993. This method was in turn absorbed as a part of the AU after its establishment during Lusaka Summit of July 2001. The Organization of African Unity was officially disbanded on July 9, 2002 during the 38th ordinary session of the AU Assembly that took place in Durban. The African

Union after that assumed the rights, authority and responsibilities of OAU. One of those responsibilities is the management of conflict.

The mechanism was predated by various alternative efforts at finding a suitable formula to tackle conflicts on the continent. This can be seen in the OAU Constitution at inception in the year 1963 which consist of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration that had the objective to facilitate non-violent settlement of conflicts among constituent nations. The Commission's duties were limited to inter-state conflicts and was also given the authority conduct investigation and inquiry into the disputes that are brought before it. Unfortunately, the Commission was never operational and was scrapped.

The United Nations also got involved in managing some of these conflicts. A major defect of these impromptu provisions is their reactivity and are intended as remedy instead of being proactive and preventive(Naldi, 2002). But in the case of MCPMR, it attempts to include in conflict management and resolution processes in Africa a new institutional dynamism which enables rapid action in order to prevent or manage and eventually settle the disputes whenever and wherever they take place(OAU, 1993).

The Constitutive Act of the AU (that succeeded the Charter of the OAU) initially did not make provision for a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The OAU's MCPMR and the Cairo Agenda for Action on the MCPMR were not taken into consideration inside the charter. It was connected with the hastiness at which those who drafted it had to conform to the snappy time limit given by Libya(J. Cilliers, 2002). In order to correct this, the aims of the Cairo Declaration happened to be an essential component of the stated aims and objectives of the African Union, according to Article 5(2) of the African Union Act. It must be mentioned here that against the framework of danger constituted to African growth and advancement by the proliferation of portable firearms, the African Union also ratified a Protocol on the creation of the PSC of the African Union in order to

override all motions and resolves of the OAU on MCPMR when it eventually comes into effect.

The attention given to matters of managing disputes by African Union came from awareness which shows the impossibility of a community plagued with brutal dispute to gain optimally from globalization centered on politics and economics(Ibeike-Jonah, 2001). Brutal conflict is one of the key factors behind the underdevelopment of Africa. Several African countries have history of violent conflicts. Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Togo have been ravaged with various levels of violent conflicts. This environment of conflict and crisis, including those that have not developed into war inordinately distract the government's attention from vital sectors of growth and advancement to enlarged duty of domestic preservation of order in the state.

Around three hundred billion dollars is assumed been expended on the warfare industry yearly at the global level(Boulding, 1990), and Africa takes in a substantial per cent of that amount, that could have been used to develop other vital sectors and the economy. This fact is obviously one of the key factors contributing to under development in Africa, as it becomes impossible for the governments of the constituent states to contribute their energy and scarce resources maximally on vital economically advantaged sectors, as the presence of conflicts and finding solutions to resolve those conflicts has also gulped substantial amount from the available resources.

The approach of preventive diplomacy had its formal thrust during the 1992 assembly of the heads of state and governments of the UNSC. Participants in the gathering were encouraged to pay future attentiveness to analysis and submissions on methods of nourishing the competence of the UN for preventive diplomacy, peace-making and also peacekeeping'(Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The *Agenda for Peace*, written by the UN Secretary-General soon after as an answer to this problem, included a chapter which is on preventive diplomacy. The report had a warm reception by the United Nations General Assembly in October 1992. The position of the US has also favored

preventive diplomacy as a key point of the United States policy regarding the continent of Africa(Lund, 1996).

1.4.1 Guiding Principles of Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR)

The MCPMR of the AU can be viewed as a rational response to the several frustrations and challenges facing Africa and its inhabitants after the end of the cold war. This mechanism is firm on the point that the task of solving African difficulties lies primarily in Africans hand. It submits that African governments have now realized that although the international community can really be supportive, it should not be anticipated or banked on to be in the forefront when it comes to the making, building and keeping of peace on the continent. The guiding principles of MCPMR therefore, among several others include the recognition of sovereign equality and interdependence among the individual Member States; there should be respect for the borders in existence when independence was achieved; also, African citizens are expected to participate in the organization's activities. It is also expected from constituent nations to abstain from interfering in the domestic matters of one another and any issues between the members should be resolved peacefully without resulting to usage of force.

It is expected of the member states to show commitment in sustaining the ideals of the organization and make their donation to encourage and sustain peace on the continent. This can be revealed in showing willingness to partake in the management of conflict and in resolving disputes at the regional level and on the continent as a whole; contributing appropriately to the Peace Fund initiated for certain reason; regard for lawful governance, according to Lomé Declaration, and also human rights; to have established representations at the head offices of the AU and the UN with sufficient staff and equipment in order to have the capacity to undertake the obligations that go along with membership; and also, must show commitment to fulfill their financial duty to the Union.

1.4.2 Essential Provisions of MCPMR

The subject to be dealt with under this part deals with the different concepts under peace studies: conflict prevention, reduction, management and resolution; preventive diplomacy; peace-making and peace-building. In what way can these concepts be applicable to the conflict management mechanism of the AU?

The concepts of preventive diplomacy and peace building all have the objective of averting the escalation of disputes. In context, those that labor towards reduction of conflict or those that undergo the building and construction of peace blocks are actually engaging in preventive diplomacy.

What then are the measures and arrangements of African Union mechanism for (i) preventive diplomacy (ii) peace-making and (iii) peacekeeping?

The essential arrangements of the MCPMR of the AU for the preventive diplomacy/ peacebuilding aspect entails the following:

- Setting up of conditions that are conducive for sustaining Peacebuilding development;
- Promotion of democratic practices and acceptable governance;
- Promoting the rule of law;
- Defense of human rights and their basic freedoms;
- Early warning system;
- Stoppage and combat of global terrorism;
- Engage in and encourage post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
- Engage in reconstruction after conflict;
- Undertake preventive deployment;
- Ensure and stimulate the awareness level on the necessity of protecting the environment;
- Ensure collaboration of African regional institutions and organizations
- Encourage cooperation between and among neighboring countries

The strategic provisions of the MCPMR of the African Union for the Conflict Resolution/ Peacemaking aspect entails:

- Carrying out peacemaking process through using of good offices and mediation, and several other approaches to conflict resolution.

The essential measures of MCPMR of AU for Dispute Settlement/Peacekeeping aspect entails the following:

- Undertake peace support actions and intervention;
- Engage in humanitarian operations and disaster management;
- Shared defense strategy for AU should be incorporated. (Albert, 2010).

The majority of the measures contained in African Union conflict resolution mechanism denotes the importance of preventive diplomacy and shared security in tackling post-cold war conflicts on the continent. Preventive diplomacy is therefore reasonable and logical in this context since conflict is usually patterned and therefore can be predicted. That is, signs of impending conflicts can be clearly seen or spotted and can therefore be checkmated. Also, natural disasters which is the most complicated side of environmental conflict, is predictable. As far as the required actions to prevent such disasters are carried out, the impacts on human can be curtailed if not totally removed. In the same way, other human-created conflicts can be avoided. It would nonetheless involve the whole international community to execute any fruitful and successful program of conflict prevention in this modern age.

In this contemporary world, it is considered that preventive action needs an international system whereby the United Nations, regional organizations, states, NGOs and some other institutions work together over the removal of conflicts source and prevention of the birth and rise of conflicts (Rupersinghe, 1993). This happens to be a part of bases that makes the African Union Constitutive Act necessitate partnership and collaboration between African Union and sub-regional institutions and also the United Nations in handling conflicts within the continent. The key aim of the African Union Mechanism is therefore the prediction and pre-emption of conflict and the intention of eliminating the necessity to utilize the elaborate and capital-demanding

peacekeeping operations, that many African nations will see as burdensome to fund (African Union, 2002).

1.4.3 Potentials Issues with Implementation of the Mechanisms

The MCPMR promises a better future for Africa as far as peace is concerned. This mechanism of the African Union is an extremely important asset for the continent and must be promoted and strengthened, as it shows the genuine determination of the continent to totally shoulder its duties. The contradiction, nonetheless, goes thus; a conflict management mechanism, similar to the Laws of a nation-state, will not apply and execute itself; and can only be functional through people. It is therefore possible for African Union to maintain a flawless conflict management mechanism but lack the expected and needed ability to constructively make effective this mechanism. The challenges for the future can be seen from this dimension. What then can be the foreseeable problems?

The first issue with MCPMR implementation is financial constraints. How can the African Union generate adequate capital resources for proper implementation of its elaborate security management system? The African Union experience is instructional. As far as the African Union member states (as observed under the OAU) are reluctant to fulfil their monetary responsibility to the institution, the task of managing disputes will basically be carried out by the global community. A good illustration of this point under the OAU is the stalemate experienced by the OAU peace-keeping troops operating in the Republic of Chad by 1981. It was up to a year before the OAU could deploy an intervention force in Chad after the expression of such necessity by OAU. Again, after the deployment, there was no significant favorable result due to finance limitation and also insufficiency of appropriate military expertise and logistics. The intervention force was removed ahead of time in 1982. Such a situation like this is worse than lack of intervention in a conflict. The conflicting groups purely take the removal of the OAU force to indicate the inability for peaceful resolution of the conflict. This made both disputants to invest more in the bloody encounter, expecting to win the battle.

The African Union therefore needs to do more in ensuring that members do not default in their payment to the organization.

A further major issue is the suspicion among the leaders in Africa. This constitutes several matters which include cross-border assistance of armed rebellion. The application of MCPMR will be difficult under such a condition. As an example, the former and late Libyan leader, Muammar Ghaddafi, who promoted OAU transmutation to AU was also acknowledged for the sponsorship of several dissident factions on the continent. He sponsored and armed Charles Taylor of Liberia and Foday Sankoh of Republic of Sierra Leone to carry out insurgent struggle and fighting and carry out military operations against their respective national governments(The Graduate Institute of International Studies Geneva, 2001). The Sudanese government has also been acknowledged to be active in the prolonged conflict in Northern Uganda. All these create difficulties for the leaders to work in unity in order for stability to reign on the continent.

Another issue borders around operational efficiency of national armies. African military still have lots to do in the area of having well equipped army and also in the qualitative training of their military in guerrilla warfare. Majority of African governments fail to pay the required attention towards preparing and training the national military to be combat prepared and organized, especially in terms provision of the necessary equipment both qualitatively and quantitatively and also giving the right motivation to their armies. Strong military are necessary for the proper implementation and operation of the African Union Mechanism for conflict management. African armies must therefore be strengthened when it comes to training and also motivation.

1.4.4 AU Conflict Resolution Mechanism and Past Cases

The African Union Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was first operation under the Organization of African Unity, as it was adopted in the Cairo summit of 1993, long before OAU metamorphosize to become the African Union. It's success under the OAU was largely as a result of the well-established collaboration of the OAU with

the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) was therefore functional in its initial stage through working with established regional organizations on the continent such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West African subregion, Southern African Development Community (SADC), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and a few more others (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017).

A clear example where the African Union worked with a REC to ensure peaceful management and resolution of conflict on the continent is seen in the Liberia Civil War. This war was one of Africa's bloodiest. From the year 1989-1996, more than 200,000 Liberians lost their lives while over a million others were scattered over different refugee camps in neighboring countries. By August 1990, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to commence the deployment of a joint military intervention force, labelled the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and put it under Nigerian control. This mission later included military men from other non-ECOWAS nations, such as Uganda and Tanzania as a result of the involvement of the OAU.

ECOWAS involvement in finding a peaceful resolution in Liberia continues as the regional organization helped to broker a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin in 1993. After this, in September 1993, the UN Security Council launched the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), in order to reinforce ECOMOG in the implementation of the peace agreement. The deployment of UNOMIL took place early in 1994 and consisted of 368 military observers with associated civilian personnel to monitor the implementation of Cotonou Peace Agreement. General elections was scheduled to hold in February/March 1994, but by May 1994, a renewed armed violence erupted and failed to stop. It was fierce, to the extent that ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were seized and taken hostage by some rebel factions. The humanitarian state in Liberia became devastating, with about 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian agencies were

not able to get to majority of these Liberians as a result of the high level of insecurity in the country (Ojo, Ojo, & Agbude, 2015).

The OAU Council of Ministers therefore met in its 60th Ordinary Session in Tunis, Tunisia from 6 to 11 June, 1994 and passed resolution on Liberia. In the resolution, it expressed concern about the increase in fighting and hostility among the different factions. The OAU also reiterate the necessity for disarmament and also the needed access to different parts of Liberia that are in need of humanitarian relief supplies. It considered the invaluable contribution of other African nations through the OAU to the ECOMOG troops, specifically Uganda and Tanzania, and also the United Nations military observers. The OAU objectives, operating through the structure of its peace mechanism, has been in line with that of the ECOWAS regional organization, that is, to help impose a cease-fire; assist Liberians to establish a functional interim government until elections would take place and also put an end to the killing of innocent civilians.

Although the Liberian Civil War continued till 1997 after which general elections were held and a second Civil War broke out in 1999 and ended in year 2003 with a new election held, the OAU, and later African Union, has been active through its various conflict management and resolution mechanism, partnering with ECOWAS and the UN to ensure the resolution of the Liberian crisis and also bring about stability to the country (Badger, 2008).

Another major conflict in Africa that the OAU resolution was passed and its peace mechanism put in place was the Rwandan Civil War. It started mainly as conflict between the Rwandan military which represents the ruling administration in the country, and the rebel group, that is, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The war spanned 1990 to 1994, and it arose from the existing ethnic conflict, that is the dispute between the Hutu and Tutsi population in the country. The war started in October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded the north-eastern part of Rwanda. They suffered setback when their leader, Fred Rwigyema died during the combat by the second day. This

made the Rwandan troops with assistance from France to gain upper hand and the RPF were therefore conquered by October ending. Paul Kagame who was initially in the US when the invasion took place came back and took command. The RPF therefore began a guerrilla war, and it persisted till the mid-1992 with no party gaining the upper hand. After several protests in the country, the then President Juvénal Habyarimana was under pressure to start peace negotiations with the RPF and other domestic opposition groups. A group of extremists from the Hutu ruling class were still against striking a deal with the RPF and a fresh violence by the RPF therefore began again in early 1993, and again, negotiations came to successful conclusion by the ratification of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 (Magnarella, 2005).

With the gradual implementation of the terms of the peace accord, the Hutu Power movement gradually gained influence and hatched a plan to exterminate the Tutsi ethnic group. This plan finally came into action after the murder of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994. Within 100 days, about 1,000,000 Tutsi people and moderate Hutu people were killed in what is now known as Rwandan genocide. The RPF therefore immediately resumed the civil war. They captured several territories in the small nation and encircled different cities. By the middle of June, 1994 they had completely encircled the capital, Kigali, and they seized it on the 4th of July, 1994 (Baisley, 2014).

The Council of Ministers of the OAU therefore passed a resolution on the situation in Rwanda during its meeting in Tunis, Tunisia from 6th to 11th June, 1994. The organization expressed grave concern over the continuation of the massacres of innocent civilians in the country. The OAU also recalled the Communique which was issued by the key organ of the OAU Mechanism for conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 28th of April 1994, on the killings in Rwanda and the liability of the perpetrators under international law. In the strong condemnation of the OAU, it stressed the urgent need to end the systematic killing in Rwanda and immediately stop hostilities. It also requested the central organ of the OAU MCPMR that was working closely with the mediator and peace facilitator and leaders within the region to follow up the situation in Rwanda with a view to

putting an end to the wanton killing and violence and bring about stability to the country with the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

These actions by the OAU are part of its efforts through MCPMR which are aimed to avert and prevent further wide-scale conflicts in the region. The Rwanda war later ended that month, as the RPF captured the last territory controlled by the interim government, with the perpetrators of the genocide fleeing the country. The new government later began a program of rebuild the infrastructure and economy of the nation, and brought the perpetrators of the genocide to trial, engaging in the promotion of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi population (Lemarchand & René, 2002).

The OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as seen in the cases illustrated above was able to collaborate with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and deploy troops either to manage an existing conflict or to prevent rising tension from escalating into war. Other cases where the OAU has functioned to prevent and resolve conflicts through its Mechanism are seen in Republic of Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, and a few others. Nine years after the creation of the OAU MCPMR, the approach to this mechanism was overhauled with the adoption of the African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol in July 2002. This was as a result of several issues that centers around the limitations of the MCPMR mandate such as the exclusion of conflict intervention. The OAU Central Organ only allowed and empowered the MCPMR to carry out non-military peace observation missions. The OAU MCPMR has notwithstanding demonstrated the commitment of African nations which commensurate with that of the UN (Ali & Matthews, 1999).

1.5 African Union and Peacekeeping

The first ever African Union peace mission commenced in Burundi in year 2003. It was codenamed the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and was completely launched, organized and carried out by African Union states. It denoted a significant development for African Union when considering self-reliance in the operation and implementation of peacebuilding. The Peace

Security Council authorized 3,500 military and civilian work force for deployment. It had the directive to supervise the performance of a December 2002 ceasefire agreement which was ratified between Burundi's conflicting parties(Andrews & Holt, 2007).

A noteworthy African Union mission is the mission in Darfur, that is, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). It started June 2004. And a more current one is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM forces were deployed in March 2007. Since it started engaging in peacekeeping roles which might otherwise have been taking on by the UN, the African Union has become a more important actor and UN ally in tackling matters of peace, stability and security in Africa. As a result of the common interest in the promotion of peace and to ensure a stable continent, collaboration with African Union and the progress of its peace keeping ability and potential are predominant elements in the United Nations reform agenda in present-day. United Nations assistance and support has been vital to the enhancement of the African Union's capability to adequately stand up to regional conflicts(Andrews & Holt, 2007).

Some have criticized the African Union Mission in Darfur to be a disaster. This may just represent a high expectation from an organization which started only three years before the mission in Darfur was deployed. But as stated by some international diplomats and analysts; the African Union mission in Sudan should be considered to be a significant important political step, since the organization got engaged in the difficult task from scratch. AMIS started as an impromptu mission and advanced in an impressive manner into a full mission. Through this effort of the AU, the PSC have strengthened the continent's response to conflicts. Although the incapability of the AU to effectively handle the Darfur crisis resulted into the intervention of the United nations, the UN intervention only built upon the successes of AMIS and also learnt from its flaws (Klingebl et al., 2008).

1.6 African Union and Partnerships

Annual Consultation between the AU Commission, members of the African Union PSC, the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, representatives of the G8 member countries, the EU, the UN and some other allies occurs yearly. It gives the chance to improve and also evaluate the success achieved in previous year and during the execution of the general African Union peace and security scheme. The CEWS which depends upon the Regional Economic Communities was by then foreseen to have been established by 2009. Capacity building part of the APF has already been set up through the European Union following the appeal of the African Union with over 250 million Euros.

Allies have always promised their assistance for the operationalization of ASF and the development of the necessary and needed capacity, which includes the police and civilian constituents. Also, the formulation of EURO RECAMP (Reinforcement of the African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program) is a vital contribution to the performance which is targeted at the operationalization of African Security Force. The program is targeted at training African leaders through civil-military actions in the establishment of decision-making scheme for management of conflict at the continental stage. At the outset, it was fronted by France. Practically, this will entail a strengthened politico and strategic capabilities of the AU. It is a fact that there can be no success in development policy if peace and security are found wanting. Also, if a security policy meets with failure in tackling the root causes of a dispute, such a security policy will be unable to give a positive result.

1.6.1 African Union and the United Nations

When it comes to peacekeeping operations, the UN has been a notable ally of AU. This cooperation is seen in the areas of United Nations peacekeeping missions, the deployment of missions of regional or continental organizations on the African soil, with or without assistance from the United Nations, the joint deployment of UN peacekeeping troops together with those of regional organizations, and arrangement of task by a regional organization and the UN mission (Klingebiel et al., 2008). There also exists a significant level of

relationship between PSC of the AU and the UNSC. Yearly gatherings between the two departments are at the moment a constant factor. (Moolakkattu, 2010) mentioned that the United Nations Security Council consumes more time talking about issues in Africa than any other continents.

Therefore, the systems which emerged in UN–AU relations occurred under the condition of short-term needs instead of any long-term tactical plan (Andrews & Holt, 2007). The African Union Constitution makes PSC the primary mechanism for peace and security on the continent, without seeking for approval from the UNSC. It nonetheless recognizes the potentiality of operating in close relations with UNSC. Notwithstanding that in some ways it recommends a lessened contribution for the United Nations in this area, pragmatic reflections made it a necessity for the African Union to recognize the United Nations as the leading actor. Thus, there has always been the impulse to push for increased partnership between the AU and the UN (Aning & Atuobi, 2009).

CHAPTER TWO

EXAMINATION OF THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN

The genesis of the Darfur conflict, that has been in a state of humanitarian emergency since 2003, with over 2.5 million persons from among six million total population in the country been displaced and in several refugee camps, are complex, and dynamic. This chapter therefore investigates the history of the Darfur conflict, as the main case study of this work, in which the African Union PSC also got involved. The conflict in Darfur will thus be examined from the perspectives of issues in the conflict, the associated parties or groups and their interests. After examining the history of the Darfur conflict in the first part of this chapter, the subsequent parts provide the contextual definitions of the three aspects that this chapter will pay attention to, that is, parties, issues and interests. The last part examines the current situation in Darfur.

2.1 History of the Darfur Conflict

It is always easy for the Darfur conflict to be misunderstood or misrepresented at times due to the complexity and multifaceted nature of conflict occurring in Sudan as a state. There was the general and also very tough South Sudan conflict with the Sudanese government which have now been resolved as a result of the final act of secession due to the referendum undergone by the inhabitants. The case of Darfur and the conflict in Darfur is entirely different though, and had no real connection with the now resolved South-North Sudanese conflict.

In order to properly understand the Darfur conflict, one has to look into the components of the Darfur region in terms of ethnicity and race. This is a major aspect in the conflict before going to any analytical exercise of the marginalization of the region, still ethnical and racial in nature, by the central Sudanese government. Darfur region of Sudan was one of a chain of powerful Black African states historically. It emanated along the Sahara's Southern edge in the prehistoric and early modern times. By the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Darfur was an orderly and successful empire. By the year 1916, Darfur had come under the British rule. By the time Sudan got its independence from Britain in the year 1956, Darfur belonged to the new independent state of Sudan, and therefore governed by the government in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan. While under the British rule, Darfur was been ruled lightly through the Darfurians themselves. But after independence, the Sudanese government was ruling Darfur more directly. To make it worse, The central government was running Darfur not by local appointees from Darfur, bought by officials that were taken in from other regions of Sudan, mostly from Khartoum. The non-Arab Darfur people are therefore under the rulership and mercy of the Arab-speaking population of Sudan.

The second historical factor which has significant bearing upon the conflict in Darfur is pan-Arab nationalism. It was from the year 1950 that Egypt, Libya and Syria started making efforts for the unity and expansion of the Arab nations. The late Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi made more efforts towards this and also assisted the Government of Sudan in dominating Darfur. This effort at Arab supremacy led to arabisation policy in the Darfur region which in turn resulted into the marginalization of the region's mainly non-Arab population.

In the year 1994, still in pursuit of this arabisation policy in Darfur, the Sudanese Government attempted the abolishment of the single existing traditional polity in Darfur, which is the 'Masalit Sultanate.' All these included the marginalization and oppression being melted upon the Black Africans in Darfur. Resentment among the Darfur population had therefore been

increasing, and this led to the clash between the Arabs and non-Arabs in the region, and it thus took on a racial coloration. The abolition of the somewhat functional native administration in Darfur in the year 1972 also led to the collapse of government in the region. Since the normal administrative, political and judicial functions collapsed, there has been a governmental vacuum. Only a few customary courts are performing. Physical force and violence means are always used to solve land disputes and grazing issues instead of using legal means.

Another vital factor which is linked to the Darfur conflict is the issue of prolonged drought in the land. In the year 1984 to 1985, a terrible drought struck the land and claimed about 100,000 lives in Darfur. This terrible drought also resulted in a decrease in the amount of lands that are habitable. In the same vein, it also caused a sharp rise in population as a result of the Republic of Chad being hit by similar drought, and therefore immigration into Darfur. The population therefore increased significantly. This increase in population resulted in more persons in competition for less land. And this resulted in conflict, alongside racial, economic, linguistic, religious and political divisions.

The three factors touched above represent the key facilitators of the problems in Darfur which resulted in the Darfur conflict. Although there are other factors which are also significant and cannot be therefore totally ignored. The civil war in Southern Sudan which lasted for over two decades has its impact over the Darfur conflict, although not a direct one. The South Sudan conflict with the central Sudanese Government in Khartoum has been a major issue for Khartoum. It therefore concentrated more effort on this front and had no full concentration and time for Darfur. There had been real and concentrated peace negotiations between South Sudan and the government in Khartoum since the year 2002, and the conflict fully ended in the year 2005. Due to this, the Sudanese government had the chance and chose to devote additional time and concentration on the rebel in Darfur. This resulted in the aerial bombardment response to the rebels' action in the year 2003 which serves as the landmark for the outbreak of the Darfur conflict.

Historical geo-political events have also gotten their influence in terms of facilitation of the conflict in Darfur. Two countries sharing border with Sudan have always supported the rebels in Darfur. These two countries are The Republic of Chad and Eritrea. Chad happens to be predominantly a non-Arab country. It also had gotten issues with Arab expansion motives as it was invaded by Libyan armies in the year 1980 and also from the year 1983 to 1987. There is also connection between Libyan Arabs and the Sudanese northern Darfur Arabs. These northern Darfur Arabs tribe are the ones finally used by the central Sudanese Government of Khartoum to persecute and unleash violence upon the Black African tribes of Darfur. These Northern Darfur Arabs formed the dreadful militia group named Janjaweed in the 1990s. These group, with the support of the Sudanese government have been responsible for the massacre of many Black African lives in Darfur.

In the case of Eritrea, it has always held the Sudanese Government responsible for the funding of Eritrean extremist rebels, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, that was in the habit of attacking the border military men of Eritrea in the 1990s. Eritrea had to break off diplomatic ties with Sudan for ten good years. Not until the last month of the year 2005 did the diplomatic ties was later restored. Eritrea even had to tactically support a number of rebel groups from Sudan in order to form another government in the country.

The relationship of Sudan with Chad and Eritrea therefore also had a significant impact on the Darfur conflict, as the lack of good relations also turn to support for the rebel groups in Darfur and therefore a substantial factor in the escalation of the conflict. Although these two countries are now at peace with Sudan, the Darfur conflict is still in existence. Extensive killings have been halted since the year 2009, but stability is yet to be seen in Darfur.

2.2 Understanding Parties to, Issues and Interests in a Conflict

Conflicts are intricate occurrence with different root-causes and a range of actors who may have collision of interests during interaction (Mwagiru, 2008).

Due to this interests' collision of the involved parties, matters which form the core arguments of the conflict are negatively affected. Thus, the comprehension of a conflict can only be sufficient if the actors, issues and parties involved are mapped out in an objective manner. For the identification of the various types of interventions, Van de Vliert emphasize both structural and process models of conflict to give rise to five key factors which could represent the focal points of interventions; antecedent conditions, conflict issues, parties, behaviors and consequences (Van de Vliert, 1985).

Primary parties are those who are in opposition to one another, or are fighting each other, and also have direct interest in the end result of the conflict as both the existence and resolution of the conflict has a direct consequence for them. Secondary parties' interest in the end result of the conflict is indirect, with the consequence for them also not a direct one. These secondary parties are generally allies or supports of the primary parties and not direct opponent or rival to the main parties in the conflict. The parties in conflict can again be grouped in accordance with their position with respect to the other group. Interest groups are therefore divided into moderates, hardliners, external supporters, conflict profiteers, and spoilers (Burgess & Burgess, 2004).

Conflicting groups usually have the notion that the most extreme individuals are those who belong to the side of the opponent and are, actually, the mouthpiece of every fellow in the rival side. Although, there always exists substantial variation in opinions among group members, institutions, and states. With some members been identified as hardliners, others lean towards less extreme opinion or view. In some instances, some individuals in the party may also consist the headship or the management, although the dynamics of conflict usually choose members with some extreme stamina as leaders, for the fact that they usually speak out more and maintain a strong stance on issues. But as dynamic as conflict situations may be, the leaders may change their hardline stance with time or depending on the prospect of winning or loosing in the conflict. Considering this utility of loss or gain in the conflict, and also considering the available resources needed in maintaining

the conflict, the change in leadership position in any conflict, especially considering the degree of being hardline or moderate, may not necessarily translates to a change in the position of the whole followers. This at times, usually results into leadership change within the group, or rebellion among the group members leading to splitting or factions within such group.

Whether they are leaders or just members, generally moderate stakeholders always take up essential responsibility during peacemaking. This is due to the fact that they can see the valid aspects of every perspective, and therefore, moderates usually show more flexibility during negotiation. They are generally willing to take into consideration different options and also manifest consideration for the demands of others just as they do for theirs. Extremists have a narrow definition of negotiation schemes and they take inflexible stance on issues whereas moderates are on the average accessible to be persuaded and may even be ready to make compromise and readjust their stance. These moderates represent what some scholars refer to as 'constituencies for de-escalation'(Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012). These set of persons are usually relatively easily approached with appeasing signals or confidence-building actions instead of argumentative and hostile schemes. Due to their ability to make provision for vital basis for fruitful peace processes, third parties taking part in multi-party conflicts have to make sure that the opinions and desires of the moderates are listened to and considered.

Issues, in most cases, are laid down with regards to the stance maintained which consists also of the demands on the other which are not acceptable. Beneath such stance is an interest or an earlier reason which assists in the explanation on why the stance was taken. Also, beneath such interest is usually a core requirement which when frustrated, serves as a threat to the identity or survival of the group, and a deep anxiety of the result of not tackling such requirement. The examination of matters, underlying concerns and wants usually coincides with the differentiation phase of the confrontation, and can be ameliorated through the consideration of other

factors like the impacts of outside actors on the conflict (Saaty & Alexander, 1989).

2.3 Parties in the Darfur Conflict

The conflict began in the year 2003 when two primary insurgent parties with related resentment; the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLM) rose against the central Sudanese administration in Khartoum, and accused it of undue accumulation of authority and wealth at the expense of Darfur. The rebels, after that, have disintegrated into a numerous competing faction and they have all made various significant contribution to the conflict. The estimation put the number of rebel factions in Dafur to be more than 13 (Flint, De Waal, & International African Institute., 2005).

JEM, and the SLM struck main towns in the northern part of the city. Their first target was Gulu, which happened to be the capital of Jebelmaru region. The insurgents also strike Kutum, Tina, Mellit and All asher, where several aircrafts on the grounds were bombed. These rebels attacked the town in their numbers (in hundreds) and they used forty brand new land Cruisers, with advanced weapons, such as rocket-propelled grenades and automatic rifles.

That served as the beginning of these series of hostilities which led to the killing of more than 400 policemen and 80 police stations demolished. According to the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, majority of the investigations reveal that the Sudanese central government was met unexpectedly by the gravity of the violence, since it was unprepared to face such intensity of armed assault from the insurgents (*Report of the International Commission of Inquirv on Darfur to the United Nations Secretarv-General on January 25,2005*, 2005). Also, the insurgents looted government's weaponry, and this added strength to their operations.

The Darfur conflict also had ethnicity dimension, as various tribes maintain support for the direct parties. A party in the conflict consists primarily of the Sudanese armed forces and the Janjaweed, which is a militia body assembled mainly from the Arab Baggara tribes. And the other part of the conflict consists various rebel groups, most importantly, the SLM and JEM, enlisted mainly from the land-cultivating non-Arab Lur, and Zaghawa tribal groups. Although it denied in the public that it is supporting the Janjaweed tribe, the Sudanese government made monetary provision and gave aid to the militia and also took part in cooperative attacks that targeted the tribes where the rebels drew their support (De Waal, 2007).

The secondary parties to the Darfur conflict consist of African nations and the global community. The Sudanese administration complained formally to the UNSC against Eritrea for its instigating, supporting, and funding of the rebels in Darfur. The Sudanese government also made accusation against Chad for backing Darfur's National Redemption Front rebels in their exercise of cross-border raids (Behrends, 2007). In another development, Libya organized rounds of dialogues with the major actors in the conflict in Darfur in the year 2007.

In his first move at confronting the Darfur crisis, the United States designated Andrew Natsios to be its Special Envoy on Sudan so as to encourage diplomatic resolution of the conflict. The United States also persuaded China to take advantage of its leverage with the Sudanese government to bring about peaceful political resolution of the conflict.

The actors participating in the Darfur conflict consisted of ethnic groups, rebel groups, the Sudanese government with other nations of the globe, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and institutions. All of these actors performed either constructive or destructive roles through the management or escalation of the conflict in the Darfur region.

2.3.1 The Rebels

The rebels as a party to the conflict in Darfur will be analyzed in details in this section. From the onset of the conflict, there existed just two major rebel groups. The first one being the Justice and Equity Movement (JEM). JEM are very organized rebels that contains mainly of Black African tribesmen. They came into existence as a result of the lack of satisfaction in the unfair manner which is also not Islamic that the Central Sudanese Government is treating the Black African Darfurians. Their main leader happened to be a man named Dr. Kahlil Ibrahim. He resided out of Sudan for several years before coming back home and he was killed in the year 2012. This made his brother who is not charismatic as him, Djibril to take up the leadership role, and this resulted in increasing discontent. The origination of Justice and Equity Movement goes back to the year 1993.

A group came together and began to plan on the best way in which Sudan can be governed. In the year 2000, from the group which was still growing came out *The Black Book*, that described with details the incompetence and failures of Central Sudanese Government in tackling the marginalization occurring in Darfur. By this time, the group had seen and concluded that no reform could take place from the Central Government and therefore started to form the rebel group, Justice and Equity Movement. They voiced out for the establishment of an Islamic state, but they made known that sharia law could be applicable to just the Muslims.

The second major primary rebel group is called the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA). They are not as organized as the Justice and Equity Movement, as they were not with any main ideological sticking point. The primary sticking point for them was the total discontent with the way the central Sudanese Government is treating the Darfurian population and since this government has been failing to listen and find a solution to this mistreatment and persecution, the alternative way for them is to resort to armed conflict with the central government.

This made the Sudanese Liberation Army the strongest rebel group in Darfur, as they largely organized the two original attacks early in the year 2003, that alerted the central Sudanese Government and brought out the counter-insurgency strategy it operated with. Also, the Sudanese Liberation Army demand for a secular government and not Islamic one like the Justice and Equity Movement.

Three years after the establishment of the Sudanese Liberation Army, it split. It was a faction of this SLA that ratified the Darfur Peace Agreement which was signed in May 2006. This Mini Minawi group later had several of his troops departed, but regrouped again under the umbrella of National Redemption Front, and still consist close to a dozen factions of those who show loyalty. There is also the faction under the relevant umbrella group, SLA/Unity. This faction has as a part the highly respected humanitarian coordinator, Suleiman Jamous. The Justice and Equity Movement, JEM, has also split into two factions.

These two main rebels with their subsequent factions have carried out numerous attacks against the Sudanese Government and its properties, as they demand for justice and equity in the affairs and responsibilities of the government towards its citizens.

As years pass and go, things became dynamic as these rebels at times are weak in terms of coordination and other times exhibit strength. During their well-coordinated period their attack on the government is always violent and devastating. This is clearly seen in the April 25, 2003 attack on the Al Fasher airport, where five airplanes and two helicopters were destroyed and and 100 persons killed. There had been no rebel group in Sudan which had achieved such devastating level of destruction prior to that. This then resulted into the violent response of the central Sudanese Government which also made use of Arab militia group to fight the rebels. This neither deter the rebels from carrying out further attacks as they were emboldened as they grew in number. Another major attack the rebels effected was the 2008 raid at Khartoum's outskirts.

The time of their weakness started when Sudan and the Republic of Chad signed an agreement to put an end to interfering in each other's domestic matters. This action put restriction on one major source of arms and ammunition with other forms of assistance for the rebels.

The catastrophe that faced Libya during the uprising against the late president Ghaddafi and after his death happened to be another occurrence which had negative impact on the sources of arm procurement by the rebels. This made the rebels to be weakened easily with them not seen as a serious threat to the Sudanese Government.

Also, the Sudanese army with its sometimes poor morale and lack of commitment from troops to the nation had changed, as the Sudanese government with cash had funded the military well. This has also been complemented with the utilization of proxies, the Janjaweed, which is now the Rapid Support Force (RSF), by the President Al-Bashir.

2.3.2 The Janjaweed Militia

What the word Janjaweed really stands for is "devils on horseback." Although from history, it has meant different things. Initially as one of the issues occurring in there, there had always been different groups of bandits who rise up periodically and commit atrocities in Darfur. There are usually referred to as Janjaweed. Both the farmers and herdsmen referred to them by that name. Later and with time, this group of bandits were politicized and used by the government to engage in what can be termed "counterinsurgency on the cheap", which is an intentional attempt by the central Sudanese Government to gather and arm those groups of Arabs. The Sudanese Government used to deny this assertion though. These Arab militia group is being, buttressed by fighters who comes from other states like Arabs men from Libya and the Republic of Chad. Also, some prisoners are intentionally freed in order to assist in managing the Janjaweed. An example is the popular Janjaweed leader by the name Musa Hilal. These militia employ counter-insurgency strategies and terrorize civilian population from where the Darfur rebels come emanate. The number of the Janjaweed militia at any point in time varies between about 12,000 - 30,000 persons.

Despite the Sudanese Government denial of being involved with the Janjaweed militia, there exists obvious evidence of the government working hand-in-hand with the Janjaweed. An example is when there are aerial bombardment of villages by the government aircrafts which would be immediately followed by the Janjaweed militia attacking the villages. There were also eyewitness evidences of Janjaweed militia men and Sudanese military personnel interacting when raids are going on or after the raids. And also, there are reported instances of Janjaweed militia men wearing military uniforms.

Despite the numerous evidences supporting the Sudanese Government's involvement or collaboration with the Janjaweed militia group, it must also be mentioned that the historical origination of the group as bandits also denote that as a result of the reign of lawlessness in Darfur, some Janjaweed militia group and men also unleash violence singularly as a tribal issue to carry out revenge, or just to loot, but hiding under counter-insurgency. Examples can be seen in situations where the Janjaweed conducted assaults on villages which consist of Arabs, such as Amar Jadeed in 2007. Some Arab tribes therefore conduct attacks on other Arab villages. Also, at certain point in the year 2007, an increasing number of Arab tribes maintained the lukewarm attitude of the Sudanese Government to their plight, and therefore changed side to the rebel party.

The clashes between the Arabs tribes also claimed substantial number of lives in its hundreds and displacement of the village population up to 50,000 people. There were several attempts to also reconcile these warring Arab groups. This has always resulted into constant cross-party from being pro-government to turning into anti-government again. As an illustration, Musa Hilal, who has been a leader of the Janjaweed support for the Sudanese Government numerous atrocities, later turned into a critic of the government with attempts to even take control of a section in Northern Darfur. But again, he switched side to the government side and assist the Sudanese Government in its atrocities against the Black African Darfurians. Noteworthy

mentioning in this section is also the Rapid Support Force (RSF) which is a militia group just like the Janjaweed under the umbrella of which similar strategy of counter-insurgency and similar actors and people exhibit the Sudanese Government's cruelty. This change in name was a result of the return of a group of Janjaweed militia men who fought in South Kordofan. They settled in Darfur as a result of President Bashir's direction.

2.4 Issues and Interests in the Darfur Conflict

The conflict turned violent in the year 2001 when the rebels in Darfur commenced arms conflict, with the accusation that the government neglected the region. They maintained that the government is persecuting and suppressing the black Sudanese in favor of the Arabs. As a reaction to the violent actions of the rebels, the Sudanese government initiated a military operation of aerial bombardment which acted as aid for the ground assaults carried out by the Arab militia, the Janjaweed. The government-supported Janjaweed militia group faced accusations of different serious human rights abuse, such as mass killing, plundering, and systemic rape of the black people in Darfur (Hoge, 2007). They constantly engaged in the burning down of whole villages, driving the survivors away so that they escaped to refugee camps, located primarily in Darfur and the Republic of Chad. Most camps located in Darfur have the Janjaweed forces nearby.

The Janjaweed militia group is therefore a major party or actor in the Darfur conflict. It ranks alongside the central Sudanese Government, both as the two parties together against the non-Arab Darfur rebel groups. The Janjaweed also have presence in the eastern part of The Republic of Chad, although they are still mostly Sudanese Arabs tribes that came from the nomadic cattle herders.

A vital issue and interest matter with the Janjaweed militia, apart from being assisted by the Sudanese Government is that the limited rainfall in Darfur and resultant effect over the natural grazing land and fertile arable farmland led to serious competition in Darfur not only among the local farmers and the cattle herders, but then between the cattle herders, who are predominantly of

Arab tribes, and the local farmers, who are generally from the local Black African tribes. This particular issue brought about by scarcity of rainfall therefore centers on competition concerning resource and land allocation. The herders will need their cattle to graze on green pasture, as many of the Darfur Arab tribes are even nomadic cattle herders. The scarcity of green pastures means they can even allow their cattle to wonder into farmlands in order to be fed with the needed green pastures which will now be the crops being cultivated by these local non-Arab farmers.

The farmers on their own, will also work hard to look for fertile and arable piece of land from the very few available due to drought to cultivate their crops, which also serve as their means of livelihood. This competition for land and incursion upon their farms therefore constituted a major problem for them which they believed they must have to rise and physically defend their rights to land also, as their opponents who are the Arabs cattle herders are being supported by the Central Government in Khartoum, and therefore being favored above themselves, who even happen to be the original land owners and historically it has been the local Black African Darfurians who own the Darfur empire and also rule the empire. It is therefore an obvious fact that the issue of lack of rainfall and drought, if absence in Darfur would have also prevented a significant causative factor in the escalation of disputes in the Darfur region.

The interest of the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir who has ruled the country for three decades now, since the year 1989, is also a matter of interest in the conflict. His personal interest in power and ruling has certainly been a factor in the advancement of his fellow Arab men in Darfur at the expense and marginalization of the majority non-Arab tribes in the region. His interest to clinch to power by all means has meant that opposition and protests would not be handled in a civil manner, but with harsh policies and dictatorial nature. This issue and interest in itself has generated serious resentment among these marginalized and persecuted non-Arab tribes. It has been one of the grievances been nursed which finally burst and its escalation therefore led to the rebel attacks in the year 2003.

Following the Sudanese leadership's unwavering and firm failure to adhere to its promise to put an end to the brutality and human right violations present in Darfur, the United States closed up the assets of three Sudanese persons with involvements in the conflict. The United States also sanctioned 31 firms that belonged to the Sudanese government. The sanctions were aimed at increasing the political pressure on the Sudanese government in order to halt the brutality and human right violations it has been involved in. It also complements sanctions which the US had laid on the country since the year 1997. It has been asserted that the United States interest can be traced to the geopolitical significance of the country, as it is located between Africa continent and the Middle East, and it also possess a significant leverage in the war-torn region of Horn of Africa (Abramovici & Stoker, n.d.).

China's position as a functional and influential player in Darfur crisis can be seen from two directions. The first is from the fact that it went against deploying of United Nations forces to Darfur region as it abstained in the crucial vote on United Nations Resolution 1706. It abstained from voting due to its claim that the Sudanese administration was not prepared to take in United Nations peacekeepers on its soil. Although the reason for the Sudanese government refusal to let in UN peacekeepers was that there was no strong international pressure on it to accept the peacekeeping force. China dismissed the criticism against its refusal to put pressure on the government of Sudan, apparently because of its petroleum interest in the country. China, who is the largest purchaser of Sudanese petroleum, also sells weapons to Sudan. China was also accused of encouraging the violence in Darfur from international sanctions (Daly, 2007).

2.4.1 The North-South Conflict Influence

As earlier mentioned, the Darfur conflict and the Sudan's North-South war can be mistakenly mixed to be the same thing, whereas they are not. The conflict between the Northern and Southern Sudan has been in existence before the Darfur conflict became glaring openly for more than a decade. This South and North conflict in Sudan gave rise to two million casualties and

four million persons been displaced. The war represents a previous war being continued by the same conflicting parties which was from 1955 to 1972. It actually began even before Sudan became independent from Britain, precisely a year before it got independence.

During the British reign, the Northern Sudan and Southern Sudan were separated, as the Southern part which consists majorly of animist and Christian population were seen to be a blockage to the expansion of Islamic religion. Southern Sudan therefore shared several elements with the neighboring, Kenya and Uganda. The main point to bring out relative to the Darfur conflict been discussed here is the fact that within the couple of years when the North and South conflict was being negotiated and finally settled in the year 2005 through a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the conflict in Darfur broke out. One of the causes of the sudden breakout of the conflict was realization that Darfur issue was ignored because it was not part of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the South and North Sudan, although it was initially a part of the John Garang's general view of Sudan, that considered every minority groups. The death of John Garang, who was a South Sudanese and highly educated and also a member of South Sudanese rebels who might have been a Vice-President of Sudan considering the Peace Agreement deal, in a helicopter accident in the year 2005 was a suspicious one, despite its resemblance to be an accident.

A second reason for the sudden breakout of the conflict was the intractable nature of the North and South Sudan conflict which made it impossible for the central Sudanese Government to concentrate on the conflict in Darfur, the reason been that it was considered rational that focusing on Darfur could made working towards peace on the North and South conflict slow and may render the negotiation ineffective, therefore it demands full concentration from the government. This made the Darfur conflict linger when it could have been deliberately focused on and negotiated in its first one and half year. Instead, the Central Sudanese Government opted for counter-insurgency strategy by aiding the Janjaweed militia group to fight the Darfur rebels. A

General with the central Sudanese Government who opined that the Darfur rebel cause should be addressed, was sacked.

It must be mentioned that the Republic of South Sudan was finally formed and the North South Sudan war ended. Although civil war between the dominant tribes of Dinka and Nuer had existed in the newly formed South Sudan state, it has also turned into a very poor state despite its proven oil reserves, but the Sudanese Government have been freed from the conflict with the South and now have the strength and time to focus on the Darfur conflict.

2.4.2 The Arab-African Question

Sudan initially happened to be the largest African nation and the tenth in the world before South Sudan became independent in the year 2011. It extended across the Arab world to the north and the black African world to the south. Khartoum is generally governed by three Arab tribes. The conflict in Darfur is therefore generally viewed to be an Arab-African conflict, buttressed through the utilization of the Arab Janjaweed militia which set against the Black African Darfuri. All the sides in the conflict are Muslims.

There are complications to the conflict composition though, than the direct and simple structure outlined above. To start with, Darfur contains 60 percent African. A part of the 40 percent Arab remnants also faces negligence by the Sudanese Government. This was why in the year 2007, a new rebel group which was established and consisted of non-Janjaweed Arabs, sought representation in at peace talks and favored good interrelations between the Arabs and the Black Africans. Another important point here is the fact that intermarriage between the Arabs and non-Arabs of Darfur have been in existence for decades. Therefore, although narrow ethnic differentiation occurs, the recognition of a person to be African or more specifically to be an Arab, is always usually a political utterance.

Politicizing ethnic background in Darfur and Sudan generally can be traced to various sources, one of it being the late Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi who envisioned a pan-Arab state around the late 1970s which straddles the

desert. He therefore generated the thoughts of Arab supremacy and also arms usage in Darfur and believed Sudan as a state was in support of his vision. He gave several gifts in terms of finance and military equipment / support to the Government of Sudan over the years, but the Sudanese Government maintained its independence and sovereignty despite appreciating the gifts. Also, Gaddafi made use of Darfur as his base relating to his operation in the Republic of Chad while at war with the country.

The Sudanese government also did a lot to weaken the Darfur region through subdivision into three provinces and additional two provinces in the year 2012. It also made sure it ended the traditional path of rulership and authority. The Sudanese Government made use of divide and rule strategy to conquer and control the Darfurians. The land issue in Darfur must therefore be taken as a vital issue in order to be able to solve the dispute facing Darfur. The Sudanese Government has always capitalized on this issue of land tensions as a manipulative tool for the Arabs nomadic tribes, especially the Rizeigat tribe in the North own camels, so that they can be on the government side and be used as government's proxy fighters.

2.4.3 The Environmental and Land Issue

The environmental or climatic condition which have a natural effect on the land has also been a vital factor in the Darfur conflict as mentioned in the introduction above. With time, a section of North Darfur has been faced with the issue of desertification due to the absence of rainfall. This has gotten grave consequences on both the farmers and the cattle or herdsmen. The farmers who are predominantly the black African Darfur tribesmen started erecting fences around their farmland so that the Arabs Darfur herdsmen and other nomadic tribesmen pattern of grazing were also interfered with.

Again, it needs to be understood that generally from historical point of view that the land or most land in the Darfur regions belong to the farmers whose tribes happen to be the original Darfurians historically. They therefore hold claims to the lands and therefore growth in intensity and clashes between the farmers and herdsmen.

It therefore can be said here that climate change is also a vital factor in the causes of Darfur conflict. Although ethnicity or cultural differences is still traced to be the root cause, climate change which is an ecological factor has aided in the complexity of the conflict thereby adding to its multi-facet nature. Excluding the desertification issue would therefore not prevent the intensity of the Darfur conflict, but in the same manner, it has also aided and added to its complexity and therefore the difficulty in arriving at a permanent resolution of the conflict despite the involvements of different actors from institutional actors like the African Union and the United Nations.

Climatic factors may although be exploited by the government to pressurize more the opposing party to give up or to even oppress them. The latter being the case in Darfur, as the Arabs herdsmen are aided by the Sudanese Government in the conflict. These herdsmen destroyed the crops and plantations of the Black African darfurian farmers and even rape their women and steal their crops. The central Sudanese Government did virtually nothing to stop such violent acts of the herdsmen, thereby allowing the environmental factor in the conflict to play into the hands of the Arabs herdsmen in the Darfur region and destabilizing more the region and also intensifying more the conflict.

This environmental factor in the Darfur conflict, if properly dealt with by the Sudanese government have a great chance not only to reduce the intensity of the conflict, but also could bring about a new form of collaboration among the various Darfurian ethnic groups, thereby changing gradually the dynamics of the conflict in a positive manner so as to bring about increase prospect for a permanent solution of the conflict.

2.4.4 September 11 and the War on Terrorism Factor

What connection can the September 11 terrorism incidence have with the conflict in Darfur? This is not a complicated issue at all, despite its seemingly indirect posture. There has been a period that the leader of the September 11 terror attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and on Pentagon in Washington DC, in the United States, Osama bin Laden, was residing in Sudan. That period was between the year 1991 to the year 1996. It was

President al-Bashir who finally made sure he left Sudan, and that made Osama bin Laden to relocated to Afghanistan. After the September 11 occurrence, the United States government began to make use of the Sudanese Government for gathering intelligence on terrorism.

The hesitation of the United States to follow up their assertion of genocide in Darfur with strong response has been opined by some analysts that it is as a result of the complication of the issue coupled with the pre-occupation of the United States in Iraq due to the 2003 war. But some other analysts have opined that the a primary reason for the United States has not laid serious pressure on the Sudanese Government is due to the value placed on potential intelligence knowledge needed from Sudan than the lives of the Darfurian victims of the government horrific acts.

The United States even lifted substantial sanctions on Sudan. A part of the five key reasons was the notion that the Sudanese Government had shown cooperation in passing intelligence knowledge to the United States on terrorist movement. This, the United States took very important as it is primary in its national interest as compared to doing more it could for the sake of the innocent civilian lives dying in Darfur.

2.4.5 The Genocide Question

Several major actors in the international community have referred to the numerous killings in Darfur to be genocide. This include the former United States Secretary of State Collin Powell, and also the United States Congress, and also some other groups and reports. Genocide has a formal definition in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, although it is not without argument. As regard the Darfur conflict, it is not every actor in the international community that claim the occurrence of genocide in the Darfur region. As illustration, the investigation carried out by the United Nations on Darfur came with the conclusion in the year in 2005 that the situation was not technically genocide, partly on the ground that it founds no reflection of genocidal "intent" on the Sudanese

Government as a whole, despite mentioning that individuals inside the Sudanese Government did.

Genocide as a terrible act which is crime against humanity and therefore always draw the attention of international community where ever the act is been perpetrated. Even when not purely genocide but near what genocide is, it calls for serious attention as such acts can be horrific with innocent lives at risk. And in the case of Sudan, it is generally believed that the government of President Al-Bashir has perpetrated such horrific crimes against humanity and this is the reason why he is been sought for by the International Court of Justice in the Hague. There have been several reports by eyewitnesses which shows acts of genocidal intent by the Sudanese Government in Darfur.

The atrocities in Darfur by the central Sudanese Government against the civilian population and innocent citizens can therefore be seen as genocide as the government itself has sponsored and aided the Janjaweed militia to carry out several such inhumane acts in Darfur. The case brought against President Al-Bashir of Sudan at the International Criminal Court (ICC) which centers on charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes is therefore an on-going one. And there has been limitation since on the travelling of President al-Bashir himself, as he would be arrested by any country who will go by the order of the International Criminal Court, of which most will actually do.

2.4.6 Oil and the China factor

Majority of Sudanese oil is purchased by China. Also, China trade arms to the Sudanese Government, alongside Russia. Sudan accounts for around five percent of China's petroleum importation. Being one of the permanent United Nations Security Council member with veto power, China had prevented many resolutions against the Sudanese state. There was a little shift in China's stance though, when activists took steps to connect China's protectionist position toward the Sudanese state with China's 2008 Summer Olympics, as there was preparation to tag it 'Genocide Olympics.' if China fails to pressurize the Sudanese Government to put an end to the violent acts

against the innocent civilian population in Darfur and enter negotiation with the rebels. Although the event has passed, more had been expected from China to practically reinforce that petroleum supply is prevented from a state which is not on the brink to implode.

The pressure from the activists really yielded result as it could be said that it helped to pave an easy way for the commencement of the hybrid African Union-United Nations peacekeeping operation in Darfur. China would have vetoed such move, but it chose instead to abstain. China abstinence from such vote instead of vetoing, an action it has normally done as far as vote on Sudan has been concerned, was connected with what China sees to be a positive posture it needs to assume leading to the Olympics it was about to host. Although the AU-UN hybrid peacekeepers are finally allowed into Sudan, the Sudanese Government has always interfered in the smooth operation of the peacekeepers, thereby impeding the optimum effect of their presence on the situation in Darfur.

As regards the Sudanese oil, it must be known that when the new state of South Sudan was finally established, it brought some complexity to the oil issue. South Sudan possesses majority of the oil, but the oil can only be transported to the port for exportation by pipeline which passes via Sudan. The flow of oil was halted for more than a year when a dispute over oil policy between both states occurred. However, Sudan is still in possession of oil, about 130,000 bpd, and China has signed agreement with the Sudanese Government so that it is now in control of 75 percent of oil investment in Sudan

2.4.6.1 The United States, China, and the Oil in Darfur Question

Another major question concerns the presence of oil in Darfur. Maps of oil concessions have revealed that some oil blocks handled by China, extends into Southern Darfur. Some analysts have indicated that Sudan have found oil in the Darfur region. For the fact that petroleum has been seen on the South Kordofan region border, there is all likeliness that this extends into Darfur. Finding oil in Northern Darfur looks a bit impossible. Although there

has been a lot of speculations over cover-ups on oil discovery in the Darfur region as a result of the possible competition by the great powers, especially the United States and China to secure as much petroleum as possible in Africa, the extent to which there is cover-ups as to the presence of oil in Darfur is still a fact which its full scope is not known.

It must though be noted again that any secret attempt by the United States administration for regime change in Sudan must still face the needed intelligence on terrorism from Sudan. A fact which may be debated again is the consequence the search and discovery and drilling of oil in Darfur can or may bring to the conflict in Darfur. For if the situation is tense and discovery of oil is being followed up with drilling, there certainly would be issues like destroying of oil infrastructures by the rebels.

For now, what is clear is that the Sudanese government deals mostly with China pertaining its oil. And any entrance of the United States companies for now may be impossible except with regime change (Large, 2009). The primary matter which is the impact on the resolution of the Darfur conflict should be seen as positive in as much as the oil revenues gotten would be shared by the central Government and Darfur. This measure if finally operational should therefore bring stability to the region.

2.5 Current Situation in Darfur

In the year 2011, a power sharing agreement was established between the Sudanese government and the rebels, the Darfur regional authority was therefore founded. The goal was to found a better political power sharing acceptable to all and also distributing the wealth of the region equally. Even with this, violence still persists to the present day in many sections of Darfur.

Rebel groups fight among themselves over the control of the natural resources and the spoils of land. These has created several factions from the existing rebel groups, and those factions are also for most part, although periodically get involved in fighting one other, as they kill and also extort one

another and grab one another's lands. This is a bad sign to achieving total peace in the region. It is also a clear sign of the persistence of instability in the region.

The Hybrid United Nations / African Union operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is still operating in Darfur till present. Decision was made by the United Nations Security Council in July 2018 to ensure the eventual exit of UNAMID by the year 2020. The UNAMID mandate actually expires by 30th of June 2019, but the security situation in Darfur is yet to be stabilized as expected despite decrease in the level of violence.

Also, the Sudanese forces are used to blocking the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UNAMID, peacekeepers and aid groups the required access to internally displaced people and also to areas affected by the conflict. This access denial by Sudanese forces happens on several occasions. More than two million persons have remained displaced due to the Darfur conflict which started in the year 2003.

Also there has been on-going protests since January 2019. And in both January and February, the security forces have unduly cracked down on anti-government protesters, with hundreds of protesters being arrested and also beaten with hard sticks and rods. This protest happened in different locations across the country, including Darfur region. Many university students involved in the protests across the country were violently dispersed. One student was shot at by the security forces during the protest in Western Darfur and was killed. About five persons were also killed by the security forces at a displaced persons camp in central Darfur (Security Council Report, 2019).

Those arrested and detained by the security forces are being held without charges. Also, they are also being tortured while in detention. Human right activists were arrested alongside opposition party members and also student leaders. The government of President Omar al-Bashir has also been restricting the media through suspension and confiscation of editions of their

newspapers for covering the protests and also being critical of the government and its policies. With the central government still showing and acting dictatorial and brutal to the civil population, this is also impacting the yet fragile situation in Darfur. And a better government will certainly impact more stability in the Darfur region.

Also, the issues of the refugees and internally displaced persons is a matter of concern to the international community and human right groups. The Republic of Chad alone is presently home to close to three hundred thousand refugees who are from Darfur. Most of these refugees in Chad have been there for more than a decade. In January 2018, the Sudanese Government, The Republic of Chad and the United Nations signed an agreement to repatriate 20,000 refugees from the Republic of Chad to Darfur during the year. The first set of refugees who were fifty-three in number were returned in the month of April, 2018. It was a test set, and the UNHCR believed its success will result into more refugee returnees to Darfur. The action was however halted as a result of the presence of insecurity and the absence of infrastructures for the returnees in Darfur (Durbin, 2018).

Although the Sudanese Government kept on assuring the international community of its readiness to receive the returning refugees, what has been on ground says otherwise. Voluntary returns of the refugees back to Darfur is therefore still dangerous. Gunmen still attack residents and returning refugees in Darfur. Also, some approximately four hundred internally displaced refugees who returned to Darfur and to their village in Eastern Darfur were reported to be beaten by militant men in March 2019. The presence of rebels and also new settlers in Darfur has therefore constitutes danger for the returnees. The Janjaweed militia has also taken advantage of the vulnerability of the returning refugees and still engaged in killing of local farmers, stealing of crops, kidnapping of people for ransom and raping women. There is therefore a prevalence atmosphere of insecurity for the returnees in Darfur (Africanews, 2019). The Sudanese Government also seems to be doing nothing concrete in tackling this troubling insecurity which

persists in Darfur, although a little mild as compared to the period when the conflict was on-going and intense.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the international community still have a great and vital role to play in Darfur. Leaving the Government in Khartoum alone to handle the present-day Darfur issue alone may escalate matters and bring back the region into intense conflict again. UNAMID therefore have to remain indefinitely for now and keep on assisting in the maintenance of peace as pressure is been laid on the Sudanese leaders by the international community to do the needed.

2.5.1 President Bashir Overthrown Through a Coup

The pressure mounted by protesters for months which was intensified on April 6, 2019 when protesters remained at the palace entrance, in a sit-in protest, has generated result as the military finally ousted President al-Bashir as the president of Sudan. He was first replaced by General Ahmed Ibn Auf. However, the people rejected this, and he was again replaced by Lieutenant General Abdelfatth al-Burhan. After this the protesters, which are led through the coalition of the opposition, the Freedom and Change Forces (CFC), saw that the old regime was still intact in the new government and therefore demanded for total removal of the military government and a civilian government should be handed over to. The military's Transitional Council (TMC) again engaged in the removal of some other leaders like Gosh, who served as the head of the secret intelligence service (NISS). The coalition again rejected the military government as the old regime structure is still very intact (Azikiwe, 2019).

The protest continues and the coalition has not given up with increase in the number of protesters serving as encouragement to continue the protest. The military leadership has not given any hope of good intent, as the vice-president happens to be Lt. Gen. Hemeti, the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which has committed lots of atrocities in Darfur (Radio Dabanga, 2019). The hope for Darfur conflict being finally resolved and permanently settled therefore lies highly again on who the civilian

government will be handled over to. And this therefore again is primarily hanging on the decision of the current military government whose action can and will only be seen positive if relevant and due pressure is laid upon them to take the right action by handing power over to a properly elected civilian government.

The African Union has so far not made any significant comment or effort on the recent occurrence in Sudan. It certainly is being very careful as it is observing the developments and is definitely working behind the scene through the Ethiopian prime minister who is acting as a mediator between the protesters and the Sudanese military which is now on top of affairs in Sudan. A vital interest to African Union must therefore not exclude the Darfur region. As the AU-UN hybrid forces are still present in the region. The African Union must therefore ensure a smooth transition by the military leadership into a democratically elected government that will ensure peace reigns in all the troubled region of the country with Darfur being a prime region to ensure this. The mediation for now, by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia may face limitation with the support of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, but a combined efforts by the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and other state actors like the United States and Britain will go a long way in making the Military Transitional Council (TMC) to effectively handle power over to a civilian government that will be democratically elected in a properly conducted election (Aljazeera, 2019).

The suppression of protests through force should signal a clear sign to these institutional and state actors that power cannot be entrusted in the hands of the current military leadership as they will not only suppress the civilians, most of the leaders are complicated in the violent acts of the ousted regime in Darfur, and therefore there will be no significant change in handling the Darfur issue in a more better way as to ensure a permanent resolution of the crisis. A good result that can come out of this latest development if well handled by the international actors which include the African Union is that it will serve as a lesson to other leaders in African nations that irrespective of how a bad regime is ousted out of power, there must be proper handling of

the power for adequate transition back to civilian rule through proper democratic process. Also it is expected to learn again that irrespective of the way and manner a government is taken out of power by the people, if the people observe that those who still handles the power are part of the ousted regime structure, there would not be trust in the government and it would lead to continuous demand for change in leadership by the people.

These latest development in Sudan therefore brings with it glimpses of hope as well as fears of relapses, especially if adequate pressure is not exerted on the Military Transitional Council to take the right steps for peace to reign in the country.

2.5.2 Security Forces Clash with Protestors

Due to the ousting of the long-term President al-Bashir (an occurrence which occurred during the almost completion of this work) there has been clashes between the security forces and the protesters. The protesters have been making use of peaceful means and have also deliberated on engaging in mass civil disobedience. So far the new military government have been suppressing the protest, and the disagreement with the opposition over the handling of the government to civilians is still on. Hemeti, a general who has been in control of the RSF and now second in command in the Sudanese government has been know to be violent and mean in dealing with civilians.

It has been opined by some analysts that the present military government may trail the path of Egyptian President, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi by transforming themselves into civilians and also contesting in elections when the time comes to handle over to civilians. This has happened in some African nations as it is not a new thing. The danger been sighted here is that the present military heads, and specifically Lt. Gen. Hemeti has been one of the more complicated Arab persons who perpetrated violence in Darfur. The probability of hostility therefore arising again with such person at the hems of the affair in the country is thus very high (Downing, 2019).

With the international community watching events in Sudan, the need to protect Darfur and ensure any government who comes to power assist in

finally solving the Darfur conflict unto a permanent resolution should be a major expectation. There has been a wide coalition of different opposition groups with the Freedom and Change Forces, the DFCF, and the professional associations of doctors, lawyers, etc., on the streets, and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), negotiating with the Transitional Military Council (the TMC) towards final transition or handing over of power to a democratically elected civilian government. This is a major demand, as these opposition coalition are bent on seeing the best from the ousting of the decade long President al-Bashir.

As this study is centered on the Darfur conflict, the recent events in Khartoum has to be seen in the light of its impact on Darfur and a permanent resolution of the conflict. The SPA which represents the leadership of the professional groups comes almost exclusively from the Khartoum region. With this in mind, a careful observation of the way in which the inclusion of the voices of the persecuted and marginalized regions like the Darfur region is carried out by them is very vital. A good balance in the event and occurrence taking place is the fact that people protesting on the streets and main roads are generally all-round represented. That is, these people also consist of substantial number of persons who fled the persecuted and marginalized areas where violence has been perpetrated by government supported militia men and came to urban regions for means of livelihood. Furthermore, a large caravan which arrives from Darfur has been reported to join the protests in Khartoum and this is a plus to the hope of realizing a well and permanent change to governance in Sudan which certainly when realized will bring a positive change to the issues in Darfur and the conflict as a whole.

Again this necessity to ensure that the Darfur region is considered in the choosing of a new civilian government in Sudan is also necessary because the present Vice President, Hemeti, has been the one in charge of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is a reborn version of the Janjaweed militia group supported by the Sudanese Government of ousted President al-Bashir to commit grave atrocities in Darfur, killing innocent citizens and raping their women. It therefore will be very hard to imagine people of such in power

again in Sudan and peace will rain. It certainly will be impossible. Not only Hemeti, there are also others among the current military leadership, like Auf, who is also complicated with killings. The final power must therefore not be given to them in a transition of power, as it will not bring any real change to governance in Sudan and its handling of the Darfur conflict (Downing, 2019). As things are right now, there has been no real sign of the readiness of the military to transfer power for civilians or pave way for civilian rule. Although this has been the major request of the Professionals Association (SPA). They demand for a typical model of civilian governance with the military under it and reporting to the civilian administration. The SPA has said it would not transform to a political party. This has therefore led to the availability of space to be filled up as there have not been any strong opposition political party with the rain of the ousted former President al-Bashir. Therefore, as things stand right now, there has not been any strong candidate seen to contest for the civilian president in Sudan.

Another issue to mention is the support of Saudi Arabia who has always helped the Government of Sudan financially. It has promised a sum of \$3 billion to assist Sudan. Hemeti with his Rapid Support Forces and others have assisted in fighting for Saudi Arabia in Yemen. It is therefore seen with the support of Saudi Arabia for the military Sudanese government denotes that external forces may yet and again contribute destructively not only into Sudan as a whole but also in Darfur if care is not taken by these external actors (Alamin & Shahine, 2019).

It must also be mentioned that the Rapid Support Forces of Hemeti is different from the Sudanese military. This is therefore another major issue to contend with, as the Rapid Support Force is almost as strong as the Sudanese military. This certainly is dangerous for a peaceful and stable Sudan. There also have been reports from the media outlet of Russian assistance to the new military Sudanese government in curbing the increasing unrest in the country. It must be mentioned that women have played a largely important role in bringing down the government of ousted President al-Bashir. This is coupled with other efforts and voices which also

included voices from Darfur. Many of these voices now seemed to be sidelined again. This therefore calls for international actors like the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union to rise up and put pressure on the current military government for a quick transition into civilian rule, so that the efforts of all the protesters both death and alive will not be wasted.

These international actors mentioned above have only issued limited statements so far in support of civilian rule. The needed high pressure to be exerted on the current military government by these international actors will therefore go a long way in ensuring smooth and rightful transition by the current military leadership. There is therefore the need by these respected international actors to reign in on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirate to halt supports for the military leadership in Sudan both the financial and military supports. These supports have emboldened the leaderships as clashes by the protesters with the military have resulted into the death several civilians. The longer the waiting period, the more emboldened the military government becomes. The Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) also has not been relenting as it has plans for a general strike in order to mount additional pressure on the current military leadership for quick and expected return of power to democratically elected civilians (Kulkarni, 2019).

CHAPTER THREE

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF AU PSC IN DAFUR

The Peace and Security Council represents the AU organ that is in charge of the enforcement of the union decisions. It was put forward at the Lusaka Summit in the year 2001 and later founded in the year of 2004 under a protocol to the Constitutive Act. It is structured quite after the UNSC. The protocol's definition of the PSC refers it as a collective security and early warning arrangement facilitating timely and effective response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. Other duties given to the Peace and Security Council by the protocol are the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, post-conflict peace building and development of joint defence policies (Francis, 2006).

The Peace and Security Council consists of four primary organs for the making and implementation of its decisions. These are the military staff committee, the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby force.

The Military Staff Committee (MSC) that serves as a technical advisory committee to the Peace and Security Council advises on every issue which relates to peace keeping and deployment. The Panel of the Wise has a role that is vital to diffuse tensions and deal with delicate matters. It is given the responsibility of advising the Commission, the PSC or to express its view on issues relating to peace and security. Then, the CEWS, that represents an advance warning situation room, is associated with the continent's prediction

or awareness of conflict possibility and also some Non-Governmental Organization's and similar civil society forums are involved in the aspect of data collection for such prediction. The African Standby Force (ASF) represents the realization of the continents' potential for peace sustenance exercises with the objective to form five regional brigades which will constitute the African Standby Force. These contingents are to undergo training so as to guarantee for deployment possibility under the RECs, the African Union or the United Nations, and inside or far away from their territory (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

The PSC consists of fifteen members, in which five members are voted in for a three-year period, which can be renewed, while the remaining ten are voted in for a two-year period, which is also renewable. States are expected to aspire for election to the council and can only be qualified when the yardsticks which consist of substantiation of political will and accountability are met. In selecting the PSC members, the process is democratic and the most committed members are put in leaderships position. This serves as a source of motivation and strength for the council. The Peace and Security Council assembles at anyone of three stages which are; the Summit, Ministerial and Ambassadorial levels, and it depends on the magnitude and urgency of issues to be tackled (Zack-Williams, Frost, & Thomson, 2002).

3.1 The Role of the AU PSC in Conflict Management in Africa

Africa has always been susceptible to several conflicts. A Human Security Report in the year 2007 maintained that all through the '90s, a greater number of people had died through intense conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa as compared to the remaining part of the globe joined together. The same Human Security Brief also gave a notable progress: the sum total of people who died from armed conflicts reduced significantly starting from the year 2002 to 2005 (from over 9,000 persons to less than 3,000 persons). However, there was slight increment in the years that followed (Mack, Nielsen, & Cooper, 2008).

One of the key reasons given for such positive outcome is the success achieved in the establishment of the AU's peace and security framework. When the PSC was initiated on Africa day, 25th May 2004, it was faced with so many conflicts on the continent. But several successes have been recorded by this organ over the years, despite various challenges. This section will examine the responsibility of the PSC in conflict management in Sudan under different other sub-sections. The PSC has also played vital roles in other major countries on the continent such as in Somalia and Kenya (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). However, this work has chosen to deliberate on Sudan as the case study, specifically, the Darfur conflict.

3.2 The PSC Involvement in Sudan

With the continuation of the armed conflict in Darfur in the year 2004, the PSC in its tenth gathering on the 25th of May 2004 mandated the Commission's Chairman to guarantee a credible supervision of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement by deploying African Union Observer Mission, consisting the expected and needed civilian unit and, if mandatory, the protection component, for supporting the work of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), and dependent upon the result of the African Union-led Reconnaissance Mission to Sudan and Chad (from the 7th to the 16th of May 2004). Also, the PSC demanded that the AU Commission on Refugees send a mission to Darfur region for assessment of the humanitarian situation and recommends the best way the African Union's contribution can help to alleviate the plight of the internally displaced and those other persons that are affected in the conflict. Again, it recommended that the African Union Commission on Human and Peoples Rights send a mission to Darfur for inspection of the account on the abuse of the rights of the people in the region (African Union, 2004a).

This observer mission finally developed into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and it remained the main outside peacekeeping force which provides and maintains security in the Darfur region. During its 13th meeting which held on 27th July 2004, the Peace and Security Council asked the Commission Chairman to put together a preparation and submission of a

broad proposal on the best way to strengthen the productiveness of the African Union Mission on the ground, and this include the prospect of modifying the Mission into a fully-fledged peacekeeping mission, with the necessary directive and size and also to guarantee the successful execution of the Cease fire Agreement. During the seventeenth assembly on 20th of October, 2004, the Peace and Security Council concur on an intensified AMIS mission that consists of 3,320 personnel, and includes 2,341 military personnel, about 815 civilian police and a convenient number of civilian personnel (African Union, 2004d).

Over two million persons were dislocated from their houses and properties across a sweeping and remote desert area. There were flocks of Internally Displaced Persons in large camps along with many scattered IDP settlements. Some of the IDPs relocated to cities and towns in Darfur, usually staying with friends and/ relatives. Although several villages were demolished, some still remained (Niemeyer, 2006). This posed a challenging situation to the African Union which made it to come up with positive protection measures. It is therefore in regard to this that the Peace and Security Council during its 28th meeting suggested that the civilian part of AMIS should be deployed (African Union, 2005b).

The Commission Chairman and his special envoy (Hamid El Gabid) consulted the disputants in the conflict with the primary objective of bringing them forward for dialogue. The Peace and Security Council during the 13th meeting had supported the chairman and his special envoy to vigorously follow up the matter (African Union, 2004b).

In several of the PSC meetings like the 24th one, it laid emphasis on the fact the nature of the Darfur conflict is political and socio-economic. Therefore, a more logical mechanism for achieving a permanent solution of the conflict can be found in the Peace Talks (African Union, 2005a). There then comes the Abuja Peace talks which were held in Abuja, the capital city of Nigeria, and under the auspices of the AU.

The 16th meeting of the PSC was held on 17th of September, 2004, and it gave accolades to former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who was the then AU Chairman, for his leadership and unrelenting efforts in the promotion of a negotiated solution to the Darfur conflict (African Union, 2004c). In the meetings that followed, the PSC admonished the disputants to be present at the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which is at the upper level and undergo the negotiation process in sincerity of intention and also based upon the premise of the outline framework Protocol for resolving the Darfur Conflict, which had been given to them, so as to attain early agreement (African Union, 2005b). After that, the PSC, during the 34th gathering, signified its support for Salim Ahmed. Salim was the African Union Special Envoy and Mediator, and the 5th Round of the Inter- Sudanese Peace Talks that occurred at Abuja and began on 10th of June 2005 was under his authority.

3.2.1 Peace Support Mission in Sudan

Peace Support Operation (PSO) illustrates the orderly global aid initiatives which is supportive of the maintenance and peace building and its supervision and also preventing the resurgent violent conflict. Peace Support Operations are divided into two types namely: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping operations engage in the monitoring and support of the effort at establishing peace, generally within the frame of a peace agreement while peace enforcement operations initiate requirements and specifications for the establishment of peace and the use force is allowed (Jakkie. Cilliers & Mills, 1998). The African Union was formally launched on July 2002, and just a year after it had stationed its maiden peace operation in Burundi. Also, under the Peace and Security Council, it afterwards established peacekeeping missions in Darfur in the year 2004, and also in Somalia in the year 2007.

So far, the Darfur conflict which has evolved since February 2003 has posed a massive problem to the African Union since it's inauguration in Durban, South Africa in July 2002. In several areas, this conflict is been seen as an evaluation of the African Union ability to solve disputes on the continent and

its resolve for the complete implementation of the appropriate standards provided in its Constitutive Act. So as to face this challenging task to maintain peace and stability in the Darfur territory of Sudan, the African Union established the operation which is labeled the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) (Burr, Collins, & Burr, 2006).

The government has always been failing in protecting civilians in Darfur, and the leaders of AU are unable to handle such international responsibility alone. The notion of African answers to African issues serves as a good opportunity for the United States and European policy makers to just respond to the African Union demands for financial and logistical assistance without doing anymore.

The African Union mission in Sudan nonetheless floundered mainly due to the Sudanese government's obstruction and prevention of it to function effectively. The Sudanese Government was thoroughly skillful in manipulating against the operation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the country. The government in Khartoum under President Omar Li-Bashir specifically said that the deployment of United Nations troops would be equivalent to recolonizing Sudan (Murithi, 2009). Moreover, AMIS I and AMIS II too experienced failure in the fulfillment of their mandates due to insufficient troops coupled with poor equipment and training.

3.2.2 Mediation in Sudan

Mediation is a practice where by a third party helps in finding resolution to a conflict between more than one conflicting groups. It is a non-adversarial technique of resolving disputes. The mediator's responsibility is the facilitation of dialogue between the conflicting groups, render assistance to them so that they focus on the actual matters in the dispute, and provide options which is are able to satisfy the interests and needs of every disputant in the conflict in an effort to arriving at a long-lasting resolution of the conflict (Touval & Zartman, 1985). Some scholars are of the opinion that neutrality is

expected on the part of the mediator, as the mediator is expected to focus mainly on the facilitation of a decision-making exercise.

Also, Stulberg maintained that the interest of a mediator in a dispute in some cases can lead to facilitation of a speedy settlement of the dispute (Stulberg, 2005). But according to Crocker, he opines that a mediator's neutrality cannot be said to be the same with the concept of being "indifferent" in one's choice pertaining to the preferences of the conflicting parties, only that the mediator possess no real stake in the outcome of the mediation process (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 2003). The African Union PSC performed this role in Darfur.

Violence and fighting had erupted across the western Sudanese region since the year 2003, setting the insurgents or rebels against the Sudanese Government troops and its associated Janjaweed militiamen. Both sides have accusation of human rights abuses against them, as an estimation of three hundred thousand persons have lost their lives in Darfur and additional 2.7 million persons were compelled to abandon their residences and properties. Acknowledging the presence of this conflict and the grave challenge it poses, the African Union conducted Inter- Sudanese Peace Talks on Darfur managed through the leadership of the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo who was then the Chairman of the AU, and in dialogue with Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, who was the Special Envoy and Chief Mediator.

It was these talks that climaxed to yield the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) which was ratified under African Union auspices on 5th of May 2006 between the Sudanese administration and the section of the rebels, Sudan Liberation Army which was under the leadership of Minni Arkou Minawi (SLA/MM) (Flint, De Waal, & International African Institute., 2008). This served as first measure in putting an end to the violence. Although intense and harmonized effort was required for it to have an effect. There exists the assertion that the Agreement did not include all the stakeholders especially other insurgent

groups. This led to the initiation of other African Union-United Nations mediation processes on Darfur.

African Union Special Envoy, Salim A. Salim, and its United Nations counterpart, Jan Eliasson operated together through collaboration for the progress and success of the political process for Darfur conflict resolution. A preliminary meeting for rebel leaders for the discussion of a collective dialogue platform resulted to a mutual communique that reflected joint stance agreed on various primary matters. Some vital leaders, however, did not participate in the process. Notwithstanding, jointly funded AU-UN Peace talks were carried out in the Libya capital city of Tripoli.

It must, however, be stated in the case of the Darfur conflict that the endeavors of mediators have been obstructed through the splitting of the insurgent camps into several divergent, mini groups, and this makes it more difficult for them to embrace a united stance during dialogues.

3.2.3 Addressing Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

All conflicts involving the use of firearms always generate humanitarian crises. Taking Iraq as an example, Oxfam Canada observed that the brutality present was concealing humanitarian catastrophe, as about eight million persons – just about one in three - required emergency aid (Oxfam, 2007). This has similarity with the situation in Darfur as the World Health Organization observed in the year 2004 that between 6,000 and 10,000 persons died from ailments caused by infections and brutal use of force every month, just as massive rainfalls and a ravaging insurgents obstructed the efforts of the United Nations to constructively tackle one of Africa's most severe humanitarian crises (Valenciano et al., 2004). The African Union tried its best in devising ways and means to find lasting response to the difficulties facing the IDPs and to address the roots and manifestations of humanitarian crisis.

Although the resources available are insufficient, the African Union took actions towards contributing to the efforts targeted at confronting the

humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. By February 2004, a contingent from the Commission of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs paid a visit to the refugee camps situated along the Sudan-Chad border. Thereafter, the African Union made a significant monetary donation to the UNHCR for the assistance needed for essential water projects in the arid desert which is the site of the refugees.

In continuation of the African Union's assessment of the refugee crisis and the plead by the Peace and Security Council for African humanitarian NGOs to be included in attempts to relieve humanitarian catastrophe taking place in Darfur, the African Union gave 200,000 USD to Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) which is a Pan-African NGO to help in providing medical aid to the people in the Darfur region.

It was due to this fact that, on the 8th of April 2004, and under the leadership of President Idriss Deby of the Republic of Chad and the Chairman of the AU Commission and also in amidst global onlookers and facilitators, the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A and also the JEM, that later surfaced as a different armed group in Darfur, ratified a Humanitarian Ceasefire Accord concerning the dispute in Darfur and also a Protocol relating to setting up of Humanitarian Assistance in the region (Franke, 2008).

Inside the Ceasefire Agreement, the warring groups came to consensus, among other things, to end fighting and announce a cease-fire for a time-period of 45 days which will necessarily be renewed except one of the warring parties is opposed to it; to create a Joint Commission and a Ceasefire Commission; to encourage and promote the distribution of humanitarian aid; to gather in a near future time for a meeting that will bring every actor side by side in Darfur so as to come to agreement on an international and precise settlement (Tardy & Wyss, n.d.).

3.2.4 Ending Human Rights Violations in Sudan

For the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, the Constitutive Act authorizes regard for the sacredness of human life, and denounces

indemnity, political killing, terrorist actions, insurgent activities and unconstitutional replacement of government (African Union, 2003). In order to effect protection of human rights, there can be intervention in the sovereign affairs of member states under specific conditions by the African Union. As an illustration, states may request the African Union to intervene for the restoration of peace and security inside their countries. While constituent nations should not unilaterally intervene in domestic matter of other nations, the African Union can mandate joint response against a member state when it discovers that terrible conditions, like war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are in existence (Baimu & Sturman, 2003).

The African Union made several efforts in addressing matters of violations of human rights and indemnity taking place in Darfur. By of 25th of May 2004, the PSC had petitioned the ACHPR to investigate the human rights conditions in the Darfur region. During its 35th Ordinary Session that took place from 21st of May to 4th of June 2004, the ACHPR resolved to dispatch a Fact-Finding delegation to Darfur. The Fact-Finding task occurred from 8th to 18th of July 2004. Accordingly, the ACHPR Chairman sent an appeal to the Sudanese President, Al Bashir, underscoring the necessity to take crucial preliminary actions to deal with matters that relate to the security of the Internally Displaced Persons, to protect the females from rape and harm, provision of access to IDPs and also humanitarian aid, the secured homecoming of the Internally Displaced Persons to their communities and the stationing of human rights observers. Generally, the African Union has regularly petitioned that those that are engaged in violation of human rights in Darfur should quickly be made to face the law in order to halt the atmosphere of impunity in Darfur.

3.3 Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sudan

As a country goes beyond conflicts, post-conflict reconstruction therefore turns to be at the center of African Union efforts. The realization of this made the African Union to commence work at developing a structure for post conflict reconstruction and development on the continent. In the year 2003 at

Maputo, an African Union ministerial meeting looked into the African Union's ability to carry out post-conflict reconstruction and established a committee for post conflict reconstruction in Sudan. Such action was crucial for the prevention of any deterioration back to brutality and the dominance of anti-democratic groups. It is vital due to the fact that the presence of stability in countries which are the pillars of their regions, as seen in Sudan and Kenya has the ability to set going the development of the whole continent (Barungi & Mbugua, 2005).

The African Union therefore founded a Post-Conflict and Reconstruction Framework. It came out from the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework developed by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in the year 2005. Its main objective is the improvement of timeliness, efficacy and coordination of affairs in post conflict states and the laying of the needed basis for social justice and sustained peace, which is in accordance with the continent's dream of reconstruction and development (African Union, 2006). It consists of different fundamentals and directs different interventions for peace building causes so as to attain the objectives are seen in the structure.

The African Union has reiterated its persistent dedication to the reconstruction of the communities and villages affected by war through the forming of an African Union Ministerial Committee on Post-Conflict Reconstruction of the Sudan. The Foreign Minister of South Africa, Dr. Nkosazana Zuma led the Committee, and it comprised of the foreign ministers from Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan.

The Committee had extensive talks with the Administration of Southern Sudan, SPLM, the civil society and women groups. Notable in the talks is the execution of the Darfur Peace Agreement as requirement for maintenance of peace in the country (Sarkin, 2009). Also, some other vital matters were settled during these talks.

A detailed scheme for Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Darfur region was later unfolded by the Ministerial Committee. The Sudanese Government consented to the identification of sections that requires prime concern in order to assist the African Union member states to quicken the execution of every initiative and the different groups concur over formation of a Joint Technical Committee of the African Union and the Government of Sudan to come up with the necessary guidelines to implement the projects.

Early in the year 2005, Ali Osman Mohammed Taha who was First Vice President of Sudan applauded the African Union Ministerial Committee for the task it was shouldering in Sudan's post-conflict reconstruction attempts.

3.4 Emerging Issues Regarding AU PSC in Conflict Management and Resolution

Since the establishment of the African Union, there has been very high hopes upon the organization as the lawful authority and power for conflict management on the continent. But then, there exists a number of challenges which the confronting the organization. Some of the weaknesses in the present strategy to conflict prevention and management consist of the lack of thorough and extensive survey of conflicts for the provision of efficient and adequate basis to make resolve on intervention. Despite the use of fact-finding missions in its work, only tiny research has been carried out on present conflict prevention and management effort of the African Union. A serious gap in the institution's operations is the absence of African-funded research and survey; many researches on conflict (with its related policy formation) was sponsored by sponsors and Northern administrations and tackled by their think-tanks. Such has a negative impact on the quality of the AU's approaches and reaction to conflict (Jakkie Cilliers & Sturman, 2002a).

The absence of unrestrained systematic orientation of the African Union on the state of affairs in conflict areas adversely influence the duty of the African Union in conflict management. The lack of constant and knowledgeable information has adverse effects on the decisions and eventually the

productiveness of African Union actions. There is therefore the necessity to deliberate with appropriate Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) involved in systematic work and are also influential on the ground.

Also, there exists intense vested interests in the AU which limits its independence in exercising actual influence. The African Union suffers from related circumstances in the same way as the United Nations. It is weak in maintaining a firm position in conflicts where a more important member-state is directly or indirectly connected. The Sudan conflict falls to this category. Also, the crisis in Eastern Congo, Somalia and also in Zimbabwe are all examples showing this fact. In some instances, its integrity and impartiality are brought into disrepute (as seen in the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict) or the organization is seen as being too feeble and therefore cannot be taken as serious as it should be seen. Several governments, both on the continent and non-African countries sabotage the efforts of regional and sub-regional institutions when they do not go with their national interest. Also, several African governments guard jealously their sovereign privileges, and are therefore opposed to conceding any control and authority and also against the involvement of 'variable geometry' strategy to inter-state undertakings (Cheru, 2002).

Apart from this, the African Union is restrained by the absence of proper technique for the dissemination of information about the resolutions and undertakings of the African Union (this issue is also identified with RECs). The adequate and expected awareness of the work of AU, NEPAD and the RECs appears insufficient and small, even among the learned African community, and present-day training and associated investigation on these configurations are deficient in educational institutions.

The absence of the requisite capacity to manage the conflicts in Africa is another main constraint that the African Union has to face. In order to manage a conflict, great amount of resources, in terms of financial, human and material are needed. Not a single one of these various resources is sufficiently available at the African Union, both quantitatively and

qualitatively. Also, the African Union is deficient in the ability to supervise and keep under surveillance post-conflict state of affairs as a prevention against the likelihood of relapsing back into the conflict. In carrying out mediation on the most difficult issues and in the implementation of peace accords, Africa still regards highly Europe and the United States (once in a while it is bilateral, and at times it is under the United Nations umbrella). Until now, this has been carried out entirely on an ad hoc basis, with no harmonized review of how the relationship between African intergovernmental institutions and the United Nations interface (Flint & De Waal, 2008).

The identified resource gaps have been given broad acknowledgement and significant donor awareness. Ironically, the African Union is also slow in the utilization of external assistance. Therefore, in considering the limitations to the capabilities of the AU, the part this resource constraints are playing in conflict management is quite significant – and the same in the Darfur crisis in Sudan. However, it is not only resource constraint that limits the role of the African Union in the management of conflict on the continent.

The establishment of a sustainable government of peace, security and stability must be a worthier goal of the African Union. The vital aspect of ensuring peace and security gave rise to the formation of the PSC provides and this has assisted much as it created the structure to concentrate awareness and public debate on the security issues which afflict Africa. But the question remains on if this can bestow the type of value which Nkrumah's Military High Command was intended to advance in the reformation context of Africa. The continent now serves as an open bazaar for small arms which continue to aid violence and cause the death of many innocent persons. These small arms serve as weapons of mass destruction on the continent and the arms traders utilize disputes as a channel of passing on the lethal weapons in order to destroy the continent's stable and non-violent future.

A related issue on the continent has been the presence of private armies. Mercenaries move with freedom in conflict regions and even try to destabilize properly elected governments at times (Jakkie Cilliers & Sturman, 2002b).

Africa always has always got the image of the most open continent with the greatest interference by external actors. Although the continent is rich, its people are poor. Those who are benefitting from the continuation of such situation ensure the presence of a very unfavorable security situation, which sabotage the duty to empower Africa economically. With all these security issues facing Africa, the PSC should be able to handle part of the problem. The absence of a shared purpose and opinion, will always result into a lack of joint action to tackle the various security issues on the continent. The Darfur conflict in Sudan is a good case study. Sudan who is a member of this council, and has its Arab nationals facing accusation of human rights violation against natives or black Africans; and there has been no statement on this from the Peace and Security Council. There is the necessity for member countries to be able to speak out whenever there is a major human rights violation.

It is acceptable to say that the Peace and Security Council will send peace keeping troops to areas of conflict and will anticipate and prevent conflicts or it's escalation. In reality though, in as much as the national interest of every Government prevents it from noticing genocide and serious human rights violations, implementing the PSC goals cannot come easily (Makinda & Okumu, 2008). The PSC should consist of only member-states who have been tested for their record of democratic governance, respect for civil and political freedoms and proven human rights records.

Another key issue facing the Peace and Security Council is how it desires to find capital. If security is taken to be very vital, resources must therefore be generated from the national treasury of each member state. The rich states should have higher contribution while those states which obtain massive revenues from natural commodities such as petroleum should contribute even more. It should be disturbing that the PSC does wish to raise funds from external sources such as the European Union. The bulk of its funding must be expected to be internally generated (Malan, 2012). Donor money generally does come with some complex strings attached to it, therefore creating difficulty in viewing Africa's security with its own very eyes.

CONCLUSION

The African Union as the replacement of OAU has undertaken diverse numerous roles in the prevention of conflict, its management and also in the resolution of conflicts. The AU has also played vital roles in peacekeeping and peacebuilding in Africa. This work analyzed the role of AU in the resolution of the Darfur conflict. The study has therefore carried out the required investigation in analytical manner. The causes and issues which surround the conflict in Darfur were unraveled; proper examination of the AU framework for resolving conflict in Africa was carried out; the various relevant approaches utilized by the AU towards resolving the conflict in Darfur was studied in order to evaluate the effectiveness of such approaches in the Darfur conflict resolution attempts and to conceive relevant strategies tailored towards a long-lasting resolution of the conflict in Darfur.

The study has also examined the PSC of the African Union. From the different duty of the PSC seen, it can be seen that in circumstances of grave acts by a state, the PSC is also in a position to recommend the required action for the African Union, as it weighs its option on what exactly to do. But considering the Darfur case study considered, a state government may systematically be partial in a conflict through the support of a side in the conflict, or the state itself been a party in the conflict. The Darfur conflict and the way the African Union is involved has therefore not only given the opportunity to see the areas where the AU is weak and therefore needs improvement, it has also given us the chance to see the necessity of partnering with international community as at when necessary. The study has revealed the relative sustenance of stability in the conflict region when the AU/ UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID) commenced. It is still this hybrid operation that remains till date in Darfur, and despite the mandate moving closer to expiration, it has been extended again till 2020.

The experience of operating with the United Nations Peace keeping force should make the African Union able to handle more efficiently peacekeeping by African troops when needed or whenever necessary. As no region can guarantee that there will be no conflict in the future, it is therefore reasonable for regional organizations to arm themselves with the required skills which come through experience so as to ensure the stability of their regions and reduce to the minimum, if not totally prevented.

Also, since any peace mission launched by African Union, its decision comes from the Peace and Security Council, the AU supposed to hold vital the record of the leadership of the members vying for PSC membership during election. In order to prevent bias decision, there should be other form of mechanism put in place by the organization to check and review the decisions of the PSC before been implemented by the AU commission. This is important since the decision of PSC are also vital for smooth running of the AU and also its perception by member states.

A major problem to AU smooth operation as highlighted in this work has been funding. The African Union therefore have to look into ways to make African economy robust and competitive as seen on the other continents of the globe. The AU need not only ensure the proper and adequate contributions of the member states to the organization, but must also establish additional tools to improve the economy of the Union. The establishment of the African Development Bank (ADB) is in line with this. The AU must therefore encourage African Nations on the need to take proper fiscal measures and policies and abstain from obtaining dangerous loans from foreign powers which usually have repercussion overtime when those loans become burdensome for the nation. A debtor nation with high level of debts will always chase investors away. If investment in Africa by foreign businessmen increases, the economy will improve the more, poverty will be reduced in many states, and there will be less conflicts arising on the continent. A robust African Union will be possible through robust African nations in terms of economy and other vital national indicators.

The study has also examined the way AU has involved mediation in handling the conflict in Darfur. Apart from the involvement of the United Nations and presence of peacekeeping in Darfur, the AU had organized several meetings with the warring parties and has chosen neutral and impartial persons to act as mediators. Majority of the peace talks facilitated by the African Union have been with authentic mediators who are respected personalities and leaders. This aspect has been well handled by the AU, just like the peace talk that took place in Abuja between the different factions in the Darfur conflict. Although it is one thing to organize peace talks, and another thing to arrive at agreement, the AU from experience has recorded successes in making use of mediators in peace talks to bring warring parties to agreement, or to reduce tension and also minimize conflicts.

A major issue faced by African Union during mediation process it facilitates is always the issue of inclusion of all parties to conflicts. This same issue is seen in the Darfur case. It is this same reason that has caused divisions and factions even within the same side of parties to a conflict. The African Union must always ensure that all factions every party to a dispute are compelled and carried along during mediation in which the organization uses its mediators. The complexity arising in situation like this is seen when a party in a conflict and with a specific name having two or more factions and maintaining the same name. In this case the factions are to be treated as been separate, although under the same umbrella of a single name. This translates to the fact that all the factions must still present their representatives at the mediation table.

In the Darfur conflict, the SLA later split into factions headed by different leaders. The inability of the Sudanese government and in turn African Union mediators to deal with all factions had always been resulting into impracticable agreement in the real sense of it, as the factions which felt ignored continue to pursue hostility towards the government. But when with time it was ensured that all factions were carried along, agreement ratified were being adequately implemented, although some still break off with time.

Coming to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur and also the internally displaced persons, the African Union has always been weak in punishing strong national leaders who always use their power and position to unduly punish the citizens. The Sudanese Leader Omar al-Bashir is facing accusations by the ICJ over genocide, for ordering the mass killing, rape and human rights violations in Darfur. Fellow African leaders have to obey the directions of international courts or persuade and lay pressure on their counterparts involved in such acts to abstain and instead cooperate with the African Union and international community in properly resolving such ethnical or internal conflicts occurring within any specific nation state. This also call for the strengthening of the African Union to be able to lay embargo on nations and also sanction nations whose leaders get involve in genocide and human right abuse against its citizens. The capacity of the AU to do this will not leave the burden only to the international community and it will also make leaders to take extra care before venturing into such inhumane acts.

The present condition of the returnees from the internally displaced camps outside Sudan back to Darfur is still bad as observed within this study. This is mainly due to the insecurity that still exists in Darfur. For this issue of insecurity to be properly resolved, the government of Sudan must truly be committed to providing the necessary protection in that region for the returnees. Also, strong legal action has to be put in place against anyone who bridges the security in the region and is caught.

The global community, working with the Sudanese government also have to look into the provision of the needed infrastructures in the different communities in Darfur. Facilities such as health and educational infrastructures are needed to be put in place for the returning refugees. The Sudanese Government also need to give international NGOs the freedom to work within the region and also provide them with needed security. This will help to alleviate the conditions of the returnees so that they don't become a burden to the economy of the country as unemployed persons with time.

The Darfur crisis, despite its complexity has seen a noteworthy contribution by both the African Union and the United Nations to the resolution of the conflict. Although the region is yet to enjoy full stability, the committed efforts of the African Union by disposing all of its conflict resolution mechanism towards the Darfur conflict has resulted into the achievement obtained so far in tackling the Darfur conflict. The partnering with the United Nations to form UNAMID from AMIS when it saw it could not handle the situation alone is in itself an achievement for both the African Union and the United Nations as well.

As the African Union is growing in managing its own issues and being in control, the Darfur crisis has called the attention of policy makers again for the need of the leaders of nations to embrace reconciliatory approach to internal disputes and conflicts within their nation states. This will prevent escalation of conflicts which will be demanding not only economically but also politically. It will also have the opportunity to claim more lives and also displace citizens internally which in turn cause chaos for such nations and her neighbors.

A vital lesson in this is therefore for the AU to also monitor member states in order to be able to give the necessary guidance and assistance when there is internal disputes that may escalate and result into national chaos if not controlled. This study has also revealed the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the AU. It does what exactly has been specified in the last statement. Only that its efficacy may really need improvement as generally observed.

This study in the examination of the relationship in existence between the AU approach to conflict resolution and the degree of hostility among the disputants of the Darfur conflict has realized that the AU conflict resolution approach has a relatively minimum contribution towards a permanent resolution of the Darfur conflict. The Darfur conflict which began in the year 2003 has been colored with the denial of political and economic rights of the Darfur people by the Sudanese Government. In

analyzing the different elements that have contributed to the escalation of the Darfur conflict such as the discovery of oil in the region and control of the oil resources, the non-inclusion of all the disputants in the conflict, especially the Western Darfur people during negotiations which resulted into the ratifying of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, this study has revealed the incapability of the AU PSC to make a significant impact towards a permanent resolution.

In the same vein, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has been unable to make substantial impact to de-escalate the conflict. The reason for this from the study has been the restricted mandate of AMIS and also the several logistics issues facing AMIS. The study therefore observed United Nations ability to take up important task in the restoration of peace in the Darfur region through the joint peacekeeping operation. The African Union now has to keep up and endeavor to sustain and maintain the present level of peace and prevent any deterioration that may result into increase violence in the region or full-blown war.

Finally, with the recent developments in Sudan as a whole, that is the change in government of President al-Bashir who has ruled for three decades, the African Union must not relent in taking the opportunity to muster more pressure through both its mediation mechanisms and also partnering with other international actors in order to bring about a civilian government that will be able to negotiate the Darfur issue to a permanent peaceful resolution where justice and equality reigns in running the affair of the nation.

The obvious impact of the removal of the Sudanese President, Omer Hassan Al-Bashir, on 11th April 2019 and the recent political developments in Khartoum on the Darfur peace process is still to be fully assessed. As of 14th June 2019, contained in the special report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the United Nations Secretary-General on the strategic assessment of the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is the claim that the security situation in Darfur remained generally stable, despite the fragile nation facing the problem of criminality and humanitarian

crisis, especially in the Darfur region. On 27th June 2019, the UNAMID mandate was renewed. The focus of the mission is proposed to shift from its peacekeeping nature to more of political and peacebuilding support, with an exit proposed for peacekeeping personnel in Darfur by June 2020.

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YAKIN DOĐU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

05.08.2019

Dear Petronella Biri

Your project “**African Union and Conflict Resolution: The Darfur Crisis in 2003 -2018**” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note:If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.