



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO EXIST? THE DYNAMICS OF
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF SETTLER COLONIALISM:
THE CASE OF PALESTINE**

WALEED SALEM

PhD THESIS

NICOSIA
2019

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PhD THESIS

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NICOSIA
2019

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Waleed Salem

ABSTRACT

WHO IS ELIGIBLE TO EXIST? THE DYNAMICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF SETTLER COLONIALISM: THE CASE OF PALESTINE

This PhD thesis aims to expand on the ‘logic of elimination’ of the settler colonial projects by analyzing in depth its dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, who is eligible to exist, and /or to be counted in these projects with a specific focus on Palestine as a case study; compared with three cases of The United States, South Africa and Ireland/ Northern Ireland. The thesis assumed that the Zionist project is characterized by ‘Demographic Elimination’ as the main feature of its inclusion and inclusion dynamics, combining the erasure of the land: place, space, territory, and the landscape; together with the displacement of the indigenous population internally and externally, and the replacement of them by settler colonialists brought from outside. These processes were practiced during the period of the Zionist Settler colonial project in Palestine in the 19th century leading to the establishment of the Israeli State in 1948, and continued after 1948 and 1967 by that State of Israel as being a “Settler Colonial State” in expansion. These methods are implemented in the frameworks of belligerent occupation, Apartheid, and Settler/ Internal Colonialism, combined with the structures of “Settler Democracy” and “Herrenvolk Democracy” that are both ethnically exclusive to the other politically, legally, economically (Through the settler colonial political economy), socially, and culturally. Since the 1940s the United States of America played the role as a ‘mother country’ to Israel and its settler colonial inclusion and exclusion ongoing project. Previously Britain played the mother country role. Before that the Evangelical Americans, German and the British created a Zionist Approach to conquer and settler Palestine in the early nineteenth century before Zionism emerged. The study is going over five chapters, and ends with a brief overview of the possibilities for decolonization, and for re-inclusion.

Keywords: Settler Colonialism. Eligibility to Exist: Inclusion and exclusion politics. Logic of Elimination. Demographic Elimination. Ireland. South Africa. The United States. Israel. Palestine.

ÖZ

KİM VAROLMA HAKKINA SAHİP? YERLEŞİMCİ SÖMÜRGEÇİLİĞİNİN İÇLEME VE DIŞLAMA DİNAMİKLERİ BAĞLAMINDA FİLİSTİN ÖRNEĞİ

Bu doktora tezi yerleşimci sömürgeci projelerin “tasviye/yok etme mantığını” Filistin örneğinden hareketle ayrıntılı bir şekilde açıklamayı ve tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda tez, temel olarak bu projelerin yerli halkı tasviye etme mantığındaki inceleme-dışlama; var olma hakkı kanılığı; ve süreçte sayılma hakkı vasfı gibi dinamikleri derinliğine incelemekte ve Filistin örneğini Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Güney Afrika ve İrlanda/Kuzey İrlanda örnekleriyle karşılaştırarak irdelemektedir. Tez bir yerleşimci sömürü projesi olan “Siyonist projenin” temel niteliklerinin inceleme ve dışlama dinamiklerinin temel unsuru olan nüfus tasviyesi; uzam, mımıka ve arazi terkinine dayalı bir toprak tasviyesi; ve yerli halkın dışarıdan getirilmiş yerleşimciler tarafından hem Filistin içinde hem de dışında yerlerinden edilmesi ve yerlerine yerleşilmesi olduđu değerdendirmesi üzerine kurulmuştur. Bu sürecin tarihsel olarak 19. yüzyılda başladığını iddia eden tez, sürecin İsrail devletinin kuruluşundan sonra da Yerleşimci Sömürgeci İsrail Devleti yürütücülüğünde 1948 ve 1967 savaşları sonrasında genişletilerek devam ettirildiğini savunmaktadır. Bu sürecin yürütölmesinde dış güçlerin etkisini de irdeleyen tezde 1940’lı yıllardan itibaren “ana ölke” rolünü üstelenen Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin bu konuda ilk olmadığını yerleşimci sömürgeci projenin kuruluşundan önce ve Siyonizme dönüşüm sürecinde Siyonist yaklaşımı bir fetih ve control aracı olarak görerek oluşumunda ve gelişiminde rol oynayan Evanjelistlerin ve Birleşik Krallık’ın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nden çok önce “ana” rolünü üstlenen dış aktörler olduđu da değerdendirilmektedir. Yerleşimci sömürgeci projenin yöntemlerini muharip işgal, apartheid, Yerleşimci/İç Sömürgecilik, Etnici Dışlayıcı Yerleşimci Demokrasisi ya da Üstün İrk Demokrasisi kavramsal çerçevelerinde tartışan ve 5 bölümden oluşan tez, ortaya koymuş olduđu hipotez ve araştırma çerçevesinde dekolonizasyon ve yeniden kapsayıcı bir yapıya dönüş olasılıkları hakkında yeni tartışmalara ışık tutacak bir değerdendirmeyi de içermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yerleşimci Sömürgeciliği, varolmaya kanilik, içindeleme ve dışlama politikaları, Tasviye mantığı, demografik yok ediş, İrlanda, Güney Afrika, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, İsrail, Filistin.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANC: African National Congress.

ASA: American Sociological Association.

Cairo Agreement: Gaza-Jericho Agreement 1994.

DOP: The Israeli Palestinian Declaration of Principles (Oslo Agreement).

EU: European Union.

GFA: Great Friday Agreement.

IRA: Irish Republican Army.

OCHA: United Nations Office of Coordination of Assistance to the Palestinian People.

Oslo II: The Israeli Palestinian Interim Agreement, 1995.

PA: The Palestinian Authority.

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization.

UN: United Nations.

UNRWA: United Nations Refugees and Work Agency.

USA: United States of America.

Yesha: Judea, Samaria, and Gaza Council

INTRODUCTION

i. Theoretical Framework and Thesis Description

Settler colonial studies are an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that includes political, social and economic aspects. They are in relevance more to 'Transnational Relations', rather than to the international relations. The transnational here refers to the cross borders relations and interactions between peoples and nations, and their non-state actors. In this sense Settler colonialism is about people moving from one country to another to conquer it from within and to make it as their country on the expense of its indigenous population.

The transnational relations are wholly ignored by structural realism, because of its particular focus on the 'international' as composed of states, and their relations and interactions (Arts, 2000).

On the contrary the non- state actors includes trans-governmental bodies, such as the UN, the EU, the global civil society organizations, and the multinational corporations. They also include intrastate agencies being non-violent like the national civil society organizations, and the private sector bodies; or violent like the armed and the terrorist groups. The individuals are also non-state actors who act either violently or none violently (Golan and Salem, 2014; Salem 2018a). Settler colonial movements are also non-state actors.

Further, Settler colonialism and its case study presented here, has three transnational aspects: One of them is related to the definition and life cycle of the settler colonial projects that are based on conquering, displacing and replacing, and the movement of population from one country to another to transform the latter to become their country on the expense of its indigenous people (Wolfe 2006, Veracini 2011, Sayegh 1965, Al Masiri, 1990; Hammad 1984; Shafir, 2002). As such the settler colonial project cannot perform without the "Logic of eliminations towards the indigenous population" (Wolfe, 2006; 2012; 2013). This logic can take different ways against the indigenous

population such as committing genocides, assimilating part of them within the new emerging settler majority, or disconnecting between them and their lands and depriving them of the national and the citizenship rights or transferring them to outside their country.

The logic of elimination secondly creates transnational conflicts between the settler colonials and the indigenous population as a result of the emergence and growth of the colonial settler project. Different than the conflict between states over borders and different than the Colonial projects that do not aim to conquer the country; Settler colonial projects create the intra border conflict that is between peoples. This conflict is multifaceted, as the settler colonials create a struggle about land and territory ownership, formulate different claims about their past and present history, and about their fate in the future as well. Usually, all that to be covered by ideological argumentations claims about differences of culture and others for the 'civilizing of the underdeveloped natives' as the settler mentioned above colonial studies of Wolfe, Veracini, and others above showed. The third transnational aspect has to do with the nature of the Israeli State (taken as a case study in this thesis) that did not define its borders when established in 1948. This last fact was due to the Israel willingness to expand itself in 1967 beyond its 1948 borders, by using the extraterritorial Methods of action of the transnational settler colonial actors, characterized as mentioned by leaving their country or territory to acquire a new one. Israel used these new territorial methods in 1967 and after to achieve its expansionist settlement project that is in progress beyond its 1948 UN recognized borders, rather than acting as a state with decided borders. Israel is still without a Constitution that defines the state borders (Sayegh, 1965; Butenschon, 1993) as such Israel recruits Jews from the world countries as one extraterritorial method and expands colonial settlements beyond its 1948 UN recognized borders as a second method and initiates wars and military raids as a third extraterritorial method. These three methods resemble those of the non-state actors including those that were used by the Zionist movements in the pre-1948 period.

Accordingly, that is why the balance in the activism to build colonial settlements in the 1967 occupied territories between the state being as a non-state actor in its modus operandi, and the settlers' movements are to the side of the state in the post-1967 period as to be illustrated later in the chapters' two to four of this thesis.

Drawing into the transnational aspect of the study, and the extraterritorial territorial nature of the Israeli settler colonialism, this study question is who is eligible to exist? Who is included and who is excluded, both concerning territory and to citizenship? This question is embedded to the 'logic of elimination' in one hand, and it is an expansion of it in the second hand.

The above question is a crucial question for the settler- colonial projects sought to conquer the country and to eliminate the indigenous population physically by genocides followed by assimilation of the rest, as took place in the USA, New Zealand, and Australia, or demographically, as in the case of the Zionist project and Israel. In the other hand, the settler-colonial project in South Africa and Algeria failed to create settlers' majorities and to eliminate the natives. Therefore, they were obliged either to leave as in the case of the settlers in Algeria or to find a way to co-exist with the indigenous populations within an agreed upon 'equal' citizenship formula in one unitedstate as took place in South Africa.

The Irish model is different than the previous models. Here the settlers were able with the British Government support to create a majority in parts of Ireland composed of Ulster six counties, through 800 years of settling and benefiting from plights. These plights are such as the one through the "Potato Famine" of 1845 to 1852 that left one million to die and one another million to leave the country. The Separation of Ulster from Ireland by Britain took place in 1921. The name of Ulster was changed to become Northern Ireland. The settlers created their single majority rule in Northern Ireland till 1998 when they reached a

power-sharing agreement with the indigenous population through the Great Friday Agreement (GFA) that year. The details of these comparisons and their evidence are to be found in these thesis chapters one and three.

Given its non-state actors focus, this thesis will study and compare the British model of settler colonialism based on privatization and therefore giving autonomy to the non-state actors initiatives as it will be shown in its representations in the four cases of the United States, Israel, Ireland (not only Northern Ireland), and South Africa. These four cases responded to the question of who is eligible to exist in different ways as mentioned above. This fact makes them suitable to discuss the solutions of inclusion and exclusion presented to the settler- colonial project in Palestine either by creating one unilateral Israeli state by getting rid of most of the Palestinians as in the American case of getting rid of the Amerindians. The Second solution to the research question might be in light of the South African formula of inclusion between the colonial settlers and the natives in one state based on equal rights. Finally, the solution might be through inclusion through a partition of territories between Palestine and Israel as took place in the Irish model, with all the differences to be shown in the following chapters. These three models of inclusion and exclusion are thus very relevant to the ongoing discussion about the solution of the inclusion and the exclusion issue in between their three solutions of the unilateral country, the united country, or the partitioned country. These models are selected therefore because of being relevant to the answer of this study question in this regard.

Common also between all these cases, is another component of inclusion and exclusion, related to the instrumental use of 'identity politics,' used not only to define who is eligible to exist but further to define who counts from those who are eligible to exist and to which level of rights they are counted. In the other hand, these cases determine who is not eligible to exist following self-created criteria of indigenization and otherization to be put in practice after the

establishment of the settler state. Democracy and citizenship studies will be referred to analyze this dimension of the settler-colonial projects.

The violent non-state actors play an essential role in such conflict about land possession and who is eligible to be given (and to give) its identity and to live over it. Such a position is primarily played in the British directed settler-colonial project, which was privatized versus the French ones which were more state-led settler colonial projects as in Algeria where France as a state wanted Algeria to become a part of France while using the settlers to implement this objective without giving them independence. In the British settler-colonial project, non-state actors' played autonomous roles in the creation and the advancement of the settler- colonial projects. In another side, non-state actors played a crucial role in the case of the national liberation movements created by the indigenous population in response to the settler- colonial projects.

In this regard, a hint to the other international relations theories might show that liberal internationalism focused only on the role of non- violent state actors in creating cooperation and interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977), but it gave less attention to the role played by the violent ones in creating rifts, and enmity between the world peoples. Marxism in the other hand gave a vital role to the Proletariat class as a non-state actor for toppling the capitalist regime worldwide and creating an alternative communist world (Marx, 1848). Marx and Lenin analyzed as well the roles of cross borders colonialism and later on imperialism focusing on the economic analysis (Lenin, 1916, 1967), while they also spoke about the right of people for self-determination, considered by them as the first stage to the Socialist Revolution. By Using the Gramscian analytical point of departure, the critical theory widened the non-state actors' analysis to include forces beyond the proletariat such as the social, feminist and environmental movements, for instance, Cox did (Cox, 1981). The other theories which focus their analysis on the international society, such as Constructivism (Wendt, 1992) and the English school (Bull, 1977) rather than only the

international, as operated by the states, also gave some 'taste' to the roles of the non-state actors. In sum, the theories except for probably Realism, all gave some part to the non-state actors, but none of them spoke about the settler - colonial movements as a non-state actor in their assessments and debates.

This study will discuss the roles played by the settler- colonial non-state actors in creating and expanding the settler- colonial projects, and how these roles intermingled with those of the state as being usually the mother countries of the settler- colonial projects, and how the acts of the non-state actors prepared the ground for the creation of states. In the cases such as of the United States and Israel, for instance, non-state Actors like the Puritans and the Mennonites played roles in the initiation and the progress of the settler-colonial project in the United States, and the Zionist Movement regarding Israel as it will be shown later in this study.

In the chapters of the study, the roles of the internal factors, the states, the international community, and the transnational non-state actors will be discussed in relevance to the processes of the development and sustaining the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler colonial Project in Palestine. These factors roles will be also discussed in light of their possible roles towards the transformation of the inclusion and exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine. These previous points are part of the research question which is not only about the inclusion and exclusion politics of the settler- colonial projects, but it is also about how to transform them towards inclusion and decolonization.

The study is based theoretically on the re-emerging literature about settler colonialism, which is also receiving a growing acceptance in academia. As signs of this consent, *Taylor and Francis* launched a Settler Colonial Studies Journal in 2011. The American Sociological Association (ASA) recognized this 'new'

field and accepted having sessions about it in its annual conferences in the last decade (see Programs in ASA Website: www.asanet.org).

Besides that, there is growing number of studies by international scholars such as Wolfe (2006; 2011; 2013), Veracini (2010; 2011; 2013; 2014; 2017) Piterberg (2009), and many others. There are Israeli scholars in line with this approach entirely or partially; among them For instance: Pappe (2007; 2008; 2012; 2013; 2015), Shafir (1989; 2002; 2005), Yiftachel (2012a; 2012b), Azoulay and Ophir (2012), Gordon (2012), Sand (2010, 2012), Weizman (2007), Behar (2011), Davis (1997, 2003) and several others.

On the Palestinian side, there are 1960s studies of Sayegh (1965), Abbas (1977;1979,1982,1984,1989;1994), Abu-Lughud and Abu-Laban (1974), Zureik (1979), Hanafi (2012), Falah (1989; 1993), Farsoun (1975), Kana'aneh (1990; 2000), Jiryis (1969), Masalha (2003), Rouhana(1997; 1998; 2014; 2015), HounidaGhanem (2009; 2011; 2018, 2014, 2017) Samman (2012), and Badran(2010; 2015) and others abroad such as Bazian (2014), Massad (2006) and others.

There are also, other Arab early writings on the issue such as the seminal writings of Al Masiri (1990a, 1990b), Gabbour (1970), Tou'mah (1972), and Hammad (1984; 2000; 2017) Studies. All about Zionism, settler colonial entities, and the comparison between Israel and South Africa prepared by some of these scholars. Many Palestinian scholars who wrote about the Palestinian refugee's issue can be added to the list, due to their analysis to the dispossession process, and despite that, they did not use settler colonialism as the full point of departure for their analysis. These are such as Khalidi (1959, 1961, 1982, 1987, 1988,1992,1993,1997, 2008), Sanbar (1987), Abu Sitta (2011), Sakhnini (1986; 2012), Tamari (1999; 2002; 2005) and many others. Besides the available Palestinian studies, certainly, there is a need to develop the Palestinian

research on settler colonialism and its dynamics and mechanisms as practiced in Palestine in comparison with other international cases of settler colonialism.

The 'new' settler colonial studies can be perceived as the second stage of the scholarly development and the methodological enrichment of this field. The first one included few Arab and Palestinian studies about settler colonialism written between the 1960s to the 1990s. In addition to that literature, many Western academic writings combined both colonialism and settler colonialism under the heading of colonialism such as Fieldhouse (1966), Fredrickson (1988). At that period, one can also find those studies that were conducted by anti-colonial intellectuals such as Fanon (1952; 1963), (Cesaire, 1950/1972), and Mimi (1965). These names and others alike were militant intellectuals who wrote about imperialism and colonialism, including settler colonialism wherever it existed; combining that with their struggle and activism for national liberation and social change. The second stage is almost purely academic, expressing the growing academic recognition of settler colonialism as a current field of inquiry.

Besides the settler colonial studies, and to verify the research question about inclusion and exclusion in the settler colonial projects, this study will use additional complementing concepts such as internal colonialism (Zureik, 1979), ethnocracy (Butenshon, 1993; Yiftachel, 2012a; 2012b) and Herrenvolk Democracy (Den Berghe, 1981), Settler Democracy (Mann, 2005), Postcolonialism (Fanon, 1952; 1963), Said (1978), Spivak (1999), Neo-Colonialism (Nkrumah, 1965) and 'Coloniality' (Quijano 2000; 2007; Mignolo, 2007). These concepts will help to analyze the structures of the settler colonial projects and also the types of democratic systems that they create and run in a way that can assist in implementing their inclusion and exclusion processes as it will be shown.

Internal colonialism formula can help to clarify the inclusion and the exclusion dynamics of the settler-colonial project after the establishment of the settler state (see Chapter one). Postcolonial and the Jewish Postcolonial Studies as another additional and complementary theoretical reference can also add to the

analysis. The settler- colonial studies are focused only on the territorial issues, without dealing with the other matters of culture and ideology analyzed by Postcolonialism and central to the study of the Israeli Palestinian case inclusion and exclusion processes. In this regard, IlanPappe went even further suggesting that settler colonialism analysis is not enough to understand the Israeli policies towards the Palestinians. In his opinion, Israel promotes besides settler colonialism other components such as racism and the consideration of the other as 'alien'. Also, Israel has a kind of international immunity towards criticism (Pappe, 2012). Herrenvolk Democracy might also help in clarifying the complexities of inclusion and exclusion in the level of who counts/ and do not count. The term Herrenvolk democracy combines democracy for the settlers and settler colonialism towards the indigenous population living inside the settler colonial state (Den Berghe, 1967).

Ethnocracy (Butenschon, 1993), and Open ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2012) can help also explaining some of the leading assumptions about inclusion and exclusion, and the practices of the settler- colonial states and their ethnocratic structures that produce systems of domination. These systems of power are ethnic- inclusive regarding the rights of access to the land, and the right of participation in the democratic decision-making processes, both combined and resulting of Apartheid structures and practices that exclude the other ethnicities and discriminate against them. The Herrenvolk Democracy and the Settler Democracy can further assist by showing that the settler colonial societies are entirely far from being inclusive and that they are fully exclusive, by having democracy to the settlers, which is murderous against the indigenous populations as Mann advice (Mann, 2005).

Postcolonialism can assist in answering the research question first due to its focus on the culture and how it is used by Western/ Northern Man, including the Israel Western Man, in his/her treatment with the South native

populations, including the Palestinians as a tool of exclusion and dominance: (Fanon, 1952; 1963; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1999; Sylvester, 2011) and others.

This study will use Postcolonialism without a hyphen, rather than Post-Colonialism with a hyphen. As Sylvester advised, opposite to the latter that is practiced with ex-colonies, the former refers to the Democratic States methods of control of all the countries of the South, regardless to if each of these was a former colony or not. Here she refers to the global five methods of control through the use of media, technology, finance, ideas, and ethnicity (Sylvester, 2011, 192).

Concerning the Israeli-Palestinian context, besides the continuation of the expansion of the settler-colonial project through land confiscation and settlement expansion from its establishment in 1948 till today, Israel additionally used the five mentioned methods of control with the Palestinian Authority since its establishment in 1994. According to Veracini "The PA and Hamas- led government in Gaza could end up inheriting the occupation's structures and fashion their rule as postcolonial successor polities" (Veracini, 2013, 33). It will be interesting also to compare these post-Oslo postcolonial structures with the Israeli State consideration of itself as a Postcolonial state that emerged after a 'national struggle for liberation' from the former British colonizers (Hesse, 2012, 33,133). The study will assess Veracini expectation about possible postcolonial fashioning of the PA in West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, to find out if this will be the case, or that the two authorities' existence is just coverage for the ongoing expansion of the settler-colonial project in the ground. Also, the perception of Israel as becoming a postcolonial entity after its establishment as a state in 1948 will be examined (see chapters two and three), including the impact of this case it happened on the Israeli exclusion and inclusion politics.

The Postcolonial aspect has then two dimensions in the Israeli Palestinian context. It is in one hand useful to analyze the status of the Palestinian authority as if it is the potentially postcolonial entity. In the other hand, it is helpful for the

analysis of Israel policies towards the Palestinian Authority since 1994, and if these policies are working to sustain its postcolonial entity towards some exclusion of the Palestinians in a semi-independent Palestinian Entity. Or maybe dealing with this entity as a provisional body till the settler-colonial project will be completed towards a full exclusion and elimination of the Palestinian internally and externally as the study will describe the different ways of doing them. Besides that, there is the question about whether Israel became a postcolonial entity after its establishment in 1948.

As Pappe advised (see above), a complex of multiple theoretical tools will be required to clarify the case of Palestine. In addition to settler colonialism and Postcolonialism, these tools also include neo-colonialism, and the concept of 'Coloniality' that emerged in the 1990s in Latin America (Quijano, 2000; 2007).

In the light of these general references, the study will also allude with some hints to the role of finance and economic aspect of exploitation in the Israeli Palestinian context, Neo-Colonialism, mainly in the period after the war of 1967. Further on the study will elaborate on the complexity of the Israeli–Palestinian context that includes the practice of Postcolonialism and Neo-Colonial and Apartheid aspects with Gaza and areas A and B of West Bank. The formers to be taken together at the same time with a continuation of colonialism and settler colonialism, combined with Apartheid, mainly in the framework of the expanding of East Jerusalem in the expense of West Bank, and in Area C of West Bank, and Hebron. Besides that, the concepts of the Peruvian sociologist Anibal Quijano about the coloniality of power, by economic and political means, and the coloniality of knowledge, by epistemic means, continuing after the end of the direct occupation will be used as an additional theoretical tool to explicate the Palestinian Israeli relations after Oslo agreement of 1993. The relationship between this last concept and the other concepts of Colonization, Colonialism, Internal Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Neo-Colonialism will be elaborated in chapter one. The chapter will be showing where they converge, and where they diverge, and how each one of them can help to bridge the shortfalls and the

gaps of the others concerning the answering the question about the inclusion and the exclusion approaches of the settler-colonial project in Palestine.

In this context “continuity and discontinuity should be considered together” (Veracini, 2013, 33). These two aspects will be subject to a thorough investigation in the study following the advice of historical sociology in this regard.

What will be the nature of this continuity/discontinuity in the coming ten years? Will the internal colonialism, the postcolonial, the coloniality, the neo-colonial, and the Apartheid aspects continue, or they will evaporate due to the ongoing intensive settler colonialism? Will the result be a new transfer to the Palestinians, or that the internal and the external factors, both international and transnational, will be able to make a shift in the direction towards some Palestinian self-determination, or towards keeping ‘muddling through’ by preserving the current situation, or any other option? The study will discuss these different possibilities to find out what inclusion and exclusion options are prevailing over the others in the settler-colonial case of Palestine.

ii. Problem Statement and Study Question

Following the ‘Logic of Elimination’ of the Settler Colonial Projects, and its practice in Palestine, this thesis aims to expand in the exploration of this logic by adding to it the question of who is eligible to exist, or in other words the issues inclusion and exclusion in specific within settler colonialism. These issues include three dimensions:

Firstly, the inclusion and the exclusion with the land and who gives its identity, and who is eligible to live over it, or to be displaced from it.

The second dimension is the inclusion and the exclusion concerning the mere physical existence, and the demographic presence.

The third dimension is the inclusion and exclusion regarding citizenship and the democratic system. This dimension is relevant also to the question of who counts as part of the people or as part of the political system as well.

Taking Palestine as a case study for this exploration, the thesis aims to verify further the following multiple questions concerning this research question:

What are the similarities and the contrasts in the settler colonial project to Palestine regarding its inclusion and exclusion politics? These similarities and differences to be explored in three dimensions: The Temporal: Between the pre-1948 period, before the establishment of Israel, and the post-1967 period, after the occupation of the rest of Palestine. Do the processes of inclusion and exclusion change between these two periods? The Geographical: Between different districts/ locations of Palestine. Do the inclusion and exclusion process change between these localities? And the extraterritorial: Regarding the Palestinian refugees versus the Jewish communities worldwide and what are differences in the inclusion and the exclusion policies towards both of them conducted by the settler colonial project?

The research question of inclusion versus exclusion of this study will be analyzed in four categories related to the settler colonial project *modus operandi*:

The first category is the exclusion from the territory, deterritorialization, of the indigenous population by ethnic cleansing, or what is called in Israel as "Transfer" combined usually with dispossession and displacement, and followed by reterritorialization of replacement, Judaization of land, place and territory, the landscape, and the space, and Israelization of the institutions. This transfer might be internal and thus creating internally displaced persons (IDPs) or external by creating refugees.

The second relates to the recognition of the indigenous people, usually provisionally, right of residency but without recognizing their identity and citizensrights, or known attachment or access to the land. This example takes place as is it the case in East Jerusalem for instance which its area was annexed to Israel in 1967 while its Palestinian population was not annexed but considered as "Jordanian citizens residing permanently in Israel." In the opposite: Granting extra-territorial citizenship rights to all the Jewish people worldwide towards all *EretzYisrael* that includes the Palestinian 1967 occupied territories, creating as such two definitions of "Demos" in whole historical Palestine. One of these definitions relates to the indigenous people by excluding them from citizenship, or full citizenship as in the case of the third category below. The second is extraterritorial that include in the Demos persons and groups who live outside the state territory due to the claim that they are part of the "Jewish people" living in the Diaspora.

The third category is based on the differentiation between full citizenship, to Jews, and the "Passport citizenship" (Davis, 1997) which does not grant equal rights. This category was created to address the Palestinians inside Israel who are opposed to the Jews have no right to bring their relatives and their people members from outside to become Israeli citizens as it happens with the Jews upon their arrival to Israel.

The fourth category is composed of those who are fully stateless such as those who live without any citizenship or residency rights mainly in East Jerusalem, and West Bank and Gaza.

This study will go over the strategies, policies, justifications, and methods of inclusion and exclusion from the "Demos" that are used by the settler- colonial project in its two major stages: The First stage of the initiation and the progress of the settler-colonial project, and the state-stage that followed, with a particular focus on the cases when settler states are established, and find out how they

implement the inclusion and the exclusion politics territorially and extraterritorially, in different regions, and over different periods.

To verify the study question about inclusion and exclusion in the settler- colonial projects, an analysis of the similarities between them regarding their inclusion and exclusion politics will be made: First, there is the United States model of full exclusion by wiping out the indigenous population, followed by establishing an almost pure settler state. Second, there is the South African model of inclusion and integration by creating equal political rights for both the former settlers' communities and the indigenous population. Third: The Northern Ireland model of the partition of the country, followed later by agreeing to live peacefully as segregated two communities who each exclude the other. Further, the research will compare these three models of inclusion and exclusion with the case of Palestine and draw the results of similarities and contrasts in inclusion and exclusion methods and processes of these settler- colonial projects.

Does the settler colonial project in Palestine is entirely similar to any of these three cases, or it represents a different one with partially different dynamics regarding inclusion and exclusion politics?

Regarding the solution towards inclusivity in another hand, will Palestine witness an Irish or South African solution in finding a formula for cohesive or coexistence based citizenship in the framework of keeping the unity, one state in the whole Palestine: the South African solution. Or the answer will be by Israel accepting a partition of the country to two parts as happened in Ireland after 1921 independence and follow that by two processes that Israel will learn from both Ireland and Britain. The one learned from Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland will be by creating a power-sharing formula by Israel with its Arab Palestinian population inside its 1948 borders as the Northern Ireland power-sharing formula and the Irish Republic inclusion of the Protestant British settlers (five percent of the population) as equal citizens in the Republic teaches. The second will be from Britain by leaving as Britain did as an occupying force to

Ireland till 1921, the right of self-determination for the Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem? Or it will go in the path of America by eliminating the indigenous population if not by genocides, but by "demographic elimination" as it was called by Nadim Rouhana (Rouhana, 2015)?

The Three models of inclusion and exclusion are then: A United country, a divided country, and a country of mono-control. The question is: Which one of these Israel will choose? The more detailed comparisons to these three models will follow. After making these comparisons, the study will investigate the ongoing processes and the prospects of the inclusion and exclusion of the settler-colonial project in Palestine. This case will be discussed as a result of its dynamics in one hand, its interaction with the indigenous population in the second hand, and its interactions thirdly with the international/ transnational arena both in the Middle East region and globally.

iii. Hypothesis

Following the study question, this study hypothesis is a complex of a hypothesis and sub- hypotheses all related to the past, present, and the future of the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler colonial projects. The Hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses are also related to the roles of the different local, regional, and international actors in preserving, sustaining, or transforming these inclusion and exclusion politics. The complex of hypotheses is following Michael Mann method, when he suggested eight theses for verification in his seminal book 'The Dark Side of Democracy' (2005). What is thesis is suggesting is less ambitious than Mann, and that is to verify one hypothesis in all aspects manifested in the sub-hypothesis that it includes.

The Study hypothesis is: In comparison with the models of inclusion and exclusion of pure settler state model (the USA), the integrative state model (South Africa), and what looks like as the partition model (Ireland) (see Chapter one). In comparison to these, the Zionist settler-colonial project inclusion and exclusion politics is seeking 'demographic elimination' of the indigenous

population as the path towards the creation of a pure settler state like the USA. This state created an enduring process of internal and the external dispossession for the Palestinians that continued till today. Such a process will also continue by different means in the future unless the external Arab and international factors can reverse it.

The following points / Sub- hypotheses are clarifying the different aspects of this hypothesis:

- Part of the assumption includes that the Zionist project aims to move the Palestinians outside their country, and take over their lands. It is assumed that this process did not change after Israel was established in 1948. The State of Israel repeated the transfer of another part of the Palestinians later in 1967, the same as the Zionist non-state actors did in 1948.

- Other part of the assumption is that the peace process that started by Madrid conference for Middle East Peace in 1991 did not change the “Exclusion/transfer option’ of the Palestinians from their homeland, but on the contrary, it might played the role of a mask hiding the growing voices inside the Israeli state towards that transfer (Cook, 2015). (Details in Chapters two and four).

- Also assumed, that there are other ongoing steps of internal Exclusion since 1967 by taking over the Palestinian land, and thus creating new internally displaced persons (IDPs). While at the sametime transferring these lands to the Settler colonials, increasingly growing in West Bank up to one million in the upcoming years as is the suggestion of the Minister of Housing Mr. Yoav Galant presented to the Knesset in the last months of 2017(www.mondoweiss.net 17th of November, 2017).

- Also assumed that the international politics based on Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism, the internal dynamics in the Zionist Movement and Israel, and the Palestinian armed resistance and the Arabs politics and actions were incapable of preventing the 1948 and the 1967 external transfers. Assumed as well that If these politics stay in their current shape, they will also be incapable of stopping further transfers and will be as well inept at convincing Israel to restrict itself to its 1948 UN recognized borders.

In the aspect of transforming the exclusion and inclusion politics, it is also assumed that there are two possible paths for changing the described track of exclusion from the land, territory, and country:

- The first is the Palestinian non-violent struggle that was the only method that created PARTIAL results in the path towards Palestinian independence, and the reverse of the exclusion process assumed by this thesis. For instance, the 1987 Intifada led Israel to recognize the PLO, but the negotiations that followed did not lead to Palestinian independence.

Accordingly, it can be assumed that the 1987 model of the Intifada might be developed to become capable of changing the transfer/ full exclusion track. The new Intifada to emerge might be a comprehensive, continuous non-violent Intifada, and inclusive to an Israeli and international essential participation this time, and by making the whole world as its courtyard. Such an Intifada will create the Arab and the global momentum of pressures/ boycott/ freezing of aid and investments in Israel and its colonial settlements. All these pressures required for changing the Israeli stands of exclusion, and the creation of another process of inclusion as happened in the case of South Africa, or by dividing Palestine between two peoples in two states in the same land.

The Intifada actions in Palestine and globally might not stop until it succeeds, together with negotiations or without negotiations, to make Israel change

direction; to become an ordinary territorial state on 1948 borders, and to accept sharing historical Palestine between two countries. This acceptance might be done based on 1967 borders according to the partition model of 'full' separation between two peoples as in the case of the partition that took place in the Indian Peninsula by the creation of the two separate countries of India and Pakistan in 1949.

The other model of separation presented heavily in the debate in Palestine but did not entirely fit, is following the case of Ireland divided to one almost pure Irish State, The Republic of Ireland with a minority of Protestants who came from Britain in the several centuries earlier. This model is a model to Israel with the Palestinian minority inside it but without any return of the Palestinian refugees who were living in historical Palestine before Israel was established in 1948). The second is an invented (Northern Ireland) that was created and became part of the United Kingdom, while resided by two ethnic groups, that one of them have a slight majority of 48 percent protestant unionists with Britain versus 45 percent Catholic Irish nationalists according to the 2011 census in the Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, www.nisra.gov.uk). As it will be shown in chapter one that this Irish solution is not the model for the partition model in Palestine although it is presented in the debate as such at the PASSIA (2005).

The ultimate solution that a successful Intifada might come with is by having one integrative country based on equal citizenship, The South African model, rather than to continue to be the holder of extraterritorial expansionist one. The Irish and South African cases will be discussed thoroughly in this study to find out if they have any relevance to the case of Israel and Palestine.

- If this non-violent way did not take place or failed, the second assumption would be that the upcoming expected changes in the Arab region will create conditions for the second possible path that will include highly destructive wars,

with non- state violent actors' participation. These wars will make the ability of Israel to continue existing as a state very slim and will create another path in which Israel and its Settler colonials will be entirely excluded through elimination by the Arabs and the Muslims. The history of Palestine presents different cases of conquering or liberating it from outside. For example, besides the Islamic conquest by the Muslim Caliphate Omar Bin Al Khattab of Palestine in the seventh century from the Byzantines, Salah Eddin Al Ayyoubi liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187 ending by this their "Jerusalem Latin Kingdom" as it was called. Later Jerusalem was released once again from the Crusaders by King NajmEddinAyyoub in 1244 both (he and Salah Eddin) coming from Egypt.

Two days after the British conquest of Jerusalem in 9/12/ 1917, General Edmund Allenby declared that: "The wars of the Crusaders are now Complete" (Bazian, Al Jazeera, 14/12/2014). There are several interpretations for the role of this crucial external factor to Palestine ranging between its religious and geographically strategic position in the region, and others. The discussion of these interpretations is outside the scope of this thesis, but what is assumed here is that this history might create the conditions for Israel defeat from outside as one of the options like what happened with the two hundred years lifelong Crusaders Kingdom.

If the two assumptions for the reverse of the settler-colonial project exclusion politics (The Comprehensive non-violent Intifada, or the liberation from outside) failed, the third assumption would be in this case that the Zionist settler-colonial project will fully succeed (as the USA did). A kind of success to be achieved by repeating the partial demographic elimination that took place against the Palestinians in 1948 and in 1967 to outside their country by other ones to keep the 'Jewish majority' in the country. Besides that the Palestinians to be excluded by different means of elimination like transfer, and keeping stateless, or as a minority among a Jewish majority. In the United States, the settler- colonial

majority was created by wiping and genociding against the indigenous population, while in the case of Israel the Jewish majority was created by massacres, plus demographic elimination and the deprivation of the Palestinians who continued to live in their country from citizenship as this thesis will show.

These assumptions and possibilities for changing the track of inclusion and exclusion will be further discussed in details in the study chapters mainly in chapter five.

In conclusion to this part, this study hypothesis includes three formulas: One that the exclusion of the indigenous population versus the inclusion of the settlers will succeed through further demographic elimination. The second will be an alternative formula for the inclusion of all together in the same land: The indigenous people and the settlers in one state solution as in the South African case, or in two states solution, assumed to be achieved through a comprehensive and continuous non-violent global Intifada. If these two did not work then the third formula built based on the history of the region might come in: This formula will be realized when a path might become open once again for the opposite exclusions through wars in which Israel will exclude more Arabs if won, or vice versa when the Arabs defeat Israel.

iv. Study Objectives

The overall objective of this thesis is to study the exclusion and inclusion politics of the Settler colonial project and its underlying ideological and historical justifications in Palestine, through the assessment of the practices, and the ramifications of these politics.

On the way of achieving the overall objective, the study will be seeking to contribute to a more in-depth explication of the exclusion and inclusion politics of the settler colonial settler projects, and what aspects of continuity and change these politics pass through their different stages of development.

In a contribution to the comparative studies, the thesis is seeking to first compare between various settler colonial projects regarding their inclusion and exclusion politics. Secondly, it will differentiate between different stages of the settler-colonial project inclusion and exclusion politics in Palestine. Thirdly it will distinguish between the various locations in Palestine and how the colonial settler project performs similarly and differently regarding the inclusion and the exclusion politics between these places.

v. Significance, and Expected Added Value

While there is some research about the settler colonial project in Palestine (All the Israeli and the Palestinian formerly mentioned scholars' studies and others including international academics). But there are almost none comprehensive one about the question if the Israeli policies after 1967 fall under settler colonialism rather than the dominant language about the occupation. In the last few years, a new development took place, when the word about occupation started to be combined with the style of Apartheid. However, when the term settler colonialism is used in this study, it will mean those settlers and their state establishment and practices that aim to displace and replace the indigenous population in the long term, while creating two systems of Apartheid for the short term till the full displacement takes place. During the short term Apartheid period there will be two systems: One is the system of privileges to the settlers. The second is the system of discrimination and oppression against the indigenous population that is inclusive to partial displacement processes as will (see for instance Saeb Erekat studies of 2010 to 2016, Mohammad Dajani, 2017).

This study will delve into the "un-debated" question if the project implemented towards West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem is a settler colonial project similar in its essential features to the one that was practiced in the pre-1948 period. Also analogous to that one that is still practiced through the internal transfers taking place today in the Naqab, the Triangle, and the Galilee inside Israel? This Study will show how occupation and Apartheid might be just

temporary practices inside the overall settler colonial project till the time become ripe for an additional transfer/ Full exclusion. In this sense, this study is new of its kind.

All of that will be analyzed in the framework of the inclusion and the exclusion approaches of the colonial settler project, including the inclusion and the exclusion from citizenship, the territorialization versus deterritorialization concerning the relation to the land, including the transfer and the expulsion. In the case of the settler-colonial project in Palestine, there are few books and articles about this issue of inclusion and exclusion such as of Uri Davis (1997); Said Zeedani (1993) Nadim Rouhana (1997; 2015) Laureen Banko (2016), and Nils Butenschon (1993). These studies will be referred to in the following chapters while this study will be the first to research this aspect thoroughly.

The significance of such an undertaking will be manifold: First, it will allow for a new kind of diagnosis of the context and its dynamics that might be more helpful when thinking of solutions to the Palestinian problem between the two states solution, the one Israeli state solution, the one joint one State solution (Either through bi-nationalism, or a one state for all its citizens).

Second, it will contribute to the enrichment of the understanding of the exclusion and the inclusion politics used by the settler colonialists to sustain their dominance versus the indigenous population, and specifically about those politics of the one that is practiced in Palestine. Third, it might trigger new academic debate about the nature of the Israeli presence in the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories and its comparisons with other settler colonial projects. Fourth, it might contribute to a better understanding of the role that non-violence might play to shift the direction of the colonial settler projects towards elimination and exclusion.

In the arena of theory, this study might contribute to the enrichment of the literature about the transnational aspect of the international relations discipline and the understanding of the place of the settler colonialism studies in this discipline. Further, than that, the study might contribute to a more in-depth knowledge of the role of the violent non-state actors, either when acting in tandem or contradiction with the state. It will also add to the democracy and citizenship studies, and specifically regarding the politics of inclusion and the exclusion from citizenship. Finally, there might be a contribution to the development of the theoretical understanding, out of the realms of Neorealism and Neoliberalism as well, of the complexity of the Middle East regional and international politics towards the settler colonial project in Palestine, and how they contribute to sustaining or restricting its expansion, and its exclusionist politics as well.

vi. Justification

As indicated in the theoretical framework above, there are only few studies about the inclusion and the exclusion policies of the settler colonial projects taken in comparative perspective. Secondly there is not enough literature that compares between the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler colonial project in the making and after it succeeds in creating a state. This thesis aims to contribute to the filling of these two gaps.

vii. Methodology

This study uses the three methods: The historical (including historical sociology), the comparative, and the case studies. The historical method will be used by going back to history to discover the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine and the other international cases selected for this study. The continuity and change/ discontinuity and disruptions in these politics and the structures that create them according to the oversights learned from historical sociology will be also made. Historical Sociology also teaches that anarchy and hierarchy should be studied together, the units and

the sub-units roles to be compared, and the variety of internal/external, and social/societal, economic and political factors to be included in the analysis and transcending as such the mono causality (Hobson and Hobden, 2002).

The comparative will have five aspects: One is a comparison between different theories. Second is between various settler colonial models. Third between several approaches of analysis, the colonial settler one versus the other approaches of ethnocracy and the others mentioned above. Fourth between different locations (West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem, Naqab, Acre, the Galilee, and Jaffa). Fifth, between different solutions towards the colonial settler project.

The case studies will also be used in chapter four concerning the Refugees, The Palestinians inside Israel, Jerusalem, Area C, The Palestinian Authority, and Gaza. These cases were presented to show how the inclusion and the exclusion processes are operationalized in the ground and to show their results.

Besides the academic and historical references as secondary resources, books, and journals, the study will also be using a lot of other resources. These include original books, newspapers and electronic media news agencies, published reports, articles, statements, and plans.

Original documents such as official documents, plans of the settlers Council *Yesha* in West Bank, Israeli military orders, pamphlets of refugees committees, and the pamphlets of the committees acting in the old cities of Jerusalem, and Hebron as examples.

In the use, there will be also governmental and official websites such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Israeli Government websites, and non-state actors' websites (political parties, civil society organizations, and human rights groups), and the violent non-state actor movements. Results of public opinion polls will be also used. Besides that, unpublished Doctoral dissertations will be reviewed, and site visits will be also made.

The study follows the past author research on citizenship in the Israeli Palestinian context (Salem, 1997; 2010; 2017; 2018), Conflict and peacebuilding coordinating projects(2005, 2006, 2010, and 2017). It follows also his research on Non-state actors (Salem1999, 2014; 2018), and other hundreds of newspapers and magazines articles analyzing different aspects of the conflict. Also, it follows the writers work on related projects as a civil society activist over the last forty years.

viii. The Scope of the Study

Each study has its scope and limitations:This study Focus will be specifically on the inclusion and the exclusion policies of the settler-colonial project in Palestine before 1948 and after 1967, and their dynamics. It will not study all that project economic, social and political structures and processes, except to the extent of their contribution to the analysis and the clarification of this research question.

It will analyze how the international and the transnational relations of this project played, and how they will play, the roles of sustaining or restricting the expansion of it, and in influencing its inclusion and exclusion politics.

Concerning the comparison, this study will not make a full and detailed comparison with other settler colonial projects in all the social, political and economic aspects of them, but the comparison here will focus on the inclusion and the exclusion approaches of these projects.

The study will make another further comparison between the settler colonial inclusion and exclusion politics before 1948, and after 1967 periods, to develop a better understanding on how these inclusion and exclusion politics went through history and what are the similarities and contrasts that took place between them.

Regarding the post-1967 period, the study will include the 1967 displacement and the post-1967 ones that created an additional refugee issue to be discussed as one of the exclusions and eliminations politics results.

The study of the post-1967 period regarding the exclusion and the inclusion politics might reveal interesting comparisons. These comparisons are such as the point that the settler-colonial project in the post-1967 is still in the process of the making and growing in the ground with a full exclusion policy, versus the pre-1948 one that took a new shape after the state of Israel, established in 1948. The question if this unique shape inside Israel can be described in relevance to the inclusion and the exclusion politics towards the indigenous population as "internal colonialism" as Elia Zureik (Zureik, 1979) advised, or as a continuously active settler colonial project as Jonathan Cook proposed (Cook, 2015) is to be tested. Such a test will enrich the comparison between the two stages, but it also will improve the findings of this study.

The study aims to find out what will be the fate of the post-1967 settler-colonial project, based on investigating its structures and processes in comparison with the pre-1948 one. In this regard it can be said that that the two projects are entirely different: The pre-148 one had Britain as the mother state. The post-1967 one has Israel itself becoming the mother state in one explanation (Shtayyeh in Journal of Palestine Studies 2016), and Israel being the implementer in the ground while the United States is becoming its mother country as this study argues (see chapter three). The pre-1948 and 1948 settler colonial project stage in Palestine were achieved by the Zionist Movement as a non-state actor, while the Israeli State runs the second after 1967 in cooperation with the settlers and right-wing movements acting in Israel and the Diaspora, Mainly in the United States.

Others will claim that there is one Zionist settler-colonial project that started officially with the first Zionist conference of 1897 and still continuous till today (Al

Masiri, 1990; Cook, 2015; Sayegh, 1965). For them, Israeli State is a project-oriented and missionary one rather than being a "normal state" of its citizens. As such the Israeli State is a state in expansion, and when it runs a settler-colonial project in the 1967 territories, it is not doing that to help create another country (as Britain did in the pre1948 period), but to achieve its expansion. Here the state is using non-state actors' methods and unites its work with non-state actors.

The study will discuss these opinions in one hand. Secondly opposite to the pre-1948 period it will also explore how the settler- colonial process is intermingled in different periods with the occupation, internal colonialism, Apartheid and ethnocracy, Herrenvolk democracy, Settler democracy, postcolonialism, neo-colonialism, and coloniality. Finally, it will find out which of these eight will be the principal component, and therefore answer the question about the fate of the post-1967 settler-colonial project and its exclusion politics towards the indigenous population.

As said, the detailed research investigation about the post-1967 period is to be done only through an intensive comparison with the pre-1948 period, and also with other settler colonial cases inclusion and exclusion politics worldwide.

ix. The Structure of the Study

This study will be composed of this introduction and five chapters.

Chapter one is a theoretical and comparative one that starts by presenting the settler colonial framework of analysis and its main components according to the literature. This literature review will aim to find a solid basis for the definition of the settler- colonial projects, and when the settlers become natives. The chapter will also present the internal colonialism, ethnocracy, Herrenvolk Democracy, settler democracy, and the Postcolonial, the Neocolonial, and the coloniality frameworks of analysis as additional theoretical references to this study and will show how they can assist in explaining better the settler- colonial projects in

terms of their structures and the roles played by their actors. This study will discuss and compare these different frameworks to find out where they converge and diverge. The chapter will also include an attempt to theorize the politics of inclusion and exclusion of the settler-colonial projects by referring to democracy and citizenship studies and liberalism, Marxism, and realism approaches to citizenship. The chapter concludes a proposed typology for studying exclusion and inclusion politics in the settler- colonial cases, and ideas for the theorization of the settler colonial state.

In the last section of chapter one, the previous parts definitions and theorizations will be used to verify the three ex-mentioned international models perceived as settler colonial to find out how much they all fit with the criteria of settler -colonial project in one hand, and how they underlined and practiced their inclusion and exclusion politics in the second hand. Chapter one will also compare these cases inclusion and exclusion politics. This comparison will be like another step of preparation of the ground to find the similarities and the contrasts between these cases and the case of Palestine, to verify this thesis assumption that is stating that the case of Palestine is different than those cases regarding inclusion and exclusion politics. The chapter will try to develop a model for the inclusion and exclusion politics that is relevant to the settler colonial projects that succeed to create states, United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel.

All in all the first chapter will lay the groundwork for the subsequent chapters by designing a theoretical framework for the study of this research question about the settler colonial projects inclusion and exclusion politics.

Chapter Two: will be allocated for the analysis of the Palestinian case as a settler colonial case conceptually and historically. Theoretically in comparison with the other ways of consideration by academics and scholars: such as Occupation by (Veracini, 2013), Apartheid and ethnocracy by (Yiftachel, 2012a,

and Butencheon, 1993 for example), Herrenvolk Democracy (Van Den Berghe, 1967), Settler Democracy (Mann, 2005), coloniality (Quijano, 2007), Neocolonial situation (Shohat, 1992; Shohat and Stam, 2003 for example), and Internal colonialism (Zureik, 1979). Particular focus will be made on how these different approaches understand and present the issue of inclusion and exclusion within their frameworks. In this chapter these formulas presented by academics mentioned will be discussed, but also other similar ideas presented by politicians and political groups who support each one of these options will also be alluded to in this chapter. When discussing these formulas, the analysis will be made about their impact on the research question of inclusion and exclusion of the settler- colonial projects.

Historically, this chapter will analyze the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the post-1967 period in sub-stages: The period from 1967 to 1977 when the occupation was perceived to be temporary and that it will vanish. Second was the period from 1977 to 1987 when the settler-colonial project intensively expanded. Third the period from the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987 to 1994 which looked to get the Palestinian right for self-determination closer. The fourth stage was from 1994 to 2000 when a period of "Imagined" postcolonialism combined with the occupation, neo-colonialism, Apartheid, and settler colonialism emerged, and later sustained from 2000 and after while the weight of the settler colonial aspect grown intensively among these five components as it will be shown.

The Chapter will also discuss the status of the Palestinian Authority as a Tutelary democracy. The chapter will consult the political process between Israel and the Palestinians after Oslo 1993 Declaration of Principles and the impact of these on the inclusion and the exclusion politics of Zionism. The chapter will end with a conclusion about Israel as a settler colonial state rather than any of the other types mentioned above.

Chapter three will also include a historical review of the settler-colonial project in Palestine, and how it started in Europe by the Protestant strands centuries before Zionism emerged. The chapter will consist of a brief overview of Zionism Messianic ideology and its inclusion and inclusion politics, how it emerged and developed its concepts and the international factors that supported it. Additional critical questions for this chapter will include the question about if Israel became a mother country to the settler-colonial project in the post-1967 Palestinian occupied territories, or this project is planned to and implemented mainly by it, the Israeli State. Another question is related to the issue if the Israeli settler-colonial project is taking place only in the post-1967 occupied territories, or it takes place also inside Israel proper as Jonathan Cook argued (Cook, 2015). Finally, there is the question about if the settler-colonial project in the post-1967 occupied territories is a continuation to the one that the Zionist movement started in the late 19th century, and therefore it represents just a new stage on the path of the completion of that project? These additional questions are also keys to assess the nature of the inclusion and the exclusion politics adopted, under what justifications and for what objectives.

In Chapter Three, a comparison between the Palestinian case and the other three models of United States, South Africa, and Ireland that started in chapter one will be continued in this chapter as well, mainly about their inclusion and exclusion approaches. As an outcome of this comparison, a tentative answer to this thesis question about if Palestine is a different case of inclusion and inclusion will be presented. The following chapter four will include case studies allocated to presenting additional empirical data for the verification of the study hypothesis.

The question of the mother state to the Zionist project in Palestine in the pre-1948 period will also be discussed in chapter three including a brief presentation of the Zionist movement contacts and negotiations with the major powers in the world as presented in documents and diaries of that time. Here the different

opinions of the mainstream academia in Israel who deny the settler colonial nature of the Zionist movement claiming that it is a "national liberation movement" that emerged without a mother state will be presented. The chapter will discuss the variety of opinions of those who claim that Israel had Britain as mother state (Hammad, 1984) or a mother state to a step-daughter or satellite movement (Pappe, 2008), or as it had "collective motherhood" (Rodinson 1973), or others descriptions that will be presented. This section will be linked with the research question by clarifying as well as the contribution of the mother states to the sustaining of the exclusion politics of the Zionist settler-colonial project.

All the sections of chapter two and three aims to study Zionism and Israel inclusion and exclusion politics in historical and comparative manners, and also about citizenship policies and democratic structures to preliminary verify this study question about the nature and the direction of the Zionist settler-colonial project inclusion and exclusion politics.

Chapter four will include an intensive analysis of case studies of exclusion and inclusion by the settler colonial project in Palestine after 1967. The cases of exclusion are East Jerusalem, Area C of West Bank, including the politics of exclusion towards the Palestinian Bedouins, and Hebron. Besides that, the Gaza Strip will be added as another case. These cases will be compared with the ongoing ones of the Naqab, The Triangle, and the Jalil inside Israel. The similarities and the contrasts between the settler colonial project policies and practices towards these different locations will be concluded. Following these cases, the process of inclusion and integration of West Bank and East Jerusalem as territories in Israel by settlement expansion, law use, and other tools, while excluding the Palestinian people by different means, will be analyzed.

The case studies will be divided as follows in this chapter, presenting a concrete answer to the research question about the nature of the Zionist settler-colonial

project as a demographic elimination project in terms of its inclusion and exclusion politics:

Demographic elimination One: Refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs) in area C, the Old City of Hebron and others in comparison with the IDPs cases inside Israel, and the stateless groups, identity cards losers and the returnees without naturalization.

Demographic elimination Two: The rights of residency without rights to land: This is the case of East Jerusalem, in comparison with the power of formal citizenship but without the right to the land as in the case of the Palestinians in Israel.

Demographic elimination Three: Is about the elimination of the original citizenship by giving the right of formal citizenship without the right to land: The post-1967 occupied territories individuals who got Israeli passports (in comparison also with the Palestinians inside Israel).

Demographic elimination Four: Dismantling the Israeli settlements from Gaza, Jenin, and Jericho: Exceptions of the settler-colonial project? Or Proof to its antithesis? Or it is a step to sustain the settler colonial project according to 'The strategic interests' thesis?

Chapter Four will also follow the four cases of demographic elimination and exclusion to present the alternative process of implantation and inclusion in follow up of the research question in this regard, referring to the settler-colonial project in the post 1967 occupied territories: Its Historical development, characteristics, modes of operation, both the violent and the non-violent ones, and perspectives. The chapter will also review the roles of the different Israeli actors in providing with the legal frameworks, economic support and finance, and other factors for the development of the settler- colonial project. These

include The Government, the political parties, the non-governmental organizations, the settler's organizations, the academic institutions, and think tanks, the Jewish Agency, the Jewish communities, and the Jewish organizations worldwide and the Jewish lobby groups in the USA and Europe. The types of violence used in this regard will also be explained to clarify all the aspects of the inclusion processes of the settler colonials versus those aspects of exclusion to the Palestinians as the research question proposes.

This chapter will also attempt to illustrate the violence embedded in the settler-colonial projects as an integral and structural part of them. This violence practiced in an asymmetry in two dimensions one of them that is connected to the demonizing of the native and making him/her as responsible for the violence that he/she receives as a 'response to violent acts that he/she conducts' as it is claimed. The second dimension is related to the settler-colonial violence itself, as used by the non-state and the state settler colonial projects actors as an integral structural part of the inclusion and the exclusion politics in all the mentioned stages of the project. In chapter four a return to this theme will also be made. In this regard, the Army violence, and the Settlers ones for dispossession and ethnic cleansing will be reviewed in stages since 1967 using in one hand the statistics made by the Israeli human rights organization of B'tselem, and others. In addition to that, the statistics of the United Nations Commission for Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinian People (OCHA) will be used. In the theoretical side Aime Cesaire (1950; 1972), Albert Memmi (1957/1965), Hanna Arendt (1973), Giorgio Agamben (2005), Johan Galtung (2015), and Franz Fanon (1952, 1963) writings will be the background of the analysis of this structural violence. Also, the impact of violence on the settler colonial theatre in different phases will be concluded, especially about the research question related to the contribution of the settler-colonial project on the exclusion process of the Palestinians.

Chapter five: will be a conclusion composed of two parts, one will be predictable about the decolonization process to transform the exclusive nature of the Israeli settler-colonial project, and will discuss the roles of the internal and the external factors in sustaining or restricting the Israeli settler-colonial project, and influencing its inclusion and exclusion politics in the post-1967 period. Here the study will discuss the Israeli internal dynamics and the Palestinian ones, and the dynamics between both of them, the peace process, the agreements and the means of their implementation, the conflict in the ground, the wars on Gaza and all the other dynamics. Next, to that, the chapter will discuss the Arab and Islamic dynamics, followed by the EU and the BRICS countries policies, and the United States ones.

In the second part, this concluding chapter summarizes its findings and presents some future perspectives. The study hypothesis will be fully verified, and all the alternative formulas for the inclusion of both the indigenous and the settlers will be presented. Further than that the two states solution and its related various proposals, the one-state solution and all its faces, the federal and the confederal solutions, the trilateral solution together with Jordan, the Middle East Union and the Mediterranean solutions and others. Comparisons between these formulas will be made, to be followed by an assessment of what works and what not. Lessons from the different international settler colonial models will be presented, and finally, the scenario of further exclusion through another collective dispossession and the ethnic cleansing process will be assessed. Some predictions will be made determining if the exclusion or the inclusion models will take over, or probably a third option of muddling through.

In Conclusion of this outline, the Journey to verify the research question about 'who is eligible to exist: the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine' went through the five chapters as follows:

In the beginning, it was necessary to provide the reader with an introduction of the four settler colonial projects compared and find out their similarities and

contrasts between them (chapter one). This chapter was followed by studying the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine in comparison with the other approaches and comparison with three settler colonial projects (chapters two and three). In chapter two and three also comparisons between the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine were discussed historically between different historical stages of that project, and by also clarifying the roles of the peace process and the kind of democracy structures of that project that contributed to the exclusion process of the indigenous population. The parts of the mother countries that supported the Zionist settler-colonial project since the 19th century and before it started were clarified including the settler colonial projects created in Palestine by those countries before Zionism excluding the indigenous population. The role of the United States as a mother Country since the 1930s till today was also presented with its impacts of exclusion of the indigenous people. Chapter four came on after to give the facts of inclusion and exclusion of the settler-colonial project in Palestine in different places and locations. Also, the chapter presented the processes of implantation and inclusion of the settler colonials and the Palestinian lands in the Israeli State. Finally, the conclusion summarized the results about inclusion and exclusion and discussed the possibilities of transforming these politics through a process of decolonization.

The following chapter one will discuss the settler colonialism paradigm, and the four cases of it of United States, Ireland, South Africa, and Palestine. The next chapters two and three will delve on the research question of the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine in comparison with these in the other three mentioned are settler- colonial projects and contrast with the different approaches. Chapter four will follow by presenting the settler-colonial practices in the ground in Palestine through case studies, to be followed by the study conclusion chapter. The analysis in all the chapters will include the roles of the structures, actors, and conceptual frameworks regarding the inclusion and the exclusion politics.

CHAPTER I

SETTLER COLONIALISM EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION POLITICS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

This Thesis focus is on the inclusion and the exclusion politics of the settler-colonial projects. The question is: How these politics can be perceived? How might a typology that one might try to develop for studying them specifically in settler- colonial context look like?

In an attempt to answer this question, this chapter includes four sections besides this introduction. Section one will present the concepts of the settler colonial framework of analysis briefly in comparison with other conceptual frameworks mainly with the other relevant frameworks of internal colonialism (and its twin concept of Herrenvolk Democracy), Postcolonialism, Neo-colonialism, Ethnocracy, and Coloniality. Besides that, the section will compare the mentioned framework with other partially contrasting ones like 'contested settlement' and population resettlement in international conflicts.' The part will end by alluding to the debate about settler colonialism between its proponents and its adversaries.

Section two will be an overview the roots of the inclusion and exclusion politics as presented by philosophy, and the theories of Liberalism, Realism and Marxism. The part will also analyze how the settler colonial project practices the inclusion and the exclusion politics, ending with a proposed typology about inclusion and exclusion.

The third section will present the different models of settler- colonial projects and their inclusion and exclusion politics.

Finally the results of the previous three sections will be concluded regarding inclusion and inclusion modalities in the settler- colonial projects, and will present ideas for the development of a theory about the settler states.

1.1 Settler Colonialism Conceptual Framework and the Other Alternative Concepts

Settler colonialism is a framework of analysis to a phenomenon that is different from colonialism. Colonialism is "exogenous" (Veracini,2010, 2011; 2013), based on rules from the outside metropole by using military power to get the added value out of the exploitation of the indigenous population. In the other hand settler- colonialism is conquest by people who come to settle on the expense of the indigenous population. The aim as such is to replace the indigenous, logic of elimination, and not use their labor force to produce an added value (Wolfe, 2006). The result will be"societies in which Europeans have settled, where their descendants have remained politically dominant, and where a heterogeneous society have developed in class, ethnic and racial terms" (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 3).

The focus of this new definition is on the nature of the modern society of settlers, but later on, Wolfe and Veracini added the other component to the meaning which is about the way that the settler dealt with the indigenous population by the logic of elimination. In this regard, Veracini stressed that the settler- colonial projects due to their inability to create a population majority by immigration, have no other choice than the"absolute need to develop refugees (Veracini, 2010, 35).

Wolfe in other hand mentioned different tools of elimination of the indigenous population including genocides, removal, allotment, and changing the blood

quantum through marriage and sexual relations between the indigenous and the settler populations (Wolfe, 2011) as such Wolfe considers settler colonialism to be as "a structure not an event" (Wolfe, 2006). This statement includes two components; one of them is that "The opposition between native and the settler is structural relationship rather than an effect of the will" (Wolfe, 2013, 263). As a result, the settler- colonial project represents a process that is continuous and not merely a past event that starts and ends at once. In this regard, the settler position is an inherited one, therefore, and as a result of historical conditions, Patrick Wolfe considers himself to be settler where he lived in Australia; Something that his awareness will not change it (Wolfe, 263).

Earlier than all these definitions Fayez Sayegh defined Zionism as a settler colonial project in a book that he published in 1965. Later on, Maxime Rodinson identified settler- colonial project as being "a collection of persons who leave their country to go populate another" (Rodinson, 1973, 92). In the same page, he defined colony that does not include conquering and settling to be as a "territory occupied and administered by a nation outside of its boundaries and remaining linked to the mother country by very close ties" (Rodinson, 92).

These definitions bring us back *to more elaboration about* colonialism and settler colonialism; the first is not interested in creating a demographic change in the colony, while settler- colonial projects do. Colonialism rule from outside while the settler- colonial project rules from inside, finally there is a binary relation between the colonial and the colonized in the colonial project, while in the settler colonial project the relationship is trilateral that include the metropole, usually being as the mother country of the settler project; the settler project and the indigenous population (Veracini, 2010, 5-6). Here the mother country component of Rodinson definition to the colony should be moved and added to his definition of the settlers-based colonialism. Elkins and Pederson add a fourth component for the twentieth-century settler colonial projects, which is "a local

administration charged with maintaining order and authority" (Elkins and Pederson, 2005, 4).

In another resource, Veracini went further discussing the relationship between colonialism and settler colonialism as a dialectical relationship that includes points of convergence, and other of divergence. The rapprochement comes from two facts, the first in need of the settler-colonial project to the mother colonial state support militarily, economically, and by allowing an additional number of settlers to arrive. In another hand the settler- colonial project might use for a transitional period the colonial formula of 'work for us', but later on the same project will seek the departure of the original population, therefore this complete project formula is "work for us till you leave" (Veracini, 2011, 3).

Fieldhouse tried earlier in 1966 to differentiate between four types of colonies: The first is the mixed colonies to be implemented when the colonial settlers use the labor force of the indigenous population. The second is the plantation colony for which labor force will be brought to the colonial settlement from outside. The third is the pure settlement which does not depend on any 'alien' labor force besides one of the colonial settlers, and the fourth and the final is the occupation colony which do not bring any settlers to the occupied country, the last is colonial while all the other three are settler- colonial models(Veracini, 2010, 6; Piterberg, 2009,48). Wolfe and Veracini developed the concept of settler colonialism on the basis of the dominant third model, the pure colony, being also the ultimate goal of the settler-colonial project that aims due to its 'logic of elimination' to create a state that is pure as much as possible from the presence of the indigenous population (Wolfe, 2006;Veracini 2010).

Settler colonialism is about a settler who colonizes another country than his/her original country; therefore the settler is not an immigrant but a conqueror (Mamdani, 1998). The immigrant goes to another country and abides with its rules and regulations, while the settler seeks to make the other country as

his/her's. In other words, "there is a significant analytical distinction between immigrants 'effectively-permitted' into a non-disputed territory and settlers introduced" (Haklai and Loizides, 2015, 2). The same authors define "settlement" as a product of the settlers acts as a "political action involving the organized movement of a population belonging to one national group into a territory in order to create a permanent presence and influence patterns of sovereignty in the settled territory" (Haklai and Loizides, 3).

Later on, these definitions will be tested regarding the cases that will be discussed in this thesis, some of the questions that these definitions raise include: Are all the settlers represent 'national groups'? Or there are other categories in this regard? Do settlers go to settle in 'disputed territories'? And what about the immigrants who join the settler state after its establishment. Are they also settlers or just immigrants? Finally, what about the next generations of settlers starting from the second generation after the establishment of the settler state, are they also settlers or they can be considered as natives in the 'new' country?

So far, the literature presented different answers to this set of questions. In one hand Veracini considers that the settler- colonial project seeks to erase itself by creating a postcolonial state where the settler becomes a native (Veracini, 2010, 2). In his most recent article, he repeated this conclusion by calling to "Kill the settler in him and save the man" (Veracini, 2017). In the other hand, Patrick Wolfe looks to be advised that the settler colonial project continue its modes of action after the establishment of the settler state as he was quoted above. For Wolfe, the settler colonial project leaves a print that cannot be subject to elimination among the indigenous population (Wolfe, 2012, 228) also it creates problems of integration in the emerging settler states (Wolfe, 263). Further than that Wolfe still see Israel as a settler colonial project that also might be preparing for new genocides against the Palestinians due to the cancelation of its dependence on the Palestinian labor force as an indicator (Wolfe, 244), while

Veracini analyzed it as a state that moved from its pre-1948 settler colonial project to an occupation project after 1967 (Veracini, 2013).

This thesis will get back to this discussion about the case of Israel in chapter three. Elkins and Pederson presented as well political, legal and cultural issues that make it difficult to conclude that the settlers get indigenized after they establish their new state as Veracini claimed. The points mentioned by these two scholars include the issues of identity, the structure of the political system, culture, citizenship modalities, the type of democracy practiced, the structure of the civil society, and the legal system (Elkins and Pederson, 2005, 12-17).

For this thesis, the settler colonial project can get indigenized if it will also be able to gain legitimacy and recognition from the indigenous population. This legitimacy to be achieved after its success to redeem the issues of the past and to create a standard formula for inclusion that bridges between the ethnic and the individual's rights as it will be clarified in section two of this chapter. The Egyptian scholar Majdi Hammad in his comparative Ph.D. thesis that he published in a book in 1984 confirmed this conclusion by stating that the settler colonial state can get its legitimacy only after it gets both the international and the indigenous population recognitions as it is the case of United States for example (Hammad, 1984).

Any settler colonial project cannot emerge without a set of national/ identity, religious, historical, cultural, legal claims, myths, and justifications. To add to that intentions and claims regarding the common destiny as Otto Bauer suggested (Stasulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 19).

On nationalism and identity, the "We" discourse is used against "them." As it is shown in the next section, this formula in the specific case of settler colonialism will be stretched to the end, and therefore all acts against "them" become eligible. This 'stretch' takes place as a result of three bases dominating the

settler colonial discourse/and about it according to Gabriel Piterberg. These three characteristics are "the claim of the uniqueness of each settler nation, the uniqueness of the intentions and the consciousness of the settlers as master citizens, and the presence of indigenous population" (Piterberg, 2009, 80). In another place, he adds another basis about "the creation of an alternative civilization" (Piterberg, 84).

Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis added that the settler colonialist presents themselves as the "originals," as the founding nation on the earth, while the other nations will be considered as aliens or gentiles. As a result, settler colonials will use their European nation superiority and impose this nation worldwide, depriving at the same time the indigenous population nations from having their national independence and national citizenship, and through the way from using their language and symbols, or to celebrate their national events in the public sphere (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 20-25).

Concerning the religious claims, settler colonials present themselves as holders of a mission that is ordained by good. Usually, the sacred mission will be combined with the vision about themselves as a civilized super nation (or part of the nation), who will carry the "white man burden" (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 22), to bring the primitive people from the pre-history of barbarism to the history of civilization. Or to destroy these people and take their lands to develop it according to God will. Shlomo Sand presented in details this combination of religious and national claims in his study about the "Invention of the Jewish People" (Sand, 2010). By making this combination, settler-colonial projects succeeded in some cases to change the narratives of the conflict with the indigenous population from being a conflict about land, to become a conflict between identities that each has equally the right to claim for being the land that belongs to their nation.

The historical claims are well connected to the national and religious ones, in some cases of settler colonialism, the settlers will claim that they are coming back after thousands of years to the historical land where their ancestors lived (the Zionist- Israeli case for instance: Sand, 2010). Or they will claim that the indigenous population was living in a pre-history period till their country was discovered, and where history starts with that discovery (the case of the two Americas with the 1492 Columbus discovery of North America and other discoveries (Wolfe, 2013, 257).

Now to the cultural claims that are represented in a binary of the civilized and non-civilized, the developed and the non-developed, and connected to the calls for modernization, modernity, and rationality, the individual freedom and later on with democratization. The settler colonials sought accordingly to spread these concepts and practices all over the world by subordinating some countries to colonial rule, and by trying to create new copies of Europe in other places as happened in the two Americas, Australia, and New Zealand. In addition to that settler- colonial project usually dominates over the culture of the indigenous population and its symbols, and then follows that by restricting multiculturalism to the diversity of culture that exists among the settlers, while preventing the free representation of the indigenous population culture (Stasiulis, and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 23, 26).

Legal claim came in the fore as well, first by claiming that the settled countries were empty lands (Pappe, 2007; Shohat and Stam, 2012), or claiming that they were state land without owners (Fields, 2016), or just an open land that is not divided to pieces of private and state ownership, as it was the case in the United States. Garry Fields in his book "Enclosure" described in details how these enclosures took place in Britain, United States, and Palestine by using new invented property laws, in addition to using cartographic and architectural tools in order to achieve the goals of the "modernizers with territorial ambitions" (Fields, 2016, 5).

Finally: the intentions, and the common destiny, as two additional components. These two are not a direct part of the claims, but they are embedded on them. Regarding the intentions, usually, the settler colonials do not declare all their plans, but keep some to be announced in later stages when time becomes ripe for them, these are such as the intentions to expel and transfer the indigenous population or commit genocides against them (Al-Masiri, 1993). Besides that, some intentions might be declared openly, but others "express themselves as natural results of the process of the settler-colonial project" (Piterberg, 2009, 80-81).

The common destiny component comes in as another tool used to ensure the cohesion of the settler-colonial project becoming by this united not only around one objective of creating and sustaining the settler colonial project based on historical, national and religious claims from the past. The Common destiny is also united around defending the future destiny, by keeping the survival of the settler-colonial project and strengthening it to be able to confront any external challenges. The common destiny also plays the role to sustain even the settler-colonial project resilience towards the indigenous population resistance.

Through the way of developing the settler colonial framework of analysis as a different framework than colonialism, the concept took several shapes, Veracini followed the concept development since Marx and Engels wrote in 1848 that capitalism "must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere" (Veracini, 2010, 1). He refers later to the French sociologist George Balandier (1920-2016), who was a specialist about Sub-Sahara of Africa, and who wrote about settler -colonial projects in 1951 as being related to the dominance of a foreign minority over the majority of the indigenous population. Others followed in the development of this framework of analysis as presented above.

In 1979 Elia Zureik used the term "internal colonialism" to describe the Israeli policies towards its Palestinian citizens inside its 1948 borders (Zureik, 1979). What Zureik presented here is another approach to the one that Veracini advocated about the transformation of the settler colonial state to a postcolonial entity after its establishment of its state. Veracini presented three conditions for what he called as the success of the settler- colonial project. These three conditions are related to getting itself free from the metropole country control, its termination of the indigenous population autonomous, and the ability to take over and "tame" the landscape. With these conditions fulfilled the settler colonial project will become a one "that has successfully run its course" and it will become "no longer settler colonial" (Veracini, 2013, 28), but it will become a postcolonial entity as its settler became indigenized (Veracini, 2).

Zureik on the contrary advocates the idea that the settler- colonial project will be transformed into a one that practice internal occupation against the indigenous population rather than eliminating itself as a settler colonial and become postcolonial. For Zureik and the other proponents of the internal colonialism framework (see below), there is what is shared between both settler colonialism and internal colonialism, but also there are differences between them. Both are discriminating against, controlling and excluding the indigenous population racially, ethnically, and from civil and political rights. But the first, the settler colonial, practice these aspects against a majority of the indigenous in all cases during the period of its progress, while the second (the internal colonial) practice them in most cases against a minority of the indigenous who continued to exist after the "success" of the settler -colonial project.

Despite the use of the term once for the first time by South African Scholar and activist Leopold Marquard in January 1957 to describe the policies of the South African Apartheid system against the majority of the black there (Marquard, 1957). The concept of internal colonialism theoretical development took two shapes after. One of these shapes was conducted by the Latin America and

South American scholars who used it to expose the uneven growth in their countries and the deep factors that make it continues by the creation of local elites who internally colonize their countries for the achievement of their interests and also those interests that they have with the Center (Casanova, 1965). Another use was proposed by the American scholar Robert Blauner and the Chicano and Chicana scholars (referring to Mexicans in the United States, and the second applying to the feminist side of them) such as Rodolfo Acuna and others.

Contrary to colonialism practiced against majorities, Robert Blauner developed the theory of internal colonialism as a concept and practices against minorities living in the dominating state. His focus was on the United States and the types of the internal colonial procedures it was practicing against the African Americans (Blauner, 1972). Following Blauner approach other scholar questioned if colonialism is just an event of the past, and if the United States became already a postcolonial state, or it is still practicing an internal colonial method (Pinderburghes, 2011).

The Chicano studies scholar Rodolfo Acuna presented in 1972 six aspects of internal colonial politics that were used in the United States by the Anglo-Americans against the other Americans such as the Chicano. These six aspects are: The invasion of the land by other people who dominated after the attack, the indigenous people became subjects to the new dominating power involuntarily, besides that they became subject to alien culture and alien government imposed on them, and subject to racial discrimination and cultural genocide, and therefore rendered powerless politically and economically. Finally, the Conquerors feel that they have a mission to fulfill by conquering and getting privileges that they think that they deserve as a reward (Acuna, 2007).

So far, there are two versions presented about the fate to settler- colonial project mainly if that project succeeded to establish its state. Veracini claims that this project eliminates itself at this stage, and a postcolonial state emerges, while

other studies claim that it moves instead to "internal colonization." Influenced by Veracini, the Settler Colonial Studies Journal will claim that "There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends." What happens to these cases that Veracini called as Successful? Are they post-settler (postcolonial), or internal colonialism entities (Or Herrenvolk Democracies), or maybe ethnocracies as claimed by a third option (Yiftachel, 2006 (English) and 2012a the Arabic version).

The internal colonialism criticism to postcolonialism was presented partially above, to be added to that the objection made to it by Patrick Wolfe and Ella Shohat. Wolfe criticized the concept as showing colonialism as it ends for the sake of free founders who get localized after the establishment of the settler state (put it differently: when the settlers get indigenized according to Veracini), while ignoring the fate of the indigenous population who become as a small minority in the colonial project (Wolfe, 2012, 86). Ella Shohat went further criticizing postcolonialism as it includes the danger of superseding the study of the present colonial structures and the past pre-colonial ones. Accordingly, it is ahistorical, makes an elision to class and political economy analysis, and has an ambiguous relationship with the indigenous population (Shohat and Stam, 2003).

Beyond these criticisms, postcolonialism might still to be valid for those studies that focus on finding out the remaining and continuous impacts and process of colonialism in the new emerging countries after getting their independence. The branches of postcolonialism such as the subaltern studies and those that focus on the dominance of the western culture might be relevant including to Palestine. Here an "imagined" postcolonial entity was established through the Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian side and postcolonial cultural tools of domination were used to control it combined with other means of neo-colonialism for economic dominance, and these together were used to mask the

continuation of the settler-colonial project in the ground(see more detailed analysis in the upcoming chapters).

Regarding Neo-Colonialism, it was a concept that was coined first by the African leader Kwame Nkrumah in 1965 in his publication titled as "Neo-Colonialism, the last Stage of Imperialism." In this publication, Nkrumah signaled to the return of colonialism as the ruling of the formerly colonized countries from outside, but this time by economic and monetary means, and by encompassing the former colony by troops in its borders as he mentioned in the introduction of his publication (Nkrumah, 1965). In a revision of Lenin theory about "imperialism as the last stage of capitalism," Nkrumah suggested. Neo-colonialism be the last stage of Imperialism (Nkrumah, 1965).

For Lenin, imperialism had five characteristics: The concentration of capital and the dominance of monopolies, the merger between the industrial and the financial capitals and the emergence of the oligarchy, the export of capital further than the export of goods, the formation of international capitalist unions of monopolies, and finally finishing the distribution of the world between the biggest capitalist countries (Lenin, 1967 edition). Nkrumah who was a Marxist added colonialism to the analysis; he was also a national leader who led Ghana for the independence from colonization. Nkrumah modified Lenin formula to become a combination of national, for the full liberation of the Third World, and economic, by presenting the economic independence as one of the requirements for the completion of independence.

These additions by Nkrumah are also of significance to Palestine were this thesis analysis will include also examining the Neo-colonial tools of control used by the settler- colonial project there, and also exploring the Neo-colonial methods used by the international donors and how much these assists sustain the settler-colonial project.

Besides the former formulas, the ethnocracy one, presented a state system that is characterized by citizenship along ethnic lines, unclear borders and frontiers of the state, government monopoly by a 'distinguished' ethnic class, ethnic separation in both the political and the social systems, partial civil and political rights to the individuals of the ethnic minority, and final the disrupted concept of the *Demos* that do not consist of equal citizens (Yiftachel, 2012 a, 25-26). Such a system is a result of three political and historical generators which are: The formation of a settler-colonial society, the mobilization power of the ethnic nationalism, and the ethnic logic of the capital (Yiftachel, 20). According to this formula the settler- colonial society is already formed (but further transformed to another shape that is called as "ethnocracy," that continued the geographical expansion, but this time due to ethnic drivers rather than settler-colonial ones, till Oslo 1993. The latter led as Yiftachel maintained to an end of the expansionist aspect of Zionism and its Great Israel project, which was replaced by an Apartheid system of separation (Yiftachel, 2012a; 2012b). Accordingly, it is not possible to think of ethnocracy within the terms of internal colonialism, or within the *Herrenvolk Democracy* that combines between democracy to the settlers and a settler- colonial system towards the indigenous population (Van Den Berghe, 1967; 1983; 2002).

This brief review of colonialism, settler colonialism, internal colonialism, and *Herrenvolk Democracy* looks to be close to the concept of internal colonialism, Neo-Colonialism, and ethnocracy. It showed that there is a proper diagnosis in the academia about the settler colonial project while in progress. At the same time, there is no agreed-upon prognosis to the nature of the emerging settler colonial states. The previous explanations mean that there is an absence of a coherent scientific theory about the status, the structure and the agency of these settler states.

This study will adopt the point of departure supported by empirical data that the settler colonial projects that succeed to build states will continue their settler-

colonial demarche by bringing more settlers from outside, now on the name of immigrants. They will also continue creating new colonial settlements on the expense of the indigenous population who will continue to practice internal colonialism by different means as well and at the top of them separating between them and their rights to their lands. In brief, the position that settler colonialism is a valid formula for analysis when the settler- colonial project is in progress, while it will not be so after the establishment of the settler state needs reconsideration. That is because it at the end grants legitimacy and justify the settler colonial project before it getting of its legitimacy from the indigenous population with all the conditions needed to reach that point of legitimacy (see section 2 below).

Beyond these significant formulas for the analysis of the 'successful' settler colonial projects and their structure after the 'success,' other complimentary concepts are in need to allude to. One of these is the concept of coloniality that does not accept that a postcolonial stage comes after the colonial, but instead it seems that there is one Western global process of which "Europe becomes the locus of epistemic enunciation, and the rest of the world become object to be described and studied from the European, and later on the United States, perspective" (Mignolo, 2007). As such coloniality is a concept that studies Western concepts such as modernity, modernization, democracy, and emancipation, and the way they are presented as preconditions to "happiness", while they are in fact reproduce coloniality, not as coloniality economic and political power, but also the coloniality of knowledge were the minds, and the imaginations will be too occupied (Mignolo, 2007, 446-451; Quijano, 2000; 2007).

In comparison with postcolonialism, this concept of coloniality is influenced by Fanon, Cesaire, and others who analyzed the modes of the continuation of the colonial including through the occupation of the knowledge, while postcolonialism gets its inspiration from Michel Foucault poststructuralism

(2010), Edward Said *Orientalism*, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak *Subaltern studies* (Mignolo, 2007, 542).

While postcolonialism includes the danger of considering the colonial as finished, and that it is time to deal with the challenges of its "post," coloniality advice that the struggle against colonialism should continue. Here the concept of de-coloniality is presented to mean the liberation not only from the political and the economic constraints of the colonial but also the liberation from its epistemologies and concepts such as the western driven concept of "emancipation" that need to be replaced by the concept of "liberation" (Mignolo, 457). Although this concept of coloniality is about all types of colonialism without specifying, it is still looking like having significance to this study as a guiding concept to help 'unmasking' the epistemologies used to launch and sustain the settler colonial projects domination.

Beyond this conceptual review of the settler colonialism and the related concepts, it might be useful to end this section by mentioning the criticism raised to the settler colonial framework of analysis, and the theories that avoided using the concept of settler colonialism. These theories suggested other ideas such as "contested settlement" presented by Haklai, and Loizides (Haklai, and Loizides, 2015), and the concept of "Population resettlement in international conflicts" presented by Arie M. Kacowicz and Pawel Lutomski (Kacowicz and Lutomski, 2007).

Settler colonialism framework was criticized for being a "rigid interpretation model," and as a "so flexible one" to the extent that it can include together different facts about the progress of the settler colonial projects (Rowse, 2014). Finally, this framework can be a "dangerous undertaking" due to its creation of equity between settler colonialism and the "elimination of the native" (Rowse, 2014). Rowse also added that the claim that the aborigines are homogenous as subjects to elimination is not right, and he presents Australia as an example,

where there is a lively diverse vision between the aborigines reading their past and future (Rowse, 2014).

In response to these criticisms, Veracini stressed by referring to Patrick Wolfe that "elimination of the natives" is the logic of the settler- colonial projects, but this does not mean a deterministic result of them. Therefore, flexibility in the analysis of the different settler colonial projects can be seen, and also the rigidity can be avoided (Veracini, 2014). In another piece, Veracini stressed the need for the development of interpretation tools for erasing Colonization and the ways to do that concerning the settler colonial projects (Veracini, 2011). In his 2011 piece, Veracini was referring to one of the weaknesses of the settler colonial framework related to its focus on the elimination procedures handled by the settler- colonial projects, without accompanying that with a proper analysis to the indigenous population resistance and its effectiveness. He also criticized attending it with a study of the roles of the internal factors, inside the settler colonial project itself, and the regional and the international elements in influencing fully or partially the *modus operandi* of the settler colonial projects, a component that this thesis will analyze.

Finally, it might be worthy to mention that one of the proponents of the settler colonial framework tried to bypass this weakness of it by claiming that the settler colonial project plays the role of "enduring the natives" by enduring making them stressing on their rights and practices to "exist, resist, and persist" (Kauanui, 2016). He presents this kind of approach as an alternative to the elimination approach of Wolfe. He also calls for bridging between the settler- colonial studies and the indigenous studies since the latter cannot and shouldn't replace the former (Kauanui, 2016). This thesis will also learn from this insight.

Regarding the concept of contested settlement, it can be foreseen that its proponents assume that settlement is going over contested territory that is subject to opposing claims between different groups. The editors claim in their

introductory chapter that settlements over a contested territory are not "unique to the Israeli Palestinian conflict" (Haklai, and Loizides, 2015,1). Accordingly, the book includes the cases of Israel- Palestine, Western Sahara, East Timor, Kirkuk, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and Libya.

The editors consider the positions and the narratives of the settlers and their sympathizers in equal terms with the positions of the early residing people in the territory and also go to some legal issues to prove that a particular territory becomes contested because it has no prior owner (Haklai and Loizides, 2015, 13). By this logic, Haklai and Loizides free themselves from delving to the crux of the issues that are related to the rights of the indigenous population, also the exempt themselves from testing the claims of the settlers empirically to find out their validity.

As such the authors bypass clear cut concepts, for example as the 'elimination of the natives', and 'ethnic cleansing. The latter was defined by a researcher who made a thorough study about the history of ethnic cleansing as the 'expulsion of an undesirable' population from a given territory, due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic, or ideological considerations, or a combination of those" (Bell-Fialkoff, 1993). The literature also differentiates between ethnic cleansing and forced migration by the fact that people conduct the first against other people, while the second includes all those obligatory migrations that take place due to natural reasons or reasons related to what people do against other people. Therefore, forced migration is general and broad, while ethnic cleansing is a particular concept. Oxford Refugee Studies Center releases a special periodical review about forced migration.

If the settlement is going over contested territory, then a correction of its results might be the solution through a resettlement process. This is what the edited book about "population resettlement in international conflicts" (Haklai and Loizides, 2015) is calling for.

First the authors see the resettlement as a result of international conflict, which means that both sides have claims that should be taken into consideration, also they know what they call as the 'resettlement of population' as a step to be done while none of the sides to be blamed for committing what led to the plight of refuge. In the introduction the editors present that the aim of the book is to study the "legitimacy of resettlement politically and legally" (Haklai, and Loizides, 2015, XIX), and that is as an expression to the convention that there is a lack of enough studies about resettlement and its applications to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In this regard, they question if there is a real difference between allowing the refugees to return, and resettling the refugees outside their country of origin (Haklai, and Loizides, 2015, XIX). This study will get back in the next section, to this kind of approach which looks to be about trying to find technical solutions to the refugees' issue, while forgetting the deeper ramifications regarding human rights and the nature of the emerging settler state on the expense of the refugees of the 'other' people. And if this state will seek to find an inclusion formula of reconciliation with them or it will continue its attempts to get rid of them. This point opens the way to section two of this chapter below.

1.2 I and Thou: Theorizing the Roots and the Manifestations of Inclusion and Exclusion

Back to philosophy, I and thou are the antithesis to me and him or her (Martin Buber, 2010). In the first case one deal with the other based on the relationship that connects both; in the second one deal with the other as a subject to ignorance, hatred, exploitation, and killing. In the first case, one will seek to know the other, engage with him/her in joint ventures, and developing new favorable products for humanity. In the second case, I against him/her will be prevailing. Stretching this formula to the ethnic and national levels will become we versus them which is practiced by living peacefully together in some cases, while practicing violence "in the name of identity" (Maalouf, 1999) as it is the case in many Arab world conflicts for instance.

Further on, these two approaches on how to relate to the other, both recognize the differences in language, history, culture, social and economic background, racial and ethnic and national affiliations, color, religion, sex, age and all the other differences that create diversity between the human beings. But the first approach is characterized by both looking to build on the commons that also exist between the people such as their common concern to preserve life, and their shared values in one hand. In the other hand, this approach will seek to find and continuously improving the ways for dealing peacefully with the differences through the development of mechanisms for the respect and the management of diversity, including mechanisms for conflict resolution. In peer relations, the development of this two-dimensional approach looks obvious, but is it so in the societal and economic ties, or the political arena?

How can we transfer "me and thou" relationship from the human relations arena to the citizenship arena characterized by reciprocal civic, political and social rights between the citizens and the state (Marshall, 1950; Isin and Turner, 2007). How can we transfer it as well to the arena of the relations between races, ethnicities, defined as groups that are still part of the state while having their unique different language, history and culture than the other groups/ ethnicities within the same state (Erikson, 1993, 6) and nationalities (as peoples who have their special language, history? Culture, and territory and in comparison, with ethnicities have their nation states or seek to create it (Erikson, 6). Identity discourse of "we" versus "them" usually follows in the relations between different ethnicities and different nationalities (Erikson, 6; Anderson, 1983 for instance). In this regard, Michael Mann suggested in his seminal book "The dark side of Democracy" differentiating between demos-based and ethnos-based democracies. The first is about the inclusion of all groups of the population, and the second is about the dominance of one ethnicity over the others. Settlers Democracy as he called it has its roots in the ethnos-based democracies (Mann, 2005).

In the Stanford Encyclopedia, one can find an overview study prepared by Dominique Leydet. This Study mentions four concepts of the Citizenship: The Universalist, Marshal as above, the differentialist, according to race, ethnicity, class, culture, or gender, the liberal nationalist, and the liberal internationalist, both support diversity either in the framework of the nation-state or globally (Leydet, 2017). These concepts express more in-depth ongoing discussion about Sovereignty, and if this concept refers to the sovereignty of the people, or the nation, or the state, or sovereignty over a territory. These discussions also express the contested relation that exists between the four concepts of nation, state, people, and nationalism (Isin, 2012, 29-32).

Back to theories, in general, the liberal, the realist, and the Marxist literature about democracy dealt with these kinds of questions; in the liberal side democracy is perceived along equal citizenship individual and collective rights mainly in the civic and the political arenas (See for instance Zeedani, 1990a, 1990b, 1993a, 1993b, 1993c, and 1994). In another hand, there is an egalitarian concept of liberalism that expresses itself in the policies of the welfare states, the Scandinavian countries, by empowering the state to take measures for alleviating poverty and the differences between the social classes. Also, there are liberal egalitarian writings such as the book on economic democracy for instance by Robert Dahl (Dahl, 1986; 1989) that presented a formula for corporate management of the economic firms between the managers and the workers.

Besides that, Liberalism with its international and institutional versions advocate for an ongoing process for the emergence of inclusive global citizenship through all kinds of institutional cooperation, interconnectedness, and interdependency (Koehane and Nye, 1977). According to this approach “Democratic Peace” emerges as a situation where the democratic countries do not go to war against each other, the theory of democratic peace. Realism questioned this theory

showing the aggressiveness of the 'Democratic States', especially towards the undemocratic ones for the sake of their interests and without any respect of the international legitimacy. Also, Realism maintained that democracy would not prevent democratic countries from fighting each other as well when their interests clash with each other (Waltz, 1992).

The realist approach does not share liberalism "optimism" regarding the prevalence of citizenship and its values inside the state, and that the national and ethnic differences will disappear. For Morgenthau, the high state interests (the military and the political) are the engines behind the state behavior, not values, where he denies the presence of universal values (Morgenthau in Burchill et al., 1996, 73-79). Accordingly, democracy is part of the "low politics" that are marginal, while interests are defined as representing the "national interests" that the state carries and defend on the name of its people. Besides that, structural realism does not see a possibility for the states to move towards cooperation globally, and that is due to their conflicting interests, and the uncertainty that each state has regarding the other states plans against its security. Accordingly, the competition was the case and will continue to be the case within the framework of the global anarchy. Kenneth Waltz as said went even further to suggest that the increase of the number of democratic states worldwide will not bring the world to more peace and more inclusive global citizenship (Waltz, 1959; 1992).

In another hand, the Marxists called for "Socialist democracy" that gives priority to equality on the economic rights across nations. As such Marxism recognizes the class struggle, and advocate that the classes unite globally, the bourgeoisie unites in the era of imperialism "after it finishes the division of the world between its countries and their monopolies" (Lenin, 1967, 116). In another hand, the proletariat finds a reason to unite globally to end the bourgeoisie exploitation (Marx, the Communist Manifesto).

Accordingly, Marxism looks to nations and ethnicities as transitions in history, prevailing during the period of capitalism where the bourgeoisie tries to convince the proletariat to support it to achieve its 'selfish' interests on the expense of the proletariat. For Marxism, this structure needs to be turned down by creating the brotherhood between the proletariat all over the world.

Following this brief overview, one might call liberalism as the theory for equal citizenship state and global citizenship, realism as the theory that calls for the nation-state that achieves equality between the dominating ethnic groups' members and not necessarily between all its citizens. Finally, Marxism can be perceived as a transnational theory that calls for the transcendence of nations in the path of the creation of a world for equals after toppling down the bourgeoisie. An additional reference to this conclusion will be made later in the following paragraphs of this section. Till then, it can be added that settler colonialism of imposing one nation or segment of one nation, on the expense of the elimination of other people looks to be as an extension of Realism. Here the national interests are stretched to the transnational arena and acts as exclusively representative to one people against another globally.

The literature about democracy is also concerned about finding the "best" formula for democratic inclusion. Schmidt in 2005 presented one of the models for that in the framework of liberal democracy suggested five components/ benchmarks for this inclusion; these are: "1) Full access to participation. 2) Representation in the important decision-making processes and institutions. 3) Influence in power over government decisions. 4) Adoption of public policies that address group concerns and interests. 5) Socio-economic parity" (Schmidt in Wolbrecht and Hiro, 2005, 4). The concern here is not about analyzing these benchmarks entirely in light of all the three briefly reviewed theories above, but it is about their relevance to the inclusion and exclusion politics in a settler colonial context as it analyzed below.

One of the questions is: What if the "democratic" system is a kind of one that came out after the implementation of a settler project in the expense of indigenous population as it is the case of United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Israel? Will the model of Schmidt perform in this case? Wolbrecht and Hiro edited book papers examined the case of the United States in this regard and its confusion between the freedom and race lines. The authors of the book chapters analyzed the problems consisted of each of the mentioned five components/ Benchmarks as they call them due to the mentioned confusion (Wolbrecht and Hiro, 2005). Aside to the United States example, this study will analyze the Israeli model in length in the upcoming chapters.

The current ongoing problems in countries that were established through conquest and settling bring us back to the version of realism widened to the international/ transnational arena through settler- colonial projects. Based on the discussion above, there are three models of exclusion versus inclusion in the world. These three are: First, excluding those who do not count as in democracies, where the people who do not have citizenship, usually due to not reaching the age for voting as defined by the constitutional law, cannot vote in the state political elections. This one is the liberal democratic model.

The second model is the realist model that gives priority to interests, including the ethnic benefits, over democratization, and therefore justifies exclusion as necessary for the stability and security. Accordingly, it is about excluding entirely, or partially those who do not belong to the dominating ethnicity. In this regard, the world countries are mostly multiethnic, and there are fewer countries that consist of one ethnic group only. In these cases of multi-ethnicity, the practices of the dominating ethnic group diverge. In one hand some states select the path of discrimination against the other non-dominating ethnic groups (for instance, the ongoing discrimination in rights against the African Americans, and against the Palestinians inside Israel (Rouhana 2015; Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009; Kretzmer, 2002). Other states secondly implement ethnic

democracy (Smootha, 1993; 1997) where the rights of the non-dominated groups will be ignored and marginalized. Thirdly some states apply ethnocracy (Butenshon 1994), or open ethnocracy (Yiftachel, 2012a; 2012b), where the electoral part of democracy is used, but in a framework that blocks freedom from flourishing, and by denying the rights of the non-dominating ethnic group (being an indigenous population, in this case, to have the rights concerning the access to the land in one hand, while granting extraterritorial rights of return from the "Diaspora" to the dominating ethnic group. The last group also has the right to expand territorially beyond the state borders, internal colonial practices as Elia Zureik called them in the previous section. This approach with these three manifestations is the realist "Nation-State model." Regarding Palestinians inside Israel, they face these three manifestations together as it will be thoroughly analyzed later.

The first model is practiced in the states that provide equal rights to all their citizens regardless of their origin, religion, former nationality or any other reason for discrimination, while the second is practiced on those kinds of nation-states which condition equal citizenship rights by the affiliation with the dominating national identity. In the case that the non-dominating ethnic groups consist of the indigenous population, this model becomes even harder as it was shown. Beyond these two that one is almost fully inclusive, and the second is either partially inclusive or fully exclusive to the other ethnic groups. It is essential for this thesis focus, to shed light on another extension to the third manifestation of the second model, ethnocracy and open ethnocracy combined with the internal colonialism, this extension is settler colonialism that is about the full exclusion of the indigenous people and the separation between them and their lands, territory, homeland, space and the landscape. This extension defines inclusion and exclusion along other lines differentiating between the "civilized" and the "savage," the "developed" and the "underdeveloped," as such ethnocracy is stretched to its end and therefore becomes fully exclusive, with the addition to the deprivation from territory to it. This "exclusiveness" was practiced in two

stages of the performance of the settler- colonial projects, one during the process of developing that project, and the second after the establishment of states by those settler colonial projects that succeeded to do so. Michael Mann called this extension as "Settlers Democracy Model" as earlier mentioned (Mann, 2005).

Till the late 19th century the differentiation between the civilized and the savage was going along color or race lines. Franz Fanon expressed the first by observing that France and the "White community" dealt with blacks as just "things," or "statistics" (Fanon, 1952, 29). Accordingly, France was capable of bringing them as slaves from Africa starting from 1625 to Martinique to work in sugar canes and coffee plantations. The same happened with the settlers in the United States, who were bringing slaves from Africa in the 18th and the 19th centuries as goods for sale. The race line in the other hand characterized the practice of the settlers in the Americas in their relations with the "Red Indians," or the "Native Americans" as they are alternatively called. As will be shown later in this study, these were subject to population transfers, enclosures, and concentration in reserves, genocides, and appropriation of their lands.

The indigenous populations were usually considered as "underdeveloped," waiting for the "white man to come to fulfill what is usually called as "the White man burden" (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis, 1995, 22). Now the question is how this "White man burden" was handled?

First, The white man burden' was taken with the position that considers the underdeveloped population Not to be as "others" who will be accordingly subject to development by the white man, but just as "things" that can be ignored, killed, traded as a chattel, and used in indentured work. The result here will be that these indigenous are not the subject of the white man developmental plan. Second, and as a result, the white man burden was practiced as a burden to develop the lands of the indigenous populations by taking them over from them. Justifications for such an attitude were developed, such as in the case of the

Americas the White man usually considered the indigenous population as mostly nomads and hunters, who failed to develop their lands, and left it barren for the "white man" to come and develop it.

In relevance to this case and others who considered the indigenous population land as empty, Stam and Shohat wrote "The fact that a densely populated and culturally remolded land was seen as "virgin" reflects a kind of mental "ethnic cleansing," a discourse of imagining removal" (Stam, and Shohat, 2012, 6).

The "imagined removal" was put in practice by different settle colonial projects by the appropriation of land and enclosing it. Therefore eliminating, Uprooting, displacing, dispossessing, transferring, ethnically cleansing, deterritorializing, spacio-cide and genocide committing against the indigenous population, and then replacing, reterritorializing, and resettling of the new population on the place, the land, the territory, the space and the landscape of the that not recognized as other giving new shapes to all of these components. The concept of "Frontier" was also used in this process understood as the borders that the human being "bravely" challenges to control nature or to create a new civilization or a new nation in the struggle against the "savage" and the "underdeveloped." The frontier as such was understood as a binary relationship: The human being, usually the "creative" and the civilized Western against the borders, nature, or the underdeveloped people. In this regard the frontiers were presented as both a geographic concept, and as a process of winning, creating, and developing regardless to what happens to the others who live and struggle in the other side of the frontier (Russell, 2001, 1-3). Later in this chapter, the concept of the frontier as being behind the emergence and the development of the "American Nation" with its "special characteristics" will be presented (Turner, 1898).

This kind of conceptualization and practice of exclusion stretches the nation-state to the international/ transnational relations. It is about excluding one nation as a precondition for the creation of a new inclusive one to its ethnic group at

the expense of the former. The two first models of inclusion and exclusion are about "who counts" within a democracy, but this extension to the second model is about "Who is eligible to exist" first as a human being before being a citizen. In the first two models, the struggle is for more inclusive citizenship, but in this extension, the battle is for the physical, political, cultural, economic and social survival of the indigenous population as a precondition of the struggle for their citizenship. In the two models, the question is about how to move from one level of democracy to another more inclusive one. On the contrary this extension to the second model to its end, the question is: Why democracy is not sufficiently practiced as a deciding factor in the international/ transnational relations and instead there are dehumanization and demonization of the other prevailing as dominant practices in part of these relations?

Above the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of the settler during its progress were briefly explained. The following question is about how the struggle for inclusiveness might look like in the societies of the 'successful' settler colonial projects? Cases of settler colonialism to be reviewed in this study present different answers to this question. In all of these cases, the question that still to rise is about the fate of the leftovers from the indigenous population in the newly established settler states with the inclusion and the exclusion processes? One common thread between the cases in answering this question is about the move of the newly established settler states to the former three manifestations of model two, ranging between discrimination against the indigenous leftovers, or practicing "ethnic democracy" (Smoocha, 1993; 1997), and by practicing "ethnocracy" (Butenschon, 1993), or "open ethnocracy" (Yiftachel, 2012a; 2012b), combined with the internal colonialism of Zureik (1979).

Besides that, in all these cases the new emerging settler society will develop laws and procedures that perform within an ethnic and internal colonialism domination setting. As such it will continue to receive new immigrants, restrict the rights of the indigenous population to get back their expropriated land, and

will create diversity and multicultural systems within the framework of hegemony, and that all will not be combined with recognition of the atrocities of the past, or with recognition of the indigenous as a nation. The result will be that the indigenous will continue to feel as they are living within the imposed structures of diversity and multiculturalism of the other that is far from being inclusive to them, and where they feel that their citizenship in these societies is not representative of their national identity (Stam, 2012; Shohat, 2003).

While the indigenous populations are not adequately included or excluded in the new emerging settler-colonial societies, the other (the settler population) will be fully covered and over-represented, enjoying a privileged position over the indigenous people. In this regard, one of the interesting questions to discuss concerning the inclusion and the exclusion component is the question of "when the settler can become a native?" In the academia there are two answers to this question: One that considers the settlers becoming natives after their success to establish their states (Veracini, 2010; 2011; 2013), and the second looks for a process for the creation of new "We" composed by equal citizens who passed a process of reconciliation (Mamdani, 1998; Zreik, 2016). For Mamdani (heavily influenced by the South African model) it will not be a solution in case of the victory of the indigenous that they replace the former settler-colonial dominance with their ethnic dominance. Nor it is enough to create a dual system of equal individual rights to the citizens combined with ethnic rights to the natives with all the tension that will emerge between these two sets of rights. For him, the solution should be by creating a new formula that merges the indigenous population and the former settlers as both enjoy the position of the citizen and the position of the native at the same time (Mamdani, 1998).

Raef Zreik brings to the table the issue of reconciliation as a requirement to create a new "we." For him, this will include the recognition of the settler society of past historical injustices, give up with their privileges, and recognize the equal individual and collective rights for both the indigenous and the settler

populations. In his opinion, the indigenous should reciprocate by recognizing the national rights of the settlers, regardless of how much this will be difficult because of the legitimacy that it gives to the settlers that created the colonial settlements on their expense (Zreik, 2016). With that said, Zreik, as it seems, was able to identify one of the crucial issues between the settler colonial entity and the indigenous population. The Australian scholar Pearson adds lighter to this issue by reminding of the direct fact that "aboriginality must be understood as an artifact of the colonial encounter" (Pearson, 2001, 25). Before the settler colonial conquest, Pearson reminds in Chapter eleven of his book about the existence of indigenous nations that the settler project deprived them of establishing their independent states. In the opposite, the settler colonial project created states to segments of nations that came from another country. Accordingly, he sees it be challenging to create a new nation from all of this mix of the indigenous and the "newcomers" (Pearson, 2001).

The settler colonial model is different than the liberal model and an extension to the national state realist model of exclusion and inclusion to its ends of full exclusion. In this regard, Liberalism and Marxism are in one hand both transnational. But the Marxists sought to create global citizenship after the collapse of the bourgeoisie, like the dream of liberalism for the creation of one open world without borders. Liberalism aimed to achieve this goal through the connections and the interdependency that will be created as a result to the cooperation networks and the flow of trade, rather than through the proletariat victory as the Marxism advocated. In the other hand, Marxism expressed the dream of bringing the proletariat of the nations together as an expression to its transnational approach, while settler colonialism embedded nationalism in the transnational and invented its new national entities where it succeeded on the expense of the indigenous populations. The Marxist Model did not manage to create the globe that it imagined; on the contrary, it created nation-states models such as those that are still in existence in China, Cuba and North Korea.

In the other hand, the settler colonial project created its versions where it succeeded in the countries that were mentioned.

Wrapping up the comparison between the three mentioned models, it is clear that the first, the liberal democratic, represent a case of open identities in their interactions and communication with each other. The second, the nation-state realist model one, is a discriminatory model between different classes of citizenship and residency combined with varying levels of rights class one and class two citizens and probably more than two in addition to the different residency levels. One of its versions furthermore recognizes citizenship to a particular ethnic group and holds it from another. The third, the Marxist, created hierarchal societies with different levels of citizenship, the highest among them is for those who are members in the Communist Party, and where is also human rights enforcement is absent for the citizens. The settler colonial as a particular version of the second model passed two stages, the first is during its progress according to the mechanisms clarified above, and the second is practiced by its "successful" mentioned cases, which moved formally to "lighter" versions of the second model after the success. But this move might be an illusion, due to the following differences between model two and this extension of it, using Schmidt benchmarks as a basis for the comparison.

The settler colonial project while in the making cannot meet any of Schmidt benchmarks: It does not recognize either the humanity of the other nor recognizes the other citizenship; also, it disconnects between the other and his/her rights to the land. Therefore the basis of Schmidt benchmarks of having an ordinary society is non-existent. Accordingly, no participation and no representation will be provided to the indigenous population, nor access to decision making, or to influence the decision makers.

Contrary to socio-economic parity, the case of settler- colonial project is a case of elimination. In this case and contrary to Schmidt model the indigenous

population achieves their demands by struggle and resistance, rather than by lobbying for the improvement of their citizenship conditions, as the two cases of their success indicates. These two cases are Algeria, a matter of evacuating the settlers, and South Africa, a case of creating new common citizenship between the African black majority and the white settlers after giving up with their dominance privileges as a minority. Besides these two, the case of Northern Ireland was a case of compromise that was achieved between the settlers who became the majority of the population and the indigenous population achieved after a long struggle of the indigenous people. This compromise is still problematic as it will be shown.

In the opposite of this full exclusion of the indigenous peoples, the settlers created their settler democracies during the expansion of their settler-colonial projects (see section three of this chapter). As a basis for this kind of democracy, the settlers in the United States, Canada, and Australia created processes of integration according to the "Anglo-Conformity" rather than according to the "Melting Pot" concept as Den Berghe maintained (Den Berghe, 1983). The insight of Van Den Berghe means that democracy and democratic rights were limited to the Anglo-Saxon settlers, while the indigenous population was entirely excluded from those rights.

The settler- colonial projects who succeeded to create states are struggling to move to the model two nation-states version, but enormous hurdles are standing on the way of such a move. Taking Schmidt Benchmarks, one can see that these benchmarks will be fulfilled or withdrawn from citizens according to their position in the existing national divide between the privileged settlers and the disenfranchised natives. In such an arrangement the participation of the indigenous population will be secured in specific selected fields only, and their full recognition will condition it to the state that was created and its "facts" on the expense of them. Besides that, they will not enjoy good representation in the critical decision-making institutions and processes, nor will have the power to

influence the decisions of the government. Concerning the public policies of the government they will not aim to fulfill their concerns and interests, nor will socioeconomic parity between them and the dominating ethnic group be sought. The formula for the struggle for inclusion and citizenship moves partially here to 'who counts,' and this move is partly because of the acts related to the question of 'who is eligible to exist' continue after the establishment of the settler state. These acts include the non-recognition of the indigenous population national and ethnic identity primarily and recognizing their rights on that basis, as it is the case of Israel performance with its supposedly Palestinian citizens inside its 1948 borders. As a result, Israel will continue its internal and external displacements as well against them.

It is time now to conclude some typology to help discuss the inclusion and exclusion models. Three models of inclusion and exclusion were discussed above along three theories if other theories will be added to the analysis, such as constructivism and post-structuralism and especially their concepts about the subjectivity of the discourse, more will be concluded about exclusion and inclusion and the different ways these two combined processes operate. The intent was not to conduct a comprehensive research about inclusion and exclusion according to various theories but to clarify some of its dimensions to the extent that this will help to explain how the processes perform in a settler colonial context. The Author further believes that adding those mentioned new theories will not add too much to defining other additional poles to those two identified: Full Inclusion in one side of the extreme and full exclusion in the other side of it. Further than that constructivism and post-structuralism, are both fall within the framework of 'who counts?' and how this happens, and they do not have that much to add to the other extreme of who is eligible to exist?

The typology to discuss inclusion and exclusion looks to have two frameworks: The first is 'who counts' framework which defines whom to include and whom to exclude in the four components of inclusion and exclusion, which are (with some

modification of Schmidt): Equal rights, participation, and access to decision making, representation, and economic and social parity. This framework is relevant to the states, and other sub-units inside the states such as the local governments and the civil society organizations. As such this model meets with the liberal democratic and the Marxist models, and it also takes from realism its three manifestations of discrimination, ethnic democracy, and ethnocracy and open ethnocracy and internal colonialism, practiced in a nation-state that is not fully inclusive, and do not recognize equal individual rights.

The Analytical framework 'Who counts' for inclusion and exclusion is relevant to the formal structures of the state and citizenship relations. In another hand, the other framework of 'who is eligible to exist' brings to the fora the pre-state, and pre-equal citizenship modalities that are aimed at defining the eligibility of the others that "our" religion, race, ethnicity, or national entity to the mere existence. The results of such conceptualization start with the dehumanization, demonization, and non-recognition of the other, and ends with the "logic of elimination", that includes as Patrick Wolfe advised both physical elimination through genocides and killing, and through assimilation aimed at erasing the original identity (Wolfe, 2006; 2011; 2012). Besides these, there are other types of elimination, such as demographic elimination through transfer (Rouhana, 2014). Others might be added such as the 'national and political and legal elimination' by depriving the indigenous population of establishing their state, and their own citizenship because of the settler colonial conquest on their expense, and this process to include other resulting components such as 'social elimination', 'elimination of the economy' and 'cultural elimination'. All these eliminations are conducted by erasing the place, the space, the territory, the landscape, and the society, the economy and the culture of the original population. Opposite to colonialism that aims to use the cheap labor work of the indigenous to produce added value, the settler -colonial project seeks to get rid of them and replace them as being non-eligible to exist according to the colonial settlers claim.

The settler -colonial project attempts to move to 'who counts formula' after the establishment of its state. The international experiences of settler- colonial projects show two cases in this regard: One case was that an agreed upon formula for the inclusion in a type of equal citizenship was achieved, such as in the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, with all the hardships facing the process which will be explicated. The second case is where such formula was not achieved fully or partially, and instead legal and practical modes of discrimination, ethnic dominance, internal colonialism, and ethnocracy prevailed or continued to prevail from the previous stage, these are such in the cases of the United States, Australia, and Israel. These cases can be described as the cases that practiced the formula of "who is eligible to exist" during their progress, then moved to a formula that is a mix between the "who is eligible to exist" and "who counts." As political systems, they accordingly suffer from a Chronic Instability" (Yiftachel, 2012a, 29) concerning the non-stop and continuous tension from that mix.

As a typology for inclusion and exclusion, we have then three formulas: The who count formula, the who is eligible to the existing formula, and the mix of both. As for the solution for the second and the third formulas, on the other hand, three kinds of solutions can be learned from past experiences. One Solution is about addressing the past atrocities and seeks forgiveness for them, and this is the South African model of Truth and Reconciliation, which suffered from the problems of the balance between Amnesty and reparation and the partial implementation of it among other issues discussed by Lindahl (Lindahl, 2010). The second is about putting the past atrocities aside and agree on a co-existence formula for the present and the future of composing a joint political system, while segregation will continue in the grassroots level and many sectors like education and others, and each side will keep with their narratives, and this is the Irish Model.

Following the shortfalls of these two models, this research might conclude the following components for the development of a third formula that deals and find solutions to the problems of the past, the present and establish arrangements in the ground for the future at the same time.

The components here might include: First, solutions for the past atrocities by acknowledgment, recognition, restitution, an apology and compensation about them by the perpetrators, and then solve them in a way that includes both amnesty and reparation procedures in a path that leads to reconciliation. Second, addressing the present issues maybe not by 'engineering' of a new 'we' as RaefZureik suggested above, but by the recognition of individual and collective rights including the right of the different ethnic and non-ethnic groups of keeping their identities and respecting each ethnic group memory and narratives creating by this a basis for real multiculturalism as Ella Shohat advised (Shohat and Stam, 2003). Third, design a system of equal citizenship, collective and individual rights, including reasonable solutions of the issue of immigration, and return in the Israeli- Palestinian case. The Argentinean simiotician Walter Mignolo called this kind of arrangement as the one that will create what he calls as "Plura-versality" versus the universality of the West which is about a totality that leaves no place to other components than its (Mignolo, 2007). Also, such a solution will find a way out "beyond the civic-ethnic dichotomy" (Reeskens and Hooghe, 2010) that prevails in the literature about nationalism and citizenship and find a way for a kind of arrangement that respect and expose both.

Such a formula will not be a manageable undertaking, but it can come out, or might not come out, as a result of internal and external international factors related to each specific case. The temporal, geographic, and extraterritorial aspects of citizenship arrangements mentioned in the introduction are embedded in the proposed formula above. If this formula does not work, there will be no other option than activating the principle of right for self-determination

by having autonomous administrative, or territorial or national or ethnic, or cultural arrangements or splitting to separate states. This latter solution still will be in need to be explicitly studied according to the particular situation of each case.

1.3 Models of Settler Colonialism

This section will be discussing three models of settler colonialism that are relevant to the analysis of the case of Israel. One of them of the USA that addresses the Israeli past of trying to create a semi-pure Jewish State as happened in 1948 and that might also be repeated in the future to sustain the state Jewish majority by launching further transfers. The second of South Africa that addresses the ongoing discussion in Israel and Palestine about the possibility of one state solution and its integration parameters and models both before and after the collapse of the Apartheid system. The third and the last is of Ireland which was annexed as a whole to the United Kingdom in the year of 1800 but got its independence in 1921. While a part of it is continued to be annexed to the United Kingdom till today, the Northern Ireland, enjoying at the same time an autonomous government granted at the beginning to one side, the Loyalist- Unionists Protestant majority who called for uniting with Britain, by Britain, then by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement to the two sides of the conflict, the mentioned Loyalists-Unionists and the Nationalist-Republicans who called for the reunification of the whole Ireland. This autonomy is almost similar to the autonomy to the Palestinians that was part of the Israeli Palestinian 1993 Declaration of Principles known as Oslo Agreement.

While the two models of the United States and South Africa are clear, the Irish one is far from being so, and it is selected for this study because of the heated ongoing discussion about it in the Israeli Palestinian context among both academics and the practitioners (see for instance; Spitka, 2016, Palestine-Israel Journal 2017, and The Palestinian Academic Society for International Affairs (PASSIA), 2006). Besides the delegations of each side and the joint

delegations' visits to Northern Ireland, it is presented in the Israeli Palestinian context, and also in the academia, as a contested example.

Some academics chose to deal with Ireland or Northern Ireland in terms of partition that the Israelis and the Palestinians can learn from (Coakley 2005, 43; Fraser, 2005, 59; Phoenix, 2017, 17). In opposite analysis here no partition to two states was conducted in Ireland, but a creation of one state, the Republic of Ireland, and the annexation in the other hand of part of Ireland to Britain, Northern Ireland. Others presented the case in a way that means that Israel will offer the Palestinians a permanent status plan for a self government under Israeli control, in which Israel will keep Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements under its rule, while giving the Palestinians the right to run their internal affairs in Gaza Strip and the parts of West Bank that are not included in the settlement's region (Lustick, 2005, 211-212).

Lustick presented Israel as if it is in the place of Britain who had its country outside Ireland, while Israel exists in a part of the geography of Palestine. As Such this comparison will not be tenable since it will not fit with the further Israeli expansion ambitions resulting from its settler colonial nature, nor will it make the presented solution by Israel sustainable.

A third opinion went further by suggested creating a "West Bank Forum" that include both Palestinians and the Jewish settlers the same as Northern Ireland became the common country of the Protestant settlers and the indigenous Catholics (Pollak, 2006, 62-68). While excluding Gaza due to being already a "self-governing" territory(Pollak,64), this proposal includes also normalizing and indigenizing the settlers in West Bank after few decades passed since 1967 war when the West Bank and Gaza were occupied. In Northern Ireland, this process of indigenization took centuries to happen after the startup of the settler-colonial project there in the year of 1167. More significant that process of indigenization was completed only when the original indigenous population recognized it, the crowning of that recognition came through the Great Friday Agreement in 1998.

Accordingly, the idea of indigenizing the settlers in West Bank without prior political agreement looks like being a jump in the air, especially when there are other earlier issues that still not solved such as refugees' rights, and the agreement about the borders and the citizenship models in both states of Israel, and Palestine waiting to emerge. Yet there is another deeper issue which is the essential difference between Ireland and Israel in the sense that the first represents an original country that was divided by the British, while Israel is a settler colonial project that was created in 1948, then it expanded in 1967, therefore it does not look as logical to suggest indigenizing the settlers in 1967 occupied territory before solving prior issues resulting from the 1948 Nakba. In this regard, the emerging Republic of Ireland indigenized and gave equal citizens rights to its Protestant minority, something that Israel did not give yet to its Palestinian minority who are living inside the Israeli proper.

However, there are different areas of possible comparison between the case of Israel, and the case of Ireland under the British settler colonial rule. One of these relates to their settler-colonial past ignored by the three above mentioned comparisons: In Ireland till 1921 and in Northern Ireland till 1998, in comparison with the pre-Israel Zionist movement prior to 1948. The second relates to the future of Israel relation to West Bank if it will annex it, then revoke that annexation later, like the Irish past in terms of the 1921 revocation of the annexation that Britain imposed over Ireland in 1800. Finally, there is a third possible arena of comparison that is in relevance to the similarities and contrasts between the British policies towards governance under its control in Northern Ireland, and the Israeli policies towards the governance of West Bank and Gaza since the signature of Oslo agreement in 1993, and also in specific towards Gaza since the Israeli Army withdrawal from it in 2005.

The settler colonial past is also common between Israel pre-1948, and South Africa pre-1910 when the country got its formal independence that was sustained in 1931 with the continuation of South Africa of its membership in the

British Commonwealth and then getting its full independence in 1961. Besides that, common past both shared the Apartheid; a word that came literally from apartness which means separate development practices that became an official policy in South Africa in 1948. Accordingly, Apartheid can be defined as "a set of policies and practices of legal discrimination, political exclusion, and social marginalization, based on racial, national, and ethnic origins" (Ben-Dor, in Pappe 2015, Chapter 3), while it is practiced by Israel in its policies towards the Palestinian minority inside it combined with internal colonial procedures as Pappe and Zureik advised (Pappe, 2015; Zureik, 1979).

The following 1967 expansion of Israel towards West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem created the question if an Apartheid regime was created in all the land of historical Palestine which will require moving from the two states solution territorial based solution to a one-state solution, that to be constructed like in the case of South Africa along equal individual and collective rights. The other face of this last theme is if the Israeli expansion in the 1967 occupied territories is more similar to the South Africa settler colonial past that also included Apartheid as one of its components. In the Israeli Palestinian context, there is also another heated discussion among the academics and the practitioners about the South African Apartheid rather than about the South African settler colonial past, writings here focused on the 'Apartheid' nature of Israel, and on its previous relations with the apartheid regime in South Africa (Mathew 1977, Farsoun 1975, Toumeh 1972, Abbas 1989, Salameh 2012). There are yet fewer studies about the South African settler colonial past except those written by some Arabs (Jabbour, 1970; Hammad, 1984). In the political discourse, there are also groups who lobby for disqualifying Israel as an Apartheid state such as the BDS movement, and some Israeli left-wing groups.

In Comparison with the United States, both have the same settler colonial past, the first by removing and transferring and 'genociding', and the second by killing, 'massacring' destroying villages, and transferring inside and outside the country.

Both also have a common present of expanding and attacking outside their borders. Unlike the contested discussion about South Africa and Ireland in Israel and Palestine, the comparison between the settler colonial projects of both the United States and Israel is highly low on the Palestinian academic agenda, the focus instead is around the USA biased policies towards Israel (see for instance Saeb Erekat Studies 2010-on), or around making policy advice to the Americans in regard to alternative paths for the promotion of peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Salem, 2018; Golan, 2018; Schiff, 2018). It might be assumed that the reason for such an absence of the mentioned comparative studies is that the American settler colonial past go back in history to more than five hundred years, and started by the Spanish directly after the discovery of United States by Christopher Columbus in 1492, then followed by the British starting from the first Settlement in Virginia in 1606 (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 21). And also, the French and the Dutch, each establishing their new world: New England, New France, and New Amsterdam. But if this assumption is right, why then there are emerging American and American Universities Studies comparing between settler colonialism in the USA and Israel (Fields, 2016; BenTalib2014; Waziyataween, 2012). Palestinian research in this side looks to be in need of development.

In these three cases, one was able to create a pure settler colonial country (the USA), another one witnessed the collapse of the settler colonial system, and the creation of an integrative system that is inclusive to the former settlers, South Africa. The third case of Ireland witnessed taking part of it that is still under the British rule till today, in this part a joint local autonomous government under the British overall rule was created after 1998 Great Friday Agreement. This joint Government was unable to function till 2007 due to the disagreement over different issues, on the top of them was the issue of the decommissioning of the Irish Republic Army (IRA) weapons. After ten years the joint Government collapsed in January 2017 and ever since the country is back to the full British Rule (Morrow, 2017).

The three cases had one major mother country, which is Britain. In the United States it followed the Spanish as a colonizer, and later defeated the French in the so-called Indian war that continued for seven years from 1754 to 1763, and then it became the dominant colonial power in the country. In Ireland Britain had a unilateral rule, and in South Africa, it dominated it after fully defeating the Boer Dutch in 1910 following several successive wars. In the case of the Zionist movement Britain also played the role of the mother country by giving Balfour Declaration of 1917, and facilitated the Jewish emigration, provided economic facilities to the Zionist movement, and reformed the laws in a way that allowed the Zionists to take over the land during its Mandatory period over the country from 1917 to 1948 (Fields, 2016; Pappe, 2008). This is generally speaking, but when it comes to the details of the British Zionist relations, there are different ways to analyze them in the literature. All will be discussed in chapter two.

Opposite to the Spanish and the French settler colonial approach that operated and managed by the state. The British approach was about privatizing the settler colonial projects, either first by creating some through companies (Like London company that created Virginia starting from 1606), second through proprietors (Like the British King Charles II granting of Pennsylvania to William Penn in 1681 as settlement of the king debt to Penn's father) (Goodman and Gattel, 1972). or third through a privileged 'stepchild' or a 'Satellite' movement like in the case of the Zionist movement as Ilan Pappe called it (Pappe, 2008).

While the Spanish and the French settler colonial projects were driven by Catholicism and the promotion of its teachings and also as a religion in the world, the British Settler colonial project in the contrary was driven also by their Protestant orientations including the aim to accelerate the process of the return of the Messiah to rescue the world. The concept here is connected to millennialism which a Christian belief is promoted by some Christian denominations mainly the Protestant ones, which claims according to Revelation 20:1-6 that a Golden age will take place in the world and prevail for one

thousand years in which Jesus Christ will be ruling. Among the early nineteenth Century British Missionaries to Palestine who acted to promote this Millennial idea was the Christian Missionary Society (CMS) who acted in the early decades of that Century aiming to confront Catholicism and to convert Jews to Christianity, followed later by London Jewish Society (LJS) who operated for the same objectives since 1840.

In 1865 the Palestine Exploration Fund was also established by the British with the aim to conduct archaeological excavations in Palestine to verify what is included in the bible (Leest, 2008; Robson, 2009). In a later stage, other Protestant Groups from other European Countries acted in Palestine, among these was Basel Mission that started in Switzerland in 1815, rejecting modernity, and looked for the revival of the natural and agricultural life outside Europe. The Templars also are another Protestant Group that came from Germany, and they believed of apocalyptic vision of the prophet in the Holy Land, and this is why they settled in Palestine between 1868 to 1882 with the aim to accelerate the return of the Messiah (Pappe, 2008, 619), and the process towards Armageddon Battle that will take place between different Armies in Megiddo in Palestine, leading to the end of the world according to the Book of Revelation in the New Testament. In this regard, there is a little bit difference between the Old Testament that considers the people of Israel as the selected people by God, and the New Testament that promotes the idea of preaching for Jesus Christ teachings and way of living (Pillay, 2010, 7, 8, 17). The new emerging Christian Zionism and Evangelicalism especially in the United States which represent one of the extensions of Protestantism goes beyond this difference by supporting Zionism and Israel as they see that support as necessary for the return of Jesus Christ.

These Protestant Millennial origins of the British settler colonialism are not relevant only to Palestine. Crawford Gribben wrote several books and articles about its relevance to America and Northern Ireland Protestant Community

(Gribben, 2007; 2009; 2011). In regard to Northern Ireland, he showed how Mr. Ian Paisley stood against the Pope and interrupted his speech in 1988 presenting Protestant strong positions against Catholicism that he practiced also against the Irish Nationalists who are also Catholics (Gribben, 2007). In a later period, Mr. Paisley became the head of Democratic Ulster Unionist Party (DUP) who shared the common Government of 2007 to 2017 with the Sinn Finn.

In the United States as well, the British Protestant groups' role was also clear, For Instance William Penn who established Pennsylvania was a prominent member in the Quakers (Religious Society of Friends), which is a Protestant religious movement, also Massachusetts was created in 1632 by the Puritans who are Calvinists Protestants started in England in the sixteenth century and aimed to 'purify' the church from the Catholic Practices. Further, they believed that well selected a specific group for survival (Goodman and Gattel, 1972).

In South Africa as well, the role of Protestant missions was manifest in the settler colonial project there. The roles of Church Missionary Mission were clear since 1837, also the roles of the London Missionary Society, mainly during the period of David Livingstone who was a Scottish explorer played the role of the missionary and the merchant in another hand. In this regard, South Africa was characterized by a role of the white missionaries that combined between both converting the African black "un-civilized, barbaric, Violent and lazy" creatures to Christianity and civilization in one hand (Russell, 2011, 26) and promoting trade and the marketing of the European products in the other.

As such the missionaries in South Africa were playing in the hands of the settler colonial system, that prohibited the indigenous South African population from citizenship, imposed slavery till 1838 and used it in the white settlers' agricultural plantations, and in the diamond mines since discovered in 1867, and the gold ones since discovered in 1886. In addition to that of initiating frontier wars against them in order to protect the "White man security" (Russell,

26).Therefore, a difference emerges between the roles of those missions in Palestine and South Africa:

In the first the missions acted for the preparation for the return of the Messiah, including the acceleration of the process of gathering Jews in Palestine as a step towards this return, disregarding as such the rights of the indigenous population of Palestine as if they are nonexistent. On the contrary in South Africa, the settler colonial project excluded the indigenous population from citizenship, took over their lands, and their country wealth and natural resources. But at the same time kept using their cheap labor force, and continued to do that with South Africa move officially to Apartheid by the year of 1948. Such a move that faced an international condemnation and steps against South Africa combined with the white dependency on the black labor both led to the collapse of the South Africa Apartheid Regime (Abbas, 1989; Kasirli, in Pappe 2015).

The three cases discussed to share the characteristic of being settler colonial cases, first the United States that was created around the 'right of discovery' becoming the right to conquer, to settle, and to remove the indigenous population. Second: Ireland which its Gaelic origin became subject to the British attack through the British Settlement in the country over eight centuries. In 1921 the British settler Colonial project stopped with the independence of the Republic of Ireland. But what about Northern Ireland that was separated by Britain from Ireland and went under a British Sovereignty and a local governance system dominated by the Protestant settlers? David Miller claims that the period from 1921 to 1960s in Northern Ireland cannot be described as a settler colonial period only, and that is because of being a period of quietness and internal peace. He refers to other possible interpretations to that period one of them is the Marxist that has the capability to refer the British continuous presence in Northern Ireland at that period to the British imperialistic interests rather than to its colonial aspirations that might already be passed (Miller, 1998).

While others like Terry Eagleton considers it to continue being a settler colonial case until nowadays (Eagleton in Raid, 2014, 234). What is the discussion here?

Back to the previous sections of this chapter, there are two issues at hand, the first is about whether a new postcolonial entity emerged in Northern Ireland after 1921 transcending the previous settler colonial situation or not, and the second is about when the settler becomes a native, or get indigenized? Eagleton will claim that a settler colonial entity emerged in Northern Ireland after 1921 ruled by the earlier created majority of settlers and that their ruling is sustained only due to the continuation of the British colonialism including by the continuation of the British army presence in Northern Ireland.

According to this analysis of Eagleton, the Protestant in Northern Ireland are still to be considered as settlers and they are not transformed to Natives, and that is regardless to the fact that they became the ruling party with the British support (Eagleton in Raid, 2014, 234). Miller has an opposite view claiming in one hand that the settler colonial framework cannot be the only framework for the explication of the Northern Ireland case. He refers first to the fact that most the studies will argue that the British historical presence in Northern Ireland is far from being colonial (see more about this claim below). Then Miller questions if Ireland ceased to be a British Colony: Is it in 1801 when Britain released the Act of Union of annexing all Ireland to Britain? Or is it in the opposite when Britain gave independence to 16 Irish counties to compose the Republic of Ireland? Or it is when Britain decided in to end the unilateral ruling of the Protestant Unionists in Northern Ireland in 1972 and to return to the direct ruling of it? Besides these questions Miller questions if the Protestant settlers became already natives of Northern Ireland?

In this regard Miller refers to the fact that part of the Protestants considers themselves already to be Irish, while some others of them called for the creation

of a new "Ulsterian" identity in reference to the Ulster which is the historical part of Ireland where the Protestant settler majority was created (Miller, 1998,1-12). Miller is not referring here to that third group among the Protestant who still seek to have a unity of Northern Ireland with Britain.

In a most recent study, Byronie Raid, brings this debate to a broader context, in one hand he does not see the situation in Northern Ireland as similar to the third world postcolonial countries after they got liberated from Colonialism. But on the contrary in Northern Ireland two communities, one represents the indigenous population and the second represent the settlers inherited the British direct rule and the emerging question if they can be considered as one nation. In this regard Raid says that it is not right that each Protestant person is a colonialist or had a colonialist history, at the same time he defines himself to be "Protestant Northern Irish" who at the same time is a witness of the history and the legacy of the Protestant plantations and dominance over Northern Ireland (Raid, 2104, 234-238).

In the United States, the settler colonial project became America. Maybe helped on making that relatively easy that the number of the former native population was relatively small according to different estimations, while the number is still contested among different scholars For instance (Denevan 1992; Dobyns, 1976), the Arizona Archives about Dobyns writings, and (Henige, 1998).

All these scholars agree that this number significantly decreased. As one source advice, this decrease went from 112 million in 1492 when Columbus 'discovered' America to 6 million only in the year of 1650 (Denevan, 1992), stretching themselves in a huge country of 9,834,000 km² that was enough to absorb many more than them. The decrease of the number of the Native Americans was due to the spread of diseases that the European settlers brought with them such as smallpox, and also due to genocides that took place in the micro level rather than in the macro level (Rensink, 2011). The reason for them

being micro rather than macro might be related to the privatization of the settler colonial British motivated projects in America. In 2010 the Native American ancestors do not exceed the number of 4,9 million who own only 0.12 percent of United States land, while 98 percent of the native Americans were killed through genocides (Waziyataween, 2012, 182-183).

With these details can the United States after its independence of 1776 be considered as a postcolonial entity? Aziz Rana (Rana, 2010) first advised that the American Revolution was not a revolution of independence per se, but rather a revolt of the settlers against the restrictions that the British Government decided to impose on their freedom of taking over the American Indians land. These restrictions were imposed in 1763 after the "Pontiac Rebellion" which represented one of the bloodiest wars. The restrictions included the prevention of the settlers to appropriate Amerindians lands in the West of the Appalachians which gave the Amerindians a big Reserve there (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 89). Confirming Aziz Rana's conclusion, the American Declaration of Independence of 4th of July 1776 written by Thomas Jefferson condemned these decisions by the British King, and considered that they made the American States under the danger of invasions from outside and 'Convulsion from inside', then it added other accusations to the British King such as "Obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriation of the land" (Jefferson in Hutchins, 1988, 2). As such, the American created State is one of the settlers who created their presence, not over the land of their place of origin, but over an appropriated land from other people, consequently, those other people were prevented to have their right of self-determination till today.

The United States proved several times to be aware of this dilemma, tried also to fix it by recognition and apologies, such as the 1975 "Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act" (Department of Interior Public Law 93-638 in www.bie.edu) which recognized the Amerindians right of self

determination, and gave the Amerindian nations the right to run their social welfare, housing and educational Affairs independently. In 1994 the Congress recognized the Amerindians educational colleges, and in 2009 President Barack Obama signed The Native American Apology Resolution. Despite all these steps the Amerindian scholar Waziyataween considered them not to be enough. She added that the leftwing colonial settlers are trying to rename some places and to bring back their original Amerindian ones, but while doing so, no feeling of guilt is included (Waziyataween, 2012, 181). To quote also Patrick Wolfe: "The Settler Colonialism does not simply replace native society tout court. Rather, the process of replacement maintains the refractory imprint of the native counter-claim" (Wolfe, 2006, 389).

With this 'Refractory Imprint' among the Native Americans, comes the question of In which meaning the United States can be perceived as a postcolonial society if it still has its victims in its within? Besides that, how the United States can be perceived as a country that came to existence as an outcome of a national liberation revolt as it was the case in the third world? And how the American revolution can be understood as a revolution for independence while it left behind the native people losing their right to have their independence, and having that 'injury of the history' living with them till today? Even if the related questions about the American identity and the emergence of the American nation in the land of America will be left aside from this discussion, it can be said that like the case of Northern Ireland Protestant discussed above that the American nationalism will continue to carry the imprints of its specific history, characterized today not only by the revival of the Amerindians identities, but also by the continuous discrimination against the African Americans, and the prevailing pride in the South States of their history of slavery.

Besides the above the vision and the practice of the American Free individual that was perceived by Alexis De Tocqueville in his book *Democracy in America* published in 1835 (Toqueville, 2000) as the basis of the civil society

development and accordingly for the liberty and the decentralization of governance in the United States might be added, since it was also supported by the American Historian Fredrick Jackson Turner writing in 1893, suggesting that the American democracy emerged in the frontiers as places of confrontation. For Jackson Turner, it is as much as these frontiers widened, as much as the American democracy become stronger. Unlike Europe-he claimed- that the United States had an open land for appropriation, which created an American society that is more democratic, less interested in hierarchies. But also, more violent, less scientific, more individualistic, had a strong contempt to the Authority and the dominating elites, and more dependent on ad-hoc organizations. These all characteristics are in contrary to Europe who has the hierarchies of Armies, Churches, Aristocracies, and notables and has the prior theoretical dream of democracy (Turner, 1898). The common between Tocqueville and Turner is this notion of individualism, private property, liberty, freedom of appropriation of land, the acquisition of power and status by work. These characteristics might still to be those prevailing in the United States till today.

Yet, Turner added violence as an additional characteristic of this society of "absolute individualism" (Turner, 1898), which means that the individual is free to possess and to use arms. In this regard, amendment number two of the American constitution dated in December 1791 states that "A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a Free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed" (law.cornell.edu). An article that was developed by then between competing states that went later in four years of civil war against each other from 1861 to 1865 focused on the issue of slavery. This article continued until today. According to the statistics thousands of the Americans get killed every year because of gun use, the latest article by Professor Alon Ben Meir showed that 33880 Americans are killed due to gun use as an average every year in the United States; this means 93 persons per day. While the number of American soldiers that were killed in the Iraq war did

not exceed 4530 soldiers, and in Afghanistan, the number did not exceed 2408 soldiers (Ben Meir, 2018).

Yet the legacy of the past of a settler colonial society who also used slaves is not only internal, but it has also external ramifications. In this regard, the United States might learn from its internal experience that imposing facts in the ground works, and therefore developed its international politics accordingly. Examples include the American global expansionism, and its role in controlling the world and initiating wars according to the American interests rather than according to an emancipatory agenda for humanity (Rana, 2010). Aziz Rana called the United States as such as a "settler empire", expressing the settler mentality and action of reaching out by force and conquest regardless of the international law, and the respect of the sovereignty of the other nations of the world (Rana, 2010). Here this settler empire does not create new settler colonial projects but the settler colonial mentality of using force and conquest are its favorable tools with the world. Besides that, Daryl Glaser called the United States as a "settler-majority Democracy", in which restrictions are still imposed on some parts of the peoples of the United States rights for full representation and full participation in the political, economic and social processes, including the right of access to decision making (Glasser, 2012, 234).

In the case of Northern Ireland, as discussed above joint governance emerged under a British control rather than a Postcolonial regime succeeding a revolution against a colonial system as happened in the third world during the period of liberation from colonialism. In contrast, the USA emerged as a kind settler empire that its settler project methods of war and conquest are still used globally, rather than a postcolonial entity that required having a revolution against colonialism, which was not the case of the American Revolution as discussed.

Till today United States still acting as a colonizer in different regions annexed to it, these include Hawaii 28 thousand Kilometers far from the United States that the latter toppled its Monarchic regime in the late 19th century to serve the interests of the American Plantations holders there, annexed it unilaterally to the United States in 1897, and transformed it to an American State in 1959. In 1993 the American Congress passed "the United States Public Law 103-150" famous as the Apology Resolution which recognized the role of the American citizens in toppling monarchy in 1893, but without apologizing to the Hawaiian people for taking their land and occupying their country till today (Rigby, 1980; Guzman, 2016).

Besides the American occupation to Hawaii, the United States rules Puerto Rico, Guam, and US Virgin Islands, all as Unincorporated Territories of the United States, or Non-self-Governing Territories as Guam and the US Virgin Islands are called by the UN. The first was annexed to the United States in 1898, its citizens were granted American citizenship in 1917. But till today they have no right to vote for the President and the Congress because they did not become as one of the States of the United States (Caban, 2002). In 2017 a referendum took place about that issue, but only 23 percent of the population participated due to the Popular Democratic Party call for a boycott. As a result, the country was not granted a US State position (Theatlantic.com, 13/June/2017). The second was also occupied by the USA in 1898, given American citizenship to its citizens by 1950, but without rights to vote for the American Congress and the President till today, and ruled internally by a local Governor elected since 1968 (www.guampedia.com). The third was bought by the USA from Denmark in 1916, granted American citizenship in 1927, but also without the right to vote for the Congress and the President, and ruled by a governor.

Together with these cases of American presence that combines the aspects of both colonialism and settler colonialism, the United States also occupied the

Philippines and Cuba both ceded to it by Spain in 1898. For Cuba, that occupation was on-off till 1922 when it was finished, and in the Philippines the American occupation continued till 1946. Later on, the United States got involved in the wars against Communism, mainly through its intervention in Vietnam from 1965 to 1975. After the collapse of Soviet Union, the USA initiated its international wars under the banner of fighting terrorism as in the case of the American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, and on the name of promotion of democracy as in the second war against Iraq in 2003 which was called as the Iraqi Freedom Operation.

However, it is also to be noted that the United States of today continued to change its shape since its 1776 independence, till 1959. In 1803 United States bought Louisiana from France for the amount of 11,250,000 million dollars, and in 1848 United States defeated Mexico in the American Mexican war. The result was that Mexico ceded to the United States 529,000 square miles in the American West including California, Nevada, Utah, New Mexico, fourth of Colorado, and a small part of Wyoming. This was the largest expansion of the United States. Besides that, the United States annexed Texas in 1840, after three years of its Liberation through a revolution from Mexico. That annexation followed an American settlement process on Texas on the expense of the Amerindians leading to the creation of an American Majority against the Amerindians. The last two states to join the United States were Hawaii and Alaska both in 1959. The latter was bought from Russia in 1867 for 7.2 million dollars. By today there is the ongoing controversy about the occupation of Hawaii, the status of Puerto Rico, and the American Virgin Islands, and there are groups that call for regaining back the independence of both California and Texas.

Moving to South Africa, it can be seen here that South Africa passed two stages before the end of the apartheid regime in 1994. These two stages are the settler colonialism stage (1652 to 1910), and the second is the Apartheid stage of 1910

to 1994. The settler colonial modes of action also continued in the second stage under the frame of Apartheid.

The first stage started by the Dutch settlement in the Cape in 1652. At that year Jan Van Riebeeck the representative of the Dutch East India Company began a settlement there to provide the fleet of Dutch ships sailing around the Cape of Good Hope with food and rest (Hammad, 1984, 45).

The unilateral Dutch settler colonialism continued in South Africa till the end of the 19th century when Britain came in as an additional player (Farsoun, 1975, 154). In times when gold and diamond were discovered bringing South Africa to the third internationally in gold production by today. The Dutch colonial settlers concentrated on cultivation of vegetables and fruits, in addition to raising livestock for which they were moving from one place to another to find grass for them, for that they were called as the Trekkers. This mode of settlement created tension with the original population of the Khoikhoi who consisted of people who also depend on shepherding. Therefore, the Dutch settlers used to remove the Khoikhoi from their land but also took their children to raise them up to become servants to the Dutch Boer as they were called.

The Dutch Boer brought slaves from outside as well to work on their Orange Free State that was established in 1854. When the English came and established their settlement in the Natal in 1850, a tension was created with the Boer over the land and the control of the sea trade route.

The tension between the Boer and the British created several wars among the two sides, one called the Transvaal war of 1880 to 1881, another war was in 1899 to 1902, which led to the British dominance over most of the territories of South Africa. Few years after a four years negotiations led to the declaration of 'South Africa Act' in 1909, followed by the formation of South Africa Union in 1910 when the Boer who was fully defeated accepted to join that South Africa Union that Britain created to include all the territories of South Africa. The date

of the creation of that Union was considered to be the date when South Africa got its nominal independence. During their period the British gave priority to preserving the trade sea route, and also to exploit the diamond that was discovered in the in 1867, and the gold that was discovered in 1884(South Africa, www.sahistory.org.za). Besides that, Britain supported the colonial settlers in their private initiatives to take over the country land or ignored to take action against them when they do so (Farsoun, 1975, 165-166). As a sign of support, the 1913 Native Land Act released by Britain in 1913 gave the original population the ownership of 7 percent only of the country land, this percentage was raised to 13.6 percent of the land in 1932 granted to 70.7 percent of the population (Matthew, 1977; Ervin, 2017, 114; Gidron et al, 2002, 40). The rest of the land was given to the settler colonialists. In 1914 a delegation of the African National Congress (ANC) traveled to London to protest the Native Land Act but they were met by deaf and mute position from the British Government.

As it looks like from this short overview so far, the British ruling to South Africa was strengthened rather than weakened after the formation of 1910 Union. A further step towards full independence took place in 1931 while the country continued its presence in the British Commonwealth. In 1961 full independence was declared after a referendum in 1960 that decided to end the sovereignty of the British Queen over South Africa. In that referendum, the Natal Province who enjoyed a majority of settlers from British Origins voted against independence. This voting signaled to a different process than Ireland and the United States. In the case of Ireland, a Postcolonial state of the Republic of Ireland emerged directly after the Anglo- Irish war of Independence of 1919 to 1921. Northern Ireland instead came under British Sovereignty. In the case of the United States, the settlers fought against Britain who put restrictions on their capacity to possess the lands of the Amerindians, therefore they revolted against the British rule, leading to the creation of an independent state in 1776. After that year this state, cannot be considered as postcolonial because this description goes for countries that their original population got under colonial rule, then they got their

independence usually after a revolution as happened in Ireland. Instead, the United States became after 1776 as a Settler Empire that expanded on the expense of its neighboring countries and provinces till 1959, followed by stretching its expansion to all over the world starting from Vietnam War.

Contrary to these two cases, in the South Africa case, the war of the settler colonialists against their mother country did not take place directly before the establishment of the Union in 1910. The question is why this happened? As shown the Natal Province settler colonialists, Similar to the Northern Ireland Loyalists, voted even against independence from Britain in 1960. One of the reasons for that might be because of the fact that Britain did not put restrictions on the white acquisition of land in South Africa as in the case of the United States. In contrary Britain here passed the 1913 Native Land Act that allowed for the White to take over land reaching the acquisition of around 87 percent of the land of South Africa by 1931 as shown. Probably Britain of the twentieth century here learned already from its eighteenth-century experience in the United States and initiated 1913 land law to prevent the repetition of that case. But if this is the answer then why the Zionist Movement fought against Britain in the nineteen forties? It seems here from a historical-sociological point of view that the history does not repeat itself in the same way in different places/cases, therefore there will be a need to analyze the specificities of each case to find out the ruptures, and not only the continuities. Chapter three will try to answer the reasons for this difference between the practice of South Africa settler colonialists and those of the Zionist movement in Palestine towards the same mother country of both.

Actually, the contradictions between Britain and the settlers took a different path in South Africa, as mentioned the Dutch Boer, later called as Afrikaners, and were obliged to join the South Africa Union under British ruling after their defeat in the war that was finished in 1902. After the declaration of the 1910 Union, the British affiliated Settlers established the South Africa Party. That Party administered South Africa, and in 1922 the Party oppressed Rand revolution

that was initiated by the Afrikaners in the mines sector. After this oppression, the Afrikaners established their own Party that was called "The National Party". This Party won the elections in 1948 and started the Apartheid by then, and it was the same Party that conducted the 1960 referendum that led to the full independence from Britain despite the objection of the Natal settlers affiliated with Britain (Gidron et al, 2002, 40).

Do these developments represent the Boer revenge for their earlier defeat by using electoral means? Is the difference between the United States and Ireland cases in one hand and the South African case in the second hand is that the settler war against the mother country preceded the independence in the first two cases while it took place in South Africa in an earlier stage by part of the settlers and not all of them, defeated in that war they launched their revenge by different means later on? Haklai and Loizides considered such cases of interaction as related to the settlers' agency in their relationship with the sending country/ies as they call it instead of the mother country. In this regard, they argue that settler agency exists when the settler sending or mother country is democratic in regard to its internal politics and thus allow the settlers to create lobby groups for their demands. The United States and the Israeli settlers are mentioned by them as examples to this active Settler Agency (Haklai, and Loizides, 2015). South Africa can be added here as a third example of this settler's agency taking in consideration as well the contradictions between the Boer Dutch and British settlers

If a Postcolonial state emerged in 1921 in Ireland, and a British country emerged by then in Northern Ireland, and a settler empire emerged in the United States after its independence in 1776, how South Africa can be described in the period from 1910 to 1961 while in different stages of independence? And how it can be described for the period of 1961 till 1994 when the Apartheid regime collapsed? And finally, how it can be described after 1994?

Similar to Northern Ireland from 1921 till the Great Friday Agreement of 1998, the first period of 1910 to 1961 was a period of autonomy of the settler colonial entity ran under the British Crown. Therefore, it cannot be considered as Postcolonial period, but rather a continuation of the settler colonial period combined with Apartheid officially declared and practiced from 1948 but practically before (see later). Here a minority of white settlers ruled a majority of the black and colored population. The South Africa Communist Party called this regime to be a "Colonialism of Special Type" where the control was transferred from the British Imperialism to a local Colonial Power (Kasirli, 2015). Glasser in other hand called South Africa of 1910 to 1994 to be a "settler-minority democracy" was a minority of whites created democracy to them while excluding the other parts of the population. For him, this "settler-minority democracy" was different than the United States "settler-majority democracy" in a sense that the latter came about after murdering the indigenous population, something that did not happen in South Africa (Glasser, 2012, 232).

In the next period of 1961 to 1994, the Apartheid continued to be practiced as both the system of governance and life, combined with internal colonialism methods and practices against the majority blacks, so no postcolonial period can be talked about. However, the problem emerges on how to describe the period after 1994 when the Apartheid collapsed. Some in South Africa call the system ever since to be a post-Apartheid, and few as a postcolonial. In this regard, Windsor S. Leroke maintained that "Post-Colonialism in South African social science is an emerging paradigm... is not clearly formulated intellectual project" (Leroke, 1998. P.55). He considers Post-colonialism to be a new project that needs development. In the other hand Monica Popescu considered Post-Colonialism, Post-Apartheid, and Post-Communism in South African a dissertation (Popescu, 2005). In criticism to this approach of symmetry between these concepts, PremeshLalu argued that the terms Colonialism, Post-Colonialism, Apartheid, and Post-Apartheid should not be perceived in the case of South Africa in a "temporal linear sequence", since also there is a need for

the decolonization of the knowledge as well in addition to the decolonization of the territory. Accordingly, Lalu suggests what he calls as a 'Postcolonial critique of Apartheid' understood in the line of redefining the postcolonial to become, following Stuart Hall, as 'thinking the limit' rather than a temporal period after colonialism gets to an end. He follows the subaltern studies in this regard as he says (Lalu, 2008).

So, how South Africa after 1994 can be described? It definitely not a Postcolonial since South Africa case was earlier a combination of settler colonialism and Apartheid, then it will not be logically followed by Postcolonialism. Therefore, an alternative description like Post-Apartheid have the capacity to tell us that Apartheid is over, and another description like Post-settler colonial, a term to be used despite the earlier mentioned objection of Veracini, to refer here to the entity that emerges after the end of Settler colonial project. Can also tell us that the settler colonial project is over, but it also has the power to tell us that there are stages that still need to be passed in the direction of the full integration of the former settlers in the new integrative society. Therefore, it is suggested to describe South Africa after the 1994 transition in terms of this study as a combination of Post-Apartheid and Post-Settler colonial society that are struggling simultaneously for the creation of an integrative society in terms of citizenship and inclusive democracy, inclusive economy, and inclusive society.

What left for this section, is a review of the inclusion and the exclusion politics in the three discussed cases: Starting with South Africa, during the period of full settler colonialism of pre-1910 when the concern was about the relation between the mother country interests to protect the trade route to India, and the settlers' interests of appropriating land, and ensure their safety. These two concerns and especially one of the settlers means a full exclusion of the indigenous population even from humanity, therefore no attention was made to them what so ever. Along with their interests, the Boer took over the Cape in the

17th century. Then starting from the thirtieth of the 19th century the so-called the Great Trek of moving to inside South Africa and creating new colonies on their way on the expense of the indigenous population, such as the Transvaal and Natalia, the latter taken by the British in a later stage. As such the opposite happened which is a full exclusion of the indigenous population was conducted including from the political representation, and also by stripping them from citizenship and citizenship rights. At the same time the indigenous population were used as cheap labor force by enslavement of the children of the Khoikhoi, and also the San, as mentioned, also wars were conducted to subordinate them such as the Boer wars against the Khoikhoi in the 17th century and the British War against the Zululand (The Zulu Kingdom) for almost six months in 1879 that got to an end by the Zulu defeat and the British takeover of their lands (Mathew, 1977, 114).

To make it more complicated, slaves were also brought from the neighboring countries since the 17th century and continued till the global slave's trade was stopped in 1807, by then sixty thousand slaves were brought in already to South Africa (South Africa, www.sahistory.org.za). This last characteristic made the South Africa case different than Ireland and Palestine where slaves were not used. But also, almost similar to the United States where the slaves were brought mainly from outside the country. Did the South African settlers' dependence on the local labor force led to a different fate to it than the United States, Israel, and Northern Ireland? The answer is positive because here the Settlers did not commit genocides against the indigenous population, nor they transferred them to outside the county. As such, they kept them in the country as population majority disenfranchised from all political, social and economic rights, displaced from their lands, and subjects to wars against them. Despite all of that they were kept in their country without getting eliminated physically, as in the case of the Amerindians, or demographically, as in the case of the Palestinians. This characteristic of South Africa made it possible at the end for

the South African indigenous population to struggle for their rights leading to the change in that country (Kasirli, 2015; Abbas, 1989).

During the pure settler colonial period, citizenship and local governance were given only to the settlers, such as the British granting in 1852 a limited self-government to the Transvaal district that was ruled by the Boer. In 1902 the Transvaal and the Orange Free State of the Boer were given a "self-governing status" by the British Authorities (South Africa, general info, www.bbc.org). The British settler colonies, on the contrary to these districts enjoyed autonomous situation under the rule of the British Kings and Queens. Natal Colony, for Instance, was given the status of a constitutional monarchy till the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. It was run since established by a Commissioner appointed by the Crown, and additionally, it was locally governed by Prime Minister since 1893, surrounded by an elected Parliament by the settlers (Guest, 1993/94; www.natalia.org.za, Porter, 1981). Around that period Gandhi came to South Africa and in the Natal, he became the secretary of the Natal Indian Congress that was established in 1894 there in order to seek for equal rights to the Indians in South Africa. The latter suffered from a discriminatory type of citizenship opposite to the black who was fully denied citizenship.

The process the Apartheid system was declared as an official policy in 1948, although the Apartheid policies and practices took place before then. In 1913 a land act was released as mentioned which gave the indigenous lands to the settlers, expressing a settler colonial act, but also has an aspect of Apartheid. Gandhi faced in South Africa the discriminatory treatment to the colored in South Africa when he was denied a first-class train ticket bought for him in the Natal train station, and when he rejected to move to the third-class section he was ejected from the train (Guest, 1993/94, www.natalia.org.za). Neville Alexander further mentioned that all the Apartheid System politics and procedures were adopted as early as 1903-1905, the years of the preparation of

“the Report of the South African Natives Affairs Commission” led by Sir Godfrey Lagden(Alexander, 2012, 200; 2013).

When adopted in 1948, a series of laws were released to impose it, these laws expressed the Apartheid modes of exclusion of the blacks from citizenship. These include among other acts, the Prohibition of mixed marriage Act of 1949, the Groups Areas Act of 1950 which prevented the blacks from freedom of access to the cities and the industrial and agricultural areas, except for permitted workers who will not be allowed yet to bring their spouses and relatives to live with them on those areas. In the Same year, the Population Registration Act classified the people in the registration according to the color of their skin, whites, blacks and colored. In 1952 the Abolition of Passes and Coordination Act, obliged the blacks to carry Pass that includes the name, a picture, the place of work, evaluation of the performance in work, and violations to the law committed. Finally, there are the laws of the Bantustans, starting from the Bantu Authorities Act of 1959 which distributed the black to 10 ethnic groups, each to have its own Bantustan. These Bantustans were called as States, or homelands since 1976 and the Blacks were given citizenship specifically to those states without South African citizenship. Also, they were not free to leave them or to reside in urban areas without permits (Klarren, 2010). One of these Bantustans, Transkei, was given in 1963 the status of a Republic that was connected to South Africa, but it was not recognized by any country in the world. In brief, these laws restricted citizenship and its rights for representation and participation to the settlers. The Colored were also given minor rights, while the "majority" of the settlers in the ruling system was preserved by excluding the black population majority from citizenship and its rights, and by putting them in concentrated reserves(Bantustans) that they will not be allowed to leave without permits.

The Apartheid faced several protests; among these was a big protest in 1976 in Soweto Bantustan leaving six hundred students killed. In response to this

protest the ruling National Party developed what it was called "the total strategy" that included the establishment of a third chamber in the Parliament for the colored people, allowing black to have leaseholds in the cities, and allowing the mixed marriage, lifting the restrictions on the blacks freedom of movement, and allowing them to enter those recreation places that were limited previously to the whites (Gidron et al, 2002, 43-44). This total strategy implementation might pave the way to the collapse of the Apartheid regime and the transition to democracy that started in 1994.

The struggle for change in South Africa passed roughly four stages with the African National Congress (ANC) playing a crucial role in all of them: The first stage was of dialogue with Britain and the local regime, depending on the trust that the South African Middle Class that led the ANC had towards Britain and its Liberal democracy (1912 to 1948) followed secondly by a non violence, and no cooperation struggle campaign from 1948 to 1960 that included boycotting the Governmental institutions (Alexander, 2012, 201-202). Then thirdly the move to arms struggle after the creation of the 'Spearhead of the Nation' as a militant organization that initiated armed attacks for a short period then stopped and the struggle went back to non-violence with essential participation of the workers in the gold mines and other economic sectors, and social groups.

In comparison with the United States in regard to the inclusion and the exclusion politics, South Africa was faster in stopping the use of slaves since its prohibition by Britain in by an Abolition Bill released by the British Parliament in 1833. For the United States, it has yet to wait for the civil war of 1861 to 1865, in order to release the 13th Amendment of the American Constitution which abolished slavery. Besides that, all types of discrimination against the black's civil rights were canceled in South Africa after 1994, while the United States took two other centuries after 1865 till discrimination acts were deleted in the 1960s after the strong struggle of the civil rights movement there led by the Black Pastor Martin Luther King. In other comparative note, both witnessed the implementation of

private settler colonial projects. But since 1910 the settler colonial expansion and the attacks on the blacks were conducted in South Africa by the Government and according to the law, while in the United States these continued to be conducted by the settlers' private initiatives (Evans, 2005, 183-203). Yet the major difference between both in regard to the exclusion and inclusion policy is that the United States excluded the indigenous population by murdering and genociding, while South Africa excluded them by putting them in reserves, a method that also was used by the United States in addition to the physical elimination of the natives.

In conclusion to the inclusion and the exclusion politics in South Africa, it can be said that these politics started by a full exclusion from citizenship to the indigenous population combined with a partial inclusion of the colored groups. During the period of Apartheid, the full exclusion from citizenship and political representation and participation continued against the indigenous black population, while the colored groups' citizens rights were increased to include having a chamber in the Parliament that represent them.

After 1994 an inclusive process of equal civil and political rights was created. But the economy in the second hand is still monopolized by the previous white owners but this time in cooperation with the new emerging black capitalists, and middle class, who both aimed to open the African Markets for the South Africa products and to bring investments to South Africa. While poverty continued to prevail mainly among the majority of black workers (Seekings, 2014; Alexander, 2012, 206). Besides that, the reconciliation process that took place via the Truth and Reconciliation Commission failed to create holistic integrative citizenship by bridging the gap between truth and reconciliation, and amnesty and punishment for the atrocities. In 2008 racist and xenophobic attacks and counter-attacks erupted in the country, also racism continued to be used as a justification to the economic marginalization of the poor (Clark, 2002; Chapman and Merve, 2008; Alexander, 2012, 99, 207-208).

Moving to Ireland, the British settler colonial inclusion and exclusion politics in Ireland till its independence of 1921 will be discussed, and then a focus will be made on these politics' implementation in Northern Ireland in two stages, one from 1921 to 1998, and the second from 1998 Good Friday Agreement till today. As in South Africa, the major characteristic of the inclusion policy towards the indigenous population in Ireland by the British and their settlers was by dispossession from their land and by disenfranchisement and creating limits to their citizens' rights. This is in general, while there are some differences to be reviewed in the following paragraphs.

The British colonial settlement Ireland passed two stages till 1921. In the first among them, British Catholics settled Ireland which continued till the sixteenth century, when the King Henri the 8th started the so-called "The British Reformation" by moving to Protestantism and breaking with the Pope and the Catholic Church. By then the second Stage of British settler colonialism started from 1553. This stage was a stage of Plantation when the new Protestant settlers expropriated the lands of the Anglo- Irish Catholics in the Province of Ulster (Coohill, 2000, 19, 26). This was exclusion by displacement and dispossession. What followed was the so-called "Penal Laws" of 1691 to 1778, continued officially till 1829, which excluded the Anglo- Irish Catholics from representation and participation, by preventing them to participate in the governmental positions, disenfranchise them from voting rights which were granted only to the Protestants, and moreover put restrictions on their freedom of worship.

In the period from 1704-1709 other laws followed in Ireland preventing Catholics to buy lands, also they were not allowed to lease lands for more than thirty years. As a result, the Catholics were left owning only five percent of Ireland land by 1778, some of the Catholics changed to Protestantism in order to protect their lands. Finally, the Declaratory Act of 1720 gave the British Parliament the right to legislate for Ireland, and the responsibilities of the Irish

Parliament were restricted by other law. In 1793 the Catholic landowners were allowed to vote and run in the Irish elections, but the bill of 1829 prevented those who succeed in the elections from them to have a seat in British Houses of Common and Lords, finally, in 1800 Britain decided to annex Ireland to it (Coohill, 2000 25-43). In 1870 a struggle for Home Rule aiming to increase the internal autonomy within the continuation of the unity with Britain started and continued till 1904 when the Sinn Finn was established calling for the independence of Ireland.

In 1919 the Irish Republican Army was established to participate in the war for independence. In 1920 British Irish negotiations were conducted during the Irish war of independence and the declaration of the Government of Ireland Act by the British Government which created an autonomous area in Northern Ireland. The negotiations lead to the signature of a Treaty in 1921 that included the confirmation of the partition of Ireland, were 16.7 percent of the country (a big part of Ulster Province) became Northern Ireland ruled by the Protestants, and the other part was declared as an independent Ireland but connected with the British Commonwealth. In 1937 Ireland declared a constitution that confirms the Unity of all Ireland. Later in 1948 Ireland was declared as fully independent Republic, this independence became official in 1949.

This brief review showed that Britain used three tools of exclusion during its long period of colonization to Ireland; one of these was by allowing the British settlers to expropriate lands, dispossess the native population and create their presence on the expense of them. The second was by prohibiting the native population rights to representation and participation, and the third by using partition in 1920 as a tool to create an area that enjoys a settler majority. Therefore, excluding this area from the whole country, and marginalizing the native population living in that area, including the prohibition from their right for self-determination. The following paragraphs are about this process of exclusion in Northern Ireland.

In 1920, the British Prime Minister Lloyd George granted Home Rule to the Protestant representing the majority of the population in six out of nine counties of Ulster. The other three counties were kept in Ireland due to their Catholic majority (Coohill, 2000, 132). After the partition of 1921, this Home Rule was practiced by allowing the landowners, the ratepayers, and the householders to participate in the elections according to certain percentages, the other parts of the people were not allowed to vote (Glasser, 2012, 240). This prohibition played mainly against the Catholics since ninety percent of the commercial property was owned by the Protestants, and only two from each household were allowed to vote, given also that most of the households were owned by the Protestants. Besides that, a change in the counties borders were made from 1922 to 1924, in addition to the cancelation of the proportional system, both led to an increase the Protestant representation, while the Catholics victories in local councils, for instance, went down from having 40 percent of them to having only two of them after 1922 change of laws (Hancock, 1998).

These arrangements against the Catholics had to wait till 1967 when the Civil Rights Movement launched a non-violent campaign calling for the full and equal civil rights, including in regard to voting and housing. The Downing Street Declaration of 1969 echoed this struggle by announcing that all Britain inhabitants are equal (Coohill, 2000, 177). In line with the Civil Rights Movement non-violence path of struggle, the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) emerged in 1970, while at the same time the IRA decided to resume the arms struggle, that period is famous in the Irish history as the period of Troubles, that led to the return of the British direct rule over Northern Ireland in 1972, and that continued till 1998.

During the first year of the British direct rule, both England and Ireland got the EU membership in 1973, creating thus British and Irish proposals to move from exclusion to inclusion in Northern Ireland. Such a new process required Ireland to make some concessions towards the unity of all Ireland and towards the

rights of both the Protestant loyalists, who seeks to become part of Britain, and the Protestant Unionists (Who seeks independence but keeping at the same time the Union with Britain). In another hand, Britain was obliged to think of formulas for the inclusion of the Irish Nationalists (Who seeks independence from Britain), and the Irish Republicans, who seek to bring the Unity of Ireland back. Another reason that pushed the two sides to search for inclusion possibilities was the Cold War, and their joint position in the capitalist countries side against Socialism and the Soviet Union. At that time the IRA stronger faction, the Official IRA, adopted a Marxist position opposite to the Provisional IRA who took a national position. The first was against the Republic of Ireland as well, because it accepted the partition of Ireland in 1921. Accordingly, both Britain and Ireland found a common enemy of IRA (Mallie and Mckittrick, 2000, 42), and instead, they decided to work with the nationalists (Mainly SDLP). The Unionists, Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) who both were in favor more or less to find to a joint formula of governance inclusive to the settlers and the indigenous population in Northern Ireland (Attwood, 2017, 40-47; Salem, 2017, 100-106; Mallie and Mckittrick, 2000).

Despite these facilitating factors, but they do not mean that the British-Irish proposals were accepted right away. For example, the Sunningdale agreement of 1973, which proposed a joint Council between Northern and Southern Ireland and the establishment of a joint Parliament composed of UUP and SDLP were rejected by the Unionists because of fear to pave the way for reuniting Northern Ireland with Ireland (Coohill, 2000, 179). In 1985 Britain and Ireland signed an agreement calling for the respect of the rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, and also to respect the power of the Unionists not to unite with Ireland. Also, a joint British-Irish Conference was created to find a solution to the conflict (Salem, 2017; Coohill, 2000, 182; Mallie and Mckittrick, 2000; Gidron et al., 2002, 53).

While the reciprocal exclusionist practices and the segregation of living in different neighborhoods separated from each other by walls, the British-Irish interventions with the parties were accelerated after the 1985 agreement. In 1993 the British Government released the Downing Street Declaration of confirming that Britain has no economic self-interests in Northern Ireland, nor any wish to annex it. This development led to 1994 ceasefire in Northern Ireland that was followed by the declaration of a joint British-Irish document called as 'the framework of the Future' in 1995, and the establishment of a body for Decommissioning in 1996. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the positions of the IRA and the Sinn Féin who became ready for a solution in Northern Ireland instead of just waiting for the unity of Ireland. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair who was elected in 1997 started negotiations with the IRA which became an eligible negotiation partner after accepting the 1994 ceasefire. The American Senator George Mitchell joined as a mediator, and the 1998 Great Friday Agreement (The GFA) between the parties in Northern Ireland was the result (Coohill, 2000, 189-192; Salem, 2017).

The GFA proposed a top-down formula for inclusion (Morrow, 2016; 2017), and that is by the creation of a joint national Assembly for which Britain will devolve some domestic responsibilities, while the duties of defense, security and order were kept in the hands of Britain until 2010. The Assembly will make decisions according to parallel consent of the two communities' representatives, or through voting of sixty percent of the majority of those present when voting takes time, conditioned that 40 percent at least of the nationalists and the Unionists designations will be present and voting, point 5.d of Strand one. The GFA gave the people of Northern Ireland the right to decide their future freely, which required changes in the British and the Irish Constitutions recognizing that right. In the other hand, the Agreement kept Northern Ireland as part of Britain till the people of Northern Ireland vote alternatively.

Regarding Citizenship, the GFA gave in point (VI) of the Constitutional Issues the people of Northern Ireland the right to have either/ or both British and Irish citizenship. Also, Annex 2 at the end of the Agreement defined those who are eligible to British or Irish nationality or both to be those who born in Northern Ireland while having at the time of birth one parent who is British or Irish. The annex also gives citizenship right to those "otherwise entitled to reside in Northern Ireland without any restrictions on their period of residence."

Regarding Reconciliation and Victims of Violence, article 11 of strand 3 of GFA included that 'the achievement of a peaceful and just society would be the true memorial to the victims of violence.' Opposite to South Africa', this phrase meant that the atrocities of the past would not be considered to create a path towards community reconciliation beyond the prevailing segregation. GFA recognized in point 3 of the section about "Rights, Safeguards and equality of Opportunity" the importance of tolerance in regard to "linguistic diversity" towards "the Irish language, Ulster-Scots, and the languages of the various ethnic communities, all of which part of the cultural wealth of the Island of Ireland". Points 1 and 2 in the same section also included ideas for the implementation of "a new regional development strategy" by the British Government. Finally, the part about "decommissioning" stressed the importance of non-violence, disarmament, and the need of cooperation with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning to finish this task in two years after the approval of the agreement (Great Friday Agreement, 1998 www.taoiseach.gov.ie).

No doubt that GFA represented an example for the creation of an inclusive process between two ethnic segregated groups, one of them composed of colonial settlers and the second is the indigenous population. What GFA achieved in the path to inclusivity includes in the top that it was able to transform the process between the negotiating parties from violence, to partnering to find a solution. Accordingly, the negotiators as leaders to their organizations, worked

with these organization to decrease the violent acts. The level of violence and the number of its actions drastically reduced after the agreement to 100 attacks in the 15 years from 1999 to 2014, in comparison with 564 attacks in the last five years of 1989 to 1993 before the agreement (Bollens, 2017, 88). Besides that, shared, inclusive governance was created, political norms and human rights principles were adopted, joint grassroots activities were developed, and an economic plan was initiated. However in another hand the split between the parties continued, the Democratic Unionist Party voted against the Agreement, and a division from the IRA continued their violent attacks and as well as other Protestant military groups. The segregation and the conflict between narratives and hostility also kept in the community level, the structures of Justice and the creation of integrative police was not achieved and also decommissioning did not take place, and the crimes of the past were not settled (Morrow, 2016). In brief, and despite the formal political structure of inclusivity that was created, community-based inclusivity was not achieved on the other hand, and the two communities continued muddling through.

Did the twenty years that followed the GFA carry any change to this conclusion? Developments that took place after in Northern Ireland generally gives a negative answer regarding achievements towards inclusiveness in the community level in Northern Ireland, while other results were made on the other issues. The ten years that followed GFA were spent in different attempts made to fix the joint assembly, finally, in 2007 this assembly started functioning continuously for ten years till it collapsed in 2017, and Northern Ireland went back again to the direct British rule.

The first crisis for the assembly was in 2002 when the British Police attacked a meeting of Sinn Finn, followed by the British freezing of the Assembly and bringing Northern Ireland back to the direct British rule. In 2006 the two governments of Britain and England agreed to bring the assembly back in March 2007. Later the assembly was back to functioning, helped on that the IRA official

declaration of 2005 to end its military campaign, and the announcement of the decommissioning commission that IRA finished putting its weapons out of use, followed in 2009 by the Unionist military organizations doing the same. These Unionist organizations are the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Red Hand Commando. In another hand, Ulster Defense Association and a split called as continuity IRA rejected to stop the violence. After the re-composition of the Assembly, Britain removed the last military tower it had in Armagh in Northern Ireland.

The election of the Assembly in 2007 brought to power the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who voted earlier against GFA with 36 seats, followed by Sin Finn that got 28 seats. These hard-core parties were those who were capable of composing shared governance that continued for ten years. During their period the police consisted earlier of 90 percent Protestant, and Justice Responsibilities were transferred to their government from Britain in 2010; also they tried in 2009 to develop a plan on how to solve the problems resulting from the 1960s and 1970s troubles. The joint assembly collapsed at the beginning of 2017 due to accusations of mismanagement of an economic plan by the first minister ever since Northern Ireland is back to direct British rule (www.gov.uk; BBC; The Guardian newspapers websites).

If decommissioning completion by the IRA, was the reason behind the establishment of a joint stable government in 2007, but this Government collapsed in 2017. According to Duncan Morrow, this collapse indicates to deep issues of conflict that left unresolved by GFA. For him, the GFA was an agreement to sidestep Northern Ireland problems aside when Britain and Ireland do business between each other. But on the other hand the two ethnic groups in Northern Ireland voted with 72 percent support to it because they sought to have stability and peace and to stop the violence.

Duncan Morrow maintained that "Northern Ireland came into being more as a tactic than a goal" (Morrow, 2018) when it was invented by Britain followed by the Unionists. But the Nationalists did not accept to live in the side where the Unionists live. Therefore, what left is hostility "Chronic Hostility was the Northern Ireland identity". As a liberal, Morrow calls for the creation of relationships, integration, and inclusivity rather than just building top-down institutions. For him what required for that are equality, integrative education, joint housing, joint civic forums, and declarations of freedom and others about the shared future (Morrow, 2017).

Besides this liberal solution of Morrow, there are others for achieving inclusivity, such as the one that aims to use consociational democracy suggested by Arendt Lijphart (Lijphart, 1969). It looks impossible to annex Northern Ireland to Britain or to bring back the unity of Ireland due to the reciprocal objections of the two ethnic groups. It might also be challenging to integrate them in one shared identity, even given that the Protestants do define their identity different between those who consider themselves as Irish, or Ulsterians, or British (Miller, 1998, 11-13). In the other hand the Catholics are defining themselves as Either Irish or Northern Irish. The question then will be about how to include these together? Maybe a way to do that can be done by accepting first their different identities, and celebrate that diversity through a kind of consociational arrangement as Lijphart proposed.

Azmi Bishara tried to compare Northern Ireland arrangements with those proposed by Lijphart in four components: Wide Coalition Government inclusive to all parties, cultural self-government system, proportional representation in jobs, and veto right to the minorities (Bishara, 2018, 17). The first point is already implemented in Northern Ireland, the second is not achieved, the third is improving during the process, and the fourth is not implemented. But the mentioned above system of voting adopted in the Assembly in Northern Ireland provides another way like a veto, but this veto is offered to both parties rather

than only for the Catholic minority. Unlike South Africa where a transition to a Post-Apartheid system was launched after 1994 according to the liberal democratic formula of respect of both individual and collective civil and political rights, Northern Ireland created a stifled and paralyzed kind of joint governance of vetoing each other positions expressing by this reality the unwillingness to move to either the liberal democratic formula of inclusion, or the consociational form of it. The question of the future will be about where this situation of reciprocal ethnocratic discourse within the façade of democracy without its content will lead Northern Ireland to?

The third and the last case for the review in this study of the inclusion and the exclusion policies in the United States, different than both South Africa and Northern Ireland, the "Logic of elimination" of Patrick Wolfe operated openly in this case as a way to create a settler majority on the expense of the indigenous population. In South Africa, the settlers couldn't generate a population majority, and in Northern Ireland, the settlers' majority was created in six counties of Ulster that were torn from full Ireland to create a separate entity for the settlers. In the United States, the settler-colonial period witnessed genocides, starvation, malnutrition, white racist superiority, demonizing, the use of Papal documents that the non-Christians cannot own the land, and removals (Paul, 2011, 169-171). These acts continued as well after the declaration of the United States Independence of 1776. Patrick Wolfe summarized, in other words, the methods used in the United States by three: Indian Removal, General allotment, and changing the blood quantum through marriage and sex relations leading to assimilation (Wolfe, 2011).

These processes in the USA started directly after Christopher Columbus' Discovery' of it in 1492. First by Spanish, and then came the Dutch and the French. The British joined in the 17th century when they established twelve colonies in the United States in that century. These twelve starting with Virginia in 1606, and followed by others as Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and

others, covered the area between French Canada, and Spanish Florida (Goodman, and Gattel, 1972, 20).

The claim of the 'Discovery' of the United States, was part of the mentality of that time that 'What you discover,' actually what you conquer, is yours unilaterally, regardless of the indigenous population. But as a fact, United States was not first an empty land before the 'Discovery' as indicated earlier, but it resided through thousands of years by peoples that were called by the discoverers as Indians, but according to their original languages they were called as Mi'kmaq which means the 'First Nations People.' In their reserves, till today they are still having Mi'kmaq Elders such as Daniel N. Paul who wrote and published a series of books entitled as "We were not the savages" (Paul, 1993; 2000). These nations included many such as the Cherokee, the Choctaw, Sioux, Iroquois, Apache, Navajo, and others. They also called the country "AbyaYala" which means "Land in its full maturity" (Stam, and Shohat, 2012, 5). These people's mode of life depended on hunting, fishing, and cultivating maize and crops. The British settlers learned to farm these products from them but called them as savages despite this learning (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 38).

The discoverers in one hand ignored all of this, denied the binarism of the United States that they created, considered the country as their unilateral possession, made the history starts with their discovery as if nothing was there before. In the best cases they today find binarism as part of the past ignoring as such the other that was eliminated physically, socially, and culturally (Wolfe, 2013, 257-259). Therefore, the exclusion politics of the settler colonialism in the United States included this characteristic of occupying the land with all its aspects as a place of living, as a space for social economic cultural and political interactions, as a territory of sovereignty. And finally as a landscape that expresses the economic, social, and cultural prints of those who live inside it. Besides that, this exclusion includes the denial of the other history and the

destruction of their societies, economies, cultures, and also their modes of governance as well.

In his seminal article "Recuperating Binarism," Patrick Wolfe goes further in explaining these processes of exclusion, he says that the settler- colonial project, when creating its coexistence formula, it imposes it by abolishing the sovereignty of the other and not only by rejecting the principle that the other is equal. The result according to Wolfe will be the elimination of the horizontal vocabulary of the international relations and replace it by a "vertical reality of domination", in which the conflict between the new emerging sovereignty of the settler-colonial project, and the sovereignty of the natives become an internal depoliticized issue handled by technical means by the settler colonial projects (Wolfe, 2013, 258-262). As a result, the frontiers "Being a way of talking about the historical process of territorial invasion-Accumulative depredation through which outsiders recurrently advance on natives to take their place" (Wolfe, 257) became less invisible (Wolfe, 259). While at the same continuing by means such as bringing immigrants and settle them on the natives' lands after the settler colonial State emerges, as Israel does (Wolfe, 263).

The elimination of indigenous nations and the creation of newly invented one on its ruins is thus what the United States it is about. The methods above were just tools used in the path of achieving that objective by the settlers there. Further, the colonists used another means of "Privatizing" the Amerindians lands, by using the European concept of private land ownership, to divide the community-owned lands of the Amerindians. As such Garry Fields described the conflict between the settlers and the natives as follows:

"A people who have little love for possessing the land as property were overwhelmed by people who loved lands property above all else" (Fields, 2016, 50). Therefore "Settlement meant land taking, and land taking meant violence, and removal of the Indians, dispossession, and uprooting" (Fields, 2016).

According to the Amerindians religious and cultural beliefs, the land was considered like the sky and air, therefore as being not eligible for private ownership. They believed instead that the right to the land is inherited from its use rather than from its property. The land as such was under the authority of the *Sachem*: the head of the village, who distribute it for usufruct by the village members. In between the communities also there were bounded areas that their lands will be used by the different villages (Fields, 2016). The Spanish conquered these lands based on the "discovery right," and launched a state-directed project for promoting Christianity among the natives.

When the British came into the United States, they used another concept that justifies the acquisition of land by the "Natural Law" inherited from the Roman Empire, which claims that the land is the owner of those who aims to improve it for the welfare of humanity (Fields, 2016). This British concept was fully exclusive against the native population. In this regard, the British used Plantation, and those British farmers who used Plantation were called as "Yeomen Farmers." As they considered the Amerindians to be the enemies that should be removed, they did not hire them in their farms but brought indentured slaves from Africa instead. These slaves brought by the British and the non-British settlers in the United States were considered as chattel labor according to the "Black code" of that century. There were also ships that were allocated to bring them and sell them like any product in the United States. In a later stage, a tax of ten dollars was decided by the 1787 American Constitution article 1:9 to be paid for every slave to be brought to the United States till 1808 when slave trade became illegal. By 1690 the slaves were representing as 20 percent of the United States population. In 1865 the Amendment 13 promoted by President Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War between the Northern and the Southern States, abolished slavery (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 33-36; The American Constitution, constitutionus.com).

The discrimination against the African Americans continued later on as to be described below. Back to the Amerindians, the exclusion of them from land, took place through three hundred years of wars (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 38), starting from 1622 to 1644 Powhatan Confederacy Wars in Virginia, and ended by the Slaughter of the Amerindian Sioux Chief Big Foot by the American Army during 1890 war in South Dakota. Skirmishes followed after till 1923. Some of these wars continued over many years including a decade and even longer. In addition to Powhatan long wars, other long ones took place such as the King Philip War of 1675 to 1678 that took place in Massachusetts when the Amerindian leader King Philip tried to move the settlers out. There were also the 1689 to 1763 seventy-four years long French and Indian wars that Britain fought against France and its Amerindians allies for the possession of North America, ended by a British victory.

After the American Independence, the Amerindians were "reinvented as savage" and lost their positions as farmers, but also, they were not given citizens status. In 1787 the American Constitution excluded from representation "Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons" (Article 1, section 2, clause 3). The last sentence is referring to another compromise that took place between the different States regarding the representation of the slaves, as included each 3 out of each five slaves were considered as equal to one person regarding representation. In 1823 the Chief Judge of the United States John Marshall ruled in the case of Johnson versus M, Intosh case, that Amerindians have the right of occupancy of land, but have no right of ownership of it. This resolution paved the way to the Congress to pass the "Indian Removal Act" in 1830 which allowed for the removal of the Amerindians, mainly the Cherokee, to the West of the Mississippi River. By 1840 this removal of the Cherokee was completed and the leftovers of them after the death of many during to what was called as "the trail of tears" were settled on what was called later as Oklahoma (Fields, 2016). Later other Amerindians were removed to the West of the Mississippi, such as the Sioux, who resisted the new waves of settlers in the so-

called "the Sioux Wars," that continued from 1854 to 1890, under the leadership of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse (www.u-s-history.com). One of these Sioux wars took place in Dakota as mentioned above which lasted from 1862 to 1890. During that war, the Amerindians were dispossessed from Minnesota and resided in other States like Iowa (Ben Talib, 2014).

During these wars the process was as follows as described by Goodman and Gattel: "The Process of Indian Removal followed a grim pattern. As each wave of white settlers coveted the nearest Indian lands, the U.S Government negotiated treaties that opened new areas for settlement and provided the Indians perpetual control of land that they still retained. But white pressed on relentlessly "Each new removal treaty meant a new betrayal" (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 161).

The Amerindians resistance led further to their annihilation (Goodman and Gattel, 162). Garry Fields adds to these the economic mechanisms that were used in the early stages of settler colonialism before the emergence of the United States. These include creating an exchange in which the Amerindians will buy cooking pots, knives, axes, wool blankets, and others while they will provide the settlers with fur. By the time the ability of the Amerindians to respond to the growing demands of the settler's market for fur drastically eroded and they were obliged to give lands to the settlers. Besides that, the settlers brought with them diseases that killed too many Amerindians (Fields, 2016).

The inclusion and the exclusion politics towards the Amerindians took two stages as illustrated; the first that took place before the American independence was entirely exclusivist as explained above. The second started years before the independence and mainly after the 1763 Pontiac Revolution when the American settlers began to violate the British restrictions imposed on their freedom to conquer the land. During the 1770s around two million and a half colonists were living in the United States (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 33).

Contrary to excluding the Amerindians, those settlers created a kind of their system of inclusion, through a type of governance that was relatively separate from London that is three thousand miles away. This governance included having a Council for the issuance of laws, that is composed of the settler male adults, in Massachusetts this Council was elected, working beside a Governor and a Sheriff appointed by the British Crown or by the Proprietor. This structure gave the settlers some space to maneuver and to reject British politics when restricting their freedom to conquer and dispossess (Goodman and Gattel, 45-47). What made things worse between Britain and the settlers was the British decision to send forces to work in the ground to implement the new choices of restricting the individual takeover of land in one hand, and to direct the settlers to new "legal" settlements that Britain created for them in Florida and Quebec. The settlers resented restricting them to individual settlements, and also they resented the British military presence, especially after Britain made several decisions to oblige the settlers to contribute to the provision of food and care to its soldiers in one hand. Britain also decided restrictions be imposed on trade such as taxes on business aiming to find salaries to the British employees, such as the 'Tea Tax' (Goodman and Gattel, 87-92).

These developments accelerated the process towards the American settlers' revolution for independence. In the first years of 1777 to 1787, the new United States took the shape of confederation, and then it was transformed into a federation. In both cases, the inclusive democratic system was for the male settlers till 1920 when women right to vote was added, and also African Americans were allowed partially to vote in some states since the last third of the nineteenth century as explicated. At the Same time, the African Americans continued to be excluded practically speaking by different means and procedures including through local laws in the Southern States.

Regarding the Amerindians, they had to wait till 1924 when the "Indian Citizenship Act" was released to give them full American citizenship in the States for the first time with some shortfalls (see below). Before that, the Government treated them according to different frameworks as clarified by Robert Porter, one of these frameworks considered them as "separate Domestic Dependent Nations" which led to the removal of them to reserves designated by the government. The second framework was about considering them as "Wards of the US Government," and therefore deprives them of the citizenship rights including the right to possess the land, and the right to raise their children. Their children were taken from them to be raised and educated instead by Christian pastors in special "Boarding Schools" where they will not be allowed to use their native language or to practice their traditions, and also their parents will not be allowed to visit them. This framework included also putting them under a special bureau that is called The "Bureau of Indian Affairs" to take care of them (Tsosie, 2016, 1707-1715). This second framework included dealing with them according to the 1887 "Dawes Severalty Act" that gave land allotments to them in the reserves designated by the government and create individual schools for their children.

The third framework for dealing with the Amerindians was implemented with the release of the 1924 "Citizenship Act" which gave the Amerindians citizenship rights from the State and not from the Constitution, in addition to keeping their citizenship to their nations (Dual citizenship). According to this logic of the Act, the States were given the right to decide when and how to implement this Act in each one of them. Besides that, American citizenship was imposed on the Amerindians in some States without their consent. This development led the Iroquois Nation to reject American citizenship and to insist on keeping their original citizenship (Tsosie, 2016, 1717-1718). In another hand, Some States did not find its way to implement this Act till 1957(www.americanlibrary.gov; Tsosie, 2016, 1718). The Fourth framework recognized the Amerindians as "Racial minorities" that have double status, by being in one hand citizens who

have civil and political rights according to the State-Federal Law, while also having recognition as racial minorities according to the civil rights law. The latter will mean that they will be deprived of housing, voting, employment and other collective rights to all citizens (Tsosie, 2016, 1726).

These four frameworks present the dilemma between recognizing the collective right of self-determination which lead to a multinational state and the recognition of individual citizens' rights in one nation. In 1988, Congress recognized the democratic ideas and values of the Amerindians (Paul, 2011, 166). In 2007, United States recognized the "UN Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples" (Tsosie, 2016, 1732), followed in 2009 President Barack Obama signature of the "Native America Apology Resolution." This apology was not followed by solving the mentioned dilemma, but the Amerindians were kept till today to be taking care of by the separate body that was established in 1824 under the name of the "Bureau of Indian Affairs" as mentioned. This Bureau is working under the Ministry of Interior. This arrangement keeps the feelings of some of the Amerindians that they are still looked at as separate, or that the apology declared is not that serious. Another part of them, as Waziyataween earlier quoted, or as the Iroquois nation, will feel that their right of self-determination was not fulfilled. The "United States Department of the Interior Indian Affairs" tasks according to their website include that they run "55 million surface acres, and 57 million acres of subsurface minerals estates held in trust by the United States for American Indian, Indian tribes, and Alaska Natives". Their educational section also provides education to 42,000 Indian students (www.bia.gov). These arrangements represent a kind of separate development that is still going on without a clear recognition of the right of self-determination of the Amerindian Nations.

Academic studies about citizenship in the United States consider this arrangement of the Indian Affairs to be problematic also due to the history of the United States with the indigenous people's rights.

As it might be concluded from the brief history of the US inclusion and exclusion politics presented in this chapter, the country has several citizenship problems resulted from its settler-colonial history. These problems are not limited to the Amerindians, but also, they include the African Americans, the former Mexicans residing in those States that were annexed to the United States from Mexico in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Puerto Rico, Hawaii, Guam, and the American Virgin Islands. That all without adding the problems of citizenship of the immigrants from all around the world to the United States which will require another separate study. Due to these kinds of issues, Rebecca Tsosie criticized the American citizenship system on that it is based on Nationalism; you should become an American to get American Citizenship. Tsosie suggested (following also other academics such as Carol Goldberg and Robert Porter) that citizenship in the United States should be defined and practiced along with another kind of "politics of inclusion" as she called them. These politics should include in her opinion recognizing the self-determination of the indigenous peoples, accept multiculturalism, and accordingly grant them a new kind of citizenship that will also help solve many existing problems such as the problem of the Dreamers which is consisted of people who was born in Mexico, but grow up in the United States (Tsosie, 2016, 1692- 1697).

Besides the elimination of the Amerindians, and the inclusion and exclusion politics towards them, the United States policy towards the blacks, called later as African Americans, took another direction. The Amerindians were subject to termination "The Indian was not even considered useful material for domestication to exploit his labor" (Goodman and Gattel, 1972, 199), while the slaves were subject of exploitation. After the 1808 abolishment of slavery trade, this trade continued to take place illegally until 1859. This contradiction between the legal and the practical continued after. So, after the 1865 abolishment of slavery, another law was released in 1866 titled as The Civil Rights Act. This law gave the male blacks full American citizenship.

On the contrary to the above mentioned law the so-called Jim Crow laws of 1876 to 1965 in the Southern States came on to separate between whites and blacks in the public facilities. The Ku Klux Klan was also established in 1865 to attack the blacks. The Southern States imposed restrictions on the rights of the blacks to vote from 1890 to 1908. During the First and the Second World War, the American blacks fought separately from the Whites. These practices continued till the black's struggle for equal civil rights started to give fruits in the 1950s and the 1960s led by Martin Luther King (W.E.B. Du Bois, 1961).

According to this review of the three cases, it can be concluded that the United States one is different than the other two cases. In those two cases fully or partially integrative political governance systems were created inclusive to both the settlers and the natives' representatives. In the United States case, democratic representation was made as limited to the settlers, settlers' democracy as Michael Mann called it. In another hand, the indigenous as shown were butchered, and the leftovers of them are still facing exclusion, marginalization, and no proper recognition of their national and civil rights till today by the settler colonial state also called as a Settler Empire state as Aziz Rana proposed, and discussed earlier.

Chapter three will take these three cases to be compared with the case of the settler-colonial project in Palestine.

1.4 The Need for a Theory about Settler Colonial State, and its Inclusion and Exclusion Politics

In the previous sections, the settler colonial framework of analysis, and its inclusion and exclusion politics were explicated. It is clear by now that the 'successful' settler colonial project passes two major stages: The first is when the project is in progress, and the second is when the project becomes a settler colonial state. Some of the emerging settler colonial countries collapsed at a later stage such as South Africa and Northern Ireland, but others were sustained

like United States, Canada; New Zealand and Australia, and a third category is still struggling for its legitimacy and full recognition from the indigenous population and the surrounding region like Israel.

In the literature about the subject, there are a lot of studies and analysis about the first stage, but the research about the second stage is mixed and ambiguous, where the three mentioned types of the 'successful' settler state are classified almost together under the heading of the "postcolonial." Therefore, Veracini went even further by suggesting that in these cases settlers will get indigenized without him presenting proper conditions for that indigenization as it was shown. It is safe then to say that there are missing studies within the settler colonial framework about the settler- colonial states and the studies about them were moved mostly to the postcolonial studies. This study first calls then is for 'liberating' the settler colonial states analysis from the postcolonial unilateral hijack, and regaining back the analysis about them to their natural framework off analysis which is the settler colonial studies framework.

In support for such an approach, the Egyptian scholar Majdi Hammad divided the stages of the settler-colonial project to three: The first is about the establishment of a settler social entity through immigration, the second to move to a settler colonial entity that plays a political role that aims to establish a state, and finally comes the third by creating a settler colonial state. Hammad maintained that there are four mechanisms used to implement these stages: the intensive settlers immigration, followed by the systematic dominance, and then by conquering from inside, to be followed finally by establishing the settler state and uprooting the indigenous population (Hammad, 1984). What follows this point is that the other frameworks of analysis (like the postcolonial and the others alluded to in this chapter) are still to be used for the study of the settler colonial state, but as a complementary to the settler colonial analysis and under its heading. The need for a theory about the settler colonial state and its modes

of action looks to be as an urgently required undertaking. At the end of this final part of this section, some suggestions will be presented in that direction.

In the pre-settler state, modes of exclusion prevail along the line of elimination, being physical, demographic, ethnic and national and political, social, economic, and legal. In this sense, the indigenous will get what 'they deserve' due to their "savage" and "underdeveloped" nature. Therefore, besides erasing, they will not be allowed to have their right of self-determination in their independent states or autonomies that rule according to their freely decided legal and political systems, nor developing their cultures and economies, or to keep the cohesion of their societies that get fragmented and deterritorialized when it comes to their connections to the land. Dehumanized, demonized, and with no recognition, they will not be allowed to obtain citizenship rights to participate, nor to be represented, or to have access to the decision makers. Also, they will not be considered eligible for development.

When the settler state emerges, the status of the indigenous population became confused between the former stage model of full exclusion, and the new emerging but gradual model of partial inclusion, and the result will be a mix. Total exclusion in one hand will continue by for instance depriving some parts of the indigenous population of citizenship and depriving those who escaped during the 'Frontier wars' to come back. The emerging settler state will conduct further additional massacres and genocides to purify the country from the terrorists. Besides that, Enclosures of lands and territories for confiscation and for imposing a military rule will be conducted (Fields, 2016).

Another process of partial inclusion starts after the emergence of the settler state. This process is incomplete and not full because no equal citizenship with the settlers will be given, and if formal citizenship is offered along the line of individual equal rights. These will be combined with an ethnic definition of the state to itself which will result with discrimination against the rights of those who

are not affiliated to the dominating ethnicity (Yiftachel, 2012a, 2012b). If this combined with the formerly mentioned continued disconnection between the indigenous and his/her land, then a worse situation than ethnocracy emerges which Elia Zureik called as "Internal colonialism" (Zureik, 1979). The difference is that ethnocracy formula is a kind of postcolonial projection that imagines a "post-settler" state that discriminates against the non-ethnically dominating parts of its population by excluding them from the "Demos" wholly or partially. In the other hand, the internal colonialism formula is a one that is eligible to describe a situation of a settler state who still considers the leftovers of the indigenous population as enemies, and deals with them accordingly. Settler colonial states use both internal colonialism and ethnocracy, and the second is used in the framework of the first as Blauner (1972), and Elia Zureik (1979) advised regarding the United States and Israel.

There are other components to be added to the settler state performance besides internal colonialism and ethnocracy, and the resulting Apartheid from the latter. If one will imagine a mix of settler colonialism and internal colonialism as the heading of the settler state politics, then one will be able to see other complimentary components added under this heading. These include ethnocracy, and Apartheid, coloniality by using epistemic methods for domination, neo-colonialism by using economic plans for power, and postcolonial approaches will also be used, especially those five earlier mentioned by Christine Sylvester which are media, technology, finance, ideas promotion, and ethnic discrimination against the indigenous population. Out of these five ideas promotion, and to a certain extent media, is interlinked with coloniality, finance, and technology with Neo-Colonialism, and ethnic discrimination with ethnocracy. This connection represented one reason Why Ella Shohat considered the concept of postcolonialism to be unnecessary (Shohat and Stam, 2003).

Towards a theory about the settler colonial state, this study suggests to define it as a mix of settler colonial and internal colonial state. The first in the sense that it continues bringing settlers from outside in the shape of immigrants, and give them rights over conquered land from the indigenous population while preventing the indigenous refugees to come back to their original country, and preventing any meaningful process towards a full reconciliation with the indigenous people. The second in the other hand is referring to its colonial practices towards the leftovers from the indigenous inside its proper, taking the shape of confiscating their land and other colonial methods. When studying the specific cases in this chapter, it will be shown what is familiar and what is different between them in this regard.

Under the heading of settler colonialism and internal colonialism the other ethnocratic and Apartheid, neo-colonial, postcolonial, and coloniality comes in as a complementary in the ways that were described above. In this regard, the question that this study is raising about the Israeli settler-colonial case is if the practice of these corresponding components will be permanent or only provisional till time becomes ripe for the transfer of the Palestinians to outside their country for the third time as a continuation to 1948, and 1967 previous ones. In this sense are the procedures of moving from who is eligible to exist formula partially to the "who counts" one with a mix from the above formula as shown, is just a provisional move in the path of returning later to the first formula? Or the indigenous resistance combined with internal changes in the settler state and regional and international factors will prevent the option of the third transfer to emerge? The following chapters will discuss these questions.

CHAPTER II

SETTLER COLONIALISM IN PALESTINE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND THE POLITICS OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Chapter one included a theoretical background and the comparative analysis of three settler- colonial cases in general, and their inclusion and exclusion politics as well. This chapter will thoroughly examine conceptually the nature of the Zionist Project in Palestine, which is widely claimed to be a “national liberation” project that is about the right of the Jews of return to their historical promised land, rather than a kind of project that can be included under the settler colonial heading.

As a start, this chapter will analyze in its first section the different conceptual claims about nature, and the ideology of the Zionist movement and Israel that followed, and how they used together with the two intertwined methods related to their primary objectives for the creation of material and demographic facts in the ground. Besides that, how they combined with the elimination of the other by different legal, historical, political, social, geographical and physical means, and how the various negotiations rounds were conceptualized by Israel and used to assist in achieving these objectives. The analysis here will be mainly conceptual, rather than historical, aiming to make a critical assessment of the different concepts used by thoroughly examining them and comparing between them.

Next, to that, section two will analyze the inclusion and the exclusion policies of Zionism according to different democracy models ranging between Liberal, consociational, ethnic, Herrenvolk Democracy models, and the models of ethnocracy and settler democracy. As part of the analysis of these two sections, the chapter will include comparisons between the two stages of Zionism: The pre-1948 stage that led to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and the post-1967 stage after Israel occupied the rest of Palestine. The two phases will be compared, and in between the State of Israel policies and interactions with its Palestinian citizens in the period of 1948 to 1967 will be explained as being signals-providers to the kind of policies and communications that followed with the other part of the Palestinians that found themselves under the Israeli occupation. The continuities and the ruptures between the pre and the post-1967 policies and interactions will also be alluded to in this regard, and also the different methods of inclusion and exclusion will be analyzed in section two.

Section three will sharpen the discussion about the settler colonial nature of Israel, to be compared with the other approaches of Postcolonialism, neo-colonialism, internal colonialism, and coloniality. This analysis will be followed by the transformations that took place regarding these concepts in the post-1967 period. At that period the debate became between those who claim that what happened in 1967 and after is a continuation of the "Eretz Israel" project, and those who use the other terminologies of occupation, separation and Apartheid, or the expansion of the settler-colonial project beyond the 1948 borders. Comparison between these approaches will be made towards a cohesive conclusion. Section four will conclude the previous sections analysis by suggesting Israel as a settler colonial state.

2.1 Zionism, Israel, and Settler Colonialism

It might be useful to start this section by analyzing the Zionist concept about Zionism defined as a National Liberation Movement that aimed to return the

Jewish people to their historical and promised land of Palestine. As summarized by Mordechai Bar-On, Zionism was based on five ideological components: The ingathering of the exiled Jewish Nation, the creation of a territorial base for Jews in the Land of Israel, the creation of new Jewish Presence in the “Land of Israel”, the creation of a Jewish Sovereignty, and the achievement of peace and international justice (Bar-On, No date mentioned).

These five components create questions about the relationship between the exiled Jews and the land of Palestine called as The Land of Israel, followed by questions about the national identity of the exiled and if they had when Zionism emerged at the end of the nineteenth century a common one that brings together all the Jews who live in different places of the world called as The Diaspora. Other questions are about how much representative is Zionism to the Diaspora? To what extent the Diaspora Jews are the ancestors of those who left Palestine after the expulsion of Jews by the Roman Emperor Titus in 71 AD? If yes can these keep their right to return to Palestine after the 14 centuries of Arab ruling from the 7th to the 19th century of Palestine? If it is their right to return to Palestine, then: What is about the Jews who kept living in Palestine and who became Palestinian Jews over the centuries till Zionism emerged? What was the vision of Zionism towards the Native population which was living in Palestine? How Zionism also envisioned its relations with the neighboring Arabs to Palestine? And finally, how it envisioned its relations with the world Jewry and the different trends among them regarding Palestine?

Starting with the last question, Zionism when launched in the end of the 19th century was far from being representative to the Jews worldwide, the Middle Eastern Jews did not join it for instance, besides that the prevailing opinion among the Jews in Western Europe was about the Jewish emancipation within the societies that they are living in. At that time, most of the Jews believed that the return being religious rather than being national should wait for the Messiah

who will be in charge of it. Following this, for instance, the Jewish Canadian Professor Yakov Rabkin wrote saying:

"Zionists and their adversaries as well agree that Zionism and the Jewish State that followed amid the 20th Century represent a rupture in the Jewish History that followed the line of the emancipation and secularization of the Jews of Europe in the nineteenth and the twentieth century" (Rabkin, 2006, 23).

This emancipation and secularization of Jews were promoted by the Haskalah Jewish movement which emerged in West Europe and sought the integration of the Jews in the European Enlightenment process. Besides the Haskalah many other Jews joined the Socialist Movements in which they became leaders such as Karl Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg the leaders by then in the German Socialist Movement. Opposite to Western Europe Russia was a particular case. According to Rabkin, an Ethnic Jewish group emerged in Russia. This group had by then two characteristics of a natural nation: "Common land (residency area in Russia), and common language "the *Yiddish*" (Rabkin, 2006, 27). This situation created an inclination to establish a "natural "Jewish home in Russia that speaks *Yiddish* led by the Bund Party established at the end of the 19th century. This Jewish Party rejected Zionism but called for "A cultural and territorial Autonomy for Jews in Russia. Besides this trend Zionism also found a ripe soil for its advocacy in Russia, using the 1880s and after pogroms against Jews, and the lonely life of Jews in Shtetls, that were like small towns inhabited by Jews only to create support to its ideology. Accordingly, it is not by accident that the majority of the Zionist leaders came out from these Shtetls except Jabotinsky who was born in a big city, but the Zionist propaganda did not motivate the Russian Jews to immigrate to Palestine. On the contrary at the beginning of the 20th century, only one percent of the Russian Jews immigrated to Palestine, while the majority went to North America (Rabkin, 2006, 28).

The core of the other questions is about the Zionist claim of the Nationhood of the Jews regardless of their place of residence worldwide. As such Zionism

was, and still, a call to the Jews everywhere in the world, either to skip the citizenships of the countries in which they reside and leave to Israel, or to become loyal to Israel more than their loyalty to their countries of residence, or to have double commitments. This position is not accepted by the majority of the Jews worldwide till today, mainly by those millions of Jews who live in the United States.

Mordechai Bar-on claims that the Jews consisted of a nation due to having a "common race and a distinctive Historical consciousness." He calls the latter as "Historical Judaism," a description that is adopted by the secular non-religious Jews, in contrast with the religious Judaism. For Bar-on what was missing for the Jews is the absence of a geographical jurisdiction over a certain piece of land (Bar-on, no date of publication). Bar-On did ignore here the component of living over a common piece of land and the common language as the other two components required for the emergence of a nation. Regarding the other component that he added which is the common race, it can be said that this component is at least controversial: In one handsome Jews might claim that they kept a significant racial characteristic due to their living separately in their Ghettoes while abiding intermarriage with other races. In the other hand, Shlomo Sand will advise that: "Everybody knows that the Jews do not constitute a pure race, but there are Jews, and especially National and Zionist ones, who still inclined to stress an erratic and deceptive theory claiming that the majority of Jews belong to an ancient and eternal race" (Sand, 2012, 31).

Ethnos "who found shelter among other peoples, and when these peoples let him down at a crucial point of time; he started to return to his father's lands" (Sand, 2012, 31). This quotation looks as if Sand is responding to Moses Hess (1811-1875) who claimed that "The Jewish race is one of the main races in the human history, this Jewish race maintained its unity despite the climate influences, and the Jewish features kept their purity through ages" (Abbas, 1984, 127).

Sand maintained then that Jews were far away from keeping a pure race over centuries. Therefore, he denies the presence of a Jewish Nation, but at the same time, he sees that an Israeli people were created in Israel after 1948. More on this last point later, but in line with Sand, it might be suitable to mention Kautsky the Marxist Jewish leader, who also rejected the presence of a pure Jewish race, and even called Jews as a religious sect and dismissed the existence of a "Jewish Nation" due to its lack of land and language (Lenin, 1980, 37, 49). Abdel Wahab Al Masiri went further questioning the Jewish Nation, saying that "the Zionist Definition of it is not accurately known", and about "a people that were deprived of their land for 2000 years ago, and have the right to return to it without waiting for the Messiah" (Al Masiri, 1990, 59).

Al Masiri questioned the "Common history component" between Jews, asking about what is historically common between the Jews of Yemen and the Jews of the United States? (Al Masiri, 1990a, 60). Finally, Al Masiri maintained that capitalism paved the way for the Jewish departure of the Ghettoes to integrate with the European societies especially in West Europe, which make the Jewish Nationalism false (Al Masiri, 1990a, 61). In the other hand he concluded that the Jewish question is a result of a European problem that emerged in the late 19th century and included the issues of the goods surplus and the people surplus. These problems combined with the ability of Europe to expand globally led to the opening of further markets to the European goods, and the export of population from Europe to outside it. Jews were included in this process, especially those of Eastern Europe who were unable to integrate due to the late development of capitalism and its integration policies on those countries with Russia on the top of them (Al Masiri, 63-64).

Since there is no evidence supporting the existence of a Jewish People, Zionism is then far from being a National Liberation Movement for those people. Despite this fact Zionism was capable of working with the big powers of the

world following their Messianic ideas that emerged in the seventeenth century, mainly among the Protestants, preaching for the return of Jews to Palestine to accelerate the process of the arrival of the Messiah (see chapter 3).

Zionism was also involved in separate negotiations especially with Britain that aimed to establish the Jewish State in Uganda, Argentina and other places of the world before finally deciding to choose Palestine. Beside that Zionism was able to recruit Jews to immigrate to Palestine. These came especially from Russia and other Eastern Europe countries creating as a result of a National Home that was developed to a State in 1948 occupying 78 percent of the historical land of Palestine, and then the rest of Palestine in 1967. How this paradox between the absence of full representation to the Jews worldwide, and the success in establishing a state can be explained further? (See 2.3).

The National Jewish Home, started officially after November the 2nd 1917 when the British Government decided to release Balfour Declaration that gave Jews the right to establish that "Jewish National Home", but in fact there were around fifty-nine thousand Jews according to McCarthy living already by then in Palestine in 1914 (McCarthy, 1990, 26). MutazQafisheh presented other estimations for 1922 showing that by that year there were 729,873 registered Ottoman citizens of Palestine out of them there were 7,143 Palestinian Jews who were the ancestors of the Jews who lived over centuries in the Country, representing one percent of the Population (Qafisheh, 2008, 94). The other non-Palestinian Jews came to Palestine either for religious reasons and stayed. Others went through the Jewish Philanthropists Edmond Rothschild and Moses Montefiore projects in the country and a third group went through the Zionist movements such as *HoveviTzion*: the Lovers of Zion that was established in Russia in 1881 after the pogroms against the Jews there and established several Colonial Settlements in Palestine starting by *Rishon Le-Tzion* close to Jaffa. Besides these other non-state Zionist actors played a role of bringing Jews to Palestine, among these was the Zionist Labor movements of

PoaliTzion(1901), *HapoilHatzair*(1905), and the youth movement *HashomerHatzair* (1913).

The question for this section is about how these comers envisioned their relations with the indigenous population of Palestine that consisted by 1914 of 657 thousand Muslims and 81 thousand Christians according to McCarthy estimations (McCarthy, 1990, 26).

For the Lovers of Zion, they wanted at the beginning to establish a separate Jewish presence in Palestine that will not be on the expense of the indigenous population. The wisdom was about buying lands, and the creation of Jewish settlements besides the indigenous people rather than on the loss of them. According to RanAaronsohn, this project went on peacefully till 1917, except the uprooting of 150 tenants, but Adel Manna added that many Bedouins were also uprooted (Scham, Salem, and Pogrund, 2005, 84). The idea of Separate development emerged later to become an idea for promoting the Pure Jewish work and prohibiting the use of the Palestinian labor force in the Jewish settlements by the Zionist Labor Movement starting from the second *Aliyah*: Ascendance to *Eretz Israel*, of 1904 to 1914 as it is called. In other words, there is a common thread that brought together the ideas for separate development promoted by the Lovers of Zion and between the Zionist Labor Movement that followed since the Second *Aliyah*. In the Israeli mainstream academia, this idea of separate development was highly adopted; here is for instance what the Israeli scholar Eisenstadt said about it "the Jewish Pioneers, on the whole, tended to segregate themselves from the setting and attempted to transplant into their frameworks various European Institutions" (Eisendstadt, 1967, 5).

The idea is then about creating a new modern European Society in a part of the Middle East "Which contained all the major characteristics of the so-called under-development" (Eisendstadt, 1967, 5). In the opposite, they were not "motivated by economic considerations but by the desire to bring about a

national and social renaissance- a transformed and modern society” (Eisenstadt, 1967, 5). Eisenstadt calls this process as a "Colonization" rather than "Colonialism" since the first is a process of building the new society/ state besides one of the natives, while in the second the society and the state are to be made on the expense of those natives. Ran Aronsohn and Ruth Kark follow the same line of thinking (Scham and others, 2005, 75-76, 3-15). Gabriel Piterberg analyzes similar positions of other mainstream Zionist Academicians such as Anita Shapira, Rivka Bar-Yousef, and Yousef Gorney (Piterberg, 2009). Concerning these positions, Piterberg maintained that their holders are moved by three myths, the negation of the exile, the return to Israel, and the return to the history. The first myth refers to “an old Jewish Nation that existed over a certain land or region” (Piterberg, 2009, 120). This Nation is characterized by waiting for its salvation through the *Aliyah* once again to the land of Israel. The second refers to Palestine as a country that became empty due to the absence of a Jewish Sovereignty over it, and as such a country without a history despite the presence of other people whom will not give it a history as much as the Jews do not exist in it. Finally, the third myth refers to the idea of reviving the Jewish Nation that cannot be achieved without the ingathering of the Jewish exile in “*Eretz Israel*” (Piterberg, 2009, 120-121). The common thread between these myths is the denial of the presence of other people in Palestine; we want to build our nation besides them. Eisenstadt also presented the idea of creating a Jewish modernity model that is separate from the “Middle Eastern traditional society” (Eisenstadt, 1967, 4). It is noticeable that the Palestinian society also included Jews who continued to live in Palestine after the Roman exodus and became Palestinians. It is also noticeable that these ideas are far from being a subject of consensus among all the Jews worldwide. As noted earlier many Jews of the United States do not share these ideas till today and behave as proud Americans rather than being willing to make *Aliyah* to Israel.

The Zionist Labor Movement represented the mainstream at that time, and their separate development strategy was adopted by the mainstream Israeli

academia as shown, but in the same time, the Revisionists who were led by Ze'ev Jabotinsky adopted another attitude towards the indigenous population. In one hand he accepts the equal human rights to the Palestinians given the achievement of a Jewish majority in Palestine and that they receive it after they become a minority. In the second hand, he continued writing in 1923 in his famous Iron Wallpaper that the Palestinians will not accept to give their land voluntarily to the Jews, saying with all the frankness possible that: "It is utterly impossible to obtain the voluntary consent of the Palestinian Arabs for converting 'Palestine' from an Arab country into a country with a Jewish majority" (Jabotinsky, 1923). He also said that none of the previous colonial projects was implemented with the consent of the native population, and he sees the Palestinians not to be fooled that can be cheated, bribed, or creating understanding with them. Instead, he proposed the continuation of the Zionist Colonization by power and behind an iron wall that the Palestinians will not "be able to breach." Jabotinsky added that when a Jewish Majority will be created the Arabs will become a minority under the mercy of the Jews. By then they might come to make a compromise as a result of the Iron Wall, but they will never present these kinds of bargains when they are still a majority and not yet defeated like now (in 1923). Finally, Jabotinsky says that Zionism is moral and just, and the issue, for now, is about the implementation of that justice.

In a later version of the revisionist attitude towards the indigenous population of Palestine, these were considered as invaders and conquerors to Palestine after the Jews were evacuated from it by the Romans. In his 1995 book *A Place Among the Nations*, Benjamin Netanyahu the current Prime Minister of Israel, echoes these claims by saying that *Eretz Israel* was a subject of: "A militant Arab settlement that confiscated the land, the houses and the labor force in Eretz Israel during the Islamic governance period" (Netanyahu, 1995, 95).

Netanyahu considers the Jews to be those who are eligible for acquiring historical rights in the country, and later the Arabs came and uprooted the Jews

from their homeland. In his opinion, the long centuries passed since the Arabs occupied *Eretz Israel* cannot be used as a justification to cancel the right of Jews in this land. He presented different historical cases of return of authority after centuries, such as the return of Cordova to the Christian rule after 500 years of Islamic ruling, and the return of Grenada to the Christians after 800 of Islamic ruling (Netanyahu, 63). It seems here that Netanyahu is mixing between the return of the authority as in the cases of Cordova and Grenada, and the recovery from overseas to invade a country as the Zionist Movement did as a self-appointed representative of the Jews. Netanyahu examples would be relevant if the Jews of Palestine took over the authority once again, but these wouldn't do it because they became Palestinians, the same as the Jews of the United States became Americans.

Following Netanyahu, a researcher at Middle East Forum claimed the indignity of Jews towards Palestine. Opposite to the claim that Israel is a result of settler-colonial project, he turns it down to claim the contrary, by saying that the Arabs were the settler colonialists in Palestine and not the Jews who have a continued history and continued presence that goes back to 2000 years in the country. He would also argue that the Palestinians are either Jews or Christians who were converted to Islam, or Arab immigrants to it through ages, which constitute that they were not indigenous population. He finally claims that the Arab "illegal" immigration to Palestine increased its Arab population by 37 percent from 1922 to 1937. Also, the other 60 thousand came to Palestine in the period between 1932 and 1949. In conclusion, the writer claimed that the "Palestinian question is a reaction to Zionism, secondary and not an act of indigenous citizens" (Joffe, 2017).

Following Joffe article, several questions might be raised: If the Palestinians include as part of the Jews and Christians that converted to Islam, the question becomes if these are indigenous population or not. Besides that, does the measurement of indignity goes back to religion, so if one is a Jew, then he is

indigenous, and if he/she is a Muslim he/she is not? Referring to a study made by Fred Gotheil which claims the same as Joffe, Elia Zureik indicated that Gotheil did not include in his statistics the number of Palestinians who were outside Palestine when the British 1931 census was conducted. The number of these was 31,340, added to them also several internal immigrants inside Palestine proper that did not become Israel in 1948 (Zureik, 1979, 48-50). Finally, there is the issue that needs more severe handling, which is about the so-called Arab immigration to Palestine considered "illegal" by the writer, while Palestine was officially part of the Greater Syria till the Nablus National Conference of 1922. That conference started to deal with Palestine as a separate territory that faces unique challenges in comparison with the other parts of Greater Syria, due to the Jewish immigration and the buying of lands made specifically to Palestine under the British Mandate (Sakhnini, 1986, 95).

However, the 1922 mentioned decision did not mean to contradict with another concept which is the links and the belonging of Palestine to the Arab World based on Arab Nationalism that was prevailing. According to this Arab affiliation, the Palestinians and the Arabs did not recognize Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 that divided the Greater Syria apart, nor the Balfour Declaration to build a Jewish Homeland in Palestine of 1917. They did not recognize the borders resulting from these colonial documents. Therefore it is evident for Palestinians to live in Damascus or Beirut, even if they lose their citizenship according to the British citizenship law of 1925, and its modified version of 1931. Besides that, many Arabs were coming to live in Palestine, and even to participate in the struggle against Zionism as a national and religious duty, examples here include Sheikh EzzEddin Al Qassam who came to Palestine during the 1930s from Latikia of Syria to practice Jihad there. Also, in 1948 a Palestinian war with the Zionist project took place first (With the participation also of Arab Volunteers led by the Commander Fawzi Al Qawiqgi and fought under the banner of "The forces of the Sacred Jihad," and then the Arab Armies intervention followed it.

According to the above, any study about the demographics in Palestine during the British Mandate period will be methodologically problematic if it will not take in consideration the issue of affiliation and interaction between Palestine and neighboring Arab World being. This affiliation is a continuation of a long history of togetherness, unity, and joint districts (Wilayat, for instance, the Sunjuks of Nablus and Acre were parts of the Wilayat of Beirut in the late Ottoman period since the establishment of that Wilayat in 1888). These links were created mostly under the religious banner (including of the four centuries of the Ottoman Empire), and later under an Arab National banner.

2.1.1 The Post- 1967 Zionism

The second revisionist version that was expressed By Netanyahu and some academics like Alexander Joffe mentioned earlier, is becoming a mainstream version in the language of the Israeli colonial settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem. It can be found for instance in the website of the Regional Council of the Settlers called the Yesha Council, and also in the Channel Seven that represent the settlers among many other venues. The Story presented is straightforward: The Palestinians have no rights in this land, being most of it a state land that Israel occupied from Jordan. There was never any entity that was called as a Palestinian State.

Since Jordan occupied this land in 1948 opposite to the UN resolution 181 that considered it the land of the Palestinian state that was supposed to emerge there. It is claimed then that Jordan presence in it between 1948 to 1967 was illegal, and it was kept to the Israeli people to return to it being part of the historical land of Israel that belongs solely to the Jewish People as it is said. Finally, the argument goes by denying the presence of Israeli occupation in what became to be called as "Judea and Samaria," but on the contrary it is presented as part of Eretz Israel, and the Palestinians living over it are presented as "gentiles" who invaded the area from outside. This is a reproduction of the narratives that were presented when Zionism started and was used against the Palestinians in the pre-1948 territory. Another way to put it will be that this kind

of story was there all the time since the emergence of Zionism, it continued to be used all the time with the Palestinians inside Israel living in the Galilee and the Naqab. Regarding the West Bank and Gaza, it was made partially latent during the period of the peace process of 1990,s, but the settlement expansion continued to take place all the way ahead.

Later this mentioned narrative went out fully publicly by the mainstream of the settlers after the collapse of that peace process since 2000 and after. Ben Naftali, Gross, and Michaeli unmasked how these positions contradict the UN resolutions that considered the Palestinian territories that Israel appropriated after 1967 war as "occupied territories" (Ben Naftali et al, 2012, 39-113). They also went further explicating the kind of legal system created in these territories by Israel after the war, which made everything as "indeterminate", which is translated in practice to the "Permanency of the temporary": Temporary military Orders, temporary procedures, temporary residency rights, temporary access and movement arrangements, and others (Ben Naftali et al, 2012, 40). These types of methods are all coming from one root, which is the absence of any recognition of the rights of the Palestinians to the land and the territory, leading to a Jabotinskian formula of recognizing the individual human rights of the Palestinians temporarily. While at the same time denying their national rights including the attachment to the land, and all the other national rights of giving it's the name of the Palestine, and or planning for the establishment of a Palestinian State over its parts occupied in 1967. Dr. Ady Ophir concluded from this logic that the Palestinian from an Israeli perspective would be punished not because he/she committed something wrong, but he/she will be punished because he/she is not expected to exist where he/she is (Ophir, 2006).

The significance of this "back to ideology approach," or the "unmasking of the former ideology," might be that Israel is already considering the compromise is over together with the peace process that is based on the concept of compromise. Others will go further to conclude that the peace process was a

public relation play that was designed to cheat the Palestinians while the appropriation of their land will continue (Edward Said, 1995a and b; 2002).

Some "optimistic" proposals suggested on the contrary that Oslo Declaration of Principles of 1993 (DOP) as an agreement led to the stoppage of the territorial-expansionist approach of Zionism and the State of Israel, and replaced it with Apartheid and separation (Yiftachel, 2012; Gordon, 2012). But it seems that the developments that followed the years of these writings brought Israel to more evident settler-colonial positions. By 2018, one can see a government in Israel that includes in its membership several ministers who live in West Bank Settlements and plans to increase the number of settlers in West Bank to one million in the coming years.

The Government Coalition members have plans to annex additional parts of West Bank such as the area of *MaaleAdumim* settlement and others to the territory of Jerusalem that is already added to Israel. Others in the Coalition plan to annex Area C that consists of two-thirds of West Bank territory to Israel, and evacuate it's around 393,163 Palestinian population by the end of 2017 (www.pcbs.ps) from it. (Minister of Agriculture Uri Ariel from the Jewish Home Party). Besides that and when moving to the Knesset, a 'Caucus for the Victory of Israel' inclusive to 26 Knesset Members out of 120 members, calling for a full defeat to the Palestinians to make them give up with the Palestinian refugees' rights, and accept the Israeli annexation of West Bank.

Daniel Pipes the former advisor of the American President George Bush is the initiator of this project for defeating the Palestinians, he started by the establishment of a Congressional Group for the victory of Israel in the United States in 2017, followed by the Caucus in the Knesset a few months later. In an article that he published through "the Middle East Forum" that he runs, he suggested procedures to be used for achieving the victory of Israel. These include in his opinion stopping the peace process, cutting aid, punish the

families of the Palestinians who make attacks against Israel, and bury the bodies of those in anonymous places, and finally, he suggests cutting water and electricity by Israel when the Palestinians will continue resisting (Pipes, January 2017; www.meforum.org).

Moving from the government and the Knesset to the Settlers, one proposal to be mentioned is the Yesha Council of the settlers' scheme of March 2013, on the eve of President Barack Obama visit to Israel by then. In this proposal Yesha Council suggests deleting the Palestinian State from the agenda, annexing most of the West Bank (that they call as part of Eretz Israel) to Israel. It also proposed bringing the number of the settlers in West Bank to one million in the coming years to make West Bank (Judea and Samaria as they call it to become Jewish. The plan also suggested restricting the Palestinian presence to Areas A, and B of West Bank both consist of no more than 36 percent of its territory. In the end, the Yesha Council considered this plan to be viable to the security of Israel, and realistic (Yesha, 2013www.myesha.org.il). The Israeli Government adopted the last proposal as it was shown above, which also indicates that the Government and the settlers who are supposed to be as non-state actors support each other. Besides these, there are other proposals that all are about the annexation of West Bank to Israel. One of these is the proposal that was earlier presented by Moshe Arens the former Minister of Defense(Arens, 2/6/ 2010 www.haaretz.com), and adopted today by the Israeli President Robi Rivlin and the Deputy Minister Tzipi Hotoviley during her speech in the 4th "Sovereignty Conference of 2017 commending Caroline Glick who called for the idea (see below). This proposal calls to give all the Palestinians of West Bank Israel citizenship after the annexation. Caroline Glick, a Journalist in the Jerusalem Post Newspaper, also wrote a book calling for the same idea that she called the "Israeli Solution" (Glick, 2014). Outside the Knesset several extreme political parties are preparing to run in the upcoming Israeli elections, these are such as the Zehut Party led by the former Likud member Moshe Feiglin. The Party calls in Moshe Fieglin introduction to its platform to the establishment of "The state of

the Jews," rather than a "Jewish State." In such a state there is no place to the other, and the religious and secular Jews will be united around what he calls as "Authentic Judaism" (www.zehutinternational.org). The platform included in the same website starts by saying: "The land of Israel has been transformed from a barren, practically desolate land to a land flowing with milk and honey. It has become a world hub of science and progress". Accordingly, the platform calls for a "State of the Jews that matures from Zionism of existence to Zionism of Destiny." The maturation to be achieved by actualizing and "fortifies its sovereignty in all parts of the land of Israel under its control," and "the implementation of full sovereignty in Judea and Samaria" as included in section four of the platform. This move to the Zionism of destiny will require limiting citizenship to Jews only, and allowing for the freedom of Jewish building in all the land of Israel without restrictions or freezing, which will require the cancelation of Israel Land Authority and the transformation of the land ownership to the local Jewish communities.

In the section about security the platform of 'Zehut Party' calls for a definition to the enemy to be as any "Person, organization, or country, rather than any means of fighting such as terror, tunnels, or rockets." According to this definition, the enemies should be eliminated and not only their weapons following the *Talmud* "Whoever comes to kill you, kill him first" (www.zehutinternational.org), the Party is aiming to achieve a full victory, and not only containment of the enemy (See Daniel Pipes here as well).

Following the security section, the party presented his strategic plan in chapter seven. According to the offered plan, the party rejects the presence of a Palestinian problem or a Palestinian nation, claiming that both were created to confront Zionism. In the other hand the party sees that there is an Arab Nation that rejects the Israeli sovereignty over the land of Israel. Accordingly, any Solution with the Palestinians will not solve this fundamental problem with the Arab Nation. Besides that, the party advised not to make any political

concessions due to international pressure, but instead, we should follow that the United States makes a retreat when Israel defines its demands sharply. Therefore, Israel should stand firmly behind its position about the land of Israel that the Jews developed their affiliation to it through generations "based on the decision of the creator, the God of Israel"(www.zehutinternational.org).

What to do then with the Palestinians? First no citizenship of Israel according to *Zehut* Party Platform, but the development of a human rights formula that allows for an "honorable departure" of those who fight against Israel with the families similar to the PLO departure of Beirut in 1982. Those who reject this option should be deported by force. About the Palestinians inside Israel in its 1948 borders, their Israeli citizenship should be taken from them and give them a temporary residence status. Those who have this status are to be given two options: Option one "a generous package for Arabs interested in emigration" including giving them the right to sell their properties quickly to the State of Israel. Here the platform claims that sixty percent of the Arabs living in *Judea and Samaria* (170 thousand households) are welcoming to the Jews and that buying their houses will cost the state much less than Oslo Agreement that its cost to Israel reached one trillion dollars. The platform also claims that there are around 12 to 16 thousand Palestinians who leave to Jordan via Allenby Bridge per annum. Option two presented by the party is about giving them a permanent residency status like Puerto Rico, conditioned by declaring their loyalty to Israel. In this case, they will not be asked to serve in the Israeli Army, but if some of them did, they would become subject to pass different stages till getting Israeli citizenship.

More or less the Jewish Home Party led by Naftali Bennet share the ideas of *Zehut* Party. The Jewish Home was established in 2008 (Following the National Union of 1999) as a coalition of different parties all calling for the Jewish Sovereignty over the Whole Land of Israel. This party is a critical partner in the Israeli Government of 2015 to April 2019 in Israel led by Benjamin Netanyahu.

Another party is the Judeo-Christian Bible Block Party led by Dennis Avi Lipkin who is a writer, businessman, and former editor and translator in the Prime Minister office from 1989 to 1990. This Party calls for a Judeo-Christian alliance that aims for the expansion of Israel beyond just annexing West Bank to it. The party has plans for Saudi Arabia explained in Mr. Lipkin book "Return to Mecca." According to that book the Jews when were deported from Egypt by the Pharaohs, went to *Alloz* Mountain in North Saudi Arabia rather than to Sinai as it is known. Staying there over 38 years (followed by two years in Jordan), the Jews left some scriptures there. According to Lipkin Israel will be invited to help Saudi Arabia militarily against Iran, the Houthis of Yemen, and ISIS. Israel will accept the invitation according to his opinion and as such will return to Mecca, and in cooperation with the Judeo-Christian coalition it will be able to defeat Islam (Lipkin, 2015).

Besides these parties, new conferences held in Israel in the most recent years call for enforcing full Israeli sovereignty over West Bank. Ribonut (sovereignty in Hebrew) conference was held in Jerusalem by the Women in Green together with the Forum for Sovereignty in which the speakers included the Ministers and Knesset members such as Zeev Elkin Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, Yariv Levine Minister of Tourism and Tzipi Hotovely the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (www.womeningreen.org). This conference held in 2017 was the fourth, in the third one that was held in 2013; Dr. Martin Sherman from the Israeli Institute for Strategic Studies, for instance, said that the annexation of "*Judea and Samaria*" will not be enough without being followed by the reduction of Arab Population in that area. To accomplish this Israel should "declare the Palestinian-Arab collective what it, itself to be: An Impalpable enemy, dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish-Zionist entity." Then he advises that: "Israel, therefore, has no obligation-moral, legal or practical to sustain the socio-economic edifice of a hostile collective, committed to its demise as an entity and the slaying of its citizens, as individuals. Quite the opposite! Israel has the moral duty to induce its collapse- to stymie the efforts to destroy it and to slaughter its

citizens, for whose fate is responsible" (Sherman, 2013, www.strategic.israel.org). Dr. Sherman titled and ended his lecture by Herzl famous phrase; "If you will it, it is not a dream" (Sherman, 2013, www.strategic.israel.org).

Other conference organized by Ted Belman, the editor of a web page called Israpundit and a writer in Channel Seven of the settler's website called for toppling the Jordanian Regime and appointing a Journalist living in London called Mudar Zahran as a ruler instead. Following that step a transfer of 415,000 Palestinian families from West Bank to Jordan to take place, and give 50,000 dollars compensation for each one of them to help them start a new life there. The Conference was called "The Jordan Option: The Ultimate Solution Conference," and all its papers can be found in the Youtube.com uploaded by Les Glassman (Belman, 2017).

Besides these groups in the government, the parliament (including those who are seeking to run in the coming elections), and among the colonial settlers, other groups can be described as extremely violent groups. These include the Price Tag, and the Hilltop youth Groups, Tammarud, Lehava, and the many groups that act to revive the Temple Mount in place of Al-Aqsa Mosque, such as the Temple Mount Institute, and the "Temple Mount and Eretz Yisrael Faithful Movement." Also, there are other settlers' societies like *Elad* and *Ateret Kohanim* in Jerusalem and others there. These groups follow a line of thinking that Israel should be transformed into a religious state that rules according to the Jewish Biblical law which leaves no place to the non-Jews in the Jewish State. They follow the line of thinking that the only way to avoid a new catastrophe against Jews is by using violence against the gentiles. Adopting the positions of Rabbi Yitzhak Ginzburg they seek to achieve three goals due to the arrival of the time of salvation, these three are: Appointing a Jewish King, killing all the offspring of the Amalekites, and re-building the Temple Mount. Those among them who call for the revival of the Temple are seeking to do that by destroying Al-Aqsa Mosque first (Aldrovandi, 2014; Muhareb 2015; 2016).

Regarding the Youth Hilltop Groups they started in 1998 when Ariel Sharon the Minister of Defense at that time called them to take over the hills in West Bank as a protest to Wye River Memorandum that was signed by Prime Minister Netanyahu by then. The Price Tag group started in 2008, and Tammarud emerged as a split from it led by Meir Ettinger, the grandson of Meir Kahana the founder of Kach movement at the end of 1960.s. These groups attacked tens of Palestinian mosques and churches in West Bank and Inside Israel, burned Dawabsheh Family in the village of Douma close to Nablus in 31st of July 2015 inside their house when they were sleeping, burned and destroyed Palestinian agricultural lands and products, and assisted in establishing the so-called "illegal marginal settlements outposts" (Muhareb, 2015; Qubaa 2015; Shulhut 2012; Al Salih, 2011).

This kind of ideological narrative explained above is combined with a security narrative designed to justify the preservation of the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories in the hands of Israel. Besides Netanyahu and the former extreme groups, Professor Mordechai Kedar adopts this security justification approach. In addition to his contention that all Palestine is *Eretz* Israel, Kedar also thinks that any Israeli withdrawal from West Bank will bring a security danger to Israel the same as the one that was created in Gaza Strip as he maintained. He suggests then that Israel should keep all the Palestinian territories under its sovereignty while creating eight city-states in West Bank (including special status to Bethlehem). In the other hand the villages will be kept according to Kedar proposal under Israeli control, and Israeli citizenship will be given to those who wish from its population (Kedar, 2012).

Back to the history of post-1967 occupation, one can find the continuities and the ruptures in the Israeli perspective towards the Palestinian territories that were occupied by then. The review of Ehud Sprinzak showed that directly after the war a movement called The Movement for the Whole Land of Israel was established and included members from all the Israeli political spectrum at that

time, the right and the left, the religious and secular (Sprinzak, 1991). The movement called for the annexation of all the 1967 territories to Israel including Gaza Strip. At the same period, the Labor (*Mapai*) Government took a position in between adopting the annexation of some parts to Israel while giving autonomy to other parts of West Bank. Based on Yigal Alon plan, the Minister of Labor by then, called "The future of the occupied territories, and the solution of the refugee issue" (Hendel, 2012,721) that was not officially approved, but practically adopted. The Government in one hand started the settlement projects by establishing a colonial settlement in *Gush Etzion* in 27/9/1967 and three military based settlements in Jordan Valley in 1968, then the first settlement of KfarDarum was established in Gaza Strip in 1970.

All these steps by the Israeli Government were also preceded by expanding East Jerusalem twelve times on the expense of West Bank territory at the end of June 1967, and annexing this expanded area to Israel (Hendel, 2012, 721-722, 725-726). These practical steps by the Government echoed the Alon plan that called for the annexation of Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, Gaza, and the Southern Hills of Hebron to Israel. While there will be no settlement building inside the Palestinian densely populated areas which will be given autonomy, also the transfer of many refugees from Gaza to the West Bank will take place (Hendel, 2012, 721-722).

The policy of Mapai was also based on the "waiting mood" position to a territorial compromise with Jordan, a policy that continued till the collapse of the Mapai Governments by 1977 when the Likud took over. Finally, during its period, the Mapai Government allowed the establishment of other colonial settlements by non-state actors such as those of *Gush Emunim* Movement: the Block of the Faithful, who adopted the whole land of Israel strategy. When this movement rejected in the 12th of April 1968 to leave the rooms that they rented in Park Hotel in Hebron during the Passover festivities, the government evacuated them from there but moved them to the Israeli Military headquarters

in the city, and they started building houses around it (Hendel, 724). During the Mapai Government period, the number of settlers reached six thousand in West Bank (except East Jerusalem) by 1977, living in 28 agricultural settlements (Al Salih, 2011, 9).

When the Likud took over in 1977, the strategy for territorial compromise with Jordan withered away, due to the Likud position of annexing all the 1967 occupied territories to Israel. Instead, a plan for the functional distribution of responsibilities between Israel and Jordan was presented (Ayed, 1996). More essential the Likud Government, decided to move to urban intensive settlement, leading to the increase of the number of the settlers to 111,600 living in 122 settlements in the West Bank and Gaza by 1993, in addition to other 153 thousand in East Jerusalem, altogether 265 thousand settlers (Al Salih, 2011, 10).

The increase of the number of the settlers reflected itself in changing the dynamics in the Israeli society and its political map, thus by the beginning of the 1990s six blocks of extreme groups that all call for the Whole land of Israel idea was present in Israel, as listed by Sprinzak. These groups included the parliamentarians (the *Likud* and *Tzomet* parties), the pragmatists (*Gush Emunim* and *Moledet*) who sought to promote settlement expansion by violating the Israeli law, the extremists like Rabbi Moshe Levinger who represented the extreme strand in *Gush Emunim* that was supportive to killing the Arabs, the Terrorists like *Kach* Movement of Rabbi Meir Kahane which a split of it called Eyal planned and executed the killing of the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin at the end of 1995, and finally the moderates like Mimad Movement that sought to Promote the idea of Whole Israel land by preaching (Sprinzak, 1998, 3-6, 20).

According to the increase of these blocks and groups, it was evident that the Rabin Labor Government that ruled Israel from 1992 to 1996 was incapable of passing the 1993 Oslo Agreement in the Knesset without the support of the

Palestinian members in it. The agreement was caught in the 23rd of September 1993 with the small majority of 61 Knesset members out of 120 Knesset members, 50 voted against, and 8 abstained (www.knesset.gov.il, 1948).

The 1993 Declaration of Principles (famous as Oslo Agreement) included a period of Autonomy for five years to the Palestinians without any Israeli commitment to freeze the settlement expansion during that period. The document also included an agreement to start the negotiations about the permanent status issues of Jerusalem, refugees, borders, settlements, security and water three years after the autonomy to reach a final agreement by the end of the five years. Accordingly, a final status agreement was supposed to be achieved in May 1999, five years after Cairo Agreement of 1994 that led to the Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, while the Israeli settlements were kept in both (See the Oslo negotiator book Ahmad Qurie'a, 2006a). None of this happened, also two years later to the signature of Oslo Rabin was killed, and as a result, the government went back to the *Likud* led by Benyamin Netanyahu in 1996. This Authority is still in the Israeli Right hands and the splits from it (*Kadima* Party of Ariel Sharon, followed by Ehud Olmert from 2002), except for a short period from 1999 to the beginning of 2002 when the Labor Party led by Ehud Barak ruled for the last time till today. Barak tried to have an agreement with the Palestinian Authority about the final Status issues starting from Camp David in July 2000 and followed by Taba negotiations of January 2001 which were already too late due to Barak failure in the 2002 elections when Ariel Sharon was elected. At the beginning of 2009 Netanyahu was back again and continued to rule till the moment of this writing.

2.1.2 Zionism Concept and Practice of the Peace Process

For the needs of this thesis, the Peace process will be discussed here from the perspective of Israel and Zionism about its objectives and processes. This process in the post 1967 period was a result of the growing debate inside Israel between two trends: one that wanted to preserve and save the settler- colonial

project within the Israeli 1948 proper, and to give up with parts of the 1967 territories as a result to the fear that keeping these territories in the hand of Israel will create a demographic threat to the Jewish majority in the country. The second wanted to keep the territories and find solutions to its Palestinian population through giving them residency status rather than citizenship, or provide citizenship to a part of them and to exclude others, or by offer transfer by financial incentives or by the use of force.

The first trend was a continuation of the Labor idea of Territorial compromise, but this time directly with the Palestinians and not anymore with Jordan especially after Jordan decided disengagement with West Bank in 1988. In the light of the 1987 Intifada, and the Palestinian national council resolution of 1988 to accept a Palestinian State on 1967 borders with a recognition of Israel followed by the start of Palestinian American right talks in the same year. All these developments led the Israeli Labor Party Government to negotiate with the PLO.

This peace process did not die right away after Netanyahu was elected first in 1996. He first tried to change its terms of reference; two examples are worthy of mentioning. First, he obliged the Palestinian Authority to accept re-negotiating the status of Hebron, and the result was Hebron Protocol signed in 17/1/1997 allowing for keeping the heart of Hebron consisting of 20 percent of the city in which the Israeli settlements exist in the hand of Israel Israeli Army. Second, the evacuation of all West Bank in 18 months starting from the end of September 1995 when the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II) was signed, which was first not implemented in 1997 (18 months later), was changed to become as a promise of Israeli withdrawal from 13.1 percent of West Bank according to Wye River Agreement signed between Netanyahu and Yasser Arafat in 1998. This promise was not fulfilled as well. Nor the peace negotiations of Camp David and Taba that followed were successful.

Sharon came after he got popularity due to his visit to Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem which resulted with the eruption of the second Palestinian Intifada in September 2000. He spent his time in oppressing the Intifada, expanding the settlements, and signing agreements to curb terrorism with the Palestinians like Sharm al-sheik Memorandum in 2005. But his basic moves were two: One when he sent the Israeli tanks to re-occupy the Palestinian cities of West Bank handed to the Palestinian Authority in the 1990s. The second was regarding Gaza when he decided to withdraw the Israeli Army and to dismantle the Israeli settlements there unilaterally and without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority. He also withdrew the Israeli forces and dismantled the settlements from Jenin area in West Bank as well. This move took place in 2005 leading to a split in the Likud Party and to him to quit and establish a new Party that was called "Kadima."

The Gaza evacuation might be illustrated in the background of the Likud, and the Labor Parties strategies, the former since 1977, starting from the negotiations with Egypt when the Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin did not show any interest to keep Gaza in the hands of Israel. The veteran journalist Thomas Lipman did a review to 1303 pages of documents of President Carter Administration about Camp David Negotiations (Volume8 of the State Department's "Foreign Relations of the United States"). According to that review, he found the hot debate about West Bank that Israel called as *Judea* and *Samaria* but as for *Gaza*, it was a stepchild of the negotiation throughout- nobody wanted it" as he wrote (www.lobelog.com, August 22, 2014). Later a proposal to handle Gaza to the Palestinians was an offer made during Oslo secret negotiations, leading more after that to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Jericho first (Qurei'a, 2006).

The Israeli concept since 1967 was that West Bank Should be Judaized partially (Labor Party, and later on Kadima as big mainstream parties deciding the Israeli politics in specific periods). Or wholly or almost entirely, all the Likud till 1996

when Netanyahu became a Prime Minister for the first time, then significant parts of the Likud after and The Jewish Home Party. Starting from 1977 the Likud presented the idea of evacuating Gaza and giving it to Egypt, and in 2005 it was abandoned unilaterally by the Likud Prime Minister Ariel Sharon when it was late for the Likud who moved back to more right-wing positions after Menahem Begin to accept it. Therefore, Sharon move was confronted by fierce opposition inside the Likud which led Sharon to split and create a new party (see above). The Labor Party seems to follow the Likud in this regard.

At their side, formerly the Labor Party wanted to annex Gaza to Israel as Alon Plan advocated (see above). But in 1992 Oslo Negotiation they offered to handle Gaza to the Palestinians and what came later, due to the Palestinian insistence that part of West Bank should be added to Gaza as part of the first Israeli withdrawal, was a Gaza and Jericho first Agreement signed in Cairo in 4/5/1994 as first step for the implementation of 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles. According to that agreement, the Israeli Army withdraws from Gaza except for the Yellow areas that include the Colonial settlements and the military camps (Cairo Agreement, 1994). These settlements waited for Sharon to dismantle them in 2005.

Here as shown, the Israeli settler-colonial project was selective in terms of the territories to be annexed to Israel. It is a consensus in Israel was the idea of adding the most significant part, the West Bank, fully or partially to Israel. But regarding the tiny and small Gaza, many convinced themselves including among the right-wing Parties that Gaza is more a burden than being an asset to Israel. After Hamas success in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections, and its takeover of Gaza these ideas became even stronger, combined with the fact that Gaza became a security threat that was handled by the three wars of 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 without success in toppling Hamas regime down, or stopping the risk of the rockets on Israel. Along with these ideas, it was suggested that the Palestinians could be compensated for the loss of West

Bank fully or partially by giving them the tiny densely populated Gaza Strip of its 360 kilometers and lack of pure drinking water to become their state or autonomous entity. In the other hand, some proposals were made to expand Gaza to Sinai of Egypt (Yehoshua Ben Aryeh (2005) and Giora Eiland (2008).

All the above mentioned proposals signaled to the Israeli plans to prepare for another state or autonomous entity to the Palestinians. But as much as the last proposal looked beautiful in the paper, as much as it proved to be almost impossible to implement without either the Palestinian Authority return to Gaza after it lost its control there by 2006 as a result of the Palestinian internal fighting that was followed by a split between Fateh and Hamas that is still going on till today. Also, it is highly doubtful that Egypt will be ready to give parts of Sinai to the Palestinians.

A second option was made for having an indirect agreement with Hamas. The proposal included the release of Israeli hostages that Hamas has since the last war of 2014 and a commitment to a full calmness by Hamas. In the expense of that Israel was supposed to give airport in Gaza or Al Arish in Egypt according to different proposals. Seaport in an artificial new small island to be created under Israeli control in the sea around Gaza as the Israeli Minister of Transportation Yisrael Katz proposed. Or by having a platform in Larnaca port in Cyprus where Israeli inspectors will inspect goods before transferring them to Gaza as the EU Envoy Christian Berger proposed. Industrial zones in Sinai as proposed in 2018 meeting in the White House in Washington organized by Gared Kushner, the American special envoy to the Israeli Palestinian peace process and freedom of access to the people of Gaza.

With the continuous failure to move any of these two options along, and the continuation of the tension on the borders of Gaza, it can be seen that there are growing voices in Israel that call for the re-occupation of Gaza, and the re-establishment of the Jewish colonial settlements there. In this regard, a former

officer in the Israeli Army called Meir Eindor wrote an article in the daily Israel *Hayom* called for the return of settling Gaza 13 years after the Israelis were expelled from there referring to the 2005 evacuation of Gaza. He sees that settlement in Gaza will bring both security and also good neighborly relations between the settlers and the population of Gaza as it was in the past before 2005(Eindor, Al-Ayyam newspaper, 10/7/2018, 15). The Israeli military correspondent of *Yediot Ahronot* Newspaper Ron Ben Yishai also wrote that the Israeli Army if went to a new war against Gaza, will enter it and will not leave it this time, which means a re-occupation (www.amad.ps 17/7/2018).

If what Ron bin Yishai expects will happen, Israel will face one of three scenarios according to the Palestinian academic Husam Al Dajani. The first among these will be related to the size of human and material losses that Israel will have, and those that the war will create in Gaza leading to international and transnational organizations responses. Second, the Scenario of creating an alternative to rule Gaza in cooperation with Israel, which is highly doubtful to happen, will result with chaos and the absence of the option to rule Gaza. The Third scenario is what the writer calls as the "black scenario" represented by the demographic problem that will be created in case that Israel decides to treat Gaza as part of the Israeli occupation state (Al Dajani, www.maannnews.net, 19/7/2018).

So far, the finding from the above is that the settler- colonial project in Palestine has two agendas: The expansionist one which refers more to the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the continuous and rapid increase of the Jewish Settlements in both of them. The second is the one that has to do with the question of what bargaining the settler- colonial project should do in each period. In this regard, the settler- colonial project tends to accept some compromises in specific periods, but these compromises are always temporary and subject to violation and changes.

It was shown for example how Netanyahu first government in 1996 changed the terms of reference for the negotiations. When the comparison between the pre-1948 period and the post-1967 one will be made in the coming sections, it will be shown how the political agreements played the role of buying time to the settler colonial project to grow in the ground both quantitatively and qualitatively, and it also will be shown how the big powers helped in this direction. Gaza wise the settler colonial project as shown kept changing all the time regarding it, it is in one hand a demographic problem that cannot be swallowed without changing the demographic balance in Israel, and also it is an economical, security, and humanitarian burden. Therefore, any solution of re-occupying it by Israel will prolong the conflict with its Palestinian population rather than solve it as Dr.Dajani showed, or Israel has to find a way out of the demographic problem in Gaza by evacuating the Gaza people to Sinai.

Till now the ideas in Israel is about expanding Gaza to Sinai through an agreement with Egypt, but what will happen and in which direction will the Israeli position move in the future? One of the possible scenarios might be that the events of any future war will be used to evacuate the Gaza population by force as happened during the previous evacuations that took place during the 1948 and the 1967 wars to the Palestinians. Till then Israel will continue using temporary solutions and conflict management procedures including the initiation of periodical wars as being one of the inherent characteristics of the settler-colonial projects.

What happened with the negotiations that took place after 2000 provides with other examples of how the negotiations were used as a public relation play that aimed to mask the continuation of the settler-colonial project in the ground. In other words, two processes were going on together, and in tandem since 1967, one of them is the non-stop land grab and settlement expansion including during the best times of the peace process. The second was about negotiation and the presentation of peace proposals, and this second played the role of buying time

for the sustaining of the first. The Ehud Olmert-Mahmoud Abbas negotiations of 2008 and the John Kerry Initiative of 2013-2015 are the further examples to be discussed here, both taking place while the number of the colonial settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem jumped to 614,010 by the end of 2016 according to Statistics of Peace Now. Out of these, there were 399,300 settlers in West Bank living in 129 settlement and 101 settlement outposts, and composing 12 percent of the population of West Bank. In East Jerusalem, there were 214,710 settlers in 2016 living in 23 settlements that 13 of them are inside the Palestinian localities (www.peacenow.org.il, and see also chapter four).

The Olmert-Abbas negotiations discussed all the issues of the permanent status solution between the Palestinians and the Israelis, including the effects of Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, borders, water, security, and prisoners, to agree on the establishment of a Palestinian State. These negotiations also included another team that was also meeting regularly to discuss the political and technical details. This second team was headed by Tzipi Livni and Ahmad Qurei (Abu Alaa) one of the key Palestinian negotiators since Oslo 1993. The negotiations went on according to the statement of the Annapolis Conference that was held in the United States in 27/11/2007. According to that statement the talks should include two tracks one concerned of the permanent status issues, and the second on the implementation of The Road Map of 2003 commitments that include among others the settlement freeze, the reopening of the closed Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem, the free passage between West Bank and Gaza, and others. None of these commitments were fulfilled, and on the contrary, the Israeli side declared after Annapolis that they would build new 307 settlement units in Abu Ghneim Mountain close to Jerusalem (Qurie`a, 2014, 163). The time ceiling for the negotiations was till the end of 2008, but before the end of the year, Mr. Olmert withdraws his commitment to finalize the talks about the core issues of the permanent status by the end of that year (Qurie`a, 162). Also, he presented additional demands as requesting

the Palestinian side to recognize in advance the Jewishness of the State of Israel (Quirle'a, 39).

Saeb Erekat a Palestinian key negotiator summarized the results of following Annapolis conference negotiations as follows: "On borders, the two sides agreed that the Palestinians would get back a territory equivalent to what was occupied by Israel in 1967 through borders modifications and lands swaps. The Israeli proposal included annexing 6.5 percent of West Bank to Israel, and giving the Palestinians 5, 8 percent from Israel, in addition to 0.7 percent to be used for the free passage between West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestinian side suggested an exchange of 1.9 percent of the territory that is equivalent both quantitatively and qualitatively."

"On Jerusalem, the Israeli side presented giving back the Arab neighborhoods to Palestine while creating a holy basin in the old city and around which will not be under the sovereignty of any of both sides, but under special arrangements. The Palestinian side demanded the return of all East Jerusalem to the Palestinian sovereignty to become the capital of the state of Palestine that will guarantee the freedom of worship to all religions in the city".

"On the refugee's issue, Israel offered to return 100 thousand refugees in five years to inside Israel, while the return of refugees to the Palestinian state will be an internal Palestinian issue. Israel rejected to bear any responsibility for the emergence of the refugee problem but offered to participate in paying compensation as part of a special international fund for that task. The Palestinian side stressed the right of return, and the right of the refugee to choose between returning to Israel, or to the Palestinian state, or to stay in his place (See for instance Ethan Bronner summary of Ehud Olmert memoirs (www.nytimes.com 27/1/2011), and the Aluf Benn article that revealed Olmert plan for peace with the Palestinian in www.haaretz.com 17/12/2009, and others), or to go to another. The Palestinian side added that compensation

should be also paid and not as an alternative to being paid only to those who will not return. Finally, the Palestinian side also suggested that additional compensation should be paid to the countries that hosted the refugees".

"On Water, Israel wanted to keep its control over all the water aquifers, and gave Palestinians the quantities of water they need, while the Palestinians asked for their control over their aquifers, and also their water rights on the Dead Sea, the Jordan Valley, and Mediterranean Sea on the shores of Gaza".

"On security, the Israeli side requested the creation of a demilitarized Palestinian state, and the Israeli control of its airspace and preserving Israeli military presence in different places inside it. On the contrary, the Palestinian side wanted a fully sovereign state that has its freedom to acquire weapons needed for the fulfillment of its full responsibilities, and that has full control over its borders, airspace, and territorial waters. Finally, on prisoners, the Palestinian side demanded that all the Palestinian prisoners to be released whenever the final status agreement will be signed" (Erekat, 2009, 4-6).

Using primary resources such as those of Ahmad Qurei and Saeb Erekat that were not denied by the Israeli negotiators by then, some of the details of these negotiations were presented here as an example of the gaps that continued to exist after between the two sides mainly on the demographic issues, the return of the refugees. And the security ones, Israeli presence inside the Palestinian state, and creating a demilitarized Palestinian state.

In between, there are also gaps resulting from religious roots, and the Israeli wish to annex the big settlements blocks to Israel, Jerusalem holy Basin idea to keep part of Jerusalem under common control and the idea to annex 6.5 percent of West Bank to Israel. There were also gaps resulting from mistrust of the other, such as the demand to keep the water aquifers in the hands of Israel, in addition to all the non-confidence on the security issue. Despite that these negotiations were the closest ever to an agreement between the two sides. In

comparison with those of Camp David 2000 at that Time, Ehud Barak offer does not exceed giving back 91 percent of West Bank and another 1 percent through a land swap. Also he wanted to keep parts of the Old City of Jerusalem in the hands of Israel, create a joint sovereignty in Al Haram Al Sharif, lease the Jordan Valley from the Palestinians for long decades, and rejected the concept of right of return of the Palestinian refugees (see for instance, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley, 2001. Ahmad Qurie'a, 2006; Raviv Drucker, 2014; www.nad.ps). It is noticeable here that both Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert conducted the negotiations with the Palestinians close to end of their terms as Prime Ministers, also coincided with a similar situation to the American Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush who also were at the end of their terms period.

In the other hand, the nine months negotiations of Kerry Initiative did not go on smoothly; it took time till it started, due to the disagreement on the terms of reference of it. In the beginning, the Palestinian side sought an Israeli freeze of settlement expansion during the negotiations period, and to resume the negotiations from the point that it stopped previously with Olmert. But none of these demands was fulfilled, and the negotiations about the permanent status issues was resumed from scratch upon an Arab Peace Initiative follow up committee request after they met John Kerry in Amman in 17/7/2013 (Erekat, 2013, study no. 14, 13), with no consideration of the results of the previous agreements.

Besides the direct meetings between Abbas and Olmert, the Kerry initiative included other direct intensive meetings from August to November 2013 only between the two negotiating teams of Saeb Erekat, the head of PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, and Mohammad Shtayyeh, the member of the Central Committee of Fateh which also had Erekat as a member, from the Palestinian side. From the Israeli side, the participants were Tzipi Livni, the Minister of Justice and the head of *Hatnua* Party, and Yitzhak Molkho (the Advisor of Prime Minister Netanyahu). Later to that period in which 25 meetings

were held, a kind of proximity and indirect talks were held between the American team and each side separately. Also, direct negotiations were held between John Kerry and Netanyahu to discuss the details of what will become an American Framework Agreement.

From November 2013 to the midst of February 2014, the process was limited to meetings between the American team and the Israeli one without resorting to the Palestinian side as the Israeli *Haaretz* Newspaper Journalist Barak Ravid wrote as a result of his investigation of what happened in those talks. Ravid added that when Kerry presented the results of his talks with Netanyahu to Abbas for the first time on February 19th, 2014 in Paris, these results were a shock to the Palestinian President (Ravid, 2014).

According to Raviv Drucker, Netanyahu did not present any territorial offer or a map, and he gave security demands to the Palestinian side (Drucker, 2014). On the details, Ravid investigation showed that by the Midst of November 2013 it becomes evident that the two sides were unable to achieve a permanent status agreement. Also, Israel declared plans for new settlement expansion in November which led to the resignation of the Palestinian negotiation team.

These mentioned developments led the Americans to change direction and to start working on something more modest than a final status agreement, and that can be called as a Framework Paper for an Agreement to be declared on the name of the American side only, while each side will have his right to give reservations on it. This framework of 10 pages that no copy of it was delivered to the Palestinian side did not include any parameters on how to solve the problems of Refugees, Jerusalem, and the settlements as Ravid investigation showed. Nor it gives clarity on the issue of the border with question marks kept about if Netanyahu will accept withdrawing from ninety percent of West Bank as included in the document, nor a position in regard to land swaps was involved, and Netanyahu made no indication what so ever to the scale of territorial

withdrawals that he is ready to assemble. Besides these, the document presented a clear position regarding the recognition of Israel as the National State of the Jewish People, and regarding the security issue by calling for a demilitarized Palestinian State, and the preservation of the presence of the Israeli military troops in the Jordan Valley (Ravid, 2014).

While Netanyahu changed the terms of reference of the peace process during his first term of 1996-1999 (see above), he acted regarding Kerry initiative in two ways that aimed to block any progress towards an agreement. One of these ways has to do with the blocking of any development during the negotiations on the significant issues of territory (borders and settlements), Jerusalem, and refugees while presenting security demands and the recognition of Israel as the National Home of the Jewish people. The second way was through settlement expansion, and new legal actions proposed by his colleagues in the Likud Party during the nine months of the Kerry Initiative. Among these were the approval of building 14,000 new settlements units during these months according to Peace Now. Added to that was the submission of draft laws to the Knesset by the Likud member and Minister Miri Regev, one in December 2013 that aimed to apply the Israeli law on the Jordan Valley, and the second of February 2014 that sought to annex individual settlements and the roads to them to the Israeli proper.

In conclusion, while Oslo was a framework for the negotiations and its following agreements were all about interim agreements, like Cairo 1994 agreement, Oslo agreement of 1995, Hebron Protocol of 1997, and others reviewed by Galia Golan (Golan, 2007). Three processes took place towards finding a final solution to the conflict. These are Camp David 2000, Olmert- Abbas negotiations 2008, and the Kerry Initiative (29/7/2013- 29/4/ 2014): The first, the 2000 Camp David Negotiations, was two weeks negotiations that collapsed and followed by Israeli attacks on Yaser Arafat as a non-partner, and the Palestinian second Intifada. The latter collapsed despite making progress due to end of the term of Olmert and him going to war against Gaza from December 2008 to January 2009, and

the third was the most difficult one due to the ideological line of Mr. Netanyahu. As in the former two violence also followed here when the Israeli Army initiated a 51 days war against Gaza starting from August 2014. In all the three the common was about the continuation of settlement expansion during the negotiations, but in contrast, the last was the one in which Israel reached the point of no readiness to end the occupation and to accept the withdrawal to the 1967 borders.

The last development was followed by other moves leading at the end to the Israeli approval of the " Basic Law: Israel as the National State of the Jewish People" law in 18/7/2018. This law brings the Arabic language down that being as earlier a second official language, and that encourages the promotion of settlements confusing in this way between the State of Israel that is supposed to be according to the UN recognition on its 1948n borders and *Eretz* Israel that seems to include the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. The writer MarzouqHalabi described the situation as becoming about "resumed settler colonialism" which leaves no place for any further Negotiations (www.arab48.com 18/7/2018).

Will further negotiations be held in the future after these developments? It might be not possible to predict, but it looks to be more unlikely. This thesis suggested instead of what Halabi concluded, that the discussion among the Zionist Parties in Israel was always between those who want a mini settler colonial state that includes the Israel of 1948 with some additions from Jerusalem and West Bank, and those who wish to the full *Eretz* Israel without concessions, while seeking to find other kind of solutions to the fate of the indigenous population as analyzed.

2.2 Settler Colonialism, Democracy Inclusion and Exclusion Politics and the Indigenous People

After this review of the nature of the settler-colonial project in Palestine, its ideology, changes through two stages of history, how it used negotiations with the indigenous people to serve its interests, and its current status, it is safe to

conclude that the Zionist Movement was a settler colonial movement rather than being a National movement of the Jewish people that existed and preserved its identity overages. As such it was an elitist rather than being a representative movement to all the Jews worldwide. Also, it was about Colonialism at the expense of the indigenous population rather than about colonization and separate development besides them.

A good starting point to the issue of inclusion and exclusion about Zionism and Israel might be by examining the following kind of questions: Regarding Zionism, what is about the historical identity of Palestine and its relation to the question of indigeneity? How Zionism envisioned this question, and was its vision inclusive or exclusive to the indigenous people in Palestine? Also, IlanPappe question can be added which is: Was the Zionist movement crimes against the Palestinians motivated mainly by its nationalism, or colonized-colonizer nature (Pappe, 2008), or more by its settler colonial nature? These questions are fundamental regarding the first question of the exclusion and the inclusion politics which is the question of who is eligible to exist) (see chapter one).

Regarding Israel; Does Israel represents a nation-state of the emerging Israeli people with or without relevance to the indigenous population? How to describe Israel in terms of its democratic system and its inclusion/ exclusion politics towards the indigenous people is it based on liberal Democracy? Or based on Consociational democracy, Ethnic democracy, Ethnocracy (open or closed), Herrenvolk Democracy, or on Settler democracy? To enlighten the analysis of these components the kind of democracy that Israel created after 1993 in the post-1967 occupied territories will be briefly described, then the Israeli factor in its making and its performance will be concluded. These different models of democracy/ non-democracy relate to the two components of inclusion and exclusion, the one that relates to who is eligible to exist, and the second that is related to the question of who counts (see chapter one).

Beyond these, section three will conclude about Israel if it is a Postcolonial/neocolonial State? Or is it a state of coloniality nature, internal Colonialism or settler Colonialism State? Regarding its expansion after 1967, is its occupation? Or is it Apartheid and a system of separation? Or a Settler Colonial State? Or any other form such as the one related to the right to expand within the historical land of Israel?

Starting with the questions about Zionism, it might be useful to quote first the definition of the UN Special Rapporteur Jose Martinez Cobe about the indigenous people, one that is familiar in most of the studies about the issue, especially in the absence of a UN official definition. This definition reads as follows: "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, following their cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal systems". The components of this definition are included in a way or another in the 2007 "United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples," issued by the General Assembly (Resolution number 61/259, www.un.org).

In the preamble of that resolution, there is a strong language against any superiority of one nation or individual over other people or individuals due to their national, racial, religious, ethnic, or cultural origin. The preamble considered such a superiority to be "racist, scientifically false, legally invalid, morally condemnable, and socially unjust" (Resolution number 61/259, www.un.org). The preamble also uses a strong language against the historical injustice and colonialism and the dispossession of the lands, territories and the resources of the indigenous peoples.

As Mansour Nasasra mentioned, the concept of indigeneity is a contested one, due to different reasons that among them the presence of other terms such as "the First Peoples," or the "First Nations," and the confusion between it and the concept of minority (Nasasra,2013).

About Palestine, the concept has some deficiencies when applying it to the Palestinian people as a whole. The first part of Cobe definition might look beautiful here, but the second part of the definition does not seem so, on the basis that the Palestinians are not part of the dominant society, but they are other people who struggle to get back their right of self-determination.

Within this framework, there is the question of the Palestinian refugees, and their right of return. In other words, the concept as defined by Cobe looks as aiming to preserve a distinct political, social and cultural identity of the indigenous people within the dominant structure of dominance by the winners who appropriated their lands and resources. However, Nasasra adopts the concept of indigeneity as a one to help explicating the situation of the Palestinian indigenous population in the Naqab area, being a minority that Israel considers as an "ethnic group", a concept used with the aim to divide the Palestinians to different ethnicities instead of being one nation (Nasasra, 2013, 88).

Besides the above Nasasra suggests using the term indigenous people when also referring to the Palestinian people as a whole (Nasasra, 2013, 86). Supporting the position of Nasasra, Hatem Bazian will suggest that the Palestinians are the historic indigenous people of Palestine in opposition to what he calls as "the Biblical Theology of Dispossession" that are combined in the other hand with "recreating the biblical text in the modern." In this sense, the Palestinians preserved their presence in their land for long centuries till the beginning of the 20th century. He wrote: "In reality, Palestinians are an indigenous population that entered the 20th century as victims of a global,

colonial grab of the territory and resources of the collapsed Ottoman order” (Bazian, 2014).

Using such a "historical indigeneity" approach might be a difficult undertaking given the massive dominance of the Israeli and the Zionist narratives, that also aimed to silence the Palestinian narratives as Keith Whitlam maintained (Bazian, 2014). A different way to put it is to speak about two narratives that are both right. A position that is adopted by some Israeli scholars such as Shlomo Avineri who considered the Israel-Palestinian conflict as a one that is taking place between two national movements as he wrote (Avineri, Haaretz, 2/10/2015; 8/10/2015).

According to Avineri position, Zionism has a national character, something that is denied by other Israeli academic as Shlomo Sand, who accepts the presence of an Israeli people that emerged in Israel after 1948, but did not take at the same time the appearance and the formation of a Jewish people before the establishment of Israel as Zionism claimed (Sand, 2012, 19).

Sand does not see the presence of any continuous Jewish Ethnos, but on the contrary, the Yemeni Jews, for example, are similar to the other Non-Yemeni Jews rather than being identical to the Other Jews from other countries (Sand, 2012, 135). In another book, he denies the myth that Jews left Palestine when the Roman Emperor Titus expelled them in the year 70 AD, and that they kept their true identity alive for two thousand years after this exodus till they returned to their homeland *Eretz Israel*. He first says referring to Roman resources that the Romans did not expel the Jews after destroying the Temple in the year 70, the Romans at that time did not also possess' cars and trucks at that time to use for expelling the Jews (Sand, 2010, 179; Sand, 2012, 32). On the contrary, many Jews continued to live in Palestine after, and they established the Hashmonaim Kingdom which revolted against the Romans led by Bar Kochva in the year 132. After that revolt, the Jews also did not leave Palestine, and when

the Arabs conquered Palestine in the seventh century, there was a Jewish majority among its population that some of them were converted to Christianity starting from the year 324 (Sand, 2010, 233-234).

In regard to Babylon mentioned as the place that the Romans deported the Jews to in the year 70, Sand suggests that there were Jewish community there since the sixth century BC, and these did not 'return' to Palestine after Ceros the Persian leader occupied Palestine and allowed the Jews to return to it in the year 587 (Sand, 2010, 183,194). Sand shows how Jews were unable to keep their "pure ethnos" by mentioning several examples, such as the one above about Jews got converted to Christianity and later converted to Islam after the 7th century (Sand, 2010, 235-236).

Sand also mentions different examples about Jews imposing their religion on others such as the Hashmonaim who imposed Judaism on their neighbors (Sand, 206). Then he said the emergence of Judaism separate from the Jews of Palestine in places such as Babylon, Himiar in Yemen in the 4th century (Sand, 2010, 256), showing as such as it is a myth to talk about one pure Jewish ethnos that continued over 2000 years of Diaspora. Later he gives an excellent overview of the Khazar Kingdom that occupied the Valleys close to the Volga River and the North Caucasus (Sand, 2010, 279). The King of this Kingdom Polan was converted to Judaism during the period of the Abbasid Caliphate Haron Al Rashid (763-809) (Sand, 2010, 286). And it is believed that the Jews of Eastern Europe who colonized Palestine are the ancestors of those Jews who are part of the Turkish and the Mongol origins rather than being the ancestors of the "sons of Israel" As Arthur Koestler wrote in his 1976 book "The Thirteenth Tribe" (Sand, 2010, 301).

As he destroyed the myth of the Jewish People, Sand also destroyed the myth of *Eretz* Israel. He mentioned that the first invention of *Eretz* Israel was by Christians, since it was said for the first time in the Gospel of Matthew at the end

of the early century, and that is opposite to the other Gospels which referred to it as the Land of Judea. Sand stresses that both names at that time were ecumenical and not 'national' as used later by Zionism (Sand, 2012, 45-46). Further, in the Old Testament, the *Eretz* Israel was mentioned to include the land of the Kingdom of Israel in Samaria, and it did not include Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, and their suburbs as part of it. The last locations were called as "the land of Canaan," while the land of Judea was not mentioned in any text at that time as being *Eretz* Israel (Sand, 2012, 43). Finally, Herzl, Borochoy and other Zionist leaders used the name "Palestia" to the region, but when their writings translated to Hebrew, the word Palestia became *Eretz* Israel (Sand, 2012, 42-43).

If the *Eretz* Israel was not the common name of the country, then what did the successive generations use its name?

The country was called Canaan Land 4000BC, and this name continued for 3000 years. After the Philistines came in the 13th century BC from Crete Island, they gave the country their name, which also Palastu and Pilistu in the Assyrian, and P-r-s-t in the old Egyptian, and Palaestina in Greek (Sakhnini, 1986, 18-19). As shown by Shlomo Sand above when David created the Jewish Kingdom in Judea around 985 BC as Sakhnini mentioned (Sakhnini, 1986, 19), David did not use the name *Eretz* Israel, and the name of Palestine continued during and after the David Kingdom. Later the name became "Palaistine" as used by the Greek and confirmed by the Jewish historian Yousifus in the first century, and then the Romans followed using the name "Palaestina" which was also stamped on the Roman coins by the Emperor Visban after 70AC. The name continued later, and when the Caliphate Abu Bakr handed the flag to Amr Ibn Al-As, the leader of the Army that was given the task to conquer Palestine. The Caliphate told him to pass the way of Ilya (Jerusalem) till he arrives at the land of "Filistin" as he called it due to the absence of a letter equivalent to "P" in Arabic,

therefore he turned the “ P” to “F” The name continued as Palestine ever since (Sakhnini, 1986, 23-24).

Following the above review, it is clear that Zionism invented both the Jewish People and *Eretz* Israel. As Hatem Bazian wrote this invention was instrumentalized to create a Jewish State on the expense of the Palestinian people: First by denying the presence of that people, and second by the dispossession and the elimination processes and operations that followed. In this regard till the date of the establishment of the State of Israel in the 15th of May 1948, Zionism was unable to appropriate more than 6.5 percent of Palestine; also, Jews did not represent a majority of the population. According to the English- Palestine yearly statistical book of 1947-1948 quoted by Edward Said, Ibrahim Abu Lughod and others, in 1946, there were 608,225 Jews in Palestine, while the full population was 1,912,212 (Said et al, 1986, 9).

These numbers show that the amount of the indigenous population was more than twice more significant than the amount of the Jews. In the other hand, only 150,000 of these continued to live in the new Israel after the 1948 wars. Before Zionism Palestine was also well populated, for instance in 1878 the population was 462,465 including 87 percent Muslims, 10 percent Christians, and 3 percent Jews (Pappe, 2017) in 1922 the population density in Palestine was 72 persons in each square mile which were a significant number in comparison with the States of the region and outside it (Said et al, 1986, 13).

These numbers are referring to the indigenous population, that include an Arabs of Muslim Sunni majority and a minority of Christians, Shia and Druze, 65 percent were working in agriculture, living in around 500 villages, and cultivate products such as crops, fruits, and vegetable. Besides that, part lived in the cities working in the industry, and different professions (Said et al, 1986, 9). The towns were also the centers of the national action, the many newspapers and

magazines, the lively intellectual life, and the civil society organizations (Salem, 1999; 2014).

In the national arena, the early warnings against the Zionist ambitions towards Palestine were made by Yousef Dia Al Khalidi the Jerusalemite prominent personality, the first mayor of Jerusalem in 1867 and the member of the Ottoman Parliament, Al Mabothan, in 1876 in his letter to Herzl in 1899. Other warnings came in the writings of the Lebanese intellectual Najib Azouri in 1906 in his book titled as "The Awakening of the Arab Nation." Also, RuhiKhalidi who was an intellectual who studied in the Sorbonne in France, and also became a member in the Mabothan about Zionism in 1913, and of the Journalist Najib Nassar in 1913 and others (Salem, 2014; Shehadeh about Najib Nassar who was his uncle, 2010).

In the period of the British Mandate, the lively intellectual life included liberals who called for equal rights to women and the separation between the politics and religion, such as some of the writings in the Falastin newspaper (Shomali, 1990, 174-187). There were also Marxists such as NajatiSidqi from Jerusalem (Abu Hashhash, 1990), Islamists who were moderates studied in Al Azhar as students of the reformist Islamic scholar Mohammad Abdo, or Sufis like Fatima Al Yashratiyyah from Acre. There was also an Arab Nationalist trend, such as Aref Al Aref, Palestinian National trend, Najib Nassar, and a humanistic trend, Khalil Sakakini (Salem, 2014, 23-26).

The Muslim-Christian committees in the 1920s led the national struggle during the British Mandate period, then by political parties, and the Arab National Committee Starting from the 1930s and after. The political demands were precise: Stop the Jewish immigration, stop the land purchase and the end of the British Mandate and establish a Palestinian National Government (Hourani, 1980; Sakhnini, 1986, -112). Besides that, there were vibrant civil society organizations that included labor and women movements since the 1920s, youth

movement since 1930s, public clubs such as the Arab and the Orthodox clubs, and different kinds of service delivery organizations (Muslih 1993; Nakhleh 1994; Salem 1999). Jaffa and Haifa in this context were the Palestinian openings for the Palestinian contacts with the world through their ports. Jaffa and Jerusalem were also the centers of most of the political parties and the intellectual and the artistic life, and Jaffa was a producer of oranges and citrus that were exported in a good quality and a professional way to Europe (Tamari, 2005; 1999; Mansour, 2008; 2016; Haikal, 1988 (2014).

Therefore Palestine wasn't a barren country that is free from people but a country that had a people who promoted their indigeneity a generation after the other. These indigenous are called the Palestinians inclusive to the Palestinian Jews. The other Jews who came from outside were then settler colonialist rather than being indigenous as Shlomo Sand studies shown. The land was barren only at the mental level: "Empty not necessarily in the sense of inhabitants, but rather a kind of cultural barrenness outside the civilization" as Metternich said, European colonies "could be freely placed not in opposition to but the midst of more or less backward peoples. These colonies could not help but become "poles of development to use the recent term anachronistically" (Rodinson, 1973, 40).

As said till 1948 Zionism was unable to change neither the demography nor the topography and the landscape of the territory of Palestine. In 1948 and after the dispossession of Palestine took place. Therefore the observation of IlanPappe becomes worthy of examining: He wrote that Zionism worst crimes against the Palestinians were national more than a colonial one (Pappe, 2008, 613). In the previous page to this, he wrote "I will argue that Zionist settlers-indeed Zionist thought and praxis- were motivated by a national impulse, but acted as pure colonialists" (Pappe, 2008, 612).

As shown by referring to Shlomo Sand and others earlier there were no "Jewish people," nor "Eretz Israel" and these were invented by Christianity and Zionism to create a "new nation." Opposite to the other nationalisms that were all invented and imaginative as Benedict Anderson shown, but sought to establish their national states over their land (Anderson,1983), Zionism sought to establish its national state over land that exists outside where the Jews were living, and this was a myth. In one of the most recent books of IlanPappe titled "The Ten Myths about Israel," he confirmed the same conclusion as part of his discussion of myth number two in which Zionism claimed that the Jews are a people without land (Pappe, 2018). Therefore, the puzzle emerged with the earlier conclusion of Pappe made years before that the crimes of Zionism are national rather than being colonial: Did he here contradicts himself by claiming that Zionism as a national movement in 2008, and claiming the opposite in 2018? Or maybe because he is aware of the Zionist crimes of the period of 1948 and after, since he wrote his seminal book about it titled "the Ethnic Cleansing in Palestine" in 2006, and published in Arabic in 2007, he thought that by then Zionism already reached the point of creating a new nation that was called as "the Israeli nation"? The question here becomes about if the establishment of the state is the criteria for the emergence of a new nation. Or there should be there another criterion such as creating one language and a cohesive historical narrative, in addition to the creation of stability that is based on the consent of the different sectors including those that belongs to the indigenous population? Finally, Pappe might mean the crimes committed by Israel against the Palestinians after its establishment until today, and these are too many when one calculates the number of wars and attacks committed ever since. But do wars and attacks represent the entire story, or there is also the settler -colonial expansion? Is this expansion rooted in settler colonialism or the emerging Israeli nationalism, or both?

It is worthy also of examining another argument made by IlanPappe when he considered the interaction in Palestine from the Zionist side with the Palestinians

to have components inside each Zionist: One is about him/her as a colonized and the second is about him/her as a colonizer. His article here is about the "Shtetls" referred to earlier, which were small towns of Jews limited to them in Eastern Europe. In these shtetls the Jews were victims and colonized; in Palestine, they became victimizers and colonizers (Pappe, 2012, 42, 44). For him the Jews of Israel today are not all victims, but the feelings of the victim still exist combined with becoming a victimizer at the same time (Pappe, 2012, 55). Besides that, the Zionist Jews outside Palestine strangely consider themselves as the owners of the country, and the indigenous people of it, even if they did not walk one mile inside it or reside in it. In this regard, they consider the Palestinians more than an alien, but aggressive aliens. They think it also a shame (*Klon* in Hebrew) if the Palestinians exist besides the Jewish Settlements, and that it is *Kavod*: an honor, to attack them, and to get rid of them, considering the latter as a temporary evil that there is no way to evade it (Pappe, 2012, 51-52).

The concept of Jews being victims when they were living in the shtetls might be right, but the idea that they were colonized do not look to be as convincing due to the absence of the colonialism aspects that have to do with exteriority, colonizing a territory outside the colonial country proper. In another hand his explication of the behavior of Zionism and the Zionists looks revealing; in this regard, he adds that settler colonialism is not history for Israel like what happened in the United States and Australia where the indigenous population was integrated. But on the contrary, it is a practice that allows Israel to present itself as "both a colonial and post-Colonial phenomenon" (Pappe, 2012, 41). At the end he says that since Israel is still saying the other as an alien, it is the reason then for "that is why ethnic cleansing began as an idea, turned into a strategy, was executed as a policy, and remains as a vision to the future" within "uncompleted project of Judaizing" (Pappe, 2012, 56).

Moving to the questions above about Israel, this last quoted revealing insight by IlanPappe helps to explicate Zionism as a continuous and uncompleted settler-colonial project in a shape of a State that works on the expansion and the ethnic cleansing as projects in the making. A similar analysis of Patrick Wolfe showing Israel inclination towards additional future genocides and transfers was alluded to in the previous chapter. But Lorenzo Veracini has a different version about this matter stating that there is no settler or post-settler state and that Israel transformed itself after 1967 to the status of colonial occupation, rather than continuing to be a settler colonial project as it was earlier. The settler state part was discussed in chapter one; the discussion here will be mainly about the second part relevant to this chapter.

In an article published in the *Journal of Palestine Studies* in 2013, Veracini sees a shift after from "a border to an ethnic conflict" as suggested by Menahem Klein. But he suggests that "We should consider a parallel shift that involves a transition from a system of relationship that can be considered as settler colonial to a relational system crucially characterized by colonial forms" (Veracini, 2013, 27). The argument goes later as follows: In the pre-1948 period, the Zionist project was a settler colonial that succeeded to create a legitimate state and to indigenize the settlers who became natives.

Veracini went further suggesting that on the contrary, the post-1967 settler colonial project is facing questions of moral and legal nature which make it impossible for this project to get indigenized as happened to the pre-1948 project. This project did not understand itself as well as emancipated from international supervision and control. Also, Israel failed to create a "domestic dependent nation" in the post-1967 occupied territories as Britain did with Zionism which was its 'domestic dependent nation'. Further, it failed to bring enough Jews from the world to Israel to create a Jewish majority in the 1967 occupied territories. In the other hand, Veracini does not expect the 1948 and the 1967 expulsions to be repeated for a third time because the regime in West

Bank and East Jerusalem is 'operating satisfactorily.' Accordingly, Veracini concludes that the situation in the post-1967 is more colonial than a settler colonial, the former is trying to take the shape of permanent occupation, and it created a segregation system which is colonial rather than aiming to normalize the life of the settlers in the occupied territories.

The Article of Veracini was written in 2013. The developments during the second Government of Benyamin Netanyahu that started in 2013, followed by the election of the American President Donald Trump in November 2016, might create some new trends that might change the 2013 conclusions of Veracini. After Trump Israel was emancipated from the American control and supervision to a significant extent, and therefore had a free hand to legalize the 110 settlements outposts that were built illegally from the Israeli laws themselves on the West Bank in 2017. Also, Israel decided that the Palestinian owners of these seized lands can follow the Cypriot model of seeking compensation for their properties.

The United States President Donald Trump gave Israel a free hand in Jerusalem after moving the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to it in May 2018. The administration during his period made a blind eye towards the resumed and expanded Israeli settlement expansion in West Bank, and the law that prevents the Palestinians to submit cases against the Israeli Army and the settlers to the Israeli high court in 2018, accompanied by several proposals and draft laws for annexation of parts of West Bank to Israel, and the plans of evacuation of the 46 Bedouin communities living in area C of West Bank. Finally the Basic Law: Israel-The National State of the Jewish People, issued by the Israeli Knesset in July 2018, which recognize Palestine as *Eretz* Israel and the country that belongs to Jewish people worldwide, taking out as such its Palestinian identity, belonging to the Palestinian people and the Palestinian history, and making the Palestinians as aliens in their country.

These developments signal to some more profound shortfalls in the Veracini analysis. First Israel is still dealing with its Arab citizens inside 1948 proper as enemies that are subject to the confiscation of their lands, and to the treatment as second-degree citizens passport citizenship according to Uri Davis, 1997, and 2003, preferably real nationality. They still have a group of unrecognized villages, and non-recognition of their rights as a national group, besides all the aspects of discrimination in the budgets and the development plans, and preventing them from buying properties and houses in the Jewish neighborhoods, and preventing their use of the state lands that are excluded to the Jews use. With the July 2018 Nation-State Law (see above) they became fully aliens in their country (see for instance Ghanem 2009; Falah, 1993; Kretzmer, 2002, and also the documents: The Future Vision paper of the Palestinians inside Israel 2006 www.adalah.org, Haifa Declaration, 2007 www.mada-reserach.org, and the Democratic Constitution, 2007, www.adalah.org).

Very telling in the response of the Nation-State law is that the three Druze members in three different political parties in Israel decided to go to the Israel high court against this law. These are Hamad Ammar from the Jewish Home Party, Karam Hasson from Kulano Party both members in the governmental coalition, and the third is Saleh Saad from the opposition Zionist Camp Party (www.maannnews.com 23/7/2018). Besides that, the practices towards the Bedouins lands in the Naqab should be mentioned. In this area consisting of 12000 Square kilometers (almost half of the size of historic Palestine), the state of Israel does not recognize the Bedouin ownership of their lands. In the other hand, the Prawer official Committee decided to remove 36 Bedouin villages, and the Israeli Government decided in November 2013 to remove the town of Umm Al Hiran (Bazian, 2014).

Moreover there are the historical attacks on the Bedouin lands and neighborhoods going on since 1948 (Falah, 1989), and other ongoing

evacuations like in the case of Al Araqib village demolished for 131 times Till July 2018(SeeNasasra 2013, Nasasra 2017, and Abu Sitta 2011). What is missing here in Veracini conceptual framework is the failure to envision and theorize a settler colonial state. The system of his thinking is moving around the idea that the settler- colonial project gets to an end with the establishment of a state that brings the settlers to become natives. As shown from the above the new natives of 1948 continued settler colonizing against the indigenous population there till today, which gives merit to IlanPappe way of talking about Zionism as an incomplete project of Judaizing. This core failure of Veracini led to another one when he proposed the need of Israel to a baby "domestic dependent nation" to take care of it as Britain did with Zionism in the pre-1948 period. On the contrary here Zionism that did not complete its project in 1948 sought to end it after 1967 as also IlanPappe advised.

In other words, instead of looking to Israel to become a mother state to a new settler-colonial project, this new project of the period after 1967 is a continuation of the same plans that was conducted in the pre-1948 period by Zionism with British support. But continued from 1948 to 1967 by the State of Israel against its Palestinian "citizens", and then after 1967 is maintained by the state inside Israel and also in the 1967 occupied territories in cooperation between the state as the critical factor in deciding about the new settlement units. Also, budgeting for them and building them, and the settler non- state actor organizations who also played a less dominant role in developing the colonial settlements. In the case of Britain-Zionism in the pre-1948 period, the Zionist movement was another entity than of Britain, but in the case of Israel and the colonial settlers in West Bank they belong to the same entity, and all are part of the process of creating the Full land of Israel. Therefore, why Israel will need to create a baby domestic dependent nation from them, instead of cooperating to complete the Zionist project expansion?

The final point of discussion with Veracini has to do with the extent to which the settler colonial project in West Bank and East Jerusalem can get indigenized. Opposite to what he advised Zionism suggested a separate development approach ever since (see Eisenstadt above), therefore it was not by accident that the Hebrew Work slogan was raised since the second Jewish *Aliyah* that started in 1904.

After 1967 the colonial settlers did use Palestinian labor force inside the settlements, the number of those by 2018 might be reached around fifty thousand according to some resources. But in another hand, the colonial settlements in West Bank are living as entirely separate from their surrounding by walls and pipe wires, and are not interested in creating any "normal" interactions with their neighbors. In such a situation how the indigenization of the colonial settlers might happen? 1948 tells that this indigenization never took place before the establishment of Israel. The political interactions, such as the talks between the political leaders, and the relations created by some Jewish Organizations who called for a bi-national state such as *Brit Shalom* in the 1920s and *Ihud* in the 1940s with the Palestinians. Nor the economic interactions, such as in the British projects as the railway and oil companies, and the work as employees in the British Administration were able to create such indigenization (Kaufman, Salem, and Verhoeven, 2006, 11-39). All these interactions did not lead to a 'harmony' with the indigenous population who kept their original positions against the land purchase and the Jewish immigration to Palestine.

Along with this analysis, the indigenization of the settler colonialists had to wait to be done by force through the expulsion of the Palestinians were made during and after the war (Pappe, 2007; Khalidi, 1959; 1961; 1982; 1988; Kana'aneh, 2000; Sanbar, 1987). Regarding the post-1967, one can find a discussion in Israel during the 1980s about the ability of the settler-colonial project to win. Some articles of the Israeli newspapers by then showed that this is possible and

since some of the settlers were ideologically holders of the idea of the Whole Israel land. The articles advised that the settlers might establish a separate army for them (see for instance a discussion between Army Generals, and commentaries by Zeev Schiff, in *Al-Masdar*, 1988, 61-66, 83-85, 49-51). In the other hand an article written by Uri Avnery at that time advised that the settler - colonial project will not succeed in the West Bank due to the inability of Israel to bring immigrants in significant numbers from outside, which was a precondition for the settler colonial project to succeed in 1948 (Avnery in *Al Masiri*, 1990, 322).

In the second decade of the 21st century, things looked different. Now, almost nobody in Israel is suggesting that a Judea State will be established separately from Israel, mainly after the settlers became a key decision maker in the government especially the one that was composed in 2013.

In another hand, the Government loyalty to the settlers reached a point that the Minister of Housing Mr. Yoav Gallant will adopt in 2017, a proposal of the *Yesha* Council of the settlers prepared in 2013 and calling for bringing the number of settlers in West Bank, without East Jerusalem, to one million. This time the Minister suggested this increase to take place by moving part of the population from Gush Dan Area in the center of Israel to the settlements in West Bank (Gallant, www.timesofisrael.com, 19/12/2016).

According to Galant position, the number of settlers in West Bank will be increased by internal population movement rather than via immigration from outside, and this was the idea that came to the mind of the Minister. Now the success of this idea is dependent on creating incentives to those who live in the luxurious areas of Gush Dan, Tel Aviv, and Haifa and in between them.

These incentives are already provided by cheap apartment's prices and paying in long term installments. The incentives also include creating a touristic

infrastructure in the colonial settlements, creating excellent and fast roads between them and Israel, and other incentives that might make some people buy an additional house in the settlements to the one that he/she has inside Israel (see a good and lengthy report about the settlements by Jake Wallis Simons, published in www.telegraph.co.uk). Another incentive is what Netanyahu called "Dissolving the concept of the countryside" (Al-Ayam, 31/1/2017) to promote modernization. Will the Settlements in West Bank follow the level of the development of Tel Aviv and Haifa? Regardless of how much this development of the demography and the infrastructure will be, it will not be able to defeat the population balance with the Palestinians who reached at the end of 2017 the number of 4,780,978 without the refugees living outside Palestine (www.pcbs.ps).

According to this review, what will be the solution? Will Israel be ready to withdraw all these settlers as part of a peace process? This withdrawal does not look likely due to the tracking of the negotiations elsewhere in this section. Will Israel be ready for a compromise of the kind that Camp David Negotiations and the others that followed advocated by annexing the big settlement blocks to Israel after gathering all the settlers inside them? Full proposals for such a solution were prepared by Baker Institute (Dejerejian, www.bakerinstitute.org, 2010), and Geneva Initiative (www.geneva-accord.org; Arieli, Shaul www.shaularieli.com). As shown in the previous review of the negotiations the Israeli Government composed in 2013 are not interested in such a solution anymore, but it seeks to annex Area C which represents two third of the size of West Bank and to expel its population composed mainly of Bedouins and small hamlets who do not exceed 393,162 according to the Palestinian Statistics. Besides that, there is now a Caucus in the Israeli Knesset composed of 26 members that call for full Israeli victory (www.meforum.org), supported by an American Congressional Caucus calling for the same and produced by the Middle East Forum that is directed by Daniel Pipes (www.meforum.org). There are also groups who call for expelling the

Palestinians to Jordan, Ted Belman, and *Zehut* Party, and others who even call for the Israeli return to Saudi Arabia, Avi Lipkin, as mentioned earlier.

Will, all of this, led to the achievement of the indigenizing of the colonial settlers according to a modified version of 1948 expulsion that includes a "modified Jordan option" as it was called by Giora Eiland (see above). That consists of a trilateral solution in which Gaza that is expanded to Sinai will become the Palestinian State, and therefore there will be two options for the expulsion of the West Bank Palestinians one to Jordan and the second to the bigger Gaza State that includes parts of Sinai.

According to the writer Hasan Khader, the significance of the Israeli Jewish Nation law that was passed in the Knesset in the 18th of July 2018 and mentioned above is that it is supported by the new family of populist governments in the United States and Europe. It aims to cross the way before a Palestinian majority emerges (Khader, *Al Ayyam Newspaper*, 24/7/2018). This analysis fits with the idea of creating a Palestinian State in the extended Gaza and expelling the West Bank people to there. But it should be said here that the path to such a solution will require Egypt cooperation in Granting part of Sinai to Gaza, and also will require changing Hamas regime there as it looks like none of these two conditions can be met. So again, what is the solution?

Indeed, after all the investment in the settler Colonial project, Israel is far from stopping or reversing it. So the Palestinians have two options either to change the track by their struggle coordinated and joined by the Arab and the international supporters or to comply and accept to live in their country as aliens who have no recognized connection to the land and the state as the Israeli Nation Law indicated. The second option is not a solution given the experience of the Druze inside Israel who paid all the loyalty required to Israel including serving in the Army, but they still to be rewarded by the Law of Israel as a State to the Jewish Nation. The first option might be difficult with the ongoing turmoil in

the Arab world and the populism worldwide. Till these global conditions change, Israel might have an opportunity to expel the Palestinians once again exploiting an emerging war situation that might be with Iran or any other party. In Jordan, this option is foreseen. After the law of Israel as the State of the Jewish people, the former Prime Minister of Jordan Mr. Taher Al Masri wrote considering this law as the second Nakba in which Netanyahu completed the fulfillment of Herzl and Basel conference of the 1897 program of creating a Jewish State in Palestine. A state in which there is no place to the other, and accordingly opens the way for the expulsion of the Palestinians to Jordan (Al Masri, www.ammonnews.net , 22/7/2018).

As a conclusion of this part, it looks like things have been changed five years after Veraciniarticle. More importantly, he has a significant shortfall in his assumption that the Zionist settler-colonial project was completed in 1948. That Israel is a mother country to the settlement project in the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories instead of being the holder of it as itself being a settler colonial state that works as a vehicle for the completion of the Zionist Project as both Patrick Wolfe and IlanPappe advised.

The last point moves this thesis to the questions about the nature of the Israeli settler colonial state. As this thesis concluded above, the settler colonial nature of the state is evident, but at the same time, it will be fair to review different other academic perspectives about this nature to make comparisons before concluding results. Before considering these perspectives, it is worthy of mentioning that among the Israeli right wing, the ongoing discussion is between those who are seeking to create a Jewish State that rules the country according to the Bible, and following the God promise to the Jews regarding *Eretz Israel*. And in the other side those who are seeking to confirm Nationalism, and therefore affirm the 'historical rights' of the Jews regardless of being religious or not. Both versions agree on making the country as exclusive to the Jews, and therefore both have problems regarding democracy as it will be shown later.

At the same time, the tension between the religious and the national/secular will continue, given that each one of them has different colors. For Instance, the religious stream includes those who call themselves as national religious such as the Jewish Home Party and those who are entirely religious such as *Shas* Party and *YuhdutHatorah* Party. These three are representing the mainstream religious parties in Israel, and they found a compromise with the nonreligious right-wing parties *Likud*, *Kulano*, and *Yisrael Beiteinu* to compose the 2013 last government in Israel. Lately, they found common ground with the right-wing secular parties regarding the National State law approved by the Knesset in the 18th of July 2018. But this compromise is not necessarily accepted by the extreme right-wing religious movements that still call for the establishment of a pure religious state such as *Lehava*, *Price Tag*, *Hilltop* Youth, and *Tamarrud*, *The Temple Groups* and others.

Among the secular right wing, there are also groups like *Zehut* Party who do not want to leave any place to the non-Jews in the Jewish State as the recent law did. The point here is about the need to see the dynamics of the development of the settler colonial State. In 2018 the right-wing secular and religious is prevailing, but this was not the case before. It might not be the case in the future when more extreme groups that have marginal strength by now might become the mainstream in the future.

The compromise between the religious and the secular right wing in regards to the Nation-State Law came first on the name of the Law which was called as "Basic Law: Israel, the National State of the Jewish People." This phrasing includes two components one is Israel the National State, and the second the Jewish. The first will be a state of the people, who are its nationals, but the latter makes the state exceeds its borders to become a representative to the Jewish people wherever they live worldwide, moreover it gives nationalization for these Jews when they become Israeli. The religious roots of the definition of the

Jewish people are evident here. The clearer is the claim of the state to be representative to all the Jewish people, which at the same time means that it does not represent the non-Jews staying in the country.

The following articles in the Nation-State Law say that Israel Land is the national homeland of the Jewish People, and the State of Israel is the National State of the Jewish People. The articles also say that the practice of self-determination in the state of Israel is exclusive to the Jewish people. In the rest of the law articles Hebrew is made as to the state language, and Arabic is downsized from its previous position as a second official language to a "language that has the special status." Jerusalem is mentioned as the 'Full and the United Capital of Israel,' and then it is asserted that the State "Considers the development of Jewish Settlement as a national value, that the state will work for its encouragement, support its creation, and fixing it" (www.timesofisrael.com, 19/7/2018). The Nation- State law was considered exclusivist including from the Druze who served the state and now found themselves out of it as mentioned. The bill keeps the borders of Israel as undefined, and decides unilaterally for Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel, and for West Bank to be open for Jewish further settlement expansion. The previous facts all means that the eligibility for existence in the minds and the practice of the Zionist leaders is still limited to the Jewish people while the others should enjoy a provisional existence till the time become ripe for their demographic elimination (Rouhana, 2014) or otherwise.

Regarding the other perspectives, the next part is about the approaches to democracy and subsequently the inclusion and the exclusion politics that they suggest to the natives, these include Ethnic democracy, ethnic constitutional order, Ethnocracy, and settler democracy compared with liberal and consociational democracies, and their relevance to Israel. All of them except the ethnocracy version of Nils Butenschon, and the settler democracy of Michael Mann, and the alternative liberal democracy of Azmi Bishara (see below), are avoiding the settler colonial nature of Israel which is about a full exclusion. To

conclude about the Israeli democracy, the kind of democracy that was created by Israel in the Palestinian 1967 occupied territories will also be analyzed briefly at the end of this review.

2.2.1 Models of Democracy, and the Inclusion or Exclusion Perspectives

This thesis starts with Sammy Smooha, the concept of ethnic democracy. Smooha defines ethnic democracy as "a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights to minorities, with the institutionalization of majority control over the state"(Smooha, 1997, 199).

The characteristics of ethnic democracy include as he maintained, that it is a system that operates based on "two contradictory principles." These are:" The democratic principle making for equal rights and equal treatment of all citizens, and the ethnic principle making for fashioning a homogenous nation-state and privileging the ethnic majority" (Smooha, 1997, 200). Further the "State identified with a core ethnic nation not with its citizens"(Smooha,199), and the State policies will be directed to the creation of"a homogenous nation-state, a state for a particular ethnic nation, and acts to promote the language, culture, numerical majority, economic well-being, and political interests of this group" (Smooha,200).

Regarding the inclusion and the exclusion of the minorities, they will be treated as a "second class citizens, feared as a threat, excluded from the national power structure, and placed under some control"(Smooha, 1997,200). Nevertheless, the minorities are allowed to struggle for gradual improvements for their status.

Smooha compares ethnic democracy with liberal, consociational, and herrenvolkdemocracies. For him, ethnic democracy is different than liberal democracy because "it fails to treat all citizens and groups equally" (Smooha, 1997, 200). It is also different than consociational democracy" because the state

is not ethnically neutral, rather it is owned and ruled by the majority, while the minorities do not enjoy autonomy and power sharing" (Smootha, 1997 200).

If these two (the liberal and the consociational) are democracies that ethnic democracy is different than both of them, but it is also different than those types of democracy that are practiced in ethnically divided societies such as the herrenvolk democracy as a term that was coined by Pierre Den Berghe in 1981 (Butenschon, 1993, 3-4). According to Smootha, the difference in this case is "because citizenship (in the Case of ethnic democracy: W.S) is extended to all and the minorities who are not excluded from the benefits of citizenship, and are allowed to avail themselves of democracy for furthering their interests" (Smootha, 1997, 200). Ethnocracy is beyond Herrenvolk Democracy because they see that ethnicity and democracy cannot go together. Therefore the state cannot represent a particular ethnic group against one another and continue to claim to be democratic at the same time.

Following the above, and using the criteria of Schmidt mentioned in chapter one, one can see that the consociational democracy and the ethnic democracy, are both struggling with the question of "who counts"? In the former, the different groups have equal rights, equal participation, representation, and access to decision making and the economic benefits, while in the latter the equality on these all are not provided, but the different groups are still counting in an asymmetric way. Herrenvolk Democracy in the other hand is about ethnic dominance in which the five criteria of Schmidt will exist only formally, and in a way that will not make the marginal groups capable of making a difference.

For Smootha, Israel is an ethnic democratic state: In one hand it is an ethnic because it is a Jewish State rather than an Israeli state, it has a deep division between its Jewish and Arab population that prevent the emergence of a nation, it has no separation between state and religion and state and ethnicity (Smootha, 1997, 200). It also continues to implement the 1945 emergency law, gives

power to the executive authority to suspend civil rights, has its intolerance towards the left parties and opinions, and its recognition of equal rights to the minorities. It imposes the Hebrew language as the language of the state and the Jewish feasts, heroes and symbols as feasts and the heroes and the symbols of the state, limit the right of return to the Jews, has ethnic laws, and ethnic endogamy (Smootha, 205-206). These characteristics make Israel as an exclusive state towards the Palestinians and the seculars and the left.

In another hand for him, it is a democratic state because it has a full voting right, multiparty system, free elections, and civil authority over the army, independent judiciary, and peoples and elites support to the democratic institutions (Smootha, 1997, 205). These characteristics, on the contrary, express the inclusive dimensions of Israeli democracy for him.

Smootha compares his analysis of Israel as an ethnic democracy with other studies, stating that Lijphart, for instance, considered Israel as a unique case that falls outside the known patterns due to the different relationship that it has between the military and the civilian, and its different path to political modernization (Smootha, 201). Besides that, most scholars consider Israel to be "liberal democracy with certain consociational elements and some shortcomings"(Smootha, 201). For Smootha Israel is not a liberal democracy because it is a Jewish state, and it is not a consociational democracy because it would need to "become a bi-national state" to be so (Smootha, 201).

Regarding the perspective to Israel for being a liberal democracy, two versions are representing this perspective. One of these versions will claim that Israel was a liberal democracy till it was hijacked by the orthodoxy, arguing that liberal democracy in the case of Israel is inherited from the Jewish religion, which its traditions stress pluralism, the self-government among the Jewish Diaspora, the voluntarism in the Yishuv, and the semi-federal structure of the Zionist movement (Neurberger,1990). In a most recent study, Rozani will argue that

Israel is still a liberal democracy despite the current threats from religion, and he sees these threats to be manageable so far (Rozani, 2018).

On the contrary of this perspective, the other one (this thesis to call it as the alternative liberal democracy) sees that liberal democracy is not only any present in Israel, but it is also a threatening perspective to its mere presence as a Zionist entity. In this regard, in several books and many articles, Azmi Bishara argued that liberal democracy would require equal individual and collective rights for all the citizens without any discrimination. For Bishara this is not present in Israel. Therefore he argued in favor of the transformation of Israel to a "State for all its citizens" as a prerequisite to the move to liberal democracy (Bishara, 2005).

Here are the two versions of liberal democracy, one that sees it as present among the Jews while facing challenges among them and also seeks to integrate the Palestinian citizens gradually in the system as advocated by the numerous policies for that developed since 1948. This approach is a "who counts" approach. The second is about it as non-present because it is exclusivist towards the individual and the national collective rights of the Palestinian citizens living in Israel, something that needs a structural change for the inclusion of these rights, rather than cosmetic changes that do not question the main assumptions and the structures of the dominant system. This second version of liberal democracy also questions Sammy Smooha position who believes that there is a "corrective mechanism" within the Israeli ethnic democracy which makes it capable of finding more and better venues for the inclusion of the marginalized within its framework. This alternative liberal democracy approach goes back to the essential questions of who is eligible to exist and seeks to solve them first.

Back to Sammy Smooha, he also discusses the different opinions of those who consider Israel to be an ethnocracy such as Ian Lustick, Nadim Rouhana, and

Oren Yiftachel. Regarding the latter, he presents him as accepting the description of Israel as an ethnic democracy but questioning at the same time the ability of Israel to keep its ethnic democracy while it has a bi-ethnic reality. According to Yiftachel, Malaysia preservation of democracy was possible because it had only a minority of immigrants, while Yiftachel sees in another hand that ethnic democracy collapsed in countries like Israel, Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka where immigrants composed a majority opposed to the indigenous population. Smootha rejects this analysis saying that Israel deals well with such obstacles since it developed "effective mechanisms" of control over the minorities (Smootha, 1997, 204). In the following paragraphs Yiftachel takes on this criticism will be considered.

Moving to Ethnocracy: For Butenshon "Ethnocracy is a political regime which in contrast to democracy is institutional based on qualified rights to citizenship and with ethnic affiliation (defined in terms of race, descent, religion, or language) as the distinguishing principle" (Butenshon, 1993, 3).

With this definition, Butenshon accepts the concept of Herrenvolk democracy because it includes in one hand democracy for the dominant group, while in another hand it refers to "racist, strengthened by the German connotation, nature of the system" (Butenshon, 1993, 4).

In another hand, he criticizes the ethnic democracy of Smootha and Hanf of being more problematic than the Herrenvolk democracy, and that is because "it refers specifically to the rights accorded to the non- dominant groups. The rights of these groups are not only limited in important respect but made conditional on the national interests of the dominant group" (Butenshon, 1993, 4).

For Butenshon, Israel as a Jewish State" or the state of the Jews as Professor Klein "would correct us"(Butenshon, 1993, 13), does not have a state idea independently of the Zionist state idea"(Butenshon, 1993, 13). What that means in

concrete sense is that the idea of the state of Israel is not territorial but rather an idea of "territorializing a non-territorial nation"(Butenshon, 1993, 13). Key for such a state is the component of "rapid and intense expansion"(Butenshon, 7), in addition to "Domination and suppression of the opposition"(Butenshon,7). The expansionist nature is of a state that decided not to have a constitution that defines its borders, a state that claims to represent the Jewish people worldwide rather than to be a representative to its citizens, a state of law of return that allows "return" only to Jews, while depriving the non-Jewish population of that right. A state that cut the Palestinian refugees from the Diaspora, and also gives full citizens rights to the Jewish settlers in the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories while depriving the Palestinians of these rights (Butenshon, 1993, - 18).

In conclusion, Butenshon considers it as a state that creates a system of exclusion of a part of the Diaspora to sustain its dominance to be a non-democratic, but just an ethnocratic state (Butenshon, 19). As such this exclusion of the other people from the Diaspora is a total exclusion, done for some by dispossession and expulsion to the outside the country, and to other by internal displacement, the non-recognition of their rights to the territory, to the national rights, and discrimination against their rights as well. This model of Butenshon is then the second one besides the "Alternative liberal model" that questions Israel regarding its main assumptions and practices about "Who is eligible to exist?"

While the expansionist aspect of the Israeli Ethnocracy is bright in Butenshon analysis, it is less evident in Yiftachel writings. As shown above Yiftachel was in 1990s a proponent of Israel as an ethnic democracy while he also had some doubts about its shortcomings, later he wrote his seminal book about Ethnocracy (2006 English version, and 2012 Arabic Version), at that book he considered Israel to be an open Ethnocracy that includes some democratic aspects. Yiftachel is also different than Butenshon definition to it as an

exclusive to any democratic point towards the other ethnic groups than the Jews. Using the extended Arabic version of Yiftachel book of 2012, it can be said that Yiftachel version of ethnocracy includes the following components.

First of all, he defines ethnocracy to be “A special mode of a system. This System operates for the empowerment of the dominant nation (which usually described as the distinct group) to expand and to go further in imposing ethnicity, and dominance over the disputed regions, and over the political entity” (Yiftachel, 2012a, 19-20). For him, such a system includes several forms, one of them in dictatorial using ethnic cleansing methods such as Rwanda and Serbia. The second used methods of control and isolation such as Sudan and South Africa, and the third is about those ethnic regimes that present themselves as both democratic and ethnic. Their democratic aspects will include in this case some democratic procedures such as elections, some civil rights as the freedom of movement, Parliamentary system, and a relatively open system of communication freedom. In the other hand their ethnic nature will be present through the use of undemocratic procedures for ethnic expansion to the dominant ethnic group. This group includes countries such as of Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Latvia, Serbia, Australia and Israel (Yiftachel, 20).

Yiftachel study is about the third group, which is mobilized by three main historical-political engines: “A) the formation of a settler- colonial society. B) The recruiting power of the ethnic nationalism. C) The ethnic logic of the Capital” (Yiftachel, 20). As such, this system is an exclusivist towards the other ethnicities, and although it gives them "some important civil and political rights, partial ones" (Yiftachel, 25), in the end, it does not integrate them in the system as ethnic democracy formula claims (Yiftachel, 32). Finally, Yiftachel listed some characteristics of the open ethnocracy that he is advocating. These characteristics include: Ethnicity is the determining factor of the distribution of rights, authorities, and resources, avoiding as such the full citizenship for all those who live in the region, and creating as such permanent tensions between

the democracy and the ethnocracy politics. Besides that, the frontiers of the state and its Demos will not be apparent due to the active role of the ethnic Diaspora, and the limited and unequal rights of the ethnic minorities. What follows is an ethnic monopoly of the government and the decision making towards most of the public policies, and separation and polarization in the ethnic level and the class level (Yiftachel, 2012a, 25).

In a recent paper, Yiftachel considered Israel as moving to creeping Apartheid that is practiced against the Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories and inside Israel as well (Yiftachel, 2012 b, 98). He maintained that the 1993 Oslo agreement witnessed the “end of the Zionist expansion” and the emergence of an apartheid system instead (Yiftachel, 2012b, 104), that include “politics of ghettoization”(Yiftachel, 2012 b, 111). Therefore, Israel moved from colonialism (intrusion of the space and the resources) to apartheid (Segregation and inequality against the Palestinians) (Yiftachel, 2012 b, 96).

In the light of the Jewish settlement expansion during the two periods of Netanyahu Governments since 2009, this conclusion of Yiftachel cannot stand the test. Although his thesis stresses the settler colonial history of the ethnocracies, this comparative analysis still bringing together states that have clear settler colonial past, Estonia and Australia with others that have less clear settler colonial past, Sri Lanka. And a fourth that has both history and continuous settler-colonial project, Israel. Therefore, the comparison does not look to fit and also calling these all as ethnocracies might play a role to obscure both the past and the present of what Michael Mann called as “settler democracies” (Mann,2005).

In the other hand, a development happened on Yiftachel analysis towards the Israeli Ethnocracy. Earlier he considered it an open Ethnocracy in 2006 when he wrote the English version of his book translated and published in Arabic in 2012. Later he took a new position opposite to those who considered Israel to be an

ethnic democracy, by saying that Israel can be regarded as a democracy only if its system will be presented as if it is limited to the green line, and if Israel state will be extracted from the history and the Nakba, removed from Geography where it deprives 4 million Palestinians of their rights will full citizenship rights are given to the Jewish settlers, and finally extracted from its colonial project(Yiftachel,2012b).

This model of Yiftachel is then another one that tries to explore the potential of the Israeli system based on who counts formula and the Schmidt criteria to it. His attempt puts him in the middle between those who see Israel as a country of who counts potential, and those who understand that unless Israel passes structural changes, it will not be capable of moving from who is eligible to exist to who counts formula.

This overview of ethnic democracy in comparison with other types relevant to divided states, and mainly Ethnocracy, had shown that such a concept worked well in countries where the immigrants were a minority such as Malaysia. While in the situations where the immigrants became the majority in the expense of the indigenous population such as Israel, it has the following shortcomings regarding territory, Demos and governance, the three requirements of the nation-state.

First, regarding territory, it talks about Israel as if it is limited to 1948 borders, while it is still a non-territorial state without defined borders. Second, regarding the Demos, it considers itself as a representative to the Jewish nation all around the world, while in another hand it supports and gives citizenship to Jewish settlers beyond its 1948 borders. On the other hand, extract the Palestinian refugees from its population, and deprive the Palestinians who live inside Israel and also in the 1967 occupied territories from equal rights with the Jews. Further than that ethnic democracy ignores settlement expansion and the displacement of a continuously increasing number of the Palestinians. Third, regarding

governance, it created a mono-ethnic dominance system in which the rights of the minorities are defined according to its conditions and restrictions.

Finally, in a recent article by Smootha, he considered Israel has five cleavages: "political stream, religious observance, class, ethnicity, and nationality"(Smootha1993, 309). Of a note that he considered in that article the cleavage between the Western and the Oriental Jews to be an ethnic one, while he thought the division between the Jews and the Palestinians inside Israel to be a national cleavage.

According to the literature, ethnic groups are part of the state, while nationalities are defined in their relation to the state, or their right of self-determination to create a new state (Erikson, 1993, 6). The question becomes on this basis if the Palestinians inside Israel are an ethnic group that will decide its fate inside Israel, or part of the Palestinian People and their right for self-determination, or a combination of the right to equal citizenship in Israel, plus of recognizing them as part of the Palestinian people. This question will be dealt with in the following sections. For now, it is clear that the ideas of ethnic democracy and open Ethnocracy both raise questions more than provides with answers in the case of Israel.

2.2.2 Peleg's "Ethnic Constitutional Order"

Ilan Peleg (2007) presented a third alternative to the two about ethnicity presented by Yiftachel and Smootha, which he called as the ethnic constitutional order(ECO), that is represented by states who do not serve their citizens equally, but rather stand for a particular ethnicity being a majority, like Israel, or a minority, like the former South Africa. For him this order when it represents the ethnic majority is giving concessions to the minority and its rights, but not in a way that will endanger the hegemony of the ethnic majority. He maintained that this regime combines between the individual and collective selective rights given to the minority. He in this regard make a reservation on the un-clarity of the concept of ethnic democracy, while he rejects Yiftachel claim that open

Ethnocracy cannot be a democracy (Peleg, 2007,6). In his opinion, ECO include both ethnic hegemony in one hand and partial democratic rights to the minority in second hand which makes him closer to Smootha, despite to his reservation regarding the ambiguity of the ethnic democracy concept.

The significant contribution of Peleg ranges around two components: First, his idea that that the ECO can be transformed, and that this Transformation will require not only granting individual rights, but also make constitutional changes either partially and historically like what happened in Spain after Franco when the county was transformed to a semi-federal and ethnoterritorial arrangements (chapter 4). Or the transformation might take place by mega constitutional fundamental changes such as the division of Czechoslovakia to the two countries of the Czech Republic and Slovakia peacefully (chapter 5).

The second significance of Peleg analysis is that he studied numerous cases of transformation from ECO to more democratic systems, by balancing between the individual rights and the collective rights, and between the dominating ethnic group and the dominated ones (Peleg, 2007,17). Like Smootha, Peleg still not considering the crucial difference between Israel and the examples that he mentioned. This difference is related to its expansionist nature alluded to by Butenshon, while analyzed by Yiftachel as being part of the Israeli past, while he sees the Israeli present is more about segregation and apartheid. Regarding the inclusion and exclusion, Smootha and Peleg see that there are venues that the Palestinians inside Israel can use for the improvement of their status. Peleg is even more positive thinking of the Ethnic Constitutional Order as a mechanism that will improve the condition of the Palestinians inside Israel. Yiftachel in other hand sees that space for the achievement of improvements to the rights of the Palestinians inside Israel is shrinking, while Butenshon is already considered that the Palestinians are entirely excluded from the system because both they're collective, including the national rights and individual rights, are not recognized by Israel. He also considers Israel to be an

expansionist State which represents a response to Veracini as well. Peleg Model exists within who counts formula; he believes more than Sammy Smooha in the corrective procedure included in the ethic regimes elevating it a constitutional order.

Finally, for this review, the settler democracy formula as presented by Michael Mann in a seminal book (Mann, 2005) requires an overview. According to Mann there are two types of democracy one is inclusive to all the Demos, and the second is based on the Ethnos (Mann, 3). The key for the first is the promotion of the diversity of groups and individuals, including the classes and the interest groups, while the second is organic ready to conduct ethnic cleansing against all those who are not part of the organic group. Both create liberal democracy, the first for all the groups within diversity and the second develop it only for the dominant ethnic group. In case that the dominant group represents a settler community, they will establish a democratic system for them alone, a settler democracy, while the native population will be entirely excluded (Mann, 55-56).

Mann concluded that the liberal democracy had two faces, one democratic liberal to its society, and the second is ethnic exclusive practiced first against the populace who has no voting rights as in Britain the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. Or as in the United States, where the American Constitution was discussed and approved by 55 persons of big landlords who met in Philadelphia representing 13 States where they were elected by a group of citizens that do not include women, slaves, and the indigenous population. Later the ethnos structures were used as exclusive to the natives in the colonized areas of the world that followed (Mann, 56).

Mann called the ethnos-based democracy as the Dark side of Democracy which is also the name of his book, it is dark because it is murderous, he says: "I argue that that the more they embodied settler democracy, either de facto, or de jure, the more the murderous cleansing" (Mann, 70). Referring to the

Jeffersonian "vision of we the people" which was "egalitarian and democratic, but ethnically exclusive, since the people were culturally homogenous, as civilized," he concludes that "The more the settler democracy, the more the ethnic cleansing" (Mann, 107). Unmasking modernity, Mann will add that ethnic cleansing is modern, saying in this regard: "Ethnic cleansing is not primitive, or alien, it belongs to our civilization, and us. Most say this is due to the rise of nationalism in the world, and this is true" (Mann, 74). To indicate this fact, Mann mentioned that the number of people killed in the twentieth century was seventy million more than those killed in the previous centuries. In this context, he sees the settler democracies as "truly murderous, more than authoritarian colonial governments" (Mann, 4). Also, they are more murderous than the previous historical states which witnessed class cleavages rather than ethnic one, then religions came to unite the classes, and finally democracy came to build equal citizenship for all men, women, and classes in a national framework that retrieves the past, as such democracy included settler's democracy as its dark side (Mann, 19).

This framework of settler democracy proposed by Michael Mann looks to be a good fit with the settler colonial framework that produces such kind of democracy. In the other side of settler democracy Mann mentioned the democracy of the indigenous population "were more democratic than the settlers" (Mann, 108).

Along with this insight the democracy in Palestine can be discussed during the late Ottoman period as a participation in the Ottoman Parliament *Mabothanin* 1876, and 1908, and in Arab and Ottoman societies established in Istanbul, Damascus, Beirut, and elsewhere, in addition to the civil society organizations that started to emerge in Palestine in the late 19th century (Salem, 1999 43-46; Nakhleh, 1994). During the British Mandatory period, the Palestinian democracy continued as a civil society and grassroots democracy that emerged in the 1920s, in the society in the absence of the state when the Palestinians

composed Islamic-Christian Committees to lead their struggle against Zionism and the British Mandate. The Palestinians adopted the concepts and the methods of pluralism, participation, and elections (Salem, 2014, 19; Said et al., 1986; Abu Lughud and Jirbawi, 1993). In the other hand, the Zionist settlers created their ethnic democracy that is entirely exclusive composed of the World Zionist Movement, the Jewish Agency, starting from 1923, and an elected Assembly for the Yishuv that was called as, Knesset Israel that elected the Zionist National Executive in Palestine periodically. The British Mandate gave recognition to Knesset Israel in 1927 as a voluntary body that represents the Jews in Palestine. The Knesset was responsible for increasing the settlement, bringing more Jewish immigrants to Palestine, developing *the Haganah*: Jewish defense forces, and a police force, grow independent institutions of education, health and others, preserve the independence of the religious institutions, and develop an active exterior policy towards the British Mandate (Eisenstadt, 1967, 25). As such two completely separate frameworks of representation were present in Palestine during the British Mandatory period. One of the indigenous populations that aimed to defend Palestine and to keep it on the map. The second was the Zionist movement one that sought to transform Palestine into another entity through social engineering that goes according to pre-prepared plans.

The British Mandate colonial Authorities tried to experiment with a top-down attempt to create new Demos that is inclusive to the two communities together. The idea according to the text of the Balfour Declaration was about bringing Jews as a recognized people in that declaration along with the Palestinians who were considered as communities and casts. Therefore, what looked in one hand as a representation according to the religious affiliations in the progressive ideas for creating either a legislative council or a consultative one especially those of 1922 and 1935 was in the content representation to the Jews as the Jewish Nation, while the others were represented as Muslims and Christians only. In the second hand, the British High Commissioner was appointed as the head of

the Government or its reference, and the inauguration of any law decide made conditional to his approval. Finally, the responsibilities of the proposed Councils did not allow them to cancel both the Balfour Declaration of 1917, and the 1922 United League of Nations Text on Terms of the British Mandate, which included Balfour Declaration that gives the Jewish people the right to establish a A National Home in Palestine while non-prejudicing the religious and the civil rights of the other non-Jewish Communities in Palestine. At that time these non-Jewish communities were representing the significant majority of the population of Palestine as earlier shown. Opposite to this British perspective, the Palestinians wanted to establish a National Government selected by an elected Legislative Council by the Palestinians including the Jewish Palestinians (See more details in Sakhnini 1986, and Khallah 1982).

This overview showed that the Zionist democratic process in the pre-1948 Palestine was fully exclusive, acting against the mere presence of the Palestinians over their homeland, but aimed to establish Jewish Settlements and expand them on the expense of the Palestinians. The British supported them by making the goal of the British Mandate as a one that aims to support the establishment of the National Home in Palestine, also the British recognized the Jewish Agency as a tool to help to establish the national home for Jews as included in articles 4 and 11 of the League of Nations Terms on the British Mandate (Abdul Hadi, 1997, Vol. 1, 52-55). The British Mandate democratic process was also exclusive to the Palestinians right of self-determination as shown, focusing instead on the establishment of a National Jewish home. The 'democratic structures' that it created in Palestine were like others that Britain created in all its colonies. They were "Hierarchal and authoritarian but ethnic inclusive" (Mann, 2005, 107). But the case of Palestine Britain was biased to the Jews, who were included as a 'people' while the indigenous population was included as religious and civil communities. Including them in a structure administered by the appointed British High Commissioner also created a kind of hierarchy that has nothing to do with democracy and its structures. In this

regard, Lisan Al Arab newspaper published 10/3/1922, the Palestinian delegation response to the British constitution for Palestine. In that response it is said; "It should be said that it is not part of the spirit of democracy, and not appropriate with the representation principles to appoint the head of the executive power to be over the legislative authority and to have employees of the Government as part of the legislative authority. This arrangement will lead to an arbitrary role of executive authority when it becomes the foe and the judge at the same time" (Khallah, 1982, 802-804, 803).

Opposite to the British recognition of the National Jewish institutions, it recognized for the Palestinians to establish Islamic- Christian societies only. As published in Al Kawakeb newspaper in 298/1/1919, the Islamic Christian society was approved by the British as a society that aims to "The development of the agricultural, industrial, economic and trade affairs" and to work beside that for a vague objective that aims for "The preservation of the sons of the land material and cultural rights"(See Text in Khallah 1982,807-808, and the quotation in 808). Accordingly, the British did not recognize the Palestinian right to statehood except for a short period in 1939 when the British Government released the White paper identifying a Palestinian State vaguely to be established in ten years (See details in chapter 3).

The fully exclusivist Zionist project, and the British exclusivity against the Palestinian national rights, in favor of the Jewish one was both in the background that led to the establishment of Israel in 1948, followed by 'granting' the Israeli citizenship by it to the Palestinians inside Israel, while keeping them at the same time under to military rule till November 1966. The justifications made for such an army rule referred to security as a reason behind it, but Alina Korn will argue that the aim was related to political interests to create an image that the Arabs are a threat to Israel. In the short-term level, the Military rule was accompanied by the use of the British Emergency Law of 1945, the law of the security closed areas of 1949 and the law number 5710 of 1950 which

considered any Palestinian who was not registered in 1948 to be an absentee, even if he/she got an Israeli citizenship (Present-Absentee as those of this category were called). The first two laws were also used among other procedures to take over more Palestinian lands, to continue evacuating villages and expel their population to Lebanon during the period of the 1950s, and to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement and make this movement conditional to getting permits (Korn, 2017, 3; Jiryis, 1969, 5, 9). Therefore, Israel policy towards its Palestinian citizens was at the end exclusive, regardless of the formal citizenship that was granted to them. Michael Mann settler democracy model helps to explicate this case as being fully about who is eligible to exist formula, while the Buteschonethnocracy model and the alternative liberal model are going further by providing an alternative to this former formula. Azmi Bishara called this alternative formula as a: "State for all its citizens" in which all of them will enjoy individual and collective rights (Bishara, 2005).

Few months after the lifting of the military rule over the 1948 Palestinians, the rest of Palestine was occupied in 1967. By this happening the Palestinians became divided between different groups who are subject to various "demographic elimination methods." The demographic elimination can be done by several means: Expulsion, erasing villages and communities from the existence, uprooting from the place, annexation of territories to the settler colonial entity, identity cancelation, and the imposition of other citizenship. The Palestinians inside Israel faced this demographic elimination by the cancelation of their Palestinian national identity, and imposing the Israeli citizenship on them, while the state continued to deal with them as enemies. The Palestinian refugees of 1948 and the displaced persons of 1967 were demographically eliminated by expulsion. The internally displaced persons such as those who were considered present- absentees, or part of the non-recognized villages in Israel, were demographically eliminated twice, once by imposing the Israeli citizenship on them, and the second by uprooting them from their original

communities. The Naqab Bedouins are still also facing elimination by eradicating them from their places and the non-recognition of their indigeneity. Demographic elimination also continued after 1967, by villages being destroyed such as *Yalo*, *Emuas*, and *Beit Nuba* directly after the 1967 war, and the expulsion of their population. By demolishing Al Sharaf neighborhood of the Old City of Jerusalem, and evacuating its population to Shufat Refugee Camp. After the war, East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel, and its Palestinian population faces another type of demographic elimination by considering them according to the Israeli laws as Jordanian citizens residing permanently in Israel. Other categories were created to the Palestinian living in West Bank and Gaza as it will be explicated later in this chapter. As such the 'fight' about who is eligible to exist continued by the Israeli settler-colonial project all the way ahead since Zionism inception.

Following this analysis, the demographic elimination is the dominant characteristic of the Israeli settler-colonial project in comparison with other settler colonial projects as Nadim Rouhana indicated (Rouhana, 2014). This Fact does not mean that the Israeli settler-colonial project did not include other means such as genocide and the spacio-cide. In this regard, Michael Mann differentiated between different 'cides' and Isam Sakhnini (2012) spoke about Israeli genocides, while Sari Hanafi invented to term spacio-cide (2013).

Mann (2005), included Ethnocide defined as "unintended wiping of a group and its culture", Genocide which is "A criminal act intended to destroy an ethnic, national, or religious group" as the UN defined it, Politicide meaning "Killing of the entire leadership, and potential leadership class of a more generally victimized and feared group". Mann also adds Classcide, killing a full class, partial genocide, and then he concludes that "Murderous ethnic cleansing includes partial forms such as forced conversion, politicide, classcide, and total forms such as total forms of wild deportation, sterilization, forced marriage, some forms of rape, and ethnocide" (Mann, 2005, 12-16).

Mann list looks to be comprehensive as far as it is about the components of ethnic cleansing also used by IlanPappe to describe the Palestinian exodus in 1948 (Pappe, 2007). The methods he mentioned were all used by Zionism except probably the conversion to Judaism, forced marriage, and sterilization, but in another hand, he did not include the other part that acts parallel to ethnic cleansing till it replaces the indigenous people by another settler-colonial entity. This situation can be called as "settler colonialism," a process that includes both the elimination of the indigenous and the plantation of an alternative on his expense. The idea of 'spacio-cide' can be located in the middle between the ethnic cleansing approach and the settler- colonial one. In this idea, Sari Hanafi focused on the loss of the land by the Palestinians rather than genocide as the primary tool of Zionism. For him, the loss of the land was for the Palestinian equivalent to the loss of life. Therefore he presented the 1948 Nakba as a "loss of land, and loss of life status as well" (Hanafi, 2013). Nevertheless what Hanafi did can also be perceived as an attempt to create a concept that encompasses together the results of the methods described by Michael Mann while focusing on the central among them which is the loss of the land. These results come all under one word: The Full Erasure of one ethnicity from the geography (the place, the space, the territory, and the landscape), resulting of dissolving its national structure and its political system, dispersion and removal of its society, eliminating its economy and culture (Hanafi, 2012).

IssamSakhnini (2012) presented another way of understanding, claiming that Zionism was genocidal. He first goes back to Raphael Lemkin, the Polish scholar who introduced the concept in 1944 as meaning "the destruction of the basic foundations of an ethnic group in order to erase it" (Sakhnini, 2012, 15-16), not necessarily here that the erasure will be full as the "UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide" of 1948(www.UN.org, December 1948). Regarding the components of Genocide Sakhnini also adds the ethnic cleansing used first in 1992 during the war in Bosnia (being inclusive to genocidal acts as well while operating). Later he adds also the concepts of

Transfer or population expulsion that include genocidal acts as well. Finally he adds the "Memorycide" which means killing the collective memory of the group or nation as a requirement for completing the genocide, conducted by obliterating, silencing and replacing the history of the group by another in one hand, and the destruction of the material expressions of the memory such as the historical sites and others (Sakhnini, 2012, 15-21). Quoting Lev Greenberg, Sakhnini adds in another place the concept of "Symbolic Genocide" which refers to killing all the symbols of the indigenous people (Sakhnini, 2012, 99). Sakhnini goes in the rest of his book over the Zionist and the Israeli biblical and Zionist concepts and practices concerning all these components.

While expanding on the issue of who is eligible to exist, the analysis above might show that there are two ways to deal with this issue, one from the point of view of the targeted people, the indigenous population, as a point of departure, and the second is from the perspective of the perpetrators, the settler- colonial approach. The first relates to the indigenous studies which deal with cases that are not all subject to settler colonialism, the second relates specifically to settler colonialism. In this context settler, colonial studies can be informed and get inspired by the full range of concepts and practices expressed by the indigenous studies. Besides the 'Who is eligible to exist,' Israel might be obliged to use a 'who counts approach,' even though provisionally as the experience of the Oslo Agreement of 1993 showed.

2.2.3 Palestine after Oslo: A Tutelary Democracy ?

In January 1996, the Palestinians held their first public elections since 1948 Nakba. There was a partial election that was limited to Gaza in 1966. The elections of 1996 were more comprehensive, included West Bank, Gaza and partially East Jerusalem. They also came as an outcome of an Israeli Palestinian agreement in this regard through the interim agreement that was achieved in 28th of September 1995 after the negotiations that were held in Taba/Egypt by then. This agreement was called also as Oslo II.

According to that agreement, the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip were allowed to participate in the elections of a Palestinian Legislative Council that is composed of 88 members, in addition to electing the President of the Palestinian Authority.

The Palestinian refugees living outside Palestine were not allowed to participate. Also, restrictions were made on the participation of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem in those elections by allowing only a few thousands of them to send their votes by post envelope to the Palestinian Authority through the Israeli run post offices in East Jerusalem. Besides that, the rest of the Palestinian Jerusalemites were asked to vote in West Bank areas out of Jerusalem. Besides these restrictions, the PA areas of full control did not exceed 18 percent of West Bank which was called as 'Area A,' according to the Israeli Palestinian agreements (See details in Galia Golan, 2007).

Accordingly, it can be argued that the 1996 elections were held under an Israeli dictation of its conditions and procedures, creating as such a Palestinian Authority (PA) as an agent for the implementation of the agreements with Israel rather than being an agent for democratization in the Palestinian society (Al Shikaki, 1996; Khan and Giacaman, 2004). In this regard the Israeli right-wing politician and former Russian dissident Natan Sharansky wrote: "The logic of Oslo was simple; we need peace and security in the Middle East. We are tired of all these wars. Take a dictator from Tunis, bring him to West Bank and Gaza, give him control over 98 percent of all the Palestinians, offer him territory, legitimacy, and economic tools and as a result, he will be so interested in playing the role of a leader to his people that will become our partner. That was the idea" (Sharansky, 2004, 8).

This is undoubtedly logic of a 'tutelary' kind of democracy defined as being under the domain of the Israelis, with the aim that is not for democratization but more for the implementation of the agreements with Israel through an authority

that has a public legitimacy. In the following lines the aim is to deconstruct such logic and then to assess it. Initially, the term Tutelary Democracy was coined by Adam Przeworski to refer to a "Regime which has competitive, formally democratic institutions, but in which the power apparatus, typically reduced by this time to the armed forces, retains the capacity to intervene to correct undesirable state of affairs" (TAS, 2015). Later on, Derinç Kanol and others used the term to refer to democracy in Northern Cyprus under the tutelage of Turkey (Kanol, 2014; Kanol and Koprulu, 2017). This thesis here is using this term to discuss the Post- Oslo Palestinian democracy under the tutelage of Israel and the donor countries (see below).

Besides the approach described above, there are other three approaches to describe the institutional process that took place in the Palestinian 1967 occupied territories since 1996. One of these approaches considers democracy to be impossible to achieve under the Israeli Occupation, and that the Palestinians should first get their national independence, and then they can democratize after (Hilal, 1995, 83). This approach meets with the classical literature about democracy which makes it possible to be built only within the framework of the Nation State, while imagining the possibility of having democracy in the absence of the state is unthinkable.

The second approach of these additional three argues that what took place in Palestine since 1996 is a process of de-democratization. According to this view, the democracy should be inclusive to all the Demos. Since the Palestinian refugees were cut from the Demos, and the Palestinian Jerusalemites were discriminated against, then it is not a democratic process that one that took place. Karma Nabulsi will add in this regard that such de-democratization deprived the "Palestinian political and civil society of the benefits of the legitimate associations and parties that had served them hitherto, on both local and state levels" (Nabulsi, 2003, 117).

The third and the last approach will try to develop a concept for democracy in the absence of a state, by first considering what took place in 1996 and on to be a " democratic route that is not sufficiently deep to become an internal process with its own motives and mechanisms towards democratization"(Salem, 2011,157). This route created after 1996 can be generally described either as "A Palestinian transitional democracy under an agreed upon Jurisdiction with Israel and the International community mainly the US" or "under an imposed jurisdiction by Israel." In both these cases, it is a tutelary democracy created for a Palestinian Autonomy that is not yet a state (Salem, 2000; 2011).

The question is if this tutelary democracy was more under the tutelage of Israel as Sharansky claimed, or the tutelage of the USA and Europe?The negotiations that took place in Taba-Egypt in September 1995 and that aimed at reaching to an interim agreement included an agreement on the Palestinian elections that will elect a President and 88 members of a Legislative Council separating as such between the Legislative and the Executive. The details of the negotiation show that the Israeli negotiators presented the idea of having a council of 25 members which will have combined legislative and Executive roles as it was agreed in the prior Cairo Agreement of May 1994. The Palestinian negotiators rejected this position and asked for two separate legislative and Executive bodies, with the legal to be composed of 100 members. The result at the end was an agreement to have elections for a Legislative Council of 88 members representing 16 districts, and to elect a President as well (Salem, 2011, 158).

This information tells about the contradictions and the tensions with Israel, where the latter was interested in having a combined legislative and Executive body that will implement the agreements, while the Palestinians aimed for the creation of mini-state democratic structures. If these structures act democratically or not is another question, which the answer for it is no due to different facts. Among these is that Arafat continued after the elections to rule individually benefiting from various factors such as that his Fateh Party was

dominant in the new elected PLC, and he was the head of that party. He continued to use PLO being also its leader by himself to weaken the authority of the PA using the nature of the Palestinian political system as a combination of PLO and the PA, being the former considered to be the higher and the reference of the latter. Besides that, the former represents the Palestinians all over the world while the PA represented the Palestinians who live in the 1967 occupied territories only. These processes took place in times that Arafat Authoritarian ruling was also sustained by Israel and international donors who were sending the financial aid (the international donors) and the taxes revenues (Israel) to a bank account run by Arafat (Salem 2011).

Besides the tension with Israel that aimed to get a state structure as much as it is possible rather than seeking to create a Palestinian democracy, Arafat and the PA established a relationship of dependency towards the international donors. Within the framework of this relationship, Arafat was committed to going on the negotiations and the security cooperation with Israel under the USA mediator leadership, in the expense of the USA and Europe provide him with financial support to build the institutions of the PA and to pay the salaries of its employees. In this framework, the international donors made a blind eye till 2000 towards Arafat Authoritarianism as much as he was successful in providing Israel with security. The position of the donors changed after the 2000 Intifada when the international donors started to make the continuation of their support to the PA conditional to conducting reforms by the PA, leading to the appointment of a Prime Minister in 2003, and creating a bank account for international grants that is connected to the Ministry of finance rather than to Arafat office, among other reforms dictated by the international Quartet through the 2003 Road Map (Salem, 2011).

What this review tells us that the 1996 emerging Palestinian democracy was under the tutelage of three actors, two are external, and one is internal.

The internal among these is the PLO tutelage over the PA, and the two externals are: The international donors and peace brokers, and Israel which practice its tutelage by two means: One by the continuation of its occupation and settler colonial project over the majority of the Palestinian Territories, and its prevention for the return of the Palestinian refugees. The second by direct control measures such as that the movement of the goods and the individuals-including the PA staff itself, the Palestinian Legislative Council members, and the President of Palestine himself are subject to Israeli approval and permits, and that is beside restricting the Palestinian elections in East Jerusalem. In general, all that meant that Israel kept its control over the territory, while gave the Palestinian Authority the responsibility for a population of inhabitants who do not have yet an agreed upon identity, in the expense to this the PA was asked to provide Israel with security. This was the compromise. Is this compromise fall within the framework of who counts as an alternative to the frame of who is eligible to exist? (See below).

Still, according to this view, the Palestinian route to democracy was historically speaking a civil society based (Salem, 2014), characterized by the practice of participation, pluralism, and elections in the civil society organizations and their coalitions and networks, including their political systems. This civil society democracy' practiced since 1919 in the absence of a Palestinian State and aimed to compensate that absence by a civil society-based leadership to the Palestinians (Abu Lughud and Jirbawi, 1993). This route to democracy did not ripen to a transition to democracy according to this view due to the instability of the Palestinian situation including the 1948 uprooting, and the other forced migration that took place during the 1967 war. No accumulation took place towards the development of democracy in Palestine, but at the same time, the three characteristics of the route to democracy continued all the way ahead from 1919 to 1996 when the Palestinian Authority was elected. But did the election of the Palestinian Authority represent a move from civil society democracy to a state-based democracy? The answer is not because the PA was given an

autonomy rule than a state. In 2012 the UN General Assembly voted for recognizing Palestine as a State, but this recognition did not lead to a change in the ground where the PA continued to act within the restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupying force.

In conclusion to this part, it can be said that the 1996 election was a juncture to move from the former civil society based 'route to democracy,' to a kind of structure of transition to democracy, by creating a tutelary hybrid regime. The latter was sustained rather than moved from transition to consolidation of democracy, and that is due to the impediments imposed by the three tutelages that were mentioned.

In the previous two parts, the Palestinian democracy was clarified as a tutelary democracy, while the Israeli one was analyzed as not to be either as an ethnic democracy or an Ethnocracy. Therefore, the question is what to describe it? Based on the analysis made by Nils Butenschon, and adding the territorial aspect to it, one can then call the Israeli democracy to be as a settler colonial democracy that is characterized not only by excluding the other people from their rights partially or entirely as the ethnic democracy and the Ethnocracy models suggested successively. But further, deprive the other of the primary means for the preservation of their existence by taking over and confiscating their land and territory and erasing their existence. In the framework of such kind of democracy which is a democracy to the settler colonials, any ethnic and ethnocratic (or open ethnocratic) procedures that include some rights to the other people will be practiced only as temporary till the erasing will take place. Furthermore, they will not include rights to land and territory which will continue to be subject to seizure and confiscation all the way ahead.

This framework of understanding the type of Israeli democracy will also help to understand the Palestinian tutelary democracy of 1996 as a product to the Israeli settler-colonial democracy. That to be perceived in the sense that the

Palestinian tutelary democracy was given authority over the Palestinian population civic issues, given an autonomous right and not the power of self-determination in a separate state of their own, and no authority over the territory, and security. Therefore the Palestinian Authority was given the ruling over the 98 percent population that concentrated in Gaza Strip and the West Bank cities and villages comprising together no more than 36 percent of West Bank. While the other 64 percent of West Bank called area C according to the Israeli Palestinian Agreements, were kept in addition to East Jerusalem under full Israeli control with around 614 thousand Jewish settlers living on it and granted the Israeli citizenship while they live in an area that is not part of Israel proper.

Being an authority over the people without the land and national rights does not mean yet also that it has jurisdiction over all the Palestinians. In this regard, the millions of Palestinian refugees and hundreds of thousands of the Palestinians who live in East Jerusalem are not under the authority of the PA, and as well the 1.5 million of Palestinians who live inside Israel face discrimination against them as second class citizens according to the study of Sami Smootha. More direct the Palestinian Authority has no control over the national rights of the Palestinians in West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. In all these three areas the disconnection between the human being and the land continued. In the pre-Oslo period, East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel Levy, while West Bank and Gaza were defined as territories administered by Israel. After Oslo, they became as "territories that are under dispute" in which their final status will be determined in the permanent status negotiations. With the 2005 Israeli evacuation of Gaza, it became closer to be defined by Israel as Palestinian territory, but this territory still lacks an agreement that recognizes it as such. Till then the Israeli forces are even controlling it from outside, beside the three wars that took place between 2018 and 2014, and the continued tension all the time on its borders with Israel. All these phenomena keep the possibility for Israel to go back to its 1967 when the wisdom was about the annexation of Gaza to Israel (see above).

Within this framework, the Palestinians in East Jerusalem kept being defined by Israel before and after Oslo as Jordanian citizens residing permanently in Israel. The West Bank people were identified in the pre Oslo period as "Jordanian citizens residing in areas administered by Israel," to become after Oslo as Palestinian residents (not citizens) residing in areas that are under dispute" (Salem, 2018). Finally, the Gazans were considered in the pre Oslo period as "Stateless living in areas administered by Israel" and after Oslo, they became as "Palestinian residents in territories administered by the Palestinian Authority" (Salem, 2018). The difference between West Bank and Gaza is that the former was ruled by Jordan in the period from 1948 to 1967 when the Palestinians there were offered Jordanian citizenship, while Gaza was ruled by Egypt who did not provide the Egyptian citizenship to them. After 2005 Gaza became the closest among the three areas to the Israeli recognition of its Palestinianship (Salem, 2018). Finally, after the approval of the Israeli Nationalism laws by the Israeli Knesset in July 2018, the West Bank might become as no longer as an area under dispute according to the Israeli definitions to become a de facto part of Israel instead.

The conclusion of all of these insights is that the Palestinian tutelary democracy is not so because it is only subject to the trilateral tutelages mentioned. But also for a deeper reason that is related to the fact that it has no control over territory, and it has to comply with all the restrictions and impediments resulted from this absence of territoriality. As such the conclusion of all of this analysis is that the exclusion from existing continued, and it was in the background behind the creation of different types of residency to different groups of the Palestinians as shown above. Concerning democracy as shown Israel was more interested in creating an authority that brings it security rather than being involved in creating a Palestinian independent democratic representation and that is why it created many hindrances on the path of the development of the Palestinian democracy. At the Palestinian side, it is clear that Arafat struggled with the Israelis in 1994-1996 to create a Palestinian representation. In that sense, Arafat was interested

in making Palestine look like a state with state structures, rather than he cared about democracy, and democracy development. With Mahmoud Abbas who became the President in 2005 after Arafat, this mode of operation continued while the democratic aspects of the Palestinian life kept diminishing.

2.3 The Israeli Settler Colonialism and its Inclusion and Exclusion Politics in Comparison with Other Perspectives

2.3.1 Israel as a Postcolonial Entity

Following the verification of the settler-colonial approach and its relevance to Zionism and Israel, it might be time now to delve more in-depth on this approach analysis by comparing it with other methods to Zionism and Israel. As analyzed so far, the former Zionist and the next Israeli settler colonial project were both all the way exclusivist, focusing on who is eligible to exist, and on the identity of the land. Following it used (and still using) all the means, especially those of the demographic elimination against the indigenous people in Palestine.

Starting with Postcolonialism discussed in several places in chapter one, Israel does not look first a postcolonial entity. If Israel is a postcolonial entity, then what about the indigenous population and their lost right to establish their postcolonial entity suppressed because Zionism created its state on the expense of them? Do they count in this case? Different than the United States, where most of the indigenous populations were butchered, the majority of the Palestinians still exist, either as refugees outside and inside Palestine, or as inhabitants of Israel, West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. Recognizing Israel as a postcolonial entity will be then on the expense of their rights in the same territory, this is first. Second, Israel cannot be postcolonial because it does not establish its State over a land that it had a historical continuity over it, but instead Zionism and the Jewish immigrants that it recruited came from outside, without being the ancestors of those Jews who left Palestine in the year 70 after the proclaimed Roman exodus of Jews from Palestine (Sand, 2010).

2.3.2 Israel as a Neo-Colonial Entity

The Marxist analysis presents Israel on the other hand as an imperial and Neo-Colonial entity. The imperial analysis focuses on the economic issues and therefore focuses on the mechanisms of exploitation domestically and internationally losing as such the other aspects of exploitation and suppression related to one people replacing another as settler colonial entities do. The neo-colonial approach looks to be as a correction of this shortfall. The neo-colonial approach as such combines the economic aspects with the globalization of the national struggle for freedom from the continued colonialism. Colonialism withdrew their military forces after the formal independence of the colonies from the door, but came back from the window by economic exploitation means using the Cartels, the Trusts and all the other types of Multi-National Corporations', As the African leader Kwami Nkrumah said (see more in chapter one).

The characteristics of imperialism as presented by Lenin were included in chapter one, they all economic, including the point of dividing the world between the imperial countries. The division took place mainly a division of exploitation zones for the importation of goods and capitals. After Lenin, these economic methods were widened to bypass the previous colonial division of labor which allowed the colonized to focus on agricultural production, while the industrial ones were kept in the colonial countries. The new additional methods included the use of aid as another tool for dominance, allowing for the emergence and the development of industries that use the western machines and technology products to produce goods for consumption in the pre-colonized countries. These developments created a new type of domination that is not using military means as it was in colonialism but creates instead a relation of dependence and uneven development worldwide (Frank, 1966). A center and periphery emerged (Amin, 1974), or a center and semi-periphery and periphery as components of World System Theory (Wallerstein, 1976), what Kwami Nkrumah did that he put the struggle for freedom in this framework to become also economic freedom and not only a political one. Therefore, his frame still economical and do not

include phenomena like settler colonialism. In another hand this framework importance is still, need to be explored about the role of the economic factor, and if this factor represented a major one that motivated Zionism and also the later Zionist expansion. This part will allude even to this question.

Where is then the location of Israel within this Marxist framework? In some Marxist writings, especially by the Israeli, Arab, and Palestinian Marxist scholars, Israel looks to be part of the center, and therefore an imperialist state. For Instance, the Palestinian Israel academic Ahmad Saad considered it to be a "Monopolistic State Capitalism" that take part since the latest of the nineteen seventies as an "agent and partner as well to the imperialistic regimes in the redistribution of the regions of dominance economically and strategically between the imperial powers" (Saad, 1989, 19, 25).

In the other hand the Egyptian Marxist academic Fouad Morsi thought about Israel as a 'Small partner', or 'A Minor Imperial power', or "A global capitalist organization" dominating significant parts of the global economy such as the dominance of Rockefeller and Rothschild Jewish families over the Oil Cartel that consists the USA, Britain, and France (Mursi, 1983, 7, 8, 27,78).

Finally, the Palestinian academic Hussein Abu Al-Namil considered it to be a "Great Regional Power" (Abu Al Namil, 1988, 368, 392). In this regard, Fadel Al Naqeeb mentioned that the Zionist economic projects in Palestine were capable of importing products to Egypt, The Fertile Crescent, and South Africa at the end of the nineteen thirties (AlNaqib, 1995, 27-28). Later the 1967 occupation provided Israel with a new market for its surplus products, to hire cheap labor in the so-called black economic sector, which allowed the Jewish workers to move to a higher economic position as engineers or in administrative jobs (Saad, 140-141).

Abu Al Nammel added that the 1967 occupation helped Israel also to solve the water problem by using the water resources that exists in West Bank, and it also enabled it to solve the unemployment problem (Abu Al Namil, 1979, 368-369). Besides that, the opening of the Arab Markets for the Israeli products, after Camp David Agreement with Egypt in 1978, and then after the peace documents signed with the PLO, and Jordan in 1993 and 1994 successively produced changes in the Israeli economy (Al Naqib, 1995, 40). These changes include for instance the creation of some economic projects between Israel and Jordan, such as the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) since 1998 as trilateral projects between USA, Israel, and Jordan (Press-Parnathan, 2009,198), and later signing a contract for selling the Israeli Gas to Jordan in 2015 for 15 years (Ghanem, Hounida, 2017, 182).

However, Israeli dominance as a significant regional power come from the fact that it is the most significant military power in the region rather than being the biggest economically. These mentioned economic developments should not create an impression; therefore that Israel became the dominant party economically over the Arab World. Israel central economic exchange is still first with the USA, second with China and Hong Kong countries, third with the Palestinian 1967 occupied territories, fourth with the EU countries. The exchange with the Arab World comes in a lower degree due to the continuation of the Arab economic boycott to Israel officially, as a study about the economic trade between the Arab Countries and Israel shown (Haidar, 2011). Accordingly, the pure economic analysis might be misleading if it will not be connected with other aspects.

2.3.3 The Political Economy of Settler Colonialism

This last point leads this part to what might be called 'the Political Economy of Settler Colonialism.' The starting point of departure for such an economy is the ideology of appropriation and dispossession rather than the economic motives, as Zachary Lockman wrote in his response to the economic motives suggested by Gershon Shafir (Lockman, 2012, 23). Along with the ideology, a land (usually

called as barren) will be looking for, then taken over, while the indigenous population will be hired as a cheap labor force without recognition of their national rights, or they will be excluded, and pure settler's colonialist projects will be conducted.

The last brings us back to the four models of colonial economic projects, the military, the pure, the mixed, and the plantation. The first is colonial, but the other three are settler colonial: The pure, opposite to the mixed, do not use local force power, while in the Plantation model the labor force will be brought from outside as happened by bringing slaves to the United States and South Africa (Fredrickson, 1988; Fieldhouse, 1966). For Shafir Zionism used the Pure Settlement colony model, but when it used local labor force of the indigenous population, it changed it to become 'Ethnic plantation colony' defined as a type of colony that "Mixes between the dominance of the European settlers and that hiring of the locals, but preserving at the same time the ethnic divisions and barriers between the inhabitant's groups. Examples of this type existed in French colonial Algeria and the English colonies in Kenya" (Shafir, 2002, 150).

During the Mandatory period in Palestine Zionism brought 11 thousand Jewish Yemeni workers to work in the colonies in the period from 1914 to 1918 when Zionism raised the "Hebrew Work "slogan. This development was following the so-called socialist nature of the Zionist labor movement who raised that slogan by then. Socialism for them was implemented to mean in a way or another to avoid exploiting the Arab labor, let us then avoid hiring them and do the work by ourselves only. As Shafir put it "They were opposing the exploitation of the Arab workers, but they solved the problem by preventing the employment of Arab workers" (Shafir, 2002, 156). In another hand, this development did not prevent the colonies from continuing using the local cheap labor force partially at least till 1936 revolution while keeping the ethnic separation according to the ethnic plantation model (Al Naqib, 1995, 184). The same mode of action continued after

1967 by using the Palestinian cheap labor force in the Israeli economy and the colonial settlements as well.

In the case of Israel, what this thesis called as 'the Political Economy of Settler Colonialism' might include the following characteristics: The Land was taken first, and then the building of the economy followed according to pre-prepared plans, and by using immigration to expand the colonial settlement building. During the Mandatory period the Jewish Agency played a crucial role in this economic building (Abu Al Namil, 1988, 30), then the State of Israel represented the same role after 1948 in a situation when the bringing of immigrants, building an active military and security forces, and other central that required a central role (Al Naqib, 1995, 28). This pivotal role of the state in the economy started to change only in the nineteen-nineties after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the peace process with the Palestinians and Jordan. At the same time the public sector continued to play a significant role in the economy through the Military industry, the *Histadrut* projects, and the building and expanding the settlements, and the absorption plans and projects to the new immigrants to Israel.

The combination of the roles of the different sectors of the state, the army, the *Histadrut*, the international investments in Israel, including those conducted by the Jewish companies and organizations, the foreign aid, and the Jewish and non-Jewish communities' worldwide contributions to Israel and the exclusive economic relations that Israel has with both the USA and Europe. Israel developed in addition to economic ties with China, Japan, India, and Russia, and investments in those countries and others. All this combination created an economy that is highly sophisticated in all the sectors of industry, agriculture, diamond, high technology, and others, bringing Israel to become one of the most top twenty states in the UN Development Index, giving it the rank of 19 in 2016 Index (www.hdr.undp.org).

The factors that helped Israel reaching that point are involved, in one hand despite the internal divisions between the parties. However, Israel due to its settler colonial nature where all its Jewish citizens benefited from the grabbing of the land and the territory of the Palestinians, was able all the time to give priority to the external contradiction, and also it was able to trump the class differences by the ethnic affiliation that brings the labor force and the Bourgeoisie together as Yiftachel (2012a) and Mann (2005) advised. The use of the cheap Palestinian force (and later the foreign labor force) assisted in giving the Israeli labor force highest economic positions with better salaries which also minimized the conflict between the classes in one hand, and brought the labor force behind Zionism and its slogans in the second hand. The settlement expansion that took place in the Palestinian occupied territories after 1967 and the privileges given to the settlers also contributed to the diminishing or at least neutralizing the class divisions.

The Political Economy of the Settler Colonialism continued as well in the period after 1967. In this regard Gershon Shafir advice that settler colonialism of the post-1967 period is a continuation of the one that was there in the pre-1948. Opposite to the Israeli liberals who claim that the pre-1948 period was a period of national independence and that the period after 1967 is a period of occupation that might end by negotiations. Shafir believes that the two periods are different stages in one continuous settler colonial project. For him, when Zionism decided in the period from 1937 to 1947 to give up with some territories to be annexed to Jordan or to become Palestine, it did not do that due to peace intentions. The opposite Zionism was aggressive, and from aggressiveness point of departure, it decided to give up provisionally with these territories due to that fact that there is no Jewish presence on them (Shafir, 2002, 163). Therefore, Shafir sees the post-1967 period as a continuation of the pre-1948 period, while he presented the following picture of comparison between both from economic perspectives: The pre-1948 period was a one that witnesses a divided labor market, uniting the Jewish workers in one hand along with national

basis, and using this basis to exclude the Arab workers (Shafir, 150). The land was taken by purchase till 1948 were only 6.1 percent of the land of Palestine were bought from big landlords, while the rest of the land was appropriated during and after 1948 war (Shafir, 168).

In comparison in the post-1967 occupied territories the lands were confiscated by military and administrative orders of the state. This process was accompanied in the beginning with the entirely pure settlement colonies that were established by the *Gush Emunim Movement*. The Block of the Faithful (Shafir, 166). At the beginning two trends emerged, one that called for limited pure settlement colonies, aiming to preserve an ethnic homogeneity and leaving the rest of the land for bargaining with the Arab side. The second is the one that called for the establishment of full pure settlement colonies, dominating over the Palestinians for a while to be followed by expelling them. Till 1973 around 100,000 Palestinian workers were hired in the Israeli economy along of keeping the ethnic division line, later to that voices grown calling for their expulsion, due to the fear of the "Demographic problem" that the Israelis felt, just like the Protestant settlers in Ireland, and the British settlers in Quebec (Shafir, 167-169).

The conclusion from the above is that the exclusion process also took an economic shape that is part of what can be called as a settler colonial political economy. In this regard, the description of Israel to be a fully neo-colonial misses this point about settler colonialism and its impacts on the economy. In the other hand the concept of neo-colonialism is still relevant to understand some parts of the Israeli economic agenda to Palestine and the Arab world. In the case of Palestine by modifying it to become inclusive to both the colonial and the neo-colonial aspects as Abdallah and Al Barghouthi advised (Abdallah and Barghouti, 1988), but also by adding settler colonialism political economy to the analysis.

2.3.4 Israel as an Internal Colonialism State

Now, to the description of Israel as internal colonialism, a kind of concept that at a particular stage was influenced by the Latin America Marxist theories about dependency (see chapter one). In the case of Israel, Elia Zureik developed it to include both economic and non-economic components, representing a cluster of class, ethnic, racial, cultural, and national relations. But these relations for him are all encompassed within what he called to be as imperialism implemented within one nation-state. He wrote defining internal colonialism to be as: "An important aspect of internal imperialism is the development of the imperialistic relationship between capitalist and not capitalist economies within one nation-state" (Zureik, 1979, 18).

In the case of Israel, this "imperialistic relationship" includes other non-economic components such as ideology and belief systems, racial dominance, and structural attitudinal and historical antecedents (Zureik, 22). In such an order the natives will internalize the Western liberal democracy and its concepts of individualism, compromise and competition as Franz Fanon advised. Also, the cultural imperialism will be used to legitimize the inferior and the subordinate situation of the colonized, a co-optation prevails through the traditional collaborators, while the others became as a lumpenproletariat. All in all, a system of domestic internal colonialism emerges that include a superimposing of the capitalist system on the Arabs, the creation of pockets of hinterlands for the natives, in opposition of the metropolitan centers of the settlers, and the dehumanization of the culture and the way of life of the indigenous population (Zureik, 26-30). The following parts of Elia Zureik book are about the history of the Zionist project since the late Ottoman period, and how it used the land situation to expand. Then he follows with a focus On Israel after 1948 discussion the other perspectives that consider Israel to be as a liberal democracy, or thinks the struggle to be between two nationalist movements as this thesis discussed above. Also, he explains the political and socio-economic- cultural status of the Arabs inside Israel.

While this concept of internal colonialism makes a lot of sense when it comes to Israeli politics towards its Arab population living inside it, but it also will need to be combined with settler colonialism. A concept that Zureik did not use although he spoke about some of its aspects like the continuous land appropriation and the displacement of the indigenous population in Israel after it was established. In this regard, Rodolfo Acuna concept of internal colonialism presented in chapter one might be more concise and more precise about the settler colonial aspects of the internal colonialism. Zureik and Acuna with this partial combination of the concept with settler colonialism also make a point of departure from Veracini point of view which do not see a space for a settler colonial state (see chapter one). Besides that, the term was confusing between its Latin America version focusing on the economy and the other non-economic generators of internal colonialism. In the coming decades after Zureik writing of the book more components were added that can lead to its enrichment if the concept if they became a part of it. These new components came out from the studies about the indigenous-settler relations in the Naqab (Nasasra and Falah mentioned earlier for instance), and the reviews about land expropriation, the Judaization of the Galilee, and the rest of the Triangle. In addition to the concrete studies about the non- recognized villages inside Israel, it is adding to that the studies about the different political, legal, and economic aspects of the life of the Palestinians inside Israel (see for instance, Haidar, 1995; Nakhleh, 2008; Rouhana, 2014; Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009 and others).

Among the mentioned above Asad Ghanem has a unique approach talking about an indigenous minority in an ethnic state, by this way of presenting it, he seeks equality for that minority not only as individuals but also as a collective by getting the state recognition of it as a national minority (Ghanem, 2009,385). In the other hand as the state of Israel defines its relations with the Palestinians in Israel in light of its conflict with all the Palestinians (Ghanem, 380). Then there is no way for Ghanem than to call for a solution that will take place between two nationalities as he sees them, the Israeli citizenship and the Palestinian one.

For Ghanem, the appropriate solution for this case will be by the establishment of a bi-national federal state between Israel and Palestine (Ghanem, 2005; 2007; 2012; 2017). Ghanem ideas are part of the transformative kind of debate going on among the Palestinians inside Israel in the last 20 years at least, starting from the moment when Azmi Bishara established the Democratic National Collective in 1995, who presented the idea of transforming Israel from a Jewish State to a state for all its citizens. This debate led to the development of "The Future vision for the Palestinians inside Israel" by the Regional Committee of the Heads of the Local Arab Councils in Israel" (www.adalah.org, 2006). The Democratic Constitution of Adalah Center (2007) and the Haifa Document of Mada Al- Carmel Center (2009). All these documents sought equal individual and collective rights for the Palestinians inside Israel. But while the last two of them do not see that this is possible without dismantling the Zionist nature of the state with is the main obstacle on its path to full liberal democracy. The first one makes it suffice that the state allocates financial resources and develop a political will to achieve equality for the Palestinians inside Israel without a change in the state structure (Nakhleh, 2008, 146).

The previous discussion showed that there are two paths to equality for the Palestinians inside Israel, one to be achieved by accumulating improvements within the Zionist system, and the second is by breaking with that system as a prior condition for change. Asad Ghanem was a participant in the development of the first document mentioned above that seeks rights inside the system itself. At the same time, he is calling for a bi-national state as an alternative plan if that equality option will not be achieving. This combination is evident for Ghanem who sees Israel as an ethnic state expressing the dominance of the Israeli nationality over the Palestinian one as also Yiftachel advocated (see earlier). In another hand, he sees the Palestinians inside Israel as partly Palestinians, and partly Israelis, but at the same time as a "third group that has its narrative" (Ghanem, 2012, 343). Therefore he wanted them not to be as part of a Palestinian state that he also sees as impossible to be achieved (Ghanem,

2005), but he wants them to be together with the two peoples in one bi-national state.

The latest decade, brought the so-called 'The New Right' to govern Israel, this right composed by the new Likud led by Binyamin Netanyahu, The Haredi Parties, the national religious parties, the settlers and new right-wing movements like *Im-Tirtzu*. The Characteristics of this new right according to Hunaida Ghanem include the call for a Jewish State, the aggressiveness towards the Palestinians and the Muslims, the glorification of power, and the hostile ideology against the gentiles. This new right is opposite to the rational one that ruled Israel in the first period of the Likud governance in 1977 (Ghanem, 2017, 10). With these developments, it is more likely that the grab of the land and the settlement expansion will be the case, including against the Palestinians inside Israel, while it will be less likely to change the Israel state Structure, or even to make improvements for the situation of the Palestinians within that structure. The Nation- State law released by the Knesset in the 18th of July 2018 and analyzed earlier is just an additional signal in that direction.

2.3.5 Israel and “Coloniality”

In the Israeli context, Coloniality is also used; the key for this concept as shown in chapter one is that the colonial does not leave to become a post or neo-colonial, but it continues using epistemic tools besides the political and economic ones. The epistemic tools include the concepts of modernity, modernization, emancipation, and others imposed from outside with no relevance to the local concepts and practices. In the case of Palestine, coloniality played its role in a settler colonial context, was these concepts meant the modernity and the emancipation for the Jews, to be achieved by the elimination of part of the indigenous population, and the subjugation of the rest of it. This way of envisioning these concepts are still prevalent; for instance, Mr. Netanyahu presented them during his opening ceremony of a street that links some settler colonial settlement in the North West Bank with Israel. He said at that speech that Israel will continue "dissolving the concept of the periphery" and

the countryside landscape to promote modernization (Netanyahu, January 2018 in TimesofIsrael.com). What he meant here is to bring the settlements in West Bank to the developmental level of the cities inside Israel. The missing here is the impact of this process on the dissolution and the fragmentation of the Palestinian villages in the area.

Coloniality is also imposed through the education of the Palestinians inside Israel to become loyal Israeli citizens while disregarding their national identity (Mi'ari, 2014), and perform for the prevention of the establishment of an Arab University inside Israel. In the West Bank lists of books related to national issues are still prevented by Israeli military orders, and in East Jerusalem the process to impose the Israeli curricula in all its schools is ongoing. The aim here is to create generations that are israelized, and ready to internalize Israel as their state inside Israel, and to the lesser extent in East Jerusalem, and to destroy the Palestinian national identity from the Palestinians in all Palestine.

2.3.6 Israel and Settler Colonialism in the Post-1967 Period

The post-1967 period added new components to the debate about the nature of Israel and its relation to the new territories occupied at that year. In this regard, some of the Israeli left-wing academics called Israel presence in the Post 1967 territories to be as a military occupation.

Azoulay and Ophir used occupation as an overall system as a description of what happened after 1967. They stated that this occupation is inclusive to other subsystems such as Apartheid and settler colonialism (Azoulay and Ophir, 2012). The Palestinian Professor Mohammad Dajani also wrote an article to Fikra Forum of the Washington Institute, arguing that the case of post-1967 is a case of occupation rather than a case of Apartheid. He says that Virginia Telly and Richard Folk define Apartheid according to the 2nd article of the "International Covenant against the Crime of Racial Separation", and this definition includes "The practices of isolation and discrimination, and the dominance of one ethnic group of humanity on another one, persecuting it

systematically”(Dajani,washingtoninstitute.org, 2017). For Dajani, this definition is irrelevant because there are two conditions to make it valid in the case of the Israeli control of the post-1967 occupied territories. Condition number one: The discrimination should be institutional and according to the law, and two: The bias should be racial, and therefore should be visible in the public sphere by separation in the houses, job places and opportunities, and public services, the social activities and others. Finally, Dajani calls for a Palestinian for self-determination and end of occupation towards Palestinian free, independent, and sovereign statehood, rather than ending Apartheid and become part of Israel (Dajani, 2017). An Israeli South African former journalist used a similar argument to Dajani one to claim that Israel post-1967 is a case of occupation rather than being a case of apartheid (Pogrud, 2016).

Azoulay and Ophir and Dajani are both rights regarding the existence of the belligerent occupation, but they miss the colonial settlement process practiced as a joint venture between the Israeli Governments, its military administration in the Palestinian occupied territories and the settler- colonial none state actors. In another hand when they discuss the settlement expansion, they present it as a soft matter that can be solved through the negotiations between the two sides (Golan, 2007), also missing here the status of settlement expansion in the Zionist and the Israeli expansionist agenda.

Back to apartheid, Dajani focused on the absence of some practices to say that it is not existent, but what about the policies, and also a lot of other aspects of separation between the Israelis and Palestinians. In this regard, Shafir spoke for instance about the practice of Pure Ethnic Colonies as shown. Also, the Hebrew Labor slogan was raised since the beginning of the 20th century. What “mental assumptions” and resulting politics these practices express? The previous section reviewed the ideas about the selected people by God and their exclusive right of the Promised Land. Aren’t these representing the mental background for

an apartheid practice embedded in a settler colonial project with an ultimate goal to transfer the indigenous population and replace them?

As Oren Ben-Dor maintained in South Africa, the Apartheid was a one practiced through the ruling of a settler- colonial minority. While in Israel it the 1948 ethnic cleansing when a façade of democracy was created to hide the Apartheid represented by directing most of the state investments to the welfare of the Jews, using the laws of land and properties to Judaize, preventing the Palestinians to live in Jewish neighborhoods and others. In the end, there is a democratic façade that hides what Ben-Dor called "Inbuilt Justice" (Ben Dor, 2015). In this regard, Joseph Massad noted that the "right of Israel to exist as a Jewish State" is kept to be used permanently as a justification to give Israel the right to be racist (Massad, 15/3/2007).

Regarding the post-1967 occupied territories, it is widely claimed that Oslo 1993 created a new system of separation between the Israelis and the Palestinians in these territories. According to Oren Yiftachel, this system diminished the settler colonial project expansion (Yiftachel, 2013).

Similar Hilla Dayan, Ariel Hendel, and Niv Gordon share the same idea in general (see their chapters in Hanafi et al, 2012). Gordon, for instance, speaks about a separation model that followed a settler colonial model. For him the "settler colonial principle" as he called it can be defined as "a form of governance in which the colonialist will try to administer the colonized life affairs while exploiting at the same time the resources of the occupied territories" (Gordon, 2012, 292). For Gordon, this principle faced several contradictions such as that "the grand investment in the infrastructure of the settlements, and the transfer of thousands of Jewish civilians to live in the occupied territories contradicted the claim that Israel kept always repeating that occupation was temporary" (Gordon, 308). Besides that the settler colonial principle contributed to the increase of the national awareness and ended with "the reproduction of

the Palestinian national self" (Gordon, 308). These contradictions transformed the Israeli policies to the 'Separation principle' which means: We are here, the Israelis, and you are there, the Palestinians (Gordon, 309). What followed here was not a withdrawal of the Israeli forces, but a re-organization of the Israeli Authority over the Palestinians (Gordon, 310), in a way that Israel became disinterested of the life of the Palestinians (Gordon, 316). In other words what took place after Oslo was a withdrawal from the life of the Palestinians rather than a withdrawal from the territories that kept in the hands of Israel. The Palestinian territory was divided to areas A, B, and C, and representing as such "The Ghetto of Israel, in times that Lebanon represented its borders area" as James Ron wrote since the 1970s and 1980s (Gordon, 317).

This point of view gives a partial description of what is taking place in the 1967 occupied territories. It is right in the sense that Israel started after Oslo to deal with the Palestinians from 'outside' by shelling them from the air, restricting their movement when they leave their cities and villages, doing incursion in their territories whenever needed according to the Israeli security considerations, preventing the freedom of movements between the three parts of Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem in addition to the many restrictions to move from one place to another inside West Bank itself. AimeCesaire spoke about the "thingification" of the colonized by the colonizer (Cesaire, 1972), which leads to dealing with them as 'targets' a word used by the Israeli media when describing any attack made from the air on a Palestinian target.

The target is usually human beings who get killed and injured by the mentioned attacks. However, this thingification process is combined by grabbing the land, and the ongoing increase in settlement expansion. In one hand the Palestinians are brought out the Israeli "screen" and became, by all means, invisible (including the absence of signs to the Palestinian villages in the West Bank streets, or making these invisible while at the same time visualizing the names of the colonial settlements). In the second hand, the ongoing settlement

expansion brings to the fore the other part that Nev Gordon ignored in his definition of settler colonialism, considered in his words as the colonial occupation only.

In this regard, Gordon touched well the point that separation was a disengagement with the Palestinian people, but not a withdrawal with their lands, which left in the hands of Israel especially area C that represents two thirds of the size of West Bank, and East Jerusalem. This separation between the land and the people might be a step on the path of separating the people from Palestine as a whole through an upcoming transfer. Till then the separation combined with Apartheid practices will continue provisionally taking the shapes of excluding the Palestinians from their country, and preventing them from controlling their resources, and restricting their freedom of movement. That is, besides, the separation wall that was created in their land restricting the Palestinian travels to Jerusalem and other parts of their cultivated lands, around 11 percent of West Bank. That became located inside Israel on the West side of the wall. All that combined by stratifying the Palestinians in different categories of citizenship and residency as explained in a previous section. The exception here is Gaza where the Palestinians are controlling parts of their lands inside the imposed Ghetto on them (except those in the borders with Israel, where the Palestinian access to the land is subject to Israel security considerations) (see more about Gaza in the previous section, and also in chapter four).

The overview so far tells that a belligerent occupation exists, but combined with Apartheid, settler colonialism, which create a complicated situation that brings these three components together (HounidaGhanem, 2017, 22-23; 2014). Within this complex, there is also the practice of neo-colonialism by dumping the Palestinian market with the Israeli products while restricting the Palestinian agricultural and industrial production and creates a one joint custom union between Israel and the Palestinian territories. This Union makes it open to the Israeli products while certain Palestinian products are only allowed to go in

Israel, and also restrictions are made on the Palestinian trade with the Arab World (Paris Economic Protocol, 1994).

Such complicated situation is confusing to many; therefore, it can be seen that many call it as Apartheid; these include academics and politicians (such as Saeb Erekat, and Mustafa Barghouti). The first wrote that Israel created two segregated systems in West Bank one of the privileges to the Israeli colonial settlers, and the second is for the Palestinians that includes maintaining the status quo, having a Palestinian authority without any authority, and continuing the occupation without any cost, and separating Gaza from West Bank and link it gradually with Egypt. It is noticed here that Erekat will describe these phenomena as “occupation” (Erekat, December 2012, 26). By using Apartheid as a description, the Palestinian users of it might mean the Apartheid system that segregates between the Palestinians and other Palestinians in one hand, and between them and the Israeli colonial settlers in the second hand. This way of looking to the case might be as a way of calling to end this segregation and create a Palestinian state on 1967 borders; this is Saeb Erekat version. The second might be that says that the two states solution and the territorial compromise are over due to the settlement expansion. Therefore, there is no other way according to this view than taking a South African path by calling for the achievement of individual and collective rights for both peoples in all the historical land of Palestine; this is the call of those who look for a bi-national state (Asad Ghanem above for instance).

Salim Tamari responded to this kind of an approach that a recognition of the right of the Palestinians as a people first and in self-determination second will be a requirement that needs to be achieved before moving in the direction of bi-nationalism, otherwise this move will not work due to the denial of the Palestinian national rights (Tamari, 2005, 67-73). Mark Rifkin additionally wrote regarding a relevant issue that the use of the terms indigeneity and Apartheid as if they the same concept leads to the missing of indigeneity and the indigenous

people right for sovereignty and self-definition (Rifkinn, 2017). Similar concerns about the concept were made by the Palestinian academic and poet EzzEddin Al Manasrah, who considered the idea of one state solution (the Bi-national state), as an adaptation with the occupation, normalizing the Israeli presence in the ground, and escapism ahead (Al Manasra, 2018).

The two versions, the one-state solution in a post-Apartheid period that is based on equal rights in all historical Palestine, and the two states solution along the 1967 borders are both do not look to be possible. What emerged alternatively is an Israeli version of one state solution that includes Israel in its 1948 borders, and the de jure, the expanded East Jerusalem on the expense of West Bank. And the de facto annexed areas from West Bank to Israel. In the rest that is not de facto annexed, and that consists of Areas A and B of West Bank representing no more than 36 percent of its size and the tiny Gaza Strip with its 360 square kilometers. In these, a Palestinian Authority was established under the Israeli and the international tutelage to take care of the daily life issues of the people. Veracini called this authority to be like a Postcolonial structure which also (including its two parts: The Palestinian Authority in West Bank, and Hamas who is de facto ruling Gaza since 2006 when the Palestinian split took place) "together with the Plethora of western non-governmental organizations can be considered an integral part of the occupation in its current configuration" (Veracini, 2013, 33).

As ironic as it might look like the Israeli recognition of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in West Bank might be provisional even though it signed the agreements with it since 1993, and at the same time recognize Hamas Authority indirectly in Gaza. The reason for that is apparent, the PA exists where Israel is planning to annex, Hamas rules on the contrary an area that Israel decided not to annex, and that is why Veracini conclusion might need some modification. As explained earlier in this period the ideas for annexing and expanding Israel to include the

whole land of Israel as it is called is growing. Of course, this is inclusive to West Bank and East Jerusalem to become parts of Israel.

Opposite to these ideas, the Palestinian 'realists' are calling for the division of Palestine to two states along the 1967 borders, while others are calling for plethora of 'idealist' alternatives that are based on one state model: The bi-national State (Ghanem, 2005), the State for all its citizens (Bishara, 1996), the state for all its citizens and absentees (Masalha 1993; Davis, 2003; 1997). There are also the different models of federal and confederal solutions between the two peoples (See a review of these options by Salem, 2017), and the Benelux ideas that include Jordan with them (Shtayyeh, 1998).

Besides these there is the Islamic version which considers Palestine as a whole as an Islamic Endowment, and that the only way to liberate it is by armed struggle. Hamas expressed this opinion before its 1994 acceptance of a Palestinian State on 1967 borders without recognition of Israel (Hroub, 2000; Al Sha'er, 1999); and also by Islamic Jihad and academics such as Abdel Sattar Qasem who is also a prolific writer of columns. In one of his latest, he expected Israel to vanish in less than quarter a century due to different reasons such as the corruption among the political elite, the change in the army that is not any more ideological and cohesive, the lack of the geographical, demographic, and strategic dimensions. Therefore Israel became a target for the missiles and the rockets of Hizbullah and Hamas. The changes that are taking place in Syria and Iraq might become threatening to Israel, and as well the Iranian military presence is becoming close to Israel (Qasem, www.almayadin.net, 5/9/ 2017). In the same line, the Egyptian scholar Majdi Hammad suggests that Israel is selecting the path of the Crusaders State that was established in Palestine and parts of Jordan, Syria, and Sinai between 1099 and 1291. That State sought the option of enduring conflict and rejected all compromises, similar to Israel that seeks regional expansion and therefore declines all the solutions being two

states or one state. This option of Israel according to Hammad will put the future of Israel under jeopardy in the path of its dismantlement (Hammad, 2017).

Balancing the ideas about the possible vanishing of Israel, one has to see also the other factors such as the influential American support to Israel. The Israeli plans to solve the demographic problems by a new transfer benefitting in this regard from the Syrian civil war example that created millions of refugees. The strength of the Israeli Army in comparison with the Arab ones. The incapability of Hamas and Hizbullah missiles to liberate Palestine while they can annoy and do damage. The long time that Iraq and Syria will need to recover from their internal problems. The impasse that Iran has due to its troubles with the United States, and its domestic difficult economic situation in addition to the presence of internal opposition among the Iranian people, and other factors to think of. Therefore, a more thorough analysis of the different factors needs to be investigated to make as much as accurate analysis possible (see chapter five). Till then the Israeli settler-colonial project will continue as is in high speed.

2.4. Israel as a Settler Colonial Case

Time to wrap up this chapter, as Shlomo Sand and Yakov Rabkin indicated Israel is not a unique case of people who returned to their country after 2000 years of the Diaspora. Therefore, it is comparable with other instances of settler colonialism as Gershon Shafir and others indicated. As Faye Sayegh maintained the Zionist settler-colonial movement had four characteristics: The Colonization of Palestine to create a nation to them, the resistance that it confronted from the Palestinians and the opposition by the Ottoman Empire, the continuous drive towards regional expansion, besides that; "The Zionist colonization of Palestine was essentially incompatible with the continued existence of the native population in the coveted country. Zionism also considered Palestine as the national home of the Jews and rejected assimilation with the native population, while seeking racial self-segregation and social exclusiveness". (Sayegh, 1965, 206-214).

Maxime Rodinson defines colonialism as "A collection of persons who leave their country to get populate another" (Rodinson, 1973, 92). According to this definition, he says that the last Jewish state in Palestine was finished in 63 AD, and the previous Jewish revolution in Palestine was in 135 AD, then a Jewish State was established in the South of Arabia, and another one later was called as the Al Khazar Kingdom. Upon this history, there are no spaces for the claim to return to Palestine, because it was inhabited by other people the same as the Jews became parts of other nations in the world (Rodinson, 91).

These two scholars' ideas were mentioned as a confirmation to all the previous analysis in the last two chapters. In this regard, an Israeli Ph.D. candidate wrote: "Israel is a settler colonial state, and that is ok." He says that settler colonialism is about settler colonialist who travels to other country aiming to make it their independent nation and use violence against the indigenous population like what happened in the cases of USA, Canada, Australia, and also Israel. Claiming this is for him is ok because it does not mean taking an anti-Semitic position, or rejecting the idea of the Jewish historical attachment towards Palestine (ArnonDegan, 2016).

How does the Israeli settler colonialism look in the period of post-1967 war?

Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir suggested the need to combine occupation with settler colonialism and Apartheid as Hunaida Ghanem did above, and As Rael Zreik did in his introduction to Azoulay and Ophir book (Azoulay and Ophir, 2012, 11). However, Azoulay and Ophir suggested also that it is essential to understand the accurately the system of occupation "rather than seeking to prove that it is colonialism, or Apartheid" (Azoulay and Ophir, 19). For them, the occupation and the settlers colonial project got united in 1977 after the Likud took over the rule of Israel, while after Oslo the colonial settlement areas were determined and a separation system emerged as they claim similar to Nev Gordon above (Azoulay and Ophir, 342). They maintained that the occupation reached a threshold which solution to choose among two solutions: Either

granting citizenship and the full implementation of the sovereignty of law or start a comprehensive war (against the Palestinians: W.S). In other words, "either a peaceful solution or a comprehensive war that includes a collective killing or a defeat to the Israeli side due to the unexpected joining of the war by exterior forces, such as Iran, Syria, or Hizbullah" (Azoulay and Ophir, 247-248). Nevertheless, they say that Israel is still suspending this comprehensive war.

If this is the situation, then there is no place to the claim that Israel after 1967 became a mother state to the settler colonial project as some claim (Shtayyeh, 2016, 24). This might be partially the case in the period from 1967 to 1977 when the Labor government agenda for settler colonialism collided partially with the settler's plan as defined by then by Gush Emunim movement that aimed for the full annexation of the 1967 occupied territories to Israel. In 1977 the Government agenda and the settlers one became the same towards the 'whole Israel land agenda' as mentioned above. In 1991 the Israeli society started also expelling the Palestinian workers from the Israeli economy, signaling the move towards the preparation of "getting rid of the agenda" (Azoulay and Ophir, 167). This move is currently suspended as indicated, maybe waiting for a regional war that will give a justification to implement it. Opposite to occupation that usually has a beginning and end, and does not bring settlers to live in the land in the expense of the natives, and does not aim to change the identity of the country and its space and landscape. The settler colonial project carried together by the state of Israel, and its colonial settlers aim to be permanent, brings settlers, and seeks to change the identity, space and the landscape of the country.

Following all the above, IlanPappe wrote: "The ideology that led to the expulsion of half of the indigenous population of Palestine in 1948 is still alive and still pushing towards an unmerciful expulsion that sometimes is invisible, to those Palestinians who still live in their country".

He added: "Ethnic cleansing is an Israeli priority. It has no relation with any hierarchy (such as those who are luckier, and those who are not lucky among the Palestinians). The Palestinians in the Greater Jerusalem area are exposed to ethnic cleansing while this book is sent to the publication house. The Palestinians who live in Israel have an illusion that they are safe (the Palestinians living in Israel), might become a target in the future. 86 percent of the Jewish Israelis responded to a new public opinion poll, expressing their will to see the Palestinians displaced" (Pappe, 2007, 289)

In the following chapter three, this thesis will be going back to Christian pre-Zionism routes of Zionism and the Zionism relations with the great powers at that time, and at the end, there will be a comparison between Israel and the other three settlers' colonial cases selected for this study. In this respect, the following chapter is allocated to defining the intellectual roots of exclusion and inclusion politics of the Zionist settler-colonial project in Palestine, such as Messianism, and the Zionist Messianism. The roles of the mother countries to the settler- colonial project in sustaining these politics is also presented and discussed within this context.

CHAPTER III

THE ROOTS OF EXCLUSION: MESSIANISM, ZIONISM AND THE OTHER SETTLER COLONIAL PROJECTS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The settler -colonial projects are about exclusion. This exclusion has both intellectual roots related to social-economic conditions in the countries that produced/s them, but exclusion is also a practice that leads to dire results. As such exclusion is multifaceted, and it might include: First, Exclusion of the other from the humanity, on the basis of the idea that the Man is only the European, rational, and enlightened (Said, 1978, 217, the Arabic version) versus the cannibals and the beasts like the names that were given to the Amerindians. As such the enlightened gave themselves the right to conquer, to colonize, to establish colonies, to enslave, and to oblige the others to work in indentured works as done in the United States and South Africa. Second, to demonize the others so they will become responsible for what happened to them , third to deny and not to recognize both their individual and collective identities and their symbols, history, narratives, myths and traditions, fourth to abstain from accepting their right to equality socially, economically, politically, culturally and in the law as happened in Ireland first and later in Northern Ireland, and fifth to consider them as subjects to the kinds of treatment that you unilaterally decide to inject on them, being non-citizens according to your consideration, and accordingly to criminalize any resistance that they show, or express.

In the beginning, the exclusion was from the right to exist as a human being, and in a later stage, it became an exclusion from the political and social participation fully or partially. In the case of Zionism, the partial participation that took place towards the indigenous population after 1948 did not mean that the collective rights were recognized. Exclusion from humanity is non-recognition of one as a human being, and as an individual as well. Secondly, the exclusion from citizenship is non-recognition of national rights as a collective.

The first can result in genocides, ethnocides, ethnic cleansing, and spacio-cides. The second includes politicides, including the execution of the right of the indigenous for self-determination, where a nation is created over the land of other nation. In this second case, the people will be dealt with as sects, denominations, and separate ethnic groups as the State of Israel doing by dividing the Palestinians inside Israel to Bedouins, Druze, Muslims, and Christians, and therefore not as part of one people.

In this situation, the search for collaborators will be the rule either as individuals or collectivities, and the distinction between moderates presented as the good ones and usually as exceptions among their people, and the extremists. The first will be treated by all means to make them famous, and to present them as the symbols of their people regardless of how much constituency support, they have, but at the same time they will be all the time subject to tests to confirm again and again what they say. The Settler colonial agents who grabbed the land, and the present and the future of the country will need confirmations of concessions to them again and again from the victimized. When they reach the point of sustaining their victories, they will no longer be in need for the moderate; they will get rid of him/her/ He/ she was needed to play a role required for a specified period. When that role is completely consumed, the moderate will end his role, and sometimes to be replaced by someone who is further moderate and ready to give more concessions.

Fanon (1952) and Césaire (1950/1972) spoke about these kinds of persons and groups differentiating between collaborators, the employees of the colonial administrations, and the "political moderates." However, in the case of Palestine, two examples among many can be mentioned to show how the settler colonial project operates in this regard. One of them is an example of moderation like in the case of the Palestinian 'moderate' leader Yasser Arafat and how other supposedly more moderate Mahmoud Abbas replaced him, and the second is a case of "collaborators", which is the case of the Druze inside Israel and their story with the Nation-State Law of July 2018.

In the case of Yasser Arafat, although he was the leader who reached and signed Oslo Agreement in 1993, and decided on all the following documents with Israel till Camp David 2000 when he refused to sign an Agreement with the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak according to the following conditions. Arafat compound in Ramallah was put under siege by the Israeli Army from March to early May of 2002, part of the compound was demolished, and then he was kept imprisoned in his compound till he passed away in the beginnings of November 2004. Before he died, he was obliged according to the Road Map plan of 2003 released by the Quartet for Middle East peace to give up with some of his authorities by appointing a Prime Minister in the 19th of March 2003. The elected Prime Minister was Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazin, who was considered by the international Quartet for peace in the Middle East and Israel as being more moderate than Yasser Arafat, was elected as a President 2005. Ever since he was in the head of all the negotiations with Israel that followed, and like Arafat, he couldn't "swallow" the harsh Israeli conditions to reach a final status agreement. By the writing of this thesis, he became to be considered an extremist and the search for an alternative to him began.

For the Druze in Israel, although they selected to ally with Israel in 1948, joined the Israeli Army, and fought in all Israel's wars, including losing lives of many Druze soldiers. But despite this Blood Pact as they called it, the Israeli Knesset

passed the Nation-State law in the 18th of July 2018 that does not recognize them as equal citizens in the State (see chapter 2). According to the well-known Israeli writer David Grossman, this law "Deepened the occupation and The Apartheid, and transferred them from the areas of occupation to inside Israel" (Grossman, Al Ayyam newspaper, 4/8/2018). He added that the law made the Arabs inside Israel "dependent on the good and the bad intentions of the government and that their presence here is conditional, but they might become absentees in any moment" (Grossman, Al Ayyam newspaper). For the Druze who served in the Israeli Army, this was a shock. The spiritual leader of the Druze Muwaffaq Tariff said in his address to tens of thousands of demonstrators against the law in Tel Aviv that "the state did not recognize them as equal citizens despite the 'blood pact', and the cemeteries of the Druze soldiers who fell as "martyrs" in the Israeli wars" (Tariff, Radio Makan (Israel Voice), 4/8/2018). Till the moment of the writing of this thesis this issue is still ongoing, one of the ways out proposed the inauguration of a new law that recognizes the equal rights of Druze and that is if the High Court of Justice will not cancel the law based on a petition by Mertez Party against it.

These were examples to show that the settler- colonial project is of a nature of being exclusive, and against the other as a collective. Therefore, the moderates and the collaborators will be used to help to fulfill the requirements of passing certain stages in the development of the project. When these stages are fulfilled there will be no need for them any time longer.

This chapter goes in three sections as follows: Section one will discuss the roots of exclusion and its relation to Messianism and Zionism as two models of exclusion, and how the first preceded the second regarding the *Eretz* Israel as a Promised Land to the Jewish People. The second section will discuss the role of mother/s country/ is towards the emergence and the development of the Zionist project, and this to be done in comparison with the ideas that considered Zionism to be an "independent national movement" that also fought against the

colonial powers mainly Britain in the 1940s. As a continuation to chapter two, the third section will first summarize the commons and the divergences between the case of Israel and the other three cases of settler colonialism of the United States, South Africa, and Ireland presented earlier, and will move a step forward discussing what these cases can inform Palestine and the Zionist Settler colonial project there. At the end there is a summary of the chapter.

3.1 The Roots of Exclusion: How Messianism Preceded Zionism Regarding the 'Promised Land'

Structuralism, culturalism, and structuration, might be the three perspectives required to discuss the roots of inclusion. The first refers to what structures impose on the individual and society. The second focuses on the actors' beliefs, traditions and other mental sources as motives to human action, and the third focuses on the interaction between the structure and the actors and the reciprocal relationships of influence between them.

Structures include political, economic, social, geographical, and all the others like that dictate the human being behavior. Marxism is a theory of determinism who defined inclusion and exclusion as taking place according to the class; and the social position within the mode of production, was a subject as such to structuralist influence, by the emergence of Marxist Structuralists such As Louis Althusser and NicosPoulantzas who focused on the structure of power and the process to change.

Johan Galtung tried another detailed example on how structures might lead to exclusion and inclusion in his contribution to the development of a theory about how civilizations emerge and as a result the differences in their inclusion and exclusion practices (Galtung, 2014). In his contribution Galtung includes Geography as part of "naturism" to the analysis, stating that his book is about "structuralism in culturalism" but then he adds that "structuralism and culturalism

are neither exhaustive nor Exclusive" (Galtung, 32). In the end, he refers to the differences between civilizations to the geographical location, which is a "natural structure" as it can be said in other words. What follows is that he uses geography as having a "huge explanatory power" with the "basic differences are between the polar-temperate-tropical zones around the world, meaning latitudinal similarities and longitudinal differences" (Galtung, 36). This geographical division for Galtung creates some differences: "Polar zone: Nature harsh and unmodifiable, cooperation to survive. Temperate Zone: Nature modifiable, control of nature key to power. Tropical zone: Nature generous, ownership of nature key to power" (Galtung, 37). Concerning this thesis the Western civilization emerged in the temperate zone, that aims to control nature at home and globally. Therefore their advantage included "Scientific- technical brilliance, like the Chinese, and brutal singularism-universalism unlike the Chinese" (Galtung, 38).

A reminder here should be made to Walter Mignolo concept of Plura- Versalism mentioned in chapter one as an alternative e to the Western Universalism aiming to export and to impose the Western ideas of modernity, modernization, emancipation, western democracy, equality, justice and other similar concepts on the other civilizations. The first concept of universalism does not recognize the diversity of the world, but the second of plura-versalism does. The opening acts exclusively against the others, and the second is exclusivist. The other concept is singularism which gives uniqueness to the individual, when linked to the western individual it becomes about the latter to impose his/her will over the "non- singular" peoples in the world (see later). Finally, there is a need to allude to Galtung analysis about the United States being a part of the West. He describes the United States as a fundamentalist country, a "homo American in extremis" (Galtung, 71). In this regard, he adds that after the Killing of Kennedy in the Southwest of the United States (an area of extraction industry), all the Presidents that followed him came from the Southwest except Barack Obama.

He describes the South (West) to be "also a depository of reactionary, self-righteous, crusading, evangelist ideologies and movements" (Galtung, 71).

The geographic location might be one determining factor as explained by Galtung, but other factors concluded from history as he mentioned (Galtung, 36). Also, culture might be added. The latter should be perceived not as inherited, static, permanent, ahistorical and enduring difference between the peoples and the civilizations according to established religions and ideologies, as the culturalists claim, such as Samuel Huntington in his clash of civilization thesis, and the Islamic fundamentalists who claim the singularity of their culture versus the one of the West, and the racists and the ethnocentric who refers cultural differences to the different races and ethnicities (Salame, 1994). In the other hand, there is the use of culture as Postcolonialism indicated for the production and the practice of ideas that aims from hegemony and dominance, being about the imposition of one ideology, or one race, or one ethnic group, or one pact, or one sex over the others. Here culture is the one as it is practiced, but also expressed in the literature (as Edwards Said did in his two books of *Orientalism*, 1978, and *Culture and Imperialism*, 1993), or in the media, or in the ideologies, such as the Nazism, Fascism, Stalinism, Messianism, and Zionism, all coming from the West.

A new stream of research is connecting all these ideologies to modernity and the idea of human redemption that is promised as a "final resort" to humanity as such modernity was presented as a Promise of emancipation, freedom, democratic peace, renaissance and enlightenment, all to be a kind of rupture with the past of slavery, serfdom, and exploitation. Emerged as a response to the despotism of the Catholic Church, it carried also the Messianic nature of Protestantism that also appeared in the same period calling for the reform of Christianity and the transformation of it back to its origins that were about the redemption of the human beings rather than being about the sustaining of the authority of the church. In this regard modernity promised redemption in the kingdom of the world, the same as the millennialist idea of the Protestant

Evangelicals that promised of a thousand years of peace to prevail in the world after an apocalyptic processes that include wars and the killing of two third of the Jews after collecting them in the Promised land of Palestine called as the land of Israel, followed by Jesus Christ descending from the heaven, and converting the rest of the Jews to Christianity, then peace will prevail (Schmidt, 2016, 11- 21; Ervin and Brown, 2017). In terms of exclusion, Messianism is thus a full exclusivist perspective that aims to exterminate significant parts of the Jews and others, to be followed by converting the rest to Christianity, and abolish their religion entirely.

Messianism emerged in the sixteenth century. Messianism called for the return of Jews to the Land of Israel ever since. The literature about Zionism include a lot about this Christian Zionism, that played a crucial role in convincing the Jewish Zionism to follow its path in the later stage of the end of the nineteenth century(see for instance Al-Masiri, 1990A; Al Masiri, 1990B; Abbas, 2011; Kark, 1994; Pappe, 2008; and others).

More primary resources about it can also be found, one of these is the website of the International Christian Embassy- Jerusalem (www.int.icej.org)which was established in 1980 in the city. They claim that the history of Christian Zionism goes back to the first century, but "as a definite theology," it started in the 16th and the 17th century among the Protestants such as the Puritans in Britain led by Cromwell. In the year 1587 a man called Francis Katt was burned because he called for the return of the Jews to their land, and the 17th century books were published calling to the same idea, one by Thomas Brightman in 1607, and other by Isaac de La Peyrere (1594-1676) who was the French Ambassador to Denmark. In the 18th century, Christian Zionism became a Movement that includes politicians, theologians, and writers in its membership, such as Thomas Newton the Bishop of Bristol. In the 19th century it reached high-rank personalities such as Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, and Charles Henry Churchill the British Colonel resident in Damascus, who adopted the idea

of establishing a Jewish State, and accordingly wrote the following to the Jewish philanthropist Moses Montefiore in June, 14th, 1841: "I consider the object to be perfectly obtainable. But two things are indispensably necessary. Firstly, that the Jews will themselves take the matter unanimously, secondly, that the European powers will aid the Jews (Goodman, Bonnie, www.historymusings.worldpress.com 14/6/ 2018).

Others joined as well in the 19th century, such as Lawrence Oliphant (1829-1888), the industrialist Edward Gazalet (1827-1883), the American William E. Blackstone, and the William H. Hechler who was the Chaplain of the British Embassy in Vienna where he worked closely with the founder of Zionism Theodor Herzl. Hechler dedicated thirty years of his life calling for the establishment of a Jewish State, and attended the first Zionist conference in 1897 before he passed away (Malcolm Hedding, 2010, www.int.icej.org, also other articles for him in support to Israel can be found in the website of the "Christian Embassy-Jerusalem" www.int.icj.org),(see also below about the roles of these figures).

Some Christian Zionist societies might be added to the above list; these include the "Peaceful Crusades" as the German settlers were called in Palestine. Hermann Guthe who was a geographer participated in the establishment of "German Association for the Study of Palestine." These started to make the pilgrimage, or come to study Palestine first, but later started to settle in the country like the French explorer Victor Guerin who aimed to revive the old Crusaders' kingdom and to the redemption of the land. Also, there were the Templars a Protestant Group who came from Germany and resided in Haifa and other places starting from 1868. The Templars wanted to shorten the way to the dome day (Pappe, 2008, 615-616). The other sites where the Templars established settlements besides Haifa included Jaffa (1869), Sarona (1871) Jerusalem (1878), Wilhelma (1902), the Galilee Bethlehem (1906), and Waldheim (1907). By the First World War 750 of them only were left in Haifa. It

is noticeable here that these settlers were poor and they depended on their direct work on the land (Carmel, 1975, 442-446). Besides the Peace Crusades there was also other societies such as the Palestine Association that was established in Britain in the year 1805 aiming to study "The land of Israel" and its biblical and physical history in Palestine; the Royal Geographical Society of 1830; Palestine Exploration Fund of 1865, and also to mention the "London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews" (Kark, 1994; Robson, 2009). In the more official side, Christian Zionism found its way to the British politicians' interests after Mohammad Ali was defeated and the forces of his son Ibrahim Pasha were ousted from Palestine in 1839 after eight years of ruling. In the same year Earl Shaftesbury who was a British politician called upon the Jews to go back to Palestine being a "land without people" as he called it. In the year after he wrote a letter to the Prime Minister of Britain Lord Palmerston (1784-1865) calling him to allow for the return of the Jews to their "old country." In the same year Palmerstone wrote to the British Ambassador in Istanbul Lord Pronsoy, ordering him to convince the Ottoman Sultan to invite Jews to establish a state in Palestine as a step that might help to solve the financial problems of the Ottoman State, and to create a barricade in the face of Mohammad Ali of Egypt (Abbas, 2011, 28-29; Touma, 1981, 6). According to the Zionist leader Nahum Sokolow the future of Palestine became a priority on the British agenda after the defeat of Ibrahim Pasha the son of Mohammad Ali, and the idea that emerged was about the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine to protect the British way to India (Touma, 1981, 5-9). As such it seems that the British Government adopted the Zionist aim before Zionism for economic and strategic reasons (Touma, 14).

Another prominent British politician to mention here is Earl Shaftesbury who was a Christian Zionist who influenced Palmerston move of 1840 discussed above. In the same century, Benjamin Disraeli also took the Prime Minister position in 1868, and again from 1874 to 1880. Disraeli appointed asked the Scottish citizen Lord Laurence Oliphant who was also Christian Zionist, Parliament member and

a novelist to establish a company for land investment in Palestine after getting a permit from the Ottomans, and he ordered his Minister of Foreign Affairs Salisbury to follow with the Ottomans (Abbas, 2011,29). What happened later was that Oliphant came to Palestine, and tried a Jewish colonial settlement in the Galilee, and suggested ideas that Israel implemented then such as the drainage of Al Hula Lake, and to besiege the local population in reserves (Pappe, 2008, 617). Also, he suggested creating another settlement in the Blaqaa in Jordan (Pappe, 2008, 617).

The European Consuls in Palestine starting with the British in 1839 also played a role in the pre-Zionist attempts to create a Jewish presence in Palestine. The British Government told the British Consul Mr. W.T. Young before arriving in Palestine that he has to pay special attention to the Jews in Palestine. At that Time France adopted the Catholics, and Russia adopted the Orthodox Christians, but since there were no Protestants in Palestine, Britain decided to take the Jews to create a balance with those big powers. In 1841 Lord Palmerston also suggested the creation of Jewish Protectorate in Palestine, which gave another momentum to the work of the British Consul with the Jews (Eliav, 1975, 424).

Another Protestant country that created a Consulate in Palestine was Prussia, who also represented Holland which is a third Protestant country, upon the arrival of the Consul in 1840 the King of Prussia Wilhelm the second stated that the aim is for "Establishing a joint Europe Protectorate over the holy cities in Palestine, while promising national autonomy for the various Christian sects and protection to the Jews" (Eliav, 425).

Since this plan was rejected from Austria and Russia, the Prussian Consul decided to work jointly with the "London Missionary for Promoting Christianity among the Jews" mentioned earlier to convert Jews to Christianity. The two countries established a joint mission in 1841 which they called the "Protestant

Bishop in Palestine." In 1842 Michael Alexander Solomon was appointed as the First Bishop of the joint mission. Solomon a converted Jew to Christianity, he gave his church the name of "Hebrew Christ Church," and decided that his mission will be to bring Jews to Palestine and convert them to Christianity there (Eliav, 42). The idea was at the end the "creation of the Jewish Protectorate in Palestine" as also the German military attaché to the Ottoman Empire Mr. Helmut Von Moltke in the period of 1835-1839 suggested to the Ottomans, stating that such a Protectorate will create a buffer zone between The Ottoman Empire and Egypt (Eliav, 425). The German Protectorate plan was prepared, but the official German Settlement in Palestine did not start as it seemed till the end of the eighteen sixties when the Ottoman Empire issued a law that allows the foreigners to buy lands in Palestine. In 1869 the Ottomans also gave the Germans the right to settle in all the regions of Palestine (Eliav, 431).

Besides the European Consulates, also the United States established a Consulate in Palestine in 1844 (<https://jru.usconsulate.gov>), but archival research conducted by Ruth Kark (Kark, 1994), showed that the American interest to establish a Jewish presence in Palestine goes back to the 17th century. In the beginning, there was dominance in the United States of the traditional Protestant concept that connects the Anglo- Saxons and Western Christianity with the "Land of *Torah*." In this regards the Jewish Psalms book was the first to be published in Massachusetts (where the Puritans established the settler- colonial colony) in 1640 and it was called by several names such the New England Psalms, or the New England version of Psalms, referring to the consideration of the United States to be the Utopian New England. Therefore the New Canaan, the old historical name of Palestine, and its 'heavenly Jerusalem' versus the 'earthly Jerusalem' that is sacred to the Jews. In this sense, they wanted to distinguish themselves from the Jews. The Mormons also made the same distinction between the "Earth Jerusalem in Israel and a New Jerusalem in America as Kark indicated, also stating that there are around 1000 towns and villages in the United States that carry names from the Torah, for instance,

"Salem" the old name of Jerusalem was given to 66 locations and Zion to 25 (Kark, 1994, 19-20). However, on the other hand, the Mellinist ideas to bring the Jews back to Palestine found soil in the United States in the 19th century among the Mormons, but also among the Adventists, the former sent an envoy to Jerusalem in 1841 to organize a festival aiming to grant Jerusalem to the Jews (Kark, 22-23). Further, the second President of the United States John Adams said in 1818 the following: "I wish the Jews again in Judea an independent nation" (Kark, 3).

Following was the spread of the dispensationalist ideas by the Methodists and others to find a way to bring Jews back to Palestine. Also followed that different American Christian organizations opened branches in Palestine, among these was the "American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions" located in Massachusetts, and the Adventists, Mormons, Baptists, and the Quakers (Kark, 24-25). Till the eighteen-forties, the aim was about preaching and converting, but after the American mellinists started to come to settle in the country to implement their ideas in it. These settlers created agricultural settlements for a short period such as the Mount of Hope (1853-1869), Adams (1866-1867), and Urtas (1850-1852). Although these settlements failed they created the beginning that was followed by the German Templars attempt to build settlements (see above), and then the settlements of some Zionist movements followed (see below). Besides that, the American Jewish philanthropist Judah Touro joined the British Jewish philanthropist Moses Montefiore in establishing the first Jewish neighborhood outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem. This neighborhood still exists till today (Kark, 32-37).

Among the American Consuls, it might also be helpful to mention the first one who was called as Warder Cresson, who was first a Quaker, and then he was converted to the Mormons. He arrived at Jerusalem in 1844. Before he came, he published a book titled "Jerusalem, the Center of the joy of the whole world" in which he said that the Jews would be brought to repentance. In Palestine, he

tried to establish agricultural settlements in Jaffa (Aderet, Haaretz, 2013; Kark, 1994, 33).

The previous review tells two things; first that Messianism and its millennialistic ideas were both deeply embedded in the Christian Protestant strand, and that these ideas were also embedded in the Western concept of modernity that looked as secular. But its content included those ideas about the salvation of the man and getting him/her the ultimate happiness in a new land either in the United States where the names New England, New France, and New Amsterdam were used (see chapter one) or in the "promised land" in Palestine. All these are inherited from religious roots as early explicated. The second thing yet is that those Messianic-millennialists made no attention what so ever to the indigenous people who were living in Palestine. Their concept towards these people was fully exclusive, and all their interest was about how to find and to "re-settle" the different locations of the "Land of Israel" as it is described in the Old Testament adopted by the Protestants as inclusive to the Torah and the Bible together.

These Messianic ideas and movements were precursors to Zionism. Not to be taken wrongly, Messianism did not emerge and grew in Europe due to an intellectual development that is separate from European history. On the contrary, it can be said in general terms that Messianism developed as a response to the authoritarianism of the Church and to some difficulties created by the capitalist development starting roughly from the 16th century. For instance, the Basel Mission that emerged in Germany in 1720 rejecting industrialization and calling for the return to agriculture. As a result, they were expelled by the church and found no other way than to emigrate to Africa and to create agricultural settlements there (Pappe, 2008, 620-622). Another example is the Puritans who emerged in Britain in the 17th century as a reformist Protestant group that aimed to purify the Catholic Church from the Catholic ideas and practices. As a result, they decided to leave England and to find their "pure" New England in the United States and specifically in Massachusetts

where they created their most significant colonial settlement as mentioned in chapter two.

The Basel Mission and also the Puritans were persecuted in Europe, but at the same time, they were moved by their own beliefs to settle outside Europe, the first for their rejection of industrialization and the second by their eagerness to create a society that is entirely "pure" from Catholicism.

3.1.1 The Zionist Messianism

Moving to Zionism, this section starts with a brief historical overview of its inclusion and exclusion politics. In this regard, it is not a secret that the first emergence of Zionism was in Russia and the Eastern countries of Europe were the capitalist development and its accompanying ideas of emancipation, equality and integration were weak opposite to West Europe. As a result pogroms were conducted against Jews in the Russian Empire starting from 1882-1884, and followed by another wave of pogroms from 1903-1906, and others till the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution resulting of thousands of killings and the flee of 2 Million Jews mostly to the United States, while only 60 to 70 thousands of these found their way to Palestine during the first and the second emigration waves to Palestine, the first from 1882 to 1903 and the second from 1904-1914 (Eisenstadt, 1967, 11, 13- 14). To note here that the second wave of immigration also included Jews who were brought from Yemen (Eisenstadt, 1967, 20). Most of the first wave of emigration took place before the first Zionist Conference of 1897, and also before Theodor Herzl published his 1895 book *Judenstaadt* (The State of the Jews and not the Jewish State as it is translated to the English version of the book, as Massad Indicated (Massad, 2006, 15).

It is also noticeable that Herzl was a proponent of solving the Jewish Question in Europe through integration and by getting the Jews converted to Catholicism. According to the writer of Herzl biography Alex Bein, who also wrote a biography of Herzl, and his introduction of the *Judenstaat* (Bein, 1988). Herzl continued to call for the integration of the Jews in Europe till 1894. Bein wrote that Herzl till that year was not seeing any consensus among Jews regarding their rights in the 'historical lands of the Jews', not he was convinced that Jews worldwide

belongs to each other, but resides on the contrary to the different nations where they live. If there was something familiar that brings the Jews together, this was the pressure on them, and if this pressure is lifted then the Jews as Herzl maintained will start acting and responding with their emancipated minds rather than under compulsion.

It is said that the emergence of what was called the Dreyfus Affair. Dreyfus was accused in France in the same year of 1894 of collecting secret information as an officer in the French Army and leaks them to the German. Dreyfus trial was accompanied by an anti-Semitic campaign against Jews, accompanied by another campaign against Jews in Vienna conducted by the anti-Semitic party who won in the elections on that city by then. These two developments led to a quick change in those ideas of Herzl about integration to become instead a proponent of transferring Jews to outside Europe, to create a separate nation-state to them. Abbas sheds some doubt about this agile transformation of Herzl ideas that took place in one year by moving from one extreme to the other, although many Jews leaders and intellectuals continued to advocate for integration to be the best way to confront anti-semitism (Abbas, 2011, 33).

The Zionist movement startups were then in Russia. In these regard early leaders such as the French Jewish philosopher Moses Hess (1812-1875), and the Russians: Asher Ginsberg (AhadHaam) (1856-1927), Leo Pinsker (1821-1891), Ber Borochov (1881-1917), Menachem Ussishkin one of the leaders of *HoveviTzion* (1863-1941), David.D. Gordon (1856-1922), Berl Katznelson (1887-1924), Nachman Syrkin (1868-1924), and David Ben Gurion (1886-1973) are very important. The prevailing concern of these was about the promotion of the Jewish presence in Palestine and to normalize the Jewish life, AhadHaam wanted to do that by reviving the Jewish culture, history, and language (the so-called cultural Zionism) and by living besides the Palestinian Arabs, while the others above did not pay attention to the Palestinians. Leo Pinsker was the founder of HoveveiTzion movement in 1881 which established the early Zionist

settler-colonial colonies in Palestine (see names below), while the others above (except Moses Hess) are the founders of the Zionist labor movement who promoted the establishment of the Kibbutzim and the Moshavim mainly during the second wave of emigration to Palestine (1904-1914). The addition of Moses Hess to this list is due to the fact that he was the first to write calling in his book of "Rome and Jerusalem: The last National Question" in 1862 to the establishment of a "Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine as a solution to the Jewish question, and that was thirty-four years before Herzl wrote his *Judenstaat*.

During and before the first wave of emigration to Palestine, three additional actors to those motioned above (mainly the British, the German, and the American actors and their consuls in Palestine) played roles in promoting the Jewish settler-colonial project in Palestine. These were the French Government; The Jewish Philanthropists, and the Zionist Movement, composed in this period from Hovevi Zion, the Biluim which refer to the Bilu Movement. An abbreviation of the Hebrew words: Let us travel to the House of Yacov (Nusairat, 2014, 22), and the Zionist labor movement who joined at the end of this wave). The focus during this period was on the Jewish colonial settlement in cities such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Safad, Jaffa, and Tiberias. In Jerusalem, for instance, the British Jewish Philanthropist Moshe Montefiore created a school in the city in 1830 as a sign of support to the Jewish community in the town (Eisenstadt, 1967, 8). Later in the century, he created *Mishkenot Shaananim* in 1860, in cooperation with a Jewish American philanthropist as mentioned earlier. In 1892 the Montefiore Welfare Fund also established Yemin Moshe settlement besides *Mishkenot*.

Besides the settlement in the cities, also other ones were created in the countryside as agricultural settlements, these include Petah Tikvah (1878), and the other followed in the 1880s and 1890s, including Rishon Litzion, Rosh Pina, ZichronYacov, Hedera, Rehovot, Ekron, YesodHamaala (Eisenstadt, 1967, 8,

11, 13). Many of these were built with the support of the French Jewish Philanthropist Baron Edmund De Rothschild, but besides them, the Biluists (a national socialist Zionist Movement) established Gedera as a settlement that followed a Zionist national line than a philanthropist one run without a clear national objective (Eisenstadt, 1967, 13). At that period the settler- colonial projects of Rothschild used the cheap Palestinian labor, and they were run directly by bureaucrats appointed by Rothschild himself. By 1900 Rothschild established the Jewish Colonization Association as a philanthropist umbrella for his projects, but the second wave of Jewish emigration to Palestine took a separate path from his philanthropy as it will be shown below.

The French also played a role towards the early Jewish Colonial settlement in Palestine, in one had Rothschild as a French Philanthropist played a role as shown, but more significant was the position of the French Government. In this regard many refer to a statement that was made by Napoleon during his invasion to Egypt and Palestine supporting the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine (Abbas 2011, 27), but an investigation that was made by Mohsen Saleh showed that there is no evidence what so ever that such a statement exists (Saleh,2017). In the other hand Napoleon the third private secretary Ernest Laharanne wrote a book in 1860 showing the economic benefits that Europe can get if Jews will be allowed to settle Palestine (Massad, 2006, 15) — following that the French Minister of Justice Adolph Cremieux founded in 1860 the "Alliance Israelite Universelle" to assist in protecting the Jews human rights worldwide. The Alliance established an Agricultural school in Jaffa in 1870 (Eisenstadt, 1967, 8). The school was called as Mikveh Yisrael (Penslar, 1991). Besides all of that France gave another document to Zionism on the 4th of June 1917 which was like another Promise to settle Jews in Palestine. At that time Nahum Sokolow the Secretary-General of the World Zionist Congress met with the French. After the meeting, he got an official letter from the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs of France Mr. JuresCambon. At that letter, originally published by Balfour project together with an English translation, Mr. Cambon

commended Sokolow way of presenting the Zionist case. Then he added: "It would be a deed of justice and reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the Jewish nationality in that land from which the people of Israel were exiled so many centuries ago. The French Government, which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked, and which continues to assure the victory of right over might, can but feel sympathy for your cause, the triumph of which is bound with that of the Allies. I am happy to give you herewith the assurances" (Balfour project, www.balfourproject.org).

Few months after this French Declaration, the Balfour Declaration promising Jews of a national home in Palestine was declared on the 2nd of November 1917. Balfour gave that promise at that time even though Palestine was still considered by then as a "neutral area" according to Sykes-Picot British- French Agreement of 1916. At the end of 1917 Britain occupied Palestine and put it under its Mandate. That Mandate was recognized by the UN Text of the Terms of British Mandate In 1922. Upon these developments, the British French competition over Palestine found its way out after France recognized Palestine as an area allocated to Britain, and that took place in 1920.

The third actor was the Zionist movement with its branches mentioned above, which started establishing its colonial settlements in Palestine in the last quarter of the 19th century, in cooperation with the Jewish Philanthropists first, then without them beginning from the second wave of emigration to Palestine (1904-1914). This second wave created the concept of "Hebrew Work" that aimed to provide independent economic lives to the poor workers that it brought from Russia and Eastern Europe to Palestine. It created joint economic projects for the Jews only, run according to the socialist principles, and it established the first Zionist city in Palestine which is Tel Aviv in 1909. Also, Dajania was established in the same year as the biggest *Kibbutz* in addition to other Kibbutzim found. The movement who led the establishment of these projects

was called as the Zionist Labor Movement. The leaders mentioned above developed its ideology, and the organizations of *Paoli Tzion*, *HapoelHatzair*, *AhdotHaavoda*(see chapter 2), conducted as a non-state actor the work of recruiting the Jews and arranging their travel to Palestine to become settler colonialists. These ideologists and their organizations were all motivated by the idea that the fulfillment of the national aspirations comes first then the class struggle (Borochov for instance). Also, some of them split from the Russian Bund Party.

While the Bund Party aimed to create an individual autonomy for the Jews in Europe, and a distinct part to the Jews in Russia which Lenin criticized in several articles that he wrote between 1903 to 1919 (Lenin, 1980). These Zionist movements went further to create "Socialism for the Jews only in Palestine" by first creating the State and then the class struggle will emerge later between the newly emerging bourgeoisie and proletariat to be formed in the Land of Israel. What are the status and role of the indigenous population in this process? The answer was that only this status and this role should be eliminated for the Jewish Zionist labor movement. It should be noted here that the Zionist academics resources differentiate as Eisenstadt, for instance, do between the Jewish Philanthropists who are according to his analysis were not carrying, nor promoting any national agenda, and the Zionist Labor Movement (and *HoveviTzion* and the *Bilu*Movement as well) who were taking such a national programme as he called it. In response settler- colonial perspective will say that there were two stages for settler colonialism. In the first wave, the Jewish Philanthropists used the plantation model of Fredrickson that include hiring local workers to work for their masters the Jewish settler colonialists, while in the second wave there was a move to the pure colonies model in which no domestic workers will be hired as Gershon Shafir explained (Shafir, 2002). Accordingly, in both cases settler colonials were brought from outside and settled in a country outside their original homelands, representing as such a perfect fit with the settler colonial perspective.

Contrary to the most of the period of the first wave of the Zionist emigration and its settler- colonial projects that were conducted by the colonial powers and the Jewish Philanthropists and the labor movement in a later stage, the Zionist labor Movement played its role in Palestine during the second wave of emigration. However in an interaction with the official Zionist movement that emerged from the First Zionist Conference held in Basel in Switzerland in the year 1897. Both were in full agreement regarding the objective, a Jewish State in Palestine as the ultimate goal, with a lot of competition in the practical level and the seeking for a higher percentage of representation in the Zionist Movement institutions, as the archival studies have shown. The 1897 first Zionist Congress approved the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine, and not a Jewish state to avoid provocation to the seculars and the Russians. The Congress decided as well to support Jewish emigration to Palestine, to establish a Zionist Bank for fundraising, and to make agreements with the governments to secure their support (Al Sharif, 2010).

The Official Zionist movement, created official institutions, The World Zionist Congress (www.wzo.org.il), the Jewish National Fund *The Keren Kayemeth LeIsrael* (www.kkl-jnf.org), and the *Keren Hayesod* (United Israel Appeal, www.kh.uia.org.il). Later on, the Jewish Agency (www.jewishagency.org) was added. The first was established in 1897 as a general assembly and a legislative body to the Zionist Movement. The second was established in 1901 to “developing the land of Israel, and strengthening the bond between the Jewish people and its homeland” as included in its mentioned website. The third was established in 1920, and works in “partnership with the Jewish community” to “further the national priorities of the state of Israel and Israeli society, with special emphasis on advancing weaker communities, nurturing the disadvantaged and marginalized youth, encouraging Aliyah, implementing rescue operations, and connecting youth Diaspora Jews to Israel and Jewish Life” as included in their website mentioned above.

The Jewish Agency as the fourth Zionist Organ was established in 1929 after a crisis in the Jewish emigration to Palestine due to the economic crisis there that led a significant number of Jews to leave Palestine. The Jewish Agency mission was to "Connect the global Jewish family, bringing Jews to Israel, and bringing Israel to the Jews" as also mentioned in its mentioned website. The Agency conducts this mission by facilitating Aliyah to Israel, organizing tours to Israel, promoting the Hebrew language, among other activities alike. The second was established in the early stage to secure land for Jewish Colonial settlement in Palestine, the third was found few years after Balfour Declaration to work on fundraising for the Jewish emigration and the Jewish colonial settlement in Palestine, and finally the fourth took the responsibility of facilitating the migration to Israel. Common between all these bodies is the concept that does not differentiate between Israel and the Jewish people worldwide. Therefore, any Jew in the world is considered to be a potential Israeli, and to be recruited to Israel accordingly.

The first Zionist Conference of 1897 was preceded by the publication of Theodor Herzl book, the *Judenstaat* (The Jewish State). A review of an original copy of the book teaches that it is formulated around a non-utopian approach that believes in planning for how to make the idea materializes. At the end of the book Herzl wrote: "If you will it, it is no dream. It is in our hands" (Herzl, the original version republished electronically by www.gutenberg.org). At the beginning of the book he defends his idea of establishing a State for the Jews as not being a utopian idea, instead it is like "a steam-power generated by boiling water" (Herzl, 1896, 70), then he adds that "The Jews who wish for a state will have it, and they will deserve to have it" (Herzl, 72). He justifies the need for such a state by the Jewish misery, and the anti-Semitism (Herzl, 70). Then he presents his plan on how to make it happen. First, he wanted to have the society of the Jews who will prepare the studies and the Jewish company that will be responsible for the implementation (Herzl, 93). Second, the support of the big powers will be sought to give the Jews sovereignty over a piece of

land, and here he added that the anti-Semitic states would be willing to help Jews in this regard (Herzl, 93). Third, after getting the big power approval the Jewish emigration to the new country will take place in stages, at the beginning the desperate, then the poor who both will make their living better in the new country, then the prosperous will follow them later (Herzl, 82). Here he presented a new idea for the acquisition of the land, and that is by buying the land in an auction, and making the payment of the cost to be through labor work rather than to be by paying money (Herzl, 142). Accordingly, he disagrees with Rousseau concept of the social contract as a starting point for the formation of a state, and instead, he sees that the "state is created by a national struggle for existence" (Herzl, 136). In the same book, Herzl mentioned Argentina and Palestine but preferred the latter, saying that in Palestine "We should there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism" (Herzl, 95-96).

In this regard, he offered to pay the debts of the country that is the "present master of the land" in Palestine and to build new roads and other projects to it, if it will approve the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (Herzl, 95). Herzl did not mention any word about the indigenous population in Palestine in his book. He visited Palestine in 1898 to meet the German César Wilhelm the second followed by writing a novel that dealt with the indigenous people issue (see later). At this stage he was interested only in getting the Ottoman approval for the establishment of a 'piece of Europe' that will be under European protection as well within the Ottoman Empire.

Herzl approach of getting the approval of big country before settling in Palestine was called as the Political Zionism, but opposite to it, there was the Practical Zionism that sought to create Zionist facts in the ground in Palestine. The Practical Zionism included two groups, the one that found a socialist path by establishing cooperatives that use Hebrew work. This group was composed of Labor Zionism, and *HoveviTzion*, who started their settlement colonial projects

in Palestine earlier and the other was composed of some activists in the Zionist Movement who wanted to follow more a capitalist kind of projects, these were such as Arthur Ruppin and Otto Warburg.

Ruppin established in 1907 the first office of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine and became its head; he also was one of the founders of Tel Aviv in 1909. Ruppin as an archival Ph.D. study shown was a believer of social Darwinism and racialist theories. He believed that the Jewish race will be improved and that the Jewish soul will be restored if it will be mixed with the German and the Slavic races (Penslar, 1987, 134). Ruppin followed the Prussian Colonization Commission model, which was about buying lands in Poland and selling them to German families at low cost to invest on them without the use of any Polish labor force. The aim was to increase the German population in those areas (Penslar, 151-153).

In 1907 Arthur Ruppin presented a plan to increase the Jewish trade and to build roads, railways, hotels, and resorts. He also suggested leasing lands for the poor Jews for ten years in low cost followed by giving them the right to buy land and pay its price in 20 to 30 years from the mortgage (Penslar, 149). Ruppin fellow German botanist Otto Warburg tried a search for Phosphate in Palestine in 1904. Warburg was also a member of the German team as it can be called in WZO with Selig Soskin and Franz Oppenheimer. They developed in 1903 a model for Zionist settlement expansion that followed the German colonies model in Africa; the model included agricultural projects, and national projects such as roads and railways (Penslar, 97-101). Besides being practical Zionists but this group of German botanists and agronomists thought of themselves as implementers of Herzl approach for settling Palestine, but they differ in the sense that they did not postpone the start the settler- colonial projects till they get an approval of high power. Ruppin thought of himself also alike, but he started his activities in Palestine in 1907 three years after Herzl passed away.

The controversy between the mentioned two Zionist trends was then less tense that it was described, and that is because even the Political Zionism established the Jewish National Fund *Keren Kayemeth* since 1901 when Herzl was still alive. That Fund bought the first piece of land in Palestine in 1905 (one year after Herzl death) close to Tiberius (Penslar, 1987, 114). In the 1907 the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann created what was called as the 'Synthetic Zionism' that combines both the political and the practical Zionism. Supported by the Zionist labor movement in Palestine, he created in 1909 he along with Menahem Ussiskhen and Nahum Sokolow an opposition to David Wolfsohn who was elected as the head of WZO after Herzl passed away. The opposition called for the acceleration of the Jewish settlement in the ground (www.Jewishvirtuallibrary.org).

After the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the high power approval was secured, and therefore the discussion between the Political and Practical Zionism got to an end. At that period, and due to the first world war, there was an eight-year between the 11th Zionist Congress (Vienna, 1913), and the 12th one held In Carlsbad (Czechoslovakia) in 1921. During this last conference Weizman was elected as the President of the WZO which also united the political and the practical trends together, also during Weizmann period efforts were accelerated to solve the tension between the more formal approach of WZO and the Practical Zionist Labor movement till both got united inside the WZO in 1927 (Penslar, 1987, 208).

However, Zionism by then included three main streams, the secular Socialist stream of the labor movement that called for the establishment of a "national homeland for the Jewish, and the alternative secular Nationalist-Liberal one who wanted also to include Jordan as part of the Jewish Homeland project (Jabotinsky, 1923), and finally the Religious Zionism that aimed for the establishment of a Jewish State. These three streams with the different colors of each one of them are still more or the less the same in Israeli politics today.

The first one included both the "pioneers and the apparatchiks" as called by Penslar (Penslar, 1991), who created the early Zionist settlements in Palestine in the pre- Basel conference period. They were able to get Balfour Declaration from the British in 1917 promising for the establishment of a national home for Jews in Palestine by Chaim Weizman, they created the *Hebrew University* in 1918, and the *Histadrut*: the workers union, led first by David Ben Gurion, and the *Haganah*; the Zionist Military Organization, in 1920. They later took the leadership of the *Zionist* movement, David Ben Gurion becoming like the leader of the WZO in 1946, and they ruled Israel unilaterally from 1948 till 1977.

The second Zionism stream(the secular-Nationalist-Liberal) established the *Keren Hayesod* in 1920(Jabotinsky), then they found the Zionist Revisionist Movement in 1923 which played the role of the opposition including the split from the WZO in 1935 when Jabotinsky established "The New Zionist Organization" parallel to the WZO. In 1939 Jabotinsky started attacks against the British forces in Palestine conducted by his organization *Irgun Tzvai Leumi*: The National Military Organization, as a response to the British release of the White Paper which promised a Palestinian state in ten years. Later Abraham Stern split from the Irgun in 1940 after the Irgun agreed with the Haganah to support Britain against the Nazis during World War II. Stern rejected this position and decided to continue the attacks against the British forces in Palestine through his new organization called *Lehi: LohamaiHerut Israel*: The Fighters for the Freedom of Israel. After 1948 this stream also continued in the opposition till it won in the Israeli elections on the name of the *Likud Party* (Muhareb, 1981).

The third Zionist stream was composed of the Religious Zionist Party Hamizrahi that emerged in 1902. While this Party continued to believe that the Jewish Salvation is a divine and Messianic task (and that is similar to the traditional Jewish non-Zionist belief also shared by *AgudatYisrael* Party that was established in 1912 but joined the Israeli elections and Governmental coalitions

after 1948. But unlike *Naturi Karta* religious Movement that does not recognize Israel and considers Zionism to be an attack on God will that dictate Jews to wait for the Messiah to come to get their salvation (About *Naturi Karta*: See Abbas 2011). But different than those movements, *Hamizrahi* supported Zionism on the ground that it will create a Secure Shelter to Jews (Persico, 2016, 41). In another line of thinking Rabbi Abraham Kook (1865-1935), suggested that the "passivity of the conservative religious Jews the *Haredim*, motivated the process that God put the burden of the Jewish Salvation on the shoulders of the Jewish secular impertinent". The latter at the end will follow Judaism as he suggested and will at the end create a Jewish state run by a Messiah- King (Persico, 39). *Hamizrahi* took the shape of the *Mafdal* Party: The Jewish National Party, after the establishment of Israel, while Rabbi Kook ideas had to wait till 1967 to take shape through *Gush Emunim* settler movement that its members acted through the *Mafdal* at the beginning, and then they split to establish *Gush Emunim* Movement in 1974.

3.1.2 The Zionist Messianism and the Other

In light of the previous section, the Zionist Messianism can be perceived as the counter-thesis of the traditional Jewish religious position that the Jews should wait until God sends the Messiah. Zionism turned that down and transformed the God mission to the human beings, the same as the Protestantism negated the position of the Catholic Church and advocated for processes that will accelerate the operation of the return of the Jesus Christ. Two differences between these two Messianisms can be caught. First in the case of the Protestant Messianism the processes to accelerate the back of the Jesus Christ took place in the land of Europe and also outside it by promoting settler- colonial projects in different areas of the world, while Zionism aimed to achieve its Messianic objective only outside Europe, and in the expense of the Palestinian people. Secondly, versus to the Protestant Messianic settler colonial adventures worldwide, Zionism claimed itself as a national movement to all the Jewish people aiming to collect them in the Promised Land. In the case of the

Protestant settler colonial projects, new nations were created from those settlers who came from Europe to countries like USA, Canada, and Australia. Besides these contrasts/ similarities, the above review has shown how those Protestant Messianic ideas prepared the ground for Zionism, and how they are still cooperating and supporting it till today. According to that Zionism can be defined at the end as "The movement that emerged in the western world, and called for transferring all or part of the Jewish minorities from their countries, and to settle them outside Europe. But it can also be defined as: A cultural, political, economic, and social movement in the Western civilization and not among Jews only, in a way that there will be no separation between the Zionism of the Jews and the Zionism of non-Jews as it is usual, but both will be looked as interlinked stages in one historical and civilizational context" (Al Masiri, 1990b, 234).

Now to Zionism, and its position towards the other in the land of Palestine, as expressed mainly by the original writings of its leaders, with a focus first on the views of the mainstream Zionist trend at that time. The positions of that trend were developed first by the fathers of Zionism, and later they became the position of the political, practical, synthetic, and Labor Zionism. Secondly, the views of the revisionist Zionism of Jabotinsky which was the opposition in the pre-1948 period will also be reviewed. In the end, a comparison between the two will be made regarding their positions towards the other.

Starting with Herzl, he presented his position towards the other on different occasions. In his novel *Altneuland: The Old-New land* published first in 1902, and later translated to Hebrew by Nahum Sokolow carrying the name *Tel Aviv*, he presented Rashid Bey as one of its characters. Rashid Bey was displayed as a young Arab engineer who has a doctorate in Chemistry, participated in the Jewish projects and became rich, and represented the Arabs in the state leadership. Rashid was thankful in the novel to the Jews for the development that they brought to the land and the opportunities that they created to the Arabs in the country. The novel starts by a trip from Vienna to the Pacific by a lawyer

called Fredrick Lowenberg together with Prussian Aristocrat called King Court. During the journey, the ship stopped in Palestine to find it a 'destitute, sparsely populated and barren' country. The lawyer and his colleague traveled after that to the Pacific and came back to Palestine 20 years after in the year 1923. They found instead that the country was crucially changed to become a Jewish State called as The New Society that is well populated, prosperous, and has developed industry and technology, besides having a free and fair structure that guarantees equality to all its citizens. They were also eyewitnesses on elections that took place in which an extremist Rabbi run called Geyer ran with a program that says that the country belongs only to the Jews, and called for preventing the non-Jews from voting. Luckily this Rabbi was defeated in the elections (Herzl, 1902).

In this novel, Herzl was presenting a model of a state that is in one hand Jewish, but at the same time giving equal voting and participation rights to its non-Jewish population. The state is Jewish. Therefore its identity is Jewish, and the Arabs who left it as "destitute, sparsely populated and barren" before Zionism arrived, should not be given a national collective right by giving their name to the country. This model looked to be a model of equality to Avineri (Avineri, 2009) and many other Israeli liberal democrats who believed on the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. Beyond this belief, the question emerges if the State was to include all the Arab Palestinians or only the leftovers of them? In this regard Herzl wrote in his (Diaries in 12/6/ 1895) the following: "When we occupy the land, we will bring immediate benefits to the state that receives us. We have to take over nicely, the private property in the land that is planned to us. We will seek to evacuate the impoverished population through the borders by finding them jobs in the new countries that they will be evacuated to. We will prevent them from doing any work in our country. The landowners will follow us, and we should take over the properties, and evacuate the poor mysteriously and carefully" (Al Sharif, 2010).

In this quotation, Herzl is presenting his plan of making agreements with the landowners, buy the lands from them, and then expel the poor serfs through the borders, while the rich "Like Rashid Bey" will continue living in the Jewish State representing a minority that will join political and economical business with the Jews. In 1948 this model was implemented with some modification by the evacuation of 750 thousand to 900 thousand Palestinians from all the classes, and only 150 thousand stayed home representing a minority in the new state. In the beginning, the Arabs were not allowed to join the Israeli parties, but from the 1950s some few personalities were allowed to do so, and to run on these parties' lists to the Knesset elections as "selected" representatives to the Palestinians as Rashid Bey did in the novel. All in all, Herzl model in his novel designed individual rights to the leftovers from the non- Jews in the Jewish State, to be practiced in a way that gives privileges and public affairs positions to a selected people of them who recognize the 'great blessing' that Zionism brought to Palestine (Molavi, 2013, 133).

Bowman went further in sharpening the above conclusion suggesting that Herzl created a kind of treatment to the Palestinians that goes beyond the political to the ontological dealing with the Arabs ontologically as non- Jews, who are invisible and represent internal enemies that should be subject to containment, control, expulsion, and extermination. In this regard, the Arab Palestinian represent (using Giorgio Agamben metaphors) a "Zoe bare life" like animals, with an abstraction of their human nature and therefore denied human rights like the other humans, and that is opposite to the "Bio life" when the human being is recognized. As such the issue of exclusion is the thing to deal with first before talking about their rights (Bawman, 2010). In the opposite of that Herzl thought good about the Jews as "intelligent brothers to the Palestinian people" as he wrote the Palestinian intellectual and Ottoman Mabothan Council Yusef Dia Al Khalidi in 1899 (Khalidi, Rashid, 1997,91-93; Nusairat, 2014, 193; Al-Sharif, 2010).

The exclusion of most of the Palestinians from their land by expulsion, and the exclusion of leftovers of them from their national rights and to give the country their name was not the position of Herzl only. In 1918 Max Nordau wrote an Article titled *The Arabs and We* (Muhareb, 1991/1992), at the beginning of the article he recognized that *Eretz Israel* is not barren, but inhabited by around 600,000 Arabs according to the Turkish census. After that, he made suggestions on how to overcome this obstacle on the way of establishing the national home for the Jews, such as accelerating the process of Jewish emigration, buying lands, cultivating the abandoned land, and transforming what is desert today to a blessed and prosperous Paradise. Besides that, the article is full of descriptions to the Arabs as Simple people and cultureless, have a primitive way of cultivation, and that their objection to Zionism is not original (Zionism can develop them and reach an agreement with them as he claimed), but a result of "provocations by anti-Semitic persons" (Nordau, in Muhareb1991-1992, 88-93). In the same Journal, there is another article by Nordau written in 1920, showing concerns about the attack on a Jewish settlement of Mettula, created in the Palestinians village of Metallah, and the anti-Zionist demonstrations in Jerusalem, Haifa, and Jaffa. He refers these protests to two groups, one is "a small group of Syrian Christians, who succeeded in recruiting with them Arab nationalist individuals who adopted a European civilization, and Muslim individuals, fanatic nationalists who do all that they can to stimulate enmity feelings against Zionism and the Jewish emigration to the land of Israel" (NordauinMuhareb, 1991-1992) . This group uses Journalism in their attacks, and call for the Arab Unity according to Nordau.

The second group for Nordau is the peasants in Palestine who represent the "Crucial majority of the population in *Eretz Israel*, and who are showing with loud voice their opposition to Zionism and Balfour Declaration."For him, the opposition of this second group to Zionism is "artificial, and that peasants have no any opinion on the political issues, but they like to sit comfortably, and not to be obstructed from working in their fields." He thinks then that this group is

incited. But he follows to admit that Jews in Palestine do not represent more than one opposite to nine or ten Arabs, therefore he sees no way that reaching an equal number quickly with the Arabs, and to convince Britain to allow the entrance of 500,000 Jews to the "land of Israel" right away (Nordau in Muhareb, 94-99).

Displacement and replacement are the names of the play then, but in 1920 it does not work yet by Jews becoming any more than ten percent of the population as Nordau wrote. In 1932 the number of Jews in Palestine became 180 thousand as the head of the political section in the Jewish Agency Haim Arlozorof wrote in a letter to Chaim Weizman. In that letter, Arlozorof complained that the gradual Zionist method towards Judaizing Palestine does not look to work, and that "In the current world conditions it is not possible to achieve the Zionist vision. The Zionist plan is amenable to go in the path of collapse that cannot be prevented". He also mentioned that due to the high percentage of the Arab population growth, Zionism was in need for 500,000 to create a population balance, but now (in 1932) it will need 800,000, and in 15 years ahead it will need one and quarter million to achieve the balance. Then what to do with this impasse? Arlozorof skipped three options, the gradual, the postponement of the fulfillment of the Zionist vision to better international conditions, and the making of the decision to decrease the geographical space of the land of Israel (he considered it as inclusive to the two banks of the Jordan river). Then he suggested a fourth option of creating "An organized revolutionary ruling by the Jewish minority... that will take over the state apparatuses, the administration, and the military power to prevent the risk of the taking over of the authority by the non-Jewish side, and the risk of revolt against us". This revolutionary government will create as he maintained a systematic policy for development, emigration, and settlement (Arlozorof, 1932, in Muhareb, 1991, 65- 78). After a year of this letter, Arlozorof was assassinated in Tel Aviv; the assailant is still not known till today.

For Arlozorof, the Palestinians were just numbers that should be exceeded for the sake of the fulfillment of the Zionist dreams. Interesting enough that he admitted in the same article that the Jewish trends of Cultural Zionism, *Brit Shalom* (a group that was led by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber and called for the establishment a Jewish-Arab bi-national state during the 1920s), and others did not share the Zionist ideas of creating a Jewish majority in the country. This confession also signals to the absence of Jewish consensus regarding Zionism. A few years later the World War II erupted, and in light of the Holocaust, 265,000 Jews came to Palestine during the fifth Aliya from 1932-1944 (Eisenstadt, 1967, 11) while the majority of Jews who left Europe at that period found their way to the United States. In 1936 the number of Jews in Palestine became 348, 078 out of 1,366, 692, and in 1946 the number was 608,225 out of 1,912,112 according to the British annual statistical book for Palestine (Said et al., 1986, 8-9). The Palestinians kept their majority in the country till the end of the British Mandate in 1948, and by then only Zionism was capable of establishing the "Minority revolutionary Government" that Arlozorof proposed in 1932, taking the shape of the State of Israel that was declared in the 15th of May 1948. This state and its previous Zionist movements took the responsibility of evacuating the Palestinians according to plans A, B, C, and D starting from December 1947 and continued over six months till May 1948 (Pappe, 2007). After the establishment of the State of Israel, other expulsions took place and continued during the 1950s as Sabri Jiryis informed (Jiryis, 1969, 9).

Before going to 1948, it is worthy to see how the Zionist Revisionist Movement envisioned the other. In 1923 Zeev Jabotinsky wrote his famous article The Iron Wall. At that article, he made a straightforward and clear proposition. After saying at the beginning of the article that he is supportive to the idea of living in peace with the Arabs in the land of Israel, he adds that the question to present is 'if a peaceful aim' can be realized by peaceful means. For him, the answer to this question does not depend on our attitude, but it is related to the view of the Arabs towards Zionism. In this regard he considers the Arab position towards

Zionism to be harmful, and that there is no hope, even faint, that they will accept transforming Palestine to a country that has a Jewish majority. He considers the Arabs to be carrying a low level of culture, but he believes that they cannot be bought by tactics such as giving them economic and cultural privileges, or by clarifying our objectives to them, or by seeking an agreement with the Arabs outside Palestine that we have nothing to offer in the expense of it. So, what is the solution? For him the answer will be by establishing a strong iron wall without any gaps in it, and by setting it the Arab extremists who say no will lose the light of their slogans, and other Arab moderates will emerge and start compromising with us on practical issues, such as looking for guarantees against their expulsion, and civil and national equality (www.en.jabotinsky.org).

In other article about the 'Ethics of the Iron Wall', Jabotinsky suggested that the Arab appropriation of the land does not give them the right of self-determination over it, while neglecting the power of the historical right of the Jews in times when the world already recognized the right of return of the Jews to their land. In another hand, the Arabs have many countries, and more land than required, therefore "the seizure of a piece of land from a people who have big districts to prepare a house for a mobile and wandering people is a just act" (Mohareb1990, 62-66).

In comparison between Herzl and Nordau in one hand versus Jabotinsky in the other hand, one can see that the first is ready to accept that some of the indigenous population to be included in the political system that the former creates, also it takes to work on convincing the indigenous about the just nature of Zionism and the benefits that it can provide to the indigenous. In the other hand, Jabotinsky and the revisionists found it as a waste of time to convince the Arabs or try to find people who believe in Zionism and ready to support it among them. He also did not believe in offering them any political civic and national rights before they comply with the Iron wall, even further he does not see merit in giving them assurances of no expulsion to them before that compliance. Both trends agreed on the achievement of the land of Israel strategy as a full

exclusivist strategy to the other but disagreed about the tactical concessions towards that others and the timing of giving these concessions towards a cosmetic inclusion in the settler colonial democracy. More importantly, Jabotinsky wanted to keep the threat of expulsion of the indigenous present till the iron wall became active, the first trend said that in some of its statements but it left the door open for accepting some leftovers of the indigenous population within the settler colonial democracy. These two trends towards the other are still impacting the Israeli politics till today with some modifications as it will be shown later. In between these two trends, there were also minor ones that called for a binational state like Brit Shalom of Martin Buber mentioned above, or like the Mapam party 1947 proposal (Sakhnini, 1986, 176).

In practice, the first trend representing the majority before 1948, took the primary responsibility in transferring the Palestinians, the critical role of David Ben Gurion to be mentioned in this regard. Nur Masalha four books about the 1948 transfer (and 1967 as well) presented the details by using the Israeli and the British Archives and other resources (Masalha, 1992; 1997; 2003), also there are pioneering works of Walid Al Khalidi (Al Khalidi, 1959; 1988), and the seminal book of IlanPappe about ethnic cleansing (Pappe, 2006), the English version, and (2007), the Arabic version. Finally, there is Benny Morris version about the birth of the Palestinian refugee's problem although he revised and lightened it later (Morris, 1989; 2004). Besides these other many publications about the transfer of the Palestinians can be mentioned which make it well documented. What might be necessary for this study about settler colonialism is the conceptual framework that was used to justify such a transfer, more than the historical details of what happened?

The Peel Commission report of 1937, which suggested the division of Palestine, can first be mentioned as an example of the rational justifications behind the transfer. Following the dilemma that Arlozorof expressed in 1932 (see above), Zionism started to think of alternatives to create the Jewish State, the one that

came to the mind of the Zionist leaders was the concept of "Population exchange" between the Jewish State and the Arab State. This concept was presented as proposal before them to the Peel Commission, and at the end, the Commission suggested the transfer of 225,000 Palestinians from the Jewish State to the Arab State, and 1250 Palestinians from the Arab State to the Jewish one (Sakhnini, 2012, 78). At that period the example of 1922 of the population exchange between Turkey and Greece of exchanging 6, 3 million Turks with 400,000 Greeks by force was mentioned to justify the proposed exchange of population. At that case, the exchange took place between two separate states and not between an indigenous people and a settler colonial project created in their expense. Noteworthy at that time that the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency created a "Committee for inhabitants transfer" (Masalha in Sakhnini, 2012, 81), also Ben Gurion stated in this Committee meeting of June 1937 "I support transfer by force, and I do not see anything non-ethical on it" (Benny Morris in Sakhnini, 2012, 79). In a letter that he wrote to his son Amos in the same year, he said in an English version translated in 2011 for the first time by the Palestine Studies Institute from the Hebrew version of the Ben Gurion Archives Online housed by the Ben Gurion Heritage Institute in S'deBoker of Ben Gurion that: "What we want is that the whole and unfired land be **Jewish** (emphasis added by Ben Gurion). A unified Eretz Israel would be no source of satisfaction for me- if it were Arab" (Ben Gurion in Journal of Palestine Studies, 2011/2012, 245).

So population exchange was one of the conceptual/ practical used for the justification of the transfer of the Palestinians. This concept came back again by the Avigdor Lieberman *Israeli Beitenu* Party 2004 proposal of population exchange with the Palestinian State by transferring the Triangle area with its Palestinian population majority to the Palestinian State to come and annexing in return the big colonial settlements blocks in West Bank to Israel. Lieberman's is a proposal of exchange of territory in addition to the exchange of population. Another proposal to mention is Zehut Party plan of population exchange

presented in Chapter two. The final example is Herzliya Conference that adopted in 2001 a suggestion of population exchange to be displayed on the negotiations table whenever it is resumed (Zureik, 2003).

Other transfer ideas were given different names such as The return of Arabs to the Arab; By leaving Palestine and emigrate to the broader Arab region, "immigration, resettlement (Read : The proposals for the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in Sinai in 1950s, and later by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1980's. Also read the proposals for resettling the Palestinians of Gaza in Sinai as proposed by Yehoshua Ben Aryeh (Aryeh, 2006), followed by Giora Eiland (Eiland, 2008) who both actually suggested a widened Palestinian State that includes Gaza and parts of Sinai, which signals for the possibility of transferring the West Bank Palestinians to that State). Followed there are also the ideas for the "Rehabilitation of the Palestinians in the Arab countries" (Masalha, 2003, 25). As Nur Masalha continues these ideas are coming from the same root which is that "Israel is an exclusive right that returns to the Jewish people, and that the Palestinians are aliens who either accept the Zionist dominance or leave" either voluntarily, or through a mutual agreement, or by force (Masalha, 2003, 25). As "aliens" the Palestinians are mainly Arabs, they came from the Arab countries, and they should leave back to those countries since they have no real emotional attachment towards Palestine. These 'ideas' claim that the real problem for the Palestinians is about getting a dignified life, and this they can get in the Arab world (Masalha, 2003, 27).

All these ideas above were and are presented to hide the essence of the concept of demographic transfer, and the pre-determined plans to conduct it as "The light expression of the organized erasing of Arab population of Palestine to neighboring or distant countries, which represents a goal that a majority of the Israelis believed in after 1967" (Masalha, 2003, 26). To these other types of transfer can be added such as the so-called "silent transfer" due to severe economic hardships, or security conditions that puts the individual security at

risk (Zureik, 2003). Besides that, the question of "demographic threat" is also presented as a leading theme based on the Israeli concept of security that is not only about the threats to the survival, but exceeds that to consider any threat to the Jewish Majority of the state to be a security threat. In this regard IlanPappe quoted Benyamin Netanyahu as saying in 2003 "If the Arabs became 40 percent of the population this would be the end of the Jewish State, but 20 percent is also a problem, and if the relationship with this 20 percent will become problematic, the state will have the right to go to extreme procedures" (Pappe, 2007, 279). As such the Arab person becomes a security threat just for his /her physical being and without committing any crime that violates the Law. The same goes for the Arabs as a collective. In this regard the Zionist solutions for them as a "demographic problem" ranged as shown between two options, the first is the exclusion while present, with the concept of the present- absent as a term used to describe the Palestinians inside Israel, suffering from the absence of recognition of some of their villages, the confiscation of their lands, the prevention to use lands of the Israeli Land Authority which keeps the land use exclusive to be a right for the Jews only, given that these lands were confiscated from the Arabs according to the " Absentees Properties Law" of 1950 and other laws (Haidar, 2007, 5, 9). The second solution is the transfer by the different means that mentioned, to add to them the possibility of collective removal in case a war erupted and can be exploited to conduct such a transfer.

Of course, in his book Masalha referred to the transfers that took place before and after 1948, but in the quotation above he also wanted to stress that the majority of Israelis continued to believe in transfer and its justification after the 1967 war. Regarding 1948 he estimated the following results according to the books published in the last 15 years till the publication of his book "no less than 122 Arab locations were evacuated under the threat of the Jewish Army; 270 locations were evacuated due to the military attacks of the Jewish forces, which used a tactic of attacking each location from two directions, and leave roads for escaping as a "model" that was effectively and pre-determinately used by Yigal

Alon to make sure that the Arabs will evacuate their places; 38 locations were evacuated in fear of Jewish attacks or because the people got blockaded during the fight; 49 locations were evacuated after the collapse of neighboring villages and towns; 12 locations were evacuated due to the Jewish psychological military methods such as the spreading of rumors and the whispering campaigns" (Masalha, 2003,40).

All of the above are 491 locations. After May 1948 other many places were evacuated, Lod and Ramla July 1948, Al Majdal to Gaza 1950, the areas of the Naqab Bedouins 1949- 1959, Dawymeh November 1948, and others (Masalha, 2003, 40-52). In many of these places and others massacres were conducted like in Dir Yassin (April 1948), Lod, and Dawaymeh, in this regard the Israeli historian Arieh Yitshaqi calculated ten big massacres of more than 50 victims for each, and 100 smaller massacres (Masalha, 45-46).

Three years after Nur Masalha book, IlanPappe published another book showing those 531 Palestinian villages, and 11 towns, or a suburb of a city following Dalet plan (Pappe, 2007, 93). Referring to the Zionist Archives Pappe found that this plan that was approved in the 10th of March 1948 in a meeting of 11 leaders led by Ben Gurion, and held in the "Red Building" in Tel Aviv. The plan included two options, the first by destroying the villages through burning, blowing up, and the planting of mines mainly in the densely populated centers, and the second by sweeping and taking over operations by the encirclement of the villages and searching operations inside them. In case of resistance, the armed communities should be eradicated, and their populations should be expelled to outside the borders of the state (Pappe, 2007).

The mentioned above plan we preceded by plans A (1937 aiming to take over Palestine in case of British withdrawal). Followed by B (1946), and C (A combination of A and B plans which included a lot of politicide actions against the Palestinian political leadership, the instigators, those who killed Israelis and

those Palestinians who serve in the British Mandatory system as officers or high-rank employees. Besides that, the plan includes disturbing the movement of the Palestinian transportation, and harm to the Palestinian life resources such as water wells, mills, and others, attacking coffee shops, clubs, and the Palestinian gatherings; besides of attacking the villages that support enemy elements (Pappe, 237-38).

Clear from this brief review that the process of displacement and replacement got a momentum by 1937 after the Peel Commission report suggested the division of the country to two states, at that time the Haganah became stronger after its members were trained by the British officer Orde Charles Wingate, starting from 1936 (Pappe, 2007, 25). The Jewish Agency presented a plan for the partition of Palestine to two states in 1938(www.ecf.org.il/issues/250). By the 1939, the British released the "White Paper" which gave a promise to the Palestinians to establish a Palestinian State after ten years while allowing for 75 thousand Jews to immigrate to Palestine in the first five years of them (see text on Abdul Hadi, 1997, p 111-116, and see also Sakhnini, 1986, p. 147-152). Both sides rejected this proposal and then the eruption of the Second World War in September that year suspended that proposal. In the meantime, Zionism continued its preparations, and became more assertive about establishing a Jewish State which represents its interpretation of the British Balfour Declaration original plan of establishing a "National Home to the Jews in Palestine." The turning point in this regard took place in the American Zionist Conference held in Baltimore in 1942.

The Baltimore conference called for the establishment of a "Jewish Commonwealth" in Palestine without calling for the establishment an Arab state beside it as the Jewish Agency called to in 1938, and open its gates for the Jewish immigration conducted directly by the Jewish Agency (Abdul Hadi, Vol.11997,118). In 1946 plan C was prepared, and villages' files were ready since the end of 1930s as well (Pappe, 2007, 28), followed by Plan Dalet in

1948, the year when Israel was established followed by the transfer that left 750,000 to 900,000 as refugees outside their country. Another replaced a people, and when Israel was created, it included 78 percent of the land of Palestine versus only 56.47 percent was given to it in the 1947 UN Partition Plan. According to that plan Israel was supposed to keep 400,000 Arabs, and 200 Arabic villages within its borders, but only 150,000 Arabs were left, and the others were evacuated.

3.2 The Zionist Project and the Mother Country

As indicated, in 1869, the Ottomans decided to allow foreigners to buy lands in the Empire. As shown this law was followed (and sometimes preceded) but attempts by many sides to settle in Palestine, including the Messianic Americans, the Messianic Templars, The Messianic Christian Crusades, and the different Jewish groups: The Jewish philanthropists, and HoveviTzion as also a Jewish organization originated in Russia, and that wanted to re-establish the connection between the Jews and their “fatherlands” in the 1880s. The Labor Zionism joined later, and the official Zionist movement was the last comer. According to this variety of groups who tried to settle Palestine, Alexander Scholch concluded that Zionism was only but a one group that decided to take over Palestine till the First World War erupted in 1914, when the conditions of that war and the interests of the British Empire led to the strengthening of the Zionist Jewish settlement project in the expense of the other projects of settlement. Balfour declaration was crucial in this development. The conclusion of all of this for Scholch is that the conflict in Palestine was imposed on the Middle East from outside, and it was not originated from the region itself (Scholch, 1992/3, 39-40). Further, it can be concluded that at the beginning the approach towards Palestine was a Christian Messianic, and since this approach required collecting the Jews in Palestine to get them converted to Christianity in a later stage; the Zionist movement was given the priority above the other colonial settlement attempts through Balfour Declaration of 1917.

Before discussing the crucial role played by the Balfour declaration, a brief overview might be needed about the part of the Ottomans in the emergence of the Zionist project in Palestine. In this regard while the Ottomans were far from being a mother country to the Zionist project that provides it with political support internationally, in the contrary the proponents of the Islamic project in the Arab World present it as the Islamic Empire that did not relinquish and gave up as the liberals, the nationalists, and the socialists did (Hroub in his introduction to Nusaiart book, 2012, p. 39). An example is Hizbu El-Tahrir (Liberation Party) which is an Islamic Party that calls for the revival of the Ottoman Islamic Caliphate (Hoiglit et al., 2015).

Beyond these studies, a PhD investigative study that used Herzl Diaries and resources related to the Zionist and the American and the British archives found that the Sultan Abdul Hamid took a double and mixed position. In one hand he made strong statements against the Zionist immigration to Palestine (Like his letter to Shiekh Abu Al Shamat the head of the Shadhiliya Sufi method in Damascus in which he said that he was taken of his position due to his attitude towards the issue of Palestine (Nusaiart, 2014, 33). There is also his famous statement advising Herzl that he "will not sell any foot from the land because it is the ownership of his people and not himself" (Nusairat, 46). In the second hand, Sultan Abdul Hamid was relatively flexible in the ground, by accepting Herzl to meet him five times from 1896 to 1903 including twice he paid the expenses. The aim was to discuss the idea of giving a Farman allowing Jews to settle Palestine in the cost of Zionism to contribute to funding the debts of the Ottoman Empire; Allowing for the establishment of 46 Zionist Settlements and 33 residency locations in the Palestinian cities between 1882 to 1908, including raising the number of Jews from 5000 in 1882 to 80 thousand in 1908 (Nusairat, 2012, 46).

Sultan Abdul Hamid did not give Herzl the Ferman that he and the proponents of Political Zionism looked for, but in another hand he allowed the Zionists to

benefit from the law that allows the foreigners to buy land in Palestine. Examples of that include: the Russian Jews purchased mikveh Yisrael settlement land in an auction organized by the Ottoman Authorities due to the inability of the residents to pay the taxes to the Authorities. The other example the selling of the land of 'Al Metallah village' mentioned earlier to Baron Rothschild in 1895 to establish the settlements of Metulla as a punishment to the people of the village after an uprising that they made against the Ottomans (Nusaiart,19-20).He also released Fermans and opposite Fermans. For instance, in 1882 the Ottoman Empire released a Farman that allows Jews to reside everywhere in the Empire except Palestine. After a complaint by the Foreign Consuls who accused the Ottoman Empire of violating its capitulations agreements with them that allows their citizens to travel freely in all the Ottoman Empire territories except Hedjaz, the Ottoman Authorities was obliged to make a retreat, and gave in 1888 approval to the Jews to come for a religious visit to Jerusalem for three months. Again, the USA, Britain, and France made a complaint, and the result was that the Ottoman Authorities were obliged to make another retreat by stating that the three-month residence in Palestine is relevant to the immigrants who come to Palestine in groups, while individuals are allowed to go and stay without restriction. In 1898 Jews were allowed for one month visit to Palestine only, but this restriction was lifted again in 1899 (Nusairat, 15-17).

All in all the Ottoman Empire allowed Jews to infiltrate to Palestine in different ways. One way through coming to any region of the Empire and travel from there "illegally" to Palestine; second come as citizens of the European countries and the United States and get the privileges allowed to those countries including the right to buy a land, and then stay afterwards "illegally" in the country or become Ottoman Citizens. What is striking from the above is the role of the "mother countries in actions" mainly the two Protestant countries of the United States and Britain, and the role the Consuls of these two States in Jerusalem played to bring Jewish immigrants and sustain their presence in Palestine.

The Ottomans role in supporting the Zionist project in Palestine took another shape during the periods of the ruling of the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908, and 1912. The Palestinian Encyclopedia summarized on the basis of various resources some of the actions of this committee of supporting Zionism, which included: Allowing for the establishment of Tel Aviv in 1909; raising the number of Jews in the Jerusalem Council from one to two; creating the Anglo Palestinian Bank in 1908 which tried to buy land and build a Jewish settlement close to Rafah in Gaza Strip; allowing the opening of a Zionist Organization office in Istanbul; allowing Jabotinsky to come to Istanbul to supervise the Jewish newspapers published there, appointing one Jewish Minister of Finance in 1908, and three Jewish ministers of Finance, Trade, and Agriculture . When they were back to rule in 1912; they canceled the Red Passport that permits Jews to live everywhere in the Ottoman Empire except Palestine; holding of negotiations with the Zionist leaders by Jamal Pasha in 1910, and then he gave lands to the Zionists. Talaat Pasha the Grand Vizier made a statement in January 1918 giving permission to the Zionists to immigrate to Palestine, and establish colonial settlements in it; later he met with the Jewish leaders in Berlin in which he accepted the establishment of a Jewish Company in Istanbul to be responsible for colonial settlement, and its coordination with the Ottoman Empire. Established in Salonika City at the end of the 19th century the Committee got the support of both Zionism and the Masonic movement there (www.palestinapedia.org). These steps gave Zionism more than what Herzl was demanding in his meeting with Sultan Abdul Hamid, but the ability of the Ottoman Empire to fulfill these steps was only minor due to the collapse of the Empire at the end of the World War I.

Another country that attention should be paid to is Germany who united their efforts with the British in Palestine as earlier indicated, but they also tried to convince the Ottoman Sultan to give a Ferman to the Jews to settle In Palestine during the Visit of the German Emperor to Istanbul in 1898. The Emperor met Herzl there as well, and later met him again at the entrance of Mikveh Yisrael

settlement at that year to inform him that the Sultan rejected Herzl demand for a Farman that Allows Jews to have Palestine. As the writer of Herzl biography Alex Bein indicated, the German Emperor adopted the idea of transferring Jews to Palestine under his protection (Bein introduction to *Judestaat*). According to the records, Germany was the first country that Herzl tried to convince to give support to the State for the Jews in Palestine. In 1895 he met in Vienna with an Evangelical Reverend William Henry Hechler (1845-1931); the latter was a member in the messianic "Church Missionary Society" and the writer of a book in 1896 titled; *The Restoration of the Jews to Palestine*. By 1895 Hechler served as a chaplain in the British Embassy in Vienna till 1910; he met Herzl in 1896 and helped him later to meet the Grand Duke of Baden Fredrick I, followed by meeting other higher Caliber German officials till he met the Kaiser in 1898 as indicated. It is noteworthy here that the WZO office continued to be in Germany until 1920 (Cologne from 1905-1911, followed by Berlin from 1911-1920) (See Reinharz, 1980). In 1898 Herzl faced the opposition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany Mr. Bulow in addition to the objection of the Ottoman Sultan, and accordingly Herzl moved his "political Zionism" attempts to Britain to discuss other options for the State of the Jews such as Uganda, Sinai, and Al Arish and Cyprus mainly in the period of 1902 and 1903 (Welman, 1961, 246).

What left to be mentioned about the relations with Germany is the "Haavara Transfer Agreement" that was signed between the Jewish Agency (and through it the Anglo-Palestine Bank), and the Zionist Federation of German Jews in one side, and the Nazi German Ministry of Economics in Berlin in the other hand. The agreement was signed in the 7th of August 1933, and it included allowing the German Jews who wish to immigrate to Palestine to sell their properties in Germany, and then to buy German goods that will be exported to the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine. Upon the arrival of the German Jew to Palestine he/she will cash the costs of these goods from the Anglo-Palestine Bank (Berkai, 1990; Weiss, 1998) This agreement contributed to the immigration of 60,000 German Jews to Palestine from 1933 to 1939. For the Nazi Government this agreement

was seen as a way to combat the Jewish Boycott to the German products that were prevailing at that time among the world Jewry, but for Zionism the labor Zionist Movement supported the agreement all the way ahead as being a gradual transfer that goes in accordance with Palestine Jewish Yishuv capacity of absorption. Besides that, the Revisionist Zionism led by Jabotinsky rejected it and sought alternatively to have agreements with the German and the Polish Governments to transfer the Jews of these countries collectively to Palestine (Berkai, 1990, 142-143). The Jewish Agency hid this agreement until 1935 as also Weiss mentioned due to the Jewish rejection worldwide to left the boycott of Germany. The Arab and the Palestinian resources in other hand refer to the Zionist- German agreement as an example of how Anti-Semitism and Zionism feed each other (Abu Al Namil, 1988; Abbas, 2011; 1984).

All in all, there is evidence that the world Jewry was principally against the Zionist- German agreement, while the Zionist Movement looked for it, while it was divided between those who looked for a deal for a gradual immigration which happened and the others who looked for an alternative agreement for the transfer of the Jews to Palestine. In that sense, Zionism decided unilaterally that every Jew should be willing to immigrate to Palestine in one hand and appointed itself as the organizer of that immigration on the other side. Mirror image to that position was that of Nazi Germany, which as Weiss mentioned did not ever prohibit the Zionist Movement in Germany, while it attacked those Jews who were looking for assimilation in Germany and Arab (Weiss, 1998, 159). Before and after the Holocaust most of the German Jews (a little bit more than half million by then) left to the United States, and only 60000 to Palestine.

In conclusion to this part about Germany and Zionism, it is clear that Germany played an early active role in the 19th century to create colonial settlements in Palestine, to support others created by Zionist organizations, and to facilitate the immigration of Jews to Palestine, in addition to its attempt to create a Jewish State in Palestine under its protection. Failure to do so was evident by the end

of the 19th Century when the competition about Palestine moved to become between France and Britain. Earlier the French role was presented including the 1917 French "Promise" made by Mr. Cambon the Secretary of the Foreign Affairs to Sokolow (see above).

More should be presented about the competition between Britain and France, and Britain takes the leading role in the region since McMahon Hussein correspondence in 1915 when the first was the British Commissioner in Egypt, and the second was the Sharif of Mecca who decided to revolt in cooperation with Britain against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. Britain promised through the mentioned correspondence to support Sharif Hussein objective to achieve the independence of the Arab regions from the Ottomans and to establish a United Arab State in the Red Crescent area and Hedjaz. The aim here is not to discuss the details of that correspondence, but to find out their impact on Palestine, and how they prepared the ground for the agreements and the documents that followed. Regarding the status of Palestine in that correspondence, it can be said according to the memoirs of a prominent Palestinian leader of that time that were published in three volumes in 2012 after the family approval: "His Majesty Hussein Ben Ali over sighted when he accepted in one of his letters to postpone the decision about the future of Palestine till the end of World War I; accordingly he allowed Britain to shelve the Palestinian question till the end of the War (Hussein Khalidi, 2012, 122 of vol.1). In another hand, other references maintained that the correspondence included Palestine in the Arab State (Sakhnini, 1986, quoting the Palestine Arab Refugees Office in New York, documents, p.42), and the copies that Sharif Hussein published in the Arabic newspapers included it (Khallah, 1982, 42). Besides that, the British who hide the correspondence till 1939 were obliged to compose a committee to Study them at that year. The Committee presented its results to the Council, and the London Conference held at that year, stating that "Palestine was excluded from the correspondence, but they admitted that this exclusion was not made in a clearly defined paragraph that is free from being false" (Khallah, 1982, 46-47).

In the same mentioned book Hussein Fakhri Khalidi who was the Secretary of the Arab National Commission in the 1930s, and the Mayor of Jerusalem in 1934; criticized King Faisal of Syria communications with the Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann in Which he accepted “even though latently” to give up with Palestine to the Jews, in return to the Zionist Movement support to the independence of the Arab States (Khalidi, 2012, 123). The Faisal -Weizmann agreement that was written in English that King Faisal do not understand, was presented to him in January 1919 by T.E. Lawrence who was the only translator of the document to Faisal, after listening Faisal signed in Arabic, but he added a caveat saying that his signature is with the condition that Palestine should be part of the Arab State. Three weeks later the Paris Peace Conference was held, and the Zionists presented the Agreement there without King Faisal caveat (Allawi, 2014, 188-189).

The above versions of the communications about Palestine between the allies of Britain (The Zionist Movement and the Hashemite family of Sharif Hussein and his son Faisal) will continue later with the other son of Sharif Hussein Abdullah who was appointed by the British as the Emir of Jordan since 1921 as will be alluded to then. For this stage, it can be said that the settler colonial project for Palestine sought to get a kind of Arab approval and to create regimes around Palestine that will be like buffer zones to protect the Zionist project from the threats that might come from the surroundings. Despite the controversy if Palestine was included or not in the Arab State promised to Sharif Hussein, but the developments that followed showed that this controversy was used to divide the Great Syria and Iraq between Britain and France as an alternative to the creation of an independent Arab State, as it was agreed upon in Sykes-Picot 1916 Agreement between these two countries.

According to the Sykes-Picot Agreement Palestine that was inclusive to Transjordan till then was divided into four parts: An international part that

includes elements of Palestine in the West of the Jordan River (Including Jerusalem and other cities that include holy places); A British administered area that consists of the ports of Haifa and Acre. An Arab region (to be part of the Arab state to be established under the British) that includes Transjordan, and Hebron, and the Naqab as well; and finally a French area that consists of the North of the Tiberius lake and Safad (Sakhnini, 1986, 41-42). In general, Britain got most of Palestine including Transjordan either under its direct ruling or as part of the Arab State that follow Britain, while France was given only a small portion of Palestine. Some resources further mention that Sharif Hussein was aware of these arrangements as Al Manar newspaper that was edited by Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Reda wrote in 1920 (Khallah, 1982, 52).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement was the precursor of another document that followed; the Balfour Declaration made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain Arthur Balfour in the 2nd of November 1917. The Declaration was subject to negotiations between the Zionist Movement and the British Government over months earlier (see different versions on Abdul Hadi, 1997, pp. 21-22). At the end the final version took the shape of a short letter sent by Mr. Balfour a week after the British occupied Beer Al Sabe' a in Palestine to Lord Rothschild stating in its main paragraph the following: "His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall prejudice the civil and the religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or in any other country" (In Abdul Hadi, 1997, volume 1 21-22).

This declaration, the way it is written considering the Jews to be "people" while the indigenous people in Palestine who consisted the majority of its population were considered just as "communities", signaled a turning point for Zionism from looking to Germany first, and partially later to France as mother countries to its settler-colonial project in Palestine. The debate about the reasons behind this

Declaration is still ongoing until today, including the prevention of France or Germany to take over Palestine through an agreement with the Jews; the recruitment of the United States to join WWI through the American Jews pressure on the American Administration, and others (Sakhnini, 1986, 42-51; Khallah, 1982, 53-63). But besides these justifications, other studies added Messianic reasons. For instance, a website that is specialized in studying Balfour Declaration showed that Balfour was brought up as an Evangelical by his mother Lady Blanche who was the sister of Lord Salisbury mentioned earlier in this thesis as the Prime Minister of Britain who was highly sympathetic to the Zionist cause. Spooner quoted Geoffrey Adelman writing in the Jewish Chronicle in 2012 that: "The Balfour Declaration was born out of religious sentiments. Arthur Balfour was a Christian mystic who believed that Almighty had chosen him to be an instrument of the Divine Will. Perhaps as a precursor to the second coming of the Messiah" (Spooner in Balfour Project, December 19, 2017, www.balfourproject.org). The writer also mentioned similar quotations by Tom Segev and others about the role of the Protestants in creating Zionism by Anita Shapira. Finally, he mentions the Prime Minister of Britain when Balfour Declaration was released Mr. Lloyd George, who was also an Evangelical who his law firm acted for Herzl in 1903 as well (Spooner, in Balfour Project, 2017). Finally, Spooner quoted Balfour as saying in 1919 about his "Social engineering" plan of creating a new population majority on the expense of the indigenous population. Balfour said: "Palestine presented a unique situation. We are dealing not with the wishes of an existing community but are consciously seeking to reconstitute a new community and building for a numerical majority in the future" (Spooner in Balfour Project, 2017).

The concept of "National Home for the Jewish people" was far from being clear. Also, the implementation of it passed several stages. Before going to these stages, it is worthy of mentioning the position of a Palestinian intellectual who wrote a booklet in 1925 titled "Palestine after the Great War." This writer was Khalil Al Sakakini, who wrote that the "rejection of Balfour Declaration" to

recognize the political rights of the Arabs in Palestine, led to the consideration of them as aliens" (Sakakini, 1925, 18; Salem, 2014, 171). Later he added the results of these considerations, which include "The extraction of Palestine from the Arab Unity; making Hebrew an official language in the country; open the country with all its space to Jewish immigration, and the inauguration of a Jewish Commissioner to run the country." Till he says that as aliens " We will become water servants and woodcutters, except if we will be expelled fully from our country, or exterminated as one of their leaders Zangwill said: We should exterminate the Arabs quietly but continuously. Isn't this inclusive to the imagination?" (Sakakini, 1925, 34-35; Salem, 2014, 172).

The Palestinians were alerted by the dangers of Zionism, and its aim to displace the Palestinians since the end of the 19th century. Quoting several resources, Fadwa Nusairat mentioned petitions sent the Ottoman Sultan by the Palestinians at the end of the 19th century; one of these was when the dignitaries of Jerusalem sent a protest letter to the Wali asking for the prohibition of the Jewish immigration and appropriation of land. A petition was sent to the Sultan in the same year telling the details of the collision of some officials in selling lands to the Seller Jews in Jaffa and Haifa. Also, telegraph signed by five hundred Palestinians was sent in 1891 to the Grand Vizier requesting Farman that prohibit the Zionists from entering Palestine or buying lands in it (Nusairat, 2011, 28-29). Later to that many Palestinian wrote about the danger of Zionism to Palestine, such as Yousef Dia Al Khalidi letter to Herzl of 1899 stating that Palestine is part of the Ottoman Empire. He asked the Zionists to leave it alone; Najib Azouri who was the Deputy of Kazim Bey the Wali of Jerusalem, then he resigned after he found out that Kazim Bey was getting Bribes to allow for selling the lands to the Zionists. Azouri wrote his book in 1906 "The Awakening of the Arab Nation" in which he showed the dangers of Zionism to Palestine. Ruhi Al Khalidi who was an academic graduated from the Sorbonne in France, and a member in the Ottoman Parliament representing Jerusalem, "toured" in the Zionist settlement in Palestine and wrote quantitative research about them titled

"Zionism in 1913 (Salem, 2014, 97-135, 231-256). In the same period, the Journalist Najib Nassar the editor of Al Carmel newspaper in Haifa wrote several articles about the dangers of Zionism (Shehadeh, 2010).

These are but examples of the Palestinians being early alerted about what was planned to their country, they also give an idea about the ways used to facilitate the Zionist immigration, and land appropriation inclusive to bribes and other means. It should be said then that the Balfour Declaration came out in 1917 as a crowning Declaration to those land expropriations and building the Zionist Colonial settlements that took place earlier to it in one hand. In the second hand, it gave a British Legitimacy to the "Zionization" of Palestine, which became in the 24th of July 1922 an international legitimacy by the UN-League of Nations issuance of the "Confirmed Text on Terms of the British Mandate" (In Abdul Hadi, 1997 volume, 1).

What is worthy to notice before moving to the UN Text is that the pre-1917 Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine (see details earlier) was impossible to take place without the adoption of Britain, Germany, and the USA, and their Consuls in Palestine to the Jewish immigration. These Consuls used all the pressures possible on the Ottomans to facilitate it, and as well to facilitate the Colonial settler's takeover of lands in Palestine. Again this all means that the Zionist movement wasn't a "national liberation movement" that is free from "settler Colonialism" and from being dependent on one single a mother country, or a group of mother countries.

In the light of the previous review, it looked that Zionism passed two stages in its relations with the mother country/ies. The first was from the second half of the 19th century till 1917 when Zionism was getting the support of different mother countries as mentioned, then after 1917 the support became mainly British using various means as it will be shown below, and that continued till the end of the 1930s when the United States also started to interfere for the sake of the

Zionist movement mainly after its victory in the second world war which opened the way for the United States to become the center of the Imperialist world leaving Britain behind. As a signal to this change the United States President Harry Truman rejected the British White Paper of that year that spoke about a Palestinian State to be established in ten years. Alternatively, Truman "advocated for opening the gates of Palestine to 100,000 immigrants, a position disputed by British Foreign Secretary Bevin" (Heruwitz, 1979). Twenty years earlier United States President Woodrow Wilson sent King-Crane Committee as an official American Committee to Syria that was inclusive to Palestine at that time. The Committee recommended keeping the Unity of Syria and put it all under single American Mandate. More significant to this thesis, the committee recommended in its fifth clause that: "Serious modifications of the extreme Zionist program for Palestine of unlimited immigration of Jews, looking finally to making Palestine distinctly a Jewish State" has to be made, followed by keeping Palestine as part of Syrian under the American Mandate that will also act to preserve the religious rights of the three monotheistic religions in Palestine, and to prepare Syria for independence as a democratic State. The committee reported that the Zionist representatives that it met "Looked forward to practically **complete dispossession** of the present non- Jewish inhabitants of Palestine by various forms of purchase." The British officers met by the Committee completed the picture and said that they "generally thought that force of not less than fifty thousand soldiers would be required even to initiate the program." To remind this was the exact number of the Jewish fighters that conducted the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in the six months from December 1947 to May 1948, who were fighting against 10 thousand Arabs including 7,000 thousand Palestinian fighters and 3.000 Arab volunteers as IlanPappe indicated (Pappe, 2007, 54). At the end the committee recommended modifying and not canceling the Zionist project and keep it as a national home to Jews to be part of Syria, rather than to become a Jewish State in Palestine in the expense of the nine-tenths of its whole population (see the committee original text of recommendations in Abdul Hadi, 1997, p. 33-36, with clause five

covered in p.35-36).The Committee rejects the use of armies to inflict injustice, such as “For the initial claim, often submitted by Zionist Representatives that they have ‘right” to Palestine, based on an occupation of two thousand years ago, can hardly be seriously considered” (Abdul Hadi, 1997 volume. 1, 33-36).

Even though King-Crane Committee was an official one appointed by the USA President, but its recommendations were kept secret by the US State Department for three years, till they were published in the 2nd of December 1922 by Editor and Publisher, (V.55, No.27, 2nd section (www.balfourproject.org).This publication was made a few months after the League of Nations issued the Terms of the British Mandate on Palestine by 24/7/1922 (see above). Therefore, these recommendations were already expired. In another hand, their clarity (and the Balfour Statement of 1919 as well) should keep no doubt about the settler colonial nature of the Zionist project in Palestine. In another hand, the position of the United States Department shouldn't be a surprise given the American historical support to the "return" of the Jews to Palestine since 1640(see earlier). The British Messianism, and how it performed in Palestine was discussed above, but in preparation for the Balfour Declaration, another document should be mentioned due to its clarity regarding the settler- colonial project of Zionism, and its eagerness to get a mother country support, and due to its link to what will happen later, this one was written by Herbert Samuel (1870-1963) in 1915, when he was the President of the Local Government Board. Samuel, who is a Jew, became the first British High Commissioner to Palestine from 1920 to 1925, which allowed him to implement his ideas presented in the 1915 "Future of Palestine" memorandum that he submitted to the British Cabinet.

Samuel document echoed the twelve million Jews attachment to Palestine over the last 18 centuries, and called for the annexation of that country to Britain, who will allow for the Jewish Immigration, purchase of land, development of economy and education, so the Jews can increase their number gradually from being 90,000- 100,000 versus 400,000 to 500,000 Mohammadans to a majority that

can establish a Jewish State. He mentioned that the independence of the Christian religious places should be secured including the roles of France and Russia towards the Catholics and the Greek Orthodox, while the Mohammedans will also have their sacred sites inviolable by adding one or more of them in the governor Council. He considered Palestine to be mostly barren, backward and in blight and squalor, while only the Jewish and the German colonies there are developed, then he presents the reasons why Britain should take this task to fulfill a deep commitment among the Protestants towards the Jews and to avoid other options of France or Germany taking over Palestine, or the internalization of it, or leave it in the hands of Turkey, or annex it to Egypt. He defied all these options and found that the only one is about Britain taking over of Palestine to protect also its presence in Egypt from military attacks, and to get the support of the Jews worldwide (Samuel, 1915).

The Balfour Declaration was a contradiction to the article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations issued in 1919 during the Peace Conference held in Paris by then and became active in January 1920, which states: "Certain Communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of the administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until they can stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory" (Rogan, 2013, 41).

According to Rogan, the development of the investment and construction that took place in the 19th century in the Ottoman provincial capitals such as Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Baghdad carried some aspects of growing 'stateness' (Rogan, 2013, 41). To mention also the Ottoman reforms (Tanzimat) during the 19th century, starting by the Sultan Mahmoud the Second (1808-1836) creation of new western-like schools; his cancelation of Taymar (Allocating lands to the Army officers); the execution of population census. He

was followed by Sultan Abdul Majid who made a commitment by Sharif Kalakhanah reforms of 1839 to save the souls and the properties of the subjects and to create equality in the taxes. After Hamayoun Reforms followed in 1856 followed also allowing for the non-Muslims to participate in the local councils, and to release them from *Jizia*: the head tax, and making a pledge to fight corruption and bribery (Rafiq, 1978, 370-383). A constitution in 1876 followed, and after a period of suspension, it was released once again in 1908 putting the Ottoman Empire on the path of modernization.

Back to the article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, the first question is about how this League made Palestine as an exception to it by issuing the Text of Terms of the British Mandate in the 24th of July 1922 which gave the right to the Zionist Movement to establish a "National Home to the Jews in Palestine" (article 2); recognized the Jewish Agency as a public body that is responsible for giving advice to the British Mandate and to " construct or operate upon fair and equitable terms, any public works ,services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as the Administration does not directly undertake these matters" (Article 4, and quotation from article 11); and allowed for the facilitation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine (article 6) (see the text in Abdul Hadi, 1997, p. 52-55).

All in all, these Terms gave the "right of self-determination" in the land of Palestine to the settler colonialists instead of giving it to the indigenous population. As Jamal Al Hussein the head of the Arabic Party in Palestine said in his testimony for Peel Commission in 1937, that in contradiction to article 22 of the Covenant of the League of the Nation, the wishes of the indigenous population were not taken in consideration either when Balfour Declaration was issued, or when the Terms of the Mandate were released. He added that according to these Terms the Jewish Agency was appointed as "A Mandate Government over the Mandate", so the latter gets guidance from the former, as an opposite to the concept of the Mandate which requires a country to take the

responsibility of preparing a particular people for independence, but what happened in the case of Palestine is that Britain did not come as a Mandate to help prepare the Palestinians for independence, but instead it came together with other Mandate Government over it , which is the Jewish Agency, with the aim to establish a National home for Jews in Palestine (Abu Rmoleh, 2000, 46) where you can also find the full text of the Palestinian testimonies for Peel Commission published first in Al Nafeer magazine in 1937); this clearly means that the Mandate over Palestine was at the end Zionist, supported by the British to grow gradually through immigration, land appropriation, and economic development all to be facilitated by Britain for the sake of the Zionist Movement. But as in other cases of settler colonialism, the relationship between the mother country and the settler colonial project do also include contradictions in positions. In this case of Britain and the Zionist Movement, the question about the size of the "National Home for the Jewish people" was an issue of convergence and divergence between both positions before 1948. First, the Balfour Declaration left the size of Palestine open. At that time the Zionist Movement understood that the National home includes all Palestine including Transjordan (see for instance the 1919 Zionist Movement proposal to the Paris Peace Conference in Sakhnini, 1986, p.53).

What followed was the new position of Transjordan in article 25 of the text of the Terms of the Mandate, which gave Britain the right to suspend the implementation of the mandate texts in Jordan, but it did not cancel this possibility (Abdul Hadi, 1997, volume 1, 54). Later to this article, the representative of Britain in the UN-League asked for a modification of article 25 leading to the exclusion of Jordan from the land of Palestine allocated for the National Home.

British recognition of Jordan in 1923 followed the last step and a British Jordanian agreement in 1928. In this regard, Sir Alex Kirkbride, the representative of Britain in Karak city of Jordan was quoted saying that Britain

wanted by this step to keep Jordan as a reserved area for the Palestinians who will leave Palestine due to the Zionist settlement expansion (Sakhnini,1986, 65-66). This position of Britain was not accepted right away by the Zionist Movement, and the Revisionist Zionist Movement and the parties that followed its line after 1948 (Mainly Herut) continued to consider Jordan as part of the National Home till the signature of the Jordanian Israeli Peace Treaty of 1994. Without delving in another research about the details of the positions of each Party it can be said roughly for now, that there are parties today who consider Jordan to be the Palestinian State, these are such as *Herut*. The National Movement established in 1999, *HabaytHayehudi*, *Zehut*, and others.

Jordan position in the geography of Mandatory Palestine was one issue of the difference between the mother Britain and its allying Satellite Movement or Step Daughter the Zionist Movement as it was called by Pappe (Pappe, 2008, 628). Another issue of difference was related to the fate of the indigenous people of Palestine. In this regard Herzl wanted from the beginning to buy Palestine from the Ottoman Sultan, expel its sparse population and keep those rich and moderate who are ready to cooperate with the Zionist State (see earlier), King-Crane Commission report was also clearly expressing the same objective (see above); but in its side Britain position passed roughly four stages in this regard: In the first Stage Britain wanted to create a new country in which the Zionists and the Palestinians live in it in peace and harmony, a position that continued till the end of the 1920s according to IlanPappe(Pappe,2007, 23), and till the Middle of 1930s according to Hussein Al Khalidi, who wrote the following about the British High Commissioner Arthur Wauchope (1931-1938):"He sought to integrate the two peoples in one melting-pot, so the Jew will forget being a Jew, and the Arab will forget being an Arab, and the two parties will act under one nationality, and one objective defined as the creation of a new people and new patriotism, which is the common Palestinian patriotism, especially because the Arabs and the Jews belong to one Semitic origin" (Khalidi Hussain, 2012, 209).

In this regard, Pappe suggested that this stage included according to the British "an equal participation in the Parliament and the Government. The question is if that was so? Asymmetry actually was key in all levels, in one hand the terms of reference was the Balfour Declaration and the Terms of Mandate, which were accepted by the Zionist movement but obviously not by the Palestinians; the Palestinians called for a national Parliament and a national government representing the indigenous population including the Palestinian Jews while excluding the Zionist immigrants, while Zionism wanted to impose its legitimate presence in Palestine by getting the indigenous population recognition of a joint structures to be created together with the Zionists who considered themselves as the "owners of the country" which exacerbated the asymmetry .

These mentioned shortfalls expressed themselves during the process. For instance after the first British High Commissioner arrived in Palestine in 1920 he started right away cooperating with the Jewish Agency as a "Mandate over the Mandate" while he and the other Commissioners that followed suggested to the Palestinians to create an Arab Agency to them, but in the condition that it will be led by the High Commissioner who also gave himself the right to appoint its members (Khalidi Hussain, 2012, 158). Besides that, Mr. Samuel gave two Jewish Companies the power to create Electricity Company, and to extract Potassium from the Dead Sea, and allowed for a gradual Jewish immigration to Palestine (16500 immigrant every year), and decided to adopt Hebrew as one of the three official languages in the country; in 1922 a constitution of Palestine was issued with the task to implement the Terms of Mandate; in 1925, the law of Nationality was released to facilitate for Jews to get Palestinian citizenship; chapter three of the law allowed any Jew to get Palestinian citizenship if he/ she stayed two years in Palestine during the last three years preceding his/her application (Khallah, 1982, 135,306). Finally, he established in 1920 a Consultative Council headed by him and composed of 10 appointed British Employees, 7 Arabs, and 3 Jews. (Khallah, 1982, 136). Followed in 1922 by a Legislative Council that was established in accordance of the Constitution

consisting of 22 members: 10 employees, and 12 representatives of Muslims (8), Christians (2) and Jews (2) (Sakhnini, 1986, 95).

The policies biased to the Jewish immigration and privileges to the Jewish companies were combined with other new biased policy towards land and agriculture in Palestine; a new land law was approved in 1920 which prohibited selling any immovable property without a government approval, and prevented selling lands to people living outside Palestine; also in the following year a decision was made to close out the Ottoman Agricultural Bank created by the monies of the Palestinian peasants; besides that the army 1920 law of “Acquisition of land” was used to confiscate Palestinian properties. These laws and the one of 1928 for the settlement of land properties rights that aimed to finish the community ownership of the land (The Musha’a system) prepared the ground for the facilitation of the Zionist acquisition of land (Khallah, 1982, 749-751).

These policies in the first years of the British Mandate created responses both the political level and in the ground showing the failure of the British integration policy. Politically the Palestinian delegation who travelled to London to See Winston Churchill the Minister of Colonies in 1921 called instead of integration to the cancelation of Balfour Declaration, and stopping the Jewish immigration to Palestine (Khallah, 145-146); in the ground demonstrations in Jerusalem and Jaffa took place in the 1920 and 1921 calling for the same demands in addition to rejecting the separation of Palestine from Syria (Touma, 1981, 11-113, 120).

The failure of the British integration policy became more apparent during the 1929 clashes between the Palestinians and the Zionists in 1929 in Jerusalem, Hebron, and other cities; and during the 1933 uprising; and finally, the 1936-1939 revolution. During these events that Palestinian demands were also elevated to include the call to end the British Mandate and to establish a Palestinian national government, stopping the Jewish immigration, and stopping

the land purchase. These demands were also presented in the Arab testimonies for Peel Commission in 1937 mentioned earlier. In the other hand that period also witnessed some contradictions between the Zionist Movement and Herbert Samuel, but these contradictions were about the range and the dynamics of the Zionist project rather than about its legitimacy by Britain versus its delegitimization of the right of the Palestinian people of self-determination; therefore these contradictions were about things such as The prevention by Samuel to the Zionist Movement to buy lands in Transjordan; his plans to establish Palestinian institutions under the British control; that besides Zionism fear of the Arab enmity from outside Palestine to the Zionist project. Instead the *Vaad Leumi*: Zionist National Committee, in Palestine, presented a memorandum to Churchill when he visited Palestine in 1922 stating that Palestine is but a small part of them from the Arab land and that the emergence of a Jewish Renaissance in Palestine will reflect itself positively on all the Arab Nation; the memorandum also included illusions that the Arabs will accept the Balfour Declaration and the National Home for the Jews as a precondition to the Zionism cooperation with the moderates of them against the extremists (Caplan, 1982).

According to the above, the Palestinians rejected Zionism and its project on the expense of them, and Zionism in other hand acted against the emergence of any Palestinian institutions even if they will be only formal and under British Control. These facts led to the failure of integration that was proposed by Britain; therefore, Britain moved to the second stage, when it started calling for a partition of Palestine to two states. The Report of the Royal Commission (Peel Commission) of 1937 was the first report to present a British Partition plan officially, but also other unofficial plans were discussed such as those with Emir Abdullah of Jordan in 1937 in preparation for Peel Commission partition plan. At that time the Emir intensified his visits to his winter house in Jericho to meet with some Palestinian leaders from the Defense Party that represented the opposition to the Palestinian leader Haj Amin Al Hussein by then; he tried to

convince them to support a partition of Palestine and annexing the Palestinian part to Jordan; then he traveled to London and discussed the same ideas with the British officials there before the Peel Commission report was released. The Peel Commission Plan Included a call for negotiations to achieve treaties between Britain and Transjordan together with the representatives of the Arabs in Palestine, and with the Zionist Organization; to establish two States one Arab that include Transjordan and parts of Palestine and the second will be a Jewish State over parts of Palestine (Abdul Hadi, 1997, volume, 1, 99).

The Emir Abdallah plan included also leaving the holy places in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, and the Tiberius Lake under the British Mandate (Sakhnini, 1986, 126). A Palestinian rejection met the Plan and Zionist one as well. The Palestinian official leadership of Haj Amin Al Husseini rejection was a straightforward opposing giving up of any part of Palestine to the Zionists, while the Zionist response was yes and no together: Yes, to the partition, and no to the size given to the Jewish State since they were seeking a more significant proportion (Sakhnini, 1986, pp 128-129). On the basis of these positions, the British Government sent another commission in 1938 called Woodhead Commission that presented another partition plan; that included the partition of Palestine to five parts one Palestinian, one Jewish, and three Mandatory parts, and invited the parties to London to discuss and reach an agreement (Abdul Hadi, volume,1,1997, 104-105). The faced the same fate due to the rejection of the two sides, while the mentioned London conference opened the way for the third stage of the British policy in Palestine.

In the eve of the Second World War, The British Government wanted to calm down the situation in Palestine to help also recruit Palestinian and Jewish soldiers to fight under the banner of the British Army. Accordingly, the British Labor Government moved quickly to the third stage trying to reconcile between the Palestinian demands for national independence, and the Zionists demands to establish a Jewish State in Palestine through the White Paper that was

released by the Labor Government in London in 1939 after a conference of the parties held in London In February 1939.

The White Paper included an adoption of the Palestinian demand for national independence, but it postponed it to be implemented ten years ahead; but during the first five years of these ten years a vast number of 75,000 Jewish immigrants will be allowed to enter Palestine in addition to other 25,000 Jewish refugees, and others might follow in the five years after subject to the Palestinian voluntary approval (Abdul Hadi, 1997, volume, 1, 111-116). The White Paper policy was rejected firmly from the Zionist side, and to a lesser extent from the Palestinian leadership, especially in regard to the Jewish new immigration to Palestine, the postponement of the Palestinian state establishment to ten years after, and that it did not include giving pardon to those who fought during the 1936 revolution (Sakhnini, 1986, 150-152). It is worthy of mentioning here that the Palestinians conceded in 1939 by accepting the Participation of all the Jews (not only the national Palestinian Jews as it was the case earlier) in the Government according to their percentage of the population (Sakhnini, 1986, 11). In another place, Sakhnini mentioned that such a concession was even made as early as 1925 when an official Palestinian delegation presented the same idea in a memorandum that they gave to Amery the British Minister of Colonies during his visit to Palestine by then (Sakhnini, 1986, 100).

At the Zionist side, Some Zionist armed groups started also attacking the British forces as a sign of rejection to the White Paper, beginning by the Irgun Zionist military group, then followed later by the Haganah who participated in some attacks while at the same time negotiated with the British the terms of the participation of a Jewish force in the World War II, first by the creation of Jewish military group that reached the number of 26,000 by 1945, including a new elite Brigades to conduct special offensive operation (*The Palmach*). By 1944 Britain recognized this force and accepted its participation in the war in Europe while

raising a Jewish flag and under the name of *Eretz Israel* (Muhareb, 1981, 92-94).

Opposite to the Zionist propaganda; especially by the right-wing Zionists, about a national war of liberation against the British occupation, it is Noticeable here that the clashes with the British were limited mainly to the right-wing revisionist Zionist group (*Irgun Tzvai Leumi*), with some participation by the mainstream military organization, the Haganah who also decided to support Britain in the war against Germany and its allies. Further than that the mentioned developments did not lead Britain to give up with its objective to create a national home for Jews in Palestine, or to withdraw its practical support for its establishment in the ground as it was also evident in 1947-1948 (see below). In the political arena, the Baltimore Conference of the American Jewry held in 1942 also strongly rejected the plan (see earlier), and even done Chaim Weizmann.

The British at their side rolled up the White Paper proposal after the eruption of the Second World War in September 1939, the war ended with the USA victory and taking the world lead instead of Britain who was collapsing and withdrawing from its colonies worldwide; therefore, by 1946 the White Paper was entirely dead after the British Government decided to involve the Americans to prepare together plans for the end of the Problem.

An Anglo- American Committee was established in 1946; its plan followed the position of President Truman of calling for the permission for 100.000 Jews to enter Palestine soon, also it rejected the establishment of Palestinian Stats, and called for the cancelation of the British 1940 law which restricted the right of the Jews to buy lands in some regions of Palestine; finally the committee called for the continuation of the British Mandate till the UN make an agreement on a UN Trusteeship System (Abdul Hadi, 1997, volume.1, 126-131).

Another American- British experts committee (The Morrison-Grady Committee) followed in the same year and called for the division of Palestine to four districts One Jewish, one Arab, Jerusalem district, and the Naqab District. The overall authority over the country to be left to Britain, in addition to the two districts of the Naqab and Jerusalem; later a trusteeship will be established to prepare the ground for either partition or a bi-national State (Abdul Hadi, volume 1, 1997, 137).

The United States was not convinced of the last proposal due to the rejection of it by the Zionist Movement, who also rejected to participate in any conference to discuss it. Even the Palestinians reject it. Accordingly, Britain was obliged to hold a conference in London in September 1946, and January 1947 (as a second session) which was attended by the British Government and the representatives of the Arab Countries, while boycotted from the Palestinians and the Zionist Movement. The conference failed to agree on the parameters of the Trusteeship system for five years that was suggested by Ernst Bevin the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain, nor on the borders of the state that will follow; and on principle and the percentages of the Jewish immigration to Palestine; at the end Bevin declared the failure of the conference and the British decision to submit the problem to the UN, opening the way to the fourth stage of the British policy regarding the pre-1948 Palestine (Sakhnini, 1986, 165-175).

The fourth and the final stage took place when Britain decided to bring the file of Palestine to the UN table in 1947, and then decided to withdraw its forces from Palestine in the 15th of May 1948. The events that took place by then showed that Britain left the cities, the villages and the public spaces in Palestine, and concentrated their forces inside their military camps combined with a decision to limit their military operations to be only responses to the attacks on them, at the same time Britain gave the properties deeds in Palestine to the Zionist organization, and also informed the Zionist military groups in advance about the dates of their forces gradual withdrawals from the Palestinian cities, which

allows the Zionist groups to implement their Plan Dalet leading to the establishment of the State of Israel in the night when the last British soldier left Palestine (Pappe, 2007, 137). The UN 1947 Partition plan (UN General Assembly resolution 181) was followed by a different concept for its implementation in the ground; for example the Jewish State was supposed to include according to the text 400,000 Arabs, but in the application Britain supported an ethnic cleansing process that led to the Evacuation of Most of these, also nor Britain, neither the UN forces present interfered in order to prevent such ethnic cleansing from happening (Pappe, 2007, 121). In regard to the UN Britain stopped the UN to deploy an orderly UN team in Palestine, therefore the UN was left only with monitors (Pappe,138), for example these monitors were witnesses to the expulsion of Abu Shosheh village Palestinians due to their systematic visits to it (Pappe, 2007, 121).

The conclusion so far is as follows: Britain was a factually active mother country to the Zionist project during the period of the British Mandate over Palestine, without the British it was almost impossible for the Immigrating Zionists to get an assertive policy towards the establishment of a Jewish Homeland that became later in the 1930s "A Jewish State" in the British policy; without Britain the land appropriation wouldn't happen, neither the Jewish acquisition of the Palestinian citizenship would take place, nor the military training in the ranks of the British Mandate Police, or by the British officer Orde Charles Wingate would take place and no dynamic Jewish immigration to Palestine. Even during the period of the Britain call for a Palestinian State in 1939 it kept it open to the Jewish immigration, and also the proposal was taken very quickly out of the table, the replacement was the partition plan which will in one hand fulfill the promise of the national home to the Zionists, but in second hand encourage Emir Abdullah of Jordan to annex the Palestinian parts to his Emirate as it happened in the 1930s. When the UN approved the 1947 partition plan, the Palestinian West Bank parts were annexed to Jordan in 1948. Also, the Gaza Strip was put under Egyptian Administration till Israel occupied them in 1967.

1948 was not the end of the story, but the beginning of it. Two changes took place at that time regarding the borders of Israel, one among the Labor Movement who for then 1948 was not the end, but they continued to dream of the "Whole Israel Land" in all Palestine including the West Bank and Gaza, and the second is the Revisionist Zionists who continued to dream of original Palestine till Oslo Agreement of 1993 was signed, followed by others who still wanted to have Jordan either as part of Israel, or as an alternative Palestinian State as Ted Belman and Zehut Party (see chapter two). Due to these orientations, the Israeli Constitution was prepared and approved by the Israeli Knesset in 1948 but left the borders of the State Open.

In another hand, research has discovered the presence of a map that was prepared by the Jewish Agency in 1947 for a Jewish State within borders that are almost similar to the 1967 borders (Pappe, 2007, 35). Also, in 1948 a military campaign was conducted to occupy Jenin, and Yitzhaki Operation was undertaken to fill Qaliqilia and Tulkarem all cities in West Bank (Pappe, 2007, 152-153, 177). In 1967 the full mission was accomplished, but what left according to Kana`aneh is the next task by expelling the Palestinian population to outside Palestine. He wrote: "The Israeli plan was fulfilled only partially till now by appropriating all the Palestinian land; but it is not completed in regard of getting rid of the whole indigenous Palestinian population, and this is what we believe that Israel will seek to achieve in the foreseeable future" (Kana`aneh, 1990, 15).

Sayegh goes further by suggesting that the Zionist project is still incomplete in the sense that it does not yet achieved its three objectives of establishing the state, expelling the Arabs, and the territorial extent which will be made only when the 1919 Jewish Agency map of Palestine will be completed including the annexation of Jordan, South Lebanon, and the South and Western- South parts of Syria to Israel (Sayegh, 1965, 220). Probably some changes happened since

1965 when Sayegh wrote his study and today that might change some of his conclusions, but he is still entirely right regarding the expansionist nature of Zionism.

In other words Britain as a mother country created a state that acted as a state in the making, looking continuously outside its borders and seeking to expand. The Mother country and its "step Child" (Pappe, 2008) worked in tandem when the latter was in need for the former, but when the latter became strong enough to stand alone, the contradictions began to like what happened in the 1940s when the Zionists started calling on Britain to withdraw from Palestine in this case (Sayegh, 1965, 213), and like the "American revolution" against Britain (see chapter 2), or like the revolt of the settlers of Algeria against France (Rodinson, 1973, 64). To complete this analysis also the differences of the Zionist Settler colonial project than others should be mentioned regarding its relations with the mother country. In this regard, Zionism did not depend only on Britain and other mother countries earlier, but there is also an independent role of the Zionist movement itself that should not be ignored. This role included recruiting the Jewish Monies to build colonial settlements in Palestine, and also included the use of the Jewish communities spread in different countries in the world to lobby Governments and recruit support; the Jewish Communities in the United States, Germany, Britain, Russia, and other countries played such roles as it can be concluded from what was presented so far in this thesis. IlanPappe went even further to suggest that Zionism is one of case in which a "National movement" emerged, and looked for the return to the Promised Land as if it is a national movement, "but in fact it uprooted other people and became colonialist as such" (Pappe, 2008, 614). The National Nature of Zionism was discussed elsewhere in this study, but the point to stress here is that it is right that Christian Messianism preceded Zionism, and it is right that without Britain the State of Israel might not emerge, but these facts should not lead to the ignorance to what is unique about Zionism as a movement that has its colonial

nature as part of its being and not as a characteristic imposed on it from outside only.

Does what follow 1967 is that Israel became a mother country to a new settler colonial project? Will, the relationship between Israel and the settler-colonial project in the post-1967, occupied Palestinian territories ends with a crisis like what happened before with the other settler colonial cases?

In a partial response to these questions, Mohammed Shtayyeh said in a published debate "the mother country for the settler colonial project in Palestine was the world and the Jews of the World, but after 1967 Israel became the mother country, and the Daughter is a settler- colonial group in West Bank" (Shtayyeh, 2016, 24).

Agreeing in different way Lorenzo Veracini suggested that: "Israel's contiguity to the territories it occupied, combined with the special relationship to its settler-colonial project there, could obscure the fact that, structurally, its position vis-à-vis the West Bank and Gaza is analogous to Britain vis-à-vis Palestine during the Mandate (1922-1948). Structurally, both Britain and Israel functioned/ function as the metropolitan center (the occupying colonial power) relative to the territories they seized militarily in 1917 and 1967, respectively. Both sponsored Jewish colonial settlements. But whereas Zionism during the 1947-1949 war was able to expel the majority of the Palestinians from within of what became Israel proper, in 1967 the population living in what remains of Palestine did not leave" (Veracini, 2013, 29).

Another way to assess this issue is historical. Till the Likud took over the government in Israel for the first time in 1977, the period of 1967 to 1977 witnessed two settler- colonial proposals in regard to the post 1967 settler-colonial project, one of them was Governmental going online with Alon Plan of settling mainly in the strategic positions in West Bank and Gaza in addition to

annexing East Jerusalem to Israel (see earlier), and the second project was the one adopted by certain non- state actors such as Gush Emunim and the Movement for the whole land of Israel. It should be noted that the difference between these two trends was only relative, because the Labor Government at that time conducted transfer actions during and right after the 1967 war such as the demolition of the villages of Yalo, Emuas and Beit Nuba close to the Green Line between Israel and the occupied West Bank; demolished and expelled the Palestinian population of the Old City of Jerusalem to Shuafat Refugee Camp in the same city, evacuating and expelling the 1948 Palestinian refugees from Jericho city refugee camps to Jordan, and last but not least arranging buses to take people from Damascus Gate in Jerusalem and drop them in the borders with Jordan. These transfers are well documented by Nur Masalha (Masalha, 2003, 177-213) Secret documents that were newly released also shown that the Israeli Cabinet discussions in 1967 included the subject of the transfer of the Palestinians. During those debates Levi Eshkol the Prime Minister of Israel by then said that he is: “Working on the establishment of a unit or office that will engage in encourages Arab emigration” “We should deal with this issue quietly and covertly, and we should work on finding a way for them to emigrate to other countries and nit just over the Jordan (River)” (Aderet, Ofer, Haaretz, 17/11/2017).

In the debate ideas were also presented to pressure Gaza Strip population, including stopping the provision of water, to oblige them to leave (Aderet, in Haaretz, 2017). However after the war, the Labor Government and the Settlers non- state actors movement converged in the sense that both wanted to establish a colonial settler project in the post- 1967 occupied territories, but they diverged between the Settlers non- state actors willing to do that under the banner of the Jewish return to the full lands of Israel, and the correction of the mistake that was done in 1948 by stopping the war before conquering all the land of Israel. In the other hand, the Government wanted to settle in the strategic location for Israeli security needs (Yigal Alon position), or in a way that

will not create obstacles for the annexation of the whole territories and their population to Israel (Moshe Dayan position). Accordingly, the settlers raised at that time the idea for creating a "Judea and Samaria" State to be independent of Israel as indicated earlier.

The situation became different after 1977 when the Governance in Israel moved to the Likud with its harsh and more ideological position aiming to create the conditions for the re-establishment of Israel on the whole land of Palestine. The developments that took place ever since till 2018 was covered in chapter two, but what can be concluded here is that with this convergence between the Government position and the colonial settlers one the idea for establishing a separate Settler colonial state that is separate from Israel evaporated, but instead the settlers hijacked the Israeli politics and created their blocks in the Knesset and the Government leading to a situation that the Government became the servant of the settler-colonial project, not only because of the settlers pressure but more importantly due to the Government parties ideological agreement with the colonial settlers.

The conclusions here are apparent: One: The classical model of mother country versus a baby settler project did not work in the case of Israeli presence in the post-1967 occupied territories. Instead, we see here a state that thinks that its settler-colonial project was not completed in 1948, and the time come after 1967 for this completion. Second: As indicated earlier, this is contradictory with the Veracini model that the settler project get to an end after a state emerges out of it. In this case a settler colonial state emerged, and it is continuing its project in two ways either by seeking to create a Jewish Majority in the post 1967 occupied territories which do not look likely, or by demographic elimination of the indigenous people “ Physically and/or discursively “ as Veracini also wrote (Veracini, 2013, 30); physically by the expulsion to outside the country, and/ or discursively by depriving them from their citizenship and political participation rights as happening. Third: Veracini in the quote above mentioned the contiguity

issue between Israel and the post 1967 occupied territory, but he missed here that the issue goes beyond just a territorial contiguity; it is more about a settler colonial State that looks to its settler-colonial project as being incomplete in 1948, and now it is in the process of completion. He also sees the special relations between the state of Israel and the settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem, but what is missing here is that the issue exceeds being just a special relation, to be more an ideological convergence between the settlers and the so-called "The new right" in Israel that was strengthened in the last decade, and which aims among other things to establish the whole land of Israel; to elevate the Jewishness of the state over its democratic structure; to revive the Messianic nature of Zionism, and to strengthen the national myths about the whole land of Israel through the pact of extreme national Zionists and the religious radical Zionists that it created called in Israel as *Hardalim* which refers to the combination between the secular *Hilonim* and the religious *Haredim*, Right-wing groups in Israel (Hunaida Ghanem,2017, 10; Bashir,2016, 30).

The result of this analysis is clear. No mother state versus a baby one is in town. This is the case, then: How one can theorize the Israeli presence in the post-1967 occupied territories concerning its colonial settlers there? The answer might be as follows: A Zionist settler colonial state emerged in 1948 with Britain being its mother country. This State continued its settler-colonial activities ever since against its Palestinian population inside its proper and later inside its proper and in the post-1967 occupied Palestinian territories together. Accordingly, the search shouldn't be about a mother-baby settler colonial relationship in the framework of the relations between this state and its settlers in the post-1967 territory, but it should be in the framework of Israel as an ongoing settler colonial project with its outside mother country. It should be about Israel as a continuous settler-colonial project in the process of completion and its external supporting forces, being in this case the United States which moved to the leadership worldwide directly after the second world war, and became the caretaker of Zionism and Israel (and a caretaker after 1967 to Israel

settler-colonial project in the post 1967 occupied territories) instead of Britain ever since. Some World Jewry organizations that are blindly supportive to Israel should be added besides the United States in this regard.

3.3 The Other Settler Colonial Cases Possible Contribution to the Explication of the Past, Present, and the Future of the Zionist Settler-Colonial project, and its Potential Transformations

Some comparisons were made in chapter two between other settler colonial cases and the Zionist one. The objective now is to go further in these comparisons towards both better explication of the exclusion and the inclusion mechanisms used by the settler-colonial projects in the past and the present and to try to predict using Ian Lustick way of prediction mentioned in chapter one of this study. The Specific question for this part is: What are the past, present and the future of the Zionist Settler colonial project in Palestine when it is compared with the three cases of United States, South Africa, and Ireland and Northern Ireland?

Common between all these cases is that they followed the British Model of the privatization of the settler-colonial project under the British supporting colonial rule. All of them were satellite movements in a sense as IlanPappe described the Zionist movement who depended on the political support of Britain but also used none state actors' capacities and finances. All imagined a barren land from the western civilized; all thought of themselves as god messengers and holders of a divine mission to make the desert blossom, and the countries modernized; all created their "settler democracy systems" that as much as democratic for the ethnos. The ethnicity/ies of the colonial settlers and in the expense of all people participation, as much as it is savage as Michael Mann maintained against the demos, the latter perceived as inclusive to all people within the state proper regardless to their national, ethnic, racial, sex, color differences or any other reason for dispute.

In the other hand among the four cases discussed in this study, there is one that already passed its former settler colonial structures, and this is South Africa who reached in 1994 an agreement to end the Apartheid system, and to integrate the old minority of the colonial settlers in one integrative democratic order together with the blacks and the colored indigenous majority, on the basis of the principle of equal rights to all; another one is in which Britain decided to cut six counties of Ireland in 1921, and to establish Northern Ireland consisting of them under its ruling. Through 1998 Good Friday Agreement it was agreed by Britain, Ireland, and the American mediator George Mitchell to create a stalemate that is free from violence, and represented in a power-sharing system that brought the loyalists/ Unionists settler colonialists and their offspring, and the indigenous Nationalists/ integrativists together, but left the identity of the land and its belonging open, while the British administration was kept (provisionally or for a long term, as this point also wasn't decided) with some responsibilities to control and run the power-sharing process. In these two cases, there are processes of integration. One of them (South Africa) is witnessing an ongoing process of integrating the settler colonialists together with the indigenous population that is going on with difficulties mainly due to the continuous settler colonialists dominance over the economy along with a minority of new black capitalists which creates tensions and instability in the country (Abdel Fattah, 2018; Jeenah, 2012); in the other hand the second (Northern Ireland) which decided to start an integrative process on paper, but failed to launch it practically till today, 20 years after the Good Friday Agreement.

The other two cases of the United States and Israel are different, since both represent cases of which the settler colonial projects were able to create unilateral states for the settler colonialists, in the United States this was achieved in 1776 after settlers war against Britain that was called as the "War of independence", and the second was established on the 15th of May 1948, less than six months after the United Nations General Assembly resolution 181 of 29th of November 1947 gave it the 'right' to be established, this was Israel.

The United States case is both similar and different than the Zionist project, but it is the most similar. In one hand both shares the characteristics mentioned above, further, the two cases past (The pre-1776 American past, and the pre-Israel per-1948 past), presents other similarities, including first the "logic of elimination." In the United States this logic was genocidal to the indigenous people; their places, space, territories, and their landscape; while the Zionist pre- Israel experience informs that the elimination took the shapes of "demographic elimination" as Nadim Rouhana maintained in the shape of ethnic cleansing, and external and internal disposessions, and the acquisition of the places, space, territory, and the landscape as well in addition to massacres. In both cases the society was also dispersed, its social cohesion fragmented, and it's National and political identity killed. This was a full exclusion. The early 17th century Councils of the representatives in Massachusetts, Virginia and other States in the United States, and National Committee; *Vaad Leumi*, of the settler colonial settlement in Palestine, were all councils that aimed to discuss and prepare the best and the fastest plans for the displacement of the indigenous populations, taking over their lands, and deprive them from any aspect of representation. The "leftovers" after the genocide in the United States and the demographic elimination by Israel were given inferior positions after the states were established in the United States the African Americans got their equal rights only recently, and the Amerindians still suffer the absence of full recognition of their rights as explained in chapter two. In Israel, the consideration of the State as "Jewish" rendered the Arabs inferior and second-degree citizens.

The American and the Zionist past in other hand differ on the ways of elimination, the first was more genocidal, the second committed massacres but were more for 'demographic removal'; the first tend to take over lands, and transform them from the status of communal and public properties as they were tom private property lands, this was done by the "right of discovery", by conquering, or by pushing the Amerindian gradually to the West of Mississippi

by an agreement after an agreement, and finally by trade in a way that the Amerindian tribe will be obliged to give the lands in order to get rid from debts; while the second got lands in the pre-1948 period through purchase mainly from the Arab landowners such as Sursuq and "Al Tayyan families from Lebanon, or by getting the so called "State land" from the British; or by the use of the British land laws of transforming the communal (*Musha'a lands*) to private land through registration, that many peasants couldn't do and as such facilitated the purchase of lands by the Zionists; or by bribes; or the use of the foreign consulates pressures on the authorities as it was the case during the Ottoman period that preceded the British Mandate.

The elimination of the Amerindians, was also intensified by bringing slaves from Africa to work on the settlers plantations instead of the Amerindians, in the opposite the Zionist Movement did not bring a labor force from abroad in the shape of slaves, therefore contrary to the plantation model of United States the model of pure and ethnic colonies were used, either by having a full Hebrew work in the colony, or by continuing to hire Palestinian labor force , but keeping the ethnic division at the same time as Gershon Shafir maintained; besides that Yemeni Jews were brought in the beginnings of the twentieth century to replace the Palestinians workers as early indicated. One of the reasons why slaves were brought might be related also to the massive size of the United States which represented in the pre-1776 together with Mexico and Canada tens of thousands of Kilometers before the division of these from each other; while today United States is 9,834,000 km² which is also very big. The Land of Palestine is tiny and not more than 27,000 km² in which Zionism planned for 3 to 4 million Jews to build their lives and professions in it. Therefore no foreign non-Jewish labor force was sought.

The United States was established after a war between the settlers and the British forces; the end was the declaration of the United States in 1776. In the other hand, Israel was created by a UN decision as indicated. Some will say that

the Jewish "struggle for independence" led to the evacuation of the British forces under the hits of the Zionist groups, but as a matter of fact it was Britain that decided to take the file of Palestine back to the UN in 1947 as indicated, and then it started to prepare for the withdrawal; in another hand the attacks by the Irgun and Lihi on the British forces were minor, even though that the Haganah also joined in some attacks while keeping the cooperation with the British mainly during the Second World War (Abdel Hafidh Muhareb, 1981). This means that Israel was established under UN radar; its implementation conditioned its admission to the UN in 1949 to the 194 UN General Assembly Resolutions which requires Israel to allow the return of the Palestinian refugees to their country. The significance of this point is twofold; in one hand it gives the settler colonial project in Palestine an international legitimacy, but it also put Israel actions under the international radar in the second hand. Given the Western support to Israel, the first consideration was given the priority over the second consideration. Therefore Israel is not any more requested to implement the right of the Palestinian refugees to go back to their country.

The Zionist model, also created a Palestinian refugee problem, the majority of these took refuge outside Palestine mainly in the period when the ethnic cleansing process by the Zionist military organizations was conducted during the last six months before the State of Israel was created in 1948; the rest were kept as "leftovers" inside Israel including those who are internally displaced (see earlier). In the case of the United States, another process took place, in one hand the majority of the Amerindians were slaughtered decades and more before the establishment of the state, and the rest found places to live inside the vast territory of the United States. The size of the country played a significant role, here again. Also, this component of refugees contributed in addition to other factors to the keeping of the conflict open for Zionism not with the Palestinians only. But also, with the Arabs, and that is opposite of the United States where the dispute was settled, and the state stabilized; the difference here is between a finalized settler colonial projects, the United States, and

another one of settler colonial state that is still in the making (Israel). Besides that, one characteristic of the conflict here is that it is an Arab-Israeli and not only a Palestinian Israeli since Palestine is part of a more significant entity, the Arab Nation.

Moving to the present of the two cases, the US present since 1776, and the Israeli present after 1948, some other comparisons can be added. In the United States 4,9 million Amerindians were present in the United States by 2010, as Waziyataween indicated the majority of them are not any more convinced to struggle any more against the American occupation of their country despite the fact that do not possess more than 0.12 percent of the land of American and that 98 percent of the Red Indians of the World were slaughtered; one of the reasons for that absence of interest is related to the fact that the United States made an apology, and also the settler colonials did not claim that they are indigenous (Waziyataween,2012, 181-183). This means that the process of assimilation (which represents another way of elimination in this case of the national identity and the right of existence as a separate independent people) worked very well in the case of the United States. In the contrary is Israel in which its Jewish nature played the role of an obstacle for the assimilation of the non-Jews in the State system, in one hand they were allowed to participate in the Israeli Ethnocratic or herrenvolk democracy, but at the same time their rights were not recognized, and the state continued confiscating their lands, and discriminating against them; the result was the continuation of the presence of a vibrant national group of Palestinians who produced visionary documents about their Palestinian and Arab affiliations as indicated earlier. Since also the Israeli occupation took another step in 1967 by occupying the rest of Palestine, the exclusion process that led to the strengthening of the Palestinian national identity got more momentum.

Besides this difference between the present United States and present Israel, there is another issue of commonality between both, in the top of the list of

these is the United States caretaking of Israel started since the end of the second World war, the Joint Messianic approach that both countries currently share, also the Joint expansionist role that both play (the USA as an Imperialist Empire as Aziz Rana indicated, and Israel as a regional imperialist power as Fouad Morsi indicated), the priority they both give to military force and physical security discourses; there is also the American support to Israel politically in the UN and different international organizations, and financially by the considerable help given by the United States to the Israeli economy, and also to the Israeli military capacities, the last in this regard was 38 billion dollars of American aid allocated to Israel in the previous year of President Obama term in 2016.

The American Evangelicals private financial Contributions to Israel, through several organizations such as Christian Friends of Israel Communities, and the American Friends of New Communities in Israel, and also the contributions of the Jewish organizations in the United States for the support of Israel such as AIPAC, Haddasah, the World Zionist Organization, and others should be added. According to a report prepared by Maan Development Center in Ramallah in 2010 the amount of expenses of these organizations in the Jordan Valley only in 2008 was 86,283,928 dollars, while their revenues were 151,206,036 (Ma'an Development Center, 2010, 33).

Today there are also an emerging new Jewish organization in the USA called the Israeli American Council (IAC) led by the Jewish Billionaire Sheldon Adelson, the friend of the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, and one of fundraisers for the President Trump electoral campaign, in addition to his role in convincing President Trump to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem that took place in the 14th of May 2018; he established this organization to compete with AIPAC that became a moderate for Mr. Netanyahu, and to struggle against J Street and the other left organizations acting among the American Jewry. During the President Trump period, he said several times that he would learn from Israel how to build the separation wall

that he is planning to build on the borders with Mexico (Washingtonpost. com, 5th of August, 2017). He sent a security delegation led by the US Homeland Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen to check and learn from the Israeli security arrangements in the borders of Gaza with Egypt, and the kind of technology and methods Israel uses to protect its security (Nielson, www.timesofisrael.com, 13/6/2018).

Finally, it should be mentioned that the messianic team around President Trump already dropped the issues of refugees and Jerusalem from the Israeli Palestinian negotiation's agenda; made a blind eye towards the Israeli settlement expansion, stopped most of the funding of the UNRWA, and also most of it to the Palestinian Authority (200,000 million dollars cut from the American Aid to Palestine as the American State Department decided on the 24rd of August 2018).

These developments look as if the United States is joining the "Israeli Victory Agenda" that was developed by Daniel Pipes (See chapter two). They are expressing as such a new stage in the American support to Israel towards taking crucial decisions by Israel to annex all the historical land of Palestine, and thus finish any hope of achieving two states solution on 1967 borders and putting the Palestinian right of self-determination in the abyss. In another hand, these developments express as Majdi Hammad maintained the "Crusader State option" for Israel being the option of constant and nonstop conflict (Hammad, 2017). Where will this option lead to? This is an inevitable question that its answer is unpredictable being dependent on the intermestics. The international, Middle Eastern, and internal components and the interactions between all of these in the coming future.

The Future of the two cases thus is a matter of prediction. In this case, it is possible to generally say that the American experience is a one of imposing facts and changes by force, and as well by imposition. The American loss in

Vietnam and the chaos it created in Afghanistan and Iraq do not look to be teaching the United States a lesson or to change its direction. The same goes for Israel who decided to be in a constant situation of war, and always alerted. That is why the United States and Israel look to be more similar than any other settler colonial projects. Here we have a one that is finalized and is seeking to create its repetition through Israel, the settler-colonial project in the making; in this regard Ian Lustick maintained that when the mother country start to remove key issue from the negotiations table to decide about them, like what Trump administration already did in regard to Jerusalem, refugees and other matters; in this case a threshold is passed in the path of creating new facts in the ground leading to a dramatic change (Lustick, 1993). The Palestinians and the Israelis are looking to be in that threshold point at the moment.

Moving to Ireland/ Northern Ireland past of pre- 1921, and Zionism/ Israel till 1948, It is first interesting to notice that the British Mandate hired officers who served earlier in Northern Ireland (Khalidi, Hussain,2102, 384). Also, during the period of presenting proposals for the partition of Palestine by Peel Commission in 1937, and Woodhead Committee of 1938, Neville Chamberlain the Prime Minister of Britain received a memorandum in 1938 written by the Secretary of the State for Colonies William Ormsby-Gore in which he indicated to the “unique similarity” between Ireland and Palestine” (Sakhnini, 1986,134). Maybe Mr. Ormsby-Gore was referring to the partition of Ireland in 1921, and the possibility of repeating it in Palestine in the context of that time.

The partition of Ireland was done by a decision of the British Government in 1921. In the year of 1800, Britain decided to annex all Ireland to Britain and to work for the integration of it's Catholic and Protestant together, as it was its strategy in Palestine explicated above. The 1921 in Ireland looks to be similar to 1937 in Palestine when the Peel Commission suggested the Partition; more interesting is that the Palestinian part according to that commission plan was supposed to be united with Jordan, and not to have an independence, exactly

like the six counties of Northern Ireland that were supposed to get annexed to Britain. Maybe, Mr. Ormsby-Gore meant all these similarities. However, in 1947 the United Nations General Assembly decided in November 1947 to establish two states in Palestine one Jewish and one Palestinian. In the end, this resolution was not implemented, and West Bank was annexed to Jordan while Gaza was put under an Egyptian Administration that continued till 1967, similar to the British Administration to Northern Ireland that remained till today.

The two partition stories also contrast. In the case of Ireland, the partition came out after 800 years of the British colonialism; the settlers brought there were mainly British. In the case of Palestine, the Jewish State came to the being after few decades only of planned colonial settlement that were primarily Jewish with British support. The result of both cases was different in one hand the Protestants in Northern Ireland asked for the Partition to use the majority that they have in six counties to call for the annexation of these six counties to Britain because they considered themselves to be British citizens. In the second-hand Zionism used the British support to create a Zionist colonial settler country in Palestine to be separate and independent from Britain. The result of this is that calling the 1921 process in Ireland as a partition is misleading. What happened there was that Britain revoked its annexation of the year 1800 of most the counties of Ireland which allowed for the establishment of the Republic of Ireland, while kept the annexation of six Irish counties to Britain. By considering the position of the other side, the Catholics and the Palestinians, this conclusion can be better understood.

In the case of the Catholics (the Nationalists), the decision of Britain of 1921 created a split among them that led to three-year civil war between those who wanted the six counties not to be separated from Ireland and to have a full Irish independence, and those who accepted the independence on Ireland without the six counties. After the three years, the Republic of Ireland was sustained, but its links with Britain continued till 1937 when Ireland released its constitution,

but conflict erupted in Northern Ireland between the dominating Protestant Loyalists and Unionist Parties in one hand and the Nationalist Catholics in the second hand. The first ruled Northern Ireland unilaterally from 1921 to 1972, while the latter was divided by then between those who were ready to call for a power-sharing system and those who continued to call for a united Ireland. In the case of Palestine, a division took place between the position of the Majority of the Palestinian leadership in 1937 towards the Peel Commission partition plan, and the position of the "Defense Party" led by Raghib Nashashibi who accepted the plan and called for the annexation of the Palestinian part to Jordan. In 1947 this division was repeated, but the Defense Party representatives held conferences in Jericho and Nablus that gave support to the position of Emir Abdullah to go ahead and annex West Bank to Jordan. In the other side, the Palestinian leadership held a conference in Gaza in October 1948 that created a Palestinian Government and a Palestinian National Council, but this Government ruled only for two weeks till it was dissolved by the Egyptians who put Gaza under their administration till 1967 (Shabib, 1998; Al Az`ar 1998).

In both cases, the aspiration of the majority of the indigenous populations was not taken into consideration. In the case of Palestine where the majority of the indigenous was kept till 1948, a referendum would have been a suitable tool to measure these aspirations. However, the matter would have been more complicated in Northern Ireland, where a majority of Protestant settlers was created in the six counties kept annexed to Britain. So maybe, and due to the split in the position between all the Catholics in all Ireland, a referendum that includes all the Irish in both North and South to decide on separating the counties from Ireland, or keeping them as parts of it, was more suitable for this case. In both cases, this democratic process was not introduced. Instead, the will of Britain and the settler colonialists were imposed on the indigenous in the path of excluding them and excluding their national aspirations as well. In Palestine this exclusion took place by the expulsion of most of the Palestinians

to outside their country (a full exclusion), while in Northern Ireland no ejection was done, and nor refuge was created. Instead, the exclusion from the 'who counts' process prevailed in Northern Ireland by preventing the Irish Nationalists from participating in the political system until 1972, followed by conditional participation until 1998 as illustrated.

The Northern Ireland present, starting from 1998 Great Friday or Belfast Agreement, and Israel's one beginning in May 1948 tells different stories. In the case of Northern Ireland, an inclusion process in the political system emerged; on the contrary, Israel created another new exclusion process. One inside Israel from 1948 till today which is a process of exclusion by defining the state from the beginning along ethnic lines, denying the national rights of the Palestinians inside Israel, and limiting the rights of access to the land to Jews only. In the other side, the Palestinians were under a military rule till 1966, and when it was lifted the exclusion continued in a way that they were included through representatives in the Knesset but continued to be deprived of the equal citizenship rights, and the access to land and national rights. As discussed earlier this herrenvolk type of democracy, represented a kind of continuous settlers democracy that went ahead to grab land, and to practice internal colonialism towards the indigenous population who were supposed to become (together with their relatives that were forcibly migrated) equal citizens in the new emerging State. If it was to be a state for all its citizens regardless of their different affiliations, either being national, ethnic, religious, or according to sex or color, or any other reason for differentiation.

The other process of exclusion, which was more chronic and more endemic, was created in West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem in the aftermath of the 1967 war. Here the Palestinians were divided to different categories of residency rights (with no citizenship rights) as explained in chapter two. But all are without rights to the land that was considered as land under dispute without an agreed upon owner until the latter will be defined as a result of the

negotiations. In the end, all the categories represented a population rather than a recognized people, and when the Palestinian Authority was created in 1994, the objective was that it would run the population civil issues within an autonomy till the 'Final Status' negotiations will come and give them the identity of the people. Since these negotiations failed to reach an agreement so far, the result was about keeping the Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories as a population rather than the aim to get them to become a people who have political rights as it was included in the preamble of Oslo Declaration of Principles (DOP).

In Northern Ireland, an inclusive representation process was created in one Assembly combined with a decision-making process according to a system that allows for the inclusion of the concerns of each party called De'Hondt following the name of the Belgian lawyer who invented it. This system defines who gets what position according to mathematical calculations, and therefore guarantees that the positions will be kept in the hands of the big parties. This is in the formal level which gave the dominance in the assembly to the two prominent loyalist and national parties. In a deeper level, the annexation to Britain that took place in 1921 continued until the people of Northern Ireland makes a different decision. In this regard, Britain kept in its hand after 1998 crucial matters such as the connection of Northern Ireland with the crown, the international relations, defense and security, immigration, taxes, and others. Besides these, the Secretary of the State in Northern Ireland is British who takes the responsibilities devolved to Northern Ireland Assembly when the latter got dissolved or paralyzed due to the disagreements between the loyalists and the nationalists. After the 1998 Good Friday Agreement the Assembly witnessed a situation of instability till it finally worked continuously from 2007 to 2017, and then it was paralyzed again since January 2017 till today, giving Britain the right to rule the country directly.

This overview tells that what is there in Northern Ireland is a British occupation that gives autonomy to the local parties to rule on the internal issues. This looks like the Autonomy for five years that was included in the DOP signed between the PLO and Israel in 1993, but with the following difference: In the Northern Ireland Britain is staying as a power for the protection of the British settlers that it sent to Northern Ireland in which significant portion of them calls for the annexation of Northern Ireland formally to Britain, while in the case of Palestine the Israeli occupation exists against the will of the Palestinian people, but certainly in tandem with the intentions of the settler colonialists that Israel keeps sending to the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories. The difference here is that Britain sent its colonial settlers to Ireland till 1921, while Israel is still carrying its an expanding colonial settlement till today. Common here between the two cases is the continuous status of autonomy (In Palestine since 1994, and in Northern Ireland since 1998) without an end looking to be at the end of the tunnel. Another point to mention here is that the Autonomy in Northern Ireland was operationalized only when the most extreme Unionist Party who rejected the Good Friday Agreement composed the Government in 2007 together with the Sinn Féin. This was the Democratic Unionist Party led by Ian Paisley who accepted to form a government with the Sinn Féin only after the latter completed the decommissioning and putting his arms entirely out of use. Paisley's deputy first Minister from the Sinn Féin was Martin McGuinness.

The Joint Government of these two Parties collapsed at the beginning of 2017, when the two of them were still struggling over the most challenging issues of Culture, language and identity (British, Ulster Scottish), Irish, or both, parades and flags, and the legacy of the past (Londow and Sergei, Council for Foreign Relations, 2018); the 2017 elections brought 39 seats to the most significant two Nationalist Parties, versus 38 seats to the two biggest unionists parties, out of 90 seats of the Council; this happening for the first time due to the growing percentage of the Nationalists in the population from being 34 percent according to 1972 census, to become 45 percent in the last census of 2011, versus 48

percent to the unionists who went down the 50 percent threshold for the first time (Nolan, www.irishtimes.com, 2017). This development might add to the heated situation in a country that is still segregated in the community level, and divided in its loyalties in the national level seeing the Unionists joining the British Westminster Parliament while the Sinn Fin boycotting it, and instead nominate Martin McGuinness to run for the Irish Republic Presidency in 2011 although he did not win, and he was not able to vote for himself. In this regard the reader to be reminded once again that the fate of Northern Ireland was left to its people to decide, so it was left as an open question.

In Israel the national security is linked to demography, the fear to lose the Jewish majority of the population and to lose the state accordingly. The same problem seems to be emerging in Northern Ireland. Will it lead to it a new referendum in the coming future that will change the political structure of the country to a one in which the nationalists will prevail? Difficult to predict, but the new emerging demography it seems is becoming a factor in the conflict there. Like the full segregation between the Israelis and the Palestinians and their dichotomy regarding the land history, identity, culture, and language; including between the Israelis and the Palestinians inside Israel proper. It is the same in Northern Ireland, but the difference is that these issues there became issues for negotiations between the two parties in the same country, while here these issues are subject to the imposition by one party on the other. Will these issues there lead to a permanent collapse of the joint government (already 19 months without a joint government there), or the government will be back to the track? The mentioned demographic issue might complicate things, and also will do the vote in Northern Ireland against the Brexit (56 percent were against) in times that Northern Ireland is getting one billion dollars support per year from the EU, and also the neighboring Republic of Ireland with its open borders with Northern Ireland is still a member in the EU. Again, it is difficult to predict what will happen; But Ireland Israel Palestine wise the following scenarios can be drawn for the future. The study will go over some of them briefly since they were

discussed in chapter two, but before doing so some words should be said about the role of the third party in both cases: In the Northern Ireland case and Israel Palestine as well, the collapse of the Soviet Union played an essential role in DOP of 1993, and the GFA of 1998. In Ireland the Sin Finn was looked at as Marxist during the Cold War period, but with the fall of Marxism followed by the flexibility of Jerry Adams personality, opened the way for a breakthrough; that was sustained by the intervention of several international stakeholders, on top Britain, the Republic of Ireland, the European Union, and the United States. The latter witnessed a significant number of Irish immigrants to it (4.5 million between 1820-1930), and between 1820 to 1860 the Irish immigrants represented one third of the immigrants to the United States, to be added to that that the Irish participated as colonial settlers in the killing of the Amerindians in Dakota and Lakota as part of the British troops (Library of Congress, www.loc.gov). In 1982, 41 million Americans said that they have Irish heritage (Spitka, 2016, 107).

The above information explains the intensive American involvement in the peace process in Northern Ireland through Senator George Mitchell, following also the several British- Irish Agreements since 1985 as described earlier in chapter two, and the fund that the EU and the United States created to support the process. Spitka called this type of intervention to be “united- neutral” which was enough there, while in Palestine the intervention was “divided partisan” which was a recipe to its failure; Spitka maintained that the case of Palestine-Israel will require a “united Partisan approach” to stand on the face of the aggressive side (Spitka, 2016, 166-168). Finally, here some words about the GFA in comparison to DOP. Both were not final solutions to the conflicts. It sufficed to them to calm the situation down: Ending violence in Northern Ireland followed by finding a common political power-sharing mechanism that achieved calmness in the ground a decommissioning of the IRA. The process of power-sharing witnessed progress but also setbacks, and at the end, it got stuck with the critical issues of culture, identity, language, and the problems of the past. In

the case of Palestine- Israel the DOP was also an interim agreement that created an autonomous authority under the Israeli occupation, stopped violence and created a process of negotiations to get gradually to a final status agreement. Twenty-five years already after DOP in 2018, the situation went backward, while a stalemate exists in Northern Ireland.

What are the future scenarios for the Palestinian Israeli case in light of the Irish/ Northern Irish case? This is the last question for this review of the two cases here. The most common between the two cases along with the previous overview is that both of them live till today under occupation: British and Israeli military, but after that, they diverge. In Northern Ireland the occupation was combined with bringing settlers till 1921 then it became almost a pure occupation afterward. Noteworthy in this case that Britain uses the description 'part of Britain' when it talks about Northern Ireland, but this description does not change the fact that Britain separated Northern Ireland from the whole Ireland in 1921, and the fact that the Irish people did not accept this separation till today. In the case of Palestine, the occupation continued in the 1967 Palestinian territories but combined with settler colonialism and Apartheid practices there, and the continued internal colonialism inside Israel proper. Accordingly, will the British annexation to the whole Ireland to Britain in 1800, and Northern Ireland in 1921 be repeated regarding the Palestinian occupied territories in 1967? A lot of signals presented in chapters two and three were made as indications for such a direction. The other one of the Cancellation of the British annexation to the most of Ireland in 1921 does not look likely, but will conditions emerge in the future in which Israel will annex the post-1967 occupied territories to its proper then cancel this annexation later? This looks a theoretical question.

Besides these comparisons, this thesis discussed in the previous two chapters other scenarios for Palestine in light of the Irish case. One of these scenarios is the annexation of parts of West Bank to Israel while others will be transferred to Palestine as Ian Lustick suggested, to be followed by a Palestinian fighting; the

second is a division of the 1967 occupied territories with the settlers as Pollak (Pollak, 2007) proposed and leaving Gaza aside to be the Palestinian State; a third scenario is about the transformation of Israel itself to the equal rights model to all its citizens like what the Republic of Ireland did toward its Protestant minority that represents 5 percent of the population; and the last scenario is about the independence of Palestine and Northern Ireland as well, on the basis of equal rights for all their citizens, and in this case it will not be a problem if Northern Ireland goes back to reunite with the Republic of Ireland.

The last case for comparison is South Africa with Zionism/ Israel, this country has a past of Settler colonialism till 1948 which is comparable with the Zionist settler colonialism till 1948, and it also has another history of Apartheid that started officially in 1948 when the National Party of the Afrikaners composed the government, at that period Apartheid was also combined with settler colonialism. In 1961 Britain withdrew its forces, and the Apartheid continued till 1994 when the transformation to a democratic government took place.

The settler-colonial past of South Africa started in 1652 when the Dutch Boer arrived and started settling, followed a century and a half ahead, in 1795 with the British. Both brought colonial settlers to the country. The aim at the beginning was about securing the Cape of Good Hope as the sea route to India, but later diamond was discovered in 1867, and gold in 1886 creating additional interests that led to a war between the British and the Boer from the end of the 19th century and continued for several years as early indicated till Britain won. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 created another interest. As Farsoun wrote, the British issued the "Union Act" of South Africa in 1909 with the aim to keep the Cape of Good Hope as an alternative route to the Suez Canal if the latter was endangered; in the other hand it was one of the aims of Balfour Declaration to create an entity that will help to preserve the control over the Suez Canal (Farsoun, 1975, 155).

Similar to the case of United States, slaves were brought from outside to serve in the 'White settlers' plantations, but different than the United States case the treatment of the local population of the blacks and the colored was not genocidal. Sometimes these were uprooted from their lands and left jobless, but mostly they were collected in reserves that they are prohibited from going without permission and used as a cheap labor force in the agriculture, industry, and mines. Opposite to the process of pure ethnic colonies created by the Zionist project in Palestine starting from 1904, South African whites depended on the local labor force. Later on, this labor force provides with the fuel that energized the process of change in South Africa, starting by the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 when 69 people were killed; followed by Soweto strikes by the students of 1976, and in 1985 COSATU, the Congress of South African Trade Unions was launched to take a critical role in the struggle (Abdel Fattah, 2018, 13).

Back to the settler colonialism period in South Africa, Zaaiman presented an interesting comparison between the Afrikaners, the former Boer, colonial settlers and Zionism: Both started at the end of the 19th century including the revival of their historical languages, and the invention of their past histories and their envisioning of barren lands; both combined settler colonialism with racial discrimination, both moved to Apartheid practices in 1948; both obsessed of demography and uprooting and rule and divide, both created an economic and military cooperation between them, both use oppression, subjugation, violence, house demolitions, and assassinations extensively; Finally both glorify the military and the security apparatus, and depend on nuclear weapons and conscription (Zaaiman, 2007). Glaser added to these that they also use settler democracy to exclude the other from participation, or equal participation (Glaser, 2012, 232). In the case of Palestine the Zionists created their settler democracy inside their colonies on the basis of equal participation by all the settlers, while they participated in a formal structure together with the British and the indigenous population which was far from being democratic due to the

appointment of the British representatives in one hand, and the restriction of the authorities of the Joint Council in a way that cannot challenge Balfour Declaration and the Terms of Mandate focusing on the creation of a national home to the Jews in Palestine. In the South, Africa voting was granted to the settlers, then gradually to the colored while the blacks were obliged to wait till 1994 to have their equal voting rights with all the other citizens.

Besides these similarities in regard to the settler- colonial period in South Africa, one can add the cooperation between them till 1948, starting from Herzl letter to Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902), the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896 asking him for convincing the British to become the mother country of Zionism, and followed by the Letter from General Jan Smuts who was serving in South Africa, and had a friendship with Chaim Weizman. Smuts sent his letter to Colonel Amery stressing that the borders of the Jewish State should include the Litani River in Lebanon, and the sources of Jordan River water, and urged him to allow for broad Jewish immigration to Palestine. Smuts Also had a role in releasing the Balfour Declaration earlier (Abbas, 2011; 1984, 135-141).

After the settler- colonial period, South Africa moved to Apartheid, according to the Jewish Trotskyite leader Moshe Machover "Apartheid can be reversed, but ethnic cleansing cannot be reversed especially in short and the medium runs" (Machover, 2014). This quotation is signaling one again to the main difference between the Zionist settler-colonial project and that one of South Africa. In the second no expulsion and no transfer of the indigenous population took place, and that is on the contrary to the Zionist project. But beyond that, the Apartheid period in South Africa is comparable with the ways that Israeli used in its relations with the Palestinians inside its proper, and the Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories. Like the South African reserves, the Bantustans, to the indigenous population, Israel enclosed the territories of the Palestinians inside Israel, and put them under a military rule from 1948 till 1966; like in South Africa the move from and to these enclosed territories was not possible without

permits, but different than South Africa at the same time the State of Israel continued confiscating their lands by different laws combining Apartheid with internal colonialism as indicated earlier. Therefore, Israel is an Apartheid state plus, despite that Israel took a position of condemning the South African Apartheid in the UN, while kept a strong economic, military and security cooperation between the two countries (Abbas 2011/ 1989; Mathew, 1977; Farsoun, 1975); the South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd commented on Israel votes by saying: "The Jews appropriated Israel from the Arabs who were living there since a thousand year... I agree with them on that, because, similarity to South Africa Israel is an Apartheid State". Following the author questioned why Israel should condemn the "Separate development" that it also practices in its proper (Mathew, 1977, 112-113).

In regard to the Palestinian territories in 1967, the use of Apartheid to describe it might help to expose the concept of "Separate development" between Israel and the Palestinian 1967 occupied territories, also it might help to explicate the separate development between the Colonial settlements in West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the Palestinians, but at the same time this description bears two risks, the first among them is about imagining the situation as a one that does not include the concept and the practices of territorial expansion that is definitely not part of the Apartheid concept; the second will also be about thinking of extra-territorial solution that calls for one State solution in the whole of Palestine, while ignoring the pre-condition for such a solution which is related to getting a recognition of the rights of the Palestinians towards their lands. As Hounaida Ghanem maintained, and this study agreed earlier, besides Apartheid other two major components are also needed to describe the situation in West Bank and East Jerusalem, and in order also to keep their unity with Gaza, these are: the Occupation by the Israeli Army, and the ongoing settler colonialism; the first refers to the system of control used with the Palestinians (that also include Apartheid aspects), and to support and sustain the latter as well, and the second

provides land grab, but separate development as well (Ghanem, 2009, 8-9; Hounida Ghanem, 2018).

Along with this trilateral description, it is time to wrap up the relevance of this analysis to the Palestinian other areas, besides West Bank discussed above, there is also Gaza Strip, and the Palestinians inside Israel; In the three places, there are occupation practices, as the case of Britain in Northern Ireland. There are Settler- colonialism, as the past of the USA and South Africa, and Apartheid, as the case of also another history of South Africa. As for Gaza occupation is practiced by controlling the borders from outside after the colonial settlements were dismantled, and the Israeli Army withdraw; a separate development process was created to Gaza with a high level of discrimination and a lot of hardships which is an aspect of an Apartheid policy towards those that you enclose in Bantustans, and then impose all kinds of restrictions against them, in a situation that you are also capable to re-occupy the inside Gaza in any time. Moreover, the prevention of the Palestinian refugees in Gaza who represent the majority of its population to return or to find a solution to their plight is a settler colonial aspect of no recognition of the necessary national and collective rights of the Palestinian refugees living in Gaza.

As for the Palestinians inside Israel, the non-recognition of their collective rights as a national group and accordingly the no-recognition of their rights to bring back their relatives the Palestinian refugees living in the refugee camps in West Bank, Gaza Strip and abroad; is a settler colonial aspect. The continuation of grabbing their lands and preventing them to equally use the so-called state land that was confiscated from them is about another a settler colonial aspect that is also called as 'internal colonialism.' Besides that, preventing them from residing in the Jewish residency areas and discrimination in all the walks of life are Apartheid aspects.

As all together, West Bank, including East Jerusalem and Gaza are subjected to the trilateral process of settler colonialism, playing its role in different ways between both of them, apartheid, and belligerent occupation. What might be missing for the Palestinians inside Israel is the military occupation that was finished officially in 1966, but parts of its practices are still taking place by civil authorities who conduct internal colonialism and Apartheid.

Learning from the three discussed case, the future scenarios that might include: Scenario one: On the basis of the Demographic growth, that led already to the creation of a Palestinian majority in all the territory of historical Palestine as the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture recognized in 2012 by showing that in historical Palestine there are 5.9 million Jews versus 6.1 million Palestinians (Eldar, Haaretz, 16/10/ 2012). Accordingly, a full and pure Apartheid situation to emerge where Israel will be back to the use of the Palestinian labor force creating as such a South African future to it.

This scenario contradicts the main characteristic of the Zionist project since it started, being an ethnic pure colonization project in the level of its "settler colonial political economy," and being an exclusivist settler colonial as its main feature as well. Accordingly, the Zionist project will abide by losing its settler-colonial expansionist nature to become a pure Apartheid project. Also, it will adhere depending on the Palestinian labor force as a primary working force, and that is because it will be digging its grave by its hands in this case following the South African model. Finally and with a difference from South Africa the Jewish colonial settlers' current use of the Palestinian labor force follows the model of ethnic separation that can be dismissed in any moment leaving the space for other models of exploitations to be used, as Gershon Shafir described (see earlier) rather than the model of South African exploitation in the time of the Apartheid where the use of the local labor force was an integral part of the system that was not replaced by other modes of exploitation.

Opposite Scenario for Zionism to deal with this demographic problem can be done through using one or more ways of elimination. The minimum among these will be by keeping the denial of the national rights of the Palestinians, and accordingly divide them to groups to be able to manage them, one group that has Israeli citizenship but with discrimination in rights, the Palestinians inside Israel. The second group who are allowed to apply to Israeli citizenship with restrictions, while the majority of them are given residency rights, the Palestinians in East Jerusalem. The third group of West Bank and Gaza who are denied access to Israeli citizenship; therefore, the Jewish majority in the state will be kept secured by this state of denial. This minimum model includes as shown a rejection of the right to national rights and citizenship to the majority in one hand, and giving Israeli citizenship to a small minority in another hand, and thus getting their original nationality castrated. Opposite to that the maximum scenario for elimination might be by collective expulsion of the Palestinians during a period of a war or a big crisis as earlier indicated; till then different ways will continue to be used for “silent transfer” through security and economic pressures.

Finally, the international third-party factor was essential to end the case of South Africa with a collapse of the regime due to the different diplomatic and international economic boycott of the regime, and sanctions as well. But in the cases of Israel and Northern Ireland the two were established by an international will. In the case of Northern Ireland, it was the will of Britain, but in the case of Israel, it was by the will of the international community as a whole. This last fact triggered the other international parties to work for the modification of the British project in Northern Ireland, and they succeeded to make this modification through the Great Friday Agreement, regardless to the extent to which the amendment was made. So, in the cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, the international community played a role in pressuring to get it solved in the first case, and a role to modify the British arrangements in the second case. Israel is a different case that was established according to the will of

Britain, United States, Germany, and France to a lesser extent in the first stage, but by the will of the UN with all its powers in the second stage including the Soviet Union at that time. Israel is then more sustainable than the two cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa. As it seems then that the international factor will be essential in making Israel retreat from its settler colonial nature, as they created and strengthened it, they can under certain conditions make it recede. The requirements are to be discussed in chapter 5.

In Wrap up, this chapter included three sections and an introduction. The first was about exclusion and its relation with Messianism, the second about the issue of the mother country to Zionism, and the third was about comparing the settler- colonial cases included in this study regarding their inclusion and exclusion politics. I and thou are keys for human interactions, Martin Buber. In some cases, this interaction leads to harmony in the personal level and accepting of the other and recognition of diversity in the public sphere being political, social, or economic.

In other cases, exclusion is the result due to its characteristic of having a deep root in human history. Exclusion includes political, social, cultural, legal, and economic aspects represented in personal and collective behaviors and also in ideologies as presented in chapter two.

This chapter discussed one aspect of the complexity that leads to the exclusion in general and in Palestine in specific.

In general, the chapter discussed the exclusion related to Messianism being Christian or Jewish. In specific, the chapter discussed the place of Palestine in such Messianic approach. Palestine was imagined from the beginning as a “virgin land” for re-discovery of the roots and the places of the Bible in its soil. As such there was carelessness about its people who live and produce and

consider it as their country. These people were ideologically excluded and as if non-existent.

In contrary Palestine was considered as barren till its Jewish People come back to it as a promised land. The promise added to the inspiration of Messianism, therefore Palestine was the place where they sent first their missionaries, and research groups such as the Palestine Exploration Fund to study and to find out the locations mentioned in the Torah.

Late in the 19th century, these Messianic Groups composed of States and non-State Actors as well, started creating settlements for their protégées in the Holy Land. The details of the American and German settlements were presented in the chapter in this regard. The so-called the "Jewish Philanthropists" also joined in the settlement adventure by then as presented.

In the light of the results of the First World War, and the emerging competition between Britain and France to divide the Middle East between them; France was the first as shown to give a promise to the Zionist Movement to claim Palestine as Jewish. A few Months later Balfour Declaration was declared by Britain. The politics of Sykes-Picot and the following Agreements between France and Britain gave Palestine at the end as a Mandatory area to Britain who had stronger Messianic history due to its Protestant affiliations. Also, the Zionist leaders selected Britain rather than France for the Mandate over Palestine. Britain was also the center of the Zionist movement work and its central figure Haim Weizmann. As discussed The Zionist Movement started by non-State actors acted in South Europe, before its official establishment in 1897.

The combination of mother Countries together with Jewish bodies: The Philanthropists, the Jewish non-State actors, and later the Zionist Movement. All these factors gave Zionism its character as a Satellite Movement to the international powers and then as a Stepchild to Britain. After 1967 occupation

Israel as a settler colonial state without a defined continued its expansion in the newly occupied territories, rather than becoming a mother country to the new emerging settler colonial project after 1967.

In its part, Zionism developed its Messianic approach of exclusion towards the other. This approach included the consideration of Palestine as Jewish, taking over the land of the indigenous peoples and creating separate Jewish entities over them called as the *Yishuv* with all its institutions including the structures of Settler democracy and the settler-colonial political economy” ones. The aim was to create the foundations for the creation of a Settler colonial state that emerged in 1948 without defined borders or a constitution.

The Zionist Messianic positions were adopted relatively by different parties and non-state Actors as well in the post-1967 period leading to 614,500 colonial settlers in these territories till the end of 2016. The number of settlers might grow to one million in 20 years following the natural growth of the settler colonials alone.

Significant in this chapter is the positions of some key Zionist leaders such as Herzl, Nordau, Arlosoroff, and Jabotinsky that were reviewed from Primary resources. The first two are representatives of the ‘political Zionism’ that aimed for a significant power approval to the establishment of a Jewish State. The third was a Representative of the Labor Movement in Palestine, and he sought the establishment of a Revolutionary Zionist Government in Palestine in 1932 as a method to create a Jewish Majority in the country. The last was the founder of the Zionist Revisionist Movement who called for deterring the Arabs and not to give any concessions to them. In a way or another trend continued to be the major ones in the Israeli politics till today, except the fact that the post-Jabotinsky positions of the so-called New Right are prevailing in Israel in the recent years. This new trend is rejecting the Jabotinskian liberal democratic positions for the Jews and combines the secular and the religious trends in one

joint group. This trend grows as a result of settlement expansion in the post-1967 territories.

In its third section, the chapter compared the Zionist experience regarding inclusion and exclusion with the other experiences of South Africa, Ireland, and the United States. The first was able to move beyond the fully exclusionist position of the earlier settler colonialism, and the later partially exclusionist position of the Apartheid. A new system was established in 1994 that almost bypassed both. In Ireland Britain gave it its independence in 1921, but six counties were separated from Ireland in the North to meet the needs of the Protestant British settlers who consisted the majority there. An inclusive government was established in 1998 in Northern Ireland, but this inclusive process there is facing difficulties until today as shown. Israel and Northern Ireland both face the problems of demography, separation from the mother country, British military occupation versus the Israeli military occupation. In both cases of South Africa and Northern Ireland, the third-Party intervention led to the change that was achieved. In opposite, Israel was recognized by a conditional United Nations resolution (273) that accepted the admission of Israel to the UN membership, but with the conditions of allowing the Palestinian Refugees back, and decreasing its space to the 1948 Partition Plan Resolution.

Concerning Israel and the United States, the latter was established at the expense of genociding the Amerindians and exploiting the slaves that were brought from Africa. Israel in another hand is a 'journey' of demographic elimination. Israel is continuing its expansion as a "settler colonial State" while the USA is acting worldwide as a Settler Empire as the term coined by Aziz Rana.

CHAPTER IV

THE DYNAMICS OF ELIMINATION AND IMPLANTATION

One of the common characteristics of the American settler colonial project and the Zionist one is that both conducted the elimination of the natives mostly after their declarations of independence. In the case of the United States, the elimination took place partly before the independence, but the elimination process of the Amerindians continued until the beginnings of the twentieth century. In the case of Zionism Britain used methods of internal elimination during its Mandate over Palestine, but the external elimination had to wait till the 1948 war and the following establishment of Israel. After this elimination the land was declared as Israeli, and the 1950 Law of Absentees Property proclaimed the indigenous population as either Absentee (A descriptive name given to them despite the fact that they were uprooted, and did not become absentees by their will), or as Present Absentees, the latter referring to those who continued to be present in Israel, while left their original lands temporarily, and were out in the period after 29th of November 1947 (Haidar, 2007, 11).

Contrary to the United States, Israel was established along a UN decision, and later it was admitted membership in the UN according to the UN General Assembly resolution 273 that made this admission conditional to the Israel's implementation of the previous resolutions 181 (The partition plan of the 29th of November 1947), and the 194 (The resolution about the return of the Palestinian refugees of 11th of December 1948) (www.un.org). Israel did not meet these

conditions, but the contrary took place when only 600,000 Dunams were left in the hands of the Palestinians out of 20,350,000 Dunams representing all the lands at that time, obviously the rest went to the sides of Israel as a State, and also to the Keren Kayimet and others according to the Israeli State Comptroller report of 1957 (Haidar,2007,14),and the refugees were not returned to their homeland until today in order to prevent any change in the " demographic balance" planned to be for the welfare of the Jews.

The dynamics of elimination by the Zionist project included a set of procedures expressing other aspects in addition to uprooting the people and the appropriation of land. This set is a complex of acts that usually called as 'temporary,' but at the same time sustainable in the sense that their content keeps changing all the time. Common between these is the concept of "demographic elimination" coined by Nadim Rouhana (Rouhana, 2014), aiming in another hand to create a Jewish demographic majority. At the same time, there are continuities and ruptures among the methods of elimination used from 1948 to today.

It is noticeable that each method of continuity also includes its rupture. For Instance, the 1948 uprooting of 729,000- 957,000 found its continuity in 1967 uprooting of 173,000-200,000 during the war according to the Israeli calculations, and 250,000 according to the Jordanian estimates (Salem, 1996,21). To these last numbers, those that left Palestine after the 1967 war due to economic, political and security hardships resulted from the occupation are required to be added. The number of these reached around 273,000 between 1967 to 1985 (Abu Al Shukur, 1990, 5), a later study by the Development Studies Center conducted in 2004 showed that 25 percent of the Palestinian youth between 18 to 27 years are willing to emigrate (Hijazi,2014), also the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics estimated that around 56570 were migrating every year between 2005 to 2009 (PCBS, 2010), and showed in another study that 23,6 percent of the Palestinian youth are willing to emigrate,

37 percent from Gaza and 15,2 percent from West Bank. The report showed that 62.5 percent of those who were ready to migrate were not thinking of a permanent emigration (PCBS, 2010). Finally, a recent study of 2018 by Al Aqsa University in Gaza showed that 51.8 percent of the youth in Gaza would be ready to consider proposals to emigrate outside (www.palsawa.com, 12/7/2018).

The continuity regarding these numbers is evident in the sense that the forced immigration that took place during the 1948 and 1967 wars were followed and continued by more "Silent migration" escaping the hardships of occupation, especially after 1967. Besides that, the years after 1948 also included more forcible immigration that continued to take place against the Palestinians in Israel till 1959 as shown by Sabri Jiryis in chapter three. In another hand the rupture, in this case, was that the number of those who were forced to immigrate in 1967 was much less than those who were obliged to leave in 1948, reaching almost the quarter of it, but here it is necessary to notice that additional forcible immigration took place after the 1967 war bringing the number of the 1967 displaced persons up to 408,000 by the end of 1968, of which 361,000 from West Bank, and 47,000 from Gaza Strip (Al Hasan, 1995). In the previous chapter, Nur Masalha was quoted regarding the processes of uprooting and evacuations that took place directly after the 1967 war.

Another method of elimination was conducted through different categorizations of citizenship and residency that were used after 1948 and 1967 wars with the leftovers of the Palestinians in their homeland. These included in 1948 the annexation of the land and the people by giving them Israeli citizenships, the annexation of the land of Jerusalem, but without giving Israeli citizenship to its residents, and the consideration of West Bank as an area administered by Israel, and later as an area under dispute. But without giving any residency rights, Like in East Jerusalem, or citizenship rights despite being assigned a giving a lower level of citizenship, the Palestinians inside Israel. Regarding

Gaza, the Palestinians there were giving after Oslo the status of Palestinian residents in areas administered by the Palestinian authority.

The continuity component here is the denial of the Palestinian national identity, the Palestinian right of self-determination, and instead fragmenting the Palestinians as a rupture to different categories of citizenship and residency "granted" by Israel. The result is the elimination of the Palestinian, and his/her right of the creation of political, legal, economic structures of a state, and to flourish his/her culture and preserve his/her society, besides preventing him/her from acquiring the place, space, territory, and the landscape.

Due to these different categories of residency/ citizenship, other procedures of demographic elimination followed representing a continuous process of continuous elimination. For example, house demolition continued for all the Palestinian houses before and after 1967, besides the appropriation of lands and the establishment of Jewish settlements (see details below). A particular case to mention here is the one of the Naqab that consists of 12,000 square kilometers (Almost half of the size of Palestine), in which the leftovers of the Bedouins after 1948 were considered as stretching their presence to a vast geographical area, therefore the elimination, in this case, took the shape of building towns and concentrating Bedouins in them representing the only case was the state of Israel made towns from the Palestinians.

The reason for building the towns for the Bedouins aimed for "Forced Sedentarization" of them as called by Ghazi Falah (Falah,1989,167) in a limited area of the Naqab, while appropriating the significant portion for the Jewish settlement expansion, and the Israeli military use (see below). After 1967 the methods of elimination became more comprehensive and took further shapes to keep in another hand the Jewish demographic majority. In this context the permanent Israeli checkpoints that were erected between West Bank and Gaza in one hand, and Israel and the annexed East Jerusalem in the second hand in

1993, El-Gazi aimed not only for security reasons but also to control the Palestinian access to Israel.

Qatamesh went further than Falah reminding that these checkpoints started even earlier before becoming permanent structures in order to control the access of the Palestinian workers to Israel after a new period of "Hebrew work" began in 1990 due to the Intifada and the immigration of the Russian Jews to Israel by then (Qatamesh,1991,57-65). Later the erection of Wall since 2002 between West Bank and Israel (including the annexed East Jerusalem) aimed at the same demographic and security objectives. The withdrawal from Gaza followed to focus on increasing the numbers of Jews instead in the Galilee, Naqab and the greater Jerusalem to preserve the Jewish majority in these locations as Ariel Sharon said in 2005 (Mouasi, 2014). Further examples will be mentioned in the detailed review below.

This chapter includes three sections. Section one will discuss the demographic component as an essential one determining the current *modus operandi* of the Zionist settler-colonial project towards the indigenous population, and as key in determining its future. Section two will be an overview of the ongoing elimination process of the indigenous population inside Israel, in the 1967 occupied territories, and regard to the Palestinian refugees. Section three will discuss the settler-colonial project in the 1967 occupied territories and the roles of the different actors of the State, the Army, the political parties, the Judiciary, the Universities, and the think tanks and policy development institutes, and the settlers and their none- state actors; all that besides the Jewish Agencies and the Zionist individuals outside Israel, such as the roles of the Jewish Agency and Billionaires like Ervin Moscovitch, and the messianic Christian organizations, section three will also include a conclusion about the fate of the Zionist settler-colonial project in relevance to factors such as the colonial settlers' and the Israeli army violence and the Palestinian/Arab responses, and the scope of the support that this project gets and will continue/ discontinue getting from the

United States as a mother country that replaced Britain, mainly since the end of World War II. Finally, section 3 closes with the presentation of a summary and the findings of the chapter.

4.1 The Demographic Elimination: Process, Successes, Restrictions, and Prospects

In the case of Zionism, demography is a means rather than being an end. The end is a Jewish state; however, the creation of a Jewish population majority is the means to get to that end. This analysis means that the objective is for as much as a pure Jewish population as possible, but it further implies that demography as a means to get to a Jewish majority is a national security issue. Accordingly demographic elimination cannot be understood as a onetime event, but as a process that aims to diminish the numbers of the indigenous population by different means, and to prevent them from developing a collective national aspirations, which allows the indigenous people to seek in a particular moment the state recognition of them as a national group, and if not fulfilled to find instead a UN recognition of them as a national minority who deserves more than individual rights within a Jewish national state in which the collective rights are limited to the Jews.

All the mainstream Zionist Parties in Israel agree on the importance of the preservation of the Jewish majority in the State, even though they differ on the ways to achieve such a goal. In this regard demography is also an Israeli Government concern. For instance, Israel established the "Demography Council" as it was called in 1976 chaired by Zeina Herman and with the participation of Shmuel Toledano who was the Advisor of the Prime Minister for Arab Affairs. The Council task was to discuss how to the "Family Planning in the Arab Society"; considered to be the "Major Problem of those days" (Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009, 18) as Toledano said. The participants at that Council meetings agreed to keep the sessions secret without any leaks to the media.

Forty years after the Minister of Diaspora Jews by then Naftali Bennet established a committee in 2016 to discuss how to increase the Jewish population of Israel. The committee suggested that the work for that should be in five circles: Circle number one to recruit as many as possible of the 14 million Jews, most living outside Israel to immigrate to Israel, and the other four circles include working with an additional 60 million people worldwide who either changed their Jewish religion, or ancestors of Jews till the fourth generation, or people who keep a relationship with the Jews. The committee report signaled the decrease of the numbers of the Jews globally standing at 1.4 percent annual increase, and that is due to the mixed marriage that reached 35, 58, and 80 percents in Europe, the United States, and the former Soviet Union Countries successively (madarcenter.org, 29/3/2018).

The last Israeli governmental concern of the demographic issue, made the Government and the Knesset members outraged after an officer in the Israeli "Civil Administration" in the West Bank presented in 2018 a report to the committee of Security and Foreign Relations in the Knesset showing that the Palestinians in the whole country already outnumbered the Jews (6.5 million versus 6.3 million). The Officer was attacked because he used the statistics of the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics, which considered being an exaggeration, but in other hand an Israeli prominent expert on demography (Sergio De Pergola) supported the report with a slight modification that there are 300.000 Palestinians living outside and a similar number of Jews living in Israel without being granted a Jewish identity according to the Jewish Jurisprudence (www.madarcenter.org 29/3/2018).

According to the above, the demographic issue is a contested one in Israel-Palestine, and a subject of controversy between the different political parties. As such, there are currently various ways to deal with the demographic threats, coming out from the mere presence of the Palestinians and their natural population growth; it is worth here of presenting the two contradictory

approaches of the academics Arnon Soffer and his colleague Evgenia Bystrov, versus the one of Yoram Ettinger on how to analyze and how to solve this issue. Bystrov and Sofer warned in 2011 study that Israel is becoming more and more as the Tel Aviv Republic where there is a clear Jewish majority and population density up to 7000/ K2 (Bystrov and Sofer, 2011, 38), but that this republic is surrounded, from inside, by the Bedouins in the North Naqab; the Arabs of the Triangle; the Arabs of the North, the Arabs of East Jerusalem, and the Arabs of the mixed cities, and from outside from 4 million Arabs who live adjacent to Israel, and 10 million others who live in 50 kilometers far away from Israel (Bystrov and Sofer, 34).

Bystrov and Sofer see a significant danger in that the Bedouins and the Arabs of the North have 63 and 40 percent children who are less than 18 years old while the Jewish children of the same age do not exceed 30 percent of the Jews in the Country (Bystrov and Sofer, 45). For the Bedouins, they see that they will increase from 14 percent in 2010 to 23-25 percent in 2030, due to their annual growth rate that is between 3.5-4.5 percent (Bystrov and Sofer, 27, 41). In the Triangle, there were 120,000 Arabs versus 5000 Jews in 2010 (Bystrov and Sofer, 47). And the North (the Galilee) the Arabs represented in 2010 around 53 percent of the population versus 43 percent Jews (Bystrov and Sofer, 47). In Jerusalem, the Arabs represented one-third of the people in 2010, and this percentage is growing (Bystrov and Sofer, 46). And finally, the mixed cities of Ramleh, Lod, Acca, Haifa, and Jaffa in addition to tens of other towns are suffering from continuous national, economic, cultural, and regional tension (Bystrov and Sofer, 48).

In conclusion (Bystrov and Sofer maintained) these five groupings together with what they call as "*Judea and Samaria and Gaza Arabs*" are closing the circle around Tel Aviv Republic (Bystrov and Sofer, 48), and the Arabs in the whole land of Israel will represent in 2030 the percentage of 53 percent versus 46 percent to the Jews, and that is due to the Arab population annual rate of growth

which is around 3,1 percent versus 1.5-1.9 percent annual growth of the Jewish population (Bystrov and Sofer, 27, 41, 51, 59). For them Israel in 1948 borders plus East Jerusalem will have 72.2 percent Jewish population by 2030 due to the high percentage of 6 to 7 percent annual growth among *Haredim*: the ultra-orthodox Jews, who are expected to rise from 460,000 thousand in 2010 to one million by 2030 (Bystrov and Sofer, 28,51). However, they see that the rise of the Palestinian population in the "whole land of Israel" will hit the majority of the Jews in that area in the coming years. Therefore, the solution for them to preserve the Jewish majority can be guaranteed by the separation from the Arabs and the redistribution of the population inside Israel (Bystrov and Sofer, 46-48). In addition to the full denial of entry of the 'strangers' to Israel (Bystrov and Sofer, 39). They do not see the immigration as a method to solve the problem anymore given that 3 million Jews immigrated to Israel since 1948 from which one million already left till 2008. Besides that, 50 percent of the Russian Jews are not willing to continue living Israel in the long run (Bystrov and Sofer, 60-61).

In sharp contradiction with Bystrov and Sofer, Ettinger does not see demography as a reason for Israel to withdraw from the 1967 occupied territories, he developed the Ettinger Report as a US-Israel Initiative to struggle against the Israeli demography experts, the Israeli Zionist left-wing parties, the exaggerated numbers of Palestinians issued by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and the former American President Barack Obama, who all are spreading the 'conventional wisdom' that the only way to keep Israel alive is by preserving its Jewish majority and that this majority cannot be held without an Israeli separation from the Palestinians by withdrawal from the territories that were occupied in 1967, or by other means such as walls as Sofer suggested (www.theettingerreport.com).

In a nutshell, Ettinger sees that 6.3 million Jews were present in the "whole land of Israel" by 2013 comprising 66 percent of its population versus 1.66 million

Arabs in "Judea and Samaria" and 1.65 million of Arabs inside Israel. For him, these are good news from Israel given that the number of Jews did not exceed 40 percent minority in 1948. He also adds that in 1995 there were 2.3 Jewish births versus each one Arab Birth, while it became in 3.2 births versus each one Arab birth in 2012; he also counts on possible new immigration to Israel like the influx of one million Russian Jews to Israel at the beginning of the 1990s, even in Jerusalem he sees 4.2 fertility rates for Jews versus 3.9 fertility rate for Arabs in 2013 (Ettinger, 2013). Ettinger calculations sharply contradict the results of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics which showed that 4.780.978 Palestinians were living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem by the end of 2017 (www.pcbs.gov). More significant Ettinger calculations contradict the report of the Israeli Army to the Knesset in the 25th of March 2018 mentioned in chapter three, which showed that 6.7 million Palestinians versus 6.5 Jews live already in the Whole Land of Israel.

The "politics of demography" (Sadot, 2016) is as such very tense, Sadot also quotes Yasser Arafat that he depends on the "Palestinian woman womb" to counterbalance the Jewish demography in Israel. The asymmetry here is apparent: For Zionism demography is a path to make land speak Hebrew, and give it the name of Israel; therefore, it is an issue of elimination of the other. For Arafat and the Palestinians, demography is a method of resistance to increase the Palestinian population in the face of those who seek to eliminate it. The question is in which scenarios these politics of demography might evolve especially with the shrinking possibility for further massive Jewish immigration to Israel after the big wave of migration of the Russian Jews to Israel at the beginning of the 1990s which brought one million new citizens, and modified the balance between the Jews and the non- Jews inside Israel. Accordingly, Israel will need other options for elimination, and in this regard, four scenarios might be imagined, two are peaceful, and the other two are not: The first among these scenarios is the one related to the creation of a joint state, for all its citizens (Bishara, 2002a), or all its citizens and absentees, the Palestinian refugees

(Masalha, 1993), of federal (Schwartz, facebook. com/groups/fedrip/PA.IL.ORG) or confederal (Avesar, 2007), or bi-national (Ghanem, 2005; 2007; 2012). Given the Israeli politics of elimination, this scenario does not look likely.

The second scenario is two states along the 1967 borders with its different versions, the two completely separate states, the two states that each for all its citizens, the two parallel States models of Mark Le Vine and Mathias Mossberg (Le Vine and Mosberg, 2014), the two states with open borders and respect of attachments in both sides (Zeedani, 2007), a negotiated agreement resulting of two state with borders modification; Noticeable here that all these versions include a way/s to solve the Palestinian 1948 refugees' issue. Given the Israeli politics of elimination, this scenario does not look likely as well.

The two scenarios above are subject to a peaceful solution that can come out from negotiations, or through peaceful and democratic means, such as the solutions for the creation of a federation or confederation. Besides them there are two Israeli Scenarios: One that either solving the Israeli demographic dilemma by further social engineering such as making cuts through the transfer of the Triangle together with its Palestinian population to the Palestinian Authority, and thus keeping the Jewish majority for a longer term in Israel (Avigdor Leiberman proposal to discuss this idea with the Palestinian Authority as part of the so-called "territorial exchange" as discussed earlier in chapter three. Or take parts of East Jerusalem unilaterally, without any agreement with the Palestinian Authority. Out of it as the Minister of Jerusalem Affairs, Zeev Elkin proposed in 2017 when he suggested taking Kufr Aqab and ShufatRefugee Camp out of Jerusalem and create a particular municipality to them without transferring them to the Palestinian Authority at the same time. Or by taking the position of Ettinger as a point of departure to call for granting Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians in West Bank, without Gaza Strip, claiming that such a move will not affect the demographic balance in Israel, the Israeli President Robi Rivlin and others as presented in chapter 2.

The other Israeli Scenario calls for conducting another external transfer against the Palestinians whenever the time is ripe for such a step, such as to do that when a regional war erupts, or when the Palestinian resistance reaches a point of escalation that will require a higher dose of retaliation. The proposals included in chapter two for population exchange with the Arab Countries, or for sending them Palestinian refugees to reciprocate the sending of Jews from the Arab countries to Israel are just examples in this direction (see chapter two).

Scenario three looks to be ranging between 'Let us manage the demography till the threshold or the ripe moment for a solution will come' and the 'Let us solve it by granting Israeli citizenship and thus kill the Palestinian identity and its representation.' But the second solution looks to be also as a conflict management that Israel will take, while the historical injury of the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and displaced persons of 1967 will continue bleeding without a solution; similarly, is doing the Lieberman proposal about the Triangle region which will not solve all the conflict, and Zeev Elkin proposal about East Jerusalem. What is left then is either scenario four, or accepting either one or two? Which one Israel will select and why?

The scenarios one and two represent non-starters to the current Zionist Israel representing the third stage of Zionism which focuses on the national and the religious affiliations of the Jews to the land of Israel and building the Jewish active State, being as such the holder of an ongoing project for the appropriation of Palestine and the dispossession of its people by different means. Probably the dismantling of the Zionist structure of the state will open the way for its recognition of the other and the acceptance of the proposal to live together according to a historical reconciliation formula. Till then what looks more logical for Israel is to try scenario number four as a way to try to solve the demographic dilemma resulting from the concentration of Israel in the Tel Aviv Republic as it was called by ArnonSoffer, and the inability of Israel to solve it by bringing

additional hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from outside. If this analysis is tenable, then it can be concluded that scenario number three is conflict management in the 'time out' available till the time become ripe for further transfer of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, if one imagines that this transfer happens; will it solve the conflict, or it will create another "time out" till it will be solved? Here are the following possible related scenarios which show that Israel can plan, but it cannot necessarily achieve what it plans for due to the presence of others who also design and also practice their retaliation to the Israeli plans: Transfer will face a robust Palestinian resistance this time, if the Israeli re-occupation of the tiny and microscopic refugee camp of Jenin during the second intifada of 2000 took 18 days and many casualties; this time the Palestinian resistance will be stronger and will create bigger casualties, also the Palestinian retaliation attacks will cover all the parts of Israel. Gaza will also generate another front of shelling all parts of Israel by rockets. In short, this time the Palestinians who can fight will do that till the end. During and after 1948 war the Palestinians had West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt to take refuge on them in times when they were not holders of weapons, During and after the 1967 war some took refuge in Jordan with fewer numbers than 1948 and in times also when people lack weapons to defend themselves.

After Oslo, the situation became different: the PLO came back home together with its previous *Feda`yyeen*: the fighters, it established armed security forces who already participated in military clashes with the Israeli troops during the so-called the tunnel events in 1996, and also during the second Intifada of 2000; the factions also created their military Brigades the biggest are *EzzEddin Al Qassam* of Hamas and *Al Aqsa* Brigades of Fateh among others. All of these will not be able to stop Israel from massacring, practicing the erasing process of houses and peoples, and others, but the price this time will be very high. Also, the people will take the streets combining the violence with non-violence. Finally, harsh clashes might take place between the Settler colonialists and the Palestinians leading to more complexity to the bloody scene.

Where will the transfer take place? As a matter of geographical contiguity West Bank has this contiguity only with Jordan to which the Palestinians can make their influx to if any; therefore starting with Jordan, this country might close its borders this time and might not allow Palestinian forced migration to Jordan for a simple reason: This time adding more Palestinians to Jordan population might open the path for the creation of a Palestinian State in Jordan as the Israeli extreme right wing wishes. The fight for Jordan this time will be a fight for the destiny of the country: To be or not to be. The result will be the eruption of an Israeli Jordanian war; which might trigger others to join such as Iraq who will feel to be the next on the Israeli list is also given the Israeli renewed 2018 threats to attack Iraq and the so-called 'The Iranian presence there.' Therefore, Iraq might try a preventive retaliation of self-defense.

Lebanon and Syria represent another story. In the case of transfer to these two countries, Israel will be obliged to take the Palestinians in vehicles to the borders of these two countries and to drop them there due to the absence of geographical contiguity between both of them and West Bank, but given the Palestinian resistance as mentioned above this transfer process will be a very difficult undertaking; furthermore Israel might avoid transferring Palestinians to Lebanon in order to avoid triggering another front with Hezbollah. Also, both States will close their borders this time. In Lebanon Hizbollah might retaliate by shelling Israel if Israel decided at the end to take the risk of transferring part of the Palestinians of West Bank and East Jerusalem to Lebanon; also, the other Lebanese parties will feel endangered by the Israeli attempt to change the demographic balance in Lebanon. Therefore the Lebanese Army itself might join the battle, making the situation more complicated.

In one case the transfer to Lebanon will be possible; this case is the case if Israel decides to the transfer of its Palestinian population from inside who definitely have a geographical contiguity with Lebanon; IlanPappe did not

exclude such an option as shown in the previous chapters; the people here are less capable of fighting back by using lethal means as it is the case in West Bank, but they still can use non violence means of struggle effectively as shown in the Naqab villages of Al Araqib and Umm Al-Rihan and other places. Finally, in regard to Syria there is no geographical continuity towards it for both the West Bank Palestinians and the Palestinians inside Israel; and that is due to the annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights to Israel; therefore, a collective transfer to Syria does not look to be likely especially that it also might trigger a Syrian Israeli war.

The final option for Israel to conduct the transfer of West Bank Palestinians is to Gaza by expanding it towards Sinai of Egypt or without. This option faces several obstacles, one of them is the rejection of Egypt to annex parts of Sinai to Gaza, and also the Gaza resistance that will be conducted in support for their brothers and sisters in West Bank, and finally there is the resistance in West Bank that will make it difficult for Israel to carry the West Bank Palestinians in vehicles and throw them on the borders of Gaza. One possibility was discussed as part of the American President Donald Trump Ultimate Deal for such a scenario which will require an agreement with Egypt to establish economic projects in Sinai in which the Palestinians of Gaza will find work. In the absence of an Egyptian readiness to give parts of Sinai to Gaza, this option is presented to provide incentives for the development of the Egyptian economy in one hand, and it can be perceived in the second hand as an option for a humanitarian solution to Gaza crisis in the short term, but in the longer term it might mean the sustaining of a Palestinian State in Gaza that the Palestinians of West Bank will be encouraged by economic incentives and others to emigrate to; being so it will become like scenario three procedures of creating an additional conflict management mechanism that will assist in the 'silent transfer' of the West Bank Palestinians to their state in Gaza; obviously this will also need to have Gaza to become an attractive location for such an emigration starting by solving chronic issues that Gaza face today such as the lack of pure water for drinking there.

This analysis had shown that the only place and the less risky for the transfer of the Palestinians in times of a regional crisis or war is Jordan; and since Jordan rejects such a proposal, there are several Israeli proposals of transfer that focus on conducting the transfer to Jordan by toppling the Jordanian regime and appointing a one that is loyal to Israel and ready to make Jordan becoming a Palestinian state and to accept the transfer of the West Bank Palestinians to its territory (See Ted Belman proposal in chapter two) . Will such proposal bring back the older Zionist ambitions about Jordan being part of Palestine till the 1920s when the British gave it a separate entity? This is a question that might need another research.

The other option for Zionism will be about the establishment of a Palestinian State in Gaza that will be under Israeli control in one hand and will be linked to Egypt in a way or another. The plan as discussed in the White House meeting in Washington in March 2018, held without Palestinian participation, includes economic incentives for the development in Gaza, and also around it in cooperation with Egypt. Till the moment of this writing the plan was facing a rejection from the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah who thought of it as a plan that aims to cross the way to the Palestinian Statehood on 1967 borders, and to limit that state to Gaza while Israel will be given a free hand to annex West Bank to Israel.

In conclusion to this part it can be said that the plans for the demographic elimination of the Palestinians are still going on, currently these plans are two: One is about the transfer to Jordan, and the second is about limiting Palestine to a State in Gaza and encouraging the Palestinian silent transfer from West Bank to Gaza State. There is no contradiction necessarily between these two options, and they can go together, and also as well with other options such as facilitating the Silent Transfer of the Palestinian to everywhere in the world through the Open Borders policy with Jordan created by the Israeli Minister of Defense

Moshe Dayan since the end of the 1960s. Back to the inclusion and the exclusion politics it can be simply concluded here that the indigenous population are not dealt with as human beings who have as such natural rights to citizenship, but they are excluded instead for what they are, due to the fact that their mere physical presence is considered by Zionism to be as a threat to the preservation of the other population majority.

4.2 The Ongoing Elimination Process

Starting with the overall picture of elimination of the Palestinians in the past 70 years since 1948, regardless of the time and the place differences might be helpful. The presentation of the overall picture has, on the other hand, the power to show the temporal and the place differences as well.

The typical overall seventy years experience is settler colonialism taking different shapes in different places and different times. Oren Yiftachel suggested that "The policies implemented regarding the Palestinians inside Israel became similar, even though not identical with the mechanisms used in the occupied territories. These include The use of the emergency regulations; the restrictions on entry and marriage, the infiltration of secret spies; the restrictions on money transfer; the security supervision of the democratic organizations; and the continuity of spatial and planning restrictions" (Yiftachel, 2012a, 274-275).

Yiftachel also sees the mentioned continuity line over the seventy years, in which the Zionist settlement in Palestine passed five stages each building on the results of the previous one, the first among them was the period of refugee's colonialism by European Jews who escaped from Europe, followed by a military colonialism that conducted the ethnic cleansing and established the State of Israel in 1948, then internal colonialism continued till 1967. Afterward, it was transformed into political colonialism "of an expanding and boundary-breaking nationalism, increasingly connected with religious- messianic

narratives"(Yiftachel, 2012a). Finally, it entered a "Fifth phase of "oppressive consolidation" which integrates partial territorial concessions with the new spatial relationship, based on a deep ghettoization of Palestinians" (Yiftachel, 2012a, 254).

Yiftachel attempt to create several phases looks courageous in the sense that it comes from inside the colonial society "accusing" its system as such as its main feature, and to be as such till today, but besides this general assessment he still has his belief that the Zionist movement started as a "liberation movement with the establishment of a national home primarily in the shadow of the oppression and destruction of European Jewry"(Yiftachel, 2012a, 53;2010, 75), along this formulation he called the first stage of Zionist colonialism in Palestine as refugees colonialism signaling to its just nature, partially carried by such colonialism. The question here is: Why only a minority of the Jews who left Europe came to Palestine by then? And why the majority that immigrated to other countries such as the United States integrated into the societies there instead of creating settler colonial entities in those countries? These questions mean that the part of refugees who selected to come to Palestine was the settler _colonial part and they cannot by any means get the name Refugees colonialism that gives a partial legitimacy to their atrocities conducted in the expense of the indigenous population in Palestine.

The other point with Yiftachel is about the name that he gave to the last two decades and a half as an oppressive consolidation. In another part of his analysis he spoke about components of this stage such as the withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the creation of the wall of 2003-2007 (Yiftachel, 2012a, 272), and that the "Israeli expansionism grinds to halt" (Yiftachel, 2010, 77; 2012, 255). Elsewhere he called this process as replacing settler colonialism with what he called as a "creeping Apartheid" (Yiftachel, 2012b), he defined it as an Apartheid due to the "division of the inhabitants to classes according to their ethnic-racial identities, in relation to legal considerations sometimes and in relation to the

status quo in others" (Yiftachel, 2012b). He further called it "creeping" because Apartheid was not declared as an official policy, and also because the "inequality is still dealt with as a temporary situation" (Yiftachel, 2012b, 274). In chapter two this thesis discussed this perspective of Yiftachel thoroughly as well. Instead, the thesis proposed a continuation till today of stage four of Yiftachel list above combined with Apartheid, and belligerent occupation (see chapters two and three). In this sense Zionism insured its continuity in one hand, and took a new shape of renewing itself in the second hand through the third transformation of Zionism characterized of being a combination of aggressive national who seeks more land grab on the expense of the indigenous population combined with religious-messianic narrative as Yiftachel proposed for the fourth phase.

In the first phase of Zionism, it established the state through adopting and practicing a distorted version of socialism (Sternhal in Masalha, 2003, 25) that advocated getting rid of the original population rather than exploiting them, the Hebrew Work was the alternative in the pre 1948 period followed by the use of the Palestinian labor force within an ethnically dominated political and economic structure after the establishment of the state (Shafir, 2002), within this structure the appropriation of the Palestinian land continues. This "Labor Socialist trend" continued to rule Israel unilaterally till 1977 when the Likud took over. Regarding the Palestinian occupied territories of 1967, the Labor wanted to annex parts to Israel and to leave other pieces for a future compromise with Jordan, while the Likud sought an aggressive policy of colonial settlements expansion including in the heart of the Palestinian cities and by establishing settler- colonial towns.

However, in its third transformation Zionism moved to what Hounaida Ghanem called as the New Right emerged due to the transformation of Israel to a more conservative and religious society; the entry of the Oriental Jews to the political elites earlier limited to the Ashkenazi class; the growing power of the settlers; resulting of the sunset of the old Jabotinskian secular right. This new right is

composed of the religious Haredi Parties, the national religious parties; the extreme Likud members; the other secular national groups such as *Israel Beiteinu*; and none-state actors such as "*ImTirtzu*." Finally, this new right calls for the promotion of the Jewish State versus democracy; very aggressive towards the Palestinians and all the Gentiles; glorifies the power-politics; and promotes the confrontation between the "civilized Israel and the dark Arab and Islamic civilization" (Hounida Ghanem, 2017, 10-11).

Following this review, one can see a trend of continuity, and a signal to the fact that as long as the dominance continues, as long as the number and the influence of those who benefit from it increases. Linked to this is the effectiveness of the struggle of the indigenous population. As much as this resistance is not active as much as resilience against any concession will become a phenomenon among the settler colonialists who develop their own Agency to influence the political system in their country in favor of their interests (Haklai, 2015). The result here is about one continuous settler-colonial project that used the methods of "SEEK" as its Hebrew words were abbreviated by Yiftachel combining settlement, security, expansion, ethnic transformation, dominance, and marketing. These six components of elimination and implantation were practiced after 1948 by the planner Arie Sharon against the Palestinians inside Israel, then later by Ariel Sharon since the 1970s against the Palestinians inside Israel, and in the 1967 occupied territories as well (Yiftachel, 2012a, 247,256).

The tools of elimination are intertwined with the means of implantation. In the case of Zionism, the labor movement and *Hovevi Zion*: Lovers of Zion, brought their followers at the beginnings of the Zionist immigration to settle in Palestine, the processes of displacement of the indigenous population were followed by the process of replacement of them by the new Zionist settler colonialists. This is in general but in specific new methods was included, beyond SEEK caught by Yiftachel there are other political, social and cultural, economic, and legal

processes involved. In this sense the replacement is not only physical, but it also includes uprooting, deterritorialization, and the dispersion of the society; further it include the cancelation of a people; the denial of their right to establish their own political and legal and economic system; a kind of additions that the SEEK model might not be able to capture due to its ethnic dominance focus in which the right of self-determination of the indigenous people and their right of return does not seem to have the attention that they need.

There are other tools of elimination and implantation that were used by Zionism in different periods; these include Judaization, Israelization, isolation, and closure. The first includes that you displace to replace politically, economically, socially and culturally, and legally; a process that provides for changing the place, space, the territory, and the landscape, and give these a new look that fits with the new people. The second is not only about elimination by giving other the nationality of the settler colonial entity to the "leftovers" of the indigenous but is exceeds that aspect to include others. As defined by Bishara, Israelization does not mean "The Judaization of the Arabs in Israel, nor their leaving of culture", but it means "The modification and the change of this culture in a way that makes its inclusion in the Israeli framework possible, briefly it means the distortion of it, and this was the process of the emergence of the "Israeli Arab" (Bishara, 2002a, 64).

In another hand, the Isolation is about two processes of disconnection, the first by cutting the territorial contiguity between the Palestinian communities, and the second by creating Jewish colonial settlement between them making them look like as a mushroom or a Swiss cheese as it is the term used to describe this process. Those who are not displaced would be subject to isolation even if they got israelized. In another ward, Israelization is not an escape from loneliness as much as one is not a member in the settler- colonial community; the example of the Druze mentioned in chapter three is self-explanatory in this regard. Finally the closure is another tool of isolation, by disconnecting territories from each

other in order to impose control either within one city/ location by dividing its parts from each other and create a permit system for movement and access, or closure between the cities and the different places by creating a network of access and mobility through selective and temporary permits in order to ensure fragmentation as in the case of separating West Bank from Gaza Strip, and West Bank parts from each other, and between them and East Jerusalem as an example.

Five tools of elimination are at hand then, displacement and its twin replacement, Judaization, Israelization, isolation, and closure. These five components will be used in the next section as tools of analysis to clarify the cases of the Palestinian refugees, the 1948 Palestinians, East Jerusalem, West Bank, and find out the continuity and ruptures between these cases. The fragmentation of the Palestinian people will also be included in the analysis as one of the tools used by Zionism to facilitate the appropriation of the Palestinian land.

4.2.1 The Uprooted: The Case of the Palestinian Refugees

The Palestinian uprooted around 1948, and in 1967 and after, are of several kinds; over decades their issue became more and more complicated including to the side of the Israeli side readiness to recognize its responsibility towards the creation of their plight that was presented in the earlier chapters. In later stages their issue became a contested one with the Israeli side in the multilateral Working Group about Refugees that emerged from Madrid Conference for Middle East Peace of 1991, the disputed points included the definition of who is and who is not a refugee and if this consists of the descendants of the refugees or not; but also included the solution of the issue by the right of return to Israel, or by the resettlement in the host countries or third countries.

To start with the definition of 1948 refugees, the Palestinian refugee according to the UNRWA "shall mean any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both his home and means of livelihood as a result of 1948 conflict" (Zureik, 1996, 9). The

UNRWA continued to give refugee status according to that definition until 1952 (Salem, 1997, 34; Salem, 1996, 17). Bowman sees some shortfalls in the UNRWA definition such as that it does not include those refugees who went to other countries than those where UNRWA operates; the internally displaced persons who stayed in Israel; those who resided in West Bank and Gaza and East Jerusalem and got replaced in 1967; the post 1967 deportees by Israel; those who traveled outside and were late to come back; those who were out Palestine when the 1948 and 1967 wars erupted; and those that their pride prevented them from registering with the UNRWA (Bowman in Zureik, 2011; Salem, 1997, 9-10).

According to the above, Zureik suggested adopting a definition that was presented by the Palestinian Delegation in the first meeting of the Refugee Working Group held in Ottawa, Canada on 13th of May 1992 that included all these categories, and also their descendants (Zureik, 1996,10). Opposite to these definitions the Israeli side presented in the Multilateral Working Group about Refugees its meaning that refugees represent those who left during the war only and not those who went before or after, and without their descendants, also they presented to the agenda that the working group should not discuss the issue of the Palestinian refugees only, but also other refugees like the Armenians and others, finally, due to their rejection to recognize the Israeli responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian Refugee issue, they wanted the working group to focus only on the humanitarian assistance to the refugees leading to re-settlement, rather than on the UN resolution 194 and the right of return that the Palestinian delegation came to the meetings for (Peters, 1999,7-30; Salem, 1997, 107-122). These issues led to the breakup of the Refugee Working Group by the Middle of the 1990s.

The Israeli idea behind considering Palestinian refugees as only those who left during the battles is built on the assumption that the problem will evade over time when all the 1948 and the 1967 refugees will pass away. This year President Trump of the United States declared his support to the Israeli position

in this regard, saying that the refugee's number does not exceed 40.000; prior to that he decided to stop the American aid to the UNRWA (US: only 40000 Palestinian refugees left today see: (Middle East Monitor July 31, 2018).

While it is not known if this number presented by Trump also includes those who left in 1967 war, but the gap here is clear between two positions: One that want to keep the Jewish majority of Israel, and to avoid it becoming a state for all its citizens as it is in democracy by the return of the refugees; and the second who consider the Palestinians as those who were registered officially in Palestine before 1948 war, and in Jordan and Egypt before 1967 war. Since these were forcibly moved outside their country then it is evident that they and their descendants as well have the right to return to their homeland; giving up with this right should be an option to be selected by refugee him/her self and not a position to be imposed on them from outside.

If the number of 1948 refugees ranged between 726.000 to 957.000 according to the UN sources according to 1949 and 1950 estimations successively (www.pcbs.org, 2018), there are other hundreds of thousands of the so-called the Displaced Persons that were added in 1967 and that include several categories: Those who were outside Palestine from 1952 to 1967; those who left during the 1967 war; those who left after the 1967 war such as the deportees, or those who left due to economic, social or security hardships, or lost their permits while outside; and finally those who became internally displaced due to the demolition of their houses, villages and, or neighborhoods, or due to the seizure of their lands, or the destruction of their properties, or for any relevant reason (Salem,1996,17-30). Israel recognizes only the second category according to a definition that the displaced persons of 1967 are those who left during that year alone, the Israel number is 173,000 for these, while Jordan gives the number of 250,000(Salem, 1996, 21).To be added to this the amount of the first category which is 200,000 (Salem, 1996, 19),and for type three an average of 120,000 of those who lost their Identity Cards while abroad, and 1660 deportees, in addition

to a non-fully counted number of emigrants 273,000 from 1967 to 1985(Salem,1996, 23). Finally for category number four the available quantities are not complete, but the IDPs of the three villages of *Yalo*, *Emuas*, and *Beit Nuba* were about 30,000, to be added to the 8000 that were evacuated from the Old City of Jerusalem and re-resided in Shu'afat Refugee Camp in the city, and to be added also the number of Jerusalem people who move to West Bank due to the hardships in Jerusalem (Salem, 1996, 24).

Badil Center added other components that create IDP'S such as the excessive use of force detention and torture, forced evictions, attacks, and harassment by non-state actors such as the settlers; revocation of residency rights; closures and segregation; discriminatory distribution of land, settle implantation and the policy of Judaization (Badil, 2009, 19-29). The exact numbers of each of those categories mentioned by Badil Center keep changing from one day to another. Besides that, Wakim wrote about the IDP's inside Israel who live in 70 villages, not allowed to go back to their original villages due to the confiscation of their lands on the basis of the "Absentees land Law of 1950 and other laws, the number of these was 46000 in 1950 according to a UNRWA calculations out of 156000 Palestinians 30 percent (Wakim, 2002, 70). The "The Committee for the Defense of the Internally Displaced Persons in Israel" was established in 1992, and it is taking the lead in defending their rights till today.

This overview was not only about the numbers, but also about the methods used to create a refuge, and the ways to divide them into different categories that each seeks different rights. For the refugees the power was initially the return to inside Israel with the condition made by the UNGA resolution that the returnees "Should live in Peace with their neighbors", a formula that can be achieved by either granting them an Israeli citizenship, or residency in Israel as included in the UNGA Partition Plan Resolution of 1947. But later this right became about five options presented to the Palestinian Refugees by Clinton Parameters of 2000; one by staying where they are, second by going back to

Israel subject to Israel approval of the criteria for that return; third return back to the Palestinian State on 1967 borders; travel to a third country; and fifth accept compensation (www.ecf.org.il). This proposal was finally changed by Trump latest statement that the refugee number does not exceed 40,000, without presenting solutions to these from his side at the same time. In the meantime, new proposals keep coming to resettle refugees (Masalha documented the previous ones till 1972, and by MasriyehHazboun till 1996), such as the last old or new one to resettle Gaza Refugees in Sinai (see below).

Regarding the 1967 Displaced persons, there was a process to solve their problem by the 1990's Quartet Committee established according to Oslo 1993 article number 12 which talked about allowing them to return; the committee was composed of Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Egypt. The committee met few times then its work was frozen after the disagreements its members have about the definition and the numbers of the 1967 displaced persons who all were looking to go back to West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Finally, the IDPs issue took different paths, for instance the IDPs inside Israel were not included in the negotiations and were left to struggle for equal rights inside Israel, while those who lost their identity cards abroad were given the right to apply to a joint committee composed from both sides to get their residency back (Article 28 of the Civil Affairs annex of 1995 Taba Agreement).

Finally, in regard to refugees return 40,000 to 50,000 were allowed to come back with the Palestinian Authority in the 1990s, and besides that Israel used the Family reunification formula to let persons to come back after checking their security files, such a method was an alternative to the right of return one, and it aimed to solve humanitarian rather than political issues (Salem, 1997, 116). The family reunification formula faced a challenge itself since 2002 when Sharon Government decided to freeze the family reunification files between the Palestinians from East Jerusalem in one side, and the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza in the other hand (www.adalah.org).

It is noticeable that new methods keeps to be added all the time for the dispossession of the Palestinians, for instance the Separation Wall that the Israeli Authorities started building in 2002 will confiscate 16.43 percent of West Bank territory when it will be finished leaving thousands displaced (State of Palestine Strategy for Area C, 2018, 11) , besides that there are the growing displacements against the Bedouins in Area C, and Hebron 2 area consisting of 20 percent of Hebron and resided by 40000 Palestinians who are under the threat of ongoing evacuation by different means (State of Palestine Strategy for Area C, 2018, 53).

All in all, refugees consist the majority of the Palestinian people, by the end of 2017, 5,869,733 are registered with the UNRWA (including 5,340,443 Refugees), of which 28,4 percent of them live in 58 refugee camps run by the UNRWA in West Bank, Gaza Strip, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon (www.unrwa.org). However, Al- Awda network provide the number of 7, 2 million including those who neither are nor registered by the UNRWA such as the 355,000 IDP's. Regarding 1967 Displaced persons, the same network considers them to be 834,000 with no accurate date included (www.al-awda.org).

According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics the number of the Palestinians worldwide was 12.706 at the beginning of 2017, the percents are: 23.4 West Bank, 15 Gaza, 21,1 inside Israel, and 49.5 percent in the Arab countries and the world(www.alzaytouna.org), but given that 42.5 percent of West Bank and Gaza are 1948 refugees (26.6 percent of West Bank population, and 66.2 percent of Gaza Strip population), this means that the refugees are the majority of the Palestinians (www.pcbs.org, 2018). According to Al Awda Center Statistics the percentage will be around 56.6 refugees who are eligible to right of return and compensation studied by other researchers (Qubrusi,1996; Hadawi, 1988; Salem 2006); but the conclusion for this research is that the Palestinian problem was and still in its essence a refugee problem, as shown this problem

resulting from the “demographic elimination policies” is still open without a solution, more striking is the continuous and the ongoing creation of new types of refugees as indicated, leaving as such the Palestinians in a continuous Nakba that is open as big wound that keeps becoming bigger and bigger a day after a day, and therefore transferred from the older generations to the younger ones instead of getting transformed to a new positive and alternative situation.

4.2.2 The Marginalized: The 1948 Palestinians

So far, there is not sufficient theorization about the Palestinians in Israel using the settler colonial framework (Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009, 95). Instead, five approaches to discussing their status were observed. The modernization approach by Rekhis and Landau including the modernization as an imposed process of Rozenfeld, the ethnic democracy of Sammy Smooha; the dominance model of Ian Lustick; and ethnocracy of Oren Yiftachel (Ghanem and Mustafa, 2012, 53-58). None of these five is sufficient since the Israeli policy is at the end a kind of one that deals with the Palestinians inside Israel as enemies, rather than dealing with them in light of democracy and citizenship. The root behind this way of treatment can be found in the declaration of the land in 1948 as Israel, and annexing its population who were given Israeli citizenship to the new emerging State.

As enemies the Palestinians inside Israel 1948 territories are excluded from political decision making, participating in the margin of the economy, and education is used as a way to control them (Ghanem and Mustafa, 65). They before that have no control over their space, which became a subject to Zionist Salvation of the Land and Hebrew Work conducted after the negation of the Diaspora as the three main Zionist principles (Ghanem and Mustafa, 62). As Yiftachel indicated, the Palestinians inside Israel represent 16 percent of the population, while controlling only 3.5 percent of the land; the jurisdiction of the Palestinian local authorities do not exceed 2.5 percent of the land of the State; the State confiscated around half of the lands that the Palestinians possessed till 1948; only 0.25 percent of the State land was distributed to the Palestinians

in Israel; The Palestinians are not allowed to acquire or lease around 80 percent of the State land; the Palestinian population in Israel increased six times since 1948, while the land allocated to them was decreased by half; 700 Jewish neighborhoods were built since the foundation of the state, while no single Palestinian community was built except 21 towns and villages built in order to resettle the Bedouins; finally there are tens of Bedouin villages in the South that have no state recognition, but on the contrary the State is planning to dismantle them (Yiftachel, 2012a, 182-183). These all are aspects of Judaization, and exclusion from equal citizenship.

The legal system in Israel was formulated to serve this process. The State lands are ownership to the Jewish people and can be transferred only to Jews (Haidar, 2007), The State flag, Anthem and the days of rest and feasts are all Jewish, the law of return of 1950 gives this right only to the Jews; the British Emergency Law of 1945 is still active; and also, the discriminatory laws regarding work, education, budgets, and others are still present. Finally, collective rights are prevalent only in the field of religious rights, but under control (Kretzmer, 2002; Bishara, 2002, 40). In the most recent years new laws were added for the exclusion of the Palestinians Israel; for instance the Nation-State Law of 2018 canceled the position of the Arab language as an official language, also it canceled the definition of Israel as a "Jewish and Democratic State" as it was in the Declaration of Independence; earlier law of 2011 prevented any activities from celebrating the anniversary of the 1948 Nakba; and also the Law of Citizenship passed several stages since 2002, to avoid granting citizenship to any spouse from the 1967 occupied territories, final example is the Loyalty Law of 2018 which gives the Minister of Interior the right to withdraw citizenship from any citizen who supports terrorism; similar to this law was also the law of expelling any member of the Knesset of 2016 by a Knesset vote (Madar Center, 2016).

The contrary of these laws the National Democratic Collective submitted to the Knesset debate at the beginning of June 2018 a bill that aims to cancel the "Jewish Nature of the State of Israel and to create a state for all its citizens." The draft law was presented by the Knesset Member Mr. Jamal Zahalka and his colleagues in the "National Democratic Collective" (www.madarcenter.org, 6/6/2018), but the Speaker of the Knesset prevented the National Democratic Collective from discussing this draft law in the Knesset. Again, these are representations of a position of a State that do not consider the Palestinians as belonging to it. One can also mention the siege of the Arab villages under a military ruling in the period of 1948 to 1966 when they were not allowed to move out their villages without permits. This was a period of Isolation and closures.

The Palestinians inside Israel were also subject to Israelization, by first imposing the Israeli citizenship on them after changing the name of the country from Palestine to Israel as earlier said. As a defeated community, they accepted the imposition of the Israeli Citizenship on them; and instead they raised the slogan of equality with the Jews that they sought to fight for inside the Israeli society primarily by the Israeli Communist Party who carried this slogan; leading to the emergence of political, economic, social, educational, and legal demands in the path of achieving the Israelization required. Therefore, Israelization was a multifaceted process, supported later by the Palestinian Authority after its establishment in 1994 as an encouraging process that prepare the 1948 Palestinian holders of the Israeli citizenship to play the role of bridging between the Palestinians and the Israelis in the "ongoing peace process" (Bishara, 2002, 63). But the process of Israelization was accompanied by another process of Palestinianization among the Palestinians inside Israel (Rouhana, 1997 /2015). In 1958 the Arabic-Popular Front, was established as a Palestinian National organization, followed by the Land Movement that was dissolved by the Israeli Authorities in 1965 when it tried to develop a list of running in the Israeli Knesset elections (see Mustafa and Ghanem, 2005 for the full list of the Palestinian movements inside Israel).

In general, it can be said that the struggle between the Israelization and the Palestinianization among the Palestinians in Israel passed four stages: From the policies of coexistence to the policies of rights; from identity policies to the policies of identity; from representation policies to the political representation, and the policies of differentiation versus the policies of recognition (Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009, 23-26). In the first stage, the Palestinians inside Israel position started by accepting the passive kind of coexistence after the 1948 war but started later to call for their rights of equality with the Jews. In the second stage integrated with the first one their position was transformed from defending their identity to act for its rights; in the third stage they moved from developing policies about representation to practicing them later; finally in the fourth stage they developed the debate between these two trends, the one that calls for the recognition of the Palestinians inside Israel as a national minority and give it a cultural autonomy; and the second represented by the Islamic Movement called for a differentiation, but selecting to act separate from the state without asking the state for any kind of recognition for the Palestinians collective rights in Israel. Being intertwined, the four stages above can be also divided to two, the first was a combination of the struggle for equality and the identity policies that continued till the midst of 1990s when the National Democratic Collective was established calling for the transformation of Israel from a Jewish state to a State of all its citizens, and called accordingly to the State recognition of the Palestinians inside Israel as a national minority (Mustafa and Ghanem, 2005, 37, Salem, 1996, 43- 49). At the beginning the politics of equality practiced by the Israeli Communist Party was challenged by the Islamic Movement since its revival in the end of the 1970s when a secret Islamic group calling for armed struggle against the Jews was established under the name of " Al-Jihad Family", followed in 1983 by the establishment of the group of the Muslim Youth; and the transformation to the political work in 1989; and at the end two Islamic movements emerged in 1996, one called the South Islamic movement who participated in the Israeli Knesset elections seeking the state recognition , and

the other acted in the North mainly the Triangle calling for a policy of differentiation with the state. The latter was preceded by other small Nationalist-Marxist movement called *Abna'a Al Balad*: The Sons of the Country that started in 1972 and called for a differentiation policy with the state. By the middle of the 1990s, three trends became clear: the one that continued to call for equality, and the second that called for the state recognition, and the third that called for differentiation.

What did these three strategies mean regarding the struggle between Israelization and Palestinianization among the Palestinians inside Israel? In one hand it expressed the success of Israel of dividing the Palestinians inside Israel. In this regard the strategy of state recognition emerged as a response to Oslo Agreement of 1993 in which Israel recruited the PLO support to its consideration of the Palestinians inside Israel as Israelis, leading to the feeling among those Palestinians inside Israel that PLO marginalized them and left them behind, without seeking to defend their collective rights (Salem, 1996). Besides that, the equality strategy was divided in practice to two ways of conduct: One that sought equality by struggling for equal rights and the second sought equality by getting integrated into the state structure as employees. After 1967 these worked, using their good Hebrew and their experience with the Israeli institutions, either as agents for the implementation of the Israeli policies, as being part of the municipality structure in East Jerusalem, staff of the military system in West Bank and Gaza, and the Israeli Ministries branches in East Jerusalem. Finally, as mediators in the economic deals between the 1967 Palestinian occupied territories and Israel (Bishara, 2002a, 30-31). Besides these, there are others who came to serve the Palestinians in the 1967 occupied territories as academics, Lawyers, engineers, and other kinds of jobs. Furthermore, the interactions created between them and those of the 1967 occupied territories created also further processes towards their Palestinianization. Aspects of Unity of all the Palestinians grow; in addition to

the unity between the communists, and the Islamists across 1948 so-called Green line.

The Land Day of 1976 became a symbol for the Palestinian collective struggle against land appropriation, and later the 1987 Intifada in 1967 resonated among the Palestinians inside Israel leading to the expansion of the power of those who consider themselves to be mainly part of the Palestinian people, but till then, the 1990s, they called The Democratic National Collective, for the establishment of a State for all its citizens in Israel while supported the two states solution across the 1967 borders at the same time. The later developments such as the killing of 13 Palestinians inside Israel in 2000 by the Israeli security forces in response to demonstrations protesting the Israeli attacks on Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, followed by different new laws of discrimination and exclusion (see above) crowned by the rejection of the "Law of the State for its all citizens" and the approval of the Nation-State Law this year; and the failure of the Oslo peace process and the two states solution paradigm, and the alternative path of the Palestinian Authority towards internationalization. All these developments might play a role in increasing the unity between all the Palestinians around a one-state solution strategy that will take any of the shapes of a bi-national state, State for all its citizens in the whole Palestine (Abdel Fattah, 2009), or a state for all its citizens and absentees (Masalha, 1993). However, this growth strategy is still not adopted officially by the PLO since it will require a return by it to its 1960's original proposal of a "Democratic Secular State" in the whole land of Palestine. The PLO position is critical to reuniting the Palestinians around one integrated strategy that might have better potential to block the Israeli fragmentation politics in one hand and to make achievements in the face of the settler-colonial project in the second hand.

Till the 1990s Israel was capable to sustain its settler-colonial implantation on the expense of the Palestinians inside Israel by its settler-colonial acts in one hand and by fragmenting the Palestinians inside Israel in the other hand, first by

granting them Israeli citizenship in 1948 opposite to their original one, and accordingly create a new framework for them to struggle for equality. This framework looks to be broken by the last decade. Also, the frame of getting the state recognition of them as a national minority was broken as well. What left might be a "return of the Palestinian unity" by disengagement with the Israeli settler colonial structures and select a path of differentiation. It was since the midst 1990s when the Palestinians inside Israel started looking for solutions from "Outside their Israeli citizenship" (Ghanem and Mustafa, 2009,12), such as boycotting the Knesset elections (only 53 percent of them voted in 2009, and 56 percent voted in 2013 (Jaber, 17/3/ 2015 www.noonpost.org), followed by 70 percent in 2015 due to the establishment of a “ United list” between all the Arab parties and movements (www.mada-research.org 21/3/2017),and it is not known yet what will be the percentage for the coming elections due to the setbacks created by the last years new Israeli Laws.

Besides boycotting the elections, other tools used including the Islamic Movement idea of the creation of a self reliant society and the purpose of the preparation of a democratic constitution beyond both the Jewish State and the Jewish and democratic state that cannot be established due to the contradiction between its two parts: The Jewish and the democratic as a poll conducted by Mada Al Carmel Center had shown in 2004 by 62 percent who believed that these two concepts could not go in tandem (Ghanem and Mustafa,2009,14-16);striking enough as will the interpretation of Ahmad Tibi the Palestinian member in the Israeli Knesset when he said “ Israel is a democracy for the Jews, but a Jewish State for the Arabs” (Shlaim, 2018).

In concrete the Israeli policies towards the Jalil, the Naqab, and the Triangle can be briefly overviewed as examples: To start from the Jalil as it is called in its Arabic Name which the majority of it was supposed to be part of the Arab State according to the 1947 Partition Plan. As indicated earlier the Jalil still enjoys its Palestinian majority till today. Therefore during the period from 1948 several

projects were presented in order to Judaize the Jalil (Falah, 1993); one of the most significant among these was the 1976 project for the "Judaization of the Galilee"; the project included the building of 60 Jewish settlements in the top of the hills in the Jalil, in addition to building another 20 small Jewish settlements in the Naqab (Yiftachel, 2012, 268). The name "Judaization of the Galilee" expressed the position of the Israeli government of considering its Arab population as aliens that their lands are eligible to be expropriated (Bishara, 2002, 34). Therefore, the response of the Palestinians inside Israel was by conducting the "Land Day" at the end of March 1976, a strike that included demonstrations that resulted in six Palestinians killed. Other several projects for the Judaization of the Jalil were presented after, such as the 2005 project of Shimon Peres, the Minister of the Development of the Naqab and the Galilee Shimon Peres, aiming to establish 10,000 building units, and the 2013 plan for creating small settlements in the upper of the hills in the Jalil (Mouasi, 2014, 150-156).

If the story of the Jalil is a story of Judaization, it is for the *Naqab* (The Arabic name of it which means the dry land (Falah, 1986, 38) an account of uprooting, land appropriation, and displacement and forced sedentarization. The same as the big part of the Jalil, *Be'ar Al Sabe'* a: The Arab name of *Beer Sheva*, as it is called in Hebrew, was part of the Arab State according to the UN Partition Plan of 1947. The Naqab consists of 12,000 square Kilometers (Falah, 1986, 42) from 27.000 thousand consisting all the historical land of Palestine including West Bank and Gaza Strip. After Israel took over the Naqab in 1948 only 15 percent of Be'ar Al Sabe' a population was left. Israel transferred them to an area composed of 90000 Dunams called *Siage*: The Enclosure and they were told that they would be allowed to return in a period of two weeks to 6 months, but they stayed till today under attacks of further evacuations (Abu Sitta, 2011; Nasasra, 2013).

In 1950 The Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion sold 2.5 million dunams of the land of Be'r Al Sabe' a to the Jewish National Fund, and later he claimed that that Fund owns the land as a charitable Society which he has no authority over it (Abu Sitta, 2011). The Bedouins in the Siage did not get any state services until 1952. Instead, the state continued to expel them through the borders until 1953 (Falah, 1989, 116). Sabri Jiryis included expulsion stories that took place until 1959 (Jiryis, 1969). After the outside expulsion another stage started by the collection of 20000 Bedouins in 7 sedentarization towns including *Rahat*, *Tel Al Sabe'a*, *Al-Shqeib*, *Kseifeh*, and *Ar'ara*; but also the internal deportations continued such as the evacuation of 750 Bedouin families in 1982-1983 from Tel Al Maleh area in order to establish new camps and an airport to the Army after the evacuation of Sinai due to Camp David Agreement with Egypt by then (Falah, 1989, 136- 183).

Finally, in 2013 PrawerPlan was presented to demolish tens of the Bedouin non-recognized villages in the Naqab, and to confiscate 800000 dunams from the Bedouin land. Prime Minister Netanyahu canceled the plan in the same year after a long struggle of the Bedouins (www.adalah.org, 2013), but the hardships of the Bedouins continued till 2018 when the High Court decided to evacuate the village of *Umm Al Rihan* in April, while the plight of Al Araqeeb village continued after it was demolished for more than 133 times.

The third case is the Triangle, which was transferred to Israel by Jordan in 30th of April 1949 according to Rhodes Agreement. Attempts were made ever since to Judaize it like the Galilee, but at the same time the Israel appetite to keep it in the hands of Israel was low; Sharon, for instance, considered the transfer of this region from Jordan to Israel to be a strategic mistake, but he suggested in the 1990's the so-called The seven stars plan to establish seven settlements in the Triangle (Mouasi, 2014, 145-150). Besides that the Triangle is an area where zoning plans are not approved, witnessing also a high percentage of house demolition; the region also saw Kufr Kassim Massacre of 1956 when 49 Arabs

were killed, and the establishment of the crossing Israel street on the expense of the Palestinian residents there; finally the establishment of settler- colonial colonies like Harish and others and 90 percent of the area land were confiscated between 1948 and 1966 for the Jewish settlement expansion (Mouasi, 2014, 141-150); however what Sharon considered as a mistake in the 1990s became a proposal for the exchange of the Triangle with the Palestinian Authority suggested by Avigdor Lieberman as indicated earlier if any future agreement will be made. But since there is no peace process in the Horizon, the other plan for the continuation of the Judaization of the Triangle will continue, but this will not mean that they will necessarily succeed.

In conclusion to this part, the process towards the Naqab, The Galilee and the Triangle is of a settler colonial nature till today representing the settler-colonial project that still in progress by a state that is drunk of its nationalism, and its aggressive attitude to appropriate, possess and dispossess. Elia Zureik called this process as internal colonialism, but it is also combined with an ethnocratic type of democracy in which the Arabs are not participants in the decision making, even classified in classes in which the Druze comes first as allies to Zionism, followed by the others divided along religious lines Christians versus Muslims. Or ethnic range, Bedouins and non-Bedouins. The dark side of this democracy is growing using the language of Michael Mann in a way that it might be already in the path of cancelation of its Arab citizens' formal presence in its "democratic Structure" including the Druze.

The puzzling question here is in the contradiction between the creation of a new country in the expense of the indigenous population, followed by annexing their leftovers to it by granting them individual rights rather than collective rights in Jewish State, then continue after that to deal with them despite the citizenship formalities as non-citizens but even as enemies. If this the case of Israel treatment with its formally recognized citizens, then the question will be about

how Israel will deal with the other category of residents with all its types after 1967?

4.2.3 The Residents: East Jerusalem, the West Bank Divisions, and Gaza Strip Palestinians

In the early years of the 1967 occupation, the Israeli Mapai-led Government annexed East Jerusalem to Israel on the 28th of June 1967, while deciding to call the West Bank and Gaza Strip as “areas administered by Israel.” During those early years of occupation, Minister Yigal Alon and others called for the annexation of the Gaza Strip to Israel and started the creation of settlements in the West Bank such as Gush Etzion in the North of West Bank (Pappe, 2012). By 1977, a change to this policy took place with the formation of the Likud Government in that year led by Menahem Begin. In 1979, the Government decided to give legitimacy to the first Israeli settlement in the West Bank called Elon Moreh that was established during the period of the former Mapai government. This legitimization led to a tremendous increase of settlement expansion in the West Bank, causing the number of the settlers to go up to 91000 by 1991 (Jubeih, 2012, 59) when the peace process started by holding the Madrid Conference at the end of October that year. Since the Madrid conference and until today the number of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem jumped to more than 614,500, according to Israeli sources (Peace Now website), while the Israeli settlers were only evacuated from the Gaza Strip and Jenin area by 2005.

This brief overview shows that the “peace process” for the Israeli Governments did not exceed being a public-relations play that was mainly created as coverage for the continuation of the settler-colonial project. The number of settlers grew by around seven times during the 27 years of the peace process which have passed since the Madrid conference in 1991.

On the other hand, the colonial settlement increase led to the presence of two populations in the same territory: The emerging Settler colonial presence since 1967 and on versus the indigenous people. This is the same as was the case before 1948 leading to the transfer of the Palestinians that year by force. This transfer was repeated in 1967 by the Israeli Army (Masalha, 2003, 177-213). The question, then, is if there is currently a preparation for a third transfer to be added to the 1948 and 1967 ones, and to be implemented during any upcoming war or severe crisis with the Palestinians. Zionism can plan for such transfer, but this does not mean that it can apply it as analyzed in the previous section.

History so far tells that the Zionists transferred the majority of the Palestinians in 1948, and a fewer number of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians in 1967. In both cases, a transfer took place, while the rest of the Palestinians were put under a strict military rule that works in the service of the colonial settlers, and therefore subject to the confiscation of their lands and houses and other oppression and suppression procedures. These two examples point to a policy that includes two components. The first is the dispossession and ethnic cleansing (Nishul as a term in Hebrew coined by Jeff Halper in 2005), to a part of the Palestinians, and the second is keeping the other part under an apartheid system.

After 1967, this bi-dimensional policy was practiced fully in East Jerusalem. For example, Israeli Buses were placed in Damascus Gate after the 1967 war to transport the Palestinians to the Jordan River on their way to Jordan (Masalha, mentioned an additional example regarding the demolition of Al Sharaf Neighborhood in the Old City of Jerusalem and the transfer of its population to Shuafat Refugee Camp. Besides that, a full apartheid policy was practiced against those who continued to live in the city as will be shown below.

Later, this policy became the one that is practiced in area C, consisting of two-thirds of the West Bank that is under full Israeli control. For example, the

Bedouins who are living in this area are under continuous processes of dispossession, while the settler- colonial project is taking over most of area C as a zoning area for the expansion of the settlement residence areas, factories, high-tech industries (as in *Salfit* district), and the agricultural production areas. This is beside the Israeli control over the Palestinian water resources that are located in area C.

In 2016, the Israeli Minister of Agriculture, Uri Ariel, called for the full annexation of area C to Israel and deporting its 150,000 Palestinian residents to area A of the West Bank (www.washingtonpost.com; www.breakingisraelnews.com, 2016). Neftali Bennet, the Minister of economy, called for the same several times, and prepared a plan for a gradual annexation of the West Bank to Israel, starting with the annexation of *Maale Adumim* settlement directly after the inauguration of the new American President Donald Trump on the 20th of January 2017 (Theguardian.com, 3rd of January, 2017).

The conclusion here is that there is a one Israeli annexation policy. For East Jerusalem, it was made as de jure, while made as de facto for area C of the West Bank. This policy was combined with other one aiming to divide the Palestinian through the invention of formal differences. For instance, the Palestinians in East Jerusalem (different than West Bank and Gaza Palestinians) carry blue Israeli identity cards that do not give them at the same time the rights of the Israelis (see below), but it allows them to travel inside Israel and to use its airport (with a lot of hardships) to go abroad, in addition to getting national insurance and benefiting from the Israeli health insurance system. These gifts will become perceived as poisoned when we see that they are also combined with separating the East Jerusalem Palestinians from their brother and sister Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and restricting their freedom to travel to these two Palestinian Territories. On the other hand, these differences are narrowing day after day due to the Israeli preparations to annex area C to Israel and to transfer its Palestinian population.

The Fragmentation policy is not limited to the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, but it is a general policy towards all the Palestinians. The Palestinians inside Israel were given Israeli passports, but they face the same procedures that are practiced against the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and area C of the West Bank. They suffer thus from internal dispossession against the Bedouins of the Naqab and the non-recognized villages, with the prevention of 1948 internally displaced persons (around 300,000 today) to go back to their communities. They are also not allowed to return to their pre-1948 villages even when there is a resolution by the Israeli High Court allowing them to return to them. The case of Iqrit and Kufr Berem villages and the High Court Resolution of the 1950s letting them go back to their two villages neighboring the Israeli borders with Lebanon is an example.

Besides dispossession, the Palestinians inside Israel face all kinds of discriminatory policies in all economic, social, and political levels confirmed by Israeli resources such as the equality index of Sikkuy (1999-2009), and the publications of Sarah Ozacki Lazar (2016).

The fragmentation policy created different situations for the Palestinians. Described by the Palestinian Knesset Member Jamal Zahalkah, it is a complex of “a system of one Center called Israel that creates a democratic Jewish state to the Jews, combined with a racial discrimination system against the Palestinians inside Israel; a prison system for Gaza; a full apartheid system in the West Bank; Judaization system in Jerusalem, and an exclusion system to the Diaspora Palestinians” (Zahalkah, Maan news, 2016).

A modification to Zahalkah statement will be that the Judaization system is not only for Jerusalem, but it is also the prevailing one when dealing with the Palestinians and their lands inside Israel and in the West Bank.

This fragmentation policy aims to divide the Palestinians and to prevent the emergence of one united agenda for all of them. The Palestinian program is currently split between the agenda of the struggle for equality for the pre-1948 Palestinians, the agenda of independence and statehood for the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem Palestinians, and the agenda of the right of return to the Palestinian refugees. The question will be if the standard features of the Israeli fragmentation policy, especially dispossession (external and internal) and the apartheid practiced against all the Palestinian groupings, lead to a united agenda between all the Palestinians. Will Jerusalem also be vital for the development of the Palestinian commons?

4.2.3.1 The Settler Colonial Citizenship Politics: The Case of Jerusalem

Citizenship understood as a reciprocal relationship between the human being and the state, on the one hand, the society and the homeland on the second hand (Salem, 1997), is non-existent in Jerusalem under Israeli occupation since 1967. Ever since the Israeli citizenship politics were the alternative.

Citizenship politics presented here are those politics that include a combination of social and territorial engineering methods of exclusion and inclusion to achieve a specific political goal. Such politics cover in the case of East Jerusalem a triangle of three primary processes: De-territorialization, fragmentation, and isolation. To promote such processes, they are combined with other three assisting methods: de-equalization, de-democratization (discussed earlier by Karma Nabulsi, 2003, p.117), and de-development (discussed previously by Sara Roy regarding the Gaza Strip, third edition 2016). This paper will focus on the de-territorialization and the fragmentation and isolation regarding citizenship in East Jerusalem while the other mentioned dimensions are covered intensively by the cited studies and others.

In Jerusalem, the settler-colonial citizenship politics were conducted differently in two periods: The pre-1948 Period, and the post-1967 Period.

Regarding the first period, the citizenship politics were conducted by the Zionist military factions, leading in 1948 to the dispossession of all West Jerusalem Palestinians. This period was covered earlier by many studies (Tamari, 2002). Therefore, it will not be discussed here.

The second period of post-1967 occupation is the one discussed here. While the Zionist factions were the perpetrators of the citizenship politics of dispossession in the pre-1948 period, this task is practiced by the Israeli Government in this second period. Contrary to the one-sided citizenship politics of the Zionist factions focusing on dispossession in the pre-1948 period, the Israeli government policies of post-1967 included several components, on the one hand dispossessing part of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem, and on the other hand implementing a policy of "imposed inclusion without integration" towards those who did not leave (Salem 2006, 5). This policy included the use of different military, legal, economic, social, and political means to sustain it. Thus, what has existed in East Jerusalem since 1967 is not merely a military occupation as it is being described by the local and international politicians, but rather a colonizer missionary state politics that are directed to the fulfillment of the state mission.

Contrary to the normal state that serves all its citizens, the State of Israel is a kind of country that works for the promotion and the implementation of ideology. Since "The United Jerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel and the heart of the Jewish people," according to this ideology (Herzliya Conference, in Madar, 2009). Then the state will work for materializing this aim into reality. The implementation of this goal will require as a first component of the Israeli citizenship politics the deterritorialization of the Palestinians from and in East Jerusalem in several stages. These stages according to previous research are

as follows: Stage One, 1967–1993: The period of Annexing East Jerusalem to Israel on 28th of June 1967, confirmed by an August 1980 Knesset legislation, and sustaining this annexation and adding parts of the West Bank to East Jerusalem, doubling it thus by 12 times from 6 square kilometers as it was before 1967 to 72 square kilometers after the 1967 occupation.

Stage Two, 1993–2006: The separation between Jerusalem and the rest of the 1967 Palestinian Territories by the closure system that started at the end of March 1993, and the creation of a “new Jerusalem” outside Jerusalem (*Ma’ale Adumim*, *Pisgat Zeev*, and *Givat Zeev* colonial settlements).

Stage Three, 2006–today: creating the Greater Jerusalem by annexing the “new Jerusalem” to it, in addition to the creation of a “Jewish Old City” that surrounds the Old City, and sustaining the separation between Jerusalem and the West Bank by the establishment of the Separation Wall (Salem, 2010, 9-23).

The upcoming Israeli plans regarding East Jerusalem include the establishment of the Metropolitan Jerusalem by stretching Jerusalem to the Dead Sea shores and the creation of substantial touristic and economic complexes in the empty areas between East Jerusalem and the Dead Sea (Arafah, 2016). This process includes, on the one hand, annexing of new territories to Israel, and on the other hand, ousting territories from what was considered the “Jerusalem Governorate” before 1967.

Citizenship-wise, this meant forcing part of East Jerusalem Palestinians to start living under Israeli law in the areas annexed by Israel, and others to be separated from the former pre-1967 Governorate of Jerusalem and to become subject to another kind of Israeli control managed by the Israeli army. The territories that were ousted from the former Governorate include the villages of *Eizarriyah*, *Abu Dees*, *Sawahreh Al Sharqiyyah*, *Al Shiekh Saad*, *Hizma*, and *Qalandia* among others. This inclusion and ousting created two different

categories as part of Israeli citizenship politics. On the one hand, those placed under the Israeli-annexed areas of East Jerusalem is considered as Jordanian citizens who live permanently in Israel. On the other hand, those who were ousted were considered till the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 as “Jordanian citizens living in areas administered by Israel,” and after 1994 they came to be defined as “Palestinian residents in areas under dispute” (Salem, 1998).

The deterritorialization of the Palestinians in the framework of the former East Jerusalem Governorate took thus three ways, one by a direct expulsion of part of the population during the 1967 war, and by different methods of ethnic cleansing to be explicated from now on, the second by redefining the territory that was annexed, and the Palestinians living in some of its parts finding themselves deterritorialized from East Jerusalem. The third was that those who were deterritorialized from the former Jerusalem Governorate found themselves re-territorialized in Palestine and de facto relations with the two Governorates of Ramallah and Bethlehem rather than with Jerusalem.

The other face of this deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the Palestinians is the reterritorialization of the Jewish colonial settlers. It should be noted that this process has different dynamics than the dynamics of the other one used towards the Palestinians. The colonial -settlers are not deterritorialized from their previous residence and life locations, but they are brought to the new territory by incentives, being either ideological or economic, and services through government grants, exemption from taxes and other means of support. The settler-colonial project in East Jerusalem does not restrict itself to the city borders as defined at any moment, but it keeps expanding beyond these boundaries. In other words, the settler project as a mission in the making is the tool used by both the settlers and the Government for creeping annexation of more significant parts of the West Bank to Israel by adding these pieces to the borders of Jerusalem.

Finally, what constitutes the definition of the East Jerusalem Palestinians as Jordanian citizens residing permanently in Israel is multifold: First: They are considered Jordanian Citizens, not Palestinians, a claim that is based on the Israeli position that the Palestinian citizenship and state never existed, while on the other hand, the area was under the Jordanian ruling system which offered its residents Jordanian citizenship and Jordanian passports.

Second: As Jordanian citizens, they are aliens who are eligible to get residency rights only. As such they get Israeli travel documents (not passports) issued according to " paragraph 2(b) of the law of Passports- 1952" (Halabi 1997 / 2001) as written on its cover page, then in the next page, their nationality is mentioned to be Jordanians.

Third: They reside in Israel, based on the Israeli ideological claim that Jerusalem is historically Israeli (Jewish) that was taken over by different aliens, the latter of which was Jordan. According to this narrative, Israel liberated it in 1967 and brought it back to its original owners, which are the "Jewish people as it is claimed." These claims are already analyzed and responded to by many legal and political studies (Halabi 1997; 2001), while the question of this paper is how permanent the right of residence in the city is according to the Israeli law.

An answer to such a question will suggest that the time range of this permanence kept changing. In the beginning, seven years of staying outside the city were enough to end the permanent residence of a Palestinian in the city, while in Fat'hiyeh Shikaki's case in the 1990s, six years were enough to confiscate her Jerusalem ID. Besides that, the Israeli law allows the confiscation of IDs in case that one is considered to be violating the residency rules, such as withdrawing Mubarak Awad's ID in 1988 because he was called by then to the boycott of Israeli products. This same procedure was again used by taking away the IDs of Hamas members in the Palestinian Legislative Council in 2006.

Therefore, the residency permanency is first not without a time limit, and secondly, it can be withdrawn for violations of the Israeli laws. Still, there is a third aspect of this policy which is restricting the granting of residency status to new Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who get married to East Jerusalem Palestinians, or a Palestinian living inside Israel. This policy was intensified in 2002, and the human rights organizations follow their details (www.adalah.org).

Thus, the residency rights of citizens of another country (Jordan) as they were considered keeps diminishing. On the other hand, this policy is about the “permanence of the temporary,” as the Israeli academic Adi Ophir put it (Ophir, 2006, 25). However, this permanence is not without a time limit as explicated; it might also be a temporary status till a ripe time arrives for conducting a new transfer of the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. In this regard, Adi Ophir also wrote that Palestinian is punished not because he/she committed a mistake, but because he/she exists in a place where Zionism expects him/her not to be (Ophir, 2006).

Therefore, the imposed inclusion without integration in Israel is a temporary policy, combined with a stateless situation (residency instead of accepting the Palestinian citizenship of East Jerusalem Palestinians), that in addition to discrimination by the Ministry of Interior procedures (Rweidi, 2000), the national insurance systems (Vitullo, 1998), and the municipality services (Margalit, 2011; Margalit, 2014). Besides these, there is also the discrimination in schools against the use of the Palestinian curricula, and the discrimination against the Palestinian professionals who are obliged to join the Israeli professional associations and to study Hebrew to be able to work. That is in addition to the workers who are required to accede to the Israeli Histadrut to be able to receive their job rights.

The phenomena of inclusion without integration exceed the examples mentioned above, and it stretches to all aspects of the life of the Palestinian in East Jerusalem, including the imposition of the Israeli rules over the East Jerusalem health, education, and other institutions versus the deportation of the Palestinian organizations from the city. On the economic level, West Bank and Gaza Strip products have no freedom of access to East Jerusalem, while Israeli products do (for the underdevelopment in East Jerusalem, see UNCTAD reports, mainly from 2016).

The empirical data above shows that to understand the Israeli Citizenship politics in East Jerusalem better; they need to be analyzed in a settler colonial framework that includes different comparisons. One of these comparisons is with the old pre-1948 Zionist citizenship politics, and the second correlation between settler colonial politics in East Jerusalem versus the rest of Palestine, and also versus the rest of the other areas in the pre-1967 Jerusalem Governorate.

Such an analysis is different than the Open Ethnocracy analysis of Oren Yiftachel (2006). While Yiftachel mentions the territorial issues, he still focuses more on the inclusion and the exclusion from the demos, claiming in between that the Israeli Ethnocracy is an open one that accordingly includes some aspects of democratic rights to the non- privileged groups.

On the other hand, the settler-colonial approach is less different than the Ethnocracy approach of Nils Butenschon (1993), who while focusing on the territorial issues of domination, still sees the solution of a rights-based approach around the idea of full inclusion in the demos. On the contrary, the settler-colonial approach is both rights-based and territorial based. Therefore, getting the democratic rights should not be separated from the right to territory and getting it back.

Based on this approach, this part showed the process of deterritorializing the Palestinians in East Jerusalem and out of it (also called dispossession, displacement, and “*nishul*” in Hebrew as Jef Halper, 2005 advised). This process was followed by Judaization of the Palestinian land including the place, the space, the territory and the landscape, and the Israelization of the institutions, by expelling the Palestinian organizations outside the city and imposing the Israeli ones instead. These practices were also followed by imposing the affiliation to the Israeli institutions on the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. The latter is combined with the dispersal of the East Jerusalem society and its communities through fragmentation of the Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem and marginalizing them to become no more than enclaves surrounded and cut from each other by Israeli colonial settlements. The Palestinians living in the pockets have to suffer from isolation and disconnectedness from the other Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza through the closure system and the building of the wall. Combined with the policies of inclusion without integration, will leave the Palestinians alienated in their city, politically and socially fragmented on the public level and atomized on the individual level.

4.2.3.2 Palestinian East Jerusalemite Citizens’ Responses

As is said, the settler colonial projects to succeed they will need a type of local, regional, and international interactions with the indigenous in which the settler-colonial projects win (see the rest of this chapter and the next one). Regarding Jerusalem, the Palestinian responses to the Israeli settler-colonial citizenship politics varied between reactions of institutions on behalf of the East Jerusalem Palestinians, and responses by the citizens themselves. In the end, these responses were incapable of changing the direction of annexation in the city, while they succeeded to preserve some Palestinian institutions in the city as it will be shown.

Briefly speaking, the period from 1967 to 1987 was a period of institutional responses rather than direct citizens' responses. This does not mean that this period did not include any direct partial citizens' responses. One of the repeatedly mentioned examples of these citizens' responses is the success of the teachers in Jerusalem to prevent, through their strike, the imposition of the Israeli curricula in East Jerusalem schools. Also, there is the success of the keeping the *Waqf* (Islamic and Christian endowment) out of Israeli control in the early years of the occupation, but these were specific struggles that did not lead to a comprehensive Intifada as happened in 1987.

The Canadian researcher Anne Latendresse divided the period of Palestinian resistance from 1967 to 1994 to four stages. The first stage from 1967 to 1974 entailed the Palestinian success to preserve the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem: The *Waqf*, the educational institutions, the chamber of commerce, the Labor and the professional trade unions, Al Maqased and Augusta Victoria Hospitals, and the electricity company. The second period is from 1974 to 1987, the period of Sumud (Steadfastness) included support through the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee. The next stage spans from 1987 to 1992, the Intifada that redrew the 1967 borderline between what is Palestine and what is Israel, and the last stage was the stage of negotiations from 1992 to 1994 (Latendresse, 1995, 27-55). Latendresse's review shows that the five years from 1987 to 1992 were the only years of citizens' comprehensive struggle. Afterward, the responses went back to the hands of the elites, this time not represented by the grassroots elites who fought for the preservation of their institutions as was the case from 1967 to 1992 but represented by the high political elite which looked for negotiations as a way out of the settler- colonial occupation.

From 1994 to 2001 (when the national leader and the head of the Orient House institution in East Jerusalem Faisal Hussein passed away), the responses were kept in the hand of the Jerusalem institutions, but after 2001, the Israeli authorities closed these institutions in East Jerusalem starting with the Orient

House itself. That closure was in opposition to Shimon Peres' (by then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel) pledge in 1994 to Johan Holst, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway to keep the Palestinian institutions open in East Jerusalem. What followed was that the independence of the Palestinian institutions in East Jerusalem went under attack. The Israeli authorities worked to impose the Israeli curricula for education in East Jerusalem, making the Electricity Company dependent on getting energy from the Israeli one and making the hospitals in East Jerusalem reliant to a significant extent on the Israeli health funds. By 2016, what was left out of Israeli control was only the Islamic and the Christian Waqf, where there is ongoing Israeli attempts to change the status quo and to gain control over them.

Beyond the Institutional responses, the citizens' responses stopped in 1992, to be revived in the second Intifada of 2000, but with minor and weak participation from the citizens of East Jerusalem. This low level of involvement may be a show of protest towards the Palestinian National authority, as a response to the postponement of negotiations regarding the issue of Jerusalem' to the permanent status negotiations, and the failure of these talks that took place in Camp David in 2000. However, this question is one that needs further research. While not participating intensively in the 2000 Intifada, the Palestinians of East Jerusalem faced restrictions on their freedom to travel to the West Bank in the first years of the Intifada; they were also banned from going to Gaza, an ongoing ban until today. Other restrictions included the erection of the wall in 2006 around Jerusalem separating Jerusalem partially from the West Bank, followed by the failure of the negotiations held after the Annapolis Conference in 2007, and the war on Gaza at the end of 2008. All those combined with the sustaining of the Israeli institutions in East Jerusalem while the Palestinian ones were shut down led the East Jerusalem Palestinians to respond in four different ways:

The first is what I called in previous research "imposed adaptation response" by joining, for instance, the Israeli Labor and professional trade unions to receive

work rights, or joining the Israeli health funds to receive health services. The second response is the voluntary adaptation practiced by a minority who works in the Israeli institutions and votes for the Israeli municipality elections. The third is a kind of adaptation that aims to avoid the negative side of the Israeli exclusion policies, such as registering an NGO according to the Israeli law in order for it to be able to work in the city, paying the penalty with the aim of avoiding house demolition, or registering a residency to a husband or wife from the West Bank to prevent deporting him/her from the city.

The fourth and the last response is what I called "adaptation through rejection" (Salem 2006, 8). This type of response takes two shapes. One is by confrontation with the settler- colonial system as happened for instance in 2014 after the burning of the Palestinian child Mohammad Abu Khdeir. An extreme Jewish right-wing group kidnaped Abu Khdeir from the street in his village of Shufat in Jerusalem. The other example of confrontation is the 2015 stabbing events of Israeli soldiers and policemen by young Palestinians in Jerusalem. The second response is the silent rejection, by building houses without a permit in a bigger number than the Israeli authorities can demolish, keeping thus an address in East Jerusalem or returning to it to avoid confiscation of their IDs, or living "illegally" in Jerusalem according to the Israeli laws (Salem,2006, 8).

These responses have two characteristics. On the one hand, they are citizen-based and community-based. On the other hand, they are about the right of people to human security, which means the right of all people to equal access to the freedom from fear and the freedom from want. This is one side of the coin. On the other hand, the responses are still scattered, local, spontaneous, not continuous, not part of a comprehensive United and cohesive plan, and nor capable of stopping and changing the course of the settler-colonial project in the city. They are responses that aim to keep survival within the framework of severe hardships, no less and no more.

4.2.3.3 Conclusions about East Jerusalem

Back to the theoretical frameworks, the question is: In which conceptual framework East Jerusalem and its citizenship can be explained?

Towards a typology, five analytical frameworks might be identified; these are the frameworks of equality/inequality, occupation, colonialism combined with Neo-Colonialism, ethnocracy, and Apartheid, and settler colonialism.

The first framework of inequality or equality is one that is open to two options. The first will seek to improve the level of equality in services within the current structure of power relations that exist in the city. This approach is conducted by part of the Israeli human rights organizations acting in the city against the discrimination of services towards East Jerusalem, in comparison to those services delivered to West Jerusalem. The problem of such an approach is that it ignores the political rights of the Palestinians, and therefore it adds to the sustaining of the current power relations in the city. Further, than that, this approach is incapable of confronting the dynamic processes of escalating the de-equalization as an ongoing process in the city. The other approach within this framework is the one that seeks to achieve equalization through a full transformation of the current power structure, and the creation alternatively of one bi-national state, or a state for all its citizens. This approach includes a future project to be discussed briefly in chapter five.

Regarding the description of the situation in East Jerusalem as being under a military belligerent occupation, it should indicate that this is a partial description that is not enough by itself due to the fact that the Israeli army and the security forces are acting on the service of the ongoing settler-colonial project in the city and not vice versa.

The combination of colonialism (occupation) with the neo-colonialism is also not enough to describe the situation in Jerusalem. On the one hand, there is a military occupation in the city. On the other hand, there are neo-colonial aspects

of domination going on such as monopolizing the East Jerusalem market to the Israeli products and preventing the Palestinian products from having their freedom of access to the city. Besides these two components, there is also a third one which is the settler- colonial element aiming to Judaize and Israelize the city. The ethnocracy framework focuses as discussed on the inclusions and the exclusions from the demos while giving less weight to the territorial issues and the people rights to them. Apartheid is the result of such an analysis while ignoring partially or entirely the other process of ethnic cleansing and spacio-cide.

The settler colonial framework is the one that is capable of overcoming the shortcomings of the four typologies mentioned. On the one hand, it can explain the combination of military occupation with neo-colonialism and settler colonialism. The occupation tools are used as tools to sustain settler colonialism, while the neo-colonial instruments, apartheid policies and the improvement of minor and partial civil rights, are all used as temporary procedures till the right moment comes for the launching of a new transfer against the endogenous population, or most of them.

Being such a process rather than an event, the settler- colonial project is currently escalating its steps towards a new collective transfer for the Palestinians as a repetition of the two transfers of 1948 and 1967. The growing internal displacements in area C and East Jerusalem and the booming voices towards the annexation of area C to Israel and evacuating its inhabitants also are just signals for the preparation of such upcoming transfer, to be executed as much as the Arab and international policies continue to be incapable of changing the path as they are. The tools of settler colonialism presented here will be those that will be used in that direction, but this does not mean that Zionism will succeed in its plans despite all the odds (see the previous chapter). Finally, the responses of the Palestinians to the settler- colonial project were mostly either top-down responses, through arm-struggle or negotiations, or

bottom-up political activities taking the shape of demonstrations, sit-ins and others alike, while what was missing is a bottom-up community-based process that creates and sustains Palestinian facts on the ground in the path of providing people with human security components of freedom from fear and freedom from want.

4.2.3.4 Area C of West Bank

The Zionist project since its inception was more ideological rather anything else. It has created an economy separate from the original people before 1948 in Palestine, using the model of "pure colonization" explained in Fieldhouse (1966). After 1967, the thesis of "retention of territories" for security reasons was used As a pretext for covering up the exclusive ideological essence of the Zionist project since the beginning of the nineteenth century. The employment of Palestinian workers in Israel and the settler colonies did not mean the abandonment of the exclusive colony but re-formed it in a new form called by Gershon Shafir as "ethnic colony" where the ethnic basis, will remain on all levels despite the hiring of indigenous workers (Shafir, 2002).

The current characteristics of the Zionist project since 1967 have shown signs of its continued essence. In that year, the "full land of Israel" movement was formed from broad spectrums of the right and the left in Israel (Sprinzak, 1991). Moshe Dayan also called for the annexation of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 to Israel, The ruling Labor Party took a settlement-oriented approach to security focusing on Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley and Gaza in accordance with the Yigal Alon plan, while complying with the directions of Gush Emunim for construction in Hebron and near Nablus (*Alon Moreh* colony). After the Likud's rise to power in 1977, the colonial settlement movement intensified and became urban in addition to settling in the heart of Palestinian cities (Al-Salih, 2011). In the previous stage, the Labor Party wanted to annex parts and left other parts of the West Bank to negotiate with Jordan following formula for the regional compromise, as Shimon Peres called it. Since 1977, the

trend has been more towards full annexation with Jordan given a functional role to meet the civil services of the Palestinians (Ayed, 1996).

The 1987 Intifada was about to turn down this situation, and to create the foundations to the freedom and independence of Palestine, but the declaration of the Oslo Accords in 1993 cut the way for this transformation and laid the groundwork for a gradual process towards the state, which included, according to the Interim Agreement (www.mfa.gov.il, 1995) of 1995, the division of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank into Areas A and B, and c. The latter, who was determined to be subject to total occupation, accounted for 61 percent of West Bank (3462,4 square kilometers out of 5500 square kilometers of all West Bank and Gaza) the rest was 18 percent as area A, and 21 percent as is B (see definitions below), are C include also Hebron 2 area and East Jerusalem in which the Palestinian Authority is allowed to invest and develop projects in 1 percent of it only (State of Palestine Plan for area C, 2018, 54, 6). This division was understood as an interim arrangement for 18 months during which three Israeli withdrawals would end, and the Palestinian Authority would hand over all the West Bank; except military positions and the area under construction in the settlements and East Jerusalem (Article 11 of the Interim Agreement of 1995). Article 27 of the same agreement did not include any provision for the establishment of an Israeli civil administration in Area C, which requires Palestinians to submit and authorize permits (Ministry of Local Government, 2016, 9).

The Israelis did not deal with the Interim Agreement following its text, but dealt with it the same as its previous and followed agreements, as just a public relations game aimed at gaining time for the expansion of colonial settlement and the establishment of facts on the ground. Therefore, the Civil Administration remained in place, and settlement colonization was increased to 614, 500 by the end of 2016, according to the estimates of the Peace Now movement, which includes East Jerusalem and on its front page, representing more than 20% of the population of the West Bank and Jerusalem. These settlers have a natural

increase of 3.9 percent per year without the addition of any new settlers to them (Dalumi, 2017). This increase encouraged the Israeli government to plan to increase the number of settlers in the West Bank to one million in the next ten to twenty years (see for example, the statement of Minister Zeev Elkin in this regard in November 2017).

In addition to colonization, the occupation has complete control over the precious natural resources of Area C, including the water sources, the Dead Sea and its minerals such as potassium, bromine, and magnesium, and the fertile lands of the Jordan Valley and its archaeological and tourist areas. Area C provides the Palestinian economy with \$ 3.4 billion annually if Palestinians are given access to and work in Area C (World Bank, 2013). The colonists viewed the West Bank as the "Land of Israel" controlled by the "outsiders" and as the one that the "Jewish people" returned to after two thousand years of exile appropriating it from Jordan who represented the last "illegal authority over it." By the end of 2016 colonial settlers-controlled 42 percent of the West Bank as zoning plans for the settlements (B'tselem 2017), in addition to the areas of domination, where the command of the settlement of MaaleAdumim, for example, reaches to the shores of the Dead Sea. This paper will focus on the developments of the structures of control over Area C and the mechanisms of disengagement with them, especially in the period after 2010.

4.2.3.5 Origins of the Structures of Control in the Area C

The Zionist project for Area C is a connected and separate project. It is in one hand connected with the general Zionist trend to kill the relationship of the Palestinian people to its land, as reflected in the Israeli nation-state law of 2018, which culminated in the series of measures practiced and still practiced by Israel after its attack against its Palestinian citizens in Jalil, Triangle, and Naqab. The essential element here is the policy of "demographic elimination," as Nadeem Rouhana (Rouhana, 2014) calls it, compared to "physical eradication" through total annihilation, as in the cases of America, Australia, and others, studies by

Patrick Wolfe (Wolfe, 2011, 2013) The demographic elimination mechanism has the significance of conducting at least internal expulsion Nour Masalha documented, or the destruction of villages along with the eviction (*Yalu, Emwas and Beit Nuba* after the 1967 war), and the expulsion to outside Palestine, the displacement of 1948, as well as the displacement of the people of Jerusalem in 1967 in 2003. Also, there is a silent displacement by pushing the population of Area C to the A, where the population growth rate in Area C was only 1.8 percent in 2011 and 2.9 percent in 2009 (The EU heads of mission report about area C 2011-2012). There are also 141,500 people have migrated from the area C between July 2015 and the end of 2016 (Ministry of Local Government, 2016, 19).

Among the causes of internal displacement are house demolitions (11,000 houses currently under threats of destruction in Area C), the militarization of settlers and their attacks against the Palestinians, 184 attacks in the first four months of 2018 (figures from the OCHA web page), and the lack of building permits (e.g: the Palestinians submitted 2020 requests for a building permits between 2010 and 2014, of which only 1.5 percent was approved, i.e., 33 applications). The Palestinian National Authority submitted 108 plans for 116 sites from 2010 to 2015, of which only three were approved as indicated by the sources of the Civil Administration itself (recent figures from the B'Tselem website). The construction of the wall, which transferred a large part of the agricultural land of Area C to the Israeli side, has also created a permitting mechanism for the entry and exit of the owners of these lands. Finally, there is the mechanism of preventing the Palestinian citizens from entering the *Ghor* area: Jordan Valley, without permits.

These elimination policies have one root to do with denial of Palestinian citizenship and the replacement of it by the Israeli citizenship. The Palestinian in the West Bank after Oslo became known by Israel as a "Palestinian resident in the disputed territory," in the development of Oslo's former concept of the Palestinian as a Jordanian citizen living in Israeli-administered territory (Salem,

2018). With the adoption of the Israeli nation-state law, the West Bank was no longer defined as a disputed territory but rather was considered to be part of Israel. The following developments marked the transition to this new trend: First, there is the nation-state law itself, which includes the promotion of settlement in the Land of Israel. The text states, "The State considers the development of Jewish settlement to be of national value and works to encourage it and to support its establishment and stabilization." (Arab 48.com, 18/7/2018). It is noted here that the law, as well as all its previous laws, does not define the borders of the state, which opens the way for the expansion of settlements in Area C, Jerusalem, and Hebron.

Secondly, the adoption of the Land Settlement Law by the Knesset on February 6, 2017, which legitimized the indiscriminate settlements, built on private Palestinian land, giving legal coverage to 4,000 colonial units in 120 random settlements. Minister Naftali Bennett described the government's approval of this law before it was passed on to the Knesset as "similar to the 1977 transformation, as we moved from an anti-Palestinian policy to a policy of annexing *Judea* and *Samaria* to Israel" (maannews.net, 12/5/2016). This statement was followed by another made by the Israeli Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked who said: "We have half a million Jews in Area C in exchange for 100,000 Palestinians, so we have to annex the area to Israel," (Shakid, maannews.net, 3/1/2018).

Third, there is the Knesset's approval of the applicability of the Israeli law to the settlements in the West Bank.

Fourth, changing the language, for instance, *Al-Khan Al-Ahmer* Bedouins, who were expelled from the *Naqab* in 1950, was accused by the Israeli Supreme Court of residing on land belonging to the nearby settlement of *KfarAdumim*. The area of *Turmos-Ayya* is called the *Shilo* Valley, and so on. In this context, Israeli authorities and the Israeli Supreme Court used the term "local population" in their deliberations and decisions to refer to those living in the West Bank

since the High Court Judge Salim Jubran resolution to call them accordingly in early November 2017 (www.jewishpress.com, November 4th, 2017), allowing as such for the accusation of the Palestinians of dominating lands that belong to the Jewish settlements, and therefore issue orders for eviction of them from the colonies; in this regard plans are prepared to evacuate 46 Bedouin locations based on are C.

Fifth, Legal changes, such as Military Order No.1597 of 2018, which paves the way for further demolition of Palestinian houses built without a permit, and turns cases brought in these matters to the Magistrate's Court as an alternative to the Israeli Supreme Court. The resolution of May 28, 2018, also forbids Palestinians in Area C from going directly to the Supreme Court before their cases are heard and discussed in the Jerusalem District Court, thereby further eroding the Green Line and promoting the real annexation of Israel.

Sixth, the establishment of a new settlement, the first of its kind since 1991, called *Amichai*, near the Palestinian village of *TurmosAyya*, to settle 42 families that were evacuated from the settlement *Amona*, which was built on the private land belongs to Palestinians of the village of *Silwad*, where Netanyahu offset by twice the area of the former colony in 2017. In August 2018, a new development took place with the enactment of the legislation of giving the neighboring Adi Elad illegal outpost the status of the regular settlement, then annex it to *Amichai* as a neighborhood of it.

These developments define the general policy of Zionism and its government towards the Palestinian people in all its places within the homeland. However, Area C is a Zionist priority in terms of annexation, Israelization, and Judaization as it progresses, and today there is debate in Israel between those who want creeping annexation to it; and the others who wish too start procedures to include them in Israel legally ultimately or gradually starting from *Ma'aleAdumim*, as requested by Naftali Bennett. Likud member Gila Gamliel proposed

expanding Gaza to Sinai and expelling Palestinians who reject Israeli rule in the West Bank to their Palestinian state there (Channel 7 Hebrew, 10/11/ 2017). And a third Likud member, Tzachi Hanegbi, threatened in July 2015 the Palestinians with a "third Nakba"(www. 972mag.com, 24/7/2017), a member of the Jewish home. Betzeliel Smotrich threatened three options for the Palestinians: leaving the country, accepting to live in unequal rights with the Jews, or rejecting the Israeli rule which Israel will respond to by carrying out the transfer. The Arab Knesset member Aida Toma Suleiman presented a complaint with the legal adviser to the government against these statements (*Ra'i Al Youm* 19/5/2018). There is also a statement by Agriculture minister Uri Ariel, who called for the expulsion of the residents of Area C and the official annexation of it to Israel, and the program of the *Zehut*. Identity party, a party headed by Moshe Feiglin, who participated in the Knesset elections of 2019, which calls for the expulsion of the Palestinians abroad in return for compensation (www.zehutinternational.org).

Thus, the structures of Israeli control of Area C refer to two components: elimination and implantation. The first is represented by the separation between the Palestinian human being and the place, sphere, territory, space, and landscape, added to that the denial of his/her citizenship, the dissolution of society, economy and culture, not to mention the removal of its identity and personality, and the refusal to recognize any individual or national rights, including the right to self-determination. In other words, it is a matter of elimination to zero politically, nationally, economically, socially, culturally and all the Palestinian structures that result from them. In comparison with Jerusalem, it seems that this is also what is going on, where many differences between what is going on in Jerusalem and what is going on in area C have been melted (Salem, 2018). The process of parallel implantation begins with the acquisition of the place, sphere, territory, space, and landscape, and restructuring it politically, economically, socially and culturally for the benefit of another people at the expense of the original people; it is also worthy of referring to another complex

of control that is related to the idea of modernity, where the existing indigenous society is backward and must be replaced by a modern society. In this context, Netanyahu spoke at the beginning of this year that the government would seek "to dissolve the concept of existing rural areas and replace its structure by modern one that one enjoys to look at." This statement came during the opening of a new road linking the settlements close to Qalqilya and the city of Kfar Saba in Israel (Al-Ayyam newspaper, 31/1/2017).

These control structures are based on the fact that what the Palestinian people face is not only a military occupation but a combination of occupation, colonial colonization, and apartheid (HounidaGhanem, 2018). As the occupying power plays the role of promoting the colonial settlement project, this means two things in regard to the Zionist project; the first is that the Zionist project is still in the process of expansion and did not stop with the establishment of the state in 1948, contrary to what Veracini maintained in this regard (Veracini, 2013). The second is that we do not stand in front of a settlement colonial project that has the mother state of Israel as Muhammad Shtayyeh maintained (Shtayyeh, 2016, 24), which will also be separated from Israel. As the latter was also separated from the British motherland in 1948, but on the contrary, we stand against an unfinished colonial settlement project for the State of Israel. As for the component of apartheid, it includes the separation between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The ESCWA report, written by Rima Khalaf, added that Apartheid also provides for the division of the Palestinians into several groups in terms of the level of citizenship. The Israeli citizens, residents of East Jerusalem and those who are subject to the denial of identity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the refugees abroad and the camps of the country (ESCWA report, 2017).

4.3.3.6 Palestinian Responses and the Mechanisms of Disengagement

The PNA plans did not include Area C programs until 2013. Until then, Area C was considered as part of the Occupied Territories without particular privacy. In

this context, the reform and development plans (2008-2010), national development (2011-2013) to the government of Dr. Salam Fayyad did not include specific plans for Area C (EU Heads of Mission report), and the Conference of the Center for Democracy and Community Development in cooperation with the American University in Jenin entitled "Human Security in Area C" for 2010 can be considered the first conference highlighting the issues Area C, followed by another conference held by the Institute of Palestine Studies in 2012.

The general idea with Dr. Salam Fayyad was that the territories occupied in 1967 were all occupied territories and not disputed areas. Consequently, construction and development were directed to area C without looking for Israeli permits, especially in the 1 percent of Area C that Israel allowed the Palestinians to build and invest in. The idea was related to the creation of facts on the ground despite the nose of the occupation. However, the Ministry of Local Government has continued to submit plans for the Civil Administration to obtain the necessary permits before implementation in the 1 percent mentioned. Moreover, Fayyad's government plans to stop the accelerated settlement couldn't work, nor it was able to reverse the settlement expansion partially.

With the National Plan 2014-2017(State Building Plan on the Road to Sovereignty released by the Palestinian Authority, the situation has changed, and Area C has become central to national planning. Area C is mentioned as a priority area in planning on pages 4.5, and 18 of the English text of the plan, on page 18, the plan states that Area C, particularly the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea, is essential for achieving national independence and control over natural resources. The plan called in page 21 for action to mobilize funds for the implementation of economic development projects in Area C, to achieve national independence that the previous national plans failed to deliver.

While the plans of the Palestinian governments until 2016 focused on building institutions towards achieving sovereignty, the "national agenda for the years 2017-2022" (Nationalpolicy Agenda 2017-2022, December 2016) released by the Palestinian Authority as well, began to focus on building the citizen. The plan also decided to "replace the policies of creating Israeli facts on the ground with policies to create Palestinian facts at the international level" (Nationalpolicy Agenda, 2016,17). The plan included priorities for East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine and the lifting of the siege on Gaza and the development of Area C and promised to prepare a "Transitional Plan for Independence" (Nationalpolicy Agenda, 2016,19). This was the first time that the idea of making Palestine an international reality presented in return for the theft of Palestine on the ground. In the past, the focus was on the fact that the Palestinian people were building their sovereignty. With the latter, the international community had become called upon to achieve independence for Palestine. Is this development a step forward towards national independence? Or does it reflect a tendency to rely on the world to bring us independence? And how likely is such a strategy for success?

This last vision was preceded by several plans for Area C, both by the Ministry of Local Government in collaboration with UN-Habitat (UN Habitat 2016; 2016, www.geomolg.ps) or by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (2014). The common denominator of these plans and studies, after being reviewed, is the decision to continue working with the Israeli Civil Administration and to submit requests to them under titles such as 'indemnification' or 'avoidance of harm.' This was accompanied by working with international donors, especially the Europeans, to pressure the Israeli Civil Administration to speed up the projects. In this regard, it was decided to give 18 months to the Israeli Civil Administration to approve the plans submitted for Israeli ratification. A consortium of the European Union's ECHO program (The European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (details in www.ec.europa.eu) had been formed in 2015. Its members include Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden, and subsequently joined by France,

Ireland and Denmark to work following this strategy with the Israeli Civil Administration in Area C, Especially the Ministry of Local Government. The above ideas, as well as improvements by the consortium, imply an implicit acceptance of Israeli control of the majority of Area C and additional approval of action only within the 1percentage of Area C available for Palestinian development.

It was necessary to take an early look at the facts that the occupation hastened to impose in Area C, and therefore the struggle since 1997 based on the refusal to work with the Civil Administration after the end of the 18 months of Israeli withdrawals at the time. Instead, the Civil Administration and its permits have been dealt with to date with some improvements. Among the three options put forward by Dr. Camile Mansour at the Institute of Palestine Studies conference on the same topic in 2012, the Palestinian National Authority appears in the light of the decisions of the Central and National Councils this year to be on its way to completely break the agreements with Israel, which represents the maximum option put forward by Dr. Mansour. When he mentioned that the Palestinian State should have been announced at the end of the interim period on May 4, 1999, the agreed upon date between the two sides to reach an agreement on the final status. The increasing internationalization of the Palestinian issue seems to be an attempt to achieve this disengagement with international support, beginning with the recognition by the United Nations of the State of Palestine in 2012 and the subsequent accession to various international organizations and bodies.

This option includes bypassing any transitional or partial solutions such as the refusal to deal with the Civil Administration and the implementation of projects in Area C without their consent. In this context, the vast gap between internationalization as a top-down policy and the application of projects on the ground, where the civil administration is still controlling. How can this gap be bridged to allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state, two-thirds of which is in Area C? As well, there seems to be no harmony between the ability of the

Authority over the "top-down internationalization" (in the United Nations and the world) and its ability to conduct the necessary and fundamental internationalization to make internationalization succeed, namely, 'internationalization on the ground'. To achieve the latter, there is an urgent need to unify the Palestinian people first as a prelude to mobilizing the world alongside it. Secondly, request the Authority to declare a comprehensive plan for the intensive Palestinian construction in Area C, and therefore to encourage part of the population in Areas A and B to move to area C. In this framework a freeze to be declared for asking the Israeli Civil Administration for Permits, and this to be an integral part of a comprehensive civil resistance plan of occupation with several components. The Authority calls on the governments and people of the world to join them to support the unification of the Palestinian people and its factions and parts first; to promote human development, and the imposition of boycott, sanctions and divestments; and the legal struggle in various judicial levels internationally, and the escalation of nonviolent resistance on the ground, taking creative forms such as building villages *Al Karamah* and *Bab Al Shams*, and repeating it tirelessly as happened with the experience of *Al-Araqeeb* village in the Naqab.

Finally, there is the element of resistance as development through the creation of facts on the ground and protecting them through international alliances on the territory and cooperation with local bodies and committees, as happened with the village of Aqaba near Tubas. These components guarantee the support of the diplomatic internationalization with the internationalization on the ground by bringing the world to Palestine to build with the Palestinians on the land and through the rebellion against the restrictions of occupation. Diplomatic internationalization cannot be achieved without pressure from the ground. Therefore, the Palestinian Authority might need to focus on the component of the actions on the ground first and win the unity of the people to achieve its goals.

4.2.3.7 Gaza: The Siege of the 'Leftovers'

During the British Mandatory Period, Gaza Strip was in 1922 part of the *Liwa'a*: Southern Province of Palestine that included two districts each one called as *Qada'a*. These two are Gaza, and *Be'ar Al Sabe' a*. In 1945 Gaza became the Province that includes the same two districts. As a district, it consisted of 1,111, 501 dunams. In 1948 the State of Israel took over 811,501 dunams around 73 percent of the district lands, built 18 colonial settlements over them, and left Gaza Strip that the world knows as composed of 365 square Kilometers only (Al Batsh, 2003, 19-23). When Israel took over Gaza Strip in 1967 it confiscated 119,000 dunams from its land (Batsh, 61), and several colonial settlements were established consisting of 5000 colonial settlers, half percent of the population of Gaza, over those lands continuing till 2005 when these colonial settlements were dismantled, and the Israeli Army forces were evacuated from within Gaza Strip during the so-called as The Disengagement Plan.

Back to 1993 permits system to the Gaza workers in Israel was imposed one year before the formation of the Palestinian Authority, the permit system became a siege in 2005, and then transformed to a sufficiently strict blockade after Hamas victory in the Palestinian elections of 2006 that was followed by Hamas Takeover of Gaza in June 2007.

Is the question relevant for this thesis is: How the Israeli Disengagement with Gaza in 2005 can be perceived? One approach to answering this question is by Israel who claimed that they left Gaza, and accordingly they have no responsibility of what so ever going there and that there is no place to ask Israel to comply with the occupation laws such as the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations (Gisha, 2011,5).

Another answer will be that occupation continued despite the so-called Disengagement. The 2005 plan was given the name Disengagement, not

Withdrawal. The signals here include first, the continuation of Israel control of the move and access including in the air space, the regional maritime. By restricting the limit to the Gaza fishermen to 3 miles and 6 miles when the security situation calms down, controlling the crossing borders between Gaza and Israel, and Gaza and Egypt; second, controlling the populations register. Third, continuing to collect taxes of customs and added value tax according to the Israeli unilaterally decided sums. Fourth, continue to control the land of Gaza by selecting a no 'entry zone' of 300-1500 meters close to the borders of Israel, while the official closed amount exceeds that to reach 17 percent of the cultivated area in Gaza. Fifth, The Occupation is still controlling the civic infrastructures in Gaza such as the electricity station in Gaza that is provided with solar from Israel. Sixth and final, controlling the Palestinian Authority and the crossing borders between West Bank and Gaza that go through Israel (Gisha, 2011). The Disengagement Plan text itself as the Israeli Government modified it in 6th of June 2004 says "F. Completion of the plan will negate the validity of any claims against Israel regarding its responsibility for the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip"; however it later keeps the Israeli "exclusive control of the Gaza airspace, and will continue its military activity along the Gaza Strip's coastline" , also will keep the Israeli control to the border area between Gaza and Egypt called as, the Philadelphia Route (Salem 2004, 61, 64; Golan, 2007, 119-131). To remind here the plan also included the dismantling of 4 colonial settlements in Jenin District of West Bank, but different than Gaza the Israeli Army kept his presence in Jenin.

These are all signs of dismantling the settler -colonial while keeping the colonial regarding the tiny Gaza Strip while continuing the settler colonial project in most of Gaza district that was taken over in 1948. In this mentioned framework the "withdrawal" from Gaza can be understood rather than by looking separately to the tiny Gaza Strip occupied in 1967. Put it simple: Israel decided in 1948 to take the big part of Gaza in 1948, and left the other smaller role as a leftover to the Gazans including the Gaza District refugees who the majority of them found themselves in Gaza opposite to the different districts of Palestine which its

refugees found their way to Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Gaza Strip includes then its population, but more importantly the uprooted from Gaza and *Beer Al Sabe' a* districts in 1948; Out of the 294603 population of Gaza in 1952, 201137 of them were refugees, more than 68 percent of the people added at once in 1948 to the tiny impoverished Strip (Al Sourani, 2013, 11). This is the reason probably why the relation between Gaza Strip and Israel is so tense. Here settler colonialism thrown its victims in 1948 to its adjacent borders; this is also might be the reason for the several Israeli proposals to annex parts of Sinai to Gaza (see later) in order to widen the space and the resources to these refugees with the hope that this will make them less demanding regarding the return to Israel.

However, Israel decided in 1967 to share the Leftover with Gaza Strip, by first occupying, followed by annexing one-third of Gaza and creating 16 to 17 colonial settlements according to different sources to 7254 settlers there. The settlements were built over 15 to 20 percent of Gaza, but the area controlled by Israel reached 38 percent of Gaza Space if one adds the so-called "Yellow Areas" (see later) to counting by then according to the World Bank (Salem, 2004, 54-55).

Opposite the colonial settlements in West Bank which was more successful, the settlers here did not compose more than half percent of the population; also the prospects for their growing looked slim due to the tiny space of Gaza; add to that the resistance of the indigenous people in Gaza in which the first Intifada erupted in 1987, leading Israel to present " Gaza First" proposal during the Oslo secret negotiations with the Palestinians that started in 1991.

The Palestinian negotiators added Jericho to the proposal to become Gaza and Jericho first in order to ensure the unity between Gaza and West Bank, and this was how the Oslo Declaration of Principles started in 1993 followed by the Cairo Agreement about the procedures and arrangements in Gaza and Jericho during

the so-called "the interim period". These procedures included by then keeping the colonial settlements and the military camps in Gaza and Jericho to be discussed in the framework of the permanent status negotiations that will start in the third year of the interim period, while the Israeli military forces will redeploy outside the areas A and B, decided to be under the Palestinian Authority ruling, A as under full Palestinian ruling a, and B under a Joint ruling: Palestinian civil, and Israel security. Along with these arrangements the Palestinian Authority emerged in 1994. Gaza wise the Palestinian Authority ruled the Palestinian cities in Gaza which were like area A in West Bank as it was called in Oslo II Agreement of 1995, also ordered the civil issues over the Yellow area, allocated at the same time as a security belt to protect the Israel colonial settlements. Therefore, they were under full Israeli security control the same as area B that was invented in 1995.

The 1994 Agreement also included a special arrangement to *Al Mawasi* area close to the cities of *KhanYounis* and *Rafah* which was left under Israeli security control, while the Palestinian Authority was given 5 kilometers of it to use for civil purposes only, and the Palestinians were given freedom of access to it through certain roads only. *Al Mawasi* is located on the shores of the Sea where the large settlement of *Gush Katif* existed as well. The Status of *Al Mawasi* was a special one not similar to area A and B of West Bank, but the area of the colonial settlement in Gaza can be considered the same as area C of West Bank that is under full Israeli military and civil control. Finally, the Agreement divides the sea areas to L, K, and M, in which the Palestinian fishermen will have access to L area till 20 miles in the sea, while the regions K and M will be restricted to the Israeli military forces use (see Cairo 1994 Agreement "Gaza and Jericho Agreement, specially "The Protocol About the withdrawal of the Israeli Military Forces and the Security Arrangements" articles 2, 3, and 4, in www.qanon.ps).

This arrangement of sharing Gaza with the Palestinians from 1967 to 1994 did not work; also, the one that followed of sharing Gaza with the Palestinian Authority (1994-2005) did not work. In the first stage, Gaza was an area of military struggle till 1972. During that period the occupation was not able to enter many of its locations, the violent confrontations took place till July 1971 but continued in lower pace in 1972, in 1967 the battles reached the number of 2430 operations, 28 percent of all operations in the 1967 occupied territories. The battles went down to 9.5 percent in 1972 after the PLO defeat in Jordan (Al Sourani, 2013, 32). The clashes also went up also since 1982 and continued till the first Intifada of 1987 that started in Jabalia Refugee Camp in Gaza.

These armed struggle confrontations, and clashes, among others, made Israel think of an arrangement about Gaza even if it will take unilaterally as happened in 2005 by the Disengagement Plan. It should be mentioned again that during Oslo negotiations Israel presented its readiness to give Gaza Back to the Palestinians, but the latter insisted on having Jericho added to it (Qurei'a, 2006, 83-88, 104).

After 1994 the arrangements with the Palestinian Authority included joint security patrols as was included in the former mentioned Cairo Agreement, these Patrols continued till 2000, when they stopped after the killing of the Israeli soldier Yosef Tabaja in the hands of one of his Palestinian Colleague in the joint Patrol near Qalqilia in West Bank (Harel, Haaretz, 17/8/2003). During the Joint Patrols period, the task was not easy. The joint Patrols were supposed to ensure safety and security in the roads, but as an Israeli study written by the Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of security coordination with the Palestinian side before he retired, there were conflict of interests in the patrols, the Israeli party looked for the safety of the Israelis and the Palestinian party looked for the protection and the freedom of access to the Palestinians; besides that the process included different interpretations and different understandings

among other reasons (Michael, 2003) (see also Harel, Haaretz, 17/8/2003 Amos Harel: summary of Kobi Michael study).

One of the times when the Palestinian and the Israeli security forces went in comprehensive fighting against each other was in 1996 when Mr. Netanyahu Government by then decided to open a tunnel under *Al Aqsa Mosque* in Jerusalem.

By all means, Gaza proved not to be a place for Israel to keep occupying from inside; as such one way to explain the Israeli disengagement with Gaza is by saying that Israel kept Gaza district of 1948 in its hands as earlier indicated, and gave the leftovers of it to the Palestinians. This thesis will call this interpretation as a long-term interpretation. This interpretation can also be sustained by the other facts about the Palestinian resistance from Gaza that followed the 1948 uprooting, this resistance was conducted through several actions, such as the creation of a Palestinian Government in Gaza in October 1948, and holding the first Palestinian National Council there. Two weeks after the Egyptians arrested Haj Amin Al Hussein and put him in solitary confinement in Cairo, and the Government was dissolved. This government establishment signaled the Gazans persistence to continue struggling and keeping the Palestinian identity alive.

During the first half of 1950's negotiations were made between the UN and the Egyptian Government to settle the Palestinian refugees In Sinai, The Gazans were firmly against and big demonstrations took place in Gaza in 1955 leading to the cancelation of the proposals; during to the Israeli French and British war against Egypt in 1956, Israel occupied Gaza from 2/11/1956 to 7/3/1957, during that period many massacres were conducted by the Israeli army as indicated in chapter 3; following the war Egypt allowed the Gazans to establish a Fedayeen Brigade which held more than 200 operations against the Israeli Army. In 1962 a constitution was Gaza prepared to consist of parts that confirm the Unity of the

Palestinian people and the role to be played by Gaza in this regard. In 1963 an election for a Palestinian Legislative Council was held in Gaza, and in 1966 the first elections of the "Popular Organization" of Fateh were held in Gaza (Al Sourani, 2013; Abu Al Namil, 1979). The story of this struggle after 1848 was briefly told above.

Besides these historical facts, and the Israeli organization of its settler-colonial project over Gaza district by taking the significant portion and give the leftovers to the Palestinians, there is another complimentary way to explicate the Israeli disengagement with Gaza in 2005, that way is related to the re-organization of the Israeli settler-colonial project in the whole Palestine. In light of this insight, Ariel Sharon was quoted saying in 2005 that the disengagement with Gaza, aims to strengthen settling the Naqab, Galilee, and the Greater Jerusalem (see previous part of this chapter). In the words of Hilal describing Sharon Strategy as a one that: "Its core is about drawing new borders to Israel that include the annexation of the biggest parts of Palestinian territories to Israel, and to exclude as much as possible of the Palestinians, under the slogan of preserving the Jewishness of the Israeli State" (Hilal, 2005, 5). Within this strategy to keep the Jewish majority and a significant portion of lands in the hands of Israel at the same time, Sharon found it as useful to Israel to leave Gaza with its considerable population density reaching at that time 1, 3 million, and focusing instead on settling other parts that have less Palestinian population, and in building the separation barrier in the West Bank and isolating Jerusalem. But this plan of Sharon was also part of a broader plan in which he declared Yasser Arafat as a non-partner, reoccupied West Bank A area cities in 2002, and put Arafat himself under siege in his Compound in Ramallah, as all signals of Sharon focus on West Bank. When Mahmoud Abbas, Abu Mazen, succeeded Arafat who passed away in November 2004, Sharon was pressured to hold a meeting with him in Sharm El Shiekh in Egypt in February 2005 attended by Egypt, Jordan, the US, and the EU. In that meeting Sharon promised to release a significant portion of Palestinian prisoners, to withdraw from the Palestinian

cities, and to facilitate the access and movement of the Palestinians. Later he did not fulfill any of these promises and continued to deal with Abbas as a no partner, and went ahead in conducting the disengagement with Gaza unilaterally (Hilal, 2005, 6-7).

Sharon Government Disengagement plan implementation put Gaza under a full siege without a Palestinian control to the mainland borders, nor to the air, and to the Palestinian Airport in Gaza that was approved by Cairo Agreement was destroyed during the second Intifada of 2000. The seaport that was part of the same agreement, and was under construction was also destroyed during the second Intifada. In the opposite, the Palestinian Authority composed technical teams led by the Minister of Civil Affairs Mr. Mohammad Dahlan to prepare for the day after the Israeli disengagement in all fields, and they developed a comprehensive report about their work (Dahlan, 2005). These plans did not see the light due to Hamas taking over of Gaza.

With the siege that include also a re-organization of the six crossing borders around Gaza, *Rafah*, *Karni*, *Erez*, *Sofa*, *Nahal Oz*, and *Kerem Shalom* (Wahbah and Saleh, 2008), and Hamas success in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections (PLC) in 2006 followed by Hamas takeover of Gaza by force in June 2007 and the Hamas capturing the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit as a hostage in the same month, all complicated the situation of Gaza internally between the Palestinian factions, and externally with Israel, and also with the Quartet for Middle East Peace that was established in 2003 to follow the implementation of the Road Map Plan for Peace that was approved by its parties, the USA, Russia, The EU and the UN. After Hamas Takeover of Gaza Israel tightened the closure on Gaza and followed by three successive wars of 2008-2009, 2012, and 2014 against Gaza. The Quartet also declared its boycott to Hamas till it fulfills three conditions that Hamas has to recognize Israel, accept the PLO Agreements with Israel, and condemn violence.

Furthermore, to above a donor conference was held in *Sharm El Sheikh* in Egypt in 2nd of March 2009 allocating 5.2 billion dollars for rebuilding Gaza after the war. These amounts mixed the overall donor's support to the Palestinian Authority along with the aid to Gaza (Al Batsh,2011, 4), but more importantly, the amounts allocated to Gaza were not spent due to the unwillingness of the donors to pay monies to Hamas as the ruling Party in Gaza. During *Sharm El Sheikh* Conference the Palestinian Authority presented a report showing that the total number of houses harmed during the war three weeks reached 15550 houses of which 4036 were wholly demolished and 11514 partially destroyed (Abu Shahla, Pal-Think report, 2011, 15). After the last war on Gaza called by Israel as "The Protective Edge Operation" of more than fifty days in July- August 2014 (B'TSELEM report, 2016). The Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), prepared a report showing that 4,818,170,000 dollars will be required for the post-2014 reconstruction programs, and 3,024,618,916 dollars for the pre- 2014 reconstruction and development plans, altogether 7,824,788, 960 dollars (PECDAR, 2014, 65).

The siege did not result in making Gaza as a prison only, but it also had ramifications on all the future of Palestine. In one hand the advisor of the Prime Minister Mr.DovWeisglass said that the Disengagement Plan aimed to cut the way for the implementation of the Road Map plan first stage obligations that included freezing the settlement expansion except for the natural growth, evacuate the Palestinian cities, and get engaged in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority (Hilal,2005,6). However, it seems here that Weisglass preferred to go for stage two of the Road Map which included a non-obligatory option of creating a Provisional Palestinian State. Such a state according to Weisglass will be established first in Gaza under Israeli control, which means that it is not free. And can be in one hand an Israeli compensation for the Palestinians for losing West Bank and East Jerusalem and in second hand an enclave that Israel can bargain with Egypt about its extension to Sinai (see Giora Eiland and Yehoshua Ben Arie proposals on that earlier). At the end the

strategy was about the de facto annexation of how much possible of West Bank to Israel, widening East Jerusalem that was already annexed in 1967 on the expense of West Bank territories, promoting the Judaization of the Naqab, Jalil, and the Triangle, and preventing as a result the establishment of a Palestinian State besides Israel. This all means that Sharon was planning to the so-called the "whole Israel" including the 1967 occupied territories according to his concept; which leaves no place to the question that the settler colonial project after 1967 is taking place in the Palestinian occupied territories of 1967 only, while Israel is just its mother country.

To that to be Added that the siege or disengagement twin created the illusion as if Gaza was freed, and the image of the existence of two equal enemies, Hamas and Israel, combined with the perception that the aggressive Israeli acts towards Gaza are only retaliation to Hamas attacks on Israel and the security of its citizens. Gaza also lost its seaport and airport and became obliged to practice its international trade through the Israel seaports, and finally Gaza lost its economic independence by the Israeli positions that prevented Gaza to drill its Gaza located in its maritime (Muhasin, 2016, 180; Salem 2016), PECDAR plan of 2014 mentioned that Gaza has Gas fields that can produce up to 30 billion cubic meters of Gas (PECDAR, 2014, 45).

According to the United Nations Reports, Gaza will not be a liveable place by 2020, "when the damage of the water aquifer is irreversible", and the population will become 2,1 million, with 5,835 population density per square kilometer, and therefore a need for 71,000 building units (United Nations and Nations Unies, 2012, 3, 8; 2013).

4.2.3.8 The Palestinian Authority (PA) Jurisdiction and the Israeli Settler Colonialism

Under a settler- colonial system, the Palestinian Authority is ruling 18 percent of West Bank independently, but with the kept right to Israel to conduct hot chases

inside this so-called area A when Israel sees necessary for the Israelis and the settlers' security, these chases are regular, and performed after informing the Palestinian security forces in order to give the chance to the latter to evade its security presence inside the Palestinian cities when the Israeli army makes its incursions. Besides that, the Palestinian Authority share responsibility with Israel over other approximate 21 percent consisting of Area B, in which the PA has a civic duty, and Israel has the security one, while allowing the PA to have 25 Police Stations in the villages to deal with internal security issues (see names of these villages in appendix 3 of the 1995 Interim Agreement, pp.77-78).

Regarding area C, the PA has the right to build in 1 percent of it only, while both the civil and the security responsibilities are in the hands of Israel. Besides that the PA do not have an authority over Hebron 2 area which was left according to 1997 Hebron Protocol 20 percent of Hebron resided by 40000 Palestinians under Israel full control due to the presence of the colonial settlers in the heart of the city dividing the city to two parts with problems of movement and access between them, and also inside Hebron 2; also there is the absence of the PA control over East Jerusalem which is used by Israel as an enclave that keeps expanding by the gradual annexation of West Bank parts to it.

Finally, since 2007 there are two authorities one in Gaza under full siege in an area that will not be liveable in 2020, and the second in area A which is subject to Israeli incursions in any time. The PA here took the responsibility of the population while the land was left to Israel to grab. These arrangements were supposed to continue till the permanent status negotiations end with success by May 1999, but they were prolonged till today. The policies of the PA and the donors (especially the Europeans) were unable as shown above to change the track in which the Israeli dominance is deepening combined with more implantation of both colonial settlements and colonial settlers as it will be shown in the next section. Within this framework the PA responsibilities kept eroding day after day, given that its civic and internal security tasks were interlinked with

those in Israel, for instance, the Palestinian security departments are linked with security cooperation agreements with Israel, and the Palestinian economy is dictated by the Paris Economic Protocol that created a custom Union between the Palestinian territories and Israel, which restraints and put conditions for any further economic relations of the Palestinian Authority with other countries in a sense that these relations should not contradict the custom union involved (see Paris Economic Protocol).

If the split between Hamas and Fateh (and Gaza and West Bank) since 2007 will be added to the picture, then one will see how the democratic process was paralyzed ever since and will see the shrinking space for civil society activism in both West Bank and Gaza (Salem, 2018). It seems that the settlers' democracy in one side needs to be combined with fragmentation and de-democratization on the other side for the first to have victory. In the absence of any democratization in East Jerusalem for the inclusion of the Palestinians there in a political and municipal system that represents them, the settler- colonial project there is going on without almost any restriction reaching the point to take over Al-Aqsa Mosque (Muhareb, 2015; 2016). The control of Gaza from the outside by Israel left no place rather than to Hamas hegemony and its restrictions of civil rights and freedom of expression, and to restrict its interactive social communication with the West Bank, and all the plans to unite both such as the Ihud Barak high bridge proposal, the Rand Corporation ARC proposal, the free passage proposal, and others that all failed (Cairo Agreement, 1994; RAND Corporation, 2005).

In the West Bank area A, the PA exists practicing a type of governance that combines between rent-seeking, corruption to a certain extent, and a weak structure of democracy (Khan, Giacaman, and Amundsen, 2004, 1), today this structure became a one that created tens of thousands of employees who depend on their salaries on the PA, and respectively on the donations by the international community. In other words, the work in the PA institutions became an interest, and with the closure of the work possibilities in Israel, work in the PA

became more and more critical and as well the work in the Israeli settlements in West Bank in which the number of the Palestinian workers in them reached 24,200 in 2017.

In a more telling overview, the West Bank is composed of four interest groups, first the PA that depends on the added value taxes revenues and the donors grants to run its activities and less on the taxes that it collects directly from the people, and the civil society organizations who depend also on donations leading to the creation of a “globalized elite” as called by Sari Hanafi (Hanafi, 2005). The third interest group is the comprador and the mediators including those who invest in the Israeli economy reaching the amount between 2.5 billion to 5, 8 billion dollars (Smirat, 2011). Finally, the workers who some are obliged to work in the Israeli settlements due to the deterioration of agriculture, and industry in West Bank estimated as 24,200 out of 128400 who was working in Israel in 2017 (www.pcbs.org, 2018). In regard to Gaza it is dependent on the monies sent to it by the PA in Ramallah, and on the supplies by Israel and Egypt in order to be able to operate its electricity station, finally the UNRWA plays a role as a big hiring Agency while this is now diminishing due to the restrictions on the funding to the UNRWA.

What all this overview tells is that while the Palestinian Autonomy was prolonged for almost 20 years starting from 1999. The question is why this structure was not transformed during all this period but on the contrary it was sustained as the practices in area C is showing by seeking Israeli permits to any projects by both the PA and the donors. This sustaining process played the role of preventing any meaningful non-violent struggle for liberation. In other words, the occupation and its settler-colonial project created the structures that make it functioning, at the beginning by military orders and harsh military procedures. But now more by creating common interests that generate consent as Gramsci advised (Gramsci, in Ayyoubi, 1995, 6), or a third Dimension of power' which is latent and consent creator as Lukes recommended (Lukes, 2005).

A scheme of the occupation system since 1967 might be divided into different stages regarding its way of dealing with the indigenous population, in the first stage (1967 to 1976). The occupation tried to look benevolent through opening the bridges to Jordan and hiring workers in Israel to allow annexing East Jerusalem and starting the settler- colonial project. At that period the symbols related to Jordan took the lead in West Bank (Maoz, 1975). But also, PLO National Front emerged in Jerusalem in 1973 (Salem, 2017), and clashes between the Israel Army and the school's students erupted in 1974.

By 1976 a new stage under PLO leadership started by the election of Mayors affiliated with the PLO. These Mayors took a significant role in the preparation of a conference held in Jerusalem in 1978 rejecting Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, and they led the people to struggle against the Civil Administration appointed by Israel in the beginning in the 1980s and after they faced an Israeli attempt to assassinate some of them. All that prepared for the first Intifada in 1987 which ended by bringing the PLO to Palestine and the creation of the PA in 1994.

The PA relations with Israel were of the type that PA will provide Israel with security and Israel will compensate the PA with further withdrawals (Salem, 2005; Sharansky, 2004). But this formula was broken after the Israeli extreme right-wing activist Baruch Goldstein broke in Al-Ibrahimi Mosque in 25th of February 1994 killing 29 Muslim prayers to be followed by Hamas explosive acts inside the Israeli cities as a response, by that happening the formula stopped functioning, and the dates for withdrawals were not respected.

By 1996 the Palestinian security forces found themselves in clashes with the Israeli Army after Netanyahu decided to open a tunnel under *Al-Haram Al-Sharif* in Jerusalem, then the situation deteriorated to the second Intifada in 2000, and what followed was that the United States dealt with the PA as the producer of

violence leading to the declaration of the Road Map for peace which was a performance-based plan to give the Palestinians according to what they deliver. The plan was considered as such as a punishment and as an end to the peace process; and the result was that the Palestinians elected the group that does not believe in the peace process, which was Hamas in 2006, the rest of the story after this date was told in different place of the above.

This schematic review was presented to show that the "Benevolent occupation policy" was utterly broken in 1987. In 1985 the Israel Likud Government presented a plan for economic peace accompanied by an idea for a functional division of authorities with Jordan. But since an agreement couldn't work with Jordan on this idea, PLO was brought in, and Oslo Agreement was signed in 1993, a year later the Palestinian National Authority (the PNA) was established as a PLO organ to run the 1967 territory jointly with Israel. Today the PNA is playing the role of administering the civil tasks while they are leaving Israel to conduct the entire land grab and the establishment of more colonial settlements. As said earlier this process of Israel taking over the land, and the PNA to be responsible over the population was sustained, and the Palestinian resistance became localized in some locations such as *Bil'in*, *Ne'ilin*, *Kufr Kaddoum*, in Jerusalem around *Al Aqsa* Mosque defending it from the attacks of the extreme right-wing Jewish groups. The reason for this localization in West Bank is because the four interest groups that were created (see above), therefore the force for transforming the situation was evaded, and definitely, a new path will be needed to bring back this power of transformation, and maybe to be led of another kind of forces.

Finally, Gaza is another story in this regard where Hamas created military capacities and weakly public demonstrations in the borders with Israel. But at the same time, its ability to change the situation is minimal. Given the Israeli and the American work on it to convince it to accept proposals that are less of what was included in Cairo Agreement of 1994 such as an airport and a seaport in

Gaza, while Hamas discussed the creation of a platform at Larnaca Airport in Cyprus under Israeli and European control in the year of 2018, which was rejected by the PA in Ramallah (Gaza Development, 2018).

Is this the end of the Palestinian national dream, or there is another option to think of to keep the dream alive? Chapter five will discuss this question.

4.3 The Process of Implantation of the Settler Colonials and the Settlement Colonies

As discussed, the Israeli project in the post-1967 occupied Palestinian territories is a combination of settler colonialism in progress, military occupation, and Apartheid system; all of these sustained by the settler democracy of Israel as a whole, and by the settler's democratic institutions as well. The Actors included in the process are The Israeli Government, The Israeli Zionist political parties, the Settlers Agency, the World Jewish Organization, including the Jewish Agency, the *Keren Kayimith*, and the Keren Hayesod, and the International "Philanthropists" mainly the Evangelical Organizations, and finally the United States of America. The analysis below will also include where these actors' roles overlap, and where they are probably sometimes contradicted.

To begin with the an overall view of the central positions of the Zionist trends in Israel, it can roughly speaking, divided to two significant trends in Israel today, one considers the State of Israel seventy years after to be still a state information, or in progress, and seeks as such to continue its territorial expansion, and the second who is trying to leave the "non-annexed parts" of the territories as they call them avoiding using the word "Occupation", and keep the "annexed parts" of them in the hands of Israel (Sher et al, 2003). The first trend is in the boom as shown, and the second is diminishing. The first includes those who seek the Zionist project expansion by the annexation the 1967 occupied territories or the most significant parts possible of them to Israel, and those who

openly declare their plans to prepare Jordan or a widened Gaza towards Sinai to be the alternative Palestinian State.

The second trend point of departure is that the return of the Palestinian refugees is hazardous for the preservation of Israel as a Jewish State, along the same line they thought of the West Bank Palestinians as also critical demographically in case that this area will be annexed to Israel. But at this point, they were defeated by the first trend leading to their accelerated deterioration. In this regard the primary trend will argue that the demographic danger does not exist given the fact that the settler colonialists in post 1967 occupied territories increase annually by 3.9 percent opposite to 2.5 percent annual increase of the Palestinians, besides that those settler colonialists compose a majority in Area C of West Bank and East Jerusalem, and finally the Orthodox Jews are growing by more significant portions than the Palestinians inside Israel, which make such a demographic fear groundless, they say.

Far from thinking of a political solution that considers two peoples who have equal rights, the Palestinians are thought of by these two trends prevailing in Israel in demographic terms. The first sees that the Israeli demography can beat the Palestinian one, in the long run, depending on the natural population growth more than on further Jewish immigration to Israel. The second sees no place to the Palestinian refugees inside Israel because they will present a demographic danger, and it also wants to keep parts of East Jerusalem in of Israel. The first trend is composed of the religious and the secular right-wing parties, and their rallying organizations inside Israel and abroad, and the second by the left-wing parties, the Zionist camp including the Labor Party and its ally *Hatnu'a*, and *Meretz*, and the center-left Parties *YeshAtid*, as they are categorized in Israel, in addition to their allying organizations in Israel and abroad as well.

The second trend is departing its original position of territorial compromise gradually, therefore except of *Meretz*, the others mentioned found ways to

recognize fully the colonial settlement expansion in Area C by calling for the annexation of the significant settlements blocks there to Israel in return to unequal swap of territories, to remember here the proposal of the Israeli Prime Minister IhudBarakin Camp David to annex the settlements blocks to Israel in return to giving the Palestinians unequal part from the Naqab, *Halutza* area, and the proposal of Yitzhak Herzog the former leader of the Labor Party calling for 10 years quietness without violence and terrorism, to be followed by negotiations on two states solution that will keep Jerusalem and the big settlements blocks in the hands of Israel; till then Israel will continue building in the big settlement blocks and will separate the Jerusalem villages around Jerusalem from the city (www.haaretz.com 23/2/ 2017). The other proposal in this regard is the one of YairLapid the head of YeshAtid in which he called for joining a regional conference that will lead to separation with the Palestinians for 15 to 20 years, and he did not mention the establishment of a Palestinian State, however he said establishing such a state in another conference held in Kiryat Gat but he stressed that it should be disarmed and that Jerusalem should not be part of it (Lapid in www.haaretz.com 26/3/2017). In a way or another Israeli left and center-left as they are called in Israel, found their ways to come closer to the Israeli right-wing parties' position in the belief that this is the only way to preserve their relevance and not to vanish.

The analysis of the political map in Israel and the place of the other within it are relevant to this study and the plans foreseen for the future of the 1967 occupied territories. If Oslo 1993 to be taken as a starting point for an Israel PLO official engagement to try to solve the conflict along the lines of being merely "political" and related to "borders and diplomatic measures" (Elghazi, 2012, 623), then three stages of that engagement can be foreseen: The First stage is the longer one from 1993 to 2008 when the idea of territorial compromise was the subject matter, including the Sharon unilateral withdrawal from Gaza leaving its inside to the Palestinians with all the complexities involved explained earlier. The two other stages took place during the period of Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime

Minister starting from 2009, while he talked about territorial compromise and the establishment of a non-sovereign and non-independent Palestinian state in two speeches that he made at Bar Ilan University in 2009 and 2012, but he changed after 2017 when president Trump was elected.

The change in the political plan of Netanyahu was minor because in one hand he kept presenting a term of reference of that Israel gets first what it wants, and then the leftovers can be given to the Palestinians. On this basis he asked for the recognition of Israel as a State of the Jewish people; Ideas first presented by Ehud Olmert in Annapolis Conference in 2007, guarantees for Israeli security needs; and called for keeping the whole Jerusalem in the hands of Israel, and no return of the Palestinians refugees, no dismantlement of any colonial settlement and no territorial swaps as well. In Addition to the continuation of the Israeli control over the Jordan valley (Ravid, 2014). What will be left after all of this is the Palestinian cities and some parts of area B, and small portion of area C that are not part of the colonial settlements-controlled areas, to be transferred to the Palestinians representing a discontinuous territory, that the Palestinians can call it as a State while it has no sovereignty over its territory in the air, the sea, and the mainland.

The new after the election of the president Trump was Netanyahu movement to another stage in which he developed a joint agenda with the United States that aims to decide unilaterally on the issues of Jerusalem, already the American Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to it in the 6th of December 2017, refugees by stopping the American financial support of 304 million dollars to the UNRWA in 2018. And the colonial settlements by allowing Israel to go back to the policy of expanding them extensively as going on in 2017 and 2018 when 19000 building units increased the settlement expansion in the period from the 1st of January 2017 till the end of June 2018 , 13000 in 2017, and another 6000 in the first half of 2018 (www.eeas.europa.eu).

President Trump also stopped almost all the American support to the Palestinian Authority up to 844 million including the UNRWA sum mentioned and the support to Jerusalem Hospitals of 35 million; the support for the infrastructure development in West Bank and Gaza, and others (Erekat, www.maan.net12/10/2018). In this context one can understand the results of Netanyahu meeting with President Trump in September 2018 when Trump said that he likes most the two states solution, and Netanyahu responded by mentioning that there are different definitions of what “ State” means and that each one can define it different way (www.timesofisrael.com 26/9/ 2018).

It is doubtful if this dialogue between Trump and Netanyahu will lead to tension between both when and if an American Ultimate Deal will be declared, especially with the fact that this American Administration almost moved to the Israeli positions regarding Jerusalem, refugees and the settlements. In this regard the Jordanian veteran Journalist Hamadeh Faraneh wrote that the joint aim of Trump and Netanyahu is to destroy the Palestinian material achievements either inside Israel and in the other locations; allow for the Judaization of Jerusalem, and the Israelization of the Jordan Valley, the fragmentation of West Bank by colonial settlements, and thus make it a country that is “Transferable” to its people, and preventable for the establishment of a Palestinian state (Faraneh, Al Dustour newspaper, 8/10/2018).

In other hand the Foreign Policy Journal explained that these American policies, especially in regard to the UNRWA, will play the role of destabilizing the situation in Jordan by leaving the refugees there without support in one hand and by pressuring the Jordanian regime to settle them in Jordan which will lead to transformation of Jordan to a Palestinian State , precisely as the Israeli right-wing parties advocate, and that is due to the fact that the Palestinian refugees and 1967 displaced persons represent around 65 percent of the population of Jordan according to a 2009 study by Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, and the

UNRWA resources, 3.6 Palestinians versus 1.9 million Native Jordanians (Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009).

The last stage starting in 2017 tells that the mother country, the United States, decided to pass the threshold between keeping issues for negotiations and between deciding on them unilaterally. Accordingly, it is now clear that the Americans moved Jerusalem from the negotiations table, limited the number of refugees to be negotiated about to 40000 only, and left the issue of the settlement expansion to whatever the two sides will agree about it. Beyond that this Administration is pressuring Jordan to accept the settlement of refugees in Jordan and pressing Egypt to absorb Gaza economically as a first stage by creating economic projects in its borders with Gaza and therefore take the burden of Gaza from the Israeli shoulders, and transform it gradually to Egypt while cutting the contacts between Gaza and West Bank which will prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state in both, and promote alternatively the Gaza State as the Palestinian State extended as much as it is possible to parts of Sinai(See Eliand and Ben Aryeh Proposals earlier). These developments encouraged Mr. Netanyahu to move almost entirely back to his positions expressed in his 1995 book mentioned previously (Netanyahu, 1995).

These changes of the positions of Trump and Netanyahu Administrations deserve explanation that goes beyond just narrating the developments. The way the question is essential here, and the answer partly goes to the status of the settler-colonial project and how it can be perceived by Realists who believe in the facts created in the ground. Today there are hundreds of thousands of settlers; with East Jerusalem and area C is already Judaized. If one will choose the transformative theories such as the Marxist and the critical theories, then the starting point will be around the question of how a particular situation can be transformed. Even if one chose constructivism, then the question will be about, how the situation can be changed according to what we want as people living in the ground and as an international community as well? But in the prevailing

realism of the United States and Israel, the question becomes, how the facts in the ground can be sustained?

The key here is the issue of interests, mainly the real ones which hide security and ideological assumptions and considerations behind them. In the case of Israel, the interests include a concept of security that stretches to demography and ideology as well; in other words, a security concept that is related to historical claims about the Jewish attachments to the Land of Israel. In the case of the USA, it is much complicated and can be seen within one of the following two frameworks of analysis. The first framework is about the USA estimations about its position worldwide, and the second is about the internal American politics and its unique relations with Israel isolated from the world.

Taking the first framework it will read briefly as follows: the United States is the world significant power without a competitor, the Arab world is weak and in disarray and do not represent any threat to the American interests, and in this situation can even use the Jordanian and the Egyptian need to the American Aid to twist the arms of these countries and pressure them to give concessions for the interest of Israel. The second framework starting point is that Israel represents an internal American issue due to the messianic positions of millions of Americans (see chapter 2), and the roles of the Jewish lobbies in the United States especially AIPAC and the new Israeli American Council (IAC) supported by the Jewish American Billionaire Sheldon Adelson who paid the costs of moving the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in the end of 2017 — added to that the new emerging component showing that one of each almost six colonial settlers in the West Bank is an American (Hirschhorn, 2017), which means that the USA became a partner in the Israeli settler-colonial project in the ground. Looking at these two frameworks together in the period of Trump administration shows that this Administration selected the second approach even though it might destabilize the situation in Jordan and Egypt in the longer run. Even maybe this destabilization is a must triggered by the messianic

Christian and Jewish interpretations, the first for the acceleration of the process of the return of the Messiah and the second for the acceleration of the process of full Jewish Victory by their full sovereignty over the Gentiles.

It is difficult in this context to predict fully who is feeding the other; the growing American Messianism or the growing Israeli one? Reports published in August 2018 showed that Israel warned President Trump that his decision to cut the support to the UNRWA might add up to the destabilization of Gaza, and that his decision to stop the American Aid of 200 million dollars to the Palestinian Authority made in the same month might contribute to the collapse of the Palestinian Authority (www.theintercept.com 30/8/2018). How long will this process continue? Difficult to know, but one thing is clear in between which is that Israel is back open to its settler-colonial project that it does not leave fully ever, but tried to hide it during the Oslo process by a public relation play to achieve a political agreement and on the borders while continuing the colonial settlement expansion in the same time, as shown in chapter two this open play aimed at buying time to accelerate the process of colonial settlement expansion and make it to grow more than six times during the peace process reaching a point today that the natural growth of colonial settlers together with some new settlers added is on 3.9 percent (Dilmoni in www.haaretz.com,/3/2017). Which means that the current number of colonial settlers, standing at 614,500 by the end of 2017 according to Peace Now calculations, will be around a million in twenty years ahead assuming that this percentage will continue to be the same without growing in the coming years. And it is assuming that the paralysis of the big waves of immigrants to Israel will continue after the last big wave of immigration from the former Soviet Union Republics at the end of the 1980s and the beginnings of 1990s.

Along with the above conclusion, it can be noticed that the currently ongoing peace process seems to be over unless a new Palestinian leadership who accept less can be found. The reason here is related to the fact that Israel is a

colonial entity that also created its democracy as a settler democracy (Mann, 2005).

In this framework the contradiction between democracy and colonialism in Israel is both structural and historical, as Azmi Bishara maintained, while adding that the colonial nature of Israel "was not transformed yet to a past history of Israel, but colonialism is still reproducing itself as a component in Israel's structure, which means that it represents a part of its present history and its present operation" (Bishara, 2005, 18). Along with the developments of the Israeli politics and its practices in the post-1967 occupied territories it was shown in the previous chapters that Israel continued the Zionist movement project of the pre-1948 period assisting/ and assisted by the Zionist none-state actors in this regard. Bishara looks to this result as a contradictory to the positions of the Israeli left who considered two stages: The first was when a "national liberation movement" operated in the times of the pre-1948 Zionism, and the second after 1967 when Israel became an occupation.

Bishara calls the situation in the post-1967 to be a "colonial- Apartheid" because it includes both settler colonial aspects and Apartheid ones (Bishara, 2005, 18-19). This state that is running a settler colonial project through a belligerent occupation and apartheid practices will indeed need a different type of therapy than that of negotiations on borders and territorial disputes (see chapter five).

In both the pre-1948 period and the post-1967 period, there was no need to legalize the apartheid itself as happened in South Africa. In this sense, Zionism was different in that religion and nationalism were both identical (Bishara, 2002b, 168). Therefore, Zionists came from the beginning to claim the land, and instead of legalizing the Apartheid itself. It authorized racial laws that created from the opening two types of citizens, one is the Jews who were considered to be eligible to all rights officially since the Balfour Declaration, and before in practice. The second is the indigenous population who were denied all rights in

the pre-1948 period; they were given formal citizenship of second degree in a Jewish State after 1948, while they lived under a military rule till 1966, subject to land confiscation, and the discriminatory procedures.

The formal citizenship to 1948 Palestinians was a difference between them and the post-1967 occupied, the latter was considered as residents without citizenship rights, except leaving the application for citizenship as an option to the East Jerusalem Palestinians as earlier indicated. However, despite these differences, the common was settler colonialism practiced against all, while the apartheid practices differed from one area to another, so inside Israel it is apartheid of discrimination against formal citizens, and in the West Bank it is apartheid against residents who have fewer rights than the first category. The later focus on the Jewish State, or the State of the Jewish People since 2007 diminished these differences in practice, in this regard one can ask if there is any difference for instance between evacuating the Bedouins of *Umm Al Hiran*, or *Al Araqeeb* in the Naqab mentioned earlier, and the projects to evacuate the Bedouins from 46 locations of area C of West Bank, such as *Al Khan Al Ahmer* location? This might be the place to allude to the difference made between the two concepts of the Jewishness of the State, as Hounida Ghanem put it "the Jewish State is about an overall characteristic and identity, while the State of the Jewish People is about the national dimension, and therefore the demographic one" (Hounida Ghanem, 2011, 14).

Common between these concepts is the return of 1948 narratives (Bashir, 2011, 88), previously and during the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations the Palestinians starting point in the negotiations was the 1948 file of the right of return of the Palestinian refugees, while the Israeli one was about 1967 file as the starting point. Therefore, Israel discussed the performance of the Palestinian refugees mainly to the 1967 area, while a symbolic number will be allowed to go back to Israel (Susser, 2016, 259-271). At that time Israel wanted to have Israel as Jewish and not for all its citizens. Therefore it rejected the joint return of the

Palestinian refugees to inside Israel. In the last decade the Israeli position took another push forward in a sense that the return to 1948 agenda became in one hand a non-negotiable position, and in the second hand which is more important a position of "return of the Jews" to a country that has no identified borders, and thus making the Jewish return to what is called as Judea and Samaria as part of the return to the mentioned state. In this sense the Jewish State concept gives the state its identity, but the State of the Jewish people offers that state its structure and its hierarchy's military and civil that can ensure the establishment, the continuation, and the sustaining of the State and it can impose its will on the other by coercion, harassment, and internal and external transfers.

The new then based on the above is that Israel is back to the 1948 agenda, which is now about the Judaization of all historical Palestine, and not only those that were taken in 1948. The culmination of this position came by the approval of the Nation-State Law by the Israeli Knesset in the 19th of July 2018, considering a State of the Jewish people without defined borders, and with Jerusalem with its two parts as its capital, and with its support to the colonial settlement expansion in all historical Palestine. Such a law paved the way for the Palestinians to go back to their original claim towards all the historical Palestine, in this regard the head of the National Democratic Collective Mr. Jamal Zahalkah went even further by arguing that Israel has an existential deficit which is that its democracy was created along with the ethnic cleansing, and not only the Jewish State. Accordingly, its democratic structure is illegitimate especially when the Knesset will give itself the shape of Founding Assembly as it usually does when it goes to issue Founding Laws like the Nation-State Law (Zahalkah, 2018, 17). Such a law eliminated the differences between the different segments of the Palestinians both inside and out Israel of its 1948 borders, but will this help to create one common agenda for all the Palestinians inside and outside Palestine in response to the current settler-colonial project that they face? This is difficult to predict, while chapter five will analyze the direction to go by analyzing the different Palestinian opinions in this regard.

The return of the 1948 agenda inside Israel, which is taking the shape of the so-called "The Whole *Eretz* Israel"; is combined this time with one important difference between the post 1967 period and the pre 1948; in the latter the Zionist project was carried by groups that call themselves as "Socialists", while in the former the Zionist agenda was not only continued by a State, but also this State was taken over by religious-national, and national-religious in the sense that the first is about the Jewish State promotion, and the second is about the State of the Jewish People (Ram, 1993, 329).

The first group (such as the religious parties of AgudatYisrael, and Shas) gives the state its identity for now in one hand, but the extreme groups of it look for the creation of a religious State in Israel in the long run by getting rid of the seculars and their western democracy, these consist of organizations such as *Lehava*, *Tamarrud*, the Hill Top Youth, conducting price tag activities against the Palestinians; the " Temple Mount and Eretz Yisrael Faithful Movement" with all its daughter organizations (Muhareb, 2015; Ghanem and Shulhut, 2011; Jammal, 2012; Qubaa, 2015). This group as it exists in the current Israeli political map in the Knesset is more religious than national, while the non-state actors' groups of it are entirely against nationalism, secularism, and democracy.

In the second hand, the group that calls for a national-religious approach is a mix of parts of the Likud, together with the National-religious Party of *HabaytHayehudi* led by Naftali Bennett who is more rational than being religious (Persico, 2016,48). Bennet is in one hand represent a continuation of the mainstream National Religious Party; the *Mavdal*. But at the same time, he was able to coalesce together several national-religious groups, putting himself as the other right-wing power in the Knesset and the Government as well. More relevant to this thesis he created an agenda for colonial settlement expansion in the West Bank that bypassed the agenda of *Gush Emunim*: The Block of the Faithful, who were pioneers in creating the first colonial settlements in West

Bank after 1967 according to the teachings of Rabbi ZviKook. This Rabbi considered the seculars to be the holders-provisionally- of God will create and expand the Jewish State. Therefore, he called for cooperating with them by the religious groups to do so. Gush Emunim followed this line for a while till its gradual disintegration during the 1980s (Persico, 2016, 41-42).

Bennett worked on other direction out of his believe of joining the national camp, eliminating the rift between it and the religious camp, and as such present himself and his party as Zionist patriots who compete for the leadership of the Zionist movement itself. The result is not only that the religious movements who do not want to take the lead are diminishing. But also the Labor and the Socialist are leaving the political arena gradually, and even some new political groupings who are more extreme are emerging in the fringe of the political map, but it is difficult to predict their ultimate strength.

So far, Israel passed 70 years out of which 19 years were in its 1948 borders, and the other 51 years was a period in which Israel controlled all the historical Palestine. After the 1967 occupation, Israel passed a period of national unity between the left and the opposition, who agreed about the future of the occupied territories. The government after 1967 war was a National Unity Government, the dominating labor party of it was thinking of dividing them with Jordan, while *Gahal* Party was thinking of annexing it. Within this governmental structure it was obvious to give a vital role to a person who believed in annexation, that person was Moshe Dayan the Minister of Defense who wrote addressing the Palestinians "You as a people do not want us in the present time, but we will impose ourselves on you"(Hendel,2012, 723). His utmost offer by then was an autonomy to the West Bank population; the transfer of Gaza population to the West Bank and then annex it to Israel, and building big settlement blocks, he also proposed a plan for invisible Israeli presence in the occupied territories, and the freedom of movement between West Bank and

Gaza, and between them and Israel and Jordan (Hendel, 2012, 723; Gazit, 1984).

Shlomo Gazit who was the "Israeli Military Coordinator of the Territories Affairs" by then mentioned a document that was released by his office in October 1967. Four objectives were included at that document: Keeping the Israeli military control over the territories, support the Palestinian emigration to outside, settling the Palestinian refugees living in the refugee camps of West Bank, and the full integration of the territory's inhabitants in Israel (Gazit, 1984). At that period the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel was composed in the public level, this movement included members from the entire political spectrum and called for the full integration of the territories in Israel (Sprinzak, 1991).

The National Unity Government collapsed in 1970 after the approval of the Labor Party of the American Minister of Foreign Affairs William Rogers for Peace Negotiations between Israel and the Arab Countries, and at this point the rift between the Labor and Gahal emerged when the first started to work for the promotion of his idea for a territorial compromise, while the second continued its ideological position towards annexation.

A point of caution here should be mentioned about the position of Golda Meir the Prime Minister of Israel from 1969 to 1974, although she accepted Rogers Plan as mentioned, but at the same time she did not see any possibility for peace with the Arabs, and therefore she once said "Peace is far away, and Israel should continue staying in the territories for a long period to come", then later she responded to objections made by her party members saying that "The Jewish people have the right to exist, without that there are no ethics in the world"; later her saying that the "Peace will come when the Arabs will love their children more than they hate Israel", and the other one stating: "When peace comes we will perhaps in time be able to forgive the Arabs for killing our sons, but it will be harder for us to forgive them for having forced us to kill their sons"

these both were quoted in several studies, but at the same time they were subject to doubts (Rachlin,haaretz.com 2015)Ms. Meir was offered a plan of the United Kingdom between West Bank and Jordan in 1972 by the King of Jordan, but she rejected the proposal, and the Knesset Resolution published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:"The Knesset has determined that the historical right of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel is beyond challenge" (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.com) Then the resolution reaffirmed the Knesset Resolution of 15 December 1969 which speaks about peace treaties to be achieved with the neighbors through direct negotiations, and without any prior conditions, then the resolution presented in general terms that this peace should be based on achieving secure borders, " Cooperation and mutual aid, the solution of any stumbling block in the path to peace, and the avoidance of any aggression, direct or indirect" (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.com).

What followed this policy that was in common with Gahal positions it seems despite the later withdrawal from the Government was the 1973 war defeat, after which the labor continued to rule for another four years till it handed over the authority to the Likud in 1977. The following can be said for the explanation of this change: The Labor systematic discrimination against the Eastern Jews who decided to join the Likud, the results of 1973 including the partial Israeli defeat, and the corruption case discovered that was related to a Bank Account on the name of the wife of the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (*MADAR Cente*, www.madarceneter.org, 2009).

During the Labor Party and partners the *Ma'arakh*: The Alignment Coalition, ruling from 1967 inclusive to seven years of unilateral ruling together with his Zionist left allies from 1970 to 1977. The Government established in cooperation with Gush Emunim or by making a blind eye towards their colonial settlementactivities, 22 colonial settlements in West Bank and other 5 in Gaza Strip without Jerusalem (Ayed, 1996). The Government presented also the Alon Plan in 1967 that sought to annex a built of 10 to 15 kilometers alongside the

Jordan Valley to Israel in addition to another made from the North of the transportation road between Jerusalem and the Dead Sea, and to annex the Hebron Mountains and Gaza, while concentrating settlement expansion on the Jordan Valley and around Jerusalem and Hebron Mountain, also he proposed settling Gaza refugees in West Bank (Hendel, in Hanafi, 2012, 721-722). Besides that, the Government annexed East Jerusalem to Israel in June 1967, increased its size 12 times in the expense of West Bank territories and started an intensive build up in the city since then (B'tselem, 2002). Finally, the Government Minister without Portfolio Yisrael Galili proposed in April 1977 a plan (Just a month before the election of the Likud) that aimed at building of new 160 colonial settlements in West Bank from 1977 to 1992, in addition to other 20 in Gaza (Ayed, 1996).

The Labor Party also created the Military Governance system in the 1967 occupied territories that denied the citizenship rights of the indigenous population in one hand, but it also is ruled by Military Orders for the expropriation of their land, for instance, the Military Order 58 of 1967 declared lands to be 'Absentees Properties' and therefore these lands were confiscated. In the same year, the previous law was followed by the order 59 which confiscated the properties of the Jordanian Government. According to the Military Order 59, 13 percent of the West Bank land was expropriated by Israel till 1979, while other 7.5 percent of West Bank land was expropriated till five years after the issuance of the Military Order 58 (Hendel, 2012, 721).

Earlier to these orders confiscation of lands was made for military use, then later it became like a tradition to create a *Nahal*; the military settlement and to be transformed later to non-military colonial settlers (B'tselem, 2013). In August 1967 water resources of West Bank were confiscated according to the Military Order 92, and this was followed in 1969 by order number 291 which stopped the land registration in West Bank in times when 70 percent of lands were not registered. In the same year also Order 363 was issued preventing the

Palestinians to build over the C 'Natural Reserves' leading accordingly to the confiscation of another 5 percent of the land of West Bank. Finally, the Military order 418 for the year 1971 created a Planning council composed of Israelis only to receive building permits requests and to decide on them (Hendel, 2012, 721-727). With these orders and others, Israel was able to create the basis for the settler Colonial regime in the post-1967 occupied territories.

When the Likud took over in 1977, he found an accumulation of achievements to build on towards accelerating the colonial settlement process. The Likud moved from the small agricultural and military type of colonial settlements to urban colonial settlements building, and in between 1977 to 1985, 70 new colonial settlements were established, and the number of settlers jumped from 7000 in 1977 to 35000 in 1985 (Hendel, 2012, 731). In 1978 Matityahu Drobles the Head of the settlement Unit in the Zionist World Organization (WZO) presented a plan to build 60 new towns and villages in the Post 1967 occupied territories (46 according to Shtayyeh, 2017, 27), five years after he presented a plan for settling additional 100000 settlers there (Hendel, 2012, 733). Shtayyeh added that Drobles suggested building the new colonial settlements in clusters that will also provide the colonial settlers with jobs in the industry, tourism, services, and less in agriculture. The WZO allocated 3.2 billion dollars for the implementation of the plan (Shtayyeh, 2017, 27). Other plans were presented by the Likud Government such as the Sharon plan of 1977, the Minister of Agriculture by then aiming to bring the number of settlers to one million in twenty years, and the plan of Ezra Weizmann of 1978 aiming to build six big towns including Ariel in the North of West Bank and Efrat in the North of it (Shtayyeh, 30-32). The WZO also presented in its plans of 1983 to 1986 to establish 165 colonial settlements in three stages till 2010 except those that were found in Jerusalem and the Jordan Valley; the aim was to increase the number of the colonial settlers to 1.3 million by the year of 2010 (Shtayyeh, 32-33).

Besides these plans for intensive investment in settler colonialism focusing on urban colonial settlement, the additional component of the Likud Government procedure towards expanding the colonial settlements was by deciding to confiscate and build over private Palestinian ownership. This transformative decision in the history of settler colonialism in Palestine was made in 1979 in order to bypass the Israeli High Court decisions of rejecting the establishment of Colonial Settlements for security purposes as was the case when the High Court decided to reject the establishment of Elon Moreh Settlement in the North of West Bank close to Nablus rejecting the 'security purposes' excuse for establishing it over a Palestinian private land. To justify such a decision, the Government used the case that 70 percent of the lands in West Bank is not registered, and accordingly it decided that these lands will be confiscated and become State Lands in case that they will be cultivated for a specified period. Upon that decision, 30 percent of the West Bank became State Lands automatically. This decision was followed by other one in 1982 which allowed for building colonial settlements by individual initiatives without waiting the Keren Kayimet initiatives, and by the issuance of the Military orders 783 and 892 of 1979 which gave the colonial settlements additional authorities and expanded their control to include 42 percent of West Bank territory (Hendel, 2012, 733-736).

The process described above was called as "creeping annexation", a process that started in 1967 by confiscating lands for military use, and/or by confiscating the lands of Absentee, and the Natural Reserves, and finally building over the Palestinian private land, followed by appropriating 61 percent of West Bank as area C under Israeli full control since the Interim Agreement with the PLO since 1996. Accordingly, the Palestinian Authority has an Authority to plan for 39 percent of West Bank inclusive to areas A and B and without East Jerusalem.

The creeping annexation included in addition to land confiscation other procedures such as the 1982 step of transferring the responsibility over the

water resources in West Bank from the Army to the Israeli water company *Mikrot* to continue drilling 83 percent of West Bank water to Israel and the colonial settlements; further in 1984 the Knesset decided to modify the Emergency Law of Defense in a way that allows for the implementation of the Israeli legislative laws on the colonial settlements without the need to change the individual laws one by one (Hendel, 737-739).

Along with these developments and the fact that Jews became a majority in East Jerusalem by July 1993, 160000 Jewish settlers versus 155000 Palestinians (Hendel, 748), it seems that Oslo Agreement of September 1993 was signed after all of them was completed in the ground. In other words, Israel ended creating facts in the field by putting 42 percent of West Bank territories at the hands of the settlers in 1979, decided to have them following the Israeli law in 1984, and Judaized East Jerusalem, then went to the peace process after all these steps were completed. In the light of these explications, one can understand what it means the postponement of the Issues of Jerusalem and settlements and others to the so-called permanent status negotiations. This postponement meant in some sense that these facts were created to stay forever from the Israeli point of departure.

The colonial settlement continued then during the Peace Process period, in 1992 "*MaaleAdumim*" in the outskirts of Jerusalem was declared as the first settler colonial city in West Bank followed by Ariel close to Nablus in 1998. In the same period, the establishment of new colonial settlements almost stopped except five settlements that were established. One of them is *Modin-Ilit* which Netanyahu first Government of 1996 established, and the pre-last was the settlement of *Nigohot* established in 1999, then the new colonial settlements stopped till 2017 when Netanyahu third Government decided to create the colonial settlement of Amichai in the middle of the way between Ramallah and Nablus to resettle the settlers of the former "illegal" settlement outpost Amona that was dismantled after the Israeli high court decision to do so, due to that the

facilities offered by the Government Ministries to the colonial settlements taking the shape of loans from the Ministry of Housing for building, in addition to different kind of support by various Israeli Ministries of Education, Economics and others (Shtayyeh, 2017, 38-39).

In the period before the 1990s, there was a tense discussion in Israel regarding the burden that the settlements make for the Israeli economy and establishment over clearly defined Palestinian private ownership.

In response to the evacuation of *Amona*, the Israeli Government decided in the same year to legalize the status of 55 illegally built settlements outposts according to the Israeli law that is built over private Palestinian lands consisting of 4000 building units. The Government decision became a law approved by the Knesset in the beginnings of February 2017. According to that law, it was decided that the colonial settlers bought the Palestinian private lands in good intentions. Therefore, it was decided to transfer these private lands to Government land within year, while the Palestinian ownership rights will be taken within 6 months; and the colonial settlers will be able to transform the property rights from the Government to them after 60 days of the transformation of the Palestinian private property to a Governmental property. The Palestinians were offered the right to get compensation following the Cypriot model of compensation for properties between the Cypriot and the Turkish parts of the Island. This law is frozen temporarily by the High Court till it will decide about its validity (Maan News Agency, Haaretz newspaper, and other news resources from December 2016 to February 2017).

The colonial settlements were implanted then "not for the solution of a housing problem, but for the implementation of an ideology, and an eclectic systems, to be practiced not only within the borders of the Israeli settlements that the settlers seek to establish, but over the whole Palestinian occupied territories which they consider as part of the Greater Israel land" (Al Atrash, 2011, 12).

According to this insight, it not surprising that the State will spend billions of dollars for the colonial settlement's expansion, the amounts according to Israel Jerusalem Fund is 60 billion dollars from 1967 to 2017. To be added on the expense of the poor classes. The Black Panthers representing the Eastern Jews, followed by the *Ohalim* Movement and the EasternRainbow ones presented this kind of dialogue to the internal Israeli debate. After 2000 the discussion became even tenser, but took a new basis, speaking about the existence of two economies. One for Israel inside the Israeli 1948 borders which is privatized and the second is the one that Israel created in the post-1967 occupied territories characterized of being subsidized by the government (Elghazi, 2012, 6129-641).

The new discussion after the year 2000 defeated the old one of claiming that those colonial settlements are established at the expense of developing the weak areas and the situation of the poor in Israel. In the opposite the weak people in Israel move today from the privatized market economy areas inside Israel to live in the subsidized colonial settlements. In other words, Israel is currently solving the tension between the classes by creating a supported life for the poor and also for those from the middle Class who seek to improve their income and life conditions. Today it is not a secret that some of these own two houses one inside Israel and the second in the post-1967 occupied territories.

If the colonial settlements started and also continued as dependent on the Israeli State and the WZO and others support, but this does not mean that the settlers who reached the number of 614,500 by the end of 2017 are without an economy that provides them with good incomes, for Instance the colonial settlement of *Psagot* in the hills around Ramallah is a right place for the production of good wine in Psagot Boutique Winery that import its products to Europe with the Label produced in West Bank in order to hide that it is presented in a colonial settlement (The Telegraph report), the same goes for *Shiloh* which produce wines that are sold in the United States, especially in New

York (The Telegraph report, and an interview with an anonymous person from *TurmusAyya* Village, 30/8/2018).

The Daily Telegraph intensive report showed that the Tourism sector is also growing in the Colonial settlements. Finally, a Settler Capitalism (Elghazi, 2012) investing in the colonial settlements using the excellent services of the poor Jewish workers as Matrix Company is doing for instance in Modin Illit (Elghazi, 2012). Besides this company, Nazzal calculated around 500 companies, Israeli and international, who work in different sectors inside the colonial settlements, include in fabricating lands and building sales by different ways (Nazzal, 2016).

The concept of the Settler Colonial Political Economy (see chapter two) is enforced here then, benefiting from the suspension of the law in the occupied territory and therefore putting the law behind regarding the land acquisition and the labor rights in specific. The key for a settler colonial economy is that it's the starting point is the illegal acquisition according to the international law of the land of the other people and to create an economy there that its benefits go to others than them. Such an economy will provide products to the settler colonial original society, but also the World.

Europe by 2012 was importing for example goods from the Israeli colonial settlements 15 times more than what it buys from the Palestinians, and that besides of having several EU companies working in the colonial settlements, and the EU support to the colonial settlements through different EU programs (APRODEV, 2012 www.fidh.org, 4-5).

In regard to the Settler Colonial Political Economy relations with the native Palestinians, the starting point to mention here is that Israel also transferred to a certain extent the use of the Palestinian labor force to the Palestinian territories

by relatively closing the Israeli labor market on the face of the Palestinians and diverting them towards the colonial settlements instead (Qatamesh, 1991).

Moving to the settlers Agency, it might be a start to tell significance of the story of the Government in 1967 with Gush Emunim, While the Government annexed East Jerusalem of 12 times size more than it was in the pre-1967 period to Israel at the end of June 1967, and also started Gush Etzion colonial settlement in September in the same year. Gush Emunim followed the path by occupying the Park Hotel in Hebron in April 1968; the government response was by evacuating them from there, but at the same time giving them residence in a nearby military camp and from there they started the colonial settlement project in the heart of Hebron.

This story of Gush Emunim in Hebron does not signal a contradiction between the Government and Gush Emunim and non-state actor religious organization who followed the path of Rabbi Zvi Cook as mentioned. Therefore they sought an agreement with the government rather than friction with it. Also, the National Unity Government that was ruling at that time found the same kind approach with Gush Emunim. The significance of this story is that the colonial settlement project started as a cooperative project between the Government and the non-state actors, with the dominating role in this partnership to the Government. During the process, there were minor conflicts taking place at certain moments, but this partnership was productive at the end all the way ahead.

An example of how effective was this partnership is Hebron itself where Gush Emunim started; today there are the significant colonial settlement of KiryatArba resided by 7400 colonial settlers, as part of 17 colonial settlements, 2 farms, 16 colonial settlement outposts, and an industrial area consisting of 36 percent of the size of Hebron Governorate. Among these are the 600 to 800 colonial settlers living in five colonial settlements of *Tel Rumeide*, *Bet Hadasa*, *Bet Romano*, *Avraham Avinu*, *Rajabi* house, in the heart of Hebron. These

settlements are resided by the most extremist Jewish Groups who believe in evacuating the Palestinians such as BeruchMerzel who was affiliated with *Kach* and later with similar Jewish extreme groups. The colonial settlers created Jewish archeological sites in *Tel Rumeide* and *Bet Romano* over Canaanite ones, and also created a touristic center there. The colonial settlers live among around 6500 Palestinians who were living in the Old City of Hebron in 2015.

Noticeable here that the number of the Palestinian residents in this area was 4000 in 1952, but went down drastically to 400 in 1995, before growing again to 6500 by 2015. The 400 settlers who most of them came from the United States and France, are guarded by 1500-2000 Israeli soldiers, making the life of the Palestinians to be like living in big prison in which there are 120 obstacles, 18 checkpoints, 512 shops closed by military orders, and other 1100 closed due to the inability of providers of goods and the customers to arrive because of the hardships imposed, 1000 houses abandoned consisting almost 40 percent of the homes of the Old City, 4200 pupils obliged to cross checkpoints in their way to and back from their schools; the *Tariq bin Ziad* school, for instance, is surrounded by a checkpoint; and streets closed, and therefore it takes people longer time to travel from one part to another inside Hebron by using alternative longer ways. For example, the Martyrs Street was closed after the massacre conducted by Baruch Goldstein against the Muslim prayers in *Al Haram Al Ibrahimīn* February 1994 leading to the killing of 29 persons while they were praying.

To be added are the almost daily attacks by the colonial settlers, and the imposition of permits of entry on the Palestinian residents of *Tel Rumeidi* to be able to leave and come back to this neighborhood of Hebron, combined with the prevention of their relatives, or any Palestinian living outside the community to visit them there. And finally, the restriction of movement of the pedestrians so the Palestinian cannot walk in the roads and areas around *Tel Rumeidi* (Information is taken from (HFACE and TIPH, 2018; Badil 2016; Ma'anDevelopment Center, 2008). In 1997 Hebron was divided according to

Hebron Protocol to Hebron 1 consisting of 80 percent of Hebron which was located under Palestinian full Authority, and Hebron 2 consisting of the other 20 percent of Hebron located under entire Israeli military and civil authority, and resided by 40000 Palestinians; the old city of Hebron is part of Hebron 2 (see Hebron Protocol 1997, and HFACE- TIPH book, 2017).

This is just an example on how the implantation of colonial settlements is made in a way that the government plans the major colonial settlement projects, allow for others to be initiated by the non-state actors, support them the entire road ahead. To be mentioned here that after the massacre conducted by Baruch Goldstein in 1994, the Israeli left-wing organizations pressured the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to exploit the event to evacuate the colonial settlers from the heart of Hebron, but he rejected to do so. Later in 1997 his succeeding government led by Benjamin Netanyahu was able to sign the mentioned Hebron Protocol with the Palestinian Authority which kept the Old City of Hebron colonial settlements in place as said leaving the Palestinians there with many hardships as also illustrated.

Earlier this thesis also mentioned other two examples of the Government acting in the service of the colonial settlers. These are: In response to the Israeli high court resolution about the illegality of Elon Moreh colonial settlement. The 1979 change of the Israeli laws came in by the government in a way that allows confiscating and building over Palestinian private land if it is proved that these lands are not cultivated for a specified period. In 2017 the Israeli Government also legalized the "illegal, according to the Israeli law settlements outposts" built over Palestinian private lands that there were no proves that they were abandoned without cultivation, this decision of the Government came out after the Israeli high court decided to evacuate one of these outposts called *Amona*. The latter also was compensated by the Netanyahu Government by creating other colonial settlement to them called Amichai. The conclusion of all of these examples is that there was no difference between the left, the Labor, and the

right, the Likud Governments, regarding the issue of keeping the colonial settlements in place.

The only two cases when colonial settlements were evacuated are Yamit in Sinai in 1982, and the colonial settlements in Gaza and Jenin Area in 2005, the first conducted by the Likud Government and the second by Ariel Sharon before splitting from the Likud and creating Kadima Party in November 2005. These two cases created tension between the government and the settlers that were solved by giving compensation to the colonial settlers.

In the first case, 1400 colonial settlers' families were evacuated in return of having peace with the most prominent neighboring Arab Country to Israel each family was granted 500000 dollars as compensation, all 660 million (Thein, washngtoninstitute.org, 2004). In the second case, the colonial settlers were given the option to leave Gaza voluntarily till the military evacuated the 15th of August 2005, who rejected to do so in five days with no casualties registered. The compensation law that was approved by the Knesset in the 16th of February 2005 included compensation for the distress resulting from moving to a new place, and also offered lands and houses to the evacuees in the two preferred areas by the law: The *Naqab*, and the Galilee (Simkhi and Serbi, 2005). The average family received 450,000 dollars as the full amount of compensation (www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org text about "Gaza Disengagement Plan").

Besides these cases of tension between the Israeli Governments and the colonial settlers, there were also some frictions that took place in those cases when the Government decided to freeze the expansion of the colonial settlements. Three examples here might be presented: One when the Rabin Government Agreed in 1992 with the American President George W. Bush to freeze the colonial settlement to be able to get the American loans allocated at that time for the absorption of the Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union to Israel. The agreement allowed for building in the colonial settlements to

meet the Natural Growth requirements, but the Israeli Government implanted the agreement in a way that is recognized between the Security Settlements in which no restrictions on the building were made and the Political Settlements where limit imposed. In this way, Rabin Government was able to contain and minimize the tension with the settlers to become a tension with the minority of them who lives mainly in the so-called Political Settlements meaning those who exist inside the Palestinian densely populated territories.

The second case was of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon agreement with President Bush Junior in 2004. As part of his plan to evacuate Gaza and Jenin from the colonial settlements, he negotiated with the United States for something instead. The result was an American Presidential declaration at that year stating that it is "unrealistic to expect that the outcome of the final status negotiations will be a complete return to the armistice line of 1949" (Bush, 2004). This American letter was considered as an approval by the American Administration of the right of Israel to continue the construction in the big settlements block that is close to the green line, which Rabin called earlier as security settlements.

The following Government led by Ehud Olmert followed the path and decided to continue building without any restrictions in Jerusalem, and adjacent to the settlement blocks without being restricted only within its boundaries, and in the isolated settlements within their boundaries exclusively, while he promised to evacuate the so-called illegal settlement outposts. Clear here that both Sharon and Olmert succeeded in convincing the Americans to drop the idea of preventing the construction for natural growth purposes in East Jerusalem and the big colonial settlements blocks adjacent to Israel, *MaaleAdumim*, *Ariel*, *Gush Etzion* and the other colonial settlements around Jerusalem. Noticeable here is that the majority of the colonial settlers live in these blocks.

Besides that, Sharon and Olmert accepted the "Natural Growth formula regarding the isolated colonial settlements. Till 2004 the American position was that the colonial settlement expansion in West Bank and Jerusalem should be for essential growth purposes only. This American position declared by a report that was prepared by Senator George Mitchell in 2001, was a point of departure for the former American position that considered the colonial settlements to be "illegal" according to the international law, and they included in the 2003 Road Map for Peace the rejection of the settlement expansion and the call for their freeze. By 2004 it seems that the American Administration moved to a new position of accepting colonial settlement expansion in East Jerusalem and the colonial settlements blocks as well as discussed earlier. One sign of the continuous deterioration of the American position in this regard was in 2007 when Olmert announced his approval of building hundreds of new housing units in the West Bank in the eve of the Annapolis Conference for peace that was held at that month. The Americans considered this step by Olmert to be as "not helpful" without adding any other words of denying it (Qurie'a 2014).

After that the Obama Administration came in the United States, starting by appointing the same Senator Mitchell as a mediator between the Palestinians and the Israelis, and here the third case for the third thesis came in, when Mitchell in 2009 called for the freeze of the colonial settlements, but this time without freezing the natural growth as he called for in his 2001 report. This new position made it possible for Mitchell to reach an Agreement with Netanyahu about a settlement freeze that does not include 3000 ongoing building units, and other 492 units approved, in addition to the continuation of the building for kindergartens, the public buildings and Jerusalem (Erekat, 2010, 10, annex 2), Netanyahu called this agreement as a "slow down building" rather than freezing because it does not restrict his ability to continue building according to previous decisions made by his Government. Regarding the American position, it moved later to UN Security Council resolution 2334 which was passed in the last period of President Obama returning to the original American positions about the

illegitimacy of the colonial settlements and their expansion, and then to the current American Administration positions presented earlier.

In all these cases, the government was able to find ways to contain the tension with the settlers, which was about the details and the quantities of the colonial settlements to be built, and when and where, more than being about the 'principles' related to the existence of the colonial settlement project which is not questionable for both. In the case of Begin Government decision to evacuate *Yamit* Settlement in Sinai in 1982, it was connected to moving them to other parts of 1948 at the expense of the Bedouins lands in the Naqab, the same took place in regard to the evacuation of Gaza colonial settlers who were resettled in a Palestinian confiscated land in the Naqab and the Jalil. In the other hand the freeze that took place by Rabin 1992, and Netanyahu 2009 was a kind of slow down rather than being a freeze. In other words, what Sharon did was a kind of re-distribution of the population to keep the Jewish Majority for which he got the American support and something in the expense from the United States (see above). While Rabin and Netanyahu made empty and meaningless steps as a part of the public relations play with the United States, and what they both did prove not to be more than creating some time out, which the settlement expansion was resumed in high speed after.

On the basis of the above, the tension when happened between the Government and the settlers, it usually take the shape of controversies about the pace of the colonial settlement expansion, and others resulting from the Israeli government willingness to keep a minimum enforcement of the Israeli law, in times that the government leaves the majority of settlers illegal acts without any step of retaliation or punishment, an example of this is the Government legalization of 110 settlements illegal outposts in 2017 resided by 4000 colonial settlers as mentioned above. The other case is that the significant majority of the complaints against the colonial settler attacks go with an indictment (www.Yesh-din.org, 2011).

Important to notice here that there are differences among colonial settlers themselves in this regard, so their official Councils such as *Yesha*: Council of the Jewish Municipalities in Judea and Samaria, and Gaza, advocate non-violently against any settlement freeze or settlement evacuation by the government, while condemns the acts of violence conducted by extreme settlers' groups like the Price Tag and others previously mentioned. In general, the attacks by these groups against the Israeli Army took mainly a retaliation nature, such as when the Army comes to evacuate an illegal settlement outpost such as the Israeli Army evacuation of houses occupied illegally by the colonial settlers in the heart of Hebron. In the 3rd of December 2008, for instance, the Army evacuated home in Hebron, and they were faced by eggs and paintings throwing in addition to verbal attacks, at the same time the colonial settlers killed three Palestinians and fired several Palestinian homes(www.Haaretz.com,2008).

As these examples show, the violent response by the colonial settlers against the Army evacuations go against the Palestinians, while no casualties were registered at the army side, and in the other hand, the army uses ways that do not cause harm to the settlers when evacuating them. In this regard, the most severe attack by the settlers against the Army is the one that took place in 2011 by attacking a military base using stones, vandalism, firing, and throwing paintings (Broner, www.nytimes.com 13/12/2011). Also, to mention the most severe event when a colonial settler shot the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during a public event in Tel Aviv in the 5th of November 1995 because he went far in his connections to the Palestinians as the colonial settlers advocated. It is also worthy here of mentioning that the colonial settlers' relations with the Labor Party Governments were not always harmonious, from 1967 the Labor supported the settlers. From 1970 to 1977 there was some friction between the Labor Party policy of building in the areas that meet with the Israeli ideological and security requirements (Mainly Jerusalem and its environs, The Jordan

Valley, Hebron, and the Eastern Slopes of West Bank. That adjacent to Israel where the water resources are also present, which will not do any harm to the Israeli demographic majority, and the settler's agenda of building everywhere based on their Talmudic teachings about it all the area of being the Land of Israel. Except for Shimon Peres from the Labor who supported the settlers, the rest of the party was against the settlers building everywhere in West Bank (Haklai, 2015, 27).

At that period, it was not rare to read articles written by Israeli left-wing Journalists in the Israeli media about the danger of the establishment of the Judea State that the colonial settlers will create as a separate state from Israel. See for instance Schiff in (Al Masdar Translations, 1988; Sprinzak, 1991/1998).

The Likud election in 1977 and his agenda of supporting the colonial settlers put these expectations aside, and when the Labor Party joined a National Unity led by the Likud in 1984-1990, the Labor did not object the settlement expansion; later when Rabin composed a Labor Government from 1992 to 1996 he tried to oblige the colonial settlers to follow his line of differentiating between security and political settlements (Hakla, 29). Barak last Labor Government from 1999 to 2001, accelerated the colonial settlement expansion, for instance from July 1999 to the end of the year it approved the building of 3196 units exceeding the 3000 of the former Netanyahu Government (Hockstader, www.washingtonpost.com, 20/10/1999); (Hockstader, [washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com), 1999).

Yet the severe attacks are those that the colonial settlers conducted against the Palestinians including killing, Injuring, and also their growing attacks against the Palestinian Agriculture including the theft of crops, vandalism, put cultivated lands on fire, and others, in response as they claim to what they call as the Palestinian Agricultural terrorism (Salem, www.transcend.org 20/6/2018), the Palestinian mosques and churches, and the Palestinian commutes. For instance, in 2013 around 10000 trees were cut or damaged according to the UN Office of Coordinating the Humanitarian Assistance to the Palestinians (OCHA). The colonial settlers' attacks are well documented a day after another by the reports of the human rights and UN organizations such as B'Tselem, Yesh Din,

OCHA, and also by the EU Heads of Missions Annual reports. These attacks might start by the burning of *Al Aqsa Mosque* in August 1968, and accelerated when the Jewish Secret Underground was established in the 1980s and conducted attacks against the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah in June 1980 leaving both of them with serious injuries, followed by an attack against Hebron University in July 1983 leaving three killed and tens injured (Hendel, 2012, 735, 738). The colonial settlers' attacks reached a new summit in the latest years with the attacks mentioned above.

Finally, it is worthy to mention the colonial settlers and their supporters in the Israeli right-wing groups incursions to *Al Aqsa Mosque* in Jerusalem in violation to the position of the High Rabbinate in Israel who considers the place to be sacred to the extent that Jews should not pollute its purity by visiting it, and the Jews who attend should be punished by death (Muhareb, 2016, 6). This nationalistic-religious represents the new right wing in Israel (see earlier) and does not believe in the position of the High Rabbinate.

As Muhareb explicated there are now seven kinds of Temple Movements who each include several groups promoting agendas towards *Al Aqsa Mosque*; according to what they call for these are: A group that calls for re-building the Temple by people's hands such as the 'Temple Institute', 'The Movement for Building the Temple', and 'Women for the Temple'. The second group is calling for keeping the Temple as a religious, cultural center such as the 'Temple Mount and Eretz Yisrael Faithful Movement' and 'To the Hamour Mountain Movement.' The third group is calling for allowing the Jews to pray in the Templesuchas'The Human Rights Movement in the Temple Mount'.The fourth group calls for the imposition of the Jewish control over the Temple and to prohibit the Muslims from entering. These are such as 'The Temple Mount Belongs to us' Movement and 'The Movement for the Salvation of the People and the Temple Mount.' The fifth Temple group is calling for the study of religious rituals and presenting oblations in the Temple Mount, such as 'The Institute of Temple Mount Studies

in MitzpeYirecho,' 'Yeshivat the Temple Torah,' and the 'Temple Mount Yeshiva.' The sixth group is calling for the reproduction of the religious rituals required in the Temple such as 'The Temple Institute,' 'The House of the Hebrew Artist' and 'The Temple Works Institute.' The seventh and final there are those who seek to educate and disseminate the information and the studies about the Temple such as 'The Institute for Temple Knowledge' (Muhareb, 2016, 13).

Today, the colonial settlers consist a majority in area C of West Bank which represent two-thirds of its size including the Jordan Valley and the Eastern Slopes adjacent to Israel, and also in East Jerusalem. They also had a Separation Wall and a system of bypass roads that create a direct and secure link between them and Israel and keep the Palestinians and their residency areas invisible. Within this "geography of catastrophe" (Hendel, 2012, 209), the Palestinians are made invisible by means that restrict their movements such as the wall, the barricades, the checkpoints, the pipe wires; while the colonial settlers became in a position of enjoining control of roads in a way that makes these roads by 2010 dangerous to the security of 250000 Palestinians and 83villages (Haaretz,www.haaretz.com, 18/1/2010). A new example in this regard is related to an "illegal outpost" established close to Halamish colonial settlement close to Ramallah, which put a sign stating "The Area where you are now is under the control of the Jews. The entry of Arabs to this area is completely prohibited; the danger of death" (www.middleeastmonitor.com, 11/4/2018).

Around that outpost, the Israeli Army created two checkpoints in the two sides of it checking the Palestinians strictly. These new facts mean only one thing that the land of West Bank and East Jerusalem is already considered as Israel, and the others are just guests in the best scenario. Haklai supports this conclusion by saying"the presence of Israeli settlers serves to institutionalize Israeli sovereignty over parts of the putative Jewish Homeland" (Haklai, 2015, 17).

Haklai shares the position of considering the area occupied in 1967 to be putative, but he declares clearly that the colonial settlement project over it aims to create Israeli sovereignty over it. Following what he wrote, the Head of the Gush Etzion colonial settlement Regional Council David Perl told The Telegraph reporter who toured the colonial settlements in West Bank saying about the Palestinians "If they fight us, we for sure won't let them live here" (Simons, The Telegraph Report).

Till 1977 the West Bank and Gaza were considered as an area "administered by Israel" till a compromise about it will be reached through the negotiation, this was the Labor Party approach. By 1977 an annexation policy was put in implementation, and by 1979 a percentage of 42 percent of West Bank became under the control of the colonial settlements, what followed was Oslo process that defined the West Bank and Gaza as "territories under dispute" that their fate will be decided in the permanent status negotiations. But Oslo created area C in 1996; followed by ideas to create a "Palestinian State with Provisional borders" starting from 2003 after the issuance of the Road Map that year which that option as a voluntary option to pass in its second stage (see the Performance-based Road Map of 2003).

Prime Minister Sharon presented that option by then and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres as well. The idea was to transfer areas A and B and some parts of area C that will be agreed upon to the Palestinian Authority reaching 60 percent as it was presented at that time.

After the failure of the Kerry Initiative in 2014 the idea became that all area C is Israel, and that should be annexed to Israel at once or in stages. In 11th of October 2018, Ayelet Shaked the Minister of Justice in Israel repeated previous calls for annexing this territory due to the presence of a Jewish Majority in it; in her opinion, around 100000 Palestinians are living in the area, and Israel can absorb them (Ayelet Shaked, www.arab48.com, 2018). This is a summary of the status of West Bank through the previous decades of occupation, clear so far is : The annexation of Jerusalem, getting rid from Gaza, and the planning to move

for the current de facto annexation of area C to a De jure annexation to it, while keeping the silence about what will be the fate of areas A and B, however signs in regard to these areas started to emerge by the calls to expel these areas Palestinians if they fought against Israel (see earlier), or by the approval of the Nation-State Law in July 2018 which considered all the historic Palestine to be Israel.

In this context explained above, the Palestinian Authority was created as an exception to work in the Time out, given the responsibility for the people and the services rather than over territory, in addition to other restrictions in its freedom to act in East Jerusalem, Area C of West Bank and in Gaza Strip. In addition to the continuation of the colonial settlement expansion during its period and building the 712 kilometers separation Wall that took 9.5 percent of the West Bank and put it in the side of Israel. While 85 percent of its route inside West Bank, so far 460 Kilometers of it were completed till September 2017, and it already cut Jerusalem from West Bank, and also cut parts of Jerusalem by checkpoints such as *Shufat* Refugee Camp and *KufurAqab* annexed to the Jerusalem Israeli Municipal borders after 1967 war (B'Tselem, 2016; IrAmim, www.ir-amim.org.il).

When the Palestinian Authority was established the talk was still about Occupation and how to end it in a way that will lead to a type of territorial compromise. Ehud Barak followed by Ariel Sharon was the last two Israeli leaders to talk about ending the occupation. Later a "Commission to examine the status of building in Judea and Samaria" led by the High Court Judge Edmund Levi was composed, the Commission released its report in July 2012 stating: "Form the point of view of the international law, the classical laws of "occupation" as set out in the relevant international conventions cannot be considered applicable to the unique and sui generis historical and legal circumstances of Israel's presence in Judea and Samaria spanning over decades" (Regavim, 2014).

By this report Israel legalized the colonial settlements in the post-1967 territories closing the way in the face of those Israeli leaders who said earlier that there is an occupation. Also negated all the international UN resolutions that called for the end of occupation and the established of two states solution.

In this context, the Palestinian Authority is working, with authorities that keep diminishing, but at the same time disabled to break the cycle of connections with Israel, which was made as an "ordinary exception" (Agamben,2005), that is very difficult to get rid of it. Being in one hand accepted by the donors who will not make any real moves in area C and East Jerusalem without an Israeli approval as shown, who also will not take any Palestinian position to break with the security cooperation with Israel, nor with the economic agreement with it which restricts the economic relations with the others, mainly the neighboring Arab countries.

According to the above logic, the exceptional that is obligatory will look as an ordinary that the Palestinian Authority is obliged to deal with its all restrictions and constraints, in this sense "Occupation has a normalizing power which makes it look as normal" (Udwan, 2011, 17), and this also interpret why the occupation creates a submissive process through time which diminishes the ability gradually and the willingness of the natives to resist (Mimi, 1957/1965; Bourdieu in Udwan, 2011, 18).

Moving from the structures to actors, here one can see an actor who is aggressive in grabbing the land, building the settlements and create facts in the ground and keep escalating when it comes to his plans and their implementation. In the other hand this aggressive actor, the colonial settlers and their Government already keep re-creating their enemy, adapting this enemy to new situations and industrialize submission. The question is how this process can be explained.

Agamben idea about making the exceptional an ordinary make a sense in explicating as shown, but also other concepts can be used such as, the Law-Making violence (Benjamin, 1986), which creates new laws that will be difficult to escape. Albert Mimi idea about the diminishing capacity to resist (Mimi, 1957/1965), Franz Fanon ideas on how the native internalize the coercion of the occupier and use it internally (read: How Hamas used the same methods of the occupation when it took over Gaza in 2007 through a bloody coup against Fateh).

There is also Hannah Arendt approach to violence as an action that is overestimated by the thinkers and the practitioners as well (Arendt, 1973; 1970), and Bourdieu about the Habitus which include changing the binary relations between the structure and the actor to become sometimes a position in which: "The actors will not need to design objectives to be like goals for their practice. That is because they are not selves opposite to subject (A problem) emerged through cultural action of knowledge. But they are fully involved in their affairs and present to what will come, and what should be done. They are practical and has a sense of praxis that is not presented as a thinking matter or a targeted possibility through a project, but it is printed in the present of praxis" (Bourdieu 1998, in Udwan, 2011, 18).

This insight is quite impressive by widening the thinking process, and to take from the "Rational persons" who plan and design objectives to the praxis, to include in it also the "ordinary" who act spontaneously according to their experience and thinking while working. Palestinian wise the people act accordingly, but with the difference between a place and another. In general, all the Palestinians participated in the struggle against settler colonialism, even when the cost of the struggle was more prominent than just staying calm, the price paid by the Palestinians as a result to 1948 fighting is an excellent

example in this regard when they lost their country and were dispersed all around the region and the world.

Other examples can be mentioned from the most recent Palestinian struggle mainly in comparison between the first Intifada of 1987 and the second one of 2000, the first was mostly non-violent, with high public participation (Salem, 1990, 9-23), leading to the bringing the PLO back to Palestine in the shape of a Palestinian Authority. While the second of 2000 was more by military means leading to the failure and more conditionality from the international community towards the Palestinians, for instance, the Road Map of 2003 was a Performance-based plan, in other words it laid conditions that the Palestinians should fulfill first such as stopping violence, disarming the organizations that used force, and building transparent institutions as conditions for moving ahead towards getting the occupied territories back from Israel within a gradual process (Salem, 2004).

Different than the 1948 case the 2000 Intifada was a case of bad planning while in 1948 the fighting was obligatory path practiced when the people had no other option than to fight in order to prevent the planned transfer after Britain decided to leave the country and, in the interim, redeployed its forces to be excluded to the military camps leaving the Palestinians to their fate alone opposite to Zionism. In both cases, there was a failure by losing the big part of the country in 1948, and by accelerating the process towards losing it in 2000 Intifada.

In this regard it can be said that the settler colonial projects get the kind of natives that have structures making it possible for them to be defeated, but this saying has to be taken with a caution in the Palestinian case for three reasons: The first is that different than the other settler colonial projects international resolutions established the Israeli one. Second, Palestinians do not stand as a nation by themselves. But they are part of an Arab nation ruled in 1948 by regimes who could not help that much due to being under European colonial

regimes, and their wars with Israel later did not bring the successes required towards the liberation of Palestine. Third, opposite to the other settler colonial cases, the Palestinian one is still ongoing. Therefore the final result of the full victory of one party on the other was not concluded yet.

After more than one hundred years of struggling, the Palestinian resistance accumulated lessons learned, by today one of the questions is if the current situation of no active resistance is a result of a decision by the Palestinians who might know already by heart that waging a comprehensive struggle might put them in the edge of new transfer and a third expulsion from their country? This question is related to the Palestinians in general. The absence of the Palestinian refugee's productive struggle due to different restrictions for their case, such for instance the continuous marches in the borders, and the lack of the public participation in the confrontational demonstrations with the Israeli army and the colonial settlers. Today the big demonstration is taking place inside the Palestinian cities where there is no Israeli Army present, or in the villages who suffer from the separation wall like *Balin*, *Ni'alin*, *Kufr Kadum*, and few others with minor participation in each. In addition to that, there is no boycott of the Israeli products or withdrawal of the Palestinian workers in the colonial settlement and the Palestinian investments in the Israeli economy reaching the amount between 5.7 billion to 7.3 billion according to a study by Isa Smirat (Smirat, 2011).

If one moves from the general to the specific, some additions need to be added. In Gaza the marches to the borders are going on for several weeks already by Gaza population which consists a majority of refugees who see with their eyes the rest of Gaza District occupied in 1948 in the horizon, but also the struggle for the ending of their imprisonment in Gaza in addition of struggling for the right of return as described earlier; for Jerusalem and West Bank the popular civil struggle became rare and as a response to occupation acts rather than as an initiative to a comprehensive struggle. In other words, the struggle is localized, besides it, one can see also actions of spontaneous attacks especially by knives

against the Israeli army that each young assailant who conducts one of them knows in advance that he/she will be killed, but he/she still do it. Noticeable that these youth who hold these attacks are independent of the Palestinian political factions; which does their acts as spontaneous, scattered, and non- continuous.

The situation of the Palestinian struggle can be characterized by being localized, erupted as a response to acts conducted by the Israeli occupation. The fragmentation effect resulting from long years of occupation is evident here and due to long decades of separation between the territories and divisions inside each territory.

How much this situation reflects Bourdieu thesis? Yes, here one can see the localized, and therefore the disconnected from the national holistic agenda for the sake of defending and struggling for daily life issues confronted in the local. At this sense, the occupation succeeded after decades to adapt the Palestinians and to normalize them with its tight and heavy control in the ground. Nobody can predict how much this situation will continue, but the Palestinians are there. Elise Aghazarian wrote in 2010 suggesting a schizophrenic practice resulting from the long-term occupation. The idea here is that the natives at the end were re-formulated in a way that makes it possible to the settler colonial project to proceed with significant hurdles on the road. The occupied here tend to imitate the internalized occupier behavior. Aghazarian shows how this imitation takes place in the situation of Jerusalem through concrete examples of the behavior of the native Jerusalemite that she presents (Aghazarian, 2010).

In wrap up, this chapter about, the Dynamics of elimination and Implantation, analyzed first the tense Israeli demographic politics and uncovered the assumptions behind each one of them, and their significance, successes, and prospects.

Next, to that the chapter made an overview of the settler colonial ongoing elimination process. Here six essential elimination methods were identified. These include the displacement and the replacement, Judaization, Israelization, Isolation, and closure methods.

The mentioned overview included first the Palestinian refugees (the uprooted), including the 1948 refugees, the 1967 displaced persons, and also the Internally Displaced Persons (The IDP's). Following the status of the Palestinians inside Israel was reviewed. The name, the Marginalized was used to describe them because they face internal colonial practices in the *Naqab*, The Jalil and the Triangle. This part follows as well the Israeli ethnocractic methods of excluding and israelizing them.

The post-1967 policies combined Belligerent Occupation, settler colonialism, and Apartheid followed, also showing the differences, such as in East Jerusalem where annexation was made in 1967 while leaving the people as Jordanian Citizens residing in Israel. Following was area C of West Bank composing two-thirds of its size and that is subject to colonial settlement expansion and de facto annexation, and finally Gaza under siege of the leftovers from the Pre-1948 Gaza province that consisted of 1,111,501 dunam's, while all Gaza after 1948 consisted of 365 square kilometers only. In 1948, 68 percent of its population of 1952 (294603 by then) were refugees from Gaza province.

In 2005 Israel withdrew its forces and dismantled the Settler colonies from Gaza, to focus instead in the Judaizing of the Naqab, East Jerusalem and the parts that it needs in West Bank as the Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon said by then. In the other hand Gaza was left under Israeli colonial control to its borders and to what gets in and out of it.

The chapter also went over the Israeli policies towards the Palestinian Authority that was established in 1994. Before that, the chapter reviewed the Israeli policies development in the occupied territories till the establishment of the

Palestinian Authority and giving it the authority over the people, while Israel kept the control over the land, besides that the Palestinian Authority was dictated to provide Israel with security.

In its last section, the chapter overviewed the process of implantation, in the context of a settler colonial state in the making. Accordingly, this section follows the state policies in different stages regarding the settler-colonial project in the 1967 occupied territories. It follows as well the positions of the various political parties in Israel and the changes that took place on these positions over the years of post-1967 occupation. Following the chapter chases the roles of the Jewish philanthropists, the World Zionist Organization, and the Jewish Agency and their different branches, and the role of the United States as well in sustaining the settler colonial project expansion through several decades. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion of the Settler Agency as a non- State actor one and its prospects regarding the future of the Palestinian 1967 territories

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The previous four chapters will be briefly summarized in this concluding chapter. Following the multi-dimensional hypothesis of this study (see the Introduction) the chapters included the review of the inclusion and the exclusion politics of settler colonialism past and present, but they included parts as well about how these projects were transformed regarding their inclusion and the exclusion politics. The analysis of the transformation of the settler-colonial project was made in two directions in the study. One of these was about the settler colonial experiences that found a solution of the inclusion and the exclusion issue: Permanent like the USA, and South Africa with the different fate of settler colonialism in both of them, or Temporary or Unstable like Northern Ireland (see chapters one and three). The other transformation is related to the settler colonial projects that are still in progress and did not reach their final destination yet as in the case of Israel. The first cases are already transformed and decolonized, while in the case of Israel, it is still in the process of transformation, but not necessarily in the process of Decolonization.

Opposite to the policy analysis methods that used predictions and scenarios developed by the experts, this study hypothesis and analysis as well followed the advice of Ian Lustick (Lustick, 2005: see the introduction). Lustick advice is on how to make scientific predictions about the fate of the inclusion and exclusion politics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine, by learning First from that settler-colonial experiences that found a solution such as the United

States, South Africa, and Northern Ireland studied here, and Second by learning from the history of the region around Israel, and the internal dynamics of the settler-colonial project in Palestine, and finally learning from the roles of the international/ transnational factors and players in sustaining the settler colonial project in Palestine or transforming it.

Learning from the other settler colonial projects that found a solution, the settler colonial project in Palestine will either exclude the other people of Palestine or create a mono- State for the settlers without most of the other people living in Palestine (this is the American model). Or it will follow the South African model of inclusion of the two peoples in one state/ one country model. Or finally, follow the Irish model in which parts of the country were separated from the other parts, and a kind of ruling was created inclusive to both communities of the settlers and the nationalists under the control of the British Crown. The Irish Model will mean the creation of a joint –ruling between the settler colonials and a Palestinian Authority in West Bank, under the Israeli supervision. These models were discussed thoroughly in chapters one and three.

The chapters also discussed the roles of the internal, regional, and the global factors in sustaining, or transforming the settler colonial project inclusion and exclusion politics towards following either the American model, the South African model, or the Irish model. Besides these models, other two were presented following the study hypothesis: One is by the Palestinians, using nonviolence means supported internationally, leading to an inclusive model of both sides in one state or two states models. And the second is about creating an exclusive counter process to the Israelis as learned by the history of the region where Arabs will become active and ‘liberate’ Palestine from outside. One model was excluded which is related to the Palestinians unilateral liberation of Palestine following the Algerian model that was adopted by PLO in its early years. This Palestinian strategy is analyzed below showing why it failed.

Finally in this part, transformation of the settler colonial projects inclusion and exclusion politics is not always a decolonization process, as shown above, the United States model the settler- colonial project was transformed by genociding the indigenous people, and in the case of Northern Ireland it was transformed towards inclusion while keeping the British Control over it. Decolonization in the other hand is a type of transformation in which the settler colonials will be obliged to leave (as in the cases of Zimbabwe and Algeria not thoroughly discussed here), or by creating a joint formula of inclusion for the indigenous people and the settler colonials as happened in South Africa. Added to the previous chapters, this conclusive one also alludes to the issue of Decolonization but will expand more about it in further research.

This chapter will include two sections: The first will summarize the previous four chapters, but also in combination with the possibilities of re-inclusion as part of a decolonization process of the land, and the rights of the peoples for self-determination and representation in equal basis as well. The Second section will be about the concrete probabilities of re-inclusion in the same case and will end with final sum-up. According to Habermas (Habermas in Burchill et al, 1996, 152-155), knowledge should follow an 'emancipatory interest' of the researcher to assist in solving the humanity plights. This approach is the one used in this study which makes it far from being just 'technical' as in the case of policies, or 'practical' that promotes only understanding and not transformation as both Habermas and Cox advised (Burchill et al, 1996, 152-155).

5.1 Are Decolonization and Re-inclusion Possible ?

Starting by the summary of this thesis and also in link to decolonization and re-inclusion, it should be first stated that further to colonialism and settler colonialism a decolonization process can take two shapes. The first is the decolonization from the binary colonial relation characterizing the relationship between the metropole and the colonized people, and the second is the

decolonization from the settler colonials, and the metropole who both act together within the settler colonial projects contexts (Veracini, 2011 and 2013). This thesis is about the second shape. In this shape the settler colonials come to stay, to uproot and to replace, and here is where it is different than colonialism as mentioned in the previous chapters. The Latter use military means to control and to exploit, while settler colonialism brings with its new immigrants who come to settle and to seize, not only to live in peace with the indigenous population. When Settler Colonialism is the direction, the colonial country uses its military power, and its control to bring settler colonialists, to settle them, and to support the establishment of their political, institutional, legal and economic- social structures. In the case of colonialism, there are two confronting parties: The Metropole and the Indigenous population, while in the case of Settler Colonialism a third party will be added: The Settler- Colonials, and as such the parties concerned become three. Usually, the Colonial State will be in the side of the settler colonials, and the indigenous population will be obliged to fight against two enemies: The Colonials and the settler colonials. The question is about how this decolonization process can take place in a settler colonial context, and what are the international experiences can tell in this regard?

The Settler Colonials motives vary as discussed in chapter one. In the beginning, Discovery was the motive to settle the new land combined with the attempts to solve the population surplus in Europe (Al Masiri, 1990a) and some Messianic concepts were behind settling the New World as well (see chapter 3). In other cases 'settling' took place in the pre-Westphalian State periods when the borders were not yet recognized as in the case of the British settler-colonial project in Ireland starting from the 12th century; or due to a economic reasons such as protecting the trade way to India, and creating locations in the Middle of the way to provide the ships with food and water supplies like it was in the case of the Dutch early settler-colonial project in South Africa. Religious factors also played roles in the cases of Ireland and South Africa, first by preaching to

Christianity among the pagans in South Africa, and later by the attempts to expand the Protestant denomination in Ireland starting from the 16th century and on.

In the case of the Zionist settler-colonial project, the reasons behind it were too complicated. First Germany, France, the United States, and Britain adopted the Zionist project before the emergence of Zionism as was shown in chapter three. Later some of the Jewish philanthropists joined in the service of the same objective mainly in the nineteenth century. What followed included recruiting a portion of the Jewish Bourgeoisie in Western Europe to help linking with the Jewish Organizations in East Europe (such as the *Hovevi Zion* and *Poali Zion*), who were in charge of recruiting Jews to immigrate to Palestine since the 19th century as a response to the pogroms that took place against Jews in those countries. The story of Theodor Herzl movement to Zionism is a striking example here. He was an enthusiastic advocate to the integration of the Jews in Europe, and he thought of establishing youth clubs who will seek preaching Jews to become Christian Catholics, then in few years he adopted Zionism and held the first Zionist Conference in 1897. It is said in his autobiography that the Dreyfus event in France described earlier changed his mind (Bein, 1988) but the same autobiography mentioned that he was in good relation at that period with Reverend William Henry Hechler who was a German Clergyman as part of his Restorationist Anglican beliefs. Maybe this clergyman contributed to changing his ideas, but also perhaps the pogroms in East Europe countries contributed to the change of his views being a journalist who was following the news, more than the minor Dreyfus event (Abbas, 2011, 33). This conclusion might also find support like Herzl personality as a one who was born in Budapest (Eastern Europe), and then his family moved to Vienna.

The Zionist project implementation in Palestine was conducted (as discussed in chapters two and three) during two periods. The first was by the Zionist Movement during the late Ottoman period, but with the support of the European

mentioned countries above. The Jewish Philanthropists, and also with the 'blind eye' of the Ottoman Empire due to bribes to the local governors, or the Ottoman interests with the Western Countries. The second stage took place after the 1917 British occupation of Palestine following the Balfour Declaration of the same year. By 1948 this stage was completed by the Zionists taking over 78 percent of Palestine, the creation of Israel, and the expulsion of 750,000 to 900,000 Palestinians from their land. The 150,000 leftovers were placed under a military rule till 1966, subject also to Emergency Laws that separate between the human being and his/her land, leaving the latter a subject to internal colonization as called by Zureik (Zureik, 1979), contrary to the idea that Israel succeeded in creating a new 'nation-state' that turned the settler-colonial project over by transforming the settlers to citizens (Veracini, 2013).

The Israeli settler colonial state as this thesis called it (see chapter two), developed its settler democracy, murderous to the others as much as it is profound for the settlers (Mann, 2005). This settler democracy attacked besides its Arab citizens, also other Palestinians outside Israel proper, it first attacked *Qibiavillage* near Ramallah in 1952. Then was 'murderous' against Nasser Regime in 1956 when it attacked Egypt by then in cooperation with France and Britain; committed massacres in Gaza in 1956-1957 while ideas were discussed to annex Gaza to Israel (Sakhnini, 2012), and fought a battle against the Jordanian army in 1966 near *Al Samouvillage* close to Hebron. Accordingly, the settler colonial project did not make a pause from 1948 to 1967 when it attacked Jordan, Egypt, and Syria but it was in the process of offensive all the time. By 1967 the rest of Palestine was occupied by Israel and the Golan Heights from Syria and Sinai from Egypt as well.

The settler colonial state learned from its experience in the pre-1967 period with the Palestinians inside Israel. One hand it canceled the military role imposed on them, but alternatively, it placed the Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza under a military rule and ran their daily life by military orders. Only East Jerusalem

territory was annexed to Israel in 1967, but without 'granting' Israeli citizenship to its Palestinian population like it was the case with the Palestinians inside Israel. At that time Israel promised the UN to implement the UNGA resolution 273 which required Israel to return to the 181-resolution of 1947 giving Israel two third of the territory that it took in 1948, and to allow for the return of the Palestinian refugees. Since these two conditions were not met, Israel decided to give the minimum by 'Granting' Israeli citizenship to the Palestinians who became part of Israel as a way for the elimination of their Palestinian national identity. After 1967 Israel did not feel that it is obliged to eliminate the nationality of those that it occupied in that year by granting them Israeli citizenship. Two reasons were behind this position. The first is the 'demographic fear' that the Jewish majority of Israel will be lost in the long term if a big number of Palestinians will be added at once to Israel. The second is related to Israel's claim that the 1967 war was a 'war of defense that was imposed on Israel.

The claim above was used by Israel to ignore the population while taking over the territories and calls them as 'areas administered by Israel. The latter was a kind of term that meant to keep the identity of the land as 'unrecognized, although the UN resolutions 181 and 194 of 1947 and 1948 considered them as Palestine. The irony here is that Israel recognized the 181-partition resolution of 1947 but rejected to accept it as a basis for the recognition of the Palestinianship of the areas occupied in 1967 which were parts of the Palestinian state (besides others that were annexed to Israel in 1948 as mentioned). Besides keeping the lands allocated to the Palestinian state from its territory in its hands. Israel also claimed that the territories occupied in 1967 lost their Palestinianship by merely annexing them to Jordan from 1948 to 1967, a step that was never accepted by the UN ever since (see details of these case studies in chapter 4).

The Israeli 'control' over the post-1967 territories took the shape of a combination between Belligerent occupation, settler colonialism, and Apartheid.

The third was used as a tool to subordinate the people who were kept separate from Israel; the second to appropriate the land of the Palestinians and displace and replace, and the first is the Israeli state tool to assist in implementing the second and the third. That is all interpret why Israel is not the mother country of the settler-colonial project in the post-1967 territories, but it is the initiator and the leading implementer of it. For Israel what is going on is a process to expand Israel and annex the 1967 territories gradually to it rather than to be a mother country for a settler- colonial project run by the settlers and aim for the creation of a new state separate from Israel. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and the evacuation of the settlements from Jenin 2005 and Jericho 1993 are just the exceptions that prove the rule, being part of a process that aimed to reorganize the Israeli settler-colonial project and its ability to achieve the demographic majority wherever it can (see chapter 4).

The negotiations with the Arabs and later with the Palestinians were part of the Israeli government strategy till the recent years. As it looks by now this strategy aimed to buy time till the settler colonial project get sustained. Noticeable that in all the peace agreements the colonial settlement expansion was not stopped ever except for short periods in different stages; therefore, the peace agreements kept always the right of Israel to preserve lands defined by Israel as 'strategically' important for 'security reasons,' and to expand colonial settlements over those lands. In this context, the Palestinian Authority established in 1994 were placed as an authority over the people to provide them with salaries and services, while the lands were kept open for settler colonialism. However, the people also were not left free, but were placed under Israeli procedures that restrict their freedom of movement between the Palestinian Governorates and inside each governorate as well, besides that Palestine was kept dependent on its 'custom union' economic arrangements with Israel that also restricts Palestine economic relations with any other party besides Israel. The Palestinian workers were also kept working in Israel and the colonial settlements as a cheap labor force within a system of ethnic colonial farmers called by Shafir

(Shafir, 2002, 150), which keep the ethnic separation between the settler colonials who own the land and the indigenous population brought to work in it. With this separation, the number of the Palestinian workers in Israel and the colonial settlements was going up and down according to the political situation in one hand, and according to Israel's move to more right-wing politics who prefer the so-called 'Hebrew Work' without the use of Palestinian workers. Even when Palestinian or foreign workers are still to be used inside Israel pre 1948 borders and in the colonial Settlements in the post-1967 occupied territories, the ethnic separation will be kept (Shafir, 2002) (see chapter two).

This thesis presented the concept that described Israel as a Settler Colonial State representative of a settler-colonial project in the making. This description is not new but was presented by several scholars before such as the Egyptian Scholar Majdi Hammad (Hammad, 1984). As said this characteristic of the State of Israel created non-classical settler colonial situation. In the classical position, colonial settlers go to settle under the umbrella of a mother country, and this was the case of the pre-1948 Zionism Movement with Britain as a mother country. But it became a different story after 1967 as mentioned. Similar to Israel in this regard is The United States in which settlers were assisted by a mother country, mainly Britain, fought against it later for the settler colonial's independence that was achieved in 1776 — but followed by settler colonial's expansion through wars against Mexico, and others leading for instance to the acquisition of a significant portion of territory from Mexico in 1848 after the defeat of the latter in the American-Mexican war. Accordingly, the settler colonial projects need decades to stabilize. In the case of Ireland around 800 years passed between the year when Britain started settling it, and between the great Friday Agreement of power-sharing with the indigenous population in Northern Ireland. Decades also passed since the settler- colonial project begun by the Dutch South Africa, joined later by the British, and till the transformation of Apartheid took place in 1994. In all the four cases discussed in this thesis settler colonialism was going on in a particular stage through a settler colonial state.

Therefore Israel might not be unique at this point. But at the same time, Israel is more similar to the United States which eliminated the indigenous population. Israel at its side conducted this elimination by demographic means as the primary tool of elimination (Rouhana, 2015) (see chapter 2).

When the settler- colonial project gets settled? What are the international /transnational settler colonial projects tell in this regard? And how decolonization took place in those cases? Veracini proposed answer suggests that the settler colonial project "extinguishes itself," while the colonial project "reproduces itself" (Veracini, 2013). Generally speaking, this should have been the case of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand where these settler-colonial projects succeeded against the indigenous population. These were counter- decolonization cases (see chapters 1 and 3).

On the Contrary of the above cases, a power-sharing process took place together with the indigenous population in Northern Ireland, but by separating them from the Republic of Ireland and as such depriving them of their right of self-determination and to be de-colonized. The only case where the transformation towards decolonization took place was the case of South Africa, where the settler colonialism and the Apartheid system were both reversed and brought to an end. Therefore, the Apartheid system combined with settler colonial hegemony was replaced by a one inclusive democracy starting from 1994 (see chapters 1 and 3). This is not the case of Israel where the settler-colonial project is still young and in the making.

If the settler- colonial projects have different destinies regarding decolonization, the question that comes after is regarding the settler-colonial present understood as the characteristics and the legacies left from the previous settler colonial project? In the United States who 'won; in its wars against the indigenous population, these legacies are taking the shape of unsettled policies towards the Amerindians, the African Americans, combined with an aggressive

policy worldwide as indicated and as also can be understood from Aziz Rana concept “Settler Empire” (Rana, 2010). In Northern Ireland, where decolonization was not achieved; these legacies are taking the shape of the paralysis of the power-sharing institutions and their inability to deal with the issues of the past. In South Africa, despite the achievement of decolonization at the political level, but the prevailing is the economic inequality where other Black exploiters join the White former rulers. This means that the decolonization of the economy is still a must.

However, in the case of Israel, the case is not a case of legacies of the past yet, the ‘present’ here is also settler colonial (maybe it is the only settler colonial present today worldwide). Therefore, the issues here are more complex, including the ongoing land seizure; the continuing displacement and replacement, the absence of a process of recovery for the injuries of the past; and others that still stand on the way of the settler to become a native as Veracini proposed (Veracini, 2013; 2015 b; 2017). In this last case, the past is continuous in the present and therefore representing a kind of past-present as much as the settler- colonial project is ongoing.

The past in the case of Israel went through different ways of elimination. The key is the demographic elimination as mentioned (see chapters 2 and 4). In details this elimination takes different shapes, starting by creating a disconnection between the indigenous and their land by all means including the use of massacres and processes of destroying to the villages as places, spaces territory, and landscape, followed by external and internal displacements. Those who reject to depart will be placed under processes of elimination of their national identity, and their right of self-determination in their own statehood; all to be followed by different procedures of isolating and disconnecting; combined by the imposition of the citizenship of the settler colonial in some; and residency or stateless position on the others; as ways to eliminate the original identity of the indigenous.

The literature about the logic of elimination of the settler colonial projects stressed mainly displacement, assimilation, and changing the blood quantum through mixed marriages (Wolfe, 2006). The latter method is not used in the case of Israel to keep the purity of the Jewish blood. The first was used intensively, but the second was used selectively to prevent any threats to the Jewish demographic Majority in Israel. The Palestinians in Israel were formally assimilated but in a context that gives them a second-degree status since the state was defined in the Declaration of Independence to be a Jewish and Democratic State giving priority to the Jewishness component. The West Bank and East Jerusalem and Gaza Palestinians were not assimilated due to the demographic fear. Actually, it is that fear that was behind ideas and practices such as the 2005 Israeli evacuation from Gaza, and the ongoing discussion these days to take parts of East Jerusalem out, and also to take the Triangle area out of Israel 1948. The demographic fear was also partly behind the erection of the separation wall that disconnects between West Bank and Israel; the permits system for entry to Israel; the division of the 1967 territories to three separate areas of West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem; the restrictions on the citizenship and residency laws; the facilitation of the travel between the Palestinian territories and Jordan through the so-called 'the open bridges policy'. Economic, security and political means were also used to create a kind of 'silent forcible immigration policy.'

Besides these tools of elimination there is a role also to the 'peace process', presented in the beginning as a way to get rid of the Palestinians by re-annexing parts of West Bank with Jordan through what was called as the 'territorial middle ground compromise' in the 1970s which was a proposal to keep Jerusalem in the hands of Israel, while dividing the West Bank between Israel and Jordan. After the failure of this plan, the Oslo process came to give the authority over the population who are not recognized as Israelis nor was allowed to become called as Palestinians. In the end, the peace process was an additional tool to gain

time for Israel settlement expansion and to create the conditions towards the full elimination of Palestine (see chapter 2).

Thinking that the elimination of Palestine is getting closer to new proposals for the elimination of Palestine were presented in the last years. One of these is about the declaration of a Palestinian state in Gaza with the expansion of it to Sinai (Ben Arie, 2005), and many others for the annexation of all West Bank, or parts of it to Israel, and others for the evacuation of the Palestinians and ideas to compensate them (see Belman proposal and other in chapters two and three). Or ideas to have a population exchange with the Arab World (*Zehut* Party). In other hand others presented different proposals for the assimilation of the Palestinians in Israel by granting the West Bank Palestinians Israeli citizenship, these are as the proposal of Caroline Glick supported by some Israeli officials such as President Reuven Rivlin. In essence here is the 'demographic discourse' of how much the annexation will influence the Jewish majority in Israel as discussed earlier (see chapters two and three).

The settler democracy aimed first and foremost to preserve the demographic balance and directed to keep the ethnic dominance of the Jewish majority and its control over the lands appropriated from the indigenous population. De-democratization of the indigenous population life is the opposite face of settler democracy. Settler democracy passed several stages since 1948. First, it aimed to sustain the new state, to appropriate the rest of the lands of the indigenous population, and to adapt them to the original order. The tools used included laws, such as the Absentees Land Law, elimination of Palestinians by Israeli nationalization to the leftovers, and the prevention of any right to return to those who were obliged to leave. After 1967 the Palestinians were suppressed till 1993 when Israel recognized 'the political rights of the Palestinian people' through Oslo Agreement. What came out from that recognition is a process of transferring the responsibility for the Palestinian people from being Israeli, to become an Israeli joint venture with the Palestinian Authority. At the same time,

most of the land was kept under the Israeli ruling. Inside Israel, it wasn't that much different with the land appropriation continuing as indicated (See chapter 4).

The Key in the Israeli settler democracy in terms of its procedures towards the indigenous Palestinians is that it is 'murderous' as Mann advised. The murder took the shapes of erasing villages and towns and destroying their ruins, leading to different types of displacement inside and outside their country; besides that, the prevention of the emergence of signals of full democracy to all the Demos (inclusive to those who became displaced outside), as an expression of a move towards an independent state. In this regard, the de-democratization process took the shape of 'transitional democracy within an agreed upon jurisdiction' with Israel and its mother country as indicated. In this sense, this formula of de-democratization is an obligatory contractual passage aimed to deter democracy from emerging in one hand and to protect the settler democracy, and the benefits it created on the other side. In the last few years settler democracy as a "murderous" method of the ruling (Mann, 2005), took more rough shapes expressed in extensive settler colonial expansion, and the growing murderous capacity of the settler colonials themselves in preparing and conducting attacks against the Palestinians. The Journalist Nasser Lahham even spoke about the existence of 400,000 pieces of weapons in the hands of the settler colonials by 2018 (Al Lahham, Maan News, 13/12/ 2018).

The 'Settler Colonial State' indeed needs its political structure of decision making for the sake of the settler colonials and in their service taking the shape of settler democracy. This structure is dynamic and far from being static at a certain point. The key for it is the preservation of the settler-colonial project and its capacity to keep growing. For that purpose, the legal system is kept flexible; therefore, the Knesset might issue a law today but change in the future. An example of that would be at the end of the last century when the laws that prohibit the contacts with the PLO were changed to allow for Oslo. In the last

few years and in times of 'demolishing Oslo' opposite laws were issued aiming to expand settler- colonial sites in the West Bank, by legalizing in 2017, for instance, the spontaneous settlement outposts that were built over Palestinian private ownership in West Bank by 'Good intentions.' In other words, settler democracy aims for the preservation of the flow of the settler-colonial project and the removal of the obstacles standing on its way. This is also the reason why the laws are flexible and subject to change, reaching today the point of debating if democratization and secularization, or Jewishness are the best to serve the Settler Colonial State expansion in all over Palestine. In the Israeli Democratic System the Knesset as a legislative body do not play in general the role of controlling the executive, but more the purpose of voting on laws, and at the end adopting those laws that are presented by the government, or its coalition parties (Shulhut, arab48.com,12/2/ 2018).

The other component for the Israeli settler- colonial state is the 'Settler Colonial Political Economy' combined with the Neo-Colonial dominance (see chapter 2). The first is called as 'political economy' rather than just an 'economy' due to the priority of the ideological or political over the economy when doing economic planning that aims to keep the ethnic separation between the masters and the local workers despite running together mixed ethnic farms (Shafir, 2002). It is worthy of indicating that this system was always there including in the periods of raising the slogan of Hebrew Work in the pre-1948 period as Al-Naqib indicated (Al Naqib, 1995), later it continued with the Palestinians inside Israel, then with the Palestinians in the areas of 1967. The second component, however, is about making Palestine as a market to the Israeli goods while restricting the flow of goods from the neighboring countries according to agreements such as the Paris Protocol of 1994 as indicated earlier. It is noticeable that in the case of the Israeli settler colonial state dominance in the 1967 territories, the trilateral method of control (the settler colonial, the Apartheid, and the belligerent occupation) are combined with other three components of control regarding the local population. The first is about the sterilization of the emergence of an

independent economy. The second is about the creation of what will look to be as a 'postcolonial' local authority PA, joining in partial ruling of the population rather than the land, while keeping the domestic market of the indigenous thirdly as an open market to the Israeli goods.

The third component for the settler colonial state is what might be called in this chapter (based on the analysis in the previous chapters) as the 'Social Settler Colonial Structure'; which is a continuation to what Hammad called as the "settler migration" (Hammad, 1984, 20). This type of migration is different than the other types of immigration: The temporary, the obligatory, and the reverse migrations. Since the main characteristic of the settler migration is to come and claim the new land as theirs, the result will be that a cohesive ethnic group will emerge with a minor contradiction along the class line (Hammad, 1984, 87). Till today all the Israeli Jews agree (except few individuals) on the legitimacy of the Zionist project within the 1948 borders. They also see the policies towards the Palestinians there to be mere as 'discrimination' that should be improved by steps towards equalizing, and they reject the return of more than a minor number of Palestinian refugees to inside Israel. After 1967 a split took place inside this cohesive position, but this split was about what is better for the settler colonial project future. Some argued that the expansion of the settler-colonial project in 1967 proper would not affect the demographic balance which is for the Jewish side, and others argued that the best to keep the Jewish majority is by making a territorial compromise and accept the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state under the Israeli control. The second position inspired the peace process, which failed because it was not an honest endeavor as shown. Due to the other social characteristic of the social structure of the increase of right-wing settler politics (Hammad, 1984, 87), the second position is deteriorating leaving the place for those right-wingers who aim to promote expansion.

Both the 'settler-colonial political economy' and the 'settler colonial social structure' are guided by the dominance of the ideological/ political (Hammad, 1984, 88). The contradictions inside the settler colonial state are those related to the 'best ways to keep the Jewish majority,' which is a political issue par excellence. As Yiftachel also added, some of the main characteristics of the settler- colonial society are the declaration of the system to be as democratic while it is ethnic and against the indigenous people. The frontiers of the state and the demos are not clear. Therefore the difference between the 'Israelis and the 'world Jewry' are not defined. The social and the economic spaces are organized along with long-term ethnic lining ups; and the religion is linked strongly with nationalism and politicized (Yiftachel, 2012a, 25-26). Finally, after 1967 this social structure was stretched to the areas occupied after that date, while the indigenous population was left behind as either second-degree citizens or as 'residents' classified in different categories as in the case of East Jerusalem, West Bank, and Gaza.

How to de-colonize in such settler colonial situation? So far, the colonization became part of history worldwide since it was defeated by the struggle of the national liberation movements. In the case of decolonization of the settler projects, three cases are already known as discussed (see chapters 1 and 3). In the first, the settler colonial project was sustained instead of decolonized by the indigenous population as in the cases of the USA, Canada, and others. In the other power-sharing agreement was achieved as in the cases of Northern Ireland and South Africa. The third case is when the settler colonial project was defeated, and the settlers were evacuated back to their countries as in the instances of the Crusaders in the past, and Algeria and Zimbabwe in the recent history. Different South Africa in which the settler colonial regime was transformed through a political agreement, the last three witnessed armed struggles, also in the case of the Crusaders the liberation of Palestine came from outside, being at that time a part of the Arab Islamic Entity and not a single unit by itself.

The agency of the Palestinians is about responding and retaliating to the agency of the Zionist colonial settlers; will this agency succeed and achieve the Palestinian independence including the evacuation of the colonial settlers? A comparison with the case where the colonial settlers have been evacuated which is Algeria is worthy of alluding to briefly here. In the case of Algeria, the agency of the Algerians was able to end and evacuate the settler- colonial project there which consisted of 894000 foreign colonial settlers mainly French and others. For this Agency to succeed doing so in 1962, it was assisted by local, regional, and international factors. In the local Algerian level, although France considered Algeria as part of France; and some Algerians acted as French including fighting against their people, but at same time the settler colonial project wasn't able to stretch over all the huge size of Algerian which is a little bit less than two million square kilometers, or to create a population majority in Algeria among 8360000 Algerians by 1954. Finally, at this point, Algeria was far away from France, and it was difficult to rule it from abroad. In the regional level, the Arab support to Algeria mainly from Nasser Regime in Egypt was helpful, combined in the international level of the fact that the 1940s to the 1960s was the period of self-determination and independence of many countries in Asia and Africa. Finally, in this case a split took place between the French Government and the Colonial settlers when Charles De Gaul decided to withdraw the French forces and to evacuate the colonial settlers from Algeria, the settlers responded by establishing 'the Secret Army Organization' who initiated attacks against the Algerians leading to the killing of thousands of them, but at the end the colonial settlers were obliged to leave (Soviet scholars, 1976). In the case of Palestinian occupied territories after 1967, they have on the contrary a small space, and they are adjacent to Israel; the colonial settlers are so far united with each other despite secondary contradictions; their position is also united with the position of their government who is supporting them by all means; the Zionist settler-colonial project in Palestine was promoted by international resolutions contrary to the one of France in Algeria and others.

The Agency of the Zionist colonial settlers in post-1967 period can be then perceived in the context of their being part of the fabric of the Israeli society, its ideology/ies, political parties, and its political system. Unlike the French settlers in Algeria (who was part of the colonial settlers in Algeria and not all of them), they had lobby groups in France, but these failed at the end to create a process of integration between their process and the French State process, therefore at the end they were evacuated. On the contrary the Israeli settler-colonial project in the post-1967 territories started by the state of Israel which is also, and unlike France a state that was created through a settler- colonial project. The colonial settlers also assisted the state mainly *Gush Emunim* as mentioned. As the Zionist settler-colonial project found its settlers democracy separately from the indigenous population in the pre-1948 period the *Havaad Haleumi*); National Committee, which was periodically elected by the colonial settlers, and mandated to discuss and find ways for the development of the *Yishuv* through taking over the Palestinian land, building over it, and bring more Jewish immigrants from abroad in cooperation with the WZO. The same process took place after 1967 by the creation of a democratic settler colonial administrative system that is part of the Israeli one. This system included the Yesha Council as an umbrella organization of all the councils, and then: *Shomron* Council of North West Bank, *Binyamin* Council in the Middle of West Bank, *Gush Etzion* Council in the middle of the road between Jerusalem and Hebron, Har Hebron in the South West Bank, *Megilot* Council in the Jordan Valley, And *Metah Yehuda* Regional Council for Jerusalem. In 2005 the *Hof* Gaza Council was dissolved after the withdrawal from Gaza. Each of these councils has its website that includes its plans and activities as well. Separate from these councils' structures, other ongoing ones continued historically for the Palestinians taking the shape of municipal elections, and later the elections of the Palestinian Authority were added since 1996. Therefore as the case in the pre-1948 period, settler colonials come, create their settlers democratic structures, and through them plan to take over the lands of the indigenous population, and to build a

new society on their expense; this is the reason why Michael Mann called these settler democracies as murderous ones, and that this aspect of murder becomes more cruel dependent on the level of democracy that it has in its relations with the colonial settlers that these settler democracies represent (see earlier). In the post-1967 these settler democracies among the settlers were a little bit different, here the settler's councils became part of the municipal councils all around Israel. Also, the colonial settlers themselves joined the Israeli political parties, in addition to the fact that the political parties also created the colonial settlements and the government that represent them, this represents once again a state-run settler colonial project. The settler colonial democratic structure for the colonial settlers aimed then to take over the Palestinian lands, and to expand the colonial settlements, and to create a new society in their expense, and the expense of the Palestinian elected Councils by the Palestinians.

The above explains the aim of the settler-colonial project to replace the native population. They also use tools to make them able to start the process of indigenizing themselves in the new territory. These tools include renaming the places, taking the street signs of the Palestinian villages and sites, creating new network of streets and linking them with Israel, create municipal council, appropriate the landscape and create new scenes, and other tools in the ground that also help to put the native Palestinians in order, and to create their gradual adaptation with the new situation. The other means to coerce the Palestinians to adapt to the unique facts on the ground include the prevention of the Palestinians to cultivate their lands, appropriating their crops and water resources, and punish them whenever they practice the becoming so-called "Agricultural Terrorism" (Salem, 2018) by putting the colonial settlers' lands on fire. In the other hand the settlement- colonial economy proved work to poor Palestinian workers as earlier indicated, also the majority it created in area C, and East Jerusalem already is making it difficult for the Palestinians to confront, and finally the colonial settlements are fully protected by walls, pipe wires, and

internal security guards system, in addition to the security provided by the Army from outside each colonial settlement, and the prevention of the Palestinians to build close to them.

The agency of the colonial settlers and its influence in the ground is combined with their agency inside Israel and also worldwide. Their Agency in the field with the support of the Israeli Government, the WZO, the Jewish Philanthropists, and the Evangelical groups worldwide, and the United States Government made them reach a position of increasing by 3.9 percent by 2016 (15765 new population) (Dilmoni, Haaretz, 13/3/ 2017). If the numbers of the colonial settlers by the end of that year was 614.500 according to the Peace Now Calculations, then the natural population growth of them will bring them up to around one million in twenty years, that is in addition to the fact that they represent as mentioned the majority of the population in East Jerusalem, and area C. Inside Israel, the colonial settlers are part of the Israeli political system. During the 1970s Gush Emunim conducted a Campaign inside the Israeli society aiming to convince the Israeli society of the mission of settling. Later on the colonial settlers increased their infiltration in the Israeli Army reaching the percentage of 25 percent in the Infantry Brigades; this increase prevented a split from happening in the Israeli Army as happened with the French one in Algeria as mentioned above; also it put the Army in a position of serving and defending the colonial settlers (Haklai, 2015, 35-36). Haklai added their influence in the political arena which includes their strength in the Likud, the Jewish National Home Party, and others including the former Hat'hiya; Moledet and the National Religious Party including others. The last-mentioned Party withdrew its support to Prime Minister Ehud Barak under the pressure of the colonial settlers inside it, leading to the collapse of his Government in 2000. In 2013 the former Secretary General of *Amana* (The colonial settlement organization of *Gush Emunim*) became the Minister of Housing in Israel, and he called for the expansion of the borders of Israel till the Jordan Valley (Haklai and Loizides, 2015, 36-37). Later the former head of Yesha Council Naftali Bennett became the head of the

Jewish Home Party and the Minister of Education. The becoming Former Minister of Justice Ayelet Shaked and the Former Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman after the Israeli April 2019 Knesset elections are also living in the colonial settlement.

The work of the colonial settlers inside Israel is an integral part of its *modus operandi*, and it takes the shape of both Parliamentary and societal actions; this work is far from being just a 'lobby work' from an outside group. Also, they conduct public relations campaigns inside Israeli society and abroad. Internationally the agency of the colonial settlers went already beyond public relations campaigns, mainly in their relations with the United States. By 2015 there were 60000 colonial settlers of American origins in the West Bank Colonial settlements without East Jerusalem representing almost 15 percent of the colonial settlers which make the United States as a partner in the colonial settlement project in the ground (Hirschhorn, 2015); this issue combined with the growing influence of the Evangelicals inside the United States, led the current American Government to recognize the colonial settlers officially and therefore meet with them regularly and invite them to the American official events.

Will the colonial settlers leave? The example of what happened in Algeria does not look like to be possible to be repeated here for the reasons mentioned above, in the other hand the Telegraph report indicated the following percentages in response to the question of why the colonial settlers moved to live in the post-1967 occupied territories: 30.2 percent said that they moved there due to the Quality of life issues, and 30 percent the *Haredim*: the religious-Orthodox Jews, said that they wanted to create a *Haredi* way of life, 28.1 percent said that they moved for ideological reasons, and finally 11.7 percent moved for a combination of ideological and quality of life reasons. The last two categories include the ideological of 39.8 percent who have spiritual and cultural attachments to the land (Telegraph report), so it will be difficult for them to leave.

Also, there are the *Haredim* who created a new way of life which will be difficult for them to leave it. Therefore, in the best-case scenario it seems that only one third of the colonial settlers will leave in case of a government evacuation order which does not look to be likely, especially with the current Israeli government structure, also reaching the threshold as defined by Ian Lustick (Lustick, 1993) with two signals at hand: The issuance of the Nation-State Law last July which considered the land of West Bank and East Jerusalem to be also Israel as analyzed earlier, and the agreement with the United States Administration to move the issues of Jerusalem and refugees out of the negotiation table.

In regard to the Decolonization of Palestine, the Arab wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973 ended with the liberation of Sinai of Egypt in 1978 through a political agreement, while the struggle for Palestine was left to the PLO since 1974 when the Arab Summit of Algeria recognized it at that year as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people". So far, the PLO performed in three models for decolonization: one was the armed struggle starting from the 1960s, and the second was the non-violence beginning from the first Intifada of 1987, followed by the negotiations starting in Oslo 1993. The Armed Struggle brought the PLO international recognition and a position as a monitor in the UN since 1974. The Intifada brought an Israeli recognition of the PLO and brought the PLO back to the Geography of Palestine. But what followed that recognition were an Israeli continuation of settler colonialism, and the use of negotiations as a public relation play to hide the settlement expansion. In other words, the PLO planned for a Palestinian State but ended by performing within the framework of a creeping Israeli one-state solution in progress.

Besides the PLO strategy, the Palestinian non-state actors practiced another one called the BDS: Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions. Following the South African Model, this strategy aimed to internationalize the boycotting Israel, withdrawing investments from it, and impose sanctions on it (Al Barghouti, 2012). The campaign was able to make achievements in the civil society and

companies' level in the West (www.bdsmovement.net). The work of BDS was restricted by the fact of the strong official support of Israel worldwide, leading to different laws to prohibit its practice in the West and the United States. These restrictions also echoed the Israeli political campaign against BDS (www.bdsmovement.net).

The Palestinian Authority complemented the work of BDS in internationalization by using both political and diplomatic, and legal means to push towards decolonization. The PA activities included presenting draft resolutions in the UN, joining UN organizations, suing Israel in the international courts, and seek the world states recognition of Palestine (Erekat, 2012). But in both experiences, the "top-down" internationalization does not look to be enough unless it will be combined by bottom-up internationalization by bringing the international community to work with the Palestinians in the ground to create economic and developmental facts in the grounds especially in area C, and East Jerusalem as indicated in chapter 4. Besides that, it might be a must to develop a kind of field creative non-violent activities by creating new villages through voluntary and nonviolent struggle and keep rebuilding them after each demolition by the Israeli settler colonials. Seeking the global participation of the world solidarity movements in such undertakings will be of significance as well (Salem, July 2018). Finally, the development of these tools might create new debates inside Israel itself that might also assist in decolonization by transforming the internal Israeli discourse from annexation to separation (see chapter 4).

The role of different actors regionally and globally might also be activated as a result of the described non-violent campaign, and also due to other factors to emerge in the region. In this regard any possible deterioration to war between Israel and Iran or Hizbullah might create a change; the prospected normalization between Israel and some Arab States in the region especially with the Gulf countries might have a counter effect especially if it will include an alliance against Iran. The future of the Salafi Jihad groups might also create a change,

and finally, concerning the Arab World, any change of any of the regimes might lead to the re-emergence of a regional war with Israel.

For Israel, the threats that come from outside are considered being the most dangerous for Israel, and that is why Prime Minister Netanyahu was worried about the fate of the Jewish Hasmonean old kingdom that lived for seventy years as indicated earlier. In another hand, the threats coming from the Palestinian side were always considered to be marginal. Except for Hamas that can make a headache to Israel for now while it is under siege in Gaza, but still can initiate attacks against Israel in the West Bank being a non-state actor and not a ruling party here. In the other hand the harsh hand of the Palestinian Authority in West Bank together with Israel make it difficult for Hamas to create a full and continuous armed struggle campaign here. For Israel it is then easier to continue in annexing West Bank as a de facto, or as a de jure; fully or gradually. The Israeli planning of this process went smoothly from zero colonial settlers in 1967 to 614,500 settlers by the end of 2016. Accordingly, the 'New Israel' of today composed of a coalition of seculars and religious (Abdel Fattah, 14/12/ 2018) feels that the way is open for normalization with the Arab World without solving the Israeli Palestinian conflict Also this government is escalating in colonial settlement expansion, and in the attempts to take over *Al Aqsa* Mosque which might trigger different repercussions regionally and internationally.

Accordingly, these Israeli acts might play the role of destabilizing the region. To add to them also the possibility of transferring the Palestinians of West Bank to Gaza, or Jordan as a result of the growth dynamics of the settler-colonial project; or by war/s that it initiates against the neighboring countries such as Lebanon, and the regional countries such as Iran. The emerging destabilization might lead to a process of liberation from outside as happened with Salah Eddin experience with the Crusaders when he came from Egypt with an Army that defeated the Crusaders in Hittin Battle in 1187 and liberated Palestine from their

ruling. Such an option was discussed in this study (see the introduction and chapters 3 and 4), and it would have been avoided if Israel accepted the peace proposals to share the land with its Palestinian neighbors.

It is also worthy to notice the international community strategy for decolonization; especially in the period after Oslo 1993 agreement. This strategy was based after Oslo on the assumption that Palestine moved to a new stage of Post- Conflict and State building (Hanafi and Tabar, 2006). Along this line of thinking the American and the European funding went to the state building while the supporting projects that aim for confronting the settlement expansion by creating Palestinian facts in the ground in area C and East Jerusalem got less attention. Besides that, funding to Gaza was stopped or minimized after Hamas took over the authority there in 2007. In the last years, the United States seems to lose the interest in supporting the concept of the state building; the justification used is that the peace process took a long period since Oslo 1993 without bringing out the result of two State solutions. However, the American steps of moving their Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 6th of December 2017, stopping the funding to the UNRWA, and the Palestinian hospitals in East Jerusalem; followed by terminating the funding to the Palestinian Authority, and supporting the expansion of the colonial settlements. All signal to a change in the American policies to satisfy the messianic supporters of President Donald Trump in the United States as indicated earlier (see chapter 3). As a mother country to the Israeli settler-colonial project, the United States seems to move to support that project dominance over the whole of Palestine. This is a counter step to Decolonization.

However, among the other countries of the world, there is a significant majority of 139 states who voted in 2012 in favor of the establishment of a Palestinian state beside Israel along the 1967 borders (Erekat, 2012). These States included are the Arab and the Islamic Countries, most of the African and Latin America countries, and also big countries like Russia, China, and India, while

many European countries abstained, and few voted against including the United States and Israel. The question for a Palestinian Decolonization strategy raised by Erekat (Erekat, 2012) is how to transform such a significant majority to a concrete and cohesive support to Palestine diplomatically as Erekat proposed by establishing a political coalition of them (Erekat, 2012), but further their practical support to Palestine in the ground might be required as well, characterized of Building in area C and East Jerusalem despite the Israeli restrictions; creating the continuity between West Bank and Gaza and rebuilding the latter after the damage resulted from the three Israeli wars on Gaza of 2008, 2012, and 2014, and last but not least create the conditions conducive to the return of the Palestinian refugees from outside.

The two states solution was the proposal that the 2012 UN vote was about. It was a proposal to create the State of Palestine on 22 percent of Palestine on the 1967 border while recognizing Israel in the rest of 78 percent. This was the compromise representing significant Palestinian concessions in regard for example to the UN resolutions 181 of 1947, and 194 of 1948 conditions on Israel to return to the 1947 resolution borders giving it only a little bit more than 50 Percent of Palestine and asking it to bring the Palestinian refugees back home. The first condition was bypassed since the Palestinians accepted Israel on the 1948 borders, while the issue of the Palestinian refugees became one of the negotiations items rather than being an obligation that Israel is supposed to fulfill.

In conclusion of this short review of the issue of Decolonization; first, the South African Solution does not look to be possible from Palestine unless conditions emerge in Israel that will support a one-state model over the all historical land of Palestine based on equal rights of all citizens. The Ireland model will not also fit unless Israel will recognize the individual and the collective equal rights of the Palestinians inside its 1948 borders, and recognize a separate Palestinian State in the 1967 territories. In other words, the Irish model will require the

establishment of two states that each is for its citizens (still Israel can use the Northern Ireland Arrangements temporarily in the post-1967 occupied territories: See section two in this regard). The models of possible citizenships inside the Palestinian state will be described below. What left still is the American model, in which Genocide was the primary method of elimination, while the Zionist/Israeli model used demographic elimination? The demographic elimination is to be perceived as an elimination of the people and their place, space, territory, and landscape as well, and not merely external and internal displacement. In contrary to South Africa and Ireland where the elimination of the indigenous populations was limited to the ignorance of their rights of self-determination, and the prevention of any independent political representation of them; the American and the Zionist / Israeli elimination was by massacring and evacuating. But the difference between the last two cases is about the role of the national in conjunction with the pan Arab and Islamic nations. This characteristic wasn't there in the American case, but it is valid for Palestine. The Arab armies of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt fought for Palestine in 1948, and most of these countries received Palestinian refugees in the same year (and in 1967 for Jordan as well). Besides that, Palestine was part of the Islamic Ottoman Empire until it was first occupied by the British Mandate that year. Further than that Palestine include Jerusalem as a holy place for all the three monotheistic religions and the first *Qibla* in Islam, and it also consists of the Christian sacred sites in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which make it even a significant place for the Christians worldwide as well.

Contrary to all the cases of settler colonialism, Palestine is an international relations case that is why the approaches for the Palestinian Decolonization ranged between internationalization and regionalization. The key for the first approach is that Israel was created by the vast world powers of Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union for a certain degree, and then later it received admission in the UN based on the international resolution 273 of 1949. Therefore, the proponents of this approach say, as an international well

established Israel; it can be brought by the international community to the acceptance of the grounds of the international law as the basis for the solution. This approach is not new, but consisted of the Palestinian leadership of the pre-1948 period, while it is fully adopted now by President Mahmoud Abbas (see Saeb Erekat booklets from 2010 to 2018).

The second approach is about either Arabization or Islamization. The first is adopted by the same group who call for Internationalization. Their point of departure is that we the Palestinians will take our responsibility to get decolonized, but to do so an Arab and international political support are required; this is Fateh Organization position. The second want to have the Islamic solution as the point of departure, therefore they either seek an Islamic support for a Palestinian strategy of Jihad for Palestine (The Islamic Jihad), or tries to get the Islamic nation to wake up by the Palestinian actions of resistance (Hamas), or wait for the Islamic nation to liberate Palestine from outside, Hizbu Al Tahrir (Al Barghouti, 2012; Salem in Hoiglit et al 2015). As an international relations issue, it is worthy to notice here that the international is embedded in the domestic. Therefore the international/ Islamic/ and Arab approaches became the internal positions of Fateh, Hamas, and the other factions inside Palestine itself. Korany called such a case as an “Intermestics” case in which the domestic overlaps with the international, and the latter became embedded in the former (Korany, 2013).

Along with the previous explanation, the complexity of the case of Palestine is now apparent. The Peoples get hurt from this project stretch all around the region, The Arab or the Islamic dependent on which ideology one count it.

The fact that the direct harm by the Zionist / Israeli settler colonial project goes to Palestine and beyond is combined with another one which is the ‘ongoing *Nakba*’ for the Palestinians, and the ongoing tension and the constant threats of war regionally. This ‘ongoing’ characteristic gives logic to the thinking that the

Zionist settler-colonial project will pay the price of its strong position with the indigenous population. Contrary to the United States where the settler- colonial project was able to annihilate most of the indigenous people and win. The Israeli project is still in the settler colonial state stage, ready always to attack and expand. This is being the case make it also logical to think that this project might be in the shape of progressing and winning in the short run while this will not be the case in the long term, due to the vital role of the region and the existential threats that it will create to Israel. In the case of the United States the settler- colonial project won, and got sustained while in the case of Israel, it is still early to conclude that the project succeeded; on the contrary it is still in progress, and it might face the fate of collapse due mainly to liberation from outside if it continues its uncompromising attitude.

5.2 Exclusion and Inclusion Politics of the Zionist/ Israeli Settler Colonial Project

Section one above was a summary of the study and the possibilities for re-inclusion through Decolonization (As opposed to the exclusive nature of the settler colonial projects) of the people in the territory according to the experiences and the results of the four settler- colonial projects analyzed in this study. Yet other part of the research in the previous chapters was about the different components of inclusion and exclusion related to who is eligible to exist as human being in one hand and as a people and in nation in the other hand, in addition to who counts within the citizenship politics of the settler colonial projects especially the Israeli one.

As analyzed in chapter 2, in the pre-1948 period, the Zionist Movement Strategy was built on the Balfour Declaration that considered Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people. Common between the Zionist Movement and the British Mandate was the consideration of the non-Jews in Palestine as communities eligible to civil and religious rights while the national rights were

limited to the Jews. This common point relates to the fact that Palestine was selected to a 'de-nationalization' process by the British, which meant that its Palestinianization was suspended, and in return, its Judaization started. This was a kind of social engineering conducted in a period when the Empires were allowing themselves to divide the world the way they wish, or meets with their interests.

At that time the leading Zionist organization, the Jewish Agency, was appointed by the Mandate Terms of Reference of 1922 as the partner to the British to help facilitate the establishment of the national home for Jews in Palestine. The Zionists understood the term The National Home as a state that was inclusive to the Transjordan till 1922 when the British decided to take Jordan out and prevented the Zionists from building colonial settlements there. Citizenship wise the British politics at that time aimed to establish a Jewish Homeland but convince at the same time the Palestinians to accept it, and to live under the Jewish ruling. These British politics looked for the impossible, due to their position of appropriating the whole of Palestine, and allocating it to the Zionist Movement. This was the leading British contribution to the elimination process in Palestine by depriving its people of having their right to decide on their political and national aspirations freely.

The Zionist movement went further, by creating its settler democracy system inside the Colonial Jewish settlements while abiding from joining the joint Palestinian-Jewish bodies that the British advocated. The First was by the creation of *Vaad Leumi*; the National Committee, through periodic elections. The Committee tasks as it can be imagined included all those related to the elevation of the Jewish presence in Palestine by organizing Jewish emigration, buying lands, expanding the settler- colonial projects, and running the economy. Concerning the indigenous population, the contacts with them were conducted along ethnic lines to be kept strict even when they will be hired in the Jewish Farms as indicated. In the political level, the Zionist left-wingers such as Martin

Buber and Judah Magnes made proposals for a bi-national state to be built based on equality in representation between the Palestinians and the Jews; and that even though the number of the Jews were far behind the amount of the Palestinians. In the 1920s Buber and Magnes created *Brith Shalom*: Peace Covenant, and the 1940s they established *Ehud* to advocate for such ideas (Kaufman, and Salem, 2006, 18). The British at their side suggested the establishment of different advisory or legislative councils during their 30 years ruling of Palestine as indicated. Part of these Councils was supposed to be elected, and region to be appointed by the British Commissioner, besides that the suggested representation was made along religious line, and accordingly percentages were given to each of Muslim, Christian, and Jewish religions; which mean that there was no British recognition of the Palestinianship of land. Finally, the proposals gave the British High Commissioner the right to approve the Council decisions and to prevent any deviations from the implementation of the Balfour Declaration.

The British policy at that time can be summarized citizenship-wise, as a one that assisted in building the settler democracy of the Zionist Movement, and in promoting the establishment of the Jewish Homeland in cooperation with the Jewish Agency. This means that Britain recognized the Jewish people as a political entity eligible for the creation of a 'national home,' while the others were identified as either Muslims or Christians, but not as Palestinians. In this sense, two processes were created: One democratic and for building citizenship for the Jews only, the settler democracy. The second was a process of de-democratization for the Palestinians by considering them eligible only for civil and religious rights as Muslims and Christians and to prepare them for the preservation of the same status in the coming Jewish State, without being eligible to political rights related to their right of self-determination in an independent Palestinian state. The Study called this process to be a one-off full exclusion; a one that is about who is eligible to exist (see chapter three).

After the 1948 war, and the massive expulsion that took place during and after it, Israel was established, and its politics towards the citizenship of the Leftovers from the Palestinians inside it was decided. As said above at that time Israel granted its citizenry to the Leftovers but kept them under a military role till 1966. The citizenship allowed meant eliminating their national identity as Palestinians, but at the same time Israel as a Jewish State as defined in its Declaration of independence, restricted their right to individual ones, without giving them any collective rights to express themselves. Therefore, they were not allowed to have their autonomy for instance. The State defined itself as both Jewish and democratic, while the priority was given to the Jewishness side.

Moreover, the state continued to consider them as ineligible to land ownership. Therefore, their lands were subject to confiscation through different laws. The thesis called this situation continued until today to be an 'internal colonization' characterized by the colonization of lands of the state "citizens." In one hand they were granted political representation rights including voting and running in the elections, but these rights were not combined with a process to equal rights, and by all means the state continued to deal with them as internal enemies and continued its settler-colonial project towards them by confiscating, uprooting and displacing and replacing, as it is the case of the Naqab till today. The study called this stage of citizenship politics to be the stage of a mix between the politics of full exclusion and those of partial inclusion. The partial inclusion is to be provided in the surface of the political rights and therefore playing the role of a camouflage. As such the rights related to those political rights can be widened and narrowed according to three components. One relates to the level of the relation between the state and the Palestinian people in general. The second relates to the changing nature of the government/s and their changing political lines, and the third relates to the communicative process between the state and its Palestinian citizens (see chapter 2 and 4). The post-1967 politics will play a role in intensifying these three variables as will be shown below.

In 1967 Israel stretched itself to the whole of Palestine. In the newly occupied territory, building colonial settlements started right away. The Labor Party Governments till 1977 annexed East Jerusalem to Israel; and started growing in the Places considered holy for the Jews such as Hebron. In addition to the building in the areas that were considered as necessary from security perspective such as the Jordan Valley and in the borders between Gaza and Israel. Citizenship wise this process of expansion was combined with two steps: The first of considering the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "Areas Administered by Israel" instead of being Palestinian. The second is by disconnecting between the land and the population by denying the link between the Palestinians and their land. Large portions of land were considered as a State land by military decisions as earlier indicated in chapter four, and the government started leasing these lands to the colonial settlers. The other result was by giving different categorizations to the Palestinian 'population', therefore the East Jerusalem Palestinians were considered as Jordanian citizens residing in Israel; the West Bank Palestinians were considered as Jordanian citizens living in areas administered by Israel; and the Gazans were considered as Stateless living in areas administered by Israel as indicated in chapter four. The conclusion citizenship wise was: The uprooting of the Palestinians and the deterritorialization of them and therefore denying the connection between them and their country, and secondly fragmenting them to different categories based on the non-recognition to their Palestinianship. In the opposite colonial settlers were given the right to claim the country and to replace the Palestinians, becoming as such the locals of it. Under these policies, the government cooperated with the non-state actors of *Gush Emunim* Movement to build on the mentioned areas considered strategically or religiously significant to Jews. The other areas were kept for bargaining with Jordan about a territorial compromise.

The Labor Governments policies prepared the ground for the Likud Party that followed after 1977. The Likud first considered all Palestine to be as the Whole Land of Israel. Therefore their colonial settlement strategy bypassed the concept

of security and religious importance and started building everywhere including the new intensive urban construction. The Likud continued using the same citizenship categorizations of the former Labor Party Governments. Concerning the Political Solution, the Likud was not in a position to offer any political compromise, instead, they completed the internal uprooting process by considering that the Palestinian citizens have no political rights what so ever in the Whole Land of Israel as it was thought. Accordingly, Jordan was invited to join Israel in a "functional distribution" of tasks in which Israel will keep the security tasks in its hands, while Jordan will be in charge of the civil affairs of the 'population'.

What was tried with Jordan, succeeded later with PLO? Through Oslo 1993 Agreement, the PLO accepted to take the responsibility of running the population civil affairs with a promise to get gradually distant lands till an agreement on the permanent status is achieved by 1999 as it was scheduled. The PLO created what looked like a 'postcolonial entity' which looked as camouflage while the grab of the land continued in the ground by the occupiers and the settler colonials.

Some changes took place regarding citizenship in this period. For the West Bank Palestinians, they became recognized as Palestinian residents living in areas under dispute. The Gaza people were recognized as Palestinian residents living under the Palestinian Authority. While the status of the Jerusalemites kept as it is, despite the minor change of allowing few thousands of them to vote for the Palestinian elections inside Jerusalem by using envelopes that do not include any Palestinian signs, this was a case in which a process of de-democratization was created for the Palestinians in which the majority of the Palestinian refugees were excluded as well as the Palestinian Jerusalemites faced restrictions when voting.

At the same time, the separation between the Palestinians and their lands continued in two ways: The first is by confiscating, and the second by being eligible to confiscation at any time. The first is made according to military orders, or by creating settlements outposts over the Palestinian private land. The cooperation between the state and the non-state actors are evident here. The Government release military orders and the colonial settlers' organizations take over private Palestinian land and establish their outposts, which will be legalized later by the Government.

When Netanyahu first government of 1996 signed Wye River Agreement with the Palestinian Authority in 1998, it was Ariel Sharon the Minister of Housing by then who incited the colonial settlers asking them to appropriate the top hills of West Bank and to establish new settlements outposts over them. Later it was the third Netanyahu Government that legalized these outposts in 2017. Citizenship wise these developments mean that Palestinians became either uprooted in their country or the 'waiting list' for eradicating to outside their country. Noticeable here that the second category is not new, but was intensified in the last few years due to the fact of that the Palestinian private ownership became under the threat of accelerated process of appropriation; especially after the 2017 resolution by the Israeli High Court allowing the appropriation of those lands(www.jewishpress.com, 15/11/ 2017).

The other new development that was intensified in the last few years is the legalizing of the settler colonials as local inhabitants in the post-1967 territories as shown in chapter four this process of localization started by the 1970s, when the Israeli laws were stretched to include the settlers who are considered as Israeli citizens living outside the country international recognized borders. According to B'tselem Human Rights organization, the local councils in the Israeli colonial settlements in West Bank are the same as those in Israel, and they follow the same system; besides that the colonial settlements were given a national priority as development areas eligible to get loans for housing; cheap

rent costs; incentives to education; grants to investors and social workers, and taxes reduction (www.btselem.org). The mentioned High Court resolution in the previous paragraph recognized the settler colonials as local inhabitants as well, as such they were given the right to develop their settler democracy structures that plan for colonial settlements expansion, and act as one Agency to lobby the government in regard to that expansion in one hand, and in relation to the future fate of the West Bank in the other side.

By the end of 2016, the West Bank was resided by 614,500 settler colonials who are considered both as Local inhabitants, but also as Israeli citizens. The majority of these prefer citizenship in Israel rather than splitting from it. In the same time there is a minority among them belonging to extreme right-wing organizations such as Lehava, Tamarrud, Price Tag and Hill Top Youths, The Temple Mount and Eretz Yisrael Faithful Movement), who seek to establish a Torah- based separate state from Israel (Muhareb, 2016; Aldrovandi, 2014). These kinds of groups failed to prevent the evacuation of Yamit after the Agreement with Egypt. Also, they were unable to stop the evacuation of the colonial settlements from Gaza in 2005. Earlier it was said that Gaza was evacuated in the framework of the re-organization of the settler-colonial project, to ensure the Jewish majority in Jerusalem and inside Israel. Today Israelis not anymore under that pressure to evacuate the colonial settlements from West Bank because there is no demographic problem, but instead, the colonial settlers are growing today by 3.9 percent per year based on natural growth, and without adding any emigrating settler to them. This means that in 20 years or less there will be one million colonial settlers in the West Bank. Along with these developments the voices are growing these days in Israel to move from the current de facto annexation to a de jure one soon as indicated (See chapters 2 and 4).

Under the Israeli system of control in West Bank a new unique situation emerged. This situation is characterized by the existence of a growing number

of Israeli settler colonials living as local inhabitants outside the internationally recognized borders of Israel. These are facing 4.8 Million of Palestinians by the end of 2018. The Palestinians are six times more than the settler colonials, but at the same time, the colonial settlers have three privileges over the Palestinians: First, they are the majority of the population in area C and East Jerusalem consisting of two-thirds of West Bank space. Second: They increase annually by 3.9 percent versus 2.9 percent for the Palestinians. Third: They have the full support of the State of Israel financially, legally, and also the help of the Israeli Army. In the other hand, the Palestinians have their steadfastness and their rejection to flee their country like what happened in 1948; their ability to continue struggling; they have a majority of them who live outside as refugees and Displaced Persons, and finally, they have their considerable expertise and knowledge about the Israeli society.

What might emerge from this situation? The signs emerging tell about a growing number of attacks by the settler colonials against the Palestinians. For example, December 2018 witnessed the recruitment of the settler colonials besides their government in attacking the Palestinians, including the closure of the streets between the cities and throwing stones on the Palestinian cars. The question if this situation leads to a full confrontation between the two communities can be left open for now. But what yet needs to be answered is if a Northern Ireland situation was created solely to West Bank and East Jerusalem? The similarities include the fact that the colonial settlers are behaving as the land is theirs and part of Eretz Israel as they call it; also, the Protestants in Northern Ireland were supported by Britain as their mother country, like the settler colonials in West Bank and East Jerusalem supported by Israel as their mother country as well. At the same time, there are differences: The British willingness to annex Northern Ireland to it is a history story, while it is for Israel a future story. Britain was a colonial and settler colonial empire of the past, while Israel is a settler- colonial project that is still in the making. This means that the state of Israel and the settler colonials are in one camp looking for the annexation of West Bank while

creating all kinds of events that will oblige the Palestinians to leave as happened in 1948. As at that case of 1948, the Palestinian left and then they were blamed for their departure by Zionism. It is difficult for now to predict if such a scenario will take place once again.

Till then what are certain looks to be that the current Apartheid practices in the West Bank are merely provisional practices till the full confrontation between the settler colonials supported by Army, and the indigenous population emerges? Till then also the Palestinians of West Bank will not be able to enjoy their citizenship in their country, and the Zionist practices with them in this regard will continue to be of a full exclusion like it was in the early days of Zionism. What will be the case with the Palestinians inside Israel who continue to be under internal colonialism? As indicated Pappe suggested that they are not far from another public expulsion after the circle is closed around the democratic part of Zionism for the sake of its Jewishness (Pappe, 2006). The latter is fundamentalist, sealed and with no place for the 'gentiles' inside it.

This was a full circle verification of this thesis hypothesis. As shown the Zionist/Israeli settler colonial project uniqueness in comparison with other projects from the same kind is that it was based mainly on the demographic elimination as the primary tool inclusive to the full erasure of the place, space, territory, and the landscape. The study also tried to verify if this experience will be repeated and by what means in the 1967 territories.

As shown in the study the entire settler colonial projects as 'structures more than an event' (Wolfe, 2006), all need to create a settler-colonial majority to succeed (Veracini, 2010, and 2011). The settler colonial project failed in South Africa due to its inability to create this demographic majority, while the creation of such a majority was guaranteed in Northern Ireland by separating its six Counties from the Republic of Ireland in 1921. In the United States, the majority was achieved by genociding as the main toll of elimination against the

indigenous population. For Zionism and Israel, they were unique by using demographic elimination and dynamically creating different methods of it over the decades. In this sense the demographic elimination was achieved in 1948 by uprooting around 750,000 to 900,000 of Palestinians from their homes after a war that included massacres documented by Walid Khalidi, Masalha, and Pappe as shown in the study chapters. The 150000 Palestinian 'leftovers' inside Israel after 1948 were eliminated by other demographic means including the composition of committees to decrease their annual demographic growth (See chapter 2 and 4), and the deprivation of them from equal rights with the Jews, and in the democratic system. Besides that, the method of assimilation that was used in the United States through cross-marriages and sex relations was not used in the case of Israel to keep the purity of the Jewish blood. Finally, to increase the Jewish majority upon them, they (The 1948 Palestinians) were prevented from bringing back their refugees from outside, while an extra-territorial right was given to the Jews all over the world to come to Israel and get its citizenship right away upon arrival to the airport. In other words Israel was unique by using the 'demographic elimination methods' versus the other settler colonial projects, firstly by creating a refugee problem that continued till today, and secondly by using territorial methods with the 'leftovers; after 1948 by preventing them to bring back their relatives who became refugees, and by using extraterritorial methods that allows any Jew in any country of the world to come to Israel and to become a citizen of it right away.

Besides these unique 'demographic elimination methods' others were used to eliminate the relation of the indigenous population to their land including in the 1948 territory by the fact of expropriation of land and other means explained in the study chapters, all meaning other methods of elimination by keeping the demography out of the land, the territory, and the national home that was excluded only to the Jews. In the United States, the Amerindians were given reserves, but in Israel, the Palestinian presence was limited to 'places of

sleeping' inside their towns and villages, while their lands were moved to the state and the Jewish Agencies ownership.

The demographic elimination methods in the post 1967 period were also unique, by annexing Jerusalem in 1967 while keeping its Palestinian population as mere 'residents', by disengaging with Gaza in 2005 to avoid its influence on creating a Palestinian majority on the expense of the Jewish one, and by creating a Jewish Majority in Area C and East Jerusalem both consisting of 64 percent of the size of the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories (see chapter 4 for details).

Since Israel does not have a constitution that defines its borders yet, this means that its settler-colonial project is still in progress till its final borders will be set, it is then not yet finalized as happened with the three other cases compared. This means that additional methods of demographic elimination might be created towards more exclusion to the indigenous population versus more inclusion of the West Bank settlers in Israel. The other three cases all took more decades to get to their final destinations: Around 350 years in regard to South Africa (1652-1994), around 450 years in the case of the United States (1492- 1924 when the wars with the Amerindians were officially finished), and about 800 years in the case of Ireland/ Northern Ireland (1167-1994). Nevertheless, the Zionist project is less than 200 years old since it started in the 1830s by the states of America, Germany, Britain, and the Jewish Philanthropists before the official establishment of the Zionist movement in 1897 (see chapter three). The different options presented by the academic debate about the future fate of Israel were introduced in the study and summarized above. Till any of them to be achieved this thesis rests its case by verifying that the settler colonial Zionist project as a transnational non- state actor project cooperating with the colonial states as well was unique in its use of the demographic elimination, and in its creation of developing different methods of that elimination through decades of its existence. These methods are still open for further developing as much as the Zionist settler-colonial project run after 1967 directly by the state of Israel

together and in harmony with the settlers' colonial movements continue to be in progress.

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PLAGIARISM REPORT

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YAKIN DOĞU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

06.05.2019

Dear Waleed Hasan Salem

Your project “ **Who is eligible to exist?: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion of Settler Colonialism, the case of Palestine**” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.

AUTHOR AUTOBIOGRAPHY

Waleed Salem is an author and editor of thirty books, and tens of Articles about Democracy, Civil Society and the non-state actors, citizenship, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. He is a former University lecturer on these issues for six years at Al Quds University- Palestine. He also taught two courses about the Middle East and the non-state actors in the Near East University in Northern Cyprus during his International Relations PhD Studies there. He also has served as a lecturer and trainer for more than 30 thousand persons through the civil society organizations. He is a former journalist who still writes columns for various journals and newspapers in Palestine and abroad.