NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

THE NATIONALISMS IN CYPRUS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (1954-1964): A CRITICAL APPROACH

CEMAL YORGANCIOĞLU

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
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ASSOC. PROF. DR. ŞEVKİ KIRALP

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
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Near East University
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences
Department of Political Science

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Department of Political Science and International Relations

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Department of Political Science

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Department of International Relations

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Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sertaç Sonan
Cyprus International University
Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences
Department of International Relations

....

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sağsan
Director of Graduate School of Social Sciences

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I dedicate this thesis to the ones who seek for the truth

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

THE NATIONALISMS IN CYPRUS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT (1954-1964): A CRITICAL APPROACH

This thesis follows a 'critical' theoretical approach and examines the strengths and weaknesses of modernism, ethnosymbolism and primordialism in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context (Cold War context). Its case studies the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders' politics of nationalism and these politics' interactions with Greece's, Turkey's, UK's, USA's, USSR's and Egypt's policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964. This thesis followed an inductive approach and a qualitative research design. It conducted historical research by utilizing primary (state archives and newspapers) and secondary (literature) sources. It reaches to the conclusion that, in the relevant period of time, the Turkish and Greek nationalisms on the island and the aforementioned states' policies on Cyprus mutually affected each other. Another significant conclusion reached by this thesis is the fact that the three mainstream theories of nationalism neglect the relationship between domestic nationalisms and foreign states' attitudes and this is a deficiency common in all the three. This very relationship requires a framework capable of analysing and questioning the concept of 'international politics' as well.

Keywords: Primordialism, Ethnosymbolism, Modernism, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, International Politics, Domestic Politics, Cold War, 'Critical' Theoretical Approach.

ÖZ

ULUSLARARASI BAĞLAMDA KIBRIS'TAKİ MİLLİYETÇİLİKLER (1954-1964): ELEŞTİREL BİR YAKLAŞIM

Bu tez, 'eleştirel' bir kuramsal yaklaşım izlemekte ve uluslararası bağlamda (Soğuk Savaş bağlamında) Kıbrıs'ta milliyetçilik siyasetinin muhasebeleştirilmesinde modernizm, etnosymbolizm ve ilkçi yaklaşımın güçlü ve zayıf yönlerini incelemektedir. 1954'ten 1964'e kadar Kıbrıs Rum ve Kıbrıslı Türk liderlerin milliyetçilik politikaları ve bu politikaların Yunanistan, Türkiye, İngiltere, ABD, SSCB ve Mısır'ın Kıbrıs politikaları ile olan etkileşimleri üzerinde durmaktadır. Bu tez, tümevarımsal bir yaklaşım ve nitel bir araştırma tasarımı izlemiştir. Birincil (devlet arşivleri ve gazeteleri) ve ikincil (yazın) kaynaklarını kullanarak tarihsel araştırmalar yürüttü. İlgili dönemde, adadaki Türk ve Yunan milliyetçiliğinin ve yukarıda belirtilen devletlerin Kıbrıs konusundaki politikalarının birbirini karşılıklı olarak etkilediği sonucuna varmaktadır. Bu tezin ulaştığı bir diğer önemli sonuç, üç ana akım milliyetçilik teorisinin yerli milliyetçilik ile yabancı devletlerin tutumları arasındaki ilişkiyi ihmal etmesi ve bu üç teoride de yaygın olan bir eksiklik olmasıdır. Bu ilişki, uluslararası politika kavramını da analiz edebilecek ve sorgulayabilen bir çerçeve gerektirir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İlkçilik/İlkçi Yaklaşım, Etnosembolcülük, Modernizm, Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Rumlar, Uluslararası Politika, İç Politika, Soğuk Savaş, 'Eleştirel' teorik yaklaşım.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	*Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou* [Progressive Party of the Working People]
AP	Adalet Parisi [Justice Party]
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People's Party-RPP]
DP	Demokrat Parti [Democratic Party]
EOKA	*Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston* [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters]
KİP	*Kıbrıs'ı İstirdat Projesi* [Retaking Cyprus Project]
KTKF	*Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu* [Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions]
MD	Minister of Defence
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
ÖHD	Özel Harp Dairesi [Special War Department]
PRC	People's Republic of China
SC	Secretary of the Cabinet
SSC	Secretary of State for the Colonies
SSFA	Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
STK	Seferberlik Tetkik Kurulu [Research Board of Mobilization]
TSK	Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri [Turkish Armed Forces]
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi [Grand National Assembly of Turkey]
TMT	*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* [Turkish Resistance Organization]
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WW II	Second World War

INTRODUCTION

The 20th Century has been the scene of incredible changes in the socio-political life of humanity. There had been many developments including the change in living standards, urbanization, cheaper transportation, a new phase of industrialization, change of social structure, sharpening of class conflicts in different countries, improvements in health services, more insecure property, mass (very high) unemployment, upraising demands for justice (and social justice), the situation/status of women, election rights in general, the change of family life, expansion of general education, and mass movements (Burke, 1980). It would be a reductionist attitude to examine a society under such circumstances by imprisoning nationalism in a *fanus*[1] in an environment where so many changes have been experienced. It is obvious that an understanding, such as the Leviathan of Hobbes, which devotes the state to an anarchic structure and leaves it alone, would also be a restriction. It has been observed that the literature on nationalism has largely tried to explain the phenomenon overwhelmingly within its domestic character. Such a discipline tried to manoeuvre within a society's territorial borders and focus on the socio-political character of nationalist mobilizations. In this context; the outer space of the *fanus* (the interaction between nationalisms and international politics) remains largely neglected.

The phenomenon of the nation has created a conundrum in which mankind endeavours for a solution and cannot be reconciled. For universal-minded liberals or internationalists, the nation is an undesirable state. However, in the age of nations, humanity has endured all kinds of sacrifices for its state and nation and has absorbed its suffering. Assuming that the current age is enlightenment and progress, it indicates a considerable deviation from the Socialist understanding. On the other hand, Abrahamic/monotheistic religions with holistic perspectives are also included in this category. It is the state of a quest that will never be fully known for the origin of the nation and its spread.

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[1] Lantern, lamp glass, the round glass used for the protection of light and sometimes for the protection of antique.

For all these different viewpoints, the nation and its nationalism are considered to be extremely problematic.

As Smith highlighted (2002b): "almost [a] universal agreement [exist]. If scholars give widely discrepant answers to the question, 'why is the nation?', they are largely united over the question of 'when is the nation?'". In this sense, literature generally stands in a modern line. For nations and nationalism, the French and American revolutions are more often taken as reference points. The meaning attributed to modernism is structural, and as sequential as sociology. Within the framework of their (supporters of modernity) understanding, there is an understanding of national identity, ideology and state, which is interpreted in urbanization, literacy, industrialization, secularization, bureaucracy and even democracy, which are the gifts of modernity.

According to many researchers, Jean Jacques Rousseau and even the cosmopolitan thinker Immanuel Kant are the first to come to mind among the thinkers who contributed to the formation of German romanticism. According to Kedourie (1960), who explained nationalism with currents of thought, Kant is the starting point of everything. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is not a nationalist and cannot be held responsible for how his ideas are interpreted by later generations. However, according to Kedourie, the political consequences of the morality developed and the epistemological dichotomy would be great. The basis of this duality lies in the distinction between the world of phenomena and the inner world of the individual. According to Kant, the source of the information was the impression of the world of phenomena. But morality should never be tied to the world of the appearance, that is, to the outside world. That was the new formula of Kant's: 'The goodwill was free and autonomous' (Lindsay, 1919, p.102). With this formula, the self-determining individual was placed at the center of the universe. It is not difficult to predict the echoes of this in the political arena: According to the formula, the right to self-determination was the most valid value, and republicanism reflecting the autonomous will of the citizens was the most valid form of government. In response to Kant, Fichte claimed that these

were the reflection of universal consciousness or ego. Fichte claimed that individuals gained reality only as long as they were included in a whole so that the individual's freedom (self-actualization) would be only through identification with the whole. According to this, the state has its [own] integrity and is important than to the individual, precedes it. In this context, individual freedom can be realized when the individual and the state are one (Wood, n.d.).

The ideas of the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) will enable us to understand the basic features of this view. According to Dumont, Herder's main purpose is to oppose the Universalist thought and Enlightenment, which was quite popular at the time (Dumont, 1992, pp.113-132; Parkin, 2009, pp.80-87). The starting point of Herder is language. People, who speak a common language, constitute the first stage of the nation. The nation is a natural extension of the family because it is the smallest group in which language is shared. Every human being is the product of a particular language and community. In other words, each language is different from each other, is unique, and that means it has its own way of thinking.

There was a direct or indirect contribution of other thinkers to the formation of the idea of nationalism. The most common name among them was the French thinker Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau's concept of *general will* influenced nationalism. According to Rousseau, the greatest danger that social life can cause is that one group could take another group under its sovereignty. The way to prevent this is to surrender to the *general will*. This can only be achieved if individuals being citizens. This will be possible by replacing the *individual will* with the *general will* (Melzer, 1983). According to Barnard (1965), Rousseau claimed that both citizenship and patriotism could only be achieved within the nation-state. Both concepts will lose their meaning in the context of humanity. Neither citizen nor patriotic can be cosmopolitan.

According to the German historian Henrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) who claimed that there was no power over the state, the unity of the state had to be based on nationality. Nationality was the greatest value; before all values, including democracy. Treitschke also gave a definition of patriotism in his writings that having a consciousness of cooperation within the political formation, respecting the success of the ancestors, and transferring these achievements to the next generations (von Treitschke, Hausrath, & Putnam, 1914; von Treitschke, 1915; Kilgour, 2004). According to Treitschke, there were two driving forces in history: the desire of each *real nation* to establish its own state, and the tendency of each state to unite all the rights that constitute its own nation under one roof. The French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874) saw the nation as the guarantee of individual freedom. The revolution that took place in 1789 was the beginning of a *fraternity* era. In this age of brotherhood, there was no distinction between rich-poor, noble-peasant. The conflicts in society, the fights ended, and the enemies made peace. Patriotism was a *religion* that people should worship. It was the driving force of modern France and European history (Gossman, 1974).

The supporters of nationalism were of course not only historians; for example, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), like the previous liberal nationalists, united the notion of republican citizenship with the idea of nationality. In his treatise *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), J. S. Mill described his nationality as a group of human beings with proximity. This kind of affinity sometimes comprised ethnic similarity, sometimes common language, religion, and most of all the common history and memories. This ensured that the group was gathered under the roof of a single political power. According to Mill (1861, p.131), the way to establish free political regimes was to create a *homogeneous* national identity, a *public opinion in unity*. For this reason, the basic political unit should be a nation, not a multinational state. The nation was a precondition for free administration. Mill's thoughts allow the study to move into a *critical camp*.

The most important group of the critical camp was undoubtedly the Marxist current. The relationship between nationalism and Marxism has been the subject of many researchers. The point in which these studies are combined in general is that the intense commitment to the nation is creating both political and conceptual challenges for Marxism. Was nationalism some kind of "*false consciousness*" (Gellner, 1983, pp.124, 129) that led the proletariat to deviate from the aim of international revolution, or should the classes and class conflict first be considered within its national borders? If so, how would the struggle against the national bourgeoisie coincide with the goal of establishing socialism all over the world? Those who were politically qualified were also included in these conceptual questions. Lenin, on the other hand, raised the distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed country nationalism and claimed that the oppressed people, under the pressure of imperialism, had the *right to self-determination* (Connor, 1984, p.45). The reasons for these contradictory attitudes and the lack of a Marxist theory of nationalism vary from author to author.

For example, Regis Debray (1977) argues that Marxism does not give importance to the concept of nature, and therefore cannot explain the phenomenon of the nation. According to Debray, Marxism has not taken into account what we produce (mankind) but has taken into consideration the manufacturer (producer). Calhoun (1997) indicates that no thinker or scientist who ignores nationalism can be criticized as much as Marx and Engels. According to Calhoun, Marx and Engels biggest misconception was that the workers would only react to the problems caused by global capitalist integration by clinging on to their class identity. The workers had many identities as well as workers' identities. Commitments to the religious community or the nation were also directing workers' reactions (Calhoun, 1997, pp.26-28). Nevertheless, in the writings of Marx and Engels, the division of mankind within national borders is also a fact as the note that each proletariat should struggle against its own national bourgeoisie at the first place.

On the other hand, some passages in the Communist Manifesto have sparked a heated debate among writers who examined Marx and Engels's view of nationalism. These are the passages that Marx and Engels say that the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is primarily *national*. The struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, although not in its essence, initially is a form a nation-wide struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first and foremost be reckoned with its bourgeoisie (Engels & Marx, 1970, p.45). Regardless of their views on the aforementioned passages, there is a complete consensus among Marxists that those who come closest to developing a concept of nationalism are Otto Bauer (1881-1938) and Karl Renner (1870-1950). Indeed, Otto Bauer's *Die Nationalitaten Frage und die Sozial Demokratie*, published in 1907, is one of the most comprehensive nationalist studies not only of Marxists but also of the entire period. Renner's solution to the problems arising from national differences was to distinguish between the state and the nation. The areas related to the nation should be limited to education and culture, and the state should deal with social and economic issues. Bauer started to solve nationalism by defining the nation. According to Bauer, the nation was a *society of fate*, with sui generis character and culture. The origins of the nation depend on circumstances, contrary to what nationalists claim. The formation of the *language community* that Herder referred to was based on a series of factors brought about by modernization. According to Bauer, the second stage was the stage of the *cultural community* (Nimni, 2000, pp.xv-xlv).

The deep debate about the origins of nations is, of course, not a limited debate with "when is the nation?". Kohn (1944), which revealed perhaps the first divergence of the literature, named it East and West and tried to put forward the argument that they had differences. While the nation-state often associated with industrialization and modernization in the West, brought nationalism into the world as its own unique ideology, nationalist movements in Eastern societies played an important role in the formation of national states. Moreover, as this concept progressed in its journey through history, it progressed not by subverting the definitions and depictions made for itself,

but by articulating each other. In this context, nationalism has come into the form of a complex concept with high mobility, different perceptions and a gateway to various discourses. It is said that universal, social and liberal nationalism is Western, while ethnic, particularistic and illiberal nationalism is Eastern (Kohn, 1944); however, Kuzio (2002) insists that Kohn does not take geography into account. As can be seen from these ratings, nationalism is a very durable ideology that can adapt itself to the ages, political regimes, economic and social structures, and thus can differ according to space and time.

It would be appropriate to refer to Smith's (1999, p.201) definition. As the scholar notes: "nationalism is not a unitary, fixed set of tenets and ideals. As doctrine, movement and symbolism, it has proved chameleon-like, capable of almost infinite adaptation and reformulation, while preserving its underlying purposes". As the post-modernist point of view notes that the ideas and ideologies of modernity are largely invalid in the current era, nationalism is still a concept driving politics at domestic and international levels and academia still attaches significant importance to it (Heywood, 2015).

The mainstream theories of nationalism differ from each other mainly in the way answer the question "when is the nation?" (Özkırımlı, 2009). According to primordialist point of view, nations date back to primitive eras as they are built upon kinships and ancestries (Geertz, 1973). Based on the modernist point of view, nations are productions of modernity and therefore the pre-Industrial and pre-Modern peoples cannot be identified as 'nations' (Gellner, 1984). The ethnosymbolist scholarship stays somewhere in the middle of the two and claims that nations are pre-modern entities built upon ethnic groups, yet nationalism is the modern conversion of ethnic cultures into national cultures (Armstrong, 1982). In 1970s, Hinsley (1973) argued that the relationship between nationalisms and international politics remained undertheorized and this thesis, completed in 2020, claims that this assumption is still valid as for the mainstream theories, the concept of nationalism within international politics hardly constituted a central concern. Suzman (1999) is among the scholars who paid attention to paid attention to

nationalism within international context, yet his study was not intended to test the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theories. What makes this thesis distinctive is the fact that it tries to make a contribution to the literature by testing the three mainstream theories of nationalism and utilizing Suzman's framework. In doing so, it aims to monitor that the four approaches' capacities in explaining nationalism within an international context are maximized when they are combined together.

The authors who tried to deal with the phenomenon of nationalism under historicity have to a significant extent been able to observe the rapid changes in human life aimed at the foundation of a 'nation-state' (see Breuilly, 1993). Nevertheless, the significant relationships between those 'nation-states' and nationalist movements have been ignored by the literature. In other words, the theories of nationalism tend to characterize 'nationalism' as a sociological phenomenon aiming for the independence and sovereignty of a specific 'nation' and neglects to question whether the interplay between nationalisms and international politics has a form of influential effect on a domestic entity's politics of nationalism. This thesis tries to question whether there is a form of mutual affection between the politics of nationalism in Cyprus and international politics, more specifically the foreign states' attitudes towards Cyprus. As the studies of nationalism generally take into account the socio-political or economic and cultural realities in observing the cases of nationalism they examine (Gat & Yakobson, 2013), this thesis tries to materialize a similar observation by taking into account the involved actors policies on Cyprus within the context of the Cold War.

As regards the literature on nationalisms in Cyprus, as will be explained in the 'literature review', a number of studies explaining the nationalisms in Cyprus within the international context exist. Nevertheless, unlike this thesis, a theoretical discussion or the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theories do not constitute a central focus in the aforementioned scholarship. This thesis's 'critical' but inclusive approach towards the mainstream theories provides it with the opportunity to make a contribution to the studies of nationalism in general as well as the studies on nationalisms in Cyprus as it

problematizes nationalisms within international framework. It concludes that an approach combining the three mainstream theories coupled with Chatterjee and particularly Suzman is likely to maximize scholarship's capacity to account for nationalism (Greek and Turkish nationalisms) within international context (Cold War).

This thesis is intended to question the politics of nationalism within the international context. Additionally, it aims to explore the strengths and weaknesses of mainstream theories of nationalism (Modernism, Primordialism and Ethnosymbolism) in accounting for this very point. The historical period this thesis focuses on (1954-1964) covers the de-colonialization of the island, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the collapse of the bi-communal partnership in post-colonial Cyprus. In this period, not only the domestic actors (the two communities) are mobilised based on nationalist inspirations, but also the "motherlands" (Greece and Turkey), the major powers (USA and USSR), regional and global actors (Egypt and Non-Aligned Movement [NAM]) are involved in the Cypriot politics via the policies they conducted towards the island. This renders Cyprus and the aforementioned period suitable to examine the politics of nationalism within the international context.

This thesis is composed of four chapters: The introductory chapter and the three chapters of the main-body. The introductory chapter explains the thesis's contribution to the literature as well as its methodology, problem statement and research objectives. The second chapter encapsulates the essential theoretical approaches existing within the studies of nationalism. It also clarifies the framework it named as a 'critical' approach. The third chapter analyses the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the context of Cold War and tries to shed light on the relationship between these nationalisms and Turkey's, Greece's, UK's, USA's, USSR's and Egypt's policies towards the island from 1954 to 1959. The fourth chapter analyses the politics of nationalism, including Makarios's pro-independence shift, in their relation to the Cold War policies of Turkey, Greece, UK, USA, USSR and the NAM towards Cyprus.

CHAPTER 1
BASIS OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

Nationalism plays an important role in every aspect of human life given the fact that it presents itself as a form of emotive and ideational form of attachment amongst people, states and societies. So far, the scholarship has made relentless efforts to describe 'who', 'when' and 'what' is the 'nation'. The theories within the field generally tend to provide an understanding of nationalism that answers such 'who', 'when' and 'what' questions. This thesis utilizes a 'critical' theoretical approach and it does not exclude Modernism, Ethnosymbolism and Primordialism in its theoretical and analytical framework. Additionally, it questions whether there is a form of mutual interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign states' policies on Cyprus. In doing so, the thesis also questions to what extent the mainstream nationalism theories are efficient in accounting for such interaction if it exists. The thesis concludes that, at least for the case of Cyprus, such an interaction clearly exists and the mainstream theories of nationalism remain to a noticeable extent insufficient in accounting for it.

1.1   Literature Review

Methodologically speaking, in studies focused on nationalism, one might observe that three general academic trends prevail. The first trend conceptualizes nationalism as a socio-cultural phenomenon. The second trend focuses on the political aspects of nationalism in the form of an intra-state Political Science analysis. The third trend problematizes the international aspects of nationalism however does not remain strictly attached to IR theories. For its analytical and hypothetical purposes, this

thesis stays at a point where the second and the third, trends are in conjunction.

While analyzing the academic literature related to nationalism, a distinction could be made between sociology and political science-oriented scholars. The first group of researchers namely Gellner (1964, 1983), Anderson (1983/2006), Chatterjee (1996), Berghe (1987, 1994), Geertz (1973), Hutchinson (2000, 2017), Yoshino (2005), Smith (1986) and Armstrong (1982) are representatives of sociology oriented scholars. In their studies, they utilize disciplines of historical sociology and social anthropology. These scholars generated theoretical approaches accounting for the formation of nations and their identities. They tried to set out the main characteristics of social groups identified 'nations'. Additionally, their theoretical considerations tried to find out 'when' the nations were created. Among this trend, Gellner and Anderson outstand as representatives of the modernist school. According to the two scholars, industrialization, urbanization and the 'nationalization' of education were the main factors creating nations in the era of 'modernity'. On the other hand, Berghe represents the primordialist point of view and argues that nations were in existence long before the era of modernity (18-19th Centuries). According to the Berghe, nations are 'sociobiological' entities created through coercion or cooperation between different races and ethnic groups. Smith and Armstrong represent the ethnosymbolist approach arguing that nationalism is a concept of modernity, however, they emphasize that nations have ethnic origins and they had already been created before the era of modernity. The members of this trend of scholars differ from each other mainly on their theoretical considerations. The 'international politics' is a crucial concept for this thesis, and, with Smith as an exception; the scholars of this trend neglect the aforementioned concept. Moreover, Smith's readings are limited to the international politics of nation-states and their ethnic relatives in neighbouring countries.

Another group of scholars approach to the phenomenon of nationalism within the disciplines of Politics or Political Science. Hobsbawm & Ranger (1983/2000), Breuilly (1993), Horowitz (1985), Brass (1991), Kellas (1991),

Alonso (1994), Connor (1994), Harris (2018), Kolstø & Blakkisrud (2016), Öğün (2000), Mark, Trapido & Marks (2014), Brubaker (1996), Suzman (1999), Kaufman (1996), Prizel (1998), Bukh (2010) and Tang & Darr (2012) and Taras & Ganguly (2015) are among these scholars. This group of scholars tends to focus on national identity, political institutions (such as power-sharing or federation) and ethnic conflicts. The central analytical actors in these studies are the institutions, politicians, ethnic groups and colonial rulers. Hobsbawm, Breuilly and Brass are representatives of the modernist school within this trend and they account for the political aspects of nationalism. These scholars focus on the social construction and 'exploitation' of nationalism for political purposes. According to Brass (2000), if ethnic identities cause political differences, the reasons for this should be sought in the elite competition. The competition of the elites determines how ethnic identities define themselves. On the other hand, while Hobsbawm characterizes nationalism and nation as products of elite-led social engineering, Breuilly describes nationalism as a political process leading to state formation. It is useful to note that, the modernist scholars focusing on the political aspects of nationalism (namely Hobsbawm, Breuilly and Brass) differ from Gellner and Anderson in their analytical actors. While Gellner and Anderson focus on the state and the society with no specific attention to political leaders, for Hobsbawm, Breuilly and Brass, political leaders are central analytical actors as they can drive the politics of nationalism. It is also essential to note that, Esman, Kaufman, Hinsley, Ollapally & Cooley, Prizel, Bukh, Suzman and Brubaker focus on the relationship between nationalism and international politics. Theoretically, Kaufman combines Brass's instrumentalism and neo-realism, Prizel and Bukh provide a synthesis of modernism and social constructivism, and, Suzman and Brubaker generate their own hypothetical approaches. As this thesis focuses on the political aspects of nationalism, its stance is closer to that of Brass, Breuilly, Horowitz and Suzman (etc.). Nonetheless, its theoretical approach is a 'critical approach'. It does not strictly follow or exclude any theory. Instead, it tests the strengths and weaknesses of the three mainstream nationalism theories via its case study on Cyprus (1954-1964). Thus, it might be claimed that the number of studies testing the three mainstream theories' (modernism,

ethnosymbolism and primordialism) strengths and weaknesses, particularly the number of studies examining these theories' capabilities in accounting for nationalisms' relationship with international politics, is rather limited. This thesis is intended to make a contribution to the literature on nationalism by trying to fill this very gap.

The literature on nationalisms in Cyprus can be categorized based on their conceptual frameworks. '*Identity*', '*ethnic conflict/conflict resolution*', '*education*' (peace education), '*international politics*' and '*insurgency*' are among the most common concepts related to nationalism studied by the existing literature. Beckingham (1957), Kızılyürek (1993, 2002, 2016), Nevzat (2005), Lacher & Kaymak (2005), Vural & Rustemli (2006), Ersoy (2006), Sitas, Latif & Loizou (2007), Peristianis (2008), Chrysoloras (2010), Akfırat & Özkan (2010), Uzer (2011), Bryant & Papadakis (2012), Kıralp (2014), Boone (2016), Öz (2016), Kemal (2017) are among the scholars studying nationalisms on the island based on the aforementioned concepts. This group of academics tends to focus on issues such as ethnicity, age, gender, religion, Kemalism, transnationalism, Enosis, Hellenism, Taksim and power-sharing. The main analytical actors in these studies are religious institutions, political leaders, struggle groups, the two communities and colonial administration. These scholars focus on the social construction of nationalism for political purposes and the acquisition of "identity". One might claim that the authors with a Modernist approach have a "process-oriented" focus, considering that they are interested in the construction part of the subject. Evre (2004) and Nevzat (2005) attempted to reveal the identity evolution experienced by the Turkish Cypriots under the colonial administration with rich archival documents. Peristianis (2008), on the other hand, emphasized that the Ottoman phase did not form an Ottoman identity on Cyprus, but the struggle for independence against the colonial administration could not be singularized under two headings too. He concluded that the developments have caused the politicization of identities. While the right-wing united around the Enosis ideal, leftists and Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the movement. Kıralp (2014) also revealed the superior roles of elites in the construction of national identity.

Studies of Papastephanou (2005), Nevzat & Hatay (2009), Bryant & Papadakis (2012), Pantziara & Philippou (2012), Latif (2014), and Kemal (2017) are among the ones focusing on education and peace education. This group of academics tends to focus on issues such as ethnicity, religion, teaching and text-books. Also, they examine the religious and political aims of the society and the gains of social transformation through education. Papastephanou (2005) argues that the origins of the Cyprus issue cannot be reduced to the religious differences of the peoples and that the fallacy of religious education is not the fallacy of yesterday, but of today. Nevzat & Hatay (2009) examined by a comparative analysis of the Turkish Cypriot relations with the colonial, ethnopolitical and secular powers in search of the codes of the nearly 200 years of change. Compared to the past, today's Muslim Turkish Cypriots live their religion more personally. Moreover, as they moved away from their past understanding of community, they distanced themselves from the Greek Cypriots (the majority of Cyprus) both sociologically and therefore politically.

Loizides & Keskiner (2004), Anastasiou (2008), Hürsoy (2010), Kızılyürek (2010, 2016), Novo (2012), Bryant & Papadakis (2012), Çağlayan (2013), Şener (2013), Bryant (2014), Sevinç (2017), Yellice (2018) are among the scholars focusing on ethnicity, ethnic conflict and conflict resolution. This group of academicians tends to focus on issues such as ethnicity, ideology, conflict, national identity, ethnic conflict, motherland, Enosis, and Taksim. The main analytical actors in these studies are political elites, religious institutions, colonial rule, and struggle/resistance groups. These researchers focus on the ethnic-based conflict climate of nationalism and shed light on political conflicts. Anastasiou (2008) suggested that "nationalism has left behind a legacy of aggression and suspicion, and an exclusivist, totalitarian concept of ethnic identity" (p.8). Furthermore, Sevinç (2017) considered diplomatic issues in the light of ethnic conflicts (1954-60), while Yellice (2018) was able to address the Athens-Nicosia crisis (1960-64), which arose after the end of the republican partnership. Additionally, Loizides & Keskiner (2004) claimed that the electoral system, particularly the cross-ethnic voting

might be utilized as an effective instrument in balancing the ethnic conflict in Cyprus.

Holland (1993, 1998), O'malley & Ian Craig (2001), Kızılyürek (2002, 2016), Varnavas (2004), Dimitrakis (2008), Novo (2010, 2012), Karyos (2011), Robbins (2012) Bryant & Papadakis (2012), Tamçelik (2014), Yalçın (2016) are among the scholars focusing on the 'insurgency'. This group of academics tends to focus on issues such as struggle, colony management, conflict, resistance, ethnic conflict, Enosis and Taksim. The main analytical actors in these studies are political elites, religious institutions, colonial administration, and struggle/resistance groups. These researchers focus on independence, motherland and decolonization nationalism. According to Holland (1993), the source of the violence was explained by the Greek Cypriot informant: *"crisis of trust"* and this was the *"missing element"* (p.174). This missing element would be the occasion for Nicosia and Washington or London and Athens never to agree. O'malley & Ian Craig (2001), on the other hand, investigated the scenario based on archival documents and covering a very ambitious large time frame and where great powers agreed to divide the island. Tamçelik (2014), on the other hand, examined a very different aspect, the *silent war*, that is, "propaganda wars" and worked on the methods and features of the propaganda of TMT.

Goksenin (1957), Windsor (1964), Hatzivassiliou (1991a), Holland (1998), Ecevit (1999), Attalides (2003), Kalaitzaki (2004), İnalcık (2006), Dimitrakis (2009), Yüksel (2011), Gates (2012), Gülen (2012), Kapçı (2014), Göktepe & Bilgiç (2014), Sakin (2014), Tamçelik (2014), Özkan (2015), Kızılyürek (2016), Yorgancıoğlu (2016), Savrun & Tınal (2017), Babaoğlu (2018), Yellice (2018) and Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp (2019) are among the scholars studying the international politics. This group of academics tends to focus on issues such as the Cold War, NATO (Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization), Eastern Mediterranean security, Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), bases and international power-sharing. The main analytical actors in these studies are NATO, the UN and the colonial administration. These researchers focus on the position of nationalism within international politics

for their political purposes. İnalcık (2006) pointed out the international dimension of the issue and stated that two different ethnicities on both sides of the Aegean, expresses its historical manifestation on the island of Cyprus. Hatzivassiliou (1991a) concluded that "Turkey had been more successful in playing Britain against Greece than had Britain in attempting to play Turkey against Greece" (p.261). On the other hand, Egypt had grown into a regional power and the NAM emerged as an international actor, the politics of nationalism in Cyprus were, to some extent, the dependent variables of other actors and conditions (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019). Özkan (2015) tried to analyze the issue through three different geopolitical discourses; and was able to address it within the framework of naturalized, ideological and civilizational geopolitics. It is essential to stress that these studies examine the relationship between the nationalist political actors in Cyprus and foreign states' attitudes towards the island. Nevertheless, their studies have no theoretical consideration on the formation of nationalism itself and this thesis's 'critical' theoretical approach makes it different from the aforementioned studies.

A significant number of studies focusing on 'identity' and 'education' tend to embrace modernist points of views in their theoretical approaches. In other words, theory-oriented studies on nationalisms in Cyprus are generally the ones that focus on 'identity' and 'education'. These studies tend to point out in advance that they follow modernist theoretical approaches and they utilize modernism to examine or to account for the nationalisms in Cyprus. On the other hand, the trend of scholars focused on aspects having to do with 'international politics' do not tend to focus on the mainstream nationalism theories. In these studies, the Turkish, Turkish Cypriot, Greek and Greek Cypriot nationalisms are presumed as phenomena shaping or influencing the international politics of involved parties in the Cyprus Question.

This thesis examines the politics of nationalism within the international context and tries to shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theories in illuminating this point. As previously noted, the theory-oriented studies on the nationalisms in Cyprus generally base their

hypothetical attitudes on a specific theory (modernism). This thesis, however, does not neglect any mainstream theory (primordialism, modernism, ethnosymbolism, etc.) and questions all these theories based on their adequacies and inadequacies. Additionally, the modernist scholarship examining the nationalisms in Cyprus utilizes modernism to account for nationalism while this thesis utilizes the nationalisms in Cyprus to account for the adequacies and inadequacies of mainstream nationalism theories. Therefore, this thesis becomes distinctive in three aspects in the literature on nationalism in Cyprus: it is among the rare works that focus on the concept of 'international politics' with particular attention to mainstream theories of nationalism, it is among the rare studies utilizing nationalisms in Cyprus to evaluate mainstream nationalism theories (and not the other way around) and it is probably the first work that questions all mainstream theories as regards their capabilities in accounting for the nationalisms on the island and their relations with international politics.

Therefore, the basic contribution this thesis is likely to make to the literature on nationalisms in Cyprus is its 'critical' theoretical approach (that does not neglect primordialism and ethnosymbolism) filling the gap caused primarily by the limited number of theoretical studies on the nationalisms on the island and the dominance of modernist school in the relevant studies.

1.2   Statement of the Research Problem

This thesis problematizes the adequacies and inadequacies of mainstream nationalism theories in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. Analytically, this thesis investigates the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. It then questions the strengths and weaknesses of mainstream nationalism theories based on this investigation.

1.3   Research Question(s) & Hypothesis

The thesis has two research questions. The first research question of the thesis is: "*What was the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?*" The

second research question of this thesis is: "*To what extent the mainstream theories of nationalism are capable of accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context from 1954 to 1964?*" This thesis follows an inductive approach and it inherently does not have a pre-prepared hypothesis. To answer the first research question, this thesis focuses on local and foreign actors as 'the units of analysis' and examines the interaction between them. In other words, the nationalist actors on the island are the domestic 'units' of analysis while the foreign states constitute the external 'units' of analysis. These domestic units are analyzed based on their politics of nationalism and the external units are analyzed based on their policies towards Cyprus. In answering the second research question, this thesis questions the mainstream nationalism theories based on the findings of the analysis.

1.4   Research Objectives

This thesis has the following goals as its central research objectives:

1. To analyze and understand the politics of nationalism followed by Greek and Turkish actors in Cyprus by utilizing primary and secondary historical sources.

2. To examine the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. These "foreign states" will particularly be Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. However, since the historical period that will be analyzed by this thesis is included in the Cold War era, interests of USA, Soviet Union and Egypt, will also be within this thesis' analytical considerations.

3. To examine the mainstream nationalism theories as regards their strengths and weaknesses based on the findings of the analysis.

1.5   Significance of the Study

First of all, this study is intended to make a contribution to the literature on nationalisms in Cyprus by examining the mainstream nationalism theories as regards their capabilities in understanding the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. Additionally, this thesis does not exclude any mainstream nationalism theory and this makes it different from

the modernist scholarship focusing on the nationalisms in Cyprus. This thesis also becomes significant as, unlike the majority of studies on nationalisms in Cyprus, it does not utilize nationalism theories to understand the nationalisms in Cyprus. Instead, it utilizes the nationalisms in Cyprus to examine the mainstream theories' strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, the main contribution this thesis will make to the literature of nationalisms in Cyprus is its 'critical' theoretical approach (that does not neglect primordialism and ethnosymbolism), which fills the gap caused by the limited number of theoretical studies on nationalisms on the island and the dominance of the modernist school in these studies.

1.6   Scope and Limitations of the Study

The scope of the thesis will historically examine issues around the nationalisms in Cyprus question in relation to the interests of external actors from the period 1954-1964. Secondly, the research will focus on the two communities' leaderships and their politics of nationalism as 'its units of analysis' (for further details, see the section methodology). This research analyzes these units within the international framework. Although this is a nationalism study, this research will not be able to explore the extent to which the politics of nationalism followed by their actors were embraced by the two communities in Cyprus. This is because the analysis will be centred on elite-driven politics instead of sociological observation. Additionally, it is highly desirable for this research to visit the archival centers in the United Kingdom (Kew) and Turkey (Ankara). However, due to the limited economic resources, this study essentially resorts to online archives and the archival centers in Cyprus. The archival data in Kew and Ankara are fairly accessible; however, this research will not be able to utilize them because of the aforementioned reasons.

1.7   Synopsis of Theoretical Framework

This thesis utilizes three mainstream theories of nationalism and Suzman's approach. Modernism, as a mainstream theory, argues that nations and nationalisms are modern social constructions. That is to say, politics of nationalism, as well as national identities of communities, might be

constructed and reconstructed socially by the state, the society or the elites. Primordialism asserts that nations and nationalisms are pre-modern concepts; they are 'given' features and cannot be re-constructed over time. According to the Ethnosymbolist point of view, nationalism is a modern phenomenon. However, nations are pre-modern entities having ethnic infrastructures. There is a social construction in nationalism; however, that social construction is not free of the origins of the community and the past. While these mainstream theories explain the formations of nations and nationalisms, Suzman focuses on a different aspect. The scholar argues that each nationalist mobilization is somehow obliged to attain international support or recognition to achieve its goals. He, therefore, concludes that nationalism is actually, at least to some extent, an 'international' phenomenon.

1.8   Methodology and Sources of Data

This thesis utilizes a qualitative research design. It utilizes newspapers and state archives as primary sources and the literature as the main secondary source of data. The analysis investigates how the interactions between the actors of political sphere are 'constructed'. Ontologically, as it characterizes political actions as 'social constructions', it does not follow objectivism and positivism (see Bryman 2016). As this thesis tries to examine the strengths and weaknesses of theories of nationalism, it does not have a pre-prepared hypothesis.

Analytically, Yurdusev (1993) makes a distinction between the 'level' and the 'unit' of analysis. Yurdusev notes that Buckley's 'levels of analysis' are composed of the empirical observations as the first level, the inductive theory as the second level and the framework or the model in approaching to the topic as the third level (see also Buckley, 1967). In the way, Yurdusev adopts Buckley's model, the general philosophical approaches on the problem or the standing point based on which the researcher constructs the analysis constitutes the 'first level'. The theory or the clarification of the problem refers to the 'second level'. The 'third level' is the discussion based on practical facts. In his examples, for instance, in analysing the 'power', the

conceptualization of power is the first (philosophical) level. The 'power politics' is the 'second' (theoretical) level and the observations on the practice of power politics make the 'third' (practical) level. At this point, the philosophical and theoretical approaches on nationalism, particularly the 'critical approach' composed of the three mainstream theories comprises the 'first' (philosophical) level of analysis in this thesis. The clarification of the mainstream theories' inadequacies in accounting for the nationalism within an international context and the elucidation of virtues of Suzman's approach in filling this gap constitute the 'second' (theory/clarification of the problem) level. Finally, the empirical observations on the nationalisms in Cyprus within the international context are of the 'third' (practical) level. As Yurdusev (1993) points out, his three 'units of analysis' are composed of the 'individual' (the 'first'), the society (the 'second') and the humanity (the 'third') and this framework is to a large extent similar with Waltz's 'three images of analysis' as 'human', 'state' and 'system' (See also Waltz, 2001/1959). According to Yurdusev, the 'unit of analysis' is actually what is observed by the research, and, what are the actors or objects the thing (or the person) that is being observed. As Yurdusev notes, Political Science scholars generally focus on political leaderships as the 'first' unit of analysis. Additionally, according to the scholar, it is not essential for research to cover all three units of analysis. In this sense, the 'units of analysis' in this thesis are the politics of nationalism: The political leaders (Makarios, Küçük and Denktaş) and leaderships (TMT and EOKA) are the 'actors' and nationalist projects such as Enosis, Taksim and Independence are the 'objects'. Thus, this thesis focuses on the 'first' unit of analysis in Yurdusev's classification.

In the doctoral theses, which conducted a historical research on the 1950s and 1960s of Cyprus, the following methods were used in general. Hatzivassiliou (1991b) examined the British politics (in 1955-59) by utilizing archival research. Khashman (1997) challenged the federal solution by historical method; Kalaitzaki (2004) utilized written sources and interviews for "perceptions of the US involvement by Athens and Ankara". Peristianis (2008) utilized historical sociology coupled with surveys and discourse analysis with a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods. On the

other hand, Novo (2010) analyzed the "Greek-Cypriot perspective of the insurgency" by primary sources and memoires and autobiographies. Chrysoloras (2010) made a discourse analysis for "religion and national identity in the Greek and Greek-Cypriot political cultures". As this thesis focuses on the mid-20th Century, the majority of potential intervieewes and survey participants (capable of linking their experiences with political concepts) are not alive. It therefore essentially utilizes written documents as main historical sources instead of oral narratives.

This thesis conducts an "exploratory" case study design as it tries to answer 'what' questions (see Yin, 2014; Collier & Elman, 2008; Willig, 2013; Rich, Brians, Manheim & Willnat, 2018; Lune & Berg, 2017). It tries to 'explore' the interaction between nationalisms in Cyprus and foreign states' politics. It also aims to 'explore' the mainstream theories of nationalism as regards their capabilities in accounting for this relationship.

Since Cyprus was a British Colony in the relevant period of time, this thesis utilizes the British archives, namely the online British Cabinet conclusions and memorandums [TNA: The Cabinet Papers],[2] and online UK Parliament papers [Hansard],[3] Cyprus Blue Books, The Cyprus Gazette[4] (Colonial Press), the Spectator,[5] and the Strait Times.[6] Furthermore, as Turkey was another key actor of the Cyprus Conflict, Turkish sources as well are utilized by this thesis. T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi [Grand National Assembly of Turkey,

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[2] CAB 128 post war conclusions, CAB 129 post war memoranda, and CAB 195 Cabinet Secretary's notebooks, [nationalarchives.gov.uk/cabinetpapers/cabinet-gov/meetings-papers.htm?WT.ac=Meetings%20and%20papers].

[3] "Hansard is an edited verbatim record of what was said in Parliament. It also includes records of votes and written ministerial statements. The report is published daily covering the preceding day, and is followed by a bound final version", ["hashard", www.parliament.uk]

[4] cyprusdigitallibrary.org.cy/

[5] archive.spectator.co.uk/

[6] eresources.nlb.gov.sg

Minutes Registry],[7] Milliyet Gazetesi[8] [Milliyet Newspaper], and Akşam Gazetesi [Akşam Newspaper], Cumhuriyet Gazetesi [Cumhuriyet Newspaper], Yeni İstanbul Gazetesi [Yeni İstanbul Newspaper], which all derived from Ankara Üniversitesi gazeteler veri tabanı[9] [Ankara University newspapers database] except Milliyet would be useful for analyzing the local and external interactions of Turkish politics. In addition, the United States (US) is also a key actor in the relevant case and its historical sources [FRUS][10] are likely to be among the useful sources for the research.

Turkish Cypriot local newspapers will be utilized namely, Halkın Sesi [The Voice of the People], Bozkurt [Grey Wolf] and Nacak [Hatchet] from Turkish Cypriot Newspaper Archive [Kıbrıs Türk Gazete Arşivi]; Department of National Archives and Research [Milli Arşiv ve Araştırma Dairesi], Grand Library of Near East University and the Dr. Fazıl Küçük Müzesi [Dr. Fazil Kutchuk Museum].

1.8.1 Reliability and the Validity of this Method

This thesis will utilize primary sources, especially official archives and newspapers to understand the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. In documentary researches, "authenticity", the unlikelihood of falsification of the documents, and "credibility", the unlikelihood of false or one-sided information in documents is of maximum importance (Scott, 1990). This research will fully provide the "authenticity" of its sources since they will directly be accessed via the online, electronic or manual ways. However, the extent which these sources provide "credibility" might not be as of guaranteed as of their "authenticity". At this point, the

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[7] T.B.M.M. Kütüphane ve Arşiv Hizmetleri Başkanlığı, Cumhuriyet dönemi meclisleri genel kurul tutanaklarına erişim sistemi [Library and Archive Services Presidency, Access to the minutes of the General Assembly of the Republican period assemblies], [tbmm.gov.tr/kutuphane/tutanak_sorgu.html].

[8] gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/

[9] gazeteler.ankara.edu.tr/

[10] Department of State, Office of the Historian [FRUS], https://history.state.gov/

researcher is aware that these materials might not be free of prejudice, partiality and bias. It is a high possibility that the archival materials and newspapers contain subjective, particularly nationalist accounts and approaches as well. This thesis will, therefore, cross and double-check the information provided by the primary sources by utilizing other primary sources and literature, to increase the reliability and validity of its arguments.

1.9   The Structure of the Thesis

By structure and organization, the study consists of five chapters. The first chapter of the thesis will basically look at the issues regarding the 'basis of the study and methodology'. This is because it will introduce to us relevant issues such as the research question, objectives, hypothesis, scope and limitations of the study, the significance of the study, methodology and the sources needed for data collection. Chapter two will center on the deconstruction and conceptualization of the theories and concepts needed for this study. This is because understanding the concepts and the theories will enable the researcher to have the optical lens in his analysis. Chapter three of the study will critically examine the history and nationalisms of Cyprus from the period 1954-1959. The fourth chapter of the study will continue to examine the history and nationalism of Cyprus in the 1959-1964 periods. The fifth chapter marks the concluding part of the study where the summary of the findings will be drawn, contribution to knowledge, conclusion, and recommendation for future studies. It will be consist of analysis of nationalisms with the specific focus on the Cyprus question putting to task issues concerning the politics, interest, and the interactions of both the local and international actors.

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND CONCEPTUALIZATION:
A 'CRITICAL' APPROACH

This chapter focuses on the theoretical framework and the conceptual understanding of nationalism. In essence, this chapter will offer a general assessment of what nationalism entails as a concept. Also, the chapter will offer and operationalize the understanding of nationalism, in line with the "grand theories" as well as the major contribution by several studies on nationalism and its applicability. In line with this theoretical and conceptual understanding of the term the chapter will also offer an analysis on the social basis of nationalist politics, which is the main thrust of the study. Therefore, nationalism as a historical concept will be discussed, nationalism as a study area within the discipline of social sciences will also be discussed. The major theories and studies carried out on nationalism will also be discussed. Finally, Partha Chatterjee's anti-colonialism, John Breuilly's 'a form of politics' and Suzman's 'nationalisms and international politics' of understanding of nationalism will herald as the concluding part of this chapter.

2.1   Nationalism as a Historical Concept[11]

Nationalism, at the end of the 18th Century, has gained a political and social character and became a modern concept and first completed its economic and social development. In Western European societies, patriotism, citizenship and nation-state have begun to be defined in a connected manner. However, as a result of the political, social and cultural

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[11] Presented at the "Tarihten Günümüze Millî Kavrayışlar" Symposium at Near East University, under the name of *"Nationalism as a historical concept: From French nationalism to the evolution of Balkanization"* on 18-19 April 2019.

developments in the world, ethnicity, ethnic-culture, irredentism, minorities, ethnic groups, and conflicts were also associated with the concepts.

Nationalism has been an *ideology* that has an important function in the process of historical development in order to create a common national identity in society. In different social structures, nationalism, the point of establishment and survival of the nation influenced the masses and resulted in significant political consequences (Smith, 2002b, p.7). The formation and relationship of nation and nationalism in Western and Eastern societies can be explained through different processes. In the West, the nation-state, which is often associated with industrialization and modernization, breeds nationalism as its own ideology, while the nationalist movements in Eastern societies have played an important role in the formation of national states (Kohn, 2017, p.ix). The point that should be considered here is that the historically emerging definitions of nationalism have not been interchanged, but rather through the articulation of each other. For this reason, nationalism has become a very complex concept, flexible and open to a wide variety of perceptions and discourses.

In the literature of nationalism, there emerged a large number of classifications; *liberal, traditionalist conservative, socialist, anti-colonialist, underdeveloped country, or romantic* nationalism (Breuilly, 2013, chapter 1; Oran, 1993, pp.43-44). Likewise, universalistic, civic, and liberal nationalism is said to be Western whereas ethnic, particularistic, and illiberal nationalism are belonging to Eastern (Kohn, 2017, p.ix); but Kuzio (2002, p.25) insists that Kohn ignores geography. As it can be seen from these classifications, nationalism is a highly durable ideology that can adapt itself to epochs, political regimes, economic and social structures and therefore can be differentiated according to place and time.

In this aspect of nationalism, which can sustain its existence largely based on certain phenomena according to structural conditions, location and time, Smith (2009) argued that "nationalism is not a unitary, fixed set of tenets and ideals. As doctrine, movement and symbolism, it has proved chameleon-like,

capable of almost infinite adaptation and reformulation, while preserving its underlying purposes" (p.201). It is not easy to define nationalism, because this concept does not function alone, it is not only the most important but also the weakest link in a chain. This concept is not only enriched by terms such as citizenship, patriotism, populism, ethnicism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, chauvinism and imperialism; nation, nationality, ethnicity, culture, race, racism, folk, patriotism etc. in other terms, and intertwined with an ambiguity.

In fact, the definition of nationalism as patriotism and national character as two different and opposing concepts such as French-German nationalism, in general, corresponds to almost the same periods (late 18th Century). However, the political developments have led to the emergence and dissemination of a definition of nationalism in the political sphere within the framework of connecting the citizens living within the borders of a state with the civic bond (Carr, 1945, pp.2-6). Many sources for the concept of nationalism were first used in the definition of the *Volkgeist* (National Spirit) used by the German philosopher Herder (Leoussi & Grosby, 2007, pp.1, 10). In general, the view that there is an inseparable link between language and culture[12] has left a decisive influence on the intellectual framework and that starts with Herder (Delanty, Hutchinson, Kaufmann, Özkirimli, & Wimmer, 2008, pp.4, 12-13) and Humboldt. During this period, especially the philosophical movement, called *German Romanticism*, had an opinion that the culture that made society unique and unified, and that each culture was different and unique. This view would form the basis of the idea of becoming a nation in the future. Since the last quarter of the 18th Century, as the concept of national character became widely accepted, and France, which had political turmoil in Western Europe, would redefine being a nation with the revolution in 1789 and in parallel, would play an important role in making

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[12] There is no doubt that language occupies a central place in Herder's understanding of the constituents of cultural identity. "Whoever is raised in the same language," he writes, "whoever learns to pour his heart, to express his soul, in it belongs to the *people (Volk) of this language*" (Briefe, 304). As this sentence reveals, Herder tends to stress the affective rather than the cognitive dimension of language's effect on the "soul" (Sikka, p.191).

nationalism a patriotic ideology in order to ensure the continuity and mass legitimacy of the state (Schnapper, 2017, pp.2-3).

The most widely used meaning of the nation in the original and literature was politicized with the French Revolution before its philosophical and cultural meaning had yet to become widespread. This process, together with the birth of national monarchies, has united people on existing lands as a modern nation; "the equation nation = state = people, and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial" (Hobsbawm, 2013, p.19). With this unification, the consciousness of the modern nation did not welcome at the rule of rulers from different ethnic backgrounds in a particular geographical area, but made it necessary for all the ruling and ruled ethnic groups to be alike. The political meaning was use that equated the nation with the people and the state because the structure and definition of states were now basically associated with a certain piece of land. According to this definition, if the nation had something in common, it was not originally ethnic origin, language and similar elements, but rather common interests against special interests and common interests against privilege. The revolutionary thinkers in this period defined the nationalism as *patriotism* and the group with the desire to live together. According to Hobsbawm (2013, pp.19-20), therefore, the concept of this revolutionary nation should not be confused with the next nationalist program, which aims at building nation-states appropriate to a community defined within the framework of criteria such as ethnic origin, common language, religion, territory and common historical memories.

By the end of the 18th to the mid-19th Century, nationalism was defined by the state, homeland and citizenship.This understanding supports the idea that every nation should have a state and that every free citizen within the borders of that state is a part of that nation. During this period, nationalism has been associated with the *right to self-determination* and *nation-state* (Greenfeld, 1992, p.160, Gans, 2003, p.75). However, Europe was still not made up of certain nation-states, which were precisely drawn from their borders, and it was becoming an important problem. In the period in

question, these two results were universally accepted: First, the principle of being a nation should only be applied in practice to communities of a certain size. In other words, every community within the states that had a great number of different communities, like the European empires[13], was not a nation. In fact, some communities were small communities "*mini-peoples*" (Hobsbawm, 2013, pp.40-41) that did not complete their development in the modern sense, and they were non-historic peoples who did not have the ability to form a state. Secondly, it was seen as an inevitable enlargement process of the construction of nations. In practice, national movements were expected to be movements suitable for national unity or expansion. In this sense, there were only three criteria that allowed peoples to be categorised as a nation, provided that they were sufficiently large to exceed the threshold:[14] The first was the nation's historical link with the present state, or the history of the past, which dates back to the very last period. The second was the existence of settled cultural elite with a written national literary and administrative mother tongue and third, including the fact that it is an imperial people to be aware of the collective existence was the conquest capability. The self-determination of the nations was only valid for the nations that were considered to have a chance to survive (Hobsbawm, 2013, pp.30-41).

In addition to the liberal thought of this period in Europe, it is necessary to mention how the socialist-communist movement, which started to become an important political view with the massive workers' movements, observed nationalism and the idea of becoming a nation. According to Marx and Engels, the modern nation was the product of a long historical process that resulted in the replacement of feudalism by the capitalist mode of production (Marx & Engels, 1948, pp.9-13). The transition to the capitalist economy led to a more homogenous and centralized structure of many social entities in Western Europe. The mitigation of local differences was one of the

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[13] Tsarist Russia, the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire.

[14] For further deep discussions, see E. Keene (1996) Beyond the anarchical society; S. N. Z. Grovogui (1996) Sovereigns, quasi sovereigns, and Africans; S. Amin (2009) Eurocentrism.

indispensable prerequisites of the market economy. In this context, Marx and Engels revived Hegel's historical and non-historical separation of nations. According to this, the peoples will either become their nation by establishing their own state or they will remain as 'nonhistoric' peoples (*Geschichtslose Völker*) (Szporluk, 1988, p.2). The non-historic-peoples were reactionary because they could not adapt to the capitalist mode of production and opposed any change because their existence depended on the continuation of the old regime. More generally, Marx and Engels thought that a common language or tradition, geographical and historical homogeneity, would not be enough to create a nation. In order to become a nation, it was necessary to reach a certain level of economic and social development (Szporluk, 1988, pp.19-20, 62-63, 69-70, 129; Avineri, 1991, p.647). However, it was witnessed that Marx and Engels did not approach the different nationalist movements in the same and single framework at different times and conditions. They strongly opposed Schleswig and Holstein's abandonment to Denmark, because Germany, according to them, had a more advanced level of capitalist development than Scandinavian countries, so it was *progressive* and *revolutionary* (Stuart, 2006; Munck, 1986, p.13).

From the end of the 18th Century, German philosophers such as Herder and Fichte formed the reaction of the Enlightenment thinkers in the view of the validity of the universal mind and the romantic philosophy based on the concepts such as *cultural specificity* and *national character*. The unification of the people outside the borders of Germany, which were described as Germans, caused the development of a new idea and definition of nationalism (Gellner, 1994, p.49). The sanctity of the state-nation-folk trilogy, which became widespread with the French Revolution, and the nationalist conception of the homogeneous nation within the boundaries of the state gained a second meaning when the Germans began to define the nation as a cultural unity. German nationalism perceived the Germans not as *citizens* living within the borders of a fixed territory, but above all as a common history, language and culture. Defending the view that the German nation was not formed by the state, which German people create their own state and the nation is a cultural society (Lawrence, 2014, p.18). This type of

nationalism is becoming an attractive definition for every people living within the borders of different states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, since it is practicable not only to the nations of civilized countries but also to all the people with cultural characteristics (Kedourie, 1960, pp.113-117; Breuilly, 1993, pp.125-143).

The German Empire (*Deutsches Reich*) was established with the provision of the German union. This development has introduced a new definition of nationalism in the heart of Europe (Lawrence, 2014, p.22). In this context, nationalism is no longer defined as the ideology of being a nation belonging to civilised citizens of peoples who have completed the process of civilization. In order to achieve a cultural unity, a second definition emerged which introduces the idea of the interchangeability of the state's borders. Another area of discussion was that nationalism was increasingly adopted by the masses as a political view. The enlargement of the right to vote, the developments in communication and transportation, the establishments of colonial empires and the debates on the national issue since the 1880s have brought a different dimension to the issue. The fact that national slogans are attractive to potential or actual voters or supporters of mass political movements has begun to make the nationalist ideology a real problem, especially for Socialists (Lawrence, 2014, p.43). The fact that the individual who is the beneficiary of liberalism has gained importance, as well as what those individuals think or feel for nationalism, has become increasingly important even in Ottoman land (Mardin, 2000, pp.276-277). In this environment, states had to create a public religion in the face of great changes and movements. The step of converting the subjects to the citizens with the instrumentalization of politics has become involuntarily raising awareness popular tendencies. This popular consciousness has increasingly led to political discourse, religion, language, and the idea of German, which, together with the idea of German citizenship, finally commemorates the cultural unity with citizenship (Calhoun, 1993, p.221). Due to the period from 1880 to 1914 was also the period of the largest mass migrations within and among states, the period of imperialism and the growing inter-national rivalries punctuated by world war. The developments have soon become a

nightmare for Socialism. The French Revolution and the establishment of the German union have transformed from a series of positive meanings into a bigoted means of policy, linking the masses with popular logic and laying the groundwork for right-wing policies. This popular nationalist era between 1880-1914 years by some historians also testifies to the foundation of modern nationalism (Calhoun, 1993, p.221). During the development of the aforementioned two nationalist movements, the instrumentalized context is the massification of nationalism and its use by governments.

The concept of the *Great War* was first experienced by the "First World War" which took place between 1914 and 1918 (Stevenson, 2004). The events until this date have transformed nationalism into a concept adopted by the masses of the people and placed on the popular basis by the rightwing policies (Avineri, 1991, p.654). With its changing meaning and definition, the notion of citizenship, the state, a sense of loyalty to a country, and the fact that only the people who have a history of self-determination, has started to be defined by the influence of German nationalism's emphasis on culture (Breuilly, 2000, p.195), by the fact that all people with a religion, language, race, and past can determine their own destiny. In this context, the ownership of nationalism by right policies combined with the unrealized utopia of Marxism and the Great Depression of Capitalism constituted the basis for chauvinistic nationalism of Fascism and Nazism after the First World War (Kardeş, 2015, pp.199-208). The idea that every nation with common cultural (ethnic) characteristics could determine its own destiny has led to the emergence of many large and small states from the collapse of Empires. Due to a commemoration of nationalism with ethnic culture; the concepts of citizenship, homeland and state are becoming a political tool used by these small states to homogenize non-homogenous ethnic cultures. While the dilemma has been conceptualized with the patriotism phenomenon for the European world, the societies that have not yet reached the level of civilization determined by the standards in non-European societies appear as ethnic nationalism (Avineri, 1991, p.641). The emphasis on ethnic culture, with the definition of nationalism on common religion, language, race and history in small countries, generates confusion. On the other hand, the new

system of small states had ethnically inhomogeneous peoples, which led to the emergence of the concept of minority (Kohn, 2017, p.xi). This new situation has led to a hostile attitude towards the state policies of minorities as well as to the relatives of minorities outside the state borders and to the formation of their foreign policies within the framework of this attitude.

After the First World War, the concept of nationalism for the world that sails to a completely different phase has come back with a more violent state of backwardness. While nationalism is an important ideology within the European system, it has begun to influence the rest of the world, especially the colonies of Western countries (Anderson, 1983/2006, pp.110-111). The nationalist movements, which emerged against the colonialist countries after the First World War, pointed to a stage in which nationalism showed the greatest wave of spread. This nationalism, which was described as Third World Nationalism, was perceived by anti-colonial movements as patriotism, just as in the French Revolution, but this time included the feeling of belonging to its homeland as a defensive ideology against the colonial powers (Anderson, 2006, pp.111-140). The point that should not be forgotten was that it included too much emphasis on ethnic culture. In the post-World War II period, this kind of nationalism, which was rapidly increasing and spreading, was called patriotism. As a result of both the colonialist powers fuelling the ethnic differences in these countries and the intellectuals with the patriotism of the less developed countries, where influenced by Western civilization and cultural concepts have helped to gain their independence. After a short period of time, the majority of the countries that gained independence, ethnic pressures, conflicts and minorities have come to the fore and have become a ball of inevitable problems.

The emergence of a triple movement that guided world politics immediately coincided with the aftermath Second World War (WW II) and divided the world into three (East and West-Bloc and Third World countries) (Arnold, 2010). While the concept of nationalism was under control in the West, it was pacified in the East (countries with socialist order). In this context, nationalism did not remain a source of inspiration for other non-liberal peoples of the East

and was seen as a characteristic of the victory of the anti-colonial struggle in Asia and Africa. In this sense, the patriotism of intellectuals who tried to be Western, educated in the West, but called their people to struggle against the West has revealed the nationalism of a less developed country, which is different from the nationalism described as patriotism in Europe (Brown, 2003, p.9). Another point that should be emphasized in this sense is that these developments are not detached from the outside and not only based on internal events. These movements, perceived as a negative form for Europe, have presented a grifted structure that has been intertwined with the concepts of modernization, liberation from colonialism and anti-capitalist industrialization. In the second half of the 20th Century, it began to be seen as the source of ethnic policies that caused inter-communal conflict (Gellner, 1983, p.51, 82; Calhoun, 1993, pp.214-216).

The concept of nationalism, which changed its shape and meaning after the WW II, has evolved from the patriotism context by the end of the Cold War and has now evolved into a concept that leads to anti-colonial and ethnic conflicts. Nationalism, born as a modern concept with the patriotism of the civilized societies of Europe and the cultural union definitions of German Romanticism, while spreading to non-Western countries, different historical situations and definitions in different geographies; it eventually turned into an international problem (Calhoun, 1993, p.215). The concept of nationalism, which cannot be derived and renew itself, cannot go beyond being a reflection where bad replicas and different paradigms meet. The situation coincides exactly with the reading of Edward Said (2003, pp.3-4).

> Historically and culturally there is a quantitative as well as a qualitative difference between the Franco-British involvement in the Orient and— until the period of American ascendancy after World War II—the involvement of every other European and Atlantic power. To speak of Orientalism therefore is to speak mainly, although not exclusively, of a British and French cultural enterprise, a project whose dimensions take in such disparate realms as the imagination itself, the whole of India and the Levant, the Biblical texts and the Biblical lands, the spice

trade, colonial armies and a long tradition of colonial administrators, a formidable scholarly corpus, innumerable Oriental "experts" and "hands", an Oriental professorate, a complex array of "Oriental" ideas (Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, sensuality), many Eastern sects, philosophies, and wisdoms domesticated for local European use—the list can be extended more or less indefinitely.

Of course, there are also views rejecting this clarifying view of Said. They link the formation of colonial societies and even the formation of the modern world to the remaining legacy of colonial empires and say that many of the communities that are independent of colonialism maintain this order themselves (Gellner, 1983, pp.97-101). It should not be concluded that there are only other forms in non-Western countries. The use of the *divide and rule* policy as a means of ethnic nationalism, which exists on the basis of ethnic culture, has also played an important role in these ethnic conflicts in order not to lose their colonies completely after their independence. During their colonies, they divided the order into administrative regions to easily manage the ethnic groups. Moreover, new problems have been articulated with treaties such as guarantees and alliance agreements with these colonial powers after independence, and the new borders of the states that have been created in a geographically arbitrary manner have fueled these conflicts (Gokcek, 2011, pp.280-282).

The 1980s, when the Cold War was nearing the end, it was perceived as the world of the waves of the European Union and globalization. It was not seen as a sign of ethnic conflict in Third World countries and a sign that the role of popular rightist/leftist politics would continue to increase in domestic politics (McCrone, 2002, pp.1-2, 8). On the contrary, as defined by the authors who contributed to the literature in the 1970s the allegations of the neo-Marxist scholars Michael Hechter (1975a, 1975b, 2000), and Tom Nairn (1981, 1997), who focused on the role of economic factors in the formation of nationalism, were on the agenda. In fact, nationalism, as Doğu Ergil has stated; from a pre-capitalist economy and unorganized social formations, to form of an organization of the capitalist economic order; it has adopted a

historical mission to link disorganized economic agents and groups to a common national decision center (Ergil, 1983). Due to global economic-political approaches, the idea has emerged that the borders of nation-states have become obscure. The supranational institutions such as international, regional and even EU strengthened, and that the world would be reshaped and integrated within the framework of values of democracy and human rights, predicted that the role of nationalism would be reduced in the New World order (Held & Archibugi, 1995). The wave of change between 1989 and 1991 was the end of Communist regimes and many ethnic issues (which were pacified) came to light. The changing climate has become destructive and relentless, just like the cold air wave coming from the Balkans (Lieven & Harris, 1997). With the collapse of socialist systems in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, at least nationalism has gained new momentum (Cachafeiro, 2017, pp.1-2). The developments have been the scene of bloody events in the heart of Europe (Ignatieff, 1993) in the last decade of the 20th Century, the so-called *Balkanization* (Breuilly, 2013, p.543; Maga, 1989; Glynn, 1993). Secessionist nationalist movements ensured the re-sharing of administrations and borders (a fight in former-Yugoslavia), and these conditions were painful; however, it was also possible to move on to the normalization process under these conditions. The increasing influx of refugees and the tendency of human mobility, societies to protect their local cultures and to have more ownership of ethnic cultures has been one of the factors that increase nationalism in domestic politics.

The emergence of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc countries was, in fact, a component of many factors. The use of nationalism as a political tool by bureaucrats of the former communist regime played an active role in filling the political and social gap formed after communism. This wave, which is a sui generis movement, is not only a feature of Third World nationalism, but it has developed in opposition to another ethnic group or nation, sometimes against the central government or against another state (Linden, 2008).

As a result, the origins of the concept of nationalism, starting with the French Revolution and the German Romanticism, have come up with an important concept that shows the influence of both the international relations and the domestic and foreign policies of the states. Nationalism has been a source of inspiration for many concepts such as patriotism, ethnic culture, the right to self-determination, nation-state, 'other' distinction, national identity, wars, ethnic problems, and right-wing conservative policies. Nationalism as subject and location, it is a concept that affects the recent history, which has a massive role both to the individual and to the society and is directly influenced by hundreds of millions. Nationalism has been dealt with in almost every discipline of social sciences such as sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, philosophy, and communication. Nationalism as a research area in the 20th Century has peaked in the 1980s with the works of the most renowned names of the field. The concept of nationalism needs a common recognition, like concepts in other disciplines of social sciences. Many issues are still being questioned about the origin of concepts, how and why they arise, what kinds of features should be sought, and many questions are still being asked for answers.

2.2   Nationalism as a Study Area in Social Sciences

The origins of the idea of nationalism can be traced back to the end of the 18th Century, to Herder and Fichte (Barnard, 1965) and to Kant and Rousseau (Carr, 1945; Kedourie, 1960). On the other hand, considering it as a subject of social science was found in the 1920s and 1930s. Although nationalism has a very old history in terms of feelings, behaviors and attitudes based on national sentiment, it is a modern phenomenon as an ideology or political doctrine. Although many different definitions have been made about nationalism, the common point of these definitions is that nationalism is a moral and normative system of belief (Smith, 2000, p.40). Nationalism emerged in Western Europe after the Industrial Revolution as a political ideology (Baradat, 1991, p.1). In fact, this time period corresponds to the emergence of the concept of the nation-state in Western Europe with the transition from the feudal order to the central state order. The process of social change that has been taking place since the 15th Century (Hasting,

1997) has accelerated and the main ideology that came to the fore in the social and political fields as a result of the new collective needs in the countries that carry out the Industrial Revolution has become nationalism (Deutsch 1966; Tilly, 1975). Since the end of the 18th Century, it has first been defined intellectually by many Enlightenment and anti-Enlightenment thinkers and has gradually become a political and mass concept. It is in the years after the First World War that nationalism, which is seen as a positive element in the domestic and foreign policies of the states and sometimes seen as a problem in international relations, has started to be examined by social scientists (Smith, 2000, p. 57).[15]

It can be said that nationalism, which is one of the main dynamics of history and politics from the 19th Century, has entered the world of ideologies and continued its influence until today. According to Leon Baradat (1991, p.11):

> nationalism is the most powerful political idea of the last several hundred years. It has a great impact on every person in every modern society [and] is so powerful that it has dominated almost every other idea system [except] only certain extreme forms of anarchism.

This ideology, which has a very high social profitability in different geographies and at different times and can mobilize the masses, has strong ties with modernization. It may be thought that societies and communities were a collective consciousness in the past, but the integration of this consciousness into the nation and the state began in the 19th Century. The British, French or German nations have not been discovered in the 19th Century, but along with nationalism these nations have politicized and established their nation-states in which the national borders and political borders coincide with the Gellner's definitions (1983, pp.1-2)

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[15] "As for nationalist ideologies, interwar pioneers of the study of nationalism—Carlton Hayes, Louis Snyder, and Hans Kohn, as well as Edward Carr and Alfred Cobban…" Smith (2000, p. 57).

Nationalism can be seen as a form of culture, as well as a kind of political ideology and social movement (Smith, 2002b, p.7). In other words, nationalism includes both the foundation of politics on a cultural basis and the politicization of culture (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.21). In general, nationalism is the subject of sociology, especially in terms of the circumstances in which it has emerged, but nationalism as an ideology is mainly the subject of political theory and philosophy (Erdoğan, 1999, p.89). As a result, of the transformation of nationalism into a mass action, becoming a social phenomenon and great transformations (the emergence of new states, independence movements, great wars, etc...), it is observed that there was no systematic study of nationalism in the period until 1914 when social scientists began to deal with the issue. The small-scale studies until that date were more philosophical and largely focused on the writings and criticisms of James Stuart Mill (1806-1873), Ernest Renan (1882) and Lord Acton (1948).

Nationalist studies after the First World War were more neutral and stripped of their feelings. Historians such as Carlton Hayes (1931), Hans Kohn (1944, 1965) and Louis Snyder (1963, 1968) played a particularly active role in nationalism-related studies, and these historians' attitudes to the subject had elements of sociological analysis. It is obvious how different this approach is from the historical approach that deals with events-facts in a chronological dimension and in a linear way. Studies on nationalism, which have gained an increasing momentum between the two world wars (*inter-war period*), have been further enriched by the emergence of totalitarian regimes in Europe, and by studies that take into account the psychological dimension (Hertz, 1944). Following Hans Kohn (1944), who made the first distinction between progressive Western nationalism resulting from the French Revolution and the subsequent nationalisms that became increasingly conservative and reactionary, many social scientists developed theories in this field.

After the WW II, a new era of nationalism research has been introduced. The emergence of the newly independent states in Africa and Asia has led to an intense interest in the issue. Those who made significant contributions were American political scientists who were interested in the problems of political

development. Political scientists such as Alpter (1964), Halpern (1964), Geertz (1963) and Emerson (1960) have not only given us a better understanding of the political systems of Africa and Asia, but also explored the causes and consequences of nationalism in a broader global context, far from the European framework. The focus of interest of political scientists has been on the role of nationalism in the creation of a new nation.

According to many researchers, Jean Jacques Rousseau and even the cosmopolitan thinker Immanuel Kant are the first to come to mind among the thinkers who contributed to the formation of German romanticism. According to Kedourie (1960), who explained nationalism with currents of thought, Kant is the starting point of everything. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is not a nationalist and cannot be held responsible for how his ideas are interpreted by later generations. However, according to Kedourie, the political consequences of the morality developed and the epistemological dichotomy would be great. The basis of this duality lies in the distinction between the world of phenomena and the *inner world* of the individual. According to Kant, the source of the information was the impression of the world of phenomena. But morality should never be tied to the world of the appearance, that is, to the *outside world*. That was the new formula of Kant's: '*The goodwill was free and autonomous*' (Lindsay, 1919, p.102). With this formula, the *self-determining individual* was placed at the center of the universe. It is not difficult to predict the echoes of this in the political arena: According to the formula, t*he right to self-determination was the most valid value*, and *republicanism* reflecting the autonomous will of the citizens was the most valid form of government.

In response to Kant, Fichte claimed that these were the reflection of universal consciousness or ego. This eliminates the inexplicable laws of Kant, making the outside world completely understandable. The connection of the external world with universal consciousness brought the idea that this world should be perceived as an organic whole. Fichte claimed that individuals gained reality only as long as they were included in a whole so that the individual's freedom (self-actualization) would be only through identification with the whole. These

thoughts lead Fichte to an *organic state*. According to this, the state has its [own] integrity and is important than to the individual, precedes it. In this context, individual freedom can be realized when the individual and the state are one (Wood, n.d.).

The ideas of the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) will enable us to understand the basic features of this view. According to Dumont, Herder's main purpose is to oppose the Universalist thought and Enlightenment, which was quite common at the time (Dumont, 1992, pp.113-132; Parkin, 2009, pp.80-87). The starting point of Herder is *language*. People, who speak a common language, constitute the first stage of the nation. The nation is a natural extension of the *family* because it is the smallest group in which language is shared. Every human being is the product of a particular language and community. In other words, each language is different from each other, is unique, and that means it has its own way of thinking. This logic, of course, is not only for language but also for traditions, ceremonies, memoirs, laws, practices, myths etc. also applies. It is clear that all of these thoughts expressed politically: '*National communities are unique and have sui generis formations*'. They may have forgotten their essence, gone through a regression process, but that doesn't mean they won't return to their old natural authentic state. The people who make up the nation must be able to determine their own destiny (this is the supreme political value) and the nation, which is the whole of the citizens, should be able to establish its own state. In this context, the equation of German romantic nationalism, which combines *language*, *nation* and *state* trio, has been formed (Judt & Lacorne, 2004, pp.3-5).

There was a direct or indirect contribution of other thinkers to the formation of the idea of nationalism. The most common name among them was the French thinker Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau's concept of *general will* influenced nationalism. According to Rousseau, the greatest danger that social life can cause is that one group could take another group under its sovereignty. The way to prevent this is to surrender to the *general will*. This can only be achieved if individuals being citizens. This will be

possible by replacing the *individual will* with the *general will* (Melzer, 1983). According to Barnard (1965), Rousseau claimed that both citizenship and patriotism could only be achieved within the nation-state. Both concepts will lose their meaning in the context of humanity. Neither citizen nor patriotic can be cosmopolitan. Rousseau argued that it would be difficult to consolidate these two concepts in large states. The consciousness of simultaneous citizenship and patriotism can be best achieved, in the small cantons. The point to note is that in Rousseau's thinking, the sources of citizenship and patriotism are different. Patriotism is a work of emotion, it originates from the inner world of man, and it is spontaneous. Citizenship is the products of the *rational will* it is more conscious. Accordingly, citizenship does not derive from patriotism; is a constructed concept.

The 19th Century would be referred to as the "*age of nationalizm*". In this century, where nationalism is more discussed with moral and philosophical dimensions, two types of approaches are generally encountered. The first of these was the approach of "*partizan*" part of thinkers and scientists, who sympathized with nationalism and who used their work to contribute to the development of a particular process. The second was a "*critical approach*" that opposed nationalism, which saw it as a temporary phase in the process of historical development. There were also Liberals –for example, Lord Acton– who advocated this second approach, which was mostly adopted by Marxists. The most important of these was that the advocates of both approaches accepted the naturalness of nationalism without questioning it as an indispensable part of social life.

According to the German historian Henrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) who claimed that there was no power over the state, the unity of the state had to be based on nationality. Nationality was the greatest value; before all values, including democracy. Treitschke also gave a definition of patriotism in his writings that having a consciousness of cooperation within the political formation, respecting the success of the ancestors, and transferring these achievements to the next generations (von Treitschke, Hausrath, & Putnam, 1914; von Treitschke, 1915; Kilgour, 2004). According to Treitschke, there

were two driving forces in history: the desire of each *real nation*[16] to establish its own state, and the tendency of each state to unite all the rights that constitute its own nation under one roof. The French historian Jules Michelet (1798-1874) saw the nation as the guarantee of individual freedom. The revolution that took place in 1789 was the beginning of a *fraternity* era. In this age of brotherhood, there was no distinction between rich-poor, noble-peasant. The conflicts in society, the fights ended, and the enemies made peace. Patriotism was a *religion* that people should worship. It was the driving force of modern France and European history (Gossman, 1974).

The supporters of nationalism were of course not only historians; for example, the British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), like the previous liberal nationalists, united the notion of republican citizenship with the idea of nationality. In his treatise *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861), J. S. Mill described his nationality as a group of human beings with proximity. This kind of affinity, sometimes ethnic similarity, sometimes common language, religion, and most of all the common history and memories. This ensured that the group was gathered under the roof of a single political power. According to Mill (1861, p.131), the way to establish free political regimes was to create a *homogeneous* national identity, a *public opinion in unity*. For this reason, the basic political unit should be a nation, not a multinational state. The nation was a precondition for free administration. Mill's thoughts allow the study to move into a *critical camp*.

The most important group of the critical camp was undoubtedly the Marxist current. The relationship between nationalism and Marxism has been the subject of many researchers. The point in which these studies are combined in general is that the intense commitment to the nation is creating both political and conceptual challenges for Marxism. Was nationalism some kind of "*false consciousness*" (Gellner, 1983, pp.124, 129) that led the proletariat to deviate from the aim of international revolution, or should the classes and class conflict first be considered within its national borders? If so, how would

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[16] Treitschke was counting only the great and powerful nations as real nations (folks).

the struggle against the national bourgeoisie coincide with the goal of establishing socialism all over the world? Those who were politically qualified were also included in these conceptual questions. Lenin, on the other hand, raised the distinction between the oppressor and the oppressed country nationalism and claimed that the oppressed people, under the pressure of imperialism, had the *right to self-determination* (Connor, 1984, p.45). The reasons for these contradictory attitudes and the lack of a Marxist theory of nationalism vary from author to author. For example, Regis Debray (1977) argues that Marxism does not give importance to the concept of nature, and therefore cannot explain the phenomenon of the nation. According to Debray, Marxism has not taken into account what we produce (mankind) but has taken into consideration the manufacturer (producer). Calhoun (1997) indicates that no thinker or scientist who ignores nationalism can be criticized as much as Marx and Engels. According to Calhoun, Marx and Engels biggest misconception was that the workers would only react to the problems caused by global capitalist integration by clinging on to their class identity. The workers had many identities as well as workers' identities. Commitments to the religious community or the nation were also directing workers' reactions (Calhoun, 1997, pp.26-28).

On the other hand, some passages in the Communist Manifesto have sparked a heated debate among writers who examined Marx and Engels's view of nationalism. These are the passages that Marx and Engels say that the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is primarily *national*. The struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, although not in its essence, initially is a form a nation-wide struggle. The proletariat of each country must, of course, first and foremost be reckoned with its bourgeoisie (Engels & Marx, 1970, p.45). Regardless of their views on the aforementioned passages, there is a complete consensus among Marxists that those who come closest to developing a concept of nationalism are Otto Bauer (1881-1938) and Karl Renner (1870-1950). Indeed, Otto Bauer's *Die Nationalitaten Frage und die Sozial Demokratie*, published in 1907, is one of the most comprehensive nationalist studies not only of Marxists but also of the entire period. Renner's solution to the problems arising from national

differences was to distinguish between the state and the nation. The areas related to the nation should be limited to education and culture, and the state should deal with social and economic issues. Bauer started to solve nationalism by defining the nation. According to Bauer, the nation was a *society of fate*, with sui generis character and culture. The origins of the nation depend on circumstances, contrary to what nationalists claim. The formation of the *language community* that Herder referred to was based on a series of factors brought about by modernization. According to Bauer, the second stage was the stage of the *cultural community* (Nimni, 2000, pp.xv-xlv). French historian Ernest Renan (1823-1892), with some thoughts, suggested in 1882, opposed to definitions that describe with objective elements.

> But then what is a nation? […] How is Switzerland, which has three languages, two religions, and three or four races, a nation while Tuscany, for example, which is so homogenous, is not one? Why is Austria a state and not a nation? In what respect does the principal of nationality differ from that of race?

Moving from this point, Renan (1882) argued that the nations were not eternal and that they would have an end as well: "A heroic past with great men and glory (I mean true glory) is the social capital upon which the national idea rests". Renan, who tried to adhere to liberal principles, brought politics and common history to the forefront in the birth of nations.

As a social phenomenon, the theoretical approaches to nation and nationalism can be divided into two main camps, as a social-cultural approach and as a social-political approach. The theories developed for nationalism have been classified within themselves in time and located in three different general approaches. These will be considered as *Primordialist*, *Ethnosymbolist* (social-cultural) and *Modernist* as (social-political) trends or theories.

The first criterion used in this classification is how the ideas about what nationalism is, how it emerges, what sources it nourishes, how it matures, how it is spreading, and why it is so strongly embraced. Whether a distinction can be made, like good and bad nationalism (Kohn, 1944), whether nationalism is a modern concept (Gellner, 1983) or whether it is an element of continuity that has roots in pre-modern periods (Smith, 1986), whether it is culture (Gellner, 1983) or not whether it was a concept related to politics (Breuilly, 1993), and in parallel, whether the nations were invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983/2000) or modernizing their old roots, has deepened these similarities and differences.

The most important differentiation in nationalism theories focuses on the origin of nationalism. Accordingly, there are three different phrases of theories: Primordialist, Ethnosymbolist, and Modernist. According to the Primordialist theory, the past determines the future and nations have existed since eternity and it's just as natural as human sight and speech. According to ethnosymbolists, the past is the boundary and in most cases, modern nations have evolved from pre-existing ethnic communities and are a flexible element of the social and political environment as they respond to the genuine needs of people. According to modernists, the past is used by the present and the nations, which have emerged as a direct or indirect consequence of the different processes associated with modernization, apply to the past to legitimize their present existence and reflect themselves to the future. Accordingly, primordialists focus on genetics, kinship ties, and affinity to relatives, social origins and cultural references depending on subdivisions within the paradigm. While perennialists (Ethnosymbolist) base their ideas on the constant or recurring concrete nature of nations, modernists attach more importance to the socio-economic, socio-cultural, political and ideological pillars of nationalism.

Another group of researchers has argued that it is necessary to develop typologies that will determine the origins of nation and nationalism and that a concept which can explain its nature cannot be produced, but which will have different forms of nation and nationalism (Özkırımlı 2010, pp.35-39).

Özkırımlı (2010, pp.9-10) points out that the subject can be examined in four periods of time. It was described as the birth of the idea of nationalism in 18th & 19th Century; 1918-1945 when the academy was the subject; 1945-1989 when the debate intensified; and since 1989 as an attempt to overcome classical understanding. It is possible to distinguish three basic groups of individuals who perceive and construed themselves as members of a single nation and accordingly state structures. In the first group, they were designed as centred in Europe and the near vicinity. In the second group, are formed as a result of immigrants coming from various geographical regions and observed in America (Europeans abroad), and the third group emerged after the First World War when empires collapsed and were replaced by new independents. The structuring of all three groups of nation and nation-state fiction includes qualities that distinctly distinguish themselves from the fiction of the other group and the form of structuring. This qualitative difference was primarily due to the specific conditions of each group's formation (Erözden, 1997, p.9). No matter how specific the particular conditions of the nation-state fiction of all groups, the specific conditions in question have a common goal.

The modern state has dedicated the concept of *sovereignty* to the continuity of its own power by basing the principle of power on the people, which has been collectivized by one person, and made the concept of sovereignty its own ornament (Ardito, 2015, pp.177-182). In medieval Europe, which is foreign to the modern state idea, personal agreements are inevitable. It was a strange understanding that no one other than the king had the power to legitimate and enforce laws (Hague, Harrop & McCormick, 2016, pp.23-24). Along with the loss of the political and social power of the church and empires; first the concept of absolute state was formed, then the concepts of the modern state, citizenship, and nation emerged as a product of a multi-layered historical background (Breuilly, 1996, pp.164-167). The king against church and lords, in the sense that the use of the *auctoritas* and the *potestas* belong to him, had to resort to the nation in *de facto* and then legally (Arendt, 2006, Chapter 4, section 2).

Throughout the 18th and 19th Centuries, a nation that is a *homogeneous* community in cultural terms, the nature of sovereignty has expanded within this semantics (Gellner, 1983, p.24).[17] This process of enlargement and homogenization has been shaped by the need for legitimacy of the modern state and the problem of mobilization of its citizens. Together with this problem, a tension between state and sub-micro-identities has formed and these two sides are articulated. The formation of massive national movements has been shaped within the context of this tension (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, pp.84-92).

Ernest Gellner begins by addressing the relationship between the question of legitimacy and nationalism in the work of the Nation and Nationalism. Accordingly, "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state" (Gellner, 1983, p.1). Benedict Anderson, in his work on imagined communities, defines the nation as an imagined community that will reveal itself to *sovereignty*, and as cultural productions shaped together with nationalism (Anderson, 2006, pp.5-6). The expression "*cultural construction*" in this context points to the concept of nation and sovereignty and the opposition of the modern state to the question of legitimacy. However, national identity is not a *ready* answer, but rhetoric and a construction process in which different answers are included (Calhoun, 1997, p.6).

Before being conceived as a nation in a modern sense, the word "*nation*" was understood as a community based on "common language, or culture, or geography, or religion, and try to identify nations by grouping together those who share the particular defining characteristics" (Nevzat, 2005, pp.15). Under the conditions triggered by the dynamics that condition modern states,

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[17] Regionalism has maintained its existence until the 19th century; it was not until the 1900s that the majority of the French peasantry was fully incorporated into the French nation, despite the fact that a mass national education had been implemented and that the Third Republic had been under military service in the *"Jacobin"* state (Smith, 1991, p. 58).

the word 'nation' expands to mean a multi-dimensional emigration. Previously, the nation, which represented basically nobility and intellectuals, laid the ground for the expansion of the bourgeois class (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.10). The pioneers of this expansion first naturalized and personalized the nation by writing new histories and built it as a transcendent being at the same time. Within the anatomy of the concept of nation, the concept of linear history and primordial identity assertions are articulated; national historiography has been put into effect to awaken a sense of collective identity (Calhoun, 1997, pp.51-54).

In his pioneering work, Karl Deutsch, like Gellner, tried to explain the processes of nation formation based on the distinction between traditional society and industrial society. That the nations are based on the intensification of complex relations; urbanization, newspapers and book literacy, have shaped this density (Dieckhoff & Jaffrelot, 2005, pp.13-14). Benedict Anderson, influenced by Deutsch's approach, followed a similar course, drawing attention to the influence of capitalist publishing in the process of building nations. Anderson argues that the essence of the imagination of the nation is changed, is an age in which the tongues of the *Holy Truth* fall, the hierarchies, the cosmology and the understandings of the time change; were originated from the interaction between the capitalist system, printing technology, and linguistic diversity (Anderson, 2006, p.36).

Elie Kedourie has developed an analysis of thinkers like Kant, Fichte, and Schelling in his work titled *Nationalism*. According to Kedourie, there is a connection between the concepts of *will* and *nation*. Kedourie, who refers to the text of Ernest Renan, *What is the Nation? (1882)* argues that there is an association between nation affiliation, the wills of individuals, and their right to self-determination (Kedourie, 1960, pp.80-81). Fichte, who set out from the concept of self-determination of the individual who finds expression in Kant's philosophy, is the first thinker to systematically present the nationalist movement (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.11-14).

The revolutionary new order that established itself with the idea of an individual with natural rights; when the understanding of cosmology of the old philosophy is inadequate; it has embraced the capacity to precisely determine the purpose and boundaries of human knowledge without resorting to the ideological and metaphysical assumptions of *self-determination* that are embodied in the Kantian philosophy (Kedourie, 1960, pp.20-31). According to Gellner, this view of Kedourie does not conform to historical facts. According to him, there is no relation between the concept of Kant's self-determination and the self-determination of the nation's. The idea of homogeneity based on individual wills did not itself cause nationalism; the need for homogeneity brought by the industrialists has caused nationalism (Gellner, 1983, p.46).

Essentially, Kedourie (1960, pp.74-82) also refers to modern nations, among to the struggles between dynasties and wars between states; to the divergent differentiation of the interstate force balance of the European state system, and the *ius gentium*. In addition, he has pointed to the impact caused by such factors such as population growth, an industrial revolution, and the destruction of traditional society (Kedourie, 1960, pp.95-96). However, while pointing out structural transformations and highlighting the intellectuals' sense of belonging to the nation with modern wisdom, he left the question of why this emotion turned into a nation-building process (Dieckhoff & Jaffrelot, 2005, 47-48).

According to Gellner (1983, pp.36-37), state organization as a specialization and concentration for the construction and preservation of order is a prerequisite for the emergence of nationalism. The author has touched on the potential for the nation formation of high cultures reshaped by the states; but mainly focused on the responses to the legitimacy problem that governments have shaped (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.130-131). According to Gellner, for the construction of a homogenous society for industrialization, after partly absorbing the cultural fragmentation problem that needs to be overcome national movements have been shaped and the road to the crystallization of national consciousness has been prepared (Dieckhoff & Jaffrelot, 2005,

pp.18-19). The developing modern state has undertaken the construction of an *individual* who has an active, literate and standard culture that is required by the industrial revolution that took place in the old state form (Gellner, 1983, pp.63-65).

According to Gellner, the self and potentially existing and the destiny that must be laid down in history, the understanding of the natural nation is a myth. "Nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures" (Gellner, 1983, p.49). Gellner's conception of nations as modern data is supported by many theorists; where the concept of "*invention*" that he used was caused by the discussions. Benedict Anderson, along with joining Gellner on the modernity of the nations, criticized the theorist over the concept of the invention. "Gellner is so anxious to show that nationalism masquerades under false pretences that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'" (Anderson, 2006, p.6).

The research on what nationalism is, why and how it was built, what processes are spreading, and what are the social, political and ideological foundations of it are shaped within the framework of questions such as good and bad nationalism. The majority of Marxist researchers, who evaluate nationalism as a negative concept within the framework of racism and *center-periphery* (exploiter-exploited), argue that a distinction cannot be made, such as good and bad/evil nationalism. Since nationalism has an exclusionary and racist language from its birth, they advocated their views as the process of spreading from Europe to the world. This racist language has diversified both internally (language in the internal politics of non-European states) and externally (the distinction between the *civilized* European nationalism and the nationalism of underdeveloped countries). Etienne Balibar (1991), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974/2011a, 1980/2011b, 1989/2011c, 2011d) and Partha Chatterjee (1975, 1993) are some of these researchers.

According to Etienne Balibar (1991), nationalism is not the sole cause of racism, but the decisive condition for its emergence. Racism is the *other* for everyone, or rather, the place of the *other* race. The transformation of nationalisms aiming at liberation into nationalisms aiming at domination originates from this feature of nationalism, and this experience obliges constantly question about the repressive potentials of all sorts of nationalism. Racism is constantly emerging from nationalism, and not only outward, but also inward. Racism is not an expression of nationalism, but an attachment to nationalism. It is always excessive compared to it, but it is always necessary for its construction. What theoretical racism calls race or culture is a constant source of the nation and an intensified form of attributes that belong only to citizens. The nation must gather around the race. The racial-cultural identity of real citizens remains invisible, but this identity reveals itself as opposed to the semi-imaginary pseudo-visibility of fake citizens. 'Imperialism' (Smith, 1955) established itself on the basis of civilization from the simple conquest attempt and transformed itself into a universal hegemony only as racism (Balibar, 1991, pp.37-64).

Wallerstein also looks at the concepts that are systematically associated with each other such as race, nation and ethnicity. He associates race with the center-periphery relations, the nation with the system of states formed in this center-periphery relations, and ethnicity with the concept of minorities within these states. In this context, the race, which encompasses the nation and ethnicity as a general feature of the system, is related to the division of labour in the world economy, that is, the center-periphery contrast. The concept of nation is related to the political superstructure of this historical system, the sovereign states that form and derive from it the interstate system. The ethnic group category, on the other hand, is associated with the establishment of household structures that ensure the protection of the large share of free labour in capital accumulation, and therefore nationalism is also a sub-phase of racism (1989/2011c, p.225; 2011d, pp.58, 154-155, 172, 182).

The debate between Gellner and Anderson over the concept of "invention" continued with the argument between Anderson and Partha Chatterjee that

the places of origin of nations imitate each other chronologically and use them as models (Anderson, 2006, p.141-142). According to Anderson (2006, pp.139-140), in the case of Asia and Africa, in parallel with capitalist publishing, the pioneering leadership of individuals who have gone through disjointed and colonial education from the local bourgeoisie and the vanguard elites has used Western models of nationhood during their nation formation process. Partha Chatterjee, in '*The Nation and its Fragments*', objected to that argument of Anderson. According to Chatterjee (1993, p.5), it is not possible to claim that the communities envisioned in the colonies were chosen in an interlocking way between the European and American patterns. In Chatterjee's view (1993, p.5), even the imaginations of the colonial peoples were abandoned forever to be exploited.

According to Anderson (2006, p.46), the nation as an imagined community; shaped for the first time in American colonies and then subsequently passed to the European continent. At first, nation-building based on the idea of salvation turned into a political and ideological problem in the second (Erözden, 1997, p.17). According to this thesis; the age of nations consists of three stages: the first is the influence of states formed in Latin America in the early 19th Century; second, Woodrow Wilson's move that problem to Europe during the Treaty of Versailles; and third, the period opened by world order resulting from the independence of the colonies (Hall, 1993, p.2).

According to Anderson (2006, pp.47-58), the reduction in the influence of the central state, not the language, is a trigger in America's experience. American-born officers, mainly European, but unable to benefit from the privileges of being European, have gained geography and history awareness during their administrative travel. As well as the analysis of Anderson's experiences in the Asian and African, his view of the national experiences of the American colonies is also European-centered. Officials ('*criollos*' *or* '*creole*' *as Anderson term*)[18] who have gone through the education of

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[18] "person born in a country but of a people not indigenous to it," c. 1600, from French *créole* (17c.), from Spanish *criollo* "(person) native to a locality," from Portuguese *crioulo*,

Western-based states and who have imagined their own communities in their institutions have led the process of nation formation through the ideal of Europe (2006, pp.61-65).

The *criollo* communities, which are not from to the lower races but associated with European culture; was considered a threat to European states that have political, cultural, and military means (Anderson, 2006, pp.58-59). According to Anderson (2006), while Asian and African nations copied European models; the imaginary communities in the American colonies are shaped by the bureaucrats that the European states have appointed in the colonies. Thus, Anderson, on the one hand, talking about colonial memory; on the other hand, by making a reading centred on the administrative practices of criollo servants; instead of developing a view from the bottom made a Europe-centred emphasis. In this context, Anderson's colonial nations seem to have been given before national movements have taken shape. The unconscious process and the imagined community, which he describes, lack historicity (Dieckhoff & Jaffrelot, 2005, p.16).

According to Anderson (2006, pp.24-26, 194), a momentary conception of medieval thought, in which the idea of the past and the future are intertwined, is dominant; has been replaced by the idea of *homogeneous empty time.*The novels and the newspapers, which are active in the construction of the nation, have been dealt with in the idea of empty time. Anderson claims that this is the separation Walter Benjamin made between *homogeneous empty time* and *historical time*. Accordingly, the idea of progress imagined that humanity is inhomogeneous and empty time perception. According to Benjamin, "*homogeneous empty time*" is the exact opposite of historical time (Benjamin, 2007, pp.261-264). *"Empty homogeneous time is the time of capital"* and nationalism is a supporter who takes over this idea, the one that drives, wrapped in this idea and who desires homogenization (Chatterjee,

diminutive of cria"person (especially a servant) raised in one's house," from criar "to raise or bring up," from Latin creare "to make, bring forth, produce, beget," from PIE root *ker- (2) "to grow" (Retrieved from https://www.etymonline.com/ word/creole).

2001, p.399). This supporter; located on the past and future plane, the vertical time conception was put into effect for the purpose of adding horizontal synchronicity between spaces; it became the basis for making massification possible through capitalist publishing (Erözden, 1997, pp.15-16).

> The revolutionary vernacularizing thrust of capitalism […] a change in the character of Latin itself, […] the impact of the Reformation, which, at the same time, owed much of its success to print-capitalism and […] spread of particular vernaculars as instruments of administrative centralization by certain well-positioned would-be absolutist monarchs. […] They created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars; […] the embryo of the nationally imagined community. […] Print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation (Anderson, 2006, pp.39-44).

According to Anderson (2006, pp.115-116), the spread of capitalism on the world scale; homogenization policies and popularization of mass education, has created bilingual elites. These elites, in the process of nation formation built-in "*homogeneous empty time*", through the literacy of printed material, have the opportunity to say 'we could be like Westerners'. Chatterjee criticized Anderson in this regard, and the thesis that the new institutional space of the national language is capitalist publishing is correct but argued that the original features of the colonies did not allow for a simple transfer of European models (Chatterjee, 1993, p.7). In connection with this criticism, Chatterjee criticized Anderson in his work entitled "*the nation in heterogeneous time*" to regard modernity as a homogeneous empty time conception, a womb where nations are imagined. Accordingly, homogeneous empty time is the time of the capital. Humans cannot live in homogeneous

empty time; they can only imagine it. In this sense, the real space of life consists of *heterotopy*[19] (Michel Foucault's word) (Chatterjee, 2001, p.402).[20]

Between Gellner, Anderson, and Chatterjee, the debate on how the nations can be invented, imagined, and constructed; it is not limited to these authors. Although Eric Hobsbawm admits that, in the study of the Gellner's '*Nations and Nationalism'*, treatment for nationalism as a politics and conflict of national units; claims that not considering ordinary people's gaze limits Gellner's theory and leaves it incomplete (Hobsbawm, 2013, pp.9-11). According to Hobsbawm, ethnicity is effective in nationalism, but its roots are not in culture. Their roots are an ideology based on the principle of wrong consciousness that should be sought mainly in the political economy (Calhoun, 2007, p.54). In this framework, Hobsbawm acknowledges that the preliminary national movements are partly effective in the process of nation formation, but according to him, the main determinant is the process of state-building (Hobsbawm, 2000, pp.71-79).

In the process of nation-building, which is the determinant of modern state construction, religious and cultural choices provide only partial advantages (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, pp.69-72). According to Hobsbawm nations and national movements are products of social engineering. In this context, "*invented traditions*" that are put into practice during the construction of nations must be examined (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.94). Thus, in Hobsbawm's thesis national ideology, personalize the nation through invented traditions, in a way that corresponds to economic politics, interests, and processes and build the nation as a collective entity. "It is clear that plenty of political institutions, ideological movements and groups - not least in nationalism -

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[19] The prefix hetero- is from Ancient Greek ἕτερος (héteros, "other, another, different") and is combined with the Greek morpheme τόπος ("place") and means "other place". Foucault uses the term "heterotopia" (French: hétérotopie) to describe spaces that have more layers of meaning or relationships to other places than immediately meet the eye.

[20] Accordingly, anti-colonial nationalism has begun to build its own sovereignty far beyond the spiritual realm of the colonial state through the distinction made between the material field and the internal domain of cultural identity in which the West dominates.

were so unprecedented that even historic continuity, had to be invented" (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.7). This is a proposal close to Anderson's thesis that the nations can be imagined inhomogeneous empty time. However, while Anderson pointing to the space opened by the capitalist publishing, the scope, power, and meaning of national movements for Hobsbawm are determined by the state (Smith, 1986, p.10). Hobsbawm, in accordance with the decisive role of state construction; takes ethnic and cultural categories as secondary elements. According to Hobsbawm (2013, pp.63-65), even the most obvious ethnic differences for modern nations have played a secondary role. This does not mean that the standard language is not an important element of national unity because it can be invented like everything else.

An inventive standard language that is not a direct product of ethnicity is a combination of power balances and the intersection of historical conditions. According to Hobsbawm (2013, p.59-62), language is important in shaping the model of elite communities in communication. The standard common language is a must for the construction of nations, with the feeling of attaining eternal stability. In this context, Hobsbawm seems to follow the Gellnerian line. Gellner (1994, pp.37-38) claimed that ethnicity was eroded by industrial society and that what constitutes *ethnicity* and standard language was built by national movements within a pool of cultural differences.

The most important contribution of Eric Hobsbawm to the theories of nationalism is the term of *proto-nationalism*, which takes advantage of the theories of Gellner and Hroch and forms his ideas about the construction of the nation and the expansion of nationalism. Hobsbawm, which reveals the fictional link between proto-nationalism and modern nationalism, first used the term nationalist as defined by Gellner, in the sense of a principle that essentially argues that the *political unit* and the *national unit* should be compatible. While defending that the nation belongs only to a specific and historically close period, Hobsbawm criticises Gellner for not giving sufficient importance to the evaluation of the sub-culture and agrees that Hroch should

divide the history of national movements into three stages (Hobsbawm, 2013, pp.46-79).

In spite of his views as a synthesis of the theories of Gellner and Hroch about the construction and spread of nationalism, Hobsbawm concentrates on the connection between European societies and modern nationalism from the modern world, which he described as proto-nationalism, and presents a unique interpretation of nationalism. According to Hobsbawm (2013, p.54), national languages are almost always semi-artificial constructs and things that are almost invented. On the other hand, the most important element of proto-nationalism is the consciousness of belonging to a political unit, not of language, ethnic origin or religion (Hobsbawm, 2013, p.59). There is no historical continuity between proto-nationalism and modern nationalism, but proto-nationalism facilitates its work in the process of spreading nationalism. The establishment of a state is not enough to create a nation (2013, pp.76-78). The important point here is the massification of national consciousness of ordinary people so that nationalism can become a political power.

In his book '*Encounters with Nationalism*', Gellner (1994) repeats that he regards the concept of culture as a secondary element. According to this view, "polity, to a nationalist order characterized by anonymous mobile masses who share a literate culture transmitted by an educational system and who are protected by a state identified with that culture" (Gellner, 1994, p.28). The fundamental element that creates the need for anonymous and homogenous communities is the effect of industrialization and modernization. John Breuilly, in the title '*Approaches to Nationalisms*', states that Gellner's homogeneity through mass education that the claim that it is necessary for industrialization is correct, but that process is limited because it does not explain why and how it applies (Breuilly, 1996, p.161). Accordingly, the fact that industrialism demands a homogeneous and anonymous mass is correct at the level of description. However, this answer does not answer the question of why the nation and nation-state models dominate. Gellner's approach has been criticized for being limited to functionalism, reductionism on the impact of industrialization on nation formation and in understanding

the strong passions that gave birth to nations (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.135-136). Craig Calhoun argued that Gellner's definition of nationalism is narrow and even if built by the hand of states, claimed that national identities neglected the influence on our lives (Calhoun, 1997, p.11).

The strongest objection to the controversies of modernist theorists and their analysis of the processes of nation formation came from the names of the *ethnosymbolists* Anthony D. Smith, John Armstrong, and John Hutchinson. This term has been used to characterize theorists who have focused on the ethnic background in nationalism analysis (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.143). Anthony D. Smith, the most prominent representative of this movement, acknowledges that nationalism is a modern phenomenon in the work of the *Ethnic Origins of the Nations* (1986), but the ethnicity model, which preserves its existence until the beginning of the modern era, and the '*ethnies*' shaped as the product of the power struggle among the ethnic elements; they are active in the formation of nations (Smith, 1986, p.15). Smith stated that the national movements went to political arena towards the end of the 18th Century, but at the same time, they were shaped by old motifs, imaginations, and ideas (Smith, 1991, p.71).

Smith (1995), following the traces of his previous work, criticized modernists' theses about ethnicity. According to this critique, modernists argue that ethnic bonding is not a priority for individuals and nations and claiming those individuals can change the ethnicities they are bound. In this context, they have shown limitations in understanding the power of the collective and of understanding the central role of the ethnic organization (Smith, 1998, pp.185, 190-193). However, Smith does not claim that there is a direct overlap between ethnicity and the nation. Ethnic cultures are strong categories, but they do not move with fixed essences without any change (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.150).

According to Smith (1986, p.13), there are also two separate views that see a radical break between the nation and ethnicity, or a direct continuity, are superficial. In order to escape these two interpretations, it is necessary to

make use of the *ethnie* concept, which includes ethnicity and its symbolism and its relations with other ethnic communities. In this context, Smith's emphasis on ethnic organization focuses on rather than language, on folk culture, legends, memories and other identity elements (Calhoun, 1997, p.55). Languages while a more permanent component; other elements correspond to the new meanings, new symbols, and re-organization requirements that an ethnic group has in relation to other ethnic communities.

> It is this sense of history and the perception of cultural uniqueness and individuality which differentiates populations from each other and which endows a given population with a definite identity, both in their own eyes and in those of outsiders (Smith, 1986, p.22).

According to Smith (1986, pp.21-31), ethnic identities are shaped by mutual relations with other ethnic categories, cultures and political units. Since mythic and symbolic things change very slowly, ethnie has a continuity that goes beyond centuries. Reminding the members of their *essence*; a collective name, the myth of common ancestry, common history, common culture, adds a sense of solidarity and territorial identification. Although Smith did not see continuity between the nation and ethnicity as a matter of fact; it does not provide an in-depth explanation of how the transition from the first to the second takes place. Between these two, it limits itself by making a difference in quality (Erözden, 1997, p.75).

Smith does not adequately stop over differences between ethnic communities and modern nations (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.158). The concept of *ethnie* in Smith's theory where an ethnic community has been burdened by various struggles over relations with other ethnic communities; even if restructured by symbols, meanings, and beliefs, it continues to be ambiguous. Thus, in Smith's theory, the categories that are currently constantly built and vague are presented as the basis of modern nations. Elements of ethnic, cultural and symbolic memory, which are essential conditions for the construction of the nation, are considered as a *distinction* and *triangulation* point (Booth, 1999). Moreover this basic is pieced,

discontinuous, and institutionalized. Moreover, it is not possible to know the meanings of the parts handled and how much of it is built-up categories (Breuilly, 1996, p.151) or as Guibernau (2004) highlighted that "Smith's classical theory of nations and national identity fails to establish a clear-cut distinction between the concepts of nation and state" (Guibernau, M., & Hutchinson, 2004, p.7).

According to Smith (1986, pp.32-41), the foundations of ethnic communities, regardless of established culture; immigration, nostalgia, memory, possibilities of institutional religions, and through the war between the states can be thrown. Nationalistic ideologies, on the other hand, start as an elite movement that the roles of the intellectuals are dominant. These national movements become masses through slogans, ideas, symbols, and ceremonies and shaped on the ethnosymbolic basis (Smith, 1991, pp.73-74). Smith, with the thought of the nation; although there is a connection between ethnic categories, social relations and symbols in the old world; of the nation, but suggests an *interim formula* claiming to emerge under certain conditions (Erözden, 1997, pp.74-75).

According to Smith (1991, pp.69-70), the nation seems to be modern in many aspects, but its roots are deep.Nations need socio-political, cultural-psychological and other things that are shaped by the historical course of *ethnie*. Nations need ethnie to be distinguished through by their *otherness*. It is not possible to understand the complex structure of nations, regardless of these distinctions that are shaped within the ethnic base. According to Smith, Gellner considers into account the aristocratic ethnic categories which are confined to literate and ruling classes only when examining pre-modern agricultural communities; and could not understand the importance of ethnicity and reached superficial results (Dieckhoff & Jaffrelot, 2005, p.28).

Smith goes further and argues that especially for the non-Western nations, there is no element of the invention and claims that ethnic core reconstruction processes, is dominant (Smith, 1991, p.111). According to Smith, the importance given to the power of the modern state is dangerous

while trying to explain the nations and national movements. Smith regards that nationalism is "*modern*" but at the same time it claims that ethnic categories are determinative in the process of nation formation through *ethnie*. Thus, cannot be saved to be treated as "*primordial*". "It is not clear why ethnosymbolism and perennialism should be treated as separate categories. What unites them is their belief in the 'persistence' and 'durability' of ethnic and national ties" (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.203).

As a response to the modernization of the nation, separation, reform and integration strategies can be defined through coordination, massification and legitimacy functions (Breuilly, 1996, p.170). According to Breuilly, within a sample of examples of nationalism gathered in an elective manner, by severing from their historical context and ignoring the functions listed above, these general theories are unreliable (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.84). Unlike other human organizations, the nation has an emotional and cultural climate. Nationalism, on the other hand, as political identity and loyalty, seeks to base the nation on political autonomy as a sovereign state (Breuilly, 1996, p.148). Ethnosymbolists exaggerate the persistence of ethnic identities, arguing that nations also exist before modernization (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.158). In this context, the ethnosymbolists, while the nations are being constructed politically; they do not take into account the fact that ethnic elements that have been compiled and recovered are also built.

There is a large literature on the place and time of the nations and national movements on the stage of history, the relation to the ethnic categories, which factors are influential in their formation, and what nations are to be regarded as concepts of invention and imagination. The question that arises from these discussions is that: 'Is it impossible to mention models that are able to distinguish separate experiences of nation formation from specific causal sequences?' The Czech historian and theorist Miroslav Hroch has a proposition to overcome the current dilemma of theories of nationalism, by the theory and method he has made. According to Hroch (1993, p.3; 1996, p.78), it is not possible to propose a single model or theory to understand

nation building. However, it is possible to propose a "*method*" that can include separate instances.

According to Hroch (1996, pp.79-80, 1985, 2015), it was formed at the end of the 19th Century in Europe, by the experiences it has had since the medieval; there were eight nation-states such as France, Britain, Netherland, Portugal and over thirty other non-sovereign ethnic groups. According to Hroch (1996, p.81), it is not possible to handle these two groups within a single theory. However, it is possible to propose a specific method. According to Hroch, it is possible to address the authenticity of separate nationalism theories within a three-phase development process. Accordingly, in *phase A*, a researcher of language, culture, and social history and it is dominated by emitting the pioneers. At *phase B*, a new nationalist group is identified and masses are sought among the ethnic communities. At *phase C*, massification and construction of social structure are experienced.

According to Hroch (1985, pp.4-5), it is mainly the economics shaping the infrastructure of politics of nationalism. The original form of the nation, while depending on other variables varies like "*territorial, political, religious, cultural, and linguistic and so on*". Hroch takes the nation as data, and nationalism even though seems to argue that this is the end result; nationalism crystallizes in its historical background, which precedes itself (Erözden, 1997, p.72). Although national movements act on a specific ethnic and cultural level, ethnicity and culture itself were built simultaneously by *processes of conflict and negotiation*. Although it appears to be a function similar to ethnie in Smith's theory, in Hroch's approach, economic activities concentrated under modern conditions, not ethnic categories, were accepted as the basis. Moreover, these economic activities have not been reduced to industrialization as they were in Gellner. According to Hroch (1985, p.3), nations, while not being eternal categories, they cannot simply derive from nationalism; but they are shaped in the historical background of concrete social reality.

Although Hroch seems to be treating the nation as data; in a way that allows us to consider the results of the original sample would have opened separate areas with different variables. Hroch (1996, p.83), in a transition from Phase B, to phase C; the formation of vanguard agitation in the absolutist regime, beginning after a constitutional revolution, massification takes place in the old regime and makes a quadruple distinction among examples of early massification by capitalist institutions. However, he adds that his proposal does not apply to every nation-building experience, adding that "it is only valid for some of the European nations" (Hroch, 1985, p.8). According to him, the differentiation in these experiences, the national consciousness is fermented from phase B, which is active during the transition to phase C, which massification takes place. Political, social, economic and other factors are formed by the original results are formed (Erözden, 1997, pp.27-28). Consistent with this finding, Hroch argues that his own typologies cannot be generalized, underlining the necessity of conducting studies that take into account the entire historical background of "*multi-causal*" and social reality (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.117). Hobsbawm after stated that he was particularly interested in the massification which was dealt with as the C-phase, by taking over Hroch's analysis, he claimed that his approach valid to all 19th Century Europe (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.12).

In fact, the reason why the research and the emerging theories of nationalism are so diverse is to be sought in the experience of nationalism through the structural conditions and historical negativities that existed in every society and in the constant variability of it. In other words, this is perhaps the reason why there is not a single, grand and universal theory of nationalism. Today, the most important question that needs to be examined and waiting for answers is why nationalism can constantly renew itself, albeit in different forms, and why it constantly increases its degree of effectiveness. In fact, nationalism has to create a hegemonic discourse to create voluntary members, and this ideology ensures continuity as long as keeping its massification. Nationalism, which affects social and international relations most and connects the masses like faith, is quite durable and not easily dilapidated; it is a concept still in need of further research.

In conclusion, the study of a nation and nationalism processes, theories and concepts of nationhood sets offered by these theories are used. According to the present thesis, these theories provide various explanatory possibilities in correspondence with certain developments in certain processes. They carry limitations in terms of their capacity to grasp different samples. Many of these theories are thought to resemble each other, abstracts at the theoretical level; they try to understand their divergent experiences of nationalism through concepts that are abstracted from these abstracts. However, they can go no further than reductionism and arbitrary interpretations of nationalism theories based on a particular set of reasons. A single descriptive cause or common pattern cannot be suggested from the common features of different experiences. Regardless of the specific factors that differentiate a nation formation experience from the others, the fact that the characteristics seen in a few examples are pointed out provides a limited explanation.

Nationalism according to Faruk Sönmezoğlu (n.d., p.120), it "is a socio-political trend whose scope and characteristics are determined by the users, and whose emergence and development closely related to the national state". Last but not least, there is still a frame that is still in its *introduction* phase since that day. Written theory books still have to be the prisoner of the word "*introduction*". The result stands at us as an undeniable reality.

2.3   Theories and Claims of Nationalism

The differences seen in the understanding of the concept of the nation are similar to the differences in nationalism. According to Kellas (1991), nationalism can be regarded as a form of ideology and behaviour. According to Kedouri (1961) a doctrine, according to Smith (1986) an ideological movement, according to Gellner (1983) a political principle, according to Calhoun (1997) a discourse. As can be seen, the situation of nationalism is not brighter than the nation in terms of its relations with other concepts (Özkırımlı, 2010).

When nationalism is the subject of theory, many definitions of nationalism and theories are mentioned rather than a single definition of nationalism. In

the emergence of this situation, the theoretical content of different nationalism theses such as the historical conditions, the spirit of the times and places, the determinants of religious factors, ideological attitudes have been influential. Many thinkers developed different theories at different times for different reasons and contributed to the emergence of different theories of nationalism. Accordingly, in the literature, rather than a definition of nationalism, nationalisms and their definitions are mentioned. In this section, the theories developed on nationalism will be discussed and the meaning of nationalism will be clarified.

While Anthony Smith (1998) argues that theories of nationalism can be divided into four groups, such as Primordialist, Perennialist, Modernist, and EthnoSymbolist; while Umut Özkırımlı (2010) on the other hand states that, the theorists of nationalism in the literature have been classified into three groups: Primordialist, Modernist, and Ethnosymbolist. From these paradigms, Modernists are strong in theory and weak in history, while perenniaslists are strong in terms of history and weak from a theoretical perspective. According to Smith, the so-called socio-biological termed those of Primordialist is reductionist, while cultural-primordialist are largely speculative or out-of-history. Because of that, either they constitute no theory or theories are deficient in creating and they hardly contain any history (J. Anderson, 1986). Smith (2009, p.136) states that ethnosymbolists have developed approaches, not theory.

2.3.1 Primordialism

Actually, Primordialism is not a theory of nationalism; it is more of a perspective/approach. As Özkırımlı described (2010, p.49), Primordialism is "an umbrella term used to describe the belief that nationality is a 'natural' part of human beings [...] and that nations have existed from time immemorial". The common feature that is thought to combine modernists is that they see nationalism as a "gift" of the modernization processes, and thus of recent history; the importance of ethnicity to the nations that unite ethnosymbolists; if Primordialists should be united, as mentioned above, the nation's see them as their natural constructions. The term primordial elucidate in Oxford

Dictionaries (n.d.) as an adjective which used for "existing at or from the beginning of time; primeval [...] which origins lay in Late Middle English: from late Latin *primordialis* 'first of all', from *primordius* 'original'". The two meaning simultaneous used as were "existing from the beginning of time" and for "the earliest stage of development". The primordialist approach sees ethnicity as a natural and unchangeable sense of loyalty, resulting from social practices such as religion, language, and tradition from the place where the man was born, and as a result of the social convergence (Selçuk, 2011, p.2).

Edward Shils (1957), the first to use the term primordialism, uses this term to examine the relationships within the family. According to him, loyalty among family members is not due to continuous communication between them, there is a sense of loyalty that is difficult to express with words arising from the "*blood bond*" connection between them (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.49-50). Clifford Geertz, a sociologist/anthropologist, states that what is meant by primitive societies is the linkage between the elements of social life that are supposed to be "*given*", or more precisely "*given*", and the links between them, religion, language and certain social habits. This is not because the interests are so necessary, but because the bond itself is considered important. What matters is 'natural' closeness, not social interaction (Geertz, 1973). Primordialism is represented mainly by Geertz (1973). According to the Primordialist thought, the contemporary nations are socio-biological extensions of their ancestors, and the nationality is "given" to a person with "primordial" ties by birth. Clifford Geertz (1973, p.259), one of the founders of the 'primordialist approach', described the term 'primordial' as follows:

> By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the "givens" - or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed "givens" -of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.

According to Geertz (1994), ethnic, religious and linguistic features of mankind constitute his or her "primordial identities" that are "acquired" by birth. The continuity of the primordial ties is a historical process and modern society continues to exist as an organic and modern extension of its ancestors. Race, ethnicity and language are amongst the main characteristics of national identities reflecting the "primordial" ties of individuals with their ancestors. Thus, nationality is a "given" characteristic shaped by primordial ties (Hasanov, 2014, pp.82-87).

Walker Connor (1978, p.379), another representative of the primordialist approach, defines the nation as "[the] essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way". According to him, ethnic ties are stronger than civic ties. Connor notes that the most significant indicators of this are the continuing the cases of ethnic conflicts (Conversi, 2004; Erözden, 1997, pp.64-66). The school of Primordialism explains the nation as an entity which was created long before the nation-states. However, nationalism might be regarded as a post-modern concept. Özkırımlı suggests that our "ties" are thought to us by the construction of knowledge (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.166).

It is not possible to take the concept of nationalism based on primordial approaches independently of the work on ethnic groups. The approach first takes shape in studies that examine the ethnic identity and the nature of the bonds that make up this identity. 'Primordialism' is a general term used to characterize similar approaches. It does not specify a completely homogeneous category. Indeed, different perspectives can be distinguished within researchers who adopt a plausible explanation. In addition to this view of Primordialists to nationalism, there are also scholars regarding nationalism from different perspectives. Anthony Smith (1994) handles Primordialism under three headings; "natural, biological and cultural" primordialism, while Tilley (1997); considers "biological, cultural, and psychological". This thesis will be examined with A. Smith's perspective.

The *nationalist* approach says that being a member of a nation has an innate character, such as the experience of seeing, hearing, tasting. The fact that people belong to different ethnic groups is a necessity of nature, and these ethnic groups tend to exclude those from themselves. Therefore it is possible to reach the idea that ethnicities are always naive. This approach attributes a *personality* to the origin, denies difference with ethnic groups, and makes nationalism a fundamental attribute of humanity in every period (Smith, 1998, pp.8, 11, 18, 116). In the 19th Century, the concept of education, state-building and the understanding used by the politicians were derived from this.

Some authors who are sceptical of naturalism believe that nations are only very ancient communities, as they are shaken from the idea that nations have existed since time immemorial. In the face of this claim, Anthony Smith (1998, 9. 159) calls this '*perennialism*'. The term *perennial*[21] elucidate in Oxford Dictionaries (n.d.) as an adjective which used for "lasting or existing for a long or apparently infinite time; enduring or continually recurring [...] which origins lay in Mid 17th Century: (in the sense 'remaining leafy throughout the year, evergreen'): from Latin perennis 'lasting the year through' + -ial". According to the Perennialists, the nation was a very old thing and the only thing that changed was the way it was wrapped. However, had similar views with other Primordialists in the opinion that the national essence was never lost and was only asleep (Smith, 1998; 2000)

Another approach of Primordialism is the socio-biological in which includes the concepts of reproduction. According to the socio-biological view, the cultural group is considered as a large lineage of societies, and cultural elements such as language, religion and colour are considered as symbols of biological similarity. Pierre van den Berghe (1978, 1994) is the principal representative of this approach, which defines social ethnicity as a form of the extension of the kinship and the choice of relatives, which is effective in the adaptation of individuals and society in the process of using scarce

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[21] Perennial. (nd.). In *Oxford dictionaries online dictionary*. Retrieved from
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/perennial

resources to survive. According to Berghe (1978, p.403), the main axis of the problem lies here:

> My central thesis is that both ethnicity and 'race' (in the social sense) are, in fact, extensions of the idiom of kinship, and that, therefore, ethnic and race sentiments are to be understood as an extended and attenuated form of kin selection.

Ethnicities are regarded as a socio-biological phenomenon. From this point of view, the origin of ethnic devotion is in genes and instincts. People want to be with people who are like an instinctive impulse; therefore they find their spouses from the same origins. In this analogy, culture is a very important factor (Özkırımlı, 2010, 53-55).

Another important aspect of this approach is that kinship is in a remarkable point in the relations of society and that it is a projection in phenomena such as nation, ethnicity and race. According to van den Berghe, (1996, p.60), the underlying cause of the formation of ethnicity is predicated on the fact that "we are not only selfish maximisers, but intelligently opportunistic one [the future at this point is] reciprocity and nepotism".

Individuals prefer relatives to non-relatives, close relatives to distant relatives consciously or unconsciously (Berghe, 1978, p.402). The choice that brings out ethnicities is important. This is because it is the only element that enables the blood connection to be established. Blood ties and kinship gain importance due to this genetic mechanism for successful breeding (Kellas, 1998, pp.5-6, 13). More precisely, unlike the cultural approach, the blood bond is important in the socio-biological approach. But on the basis of the formation of the blood bond, (and the more important thing is that revealing the kinship relations), it is the motivation for successful reproduction and proliferation. According to Berghe (2005, p.117), "ethnicity is both primordial and instrumental/socially constructed". In this sense, occupations, migrations and non-family marriages have destroyed biological similarity. Finally, according to van den Berghe (1978, p.403), the three instincts to human

relations are dominant (*principles of sociality*): kin selection, reciprocity and coercion. "Reciprocity is cooperation for mutual benefit, and with [the] expectation of return, and it can operate between kin or between non-kin. Coercion is the use of force for [the] one-sided benefit, that is, for purposes of intra-specific parasitism or predation". According to Berghe, inter-race coercion or co-operation forms the ethnic group and inter-ethnic coercion or co-operation form the nation. In other words, to cross to an upper level (as a group), either with the coercion and domination of the bigger group or with peace and cooperation among the equals.

The culturalist approach is often associated with and involved in the work of Edward Shils (1957) and Clifford Geertz (1973). In this sense, this approach is the most profound approach of primordialism. Eller and Coughlan (1993) describe the three basic principles of this approach, expressed in the work of Shils and Geertz, as follow:

i. Primordial identities or attachments are 'given', a priori, underived, prior to all experience or interaction […] attachments are 'natural', even 'spiritual', rather than sociological. This is the aspect of primordialism which we call apriority.

ii. Primordial sentiments are 'ineffable', overpowering, and coercive. They cannot be analysed in relation to social interaction. This aspect of primordialism is its ineffability.

iii. Primordialism is essentially a question of emotion or affect. Geertz speaks of primordial 'attachments', 'sentiments', and 'bonds' [...] the concept has most often to do with feelings. This third aspect of primordialism we shall call its affectivity (Eller & Coughlan, 1993, p.187).

It should be noted that the authors who advocate this approach do not think that they have the above principles, they think it is believed by society as a matter of culture (Özkırımlı, 2010, 55-58). Although Primordialism has approaches that refer to different points, they often point out that the nation is a common concept from the same or multiple points as ethnicity. According

to the primordialist point of view, the concept of a nation did not appear with modernization as modernists or ethnosymbolists said. In this sense, it gives a hybrid concept image to ethnicity. This leads to many different approaches to ethnicity and the nation where he primordialists have directly connected to it.

Although nationalist ideology uses community and family rhetoric, the nation is categorically different. The nation is directly related to interpersonal relations, and therefore is more local than these groupings. According to Karl Deutsch (1966), nationalities become the nation when they have the power to stand behind their retaining wall. It is a fact that in almost all of the nationalisms, militarism and traditional patriarchal culture have a sexist character, largely due to its adoption.

Another criticism of the primordialism approach is that ethnic and national identities are inclusive and prioritized. In particular, the representatives of the ethnosymbolism, in this regard, direct a similar critique to the "given" and "static" thesis of modernists. According to them, ethnic and national identities may overlap with other identities and identities from time to time, complement each other and even went into conflict (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.60-67). To illustrate this with an example, people can use different identities belonging to the social group to which they are a member to meet their immediate pragmatic needs. While people are more effective in different events and in different ways, sometimes familial identity, sometimes regional, class and even gender-related identities can be highlighted.

A scholar of nationalism, Roger Brubaker (1996) describes primordialism as "a long-dead horse that writers on ethnicity and nationalism continue to flog" (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.67). Horowitz (2002, p.73), on the other hand, says that:

> Undoubtedly, primordialists are the most caricatured and most maligned for their naïveté in supposing that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen, immutable rather than malleable, and inevitably productive of conflict. The matter reached the point at which anyone wishing to make an argument about the fluidity of identities or the

rationality of pursuing a conflict has half the argument made by citing the allegedly contrary view of unnamed, benighted primordialists. So evocative is the epithet, there is a reason to suspect the primordialists are no longer much read.

On the other hand, Brass (1991) criticizes primordialism by showing the people who live in foreign countries and do not teach their native language to their children as an example. In such cases, many children do not intend to learn their mother's or father's language. Thus, it appears rather difficult to regard nationality as a "given" feature. Moreover, Coakley (2018) argued that "primordialism may better be viewed as an ingredient in nationalism than as an explanation of nationalism".

As a general assessment, it is observed that scholars who advocate the primordialist approach have more in common points than modernist and have a relatively non-different appearance.

2.3.2 Ethnosymbolism

With the intensification of the debates on nationalism, there has been another focus of debate on ethnic/ethnicity in the literature. The third group of theories of nationalism constitutes the ethnosymbolist approach among the primordialist and the modernists, which is named as the *mid-ground* (third-way). This focus is also closely related to the ethnic and territorial classification of nationalism. The ethnosymbolists developed their basic arguments based on the criticism of modernism. The ethnosymbolist range is used to describe concepts that give emphasis to ethnic background and culture in the analysis of nationalism (Smith, 2002a, pp.14-15; 2009; 2005, p.98). Ethnosymbolists such as John Armstrong, Anthony D. Smith, and John Hutchinson, who rejected primordialism and found inadequacy of modernism, tried to find a kind of *middle way* to reach a synthesis from these two approaches. Like many theorists, they don't give themselves the name/term of the ethnosymbolist to their work. As a matter of fact, Armstrong does not mention that term in any of his works. While Smith described Armstrong's

point of view as 'perennial', Hutchinson calls both Smith and Armstrong's point of view as 'ethnicist' (Hutchinson, 1994, p.7, Smith, 1984, p.453, 458).

Ethnosymbolism focuses on the subjective elements in the formation of nations, the distinctive feature of nationalism, its influence, and whether ethnicities continue to exist. By doing so, the ethnosymbolist approach tries to penetrate and understand the inner worlds of ethnic origin and nationalism (Smith, 2009, p.61). The prominent emphasis on the perpetuity (perenniality) of the pre-modern foundations of the nations refers to an interpretation in which ethnic identity is regarded as a systematic form of belonging. Thus, the nation, which is a modern form of belonging, is linked to the continuation of an old systemic belonging (*la longue durée*)[22]. According to ethnosymbolists such as Smith, Armstrong and Hutchinson, nationalism can only be understood through the analysis of "*la longue durée*" common cultural identities, but that doesn't mean that they share the same understanding (Armstrong, 2004; Smith, 2009, pp.16-17, Malešević, 2018). Ethnosymbolists discuss the historical process of nations in a broad period of time and explain the emergence of modern nations by carefully examining their ethnic background; because the existing nations are the continuation of the ethnic communities of the pre-modern era. Since the ethnosymbolists recognize nationalism as the product of modern times, they are separated from the primordialists (Özkırımlı, 2010, 143, 148). Nationalism is the phenomenon of the modern process in Europe in the 18th Century. According to Smith (1986, p.69) "everything in agrarian societies - the nature of culture, the structure of power, the nexus of economic tics - conspired to prevent the emergence of nations".

In this context, it can be said that the ethnosymbolists are trying to create a more homogenous structure than the primordialists and modernists. With the guidance of the past, it is assumed that the capacity to predict/understand nationalism today will be attained. According to ethnosymbolists, the

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[22] *Longue durée*: a historical process of long duration, consideration of which provides an extended time perspective in social science analysis (Armstrong, 1982, p. xxi).

development process of nations must be handled in a wide timeframe, because it is impossible to explain without considering the ethnic backgrounds of the birth of modern nations. Today's nations are the continuation of the ethnic communities of the pre-modern era (Smith, 1986, pp.5, 8). The two structures are different in terms of development level, not species. Ethnic identities are more durable than they are considered; they protect their essence against the traps of history such as migrations, invasions, inter-ethnic marriages for centuries. The nations of the modern era are shaped under the shadow of old ethnic cultures. Myths, symbols, customs and ceremonies from the past determine the content of today's nationalisms and assuming that they differ from the primordialists (Smith, 2000, pp.19, 36). On the other hand, they argue that nationalism should not be satisfied with the theories that explain it through modern processes such as capitalism and industrialization, because such approaches ignore the permanence of ethnic loyalties. According to ethnosymbolist, the correct point of view should cover a longer historical period, and today's nations should be evaluated in the same pot as their ethnic ancestors (Smith, 1986, p.13-18).

After the popularization and exploration of ethnicity studies in the US, the subject was concentrated at the point of the melting pot. However, Glazer and Moynihan's (1963) work, "beyond the melting pot", led to the collapse of the melting pot thesis. The study revealed that ethnic identities of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish living in New York City continued. However, one of the main reasons for the turmoil here is that ethnicity has also been used in the US to express individual nations from different countries and even from different continents. This implies essentially the equalization of the concepts of nation and ethnicity.[23]

Smith (1996, p.362) argues that the ethnosymbolist approach can be advantageous in three aspects. First, such an approach will help us

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[23] According to Glazer & Moynihan (1963), the first use of the term is based on Riesman work (the Lonely Crowd).

determine which population will initiate a nationalist movement when adequate conditions are formed and which form of action this will take. Second, the approach will enable us to understand the role of memories, ceremonies, myths and symbols in the shaping of nationalism. Nationalism often pursues symbolic goals such as education in a specific language, a television channel in its own language, protection of sacred monuments. Materialist or modernist theories cannot adequately explain these issues; they cannot grasp the power of collective memories. Thirdly, the ethnosymbolist approach explains how nationalism can have such broad public support. The intelligentsia may invite the masses of the people to history, but assuming that they accept this call by establishing causation with the material interests of the people, and in this sense, the approaches that emphasize ethnic cultures will mean getting out of this process. It is believed that this approach will not be illuminating.

For a thorough understanding of the ethnosymbolist approach, John Armstrong's historical perspective on *Nations Before Nationalism* (1982), also Anthony D. Smith's theories/approaches to *Ethnic Origins of Nations* (1986) can be viewed. This approach proposes a dual starting point in the analysis of nation formation. The first is the importance of symbols, values, memories, myths, legacies or historical groups for the formation of cultural society. The second is the vital role of ethnic communities and ethnic ties, or ethnies, for the foundation and continuity of nations (Smith, 2002a, p.12).

> An ethnie may be defined as a named human population with a common myth of descent, shared historical memories, one or more elements of common culture, a link with an historic territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the elites.

This definition raises a link between the two starting points. This connection is the central position of "*myth-symbol communication*", which Armstrong articulates in the definition and continuity of ethnies. Smith adds this to the subjective history of historical memories and traditions, or members of a society of "ethno-history", and in particular the important role of heroes and

"golden ages". Among myths, the lineage and ethnic selection play a vital role in the self-definition and continuity of the ethnies, while the "symbolic guard border", as Armstrong called, play an important role in the revival of collective emotions and the long-term cultural difference (Armstrong, 1982, pp.7-9). Armstrong claims that there are two principles of social organization, one based on soil/land ("*Dar ul-Islam*", p.64) and the other on kinship, that helps to explain the separation of ethnicity between Islamic and Christian Europe (Ch.3, pp.54-92). Accordingly, as Mehmet Nuri Yılmaz highlighted, the idea and philosophy of dar-ul Islam that refers to the dominance and the mode of government of the Muslims and the state and the governments other than Islam in the Dar-ul-Harb (Yılmaz, 2004). Armstrong traces a series which influence on ethnic identity that extends from nomadic or settled forms of life to their characteristic of nostalgia, to the world's religious civilizations, to their imperial myths, to their urban settlement patterns, to their central government types, to religious organizations and to the most disparate linguistic differences. Armstrong does not offer any perennialist theory that equates the formation of ethnic communities, the birth of pre-modern nations or nationalism, and the modern nations based on their own ideology.[24] Instead, it lays the groundwork for complex elements' (1982, pp.3, 6, 9, 21, 131, 297) that only comes together in the formation of different ethnic identities (1982, pp.290-299). Smith argues that most modern nations are often shaped by pre-modern ethnic extracts or by predominant ethnies who, over time, have managed to merge with the ethnies of the periphery. In other words, Smith, in contrast to modernists, but in a way similar to Armstrong and John Hutchinson, is of the opinion that modern nations have replaced the ethnic basis in the historical process.

In his evaluations of the relationship between ethnicity and nation, A. Smith (1986, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2009), who examined the subject of ethnicity most in the context of nationalism, uses the following statements: "No enduring world order can be created which ignores the ubiquitous

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[24] Armstrong used the 'perennial' word once and beyond the meaning used in nationalism studies, not as 'continuous' in his work (Nations Before Nationalism, 1982).

yearnings of nations in search of roots in an ethnic past, and no study of nations and nationalism that completely ignores that past can bear fruit" (Smith, 1986, p.5). According to Kedourie (1988, p.25), the concepts of ethnicity have been chosen in the plural societies, in terms of culture, language and physical characteristics, to express those that are generally different from the majority. In his view, the US is a plural society, and with the 1960s, the authors began to focus on this issue. According to Smith (1986, p.2):

> There is much more to the concept of the 'nation' than myths and memories. But they constitute a *sine qua non*: there can be no identity without memory (albeit selective), no collective purpose without myth, and identity and purpose or destiny arc necessary elements of the very concept of a nation.

Smith (1986, p.11) argues that the nation is a modern phenomenon and that it emerged as an ideology only after the 19th Century. Smith, however, underlines the fact that there are ethnies that have been rooted in Europe and the Middle East for centuries, arguing that there is a connection between these ethnic communities and modern nations. Although Smith did not establish a direct link between ethnic communities and modern nations and stated that many ethnic communities could not be a nation, and argued that the ethnic communities of earlier periods had an impact on the formation of modern nations and nationalisms. Modern nations cannot be understood without understanding ethnic communities before it. Within this framework, Smith (1991, p.21) defines the definition of the nation: "a collective proper name, a myth of common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of a common culture, an association with a specific homeland, a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population".

In the question of how the ethnic community is formed, Smith (1986) proposes two different ways: coalescence and division. It goes through two typical assumptions for the merger, either with the amalgamation of two or more units or assimilation In this sense, with a reverse movement again from

a number of factors (such as sectarian) or through *proliferation* (Horowitz's term) can be separated. As with these proposals, the differences between the ethnies and the nations are not certain. In reality, nation formation based on one or more ethnicity is quite long. In other words, a long series of processes such as increasing regionalization, centralization of collective myths and memories, territorial expansion and expansion of popular culture, increasing economic unity and legal standardization could be effective. Such processes are unstable and can be reversed. There is no claim that Smith is infallible and unchanging. The only fact that temporal factors cannot change is the idea of continuity in the minds of individuals. There are four different concepts that Smith believes play a role in the continuum and rebirth of ethnies: "Religious reform, cultural borrowing, popular participation and myths of an ethnic election" (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.150-151). These processes, as Smith calls them, constitute "*ethnic cores*".

At this point, Smith is aware of the problem between the *ethnic core* and the modern nation and continues to support his argument with three different reasons. The first is that the first nations formed around this nucleus (ethnic core) and set an example for the formation of the nation. Secondly, it is much easier to put the *'demotic'* kind of community, which has preserved its existence in many parts of the world until the modern era. Finally, in spite of all deprivations, the need to produce (fabrication) consistent mythology (Bell, 2003) and symbolism would be more important than everything else in terms of continuity (Smith, 1991, pp.41-42).

In his work, Smith (1991, p.72) found the use of five differences in the concept of nationalism within the literature:

  i. the whole process of forming and maintaining nations or nation-states
  ii. a consciousness of belonging to the nation, together with sentiments and aspirations for its security and prosperity
  iii. a language and symbolism of the 'nation' and its role

iv.   an ideology, including a cultural doctrine of nations and the national
      will and prescriptions for the realization of national aspirations and the
      national will

v.   a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and
      realize its national will.

As can be seen from above, because of the last two articles, Smith (1991, p.73) has used his definition for himself in favour of *ideology* and "define nationalism as an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'". In this sense, *autonomy* is the symbol of struggle, the *unity* of equality, and *identity* symbolizes discovery and transformation of sameness (1991, pp.74-75). Smith (1991, p.74) has made four fundamental propositions for his nationalist ideology (core doctrine) as:

i.   The world is divided into nations, each with its own individuality,
      history and destiny.
ii.   The nation is the source of all political and social power, and loyalty to
      the nation overrides all other allegiances.
iii. Human beings must identify with a nation if they want to be free and
      realize themselves.
iv.   Nations must be free and secure if peace and justice are to prevail in
      the world.

Thus, when Smith (1991, pp.82-83) decided to determine the types of nationalism, he made two basic propositions for the types of nationalism based on the concept of "East-West nationalism" by Hans Kohn. These will be territorial nationalisms (soil-based) and ethnic nationalisms (ethnic forms of nationalism). The distinction he made here was also divided into two as pre (a) and post-independence (b). To summarize them briefly:

i.   (a) Territorial nationalisms (pre-independence): Anti-colonial
      nationalisms.

(b) Territorial nationalisms (post-independence): Integration nationalisms.

ii.   (a) Ethnic nationalisms (pre-independence): Secession and diaspora nationalisms.

(b) Ethnic nationalisms (post-independence): Irredentist and 'pan' nationalisms.

Smith admits that he is still inadequate, but he believes and insists that such a simple typology will be useful. As a result of the long-term study of Smith's nation formation processes, it emerges as the two main routes:

I.   Lateral (aristocratic) ethnies → bureaucratic incorporation → civic-territorial nations → territorial nationalisms (from above; usually led by the elites).

II. Vertical (demotic) ethnies → vernacular mobilization → ethnic-genealogical nations → ethnic nationalisms (from below; usually led by the intelligentsia) (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.155).

As can be seen from above, Smith has made a more class reading here, and focused on the stages through which the route will take place. There are two main ways in which the ethnies, (which are the basis of modern nations), to become nations. The first type of ethnic foundation is *lateral*. These are mainly upper-class ethnic communities and their borders are irregular and large. But as Gellner described, they do not have the need and interest of a cultural link with the lower classes they exploit. The second type is *vertical*. This is the people's society where the borders for entry are very high. All classes at least share a common culture (ex. religion) more or less.

The ethnosymbolist thought has been criticized in many aspects with the statement of Özkırımlı (2010). Ethnosymbolists confuse concepts (define the nation as an enlarged and developed form of ethnic groups). They do not adequately consider the differences between ethnic communities and modern nations (with a very well-intentioned and overly optimistic assumption, an assumption that all ethnic groups have a common consciousness and history, and that the symbols of the past are in the same

meaning as today). They misinterpreted by arguing that nations and nationalism exist in the pre-modern period (lack of political goals such as autonomy, independence). They ignore the fact that ethnicity has a variable (diversity) structure (refusal to accept ethnic identities that have changed throughout history, e.g.: a pagan and then a Christian and maybe a Muslim today); they exaggerate the permanence of ethnic identities (most myths can be invented and the useless ones can be ignored), and their analysis of the formation of ethnic consciousness is inadequate (the wrong assumption, e.g., solidarity is not spontaneous in the past, but on the contrary, as Zubaida put it, it is the economic and political institutionalization that ended feudalism) (Özkırımlı, 2010, pp.157-165).

According to Connor's ethnicity, ethnic group and nation, semantic use was so close that confusion was inevitable, because it's a tendency of politicians and modernization theorists (Connor, 1994, pp.89-117; Conversi, 2004, pp.2-3). O'Leary (1997) stated that the concept was used as an "*umbrella*" concept (Greenfeld's term, 1992, p.3) like nationalism and that many irrelevant concepts were combined. According to Breuilly (1996, p.151), the difference between the modern nations and the collective masses of the past is the awareness created by literacy. Calhoun (1993, p.229), on the other hand, further goes to the point that the issue cannot be merely the defense of ethnic similarities or common ethnic background, "but a claim that certain similarities should count as the definition of political community". Subsequently, Breuilly (1996) questions the cultural materials of the past and states that the extent to which the accepted identity has influenced by myths and symbols is an unquestionable issue.

2.3.3 Modernism

In the work of nationalism, Modernism which developed as a reaction to the Primordialists who accepted nationalism as natural and universal, or against those who believed in its perenniality, they have opened the horizon of the field and brought depth with their perspective. *Nationalism and Social Communication* published by Karl Deutsch in 1953 (Özkırımlı, 1999, pp.97-98) and Elie Kedourie's *Nationalism* of (1960), which, according to Breuilly

(2000, p.187), "that accounts for the first word in the title of the lecture" can be regarded as the first precursors of the change in literature. As a critique of modernism as of the 1980s, under the precedence of A. Smith, the dominant contrasts of the literature are Ethnosymbolists; but still, maintain its place in nationalism studies. In the nationalist rhetoric, first a state, then a nation, or vice versa, is true. This situation is important for both theories. Because, according to modernism, the role of the state in the determination of the international borders in terms of the political and economic existence of modern devices is functional in terms of the formation of a modern nation. Ethnosymbolists also have the idea that the essence of the nation should not be considered separately from the state, and it requires states to focus on the nation. According to Carr (1945, p.1), which periodized nationalism in its work and discussed it on an international basis, the nation, with its synonyms in other languages since the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, is one of the most natural words in Western Europe as an important political unit. The explanation that Carr has made in relation to the nation is a reflection of the pre-acceptance of modernist theory. In this theory, the nation was formed simultaneously with the modern political and economic formations.

The conceptual schemes developed by Durkheim and Weber, who are the pioneers of modern theory on nationalism, are also important in terms of forming the theoretical foundations of the idea of nationalism. The way that both sociologists focus on social perception in the final case, shaped the idea of modern nationalism. In particular, Weber's understanding of the state and Durkheim's approach to social phenomena are a core in terms of shaping the historical and social foundations for political science and nationalism is a synthesis of these concepts in both sociological and historical context. In this context, Weber emphasized the importance of social life in explaining human and its *actions* at the core of social structures, while Durkheim and his followers regarded it as the systems of *structured* relations (Lawrence, 2014, pp.133-134). In line with these and similar developments, it can be stated that the main axis of the studies related to nationalism has created a modern paradigm.

The common point of the studies that adopt this approach is that nations and nationalism are modern-age structures (Gökalp, 2007, p.284). According to the Modernist theory, industrialization, the spread of mass communication, the birth of the modern state, the economic and social structure generated by capitalist production, social changes after secularization, urban transformations and the domination of the bureaucratic state in the political arena are the factors that enable the emergence of nationalism. It is not possible to think nationalism independently from these processes. There are no social, political and economic conditions that will allow the emergence of nationalism in ancient times. These conditions are formed in the modern age; in other words, nations are only a sociological necessity in the age of nationalism. As Gellner stated, "these circumstances taught my father the contingent nature of nationalism: nations are not given but are created by states and by nationalists" (1997, p.viii; a preface written by David N. Gellner).

Compared to other approaches, the number of subjects agreed by the modernist approach is almost non-existent. From this point of view, it is observed that the authors prioritize or emphasize different factors. Beyond mutual criticisms, it would be more useful to classify the modernist scholars by their way of dealing with the issues they deal with and to instrumentalize. Breuilly, "very broadly [...] see three different areas of interest: doctrine, politics (the political movement), sentiments (national consciousness)" (1996, pp.146-149). At this point, Özkırımlı's (inspired by Breuilly) approach to the subject will be useful: "[the] modernist theories [divides] into three categories in terms of the key factors they identify" (2010, p.72). According to this, the researchers who focus on economic factors in their analysis of nationalism will be included in the subject of '*economic transformation*'. '*Political transformation*' will touch upon mainly to the areas of political factors, and '*social-cultural transformation*' to the ones who emphasize the social-cultural factors (2010, p.72). The criticisms against this classification will be discussed at the end of the part.

The authors who emphasize and adopt the *economic transformation* approach often try to explain the phenomenon of nationalism as a result of the transformation and cycle of economic relations, which they consider to be the substructure of social-cultural formations. The current of this trend is usually being had taken ownership of the neo-Marxist researchers. When viewing from this context, the lack of Marx's work on the concept of nation/nationalism constitutes a problem of analysis (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.11). Davis' claims that he was planning to write a book, but this intention does not turn into a *de facto* (Davis, 1978, foreword, p.1). However, it would be more reasonable to argue that at no time in his life Marx had a systematic interest in nationalism. Considering the century in which he lived (19th Century), he thought that the problems that Marx had addressed were more macro scale and that the issue needed a grand theory. In this context, Marx has put it at the center of the class analysis. In a later period, Lenin, who followed the footsteps of Marx, addressed the issue in a more systematic way. In fact, it can be said that Lenin was the first Marxist to address the issue systematically. It also created such an analysis framework that it inspired people to evaluate Marxism in the context of colonialism/imperialism and its application to colonial countries. In this context, Lenin is harshly criticizing Rosa Luxemburg's *Janus Brochure* (Luxemburg, 1915), who argues that national liberation wars are no longer possible because of the division of the world between imperialist countries. According to Lenin (2014, pp.222-227), national wars are not only probable or possible but also inevitable and progressive. But, Engels will pave the way for criticism towards Marx in the coming period with the approach of *historical* nations and *non-historical* nations. In this context, according to Rosdolsky (1965), Marx and Engels have somehow endorsed the national struggle of workers. In this respect, the idea that the class struggle of the proletariat can be successful if it is organized on a national basis has been developed. In other words, the national struggle and the class struggle are equalized, or more precisely, they have been confirmed (Davis, 1978, p.30). This situation reminds the fact that a theory of nationalism cannot be produced as a situation that reveals all the dilemmas of Marxism. In the same way, Tom Nairn said: "The theory of

nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure" (Nairn, 1981, p.329).

The rising nationalist struggle against world imperialism, which prevailed in the Third World (*so-called*) countries in the 1960s and 1970s, has encouraged neo-Marxists to deal with the issue. It has guided classical-orthodox Marxism to the requirements of the modern era, and in its theoretical analysis, it has given more importance to culture, ideology and language. As a result of this orientation, many works from the left thinkers and writers who are interested in nationalism literature have been added. As a starting point of the argument of Nairn (1981) can be argued (which makes it modernist), which, on a periodical basis, has already produced no theory of nationalism because the necessary conditions were not formed.

In order to avoid angular inaccuracies, Nairn re-examines the subject. First of all, he was not willing to present a theory, but he wants to give an idea of how this can be done. First, the angle has to be a materialist to confirm the correct perception; furthermore, researchers will have a duty to find the right framework. In this sense, the historical origins of nationalism should be the dynamics of change that the near century offers. It is too wide to be explained by the internal dynamics of societies, and it is necessary to evaluate the development through the historical process. According to Nairn (1981, p.332), this is, of course, *world history*. Moreover, it is the political economy of the French and Industrial Revolution that has been reflected in the present day. It is obvious that the *dependency school* has an impact on these views. A. G. Frank (1967), S. Amin (1978) and I. Wallerstein (1974/2011a, 1980/2011b, 1989/2011c, 2011d) have many studies on world systems (capitalist exploitation system) (Zubaida, 1978, p.66).

As Nairn said, this was the result of uneven balanced development. Nationalism, which is the result of the capitalist system, has displayed an *uneven development*. The idea of enlightenment of Europe has been mistaken here and the assumption that civilization will develop in a balanced way has been demolished. At this point, the idea of development faced an

ongoing uprising against trying to silence the communities that it could not rule out; this revolt is nationalism (1997, p.71).

> Nationalism was the effort by one 'backward' culture and people after another to appropriate the powers and benefits of modernity for their own use. Having been redefined as backward, they aspired to move forward. However, this motion occurred partly against the tide coursing over them from the central domains of industry and urbanisation.

The developments have accelerated the learning of the truth. It is understood that what is sold as progress is actually domination and exploitation. The abyss between the periphery and the center were so deep that it was impossible to close. At this point, someone had to confiscate the situation and take responsibility. According to Nairn (1981, pp.338-389), which will attempt to try this was: 'the peripheric elites [whom] had no option but to try and satisfy these demands by taking things into their own hands'. The real problems of the nations who started to transform have also come to the surface at this point, but there was nothing in the hand but the nation. There was only one thing to do about the matter left in the hands of intellectuals: "the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history, and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood" (1981, p.340). This point was the Roman god '*Janus*', the concept that Nairn brings to literature. Two-faced Janus while with one face facing the future was looking back with his another face. Nairn was illuminating this point like this. Instead of progressive ideas and development, human beings have been desperately forced to look back; all of this is because of *uneven development*.

Michael Hechter has tried to apply Wallerstein's uneven development situation, which he frequently refers to in world-systems analysis, to nationalisms by using the center-periphery distinction within the context of elements within a state (Hechter, 1975b). Hechter focuses on *internal colonialism* in the emergence of nationalism. The template can be briefly summarized as follows. The geographically unequal distribution of

modernization creates two types of developed; a highly developed and underdeveloped community within the territory of the same state. Hechter goes further than Nairn, arguing that the situation has not only an external dimension but also an internal one. "The superordinate group, now ensconced as the core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aiming at the institutionalization and perpetuation of the existing stratification system" (Hechter, 1975a, p.39). The above discussions reveal that nationalism is more '*a form of politics*' than anything else in the Third World.

In modernism, the second major understanding is the group of scholars who conduct the *political transformation* to the forefront. The most emphasized of political transformation is the place of the new form of political organization in the formation of nations in the modern sense. In this context, they have tried to explain concepts such as independence, national interests, legal nature, citizenship, legal developments in the international system, and social engineering. They often characterize the nation-building as the product and form of the political and legal organization of modern age and, more recently, as the product and structuring of social engineering or as Özkırımlı briefly summarizes the case as "the rise of the modern bureaucratic state, the extension of suffrage, the growing role of elites and their power struggles, or the changing nature of warfare" (2010, p.83). The works that consider nation and nationalism as a political transformation which is the product of modernity; John Breuilly's (1993) nationalism as '*a form of politics*', Paul Brass's (1991) use of nationalism by the elite '*instrumentalism*', Eric J. Hobsbawm's (1983) '*invented traditions*' could be mentioned.

The first issue to be addressed before referring to the work of Breuilly is the '*comparative history*' method that he added to the literature. From this point of view, a theory must not be perceived. Breuilly, for his studies, has already considered that there will be a way researchers can use it, which is the development of a method of precedence beyond a theory. In this context, it was concluded that two factors were necessary for an effective analysis. According to Breuilly (1993, p.1), the first of these is the necessity of

developing a typology, and the second is the study by the comparative history method (using the same methods and concepts). As a conclusion, Breuilly insists for this theoretical framework that it should be evaluated not on a single selected case study, but rather it should focus on the need to be evaluated with more case studies.

Breuilly (1993), who has created a position that cannot be modest in the literature with his specific typology and his case studies, defined nationalism as: "political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments" (1993, p.2). In this sense, he demonstrates a state-oriented and modernist approach, and argues that a nationalist argument is a political doctrine based on three fundamental claims (Ibid.):

  i.   There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.
  ii. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
  iii. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty.

In this sense, Breuilly with the expression of Özkırımlı (2010, p.85) defines as "nationalism is above all about politics and politics is about power". Because of this, it is not meaningless for Breuilly to make the state as a buttress. The modern state to be established and the constituent forces (the powers and the classes) are obliged to be the focal point. The importance and role of nationalism should be understood and its position should be defined. In short, it is preface that the matter is a form of politics, and from this point of view, it facilitates the analysis of the matter as a political movement.

A second point is that it accepts the study of nationalism as a state of coherence with modernism. His suggestion is the understanding of that structural transformation, which runs to political modernity, and it is also a state of crisis (Breuilly, 1996, p.163). The concept he refers to for structural

change is the *generic division of labor* and it's a transition from corporate to functional division of labor (Ibid.).

> By this term, in contrast to the more specific *economic division of labour*, is meant that the very broadest categories of human activity - coercion, cognition and production (or in more conventional terms: power, culture and economy) are redefined and placed in a different relationship to one another.

Because of this, Breuilly states that Europe is in transit through the corporate to the functional division of labor. Therefore, there has been a change in his example (the guild). The guild has three different functions in the past (economic, cultural & political), but they are subject to change with a new social function. It is that the economic and political ground is transferred to the public (state and organs) and to the private. Therefore, the church, monarchy and peasant communes are no longer sufficient to control social life, because the church is no longer able to control all functions. However, this change and the establishment of the new nation-state will not be easy. Nationalism is gaining importance at this point. The nation-state gives its citizens an identity (Fearon, 1999) through political participation and consolidates political legitimacy through the bond of citizenship.

The third and final stage is the connection of the issue to nationalist policies. Breuilly insists on understanding the change in the *state* that he has placed in his focus (1996, p.164). The structural changes that the state has undergone also more clearly explain the public-private distinction in today's world (this means double transformation). The structure that presents a multifunctional phenomenon has evolved into a new phase with the inevitability of change. The pace' of change has occurred within the context of the consensus-conflict climate and not easily realized. "This is the development of the modern state" (1996, p.164). Based on this context Breuilly (1996, p.164), the fact that the state is the only source of legitimate sovereignty is actually a manifestation of modern sovereignty: "All powers of coercion had to rest with the state". This structural change is inevitable within 'corporate ties'. In this

sense, the construction of the new will be inevitable in the name of no destruction for society. At this point, he claims that nationalist ideas could be related to the issue. Because of this, Breuilly describes the ideal citizenship of the state with a downward context of interest; and the influence of society and the interests of the individual on the state with an upward context.

The first solution made was the *political* solution of citizenship. In a liberal and democratic context, respect and loyalty to the state have been produced and the '*nation*' became an organ of citizens. As stated here, the issue has been evolved into the political rights of citizenship instead of cultural differences. It was based on a Rousseauian idea that there would be no freedom beyond the state, and it would live freely under the auspices of the state, which is the most familiar form of *'general will'*. The second solution produced was the *culture* issue through the collective character of society (1996, p.165). The (standardized) identity offered by the state is a means of explaining how the political elites legitimize the state and receive the support of the people by including an instrumentality. In Breuilly's words (1996, p.166), "Liberalism, the first major political doctrine of modernity", would not be an easy matter. Liberalism became "*a sleight-of-hand ideology*" that tries to connect two phenomena with a magical sense, because of the wide range of inadmissibility and inequalities inherent in it, and the deprivation of a common and modern political language.

When Breuilly (1993, p.9; 1996, p.166) attempted to create his own typology at this point, he made some sort of decomposition. First, he started with the characteristics of the political movement. He named the situations as *opposition* where the political movement was not based on the state, and in the second phase it has become the basis of the group or *thought* that came to power. The second context was separated by *living lands*. What needs to be understood here is either *'some'*, *'all'* or *'more'* of the land. As a result of these separations, it was able to claim that there were three different strategies: "separation, reform, and unification".

	Opposed to non-nation-states	*Opposed to nation-states*
Separation	Magyar, Greek, Nigerian	Basque, Ibo
Reform	Turkish, Japanese	Fascism, Nazism
Unification	German, Italian	Arab, Pan-African

Moreover, according to Breuilly (1996, pp.166-167), there are three basic functions, namely "*cooperation, mobilization and legitimacy*" carried out by nationalist politics. Based on his understanding, cooperation is to encourage common ideas towards the common goal, based on different ideas among the elite. Mobilization is the inclusion of large groups (which excluded) into the politic process in the context of support for the movement. With *legitimacy*, he stated that the movement is trying to justify its right against both internal and external forces and to create public opinion.

As a continuation in a way similar to Breuilly' politics-centered framework, Paul R. Brass (1991) has deepened his work as "*instrumentalist* nature". The constructive stance argues that unique cultures with distinct boundaries for different social groups, which do not overlap with other cultures, are rarely encountered. Paul Brass argues that the *primary* identities of the people are plural, open to choice and shaped according to the situation than the primordial scholars thought. The existence of cultural similarities or strong emotional bonds cannot guarantee national status or political action. "The leaders of ethnic movements invariably select from traditional cultures only those aspects that they think will serve to unite the group and that will be useful in promoting the interests of the group as they define them" (Brass, 2000, p.883). In a nutshell, competitive elites have utilized as a tool the *ethnic* and *identity* in their hands, to gain *prosperity*, *power* and *prestige*. They are reproduced in this way.

Based on his own assumptions, Brass (1991, pp.13-16) established a framework for nationalism studies. Under these assumptions,

i. Ethnic identity is itself a variable, rather than a fixed or 'given' disposition.

ii. The critical role the relationships established between elites and the state, particularly the role of collaborators with and opponents of state authority and state intrusion into regions inhabited by distinctive ethic groups.

iii. Ethnic variability and from the nature of the dynamics out of which ethnic identities are produced that the process of ethnic identity formation has consequences for the very definition of the ethnic group in question and for its persistence. The cultural forms, values and practices of ethnic groups become political resources for elites in competition for political power and economic advantage.

iv. All these points that the process of ethnic identity formation and its transformation into nationalism is reversible.

In this context, in order to explain his claims on transformation and interchangeability, Brass first sets out his definition to resolve this complex relationship. In Brass (1991, p.19) statement:

Any group of people dissimilar from other peoples in terms of objective cultural criteria and containing within its membership, either in principle or in practice, the elements for a complete division of labour and for reproduction forms an ethnic category.

Brass which prioritized and tries to improve his approach is trying to understand identity formation and identity change from the ethnicity characteristic. At this point, Brass considers that the existence of "objective cultural markers" for the ethnic transformation process is necessary but not sufficient. Another point indicates to the competition of elites. It draws attention to many aspects of competition and focuses on issues such as the elites trying to take control of a society or to evaluate the opportunities that occur in the society with their changing dynamics, or the achievement of prestige (Ibid, pp.62-63). Competition for local control may take four different forms (Ibid, p.63):

i. Local land controllers and alien authorities
ii. Competing religious elites

iii. Local religious elites and collaborationist native aristocracies

iv. Native religious elites and alien aristocracies

Another kind of elite competition according to Brass (1991) is 'the form of competition'; which is inevitable for the mobilization of society within the process of modernization in developing societies. Despite all these '*manipulations*' (in Brass terminology) (Brass, 1991, p.63):

> the existence of the means to communicate the selected symbols of identity to other social classes within the ethnic group, the existence of a socially mobilized population to whom the symbols may be communicated, and the absence of intense class cleavage or other difficulties in communication between elites and other social groups and classes.

Referring to K. Deutsch in the context of continuation, Brass points to the possible phenomena that will be experienced under the modern state. In this respect, the logic that prioritizes communication, literacy, mass communication, newspapers, standardization of local languages, books, and educational environments, it also considers cases that help the process as a result of modern life. This is "the means and the demand for new opportunities and a new form of communication" (1991, p.64). There are two types of situation which assume that the ethnic transformation will succeed for Brass (1991, p.64):

i. Where there is a local religious elite controlling the temples, shrines or churches and the lands attached to them as well as a network of religious schools;

ii. Where the local language has been recognized by the state authorities as a legitimate medium of education and administration, thereby providing the native intelligentsia the means to satisfy the new social groups aspiring to education and job opportunities.

Moreover, Brass (1991) also highlight the dominant group perception towards the disadvantaged group as a threat to its status, which it may develop a nationalist movement of its own. In the context of economic opportunities,

there are three factors for the ethnic competition which is the "sectorally-based competition for control over state power" (Brass calling) are listed as follows (1991, pp.64-66):

i. The existence of and the strategies pursued by nationalist political organizations

ii. The nature of government response to ethnic group demands

iii. The general political context

One of the other well-accepted scholars for the nationalism studies is the Marxist historian *Eric J. Hobsbawm* and his famous "*invention of tradition*" concept. This part of the study will focus mainly on how Hobsbawm perceives past and historical events and its views on these issues. According to Hobsbawm's (2000, pp.8-10, 14-19) concept of modernist nationalism, the nation has emerged as a product of modern times. This understanding of a nation and nation after the emergence of a modern state based on certain land/territory emphasizes the political (central state) and the economic development (capitalism, industrialization and urbanization and national economy) in relation to it. Hobsbawm claims that having a Marxist point of view does not mean that he accepts certain things as given because the author uses a posteriori method instead of the a priori method (1997, pp.viii-ix, 31).

According to Hobsbawm (1997, pp.7-8), the history of nationalism and nationalist ideology, which constitutes *"the capital of knowledge"*, is not what ordinary people (or ancestors) maintain in their memory (tradition). According to Hobsbawm (1997), a historian should be in this manner:

> History is not ancestral memory or collective tradition. It is what people learned from priest, schoolmasters, the writers of the history books, and the compilers of magazine articles and television programmes. It is very important for historians to remember their responsibility, which above all, to stand aside from the passions of identity politics.

History is a collection of information that has been popularized and institutionalized by competent (writers), written, and portrayed (1997, p.8). It should be noted that apart from the mutual relationship of the past to the present, there is an aspect of the present and future aspects of being a model. The past, which covers everything that has ever happened, has a structure over time and space. The past was the model of the present and the future. The past represented the key to the genetic code that allowed every generation to reproduce their own lineage and to regulate their relationship (Hobsbawm, 1997, p.25). This is not only for people who are accustomed to thinking with traditional patterns but also for those who are paradoxically passionate about innovation. The acceptance of *history* courses in the modern education system all over the world or the search for *ancestors* by modern revolutionaries (although they have no need to support their own ideologies) proves that this is true (Hobsbawm, 1997, pp.18, 20).

> 'Invented tradition' is taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.1).

In this sense, all nations and nationalisms are products of *"social engineering"* (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.13). In line with the interests of the elites in the society, nation-states have *invented a tradition* in order to legitimize the current situation, take control of the citizen of the state and integrate it into the system. Every society has a stock of such materials (such as symbolic practices and communication language) that it needs (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000; Özkırımlı, 2009, s. 7). By the invention of the tradition that emerged in the periods of rapid social and political transformations (1870-1914), the author touches upon the old traditions and the adaptation of it to the new conditions, and later on the traditions which were entirely fictitiously invented (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, pp.263-307; Erözden, 1997, p.16). According to this, the past, which is the indispensable element of nationalism studies (perhaps most important), can be re-invented

if it is not suitable for the intended purpose. The past based on fixed practices, whether relying on the real or invention has become the legitimation of change. In the last instance, the only thing that changes is the adaptation of the new to the old situation (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.5). The only reality that can be deduced from this (continuity) is the "use [of] history as a legitimator of action and cement of group cohesion" (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2000, p.12).

In modernism, the last major understanding is the group of scholars who conduct the *social/cultural transformation* to the forefront. The most important feature of social-cultural transformation is that it separates the development of humanity into phases. This approach distinguishes between traditional society and modern industrial society. According to Ernest Gellner (1983, p.1) "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent" and a phenomenon unique to the modern era. Gellner divides human history into three phases: hunter-gatherer, agricultural and modern-industrial societies. Gellner thought that nation and nationalism could not exist because of the lack of strong central and integrated commitment in the hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies. Another researcher in the field, Benedict Anderson, thinks that nationality and nationalism are "cultural artefacts of a particular kind" (Anderson, 1983, p.4). According to the author, in order to understand these productions, we need to analyze when and how they were born, how their meaning changed over time, and why they have such a strong emotional legitimacy today (Ibid.). This approach and perspective can be mentioned in three important works produced. These are the *High Cultures* of Ernest Gellner, the *Imagined Communities* of Benedict Anderson, and Miroslav Hroch's *Three-Stage Development* of National Movements.

If a bet had been made for nationalism, it would probably be Ernest Gellner, the author who won that bet. The bet here is of course not the appreciation, but the contribution to the literature. As Özkırımlı points out, it is clear that prominent figures of the literature such as his student Anthony D. Smith, Marxist Tom Nairn and John Breuilly have been evaluated as of the leading

figure of the literature is obvious (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.98). Its contribution is the most comprehensive theoretical work ever developed. Gellner's sociological point of view is Weberian and Durkheimian but that does not mean that he ratified them. "Durkheim was in error when he in effect classed advanced pre-industrial civilizations and industrial society together under the single heading of organic solidarity" (Gellner, 1983, p.27). He was also differentiating with Durkheim from the perspectives of religion. "Society can and does worship itself or its own culture directly and not, as Durkheim taught, through the opaque medium of religion" (Ibid, p.142). Nevertheless, he shed light on the understanding that he represented in his work with the understanding of seeing life within the stages.

Gellner (1983, pp.129-130) begins by explaining four different misperceptions and understanding to work as the ground for the model. In his own words, he refers to these false theories as "either an ideological accident or the fruit of mere resentment […] list of false theories of nationalism:

i. [*The nationalist theory*] It is natural and self-evident and self generating. If absent, this must be due to forceful repression.

ii. [*Kedourie's theory*] It is an artificial consequence of ideas which did not need ever to be formulated, and appeared by a regrettable accident. Political life even in industrial societies could do without it.

iii. *The Wrong Address Theory favoured by Marxism*: Just as extreme Shi'ite Muslims hold that Archangel Gabriel made a mistake, delivering the Message to Mohamed when it was intended for Ali, so Marxists basically like to think that the spirit of history or human consciousness made a terrible boob. The awakening message was intended for classes, but by some terrible postal error was delivered to nations. It is now necessary for revolutionary activists to persuade the wrongful recipient to hand over the message, and the zeal it engenders, to the rightful and intended recipient unwillingness of both the rightful and the usurping recipient to fall in with this requirement causes the activist great irritation.

iv. *Dark Gods*: Nationalism is the re-emergence of the atavistic forces of blood or territory. This is the view shared often by both lovers and haters of nationalism. The former think of these dark forces as life-enhancing, the latter as barbarous. In fact, man of the age of nationalism is neither nicer nor nastier than men of other ages. There is some slight evidence that he may be nicer. His crimes are equalled by those of other ages. They are more conspicuous only because, precisely, they have become more shocking, and because they are executed with more powerful technological means. Not one of these theories is remotely tenable.

The sociological stance of Gellner, which is its starting point, is important in this sense. According to him, the nation and the state are two different entities/forms. He refers to the definition of Weber for the state as "the monopoly on legitimate violence (order)". While, he admits that the concept of nation is a difficult concept, as a result of the sample made by "*two men*" and suggests that the issue contains cultural, volunteerism and some merit, together with an internalized unity, communication, mutual recognition and sharing. Being a member of a nation is not a natural property of a human, but it has taken such an appearance in our time. The nation is not a universal necessity like the state, but a contingency. As Özkırımlı highlighted from Gellner that, "nationalism became a sociological necessity only in the modern world" (2010, p.100).

Hence, as mentioned above, Gellner divided human history into three phases. In order to explore his theory firstly define the period of the *agrarian society* (hunter-gatherer/agro-literate society) (Gellner, 1983, pp.8-18). Small peasant communities often live an inwardly oriented life due to their own economic needs rather than political necessity. According to the nationalist theory, neither culture nor power, are directed towards the other in the conditions of the agricultural age. The agricultural society shows absolute inequalities and externalizes them, making them inevitable, constant and natural, thus strengthening them and making them acceptable (Gellner, 1983, pp.11, 13). In this respect, this rigid class mechanism limits any

change or external interaction in this sense. Industrial society strengthens the boundaries between nations rather than cross-class boundaries. In agricultural societies, various cultures sprout like mushrooms, but the conditions do not encourage a development that is often called cultural imperialism, i.e., the establishment of the dominance of any culture and the inclusion of the entire political unit. Gellner gives examples of Ancient Greek city-states that the cultural similarities existing in the agricultural society do not lead to political homology. In this sense, there is no place for nationalism in this phase (1983, p.14).

According to this, in the periods when industrial societies did not emerge and in the period of the agricultural society, neither nationalism nor the idea of the nation was able to emerge; because the conditions have not yet manifested itself. In his theory, Gellner focuses precisely on the point that creates this need, that is, the point of refraction in a process of transformation that changes society deeply and completely, and the circumstances that it creates afterwards. Industrialization with Gellner's definition is "an enormously complex transformation occurred in a very large, diversified and intricate society, and the event was unique" (1983, p.19). As Gellner's focal point should be industrialization rather than capitalism, it is from the Weberian point of view that the entrepreneurial spirit must be re-formulated from the concept of the central state which Weber has attributed to the bureaucracy. "If a centralized bureaucracy exemplifies the new *Geist* (new spirit) just as much as does the rational businessman, then clearly we are concerned with industrialism, rather than with capitalism as such" (1983, p.20). The concept of rationality was put forward in the 18th century and based on David Hume and Immanuel Kant. This concept used by Weber is primarily:

i. One is coherence or consistency, the like treatment of like cases, regularity, what might be called the very soul or honour of a good bureaucrat.

ii. The other is efficiency, the cool rational selection of the best available means to given, clearly formulated and isolated ends; in other words, the spirit of the ideal entrepreneur (1983, p.20).

At this point, Gellner claims that the industrial age is the first and only society that has a unique desire for continuous growth, constantly evolving, and carries its ideal. In other words, industrial society is the only society that can exist and rely on sustainable and sustained growth based on predictable and continuous development (1983, p.24). In this context, Gellner's theory is not primarily concerned with individual examples of nationalism, but rather a functionalist theory that focuses on the big picture, which explores what nationalism, does with a functionalist method. As the second main feature, Gellner's nationalism is regarded as a by-product of industrial society as a phenomenon emerging in modernization.

According to Gellner (1983), the transition to *high culture* is the transition from an agricultural society to industrial society, and it is both natural and inevitable that a breaking point takes place. Here, it is necessary to explain what Gellner meant by high culture. The established written language, which has standardized rules and uses, has penetrated the members of the society through formal education, refers to the high culture of that society. Through this high culture, the members of society are given citizenship consciousness and every citizen has acquired the basic skills and competence that they need to become an employee of the new-style factories. The higher culture helps more states because it allows the state to acquire an army of citizens who share a common culture, who are easier to act together and take orders. On the other hand, even Breuilly admits that in his critique, high culture facilitates a civic consciousness (1983, pp.24-29). In this sense, this modern army has a number of features:

i.   Literacy, numeracy, basic work habits & social skills.
ii. A man's education is by far his most precious investment.
iii. Modern man loyal to culture / not to: monarch, land or faith (1983, pp.27-28).

In this sense, Gellner's (1983, p.38) assertion is that it brings culture and state together.

> The imperative of exo-socialization is the main clue to why state and culture *must* now be linked, whereas in the past their connection was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose, and often minimal […] that is what nationalism is about, and why we live in an age of nationalism.

In this sense, Gellner (1996, pp.111-112) has tried to define and explain the path to today's nationalist order which he developed for his theory in five stages. These are as follows.

i. The baseline
ii. Nationalist irredentism
iii. National irredentism triumphant and self-defeating
iv. Nacht und Nebel (Night & Fog)
v. Post-industrial stage.

But even Gellner himself acknowledges that this is not enough that "the schema is by no means universally applicable, even in Europe" (1996, p.127). In order to skip from these discussions, Gellner realizes and hypothesizes that four different time zones play a crucial role as periods for Europe.

i. The Western, Atlantic seaboard of Europe
ii. The Eastern side of the defined territory, old Roman Empire lands
iii. Further East
iv. Eastern border of Europe.

From this perspective, Gellner's considers nationalism as an intellectual idea, but rather than as the producer of modernity, regarded as a product of modernity. Another point is that the homogenization of the culture and the nesting of the nationalist orientation, and for this, the main external effect is that it comes without industrialization. Difficulties and new alienations that people have to face in the cities they leave their villages will undoubtedly be very different from the old ones (Gellner, 1983, p.46).

Benedict Anderson (2006) a historian, which is another very important name for nationalism debates, drew attention to the importance of cultural

dimension in the political process by describing nationalism as an "*imagined communities*". Anderson (2006, p.4) begins at the very beginning of his book with the discovery of the paradoxes in the minds of theoreticians.

i. The objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists.

ii. The formal universality of nationality as a sociocultural concept - in the modern world everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender - vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such that, by definition, 'Greek' nationality is sui generis.

iii. The 'political' power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence.

Anderson does not hesitate to reveal his own original definition in this sense: "My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind" (2006, p.4). According to the author, in order to understand these productions, it needs to be analyzed when and how they were born, how their meaning changed over time, and why they have such a strong emotional legitimacy today. Emphasizing that nations are imagined communities, Anderson underlines that fiction must not be confused with imagination and accused Gellner of "grasps 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation'" (2006, p.6). Indeed, Anderson's intervention is very important because the imagination of the nation should not be considered to be a false one. In this context, the perceptions of the people that make up the nation and their thoughts about their nations are important. In this respect Anderson (2006, p.4) understanding could be formulated as follows:

> the creation of these artefacts towards the end of the eighteenth century was the spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became 'modular,' capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be

merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations.

So, "nationalism should not confine itself to specifying the cultural and political factors which facilitate the growth of nations" (1983, p.7) and that ideological inclination has been made things worse for the definition of 'nation'. In Anderson (2006) nationalism studies, the theoretical study is based on the fact that it is *de-Europeanized* or the lack of *de-Europeanized* theoretical study (p.209). Along with these facts, his book focuses on non-European societies, particularly South-east Asian countries. As Chatterjee (1996, p.50) points out, Anderson refused to define a nation with a series of external and abstract measures, but on the contrary, it has radically overturned the determinist scheme by suggesting that a nation is an imagined political community. The nation has not been produced solely by the convergence of certain concrete social realities, but it has also been thought, imagined and created. Because of this, Anderson imagined them as physically '*limited*', '*sovereign*' with the fall of the dynasty, and as a '*community*' of comrades based on equality (Anderson, 2006, p.7).

Anderson attempted to explain the events with two historical entities. These two historical entities (cultural system), which collapsed in the 17th Century, are the *religious community* and the *realm of the dynasty*. According to Anderson (2006, p.12), this is:

> What then was required was a secular transformation of fatality into continuity, contingency into meaning. As we shall see, few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation. If nation-states are widely conceded to be 'new' and 'historical,' the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial past, and, still more important, glide into a limitless future. It is the magic of nationalism to turn chance into destiny.

On the other hand, the fact that nationalism draws attention to "*print capitalism*" for the first time makes it a distinctive feature that distinguishes Anderson from other theorists. For Anderson, the discovery of book

production in the mother tongue, which allowed typography/printing and communities to imagine themselves as a nation, were the conditions for the emergence of nation and nationalism. When the Latin market was satisfied, broadcast capitalism sought new regional language markets with the help of the new Protestant emphasis that every believer should read the holy book (Bible). This encouraged the standardization of official regional languages, which were lower than the Latin but above public level. After the books, the newspapers, which were never seen before or in the category of new imagined people, united readers who did not know one other and came to the highest daily sales (Anderson, 2006, pp.37-46). This manner was quickened by three circumstances:

  i.   The first was a change in the character of Latin.
  ii.   The impact of the Reformation, which owed much of its success to print-capitalism.
  iii. The adoption of some vernaculars (argot) as administrative languages (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.110).

These developments contributed to the basis of national consciousness in three different ways.

  i.   They created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars.
  ii.   Print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation.
  iii. Print-capitalism created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars (2006, pp.44-45).

What makes 'new communities' imaginable for Anderson "was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human diversity" (2006, pp.42-43). As Özkırımlı stated in his extract from Anderson, "the general increase in literacy rates, together with a parallel growth in commerce, industry and communications, created new

impulses for vernacular linguistic unification. This, in turn, made the task of nationalism easier" (2010, p.111).

Afterwards, in his studies for the development of much nationalism, Anderson states that the naturalization of the dynasties of Europe was the *"official nationalism"* with a citation from Seton-Watson (2006, p.86). Another type of nationalism was *"anti-colonial nationalisms"* in Asia and Africa, which he called the *"last wave"* (the greatest wave). As a source of inspiration for developing nationalists of this type, Anderson has demonstrated the experience in Europe and America (2006, pp.113-140). In this context, based on the developments in the colonies, Anderson (2006, p.140) made a very serious analysis:

> The expansion of the colonial state which, so to speak, invited 'natives' into schools and offices, and of colonial capitalism which, as it were, excluded them from boardrooms, meant that to an unprecedented extent the key early spokesmen for colonial nationalism were lonely, bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeoisies.

Another approach that tried to explain the rise of nation and nationalism in the context of modern society came from Miroslav Hroch (1985). Hroch is the first author to conduct nationalism in a systematic comparative framework with quantitative social-historical analysis in the context of movements. Like many great writers, Hroch (1985, p.3) starts with a definition:

> In contrast with the subjectivist conception of the nation as the product of national consciousness, nationalism, the national will and spiritual forces, we posit the conception of the nation as a constituent of social reality of historical origin [therefore] the origin of the modern nation as the fundamental reality and nationalism as a phenomenon derived from the existence of that nation.

From this point of view, Hroch has a number of parses and ultimately comparisons but kept the six classes of Breuilly as a "sophisticated model of

six classes of nationalism is a rare exception" (Hroch, 2006, p.30). According to Hroch (1993, p.3), this was "the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe". In this sense, he shares his observations with two basic types. The first was the European countries with a total of ten. The first eight "nation-states", among which France, Sweden, and Britain, are called the modern state much earlier, and the other countries who are lacking dominant ethnicity, Spain, Denmark, Portugal, the Netherlands and finally Russia, give examples. Significant data for Hroch are the bureaucratic absolutism, which is strongly strengthened around the parliamentary systems, an increasing number of state officials (civilian and military) and a higher unity within the boundaries of the state (2006, p.30). On the other hand, there were two nations who were late in establishing their nation-states and political unions; the Germans and Italians that Hroch used the term "emerging nations" for them (1985, p.6).

The second types of countries which are more than thirty states treated as *"non-dominant ethnic group/community"*. Hroch personally problematizes the second and declare that "[his] own research has been concerned with this second type of situation" (1996, p.80). The second group of the Hroch begins with the discussion again. "The onset of the modern stage of nation-building can be dated from the moment when selected groups within the non-dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to-be" (1996, p.80). This intelligentsia observed some shortcomings that the nation did not have, and tried to convince its citizens consciously of the importance of belonging to the nations. These organized activities have tried to make all the qualities of "a fully-fledged nation" a national movement. In this sense for nationalism, Hroch highlighted as "namely […] absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests" (1996, p.80). As a matter of fact, Hroch's standing on it, and as he observed in the West, has become an important force, "a type of power politics with irrationalist overtones" (1996, p.81). However, Hroch (1985, p.22; 1996, p.81) distinguished them from classical national movements and these objectives generally included three basic requirements:

i. the development of a national culture based on the local language, and its norm al use in education, administration and economic life

ii. the achievement of civil rights and political self-administration, initially in the form of autonomy and ultimately (usually quite late, as an express demand) of independence

iii. the creation of a complete social structure from out of the ethnic group, including educated elites, an officialdom and an entrepreneurial class, but also - where necessary - free peasants and organized workers.

At this point, there is a necessity that Hroch is vehemently focused on. "The trajectory of any national movement was only consumed when all were fulfilled" (1996, p.81). According to Hroch (1985), there are three stages in the formation of modern society. At the first stage, there is a conflict of domination between absolute monarchies and the rising bourgeoisie. The second stage is the era of capitalism following the first stage, which results in the victory of the bourgeoisie. In this age, an organized working class movement also begins. In the third stage covering the 20th Century, worldwide integration and an unprecedented era of mass communication will begin (Llobera, 1999, p.14). Following the three-stage development of modern society, Hroch similarly examined the movements of nationalism in three stages. Three structural phases can be distinguished between the beginning and the end point, without neglecting the role of the activators and the degree of national consciousness:

i. *Phase A* (*the period of scholarly interest*): The energies of the activists were above all devoted to scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural, social and sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group - but without, on the whole, pressing specifically national demands to remedy deficits (some did not even believe their group could develop into a nation).

ii. *Phase B* (*the period of patriotic agitation*): A new range of activists emerged, who now sought to win over as many of their ethnic group as possible to the project of creating a future nation, by patriotic

agitation to 'awaken' national consciousness among them - at first usually without notable success (in one sub-stage), but later (in another sub-stage) finding an increasingly receptive audience.

iii. *Phase C (the rise of a mass national movement)*: Once the major part of the population came to set special store by their national identity, a mass movement was formed (1985, p.23; 1996, p.81).

There are four types of national movements that Hroch produces in particular for Central and Eastern Europe ("but not only there"):

i. In the first, the inception of national agitation (Phase B) occurred under the old regime of absolutism, but it acquired a mass character in a time of revolutionary changes in the political system, when an organized labour movement was also beginning to assert itself. The leaders of Phase B developed their national programmes in conditions of political upheaval. This was the case with Czech agitation in Bohemia, and with the Hungarian and Norwegian movements, all of which entered Phase B around 1800. The Norwegian patriots gained a liberal constitution and declaration of independence in 1814, while the Czechs and Magyars developed - albeit in very different fashion - their national programmes during the revolutions of 1848.

ii. In the second, national agitation likewise got under way under the old regime, but the transition to a mass movement, or Phase C, was delayed until after a constitutional revolution. This shift of sequence could be caused either by uneven economic development, as in Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia or Croatia; or by foreign oppression, as in Slovakia or the Ukraine. Phase B can be said to have started in Croatia in the 1830s, in Slovenia in the 1840s, in Latvia at the end of the 1850s, and in Lithuania not till the 1870s - reaching Phase C in Croatia not before the1880s, in Slovenia in the 1890s, and in Latvia and Lithuania only during the revolution of 1905. Forcible Magyarization checked the transition to Phase C in Slovakia after 1867, as did oppressive Russification in the Ukraine.

   iii.   In the third type, the national movement acquired a mass character already under the old regime, and so before the establishment of a civil society or constitutional order. This pattern produced armed insurrections, and was confined to lands of the Ottoman Empire in Europe - Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria.

   iv.   In the final type, national agitation first began under constitutional conditions, in a more developed capitalist setting, characteristic of Western Europe. In these cases, the national movement could reach Phase C quite early, as in the Basque lands and Catalonia, while in other cases it did so only after a very long Phase B, as in Flanders, or not at all - as in Wales, Scotland or Brittany (1996, pp.82-83).

From this point of view, Hroch explains the phases in terms of establishing its own typology. It is understood from this that the actual movement has not started, but with the *Phase A*, the ethnic researchers are investigating the past of the group and laying the ground for the formation of national identity. After this, Phase B, in which the real movement begins, emerges as a new product with the hand of intellectuals seeking cultural and political changes. It should be noted that the cancellation of the first stage leaves important resources for the second stage. It refers to three processes that accelerate or determine the process (Hroch, 1996, p.85):

   i.   a social and/or political crisis of the old order, accompanied by new tensions and horizons

   ii.   the emergence of discontent among significant elements of the population

   iii.   loss of faith in traditional moral systems, above all a decline in religious legitimacy, even if this only affected small numbers of intellectuals.

According to Hroch (1996, pp.87-88), "the pattern of a successful national movement thus invariably includes at least four elements":

   i.   a crisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains

ii.   a basic volume of vertical social mobility (some educated people must come from the non-dominant ethnic group)

iii.   a fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, schooling and market relations

iv.   nationally relevant conflicts of interest.

It is an undeniable fact that the Modernist approach forms the main body of the theory. The modernist approach, which takes shape under three main headings, focuses more on transformation and insists on modern time for the time dimension of the theory. This broad spectrum still has no immunity. However, it is still more useful or even necessary to consider it separately in the context of criticism.

Under the name economic transformation, two authors have been subject to review. The first of these is the Nairn and *"uneven development"* model. Nairn tried to adjust the economic dimensions of the subject according to the Marxist theory. Perhaps the most compelling of the criticisms is that the model does not match the facts in terms of time. The misconception here is that nationalism does not occur in Europe, but in the colonies. However, first colonies were formed and then reactionary movements were born against them. Secondly, it accepts nationalism as a given and ignores the nationalism that was formed afterwards. Nairn's Scotland leads him to primordial given acceptance (essentialist view). From this point of view, it can be argued that he also brackets Marxism. As a result, he is confronted with reductionism as a victim of his singular point of view. Hechter's model of *"internal colonialism"* is further than Nairn in criticism. It can be accused of being incompatible with facts, which means "reductionism". It is natural to have inter-regional differences within countries. Everything cannot be explained by the concept of exploitation. Moreover, there are issues such as "memory" that rationality can not explain. The events taking place in the Balkans or the motivation of Nazi Germany can be considered within this framework.

Under the name of political transformation, three authors were examined. Rather than singular criticism, it would be appropriate to address the issue in general terms. A more detailed study will mean exceeding the scope of this thesis. In the critique of modernism, first of all, they cannot accurately determine the date of the emergence of national consciousness. In particular, it is the point of criticism by ethnosymbolist authors. The dream of an 'ideal type' of the nation, which is a troubling side of modern thought, is among the reasons for this point. This is Smith's (2008) rightful point of origin here (imagining within Europe and excluding outside). Another point of criticism is to overlook the continuity of ethnic cultures. There is no answer to the question "which one" at the point of inventing ongoing traditions. Smith believes that reinterpretation rather than invention would be more accurate. It should be noted that traditions can be invented (open to debate) but the dimension of belief is an undeniable fact and a point missed by the modernist approach. They also cannot explain why people are willing to lay down their lives for the sake of their nation, based on this belief context (passions). They adopt a reductionist attitude by highlighting the factors of modernism. The singular conception of modernism ignores traditional differences with local cultural and social ties. Formation of a state and a nation are not identical processes. Smith's (1995) is a source of criticism, particularly towards Breuilly. The criticism is based on the assumption that everyone will be included in the dominant discourse (p.38-39). The creation of institutions that will be embraced by all individuals, or the identification of the whole individual of society with the state as a culture, or its inclusion in the "national discourse" may not occur. It is an unassailable fact that a section of society has the potential for alienation. In such societies, the formation of upper identity did not occur and homogeneous society has not been realized. Lastly, instrumentalist approaches put more emphasis on the role of the elite in resolving nationalism (especially on identity issues). The source of criticism of the primordialists was crucial where Brass also an accepted question: "What factors are critical in determining which of those distinctions, if any, will be used to build political identities?" (1991, p.77). In other words, which differences are chosen according to what? The point of priority is to stay somewhere between the elites and the political conditions.

Under the name of socio-cultural transformation, three authors were examined. The first criticism for Gellner is the (generally accepted) over-functionalist. The problem here is based on Gellner's perception of priority/posteriority. For Gellner, nationalism is the cause. In other words, nationalism is essential for industrialization. An industrial society devoid of nationalism cannot be sustained, that is, nationalism cannot be the creation of forces that create modernization and industrialization.Therefore, it would be wrong to attempt to explain nationalism by its function. Nationalisms that started before industrialization have to be excluded from this scope. Another prediction is that it will lose its importance in societies that complete the industrialization process. This assumption does not reflect the facts. In this sense, nationalism movements should not be seen in industrialized countries. Gellner's theory is far from explaining strong passions, just like other modernist authors. Another criticism is that it is too generalist. "Bird's eye view" criticism is generally used for the theory, and it misses the micro-level with its macro-level perspective.

Another modernist author is Anderson. Anderson also gets the label of reductionism, a subject of general criticism towards modernist authors. Anderson's problem is that he sees the nation as a cultural construct and tries to explain it through the developments in the cultural sphere. Another false causation again gives Anderson a headache. He advocates the inverse relationship between nationalism and religion. However, it falls far from explaining nationalism in societies where religion does not decline. Kellas (1991), for example, was able to suggest that nationalism does not always replace religion. Another criticism is the claim that nationalism first appeared in the colonies in America. This is a subject of extreme controversy, however, the authors have generally agreed on Europe. On the one hand, Breuilly criticized the evaluation of different nationalisms on the same scale, while Chatterjee (1996, p.216), on the other hand, opposed the analysis of anti-colonial nationalisms. "If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?".

The last modernist author of this thesis is Hroch. Hroch criticizes not only by modernist authors but also by Amstrong (Ethnosymbolist). The point of criticism that they could not agree with Gellner is that nations emerged as a result of a long development period (since the Middle Ages). A point that Gellner would never accept (nationalisms that existed in the Middle Ages). They agree with Armstrong about the length of the process, but with the phrase "from a certain time," they diverge. Armstrong claims that it has been around since the beginning of the time, while Hroch says it has been since the Middle Ages. In this aspect, Hroch has been labeled with Primordialism. Another critical point for Hroch is on the three branches of Modernism theory. Getting stuck in the cultural perspective while trying to get rid of the economic reductionist aspect. Faced with cultural reductionism, Hroch is accused of missing political issues. For Hroch, regional nationalism is more important than modern nationalism, so it can be considered to cause such criticism. His main research intention was Central and Eastern Europe and in particular the 19th Century.

2.4   Partha Chatterjee's "Anti/Post-Colonial Nationalism"

All discussions started with the assumption that there could be another world outside the default or important world. Partha Chatterjee (1993a, 1993b, 1996) is one of the most powerful contributors to these discussions in the context of nationalism studies. It has established the concept of "anti-colonial nationalism" which is called by its name in the literature. Chatterjee is the presence of European writers who, in fact, prepare and justify the departure point. Chatterjee has been in a position to criticize even Marxist writers, who are in contrast to the authors who describe Europe's experiences of nationalism with their own perspectives. This is because, rather than Anderson's '*imagined communities*' concept, prioritized '*whose imagination*' understanding and ask: "If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?" (Chatterjee, 1996, p.216).

> History, it would seem, has decreed that we in the post-colonial world shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonised (Chatterjee, 1993b, p.5).

In this sense, Chatterjee opposed Anderson and claims that "the most creative results of the nationalist imagination in Asia and Africa are posited not on an identity but rather on a difference with the "modular" forms of the national society propagated by the modern West" (1993b, ibid.); therefore, Chatterjee argues that "as history, nationalism's autobiography is fundamentally flawed" (1993b, pp.6). In this sense, the modular forms formed do not conform to the Western understanding and are even structured through differentiation. In response to this understanding, Chatterjee tries to explain his thoughts with three different stages, or as he named, "the necessary ideological moments". This understanding is similar to the three stages of Hroch but differs in understanding. At this point, Chatterjee (1993a, p.50-51) makes a new staging, taking advantage of *Gramsci's* words for India. Gramsci's "war of movement, the war of position and underground warfare" has changed to:

i.   The moments departure
ii. The moments manoeuvre
iii. The moments arrival

"The *moment of departure* lies in the encounter of a nationalist consciousness with the framework of knowledge created by post-Enlightenment rationalist thought. It produces the awareness - and acceptance - of an essential cultural difference between East and West" (Chatterjee, 1993a, p.50). It is the belief that the West is culturally equipped for power and progress, but the lacking of such things in the traditional cultures of the East has condemned it to poverty and subjection. The European authors of nationalism claim that it is historically invariant and the

only secret of overcoming is to replicate Europe's modern culture. According to Chatterjee (1993a, p.51),

> Nationalist thought at its moment of departure formulates the following characteristic answer: it asserts that the superiority of the West lies in the materiality of its culture, exemplified by its science, technology and love of progress. But the East is superior in the spiritual aspect of culture.

The real modernity for the East is the moment when the East and the West cultures are synthesized. As Özkırımlı narrated "the *material* is the domain of the '*outside*', of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed" (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.183). The supremacy of the West in this area had to be acknowledged and for the East, it was supposed to be the goal of catching up and passing through in every sense. On the other hand, "the *spiritual* […] is an '*inner*' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity" (Özkırımlı, 2010, p.184). In this sense, Chatterjee adds that the materialism of the West that is to be copied will require protection for the spiritual sphere (1993b, p.6). "This formula is [the] fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa" (1993b, p.6). According to Chatterjee, first of all, the dominion of the spiritual realm is proclaimed and the rape of the colonial power is prevented.

According to Chatterjee (1993), an elitist program is needed at this point. This intellect (refined) can only be realized with an enlightened understanding. The superstitious belief and irrationality possessed by the people will prevent them from realizing these ideals. The aim is to create a political independent nation-state. This project is actually the reproduction of order (colonial order). This production is national, organized, where there is an inter-class alliance and this is the movement of the masses under a leadership.It could be done in two fundamental ways. At this stage, Chatterjee (1993) says that any acts of radical action or extermination that involve violence against the institutional structures of the colony have not

been observed. On the other hand, it has made it possible for all the pre-capitalist dominant classes to evolve into an auxiliary position alongside the system. In this sense, they have been subjected to the actions of the administration, including their limitation, passivity, and if necessary aggression. This is done at the *moment of manoeuvre*, with many contradictory possibilities as a very important moment.

According to Chatterjee (1993a, p.51), "the *moment of arrival* is when nationalist thought attains its fullest development". The discourse here is not only done with a single, consistent and unclear voice, but also by reviewing all previous contradictions, divergences and differences, and incorporating each stage of the history of formation into a unified discourse. This nationalist ideological unity thought it was trying to take place in the united life of the state. Nationalist rhetoric is a passive revolution that tells the history of its own life at the time of its arrival (1993a, p.51). As a result, Chatterjee argues that the extent of the '*Universal World*' or '*Western universalism*' is no more than the '*Oriental exception*'. This not only allows us to think of new forms of modern society but also new forms of the modern state. Chatterjee's approach towards the grand theories, particularly towards modernism, is significantly critical as the scholar claims that the colonial rulers left to colonial peoples 'nothing to imagine' (1996). Nevertheless, his colonial approach is hardly as comprehensive as the main-stream theories.

2.5   Suzman and the nationalism within international context

According to Suzman (1999, p.3), nationalism studies are in an "unfair" division. On the one hand, the view of political scientists and sociologists from the domestic level, on the other, international relations theorists focusing on global influences. This is an untenable point for nationalism studies. "Understanding how nationalist movements come to create or control new states requires looking at both 'domestic' and 'international' factors". In this context, he asked two questions; "how do they develop", and "how their strategies work towards building or controlling a state in the international system". At this point, the biggest phenomenon that comes across Suzman is the struggle against the end-user (colonizer) "British Empire". It is a fact that

the British were a colony empire all over the world and their politics were not irresponsible (for their own benefit). According to Suzman (1999, p.13), "nationalist movements rarely develop in complete isolation from the broader international arena". According to the scholar, strategies, as well as success and failure of any nationalist movement depend largely on the interplay between the actors in international politics. From this perspective, each nationalist movement has two ultimate goals: Attaining sovereignty at domestic level and attaining recognition at international level. In this context, the demands of nationalist leaders will be briefly *de jure* recognition at international politics and *de facto* control at domestic politics. Therefore, a nationalist movement's domestic strategies are directly linked to foreign actors' international strategies. In summary, Suzman examines his cases (Irish Nationalism, Afrikaner Nationalism and Zionism) on the basis of the concept of sovereignty and questioned "how do nationalist movements *transform* themselves from small social groups to rulers of sovereign, independent nation-states?". Suzman, as Breuilly, notes that an ethnic group mobilized within a nationalist movement might be characterized as a potential nation (1999, p. 1). Even though, each nationalist movement characterizes its national identity as '*sui generis',* Suzman draws attention to the fact that all the nationalist movements have interactions with other states and the world order and this is actually one of their features in common. In such a situation, the formation of nationalism requires not only domestic structural opportunities but also international and structural opportunities. In this respect, Suzman (1999, p. 4) recommends analyses on nationalism to:

i. examine the social and cultural background to national mobilisation, relating the emerging nationalist ideology to the ethnic context in which it was derived.

ii. look at the resulting organisational networks set up by nationalists, encompassing the role of material factors in persuading people to give their allegiance to the movement.

iii. analyse the impact of ethnic conflict and how it helped shape nationalist strategies.

iv.   examine the impact of the international state system on each movement.

Suzman's aforementioned hypothetical and analytical framework is useful in evaluating and observing the politics of nationalism within the international context. This thesis examines not only the way the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot nationalisms were created and mobilized the masses. It also questions these nationalisms' linkages with the international system and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus. It is a fact that Suzman (1999) problematizes the relationship between nationalisms and international politics. Nevertheless, the scholar's theoretical attitude towards the formation of nations is hardly as comprehensive as the mainstream theories. Additionally, Suzman's approach towards the mainstream theories is not quite critical as the scholar opens a 'new window' without monitoring the deficiencies of the grand theories.

2.6   The 'Critical' Theoretical Approach

As previously explained in this thesis, primordialist approach argues that nations are pre-modern entities and the contemporary nations are actually natural and historical extensions of their ancestors (Geertz, 1973). While the modernist theory notes that nations and nationalisms are productions of modernity (Gellner, 1983), the ethnosymbolist approach claims that while nationalism is a form of modern social consciousness, nations are pre-modern entities (Smith, 1986). As can be concluded, each grand theory has its own answer to the question 'when is the nation?'. Nevertheless, these illustrations hardly problematize politics of nationalism within the international context. In order to overcome this inadequacy, Suzman's (1999) argument that each nationalist movement seeks for a form of international support is quite helpful. Accordingly, it appears possible that political leaders design their politics of nationalism in a way suitable for a number of foreign states' interests to gain their support. Or, more importantly, the likelihood of gaining international support might give the political leaders the chance to choose between different politics of nationalism. Furthermore, as Chatterjee (1996), whose stance towards modernism is manifestly critical, claims that colonial

societies suffered due to ethnic nationalism particularly because each ethnic group prioritized preserving its own ethnic culture against colonialism. In another work, Chatterjee (1986) claims that the mainstream type of nationalism prevailing among colonial peoples is the anti-colonial struggles for independence.

The 'critical' theoretical approach of this research does not exclude the three mainstream theories (modernism, ethnosymbolism and primordialism) or Chatterjee's and Suzman's approaches. Nonetheless, it argues that, in explaining nationalism within international context, each of the five approaches have some inadaquacies. Nevertheless, a theoretical approach binding all the five together in illustrating for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context is likely to cover each approach's own gap and provide the research with the essential analytical background. Furthermore, such a critical and also integrative approach is likely to monitor to what extent the five approaches are capable of illustrating for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. In other words, the 'critical' theoretical approach is actually an examination of the aforementioned theories' and scholars' strengths and weaknesses in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus from 1954 to 1964 within the international context.

Conclusion

This chapter juxtaposed and explained the mainstream theories of nationalism existing in the literature (Modernism, Primordialism and Ethnosymbolism) as well as the prominent scholars representing these theories. It also discussed Chatterjee's and Suzman's approaches on nationalism. As Suzman notes, no 'nation' lives in a *'fanus'* and no nationalist movement is free of interactions between international actors, historical conditions and the world order. Suzman (1999) problematizes the relationship between nationalisms and international politics, and, this relationship is manifestly ignored by the three mainstream theories. Nevertheless, the Suzman's theoretical attitude towards the formation of nations is hardly as comprehensive as the mainstream theories. On the other

hand, Chatterjee's (1996) approach towards the grand theories, particularly towards modernism, is significantly critical as the scholar claims that the colonial rulers left to colonial peoples 'nothing to imagine'. Nevertheless, not only his colonial approach not as comprehensive as the main-stream theories, but also his framework is not compatible in illustrating for the politics of nationalism within the international framework.

This thesis focuses on the nationalisms in Cyprus in the 1950s and 1960s. This period of time is a part of the Cold War history and the process of *de-colonialization.* As the world politics in those years were shaped by the bi-polar structure of the world order, the rise of the NAM and the seek for independence of colonial societies, this thesis tries to shed light on the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international framework.

As the world politics is a 'game' of interconnectivity, one might argue that the nationalisms in Cyprus were also part of this interconnectivity. The mainstream theories of nationalism do not tend to characterize the phenomenon of nationalism as a part of such interconnectivity and they are not totally compatible with this thesis in achieving its research goals. Therefore, this thesis provides a historical and political analysis of the 1950s and 1960s at regional and global levels and it tries to highlight the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. The next chapters of the thesis analyse the nationalisms of the island, examines their relationships with the international actors' policies and questions the mainstream nationalism theories based on their capabilities in illustrating for these relationships.

CHAPTER 3
FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC (1954-1959)

"H.M. Ambassador in Amman in a recent despatch said that the contest between East and West in the Middle East is like a game of tennis in which the only score is from a double fault" (CAB 129/91/9).[25]

This chapter attempts to shed more light on issues surrounding the founding steps which eventually, lead to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus from the period 1954-1959. To achieve this aim, the study will critically analyze and evaluate topical issues such as international politics; the role played by foreign actors especially their policies regarding Cyprus. Other issues such as the various nationalists movements in the Post- Ottoman period, the role played by the USA, NATO, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Turko-Greek policies regarding Cyprus within the lens of local nationalisms, and their inter-play as prescribed by the various narratives and approaches of nationalisms. In this context, this study will cover mostly the British Colonial era, its interactions and impact it plays in reshaping the country's relationship at both the domestic and international level. Exploring these issues within the various theoretical lenses of nationalisms will suggest if these theories have the necessary operational capacity to explain these issues.

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[25] It was said by the Ambassador of Amman Sir Charles Hepburn Johnston, who took part in the memorandum of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd with "Relations with the Soviet Union" (21 January 1958).

3.1   The International Politics

This part of the study will analyze the important contribution of not only global politics in shaping the founding of the Republic, but it also goes on to evaluate the actions played the various states and non-state actors in the establishment of Cyprus. These actors included the US, NATO, the USSR, Turkey, Greece, and Egypt. This is based on the fact that it is undeniably evident that London and NATO military priorities are at the focal point of the analysis of the renewed network of relations in the region after the WW II. This part of the study, further investigates how these external actors, which were divided into two separate fronts in Cyprus, eventually caused involuntary articulation of domestic actors'. Especially with the Suez debacle and it's intending consequence in defining these relations, where the destiny of modern-day Cyprus birthed. This fiasco does not only point out the failure in Suez, it further paved way for British to realize that its presence and grasp control over Cyprus has waned as further evidenced in a damaged relationship with other actors.

3.1.1 Foreign Actors' Policies on Cyprus

First of all, when nationalism emerged, the world was being ruled by empires and advancing its industrialization phase. If we explain this within the framework of the modernist school led by Gellner, the revolution in technology triggered by social, economic, cultural and political transformations. This was a set of developments that made it possible and necessary to begin the transition from feudalism to industrial production, from the majority rural to urban society, and from empires to nation-states.

This was closely related to the politics of the powerful or victorious empires of tearing apart the weakened or defeated empires prior and after the First World War. As Breuilly pointed out, the development of the world of nation-states was only six nation-states in the 1800s, while 30 states emerged in the 1900s (Breuilly, 2014, p.388). Even Arab nationalism in the Ottoman lands began to be seen for the first time in this period (Hobsbawm, 2013, p.106). Besides that, after the WW II, these empires either collapsed completely or entered the stage of dying, and colonial peoples began to rise on the world

stage with nationalist claims. Therefore, from 1776 until the beginning of the Cold War period, the general functioning of world politics and the invention of nationalism itself were the products of the inter-imperial struggle and the peoples fighting against these empires.

When we look at the founding of the League of Nations and the treaties signed with the defeated empires, it can be seen that the creation of new nation-states is possible by the destruction of the weakened empires by powerful empires. However, after 1945, both the world political system and the establishment of the United Nations as a more inclusive and more robust unity than the League of Nations, and even though it was victorious from the war, the British Empire entered the death phase. It was now almost inevitable that the empires in the world order would fall apart and leave their place to the new nation-states or to the borders redrawn by the influence of nationalism. In this respect, it was not a coincidence that the rise of nationalist claims in Cyprus, which was a colonial land, precisely in this process of de-colonization.

This study examines the interplay of nationalist movements in Cyprus with the UN, Britain, the US, the USSR, the NAM, Greece and Turkey during the Cold War period. Since the historical process of the study coincides with two successive Cold War phases, the general view of world politics is taken into consideration in these phases. With the end of the concept of empire that entered the process of destruction as a result of the WW II, the interplay for the concept of nationalism is now the only address of nation-states. The United Nations, which was on the stage of history as of 1945, reflects this longing. It is a model in which nations are states and desires the state have a word in the system. The Cold War phase, in which the colonial empires were liquidated, of course, led the de-colonization process. In this sense, the territory of the First World War losers was similarly conceived around a certain purpose. The trend of victorious powers after the First World War was to break up defeated forces. This was a phenomenon that created nation-states. However, after 1945, being a victorious state did not support the tendency not to abandon the colonies. This understanding is about

destroying even the crumbs of empires. The principle of self-determination, which sprouted in 1919, has now become the unstoppable will of all colonial peoples.

The Cold War has introduced many institutions and concepts such as the United Nations, de-colonization movements, and inter-bloc politics, the Third World, the NAM, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, the Liberal/Capitalist West and the Socialist/Communist East. The renewed understanding of such institutions and concepts in history also demonstrates that the time experienced belongs to a new era. Therefore, the nationalist movements that were activated or pacified were in a situation of finding a living space within the same time frame. Many micro-nationalisms, which were supposedly pacified during the Cold War, emerged one after the other. These events, which took place mostly within the socialist geography, have incorporated new states into the system just like after the WW II. The most distinctive feature of this period is the fact that the event was at the side of Europe and was carried out in an international identity (in a time when Russia had almost no influence) under the name of a rapid wave of democratization. From this perspective, the concept of distance to Europe is also a phenomenon worthy of attention.

The first phase of the Cold War, the *Confrontation period* (1947-1962), meant a long-term struggle (time and space infinite), mistrust and an endless war in world politics. The essence of the matter was to develop a geopolitical containment policy against the expansionist policy of the USSR. A historic decision quickly determined the character of the period. The policy created under the name of American President Harry S. Truman ("The Truman Doctrine," FRUS) will also be the cornerstone of future American foreign policy. Two issues were prominent among the factors that led to the promulgation of the doctrine. The first was the end of British aid in the Greek civil war, and the Soviet meddling in the Turkish internal affairs via their demands on the Straits. In addition to these, four different factors are mentioned that influenced Truman's decision making.

The failure of Soviet troops to withdraw in accordance with the 1943 Tehran Declaration; on the one hand, while trying to pull oil concessions from the Iranians, on the other hand, they are fighting (supposedly) with the separatists in North Azerbaijan; a demand for some rights (bases and transit) from the Turkish-controlled straits and ultimately the rejection of the 1946 Baruch plan (international control over nuclear energy and weapons). In this context, Truman asked the US Congress for the approval of $400 million for military personnel and equipment for Turkey and Greece. President Truman found himself right on two points. A Communist victory in the Greek civil war would certainly disturb Turkey's political stability, and at the end, it would disrupt the political stability of the Middle East. It is a strategy of serious and vital importance to American politics that can't be allowed for national security ("The Truman Doctrine," FRUS).

The transformation of the first phase of the Cold War was a worldwide event, as well as the successful 1949 experiment of the atomic bomb by the Soviets. Other international issues from this period included the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948, as well as the blockade of West Berlin in 1948-49 (Felton, 2019). Along with the revolutionary movement completed in China in 1949 and the establishment of the Communist power, the Korean War took place in 1950-53. In the same year, it was witnessed that China invaded Tibet and Taiwan straits became a problem (Blanton and Kegley, 2016, p.99).

In addition to the ones in the first division, other international events were as influential and important as the previous events. The establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 with socialist states opposing the NATO alliance brought another uneasiness to the bipolar world. the 1956 Hungarian uprising and revolution (the invasion), the nationalization and war of the Suez in 1956, with the success of the 1959 Cuban Revolution and the arrival of communism, which became widespread in the world outside the Soviets, to the doors of America, fluctuations in the workers' movements in NATO countries and signs of spreading in Latin America, and the separation of the 1961 City of Berlin by the wall are some of the events (Blanton & Kegley,

2016, p.99). The fact that this period coincided with the aftermath of Stalin and the initiation of the de-Stalinization policy by the decision taken in the 20th Communist Congress was also an issue that needs to be addressed (Khrushchev, 1956).

In the early phase of the Cold War, there was a very sharp bipolarity. The world was divided between the liberal-democratic western camp and the socialist eastern camp. On the other hand, on the road to the end of the imperial era, the authority to regulate world politics was given to the UN by an agreement between the nations of the world. However, the UN's authority to ensure world order through military force was in the hands of the Security Council, which includes the US, the USSR, Britain, France and China (not People's Republic of China). Within the framework of the new world order principles such as the "free world", and "self-determination", encouraged the colonial peoples to become nation-states and to emerge on the political stage, while encouraged the last empires, such as Britain, to liberate their colonial lands. One of the main characteristics that separated the first phase of the Cold War from the second was that the dominant forces (the US and the USSR) had maximum political influence in their respective regions of influence. Their allies were very loyal to the dominant forces and had limited relations with the counter-bloc. This would change with the détente period that began with the Cuban Crisis of 1962 (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).

At the beginning of the Cold War, nationalism made the colonial peoples more influential than ever and the colonial peoples' internal dynamics and the collapse of empires have paved the way for their entry into the world system under the assertion of nationalism. When India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Myanmar (Burma) Japan and Israel, which are among the first states of this period, are examined, it is observed that there is an internal interaction with indigenous actors and external interaction with the system and the superpowers of the Western bloc. While India, Pakistan and Myanmar became separate states with the ethnic conflict in the de-colonization phase, Israel was the result of the clash between Palestinian Arabs and Jews in the process of ending Britain's mandate in Palestine, Japan, on the other hand, was the result of

reform nationalism, as Breuilly put it, against the emperor with the end of the American-British mandate. In this period, as well as the struggle of the colonial peoples' for independence, ethnic conflicts within themselves are also common. The fate of any of these nationalism struggles has not been independent of the de-colonization and the Cold War, and this is no exception for Cyprus.

3.1.2 Nationalisms in the Post-Ottoman Lands

The Middle East;[26] with its geography, boundaries, ideas, movements, resources, culture, religious structure, politics, and ideology has a different position from other regions on earth (Anderson, 1987). The Ottoman Empire, a regional power in its last period, kept the Middle East under its rule until the 20th Century. The Middle East is the name of the geopolitical concept given to this geography in the British-centered world geography. The given name was not a coincidence and the post-Ottoman territories were also divided between the British and French forces.

This region, which has the resources and energy to change the international power balances, has also become an important area for the countries' power balance strategies. The Middle East has its unique structure and its movements within the world system and its present conditions are realized within the framework of these special features. The fact that the Middle Eastern countries mostly have Islamic religion (although there are different religious elements as a minority) and have the majority of societies on the Arab ethnic basis, Middle East politics, its socio-cultural structure, ideology, statehood in the nation-building process, economies, resources, and understanding of this life, always be in interaction, it revealed a peculiar structure. Understandably, a state/nation formation as defined by Weber has

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[26] It is suggested that the literary product can be used by the Indian Office established in the 1850s, albeit widely claimed to be Thomas Edward Gordon (1900) instead of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1902) (Koppes, 1976). On the other hand, for Cemil Meriç (2014) who approaches with a critical view, with a definition of the region is as follows: "*The Middle East is a slippery concept. Because it is a concept that the narrations are various about when it was born, why it was born, what its boundaries were*" (pp. 69-80).

not been realized in the Middle East (Anderson, 1987, 1991; Kedourie, 1992; Ayubi, 2009).

> Nationality and citizenship, nationalism and patriotism are new words in the Middle East,[27] devised to denote new notions. Nation, people, country, community, and state are old words, but they are words of unstable and therefore explosive content. To complicate matters further, the same may be true even of the names of specific ethnic, national, communal, and territorial entities (Lewis, 1998, p.10).

The state definition of Machiavelli, the backbone of the Weberian state, which is also referred to in the related articles of Harik (1985) and Anderson (1987), presented a political view representing the Renaissance thought that came after the Medieval. In his work, he presents a national and secular understanding of the state. Machiavelli, further puts forth the ideal of a national state based on strength and argues that the state or the sovereign must take the sovereign based on a nation. "According to this understanding, the state should not take power from the Church and must be saved from being attached to the Church" (Machiavelli, 1515). But according to Anderson (1987) "Among the sovereign nations of the world today there are numerous cases which fail to meet the classic Weberian definition of the state" and the Middle East is not exceptional in this sense. Plus, Weber's approach does not comply with the *"rational-legal"* model. In this context, the typology that Harik created is quite definitive: "The principles which explain the emergence of the Arab state system are *ideology*, *traditions*, and *dominion*" (Harik, 1985, p.21).

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[27] ""Middle East" is self-evidently a Western term, and dates from the beginning of this century. It is a striking testimony to the former power and continuing influence of the West that this parochial term, meaningful only in a Western perspective, has come to be used all over the world. […] This is the more remarkable in an age of national, communal, and regional self-assertion, mostly in anti-Western form" (Lewis, 1998, p.5).

Within the framework of the *millet*[28] system in the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim groups were defined by their own beliefs in the hierarchical structure formed based on religion and religious authorities recognized by the state in their religious law are represented. Due to that especially for the Muslims for many centuries, even relatively, the peoples living under Ottoman rule did not dream of a state for themselves, and they were convinced that their religious and administrative needs were met by the concept of Caliph. In one sense, till the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, the Muslims in Cyprus or elsewhere (Arabic countries, Balkans, etc.) were subjects of the same state and followers of the same Caliph. With the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey, the Turkish-speaking Muslim community in Cyprus became the Turkish Cypriot community (Kızılyürek, 2002). In a way, as a reflection of Yusuf Akçura's (1976) conception of three political styles for the empire, the Muslims of the island inevitably had to follow the same path and reached the final stage with Turkishness. Although the existence of the Caliph helped carry out or to continue the Muslim identity, however, the lowering of the Ottoman flag on the island was a major blow to the Ottoman identity. In this context, the appearance of the young Turks in the island press and the development of the idea of nationality among the intelligentsia should not be ignored. Moreover, in the context of the events taking place during the Evkaf elections, it is necessary to evaluate the instrumentalization of nationality. The developments have brought Evkaf to the center of politics. At this point, the Muslims of Cyprus should be evaluated together with the nationalist advance that developed in Greece and the growing Enosis demands on the island. Undoubtedly, it would be a wrong argument to say that the Muslim Turks of Cyprus were affected by a single factor under such incitement (Vural & Rustemli, 2006; Nevzat & Hatay, 2009).

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[28] In the Ottoman system, the term "*millet*" means a religious community with its meaning in Arabic, this term sometimes reflects a large community as it is, sometimes it refers to a language-speaking group, sometimes to people of the same faith who worship in a place of worship. (Eryılmaz, 1996, p.16)

Within the ideological structure of the Middle East, ideologies have also become politicized. The ideological perspective of the Middle East is very broad. The ideologies in the Middle East differ in many ways from the ideologies that exist in other parts of the world and which influence the region. In the Middle East, ideologies are embodied in two parts. The first is national ideology and the second is religious ideology.

National ideology is not an ideology unique to the Middle East region. The basis that distinguishes it from other regions or places is that the national ideology in the Middle East is abstracted from religious elements in a society integrated with religion and used as an argument for religious politics, and it is a structure that creates and identifies itself against situations that will destroy or harm the self. National ideology is an ideologized structure of the framework of a country, a leader or an understanding, that the ideas, events and activities which put forward. It is generally observed that national ideology is fictionalized on being able to integrate into the modern world and form strong foundations such as unity and solidarity within itself. What is described as national ideologies are Ba'athism, Nasserism and Liberal Constitutionalism. An ideology which is important is the ideology of secular nationalism. Generally, the ideology of secular nationalism can be called the comprehensive form of national ideologies.

The Balkans was the first region in the Ottoman Empire that experienced the collapse of the *Millet System.* Via the nationalist revolts, such as that of Serbs and Greeks in the 19th Century and Bulgarians, Macedonians and Albanians in the 20th Century, a significant number of non-Muslim societies gained national independence (Kedourie, 1960). Secular nationalism, the thought of states in the Middle East after the First World War, or societies under the auspices of the mandate, was often based on the understanding of the *qawmiyya*[29]. In other words, it was the desire to create the Great Arab

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[29] The term *qawmiyya* is now widely used in Arabic, with a connotation of ethnic nationality or nationalism, particularly in the pan-Arab sense. It is however a word of fairly recent origin, and has already undergone several changes of meaning. The classical Arabic terms denoting group identity are *umma* and *milia*. Both have their analogs in Hebrew

and Islamic state. However, the policies and interests of the powerful states of the period that governed the colonial or international system, as well as the lack of capacity of Arab countries/societies to act together, led to the collapse of the understanding of the qawmiyya and replaced with a more restricted and narrowed nationalism. It is the *wataniyya*[30] understanding. Wataniyya is usually an ideology of Egyptian origin. Wataniyya is a socialist ideology that has evolved from Arab and Islamic nationalism specifically to identity or nation-state nationalism. With this ideology, states in the Middle East have started to put forward their politics and world view through their national self or the identity they have created.

Ba'athism is generally a continuation of the understanding of the qawmiyya. At the same time, it is to unite the Arab communities under one flag and to take a hard defensive stance against the negative actions, policies and strategies carried out internally and externally against Arab community or the Great Arab Islamic State. Due to the existing structure in the Middle East, this ideology has found a living space in some countries. These countries are Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Today, however, democracy and singular nationalism have taken their place in the changing and newly created Middle East order.

Nasserism is a nationalist ideology and a "movement transformed into a revolutionary character" (Gershoni, 1997) in which Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser had influenced on the Arab and Muslim peoples in the region,

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and Aramaic, and are very likely loanwords from those languages. Both occur in the Qur'an. Umma seems to mean no more than a group of people, however defined-by descent, by language, by creed, by conduct, or other. It may refer to whole communities, or to subgroups within such communities, as for example, the righteous (Lewis, 1998, pp. 81-82).

[30] "More often than not, the *watan* in classical literature is a town or even a neighborhood, a province or even a village, rather than a country in the modern sense. Watan might evoke affection and nostalgia; it is often linked with regrets for vanished youth, lost friends, a distant home. [...] on the contrary, a political connotation is explicitly rejected and is seen as belittling." (Lewis, 1998, p. 57).

especially in Egypt after the WW II. There is an identity nationalism based on the historical and cultural structure of Egypt before Islam. Its ideology called Nasserism and Arab Socialism becomes a source of hope for the Arab masses oppressed under colonial British rule. Nasser took the lead in Egypt with the revolution and made many radical innovations and had the power and arguments to influence the Arab peoples in other countries that shaped the politics of the Middle East. According to many researchers, it is said that it has a personality and understanding that protects Arab nationality against external forces and protects its interests and is accepted as a leader by other peoples in the region except Egypt (Salem, 1980).

As Abou-El-Fadl (2020) notes, the Free Officers in Egypt had embraced an anti-British and anti-Colonialist political line. Additionally, their nationalist attachment to Palestine was quite high. When Greece and Greek Cypriots demanded Enosis and London refused to leave the island, as the main anti-British actor in the region, Nasser became the primary ally in Greeks' struggle (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019). This urged Egyptians and Turks to join different camps in regional politics. The Egyptian and Greek nationalisms in were aiming to diminish the British hegemony in the region and the Greco-Egyptian cooperation might be explained as a strategic necessity for both sides.

After a brief conceptual, political and sociological analysis of the Middle East, in this study will reflect the phenomena experienced by the colonial powers and the events that have developed especially in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Given the historical significance of the region, the following should be emphasized. The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire did not just mean the end of a state for the Arab peoples; it also meant the end of the political, social, and religious order that had shaped their behavior for 400 years (Hourani, 1991; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p.169). The *reaya system* (subject to a person or a state) in the Ottoman Empire and patrimonialism which are the basic principles of national status, loyalty and submission principles, were met by the Caliphate to meet the demands of peoples in terms of administrative and belief dimensions. According to the thought of

Islam from the past, the only community in which Muslims are politically loyal is the *umma* or the community of believers (Goldschmidt & Al-Marashi, 2019, p. 150).

The political system of the Middle East countries is based on the concept of a territorial state with a Western inclination and the 'nation' mentality of the region consisting of the system of organization of the ethnic and religious sections of the region. Although both the concepts of territorial state and nation-states are triumphantly accepted in appearance, it is strange for the Middle East's historical experience, political culture and community understanding (Karpat, 2001, p.209). At this point, Sami Zubaida refers to the sources of the differences in Middle Eastern state structures and points out two main frameworks. According to Zubaida (Zubaida, 1993; 2004, p.407), the Western modern state was formed as a result of a definite historical, social and economic process and a response between the political power and the people in the form of a complementary one. However, the emergence of Middle Eastern states is determined by external sources and forces, not by essence. Power creates uniform integrity. It is inherently oppressive because it does not form the basis of social clusters. The second point of view is that both historical and cultural differences between the Middle East and the West create obstacles to the formation of a Western-type nation-state. These obstacles arise from the fact that the idea of nation is found in a jarring and often intertwined manner with the concept of Islam, weakening of the tradition of civil initiative, and the difficulties of citizens in their contacts with the state, which became liberated by the collapsed community structures.

According to Morroe Berger, who studied Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, there were no institutions in the Near East that could instill the spirit of citizenship into society (Özbudun, 2000, p.193). It is understood that the three components of the Ottoman state tradition affect the structure and behavior of successive states. The first is the *absence of a nation-state tradition* because the Ottoman Empire was not a nation-state. Baghdad Korany explains the idea of the establishment of Arab nation-states and the

demarcation of their borders as follows. The external factors were decisive in drawing the boundaries of the Arab states (Unimaps.com, 2005). The boundaries in today's the Middle East, and therefore the entire modern Middle Eastern state system, are the products of this mandate period. Because of their 'foreign' origins, this system of states would face two problems in practice: domestic tensions during the institutionalization of the system and territorial disputes that emerged after the system of states (Korany, 1987, pp.48-62). The nation-state has not been fully legitimized in any country of the Arab world, as in Turkey. The nation-state is being attacked in three branches in the Arab world. These are Arab nationalism, Islam, and the divisions created by ethnic groups or sects within the country.

The second is *the capacity to concentrate and expand political power*. In contrast to feudal systems, where political power was small and scattered, in bureaucratic empires such as the Ottoman Empire, power (i.e., the power to penetrate society, raise funds and bring about regulation) was concentrated in the center. The autonomous state apparatus of the bureaucratic empires have a greater capacity than feudal systems in terms of concentrating and expanding political power in their own hands. These state devices, which are not under the influence of established class interests, can use political power with greater ease for the economic and social modernization of their countries (Özbudun, 2000, p.203).

Finally, *the absence of representative institutions*. The combination of factors that made it possible to intensify and expand political power in the Ottoman Empire and the new states established in the imperial territories made it difficult for the distribution of power i.e. the development of democratic institutions. It is stated that the roots of the process of the birth and development of modern democracies in Western Europe extend to medieval feudal traditions. Western European feudalism was based on a legally defined, mutually binding separation of powers between the relatively weak central authority and the institutionalized local power centers. Europe has evolved from this social and political pluralism in the medieval ages to constitutional order, a state of law and modern representative institutions,

except for a short period of interruption (Özbudun, 2000, p.204, Salem, 1980).

Although the fundamental dynamic (sharing) that led to the emergence of the First World War was European states, the territories of the Middle East region in the post-war period played an active role in starting the war by being centered on global conflicts. Because the greatest element that shaped Sykes-Picot has been the power struggles of the great powers in the Middle East. Britain's desire to put an end to the Ottoman rule over Egypt and Cyprus, and the aim of expanding its position in Palestine, Iraq and Southern Iran, despite other forces, are among the most obvious examples of this power struggle. On the other hand, the main territorial targets of France in this struggle were Syria and Lebanon. The reason for choosing this colonial land is mostly because of the Christian inhabitants.

Due to the Ottoman-German alliance during the war, the British pursued a policy of inciting the Arabs living under the Ottoman protectorate and promised that they would take over by establishing an independent Arab state for Hussein, the sheriff of Mecca of the time. Sharif Hussein did not want to miss the opportunity of this Arab kingdom. In this context, the negotiations between Sherif Huseyin and Sir McMahon, the British High Commissioner of Egypt from July 1915 to February 1916, concluded and referred to as the Sheriff Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Sharif Hussein revolted against the Ottomans in June 1916, at a convenient time of war after the settlement with Britain. However, with the advent of the Sykes-Picot agreement, it was revealed that Britain had breached some of its promises to Sharif Hussein.

During the First World War, England wanted to benefit from the Jews in Palestine. To this end, Arthur James Balfour, Secretary of state for the British war cabinet headed by Prime Minister Lloyd George, sent a letter to Lord Rothschild, who provided the greatest financial support for the establishment of the Jewish state and was the president of the British Zionist associations, on 2 November 1917, supporting the Jews to establish a homeland in

Palestine. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, and the occupation of Damascus by the French at the same time with the establishment of a regional state, the Arabs turned to the development of their new state. Once the Arab people were inhabitants of the Ottoman province, they now had to create new identities for themselves, such as Iraqis, Palestinians and Syrians (Köprülü, 2013, pp.60-63).

As a result of the First World War, the 1919 Paris Peace Conference created a mandate commission under the umbrella of the League of Nations. During the inter-war period, the Arab political movements tended to be independent of the control of foreign states. The focus on gaining independence was mainly because the Arab political leaders of the interwar period came mainly from landowners and professional classes. The war years didn't have a lot of social upheavals. For example in Egypt, before the First World War, the ruling and elite classes were landowners educated in Europe. In Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, traditional notables continued to be privileged until the 1930s. While the executive groups continued and enjoy local support, they were campaigning against Britain or France. Nevertheless, the Arab leaders were trying not to anger the imperialist forces even when they wanted their sovereignty (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp.171-173).

Pan-Arabism, which is largely secular and socialist, which possesses the ideology of solidarity and unity among the Arab peoples, namely the ideology of integration, has made these countries weak. However, in the following years, these countries have experienced permanent developments by acquiring new central units and political identities through the construction of capital and provincial mechanisms and the opening of urban transportation and trade routes. They successively regained their independence, for example, 1932 Iraq, 1943 Lebanon, 1946 Syria and Jordan, but failed to achieve improvements in fortifying their authority (Owen, 2006, pp.56-62) . An independent nation-state similar to the Republic of Turkey could not be established in Arab countries. Among the reasons for this was the inability to reconcile the locality of nationalism with the universality of Islam. Intense efforts, whether intellectual, political or economic, on the Ummah or Pan-

Islamist awakening, have not been successful in practice (Sander, 2017, p.29).

The impact of the Cold War on the Middle East is very difficult to evaluate. The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 represented the Nazi genocide on one side and the failure of the British colonial policy on the other. In the years after World War II, the intricacy of all forms of politics, diplomacy and armed conflicts in the Middle East cannot be easily understood by the kaleidoscope of Soviet-American ideological or geostrategic conflicts. The establishment of Israel, which was supported by both the Americans and the Russians at the stage of establishment, but by the beginning of the 1950s it was observed that Soviet foreign policy supported Arab nationalism.

Between 1945 and 1962, most Arab countries gained their independence politically. All of the countries that gained independence became members of the Arab League. The Arab League was formed in March 1945 under the leadership of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Arab League aimed to target cooperation among Arab countries and the role of Egypt, one of the most important countries of the union, played a major role in the discussions on the Arab unification. The dominant idea in the Middle East world in the mid-20th Century was the idea of Arab nationalism, which sought reforms as a society on the issues of unity, independence and equality among Arab countries. This idea was embodied in the personality of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Under the leadership of Syria and Egypt, in February 1958, Arab nationalism experienced major development and a short-term union was established. This alliance ended in September 1961 with the departure of Syria. In 1963, however, there was another attempt, including Egypt, Syria and Iraq. But this merger was over before it started because of political differences, economic inequalities and the difference in development models. Despite the policies, speeches and actions of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the leader of Egypt among 1956-1970, the establishment of the Arab League with the aim, was not successful. Arab nationalism is socially claimed to be a people's movement, even though it holds all the ideas emerging from the Arab geography in the background. In

particular, external pressures and military defeats were the reasons for the failure. Arab nationalism was now represented by three main movements: Ba'athism, Nasserism and the Arab Nationalist movement.

As explained in further details in the following sections of the thesis, in the 1950s, Egyptian pan-Arabism became an ideological movement that jeopardized the Middle Eastern order designed by Anglo-American masterminds. It is a fact that plenty of Arabic states refused to follow Nasser and to submit leadership of Arabic realm to Egypt. Nevertheless, as Nasser refused to cooperate with Israel and Turkey in particular and the Western bloc in general, one could claim that his understanding of pan-Arabism had an anti-Western character. In the 1950s, Egypt and Greece (in other words pan-Arabism and pan-Hellenism) were in league against the Anglo-American plans in the Middle East. As American and Soviet interventions in the Suez crisis appeared, Nasser became a symbol of the weakness of the British Empire, though not terminated (although ended). Therefore, the British Empire had to struggle against pan-Arabism and pan-Hellenism in the Eastern Mediterranean in a time when it was relatively weaker in comparison to 18th, 19th and early-20th Centuries.

In the World War II, The United States with the Soviet Union, have become the two major actors and leading forces in the bipolar order of the Cold War, alongside the threat they posed to nations that are liberated from Europe and other states around the world from the Nazis. While the U.S. mentality encouraged the founding of liberal-democratic regimes in Europe, the Soviets however, preferred communist regimes in numerous Balkan and Eastern European countries (Wettig, 2008, pp.47-49). As a British Colony, Cyprus remained under the NATO's hegemony.

3.1.3 Policies of USA (NATO) and USSR on Cyprus

During the Cold War, there was an extraordinary power rivalry between USA and USSR. For example, the Yalta Conference witnessed a demand of Soviets for the membership of the United Nations to socialist republics', nonetheless; they rejected it on the grounds that it was the possibility of

enhancing the hegemony of the Soviets. During the Cold War era, these major powers blamed each other of forcing their political and economic administrations on other nations.

Right after World War II, Great Britain's influence in world politics reduced in terms of military and economic power. However, the Suez Canal still had maximum geostrategic significance for London. The channel was defined by the British Council of Ministers as follows:

> "The Middle East is therefore a region of life-and-death consequence for Britain and the British Empire in four ways :—

i. as an indispensable channel of communications between the Empire's Western, Eastern and Southern territories;

ii. as a strategic centre, control of which would enable an enemy to disrupt and destroy a considerable part of the British Imperial system and to deprive Britain herself of many supports and resources essential to her status and influence as a major Power;

iii. as the Empire's main reservoir of mineral oil;

iv. as a region in which British political method must British way of life is to survive.

> The vital importance of those four hard experience in both world wars [and] the island of Cyprus, lying just West of the Fertile Crescent, is the only territory in this region over which we hold full sovereignty" (CAB 66/67/55, p.2).

Due to the circumstances clearly stated above, the British were in a state of dependence on Egypt (due to the Suez Canal). During World War II, the British decided to refrain from dictating politics to the Arab states because of their satisfaction. Instead, they had the intention of establishing good relations and staying wide-awake to external anti-British propaganda that could lead to political disturbance. In this context, London was decisive to protect the Middle East against the Soviet Union and communism for at least the next 20 years. "According to the British, Palestine was also significantly

important in defending the Middle East and its '*partition*' was not preferable". Likewise, Cyprus was also a vital stronghold for the British and London had no intention to leave the island. On the other hand, in a way similar to Palestine, the partition of Cyprus would also inflame the Irish secessionism, a crucial issue occupying the British political agenda (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019). Furthermore, within the upcoming designing conspiracy of the post-war Middle East led the British to be aware of that the Arab League[31] was against two things: "the French pretensions in the Levant [and] particularly the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine" (CAB 66/67/55, p.11). Moreover, London was engineering to deploy garrisons in Cyprus and Palestine (CAB 66/67/56, p.1). The British government drafted the Sandown Plan[32] during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948. The scenario was based on security strategies to be achieved against concurrent Soviet attacks on Western Europe and the Middle East. As such, Palestine, Egypt (especially the Suez Canal region) were vital to the defense of the Middle East (Cohen, 2017, p.190 (Note 51)).

The establishment of the state of Israel has brought a new wave of excitement to the region, but this will not be in the sense of bringing satisfaction. On the other hand, the two major powers became first states for *de facto* (the US) and *de jure* (the Soviets) recognition (Quigley, 2016, p.94). While the politics of Modern Turkey (nationalism & foreign politics) could not reconcile with Arabism, the state of Israel was able to follow a pro-Soviet path, thanks to Stalin's assistance to Jews who had gone from Europe to Palestine to join the state of Israel (Demirtaş, 2013, p.112).

Just before the change of balances (November 1948), while Turkey stood alongside the Arabs in the UN General Assembly, the American-Israeli

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[31] Members: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt.

[32] "DEFE 4/16 JP(48)106, 7 October 1948; DEFE 5/8 COS(48)123, Plan '*Sandown*', 16 October 1948, TNA. "The first American plan for the Middle East, called '*Halfmoon*', was approved by the National Security Council in May 1948, and was substantially in line with Britain's Plan '*Sandown*'", D. R. Devereux, *The Formulation of British Defense Policy Towards the Middle East, 1948–1956,* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1990), pp.22-23" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p. 926 (endnote 30).

rapprochement had caught up with Turkey to take its axis in the direction of Israel which it subsequently participated in and it became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel in the Palestinian Reconciliation Commission (Zürcher, 2017, p.223). Also, Turkey's recognition before Britain is a detail which should be underlined ("Türkiyenin İsrail devletini fi'len," 1949).

At the time of NATO's (1949) establishment, its members were cautious for its neighbors on both sides of the Aegean. But it should also be noted that although both states were not founding members of NATO, they were at the same point as the West in positioning their international politics (Steil, 2018, pp.35-36). "In the eyes of the British, Turkey, Greece and Iran would be among the states constituting the '*outer fringe*' of NATO as allies of the West" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p.916). According to this understanding, there was no requirement to be members of the organization (CAB 129/33/56, p.1; CAB 129/36/183, p.1; CAB 129/36/284, p.2). In accordance with Russian policy towards the Straits, Stalin demanded that an international organization be established for renewing the "Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of Straits". Moreover, it's declared his intention to annex the two cities from the East (Kars and Ardahan). In the face of such a situation, Turkey was forced to join the Western camp, albeit reluctantly, and made efforts to do so. The Korean War, which broke out in 1950, opened the doors for Turkey and Greece to join NATO and consent received (McGhee, 1990, pp.70-71, 78). Even before the end of the war, the two neighboring countries were incorporated into the union in September 1951 ("Ottawa Konseyinde," 1951, p.1), and the continuation (February 18, 1952) Turkey accepted the issue of membership ("Lizbon'a gidecek heyet," 1952). Given the early stages of the Cold War, there were a number of preference and differences between the two (the US and Britain) NATO members (Stefanidis, 1991, pp.253-254). In response to their preference for the Americans, the British devised the *Sandown Plan* (which was less costly), which, in response to the possible Russian invasion, made Israel the main battleground (CAB 128/19/39/4). The rising American objection to Israel being the main battlefield and the formation of the '*outer ring*' came into play and the British were stepped back.

As of 1950, the new plan has been updated as the '*Celery Plan*'[33] and heralded American priorities.

In the eyes of the Egyptians, the Turks were perceived as a collaborator of the West and an "allies of imperialism", and in a way, they were the epitome of the relations between Turkey and the Middle East countries (Fırat & Kürkçüoğlu, 2001, pp.617-620). As soon as Turkey becomes a full member of the Union, in 1951, together with the UK, US and France, Turkey agreed to establish a force in the region (Middle East Command). The four states agreed that it was crucial to make Egypt a member of this network. These quartet offers to join forces with the Egyptian government ("Mısıra dört devletin teklifi," 1951, p.7). The Soviet administration, on the other hand, is very pleased with Egypt's cautious stance, and in this manner, King Farouk publishes his rejection ("Mısır dün dörtlerin," 1951, p.1). When the leaves on the calendar show 1952, a new time for Egyptian territory will begin and King Farouk will be ousted ("King Farouk abdicated," 1951, p.1). The plans of the British will be changed and this will bring their headquarters in the Middle East to Cyprus.[34]

Despite Egypt's unobtrusive stance, the American government continued to seek opportunities for cooperation in the region to counter the Soviet 'threat'. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles visits Egypt, Israel, Libya, Greece, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in May 1953 ("doc.1-54,"

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[33] "DEFE 5/24 COS(50)363 15 September 1950, TNA; 'Memo 282 of 1951. Short Term Plan for the defence of the Middle East review of Current Factors Affecting Plan 'Celery', DEFE 5/31/282, 7 May 1951; 'Memo 439 of 1951. Revision of Plan Celery' DEFE 5/32/439, 27 July 1951, TNA" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p. 927 (endnote 42).

[34] "DEFE 5/34/600, 'Construction in Cyprus of Headquarters accommodation for the Commander in Chief, Middle East Land Forces, or for an Allied Commander', 18 October 1951; DEFE 4/53/62, 'Proposal to establish a Joint Headquarters in Cyprus for GHQ Middle East Land Forces, and HQ Middle East Air Force', 6 May 1952; DEFE 4/54/76, 'Establishment of a Joint Headquarters in Cyprus', 4 June 1952; DEFE 4/55/103, 'Establishment for Joint Headquarters in Cyprus', 17 July 1952" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p. 927 (endnote 47).

FRUS). During his May 1953 visit to Turkey, Dulles stated that he was "largely pleased with the role played by Turkey in the free world" ("Başvekil dün Dulles," 1953, p.1). Dulles established the doctrine of the 'Northern Tier', stating that the priority of the U.S. government would be to ensure cooperation with Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan (Yeşilbursa, 2001, pp.65, 67-68). The territory of these four formed a strategic front against the Soviets (Dimitrakis, 2011, p.30). It's not a coincidence that these states, whose reason is too obvious to be hidden, merged with the British state to form the CENTO (Yeşilbursa, 2005, pp.24-27, 80-90, 2019).

The British Foreign Affairs was aware of the fact that the Turks were very "enthusiastic" with the financial assistance they received from the West (CAB 129/66/58). Moreover, within the American "outer ring" strategy a pivot role was being considered for Turkey. In this sense, Southeastern Anatolia was a very important place for the deployment of military equipment.[35] The equipment provided to the Turks was also a deterrent for India, and the US Ambassador to Ankara advised the Turks to hold military talks with Pakistan. The main axis of the talks envisioned cooperation and a "form of joint planning" with Iran and Iraq (CAB 129/65/4). The dialogue between these four states formed the basis of the CENTO (FO 371/115486/1073/95). The changing dynamics of the Middle East meant that London needed to perform more aggressively, and it would not be quite enough to consider the region's defense system in Egypt's absence (CAB 129/65/6).

In the period from December 1953 to January 1954, several issues occurred that severed the relationship between Egypt and Turkey. The anti-British, as well as the anti-Turkish sentiment of the Egyptian administration, become even harsher. Turkey's Ambassador to Cairo Fuat Hulûsi Tugay and Deputy Prime Minister Nasser had lived unsavory events in and a diplomatic crisis broke out which later Tugay was declared as persona non grata ("Mısır

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[35] "Alternative location outside Egypt for UK Middle East base; redeployment of Middle East forces; proposal for pre-stocking British military stores and equipment at Mardin, Turkey", 1953-1955, TNA, PREM 11/942 (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p. 927 (endnote 54).

hükümetinin dostluğa," 1954, p.1). After that, it is the formation of suitable ground for Greek-Egyptian rapprochement. In this context, the Egyptian government has made it clear that it will support Enosis, and it has made it possible for the two countries to open up even more ("Yunanlılar Gl. Necibi," 1954, p.1; "Paşa Necibin başından," 1954, p.1).

Friendly relations between Egypt and Greece continued with anti-British and anti-Turkish motivation. London, which refrained from negotiating Cyprus, found itself in front of the UN but also had the support of NATO and the British Commonwealth countries within the Political Committee. It is necessary to make a note of history in terms of an interesting stance, even if America and Iceland are reluctant to support it (CAB 129/71/319, p.1); while neither the British nor the Americans could support Enosis. There were two motivating reasons for American politics not to say a clear anti-enosis line. The first is the public stance against colonialism for the free and liberal world, and the second is not to receive a reaction from the Greek lobby for the upcoming elections (November 1954). Moreover, the US had no such position (Johnson, 2000, pp.234, 237; Young, Pedaliu & Kandiah, 2013, pp.92-97).

> For the British, the Cyprus issue could not be negotiated with Greece alone; the island was of maximum geostrategic importance and the Turks were highly unlikely to accept Enosis. Furthermore, if the British paved the way for the Greeks, the Turks would also expect London to return the island to Turkey. Nevertheless, the British knew that, as long as they wanted to remain on the island, they would enjoy Turkish support (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p.918; CAB 129/71/319, p.1).

February 1955 was the time for a new agreement for the Middle East, (security and defence) and Turkey and Iraq were the states that laid the foundation for it ("Türk-Irak Paktı Dün," 1954, p.1). In return, the Egypt-Syria pact is signed ("Mısır ve Suriye," 1954, p.1). Britain, Iran and Pakistan then joined the Baghdad Pact, which was later changed to CENTO (Powaski, 1998, p.117). For London, Nasser was now a security threat and had the

talent to disorder the plans. Egypt, which has become a threat to the British, has now implicitly included Greek and therefore Greek Cypriots in this cluster because of its association. In this context, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were now important allies for the British. As Egypt's anti-Western stance continued, the 'Northern Tier' defence system would retain its importance. "Furthermore, Turkey was the pivot to the Northern Tier defence and according to the British, it was necessary to keep this factor in mind 'in all considerations of the Cyprus question" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p.920).

The post-Stalinist Soviets evolved into a new understanding in line with the decisions taken by the 20th Congress, the opportunities for cooperation with leaders of anti-Western space were born through *de-Stalinization* politics. In this sense, in line with this policy, NAM countries have entered the Soviet radar (Gaddis, 2006, pp.109, 124-128). In the mid-1950s (in the absence of enosis), on the other hand, there was no difference between pro-Enosis nationalists and communists. In light of all this information, a Greek Cypriot administration could have been "a part of the Soviet camp" (CAB 128/27/57, pp.7-8).

The Suez incident constitutes a very important turning point in the establishment phase of the Republic of Cyprus. Nasser's visit to Moscow and the search for financial resources (Turner, 2009, pp.258-259), followed by the nationalization of the canal (26 July 1956) heats the waters in the Mediterranean ("1956: Egypt seizes", 1956; Thrope, 2006). Twenty-two states, including the parties of the 1888 Agreement and its channel-goers, are invited to the conference in London (held between 16-23 August). Egypt and Greece do not respond to the invitation. The issue attributed importance to the Greeks in this regard, validates Egypt's support in the UN (Hatzivassiliou, 1989, p.121). For London, there is now a fact: "Greece was Nasser's friend" (Hatzivassiliou, 1989, p.128).

After the failed conference, the UK, a member of the Baghdad Pact, request the member states (Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) to "take the necessary security measurements" (CAB 129/83/236). Allied to the British, the French-

Israeli duo mobilized in October 1956. The operation takes place shorter than expected and easily, but the issue that is not taken into account is revealed. American and Soviet warnings would very quickly evolve into a political "*humiliation*", replacing military success ("Yeni bir Dünya," 1956, p.1, 7). For the British, Nasser is now an enemy that must be destroyed. For the Americans, on the other hand, this death would have done nothing but provoke the Russians and would jeopardize "world order and stability" (Bowie, 1974, p.61). As a result, the French and British forces went back as they arrived (CAB 128/30/87, p.3).

During the conference, Turkey's pro-Western stance pleased the US and Britain. The Turkish government began an attack on importing 17 warships from Britain during the Suez Crisis. London, on the other hand, had no intention of giving ships to Spain or Peru due to NATO's geostrategic priorities (CAB 129/83/202; FO 371/124037-8). London was in a serious dilemma for Turkey. On the one hand, lack of resources and NATO's defence needs stood. Ultimately, London agrees on the offer of the three frigates (CAB 195/15/60(5b); CAB 128/30/60/3). In the final analysis, Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd expressed a positive opinion on Turkey's demands, while the Foreign Office advised the Cabinet on what was written below:

i.   The importance of Anglo-Turkish solidarity in the Middle East grows daily: Turkey has supported us staunchly over Suez.

ii. The Turkish navy urgently requires replacements. These would make Turkey a more effective member of NATO and of the Bagdad Pact.

iii. The forging of a long-term link between the British and Turkish navies is particularly desirable at a time when the Anglo-Greek naval connection is virtually at an end.

iv. Turkish goodwill is an indispensable pre-requisite of any permanent settlement of the Cyprus problem (CAB 129/84/257).

Regarding the Cyprus issue, London was pushing Makarios (while in exile in Seychelles) to stand up to violence, but they knew that this would be inadequate (CAB 128/31/2/4, pp.7-8). In this regard, London which is seeking

a self-interest has decided to utilize NATO good offices and seek common ground for reconciliation. A debate involving NATO rather than the UN General Assembly, which could be interpreted indirectly as a sign of diminished political options, was of course ahead of the British government's preferred choices (CAB 128/31/22/2, p.5). In this sense, it was clear that a UN General Assembly, including the Soviets, would be troubling for the interests of London and the West in designing the future of Cyprus (CAB 128/31/21/2, p.4).

> In October 1957, Henry Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, offered the 'guaranteed independence' formula for the resolution of the Cyprus Question. Accordingly, the island would be independent and its constitutional order would be 'guaranteed' by the USA, UK, Turkey and Greece. According to the British, however, Cypriot independence would be in the form of 'restricted independence' coupled with British sovereign base areas, as well as a Turkish base or a Turkish-ruled NATO base. (CAB 128/31/78, pp.9-10; CAB 129/90/276 quoted in Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p.924).

The Soviet role in the Cyprus issue was a slow and cautious entity. In light of the factors and actors described above, it is seen that NATO is more dominant than Moscow. The role imposed by the Soviets lack of position is more based on the metaphor of a goal scorer looking for a position. In this sense, Athens' choice of Enosis has dragged itself into the game it plays itself in. According to this conclusion, the adventure for the sake of Enosis first brought the Greek government to Nasser's port in Egypt. Then, with Nasser, they sailed from Suez and docked at Russia's port, and that ultimately meant a position from the Russian port against NATO headquarters.

In the mid-1950s, the Cyprus Question remained an intra-NATO problem as the Soviet Union was not involved in the issue at least to the extent which it was involved in the 1960s. Additionally, the NAM had not yet grown into an influential actor. Nevertheless, regional partnerships were not utterly free of

nationalist preferences (Holland, 2017, p.1). For London and Washington, the integrity of the southern flank of NATO, as well as stability in Greco-Turkish relations had maximum importance. Thus, in was not a coincidence that the Zurich-London treaties established a form of Greco-Turkish equilibrium in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Egypt was not pleased with Western and Turkish attitudes towards the region and the Greco-Turkish relations suffered a conflict due to the Cyprus dispute, Greece joined its forces with Egypt while Turkey was in league with Britain. In other words, Greece and Turkey required partners in their nationalist struggles on Cyprus. It is also noteworthy that, Enosis and partition would keep Cyprus a NATO island. Due to that, for Egypt, as Greece conflicted with Turkey and Britain (Egypt's rivals in the region), Enosis was more preferable to Cairo when compared to partition and the continuation of British colonial rule over the island (Mallinson, 2005, pp.31-33; O'Malley & Craig, 2001, pp.32-44, 89).

3.1.4 Policies of "motherlands" (Greece and Turkey) on Cyprus

For the Ottoman lands, the first political party (political organizations) movements were mostly composed of non-Muslim elements or the organization of minorities. One of the first examples of these political organizations was seen at the beginning of the 19th Century. These movements, called the beginning of Greek nationalism, one of the first nationalist movements in the Balkans, were the core of the first national-state projects. *Filiki Eteria* or *Hetairia Philike* (Society of Friends - *Φιλική Εταιρεία* or *Εταιρεία των Φιλών*), which sparked the Greek national movement, was founded in Odessa in 1814 by three Greek merchants and "for six years the Hetairia had developed and expanded without any definite plan or policy" (Phillips, 1897, pp.20-23). The movement around the centre of *Megáli Idéa* (Great Idea - *Μεγάλη Ιδέα*) was formed around *Ethniki Etaireia* (National Society - *Εθνική Εταιρεία*) in 1894. Due to the characteristics of the period, there is a need to focus on the fact that there are great powers behind these secret organizations.

This new state (the Greek nation-state) was small compared to today and still, there existed a large population to be included outside the Greek

territory (Clogg, 1973, 1992). On the other hand, the establishment of the Turkish Republic (Turkish nation-state) took place in a different context, and they had to defend the last borders of a shrinking empire. So, the newly established Republic of Turkey was hosting a different character. One could argue that in the very first installation, the emphasis on "sovereignty and nationality" written to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey heralded a French-type of state formation, while Greek nationalism was expansionist, imagined across borders, and had a romantic and German-type character. As a matter of fact, in the early 20th Century, the Turkish nationalism (Gökalp, 1973) had also had an expansionist, pan-Turkist character. In this context, there is another noteworthy difference that can be claimed. In the first bet, the general is the antagonism of the religious authority and of the nationalist secular stance. Moving from example, in a country like Turkey, the nationalist movement, which has developed against both traditional religious institutions and the traditional state (Ottomans), can establish a new regime, which is the third style explained by Yusuf Akçura (1976, pp.33-36), Berkes, (1998[1964], p.318) and Heyd (1950). Nonetheless, Ataturk and his associates were well aware of the fact that Turkey lacked sufficient power to attain such pan-Turkist goals and they were concentrated on safeguarding the Turkish Republic's territorial integrity rather than annexing the ethnic Turks' territories. On the other hand, Greece also refrained from conflict with greater powers, particularly with the British, in its struggle for Enosis. The policies of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus on many occasions proved that, the distribution of power in world politics might prevent the states from pursuing nationalist (and expansionist) goals. The basis of these flourishing nationalist currents on both sides of the Aegean was very much related to the growth or contraction roles that the natural conjuncture had given them.

One of the historical milestones of Cyprus, which constitutes the main axis of this study was the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) and the British assistance to be received at the next Berlin Conference. As a result, the island was leased to the British Empire. From this point onwards, Greece was the first of the motherland to hit the stage of history.

During World War I, in 1915, Britain and France proposed Western Anatolia, one of the goals of Megali Idea, to bring Greece into the alliance. After the Dardanelles defeat of the Allied Powers in March 1915, Britain promised Cyprus to persuade Greece to join the war (After the outbreak of World War I, Britain officially annexed Cyprus). Believing that the dream of Greater Greece would finally come true, Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos of Crete led Greece into war alongside the allies (26 June 1917). The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), signed with the Turks at the end of the war, gave İzmir and the Aegean region, the Aegean islands, East-Thrace to Greece and approved the release of Cyprus to British rule. Megali Idea was just about to happen (İnalcık, 2006, p.19 – translation from the original source).

Subsequently, a different Cypriot context for the motherlands emerged. Following the First World War, a Greco-Turkish War occurred on the Anatolian estate. The incident, which Greek history called the Asia Minor Catastrophe (*Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή*), thus paved the way for the Lausanne Peace Conference. Although Greece is in ruins, legal ties between Turkey and Cyprus, another motherland in the context of Cyprus, will also be severed as a result of the conference. Below are the articles of the Treaty of Lausanne (1924) that relate to Cyprus:

I. SECTION – I. TERRITORIAL CLAUSES

- ARTICLE 16. – Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned.

The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.

- ARTICLE 20. – Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914.

- ARTICLE 21. – Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted.

Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality.

It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.

Cyprus was abandoned to Britain in 1924 as a result of the lack of cross-border nationalism due to the conjuncture of Atatürk's Turkey. As a result of an era, the island will be declared a Crown Colony in 1925.

Cyprus, a Crown Colony as of 1925, was shaken by a wave of uprising in 1931 that covered the entire island and lasted for about a month (Kalantzopoulos, 2016). The apparent rationale for the rebellion is the increase in customs tariffs. The Legislative Council (*Kavanin*) rejected the law, but the prevention of the budget deficits (the decision of Governor Ronald Storrs) led to the bloody events known as the October Incidents (Oktovriana Οκτωβριανά). What is notable here is the fact that Alexis Kyrou, the Greek Consul in Nicosia, was at the center of the issue and the opposing position of Greek Prime Minister Venizelos. Immediately after the event

occurred, Venizelos gave a subtle diplomatic adjustment to the issue. "The Foreign Office had supported a more subtle approach to that of having him declared a *persona non grata* and abruptly recalled" (Nevzat, 2005, p.406). For the Turks of Cyprus, the noteworthy aspect of the incident will be a completely different aspect. As Nevzat highlighted the "influences had made Turkish nationalism a perceptible phenomenon amongst the Turks of Cyprus by the time of the October Revolt of 1931" (2005, p.abstract). What is to be noted here is that while the motherlands look at the event cautiously or even coldly, the two local nationalists (as will be seen in the future) seeked to include them in the event. Moreover, as will be seen in the future, it will observe that the Greeks are involved without taking permission from the British, while the Turks will only enter the event after obtaining permission. Here, "discourse reflects power relations, and colonial masters by definition think in terms of permanence" (Heacock, 2017, p.34).

After the Second Great War, the Greek Cypriots' expectation of Enosis became more widespread. However, it was a known fact that Great Britain had no intention of recognizing the right to self-determination in Cyprus and has a strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean plans at every stage of history. While a new world order was being established, the great states and regional powers were coaxing to be as careful and rational as possible. Based on this fact, after World War II, the disposing of many colonies has held an important place as it had been in the Eastern Mediterranean design. After Egypt had toppled the king off his throne, the work was determined to be harsh, and the relocation of the Middle East headquarters had become inevitable. In this respect, the principle decision was taken in December 1952 (which was considered to be 4,200 personnel); with the new proposal (CAB 129/65/26), the figure was offered at 2,500 and the decision was concluded by January 1954 (CAB 128/27/5, pp.38-39).

At this point, the place where the story began indicates where it ends. The Foreign Secretary said that "a move to Cyprus offered certain definite political advantages. Thus, it would be very acceptable to Turkey and should help to convince the Greeks that we intended to stay in the island" (CAB 128/25/101,

p.130). Before an option was designed especially for Cyprus, in case of a possible Egyptian catastrophe, a US-backed military apparatus was designed with Turkey "for pre-stocking equipment at Mardin and the 'outer ring' strategy" (CAB 129/65/9, p.3).

Turkey has avoided getting involved in the Cyprus problem until the British have encouraged it otherwise. For example, in January 1950, the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church organized a plebiscite, and more than 95 per cent of Greek Cypriots said "*yes*" to Enosis (Peristianis, 2008, pp.159-160). Right after the plebiscite, Turkish Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak made his speech in Parliament on 23 January 1950 that "there [was] no Cyprus problem since Cyprus [was] under British rule and Britain [had] not even the slightest intention to leave the island to another state" (TBMM, 23 January 1950, p.288). Similarly, Fuad Köprülü, who was the Foreign Minister of the Menderes government on 24 February 1951, said in the parliamentary podium that he did not believe that there would be "any change in the status quo of the Eastern Mediterranean" (TBMM, 24 February 1951, p.698). In another statement he made on 19 February 1954, Köprülü made it clear that the Turkish government did not believe that "a change in the island's status quo [was] essential" and it was "meaningless to negotiate with a friendly and ally country, Greece, on an island that belong[ed] to Britain". (TBMM, 23 February 1954, p.763)

Whether there is an agreement or not, without relying on negotiations with the Egyptians, the steps of the Middle East headquarters have been stepped up in line with the decision taken for Cyprus. The proposed schedule in light of the plans and adjustments made, the process was expected to be completed by July 1955 (CAB 129/67/137). In the Washington talks, 1306-7 telegrams sent by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom revealed visible issues about the newly established world order. The main backbone of the debate was paragraph 3 of the joint statement, and the emphasis on the right to self-determination was mainly for the satellite states of the Soviet Union. However, the reference to Cyprus as first in the Cabinet is a very meaningful matter that needs to be addressed (CAB 128/27/44, pp.3-4).

A declaration in the terms now proposed might well be held to apply to any separatist movement anywhere in the world: it was likely to cause us embarrassment in Cyprus […] We uphold the principles of self-government and will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence (CAB 128/27/44, p.3).

The constitutional debate, suspended during the Palestine issue in the late 1940s, ended during the hot summer of 1954. The risk of an exodus from India and Burma changed all plans (Asia/Middle East). In this context, the Defense Minister states that "our feet must be in Egypt or Palestine". As a result, the fear of being released into the atmosphere and the ambiguity towards the future of Palestine takes on the hanger of the constitutional studies in Cyprus, which are supposed to be, announced soon (CAB 128/27/20, pp.130-131).

However, the Greek Prime Minister Field-Marshal Papagos had suggested a proposal for military bases in both Greek Cyprus and Greece (even though he knew it would not be accepted). Under the long-term interests of the British in the Middle East, made them pretend to have not heard any suggestions (CAB 128/27/53, pp.4-5). *Turkey* (for the Middle East) and the *Turkish minority* (for Cyprus) had a necessity for a stabilizing element against "the Nationalist movement led by Archbishop Makarios and the '*Ethnarchy*' of the Orthodox Church. There are no middle-road political parties. The anti-clericals are Communist-dominated" (CAB 129/69/245, p.3) has led to an inevitable argument:

Her Majesty's Government is fully recognizable that the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking parts of the population links with Greece and Turkey. 'Her Majesty's Government fully recognise that the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking parts of the population have close cultural links with Greece and Turkey (CAB 128/69/245, p.7).

In short, there was not the slightest difference between the extreme nationalists and the communists in the face of British administration (CAB 128/27/57/6, pp.7-8). Towards the end of the summer of 1954, on September 8th the Manila Pact (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization-SEATO)[36] was signed, while the Cabinet had a self-determination gripe; the Colonial Secretary had been pointing at Cyprus (CAB 128/27/59/2, p.4). But more importantly, the Colonial and Foreign Affairs Ministers had proposed to postpone the signing of treaty, until the Cyprus issue was independent of the UN (CAB 128/27/61/3, p.4).

In 1954 Greece's proposal was to be handled under the auspices of the UN. Before the Cyprus issue was addressed in the Cabinet a typology for Commonwealth membership was created. In the context of this typology, Cyprus is designated as Group B. The concern of the self-governing concept described here was actually what would have happened if it had fallen into the 'Soviet camp' (CAB 129/71/307, pp.4-5).

The Cyprus issue, which is demanded from Foreign Affairs, is open to debate within the framework of relevant information for the UN. It is accepted that the subject has many facets.

i.   Firstly, it cannot be negotiated with Greece alone.
ii. Secondly, the Turks will never accept the return of the island to the Greeks.
iii. Thirdly, if British give way to the Greeks, they should wait for the island's demand for repatriation from the Turks.
iv. Fourthly, if British keep constant, then will find support from the Turks.
v.   Finally, if the British appeared as they would leave the island, then there would be a demand from the Turks. In this context, the existence of the Turks would be sufficient if they were stable on their politics (CAB 129/71/319, p.1).

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[36] Generally accepted as the South-Asian version of NATO, for Manila Pact see
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp

In August 1954, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Pact, which envisioned the security and co-operation of the three states ("Üçlü ittifaktan beklenenler," 1954, p.1). However, the Cyprus issue soon overshadowed Greco-Turkish friendship. The Cyprus issue was discussed at the UN Political Committee meeting on 17 December 1954. Greece has demanded the right of self-determination for Cypriots, while Britain and Turkey have stressed that Cyprus is a British island, based on international agreements. According to the two states, under the UN Charter, the Cyprus issue was a domestic issue that only concerned Britain. At the end of the day, Turkey and Britain had achieved their objects and the Cyprus issue at the UN General Assembly was not discussed ("Kıbrıs meselesi dün," 1954, p.1).

As a result of the meetings held under the UN, the offer was rejected. After that, there had been numerous bloody events which took place in Cyprus and Greece. Within the same time frame, a group of British journalists visited Istanbul. One of the most senior journalists, Scott Richard, the political journalist of Manchester Guardian, said:

> I will remind you of the British government's position before the Cyprus issue. The Cyprus issue is not an international one, it deals directly and indirectly with Britain's domestic policy. For this to be an international issue, the UK must discuss this issue with Greece ("Kıbrıs ancak Türkiye'ye," 1954, p.7).

At the end of all this, in the spring of 1955, the British decided to put a more restricted version of the 1948 Constitution into action. The reasons were very clear; the Anglo-Greek, Anglo-Turkish relations and the Cyprus problem in the UN. At this point, the report of the Minister of the Colonies A. T. Lennox-Boyd argued that the provocations of the Orthodox Church and Greece, along with the Communist Party (the most organized party within the colonies) and the racial conflict, bloodshed was inevitable.

i. the 1948 offer of a constitution should be withdrawn and a more limited type of self-governing institutions be introduced instead as soon as practicable; and

ii. no statement should be attempted that Her Majesty's Government might at some date in the future be able to contemplate self-determination for Cyprus, but that on the contrary it should be reaffirmed that they could not contemplate any change in sovereignty (CAB 129/74/92).

The memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden, on the other hand, had explained the external context. Under the four headings, Greece was locked up by an internal pressure mechanism and the pressure of the Greek Church. In the UN, the defeat of the Greeks was gratifying, but the second round was not guaranteed. Repetition of what happened in Africa to the French should be expected on the island. As long as the British were permanent and static on the island, it was guaranteed to receive full support from Turkey. Foreign Affairs had informed that, in the self-government issue, the guarantee of the rights of the Turkish minority was expected from Turkey, and beyond that, within NATO and the Balkan Pact, that they should not behave devastating. On the American support issue, "[they] must do everything possible to ensure that the US Government use their influence with the Greek Government to persuade them to drop their Cyprus campaign" (CAB 129/74/93, p.2). The constitutional renewal and self-determination debates had taken place in 1955, were left to the acceptance of the Greeks, the support of the Americans and the right time.

> If the Cabinet should consider that the scheme outlined was not sufficiently imaginative, it might be possible to combine with it an offer to discuss such other possibilities as a cultural convention or dual nationality (CAB 128/29/4, p.7).

On June 14, 1955, *Britain-Greece-Turkey tripartite invitation to London* proposal was accepted (CP.(55) 33).

> The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary and the Colonial Secretary (CP.(55) 33) proposing that the United Kingdom Government should invite the Governments of Greece and Turkey to send representatives to confer with them in London in search of a basis for a solution of outstanding differences over Cyprus (CAB 128/29/14).

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden said he and the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd were pleased that the suggestions which the United Kingdom had proposed for further constitutional progress in Cyprus were rejected by the Greek Cypriots with the encouragement of the Greek government. In the continuation of the subject, sole acceptance by Turkey was also within British plans. However, it was decided that it was possible to get rid of the UN in this way. The Cabinet lastly decided to form a committee consisting of Minister of Defence (in the Chair), Commonwealth Secretary, Colonial Secretary, and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Nutting) to put forward for further constitutional advance in Cyprus (CAB 128/29/14). On the eve of the London Conference, Prime Minister Mintoff in London came to speak of the Malta issue. The idea of Sir George Schuster was remarkable in this context: The idea of Sir George Schuster was remarkable in this context: "The Maltese want to join us, and the Cypriots want to join with Greece" (CAB 129/76/53).

The second disadvantage is that the minority on the island have the potential to bring minority issues in other colonies into a distressed state. To avoid one of the concerns of the London government, which is the impression of the public opinion on the issue of sovereignty over Cyprus would be discussed with foreign governments thought that it should not be the only subject of discussion at the Cyprus Conference ("3-Power talks," 1955). Another interesting point was that while Makarios' name was publicly written for Greek Cypriots leadership, the Turkish Cypriots did not have a leading name (CAB 129/75/33; CAB 128/29/14, pp.4-5). As on the other hand, while another remarkable aspect is the absence of legal authority of Turkey regarding Cyprus. When dealt within this context, it was the dilemma of the

matter, was the opening/opportunity of the British. When tactically two governments thought that they had been promised, they would be confronted only by the British constitutional proposal.

The events and conjuncture led to the acceptance of London's proposal and its acceptance by the two countries. Meanwhile, the organised process that threatens British rule in Cyprus has gained momentum. After the sad events, the Minister of Colonies visited the island, and after these unwanted developments, only relevant measures could be taken.[37] In this context, while the intellectual preparations were made for the conference, security and strategic issues were discussed and the date for the conference decided as 29th August (CAB 128/29/23, pp.5-6). Four articles have been written under the "*the strategic importance of Cyprus*" title presented in memorandum but are summarized as follows: "*No other place remains to us which could fulfil these functions*" (CAB 129/76/82).

   i.   The natural advantages inherent in its geographic position.
   ii. Its ability to house the necessary elements of our land and air forces in the Middle East.
   iii. It provides the site for the Headquarters which in peacetime is the centre of our military influence with our friends and allies in the Middle East and will be the focal point from which we conduct our operations in that area in war.
   iv. It contains two important strategic airfields on which much money is being spent in order that we may play our full, part in strategic operations in war (Ibid.).

The continuation of the report was the best estimation of what could be experienced in the next five years. They have considered the scenario of

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[37] The phenomenon to be emphasized here is the declaration that even the measures to be taken against the EOKA terror are taken according to the conjuncture. "The Colonial Secretary said that during his visit to Cyprus he had satisfied himself, by personal discussion with the Governor, that special powers were needed to break up the terrorist organisation which was threatening to disrupt the administration by acts of violence" (CAB 128/29/22, pp. 6-7).

bringing the communist reality to the primary position and a communist regime could come if they left the island. Although EOKA was not a communist organization (Katsourides, 2014, pp.489-490), they would continue its activities, but the main unions were under communist control and were in full support. In this case, if the island was transferred to Greece, ethnic turmoil would be inevitable.

> An outbreak of communal strife would seriously impair the efficiency of Cyprus as a base. [...] On the other hand, the Greek Government has already intervened by encouraging the Cypriots to violence. Both Greek and Turkish Governments may follow this by training the Cypriots in sabotage and resistance techniques, and by the supply of arms and leaders (Ibid, p.2).

In the comprehensive colonial security report prepared at the corresponding time in advance of the conference, Cyprus has been called one of the five countries that might be been a problem in the coming years. They have examined under the headings communism, labour, racial and anti-British troubles. Enosis was defined as '*burning problem*' and '*best organized Communist Party in any Colonial territory outside the Far East*', was made of such cases detected (CAB 129/76/89, pp.51-54). The events that force the British system in Cyprus were now on the agenda of the British Cabinet. The greatest fear of the British mind was this; as in the channel events, there was no longer a second base to lose or a defeat in the Middle East (Alecou, 2016).

As a matter of fact, before going to the conference, the British, who designed the possible failure, increased the allowance for the police. The only argument for failure was to protect the Eastern Mediterranean against the Russian attack, as it was during the first occupation of the island (1878) (CAB 128/29/28, pp.8-9). In this context, as the conference day approaches, the Cabinet clarified its needs for Cyprus.

i.   a secure position for our Middle East Headquarters and a safe base for the deployment and supply of a strategic reserve and for staging aircraft;

ii.   the maintenance of a physical symbol of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East;

iii.   the maintenance of order and good government in Cyprus and the encouragement of its steady progress towards internal self-government (CAB 129/76/94).

As a result, in the development of tactical phase based on Cyprus negotiations which note by the Minister of Defence Selwyn Lloyd, the following considerations offered as to be taken into account:

i.   The Greeks will naturally suspect us of wishing to keep them dangling. So we must not give them cause for complaint on this score.

ii.   But subject to this, we should try to keep the negotiations going as long as possible. We want to give tempers time to cool and we want if possible to go on talking so long as the United Nations Assembly is in session.

iii.   We must be careful not to gang up with the Turks or stimulate their resistance to self-determination. Otherwise the Russians will probably get to hear of it and will inform the Greeks with damaging results. But we must try to devise a procedure which will make it certain that the Turks state their position clearly.

iv.   Finally we should bear in mind that the terms of our invitation envisage a conference "on political and defence questions which affect the Eastern Mediterranean including Cyprus" (CAB 129/76/94, Annex C, p.5).

The child who was expected to be born was named: '*Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus*'. The most crucial point of the last preliminary information presented by Foreign Minister Harold Macmillan was:

They are also agreed in recognizing the key strategic position of Cyprus and the vital contribution of the British military headquarters

and base in the island to the maintenance of peace and security in the areas of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (CAB 129/77/117).

The design of the conference was shaped around these two main questions for negotiations in light of the above-explained information. The formulation designed had to be internalized by everyone and the British succeeded in doing so. The so-called self-governing problematic, which would secure the status of minorities with the appropriateness of the international conjuncture, also included the exercise of the people's right to self-determination. In this context, the necessity of a system in which minority rights are protected has become primary. Since Greece was obliged to defend the majority, the task entrusted to Turkey was also to advocate the minority (CAB 129/77/117). In an almost open letter-style article published in the Spectator Gazette before the Conference, London took a realistic approach to the following points:

    i.   It is obviously impossible for the British Government to accept a straightforward application of enosis, but it might be possible to work out some compromise solution, which would permit the maintenance of British bases in Cyprus and safeguard the rights of the Turkish minority.

    ii.   Now that Britain has abandoned her earlier intransigence over the Cyprus question, ails time that the Greek Government broke its subservience to the demagogues of the Ethnarchy.

    iii.   The disadvantages of proceeding to extremes has been shown before in the history of Hellas. Before coining to London the Greek Foreign Minister should take a deep breath and read Thucydides. ("Compromise on Cyprus," 1955).

The greatest success from the beginning was perhaps the necessity of publishing a communiqué. Another issue was that the Greeks had to leave the plebiscite option for unification and that's the second gain. Plus, Turks do not want to have any changes. The fact that the Treaty of Lausanne could not be renewed without the question of Thrace and the Dodecanese islands put Cyprus in a very important position. Additionally, Cyprus was an

indispensable '*back door*' for Turks (CAB 128/29/ 30, pp.3-5). Due to that, the Turkish delegation inevitably rejected autonomy and annexation requests ("Muhtariyet ve ilhak taleplerini reddettik," 1955, p.1). On the other hand, the Simonstown Treaty and the Cyprus Conference led Franco Spain to hope for Gibraltar (CAB 129/77/147).

When the dates were shown in October 1955, the Channel waters began to warm up. As regards oil in the Middle East, threats have become visible and British Foreign Affairs complained of rather slippery ground. Beyond that, after the Egyptians and Saudis, the Russians were also populated in the region with large financial expenditures. The main reason for the fear is played with the passion of nationalist local elements for the activities to be carried out in the area. Above all, the Russians provided arms to the Egyptians and even to Syria. Moreover, hundreds of Arab youth had been taken to visit Russia and their satellite states. Arabic, Persian and Kurdish publications were used for this purpose. Egyptians embarked on cultural leadership in the Arab world, and they used the press, radio, and education as weapons. Just as the Greeks did, they subsidized the salaries of teachers in Cyprus (CAB 129/78/152). The British Foreign Ministry said the ending Suez Treaty had created a vacuum effect, inevitably opening up to an imbalance of creativity and external influences.

> The Prime Minister said that the main objective of our policy should be
> to protect our vital oil interests in the Middle East. From this point of
> view the strengthening of the Northern Tier[38] defence arrangements
> was more important than the attitude of Egypt. Turkey was the pivot to

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[38] "Dulles began to put forward a new concept for the defence of the Middle East based on co-operation with the Northern Tier states of Turkey, Iraq and Iran. This idea was encouraged by recent developments in the eastern Mediterranean"., O. Almog, Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez (London: Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), p.10; see the different expectations of the British and Americans for Northern Tier from O. Almog Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez.

the Northern Tier defence. This factor should be kept in mind in all considerations of the Cyprus question (CAB 128/29/36, pp.3-4).

After the Middle East, the Balkans was another geography affected by the Cyprus issue. Regretfully, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden's meeting with Kardelj, Vice-President of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council, regrets that the Balkan Alliance was also affected by the problem in Cyprus. Another striking aspect of the conversation was that it mentions two things as the reasons why he talked to the Turks before the Greeks. In the end, the Turks would be angry about Cyprus, and "Cyprus was the last Turkish off-shore island" (CAB 129/78/179, p.4). In November 1955, Makarios rejected the constitutional offer because it did not contain self-determination (Mayes, 1981, p.70). When viewed throughout history, the uniqueness of the walking path (Enosis-no alternative) made the Greeks of Cyprus easily predictable. It was difficult to claim that they did not read the given texts, but it was impossible to prove the opposite (CAB 128/29/42, pp.7-8). However, even the deportation of a simple bishop form London was judged according to the conjuncture (i.e. elections in Greece in March).

In the spring of 1956, in the context of the upcoming Soviet leaders' visit to London, the quote from Foreign Minister Bevin's speech at the United Nations General Assembly showed the position of the Greeks in the eyes of London: "We know the reason. It is that the Soviet spider wants Greece within its web [...]" (CAB 129/78/197, p.13). On the other hand, Eden's response to Indian Prime Minister Nehru was a telegram of the Baghdad Pact. Jealous of the rivalry between the Hashemi and Saudi dynasties, he suggested that Egypt existed before the Treaty of Baghdad. In the next stage, tries to explain how the Soviet Union is trying to infiltrate the Middle East by saying it will focus on the benefit of reconciliation with Israel (CAB 129/78/199). The American government has pledged full spiritual support except for participation in the Baghdad Pact. It was about more financial aid for Turkey. After Prime Minister Eden and Secretary of State Lloyd's visit to North America, the argument that the three governments should confirm their

intention to meet the conditions of the Tripartite Declaration to address the Israeli-Arab differences was noteworthy (CAB 128/30/10, pp.3-5).

By January 1956, the British stated that they were positively approaching to Malta; while on the other hand, they confessed that Cyprus would be implicitly disposed of as they tried to define their tendency to move away from Cyprus and called it an "inconsistency". Moreover, furthermore, the radio broadcasts made in Athens, brought incredible discomfort comes to the Cabinet countless times. It will be more valuable in these circumstances, not only stress on the will of the Enosis but also strain on behalf of regional events and interpretations (CAB 128/30/2, pp.4-7). In different circumstances, as a counter-tactic to the British (at a time when they were so-called very close to agreeing with the Governor of Cyprus), Makarios not only demanded a general amnesty but also for releasing the death sentences of prisoners. To sum up, the Cabinet stated that the constitutional question would first and foremost be for the writing of a liberal and democratic constitution, with the demands of the majority and the assurances of the minorities under the same roof (CAB 128/30/17/5, p.7). The Cabinet decided that the security issue could not be resolved, and on 6 March 1956, Archbishop Makarios and the Bishop of Kyrenia were exiled to Seychelles. Among the justifications for the decision to be taken could be summarized as the amnesty framework, the approval of the Greek-Cypriot majority before the constitutional arrangements and the date of the transfer of internal security (CAB 128/30/18/1, p.3; CAB 128/30/19/2, pp.3-4).

As a result of the negotiations which led to the deportation of Makarios and remained fruitless, London finds its way to Ankara (CAB 128/30/22/6, p.6). Crossing the line was, in Prime Minister Eden's words, *"helpful"* and a headline was reflected in newspapers after positive talks: "It is essential for Cyprus to take Turkey's consent" ("Kıbrıs için Türkiye'nin," 1956, p.1). After all, "the constitutional problem in Cyprus was also of some concern to the governments of Greece and Turkey" (CAB 128/30/30/2, p.3). British politics has indirectly reached the point that without Turkey at this stage, the problem

cannot be solved. Before the visit of the governor of Cyprus to London, Prime Minister Eden questioned the availability of a new initiative and said:

> Now that there was a more widespread recognition of the extent of Turkish interests in Cyprus, there might be advantage in bringing forward some suggestion of this kind. This need not exclude the possibility of further constitutional development in the Island (CAB 128/30/38/1, p.4).

This idea was a clear indication that the tripartite mixture (Britain-Turkey-Greece) would be on the table for the rest of the time. However, Prime Minister Eden acknowledged that the perception of Cyprus in the outside world was mistaken and mandate ministers to refer to Cyprus in their speeches as much as possible (CAB 128/30/39/1, p.3; CAB 128/30/40, p.10).

Governor Harding (ex-Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field-Marshal Sir John Harding, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus) returned to London for the breakthrough, which was supposed to take effect in June 1956. On the road to London, Harding was convinced that a constitutional order without self-determination would not be accepted and a turning point. The Cabinet meeting, attended by Harding, marked a turning point for Cyprus (CAB 128/30/41/6, pp.8-10).

To meet these challenging conditions, the Colonial Policy Committee had developed two alternative policy statements and advised to the Cabinet. As first the Committee began by announcing the appointment of Lord Radcliffe, a constitutional Commissioner, to draft a constitution.

i. Under the first alternative it would be announced that the issue of sovereignty would be determined by a plebiscite held after the expiration of fifteen years from the date when the new constitution came into effect.

ii. Under the second alternative the United Kingdom Government would undertake that, at the expiration of ten years from the date on which the new constitution came into effect, they would accept a majority

decision of the Standing Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) on the question whether a change in the international status of Cyprus could be reconciled with the due discharge of Western defence obligations in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East (CAB 128/30/41/6, pp.8-10).

Under these discussions, the three countries (future guarantor countries) on the island could have military bases and move the issue to NATO. Plus, for the first time, self-determination has been seriously debated and questioned whether it would be in ten or fifteen years. At the same meeting, Lord Radcliffe (CAB 129/82/161) was appointed (12 June 1956).

On June 19, 1956, during the presentation of the Colonial Policy Committee report it was said that "Government had already accepted the principle of self-determination".

    i.   a treaty had been concluded between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey regulating in their common interest its use for military purposes; and

    ii.   special treaty arrangements had been made to safeguard the interests of racial minorities (CAB 128/30/44/6, pp.4-5).

The nature of the agreement would carry a military purpose for the three countries. The issue was given international recognition after an interim 10 year period after NATO approved its members. London added to their proposal against any reactionary response from the Turks that "[they] should supplement this by an offer to the Turks that they might have use of the military facilities in the zones retained under our sovereignty". On the other hand, London keeps in mind that "it was an essential element of this plan that the question of self-determination should not be raised internationally by the three Governments". Meanwhile, it was essential to discover whether the US would be prepared to support a new initiative on these issues from the other side of the ocean. Soon, these arguments would form the basis of the 1960 Republic (CAB 128/30/44/6). The British accepted the right to self-determination on the assumption that the Turks would not approve which drive for deadlocks.

To have a realistic grasp of the subject, it is important to know which one has been informed first (Greece, Turkey and the US). Moreover, due to the Cyprus issue, the onset of discomfort within the party emerged (CAB 128/30/46/3, p.3). The internal and external dimensions of the congestion were growing daily. In September 1955, and during the Harding-Makarios negotiations, no results were obtained. The subject needed a better understanding, so the Imperial Chiefs of Staff, Templer, came to Ankara. The importance of the issue was finally understood in the House and the Cabinet.

> As it has proved impossible to obtain international agreement in this matter, which so clearly contains the seeds of grave danger to the whole future of the Eastern Mediterranean, Her Majesty's Government have to accept that for the present progress by this means cannot be realized (CAB 128/30/49/7, p.8).

To return from this deadly path, it was decided to develop self-government again. In a nutshell, emerging as a formula, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean interests and prestige of British on one side, on the other side, Turkey and other allies should not be ignored. On the other hand, for another strategic point (British Somaliland) in the memorandum prepared by Colonial Minister Lord Lloyd after his visit to the region, the fact that it was established with Cyprus was remarkable.

> This, however, would be very dangerous to us in other interests. For example, it is exactly what the Greeks have been saying in the case of Cyprus. I do not see any form of international arbitration which we could accept and we must face having to make this clear to the Somalis (CAB 129/82/180, p.11).

Referring to the fact that, it would be disadvantageous to have it handled by the International Court, and concluded that it would be in line with the expectations of Greece under the UN framework. "It has become plain that steps to create conditions which might lead to the application of self-determination for Cyprus would raise far wider issues for our Turkish allies as parties to the Lausanne Treaty settlement" (CAB 128/30/48/7, pp.7-8).

A week before the Suez case occurred, there were incidents in the region that were not related to one another, but could make sense in the bigger picture. The articulation of the Egyptian broadcasting system to Athens-based radio broadcasts, which had previously been on the agenda of the Cabinet, has become a serious source of the disturbance (CAB 128/30/51/5, p.6). Besides, the British plane, which was forced into Athens by Greek military aircraft, has become a separate discomfort (CAB 128/30/44/6, p.5). On the other hand, the Soviet administration had offered free weapons aid to Jordan (CAB 128/30/53/5, p.7). On the same day, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser announced that the Suez Canal was nationalized ("1956: Egypt seizes," 1956; Thrope, 2006). The assembled Cabinet found it appropriate to start preparations for the military operation in the face of developing events. In this context, "fighter squadrons would also be sent to Cyprus". In other words, Cyprus had become part of the upcoming war (CAB 128/30/54, p.3).

In August 1956, another issue (in the continuation of the above-mentioned question, while Lord Redcliff was conducting the constitutional work), the education subject came to the Cabinet agenda with another security perspective. Following the request of Governor Harding, the Colonial Policy Committee had approved that the Greek teachers' residence permit would not be renewed. Closed schools can only be open if they provide the necessary conditions. The intellectual dimension of the debate was that the new approach could lead to criticism against de-Hellenization (CAB 129/78/197; 59, CAB 128/30/2, p.3).

In joint discussions with France and the US, US Secretary of State Dulles worried about aid and pointed out that the international mechanism should not be an agency of the United Nations has led the British to be anxious. He also made it clear that he would strongly reject the use of early force. In this sense, he asserted that the right move would be to organize a conference. Regarding the issue, he stressed that the 1888 Constantinople Convention should be relevant and that it would be useful for the Soviet Union to join as well. On the other hand, the source of stress for the Americans was an illusion that could be established with Panama. In this context, invitation list

of participating states was considered under three categories as *'signatory countries of the original Convention'*, *'five of the leading maritime Powers'* and *'six Powers with a vital interest in seaborne trade through the Canal'* (CAB 128/30/56, pp.2-3).

The importance of this conference for Cyprus was the decision taken by the Cabinet that "all the countries invited would be represented, except Greece and Egypt" (CAB 128/30/59/3, p.4; "Compromise-Minded Conferees," 1956, p.43). Moreover, the Turkish government knocked on the door of the British and declared that they wanted to buy a total of 17 pieces warships. The cabinet considered the following: "On political and strategic grounds we should want to sell to Turkey rather than to Spain or Peru" (CAB 129/83/202). On the one hand, Turkey's lack of money and on the other, the need for a strong defence of the NATO force was discussed (CAB 128/30/60/3, p.5). It was decided to offer three frigates on the loan. While the Turkish government continued to press the British Cabinet on the issue of warships, Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, was fully supportive of Turkey. During the Suez affair, London received full support from Ankara in a UN vote to prevent the Baghdad Pact from collapsing on its own and long-term flights in Turkish airspace. The only point of discomfort over the matter was the issue of lending, as the ships were sold for cash to another pact member Pakistan (CAB 128/30/83/6, pp.8-9).

As the Middle East drifted into the war on the Suez Canal, the ongoing Malta controversy reignited. The initial emphasis made was that none of the bases (Malta, Cyprus, Libya and Gibraltar) fully met the requirements of the three services. The emphasis on the unsettled political climate in the Mediterranean and Middle East was crucial. The position of Libya, its inability to use against any Arab state, in the shed light of political developments, "could at any time radically change the strategic value of Cyprus". In this context, imagining that only Malta and Gibraltar would be left behind has highlighted Cyprus's difficulties and the possibility of an exit (CAB 129/83/205).

Against Greece's demand for self-determination at the UN, London was being prepared to hold the Greek government accountable for inciting violence and terrorism in Cyprus. Holmes[39] went to Athens to see if the Greek government was in change regarding Cyprus and came back with three different ideas.

i. First, they were ready to agree that after a period of three years (which they might be persuaded to extend to five years) a decision should be taken on the date when the principle of self-determination should be applied to Cyprus. This decision might be taken by a 3/5ths majority vote in the North Atlantic Council or by direct agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the elected Government of Cyprus which would contain representatives of both communities in Cyprus.

ii. Secondly, they assumed that a liberal constitution, with proportional representation, would be introduced in the Island.

iii. Thirdly, they asked that Archbishop Makarios should be given an opportunity to express his views on the constitutional proposals.

They had not asked that the Archbishop should be released from detention in the Seychelles; and Mr. Holmes believed that, if they could obtain satisfaction on their first two points, they might be prepared to proceed on these without obtaining the Archbishop's concurrence (CAB 128/30/70/7, p.8).

By October 1956, the UN on the one hand and Cyprus, Suez and the Eastern Mediterranean on the other had become a changing shell. In this context, the British Foreign Office requested the authority on the privileges and immunities of the Baghdad Pact. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs demanded to be "authorise to enter into negotiations with other member Governments in the Pact, and with the US Government, for the purpose of reaching agreement on the privileges and immunities to be accorded to the organization" (CAB129/83/236, p.2). In the matter of the Suez Canal, the

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[39] Julius Holmes, who was formerly the United States Minister in London and now held the post of Adviser to the United States Secretary of State on North Atlantic Council Affairs.

British Cabinet realizes that they would be responsible for the military action of Israel against Egypt in the future and if the French are not allowed to use the facilities of Cyprus, they would not be able to operate (CAB 128/30/72/6, pp.7-8).

In the second half of November 1956, the action was taken for another node of the Eastern Mediterranean. Lord Radcliffe (FCO 141/4356, 141/4357, 141/4358), who has been preparing for months, finally sets out the Constitution as a report. The system that was installed was *'a system of diarchy'* (CAB 129/84/264). The system to be created had two dilemmas. The first was either to have a liberal and democratic constitution that would base 18 per cent of the Turks on political equality or the second, to protect minorities there should have to be any mechanism that balanced from the overwhelming majority. A constitution spirit that standing away from the daily chores, "a legal framework for a political body in which there was inherent the capacity of growth and development". Because of the lack of such a constitution, Lord Redcliff accepted that it was a *'narrow jacket'*. As a result, he concluded that the constitutional establishment of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities based on equal political representation cannot be in the interest of Cyprus as a whole. The international fears carried by the British did not make any effort to encourage them in this regard. At the end of the day in 1956, a small jacket was planted for the Cypriots so that no one could fit in (CAB 128/84, C.A. (56) 33).

The Colonial Policy Committee, which deals with the issue in-depth, made several inferences. Though parallel to the expectations of the British in the Middle East, they were aware of the difficulties in the *diarchy*. It was inevitable that Makarios' behaviour was in his interest to get rid of the island of Seychelles and return to Cyprus. It would not be wrong to accept this move as a sign that Makarios would be released. On the other hand, the admission of the British Cabinet recognition of the right of self-determination had tacitly brought with it a thesis of *partition* in an environment where two large ethnic groups lived. The sending of the draft constitution specifically to Seychelles was an attempt to squeeze Makarios over the edge. "In the

announcement of policy which would be made on the publication of the report, it was proposed to foreshadow the possibility that it might ultimately be necessary to resort to partition when self-determination eventually came to be applied" (CAB 128/30/98/1, p.3). Enosis's antidote, Partition (*Taksim*) had landed on the scene.

> Discussion showed that the Cabinet shared the misgivings felt by the Colonial Policy Committee about the need to foreshadow at this stage, in a statement concerned primarily with the introduction of representative institutions in Cyprus, the ultimate possibility of partitioning the Island. The following points were made:—

i. A reference in the proposed statement to a "right" of self-determination, combined with the mention of partition, might be turned to mischievous account in reviving *the question of the Irish Settlement*. It was agreed that the phrasing of the statement should be re-examined from this point of view. It might be sufficient to indicate that, when the time came, the Government would be guided by their view that the principle of self-determination should be applied in a manner which would ensure that self-determination was enjoyed by Turkish Cypriots no less than by Greek Cypriots.

ii. Partition might well prove to be the only ultimate solution. The Government might, however, find themselves in an anomalous position if they attempted to pursue a policy of constitutional advance which was subject from the beginning to the condition that the Island might eventually be partitioned against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants.

iii. The Chiefs of Staff had advised that the Island would need to remain under a unified sovereignty so long as it was required as a military base and the possibility of partition could not, therefore, arise until this period had come to an end.

iv. Some doubt was expressed about the expediency of giving at this stage an undertaking to submit the question of self-determination to a plebiscite. It was pointed out, in reply, that on this question the Cypriot

population as a whole might express a different view from that of their elected representatives. Moreover, a reference to a plebiscite would do much to attract the support of public opinion in Greece (CAB 128/30/98/1, pp.3-4).

The partition thesis had become a fatal decision for the British in the Irish context. Further than that, contrary to the partition thesis, the right to self-determination had to include the Turkish Cypriots. The 1956 Constitution was indispensable to the British and the necessity to defend the Turkish Cypriots rights to the fullest, in fact, a product of reality and rational thought. Discussions at the Cabinet meeting that dealt with the issue of Taksim in greater depth were important to shed light on the future. Lord Privy Seal conveyed to the Cabinet the concerns of Prime Minister Eden, who had telegraphed, concerning the partition: "if partition had to be contemplated, it should provide a share of the Island for ourselves as well as for the Greeks and Turks". Also, the Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd said from Paris that the pressure on the NATO Council on Cyprus had increased. Moreover, the Colonial Minister Alan Lennox-Boyd suggested that they should not ignore that there might be three parts instead of two on the occasion of the partition (CAB 128/30/99/2).

> The Colonial Secretary said that a partition of Cyprus into three parts, rather than two, need not be excluded. But the question of partition would not arise until the Island was no longer needed as a base and, when that stage had been reached, a tripartite division would be unnecessary. The prospect of partition as a possible ultimate solution, would, however, give the Turks an effective veto against Enosis; and the Turks would not even acquiesce in our proposals if this possibility were not foreshadowed (CAB 128/30/99/2, pp.3-4).

Beyond all these arguments, the division of the island further than the military base involved several impossibilities. For example, Famagusta did not have enough port facilities. In this context, the Cyprus issue had to be urgently improved; otherwise, it would be possible for the issue to deteriorate as a result of international pressure. The issue of partition assured to keep the

Turks in balance. On the other hand, there was an unpredictable threat to the Greeks (CAB 128/30/99/2).

The Greeks were reluctant to discuss the issue until Makarios was released from captivity, and the date of his right to self-determination was set. There were deep suspicions in the British Cabinet that the partition of the island was strategically satisfactory. "But the alternative of conceding partition forthwith would be a premature and unrealistic approach to the problem" (CAB 128/30/102/1, p.4). In this case, the partition was unrealistic and its strong emphasis had annoyed the Greeks too much. At this point, the X formula was invented to please the Greeks. "The balance of advantage seemed to lie in rejecting the formula about partition [...] a more positive form of wording might be adopted, on the following lines: —".

"X"	"In other words Her Majesty's Government recognise that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed community must include partition among the eventual options" (CAB 128/30/102/1, p.4).

After the trilateral negotiations began in September 1955, the move to return Greeks to the table could be seen as the second phase. Yet the bond with Ireland scares the British.

> It was agreed that further consideration should be given to this alternative formula, both in terms of its probable effect on the Turkish Government and from the point of view of the possible analogy with the relations between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic (CAB 128/30/102/1).

"The alternative drafts annexed to C. (57) 4 conveyed the impression that" the deadlock reached by the problem was so high. The Archbishop indicated that he would use his influence to end terrorism in Cyprus, while there was no chance of breaking this deadlock (CAB 128/31/2/4, pp.7-8).

"The alternative drafts annexed to C. (57) 4 conveyed the impression that" the deadlock reached by the problem was so high. The Archbishop indicated that he would use his influence to end terrorism in Cyprus, while there was no chance of breaking this deadlock (CAB 128/31/2/4, pp.7-8). In this context, Foreign Minister Lloyd has been recommended to accept the offer of NATO Secretary Lord Ismay and to use his good offices for reconciliation (CAB 129/85/49). Meanwhile, the American government had offered to talk about Cyprus around the table in the UN. The Cabinet had decided to be focused on the insistence that the case was a domestic affair and the need to deter the Americans. London determined that it could only be accepted that negotiations with the Turkish and Greek governments were opened (CAB 128/31/6/1, p.3).

February 1957 was the days when the Cyprus question was again discussed at the UN. The investigation of the claims that the Greeks provoked terrorism in Cyprus was on the UN and Cabinet agenda. However, the classic outcome expected from the UN was the continuation of constructive negotiations. Meanwhile, Canadian Foreign Minister Pearson had suggested that NATO should be included in the UN; on the other hand, Cabinet had always opposed it. The reason behind was clear that London has opposed such proposals because NATO's findings could lead Greece or Turkey to flee the organisation if they are unfavourable to either side. So Cabinet concluded that "it would be preferable to express readiness to consider the proposal sympathetically, without finally committing ourselves to accept it" (CAB 128/31/13/4, p.4).

The NATO Secretary-General had considered setting up a committee of three member states that were not directly members. However, at this stage, the British did not intend to be involved in the matter. In case of disagreement, it would not be good for them to be held accountable and ultimately face a split (CAB 128/31/15/6, p.7). In any case, the common understanding of the three governments was the best solution to solve the problem; otherwise, the alternative would inevitably be a partition (CAB 129/86/58). The Foreign Secretary Lloyd said at the NATO meeting, they

have linked their positive approach to the issue to seek a solution; but they were disturbed by the burden of other meanings and made it clear that they would not be entrepreneurs (CAB 128/31/16/8, p.7).

It was difficult to argue that the compact approach planned to be adopted under the 'Defense Plan of 1957' did not amount to a radical change in the British defence system (CAB 129/86/69). NATO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and the positive American policy towards the Middle East, the backbone of the changing British defence, were the basis for the adoption of a new concept. Besides, there was plenty of reference to the economy (acceptance of a difficult situation). The definition for the Middle East should be evaluated on this plane.

> Outside the area covered by the North Atlantic alliance, Britain has vital interests in two other theatres, the Middle East and South-East Asia. Apart from the importance of the Middle East itself, it is the key to the right flank of NATO and is the gateway to the African continent (CAB 129/86/69, p.6).

The emerging case leads the Cabinet to take two new decisions on Cyprus: Firstly, the good offices of the NATO Secretary-General could be used and secondly, Cypriot community leaders should also be invited to a conference in London. Thirdly (as additional), EOKA said in the last brochure that if the Makarios was released, the actions would be suspended... if so, they will also be supported and make sure they are in London. In this context, the British saw it as advantageous to keep the issue under NATO rather than the UN, and they hope the Turks will see it as well. But it was clear that the Secretary-General would be failed, and "this attempt might throw further light on the possibility of a partition of the island". For this reason, it was decided to cross-examine the issue of partition. The Cabinet has asked the Defence Minister to examine the island as a military base and a partition. In the shed light of these events, the definition of defence policy was: "the methods by which we should best attain this objective required radical reappraisal in the

light of current strategic considerations". Some of the decisions taken were as follows (CAB 128/31/21/2, p.4):

i. The White Paper reflected a fundamental revolution in our defence policy, which might have far-reaching effects on our influence in world affairs and on our ability to maintain our position.

ii. The impact of our proposals on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) might be unfortunate. NATO was the central pivot of our system of defence as a whole, and we should therefore seek by consultation to convince the other member countries of the advantages of our new policy.

iii. A reduction in military establishments on the scale indicated in the White Paper would give rise to considerable problems in the Services themselves.

iv. It was for consideration how far our allies in W.E.U. should be informed in advance about our intention to bring National Service to an end.

v. The announcement of the withdrawal of two Territorial Army divisions as reinforcements for NATO would not be very opportune at the present moment.

vi. The reference to Cyprus should be carefully considered in the light of the current discussions about future policy for the Island.

vii. The White Paper should include a reference to the need for close collaboration with the other Members of the Commonwealth in the development of our defence policy.

The Cabinet "approved the general principles of the new defence policy outlined in the draft White Paper annexed to C. (57) 69" (CAB 128/31/21/2, p.5).

Makarios understood that he had been trapped in a short period and indicated that he was ready to make a call. While on the other hand, the British Prime Minister in Bermuda (during his holiday) said that the US President was ready to take proposals for Greece on Cyprus. For London, the NATO statement should never have been in the shadow of Makarios'

statement. Makarios knew he was trapped, but it was too late. In this sense, Makarios was no longer an instrument of the British and had to leave Seychelles, as he had no choice but to be the victim of being unable to read the conjuncture (CAB 128/31/22/2, p.5).

> The resumption of constitutional discussions would not, in itself, necessarily alienate the Turkish Government since, if they succeeded, they would facilitate the implementation of Lord Radcliffe's proposals which the Turkish Government had already accepted in principle (TBMM, 28 December 1956, pp.325-335) while, if they failed, it might be necessary to resort to a partition of the island which would also be not wholly unwelcome to Turkey (CAB 128/31/23, pp.4-7).

It is understood that Makarios' mission in Seychelles has been completed for London. Both alternatives, which were the subject of discussions, were an advantage for London. If Makarios had made a good statement, London would have gone through a peaceful atmosphere in their last term in Cyprus. Otherwise, even if the requested explanation did not materialize, it would still not cause any problems. In this context, it was more valuable for London to have Makarios outside, because there was a need for a strong representative of the Greek Cypriots at the table of negotiations.

London was now convinced they could discipline the Greeks and Makarios with their partition weapon. On the other hand, another danger arose for the Turks. They would either show consent to the Lord Radcliffe's proposal or acceptance of the island's right to self-determination. The equation (a triangle) of the long-conceived subject was thus also revealed. The Enosis-Taksim dilemma was shifted to Taksim-Enosis-Radcliffe's proposal. London's only expectation now would be to replace the word Radcliffe with the word base. After this stage, Makarios became a spokesman for a part of Cyprus and was decided to be released (CAB 128/31/25/4, pp.3-5).

EARLY STAGE

(UNTIL END OF 1956)

(The dilemma of Enosis & Partition)

Enosis Partition

NEXT STAGE

(After the Release of Makarios)

Lord Radcliffe's Proposal

Taksim

Enosis

Base

Figure-1: The changing climate of Cyprus after the proclamation of Lord Radcliffe's Constitution and the release of Makarios from the Seychelles.

British defence policy had now gone beyond the partition issue, and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan ordered the island to be evaluated as a defence base (CAB 128/31/29/5, p.6). The Prime Minister said that after the established in terms of operations in Palestine, Kenya and Malaya, a General Service Medal in the name of "Cyprus" should be given in Cyprus (CAB 128/31/35/7, p.6). The fact that the medals would be distributed was indirectly an admission of the Cyprus case that would be soon closed. In another aspect, at a meeting in Valetta in Malta, Defence Minister Dungen Sandys (Minister of Defence, Marshal of the Royal Air Force) made clear the importance of Cyprus with his stance. "Unlike Cyprus, Malta did not play any major part in our global war plans". In short, Cyprus has taken its place as an operational strategic centre in London's mind and the Minister of Defence made it clear by these justifications:

In the event of global war, in which the threat was primarily from Russia, Malta was of little strategic importance. Malta's position was not favourable as a base for the launching of ballistic rockets or bomber aircraft, which could be better operated from elsewhere (CAB 129/87/114, p.6).

Moreover, in May 1957, in addition to warships, the Cabinet, decided to invest half a million pounds to the Turkish National Airline (T.H.Y.) in shares and to provide 1,5 million pounds of credit for the purchase of five Viscount Aircraft (İnanç, 2017). Behind the execution, the airspace that kept open during the Suez operation (CAB 128/31/42/6, pp.6-7) and the possibility of "the Turks will turn to the Americans, to whom these commercial advantages would be diverted" (CAB 129/87/124, p.1) was of great importance.

M. Spaak, the Secretary-General of NATO, had asked from the Cabinet to get informed before his visit to Athens and Ankara. Moreover, Foreign Secretary Lloyd brought information to the Cabinet that the Turkish government had suggested that Greeks should also be invited "as a means of complying with the last United Nations resolution". The changing conjuncture required that the invitation form be different from the form used for the 1955 Tripartite Conference. For example, the clue might have been to "consider how to influence a United Nations resolution" (CAB 128/31/48/3, p.6).

> The Prime Minister said that this memorandum was the result of consultations which he had held with the Governor of Cyprus and the Ministers mainly concerned during the past few days. Three possible courses of action were now open:
>
> i. First, we could continue to govern the Island ourselves on the basis that we had recently had some military success in the repression of terrorism and had also secured a political advantage by the release of Archbishop Makarios, who was proving an increasing embarrassment to the Greek Government.

ii.   Secondly, we could proceed to partition —which would be an admission that our policy had failed and would be liable to provoke a new outbreak of communal conflict which it might prove impossible to localise.

iii. Thirdly, we could adopt the course outlined in C. (57) 161, whereby we would retain under our own sovereignty certain enclaves which were strategically essential to us but would surrender the rest of the Island to a condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, who would jointly share the sovereignty between them.

The whole of the Island outside the British enclaves would then be placed under the government of a Governor, to be nominated by the three sovereign Powers or, in default of agreement between them, to be appointed by the Powers (other than the three sovereign Powers) which were for the time being members of the North Atlantic Alliance. Outside the British enclaves a system of responsible self-government would be introduced on the general lines of the constitution proposed in Lord Radcliffe's report (CAB 128/31/51/6, pp.4-7).

The Chief of General Staff requested the entire island but was forced to accept the situation given the political dimension and economic burden of the event. Furthermore, the new process was expected to take place under the umbrella of NATO and has reached the stage of expectation of more American pressure towards the Greeks. Also, for the first time, the Cabinet grasped the understanding that Greeks should be as satisfied as to the Turks. Meanwhile, if the Turks were to lose their faith in the possibility of partition, Makarios would have the opportunity again for Enosis. The cabinet conceded that the formula of *tripartite sovereignty* could create a climate of conflict on the island. In this context, they considered that C. (57) 161 should be examined further (CAB 128/31/51/6, pp.4-7).

London had to admit that, "NATO had neither the legal authority nor the machinery which would enable it to grant a mandate to the United Kingdom to govern the whole Island on a trusteeship basis" (CAB 128/31/52/1, pp.3-4).

They reluctantly agreed that the result was a way to turn the entire island into a NATO base. Provided that future crises could reoccur and would not be under guarantee they would give up all their rights and leave the Turks and Greeks alone to find a solution on their own. It was time for London to try to bring the Greeks to the table, and they would give them as much time as they wanted. However, there was a new requirement on the table. "The precise means by which we should do so could be left for subsequent definition, except in the case of the enclaves at Akrotiri-Episkopi and Dhekelia-Pergamos where we should explicitly stipulate that exclusive British sovereignty must be maintained" (CAB 128/31/59/2, pp.3-5).

In this context, the defence is generally been accepted with this method. Moreover, it was difficult to convince NATO to take responsibility for the island's defence, and this would be contrary to the interests of the Baghdad Pact or the use of British bases. The notes of the Chief of General Staff for the 'external defence of Cyprus' was raised and indicated the difficulties of the understanding of condominium ownership. He even went further than the impossibility and stated that only British sovereignty could guarantee it (CAB 129/88/184, p.4). Meanwhile, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Lloyd during in an informal meeting with the US Secretary of State Dulles, he received support for the proposal to hold a tripartite conference on Cyprus. The "assurance that the United Kingdom had not entered into any prior agreements with the Turkish Government" which given to Dulles, was a sign that the insecurities were at an extreme level. The US would not send observers to the conference, but during the talks, US expert on Cyprus would be stationed in London. On the other hand, NATO Secretary-General was in full support. It was decided to submit the new proposal through the ambassadors of London (CAB 128/31/60/3, p.3).

Several real reasons could be put forward that prevented the tripartite conference from happening and discouraged Prime Minister Macmillan. Among them was neither the tendency of Greeks to reject nor the elections held in Turkey in mid-October. The real fear here was that "we had prepared new proposals which we had not revealed to them" (CAB 128/31/63/3, p.4),

which the Americans could learn from elsewhere. This was the danger of losing the goodwill and support of the US.

In September 1957, the Greek proposal would be re-voted at the UN General Assembly as it did every year. The problems were the same in terms of the right to self-determination and the rule of British colonial brutality allegedly committed in Cyprus. The British's defence would again be 'internal affairs' (CAB 128/31/67/1, p.3). Despite all the despair, efforts to convene a new tripartite conference were continuing, but strangely enough, these activities were increasing before every UN meetings. However, beyond all these discussions for the British defence base ambitions, the condominium concept included several requirements.

> The concept of a condominium for Cyprus might provide the basis of a settlement for the intervening period; and consideration might be given to a proposal that Turkey as well as the United Kingdom should retain enclaves in Cyprus for defence purposes (CAB 128/31/78/9, p.9).

The Cabinet has received an offer from the Greek government as it continues to work in detail on the principles it plans to use: "Cyprus should be granted Dominion status" (CAB 128/31/81/11, p.7-8). This proposal could not be a subject to be discussed in terms of the Cabinet. It would be an embarrassing arrangement that could not be described in terms of its association with the Commonwealth members. This proposal could not even be a matter to be discussed from the Cabinet's perspective. For London even discussing such a matter, would be an embarrassing arrangement that cannot be described in terms of its relationship with members of the Commonwealth.

The issue is dealt with again by the Political Committee under the UN and endorses a draft resolution that invites the parties to settle on the question of "*single*" self-determination and this is much closer to Greece's position. Twenty countries, including Baghdad Pact members, opposed Greece, while 33 countries, including Egypt, many Arab states, the USSR, Balkan states, and even Iraq, sided with the Greeks. Besides, 27 countries, including the

US, abstained. For the first time, the Turkish government was not satisfied with this result ("Yunanistan çekimserleri elde," 1957, p.1). Although the Committee phase is lost, Iraq abstains during the General Assembly phase, while many previously abstained states vote for London. At this point, London is aware that it has barely got rid of, and they realize that they will have no other choice ("Kıbrıs Türktür," 1957, p.1).

Exit plans for the British Cabinet were on the agenda. In the absence of any misbehaviour, the draft right to self-determination, approved by the Colonial Policy Committee, would take effect seven years later. In this context, three recommendations (CAB 129/91/4) of the Minister of Colonies were accepted:

i. questions affecting the Turkish community in Cyprus would be fairly settled and the Turkish-Cypriots no less than the Greek-Cypriots would be given the right of self-determination as a community;

ii. such bases and installations as might be required to meet the strategic needs of Her Majesty's Government and their Allies would be retained under British sovereignty;

iii. the people of Cyprus showed during the seven-year period that they were ready to co-operate in working and maintaining a representative Constitution, the details of which would be for discussion, in the first instance, with the Governor of Cyprus in the Island (CAB 128/32/4/2, pp.3-5).

It was precisely at this point that, the only condition was to "provide that our requirement in respect of military bases was satisfied" (CAB 128/32/4/2, p.4). The assumption that even Makarios could come back to the island under the condition of peace led the Foreign Minister to pursue ideas as follows. "An initiative of this nature was not likely to be welcomed by the Turkish Government, for whom Cyprus has now become a major issue in domestic politics" (CAB 128/32/4/2, p.4). In short, they have taken Cyprus from their foreign affairs to their internal and that made them doomed. These proposals will then be submitted to the capitals simultaneously. It was a known fact that the Greeks would not be accepted if they were not influenced by Makarios. "If

so, it was marginally possible that the Greek-Cypriots would be given a genuine opportunity to seek a solution which was neither Enosis nor partition". Additionally, another consensus has been developed based on the loyalist stances of the Turks, plus the applicability of the arguments developed.

> It might be pointed out to the Turkish Government that their interests would best be served by a settlement which might command a measure of bipartisan support in this country. It was for consideration whether they might also be offered a base in Cyprus (CAB 128/32/4/2).

It continued with a warning from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd, who gave important clues in his reading of the future (*predicting the events of 27/28 January 1958*). Implying that the island would gain independence "might provoke the Turkish Government to renew intercommunal strife in Cyprus in the hope of forcing the issue of partition" (CAB 128/32/4/2, p.4). Despite the full support of the American president, the Turkish Government did not accept the offer and the Governor of Cyprus lost the need to visit Ankara and returned directly to Cyprus from London (CAB 128/32/5/6, pp.5-6). With the break of this brief obstruction, everything was suspended until the Baghdad Pact meeting on January 24, 1958. But the US Secretary of State enjoyed the proposals and said he would also make proposals for future negotiations. He even said he would be in Ankara for a Baghdad Pact meeting and would seek cooperation ("Dulles Ankaraya geldi," 1958, p.1; CAB 128/32/7/3, pp.3-4). In order to overcome the possible difficulties, the British Formula, based on Turkish friendship, is prepared to offer another promise. The British had previously granted (promised) the rights of the Turkish Cypriots to Turkey. In this context, if necessary, a partition can be considered a last resort.

> *The Foreign Secretary* said that during his forthcoming visit to Ankara for the meeting of the Council of the Bagdad Pact he would discuss with the Turkish Government their objections to our latest proposals for constitutional development in Cyprus and would explore further the

possibilities of devising some form of federal institutions for the Island and of arranging for Turkey to enjoy a military base there (CAB 128/32/8/5, p.7).

In case the Turkish government was in a difficult situation, the Foreign Minister had to ask the Cabinet for help with the tactics to be adopted as an emergency before leaving Ankara, and invited the Turkish government to be guided by the following written considerations.

i.   The Turkish Government had objected to the Governor of Cyprus visiting Ankara for discussions if he also intended to visit Athens. Nevertheless, it would be desirable for the Governor to take part in the discussions at Ankara and the Foreign Secretary should make renewed efforts to this end.

ii.   The discussions should be so conducted as not to exclude the possibility of partitioning the Island, if necessary, at an earlier point than was envisaged, as a hypothesis, in our latest proposals. If terrorism broke out again in Cyprus, we could not afford indefinitely to devote military resources to its repression.

iii. The Turkish economy depended to a considerable extent on the provision of United States aid. The United States Secretary of State should therefore be able to exercise a proportionately greater influence on the Turkish attitude towards our proposals.

iv.   The Canadian Government should be informed, at the appropriate time, of developments in the situation; and the Prime Minister would no doubt inform the Australian and New Zealand Governments of the position during the course of his visit to these two countries (CAB 128/32/8, p.8).

Therefore, according to the Cabinet, the US Secretary should be able to exert more influence in proportion to his attitude towards Turkey's proposals. On the other hand, Ankara's open requests are forwarded to the Cabinet by the Home Secretary, and he says that the Turkish Government wants to insist on three stipulations:

i.   first, that the Turkish Cypriot community should be given a right of veto on constitutional development during the interim period before the exercise of self-determination;

ii.   second, that our existing undertaking that the right of self-determination would be accorded to the Turkish equally with the Greek Cypriot community should be embodied in a formal agreement between the United Kingdom and Turkish Governments; and,

iii.   third, that Turkey (and Greece, if necessary) should be granted a military base on the Island forthwith (CAB 128/32/12, p.3; CAB 128/32/14, p.3).

Under all these evolving circumstances, after the revolutionary changes in the 1957 Defence promotion document, the 1958 Defence promotion document continued to move away from the national character within the framework of collective defence. NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO have continued to be pivotal. The army, which experienced its first downsizing after World War II, had its presence of personnel reduced from 1,300,000 to 375,000. In the context of the Middle East, London "decided to create an independent integrated command, with headquarters at Aden" (CAB 129/91/30). This decision also signaled a reduction in Cyprus. As a consequence, February 1958 marked a time for London that could be said to have received the approval of both parties.

> Throughout the discussions in both capitals it was made clear by me that whatever happened, British bases under British sovereignty would remain in the island. This was accepted by Turkish and Greek Ministers (CAB 129/91/43). […] We should start an urgent examination ourselves of what is involved in granting a military zone in Cyprus to Turkey and also perhaps to Greece (CAB 129/91/44).

In February 1958, Necati İlter stated in parliament that it was the British who had offered the Turks to partition Cyprus with Greece; however, by the end of 1957, the British had changed their attitude and opposed the partition. Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, in his counter-reply, replied that the British still has not given up their pro-division stance and that Ankara is still

negotiating with London. What was remarkable about this issue was that Zorlu himself revealed that "America has never taken a position in favour of Taksim" (TBMM, 25 February 1958, pp.628, 642). Although the Foreign Minister denied the truth, the Turks understood, albeit forcefully, that not only Enosis but division would not happen.

To that end, Secretary of State Lloyd said they could offer Ankara an arrangement that would free them from our commitment to accept the partition of the island as a last resort in exchange for the establishment of a Turkish base in Cyprus. For a part of the island other than the British and Turkish bases, subject to sufficient guarantees to be included in the treaty, they shall respect the rights of minorities and shall be subject to certain limitations of sovereignty in terms of militarization and foreign policy and shall attain the island's *'unitary'* self-determination policy with minimum delay. For the Turkish government, the apparent (unbeknownst) danger was London's solution, based on the tri-dominium, where they continued to make preparations (CAB 128/32/28/3). Partition was not on the table anymore. The bargaining with the Turkish government was the military base in exchange for the partition and the *'unitary'* right of self-determination that could be granted to Cypriots only by the acceptance of the Greeks (CAB 129/91/43).

From 1 April 1958 to 1 May, London decides to launch a new offensive. In addition to the existing tridominium installation plan, they design an alternative plan. The purpose of the plan is no longer to bring Greeks to the table. It is to prevent the Turks from making further demands. On the matter, the Cabinet with a single minute, which is approaching the end, discusses all possibilities in the finest details and discusses a plan with six possibilities on 1 May 1958.

> An alternative plan (C. (58) 86), based upon the cession of the Island to Greece following a plebiscite, together with the retention of military enclaves by both the United Kingdom and Turkey. The Cabinet reviewed all the main courses of action which had been suggested as possible solutions of the problem of Cyprus. These were as follows: —

i. We could abandon Cyprus, which was of declining strategic importance. But our prestige throughout the Middle East would be gravely affected if we withdrew from the Island at this critical juncture.

ii. We could retain our sovereignty over the Island and continue our attempts to eradicate local terrorism by force. This course was recommended, on balance, by the Chiefs of Staff. But there could be no certainty that, in the absence of a political settlement, such a policy would succeed; it would become more difficult to sustain as the strength of the Army was progressively reduced; and it would place an increasing strain on our relations with Turkey.

iii. We could adopt the proposal of the Governor of Cyprus whereby we would retain our sovereignty over the Island for a defined period but would also introduce a liberal constitution providing a generous measure of communal autonomy. This proposal might deserve further study; but it was unlikely to be acceptable to the Greek and Turkish Governments.

iv. We could seek to establish a tridominium on the lines indicated in the memoranda annexed to C. (58) 86. This would be a bold and imaginative gesture; and, even if it failed, it should demonstrate to world opinion our genuine desire to establish peace and order in the Island. But it assumed the wholehearted co-operation of the Greek and Turkish Governments; and, in the absence of such co-operation, it might well break down on the critical issue of internal security.

v. We could adopt the modified form of partition described in the memoranda annexed to C. (58) 89. This plan, which would assign the greater part of Cyprus to Greece, might command Greek acquiescence. But it might provoke a strong reaction both from the Turkish community in the Island and from the Turkish Government, who were unlikely to be prepared to abandon their objective of a radical partition of the Island even if they were granted a larger enclave than was suggested in C. (58) 89 and were also guaranteed the reversion of our own enclaves if we withdrew from the Island entirely. Moreover, the plan would be likely to be interpreted by the Governments supporters as a surrender of sovereignty to Greece; and

it was open to the grave objection that it would expose our enclaves, particularly in the Dhekelia-Famagusta area, to pressure and infiltration from terrorist organisations based on adjacent Greek territory over which we should no longer have any control.

vi.   Finally we could enforce a radical partition of the Island. This policy would be more acceptable to the Turkish Government; and it would interpose a friendly Turkish population between our Dhekelia-Famagusta enclave and Greek territory. On the other hand the Greek Government would probably retaliate by withdrawing from the North Atlantic Alliance; and the communal disorders which would break out in the Island itself would not only be discreditable to our reputation but might also make it more difficult for us to maintain our position in the enclaves which we should retain (CAB 128/32/36).

Approved, in principle, the plan for the establishment of a tridominium in Cyprus on the lines indicated in C. (58) 86.

The same Cabinet meeting may be called the date for the non-final agreement. It was circulated on 1 May 1958 by the Secretary of the Cabinet.

Her Majesty's Government are ready to set an example by renouncing their sole sovereignty over Cyprus, if the Greek and Turkish Governments will match this sacrifice by renouncing their respective demands for unitary self-determination and the partition of the Island (CAB 129/92/86).

Table.1:

The timing and presentation of the proposals for a tridominium in Cyprus

15th May	Information on the substance and timing of our proposals conveyed to the United States Government, to the Prime Ministers of the "old Commonwealth" countries and to the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O. on a personal basis.
16th-17th May	Final instructions dispatched of Her May Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens and Ankara.
19th	Confidential communication in Athens and Ankara conveying a

May	personal message from the Prime Minister and explaining our intentions to the Greek and Turkish Governments. Simultaneous communication to the Greek and Turkish Ambassadors in London. Guidance telegrams dispatched to Her Majesty's Representatives at posts abroad.
20th May	Ministerial statements in both Houses of Parliament, Statement by the United Kingdom representative to the N.A.T.O. Council. Communication to "new Commonwealth" Governments. Background briefing of press correspondents.

These dates are adjustable should it be decided to move the final date to 21st or 22nd May (CAB 129/93/103).

On the contrary, the escalating violence on the island has normalized the calming climate for London and the downgrade the British expectations. The policy of Her Majesty's Government in Cyprus has had four main purposes. For the continuation of the problem, London chose this main axis.

i.   to serve the best interests of all the people of the Island;
ii. to achieve a permanent settlement acceptable to the two communities in the Island and to the Greek and Turkish Governments;
iii. to safeguard the British bases and installations in the Island, which are necessary to enable the United Kingdom to carry out her international obligations;
iv. to strengthen peace and security, and co-operation between the United Kingdom and her Allies, in a vital area (CAB 129/93/106, Annex).

The Prime Minister thought the Turkish government would accept the decision to comply with the amended plan for the future of Cyprus, announced on August 16th. The Greek government's response was less positive, and the danger of an early revival of terrorism on the island was serious. At this stage, the Governor of Cyprus proposed that Archbishop Makarios be allowed to return and that the state of emergency would be terminated until the end of the year if the violence ceased to exist, depending

on the continuation of peace (CAB 128/32/68). They agreed that this possibility was impossible in the light of further discussions.

Athens rejects the invitation to the conference under the auspices of NATO, during the summer and the end of 1958. Meanwhile, the important point to remember is that Athens is no longer in its former strong position (CAB 128/32/79/2). Parties do not see any difficulty in increasing violence on the island, but the unknown factor is that London is in a strong position. Beyond all these bloodshed scenes, the first sign that the homelands have agreed jointly on the final path was that "the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey had made a joint appeal to the Foreign Secretary, in Paris, for the exercise of clemency towards two Greek Cypriots who were under sentence of death in Cyprus" (CAB 128/32/86/1; "Kıbrıs Cumhuriyet oluyor," 1959, p.1).

Turkish thesis
   i.   Ensuring the safety of life and property of the Turkish Cypriots
   ii. If a change in the implementation of the McMillan plan will occur, the corresponding Turkish proposal will be included in the change
   iii. Granting the base
   iv. Determination of the future of the island.

Greek's thesis
   i.   Review of the McMillan plan to participate in the exercise
   ii. Public amnesty of Greek Cypriots
   iii. Consideration of the Greek Cypriot majority in the determination of the future of the island
   iv. Makarios' return to the island ("Menderes bugün Zürich'e gidiyor", 1959, pp.1, 5 – translation from the original source).

Text of the "*Gentlemen's Agreements*" reached between M. Karamanlis and M. Menderes done at Zurich, February 11, 1959.

   i.   Greece and Turkey will support the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The establishment of

> NATO bases in the Island and their composition require the agreement of the two Governments.

ii. It was agreed between the two Prime Ministers that they would make representations to the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus respectively in order that the Communist Party and Communist activities may be prohibited.

iii. The first commander of the tripartite Headquarters envisaged in Article 3 of the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall be chosen by lot.

iv. It was agreed that immediately after the signature of the Treaties all the emergency measures now imposed in Cyprus should be lifted and a general amnesty should be proclaimed.

v. The Constitution shall be drawn up within the shortest possible time by a committee consisting of a representative of the Greek Cypriot community, a representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and two representatives who shall be appointed by the Governments of Greece and Turkey respectively. This committee, which shall be assisted by a legal expert, in the capacity of adviser, chosen by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey, shall in its work have regard to and shall scrupulously observe the points contained in the documents of the Zurich Conference and shall fulfil its task in accordance with the principles there laid down (CAB 129/96/32).

Three days before February 11, newspaper headlines announced that 'Cyprus is becoming a republic' (1959, p.1). In the words of Greek Foreign Minister Averofff, "we are building, we will give the key to the people of Cyprus" ("Prensiplerde anlaşmaya varıldı," 1959, p.1), while the Greek press was attacking Prime Minister Karamanlis. On the other hand, in the text prepared by the Cabinet for the reading of Queen Elizabeth II for the 'speech of the prorogation of the parliament', the Cyprus case was ended with this form:

> I was happy that, in co-operation with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and the representatives of the Cypriot communities, My

Government were able at the London Conference in February to achieve an agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus. Energetic action has subsequently been taken both in Cyprus and London towards the establishment of the new Republic (CAB 129/98/150).

The Republic of Cyprus has sovereignty over the entire island, with the exception of Akrotiri and Dhekelia (under the control of Britain), according to the Treaties of London and Zurich. The Republic of Cyprus was declared an independent state on 16 August 1960.

3.2   The Domestic Politics

Being a bi-communal society with two distinct historical heritages, domestic politics and issues regarding nationalism were informed by these ingrained cultural dichotomies between the two communities. As evidenced by several archival studies and relevant literature, this period witnessed the local nationalisms constructed and shaped in line with motherlands' socio-cultural leanings. By the end of the colonial era, these two communities clashed resulting in a civil war. The Greek Cypriot nationalism (led by Makarios, Grivas and EOKA) aimed for Enosis while its Turkish Cypriot counterpart (led by Küçük, Denktaş and TMT) aimed for the partition. These developments will be openly explored in the preceding sections of the study.

3.2.1 The Domestic Nationalisms and Nationalist Actors' Policies on Cyprus

Firstly, being a state in nation-building Cyprus (1960-Republic of Cyprus) has failed to develop a nationalist ideology, a homeland and a civic consciousness attached to this state. Within the boundaries of the colonial country, as Hobsbawm points out, the issue of creating an "imaginary community", or as Chatterjee's reverse question, "what do they have left to imagine?" questions have become an imaginary concept, and its inability to play an active role has made Cyprus singular. In Cyprus, the theory of nation-building of an independent colony and the creation of nationalism within the

borders of the state by the colonial powers is invalid, but of course, it does not prevent the manipulation of these nationalities by the colonial power.

In this sense, few features can be highlighted. First, there were two separate nationalisms (religious communities) that emulated and articulated two different ethnic groups on the island long before Cyprus gained its independence (even before colonial power reached the island) (Zhu & Blachford, 2006). It is worth noting that these "fictitious" nationalisms are not the final product. In this sense, it is a necessity and benefit that the emulated nationalisms are known. One of them, which emerged in the early stages of nationalism and acted with Herder's reference to cultural nationalism, was a state which is 1821, with nationalist demands, took action to gain independence from the Ottoman Empire (Brewer, 2011). It is one of the first examples of modern nationalism (nation-state) in the world, which Hroch defines as *"stage C"* (mass nationalism) in the stages of nationalism. The other is Turkish nationalism in 1923, which, after World War I, proclaimed French "patriotic" nationalism as the official nationalist ideology but adopted the discourse of ethnic nationalism, influenced by the understanding of cultural specificity of German romanticism.

In this sense, colonial power failed to intervene, and these two states and their nationalist views outside the island of Cyprus were influential in the construction of their national identities as separate communities of Greek and Turkish populations on the island, which were ethnically similar to the peoples of the other states (language, religion and race). The role of language and communication should also be emphasized here (primordial sentiments). Secondly, London, which ruled the island as a colony between 1878 and 1960, sought to create a weak civilian identity due to its interests but laid the groundwork for the massification of two ethnic nationalisms which has not lagged and encouraging the construction of these two different nations. Last but not the least, in 1954, Greece moved Cyprus to the United Nations for the right of self-determination and gained an international character and identity, and the two mother countries, Greece and Turkey, could be shown to be involved or invited to the problem.

In this sense, there is so much to be told about the Greek revolt that began in 1821 its repercussions have reached to Cyprus. Archbishop Kyprianou was the statement of Filiki Eteria, who was put forward as evidence for encouraging the rebellion. After the beginning of the rebellion, the leaflets distributed in Larnaca passed into the hands of the administration and the Archbishop was hanged (Luke, 1921, pp.127-131) with the permission from Istanbul. It would be wrong to claim that the island suddenly took on a nationalist mood, but the poem "July 9" would be memorized and engraved in memory (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.21; Nevzat, 2005, p.78-79). It is certain that Archbishop hanged had an influence on the Greek Cypriots. The Greek Cypriots use the phrase "what the hell, do we live in the time of Little Mehmet" in the face of rude or authoritarian behaviour. So it would not be wrong to say that the event has gained a sociological dimension.

Until the island became a British colony, a massive state of emotion showing the rise of Greek nationalism was not singular because it was not independent of other geographical regions. At the core of the matter was not the liberation or disappearance of the Ottomans, but the desire to connect with mainland Greece, or Enosis. The meaning here was political and meaningful as long as it was part of the Greek nation or part of the Greek national territory. There is no doubt that this logic will be copied over the next century by the other ethnic elements of the island (Turks), who will desire to unite with their homeland before a state of their own (Nevzat, 2005). The Muslim Turkish people of the island knew that no hope would be expected of a collapsing Empire, and they gradually began to fall away from Ottomanism and Islamism, and the new address would be Turkism. By its very nature, it had the potential to destroy its social foundations and was the fearful dream of religious structures. These were the reasons for the late Ottoman reforms. Therefore, the failure of the Ottoman strategy of liberalization and equality, which was the result of its failure, hastened the destruction of the Empire, which it wanted to protect on its grounds. Accoding to Karpat, "the centralization policy pursued through the Tanzimat reforms started as a search for means to create one unified Ottoman nation and ended by

stimulating the national awakening of all religious & ethnic groups, including the Turks and Arabs" (Karpat, 1973, p.86).

At the end of the 19th Century, the geography of the Middle East has witnessed rapid changes. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Ayestefanos Treaty (Yeşilköy) was signed. The treaty, which contained heavy provisions, opened a window of opportunity for British-led states and offered advantages to the Middle East, as well as stopping the Russians for a while. While the war had nothing to do with Cyprus, it came under the direct influence and was instrumental in renting the island to Great Britain. At the Berlin Conference (1878) it was decided that the rule of the island of Cyprus should also be left to the UK. Thus, the British domination of Cyprus, which would last until 1960, was beginning. The negative situation affected the Muslim of the island deeply, and some Muslim Turks left the island and immigrated to Turkey. Another obvious fact was that, when the Ottoman Empire handed over the island to the British administration, there was already a national consciousness among the Greek Cypriots. The primary consequence of the emergence of Greek nationalism was the closure of the island to Turkish society and the result of the forgetting of the Turkish Cypriot community. At this point, it should not be difficult to say that what the Greek Cypriots are looking for is a political fate union. On the other hand, it is one of the main reasons for the emergence of Turkish nationalism later on the island and thus, contributed to its development.

On July 4, 1878, Admiral John Hay came to Larnaca and on July 12, the last Ottoman governor Besim Pasha (legally until November 5, 1914) handed over the Ottoman island to the British (Cavendish, 1992, p.9). When Britain took control of Cyprus, there were two important community representatives active in the Greek Cypriot and Muslim communities. The Orthodox Church and the Archbishop were the spokesmen of the Greek Cypriot community. The representative of the Muslim people in Cyprus was the Mufti office and the 'Evkaf' Administration, which owned the lands of the *'Vakıf'* the island and whose managers consisted of Muslim people.

In this sense, the representatives of the two communities should not be compared in terms of their impact on their communities. Above all, the Orthodox Church in Cyprus is the oldest and most established institution in the history of Cyprus (Englezakis, Loannou & Loannou, 1995, p.29). Apart from the political privilege of being the head of the nation during the Ottoman period, the church also had a social role in maintaining the Greek-Orthodox culture. This role gave the Church a mandate in the nationalistic organization (political duty). Moreover, it was also empowered and enriched by the tax collection authority, which was the monopoly of the state. They also had a profound effect on their people, since the church regulated all areas of life (economic, educational, cultural, and political) from birth to death (Özkul, 2010, 97-104).

Although the British rulers were aware of the nationalist sentiment among the Orthodox Christian Cypriot elite, they were unable to predict the possible future consequences. Furthermore, London's uncertain position on the future ownership of the island was causing considerable grievance to this heightened awareness. Therefore, the ordinance on Hellenistic congregations (Hill, 1952, p.497), adopted in February 1879, contained no sanctions. In 1880, there were about six hundred Greek citizens who settled in Larnaca and Limassol in Cyprus and tried to spread the idea of becoming a "όνειρο έθνος" [dream nation] among its Orthodox Christian inhabitants (Varnava, 2009, p.163).

When Britain took over the administration of Cyprus in 1878, it found a Greek-Orthodox majority, led by a Church that acted independently with the power to represent the Greek Cypriot people in all areas, and a Greek-Orthodox bourgeoisie that had become wealthy as a result of its economic activities. On the other hand, with the de facto withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the administration (Gürel, 1984, pp.17-34), a Muslim minority that had lost its military and bureaucratic class and was no longer capable of being a dominant *'nation'* engaged in agriculture was found (Ibid, p.14).

Since the new modern institutions of the island were incompatible with the current socio-political culture of Cyprus, the British administration faced various challenges during this period. The problem of being internalized by the inhabitants of the island arose during the period when the real problem became economic difficulties. When the nine Orthodox Christians and three Muslims in the Legislative Council (*Kavanin*) were voted in, especially with monetary matters, the six British-authorized members remained meaningless and became useless. On the other hand, radical-nationalist publications could not be controlled by the administration and their publications could not be stopped (Hogarth, 1889, pp.249-253). It should be noted that the demands of enosis in the early years were not as large as imagined, nor were they even perceived as threats. The Cypriot villagers, who were unaware of the existence of Athens, did not suffer from enosis. Moreover, there were some doubts among intellectuals and clerics about the Greek administration. They had reservations about conscription and taxes. Besides, 1/3 of the island's population was not Greek (Hogarth, 1889, p.246).

Many Orthodox Christian newspapers on the island were publishing racial and provocative material. These were, *Κύπρος* (Cyprus), *Νέον Κιτίου* (Neon Kition), *Αλίθα* (Alitha), *Στασινός* (Stasinos), *Σάλπιικς* (Salpiiks), *Έννωση* (Union) and *Φώνη της Κιπρού* (Voice of Cyprus). These events gave rise to their own opposition. The first political movement started in the 1880s was *Kıraathane-i Osmaniye* (Ottoman Club of Nicosia) and was established against the Greek Kıraathane (Greek Clubs). Although there is no specific statute or registered member of Kıraathane-i Osmaniye, this formation is accepted as the first political organization of the Muslims of Cyprus (Evre, 2004, p.46). Kıraathane-i Osmaniye's publication organ, Zaman Newspaper (*Mir'at-ı Zaman*) listed the principles as follows:

  i. To fight British colonialism,
 ii. Maintaining national consciousness, maintaining trust and commitment to the motherland,
iii. Standing against enosis,
 iv. To announce the voice of the Turks to the world public,

v.   To develop the Turkish Community in every field, to protect the rights of Turkish artisans and workers,

vi. To serve Turkish ethics and education,

vii. To pursue the interests of the Island Turks, not their self-interests (cm.gov.nc.tr, Kıbrıs'ta eski yönetimler[40]).

The newspaper *Mir'at-ı Zaman* protested the government's attempt to bring an English school principal to a Muslim girls' school:

> We are not going to make our girls (serve as) English schoolmistresses, or Interpreters in the Government Departments, or let them dance a waltz at a public ball. If the intention of the Government is to drag us into English Civilization, such things can never be admitted by Moslem Civilization (Papadakis, Peristianis & Welz, 2006, p.49).

Until then, the Muslim Cypriot elite who supported Ottomanism began to be influenced by the Young Turks movement in the Ottoman Empire. In the late 1890s, new publications of Kıraathane-i Osmaniye, such as Kokonuz, Feryat, Mirat-ı Zaman, published pro-young Turkish articles, except *Mir'at-ı Zaman* (the favour of Ottomanism) (Evre, 2004, pp.47-48). For the young Turkish ideology, geographical closeness was the biggest factor that helped it spread rapidly on the island. Restrictions on the publication of young Turkish magazines within the Empire turned the island into a safe space for these publications. It caused some young Turks from Anatolia to flee to Cyprus, especially for this reason. Their ideology began to spread throughout the island through the branches of the *İttihak ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Union and Progress Society) established by these young Turks. However, Mufti Ali Rıfkı and the people still felt a strong loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan. On this occasion, they believe that they support the preservation of local structures and multiculturalism in Cyprus and were opposed to the emerging Young

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[40] On the occasion of the political stance, the word "Turkish" was used instead of the "Muslim" word. The newspapers of the period appeal to the Muslims population rather than Turks.

Turkish movement (Evre, 2004, p.48; Varnava, 2009, p.182). In April 1897 the war between Greece-Ottoman, made the first measures taken by the British authorities not to have nationalist clashes (Coughlan & Mallinson, 2005, p.575). The upcoming new century would testify the construction of Turkish nationalism for the Muslim population of Cyprus.

> Students were reciting nationalist prose, and teachers were preaching to the public on the virtues of the Turkish nation. Compared to the Greek Cypriot educational establishment, that of the Turkish Cypriots might have been relatively delayed in efforts to implant a national consciousness amongst their community, but not perchance as tardy as many perceive (Nevzat, 2005, p.109).

When Archbishop Sophorinos died in 1900, the Orthodox Christian clergy split into two groups: one openly supporting Hellenic ideals, and the other good relations with the British authorities. They claimed that the Orthodox was the only identity the people needed, and cooperation with the British authorities would meet the spiritual needs of the Orthodox Christians. When the conservative stance was not as strong as the Hellenic stance, local Orthodox Christian politicians *"invented"* the enosis declaration (three years after Sophorinos' death) (Varnava, 2009, pp.179-180). The Greek Cypriot members, who see the absence of the Turkish member as an opportunity, succeed in making the law (Enosis). In response, a new law was enacted due to the rising objection of Muslims and the assistance of British members. It has been stated that Muslims are uncomfortable with the claims of Enosis. Any change of status would be to return the island to the Ottoman Empire (Gürel, 1984, pp.47-48; Evre, 2004, p.43).

On the one hand, the success of the Young Turks movement in gaining power and the start of the Second Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire was considered and accepted by the island's Muslim elite as a reasonable alternative. Due to the tensions in the 1900s, it also affected the Muslim elite of the island. As a result of these provocations, the first Cypriot Muslim Association was established in 1908 under the name of the *Türk*

Teavün Cemiyeti (Turkish Welfare Association). The usage of the word *"Türk"* for the first time also illustrates the ongoing transformation of religious identity into national identity in the Muslim community of the island (Evre, 2004, pp.47-48).

The rise of the Enosis movement and the success of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire on the other caused the Turkish Cypriot nationalist aspirations to strengthen. The following years brought two pan-Turkish associations, the *Terraki Kulübü* (Progress Club) and the *Hürriyet Kulübü* (Freedom Club), which later joined in 1909 under the name *Hürriyet ve Terraki Kulübü* (Evre, 2004, p.48). On the other hand, the 1900s occurred as a church crisis for the Greek community. The status of the "*head of the nation*" reflected the problem of the "*national leader*" (the pain of the transition to modern understanding). The incident which took place between the churches of Kyrenia and Larnaca was so long that the Turks won the Mayor and the Vice-Mayor in the Nicosia mayoral elections of 1908 (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.29; Demiryürek, 2017, p.19). Hürriyet ve Terraki Kulübü made its first mass public protest on September 1911, on the day of Balkan Wars started, and protested Enosis claims in Nicosia, with Cypriot Muslim elites (Nevzat, 2005, p.109). A year later (May 1912), due to the Italian invasion of the Dodecanese islands, more bloody events took place and the island became even more confused (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.39). Kızılyürek says that; "the events of Limassol can be considered as the first ethnic violence in Cyprus history" (2016, p.40).

History would now witness World War I and the unification of Greece and Crete. After this date, the Turkish Cypriot would always have the same question in their minds: "*Wonder if we'll be like Crete?*" While the Greek Cypriots of the island got excited by "*Enosis*", the Turks caught "*Crete-Syndrome*". With the start of the war, the island was soon (5 November 1914) annexed by the British (Colonial Office, 1914, p.103). In the face of developing events, Greece joins the war alongside the Allied Powers to avoid threats. Expectations of Enosis on the island have now skyrocketed. It is also necessary to note that they did not accept the suggestion made two years

ago. London offered the island to Athens in exchange for joining the war but did not receive a positive response. The Greek Cypriots were celebrating as the victorious side of the war. On the other hand, the Turks of Cyprus were demonstrating for the return of the island to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, a delegation led by *Mufti Ziya Efendi* went to London in 1918 (İsmail, 1992, p.5). The Greek occupation in Anatolia, which started after the war, ruined everything even more. This time, in 1919, a committee of Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council led by Archbishop Kryllios went to London. In the light of an irreversible situation, and with the efforts of Dr Hüseyin Behiç, the party of *Türkiye'ye İlhak Partisi* (Annexation to Turkey) was established and the return to the Ottoman Empire took on a political dimension (Evre, 2004, pp.50-51). As a result, the Greek army, which was taken out of Izmir with a heavy defeat in September 1922, became a source of frustration for the Greek Cypriots this time.

Limassol Labour Center was established as the first and joint movement for the labour movements that started to sprout after the war. The organization, which is understood to have been established jointly with the Turks, unfortunately, does not have figures for participation. For the movement's sphere of influence for an organization in its infancy, must be difficult to predict. However, it was seen that it was ineffective against the politics built on duality in the future years. Furthermore, Turkish labourers started to leave the organization in the 1940s (Nevzat, 2005, p.110).

Cyprus, which entered the first quarter of the 20th Century with limited incidents of violence, was generally free from violence. Despite all these incidents, life continued from where it left off. As a result of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Turks of Cyprus were dragged into uncertainty. On the other hand, for Greek Cypriots, Enosis has taken a closer position (the belief was). The Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was the end of an era for Cyprus, and the island officially became a British colony in March 1925 ("The Cyprus Gazette," 1925, pp.227-238).

After the declaration of the Crown Colony, the administrative structure of Cyprus began to change. The High Commissioner was replaced by a Governor, and the Executive and Legislative Council (Kavanin Meclisi) was established. The *Executive Council* was established by a mixture of four officers (attorney-general, under-secretary, head of the financial and police department) and three civilian members, while the *Legislative Council* led by the Governor, with twenty-four members. The assembly was established with the record of maintaining the Governor's right to dissolve at any time ("The Cyprus Gazette," 1925, pp.227-238).

In the new process that began with the Ottoman leasing of the island to Britain in 1878, Turkish Cypriot intellectuals were struggling for existence in the face of the Enosis demands of the island's other ethnic community, the Greek Cypriots, who were conscious of early nationalisation. The effective idea that led the Turkish Cypriot community in this struggle was "*Turkish nationalism*", which was also influenced by the Republic of Turkey. In this period, the leaders of the Muslim-Turkish community were not close to the proposal of the mukhtar, which the British occasionally expressed, nor to the demands of the Greek Cypriots for independence and later for Enosis. The common point of the groups that had different intellectual quarrels within the Turkish Cypriots was subject to "Motherland" Turkey. Kemalist Mısırlızade (Mehmet) Necati Özkan, who played an important role in the political life of the Turkish Cypriots, first showed great success in the Nicosia Municipal Elections of 1926 and 1930. During the elections of the *'Kavanin Meclisi'* in 1930, he became the leader of the group known as the *"Halkçılar – Mersin Dalı"* (People's Party – Myrtle Tree) and won against *Evkaf Murahhasi* (Evkaf Envoy) (Sir) Mehmet Munir, the candidate of the *"Gelenekçiler – Zeytin Dalı"* (Traditionalists – Olive Tree) supported by the British (Pınar, 2013). Right after the elections, one might call as a continuation of the movement known as the *"Meclis-i Milli Hareketi"* (National Assembly Movement) of 1918, which can be called the (Second) *"Milli Kongre"* (National Congress). Necati Özkan, with a letter dated April 20, 1931, invites Turkish Cypriot notables from all over the island to a meeting at his home in Nicosia on 1 May 1931. In congress, issues concerning the community are discussed. The decisions

taken here are noteworthy: Ensuring the transfer of the *Evkaf* Administration to the society, the election of the new *mufti* and the formation of a committee that will serve for three years. As a result of the Congress, of course, the British immediately declare that they do not recognize the *mufti* (Birinci, 2001d, pp.19-24).

The 1929 economic crisis in the world somehow reaches up to this small island in the Mediterranean Sea. Tax increases, which began in the late 1920s and continued in the early 1930s, remained on the agenda (for the need of Imperial Defence). The insensitive colonial administration (drought in the 1920s had already bent the waist of the people) has become unbearable. These proposals increased discontent in Cyprus and led to mass demonstrations in October 1931. Without concern, the rejection of the Legislative Council,[41] British Governor, as the head of the government, passed the law. On 22 October 1931, Greek Cypriots organized a massive protest against British authorities in Nicosia. The revolt burned the Government House and several injuries with six deaths. Before the British authorities could resume control, intifada spread to all over the island, and various similar incidents occurred in 598 villages. After these developments, the British authorities immediately dispatched military reinforcements to the island. As a result of the incident, the time of "prohibition period" was registered for the history of Cyprus (between 21 October 1931 and 14 April 1941). According to court records, 2000 people were punished for involvement. Many Greek Cypriots, including bishops, were sent to exile, total ban for all kind of political activities, not only flags and books of mainland's but also ringing the church bells stopped. These measures will trigger the radicalization of future Enosis trends. After the abolishment of the Legislative Council, an *Advisory Council* was established in 1933 (Solsten, 1993, pp.21-22). As Governor of Cyprus, Storrs wrote of the aftermath of the uprising:

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[41] The proposal was rejected by thirteen votes against twelve votes. The Turkish Cypriot member who voted against was Mehmet Necati (Mısırlızade).

As it is, future Governors will benefit, solely because of the disturbances, by all—and more than all—the safeguards for which I through five years of peaceful development had vainly petitioned. The Greek Consul was expelled. The Legislative Council was abolished. The troops were brought to Nicosia. The doctrine of Enosis was proclaimed illegal. The Union Jack is no longer obscured by foreign flags, and church bells ring for their lawful purposes (Storrs, 1937, p.605).

London grasped very well with the role of the Church of Cyprus in the struggle for Greek nationalism and Enosis. In November 1933, when Archbishop III. Kyrillos passed away, administration prevented elections for his replacement by not allowing the bishops in exile to return, and this post remained vacant until 1947. Besides, since the clergy led the 1931 uprising, London enacted a law governing the internal affairs of the church and requiring the government's approval in the election of the Archbishopric. The law was repealed in 1947, and 14 years later in June 1947, he was elected Archbishop of Leontios. Municipal elections were postponed and until 1943 and mayors and municipal officials were appointed by the government. The governor was also supported by an Executive Council and two years later with the Advisory Council, and both councils were composed of appointees and were tasked to advise on internal matters only (Solsten, 1993, pp.22-23).

Due to the martial law of the British Government, which began in 1931, Cypriots had a hard time under pressure. With the occupation of the Axis forces that started in October of 1940, the Greeks of Cyprus had to delay their dreams and thoughts for a while. Towards the end of this period, the outbreak of World War II forced the British Government to soften against the islanders. Cypriots are among the rare peoples of a war.

For centuries, the peasants who were oppressed in the hands of usurers, interest-bearers and opportunist traders were taken away very cheaply by foreclosures and compulsory sales due to their debts. As well as the debt, thanks to the cooperatives developed, the

dependency on usury and merchant was saved in the future (Gürkan, 1996, p.122).

By 1941, the British government had enacted a law enabling free elections. However, the continuation of the WW II and the Nazi threat postponed the elections to later years. At the end of the WW II, Turkish Cypriots seemed to be a scattered, congregation far from unity trapped between the British promise of autonomy for Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot demands for Enosis. In this political environment, municipal elections took place on 21 March 1943. For these free elections, after 12 years of martial law, Cypriots have returned to politics. At the same time, this meant the first political competition for Turkish Cypriots, Necati Özkan and (Young) Dr Küçük was going to face for the first time. In the last elections in 1930, the mottos of *"geç öne, doğru yol göster Necati, bağrımız yanıktır, su ver Necati"* [late forward, lead the way, Necati, our bosom is burnt, give water Necati] were echoed in the streets; this time the mottos was that of *"söz Küçük'ün su Necati'nin"* [word belong to Kuchuk and water to Necati]. Turkish Cypriots, who will compete for the membership of the Nicosia Municipality in the 1943 elections, participated in the elections in two groups. One of the most noteworthy features of these elections is the fact that nationalism is not in the monopoly of the elites as in the 1930 elections (Fevzioğlu, 1998, p.19).

The leader of the group, which was elected as the People's Party, was led by Dr Küçük and the other group was led by Necati Özkan. With this, it is interesting that Dr Küçük has taken part in the political scene, addressed the public with his Turkish rhetoric and that the British government is not disturbed by this. The best example of the British government's policies in this direction is the fact that Dr. Themistoklis Dervis, the mayor of Nicosia before the 1943 elections, did not give a voice to changing the names of districts with national elements in places where Turkish Cypriots are concentrated. Historical *"Sarayönü"* and *"Hacı Sava Gate"* names have been changed to *"Atatürk Square"* and *"Πλατεία Μεταξά"* (Metaxas Square) respectively. The fact that the British did not object a voice to these

developments during the election propaganda was nothing more than their intention to create a backdrop for their future projects.

During this period, when the election propaganda was raging, the *"Söz Newspaper"*, the only Turkish newspaper in those days, was an important propaganda weapon for the candidates. This newspaper was mostly in the Pro-Küçük line. It is observed that the Söz newspaper called the Lawyer Fadıl Party, while Necati Özkan's group did not convey the rally speeches:

> On the same day, (in the afternoon) members of the Lawyer Fadıl Party, who gathered in Asmaaltı Square, spoke and explained to the public their programs and talked about what they did and would do at length. Since we cannot restrain what is said there, we will not be able to talk about it in detail here. However, we would like to focus on a few sentences that Mr. Necati Özkan has made in relation to our newspaper (Haşmet Muzaffer Gürkan, who was transferred from Söz Newspaper on 16 March 1943, 1996, pp.125-127).

As a result of the municipal elections in 1943, the *Halk Partisi* (People's Party) was victorious in the elections. On March 21, in the elections in which only men voted, the result in Nicosia was as follows. Dr. Fazıl Küçük 548, Necmi Avkıran 521, Şükrü Veysi 492 and Necati Özkan were elected with 455 votes. People's Party Hasan Fahri Uzman lost the election by only 5 votes (Gürkan, 1996, p.127). The 1943 elections, with the contributions of the British Government, created a spirit of unity among Turkish Cypriots. However, because of these elections for the first time confronted Dr. Küçük and Necati Özkan were now entering the social leadership race.

Beginning in mid-1924 and participating delegates on 1 February 1925, the organization charter was approved, and the "Kıbrıs Türk Cemaat-ı İslamiyesi" (Turkish Cypriot Islam Community) was established, but soon they were destroyed by structural issues. As a second attempt, on 18 April 1943, 76 people gathered in the Evkaf Office of Sir Mehmet Münir and adopted a 30 article which "Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlığı Kurumu" (KATAK- Association of the

Turkish Minority of the Island of Cyprus) was formed upon the call of four Turkish Cypriot members elected to the Lefkoşa Municipal Community in the February 1943 elections, signed a historic resolution. Besides, Sir Münür emphasized that it could help to establish such an association and to maintain its relations with the government. Seeing the Turkish Cypriot community as a whole unable to act, London encourages to bring national identities to the fore with the imposition of new conditions. As a counterbalance to the Greek Cypriots, London required a single tidy Turkish Cypriot organization. In short, they wanted only one interlocutor. They assigned this task to Sir Mehmet Münür, the most reliable name. Because time was running out, the demands of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis were reaching serious proportions (An, 2005, pp.1-4; Gürkan, 1996, pp.134-135). Against enosis Turkish elites match with British will. *"Common Will"*. Shortly after the establishment of KATAK, factionalization took place within the formation and the members of KATAK fell into dispute among themselves, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, the leader of KATAK, formed *Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi* (KTMHP - Cyprus Turkish National People's Party) in 23 April 1944 with a logo *"wolf head"* (An, 2005, pp.9-10).

> The Turkish Cypriot National People's Party was established last Sunday in Nicosia and the delegation was elected by the following: Fazıl Küçük, Mr A. Pertev, Mr Faiz Kaymak, Mr Munir pharmacist, Mr Siret Bahceli. Approximately 200 guests attended the meeting and the constitution consisting of 62 articles was read and accepted. The Coat of Arms will be <<Boz Kurt>> ("Kıbrıs Türk Milli," 1944).

Dr. Küçük and his friends, who made good use of the political conjuncture, were closely following and keeping a close eye on the future policies of the British administration with the newly established National Party, and also being a candidate to fill the political gap formed during the troubled years of the people (Bozkurt, 2015). On October 23, 1946, British Colonial Minister Arthur Creech Jones announced that new projects for economic development in Cyprus were being prepared (HC Deb., 1946). In this framework, a council is established in which the indigenous people will have a say in the internal

affairs (*Consultative Assembly*). London appoints Lord Winster to the island as governor for the new constitution. While the reactions of the Greek Cypriots to the work of the new governor increased, against the new autonomy-oriented regulations, on the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots did not make any voice due to the threat of Enosis. In parallel, the idea of nationalism among Turkish Cypriots was growing every year. At this point, one might argue that London's support for the Turkish Cypriots towards nationalisation is being felt. The most well-known threat here was put forward by the Colonial Office itself:

> The Enosis, or "Union with Greece", Movement has for long been the main political cry in the Island; but recently, in addition to this, there has developed a rapid and dangerous spread of Communism. A strong Communist Party has been formed under the leadership of a Cypriot trained in Russia and this organisation is conducting a campaign with growing vehemence, which has allied Communist doctrines with the demand for union with Greece. In the recent Municipal elections this party has emerged as the dominant force.

The first meeting of the Consultative Assembly took place in November 1947 in the English School. The purpose of this meeting was not only an opening ceremony. However, in his keynote speech, Governor Lord Winster stressed the importance of the government supporting multi-party in the new order but emphasizes the importance of not being opposed to the London Government (Gazioğlu, 1996, p.377). This process was followed by a new constitution proposal in 1948. This process was followed by a new constitution proposal in 1948. This constitution, which will prepare the ground for the conflicts in the lives of Cypriots, is debated in both communities. In general, the prominent Turkish Cypriots made a positive decision about the constitution. However, Greek Cypriots are stuck between independence and Enosis and express negative opinions against the constitution (An, 2005, pp.63-64). The British administration has encouraged a commission called *"Türk İşleri Komisyonu"* Turkish Affairs Commission under the presidency of Judge Mehmet Zeka Bey for the improvement of their economic and political levels

by keeping the loyal subjects of Turkish Cypriots under control after the negative results of the constitutional works. This commission will identify the alleged problems of the Turkish Cypriots and submit a report to the government. On 23 October 1949 the *Kıbrıs Milli Türk Halk Partisi* merged with *KATAK* and was restructured under the name of *the "Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birliği Partisi"* (Turkish Cypriot National Union Party).

After the 1941 expansions, another branch, the labour unions, also pursued their own formation. On 27 December 1942 "*Türk Amele Birligi* – Niyazi Dağlı" (Turkish Labor Union- first Turkish union based on nationality); on 15 August 1944 "*Güneş Türk İşçi Birliği* – Hasan Şaşmaz" (Sun Turkish Labor Union) was established. A unification of these unions was done on 15 October 1944 under the name "*Lefkoşa Türk İşçiler Birliği*" (Turkish Labor Union of Nicosia-First Turkish Union). On 23 December 1945, they were also joined to Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Birliği. Throughout the 1940s, Turkish Cypriot labourers left the unions under the hegemony of the Greek Cypriots due to the insistence of Enosis. Another issue was that, before political unification, social, cultural and sporting organizations merged to form the "*Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu*" (KTKF-Federation of Turkish Cypriot Institutions) on 23 October 1949 (Kızılyürek, 2002, p.243; An, 2005, pp.12-14, 75-76).

During the 1930s, the Turkish Cypriot community was unable to provide the centre-periphery phenomenon. The unlivable experience lived in many circles during the 1940s, in labour, ethnicity, and sporting, social or political dimensions. The Greek Cypriot community, representing the majority of the island, also suffered the same problems. The Communist Party, which had its first political experience in the 1920s, closed down like all other formations after the 1931 rebellion. In 1941, left-wing Greek Cypriots, who knew the unwieldy nature of the centre as a chance for them, organized for a more radical stance. It will not wrong to assume that AKEL (*Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού* (ΑΚΕΛ) – *Anorthotiko Komma Ergazomenou Laou*) [Progressive Party of the Working People] is a turning point for the Greek Cypriot community with its appearance on the political scene. Besides, thanks to the WW II, they had another chance. With the anti-fascist

committees that they could organize up to the villages in the face of Fascism that burned the world, the unrivalled phenomenon that occupied the *'centre'* within a short period became a threat to the *"church"*. Referring to the Atlantic Charter, they articulated the principle of self-determination in 1942 by interpreting it with Enosis and it was approved at the party congress in 1943. AKEL's establishment and rapid rise have unsettled traditional right-wing circles and the church. In fact, the "Enosis leadership" was at the centre of the contention. As a result of trade union developments on the island, AKEL's KSK (*Συνδικαλιστική Επιτροπή Κύπρου*-Cyprus Trade Union Committee) had over 10,000 members. They achieved quite successful results in the municipal elections in 1942. In the elections of 1946, they experienced a complete victory. In the election of the Archdiocese of the church in 1947, Leondios, who was also AKEL's candidate, won. These events were nightmares for the traditional wing of the church and politics. He passed away a month later (suspicious death) after, this time II. Makarios (more nationalist and anti-communist) is elected. The event that came to the fore in 1947; AKEL's warm gaze on London's proposal for constitutional autonomy, "*Enosis only Enosis*" is the motto around the church and the scribbling of AKEL. In light of these circumstances, AKEL, who failed to perform the Enosis plebiscite in 1949, has been articulated to the church with the plebiscite made by 1950 (Kızılyürek, 2016, pp.61-67). As a result of the events, the centres of the two communities are occupied with right-wing and nationalist elements.

The proposed constitution in 1948 was supported by the Turkish Cypriot members of the consultative assembly. However, the proposal was rejected by the Greek Cypriot members as it would not contribute to enosis (Hatzivassiliou, 2006, p.46). Therefore, the draft of the new constitution was not approved by the Legislative Council in May 1948. Moreover, while the Greek Cypriot right bloc was not in Assembly, AKEL members declared that they could not accept the constitution and left the Assembly. In this case, the Assembly no longer functions (Gürel, 1984, p.62). Lord Winster, in August 1948, abolished the Legislative Council and stated that from this point

forward, only the new draft could be discussed in the future (Gürel, 1984, p.63).

To make a comparison for the Greek Cypriots, AKEL was articulated with the Communist front, one of the sides of the Greek civil war. On the other hand, the church is articulated with a nationalist front. Therefore, the confrontation in the motherland would determine the fate of Cyprus. So to speak, they pray for the victories of that they support. In other words, victory in the motherland could also pave the way for its victory on the island (Kıralp, 2015, pp.46-47).

On the other hand, the same excuses do not apply to the Turkish Cypriot community. The political rivalry has mainly occurred among newspaper writers, the intelligentsia and the small capital group. Among these, Necati Özkan and Dr. Küçük are the two most prominent figures. Indeed, it can be argued that there was a so-called fight for community leadership, which was merely for municipal council members. The dilemma here was the choice that had to be made. One side of the British administration, on the other hand, was a Turkish nationalism (on behalf of investing for the future). In short, while homeland Turkey did not have any preferences in the early 1950s (Democrat Party's policy of getting along with Greece should also be noted), the small political elites on the island sought to play politics through Turkey.

These two small nationalisms, which somehow formed their national camps, were now ready for the political struggle of the 1950s. Greetings of the newly arrived Archbishop *Μιταήλ Χριστοδούλοσ Μούσκος* (Mihail Christodoulou Muskos - Makarios III) in the Greek Cypriot community of 1950, while Dr Küçük came to the fore for the Turkish Cypriot community. The Cyprus issue, which gained an international dimension as of 1954, is now a time when local elements (albeit limited) are involved. Unwilling to come to this game, Makarios III warns Athens. It was a trick, and it was about Nicosia and London. On the other hand, the motherlands attending the conference express their wishes and the game begins. There was a rally of the Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti (Turkish Cypriot Community) before the 6-7 September events which erupted as a result of the allegations made during the

conference (a bomb was thrown at Atatürk's House in Thessaloniki). The incidents did not take place as intended by the government. The events have spiraled out of control and turned into a frenzied act of looting. The government has arrested the members of the community and the communists to relieve itself of the burden ("İstanbul ve İzmir", 1955). On the other hand, in a synchronized manner on the island, the British administration arrested communists (Gürses, 2014; Kıralp, 2015, pp.49-51).

In April 1955, London witnessed the first organized armed struggle group against colonial rule (Woodhouse, 1956, p.11). When the Greek Cypriot community fails to achieve the results expected from the UN, a two-headed armed organisation is established. The political wing of the organization would be Makarios III, while the military wing would be under the direction of Colonel Grivas (Druşotis, 2007). The island has now entered a climate of violence. Thus the best habitat was created for nationalist elements. For example, after the death of G. Afksendiu (the second man of EOKA) in 1957, took AKEL, who opposed the armed struggle, to the point of self-criticism. However, AKEL leadership offered cooperation and got rejection by Makarios (September 1955). Not long after, EOKA will direct their attacks not only on the British elements but also on the AKEL (communist elements). As can be seen in the following pages, *Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı* (TMT – Turkish Defense Organization) will follow the same path (Kızılyürek, 2016, pp.85-93).

London makes some arrangements on the *Evkaf* and in June 1955 and fifteen Turkish Cypriots appointed the Evkaf administration as "*High Council*" under the presidency of Dr. Küçük (Ismail, 1992, p.14). The establishment of a resistance organization in Turkish Cypriots also started with Dr Küçük. The first Turkish Cypriot resistance organization was *'Kıbrıs'ın İstiklali İçin Türk Mukavemet Birliği'* [KİTEM-Turkish Resistance Association for the Independence of Cyprus], which was established a few months after the foundation of EOKA in June 1955. KİTEM was an organization that appealed to a small group of intellectuals of that day. On the other hand, for a politically stronger voice, the "Kıbırs Türk Milli Halk Partisi" was renamed to the "Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi". After a while, the teacher Selçuk Osman, together with the

furniture maker Şakir Özel, founded VOLKAN again under the direction of Dr Küçük ("Kıbrıs Türktür," 1955, p.1; "Kıbrıs'ta gerginlik son," 1955, p.1). VOLKAN goes to a wider organization and takes over all powers. The tasks of these established resistance organizations were to keep the morale of the people high, to organize rallies and to show that the Turkish Cypriots were against Enosis. It was an unarmed resistance, an organization without a weapon ("TMT tarihinde kısa," 2011). The end of these journeys will be the ultimate organization under the umbrella of TMT, like the summer months of 1957. In fact, when the establishment of the TMT was contacted with the motherland, it could be claimed that it took the name of "*Kıbrıs'ı İstirdat Projesi* [Retaking Cyprus Project]". This retake could have been an entire island.

In addition to these security organizations, Turkish Cypriots also engaged in various socio-cultural and socio-economic organizations before the TMT. Dr Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were the ones who designed and initiated these organizations. For example, the "*Turkish-to-Turkish*" campaign launched in the name of the recovery of the economically lagging Turkish Cypriots is an economic mobilization that leads to the birth of Turkish merchants and rich people. The "*citizens speak Turkish*" campaign, which was launched in the name of keeping Turkishness in mixed villages, is also an important socio-cultural activity aimed at ensuring the unity of the minority Turks in Cyprus (Örmeci, 2015).

After the London Conference, London sends retired Field Marshal Harding to the island. Harding was an attempt to gain control of the island. On the other hand, for the first time, a Greek Cypriot (Makarios III) takes into consideration and sits for negotiation. However, to strengthen his hand, he even will work with the communists and risk everything, and even if the entire island is turned into a prison camp, he will not give up the fight. It then starts passive resistance to the British ("New passive resistance," 1955, p.2). Under these circumstances, Harding does not meet military or diplomatic expectations.

The island was now an open battle arena. British soldiers and officers were never able to walk around unarmed. This time, colonial engineering came into play. Although the Turks were not the target of the EOKA resistance, the economic obligations imposed by poverty made the Turkish Cypriots a suitable agent for the British. Three class police forces (special-auxiliary police-commando) were employed. As Kızılyürek says that one of the targets of EOKA's anti-colonial violence was Turkish Cypriot inevitably became police. It should not be forgotten that the British administration objected to the KTKF's proposal in October 1955 for a kind of "*village ranger committees*" and suggested that they join the security forces (2016, pp.103-109). There was causality between VOLKAN organization and police enrolment, and those in charge of the organization supported this situation. They were also executing a binary function (Keser, 2006, p. 166). For example, in 1958, when arms shipments began, the police organization was actively working (Sadrazam, 2013, p.581).

London had taken a risk by negotiating with Makarios and made a double-fault. They then transferred the risk to Makarios by Lord Redcliff's constitutional proposal, because the chance given to Makarios backfired (Hale, 2013, p.97) and the agreement could not be reached. Ankara was not happy with the Harding-Makarios talks and expressed this in the most severe language. As a result, Ankara was the only winner of this movement and London had to be a companion with Ankara. Ultimately, London accepted that they were negotiating with a wall and deported Makarios. It was a double-fault that he blew the opportunity afforded to Makarios and now the constitution would be written in his absence.

The deaths of Sargent Abdullah and Mihail Karaolis lead to irreversible inter-ethnic relations on the island. Now, hatred begins to widen the gap. The first division is tested in the absence of Makarios. In the American Civil War, the line separating North and South was also established in Cyprus under the same name, and the "*Maison-Dickson line*" was built with wires. In the last meeting of Harding-Makarios, the words of Colonial Minister Lennox-Boyd against Makarios himself represents the next; "God Help Your People!". Dr

Kucuk stated that during Lord Radcliffe's constitutional work, not only desired an autonomous administration that would protect the vital interests of the Turkish community on the political future of Cyprus but he also sincerely wished to go further and unite with Turkey (Kızılyürek, 2016, pp.126-132).

The summer of 1956 brought two turning points for Cyprus at the same time. Lord Radcliffe's constitutional work on the one hand, and the Suez crisis on the other hand, just like the two sides of the vice kept squeezed Cypriots. The British government hopes the proposed law will serve as the basis for an agreement between Great Britain, Turkey and Greece ("Kıbrıs için müzakereler," 1956, p.1). In this context, the Turkish side knows the blur of London as an opportunity and takes a good step on the partition and adopts a national policy. The arrow is now off the bow. Even though the Greeks couldn't get a kind of counter-politics from the Turks, they were helped by London politics (constitutional offer). "If the new constitution announced in the House of Commons does not satisfy the parties, Cyprus is likely to be divided (Taksim) into two" ("Kıbrıs'ın ikiye taksimi," 1956, p.1). The word *"Taksim"*, so to speak, falls into the atmosphere like a bomb, and the blessing that the Turkish Cypriot elite sought and could not find is revealed. Now, the thesis, anti-thesis and everything was clear for the Turkish Cypriot: "Ya Taksim ya ölüm" [Either Partition or death].

However, this time, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, who accepted this policy and went into a static state, were making double-faults. Just like the Greek Cypriots and Greeks who have become prisoners of a politics with no alternative, like Enosis. Now, inter-ethnic conflicts on the island have begun to be visibly experienced. The long-awaited moment had arrived. Makarios was no longer needed inside, but outside. Instead of Athens, which did not yet understands that it had to come round, it was Ankara, the other capital that should be set on the road now. The bait of Athens was also the bait of Ankara, and the vision to solve this paradox did not exist in the two capitals. In short, Taksim was not invented for the Turks, but Athens, whereas London cannot drive politics like Taksim because it had a problem like Ireland.

In 1957 there were general elections in Turkey and this atmosphere was the favourite habitat of nationalism. Prime Minister Menderes, who tried to consolidate the anxiety of economic congestion with national discourses, was also doing what the Turkish Cypriot political elites desired. In July 1957, a new structure was brought to the agenda in the Turkish Cypriot community. VOLKAN and Dr Küçük are no longer sharp enough. Rauf Denktaş, Burhan Nalbantoğlu and Kemal Tanrisevdi (Turkish consular officer) started an organization with military authorities (Keser, 2006; Balyemez, 2018).[42] The establishment of TMT was also a signal that the future leader would also change. As a matter of fact, in the first declaration dated November 1957, all previous organizations were abolished (Gazioğlu, 2000, p.9; Akkurt, 1999). In the same year, the Turkish Cypriot elites enter into another change and take on the politics that "we can no longer live together, not equality". Fabricated propaganda by the two sides through the media was the greatest evidence of this. In Denktaş's statements, it is possible to list the reasons for the establishment of TMT as follows:

i. Filling the void in the face of EOKA's underground activities for Enosis
ii. To unite the regional organizations of Turks under one roof
iii. To get support by contacting resistance fighters in Turkey
iv. To win public support for a long-term struggle and instil trust in the public (Akkurt, 2000, p.39).

The NAM had not yet excelled in those years. On the other hand, the USSR has not been intervening enough in the Cyprus problem yet. For this reason, Cyprus was a NATO island as a British colony, and in the case of Enosis and Taksim, the projects of local nationalism, it would [still] remain a NATO island. So much so, Denktaş said: If you do Taksim, you will at least save half of them from communism, because most Greek Cypriots are Communists (An, 2005; Kızılyürek, 2015, 2016). Makarios told the press at the Bandung Conference that, "the overwhelming majority of Cypriots

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[42] For further reading, Neriman Cahit's interview with Tanrisevdi published in the Ortam Newspaper, "TMT'li yıllar [Years with TMT]"; it's the installation moment that [still] remains a mystery.

supported the unification of the island with Greece, and the Greek side could afford to leave the base areas to the British in exchange for Enosis" (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019, p.919). In short, these local nationalities were nationalism that suited Western interests and both declared war against the Communists. In this sense, these nationalisms were designed to suit NATO interests. It was also a fact that TMT imitated EOKA in style, and this was revealed by Rauf Denktaş himself (Denktaş, 2000, p.258; Crawshaw, 1978, pp.286-287).

January 27-28, 1958 led to a first for Turkish Cypriots. They clashed with the colony's security forces. When the whispered news started from the night became the headline the next day, a mass demonstration on fake news began (Bozkurt newspaper (27 January 1958): "İngiltere Taksimi kabul etti [Britain accepted Taksim]). This time, the streets of Nicosia moaned with "Taksim, only Taksim" instead of the cries of "Enosis, only Enosis". However, in reality, Ankara (Foley, 1962, p.174) and Turkish Cypriot elites understood that Taksim was a dream, but it was too late.

> The Foreign Secretary said that the internal security situation in Cyprus had deteriorated in the last few days and the Turkish Cypriots appeared to be deliberately attempting to create the impression that it was impossible for the two communities in Cyprus to live together harmoniously (CAB 128/32/47/3).

As the summer months of 1958 began, an unnamed civil war had begun in Cyprus. London could not perceive events on the island only at a local level. Due to the painful atmosphere through which the Middle East passed, they could not even arrest properly (CAB 128/32/58/2). It was now ringing alarm bells for the US and therefore for NATO (the threat of Communism). The second half of 1958 quickly evolved towards its conclusion. In February 1959, with the historic Zurich and London conferences, the child was named: *"Republic of Cyprus".*

3.3 The Interactions between Domestic Politics of Nationalism and Foreign States' Policies

The beginning of the Cold War led to a new form of bi-polar order in world politics. The two major powers that defeated Germany and Italy were [actually] non-European actors, and, the destiny of Europe was shaped by these non-European countries (USA and USSR). Britain and France suffered a sharp decrease in their economic and political power. This meant that the USA would soon be the leader of the western camp. In the "new world", the US government attached importance to liberal-democratic values and urged the American allies to grant freedom to their colonies. Thus, not only the promotion of the "free world" by Washington but also the collapse of British and French "empires" led to the process of de-colonialization. The colonial peoples launched struggles against political dependence on colonial powers, inter-ethnic inequalities and economic oppression. A decade later, Cyprus also experienced a struggle for liberation against the British. The establishment of the United Nations, a mechanism aimed at global-governance, had had radical effects in world politics. Despite the criticisms against it, the United Nations had comprehensive institutions and it welcomed the membership of all the "free nations". The right to self-determination promised freedom to colonial people and became a supplementary ideal for nationalist mobilizations in the colonial realm. In the mid-1950s, the Greek side demanded the right to self-determination from the British to end the colonial rule.

In the 1950s, the NAM was about to be established however one might hardly claim that the movement could become an influential actor till 1960s. On the other hand, the "two-camp thesis" of Soviet leader Stalin led the USSR to not to support communists in the Greek civil war (1947-1949). According to Moscow, not only Greece but also Cyprus was "in the American region" and the Soviet Union refrained from interference in the Cyprus Question till the 1960s. This enabled the four NATO allies (USA, UK, Greece and Turkey) to find an "intra-NATO" solution to the Cyprus Question. Therefore, one might undoubtedly argue that Cyprus was an island

experiencing the de-Colonizalization "trend" within the bi-polar "transformation" of the Cold War world order (see Blanton & Kegley, 2016).

In the eyes of the British, Cyprus was of maximum geostrategic importance and London was quite reluctant to leave the island till the Suez Crisis. The "humiliation" that the British suffered due to the Soviet and American pressures led London to decide that it no longer needed entire Cyprus (Bowie, 1974). At this point, it is important to stress that, till the "humiliation" in Suez, the British encouraged Turkey to play a more effective role in the Cyprus dispute to deter Greeks' struggle for Enosis. The British made Turkey a part of the Cyprus Conflict to urge the Greece side to abandon its self-determination/Enosis demands. However, when they left Suez, they accepted that the future of Cyprus had to be determined not only by London but also by the two communities and their "mother-countries" Greece and Turkey (Hatzivassiliou, 1989). On the other hand, the military projects as "Northern Tier" and "CENTO" rendered Turkey a valuable partner for the West, Britain and USA could not afford to allow Greece to annex the entire island.

The decline in the power of Great Britain indicated that the future of Cyprus would not be determined in a purely "British-style" and the island would have an "Anglo-American design". Likewise, as the NAM had not yet grown into a key-actor in world politics and the USSR left Cyprus "in the American region", it was clear that Cyprus was not in a position to become something much different than a pro-NATO island. It was hardly a coincidence that the two leaderships on the island promoted Enosis and partition, two theses that would render Cyprus a NATO island. As Makarios offered the British installation of base areas as an exchange for Enosis, the Turkish Cypriot leadership tried to convince the British that the partition would be an effective formula to keep "at least the half" of the island "free of Communist threat". Furthermore, both nationalist mobilizations on the island were strongly anti-Communist (Kızılyürek, 2016). Likewise, the fact that both sides demanded the right to self-determination (of course in different contexts) was also compatible with the de-colonization trend in world politics. That is to say, the

two communities of the island tried to show the West that their nationalist mobilizations and demands were not contradicting to western interests. As a matter of fact, in the 1960s, with the rise of the NAM and the rapid de-Stalinization of Soviet Foreign policy, the Cyprus Question gained different dimensions and it was no longer an intra-NATO issue (Bilge, 1996). Nevertheless, in the 1950s, the Cyprus Question was largely an "internal matter" of NATO. Therefore, the form of nationalism demanding the unification with "mother-countries" meant, directly or indirectly, keeping Cyprus as a NATO territory. In one sense, based on the nationalist demands of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaderships, Great Britain, a NATO-member, would leave the island to its ally or allies in NATO. In all considerations on the relationship between the nationalisms in Cyprus and the Cold War, it should be kept in mind that as a British colony Cyprus was a NATO island and Enosis and partition would keep it so. And, the NATO alliance that encouraged Cypriots to establish the Republic of Cyprus expected to create a pro-NATO regime on the island and authorized Greece, Turkey and Britain in military issues (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019).

Ideologically, Greek and Turkish nationalisms in the early-modern era (19th and early 20th Centuries) had "pan-nationalist" characters. Inherently, the two communities' nationalisms aimed at unification with the national "mainland". Nevertheless, it is clear that the two communities managed to manipulate their "mother-countries" and convinced them to attach more importance to the Cyprus Question, particularly in some critical thresholds. In the early 1930s, when the Greek Cypriot community rebelled against the British and demanded Enosis, the Greek government was not at all interested in annexing Cyprus (see Nevzat, 2005). Likewise, right after the 1931 rebellion, the Turkish government made it clear to British officials that "any attempt to damage Turco-British relations will be perceived as a hostile action against Kemalism itself". At the very beginning of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were not in a position to try to annex Cyprus and cause an intra-NATO conflict. Nevertheless, the two communities on the island used public opinion in the mother-countries and urged the governments to play more active roles in the Cyprus issue (Gürel, 1984).

Pan-Hellenism, thus the *Megalo Idea* aimed to liberate all ethnic Greeks from foreign rulers and unite their territories with Greece had been a fundamental inspiration for the Greek nation-state since the 19th Century. However, Greece hardly had sufficient power to struggle against the British and convince the latter to accept Enosis. In the early 1950s, Makarios encouraged the Greek Church to establish a pan-Hellenist organization promoting the Enosis. When he became the Archbishop of Cyprus, Makarios made relentless efforts to urge Athens to promote the national cause (Peristianis, 2008). In 1951, the Greek government expressed to Makarios that they could not afford to support the Enosis. In 1952, Makarios visited Greece and told the Greek press that the government lacked courage and failed to support Greek Cypriots' national struggle. Finally, in 1953, Makarios and Colonel Grivas joined forces and decided to launch an armed struggle in Cyprus. They managed to create a pro-Enosis public opinion in Greece and Prime Minister Papagos expressed to the British government that Greece had the intention to annex Cyprus. One year later, Greece decided to apply to the UN and demand the right to self-determination to achieve the Enosis (Druşotis, 2007).

For the Republic of Turkey, the priority was safeguarding the status quo created by the Treaty of Lausanne. Thus, Ankara as well was aware that it was not in a position to exert pressure on London to pave the way for any change in Cyprus's status quo. In the late 1940s, Turkish Cypriots' massive anti-Enosis demonstration in Nicosia drew the attention of the Turkish press. Likewise, Turkish Cypriot students in Turkey were in contact with nationalist circles in Turkey and they were trying to "alert" Ankara against Enosis. Rauf Denktaş was in contact with Turkish diplomats on the island and he was urging them to convince Ankara to generate a proactive foreign policy on Cyprus (Özkan, 2015). In 1951, Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük published an open letter to Turkish President Celal Bayar and asked the latter to annex Cyprus. Till the mid-1950s, Ankara refrained from putting expansionist demands forward and government officials stated on several occasions that "there [was] no Cyprus problem". However, Turkish Cypriot leadership was in contact with some nationalist circles in Turkey. Those circles established the

Kıbrıs Türktür Derneği (Cyprus is Turkish Association) in 1954 and tried to urge Menderes government to play an active role in the Cyprus Question. Additionally, there is evidence that the British had already encouraged Turkish Cypriots to ask the Turkish government to pay attention to the Cyprus Conflict. In 1955 London Conference, the British made Turkey officially an involved party in the Cyprus Question. The 6-7 September incidents showed that Turkish nationalists had significant anti-Greek attitudes. In 1956, London referred to the "partition" of Cyprus by Greece and Turkey as a solution formula and the Turkish side embraced the partition thesis (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019).

In 1955, Athens supported the establishment of EOKA to promote Enosis, and, in 1957-1958, Ankara supported the establishment of Volkan and TMT to promote partition. It is a fact that Greek Cypriots more rapidly convinced Greece to join the pro-Enosis struggle. Nonetheless, Turkey was convinced not only by Turkish Cypriots' attempts but also by London's encouragement and the upraising pro-Enosis struggle of the Greek side. In other words, the Turkish nationalism on the island was a "reaction" against the Greek nationalism (Bilge, 1996). When it comes to the region, Egyptian intransigence towards the western plans led to an alliance between pan-Arabism and pan-Hellenism. Moreover, this alliance led Turkey and Britain to join forces in Suez and Cyprus disputes. It is also noteworthy that, while the Greek nationalism demanded the entire island, the Turkish nationalism made it clear that it could afford the annexation of the half of the island by Turkey (Crawshaw, 1978).

The two communities' nationalist struggles became to that extent effective thanks to the support granted by the "mother-countries". Likewise, the Turkish side's nationalism became efficient thanks to the British encouragements. On the other hand, the communities manifestly managed to manipulate the public opinion in "mother-countries". However, as the Republic of Cyprus "prohibited" Enosis and partition, due to the intra-NATO balances and the Anglo-American preferences, the two sides' nationalisms failed to shape the destiny of Cyprus. In one sense, it was an intra-NATO

consensus that determined the future of the island and not the nationalisms (Druşotis, 2007).

3.4 A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Nationalism Based on the Analysis

This thesis is not intended to disprove the validities of mainstream theories of nationalism (Primordialism, Ethnosymbolism and Modernism). Nonetheless, it argues that these mainstream theories do not sufficiently account for the politics of nationalism within the international context. This section evaluates the theories of nationalism with relevance to their inefficiencies in answering the research question of this thesis.

As the Primordialist point of view argues, the "primordial ties" between the two communities and their "mother-countries" played a crucial role in shaping the politics of nationalism on the island. One might hardly deny that their cultural ties with the Cypriot communities made "mother-countries" active parties involved in the Cyprus Question. Likewise, the two communities were led to an understanding of nationalism emphasizing the primordial ties with Greece and Turkey. This thesis did not follow a primordialist methodology; however, it is clear that the "Greekness" and "Turkishness" of the two communities played a role in shaping the nationalisms on the island. According to primordialists, "kinship" is among the most important infrastructures of nationalism (Geertz, 1973), and, the struggle between the Greek side (Greece and Greek Cypriots) and the Turkish side (Turkey and Turkish Cypriots) over the island constitutes no contradiction to this argument. Nevertheless, Primordialism focuses on what makes nations different from each other however it does not provide a multi-level framework for the analysis of such "differences". For instance, the primordial framework is not concerned with the power politics that caused fluctuations in the two side's nationalist demands in the 1950s and 60s (see the next chapter for further details). For this thesis, the extent to which Primordialism accounts for the "Greekness" and "Turkishness" of the two communities is not as important as the gap Primordialism does not fill. The primordial point of view

does not focus on the multi-level factors affecting nationalism and the theory does not fully serve the research objectives of this thesis.

The Ethnosymbolist approach asserts that myths, symbols, memories, values and traditions play a crucial role in forming, maintaining and changing ethnic and national identities. Therefore, attachment to the "homeland" and the durability of ethnic identities are shown as evidence that nations have ethnic origins by ethnosymbolist scholars (Smith, 1986). Indeed, ethnosymbols like the 'two-headed Byzantine eagle' used by the Greek Cypriot Church and the 'grey-wolf' used by the TMT were making references to Greek and Turkish national mythologies. On the other hand, the two communities historically preserved their indigenous ethno-religious identities for centuries. They remained attached to their historical "homelands" Greece and Turkey. In the 1950s, the two nationalisms were motivated by the hope that the two communities would unite with their historical homelands. Likewise, one might assert that the British rule triggered the Greek 'revival' (using Smith's term) and the Greek nationalism triggered the Turkish 'revival'. Nonetheless, the ethnosymbolist perspective as well remains inadequate in providing a multi-level framework to analyse the relations problematized by this thesis. According to this thesis's analytical framework, the nationalisms on the island cannot be understood without considering the Cold War conditions. Therefore, the ethnosymbolist point of view does not focus on such multi-level conditions and its framework does not fit to this thesis's research objectives.

As this thesis characterizes nationalisms as "children of their age", its hypothetical and methodological stance is significantly closer to Modernist point of view. One might argue that the two communities transformed their ethno-religious identities to national identities in the British era (19th and 20th centuries) and this largely proves the validity of modernist (particularly Ernest Gellner's, 1983) considerations. It is also a fact that the education and literacy played a crucial role in fostering national awareness of both communities and this happened in the 'modern' era. Nationalism was used as the impetus that mobilized the two communities in the mid-1950s and this

fact suits well to Breuilly's concept of 'nationalism as a form of politics'. One might argue that the leadership of the two communities 'instrumentalized' ethnic in their power competition in the de-colonization era and this could be compatible with Brass's theoretical approach. It is to the same extent possible to assert that the two communities 'imagined' (using Anderson's term, 1983) their island as a part of Turkish and Greek nation-states. The modernist point of view, with its various approaches, provides a broad and multi-dimensional framework for analysis. Nevertheless, the theories of nationalism tend to observe nationalisms as if they develop in 'glass lanterns' and neglect the interactions between foreign and local actors. At this very point, Suzman's (1999) framework becomes useful as the scholar focuses on the politics of nationalism within the international context. Suzman's framework enabled this thesis to examine the relationship between the Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island and Britain's, USA's, USSR's and Egypt's policies on Cyprus.

Scholars utilizing the modernist methodology generally tend to observe the social construction of national identities in the 'modern' era. This thesis tried to pick the two nationalisms 'out of the glass lanterns' and examined their relationship with the world order as well as the actors and the trends and transformations in world politics. For the period beginning with 1954 and ceasing in 1958, this thesis's findings monitored that there were significant interactions between the nationalisms on the island and the policies of foreign actors. The Enosis-partition cleavage on the island was not [totally] free of important regional and global developments such as the Cold War, Suez Crisis and de-colonization. Thus, to pick the nationalisms out of the *'fanus'*, Modernism as well remains inadequate and a multi-level framework as established by this thesis appears to be essential.

Chatterjee's (1986) 'colonial approach' was a *sine qua non* for this thesis. The assumption that there could be another world outside Europe turned out to be true. In this context, in order to be able to grasp the genealogy, the argument of not having a single dimension (singular acceptance) is also valid. However, there are no Taksim or Enosis derivative insights in

Chatterjee's understanding of anti-colonial nationalism. The ultimate aims of Chatterjee's concepts of 'departure', 'manoeuvring' and 'arrival' stages generally refer to colonial people's struggle of independence for founding their own independent states. In Chatterjee's (1986) point of view, nationalist movements in colonial territories essentially have anti-colonial attitudes. That is to say, the colonial peoples unite under the roof of a pro-independence form of nationalism to liberate their country from the colonial rulers and to found their own independent state. Elsewhere Chatterjee (1996) notes that the colonial peoples had 'learned' the phenomenon of nationalism from their colonial rulers.The colonial peoples were somehow divided based on their ethnicities, each ethnic group tended to adopt a form of nationalism aimed at protection and promotion of its own ethnic culture. This led the ethnic groups to embrace ethnic nationalism and caused disintegration among colonial peoples. Furthermore, such disintegration, on some occasions, urged some ethnic groups to cooperate with the colonial rulers against other ethnic groups in the name of 'nationalism'. In the struggle for de-colonialization of Cyprus, a form of nationalism aimed at the establishment of an independent state on the Cypriot soil hardly existed. For both communities, instead of independence, the 'liberation' meant unification with the 'motherland' (Greece and Turkey). Furthermore, the Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island had totally opposing goals and the Turkish nationalists were in cooperation with the British against their Greek counterparts. Therefore, the Cypriots' understanding of nationalism was not at all an anti-colonial struggle aimed for a free and united Cyprus.

Breuilly (1993) is the second author to be debated in the field in which this thesis seeks to shed light. The first issue in the light of social bases touted as Breuilly's trilogy is mobilization. Compared to Smith (he does not engage in a polemic on the direction of the movement), however, in Cyprus, it has been observed that the issue is politically central, urban and religious. For the Turkish Cypriots, the issue was mostly about the atmosphere after the 1931 rebellion and the struggle of the political elites (Necati Özkan, Dr. Fazıl Küçük); for Greek Cypriots in contrast to the nationalist character of Europe, religion was chosen as a centre for national character. Although the Greek

Cypriot left-wing party AKEL attempted to organise a plebiscite in 1949, it failed and yielded to the leadership of the Church. The definition of the working class within the Breuilly's (1993) perception of mobilization is true for both nationalisms, but these classes are articulated in right-wing politics (e.g.: the separation of trade unions). Another important issue is that empires, which are being demolished or disintegrating, create appropriate ground and time for such movements. Changing time and space will give rise to the elite of advocates of new demands. Another issue is that the colonial administration has tacitly transferred the field that Breuilly describes as a cultural sphere to the motherlands (e.g. a matter of education). It will be useful to note that it is a factor that accelerates the transfer of national emotions.

The second concept for Breuilly (1993) is social conflict. The towns are regarded as the base centers. As a justification, he cited all kinds of differences (e.g.: religion, language, sect, skin colour, etc.). He cited two sources of conflict. The first is when none of the groups can gain an advantage. It is an invalid assumption. Greek Cypriots were already at the forefront of population and economic activity. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, have been transformed as Kızılyürek (2016) put it: "From the dominant nation to an ordinary minority [Millet-i hâkime'den sıradan bir azınlığa]". In this case, the Turkish Cypriots had to exhibit their most national character. However, the wave of nationalist formation that he *'imagined'* was realized for the two nationalists, albeit at different stages. As a result, this formation that would finally find itself at the state gate would not be *"lonely"* but rather *"crowded"*.

The third concept for the source of nationalism is the class. Some parts of the debate over class do not apply to Cyprus. The place Breuilly (1993) dreams of is mostly a European place. It is German territory, exemplified by the traditional ruling class. Cyprus since the British era does not have a privileged class (noble class). On the contrary, there is no nationalism against religion. The second is the middle class. It would also be pointless to discuss the middle class in a place where there is no upper class. What

Breuilly is debating here is before and after industrialization. The working class has not been able to test well for both nationalisms. Breuilly's (1993) projection of articulation is a consistent estimate. Fourth, the periphery or peasant class has been particularly influential in the armed struggle phase (e.g., the hiding of EOKA), but there has been no movement from the periphery to the centre.

Finally, Breuilly's (1993) idea of nationalism developing through colonialism will be examined. Nationalist rhetoric of any group (without the need for an emphasis on identity) can trigger other groups. The colonial administration may consider this as an opportunity to balance this situation. The issue here is politics, not identity. As there will be no barriers (ontologically) to politics, external dynamics must exist as well as internal dynamics. It should not be as simple as by just saying the outside world is also important.

Suzman (1999) has a justified outcry for his work on nationalism: an "unfair" division. In his work, there is a lantern (*fanus*) he cannot name: "nationalist movements rarely develop in complete isolation from the broader international arena". There were three cases in Suzman's work, and what they had in common was the British Empire. Another aspect of his work is the emphasis on the interaction between the success of the nationalist movement and the actors in international politics. One of the issues missing in Suzman is the lack of an answer if there are two nationalism if they are to gain sovereignty at the national level and gain international recognition. Therefore, in a multi-actor case, one local actor is only trying to convince his motherland, while the other is able to enter into international research. Therefore, a nationalist movement's domestic strategies are directly linked to foreign actors' international strategies are not always valid. Perhaps the only thing Suzman left missing is the possibility that the issue could be a two-way interaction.

This thesis's analysis on the interplay between domestic and foreign actors monitored that, the British encouragements given to Turks to promote Taksim was not free of the Anglo-Saxon plans on the Middle East. Additionally, as

Greece and Egypt were not pleased with the Anglo-Saxon plans, they joined forces and both experienced conflict with Turkey. As the Cyprus Problem was inherently an 'intra-NATO' conflict in 1950's, both Turkish and Greek nationalisms were foreseeing to keep Cyprus as a NATO-island. Moreover, the Republic of Cyprus was also designed as a pro-NATO state (but did not become a member of NATO). As a conclusion, the mainstream theories of nationalism are to a large extent adequate in accounting for the formations of the nationalisms on the island; however, all the three theories remain inadequate in illustrating for the influence of international politics on these nationalist movements.

Conclusion

In answering the research question 1, which is *"What was the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?"*, the analysis of chapter three (covering the years between 1954-1959) indicates that there was a mutual interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus. While the nationalisms of the two communities made the 'motherlands' more sensitive on the Cyprus issue, the British divide-rule policies as well as the Washington-sponsored 'independence', namely the Republic of Cyprus, had noteworthy impact on each other. The leaderships of the two communities managed to convince the 'motherlands' to pay attention to Cyprus. The Greek nationalism made Britain to encourage Turkey and Turkish Cypriot nationalists to weight in and inhibit the pro-Enosis Greek Cypriot mobilization. The main anti-Western state in the region, Egypt, became Greek nationalism's primary ally against the British colonialism. Furthermore, the Cold War conditions made Washington anxious about the future of NATO's southern flank and all the sides were urged to sign the Zurich-London treaties prohibiting Enosis and taksim, the two nationalist inspirations of the two communities. Historically, it might be observed that the politics of nationalism designed by the two leaderships on the island and the aforementioned foreign states' policies on Cyprus affected each other.

As regards the research question 2, which is *"To what extent the mainstream theories of nationalism are capable of accounting for the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?"*, the thesis concludes that all the three mainstream theories have deficiencies. Each theory has its own understanding on the formation process of nationalism and these understandings are valid in explaining the rise of Turkish and Greek nationalisms on the island. Nevertheless, these three theories neglect the interaction between international politics (foreign states' attitudes towards Cyprus) and domestic leaders' politics of nationalism and this deficiency is common in all the three. A framework that does not ignore this interaction (for instance the framework generated by Suzman) appears essential in solving this puzzle.

CHAPTER 4
END OF PARTNERSHIP IN THE REPUBLIC (1959-1964)

"We conclude Makarios' long-term objective is not union with Greece but rather elimination or neutralization those provisions London–Zurich agreements and constitution which in effect circumscribe sovereignty of Republic. […] We believe a future Cyprus in which two large communities remain at daggers drawn, immobilizing all initiatives for progress, spells nothing but hardship and sorrow for all Cypriots" ("doc.278," FRUS).[43]

This chapter seeks to shed more light on the issues surrounding the steps that took place in the 1960-1964 periods leading to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus and its aftermath, depicting the end of a phase with the Battle of Kokkina. To achieve this goal, the study will critically analyze and evaluate current issues such as international policy; beyond the policies of foreign actors, especially in Cyprus, the roles played by local actors in meeting their manoeuvres will be taken into account. Other issues include the political roles of NATO, the USSR and the NAM, the Turko-Greek policies regarding Cyprus in the framework driven by local nationalism, and their inter-play as prescribed by the various narratives and approaches of nationalisms. In this context, this study will mostly cover the first republican period and the first division in its interactions and its impact in reshaping the country's relationship at both domestic and international level. The investigation of these issues within the various theoretical lenses of

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[43] Approved by Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and signed by George W. Ball, Under-Secretary of State under the name "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cyprus" dated 4 April 1963.

nationalism will suggest whether these theories have the necessary operational capacity to explain these problems.

4.1   The International Politics

This part of the study will analyze the important contribution of not only local politics in shaping the destruction of the republic, but it also goes on to evaluate the actions played the various states and non-state actors in the downfall of Cyprus. These actors included the US, NATO, USSR, Turkey, Greece and NAM. This is based on the fact that the political priorities of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were at the focus of the analysis of the renewed network of relations in the region during the detente era of the Cold War. This section of the study further explores how these local actors, which were divided into two separate fronts in Cyprus, this time eventually, lead to the involuntary articulation of international actors'. It is a result of defining these relations, especially with the resolution of 4 March 1964, in which the fate of today's Cyprus was born. This moment of rebirth not only signalled separation but also paved the way for international actors to realise, as further evidenced by the damaged relationship with other actors whose presence and grasp on Cyprus has been reshaped.

4.1.1 Détente Era, Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the beginning of the developments that ended the first phase of the Cold War. At this stage, both the dominant powers had lost their dominance over the blocs to some extent, and the de-Stalinization that gained momentum after Stalin's death contributed significantly to the Soviet Union's support of the Non-Aligned Countries' anti-Western outflows. Besides, the Cuban Crisis has portrayed to the world that the two dominant forces (as well as the two nuclear powers) cannot afford a direct conflict with each other.

The great powers go through a stress test, when the Russian threat of nuclear war that came up during the Suez War of 1956, is now the threat of American nuclear war, as the Soviets have attempted to deploy missiles to Cuba. The only difference here is that the two superpowers confront directly,

not indirectly. Another characteristic observed with this event is that it formed the basis of the phenomenon of détente, which reached the climax of the Cold War and then began to settle in a stable process. Among other implications, NATO's European wing understood that their views would not be taken in the face of such a great danger. Nikhita Khrushchev's failure in the field of agriculture and his irresponsible adventurous approach at the time of the crisis led to his dismissal in 1964. There was a serious conflict lived within the Eastern bloc on the Soviet-Chinese line and mutual claims of "betrayal of the revolution" were expressed. France has launched its atomic bomb program despite America. This was indicative of the waning capacity of the dominant powers to control their allies and domains.

Another important issue not to be omitted for this period is the decolonization of Asia and Africa. In this period alone, nearly 40 new states were freed from the colonial administration and declared their independence. Although the national liberation movements began in the colonial countries after the First World War, they did not succeed until the end of the WW II. Especially after the Industrial Revolutions of 1848 in Europe, the search and establishment of the colony which accelerated thoroughly have made the world a very different point. The colonialist European powers saw these lands as reserves of raw materials, labour, and territory to be settled in the future (T. Smith, 1989).

> However, the colonies were exploited, sometimes brutally, for natural and labor resources, and sometimes even for military conscripts. In addition, the introduction of colonial rule drew arbitrary natural boundaries where none had existed before, dividing ethnic and linguistic groups and natural features, and laying the foundation for the creation of numerous states lacking geographic, linguistic, ethnic, or political affinity ("Decolonization of Asia and Africa, 1945-1960," FRUS,).

The US increased its foreign aid during the détente period. In particular, it has provided incentives and aid packages to these Third World countries. Likewise, the Soviets, with a similar incentive, tried to involve them in the

Eastern or Communist Bloc against the imperialist system (as the owner of ideology against the exploiters). These new states, which are convinced that all these developments mean nothing to them, have officially announced their names through the Bandung Conference. The main purpose of the *NAM* was internal development, and its main actors and founders included Joseph Broz Tito (Yugoslavia), Sukarno (Indonesia), Jawaharlal Nehru (India), Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt).

"The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was the Third World's response to the Cold War. Without the Cold War, the concept of a Third World would not have emerged" (Arnold, 2010, p.introduction). The non-European nationalist wave that began after the WW II has warmed the atmosphere very quickly. Nationalism (independence movements), which did not find the necessary environment for its upbringing within the interwar period, as a result, witnessed the formation of over a hundred new states. Being a member of the Third World has been the result of natural selection. Almost all of the colonial lands derived from the European states automatically gained Third World membership. What these countries shared was not only the Third World membership but also their political, economic and as a result of their weakness, they were open to heavy exploitation. The economic breakthrough that did not take place after the independence was replaced by political instability in a very short time and left to the requirements of the Cold War climate. They have become a community of aid recipients dependent on the world's new superpowers (the US and the USSR). This state of necessity (aid) was a creation of the Cold War as well as the Third World. In this context, the Third World's has had two areas of struggle. The first was to gain their independence, and the other was to gain economic independence (still endless and unlikely to end). In other words, independence at this second point would also mean ending dependence (Arnold, 2010, p.introduction; Sylvester, 2014).

In the bipolar atmosphere of the Cold War, the Third World countries had to adjust their policies accordingly. The bipolar world order naturally created a magnetic field over all countries and built itself a centre (Capitalism or

Communism) seeking allies. Invented by French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre (1956), and according to Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah (1965), this was the last phase of imperialism (neo-colonialism) and the methodology for meddling in internal affairs.

The Suez Crisis which occurred in 1956, concomitantly brought new opportunities, as well as have been unearthed the dilemmas of the major powers. While the United Kingdom, the US and the World Bank agreed to finance Aswan High Dam, to built-in Egypt; as a result of the series of events that began and persisted with the request of the charismatic Egyptian President Cemal Abdül Nasır from Czechoslovakia (iron curtain country in the Communist camp) to military equipment. In line with the principle of inability to intervene in the internal affairs of the Nasser states, it quickly activates the nationalization decision of the channel. In this international affair, which was very painful for the Eastern Mediterranean, no agreement was reached, and as a result of this event, Israel was rapidly added to the Anglo-French partnership. Shortly after the start of the operation, two superpowers seized the event together and ended the occupation. Although the withdrawal of troops was replaced by the UN military force, the main importance of this event for the Third World was that the withdrawal of finance was replaced by USSR finance, i.e. Eastern finance instead of Western finance. This suggestion has been a flare-up of the situation that will be manipulated with great deftness by some Third World leaders until the end of the Cold War. The Third World positioned within the nature of the Cold War, and the NAM, which does not want to be articulated and linked to any power, has matured in such an atmosphere.

There is a consensus on the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Nehru for the NAM. He rejects offers to be a supporter for the West with the opposite of his hand and adopts the "*Third Way*" approach. In this sense, they insisted that the involvement of the NAM under the UN umbrella after the Korean War of 1953 was essential (based on the principle that everyone is affected, although they are not a party to the war). Although they were not a party to the war, they did not have access to the right to vote as a result of their

attempts, which began with the principle that everyone was affected. In this sense, the defeat of the Western attempt to exclude him from the meeting is a remarkable event that needs to be emphasized. A treaty between China and India in 1954 is also noteworthy in terms of demonstrating the capacity of different ideologies to agree. Neither of the two camps tolerated the NAM members who had made it their motto to live together. In the course of the events that took place, the demands for absolute support and approval were formed. According to Dulles' understanding of a realist perspective, "a country was either with the United States or against it", it has done nothing more than to polarize the issue. After this incident, the US will also be deprived of its sphere of influence over Egypt. On the other hand, the real proof of maturity for NAM (after the reluctant acceptance of the superpowers), is not the Bandung Conference of 1955 but after the Belgrade Conference of 1961. The influential factor here was nothing but the belief of the superpowers in NAM's neutrality and bona fide stance. As a result, it has been the Third World's most effective platform with conferences held every three years after 1961 compared to the rigid bipolar system formed in the Cold War climate.

Compared to the nationalism movements of the detente period, it does not encounter a very different picture than the characteristics of the confrontation period. There are also decolonization processes and ethnic conflicts. However, during this period, the member states of the NAM, in other words, the ethnic groups that had a say in these states, showed serious solidarity to protect their territorial integrity and prevent the separatist ethnic groups from succeeding. In the 1960s, new states were established on many former colonies. Cameroon, Chad, Ghana, Nigeria, Guinea, Zambia and Cyprus are among these states. It is no coincidence that these new states became members of the nonaligned movement within a short period following their founding. It is also no coincidence that the minorities within them, with the support of the Western bloc, act together against the danger of breaking up these states.

4.1.2 NATO, USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement

After British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan's visit to North America (June 1958), President Eisenhower recalled the importance of "the principle of private Anglo-American consultation on matters of common concern" again. The dates were not yet heralding the birth of the Republic of Cyprus. Among the discussions, the American side expressed a problem as follows: "The United States Government were, however, showing anxiety about the longer-term problem of finding some alternative leader of Arab opinion who might be able to counter Nasser's growing influence in the Middle East" (CAP 128/32/48/1, p.3). The period 1959-1964, which will be discussed in this part of this thesis, will actually reflect the journey to a known date, the Six-Day War, 1967. This episode, which is in an intricate state with the next episode, the Middle East, will be tried to discuss the three actors in the title.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the vote of the political committee on Greece's bid for self-determination was very critical for the future of the issue in the General Assembly, when majority of the Middle East and North African Muslim countries, members of the Warsaw Pact and Latin American countries voted positively. This suddenly raised hopes for a peaceful solution following Greece's defeat at the UN session in November 1958. Immediately after the session, Athens stated that a solution should be reached through negotiation and, using the UN, declared that it had partially given up on the idea of reaching Enosis (Crawshaw, 1978, p.340). This glimmer of hope was a moment of triumph for NATO. At the time of leaving the colony, it was a serious problem for two NATO member states to have two communities that believed they were ethnically one. For London, there was concern that one of the motherlands could leave the organization (NATO) at any time. A solution intra-NATO and through negotiation (except Greek Cypriots, Greece implicitly) was the request of everyone in general. By the definition of Xydis, the *'reluctant republic'* thus came to life in Zurich.

Indeed, everything was done exactly as requested by foreign actors. A federation designed within a pro-Western government, there is no space for communism, so there is no apparent threat. The case remained relatively

calm for more than two years until November 30, 1963, when Makarios triggered the constitutional crisis by proposing thirteen new amendments (Bilge, 1987, p.376). The proposal was open and clear, its purpose was to *'singularize'* the issue. It has become clear why the island of Cyprus has not been a member since its inception of NATO. It was not easy to neutralize NATO's two southern flank countries in that sense. This is why Paul-Henri Spaak used a limited initiative scope after May 1957, which would potentially harm the "Western unity". Holland, on the other hand, was able to suggest that: "Nevertheless, the analysis shows that NATO remained marginal to the eventual negotiated settlement. The oblique relationship between NATO and the emergence of the Republic of Cyprus throws light on the vulnerability of the new state" (1995, p.33). The conflict, which began on 21 December, became a truce with the negotiation of foreign actors (US, Britain, Turkey and Greece), and the British military forces were tacitly assigned the task of peacekeepers. Normally the issue should have taken place under the UN umbrella, while NATO has taken a direct position on the case. The motto in the minds was obvious: *"Mediterranean Cuba"* and this was a real threat (Windsor, 1964, p.4).

If there are a colonial past and conflict at the core of the disagreement and the complexity of ethnicity on top of it, it is very likely that the issue will become an international problem and it has been. 1964 has begun to be an eventful year for NATO in the Cyprus context. The Soviet Union, which was extremely cautious in its initial stages, believed that the problem was due to the participation of NATO members and was a supporter of not intervening. As a result, Aziz gathered the topics that motivated the Soviets' attitudes in four different points.

i. The prevalence of Communism among Greek Cypriots, even the existence of an organization that can work legally, AKEL
ii. Left-sided Papandreou government at work in Greece
iii. The British, recognized by the Soviet Union as one of the Western Imperialists, had bases in Cyprus
iv. Cold Turkish-Soviet relations (Aziz, 1969b, p.201).

In the first round of the conference, which was held in London in January 1964, a break was taken without any results ("Londra Konferansına iki," 1964, p.1). However, there was only anxiety at the time of the matter's arrival to the British Cabinet, but the worst was not within forecasts: "the possibility of a further deterioration in the situation could not be excluded" (CAB 128/38/14, p.3). However, the first meeting of 1964 was gathered with a single issue, *'Cyprus'*. Archbishop Makarios had decided to abolish the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance as the first job. In order to avoid taking responsibility, London will consider bringing the matter to the UN. However, due to the urgency of the issue, they decide that they should urgently prepare for the conference in London (CAB 128/38/1). At this point, the information given by the Secretary of the Commonwealth Duncan Sandys to the Cabinet is historical:

> The situation in Cyprus remained precarious and that there was a considerable risk of a renewal of communal fighting. It was therefore increasingly urgent to find a political solution to the problem of the Island's future; but, although he was doing all he could, in his personal discussions with the representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, to promote a common understanding which might form the basis of formal negotiations, both parties were showing considerable reluctance to co-operate (CAB/128/38/6, p.3).

The Secretary of the Commonwealth requested NATO's help from the US on the possibility that the Turkish government (The Turkish navy was conducting exercises in the Mediterranean at the time) might make an invasion movement on the island ("Kıbrıs'a NATO kuvveti" 1964, p.1). Finally, the assumption that the issue can be resolved within the UN is beyond Aziz's (1969b) details, because the Soviet Union is a permanent member of the Security Council. However, London had a conviction that Makarios would carry the matter to the UN. If it is decided (one possibility) that both the Soviets and the US would be set aside similarly to avoid Soviet intervention at the core of the matter, the island's fate may well be decided by the Afro-Asian group. This reason was clear enough for London to avoid the UN.

Ultimately, London decided that the NATO framework should be preferred and if it is necessary to occupy Nicosia Airport for emergencies (CAB 128/38/7, pp.3-4).

Returning to the moment when the Soviets were involved in Cyprus, as a result of Makarios' request and the general policy of the Russians (not involved in domestic affairs), the Soviet Union gave a diplomatic note (a soft tone in general) to the Turkish Government. The Soviet point of view was not beyond imperialist juncture/predictions; however, a position that could be opened in the Eastern Mediterranean would not be rejected and will be evaluated. Indeed, Moscow evaluated the international London Conference in this way and made the warning that endangers international peace and security (Aziz, 1969a). Shortly before the conference was closed ("Londra konferansı bitti," 1964, p.1; "Kıbrıs'ta NATO birliği," 1964, p.1), the actual figure for the guarantor states and the US, which agreed on NATO military strength, was 4,000. Although an *"Allied Force"* or *"NATO Peacekeeping Force"* of 10,000 men was considered, the consent of the American administration could only be understood within a limited period of 3 months (CAB 128/38/8, pp.3-4). In the final analysis, with the diplomatic note of Khrushchev dated 7 February 1964, the Soviet Union officially appeared in the political theatre on Cyprus. The issue discussed throughout February brings Makarios closer to Moscow. ("Kıbrıs'a Rus uçak," 1964, p.1; "Rusya Makariosa askeri," 1964, p.1). In the end, Makarios was able to move the matter from the NATO framework to the UN, and it was decided by the UN Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 to send UN Peace Force (UNSCR 186, 1964). As a mediator, Dr. August Lindt (a Swiss and a former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) considered (CAB 128/38/19, p.4), but M. Sakari Tuomioja (former Finnish minister) appointed (CAB 128/38/20, pp.3-4).

The de-Stalinization policy of the Soviets has captured the potential for rapprochement with Non-Align states with the abandonment of the two camps thesis (Allison, 1988, p.9). Cyprus and Moscow benefiting from this intersection became potential allies to each other. The intra-NATO separation

in the first half of 1964 (e.g., France was on the Greek side) was cooling the Turkish-US relations due to lack of unity. In June 1964, the US President Johnson sent a message[44] to the US ambassador in Turkey, Raymond Hare, to be delivered to the Turkish Prime Minister İsmet Inönü, in response to the possibility of Ankara making an operation on the island ("Makarios'a nota verdik," 1964, p.1). This letter changed the direction of Turkish-American relations, (or even more explicitly) has upset Turkish-American relations. Whereas the Minister without Portfolio (Lord Carrington) and the Commonwealth Secretary Duncan Sandy's made a statement to the Cabinet as:

> The Commonwealth Secretary said that the United States Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Ball, had made no reference in his recent discussions in London to the possibility that the United States Sixth Fleet should intervene in order to prevent a Turkish invasion of Cyprus (CAB 128/38/31, p.3).

Regarding the increase in the number of Greek forces by June 1964, NATO was only able to issue a condemnation declaration (CAB 128/38/38, p.4). Talks held in Washington on June 22-24, 1964 laid the groundwork for a conference to be held in Geneva ("Cenevre görüşmelerinde ümit," 1964, p.1). While, British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home provided the Cabinet with the following information:

> The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet that it had emerged from the discussions which he and the Foreign Secretary had just concluded with the Prime Minister of Greece, M. Papandreou, that the Greek Government favoured a solution of the problem of Cyprus by means of Enosis, coupled with an arrangement whereby the settlement would be in some sense guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In return they would be prepared to cede to Turkey a

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[44] The message was first hidden from the public, and after a break of nearly a year and a half, it was published as a full text in Hürriyet newspaper on 13 January 1966. Thus, this event has passed into history as the famous *"Johnson Letter"*.

small island off the Turkish coast. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, were showing increasing interest in a solution based on a partition of Cyprus, whereby they would exercise sovereignty over an area in the north-east of the Island (CAB 128/38/41, p.5).

Makarios and Athens rejected the Acheson Plan due to the base to be given to Turkey were quite large (also called Taksim) ("Makarios, B.M.e başvuracak," 1964, p.1). Meanwhile, Archbishop Makarios evaluated the chances of the change posed by the Acheson Plan as an opportunity. Upon this, Makarios applied to the UN to put the problem on to the 10th General Assembly agenda. In fact, even this is a significant achievement in diplomatic terms for Makarios. The Acheson Plan (NATO Plan) was offering the Taksim among the three guarantors. On the same days, it was stated that there could be new developments in Turkish-Russian relations ("Türk-Rus münasebetlerinde yeni gelişme," 1964, p.1), while on the other hand, America bombed the north of Vietnam ("Amerikan uçakları dün Kuzey Vietnamı bombaladı," 1964, p.1). Almost the same week, Turkey conducted a military operation in Kokkina (Erenköy) on 8-9 August, following an operation in the Dillirga region under the command of General Grivas.

Moscow declared that it would help defend Cyprus in the face of any occupation in Cyprus and that it would not stand by ("Makarios'a Rusya yardım," 1964, p.1). As the Geneva talks continue, Makarios reveals his Moscow card and corners Athens as well ("Kıbrıs'ın Rusya'ya kayışı" 1964, p.1). In the name of national unity, Greece stands by Makarios and rejects the Second Acheson Plan ("'Acheson Planı' reddediliyor," 1964, p.1). Stuck on the edge, Makarios expands his politics by opening new playing tracks for himself. Greece's pro-Enosis strict attitude now threatens the existence of the Republic of Cyprus.

In this respect, Makarios is not satisfied with this either, and after Moscow and Athens, he also mobilizes the NAM. Also, to further strengthen his position, he makes an arms deal with Nasser first, which would provoke the Americans from the very beginning. ("Makarios flies in," 1964, p.4). Nasser

explicitly declares his support to Makarios and that foreign interventions are unacceptable. Following the Cairo conference in October, the following statement is made regarding Cyprus:

> Concerned by the situation existing with regard to Cyprus, the Conference calls upon all states in conformity with their obligations under ths Charter of the United Nations, and in particular under Article 2, paragraph 4, to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and to refrain from any threat or use of force or intervention directed against Cyprus and from any efforts to impose upon Cyprus unjust solutions unacceptable to the people of Cyprus.
>
> Cyrpus, as an equal member of the United Nations, is entitled to and should enjoy unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence, and allowing its people to determine freely, and without any foreign intervention or interference, the political future of the country, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. (NAC-II/HEADS/5, 1964, p.18).

On the other hand, the basic principles adopted by NAM on international relations were sovereign equality, non-interference and respect for sovereignty. In addition to peaceful coexistence, the central NAM ideas included international solidarity against imperialism and neo-colonialism (Mortimer, 1984). After Nasser's public support, in the name of post-conference solidarity, the President of Yugoslavia Tito visits Nicosia. He addresses the public in Nicosia and publishes a joint-communique with Makarios (Kıralp, 2019, p.373). Hence, NAM had many convenient reasons to support the cause of Makarios ("Tarafsızlar Kıbrıs bağımsızlığına," 1964, p.1).

4.1.3 Middle East

The 1954-1959 period discussed in the first part of the thesis represented difficult times for London but then shrank as much as possible in the region (economic expenses were reduced and colony-driven political dependence

was over). This section will focus mainly on the region with the period 1959-1964 along with Egyptian leader Nasser and his multifaceted politics. Nasser and Makarios, who were among the leaders of the Non-Align Movement, pursued very active politics during this period. They proceeded policies that were mutually supportive of each other and were opposed to Anglo-American politics in the region.

The Suez Crisis that took place in late 1956 brought a new phenomenon to world politics: *"To flourish between the forces of America and the Soviets"*. In this sense, the Nasser factor has been the inspiration for many new cases. The Suez crisis had significant consequences for all those involved in the conflict. Egypt's military defeat (hard to believe but) turned into a political victory for Nasser and emerged as an Egyptian and Pan-Arab hero. In the face of the two imperial powers, the US and the Soviet Union had defended Egypt's sovereignty. Among the Arab nations, the prestige of the Soviets peaked, and this prestige was further accelerated when they sent arms to Egypt (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp.311-313).

The climate changed in the region after the Suez Crisis (debacle). The Cyprus administration was prepared quickly for the transfer to the Republic. The event was completed through negotiations within NATO (albeit painfully) and quickly in Zurich and London. The Soviets found the appropriate ground within the NAM in their search for allies against the containment politics carried out against them. The Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) promised economic and military aid to countries that resisted communism and also authorized the deployment of U.S. troops to maintain the independence of Middle Eastern states. In this context, with the year 1958, Soviets went to meet financial and military needs of Egypt (Dawisha, 1975, p.421, 431). In this respect, two factors prevented the development of US-Egypt relations: First, Nasser's opposition to joining Egypt into the Western alliance and his approval of Soviet military assistance; second, Nasser was an advocate of the Arabs against Israel, while the US had absolute support for Israel. Thereafter, any kind of politics that would be incorporated into Nasser's politics in the Middle East would be evaluated in this way.

With great hope, the United Arab Republic was established under Nasser's leadership, along with Syria. However, Egypt's corrupt bureaucracy had enough influence in Syria to cause a coup. In the meantime, it has to add Nasser's policy of systematic dysfunctionalization. Syrian rulers are systematically transferred to Cairo (so-called headquarters) and Egypt rulers are appointed to replace them. Syria's traditional politics and the economy then fall into a difficult situation and soon they realize that they have joined a very central, autocratic military dictatorship (Palmer, 1966). This contradictory and identity-imposing politics ultimately ended with the coup of the military. Perhaps the path to Syria's real identity has been opened up after this attempt at unity. However, Nasser's politics were very aggressive and proactive at first. In order to eliminate the threat of Nasser, King Hussein of Jordan made a military alliance with King Faisal II of Iraq (February 1958). However, Iraqi officers overthrew the King in a military coup in July 1958. The next day, U.S. Marines and British special-forces landed in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, to protect the two countries from falling to pro-Nasser forces. While there is a 'union' within the aims of the revolution, they realize that their goal cannot be achieved and they retreat. In 1958, Syria (with a two-star flag) and Iraq (with a three-star flag) were tried and failed again as a result of General Qasim's overthrow in a coup (February 1963). In this case, unity for Nasser's Pan-Arabism, or Ba'athism, has become a slogan that will live on in dreams (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p.329).

In June 1961, it is important that the President of the Republic of Cyprus and Archbishop of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Makarios, went to Egypt to visit Nasser for his first foreign state visit with an official invitation. This opened door was the sphere of inter-block politics. They had difficulties as well as immunity. The Nasser phenomenon, which was tested due to the Suez Crisis, was also an inspiration for Makarios: *"A possibility to flourish"*. Soon after the door opened, other welcoming leaders also declared their support for Makarios. Shortly afterwards, in September 1961, Makarios attended the summit conference of the Non-Aligned States in Belgrade, led by Tito, Nasser and Nehru. Setting a proactive line of politics, Makarios raises the issue of separated Germany at the conference and points out his

opposition to the segregated state model. The momentum it has caught helps to open the gates of Europe, and the first European invitation becomes Bonn (Federal Germany) in May 1962 and a week later to Washington to visit President Kennedy (Stanley, 1981, p.158). He was able to manage his crises wisely. He was using the West for economic aid and the Third World for his own security.

4.1.4 Policies of "motherlands" (Greece and Turkey) on Cyprus

The internationalized Cyprus problem, which started at the UN in 1954, continues its passion for Enosis with Greece through EOKA on the island in 1955. Towards the end of 1956, Turkey found the politics of Taksim in front of it. The agreement, which was initiated in Zürich in February 1959, is signed in London in the same month. In this case, the shared and restricted republic (the mortgaged republic or in Xydis term 'reluctant republic') has the chance to live, while the two national faiths declare and accept their defeat. It was a designed partnership and a constitution was created based on a ratio of 70% (Greek Cypriots) to 30% (Turkish Cypriots). Besides, three guarantor countries could be stationed on the island as military quota holders, while the third guarantor (UK) had two bases at 99 square miles.

The Zurich agreements are a result of the US' permanent seizure of the event on behalf of NATO and prioritizing its permanent interests, and negotiations between Turkey and Greece. In Zurich, Karamanlis and Menderes initialled the agreement, while in London, Archbishop Makarios on behalf of the Greek Cypriots, and Dr. Fazıl Küçük on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots signed the treaty. The republic that was created was in line with the geopolitical interests of the US. This agreement was a distinct indication of US hegemony in the region and became part of extensive geopolitical planning. The idea of a limited republic has put Cyprus, which emerged from the British colony, under Turkish-Greek patronage (Druşotis, 2008, p.1-3). In this context, the three treaties that are the main backbone of the republic: the 'Treaty of Establishment', the 'Treaty of Guarantee' and the 'Treaty of Alliance' are guaranteed by the signature of the parties.

With the Treaty of Guarantee, the Republic of Cyprus committed to ensure the protection of its independence and territorial integrity and to prohibit all acts that tend to encourage the unification or partition of the island. Moreover, Greece, Britain and Turkey also committed themselves to the task of ensuring that the island's independence and territorial integrity were maintained (Nedjatigil, 1977, p.58; Ertegün, 1977, pp.36-40). Moreover, the Treaty of Alliance gave way to the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey to cooperate for the common defence and pledged cooperation against any attack or aggression. According to this alliance, a triple headquarters, consisting of 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops, would be established in Cyprus. Also, the Treaty of Guarantee with additional substances will be added to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the British gave the promise to respect the integrity of the sovereign bases.

In the light of the above information, the following interpretations can be made:

i. This republic is quasi-independent, quasi-sovereign and doomed under the rule of basic treaties. The compromise reached was between Macmillan's offer (tridominium) and Makarios' demands for independence.

ii. Under the rule of basic agreements, this republic has given constitutional assurances to represent the specific strategic interests of Britain, Greece and Turkey (Joseph, 2009, p.381).

iii. Under the rule of basic agreements, this republic has had to be an extension of NATO, which reflects the "Gentlemen's Agreements" of Karamanlis and Menderes.

iv. By this republic structure, it would have a dual state structure (a functional federation rather than a regional one), in terms of executive and legislative powers as well as central and communal authorities.

v. The constructed dual (communal) economic structure, despite separate communal budgets, taxation and cooperatives, still built a single space based on the single currency and forced it into practice.

In view of these conditions, it is useful to make a reckoning on behalf of the parties without going further. It was the end of a very painful process for London and the empire with the transfer of power (the shift of hegemony in the region) and decolonization that has been going on since the WW II. London eventually asked for and received the bases. In return, gets rid of the issue with economic and political relief. London did all this in exchange for the sovereignty of Cyprus, which is impossible to hold.

In the name of Greece, historically the birth of the national-state, its expansion in the region, then the policy of not intervening, after turned to Enosis, later raised the self-determination (springboard to Enosis), and the acceptance of independence. With this assumption, Athens was free from alienating the US and NATO, from a possible military adventure with Turkey, and its destabilizing effects on domestic policy. Athens only waived the Enosis dream and gained a promising position for the future with the advantage of the majority on the island.

The issue for Turkey in 1878 had already been shipped to the refrigerator. Imagine an empire that is in the grip of sharing by the West, an Ankara that is grappling with issues of nationalism and has lost even the Dodecanese to Greece. At first, there was a non-involvement in the matter, then take back [iade] or to retake [*istirdat*], then Partition, and finally the acceptance of independence in exchange for a military presence. Ankara acquired all this by waiving the idea of Taksim. In return, has gained a right to speak on the island. It has freed from its destabilizing effects on domestic policy and alienation with the US and NATO, which also apply to Athens.

The issue for the Greek Cypriots on the island was the Pan-Hellenic Enosis movement. The prospect was to unite (Enosis) with the Motherland like other islands. The ideal of independence, which was destroyed in the Asia Minor disaster and resurrected after the WW II, was actually the way to Enosis. The best prospect for Turkish Cypriots was minority status. Independence (which was thought of as the path to Enosis), in contrast to gaining the majority advantage, by giving up the enosis ideal, quasi-independent, quasi-freedom,

with the Turkish Cypriots in the political equation, Turkey's guarantor rights and military presence in return for concessions. It is obvious that there is a provoking equation in terms of won and lost.

Finally, for the Turkish Cypriots, the historical journey began as an Ottoman successor, remained outside the borders of Misak-ı Millî [National Oath] and turn from the dominant nation [Millet-i hâkime] to an ordinary minority. In this context, they were first under Enosis pressure and demanded a broad authority [muhtariyet] by standing next to the British or stuck next to the British, and later adopted the politics of extradition to Turkey, and finally Taksim. As a consequence, they have managed to secure political equality and autonomy, as well as Turkey's guarantor title, through the Zurich and London agreements. At the end of the day, the only thing left out was Taksim.

Given that sense, the two sides who lost in this matter are [clearly] grinning. They are Greek Cypriots who have back down the idea of Enosis (Stefanidis, 2001, pp.26-28) and Turkish Cypriots who have back down the idea of Partition (Fırat, 1997, pp.68–73). For the nationalists who failed to fulfill their promises, there was a very suitable ground and that meant enough dynamite to bring down the Republic of Cyprus. On the road to 21 December 1963, the Zurich and London Agreements were deemed sufficient and called the ultimate stop. However, it would soon be understood that this was not the case [albeit painfully]. Nor it should be forgotten that the American administration that gradually replaced the British in the Eastern Mediterranean basin. There was no alternative for the American administration to replace the idea of a republic. Also, Turkey's 1960 coup d'état administration and Inönü governments were supporters of the continuation of the republic. Likewise, until the summer of 1963, Greece (Karamanlis governments) is also known to have been a supporter (Kızılyürek, 2007, p.103). In light of the above interpretations, it can be better understood how the coming years are approaching and what can be experienced.

On the eve of the London Agreement in February 1959, the plane crash near Gatwick Airport made Menderes a hero (Zürcher, 2017, p.242) like Nasser, who survived the assassination. Both were on their shoulders, and almost everyone had forgotten all the political and economic challenges that had happened. Just before the accident, the first signal on the road approaching the end for the Democrat Party (DP) power was the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [Republican People's Party] CHP's First Goals Declaration [*İlk Hedefler Beyanamesi*] and united all opposition sides ("İnönü taahhüdü tekrarladı," 1959, p.1). The establishment of the "Commission of Inquiry" [*Tahkikat Komisyonu*], which was created with 15 DP members in TBMM, was one of the last drops. When the Republic of Cyprus was declared on August 16, 1960, the coup d'état administration in Turkey was already in charge. The May 27 coup d'état toppled the DP government and temporarily replaced it by the National Unity Committee [*Millî Birlik Komitesi* – MBK or NUC] led by former Commander of the Land Forces General Cemal Gürsel (Zürcher, 2017, p.244). Major-General Cemal Madanoğlu was the controller of the committee. Just because he is a two-star general, he brought four stars General Gürsel from İzmir in order to maintain balance. Gürsel knew the story, but he was outside the committee. The staff of the coup was composed of junior officers, just like the 'Free Officers' of Egypt.

It can be considered as a moment of change, which is also valid for Cyprus. The politics that could not produce a solution became subject to İsmet Inönü and remained in a demanding position to find a solution between the soldier and the civilian. For this reason, they prepared the ground for İnönü in the political arena. This rising position of İnönü has elevated him to a decisive position in domestic, foreign and Cypriot politics. Meanwhile, a big movement of the purge has begun. As a reaction to these experiences, Retired Revolutionary Officers Association [*Emekli İnkılap Subaylar Derneği*] was founded by 235 generals ("Ordu gençleşti," 1960, p.1) and about 5,000 officers who were retired by the military purge movement after the May 27 coup. It was briefly called *"EMINSU"*. Law No. 42 of 2 August 1960 and Law No. 114 of 27 October were published by NUC. The rationale for this law included the rejuvenation of army officers, prevention of rank inflation,

elimination of troop basis surplus, and re-establishment of the pyramid in the army (Özdemir, 1995, pp.199-201; Zürcher, 2017, pp.245-246).

There was no unity of political purpose among the cadre of officers who seized power after the May 27 coup and formed the NUC. In the following days, different factions within the junta began to appear. In 1960 they were thinking about Cemal Gürsel as General Naguib and Alparslan Türkeş as Colonel Nasser. While the young radicals group (the group called the 14's of the coup) identified with Colonel Alparslan Türkeş, they supported long-term military administration, which adopted the top-down reform methodology. On the other hand, the coup leaders of the advanced age were the supporters of the rapid establishment of the parliamentary system alongside İnönü (Zürcher, 2017, p.246). General Cemal [*Aga*] retired these 14's from the Turkish Armed Forces and sent them to exile abroad on various missions. On this occasion, in December 1960, a new two-chamber system was established by Law No. 157. The first is the Constituent Assembly [*Kurucu Meclis*] and the other is the House of Representatives [*Temsilciler Meclisi*] (1924 tarih ve 491 sayılı, 1960, p. 2766).

In January 1961, the work of the Constituent Assembly began and 74 out of 262 quotas were given to parties, 49 were designated as CHP and 25 CKMP. The junta had taken a clear stance in favor of Ismet Inönü. At this stage, new parties were established (in the early months of the new year—1961). The Justice Party (JP) [Adalet Partisi] (successor to the DP) and Yeni Türkiye Partisi (YTP) [New Turkey Party] have completed their formation for a right-wing policy approach. In response to possible misbehaviour, like what happened to the DP, retired General Ragip Gümüşpala was elected as the party chairman. On the other hand, the Workers' Party of Turkey (Mehmet Ali Aybar) was established with a philosophy that exceeds the Kemalist understanding of the CHP mentality within the left politics. This era would be remembered as a time of broad social rights and freedoms. A stronger administrative bureaucracy and judiciary were designed in exchange for a weaker executive with the poor legacy of 10 years of DP power (Zürcher, 2017, pp.252-253).

A week after Menderes was hanged, the squares filled up again for politics as if nothing had happened. The MBK and its president, Cemal Gürsel, who came to power with the coup, supported the "yes" vote. CHP and Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (CKMP) [Republican Peasant Nation Party], which supported the coup, also made "yes" propaganda. YTP, one of the parties representing the closed DP tradition, also defended the "yes" vote. The AP, which comes from the same tradition, initially left the precise approval of the constitution to the discretion of the nation ("Tüzüğümüz ile anayasamız," 1961, p.1), but made "yes" propaganda in the face of heavy criticism ("Üç lider anayasa," 1961, p.1). The prepared constitution was presented to the people's vote on 9 July 1961. With a result that will be considered as a surprise, 61,7 per cent voted "yes" and 38,3 per cent voted "no" (Hamsici, 2017) and the Assembly approved October 15, 1961, for the election of MPs and Senate.

The May 27 revolution has irrevocably and dramatically changed both the architecture and engineering of the political history of Turkey. After the referendum, the junta still held power. The government had not been formed and the president had not yet been elected. Menderes' execution and the election campaigns that started immediately after seemed very bright for the CHP and İnönü. However, the result of the elections held on 15 October 1961 did not reflect this. In Birand's words:

> "The MBK was ostensibly in power, but it had exhausted its power. Now the main force was the second group known as the Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği (SKB) [Armed Forces Union], which was headed by The Chairman of the General Staff, Cevdet Sunay, as honorary president. And as a third group, there was the Colonels' junta [never on the account]. The leader of the junta was Colonel Talat Aydemir, commander of the Military Academy. In response to the generals' policy of taking the CHP as an axis, Aydemir and his colonels did not trust İnonu [...] here in the barracks, the view was so complex" (Birand, 2017).

The outcome of the elections did not achieve the desired results from the ballot box ("Hiçbir parti mutlak," 1961, p.1) and the military was 'very' uneasy about this situation. The three parties (AP, CKMP and YTP), which claim to be a successor of the DP, managed to get almost 62% of the vote and the assembly ("YSK", n.d.).[45] The SKB, which began to be as influential within the army as the MBK, argued that the elections did not fully reflect the national will and that a new coup was needed. The Istanbul wing of the junta had already signed a statement under the name "21 Ekim Protokolü" [October 21 Protocol]: "the situation will be seized if necessary". The statement was then sent to Ankara and quickly signed by the Ankara wing (Colonel Talat Aydemir). İsmet İnönü invented the "Çankaya Protokolü" [Çankaya Protokol][46] formula in order to find a solution between the army and civilians and sought consensus for "coup or democracy". With the protocol signed, General Cemal Gürsel will be the only candidate (Prof. Dr. Ali Fuat Başgil's candidacy will end), loyalty to Atatürk revolutions, loyalty to the May 27 revolutions, Yassıada decisions will not be abused and reactionaries would not be allowed. Leaving the protocol was a statement that a second coup would be accepted in advance, which would be legitimate ("Ordu, duruma müdahale," 1961, pp.1-5; Birand, 2017). The 12th period of the Turkish Grand National Assembly gathered on 25 October 1961 heralded that the military regime was over. The developments have not strengthened democracy; they have created a more fragile and guided democracy under the supervision of the military.

The year 1962 continued with the account leftover from the 27 May coup d'état. The end of the military junta ensured that the MBK completed its work and became legalized (Cemal Gürsel became president and members of the

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[45] In this sense, the most striking comment came from Birand: "Süngü ile gidenler sandıkla geri geliyorlardı, Menderes'in geceleri beyaz bir atın üzerinde bir evliya gibi dolaştığı yolunda yayılan efsaneler, silahlı güçten daha etkili oluyordu" (Birand, 2017).

[46] Joint Declaration between the Government and the Parties [*Hükümet ve Partiler arası Müşterek Beyanname*] was signed in Çankaya on 24 October 1961 and the so-called *"Second Republic"* started with the term of those days.

MBK became senators for life), but the young Colonels within the SKB were still more insistent on military rule. The operation, which started on the night of February 22nd with the "February 9 Protocol", is suppressed against the morning after wrong moves. This coup attempt, which did not take place within the hierarchical chain of the army, ended with failure ("Hareket bastırıldı," 1962, p.1; Birand, 2017; Zürcher, 2017, p.247). As a retired colonel, Talat Aydemir would repeat the same movement on May 20, 1963. In this last replay, he would notice two things. The first was that he wasn't organized like before, and the other was that he was left alone, but it was too late. After the coup attempt, he would be caught, judged, and hung with his friend, Major Fethi Gürcan ("T. Aydemir idam," 1964, p.1).

Although the CHP alone could not provide the majority to be in power from the general elections of 15 October 1961, it would come out as the first party. 24 years later, İnönü was again tasked to form the government as prime minister. During this period, he chaired three different coalition governments (CHP-AP, CHP-YTP-CKMP and CHP-Independents). The first coalition government was designed as a grand coalition at the request of the military junta. The May 30, 1962 coalition came to an end when the AP, reluctantly entering the coalition, insisted on Yassıada prisoners on amnesty ("Başbakan istifa etti," 1962, p.1). The second İnönü government was formed with smaller parties (CHP-YTP-CKMP and some independents), but as a result of the 1963 Turkish local elections held on 17 November 1963, the YTP and CKMP withdrew from the government because their votes had fallen ("İnönü istifasını dün," 1963, p.1). The AP received 45% of the vote, while the CHP's vote was again around 36%. In those days (November 22, 1962), it is necessary to note that world politics was also shaken with the assassination of American President J.F. Kennedy. The crisis of the government lasts throughout December, and Turkey has been caught without a government when the bloody events in Cyprus have begun. As a result, the Third Inönü government was established with the support of independent deputies until the ceasefire was declared, while on the other hand, the Papandreou government resigned on the same day in Greece ("İnönü azınlık hükümeti," 1963; "Yunan hükümeti dün," 1963, p.1).

Greece's situation was in pathetic condition than Turkey. It lacked political stability, and within a decade, seven different politicians (A. Diomidis, I. Theotokis, S. Venizelos, N. Plastiras, D. Kiousopoulos, A. Papagos, K. Georgakopoulos) became prime minister. Despite all the economic and political problems and instability, there was a (moderate) spring mood among the motherlands. Prior to Turkish Foreign Minister Selim Sarper's visit to Athens, the parliamentary negotiations that Prime Minister Karamanlis had experienced due to past events (the "Merten incident" related to Nazi Germany) lasted four days and were successful. This was a sign that politics in Athens (even if it's without a coup) was not inferior from Ankara in political instability ("Yunan başbakanı kendini," 1960, p.1). After the proclamation of the 'common' Republic of Cyprus, the two motherland relations further accelerate. In fact, after the Cyprus issue, Greek Foreign Minister Averoff expressed faith in the benefit of even the minorities in Western Thrace becoming a unifying element rather than an element of conflict, while Sarper stated that anything could lead the two countries to an agreement ("Sarper, görüşmelere dün," 1960, p.1). The message sent by President Cemal Gürsel, to Karamanlis confirms this: "Turkey's friendship with Greece counts as the foundations of its foreign policy". Sarper and Averoff agreed on the issues discussed. These can be addressed briefly under two headings.

i. *World affairs*: the parties agreed on issues such as international tension, disarmament and economic aid. Commitment to NATO, respect for countries in the region for peace and tranquillity in the Balkans, and the Middle East, and reliance on the UN on Africa have been decided.

ii. *Joint matters*: it was agreed that the existence of the Republic of Cyprus should be satisfied and supported jointly. In the matter of minorities, they viewed these communities as an element of unification among the two countries (Kohen, 1960, p.2).

1961 was the year of the election, and Karamanlis delivered his resignation to King Paul for general elections. Based on the Greek executive system, the provisional government (caretaker government) was established and a

retired General Konstantinos Dovas was appointed prime minister. As a result of the elections, the leader of *Ethniki Rizospastiki Enosis* [National Radical Union] (ERE) Karamanlis won the election by a clear margin (50.81%) and no coalition was needed ("Yunan seçimlerini Karamanlis'in," 1961; Caramani, 2000, pp.492-493).

Karamanlis's politics during all these events, with the dream of seeing Greece in Europe, gave results and on 9 July 1961, they signed the Protocols of the Treaty of Association with the European Economic Community (EEC) of Greece. As a result of these developments, Greece's dependence on NATO has also arrived at a crossroads. With this agreement, which entered into force in November 1962, it became the first country to join the community, except for the six-nation. In 1979, with the accession treaty, Greece would become the tenth member of the bloc in 1981 (Hatzis, 2019, pp.1023-1024).

After the 1961 elections, Opposition Leader Papanderu's *Enosi Kentrou* [Centre Union] (EK) and his leftist party Pan-Democratic Agrarian Front (EΔA in 1961 or PAME) launched a destructive opposition movement *ανένδοτος αγών* [unrelenting struggle] ("Muhalefet Karamanlise karşı," 1962, p.3) and claimed that events were taking place in the shadow of "Pericles", a NATO suitor and army-backed plan. As a result of this strife, which lasted until a new and fair election was held, the opposition gained. On top of his troubles with King Paul, Karamanlis, shocked by the murder of Grigoris Lambrakis (a Member of Parliament EDA), did not last any longer and resigned and left Greece (Clogg, 1987, pp.42-44). While presenting his resignation, Prime Minister Karamanlis requested early elections, but this request from the King was rejected. He first appointed Panagiotis Pipinelis as prime minister but was unable to resist Papandreou's opposition. The King continued to insist, this time appointing Stylianos Mavromichalis, the President of the Supreme Court, as an impartial and provisional government ("List of prime ministers of Greece," n.d.). As a result of the general elections held on 3 November 1963, a coalition emerged, but more importantly, Karamanlis's party was defeated and a period for Greek political life was over. As a result of these

uncontrolled work, "*who's governing this country?*" discourse was one of the factors that destroyed him the most. In the 1963 elections, Georgios Papandreou's party EK received 42.04% of the vote (138/300 deputies), while Karamanlis' party ERE received 39.37% (132/300 deputies) (Clogg, 1987, p.44).

On the basis of the above information, which attempts to shed light on how the date of 21 December 1963, was reached, "political instability of the motherlands" was tried to be depicted. Greece, which has achieved peace and political stability since 1952, has given its fruit at the end of the competition with the royal family on the one hand and the opposition on the other, and eventually, Karamanlis had to resign. The neutral government (Pipinelis, the closest friend of Karamanlis), which did not form as a result of the wrong choice of the King, extended the process even further. While all these processes are taking place, it is important to remember that ERE has around 180 seats still exists in the 300-seat *Ελληνικά Κοιοβοίλλολιο* [Voulí ton Ellínon - Parliament of the Hellenes]. These problems indicated that Greek local policy was in stalemate and that the Greek people, who had been living peacefully for some time, were about to be plunged into a new crisis. On the other hand, the situation of Turkey, another motherland, was also deplorable in terms of political stability. Menderes, one of the architects of the Republic of Cyprus, was overthrown by the May 27 coup and his trial was settled by hanging in 1961. The country has rolled in the bottomless well where it was dragged, and the juntas' has become a toy in its hands. Barely an election was made in October, but the junta failed to reach the desired result. Almost all parties except the CHP were equipped with military pensioners (in terms of security) and were trying to run a democracy even though it had fallen. Çankaya (Presidential residence and office) was designated as the address for all kinds of congestion, while civilians handed it over to the military authorities. In this sense, what May 27 has left as a legacy is that the post after the Chief of the General Staff is Çankaya. In short, Ankara and Athens were tired, exhausted and too worn to be able to deal with anyone on the eve of December 21st. In Ankara, despite the minority government (which was very difficult to establish), in Athens, the life

span of all interim governments in the last six months was only 'days'. It is necessary to evaluate the letter of Karamanlis sent to Makarios on 20 December 1963, under this situation and conditions. Karamanlis warns Makarios as if he knew what was going on in mind, and the pro-Enosis radicals, and warns him that a peaceful resolution of the matter (the 13-point constitutional amendment) is essential, otherwise, it could be irreversible (Reddaway, 1986, p.221).

Since the details of the path leading to December 1963 will be given in more details at 4.2 (in domestic politics), here it will be mainly based on the politics exhibited by Ankara and Athens. In this context, the incident that took place in Tahtakala, the Turkish quarter of Nicosia on the night of December 20, ("Kıbrıs'ta kanlı hadiseler," 1963, pp.1, 7, Ker-Lindsay, 2011, p.34) shows us today that, it was perceived as a signal flare and the parties entered their positions. Emin Dirvana (Turkish ambassador in Cyprus-May 27, and beyond, the Inonu government has to continue), who fulfilled Ankara's request to defend the continuation of the Republic of Cyprus, had to withdraw from his post on 12 September 1962. In contrast, the Government of Ankara was forced to change a series of policies in December 1963, approaching the island with security concerns with Greek Cypriots attacks. It would be worth remembering that while going through a difficult process due to the Cyprus crisis, İnönü managed to form a minority government together with 33 independent deputies in the Assembly and secured a vote of no confidence on 4 January 1964 with 225 votes against 175 ("3. İnönü hükümeti," 1964, p.1; Tamçelik, 2019, p.13).

The proposal for a constitutional amendment for the Turkish government should not have been a surprise; it is possible to see it clearly in the American archives. Makarios had made it clear during his meetings with members of the American Embassy ("doc.283," FRUS).[47] But more than anything, this opinion was the best prediction of the future:

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[47] "Telegram 1151 from Athens, May 11, reported that Averoff had suggested that Greece might request revision of the London agreements". (Ibid, POL Cyp–Gr), *FRUS*.

> We conclude Makarios' long-term objective is not union with Greece but rather elimination or neutralization those provisions London–Zurich agreements and constitution which in effect circumscribe sovereignty of Republic. Among these would be most of special guarantees for Turkish community and intervention rights of Guarantor Powers. We assume that his recent statements and in fact all his actions relating to communal matters are designed to carry out this ultimate objective while maintaining his position and strength on island […] We believe a future Cyprus in which two large communities remain at daggers drawn, immobilizing all initiatives for progress, spells nothing but hardship and sorrow for all Cypriots ("doc.278," FRUS).

In the initiatives with the first warmth of the event, there was still a consensus between Ankara and Athens. In Paris, Greek Foreign Minister Venizelos and Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin were able to say, "Greece has agreed with us on this issue". ("Yunanistan Türkiye ile," 1963, p.1). After the meeting held at the General Staff under the chairmanship of İnönü on 23 December 1963, his first mention was as follows: "We talked about the Cyprus issue. It seems that the two communities are sorely provoked against each other. Measures are being considered to ensure calm and to extradite public order in Cyprus" ("Genel Kurmay'da durum," 1963, p.1). When negotiations between the guarantor states failed to yield a result, Turkish jets appeared in the skies over Nicosia, the navy sailed, Turkish Military Units in Nicosia (near Alayköy-Yerolakko) went out of its camp and took positions in the Turkish part of Nicosia (Ortaköy) and Turkish army troops started to pile up near Mersin ("Müdahale ettik," 1963, p.1).

Despite the constructive of Turkish Foreign Affairs and the indifferent stance of Athens, Makarios did not step back. The truth on behalf of the motherlands was, neither Inonu's Ankara nor Karamanlis' Athens did not want a crisis because indirectly, it was giving the Soviets the chance to intervene in regional politics (Şahin & Topbaş, 2016, p.782). It is understood from the telegram sent by American Foreign Minister David Dean Rusk to the Ankara Embassy that America was caught off guard. Despite all the intelligence and

information of the American administration, this is what Rusk said: "All addressees support new British diplomatic initiative as you deem most effective" ("doc.303," FRUS). In this context, initiatives have borne fruit and the American administration has proposed joint military intervention. The intervention would begin under The UK's command and at least with a military presence on the island ("doc.306," FRUS).

The year 1964 began with an attempt by Makarios to unilaterally terminate the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance ("Makarios, garanti anlaşmasını," 1964, p.1). In this context, it enabled the issue to be moved to the UN to prevent the referral of NATO's peacekeeping force. He has benefited from the requirement to sign an agreement between the UN and the "government" of the state. The UN recognized the Makarios government as a legitimate government under the control of the Greek Cypriots and accepted that the Turkish Cypriots were invisible (Fırat, 2008, p.725). The point missed by the Makarios administration has started to reach the de facto phenomenon of Taksim, rather than in the minds ("Türkler adada fiilî," 1964, p.1).

The British Cabinet was personally given a memorandum titled "Cyprus" by Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home (C.P. (64) 2) and began to work with the news that would encourage the Cabinet. "They have, however, repeatedly assured us that they have no intention of taking unilateral action so long as the present tripartite arrangements succeed in maintaining order, and that their fleet movements are of an entirely precautionary nature" (CAB 129/116/2, p.2). The cabinet holds a session with the title "Cyprus" (single subject) and, as a result of the distressing events, organises "another" London Conference (III. Conference - the British plan which was adopted by the parties). Lord Carrington (the minister without portfolio) has been appointed "to seek the concurrence of the Foreign Secretary in arrangements whereby [we] should need" (CAP 128/38/1, pp.3-5). London hopes to create a favourable environment for the Cyprus Conference's opening session on January 15th, and the "quintet meeting" takes place on the scheduled date. However, it is considered that the NATO card will be prepared in the face of the cold stance of the Turkish delegation for the UN roof (CAP 128/38/2, p.3).

At the outset, the Turkish Cypriot leadership (Denktaş) proposes a new form of Taksim: "two separate mukhtar states" ("Denktaş, yeni bir Taksim," 1964, p.1). Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and for the Colonies has presented some new formulas that are considered "the middle way" as a result of long negotiations:

i. Turkish and Greek Cypriots living under the mukhtar administration in separate regions within the same state

ii. Turks' withdrawal from places where they are in the minority to the Turkish region

iii. Increasing the presence of the Turkish regiment on the island ("Londra konferansı tam," 1964, p.7).

Sandy's offer was not accepted, but the Turks made another conciliatory offer. The principles of this proposal are as follows:

i. Establishing a political order based on the majority system

ii. The appointment of an International force for the purpose of ensuring security and public order in Cyprus for a temporary period of time

iii. Giving additional and international guarantees to the Turks within the framework of the constitution (Ibid.).

After all, Sandy arranged the offer in the following figure:

i. During a temporary period to be determined by negotiations, Turks will be given special guarantees that will ensure the safety of life and property.

ii. During this time, the Government of Cyprus will reorganise services such as the police.

iii. The Turks living in the Greek part of the region will be able to migrate to the regions where the Turks are in the majority if they wish. The same will be true for the Greeks ("İngiltere yeni planı," 1964).

After the conference, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said that the situation in Cyprus is not only unstable but also "both parties were showing considerable reluctance to co-operate" (CAP 128/38/6, p.3).

London has requested active assistance from Washington in response to the tougher of conditions and the possible threat from Moscow and said an international force under NATO's name should be formed, but the Makarios government vehemently denied the possibility ("Rumlar Kıbrısta NATO," 1964, p.1). In light of all this information, London has concluded that it would not be wise to apply to the UN. The Makarios government rejects the points that the four sides (the UK, US, Greece and Turkey) have agreed by Clerides (as a representative). In the words of Sami Kohen, the London conference, which was "a mistake even to name the conference", lasted almost 19 days without a meeting, is over ("Türkiye ve Yunanistan," 1964, p.1). In February 1964, before the ongoing negotiations at the UNSC concluded, bilateral relations that were generally tried to be protected were finally injured and the axis shift was observed with Prime Minister Papandreou, who took office after Karamanlis ("Yunanistan başbakanı tehdit," 1964, p.1). The UN Security Council resolution has been registered for Makarios' victory and has become an internationally entitled to immunity.

In April 1964, his secret military agreement with Athens would pave the stones of the road to 15 July 1974, which would bring its end. The agreement would have approved the deployment of around 20,000 Greek troops to the island, in opposition to the 1959 Zurich-London agreements (Kıralp, 2018, p.448). The outcome of 4 March 1964 made the Turkish side suffered a serious injustice. In the taken decisions, the Turkish presence was not taken into consideration and the "Republic of Cyprus"[48], was recognized as the official government. The Cyprus government has now become a self-built entity with decisions taken in absentia (with the principle of necessity). One of the points where it violated international agreements was the established "Cyprus Army".

APPENDIX D: PART 8 - THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC

- ARTICLE 129

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[48] Hereafter, the "Republic of Cyprus", which lacks Turkish Cypriot partners (Akşit & Üstün, 2010, footnote 2).

i. The Republic shall have an army of two thousand men of whom sixty per centum shall be Greeks and forty per centum shall be Turks.

ii. Compulsory military service shall not be instituted except by common agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic (Constituteproject, 2014, p.42).

During the first half of 1964, the island of Cyprus was the scene of armed conflicts everywhere ("Kıbrıs'ta iç savaş," 1964, p.1). Makarios did not hesitate to act 'alone' anymore, and dismissed the Ministers of Agriculture and Health, saying they had neglected their duties, and changes to the cabinet went on track ("Makarios 2 Türk Bakanın," 1964, p.1). Before Makarios' public de-Atinization movement, the political construction of the Republic of Cyprus came. Since the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, which was cancelled unilaterally (an action towards the international arena), was not accepted at the UNSC, and this time it re-started with the help of Prime Minister Papandreou (Bilge, 1996, p.78; "Makarios ittifak anlaşmasını," 1964, p.1). In this sense, after Karamanlis's withdrawal from power in Greece, the Papandreou administration was able to work more harmoniously. Moreover, paths of a more convenient ground for Moscow have been opened.

The island has begun receiving troops from the Greek mainland, except for the Guarantee and Alliance Agreement. In line with the decision reached by the Papandreou and Makarios duo, a new defence structure was launched. The system in which the Greek Cypriots were mostly soldiers and the Greek were commanders was, in fact, a system that also applies to the Turkish Cypriots. In particular, the TMT organization, which completed its formation in 1958, was organized within this logic. By June 1964, Greek forces had reached 20,000. From 21 December 1963 to April 1964, Ankara's expectation that "hopes will surely get better" has now started to reverse. Ankara's patience was exhausted when the military presence on the island was no longer hidden. Ankara announces the intervention decision to the American administration and requests to make case judgments ("doc.51,"

FRUS; "doc.53," FRUS). The expected letter came from the President. The style was not good at all, and Ankara was left alone, just like the English Cabinet preparing for war in Suez (1956):

> I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies [...] I wish also, Mr. Prime Minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the Agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your Government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished. Your Government has on several occasions acknowledged to the United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances. [...] Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligated to call to your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the Island of Cyprus ("doc.54," FRUS).

This letter would not be noted well in Turkish political history as the "*Johnson letter*"[49] because it did not contain the response Ankara had been waiting for, and the President will be announced in consultation with a special message as it was reflected in the newspapers while preparing for military intervention ("İnönü Amerikaya dâvet," 1964, p.1). Ankara had stopped the intervention on one condition: "Governmet of Turkey agrees forego intervention on condition we take active interest in seeking solution" ("doc.55," FRUS). In this context, America's methodology of thinking was not different from the way of

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[49] The letter was released by the White House in January 1966 and printed in *Middle East Journal, 20* (1966), pp. 386–393 ("doc.54," FRUS).

behaviour in 'Suez' issue. In order to prevent Moscow from infiltrating NATO's southern flank, the American administration realized that it had to take over, and any misfortune could upset the inter-NATO balance (Kıralp, 2018, p.449).

President Johnson was severely distressed and wanted Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to sit down and talk with Turkish Prime Minister İnönü. Prior to İnönü's visit to Washington, he would personally tell to the Greek Ambassador Alexander Matsas against his face: "I have only a temporary hold-off. What we want is for your Prime Minister to sit down with the Turkish Prime Minister and work out an agreement. Our people are getting terribly worried" ("doc.62," FRUS). Meanwhile, President Johnson appointed Dean Acheson[50] for high-level negotiations ("doc.70," FRUS; Brands, 1987). Among the Turkish-American delegations in Washington, there was agreement on the following points:

> Summary: The conversation confirmed agreement on the following points:
>
>   i.   Provided the Greek Government also agreed, Turkey would participate in secret talks with the Greeks and Mr. Acheson directed toward agreement on a final and permanent solution of the Cyprus dispute.
>
>   ii.   These talks should begin at Camp David promptly after July 4th.
>
>   iii.   The Turkish representative would be Dr. Nihat Erim. (Dr. Erim remarked that he was scheduled to come to the United States later this summer on a leader grant and that this could be given as the reason for his return here when he came for the talks.)
>
>   iv.   In the meantime, the United States would do its best to assist in assuring the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot refugees ("doc.73," FRUS).

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[50] "The American representative was Dean Acheson, the former secretary of state and a figure who, because of his role in formulating the Truman Doctrine in 1947, was thought by Johnson to have some residual prestige in Greece and Turkey" (Brand, 1987, p.356). A presidential mediator for Cyprus (June-September 1964).

In the joint negotiations between Dean Acheson and Under Secretary of State George W. Ball, Ankara preferred to be the party seeking an agreement, while Athens sought to avoid escaping the negotiations. Makarios, who made efforts to narrow Athens' manoeuvre area under all conditions, has always tried to keep Athens under its hegemony with the rhetoric that "the Cyprus issue is a case of Pan Hellenism". He has requested an effort from Athens to move the issue from NATO to the UN solution area. ("Makarios Atina'da," 1964, p.1).

Acheson Plan I

In return for Turkish agreement to the union of Cyprus with Greece, Greece would make certain concessions to Turkey along the lines suggested below:

i.   To give Turkey assurance that its security would not be threatened from Cyprus.
     a. This area would be used by Turkey as a military base with full rights to deploy ground, air and naval forces therein.
     b. The area should be fairly substantial in size, [and] large enough.
     c. It seemed that a logical location for the base area might be the Karpas Peninsula.
ii. Special arrangements should be made for the protection and welfare of those Turkish Cypriots who would not be included within the area of the Turkish sovereign base. These were outlined as follows:
     a. There might be one, two or three relatively small areas of the Island in which Turkish-Cypriots would be in the majority or very nearly so and which could be treated as separate geographical units for administrative purposes within the general governmental structure of the whole Island.
     b. In all the rest of the Island, where Turkish-Cypriots would necessarily continue to be a relatively small minority of the population, a different arrangement could be made.

c. The Turkish-Cypriots would necessarily have to be citizens of whatever central authority was in control of the Island.

d. As a special safeguard in addition… there should be an international commissioner or commission, perhaps appointed by the UN or the International Court of Justice, who or which could be physically present on the island and charged with watching over the observations of the special status and rights of the Turkish Cypriots.

e. The island of Kastellorizo to be ceded to Turkey (cyprus-forum.com, 2008; hellenicantidote, 2018).

The first Acheson Plan, which was written above, presented a plan to unite (Enosis) Cyprus with Greece. In return for accepting it, Turkey would get a sovereign military base on the island. Makarios rejected the proposal, stating that giving land to Turkey would be a limitation on Enosis and that it would give Ankara a very strong word in the internal affairs of the island ("Makarios hiç bir," 1964, p.1). At this point, it should be emphasized that; it was only 5% of what was envisaged for Turkey on the island (Kıralp, 2018, p.449).

The actors (Makarios and Grivas), who sought to gain an international dimension by either breaking out of the clamp of Acheson's plan or sabotaging Greece, were to continue their manoeuvres in the field. In this sense, military activity had already begun in the Erenköy [Kokkina] region, which acts as a bridge for Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. Signals from the region since April have finally been justified. On 5 August 1964, it was understood that a much greater preparation was behind an operation on small fishing boats. Kokkina was besieged by Greek Cypriot forces (by land and sea). The targets were bombed by 64 jet aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Force, blocking the advance of the Greek army ("Jetlerimiz Kıbrıs'ta uçtu," 1964, p.1; "Jetlerimiz Kıbrıs'ta askeri," 1964, p.1; "Kıbrıs'a asker ve silah," 1964, p.1). President Johnson's administration assumed there would be no bombing, but it went beyond expected, and that meant ringing alarm bells for Washington. Washington has ruled that hard times have given to the Turks and attributed its strategy to Athens calming down and Makarios declaring a

ceasefire. With diplomacy conducted by President Johnson himself, their situation was calmed before Moscow intervened ("doc.104 to doc.119," FRUS). All these developments had been a matter of gains for Makarios, and have been greatly supported by NAM, Moscow and AKEL (Hasgüler, 2007, s. 156; Fırat, 2008, pp. 726-732). The accelerated negotiations after the Kokkina War produced the second version of the Acheson Plan:

Acheson Plan II

   i.   The Turkish base area simply be leased to Turkey for an agreed period of years - 50 was suggested as reasonable - instead of being ceded as sovereign Turkish territory.

   ii. The boundary of the base area on the Karpas Peninsula would be a line drawn north and south just west of the village of Komi Kebir (thus reducing the area considerably).

   iii. The special provisions and guarantees for the Turkish Cypriots would be modified from those in Acheson Plan I to eliminate the special areas containing a Turkish Cypriot majority which would have been treated under the first plan as moderate administrative units.

   iv. Instead of the central Turkish Cypriot administration in Nicosia which was proposed in Acheson Plan I, there would be a high official in the central government of Cyprus, under the chief Greek administrator, who would be provided with a staff and would be charged with looking after the rights and welfare of all Turkish Cypriots.

   v.   The special guarantees or minority rights envisaged in the first plan, such as those provided by the Treaty of Lausanne and the European Convention on Human Rights, would be retained.

   vi. Similarly, the proposed International Commissioner appointed by the UN would be part of the second plan as of the first (cyprus-forum.com, 2008; hellenicantidote, 2018).

While only Ankara was warmly interested in the first version of the plan, but this time Ankara was standing distant too. The second version, with time and

space constraints, was found unacceptable by Athens and Makarios under any circumstances. After several more attempts were made to reach an agreement, the US eventually had to abandon its efforts. Very disappointed Ankara would now decide to drive the Moscow card into the game. Turkish-Soviet relations were beginning to gain momentum both economically and politically in an environment where Turkish-American relations were being questioned (Aziz, 1969a, 1969b; Bolukbasi, 1988; "Kruşçev'den Makarios'a baskı," 1964; "Erkin, Moskova'da," 1964, p.1; "'Johnson, Amerikaya Türkiyeyi kaybettirdi'" 1964, p.1). In line with the approach of the USSR described in detail in 4.1.2 above, the expected position for Moscow has been opened. The Moscow administration, which favours the independence of nations, has announced that the Soviets will not stand by if there is an armed intervention in Cyprus ("Makarios'a Rusya yardım," 1964). Greek Foreign Minister Kostopoulos was also able to express his discomfort with Makarios' application for Russian aid ("Rus yardımından endişeliyiz," 1964, p.7). On the other hand, it was revealed that Makarios was the one who sabotaged American policy. The second version of the Acheson plan, clearly written above, has been rejected by all parties ("'Acheson Planı' reddediliyor," 1964, p.1). September 1964 was among the threats of reciprocal war in the motherlands. There was a strange time, where the army command levels were gathered, the navies (at least in newspaper headlines) were opened to the Mediterranean or the Aegean sea, the Councils of Ministers gathered with plenty of focus on Cyprus, where blood flows like a stream, an experiencing hunger, misery, and migration brutally.

4.2   The Domestic Politics

It is a time frame where many complex issues, such as the Akritas, 13 articles, Temporary Phase Plan [*Geçici Merhale Planı*], the killing of journalists, Denktaş-Dirvana fight, Makarios-Karamanlis and Papandreou relations, UN's arrival, UN's decisions have occurred. It is observed that local politics was more active in the period 1959-1964, compared to 1954-1959, and it is understood that it determined the politics of Cyprus. It can be argued that during this period, the main actor was Makarios III, the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the Archbishop of the Cyprus Orthodox Church.

However, it is seen that one of the prominent members of EOKA, Polycarpos Georkadjis, while he was the interior minister, and Grivas, who came to the island again in 1964. On behalf of the Turkish Cypriot side, with the establishment of the TMT, Dr Küçük's political position began to decline and was replaced by the figure of Rauf Denktaş (one of the founders of the TMT) as chairman of the Turkish Community Executive Committee. In this sense, this period in which local politics prevails/preponderate over foreign politics is always worth reading.

4.2.1 The Domestic Nationalisms and Nationalist Actors' Policies on Cyprus

After WW II, the motherlands had made a fateful union with the Truman Doctrine in the NATO alliance. In 1954, when Greece took the issue under the umbrella of the UN and demanded "self-determination" on behalf of the island people, the climate changed and the issue became international. London wanted to meet the demand for Enosis, primarily by granting autonomy to Cyprus. The aim was to involve the people of the island in internal administration, but Greek Cypriots found it insufficient. London's efforts to give autonomy to the people of the island, truly worked for Turkish society, and the existence of the community has been documented. For example, the bill of Lord Vinster, the governor of Cyprus, envisioned the representation (by-elections) of the Turkish community in the Legislative and Executive Council. Likewise, in the Lord Radcliffe bill, a more developed model 'diarchy' system (community representation) was envisaged and full representation was given. An ethnic autonomy was defined for the Turks in the designed model. In the Macmillan plan, however, the distinct identity of Turkish society became more evident. The Turkish and Greek communities would execute their affairs for themselves through the 'Community Councils'. The council, headed by the governor, was formed with members of four of who were Greek and two of whom were Turkish. The first conclusion here is that Greek society could not see (accept) that Turkish society was more visible in the developing autonomy models (Bilge, 1996, pp.68-73; Gürel, 1984).

The mutual struggles throughout the 1950s finally came to a conclusion in February 1959 in Zürich. When Greece failed to reach its desired results at the UN General Assembly in 1958, Karamanlis decided to solve the Cyprus problem under his prime ministership. By taking advantage of international meetings in 1958-1959, Zorlu and Averofff have made progress on the constitutional and international status issues on the Cyprus issue. A *"Partnership Republic"* regime structured with a ratio of 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots in public posts, was designed without any difficulties in constitutional matters. A special presidential regime has been considered for this *"functional"* federation, where the congregations are designed separately. For the vice-president, he is equipped not only with the ability to protect his own community but also with broad powers: "veto power" (Gazioğlu, 2000; Gürel, 1984; Bilge, 1996; Dodd, 2010).

For the vice-president veto power, it was intended to include high politics issues such as "foreign policy, defence, and security" issues. In this sense, the word 'vice' could be misleading. Among the compelling issues of the London and Zurich agreements were military bases and the number of troops belonging to the motherlands. Besides, as per the Guarantee and Alliance Agreements, the powers are given to the motherlands and the size of the bases to be left to the British. After tough negotiations, the path to independence was opened and the *'Republic of Cyprus'* was established as an independent state on 16 August 1960, based on the partnership framework of the two communities living in Cyprus and accordance with international treaties (O'Malley & Craig, 2001, p.76). The Constitution guaranteed by the treaties constituting the Republic of Cyprus was based on the principles of equal political rights and status granted to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot peoples.

Different newspapers and media outlets from the Turkish Cypriot have developed different titles and discourses of the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus: *Bozkurt Gazetesi* [Bozkurt Newspaper] "Cumhuriyetin kahraman koruyucuları hoş gediniz [the heroic guardians of the Republic welcome]", but on the third page, the news that "Cumhuriyet ilan edildi [Republic was

declared]" was made; *Nacak* [Hatchet], "82 yıllık özlemi gideriyoruz: Kahraman Mehmetçik Kıbrısta [We're removing 82 years of longing: Hero Mehmetcik in Cyprus]"; *Cumhuriyet* [Republic] *(Cyprus)* "Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti akşam ilan edildi [Republic of Cyprus declared in the evening]"; within the Turkish press, headlines used such as, *Milliyet* [Nationality] "Kıbrıs bağımsız oldu [Cyprus became independent]"; *Cumhuriyet* [Republic] *(Turkey)* "Türk askeri 82 yıl sonra tekrar Kıbrıs'ta [Turkish soldier back in Cyprus after 82 years]" and *Hürriyet* [Liberty] "Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti doğdu [Republic of Cyprus was born]".

The political elites of Cyprus resented their motherlands, which had abandoned them in the ideal of "Enosis and Taksim". The ratio of 70% to 30% was a clump of problems. On the other hand, the 'Armenians and Maronites', other small minorities of Cyprus, were also included in the Greek Cypriot community. While being the only candidate for vice president, Dr. Fazıl Küçük won; Makarios was elected with 66% against AKEL-backed Yannis Clerides in his presidential nomination. With this enthusiasm, the Republic of Cyprus has registered its first international step with UN membership ("Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti B.M.e," 1960, p.1). However, in the minds (nationalist currents) against the established republic, still existed the capitals of the motherlands (Ankara, Athens), Nicosia was still far from being the new centre (Kıralp, 2015). This statement in the Nacak Newspaper: "Kıbrıs Rumlarının Reisicumhuru Makarios cenapları [President of the Greek Cypriot's his holiness Makarios]" was a headline written on 27 August 1960, just 11 days after the proclamation of the Republic ("Rum ümitlerinin uzak," 1960, p.1).

The activities of the TMT, which were approved and supported by the Republic of Turkey before the 1960 coup, dealt a heavy blow to this organization in Cyprus as a result of the May 27 coup d'état. The main reason why the new administration 'MBK' formed in Turkey after 27 May 1960 was insensitive to Cyprus is due to the prejudices of all the decisions and practices of Menderes administration. So much so that Dr Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş were propagandized to be Menderesists (Sonan, 2014,

p.58), and claims of "Menderes' secret army" were put forward for the weapons sent by the STK to TMT ("İlk hücrede yemin," 1995, p.25). Menderes was very concerned about the activities of the Special Warfare Department and, under the new conditions introduced by the spring of 1959, reminded the members of the department of the importance of Turkish-Greek friendship and the value of peaceful solutions (Kılıç, 2010, pp.93-94).

In the confusion of 27 May, 235 generals were dismissed and General Daniş Karabelen, who has been serving as the chairman of the SKT for about 7 years, was also removed from his post. As a matter of fact, TMT is one of the most affected organizations in the new situation in Turkey on 27 May 1960. Retired Staff Colonel Faruk Ateşdağlı, who was appointed to this post to replace the dismissed STK President Danis Karabelen, takes on this task. Then Major İsmail Tansu left his post on 2nd September 1960, asking for his retirement and replaced by Staff Major Şaban Başsoy. The first Bayraktar of TMT is Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan will be recalled from Cyprus a few months later too. Thus, three people having the role of brainpower in the Ankara wing of TMT are disabled. Although the initiative of Major Tansu through Prime Minister Undersecretary Colonel Alparslan Türkeş gave a positive result in the first place, this initiative would remain inconclusive with the 14s crisis (Keser & Okur, 2011). Assessing the task of the Özel Harp Dairesi [Special Warfare Agency] (ÖHD) in a limited context, coup managers would soon realize that it was impossible to close, considering the continued support of the US, and they will decide to control it by appointing 27 new officers to the ÖHD (Satan & Şentürk, 2012, pp.516-517; Kılıç, 2010, pp.101-103). The TMT, which has been put to sleep for nearly two years or whose activities have been brought to a standstill, will start its activities again with Colonel Kenan Çoygun (An, 2002, pp.161-162).

With the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish Cypriot local political arena has also been mobilized. The cultivation of segregation seeds, whose effects can be observed by expanding even today, began with the establishment of the "Kıbrıs Türk Halk Partisi [Turkish Cyprio People's Party]". Dr. İhsan Ali was appointed as party chairman, Ahmet Muzaffer

Gürkan as party secretary-general and Ayhan Hikmet as party organizing secretariat, while the party was settled in Cumhuriyet newspaper; on the other hand, newspapers Nacak, Bozkurt and Haklın Sesi [Voice of People] were located in the counter position (An, 2005, p.165). "We will not tolerate Cumhuriyet newspaper dragging the Turkish society into heedlessness with its drug publishing even once a week" (Vudalı, 1960, p.2) was indeed an indication that the counter-politics were forbidden like drugs, beyond the line of Bozkurt Newspaper. The slogan *"Cyprus Belongs to Cypriots"* used for the news based on Cemal Gürsel of 2 January 1961 corresponded to the slogan *"Cyprus is Turkish, will remain Turkish"* ("Kıbrıs Kıbrıslılarındır," 1961, p.1). The bombs placed on Bayraktar and (Ömeriye) Ömerge Mosques in Nicosia on the night of 24-25 March 1962 were per se harbingers of the impending disaster. Cumhuriyet Newspaper has tried to make the issue a foreign focus that attempts to disrupt the communities ("Aşikâr tahrik," 1962, p.1). On the other hand, Nacak Newspaper fired the flare by saying "Bayraktar is a symbol for us" ("Bayraktar bizim için," 1962, p.1). Even though it is said to be "guilty wanted" (1962, p.2), it has been named as the honourable approach of the noble Turkish youth. These public incitements and mutual quarrels will continue throughout April. Nacak Newspaper's headline story, based on "According to the Bulgarian People's Republic Newspaper" [Narodna Armiya], "NACAK the organism of the chauvinist! Cumhuriyet the saviour of the Turkish people, WHAT COINCIDENCE IS THIS?" attacks Gürkan and Hikmet in his article publicly. They want to attract the issue to the leftist understanding and write what AKEL and the People's Party (Gürkan's party) could promise for the future (that's, drawing attention to communism). Towards the end, the situation becomes even worse and newspapers increase the dose of mutual verbal violence. In contrast to the article of Cumhuriyet Newspaper, "Nacak Bayraktar event should not tamper a lot, because there may have a snag in plans"; Nacak Newspaper warns with "When it comes to 'Speaking'... Yes, sir, We will talk! I hope we will talk a lot, not only about this but about everything!" ("Bunu bir Türk," 1962, p.1). Two lawyers die after a murder committed on the night of 23 April 1962 (An, 2005, pp.181-191). In the Greek Cypriot media, the issue is spoken of as the possible removal of the opposition and the bombing of the mosque (lowering

the mask). After the unwanted incident, Nacak newspaper "those who die are those who are killed" ("Başyazı… Ölenler öldürülenler," 1962, pp.1-4) under the title of the event curse and wishes condole.

The actual propaganda for the event appeared in the newspaper dated 25 May 1962. Emin Dırvana, the Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey, who has been unable to agree with the Turkish Cypriot leadership since his arrival on the island, would also participate in this (mosque bombing) incident. In the editorial entitled "The editorial... We have a letter to the grave: This is the danger" ["Mezara mektubumuz var: Tehlike budur"], they are implicitly accused of "you were in the role of men who had gained the trust of the Turkish embassy" (1962, p.1). Moreover, we expressed our condolences to your family, and now we say to the community, "you have survived a great danger, get well, my community with a noble spirit, full of national consciousness, clean. May we all be well" (1962, p.4) given a message saying otherwise. In the article in Milliyet, which was written by Denktaş months later as a result of the news series about Dırvana ("Kıbrıs'ta işlenen hatalar" 1964, p.2), he writes: "Dr İhsan Ali and his comrades Muzaffer Gürkan and Ayhan Hikmet are poor people who have taken refuge in the shadow of the embassy [...] we know it is a national duty to expose these people who have betrayed the Turkish community most disastrously" and in fact, it has been accepted that the subject is either tacitly accepted or left to the Turkish Cypriot leadership. At the end of the day, it would be Denktaş who comes out of this issue with the victory. Denktaş has taken a superior position with the statement given by the Interior Minister Georkadjis (who expected to come from a trip to Athens) of the *'Investigation Commission'* (composed of three high judges) established to investigate the events of Bayraktar, Ömeriye and Aykasyano. Against Rauf Denktaş, who was the attorney of the case during the period of istintak [interrogation], Yorgagis' responses polished Denktaş and took him to a justifiable position in front of his community, even if he was responsible for the incident ("Mezardan gelen

seslerle," 1962, p.4).[51] Cumhuriyet newspaper could not be republished after the incident. Also, the adventures of the opposition and left-wing parties, the Turkish Cypriot People's Party, have come to an end.

Ömer Sami Coşar, "İfşa ediyorum [I'm disclouse]" with the series of the incident, as can be understood, Denktaş and Dırvana never agreed (Paşa, 2011). Ambassador Dırvana, a retired lieutenant colonel, has maintained the politics of the May 27th, as part of the period. Ankara was in a position that did not want any problems at that time (that is, Dırvana kept the same view that he brought from Ankara to the island). Dırvana, who was originally from Cyprus, was sent as they thought he knows Cyprus. According to Coşar, two issues were indeed raised as a result of Dırvana's politics. Firstly, Denktaş and Küçük became Menderesists. Secondly, Gürkan and Hikmet have been against the establishment of a joint army and military bases and walk arm in arm with AKEL. On the other hand, in their first issue, they could raise the point as "partners in crime for miscarriages, listen to reason". This was a picture of a bloody war from the first issue on the media. Dırvana was firing as "mercimek kafalılar [lentil-headed]" against the warnings (permission to bring arms) ("Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin ölü," 1964, p.5). However, what was expected of Dırvana was that he would coordinate these groups together. According to Coşar's grouping, the comedy of democracy came to a rapid conclusion:

i. Embassy of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot People's Party appears as if they were next to them
ii. Vice President Dr. Küçük, three Ministers, and "Milli Birlik Partisi [National Unity Party]"
iii. Chairman of the Turkish Community Assembly Denktaş and Members of the Assembly
iv. Turkish Deputies in the Cyprus Joint Parliament ("Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti'nin ölü," 1962, p.5)

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[51] For further reading, Kata, M. (2016). *Kıbrıs' ta Nacak-Cumhuriyet çatışması: 1960-1962.* İstanbul: Hiperlink Yayınları.

There were two allegations for Ambassador Emin Dırvana to leave the island and his post. The first claim was that Dırvana couldn't stand what was happening at the local and wanted to go back. The second claim was that Ankara recalled him in response to his dissatisfaction with the performance. The strong belief was that after the 27th of May 1960, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was appointed only reliable people due to its changing nature. In such a period, while Emin Dırvana was a retired staff officer, he was sent to the island as the Turkish Ambassador on August 17, 1960, considering his Cypriotness. Until 12 September 1962, when he left his job voluntarily, he served as the first Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus for nearly two years.

Upon the articles published in Milliyet newspaper, Emin Dirvana sends a written statement to Milliyet. Emin Dırvana, who served as the first Turkish Ambassador in the Republic of Cyprus, has written this historical statement of 15 May 1964 titled "Denktaş gerçekleri tahrif ediyor [Denktaş falsifies the facts]" about the charges against him. This news stirred things up, so to speak, and pointed to their partnership in the fall of the republic in the mildest words: "EOKA'cıların şerrinden ve "Raufçu"ların kışkırtmasından [from the evil of the EOKA and the incitement of the followers of Rauf]" (Dırvana, 1964, p.2).

Another important building block on the road to December 1963 was the issue of the establishment of the *"Cypriot Army"*. Since the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the first veto has been used by the Vice President of the Republic on 20 October against the decision taken in the Council of Ministers for the mixed formation of the Cyprus Army. Dr. Küçük has cited the following 4 main reasons for recommending that smaller units of the army be not homogeneous:

i. Language difficulties
ii. Disciplinary practice
iii. Constitutional obligations
iv. Board, and lodging and religious difficulties ("Cumhurbaşkan Muavini Dr.Küçük," 1961, p.2).

This veto was not only a date on the calendar, but it would also open the door to the end of the Republic. So much so that according to Ömer Sami Coşar, Makarios had two goals; and claimed that the motto "Turkey must show its goodwill" was caused by these targets:

i. The first goal: *Not to allow the establishment of the Cyprus Army as ordered by the Constitution*; in return for 1200 Greeks, 800 armed Turks to be trained by Turkish officers were threatened for their plans.

ii. The second goal: *Police and gendarmerie*; the police and gendarmerie were in favour of the Turks when the republic was founded, but time quickly reversed it, and in most government offices, the Turks remained at 10%. ("Makarios EOKA'cıları polise," 1964, p.5).

At the same time, the stuck republican administration was about Article 173 concerning the establishment of separate municipalities in five separate administrative districts, which was another constitutional predicament. Although they had reached a legal basis in 1958, a special law was still expected from the House of Representatives. As the dispute unfolded, it was being managed by four-month extensions. The proposal for a constitutional amendment, which will be discussed in detail on the following pages, would be realized in such an environment. According to Makarios, the mainstay was the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance, and they should have demolished. Otherwise, cooperation in internal affairs could not be achieved, and Dr. Küçük would always run to Ankara to stand in solidarity. At the Orthodox Christian Youth Union (OHEN) meeting in Nicosia on 4 January 1962, he publicly stated that the Turks slowed down the state, had too many rights, and were indeed a minority to be protected (Druşotis, 2008, pp.12-13).

Another important issue towards the end of the partnership in the republic is the secret organization Akritas (*Ακρίτας*). It is understood that the organization, whose founding moment is quite vague, was founded on the basis of an agreement between Makarios and the Greek Regiment. The four-member leadership of the organization (*Organosis*) included Polikarpos Georkadjis, Tassos Papadopoulos, Nikos Kosis and Glofkos Clerides. As

Georkadjis, who took the lead of the organization, chose the name of *"nom de guerre"* Akritas, the name of the agency was mentioned in this way (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.286). EOK (*Ελληνικη Οργανωση Κυπριων*) was used to resemble the continuation of EOKA and vowed to carry the ideal left by EOKA to its destination. This organization, which made the former members of EOKA as yeast to itself, would soon reach serious numbers and would eventually increase its strength further with the summoning of all Greek officers. The sub-details of the Akritas Plan contained military plans in which all addresses were identified, and as of 25 November 1963, military units were decided to establish in all regions (Druşotis, 2008, pp.85-96). Apart from the Akritas organization, the paramilitary groups of Lissarides (Makarios' special doctor) and Nikos Samson were also present in the period before Makarios' proposal to amend the constitution. Another fear for Makarios was the issue of the gathering the Armed Forces in one hand. Therefore, Samson and other armed organizations were excluded from Akritas. In response to the four-part nature of Turkish Cypriot politics written above, Greek Cypriot politics was composed of four parts too. The circles that could not handle the London-Zurich agreements had fallen into the Makarios-Grivas dichotomy since 1959, while Yorgacis and Samson, representatives of the younger generation, and were also added. Enosis supporters were unable to unite; however, with the civil war beginning at the end of 1963, the merger would take place under the umbrella of the National Guard of Cyprus, established in 1964 (Kızılyürek, 2016; Druşotis, 2008).

If the 'Akritas Plan' is to be approached as a solution plan by the Greek Cypriots, it is necessary to reveal and examine the counter-plan of the Turkish Cypriot leadership: *"Geçici Merhale Planı"* [Temporary Phase Plan] and *"14 Eylül 1963 tarihli Türk Planı"* [Turkish Plan of 14 September 1963] is a second document signed by Dr. Küçük and Denktaş.[52] It should be noted

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[52] According to the claim of Ahmet An, who examined this issue: *"Geçici Merhale Planı"* [Temporary Stage Plan], which is also photocopied in the annexes of the first volume of the "Cyprus: My depositions" memories published by Glafkos Kleridis in Greek and then in English in March 1989 (see p.466-472). It was captured in December 1963 when the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, Dr. Fazıl Küçük, opened the steel safe by the Greek

that the motivation in the preparation of these plans came to the time when Makarios raised his voice for the revision of the constitution and put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership. It should also be known that these mutually produced plans are the products of extremists (nationalists) and contain various strategies and scenarios. According to the *'Geçici Merhale Planı'* [Temporary Phase Plan]:

i. We accepted the Zurich and London agreements as a "temporary phase" and signed for it. If it had been said that it was not a "temporary stage" but "a final state remedy", we would not have accepted it, we would have prolonged the conflict between the communities for a while and we could have left the United Nations against the Taksim which they say is "no, impossible for practical".

ii. [There are reasons] why we cannot accept the Zurich agreements and the Republic created by these agreements as "a final state remedy".

iii. For this reason, before the agreements, it was agreed with the then Turkish government that "these agreements are a temporary phase; during this period, maximum economic and other assistance will be made to us and it was agreed that we would pursue our "Separate Community" case as a national cause for the realization of our ultimate goal." [...] In our first contacts with Mr Gursel Pasha, the head of state, "the same principles have been agreed".

iv. There is a great reason why these agreements and the established Republic are accepted by the Turkish Cypriots as a phase and there is a great reason why not to fall into blunder sleep by keeping his eyes open; this is because the Greek Cypriots, as a whole, have accepted the administration of the Republic as a temporary stage.

v. What we see is the way out is this:

    a. The fact that the agreements are a temporary phase and the belief that our status as a "Separate Community" is essential to

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Security Forces. During the UN talks on Cyprus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of "Cyprus" Spiros Kyprianou informed the international public, prepared by the TMT (probably from the pen of Rauf Denktaş) and given to Dr. Küçük" [translated from Turkish].

realize this fact will be announced to every Turk and this faith will be spread across the island in a way that can be transferred from generation to generation.

b. To give maximum reaction to every action that the Greeks (Cypriots) have made and will take to destroy our status as "Separate Communities".

c. The outlines of the "national case" should be dictated to those who want to make opposition within the community; publication in a way that undermines the national cause should be prevented from spreading propaganda (An, 2002; can-kibrisim.com, 2014).

Again, Cleridis writes the following about another document in the first volume (1989, pp.203-207). This document was signed by Dr. Küçük and Rauf Denktaş with this attitude adopted by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. The plan agreed by the Turkish Cypriot side consisted of a series of preparatory and necessary actions before the establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot state. The plan primarily laid out the accounting of the past three years, and according to the authors [Küçük and Rauf Denktaş] believed that 1964 would be the year of more Makarios'. In this context, there were two possibilities that the 'Rum' [Greek Cypriots] could follow:

i. The Greeks could eventually abolish or attempt to ignore the Zurich and London Agreements and the Constitution.

ii. They can continue to recreate tactics. They have been following this policy for the past three years. Accordingly, the constitution will not be implemented and the Turks will be brought to a position that has lost its advantages in practice (by reducing to minority status).

According to the authors, if the constitution is officially dissolved, the motherland may intervene alone (under the Guarantee Agreement). However, the only consequence of this intervention would be to return to the conditions under which the Zurich Agreements are bound. Therefore, if the Greek Cypriots officially terminate the Constitution, the Turkish community should take its [own] destiny into its hands and move towards the

establishment of a Turkish Republic. The main points of this plan can be summarized as follows:

i.   The Turkish vice-president of the Republic will be accepted by the Turkish community as the president of the (new) Republic, and a government will be formed which will be composed entirely of Turks according to the existing constitutional articles today.

ii. The newly formed government, which will seek help from our motherland, will be immediately recognised by our motherland.

iii. This request for assistance will be followed by the intervention of our motherland. If necessary, Cypriots who have settled in Turkey will immediately be granted rights belonging to citizens of the Republic (Turkish Republic (Cyprus) passports will be issued).

iv. The Turkish members of the House of Representatives (Cyprus) and the Turkish members of the Community Assembly shall form the Assembly of the Republic and declare the provisions of the present Constitution for the establishment of a republic composed entirely of Turks.

v.   After recognition by the motherland, the Turkish Republic will immediately sign a trade agreement and an aid agreement with the motherland (the basis of international legality).

vi. There is no doubt that this movement of the Turkish community will lead to reactions and counter-actions of the Greeks. Counter-actions will be applied against Turks in practice. Following these aggressive actions, a struggle will begin that will determine the outcome and will develop between both communities.

vii. When the struggle begins, the Turkish community, which lives scattered on the island, will be forced to gather in a region and will have to defend this region.

viii. Civil servants currently in the government mechanism need to be transferred to the new service. Because the work in the first days should not be disrupted.

Finally, the authors have stated that so far the Greeks have given [them] many opportunities in this regard and that from now on, they have confidence in their behaviour that they will give [them] more opportunities (An, 2002; can-kibrisim.com, 2014).

The climate, which changes with the first statement (4 January 1962), with the veto, its trajectory changes thoroughly and puts its final point by the end of 1962. The postponement of the separated Municipalities Act, which has been in place for months, is stopped and the law is fallen from the proposal. With mutual decrees and draft laws, the issue of municipalities continues to escalate dangerously. On 25 January 1963, Bayraktar Mosque was bombed once again (Druşotis, 2008, pp.33-35). The year 1963 was passing much faster than the previous years and was approaching its end. The regulations of both communities on municipalities, which had been moved to the Constitutional Court, had been annulled. The arrangements were not accepted by the President of the Constitutional Court, German Ernst Forsthoff; but after the court, Forsthoff would also resign. After the court order, Makarios and Dr. Küçük discuss the issue of municipalities once again, but they would not get results again. *"At this point, it is necessary to note that Makarios was now listening to Dr. Küçük just like Governor Harding of Cyprus. When it was his turn, he would deport him from the republic, just like he was deported".* Greek Foreign Minister Averoff warned Makarios not to act singularly in the constitutional context in his letter to Makarios on 19 April 1963 (Druşotis, 2008, pp.40-41). Apparently, for Makarios, Papandreou presents a more convenient motherland. In this context, the first signal for President Makarios comes with the resignation of the Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis after his troubles with the Greek King. Likewise, there was no stable government in Ankara too and by the end of November, the government had fallen. In the international arena beyond the motherlands, Makarios was able to add good relations with Moscow to the impunity he had reached under the shadow of the NAM. Now the ball is on Washinton court and the expected news soon arrived: *"Kennedy was assassinated"*. It was clear what that meant. America would not be in the game for a while.

Makarios, who ruled that the preparatory phase is over and that the ground is ready, announced his offer on 30 November 1963 (PIO, 1963):

   i.   The right of veto of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic to be abandoned.

  ii.   The Vice-President of the Republic to deputise for the President of the Republic in case of his temporary absence or in capacity to perform his duties.

 iii.   The Greek President of the House of Representatives and the Turkish Vice-President to be elected by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the House.

  iv.   The Vice-President of the House of Representatives to deputize for the President of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties.

   v.   The constitutional provisions regarding separate majorities for enactment of certain laws by the House of Representatives to be abolished.

  vi.   Unified Municipalities to be established.

 vii.   The administration of Justice to be unified.

viii.   The division of the Security Forces into Police and Gendarmerie to be abolished.

  ix.   The numerical strength of the Security Forces and of the Defence Forces to be determined by a Law.

   x.   The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the composition of the Public Service and the Forces of the Republic to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish-Cypriots.

  xi.   The number of the Members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced from ten to five.

 xii.   All decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple majority.

xiii.   The Greek Communal Chamber to be abolished.

The countdown continues for December 21st (end of partnership). According to the report signed by the Greek Armed Forces Commander Ioannis Pipiles, the intended targets were fictitious and far from reality:

i.   Stage 1: Attack against the negative points of the Constitution
ii. Stage 2: Denunciation of the Treaty of Guarantee
iii. Stage 3: Self-Determination
iv. Stage 4: Submission of application to the "Greek Government to accept the unification of CYPRUS with the Greek Core" (Druşotis, 2008, p.102).

The bombing of the statue of Marcos Drakos by the Greek 'organization' [Akritas] was not only a sign of the irreversibility of the road to the end but also of the transition to the state of emergency. Although the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Clark, received guarantees in negotiations with the parties before leaving the island (20 December 1963), conflicts erupted with the excitement caused by the parties' overheating. The events that started in the Tahtakala quarter of Nicosia, as explained above in detail, expand rapidly and spread throughout the city on 23 December. None of the bilateral meetings held in the last days of 1963 could solve the problem. Collisions get worse, and the number of the dead increases. Although the joint talks for a solution have the opportunity for some improvements, the situation cannot be controlled by the extremists of the two sides. In response to all this, Ankara issues an ultimatum and then Jets (three) are sent to Nicosia, warships (four) to Kyrenia and the Turkish Regiment in Nicosia (Gerolakkos) leaves the camp. This is not the news that the Greek Cypriot leadership is waiting for, and it is a situation to be panicked. Even the execution of the Turkish hostages comes to the agenda with the stress (the size of the panic experienced). On the other hand, the assistance that Akritas expects from the Greek Regiment does not come. Greece did not have a condition to answer in these days of the crisis. On the one hand, there was unstable politics and on the other, American pressure. Consequently, Makarios, who convinced that the preparations were completed, was on the verge of accepting the deal. The help expected from Athens does not come, contrarily

Ankara's voice was getting louder and Akritas (organisation) was not working as requested. Diplomacy comes into play when things are messy, and US and UK confiscate events. The Mason-Dickson line (an heirloom from the colony time) is expanded by the ceasefire reached on 27 December. The "Green Line Agreement" drawn by General Young with a green pen (rather than blue and red) is signed by Makarios and Dr Küçük and put into effect (Taksim came into force) (Druşotis, 2008, pp.103-124; Kızılyürek, 2016, pp.319-331; O'Malley & Craig, 2001, pp.90-93).

The third London Conference was the first post-republican international meeting of the parties, but this time there were "Cypriots" in the leading roles. The established equation reflected a very brutal situation. The Greek Cypriots were tasked with suppressing the rebels *"on behalf of the Republic"*, while the Turkish Cypriots had to either escape/abandon or stay and fight and die [in order] to be protected against attacks *"on behalf of the minority"*. *Whereas, they were experiencing the reflections of the blood of poor innocent people on a vengeance (Kızılyürek's term "hınç") certificate.* In these days when the going gets tough, Dr. Küçük's call to the world's heads of state has not been effective either ("Kıbrıs Türkleri namına," 1964). As detailed in section 4.1.2, America's fears would come true like in the Suez case, and the shadow of Moscow was travelling in the region again. It was none other than the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios, who invited this intruder to Cyprus. The expected response from Russian Ambassador to Cyprus Pavel Yermosin came, and Moscow stated that Cyprus favoured freedom and territorial integrity, and Makarios had found the answer they had been waiting for. Under these circumstances, it was born dead before the London conference started. As the conversations throughout the conference extended, it became clear that the issue had grown deeper. Despite the Greek Cypriots' proposal for a functional federation (actually more unitary), the Turkish Cypriots offered a geographical Federation (i.e. Taksim). Sandy's offer to the parties was based on many preliminary acceptances. Issues such as the amendment of the Constitution, the transfer of population (canton design) were eventually rejected by the two parties. While the international community (Western flank) dreamed of a NATO

solution, while Makarios tended to escape under the umbrella of the UN with the help of NAM and Moscow (O'Malley & Craig, 2001, pp.94-93). The biggest leverage (trump card) of Makarios had been the possession of an independent, UN-member state. The NATO peacekeeping draft collapsed after the parties failed to reach its conclusion (which Makarios does not accept). Makarios opposed the proposal, pointing out that it was not clear enough and that it might strengthen the position of the Turkish Cypriots. In the negotiations, however, his frequent requests were to abolish the Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance (which is impossible), which he would eventually try to abolish himself.

The troubles have entered a new phase within the UN framework. The UNSCR 186 decision of 4 March 1964 made the Greek Cypriots a *"state"*, while the Turkish Cypriots became a *"state without or into a state"*. Due to the reference to the 'Government of Cyprus' the decision was described as a victory, especially accompanied by the phrases respect for "political independence, territorial integrity and security". Moreover, the decision to commit the UN peacekeeping force to the consent of the 'Government of Cyprus' was a decision that ignored the Turkish Cypriots. March 4 would be accepted as the beginning for the third phase in Makarios's mind: the "self-determination struggle". On the other hand, the *"Genel Komite"* [General Committee], which held its first meeting on 21 May 1964, would essentially be the Government position of the Turkish Cypriot community from that day on.

Attempts to transfer the problem to NATO result in failure. It is worth noting that the conjuncture in the world was in favour of Makarios and that it is well evaluated by the Greek Cypriot leadership. Based on this decision, Sakari Tuomioja, who was the first mediator, was appointed and UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus), which was established in stages, reached a power of over 6,000 in three months. Ankara does not respond positively to Makarios, who demanded the return of the motherland military forces to their barracks on 30 March 1964 ("Makarios'un talebine 'Hayır,"

1964, p.1). Upon this incident, Makarios declares that he has cancelled the Alliance Agreement.

Publicly, in the Milliyet newspaper of 28 March, the Turkish Cypriot leadership will no longer insist on it and would exchange the idea of *"Taksim"* with *"Federal Taksim"*. Although they do not give up the idea of Taksim, the [new] idea would now be *"Federation"* ("Kıbrıs Türkleri'nin teklifi," 1964, p.1). According to the proposal, 20% of the island is in demand. While the Yesil line was protected, a region extending from Famagusta to Lefke was envisioned, with free passes. On the other hand, the main roads would be controlled by the motherland soldiers and 40,000 Greeks would be offered to cross from north to south and again to the north in the same figure as the Turks ("Makarios EOKA'cıları polise," 1964, p.5).

Another prominent name within the Greek Cypriot leadership was General Grivas (co-founder of EOKA, leader of the military wing). The year 1964 marked a new time for the history of Cyprus, and the leader of this era was President Makarios III. In face of the failure of Enosis, which Greece had hoped for, or Makarios gaining excessive power, or with possible Moscow influence, the island is out of NATO involvement, George Grivas was back on the agenda. It is no surprise that the Acheson plan (American Plan), which was clearly explained in 4.1.4, includes 'Enosis'. Even from this perspective, it is understood that Washington, which replaces London, (which has a secondary position in Cyprus), is realized by his will and desire. Recognizing such an operation, Makarios did not hesitate to reveal his reaction, because Grivas had called on the former EOKA members in Athens to meet ("Makarios, E.O.K.A. liderini," 1964, p.1). This phase would be the beginning of a significant adventure for the Greek Cypriot leadership and would end only on July 15, 1974. After the Athens talks, the changing weather had led Interior Minister Georkadjis to converge on Grivas, as his confidence in Makarios had been shaken and he believed in the need for a unifying leader. One of the events that took place in various towns of the island in 1964 was [now] taking place in Paphos (town). In the face of Ankara's harsh ultimatum, the Greek Cypriot front is united and it is decided that Grivas should go to the

island and establish a military system. It is important to note that Makarios made this decision at a time when he had nowhere to escape. The student demonstration of 12 April 1964 had generated serious public opinion; otherwise, it would have meant a contrast to Enosis. Despite all this, Grivas would only be able to return to the island on 12 June 1964 (a credential of the complexity of the Greek and Greek Cypriot internal politics) (Druşotis, 2008, pp.167-193).

A pre-news report of the war, which soon passed into history as the Battle of Kokkina, is seen ("Rumların saldırı ihtimali," 1964, p.1; "Türklerin, silâh zoruyla," 1964, p.1). Thanks to the weapons and personnel reinforcements made from the motherland (Athens), there was [now] a division of troops equipped. The Washington administration continued to seize opportunities for Cyprus, and talks would begin in Geneva after the Prime Ministers' Washington visit. With this initiative, 'Acheson' would try another NATO resolution. The negotiations, which began in early July 1964, were hampered not only by the wobble of Athens but also by Makarios' strong standing. The 'Plan', which Papandreou was generally positive about (because it included Enosis——there would be no problem if "one flat" was missing from an apartment that you had the deed to), was strongly opposed by Makarios, although he warned him that if Communism came, it could become "Cuba" (Kızılyürek, 2016, pp.383-385). Makarios had to destroy the 'Acheson Plan'. While he complained that the 'internationalisation' of the problem was unacceptable on this ground, its 'internationalisation' under the umbrella of the UN would not create a problem. It is precisely at this point that successive moves come from Makarios. Makarios, who mobilized the *'political sphere'* against the first Acheson plan, will this time mobilize the *'military sphere'* against the second Acheson plan.

i. *Political sphere:* On July 30, he made Athens withdraw from the table. On 10 October, he announced that he would move the matter to the UN, and on the same day, he adopted a resolution of self-determination in the House of Representatives (the resolution that the

future of the whole island would be determined in a free and independent manner) (Druşotis, 2008, pp.230-232).

ii. *Military sphere*: To disperse the Turkish presence concentrated in the Mansura-Kokkina region, to clean up the region that serves as the bridgehead, to gain a great motivation.

Rauf Denktaş, who was declared *persona non grata*, had long been away from the island. He had secretly returned on 1 August to take up position for the upcoming Battle of Kokkina. The "Turkish Cypriot leadership" (*Beylik düzeni* [Seigniory/beylic order][53]), which was dispatched and administered by Colonel Kenan Çoygun, the flagstone of the TMT, was prepared for the defence of Kokkina with Colonel Rıza Vuruşkan (who was appointed as the founding commander of the TMT) on 1 August, along with Denktaş. Grivas was in Athens when the clashes began and were only able to return to Nicosia on 6 August. Grivas, who took the initiative from Makarios for the operation, (when looked at the size of the issue), should have received approval from Athens, but he did not wait for the approval. Grivas, who has taken powers in the Council of Ministers (Republic of Cyprus), orders an operation regardless of the preparation of the troops. Grivas' visit to the region by helicopter on 8 August was a fiasco in itself. The Makarios-Grivas duo was in favour of the expansion of the operation and the clearance of the area. However, Athens and Nicosia had not made such an agreement. This would have some international consequences. Grivas increase the intensity of the operations further, while the expected Turkish action takes place. Turkish jets bomb the area and military elements in surrounding villages, and the Greek Cypriot leadership is plunged into great devastation. Grivas, who arrived in the region only on 8 August, returns the same day and after the 'Council of Ministers', returns to the command headquarters and resigns from his position as Commander-in-Chief of 'Cyprus' (Druşotis, 2008, pp.241-255).

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[53] Troika administration consisting of the Turkish Embassy, Bayraktarlık and the General Committee.

There was something that the Battle of Kokkina told both sides: *"Frustration"* (White, 1990). On behalf of the Greek Cypriot leadership (especially for Makarios):

i. Firstly, the answer to the possibility that the Turkish army might make a military action on the island was given: *"it may come, even if it is limited"*.

ii. Secondly, can Athens be trusted in terms of military issues: "it is clear as day that Athens cannot act independently of Washington". The answer which received against the Turkish intervention that appeared in the last phase of the Battle of Kokkina: *"You are alone"*.

iii. Thirdly, he will understand that it is impossible to drive his route in any direction other than Moscow and NAM.

iv. In the final analysis, Makarios can now set up a game (even if it costs), as the Americans call it, "Makarios endeavouring to sabotage the Geneva meeting" ("doc.102," FRUS).

Due to the Kokkina War, the Turkish Cypriot side's frustration was realized in other respects. On behalf of the Turkish Cypriot leadership, (especially for Denktaş):

i. The belief that the motherland can land troops to the island if necessary: *"It is destroyed"*, (intervention came when it was on the brink of death).

ii. They realized that, like Greek Cypriots, they were *"alone"* in Turkish Cypriots.

iii. They understood that they could not perform the 'Taksim' with the Battle of Kokkina: *"We died but we could not divide"*.

As a result, the extremists (nationalists) of both sides hit the wall with the Kokkina incident. They understood that the issue is not just a square (Venetian column) in Nicosia. He acknowledges that the *"Grivas project"* that the American administration has partnered with Papandreou does not work and that Papandreou accepted that he could not control Makarios. Rauf Denktaş returns as he arrives (the Turkish army's withdrawal operation

receiving injured and officers). A possible Turkish-Greek war would not take place, as Grivas's resignation was withdrawn and his orders (war at sea) did not take place.

Another lesson of the Kokkina war has been the weighing of the Moscow factor. Makarios, who has lost his hope from Athens, turns to Moscow. Using its position within NAM, he received serious support from Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev with Nasser's support. However, the coup plans for Makarios (within the agreement of Ankara and Athens) cannot be realized because Papandreou did not approve those (enosis by the coup). Athens reaches a military presence of over 10,000 on the occasion of Kokkina (which would be a source of danger for the future) (Druşotis, 2008, p.201). Nicosia has now received its independence from Athens (*de-Atinization*). Makarios, who went to Cairo for the NAM meeting at the end of August 1964, has received the full support of Nasser. With the weapon agreement made, he got the weapons he wanted. What's more, he signs trade and military agreements with Moscow in September. The Egyptian missiles cannot be brought to the island as a result of heavy American pressure (Kızılyürek, 2016, p.411). Moreover, as a result of Ankara's lack of support from Washington, post-Geneva Turkish foreign policy opens the Moscow page. Khrushchev's departure from power is a unique opportunity and has been evaluated by Ankara ("Moskova'da Kıbrıs işi," 1964, p.1). During Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin's visit to Moscow, the Cyprus issue was also discussed and the Moscow political line, which had previously often referred to the "Republic of Cyprus", went to soften. Therefore, besides the declaration of independence of the island, it was accepted that one of the two societies could not dominate the other ("Ruslar Kıbrıs anlaşmasını," 1964, p.7). Moscow would announce in early 1965 that it was in favour of a *"bi-communal federal arrangement"* for the island of Cyprus (Druşotis, 2008; Kızılyürek, 2016; Kıralp, 2015).

In 1964, there had been a number of significant developments indicating that Makarios reconstructed his politics of nationalism. In April 1964, the Greek government expressed to Nedim Veysel İlkin, Turkish Ambassador to Athens, that it supported Makarios's pro-independence thesis and asked

Turkey to avoid further intervention in the Cyprus Crisis ("Papandreu 10 madde," 1964, p.1, 7). In July 1964, Makarios visited Athens. He told the press that there had been a number of 'disagreements' between the Greek Cypriot side and the Greek government, and, these disagreements were resolved after this visit. In the joint-declaration issued after the meeting, there had been no reference to Enosis. When the Greek journalists asked Makarios about the absence of the term Enosis in the declaration, the Archbishop replied by emphasizing that their aim was 'to give the people of Cyprus a complete and unconditional independence'. According to Makarios, the Enosis could not be realized unless the 'complete and unconditional independence' was achieved ("Makarios, B.M.e başvuracak," 1964, pp.1, 7). On 27 June 1964, Makarios held a press conference and stated that he attached no importance to the Greco-Turkish dialogue supervised by USA as the negotiations 'were carried out in the absence of the mainly and directly interested Cypriot people' (Kiralp, 2019, p.373). In September 1964, Makarios declared that he would apply to the UN General Assembly for securing Cyprus's independence and attaining the right to self-determination. Clerides held a press conference and told the press that the annexation of the *Meis* island by Turkey, the creation of a Turkish base-area in Cyprus and the establishment of autonomous local administrations for Turkish Cypriots were unacceptable to the Greek Cypriot side. As a response to Makarios's decision to apply to the UN General Assembly, Panagiotis Pippinelis, ex-Prime Minister of Greece, told the press that this would end the hopes for a peaceful solution by torpedoing the Greco-Turkish dialogue ("Makarios, Genel Kurula başvurdu," 30 September 1964, p.1,7). On 6 October 1964, there had been an armed conflict between the supporters of Grivas and Makarios in Limassol. As the supporters of Grivas were displeased with Makarios's relations with USSR and the Archbishop refused to inform Grivas on the treaty he signed with Moscow. According to the Turkish press, four police officers were killed ("Kıbrıs'ta Rumlar birbiryle çapıştı," 1964, pp.1, 7). On 31 January 1966, in his meeting with the Greek government, Makarios expressed that any concession from Cyprus's territorial integrity favouring Turkey, even for the sake of the Enosis, was unacceptable to him. The Greek Cypriot leader also told the Greek officials that it was 'Greek government's

problem whether a territorial concession from Greece would be made'
(Tenekitis & Kranitiotis, 1981, p.335 cited in Kızılyürek, 2009, p.26).

As can be seen in the paragraph above, there had been disagreements
between Makarios and Greek governments on the Cyprus Question. In the
post-1963 era, preserving Cyprus's independence and territorial integrity was
Makarios's primary goal. The Greek Cypriot leader refused to leave a base
area to Turkey as an exchange for the Enosis. On the other hand, in his
statements, the Archbishop made it clear that he would not accept the
Athens-Ankara dialogue as a solution framework or any form of international
negotiation ignoring Cypriots' political will. In other words, Makarios did not
accept Greek government's manipulations. On the contrary, to some extent,
he managed to manipulate Greek government's policies on Cyprus.
Furthermore, the pro-Enosis and anti-Communist supporters of Grivas were
displeased with Makarios's political line. All these facts indicate that the
Archbishop had generated a new understanding of nationalism, prioritizing
the island's integrity, its independence and Greek Cypriots' political will. This
can be accepted as a shift from the pro-Enosis line and the Archbishop
started to characterize Greek Cypriots as an autonomous political actor that
could act independently from Athens.

4.3 The Interactions between Domestic Politics of Nationalism and Foreign States' Policies

In the early 1960s, the Cuban Crisis led to taking the first step towards the
new era of the Cold War. The crisis was indeed the 'peak' of the bi-polar
confrontation and it essentially urged the two blocs into a different political
understanding. The European allies of the USA were disappointed with the
US foreign policy that refrained from asking for their opinions during the
crisis. As the Soviets as well had nuclear weapons, the European NATO
members were no longer 'sure' that the US would utilize nuclear weapons to
defend Europe in case of a Soviet attack. This led European NATO allies to
try to refrain from deploying American nuclear weapons within their
territories. On the other hand, a NATO member, France, started conducting
its foreign policy in a way that was not purely pro-American. Likewise, the

Sino-Soviet split damaged the Eastern bloc. Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev, who succeeded Stalin, generated the 'peaceful co-existence' thesis abandoning the belief that a war between the two blocs was inevitable. Coupled with the 'de-Stalinization', Moscow built its foreign policy upon the belief that a 'peaceful' competition among the two blocs in world politics was 'possible'. This led Soviets to support anti-Western movements in different countries. Furthermore, the Cuban crisis made all the states aware of the suicidal consequences of a nuclear war. US President Kennedy, in a speech he made in 1963 drew attention to the fact that 'the two strongest powers [were] the two in the most danger of devastation' and invited USSR to 'help make the world safe for diversity'. In the early détente era, the two major powers moderated their attitudes against each other. Nevertheless, they merely lost their influence over their allies (Blanton & Kegley, 2016).

The NAM composed of ex-colonial countries and countries that were not directly allied with the USA or USSR represented another transformation in world politics in the 1960s. In 1961, the NAM issued an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist and anti-racist declaration after the Belgrade Conference. The Movement promoted 'relationships of equality' among nations. Drawing attention to the disadvantages suffered by Third World countries, the Conference called for the expansion of the UN Security Council. In the mid-1960s, the Movement was opposed to neo-Colonialism, promoted nuclear disarmament, asked for the abolishment of foreign military bases all around the world and invited all the states to conduct the principle of 'non-intervention' in domestic affairs (Kıralp, 2019).

The transformations in world politics were also reflected in the politics of nationalisms of the two communities. Nevertheless, the relevant transformations gave Cypriot actors, particularly Makarios, to play. In the 1960s, while the Anglo-American side decided to destroy the Republic of Cyprus, Makarios balanced NATO's power by leaning on USSR and the NAM. After the 1963 crisis, Makarios prioritized independence over the Enosis. His understanding of 'independence' foresaw a set of constitutional amendments that would pave the way for the Greek Cypriot rule on the island

and would abolish foreign powers' rights to intervene in Cyprus. As a matter of fact, Makarios made Cyprus a NAM member in 1961 and became an influential leader among the Movement. Likewise, his relations with AKEL enabled him to utilize the Soviet power against NATO. The Soviet Union was strongly opposed to the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus. More importantly, when Greece promoted the 'double-Enosis' plan, namely the Acheson Plan, Makarios made it clear that he would not allow Athens to decide on behalf of Greek Cypriots (Druşotis, 2008). While Greece promoted a form of NATO-sponsored solution, Makarios managed to urge Greek Prime Minister Papandreou to abandon this political line. In other words, Makarios made Greek government approach to Cyprus Question as a 'national matter' instead of an 'intra-NATO matter'. The Greek government could not diminish Makarios's hold on the island and they essentially appointed General Grivas and several Greek officers to 'keep Makarios under control' (Kıralp, 2019; Druşotis, 2008).

During the 1964 crisis, Greece principally accepted the 'double Enosis' and it was actually Makarios who inhibited such solution models. Likewise, Turkish Cypriot leadership was not 'totally' satisfied with Ankara's policy on Cyprus in 1964 crisis. In a letter they sent to the Turkish government, Turkish Cypriot leaders demanded Turkish Cypriots' settlement in Turkey and this implied that Ankara remained sufficient in backing its ethnic relatives on the island. Both Denktaş and Küçük were dissatisfied with Turkey's failure to take military action. The US government offered the sides to deploy a NATO peace-keeping force on the island and Makarios rejected this offer. Instead, Greek troops and UN peace-keeping forces were deployed. On the other hand, when the US government prevented Turkey from taking military action, Turco-Soviet relations significantly developed and Moscow supported the pro-Turkish federation thesis as a solution formula (Gürel 1984; Bilge, 1996).

In the 1960s, it is noteworthy that the two communities' politics of nationalism were largely affected by the general trend in world politics. First of all, in the 1950s, as the NAM had not yet been an influential actor and Soviets attached no significant importance to the Cyprus Question, the issue had remained as

an intra-NATO matter. The two communities' politics of nationalism (Enosis and partition) foresaw Cyprus as a NATO island. Nevertheless, Makarios was well aware of the opportunities provided by the NAM and the Soviet Union. He was therefore opposed to NATO-sponsored 'double Enosis' formulas and he promoted independence which was more preferable to Moscow and the NAM. As a matter of fact, in Makarios's perspective, the form of independence coupled with several constitutional amendments was more beneficial for Greek Cypriots than the 'double Enosis' (Kızılyürek, 2016).

Greek Cypriot leadership managed to keep the Republic of Cyprus under its one-sided control while Turkish Cypriot leadership abandoned its community's seats in executive and legislative branches. In the 1950s, the two communities managed to become actors as they managed to gain their mother-countries' support. Nonetheless, in the 1960s, Makarios became a critical actor thanks to his relations with the NAM and the USSR. Thus, he had the chance to play the NAM and the Soviet cards against NATO and he did so. Furthermore, he was capable of effecting NAM's decisions as the right to self-determination in Cyprus was among the principles that the NAM leaders demanded via the declaration they issued after the Cairo Conference in 1964. Makarios was in conflict with Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey. The intra-NATO balances led Greece as well into conflict with Makarios. UK and USA were anxious not only due to the Greco-Turkish tension but also due to Makarios's relations with AKEL, USSR and the NAM. These developments made the Cyprus Conflict an inter-bloc rather than an intra-bloc conflict in the 1960s (Dodd, 2010).

Turkish Cypriot leadership could not become as influential as Makarios at the international level. Turkish Cypriot leadership's federation demand was welcomed by the USSR in 1965 and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that Moscow supported a federal partnership for the resolution of the Cyprus Question. The Soviet support for federation was actually, an outcome of developing Turco-Soviet relations. Nonetheless, Makarios's attempts to impede external interventions in Cypriot politics enjoyed overwhelming Soviet and non-Aligned support particularly when the Turkish

jets hit *Kokkina* in 1964. Right after the Turkish air-raid, Moscow announced that it was ready to help Cyprus to defend its integrity against foreign invasions. Furthermore, when the Greek Cypriot leader refused to follow Athens's manipulations and he was opposed to the NATO-sponsored 'double Enosis', he actually launched a Cyprus-centred form of national identity construction. By prioritizing Greek Cypriot will over the Athens's will and promoting independence (which was preferable to USSR and the NAM) against NATO's 'double Enosis' plans, he skilfully synthesized the Cold War power balances and Greek Cypriot nationalism (O'Malley & Craig, 2001). While in the 1950s the Cyprus 'imagined' (using Anderson's term) by Makarios was a pro-NATO western one, in 1960s the Greek Cypriot leader started imagining a non-Aligned and independent Cyprus which was fully contradictory to NATO's 'imagination'.

The Republic of Cyprus was established despite the will of the two communities on the island. The impositions of UK, USA, Turkey and Greece urged the two communities to sign the Zurich-London treaties. Ironically, three years after the establishment of the Republic, despite the will of the four NATO states, the two communities' leaderships destroyed the bi-communal character of Cyprus. This signals that the international actors might create consequences contradictory to nationalisms and nationalisms might create consequences contradictory to international actors' designs (Xydis, 1973). In the 1950s, while the nationalism projects of the two communities and their "mother countries" aimed to keep Cyprus a NATO-island, in 1960s, particularly for Makarios, things dramatically changed. As the Soviet Union attached importance to the independence of the island and the NAM became an influential actor, the Greek Cypriot leader de-*Athenized* Greek Cypriot nationalism and refused to follow Greece in Cypriot politics. As Andreas Papandreou notes, 'Makarios always talked about the Enosis however in practice he always aimed for independence' (Kıralp, 2015, 2019).

Archbishop Makarios's plans to amend the constitution were not supported by Karamanlis. Likewise, when Emin Dırvana, Turkish Ambassador to Cyprus, visited the island, Denktaş told him that Turkish Cypriots hoped to

welcome him as the 'governor' in the future. As the Turkish government supported the maintenance of the Zurich-London status quo, it was dissatisfied with Denktaş's secessionist attitudes. Even though Greek and Turkish governments promoted the continuation of the constitutional order on the island, the two leaderships prepared secret plans to pave the way for pro-Enosis and pro-partition politics (Reddaway, 1986). Greek Cypriot leadership prepared the *Akritas plan* aimed at constitutional amendments that would render Turkish Cypriots an ineffective minority and pave the way for the Enosis, Turkish Cypriot leadership prepared the secessionist 'temporary solution plan' to pave the way for partition. In 1964, when the state remained under one-sided Greek Cypriot control and the UN-recognized Makarios as the legitimate President of the island, Greek Cypriots practically managed to render Turkish Cypriots 'ineffective'. Nevertheless, as Makarios saw that Greece was negotiating the Cyprus Question with NATO countries without asking for his opinion, he refused to follow Athens's manipulations and tried to urge Athens to follow him (Druşotis, 2008).

With the emergence of violence on the island, Turkey launched preparations for military action and the US government sharply discouraged such action via the *Jonhson Letter.* The NATO states aimed to deploy peacekeeping forces on the island and Makarios inhibited this deployment by using his legitimate authority. Makarios's move led to the deployment of UN forces on the island and NATO states failed to create the desired effects (see FRUS archives). General Grivas, the Greek division sent by Papandreou and the Greek officers of the National Guard became NATO's instruments on the island. Nonetheless, as the Greco-Turkish dialogue on the NATO-sponsored 'double Enosis' failed, Makarios managed to proceed towards independence thanks to the Soviet and particularly non-Aligned support. It is clear that, as the four NATO states tried to swallow the Republic of Cyprus, they manifestly failed to do so. When the US government proposed the Acheson Plan, Greece principally agreed to partition the island with Turkey and it was truly Makarios who did not wish 'the others to decide on behalf of Cypriots' (Ibid; Druşotis, 2008).

Indeed, Turkish Cypriot leaders believed that the Republic of Cyprus would destroy the Turkish identity on the island and they were not pleased with the Zurich-London status quo. Despite this belief of Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish governments made significant efforts to discourage Turkish Cypriots to promote partition and similar secessionist ideas. However, when the Greek Cypriot side took action to amend the constitution, Turkey could not prevent Turkish Cypriots from forming ghettos and supplied humanitarian and financial aid as well as arms to Turkish Cypriots. As can be seen clearly in Denktaş's (2000) memories, to convince Turkish governments to promote pro-partition or pro-federation plans, Turkish Cypriot leaders had to wait till their Greek Cypriot counterparts took action to destroy the constitutional order. When Greek Cypriot leaders took action, Turkish Cypriot leaders managed to affect Turkey's foreign policy to a greater extent. Nevertheless, they asked for military intervention and Turkey could not take such action.

In the 1960s, Greece's and NATO's influence over Makarios sharply decreased as the Cypriot leader balanced the western power by playing the Soviet and non-Aligned card. It is essential to stress that, as the NATO could not afford a solution plan that would be unacceptable to Turkey and under such conditions the Enosis would indeed mean 'double Enosis', Makarios shifted position towards independence. Thus, Makarios could not manage to proceed towards the Enosis, and, he discovered the virtues of independence. Due to that, Turkish Cypriots were not as influential as Makarios at international level. The Greek Cypriot leader managed to utilize the Soviet de-Stalinization and the NAM and balanced NATO's power. Therefore, not only Makarios's politics of independence but also NATO's failures to swallow the Republic of Cyprus were 'products' of the changing 'trend' in the Cold War. Under such circumstances, it was the Eastern bloc and the NAM that Makarios required in balancing the West's power, and a form of nationalism foreseeing an independent, sovereign Cyprus was compatible with Soviet and non-Aligned interests (Kıralp, 2015, 2019).

4.4   A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Nationalism Based on the Analysis

The data gathered for this chapter displays that Greek Cypriots' politics of nationalism in the 1960s was far more complicated than those of Turkish Cypriots. In Turkish Cypriots' politics of nationalism, no new form of identity construction was observed. Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that Makarios manifestly launched a form of Cyprus-centred identity construction as he was disappointed with Athens's likelihood of reaching to a settlement with Ankara by neglecting Greek Cypriots' political will. For Turkish Cypriot politics of nationalism, which were based on the 'hope' that Turkey would intervene in the Cyprus Question, in the 1950s and 1960s, the loyalty to the 'motherland' dominated the very infrastructure of Turkish Cypriot national identity. Ethnosymbolist point of view claims that the nations have 'ethnic origins' (Smith, 1986) and this might explain Turkish Cypriots' loyalty to Turkey. Likewise, the Primordialist theory claims that the nationhood is 'natural' and 'given' (Geertz, 1973), the 'artificial' Cypriot state failed to represent Turkish Cypriots' Turkishness. Additionally, as the Modernist theory, particularly Brass (1991) and Breuilly (1993) argue, the Turkish Cypriot leadership utilized nationalism in motivating Turkish Cypriots to form ghettos and pave the way for secessionism or federation (in order to achieve a political goal).

The analysis of Turkish Cypriots' politics of nationalism displays no serious deficiency for the mainstream theories. Nevertheless, the case is largely different when it comes to Greek Cypriots' politics of nationalism. The historical period this chapter analysed monitors that Modernism is merely more successful in accounting for Makarios's *de-Athenized'* pro-independence shift when compared to Primordialism and Ethnosymbolism. In the 1950s, Greek Cypriot nationalism characterized Athens as the 'national centre' and is aimed at the Enosis. Nonetheless, in the 1964 crisis, the mono-ethnic Greek Cypriot government in Cyprus that ruled an UN-member state refrained from allowing Athens to make decisions on behalf of Greek Cypriots. As the Greek government failed to struggle against the 'double Enosis', Makarios invited his community to struggle for the territorial integrity

of their island. Furthermore, when the Greek government planned to overthrow Makarios to pave the way for a NATO-sponsored solution, Greek Cypriot nationalism found itself in a form of conflict with Athens (Druşotis, 2008). Greek Cypriots had expected that Greece would support them in their national struggle but the latter was sensitive about intra-NATO balances. This seriously disappointed Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, as several scholars note, the Athens-Nicosia split in 1964 crisis led Makarios to re-construct Greek Cypriot national identity with a clear emphasis on 'Cyprus first'. In this understanding of national identity, Greek Cypriots welcomed no Greek manipulation in Cypriot politics and they decided that they had to struggle against Turkish 'expansionism' with or without Athens (Druşotis, 2008).

Primordialism and Ethnosymbolism remain to some extent inadequate in accounting for this re-construction of Greek Cypriot national identity as the two approaches characterize ethnicities as long-lasting infrastructures of nationalism. Traditionally, Greek Cypriot nationalism was based on the understanding of 'mother-country' Greece and Makarios changed this. In the Makarios case, it is seen that there is a selection favouring Cyprus and Greek Cypriot interests over Greece and Greek interests in defining Greek Cypriot national duties. Anderson's (1983) notion of 'imagined communities' could account for Greek Cypriots (at least Makarios's) Cyprus-centred nationalism as Greece afforded to 'imagine' a form of 'double Enosis' and it was Greek Cypriots who had to struggle for the island's integrity. Breuilly and Brass as well can illustrate for this Cyprus-centred shift as Athens's priorities were different from Makarios's priorities and the latter required different socio-cultural motivations in mobilizing Greek Cypriots for the political struggle. Nevertheless, even though Modernism is more advantageous in accounting for Makarios's shift, the theory is hardly successful in picking nationalism out of the '*fanus*'.

The analytical framework of this thesis showed that Makarios's Cyprus-centred pro-independence nationalism was not 'totally' free of Cold War conditions. Promoting the 'double Enosis' would indirectly mean promoting NATO preferences while promoting independence would indirectly mean

staying closer to Soviet and non-Aligned preferences. As a matter of fact, Makarios was not as pro-NATO as he used to be in the 1950s since the alliance urged him to destroy the Republic of Cyprus to attain the 'double Enosis'. Furthermore, it was his relations with AKEL and the NAM's and the USSR's anti-NATO stances that enabled the Greek Cypriot leader to promote independence (). At this point, it might be assumed that Makarios's shift was not only a shift in nationalism politics; it was also a strategy compatible with potential supporters' interests at the inter-national level.

In the 1964 crisis, Greece was ready to oust Makarios if the latter tried to impede an intra-NATO settlement. Thus, Greece's stance was a pro-NATO one. It was surely Makarios's resistance against the 'double Enosis' and the failure of Greco-Turkish dialogue that urged Greece to support the Greek Cypriot cause. At this very point, we observe not only an interaction between local and international actors but also a clear interaction between nationalism and world politics. Makarios's de-*Athenized* nationalism was compatible with the anti-Western trend of non-Aligned states and the Soviet Union.

The key actor of the 1964 crisis was President Makarios, and the Turkish Cypriot community remained to a significant extent ineffective at the international level. Nonetheless, it is still understandable that Turkish Cypriot leaders demanded federalism instead of partition because, as the UN Charter (1945) assures each state's integrity and independence, destroying a UN member state was far more difficult than federalizing it. This thesis reaches to the conclusion that even though the Modernist point of view is quite successful in accounting for Makarios's pro-independence nationalism, in order the understand nationalisms in a multi-level context, Modernist framework is still inadequate.

Conclusion

As regards the research question 1, which is *"what was the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?"*, the analysis on the historical developments covering the era of 1960-64 monitored that the interaction between the two

had been mutual. The Greek and Turkish nationalist actors' politics on the island destroyed the bi-communal partnership. The NATO, including Greece, aimed for a form of 'double-Enosis' and this led Makarios to embrace a Cyprus-centred form of nationalism aimed at the independence of the island. The support Makarios enjoyed from the USSR and the NAM enabled the Greek Cypriot leader to inhibit NATO states from swallowing the Cypriot state. It should be stressed that, the NAM and the USSR became two powers interested in the Cyprus Conflict in 1960s, and, unlike 1950s, the Cyprus Question was no longer an intra-NATO problem. Thus, this gave Makarios a chance to utilize a form of Cyprus-centred nationalism instead of the pro-Enosis Greek nationalism in promoting Greek Cypriots' political interests.

In answering the research question 2, which is *"to what extent the mainstream theories of nationalism are capable of accounting for the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?"*, the findings of the thesis on 1960s is quite similar to the ones on 1950s. As the mainstream theories of nationalism neglect the interaction between the domestic nationalism politics and foreign states' policies, they remain largely inadequate in accounting for how the policies of USSR, NATO (including the 'motherlands') and the NAM shaped the nationalism politics of Greek and Turkish leaders on the island and the other way around. The political sociology in the mainstream theories of nationalism attaches no noteworthy importance to the aspect of international politics and this appears as a common weakness prevailing in modernism, ethnosymbolism and primordialism.

As Suzman (1999) notes, each nationalist movement requires international support. Makarios gained this very support from the NAM and the USSR as regards his pro-independence understanding of nationalism. Thus, Suzman's framework is helpful in evaluating the relationship between Makarios's politics of nationalism within international context. Additionally, Chatterjee (1986) argues that the colonial peoples struggle for independence against colonialism. As a matter of fact, Makarios promoted independence not in the colonial era, but in the post-colonial era. His understanding of nationalism aimed for the Greek Cypriot-rule over the island instead of the partnership of

the two communities. Thus, Chatterjee's model does not fully suit to Makarios's post-1963 politics of nationalism.

CONCLUSION

This thesis utilized a 'critical' theoretical approach and tried to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the mainstream theories of nationalism in understanding the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. The main conclusion it reaches is the fact that the mainstream theories remain inadequate in understanding the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. Mainstream theories (Modernism, ethnosymbolism and primordialism) focus on the formation processes of nations and nationalisms. As a matter of fact, their frameworks are not free of political analysis. Nevertheless, these frameworks largely neglect the international aspect of politics. This research concludes that the overall conditions in world politics (namely the Cold War) influenced Cypriot leaders' politics of nationalism to a noteworthy extent. Therefore, one might argue that the mainstream theories have a number of deficiencies in explaining the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context, as this context played quite a deterministic role at least for the case of Cyprus. Analytically, based on Yurdusev's model, the 'units of analysis' of this thesis were the politics of nationalism on the island: Makarios, Grivas, Küçük, Denktaş, EOKA and TMT as the 'actors' and Enosis, Taksim and Independence as the 'objects'. The research conducted by this thesis monitored that the international context played a vital role in shaping the politics of Enosis, Taksim and Independence as it either limited the political leaders' opportunities or gave them extra cards to play as regards their politics of nationalism.

As explained in the section of 'research objectives', this thesis analyzed the politics of nationalism followed by Greek and Turkish actors in Cyprus and observed the relationship between these politics and foreign states' (namely UK, Turkey, Greece, USA, USSR and Egypt) policies on Cyprus. The thesis also examined the strengths and weaknesses of mainstream theories in explaining the formation of nationalisms in Cyprus and these mainstream theories' capabilities in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context. This thesis had two research questions as:

"What was the interaction between Cypriot actors' politics of nationalism and foreign actors' policies on Cyprus from 1954 to 1964?" and *"To what extent the mainstream theories of nationalism are capable of accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context from 1954 to 1964?"* The 'answer' the findings of the research have given to the first question monitor that there had been mutual interactions between the politics of nationalism in Cyprus and foreign states' attitudes towards the island. As explained in broader details in the following parts of this section, on critical occasions, the political leaders on the island aligned their politics of nationalism in accordance to a number of foreign states' policies towards Cyprus. Likewise, the politics of nationalism on the island had had a clear influence on foreign states' actions towards Cyprus. When it comes to the second research question, thus to the capabilities of mainstream theories of nationalism in explaining the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context, the thesis concludes that all the mainstream theories have weaknesses in accounting for this context.

In focusing on the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context, this thesis covered two different periods: The first from 1954 to 1960 and the second from 1960 to 1964. In 1961, the NAM grew into a form of 'third power' via its neutrality in world politics. In 1962, the Cuban crisis manifestly urged the two major powers of the Cold War to avoid a nuclear war. This merely led to more positive inter-bloc relations. Additionally, in the 1960s, the *de-Stalinization* in Soviet foreign policy enabled Moscow to support neutralist leaders outside the socialist bloc. These developments indicate that the Cold War in the mid-1950s was far more different than the Cold War in the early 1960s. As a matter of fact, the politics of nationalism in Cyprus in the two different periods were also significantly different. This thesis pointed out that the changes in world politics were essentially reflected in the politics of nationalism on the island. At this very point, none of the mainstream nationalism theories seems to be capable of fully accounting for the role of international politics in the changes in politics of nationalism on the island.

This research pointed out that the nationalism politics in Cyprus and foreign states' policies towards the island significantly influenced each other. In the 1950s, the two communities' leaderships convinced the governments of their 'motherlands' to play active roles in the Cyprus Question. The Greek nationalism on the island was countered by the British with the 'pro-partition' discourses encouraging Turkey to weight in and inflaming the Turkish nationalism on the island. The American fears for the southern flank of the NATO urged the 'motherlands' to convince the communities on the island for the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. In the 1960s, the destruction of the bi-communal partnership by the domestic nationalist actors in both communities urged Washington and the three guarantors to seek for a 'double-Enosis' solution (namely the Acheson plan) and this led Makarios to promote the independence of the island. As these developments indicate, the politics of nationalism of the domestic actors and foreign states' policies towards the island had crucial effects on each other.

This thesis's analysis on the 1950s displayed that each mainstream theory might to some extent be accepted valid in accounting for the formation of nationalisms on the island. According to Berghe (1981), a primordialist scholar, race and ethnicity constitute the infrastructures of nationalism and national identity. It is a fact that the two communities on the island have different ethnic identities and a common Cypriot nationalism did not prevail in the 1950s. Both nationalisms aimed for unification with the ethnic 'motherlands' (Greece and Turkey). In other words, ethnicity constituted the core of nationalisms in the 1950s on the island. As an ethnosymbolist, Smith (1986) claims that ethnic groups protect their ethno-national cultures for centuries and this becomes the key impetus for nationalist mobilizations in the era of modernity. The clash between the two nationalisms on the island in 1950s monitors that the two communities preserved their 'Greekness' and 'Turkishness' for centuries even though the systems on the island in the Ottoman and British eras used to identify the people in religious terms (such as 'Muslims' and 'non-Muslims'). Furthermore, both nationalisms on the island suit well to the 'post-independence' typology of 'ethnic nationalism' Smith (1991) conceptualizes. As the scholar points out, some societies seek

to secede from a larger political unit (pre-independence) and they, later on, seek to annex territories of their ethnic relatives living in other states (post-independence). In this context, the ethnosymbolist scholarship's assumptions are also valid as the two nationalisms had the unification with ethnic 'motherlands' as their primary goals in the 1950s.

When it comes to the Modernist school, Gellner's (1964) argument that nationalism appears in the age of modernity and not before is also valid for the case of Cyprus. Not only the Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island in the 1950s, but also the initial Greek nationalism in 19th Century appeared with the increase in literacy and urbanization. Additionally, the modern 'high' national cultures of Greece and Turkey became inspirations for their ethnic relatives on the island. As Brass (1991) and Breuilly (1993) assert, the nationalisms on the island was to a large extent useful for the political elites in mobilizing the masses for political purposes. Not only the paramilitary activities of TMT and EOKA but also the mass rallies the two leaderships organized made ordinary habitants of the island nationalist actors. Among the rare typologies that did not suit to nationalisms on the island in the 1950s, Chatterjee's (1986) assumptions are included. The scholar notes that the anti-Colonial nationalist typology includes a 'united people' mobilized against the Colonial rulers for independence. In Cyprus, the two nationalisms did not seek independence. Instead, the nationalists on both sides were after unification with their ethnic 'motherlands'. It is useful to stress that, Chatterjee (1996) notes elsewhere that the anti-Colonial reflexes of one ethnic group lead the group to concentrate on preserving its own culture and it essentially neglects the political will of other groups. Actually, the case was highly similar for the pro-Enosis Greek nationalism in Cyprus. As the most populated ethnic group on the island, Greek Cypriots followed a pro-Enosis form of Hellenism and did not attach importance to the political will of other groups.

As previously noted, the mainstream theories are largely accurate in explaining the shaping of nationalisms on the island in the 1950s. Nonetheless, as these theories largely neglect international politics, whether

these nationalisms were somehow related to a 'larger game' in world politics remains as a puzzle. As Suzman (1999) notes, a nationalist mobilization is quite likely to seek recognition and international support. At this very point, the TMT's and EOKA's pro-Western discourses and anti-Communist practices are more easily understood. As the Soviet Union attached no noteworthy importance to the Cyprus Question in the 1950s, both nationalisms reflected pro-NATO attitudes as the future of the island would be determined by Western countries. As explained in the section '3.1.2', Nasser's anti-British attitudes and his success in the Suez were among the regional factors paving the way for the Greek nationalism to exert a form of international pressure on the British and rendering Turks suitable allies for Britain not only in Cyprus but also in the Middle East. This context becomes helpful in accounting for the alliance between the British colonialism and Turkish nationalism. Even though the Greek nationalism had Nasser as its primary regional ally, the materialization of the Enosis in the Cold War would essentially mean keeping Cyprus as a NATO island. Unfortunately, the mainstream theories of nationalism do not provide such an international perspective. Therefore, integrating a Suzman-inspired framework to nationalism studies is quite likely to overcome the mainstream theories' aforementioned weaknesses. As a matter of fact, no nationalist actor on the island tried to align its stance with domestic or international communists in 1950s as the Cyprus Question remained as an intra-NATO problem. However, as the findings of this thesis indicate, the conditions dramatically changed in the 1960s.

The thesis reaches to the conclusion that the leadership of the two communities were influential in shaping the policies of 'motherlands' on Cyprus. Both communities played crucial roles in getting their 'motherlands' involved in the Cyprus conflict. Nevertheless, as explained in the sections '3.1.3' and '3.1.4', the final word was told by international actors, not by the domestic ones. Pro-Taksim Turkish Cypriot elites and pro-Enosis Greek Cypriot elites were disappointed with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. However, the pressure exerted by the UK, USA, Greece and Turkey

urged them to accept the 1959 treaties. Thus, the 1950s was a period with more effective external influence capable of shaping Cypriot politics.

The findings of the thesis as regards the analysis on the two nationalisms in Cyprus prevailing in 1960s monitors that the mainstream theories are, to a large extent, capable of accounting for the Turkish Cypriots' politics of nationalism in the post-independence era as well. Nevertheless, for the Greek Cypriots' politics of nationalism, the Modernist theory is significantly more successful than its rivals as Primordialism and Ethnosymbolism can hardly explain Makarios's shift from 'Athens-centred' form of Hellenism to the 'Cyprus-centred' form of Greek Cypriot nationalism. On the other hand, the three mainstream theories remain insufficient in explaining the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context.

In the 1960s, the Turkish Cypriot leadership expected its Greek Cypriot counterpart to make an attempt on the destruction of the partnership. So, this would give them a card to proceed towards a form of secessionism. In 1963, when Makarios made an attempt on constitutional amendments, Turkish Cypriot leadership implemented its secessionist plans. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot community abandoned their positions in the bi-communal government and formed enclaves all around Cyprus. An ethnosymbolist account might argue that an ethnic community preserves its ethnic culture for centuries and sometimes the identity 'offered' by a state cannot be embraced by the community (Smith, 2005). Accordingly, one might assume that Turkish Cypriots, as an ethnic community, had preserved their Turkishness for centuries and the bi-communal Cypriot state did not represent their nationhood. Likewise, as a Primordialist scholar, Berghe (1981) notes that a nation is composed either by peaceful cooperation between different ethnic groups or by the coercion of the lesser one(s) by the major one. So, it might be argued that the Republic of Cyprus failed due to the lack of cooperation between the two communities or Turkish Cypriots' resistance against Greek Cypriots' coercive attitudes. Furthermore, as two Modernist scholars, Brass (1991) and Breuilly (1996) assert, nationalism is used as a political instrument in mobilizing masses to achieve political goals. Accordingly, the

historical facts signal that the Turkish Cypriot leadership utilized nationalism to mobilize the community to form the enclaves. As explained in the sections '4.2' and '4.2.1', Turkish Cypriot community's and particularly its leaders' federalist attitudes were not indicators of their loyalty to the Cypriot state. For them, if they failed to achieve a form of partition or secession, federalism would provide them with the basic requirements to preserve their Turkish identity. Thus, a new 'identity construction' for Turkish Cypriots hardly existed. Consequently, it might hardly be claimed that the mainstream theories of nationalism have noteworthy weaknesses in explaining Turkish Cypriot politics of nationalism in the 1960s. Nonetheless, the same does not apply to Greek Cypriot politics of nationalism. Historically, it might be thought that Makarios and Greek Cypriots were not as dependent on Greece (economically and politically) as Turkish Cypriots were on Turkey, and, this allowed Makarios to launch a form of Cyprus-centred construction of nationhood understanding.

First of all, the Modernist school is far more advantageous in illustrating for the Greek Cypriot politics of nationalism on the island prevailing in the 1960s when compared to its rival theories. During the 1964 crisis, Greek Cypriot leader Makarios generated a form of Cyprus-centred nationalism. As clarified in chapter four, the lack of trust between Athens and Nicosia urged Makarios to not to follow Greece's manipulations. Athens' attempts on shaping Cyprus's future by neglecting Greek Cypriots' political will and Turkish Cypriots' withdrawal (or violent removal) from the government increased Makarios's attachment to the Cypriot state. At this very point, the Modernist point of view overshadows primordialism and ethnosymbolism as the Greek Cypriot leader 'constructed' a new form of national consciousness by attaching importance to Greek Cypriots' territorial and civic identities that rendered them politically different from the mainland Greeks. The findings of this thesis largely correspond to that of modernist Cypriot scholars including Kızılyürek (2005), Loizides (2007) and Kıralp (2014) pointing out that the 1964 crisis became a threshold urging Makarios to shift from Greek nationalism to 'Greek Cypriot nationalism'. Here the arguments of Modernist school including Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1983), Anderson (1991), Brass

(1991) and Breuilly (1993) become valid as these scholars claim that the nationhood is socially constructed and it is not pre-given or static.

One might argue that the central arguments of primordialism and ethnosymbolism fail to account for Makarios's shift as they attach too much importance on the ethnic history of nations. As this thesis and the relevant modernist literature on Cyprus pointed out, the Greek Cypriot leader manifestly created a form of Greek Cypriot nationhood by abandoning the form of nationalism foreseeing an unquestionable 'loyalty' to Athens. Unlike what Geertz (1973) claims, the 'given' character of nationhood was outweighed by the constructed character as Makarios identified Greek Cypriots as a separate political entity instead of a community ruled by Athens. Additionally, Smith (1991) himself claims that nationalism is actually an entity's seek for freedom and Makarios clearly searched for that 'freedom' by refusing to follow his ethnic 'motherland'. This might be accepted as a fact approving the modernist point of view as the Greek Cypriot leader shifted from the traditional Athens-centred Greek Cypriot ethnic culture by promoting the independent Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, Cypriot scholars who followed the modernist position including Lacher & Kaymak (2005) and Vural & Rüstemli (2006) note that there are 'identity fluctuations' and 'identity transformations' in both communities. The conclusions reached by this thesis correspond to these claims as the Makarios-Grivas cleavage commencing in 1964 was reflected as a clash between Cyprus-centred (embraced by Makarios and his supporters) and Athens-centred (embraced by Grivas and his supporters) understandings of nationalism.

The non-Modernist scholarship on nationalisms in Cyprus including Alankuş (1988), Sakaoğlu (1992), Paksoy (2005), Chrysolaros (2010) and Çağlayan (2013) has the tendency to argue that the national identities of the two communities are based on their 'pre-given' and long-lasting ethnic cultures. Essentially, they claim that the nationhood in Cyprus has an essentially 'motherland'-centred and ethnicity-based character. The findings of this thesis largely contradict to these assumptions as with the 1964 crisis, Makarios started attaching further importance to the territorial identity and

characterized the Republic of Cyprus as a state independent from Greece. Such an understanding of nationhood cannot be understood with non-modernist approaches as the Greek Cypriot leader re-constructed the Greek Cypriot nationalism by prioritising Cyprus's territorial integrity over the unification with Greece. For this thesis, at least for the analysis on the 1960s, the Greek Cypriot national identity cannot be characterized as a 'pre-given' and static element as it manifestly fluctuated at least for Makarios during the 1964 crisis.

The analysis of this thesis on Greek Cypriot politics of nationalism, particularly as regards the 1963-64 crisis monitors Modernist school's advantages over the other theories. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of nationalism theories including modernism in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context is still valid. Makarios's shift from the Enosist line to the pro-independence line had many things to do with the international conditions. First, the NAM had already grown into an influential actor in 1960s. For the non-aligned countries, an independent Cyprus was more preferable than the NATO-sponsored Enosis. Second, the USSR had started supporting anti-NATO attitudes of non-socialist leaders outside its 'area of influence'. With the Acheson Plan, the US government aimed for the destruction of the Republic of Cyprus and the 'NATOization' of the island was 'totally' unacceptable to Moscow. In the 1950s, the nationalisms in Cyprus were based on politics acceptable to NATO. Nevertheless, in the 1960s, Makarios's pro-independence politics of nationalism were more acceptable to the USSR and the NAM. Simply put, in the 1960s, the NAM and the USSR were players and also instrumental actos used by Cypriot leaders (particularly by Makarios) in Cypriot politics. At this very point, Suzman's framework becomes quite beneficial in explaining why there had been a sharp change in Makarios's politics of nationalism. It was not the NATO that supported the independence of Cyprus during 1964. It was the USSR. Thus, it was hardly a coincidence that Makarios's politics of nationalism in the post-1964 era became preferable to Moscow. As he wanted to be supported by the West in the 1950s, Makarios followed the Enosist line and assured that Cyprus would remain as a NATO island.

However, in the 1960s, he required the East's support and followed an anti-NATO form of independence by shifting to a Cyprus-centred form of nationalism.

The analysis on the 1964 crisis shows that the international role of Turkish Cypriots was considerably weaker than that of Greek Cypriots. As the state remained under Greek Cypriot control, the state actions were taken exclusively by Greek Cypriots. Additionally, Makarios tried to balance the power of Greece, Turkey, UK and USA thanks to the support of the NAM and the USSR (see Kıralp, 2019). Turkish Cypriot leadership leaned exclusively on Turkey and their international position was therefore quite limited. It is also essential to note that, even though the international role of Turkish Cypriot leadership was far more limited when compared to that of Makarios, the domestic nationalist actors manifestly managed to destroy the status quo created by the guarantor states and the USA. As explained in chapter four, before the 1964 crisis, USA, Britain, Turkey and Greece had supported the maintenance of the status quo created based on the Zurich-London studies. Nonetheless, the Cypriot state was a 'reluctant Republic' (using Xydis's terms) as the pro-Enosis Greek Cypriot leaders and the pro-Taksim Turkish Cypriot leaders were not attached at all to the idea of independence. As clarified in the sections '4.2' and '4.2.1', both leaderships were making preparations to destroy the Zurich-London status quo. Consequently, the system created by NATO was destroyed by domestic nationalist actors. In addition to this, Makarios's pro-independence policies and the support he enjoyed from the USSR destroyed the Acheson Plan imposed by the USA.

Before and during the 1964 crisis, Turkish Cypriot leadership's policies were also different than their 1958 versions. Instead of promoting the share-out of the island by Greece and Turkey, Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed for secession from the Cypriot state or for a form of federation. Moreover, as the Denktaş-Dırvana conflict monitors, there had been a form of Ankara-Nicosia conflict between the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot leadership. Thus, both leaderships' understandings of nationalism, on some critical occasions, urged them into conflict with their 'motherlands'. As a matter of

fact, both leaderships had preferred some specific roles to be played by their 'mothers' and intra-Hellenic and intra-Turkish conflicts occurred when the 'mother' refused to act in the way the 'baby' preferred. On the other hand, most probably because they were still dependent on Ankara, Turkish Cypriot leaders did not re-construct the Turkish Cypriot understanding of nationhood. It is also essential to note that, even though for the Turkish Cypriot case, the politics of nationalism in the 1960s were also different from that they followed in 1950s, they did not control an independent state and unlike Makarios, Turkish Cypriot leaders did not develop a form of civic or territorial attachment to the Republic of Cyprus.

The findings of this thesis pointed out that not only the pro-Enosis and pro-Taksim (in other words 'pro-NATO') nationalisms in the 1950s but also Makarios's pro-independence understanding of nationalism in 1960s, which was built upon policies preferable to the NAM and Moscow, were not free of the conditions prevailing in international politics of their time. These findings also indicate that the mainstream theories of nationalism have weaknesses in accounting for the politics of nationalism in Cyprus within the international context as their frameworks neglect this context. For future studies, it is recommended to scholars and students of the field to integrate Suzman's approach to their frameworks or, alternatively, to develop models capable of accounting for the interaction between domestic nationalisms and international politics.

Generating a hypothetical model that combines mainstream nationalism theories (or at least one of them) with an international framework is likely to be a valuable contribution to the literature. As Gellner (1983) notes, nationalism is a phenomenon having to do with sociology, economy, culture and politics. The mainstream theories might be beneficial in understanding the sociological, economic, cultural and even the political aspects of nationalism. Nevertheless, as long as the political aspect is limited to a domestic perspective, some parts of the puzzle will remain missing. As nations and nationalisms do not exist in a *'fanus'* (glass lantern), they essentially have interactions with the world politics and a framework enabling

the researchers to observe such interactions appears as a requirement for the studies of nationalism.

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Jetlerimiz Kıbrıs'ta askeri hedefleri bombaladı [Our jets bomb military targets in Cyprus]. (1964, August 9). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Johnson, Amerikaya Türkiyeyi kaybettirdi [Johnson, made America lose Turkey]. (1964, October 31). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs ancak Türkiye'ye devredilebilir [Cyprus can only be transferred to Turkey]. (1954, December 7). *Milliyet*, p.7.

Kıbrıs bağımsız oldu [Cyprus became independent]. (1960, August 16). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs Cumhuriyet oluyor [Cyprus is becoming a republic]. (1959, February 8). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Kıbrıs için müzakereler [Negotiations for Cyprus]. (1956, December 14). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs için Türkiye'nin rızasını almak şarttır [The Cyprus issue cannot be solved without Turkey's consent]. (1956, March 15). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs Kıbrıslılarındır [Cyprus Belongs To Cypriots]. (1961, January 2). *Cumhuriyet (Cyprus)*, p.1.

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Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi kuruldu [The Turkish Cypriot National People's Party was established]. (1944, April 25). *Söz*, p.2.

Kıbrıs Türkleri namına Dr. F. Küçük devlet başkanlarına müracaat etti [On behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, Dr. F. Küçük applied to heads of states]. (1964, January 6). *Halkın Sesi*, p.1.

Kıbrıs Türkleri'nin teklifi "Federal Taksim" [Turkish Cypriots offer "Federal Taksim"]. (1964, March 28). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs Türktür [Cyprus is Turkish]. (1955, August 25). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs Türktür [Cyprus is Turkish]. (1957, December 16). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'a asker ve silah çıkardık [We have put out troops and weapons in Cyprus]. (1964, August 10). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'a NATO kuvveti teklifini şartlı Kabul edeceğiz [We will conditionally accept NATO force offer to Cyprus]. (1964, January 28). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'a Rus uçak seferleri açılıyor [Russian flights are opening to Cyprus]. (1964, February 24). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'ın ikiye taksimi muhtemel [Likely to partition of Cyprus into two]. (1956, December 20). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'ın Rusya'ya kayışı felaket olur [Cyprus's shift to Russia would be disastrous]. (1964, August 24). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'ta gerginlik son haddini buldu [Tension in Cyprus has reached its final limit]. (1955, August 22). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'ta iç savaş [Civil war in Cyprus]. (1964, March 10). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Kıbrıs'ta kanlı hadiseler [Bloody incidents in Cyprus]. (1963, December 22). *Milliyet*, pp.1, 7.

Kıbrıs'ta NATO birliği için hazırlık başladı [Preparations begin for NATO union in Cyprus]. (1964, February 2). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Kruşçev'den Makarios'a baskı yapmasını istedik [We asked Khrushchev to put pressure on Makarios]. (1964, August 14). *Milliyet*, pp.1, 7.

Lizbon'a gidecek heyet dün Ankara'dan geldi [The mission that will fly to Lisbon came from Ankara yesterday]. (1952, February 19). *Akşam*, p.1.

Londra konferansı bitti [London conferance is over]. (1964, February 1). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Londra konferansı tam çıkmaza girdi [London conference went into full deadlock]. (1964, January 20). *Milliyet*, p.7.

Londra Konferansına iki gün için ara verildi [London Conference was paused for two days]. (1964, January 21). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios 2 Türk Bakanın işine son verdi [Makarios terminated the 2 Turkish minister's job]. (1964, March 29). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios Atina'da [Makarios in Athens]. (1964, July 28). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios EOKA'cıları polise ve jandarmaya yerleştiriyor [Makarios places EOKA members in police and gendarmerie]. (1964, March 27). *Milliyet*, p.5.

Makarios flies in to see Nasser on arms offer. (1964, August 30), *Starit Times*, p.4).

Makarios hiç bir hal çaresi kabul etmiyor [Makarios does not accept any remedy]. (1964, August 1). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios ittifak anlaşmasını iptal etti [Makarios cancels treaty of alliance]. (1964, April 5). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios, B.M.e başvuracak [Makarios will be apply to UN]. (1964, July 31). *Milliyet*, p.1, 7.

Makarios, E.O.K.A. liderini itham etti [Makarios accuses E.O.K.A. leader]. (1964, April 2). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios, garanti anlaşmasını feshe karar verdi [Makarios, decided to terminate the treaty of guarantee]. (1964, January 2). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios, Genel Kurula başvurdu [Makarios applied to the General Assembly]. (1964, September 30). *Milliyet*, p.1, 7.

Makarios'a nota verdik [We gave a note to Makari1os]. (1956, June 3). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios'a Rusya yardım vaadetti [Russia promised help to Makarios]. (1964, August 16). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Makarios'un talebine 'Hayır dedik' ['We said no' to Makarios' request]. (1964, April 2). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Menderes bugün Zürich'e gidiyor [Menderes goes to Zürich today]. (1959, February 5). *Milliyet*, pp.1, 5.

Mezardan gelen seslerle cemaata ne güzel hizmet dersi âldık (!) [What a wonderful service lesson we took to the community with the voices from the grave (!)] (1962, May 25). *Nacak*, p.1.

Mısır dün dörtlerin teklifini reddetti [Egypt rejected the offer of the four states yesterday]. (1951, October 16). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Mısır hükümetinin dostluğa sığmayan bir hareketi: Kahire elçimiz Mısırı terke davet edildi' [The Egyptian government's unfriendly movement: Our Ambassador to Cairo was asked to leave Egypt]. (1954, January 5). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Mısır ve Suriye bir pakt imzalandılar [Egypt and Syria signed a pact]. (1955, March 4). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Mısıra dört devletin teklifi dün yapıldı [The offer of the four states was made to Egypt yesterday]. (1951, October 14). *Milliyet*, p.7.

Moskova'da Kıbrıs işi görüşüldü [Cyprus business discussed in Moscow]. (1964, November 1). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Müdahale ettik [We intervened]. (1963, December 26). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Muhalefet Karamanlise karşı kampanya açıyor [Opposition opens campaign against Karamanlis]. (1962, April 17). *Milliyet*, p.3.

Muhtariyet ve ilhak taleplerini reddettik [We rejected the demands of the autonomy and annexation]. (1955, September 2). *Milliyet*, p.1.

New passive resistance. (1955, September 29). *The Singapore Free Press*, p.2.

Ordu gençleşti [Army rejuvenated]. (1960, August 4). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Ordu, duruma müdahale ediyor [The military, is intervening in the situation]. (1961, October 24). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Ottawa Konseyinde, K. Atlantik Paktına iştirâkimiz temin edildi [In the Ottawa Council, our participation in the N. Atlantic Pact has been approved], (1951, September 20). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Papandreu 10 madde öne sürdü [Papandreou put forward 10 articles]. (1964, April 15). *Milliyet*, p.1, 7.

Paşa Necibin başından büyük teşebbüsleri [Pasha Naguib's bites off more than he can chew]. (1954, January 10). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Prensiplerde anlaşmaya varıldı [Agreed on principles]. (1959, February 11). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Rum ümitlerinin uzak ufukları ve Rum arzuları nelerdir? [What are the distant horizons and Greek desires of Greek hopes?]. (1960, August 27). *Bozkurt*, p.1.

Rumlar Kıbrısta NATO kuvveti istemiyorlar [Greek Cypriots don't want NATO forces in Cyprus]. (1964, January 28). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Rumların saldırı ihtimali artıyor [Greeks are more likely to attack]. (1964, June 28). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Rus yardımından endişeliyiz [We're worried about Russian aid]. (1964, August 20). *Milliyet*, p.7.

Ruslar Kıbrıs anlaşmasını kabul etti [Russians accept Cyprus agreement]. (1964, November 6). *Milliyet*, p.7.

Rusya Makariosa askeri yardım için teminat verdi [Russia assures Makarios for military aid]. (1964, February 29). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Sarper, görüşmelere dün Atina'da başladı [Sarper began talks in Athens yesterday]. (1960, October 21). *Milliyet*, p.1.

Suçlu aranıyor [Wanted guilty] (1962, March 30). *Nacak*, p.2.

T. Aydemir idam edildi [T. Aydemir executed]. (1964, July 5). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Türkler adada fiilî taksimi gerçekleştiriyor [Turks perform de facto taksim on the island]. (1964, January 10). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Yunan seçimlerini Karamanlis'in partisi kazandı [Karamanlis' party wins Greek elections]. (1960, October 31). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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Yunanistan çekimserleri elde etmeye çalışıyor [Greece is trying to take the neutrals on its side]. (1957, December 12). *Milliyet*, p.1.

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APPENDICES

Appendix-1: One of the most remarkable statements about the recent history of Cyprus by Henry Hopkinson.

CYPRUS (CONSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS)

HC Deb 28 July 1954 vol 531 cc504-14504

§The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs (Mr. Henry Hopkinson)

§Mr. Hopkinson

The reason Her Majesty's Government are to put forward revised proposals for a constitution is that, when the 1948 constitution was drawn up and offered to the Consultative Assembly, the full co-operation of the main parties was presupposed, but that co-operation has not been forthcoming and they have not been willing to operate that constitution of 1948. In many other respects certain of these political leaders in Cyprus have shown that the necessary co-operation to operate such a constitution would not be forthcoming, so in fact the constitution would not work. We are therefore proposing a constitution which we hope will work.

In regard to the second part of the question, it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] I think the right hon. Gentleman will agree that there are some territories which cannot expect to be that. I am not going as far as that this afternoon, but I have said that the question of the abrogation of British sovereignty cannot arise—that British sovereignty will remain.

Source: https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1954/jul/28/
cyprus-constitutional-arrangements

Appendix-2: NO. 5475. Treaty of Guarantee. Signed At Nicosia on 16 August 1960

No. 5475

UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, GREECE and TURKEY and CYPRUS

Treaty of Guarantee.   Signed at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960

Official texts: English and French.

Registered by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on 12 December 1960.

ROYAUME-UNI DE GRANDE-BRETAGNE ET D'IRLANDE DU NORD, GRÈCE et TURQUIE et CHYPRE

Traité de garantie.   Signé à Nicosie, le 16 août 1960

Textes officiels anglais et français.

Enregistré par le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande du Nord le 12 décembre 1960.

No. 5475. TREATY OF GUARANTEE.[1] SIGNED AT NICOSIA, ON 16 AUGUST 1960

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part,

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territoria integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest,

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution,

Have agreed as follows :

Article I

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.

Article II

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings ot the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.

Article III

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date. [2]

---

[1] Came into force on 16 August 1960, the date of signature, in accordance with article V.
[2] See p. 8 of this volume.

Article IV

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.

Article V

The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia.

The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at Nicosia this sixteenth day of August, 1960, in English and French, both texts being equally authoritative.

For the Republic of Cyprus :

† O ΚΥΠΡΟΥ ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΣ   F. KöçüK


For Greece :

G. CHRISTOPOULOS

For Turkey :

Vecdi TÜREL

For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland :

Hugh FOOT

Appendix-3: Belgrade Conference, September 1961

Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement#/media/File:Belgrade_
Conference,_1961.jpg

Appendix-4: The first Vickers TC-SEC aircraft to join the THY fleet

THY Filosuna katılan ilk Vickers Viscount TC-SEC uçağı Atatürk Havalimanına geldiği gün-1958
Ayaktakiler soldan sağa : D.Ali TURAN, Suat, Ali AK, Mehmet usta(marangoz), Erhan İNANÇ, Nazmi ORHON, Kemal, Hasan ABACI, Bekir, Abdurrahman, ? ?, Memduh KURNAZ,
Oturanlar : Hüseyin MÜEZZİNOĞLU, Sadık GÖL, Erkan ÜNAL

Source: https://www.airlinehaber.com/thy-1959-londra-viscount-tc-sev-kazasi
-detay-bilgiler-esliginde/

Appendix-5: 1 May 1925, the declaration of 'Crown Colony of Cyprus'

227

The Cyprus Gazette.

(EXTRAORDINARY, No. 1.)

(*Published by Authority.*)

No. 1691.]   FRIDAY, 1ST MAY, 1925.

No. 252.

COLONY OF CYPRUS.

LETTERS PATENT passed under the Great Seal of the United
Kingdom constituting the Office of Governor and Commander-
in-Chief of the Colony of Cyprus and providing for the Government
thereof.

Dated 10th March, 1925.

George the Fifth, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond
the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India : To
all to whom these Presents shall come, Greeting.

WHEREAS by an Order of His late Majesty King Edward the
Seventh in Council bearing date the Sixth day of July, 1907, pro-
vision was made for the exercise of the power and jurisdiction
vested by Treaty in His late Majesty in and over the Island of
Cyprus and for the constitution of the Office of High Commissioner
and Commander-in-Chief in and over the said Island :
Recites Order in Council of 6th July, 1907.

And whereas by an Order in Our Privy Council bearing date
the Fifth day of November, 1914, and known as the Cyprus
(Annexation) Order in Council, 1914, it was provided that from and
after the date thereof the Island of Cyprus should be annexed to
and form part of Our Dominions, and the said Island was annexed
accordingly :
Recites Order in Council of 5th November, 1914.

And whereas by an Order in Our Privy Council bearing date
the Twenty-seventh day of November, 1917, and known as the
Cyprus (Annexation) Amendment Order in Council, 1917, the said
Order in Council of the Fifth day of November, 1914, was amended :
Recites Order in Council of 27th November, 1917.

And whereas by an Order in Our Privy Council bearing date
the Thirteenth day of October, 1920, and known as the Cyprus
(Civil List) Order in Council, 1920, No. 2., Clause XXXVI. of the
said Order in Council of the Sixth day of July, 1907, was amended :
Recites Order in Council of 13th October, 1920.

And whereas by an Order in Our Privy Council bearing date
the Eleventh day of October, 1923, Clause XIV. of the said Order
in Council of the Sixth day of July, 1907, was revoked :
Recites Order in Council of 11th October, 1923.

And whereas by Article 20 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey
signed at Lausanne on the Twenty-fourth day of July, 1923, Turkey
thereby recognised the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the
British Government on the Fifth November, 1914 :
Recites Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed 24th July, 1923.

And whereas the ratifications of the said Treaty of Peace with
Turkey were duly deposited and the said Treaty came into force
as between the British Empire and Turkey on the Sixth day of
August, 1924 :

Appendix-6: The news that caused the events of 27-28 January 1958

Source: http://evrak.cm.gov.nc.tr/siteler/gazeteler/bozkurt/1958/

Appendix-7: Kıbrıs Türk Milli Halk Partisi (KTMHP - Cyprus Turkish National People's Party) established in 23 April 1944 with a logo "wolf head", (copied from Türk Ocakları)

Source: *Söz*, p.2 (25 April 1944).

Appendix-8: The midnight signing ceremony of 1960, August 15 to 16

Source: http://www.parliament.cy/tr/general-information/historical-review

Appendix-9: Fanus (Lantern, lamp glass, the round glass)

BIOGRAPHY

Cemal Yorgancıoğlu was born in Nicosia, North Cyprus. After completing his schoolwork at Türk Maarif College in Nicosia in 1993, Yorgancıoğlu entered Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta, North Cyprus. He received a Bachelor of Arts in international relations in July 1997. Until 2014, he was engaged in the private sector and family affairs and also received psychology certificates from Intercollage of Nicosia. In September 2014, he entered the international relations graduate program at the Near East University in Nicosia, North Cyprus and received a Master of Arts in June 2016. Yorgancıoğlu in September 2016, he was rewarded by the Near East University Admissions Committee with a 100% Dr Suat Günsel PhD Fellowship. In Political Science and International Relations Department with this thesis, he was awarded the doctorate degree. During his candidacy, he is the assistant of the International Relations and Political Science Departments, the technology editor of the NEU Journal of Social Sciences and the admin of FEAS web page. He also conducts Intro to Politics, Comparative Politics and IR Theories courses.

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PERSONAL ETHICS STATEMENT

YAKIN DOĞU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

Date: 18 June 2020

To the Graduate School of Social Sciences,

The research project titled "The Nationalisms in Cyprus Within International Context (1954-1964): A Critical Approach" has been evaluated. Since the researcher will not collect primary data from humans, animals, plants or earth, this project does not need to go through the ethics committee.

_____

Title: Assoc. Prof.

Name: Şevki Kıralp

Role in the Research Project: Thesis Supervisor

_____

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sağsan

Director of the Institute

Note: If the research project is a thesis, the supervisor and the co-supervisor (if applicable) should fill this form and send it to the relevant graduate school. If this is an independent project by a faculty member, they should fill this form themselves.