



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

**THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION  
(IOM) IN ENHANCING THE LIVES OF THE SYRIAN MIGRANTS/REFUGEES IN  
TURKEY, LEBANON, AND JORDAN**

MUSA ABDULMUMIN YELWA

MASTER'S THESIS

NICOSIA  
2021

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THESIS SUPERVISOR  
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2021

## **ACCEPTANCE/APPROVAL**

We as the jury members certify the 'ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) IN ENHANCING THE LIVES OF THE SYRIAN MIGRANTS/REFUGEES' prepared by the Musa Abdulmumin Yelwa defended on 16/12/2020 has been found satisfactory for the award of degree of Master.

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## DECLARATION

I Musa Abdulmumin Yelwa, hereby declare that this dissertation entitled 'The role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in enhancing the lives of the Syrian migrants/refugees in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan' has been prepared by myself under the guidance and supervision of 'Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü' in partial fulfilment of the Near East University, Graduate School of Social Sciences regulations and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any Law of Copyrights and has been tested for plagiarism and a copy

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In total submission to the will of Almighty Allah (SWT), I certify that it is with His guidance and support that I have completed this thesis. Verily all praise is due to Allah.

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And finally, I am indebted to my parents, whose value to me only grows with time. My sincere gratitude goes to them for their love and support throughout my life. Thank you for giving me the strength to reach for the stars and chase my dreams.

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated to the innocent vulnerable Syrians (refugees) living in informal settlements around the world.

In the pursuit of self and their relatives, they use any cached material to build shelter and seek refuge in any land; without any form of security. These are among the people who often face the most difficult situations in the world today, such as poverty, diseases, economic isolation, and racism. For many of them, human rights and values, such as democracy, human dignity, equality, and freedom are mere abstract notions with no substantial sense.

I furthermore argue that there is still a need for research addressing the motives and plans for more migration waves among Syrian refugees in the Middle East. Hopefully, this study will help to attract more attention to these Syrian refugees and bring them a viable solution.

## ABSTRACT

### THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) IN ENHANCING THE LIVES OF THE SYR- IAN MIGRANTS/REFUGEES IN TURKEY, LEBANON, AND JORDAN

International Organization for Migration (IOM) is today's world's leading migration player, a global intergovernmental body collaborating with states, intergovernmental, and non-governmental stakeholders. Most nations around the world are influenced by their policies and decisions. Yet, to what extent is IOM a big player in developing foreign diplomacy as well as coping with the influx of Syrian refugees in the post-2011 era?

This research primarily explores the foreign policy of the IOM through the goal of ensuring the well-organized and effective migration policies and encouraging international collaboration on migration issues; particularly, its capacity to force states to meet its objectives. This thesis will mainly focus on Syrian refugees: Since the start of the Arab Uprisings in 2011, millions of inhabitants have been displaced as a result of incessant revolutionary movements against the regime. A question to be asked is how far has the IOM reached in finding pragmatic solutions to migration problems, and providing humanitarian aid to vulnerable migrants, such as refugees and forcibly displaced individuals? Liberal inter-governmentalism and constructivism have been applied as a theoretical framework to answer this question.

**Keywords:** IOM, Migration, Refugees, Host communities, UNHCR, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan

## ÖZ

### **TÜRKİYE, LÜBNAN VE ÜRDÜN'DEKİ SURİYELİ GÖÇMENLERİN/MÜLTECİLERİN YAŞAMLARININ GELİŞTİRİLMESİNDE ULUSLARARASI GÖÇ ORGANİZASYONU'NUN (IOM) ROLÜ**

Uluslararası Göç Örgütü (IOM), devletlerarası ve hükümetler-dışı paydaşlarla işbirliği yapan küresel bir hükümetlerarası kuruluş olarak günümüz dünyasının önde gelen göç kuruluşlarından biridir. Bugün, IOM dünyadaki birçok ülkenin politika ve kararlarından etkilenmektedir. Özellikle 2011 Arap Ayaklanmaları sonrası dönemde Suriye’de başlayan çatışmaların ardından milyonlarca Suriyeli’nin mülteci konumuna gelmesi, Uluslararası Göç Örgütü’nün küresel düzeyde insan güvenliği konusunda nasıl bir aktör olarak işlev sahibi olduğu sorusunu gündeme taşımıştır. Bu çerçevede, elinizdeki çalışması, öncelikle iyi organize edilmiş ve etkili göç politikalarını sağlamak ve göç konularında uluslararası işbirliğini teşvik etmek amacıyla Uluslararası Göç Örgütü’nün dış politikasını araştırmayı hedeflemekte ve özellikle, IOM’nin üye devletleri bu amaca ulaşmak için zorlayabilecek bir kapasiteye sahip olup olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Bu tez çalışması; esas olarak 2011’de Suriye rejimine karşı muhalif hareketler sonucunda 6 milyondan fazla Suriyeli mültecinin yerinden edilmesi konusuna odaklanacaktır. UNCHR’in verdiği rakamlara göre; Türkiye başta olmak üzere Ürdün ve Lübnan birçok Suriyeli mülteciye bugün ev sahipliği yapmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, sorulması gereken en kritik sorulardan birkaçı ise, Suriyeli mültecilerin evsahibi ülkelerdeki algılarının ne olduğu ve IOM’nin göç sorunlarına pragmatik çözümler bulma ve mülteciler ve zorla yerinden edilmiş kişiler gibi savunmasız göçmenlere insani yardım sağlamada ne kadar etkin bir rol oynadığıdır. Tüm bu soruları cevaplarken, liberal hükümetlerarasıcılık ve inşacılık kuramları kullanılarak kuramsal bir çerçeve sunulmaya çalışılacaktır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** IOM, Göç, Mülteciler, ev sahibi topluluklar, UNHCR, Suriye, Lübnan, Türkiye, Ürdün



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## ABBREVIATIONS

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CSFP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CT	Counter Trafficking
DGMM	Directorate General for Migration Management
DICP	Department of International Cooperation and Partnership
DICP	Department of International Cooperation and Partnership
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EctHR	European Court of Human Rights
EIU	Economists Intelligence Unit
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
HNO	Humanitarian Needs Overview
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICFTU	International Confederation of Trade Unions
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGOs	International Non-Governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and Levant
ISSP	International Social Survey Programme
JRP	Jordan Response Plan
LDU	Local Development Unit
LI	Liberal Intergovernmentalism
LRP	Lebanon Response Plan

MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MCOF	Migration Crisis Operational Framework
MHPSS	Mental Psychosocial Support
MIGOF	Migration Governance Framework
MOPIC	Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation
MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PHA	Principles for Humanitarian Action
PKK	Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan
PRS	Palestinian Refugees in Syria
PSEA	Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PSS	Psychosocial Support
RPIS	Return Perception and Intention Survey
RRP	Regional Response Plan
SARC	Syrian Arab Red Crescent
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SGBV	Sexual Gender Based Violence
SHARP	Syrian Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan
SRAD	Directorate of Syrian Refugees Affairs
STD	Syria Trust for Development
TACs	Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency
TRCS	Turkish Red Crescent Society
TRP	Turkey Response Plan
UN	United Nations
UNCERF	United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Refugees in the Near East
UNSC	United Nations Security Council



WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization

## INTRODUCTION

### Background of the Study

Migration has become one of the challenging issues in shaping both the internal and external policies of many countries today. Due to various forms of migration that can be regarded as forced, illegal, or irregular migration societies are gradually becoming more diverse with refugees pouring steadily into more and more countries around the world, blending in new places and cultures. There have been frequently asked questions about the importance of diversity and day to day social relations, such as; how societies cope with change? How are they responding to diversity? How will migrants navigate the process of migration and contribute to the host countries and communities? How can multidimensional disparities associated with migration promote provenance communities and host countries, and perhaps the migrants as well? (Bimrose & McNair, 2011). A simple solution to all these questions is revolved around the process of 'integration', a mechanism by which it is possible to manage changes and variations. Both these aspects should also be examined in the creation of a specific integration strategy, given substantial qualitative adjustments and depending on how each migrant is perceived in the host society.

Oftentimes, the essence of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) seems hard to grasp. The reason is, on one hand, it is an intergovernmental body working with the United Nations' (UN) institutions, normally identified as part of the UN network, it also acts as an autonomous body to cope with the challenges of migration, on the other hand, in the absence of an international migration treaty, the authority of the IOM is controlled by its 173 member states that are focused on the constitution. The views on migration and the ideas on how to utilize IOM differ considerably among the member states. However, at times it seems like a private firm competing with civil society groups and NGOs. Among the works of the IOM also includes preventing illegal migration and returning unwelcomed refugees to their nations, or developing regions ravaged by natural disasters, which sometimes may be seen as contrary to its sole purpose for 'migration'. Thus, the IOM rises as a broad cohesive system of

schemes and field offices by which deviant range of problems are addressed, and swiftly moving from one to the next depending on the opportunities and circumstances given.

Recently, it is since the last decade that, the Middle East and North Africa has been characterized as a conflicting and catastrophic area, with increasing tension in politics; the effects of which have greatly influenced migration-related policy debates. The crises often seem to set up the foreign policy approaches of the region, by virtue of its integrity for oil resources and authoritarian rule, compelling some nearby states to comply. The outbreak of the 2011 Arab public protests which first engulfed Tunisia and spread to Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, gave rise to a civil war in Syria since then. Accordingly, Syria has become the arena for; the dilemma of both carrots and sticks- its people being subjected to an entrenched authoritarian rule, while, on the other hand, rebel forces battling to bring an end to the oppressive government that contributed to an incessant war (IDM, 2018). It is crucial to note the fact that how geopolitically the Syrian war has turned into a tremendous issue and also take into account the territorial influence.

Beginning in 2011, the Arab Spring had been spreading over MENA countries, demonstrating against their long-standing rulers and the region's lack of full democracy. The ongoing civil war in Syria, has confirmed to be one of the most violent conflicts since 2011. Nevertheless, the international community such as the UN attempted to involve in solving the conflict, but the proposals were vetoed by UN Security Council. Consequently, the Resolution no. 2249 was passed by, "condemning terrorist attacks and calling on member states to act against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)" and failed to take "all necessary measures" invoking "Chapter VII of the UN Charter which authorizes military action to restore peace and security" (Köprülü, 2018: 150, Telegraph news, 2015).

Nearly half of the population has been forcefully displaced, with several millions of people seeking refuge in the neighboring countries, especially Jordan, Leb-

anon, and Turkey (Tsourapas, 2019). Despite how these countries are struggling with their engraved problems, they have received many of the refugees and have thus had a significant and notable impact in these neighboring countries.

Additionally, some of the migrants were dispersed across Europe. "Women and children have encountered difficulties amidst the conflict as they lacked adequate access to maternal and child health (MCH) services that endangered their lives along with their immediate and long-term health outcomes" (IOM, 2016). The IOM closely monitors humanitarian assistance to people living in UN-designated areas precisely in the (refugee camps located in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan). The 'Syrian crises will be discussed further, by pertaining to the current situation in Syria and how international organizations, such as the IOM, handle the refugee issues.

This thesis aims to analyze and scrutinize the effectiveness of decisions of the IOM; and tries to answer the question, if it is still capable of supporting the lives of migrants and improving diplomacy as an adjunct of foreign policy on Syrian refugees? The study analyzes the IOM assistance to Syrian refugees receiving countries through the lens of Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Constructivism, thoroughly taking into consideration the present geopolitical situation.

The study will therefore in sequential order clarify the respective titles: introduction, statement of the problem, mission and purpose, significance of the study, research limitations, research question, hypothesis, literature review, a conceptual framework, case studies on the revitalization processes in Syria, the reviews and perceptions taken of the Syrian refugees, and finally the conclusion section - addressing the findings and shedding light for the forthcoming research areas.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Holding the Baath government (the Al-Assad family), and its allies' captive, the Syrian Arab Republic officially practices a semi-presidential system, which

hardly complies with democratic principles and thus does not determine the legal rights of its citizens, as well as fundamental human rights. In essence, simply put, Syria is a totalitarian regime where the president and his family has attained power through brutal intelligence and security officials, whose principal objective is to eradicate and repress opposition. Thus, as a result of the everlasting war that began in 2011, following the brutal response of the anti-demonstrations, as part of the Arab spring, nearly half the population has now become migrants and refugees within and across the region, hoping to find acceptance and opportunities. This calls for accommodating ways to aid the migrants or refugees seeking shelter in many places such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt (Montaser, 2020).

The semi-presidential system practiced in Syria has undoubtedly proven impermeability, maintaining its immense power in the hands of the incumbent rule (a unitary rule) at the cost of social and economic well-being of the citizens. Thus, despite the realities, very few custodians of power meticulously have nurtured false anecdotes to prove the continuing significance of the current regime: that it serves the people and reigns by general consent, that it is the custodian of national integration and Arab nationalist ambitions, and that it is a stronghold against Western 'imperialism' and Israeli 'expansionism' (Fanack, 2020). This continues to subvert the regime's transition and multi-party representation, calling for massive protests that resulted in the displacement of the multicultural population of the country by millions.

The nation, which has already undergone virtually ten years of war and displacement, now faces an alarming rate of hunger leaving countless people extremely vulnerable to COVID-19. As the pandemic spreads in the northeast (one of the country's most vulnerable regions), there is also a scarcity of the resources that are required to safeguard themselves.

Attempts to prevent coronavirus from breaking out in many of the country's congested tents and squatter settlements became nearly impossible. In government-held zones, as in nearby nations hosting refugees, Syrians live with the fact of COVID-19's danger, the struggle to work, and the nation's rising

economic turmoil are rendering their condition more difficult than it has ever been (Mercy Corps, 2020).

Hence, it is another call for a sustainable approach to improve the lives of these migrants or refugees.

In this context, this thesis will give insight on the obstacles and issues faced by Syrian refugees and hypothesize the very simple truth that, as the war continues, despite having paid comparatively little attention to these refugees, international organizations such as the IOM associated with the UNHCR and other nearby countries have helped accommodate and better their situation.

Thus, the vast literature on migration flows as well as approaches to international diplomacy has inspired this work to reassess the depth to which it can determine and enhance the very well-being of Syrian migrants or refugees through the IOM foreign policies.

### **Aim and Objectives of the Study**

This study essentially examines the impact of international bodies' collective partnership, specifically the IOM, in their activities to improve Syrian refugees' lives and well-being. More precisely, the research aims to classify the political actors working with the IOM into two categories: liberal political culture; those who have big economies, and those with less democratic or egalitarian values. Primarily, the grouping criteria used for this classification were the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS).

### **Significance of the Study**

One of the global pioneer issues facing the world today since 2011, has been caused by the ongoing Syrian crisis. This trend toward increased insecurity and abuses of human rights marks the beginning of the first mass displacement across the region. Therefore, the devastating impact of the war characterized the intensification of transgressions faced by migrants or refugees and lacking basic necessities wherever they found themselves within or outside their societies. This made the refugees seek more assistance even though

many other countries and societies have welcomed them.

There is an increasing number of studies on providing explanations for the prolonged Syrian war and the situation these refugees find themselves in. However, there is minimal research on challenging how harsh these refugees are being handled as they seek help. This thesis aims at bringing a sustainable solution to the refugee character seeking shelter in the main host nearby nations of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan; and claims the role of international organizations in enhancing and offering a better life for them. Models such as the IOM can thus reduce the difficulties of their present predicament.

The study also aims to incorporate dilemmas to the IOM practices and power dissemination and its engagement with the refugees to the existing empirical study.

### **Limitations of the Study**

The goal of this research is to explore the limitations of the IOM policies and how it can be accompanied by other collaborators as a possible answer to strengthening Syrian refugees' lives. Thus, the study has paid particular regard to the theory of the IOM policies and figure out how successful it has been in providing an extensive solution to the Syrian refugees. However, the review will only cover the period from 2011 to 2020, except where there is a crucial historic reference that will indicate current journal articles, publications, and credible authors are also being examined.

### **Research Questions, Hypotheses and Case Selection**

The study is promoted by these research questions:

- Ideational Factors: To what extent do the IOM policies affect the Syrian refugees?
- Is substantive convergence in the IOM policy approach workable towards the Syrian refugees?
- What are the overall perceptions of these refugees? (The overview of internal and external responses) and the impediments to their stay outside their

borders as well as their aspirations to return home.

## **Hypotheses**

My hypotheses are as follows;

- *The greater a member state's political power and economic size, the higher the possibility for it to follow an assertive shared normative policy towards Syrian refugees.*

The hypotheses listed above will be further explored using four selected case studies to justify the role that the IOM play in improving the lives of the vulnerable Syrian refugees: Two in high-level politics, i.e. the reconstruction of the areas ravaged by war (Nation-state re-building) and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law; two in low-level politics, i.e. the implementation of an appropriate standard in the humanitarian response plan (HRP) and the IOM appeal to diplomacy.

This study coins two significant considerations that have a great effect on the degree to which a particular normative approach is followed.

To begin with, the significance and influence of the partnering member states of the IOM over the refugees are considered important. Liberal intergovernmentalists believe that the scope of adverse self-interests and the expansion of institutional standards are equal in terms of national influence (Kurekova, 2011). Although several of the world's big countries have complicated ties with the Syrian Ba'ath government, their constitutional policies are less likely to interfere with Syria's political or economic concerns. Nevertheless, on the opposite, certain IOM partner countries in Europe, especially those impacted by refugees, have more nuanced interests in Syria, often in tension with certain policies of restraint.

On the other hand, constructivists argue that any member country of an organization is free to administer its own political culture at home. And at the same time, a member country may participate in another partnership. For instance,



there are EU countries that are welfare states that also comply with the requirements of the IOM. This is not unusual for them to have spoken extensively on normative matters as their political culture is expressed in foreign policy. Thus, many member states with a shared national political tradition don't necessarily communicate their interest. The scale of this factor has yielded a great work of political culture studies, which typically focuses on comparing the variations in cultural norms between individuals or organizations.

### **Data Collection and Method of Analysis**

In this research, a case study approach and comparative analysis have been used. The main advantages of using a case study approach in this research include identifying and evaluating intervening variables in particular cases that may be overlooked by merely explaining the influence of IOM; whereas, a comparative approach is used in providing historical examples of different instances of IOM interaction with Syrian refugees, and using contingent presumptions to describe important relationships such as concurrent interaction results in developing new IOM policies towards the refugees.

Centered on a multi-level strategy, collaborating agencies and states are at the center of the study, working mostly at the national and IOM settings and implementing their policies. This series of agreements contain a shared vision based on social values, fundamental concepts, and strategic goals. In each case, nevertheless, it is quite challenging to include every member agency or state and to compare them all. To simplify the analysis, this thesis aims to examine the priorities and policy objectives of four exemplary IOM- collaborating member agencies and states towards aiding the Syrian refugees: 'The top three' chief Syrian migrants' receiving countries (Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)'s status.

First, from a liberal intergovernmental point of view, these three are the member states with the most important economic impact and, at the same time, the greatest political effect in supporting the refugees. The study of these top three

states accommodates the ideal role of evaluating my first theory as their internal effects, national duty and complexities primarily alter the political decision of the IOMs' policies towards the Syrian refugees, although it is not enough merely to assess their circumstances. This is therefore important to draw a fair inference under comparatively small nations. Accordingly, UNHCR is included in the study as an associate exemplary agency, as UNHCR is one of the UN agencies with a traditional liberal political culture, with a mandate to protect refugees, forcibly displaced peoples, and stateless persons and to assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or relocation to a third nation.

About data collection, comprehensive archival work has been required on academic materials. As described above, the operationalization of variables will also allow the use of the existing databases for social research. In addition to secondary sources in both Migration scholarship and IOM studies, primary sources from official policy statements of IOM/Syria, leaders' speeches, meetings, and notes of conferences are also used in this study. In particular, reported interviews with academics in related fields writing about Syria and government officials in related areas have served as additions to this research (Asseburg, 2020).

The following section begins with the analysis of existing empirical research on the impact of ideational factors in the participation of the IOM in assisting Syrian refugees. It further maps the mechanism of the above-mentioned research questions by concentrating on four case studies which explain the migrants or refugees' situation.

## **CHAPTER 1: CONTEXTUALIZING THE STUDY OF MIGRATION**

This chapter of the thesis attempts to examine the key conceptual tools of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)'s status and its role under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration with the aim of identifying the necessity for orderly attempts to promote resilience through various interventions based on evidence-based, long-term development operations, and extensive alliances. The chapter further clarifies the IOM's primary theoretical frameworks and analysis for recognizing its obligation to interact with the Syrian refugees.

### **1.1 Definition of a refugee, an asylum-seeker and a migrant**

The thoughts inherent in those concepts' interpretation, in fact, made it very difficult to characterize them. These terms are used to identify individuals on the move, who have fled their homes across their territories. The words 'migrant' and 'refugee' are however sometimes used synonymously, because there is a legitimate dichotomy, it is crucial to differentiate them (Amnesty International, 2016).

It is a commonly accepted definition that a 'refugee' is a person, who has fled their own country due to war, violence, or oppression and is facing the threat of grave atrocities, seeking shelter elsewhere. Threats to their life and well-being have become so high that they feel they have no alternative but to run away and seek refuge beyond their borders because their government could not or would not shelter them from all those adverse effects (Amnesty International, 2016). Every refugee is, thus, entitled to humanitarian assistance. However, like the above definition, an 'asylum seeker' is one who has not yet been lawfully registered as a refugee and is awaiting a ruling on their application for

asylum. Asylum seeking is a legal matter. That implies everyone is allowed to seek asylum in another country. As contrary to refugees, there is no legal term recognized globally for a migrant. Like other entities and institutions, Amnesty International and the IOM recognizes migrants as individuals who are not asylum seekers or refugees residing outside their nation of birth (Amnesty International, 2016). For example, the term incorporates some specified statutory classifications of persons, such as migrant workers; smuggled migrants, and persons whose status or movements is not clearly defined by international law, such as international students, or those moving to reunite with their families abroad. Many also are leaving due to hunger, civil turmoil, violence, disasters, or other severe contingencies.

The majority of people do not even match a refugee's legal description, but they might still be in danger if they get back home. It is worth noting that even though migrants may not escape oppression, they still have the right to protection and accepted, regardless of their position in the host country. All migrants must be protected by governments from xenophobic and racist abuse, exploitation, and forced labor. Therefore, migrants should not be arrested or deported without any legal reasons.

## **1.2 The onset of the Syrian Crisis and the Influx of the Syrian refugees**

Since mid-2011 until now, the Syrian war has already displaced more than 6.6 million of the population across borders to nearby countries and has held an estimated 6.7 million internally uprooted people. Most of these refugees have primarily sought refuge in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon (UNHCR, 2020). Despite the ongoing support of refugee-hosting countries, the wellbeing of the refugees has increasingly become under severe threat, especially amid COVID-19 pandemic. Many Syrian refugees have moved on out of fear, especially to Europe.

The refugee crisis is the direct consequence of a popular uprising on massive riots as part of the Arab spring, in favor of a group of youths imprisoned for anti-regime vandalism, starting in the Southern town of Daraa in Syria. As the

conflict escalated, residents started to evacuate. The very first refugee encampments were set up in Turkey in less than two months in 2012, initially regarding them as 'guests', enjoying *de facto* protection. Over 3.5 million Syrians were hosted in Turkey since then. Over 1 million individuals managed to flee the country by March 2013. Presently, approximately 12 million Syrians are forcibly displaced and over one million children are born in exile. Of the 6.7 million Syrian refugees who have evacuated to nearby states, 93.7 percent reside in metropolitan areas, not in refugee centers (Amnesty International, 2019). Even so, it does not inherently imply that refugees are in a good state or secure. More than 60 percent of these refugees remain poor, whilst still, unemployment persists and unequal access to resources such as education and other basic services (Amnesty International, 2019).

Recently, uprisings intensify in Idlib, northwest Syria, and compelling communities to evacuate their families. About one million people have been displaced as of December 2019 amid the COVID-19 pandemic, about eighty percent of whom are women and children (Vonen, Olsen, Eriksen, Jervelund & Eikemo, 2020). The epidemic has also aggravated the Syrian migrants' security necessities. Millions of displaced persons have lost their jobs and COVID-19's economic effects render it harder to seek employment and acquire vital resources such as food, medication, and clean water. They encounter a high chance of diseases, particularly those staying in refugee camps. Resources are scarce, tents and communities are now heavily populated, finding it challenging to implement health policies such as frequent hand washing and isolation and many are stuck outside during freezing temperatures.

Given the severity, scale, and intensity of the problem in Syria, there is an immediate need for a dedicated international community's dedication to the underlying framework of legal engagement to working effectively for refugees. In this context, since the onset of the crisis, UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, and the IOM have been at the front line supporting the millions who have been displaced both inside and outside Syria. On 30 March 2016, UNHCR held a ministerial-level conference to facilitate the international division of power

through channels for supporting Syrian refugees. One of the crucial comments given at the conference by the UNHCR, Filippo Grandi, is; “*amid the refugee crises, we cannot react by shutting doors and creating barriers. The world needs to show unity and accept accountability for that*” (United Nations, 2016). In the gathering, strategies for Syrian refugee acceptance were discussed; including resettlement, initiatives for urgent entry, corporate funding services for people in a desperate situation, specialized immediate permits, and medical evacuation, as well as other options such as family reunification, workforce movement systems, and grants.

Even under scary and sometimes complicated circumstances, the collaborating partners are working tirelessly in providing life-saving services, safe accommodation, clean water, hot food, medical care, and other necessities to households that flee their families under pressure. Also, in recent months, the collaborating groups have donated warm clothing, protective blankets, boilers, and other economically important supplies to support Syrian refugees as temperature changes in the cold season (IOM, 2020).

### **1.3 Key conceptual tools of the IOM**

This part of the thesis outlines the key conceptual tools driving the IOM, identifying the role of the IOM in the structure and composition of the United Nations umbrella organizations; as part of the UN system’s six principal organs. A more holistic approach, incorporating migration aspects into increasingly addressing displacement conditions has also been provided in the section, based on the analysis derived from the extensive participation of the IOM in current displacement dynamics.

#### **1.3.1 United Nations (UN) Umbrella Organizations**

There are several agencies, projects, and programs that come under the six major arms of the United Nations structure. Organizations such as UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund), UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), and WHO (World Health Organization) are popular bodies within this Framework. The associated graph below illus-

trates the framework of UN organizations that deal with international development.




Image 1: The United Nations System

Source: (United Nations, 2011)

The pact on the Partnership between the UN and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was first enacted by the general agreement of the UN General Assembly on 8 July 2016. Simply put, the purpose of the UN-IOM Arrangement was to ensure greater cooperation between the UN agencies and the IOM while they execute their distinct directives. The pact formed a defined partnership between the two organizations, thus making the IOM a 'related Organization' of the United Nations.

At the welcoming conference of the Assembly's ruling in 2016, the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a statement saying that; *"Migration is at the core of the modern geopolitical climate and its socio-economic complexities."*

*A closer legal and progressive partnership between the United Nations and the IOM is needed more than ever at a time of unprecedented waves of migration within and across borders”* (United Nations, 2016). The Secretary-General emphasized that the ratification of the agreement by the regulatory bodies represents a ‘significant step in the long-standing and intimate partnership’ between the 69-year-old IOM and the UN, adding that *“the partnership arrangement not only legitimizes the alliance, but also creates much stronger coordination between the organizations while maintaining responsibilities and transparency”* (United Nations, 2016). He appeared hopeful that the Partnership Arrangement will lead to a successful approach to the global problems raised by massive and unexpected demographic flows, thus helping to consolidate the assistance given to the UN Member States in the execution of the migration-related aspects of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (United Nations, 2016).

At the same time, IOM Director-General William Lacy affirmed that *‘we live in a time of immense difficulty and chaos. This agreement reflects the commitment of the Member States to a more humane and organized exodus which helps everyone by celebrating the individuals behind the population’*. He added, *‘today is a historic day for migrants and families around worldwide, not just for the IOM and the UN’* (United Nations, 2016). In the deal, the UN acknowledges the IOM as a pivotal participant in the field of Migration. This requires the security of immigrants and displaced persons in countries impacted by migration, as well as in the regions of refugee relocation and voluntarily return, and integrates migration into the developmental plans of the country. It makes great sense to formalize the different linkages between the UN and the IOM. It is with no doubt the IOM is a comprehensive migration organization accepted by the UN system as an autonomous, non-normative organization that provides states with migration management services. Although the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has relatively extended its mission, yet, refugees remain the chief concern. As the IOM became an UN-related body, the UN has delegated to the IOM an increasing degree of authority for migration-related directorate procedures that would usually be performed by the UN Secretariat or by a specialist entity of the United Nations. The concern is that



the IOM's organizational structure varies profoundly from that of the UN, even in terms of mission, finance, and leadership, thus, this alteration of authority gave way to a controversial conflict of interest. In comparison, frameworks of oversight have been overlooked in this context.

#### **1.3.1.1 Distinction between a 'related organization' and a 'specialized agency' of the UN**

Within the UN charter document, the term 'related organization' does not occur at all. It is an umbrella term given to any entity that is a non-specialized agency of the UN but has the arrangement to collaborate with the UN. Accordingly, "under article 57 and 63 of the UN charter, the UN-IOM collaboration appears to resemble the relations between the UN and its specialized agencies. The major factor that separates the two entities is that the General Assembly directly controls over a specialized agency" (Cullen, 2019). In regard to both constitutional and financial matters, the General Assembly is obliged to make proposals to specialist organizations and thus specialized agencies become fully reliant on donations from the UN (UN, Arts 17; 58). Moreover, under article 64, the UN Economic and Social Council requests frequent updates from specialized agencies, such as, the measures taken by the two principle UN organs to enforce the guidelines of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Within the provisions of the UN-IOM Arrangement, the freedom and non-normative nature of the IOM has been explicitly upheld as being identical to that of the UN and the other related organizations. The analysis on the position of the IOM as directorate under the Global Compact Agreement and its potential role in international legal processes was prompted by this function.

#### **1.3.1.2 The position of IOM under Global Compact**

The Global Compact Agreement is a non-legally binding treaty establishing a basis for collaboration between states on migration issues. It was implemented in December 2018, following the conclusion of the UN-IOM Deal. As confirmed in paragraph 45, the IOM will function as the secretariat and director of the current 'UN Network on Migration', liable to oversee and assess the responsibilities of the Compact and establishing assistance for the enforcement of

those obligations such as capacity-building. The UNSecretariat (which comprises UNHCR and OHCHR, amongst others) usually undertakes both the preliminary activities for the Compact and the eventual follow-up and oversight (Cullen, 2020).

### **The dilemma of Global Compact processes with IOM leadership**

The IOM is an autonomous, non-normative organization that provides states with migration management services. It assists in handling migration in many ways, particularly returning migrants and avoiding illegal migration. It makes it more sustainable because it undertakes programs without normative restrictions; hence does not criticize government policy against certain normative criteria. The IOM functions more like a private firm than a conventional multilateral agency, relying on its cost-efficiency and promoting its privatization as a tool enabling flexibility. Capital flows into the IOM are obtained to finance particular initiatives through ad hoc contributions, mainly from states and multilateral organizations. The IOM, thus, has a business interest in migration management (Cullen, 2020).

Whilst the United Nations aims to preserve universal peace and stability in harmony with the ideals of justice and international law, particularly the protection and enforcement of regard for basic human rights (UN Charter, Article 1). The IOM's statutory duty is at the behest of and in cooperation with the states focused on, equip facilities to promote migration management, and to comply with the rules, regulations, and policies of the concerned states (UN Charter, Article 1). The UN-IOM Arrangement stipulates that the IOM is expected to govern itself through compliance with the aims and values of the UN Charter and, more broadly, to take proper account of UN regulations (Article 2(5)), however, it is clearly shown how a contradiction might occur.

The IOM, unlike the Secretariat of the UN, is not bound to the wider structure of the organization's Charter or the checks and balances contained in it. The benefit of letting the UN Secretariat oversee procedures including those called for in the adoption of the Global Compact is that in the recommendations it

gives, it has a responsibility of objectivity. The Secretariat of the UN's autonomy is regarded at face value by its governance: Boutros Ghali represented it to the Secretary-General as 'psalm 100' (Foreign Affairs, 1996). Contrarily, the IOM is systemically designed to accept government orders, since it represents governments.

### **1.3.1.3 The IOM as a smokescreen in politics**

For most states that want to exclude the migration policy at the UN General Assembly, the defining characteristics of the IOM make it more appealing in their eyes. Thus, in terms of moving any migration-related concerns to the IOM, states dissatisfied with the migration problem will vote an 'out' to the extent that instead of addressing the concerns in the panel process of the General Assembly, an initiative will be made such that those issues will be deferred to the IOM. With the IOM heading the Global Compact, it has been proven.

There are clear issues that all technical guidance and secretarial services are rendered by a civil service contractor with a financial motive at hand and no regulatory obligation to facilitate the enforcement of a mechanism in which the basic human rights of citizens are at play. To recognize that migration is the human rights zeitgeist of this era, one just needs to look at the documents of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), or the organizational structures of the UN human rights treaties (Cullen, 2020).

None of this suggests the UN migration management is or to be especially well-coordinated, that somehow the UN system of checks and balances has been either fully satisfactory or beyond scrutiny, or that its regulation of specialized agencies is optimal in some way. However, for the network management, supervision, and execution, such as the one needed under the Global Compact, it is critical that the UN has, and the IOM does not have, a normative legislative structure calling for the preservation of human rights, integrating unique oversight frameworks, and specifically demanding objectivity from its Secretariat in making recommendations to human rights.

### **1.3.2 The International Organization for Migration (IOM): A Preliminary Framework**

The IOM's history has been widely acknowledged to have arisen from the Second World War. Thus, this section offers a background hint on prior frameworks and changes that shape its prevailing diplomatic approaches towards the Syrian refugee crises.

Since early 1952, following the turmoil and displacement of Western Europe after the Second World War, the IOM commenced its operations. Later in 1953, a constitution was adopted, which was originally named as 'Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration' (ICEM). It was commissioned to assist European governments in identifying war-defeated resettlement countries, as well as providing transport for millions of migrants. Since the last half century, the IOM have participated in several human-made protracted crises and natural disasters. Examples include the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1973 military coup in Chile, the Vietnam war of 1975, the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Kosovo and Timor 1999, and the Asian tsunami and Pakistan earthquake of 2004/2005, as well as recent crises in Sudan, Zimbabwe, Myanmar, and Georgia (Olin, Florin, and Bengtsson, 2008). Nearly 11 million people were estimated to have been uprooted. Between 1998 and 2008, the organization extended its reach to become the largest international body collaborating with various government bodies to raise awareness of migration problems, to facilitate socio-economic development through migration, and to safeguard the civil liberties and the very well-being of migrants.

The IOM is today's world's leading migration player, "a global intergovernmental body guided by its migration mandate described in the IOM constitution, the Migration Governance Framework (MIGOF), the Migration Crisis Operational Framework (MCOF), and the Principles for Humanitarian Action (PHA), and other formal documents elaborating IOM's mandate" (MIGOF, 2015). Thus, 'resettlement' is an often unrecognized but persuasive mechanism, a sign of mutual unity and a share of blame to find a viable solution for immigrants who cannot go back home for fear of discrimination and who cannot live

in their country of resettlement. Nevertheless, ‘resettlement’ has been globally identified as one of the three settlement options for refugees. In emergency aid and the sector of voluntary return and resettlement, local inclusion, re-location, and thus broader stability, peacebuilding, security, and sustainability projects in origin, transit, and host communities that lead to the construction of favorable conditions, the IOM has a great deal of expertise. This comprehensive body, described by the MCOF, provides a holistic approach to migration crises taking account of imminent effects and long-term implications of displacement, especially in prolonged displacement predicaments, and adds to the efforts to enhance stability and to resolve the root causes of crisis and displacement.

In 2012, the term ‘migration crisis’ was first used by the IOM to grasp the nature of mass migrations crisis’ which raise imminent and long-term migration security issues, often using serious setbacks for endangered people and communities. IOM is an important part of the oversight committee of humanitarian law, revitalization, peace-building, human security structure that help the national, regional, and global agendas, including the Sustainable Development Goals, even though migration and displacement are frequently multi-dimensional subjects. IOM, unitedly with UNHCR, co- leads the Global Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster for Natural Disasters and IDP-induced conflicts of particular relevance to the worldwide displacement context. Accordingly, Global Cluster for Early Recovery reported that,

“Reports on Global Cluster for Early Recovery noted the IOM and its specialized task force on Resilient Strategies as participating members of the Strategic Advisory Group to the Global Cluster for Early Recovery and engaged in projects conducted by the Solutions Alliance. In addition, IOM is a participant of the specific duties for the Global Security Cluster” (2016; 12).

Regarding the transnational relocation due to disasters, IOM is a permanent appointed member of the ‘Nansen Initiative Steering Committee’, a collaborative intergovernmental mechanism led by States and other actors to assist them in properly planning for, reacting to and resolving the longer-term impacts of the crisis on the safety and health of migrants affected. In crisis countries

IOM is also the executive committee for migrants.

The number of regional mechanisms and structures relevant to migration stresses the significance of accessions to migration problems. IOM works with the world's leading institutions and fora, as well as regional intergovernmental mechanisms, through a variety of network agencies and fosters regional movement opportunities for displacement. IOM considers States as prime custodians and supports States, upon their request, to meet their duties in compliance with international law in securing individuals' and their interests. IOM works together, in this specific role, to maintain well-organized programs with government partners at all levels and also to develop the capacity to deliver successful and productive policies and activities. IOM also works with relevant United Nations institutions, international organizations, civil societies, private sector, academia, and diaspora, covering humanitarian, sustainability, peace, and security sectors, realizing the importance of multi-stakeholder alliances to respond efficiently and thoroughly to complex and uncertain displacement patterns.

### **Mission Statement of the IOM**

"Working in Partnership, optimize the possibilities of migration policies that encourage resilience to the progressive settlement of the refugee populations, other migrants and adversely affected communities" (IOM, 2020).

### **Key Programmatic Principles of the IOM**

For the progressive resolution of displacement cases, IOM implements a sequence of key programmatic principles. These principles are driven by essential international framework mechanisms that determine the duties and obligations underlying the IOM.

- Accept countries as primary actors and, at their invitation, aid States to discharge their duties in compliance with international law, to protect persons and their interests.
- Be guided, other migrants, and impacted populations by their rights and concerns, consider and promote their ambitions, and their self-understanding

of concerns in radical displacement solution.

- Recognize the populations affected are not standardized. The needs and degrees of insecurity of numerous populations, homes, and individuals vary and thus reach adequate levels of self-confidence, security, recognition of human rights and stability at various stages.
- Encourage the right to select viable options, particularly those that require versatility and cannot align with current processes and frameworks that promote substantive involvement in the process.
- Acknowledge the shift from disaster to stabilization for people, families, and communities; endorse the approaches in this process, identify the agents, supports, and motivators of resistance, rehabilitation, and growth of affected societies.
- Enhanced collaborations to discuss strategic and operational efficiencies in the pursuit of radical management of displacement circumstances among different actors, especially non-traditional allies such as the diaspora and the private sector (IOM, 2020).

#### **1.4 The Theoretical Framework of the IOM's Policy**

The theoretical research on IOM synthesis consists of a broad framework, a separation of mainstream approaches between realism and liberalism, as well as other alternative theories, including constructivism. Above all, this section provides an overview of the theoretical background of the IOM-led foreign policy work. Current ideologies (i.e., federalism and neo-functionalism) will be incorporated in the first part, and hence proceed by addressing the controversy between realists, liberals, and constructivists.

Federalism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism have had a significant influence on IOM convergence in the early years. In several respects, these three theories differ, however they still follow a common assumption, for example the significant role of intergovernmental organizations in integration. Taking Europe as a case; for Mitrany, the federalists believe that it is only by establishing a European unitary state that stability and prosperity can be achieved in Europe (1965: 129). Originally, states merge into small operational or economic fields; afterward, partly incorporated states undergo growing impetus for more

integration rounds in similar areas. In Neo-functionalism; the mechanism of regional unification in terms of how three correlational factors are linked to each other: economic interdependence among nations, abilities of organizations to settle conflicts and build actual diplomatic regimes, and a federalized commercial law that substitute state-wide trade systems (Haas, 1961: 317). The theory of neo-functionalism suggests a reduction in the value of nationalism and perhaps the nation-state; forecasts that government officials, social institutions, and broad multinational corporations within states will inevitably find it within their society to seek the best-satisfied objectives of political and market convergence at a higher, supranational stage. Even so, for this reason, it is yet to be found any evidence that, there are no supranational players in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. The same may be extended to IOM adoption, with various countries working together to accomplish shared objectives.

Realists are usually pessimistic regarding the growth in political integration. Global migration governance from a classical realist perspective is determined by the State's balance of power, as the administration handling migration has been divided. Thus, the disintegration of the system is considered to occur as a result of terror, ignorance, and insecurity coupled with the Westphalian conception of nation-state hegemony. To progress in developing a successful system, it is deemed necessary to acknowledge the fragmentation and strive to establish a patterned state ruling typically composed of many adverse effects that will enable the international organization i.e., (the IOM) to consider and develop innovative methods of cooperation.

Liberalism is considered important to clarify exactly how the IOM is being applied and how the DICP arises from the organization. Liberals, on the one hand, take a rather more pragmatic view of stakeholders in foreign relations than realists, enabling the participation of supranational institutions as well; on the other hand, they are more positive about the chances of bilateral collaboration and are thus more likely to accept the progress of the IOM. As Moravcsik states, the Liberal Inter-Governmental School claims that states only negotiate on certain topics favored by their local majorities because their prime concern



is in being elected at the supranational stage. He added that compromises at this stage are the result of asymmetric interdependence (Moravcsik and Nicoladis, 1998).

Constructivists, though, claim that the interpretation Moravcsik's made on the link between local affairs and the state's interests is clearer because it is left with no any clarification about where the interests of the state originated. Constructivist perspectives provide a way of understanding the IOM institutional development that is distinct from rationalist views, in that they see concepts and conventions as part of the cultural sphere rather than as part of rationalist perspectives. The fundamental principle of constructivism approach is that all of the pivotal facets of the global politics are socially constructed. In other words, they are affected via simultaneous shared interaction processes. Wendt has clarified the two widely accepted basic notions of constructivism as; the mechanisms of human interaction are defined predominantly by common ideas rather than by external powers, and Individual actors' identities and interests are defined by shared ideas rather than by natural order (Wendt, 1999: 32). In short, constructivist approaches emphasize the importance of norms, identity and other cognitive factors. Briefly, constructivist approaches stress the significance of cognitive norms, identities and other variables. Therefore, to centralize the concept with the subject of the study, the approach of IOM foreign policy towards the Syrian refugees is not merely applied by an IOM collective decision-making body, yet every member state contributes to the decision-making processes.

Several conceptual assumptions underlie the IOM analysis. The IOM is well established to in the academic community, as are so many organisations dealing with migration, but it has been mostly under-researched, at least until quite recently: only a very limited number of scholars have developed IOM into a study topic of its own. For Pécoud (2017), it has expanded its role and transparency in global migration policy to a large extent since the 1990s and has thus been regularly scrutinized by both academics and civil society groups. This resulted in its promotion as a status of an UN-related entity in 2016 (2017: 26). In this case, liberal inter-governmentalism and constructivism combined

will best describe the goal of the analysis, whereas liberal inter-governmentalism envisages a framework in which inter- governmental organizations work domestically and globally at the same time, constructivist approach stresses the importance of subjective variations in foreign policy interpretation and the reality that states don't seem to foresee.

#### **1.4.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism**

The need for institutional structures to initiate and promote collaboration between countries has historically been demonstrated by liberal institutions. The theory has given rise to a great deal of concern about the ability and prospects for continued international co-operation in the post-cold war world by international organizations, in particular by the United Nations. Many recent events, especially the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the re-emerging neo-conservative US foreign policy agenda to wage the relentless 'war on terror' and enlarge the field of democracy by power, go against the fundamental values of liberal institutionalism.

Realists and liberal scholars collided over the effectiveness of organizations to establish and maintain collaboration between States over a decade ago. The first report was launched by John Mearsheimer with an essay on International Security, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', written in 1994/95. In this essay, he tried to expose institutional theory's inherent flaws, particularly liberal institutionalism. He argues firmly that structural theories are defective and have little impact on state behaviour. Furthermore, Mearsheimer concluded that a pledge of liberal institutionalism to foster collaboration and peace is essentially baseless in the post-cold war world. Keohane and Martin (1995: 40) said that the institutions were essential to the operation of the government's actions, but that it would be the challenge of 'discovering how institutions could start successful interstate alliances and under what terms'. They thus suggested that institutionalism could subjugate realism by laying out the criteria for collaboration, accusing Mearsheimer of favoring his pragmatic perspective.

Liberal intergovernmentalism considers states as the key players, but also gives prime importance to international organizations such as the EU, in

which each state seeks to achieve its target by compromise and bargaining. Since 2019, “the commonly held conceptual plan of the IOM’s foreign policy for Syrian refugees depends on the crucial position that partnering Member States hold in setting up and enforcing agendas, through their own choices. This has not only stopped at the Inter-Governmental Department of International Cooperation and Partnership (DICP), but continues at the IOM Council, where expertise is shared and monitored by the member states, and thus, does not exclude the implementation of intergovernmentalist approaches” (IOM Research Institute, 2016). For liberal intergovernmentalism, the Member States are at the heart of the IOM’s foreign policy towards Syrian refugees and are key decision-makers at the eleven levels of the IOM’s external relations policy; for that reason, liberal intergovernmentalism is best maintained.

The two views of this assertion are under the principle of liberal institutionalism, one which dominates the theory of classical liberalism at the domestic level, and neoclassical theory of migration, prioritizing the organization on the international level. The neoclassical economic theory explains migration as induced by variations in profits of labour beyond markets. In Hicks’ works (1932) a widely shared concept was developed to characterize migration in the context of economic growth. Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970) stress that migration problems emerge from major wage differences within market economies or countries that emerge from complex scales of workforce strength (Kurekova, 2011).

Institutions foster laws of socialization; create codes of behaviour involving attention and understanding appropriateness. Organizations often include supra-national players with major forces in international affairs. Intergovernmentalism, distinct from realism and neo-realism, acknowledges the importance of the IOM institutionalization in its relations with Syrian refugees, and the role of internal forces (member states), including the flow of ideas in policymaking. The IOM partnership with the main refugees’ host countries of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon has illustrated how critical institutions have been in defining and influencing the priorities and policies of the member states, especially in its effectiveness and capacity of aiding these refugees with the support of the

host governments.

To clarify the IOM's reaction to its external demands (in this case, the Syrian refugee crisis) it is considered important to analyse the views of its leaders, decision-makers, and migration agencies. According to the neoclassical economic theory, migration is driven by regional inequalities in the labour markets and income gap disparities between developing and developed countries (IDM, 2018). Scholars including McKinsey, (2016); and Özer, (2014) suggest that most of the countries accepting Syrian migrants and refugees, especially Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, depend on IOM support when it comes to their migration policy approach; and that these countries understand that services play a key role in deciding the availability of state priorities (IDM, 2014). Nevertheless, there is a need to illustrate the optimal model in foreign policy debate.

#### **1.4.2 Constructivism**

As an international political theory approach, constructivism is not a uniform or coherent construct, but rather a tremendous separation between its theorists and many other theories, which makes constructivism hard to use in terms of a broad criticism and interpretation model. Especially regarding the position of the norms and the normative – that still holds a central place in the constructivism of Kratochwil, yet are a minor adjunct to Wendt's theory.

Wendt's approach is fundamentally contrary to that of Kenneth Waltz as illustrated in International Relations Theory. Wendt stresses that Waltz 'asked the appropriate questions, but answered them incorrectly'. In essence, the argument aims at demonstrating that many of the causal forces in foreign relations deemed by Neo-realists and neo-liberals to be 'empty shells' with little awareness of personality and how certain systems and constraints of actions within the regime they are otherwise properly representing. In specific, Wendt compares the actions of individual human beings and that of states — stating that people behave on objects, including other actors, based on their significance'. The concern is that the state is an exclusively hegemonic player for foreign relations and not influenced by domestic citizens in the representation by neo-

realists of countries as unitary actors (Wendt, 1999). As Wendt (1999) puts it, states are pre-social in comparison to other states in the same sense that the human body is pre-social. We can only speculate on social mechanisms at the state structure level if these processes have created exogenous, reasonably safe contexts. Steve Smith (1999) remarks, this is troubling, since it excludes humanity from the state's problem—through enabling states to play a part in international relations by supplying states with a 'personality', Wendt eliminates the role of internal persuasive behavioural issues and eliminates any input capacity in the international system (Williams, 2008).

Wendt attempts to re-establish the systemic study of foreign affairs in a collection of essays and books. This includes taking note of the role of personalities, expectations, and principles in justifying the actions of the state within a logic of neo-realists' strength. In other terms, states often misinterpret each other within the defined laws' and often that the identities of states are essentially constitutive. Their identities are mutually subjective. This conduct of countries, however, seldom forms their personality and the actions of other states (Copeland, 2000).

Constructivists see the IOM as a normative body. Its presence is a stipulation to preserve unity and to foster a rational tendency for the accomplishment of a shared aim. Simultaneously, its existence promotes some values of the United Nations: equality, human rights, labour force enhancement, health, trade, environment, both of which offer a justification for states to follow certain goals and to create an 'IOM' identity (Andreatta, 2005). In that sense, the partnering member states of Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon are acquainted with the purpose of the organization in the Syrian refugees' influx and, consequently, the relevant organizations such as the UNHCR are increasingly associated with the goals, decisions, and restrictions. For Sandholtz, the impulses may be translated outwardly with the specified normative framework (1996: 17). With the given normative structure, the instincts could be projected outwardly.

Additionally, to relate the methodology to the study, constructivism may function as a link between the perceptions of the IOM policies on Syrian refugees'

influx and the perceptions and reviews of these refugees in the local host communities. Constructivists see the form of connections between the IOM and the Syrian Ba'ath regime and the host states as initially circumscribed by the concept of assisting but not through supplying material forces (mutual benefits), however, the values and interests of voluntary partnerships are largely based on common values rather than based on existence. This shows, therefore, that constructivism opens up space for the identities and interests of international actors such as the IOM, and also see these stereotypes and motives as the outcome of the social development of such ideas in society. IOM work has found that the image of the organization is of considerable significance to the development and execution of its policies. When considering the power of identity regarding the IOM foreign policy towards Syrian refugees, it is considered necessary to take into account the interaction between IOM identity and the UNHCR, as well as the major host countries for the Syrian migrants.

### **1.5 The Notion of IOM Practices and Power Dissemination**

IOM philanthropic dedication has grown and helped report gaps in the forced migration governments, especially concerning the displaced people who are unable to gain refugee status. Nevertheless, if a government wants to sustain its adherence to core human rights and humanitarian values, there is a strong need to incorporate security issues more consistently into the function of the IOM and to overcome the dissonances connected with its continuing participation in contentious practices including 'supported migrants' volitional reinstatement'. For the most part, UNHCR and IOM work hand in hand on assisting volitional reinstatements, while IOM receives the criticism mostly. Koch goes on to argue that, increased coherence in the work of the agencies and, in effect, the power and control of the forced migration regime have been constrained by rivalry between the respective IOM departments and increasing pressure from the various branches of the IOM Member States; who could enable IOM to grow as a principal humanitarian actor, while continuing to urge unwieldy compliance with humanitarian and human rights standards (Bradley, 2017). Geneva is a case in point, where IOM has a very small, understaffed office that ensures a minimal role for inter-agency conferences where aid

agencies set priorities and train for control. On the other hand, especially in the aftermath of catastrophic events, IOM increasingly expands its presence in the field to become one of the major operating organizations, exerting power and influence, from planning and allocation of capital to policy-making and lobbying in several respects.

This section includes Barnett and Finnemore's research on the influence of international bodies and the global governance structure that Barnett and Duvall clarify the key International Organization's structures', utilizing various kinds of power (Bradley, 2017). Four forms of power are proposed: coercive, hierarchical, systemic, and efficient. Nevertheless, they focused on coercive, hierarchical, and efficient control in applying this classification to liberal international organizations, which are most suitable for interpretation of IOM's changing positions (Bradley, 2017). It also explores how IOM responds to these varying kinds of power, to a lesser extent. While conducting this study, the IOM, like many other intergovernmental organizations participating in humanitarian response, is acknowledged to be positioned at the nexus of nation-states, global human rights frameworks, and democratic rule. In other terms, the role of the IOM is influenced to differing degrees by the values of human rights, state priorities, and the push to outsource products and services rendered by states in some ways, including defense, humanitarian relief, and rehabilitation, either to civil society organizations, international institutions, or private institutions.

Although IOM is sometimes viewed in research (to the point that it is regarded at all) as a systemic outsider, however, this study shows that the IOM is very much similar with many international institutions designed to enhance and take control of the area in question.

This study, further, highlights the reality that the IOM's acquisition and practice of authority and power is not a sequential process: its actions on certain fronts undermines its legitimacy and, ultimately, its influence as an established humanitarian player, while at the same time improving its role and its commitment to the field by other activities. As Barnett and Finnemore claim, the exercise of power by multinational institutions is strongly related to their ability to

establish and assert legitimacy as bureaucracies. Fully grasped as an actor's willingness to implement philosophic and organizational means to compel certain actors to withhold judgment, power may be assigned or dependent on normative statements or knowledge (2004: 17). Although certain security stakeholders within IOM are keen to create greater authority by more systemic support and commitment to egalitarian values, yet their goal still places them at odds with other priorities within the Organization, such as gathering and maintaining the jurisdiction.

### **1.6 IOM diplomatic involvement with Syrian Refugees**

A variety of factors, not just the war, have greatly affected the Syrian migration dynamics. Determinants such as increasing climate change and also demographic and socio-economic trends have influenced the lives of these migrants and triggered their transition. To better understand the essence of having Syrian refugees or rather the migration in the Middle East as a whole, scholars have narrowly defined it as comprising of three strongly interrelated trends: (a) involuntary resettlement and mass displacement resulting from multiple, extreme, and prolonged region-wide upheavals. (b) Wide flows of illegal immigrants, driven by some economic as well as many other factors, specifically within the region or across to Europe. (c) Labor migrants' mobilization (regular and irregular) within and across the region, further with oil-producing countries posing as an attraction center for migrant labor. (IDM, 2018) The IOM extensively utilizes the Organization's high-level programming spectrum across the region, including disaster contingency preparation and response; migration and relocation; post-crisis restoration; migrants' well-being; border control; labor force revitalization; counter- trafficking assistance; such as repatriation assistance for abandoned immigrants.

*The key priorities set by the IOM to help the Syrian migrants or refugees in the region are:*

- a. Working to promote the power of education on migration discourse among states, civil society groups and other regional decision makers on migration, migration management and migration policies.



- b. Making a positive contribution to free, stable and reliable migration, with sustainable and equitable human rights protection of all migrants to strengthen the transmission of migration outcomes to the communities of origin and destination countries;
- c. Improving relief efforts to address displacement dimensions of catastrophes, with a greater focus placed on both displaced migrant communities and societies that have been affected.

“By its services, direct support for refugees, policy aid and technical assistance, research, and advocacy, the IOM works to this end. Nearly across the entire Middle East, the IOM have branches with approximately 1,500 staffs” (IOM online bookstore, 2015).

The prevailing reality that the alleged IOM's diplomatic involvement to aid the Syrian refugees has faced many challenges. Although certain pressing matters, such as the 'ongoing lack of a diplomatic solution to the Syrian war', have often created huge tension, as such, other contextual factors such as 'students continuing their education' have had an immense impact on the engagement as well. The host countries have therefore developed new strategies and response mechanisms to address the implications of extended refugee stay.

Starting in 2011, the crises in Syria has heightened, the instability sparked intense exodus in large numbers to locations both within the region and beyond. The conflict has become the primary reason for the rise in refugees and the ensuing desperate humanitarian condition in the region. Although the violence shows no indications of deterioration in the immediate future, there is a gradual rise in the number of Syrians leaving their homes. Nevertheless, concerns about the potential effect of the Syrian conflict on the reach and size of human migration are yet to be addressed. As the effect of the crisis on host communities grows, so too does the need for a survey into the need for sustainable security in these countries.

As the crisis reaches its 10th year, millions are still in search of life-saving assistance. Amid prolonged violent attacks, “the UN reports that more than 11 million Syrian civilians require humanitarian assistance within Syria, 4.65

million of which are suffering urgent needs. Although almost 176,000 Syrians returned to their homes between January and April 2020 - most of them internally displaced, 1.2 million were freshly displaced during that time. More than 6.6 million Syrian population are forced to flee, with nearly 5.6 million of which are refugees as reported in the region" (IOM, 2020). While the influence of the conflict begins to intensify, exacerbated by economic challenges and a rising COVID-19 pandemic, "almost 70% of households within Syria are insecure or highly vulnerable" (IOM, 2020). In the surrounding countries of Syria, the overwhelming majority of refugees stay below the poverty line. IOM remains dedicated to helping disadvantaged communities throughout Syria and throughout the region with life-saving and sustainable support ranging from humanitarian supplies and site protection to the production of livelihoods.

This part of the thesis is intended to pull together a range of studies investigating and addressing human mobility in the sense of the Syrian crisis, in particular looking at the diplomatic role of the IOM.

## **CHAPTER 2: CASE STUDIES ON THE REVITALIZATION PROCESSES**

The findings of this chapter are primarily based on the theory of Liberal intergovernmentalism. This is a theory that aims to understand the larger development of regional integration, in particular, the transformation of European integration and it does work in my argument to consider the foreign policy of the IOM. Thus, this chapter provides an inclusive framework of the IOM in implementing a Humanitarian Response Plan in the region and further explains the distribution of funds appealed by the IOM according to the severity of the refugee impact in each host country.

The theorists of liberal intergovernmentalism, Hoffman (1966, 1982); Moravcsik (1993, 1998); Milward (1984, 1994) claim that the definition of the European Union cannot be clarified by a single aspect, and suggest that various methods or hypotheses are required to better grasp the dynamics of the EU. Liberal intergovernmentalism sees states as the main actors and sees the EU as an international institution that can be examined in a situation of a disorder by recognizing states as the main actors, where each state achieves its objective by negotiations and bargaining. In specific, liberal intergovernmentalism examines the mechanism of such agreements and negotiations between EU member states. The IOM, like the EU, can also be seen as an independent integration of states with diverse objectives seeking a shared aim jointly.

The decision to collaborate internationally can be described in a three-stage process as one way to reaffirm states as actors and minimal rationality assumptions: States first identify priorities, then negotiate practical arrangements, and finally establish (or adapt) structures to adhere to and protect those results in the face of potential political instability. Each level is different according to LI,

and each can be described by a different theory. Cooperation, or its absence, only occurs after the multi-causal chain (Schimmelfennig, 2018).

## **2.1 Syrian Nation-State Rebuilding**

Given the relentless path of the war, the Syrian Baathist regime has in military terms, emerged victoriously. The regime and its allies have now proven to dominate about two-thirds of the country, attempting to retake the remaining areas. Diplomatic arbitration proceedings, rapprochement between war sides and social determinants, or lasting peace and prosperity are not prospective. Consequently, the country has a military base of domestic and international militias with mutually incompatible strategic objectives and aspirations for the long term political and social order in Syria, as well as with five regional and global forces (United States, Iran, Russia, Israel, and Turkey).

It is also predicted that the 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL) remnants and other extremist insurgent factions will structure the center of a new channel of militant groups and terrorists. They are prone to adversely affect attempts to reformation and also have wider repressive implications. Therefore, "the Constitutional Committee, which started its duties under UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen in late 2019, should not be expected to agree on substantive constitutional amendments or a negotiated resolution of disputes (assuming have taken place at all)" (Asseburg, 2020). Besides the lack of key parties, the Ba'ath regime under the rule of Bashar al-Assad has also made it crystal clear that it has no desire in sharing power or a democratic transition and has therefore distanced itself from the delegation of its own.

Rebuilding Syria is well underway at the moment. It does not however follow the model strategy of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), which would revolve around a centralized regional program with central planning and development, and foreign support. Simply put, several initiatives are being started by different actors, mostly at national level. In general, they don't pay attention to the needs of the people or even the refugees. Rather, they seek to further particular interests and goals in the overwhelming majority of cases and as such generally reflect the perpetuation of the war by other means.

It was in the fall of 2017 that the Baath government launched the optimization process for the first time, maintaining its control over the country as its primary interest. Instead of an extensive national revitalization, the aim was to use minimal ways in a politico-economic paradigm. The policy focuses primarily on real estate and infrastructure, covering nearly all of the country's oil and gas fields and agricultural land beyond the influence of the regime. The main objective of the reconstruction efforts is to consolidate the transitions of legitimacy that took place during the war, forced displacement, and so-called rapprochement pacts; to honor the allegiance of past and present leaders by supplying them with profitable revenue streams, as well as to reward the regime's foreign allies for accessing Syria's riches. However, no mechanism has been undertaken by the Syrian Baath regime to resolve the atrocities perpetrated during the war, transitional justice, mediation between population groups, nor institutional changes to foster equality, social integration, and rule of law. On the contrary, there continue to be significant human rights abuses and war crimes.

### **2.1.1 Politicized reconstruction**

The regime has provided over 60 legislations and rulings governing housing, land, and property (HLP), urban development, and infrastructure concerns since 2011. Together they constitute the foundation of constitutional revitalization and provide state privileges, such as monitoring strategic priorities where private properties can be seized. These powers were used by the regime not just to occupy land and buildings on a mass level with no proper accountability or compensation, but also to tear down entire communities, particularly in the outskirts of Damascus, Homs and East Aleppo, (whereas hindered IDPs and refugees from moving to strategic locations). Instead of restoring war damage, such central government-development programs are meant to modify population composition, typically to the expense of groups considered to be weaker and perhaps less reliable. Some Syrian refugees, however, find it difficult to assert private property because they live (or resided) without documents in squatter camps, i.e., being it they lost their papers while migrating, or simply because they damaged property records. Slums are reported to account for nearly 30 to 40 percent of the housing in Syria. Transportation and security

issues often leave many IDPs and refugees unfit to schedule an appointment with authorities (Asseburg, 2020).

Supporters of the regime are given lucrative investment opportunities among the ruling elites, mostly in affluent housing projects. “Rami Makhlef and Mohamed Hamsho, the cousin of the president, have gained large corporations in the consolidation of both the traditional elites and a new class of arms dealers” (Cornish, 2019). This tends to occur in an economy experiencing severe financial crises, sanctions, and high inflation, as a direct consequence of military confrontation and hostile foreign intervention and has also been more profoundly tormented than ever, by nepotism, corruption, anarchy, informality, and legitimate instability. The ‘conflict elites’ play a major role in the creation of local actors whose alliances with government, politicians, security forces, and local militias allowed them to play a significant part in the war, attempting, for instance, to mediate deals between regions ruled by different powers or with foreign agents. They now take a significant position in reconstruction, even though in these fields the government is still pursuing coordinated efforts against leading politicians.

By comparison, attempts to encourage Syrian investors residing overseas to consider investing in the country have also failed. The possible reason for this is the region’s politico-economic aspects which, in addition to the obvious issues, include a rigid investment environment and an absence of effective property security. In 2019, Transparency International rated Syria as the third highly corrupt nation in the world. As stated by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the proposed investment law framework will marginally boost the investment climate in 2019. It is intended to minimize bureaucracy and create more opportunities by lowering taxes on imports and increasing access to finance (UNCTAD, 2018).

### **2.1.2 International Aid on a short leash**

The regime developed a political and legal structure for foreign aid, guaranteeing that humanitarian and development bodies are not able to function independently in the territories it governs. The regime determines who provides

foreign assistance, where it goes, and who benefits. In this context, it is clear that humanitarian assistance is shared as it aims to protect the allegiance of elites and other individuals who are considered trustworthy and discipline others. It thus typically applies to residents of previous rebel forces such as the outskirts of Duma and East Aleppo.

With this, the regime has imposed strong restrictions on foreign interventions, particularly in international organizations' support of required sub-population in their outreach. It systematically refuses (or completely disregards) demands site inspection, evaluations, and needs assessment, and the same extends to cross-border operations approval. To carry out their work, international organizations collaborate with local partners, such as; the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) and other government-authorized NGOs like, the Syria Trust for Development (STD) (Bernard, 2017). These bodies are often dominated by the security services held accountable for severe civil rights abuses and serve as proxies for elected authorities, military officers, or militia. International corporations' policies and their practical implementation should be issued in precision or perhaps enacted by those decision-makers as well.

## **2.2 Human rights and rule of law**

In recent years, widespread animosity, mistreatment, and discrimination against migrants and several other foreign nationals are becoming much more apparent globally. Analyses, reports, and assessments persist elusiveness on the existence and scope of issues and successful solutions. Adherence with the promotion and protection of migrant rights is inextricably related to marginalization, low-status, or illicit enterprises. Illegal immigrants are most often labeled as a resource of cheap labor, beyond the protection of working conditions, healthcare, wage rates, and many other obligations, although clearly facing deportation. Respect for the fundamental civil liberties of every people in societies provides an important, transparent, and equal ground for addressing and resolving the disparities, hostilities, and possible issues that eventually bring about dialogue for different individuals and organizations with diverse priorities.

This part summarizes the key developments, concerns, players, and projects related to understanding and enforcing the protection of Syrian migrants' human rights. The claim is that the rule of law and basic conceptions of human rights are requisite principles of a free democracy and universal peace. Research shows that abuses of the basic rights of these migrants are so prevalent and often a crucial component of contemporary migration flows.

About 12 million of Syria's population live outside the country. Stated by Patrick A. Taran, the statutory enforcement of international human rights standards to foreign nationals in many nations is grossly lacking or gravely flawed, particularly with respect to irregular migrants. (Taran: 2020, Page 8) A thorough overview of the conditions, issues, and actors associated with maintaining Syrian migrants or refugees' fundamental rights and integrity for appropriate measures should be considered. It is an 'Surprising' and often 'problematic' call to resolve the human rights facet of the reality of 12 million people residing outside their country - nearly half the population - as refugees, immigrants, or permanent migrants. 'Surprising' - since research, funding, or stabilized participation in the field are relatively minimal. 'Problematic' - because it is such a controversial topic, one which organizations are raising little money and one that hits hidden agendas that would rather not see the problems explained in detail.

Given the lack of research in the field, adequate conceptual and empirical evidence is provided to explicitly and unambiguously assert that human rights abuses against these migrants or refugees are so prevalent that they are the major determining factor of modern migration flows. These individual decisions to abandon their native communities and move somewhere else are solely focused on multiple considerations instead of just one explanation. Every question of human migration purposes must take account of the political, economic, social, and environmental forces of the country that influence the choices individuals make to migrate.

At a specific frontier, the multifaceted conditions make it difficult to differentiate between refugees and other migrants. Internationally, however, it is generally



accepted that individuals who flee persecution are classified as refugees, as defined by the UN Convention and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees. Though, for 50 years now, since the bipolarity world order, the essence of military, political, and economic conflict has changed considerably (Taran, 2018: Page, 13). There are other considerations apart from direct persecution which endangers people's protection, integrity, and civil liberties. Nevertheless, there is no international norm for identifying and assessing the security needs of the people escaping the perpetual civil disorder, environmental destruction, or economic decline that threatens their life.

In 2016, an IOM committee report acknowledged that unlike many other basic variations among nations that inspire the most flow of migrants; Syrian migrants or refugees have begun to leave their homes in search of relief since the war began in 2011 (Taran, 2018: Page, 17). Given those circumstances, such has contributed to a fall under a critical level of tolerance, beyond which they no more view hopes of surviving in compliance with local protection, integrity, and well-being standards. Although definitions of acceptable economic standards and circumstances differ greatly across various nationalities, a key constraint is the opportunity to live above a locally optimal dignity of the norm. In turn, today's displacement is in no minor portion the key facet of the collapse or lack of a prosperous society and the denial of human dignity.

Syrian migrants, who are living overseas have often been seen as capable of working long hours for minimal earnings and having few opportunities to seek welfare or certain rights. "Standpoints mostly from ILO and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) indicate that organizing these migrants into unions or organizations for the protection of their rights and privileges is very hard" (Linard, 1998). Since it is not deemed inappropriate by state legislation, organizing (particularly those without correct work authorization) is easily intimidated and disturbed by the risk or actual practice of deportation. Because of their absence of appropriate acknowledgment or unstable position in destination countries, the migrants may also be employed without paying salaries, income taxes, and other expenses, which provides tax gains for workers.

### **2.3 Promotion of HRP-related Norms**

The Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) is designed for a prolonged or unexpected catastrophe that needs international support. “The program encapsulates the coherent purpose of how the vulnerable community can adapt to the needs articulated. Implementing an effective mitigation strategy is a crucial phase in the humanitarian plan process and is only achieved when the demands are identified and evaluated through the Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) or other collaborative needs evaluation and analysis methods” (OCHA, 2020).

It is a fact that there are continuously growing humanitarian needs of the Syrians. This is directly attributed to long term destabilization, recurrent displacements, deprivation of wellbeing, and tangible resources, inflated costs, and minimal economic opportunities, as the war participants disregard the people by violating international humanitarian and human rights law. With sustained crisis speeding significantly high insecurity rate, poor families and refugees need multidimensional protection to maintain their wellbeing. Thus, the influx of desperate migrants escaping Syria has been impeded by some neighboring countries, leaving thousands of refugees trapped at their outskirts in horrible situations. As the conflict is on the rise, so is the response. “A conference was held in December 2012, where the regional response plan (RRP) was adopted as a result of the coordinated strategies of more than a hundred partners around the world, with some thirty new NGOs and UN affiliates appealing for funds, to help find ways to support the vulnerable population across the region. One of the key objectives discussed during the meeting is to guarantee coherence between the RRP guidelines and the Syria Humanitarian Assistance Response Plan (SHARP) adjustments, to develop a strategic approach” (UNHCR, 2013).

The Syrian crisis is regarded as the fastest-growing human displacement since 2011 with no possibility of safely returning to their homes in the immediate future, and increasing suffering in recipient communities, where the refugees undergo through inhumane circumstances (Cornish, 2019). Simultaneously,

the states and the humanitarian communities accepting the Syrian refugees in the region encounter extremely daunting and multifaceted problems that endanger the sustainability of the whole region far beyond urgent security and support concerns of the refugees. In certain cases, it is believed that such communities are beyond humanitarian actors' control. However, since the uprising in 2011, several actors (states and international organizations) have been and still are struggling to deal with the influx of Syrian refugees.

More than six million Syrian refugees are now welcomed in five countries- Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt, each of which has its own set of national objectives and issues where developments in Syria and the flow of refugees are playing a vital role. The governments have shown a strong dedication to ensure the Syrian refugees with direct passage to their territory and assure them protection, however, the tremendous pressure on their infrastructure and resources keeps increasing. Thus, "the UNHCR claims the actual number of Syrian refugees in the region to have surpassed the estimated number because not all were register" (UNHCR, 2013). In this sense, the section proposed the top three major Syrian refugee recipients (Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey) by explicitly identifying their timely humanitarian acts as a way to improve the lives of these migrants or refugees.

### **2.3.1 Lebanon Response Plan (LRP)**

Lebanon is the major recipient country of the Syrians, hosting about 1.5 million refugees, as of 2019. Given the perpetuity of the crises, the prevalence of refugees in the country has become a matter of social and political discussion, with frequent comparisons to the effect especially on the economy, unemployment, and the environment. The significant population rise has raised immense and growing demands on the government, the people, and the international community to deal with the situation, as there are several facets of problems linked to this issue, varying from threats to national security, health, and the deprivation of shelter and protection. Today, the humanitarian needs have increased far beyond estimation, as the COVID-19 pandemic has claimed the lives of many people and continues to cause destructive social and economic agitations in the country. Thus, the Lebanese Government realizes the need

to keep creating security and support services to the Syrians.

Collectively adopted by the Lebanese authority, UN, UNHCR, IOM, and NGO collaborators, the Lebanese response plan, strengthens Lebanon's viable strategy for relief efforts of displaced Syrians in Lebanon, including Palestinian Syrian refugees (PRS), Lebanese returning home, and the Lebanese host communities seriously impacted by the refugee crisis (OCHA,2020). The refugees are hosted in over 1,200 locations across Lebanon, tightening the community responders' positions and placing relentless stress on social services and employment. The living standards of refugees and other displaced people have become extremely uncertain and the support services of both displaced and host communities are decreasing. Hitherto, public health, education, sanitation, waste disposal, and social service sectors are at the forefront of relief efforts.

This strategy outlines the increased coordinated assistance for vulnerable communities, both necessary to address a progressively distributed refugee populace and to encourage greater integration with the residents. Primarily, humanitarian interventions identify the neediest and guarantee that the urgent needs for individual protection and assistance are met. Special attention is paid to lifesaving measures, including food aid, clean water, and hygiene, the supply of key relief products, and immediate medical services and housing. Collaborators also emphasize critical security and integrity approaches including certification, proper education, and response to gender-based and sexual harassment.

The comprehensive intervention conditions equate to more than 1.2 billion dollars, with extra 450 million dollars provided by the Lebanese government in 2013, for direct support to state institutions. (UNHCR, 2013) The proposals for each operation sector illustrate what can be achieved on the ground with established and enhanced resources in a practical way. The intervention is guided by Lebanon's government and state actors, and assisted by the United Nations. Thus, in collaboration with WFP, UNICEF, and WHO, UNHCR actively

promotes the integration of the overwhelming approach, while UNRWA organizes assistance to PRS.

### **Strategic Objectives of the Humanitarian Response**

The guiding principles of the approach to which humanitarian partners have given priority are:

Guaranteeing the security of displaced persons, and vulnerable populations by;

- Positively support individuals with disabilities.
- Bolster awareness and sensitivity to sex discrimination.
- Continue to enhance protection for children and youth in danger.
- Standardize identification of Syrian refugees and PRS registration.
- Facilitate social adaptive capacity of displaced persons and residents through; mobilizing local and displaced populations to strengthen social stability and resistance to the displacement shocks.
- Direct services to wellbeing and community social services.
- Supply humanitarian support and essential services to those who need it most, by;
- Providing direct greater exposure to proper hygiene and clean water.
- Encourage sole rights to basic education.
- Promote public health programs.
- Creating opportunities for food security and rural subsistence.
- Facilitate access to basic services and relief products.
- Promote access to UNRWA public services by PRS.

In executing the initiative, collaborators assist the Lebanese government in providing essential social services, at both the central and municipal levels. The reduction of the impact of the refugee crisis on host areas has been given due importance. The Government is broadening its services to meet the adequate aid provided to affected host communities to mitigate pressures among Syrians and citizens with special emphasis on security, provision of housing, and health (UNHCR, 2013). It is hoped that there is a tendency to be protected in Lebanon for people escaping the war in Syria and that the

country shall keep enabling accessibility to social services. The measures highlighted in the plan also conclude that the security situation would permit unfettered access to the displaced people and areas affected. Distinctive mitigation plans are formulated in case the situation worsens and significant mass arrival occurs.

### **Host Community Approach**

According to data assessments, the severe pressure from Syrian crisis has fallen drastically on host communities in Lebanon relative to any bordering nation. The country's operations, from the successful closing of the Syrian border to the vast influx of refugees, held solely at community level due to the unavailability of structured camps, all came under severe pressure from competitiveness for increasingly scarce public resources and employment in the face of high inflation and safety measures.

For this motive, UNDP, UNHCR, the Prime Minister's Office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) formed a collective committee aimed at providing assistance to host communities, drawing in 23 actors including government officials, UN, and NGOs and concerned contributors (United Nations, 2013). The committee has identified several issues affecting host societies and is initiating multiple programs to fix their problems through a deliberative approach. It has also progressed on a scheduling task to undertake new measures by locating especially disadvantaged populations. This strategy illustrates these and other initiatives to guarantee the readiness of Lebanese organizations and populations in bearing the great burden of the Syrian influx. It does so in two main respects. First, business solution strategies provide measures that strengthen hosting capabilities and offer incentives to host populations. Second, the proposal introduces a unique segment on social integration and wellbeing that contains several plans to help local populations more explicitly, the least financed area of action to date.

Table 1.0: The table below illustrates the scope of aid envisioned under this strategy:

Response	Outline of outreach to host communities in Lebanon
Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1000 disabled people have access to community-based recovery programs</li> <li>• 18,000 vulnerable women and kids get respective packages and resources</li> <li>• 75,000 children and foster parents profit from psycho-social and communication programs</li> <li>• 55,000 participants across 28 community centers were provided with training, psycho-social and leisure programs</li> </ul>
Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Around 5,200 host families get assistance for the extra expenses associated with the involvement of refugee families</li> <li>• The recovery shelter supports roughly 5,800 families</li> </ul>
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 7,900 teachers were trained in teaching practice education</li> <li>• 562 Schools funded for renovations</li> <li>• About 50,000 children were enrolled in formal education</li> <li>• Roughly about 2,800 adults and young people (15-24) had access to both formal and non-formal education</li> <li>• Some 30.500 kids receive psycho-social assistance</li> </ul>
Social Cohesion and livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing 14,000 people with technical training, life experience and work recruitment programs</li> <li>• Indirectly, 500 000 people profit from the growth of physical and social infrastructures Services, while 150,000 people benefit directly</li> <li>• 12,000 people profit from income-generating operations, jobs and business growth</li> </ul>
NFIs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some 1,800 marginalized people get workplace legislation and other NFI services</li> </ul>
Public health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Immunization of 16,000 pregnant Women and 16,000 children</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Around 2,200 people were helped with trauma operations, implants, orthotics and medical support</li> <li>• Over 100,000 people have access to primary health care (PHC)'s</li> </ul>
Food security and Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An increased food safety and quality controls at border crossings will be provided to all host community members</li> <li>• 25,000 disadvantaged People are receiving packets of food</li> <li>• Agricultural and livestock development assistance is provided to support 15,000 host community members</li> <li>• 70,000 host community members will benefit from improved animal health</li> <li>• 159,000 poor people get food coupons available in local stores</li> </ul>
WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About 334,000 people benefit from a sustainable atmosphere that provides convenient way of getting rid of solid waste</li> <li>• About 50,000 people profit from a more sanitary environment that is free of bacterial wastes</li> <li>• Around 190,000 individuals have gained access to safe drinking water</li> </ul>

*Table 1.0: The scope of aid envisioned under this strategy*  
*Source: (UNCHR, 2019)*

### **2.3.1.1 UNHCR - Lebanon**

In mid-April 2019, decisions to extend laws and regulations more specifically to Syrians led to directives to dissolve illegal refuge systems, seeking expulsion for Syrians who had illegally entered Lebanon after April 24, 2019, and impose the licensing criteria for foreign employees. UNHCR recommended that the policies be implemented in an impartiality way, with the legal process being upheld, limiting, and preventing enforcement of such initiatives. UNHCR continues to advise the Government in extending common law procedural



protections to deportation proceedings to avoid illegal entry. The UNHCR reported an estimated 24,000 refugees (an increase of 44 percent compared to 2018) returning to Syria on their own or in joint campaigns assisted by the Security General, as well as supplying vaccines to those reaching. (UNHCR, 2019) The key stated reasons for relocation included reuniting with family in Syria, strengthening stability in their location of resettlement, and their socio-economic condition in Lebanon. However, there was uncertainty about the implications of Lebanon's economic downturn on Syria's refugees' influx, and the possibility of increased challenges in the quality of returns.

As Lebanon's economic crisis grew more evident, national demonstrations demanding for political change prompted the President's resignation in October. The resultant recession and work losses exacerbated insecurity for both Lebanese and refugees, and led to increased deportations due to incapacity to pay rent, protests by refugees outside UNHCR offices calling for relocation to third country and international support, as well as mental illnesses. Increased rivalry for basic services, combined with the lack of a social security system for impoverished Lebanese, contributed to the increasing inter-tribal disputes for years. To alleviate conflicts and maintain a room for security in host communities, UNHCR has extended its winter support program to include some vulnerable Lebanese. Nonetheless, Lebanon has been effective at the December 2019 Global Refugee Summit, and made numerous promises, including a re-assertion of key existing agreements at the Brussels Conventions.

As COVID-19 reached Lebanon, it urged individuals to enhance their hygiene and adopt social distancing measures to control the spread of the virus. But it became extremely hard to enforce such activities in refugee camps where insufficient water and people would rely on humanitarian organizations for supplies. Refugees get just around seven to nine gallons of water a day, varying on the region they settle in – they are woefully short of the average 26 gallons a day by the WHO (OCHA, 2020) Thus, overcrowding and bad hygiene in camps worsen physical exclusion, revealing refugees to major health threats.

Two significant remarks from the victims should be taken into account; Nasser: *"What worries me the most is that we could die of hunger."* Reem: *"It's hard to*

*explain to your kids.*” – UNHCR report (2020)

UNHCR has outlined the following targets for 2020:

- Safeguarding the integrity and well-being of refugees in Lebanon, with prioritizing the special concerns and weaknesses of the refugees.
- Actively promoting the development of sustainable strategies for refugees in the context of relocation or alternative routes to third party countries, or their voluntary reinstatement in peace and integrity.
- Making sure that refugees have full rights to security, temporary legal stay and birth, and civil status records and their protection from resettlement.
- Upholding the friendship and particular social cohesion of the Lebanese host communities.

### **2.3.2 Jordan Response Plan (JRP)**

Nine years since the start of the Syrian crisis, Jordan, acting as a pioneering precedent in coping with the conflict, keeps proving solidarity and generosity to the growing number of Syrian refugees seeking asylum, providing them with immediate de facto protection. Today, Jordan hosts 1.36 million Syrian refugees, almost 15 percent of the country’s overall population, making Jordan the second-largest host country to host the highest number of per capita of refugees in the world; this shows Jordan’s immense contribution to refugees inside its territory (OCHA, 2020). However, the liability of the influx of Syrian refugees is steadily weighing heavily on the Kingdom, where unemployment currently exceeds 12 percent. More than 312,000 Syrians have enrolled or obtained registration schedules outside tents, a method that has been facilitated since 2013 with the establishment of a registration center in Irbid’s northwest region.

Jordan Response Plan (JRP) has secured inclusive and open values to establish the strategies under the plan since its inception back in 2015, through working hand in hand with over 150 domestic and global stakeholders. Given the rising socio-economic effects of refugees, the government has called for better humanitarian assistance from aid agencies and the international community. Numerous achievements have been reached in recent years due largely to the intervention of the international community, but the condition of

many Syrian refugee households and disadvantaged Jordanians afflicted by the Syrian crisis appears fragile, that expectations raised a greater burden on the state that Jordan cannot handle on its own. It is more necessary than ever to turn promises and expectations into tangible and discoverable help by funding the necessities under JRP and ensuring the quality of the service. In addition to diplomatic, economic, and natural resources, the deficit in financing the Jordan Response Plan (JRP) of approximately 51 percent being financed in 2019 tends to exacerbate the insecurity of both Syrian refugees and Jordanians suffering protracted hardship and declining living standards. Officials introduced policies to reduce the proportion of migrants involved in the illegal labor force and aim to steer all illegal new arrivals, most of whom come without any resources at all, to refugee camps to reduce demand on increasingly inadequate natural resources.

#### **2.3.2.1 UNHCR – Jordan**

UNHCR established an irregular arrivals center in Raba Sarhan where migrants will be documented with a biometric-based system before being moved to a settlement. Amid its opening in July 2012 and early April 2013, over 190,000 Syrians have been registered in Za'atri village. A significant number of those who subsequently left Za'atri, and hence, leaving around 110,000 people in the camp, including the sponsorship scheme run by individual Jordanians through a municipality (UNHCR, 2013). The government maintains an encampment strategy at existing arrival rates, with sufficient camp capacity and facilities essential to preserving asylum accommodation. However, above the expenses associated, it proves difficulty in finding a site for a fourth camp considering the lack of reasonable and accessible land.

The population in the Za'atri camp obtained dry food supplies. Tents, sanitation kits, blankets, mattresses, and other key aid items had been collected by more than 130,000 refugees. Although basic needs are provided by humanitarian organizations, in view of the need to replenish or repair resources, they have tried to rationalize spending on non-food goods and housing. On a per-benefit basis, camp facilities and maintenance expenses are very high, especially in the WASH and Shelter Sectors. Amid the first three months of the year, more

than 4,500 prefabricated housing projects were undertaken in Za'atri to substitute tents, serving a total of four individuals each. At the end of the first quarter, there were 2,000 usable toilets, 1,000 bathrooms, and 750 water supply systems in Za'atri and residents earn 35 liters of water each person per day. Efforts to decongest the oldest parts of the camp have reinforced the need for organized resources, such as service centers, and a larger proportion of WASH facilities. The camp registered 10,000 children enrolled in school, and a further 32,000 refugees were provided with some kind of informal educational programs. Yet presence at the school tends to lag below the number of enrolled students (UNHCR, 2013). In Health, first-quarter surveys showed that only above 3 percent of new entrants needed urgent medical treatment, typically for violent wounds, and 5-7 percent received treatment within one week of their entry. Treating refugees with severe, life-threatening injuries or illnesses also overcomes northern Jordan's healthcare systems and constitutes a substantial economic strain for aid workers. Over 152,000 sessions on basic health care services were held, and over 10,000 refugees benefitted greatly from psycho-social programs.

### **Strategic Objectives of Humanitarian Response**

As the displacement of Syrians prevails, Syrians will continue to move in pursuit of protection, particularly to Jordan, since the state has affirmed its aim to retain an open border. The stated goals of Jordan's humanitarian policy are consistent with the overarching regional strategic objectives, namely security, disaster response, non-camp refugee aid, and emergency preparedness. Rescue and contingency planning in the Jordanian sense is closely linked to the provision of adequate facilities and assistance in camps to accommodate new arrivals. A similar concern is the management of camps.

- Housing in camps 300,000 Syrian refugees entering Jordan illegally, and providing them with security, emergency aid, and treatment;
- Actively promoting Syrian refugees in urban and rural areas, with a special emphasis on impoverished areas, projected at 60 percent of the total population; Supporting societies hosting Syrians to minimize the detrimental socio-economic effect of the growing Syrian population on state development and

improve direct aid to poor citizens of Jordan.

The most critical of the ultimate objectives are:

- Life-saving support by treatment and repair programs in refugee settlements, including ensuring sufficient housing, food, water, primary health care, schooling, and essential security (SGBV avoidance and reaction, the safety of orphaned and abandoned children);
- Authorization of all new comers reaching UNHCR, inspection of documented Syrians under the evacuation scheme, and authorization of refugee records in all contexts;
- Prioritized help to urban and rural refugees include shelter, basic health care, schooling, child security, and financial assistance.

Community-based evaluations and other studies highlight that limited aid in the Jordanian sense will have a drastic effect. Refugees in camps are largely reliant on relief from humanitarian agencies, while those in villages have very minimal options of supporting themselves against the scenery of increasing prices and restricted resources for life. The failure to supply necessary support would have significant implications, including additional pressure on Jordan's economy and populations decreased asylum accommodation, additional refugees engaged in poor coping processes, and return to Syria under hazardous conditions. The primary concern of Jordan Response Plan (JRP) from 2020 to 2022 is to promote and facilitate the structures to resolve such problems, thus maintaining the integrity and security of Syrian refugees and marginalized Jordanians affected by the Syria crisis, its performance will rely solely on the ongoing cooperation with the international community and their continuous support. "The JRP 2020-2022 hence reveals Jordan's continued willingness in developing a multi-year synchronized framework to contribute more successfully to the Syrian crisis in a open, coordinated and consistent way, under the Global Compact on Refugees and the 2030 Agenda, by the results of the I, II and III Brussels Conventions" (OCHA, 2020). The Jordan response Plan, as the only state coherent approach by which the United Nations offers monetary support to cope with the Syrian crisis, is jointly committed to maintaining soli-

clarity with the Ministry of Planning and International cooperation towards Syrian refugees and needy Jordanians.

### **2.3.3 Turkey Response Plan (TRP)**

Turkey is a special case because of its geopolitical influence. It is a high- middle-income nation with tremendous diplomatic influence, headed by a determined government that ultimately had a highly coordinated agenda of accepting Syrian refugees, and which has one of the strongest legal systems for refugees in the world. Today, the country hosts the highest number of refugees in the world (largely spread across the expansive country), as well as the top regional funder of refugees' response in the region.

The Republic of Turkey has incessantly granted security and aid to Syrian refugees since the start of the war in 2011. It began by offering a provisional security system that proceeded to be in operation for both Syrians and the Syrian-Palestinian refugees. In 2019, the proportion of Syrians recorded under emergency protection remains consistent at over 3.75 million, roughly half of whom are children. Accordingly, "(1) The Law on Foreigners (2) International Protection, and (3) the Temporary Protection Regulation, therefore establish a clear statutory justification for the lawful stay, registration, equal rights and amenities for Syrians in Turkey" (OCHA, 2020). Certification of Syrian refugees under interim cover by the Ministry of the Interior Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) progresses following the legal system. Furthermore, Syrian unexpected, self-organized rates of return under provisional security are analyzed under volunteer arrival protocols that are monitored within the legislative structure. The government of Turkey and the Regional Refugee and Regional Plan (3RP's) collaborators continue to track their returns.

In the early years of the refugee influx, and under the governance of the Prime Minister for Emergency and Disaster Management (AFAD), Turkey served primarily more than 194,000 people in 17 refugee camps (UNHCR, 2013). Food stuffs, hygiene, protection, social programs, education, comprehension, interaction, finance, vocational programs and other resources have continually

been delivered to the Syrians. As the proportion of homeless Syrians kept growing, the Turkish government undertook several measures to meet increased urban center necessities, to start up a registry strategy mostly through decision making centers, and to provide a guideline for the healthcare system to Syrians. Nearly half of the migrants resided with Turkish relatives in host communities across Turkey, and still some stay separately in Turkish cities, while the remaining refugees remained in camps that were built and operated by AFAD and the Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS). At the end of 2012, the percentage of Syrian refugees residing in camps rose from almost 149,000 to 194,000 by mid-2013, of which 75% were women and children, consequently, the rise led to the construction of four new camps. Thus, it is recorded that over 210,000 Syrians live in cities across Turkey, however, as of that time, only 123,000 were registered by the authorities in that year (UNHCR, 2013). Over time, the figures have improved greatly. By 2019, there are over 400,000 refugees and asylum seekers of other nationalities in Turkey and more than 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2019).

The main aspects of foreign assistance negotiated with the Government to resolve the growing influx of refugees in early 2013 (including the early empirical plan), ranged from strategic security assistance to the procurement of relief goods-including housing, essential household products, kitchen equipment, cleanliness and wellness supplies, instructional resources and food vouchers. The government has declared that aid groups should also prepare to support refugees in metropolitan centers, considering the ongoing spike in the number of refugees choosing to remain outside camps. Accordingly, the Regional Response Plan (RRP) envisages aid for both camp and non-camp refugees up to the end of 2013. Also, the amended budgetary criteria in the RRP chapter until December 2013 accumulated to \$800 million within Turkey (UNHCR, 2013). It must be accepted that Turkey alone has made an important financial influence by indirect aid, irrespective of the increased expense of human capital. UNHCR persists in being the principal organization managing and overseeing all interventions aimed at promoting and aligning the host country's current initiatives. In their various locations of competence and commitment, the RRP highlights the scheduled operations of UNICEF, WHO, WFP, UNFPA, IOM,

and UNHCR, with the overarching cooperative assistance of the UN Resident Coordinator's Office. The recently developed operations of the UNDP and FAO are susceptible to critical factors and procedural requirements of all life-saving considerations.

UNHCR performs broadcast town operations to gather first-hand information on refugee issues for those living in the city by meetings with state officials and recommendations to those deeply worried, for the precise aim of determining the security dilemma and reception constraints of the whole asylum seekers. The standards of living of Syrian communities living in urban environments, especially their relation to public amenities and welfare, are some of the issues that UNHCR actively seeks with the officials. With more and more refugees arriving, the relentless strain on the developed refugee camps appears to be a great problem. In addition, the number of non-camp refugees has increased host community services, particularly with regard to education and healthcare, with many school-age children no more being registered due to poor facilities in schools, teachers, or documents.

Due to the massive burden on the state to document the refugees staying outside camps, the UNHCR operates in cooperation centers with the authorities to promote refugee services on national referral systems, such as those regarding child safety, and responses to SGBV, including transfers and availability of safe housing and child protection units. More than 98 percent of Syrians under temporary security already live in city and village areas, with fewer than 2 percent living in the remaining seven Temporary Housing Centers (TACs). Most dwell in southeastern Turkey, and also in urban cities such as Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, and Konya, several of which are recipient groups who also face specific risks and objectives. Since 2018, 12 of the 19 TACs have been shut down amid the evacuation to cities and towns or other transitional housing areas of Syrians under temporary security residing in the TACs. Four TACs saw a marked decline in inhabitants after willful resettlement to recipient communities (UNHCR, 2020).

### **Strategic Objectives of Humanitarian Response**



As of 2020, It is foreseen, based on general trends on the ground, that the great majority of Syrian refugees aided in the camps will stay in Turkey, and thus, it is expected that new migrants will arrive in increasing proportions. The UNHCR aims to support the government officials in tracking and recording the fragmented and diverse populace by identifying persons with immediate needs. UNHCR also seeks to support the mapping and sampling exercise of AFAD, in which AFAD plans to evaluate the interests of the non- camp community for an acceptable reaction. The commitment expected by the organizations involved in this RRP also encapsulates an expectation that Turkey's borders will give way for further resettlement of refugees, and that the temporary protection system will stay in effect. The entire humanitarian response will continue to be organized and handled by the Government.

### **2.3.3.1 UNHCR-Turkey**

The main feature of the high global recognition of Turkey in the refugee case is the government's effort of registering the Syrian refugees. Thus, statistical records on Syrians in Turkey are not given access to UNHCR or other organizations, in compliance with Turkish legislation. However, the Turkish government determines which collaborators operate and where, and UNHCR is just one among several other partner organizations. So, while UNHCR is the leading agency of the UN that responds to this large influx of refugees, it does not manage any of the data and access required to serve this role.

In this case, the stance of UNHCR in Turkey is very different from that of its position in any other refugee crisis. It clearly differs from its position in Jordan or Lebanon, and similar to what would be envisioned if UNHCR is participating in a substantial flood of refugees into a developed nation with a vibrant economy. Several of the existing humanitarian planning frameworks, aid patterns, and fund ties norms in Turkey are redundant and, in answer, the UNHCR had to structure itself very differently from the standard. UNHCR's strategy in Turkey puts considerable focus on policymaking and campaigning for security in local programming; a principal task for promoting governance instead of offering precise support to refugees; a greater emphasis on top government officials by providing successful touch with high government compatriots; and

maintaining a low profile – even to the outrage of contributors and advocacy groups for rights (UNHCR evaluation report, 2016).

The organization of Syrian refugee intervention in Turkey was closely regulated by the Turkish government from the beginning in April 2011. The government originally rejected initiatives for UNHCR support, whilst UN agencies and NGOs coordinated mainly in cooperation with the government, consequently creating a situation that persists today, based on three poorly related communities' organizations.

- a) A political system that has developed over the span of five years and where the state largely implements its significant initiatives, including some NGOs and also UNHCR;
- b) UN framework coordinating UN organizations and the IOM;
- c) Multiple processes, powered by sponsors and NGOs, to collaborate amongst groups associated with a standard sponsor or in a specific field.

The key drivers for inter-agency cooperation are the 3RP, and the COP was the primary tool for the strategic preparation and organization of the UNHCR. Yet there were flaws in both interaction processes. Between 2014 and 2015, the UNHCR was more successful than the government or NGO partners in working with UN partners (UNHCR evaluation report, 2016). More effort is required to strengthen the sector-based cohesion of education, cash support, and wellbeing. Nevertheless, no consensus has been reached between the UN Resident Coordinator and the UNHCR representative on the ultimate responsibility for the management of UN organizations assisting refugees in Turkey and specifically, on the delegation of the UN to the Turkish Government on refugee issues (UNHCR evaluation report, 2016).

To illustrate the gradual and significant growth in the refugee population over the course of time, UNHCR was able to change its goals and its workforce structure. It reconfigured from case planning and repatriation to systemic interaction and programming, however, this took a lot longer than required and gave international contributors the sense that UNHCR was late to intervene or did not at all. The Government's strategy of not gathering or exchanging key

statistical profile has hindered attempts to organize and prepare a successful scheme, whereas some deficiency identification was successfully completed between 2014 and 2015 when selecting recipients for income and essential relief deliveries.

### **Syrian Refugees in Turkey hit harder Amid COVID-19:**

*“If ever we needed reminding that we live in an interconnected world, the novel coronavirus has brought that home” - Filippo Grandi” (UNHCR, 2020).*

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi acknowledges what the world has experienced as the coronavirus epidemic, widely known as COVID-19, which has, no distinctions, no variations in language. It impacts everyone on this planet, including refugees and other homeless people. It will only be addressed if we all come together as a unified group to express solidarity because what this widespread coronavirus epidemic has clearly proved is that every person's wellbeing is tied to the health of the most oppressed to disadvantaged citizens of a population, that includes refugees, lawless citizens, and internally displaced persons.

The outbreak of the coronavirus in Turkey has been a difficult time for the Syrian refugees, particularly for those who were employed in the industrial sectors, which a local sociologist has reported as the very frontier of the pandemic. Immediately the first COVID-19 case was confirmed in March 2020, Turkey took a range of steps to curb the disease transmission, such as the shutdown of restaurants, cafes, and other establishments in the public sector.

Drawing attention on how the vast proportion of Syrians in the country lack basic education, and a substantial percentage are also unskilled employees. As reported in an interview conducted, Narli claimed that; some are in manufacturing industries, and others are in the public sectors. Of course, they were all active amid the outbreak. She clarified that while Syrians can access medical services free of cost under Turkey's temporary security policy, the unau-

thorized Syrians, roughly 10 percent of the local Syrian community were unprotected (Kazanci, 2020). Many that were not certified could not really benefit from health care programs, because it became very difficult for those who acquired the virus to petition for medication at a hospital because they do not have eligibility under provisional immunity.

One of the strategies disrupted by coronavirus was the inclusion of children into Turkish colleges, as schools throughout the world were closed and schooling proceeded by online courses. Many Syrians lived in cramped homes, and they do not have the facilities required to pursue digital learning for their children. She claimed that “the government should promote its social stability measures by making a stand to examine why the Syrian refugees have trouble distance learning and accessing health facilities. Also added, according to polling, about a decade after the Syrian conflict, about 60 percent of Syrians now intend to remain in Turkey. Thus, debit cards were distributed as part of the Emergency Social Safety Net program sponsored by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the EU. About 2 million Syrians obtained it for food and health supplies (Kazanci, 2020). Narli also stressed that the major challenge encountered by the Syrian refugees is working illegally, resulting in a broad statistical gap.

## **2.4 IOM Appeal Diplomacy 2020**

Given the scope and perpetuity of the Syrian crises, there were unprecedented numbers of people have been forcefully displaced, with millions desperately in need of life-saving assistance. As the crises reach its 10th year, the UN reports that more than 11 million Syrians in need of emergency aid within Syria and 4.65 million of whom are undergoing pressing issues (IOM appeal, 2020). Reportedly, 176,000 Syrians relocated to their homes, the majority of which were internally displaced between January and April 2020, whereas, 1.2 million were newly displaced today. More than 6.6 million Syrians have been internally displaced and 5.6 million are classified as refugees across the region (IOM appeal, 2020).

As the adverse effect of the crises persists, exacerbated by the economic challenges and a rising COVID-19 disease outbreak, approximately 70 percent of families are helpless or susceptible within Syria. A vast number of refugees survive below the poverty threshold in Syria's bordering nations. Thus, the present weather temperatures in Syria steadily contribute to the insecurity and misery of the displaced people, with breastfeeding women, children, the elderly, and the ill, seriously in danger. IOM continues to dedicate in providing life-saving and sustainable support to impoverished areas in Syria and across the region, extending from immediate service and community project assistance to subsistence growth. Accordingly, to date, IOM, collaborating with UNHCR and local stakeholders, has helped many Syrian migrant workers and their families to be reinstated safely and stably. Nevertheless, the IOM's charitable efforts in Syria and neighboring countries have obtained monetary assistance from, and several others, the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, UNHCR, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UNCERF), and the IOM Emergency Fund (IOM appeal, 2020). For the rest of the year, the IOM calls for supplementary funding to begin distributing a variety of life-saving humanitarian emergency relief within Syria and in nearby nations. The funds will be directed at improving the existing IOM emergency reinstatement of trapped, endangered migrant workers and their families, providing immediate refugee transport services, and delivering temporary accommodation and non-food relief supplies to conflict-related Syrian civilians. Thus, the funds will be used to establish medical centers for refugees and immigrants relocated to Jordan, as well as for testing for contagious diseases.

As of December 2019, IOM appealed for \$205, 272,276, budgeted for 2020 to support those in need within Syrian and across the host countries of Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq (IOM, 2020).

The IOM projects and funding requests under the Syrian Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) 2020 as follows; Critical Life-saving activities (\$165,312,101), and Early recovery and Livelihood activities (\$39,920,175).

### **2.4.1 SYRIA– \$ 95,152,112 (IOM, 2020)**

#### **SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS (NFI)**

The IOM will, by shelter and NFI aid, help the urgent needs of the neediest communities in Syria. The tasks will include the following;

- Implementing simple IDP site enhancement tasks.
- Distribution of immediate non-food goods to recently displaced families and the neediest.
- Supplying tent protection practices (winterization action)
- Reconstruction and renovation of residential buildings and modernization of community centers.
- Acquisition and delivery of group tents for the neediest and recently homeless families.

The selected number of receivers: 794,400 displaced people and seriously impacted. (536,400 persons by NFI based projects and 256, 00 by adequate amenities and housing assistance).

#### **Coordination**

IOM will persist in facilitating the execution of the cross-sectoral protection against sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) emergency plan for Syria. The plan will help improve the efficacy of the solution through increased assistance to inter-sectoral PSEA networks all over Syria; training and awareness-raising between aid organizations and decision-makers on PSEA; and the increased deployment of interagency community-based grievances frameworks which will enable beneficiaries to easily and discretely notify SEA.

In order to promote evidence-based preparation and response within Syria, IOM will implement interagency priorities evaluation activities to monitor migration and revert mobility, perform sector-based and cross-sectoral evaluations, and identify emergency concerns. The IOM also focuses on helping attempts to develop the capacity to improve the efficiency of humanitarian services in Syria. The IOM will collaborate with domestic and international NGO

collaborators to actively contribute to aid workers to sector-specific and contextual professional capability growth.

The targeted number of humanitarian organizations: 300

### **Food Security**

IOM seeks to support the development of food security and the wellbeing of disadvantaged people in Syria. Activities will include;

- Delivering ready-made food to recently displaced families.
- Delivering food packages to the neediest families every month.

The aimed proportion of the benefactors: 66,250 displaced and disadvantaged individuals.

### **Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM)**

By offering inter-agency support and enhance the living standards of IDP locations in Syria, the IOM will promote the humane CCCM approach. The activities comprise;

- Coordinating IDP field service and maintenance assistance for camp committees.
- Help collaborators for the establishment and management of IDP camps and coordination centers.
- Delivering additional capabilities for site management and tasks for site control.

Selected number of recipients; 131, 374 displaced people and individuals impacted.

### **Early Recovery and Livelihood**

By fostering local economic growth, enhancing accessibility to adequate and community care, and encouraging citizen involvement and social stability, the IOM will lead to rapid revitalization and stabilization. Activities will comprise;

- Expanding engagement in society and social integration by funds-for-work and enhancing public services.
- Promoting early growth and subsistence by assisting small and medium-sized businesses through entrepreneurial activity, technical and agricultural practice.
- Growing revenue production by cash-for-work programs for disadvantaged families.

Beneficiaries target: \$16,540 displaced and impacted people

## **Protection**

Through public centers and tactical defense teams, IOM will strive to bring and further broaden its offering of enhanced security services to conflict-affected communities. Activities will comprise;

- Allocation of GBV integrity packages & urgent intervention packages.
- Individual protection assistance (IPA).
- Management of advanced child safety and gender-based abuse (GBV) cases.
- Monitoring security (on-site and digital squads).
- Psychosocial support (PSS) and mental health Psychosocial support (MHPSS)
- Judicial consulting services (legal documentation and accommodation, and property and assets).
- Dissemination of groups and advocacy.

Beneficiaries Target: 78,100 displaced and impacted people.

## **Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)**

Through delivering urgent WASH services to people 'in and out' and enhancing essential WASH equipment and WASH services at IDP sites, IOM will meet the urgent necessities of the disadvantaged communities in Syria. Activities will comprise;



- Implementation of fundamental infrastructure projects at IDP forums to maximize sanitation and lessen floods.
- Supplying WASH essential facilities at IDP locations (such as latrine installation and maintenance, water trucking, etc.)

Benefactors Target: \$220,500 displaced and impacted people.

#### **2.4.2 Turkey- \$69, 800, 000 (IOM, 2020)**

##### **Basic Needs and Essential Services**

- Shelter Rehabilitation and Rental Assistance – Renovation of shelters and WASH aid for 12,500 Syrians living in poor housing under provisional security, renovation of shelters for 30,000 marginalized refugees and citizens of the host population, and funding for communities to rehabilitate critical local infrastructure.
- One Time specialized cash assistance – Implementation of one-time financial aid for transitional security and host group members for 30,000 Syrians.
- Multi-purpose Cash Assistance – Implementation of multipurpose financial aid, under provisional security in Turkey, for 15,000 critically impoverished Syrians.

##### **Livelihood**

- Sustainable labor market inclusion – Promote the permanent integration of temporarily covered Syrians in the labor market in Turkey, including work opportunities for 3,000 asylum seekers, with a greater emphasis on female benefactors.
- Provision of Grants – Provision of financial assistance to 2,000 refugees and host community members to pursue programs that raise revenue and create small enterprises.
- Cash-for work through community stabilization activities – Provision of cash for jobs for 3,000 Syrian refugees and host community members by community stabilization programs.
- Entrepreneurship training and Grants – Train and offer grants to Turkish start-ups and 500 Syrian refugees with entrepreneurship experience.

## **Protection**

- Integrated services to refugees and migrants and promoting social cohesion in host communities – Encourage municipalities to provide 15,000 refugees and migrants with coordinated programs and to foster social stability in host communities.
- Support for community centers established by municipalities and NGOs – Support proposed or latest multiservice community centers, providing legal assistance, technical training, and community projects, supporting 2,000 Syrian refugees and local members of the group.
- Cash vulnerable support for vulnerable identified and referred cases – Requirement of personally targeted assistance by the IOM and contributed by NGOs and UN organizations for 6,000 disadvantaged listed persons.
- Provision of quick impact projects – Help for accelerated effect initiatives designed to offer 10,000 Syrians and host community members with group stability and solidarity.
- Community-Based protection – Implementation of community-based security services through mobility support teams that provide 45,000 Syrian refugees with psychosocial assistance, awareness-raising, and counseling, especially in rural areas.
- Certificate program on Psychosocial Assistance – Supporting the psychosocial diploma program for 35 Syrian refugees and local community members in cooperation with the Turkish University.
- Awareness raising and community building on counter trafficking (CT)
- Undertaking awareness-raising initiatives for 2,000 Syrian refugees on trafficking and capacity-building preparation for state officials and providers of humanitarian services collaborating with Syrians.

## **Education**

- Transportation of children to schools – Provision of transportation aid to 8,000 Syrian refugee children for access to schools in urban and rural areas.
- School rehabilitation as community stabilization initiatives (\$3,000,000)
- Recovery of Turkish school classrooms establishes schooling as part of regional reconstruction programs for 15,000 Syrian refugees and host community students.

- Language Programs – Providing Turkish language programs to 1,000 Syrian children and 6,000 Syrian adult refugees by public education centers. Funding special education needs for Syrian refugees, and funding extra lessons for 500 colleges.

### **Food Security**

- Agribusiness training – Agricultural facilities for 5,000 refugees and host community farmers.
- Micro and community gardening initiatives – Enable 1,000 refugee host communities in the creation of micro and cooperative planting projects as part of the neighborhood stability programs to improve household food supplies.

### **Health**

- Medical commodities for health care facilities – Delivery of health equipment and services to 3 health care centers for 2,500 Syrian refugees, as and when necessary by the Ministry of Health.

### **2.4.3 Lebanon- \$15,868,000 (IOM, 2020)**

#### **Social Cohesion -**

- Community Support Projects – Maintain community outreach programs to meet short-term needs established by participatory mechanisms to alleviate conflicts and facilitate the provision of municipal services to 40,000 host populations, Lebanese returnees, Syrians displaced by municipalities.
- Youth Initiatives – To encourage the active participation of youth in local communities, in collaboration with local governments and agencies, introduce youth projects (summer camps, cultural events, peace building groups, awareness projects, etc.). 5,000 people, including displaced Syrians, returnees from Lebanon, and host groups.
- Capacity Support to municipalities – Ability funding for dialogue and conflict resolution of municipalities and national government agencies and support for local crisis management. 2,000 host families, returnees from Lebanon and displaced Syrians.

- Media Initiative to Defuse Tension – Increase the awareness of local authorities and civil society on how to communicate meaningfully with the media, to facilitate impartial and constructive news, capacity building, preparation & sanitization. Aching of media workers on clarification of truth and clear news. 300 workers from agencies in global, local and social media.

### **Protection -**

- Humanitarian Border management – Equipment, staffing, preparation, and technical advice for border crossing points, employees, and elected authorities to communicate with and assist displaced people in Syria. 600 employees on the border and associated personnel.
- Lebanese returnees' registration – The IOM persists in endorsing the Government of Lebanon for registration and profiling of 22,500 marginalized returning Lebanese from Syria to include unaffected or newly arrived returnees. Service Provision through community centers – Psychological and social programs, leisure facilities, safety services, care training, recruitment via Neighborhood engagement centers and PSS teams, as well as tailored assistance resources for people with special needs. 10,000 Syrians homeless, Lebanese returnees & local community.
- Capacity building support – Enhance national structures and actors' capabilities to resolve GBV. 450 workers from local institutions.

### **Health -**

- Health Support – Provide prescriptions at the stage of primary health care (PHC) for chronic and acute illnesses, as well as prescription equipment and reproductive health products, annual vaccines and testing facilities. 40,000 displaced Syrians, returnees from Lebanon & host groups.
- Health Education & Awareness Sessions – In order to increase access to a quality primary health care plan, financial benefits and health promotion were given to specific groups. 1000 displaced persons, returnees from Lebanon & host groups.

### **Basic Needs & Essential Services -**

- Conditional Cash for rent – Rent assistance for needy Syrian households at

risk of being evicted and/or whose shelter has already been destroyed. 600 displaced Syrians and returnees from Lebanon.

- Shelter Supports and rehabilitations – Provision of materials and resources for shelter. 2,000 displaced Syrians and returnees to Lebanon.
- Winter Cash Grants – Provision of debit card winterization cash grants to help needy Lebanese returnees of Syrian and Syrian refugees to properly prepare for the cold months by buying heating fuel and other important inter-related needs. 1400 Syrians and Lebanese returnees who were homeless.
- Multipurpose Cash Assistance Grants - Cash funds are given to assist communities impacted by environmental threats and emergencies. 2,170 Syrians who have been displaced, Lebanese returnees and host populations.

#### **Livelihood -**

- Apprenticeships and Career Guidance – Career guidance, job matching and apprentice/internship schemes offered to job seekers. 4000 beneficiaries from displaced Syrians, Lebanese returnees and host communities.
- Rapid income generating activities – In disadvantaged communities, work growth has been fostered by labor-intensive investment in efficient public facilities and natural properties. 2500 beneficiaries from the Syrians who have been displaced, Lebanese returnees and host populations.
- Skill based Trainings - Vulnerable adults have been offered educational and skilled training dependent on business demand and supply. 1500 beneficiaries from displaced Syrians, host groups and Lebanese returnees.

#### **2.4.4 Jordan- \$15,500,000 (IOM, 2020)**

##### **Livelihood**

- Women's Economic Empowerment - Promote economic equality in host communities of both Syrian refugee women living outside camps and Jordanian women through targeted livelihood initiatives, including training and awareness rising involving the whole family. Project beneficiaries: 450 residents of Syria and Jordan.

##### **Protection**

- Infrastructure's improvement and Equipment at the Northern Borders - Promoting and strengthening northern frontier facilities to secure humanitarian

connectivity for Syrians and to allow for future inflows. 100,000 Jordanians and Syrian refugees.

- Enhancing the protection mechanism against human trafficking for Syrians and vulnerable Jordanians – Capacity-building of counter-trafficking partnerships and raising awareness of the dangers of human trafficking within vulnerable communities and steps they may take to protect themselves. 1,000 refugees and Jordanians from Syria.
- Transportation Assistance for Syrian Refugees - Transportation facilities will be offered to Syrian refugees in Jordan, in close cooperation with the UNHCR and the local authorities, to address a range of transport needs. 4500 Refugees from Syria.

## **Health**

Enhancing Tuberculosis TB and HIV prevention, Diagnosis and treatment among Syrian refugees and Migrants in Jordan – Facilitating the Ministry of Health with knowledge of TB and HIV among Syrian refugees, migrants and host populations, identification and case control and preventive action. 100 Refugees from Syria and needy people in camps and urban areas.

## **Basic Needs and Essential Services**

- Multi-purpose cash Assistance – Supporting 7500 needy Syrian refugees outside camps by multipurpose cash grants to meet basic household needs.
- One-time Specialized cash Assistance - Supply winterization aid in the manner of one-time grants to 7500 needy Syrian refugees within tents to address the winter season's urgent needs.

The remaining funds will go directly to Iraq and Egypt. Conclusion

In a nutshell, the main contributions of this chapter are primarily focused on the broader approach to nation-state reconstruction of Syria and the positions of Syrian refugees. It provided an integrated framework, which IOM is adopting as a description of humanitarian needs in the region, contributing an immense amount of money to help the Syrian refugees who have been displaced, mostly in Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. But only the first four host

nations are discussed in this study.

### **CHAPTER 3: OVERALL PERCEPTIONS OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEES' INFLUX**

Perceptions form people's behaviors' and actions, which then affect and influence decision-making. As long as the attitudes of the people keep aggravating by governments' short-sighted and unpredictable measures and sensitivity of the press and the catastrophic economic condition affecting refugees, the condition of the Syrian refugees will not progress. With this sole purpose, people should first consciously evaluate their internal prejudice and reflect on the social impacts of their actions to pursue viably, and sustainable alternatives to this complex and unforeseen problem.

In this chapter, a political analysis of the host countries has been provided; mainly paying attention to the sub-national strategies of each community by merely explaining the perceptions of the citizens. It also gives an overview of the prospects and aspirations of the Syrian refugees' return to their homes. The theory of Constructivists has better defined what this chapter entails since it argues that historically and socially significant facets of international affairs are constructed, rather than inherent outcomes of human existence or other basic features of world politics. Alexander Wendt calls for two generally agreed essential concepts of Constructivism, "that the structures of social interaction are directly influenced by common interests rather than material factors, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are established by these shared ideas rather than provided by nature" (Wendt, 1999). Actors are not merely regulated by a self-help system's norms, their personalities and desires become critical in examining how they act. Simply put, constructivists' approaches stress the importance of cognitive norms, identities and other variables.



In this regard, the IOM partnership with the host nations (Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan), and the UNHCR towards supporting the lives of the Syrian refugees has justified the constructivists' claim that "every member country of an organization or partnership has the freedom to administer its own political culture domestically" (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Thus, the refugees being at the borders, and also dispersed inside of these countries indicate the direct and legal oversight of these countries over the refugees. Nevertheless, the IOM acts extensively on the normative matters of the partnership because its political culture has well defined its foreign policy. However, in this sense, the IOM collective decision-making body does not just impose policies and decisions regarding the Syrian refugees, but rather, adheres to every collaborating members' contribution to the decision-making processes.

To illustrate approaches to helping the Syrian refugees, it is important to analyse the national strategies of the major host countries – Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. This involves the study of local responses beyond capital cities. The chapter also contains the perspectives of the refugees' prospects and aspirations on their return to Syria.

In 2011, each country adopted a similar approach of harmony in welcoming the Syrians. However, with the increasing danger of ISIS, particularly around October 2014, Prohibitions doubled in the countries before agreeing on major bilateral deals with the European Union in early 2016. Nevertheless, these typical processes mask essential sub-national variations. The section reveals three specific backgrounds for each country: Jordan- Sahab, Zarqa and Mafrq; and, Lebanon- Christians, Shiites, and the Sunni; Turkey- Gaziantep, Adana, and Izmir. Each State pursued somewhat more open or stringent strategies for Syrian refugees in many provinces and municipalities. The key classes of influences that tend to influence this concern the identity and aspirations of local bodies, but also the personages of individual leaders.

Mafrq was comparatively easily accessible in Jordan, closely followed by Sahab and Zarqa. The position of ethnic association and its historic ties with Syrians was significant. However, this is how the provincial elites pursue money from the central government and are as well aware of the economic incentive.

The municipalities of Sunni Lebanon were the most welcoming. Others, especially the Hezbollah-run Shia territories have the least housing rate, with Christian communities spanning a wide variety. The confessionalism of Hezbollah, which is an ally with Assad's government, has become relevant because of the primarily Sunni ideology of Syrian refugees – believed to be right or wrong joining the Syrian revolution. However, the politics of classes were often affected and the personages of some leaders were significant. In Turkey, the municipality of Gaziantep, Adana, and Izmir were the most effective providers for refugees. Party politics seem to have taken large part, with multiple parties holding opposing views in local government. Besides, large corporations also matter a lot, particularly crucial for the integration of local businesses and trade associations in Gaziantep.

For research simplicity, political analysis at all levels of governance is provided to enhance the perception of refugee protection. The scope of evaluating strategies within humanitarian organizations should also be considered.

### **Theorizing the issue – Political Analysis**

To be actively involved in politics, reasonable means need to be acquired, whereby actions of the elite decision-makers can be acknowledged. In regards to power; a question to be asked is, which actors' matter in controlling and forming specific results? Hence, about interests; the question of what empowers or influences the pragmatic decisions they make can be asked? Being able to address these concerns counts to decision-makers. In turn, it is easier to influence results if the primary decision-makers influencing agenda-setting, bargaining, and executing strategic decisions are identified. Addressing these issues methodologically relies heavily on in-depth structure-tracing to evaluate the findings formed by specific events and actors, and wrongly identifying how results may have been altered in the exception of certain factors. It involves operating within background analytical methods that are more practically useful. If handled, this may provide deeper information on what types of foreign involvement may supply refugees with positive results. In this manner, precisely due to the sheer sensitivity of mass displacement, the politics of refugee-hosting countries urgently need to be resolved. Approximately ninety percent

of refugees in the world reside in countries close to their state of origin. Thus, the dilemma is widely disputed: Only ten countries- Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Pakistan, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo shelter more than half of the world's refugees (which is 60 %) (UNHCR, 2017). Therefore, the approach to achieving improved security and workable solutions for refugees is the ability to shape political decision-making in such states: to honour non-refoulement, to provide incentives for socio-economic participation, and perhaps even to accept long-term local assimilation where necessary. This is challenging considering that such states also face major challenges in terms of protection and growth linked to the accommodation of a vast number of refugees. Yet there is variation in the governance of these respective countries. They have different regimes: they may be liberal democracies, authoritarian, or competitive authoritarian regimes. They may completely have dissimilar ties with increased dependence, independence, or interdependence with the United Nations. In unusual ways, specific identity frameworks may reinforce legitimacy: ethnicity, religion, or shared history, for instance, in the global financial market, they may hold various roles: whether predominantly in the agricultural, industrial, or resource extraction sectors, though this may, in essence, be connected to the elite's involvement of patrimonial or mortgage-seeking activity. They may have various motives for population movement: conservative, evolutionary, or neo-liberal; for instance, they may form the circumstances in which the arrival of foreigners is considered a danger or an advantage. However, these macro-level factors are not determinants influencing refugee politics. Neither is it purely the product of what is unfolding in the metropolitan areas.

Nevertheless, Politics in Nairobi, Ankara, or Bangkok explains a lot about host-state politics. While highly urbanized, in strategically isolated locations, near international boundaries, refugee-hosting typically occurs (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Consequently, a host of sub-state entities and institutions are also involved in this. Refugee politics is 'local' politics; main enforcers are often regional, district, and municipal officials. Whether refugees are perceived as advantages or dangers, not only state laws, but also domestic and foreign strategies are affected. The custom of everything including refugee-

status categorization and the freedom to work is affected by sub-national politics, regardless of national laws and policy statements. The justification for this typically comes from a clear analysis: in reality and application, even when there is a standard national policy structure, there is always sub-national heterogeneity.

In the background of the Syrian refugee crisis, this section of the study examines the 'local' nature of refugee security by showing the strategic value of the sub-national stage. The vast majority of Syrian refugees moved to nearby countries, especially Turkey (3.2 million), Lebanon (1 million), and Jordan (654,000). Initially, from 2011 to 2014, the countries had a common welcoming reaction to the population flow; then a repressive shift at the outbreak of ISIS aggression in late 2014, and various aspects of an economic contract with Europe at the beginning of 2016 to guarantee a continuous hosting. Nonetheless, there are major variations both across and, notably, within the countries. Thus the politics behind the reaction of these three main host countries is clarified. Although similarities prevail in the dynamics of the national policies of the three nations, yet there are differences at the sub-national level; the level of the municipality, or the governorate. However, there is more transparency and acceptance for refugees in some countries than in others. At the sub-national level, two large sets of variables seem to have influenced these differences: identity and interests. Political parties (Turkey), tribes (Jordan), and confessionalism (Lebanon) have been the major identity-based influences. Moreover, local political figures have often been involved in political entrepreneurship in terms of preferences, based on what they aimed to benefit from portraying Syrian refugees as dangers or advantages (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

Undoubtedly, there are some tangible or detrimental results on the spread of almost six million Syrians across neighboring countries. Perceptions are everything in this modern times. Perceptions influence attitudes, attitudes turn into behaviors, and behaviors' influence policies and reactions. The section primarily aims to explicitly clarify both the Syrian refugees' influx politics and the sub-national reactions in three main host countries - Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, thereby finalizing with a situation-specific and more comprehensive

effect.

### 3.1 Jordan Influx Compact

Prior to the start of the Syrian war, Jordan had permitted Syrians to cross the border openly, however with limitations on the freedom to work. In July 2012, “the Za’atari refugee camp was opened by the government, with an aggregate size of 9,000 refugees in 1,800 tents. Prohibitions on Palestinians arriving from Syria were enforced, with efforts to deport Palestinians entering without documentation” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Profession security has always been a cornerstone of Jordan’s policy: Jordan has high levels of unemployment, specifically amongst Jordanian graduates. A representative at the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) filed complaints with the stance of foreign governments and INGOs on establishing jobs to the Syrians. *‘This is not feasible, and it is not reasonable to persist recommending that’* (MOPIC, 2017). The government has steadily been more sensitive about stability and the possibility of violence outbreaks since 2013.



Image 2: Syrians working in a special Economic Zone in Jordan  
Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

The Directorate of Security Affairs for Syrian Refugee Camps was established in March, for instance, with a responsibility to monitor the movements to encampments. Since June, illegal western border crossings have been barred for all but rare situations, such as conflict-wounded cases, forcing Syrians to move to indirect crosses mostly along the eastern part of the territory in an attempt to dodge border control (MOPIC, 2017). Furthermore, The Directorate of Syrian Refugee Affairs (SRAD) was established in April 2014 as a subsidiary of the Jordanian security agencies to oversee Syrian refugees. Accordingly, a month later, the Azraq camp, the sixth Syrian refugee camp and the biggest, was launched (Hoffmann S, 2017). In this camp, securitization and emergency support services were merged extraordinarily. Azraq reflects both an accumulation of securitization of Syrian refugees and an initiative across the encampment to facilitate larger worldwide support.

### **Sub-National Variation**

Generally, the most politically controlled of the three primary recipient countries is Jordan, with national jurisdiction consolidated in the control of the Directorate of Syrian Refugee Affairs (SRAD), while MOPIC handles diplomatic ties with the international aid agencies. Nonetheless, there is a sub-national difference in the execution of state laws, considering the limited space for independent policy-making at the governorate or regional levels. The continuum of reactions can be best examined by referring to three provinces around the country. Mafraq is perhaps the most accessible, accompanied by Sahab and then Zarqa. Identity and the position of the 'tribes' that are expanded transnational shared history systems that connect Syrians to Jordanians may describe a large portion of this variability. Interest, and the role of economic opportunity, has also been a significant secondary factor. There is a complicated correlation between the local population in Mafraq and the Syrian refugees. There has been a prolonged existence of Syrian contractual laborers in Mafraq, attributed to a particular shared history, thus the demands of Jordan's agro-based economy and the subjugation of the rural people of Syria. Ten years of democratization transformations under Bashar al-Assad in Syria, coupled with serious inequality, and thus predicted, drought, would further weaken the poor

communities of Syria (Wagner, A-C, 2017). Furthermore, in her 2013 research, Mercy Corp states that in Mafraq, these shared historical relations are far less deep than in Ramtha, Irbid Governorate, however, they are more deeply ingrained than in other areas of Jordan (Mercy Corp, 2013). These ties have guaranteed, amid concerns of the socio-economic strains, harmony has survived. The existence of refugees and the humanitarian community has particularly brought severe tension on the economy and infrastructure of Mafraq. Costs and rents increase, as well as a burden on schools, water supplies, and the production of unbearable amounts of pollution, have raised discontent. Nonetheless, aggression has been sporadic and active recognition has continued partially due to long-standing partnerships that preceded the conflict. In addition, “the noticeable existence of migrants and the emergence of Za’atari has been seen by some of Mafraq’s communities as an incentive to obtain revenue from the national government. The inclusion of 10,000 Syrians including 25,000 Jordanians in the village of Um Al Jamal has been seen by the leader as an incentive to gain national and foreign funding” (Hoffmann S, 2017).



*Image 3: Syrian refugees at za'atri refugee camp, Jordan  
Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

The municipality of Sahab is situated on the south east of Amman and, as



such, historical social links to the Syrian population have been weak, being farther away from the frontier. Yet, it has played a leading role of accepting 50,000 refugees from Syria, Iraq and Yemen, while also being a central hub for Egyptian and South Asian migrant workers. Nevertheless, as an economic resource, it has increasingly welcomed Syrian refugees and engaged them in group meetings on local planning matters. The Sahab governor said, “It proves the depth of the culture here that we can accept many visitors” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). The Sahab Regional Economic Zone is one of the achievements of the Jordan Compact, accommodating several Syrian industrial companies, formerly based in Syria, who have moved and are now hiring both Syrians and Jordanians. In addition, the cohesive policy of Sahab is necessary to minimize the likelihood of conflicts between the host and refugee communities: their strategy undermines the concept of a dilemma between the communities. The Governor clarified that “Syrians are not outsiders; we regard them as residents. We are proud to serve our obligation towards our brothers” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Poverty and unemployment exist in the region. The reality that the Syrians have enhanced the condition for Jordanians must be acknowledged by the Jordanians.



*Image 4: Syrian boys playing at Azraq camp, Jordan*  
*Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*



The Province of Zarqa appears to lack any ethnic identity or interest-based motives for offering Syrian refugees the same form of solidarity. The major manufacturing city in northern Amman currently accommodates 47,500 Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2017), with the government estimated to accommodate more than 130,000. In remarks to the press and foreign dignitaries, “Governor Raed Al Adwan was vocal about the pressure put on the environment, health, education, and public service industries” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

Given the economic problems, his reaction was somewhat acceptable. The province has a youth unemployment rate of almost 30 percent at the level of growth, with 60 percent below 30 years of age. The convergence of these variables makes Zarqa the prime target for the perception of the involvement of Syrians by the federal government as a major development problem. The Director of the Local Development Unit (LDU) at the municipal level has not been so explicitly expressive about the problems of accepting Syrian refugees. Although the legitimacy of the formally recognized figure of Syrians in Jordan was not doubted, he among others claims that the number of Syrians living and working in Zarqa was far higher than the proportion reported. “Most come to live and work here in Mafraq, some of whom are registered in Mafraq but work in Zarqa” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Since 1948, Palestinian refugees have been in Zarqa and have been active in the creation and growth of the Jordanian state. The Syrian populace appears to lack this historical state-building feature. While Syrians were originally welcomed with a great deal of affection, there is an awareness of certain social friction in the LDU. The historical and ancestral connection experienced in the northern municipalities of Jordan with Syrian influence fails in Zarqa. *‘We have good memories of Syria because Jordanians could go to Damascus from Zarqa without a visa, to rest, buy clothing, and come back the same day, the director stated, however now, - the Jordanian residents may accuse the Syrians if asked about the socio-economic problems* (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

### **3.2 Lebanon Influx Compact**

Lebanon's reaction to the Syrian influx began with its 1991 and 1993 diplomatic deals ensuring shared right travel, reside and possess property. "These treaties' results indicated the recurrent movement of people to be an essential aspect of the two economies, with Syrians employed in Lebanon on a periodic basis and infrastructure employees who are working almost all of the time in rebuilding Lebanon" (Chalcraft, JT, 2009). There existed economic ties focused on human migration, as well as the connection between corruption and the corrupted Syrian military and politicians benefitting from the invasion of Lebanon by Syria. In July 2012, "Lebanon initiated a 'Policy of Disassociation' in the scope of the Syrian war. The policy was first considered at a conference of the Arab League in Qatar calling for President Assad to resign. The aim was to prevent the dispute from springing up" (Saghieh, N and Frangieh, G, 2014). The common consensus that Lebanon is to maintain impartiality was prompted by fears about the possible spill in Syria and tensions in Lebanon. Disassociation was essential to recognizing Lebanon's refugee policy's course and durability. Over its length, it made it possible to view the Syrian inclusion in a humanitarian rather than a security sense. However, with time passing and a growing trend of Syrians, the perception that a significant proportion of primarily Sunni Syrian refugees would perpetuate and thus would adversely affect the population stability in Lebanon against the strategic interests of Christian and Shia communities.


Following a major confrontation with Hezbollah, Prime Minister, Mikati left office leaving Lebanon without an administration between March 2013 and December 2016. This left-wing President, Michel Suleiman ruled over the country and nevertheless encountered constitutional turmoil such as lengthy discussions protracted on a new Council of Ministers. Amidst that period in May, the dissociation policy also ended (Saghieh, N and Frangieh, G, 2014). In fact, Lebanon has fragmented: Syria's regime was a crucial political and military partner and protector for the Shia Hezbollah – a significant obstacle in the political power and influence of Lebanon. The Lebanese state's reaction was thus primarily marked by a hesitation as well as the lack of political decision-making processes during the initial flood of Syrians. "It was said that the Government covered its head in the sand, identifying Syrians as 'displaced' and

refused to recognize them as ‘refugees’.” (Saghieh, N and Frangieh, G, 2014).

The cabinet immediately emerged in May 2014 from its usual state in which chaos and uncertainty were created to establish the Crisis Unit of the State, and a clear plan called the ‘October Policy’ in October 2014. The most important reform was placing limits on Syria's mobility and housing and enforcing regulations and intervene in their daily lives through General Protection – the department of State security in charge of dealing with foreigners. “The plan lays out a range of objectives: to minimize the number of refugees across the border (apart from extraordinary humanitarian circumstances) and foster returns; bring protection policies into effect at the local level” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Moreover, Lebanon agreed to permit the temporary residence of Syrian refugees in return for the allocation of about 400 million Euros. Whereas European states may have preferred to promote a weaker understanding of the October Scheme, Lebanon placed additional immigration limits on Syrians to force into circumstances of greater tenuousness and vulnerability to those who could not manage the expensive extension of residence permits. On the level of national politics, the securitization of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has only deepened as leaders such as Foreign Minister Gebran Baseel of the Maronite Christian Free Patriotic Movement maintain and protect their ethnic patriotic legitimacy in the face of Syrian refugees (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

### **Sub-National Variation**

One of the outstanding examples of October 2014 is that it contributed to the extra-legal introduction of sub-nationals at the regional level. This strategy, for instance, appears to have prompted several municipalities to place prohibitions on Syrian refugees in the evening. In essence, however, these conservative policies were introduced wrongly in certain places more lenient than others. Just 45 towns out of 1000 have instituted a curfew.



*Image 5: An informal settlement hosting around 120 refugee families near Beralias in the bekaa Valley, Lebanon  
Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

In the meantime, refugee policies, involuntary departures, and de-facto resettlement are different in various countries. The lack of a single central government and the consequent 'non-politics' against refugees has contributed to a substantial amount of decentralization in the execution of policy. The political identity and the position of 'confessionalism' may clarify much of the subsequent variance. However political economy has also been a factor in municipalities seeking to raise awareness among foreign organizations, especially those residing in informal tents, of the essential resources that Syrians rely on.

Regulations on Syrians were enforced more strictly in Hezbollah municipalities. This represents Hezbollah's alliance with the Assad regime's perception of terror and securitization and the perception that most Syrian refugees in Lebanon fled the Assad regime and were more prone to be Sunnithan Shi'a. Hezbollah has a very significant equilibrium. At the outset of the conflict, it embraced and supported Syrian refugees because Syrians opened their borders to Lebanese civilians who escaped Israeli bombing in 2006. They decided to

protect their image for charity, and therefore because their chairman, Mr. Hassan Nasrallah, maintained that war would stay out of Lebanon (Chalcraft, JT, 2009). Hezbollah's overtime securitization of Syrians was based on a tight administration of the Syrians in its groups-led communities as well as in regions it was alleged to have been battling Al Nusra and the ISIL-affiliated factions next to the Lebanese military. "Hezbollah has been active in recovering the Syrian citizens and military in the region of Aarsal, particularly, with the aggressive clusters between Hezbollah and other rebel factions. In 2016 and 2017, cases of involuntary refunds and non-refoulement were more widespread" (The Guardian, 2017).

Secondly, it is crystal clear that because of a specific shared background with the Syrians, the Sunni areas welcomed the Syrian refugees more than any other place. The coastal towns such as Tripoli and Sidon, and most of Beirut, became much more comfortable in enforcing the October ban on residence limits. Partly because the Syrian-Lebanese unofficial networks have proven to be vast and long-standing, many of them were created by the 1993 bilateral deal, which already had some 500,000 Syrians employed in the country before to 2011 (Frangieh, G, 2014). In turn, the de facto socio-economic convergence in the areas was much more feasible and the state effectively abandoned democratic society to respond to Syria's surge.



*Image 6: Kfar Qahel informal settlement in Northern Lebanon*  
*Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

Nonetheless, there have been differences in Sunni communities and identities.

Amnesty international says curfews have been enforced in Tikrit, a blended but largely Sunni zone. “The Mayor of Tripoli, in essence, promoted the Syrians’ with a comfortable and transparent approach. His estimation of the population growth of Tripoli was premised on a significant rise in the quantity of waste produced from the municipality. As reported, *‘It’s impossible to set them apart, they’re just like us, too. There are Syrians here who talk the same thing as us and have married into our families’* - Tripoli interview” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

Thirdly, there were varied reactions from Christian communities and many pursued some form of influence, whilst others welcomed the Syrian visibility. About 10% of the Syrian refugees are Christians. However, a variable other than informal settlements in many Sunni regions tends to be the social status with rich Syrians much more inclined to reside in rich Christian locations than in the rural settlements of Sunni. Thus, individuality is concerned. “In Zahle, for example, the Christian Mayor As’ad Zughayb did not enforce curfews or exploit Syrian refugees partially because of his liberal beliefs: ‘I would not prohibit a Syrian from walking in the evening with his wife after working all day’. *‘We had long-term camps in our county but the foreign agencies started talking to us just after we began gathering their waste’*. – Interview” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). This response contrasts with that in other Christian cities; for example, in the coastal town Jounieh, Syrians have frequently faced greater levels of discrimination and oppression, including by the police and General Security. In the coastal city of Jounieh, Syrians are always faced with heightened bigotry and persecution, even by the police and General Protection. This reaction is contrary to the situation in any other Christian region. In addition, the Mayor of Zahle complained about the overall lack of coordination of the solution for the refugees. He was worried about fire protection in temporary settlements, with tents too small and insufficient availability of clean water. Zahle was not the only municipality to draw scrutiny that deliberately rejected camp facilities. A UNHCR coordination officer attested that Municipalities may also use curfews to obtain the involvement of foreign interventions: some international agencies viewed curfews as an indication of civil unrest, thereby emphasizing the need for assistance and motivating local councils to signal

social tensions (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

### **3.3 Turkey Influx Compact**

The relations between Turkey and Syria have since been based on bilateral disagreements, however, restored in the 2000s and formed a framework for partnership over a large-scale variety of policy concerns, including defense, commerce, health, and agriculture. Starting from 2011, over three million Syrian population have fled the conflict in their country, seeking asylum in Turkey. In specific terms, they are regarded as ‘guests’ rather than ‘refugees. These ‘guests’ are covered temporarily (TP) so that noncompulsory departure or restriction to their stay in Turkey is guaranteed. However, due to a major regional anomaly, they do not have the rights of refugees as defined in the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 UN Protocol. The Turkish government has continually modified and adjusted some policies on Syrian residents, following an extraordinary strategy on ‘opening doors’, with almost four percent of the population embracing Syrian civil society (UNHCR, 2020). To facilitate internal peace between the country’s population and in decision-making on international foreign policy, the Turkish Government’s approach towards refugees has strengthened. As the crisis in Syria tends to worsen, Turkey has proved to be a very effective actor in regional politics. Turkey, on the one hand, has a possible theoretical ‘atomic bomb’ ability- so strong that Europe is striving vigorously to urge Turkey to avert it. The bomb is referred to as the Syrian refugees and Turkey is now using them as a bargaining chip in Euro-Turkey ties.

Furthermore, “The Turkey-Syrian High-Level Policy Board implemented over 60 strategic alliances in September 2009 prior to the start of the Syrian conflict, including mobility deals, each removing visa conditions from their respective nationals for visa-free visiting up to 90 days” (Turkish Ministry Foreign Affairs, 2017). Early in the turmoil the mobility deal hence granted free entrance across the border. In late April 2011, “the first refugees (just a few hundred of them) arrived with a relatively small concentration camp in Hatay. Turkey spent at least \$15 million by the end of 2011 in building six settlements. Therefore, a drastic rise in the number of Syrians entered the next year. More than 2,500

immigrants came on the Turkish-Syrian border in just a day in April 2012, in anticipation of a UN cease-fire" (Stack, L, 2011). In July of the same year, Turkey shifted officially in war direction after Syria shot a Turkish jet that crosses in its territories, announcing it would be perceived as a military threat if Syria's military approached the boundaries of Turkey. There was more uncertainty in October when the Syrian missile first exploded in Akçakale, a small border town where five Turkish citizens had been killed, and then there was an immediate military reprisal from Turkey and Parliament's permission to launch military forces in foreign countries by the government when it is considered necessary. By 2012, Syrian refugees in Turkey reached 150,000, followed by half a million by 2013. There was a significant spike in 2014, with more than 1.5 million registered Syrians in December 2014 (UNHCR, 2020).

Turkey has completed a nearly ten-year phase since 2013 to create progressively structured nationwide migrant and refugee management institutions. Specifically, "under the influence of the European Union, the Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) enacted the first broad migration policy and created the Directorate General for Migration Management (DGMM), which then became effective in 2014. The new law established rules to regulate migrants' arrival and departure, as well as four types of international protection: refugees (from European countries), refugees under circumstance (for non-Europeans), subsidiary protection (for persons and on the grounds of human rights), and temporary protection (for mass flood situations). The final agreement is for the Syrians was granted" (Ineli Ciger, M, 2014). The LFIP states that 6 months from the date of the first application for foreign security, refugees or temporary refugees could register for the work visa and, if the labor force situations so require, subordinate security claimants can operate for a limited time. The estimation of the informal employment of Syrians in Turkey is between 500,000 and 1 million. Private and public job centers primarily focused on agriculture, construction, and textiles. Thus, Kadköy, O (2017) and Korkmaz, E (2017), separately states that about 20,000 Syrian workers received work permits from 2011 to 2016, which account for close-1 percent of the total workforce (133: 1-8). The Country, in reality, had switched to a relatively more



conservative series of migration strategies given increasing security issues regarding establishing these entities (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Reported by Dinçer, et al. (2013); and Schleifer, Y (2013), a major step was the explosion of Reyhanlı in February and May 2013, one of Hatay's border cities with Syria; a splash in the border crossing of Cilvegözü and twin attacks in Central Reyhanli that killed at least 51 people and injured 140, respectively (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). This gave rise to the rising awareness that Syria's refugee moves may be associated with the terrorist attack. Turkey started close some of its formal border crossing points with Syria rather instantly afterward, for instance, the construction of a 2-meter wall in Nusaybin district at the beginning.



*Image 7 – Syrian Neighborhood in Adana, Turkey*

*Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

Although Turkey has declared its borders accessible, this has not been the case. As stated by Kirişçi, K and Ferris, E (2015), the Turkish government gradually perceived the double security threat raised by the PKK and ISIL as the complexities of violence in Syria had shifted towards the place of ISIS and more civilians left the Kurdish regions in October 2014, following the siege of Kobane (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Nevertheless, in October 2014, as in Lebanon and Jordan, the increasing restrictive of mobility was a significant shifting point. The government announced that the Syrian intervention was now considered 'permanent' rather than provisional and that the country had to change thusly. In the same month, a provisional security rule (as an LFIP by

law) was enacted by the ministerial conference. It ensured that all Syrians (including both camp and camp refugees even without identity papers), Syrian Palestinians and stateless were safe from forced return and relief. Turkey closed all its entry points from March to early June 2015 until it welcomed more than 15,000 Syrian people who have fled the deteriorating war in Tel-Abyad, including the passport holders. Additionally, the altered nature of the refugee crisis made the problems of cultural cohesion a national concern, a problem with several dimensions and political repercussions for urban refugees. In the subsequent public declaration of plans to award Syrian's citizenship in July 2016, Erdoğan's public opinion has, for instance, become an important political issue.



*Image 8: Refugee camp at Gaziantep, Turkey*

*Source: (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

Officials say that “more than 10,000 Syrians have been given citizenship up to now and that the applications are being processed would reach 50,000” (Interview Ankara, 2016).

### **Sub-National Variation**

The federal government, with governors serving the central government, determines the position of the refugees in Turkey. The local municipalities thus have a vital role in the development of socio-economic growth. Hatay, then the south-eastern border towns with official and in official crossings: Gaziantep, Kilis, Sanliurfa, and Mardin. Ozden (2013); Kaya, A (2016) argued, Hatay has

a long history as a cross-border representation of communal relations with Turkey, particularly with its Christian and Alawite Arabs, and thus solidarity with the Syrians was a central component of the regional identity (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). In consequence, partnerships with the host community across the border zone and current socio-economic connections have a vital role to play in favoring the self-settlement of refugees. In the South and South-East provinces, more than half the Syrian refugee majority of people live. But there was a noticeable shift in the degree of transparency in various municipalities as they decided to migrate to other areas of the world. When the whole of Turkey embarked on a more conservative turn in 2014, several municipalities displayed varying amounts of cooperation, even within the narrow domestic issues and legislative system. There is no specific administrative obligation for jurisdictions to integrate refugees into their aid and social programs under the existing legislative system. And the central government, the primary income sources of municipalities, does not include any clear financial allocation for refugees within the budget. Municipalities thus play a significant role in assessing whether refugees, who are often party-politicized, are to provide additional assistance. The position of political groups and the extent to which refugees were viewed as a future economic boost for local entrepreneurs tend to be one of the main factors behind this. This section is mostly demonstrated by the illustration of the responses of the municipal governments of Gaziantep, Adana and Izmir.

First of all, Gaziantep displayed the highest degree of city unity in all three cases. Gaziantep was one of the first towns to accept waves of Syrian refugees and built refugee camps in the all-around it is; district of Islahiye, nızip and karkamış only about 100 km from the Syrian border. Demographically, “the city has undergone the increasing impact of urban refugees since the beginning of 2012, the share of which currently accounts for almost 20 percent of its population” (UNHCR, 2017). Gaziantep’s prominence among Syrian refugees can be traced back to many factors: geographical and cultural closeness to Syria, partnerships, established social and economic networks, a comparatively strong city’s economy. Driven by the AKP, Gaziantep has been promptly participating in the initial years of the conflict with Syria’s refugees. Originally,

there is a wide variety of social programs available for refugees from education to livelihoods and assistance from the state. Initially targeted at delivering basic humanitarian relief. Group solidarity between communities and government agencies, NGOs, and foreign organizations have been set up to collaborate more efficiently in 2016. It seems like the activities and services are available for everyone, and this is a great influence on improving the local neighborhood dialog with refugees. However, social integration will take some time, as one of the silvers ~~units~~ in the Narlıtepe district states because Syrians travel too often from and inside Gaziantep to pursue cheaper housing and jobs in other towns. Evaluations between the pre-war situations of the late 2000s are essential for understanding the specific socio-economic facets of the Syrian refugee crisis for Gaziantep. In 2005, the municipalities of Gaziantep and Aleppo were political ‘twin cities. Local authorities took an initiative to improve their economic, social, and cultural relations. Locals also remember the days when taxis regularly moved businesses and day tourists between the two cities. In addition to increased business activity on both sides, “shipments from Gaziantep to Syria rose steadily between 2005 and 2010. While there has been a drastic decline of 45% in 2012, a considerable increase of 237% was reported from 2010 to 2015 primarily due to the share of local companies in supplying international emergency aid. By the end of 2016, Syrians became migrants, compared to 20 in 2011, and set up more than 800 companies in Gaziantep” (Chamber of Commerce, 2016).

The central objective of Gaziantep as a regional organizational centre for UN organizations and those engaged in the management of the crisis of refugees also benefit local stakeholders. The Metropolitan Municipality, for example, provides capacity development funding for waste disposal and recovery through the collaborations with the UNDP. As part of another UNDP initiative, the municipality and the Chamber of Industry performs training on Syrian refugees’ employability in the services and manufacturing market (Alexander Betts, Ali Ali, and Fulya Memişoğlu, 2020). The framework for cooperation remains small, although the latter has been present in Gaziantep in the early years of the crisis, and local authorities and NGOs condemn foreign partners and donors. Such critique represents a leader of the Chamber of Industry:

*“It’s like foreign organizations are trying to solve a puzzle here, but no mystery. They have been waiting so long for intervention. We found collaborators to carry out a technical mapping analysis to align Syrians’ expertise with the needs of their employees, which we cannot locate. Second, you have to define the sort of individuals you work with. You have to teach them a trade, a professional culture, and not just unconditionally donate money. Secondly, physical infrastructure growth must be sponsored. It is a condition of mass relocation, not expected immigration. They carry out unfeasible ventures without taking these facts into consideration on the ground” (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).*

Adana is the sixth most populated town in Turkey and is a major spot for Syrian refugees due to its socio-economic profile, well-developed agriculture and textile sectors, and proximity to the border provinces. A mix of internal immigrant communities from the southeast and seasonal agricultural migration labourers now more and more replaced by Syrian farmworkers is situated in the region. Also significant in the resettlement choices for Syrian refugees in the presence of large local Arab communities in Adana. For example, the Yeşilbağlar neighbourhood hosts over 10% of Syrian refugees in the region. One of the old neighbourhoods of mukhtars, fluent in the language of Arabic, told the Syrian refugees who visited the office that comprehensive familial networks had been brought back in Yeşilbağlar between local residents primarily from Sanlıurfa and Syrians from Deir Ez- Zur (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

Seyhan district municipalities (CHP), which form over 50% of the Syrian refugee population in Adana, demonstrate transparency in collaborations, above all in favour of livelihood programs, with domestic and foreign NGOs. Since a popular ‘cash for jobs’ scheme was launched in 2016, 200 Syrians and 200 Turkish residents are reportedly working in parks and green areas in the municipality for a short period. The municipality is wise in matching its citizens with pro-active refugee seats, as the Seyhan district has one of the highest unemployment rates in Turkey. The Mayor, a well-known local official, had a conversation with aid groups and focused on including the host population, rather than only helping the refugees (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). The re-

quests received shocked the municipality police, as the Syrian refugee applicants included engineers, French teachers, and architects. This suggests for the officials the immediate need to carry out a specialist mapping local to provide highly qualified Syrian refugees job prospects (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020).

In response to Syrians refugees, Izmir's municipality has been mostly inactive. The arrival of Syrians was seen largely as a transportation crisis, with Syrian people using the city as a method to enter Europe and the Aegean Sea. The central government started to concentrate on Izmir in 2015, not least due to European Union efforts to stop people's movement. In the summer months of 2015, for example, the Governor made it clear that there should be movement restrictions to deter citizens from accessing Izmir. Thus, the execution of the Turkish-EU agreement has been optimistic in reducing the pressure of reducing illegal migrant flows and the overcrowding potential of the law enforcement units and immigration managers, as one of Izmir's deputy governors has said (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). Local officials have been also concerned about violence in the Basmane area, in the city center where smugglers are bargaining with refugees on risky European travel. In comparison, the deal has minimized the booming impact of human trafficking on local economic development in the Basmane: in December 2016 shops selling life jackets, hotels, and restaurants packed with transit refugees were virtually empty. The local players have started to recognize that the remaining Syrians in town are settled, with the first provisional school for Syrians opened in 2016. This was also a key turning point for local actors to remember. Some additional interventions followed, such as the decision of the Metropolitan Municipality to include Syrians in its Milk Aid Program in early 2017, after opposition for several years to the rights-based NGOs demands. But there was no other aid or operation in the Metropolitan Municipality that answered the needs of Syrian refugees directly in December 2016 (Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, 2020). In their selection for settlement in Izmir, Syria's fugitives have job prospects, kinship relations and cultural association. In the initial years of the crisis, Syrians came to Izmir lived mostly in the district of Karabağlar, home for large Turkish-Kurdish internal migrant populations. The local people showed immense unity with the refugees,

who provided them with accommodation, food and other basic necessities. The City Council of Karabağlar Metropolitan District set up a working group on refugees, which eventually became a 'refugee assembly' in collaboration with Konak district municipalities in 2013 to find more structured ways to involve the growing Syrian population in the district. In addition to lobbying and training, their primary task is to undertake Turkish language courses for refugees, funded by local NGOs. In contrast to Gaziantep, the resources to incorporate Syria's refugees in socio-economic terms have remained very minimal until recently, and the key means of involvement for refugees are the efforts by small-scale local NGOs, such as Kapılar or Bridging Citizens. Domestic and international nongovernmental organizations, which have been operating in the south-eastern region since the early years of the crisis, began openings in Izmir in late 2015 only. For illustration, ASAM has two multi-service support services now running in Izmir since 2014. With exception of Adana and Gaziantep, refugees were not deemed an incentive for investment in Izmir's market circles. Betts, Ali, and Memişoğlu, reported, no public estimates of the number of Syrian companies registered with the Chamber was reported from the Izmir Chamber of Commerce in late 2016. The representative of the House said that Syrians are not settled in Izmir because they are not given enough incentives to invest in economically developed cities (2020).

## **Conclusion**

This section provides a comparative analysis of the local policy for Syrian refugees in the three main host countries. The findings are based on a tentative analysis of three specific situations in each of the three countries, which therefore does not give a full description of national refugee policies. Nevertheless, it reveals that local politics have influenced the results even for refugees independently of foreign and national policymaking. Foreign and national politics are frequently mediated at the governorate or regional level, for example, by the elite decision-making. Local players also play a role in integration results in countries such as Turkey and Jordan, where the authority for refugee policy is comparatively key.

There are identity-based influences, and economic variables in each of the

countries that tend to explain differences in local politics within the same region. These are large definitions and the most relevant variables in these definitions differ from country to country. Political parties are important in Turkey; confessionalism is important in Lebanon; tribalism matters in Jordan. Interests often matter: whether decision-makers are conscious that they are winning or losing over the supply of inclusive or limited replies, they frequently change strategies and reports. This refers to local mayors in particular. The structure is a simplistic study yet succeeds not only at explaining uncertainty but also at providing parsimony.

Many impacts are important to policymakers interested in the security and assistance of refugees, whether they operate on a regional, state, or local level. There can be a differing effect of international policies at the sub-national level; issues of strategic research capacity; main players are communities, making use of resources and seeing past boundaries.

### **3.4 The Refugees' Prospects and Aspirations to return to Syria**

The UNHCR has undertaken Return Perception and Intention Surveys (RPIS), and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with Syrian refugees in 2017 and 2018, in regional refugee recipient countries, on their prospects and plans to return home. However, Turkey did not participate in RPIS activities, due to the strategic framework (UNHCR, 2018). These projects seek to explore the potential plans of Syrian refugees, to listen to their views on their return to Syria as a remedy to their situation, and to help consider the viability of systematic displacement strategies from Syria. The information given via the RPIS has been analysed through regular talks and advice to transient refugees at registration facilities, border surveillance, and security updates directly or by affiliates, and other related information during the execution of security and support services as part of sustainable approaches acquired by states' operations. UNHCR has a thorough understanding of refugee issues and the purpose of their profiles and security demands, which enables details of the geographic differences, or similarities to be analysed. These are all key elements to encourage any empirical prediction of detailed displacement strategies from Syria with the priority on return proposals to Syria. This part highlights the key insights of the



fourth geographic Return Perception and Intention Survey.

Sustainable strategies for Syrian refugees draw upon a holistic policy of defence and interventions that aim to: Helping the host country and the stability of the community; promoting the self-reliance of refugees, ensuring links to services, legal resources, and means of living; extending the links of third countries to relocation and other supportive processes; arranging the voluntary return of Syrian refugees, when conditions for a safe, dignified and sustainable return are in place.


### Registered Refugees from Syria




*Figure 1: Registered refugees from Syria*  
*Source: (UNHCR, 2020)*

### Resettlement Submissions of Syrian Refugees 2014 – 2020 (176,561)

Given its restricted relocation areas, the UNHCR has recommended a limited proportion of the most sensitive refugees for relocation. This involves women and children who are tormented by war, people who are ill or who are wounded who cannot afford proper treatment, and other casualties of the conflict. Thus, in 2017, 3RP resettlement demands were 52 percent decreased by small housing units relative to 2016. By comparison, the number of Syrian refugees reported grew to 5.6 million, from 4.8 million by the end of 2016. The amount and seriousness of their weaknesses keep growing as refugees achieve their relocation conditions (UNHCR, 2020).



*Figure 2: Resettlements submission by year*  
Source: (UNHCR, 2020)



*Figure 3: Self organized refugees return to Syria by year*  
Source: (UNHCR, 2020)





Figure 4: Voluntary Syrian refugees' returns  
Source: (UNHCR, 2020)

\*The above statistics are just those that are reported and tracked by the UNHCR and however, do not represent the substantially larger proportion of returns. Other numbers from their Community Reports have been published by General Security, of which 158 persons were unidentified by UNHCR. There- turns data approach has been modified since the re-opening of the border on 15 October 2018. Consequently, the return data remains provisionally checked and updated (UNHCR, 2020).

### Refugees' wishes and aims for the future

In 2018, the RPIS confirmed that 76% of the Syrians were planning to return to Syria one day, rising from 51% in 2017 by almost a quarter. However, 19% of refugees said they never intend to come back to their homes (UNHCR, 2020).



*Figure 5: Refugees wishes and hope to return home*  
*Source: (UNHCR, 2020)*

That affirms that the preferable permanent option for Syrian refugees is optional resettlement for protection and integrity. It is crucial to understand that over the next 12 months in the same year, 49 percent of pending refugees and 41 percent of those who did not plan to return to Syria considered it crucial that they travel to Syria for a visit before determining whether or not to repatriate.

Whilst 76 % of participants wished to return home one day, 85% said they did not plan to return to Syria within 12 months in the same year, 11% were unsure and 4% were expected to return. The number of those who said that they plan to return within 12 months drastically decline from 7 to 4% relative to the RPIS study of October 2017 and the number of those who were undecided also fell from 18 to 11%, whereas those who were unwilling to return grew from 76 to 85%. The shift of expectations is probably reflected of Syria's unfolding war, particularly in the significant reduction of those who originally said they would return. This is specifically concerned: the developments in East Ghouta, Rural Damascus Governorate, which took place in February-April 2018; the latest government attacks and extension of Syria-controlled territories in Dara'a, which were organized returns from Lebanon in May 2018. Since the first RPIS round in January 2017 and amid (positive or negative) changes in Syria over the past two years, a majority of refugees continually reported that they had no intention of going back to Syria in the following year until they saw substantial security improvements, access to services and prosperity and sustainability.

*'Parents cannot inquire for their sons who are being held in custody. If we do, we will therefore be convicted'.* - Male interviewee in Jordan.




Figure 6: Intentions of refugees to return to Syria within 12 months  
Source: (UNHCR, 2020)

### The determining factors behind their return intention

The motives underlying return intentions set 12 months are explained by telling refugees to either pick the three primary factors for their plan to reverse or to indicate their absence of intention, from a broad variety of choices, as push factors (i.e. asylum conditions) or pull factors (i.e. developments within Syria). The following explanations for each type of response are the three major motives that refugees view as the primary factors impacting their return decisions. Such explanations are geographical, considering that there might be variations at the country level.

- Why are refugees intending to return?

The three key factors chosen by the Focus Group conversations for its decision to return have been developments in the security crisis, family reconciliation, and employment prospects in Syria. *'Actually, I think it would be safer for me to go back to my country, Syria - my opinion is guided by the enhancement of the security crises.'* - Egypt, female interviewee. However, this is similar to results from border surveillance in Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq whereby the need to normalize relations with relatives in Syria explains most self-organized returns. Their next return, primarily the security climate, restrictions on free travel, lack of a diplomatic compromise or improvement in the democratic process, and absence of livelihood prospects has still been stated by 60% of particular concerns and fears in

this category.

- Why are refugees not intending to return?

The three primary factors listed by those not intending to return were lack of protection in Syria, lack of livelihood, and proper shelter. The results of the October 2017 Survey agree with these issues. Accordingly, the community has been rethinking its future return plans by strengthening safety standards, offering subsistence choices, and getting access to essential facilities. Thus, these factors were comparable to those in October 2017 report, however, was not focused on 'access to social resources' but rather 'a diplomatic solution to the crises.

- Why are refugee's undecided about their intentions?

Improved stability, steps in seeking a diplomatic resolution to the crisis, and the trust that returning people would have full rights to essential resources would assist the population in agreeing on the aim to go back to Syria. These factors were also comparable to those in October 2017 report, however, was not focused on 'access to social resources' but rather 'a diplomatic solution to the crises.

### **Interests and impediments for return**

This section gives a comprehensive summary of the three major reasons offered by refugees who do not intend to return to Syria in the 12 months.


- Safety and security as the primary considerations for return

The main aspect that affects refugees' goals and aspirations is a lack of secure and consistent physical protection. In all the RPIS surveys carried out so far, this has been a clear pattern. Almost half of the explanations outlined for justifying their motives refer to the incidence of terrorist acts or the possibility of potential retaliations (45%) for the refugees who are not going to return to Syria within 12 months. 32 % of respondents in this community stressed that Syria lacks reliable and permanent protection, 8% were closely tied to service in the military, national service or recruiting issues for them and their children, and

5% were associated with anxiety about the capture, incarceration and/or reprisal on their return and/or the absence of immunity for military insubordination and military evasion. 'Even if there's not enough job (in Iraq, the Kurdistan Region), I can't return to Syria because my sons have left the military service'. - Male respondent, Iraq. Comparably, 43 % of people who did not wish to return to Syria observed that an enhanced safety condition would make them return. The primary explanation for those who proclaimed themselves to be moving back to Syria is also clear.

- Lack of adequate housing and concerns over property

Refugees have emphasized during many round RPIS in this area since 2017 that the absence of accommodation or lodging while returning is a huge impediment to avoiding return; 74% of the refugees surveyed had a house in Syria until departure in the first half of 2018. Of these, 46% said their land had been demolished and 10% said it had been partly demolished and uninhabited. Around 30% said their land stayed unchanged (10%) or partly hurt (10%) because of its inhabitable existence. An extra 14 percent said that they didn't recognize their property status.



*Figure 7: Conditions of property inside Syria*

*Source: (UNHCR, 2020)*

- Scarcity of livelihood opportunities


The war has had a profound effect on Syrian wellbeing and has contributed

to higher levels of poverty and unemployment. The access to, or lack of, livelihoods when returning to Syria has been seen particularly as a decisive force affecting return policies as services needed to ensure effective repatriation are necessary. Therefore, depending on different technical skills, refugees will accept the existence of sustainable livelihoods in Syria. 75% of the survey participants admitted experiencing and know-how in the following fields at registration: mining, building and production (24%); utilities, e.g. laundry, domestic staff, concierge (22%); farming (12%); enterprise, production, and supply (10%); and small enterprises (7%). About 8 percent indicated that they had no jobs before the crisis. A very wide variety of technical practices included a total of 17percent. Hence, sustainable Syrian economy rebuilding will provide subsistence in numerous sectors and allow successful reintegration in the future.

### Going home

- Making an informed decision to return. This last part outlines the return approaches and concerns for those planning to return within 12 months to Syria. Refugees must have sole rights to precise, detailed, and realistic facts, including human, material, and legal protection concerns in Syria, in order to make a good judgment about their future. Around 51% were hoping to go back to Syria in 12 months even though they had inadequate knowledge around their planned region of return to rebuild their lives, 8% did not know enough, whereas 40% said there was clear support. This reflects an improvement from 40% in October 2017, up to 51% in 2018, of the 11% who replied with inadequate knowledge.

Information needs of refugees intending to return within 1 year





*Figure 8: Information of refugees intending to return within 1 year*

*Source: (UNHCR, 2020)*

The key requirement was knowledge about the security crisis in their region, followed by details about shelters, then fundamental facilities, when asked what increased knowledge refugees need in their planned area of return. It should be noted that while aid agencies stress the need for prior knowledge in the field of House, land, and property (HLP) and civil documents to facilitate the repatriation of returnees, the people surveyed did not point this out as a key concern. This isn't because refugees don't think this is relevant, but partly because they don't know about certain matters or because of knowledge about the methods. Such a loss of consciousness may delay reintegration and therefore does not exactly preclude a return to Syria. *'No one in my family is in my home village to tell me the situation in Hamaya'*. - Male Delegate in Lebanon. It was foreseen, most refugees contemplating a return depended mostly on feedback from the government and their communities on the conditions in their expected region of return (41%). However, this can be troublesome as they are still removed from their points of birth. Secondary data outlets comprised media outlets including broadcast, press, networking sites (17%), group members (13%), peers (12%), and social networking details (12%). 49 percent of unsure refugees and 41 percent of those who have not suggested a return to Syria over the next twelve months thought it necessary to return to Syria for a 'go-and-see' visit before coming to a decision about their plan to return to Syria to determine the chances of restart and increase awareness about the crisis in Syria.


- Returning home with family and possessions

The chosen location for 90% of refugees who are to return within 12 months is the place of birth if provisions are approved. Others have been unsure (3 percent) or thought of another location (7 percent) because of their protection or they were their last place of residence before they flew because they were the location of the families of their wives. Equally, 83 percent of unsure persons said that if they were to move, they would go back to their country of birth. In the decision on the return to Syria and processes for them, family

matters and particularly the security of the family group play a crucial role. The desire to reunite with relatives in Syria is among the leading reasons to go there, as per immigration monitoring results in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. In the same way, 83% of the refugees will return with all the loved ones, alone 11% and six% with a few of the families within the following 12 months, whilst others stay in the asylum country, as a consequence, according to the previous surveys. Any 68% of those who intend to fly by themselves may be because their family is in Syria. Some 23% intend to fly by themselves until they get their rest (mostly the male householder) back home. Border surveillance and focus group interviews indicate that family plans to plan for potential viable returns which differ based on their conditions, for example, whether a higher earner returns ahead of a family for a chance to live in Syria or stays behind to raise funds to help a reintegrating family in Syria, whether he works in the country of asylum. Around 40 % of respondents said they would bring their properties (mainly furniture and electronics) back with them. Around 70 % of the participants abandoned packages / resources for use in Syria, such as a home, land or car, on their departure.

- Expected livelihood opportunities upon return

Within the twelve months, the refugees expecting to return hoped to find livelihood prospects in varied sectors, including agriculture (37%), micro - enterprises (12%), and infrastructure (13%) among others.



*Figure 9: Intended sector of work upon return*

*Source: (UNHCR, 2020)*

- Plans for those who are not intending to go home now 67 per cent and 47 per cent of those who announced they had no desire or were unsure to return to Syria planned to remain in their host country simultaneously, while 25 per cent and 19 per cent expected to visit the third world combined. When people were asked why they choose a country, it was mostly because of family relations, acquaintances or other connections in that country. The explanation for this was a third nation. "Canada has been revealed to be the country of preference for advancing movements (33%), followed by the United States (21%), Germany (11%), the UK (2%), Sweden (2%) and Australia (1%). Furthermore, 30% of the people in question were willing to travel to 'any nation' (UNHCR, 2020).

Despite the numerous changes in Syria, in 2018, 85% of Syrians will not be returning to their country in 2018 mainly because of reservations about safety and stability. The polls by the UNHCR over the last one and a half years appeared to be accurate. Similarly, at the beginning of 2017, Aleppo's revived government did not bring about a big change in the aim at the time. However, many refugees' views of stability and protection in their countries of origin are undoubtedly influenced by the end of Military operations in certain places of Syria. It should be acknowledged that nearly three-quarters of Syrians have dreams and expectations that one day, they will be returning to their communities, their close family and their communities.

This chapter suggested the perceptions of the mass influx of Syrian refugees in major host communities of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Thus, further investigating the prospects and future aspirations of the refugees that might guarantee their return home. The study provided changes in governments' national strategies of short-sighted, unpredictable measures, and the catastrophic economic condition affecting the refugees by scrutinizing the local responses beyond capital cities. Nevertheless, it necessitates the evaluation of individuals' internal prejudice and the observations on the social impacts of their actions to proceed viably and sustainable alternatives to this complex and unforeseen problem.

## CONCLUSION

The complexities in both domestic and international policies in many countries today include migration. Migration is now becoming a threat. With different forms of migration that are involuntary, illegal, or irregular, populations are increasingly diversifying, with migrants slowly filling new areas and communities in countries across the world. In recent years, the Middle East and North Africa, which have had a considerable impact on diplomatic discussions related to migration, have been defined, since around the last decade, as conflicting and disastrous with growing political tensions. The Arab Spring/Uprisings dispersed across the region from 2011 onwards, demonstrating the absence of true democracy in the area against their lengthy rulers.

The current Syrian crisis is one of the pioneering global challenges that the world is facing presently since 2011. This movement towards growing instability and human rights abuses indicates the onset of the region's first mass displacement. Almost half of the population with several millions of people has been forced to find shelter in the neighboring countries, especially Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey. Given the severity of the challenges, these countries have had a substantial and noteworthy influence on all of these refugees. These refugees, however, have also spread across Europe. Nevertheless, the destructive result of the conflict was the outgrowth of the transgressions experienced by migrants or refugees and thus, the shortage of needs wherever they find themselves. The refugees needed further protection while they were accepted in many other countries and societies.

The nation, which has already undergone virtually ten years of war and displacement, now faces an alarming rate of hunger leaving countless people extremely vulnerable to COVID-19 facing scarcity of the resources required to safeguard themselves. Hence, it is another call for a sustainable approach to improve the lives of these migrants or refugees. In this sense, this thesis has offered an overview of the challenges and difficulties encountered by the Syrian refugees, hypothesizing the very basic fact that the war in Syria persists.

The entire thesis has been guided by three research questions hence, a conclusion was derived, forming the result of the main findings of the research as follows:

The entire study is made up of three sections that form its research questions. The first question primarily dealt with the problem of definition and scope. The ideational factors range from democracy, human rights, Peace, Liberty to labor force enhancement, health, environment, Sustainable development, and Good Governance. How will such determinants be equally discussed in the IOM involvement with the Syrian refugees? Or do they even exist? Discourse analysis has been developed as part of the literature review beginning with the migration and development debate series on the IOM discourse and its effect on Syrian refugees (i.e., through Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey).

Secondly, the IOM is well aware of its position in the UN and the disparity of member states, and partner organizations in the approach to foreign policy. Regardless of the various political, economic, and social characteristics of each member country, the approach applied to dealing with the Syrian refugees differs. The question, then, has been: Would the inclusion of specific ideational objectives within the framework of the IOM foreign policy contribute to a substantive alignment towards these refugees? If so, then why? If not, why not? This question seeks to clarify the fact that, in adopting a standard foreign policy towards these refugees, the IOM and other UN- collaborating institutions, and certain European Union (EU) member states have taken a very different stance. Analysis on four case studies have been established to support the IOM's significant role in enhancing the life of marginalized Syrian refugees: the two in high-level politics, that is, the restoration of war-ravaged areas (nation-state re-construction) and in upholding human rights and the rule of law, and two in low-level politics, i.e the implementation of a suitable model for the humanitarian response plan (HRP) and the IOM appeal to diplomacy.

Therefore, the third key question discusses the perception of the Syrian refugees in the host communities; how are they welcomed in each state despite

their size in number and their differences within several communities. In this part, an explanation of the Syrian refugees' integration into host communities have been provided, going beyond the central governments to the sub-national variations. Thus, examines the impediments to the wellbeing of the Syrian refugees living outside their home communities as well as their aspirations to return home.

The above-mentioned research questions have been primarily discussed sequentially in separate chapters of the thesis. The thesis has been largely divided into three chapters apart from the introduction and the conclusion.

The entire thesis has been contextualized in the first chapter, by primarily attempting to examine the theoretical frameworks of the IOM, particularly, under the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, and the IOM practices and power dissemination, providing analysis for recognizing its obligation to interact with the Syrian refugees. The chapter has explained the position of the IOM with the United Nations, in general, as well as the key organizational principles of the IOM. Thus, scrutinizing the scholarly arguments of the main theories applied in the thesis; the Liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism. While liberal inter-governmentalism proposes a system in which inter-governmental organizations work domestically and globally at the same time, the constructivist approach emphasizes the significance of subjective variations in understanding foreign policies and the reality that states seem not to foresee.

The second chapter, largely based on the arguments of the theory of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, presented a detailed IOM structure for adopting a humanitarian response plan in the region. This chapter discusses revitalized structures in Syria (that is to say the restoration of the nation-state, human rights and rule of law, and the humanitarian response plan). The allocation of funds called for by the IOM in compliance with the seriousness of the refugee effect in each host country was also explained. This chapter used LI theory since it aims at explaining trends in regional integration, the EU is an example, and this is also important to my argument in considering IOM foreign policy.

A political analysis of the host communities was rendered in the third chapter, specifically on their sub-national policies, through simply clarification of their perceptions. It also offers a survey of the hopes and expectations for the return of Syrian refugees to their homes. The chapter was primarily based on constructivist findings that illustrate the significance of cognitive norms, personalities as well as other variables and the importance of historical and social linkages for social interaction.

*To what extent the IOM is a key player in developing foreign policy diplomacy as well as coping with the influx of Syrian refugees in the post-2011 era?*

It is clearly explained in the chapters of this thesis how the above-mentioned question has been answered. In short, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has provided an environment of well-organized and effective migration policies regarding the Syrian refugees' influx and has encouraged international collaboration to migration issues; especially, its capacity to diplomatically forcing the host countries (Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan) to meet its objectives. Thus, to a very large extent, the IOM has reached the highest point of finding pragmatic solutions to the Syrian refugees' problems and has extended humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable migrants, refugees, and forcibly displaced individuals.

Accordingly, the United Nations, in general, has failed to provide a sustainable solution to the conflict and the refugees' influx, even though all the members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are either directly or indirectly involved in the crises. The thesis concludes by further attesting to the effectiveness and feasibility of the role the IOM has played in supporting the Syrian refugees. The research has yielded an optimistic result regarding IOM involvement, as it is the principal organization supporting the Syrian refugees.

The methodologies used in addressing these problems are; case study approach and comparative analysis.

First, a case study approach has served to identify and examine relevant considerations to the objective of the research (i.e., Syria nation-state rebuilding, Humanitarian Response Plan, Human Rights & the Rule of Law, and the IOM donation of funds). Second, a comparative analysis, which provided historical examples of different phases of the IOM participation with the Syrian refugees (i.e., shared history with host communities). Therefore, the comprehensive literature on migrant movements and approaches to international policy has motivated this work to evaluate how thoroughness the wellbeing of Syrians or refugees have been determined and strengthened by the policy decisions of the IOM. In addition to data collection, references from official policy statements i.e., leaders' speeches, meetings, notes of conferences have been used in this study. Thus, in particular, reported interviews with government officials and residents in refugees' host communities have served as additions to this research. The thesis incorporates two vital theories that have significant influences on the research; Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Constructivism.

The use of these two organizational features to evaluate the feasibility of the IOM's role in supporting Syrian refugees is a clear indication of integration but their reach has been minimal as the United Nations, in general, have disregarded the issue. Yet, with the assistance of the UN migration agency (UNHCR) and the host countries, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has also helped the Syrian refugees in substantial ways, by guaranteeing life-saving assistance and livelihood support to many Syrians desperately in need. The importance and impact of the IOM collaborating representatives on the refugees' influx have been considered fundamentally important.

Firstly, Liberal intergovernmentalists claim that national power is similar in the scope of detrimental self-interests and the extension of institutional norms (Kurekova, 2011). The premise lays out a system where intergovernmental organizations function concurrently domestically and internationally. Based on these facts, this statement acknowledges the clear objective fact of contemporary institutions like the EU and even that of IOM: The Member States tend to be 'treaty kings' and to be of prime diplomatic legitimacy and policy-making power. Thus, given the nature of the IOM and events regarding the Syrian refugees'



character, this theory has been scrutinized in this thesis.

Secondly, the argument used by constructivists on the thesis is based on premises that an institution's member can pursue their own national culture at home. At the same time, a collaborating member could participate in another partnership. The approach highlights the significance of subjective differences in the understanding of foreign policies and the fact that states do not appear to expect. Constructivists like Wendt and Finnemore both emphasize that while there seems to be an awareness through notions and processes of the mutual production of personalities and desires, these ideas and processes create their structure, influencing external actors. Given this, the Constructivism assumption has contributed substantially to this research.

It is advised that a scrupulous study of the reality of these refugees should be carried out in proposing humanitarian aid, instead of relying on a general rule. This recommendation is made to guide researchers against generalizing positive features for Syrian refugees.

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## PLAGIARISM REPORT

### THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) IN ENHANCING THE LIVES OF THE SYRIAN MIGRANTS/REFUGEES IN TURKEY, LEBANON, AND JORDAN

#### ORIJINALLIK RAPORU

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**ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL**

Tarih: 27 Ocak 2021

Lisansüstü Eğitim Enstitüsüne

“THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM) IN ENHANCING THE LIVES OF THE SYRIAN MIGRANTS/REFUGEES IN TURKEY, LEBANON, AND JORDAN” isimli araştırma projesi değerlendirilmiştir. Araştırmacılar insan, hayvan, bitki ve/veya yerküreden birincil veri toplamayacağından dolayı bu projenin etik kurulu tarafından değerlendirilmesine gerek yoktur.

Sıfat: Danışman

İsim: Doç. Dr. Nur KÖPRÜLÜ

Araştırma Projesindeki Rolü: Tez Danışmanı

Sıfat: Yüksek Lisans Öğrencisi İsim: Musa Abdulmumin Yelwa

Araştırma Projesindeki Rolü: Tezin yazarı

Not: Eğer araştırma projesi bir tez ise, bu form danışman ve eş-danışman (eğer var ise) tarafından doldurulmalıdır. Eğer öğretim görevlileri ve üyeleri araştırmayı bizzat kendileri yapıyor ise bu form yine kendileri tarafından doldurulmalıdır.