NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS PROGRAM

THE NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC BORDER POROSITY AND INSECURITY: FROM SURVEILLANCE TO WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANS-BORDER ARMS TRAFFICKING

AMINU IDRIS

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ABSTRACT

THE NIGERIA-NIGER REPUBLIC BORDER POROSITY AND INSECURITY: FROM SURVEILLANCE TO WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANS-BORDER ARMS TRAFFICKING

Nigeria has approximately 200 million people and is perhaps the most populous country in the African continent. Ironically, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that there are over 350 million illegal arms and ammunition circulating in Nigeria. This suggests that the number of illegal arms circulating in Nigeria is by far more than the country's population. Hence, the 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) rated Nigeria as the third most terrorized country in the world. Since Nigeria is not an arms manufacturer, it is logical to say that these arms must have found their way into Nigeria through the country's borders. In 2019, the Nigerian government reports that the country has over 1400 illegal routes and 86 legal entry points on the approximately 4,500-kilometer land borders which suggests that Nigeria has one of the most porous borders in the world.

It is against this background, that this study seeks to interrogate why Nigerian borders are porous, allowing all forms of trans-border crimes, particularly trans-border arms trafficking. For over six decades, Nigeria relies on a surveillance approach to control the influx of trans-border arms from the neighboring countries. This approach entails the deployment of border patrol guards and digital surveillance facilities such as video cameras, scanners, drones, night-vision goggles, and robotics technology to monitor border crossings. The purpose of border surveillance is to prevent illegal immigration and every form of smuggling and trafficking. However, available records have shown that despite intensive surveillance, the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier continues to witness a dramatic upsurge in the influx of trans-border arms.

Specifically, this study examines why the Nigeria-Niger Republic border defies intensive surveillance and becomes a gateway for trans-border arms trafficking from as far North Africa to Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. The study

argues that surveillance fails to secure the border against trans-border arms because it is not compatible with the peculiarities and general conditions of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. The incompatibility of the surveillance approach manifests in the exclusion of the resident of the border communities in the border security project. While this study identifies three key stakeholders in the management of the frontier against arms trafficking viz: the residents of the border communities, trans-border arms traffickers, and border security agencies, the Nigerian government recognized only the traffickers and border security agents as critical stakeholders. The exclusion of the residents of the border in the security governance of the frontier created an opportunity for the trans-border arms traffickers to incorporate the residents of the border as informants who supply them information on the numerous illegal border crossings and the movement of border security agents.

Methodologically, the study adopted a qualitative method and mainly rely on secondary sources as well as in-depth interviews to collect raw data from the residents of the border communities, border security agents, seasoned academics on migration and border studies, and independent security consultants who are experts on the Nigerian borders. The raw data were analyzed with the aid of the thematic method using a descriptive coding strategy to enable the study to have a clear picture of the data in a condensed manner. Thereafter, the study reveals that the exclusion of the residents of the border communities laid the foundation for the information asymmetry amongst the three key stakeholders.

Theoretically, the study adopted the theory of information asymmetry and analyzed how the interplay of information amongst the three key stakeholders favors the trans-border arms traffickers by skewing the border security agents. To reverse the asymmetric information flow in favor of the border security agencies, the study recommends the introduction of a whistleblowing model in which the residents of the borders would be engaged by the Nigerian border managers to supply genuine information to border security agents that would lead to the interception of trans-border arms traffickers, their arms, and agents for a cash incentive. The study's thrust on whistleblowing as a viable control mechanism against trans-border arms trafficking finds expression in the optimism expressed by stakeholders and its performance in the public sector governance, banking, drugs trafficking, and smuggling of contrabands.

ÖZ

NİJERYA-NİJER CUMHURİYETİ SINIRLARINDA GEÇİRGENLİK VE GÜVENSİZLİK: SINIR AŞIRI SİLAH TİCARETİNİN YÖNETİMİNDE GÖZETİMDEN İFŞA ETMEYE

Nijerya, yaklaşık 200 milyon insanla belki de dünyanın en kalabalık siyah ülkesidir. İronik olarak, Birleşmiş Milletler Uyuşturucu ve Suç Ofisi Nijerya'da dolaşan 350 milyondan fazla yasadışı silah ve mühimmat olduğunu bildiriyor. Bu, Nijerya'da dolaşan yasadışı silah sayısının ülke nüfusundan çok daha fazla olduğunu gösteriyor. Sonuç olarak, Nijerya genelinde silahla ilgili şiddet katlanarak artıyor. Bu nedenle, 2020 Küresel Terörizm Endeksi (GTI), Nijerya'yı dünyanın en terörize edilen üçüncü ülkesi olarak derecelendirdi. Nijerya bir silah üreticisi olmadığı için, bu silahların ülke sınırlarından Nijerya'ya girmiş olması gerektiğini söylemek mantıklı geliyor. 2019'da Nijerya hükümeti, ülkenin yaklaşık 4.500 kilometrelik kara sınırlarında 1400'den fazla yasadışı yol ve 86 yasal giriş noktası olduğunu bildiriyor ve bu da Nijerya'nın dünyanın en geçirgen sınırlarından birine sahip olduğunu gösteriyor.

Bu çalışma, Nijerya sınırlarının neden geçirgen olduğunu ve her türlü sınır ötesi suça, özellikle de sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılığına izin verdiğini sorgulamaya çalıştığı bu arka plana karşıdır. Altmış yılı aşkın bir süredir Nijerya, komşu ülkelerden sınır ötesi silah akışını kontrol etmek için bir gözetim yaklaşımına güveniyor. Bu yaklaşım, sınır geçişlerini izlemek için video kameralar, tarayıcılar, dronlar, gece görüş gözlüğü ve robot teknolojisi gibi sınır devriye muhafızlarının ve dijital gözetim tesislerinin kullanılmasını gerektirir. Sınır gözetiminin amacı, yasadışı göçü ve her türlü kaçakçılık ve ticareti önlemektir. Bununla birlikte, mevcut kayıtlar, yoğun gözetime rağmen, Nijerya-Nijer Cumhuriyeti sınırının sınır ötesi silah akışında çarpıcı bir artışa tanık olmaya devam ettiğini göstermiştir.

Spesifik olarak, bu çalışma Nijerya-Nijer Cumhuriyeti sınırının neden yoğun gözetime meydan okuduğunu ve Nijerya-Nijer Cumhuriyeti sınırından Kuzey Afrika'dan Nijerya'ya kadar sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılığı için bir geçit haline geldiğini

incelemektedir. Çalışma, Nijerya-Nijer Cumhuriyeti sınırının özellikleri ve genel koşulları ile uyumlu olmadığı için gözetimin sınır ötesi silahlara karşı sınırı güvence altına almadığını savunuyor. Gözetim yaklaşımının uyumsuzluğu, sınır güvenliği projesinde sınır topluluklarında ikamet edenlerin dışlanmasında kendini göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, silah kaçakçılığına karşı sınırın yönetiminde üç kilit paydaşı tanımlarken: yani sınır topluluklarının sakinleri, sınır ötesi silah kaçakçıları ve sınır güvenlik kurumları, Nijerya hükümeti yalnızca kaçakçıları ve sınır güvenlik görevlilerini kritik paydaşlar olarak kabul etti. Sınırın güvenlik yönetiminde sınır sakinlerinin dışlanması, sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılarının sınır sakinlerini, onlara sayısız yasadışı sınır geçişi ve sınır güvenliğinin hareketi hakkında bilgi sağlayan muhbirler olarak dahil etme fırsatı yarattı.

Metodolojik olarak, çalışma nitel bir yöntemi benimsemiştir ve sınır topluluklarının sakinlerinden, sınır güvenliği ajanlarından, göç ve sınır çalışmaları konusunda deneyimli akademisyenlerden ve bağımsız güvenlik danışmanlarından ham veri toplamak için temel olarak ikincil kaynaklara ve derinlemesine görüşmelere dayanmaktadır. Çalışmanın yoğunlaştırılmış bir şekilde verilerin net bir resmini elde etmesini sağlamak için ham veriler, tanımlayıcı bir kodlama stratejisi kullanılarak tematik yöntem yardımıyla analiz edilmiştir. Daha sonra, çalışma, sınır topluluklarının sakinlerinin dışlanmasının, üç kilit paydaş arasındaki bilgi asimetrisinin temelini oluşturduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Teorik olarak çalışma bilgi asimetrisi teorisini benimsedi ve üç kilit paydaş arasındaki bilgi etkileşiminin sınır güvenlik ajanlarını çarpıtarak sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılarını nasıl desteklediğini analiz etti. Asimetrik bilgi akışını sınır güvenlik kurumları lehine tersine çevirmek için çalışma, sınırda yaşayanların Nijeryalı sınır yöneticileri tarafından sınır güvenlik görevlilerine gerçek bilgi sağlamak için görevlendirileceği bir bilgi uçurma modelinin getirilmesini önermektedir. Sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılarının, silahlarının ve ajanlarının nakit teşvik için durdurulması, çalışmanın sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılığına karşı uygulanabilir bir kontrol mekanizması olarak bilgi uçurma konusundaki itici gücü, paydaşlar tarafından ifade edilen iyimserlikte ve kamu sektörü yönetişimi, bankacılık, uyuşturucu kaçakçılığı ve kaçak mal kaçakçılığındaki performansında ifadesini bulmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: sınır geçirgenliği, bilgi uçurma, sınır gözetimi, sınır toplulukları, sınır ötesi silah kaçakçılığı, sınır ötesi silah kaçakçıları, sınır güvenlik görevlileri

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ABBREVATIONS

NBC	National Boundary Commission (NBC)
NCDBR	National Committee for the Development of the Border Regions
NNJC	Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation
ISWAP	Islamic State in West African Province
IG	Inspector-General of Police
BSAOP	Border Security Agents-Oriented Policing
COP	Community-Oriented Policing
COBP	Community-Oriented Border Policing (COBP
JNP	Joint National Patrol
IJP	International Joint Patrol
WHO	World Health Organization
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
TBIT	Trans-border Informal Trade
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
UN	United Nations
NAPTIP	National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NFP	Nigeria Police Force
NAFDAC	National Agency for Drugs Administration and Control
NIS	Nigeria Immigration Service
NCS	Nigerian Customs Service
NDLEA	National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency
DSSS	Department of State Security Service
EFCC	EFCC Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
ICPC	Independent Corrupt Practices and Offences Commission
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons

INTRODUCTION

Borders are mainly conceived as territorial hard lines separating one nation-state from others. The primary function of the borders is to connect the insiders with the outsiders and protect the insiders from the outsiders (Andreas 2003). In other words, international borders across the world are regarded as bridges that connect nationalities of different nation-states for mutual interaction. At the same time, borders are barriers that distinguish citizens from non-citizens and protect the insiders from every possible threat that may come from outsiders. This implies that Nigeria like every other country, must open its borders for mutual relations and at the same time guard its borders against any form of illicit activities by individuals and groups. However, Nigeria has one of the most porous borders in the world. With 86 formal border posts and over 1400 illegal routes (those officially identified), coupled with the shortage of border security personnel and obsolete surveillance facilities (Nigerian Tribune, Nigeria, June 17, 2019). Consequently, the United Nations reports that Nigeria accounts for about 350 million of the 500 million illegal small arms and ammunition circulating in the West African sub-region (The Guardian, Nigeria, June 17, 2018). Because of this, Nigeria has been described as one of the biggest markets for trans-border arms in sub-Saharan Africa and the third most terrorized country in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018).

Nigeria's border porosity creates an opportunity for the trans-border arms traffickers to supply arms to criminals who are engaged in the violent destruction of lives and properties of citizens mostly in northern Nigeria. In addition, the trafficking and the use of arms in ethno-religious armed violence are claiming an average of 1,000 lives per year since 1999 (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). In Zamfara State alone, the locals bury 30-50 people killed by the bandits daily, making many children orphans and displaced many families from their homes (Okeke and Oji, 2014; This day, Nigeria, April 14, 2019).

According to the authorities in Kaduna State, North- West, Nigeria, 323 persons were killed by bandits in Kaduna State alone between January and March 2021. The Kaduna State Security Council through the Commissioner for Internal Security and

Home Affairs revealed that the bandit killed 323 people and kidnapped 949 in just three months. He explained that of the 323 victims slain by bandits during the period under consideration, 292 were men and 20 were women. In the same period under review, 949 individuals were kidnapped by bandits, and 236 people died in the Kaduna Central senatorial district, which includes BirninGwari, Chikun, Igabi, and Kajuru local governments (GCTN Africa, 2021). In the North West, North East, and other parts of Nigeria, the Global Conflict Tracker reports that between 2011 and 2020, Boko Haram insurgents killed over 37,500 people, displaced over 2.5 million people, and made over 244,000 people refugees in neighboring countries (Global Conflict Tracker, 2020). Furthermore, Boko Haram insurgents and the bandits continue their violent attacks killing people indiscriminately, taking over towns and villages, burning and robbing people of their belongings, and attack Nigerian security formations indiscriminately. As a result of these attacks, hundreds of towns and villages have gone into total extinction.

According to the Niger Delta annual conflict report published by the Foundation for Partnership Initiative in the Niger Delta (PIND), the number of deaths from arms-related violence has increased in 2019 from 416 and 1013, compared to 351 incidents and 546 deaths in 2018. The organization's reports track regional, state, and local armed violence patterns in Niger Delta. Historical tensions and the expansion of armed groups (militant, criminal, and ethno-sectarian) were among the conflict risk factors. The chief sources of fatal violence during the time were organized criminals, cult battles, political tensions, land disputes, and community fights. There were 444 fatalities in the 260 documented episodes of violence associated with armed violence including piracy, abductions, robberies, and murders for ritualistic purposes. There were cult supremacy battles also occurred, with 272 fatalities reported in 78 occurrences. Gang violence was reported in all of the region's states, although it was particularly common in Rivers, Edo, and Delta. Ethnic conflicts were the third most serious conflict in the region last year, with 197 deaths reported in 77 incidents.

Consequently, the government having been convinced by the Nigerian security forces that the internal security challenges are associated with the influx of trans-border arms from the neighboring counties particularly on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, announced the total closure of all the land borders in August 2019

(Wahab, 2019). The border closure according to the Nigerian authorities, was aimed at addressing the challenges associated with trans-border arms trafficking by effectively securing Nigeria's ungoverned border spaces, particularly on the Nigeria Niger Republic border. However, few months after the border closure, the Nigerian government expressed skepticism about the possibility of achieving a positive result (Nigerian Tribune, Nigeria, December 17, 2019). This is because, despite the border closure, illegal immigrants, bandits, smugglers, arms, and drugs traffickers were determined to avoid border posts with a security presence and cross the border at all costs. This is evident in the number of arrests made by the Nigerian border security agents. For instance, according to the Nigerian authorities, contrabands such as rice, petroleum products, and guns are valued at approximately $6. 5billion were intercepted by the Nigerian border security agents in just three months of the border closure (Wahab, 2019). This is in addition to 203 illegal immigrants and eight trans-border arms traffickers that were intercepted along the borders (Wahab, 2019).

For over six decades, the Nigerian government has relied on border surveillance to control its land borders, particularly against trans-border arms trafficking. This approach entails information gathering and sharing among various security agencies, deployment of security personnel to secure the borders through regular patrol and the use of technological surveillance facilities, such as video cameras, scanners, smart fencing, night vision goggles, robotics technology among others. However, as Nwali pointed out, the current surveillance strategy does not only encourage the inflow of arms and ammunition into Nigeria through the formal and informal routes but has made Nigeria a destination market for trans-border arms trafficking and a victim of armed violence (Nwali, 2018). In addition, the lucrative nature of trans-border arms trafficking has continued to attract nationals of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroun as well as other nationals from West African countries into the smuggling rings.

The extensive scholarly literature explores various reasons why the surveillance approach failed to effectively manage trans-border arms trafficking. Scholars such as Uwazurike (1979), Rodney (1972) explores the colonial and historical evolution of post-colonial African states' borders as the main explanation to why African states' borders are porous and vulnerable to infiltration of illicit goods including arms into their territories. Rodney's historical accounts focus on the way and manner in which

the African borders were drawn without any regard to cultural affinities such as religion, language, and occupation. Rufai (2010), Blum (2014) submit that arms trafficking is simply a product of Nigeria's border porosity and poor management of the frontiers that allow unrestricted movement of both illegal immigrants and goods. However, Onah&Nwali (2008) blamed pervasive poverty, insecurity, unemployment, and lack of basic infrastructures arising from the social exclusion of citizens, particularly, the resident of the border communities in the management of the borders as reasons for Nigeria's border porosity and deficiency of effective border surveillance. On the other hand, Asiwaju (1993), Bassey (2010) tailored their argument on the complex terrain on the land borders, shortage of border security personnel, corruption among border security personnel, lack of basic infrastructure and surveillance equipment (i.e., camcorders, scanners some of the major reasons why the Nigerian borders are porous despite the intensive surveillance.

Conversely, this thesis argues that the surveillance failed to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking mainly because of the exclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of the frontier. Their exclusion created an opportunity for the trans-border arms traffickers to recruit informants from the residents of the border who supply them information on the illegal routes without border security presence in return for incentives. These incentives usually come in form of cash rewards. Furthermore, the study argues that the exclusion of the residents of the border by the Nigerian authorities perpetuates an asymmetric information flow between the residents of the border communities, trans-border arms traffickers, and border security agencies. This asymmetric information favors the trans-border arms traffickers because the information they received from the resident of the border enables them to cross the border safely and deliver arms into Nigeria. While the border security agents who are responsible for securing the border against trans-border arms trafficking fail in their statutory responsibility. Theoretically, to prove and analyze the role of asymmetric information in the security governance of the frontier, the study adopted information asymmetric theory from the Economics literature and analyzed how the interplay of information asymmetry between the above mentioned three major actors in the bordering process namely; the residents of the border communities, trans-border arms traffickers and security agents propel trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria.

As a solution, the study developed a new model anchored on "whistleblowing" driven by a reward system to supplement the ailing surveillance approach. This model is unique because, unlike the current surveillance strategy that recognized only states agents as critical stakeholders in the management of the border, the whistleblowing model recognized the role of non-state actors in the security governance of the frontier. This is because the whistleblowing model would incorporate and encourage residents of the border communities to volunteer intelligence information that can help security agents effectively secure the border against arms trafficking (Idris &Tutumlu, 2021).

Conventional definitions treat whistleblowing as the exposure of any genuine wrongdoing, or unethical behavior of a current or former employee of public or private organization by a third party to the appropriate authorities for sanction (Alford, 2001). It conceived as a control mechanism geared towards ensuring compliance with the extant rules and regulations. The policy has no restriction; it can be applied in both private and public organizations and even de-institutionalized and the informal contexts, such as arms-trafficking. Whistleblowing is said to occur when an individual or corporate body's wrongdoing is exposed to the appropriate bodies for a proper sanction (Miceli et al., 2008). This information could be given the concerned authorities for free or on the basis of cash incentives to the whistleblower (Idris &Tutumlu, 2021).

In the context of this research, whistleblowing is operationalized as the disclosure of any genuine intelligence to the appropriate Nigerian border security agents regarding trans-border arms trafficking for cash rewards. This includes reliable disclosure of their movement, agents and routes through which they cross the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier to deliver arms and ammunition into Nigeria. Available records, as shown in this study, suggest that some residents of the border communities survive on the economy of information asymmetry. Moreover, one of the most effective ways to tackle insecurity and those who perpetrate it in this part of Africa is to reverse what triggered their rise (International Crisis Group 2016).

For clarity, this thesis is organized into six main chapters. The first chapter covers a general introduction, research statement, research questions, research objectives,

main and alternative hypotheses, study significance, scope and limitation, theoretical framework, research technique, and chapter organization.

The second chapter looked at the literature on the porosity and insecurity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. The chapter specifically reviews the literature on Nigeria's border management regime and the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger frontier, as well as the efficiency of the surveillance approach as border management strategies to combat trans-border arms trafficking and argues that the approach fails because it is incompatible with the border communities and the general conditions of the border. As such, there is a need for an alternative model.

The theoretical framework is the subject of the third chapter. The strengths and weaknesses of the main theoretical viewpoints on borders and border security, such as realists and liberal perspectives, are discussed in detail. The theory of information asymmetry from economic literature was used to describe the exchange of information between the three primary stakeholders: trans-border arms traffickers, residents of the border, and border security agents. In this chapter, the thesis argued that neither the realist nor the liberals' theoretical postulations on border security can effectively secure the border against trans-border arms trafficking. The chapter, therefore, recommends the deployment of realism and liberalism simultaneously to effectively secure the border against arms trafficking.

The fourth chapter examines the evolution of the border and how the failure of the Realist surveillance strategy to separate people with similar cultural affinity in areas such as religion, sectarianism, occupation, language, and intermarriage has an impact on the management of trans-border crimes, particularly trans-border arms trafficking. The chapter goes on to discuss how liberal approaches to border management tolerate trans-border informal trade (TBIT) between Nigeria and the Niger Republic and how if further compounded the difficulties of efficient border management. The influence of the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of people, residency, and establishment of West African citizens on the control of cross-border arms trafficking is also investigated. Finally, the chapter examined how poor living conditions in border areas, as well as corruption among Nigerian border security

services, make surveillance as a management technique against trans-border arms trafficking ineffective. The chapter recommends the review of the content of the 1779 ECOWAS Protocol in line with the present realities of West African Security.

The history of the whistleblowing policy as a corruption control mechanism in Nigerian institutions was fully documented in Chapter 5. It also extensively discussed the effectiveness of whistleblowing in combating corruption, drug trafficking, and contraband smuggling, and concludes that if adopted in the control of trans-border arms along the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, the policy will be beneficial. The chapter then goes on to discuss the possibility of adopting whistleblowing as a new strategy to supplementing the ailing surveillance approach by interviewing key stakeholders who are optimistic about the proposed model. The raw data obtained through in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with important stakeholders and other secondary sources of information was presented, discussed, and analyzed in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER 1
BASIS OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

There is a consensus among border and migration scholars that border security is an integral part of the national security of a state. This suggests that the more secured a country's beacons are, the more peaceful the country is like to be. However, for over six decades Nigeria's borders have been described as one of the most permeable not only in West Africa but the world over (The Guardian, Nigeria, June 17, 2018). The permeability of the Nigerian borders enables all forms of trans-border crimes, such as smuggling of contrabands, trans-border banditry, illicit drugs, human and child trafficking as well as arms trafficking among others. The influx of trans-border arms from neighboring countries into Nigeria has been one of the enablers of various forms of armed violence, such as kidnapping, cattle rustling, banditry, insurgency, highway robbery, ethno-religious violence among others that threaten the stability of Nigeria as a corporate entity. These forms of armed violence and many more have resulted in the death of thousands of people and the destruction of properties worth billions of US Dollars. Against this background, this study adopts a qualitative method by collecting data from secondary sources and in-depth interviews to examine why trans-border arms trafficking persist on the Nigeria-Niger border despite intensive surveillance. Specifically, the study deployed a thematic method of data analysis and unveils why surveillance strategy fails to control the influx of trans-border arms into Nigeria through the Niger Republic border.

1.1 Statement of the research problem

Ironically, the number of illicit arms circulating in Nigeria, one of the most populous countries in the world, outnumbered the total population of the country. While the

UN estimated that 350 million arms are illegally circulating in Nigeria, the country's population is approximately 200 million (The Guardian, Nigeria, June 17, 2018). This is frightening because Nigeria does not industrially manufacture arms, which suggests that these arms must have come into the country through its porous borders. Consequently, it has been described as the biggest market for trans-border arms in sub-Saharan Africa and the third most terrorized country in the world (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018). Recently armed violence has intensified all over the six administrative zones of Nigeria. In the North-East, the Boko Haram insurgents are currently terrorizing civilians, burning public buildings such as schools and worship centers, and attacking security formations indiscriminately (HRW, 2021). Simultaneously, bandits are kidnapping school children for ransom, raping women, killing and burning towns and villages across the North-West and North- Central Nigeria. The people of the South East region are being tormented by the separatist's group under the auspices of Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB is a separatists' movement clamoring for the succession of South East from Nigeria) (Amnesty International, August 5, 2021). The people of the South-South (Niger Delta) are receiving their share of armed violence from the Niger Delta avengers who attack oil facilities and kidnap foreign expatriates in the name of clamor for resource control (Financial Times, April 26, 2021). The Odudua People's Congress (OPC) in the South-West are agitating for restructuring of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (BBC, July 2, 2021). These violent agitations in the South and insurgency and banditry in Northern Nigeria have individually and in combination led to the death of thousands of people, internally displaced millions of citizens, and made thousands of people refugees in neighboring countries. According to the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), as of 2018, Nigeria had over 2.2 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (IOM DTM 2019).

The armed violence mentioned above is courtesy of trans-border arms that are circulating among different groups terrorizing Nigeria. The influx of trans-border arms from neighboring countries into Nigeria through the country's porous borders is not only impacting national peace and security but is causing a serious regression in terms of the socio-cultural, economic, and political development of Nigeria (Ajodo-Adebanjoko, 2019; Ukwueze et al., 2019). It is conventionally known that the main purpose of government as the provision of security and welfare to the people. For

citizens to enjoy welfare they must be alive, therefore, the safety and security of citizens come first. One of the most effective ways Nigeria can provide security to the people is to minimize the influx of illegal arms by effectively controlling the sources of these arms. This is why trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger border needs to be properly interrogated to avert the killing of Nigerians and control an upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking by denying terrorist groups access to these illegal arms.

This research has theoretical as well as practical implications. Theoretically, this study adds to the body of knowledge on the informal economy and ethnic identity by underlining the significance of adopting a whistleblowing strategy into effective border security governance. In practice, the study demonstrates how over-relying on surveillance has failed to produce effective border security governance capable of preventing illicit weapons from entering Nigeria through Niger's borders.

1.2 Research questions

This study is guided by the following research questions

(i) Why, despite the intense surveillance approach against trans-border arms trafficking the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier remains an artificial, i.e., porous boundary?

(ii) How do the Nigeria-Niger border conditions facilitate the inefficiency of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria?

(iii) How the theories of international relations, such as Realism and Liberalism, as well as their varieties address the borders and bordering process to prevent arms trafficking. In particular, how do they deal with ethnic fragmentation and cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities that are engaged in promoting political, economic, socio-cultural, and ethno-religious integration among the border communities which subsequently propel arms trafficking into Nigeria?

(iv) What kins of perspective of understanding trans-border arms trafficking is necessary and what type of a new workable solution to the problem can exist?

1.3 Research objectives

The main objective of this study is to interrogate the extent to which Nigeria-Niger Republic border porosity is linked to trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria. While the specific objectives are as follows:

(i) To examine border conditions to explain why the surveillance approach against trans-border arms trafficking has made the Nigeria-Niger borderlines artificial boundaries.

(ii) To ascertain how the Nigeria-Niger border conditions facilitate the inefficiency of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria.

(iii) To establish how conventional theories of International Relations fail to conceptualize borders in a way that discerns ethnic fragmentation and cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities, while promoting political, economic, socio-cultural, and ethno-religious integration among the border communities. The Realist call to separate two nations through strict lines or the Liberal call to promote migration, cooperation, and integration subsequently propel arms trafficking into Nigeria.

(iv) To propose a different perspective of understanding trans-border arms trafficking and recommend a new workable solution to the problem

Research propositions

(i) Borders are definite territorial hard lines separating one nation-state from others but the deficiency of the surveillance approach against trans-border arms trafficking has made the Nigeria-Niger frontier a mere artificial boundary.

(ii) The Nigeria-Niger border conditions facilitate the inefficiency of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria.

(iii) Theories of International Relations cannot square the circle, i.e. to control ethnic fragmentation and cultural affinity of the Nigeria and Niger border communities, while promoting economic, cultural, and ethno-religious integration among the border communities.

(iv) There is a need for a different perspective of understanding trans-border arms trafficking and recommendation for a new workable solution to the problem

Main hypothesis

The surveillance approach adopted to control and manage trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger border between 2015 and 2019 is deficient, because it fails to tackle information asymmetry among the three key stakeholders (traffickers, border communities, and security agents) engaged in the process of border security governance at the Nigeria-Niger Republic.

The table below shows the alternative hypotheses that would be tested along the aforementioned main hypothesis to probe the reliability and validity or otherwise of the main hypothesis. The table below also outlines the type of obtrusive data needed to integrate the hypotheses.

Alternative hypotheses

Table 1:<u>Alternative hypotheses and obtrusive type of data to prove the hypotheses</u>

Hypotheses	Appropriate obtrusive method and the instrument of data collection
If the **rate of poverty** in the society is high, the more likely the level of trans-border arms trafficking	Literature on poverty, interviews with the residents of the border communities, academics on migration and border security, and experts in development studies
In multicultural societies where there is **ethno-religious rivalry** among ethnic nationalities, ethnic violence may fuel trans-border arms trafficking	Literature on ethno-religious violence, interviews with the residents of the border communities, and experts on Nigeria's ethnic violence
The higher the **level of bribery and corruption** among the border security agents the higher the level of trans-border arms trafficking	Literature on corruption, interviews with the residents of the border communities, and experts on border security.

Nigeria's desire for **economic integration** has rendered surveillance deficient in the control of trans-border arms trafficking.	Literature on economic integration, interview with the border security agents and experts on international organizations
If the rate of **internal insecurity** is high, citizens may be compelled to acquire arms illegally to defend themselves	Literature on security studies, interviews with the residents of the border communities, and experts on security studies

Border porosity which is defined by this work as the border condition that results in the failure of the surveillance method adopted by the Nigerian state to provide border security against trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border. The study uses the following key indicators to measure the effectiveness of surveillance, border porosity, and subsequently trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.

Table 2: <u>Variables and their indicators</u>

Border Porosity (Failure of Surveillance)	Insecurity (scale of trans-border arms trafficking)
Number of the illegal routes along the border	Number of illicit arms intercepted within a particular period
Number of security checkpoints/ patrol teams	Number of armed violence-related deaths
Number of surveillance facilities, such as cameras, drones, scanners, and video cameras at the border post	Rate of militia disarmament within a particular period
Number of border security personnel	Number of trans-border arms traffickers arrested
Number of trans-border arms traffickers arrested within a particular time	Number of arms willingly surrendered by bandits as a result of truce or amnesty

Defining key terms

Several terms are central to this thesis, but the study would limit the conceptualization to key terms such as border porosity, whistleblowing, surveillance,

border communities, trans-border arms trafficking, trans-border arms traffickers, and border security agents. For clarity, the meaning of these terms is provided below. However, the concepts are explored further in the discourse of the thesis.

Border porosity is defined as the border condition that results in the failure of the surveillance method adopted by the Nigerian state to provide border security against trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border. Porous borders are also known as permeable borders. Border porosity is defined as a state of border permeability. A permeable border is an international borderline characterized by multiple unpoliced illegal entry/routes that enable various forms of trans-border crimes to flourish (Mills, 1998). However, this research specifically sees the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier as one of the porous borders which enable multiple trans-borders crimes, such as illegal passage, smuggling of contrabands, trans-border banditry, human and arms trafficking across the borders.

Border surveillance refers to an automated method of tracking any point on the border over a wide geographic area, independent of environmental constraints on the Nigeria-Niger border. This may also include the deployment of border patrol guards and checkpoints, as well as the installation of smart fencing and digital surveillance facilities such as robotics technology, video cameras, scanners, night vision goggles, among others to improve border patrol surveillance (Aseeri, et al. 2017, p. 1).

Border communities are typically populated by individuals who share a sense of history, place and are located in a specific geographical region, normally near the borders of two or more nations. These communities usually have cross-border contacts and cultural affinities, such as common language, religion, and occupation with communities on the other side of the country's borders (Hawley, 2005; Adesina, 2019).

Trans-border arms trafficking is defined as the unauthorized physical cross-border movement of not only firearms but their parts and ammunition from Niger into Nigeria though the Nigeria-Niger border. This definition has relied on the 2019 Doha Declaration, which defines trans-border arms trafficking as the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement, or transfer of firearms, their parts, and

ammunition from or across the territory of one state party to that of another state party is defined as trans-border arms trafficking if any of the state's parties concerned does not authorize it (UNODC, 2019). The UNODC 's definition is considered all-encompassing. It touches on virtually all aspects of arms trafficking. Arms transfer refers to the physical movement of arms from one person to the other across states' borders. This suggests that for trans-border arms trafficking to occur, there must be illegal movement of firearms from or across at least two states' boundaries. The import and export are related to the unauthorized cross-border movement of not only firearms but their parts and ammunition. In the light of the above definition, trans-border arms traffickers are arms dealers who operate in illicit markets by supplying illicit guns to individuals, warring factions, or criminal gangs (Alves and Cipollone, 1998, p. i). Trans-border arms traffickers operate within the global arms trade, which is divided into two worlds: the official world of legal trade and the "shadow world" of illicit transactions (Feinstein and Holden, 2014). Trans-border arms traffickers indulge in a wide range of sophisticated cross-border multifaceted crimes, including but not limited to fraud, corruption, money laundering, smuggling, intimidation, and assassination, many of which are carried out quietly in addition to violating arms sanctions (Ukwayi and Bassey, 2019).

Border security agents are government officers entrusted with border security governance, that consists of various border enforcement agencies, not only Immigration and Customs personnel, known as border guards, but cover a wide range of agencies that enforce border policing regulations on the ground. Their main function is to keep the local population away from transnational security threats by securing the territorial boundaries of the state (Tholens, 2017). Other responsibilities include advising the government on new bordering strategies and implementation of border policy regulations among others (Coleman, 2009).

Whistleblowing is considered as a pro-social act because it is done to benefit others. The term has been widely applied in private and public institutions, for example, referring to the exposure of corporate corruption (Alford 2001; Miceli et al. 2008). Pro-social behavior by whistleblowers does not have to be selfless. The pro-social benefit can be conceived as an outcome of these practices that can be elicited with or without rewards. Whistleblowers may or may not feel obligated to act morally and

they may believe the information will directly benefit them (Miceli et al. 2008).Corruption, criminal offenses, civil violations, miscarriages of justice, severe threats to public health, safety, or the environment, misuse of power, unauthorized use of public funds or property, gross misconduct or mismanagement, conflict of interest, and actions to conceal are all examples of whistleblowing (Transparency International, 2013; Ugowe and Adebayo, 2019).

1.4 Significance of the study

Scientifically, every research comes with certain justifications to explain its necessity and significance. This study is not an exception. Primarily, the study is aimed at investigating why the surveillance approach is deficient in securing the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria. This is intending to proffer a workable solution. Specifically, this study has political, economic, socio-cultural, and academic significance as explained below.

Political significance: If the trans-border arms trafficking is not properly tackled, it may lead to lawlessness and possible disintegration of the country. In recent times, criminals particularly bandits, Boko Haram insurgents, cattle rustlers, kidnappers among others have continued to forcefully take over towns and villages, imposing taxes and issuing commands to residents. In a similar vein, frequent attacks by unknown gunmen have sent many towns and villages into total extinction (Amnesty International, August 5, 2021). The inability of the government to protect citizens from multiple forms of violent attacks may perhaps explain why many citizens resort to self-help by illegally acquiring weapons to defend themselves. This suggests that the higher the attacks on towns and villages, the higher the demand for arms and consequently increase the number of trafficked arms in circulation. This implies that there is a need for Nigerian authorities to deny terrorist access to arms and ammunition by unveiling a new model that would secure the Nigeria-Niger border against arms trafficking. As the saying goes a territorially secured nation is a peaceful country.

Economic significance: any attempt to quantify the economic potentials of this study would amount to an understatement. For instance, the former Nigerian Minister of Agriculture, Audu Ogbeh said 'the federal government of Nigeria is losing $5 billion to smuggling annually' (This day, Nigeria, November 9, 2017). It is the hope that the

recommendations that would be provided by this study would not only control the influx of trans-border arms but would equally be of immense benefit to the Nigeria customs and immigration to re-strategize and block revenue leakages incurred by the government as a result of smuggling of goods through porous Nigeria's borders. Furthermore, securing the border against arms trafficking would reduce the budgetary expenditure of the Nigerian security forces and minimize the level of destruction of private and public properties.

Socio-cultural significance: Nigerian ethnicities are more divided ever than before. Curtailing arms trafficking would deny individuals and ethnic groups access to arms and will likely ease the ethnic distrust and tension that has been perpetuated by the circulation of illegal arms. Most often, trafficked arms have been used by one ethnic group as an instrument to kill, injure, and even wipe out other ethnic minorities (Financial Times, April 21, 2021). Guns-related terror such as banditry, armed robbery, and cattle rustling have dispossessed people from their means of livelihood, as such, there is a need for a solution that would curtail the influx of trans-border arms into Nigeria.

Academic significance: this work intends to make a novel contribution to the existing literature on border security governance. This would also ensure the production of new knowledge on the subject matter. After a thorough review of literature on Nigeria's border porosity and poor management of trans-border arms trafficking, the study observed that residents of the border communities have been relegated, forgotten, and abandoned by the existing literature. With the present realities of insecurity and upsurge in arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, this study is not only justifiable but significant and timely. Hence, against the currents surveillance that recognized only state agents, this work develops an alternative border security governance model that would incorporate both state and non-state agents (residents of the border) to effectively secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking.

1.5 Scope and limitations of the study

This study has three categories of scope: contextual, spatial, and temporal. While Nigeria has maritime, air space, and land borders, the contextual focus is on Nigeria's land borders. Specifically, the research is on the efficiency/deficiency of surveillance

strategy in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border since the 2015. The emphasis is on how cultural affinities of the border communities rooted in religion; language, intermarriages, occupation, sectarianism and trans-border informal trade (TBIT) between Nigeria and the Niger Republic have over the years facilitate the inefficiency of the surveillance approach by encouraging trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria.

In terms of the spatial (geographical) scope, the study areas are the border communities of Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Borno, Katsina, and Jigawa states. The reason is that Nigeria shares international boundaries with the Republic of Niger through border communities in the states listed above. As such the incorporation of these border communities that directly share a border with the Niger Republic is fundamental in studying these borderlands. Therefore, understanding the history, religion, and socio-cultural background as well as the political culture of these communities would assist in explaining the cultural affinities between the border communities of Nigeria and Niger.

In terms of periodization, the study does not intend to cover a lengthy period but makes an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon under investigation. The study covers the period between 2015 and 2019. The choice of this period is informed by the fact that it signifies a transition from one democratic government to another. On May the 29th 2019, former President Goodluck Jonathan handed over power to the incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari who was sworn in on the promises of a better economy, fight against corruption and improve security through new strategies to confront security challenges, including trans-border arms trafficking. Buhari, a person with the military background is facing challenges with the surveillance approach and needs new thinking about arms trafficking through the Nigeria-Niger border.

In terms of limitations, research across disciplines usually suffers one form of constraint or another. This may arise as a result of political, socio-cultural, economic, security, and administrative factors. This study is not an exception. The topic under investigation requires data from various government agencies some of which were restricted/classified for security and administrative reasons. Interviewing residents

and leaders of the border communities was a bit easier because the researcher shares a similar cultural affinity with the residents of the borders. On the other hand, booking appointments and obtaining permission to interview high profiles security personnel has been very challenging and even daunting. However, introduction letters from the university/supervisor, persuasion, and informal contact have eased access to most of the personalities interviewed and vital documents required to accomplish this work.

Another constraint encountered is the language barrier especially in the area of data collection. The residents of the Nigeria-Niger border are predominantly Hausa speakers and most of the in-depth interviews were conducted in Hausa. The translation and transcription were tedious and time-consuming. This perhaps slowed down the speed of the work and affected the original timeframe of the data collection and analysis.

Furthermore, the data employed in this study is derived from male participants. This is because the tradition and culture of the Nigeria-Niger border communities do not allow visitors, including the researchers to mingle with women. Moreover, most of the women are full-time housewives who are often indoors doing housework, such as cooking and taking care of children's needs. For the matured single ladies, one can only interact or discuss specific issues with them (usually courtship) after securing their parent's consent. So, the research could not establish whether or not women are part of the residents of the border who supply information to trans-border arms traffickers, which is a matter of future research.

Insecurity, particularly trans-border banditry, cattle rustling, and kidnapping bedeviling the majority of the study areas could not allow that researcher to cover additional border communities outside Sokoto and Kebbi, Zamfara, and the Jigawa States. But the researcher is confident that the data collected is sufficient enough to answer our research questions because the border communities are mono-cultural.

1.6 Theoretical framework

Theoretically, theory of information asymmetry theory was adopted as a theoretical guide. The theory was first propounded by scholars such as George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz. George Akerlof (1970) in his paper "The Market for Lemons:

Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanisms" applied it in the study of the market for cars and how a seller and a buyer try to maximize the information available to each while bargaining over a car. He posits that in the market where there are both new and used cars and both of them can be good, the buyer can hardly know and tell the exact quality he is buying. This is because he does not have adequate information to evaluate the quality of the car he is buying. The seller who possesses adequate information on the difference between a new and old car achieved optimal benefit. He further argues that the root causes of information asymmetry in markets are the very existence of these markets. This simply implies that good cars are highly unlikely to be sold at their true market value which results in an eventual increase in the dominance of old cars in the market and a reduction in the number of good cars (Akerlof, 1970).

Subsequent scholars like Stiglitz (2000, 2002) adopted information asymmetry theory to explain how information affects the market and trade as well as the behavior of workers, producers, and consumers when making an economic decision. However, the application of the term 'asymmetric information' is now loosely used to describe a situation whereby one agent is better informed than another (Spread, 2015, p. 124). The unequal information induces a more rational action in the agent that possesses it (Grossman 1981). In other words, if a person possesses information that other(s) do not have, he or she would try to maximize it (Spread, 2015, p. 123) by using it to his or her advantage and sometimes to the detriment of others. The strength of the information asymmetric theory lies in the fact that it has been able to explain some economic phenomena that were not previously explained by other theories. It creates awareness for trading partners to seek adequate information before entering a bargain to maximize benefit which implies that adequate information is the key to achieving the objectives of every enterprise (Auronen, 2003).

In our search for a better theoretical framework for the study, we discovered that information asymmetry theory can explain multiple phenomena in other academic disciplines, particularly within social science. However, it is important to note that the theory is uncommonly used in the border literature. This is the main reason why this thesis decided to introduce it to the study of borders. This is probably the first attempt to apply this theory to

make an in-depth analysis of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

According to the information asymmetry theory, information about the products or services is key to maximizing profit and minimizing loss in a market. It implies that the party that possesses more vital information about products is likely to optimized profit while the trading partner that lacks such information may likely lose (Auronen, 2003, p. 7). Applying the central proposition of the above theory in the context of trans-border arms trafficking implies that there is an information asymmetric flow between three key players in the Nigeria-Niger border security project: the residents of the border communities, the trans-border arms traffickers, and the border security agents. The residents of the border communities in this context possess the most vital information about the terrain of the border that is needed by the border security agencies to secure the border and the trans-border arms traffickers who also need the information to cross the Nigerian borders to deliver arms. In this context, the residents of the border communities who possess this critical information needed by the other players (arms traffickers and security agents) are at liberty to exchange the information with either of the parties as pleases. However, trans-border arms traffickers have been able to out-smart the security posts and evade detection because they have an upper hand in the asymmetric information flow. The residents of the border communities supply them with critical border information in exchange for a reward (usually cash), while at the same time denying border security personnel information on the movements of trans-border arms traffickers through illegal routes.

This study argues that for Nigeria to secure the border against trans-border arms trafficking, this trend must be reversed by developing a new border security model that would balance the information flow in favor of border security agents. This is because intelligence gathering is critical to improving border security (Kartas, 2013), particularly trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border.

1.7 Methodology

This section explains in detail the research methodology used in the collection and analysis of data from the target respondents. Specifically, this section covers research design, method of data collection, the population of the study, sampling strategy,

demographic characteristics, sampling size, data analysis procedure, and ethical consideration. Furthermore, it dwells on the challenges encountered during data collection, particularly, the conduct of in-depth interviews with high profile (government) personalities, traditional rulers, and seasoned academics in local universities with a specialization in relevant areas.

Research design

In academic writing, particularly within the Social Science discipline, a research design is like a compass in the hand of a ship captain that helps him to navigate safely from one destination to another. This implies that a valid research design would lead a researcher to valid results and vice versa. In other words, valid research designs guarantee valid results. Therefore, a qualitative method was adopted to check the validity of the main and rival hypotheses that are derived from the literature, the type of data required to prove their validity (indicators), and appropriate obtrusive and instrument of data collection.

Method of data collection

Advancing from the above explanation, the research seeks to utilize a qualitative method to analyze the efficiency of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. Relevant information was collected through books, academic journals, special reports, magazines, newspapers, monographs, seminar papers, print and electronic media, as well as relevant information from the webs. In addition, in-depth interviews with key informants[1] (semi-structured interview) was organized with border community residents, traditional rulers, serving and retired border security agents such as the Nigeria Customs Service, Department of Military Intelligence, border Police, Immigration, National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons (NATIPs), private security consultants with expertise on Nigerian border, senior academics with specialization on migration and border security.

The study area

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[1] By this, the researcher interacts and interface with some selected section of individuals and groups in the study area. This is because the nature of the topic requires inputs from persons who either occupy a position of authority or are conversant with some of the thorny issues or problems in respect of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

This study was mainly conducted in the Jibia border town and the Jibia neighboring communities on the Nigeria-Niger border. Jibia is one of the Local Governments in Katsina State. The Hausa's, who are historically farmers and traders, constitutes the majority of the town's population, which ranges between 35,000 and 45,000 people (NPC, 2018). There is also a convergence of other ethnic groups from other parts of the Nigerian and West African sub-region. The Igbo's and Yoruba's are mostly shopkeepers and artisans such as carpenters, mechanics among others. The Hausa,

Zamfara, Katsina, Borno, and Jigawa States towns that directly share the border with the Republic of Niger. Furthermore, the personnel of the Nigerian border security agencies such as Nigeria Immigration, Nigeria Customs Service, National Agency Against Trafficking in Persons, Nigeria Police Force (border Police), National Agency for Drugs Administration and Control, Department of Military Intelligence,

Department of State Security Service and seasoned academics on migration and border studies in the local universities and research institutes around the border areas.

Sampling strategy

This study deployed a purposive/judgmental sampling in selecting respondents for an in-depth interview. The choice of this sampling is informed by the fact that the phenomenon under investigation requires expertise, experience, and familiarity with the area of study. Therefore, only concerned stakeholders such as residents of the border communities, academics on migration and border studies, relevant security agencies, and border security experts who are knowledgeable enough were selected for interviews. The respondents were purposively selected based on the judgment of the researcher having satisfied the above criteria.

Demographic characteristics

The demographic characteristic of this population includes Nigerians, male, female, literate, and illiterate; civilian, military, and para-military personnel, the rich and the poor, civil servants, farmers, artisans, businessmen, and informal trans-border traders. The main object of analysis of the research is border both as a living space and territorial hard lines separating Nigeria and the Republic of Niger as well as the key stakeholders in the security governance of the frontier.

Sampling size

Nigeria-Niger Republic border stretches to approximately 1500 km and covers some communities of Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and Jigawa, Borno, and Katsina states. The border communities are too numerous to be covered by this study taking into consideration the timeline of the study and available human and material resources constrain. This is in addition to the security challenges bedeviling the majority of the border communities, such as widespread trans-border banditry and kidnapping along the volatile Nigeria-Niger border which made it impossible for the researcher to assess some of the remote border communities. As a result of these constraints, the study area is narrowed down to the Jibia border. As such, the study will be conducted mainly on the Jibia border post and its environs. However,

selecting border security agents and experts for interviews have extended beyond the confines of Jibia borders but to other important border posts such as the Illela border in Sokoto and Mai Gatari border posts in Jigawa. The results that were generated from the Jibia, Illela, and Mai Gatari border communities were generalized because the other border communities and the residents of the borders share the same characteristics in terms of culture and border terrain.

A semi-structured (face to face) in-depth interview was organized with border security personnel from the various Nigeria border security agencies (see the list below). Independent security consultants with expertise on Nigerian borders were interviewed to get a different perspective on Nigerian borders and thereafter compared the raw data that was generated from the Nigerian border security agencies. Renowned academics on border security and migration studies from the local universities such as Katsina state university, Federal University Gusau, and Usmanu Danfodio University Sokoto with expertise on border security and migration were interviewed to get an in-depth academic perspective on the border for data comparability. From the residents of the border communities, an interview session was organized with the traditional rulers (traditional authorities) and residents of the Jibia border communities to get their different perspectives on the surveillance. The research thereafter assesses the role of the residents of the border communities in the management of trans-border arms trafficking and unveils why trans-border arms trafficking persist on the border despite intensive surveillance by the border security agents.

To draw raw data, a total of 40 adult respondents were selected for an in-depth interview. For ethical emphasis, the names of the interviewees were anonymized, and the researcher did not offer any financial incentives to the respondents. Thus, respondents were selected in the following manner:

Table 3: <u>Showing the categories of various respondents and the sample size per category</u>

S. No.	Target Population	Sample Size (Personnel)
1.	Nigeria Immigration Service	3
2.	Nigeria Customs Service	3

3.	Nigeria Police Force	3
4.	Department of State Security Service	3
5.	National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons	3
6.	National Agency for Drugs Administration and Control	3
7.	Renowned academics from the local universities with expertise in border security and migration studies	3
8.	Border security consultants (not necessarily residents of the border communities)	3
9.	Traditional rulers (3 from Jibia border town and 3 from neighboring communities	6
10.	Residents of Jibia border town	5
11.	Residents of Jibia neighboring communities	5
Total		**40**

Data analysis procedure

To analyze the raw qualitative data generated through in-depth interviews with stakeholders, thematic method was adopted. This method is flexible and allows the researcher to use his judgment and reflect carefully in the interpretation and analysis of the research data. The method enables the study to pick up the only necessary information and avoid obscuring the necessary data. With this method, the responses of the respondents were summed up and coded in stages according to the objectives of the research questions. Furthermore, the information obtained through the in-depth interview was logically presented and analyzed to provide first-hand information that gives analytic support to the relevant literature that was reviewed.

Ethical consideration

All the data collected via the in-depth interview would be kept confidentially using a cloud technology database. The stored data may be deleted from the database 2-3

years after the completion of the study. All transcribed interviews would be kept confidential and under no circumstances, the identity of the interviewees would be revealed to a third party. The data collected would be used strictly for this academic research purpose (thesis/publication) only.

1.8 Structure and organization of chapters

For a well-articulated analysis, this thesis is organized into six chapters. The first chapter dwells on the general introduction, statement of the research problem, research questions, research objectives, main and alternative hypotheses, significance of the study, scope and limitation, theoretical framework, research methodology, and organization of chapters.

Chapter two reviewed the related literature on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border porosity and insecurity. Specifically, the chapter examines in details literature on the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger frontier, surveillance management strategy against trans-border arms trafficking. It also answers the question of why trans-border arms trafficking persists on the border despite the extensive surveillance. The review is aimed at establishing a gap that is needed to be filled by this study.

Chapter three focuses on the theoretical framework. The chapter dwells on the strengths and weaknesses of the main theoretical perspectives on borders and border security, such as the realists and liberal perspectives. It moves to explain the main theory. The theory of information asymmetry from Economics literature was adopted as a theoretical guide to explain the interplay of information between the three main stakeholders: trans-border arms traffickers, residents of the border communities, and the border security agents.

Chapter four focuses its searchlight on the evolution of the border and how Realist surveillance strategy fails to separate people with similar cultural affinity between the residents of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities in areas, such as religion, sectarianism, occupation, language, and intermarriage affects the management of trans-border crimes particularly, trans-border arms trafficking. The chapter further analyzes how Liberal approaches to border tolerates the trans-border

informal trade (TBIT) between Nigeria and the Niger Republic and compounds the challenges of effective management of the border. The impact of ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people, residency, and establishment of West African citizens on the management of trans-border arms trafficking is also examined. Lastly, the chapter discussed extensively how the poor living conditions of the resident of the border communities and corruption among the Nigerian birder security agencies defy surveillance as a management strategy against trans-border arms trafficking.

Chapter five traced the history of the whistleblowing policy as a corruption control mechanism in Nigeria's private and public institutions. It also examines the success of whistleblowing in the control of corruption, drugs trafficking, and smuggling of contrabands and argues that if implemented in the control of trans-border arms along the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, the whistleblowing policy will yield a positive result. Thereafter, the chapter further dwells on the prospect of whistleblowing as a new approach to complement the ailing surveillance approach by interviewing key stakeholders who expressed optimism in the proposed policy.

Chapter six concluded by presenting, discussing, and analyzing the raw data generated through in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with key stakeholders and other secondary sources of information. It provides a concise summary of the major findings, recommendations and sets a further research agenda.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.0 Introduction

Nigeria shares approximately 1,500 kilometers of international boundary with the Republic of Niger in the North through Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Jigawa, Yobe and Borno States of Nigeria. The border is not only lengthy but characterized by porosity, difficult terrain, inadequate manpower, surveillance facilities, and various forms of trans-border crimes, such as arms trafficking, banditry, insurgency, kidnapping, armed robbery, smuggling of contrabands, human and drugs trafficking. The chapter intensely describes the boundary between Nigeria and the Niger Republic for a better understanding of the analysis that would follow thereafter. It further explores the Nigeria's border security regime and efforts of the various state governments that share boundary with the Republic of Niger in the management of the frontier. Furthermore, the chapter reviewed the related literature and examined the current scholarly debates on Nigeria's border porosity, particularly the trans-border arms trafficking. Specifically, the review dwells on the adequacy and

inadequacies of surveillance as an approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. The chapter concludes with a summary of gaps and relation to the present research.

2. 1 An assessment of the Nigerian border management regime: Reflections on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier

The stability of neighboring countries often translates into peace and security in one's country. For instance, in the event of war, the influx of 1% of Nigeria's population to any of its neighboring countries as refugees will alter not only alter the demography of the country but also potentially overstretch its facilities and economy. This suggests that border security is two side of the same coin. Thus, Nigeria just like every other country must effectively manage its borders to ensure stability, development, harmonious co-existence and mutual relations with its neighbors. Hence, every country has a border management regime that spells out the principles of its border policy.

The National Boundary Commission (NBC) was created in 1987 to provide a well-articulated policy on boundary management on the principles of conflict prevention and management. The main objective of Nigerian border policy is to respect the territorial integrity of all neighboring states especially as enunciated in the Cairo Declaration of the OAU (now EU) in 1964, which embraces the principle of *uti possidetis*. Nigeria's main objective is to ensure proper delineation and demarcation of its land and maritime borders with its neighbors and other areas of border relations, such as border regions development and management of trans border resources where applicable (Onyia, 2003).

Border management regime is an integrated and all-encompassing approach of administering border regions, addressing demarcation and delineation problems, by harnessing the necessary resources and cooperation to achieve a particular objective. From a macro standpoint, Nigeria's effective border management regime entails the establishment of a smooth administrative mechanism at the borders between Nigeria and her neighbors, mutual and cordial cooperation among the various security agencies operating at the borders in all areas such as checking cross border smuggling, currency trafficking, armed banditry and other forms of trans-border crimes. It also facilitates the easy crossing of people, goods, and services between

Nigeria and her neighbors, join exploration and exploitation of resources on the boundary, especially hydrocarbon resources, a joint patrol of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and territorial waters to prevent piracy and illegal fishing (Ackleson, 2016). This suggests that an effective border management policy is necessary for the establishment of an effective border policy. Hence, in March 1973, the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation (NNJC) commission was lunched with the cardinal objectives of fostering and promoting the cordial relationship between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger on common border matters.

In the context of Nigeria, any border management regime will not be feasible without cooperation from the neighboring countries. To accomplish the country's boundary policy, Nigeria put in place an appropriate institutional and legal framework that ensure the establishment of the regime through sensitizing the local population and law enforcement agencies involved in the day-to-day management of border policies to understand the purpose of its establishment (Zaiotti, 2017). Hence, for over six decades, Nigeria has always been a key player in regional and sub-regional integration, and it agrees that integration should start with its immediate neighbors. Nigeria is taking the lead in resolving any border disputes with its neighbors peacefully. In this sense, Nigeria, through the National Boundary Commission, has put in place a policy on border region development to complement this endeavor. To ensure that the policy is executed, a committee chaired by the Vice-President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was formed (Onyia, 2003). As the delineation/demarcation exercises linger, Nigeria and its neighbors continue to harmonize the laws and regulations governing trans-border relations. To further achieve this objective, a Joint Ministerial Committee to closely monitor all the existing committees such as the Joint Technical Committee and Local Boundary Committees were set up by Nigeria and its neighbors. The organization and hosting of various seminars is a part of the efforts and indication that Nigeria is committed to an effective border management regime with all neighboring countries (Odozi, 2015).

According to the 1999 constitution of Nigeria as amended, the management of Nigerian borders is the responsibility of the federal government of Nigeria. This implies that only the federal government via its agencies such as Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, Nigeria Police among others can enforce entry and

exits regulations on persons and goods coming and going outside Nigeria (Constitution, 1999, 2, (1) (2) (3)). However, in its desire to promote and consolidate an integrated border management regime, States government bordering the Republic of Niger are encouraged to explore bilateral options and engage their Nigerien counterparts to strengthen border management cooperation. The idea is to further promote cooperation at the local level between the Nigerian States and their counterpart in Niger. Since then, Nigeria-Niger border states and communities continue to have bilateral talks and engagement in areas such as security, health, agriculture, desertification, and disease control (Abbas & Roosevelt, 2021).

2.2 Reflection on Katsina State's efforts to manage the Katsina-Maradi and Zinder border via bilateral cooperation.

Katsina State shares an international border with the Prefectures of Maradi and Zinder in the Republic of Niger, spanning a total length of about 240km. Settlements around the border areas consist of 82 villages and towns in addition to numerous hamlets that dot the border region. These are found in the six Local Government Areas of Jibia. Kaita Máshi, Maiadua, Zango and Baure. The total landmass of these Local Governments is 4, I57.9sq.km: making up 17.23% of the States total landmass. Following the creation of Katsina State in 1987, deliberate measures were initiated by successive Governments of the State to ensure the development of border areas through the provision of infrastructural facilities. This is guided by the state's desire to promote peace, security and improving the living conditions of the residents of the border communities along the Katsina-Maradi and Katşina-Zinder Sectors of the Nigeria-Niger border (Musa, 2003). Nigeria and Niger border communities have shared common cultures, beliefs, and values, the communities hold regular meetings to resolve all issues that border on common security, peaceful co-existence, diplomacy and understanding of each other's views. Through this avenue, the over-zealousness of some Nigerian village heads and their subjects are adequately checked. For instance, Katina State has experienced a situation whereby a village head in Nigeria sold to Niger Nationals part of Nigeria's Sovereign Territory in Zango Local Government area (Musa, 2003).

However, the antecedents of good neighborliness between Katsina State and its neighboring Departments of Zindèr and Maradi tremendously facilitates trans-border relations between the people of the two States. Similarly collaborative efforts

through bilateral and tripartite agreements with the Department of Zinder and Maradi in areas of mutual benefit such as the provision of infrastructural activities, promotion of transborder trade, security, combating environmental hazards, among others have further cemented the relationship between the people (Lamptey, 2013).Historically, there a been long historical as well as cultural affiliations in areas such as common language, religion, and occupation between the Katsina and Maradi border communities before the partitioning of the border by the colonialists. These social relationships manifest in the socio-cultural, economic, and political activities between the people of Maradi and Zinder on the one hand and the people of Katsina and Daura Emirates on the other hand. Thus, a significant section of the people from both sides practically sees boundaries as alien and unnecessary. The residents of the border whose cultural lineage, as well as blood relations, is solidly routed across the border are likely to view the borderlines as mere formalities, artificial and irrelevant.

In 1987, the Katsina State initiated a bilateral talk with neighboring Departments of Maradi and Zinder to strengthen the existing brotherly and historical ties as well as to forestall any possibility of friction between the parties. Consequently, the first Military Governor of Katsina State, Colonel (then) Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar, on the invitation of the Prefect of Maradi, His Excellency Captain (then) Torda Heinikoye, led an important delegation to Maradi for a friendly and working visit from 12th 14th June 1988. Important discussion and mutual agreement on matters of mutual interest between the two parties were held which include agriculture and water resources, animal resources, campaign against desertification, movement of goods and persons across borders, cultural and sporting activities, road transportation among others were reached. Similarly, in September 1988 another important delegation left Katsina for Zinder for bilateral talks, where issues bordering on trade and smuggling were discussed and agreements reached. To avoid, among other things, the duplication of decisions between Katsina, Maradi, and Zinder coupled with similarities of issues and problems to be addressed, the three (3) leaders of the States, held a tripartite meeting on the 31 August-2 September 1989 at Maradi (Musa, 2003).

Figure 2: Map of Katsina State showing the Katsina (Jibia) border with Niger.
Source: Katsina State Ministry of Land and Survey

2.2.1 Katsina State Government efforts in transforming border areas

Katsina State border communities are often neglected by the Nigerian authorities despite their strategic location (Abbas & Roosevelt, 2021). However, successive administrations in the State have played their roles in bringing about development in border communities though a lot needs to be done. In this regard, the Katsina State government has taken practical measures aimed at ensuring development to the doorsteps of the border communities.

To boost the economic development and promote peaceful co-existence among the residents of the Nigeria-Niger border communities concerted efforts were made to provide basic amenities and infrastructural facilities to the residents of the border communities. In this regards, Katsina State provide portable water, qualitative education, health care delivery, and electricity to the residents of Nigeria-Niger border. Similarly, far-reaching measures have been taken in improving agriculture

and livestock as well as combating desertification. Also, a network of roads is being constructed covering some parts of the border region. Specific attention is being given to Mashi-Birnin Kuka road, which has a very difficult terrain leading to the Niger Republic from Katsina. Furthermore, **in** its determination to promote commercial activities, the Katsina State Government has established international border markets such as Jibia and Mai'adua, where goods and services from both countries are exchanged. Restrictions on the movement of goods and services are greatly relaxed on the market days to ease commercial activities. The Government presently measures to create additional markets to liberalize and integrate the exchange of goods and services among the border communities (Shehu, 2003). Disturbed by the wanton destruction of lives and properties during the perennial farmers/herdsmen clashes, the Katsina State government has initiated a policy on rehabilitating forest estates in the State. So far, the International Stock Route (ISR) stretching about 680 kilometers from Jibia (a border town with the Niger Republic) has been successfully demarcated to ease the movement of herdsmen and their stock from the Niger Republic to Katsina State (Shehu, 2003).

Despite the above-mentioned efforts by the Katsina State government, Katsina border communities are the most backward in terms of development which suggest that lots more needs to be done.

2.2.2 Challenges of the transforming Katsina border communities

Notwithstanding the success recorded, numerous environmental, socio-cultural, economic and security challenges bedeviling the residents of the Katsina-Niger border communities remain unsolved. For instance, the communication network is very important to the development of the border communities. However, it is regrettable that the majority of Katsina-Niger border communities were not linked by telephone services. This has compounded the challenges of effective communication between the residents of the border and the border security agencies. It further militates trans-border trade and tourism between the two countries.

Another counterproductive factor in the transformation of the border communities is the challenges of managing trans-border resources. To maximize utilization of transborder resources, it is desirable that machinery, be put in place by central authorities for Technical Experts from both Countries to jointly undertake a land

resource inventory in the region to ascertain the type, quantity, and quality of natural resources that are very abundant in the border communities. Unless this is done, the bulk of the common mineral resources situated along the border will remain unknown and untapped. The abundance of fertile agricultural land and herds of animals in this part of the Nigeria-Niger border region is indeed a great asset but untapped. Efforts must be geared towards, maximum utilization of these resources for the common benefit of both countries. To achieve this, research in agricultural and animal resources should be initiated, funded, and sustained by Katsina and neighboring Maradi and Differ Departments in Niger. Similarly, efforts should be channeled towards the promotion of improved pest, resistant seeds, improve the breeding of husbandry, rehabilitation of forests and grazing reserves, watering points, and veterinary clinics for the enhancement of the economic status of the border communities (Shehu, 2003).

Environmentally, the greatest problem facing the Katsina Nigeria-Niger border zone is how to effectively manage the environment and conserve its resources against the threats of desertification and soil erosion. With the current rate of desert encroachment, concerted efforts must be made to check and possibly avert its damaging consequences. Katsina State had in November 1998 hosted the joint meeting of experts on Desertification at which several action plans were enumerated. However, these actions must be rigorously pursued given the continued diminishing returns of farm produce, drying up of major streams, rivers, dams, and the menace of drought. In the light of these, Katsina State must set up an agency responsible for environmental matters. The Agency is meant to combat problems of desertification, flood and erosion control sanitation, and pest control. The issues relating to the environment need to be carried out in a scientific and integrated manner. Expert on both sides of the border frequently meets at intervals to review a comprehensive environmental master plan on combatting the desert encroachment. The wanton felling down of trees in the region should be viewed seriously if success in this endeavor is to be achieved(Shehu, 2003).

As stated earlier, the fight against desertification must be on a mutual reinforcement basis. Nigerian states bordering Niger such as Kebbi, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, and Borno with a total landmark of about 125,000km consisting of about 13% of the country's landmass, 25% of the nation's population and 50% of its

livestock have already lost about 18-20% of their land to densification. These States must as a matter of urgency meet to find a rapid response approach to this life-threatening hazard (Ibrahim, Balzter, &Kaduk, 2018).

In the area of security and trans-border crimes, the Nigeria-Niger border used to be one of the most peaceful borders. However, the recent menace of trans-border banditry, drug trafficking, and smuggling of contrabands across the borderlines call for security concerns. Security of lives and properties cannot be guaranteed unless people are sensitized to be security conscious. To this end, a joint patrol by border society operatives should be initiated to combat trans-border crimes, public enlightenment campaigns on peaceful co-existence must be emphasized (Shehu, 2003).

2.3 Reflections on the management of Kebbi State and Dosso Department border through bilateral cooperation.

Historically, the people of Kebbi State and the Dosso Department in Niger have at different times been under single rulership with common cultural heritage such as religion, tradition, occupation, language among others. Physically, the vast land of the two states is littered with sedimentary rock formations of sandstone type. The landmass is also transverse by the great River Niger and its tributaries with wide plains (Abbas & Roosevelt, 2021). However, with the scramble and partition of Africa, this area was partitioned through various conventions and treaties by the European powers. Thus, following the firm establishment of colonialism, the Republics of Nigeria and Niger were created with their boundaries drawn purely for administrative and economic conveniences. Currently, Niger Republic shares an international border with Kebbi State. The boundary was delineated on paper and subsequently demarcated on the ground. As a result, some sense of sovereignty was implanted in the minds of the native rulers of the day who took orders and directives from colonial masters. The rulers of the two countries were faced with the problem of unavoidable interaction between their peoples and also the need to maintain the integrity of their territories (Adamu, 2003).

Although the boundary between the two nations' states was initially drawn on the ground using both natural and man-made references, it is common knowledge that the boundary remains an achieves suffering from the vagaries of modern

technologies which brought open the hidden errors committed by the colonial masters. It should be borne in mind that boundary delineations and demarcation were carried out with crude references to natural features like streams, trees, and hills. For instance, some of the features such as rivers, junction paths, hills among others are dynamics that can hardly last beyond a generation. As such, they are too dynamic to be used as defining features of an international boundary. Therefore, the problem of boundary management started from the moment the boundary was demarcated. Conspicuous bearings and distances in the ratified treaties were also not left out in rendering the colonial boundary a mere artificial creation. Thus, what remains of the boundary are its pillars and beacons that continue to remain the focus of Nigeria-Niger boundary managers (Adamu, 2003).

Culturally, Kebbi State in Nigeria and Dosso Department in the Niger Republic share common history and geography such as natural drainage systems across the two administrative units. Vegetation and soil type, relief and climate of the region have not shown any significant separation. For this reason, it could be concluded that the two administrative units are simply a spatial continuum with no geographical borders or separation but were separated only by colonial politics of divide and rule. The international sector of the state measures about 200kms from Dole-Kaina to Bachaka/Tombo with common features. The dominant vegetation of protected palm-bush and the large expanse of shrubland are characteristic of this part of the North Sudan Savannah (Adamu, 2003).

However, the continuity of the two nations' common heritage necessitates interaction in all aspects of human endeavor. The geography and history of the two states have always played important roles in cementing mutual relationships among the people. Equally, international politics and diplomacy have also played a significant role in rendering the boundary artificial and less prominent. With people and trans-border services becoming increasingly dynamic and mobile, the Nigeria-Niger boundary managers face greater management challenges. The need for protecting the territorial integrity of the nation constitutes a barrier against the free movement of goods and services across boundary lines which the residents of the border always resist (Adamu, 2003).

However. efforts must be made to secure frontiers against undocumented immigration and criminal activities across the borders by incorporating the local/traditional leaders whose role has facilitated effective boundary management in all its ramifications. It is gratifying to note that, the efforts made to permanently separate the people have not been successful because of constant interaction between people across the border and the movement of goods and services. This constant and dynamic interaction of the people has invariably broken the age-old political jinx. There is m doubt that trans-border cooperation in the Kebbi/Dosso sector has thrived well in areas of commerce, agriculture, education, health care. culture and security among many others.

2.4.1 The management of Kebbi State-Dosso Department border: An assessment of cooperation and challenges.

Kebbi State shares over 600kilometerboundary with Niger and Benin Republics. However, only 39 pillars or beacons mark the stretch of this border. Thus, there is an average of only one pillar at an interval of 15 kilometers. Although this has been the handiwork of colonial masters, it should have been re-drawn by now that the so-called borderline is not visible to the ordinary eye. Indeed, the border manifests only within the vicinity of the "colonial pillars" built about a century ago. Existing borderlines connecting the Kebbi State and Dosso Department are only clear on the map but the physical hard lines connecting the two states are highly invisible to the extent that the existing borderlines cannot be decoded by even the border managers let alone the residents of the border who are not equipped with a compass or global positioning system (GPS). The villagers in this type of settlement recognized only existing traditional boundaries which limit the jurisdiction of their respective states in the area of tax collection, census, immunization, and similar other programs. Effective border management in this kind of terrain is not just difficult but expensive and tedious (Adamu, 2003).

Despite this, the Kebbi state government has actively participated and funded the management of the border for many years. These include funding ethnographical studies on the border, enlightenment campaigns, provision of social amenities, reconstruction of missing or destroyed pillars, and promotion of local bilateral committees. Despite these activities on the border, the olüm area of concern remains

that the visual expression of the borderlines on the ground is very much limited to the proximal beacons. olüme reason, the control of illegal immigration, trafficking, and smuggling among others remained a serious challenge.

In the field of agriculture, lots have been achieved especially in the provision of seedlings for forest development and control of desert encroachment. Equally. Trans-border farming activities have continued unhindered, traditional farmlands overlapped and were maintained across the border. At the governmental level, there has been co-operation in control and usage of hydraulic structures on the River Niger, irrigation farming, and control of the spread of water hyacinth. Similarly, through joints efforts, animal disease surveillance, eradication, and control, animal trade, control of fishing and fishing methods were addressed. In a similar vein, grazing reserves have been established and equipped with facilities olüme wellbeing of the residents of the border and their livestock. This has contributed immensely to controlling the farmers/nomads' disputes, especially during farming periods. Trans-border cattle routes have been demarcated, surveyed, maintained, and controlled olüme movements of livestock across the two borders. Consequently, Nomads and their livestock do not feel the impact of the boundary between the two countries leading to the boost in the production of farm produce and pest control. Agricultural produce is freely traded across the borders and migratory pests such as grasshoppers and quelled birds are jointly controlled (Adamu, 2003).

Trans-border co-operation between Kebbi State and the Department of Dosso in the area of education and health care delivery continue to increase tremendously. Students/teachers olüme programs at primary, secondary, and National Certificate of Education (NCE) or equivalent level flourish. It is managed by the French Embassy in Abuja, since the commencement of the program. Equally important, in the spirit of trans-border cooperation, the teaching of French and English languages has been introduced in schools located along with the border areas of Kebbi and Dosso Department respectively. Also, in the effort to stress the spirit of oneness, trans-border immunization programs cover three countries namely, Kebbi State in Nigeria, Dosso Department in the Niger Republic, and Borgu Department in the Benin Republic.

Cooperation in culture and sporting activities between Kebbi State and Dosso has been a remarkable one. Traditional rulers from both sides attend functions across the border communities and beyond. For instance, football clubs from Kebbi State play friendly matches with football teams in Dosso Department. Furthermore, Local Bilateral Committees (LBC) always work assiduously to facilitate uninterrupted contacts and the control of trans-border crimes across the borders. Regular meetings of traditional rulers and Local Government Chairmen of gateway local governments have olü a long way in easing tension and promoting mutual understanding and cooperation. The trans-border markets at Dole-Kaina, Kamba, Gumki, Amogoro, Kare, Dadin Kowa are responsible olüme large olüme of both informal and formal trans-border trade between the two States (Adamu, 2003).

2.5 Responding to the management of Sokoto-Dosso, Tahoua and Maradi Department border via bilateral efforts: Reflections on Sokoto State efforts

The enormous efforts made over the years by Nigeria and Niger have no doubt made a far-reaching impact in the quest for improved management of the border. The harmonious co-existence and mutual love and respect between the people of Sokoto and Tahoua States in Nigeria and the Niger Republic respectively have continued to wax strong day by day. Through careful surveillance and Swift actions (where necessary), Sokoto and Tahoua's respective governments have consistently been poised to check all frictions that have the potentials of erupting into volatile conflicts between border communities. Thus, Sokoto and Tahoua border is the most peaceful one not only on the Nigeria-Niger Republic axis but in the West-African Sub-region (Bafarawa, 2003). This has been possible mainly due to the common cultural heritage, as well as, the commitment of the governments of the two states. However, effective border management is the foundation of nation-building and economic prosperity. This implies that border management is strategic and must be given priority. Nevertheless, history is replete with unhappy situations where the peripheral parts have been used or rather misused to hold nations at ransom, thus, border regions could either facilitate or impede national development efforts. Ironically, successive governments in Nigeria have made concerted efforts to ensure efficient management of the nation's international borders through the National Boundary Commission, which was created by a decree in December 1987, a lot more needs to be done (Hahonou, 2016).

While it is not within the intention of this section to elaborate on the National Boundary Commission's efforts, it suffices to say that it has not only ensured sustained efforts in organizing trans-border cooperation but has also facilitated the implementation of the several resultant bilateral agreements between Nigeria and its neighbors. Despite this, there is still much needed to be done, as the lagging conditions of Nigerian's border regions have been the source of concern to many state Governments that share boundaries with their proximate neighbors. The crux of the problem narrows on the lack of financial support that would ensure the provision of infrastructural facilities required in the improvement of the quality of life of the people in border regions. As rightly pointed out by Asiwaju,(1993) there are necessarily two principal issues which should be addressed if we are to avert the possibility of our frontiers being converted into "edge of the blade": what to do about the development of the regions themselves and what to do about the boundaries. Unfortunately, the Sokoto-Tauhoa border communities are among the most neglected of the traditionally recognized "Neglected Rural Majority." Within this context, Sokoto State has been able to provide modern communication networks, standard educational and medical facilities, industries, nation-states coercion apparatus, and facilitate the periphery-center relationships.

2.5.1 Sokoto State government's efforts in the management of its borders with Dosso, Tahoua, and Maradi Niger Republic

Before the creation of Kebbi and Zamfara States from the Sokoto State in 1991 and 1997 respectively, the area that falls within Sokoto State in the Nigeria Niger Border covers a total of 610km of the border as drawn under the 1906 Treaty signed by then Britain and France colonial powers. The areas that bordered the Niger Republic include the Tangaza, Illela, Ciada, Sabon Birni, and Isa. They are adjacent States to Dosso, Tahoua, and Maradi in the Niger Republic. The inhabitants are predominantly farmers and have from time-to-time engaged in symbolic economic and socio-cultural relations. Despite the European partitioning of the border and the consequences of colonial administration, which the region had experienced, the links have been maintained to date. Today, with the creation of Kebbi and Zamfara States, the Sokoto State border comprises a distance of 385km. The boundary runs from Yarbakwai between pillar 29 and 30 in Bachaka village at Gudu Local Government

to Gidan Bawa hamlet at pillar 61 in Bafarawa District of Isa local government the people living along the international border with the Niger Republic are mainly Hausa. Fulani, Zabam3..awa and Tuaregs. Their main occupation is farming and pastoralism. They share a common cultural heritage and their ties preceded colonialism by many years the historical link has consistently fostered trading relations, intermarriage, and a sense of collective responsibility in ensuring security and safeguarding the national habitat. Above all, the Islamic religion has continued to make an impact on the life of the people transcending whatever notions on boundaries that came along with colonial rule (Bafarawa, 2003).

Over the years and through an articulated policy of Nigeria-Niger trans-border cooperation, a good number of projects have been executed to strengthen border management. In this regard, Sokoto border regions were considered for development by successive administrators in Sokoto State. Concerted efforts were made to provide infrastructural facilities and facilitate trans-border cooperation. The imperative, which compel the pursuit of these common objectives include education, agriculture, common ecological concerns, particularly drought and desertification, long-established traditions, occupations, mutual and beneficial linkages of the economies, and common languages. Sequel to several meetings between the Governors of Sokoto State and those of Dosso and Tahoua in the Niger Republic in the past few years, education has constantly topped the agenda on issues of mutual interest. Consequently, an educational exchange program was introduced. The main focus of the initiative is to douse the language barrier, which colonialism imposed on the people, and to improve relations among the residents of the border communities. Following a meeting held on July 7, 1994, between the Sokoto State Military Administrator Col. Yakubu Mu'azurtd) and his Tahoua State counterpart, a committee was set up to implement the scheme. Under the terms of the agreement, the government of Sokoto State was to send 20 students to Tahoua with a minimum of Junior Secondary III level of education and the same (20) from Tahoua would be in Sokoto for the continuation of their full secondary education, every year (beginning from 1996/97 session). From the time the exchange program was mounted to date, many Nigerien students have undertaken various courses in Sokoto higher educational institutions (Bafarawa, 2003).

Under the scheme, students from the Niger Republic have been admitted to Sokoto tertiary institutions, particularly, the College of Education, now Shehu Shagari College of Education. The admitted students were exposed to intensive language studies, which gives them prerequisite qualifications for National Certificate in Education (NCE) and Degree programs in Nigerian Universities. Unfortunately, the change in Government in the Niger Republic in 1999 affected the exchange program. The table below illustrates the number of students enrolled in some programs:

Table 4: Showing number of student enrolment at Shehu Shagari college of education, Sokoto (1989-2001). Source: Academic Office of the Shehu Shagari College of Education, Sokoto.

Year	No of Students
1989	18
1990	16
1991	20
1992	20
1993	26
1994	05
1995	06
1996	06
1997	26
1993	05
1994	26
1995	06
1996	06
1997	22
1998	13
1999	19
2000	36
2001	22

218	06
1995	06
1996	22
1997	13
1998	19
1999	06
2000	22

Apart from the teaching of the French language that has been introduced to the Primary school pupils in Sokoto State under the directive of the Federal Government of Nigeria, the Sokoto State Government also launched the language scheme at Rafin Duna Primary school in Gada Local Government in 1997/98. Others include, Gada, Illela, Tangaza, Gudu, Isa, Sabon Birni, Goronyo, Yabo and Bini (Bafarawa, 2003).

The agenda for cooperation was in the areas of livestock development, pest control, and diseases outbreaks. In veterinary and animal health, Sokoto and Tahoua States, in Nigeria and Niger Republics respectively exchange information on the outbreak of any animal diseases. For instance, in the area of pest control especially in control of Quella birds and locust mansion that has been reduced to the minimal level. Others are simultaneous vaccination of animals for effective control of diseases, demarcation of cattle routes, grazing reserves, water points, and the provision of other necessary information. The implementation of this bilateral agreement invariably contained the problems of farmers/herdsmen conflicts and the exchange of specialists in different areas. Other issues that have continued to dominate the agenda in this sector include agreements for the prevention of sale and consumption of expired food items and the constant need for checks on the movement of food items across borders. Since 1994, the Sokoto State Ministry of agriculture has been in contact with the regional office of the International Crops Research Institute for Semi and Allied Crops in Niamey, Niger. The relationship has brought about comparative experimental farm-testing trials in the State, under the aegis of Sokoto Agricultural and Community Development Project.

Niger and Sokoto State of Nigeria share common environmental/ecological features, soil, water, vegetation, animals, and air. The geology of the geo-political zone is characterized by thick and vast sequences of sedimentary deposits of Sokoto Basin, some Sokoto rivers and their tributaries emanate from Niger Republic A vivid case is lake Kalmalo which is an inland drainage pattern. Various species of flora, such as *Kuka, Aduwa, Dorawa, Giwo. Kade* and many others are commonly found on both sides of the border. The greatest threat posed to this region is that of desert encroachment. Although the ugly phenomenon has global consensus for urgent action, very little has been done. On the part of the Sokoto State Government, the paucity of funds required for gigantic projects associated with the control of the menace has been through the Forestry II project and programs on tree-planting campaigns. The emphasis on the tree-planting campaigns and associated exercises has recorded very title success for lack of support by the people. Besides. the number of trees that fell has always outnumbered those planted and tendered to maturity. The Federal Government of Nigeria has also been making its contributions by funding projects from the Ecological Funds, but considering the dimension of the phenomenon and the quantum of financial requirements to combat the menace, international support is necessary (Bafarawa, 2003).

The need to provide basic amenities to border communities is for both moral and security concerns. The recognition of this fact has compelled Governments to pay serious attention to executing projects that have a direct bearing on the welfare of the citizenry living on the border. Leaving the residents of the border impoverished and dejected could spawn dreadful troubles that will require huge expenses to put under control. For this, border communities must as a matter of right be given equal attention. The amenities mostly required in our borders are semi-urban water supply and village-type water schemes, rural health centers and dispensaries, primary and secondary schools, construction of roads to ease communication and ensure effective surveillance by security agents. In the area of electrification and water supply, the Sokoto government has provided amenities through the Agency for Rural Development to over 20 villages.

Considering the importance of health in propelling the development of every nation. Sokoto signed bilateral agreements on immediate reporting of human diseases and epidemics outbreaks and joint efforts to control such outbreaks and detailed reporting

of illnesses across the border. The health officials of Sokoto and Tahoua States exchange monthly records of diseases, organize seminars and workshops for the health official of the two states to create an avenue for cross-fertilization of ideas. Sokoto and Tahoua States seek each other's assistance in the procurement of drugs and other medicaments available in one State and not available in the other and research into traditional medicine is jointly conducted. Other issues in this regard were in the area of immunization in which the citizens of the Niger Republic have always benefited from.

As mentioned earlier, the relationship between the people of Nigeria and the Niger Republic predates colonialism. This historic link has been more expressed in commercial activities than in any other endeavor, apart from religious beliefs and values. However, boundaries no matter how artificial could not be washed away as they have become permanent features of modern nation-states. Thus, the best that could be done is to combat the seeming differences into advantages that could be catalytic to the development of the border regions. These attempts underscore efforts made over the years through bilateral agreements to ensure that the best is reaped from the economic interdependence amongst the people living in the border region. Some of the agreements entered with the State of Tahou at in the commercial sector include joint organization and hosting of international border markets, exchange of visits between trade associations and occupational groups, and funding of feasibility studies on mineral endowments of the two States (Bafarawa, 2003).

As stated earlier, the people of Sokoto and Tahoua States, particularly those sharing common borders with Sokoto were one and continue to remain one despite attempts by the European colonialists to separate them. Although, the creation of artificial borders and imposition of restrictions on the movement of people across the border comes with a lot of religious and socio-cultural consequences for the citizens of the two modern states. The constant interactions between the peoples have made it difficult to distinguish culturally between the nationals of the Niger Republic and people from Sokoto. Thus, successive administrations have tried to cement these ties through deliberate policies and the assistance of the federal government cultural ties between Sokoto and Niger have been maintained and strengthened through the festivities such as the Argungu fishing festival during which artists from Niger were invited to perform. Furthermore, aside from National Independence Day

celebrations, Turbaning ceremonies and other important events make enormous contributions in cementing the brotherly ties between the people of Niger and Nigeria.

2.6 The management of Yobe State border with Diffa and Zinder Departments via bilateral efforts: Reflections on Yobe State.

Yobe State shares a total of about 323 out of about 1,500 kilometers with the Niger Republic. In Yobe State the area forming the border with the Niger Republic cover the Local Governments of Machina, Yusufari, and Yunusari which are adjacent to the Departments of Diffa and Zinder in the Niger Republic. The boundary line between the areas is defined on the land sector by both telegraphic policies as well as the course of the River Kumodugu Yobe. The area has little vegetation cover which experiences a periodic drought that poses a lot of problems to the livelihood of the people resulting in the disappearance of many valuable species of trees and animals in the area. However, despite these precarious climatic conditions, the people of the area engaged in farming which varies from season to season, fishing in Kumodugu river zone, mining of mostly potash, and animal husbandry (Abba, 2003).

Because of the shared geographical, economic, historical, and cultural similarities and other forms of linkages which include einter-marriages and trade links, there exist a lot of trans-border relations and cooperation between the people of the two neighboring countries living in the border communities. Trans-border relation is active as a result of activities of pastoralists who irrespective of their countries of origin move freely in search of food, agricultural products, and other commodities across the border. This kind of relationship and cooperation are facilitated among the people in this area by the homogeneity of the languages widely spoken which includes Kanuri, Fulfulde, and Hausa. Likewise, the historical linkage between the people of Yobe and Niger on this common border dating back to the Kanem Borno Empire with headquarters at Birnin Ngazargamu the remains of which is presently located in Yobe State has played a very significant role in this respect. But, as earlier mentioned, the partitioning of Africa by the then European colonial Administrators following the treaty signed in 1906 divided the people, despite their linkage in the area of culture and history. These cultural, tribal, and historical linkages play a

serious part in reducing the incidence of conflicts, and when they do occur, they are amicably settled through local initiatives (Nwafor, 2019).

However, for the effective management of the border area and continuous sustenance of the cooperation among the border administrators and the residents of the border communities, there is the need for some adequate measures in areas like border demarcation, control of trans-border banditry, conflicts between farmers/pastoralists and desertification control measures. The control of pest outbreaks and communicable diseases and continuous cooperation and contacts are equally important in this regard.

As a result of the lack of proper management of the boundary identification points, it was discovered that some settlements along the Yobe in Nigeria and Diffa and Zinder in the Niger Republic are overlapped. For instance, the issue of straddle villages along the borderland mark' and the changing cause of the river Komodugu Yobe at various points thereby cutting a portion of land from one country to the other. Another equally important problem is the disappearance of the boundary pillars. These are indications that all these problems were discovered during the four phases of exercise of the reconnaissance survey embarked upon by the technical subcommittee on the re-demarcation of boundary by the two countries. Also, another constraint is the lack of knowledge on the location of the border points on the part of the younger generation living along the border due to a lack of continuous enlightenment. As most of the aged persons relied upon for tracing of such boundary points in case of the disappearance have passed away, although the current approach adopted by the National Boundary Commissions of the two countries in the area of enlightenment during the reconnaissance survey is commendable and need to be replicated (Abba, 2003).

As a solution, there is a need to pursue a peaceful and effective joint re-demarcation and survey of the entire borderline between Yobe and Niger. There is also the need for densification of the boundary marks that have a distance of about 30kms in between. Proper conservation efforts by the authorities and the local communities must be embarked upon to protect the River Kumodugu. The Yobe State Nigeria and Diffa and Zinder Department in the Niger Republic jointly establish bilateral border management committee and continue to pursue a common interest.

Figure 3: Map showing the border line between Yobe State in Nigeria and Zinder Department in Niger.
Source: Yobe State Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning

The porousness and sandy terrain of the Yobe and Niger Republic make the area human friendly that allow the crossing of people and goods on both sides of the border. Another menace facilitated by the porous nature of the border is the activities of the bandits who are engaged in trans-border banditry that poses a lot of security threats to the citizen of both countries, despite an effort by the joint patrol team of the Police and the Army around the border area, such incursions have proven difficult to be contained due to their sophistication. Another dimension is the incursion of trans-border pastoralists that cause a lot of damages to farm crops and threatens the life of residents farmers that mostly result in a clash between them and the farmers. In this vein, the establishment of a border post in one on the settlement along the border for proper enforcement of law and order becomes necessary. This is to ensure that agreements governing the movement of the people and goods are adhered to by the nationals of both countries. Furthermore, they should as well engage in the constant mobilization of the local border authorities to be more aware of bilateral and agreements and protocols between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger (Abba, 2003).

The Nigeria Niger border area that falls in the northern part of Yobe is within the Sahel Savanna zone which is generally considered as an area vulnerable to wind, erosion, and frequent drought. This brought about the phenomenon of shifting sand settlements, destroying houses and large areas of the farm and grazing lands. The problem mostly affected areas in Yobe State bordering Local Government areas of Machina, Yusuiari, and Yunusari. As a result of the gravity of this situation, the Federal Government, Yobe State Government, and the border Local Governments are actively engaged in combatting the rapidly-increasing phenomenon of desertification that makes life unbearable to the residents of the area. The effort of the Federal Government through the establishment of a National Action Programme was timely and apt. Likewise, the creation of the Ministry of Environment and Department of Drought and Desertification Amelioration and Environmental Conservation which the Yobe State Government has also adopted is also a clear case for concern.

At the State Government level, the Ministry of Environment and Rural Development and afforestation related projects and program have embarked upon dunes fixation activities in settlements like Sumbar and Bulatura in Yusufari Local Government. as replication of what has been done earlier in Kaska and Tolutulowa To provide the local communities in the area with a source of income generation, and to protect the environment from further degradation, the State Government jointly with the local governments planted 150 hectares of Gum Arabic tree in Machina, Karasuwa, Yusufari, and Yunsari local government during the 2000 and 2001 planting season (Abba, 2003).

The need for closer contact and cooperation between Nigeria- Niger cannot be overemphasized given the economic, historical, and socio-cultural ties between the two countries. The membership of both Nigeria and Niger in some regional and sub-regional organizations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Niger River Basin Authority (NBA) among others where the two countries pursue common objective for economic and social development could be considered a bedrock on which the local bilateral contacts and cooperation could be sustained (Charlick, 1994).

At the states level, there is some degree of brotherly, friendly relations and contact between dignitaries and officials' flourish. Also, Yobe State and the neighboring Departments of Diffa have implemented a joint immunization exercise to synchronize the National Immunization Day as done in the ECOWAS Sub-region for the effective coverage of the border area between the two countries. In other to prevent all kinds of diseases on the border both countries are working hard to combat all human and animal diseases in border communities.

2.7 The management of the Borno and Diffa Province border via bilateral efforts: Reflections on Borno State.

Borno State is strategically located at the boundary between Nigeria and Niger, Nigeria and Chad as well as Nigeria and Cameroon, respectively. The State enjoys and shares the legacies of brotherly co-existence among these three African countries. Borno State is at the end of the boundary between Nigeria and. Niger. The entire boundary is about 400 kilometers. The boundary begins from where the Kumadugu - Yobe River enters Borno State around Damasak in Mobbar Local Government right through the waterbeds of Abadam Local Government, up to the point of discharge into the Lake Chad. The Boundary then goes on from this point, for about 27 kilometers up to the tripartite point of Nigeria-Niger and Chad on the Lake. From this description, the Borno State axis of the boundary can be said to be entirely a water basin occupied by fishermen and farmers (Mala, 2003).

Management of the border: Discussion on the management of the boundary must take into cognizance the present economic plight of the people in these areas. Significant among these are economic pursuits of fishing, irrigation farming, and animal husbandry as well as accessibility to social amenities such as Health care services education, electricity, transport, access roads, and security of lives and properties. The Borno State experience in responding to the Management of the border cooperation between the two countries is limited to the relationship between Borno State in Nigeria and the Province of Diffa in the Niger Republic. Borno State has been very effective and efficient in responding to trans-border cooperation, as the existing relationship between the two communities is cordial. The security of lives and properties have been the concern of border communities in Mobbar and Abadam Local Government areas of Nigeria and in Diffa Prefecture of the Republic of Niger.

In the recent past, these communities were subjected to general insecurity as a result of the activities of Boko Haram, bandits and rebel incursion (Hahonou, 2016).

To combat the criminal activities of these groups, the Multinational Joint Task Force was created by Lake Chad countries comprising Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroun to respond to trans-border banditry, Boko Haram insurgency, armed robbery, trafficking, and prostitution (Mensah, 2017). Just like Yobe State, another area of emphasis in the management of trans-border cooperation between Nigeria and Niger has been the phenomenon of desert encroachment with its devastating consequences of loss of arable lands and grazing fields due to shifting dunes, abandonment of settlements' and forced migrations of the people. However, a more comprehensive approach to the control of desert encroachment through 6000km of a shelterbelt, stretching from Kebbi to Borno State was launched by His Excellency, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, and the then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Maiduguri the Borno State Capital (Hahonou, 2016).

Furthermore, the Borno State Government partners with the Province of Diffa on a joint health care package for the people of the border region. Similarly, pupils of the border region attend school in either of the states without any humiliation or harassment by either of the States authorities. This encourages the cross-fertilization of educational ideas and the exchange of curriculum studies.

Commercially, there is a remarkable increase in the trans-border trade between the people of the two states. While Nigerian traders from Borno State travel to the Province of Diffa to procure some items Nigeriens from Diffa and even beyond buy goods from Maiduguri which strengthens the economy of both states and encourages trans-border economic activities (Mala, 2003).

2.8 Reflections on the Zamfara State government's management of the Zamfara-Maradi border through bilateral initiatives.

Zamfara State shares a common international border with the Republic of Niger. The area bordering Maradi State in the Niger Republic is presently located in Zurmi and Shinkafi Local Government Areas of Zamfara State, Nigeria. The people living in these areas primarily engaged in farming, rearing livestock, and informal trans-border trade. Although the distance of the borderline covers only about

100kilometres, there is a lot of political, economic, and social interactions between the people of the Niger Republic and those in Northern. part of Zamfara State. Culturally, the border communities in Zamfara State and their counterpart in the Niger Republic share common historical and cultural heritage. These ties dated several decades before the colonial era. This link besides fostering inter-marriages and other social relationship facilitate trans-border trade and grazing of livestock on either side of the border by both communities that regard each other as one (Sani, 2003).

Over the years, people living in these border areas suffered neglect in the provision of social amenities. The areas of the Niger Republic bordering Zamfara State and its southern parts are more developed than, the rest of the country. In the past, several efforts were made to improve the socio-economic development of the communities residing in the international border areas for the benefit of the people from both countries. However, the Zamfara State Government established meaningful understanding and created a relationship with the State of Maradi in the Niger Republic at the bilateral level. The experience of Zamfara State in response to the management of international borders covers to large extent all economic, social, and political aspects of human endeavors (Hahonou, 2016).

Geo-political correlation of trans-border cooperation: To understand the geopolitical correlation of trans-border co-operation in the Zamfara North Western Zone, recourse must be made to the long history of association between the people in the border communities as well as the general characteristics of the people, land economy and the interdependent socio-economic relations across the international boundaries.

Concerning the history and evolution of Zamfara and Maradi international boundaries, historical evidence attests to the fact that such international boundaries are colonial creations, although local people did recognize the frontiers as barriers to ethnic and political relationships. The only difference was there was relatively tree movement of goods and people between the different groups in the zone. The treaties of 1904 and 1906 demarcated the international boundary between Nigeria and its neighbors particularly in the North Western Zone. Politically, there is much emphasis on deficiencies in political cooperation that weaken bonds with other states and

hinder desirable forms of economic or securing collaboration. Potential benefits from such collaboration are seen to be predicated on the strengthening of shared values on diplomacy that cultivates understanding, trust, and goodwill related to the advancement of immediate interest. Contemporary global or even community interactions are dominated by forms of political co-operation between Communities sharing a common border, mostly related to divergent and economic interests (Sani, 2003).

Specific policies of Zamfara State government towards management of the border include the establishment of Boundary Committee. The Committee participated actively during the launching of the phase Ill reconnaissance survey and the public enlightenment Campaign at Maigatari, Jigawa State in Nigeria, and Zinger/Diffa in the Niger Republic. However, the State could not attend some of the programs of activities including the Action Plan of 1988-2000 due to lack of adequate contact with the National Boundary Commission Headquarters in Abuja Nigeria. The Zamfara State Government has also accepted the revisiting exercise of the six missing pillars meeting and phase II reconnaissance survey to provide adequate security along its borders with the neighboring Niger Department.

The sustainable bilateral relationship between Zamfara and Maradi in the Niger Republic: The Zamfara State engages Niger communities along with the border areas into dialogue and negotiations generally to preserve the cordial relationship and trans-border crime and insecurity. In addition, Zamfara State established the State Bilateral Committee in 1988 with the primary aim of exploiting areas of common interest between Zamfara State in Nigeria and the State of Maradi in the Niger Republic. As highlighted earlier the State of Maradi and Zamfara State share common resources such as farmlands and rivers in addition to the long historical ties. The socio-economic ventures of the states provide ground for prosperity and other considerations called for bilateral cooperation between Zamfara and Maradi States (Hahonou, 2016).

Sectoral areas identified by the bilateral committee include security, agriculture, commerce, culture and tourism information, health, and education. Specifically, the areas of concern on both sides of the border deal with the movement of cattle across international boundaries, indiscriminate falling of trees, and activities of security

agencies of both countries including arbitrary seizure of goods. Others include the need for co-operation in checking the movement of criminals and persons without valid papers problem of car theft across borders, the smuggling of arms and petroleum products, and the demarcation of international boundaries. Zamfara's relations with Maradi State assist in checking the problems of occasional clashes over grazing rights, destruction of farmlands, and loss of lives. Niger's armed bandits attacked, maimed, or killed members of the border community despite joint border patrols on smuggling of petroleum products grains, and other commodities by officials on both sides of the border, leading to the mass influx of Nigeriens into Nigeria. These developments had created serious threats to Zamfara State and National Security. Similarly, to minimize the hardship being experienced by communities along Nigeria's border, the Zamfara Government considered and designed a socio-economic program aimed at ensuring that the condition of their living is improved. Most of the area suffers from one form of ecological problem or another. These include desert encroachment, seasonal flooding, gully erosion among others. Given this, a survey was conducted to identify the requirements of each town or village, which will make life easier for the inhabitants. The survey recommended the provision of amenities/facilities to Shinkafi and Zurmi Local Government border communities that share a border with the Niger Republic (Sani, 2003).

2.9 Management the Jigawa and Zinder border via bilateral efforts: Reflections on Jigawa State.

Border communities are fragmented by boundaries that are often artificially delineated, resulting in informal trans-cultural and traditional ties. The border communities in Jagawa State and across the boundary in Zinder Department were colonially created and are characterized by peasant economy, largely arable and pastoral agriculture. A sizeable proportion of the population engaged in petty trading, moving from market to market along the border. The span of the Jigawa State border with the Zinder Department covers the northern fringes of Sule Tankarkar and Maigatari, Local Government areas of Jigawa State. Though government presence is far inadequate to meet the infrastructural needs of these communities, efforts to develop these areas have been through the normal statutory and extra-budgetary allocations due to the State and the affected Local Governments. The Government of Jigawa State is very much concerned and committed to the development of

settlements along the border regions in line with the expectations and guidelines of the Government of Nigeria. To achieve this goal, the Government has diligently implemented some of the agreements between Nigeria and Niger in areas such as local bilateral committee, agriculture, trade and commerce, transport, education, and boundary demarcation (Turaki, 2003)**.**

The history of the creation of Local Bilateral Committees dates back to the 17th session of the Council of Ministers held in Maradi, Niger from 17th to 18th March 1986 during which the Council decided to meet the legitimate concern of their peoples. Border development programs that benefit both States were articulated and implemented under the umbrella of the Local Bilateral Committees. The experience of Jigawa is that such development programs foster and maintain cordial relationships between the two countries. The existence of the Committees also allows for a more coordinated approach towards the implementation of the bilateral agreements (Turaki, 2003).

Culturally, the border between Nigeria and Niger is a twentieth-century development, which came into being with the recent processes of State formation. Though new relations emerged as a result of this development, the outstanding ties that existed between the two communities remained. For instance, the influence of the geographical environment on the lives of the people can be seen in many areas. As a follow-up to the agreements entered into in conformity with the desire of the respective States, Valuable cultural artifacts are explored and preserved through approved systems. The ease with which this aspect of cooperation is promoted is largely informed by common linguistic and environment. This also proves the absence of a communication barrier between communities, even though some of our traditional industries have been phased out, marketing in certain locally produced materials still flourishes. The relations of craft production between the people of the area are still very strong (Turaki, 2003).

Trade and commerce have suffered neglect for time immemorial because agriculture was left as a peasant business. With the resolve to enhance foreign exchange earning capacity and the need to stimulate production for export as a means of diversifying the export base, the idea of establishing an Export Processing Zone came to light. The Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of Niger

signed a bilateral agreement on the establishment of bilateral committees for cooperation in Maiduguri on 18th July 1990 as a follow-up to the convention that created the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation signed in March 1971 in Niamey (Turaki, 2003).

Considering the cooperation existing between the two countries and re-affirming their commitments to the treaty and protocols of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). Obasanjo administration in May 1999 inaugurated a working group of Jigawa-Zinder Local Bilateral Committee. This group worked out the modalities of trade relations between the State of Jigawa of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Zinder of the Niger Republic. The Governors of the two states exchanged visits and discussed among other things the development and encouragement of trade exchanges in the areas within the jurisdiction in conformity with national laws and trade agreements. In recognizing the economic condition of both States and the two countries, the level of development between the two countries, Jigawa State thus decided to establish a border-free zone for the benefit both States (Turaki, 2003).

The prevailing weather and climatic conditions have produced an environment in which settlers have employed various adaptive techniques to survive. The system of agriculture is the simple bush following technique in areas of sparse population, while permanent land cultivation prevails around large settlements. In both the sparsely and densely populated areas, the land is devoted to the cultivation of the same type of crop. Millet is the most widely cultivated cereal because of its adaptability to the climate. The market Maigatari is mainly for agricultural-produced. The major consideration of agricultural production and the exploitation of solid minerals, raw materials production, and industrial inputs are important stimuli for the establishment of the export-free zone. The vast agricultural raw materials were harnessed by the development of an Export Production Village which is a complementary industry of the Export Processing Zone.

The geology together with the climate influences animal herding in these areas, it is estimated that about 40% of cattle, sheep, and goats in Nigeria and Niger are located in these border areas. Because of the nomadic nature of herdsmen and the hardship they encounter during their movements in search of posture, the Government of

Jigawa developed grazing reserves with full facilities. In the same vein, the Government of Zinder has already agreed with the concept and is also embarking on the herdsmen enlightenment program to promote agricultural and pastoral activities (Turaki, 2003).

In one of the bilateral meetings between the two countries delegates were convinced that the Maigatari Export Processing Zone presented an opportunity for increased industrial activities between Nigeria and Niger Republics especially in the area of small and medium scale industries within the zone. These include port-ready-made prototype factories and warehouses, electricity security, inland port, transit facilities, as well as. custom duty waivers and other incentives. Other specific areas exploited include the production and marketing of sesame, sugar, livestock garments, and handcraft. Since the creation of the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation, the two countries have agreed to combine their efforts towards improving their international road system. However, only four major road linkages have so far been developed, one of which is the link between Babura in Jigawa State of Nigeria and Magarya in the Department of Zinder in Niger. Convinced of the importance of a good road network in all aspects of economic development, Jigawa State, in bilateral talks with the Department of Zinder, considered the development of other transport networks, such as railway lines to enhance growth and boost economic activities (Turaki, 2003).

The glaring difference between the education systems of the two countries is influenced by the Indirect Rule system of the European Colonialists in Nigeria and the Assimilation Policy of the French Government in the Republic of Niger. Because of this glaring difference, the two countries are applying systems inherited from their respective colonial masters. But for close interaction and proximity, both countries have included in their school syllabuses the learning of French and English in Nigeria and Niger respectively. For the benefit of both countries, Jigawa State has entered into an agreement with the Department of Zinder for the exchange of schoolteachers.

Jigawa State of Nigeria and the Department of Zinder in Niger have for time immemorial enjoyed relative peaceful co-existence. The prevailing situation and the long outstanding security agreements have severally contributed to the attainment of

this position. in situations where the need arises, Joint Security Patrols prevail. Several bilateral discussions have been held and will continue to hold in areas where the attention of both States may be required to deal with any security situation. The 3rd phase of the reconnaissance survey campaign on the Nigeria/Niger International Boundary Demarcation was launched in Maigatari town on Thursday 12th March 1998. More often than not when the word border is mentioned, it is almost immediately associated with dispute, violence, misunderstanding, disagreement among others. However, as a result of friendly relations that exist between Nigeria and the Niger Republic, the international boundary re-demarcation exercise has always been peaceful (Turaki, 2003).

It is important to note that despite the efforts of the federal and the seven Nigerian State governments that shares border with the Republic of Niger, the fronter is still porous allowing all sorts of trans-border crimes. However, there is a debate among scholars as regards what constitute the border porosity. Why is there an upsurge in trans-border crimes despite intensive surveillance and commitment of human and material resources by the government? What can be done differently to effectively secure the border? These questions and many more be examined in details before an objective perspective can emerge.

2.10 Nigeria-Niger border porosity and the management of trans-border arms trafficking

Nigeria lost the last century to the tragedy of political instability, insecurity, and armed conflicts which displaced thousands of citizens from their homes or make thousands of refugees in neighboring countries such as Niger, Cameroun, and Chad. This is in addition to thousands of lives being lost and properties worth millions of dollars that are being destroyed. Regrettably, more than 20 years into the 21st century Nigeria appears to be sliding into a similar tragedy given the rising wave of trans-border arms trafficking through Nigeria's porous borders. Consequently, highway armed robbery, ethno-religious violence, kidnapping, insurgency, and widespread banditry are on the increase across Nigeria (Nwali, 2018).

Conventional literature borders and migration treats the Nigerian borders as both barriers and bridges (Agnew, 2008). They constitute barriers because they protect

Nigerians from the threats of foreigners. At the same time, they are seen as bridges that facilitate mutual relations between Nigerians and the nationals of neighboring countries. This is perhaps owing to the fact the 21st-century world has become "a global village" to an extent that no state irrespective of its level of development can pay the price of isolationism (Andreas, 2003). This suggests that Nigeria must open its border for mutual relations with outsiders and at the same time protect its territorial boundary against illicit activities such as trans-border arms trafficking, human trafficking, trans-border banditry, and other forms of trans-border crimes.

Despite this, Nigeria has the most porous and unpoliced border spaces in the world. As of 2019, an official report from Nigeria's Ministry of Interior indicates that the country has 86 formal entry points and over 1400 identified illegal routes (Ailemen, 2019). The porosity of the Nigerian borders coupled with poor management, border conditions, bribery, and corruption among others have enabled several forms of trans-border crimes, including trans-border arms trafficking to flourish. For instance, The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) reports that Nigeria with approximately 200 million population host over 350 of the 500 million illegal small arms and ammunition circulating in the West African sub-region (Guardian, 2018 quoting UN Report). This is in addition to thousands of locally manufactured guns that are being used in armed-related violence such as ethno-religious violence, rural banditry, high-way armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, farmer-herders conflict, and Boko Haram insurgency.

At different times, scholars attempt to explain what could be responsible for the Nigerian border porosity that enables the continuous upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking and other forms of trans-border crimes. An attempt to answer this question has elicited divergent scholarly explanations, particularly on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. Prominent scholars argue that the persistence of trans-border arms trafficking is a result of poor management of the borders by the Nigerian authorities. In particular, a range of authors, including Asiwaju (2011), Onuoha (2011), Adeola and Akinyemi (2012), Fayomi (2013), Blum (2014), Ewetan and Ese (2014), Osimen*et al.* (2017), and Rufa'i (2018) identified porosity of the borders resulting from, trans-border banditry, cattle rustling, inadequately skilled border security workforce, poor logistics and economic interdependence between Nigeria

and Niger as the primary sources of the border porosity and consequently insecurity, especially arms trafficking. Idowu (2014), Olomu, David, and Adewumi (2018) identified the lack of sufficient cooperation between Nigeria and Niger Republic authorities, rivalry among the inter-state border security agencies, poor intelligence gathering and sharing, low morale resulting from poor pay, lack of opportunities, and privileges for border security agents as some of the fundamental reasons for the porosity of the border and upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking.

Rufa'i (2018), specifically argues that the rising trans-border crimes such as cattle rustling and banditry on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier are the main reasons for the porosity of the frontier. Rufa'i argument can be examined and buttressed from two main perspectives. First, trans-border banditry has dislodged many residents of the border communities from their ancestral towns/villages which invariably implies that they lost not only their homes but their farms (means of livelihood). In addition, cattle rustlers have rustled the livestock animals of the residents of the border communities that serve as their farming instruments and a source of additional income. This has forced many of the victims to become wanderers searching for other means of survival including aiding smugglers and trans-border arms traffickers to cross the border for material benefits. Secondly, the devastating activities of the bandits have forced not only the farmers to abandoned their farms, but the border patrol teams also abandon their stations because they have become targets of the bandits. For instance. In January 2020. Bandits abducted four customs officers along the Dan-Bedi-Jibia highway while on routine border patrol (Francis, 2020). Similarly, in May 2020, the bandits abducted 20 famers, killed nine other people, and an Assistant Superintendent of customs Garba Nasiru by name while on official duty on Katsina-Jibia highway (Sahara Reporters, Nigeria, October 5, 2020). Consequently, the trans-border arms traffickers are taking the advantage of the ungoverned border spaces to freely cross the border smuggle arms into Nigeria. For instance, the border security agencies have deserted the border space between Gurbin-Bore town to Jibia border post which is approximately 25 kilometers.

At some of the border posts, stones, drums, woods, branches of trees and ropes are used to indicate where the border stars and where it ends. Often, these border posts are within the middle of the border communities which make enforcement of entry regulation difficult if not impossible. For instance, during a field trip at Birnin

Kwanni border post, only one officer is attached to the border post. Therefore, very few people pass through the formal border where there is security presence.

In Dole-Kaina, Kebbi State border town with Niger Republic, only a drainage divide the two countries. The Nigeria-Niger boundary passes through Dole Kaina, with one half of the town falling in Nigeria's Kebbi State and the other in Niger's Dosso State. The residents of the town are fluent in Hausa, Zarma, (a local language) English, and French, and they are exposed to not just the cuisines of the two countries, but also a variety of cultures. The town is being occupied by the Nigerians and Nigeriens and are living peacefully. they use the same currency (Naira), share one market, and move freely to the extent that they do not know when you are in Niger Republic (Sharper News, 2020).

Figure:4 Nigeria-Niger border post at Birnin Kuka, Katsina State.
Source: Nigerians Talk Magazine

■ Right Niger, left Nigeria

Figure 5: Dole-Kaina border town where Nigeria and Niger are separated by drainage.
Source: Sharper News

Popovski&Maiangwa blamed insecurity in Nigeria on the failure of the Nigerian government to exercise its constitutional responsibilities of protection of lives and properties of the citizens. According to them, the primary purpose of governance is the protection of lives and properties; as such, every human endeavor is secondary to the security of the lives and properties of citizens. The government at all levels must strive to protect not just the life and properties of citizens but their dignity. They argue that the inability of the government to protect its citizens compels them to resort to self-help to defend themselves by acquiring arms and ammunition (Popovski&Maiangwa, 2016). In recent times, the rural banditry and kidnapping across North-Western Northern Nigeria have compelled many citizens especially those along the Jibia border towns to explore self-defense options by illegally acquiring arms through the porous borders to protect their communities from the torment of bandits and other criminals. For instance, in May 2021, hundreds of Muslim worshippers were kidnapped by bandits in the Jibia Local Government Area of Katsina State while observing congregational prayers (Tahajjud prayers) during Ramadan. The bandits raided the town and abducted attendees at a mosque on the outskirts of town, according to reports. (Bashir, 2021). In July 2021, bandits stormed Zandam Village in the Jibia Local Government Area of Katsina State, killing seven people, including a police inspector. Five other residents were injured, according to Gambo Isah, a spokeswoman for the Katsina police command, who verified the incident. It was learned that the bandits attacked the town on motorcycles in large

numbers (Olaide, 2021). Aside from indiscriminate killing of residents of the border communities, the military personnel guards who are saddled with the responsibility of securing the residents of the border are not spared by the bandits either on Saturday, July 18, 2021, armed bandits ambushed Nigerian soldiers in the Jibia local government area of Katsina state, killing at least 23 soldiers. The soldiers were on foot patrol along with the border communities when they came under heavy fire from the bandits (Garda World, 2020). These attacks and many more by the trans-border bandits have caused an unprecedented need for arms by the residents of the border to defend their communities against bandits' attacks. It is common while walking along the border communities to see the residents of the border communities moving with arms.

Reece & Jones are regarded as some of the proponents of digital technology in border security. In their work titled "Border militarization and the re-articulation of sovereignty" argued that although militarization of the border may improve security, it may also interfere with the human rights of the citizens and non-citizens crossing the border. They argue that many of the international borders have difficult terrain, lengthy and porous borderlines that are extremely difficult to be policed through regular border patrol. Despite this, most of the underdeveloped countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America rely on analog border patrol to secure their borders. Therefore, as a solution, they recommend the use of e-border technology to secure frontiers (Reece & Jones, 2016). However, what Reece and Jones failed to recognize is whether or not the undeveloped countries' can afford the cost of e-border technology (digital surveillance) and also failed to interrogate whether the e-border technology is compatible with the border conditions of the underdeveloped countries. For instance, at present Nigeria-Niger border has no requisite technology, infrastructure, environment, and skilled workforce to achieve adequate digitalization of the border. More worrisome is the ongoing debates among Nigerian Migration and border security scholars on whether Nigeria has the financial capability to secure its porous border through digital surveillance. Furthermore, there are concerns on whether corruption among the border security personnel and Nigerian politicians would ever allow the country to acquire, deploy and maintain such digital surveillance technology in the future.

Olaniyan and Yahaya (2016) blamed the porosity of the border on the miserable conditions of the majority of Nigerians and especially the residents of the border communities as a significant source of border porosity and trans-border arms trafficking. They argue that pervasive poverty, unemployment, a high level of illiteracy, and the lack of basic amenities, especially in border communities are some of the major reasons behind the Nigerian porous borders. They submitted that pervasive poverty and youth unemployment, especially among the residents of the border communities fuel trans-border crimes such as smuggling of contrabands and aiding illegal migrants to cross the border. They further submit that the low standard of living among the majority of the residents of the border communities has created a feeling of hopelessness and restiveness among the majority of the residents of the border communities. As a result of this neglect and abandonment by the government, the residents of the order communities' resort to every kind of trans-border activity to survive irrespective of its legality or illegality. Often, border security agents clash with residents of Jibia border communities in an attempt to stop them from either smuggling and adding smugglers. In September 2019, the operatives from the National Border Drill Operations, which include personnel from the Customs, Air Force, Army, Police, and other paramilitary agencies, clashed with smugglers at the Jibia border in Katsina state, killing one person and injuring four others, including two custom officers and one soldier (The Nation, Nigeria, September 24, 2019).

However, Olaniyan and Yahaya (2016) did not take into consideration the relativity of poverty among different residents of the border communities. For instance, poverty is more severe in Northern Nigeria's border communities that share a border with Niger and Chad compared to Southern Nigeria's border communities that share a border with the Benin Republic. Even at that, the residents of the Nigeria-Benin Republic border communities clash with security agents over the smuggling of contrabands. For instance, in July 2020. two young people were struck by stray bullets during a conflict between customs officers and petrol traffickers aided by some residents of the Seme border in Lagos State. The two boys were playing in the Sokenu Compound of Seme when they were shot by customs bullets on Friday, according to the Nigerian News Agency (NAN). The injured victims, on the other hand, survived after receiving treatment at the Seme border Customs clinic (The Guardian, Nigeria, July 5, 2020).

Similarly, Ukwayi and Bassey (2019) tailored their argument on the complex border terrain, shortage of border security personnel, corruption, and obsolete digital surveillance equipment (video cameras, scanners, drones, night vision glasses) as an alternative explanation to why the Nigerian borders are porous despite intensive physical surveillance. They, therefore, recommend the use of digital border surveillance technology facilities to complement conventional border patrol by the security agents. Movement from one border town or security post to another is just horrific because of the thick forest particularly during the rainy season but lack of access road that would enable the movement of patrol vehicles has always been a challenge for the border security agents. The majority of the residents of the neighboring Nigeria-Niger border communities and trans-border arms traffickers usually move on motorcycles through the footpaths that link the two countries. Because of the nature of the terrain, these routes are unpoliced. Hence, the free movement of arms along these routes. However, Ukwayi and Bassey, just like Reece and Johnson (2016) failed to interrogate Nigeria's technological and financial capacity to acquire and maintain the surveillance technology. In addition, they failed to holistically examine the general conditions of the border, the living conditions of the residents of Nigeria-Niger border communities as well as the difficult topography of the borders which immensely contributed to making the borders not only porous but ungovernable. The Nigeria-Niger Republic border is not incompatible with digital surveillance technology because of the absence of requisite facilities to migrate to e-border technology.

Idowu (2014), Olomu, David, and Adewumi (2018) argue that despite the existence of Nigeria-Niger international joint patrol teams, lack of sufficient cooperation is a major factor hindering effective security of the frontier. Effective border security requires sufficient interaction, the flow of information, and cooperation between border law enforcement agencies. This is because it enables them to gather and share critical for implementing bilateral agreements. Against this backdrop, the Nigeria and Niger border law enforcement agencies have formed local and high bilateral committees that provide a forum where the border security agencies from both countries meet to discuss issues of common interest, particularly those relating to illegal entry and other forms of trans-border crimes. It also creates an avenue for the

smooth exchange of critical intelligence on various forms of trans-border crimes such as illegal movement of aliens, hard drug trafficking, smuggling, cattle rustling, and banditry.

However, Idowu (2014), Olomu, David, and Adewumi (2018) failed to recognize that the cultural affinity of the border communities in areas such as common languages, occupation, and intermarriages have compounded the challenges of identifying the nationality of persons crossing either side of the border. The inability of both border security agencies to identify residents of the border communities by their nationality has forced them to relax entry and exit regulations. Also, the lack of proper demarcation of the borders has often led to the incursions of border security agents from either side of the border. The majority of the physical beacons described in the 1906 treaty that demarcated the borderlines between Nigeria and Niger no longer exist. As such the borderlines are difficult to determine. In some instances, most of the borderland's hamlets in 1906 maps have grown to towns and overlapped in either of the border sides (Daku, 1993). In terms of language, Nigeria's official language is English while Niger uses French, this often, creates a huge communication gap. There are instances where the language barrier between Nigeria and Niger's border security agents harms effective interaction by creating a communication gap between the two countries' law enforcement agencies at the border. The poor road network between the border communities linking the two countries has limited the frequency of exchange of visits by Nigeria and Niger's law enforcement agents to discuss common border security challenges. Furthermore, most of the border posts linking Nigeria and Niger are not link up with telecommunication networks that would have enhanced the flow of intelligence between the law enforcement agencies of the two countries. These factors have favored the trans-border criminals operating at different entry points to the detriment of Nigeria and Niger corporate security.

Daku, (1993) raised the issue of trans-border markets along the Nigeria-Niger border as a viable explanation for the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger border and indeed trans-border arms trafficking. According to Daku, across the border towns linking Nigeria and Niger via Sokoto continue to witness the proliferation of trans-border markets where local trades in both legal and illicit goods. Traders from both sides of the

borders access these trans-border open markets by foot, camels, motorcycles among others through the illegal routes where there is no border security presence. In Katsina State, the story is not different, every Saturday, residents of the Jibia border town and its environs along with residents of Dan Issa and Maradi from Niger converge at Jibia open markets to trade in goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Most of the traders and their goods cross the border through illegal routes to reach their destination. In Gurbin Bore, Katsina State, every Wednesday traders from Nigeria and Niger crosses the Gurbin Bore border through the unpoliced routes and trade in different goods and services, some of which could be legal or illegal. This suggests that neither the Nigeria nor Niger government has no idea who and what passes through the border. Therefore, aside from the government losing huge revenue, trans-border open markets enable the big-time arms traffickers to disguise themselves as traders and supply arms and ammunition to Nigeria.

Another manifestation of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border porosity is in the area of trans-border education. The Nationals of the Niger Republic and vice-vasa cross the borders daily to attend both Islamic and Western schools to acquire knowledge. Although, the international language barrier has limited the pursuit of trans-border Western education between Nigeria (whose educational language of instruction is English) and Niger (whose educational language of instruction is French). Despite this, some Nigerians established universities in the Niger Republic and some of Niger's universities have their campuses in Nigeria. This has brought together students from Niger and Nigeria. For instance, the Maryam Abacha American University of Niger is owned by a Nigerian and located in the heart of Maradi city in the Republic of Niger. At the same time, some Nigerian students attend schools such as Al'nahda international university in Maradi-Niger to pursue various degree programs. Trans-border education has created an opportunity for the movement of Nigerian and Nigerien students across the borders in pursuits of knowledge. Some of these movements are either through informal routes or without a valid means of identification.

However, the pursuit of Islamic knowledge between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger has been in existence even before the formal delineation of the border by the colonialists. The propagation and teaching of Islamic knowledge, particularly in

Northern Nigeria was commonly associated with the 1804 *Jihad*-led Sheik Usmanu Bin Fodio who migrated from a town called Maratta in the present-day Niger to Nigeria. Since then, the Nigeriens (children, young, adults) cross the border immediately after the rainy season into various towns and cities especially in North-Western Nigeria in pursuit of Islamic knowledge. Some of them often return to their home country at the beginning of each rainy season to assists their family cultivate their farmlands while the practice has accorded many Nigeriens the opportunity to settle and established themselves in Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeriens are found across towns and cities across Northern Nigeria doing businesses such as import and exports, Bureau De Change, gold mining, oil & gas, transport among others. They marry and gave birth to children who have attained various positions in the civil service and occupy different political offices in Nigeria` (Interview with a resident of Gurbin Bore town in Gusau, Zamfara State, July 2020).

Understanding trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic is as complex as the frontier. In addition to the dynamics of the border, trafficking of arms is never a straightforward business; as such, it is difficult to understand. It is further compounded by the multiplicity of visible and invisible actors playing different roles in the supply of these arms (Duquet and Goris, 2018, pp.9). No wonder, daily, trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier continues to flourish because it is not only complex but lucrative (Arsovska and Zabyelina 2014, pp.401). Arms trafficking is not only limited to the import, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement, or transfer of firearms but their parts and ammunition from or across the territory of one State party to that of another State party if any one of the States parties concerned does not authorize it in accordance with article 8 of Doha Declaration (UNODC, 2019, pp.9). This is to say, for trans-border arms trafficking to occur, there must be illegal movement of firearms and their components from or across at least two state boundaries. The import and export are related to the unauthorized cross-border movement of not only firearms but their components, parts, and ammunition.

Duquet and Goris (2018) argue that trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier is triggered by demand and supply factors. They explained that in the context of arms trafficking, the higher the demand, the more the supplier (trafficker) tends to dictate the market while the lower the demand for stocks, the

more the demand dictates the market. This suggests that the high demand for trans-border arms is one of the major reasons why Nigeria is designated as a "biggest market" in West Africa. In some instances, trans-border arms suppliers trigger an increase in demand by either initiating a war or fueling dormant conflict between two or more warring factions or groups (UNODC, 2019). Nigeria as a multi-cultural state, with competing ethnic nationalities that always disagree with each other is not only at the risk of manipulation by arms suppliers that may trigger demands for arms but a destination for trans-border arms.

The demand factors for arms trafficking into Nigeria are usually ethnic mistrust that degenerates into violent conflict. This is evident in the high level of crime, weak security institutions to guarantee the safety of lives and properties of citizens, lack of confidence in the security forces, lack of trust between the government and the governed, prevalence of ethno-religious and political violence. Other factors include a high level of human rights violation by the security agencies and limited participation of citizens in the decision-making processes (Saferworld,2012). Similarly, ethnic contest among the rival ethnic nationalities has always created a situation where ethnic nationalities acquire arms to protect themselves from any possible attack from the rival ethnic groups. These factors as mentioned above have continued to undermine national security and increase the demand for trans-border arms that usually come into the country through Nigeria's porous borders. By implication, the more pronounced these factors are, the higher the demand for illicit arms in any country.

The supply factors are prominent because of less-effective arms proliferation control and regulation measures, the porous nature of the Nigerian borders, inadequate digital surveillance facilities, a skilled workforce, difficult terrain, or the combination of all. Others are corruption among the Nigerian border security personnel, ineffective enforcement of firearms regulations evident in the absence of diligent prosecution of arms traffickers by the Nigerian authorities (GriffithsandWilkinson,2007).

Politically, the manipulation of the electoral process by the Nigerian political elites is another supply factor that fuels arms trafficking into Nigeria. Often, politicians

recruit and supply arms and ammunition to youth who serve as their political thugs for intimidating political opponents and manipulating electoral processes in their favor. In Nigeria, winning an election is usually considered a do-or-die affair. Politicians hardly accept electoral defeats and when declared losers, they resort to armed violence to protest the outcome of the elections. Arms, ammunition, and political thugs are regarded as election campaign instruments. Hence, political campaigns are marred by armed-related violence that frequently leads to the deaths and destruction of lives and properties. There is hardly an electoral cycle without armed violence. On several occasions, sources of arms and ammunition confiscated from political thugs are traced to the political elites from across the Nigerian political parties (Adamu, 2018).

From the review of the above literature, it is eminent that there are numerous factors responsible for the porosity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border which enables several trans-border crimes to flourish, including trans-border arms trafficking. By implication, the reasons and explanations are multi-dimensional but can be categorized as demand and supply factors. The demand factors are mostly issues that revolve around challenges of poor leadership and the distrust between the government and the governed as well as unhealthy competition among different Nigeria's ethnic nationalities.

The supply factors are issues revolving around poor management of the borders resulting from the cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities, poor living conditions of the residents of the border communities, lengthy and challenging border terrain, and lack of adequate capacity by the security agencies authorized to manage the borders. As a result of the combination of the above factors, the Nigerian borders and particularly, the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier continues to witness an upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking despite the continued effort of the border security agents.

However, what is eminent in the above literature is that the vast of the existing literature fails to recognize the strategic role of the Nigerian border communities in the management of the borders, particularly trans-border arms trafficking. For instance, Nigeria's exclusion of the residents of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border

communities by the Nigerian authorities in the management of frontier has not been considered as a valid explanation for the porosity of the border and consequently trans-border arms trafficking. This may perhaps explain why Nigerian authorities perceived the Nigerian borders as mere "geographical hard lines" instead of "living spaces" inhabited by Nigerians and Nigeriens. In an interview with a traditional ruler from Mai Adua town, he complained that while the Nigerian authorities exclude the residents of the Nigeria-Niger border communities from the management of trans-border arms, the trans-border arms traffickers recognized and engaged them as essential stakeholders in trans-border arms trafficking (Interview with one of the traditional rulers of Jibia border at Jibia Katsina State, May 2020).

2.11 Liberal versus Realists theoretical perspectives on the border and border security.

Theoretically, there are two dominant theoretical perspectives on the border and bordering. The most dominant perspective is perhaps the realist perspective which view borders as state/physical hardline that separate one state from another while the second perspective is known as a liberal or trans-national perspective which sees border as a living space–a homeland to those who inhabit them (Persson, 2014; Andreas, 2003). On border security, the realist approach emphasizes the use of military power in defense of the territorial hard lines, while the liberal tradition emphasized cooperation and collaboration between states (Paasi, 2009). In other words, the realist perspective on border security is a single factor theory and state agencies-centric that recognize only state security agents as critical stakeholders. On the other hand, the liberal perspective is multiple factors theory that recognized the role of both state security agents and non-state security agents.

2.11.1 Liberal perspective on border security

Generally, liberal scholars examine liberalism from three major perspectives or brands. These are liberal (democratic) peace theory, institutional and commercial liberalism (Amitav, 2007).

Liberal (democratic) peace sees border conflict as the consequence of a lack of democracy. It argues that democracy and peace are compatible concepts and as such democracies do not fight with one another (Stephan, 2014). This implies that

democracies only go to war with non-democratic states to protect their territorial lines from the breach of non-democratic states who are jingoistic, militaristic, and expansionists. Similarly, Lucca argues that the full democratization of the world would eliminate every possibility of border conflict, promote global peace and security (Lucca, 2011).

Liberal Institutionalism advocated for the creation of a supranational authority to manage the interactions of sovereign nation-states to prevent anarchy in the international system. Liberal institutionalism favors a world with less effective physical hardline borders. A world guided by a supranational institution where physical hard-lines are of less relevance. Under this arrangement, the use of military force to settle every form of conflict, including trans-border border conflict, would only be activated as the last option (Keohane & Kingsbury, 1993).

The central argument of commercial liberalism is that the promotion of free trade among nation-states through the creation of a non-tariff regime fosters economic prosperity, development and breaks the unnecessary barriers caused by physical borders. The proponents of the school further argue that international trade creates economic interdependencies and peace between and among trading entities (Chenoweth, 2013). According to this school, the more nation-states embrace economic interdependence in areas where they have a comparative advantage, the idea of trans-border conflict becomes inconceivable.

As mentioned earlier, there are two dominant theoretical perspectives on border security. Unlike the realist perspective, which views borders as mere geographical hard-lines, the transnational view is part of liberal thought tradition especially commercial liberalism which accentuates the inter-dependence of states and mutual interactions and cooperation that flow from it. Thompson (2007) points out that these interactions and states' convergence, especially in the area of international trade, is facilitated by globalization and modern technologies, particularly information and communications technologies which diminish or render the barriers posed by physical borders redundant. The liberals recognize the role of both government and non-governmental actors, such as civil societies, residents of the border communities, and neighboring countries as crucial stakeholders in the management of borders. The liberals argue that, for states to effectively secure their frontiers, they must engage all

stakeholders through a bilateral agreement, cooperation, and collaboration (Paasi, 2009).

David Newman's notion of a "borderless world" offers another liberal narrative on the border and bordering processes. Under this perspective, which, the extant literature on border refers to as trans-national, "the lines which are borders are (considered to be) as flexible as they were once thought to be rigid, reflecting new territorial and aspatial patterns of human behavior" (Newman 2003, p.13). Amplifying this position further, Newman opines that "borders should be seen for their potential to constitute bridges and points of contact, as much as they have traditionally constituted barriers to movement and communication" (Newman 2006, p.143). Borders so conceived underscore the reality of transnationalism (Goldberg 2001) and the often-accompanying trans-border interactions and cooperation, leading to the convergence of domestic governance and external affairs.

Going by Newman's postulation, borders goes beyond mere physical hard lines but must be seen as "living spaces" and bridges. At the same time, effective border management requires the effort of multiple stakeholders, not just the government and its security agencies. Rumford argues that an effective bordering process must consider the role of everybody, including ordinary citizens. This is what he called 'border work' (Rumford, 2008). Schomerus referred to this practice as "multi-Pluralism"- a bordering process that involved multiple government agencies and non-state actors (Schomerus, 2014, pp.21).

2.11.2 Realists perspective on border security

Unlike the liberal tradition that recognizes the role of multiple actors, realism recognized only state security agents not only the sole critical players but the most important actors in effective bordering (Keohane, 1986). Realism detaches national interest from international morality and argues that military power is the ultimate factor that shapes and reshapes the behavior of states in securing their international borders Leaders must, therefore, distance themselves from the practice of international morality that sees human beings as good and effectively secure their territories (Bunne & Schmid, 2002, pp.142).

Realists argue that the international system is anarchical because of the absence of central political authority to control the behavior of sovereign states. At the global level, sovereign states compete with one another for market, economy, security, and extra-territoriality on a zero-sum game base (Solomon & Ferdinand, 2009). In these international competitions, no state wants to go home with nothing. This kind of competition usually creates a clash of interests between states that degenerates into an interstate conflict. The theory submits that states must organize their domestic powers to accumulate powers, which Morgenthau defines as the man's control over the minds and actions of others (Morgenthau, 1948, pp.26). Power from the international dimension manifests through the use of threats by states to secure their international borders. It is concerned with irrespective of right or wrong, legal or illegal, moral or immoral, the most powerful country achieved its desires, and others accept what they must accept (Solomon & Ferdinand, 2009, pp.60). In this suspicious context, it is unlikely for states to cooperate when it comes to the defense of their territorial lines (Robert, 1993). According to realists, in the absence of political authority, states resort to self-help by either increasing their power or forming an alliance to balance the power of others to protect their boundaries.

Having discussed and analyzed the theoretical assumptions of the liberals' and realist's perspectives on border security, it would be safe to discuss and examine the efficiency and deficiency of surveillance bordering strategy used by the Nigerian government in securing its bounders against trans-border arms trafficking. As mentioned earlier, Nigeria implements surveillance strategy mainly through analog surveillance that entails the regular border patrol to secure its borders which is under the purview of realist perspective on bordering. But before going into the analyses of whether the Nigerian surveillance strategy has been efficient or otherwise in securing the Nigerian borders against trans-border arms trafficking, we need to understand surveillance as a border management strategy.

2.12 Surveillance as a border management strategy

According to Lyon (2003), if there is any possibility of a borderless world, the 9/11 2001 attack in the US has dashed such hopes. This is because, after the attack, states became more conscious of their border security. Digital surveillance became one of the most popular concepts, particularly in border studies. The broadest meaning of

surveillance is "to watch over". But watch over what? Often, sociologically it connotes watching over personal details of people in the form of digital data to manage and control individuals and groups for security purposes (Lyon, 2003, p.16). Lyon's definition suggests that the primary purpose of surveillance is to watch the movement of people and their goods within a particular geographical territory or while crossing borders to prevent them from committing crimes.

Surveillance could be analog/physical or digital. However, global trends in surveillance have shifted from analog to digital surveillance. Unlike analog surveillance where security agents physically monitor the movement of people and their baggage within a particular state or while crossing international borders, digital surveillance technology enables the security agents to deploy digital surveillance facilities, such as video cameras, drones, night vision glasses, and scanners to scrutinize people and their luggage for security purposes (Lyon, 2005). Surveillance has been used by developed and undeveloped countries, including the United States and the United Kingdom in the management of their borders. However, the big question is whether surveillance is sufficient enough to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border from the menace of trans-border arms trafficking. To answer this question, we need to understand and analyze the conditions that enable surveillance to function effectively as a border management strategy.

Scholars on border security studies have provided grounded theoretical analysis on surveillance drawing from different empirical case studies to support their arguments (Elia and Mark, 2005, p. 2). As legal or illegal migrants, we cross other territories for one reason or another, while crossing these territories, we notice the manifestations of analog surveillance in the area of border patrol and background checks of individuals, on the other hand, digital surveillance is noticeable in areas such as biometric identification, scanners, and video cameras (Marx, 2005).

In one of my interviews, an officer from the Nigeria Immigration Service headquarters in Abuja summarized the purpose of the Nigeria border surveillance as to watch the inflow of people and goods, to prevent both the legal and illegal migrants from committing crimes, and neutralize every form of threat to the local population that may likely come into the country from the neighboring states and

beyond (Interview with a senior officer of the Nigeria Immigration Service, Abuja, December 2020). This suggests borders are lifelines of the state's security and survival and thus, effective surveillance of territorial lines is invariably policing the local population (Zureik and Salter, 2005, p.9). Seniora and Poitevin (2010) see surveillance as a bordering strategy that entails the deployment of surveillance facilities, such as video cameras, scanners, and other surveillance gadgets as well as physical border patrol by the security agents to monitor border crossing. It involves checking individual documents and goods by border security agents at various border posts to prevent trans-border crimes such as smuggling of contrabands and illegal border crossings. Depending on the country's bordering policy, surveillance defines the rules for allowing individuals to cross borderlines on the grounds of visitation of physical places (tourism), business interest, natural disasters (refugees, migrants, asylum seekers), and available opportunities, such as jobs and education.

Borders are never static. They change as a result of dynamics in cultural values, social organization, economic viability, and technological advancement of states. Therefore, depending on the viewpoint and analytical circumstances, surveillance as a bordering strategy can secure or undermine national security (Marx, 2005, p.13). This submission by Marx suggests that surveillance, like every other bordering strategy, has its strengths and weaknesses. In other words, the efficiency of surveillance is determined by ecological factors which imply that surveillance is a product of its environment.

The major challenge of surveillance as a bordering strategy is that the border condition (loose/tight) reflects the geographical, technological, military, economic, and cultural advancement of a state. In other words, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of surveillance is determined by the state's capacity in terms of its military, economic, technological, and quality of its basic political institutions (Anderson 1996, p.1). Similarly, Salter (2005) suggests that, even though symbolically, borders primarily function to demarcate the country's boundaries, the effectiveness of the surveillance depends on some internal and external force(s) (Salter, 2005, p.48). In more concrete terms, it implies that the effectiveness of surveillance in a country, such as the United States or France is likely to differ significantly compared to countries like Nigeria and the Niger Republic. This implies that depending on the border condition and development of a state, surveillance

produces different results in different environments. The section below describes the pre-conditions for effective surveillance and then embeds this approach into the Nigeria-Niger border.

The technological capacity of states in terms of the availability of citizen's biometrics data is crucial to the success of surveillance strategy. Marx (2005) identified citizen's biometric identification as a significant component of surveillance. Citizens' biometric data defines an individual's nationality at both entry points and within the territoriality of a state. In other words, the absence of a comprehensive citizen's biometric database obstructs effective border surveillance. It makes it difficult for border security agents to distinguish individuals crossing the border by their citizenship and residency status. Furthermore, the lack of citizen's biometric data makes it difficult for border security agents to trace the genuine identity and travel history of both returning citizens and visitors. Travel history helps the border security agents to track the records of people and understand the purpose for which such persons are crossing the borders.

Echoing this argument (Lyon, 2005, p.66) argues that. national identification cards, just like the citizen's biometrics database, are also crucial for effective surveillance. National identity cards mainly function to distinguished citizens and non-citizens or those who belong and those who do not belong to a state. National identity cards assist policymakers in distinguishing between those who are supposed to enjoy full citizenship rights, benefits, opportunities, and privileges from those that do not, as well as reduce the fraud among citizens and residents. This could only be achieved through strong institutions, free from pervasive corruption. Anderson (1996) argues that the quality of state political institutions that are constitutionally saddled with the responsibility of issuing such documents is a major determinant of the effectiveness of surveillance. However, developing countries most often have some of the weakest and corrupt political and administrative institutions. For instance, the 2019 transparency international corruption index ranked Nigeria 146 out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2019). Corruption has weakened Nigeria's capacity to create a national database, enroll its citizens, and issue them national Identity Cards. According to a security consultant on Nigerian borders in April 2019 in Abuja, in Nigeria, non-citizens are likely to acquire Nigeria's identity cards faster than

Nigerians so long as they are willing to bribe officials (Interview with one of the security consultants in Abuja, July 2020).

After the 9/11 attack in the US, the use of digital border surveillance technology in the bordering process gained momentum not only in America or the European States but many African countries deployed e-border technology to improve border security. However, applying technological innovations in the bordering process could only happen on the borders where there is the requisite infrastructure, technology, skilled workforce, and a functional comprehensive citizen's database. The presence of adequate technological surveillance facilities in addition to citizen's biometric data and identification cards does not only ease the surveillance but, at times, replaces traditional patrolling methods and complements the inadequate workforce within the state's border security architecture.

At present, regular patrol methods which entail the cooperation and sharing of intelligence between border security agencies, such as the Nigeria Armed Forces, Police, Customs, and Immigration among others, has been the dominants approach used in regulating the inflow of people and goods into the country from the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. To protect Nigeria's national interest, particularly, border security, Nigeria draws border personnel from the various security agencies to constitute a national joint-security-taskforce on border patrol (Ochefu and Kpogul, 2010). This suggests that regular border patrol is conducted on Nigeria-Niger borders at either national or international levels. At the national level, joint national patrol (JNP) made up of Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, and Military Intelligence, Police and National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency among others is constituted to patrol the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderlines. While at the international level, joint patrol teams (JPT) between the Nigeria and Niger Republic border security agencies are constituted to gather and share intelligence to secure the borderlines. In this context, adequate surveillance technology can improve regular patrol methods because fewer border security personnel will be deployed to monitor scanners, video cameras, drones, and other gadgets that record every movement through formal and informal entry posts. In many borders across the globe, digital surveillance technology has replaced analog border patrol. In an interview with Nigeria-Niger border Police at Jibia border post, the officer vests hope in such technology by believed it would lead to the rationalization of the border security

workforce, save the cost of securing the border, and effectively police difficult terrains that are inaccessible by patrol vehicles.

Another important factor related to technology is the economic viability of states. Acquisition and maintenance of border surveillance technology are quite expensive, particularly for poor states with vast and porous borders. Geographically, states differ in terms of economy, population, and landmass. Some states are economically viable with simple geographical terrain which makes border surveillance a more straightforward task; others are poor, with vast landmass, population, and challenging border terrain which makes surveillance cumbersome. For instance, a developing country as Nigeria has to deploy relatively more resources to secure its 923,768 sq. km. In contrast, Germany, an industrial powerhouse, has a total of 357,021 square sq. km to secure (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).In the most recent attempt to improve the technology of border surveillance, the Federal Government of Nigeria in April 2019, approved the sum of N52 billion (approx. $148.6 million) for an e-border project to install surveillance facilities (video cameras and scanners) on Nigeria's porous land borders to address surveillance deficiency (Nigerian Tribune, Nigeria,May 10, 2019).

This day, (2019). Although the program is yet to commence, its success or failure will depend on the availability of the basic requirements for the implementation and maintenance of these facilities, including funds, technology, and a skilled border security workforce, which are lacking at the moment. For border surveillance to be effective, it requires a functional and comprehensive citizen's database, complemented by the national ID cards and biometrical records. It also needs adequate technology, facilities, professional staffing, and maintenance.

2.13 The surveillance and the resilience of trans-border arms trafficking on Nigeria-Niger border.

Section 2 (1) of Nigeria's 1999 Constitution as amended states that Nigeria is a Federation of 36 states, 774 local government areas with Abuja as the Federal Capital Territory. Constitutionally, the power is divided between the federal, state, and local governments. Under the current Nigerian Constitution (1999 as amended), the management of the border is under the exclusive legislative list. Hence, only the

federal government has the power to design and implement border management policies on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier (Constitution, 1999, 2, (1) (2) (3)).

In an attempt to secure the Nigerian borders against trans-border arms trafficking, the federal government of Nigeria adopts surveillance as a bordering strategy for over six decades. The emphasis is to patrol and secure the physical beacons demarcating the country's border with neighboring Cameroun, Chad, Benin, and the Republic of Niger. The main aim is to neutralize trans-border security threats that may come into the country from the neighboring country's porous borders. In a more descriptively manner, the focuses on the use of police border guards and other agencies of government to carry out surveillance along the borders and collect the biometric data of persons crossing the border (Rozemarijin, 2013). On daily basis, individuals and commodities crossing the border are checked at numerous border stations by the border patrol teams to deter illicit border crossings and smuggling.

In the context of this study, surveillance is conceptualized as watching and collecting information on persons crossing the Nigeria-Niger border to prevent them from committing trans-national crimes. This strategy revolves around physical border patrol by the border security personnel and the deployment of technological surveillance facilities such as video cameras, scanners among others to collect biometric data of individuals crossing the border at the various entry point. The border security personnel are usually chosen from multiple security agencies to form joint border security patrol teams (Ochefu & Kpogul 2010). The Nigeria Customs Service, Immigration Service, Military Intelligence, Police, and National Drugs Law Enforcement Agencies, among others, have formed a joint national patrol (JNP) to monitor border crossings, smuggling, and other forms of crimes. At the bilateral level, international joint patrol teams (JPT) comprising Nigeria and Niger Republic border security agencies collect and share intelligence to protect the borders from illegal immigration and various form of trafficking along the border.

While studies have discovered that border surveillance is key to achieving effective border management (Cole, 2003; Rozejemarijin, 2013), the Nigeria-Nigeria border continues to witness an upsurge in various forms of trans-border crimes. For instance, despite intensive surveillance and the continuous efforts of various border security agencies, the borders are still porous, allowing for all sorts of crimes,

including illegal immigration and trans-border arms trafficking (Rufa'I, 2008). Ironically, as of 2018, the number of illicit small arms and ammunition circulating in Nigeria is more than the country's population. For instance, while Nigeria has approximately 200 million people, it hosts 350 of the 500 million illicit small arms and ammunition circulating in the West Africansub-region (The Guardian, Nigeria, 2018).Since Nigeria does not manufacture arms, it sounds logical to conclude that these weapons are brought into Nigerian territory by trans-border arms traffickers through the porous borders. Similarly, the Nigeria-South Africa Chamber of Commerce (2016) reports that Nigeria is housing 70% of West Africa's estimated 8 million illicit weapons. Most of these weapons are transported into Nigerian territory by arms traffickers through porous borders.The above reports are clear indications that surveillance is highly deficient in combating trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigerian borders.

This study is a departure from the above conventional explanations of why trans-border arms trafficking persist. It argues that the surveillance approach is deficient in managing trans-border arms trafficking primarily because the residents of the Nigeria-Niger Republic borders are excluded from the management of the border by the Nigerian authorities. This exclusion and lack of recognition of the role of the border communities laid the foundation of the information asymmetry in which the trans-border arms traffickers recruited residents of the border communities to supply information to them on numerous illegal border crossings for cash incentives. This information enables the traffickers to cross the border safely and supply arms to their buyers. Denying border security information on traffickers has not only made it difficult for the Nigerian border security agents to intercept trans-border arms coming into Nigeria through the porous borders but made Nigeria vulnerable to armed violence. This shows the imperative of interrogating why surveillance has been deficient, and which alternative model can rescue Nigeria from the upsurge of trans-border arms trafficking.

Field investigation has shown that one of the reasons why the surveillance approach failed to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border from the upsurge of trans-border arms trafficking in Nigeria over-rely on analog surveillance and has not fully incorporated the digital surveillance technology. Surveillance facilities such as scanners and cameras are only available in a few of the major formal border posts,

while the illegal routes numbering over 1400 are most often left unpoliced. This practice has left a chunk of the border spaces at the mercy of illegal immigrants and trans-border arms traffickers. (Interview with a senior Nigeria military officer from the Department of military intelligence, Gusau, Zamfara State, 16 August 2021).

Distressed by the growing inefficiency of the surveillance strategy and threat of smuggling and trans-border arms trafficking, the federal government of Nigeria in April 2019, approved the sum of N52 billion ($148, 571, 428, 57) for an e-border project to install surveillance facilities (cameras and scanners) on the borders to address the technological deficiency of the approach (Thisday, 2019). Although the implementation of the program has not yet begun, its success or failure will be determined by the availability of the requisite infrastructures and human resources (skilled personnel, energy, roads, among others) required to install and maintain the facilities. At present, the lack of these key amenities in the border areas where these facilities are to be built has already spelled the program failure.

Furthermore, the exclusion of the residents of the border in the management of trans-border arms was compounded by the inability of the Nigerian authorities to explore an alternative community-oriented border policing (COBP) approach that is compatible with the dynamics and peculiarities of the Nigerian borders. Over the past six decades, Nigeria relies on a border security agents-oriented policing (BSAOP) approach to secure its frontiers against trans-border arms trafficking. BSAOP approach has not only to exclude the residents of the border in the management of trans-border arms but denies them of any significant role. For over three decades, many advanced states including the US have embraced community-oriented policing (COP) because it has proven to be an effective mechanism in the control of social problems including drug abuse and trans-border crimes (Zhao & Thurman, 1997; Maguire, 1997; Zhao, 1996). In States such as Texas, Virginia, New York, Maryland, Oregon, and California in the US, community-oriented policing has been institutionalized as a proactive crime control mechanism and is fast becoming the popular policing practice in the US (Oliver, 2000; Worrall & Zhao, 2003).

The main aim of the COBP approach is to strengthen effective border policing and promote cooperation and cordial relations between the border security agent and

residents of the border communities. Effective management of trans-border arms requires the incorporation of both formal and neighborhood-based agents such as the residents of the border either as informants or whistleblowers (Hawdon, Ryan, & Griffin, 2003). In the context of the Nigeria-Nigeria Republic border security governance, this study argues that the community-oriented border policing (COBP) approach anchored on whistleblowing has the potentials to drastically reduced the influx of trans-border arms through the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.

The theoretical discussion on the bordering process below will show that the surveillance approach suffers not only from the challenging border conditions but also from information asymmetry between three key stakeholders. Border community residents provide adequate information to trans-border arms traffickers on how to cross the border and deny such critical information to the border security agents. This lack of information has not only made it difficult for the Nigerian border security agents to intercept arms coming into Nigeria through the borders but made Nigeria vulnerable to widespread armed violence.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.0 Introduction

The theoretical strength of International Relations theories lies in their ability to compete with each other to explain reality by reducing and simplifying complex social phenomena in such a way that they can be understood better (Amitav, 2007). In social sciences, theories are neither true nor false and tentative not permanent. A theory for a researcher is like a compass that helps a ship captain navigate to his destination safely. This implies that the key objective of International Relations and other Social Science theories is to satisfactorily guide our systematic explanation of individuals, groups, and states behavior amid growing complexities in the international system (Endre, 2011). This thesis explores a variety of theories from International Relations and other sister academic disciplines and finally adopted the theory of information asymmetry from economics literature to guide this research. The chapter also made a theoretical exploration of realism, liberalism and constructivism on Nigeria-Nigeria Republic border security governance. Specifically, theoretical postulations of realism and liberalism on best to secure borders were x-rayed to uncover their strength and weaknesses in securing the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier against trans-border arms trafficking.

3.1 Liberalism versus Realism: a general discourse.

The ability of theories in international relations to compete with one another and explain reality by simplifying complicated social phenomena is their theoretical strength (Amitav, 2007). Realism and Liberalism are perhaps the most dominant approaches in International Relations and border security. However, over the years, the Nigerian government adopted realist tradition as a bordering strategy to secure

the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking. This section intends to explore the theoretical strengths of both theories by x-raying their underlying assumptions and the relate them Nigeria-Niger Republic border security to discover their strength and efficiency in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the frontier. The discussion starts with a general discourse on the theories.

Liberalism: Is the dominant philosophy of Western culture in many respects. It may be argued that it is not simply an ideology, but the ideology of the entire human race, a fundamental truth that is not culturally particular to the West, but has universal significance (Harrison & Boyd, 2018). With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the adoption of features of liberal capitalism in the majority of countries, some liberals felt compelled to declare that liberalism and liberal principles were now the only way for humanity to progress. Liberalism now appears to be the universal ideology, with its premises universally accepted - at least in the Western world. Liberalism began in the seventeenth century, grew in the eighteenth, and bloomed in the nineteenth century with the emergence of "classical liberalism." Liberal beliefs had undergone significant revision by the early twentieth century to an extent that new liberalism had arisen (Harrison & Boyd, 2018).

Academically, between the 1900s and 1930s, liberalism was the early approach that dominated the study of International Relations, even though the outbreak of World War II posed a severe theoretical challenge to the paradigm. Liberalism regards the State as a principal actor even though it exists alongside other multiple actors in the international system (Luard, 1992; Haggard, 2014). The liberals assume that national self-determination across the European states would eliminate one of the contending sources of conflict because it would grant statehood to each state. Secondly, they argue that war is a product of secret diplomacy and agreement between nation-states and emphasized the need to end secret diplomacy and enhanced citizen's participation in the state's foreign policy. Lastly, the balance of power must give room for a collective security system that would enhance peace by reducing military hostilities (Maghoori, 2002). The liberal scholars examine liberalism from three major brands: liberal (democratic) peace, institutional and commercial liberalism (Amitav, 2007).

Liberal democratic peace sees war as the consequence of a lack of democracy. It argues that democracy and peace are compatible concepts and as such democracies do not fight with one another (Stephan, 2014). This implies that democracies only go to war with non-democratic states to protect their sovereign interest from the tyranny of non-democratic states who are jingoistic, militaristic, and expansionists. By extension, Baliga, Lucca, & Sjöström, (2011) argues that the full democratization of the world would eliminate every possibility of war, promote world peace and security. Hence the need for democratic leaders to ensure the spread of democracy to non-democratic states across the globe.

Liberal Institutionalism advocated for the creation of a supranational authority to manage the interactions of sovereign nation-states to prevent anarchy in the international system. One of the proponents of this school and former President of the United States of America Woodrow Wilson advocated for the creation of an international institution that would regulate the behavior of states to preserve international peace and security. In line with this thought, the League of Nations was formed to usher international peace and security and deter sovereign nation-states from unnecessary military aggression. Under this arrangement, the use of force would only be activated as the last option to ensure compliance with the international rules (Keohane,1984).

Commercial liberalism is centered on the promotion of free trade through the creation of a non-tariff regime to promote economic prosperity. It argues that international trade creates economic interdependencies and peace among nation-states (Chenoweth, 2013). Commercial liberalism argues that as the nation-states embrace economic interdependence in areas where they have a comparative advantage, war becomes inconceivable.

Generally, the liberal school embraced the following basic principles:

- That human nature is not only inherently good, but it allows for cooperation and collaboration with others.
- Human beings' fundamental concern for others makes human progress possible.
- Evil people are not the product of their behavior but the creation of structural imbalance arrangements.

- That war can be reduced through the elimination of institutions that makes individuals act selfishly.
- Multi-lateral efforts by states are required to solve international war as against national effort.

In a nutshell, liberal theory de-emphasizes war and military power but emphasized cooperation, collaboration, international institutions, and law as the main instruments through which international peace and security can be attained.

Realism as a theory of International Relations is frequently conceived as a critique of liberalism. Unlike the liberal tradition that recognizes multiple actors, realism recognized the state as the sole and principal actor in the international system (Keohane, 1986, p. 164). Realism detached national interest from international morality and argued that power is the ultimate factor that shapes and reshapes the behavior of states in the international system. Leaders must, therefore, distance themselves from the practice of international morality that sees human beings as good (Bunne & Schmid, 2002, p.142). Some of the leading scholars in this school include Morgenthau, Carr, Kissinger, and Thompson. Realism argues that the international system is anarchical in the absence of central political authority to control the behavior of sovereign states. Sovereign states compete with one another for the market, economy, security, and extra-territoriality on zero-sum game bases. In these competitions, no state wants to go home with nothing, and this usually creates a clash of interest that degenerates into a conflict that is rooted in human nature. States must organize their domestic powers to accumulate international powers which Morgenthau defines as the man's control over the minds and actions of others (Morgenthau, 1948, p.26). Power from the international dimension manifests through the use of threat or force in the conduct of international relations. It is concerned with irrespective of right or wrong, legal or illegal, moral or immoral, the most powerful country achieved its desires, and others accept what they must accept (Solomon & Ferdinand, 2009, p.60). In this suspicious context, it is unlikely for states to cooperate when it comes to their defense and national security (Robert, 1983). In the absence of political authority, states resort to self-self by either increasing their power or forming an alliance to balance the power of others, this creates what the realists called "security dilemma".

Drawing from the assumptions of the realists, the following deductions can be made:

- Man is, by nature, a wicked, greedy, and sinful creature.
- As such, it is a utopian aspiration to eradicate the instinct of power from a man.
- The state's primary objective is survival through the acquisition of power to promote national interest.
- The chaotic nature of the international system necessitates the states to increase their military capacity to protect themselves from potentials enemies.
- Maximization of power by all states results in the balance of power and alliance system.

The next section focuses on the theoretical exploration of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border and border security governance. It also digests whether the theoretical perspective Nigeria adopts in managing trans-border arms border trafficking is sufficient in containing trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border and if it is deficient, the section also explores an alternative to the existing theoretical approach, to sufficiently secure the border from trans-border arms trafficking.

3.2 A theoretical exploration of the border and border security: Realists and Liberal perspectives on Nigeria-Niger Republic border and bordering

From the preceding theoretical exposition of the liberal and realists' theories of border security, we can deduce that there is neither a universal definition of border nor a universal theory on border security. However, the literature on border security can be categorized mainly into liberalism and realism, and therefore, the section below limits its discussion on the theoretical exploration of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border from the realist and liberal perspectives on border security. The idea is to explore which of the theoretical perspective on border security could effectively and efficiently secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier from the menace of trans-border arms trafficking. This could be done by exploring the conditions and dynamics of the border and relate them to the theoretical postulations of both realists and liberal perspectives on border security. By so doing, we could have a better perspective on whether Nigeria requires realists or liberal bordering strategies or a

combination of both to effectively control trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.

3.3.1 The Realists, Liberals and Constructivist perception of Nigeria-Niger border cooperation and security

From a broader perspective, realism argues that states operate in an anarchic international system in which they are ultimately reliant on their capacities, or power, to pursue their national interests. The survival of the state, including its people, political system, and geographical integrity, is the most crucial national interest. Realists are also concerned about the preservation of a country's culture and economy. Realists argue that national interests will continue to dominate international politics as long as the world is divided into nation-states in an anarchic environment. Therefore, corporate existence is the primary goal of every state (Bell, 2021). Thus, the realist perspective view borders as a state's lifelines for survival while military power is the ultimate in protecting the territorial sovereignty states. This suggests that Nigeria and other countries must deploy all their military arsenals to defend their territorial lines from any foreign threat.

The Realist perspective, which is perhaps the most dominant notion, views borders as mere territorial hard-lines separating a nation-state from others (Andreas, 2008). Such hard lines, according to Andreas, are "strategic" to the state's claim to sovereignty; thus, borders have to be militarily "defended" to deter incursions by other states or even "breached" to acquire more territories and powers. The realist emphasizes territorial security and conceives border relations as inter-state phenomena in which each of the contiguous states desires and attempts to dominate others for its advantage or even the detriment of the security and survival of others (Andreas 2003). Similarly, Agnew (2008, pp.175) submits that "borders are artifacts of dominant discursive processes that have led to the fencing off of chunks of territory and people from one another". Agnew further argues that "borders matter not only because they have real effects, but also because they trap thinking about and acting in the world in territorial terms" (p.175).

According to the proponents of realism, physical barriers provide validity to laws and policies of the government that are geared towards creating a physical demarcation for would-be crossers and offenders to prevent them from committing crimes. Because of their propensity to obstruct movement, physical barriers such as walls along the Southwest US border are meant to dissuade illegal immigrants (Craig, Mark, David & Bill,2019). Additionally, they serve as a legal proclamation and due diligence specifying the standard or expectation as an expanded basis to enforce entry and exit laws or disciplinary actions, similar to traffic and trespassing.

The proponent of the border as a physical barrier argue that the concept of barriers is everywhere and common. They submit that immigration has been the bedrock of America and the American ideal for almost 400 years. The US conviction in immigration is primarily responsible for the diversity, prosperity, and democracy that characterize America. The United States has been the top destination for foreign migrants since at least 1960, with one-fifth of the world's migrants living in the US as of 2017. Despite its long history as a nation of immigrants, the United States uses a physical barrier such as fences and military bases as a border security technique to deter crimes (Atwood, 2013).

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an increased urge to build and fortify border structures all over the world. Realists think that when a state's sovereignty is threatened, it must protect itself by enforcing its borders. This suggests that the United States is not the only country with fences and electric walls, drones, and armed border guards as physical barriers. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the world had gone from seven countries with physical borders during WWII to fifteen countries. As of 2019, physical barriers are currently used by 77 nations throughout the world as a bordering strategy to maintain border security, prevent large-scale migration, and prevent terrorism (Hielmgaard, 2019). However, walls alone will not dissuade illegal immigration and other forms of trans-border crimes same way a closed and secured door or window will prevent crime such as burglary. Notwithstanding, just like the threat of punishment is enough to encourage law-abiding behavior, fencing or a wall has been proven to be a significant enforcement item for detection and identification of illegal entry, especially in metropolitan settings (Blas& Michael 2007). The desire by the former US President, Donald

Trump's decision to build the US-Mexico border wall is informed by his realist predisposition (Jessica,(2021).

According to the realists, from Europe, America, Asia to Africa, states have at one point or the other been entangled in border-related conflicts either in an attempt to defend or expand their territorial boundaries. On many occasions, states have gone to war in an attempt to invade other territories or stop the invasion of their territory by others. In Africa like other parts of the world, most inter-state conflicts are said to emanate from "the deep structure of unsettled and potentially explosive conditions of inherited boundaries of African states…often widely referred to in the literature as 'artificial boundaries" (Bassey 2010, p.xx). In other words, most, if not all, national borders in Africa are colonial creations. Of course, Nigerian borders are not an exception. The making of state borders in Africa dates back to the 1884/85 Berlin Conference in which Africa was partitioned among European colonial powers (Umozurike, 1979).

The arbitrary manner in which the border lines were drawn coupled with the fact that different colonial powers controlled them, has been a source of dispute among post-colonial independent states. This is why functional disputes sometimes arise from stringent militaristic controls at African borders. Although such disputes rarely constitute enough barriers to the informal movement of persons and goods, attempts to control African post-colonial borders militarily by restricting the movement of people across borders have often attracted local resistance (Rivkin 1963, p.10). Sometimes the unhindered informal movement of persons and goods which is a hallmark of good neighborliness does result in cross-border insecurity, leading to the challenge of whether to choose good neighborliness over national security or vice versa (Adetula, 2010). To be sure, "from the moment [borders] are established, there are always groups who have an interest in finding ways to move beyond the barrier. They may be seeking jobs, visiting family and friends from whom they have been cut off, smuggling goods, drugs or weapons" (Newman 2003, p.14). Therefore, states must deploy their military capability and design military strategies to secure their borders from the activities of criminal elements.

On the other hand, the liberal tradition emerged as a critique of the realists' perspective. From this perspective, the Nigeria-Niger Republic border is not just a

barrier but a bridge that connects Nigerians and Nigeriens. As such, the border is not rigid but a flexible artifact and trans-national (Newman, 2003). It is, therefore, impracticable to use military force to secure borders whose residents are connected by similarity in identity or group membership. Again, inhabitants of the border communities, who in some cases share cultural similarities are usually apprehensive of any attempt to regulate their movements in and out of either side of the frontier by border guards, thus, they try to circumvent border security protocols. Take for instance, in the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderland which is inhabited mainly by the Hausa tribes, in which "feeling more Nigerian, or Nigerien does not result in the diminution of their "Hausa-ness"; thus the borderline makes little or no difference to them (Miles, 2005, p.297). Therefore, any attempt to militarily restrict their free movement in and out of the border is usually seen as an encroachment on their homeland and an attempt to divide them. In his seminal work titled "Bounded Spaces in a 'Borderless World': Border Studies, Power and the Anatomy of Territory" Paasi (2009) provides yet another nuanced and stimulating perspective on the manifestation of the border and bordering processes. For Paasi, "space and power are related today in asymmetric and rather unpredictable ways" (p.216). Therefore, "a border study concentrating on borders themselves inevitably misses something, since – if we understand them as social practices and discourses that are impregnated with power and ordering – borders 'are spread' all over societies, not merely confined to the border areas" (Paasi 2009, p.224).

3.3.2 Realism and the effective management of Nigeria-Niger frontier: myth or reality?

Like most countries in West Africa, Nigeria-Niger Republic border control against trans-border arms trafficking is mainly militaristic, which is under the purview of realism. Realists' approach entails the use of fences/walls, drones, and armed military and para-military personnel to prevent illegal entry of persons and contrabands. However, the recent upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier has led to the closure and further militarization of border control, resulting in the establishment of a military base on both sides of the border (Miles, 2005, pp.297). However, despite the militarization of border security, there have been reports of the absence of security personnel in many of the illegal routes, making these unpoliced routes prone to different kinds of trans-border illegalities

(Okunade 2017). Illegal immigration and trans-border arms trafficking are mostly untracked because the frontiers are too porous to be manned physically by the security agencies as a result of their limited number, equipment, and capacity (Achumba, Ighomereho& Akpan-Robaro, 2013**).**

Despite the continuous militarization of the border, the frontier continues to witness an unprecedented increase in trans-border crimes, including arms trafficking. The inefficiency of the militaristic approach in securing the border against trans-border arms trafficking, illegal immigration, and other cross-border crimes has led to the total closure of Nigeria's land borders from August 2019 to December 2020.

As part of efforts to strengthen realism and secure its borders from the realist perspective, Nigeria partially closed its land borders with Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger in August 2019. The partial closure banned every kind of import to Nigeria and Export to neighboring countries. According to the Nigerian officials, the goal was to stop the smuggling of goods, notably rice and arms, and ammunition. However, despite the closure, the phenomenon has continued, raising questions about the measure's effectiveness and the real reasons for the decision (Sampson & Michaël 2021).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) meeting of finance and trade ministers in February 2020, which brought together Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, failed to settle the matter. Also, in January 2020, a bilateral meeting between Ghana and Nigeria on the fringes of the UK-Africa Investment Summit failed to sway Nigeria's position. In addition, Benin and Nigeria's leaders met in Abuja in January 2021 to discuss the problem at a higher level, but Nigeria's stance remained unchanged. The Nigerian Customs Service Comptroller-General, Hameed Ali, said in October, 2020 that "import and export of all commodities remained forbidden through our land borders, for the time being, to ensure that Nigeria has ultimate control over what enter Nigeria" (This Day, Nigeria, October 27, 2020). He added that reopening the border is largely dependent on neighboring countries' ability to comply with trans-border trade rules. This was the first indication that the border will continue to be closed indefinitely.

Nigeria's neighbors' persistent demands, especially Niger and the Benin Republic made Nigeria reconsider its actions on the border. Consequently, a tripartite joint committee made up of Nigeria, Niger, and Benin was set up to find measures to ease the deadlock along the borders while Mohammed Bazoum, the former Niger's minister of interior, and AurelienAgbenonci, Benin's minister of international affairs and cooperation pledged their support for any accords reached during the summit.

The meeting took place at the ECOWAS headquarters in Abuja where the Nigerian Foreign Minister explained that the committee was formed to address the shortcomings and lack of execution of the numerous agreements and memorandums of understanding signed by the three nations to combat trans-border crime. During the meeting, Nigeria's Foreign Affairs Minister noted that even after the ban on importation of foreign rice via land borders in 2016, foreign rice was and is still readily available in the Nigerian market. Noting that Nigeria is particularly concerned about the volume of arms and ammunition rice and other agricultural products that are substantially hampering local production and the country's quest for food security. The committee's mandate was to adopt measures that will facilitate and enhance the suppression of rice and arms smuggling along the common borders of the three countries, prepare and put into force the necessary bilateral agreements to combat smuggling along the common borders of the three countries and to consider mechanisms that will facilitate and enhance the suppression of rice smuggling and other prohibited items along the common borders of the three countries (*Salome, 2019).*

Furthermore, *a tripartite Anti-Smuggling Joint Border Patrol Team was established to pursue the escort and handover of goods in transit from one custom to another with vigor. The team will also implement anti-smuggling sensitization and awareness programs/measures among the three nations' populations and share data and intelligence on the movement of commodities, services, and people along the three countries' borders.* Subsequently, after series of meetings, dialogue, and negotiations, Nigeria declared a partial reopening of its land borders on December 16, 2020, although only light cars and people have been allowed to cross the borders of countries (*Salome, 2019).*

It's important to note that the closing and reopening of the borders comes with lots of consequences not just on neighboring countries, but the Nigerian government and its citizens. For instance, despite the partial closure of the border by the Nigerian government, available records have shown that within the first three months of the border closure, smuggled goods such as petroleum, rice, and arms worth (approx. $6.5 billion) were intercepted by the military within the first three months of the border drill. In addition, within the same period, 203 illegal immigrants and eight trans-border arms traffickers were arrested by the security personnel (Wahab, 2019).

Theofficials from Nigeria's Department of Commerce remarked that the shutdown had most likely resulted in the discovery of new smuggling routes along Nigeria's porous borders (Sampson& Michaël, 2021). Smuggling along the border region is fueled by differences in fiscal policies, commodity prices, product preferences, and demand factors. For instance, in comparison to Benin and Togo, some products such as rice, oil, and pasta are overtaxed in Nigeria. These items are smuggled into Nigeria for sale after being imported into Benin and Togo at a cheaper tax rate. For instance, after the border closure, Punch reports that the price of local rice(50kg) in major Lagos markets had risen from N16,000 ($44) to at least N22,500($62) (Sampson& Michaël, 2021). Nigerians also patronized specific things from the Benin Republic such as Dutch wax-branded fabrics and used vehicles, because they are cheaper. In addition, customs clearance procedures in Benin are less onerous and time-consuming than in Nigeria. Hence, some scholars argued that instead of closing borders, Nigeria should have invested in improved border security and monitoring, as well as the development and upliftment of border communities that rely on smuggling for a living. To do so, Nigeria must agree to invest in rural development, improve border security and intelligence sharing, combat corruption among border officials, and reverse the economic policies that encourage smuggling (Sampson& Michaël, 2021). These suggest that the political economy of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border posed a serious challenge to the realist bordering strategy along the border.

Part of the challenge against Nigeria's realist approach is the fact that Nigeria has a total land border of 4,047 km out of which it shares approximately I500 km land borders with the Niger Republic (Hoffmann & Melly 2015, pp.VII). Along with the

border are 86 border posts and over 1,400 illegal routes used for arms and drugs trafficking and illegal immigration (Dambazzau as cited in Business Day, 2019). Securing these borders and the enormous illegal routes have proven to be practically impossible for the Nigerian security agents because of its limited capability in terms of personnel, expertise, and equipment. The Nigeria Customs and Immigration Service, which has the constitutional authority to police the borders, have complained about multiple occasions about a lack of adequate manpower, patrol vehicles, and other surveillance equipment (Nugent & Asiwaju, 1996). The Immigration Service for instance has fewer than 40,000 personnel who are responsible for securing approximately 4,500 kilometers of Nigeria's land, as well as air and sea frontiers (Newscircle, 2020). No doubt, this number of border security agents is severely inadequate to administer and monitor Nigeria's borders.

The ongoing war against Boko Haram insurgency and other internal security challenges such as rural banditry, herdsmen/farmers conflict, kidnapping for ransom which has become widespread in Northern and Southern Nigeria have overstretched the capacity of Nigeria security forces. Furthermore, currently, there is a trans-border security operation against Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin through the Multi-National Joint Task Force –MNJTF which is composed of troops from Nigeria, Niger Republic, Chad, and Cameroun which diminish the number of Nigerian military personnel for internal combat operation (Agbiboa, 2017). In Zamfara State alone, northwest Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari orders the is deployment of military aircraft, armored personnel carriers (APC's) and 1000-strong combined force, which includes the army, air force, police, and civil defense, to begin counterattacks against bandits terrorizing Zamfara State's villages and cities (Punch, 2018).

Although the Federal Government continues strengthening policies along the realists' orientation to boost border security, such efforts have been marred with ineffective coordination and lack of synergy between various agencies, coupled with the existence of multiple border agencies with overlapping lines of jurisdiction and responsibility on border security governance. For instance, at the Nigeria-Niger border, there exist multiple numbers of government agencies with overlapping responsibilities and a lack of inter-agency cooperation. (Interview with senior personnel of the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) at Jibia border,

Katsina state, June 16, 2020). This is beside the claims for superiority by the multiple border security agencies. These challenges are further reinforced by the shortage of military and para-military personnel, sophisticated weapons, obsolete surveillance facilities, poor logistics, and lack of adequate training plagued with the growing culture of graft and pervasive corruption among the border security agents (Adams, 2012).

The economic interdependence between Nigeria and the Niger Republic has rendered the relevance of the physical hard-lines that separate Nigeria and the Niger Republic as ineffective. The prevailing economic conditions triggered both legal and illegal activities on the border in which many Nigeriens cross the Nigerian borders by all possible means in search of a greener pasture in a country (Nigeria) they perceived to be having a "booming economy" or at least which offer some kind of relief from extreme poverty that prevails in their home country. Such relief may come in the form of availability of menial jobs that can help migrants eke out a living or the presence of some untapped natural resources cum human-made wealth that can be mined or raided easily as is the case in Nigeria where illegal migrants, mostly from the Republic of Niger, engage in petty-trading and illegal mining. Nigeriens are often eager to illegally migrate to Nigeria believing the pasture is greener and when they do migrate, they end up settling for menial jobs, such as gate-guard which Nigerians (except very few) consider demeaning. That is not to say Nigerians do not engage in menial jobs: they do but prefer doing jobs of such nature outside the Nigerian border preferably in Europe and North America mainly because of the social stigma that is associated with such jobs at home (Interview with a senior lecturer in one of the local universities, Katsina, February 2020).

Besides economic interdependence, the differences in language, educational system, and colonial cultures and policies such as the French policy of assimilation in West Africa had an explicit effect on the relationship between Nigeria and Niger. The French policy of assimilation involves the imposition of French culture on its colonial territories within West Africa in areas such as culture, language, religion, dressing, and law. This is contrary to the British colonial policy of indirect rule in which the colonial masters ruled their colonies through the existing socio-cultural, economic, and political structures (Asiwaju, 1993). Despite this, the development of the colonial and post-colonial economies of both countries that led to the

development of capitalism in Nigeria and Niger was the same. Although the cultural orientation and development effects of the colonial policies on both countries differed. While Nigerian capitalism developed along with the British cultural influences in areas such as speech, dressing, social behavior among others, the colonial policy of assimilation and association in Niger led to the replacement of Niger's indigenous culture with the French culture. The elites that subsequently came to power through multi-party politics in Niger and Niger contributed to welding the two States together. The process of acquiring power in areas such as constitution, formation of political parties, elections, and other democratic rituals are similar even though the two countries operate two different systems. There is a political association and consultation between Northern Nigeria's political elites and Niger's political elites. Often, political elites from Northern Nigeria attend political rallies and campaigns in Niger and vice-versa. These political associations and consultations among power elites have further rendered the physical barrier irrelevant. The membership of Nigeria and Niger in the regional and sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU) has further deepened and cemented the ties between the two countries (Asiwaju, 1993). These political relationships among the people and political elites of Nigeria and Niger have made the militarization and realist approach a myth rather than reality.

Geographically, Niger Republic is a landlocked country that depends on Nigeria's Sea for import and export goods which suggests that Niger's imported and exported goods through the Sea could only find their way into the country via the Nigerian waters. This is an indication that while Nigeria needs Niger for mutual relations such as border security, Niger needs Nigeria for access to the Sea (Abubakar, 1993). However, political geographers focused on geographical analysis and investigations of the nature and character of the Nigeria-Niger Republic borderland and neglected the spatial-economic interactions that occur along Nigeria's international boundaries. Little economic analysis has indeed been carried out to explain the spatial structure and function of the Nigeria-Niger border settlements and trans-border spatial economic interaction in terms of trans-border trade and investment (Abubakar, 1993). Historically, due to the strategic geographical locations and economic prospects of Nigeria and Niger, there was intense competition between the European

colonial powers over control the territory. This led to the eventual partition of the territory between Britain and France after series of negotiations from 1890 to 1906 when Britain and France ultimately reached an agreement that provided the basis for the current international border between Nigeria and Niger (1975, Thom). The 1906 agreement adopted the indigenous features such as mountains, rivers, and lakes that separate the two countries and maintained the existing commercial routes while defining the boundary (Thom, 1975). Subsequently, between 1906 and 1908, the exact demarcation of the boundary was completed and a total of 138 beacons were used to mark the exact boundary (Prescott, 1961). Most of these beacons have disappeared in some of the locations they were erected thereby posing a challenge to Nigeria and Niger authorities as regards where the border starts and where it ends.

Although the Nigeria-Niger border has been in place for over eighty years and is designed to separate the two countries, it has resulted in spatial interaction at the local level and loses its physical relevance. Ideally, proximity to a state boundary is expected to affect human activities and landscapes in a variety of ways. The most obvious and important human manifestation of border location is trans-border trade, which constitutes an important component of the economy of every country in West Africa and indeed the world. In political geography, border regions defined the economic, political, and social milieus of states. However, they have often become the most neglected peripheral zones of their states and share similar characteristics of having the least level of economic, political, social, and economic development compared to other parts of the state (Muicy, 1981).

Ullman (1956) developed a three-factor typology of complementarity, intervening possibilities, and transferability that might help or hinder spatial interactions across places. Complementarity states that interactions between two places are a function of their specific interdependence such as specific demand in one place must be able to be met by supplies from the other. Opportunity is concerned with relative locations and thus hinges on the geometry of spatial arrangements rather than the characteristics of commodities (Chaman, 1979).The term "transferability" refers to the cost of transporting an item, as well as the influence of distance as a mobility limitation. The concept of complementary and other disequilibrium variables between two countries can assist explain the trans-border trade between them.

Furthermore, Asiwaju (1988) identifies five asymmetric variables in the socio-economic ties between Nigeria and the Benin Republic, which work together to create export-import trade dynamics over Nigeria's Western border. The same factors are at work at the country's Northern borders such as the Nigeria-Niger border with little or no differences (Abubakar, 1993).

I. The disparity between the Nigerian "giant" and the Nigerien "dwarf" in terms of territory and population sizes.

II. Nigeria's material and human resource imbalances, as well as disparate degrees of actual and potentials in comparison to other ECOWAS member states combined.

III. The longstanding competition between France and Britain, which caused the separation of Nigeria and other African natural planning zones in the first place. This not only paved the way for two distinct colonial administrations and the emergence of two distinct national identities, but it also paved the way for rival economic policies and organizations with different markets, pricing systems, varieties of goods and services, quality, and quantity.

IV. A divergence in momentary systems, which was later exacerbated by the subsequent evolution of asymmetrically related national currencies, such as the inconvertible naira on one side of the border and the CFA France, an easily convertible international currency directly tied to the metropolitan French on the other.

V. The existence of a common local language (Hausa) of communication and homogeneity (pp. 51-58).

Other considerations, such as the presence of key marketplaces along the border, come into play as well. The Illela, Jibia, Mai-Aduwa (Nigeria) markets among others are an important component of improving spatial contact between Nigeria and the Niger Republic. For instance, every Sunday, residents of Illela (Nigeria) and Birnin Kwanni (Niger) converge in any of the border towns to trade in goods in which they have a comparative advantage. Similarly, every Wednesday, the people of Birnin Kwanni and Illela converge in Birnin Kwanni to goods and services. Beyond the exchange of goods and services, the border marketplaces served as the spatial units of transborder interaction. People and commodities pass freely along the 8-kilometer

trails that cross the border, as well as via the official security-controlled border stations to attend either of the markets. The greater availability of manufactured products and foodstuffs on the local market in Illela (Nigeria) as a result of the differential modernization between Niger and Niger republic, as well as the greater availability of manufactured products in the local market, has done much to encourage significant trans-border trade and resulting in significant cross-border movement on market days.

3.3.3 The nature, volume, and flow of cross-border trade along Nigeria's Northern border

West African countries participate in two types of trade: domestic and foreign. This suggests that they trade with countries within the West African sub-region. There is also trans-border trade with other African nations (Onyemelukwe & Filani 1981). While the former has received more attention over time and has served as the economic hub of every other West African country, the latter has been officially ignored. The context of this discussion will focus on sub-regional trade between two West African countries that share a similar continuous border.

It is now widely acknowledged that significant intra-continental trade between autonomous African governments exists and occurs across national borders. Asiwaju (1988) expressed his displeasure with African countries' abandonment of this sector of international trade, stating that:

> It is no longer trendy for our establishment economists to claim,
> as they did until recently, that intra-continental commerce
> accounts for a minuscule share of African sovereign
> governments' external trade. The traditional myth based on a
> reliance on recorded or official trade figures and (conversely) a
> complete disregard for unrecorded or parallel business
> transactions has erupted in the face of alternative studies and
> surveys.

Contrary to popular belief, that the Nigeria-Niger Republic border has done much to facilitate trans-border trade, which has strengthened spatial interaction at the local level, little has been written on informal trade across the borders(Thom, 1970; 1975).

There are two types of trans-border trade across Nigerian borders: Official/legal or unofficial/illegal. They are legitimate when they are carried out under national legislation and relevant rules and regulations. When trans-border trade takes place in defiance of the extant laws, they are illegal. The term "smuggling" is often used to refer to unlawful trans-border economic activities (Asiwaju, 1988).

For instance, while formal and informal forms of economic transactions flourish at the Nigeria-Niger border communities, such as Illela (Nigeria)and Birnin Konni(Niger) and Jibia (Nigeria) and Maradi (Niger) among others, only legitimate trade at the officially designated border stations between the two countries are often used for statistical purposes. Often, only large-scale movement of products by trucks through the formal border posts are accounted for because they are easier to monitor and control. Trans-border trade through illegal routes which constitute the bulk of the trans-border trade between Nigeria and Niger is ignored by government officials. This implies that there are no official records of such transactions. Hence, the need to monitor trans-border trade through the illegal routes and for accurate statistics on the volume of Nigeria-Niger trans-border trade. Scholars believe that smuggling activities account for a huge proportion of trans-border trade between Nigeria and Niger, but, lack of data and the sensitivity of informal trans-border trade, experts have limited their research to the formal transborder transactions that occur on the border.

In the next section, the study intends to show the commodities that are exchanged, the volumes involved, and the flow patterns. It should be noted that accurate trade figures on Nigeria's local production are exceedingly difficult to come by, as much happens without records, particularly in the private sector which handles the majority of trans-border commerce. The majority of official trans-border trade statistics are likewise absent since the data is classified as such relevant authorities refused to share them. As a result, the information offered below is based on oral interviews and observations.

3.3.4 Commodities exchange between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger

Food: This is one of the major commodities of exchanges between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger. The Republic of Niger frequently suffers from desertification, famine, and drought which affect its overall food production. Niger often relies on

Nigeria to bridge the food shortage. Thousands of trucks loaded with grains (millet, maize, and sorghum), cereals like rice and beans, and vegetables (Tomatoes, peppers, and onions) from Nigeria cross the border through the formal and informal routes to the Niger Republic.

The table below shows trans-border local food export from Nigeria to Niger. Mostly, grains and fruits are exported from Nigeria to Niger while beans while sweet Potatoes and Thailand ricefound their way into Nigeria through the Niger Republic border (Interview with a senior Customs officer at Illela border post, June 16, 2020).

Table 5: shows some of the most common foods traded between Nigeria and the Niger

From Nigeria to Niger	From Niger republic to Nigeria
• Maize	• Beans
• Millet	• Thailand Rice
• Sorghum	• Imported Wheat flour
• Local Rice	• Dates
• Wheat	• Millet
• Beans	• Sorghum
• Yam	
• Sweet potato	
• Cassava	
• Garri	
• Plantain	
• Local Wheat	
• Fruits (Mangoes, Banana, Pineapple, etc.)	
• Kolanut	
• Groundnut-oil	
• Palm-oil	

- Cottonseed

- Tomatoes and vegetable

Trade-in livestock: Generally, livestock such as cattle, goats, sheep, camels, donkeys, and horses are among the savannah grassland household animals used in trans-border trade along the Nigeria-Niger border. They are usually traded on market days, they travel in herds across the border, usually from communities in the Niger Republic to Nigeria and beyond. Historically, there is unrestricted migration and movement of animals, particularly cattle, from neighboring Niger and Mali into neighboring Sokoto, Kebbi, Zamfara, Jigawa, Katsina, Yobe, and the Borno States. They frequently cross the border in search of water and food for their cattle. in addition, there are cattle herded by Nigeriens living in Nigeria that it's difficult to tell the difference between animals herded by Nigerian Fulbe and those herded by Fulbe from neighboring Niger and Mali.

There are no official records of the number of livestock that cross the border from the Niger Republic to Northern and Southern Nigeria. Both a cattle dealer in Jibia put the number from 80-100million per month (Interview with a cattle dealer at Jibia border post, June 19, 2020). The Fulbe, a Nomadic ethnic group, is the most prominent ethnic group engage in livestock production. They move from Northern to Southern Nigeria and the Niger Republic in search of food for their animals. During the dry season, a large number of herders cross into Nigeria from Niger and Mali to Northern and Southern Nigeria. Dealers purchase herds from the Nomads at various trans-border cattle markets and load them into trucks for transportation to the larger cattle markets in Southern Nigeria. The demand for meat and other livestock products in the immediate neighboring States and throughout Nigeria is so great that local output must be supplemented by trans-border import from Niger (Interview with the Immigration officer at Illela border post, June 16, 2020).

Trans-border cattle trading through official and unauthorized trade channels fills the consumption gap in Nigeria. This category of trading commodities includes significant products such as hides and skin. The sale of goatskin and sheepskin is another lucrative trans-border business for the residents of Nigeria-Niger. Over 90% of cattle, as well as over 65% of goats and sheep, are found in the Northern zone (Motimore,1978). Through Kano and Lagos ports, the hides and skin are sent to

Europe, either processed, semi-processed, or raw in addition to local industries in Nigeria that use some of the hides and skins to make shoes, bags, and other handicrafts.

Manufacturing: Consumer products make up the majority of the total manufactured goods that cross the country's Northwestern border for commerce. Roofing sheets, cement, and ceramics are also apparent as intermediate goods and spare parts. Plywood, iron rods, wires and textiles, as well as cosmetics and toiletries, are all frequent cross-border commodities.

The table below shows a list of manufactured products traded across the Nigeria-Niger border.

Table 6: Manufactured products traded across the Nigeria-Nigeria border

From Nigeria to Niger republic	From Niger republic to Nigeria
- Mattresses - Roofing sheets(zinc) - Cement - Soft drinks - Detergents and soap - Sweets and biscuits - Plastic wares - Plywood - Cooking utensils - Refrigerators - Batteries (dry cells) - Lamps - Iron and wooden beds - Insecticides - Agrochemicals	- Imported rice (Thailand) - Imported wheat flour - Imported vegetable oil - Imported cigarettes - Date(refined) - Sugar and milk

- Matches

- Cigarettes

- Petroleum products

- Baby foods

- Textile materials

- Cosmetics

- Automotive components

The spectrum of manufactured items traded across the border between Nigeria and Niger are indications that the border is like two sides of the same coin. Nigeria, as more industrialized Compared to the Republic of Niger, Nigeria is relatively more industrial as such it accounts for the majority of the manufactured goods traded across the Nigeria-Niger border. There are more exports to the Niger Republic than imports from the Niger Republic into Nigeria. Prices of made-in-Nigeria goods are highly appealing to the people of the Niger Republic as a result of the cheap value of the Naira.

The majority of manufactured goods from France, Italy, and other countries were trafficked into Nigeria. Tobacco, Thailand rice, wheat flour, vegetable oil, secondhand fabric, sardines, batteries, table salt, sugar, alcoholic drinks, pharmaceuticals, and a variety of textiles are examples of commonly produced goods originating from the Niger Republic to Nigeria. It was discovered that there is a bigger trans-border commerce between Nigeria and the Niger Republic than the rest of its neighbors.

The import substitution development strategy and the gradual dismantling of the physical, legal, and institutional barriers to trade in the West African sub-region with the creation of economic corridors are among the factors accounting for Nigeria's leading role in the manufacture of consumer goods within the West African sub-region. The prevailing uneven pattern of transborder commerce in this sector is further aided by the export promotion derived under the federal government of Nigeria

Generally speaking, petroleum and petroleum products, firewood, and other locally processed and semi-processed materials and handicrafts are traded on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border daily. Daily, petroleum products such as Premium Motor Spirit (PMS) Automated Gas Oil (AGO), and Dual-Purpose Kerosene (DPK) are traded both formally and informally across the border. The amount involved in formal trans-border trade was insignificant in comparison to the amount involved in smuggling. Huge consignments of petroleum products are transported out of Nigeria through illegal routes or in private cars, large haulage of petroleum is the main occupation of big-time smugglers who transport tanker loads or through drums across the border in the night and broad daylight (Interview with a senior Customs officer at Jibia border post, June 22, 2020).

Firewood is mainly used for cooking in Niger. However, its scarce in Niger due to frequent desertification and severe punishment felling a tree for firewood attract in the Niger. Hence, Niger relies on Nigeria to get more than 70% of its firewood. Regularly, donkeys, camels, and truckloads of firewood cross through the border to adjacent communities into the Niger Republic.

Nigerian poultry products (particularly eggs), dried/frozen fish are being shipped to the Niger Republic. Clay pots, mats, locally woven cloth, dyed cotton fabrics, locally made farm equipment such as hoes and cutlass are commonly traded at the border (Mbagwu, 1978).The total volume and variety of these items graded from traditional industries and crafts are estimated to be quite large, and they play a significant role in trans-border trade.

Also, the inhabitants of the borderlands usually develop a strong sense of "border identity" cemented by cross-border exchange and claims of rights to participate in cross-border trade (Flynn, 2008). For some residents at the Nigeria-Niger border, aiding illegal immigration is considered part of cross-border trade and a source of employment. Thus, an attempt by the border managers and military patrol teams to stop it is greeted with heavy resistance from the local population at the border. Sometimes security agents are attacked by the residents of the border communities who see them as enemies and agents of state exploitation who want to destroy their thriving means of survival, hence the continuous booming of illegal immigration and arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border. With the protection of the border

communities, illegal immigrants can neutralize every form of security at the border or evade it by using any of the numerous unpoliced illegal routes (Interview with one of the Immigration Chiefs at the Jibia border, Jibia, 28 April 2020).

Another major reason why the realist approach is deficient is the exclusion of non-state actors such as the residents of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities in the control of arms trafficking. Perhaps, this is because the Nigeria and Niger authorities perceived the border as a physical hard-line that needs to be defended militarily. The realists' perception of the border led to the exclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of the border. This exclusion has resulted in the neglect of the role of the border communities. Plagued with the attendant "rigged" political economy which enriches a few elites while impoverishing a significant number of the citizenry has increased class inequality and made poverty pervasive particularly the residents of the border communities (Okeke &Nwali, 2019). The mass poverty affecting the majority of the resident of the border communities may perhaps explain why some residents in villages and towns on the Nigeria-Niger borderland venture into every kind of activity to eke a living, including aiding trans-border arms traffickers and smugglers to cross the border (Rufa'i, 2018). For instance, the residents of the Nigeria-Niger border communities of Jibia are among the most impoverished and marginalized border communities. Apart from a signpost showing the borderlines between Nigeria and the Niger Republic, there are no substantial development efforts to develop the border communities (WHO, 2019).

Finally, the way and manner the realist consider borders as physical hardlines are the same way they consider physical structures and military hardwires such as robots, militarization, wall/fencing, as the best options for securing borders. However, what the realist failed to acknowledge is the fact that no two borders are the same. There is no universal theory of border security that applies to all borders. Effective border security is a function and reflection of states' economy, military, technology, socio-cultural advancement, and geographical location. For instance, at the moment, Nigeria has no sufficient resources to build a wall and fence its 1,500-kilometer land border with the Republic of Niger. It also lacks the technological capacity to digitalized the border and neither Nigeria nor Niger has the adequate military workforce to secure the border through regular border patrol. The socio-cultural

affinities of the border communities in areas such as religion, language, and occupation, make fragmentation of ethnic nationalities living on the border into different states a difficult task.

These reasons make the management of trans-border arms trafficking from the realist perspective a daunting task for the border security forces. To reverse this trend and boost border security would require either an alternative or complementary approach in unshackling the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking. But then the question is, can the liberal approach serve as an alternative or a supplementary approach to realism in securing the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier?

3.4. Liberal perspective as a supplement to realism in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier

Looking at the complexities of the Nigeria-Niger border and Nigeria's desire to contain the influx of trans-border arms trafficking requires more than military force as prescribed by the realists. The need for cooperation and collaboration from both countries is quite imperative to unravel the root causes of the problem, review the existing strategies, and incorporate all relevant stakeholders that are crucial in the effective management of trans-border arms. The realists' approach is mainly deficient because it disregards the conditions, non-states security agents, and peculiarities of the border communities. Furthermore, the ever-growing trans-border informal trade between Nigeria and the Niger Republic has further declined the relevance of the border as a barrier and rendered the militarization of the border against arms trafficking unrealistic.

The uniqueness of the liberal approach to border security is that it takes into consideration the role of multiple actors (state and non-state), persuasion, dialogue, cooperation, collaboration, and use of economic instruments such as grants, aid, and technical assistance (Solomon & Ferdinand, 2009). From the liberal perspective, the Nigeria-Niger border is not just a barrier but a bridge connecting the citizens of Nigeria and the Niger Republic. Therefore, as long as the Nigeria and Niger authorities continue to perceive the border as a mere physical hard line that needs to be militarily defended, so the residents of the border communities from both sides of the border would continue to see it as an artificial creation and any attempt to divide

families who share the same ancestral background. This is why several attempts to militarily separate the two border communities by imploring them to recognize the border as a barrier have always met stiff resistance by the locals. In extension, it created a poor relationship between the border security agents and the residents of the border communities.

Commercially, the Nigeria-Niger border communities operate many open markets weekly, markets such as Mai'adua - Mai'mujia, Konni - Illela, Gazou - Dankama, Mai'gatari - Babura, Kamba - Gaya, allow the citizens of the two countries to trade with each other. This economic relations between the citizens of both countries have further bound the people together (Dankama, 2004, pp.34). This has further declined the impact of the militarization of the border. For the liberals, established borderlines will always be breached either for legal and illegal purposes (Newman, 2003). Furthermore, the Nigeria-Niger border communities are bound together culturally, the majority of them speak the same dialect, share occupation, and are predominantly Muslims. For instance, hardly a week could pass without the residents of the border communities cross either side of the border for intermarriages, naming, and other festivities. The lack of a comprehensive citizen's database for both countries has always made it difficult for the Nigerian border security agents to distinguish Nigeriens from Nigerians (Dankama, 2004). Coupled with the fact that the borderland stretches to approximately 1,500 km (Hoffmann &Melly 2015; Cross-border Diaries 2008), with highly inadequate border security personnel coupled with poor logistics, obsolete or lack of surveillance facilities such as video cameras, scanners, drones, and helicopters to secure the border (Asiwaju, 2011) effective bordering of the frontier becomes a rather a myth. In many of the border communities, it is difficult to ascertain where Nigeria's border ends and where that of the Niger Republic starts.

As a result of the limit of militarization, Nigeria must urgently seek further collaboration with the Republic of Niger to explore bilateral agreement and cooperation as an alternative. Moreover, the historical antecedents of both countries and the ever-growing trade and investment make it imperative for the two countries to embrace cooperation and resolve the trans-border arms management challenges and their accompanying consequences. For a long time, the US-Mexico border relations have been historically contentious until June 2019 when the US and Mexico

signed an agreement to resolve the border impasse after a long time of blame game (Rachel, 2019).

No doubt the Nigeria-Niger Republic border peculiarities, as discussed above, have enabled the influx of criminal elements and weapons from as per as North Africa into Nigeria through the Niger Republic border. This may perhaps explain the resilience of not only trans-border arm trafficking but cross-border banditry, Boko Haram insurgency, farmers-herders conflict, and other forms of criminality currently confronting Nigeria. To control the inflow of trans-border arms, there is a need to explore a new strategy beyond the realists' perspective on border security.

To achieve effective management of arms, there is no point in searching for a single universal theory that can comprehensively secure the Nigeria-Niger border. Each border has its dynamics that may require different responses. The best Nigerian authorities can do, is to examine the dynamics of the Nigeria-Niger frontier and either adopt two or more theoretical perspectives to secure the borders effectively. This is because neither realists nor liberal strategies are sufficient enough to secure the Nigeria-Niger frontier from arms trafficking.

The global trend in the management of illegal immigration and arms trafficking is mainly anchored on bilateral, multi-lateral, institutional collaboration and cooperation between states, regions, and sub-regions. This is not to negate the relevance of conventional border surveillance, especially in countries with porous borders and challenging terrain like the Nigeria-Niger border. In essence, while some of the trans-border crimes such as direct military invasion may require a military response, arms trafficking may be handled better through cooperation, dialogue, and institutional collaboration among states. The liberal strategies must be harnessed to enable Nigeria, and the Niger Republic to strengthen border security cooperation, recognize and appreciate the role of the residents of the border communities and other relevant stakeholders. Theoretically, it implies that Nigeria's desire to control the scourge of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier will be incomplete without the liberal strategies complementing the current realist approach. More importantly, the inclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of the border, particularly trans-border arms trafficking, must be prioritized.

Although theoretical literature on borderwork is relevant to this study, the primary focus of the study is to analyze why the current approach to the management of trans-border arms trafficking is deficient and propose a new complementary approach. To work out a more inclusive explanation on arms trafficking with recognition of the indispensable role of the border communities, this thesis relies mainly on an in-depth interview with relevant stakeholders and examined the inefficiency of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier from the perspective of asymmetric information. It argues that the surveillance fails, not only due to the border conditions that are technologically difficult to digitalize and police, but also because of the asymmetric information flow between the residents of the border communities, trans-border arms traffickers, and border security agents that favors the trans-border arms traffickers.

3.5 Constructivism

On a rather curious note, many philosophers consider borders as neither genuine, nor reality but "merely mental constructions" embedded in "mathematical abstractions". But then, "if we are interested in the mechanisms of constant border crossing that are characteristic of human evolution", such abstraction of borders may not help (Marsico & Varzi 2015, p.6). According to the constructivists, all borders are mere inventions and socially constructed to serve inclusion and exclusion purposes.

On border security and cooperation, constructivists emphasize the importance of ideas and (European) values in the creation and development of trans-border regions. Thus, researchers emphasize that the goal of the regional building is to "terminate borders," and they point to subsequent re-territorialization, which is a common feature of EU/Schengen area borders (Turnock, 2002). This led to the emergence of new concepts such as "de-territorialization" (Newman & Paasi, 1998) and "de-bordering" (Blatter, 2001) to explain the multi-dimensional factors that are thought to conceal European borders as a result of the EU's expansion. Naturally, constructivism does not aim for exclusivity, therefore when addressing research questions, one must remain grounded in reality.

The major message of the constructive perspective suggests that there is no single path to truth. In other words, there is methodological diversity (Attila, 2013).

Constructivism is thus insufficient for understanding border regions and bordering process because foreign policies in these areas are characterized by a pragmatic, realistic way of thinking, and trans-border cooperation is examined with sufficient caution, usually focusing on security or maximization of benefits, that is, without philosophical conceptions aimed solely at building up a state. Ideas, standards, and values are elevated as a result of constructivism, whilst materialistic (production) talents and the importance of external interests are diminished (Attila, 2013).

According to constructivism, if there is no war and a stable social atmosphere in security communities, it is due not only to the distribution of power in foreign policy relations, but also and most importantly to the communities' mutual multi-level connections, which include identity formation, socialization, and so on. It is demonstrable in security communities that conflict avoidance is based on dialogue, cooperation, socialization, norm definition, and identity formation, rather than on forces outside of these processes (e.g., power distribution). The relationship between norms and constructs is intriguing because norms provide avenues and means for not just regulating state behavior but also redefining national interests and building collective identities. It is feasible to shift from "controlling" to "redefining" through them. One common component is the formation of new habits, which entails more than simply assuming a legal obligation to realize something to avoid a forceful authority (Attila, 2013).

The message of constructivism is that for communities to be secured, they require a certain level of commitment to one another. In other words, a sharing of the common identity can be significantly relied upon by constructivism (Deutsch 1968). The emergence of the sense of "this is us" and the procedures that support and improve the experience of belonging to a community are included in the latter term. If this feeling develops, joining the security community will become a social habit. To summarize, near the boundaries, a new social identity is emerging. As a result, a security community must emerge to solve problems in international and domestic politics in a constructive manner. Regional cohesiveness becomes a long-lasting and enduring communal value as a result of secure communities, which is founded on mutual adaptation and trust, thus, the constructivist approach to regional integration is far more comprehensive than logical approaches to regional integration (Attila, 2013).

Several case studies on cross-border collaboration and Euro-regions have been published in the last decade. According to some interpretations, the revival of personal relationships, the creation of new horizontal networks of cooperation, and the expansion of the number of participants in trans-border partnerships on these borders lead to the "re-interpretation" and "crossing" of borders after the Cold War, which alters the entire regional geopolitics of wider Europe (Attila, 2013). However, no one believes that borders have lost their significance East of Schengen. Russian academics prefer to see borders as separating lines that can lead to war between former Soviet neighbors, rather than lines that serve to "keep" a country "away" from the EU (Malfliet et al. 2007). Although historical antecedents may have a role in the construction of a trans-border region, several kinds of research established that the Euro-region emphasizes instrumental tasks. As a result, the Euro-identity-creating region's feature is subjugated to other, more pragmatic goals such as infrastructural developments, whose long-term viability is sometimes questioned. This remark implies that rather than focusing on the "founding myths of the Euro-regions," which try to give the Euro-regions a symbolic significance, the actual practice of trans-border cooperation (as observed in the Euro-regions) should be the focus.

Attila (2013) gives a condensed perception of constructivism on border security and cooperation as:

• border region integration is not only economic, but also for political, social, and cultural purposes

• communities of border regions where transnational civil society and are rooted promote the convergence of values

 • economic and competition-related advantages are easier to achieve when resources are used constructively and cooperatively (pp. 47-48).

By and large, the above discussion and analysis of the extant literature on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border security and cooperation suggest that borders are complex phenomena as they are "boundary sets comprised of overlapping geopolitical, socio-cultural, economic and biophysical layers and are the outcome of a bordering process" (Haselsberger, 2014). This implies that the universal theory of

border security is practically impossible because borders are always in motion, and their meaning depends on time, space and context. Therefore, border security approaches and theories need to take cognizance of the varying nature of borders (Konrad, 2015), since it is by so doing that a holistic understanding of the phenomena in their various dimensions/manifestations is possible. Moreover, it is such an understanding that is needed to evolve an effective response to border security challenges, whether from the realists, liberals, or a combination of the two viewpoints. This is imperative since sometimes the challenges that are associated with border security may require a physical, social, or a combination of physical, socio-cultural, economic, and political responses.

3.6 Theory of Information Asymmetry

The information asymmetry theory adopted from Economics literature is used as a theoretical guide for this research. Scholars such as George Akerlof and Joseph Stiglitz were among the first proponents of the theory. In his work 'The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and Market Mechanisms,' George Akerlof (1970) applied it to the study of the cars and analyzed how a seller and a buyer aim to maximize the information available to each other while bargaining the value of a car.

He claims that in a market with both new and used cars, both of which could be good, the customer can't be sure of the exact quality he's getting. This is because he lacks sufficient information to assess the quality of the particular car he is purchasing. The seller who has sufficient knowledge of the differences between a new and an old car benefited the most. He goes on to claim that the very existence of markets is the primary cause of knowledge asymmetry. This means that good automobiles are more likely to be sold at their true market worth, increasing the market's dominance of old cars and a decrease in the number of good cars (Akerlof, 1970).

Information asymmetry theory was later adapted by scholars such as Stiglitz (2000, 2002) to explain how information affects the market and trade, as well as the behavior of workers, producers, and consumers when making economic decisions. However, the term 'asymmetric information' is often applied to characterize a scenario in which one agent has more knowledge than the other (Spread 2015,

pp.124). In the case of an actor who has uneven knowledge, it causes them to act more rationally (Grossman 1981). To put it another way, if a person has information that others don't, he or she will strive to maximize it (Spread 2015, pp.123) by exploiting it to his or her benefit, sometimes at the expense of others.

In Economic terms, information is said to be asymmetric when one economic actor is better informed about a product or service. According to the information asymmetry thesis, information about the product is critical to maximizing profit and reducing loss in a competitive market. It indicates that the party with more sufficient product knowledge is more likely to maximize profit, whilst the trading partner who lacks such information is more likely to lose (Auronen, 2003, pp.7). According to the theory, the information available to each trading partner determines his/her profit or loss in trade. Often, in the exchange of goods and services, information is a key determinant of profit or loss. This suggests that the seller may likely possess more information about the goods he is selling than the buyer, which implies that the seller stands a better chance to gain more than the buyer. To reduce the risk of loss, buyers and sellers must strive to get adequate knowledge about products and services since the one who holds sufficient information is invariably likely to gain

The information asymmetry theory's strength comes from the fact that it has been able to explain several economic facts that have eluded other explanations. It raises awareness among trade partners to seek appropriate information before engaging in a contract to maximize profit, implying that proper information is critical to accomplishing any enterprise's goals (Auronen, 2003).

During a search for a better theoretical framework, this study realized that information asymmetry theory can explain numerous social phenomena in different academic and sub-academic disciplines, notably in social science. The fact that the theory is uncommonly used in the border literature, motivates this thesis to introduce it to the study of trans-borders arms trafficking. This is most likely the first attempt to use the theory to investigate trans-border arms trafficking along the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

However, like every other theoretical formulation, asymmetric information theory has certain flaws, despite being a very helpful tool for analysis. The theory's applications only address asymmetries in one direction. This work argues that it's possible for other parties to also sought for information to balance or reverse the information asymmetry enjoyed by other parties to their favor.

Applying the central proposition of the theory in the context of border security governance against trans-border arms trafficking implies that there is an asymmetric information flow between three key players in the Nigeria-Niger border security viz; residents of border communities, trans-border arms traffickers, and border security agents. In the context of the border security governance, the residents of the border communities have access to the most critical and sufficient information about the border terrain in terms of numerous illegal crossings that is required by border security agencies to secure the border against arms trafficking as well as trans-border arms traffickers who require this information to cross the border and deliver arms into Nigeria.

In this circumstance, the residents in border towns who have crucial information needed by the other participants (arms traffickers and security agents) are at liberty to share it with either of the parties. However, trans-border arms traffickers have been able to outsmart security checkpoints because residents of border towns provide them with crucial border intelligence in exchange for cash incentives. At the same time, the residents of the border refused to provide border security officials with information on the movement of trans-border traffickers through unpoliced border spaces.

Situating the above scenario in the context of profit and loss suggests that the residents of border towns who provide information to trans-border arms traffickers on unpoliced border crossings, gain from the cash incentives they receive as a reward from the trans-border arms traffickers. The traffickers also gain by using the intelligence they receive from the residents of the border communities to avoid arrest and safely cross the border to deliver their arms to prospective dealers and end-users. On the other hand, the border security agents fail in their statutory responsibility of intercepting traffickers and their arms due to a lack of credible intelligence from the residents of the border communities.

To control the menace of trans-border arms trafficking through the Nigeria-Niger frontier, Nigeria must reverse this tendency by creating an alternative border security governance model that can effectively balance or reverse the information flow in favor of border security agents. This is because the information is essential for strengthening border security, notably trans-border arms trafficking (Kartas 2013).

In contrast to the surveillance method that is state security agents centric, the new approach anchored on whistleblowing considers the incorporation and indispensable role of the residents of border towns in the management of trans-border arms trafficking. The incorporation of the residents of border towns could help to balance the flow of strategic information in favor of security agents regarding the unpoliced routes used by trans-border arms traffickers to cross the border. In addition to exposing traffickers, it will also expose the bad eggs among the border security agents who collude with trans-border arms traffickers to trafficked arms into Nigeria. It is imperative to note that the proposed border security governance model is not intended to replace surveillance but rather complement it. The conviction of this study is born out of the assumption that the hybrid of surveillance and whistleblowing will drastically reduce the influx of trans-border arms trafficking, particularly on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.

The section below discusses the central thesis and basic assumption of the Liberal and Realist theories of International Relations. This will give us a better picture and perspective in understanding the liberal and realist theoretical perspective on the border and bordering processes.

CHAPTER 4

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIA-NIGER BORDER, CULTURAL AFFINITIES, AND THE SURVEILLANCE

4.0 Introduction

This chapter dwells on the overview of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border and how the cultural affinity of the border communities in terms of religion, sectarianism, occupation, and language confounded the challenges of trans-border arms trafficking and consequently aggravate Nigeria's security challenges. The section further examines how trans-border informal trade (TBIT) between Nigeria and Niger Republic border communities compounded identity challenges in which every Nigerien claim to be a Nigerian and every Nigerian claim Nigerien citizenship. The challenges posed by ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people, residency, and establishment of West African citizens on the management of trans-border arms trafficking are also examined in detail. Furthermore, the section assesses how the living conditions of residents of the border communities in terms of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy fuels the deficiency of surveillance in the management of trans-border arms. Lastly, the chapter focuses its searchlight on how corruption among the Nigeria-Niger Republic border security agents aided trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.

4.1An overview of the Nigeria-Niger border, cultural affinities, and the surveillance

The vast of the border literature loosely defined international boundary as a hardline that excludes citizens of one nation-state from another. The international boundary is expected to stand on both de-Jure and de-facto principles. This implies that the international border is defined by physical and legal attributes. While the physical attribute is anchored on the recognition of the physical beacons separating the two nation-states, the legal dimension implies that the beacons must have formal international recognition by other sovereign nation-states. It is the combination of both the legal and physical recognition of these beacons that conferred on the state both internal and external sovereignty. On the other hand, one of the major characteristics of international boundaries all over the world is the existence of border communities along the borderlines. In this context, a border community lives

along the borderlines that defined the political, legal, and administrative limits of the two or more nation-states. This implies that residents of the border communities are the convergence of citizens who live on the borderlands of two or more nation-states though they are separated by national beacons (Dahiru, 2003).

Historically, relations between the people of the Nigeria-Niger Republic date back from the pre-colonial era. Before the colonial invasion of present-day Nigeria and the Niger Republic by the Western colonialists-Britain and France, the residents of the two countries relate to one another not based on their distinct nationalities but oneness and brotherhood. This suggests that the boundary relations between the two sovereign nation-states came into existence after the Berlin conference of 1884/1885 that scrambled and partitioned Africa to different European colonial powers such as Great Britain, France, Portugal Belgium, and Italy. Throughout the history of the partitioning of West Africa, treatise and convention for the demarcation of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border which ceded Nigeria to Britain and Niger to France have been the most peaceful exercise. Even though the agreement for the establishment of the border between Britain and France was reached before 1906, the actual demarcation of the boundary was done in 1910. These beacons that were inherited in 1910 were the same that were adopted by the Nigeria and Niger Republic authorities after their independence in 1960. These are also the same beacons that were legally recognized by the July 1964 declaration of the Organization for African Unity (OAU). A total of 148 five different beacons were initially erected and recognized by both countries on the approximately 1,500-kilometre land border, though there have been series of delineation exercises by both states that resulted in the erection of new beacons along the border (Dahiru, 2003)

4.1.1 Trans-border cooperation and peaceful co-existence between Nigeria and the Niger

The Federal Republic of Nigeria has been the vanguard of cooperation not just within the West African sub-region but Africa. Realizing the importance of boundaries and the need for peaceful co-existence among African states, Nigeria established National Boundary Commission (NBC) in 1987 (Dahiru, 2003). The mandate of the commission is to among others, promote border cooperation with Nigeria's neighbors and build stronger regional cooperation. This may perhaps

explain the cordial border relationship that exists between Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Benin, and the Republic of Niger.

Despite the existence of the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier, the Hausa's, Fulani, and Kanuri communities that share a border with the Republic of Niger have been co-existing peacefully for centuries not just because they are peace-loving but share cultural affinities such as language, occupation, and religion. The residents of the border who are predominantly farmers by occupation share farmlands across the boundary, sell and exchange agricultural produce in areas of comparative advantage. Religiously, they are also predominantly Muslims who relate to one another based on Islamic faith and brotherhood. This shared cultural affinity in addition, to intermarriages between the residents of the border communities, bounds the different nationals living on the border together beyond the nationality of their respective states. Another distinctive feature that results in peaceful border relations is the legal instruments that defined the edges of the borders. Since the inception of the borderlines, Nigeria and Niger Republic authorities respect and recognized the edges that defined their sovereignty. This may explain why Nigeria has never been in open confrontation with its neighbors over boundary issues, except with Cameroun over the Bakassi peninsula.

Furthermore, as part of the initiatives to promote border cooperation and peaceful co-existence between Nigeria and her neighbors, the National Boundary Commission (NBC) organizes series of events that bring together experts and stakeholders from Nigeria and the Niger Republic to discuss and explore areas of promoting border cooperation and security. One of such events was the July 1987 Nigeria-Niger trans-border workshop held in Kano State Nigeria. The events organized by NBC in partnership with its corresponding agency in the Republic of Niger were to identify areas of collaboration and proffer solutions to the challenges of trans-border cooperation between the two countries. The 1995-2000 reconnaissance campaign was a product of the 1987 workshop. It was at the workshop that both countries agreed to strengthen border cooperation through rigorous campaigns to sensitize the resident of the border communities on the need for cooperation and peaceful coexistence among different nationals living on the borderlands and border security agencies.

One of the key findings of the workshop was that the border communities were the most backward in terms of infrastructural development and basic social amenities in

areas such as schools, roads, hospitals, telecommunication, electricity, potable drinking water among others. Hence, the development of the border regions featured prominently in the recommendations of the workshop. After the workshop, the National Committee for the Development of the Border Regions (NCDBR) was established to accelerate the provision of basic amenities such as electricity, portable drinking water schools, hospitals, roads etcetera that are lacking in the border communities.

The workshop also emphasized the devolution of powers to local authorities in Nigeria and their corresponding local authorities in the Niger Republic to encourage active cooperation among the border communities. Though continuity has been the biggest challenge, it is important to note that the program recorded modest success in communities notably in Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, Jigawa, Yobe, and the Borno States and corresponding Department in Tahoua, Dosso, Maradi, and Diffa in the Niger Republic.

From the foregoing overview of the Nigeria-Niger border, it can be deduced that even though residents of the Nigeria-Niger border are some of the most neglected categories of Nigeria's citizens, the residents of the border communities are living peacefully. Notwithstanding, pervasive poverty, illiteracy, lack of opportunities, infrastructural deficit, desertification, and drought are inimical to the effective bordering of the frontier. More worrisome is the fact that the Federal government has perceived the management of the border as the sole responsibility of the border security agencies. This perception led to the exclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of the border.

4.1.2 Nigeria-Niger border delineation, cultural affinities, and trans-border arms trafficking.

Renowned scholars such as Iliya, 1989; Asiwaju, 1993; Iliya, 2001 and Ogunkelu, 2003 argue that delineation of international boundaries in Africa, including the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, was geared towards dividing people who hitherto share common history and ancestors for administrative convenience and material benefits. The colonial legacy of artificial boundaries created both violent and non-violent reactions on the continent. The volatile reaction comes from the countries

whose border disputes defies solution and degenerate into violent conflicts. For instance, Ethiopians and Eritreans who hitherto lived together in peace are now living as enemy's courtesy of colonial border delineation. The delineation of the international boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea by the colonialists has become a source of international dispute among the two African states for over six decades.

The non-violent reaction is mostly from the countries that decided to accept and live with the borders that they inherited from the colonialists while undermining the physical relevance of the frontiers. Under the non-violent reaction, the residents of the border communities and by extension the citizens perceived the colonial boundaries as mere writing on the sand that has no impact on their socio-cultural and economic relations. This perception implies that securing these countries in the wave of terrorism and violent extremism is becoming rather an impossible task because of the porous nature of their borders. Perhaps the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier represents a good example of this category of the borders. For a long time, the people from northern Nigeria see Nigeriens as brothers rather than distinct nationals. At the same time, the Nigeriens regard northern Nigerian borders as mere lines that separate them from their brothers. In other words, for the majority of Nigerians and Nigeriens, Nigeria and the Niger Republic are the same (Inuwa, 1993;2003).

The above assertion by Inuwa (2003) was further supported by Arzika (2007) where he argues that European colonial masters while partitioning Africa into modern states were never interested in the peaceful co-existence of the border communities and the by extension the states, but administrative convenience to actualize their material objectives. Hence, the way and manner the border lines were delineated have no bearing on the cultural affinity such as language, religion, and occupation of the communities but administrative convenience and economic considerations were the sole determinants (Iliya, 2001:11). For instance, the former British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury was quoted to have said after signing the Anglo-French Convention in 1890 which foreshadow the international boundaries of Nigeria between Dahomey, Niger, and the Chad Republic.

> We have been engaged with drawing lines
> upon maps where no white man's foot ever
> trod; we have been giving away rivers and

> lakes to each other, only hindered by small impediments that we never knew exactly where these lakes and rivers were (Arzika, 2007:15).

The above quotation by the former British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury is a testimony that colonial international were drawn using maps without any regard to the culture and tradition of the people. It also suggests that at the time the borderlines were drawn, those that draw the borderlines were not in Africa physically. Consequently, they have no idea how diverse the ethnic nationalities were which resulted in the forceful amalgamation of diverse groups. In some cases, separation of same/similar ethnic nationalities into two or more modern nation-states by mere physical hard-lines.

The above narration did not suggest that Africa had no boundary before its contact with the Western colonialists. In pre-colonial Africa, boundaries were not determined by the mere use of maps or physical hard lines but by the size and power of a kingdom. In other words, the bigger the kingdom, the larger its territorial boundaries and vice-versa (Miles, 1994:63). This implies that there were territorial conquests between and among the then powerful kingdoms such as Gobir, Katsina, Daura, Zazzau in present-day Nigeria and Maradi, and Damagaram (Zinder) in present-day Niger among others. This suggests that fixed political borderlines were colonial inventions in Northern Nigeria and Niger Republic kingdoms (Miles, 1994). This is why despite the imposition of international borders by European powers, there is still cohesion among individuals across these borders. Hundreds of peasants cross the borders multiple times a day to access their farmlands or visit their relatives on the other side of the border. Because of the historical ties between Maradi in Niger and Katsina in Nigeria, the Emir of Maradi in the Niger Republic is addressed as 'Sarkin Katsina Maradi' (Emir of Katsina of Maradi). Hence, border markets such as Jibia markets continue to draw traders from all over Nigeria and Niger regardless of government restrictions. Thus, despite the presence of border security personnel that people's movements, the Jibia border remained fictitious in the minds of the residents of Nigeria-Niger border communities(Labo, 2000).

The unrestricted movement and trans-border trade across the borders have resulted in socio-cultural and economic integration between Nigeria and Niger. This integration

which is facilitated by proximity, comparative trade advantage, and cultural affinity contributes significantly to making the frontier porous for all kinds of legal and illicit trans-border crimes (Dankama, 2004). This may not be unconnected with the common historical and cultural background that both countries share. Furthermore, the similarities in linguistics have greatly influenced the trans-border culture of the two countries, making it extremely difficult to trace the nationality of not only the residents of the border communities but other nationals of Nigeria and the Niger Republic. Moreover, most of the local dialects spoken in the Republic of Niger such as Hausa, Fulani, Gwandara, Zeharmanci (Djerma), Tuareg, and Kanuri languages are found in Northern Nigeria. In particular, the Hausa language has become a lingua franca for both the Hausa native speakers and non-Hausa's in the Niger Republic, which eased communication between the communities of the two countries. In addition, because most migrants are of the same ethnic origin, immigration officers, especially those unfamiliar with the border area, have difficulty distinguishing between 'travelers' from a neighboring state and their nationals. These shared cultural similarities and affinities between the residents of the border communities make an effective bordering process almost an impossible task. This is because the residents across the borderland relate to one another not only peacefully but with a sense of oneness and brotherhood (Sani, 1993).

Iliya (2001) gives a clearer picture of how the cultural affinity of Niger-Niger border communities affects the management of the border. He argues that "across the length and breadth of Nigeria-Niger Republic border covering Maradi, Dosso, Zinder, Tohoua and Diffa in Niger Republic and Kebbi, Sokoto, Katsina, Zamfara, Jigawa, Yobe and Borno States in Nigeria one find people with same culture, who practice same religion and also speak the same language" (Iliya, 2001, pp.26). These cultural similarities between the people of Northern Nigeria and the Niger Republic are further reinforced by trans-border marriages and festivities. These factors, individually and in combination make effective control of the border almost an impossible task. Drawing an administrative line that clearly distinguishes Northern Nigerians and Nigeriens is even more difficult. It makes little wonder that Omode (2006) argues that of all the Nigerian neighbors, the Republic of Niger has the closest ties with Nigeria. Unlike Cameroun, Benin, and the Republic of Chad that on

different occasions were engaged in open misunderstanding and confrontations with Nigeria.

The Nigeria-Niger Republic citizens are predominantly Muslims and relate to one another based on Islamic brotherhood, not the nationality of their respective countries. The Muslim residents of the border communities in Niger and Northern Nigeria in particular, see themselves as Muslims first, and being a Nigerian or Nigerien is a secondary requirement. The Muslims along with the border value Islam and Islamic brotherhood more than nationality or cultural differences (Liman, 2011). Similarly, both countries are bound by religious sectarianism. For instance, the *Tijjaniyya,Izala* movement, and *Qadiriyya* sects are found in both countries and frequently cross the border for ceremonies, Islamic preaching, and other festivities. The former Emir of Kano state in Nigeria Muhammadu Sanusi II is the West African spiritual Head of the sect and Kano State serves as the Quarters of *Qadiriyya*. Annually, thousands of citizens from other African states, including the Niger Republic converge Kano to pay an allegiance to their leadership in Kano-Nigeria.

Annually, the *Qadiriyya* sect converges in Nigeria or the Niger Republic to celebrate the birthday of the prophet Muhammad or the founder of the sect. This trans-border visit takes place mainly through the formal and informal borders and without any form of identification or rigorous entry screening of the visitors. This practice solidifies the trans-border relations between the citizens of the two states and further makes the border a mere artificial expression (Barkindo, 1993, pp.16). However, as convincing as these explanations, what was not emphasized by Iliya (2001) and Barkindo (1993) is the role of corruption among the border security agents. Most often, security agencies collect bribes and allow every category of people (not necessarily intending religious visitors) and their contrabands to cross the border without valid documents and rigorous checks of their baggage. They were all allowed to cross the border in the name of attending religious festivities. In an interview, a trader at the Jibia border, a resident of the border confirmed that border security agents appoint an agent among the locals who serve as an intermediary between security agents and illegal immigrants and smugglers. The agent collects bribes on their behalf to facilitate the free movement of illegal immigrants and contrabands. He added that only in rare cases, the border security agents deal directly

with the illegal immigrants and smugglers of different contrabands (Interview with a resident of Jibia at Jibia border post, Jibia, Katsina State, March 2020).

Cultural affinity has promoted socio-cultural integration beyond the borders. In some of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities, facilities provided by either Nigeria or Niger government to border communities such as schools, hospitals, and telecommunication networks are shared between Nigeria and Niger border communities. This suggests the tendency of the two communities to share the same facilities. For instance, Tsayau town is a border community whose half of the residents are on the Nigerian side of the border and the other half of the town's population is in Niger. Educationally, there is only one primary school in Tsayau for both children of the community irrespective of their nationality. The pupils are issued Nigerian certificates and many of them further their education in Nigeria despite being Nigeriens. After graduation from college, they can acquire Nigeria or Niger citizenship and work in either of the countries (Interview with a resident of Tsayau town at Gubin-Bore border post, Katsina State, January, 2020).

In health services, because of the limited number of health facilities, both communities access care services in communities where these services are readily available and accessible irrespective of whether they are on the Nigeria or Niger side of the border. Many residents of Jibia cross the border to attend to their needs in Maradi-Niger. Similarly, Niger residents of border communities such as Duhun-Bara on the Niger side of the border, travel 3 kilometers through the footpath to access health care in Gurbin-Bore town (a town under Katsina) in Nigeria. Access to health care has no boundary as both national's access the same services at the same cost. This often explains why the few facilities provided by the Nigerian government are overstretched by the residents of the border (Interview with a border guard at Jibia border post, Jibia, Katsina State, April 2020).

Beyond social amenities and infrastructure, some border communities along the Nigeria-Niger border use both Naira and CFA as a medium of exchange. In the Tsayau border community, for instance, Naira is used as the predominant means of exchange even though CFA is Niger's official currency. This applies to the telecommunication network. The Nigerian MTN telecommunication service provider

covered both Nigerian and Niger border communities using Nigeria's international code (+234). This suggests that there is no need for an international code to call Nigeria from many Niger border communities. As one of the residents of the border communities put it " Nigeria and Niger are just one side of the same coin" (Interview with a resident of Gurbin-Bore town at Gurbin-Bore border post, Katsina State, November 2020).

No doubt securing a border amidst these cultural affinities may be tough and daunting. However, a local-based approach that is not only community-friendly but compatible with the peculiarities of the communities would change the narratives, especially in this era of banditry where many residents of the border find it difficult to live in peace and go about their daily activities in safety and security.

The next section focuses on the impact of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria's internal security challenges. It argues that the unprecedented increase in the influx of trans-border arms has exposed Nigeria to various security threats and is mainly responsible for widespread armedviolence across Nigeria.

4.2 Trans-border arms trafficking and Nigeria's internal security challenges

One of the core functions of government is the protection of the lives and properties of its citizens from both internal and external aggression. This implies that national security has internal and external dimensions. Internal security refers to the general ability of the state to preserve peace and order within its internal borders. It encompasses the institutionalization of the legal framework to ensure the enforcement of national laws that are geared towards the protection of citizens against enemies from within. In other words, it symbolizes the general safety of citizens within their domain (Arase, 2017). From the external dimension, states must protect their international boundary against any form of external threats such as trans-border arms trafficking, smuggling, and military invasion that are likely to come through neighboring countries from either maritime, air, or land borders. This implies that safeguarding international boundaries is synonymous with securing internal borders and by extension protecting the citizens from external aggression. This suggests that borders are life-lines of states, the more secure they are, the more peaceful a state is likely to be, and vice-versa.

However, achieving internal security for successive governments in Nigeria has been a serious challenge. Scholars provide several explanations on why achieving internal security has been problematic for Nigeria. Imobigbe (1990) argues that Nigeria has been over-relying on the coercive method to enforce laws and order. According to him, the method is not only conservative but has proven to be ineffective in achieving national security. He argues that the Nigerian security managers have neglected the non-coercive methods in the enforcement of national laws. Apart from its deficiency, it has caused the Nigerian government a lot of human and material resources in the areas of mobilization and deployment of security personnel to respond to security challenges across the country. This is evident in the continuous increment of Nigerian security agencies' annual budget and an upsurge in the military personal causalities across the country (Gambari, 1988).

Similarly, scholars such as Rose & Clear, 1998; Nagin, 1998; Lynch & Sabol 2004 have examined the impact of coercion as a means of compliance with laws and order. They argue that the world over, over-reliance on excessive coercion by the police often undermines social order and creates a hostile relationship between the communities and law enforcement agencies. They further posit that aggressive policing strategy has resulted in the concealment of information by the members of the community which usually leads to poor intelligence gathering and sharing.

Ake (1981) attributed national insecurity to the failed leadership structure in Nigeria. He pointed that the elites that took over the mantle of leadership from the colonialists were more concerned with the struggle to capture and retain power for personal gains. They were exploitative, oppressive, and insensitive to the flight and demands of the people. They employ every means to win political power including manipulation of religion and ethnicity. Consequently, the culture of misrule was implanted in governance, and the will of the people was subverted through the imposition of candidates and fraudulent elections. Political instability ensued leading to a military coup and counter-coup. The political uncertainty entrenched by the political class laid the foundation of corruption, poverty, instability, ethno-religious violence, and the recycling of failed leaders across the length and breadth of Nigeria.

Similarly, Obasanjo (2001) opined that internal security challenges in Nigeria are a product of widening inequality, injustice, diseases, and widespread public corruption. He contends that the high level of poverty has a significant effect on Nigeria's security including a high level of violent crimes, low life expectancy, and political instability. He further argues that the inability of Nigerian authorities to effectively handle domestic threats has resulted in a convergence of local and global forces that continue to undermine Nigeria's national security. Ogwu (2011) argues that Nigeria's national insecurity lies with the inability of the government at both federal and states and local government levels to promote social justice and strategically integrate all ethnic nationalities through an enduring reconciliation process. From the 1914 amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria to Nigeria's independence in 1960 to date, Nigerian political elites have not done enough in galvanizing the various ethnic groups into an indivisible political entity. This is evident in the secessionist movement among the major ethnic groups such as the Biafra Republic in the South East, champions by some sections of the Igbos, and the Odudua Republic in the South West by some section of the Yoruba's. Ogwu argues that for Nigeria to remain united, there is an urgent need for political welding of the sharply divided ethnic groups to minimize ethnic violence and forestall Nigeria's break-up. In addition, the country must strengthen its law enforcement institutions, invest in people-oriented programs, encourage export-oriented economic growth and ensure sustainable political development.

From the foregoing discussion, we can deduce that scholars often attribute Nigeria's internal insecurity to the dynamics of Nigerian politics such as ethno-religious violence, lack of national cohesion, political instability, and bad governance among others. However, except in recent times, scholars are beginning to interrogate the nexus between Nigeria's porous borders and the escalation of Nigeria's insecurity. Moreover, the Defense Industries Corporations of Nigeria (DICON) is the sole manufacturer of light arms such as rifles, pistols, and ammunition for the Nigerian security agencies (Willie, 2008). So where are these illegal arms and ammunition numbering millions coming from?

To control the proliferation of illegal firearms into the country, Nigeria has initiated several measures including a regulatory framework to check the illegal proliferation

of firearms. For instance, as far back as the late 1950s, the Nigerian government enacted the 1959 firearms act (as amended) which spelled out the condition for the sales, license, acquisition, and use of firearms. However, this act becomes ineffective because of the porous nature of the land, maritime, and air borders that enable the trafficking, sale, possession, and use of these firearms indiscriminately. Often, police and the Nigerian military conducted house-to-house search and discovered thousands of illegal arms and ammunition in the hands of unauthorized persons which suggest that arms are circulating illegally across the country.

Recent studies have shown that Nigeria's porous borders enable the influx of trans-border arms and ammunition into Nigeria. These arms are often used as an instrument of armed violence by cultists, drug traffickers, kidnappers, bandits, and insurgents against the Nigerian state. The studies revealed that there is hardly any ethno-religious, political, and regional violence in Nigeria without the use of arms. Nigeria Security agencies report that in the last decade there has been a significant inflow of arms and mercenaries into Nigeria from neighboring countries and beyond through Nigeria's land borders (Osimen, Anegbode, Akande, Clement, Oyewole, 2017). On several occasions, the Nigerian security forces report that bandits, Boko Haram, and Ansaru terrorist organizations have been importing arms and mercenaries' through Nigeria's porous borders. The reports indicate that there are hundreds of Boko Haram training camps in neighboring Niger Chad and Cameroun being run by foreigners from as far as North Africa and beyond. These camps are responsible for the recruitment and training and supply of arms to terrorists operating in Nigeria. The Republic of Niger has the biggest landmass in West Africa, rampaging poverty, drought and famine are reported to have the highest number of these camps. Boko Haram insurgents and bandits usually explore the advantage of the porous border that exists between Nigeria, Niger, and Chad for training, planning meetings, and taking refuge whenever they are overwhelmed by the security forces (Interview with an officer of the Nigeria Police Force at Illela border Post, Sokoto State, July 2019).

In 2018, the Nigerian Tribune reports that in seven years (2010-2017), Nigerian security agencies intercepted over 21.5 million arms and ammunition that were trafficked into Nigeria through the country's porous borders. The majority of these

weapons were intercepted either at airports or Nigerian seaports. This is because it's much easier to track arms coming through airports and seaports borders. This suggests that arms coming into the country through the various porous land borders are difficult to track and intercept. This also implies that the sources and quantity of arms that were delivered safely into Nigerian territory remained unknown to the security agencies. The reports revealed that the lack of cooperation from the border communities has been the major challenge of intercepting trans-border arms. The report further accused the leaders and residents of the border communities of receiving money from smugglers and frustrate the Nigerian customs personnel and other border security agencies ' efforts of arresting smugglers and arms traffickers (Tola, 2018).

Furthermore, the Chairman of the National Peace Committee (NPC) and former Nigerian Head of State, Abdulsalami Abubakar recently raised an alarm on the number of sophisticated weapons illegally circulation across Nigeria. He revealed that there are over 6 million sophisticated weapons in the hands of unauthorized Nigerians across the country. These weapons have resulted in the death of over 80, 000 Nigerians, displaced over 3 million people, and still counting. The situation is worsened by the porous nature of the Nigerian borders that enable the trans-border arms traffickers to supply these sophisticated arms to bandits, kidnappers, and insurgents (Abba, 2021).

Trans-border terrorists and other criminals operating in Nigeria have access to these weapons because the majority of them are trafficked through porous borders where these terrorists control substantial ungoverned border spaces (UNODC 2013). In this circumstance, a country like Nigeria with thousands of un-policed illegal routes is more likely to be both a lucrative market and a victim of armed-related violence. For example, on July 31, 2013, a fuel tanker conveying three RPG charges, three AK 47 rifles, nine AK 47 magazines, two explosives, and 790 rounds of 7.62 special ammunition was intercepted at the Daban Masara border town between Nigeria and the Republic of Chad (Audu 2013). Likewise, Nigerian forces intercepted eight illegal immigrants with arms and ammunition along the Yola route, alleging that they were members of the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP) (Aluko 2019). Similarly, on March 25, 2018, Nigeria in collaboration with Cameroon's

security forces arrested Boko Haram members, including women and children, as they attempted to sneak guns and explosives into Nigeria via the Nigeria-Cameroun border (Kindzega 2018).

Despite significant budgetary allocations for security, including the release of $1 billion for the purchase of arms to combat insurgency (Reuters 2017), Nigerian security forces continue to intercept hundreds of weapons such as AK 47 rifles, RPGs, rocket launchers, dozens of armored personnel carriers, and anti-aircraft missiles. The bulk of them made their way into the country through porous borders, where they are accessible to different terrorist organizations. Consequently, Nigerian authorities must devise new strategies to protect the country's borders against the influx of trans-border arms.

However, it is important to note that most of the trafficked arms through the land borders cross the border safely because of the porous nature of the border. Therefore, it is difficult to report precisely the quantity of arms that are being trafficked into Nigeria. Though the number manifests in the way and manner security agencies frequently intercept arms from arms dealers or the number of arms willingly surrendered by repented terrorists under various amnesty programs across Nigeria.

For instance, the number of arms surrendered during the disarmament and demobilization (DD) phase of the Amnesty program for the Niger Delta militants in 2009 gave an idea of the quantum of illegal arms circulating in Nigeria. The Amnesty initiative saw over 15,000 militants surrender arms at the expiration of the disarmament and demobilization phase of the Amnesty. Weapons recovered during the disarmament process include 2,760 assorted guns, 28,7445 ammunition of different caliber, 18 gunboats, 763 dynamite sticks, 1090 dynamite caps, 3,155 magazines, and several other military accessories, such as dynamite cables, bulletproof jackets, and jackknives. Even with this number, many reports suggest that the militants surrendered just a tiny percentage of their weapons because they were skeptical about the government's commitment to the amnesty. Regular security agency detection of illegal arms trafficking inside and across borders indicates the worrying scale that arms trafficking into Nigeria (Osimen, et al. (2017).

The table below shows a random sample of some selected cases of trans-border arms interception by the Nigerian security forces at various points on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

Table 7: Some instances of arms interception on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border

S/N	Date	Description of arms	Location	Source
1.	2/06/2021	Nigerian Army intercepted 3 arms traffickers with RPG bombs and chargers, AK 47 rifles, and other assorted ammunition trafficked from Niger	Garin Naimaimai Village-SabonBirni-Sokoto State	*https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/465295-three-killed-as-army-intercepts-gunrunners.html*
2.	19/04/2021	Nigeria Police intercepted 3 AK 47 riffles with 96 7.62mm ammunition	Mararrabar-Gurbi border in Katsina State	*https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UDgsvvfktU8*
3.	14/05/2021	Police paraded 30-year-old Shehu Ali, a Nigerien, and others for supplying and selling over 450 rifles and 7,000 ammunition to bandits operating in Sokoto, Kebbi, Katsina, and the Zamfara States	Gusau-Zamfara State	*https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OY6A-ASwRYg*
4.	26/01/2021	2 machine guns and 179 anti-aircraft special ammunition were intercepted by the Katsina State Police command. The arms were trafficked into Nigeria through Dan-Magaji- Gurbi border in Katsina State	Katsina State	*https://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/01/police-arrest-arms-supplier-to-bandits-cp/*
5.	18/08/2020	Nigerian Army arrest 3 nationals of Niger	SabonBirni-	*https://www.vanguardngr.*

		Republic with 6 AK 47 rifles, 3 AK 47 magazines, 2,415, rounds of 7.62mm Special ammunition	Sokoto State	*com/2020/08/ army-arrest-3- niger-republic- nationals-arms- suppliers-with-6- ak-47-rifles/*
6.	14/12/2020	Customs intercepted a truck loaded with 73 guns and 891 cartridges concealed in bags of rice.	Zamare water side- Kebbi State	*https:// www.devdiscourse. com/article/ national/1369842- nigeria-customs- intercept-truck- carrying-firearms- ammunition*
7.	12/02/2014	A man was arrested by the Nigeria Police for smuggling an unspecified number of arms and ammunition from Mali to Nigeria via the Niger Republic border. The arms were concealed in	Yauri-Kebbi State	*CORRUPTION, INSECURITY AND BORDER CONTROL IN NIGER.pdf*
8.	4/08/2013	3 RPG's, 2 G-3 riffles 10 AK-47 magazines, and 10×4 40mm bombs and 85 rounds of special ammunition were intercepted by the Nigeria security forces	Borno State	*https:// studies.aljazeera.n et/en/reports/ 2013/09/20139810 4245877469.html*
9.	12/07/2013	3 AK 47 riffles, 1 GPRG, 9 AK 47 magazines, 2 bombs, 3 RPG chargers, 790 rounds of 7.62mm of special ammunitions in the fuel compartment of an oil tanker were intercepted by the border security agencies	Kebbi State	*https:// studies.aljazeera.n et/en/reports/ 2013/09/20139810 4245877469.html*
10.	16/07/2012	8 AK47 assault rifles, one G-3 rifle, nine AK-47 magazines, one RPG	Bulabulin area-Borno State	*https:// studies.aljazeera.n et/en/reports/*

		charger, five RPG, three magazines, one G-3 magazine, 14 IEDs, and several rounds of ammunition were intercepted by the Nigerian security forces		*2013/09/20139810 4245877469.html*

The above instances of interception of trans-border arms' coming into the country through the Niger-Niger frontier is an indication that effective border management is strategic to the internal security and survival of Nigeria as a political entity. However, effective management of the Nigerian borders has been neglected by the successive governments in Nigeria. As such, they have become transit zones for all kinds of trans-border crimes, including trans-border arms trafficking (Osimen, Anegbode, Akande, Clement, Oyewole, 2017). Most of the illegal routes numbering over 400 have been abandoned by the Nigerian government. These unpoliced routes often serve as a gateway for illicit arms and ammunition. This may perhaps explain the escalation of the security challenges such as farmers-herdsmen conflict, banditry, kidnapping, human trafficking, and insurgency in North-Western Nigeria and other parts of the country.

It is more worrisome that the government is becoming hopeless, helpless, and losing confidence in the capacity of the Nigerian border security agents to effectively control border smuggling and arms trafficking. This is confirmed by President Buhari's recent statement that "only God can secure the over 1400-kilometer land border between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger" (Johnbosco, 2021). While acknowledging the daunting task of effective border management Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier due to difficult terrain and complexities of the border communities, it would amount to suicide for the Nigerian government to rule out the possibility of effective management of the frontier.

No doubt, the border has caused Nigeria a lot in terms of socio-cultural, economic, and political destabilization of Nigeria, particularly northern Nigeria. The Nigerian border managers must re-strategize on areas of capacity building for the border security agents, fighting corruption among the border personnel, develop the border

communities and address poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and poor intelligent management. Above all, Nigeria must seek bilateral cooperation, collaboration and incorporate the residents of the border communities as important stakeholders in the management of the borders.

4.3 Trans-border Informal Trade (TBIT) and effective management of trans-border arms trafficking on Nigeria and Niger

The trans-border informal trade (TBIT) has resulted in economic interdependence between Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities and compounded effective management of the frontier. It is difficult if not impossible to trace when the trans-border informal trade commenced between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger. It is even more difficult to estimate the volume of such informal trade in areas such as food, pharmaceuticals, fuel, cosmetics, drugs, and electronics between the two countries (Aker et al, 2010).   What is not disputable is the fact that informal trade between the two countries started even before the formal delineation of the border by the French and British colonialists. As one walks through the various legal and illegal entry points linking Niger and the Niger Republic, one can easily observe informal trans-border trade in building materials, agricultural produce and machinery, petroleum product, and informal currency exchange by unregistered Bureau De-Change operators.

Furthermore, there is a continuous free flow of undocumented migrants crossing the border for one reason or another. They cross the border through illegal routes using a footpath, pick-up vans, tricycles, motorcycles, and animals such as camels and donkeys. A study conducted in 2005 estimated that between 4 to 5 million ECOWAS nationals cross the Nigeria-Niger Republic border monthly (Fll, 2005). Thus, this section attempts to examine how trans-border informal trade between Nigeria and the Niger Republic affects the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the frontier.

4.3.1 Trans-border Informal Trade (TBIT) between Nigeria-Niger border communities

The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2009) defined trans-border informal trade (TBIT) as the exchange of goods and services

across states' borders that does not comply with the regulatory framework of the government. The main reason for TBIT could be avoiding payment of customs duties and taxes, government regulatory burden, or porosity of borders. Trans-border informal trade does not only occur at the micro-level, it also occurs at the macro level when big firms are involved in underpayment of the custom duties and taxes for their imports (Liman, 2009).

One of the major features of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border is the existence of border communities and open trans-border markets. Residents of the border converge weekly to attend these markets either in Nigeria or the Niger Republic to informally trade goods and services. According to a Nigerian custom officer, every week, an expected 5000-6000 trucks cross either of the borders to deliver foodstuffs such as millet, groundnuts, beans, sorghum, maize, yam, wheat, and cassava. Although some of these trucks use the Niger Republic border only as a transit zone other have Nigeria as their final destination (Interview with a Nigerian custom officer, Jibia border post, Katsina State, December 2020). Consequently, smuggling and tax evasion resulting from TBIT cross the Nigeria-Niger border provide transitional features of border economic activities, interaction patterns in the border regions, and violations of international laws and conventions on border crossing, all to the detriment of Nigeria's national interest and invariably, national security (Collins, 1976).

The Niger Republic is a landlocked country at the heart of the desert with frequent drought and famine. Often, Niger depends largely on Nigeria for not only the supply of grains but vegetables and fruits. In an interview with one of the informal trans-border traders, "an estimated 1500 to 2000 trucks loads of vegetables and fruits such as mango, cola nuts, palm oil, banana, apple, and tomatoes cross the border weekly for delivery. Furthermore, an estimated 400-500 trucks cross the border informally to deliver goods such as electronics and electrical appliances (televisions, radios and home theatres, electric cables), welding machines, pumping machines to one border market or the another, this is in addition to thousands of trucks conveying cement and other building materials such as roofing sheets, iron roads, paints, tiles, ceiling fans, and plumbing materials" (Interview with a one of the informal trans-border traders, Jibia border post, Katsina State, December 2020).

A customs officer at the border revealed that hundreds of the residents of the border are into the business of soft drinks. They cross the border informally using cars, motorcycles, bicycles, and donkeys to convey soft drinks such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Juice to the communities in the Republic of Niger. Accordingly, some contrabands goods such as rice, spaghetti, soap and detergent, vegetable oil, live and frozen poultry, clothing materials, furniture, and used cloths imported into Niger from as far as Mali, Algeria Benin Chad, Cameron, and Europe found their way into Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger Republic border (Interview with a Nigerian custom officer, Jibia border post, Katsina State, April 2020).

Informal trans-border livestock business also flourishes on the border as thousands Niger Republic breed of rams, goats, sheep, cattle, camels, camel urine, and milk among others, flood the neighboring Nigerian markets of Sokoto, Kebbi, Kano, Katsina, Jigawa, and the Zamfara States. As one walks through different illegal routes, one can observe a large number of cars and motorcycles conveying various animals, such as cows, camels, sheep, and goats to one market or another. Insight is also thousands of poultry chickens and eggs. This is perhaps due to Niger's unfavorable weather condition that does not support poultry production such as chickens and eggs. Hence, the republic of Niger largely relies on Nigerian communities for the supply of poultry birds and eggs.

Although the Niger Republic recently discovered oil in commercial quantity and commenced oil exploration through the Chinese oil firm, residents of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border fueled their tanks and smuggle petroleum to the Niger Republic. This is because petroleum is cheaper in Nigeria compared to Niger. Also, the proliferation of Nigerian filling stations along the Nigerian border escalates fuel smuggling into the Republic of Niger. Furthermore, vehicles and motorcycles spare parts are cheaper on the Nigerian side of the border. This also attracts Nigerien's residents of the border to cross to the Nigerian side to purchase such spare parts. In addition, proximity between the Nigeria-Niger border communities contributes immensely to the free cross border movement and the declining relevance of the physical boundary (Interview with a resident of Mai Aduwa border town, Katsina State, March 2020).

Niger Republic's large deposits of potassium and uranium often make their underground water salty and unhealthy for drinking. This is in addition to the depth of the water. One must drill hundreds of meters to reach the salty water. The majority of neighboring border communities depend on Nigerian border communities for the supply of potable drinking water. On average, 150-200 water trucks cross the border to deliver water and ice block to various parts of Niger. This is in addition to the substantial volume of sachet water being exported informally through the illegal routes using water trucks, cars, motorcycles, and different kinds of animals (Interview with a senior lecturer, Umaru Musa Yar Aduwa University, Katsina State, April 2020).

The residents of the border communities share a common characteristic. They are predominantly peasant farmers who depend on agriculture as a source of food and common means of livelihood. It provides seasonal employment opportunities for the teeming residents of the border communities. According to a farmer along the border, the residents of the border communities believed that farmlands are the most valuable assets they possess. For the residents of the border, farmlands are much more important than the physical hard-lines that divide the two countries. These farmlands are often "cross- border farms" that spread across Nigeria-Niger Republic borders. It is a common practice to find Nigeriens farms extended to the Nigerian border and vice-versa. Although the farmers, traditional rulers, and border security agents are aware of these dividing lines, neither the farmers nor the border security agents perceived the practice as a threat.

Pastoralism is another informal economic relation that bound the residents of the border communities. In West Africa, pastoralism respects no boundary, and neither the pastoralists, not their animals recognize the existence of official boundaries. While the Hausa's along the Nigeria-Niger Republic borders are mostly farmers, the Fulani's Shuwa's and Tuaregs ethnic tribes are predominantly pastoralists. The pastoralists along the borderlines move indiscriminately across borders in search of a greener pasture for their animals. They move through the porous borders of different West African states unhindered. While passing through the border towns, they sell and cow milk to the residents of the border to raise money for medicines, clothes,

torchlight, and other necessities. For centuries ago, Fulani pastoralists move from as far as Algeria-Mali-Niger-Nigeria and beyond in search of greener pasture. This practice continues despite the security challenges associated with it for many West African states (Interview with a Nigerian immigration officer, Jibia border post, Katsina State, February 2020).

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4.3.1.1 *Curtailing Trans-border Informal Trade (TBIT) on Nigeria-Niger Republic Frontier*

Realizing the numerous challenges associated with trans-border informal trade on their economy and security, Nigeria and the Niger Republic made several attempts in areas such as promotion of bilateral cooperation, collaboration on border security, roads, postal service/information, and communication technology, and electricity supply to minimize the volume of trans-border informal trade.

For instance, as far back as the early 1970s, Nigeria and the Niger Republic formally commissioned the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation (NNJC). The commission was lunch on 3rd March 1973 with it is administrative headquarters in the Niamey-Niger Republic. According to articles 2 and 3 of the NNJC convention, the commission is primarily responsible for the identification, initiation, implementation, and promotion of trans-border cooperation between Nigeria and the Niger Republic (Dankama, 2004:55). Other functions of the commission include promotions of employment opportunities for the residents of the border communities, radio and television programs to create awareness on the need for cooperation, control of desertification, supply of electricity, postal services, and other areas of interest for both countries (Hassan, 2013). The Commission is headed by a Secretary-General appointed jointly by the two states on the recommendation of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The Secretary-General is assisted by the Assistant Secretary-General appointed jointly on the recommendation of the Republic of Niger (Hassan, 2013:44).

To ease formal trans-border communication, Nigerian and the Republic of Niger has signed bilateral communication by establishing the following communication networks to promote economic interdependence:

i. Maradi - Katsina telephone link of 12 circuit

ii. Konni Sokoto neighboring link

iii. Niamey Kaduna - Lagos international link of 24 circuits with circuits for telex

iv. A television link between the Maradi-Niger micro-wave and Katsina-Nigeria transmission station (Dankama, 2004:36).

In the power sector, Nigeria signed a bilateral agreement with the Niger Republic to supply electricity to Niger. The agreement was signed in 1972 by the Societe Nigerienne de Electricite (NIGELEC) of the Niger Republic and National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) of Nigeria and ratified in Niamey in March 1992. Since then, many popular cities of the Niger Republic get their electricity supply from Nigeria (Dankama, 2004:53).

On security, Nigeria and Niger collaborate in the fight against trans-border insurgency, arms and human trafficking, cybercrime, climate change, refugees' challenges, and spreads of communicable diseases (Hassan, 2013). Part of the strategy put in place to achieve this laudable objective is to establish a joint patrol to combat smuggling, human trafficking, and other forms of trans-border crimes (Hassan, 2013:43). Furthermore, there is a joint border patrol between Nigeria, Niger, and the Benin Republic at the tripartite border joining the three states. Despite the operation of tripartite joint patrol, trans-border crimes continue along the borderlines. This is evident in the number of illegal immigrants, human and arms traffickers intercepted by the tripartite patrol teams (Arzika, 2007).

Another major step taken to combat informal trans-border commercial activities between Nigeria and Niger is in the area of the road network to ease the movement of goods and people from Nigeria to the Republic of Niger. Some of the major roads linking Nigeria and Niger that were constructed by the Nigerian authorities include Kamba (Kebbi state in Nigeria) to Gaya (Dosso Department in Niger), Illela (Sokoto state in Nigeria) to Konni (Tahoua Department in Niger). Others are Jibia (Katsina state in Nigeria) to Dan- Issa (Damagaram Department in Niger), Kongolom (Katsina state in Nigeria) to Takeita (Danbarto Department in Niger), and Babura (Jigawa state in Nigeria) to Magaria (in Niger). There are other secondary roads such as Dioundiou (Dosso Department in Niger) to Kangiwa (Kebbi state in Nigeria). It is noteworthy that, the departments of Niger sharing borders with states of Nigeria are

all linked by, at least, one tarred road with exception of the department of Diffa (Niger) and Yobe and Borno states (Nigeria). These roads have assisted greatly in enhancing socio-economic interactions (Bobbo, 2003:15).

Only recently Nigerian government awarded a contract of $1.96 billion to the Russian construction firm to build a railway line from Kano-Nigeria to the Maradi-Niger Republic as part of measures to facilitate formal trans-border trade and curtail informal trans-border trade between the two countries. On completion, the project is expected to ease trans-border trade between the two countries, improve import duty and taxes and reduce the illegal movement of people through the illegal routes (Ayodeji, 2021).

Despite the aforementioned efforts by the Nigeria and Niger Republic authorities to minimize trans-border informal trade, the frontier continues to witness an upsurge in the volume of informal trans-border trade through the informal entry routes. Consequently, both countries are losing taxes worth millions of dollars. Furthermore, the activities of informal trans-border traders are aggravating various forms of trans-border crimes.

4.3.1.2 *Why does trans-border informal trade (TBIT) persist on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier*

Scholars advanced several factors responsible for the persistence of informal trans-border trade. Specifically, some scholars argue that the continuous upsurge in informal trans-border trade between Nigeria and the Niger Republic is majorly due to poor facilitation of trade and investment between the Nigerian and Nigerien authorities, lack of adequate and formal finance, poor market information, high level of illiteracy, lack of managerial skills, corruption, insecurity and poor management of the border (Africa & Ajumbo, 2012; Iliya, 2001).

Observation through the formal entry posts of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border reveals poor facilitation of formal trade between the two countries. This is evident in the number of days or weeks exporters used to clear goods. This is in addition to payment of excessive custom duty and taxation. Often, crossing the border through the formal entry points require tedious bureaucratic procedure ranging from the inspection, assessment of payable custom duty and tariffs. Documentary

requirements involve formal getting clearance from the Nigerian border security agents such as the Nigerian Customs Service, Immigration Service, Standard Organization, and National Agency for Foods Drugs Administration and Control, among others.

Lack of adequate infrastructure especially good roads linking the neighboring border communities causes excessive delays. Some of the importers interviewed complained of unnecessary bureaucratic delay in clearing goods through the formal entry points. This delay has a severe effect on a certain category of goods such as perishables. For instance, traders that deals with perishable products are forced to explore shorter illegal routes to deliver vegetables, tomatoes, oranges, banana, and other consumables. Furthermore, lack of adequate storage facilities such as functional warehouse facilities to store such goods escalates informal trade via the informal routes (Interview with a Nigerian informal trans-border trader, Illela border post, Sokoto State, April 2020).

The Lack of basic education and managerial skills to understand the basic custom procedures and regional trade protocols deny the informal trans-border traders' access to international finance from either Nigeria or Niger Republic Banks. This is compounded by the absence of banks on the rural border communities which perhaps makes trans-border informal trade a "cash and carry business" where traders carry "cash" and move in a group to minimize the possibility of armed robbery. This denies the government millions of dollars in taxation because it lacks requisite information as to what, when, and how much is being traded on the border markets. Access to finance could provide a tremendous incentive for trans-border informal traders to join the trans-border formal economy. Furthermore, a lack basic of education and financial information denies the trans-border informal traders an opportunity to tap into the potentials of regional markets. Because informal trans-border traders operate outside the basic regular scope of trans-border trading, market information on demand and supply is either minimal or unavailable to the informal trans-border traders (Asiwaju, 1992).

Currency exchange by the informal Bureau de Change operators popularly known in local vernacular as *Yan Chanji* at the border is one of the most amazing and major

enablers of informal trans-border trade. The Central Bank of Nigeria's foreign currency exchange policy recognized only corporate organizations for formal foreign exchange. Therefore, individual traders without valid registered companies must explore other options. It is interesting to note that while Nigeria uses Naira (N) as its official currency, the Republic of Niger has CFA Franc (XOF) as its official currency. This implies that for any trans-border trade to take place between the citizens of the two states, currency exchange must take place. All through the major formal and informal entry points along the border, one can easily sight both Nigerien and Nigerian currency exchange operators waiting for customers (Meagher, 2003). The currency exchange is on a cash basis. You give the *Yan Chanji* Naira they give you CFA Franc and vice versa. However, due to the frequent armed robbery attacks on the traders, they changed their mode of operations. They collect money and issue a note of equivalent to their customers who collect either naira or CFA Franc from their branches at the customer's destination (Interview with a Bureau De Change operator, Jibia border post, Katsina State, January 2021).

However, as Nigerian authorities continue to channel resources and energy to issues such as roads, postal services, employment opportunities, security, and electricity supply, with little attention to the management of the porous borders between the two countries. Hence, the ineffective management of the porous borders significantly continues to increase the volume of informal trans-border trade across the Nigeria-Niger Republic border (Boureima, 2014). This is compounded by the unfavorable dynamics of the border in the areas of poor facilitation of formal trade, high level of illiteracy, lack of formal finance, corruption, insecurity, and poor living conditions of the residents of the border communities.

4.4 Sub-regional economic integration and border security in West Africa: An assessment of ECOWAS protocol on the management of trans-border arms on the Nigeria-Niger border

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 as a sub-regional organization by the West African states to promote economic cooperation and the development of member states. In an attempt to realize it is founding objectives, the organization adopted the ECOWAS protocol on freedom of movement, establishment, and right of residency of citizens of member states in

1979. The protocol aims to create a borderless sub-region through a single market, currency, and free tariff zone. However, four decades after, the content of the protocol remains the same and operational despite numerous trans-border security challenges bedeviling the sub-region. Hence, this section examines the security challenges associated with the implementation of the protocol and how it contributed to the porosity of the Nigeria/Niger borders. Specifically, the section diagnoses how undocumented migration of ECOWAS citizens across the Nigeria-Niger border rendered the frontier a gateway for trans-border arms trafficking.

The quest for economic development and regional integration among West African countries necessitate the establishment of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) in 1975. According to the ECOWAS treaty, the central objective of the sub-regional organization is:

> Promote co-operation and integration leading to the establishment of an economic order in West Africa that is geared towards raising the living standard of citizens of Member States, enhance economic stability, foster relations among member states and contribute to the progress and development of the African continent ECOWAS Treaty (1975:1).

To achieve the above laudable sub-regional integration agenda, ECOWAS enacted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence, and Establishment of the citizens of the community in 1979. The protocol granted ECOWAS citizens the right of free entry and exit within the borders of ECOWAS member states for a maximum period of 90 days. After the commencement of the Protocol, member states were given 15 years to fully implement the protocol. Within the first five years of the establishment of the protocol, the use of visas in ECOWAS member states was abolished (ECOWAS protocol, 1979).

In an attempt to further consolidate the protocol, article 2(2) of the treaty requires member states to abolish all forms of obstacles preventing its implementation to build a solid foundation for regional cooperation and integration in the West African sub-region (Ochoga, 2019). Since its inception, Nigeria and other member states have been committed to the full implementation of the protocol despite trans-border security exigencies of the moment. Thus, the upsurge of trans-border arms

trafficking and other forms of trans-border crimes are enough recipes to question the inter-connectivity between the trans-border free movement and trans-border crimes in West Africa. Opanike (2016:6) argues that the security of lives and properties of Nigerians seems to be more threatened now than before with the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency and farmer-herder crisis and proliferation of arms. The rural banditry in Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Kaduna, and the other North-Eastern States bordering the Nigeria-Niger Republic is a clear manifestation of the trans-border security challenge confronting the northern region and Nigeria as at large.

Only recently, the former Nigerian Inspector-General of Police, IG Mohammed Adamu while briefing the quarterly Northern Traditional Rulers' Council Meeting reported that 1,071 deaths were recorded in crime-related cases and about 685 persons were kidnapped across the country in the first quarter of 2019. Needless to say, that most of these murder and kidnapping cases are linked to trans-border arms trafficking. A review of the breakdown of the figures shows that Northern Nigeria which shares a border with Southern Niger topped the national crime prevalence chart with 767 murder cases. The North-West that share border with Niger led the chart with 436 murder cases followed by the North-Central with 250. Zamfara alone – one of the seven states in the North-west has the highest national prevalence rate with 203 murder cases out of which 104 cases were related to armed banditry. Kaduna, Benue, Katsina, and Sokoto states recorded 112, 90, 21, and 19 deaths, respectively (Punch 2019). Consequently, people are living in fear, desperation and perpetual psychological trauma in the affected states, local governments, towns, and villages while the bandits kill and kidnap people at will, displace them from their homes and burn their belongings. Refugees comprising women, children, and elderly in their large numbers have forcefully taken over the public building, particularly schools forcing the government to shut down hundreds of primary schools and colleges.

However, the vast literature on ECOWAS protocol is uncertain whether or not the implementation of the protocol comes with some trans-border security implications for member states. Especially, for countries with porous borders such as Nigeria (Hoffmann & Melly 2015). For instance, the borderland between Nigeria and the Niger Republic alone is approximately 1500 km (Cross-border Diaries 2008). The

porous nature of the borders is compounded by inadequate border security personnel, poor logistics, obsolete digital surveillance facilities, and corruption among the Nigeria and Niger Republic border security agencies. Furthermore, the complex border terrain has created multiple unpoliced footpaths used by trans-border arms traffickers and other criminals to cross the border at will (Miles, 1994; Miles 2005; Okunade 2017; Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpan-Robaro 2013).

The trans-border security-related challenges of the Protocol such as trans-border arms trafficking tends to undermine the national security of ECOWAS member states. Despite this apprehension, Nigeria continues to give much attention to the full implementation of the Protocol with little or no interest in the security implications that are associate with it. The questions that come to mind are: How does the poor implementation of the ECOWAS protocol on free movement constitute a security threat to Nigeria? Is ECOWAS protocol making the Nigeria-Niger Republic border a gateway for trans-border arms trafficking?

Based on the above questions, the section below interrogates whether or not there is a nexus or causal relationship between the ECOWAS protocol on free movement, residency, and the establishment and the influx of trans-border arms into Nigeria through the Nigeria- Niger Republic border.

4.4.1 The nexus between ECOWAS protocol and trans-border arms trafficking on Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier

Theoretically, the formation of ECOWAS as a West African states' sub-regional union is anchored on economic integration theory which is associated with the groundworks of Viner (1950); Meade (1955), and Balassa (1961). The basic assumptions of the theory are that removal of tariffs, single external trade restrictions on non-members, harmonization of trade policies, unification of national monetary policies, acceptance of a common currency, and free movement of products, people, and residency among member states all contribute to economic growth and development.

There is no doubt that the necessity for economic integration, which includes the free flow of people, products, and services, prompted the adoption of the protocol on the free movement of persons, right of residence, and establishment in 1979. The framework's major purpose is to assist, nurture, and accelerate the economic and

social growth of member countries, as well as to improve the living conditions of their people (ECOWAS Protocol, 1979). The protocol's first phase guaranteed nationals of member states visa-free entry for ninety days, and it was ratified by all member states in 1980. The protocol's second step, the right of residency, went into effect in July 1986, while the right of the establishment went into effect in 1990. (Agyei & Clottey, 2006; Edeko, 2016). However, the nature and manner in which the protocol is been implemented have become a source of security debate among scholars.

To start with, The ECOWAS policy of integration is anchored on the principle of unrestricted international mobility and free trade which is in line with the philosophy of the common market theory. The essence is to remove encumbrances that are capable of militating the movement of citizens and goods within the member-states (Ochoga, 2019). In other words, the ECOWAS policy of integration believes that the colonial boundaries in Africa divided West African states into smaller political units that made individual states' development an impossible mission. Hence, breaking the relevance of the physical boundaries through sub-regional economic integration becomes the only answer. It is on this premise that Wilson, (2015:4) contends that the demarcation of the boundaries by the colonial powers divided territorial frontiers but the aged long economic and socio-political affection existing among border communities seems to make such demarcation an artificial exercise.

Thus, the common practice was that every community know where its territory begins and where its ends. This kind of ancient border system was necessitated by the fear of the unknown which characterized the African societies in antiquity. The legal and administrative utility of the ancient African borders management system was aptly captured by Anene (1970) as cited in Asemanya (2006: 21).

Generally, three types of frontiers zones may be identified in pre-colonial Africa. These are- zone of contact, zone of separation, and mixed frontiers. Frontiers of contact usually existed in which different cultural and political groups lived side by side, and intermingled with themselves in normally well-populated areas. Most of the politically active groups were likely to acquire this type of boundary. This implies that most of the Nigerian boundaries with other West African states have had frontiers of separation. Considering that there was traditionally a border system

based on heterogeneous communities typical of Nigeria and its West African neighbors. thus, the take-home message from Anene's contention is that even the pre-colonial African societies had their system of the boundary of which security reasons are not excluded. In antiquity, this boundary system is rooted in enclaves but not the conventional frontiers in its sense. While boundary was not an obstacle to migration among the different ethnic groups who lived in the Nigeria-Niger, Nigeria-Benin, etc. border areas, the nomadic groups, especially the Fulani, who move from place to place, looking for water and suitable grassland for their cattle (Asemanya 2006). For instance, the nomadic occupation of the herdsmen who dominated the Nigeria-Niger border villages and communities is to a large extent prepared the gateway for economic, political, and social integration of the communities with little or no regard to the security challenges of such influx. Thus, the forces of the historic integration have made the colonial boundary borderless zones. Before the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, those Nigerian border communities in, Sokoto, Zamfara, Katsina, and the Kebbi States that bordered West African states were mainly fragmented independent communities (so-called stateless societies), who were subjected to no particular central authority. It is against this premise that Nasiru (2015:98) argues that earlier than now, mobility through the West African borders poses no significant security to other African states. Such migration was largely for economic interest.

While agreeing with Nasiru's argument that colonial demarcation cannot completely abolish the historical, political, economic, and cultural integration of the Nigeria-Niger border communities in the altar of mere boundaries, the exigencies of the moment for calls for security caution (Afolayan, 1988; Nasiru, 1999; Nasiru, 2015; Ochoga, 2019). Aside from the historical affection, the forces of marriage, religious and cultural similarities, trade, and political interest have further consolidated the historic games of integration among the communities. These epic phenomena encourage the influx of Nigeriens and other West Africans into Nigeria of which such inter-state movement falls within the purview of illegal or undocumented migration (Nasiru 2015; Black, King, & Tiemoko, 2003).

The Nigeria Immigration Service reports that the majority of West Africans residing in Nigeria do not follow normal procedures and as such, the Service does not have their data. This revelation called for concern as nationals of Niger, Mali, and other

West African nationals have been alleged to be part of the Boko Haram sects and herders posing a security threat to Nigeria (Daily trust, Nigeria, June 12, 2012; The Sun, Nigeria, August 25, 2017; Daily Trust, Nigeria, April 7, 2018). Thus. it appears that one main cause contributing to increased insecurity in northern Nigeria is the country's porous borderland with the Niger Republic. This indicates that the porous nature of Nigeria's borders poses a severe security threat to the country. This is as a result of the porous nature of Nigeria's borders, unjustifiable influxes of illegal migrants and trans-border arms traffickers from neighboring nations such as the Republic of Niger, Chad, Ghana, and the Republic of Benin have occurred (Adepoju, 2002),).

In allying with the above revelation by the Nigeria Immigration Service, the nexus between the ECOWAS protocol on free movement and influx of trans-border arms shows a dependent relationship. In other words, Nigeria's national security may have been affected by the influx of West Africans and illicit arms into Nigeria under the ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency. To this end, Ochoga (2019:87) support this viewpoint on the ground that:

> ECOWAS has paid so much attention to the economic and socio-cultural benefits of integration of member-states and little attention to the security implications associated with the influx of foreign migrants…

With the lingering security challenges and the inability of the Nigerian security apparatus to guarantee the safety and security of Nigerians, there is a need to examine the socio-cultural issues such as ethnic fragmentation, cultural affinity, and the ethnopolitical cleavages of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border communities that have made the borderline to be artificial boundaries and a gateway for arms trans-border arms trafficking.

Secondly, the clamoring for sub-regional economic integration by ECOWAS has been overemphasized to the extent that, little attention on the security threat in which such influx of trans-border arms is ignored. Uba (2016:45) categorically states that economic, cultural, and ethno-religious integration of the border communities of Nigeria-Niger has propelled unrestricted immigration into Nigeria and its latent

security threat to the country, particularly northern Nigeria. The ECOWAS protocol on free movement and trade regime has further worsened the situation.

While Uba's reasoning is sound logical, African countries have generally been affected by weapons proliferation in direct, indirect, and consequential ways. Thousands of people are being killed or injured every year on the continent, both civilians and combatants. Even if no one is killed or injured, small guns proliferation and their misuse can have a significant influence on a community, country, or region's landscape. The threat and use of small guns can stymie progress, obstruct humanitarian and economic aid, and exacerbate the plight of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) (Stohl and Tuttle, 2009).

Despite the efforts of border security agencies, Nigeria's borders have been described as porous, allowing all types of cross-border or trans-border criminal activities such as human trafficking, smuggling, drug trafficking, armed robbery, money laundering, and trans-border arms trafficking to take place. For example, in 2011, it was projected that 100 million of the 640 million small weapons circulating globally were detected in Africa, including 30 million in Sub-Saharan Africa and 8 million in West Africa alone. The majority of this SALW are in civilian hands, with 59 percent in the hands of civilians, 38 percent in the hands of government armed forces, 2.8 percent in the hands of police, and 0.2 percent in the hands of armed organizations (Ibrahim, 2003; Stohl and Tuttle, 2009; Nte, 2011 and Ochoga 2019). In the same direction of thought, Ochoga (2019:76) posited that between 1999 and 2016, there were over 80 communal clashes, sectarian violence, and ethno-religious conflicts with each claiming hundreds of lives and properties, and internal displacement of women and children. The proliferation and use of SALW in ethno-religious clashes and armed robbery have killed more than 10,000 Nigerians, an average of 1000 people per year since 1999.

While agreeing with Ochoga's line of thought, the aforementioned symptoms are associated with Nigeria's security challenges is the most worrying issue. It, therefore, needs to be properly interrogated. To make the matter worse, while the ECOWAS inter-state movement policy does not take into consideration the adequate legal framework, ethnic fragmentation, and cultural affinity of the border communities on

the Nigeria-Niger border. These factors individually and in combination encourage the influx of illegal immigrants and arms into Nigeria. More so, the complexity of this problem is further compounded with the tendency for the similar ethnic groups in Nigeria and Niger to take advantage of their homogenous character for personal gains.

Another complexity associated with the implementation of ECOWAS protocol on free movement is making the frontier a crime-transit zone. Thus, Opanike and Aduloju (2016) argue that the Nigeria-Niger border has become transit zones for all forms of trans-border crimes. Thousands are dying at the hands of human traffickers who trafficked people from Nigeria to Europe through the desert via Nigeria-Niger-Algeria-Libya borders. They opined that the problem lies with the poor implementation of the protocol, and as such trans-border criminals are now taking undue advantage of the protocol'. To this end, Ochoga (2019) corroborated this position further:

> The protocol has not helped the security landscape of the sub-region. It is constituting more security concerns than boosting regional trade and economic development. Furthermore, the border security agents have turned border security into private business, encouraging smuggling of contrabands into Nigeria with just a tip of tokens.

Be that as it may, while there are so many works on the functionality and potentiality of ECOWAS protocol on free movement, but literature on the causal linkage between the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and border security of members states are sketchy (Opanike and Aduloju (2016); Ochoga (2019). Hence, the imperative of interrogating the link between the Protocol and trans-border arms trafficking on the volatile Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

The foregoing literature reveals that previous studies on ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization have neglected whether or not the implementation of ECOWAS protocol by the Nigerian authorities has contributed to the influx of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. Based on the literature reviewed, the study has been able to establish a nexus between the ECOWAS protocol on free movement, and poor management of the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

Consequently, citizens of the community, particularly those from the Niger Republic have taken advantage of the poor implementation of the protocol to engage in various trans-border crimes such as trans-border arms trafficking which continue to undermine Nigeria's national security.

No doubt, the formation of ECOWAS and enactment of protocol on the free movement of persons, establishment, and residency have helped to re-create borderless West African sub-region which existed before colonial rule. Although the free flow of citizens of member states has increased considerably within the sub-region in the last three and half decades, the challenges associated with the implementation of the protocol have been a major source of security concern for most of the member states, especially those with porous borders. Member states must work towards addressing challenges such as poor border management, illegal migration, national insecurity, and unstable economies of the member states as well as possession of multiple national identities by citizens of the member states among others.

To optimize the positive impact of the protocol, there is a need for a holistic review of the content of the protocol, harmonization, and implementation of new migration policies in line with the current security realities of member states. The most critical areas of the review must include evolving citizens database policy reforms, tackling trans-border informal trade, undocumented migration, and taking bold steps to minimize every form of trans-border trafficking. Globalization and the changing dynamics of migration in the world which commenced many years ago have led to the convergence of states to cooperate and review migration policies and laws. Since the provisions of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of persons, residence and establishment do not stop member countries to demand travel documents as contained in Articles 2, 3, and 5 of the protocol, the border security of member states must at every entry point demand valid travel document from the nationals of other member states crossing the border. Equally, they must be registered while residing in other countries because there is no provision in the protocol that prevents the Immigration agents of member states from registering them.

CHAPTER 5

TOWARDS A NEW BORDERING STRATEGY AGAINST ARMS TRAFFICKING

5.0 Introduction

As mentioned earlier, surveillance strategy has failed to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border against trans-border arms trafficking largely because the approach is incompatible with the peculiarities and the general conditions of the border. Hence, the need for an alternative model that can effectively control the influx of trans-border arms into Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the prospect of whistleblowing as a new model to supplement the current surveillance approach against trans-border arms trafficking. It also explains why we consider whistleblowing as a more viable than other options such as local policing and digitalization of the borders.For emphasis, the chapter does not suggest the total discontinuance of border surveillance but emphasized that the two approaches should be implemented simultaneously to effectively secure the border against trans-border arms trafficking. Specifically, the chapter argues that based on the performance of the whistleblowing policy in sectors such as banking, public governance, drug trafficking, and smuggling of contrabands, the Nigerian government can extend the coverage of the policy to trans-border arms trafficking. On this basis, the section argues that if the policy is implemented in the control of trans-border arms, the influx of trans-border arms on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier will be reduced drastically. To further buttress the prospects of the policy in the control of trans-border arms trafficking, we interviewed key stakeholders to examine the prospect of whistleblowing as a mechanism for controlling the influx of trans-border arms through the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

5.1 Why whistleblowing model is chosen as a complementary approach?

The search for an alternative model in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier has been one of the most daunting tasks. This is because we wanted a workable solution and an approach that has been tested proven in similar areas. While searching for a viable alternative, three alternatives were carefully examined; these are local policing system, digitalization of the borders, and Whistleblowing approach.

Local Policing: The thesis considers local policing as a viable approach because we wanted a border community-friendly approach that would ensure the incorporation of the residents of the border communities in the management of the borders. Furthermore, in the last decade, many troubled States in Nigeria have either switched from conventional policing to community policing or at least, incorporate it to complement conventional policing. In North-Eastern Nigeria, the Borno State government has incorporated the locals under the auspices of the Civilian Joint Task Force (popularly known as Civilian JTF) to complement the efforts of the Nigerian Police and Military in the fight against the dreaded Boko Haram insurgents. Presently, there are over 26,000 members of the Civilian JTF in Northern Borno and Yobe States (The Defense Post, 2019).

In North-Western Nigeria, the Zamfara State government has recruited the locals popularly known as *Yan Sakai* (Vigilante) to provide and share intelligence with the conventional police to defeat the bandits, kidnappers, and cattle rustlers terrorizing the people of Zamfara State. The Amotekun in South Western Nigeria serves as local police complementing the effort of the federal police in the geo-political zone. The formation of the security network was a product of consensus among the South Western States governors of Oyo, Ondo, Lagos, Ekiti, Osun, and Ogun State to have a local security outfit to combat local crimes. Personnel of the security outfit are directly drawn from the local population, including local hunters and vigilante groups among others (Dayo J. 2021).

Beyond the Nigerian shores, many police Departments in the United States have migrated to Community Based Oriented Policing (CBOP) from traditional reactive policing. Nearly 85 percent of police agencies across the United States were practicing CBOP or intended to adopt programs in the future (Thurman &Reisig,

1996). According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (Reaves & Hickman, 2004), nearly all larger county (94%), municipal (95%), and sheriff (88%) police agencies employed full-time community policing officers in 1999. Furthermore, a full-time community policing unit was present in 68 percent of bigger municipal and 66 percent of county police departments. Furthermore, CBOP is seen by many police agencies as a viable tool for resolving local issues, reducing crimes, and enhancing police-community ties (Maguire, 1997; Zhao, 1996; Zhao & Thurman, 1997). CBOP is currently in its third phase of development and has been institutionalized in police agencies across the US (Oliver, 2000). As a result, CBOP has become not just a popular but viable policing technique (Worrall & Zhao, 2003; Oliver, 2000).

However, despite its tendency and prospects to reduce crimes, local policing is not a common border security governance in Africa. Within the Nigerian context, local policing may be difficult to implement as a bordering strategy because it may require a constitutional amendment. The 1999 constitution of Nigeria as amended, is clear about the agencies of government saddled with the responsibility to secure the Nigerian borders. Besides, border security governance is a sensitive matter that the Nigerian government may feel uncomfortable to allow locals to take charge of its borders (Interview with Senior academic in one of the local universities, September 18, 2020). In addition, serving in any of Nigeria's military or para-military organization require criteria such as level of education, age, and physical/mental fitness. For instance, recruitment into the Nigeria Immigration and Customs Service requires a minimum of a High School certificate which the majority of the residents of the border communities may not possess.

The digitalization of borders may sound logical and a viable border security strategy. In Europe, America, and some parts of Asia, information and communication technologies (ICTs) play a significant role in mobility governance and the general management of their borders (Trauttmansdorff, 2017). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the US and for effective mobility governance, the US and other European countries commenced massive digitizing their borders. Most importantly, national security imperatives and political rationales play a vital role in advancing border digitization across the world (Dennis & James, 2013). However, border digitalization is quite an expensive project that requires not just adequate funding, but technological advancement. In addition, enabling environment and surveillance

facilities in terms of energy, telecommunication services, robots, air supports the system, and skilled manpower is not just necessities but an indispensable requirement for digitalization. This suggests that Nigeria may not be ready for digitalization because the present condition of the Nigerian borders is not compatible with digitalization. For instance, Nigeria shares approximately 4,500 kilometers of land border with its neighbors with thousands of borderlands communities on the borders. The majority of the Nigerian border communities are not connected with electricity, telecommunication services, roads networks, coupled with the porous and lengthy nature of the border that stands at approximately 1,500 kilometers of land borders made digitalization rather an impossible task. Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the world with over half of the population living below the poverty level. Currently, the internal security challenges are the priorities of the country. For instance, in April 2019, the Federal Executive Council (FEC) approved N52 billion (approximately $I billion) for electronic gadgets at the country's borders Tuesday in Abuja. The government argues that only the installation of technology gadgets could provide adequate border control and effective monitoring which necessitating the approval of N52 billion for the implementation of e-borders. The program is yet to commence due to the paucity of funds (Omololu, 2019).

Whistleblowing: is found to be not only viable but border community-friendly. It's the most compatible with the residents and conditions of the border. Since the trans-border arms traffickers give cash incentives to residents of the border in exchange for information, the government can equally do the same to source intelligence about trans-border arms traffickers. the beauty of whistleblowing unlike local policing is that nobody is going to be on the government payroll. It requires no formal education or college certificate. All categories of residents such as men, women, young, and adults can supply information about arms traffickers via a dedicated platform. Once the intelligence is proven to is genuine and led to the interception of arms, incentives would be given to the whistleblower to encourage others to do the same. It's a system that rewards individuals based on their ability and performance. The challenge with whistleblowing is adequate legislation that would protect the identity of the whistleblower. Furthermore, we drive inspiration from the performance of the policy in many sectors in Nigeria.

5.2 Whistleblowing policy

Whistleblowing is one of the viable mechanisms introduced by governments across the world to control the spread of corruption, especially in public institutions. It is often implemented as a mechanism to contain public corruption by countries with pervasive corruption in public governance. The key objective of the policy is to expose and report corrupt practices and public servants to the appropriate authorities for public transparency and accountability (Qudus&Fahm, 2021). This suggests that for whistleblowing to occur, there must be financial irregularity, a crime being committed or about to be committed, and a whistleblower who reports the crime to the appropriate authorities. In this context, a whistleblower is a person who acts as a third party by reporting wrongdoing to the appropriate authorities for sanctions (Akinnaso, 2016).

The whistleblowing policy is usually introduced through an online (anonymous) portal to facilitate disclosures bordering on financial malpractice such as stealing and misappropriation of public funds or assets by public officials to the appropriate authorities to protect the public interest. (Samad, Khalid, &Kayadibi, 2015). Whistleblowing has no limited application or coverage as it can be applied in any organization be it private or public. If implemented and backed by necessary legislation, it can serve as a powerful tool for the entrenchment of a robust and viable corporate governance mechanism that could aid anti-corruption campaigns (Nwoke 2019; Onuegbulam 2017).

However, in the context of this study, whistleblowing is defined as any act of reporting or disclosing to the appropriate Nigeria border security agencies such as Immigration, Customs, Police among others any genuine information bordering on trans-border arms traffickers. This includes their movement, arms, and ammunition, local agents, routes of supply, and any other vital information that would lead to the interception of the traffickers and their consignment for cash incentives.

5.3 Whistleblowing policy and the management of corruption, smuggling of contrabands, and drugs trafficking in Nigeria

Corruption has been described by scholars as the greatest challenge facing the corporate existence of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It has led to the

impoverishment of the majority of the citizens, ethno-religious armed violence, death of citizens, and continue to threaten the political stability of the country. Historically, Nigeria's large-scale public corruption manifested on the 16th January 1966 after the military junta accused the democratically elected government of Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Nnamdi Azikwe of perpetuating pervasive public corruption. This accusation led to the overthrow of the first Republican civilian administration. Since then, successive governments have been waging war against corruption using a peculiar mechanism, institution, or policies (Otunuga, 2016).

After Nigeria's return to Democracy in 1999, successive governments have initiated various legal instruments, policies and established independent anti-corruption institutions to champion the war against corruption in Nigeria. In line with Nigeria's desire to combat corruption, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) were established and inaugurated in 2000 and 2003 respectively to contain corruption. The two commissions were backed by adequate legislation, funding, administrative capacity, quality manpower, necessary political support, and government commitment (Enweremadu (2012).

However, despite the enabling environment for the two commissions to operate and succeed, the independence and neutrality of the anti-corruption agencies were often questioned particularly by the opposition political parties and civil society organizations. This is evident in the massive corruption allegations against the former President Jonathan's administration which was one of the key factors that led to his electoral defeat in the 2015 general election and the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari who promised to improve security, economy and fight against widespread public corruption.

5.4 Introduction and application of whistleblowing policy in Nigeria's institutions

As part of strategies to contain pervasive public corruption, President Muhammadu Buhari's administration formally introduced a whistleblowing policy to checkmate widespread corruption in Nigeria's public institutions. At this point, it is imperative to note that, before its formal declaration as a corruption control mechanism by the

Federal Government of Nigeria, the policy has been in operation informally in some of the federal government agencies such as Nigeria Customs Service (NCS) and National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). However, the formal policy document was prepared by Nigeria's Federal Ministry of Finance and approved by Nigeria's Federal Executive Council on the 22nd of December 2016. At the initial stage of the implementation of the policy, it encountered enormous legal challenges as a result of the lack of a comprehensive legal framework. To address the challenges of a legal framework, Nigeria's National Assembly comprising the Senate and the House of Representatives, commenced proceedings and enacted the Whistleblowing Protection Bill 2017. The primary purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate legislation by strengthening the legal application of the provisions of the policy documents. Section 3 of the Bill clearly defined whistleblowing as an act of disclosure on financial wrongdoing by the public officer, government agency, or public contractor. According to the bill, wrongdoing is not only limited to offenses that have been committed, it also entails, an attempt to be involved in improper financial conduct (Sylvester and Gabriel, 2017:36). The bill goes ahead to define a whistleblower as a person who reports any financial wrongdoing and dishonesty either in a private and public organization to appropriate authorities (Ogbu, 2017).

Furthermore, the bill provided that for any disclosure to be to qualify as whistleblowing, it must be verifiable, correct, and genuine about the crime being reported. This implies that the bill does not only frown at false disclosure, misleading or malicious information but spelled out the sanctions that come with such acts. Specifically, the bill criminalizes any inaccurate or misleading information about the government agency, public servants, or contractor with three years' imprisonment, a fine of N500,000 (US$ 1400 US), or as deemed fit by the presiding Judge (Sylvester and Gabriel, 2017). According to Nigeria's whistleblowing policy document, any whistleblower who supplies genuine information to the appropriate authority that led to the recovery of looted funds or confiscation of government properties from any public officer or contractor is entitled to the sum of 2.5% of the recovered loot or value of the confiscated property (s) (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2018).

Since the inception of the whistleblowing policy in Nigeria, the mechanism has been yielding positive results in many public and private institutions. It has led to arrest,

prosecution, and conviction of not just lower and middle-class public and private sector officials, but high-profile individuals, including former Governors, Ministers, and Heads of government agencies. As an anti-corruption mechanism, whistleblowing has proven to be an effective and invaluable instrument for fighting corruption. It enables the disclosure of "violation of financial regulations, mismanagement of public funds and assets, financial malpractice and theft that is deemed to be in the interest of the public" (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2019: 2). Nigeria's minister of information and culture reports that two months after the commencement of the policy, US $151 million (approx. US$2.2) and another 8 billion naira looted funds were recovered from public servants through a tip-off by three whistleblowers.   He added that, as early as 2017, the federal government was investigating over 2,200 cases whistleblowing cases instituted against high-profile public servants. According to the Minister, 95 of these cases were reported through a whistleblowing website, 1,550 cases were reported through a dedicated telephone line, 94 through emails, and 412 through text messages (Chima, 2017).

The section below would focus on the selected cases and successes recorded in some Nigerian institutions. Examples were drawn from Nigeria's banking sector, National Assembly, fight against illicit drugs, and other economic and financial crimes in the public sector to buttress the effectiveness of the whistleblowing policy and its prospect in curtailing corruption and other economic crimes in Nigeria.

In the Nigerian Customs Service (NCS), whistleblowing policy has been applied by the federal government of Nigeria as part of strategies to curtail the smuggling of contraband goods. Between January 2004 and April 2005, through whistleblowing, the Nigeria Custom seized a total number of 745 smuggled goods, these include 422 used vehicles and 323 other goods. The goods were valued at ₦2.094 billion (approx. US$5.8million). In April 2015, the Nigerian Customs Service collected a duty levy valued at N247.526 million (approx. US$695,297.76). Similarly, through whistleblowing Customs officials arrested two passengers with US$371,403, 2 Shekels, and US$318,000 respectively at Nnamdi Azikwe International Airport (Nigeria Customs Service, 2019).

In the banking sector, the former Central Bank Governor of Nigeria, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi blew the whistle by alleging that the sum of US$20b was missing in the

account of the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporations (NNPC) (Sylvester and Gabriel, 2017:37). Another prominent case via whistleblowing was the recovery of US$136,676,600.51 from a fictitious account in a commercial bank whose owner could not explain the source of the money after an investigation by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and other relevant authorities (Alli, 2017).

In 2016, the Nigerian National Assembly was on the front pages of the Nigerian newspapers after a member of the House of Representatives, Honorable AbdulmuminJibrin blew the whistle. He accused the leadership of the House of Representatives of padding the 2016 Appropriation Bill (budget) by unlawfully adding expenditure valued at ₦481 billion (approx. US$1.3 billion) for the members of the Parliament (House of Representatives) contrary to the provision of section 81 (1) of the Nigeria Constitution which allocates such powers to only the executive arm of government (Udude&Igwe, 2017). On 7 April 2017, a young man (name withheld) disclosed to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission foreign currency valued at ₦13,000,000,000.00 (approx. US$36.5million) hidden in a flat No. 7B Osborne Towers, Ikoyi Lagos state (Adebowale and Chinwe, 2018). In recovering public funds that were looted by Nigerian politicians, whistleblowing has been a huge success. According to the former acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) - Ibrahim Magu, over 30N billion (approx. US$84.5million) of looted funds have been recovered in 2017 after the commencement of the whistleblowing policy (Onjeyi, 2017). He further stated that the policy has led to hundreds of actionable tips that resulted in the following cash recoveries: N527, 643,500; US$53,222,747; £21,222,890 and €547,730 (Premium Times 2017).

In the fight against illicit drugs, Whistleblowing has yielded positive results. For instance, the National Drugs Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) has recorded a modest success using whistleblowing. In 2017, the NDLEA acting on a tip-off made a massive seizure of Cannabis Sativa weighing 34,030kg with an estimated value of ₦364 million (approx. $1million) at the Shagari Housing Estate in Akure, Ondo State (Onjeyi, 2017). Again, in 2017, following a tip-off by a whistleblower, NDLEA located and destroyed a farm of 16 hectares of Cannabis Sativa in Osun State (Vanguard 2017). In 2019, a 95-year-old man – James Salihu was arrested by the NDLEA at SupareAkoko area of Ondo State for dealing in Cannabis Sativa. The

arrest was made possible by a tip-off by some members of the community (Dada, 2019). Similar discovery (though of varying degrees) and arrests have been made by the agency in other parts of Nigeria, including the East and the North.

Accordingly, the Federal Ministry of Finance reports that whistleblowing as an anti-corruption mechanism has proved effective and invaluable. This is because it enables disclosure of "violation of financial regulations, mismanagement of public funds and assets, financial malpractice or fraud and theft that is deemed to be in the interest of the public" (Federal Ministry of Finance 2019, p.2). Whistleblowing tends to be more effective when it is driven by a reward system such as cash rewards and other incentives. Its success in the ongoing public loot recovery initiative by the Nigerian Federal Government is mainly because of the reward that awaits any whistleblower who gives useful tip-off.

No doubt, successful whistleblowing requires courage that is why the government gives a blower monetary compensation to encourage others to expose illegalities. For instance, the Ikoyi whistleblower received the sum of ₦421,000,000.00 (approx. US$1.1million) in addition to fourteen others that received ₦439,276,000.00 (approx. US$1.2million) for disclosing tax evaders. This shows that whistleblowing may not only serve as a source of income to the blowers, but it may change the whistleblowers living conditions and encourage others to do the same (Ameh, 2018).

Furthermore, because of the inherent risk, the Nigerian central legislature – the National Assembly (Senate and House of Representatives has passed the Whistle-blower Protection Bill into law. The law seeks to protect persons making the disclosure (whistleblower) for public interests and others from possible reprisal and to ensure that the matters disclosed be properly investigated and dealt with decisively (Punch 2017).

From the few cases cited above, whistleblowing continues to yield positive results in Nigeria's fight against illicit drugs, smuggling, and corruption in both public and private institutions. As suggested earlier, the whistleblowing model can be adopted and adapted to supplement the current conventional border management approach, which has been inadequate in the control of trans-border arms trafficking. The section proposed that for any successful disclosure that led to the interception of the trans-border arms, the whistleblower should be entitled to a cash reward to be

determined by the policy framework and appropriate authorities. Because of the inherent risk, it would require Nigeria's National Assembly to enact a new bill or amend the existing bill on whistleblowing to accommodate whistleblowing on trans-border arms trafficking. The policy would go a long way in balancing the asymmetric information being enjoyed by trans-border arms traffickers.

5.5 Towards a new paradigm in border security: The prospect of whistleblowing in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border

Managing trans-border arms trafficking on a volatile frontier such as the Nigeria-Niger border is a daunting task that requires constant review and adjustment of strategies to accommodate and proactively confront new challenges that usually arise. Although challenges such as trans-border arms trafficking may require a trans-national response, the ensuing internal security threats and the exigency they demand make it imperative that every state initiate and pursue a proactive internal response to border security. Moreover, borders are unique and even amid the growing trans-border insecurity, every state has some "peculiarities" to its border issue(s) that are better handled through internally tailored response. Thus, the possibility of a "valid general border security" composed of universal statements that could be tested in cases of individual borders and valid everywhere" is doubtful (Paasi 2009, p.222) and perhaps unnecessary. At best, what can be done is to develop an integrated or a sub-model of the border that builds on the existing conventional border theories/models and which must among other things, take cognizance of the specific culture, needs, and peculiarities of the border communities (Brunet-Jailly 2005).

Surveillance is largely effective because it does not only seem torpid and inelastic to adjustment but most importantly, has failed to factor in the development needs and peculiar nature of the border communities though border porosity and corruption among border security personnel are also contributory factors. It is this lack of adjustment of strategies to confront evolving realities as regard border security that has perpetuated asymmetrical information flow in favor of the trans-border arms traffickers to the detriment of effective border security.

Reversing this trend requires turning the asymmetrical information play into an opportunity through incentive-induced whistleblowing in which the inhabitants of

the border communities will be given incentives in exchange for any privy information that leads to the interception of trans-border arms.

In the context of this study, whistleblowing is defined as any genuine information by the residents of the border communities on the trans-border arms traffickers, their weapons, and agents (including those in the security agencies) to Nigeria's border security agencies that leads to the arrest or interception of trans-border arms on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border for cash rewards. In the context of reporting trans-border arms trafficking on the border, two types of whistleblowing have been considered; internal and external whistleblowing. Internal whistleblowing occurs when the whistleblower reporting the trafficking is within any of Nigeria's border security agencies. This suggests that there is a need secret or anonymous whistleblowing channel that would safeguard the whistleblower's safety and allows the organization to respond quickly to any difficulties that may occur. The external whistleblower is a third party outside the Nigerian border security agencies who report to the security agencies or relevant authorities any information regarding trans-border arms trafficking on the border. For the security of both internal and external whistleblowers, the policy would not only guarantee their anonymity but rewards them accordingly. Each of these alternatives would have its own set of procedures. Disclosures, on the other hand, are only valid if they are genuine and made in good faith (with the belief that the reporting was the right thing to do).

The success recorded by the whistleblowing policy in Nigerian institutions as explained earlier can equally work in managing trans-border arms trafficking on Nigeria-Niger Republic frontiers. In an interview with a traditional ruler in one of the border towns, the community leader argues that the federal government abandoned residents of the Nigeria-Niger border in terms of infrastructural development such as hospitals, schools, roads etcetera. At the same time, the Nigerian border security agencies neglected the role of the border communities and exclude them in the management of the frontier. As such, the arms traffickers took the advantage and recruit them into their syndicate as informant. He suggests that one of the ways governments can reverse the situation is to develop the border communities while the border security agencies should promote cordial relationship with residents of the borders. He further argues that the cash incentives that would come with the whistleblowing will put food on the tables of many families and encourage other

residents of the border to provide information to border security agencies (Interview with a respected border community leader, Illela town, Nigeria, July 2020).

This position was corroborated by a resident of Zangon Daura who claimed to have supplied information to trans-border arms traffickers on several occasions and received cash incentives. He argues that since the government neglected them by allowing the bandits to deny them access to their farmlands, they seek alternative means of survival. He argues that should the government consider them for a cash reward, many residents will be willing to supply information to border security agencies on the activities of the arms traffickers on the border on the condition that their identity would be protected by the government (Interview with a resident of Zango Daura, Katsina State, March 2021).

A senior academic in one of the local universities contend that the implementation of a whistleblowing policy in the management of trans-border arms trafficking is not only timely but quite commendable looking at the security situation in the country. However, he expressed reservations that it must be done with caution and in phases. In the first instance, the government must come up with a comprehensive policy framework backed by parliamentary legislation that spells out the sincerity of purposes and government commitment, how the residents can claim their rewards, and more importantly the safety of the whistleblowers (Interview with a senior lecturer at the Federal University, Gusau, March 2021).

The Nigeria border security agents also expressed optimism that whistleblowing policy would give security agencies access to critical intelligence required to intercept trans-border arms traffickers. According to a senior Immigration officer, information is critical to border security and refusal of the residents of the border communities to share intelligence with the border security agents is the main reason behind arms trafficking into Nigeria (Interview with a Nigerian immigration officer, Jibia border post, Katsina State, March 2021). This position was further corroborated by a senior customs officer who submitted that attempts to intercept trans-border traffickers were largely unsuccessful because of the connivance between them and the residents of the border communities. According to him for decades, the residents of the border communities survive on information asymmetry by supplying information to trans-border criminals including arms traffickers in return for cash

rewards. This situation made it impossible for border security agents to secure the border against arms trafficking (Interview with a senior customs officer, Nigeria Customs Service, Illela town, July 2019).

An officer with the Department of Military Intelligence (DMI) submits that in cases such as trans-border arms trafficking, whistleblowing can be a viable option because it rewards the courage of the Whistleblowers. It may also track some border security agents who collude with arms traffickers to smuggle arms into Nigeria. The supply of genuine information on both traffickers and security agents may eventually lead to the arrest of persons involved in trafficking on the border. He added that whistleblowing tips have been responsible for exposing a substantial percentage of all economic and financial crimes related cases in Nigeria. Thus, encouraging whistleblowers to report arms smuggling related crimes is critical for reducing arms trafficking as well as their consequences(Interview with a Military Intelligence officer, Gusau, March 2021).

A senior staff of the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) expressed optimism that whistleblowing tends to ensure the interception of trans-border arms and traffickers as long as the government is sincere and committed to the implementation of the policy. He argues that border security is the responsibility of every citizen, as such the residents of the border must volunteer useful information to the security agencies while the security agencies use the information to secure the country against any kind of external threats. He equally hopes that if the Nigerian government can courageously extend the policy to cover human and child trafficking, these forms of human trafficking along the border will reduce drastically. According to him, intelligence is the key to effective border security not only on the Nigeria-Niger border but worldwide. He further contends that for the whistleblowing policy to succeed and endure, there is a need for sensitization and public enlightenment of the residents of the border communities the general need to cooperate with the border security agencies to effectively secure the border against arms trafficking (Interview with senior personnel of the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Abuja, December 2020). Similarly, a resident of Gurbin Bore town (a Jibianeighboring town) corroborated the above position by the NAPTIP personnel but added that provision

of quality education and infrastructural development should accompany the whistleblowing policy. in his view; majority of the residents of border communities lack basic education to read and write. In addition, telecommunication networks, internet, and electricity must be provided to ensure prompt intelligence sharing between the residents of the border communities and the border security agencies. Most importantly, the border security must work hard to win the confidence of the residents to an extent that feels comfortable to share intelligence with them (Interview with the resident of Gurbin Bore town, Jibia border January 2010).

One of the community leaders argues that for whistleblowing policy to be effective, border protection agencies must develop cordial relationships with local people, according to a field report, to meet the goal of depressing arms trafficking on the borders, which also affects border communities. A community leader in Jigawa's Mai-Gatari border village posits that "arms traffickers have frequently exploited the local populace in Mai-Gatari districts to bypass border security forces. The process was effective because of the border security officials' attitude toward the locals. In border communities bordering the Niger Republic, the border administrators neglect the indigenous populace. As a result, traffickers rely on the residents of the border for information on safe border crossing in exchange for money. The indifferent attitude on the part of the government is now working in favor of the arms traffickers and residents of the border communities. Whistleblowing, which encourages people to give authorities confidential information in exchange for money, would allow people to quit supporting arms smugglers. The cash rewards from the government and border protection agencies can serve as an alternative source of income to the residents who supply information to traffickers for cash rewards (Interview with one of the district heads in Mai-Gatari, Jigawa state, Nigeria, July 2019). Corroborating this position, a Nigerian Police officer attached to Jibia border says "various attempts to elicit information from the residents of Illela border communities through the conventional civic responsibility persuasion methods were mostly unsuccessful because it does not come with any rewards. However, incorporating the residents of the border in the management of the frontier would give a sense of belonging to see the border security governance as truly theirs. When this happens intelligence would flow in favor of border security agents (Interview with a Nigerian Police officer,Illela border post, Sokoto State, March 2020).

Similarly, a Nigerian Police officer attached to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) also airs his voice by arguing that, reporting a crime is one thing and punishing the offender is another ball game entirely. He expresses dissatisfaction with the way and manner Nigerian courts dispense justice. He believed that whistleblowing in trans-border arms trafficking requires more than a policy document or legislation but political will on the side of the Nigerian political leaders to punish the traffickers who may be well connected and wealthy enough to acquire the best legal services. For the policy to endure and succeed, it must look inward within the security agencies and uncover those agents aiding the traffickers and terminate their employment (Interview with a Nigerian police officer, Gusau, Zamfara State, January 2021).

From the literature reviewed on the performance of whistleblowing, the policy has performed creditably well in Nigeria's public and private sector governance. Furthermore, based on the data collected from key stakeholders through the in-depth interview and the positive results that were generated, shows the imperative of the introduction of the policy in the management of trans-border arms trafficking. Besides, recent studies on border security have identified intelligence gathering and sharing among border security agencies and other key stakeholders are key in the effective management of the border. Hence, the incorporation of the residents of the border as non-state agents would open a new version in the effective control and management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier

CHAPTER 6
DATA ANALYSIS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter deals with data presentation, discussion, analysis, a summary of the major findings. As mentioned in chapter one, the study adopted a thematic method of data analysis to present and analyze the raw data generated through in-depth (semi-structured) interviews with key stakeholders.

6.1 Data presentation and analysis of the result

The research relies mainly on secondary sources of data and in-depth interviews to collect data from the target respondents. The key objective of the in-depth interview was to complement the data derived from the secondary sources to interrogate the relationship between the surveillance approach and trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier. Specifically, the interview questions were designed to unveil whether or not the surveillance method is sufficient in the control and management of trans-border arms trafficking and more importantly to suggest a more effective approach to supplement surveillance.

To address the main and rival research question/hypotheses, a total of 40 respondents were selected purposively in the following order; 3 personnel from Nigeria Immigration Service, 3 from Nigeria Customs Service, 3 from Nigeria Police Force, 3 from the Department of State Security Service, 3 from National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons, 3 from National Agency for Drugs Administration and Control, 3 from academics on migration and border studies from the local universities, 3 from independent experts on Nigeria border security, 6 from traditional rulers (3 from Jibia border towns and 3 from neighboring Jibia

communities), 5 residents of Jibia border town and 5 residents of Jibia neighboring communities.

The interview questions were categorized into two. The first category consists of 10 questions which were administered to the border security agents, renowned academics on migration and border studies from the local universities and independent security consultants who are experts on Nigerian borders. The second category of the questions consists of 9 questions administered to the residents and leaders of border communities within the study area and its environs (Jibia border) mainly to interrogate the role of the residents of the border communities and uncover the alternative or supplementary model that can effectively secure the border against trans-border arms trafficking.

Since the interview questions were categorized, the study needs a qualitative method of data analysis that can conveniently accommodate the categorization. This is to enable the study to organize the interview responses into themes, sub-themes, identify important or interesting patterns of relationship in the data and thereafter analyze which of the responses can potentially address the major and rival hypotheses of the research. Hence, the choice of thematic method of data analyses. The thematic method is one of the popular methods of qualitative data presentation and analysis. The choice of the method is further reinforced by the fact that the approach arguably is considered the most flexible approach in qualitative methods of data analysis (Maguire & Delahunt, 2017). The flexibility of the method enabled the researcher to generate codes and structure the different responses generated from the in-depth interview into different categories and thereafter consider what is most important or appropriate to the objectives of the study.

However, like other qualitative approaches, a thematic method has several approaches (Boyatzis, 1998; Alhojailan, 2012; Javadi & Zarea, 2016). For this analysis, the study adopted Braun & Clarke's (2006) 6-step approach which includes, familiarity with research data, generation of codes, search for themes, review of themes, definition of themes and write-up (Braun & Clarkes, 2006).

With the aid of Braun & Clarke's (2006) 6-step approach, the table below shows the steps adopted in the presentation of the data collected and what was done at every stage of the data analysis.

Table 8: Six steps framework adopted for thematic analysis of the data collected

Step	Item	Activity
Step-1	Data familiarity	In the first stage, all the data collected through the in-depth interview was thoroughly read and digested for familiarity. With the aid of notes, every piece of raw data generated from the fieldwork was translated, recorded, and transcribed.
Step-2	Generation of codes	At the second stage, the study presented all the data generated in a tabular form irrespective of its relevance or irrelevance to the objectives of the study. Thereafter, the data was organized in a systematic way using a descriptive coding strategy. This enables the study to generate descriptive codes and reduce the complexity of the data and derive preliminary themes and sub-themes
Step-3	Search for themes	At this stage, the study developed preliminary themes/sub-themes. Although there is no standard rule that defines what a theme is, we consider the main research objections, hypotheses, and sub-hypotheses of the study to establish patterns, significant relationships, and interesting facts about the data that were generated through the in-depth interview.
Step-4	Review of themes	At this stage, we modify the preliminary themes identified in step 3 by including what is significant to the objectives of the study and

		exclude what is irrelevant to the research objectives and hypotheses of the study
Step-5	Define themes	Here, with the aid of a thematic map, we defined and refined the themes to identify what each theme/subtheme is all about, their relationship to one another and what narrative best explains the upsurge in trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic frontier.
Step-6	Write-up	At the final stage, the study concluded by deriving some research findings, outlined some useful recommendations, and set a further research agenda.

Despite some similarities in the responses of the interviewees, divergent opinions among the Nigeria border security agents, independent security consultants, seasoned academics, residents, and leaders of the Jibia border communities and its environs have been established. For instance, while there was consensus between the academics in local universities and residents of the border communities on how the poor living conditions of the residents of the border fuels trans-border arms trafficking, there was a disagreement between the resident/leaders of the border communities and Nigeria border security agents as to what constitutes border porosity and why trans-border arms trafficking persist along the border. In other words, some of the responses from the different categories of respondents appeared in divergent forms. This implies that we need a coding strategy that would accommodate these differences in opinions and give us a clear picture of the data and derive preliminary themes from the responses of the interviewees.

Developing codes and preliminary themes
This analysis relies on a descriptive coding strategy to concisely compressed the raw data generated from the fieldwork. A descriptive coding system would enable the study to accommodate the divergent views expressed by the different respondents in

a tabular manner and identify similarities and differences in the responses of the respondents. This is achieved by assigning a few words to represent a particular set of opinions. This permits us to generate codes that show a clear picture and give a summary of each data set in a highly condensed manner. Furthermore, the descriptive method enables the researcher to quickly refer to a set of data for clarity and precision.

The table below shows the preliminary themes that were identified and derived from the responses of category 1 respondents which include responses from border security agents, independent security consultants, and seasoned academics on migration and border studies from local universities. The responses presented below were derived from the above-stated respondents that answered a total of 10 questions. Specifically, the questions focus on why the surveillance approach is deficient in the management of trans-border arms trafficking and what could be the alternative or supplementary approach to the surveillance. Some of the descriptive themes presented in the table below are associated with one or more codes.

Table 9: Preliminary themes derived from interview transcripts

1. Theme: Respondent's description of the border management approach against arms trafficking	**2. Theme:** The effectiveness of the approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking
Codes:	**Codes:**
-Border is porous	-Inefficient
-Border does not exist	-Poor
-Cannot manage arms trafficking	-Good
-Lines on the water	-Is an average mechanism for secure the border
-Border is an artificial creation	-Very poor
-The border is just a bridge	-Analogue
-The border is a barrier	-Outdated

-Is a living space-homeland -A dangerous space	-Incompatible with the border environment -Copy and paste approach
3. Theme: Challenges associated with the surveillance **Codes:** -Lack of digitalization -Inadequate surveillance facilities -Difficult terrain -Inadequate manpower -Lack of adequate logistics -Bribery and corruption -Language barrier -Lack of skilled manpower -exclusion of residents of the border Lack of development of border communities	**4. Theme**: Routes used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms into Nigeria **Codes:** -Unpoliced routes -Footpath ways -Desert -Rocks -Formal border post -Air space -Waterways
5. Theme: Means of transportation used by the trans-border arms traffickers to cross the Nigeria-Niger border **Codes:**	**6. Theme:** Which of the following is responsible for trans-border arms trafficking on the border? a. The rate of poverty in border communities

-Tricycles -Motorcycles -Foot -Camel -Donkeys -Cattles -Bicycles -Oil Tankers -Pick-up vans -Cars	b. The ethno-religious violence c. Nigeria's internal security challenges such as terrorism and banditry d. ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency e. Bribery and corruption among border security agents f. Cultural affinity of the border communities **Codes:** -Extreme poverty -ECOWAS protocol -Internal Insecurity -Banditry -Cultural affinity -Bribery and corruption -High level of armed violence
7. Theme: Relationship between Nigerian border security agents and residents of the border communities **Codes:** -Hostile relationship -Unfriendly -Lack of trust	**8 Theme:** The role border communities play in the control of trans-border arms trafficking **Codes:** -None -little inputs -No specific constitutional role

-Cat and mouse relationship -Security agents are seen as enemies	-Civic responsibilities -Collude with arms traffickers
9. Theme: Conditions that motivate informants to share border information with arms traffickers **Codes:** **-**Language similarities -Cash Incentives inducement -Unemployment opportunities -difficult terrain -Lack of National identification cards -Dual identity -intermarriages -Trans-border formal trade -Lack of patriotism -illiteracy - Poverty -Bribery and corruption	**10. Theme:**Alternative/supplement to surveillance **Codes:** -Digital Surveillance -Adequate manpower -Give cash incentives to informants -Build a border wall -install electric fence -provision of adequate logistics -improve bilateral securitycooperation

Review of themes

In the table below, we reviewed the themes presented above, we modified preliminary themes generated from the responses of the border security agents, independents security consultants, and season academics on migration and border studies from local universities by excluding what is irrelevant or unrelated to the main research question of the study. At this point, we integrated all the data collected and presented in preliminary themes (step-3) and apply the micro soft word "cut and

paste" function as recommended by Bree & Gallagher (2016) to include the interesting and relevant data and exclude unrelated or overlapping points. The purpose of this is to further reduce the complexity of the data by considering what is the most appropriate, applicable, interesting, and relevant to the objectives of the study. Furthermore, the study identified and collapsed themes with similar/overlapping responses, eliminated what is irrelevant using yellow ink to indicate where it is applicable, and further generated sub-themes to enrich the data.

Table 10: Reviewed themes derive from step 4 above

1. Theme: Description of the border management approach against arms trafficking **Sub-theme:** Surveillance **Codes:** -Border is porous -Border does not exist -Cannot manage arms trafficking -Lines on the water -Border is an artificial creation -Is a bridge linking communities -The border is a barrier -Is a living space -A dangerous space	**2. Theme:** The effectiveness of the approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking **Codes:** -Inefficient -Poor -Good -Average -Very poor -Analogue -Outdated -Incompatible with the border environment -Copy and paste approach
3. Theme: Challenges associated with the surveillance	**4. Theme:** Routes used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms

Codes:	into Nigeria
-Lack of digitalization	Codes:
-Inadequate surveillance facilities	-Unpoliced routes
-Difficult terrain	-Footpath ways
-Inadequate manpower	-Desert
-Lack of adequate logistics	-Rocks
-Bribery and corruption	-Formal border post
-Language barrier	-Air space
-Lack of skilled manpower	-Waterways
-Exclusion of residents of the border	
-Lack of development at border communities	
5. Theme: Means of transportation used by the trans-border arms traffickers to cross the Nigeria-Niger border	6. Theme: Which of the following is responsible for trans-border arms trafficking on the border
Codes:	Sub-themes
-Tricycles	a. The rate of poverty in border communities
-Motorcycles	b. The ethno-religious violence
-Foot	c. Nigeria's internal insecurity challenges
-Camel	d. ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency
-Donkeys	e. Bribery and corruption among border security agents
-Cattles	
-Bicycles	

-Oil Tankers -Pick-up vans -Cars	f. Cultural affinity of the border communities **Codes:** -Poverty -ECOWAS protocol -Internal Insecurity -Banditry -Cultural affinity -Bribery and corruption -High level of armed violence
7. Theme: Relationship between Nigerian border security agents and residents of the border communities **Codes:** -Hostile -Unfriendly -Lack of trust -Cat and mouse relationship -Security agents are seen as enemies	**8 Theme:** Role of border communities in the control of trans-border arms trafficking **Codes:** -None -little inputs -No specific constitutional role -Civic responsibilities -Collude with arms traffickers
9. Theme: Conditions that motivate informants to share border information with arms traffickers **Codes:** -Language similarities	**10. Theme:** Alternative/supplement to surveillance **Codes:** -Introduce cash incentives -Digital surveillance

-Cash inducement	-Adequate manpower
-Unemployment opportunities	-Recruit informants
-Difficult terrain	-Build a border wall
-Lack of national identification cards	-Install an electric fence
-Dual identity	-Provision of adequate logistics
-intermarriages	-Improve bilateral security cooperation
-Trans-border formal trade	
-Lack of patriotism	
-Illiteracy	
- Poverty	
-Bribery and corruption	

The second category of questions below was designed for the residents of the border communities to ascertain the effectiveness of the surveillance approach. A total of nine questions were asked to specifically ascertain the role of the border communities, how the general conditions such as difficult border terrain and the living conditions of the residents of the border communities such as poverty, ethno-religious violence, economic integration, internal security challenges and corruption among border security agents affect the surveillance strategy in combating arms trafficking on Nigeria-Niger border. In the table below, the study presented all the raw data generated from the fieldwork in a condensed manner and assign codes for a particular set of responses.

Table 11: Preliminary themes generated from the respondents of the second category

1. Theme: The perception of residents of the border	2. Theme: How trans-border arms traffickers	3. Theme: Rewards for providing information to

community on trans-border arms trafficking	recruit informants	the trans-border arms traffickers **Codes:**
Codes:	**Codes:**	-Money
-Is a trans-border business	-Through their existing informants	-Gold
-Means for a livelihood	-Through security agents	-Arms
-Bribery and corruption of border agent	-Through their relations on the Nigerian border side	-Clothing materials
-Government is responsible	-Through accidental contact	
-Is a sole responsibility of the government	-Through illegal immigrants working in Nigeria	
-Citizens need arms for self-defense		
-Arms trafficking Cannot be control		
-Is an organized crime		
4. Theme: The routes used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms into Nigeria?	**5. Theme:** Conditions that prompt residents of the border to share information with the trans-border arms traffickers	**6. Theme:** The kind of response border residents receive from the border patrol team for sharing (or not sharing) information with them on the movement of trans-border arms traffickers?
Codes:	**Codes:**	
-Waterways	-Poverty	**Codes:**
-Unpoliced routes	-Unemployment	-Never report anything to security agents
-Footpath ways	-Illiteracy	
-Desert	-Insecurity	
-Rocks		

	-Porous borders -Inadequate security personnel	-They exhibited I don't care attitude
7. Theme: Role of the border patrol teams in securing the border against arms trafficking. **Codes:** -Security agents are part of the arms trafficking cartel -Hostile to the residents of the border communities -Do not trust the residents of the border communities -Security agents collect bribes and compromise border governance -Security agents are afraid of arms traffickers	**8. Theme:** How the living conditions of the residents of the border communities affect the management of trans-border arms trafficking Please comment on: a. The rate of poverty in the border communities. b. Ethno-religious violence among its diverse ethnic nationalities in Nigeria's multicultural society. c. Nigeria's internal security challenges such as terrorism and banditry. d. The effects of ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency policy among West African countries. e. Bribery and corruption among	**9.Theme:** Alternative/supplement to surveillance in the control trans-border arms trafficking **Codes:** -Introduce Cash Incentives regime -Provision of basic infrastructure -Incorporate border residents of the border in the management of the frontier -Promote harmonious relationship -Localization of deployment of personnel -Introduce poverty alleviation programs -Control bribery and corruption among security agents

	border security agents. e. The cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger border communities on the management of trans-border arms trafficking. **Codes:** -Poverty is the major reason why trans-border arms trafficking persist -Bribery and corruption -Cultural Affinity -ECOWAS protocol -Sectarian affiliation -Religious affiliation -Living condition has no connection with border security -Lack of cooperation between Nigeria and Niger -Lack of electricity -Internal armed violence -Unemployment -Illiteracy	

	-Language	

The reviewed themes below were extracted from the responses of the leaders and residents of the border communities as presented in the above table (preliminary themes presented in step 3) to ascertain the effectiveness of the surveillance approach. The preliminary themes were modified by considering what is relevant and appropriate to the study. The codes in yellow ink represent the data that was excluded because they were considered insignificant or overlapping with similar opinions in the table. However, those without ink are considered relevant to the study and only these sets of opinions were considered in further analysis of the data.

Table 12: Reviewed themes derive from step 4 above

| 1. **Theme:** The perception of the residents of the border community on trans-border arms trafficking

Sub-theme: aiding traffickers

Codes:

-Is a trans-border business

-Means of livelihood

-Bribery and corruption of Border agent

-Government is responsible

-Is a sole responsibility of the government | 2. **Theme:** How trans-border arms traffickers recruit informants

Codes:

-Through existing informants

Through security agents

-Through their relations on the Nigerian border side

-Through accidental contact

-Through illegal immigrants | 3. **Theme:** Rewards for providing information to the trans-border arms traffickers

Codes:

-Money

-Gold

-Arms

-Clothing materials |

-Citizens need arms for self-defense -Arms trafficking cannot be control -Is an organized crime		
4. Theme: The routes used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms? **Codes:** -Waterways -Unpoliced routes -Footpath ways -Desert -Rocks	**5. Theme:** Conditions that prompt residents of the border to share information with the trans-border arms traffickers **Codes:** -Poverty -Unemployment -Illiteracy -Insecurity -Porous borders -Inadequate security personnel	**6. Theme:** The kind of response border residents receive from the border patrol team for sharing (or not sharing) information with them on the movement of trans-border arms traffickers? **Codes:** -Never report anything to security agents -They exhibited I don't care attitude
7. Theme: Role of the border patrol teams in securing the border against arms trafficking. **Codes:** -Security agents are part of the arms	**8. Theme:** How the living conditions of the residents of the border communities affect the management of trans-border arms trafficking **Sub-theme:** a. The rate of poverty in	**9. Theme:** Alternative/supplement to surveillance in the control trans-border arms trafficking **Codes:** -Introduce Cash Incentives

trafficking cartel	the border communities.	regime
-Hostile to the residents of the border communities	b. Ethno-religious violence among its diverse ethnic nationalities in Nigeria's multicultural society.	-Provision of basic infrastructure
-Do not trust the residents of the border communities	c. Nigeria's internal security challenges such as terrorism and banditry.	-Incorporate border residents in the management of the frontier
-Security agents collect bribes and compromise border governance	d. The effects of ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency policy among West African countries.	-Promote harmonious relationship
-Security agents are afraid of arms traffickers	e. Bribery and corruption among border security agents.	-Localization of deployment of personnel
	e. The cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger border communities on the management of trans-border arms trafficking.	-Introduce poverty alleviation programs
	Codes:	-Control bribery and corruption among security agents
	-Poverty is the major reason why trans-border arms trafficking persist	
	-Bribery and corruption	

	-Cultural Affinity	
	-ECOWAS protocol	
	-Sectarian affiliation	
	-Religious affiliation	
	-Living condition has no connection with border security	
	-Lack of sufficient cooperation between Nigeria and Niger	
	-Lack of electricity	
	-Internal armed violence	
	-Unemployment	
	-Illiteracy	
	-Language	

Defining themes

The raw data presented in tables 6 and 8 connotes a consensus among all the categories of the respondents that the Nigeria-Niger border is porous allowing all sorts of trans-border crimes, particularly trans-border arms trafficking. It further revealed the hostility between the security agencies and the residents of the border communities. The argument is what constitutes the border porosity? In other words, why is surveillance deficient in controlling the influx of trans-border arms? What specifically fuels trans-border arms trafficking on the border? Which actor (s) is responsible for the influx of trans-border arms along the border? What is the source of hostility between the residents of the border and the border security agent? These questions and many more must be address before an objective perspective can

emerge. The diagram below shows a reflection of information asymmetry among the three key stakeholders on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border security governance.

Trans-border arms traffickers

```
                    Trans-border arms traffickers
                                │
                                ▼
        ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────┐
        │   Border communities (residents)              │
        └──────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                    │
                    ▼
        ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
        │ Border entry point│◄──────│ Border security  │
        │ (Nigeria-Niger)   │       │ agents           │
        └──────────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
                    │                        │
                    ▼                        ▼
        ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
        │ Are border       │        │ Are the arms     │
        │ security agents  │        │ traffickers      │
        │ present?         │        │ coming?          │
        └──────────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
                    │ Yes                    │ No
                    ▼                        ▼
        ┌──────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────┐
        │ Traffickers      │   No   │ Security agents  │
        │ return to        │        │ return to the    │
        │ destination      │        │ border post      │
        └──────────────────┘        └──────────────────┘
                    │ Proceed to the deliver amrs
                    ▼
        ┌──────────────────┐
        │ Destination      │
        │ (Nigeria)        │
        └──────────────────┘
```

Figure 6: A Thematic map showing a pictorial interplay of information among trans-border arms traffickers, residents of the border communities and security agents.

The thematic map above shows a pictorial interplay of information among the three key actors in the management of the Nigeria-Niger border. The chart shows how a trans-border trafficker accesses the entry point of the border through the information received from the residents of the border community. The chart starts by indicating the point a trafficker makes an inquiry about safe border crossing or routes without a security presence. In any case, the trafficker terminates his movement and returns to his destination at the point he receives information that there is a border security presence which is represented by "YES" in the diagram. If the answer to his inquiry is "NO", the trafficker simply proceeds to his destination by crossing the border to deliver his arms. This implies that response to the inquiry of arms traffickers could either "YES" or "NO". On the other hand, the border security agent's inquiry on the movement of the traffickers always comes "NO" because the residents of the border who possess information on the movement of the traffickers deny him the information. By implication, border security agents are always on the losers while the trans-border arms traffickers' win by crossing the border safely and deliver their arms and the residents of the border gain from the cash incentives he receives from the trafficker. The thematic map has shown that for Nigeria to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic border, the interplay information asymmetry must be reversed in favor of the border security agencies

6.2 Summary and discussion of major findings

This study focused on the analysis of Nigeria-Niger border security governance to ascertain why the frontier is porous and notorious for various trans-border crimes.[2] Specifically, the study interrogated the strength and weaknesses of the surveillance approach adopted by the Nigerian authorities in the management of trans-border arms trafficking along the Nigeria-Niger Republic border.

The most interesting fact about the raw data generated through an in-depth interview was the consensus among the three key stakeholders that there exists asymmetric information between the residents of the border communities, arms traffickers, and

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[2]Write-up is the last stage of Braun & Clarke's (2006) 6-step approach. At this stage, the study focuses on the summary and discussion of the major findings, recommendations, conclusion and sets an agenda for further research agenda.

border security agents. However, the stakeholders were divergent on what was responsible for an interplay of the information asymmetry. For instance, the Nigerian border security agents accused the residents of the border communities of being unpatriotic by colluding with trans-border arms traffickers to smuggle arms into Nigeria by providing them vital information on safe border crossing for cash rewards. On the other hand, the residents of the border communities blamed government exclusion of the residents of the border in the bordering process of the frontier as the main factor responsible for the information asymmetry. This exclusion and neglect may perhaps explain the genesis of asymmetric information and hostilities between border security agents and the residents of the border communities. For instance, some of the residents of the border communities interviewed confessed to the fact that they were induced with tokens and other incentives to supply information to arms traffickers and smugglers because they have no alternative means of livelihood. This suggests that the inducement of residents of the border communities may not be unconnected with the rising social problems and neglect by the government. High levels of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of basic infrastructure and amenities may have contributed significantly to the hopelessness of the resident of the border communities and perhaps a reason for supplying information to the trans-border arms traffickers to eke a living. Moreover, the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics reports that over 83 million Nigerians live below the poverty line of 137, 430 Naira ($381.75) a year while the unemployment rate rose to 33.3% in 2020 (NBS, 2021).

Lack of trust and enmity has further reinforced the hostility between the resident of the border communities and the border security agents. The majority of the residents of the border perceived border security as their enemies who are determined to destroy their means of livelihood. This is attested by the refusal of the majority of the residents of the border communities to share information with the border security agents. For instance, while some of the residents interviewed admitted to having aid traffickers at one point or the other for cash rewards, none of the respondents has admitted to having ever reported the movement of the trans-border arms traffickers to the border security agents. This may explain why the majority of the respondents from the residents of the border perceived smuggling and arms trafficking as simply trading across borders. They also believe since they are not regarded as stakeholders

in the border security governance, they have no role whatsoever in securing the border against any form of trans-border crime. It is little wonder that both the residents of the border and the security agents interviewed have admitted that although border surveillance is inevitable it has been proven ineffective in securing the border against trans-border arms trafficking. Thus, there was consensus among the various stakeholders interviewed that an alternative or supplementary model is required to effectively secure the border against arms trafficking. According to the majority of the border security agents interviewed, since aiding trans-border arms traffickers appears to be a poverty-induced crime, then whistleblowing can be introduced and implemented to supplement surveillance. On the other hand, the leaders/residents of the border, independent security consultants, and seasoned academics interviewed express optimism that if whistleblowing policy is implemented with adequate legislation that protects the identity and safety of the whistleblowers, it would impact positively in reducing the influx of trans-border arms along the border.

Based on the data collected through secondary sources such as books, journals, magazines, special reports among others, and the in-depth interview conducted with major stakeholders such as border security agents, academics, and residents of the border on the Nigeria-Niger border management, the study made the following significant findings as discussed below:

a. The empirical data collected from relevant stakeholders and analyzed revealed that the current surveillance approach used by the Nigerian border security managers to secure the Nigeria-Niger border against trans-border arms trafficking is not only deficient but attract trans-border arms traffickers to smuggle arms and ammunition from as far as North Africa to Nigeria through the Nigeria-Niger border. Theoretically, surveillance's deficiency is primarily because the Nigerian authorities perceived the border from the realists' perspective which views the border as a mere "territorial hardline" that needs to be militarily defended by the state security agents. This is contrary to the liberal notion that defines a border as a "living space" whose security governance involves state and non-state actors. The realist's perception of the border by the Nigerian authorities has led to the exclusion of residents of the border in the

management of trans-border arms trafficking on the frontier. Historically, from Nigeria's independence in 1960 to date, the Nigeria-Niger border security managers rather than recognizing the three key stakeholders in the management of trans-border arms trafficking namely; border security agents, residents of the border communities, and trans-border arms traffickers, recognized only trans-border arms traffickers, border security agencies and excluded the residents of the border communities. The exclusion of the residents of border communities in the management of trans-border arms has created an opportunity for the trans-border arms traffickers to recruits some of the residents of the border communities as informants who supply them information on safe border crossing and routes without a security presence. The incorporation of the residents of the border communities by the trans-border arms traffickers has resulted in asymmetric information between the border security agents and trans-border arms traffickers. In this context, the residents of the border communities who are familiar with the illegal routes linking Nigeria and Niger rather than supply information to border security agents on the activities of the arms traffickers supply the information on how to safely cross the border to trans-border arms traffickers in return for cash rewards and other incentives. This interplay of information between the residents of the borders, security agents, and trans-border arms traffickers favors the trans-border arms traffickers because it gives them an upper hand on information about the safe border crossings and delivers arms to various terrorist groups, insurgents, secessionists agitators, and other criminals operating in Nigeria.

b. The asymmetric information between the border security agents and trans-border arms traffickers was further compounded by the over-reliance of the border security agencies on analog rather than digital surveillance. The approximately 1,500 kilometers between Nigeria and Niger are secured through regular patrol by the border security personnel. Over-reliance on analog surveillance has left a vast chunk of the border spaces unpoliced because of the poor logistics and inadequate security personnel. Even among the formal entry points, very few of them are secured through digital surveillance facilities. Part of the challenge is that border conditions in terms of critical infrastructure such as electricity, telecommunication network, and access roads do not favor the installation of digital surveillance facilities such as video cameras, scanners,

drones, electric fencing, and robotics technology. Furthermore, digital surveillance technology is a capital-intensive project that requires sufficient technology and routine maintenance. This implies that securing the approximately 4,500 kilometers of Nigeria's land borders with Niger, Cameroun, Chad, and Benin Republic through digital border surveillance calls for huge financial commitment which the federal government claims it cannot afford at the moment.

c.   The analysis of the data shows that despite government commitment of both States and federal government, poor living conditions of the residents of the border communities compounded the challenges of effective trans-border arms management. This is evident in the high level of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of basic infrastructures such as roads, schools, hospitals, and portable drinking water ravaging the majority of the border communities. It is a little surprising that the majority of the Jibia border residents interviewed complained of neglect by the Nigerian authorities. This may explain why the majority of the border residents perceived aiding trans-border arms traffickers as a means of survival, while the border security agencies perceived their action as trans-border crime. These two different notions on aiding traffickers have created a hostile relationship between the residents of the border communities and the border security agents. The data analyzed revealed a blame game. For instance, while the residents of the border accused border security agents of collecting bribes and allow every form of contraband to cross the border, the border security agents accused the residents of border communities of lack of patriotism. According to the border security agents, the residents of border communities perceived "smuggling and trafficking" simply as trans-border trade that should not attract any sanction. Hence, the residents of the border conspire with arms traffickers to smuggle arms and ammunition into Nigeria.

d.   The cultural affinity of the border communities in terms of language, religion, sectarianism, and occupation has promoted trans-border cultural relations and unity between the Nigeria and Niger border communities. Hardly a week passes by without a naming ceremony and trans-border marriage between the residents of the two border communities. From the result of the in-depth interview, trans-border marriages between the two communities have further declined the relevance of the frontier as a physical hardline. A woman from

Niger once married to a Nigerian claimed to be a Nigerian, the same goes for her children and vice-versa.   This practice dates back to the Berlin conference of 1884-1885 before the European powers arbitrarily partitioned Africa among themselves without recourse to the ethnic and religious similarities of the people. In terms of occupation, the residents of the border are mostly seasonal farmers who share trans-border farmlands. Many Nigerien farmlands have extended to the Nigerian side of the border and vice versa. In addition, the majority of them speak the Hausa language which aids their trans-border relations. These practices have made effective management of trans-border arms trafficking and other forms of trans-border crimes almost an impossible task.

e. The abuse of the 1979 ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people, residency, and establishment allowed unrestricted movement of illegal migrants across the Nigeria-Niger border. The abuse of the protocol is reinforced by the lack of a comprehensive database of citizens of both countries and national identification cards. This made it impossible for border security agents to track the nationalities of residents of the border communities and other nationals crossing the border. It is easier for residents of the border to acquire dual national identities and claimed to be Nigerians and Nigeriens at the same time. The ECOWAS protocol, particularly on establishment has further increased the volume of the informal trans-border trade between Nigeria and the Niger and consequently deepened the socio-economic interdependency between the two countries. The volume of formal and informal trade between the two counties runs into US$ billions. This is further compounded by trans-border infrastructures such as roads linking the two countries, school and hospitals. Only recently, the Nigerian government awarded US$ 2 billion contracts for the construction of railway lines from Kano through Jibia in Nigeria to Maradi in the Niger Republic to facilitate formal trans-border trade between the two countries.

f. The Nigeria-Niger border communities share similar topography. Majority of the border communities are vulnerable to drought and desertification which affect the level of food and livestock production. Majority of the residents of the border communities are mainly peasant farmers whose survival depends on agriculture. This implies that anything that affect agricultural output of the

border regions may spell doom for the communities. These phenomena if left unchecked, it may worsen the poverty situation and living conditions of the residents of the border communities. There is an urgent need for bilateral efforts between the Nigeria and Nager to minimize the impact of desertification and drought on the residents of the border communities.

g. The Nigeria-Niger border has made Nigeria and Niger just like the two side of the same coin in the sense that whatever affect one of them will have a spillover effect on the other. This suggests that Nigeria's economy, peace, security and stability, health and agriculture have a spillover on Niger and vice versa. On this note, there is a need for trans-border bilateral cooperation between Nigeria and Niger.

h. From the data collected and analyzed, the study found that the main hypothesis which is information asymmetry represents the macro-causal of the resilience of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border. Notwithstanding, alternative hypotheses such as poverty, illiteracy, ECOWAS protocol, the cultural affinity of the border communities, bribery and corruption among border security, and internal insecurity such as banditry and kidnapping constitute micro-causal explanations on why trans-border arms trafficking persist on the border despite intensive border surveillance by the security agencies.

CONCLUSION

Since the return of Nigeria to democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented increase in armed violence. Studies have shown that one of the major enablers of armed violence in Africa is the illegal proliferation, and possession of fire arms by unauthorized persons. Dokubo paints a vivid image of arms' disruptive consequences in West Africa. He posits that arms are responsible for an estimated 300,000 of the 500,000 persons killed worldwide each year. Internal armed conflicts, armed robbery, and drug trafficking account for around half of the illicit firearms that circulate throughout Africa. The UNODC estimated that of the 500million illicit weapons in West Africa, 350million are circulating in Nigeria. The availability of these arms outside of established security systems has played a significant role in perpetuating a cycle of violence and instability in which mostly women and children are brutalized (Dokunbo, 2003).

In Nigeria, most of these arms come into the country through its porous borders. Despite the continuous effort and commitment of Nigeria's government to secure its borders and control the influx of illicit trans-border arms, records have shown that the number of illegal arms and ammunition in circulation has increased more than the country's population. Consequently, armed violence across the length and breadth of Nigeria is increasing exponentially. From North to South, Nigeria continues to suffer major security challenges such as religious crises in States such as Bauchi, Jos, Kaduna, and Kano, communal conflicts in Benue and Taraba, ethnic violence between Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani in Lagos, banditry, and kidnapping in the North-West, Militancy in the South-South, and the latest Boko Haram insurgency in North-East Nigeria among others. The rate of armed-related violence across Nigeria necessitates immediate attention from Nigeria, not just because it poses security risks but threatens the corporate existence of the country. Given this context,no doubt trans-border arms trafficking through the Nigeria-Niger Republic border has become

a source of insecurity for Nigeria because it enables the supply of arms and ammunition to criminal elements terrorizing Nigeria. Therefore, the study investigates the persistence of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic border despite intensive surveillance by Nigeria's border security agencies. Specifically, the study dwells on the analysis of efficiency/inefficiency of the surveillance bordering strategy used by the Nigerian government to secure the Nigeria-Niger border against trans-border arms trafficking.

This study has illustrated that the surveillance approach to trans-border arms trafficking fails to contain arms trafficking because of the border conditions in terms of lack of a comprehensive biometric database, national identification cards, and absence of critical infrastructures such as electricity, roads, and telecommunication at the border communities made the installation of digital surveillance facilities impossible. The absence of digital surveillance facilities such as scanners and video cameras made the border security agents resort to analog border patrol and left a chunk of the border unpoliced and porous. In addition, the surveillance approach excludes the residents of the border communities, which share a cultural affinity with the arms traffickers while operating in the environment of poverty and seasonal employment opportunities. The exclusion of the residents of the border communities in the management of the borders causes information asymmetry and prevents border security agencies to manage the borders effectively. To address this challenge, there is a need to reverse the current trend in information asymmetry in such a manner that it would favor border security agents. To achieve this, the study suggested the need for a new model to manage trans-border arms trafficking, a whistleblowing model, to supplement the surveillance approach. The advantage of the whistleblowing model is that it would give the security personnel more information through tip-off and, at the same time, complements the current shortage of security personnel since only strategic border posts would require stationary security presence. Under the whistleblowing regime, security personnel will be deployed to the illegal routes based on a tip-off by whistleblowers or as the need arises. In other words, fewer security personnel will be required to man the border given that whistleblowing would provide intelligence information flow, which would enable rationalization and maximization of the available workforce within Nigeria's border security architecture.

The study made a historically excursion and traced the evolution of the border to assessed Nigeria's border security regime to get a clear picture of the border. It was revealed that the Nigeria-Niger border was invented by the colonialists during the Berlin conference of 1884-84. This implies that Nigeria and Niger were the same territory before the colonial conquest and partitioning of Africa by the European powers. After independence, Nigeria and Niger emerged as two countries and inherited the borderlines that separate them into two different nation-states. Despite this, the citizens of the two countries continue to see the border as mere geographical inventions that have no relevance in their socio-cultural, economic and political lives. On the other hand, the government of the two states perceives the border as a yardstick that defines the administrative jurisdiction of each state and must be respected. This explains why the Nigeria's government deployed huge human and material resources to secure the border because it perceived the border. It literally perceived the border as a "geographical hardline" that defines its external sovereignty. However, literature has shown securing the border requires collective efforts and must be seen as a transnational security threat. Nigeria, in collaboration with Niger, must go beyond the realist notion and explore liberal strategies on border security in terms of trans-border cooperation.

In other words, they must consider the role of both state and non-state agents. The Nigerian border managers must also change their perception of the borderlands from mere "geographical hardline" to a "living space" by extending socio-economic developmental programs to border communities. From the data, border communities are the most neglected in terms of infrastructure and basic amenities such as telecommunication services, roads, schools, hospitals, education among others. Poverty and illiteracy are so perversive that the residents of the border communities care not about the legality or illegality of whatever will put food on their table. For instance, the resident of the border connived with trans-border arms traffickers and illegal immigrants to outsmart the border security agencies and cross the border safely to deliver arms for cash rewards.

Because trans-border arms trafficking is lucrative, the arms traffickers would always seize the advantage of the border porosity and the ineffectiveness of the surveillance. This points to the fact that, aiding arms traffickers to cross the border is a poverty-induced crime. For instance, from the field trip conducted, borders communities are

some of the most neglected, abandoned, and forgotten citizens. In most of the border communities such as Dole Kaina in Kebbi State, Mai Aduwa in Katsina, and Mai Gatari in Jigawa State Nigeria, the only thing that signifies government presence are signposts indicating Nigeria-Niger border and the presence of the border security agents. Critical infrastructures and basic amenities such as schools, hospitals, roads, portable drinking water, and telecommunication networks are either scarce, dilapidated, or non-existing. The rate of poverty in border communities such as Dole-Kaina, Gurbin Bore among others is so severe to an extent that the majority of the residents of the border communities symbolize poverty. This may have explained their role in various forms of trans-border crimes. There is urgent need for government intervention in areas such as poverty alleviation programs, provision and access to quality health and education, roads, tele communication services and employment opportunities. There is also a need for more bilateral cooperation between Nigeria and Niger to fight common security, environmental problems such as desertification, trans-border banditry, child trafficking and trans-border education.

There is an urgent need for synergy among the various security agencies from both countries to re-strategize and break the monopoly of asymmetric information being enjoyed by the arms traffickers. The chain and routes of supply of these arms from both sides of the border must be broken through the inclusion of border communities in intelligence gathering. This inclusion would not only secure the borderlines but will also allow the statutory border authorities to take full control of the activities within the border communities.

As mentioned earlier, the use of asymmetric information theory in the analysis of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger Republic borders is a new exploration. This is perhaps one of the few studies on the border that adopted information asymmetric theory and probably the first to use the theory and analyzed trans-border arms trafficking on the border. The whistleblowing policy has recorded remarkable achievements in the Nigerian institutions where it has been implemented, but it is entirely a new experiment in the management of trans-border arms trafficking. This study draws inspiration from the role whistleblowing played in combatting corruption, illicit drug trafficking, smuggling of contraband, and in-depth interview with stakeholders who opined that the policy has the prospects of containing trans-border arms trafficking not only Nigeria-Niger border but entire

Nigeria's land borders. However, for the whistleblowing model to be implemented there is a need for further research from public policy and legal perspectives to develop a comprehensive policy document and a proper legal framework through which it can be introduced and implemented to secure the Nigeria-Niger Republic and other frontiers from trans-border arms trafficking.

Like every other research, this thesis has a limited scope in both context and time. Contextually, it focuses on the interrogation of efficiency/deficiency of surveillance methods in controlling the influx of trans-border arms into Nigeria through Nigeria's land borders. Numerous reports from Nigeria's security agencies revealed that millions of arms and ammunition were intercepted by Nigeria's security agencies in various air and maritime borders across Nigeria. This suggests that there is a need for further research to interrogate arms trafficking through Nigeria's maritime and air borders to unveil whether or not the whistleblowing model could equally work in those categories of borders.

Recommendations of the study

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommendations were made to address the deficiencies of the surveillance approach against trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border.

First and foremost, the empirical data revealed that surveillance is deficient in the control of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border. As such, the Nigerian government must consider the incompatibility of the approach with the Nigeria-Niger Republic border conditions and peculiarities that rendered the approach inefficient. This can be achieved by searching for at least a supplement to the current border security governance strategy against trans-border arms trafficking. Based on the empirical data analyzed, Nigerian authorities must see the Nigeria-Niger border beyond a mere geographical ''hardline'' as defined by the realists but also a ''living space-homeland'' occupied by Nigerians. Surveillance is deficient largely because the Nigerian authorities perceived the security of the Nigeria-Niger border as solely the responsibility of the state agents such as Immigration, Customs, Police, and other government agencies. Thus, the Nigerian border managers must consider the role of state and non-state agents to effectively control trans-border arms

trafficking on the border. Surveillance is not a border community-friendly approach because it does not recognize the role of the border communities and consequently excludes them in the management of the frontier. It is this exclusion that lays the foundation of information asymmetry between arms traffickers and border security agents which favors the arms traffickers. To reverse the asymmetric information flow in favor of border security agents, this study advocate for the incorporation of the resident of the border communities in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border.

To incorporate the resident of the border in the security governance of the frontier, a whistleblowing model is recommended to supplement the surveillance approach. The study considers whistleblowing viable by looking at its performance in the fight against corruption, smuggling of contrabands, and illicit drugs trafficking. The whistleblowing regime would ensure the incorporation of the residents of the border as important stakeholders in the management of trans-border arms by encouraging them to supply genuine information on arms traffickers to the Nigeria border security agencies for cash incentives. Their incorporation would address the challenges of complex border terrain, inadequate equipment, and manpower in Nigeria's border security architecture. Under the whistleblowing regime, border security personnel would be deployed based on credible intelligence receive from whistleblowers.

The overreliance of the Nigerian border security agents on analog surveillance should be addressed by providing critical infrastructures such as electricity, telecommunication networks, roads, schools among others to the border communities. The provision of these infrastructures would create an enabling environment to install digital surveillance facilities such as video cameras, scanners, and drones to complement regular border patrol by the security agents. Furthermore, material resources must be made available to acquire and maintain the digital technology as well as train and retrain the border security agents on digital border surveillance. With digital surveillance, fewer border security personnel are required to monitor the facilities which will eventually address the inadequate number of border security personnel. In addition, the working conditions of the border security agencies in the area of salaries, pension, and other remuneration must be improved to checkmate corruption among the border security agents. On the other hand, poverty

alleviation programs, employment opportunities, critical infrastructures such as schools, hospitals, roads, and potable drinking water should be provided for the residents of the border communities. This would give the residents of the border a sense of belonging to the nation.

The incorporation of the residents of the border communities in the management of the border would bridge the communication gap that exists between the residents of the border and the security agents. It will also promote cooperation and cordial relationship between the two stakeholders Sensitization of the border communities on the implication of arms trafficking should be prioritized pursued vigorously. Furthermore, Nigeria must urgently consider the enrollment of the residents of the Nigeria-Niger border communities into Nigeria's national database for identification purposes. This can be achieved through the biometric registration and issuance of national identification cards to all the residents of the border communities. Biometric registration will reduce the number of residents obtaining dual or multiple national identifications. It would also enable the Nigerian border security agencies to identify individuals crossing the border by their genuine nationality and the reasons they are crossing. Those who are legally entitled to Nigerian citizenship either by marriage can legally apply through Nigeria Immigration and acquire such by going through the laid down rules and procedures.

The content of the ECOWAS protocol on the free movement of people, residency, and establishment must be revisited by the member states to suits the current security realities of West African states. The least member states can do is to re-examine the content of the protocol in areas such as the issuance of national identification cards and developing a comprehensive national database by all member states for their respective citizens. Furthermore, the Nigeria-Niger Republic must promote formal international business through the removal of administrative bottlenecks arising from the clearing of imported goods from Nigeria to Niger and vice versa. This would encourage the informal trans-border trade to follow formal routes and limit the volume of informal trans-border trade between Nigeria and the Niger Republic. Alternatively, Nigeria and Niger can consider the establishment of dry Seaports, international chamber of commerce, banks, and other financial institutions, and trans-border storage facilities to encourage traders to use the formal entry points. Border

facilities and financial support have proven to be an effective mechanism for reducing the rate of smuggling and its economic consequences.

The alternatives hypotheses of the study such as the high rate of poverty among the border communities, ECOWAS protocol on free movement, residency, and establishment, internal insecurity such as banditry and kidnapping, the cultural affinity of the border communities, bribery, and corruption among border security agencies contributed in the upsurge of trans-border arms trafficking on the border. However, the study uncovered that the alternative hypotheses were only micro-causal while information asymmetry between the key stakeholders in the management of the border is the macro-cause of the persistence of trans-border arms trafficking on the border. This suggests that addressing the information asymmetry through the inclusion of the residents of the border communities will address the challenges posed by the alternative hypotheses.

Existing pillars defining the borderlines connecting Nigeria and Niger are either scanty or destroyed by human activities. In places like Illela, some pillars are 50kilometres away from each other. As a result, the existing borderlines cannot be decoded by even the border managers let alone the residents of the border communities who are not equipped with any compass or Global Positioning System (GPS). Certainly, it could be cogently argued that, border management is difficult because of the vastness vis-d-vis the porosity of the border. In view of the scantiness or non-existence of border pillars, their identification and replacement should be given a priority with a view to replace and reduce distance between the pillars. This could be a joint venture between Nigeria and the Republic of Niger. Furthermore, Nigeria and Niger should re-assess the number of roads/foot paths linking the countries and consider establishing buffer zones to be marked appropriately especially in areas of high economic activities to enable security agents perform their duties effectively.

Nigeria and Niger use English and French as distinct official languages which often creates a language barrier between the border officials of the two countries. To bridge the language barrier between the officials of Nigeria and Niger Republic, there is urgent need for both countries to strengthen and promote educational

exchange programmes among their teachers through high schools and universities. The exchange programmes would enable the citizens of the two countries to learn and understand the official language of each other, exchange correspondences and communicate effectively. The Sokoto and Tahoua exchange programme should be promoted and extended to other Nigerian States that share border with Niger such as Katsina, Zamfara, Gigawa, Borno, Yobe and Kebbi States.

There is an urgent need for Nigeria to urgently establish an effective border management strategy by harmonizing entry and exit laws and regulations in relation to international boundary matters with its neighbors. In this regard, a Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC) should be constituted to undertake the harmonization task. The JMC should also monitor closely the activities of the Joint Technical and Local Boundary Committees. The National Boundary Commission and other stakeholders should draw up a blue print for the establishment of an effective border management regime for Nigeria inn consultation with its neighbors. Furthermore, Federal of Nigeria and neighboring states governments should explore bilateral options to effectively manage the borders. This will go a long way to enhance and sustain bilateral and diplomatic relations among the countries. While all these efforts are meant to ensure effective management of the border, there is need for both countries to establish a joint Federal, State and Local Governments, mass public enlightenment the people of the affected area. This is with a view to sensitizing the people, the local NGOs and Civil society organizations to give adequate support in combating the desertification problem confronting most of the border communities.

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APPENDIX

NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

Questionnaire

Interview (semi-structured) using a purposive sampling technique will be deployed to extract raw data from the relevant stakeholders. The respondents are categorized into two; the first category is made up of border security agents, security consultants and academics with expertise in border security and migration in local universities while the second category is made up of traditional leaders and residents of Jibia-Maradi border communities. Both categories would answer questions on how Nigeria-Niger border porosity is linked to trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria in the following manner.

Category 1 questions for border security agents and security consultants and academics.

The following questions are specifically designed to ascertain the effectiveness of the surveillance approach in the management of trans-border arms trafficking into Nigeria. These questions would be answered by the willing serving and retired Nigeria's border security personnel, border security consultants and academics with expertise on security and migration.

Theme A: Nigeria-Niger border security approach/strategy and trans-border arms trafficking

1. How can you describe the current border security approach/strategy used by Nigerian security in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border?
2. How effective this approach/strategy has been in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the border?
3. What are the challenges associated with the current approach/strategy used in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the border?

4. From your available records and experience, what kind of routes are used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms into Nigeria?

5. Which means of transportation are used by the trans-border arms traffickers to cross the Nigeria-Niger border?

Theme B: The effect of the living conditions of Nigeria-Niger border communities on trans-border arms-trafficking.

6. In your opinion, what do you think is responsible for trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border? Can you please comment on the role of the following:
   - The rate of poverty in border communities
   - The ethno-religious violence among its diverse ethnic nationalities
   - Nigeria's internal security challenges such as terrorism and banditry
   - The effect of ECOWAS policy on free movement and residency policy among west African countries
   - Bribery and corruption among border security agents
   - Cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger border communities on the management of trans-border arms trafficking

Theme C: Effect of the living conditions of Nigeria-Niger border communities in the control of trans-border arms trafficking

7. How can you describe the relationship between Nigeria-Niger border security agents and residents of the border communities? What are the major challenges?

8. What kind of role border communities play in the control of trans-border arms trafficking?

9. When do you get information from the residents of the border communities about the movement of trans-border arms traffickers? Can you describe specific conditions and motivations of the informants

10. As a solution, what do you think is the alternative approach/strategy in the management of trans-border arms trafficking on the border?

Category 2 questions for traditional leaders and residents of the border communities

The questions below are designed to ascertain the effectiveness of the surveillance approach in the eyes of the residents of the border communities. The main objective is to interrogate the role of the border communities and how the living conditions of the residents of the border communities such as the role of poverty, ethno-religious violence, integration, internal security challenges and corruption among border security agents affect the surveillance approach in combating arms trafficking on Nigeria-Niger border.

Theme A: The role of residents of Nigeria-Niger border communities in the management of trans-border arms trafficking

1. From your experience as a resident of the border community what do you think is responsible for trans-border arms trafficking on the Nigeria-Niger border?

2. How do the trans-border arms traffickers recruit informants from the residents of the border communities who provide them information on how to cross the border?

3. What kind of rewards or benefits these residents received for providing such information to the trans-border arms traffickers as well as potential punishment for not cooperating with them?

4. As a resident of Nigeria-Niger border, what kind of routes are used by the trans-border arms traffickers to deliver arms into Nigeria?

5. As a residents of Nigeria-Niger border community, in your opinion, under which condition does one share information with the border patrol team about the movement of trans-border arms traffickers?

6. What kind of response you receive from the border patrol team for sharing (or not sharing) information with them on the movement of trans-border arms traffickers?

7. What role does the border patrol teams play in securing the border against crimes, such as arms trafficking? Please describe their strengths and weaknesses.

Theme B: Living conditions of the residents of border communities and trans-border arms trafficking

8. In your opinion, how do the living conditions of the residents of Nigeria Niger border communities' impact on trans-border arms trafficking? Please comment on the role of:

- The rate of poverty in the border communities

- Ethno-religious violence among its diverse ethnic nationalities in Nigeria's multicultural society.

- Nigeria's internal security challenges such as terrorism and banditry

- The effects of ECOWAS protocol on free movement and residency policy among West African countries

- Bribery and corruption among border security agents

- The cultural affinity of the Nigeria-Niger border communities on the management of trans-border arms trafficking.

9. What do you think needs to be done better to control trans-border arms trafficking?

BIOGRAPHY

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Career Objective:

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Profile Summary:

Possess Master's of Science **(M.Sc)** degree in Political Science from the University of Lagos, Bachelor of Science **(B.Sc)** degree in Political Science from Ahmadu Bello University Zaria and currently a Doctoral (PhD) candidate in the Department of International Relations/Political Science, Near East University, Cyprus.

- ➢ Possess ten (10) years working experience in Oil & Gas services, maritime administration, personnel management, logistics and operations, customer service relations, supply and distributions, teaching, research and community service.
- ➢ Currently a Lecturer I in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Federal University Gusau, Zamfara State

➢ A member of the Nigerian Political Science Association **(NPSA)** and the Nigerian Society of International Affairs **(NSIA)**.

➢ Experience has resulted in acquiring skills in research and administrative best practices in public and private sectors, public relations, effective relationship management, effective communication and leadership skills.

➢ Possess high level of personal and professional integrity, Literate in computer application and General Information and Communication Technology.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND/QUALIFICATION

2018   PhD (Inview) Near East University, TRCN

2016   Running Jack Computer Academy
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2013   University of Lagos, Akoka, Nigeria
                          M.Sc Political Science

2006   Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria
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2002   The Polytechnic of Sokoto, Sokoto State
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2000   Government Secondary School Tsafe,
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WORKING EXPERIENCE

2006-2007   Birth Registrar, National Population Commission, Kaiama
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RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

1. **Idris, A.,**& Tutumlu, A. (2021). Nigeria and Niger Republic Trans-border Management against Arms Trafficking: A Whistleblowing Model. *Security Journal.*https://doi.org/10.1057/s41284-021-00307-0

2. **Idris, A.,**& Tutumlu A. (2021). Boko Haram's Resilience and the Porosity of Nigerian Border. Ikenga Journal of the *Institute of African Studies.*22 (1), 1- 21.

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2. **Idris A.,**& Muhammad A. (2018). Globalization, African Economy and Regional Integration: The Role of African Union. A Conference Paper Presented at the 30th National Conference of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA) on the theme ''Elections, Security Challenges and Africa Development'' Hosted by the Department of Political/Administrative studies University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria on the 26th-29th June. **(Certificate of oral Presentation)**

3. Muhammad A., &**Idris A.** (2016). Political Elites, Elections and Democracy in Nigeria. International Conference Paper Presented at the Department of Political Science & International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, on the theme: Deepening Democracy through elections in Nigeria: An assessment7[th]-9th March. **(Certificate of oral Presentation)**

4. Olanrewaju E. &**Idris A.** (2016). Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern Nigeria: Interrogating the Poverty Intensity and Terrorism Nexus. A National Conference Presented at the 24th Annual National Conference on the theme: ''The Domestic
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ACADEMIC WORKSHOPS AND TRAINING

International Workshop on Research Methods and Approaches to Migration and Diaspora Studies Organized by the Centre for Diaspora Studies Central University of Gujarat, Gandhinagar, India.In Collaboration with Centre for Migration, Refugees and Belonging, University of East London U.K. University of Gujarat, India from 30th June to 2nd July 2020. **(Certificate of Participation)**

Academic Workshop on "Proposal writing, Scientific Communication and Research Ethics'. Organised by Center for Research, Federal University Gusau, Zamfara State.November 23rd -26th 2016 **(Certificate of Participation)**.

A Workshop on "The Nigerian Universities Electronic Teaching and Leaning Platform" Organized by Spectrum Engineering Limited: Sponsored by Tertiary Education Trust Fund, held at Federal University Gusau, Zamfara state on the 11th-13th May 2016. **(Certificate of Participation).**

Workshop on Reproductive Health, organized by Adolescent Health & Information Project, AHIP 25th-26th August, 2006 at Gusau, Zamfara state **(Certificate of Attendance).**

COMMUNITY SERVICE AND AWARDS

Guest Speaker on Nigeria Television Authority Call-in-Live program, on the topic titled Zamfara State APC Primaries: Implications for Democracy and Way forward''. 3rd October, 2018 at 8:00pm-10:00pm

Guest Speaker on Nigeria Television Authority Call-in-Live program, on the topic titled "Nigeria at 57 Challenges and prospect for Nation Building" on 1st October, 2017 at 8:00pm-10:00pm

Secretary General, Koramar Boko Street Development Association, Behind King Fahad Women and Children Hospital, Samaru Gusau. Zamfara State.

Secretary, Muslim Corpers Association of Nigeria, Kwara State Branch, 2007. **(Certificate of Merit)**

Kaiama Local Government Authority, Kwara State. 2007. **(Commendation Certificate)**

MEMBERSHIP OF PROFESSIONAL BOCDIES

Member, Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA)

Member, Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA)

UNIVERSITY ADMIISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Level Coordinator- 200 Level	2016/2018
Member FMSS students Honorary award committee	2017/2018
Level Coordinator- 100 Level	2016/2017
Member, FMSS Strategic Planning Committee	2016/2017
Member, Department Screening and Admissions Committee	2016/2017
Member, FMSS Accreditation (Sub-committee)	2016/2017
Member FMSS students Honorary award committee	2017/2018

COURSES THOUGHT

POL 206 (Introduction to International Relations)
POL 207 (Introduction to Public Administration)
POL 208 (Introduction to Local Government Administration)
POL 315 (Theories of International Relations)
POL 316 (Public Administration in Nigeria)
POL 318 (Theory and Practice of Public Administration)
POL 408 Nigerian Local Government
POL 411 (International Law and Organization)

SKILL PROFILE
 * Good research skill
 * Good in Microsoft Office and access
 * Ability to learn quickly on any job
 * Very confident, adaptive and analytical

HOBBIES
Reading, Travelling, Swimming and Table Tennis

REFEREES
On request

PLAGIARISM CHECK (TURNITIN)

20185679'The Nigeria-Niger Republic border porosity and insecurity: From surveillance to whistleblowing in the management of trans-border arms trafficking

ORIGINALITY REPORT

8% SIMILARITY INDEX	3% INTERNET SOURCES	5% PUBLICATIONS	2% STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	Aminu Idris, Assel Tutumlu. "Nigeria and Niger Republic trans-border management against arms trafficking: a whistleblowing model", Security Journal, 2021 Publication	4%
2	Submitted to World Maritime University Student Paper	1%
3	"Constructivist Views of Cooperation along the Border", 'Walter de Gruyter GmbH' Internet Source	<1%
4	www.premiumtimesng.com Internet Source	<1%
5	issafrica.org Internet Source	<1%
6	Submitted to The WB National University of Juridical Sciences Student Paper	<1%
7	issuu.com Internet Source	

ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

YAKIN DOĞU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

BİLİMSELARAŞTIRMALARETİK KURULU

15.06.2020

Dear Aminu Idris

Yourapplicationtitled**"TheNigeria-Niger Republic Border Porosity and Insecurity: An ExplorationofaNewModelintheManagementofTrans-BorderArmsTrafficking"**withthe application number YDÜ/SB/2020/741 has been evaluated by the Scientific Research Ethics Committee and granted approval. You can start your research on the condition that you will abide by the information provided in your applicationform.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee Head of NEUScientificResearchEthicsCommittee,pleaseapplytothesecretariatoftheethicscommittee by showing thisdocument.