NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNFICYP IN THE CONTEXT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

OSMAN KOÇAK

MASTER'S THESIS

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ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNFICYP IN THE CONTEXT OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse peace activities of the United Nations in the context of the Cyprus Problem. The thesis is looking to answer the question of whether the UN contributes to peace in Cyprus or it just contributes to the de facto division of the island. In essence, this thesis focuses on the peace-keeping and peace-making activities of the United Nations in Cyprus. The limitations of the UN and the UNFICYP, in particular, is questioned through the analysis of secondary data. The presence of the United Nations peace operations in Cyprus dates back to the 1964. The dynamics of the Cyprus problem has significantly changed throughout the years but the mandate of the UNFICYP has remained, limiting the powers of the establishment. This thesis especially focuses on the peace-keeping and peace-making ability of the United Nations to adapt to the changes within the Cyprus conflict.

Keywords: Cyprus conflict, UN, UNFICYP, peace-keeping, peace-making.

ÖZ

KIBRIS SORUNU BAĞLAMINDA BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER VE BARIŞ GÜCÜNÜN ROLÜ

Bu tezin temel amacı, Birleşmiş Milletler'in barış faaliyetlerini Kıbrıs Sorunu bağlamında incelemektir. Bu tez, BM'nin Kıbrıs'ta barışa mı katkıda bulunduğu yoksa sadece statükonun siyasi çıkmazına mı katkıda bulunduğu sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Bu tez, esasen Birleşmiş Milletler'in Kıbrıs'taki barışı koruma ve barışı sağlama faaliyetlerine odaklanmaktadır. BM ve özellikle UNFICYP'nin sınırlamaları ikincil verilerin analizi ile sorgulanmaktadır. Kıbrıs'taki Birleşmiş Milletler barış operasyonunun geçmişi 1964'e kadar uzanmaktadır. Yıllar içerisinde Kıbrıs sorununun dinamikleri önemli ölçüde değişmiş, ancak UNFICYP'nin görev süresi düzenin yetkilerini sınırlayarak devam etmiştir. Bu tez, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler'in Kıbrıs sorunundaki değişikliklere uyum sağlayarak barışı koruma ve barışı sağlama becerisine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, BM, BM Barış Gücü, barışı koruma, barışı sağlama.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

A4P: Action for Peace

AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People

EOKA: National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters

EU: European Union

HIPPO: High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

IMF: International Monetary Fund

IOs: International Organisations

KKE: Communist Party of Greece

MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PEO: Pancyprian Federation of Labour

RoC: Republic of Cyprus

TMT: Turkish Resistance Organisation

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNAMID: African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNEF: United Nations Emergency Force

UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

Throughout history, there were times that different civilisations have been in conflict with each other. According to a study, humans had only spent 268 years in peace in the last 3421 years and the rest of the years were spent with wars (Durant & Durant, 1968). Within this time, war has evolved, and humanity had tried to find different solutions to prevent wars. In the modern international system, humanity is still trying to find a cure for war, and it was after the Second World War in 1945 that an institution was formed to keep peaceful relations in the world. The United Nations was created with a commitment to maintain international peace and security, to promote social progress, and to better living standards and human rights among the member-states (The United Nations, 2015). The idea of peace-keeping forces started in 1948 in the Middle East with the 1948 Arab-Israeli War to preserve the ceasefire between the two sides. Since then, the United Nations peacekeepers have taken part in a variety of missions around the world to protect peace within the conflict zones. This thesis analyses the impact of the United Nations peace-keeping and peace-making missions within the scope of the conflict of Cyprus.

Statement of the problem

As mentioned above, wars have been part of human history since the beginning of human civilizations. In the 20th century, humans have faced with many problems and war has always been part of these problems. After facing disastrous wars, humans have tried to find a way to establish peace on earth and through new international organisations. In this quest, the Charter of the United Nations aims to prevent conflicts and wars in the world.

Therefore, since 1964, the United Nations is at present on the island, in the form of the peace-keeping force UNFICYP as well as a peace-making force, working as a mediator between the two communities and the United Nations. Since 1964, the UN Security Council extends the mandate of the UNFICYP every six months. As the peace-keeping forces remain in the Buffer Zone in

Cyprus, it was announced in 2020 that the United Nations Peace-keeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had a budget of 51.7 million dollars for its activities for the period of July 2020-June 2021 (UN Security Council, 2021).

Other than the UNFICYP, the UN has various institutions in the island, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) and The United Nations Youth and Student Association of Cyprus (UNYSA). The UNFICYP, as peace-keeping mission of the UN, also operates in the island. This thesis discuses on peace operations of the UN so, this thesis is focused on the operations of the UNFICYP rather than other UN affiliated institutions. Today, with all of its resources and expenditures, the presence of the UN troops on the island is questioned by the international community more than ever. It can be said that they do contribute to negative peace rather than positive peace. In other words, the UN is trying to prevent the possibility of a hot conflict in Cyprus, but in fact, they have failed to establish justice, economic development, and structures to support peace. In case of Cyprus, peace does not only mean absence of the conflict. In Cyprus problem, as also suggested in the UN resolutions, peace refers to the bizonal, bicommunal federation. Today, the United Nations is stuck in its comfort zone and accused to keep the status quo rather than establish peaceful relations. Moreover, the role of the United Nations within the Cyprus negotiations is also very important. Therefore, this thesis questions whether the presence of the United Nations in Cyprus contributes to the status quo rather than enforcing positive peace on the island to reach a possible solution in Cyprus.

Objectives and Aims of the Study

The main objective of this research is to analyse the impact of the United Nations within the Cyprus conflict. This research discusses why and how the United Nations is trapped in Cyprus with the existing situation that has become part of normalcy. In a statement last year, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated that the leaders of the two communities had agreed that "the status quo is unsustainable," clearly asserting his understanding that the UNFICYP would not remain in Cyprus indefinitely to safeguard the peace. To be able to analyse the establishment of the United Nations Peace-keeping

Forces in Cyprus, the nature of the conflict itself is also questioned by this thesis. This research discusses the following research questions:

- Does the UN contribute to the establishment of peace in Cyprus, or does it contribute to the de facto division of the island?
- Can the UN have a role in the future of the Cyprus problem in order to establish positive peace?

Significance of the Study

This research analyses the impact of the United Nations on the Cyprus conflict in the general sense. The UN is expected to have a positive impact on the Cyprus conflict since it was positioned on the island in 1964 as the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The unit was set up to i) stop the brutality between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots; ii) add to the support and rebuilding of the rule of law; iii) work with a getting back to normal conditions (UNFICYP mandate). This research sheds light on the actual impact of the UN within the Cyprus conflict rather than analyse its expected effects. In this sense, this research raises the crucial question about the roles of the UNFICYP.

This research also brings a new perspective to the negotiations of the Cyprus conflict. In general, the United Nations is the least discussed and the least criticized actor within the context of the Cyprus conflict. It is mainly the two main communities and the guarantor states of the 1960 settlement as the third parties involved in the conflict, that are generally accused to be the main propagators of the conflict.

Scope and Limitations

The scope of this research covers the period beginning from 1964, with the involvement of the United Nations in the Cyprus conflict, and ends in 2021. The research analyses the establishment of the United Nations Peace-keeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) as well as the breaking points of the Cyprus conflict. In addition to these, the thesis questions the capacity of the United Nations and discusses whether the presence of the United Nations contributes to the status quo or not. This study has potential limitations. The time frame of the research is limited as it is conducted for a given period of

time. This is a qualitative research which also means that its process is time-consuming as well as limited interpretations.

Research Methodology

This research is a qualitative case study and involves secondary data. Secondary data includes articles from academic journals and textbooks concerning the conflicting situation in Cyprus. The systematic review of the secondary data is going to be used to analyse activities of the UN and the UNFICYP within the Cyprus conflict. The case study research design is used in this thesis. The case study is used as an in-depth study of the United Nations' work on peace keeping and peace-building in Cyprus to be able to draw out valuable lessons from it.

Cyprus as a Case study

Cyprus is the other case that the UN has influenced over the course of years. It was in 1954 that can be accepted as a turning point for Cyprus. In 1954, Greece raised a question about the case of Cyprus in the United Nations under the pressure of Cyprus's Archbishop Makarios and demanded self-determination for Cyprus. However, this move of Greece was rejected. At that time, Turkey defended that the UN should not interfere because Cyprus is still a British colony, therefore it is part of the internal affairs of Britain. In 1959, the Turkish prime minister Adnan Menderes and the Greek prime minister Konstantine Karamanlis met in Zurich for a summit and after that, they met in London with the British prime minister Macmillan and the Turkish and Greek community leaders from Cyprus were Dr Fazıl Küçük and Archbishop Makarios. In these summits, the Republic of Cyprus was established, which was based on a kind of bi-communal partnership. According to these agreements, the president of Cyprus would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice president would be a Turkish Cypriot and both of them would have the right of veto. This was a sui generis case of a power-sharing mechanism. The Ministerial cabinet would follow a similar logic to be formed with 3 Turkish Cypriots and 7 Greek Cypriots. In addition, for the House of Representatives, the Greek Cypriots would elect 70 percent of the members while Turkish Cypriots would elect 30 percent of the members. The public

service would also work with a quota based on this 70/30 principle and for the army, it would be 60/40. With the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance, Turkey, Greece and Great Britain became the three guarantor states of this new republic and they have acquired the right to intervene. In addition, Turkey can deploy 650 and Greece can deploy 950 troops on the island and Britain obtained two military bases on the island. (Bolukbasi, 1998).

In 1960, the Republic of Cyprus has declared its independence and it became a member of the United Nations. However, within three years, the issue of the 70/30 ration was criticized by Archbishop Makarios. In November 1963, President Makarios has requested the annulment of the fundamental articles that had been included within the 1960 Constitution. The point was believed to diminish the Turkish Cypriots to the status of a minority. On 21 December 1963, violence has erupted between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities. Disagreement on administration between the communities grew gradually and the President Makarios was believed to continue supporting the idea of enosis (unification with Greece). It was in 1963 that the violence grew more and more on the island, the Republic stopped working as a bi-communal institution as the Turkish Cypriots excluded themselves from the administration. Archbishop Makarios was aware of this situation that may increase the possibility of a Turkish intervention so to prevent this, he accepted the USA's suggestion of deployment of a UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus. He hoped that a UN peace-keeping force can prevent a possible third-party intervention and also can strengthen his position as the President. On 4 March 1964, the United Nations Security Council has agreed on Resolution no. 186, which recommended the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) (Bolukbasi, 1998). According to Resolution no.186:

> "Noting that the present situation with regard to Cyprus is likely to threaten international peace and security and may further deteriorate unless additional measures are promptly taken to maintain peace and to seek out a durable solution, Considering the positions taken by the parties in relation to the treaties signed at Nicosia on 16 August I960,* Having in mind the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and, in

particular, its Article 2, paragraph 4, which reads: " All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use, of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations " (UN Security Council, 1964)

UNFICYP's functions were defined in Resolution no. 186. According to Article 5 of the Resolution, UNFICYP was expected to prevent conflicts between communities, contribute to maintain law and order and contribute to return normal conditions. The mandate can be listed in 8 points:

1. Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to. worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace.

2. Asks the Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order, to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus.

3. Calls upon the communities in Cyprus and their leaders to act with the utmost restraint;

4. Recommends the creation, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. The composition and size of the Force shall be established by the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Commander of the Force shall be appointed by the Secretary-General and report to him. The Secretary-General, who shall keep the Governments providing the Force fully informed, shall report periodically to the Security Council on its operation;

5. Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the

maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions;

6. Recommends that the stationing of the Force shall be for a period of three months, all costs pertaining to it being met, in a manner to be agreed upon by them, by the Governments providing the contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. The Secretary-General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose;

7. Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on his efforts;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide, from funds of the United Nations, as appropriate, for the remuneration and expenses of the mediator and his staff." (UN Security Council, 1964)

In terms of diplomatic efforts, negotiations between the two communities continued. In June 1968, negotiations started between communities under the auspices of Secretary-General U-Thant. Osorio Taffal, who was appointed as Special Representative by U-Thant, met with communities in Beirut. In 1972, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim restarted talks. Both of these negotiations collapsed without reaching a final solution. On 15 July 1974, the Greek junta staged a coup against Makarios and declared Nikos Sampson as president. Five days later, on 20 July 1974, Turkey used her rights from the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance and sent troops to Cyprus. In Geneva Conferences, a cease-fire was called but eventually, Geneva Conferences also failed (Bolukbasi, 1998). There was no progress in terms of peace talks between the two sides and violence persevered on and

off between the years of 1963-74. The island was divided in two in 1974. At the northern part of the island, there is a Turkish administration, also known as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is accepted as a de-facto state as it is only recognised by Turkey. At the southern part of the island, there is the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which is recognised by the rest of the world and accepted as the sole representative of the island by the United Nations.

Since 1974, UNFICYP managed to prevent a hot conflict between communities but on the other hand, the island is still divided without any political settlement. In this sense, the UN is accused of preserving the status quo rather than establishing peace (Sambanis, 1999). The UN Peace-keeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is located at the Buffer Zone between the two sides. Negotiations between the Turkish Cypriot community and the Greek Cypriot community to solve the Cyprus conflict has continued for more than 50 years. They have collapsed many times and there were few times in history, where the two sides came close to reach an agreement. Today, the ongoing negotiations between two communities continue with the mediation efforts of the United Nations.

Chapter Outline

Introduction

Background of the study, statement of the problem, objectives and aims of the study, significance of the study, scope and limitations, and research methodology topics are going to be explained briefly in this chapter, in order to give more comprehensive information about this study.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

In this chapter, existing literature on peace studies and conflict resolution is going to be analysed to have a clear perspective and understanding for this study.

Chapter 2: Cyprus Conflict and the United Nations

This chapter discusses the historical circumstances leading to the Cyprus conflict. A brief history of negotiations between the two Cypriot communities is also going to be reviewed. The chapter further elaborates the main roots of the problem and discusses the proposed solutions including the Intercommunal talks and the UN-sponsored solutions.

Chapter 3: The Role of The UN and The UNFICYP in the Context of Cyprus Conflict

In this chapter, the role of the United Nations and more specifically the presence of the UNFICYP in Cyprus is going to be discussed. The chapter especially focuses on the discussion of whether the UN and the UNFICYP contribute to the status quo or supports peace on the island. The power of the United Nations as a mediator to the Cyprus conflict is also limited because of the deadlock in the intractability of the conflict parties. In short, the limitations to the power of the UN are going to be analysed in this chapter. This chapter further focuses on the impact of the UN and the UNFICYP on the Cyprus conflict through the lens of a conceptualised peace and peace-building theory. The broad experience of the United Nations in peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building is starting to receive benefits regarding exercises learned and improved peacebuilding practice.

Chapter 4: The Future of the UN's Role in the Conflict Negotiation and Mediation

This chapter discusses the future of the United Nations in the given conflicts and the role of the United Nations to provide an arena to discuss terms and to the conflicting parties to discuss their terms and provide opportunities to end the disputes on the way to sustainable peace. For an improved peace-building practice is possible as 'the United Nations remains by far the most appropriate agency to oversee humanitarian aid and play a leading role in post-war reconstruction, to ensure in particular that the peace is not just the absence of violence, but a peace with justice, inclusive democracy and respect for human rights.

Conclusion

In this part of the thesis, final explanations are going to be given along with the main argument of the thesis along with a brief summary of the chapters. The final findings are presented and suggestions for further research proposed with further recommendations.

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1 History of Peace-making and Peace-keeping

History shows that in time, it became a necessity to establish an institution for the promotion of peace in Europe, this was evident decades before the formation of the United Nations. Historically, it was the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) that was accepted as a turning point in history, it had set the conditions for a number of European States to create harmonious relations and to learn the ways to keep each other in balance through an understanding that we may refer to as international organizations (IOs) today. It was the Congress of Vienna that re-established an enduring harmony in Europe. The Great Powers perceived that the current state framework was not, at this point sufficient and that they needed to look for new institutional courses of action and it is through these courses of action that the present-day International Organisations (IOs) have advanced. Among the developments settled upon in Vienna were new guidelines for strategic relations, and principles worked on both respective and multilateral discretion, developing into a proceeding with cycle of codification of standard political relations. Subsequently, since 1815, inventive thought brought about a progressing pattern of gatherings, meetings and summits to manage comparable and related issues (Reinalda, 2014). One of the worst circumstances that the world came to a halt was seen when the First World War broke out in 1914. It was Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination in 1914 that was seen as the spark of the First World War. After the assassination, series of crises took place in Europe. The Austro-Hungarian Empire used this assassination as an opportunity and sent an ultimatum to Serbia. However, Russia was supporting the Slavic states in the Balkans and sent support to Serbia. On the other side, Germany fully supported the

Austro-Hungarian Empire. From the perspective of France, absenting themselves from the war would bring German hegemony to Europe. Germany attacked France through Belgium, which caused Britain involvement in the war against Germany. Thus, the whole Europe became a battlefield. From the starting point of the war, the president of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson was calling for peace as well as trying to remain neutral (Howard, 2002). As the war continued in Europe, scarcity in resources became an issue in Germany so Germany has launched its unrestricted submarine warfare. In 1915, this campaign of Germany caused the death of 139 Americans. In addition to the relaunch of unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917, the German foreign minister offered support to Mexico in case they declare war against the USA. At this point, the USA joined the war with the Allies against the Central Powers (McKinnon-Bell & Cawood, 2001). This gave an advantageous upper hand to the Allied Powers and they managed to win over the Central Powers. (Howard, 2002). Just after the First World War, the horrors of the war increased the desire to keep peace in the world. The victors of the war decided to initiate the League of Nations. The League's goals included disarmament and preventing warfare in the world by introducing the concept of collective security and settling disputes through negotiation and diplomacy. In January 1919, at the Paris Peace Conference, Woodrow Wilson shared the first draft of the organisation with the other states (Walters, 1967).

The whole world was in a state of chaos, because of the destructive effects of the war over the world. European Empires have collapsed such as Ottoman Empire, German Empire, Russian Empire and Austro-Hungarian Empire, there were economic crises and revolutions all over Europe. The League of Nations was established under these conditions. At this point, Woodrow Wilson had introduced his famous 14 points and encouraged positive steps towards peace. They showed Wilson's vision of post-war order. In accordingly, the core states were expected to be respectful to the others' political independence and territorial integrity (Henig, 2010). Woodrow Wilson also signed the Treaty to join the League of Nations in Paris but later on in the US Senate, it was not ratified by the Senate. Without the

contribution of the USA, building up strong social and economic relations became even more difficult (Walters, 1967).

To prevent arms race and to establish peace, the League of Nations aimed to limit the power of the states. In addition to this, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the Allied states agreed on several limitations for the German military capacities. France was thinking that Germany and USSR could be a threat for them, so France continued armament, Britain had many colonies around the world, so they argued that they need a strong army to protect their Empire and continued armament. On the other side, the USA and Japan already had powerful naval forces. In 1932, the Disarmament Commission met in Geneva. German delegates demanded their right to rearm which was forbidden at the Treaty of Versailles. Meanwhile, in 1932, Adolf Hitler was elected in Germany. In 1933, the Disarmament Commission met in Geneva again. German delegates were still demanding their rearmament rights and a revision for the existing conditions of the Treaty. However, this time it was Hitler, who withdrew Germany both from the Disarmament Commission and the League of Nations (Henig, 2010).

The Second World War started with the German attack on Poland in 1939. At that time, Hitler was ruling the ruling Nazi party in Germany. In retaliation, France and Britain declared war on Germany. As the war continued, Hitler followed an expansionist policy and attacked more countries such as Denmark and Norway. In May 1940, Hitler took control of Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the Northern part of France including Paris. In September 1940, Japan, Italy and Germany signed Tripartite Pact and formed the Axis Powers (Parker, 2002). On the Eastern Front of the war, Japan was planning to invade Thailand, Malaya, the Philippines, and other colonies of the Allies. Japan attacked Pearl Harbour, a military island of the USA on the Pacific coast on 7 December 1941 to prevent the support of the USA. After this attack, the USA joined the war on the side of the Allies. In 1943, the Allies landed troops in Sicily and after the fall of Mussolini in Italy, they gained more territories. However, Hitler also moved its troops and gained control of some parts of Italy. In 1943, the representatives of the Allied forces, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Tehran to plan their next

move to defeat the Axis Powers. Meanwhile, the Soviets started the Soviet Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation. At this time, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin met in Yalta and they talked about the position of Poland as well as the post-war order and decided to form an establishment to protect peace in the world. The United Nations was founded to safeguard democracy, freedom and peace in the world In May 1945, the Soviet troops entered Berlin and Nazi Germany capitulated.   The Allies demanded Japan's unconditional surrender, but Japan rejected it (Weinberg, 2014). In August 1945, the USA dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Afterwards, Japan accepted the demands of the Allies (Parker, 2002).

In June 1945, just after the surrender of Nazi Germany, the United Nations was established officially with the signed United Nations Charter. At first, the organisation started as an alliance against the Axis powers. In August 1944, representatives of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have met to discuss the basics of this new organisation. Before the surrender of Nazi Germany, the Charter of the United Nations was ready. For holding key members in the organisation, they created the most important and influential part of the United Nations, the Security Council. There would be five permanent members of the Security Council, namely France, China, Great Britain, the USSR and the US, and these members would have the veto power. The United Nations included social and economic improvements to its Charter as the economic and social problems were seen as the reasons that strengthen extreme nationalism (Hanhimaki, 2008).

After the establishment of the UN, one of the major focuses of this new international organisation became Arab-Israeli relations. In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution no. 181, to establish separate Jewish and Arab states in Palestine. According to the resolution, Palestine would be divided into two parts to establish a Jewish state. In addition, Jerusalem would be under the control of the international regime. This resolution discussed the possible future of - religious places, minority rights and also the economic future of the region (UN Security Council, 1963). The

United Nations' partition plan in resolution no. 181, led to a conflict between Arabs and Jews. The first military observation mission of the United Nations was United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), which was established in 1948 to observe the conflict between Israel and Lebanon. UNTSO was the first intervention of the UN. According to the official resources, it was the first peace-keeping operation, but it was a military observer mission, so officials were not armed. However, the peace-keeping missions started with the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which was operational between 1956-1967 in the Sinai Peninsula. Its first mission was helping withdrawal of the armed forces after the Suez crisis, and after this, its mission was to build a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt (Langholtz, Kondoch, & Wells, 2004).

Originally, there was nothing directly about peace-keeping in the Charter of the United Nations, but the term has evolved in time. During the negotiations about the United Nations Charter, representatives of the states rejected the concept of peace-keeping, because the idea of peace-keeping meant placing military units into a state (Hanhimaki, 2008). There are two types of Peace-keeping missions in the structure of the United Nations: unarmed observer missions and armed missions (Makdisi & Prashad, 2017). As mentioned above, whether regarded as core or periphery, all sovereign states have rejected the idea of any intervention. In this sense, Peace-keeping missions could only be possible with invitation and consent. In addition to this, states can order peace-keeping forces to leave the country as happened in Egypt in 1967 (Hanhimaki, 2008). According to the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, "members should respect to each other's sovereignty and independence and should avoid any use of force and threat" (United Nations, 1945).

When the USA started a military operation against Iraq in 2003, they based their reasoning to the Article 51 of the UN Charter that gave the right for self-defence in case of an armed attack and also gives right to use force against threats (even if it is unarmed) to the peace with approval of Security Council. In this sense, the invasion of Iraq was neither legal nor illegal (Franck, 2003). The USA, both used self-defence and threat to the peace arguments as they attacked Iraq with an assumption of mass destruction weapons. This

situation can be taken as an example of a passive United Nations in certain cases and how the organisation may act in favour of American interests. As a member of the United Nations, the USA should follow the UN Charter and avoid the use of power against other nations (Franck, 2003). In addition to the USA, other permanent members also exploited their veto powers. In the case of the Rwandan conflict, the UN Security Council avoided to use the term genocide to define the conflict because of the French veto. In Kosovo, Russia and China acted together and threatened to use their veto power against any action towards Serbia (Melling & Dennett, 2017). Clearly, these engagements of the permanent members discredited the United Nations.

An analysis of the key concepts helps the construction of the other chapters of this thesis. For this reason, this chapter further focuses on the concepts of peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. The UN is engaged in many peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and preventive diplomacy efforts all around the world. For example, after the war in Darfur the UN deployed UNAMID and after the civil war in the Central African Republic deployed MINUSCA. For peace-building efforts, The UN works in Sierra Leonne, Lebanon and many other countries actively. To prevent conflicts, the Secretary-General uses good offices in many other regions where conflict can arise. In Cyprus, the UN has peace-keeping forces and also has engaged in mediations to achieve a settlement between the communities. However, the UN cannot be considered as successful in the context of mediation and peace-keeping. This argument is explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

1.2 Emergence of Peace-keeping Peace-making and Peace-building

Johan Galtung, one of the founders and also one of the pioneer scholars in the field of the peace studies, had articulated peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building first time in his article, "Three Approaches to Peace: Peace-keeping, Peace-making, Peace-building" (1976). In this article, as Galtung states, peace has 3 basics and these are peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. According to Galtung, when two parties are at war, status quo, which means the situation before war, is disrupted. At this stage, third parties can engage in "peace-keeping" in order to stop direct

violence caused by war. In this environment, status quo is desired even if it is not ideal condition (Galtung , 1976). The direct violence, here again, is defined by Johan Galtung. As he defines, direct violence as directly attacking a human being for the purpose to kill or damage (Galtung, 1969) Galtung also defined peace-making term in his article. Peace-making defined in the article as conflict resolution. With peace-making, adversaries negotiate conflict for addressing sources of the conflict and also possible solutions for conflict. According to Galtung, sources of conflict are also important. Even if there is not any war going on, arms race and war can cause problems. He states that avoiding wars and conflicts may not be enough and disagreements and worries of both parties should be heard for actual peace (Galtung , 1976). Galtung defines peace-building more like a structural mechanism; in his words, "structures must be found that remove causes of wars and offer alternatives to war in situations where wars might occur." (Galtung , 1976, p. 298). Galtung also defined two distinct types of peace: Positive peace and negative peace. Negative peace is simply absence of direct violence and the absence of war. On the other hand, positive peace refers to cooperation and harmony in society and also the absence of structural violence (Galtung, 1969). According to the UN, peace-keeping is simply intervention to conflict, peace-making is addressing sources of the conflicts with diplomatic efforts. The UN operates with good offices of the Secretary General. The UN defined peace-building as reducing the risk of recurrence of the conflict and building capacity to manage it (UN, n.d.).

1.3 How Peace-building and Peace-keeping Are Officialised

In 1992, the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted the famous report "An Agenda for Peace" to the Security Council. Boutros-Ghali analysed the dynamics and future of the peace and conflict resolution with the perspective of the UN and also defined terms like preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peace-keeping. He shed light on the preventive measures such as peace-making and peace-building in his article. In some ways, he criticized peace-keeping and suggested supportive measures like peace-building and peace-making like Galtung had suggested elsewhere but Boutros-Ghali also suggested measures for preventive diplomacy (Boutros-

Ghali, 1992). In 2000, the "Brahimi Report" was established with the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In this report, peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building were identified as the key activities of the UN's peace operations. The report further argues that peace is not only about peace-keeping and ceasefire-monitoring, peace evolves continuously, and the UN should adapt its strategies for being more efficient (UN General Assembly, 2000). This point in the Brahimi report supports the idea of this thesis that the role of the UN forces in Cyprus as peace-keepers should be questioned if the UN is contributing to the status quo or really supporting peace in the island.

1.4 Mediation and Preventive Diplomacy

The term of preventive diplomacy in the UN was coined by the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld. Preventive diplomacy's purpose is involvement into situations with good offices which can easily turn into conflicts (Ramcharan, 2008). It includes analysing roots and forces of the possible conflicts and detecting it before it happens (The United Nations, 2021). Preventive diplomacy aims to identify sources of conflicts and prevent violence. These prevention activities can be operational prevention and structural prevention. Operational prevention focuses on short-term strategies which are explained in the Charter of the UN. On the other side, structural prevention aims to analyse and solve sources of conflicts in the long term (Akiba, 2020).

As dynamics of peace become more complex, mediation types also change and adapt to this new environment. Three main shifts in mediation have occurred with this adaption process. First, mediations led by the UN have decreased in popularity around the world. On the other side, new groups such as "Group of Friends" which is a mini coalition of states for mediation activities have emerged, and also independent international mediators are gaining popularity. Each of them has their own advantages and disadvantages. As the UN has worldwide legitimacy, mediations led by the UN has the support of this power. Without this power, mediators of the UN would not have much influence. However, there may be pressures towards mediators from the UN. Because in some cases, members of the Security

Council may be one of the sides of the conflict or may have strong benefit from an outcome. When states are directly involved in the mediation, they may have influence parties. For being actually effective at mediation, states should have an international influence or have leverage over parties of the conflict. However, if they have any interest in conflict, they may choose to act in favour of their national interest and this can be problematic. Private mediators also have certain pros and cons. They heavily rely on the leverage of others from the outside. However, they can be faster than others such as the UN in sense of involvement in the conflict. Teresa Whitfield (2010) gives three advice for all mediators in her article to manage a successful mediation: "The mediator should be well informed about conflict and its complex dynamics, should find support for his/her actions and mediator should always remain neutral" (Whitfield, 2010).

1.5 Criticisms Against Peace-building and Peace-keeping

The appearance of the very first examples of peace operations or as known as peace support operations dates back to the nineteenth century in Europe that took place as a result of cooperation between states. The first examples of this cooperation are the Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine (*Commission Centrale pour la Navigation du Rhin*) and the Commission of Danube River (*Commission Européenne du Regime du Danube*), which are established after the Napoleonic Wars (Schmidl, 1999). These were mainly for managing and securing waterways in Europe. Contemporary understanding of peace-keeping and peace-building is highly influenced by the UN policies as it is the most active actor around the world. United Nations adopted liberal peace to its policies, so criticisms are both towards liberal peace and the UN. According to the UN, peace-making is the involvement of the UN into the conflict to search for a negotiated agreement. For the UN, the aim of peace-building is to increase the capacity of states for the prevention of the reoccurrence of conflict. This is a long-term activity for establishing sustainable peace. (The United Nations, 2021). This issue is further discussed in chapter 4.

1.5.1 Criticisms Against Liberal Peace

After the devastating outcomes of the Second World War, cooperation between the European states has increased even more. However, the effects of the war also affected the colonial empires and the decolonisation period started. As the colonial empires are faced with economic problems and other internal problems after the war, they started to lose power. As a result of this colonies demanded their independence.   However, the peace-keeping operation of the United Nations started to have imperialist notions. In 1956, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) established after Suez Crisis. The force is established for the withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli troops from occupied parts of Egypt during Suez Crisis (Pugh, 2004). The United Nations Peace-keeping Forces' foundations are based on these imperialist ambitions rather than peace and security. From the establishment of the UN to 1985, the UN undertook thirteen peace-keeping operations around the world. Date and location of the first peace-keeping operation is controversial. From an official perspective, the first operation is the UN Truce Supervisory Organisation. This operation consisted of unarmed observers. After the first Arab-Israeli War, these unarmed military observers were sent to the Middle East with Count Bernadotte who was the mediator. Count Bernadotte was a Swedish diplomat who was appointed by the UN as a mediator and supervisor. Similarly, another military observer operation was formed in India and Pakistan, in 1949. The UN Emergency Force established in 1956 for conflict in the Sinai Peninsula after Suez Crisis and it was the first operation labelled as a peace-keeping operation. Also, it was the first armed peace-keeping operation of the UN (Goulding, 1993). All these first peace-keeping operations provided experience and models for the future of peace-keeping operations. Robert Cox argues that neo-liberals and neo-realists try to deal with problems in a world order rather than examining the structure that causes the problem. In this sense, he argues that they prefer the status quo rather than analysing the source of the problem (Cox R. , 1981). In addition to this, Mark Duffield argues that interveners are not willing to risk their soldiers in peace-keeping operations, so they try to manage situation with sanctions (Duffield, 2001). In this sense, peace-keeping forces are not neutral but serve the status quo and peace-keeping can be seen as

managing of insurgency in weak countries (Pugh, 2004). United Nations Peace-keeping Forces' operations and deployment regions are decided in the Security Council. In other words, five permanent members of the Security Council control all peace-keeping missions. Security Council members can sometimes reluctantly approve a resolution but do not support it in reality. For instance, the Security Council approved and promised for 34 000 troops for Bosnia with the request of the Secretary-General of that time Boutros Boutros-Ghali. However, in reality, 7000 troops were sent to Bosnia (Pugh, 2004). In sense of troops, Dennis Jett identifies another major problem in peace-keeping missions of the UN from the perspective of interveners. He argues that poor countries send their troops to risky missions, while rich countries are reluctant to send their troops to unruly parts of the world (Jett, 2016).

While other countries risk their troops in missions, great powers take higher posts in the organisation. Thus, great powers have a huge impact on the policies of the UN. According to Cox and Schechter (2002), the UN become a tool for the USA for implementation of their policy. However, interventionists from the West are trying to impose Western historical experience which contradicts with multilateralism of the UN (Cox & Schechter, 2002). In this sense, peace-keeping operations become an instrument for promoting a certain type of peace which is liberal peace. Paul Rogers (2002) articulates "liddism" at this point. With "liddism" Western states with peace-keeping actually trying to keep a lid on the problem. In this sense, Westerns states do not identify the actual source of the conflict and resolve the conflict (Rogers, 2002).

Another problem of peace-keeping operations of the United Nations is overburden. After the end of the Cold War and bipolarity, new alliances emerged and some of them are regional organisations (Pugh, 2004). To lighten the burden of the United Nations these regional organisations should be included in the process. The United Nations should cooperate with regional organisations because regional organisations have the advantage of local knowledge, experience and legitimacy. In addition to this, regional organisations can provide staff and other resources. However, the United

Nations should also cover up the disadvantages of regional organisations. For example, under some conditions, regional organisations may have lack of mandate and may face challenges for maintaining neutrality (Alagappa, 1997).

Reform proposals were developed, in point of cooperation and task sharing between the United Nations and regional organisations for facilitating coordination in conflict resolution. However, hegemon powers resisted to reforms. For instance, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's second term was vetoed by the USA in the Security Council (Pugh, 2004). In 1991, Boutros Boutros-Ghali seemed like an ideal candidate for the position. During the Camp David Accords, he was one of the key actors, he was of a north African origin, an Arab, Christian, and pro-Israeli. Most of the member states of the United Nations had positive thoughts about Boutros-Ghali. However, after a while, his reform proposals like preventive diplomacy were faced with an opposition by the USA because they thought the Secretary-General was trying to attain more power. As the Secretary-General of the UN, he said it is his duty to protect the periphery countries from the ethnocentrism of the others. Western countries were shocked after he defined the Bosnian War as "war of the rich" and after his attention to hunger and scarcity in Somalia. Afterwards, he even blamed the USA for not intervening Rwanda in time. His relations with the USA became even tenser after he stated that Israel is killing civilians in Qana. On 19 June 1996, the government of the USA stated that they are going to veto the re-election of Boutros Boutros-Ghali as the Secretary-General of the UN (Rouleau , 1996).

Within the concept of peace-building, in 1996, Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote *An Agenda for Democratization* and submitted it to Security Council. According to Boutros-Ghali, democracy is crucial for preserving peace and security. He adds that with democratization lasting peace can be built (Boutros-Ghali, 1996). In addition to Boutros-Ghali's Agenda for Democratization, the Brahimi report also highlights democratization's importance on peace (UN General Assembly, 2000). However, Brahimi report explains democratization as the main objective rather than using democracy as a tool for peace-building. For many, the democratization

process is key for peace-building and democratization should be supported from the outside. According to this view, democratization is crucial, but peace does not come automatically with democratization so peace should be supported with institutions (Galtung, 2010). Especially after the Cold War, liberal peace became the main model of peace-building for the United Nations, which is the leading organisation for peace-keeping and peace-building. Liberal peace aims to establish economic and social institutions and support peace-building with these economic and social institutions, and with interventions from outside. After the end of the Cold War, international organisations such as United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and Western states argued that liberal peace-building and democratic capitalism can bring internal and external peace to war-torn countries so liberal peace, with help of the West, started to gain more popularity (Jahn, 2007; Clark, 2001). Michael Pugh (2005) analyses liberal peace-building and its purpose in his article, and he articulates an important question, "who is peace-building for and what purposes does it serve?" (Pugh, 2005, p. 38). Criticisms towards liberal peace are based on these two questions and mostly criticising interventionist notions of the Western states and state-building activities.

As also mentioned above, the United Nations and other international agencies support the liberal peace-building approach. The philosophy behind liberal peace-building is based on the same roots with the modernization theory; both of them assume that political systems tend to evolve toward market democracy inevitably. As Roland Paris (1997) argues, capitalism, by its very nature, is competitive and cause inequalities in society. Thus, implementing a capitalist market to a sensitive war-torn society may cause a backlash. Same as capitalism, democracy can be seen as a source of competition. Holding elections just after civil conflicts may divide the population even deeper. In addition, war-torn societies and states may not be able to manage these competitions in community (Paris, 1997). Establishment of a free market in the post-war communities is for the interest of Western states. Peace-builders design the economic system and markets of the war-torn states for capital accumulation. In other words, they merge peace-building and capitalism for the interest of corporations. Interveners

also present their idea which is free-market economy, as only choice to war-torn societies. On the other side, capitalism causes exploitation of the environment and labour. Meanwhile, locals who seen as "uncivilised" fight for their independence, self-determination rights and justice in their country, which is seen as problematic by peace-builders (Pugh, 2013). Neoliberal thoughts in peace-building, led mainly by international organisations like the UN, IMF, and the Western states, tend to link peace with state-building. After the Cold War, as more parties are involved in peace-building, the process started to transform into state-building. Actors, especially the Western states, perceived state-building as the ideal option for peace-building and imposed this to war-torn societies. However, this approach contradicts with the essence of peace-building. In fact, peace-building supposed to improve life standards of society, but rather than that liberal peace, with a state-building approach strengthens state itself (Campbell & Peterson, 2013). According to Fukuyama (2004), failed states are regarded as a threat for the world from several perspectives ranging from terrorism to poverty to HIV. Thus, with state-building, these problems can be eliminated (Fukuyama, 2004). As can be understood from Fukuyama's point, great powers use state-building for their own interests rather than peace. Basically, great powers design states and institutions for utilising their needs, especially for their own security needs. Thus, in its crudest form, state-building becomes a way of imposing Western needs to other states (Chandler, 2006). Peace-building, in point of fact, should focus on improvements about health, social welfare and security. However, state-building can also be used to focus on improvements in governance and strengthening state (Pugh, Cooper, & Turner, 2008).

Some scholars argue that peace-building, institutions and state-building should be established before liberalization so it can be easier to handle conflicts (Paris, 2004). As mentioned before, liberal peace-building establishes hollow institutions which can serve the interest of interveners. In addition, rather than a top to bottom approach, peace should come from the bottom that is from grassroots organisations. In other words, the public itself should be committed believers in peace. Because peace is the process itself rather than the desired end and it cannot last long when it is imposed from

out. In this sense, with communication, peace should be negotiated. Even if liberal peace successfully implements its institutions with state-building, it is meaningless for societies because these institutions are not going to have any legitimacy without public support. (Campbell & Peterson, 2013). Therefore, peace-building should not focus on state-building but should focus on the public itself. As Jorgen Johansen says (1994), "peace takes time. There is no easy way out. It is easier to start a war. If you plant an olive tree, it takes 50 years until you can harvest olives, but you can cut it down in 2 minutes. Building peace is like nurturing an olive tree." (Fischer & Baihodjoeva, 2013)

1.6 United Nations Peacekeeping and UNFICYP

In the UN Charter, there are no specific chapters dedicated to peace-keeping operations. Chapter VI of the Charter addresses "Pacific Settlements of Disputes" while Chapter VII is about "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" (United Nations, 1945). As peace-keeping operations are in between peaceful settlements in Chapter VI and military actions in Chapter VII, "Chapter VI and a half" was suggested by Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld to include the peace-keeping operations (Popovski, 2015). The UNFICYP was established with the consent of the Republic of Cyprus with Resolution no.186 (Dodd, 2010).

With Article no. 24, the UN Charter gives full authority to the Security Council for taking necessary actions for the maintenance of international peace and security. To prevent possible conflict of authority, Article no. 12, does not give any authority to General Assembly unless the Security Council requests. (United Nations, 1945). In 1950, during the Korean War, the Security Council could not be able to function because of the rivalries between two superpowers. Resolution 377A(V), which was named as "Unifying for Peace", gave General Assembly the right to make recommendations about international peace and security to Security Council. According to this resolution, the Security Council should meet to discuss the recommendation of the General Assembly (Reicher, 1981). General Assembly used its rights from "Unifying for Peace" in 1956 with Suez Crisis and established the UN Emergency Force in November 1956. Also, in another resolution, UN

General Assembly called for a ceasefire and respect to the sovereignty of Egypt (Hilmy, 2020).

On 21 December 1963, the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have erupted with underlying disagreements. In February 1964, the United Kingdom as one of the guarantor states requested a meeting in the Security Council. Meanwhile, President Makarios had requested help from the Security Council (Boyd, 1966). On 4 March 1964, the UN Security Council adopted resolution no. 186 and recommended the establishment of a UN Peace-keeping Force with the consent of the Government of Cyprus. In addition, the Security Council asked the government of Cyprus to take necessary precautions for re-establishing law and order. The Security Council gave authority to the Secretary-General to appoint commander of the force (UN Security Council, 1964). For clarifying details of the peace-keeping operation, the Secretary-General published an aide mémoire to define the principles of the operation. According to aide mémoire, UNFICYP Forces can only use arms for self-defence. Self-defence includes defence of the UN and supports to the other UN staff under attack (Theodorides, 1982).

Resolution no. 186 of the Security Council also defines the function and responsibilities of the UNFICYP. According to this resolution, peace-keeping force should act for international peace and security and also should work for the restoration of law and order in Cyprus. In addition to the functions of the UNFICYP, Resolution no. 186 also gives the Secretary-General responsibility to appoint a mediator (UN Security Council, 1964). In 1967, the Security Council invited both communities for intercommunal talks with good offices of the Secretary-General (UN Security Council, 1967). In 1974, after the devastating events, responsibilities and functions of the UNFICYP changed. After the coup d'état of the Greek Military Junta, Makarios escaped to Paphos where he was under the protection of UNFICYP and afterwards escaped from the island with help of the UK. On 20 July 1974, landed troops. On the same day, the UN Security Council, with Resolution no. 353, requested withdrawal of all foreign military units without any delay and also called Greece, Turkey and the UK to enter into negotiations for re-establishment of peace and law in Cyprus (UN Security Council, 1974). As

stated in Resolution no. 186 on 4 March 1964, the UNFICYP was established for intercommunal violence. However, with the intervention of third parties, Greece and Turkey, the UNFICYP became understaffed. After the final ceasefire on 16 August 1974, UNFICYP had humanitarian responsibilities related to refugees and Greek Cypriots who left in the North and Turkish Cypriots who left in the South of the island. For maintenance of ceasefire between sides the UNFICYP build up buffer zone which is 180 kilometres long (Asmussen, 2015). The evaluation of the peace-keeping mission of the UN, in general, is discussed in further chapters.

CHAPTER 2: CYPRUS CONFLICT AND THE UNITED NATIONS

In this chapter, the Cyprus conflict is going to be discussed. In order to understand the conflict between communities without any shortcomings and misunderstandings, the source of the Cyprus conflict should be analysed in detail. In this sense, brief information about the history of Cyprus and communities in Cyprus is going to be helpful.

Around 1400 BC, Cyprus received population from Aegean and Anatolia and in the ninth century, the island became a Greek-speaking island. Through time, various other empires ruled in Cyprus such as Roman Empire. Under Byzantine rule, Cyprus became Orthodox Christian. In the twelfth century, Cyprus was under the control of the Lusignan Dynasty which lasted 300 years. Until the Ottoman period, Genoese and Venetians also ruled the island. In 1571 Ottoman period starts after the defeat of the Venetians. After the victory, the Ottomans started to populate the island with Turks from Anatolia. In 1878, the Ottomans gave governance of Cyprus to Britain for aid against Russia (Dodd, 2010).

After the Greek War of Independence in 1821, Greek nationalism started to emerge in Cyprus. However, at that time, nationalist ideas such as enosis, were limited among Greek Cypriots. In 1915, United Kingdom offered the island to Greece for participation and support in First World War. However, this offer was rejected by Greece (Dodd, 2010). After the end of the First World War, with the Treaty of Lausanne, the Republic of Turkey abandoned claims over the island and in 1925, Cyprus became a crown colony of the UK. As Turkey abandoned its rights over the island, demands for enosis started to increase and in 1931, supporters of enosis started a riot against the colonial regime. As a result of this riot, UK started to implement strict

rules and laws. Until the end of the Second World War, these strict laws continued. In 1950, Orthodox Church in Cyprus organised a plebiscite for self-determination which would eventually lead to enosis, however, this time the UK refused to give the island to Greece (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).

2.1 The Period of 1950-1960

During the Ottoman period in Cyprus, with the *millet* system, the community was divided into two, Muslims and non-Muslims. However, Britain chooses different identifications for the communities of Cyprus and defined the population as Turks and Greeks. This ethnic identification underlined the differences of the communities. With the effect of these ethnic identifications, communities influenced more from their mainlands and in this sense, nationalism in Cyprus, both Turkish nationalism and Greek nationalism, was imported from Greece and Turkey, rather than appearing locally (Umaner-Duba & Köprülü, 2017). As mentioned before, Greek nationalism started to emerge on the island in 1821 with Greek independence. After the independence of Greece, Megali Idea was aiming to bring Greeks who were living out of the mainland together under one state. As Greek Cypriot nationalism was imported from the mainland, with enosis Greek Cypriot nationalism was aiming for unification with Greece and contribute to the Megali Idea of Greek nationalism. In addition, Greek Cypriot nationalism was not only influenced by the independence of Greece and the Megali Idea but also highly influenced by colonial rule in Cyprus. Because British colonial rule was seen as an obstacle to enosis (Kızılyürek, 2001). Turkish nationalism on the island emerged and shaped as a reaction to Greek nationalism. Two main factors that highly influenced Turkish nationalism were Kemalist reforms in Turkey and Greek nationalist desires in Cyprus. In this sense, nationalism among the Turkish Cypriot community imported from Turkey with Kemalist reforms in Turkey and it raised in the 1950s with the effect of enosis demands of Greek Cypriots (Kizilyürek & Kizilyürek, 2004).

In 1950, Greek Cypriots decided to start armed actions against the regime as they thought they could not be able to reach enosis with a plebiscite. In July 1950, a committee which was formed by religious, anti-communist and extreme rightist people, met in Athens and decided that Grivas would be in

charge of guerrilla wars and sabotage actions against the British colonial regime in Cyprus. On 7th March 1953, this committee met in Athens and showed their dedication for enosis and on 13th March Grivas officially became commander of armed forces of EOKA which would fight for enosis (Kızılyürek, 2016). At first, Makarios was reluctant, because he thought that sabotages without attacking people would convince colonial rule, but according to Grivas, they should start armed actions for enosis immediately. In 1954, Greece brought the self-determination right of the Cypriots to the UN. With self-determination, they were intended to achieve enosis. In December 1954, the UN rejected self-determination demands (French, 2015).

After the rejection of self-determination in the UN, Makarios and Grivas agreed to start armed actions and sabotages against colonial rule. In the early hours of 1 April, EOKA exploded bombs all over Cyprus and officially started armed actions. In the morning, Grivas, with leaflets, declared insurgency and aims of the EOKA (French, 2015). On the other side, Greek Cypriot left rejected EOKA. Before 1 April, KKE (Communist Party of Greece) declared that Cypriots should not start an armed uprising. AKEL had the same opinion with KKE and declared that any armed actions would serve to foreign aims. After Grivas declared insurgency and aims of EOKA on 1 April, AKEL said this action would damage interest of Cypriots and also defended that public has no consent over this insurgency. PEO, which is a leftist labour union, also defended that, sabotages on 1 April would cause strict measures against labour and also would affect relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots negatively (Druşotis, 2007). With the effect of increasing public support to the EOKA, AKEL decided to change its policy towards EOKA. However, ideas of Grivas and EOKA towards AKEL or any other leftists did not change and regarded them as their absolute enemy towards enosis. EOKA, under the leadership of Grivas, was not an anti-colonial organisation which was fighting against colonials for their independent country. Their only aim was enosis. EOKA did not have any other thoughts or aims about Cyprus apart from enosis. In this sense, EOKA was not an anti-colonialist organisation. In addition, as mentioned before, they were anti-

communist, extremely religious and conservative. On 13 October 1956, EOKA started to attack leftist Cypriots. These attacks continued and in 1958, Grivas started a systematic fight against leftist Cypriots who he perceived as traitors. From 1955 to 1958, EOKA killed more Greek Cypriots than British and Turkish Cypriots (Kızılyürek, 2016). In addition to leftists, other Cypriots who were working for British colonial forces were seen as traitors. Greek Cypriots working for the colonial police forces joined EOKA for not to be marked as traitor. As a part of the divide and rule policy, the British colonial regime was trying to take Turkish Cypriots into conflict. Colonial administration decided to form an Auxiliary Force and a Mobile Reserve. Auxiliary Forces were recruited for the protection of government buildings and posts while Mobile Reserve Forces were for riots which were EOKA in case of Cyprus. Most of the members of these forces were Turkish Cypriots. Inevitably these forces and EOKA confronted with each other. EOKA started to kill Turkish Cypriot officers, and this created tension between communities. In April 1956, because of the tension between the two communities, security forces separated them with barricade in Nicosia (Lim, 2018).

In 1955 when EOKA started armed actions against colonial forces, Grivas said that they would not attack Turkish Cypriot community. As mentioned above, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was a reaction against the Greek Cypriot nationalism and their desires for enosis. However, Turkish Cypriot leadership could not successfully produce a counter-argument against enosis. At first, they defended that island should remain under colonial rule, after that leadership defended island should be given to Turkey if Britain would leave the island. The only thing Turkish Cypriot leadership was sure of was that they were against the enosis, because, as mentioned before Turkish Cypriot nationalism was characterized as a reaction against enosis and Greek Cypriot nationalism. (Kızılyürek, 2016). As mentioned above, Grivas in 1955, said EOKA would not kill Turkish Cypriots but the British were determined to create an intercommunal conflict so confronted communities with using Auxiliary Forces. EOKA claimed that Turkish Cypriot officers were killed by accident however this was not convincing for Turkish Cypriots (Lim, 2018). Turkish Cypriots found several organisations for opposing enosis and EOKA.

In 1957, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation) was found with support of Turkey. TMT was demanding *taksim* as a counter-argument against enosis. *Taksim* meant separation of the island between two communities (Druşotis, 2007). In 1958, intercommunal conflict began and in that year between June and August, 56 Greek Cypriots and 53 Turkish Cypriots were killed. In August conflict settled down and both EOKA and TMT suspended their activities for a while. However, after the intercommunal violence relations between Turkish and Greek Cypriots remained tense (Lim, 2018). Similar with EOKA, TMT also had anti-communist ideas like EOKA. In Turkish Cypriot Community, there was not any leftist political party like AKEL. As a result of this, TMT mainly attacked to leftist people (Kızılyürek, 2016).

When identities of communities analysed, it can be clearly seen that Nationalism in both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities imported from mainlands and identities of communities highly influenced. As a result of this, nationalistic paramilitary organisations like EOKA and TMT were influenced by mainlands and even the leadership of both organisations were under the control of motherlands. TMT had high ranked Turkish soldiers and even Turkish attaché, such as Mustafa Kemal Tanrısevdi, in its leadership. On the other side, Grivas was under influence of Greece as he joined the Greek Army during First World War and formed Organisation X which was a monarchist organisation in Greece (French, 2015).

2.2 The Period of 1960-1974

With effect of conflicts, Britain agreed that there is a problem in Cyprus. Several plans and different forms of autonomy were proposed by Britain for solving the problem, such as Radcliffe Proposal, Macmillan Plan and Foot Plan, but all of them rejected (Dodd, 2010). In fact, the British government was willing to withdraw from Cyprus. In his "winds of change" speech, Harold Macmillan gave the signals of a change in British policy towards colonies. Because for the British empire cost of maintaining colonies could be higher. However, Britain was not willing to withdraw from the island completely (Varnava, 2010). In February 1959, Greek and Turkish Governments met in Zurich to discuss the future of Cyprus. On 11 February 1959, both agreed on the independence of Cyprus and also agreed on the Treaty of Guarantee and

Treaty of Alliance. After Zurich Conference, Britain, Turkey, Greece with community leaders of Cyprus met in London and the Republic of Cyprus was formed. With Zurich and London Conferences, both taksim and enosis were ruled out. Turkey and Greece had the right to have limited military units while Britain would have sovereign bases. Treaty of Guarantee gave Turkey, Greece and Britain the right to intervene jointly or separately for maintaining order. Functional Federation model in the Republic of Cyprus gave communities 70/30 representation rights in favour of the Greek Cypriot community and gave veto power to both communities (Dodd, 2010). In 1963, Makarios proposed reforms in the constitution of the republic and tension between communities started to increase again. On 21 December 1963, conflict broke out between communities after Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish Cypriots in Nicosia. After a while, Turkish jets flew low over Nicosia and violence stopped. Makarios called Turkish Cypriot officials to return back to their duties but after the violence and events on 21 December 1963, Turkish Cypriots did not feel safe. Because of their safety concerns, they formed their own enclaves for their protection against well-armed Greek Cypriots. However, their life standards decreased significantly. In addition to these, Turkish Cypriot leadership did not allow most of them to return to their posts. Greek Cypriots perceive this as an uprising against the republic and a step towards taksim (Dodd, 2010). In 1964, Greek Cypriots feared that Turkey would intervene as a guarantor state. Makarios preferred to invite UN peace-keeping forces as he feared possible intervention of Turkey or NATO. Both Makarios and Dr Küçük gave consent to the deployment of the peace-keeping forces. (Dodd, 2010). On 4 March 1964, UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus established with Resolution 186. UN Security Council, with Resolution 186, asked the government of Cyprus to take necessary precautions to maintain order in Cyprus (UN Security Council, 1964). Before deployment of peace-keeping force UN required consent from Cyprus. Makarios gave his consent as president of Cyprus, however, Dr Küçük gave his consent as a community leader. In this sense, Resolution 186 recognized the Government of Cyprus legitimate even with the absence of Turkish Cypriot community (Dodd, 2010). In 1967, after the coup d'état in Greece, Greek Junta came to power. In November 1967, Grivas attacked Turkish

Cypriots once more. From the beginning of the intercommunal violence on 21 December 1963 to 1967, approximately 630 Turkish Cypriots and 260 Greek Cypriots lost their lives, and 25000 to 30000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees. However, from 1967 to 1974 conflict between the communities stopped (Kıralp, 2017).

Negotiations between communities started in Beirut on 11 June 1968 with the support of Osorio Taffal who was Special Representative of U-Thant. Turkish Cypriots were represented by Rauf Denktaş and Greek Cypriots were represented by Glafcos Clerides. At Beirut, Denktaş was prepared to accept Makarios' constitutional reform proposals in 1963. In addition, he accepted to reduce the representation right of Turkish Cypriots from 30 percent to 20 percent and removal of veto right of the Vice President. In return, he demanded autonomy. However, Makarios rejected these offers because according to him, autonomy could lead Cyprus to taksim. In June 1971, Athens told Makarios to agree with Turkish Cypriot on proposals for preserving unitary state. However, Makarios rejected the offer (Dodd, 2010). In response, Makarios called Athens to stop intervening internal affairs of Cyprus. After contradiction with Makarios, Athens sent Grivas to form EOKA-B which would act against Makarios (Kıralp, 2017). In June 1972, Kurt Waldheim restarted negotiations and expanded it with the inclusion of two constitutional experts, but Makarios was continuing with his uncompromising attitude (Dodd, 2010).

2.3 The Year of 1974 and Division of the Island

On 15 July 1974, the Greek Junta staged a coup d'état against Makarios and declared Nicos Sampson as the new president. Makarios successfully escaped from the coup and went to the Paphos (Kıralp, 2017). According to Kurt Waldheim's statement on 16 July 1974 at Security Council, airport, broadcasting and telecommunication were under the control of Junta and the presidential palace was burned to the ground. Makarios has requested his evacuation from Paphos and was requesting UN protection. On the same day, Makarios evacuated from the island. On 19 July 1974, Makarios, at his speech at Security Council, declared EOKA-B as a terrorist organisation under the control of Athens and accused EOKA-B and Junta for causing re-

emerging violence with coup (UN Security Council & General Assembly, 1975).

After the coup d'état, Turkey asked Britain to intervene in Cyprus together, but Britain refused the offer. On 20 July 1974, Turkey intervened and landed troops to the east of Kyrenia. On the same day, the UN Security Council, with Resolution no. 353, called everyone to respect the sovereignty of Cyprus and called Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom to talks (Dodd, 2010). On 22 July, a ceasefire established in Cyprus. In Geneva, peace talks started, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots defended federal solution while Greece and Greek Cypriots defended unitary state solution. The United Kingdom, with the influence of Kissinger, also supported the federal solution. On 13 August negotiations collapsed and on 14 August Turkey started second operation. On 16 August more than 35 percent of the island was under the control of Turkish forces. It is estimated that 95 Greek Cypriots lost their lives from 14 July to 19 July and between 20 July-16 August 2400 Greek Cypriots, 550 Turkish Cypriots. In addition, 163000 Greek Cypriots and 60000 Turkish Cypriots immigrated from their lands (Kıralp, 2017).

CHAPTER 3: THE ROLE OF THE UN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

In June 1968, negotiations between communities started under the auspices of the UN. Secretary-General U-Thant appointed Osorio Taffal as his Special Representative. In Beirut, Osorio Taffal met with representatives of communities, Rauf Denktaş and Glafcos Clerides, for negotiations. In 1972, Kurt Waldheim restarted negotiations. Communities could not reach a settlement at these negotiations.

3.1 The Role of the UN

In this section, peace-making efforts of the UN in the context of the Cyprus Conflict is going to be analysed and problems about its activities are addressed.

3.1.1 Post-1974 Negotiations and the Peace-making Efforts

After the events of 1974, the island was divided into two. The Turkish Cypriots have formed the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" as their sovereign authority in February 1975 in the northern part of the island. In April 1975 the talks between Denktaş and Clerides began in Vienna under the supervision of the UN. Denktaş and Clerides have discussed bizonality, functions and types of a possible federation but no agreement was reached. At the third round of the talks, they agreed on an exchange of population. At the fifth round, Makarios appointed Tassos Papadopoulos as his negotiator. However, Denktaş refused to negotiate with Papadopoulos because he was known as a member of the ultra-nationalist organisation EOKA and he

appointed Ümit Süleyman Onan as the new negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot community. Eventually, negotiations have collapsed in 1976 (Dodd, 2010).

In February 1977, the UN bring Makarios and Denktaş together for restarting talks between communities. Makarios and Denktaş agreed on four points which were like a framework of a possible solution. Agreement defined framework of the solution as follows:

"We are seeking an independent, nonaligned, bicommunal, federal Republic.

The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability, or productivity and land ownership.

Freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property and other specific matters are open for discussion taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bicommunal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

The power and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bicommunal character of the state." (Dodd, 2010, pp. 135-136)

These four points were accepted as the basis of the negotiations in the future and displayed what solution would look like. With these points, Greek Cypriots accepted the idea of a federation as a solution. However, both sides were far from a final settlement (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). After the death of Makarios in 1977, Kyprianou became the president of the Republic of Cyprus. In May 1979, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim restarted talks based on the 1977 agreement. On 19 May, Denktaş and Kyprianou reached an agreement which is also known as the high-level agreement or ten-point agreement. According to this agreement:

"It was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979.

The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 12 February 1977 and the UN resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question.

There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic. The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects. Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus conflict.

It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardise the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions. The demilitarisation of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed. The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition and secession. The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.

The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia" (Dodd, 2010, pp. 141-142).

This agreement between the two communities can be thought as an improvement over the 1977 agreement. With these ten points, parties agree to resume talks and especially discuss demilitarization of the island and issues about Varosha (Theophanous, 2019). In August, talks restarted between Kyprianou and Denktaş. During the talks, Denktas interpreted bi-zonality as a confederation which meant two states would have their own sovereignty. Kyprianou, on the other side, interpreted bi-zonality as a centralised form of federal system which meant central government would have the sovereignty (Ker-Lindsay, 2009).

On 15 November 1983, Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared independence and formed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Only Turkey recognised this state, and the UN Security Council called all states to not recognise this new state with the resolution no. 541 (Theophanous, 2019). In March 1984, Secretary-General of that time, Javier Perez de Cuellar, proposed five points to sides and proximity talks restarted in September 1984. After some progress was made, in 1985, Denktaş and Kyprianou met face to face but eventually, negotiations collapsed without a final settlement. In 1986, Perez de Cuellar presented his "Draft Framework Agreement" which aimed to form an independent, bicommunal, bizonal, nonaligned state. However, both sides did not like this draft and accepted 1977 Makarios-Denktaş Agreement and 1979 Kyprianou-Denktaş High Level Agreement as the basis for talks (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his famous Set of Ideas which recommended a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation which would be against any partition and union with another state. Vassiliou accepted the Ghali Set of Ideas, but on the other side, Denktaş rejected and criticized Boutros-Ghali (Ker-Lindsay, 2009). On 1 November 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Alvaro de Soto as Special Advisor on Cyprus. In 2000, proximity talks between Clerides and Denktaş started. Meanwhile, Alvaro de Soto started to prepare a text which would be a basis for negotiations. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested recognition of equal status of both parties. This suggestion has resulted with the boycott of Clerides. In September 2001, Kofi Annan invited both Clerides and Denktaş for separate meetings. Denktaş rejected this offer and suggested face-to-face meetings without any preconditions. On 4 December, Clerides and Denktaş met at Denktaş's residence and Clerides became the first president to travel to the Northern Cyprus. In January 2002 Denktaş and Clerides met in Nicosia for intensive talks. According to Annan, conditions for an agreement existed and disagreements between parties could be negotiated (Migdalovitz, 2005). Meanwhile, membership of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU came up and Denktaş stated that if the EU accepts the Republic of Cyprus as a member, talks will be over. On the other side, Greece was threatening the EU to veto Eastern enlargement if Cyprus would not be admitted. On 11 November

2002, Kofi Annan submitted his draft for a settlement in Cyprus. The Annan Plan differed from 1960 Constitution, framework agreements and Ghali Set of Ideas. The Plan was based on a presidential system and also parliamentary characteristics from the Swiss model. Veto powers of communities were reduced, and central government gained more power. Both Denktaş and Clerides accepted to negotiate on this draft. On 10 December, Kofi Annan revised his plan. This version of the plan was heavily criticized in the South and majority of the people were against the plan. In the North, there was a public support with the effect of the European Union (EU) membership possibility. Meanwhile, the Copenhagen European Council approved the application of the Republic of Cyrus. For the EU membership Cyprus required to sign on 21 April (Dodd, 2010). Meanwhile, in 2003, the Republic of Cyprus held elections and Clerides was defeated by Tassos Papadopoulos. When compared with Clerides, Papadopoulos was a hardliner (Theophanous, 2019). As mentioned before Papadopoulos had an EOKA background and previously Denktaş did not accept him as a negotiator in 1976 (Dodd, 2010). The third revised version of the Annan plan modelled Switzerland, in means of federal system and its relationship with communities. The constituent states would function within themselves without any approval from federal government. The federal government would function and be responsible from subjects like foreign affairs, central monetary and financial functions, natural resources, and communication. Denktaş was under pressure of both Turkey's new government and the Turkish Cypriot community. In Nicosia, demonstrations were calling Denktaş to resign or sign up the plan. In March 2003, Denktaş visited Ankara and met with the Turkish president and government. After that, it was agreed to not sign agreement at the Hague (Dodd, 2010). On 10 March 2003, Kofi Annan called Papadopoulos and Denktaş to meet in the Hague. As expected, Denktaş rejected plan and Papadopoulos also objected to few points and argued that the plan is not ready. On 16 April 2003, Papadopoulos signed agreement for membership to the EU. On 23 April 2003, Denktaş decided to lift restrictions on checkpoints which would allow freedom of movement. For years, Denktaş argued that two communities could not live together but thousands of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots passed checkpoints

without any incident (Carras, 2009). In February 2004, Annan invited leaders to New York. In New York, sides agreed that Secretary-General would fill the blanks in the plan, but before Turkey, Greece, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots must try for a settlement. Negotiations continued between Denktaş and Papadopoulos in Nicosia from February to March but parties could not reach a final agreement. Towards the end, Denktaş announced that he would not attend to Bürgenstock for further talks as a protest and appointed Talat and Serdar Denktaş. However, Papadopoulos rejected to talk formally with Talat and Serdar Denktaş because they were officials of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and they were not a community leader like Rauf Denktaş. In this context, de Soto started talks informally. On 31 March 2004, Annan submitted the fifth form, which would be the final form, of the plan. This version of the Annan Plan would be voted in a referendum on both sides at the same time. At the Turkish Cypriot side Denktaş and National Unity Party strongly opposed to the plan while the Republican Turkish Party supported it. In the South, Papadopoulos declared his opposition towards plan. Surprisingly, AKEL supported this attitude of Papadopoulos. In referendum, 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots approved the plan and 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected it (Dodd, 2010).

After the failure of the Annan Plan Referendum, the international community reacted almost immediately. Günter Verheugen, who was EU Commissioner for Enlargement, stated that he felt betrayed by Greek Cypriots. EU started to discuss lifting embargo which would allow Turkish Cypriots trade freely. However, at the same time, the EU was also avoiding direct or indirect recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Despite all, on 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became member of the European Union (Ker-Lindsay, 2005).

In July 2006, Papadopoulos and Talat reached a five-point agreement which declared commitment to restart negotiations on the basis of bizonal, bicommunal federation and stated status quo in Cyprus is not acceptable. In February 2008, AKEL's leader Demetris Christofias was elected as president. The election of Christofias raised hopes about negotiations again. Because both Talat and Christofias had similar ideological backgrounds.

Talat and Christofias agreed to restart negotiations on the basis of bizonal, bicommunal federation. On 1 July 2008, Talat and Christofias declared that they reached an agreement in principle. Leaders agreed that solution would be based on a unified federal state with single sovereignty and single citizenship. However, they could not reach a final agreement (Dodd, 2010). In 2013, talks started between Nicos Anastasiades and Dervis Eroglu. Anastasiades and Eroglu agreed on Joint Communiqué on 11 February 2014. According to Joint Communiqué, status quo in Cyprus is not acceptable and settlement would be on the basis of bizonal bicommunal federation with single citizenship and single sovereignty with political equality. In addition, any form of partition and secession would be banned. However, after a while, negotiations were suspended because of natural gas explorations and other difficulties (Theophanous, 2019). In 2015, Elizabeth Spehar was appointed by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon as Head of the UNFICYP and also appointed as Special Representative (UN, 2016). With the election of Mustafa Akıncı on 26 April 2015, hopes about settlement raised again. Both leaders were agreed on bizonal, bicommunal federation. Akıncı-Anastasiades made some progress in negotiations and in 2016 they met in Mont Pelerin. In January 2017 Akıncı and Anastasiades met in Geneva with Turkey, Greece and Britain. However, none of the sides could agree on a final settlement. On 28 June 2017, Anastasiades, Akıncı and three guarantor powers, Greece, Turkey and Britain have met in Crans-Montana for a final solution. On 7 July 2017, negotiations collapsed in Crans-Montana (Ker-Lindsay, 2019). Disagreements were mainly on guarantees, foreign troops and also on property, governance, territory and settlers (Theophanous, 2019). In October 2020 Ersin Tatar was elected as the new leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. On 27 April 2021, Tatar, Anastasiades, Guarantor states and the UN were met in Geneva. Tatar offered two-state solution (Yenidüzen, 2021a). However, Anastasiades stated that he was disappointed because of this offer (Yenidüzen, 2021b)

3.1.2 Peace Conceptualised

Communities that experience conflict and its devastating effects should decide settlement of the conflict themselves. From top to down peace can be

achieved with treaties and state-building efforts. Outsiders, with top to down approach, are imposing their knowledge and their own understanding of the peace. However, peace should be achieved with bottom-up efforts with civil society. Locals should represent their own understanding of the peace so voices of local communities can be heard (Richmond, 2005). When international interests are of primary concern, a top to down approach is imposed to communities to identify sources of the conflict with analysing demands of the locals that remain of secondary concern. Top to down peacebuilding efforts, especially UN operations, may ignore the local demands and traditions (Newman, 2013). Imposing peace agreements from outside, also create a legitimacy problem (Richmond, 2005). As a matter of fact, a legitimate peace cannot be imported or imposed from outside. In this sense, peace-building efforts should focus to form a bottom-up peace for being legitimate and long-lasting.

Criticisms towards liberal peace-building have not triggered any major change from liberal policies. Several scholars argue that liberal peace-building could not recognize the importance of locals and also international interveners of the conflict perceive themselves as superior and locals as inferior. Thus, interveners try to impose their own understanding of peace from top to down (Heathershaw, 2013). The UN, as an important actor of peace-building efforts, should improve its policies of peace-building. The main objective of peace-building efforts should be establishing a self-sustaining peace through improving relations between adversaries (Lambourne & Herro, 2008). In 2005, world leaders recognized that peace-building actions of the UN should change. At World Summit they agreed on the establishment of Peace-building Commission for especially supporting post-conflict peacebuilding. Most of the member states were content because of the establishment of the Peace-building Commission. Peace-building Commission was designed as a body which would be in charge of peace-building actions of the UN (Kmec, 2016). Peace-building Commission, as an idea, intended to have a proactive role with decision-making authority. However, in fact, it became an advisory subsidiary without any operational capacity and decision-making power (Berdal, 2008).

3.1.3 UN Peace-making Efforts and Proposals in Cyprus

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots experienced devastating effects of the intercommunal violence and war. This shaped identity of the communities inevitably. For analysing possible settlement, it is crucial to understand perceptions of both communities.

In 1956, Britain proposed Radcliffe proposals. Radcliffe proposed a form of autonomy under the colonial rule of Britain. During the talks of this plan, Turkish Cypriots demanded their political equality and proposed federation on this basis. However, Radcliffe rejected this offer. The 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus cannot be exactly considered as a unitary state or a federal state. It was closer to a unitary state but also had federal characteristics in structure. The 1960 Constitution gave both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots administrational rights and communal institutions. Both communities had veto rights, House of Representatives and elections held separately. In addition to these, each community would elect its own Communal Chamber (Kızılyürek, 2018). In this sense, the Republic of Cyprus was functionally federation. Same as federal states forming a federation, Communal Chambers had certain authority over their own communities. However, geographically it was not separated so it was not a geographical federation but functionally federation. On the other side, the 1960 Constitution had consociational characteristics too, such as veto power, proportionality in representation and separate community institutions with high authority. In consociationalism, community leaders should also, with common agreement, cooperate in order to govern the country (Dodd, 2010).

Until 1977 Makarios-Denktaş agreement, federation did not under discussion at negotiations. Before 1974, Greek Cypriots refused to discuss federation (Kızılyürek, 2018). As mentioned before, at first negotiations between Clerides and Denktaş in 1968, Denktaş accepted constitutional reform proposals of Makarios, reduction of representation of Turkish Cypriots from 30 to 20 percent and also removal of veto power. In return, Denktaş demanded autonomy under the Republic of Cyprus. At that time, Greek Cypriots refused autonomy offer of Denktaş (Dodd, 2010). After 1974, Greek Cypriots agreed to talk about a federal solution and in 1977 with Makarios-

Denktaş agreement, federation was accepted as a model. In 1979, Denktaş interpreted bizonality in agreements as confederation and tried to bring confederation to table. Denktaş' s political background and ideas were based on taksim so he was trying to achieve secession rather than federation. It is clear that sides did not really negotiate federal solution until Annan Plan. During the negotiations of the Annan Plan, Denktaş was still same but this time he had increasing pressure from Turkey and from Turkish Cypriots. The final version of the Annan plan was submitted by Kofi Annan to the leaders and proposing a federal solution. Both Denktaş and Papadopoulos were against the final form of the plan. In referendum, Annan Plan was supported by 65 percent of the Turkish Cypriots, but Greek Cypriots rejected the plan with 75 percent. After Annan Plan, Tassos Papadopoulos and Mehmet Ali Talat started to negotiate but this time Papadopoulos was uncompromising. After the failure of the Annan Plan, both sides negotiated a federal solution sincerely first time with Talat-Christofias talks. However, they could not reach a final settlement. After the election in 2010, Eroglu, who had almost similar ideas with Denktaş and tried to stall talks. In 2015, Anastasiades-Akıncı talks started and again sides started to really negotiate federal solution, but negotiations collapsed in 2017 in Crans Montana. In this context, it is clear that federal solution was only negotiated between Talat-Christofias and Anastasiades-Akıncı.

In recent years, especially the nationalist parties became popularised on both sides of the divide, where the federal solution is not promoted anymore and found outdated by the authorities. After the election of President Ersin Tatar in 2020, these discussions became extreme and the new president started to articulate a two-state solution with the support of Turkey. In April 2021, Tatar, Anastasiades, Guarantor states and Secretary-General Guterres met in Geneva. Tatar's offers were based on mainly two-state solution in Cyprus (Yenidüzen, 2021a). As expected, Anastasiades stated that he is disappointed because of offers of Ersin Tatar (Yenidüzen, 2021b). Meanwhile Security Council renewed UNFICYP' s mandate. Renewal of the mandate caused different reactions in both communities. Yiannakis Omirou, who was speaker of the House, stated that renewal can cause distort the main

problem. Omirou said the problem is Turkish invasion (EKathimerini, 2020). On the other side, Turkish Cypriot politician, Kudret Özersay criticised of the UNFICYP and also demanded removal of one of the camps of the UNFICYP (Andreou, 2018).

Even though a two-state solution is the least possible alternative under the present conditions as there are UN resolutions against it[1]. As a matter of fact, a two-state solution was prohibited back in 1960 and there are several UN resolutions that accept the Republic of Cyprus as the sole representative state in Cyprus. The UN Security Council with Resolution 1251, defined settlement in Cyprus as follows:

> "… a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council resolutions, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition and secession." (UN Security Council, 1999, p. 2).

In addition, the Joint Communiqué agreed on 11 February 2014 that the status quo is not acceptable. It was widely accepted that the communities have no benefit in case of a two-state solution. In case of a two-state solution, Greek Cypriots lose half of their land while Turkish Cypriots lose their chance of becoming a part of the international system (Kızılyürek, 2018). Two-state solution means TRNC' s sovereignty in the north and it is clear that TRNC cannot be recognized as a state. Confederal solution is also not possible for this reason. Only recognized states can form a confederation. As mentioned before, UN resolutions do not recognize TRNC and also prohibits any international recognition. In addition, many scholars believe that Greek Cypriots can never accept to negotiate a confederation or a two-state solution, under present conditions (Kızılyürek & Erhürman, 2009).

Historically, Greek Cypriots tried for unitary state in various periods, however, these attempts were not successful. Greek Cypriots tried to convert the

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[1] See the UN Resolution no. 1251.

Republic of Cyprus to a completely unitary structure in pre-1974 period. In post-1974 period, it is even more difficult to form such a structure. Turkish Cypriots will never accept such a structure under present conditions. Because a unitary structure will be completely under the control of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots will be treated as minority in this scenario (Kızılyürek, 2018).

Federal structures can be designed for backgrounds and histories of the communities. In this sense, every federation has its own characteristics. There is no one way to form a federation, but federalism should aim for "togetherness" rather than separation or secession. Historically, Greek Cypriots' first choice for a settlement in Cyprus was unitary state. As they have the numerical majority, they believed they represent the majority therefore they are entitled to rule Cyprus without the participation of the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, historically, the Turkish Cypriots favoured taksim and they find it reasonable to receive international recognition as a separate entity (Peristianis, 1998).

After 1974, both sides agreed on federal solution as a framework. However, Greek Cypriots thought of a federal structure with strong central powers. However, Turkish Cypriot understanding of federation was closer to a decentralised federation. In this sense, asymmetrical federalism can satisfy desires of both. In asymmetrical federalism, sub-states of the federation can have different rights and powers (Duba, 2013).

There are three types of asymmetrical federalism:

"regions differ in their powers of self-government but share power equally within the federal government (asymmetrical powers and symmetrical shares).

regions enjoy equal self-government within their domains but share power unequally within the federal government (symmetrical powers and asymmetrical shares).

regions differ in their powers of self-government (some have more than others) and share power unequally within the federal government,

(asymmetrical powers and asymmetrical shares)" (O'Leary, 2010, pp. 183-209)

Asymmetrical federalism gives voice to minorities and supports their participation. However, main aim of the asymmetrical federalism is to create a structure with pluralist and democratic notions. In Cyprus, an asymmetric federal structure with asymmetrical powers and asymmetrical shares can fulfil needs of both sides. In case of an asymmetric federation in Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot community will have special power in their constituent state while Greek Cypriots will have more power in federal government (Duba, 2013).

Peacemaking efforts led by the UN and negotiations between communities can bring top to down peace to Cyprus. In other words, asymmetrical federalism or symmetrical federalism can only bring political solution to problem. For reaching a long-lasting and self-sustaining peace, peace should rise from the grassroots level. From the beginning, the negotiations under the auspices of the UN aims to bring political solution to the Cyprus conflict. Focusing only on political solution of the problem can cause problems. As mentioned above, peace should rise from the bottom up, otherwise, legitimacy problems can arise. There are bottom-up peace efforts in Cyprus, such as Home for Cooperation and Unite Cyprus Now. These organisations facilitate communication between communities and try to create an environment for bottom-up peace efforts. However, these are not affiliated with the UN and their role on the communities are limited. Because the social environment for bicommunal interaction is not ready. As a result of these their efforts for bottom-up peace are limited.

3.2 The Role of the UNFICYP

In this section, Peacekeeping activities of the UNFICYP and Resolution no.186 is going to be analysed and problems about both activities of the UNFICYP and Resolution no.186 is going to be analysed.

3.2.1 The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus and the Resolution no. 186

In 1954 Greece brought Cyprus's self-determination issue to the UN. This was the first time the Cyprus problem brought to the UN. Eventually, the UN decided to reject self-determination (French, 2015). After intercommunal violence started in 1963, the UN became more concerned about the issue and adopted Resolution no.186 in 1964.

On 4 March 1964, with Resolution no. 186, UNFICYP was established and the UN deployed peace-keeping forces to Cyprus. Apart from the establishment of UNFICYP, Resolution no.186 is crucial to understand the Cyprus conflict. Resolution no 186 mentions the government of Cyprus several times. However, at that time, Turkish Cypriot members of the government were out of their offices. With Resolution no.186, the UN Security Council have recognised the government of Cyprus as legitimate even with the absence of Turkish Cypriots. The effects of this situation are continuing and create imbalance between communities. Turkish Cypriots argue that the government of Cyprus should be illegitimate because of their absence (Dodd, 2010).

Resolution no.186 was adopted in 1964 and since that time dynamics of the Cyprus conflict evolved. According to Resolution no. 186:

> "Recommends that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions" (UN Security Council, 1964).

This article of the resolution was written to decide functions of the UNFICYP. However, at this point, "normal conditions" is a vague term in context of Cyprus. When Resolution no. 186 was adopted by the Security Council in 1964, conflict was between two communities of the Republic of Cyprus. However, today island is divided, and the Turkish Cypriots are living in the north of the island while the Greek Cypriots are living in the south. Problem evolved to a different point from situation in 1964 and it is not possible to

return to the condition in 1964 conditions. In this sense, the UN needs to reform mandate of the UNFICYP and define every point clearly, without vague words.

As mentioned before, Turkish Cypriots formed their enclaves for their protection and lived under poor conditions after intercommunal violence started in December 1963. These enclaves made it easier for UNFICYP to identify possible conflict zones, UNFICYP deployed and patrolled near enclaves for their operations. However, UNFICYP could not stop intercommunal war. Same as other peacekeeping forces, UNFICYP personnel could only use their arms for self-defence. On 15 July 1974, after the coup d'état against Makarios, intra-Greek Cypriot violence started and after Turkey's intervention on 20 July, violence against Turkish Cypriots started. UNFICYP was insufficient to intervene intra-Greek Cypriot violence and attacks on Turkish Cypriot enclaves. After the events of 1974, the island divided into two parts. Thus, UNFICYP's responsibilities were changed. Under post-1974 conditions, UNFICYP is responsible from the safety of the buffer zone (Lindley, 2001).

With Resolution no.186, the Secretary-General of the United Nations became responsible from negotiations. According to Resolution:

> "Recommends further that the Secretary-General designate, in agreement with the Government of Cyprus and the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, a mediator, who shall use his best endeavours with the representatives of the communities and also with the aforesaid four Governments, for the purpose of promoting a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the problem confronting Cyprus, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, having in mind the well-being of the people of Cyprus as a whole and the preservation of international peace and security. The mediator shall report periodically to the Secretary-General on bis efforts" (UN Security Council, 1964).

The resolution recommends Secretary-General to assign a representative who would act as a mediator. This representative would report directly to Secretary-General about negotiations. Thus, the UN, with Resolution no.186,

involved in the Cyprus conflict both in means of peace-keeping and peace-making.

3.2.2 Reasons of Failure for Peace-keeping in Cyprus

As mentioned in Chapter 2, in December 1963, intercommunal violence erupted in Cyprus between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. With this conflict between communities of Cyprus and with the involvement of the UN, the conflict became an international issue. Makarios was afraid of a possible intervention of NATO and Turkey. On 4 March 1964, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution no. 186 unanimously. Resolution no. 186 established the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with the consent of both Makarios and Dr. Fazıl Küçük, and also give responsibility of peacemaking to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. After 1974 UNFICYP deployed in Buffer Zone, between North and South.

According to the Secretary-General's report on activities of the UNFICYP between 11 June 1996-10 December 1996, several incidents happened. In August 1996, a motorcycle federation from the Republic of Cyprus announced that they would organise a symbolic ride from Berlin to Kyrenia. The Federation chose Berlin as starting point because of its historical background as a divided city and their purpose was crossing the Buffer Zone in Cyprus. On 2 August 1996 ride started departed from Berlin. On 11 August, with participation of many other Greek Cypriots, demonstrations started on the southern side of the UN-controlled Buffer Zone. Meanwhile, there were also demonstrations on the northern side. Tassos Isaac who was one of the demonstrators managed to cross Buffer Zone. On 11 August, Tassos Isaac was beaten to death near Deryneia/Derinya by the members of an extreme-nationalist organisation. During the incident, UNFICYP personnel could not prevent him to cross the Buffer Zone or could not intervene to his murder even if there weren't any firearms. On 14 August, after the funeral of Tassos Isaac, a group of Greek Cypriots organised demonstrations near Deryneia/Derinya, where Tassos Isaac murdered. One of the demonstrators, Solomos Solomou broke free and entered the buffer zone. He tried to climb the Turkish flagpole. He was shot dead by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot

forces. On 8 September, 2 Turkish Cypriot soldiers were shot Ayios Nikolaos, which is a village near British Sovereign Bases. There is no buffer zone in the area but there was UNFICYP' ceasefire line patrolling (UN Security Council, 1996).

According to the reports of the Secretary-General, various incidents happen in or around of the buffer zone. For instance, according to most recent reports, in the period between 19 June 2020-18 December 2020 total 288, 19 December 2019-18 June 2020 total 389, 20 June 2019-18 December 2019 total 414, 19 December 2018-19 June 2019 total 272, 21 June 2018-18 December 2018 total 332 military violations reported. Military violations in these reports did not cause any hot conflict, these violations were mainly minor incidents such as construction of buildings or watchtowers, installation of CCTV cameras. In addition, civilian incidents were also reported by the UNFICYP. These activities were mainly unauthorized farming, hunting and incursion (UN Security Council, 2021; UN Security Council, 2020b; UN Security Council, 2020a; UN Security Council, 2019b; UN Security Council, 2019a).

As can be seen from the event that happened in 1996 in Deryneia/Derinya, UNFICYP was not capable to prevent hot conflict between sides. In 1996, one of the sides were civilians but UNFICYP was still insufficient to prevent conflict. As mentioned above, UNFICYP is also reporting military violations from both sides such as building military constructions, watchtowers and infrastructure, installation of CCTV around the buffer zone. However, in these cases, UNFICYP can only protest authorities. In this sense, UNFICYP is not functional. Because in cases of hot conflict, UNFICYP was insufficient to prevent and also unable to deter sides from minor military violations. In absence of any hot conflict attempt or any attempt of violation Cyprus would not need the UNFICYP anyway.

Ironically, Resolution no. 186, which should define functions of the UNFICYP, is also the cause of the dysfunctionality. Secretary-General in his report S/2020/23 on 7 January 2020, stated that "With its current mandate, which does not provide it with any executive authority, UNFICYP must rely on the

cooperation of its interlocutors to prevent tensions in and around the buffer zone." and also stated in report S/2019/562 on 10 July 2019 that "… the mission's ability to curb problematic unauthorized activity remains limited." (UN Security Council, 2020a; UN Security Council, 2019b). It is clear that since 1964 the Cyprus problem has evolved and mandate of the UNFICYP should be updated according to current situation.

CHAPTER 4: THE FUTURE OF THE UN'S ROLE IN THE CONFLICT NEGOTIATIONS AND MEDIATION

The UN is operating in Cyprus with various organisations such as the UNFICYP and UNDP. This chapter is going to discuss future of the UN in Cyprus and also going to evaluate peace-keeping operation of the UN in Cyprus.

4.1 Evaluation of Peace-keeping Operations

According to Paul Diehl (1993), there are two factors for evaluating peace-keeping missions. One of them is to observe whether peace-keeping missions limit armed conflicts or not and as the second factor of evaluation, he suggests observing if they are contributing to conflict resolution or not (Diehl, 1993). Robert Johansen (1994) in his review objects to both. H argues that holding peacekeepers responsible for conflicts is unreasonable. For supporting his argument, Johansen (1994) asks, why should limited number of peacekeepers be responsible for conflict which caused by others? For the second criterion of Diehl, Johansen (1994) argues that peacekeepers should not be responsible from peace-building, because they are not designed for peace-building. In general, Robert Johansen (1994) has found two criteria inadequate and unfair (Johansen, 1994). Paul Diehl defends his two criteria and states that, as he said in his first criteria, peacekeepers should be evaluated on their abilities to prevent conflict between adversaries. Because with this criterion, it can be possible to evaluate impacts of peace-keeping operations. In addition, for the second criterion, Diehl says that it can

represent positive peace because it states the absence of violence. He defends his criterion and states that if peacekeepers cannot withdraw from the area because of the possibility of conflict, this indicates failure of the mission. William Druch, on the other side, agrees on both and states that Diehl's two criteria are good for start but they can be unfair and in some cases, it can be insufficient. Druch points out mandates of the peace-keeping operations for a fair and sufficient evaluation because each peace-keeping operation differs from each other. As these operations have their own mandates, they have different aims. While some operations aim to reach a peace agreement some of them do not (Druckman, et al., 1997).

Apart from these, Duane Bratt developed another evaluation with using Diehl's and Brown's points. Brown suggested three criteria for evaluation; did peace-keeping operation facilitated its mandate? Did operation achieved to a conflict resolution? And did operation successfully prevented or limited armed conflicts? (Brown, 1993) With using indicators of Brown and Diehl as starting point Duane Bratt developed four different points for evaluation; mandate performance, conflict resolution, conflict containment, limiting casualties. According to Bratt, conflict containment is determined by the operation's capacity to prevent third parties from intervening conflict. Limiting casualties is determined with comparing deaths before deployment of the peacekeepers and after deployment. With casualties, Bratt does not only mean military but also civilians, because conflicts can directly or indirectly kill civilians. For instance, lack of humanitarian aids can cause deaths of civilians (Bratt, 1996).

4.2 Evaluation of the UNFICYP

Paul Diehl (1993) has two criteria for evaluation of peacekeeping missions. One was ability to prevent conflicts and other was contribution of peace-keeping forces to conflict resolution.

Limitation of conflict is a controversial term in context of Cyprus conflict. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 1996, three hot conflict incidents happened in Deryneia/Derinya and peace-keeping forces were incapable of preventing these hot conflict incidents. In addition, as can be seen from the reports of

the Secretary-General, UNFICYP is also unable to deter sides from minor military violations. In this sense, UNFICYP failed to prevent hot conflicts when it arises. However, except the incidents in 1996, there weren't any other serious attempt of hot conflict. As discussed through this thesis, Cyprus conflict couldn't reach a final settlement. However, apart from the UN, UNFICYP does not have any actions for conflict resolution.

According to William Druch (1997), mandates of the operations should be used for evaluation. Because every peacekeeping operation has different characteristics. The mandate of the UNFICYP is one of the most controversial topics about the UNFICYP. UNFICYP' s mandate gives limited authority and power to the UNFICYP. Even Secretary-General stated this limitation in his reports on UNFICYP[2]. According to the Resolution no.186, UNFICYP should operate to return to normal conditions. As discussed in Chapter 3, "normal conditions" is a vague term in context of Cyprus. Cyprus problem evolved to a different point from the point in 1964. Considering that Resolution no. 186 was adopted in 1964 "normal conditions" means the situation before 1964. In this sense UNFICYP could not reached this. In addition, because of the limitations which were also stated by the Secretary-General, UNFICYP does not have authority and power to reach this goal.

Brown had three criteria for evaluating peace-keeping operations. These three criteria are also used by other scholars mentioned above. Brown used mandate for evaluation like William Druch and also used Diehl's conflict resolution and prevention of conflict criteria. Duane Bratt developed four points with using criteria developed by Diehl and Brown. Same as others, Bratt used mandate performance and conflict resolution as criteria. In addition to these, Bratt also developed conflict containment and limiting casualties. With conflict containment Bratt meant preventing third parties from intervening conflict. In the context of Cyprus, this point is complicated. Turkey and Greece intervened Cyprus in 1974. However, UNFICYP cannot prevent these interventions because these countries are already sides of

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[2] See S/2020/23 and S/2019/562.

conflict. After coup d'état against Makarios Turkey intervened Cyprus with using Guarantee Agreements.

4.3 Capacity Building

On 3 July 1990, the Republic of Cyprus applied to European Union for full membership. In 1998, negotiations and harmonization process started with Acquis screening. Republic of Cyprus completed its harmonization process and adapted various laws. On 16 April 2003, Republic of Cyprus signed Treaty of Accession and on 1 May 2004, the Republic of Cyprus became full member of the European Union (European Parliament, n.d.).

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been cooperating with European Union in Cyprus since 2001. UNDP and EU mainly working on cultural heritage projects, projects which support environmental, economic and social developments and also confidence-building measures. The main aim of these projects and programme is to create an environment for peace and also encourage Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots to work together to solve common problems (UNDP in Cyprus, n.d.).

In 2004 the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union officially. However, Cyprus was still divided due to the failure of reunification efforts. As a result, the Acquis Communautaire was suspended in Northern Cyprus. EU Aid Programme is aiming to improve capacity of the Turkish Cypriots. In this sense, the EU is funding economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community for economic integration of two communities. In addition, the EU is funding various developments in Turkish Cypriot community to ease implementation of the Acquis Communautaire in case of a reunification (European Commission, n.d.). Starting from 2006 to 2019, EU Aid Programme funded €555 million for these purposes to the Turkish Cypriot community (AB Bilgi Merkezi, n.d.).

In addition to these, the EU also started to support the Turkish Cypriot community with the Covid-19 vaccines. Turkish Cypriot community is facing difficulties in accessing the Covid-19 vaccine. Starting from January 2021, the EU started to send Covid-19 vaccines to the Turkish Cypriot community (Yenidüzen, 2021c; Yenidüzen, 2021d; Yenidüzen, 2021e).

4.4 Future of the UN and UNFICYP

In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published "An Agenda for Peace". Boutros-Ghali prepared this document for UN Security Council. In Agenda for Peace Boutros-Ghali analysed the peace activities of the UN. In addition, An Agenda for Peace also had recommendations for the future of the peace operations of the UN. Most importantly, Boutros-Ghali criticised peace-keeping activities of that time and shed light on important terms such as preventive diplomacy and peace-building (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Brahimi Report was another attempt to improve peace operations of the UN. In 2000 Brahimi Report published and submitted to both Security Council and General Assembly. Brahimi Report, same as An Agenda for Peace, criticised peace-keeping operations of the UN. Brahimi Report aims for a reform in peace operations and strategies of the UN, using preventive action and also clearer mandates (UN General Assembly, 2000).

In 2014, High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was established under the auspices of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Ban Ki-moon established the HIPPO was discussing shortcomings of the UN peacekeeping operations and adapting UN peacekeeping operations to developing conflict conditions. When compared with previous reports, HIPPO was less revolutionary. HIPPO was focused on political side of the UN peace operations. In this sense, HIPPO's recommendations were more focused on the preventive and indirect side of the UN peace operations (Andersen, 2018).

The Action for Peace (A4P) plan was started by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres in 2018. A4P has developed peace operations of the UN. Apart from preventive diplomacy mentioned in previous reports, conflict and security understanding of the UN is also changing. As stated in the website of the UN, climate crisis, increasing urbanization and poverty issues are also seen as a problem by the UN. In addition, UN predicted conflicts can happen virtually in the future (United Nations, n.d.).

The main difference between peace operations during the Cold War period and peace operations after Cold War is the aim of the missions. Cold War

peace operations were aiming to prevent conflicts from spreading into other regions which would cause greater conflicts or even a nuclear war. However, as can be seen from the UN reports published after Cold War, main aim of the peace operations became establishing positive peace (Andersen, 2018).

As mentioned before, the UNFICYP was established in 1964 with Resolution no.186 and first negotiations between communities started in 1968. Since then, a lot of things changed, both in Cyprus and in the world. Peace operation understanding of the UN and the world changed with evolving conflicts. Cyprus problem also evolved to an utterly different point. Cyprus conflict is not the same problem anymore. However, the UNFICYP remained the same in this context. The UNFICYP and the UN are insufficient in sense of preventing conflicts, intervening conflicts and also implementing its peace understanding mentioned above to Cyprus conflict. This thesis believes that the UN should revise itself to the current dynamics of the Cyprus conflict in order to improve its future activities in Cyprus.

CONCLUSION

The essential point of this thesis is to examine peace exercises of the United Nations within the setting of the Cyprus Issue. The thesis addresses whether the UN contributes to peace in Cyprus or it contributes to the de facto division of the island. The main question of this research asks if the UN contributes to the establishment of the peace in Cyprus or contributes to the status quo?" In this thesis, qualitative research methods are used and secondary data is analysed. Starting from the establishment of the UNFICYP in 1964 to 2021, the UN and UNFICYP's role in the Cyprus conflict is thoroughly discussed and analysed.

Chapter 1 focuses on the information on peace-keeping, peace-making, peace-building and UN's peace operations from the literature prepares. a clear and understandable surface for the arguments displayed in the other chapters. The Cyprus conflict and the UN's role in the context of the Cyprus conflict are discussed in Chapter 2, in order to prevent misunderstandings in the forthcoming chapters. This Chapter started from the 1950s in order to understand the roots of the conflict. The period between 1960 and 1974 was analysed after the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, followed by an outbreak of intercommunal violence and the establishment of the UNFICYP. The year of 1974 was analysed separately because interventions and division of the island are especially important to understand the current situation in Cyprus.   The following chapter (Chapter 3) analyses the role of the UN and the UNFICYP in the context of the Cyprus conflict and also discusses the shortcomings of the UN and the UNFICYP. The role of the UN and the UNFICYP is analysed separately. Because the section about the role of the UN is focused on the peace-making activities of the UN such as the mediations and negotiations. The section about the role of the UNFICYP was focused on peace-keeping activities. Both of these sections in Chapter 3 discussed the shortcomings of the UN in the context of the Cyprus conflict. As the main case study chapter, Chapter 4 evaluates the UNFICYP using several perspectives from different scholars. Additionally, capacity building activities of the UN was also analysed. With the help of the information and

discussions provided in the previous chapters, the future of the UN and UNFICYP is discussed.

Peace-building theory, as explained in Chapter 3, suggests a lasting peace can be achieved through a bottom-up approach. In other words, local understanding of peace and local needs should be heard for achieving lasting peace. Because, even though the third parties try to mediate in good intentions, a peace solution designed and demanded by the local populations last longer. However, this does not mean peace should not be supported from out. In the context of Cyprus, the UN supports peace efforts with peace-keeping and peace-making activities. As explained in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis the UN and the UNFICYP have had failures and limitations in the context of reaching a lasting peace. Especially Resolution no.186 should be updated for improving UN operations in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots still need support for achieving a lasting peace. In this sense, this thesis points out the failures and limitations of the UN and the UNFICYP and this thesis does not suggest the UN and the UNFICYP are totally unnecessary or should not exist. Furthermore, as also discussed in Chapter 3, a federal solution is believed to be the ideal solution for Cyprus as it is for the interest of all Cypriots and all Cypriots would benefit from it. According to the various resolutions of the UN, any type of secession or partition is not possible and also excluded. Thus bizonal, bicommunal federation is the most reasonable solution and also it is supported by various resolutions. The UN is one of the most important actors in the context of the Cyprus conflict. However, discussions about the Cyprus conflict are only limited to a criticism based on the efforts of the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, this thesis believes that the failures of the UN should also be discussed. This thesis analyses the peace efforts of the UN and UNFICYP for these purposes.

As also mentioned above, the main question of this thesis is whether the UN contributes to peace in Cyprus, or it just contributes to the status quo. Under the present conditions, it is clear that operations of the UN and the UNFICYP are limited and insufficient. As can be seen above, the power yielded to the UNFICYP is limited and cannot operate efficiently for a lasting peace as it can be traced in the current activities of the UN. It is believed that the UN

should revise Resolution no.186 for improved future operations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres also stated that Resolution no.186 should be revised to solve the dysfunctionality of the UN in Cyprus. This revision can bring political peace to the problem. For achieving lasting peace, the bottom-up peace efforts should also be supported and the local populations should be empowered.

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