NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

EXAMINING THE SHIFT IN THE MIDDLE EAST'S

POWER BALANCE SINCE 2011:
A SHIFT OF POWER TOWARDS ISRAEL?

M.A. THESIS

EMMMETT PAYOPAY COKER

Nicosia

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Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by EMMETT PAYOPAY COKER titled "**Examining the Shift in the Middle East's Power Balance Since 2011: A Shift of Power towards Israel?**" and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations

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I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

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Acknowledgement

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Abstract

Examining The Shift in the Middle East's Power Balance since 2011:

A Shift of Power towards Israel?

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Masters, Department of International Relations

Supervised by Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü

December, 2021, 118 pages

Since the 2011 Arab Spring, the distribution of power in the Middle East region has dramatically shifted. The popular protests that came to be known as the "Arab Spring" was a wave of pro-democracy upheavals of the Arab people which resulted in power alternations in the region entirely. From Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria, the Arab Uprisings were built on broad aspirations for political freedoms, social fairness, and human dignity. In some countries, long-lasting rules were overthrown and gave rise to either a democratic transition in the case of Tunisia; or civil wars in both Syria and Libya; or ascendancy of *Ikhwan*-led Morsi and later al-Sisi governments as it was in the case of Egypt. Having said that, this research primarily explores the changes in the power balance in the Middle East since 2011. This thesis, therefore, aims to ask; to what extent the power balance shifted Towards Israel in the Middle East region since the 2011 Arab Uprisings. As the corollary of this, the ramifications of the changes in the distribution of power in the Middle East since the 2011 protests will be addressed via referring to the enhanced role of Israel in the region. In light of these objectives, this research will benefit from the mainstream approaches and their conceptualizations of power and balance of power.

Keywords: Middle East, Balance of Power, Realism, power, Arab Spring, Israel, Egypt

Öz

2011'den bu yana Orta Doğu'nun Güç Dengesindeki Değişimi İncelemek: Gücün İsrail'e Doğru Kayması mı?

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2011 Arap Baharı'ndan bu yana, Orta Doğu bölgesindeki güç dağılımı önemli ölçüde değişti. "Arap Baharı" olarak bilinen halk protestoları, Arap halkının bölgede tamamen iktidar değişimlerine yol açan ve demokrasi talep ettikleri bir ayaklanma dalgasıydı. Tunus'tan Mısır'a, Yemen, Bahreyn, Libya ve Suriye'ye kadar Arap Ayaklanmaları, siyasi özgürlükler, sosyal adalet ve insan onuru için geniş özlemler üzerine inşa edildi. Bazı ülkelerde, uzun süreli kurallar devrildi ve Tunus örneğinde olduğu gibi demokratik bir geçişe yol açtı; veya hem Suriye hem de Libya'da olduğu gibi iç savaşlar meydana geldi; ya da Mısır örneğindeki gibi İhvan liderliğindeki Mursi ve sonraki Sisi hükümetlerinin yükselişine şahit olduk. Bununla birlikte, bu te çalışması öncelikle 2011 yılından bu yana Orta Doğu'da güç dengesinde meydana gelen değişiklikleri incelemektedir. Dolayısıyla bu tezin temel amacı; 2011 Arap Ayaklanmalarından günümüze Orta Doğu bölgesinde güç dengesinin ne ölçüde İsrail'e kaydığını irdelemektir. Bunun doğal bir sonucu olarak, 2011 protestolarından bu yana Orta Doğu'da güç dağılımındaki değişiklikler, İsrail'in bölgedeki artan rolüne atıfta bulunularak ele alınacaktır. Bu hedefler ışığında, bu araştırma ana akım yaklaşımlardan ve onların güç ve güç dengesi kavramlaştırmalarından yararlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Orta Doğu, Güç Dengesi, Realizm, güç, Arap Baharı, İsrail, Mısır

List of Abbreviations

AFESD: Arab Fund Economic Social development

 ALF: Arab Liberation Front

BOP: Balance Of Power

CSCE: Conference Security Cooperation Europe

CSCME: Conference Security Cooperation Middle East

EEC: Exclusive Economic Zone

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IDC: Interdisciplinary Center

IR: International Relations

JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

JDP: Justice Development Party

LAS: League Arab States

MENA: Middle East North Africa

MWG: Multilateral Working Ground

NATO: North Alliance Treaty Organization

OAPEC: Organization Arab Petroleum Exporting Commission

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

PA: Palestinian Authority

PDFLP: Popular Democratic Front Liberation Palestine

PFLPGC: Popular Front Liberation Palestine General Command

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

SU: Soviet Union

UAE: United Arab Emirates

UK: United Kingdom

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNSCOP: United Nations Special Commission On Palestine

US: United States

USSR: Union Soviet Social Republics

WWI: World War One

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

The 2011 Arab Uprisings that engulfed most of the Arab countries since 2011 that became to be named as the "Arab Spring" represents a wave of pro-democracy demonstrations that gave rise to unprecedented prospects for political opening in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region entirely. The Arab Spring was based on mass demands, including political freedoms, social justice, and human dignity that spread from Tunisia to Egypt to Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. Within weeks, leaders once considered "*presidents for life*," such as Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, were toppled out of office. A few months later, Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and Libyan leader Mohammad Khaddafi were respectively deposed from office. Previously repressed political institutions, particularly Islamist movements and players, re-entered the political arena, joining a large number of other newly founded political organizations. Aside from that, the number of civil society groups proliferated. Transitional administrations in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen held competitive multi-party elections, saw constitutional changes, and conducted national dialogues to show the new post-authoritarian governments' commitment.

Given these trends, many scholars predicted that Israel would be the country to suffer the most devastating consequences of the Arab Spring, particularly with the power alterations and overthrown of long-standing despotic regimes, many of whom Israel had relations with. For instance, Middle East experts Fawaz Gerges and Graham Fuller respectively dubbed Israel "the biggest loser" and "the biggest single loser, hands down (Scheinmann, 2016). With the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and the election of Mohammed Morsi, a candidate of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin's (the Muslim Brotherhood) on the Justice and Freedom Party as Egypt's first constitutionally elected president in 2013, was the most critical turning point in the construction of the perceptions as Israel the biggest loser of the Arab Spring. Within a decade of these events, the Middle East had gone from promising democratic prospect to a cycle of fragmentation, instability, and fragility. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, for example, have been engulfed in ethnic conflict that have deteriorated into

full civil war and the disintegration of state institutions. Furthermore, with the exception of Tunisia, authoritarian rule has been maintained or re-established throughout the region (Cavatorta 2013; 2020). And, contrary to popular belief, the current geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East has shifted power in Israel's favour, with Israel renewing relations and forging new relationships as a result of Trump's pro-Israel administration.

As Toby Dodges argues, "The Arab Spring was a historic moment in Middle East politics, but its long-term effects remain unpredictable" (2012: 64). In light of this assertion, the Arab Spring has resulted in major state realignment, regional rivalries among Arab states particular, and a resurgence of the Iranian-Gulf States rivalry, mostly between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as well as the political influence of evolving global hegemons in the region.

Given the ongoing and largely unanticipated regional fragmentation since the Arab Spring of 2011, which has shifted power in the region towards Israel, understanding the scholarly conceptualization of power in international relations is critical to comprehend this shift in the Middle East's power balance. In light of this, this thesis argues that the balance of power (BOP) in the Middle East has shifted since the Arab Spring of 2011. The notion of power is still a hot topic of consideration among academics in International Relations. The focus on the notion of power, on the other hand, is a defining feature of Realism. Classical realism, in particular, makes two key assumptions regarding the idea of power balances. Kenneth Waltz's structural realism theory contends, first and foremost, that anarchy is the dominant reality of the international system. The change in the system is mostly manifested via changes in the distribution of power among the components that make up the system, rather than originating from outside the system. He claims that the international system is anarchic since no official authority to regulate the state has been formed (Waltz, 1979). Because of the system's ego structure, the states have no one to turn to when they're in a predicament; instead, they can only work to grow their power in relation to one another by strengthening themselves internally or allying and realigning with other states outside (Waltz, 1979). Second, Gilpin's concept of hegemonic transition is marked by a cyclical perspective of change, which is reflected in his work. According to Gilpin, the international order represents the system's underlying distribution of material differences, hegemonic war, and the

following rebuilding in order to reflect the system's new distribution of power capacity. The expanding hegemonic state, whose power position has been confirmed by war, rather than any other country, defines the circumstances of the new international political order. States are key actors in the international system because they set the rules of engagement (Waltz, 1979), regulate the legitimate use of force (Waltz, 1979) inside their borders, and usually speak with a single voice when it comes to foreign policy (Waltz 1979). As a result, states in the international system are seen as unitary actors. As a consequence, when non-state or multinational players grow strong enough to confront state actors, power is no longer viewed in terms of polarity but rather in terms of policy networks established by policy layers. Because they provide us with a clearer view of humans, the nature of the state, and the nature of the international system, as well as a better understanding of why wars occur and how they can be avoided, these two underlying principles about the international system are widely accepted, not only in realism but also in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984) and, to a lesser extent, in constructivism (Wendt, 1999). As a result, according to the concept, the balance of power occurs when "two coalitions exist in an international system, and the weaker side, given the opportunity, joins the core states to avoid being threatened by the other, more powerful side." He hypothesizes that the existence of two or more states coexisting in a system is essential for the theory to hold in a multipolar system (one dominated by two powers with comparable capabilities, eventually defined by more than two powers with approximately equivalent capabilities). Given that Middle Eastern geopolitics is a mixture of hard and soft power and many forms of power, this thesis will draw on orthodox ideas as well as Joseph Nye's approach to power.

The aim of this thesis therefore is to examine key challenges and developments in the Middle East, particularly in terms of regional and global power dynamics since the Arab Spring of 2011. For that purpose, this research will address two questions: To what extent has the balance of power in the Middle East region shifted towards Israel since the 2011 Arab uprisings? What are the implications of changes in the redistribution of power in the Middle East in constructing regional order? This thesis will be organized into four chapters: First chapter, Introduction, the study's origins and relevance are explained. In the second chapter, Theoretical Framework, This thesis will begin with a rapid introduction of power and how

scholars viewed the balance of power in international relations. It will examine some of the main challenges surrounding the idea of power and, based on the foregoing analysis, try to establish a viable framework for understanding the alterations in the Middle East's power balance. In the third chapter, Pre-Arab Spring, this thesis will provide a historical overview of the Middle East and how power was distributed before the Arab Spring. In the fourth chapter, Post-Arab spring, this thesis will look at the aftermath and how power has moved towards Israel. The following titles will be explained in chronological order in this thesis: introduction, problem statement, aim and objective, significance of the study, research limitation, Research question, hypothesis, theoretical framework, pre-Arab Spring, and post-Arab Spring; finally, the conclusion section will address the findings and shed light on the conclusion.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

After a decade of the so-called Arab Spring, the Middle East remains in turmoil. The Arab Spring led to major uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and other Gulf States that were more or less successful in bringing about change. It also triggered chaos in Syria, where the protests provoked a violent government response that quickly escalated into a sectarian civil war. Today, the balance of power in the region has shifted. Before the Arab upheavals, the Middle East was one of the most important regions in the spotlight of regional actors, where instability and proxy conflicts, if not stagnation, prevailed (Ulrichsen, 2014). . The Middle East hosts a wide range of states, including monarchies, democratizing and authoritarian regimes. Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya, for example, have been controlled by authoritarian and one-party regimes for more than thirty years, in a difficult but mostly stable, if not stagnant. The region was dominated by both monarchies and authoritarian regimes, some of which had been in power for more than thirty years. By relying on regional alliances and treaties, as well as extreme organizations such as al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, these regimes were able to keep the demands and expectations of the population under control. The situation on the ground was then catastrophic. Given these changes, the thesis will examine the balance of power in the Middle East has changed since the Arab upheavals of 2011. The thesis will look at the Middle East as a battleground for dominance, attracting

extra-regional actors such as the United States on one side and China and the Russian Federation on the other, and drawing regional power plays to a degree far beyond their willingness to participate.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

In Middle East politics, the Arab Spring was a turning point. Demonstrations in the Middle East focused on democratic rights, social justice, and human dignity, as well as the failure of government programs and demands for a greater voice. Following the Arab Spring, several studies were conducted to examine its aftermath. Despite its promises and the hopes of the Arab world, some believe that the Arab Spring has failed to bring democracy in the "third wave of democratization" as Samuel Huntington put it (1984). Many commentators believe that the Arab Spring has ushered in a new age of authoritarianism, although democracy remains elusive. The aim of this thesis is to examine key challenges and developments in the Middle East, particularly in terms of regional and global power dynamics since the Arab Spring of 2011. For that purpose, this research will address these questions: To what extent has the balance of power in the Middle East region shifted towards Israel since the 2011 Arab uprisings? What are the implications of the changes in the redistribution of power in the Middle East since the 2011 protests in constructing regional order?

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This year (2021) marks the tenth anniversary of the Arab Uprisings. Since the 2011 Arab Spring undoubtedly the Middle East has produced new collaborations, but also power struggles, power redistribution and influence between regional and global actors, states and non-state actors. A complex network of moving interactions has emerged, characterized by overlapping and even contradictory activities. The return of the Iranian-Saudi rivalry, state instability, the growth of violent non-state groups, and the political significance of changing global oil trade patterns are just some of the geopolitical variables moving in the Middle East today (Dalacoura 2012). From this turmoil, regional storms and a combination of internal and geopolitical strife

have developed. Although post-Arab Spring events still vary widely across the Middle East, the paths of 2011 have essentially converged on the reassertion of authoritarian power. Early and widespread appeals for political change and greater participation in systems of governance have not translated into genuine democracy and pluralism. Elections were held in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, but the democratic transition in Egypt was bitterly fought and violently reversed in 2013, while the elections in Libya resulted in a government unable to develop political authority or exercise power outside its ministries. Even the transition in Tunisia, which was based on a long history of constitutionalism and stronger social and political forces and was characterized by a more diverse distribution of political power, was a mixed affair in which democratic gains were interrupted by public outrage. At the local level, power struggles and shifting coalitions persist between the youth demographic majority, the educated middle class, and the state bureaucratic elites, as well as between Islamists and non-Islamists and various schools of political Islam. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the quest for dominance in the Persian Gulf region are two long-simmering geopolitical disputes that have yet to be resolved. Another flashpoint is the Syrian crisis, which continues to destabilize the Middle East's state structure.

Today, the Middle East appears to be more than a struggle for power. Extra-regional actors such as the United States (US) and the Russian Federation on the one hand, and China on the other, are becoming embroiled in regional power plays that go far beyond their willingness to participate. Syria is a prime example of how the U S and its allies NATO and Russia are being drawn into a war over which they have little control. As a result, Israel, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are the main players in the interstate dynamics in the region, even as Qatar repeatedly tries to influence these players. Israel, for example, is the most powerful country in the Middle East. Regardless of whether Egypt's post-Mubarak transition succeeds or fails, or whether a coup against Mursi succeeds, Egypt's first democratically elected president remains at the centre of regional events. The country's geography, demographics, and history make it a natural player in regional politics. Despite the deterioration of its ties with Israel by 2009 onwards and Egypt by 2013, Turkey continues to play a role in the balance of power in the Middle East. Turkey's attraction is mainly based on its economy and economic influence on surrounding countries, as well as its close relations with the EU and membership of NATO. It was

mainly the Davos crisis in 2009 (Guardian 2009) and later the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 that created tension between Israel and Turkey (BBC 2016). The relations between Ankara and Cairo has strained due to the support of Turkey towards *Ikhwan* (Muslim Brotherhood)-affiliated Morsi government in Egypt (Köprülü 2021). The situation in Iran is completely different. Despite sanctions from the UN, the US and the EU, the country has demonstrated its ability to survive in more ways than one. It has managed to keep its nuclear program and diplomatic process going despite the sanctions and their consequences for the country's economy. The historical legacy of NATO activity in Libya has meant that the legitimacy of the post-Gaddafi Libyan state is on shaky ground, with little ability to influence events on the ground. Given these factors, Libya risks being torn apart by militias competing for local power, if it has not already been torn apart by militias competing for local power. This is thanks to UN Resolution 1973, which was used by NATO to justify a no-fly zone in Libya, but not the regime change that eventually brought about the overthrow of Mohammed Kaddafi. Political freedom in Tunisia is threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood-majority government. Given the ongoing and largely unpredictable domestic, transnational, and regional turmoil in the Middle East since the 2011 Arab Spring, which has sparked a broader discussion about the nature and potential of the balance of power in the region, this thesis would serve as a foundation for examining the factors shifting the power in the Middle East today. Today. Given the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring that sparked this change, this thesis focuses on the Middle East.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The goal of this thesis is to examine the power shift in the Middle East and how to assess it. As a consequence, the study has focused on mainstream perspectives on power. The thesis will only last from 2011 to 2020, but it will provide a valuable historical perspective on the Middle East after the Second World War. One main limitation of the study is; due to the time limitation it could not have included the role of other extra regional powers that would have roles in the region.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The goal of this research is to find answers to the following questions:

(1) To what extent has the power balance in the Middle East region shifted towards Israel since the 2011 Arab Uprisings?

(2) What are the ramifications of the changes in the distribution of power in the Middle East since the 2011 Arab protests in constructing regional order?

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

This thesis addresses and shed light on whether or not power politics shifted in the Middle East after the Arab Spring. To what extent has the balance of power in the Middle East region shifted towards Israel since the 2011 Arab Uprisings? This thesis drew its primary data from the secondary sources. The secondary data collection is a method of data collection used in this thesis to achieve the research objectives. Consequently, books, articles, online news sites and publications are used in this study. A qualitative approach was used in this research. Due to the Covid-19 epidemic and limited resources, this approach was chosen.

CHAPTER II

The Theoretical Framework

The 2011 Arab Spring brought significant changes to the Middle East. The region's states are struggling politically and economically. Some issues are local yet have regional effects, while others are worldwide. In today's Middle East, national suspicions over power and influence are widespread. This is critical given the escalating regional tensions and power shifts. Power has to be conceptualized in order to better comprehend the area following the 2011 Arab Spring. As stated before, power is an important notion in international affairs. However, without a rigorous investigation, the concept's significance is ambiguous. Researchers in international relations have embraced many ideas of power and built theoretical frameworks that encourage a critical evaluation of power in all its forms. These attempt to examine the variables that affected the Middle East's balance today in light of continuing and unforeseen internal, transnational, and regional developments.

In honour of the 10th anniversary of the Arab Spring, this thesis concentrates on the Middle East. With reference to Hans J. Morgenthau's "*Political Among Nations*" (1948), Hedley Bull's "*The Anarchical Society*" (1977), Kenneth N. Waltz's "*Theory of International Politics*" (1979), John J. Mearsheimer's "*The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*" (2001), and others, it will also examine the shift in the balance of power in the Middle East since the Arab Spring of 2011. This thesis will utilize Nye's notion of power to analyze the power shift in the Middle East. A key component of this argument is the usage of Nye's forms of power, which split power into two categories: hard power and soft power. In this context, this chapter will try to establish a viable framework for understanding the alterations in the balance of power in the Middle East based on the aforementioned research.

Concept of Power

Power has been studied for decades, if not centuries, starting with Aristotle, Plato, and Machiavelli. Despite the focus on power, scholars are still divided about

the notion, thus, resulting in its complexity and ambiguity. According to Arendt (1970: 44), power is a group's attribute that persists only as long as the group exists in its current condition. Dahl (1957: 203), on the other hand, suggested that objects of power should be called actors. Actors include people, organizations, positions, offices, governments, nation-states, and other human aggregates. Marshall Singer applies relative power. He contends that power is the capacity of a state to persuade others to serve its goals. In a negative meaning, he claims, it is the capacity to resist external influence. Quote: "Power is the capacity to exert influence and prevent influences from exercising oneself." Blau defined power as the ability to influence conduct via negative punishments (Blau 1964: 115). Scholars contend that no definition exceeds Dahl's in terms of absolute impact. Max Weber (1947: 152) defined power in the social sciences. He described it as the likelihood of an actor in a social link imposing his will despite resistance. For Max Weber, power is a zero-sum game resulting from an individual's attributes, resources, and abilities.

However, Weber's definition has certain flaws. On the other hand, Weber established a framework for comparing and contrasting the qualities of various actors (Martin 1971: 243). Moreover, by excluding conflict from his definition and defining power only in terms of zero-sum competition, Weber disregarded the possibility for mutually beneficial power interactions (Martin, 1971: 243). Talcott Parsons (1967) developed a vision of power as a system resource rather than a source of conflict. According to Parsons (1967:208), power is the ability to guarantee that units within a collective organizational system execute contractual responsibilities. So the Parsonsian definition, according to Anthony Giddens (1968: 264), ignores the fact that power is exerted over someone, and that by presuming legitimacy and unanimity among those in authority, Parsons ignores the hierarchical character of power. In sum, both the Weberian and Parsonsian schools of thinking suffer from major definitional issues (Martin, 1971: 244). These are only two instances of how power considerations may lead to intense debates and confrontations among academics. In this brief lecture, we will show how power is one of the most essential and challenging notions in social science to comprehend. Many theorists provide their own individual terminologies of power in their own ways, despite its frequent usage (Bierstedt, 1950). Gallie (1956) illustrates that power is a fundamentally contentious subject owing to opposing theories and interpretations.

The Conceptualization of Power in International Relations Theories

For many years, power has been a prominent notion in international relations theory. It has also played a crucial part in some of the most prominent efforts to construct an international relations theory today. Most people think of it as a theoretical or analytical instrument used by experts to explore global politics. The power phenomenon is used in international relations to investigate how a state may influence other nations' foreign policy decisions. Power is still a major problem in global politics. Although there are several schools of thought in International Relations, power has generally been associated with realism. Many researchers and practitioners still consider power as reality. According to realists, the international system is anarchic, all major powers have offensive military capabilities, states can never be confident of the intentions of other nations, survival is the fundamental purpose of states, and states are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2001: 30-31). Realists see nation states as the main players in the global system. "Whatever the ultimate goals of international politics, power is always the immediate goal," said Hans Morgenthau (1954: 25). "The fight for power is ubiquitous in all social connections at all levels of social organization," according to Morgenthau (1954: 31).

Carr (1964: 102) agreed with Morgenthau that politics is really about power. For realists, power calculations are central to how nations see the world (Mearsheimer, 2001: 12). Power is a fundamental motivator of political relations, although how realists define it differs. According to classical realists, human drive for power leads in perpetual power struggles (Morgenthau, 1954). For structural or neorealists, the international system's architecture drives states to seek power and maximize their power position (Mearsheimer, 2001; Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2013). There are significant discrepancies in defining and quantifying power (Walt, 2002). The components of national power method depicts power as a state's possession, whereas the relational power approach depicts power as a real or potential link (Baldwin, 2012: 2). In other words, some realists define power as the capacity to exercise relational influence on other actors. Power, according to proponents of the notion of national power components, is tied to resource ownership. To estimate a state's total strength, its major resources are generally

bundled together. Military spending, armed forces strength, GDP, territory and population all represent a country's might. A country's strength is defined by its geography, natural resources, industrial capability, military, and population, according to Morgenthau (1954). Military power is the most significant sort of power in international politics, according to Carr (1946: 109).

However, one of the issues with the national power strategy is power conversion, which is described as "*the capacity to turn potential power into actual power through changing others' behavior*" (Nye, 1990: 178). It's more vital to wield power than to just possess it. The concentration on national power prevents examination of non-state actors and concerns of interdependence, alliances, and collective action, according to Hart (1976). Behavioural political scientists have championed relationship power as an alternative to national power (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950). A relational perspective of power requires the capacity to demonstrate change. Despite these developments, the national power paradigm remains entrenched in the literature on international affairs (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, politicians and leaders will find the relational power strategy transitory (Nye 1990: 26, 2011: 240). Policymakers prefer the idea of power as resource ownership over the relational definition, according to Nye, because it is more concrete, quantitative, and predictable. The power cycle is another way of thinking about and assessing power in International Relations.

The power cycle hypothesis states that a state's ability to influence international affairs and play a significant role is impacted by its stage of development (Hebron, James and Rudy, 2007: 3). The power cycle framework enables Doran (2000) to reflect on the shifting system structure and the rise and fall of the state as a great power. While the power cycle hypothesis is significant and influential, it was developed before the Arab Spring and may have methodological faults. In assessing relative strength, Doran's theory ignores major non-state players including international institutions, alliances, and supranational organizations. The conventional approach focuses on a country's material capabilities and ignores the "soft" components of power (Kissane, 2005: 12). Despite academics' differing views of power, the notion has always been connected with realism. Partly, this is because other schools of thought have not addressed the question of power and its nuances. Rivals of Realist theory have avoided discussing "power" and have not incorporated

it in their explanations of empirical results. According to neoliberals like Keohane, governments with shared interests build international institutions and accords that successfully limit state authority (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

Power cannot fully explain many key international outcomes, according to liberal international relations scholars. Deliberately ignoring the fact that the United States is a member of the UN Security Council (Moravcsik, 1997). The function of normative frameworks and learning and persuasion processes in causation is debated (Risse, 2001; Checkel, 2001). Hannah Arendt (1995: 73) stressed the significance of social interactions and social institutions (knowledge, material resources, and practice) in the international system. The objective is not to judge which paradigm better explains politics, but to highlight how power has always dominated realist thinking. The realist paradigm has a limit, according to Barnett and Duvall (2005). The writers stress that no one concept of power can capture all expressions. To this goal, the authors created a "taxonomy of four sorts of power" that encompasses compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive forms of power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 39-75). Baldwin (2012: 18) claims that power analysis is one of the oldest and most promising tools for analyzing future international politics.

Joseph Nye's Conceptualization of Power

The rigorous idea of power started to evolve as international interactions got more regimented. Globalization has re-emphasized intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions, according to Joseph Nye (1990: 167-168). Increasing social mobilization makes technology, education, and economic development as vital as geography, population, and resources. The role of non-military forms of power has been undervalued, according to Baldwin (2012: 15). Hard power and soft power are the two categories of power Nye identifies. Persuasion is the power to persuade others to do something (1990: 154). In an anarchic international system, where states do not accept higher authority, hard or command power is connected with an anarchic international system. International politics' "*carrots" and "sticks*" are both examples of hard power, according to Nye. These factors have been used to evaluate hard power in the past. A soft power is the capacity to influence others' choices without employing coercion or force (Nye,

2008: 95). Soft power may be traced back to Steven Lukes' third face of power thesis (Lukes, 1974). To win an argument or issue, Dahl (1961) said that the actor has power. The opposing side of Dahl's argument was made by Bachrach and Baratz (1962). That is, the second face is the capacity to establish an agenda (Baldwin, 2012:5). For example, Lukes (1974) presented a third face of power when an actor may convince B to do something he wouldn't normally do. The first two Soft Power examples explain how to use power to convince someone to do something against their will. Power can dominate others by altering their wants, as seen in the third face of power. Military, economic, and opinion power are all mentioned in Carr's (1946: 108) book. In Nye's view, influencing public opinion is a kind of soft power. A key component of soft power is legitimacy. By applying its ideas and practices, a country's soft power is able to attract and influence others. Examples of soft power include normalizing ties between Israel and Egypt (Nye, 1990: 167). Soft power is gaining theoretical and practical traction, needing a full analysis. Notably, the theory's resources are conceptually ambiguous. There are several variances when it comes to defining soft power assets. Hard power has traditionally been measured by population, territory, natural resources, military might, and social stability (Nye and Armitage, 2007: 6). Soft power resources are more difficult to categorize. Soft power is behaviourally responsive power. Soft power assets offer this resource-based attractiveness (Nye, 2008). "Soft power" is defined by Nye (2008) as "the ability to influence others via culture, political principles, and foreign policy". Nye postulated soft power into the following:

(1) Culture is a set of acts that give a society significance. Nne (2008: 96),
(2) Policy, both domestic and foreign, is a soft power. Soft power is influenced by foreign policy as well. Government actions may bolster or erode soft power. Nye (2008: 96)
(3) Foreign policy at home or abroad may erode soft power (Pallaver, 2011: 95).

Conceptualization of Balance Of Power

Given these scholarly ideas of power, this thesis highlights the concept of power of balance. Scholars' perceptions of power balance differs. Some academics define it as equilibrium, whereas others characterize it as preponderance or

disequilibrium. Some call it a policy, while others call it a code of behavior. George Scwarzenberger defines. A balance of power (BOP) is an equilibrium or degree of stability that may be attained by a coalition of states or other methods. According to Inis Claude, the balance of power is a system in which specific nations control power relations without larger powers intervening. Because of this, he maintains that BOP is a decentralized system where component entities retain authority and policy. However, two basic assumptions are essential of BOP: The absence of a centralized authority makes the international order anarchic (Waltz, 1979). Because the system is "self-help," states cannot resort to a global government in times of crisis, but must instead self-strengthen internally and externally by aligning and realigning with other states (Waltz, 1979). States set the parameters of engagement (Waltz, 1979), monopoly the lawful use of force inside their boundaries, and often conduct foreign policy in concert with domestic political opponents (Waltz, 1979). As a result, governments are considered as unitary players in the global system. A BOP configuration may no longer be thought of in terms of polarity, but rather in terms of the number of policy networks that non-state or multinational organizations might contest. These two fundamental assumptions regarding the international system are well-established in realism and neorealism, as well as in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane, 1984) and, to a lesser extent, constructivism (Wendt, 1999). So they come from a variety of concepts, not only realist or neorealist principles like relative power maximization. According to Kenneth Waltz, a power balance develops when two multinational coalitions align with the weaker side to avoid being threatened by the more powerful side (Waltz, 1979). As a consequence, some have questioned BOP's legitimacy in a multipolar world (Waltz 1979). Despite these two fundamental assumptions, there are certain cautions (those of anarchy and that of states as the primary players). In Waltz's theory, BOP is a result–a variable that reflects the causal effect of explanatory factors like anarchy and power distribution in the international system.

As a result of this internal contradiction, Waltz's BOP theory has been criticized for attempting to explain one dependent variable (the existence of balance of power) with another dependent variable (the presence of balance of power) (polarity). The BOP must first determine whether it is still relevant in a multipolar world, and if the same structural constraints that promote balance in a unipolar world

apply. The bipolar and unipolar systems are still present in multipolar systems. What would be the greatest predictor of the occurrence of the balance of power if the system polarization could not be employed immediately? Rather, he maintains, it is important to return to the two core assumptions and assess what predictions may be made from them that affect the overall balance. Thus, these factors describe the possibility of a BOP, demonstrating three points: A system's intention, predilection, and contingency are often tied to the availability of new knowledge in a given circumstance, which may be external or endogenous in nature (Boxill, 2014). However, classical realism dominates the notion of power BOP balance, claiming that BOP leads in peaceful structural circumstances (Waltz, 1979 and Morgenthau, 1948). The BOP school emphasizes on the peaceful implications of power equality, while the power predominance school, or, more precisely, the power shift school, feels this position is unstable and hence conducive to violence. As a consequence, realism offers us with conflict-avoidance rules that are mutually contradictory. The BOP theory predicts deterrence failure between two equal powers, whereas the shift of power theory predicts the exact opposite. For Neorealism, the distribution of material capacities – economic and especially military might – among participating nations determines state behavior in the international system (Waltz, 1979). Power distributions within the international system may impact the extent of conflict or cooperation at any one period. The idea of global hegemony holds that the international system is more likely to be stable when a single country serves as the dominant power; while the idea of multipolarity holds that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single country serves as the dominant power (Cohen, 2008). This hegemon may influence the international system via coercive and non-coercive means. A cohesive political body with external decision-making authority, like the NATO, may also be termed hegemonic (NATO). The words used to characterize these systems are bipolarity (two equal-capacity powers) and multipolarity (more than two powers of roughly equal capability). Despite being one of the most fundamental ideas in international affairs, the balance of power theory lacks a uniform definition.

In international politics, it is a stance and method chosen by a state or group of states to protect themselves against another state or group of states by balancing their power (Britannica, 2019). That is, an international system in which states fear

violent retaliation if they act aggressively. A country may pursue a balance of power strategy in two ways: either by growing their own might (arms race) or by enhancing the power of others (alliance policy) (McKenna, 2020). Richard Little, on the other hand, examines the BOP as a metaphor, myth, and paradigm. Little says that the BOP is an IR that nations survive through avoiding military dominance by any one state (as opposed to asymmetrical power) (2007). In his thesis, when a single state obtains strength, the other countries form a defence alliance to avoid power concentration. Thus, in international relations, power dynamics are constantly rebalanced. According to Little, metaphors have a tremendous influence on any evaluation of the BOP, depending on whether the thought is a replacement or an interaction metaphor. The author claims that using the BOP metaphor as an interaction metaphor reconstitutes the meaning of power and moves it from an agency-based to a structural-based notion. He advises using the metaphor of weighing scales to help this mental shift. Transformation is a simple and uncontroversial step to take, given the widespread usage of the general BOP. Despite its broad usages, the generic source has failed to elevate BOP as a core notion in the social sciences. Until recently, the phrase "*balance of power*" was primarily used in international politics. Ironically, only international politics is perceived as highly contested, while all other subjects are deemed non-controversial. The unipolar Middle East was considered as the hegemon when Nasser came to power, and China's strategic economic and military rise was also thought crucial. The Middle East BOP theory might explain Israel. As does Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society* (1977: 112). He contends that BOP is what allows other institutions that support international order to function. Bull thinks that BOP is one that formed and maintained the European international society of states. His research shows that other institutions play an important role in maintaining the power equilibrium. Because of this reciprocal reliance, BOP is closely related with much of the complexity in international relations that Bull's theory underlines. Bull's view of the BOP, on the other hand, is both more complicated and less apparent. His approach to the BOP is complicated by his distinction between an international society and an international system. In her dissertation, Stacie Goddard connects the concept of BOP to constructivist theories of legitimation and rhetorical coercion. In Theory of International Politics, Waltz (1979: 117) seeks to build and explain the basis for such a theory. Since no one can agree on what defines a BOP structure, he recognizes that

there is no agreement on the issue. So he wonders whether it is not futile to attempt to dispel the concept's ambiguity. His purpose is to build a model of BOP and he authored one of well acknowledged and contested works in the field, the concept of BOP. However, John J. Mearsheimer's claimed that the BOP is important in international politics. Mearsheimer makes it obvious that understanding international politics requires relying on the logic of BOP. He has a totally different perspective on BOP than Morgenthau, Bull, and Waltz, which puts him apart from them. In certain cases, major powers may go beyond zero-sum competition to a zone where collaboration is at least possible. It has a more complicated significance in international relations theory than is often recognized, he claims. Not only have detractors of the notion of BOP produced inadequate appraisals of the concept, but so have BOP theorists themselves, sometimes providing inaccurate or distorted interpretations of past assessments of the concept. The consequence has been an unintentional but pervasive tendency to underplay or oversimplify what others have said regarding the BOP. Schweller (2006), for example, links the notion of an international BOP back to the Renaissance, where it is understood as a metaphorical term that considers balancing action as a response "*motivated by a natural.* In his book *Politics Among Nations*, Hans J. Morgenthau stresses the need for balance in international affairs. It was inevitable, "he says (Morgenthau, 1973: 167). It's been almost fifty years since Morgenthau first published "*Politics Among Nations*," and over thirty years since he released the fifth and final edition. In this manner, it represents the Cold War. Although Morgenthau did not state it directly, it is clear that he intended to provide a wide framework for students of international politics. Morgenthau's attempts to construct a comprehensive theory were greeted with vehement hostility from many quarters, and his notion of the BOP in particular was often criticized as ahistorical, ambiguous, and nonsensical. Despite this, realists have argued that BOP is an essential element of international politics and that any comprehensive theory of international relations must include it. They shy away from Morgenthau's overbroad approach and adapt the idea to overcome its ambiguity and incoherence. Although realism has become more divided as a consequence of this distillation, Morgenthau's approach to BOP remains significantly broader than Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer's views (1986). As Martin Wright points out, the word "*balance of power*" has several meanings, owing to the concept's obscurity. As for the concept of BOP, Inis L. Claude thinks it has too many meanings. In terms of

international relations, he utters the primary idea is simple, yet difficult. And no one state could grow so strong that it threatened the security of other states, he argued. Given this, the following chapter should concentrate on the distribution of power prior to the Arab Spring.

CHAPTER III

The Power Distribution In The Middle East Since 1945:
A Historical Perspective

The concept of power was introduced in the previous chapter of this thesis to contextualize the shift in the power balance of the Middle East since the Arab Spring of 2011. Several scholars' concept of power in international relations was highlighted including Hans J. Morgenthau, Hedley Bull, Kenneth N. Waltz, John J. and Joseph Nye. In this thesis, Nye's concept of power is used as a conceptual framework to examine the shift in the balance of power in the Middle East. Nye's concept of power, which is divided into two forms: hard power and soft power, has also been used as a framework of inquiry in this thesis, as these two types of power are at the heart of the distribution of power in the Middle East. Chapter three of this thesis then will focus on the pre-Arab spring.

The international calculus of power shifted considerably, and this had a significant impact on events in the Middle East. With the decline of Britain and France as world powers, the emergence of the Arab states as independent states created prospects for the Middle East to achieve Independence. The US and the USSR rose to become superpowers as well as the extra regional actors, and the Middle East became a major battleground during the Cold War era. Fear and distrust led to the beginning of a Cold War in the international system that had been built on the basis of a bipolar power structure. Due to oil wealth, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the rise of Arab nationalist and Islamist organizations in the Middle East, these events have significantly influenced the power distribution in the Middle East. According to historian Albert Hourani, independence was achieved "*by manipulating political forces at home and abroad and by negotiating agreements that were mostly quiet despite occasional outbreaks of public unrest* (2013).

To better understand how the balance of power in the Middle East has changed since the Arab Spring of 2011, this chapter examines the historical period

leading up to the Arab Spring. It provides an insight into the important turning points as well as how the power was distributed prior to the Arab Spring in the Middle.

The Middle East in Post-Second World War Era

The Middle East has been one of the world's most insecure regions since WWII. The Middle East's politics was dominated by four conflicting yet overlapping. The Cold War was a power struggle between the US and the USSR during the time. Arab nationalists fought the last two imperialist powers, Britain and France. Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the struggle for Arab leadership. Mostly local, yet has worldwide political repercussions. The Middle East's pre-Arab spring dominance among regional and global players is due to its strategic position and oil wealth. Thus, allowing for regional power conflicts as well as global entities like the US and the USSR to compete for regional domination. Due to these transformations, the Middle East's character and new power balance have become increasingly prominent. Among the outstanding questions is how much the Middle East's power balance has evolved since 2011. What are the implications of power shifts? Is the Arab Spring only regional? While local political and economic factors had a role, substantial shifts came from outside influences, first from West European nations, then from the US and the USSR. Some changes were influenced by the military strength of the US and the USSR, but most were driven by the people's aspiration for democratic sovereignty over time. The Middle East is now going through one of the most significant political changes in its history. Power is now being redistributed, despite the USSR and the US being heavily involved in the region's flashpoints. A variety of causes have contributed to the new power imbalances in the Middle East, including the Arab Spring and the following breakdown of the Arab governmental system, as well as the ongoing civil wars. Given the region's post-war developments, a historical context is required. This thesis traces the present Middle Eastern power dynamics back to 1945.

The Arab League

The League of Arab States (LAS) is a group of Arab countries that have joined together to form a unitary state. It was founded on March 22, 1945, in Cairo, Egypt, following a process of emancipation between Arab states and previous

imperial powers, namely France and Great Britain, the League of Arab States (LAS), or simply the Arab League, was established (Schmolinsky 2000: 67). Issues surrounding post-war colonial geographical partitioning and the split of territories, as well as strong opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state on Palestinian territory, prompted the founding of the league. Though it's uncertain not whether Western influence had a role in the development of the Arab League, Arab nationalism was clearly a driving factor behind the organization's foundation. The Arab League served as an uniting element at a time when certain regional countries desired the establishment of an Arab state while others, most notably Saudi Arabia, expressed doubts about the idea (Schmolinsky 2000: 73).

Whilst the founding members of the Arab League pledged to deepen ties with, coordination, and collective security among Arab nations, no member of the organization was willing to cede a significant amount of sovereignty to the other members (Schlicht 2013: 320; Hassouna 1975: 3). As outlined by its functional structure, which is analogous to other international organizations, the organization is divided into three divisions: the Council, the Commission, and the General Secretariat. Each division is responsible for a certain role. The LAS presently has 22 members and has seen considerable institutional growth, which has included the development of specialized institutions for educational, health, and research purposes, among other things (Hassouna 1975: 11). In their resolution, they denounced the use of violence to settle member disagreements and authorized league offices to arbitrate such disputes, as well as those involving non-members. Signatories pledged to military cooperation; this agreement was reinforced in 1950 by a commitment by members to see an assault on any member state as an attack on all members, which was ratified in 1951. According to Arab tradition, the notion of an Arab united government founded on common culture and history, which is important to the Arab way of life, can be traced all the way back to the Islamic caliphates, which were formed by Mohammed's followers. A resistance to Ottoman authority and nineteenth-century efforts to impose Turkic culture and language on Arab populations resulted in the development of Pan Arabism, often known as Arab nationalism. A revolt against the Ottoman Empire headed by the Sharif of Mecca, in collaboration with British forces, took place during World War I in conjunction with British soldiers. In return for their help, Arabs were persuaded by British authorities

that they would be rewarded with the foundation of a sovereign state. The *Sykes picot agreement*, a separate Anglo-French pact made in 1916 that breached this concept by establishing spheres of influence for Arab countries, was a violation of this principle. The Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, vowed "full support" for Arab unity during World War II in a speech delivered at the Mansion House on May 11, 1941. Arab officials, encouraged by the news, have begun conversations regarding the formation of a pan-Arab union to bolster support for Palestinians in the region. The Alexandria Protocol, which outlined the goals of the Arab League and was signed in 1944, was a landmark document. Following World War II, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser rose to prominence as the foremost proponent of the pan-Arab concept in the region. When the British and French colonial empires fell, combined with the rise of a bipolar cold war, the power structure of the region was transformed. The inter-Arab competition, the geopolitical ramifications of Mideast oil, and the US' containment strategy against the USSR provided enough fodder for the newly created league to get off the ground. Under Pan-Arabism Nasser's leadership, Arab nationalism rose to unprecedented heights throughout the region. It was hailed as a success against Western imperialism and a paradigm for future Arab states after Nasser's 1952 ascension to power in the Arab world's first military coup. His reign was marked by a series of defeats for the cause of Pan-Arabism, despite his efforts. Despite the increase in the number of member countries, the fundamental weaknesses persisted, if not worsened. It is divided and seldom achieves consensus on controversial matters as a result of a variety of factors including varied interests, religious beliefs, varying degrees of political and economic power, and other imbalances. Disputes over territory claims, oil and water distribution issues, as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, all contribute to the region's failure to establish complete tranquillity (Schmolinsky 2000: 176). Additionally, each member promised to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the other members, and binding methods for resolving conflicts were not established as part of the agreement (Hassouna 1975, 97).

The United Arab Republic (UAR), a three-year political union between Egypt and Syria, was abolished after just three years in existence (1958-1961). Yemen's civil war, for example, began in 1962 and quickly grew into a fatal eight-year proxy conflict between Egyptian and Saudi-backed troops. Despite the fact that Nasser's

revolution promised unity, it ended up bringing about divisiveness and disintegration. The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1956 was possibly the most significant event of his time. In spite of this, the Arab League continues to be divided and dysfunctional, prompting some to doubt whether the organization will be relevant in its present form in the future. When it came to the 2003 Iraq War, the League was unable to coordinate its stance, in spite of achieving wide agreement in 2002 on the Saudi-sponsored Arab Peace Initiative, which tried to address the Arab-Israeli issue. The foundation of the Arab League elevates the notion of soft power, as advocated by Joseph Nye, to a new level of maturity.

A country's soft power is defined by Nye (2008) as consisting essentially of three resources: its culture (where it is appealing to others), its political ideals (where it lives them both at home and abroad), and its foreign policy (which includes its relations with other countries) (where it is seen as legitimate and morally authoritative). Arab countries have started to use extreme cultural and political influence techniques. According to the constructivist perspective, foreign policy is impacted by factors such as identity and interest. As a result, the Arab League was able to consolidate its position as a regional group simply because of its identity and interest, which affected cultural aspects and maybe political goals. Not only did the Arab League rise to regional dominance, but the balance of power changed away from the European occupation as well. Power began to be dispersed among regional actors as a result of this. When Egypt's Gamal Nasser came to power, the Arab League's drive became even more powerful than before. As a result, under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the renewed links that existed between Arabs and Arab governments were reinforced, instilling a strong feeling of pride and ownership among Arabs. Despite the fact that Arabs were regarded as backward and a hindrance to progress because of their religious ties to Islam, the Middle East began to improve economies and raise living standards through the development of national resources, land reform, the expansion of social services, universal education, and the emancipation of rights. However, the Arab League ideologies were as a result of Marxist, Communist, and socialist ideas. In addition, the Arab league's inception was a blend of soft and hard power. Throughout the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s, the Nasser regime served as an inspiration for coups. Because of the ramifications of these events, the Middle East seemed to have devolved into a bipolar society, with

Arabs and Israelis clearly pitted against one another. It was used as a forceful technique of gaining supremacy in the area after World War II.

The Emergence of Arab-Israeli Conflict

Both Arab and Jewish people believe that they have a common ancestor, according to traditional belief. Both groups are Semitic, and their languages are almost identical. As a result, the struggle between Arabs and Jews is one of brothers (Alroy, 1975). The root of everlasting warfare is the ownership of Palestine, which both sides claim as their homeland. Isaac and Ismael, according to tradition, were Abraham's sons. God's bond with Isaac and subsequent generations of Jews is confirmed in the Old Testament. According to the Koran, God promised Ismael that he and his progeny would triumph. As a result, the sacred writings seem to represent the essence of strife. The Jews were forced out of Palestine with the arrival of Christianity and have been dispersed ever since. They were marginalized, often scorned, mistreated, and murdered. Despite this, Jews played a significant influence in a variety of fields, including art, literature, science, and medicine, in a number of nations. Indeed, Jews looked to be liberated all throughout Europe in the early nineteenth century, with the exception of Russia. Non-Jewish communities admired and revered prominent Jews (Altman, 1979).

The Zionist Movement

The spirit of medieval prejudice permeated Germany and Russia in the final part of the nineteenth century. Ethnic cleansing influenced their thoughts in new ways. In 1882, an Odessa-based Jewish physician produced a pamphlet claiming that the only way for Jews to regain their dignity was to rebuild Palestine as a national home. Theodor Herzal published *Der Judenstadt* in 1886, which sparked the Zionist movement. The first Zionist conference was organized in 1897 under Herzl's leadership, with the goal of obtaining a home for Jews in Palestine governed by public law. While some of the world's most powerful governments proposed other places, Jews could only accept Mount Zion in Jerusalem. Following World War I, the British government issued the 'Balfour Declaration,' of 1917 which expressed

British support for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine as a way of acknowledging the Jewish people's contribution to the war effort. Without respect for the rights of the Arabs, it was planned to be constructed. During World War I, Sharif Hussein, the head of the Arab world, did not oppose the repatriation of Jews to their homeland of Palestine. *There is a place in Syria for both of us*," his son Feisal, who represented the Arab world at the Paris meeting, wrote to US Justice Felex Frankfurter. Indeed, neither can succeed without the other, in my opinion. Contrary to popular belief, Arabs have never been anti-Semitic to the level that they have been elsewhere in the globe. Anti-Semitism was historically a Christian viewpoint, with its roots in Christ's torture and execution. The Muslim Arabs and Jews had a lot in common when it came to their traditions and attitudes. In Palestine, the Arabs and the tiny Jewish minority had lived in peace and harmony. As a result, the Arabs were taken aback by the 'Balfour Declaration.' The fear of losing their homeland and nation as a result of the 'Balfour Declaration' signalled the beginning of anti-Jewish sentiment.

Change In The Arab Attitude

Allies offered pledges of independence to Arab leaders during WWI. Many Arabs anticipated that the stated conditions would also apply to the Palestinian territories, as part of a Greater Syria. The League of Nations Council handed the British Government a mandate in 1922, tasked with governing Palestine and executing the 'Balfour Declaration.' Approximately 85,000 Jews resided in Palestine at the time of the proclamation. A significant percentage of these people had resided in the country for millennia. For nearly a century, the Jewish people had been the minority. The Palestine Mandate handed to Britain covered the whole territory of Transjordan, including on the East and West Banks of the Jordan River. In 1922, the British established an emirate in Transjordan, which would eventually become Jordan, under the leadership of Emir (later King) Abdullah. As a result, the Arabs of Palestine were given autonomy over 80 percent of the assigned land of Palestine. Under the British mandate, Jewish immigration (albeit strictly controlled by authorities) expanded the community's population by a factor of ten. In reality, by 1947, it had risen to well over six lacs. Similarly, the Arab population rose from a

few thousand to over a million. Arab unrest has erupted in Palestine since 1922, sparked by the extreme Mufti of Jerusalem. Palestinians were outraged by Jewish immigration and property purchases. The Arabs believed that if the current pace of immigration continued, the Jews would soon outnumber them (Cairo, 1980). In 1937, a British Royal committee led by Lord Peel concluded that there was no chance of Arabs and Jews reconciling (Yapp 1995). It advocated for the division of Palestine into a Jewish state, the continuation of the mandate over Jerusalem, and the annexation of the rest of Palestine to Transjordan. The Jewish community seemed amenable to such a solution, while the Arab community did not. The conflict between Arabs and Jews was put on hold during World War II.

Formation of Israel

David Ben-Gurion, in his capacity as Prime Minister of Israel, made a speech on May 14, 1948, in which he declared the existence of the State of Israel. (Cleveland 2018). There has been no other subject in world politics that has stayed unsolved for as long as the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East since the establishment of the Jewish state. Since the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the recurrence of hostilities between Arabs and Jews has been a constant cause of concern for the people who live in this country. However, in order to comprehend the events that led to the establishment of a Jewish state, it is necessary to consider the chronology of events. The United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) investigated the Palestinian Question and suggested that Palestine be divided into two states, one for Jews and one for Arabs. It was in May 1948, just before the British mandate over Palestine was about to expire, that the United Nations enacted Resolution 181, popularly known as the Partition Resolution, which would partition Great Britain's former Palestinian authority into Jewish and Arab governments end. By a vote of 33 to 13 with ten abstentions, the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947. Jews saw General Assembly Resolution 181 as a monumental achievement because it established the international legality of their right to self-determination in their homeland and recognized Jewish freedom of self elsewhere. It was a momentous event, one that the Jewish leadership took advantage of even if they could not reach an agreement on the future of the Holy

City. No one, not even the Palestinians, not the Arab countries, had expressed support for the General Assembly's decision to divide the country. Since Article (10) of the United Nations Charter states that the General Assembly has the ability to advise, but not to enforce, its decisions, they did not consider Resolution 181 to have binding effect on the US.

In light of the notion on which partition was planned, as well as the manner in which it was separated, Arabs began to have reservations about the UN capacity to deal with such matters impartially and without prejudice. Palestinian territory was divided between the Arab state, which got 42.88 percent of the land, and the Jewish state, which was given 56.47 percent of the territory.

At the time of the state's creation, Arabs made up two-thirds of the population, and Jewish property ownership did not exceed 5.6 percent of the whole geographical region of Palestine. Although the Jewish population and Jewish property ownership provided sufficient reason for the Principle of Partition to be enacted, none of these factors was sufficient on their own. It was generally believed that the Palestine resolution would not get the required two-thirds majority, but successive postponements tipped the scales in favour of Zionists, and the resolution passed (Miller, 2013). It was often said that postponements were intended to utilize any and all methods possible to convince those countries who were intending to vote against division to reconsider their positions. According to the Jewish Chronicle:

"*I despise the coercive methods used by Zionists in this country, who have not shied away from using economic means to silence those who hold opposing viewpoints, and I despise attempts at character assassination against those who do not agree with them,*" said Arthur Hayes Sulzberger, the publisher of the *New York Times*, in a public statement (Leff, 2000).

In comparison to the Zionist Jews who had established themselves in the US and Great Britain, they were hopelessly outmatched. In the words of Steven L. Spiegel, Zionist pressure on the White House can be summarized as follows:

"*The Zionists and their allies deluged the White House with letters and telegrams, pleading for clear American support for a Jewish state within Palestine in order to exert influence over the United Nations Security Council.*" (Snetsinger, 1974).

While the UN was deliberating on the Arab-Jewish settlement in Palestine, Jewish leaders from around the world called on US President Harry S. Truman to play a more active role. Truman responded by saying that he wanted a positive vote, but did not want to take any specific steps to achieve it. In the case of Palestine, the policy disagreement stemmed from high-ranking officials trying to persuade President Truman of their opposing views on Palestinian partition. Opponents of partition claimed the following about the repercussions of a Jew homeland in Palestine:

(a) (a) Offending Arabs would harm American businesses in the area, especially oil companies, if a Jewish state developed.

(b) America may face an energy crisis.

(c) The US military needs access to the region, including access to the Saudi military facility at Dharan.

(d) If Palestine is partitioned, it will inextricably link to global politics.

(e) Palestine's separation will boost extremism throughout the Arab world.

(f) A Jewish state in Palestine was incompatible with the United Nations Charter and American values of self-determination.

(g) (g) It would exacerbate the already strained ties between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East.

(h) The Russians would use the chaos in Palestine if it were partitioned against the West.

(i) If the West backed a Jewish state in Palestine, Arabs would flee to Russia.

(j) The future Jewish state would be pro-Soviet (Truman, 1957).).

When the British ultimately departed the land of Palestine, the plan was to establish a temporary trusteeship. The proponent of this notion thought that the Trusteeship Council, and trusteeship in general, would prevent the development of a Jewish state, thus avoiding Arab alienation and potential conflict (Jabareen, 2007). .

During the years 1917-1945, the USSR had a limited role in international affairs, because it was preoccupied with consolidating its domestic political base, transforming its economy into a socialist model, and putting in place substantial defense arrangements to ensure the country's safety and security. After rising US participation in the political issues of the Arab world, the conclusion of World War II

reignited Soviet interest in the region (Buchanan, 2014). Prior to 1947, the Soviet position on the Palestine subject was diametrically opposed to that of the US. To Washington's surprise, the USSR also backed partition, putting themselves on the side of the Zionists. The Arabs were taken aback by the Soviet Union's sudden shift in attitude toward Jews. Among other things. The goal of the Soviet Union to limit British dominance in the East Mediterranean was a major factor in its support for the establishment of Israel in 1948.

Despite the growing Cold War, the US and the USSR stood on the same side against the British at the UN for the first time. Initially, the British did not want to hand up all of its control over Palestine to the United Nations. The British sought UN aid and guidance in determining a viable solution to the Palestine issue. However, the continuing escalation of Jewish violence against obligatory authority pushed the British government to refer the problem to the UN for resolution (Sela, 2013). Furthermore, as a result of the United Kingdom's departure from India in 1947, the geostrategic significance of Palestine was somewhat decreased. The British were exhausted by the war effort and annoyed by Arab Jewish criticism of her betrayal of both her country and her people, so they decided to call it quits. It proclaimed her non-participation in the enforcement of a settlement that was unacceptable to one of the two parties engaged in a frantic attempt to repair her broken image in the Arab world. The UNSCOP, which was in charge of putting the division plan into action, was to operate under the direction and with the help of the Security Council. Neither the Palestine Commission nor the Security Council were able to come up with a clear means to put the UN partition plan for Palestine into action. In relation to the worsening law and order situation in Palestine, it was also claimed that, although the British begged the UN not to meddle in Palestine before its final departure, it made no meaningful steps to halt the bloodshed. It was also anticipated that, as Britain prepared to depart, the Palestinian issue would no longer be of paramount concern to her.

On the 14th and 15th of May, 1948, when the UN was still discussing the topic of Palestine and no definitive solution had been reached, Britain formally proclaimed the end of its mandate in Palestine and removed the siege (El-Eini, 2004). At the same time, the Zionists invoked the UN Partition Resolution and declared Israel to be a Jewish state: After the founding of the state of Israel, the superpowers quickly

acknowledged its existence. To create the state of Israel, everyone favored the partition of Palestine for its own reasons. A favourable UN vote would not have been possible without their united support. Beyond her secret support, Soviet representative Andree A. Gromyko, then Deputy Foreign Minister, favoured partitioning Palestine and creating an independent Jewish state at the UN. (Gorodetsky, 2001)

On 14 May 1948, the Secretary General of the Arab League sent a cable to the Secretary General of the UN informing him of the Arab states' decision. The events that forced Arab leaders to act in Palestine were also discussed. The UN has shown that it is unable to prevent such a disaster. The establishment of the state of Israel was quickly followed by a broad Arab onslaught. Egypt's, Jordan's, and Iraq's combined troops. Syria and Lebanon have joined the Palestinian Arabs in their fight against Israel. Even before the actual course of the 1948 war, individual volunteers from the neighbouring nations had slipped into Palestine (Katz, 1973). . The Arabs were humiliated as a consequence of the conflict. The five Arab governments' regular armies were soundly crushed. The Arab governments were unable to combine military and political aspects into a complete plan due to a lack of unified leadership. The Arab involvement was motivated by genuine concern for the Palestinian Arabs, who were in desperate need of assistance. However, specific interests and intra-Arab conflicts influenced their choice.

Israelis, recognizing that their 'cherished state' was on the line, battled with all their might to win. Their capable political and military leadership, their combat experience fighting with various Western militant forces during WWII, a highly effective intelligence network, and moral and material support from Jews in the US and other Western powers were all major factors in Israel's victory in the 1948 war (Rai, 2014). The newly formed UN attempted a number of times to stop the Arab-Israeli military conflict, but failed to do so in a timely manner. Both sides disobeyed the ceasefire's limits throughout the truce period.

Following exploratory conversations with Arab and Israeli officials on the topic of resolving their conflict over Palestine, UN Mediator Count Folke Bemadotte offered a preliminary plan to resolve the matter who was later killed. Arabs were likewise opposed to his idea for a variety of reasons, but as the triumphant party,

Jewish attitudes had hardened. The 1949 Armistice Agreements put a stop to open hostilities between Israel and the Arab nations. To complete Bemadotte's unfinished mission, Ralph Bunche was selected as acting UN mediator. The new mediator was assisted in his peace-making efforts by the Conciliation Commission, which included officials from the US, France, and Turkey. On the Greek island of Rhodes, Ralph Bunche convened armistice talks between belligerents. There were four armistice agreements signed. Israel's relationship with Egypt. Between January and July 1949, Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria operated independently. The outcome of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war put Palestine's existence in jeopardy. Under the UN Partition Plan, Israel seized a larger portion of the land designated to the Arabs. The remaining Palestinian territories, known as the West Bank and Gaza Strip, were taken over by Transjordan and Egypt, respectively (Cleveland 2018). Following the acquisition of the West Bank by Iran-Jordan, the state's name was changed to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Yapp 1994).

The Arab governments came to help their Palestinian brethren, but they caused more damage than the UN General Assembly's Partition Resolution. On the map of West Asia, historical Palestine faded away. The Palestinians were no longer considered a people with a right to a country, but rather as refugees. Nearly a million Palestinians have fled their homes, farms, livelihoods, villages, towns, and nation as a result of the conflict. The conflict ended in 1949, but it opened the way for a succession of battles between Arabs and Israelis that have resulted in an ongoing misery for the Palestinian people. There have been numerous important implications since the founding of the Jew State in 1948. The ramifications of the founding of Israel in Palestine over the objections of the Palestinian Arab majority extended into a larger Arab Israeli conflict. The first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 War and second one in 1956 called the Suez War were two consequences of this disagreement, directly addressing the Palestine problem or land. The larger Arab Israeli friction remained an unsolved festering issue, the Arab nations viewing Israel as an illegitimate state. An uneasy peace has been maintained since 1948.

The plight of Palestinian refugees was further affected by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. By June 1949, the UN assessed the total refugee population at 940,000 from 369 Palestinian towns and villages (Rai, 2014). However, reports dispute on how many Palestinians really left (Schulze 1999: 16). Regardless of the exact

numbers, the fighting made a large number of Palestinians homeless. The solution to this challenge sparked greater debate between Arabs and Jews. The Jewish position was that Palestinians should be integrated into Arab governments, whereas the Arab position was that refugees should be allowed to return home (Schulze 1999: 16).The defeat of the Arabs had far-reaching ramifications as well. First and foremost, it highlighted the absence of common goals and cooperative efforts among the members of the so-called Arab League. However, and perhaps most crucially, the Arab loss had major internal ramifications. It 'delegitimizes the incumbent authority, resulting in revolutions, military coups, and political instability', according to the UN (Schulze 1999: 15). To provide an example, in Syria, the 1948 loss was referred to as a "*big catastrophe*" and a "personal failure" that was believed to be a "national disaster" (Freedman 1979: 259). This had a significant influence on subsequent conflicts. Another effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict was the reconfiguration of Israeli and Palestinian territories. For Israel, this was undoubtedly a favourable development, since the country gained 21 percent of its original area in comparison to the partition resolution limits. On the other hand, this may also be considered as a negative since it intensified hatred from Arabs who feel that Israel should not be allowed to have any territory at all.

Among other advantages, Transjordan gained sovereignty of the West Bank, while Egypt gained control of the Gaza Strip. It is apparent that the Arabs shared the Europeans' desire to expand their power and territory. In contrast, Palestine has lost all hope of building its own state due to the seizure of Arab or Israeli property (Schulze 1999: 15). Division remains a divisive topic among Palestinians, says the PA. Palestinians have been regarded as having undergone "extraordinary change" since 1948, becoming a "mobile population" (Freedman 1979: 218). Thus, it is critical to note that the founding of Israel in 1948 shifted power in the Middle East.

As a consequence, the Arab League lost its authority to unite the region. Israel utilized both military and economic might to influence Middle Eastern affairs. In fact, the Arab-Israeli conflict fuelled Arab nationalism, as well as Pan-Arabist, Bathist, and Nasserist groups, and Zionism, which had been growing steadily throughout the eighteenth century, with the objective of 'emancipation and self-determination.' These notions grew out of the region's "concepts of identity, nationhood, history, religion, and culture" at the time (Schulze 1999: 1).

Without Israel, Arab-Israeli conflicts may never have emerged, since the Jews may not have desired or had the organization and support to form a Jewish state. As a consequence of perceived "injustice against their brothers in Palestine" and close ties to Western imperialist aims in the region, Arab nationalist radicals may not have considered Israel as a threat (Hinchcliffe et al. 2001: 13). The Iraq War may have influenced British foreign policy, and hence UN Middle East policy. Because of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, both sides thought they had been promised Palestine by the British (Schulze 1999). The Suez War in 1956, however, saw the US and USSR assume positions in the region, bringing the British participation to a halt.

The Arab-Israeli Wars

The first Arab-Israeli War erupted the day after the declaration of the state of Israel on May 15th, 1948. The Arab-Israeli Problem is regarded as a rivalry over the territories of the ancestral Palestine. On May 14, 1948, Israel declared independence from the British mandate rule, igniting the Arab-Israeli conflict and resulting in the first instance of hostility (Schulze, 1999: 13). As a consequence of the intertwining of several international and intra-regional factors in 1948, an extremely difficult situation and a trigger for war were created, which culminated in the commencement of the conflict (Hurewiz 1952: 73). Despite Israel's victory in the war, the conflict had far-reaching repercussions, not just for regional politics in the region, but also for international relations, which are still visible today in the region. Because it is such a complex and multifaceted matter, it has been the subject of much historical and visual debate throughout history (Schulze 1999: 17).

It has grown steadily since the 19th century, both in terms of popularity and goals of achieving freedom and self-determination, based on ideas of identity and nationhood intertwined with history, geography and culture (Schulze 1999:1). Developed from the Jewish people's deep-rooted biblical heritage, Zionism's foundational premise of a proclaimed "land of Israel" was derived (Cohen 1987: 33). The Middle East's anti-Semitism and persecution of Jews fuelled contemporary political Zionism. Denial of Jewish nationhood, assimilation, and the Jewish people's existence as a people was essential. Modern Zionism also had a major influence on the Middle East's regional power dynamics. It culminated in the establishment of

Israel, and when Israel proclaimed independence from the British Empire in 1948, war broke out nearly immediately. A Jewish state in the area was rejected by Arab governments who said Palestinians had a right to self-determination. Israel cannot avoid defending itself against neighbouring attacks.

Hard power, according to Joseph Nye, is the capacity to accomplish goals by pressure or threats, or the "carrots and sticks" of international politics. History has ranked hard power according to population size, land area, natural resource availability and economic strength. Israel has to use military force to re-establish power in this aspect. Prior to Israel's creation, the Arab League had established a unipolar arrangement of dominance in the Middle East. However, Arabs and Israelis might share authority. It seems improbable that Israel would have been formed or entrenched without the current Zionist movement (Schulze 1999: 1). Due to religious and cultural links to the kingdom of Israel, Palestine was the evident geographical problem and the only practical and long-term answer for many Jews (Schulze 1999: 2). This spurred their willingness to struggle and seek for self-determination in Palestine throughout the twentieth century. The Holocaust also rekindled a long-dormant desire among Jews to establish a Jewish state (Bell 2001: 171). Since a consequence, without Zionists, the Arab-Israeli conflict may never have developed, as Jews may not have desired or had the necessary structure and backing to construct a Jewish state. Due to the same language, religion (Islam), and history of the Middle East, Arab nationalists sought political cooperation via the Arab League, founded in 1957. Bell (2001: 176) characterizes institutionalized Arab nationalism as a reaction to European colonization, which they thought was superfluous in achievement of their aims (Schulze 1999: 2-3). Arab leaders have always seen Western politicians as pro-Israel. They said that Israel was not just an adversary because of the "injustice against their brothers in Palestine," but also because of its strong relationship with Western imperialist ambitions in the area, especially in reference to petroleum reserves (Hinchcliffe et al. 2001: 13; Yapp 1994; Cleveland 2018). By supporting a Jewish state, the UN General Assembly only strengthened their anti-Western sentiments. Arab leaders couldn't see why they should suffer because to the Holocaust (Bell 2001: 172).

In this aspect, Arab nationalism aided the result of the 1948-49 conflict by uniting Arab countries against not just Zionism but also Western power. Also, the

Arab boycott of UNSCOP may have exacerbated the situation in the region. Efforts were undertaken to decrease tensions between Arabs and Jews in the region (Schulze 1999: 11). Another possible reason for the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict is the impact of British and subsequently US foreign policy towards the Middle East. Both factions (Zionists and Arab nationalists) 'believed that Palestine had been pledged to them' after WWI (Schulze 1999: 5). As a result of neither party knowing their position, British strategy was already inconsistent. After WWII, the UK became the protectorate of Palestine. According to the author, the situation changed dramatically due to the Holocaust against European Jews. Following a "wave of sympathy" felt for the oppressed Jews of Europe, Bell observed that Britain was under growing pressure to facilitate Jewish immigration into Palestine, particularly from the United States (2001: 171). The British were stuck between two opposing but understandable points of view. As a result, they chose to leave Palestine in 1948 and entrust the matter to the UN.

Unsurprisingly, other committees, including the UNSCOP, came to the same conclusion: both Jewish and Arab claims had "equal legitimacy" and the only viable solution to the problem was separating the two populations (Schulze 1999: 11). So the UNSCOP had to devise a division strategy. Because this was troublesome, both Jews and Arabs began arming themselves (Schulze 1999: 12). In rejecting the UN partition proposal, Palestinians said it was "inherently discriminatory" and "ignored Palestinian fundamental rights" (Hinchcliffe et al. 2001: 11).

The 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict had several notable ramifications. Clearly, the event's most visible outcomes were the destruction and mortality. The fighting claimed the lives of innocent civilians as well as troops on both sides. In the 2006 Deir Yassin massacre, 245 men, women, and children were massacred. In retaliation, Arabs killed 77 people in the same month, mostly Jewish physicians and nurses (Ovendale 1999: 135). The Palestinian refugee crisis arose as a result of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli conflict. The UN estimated 940,000 refugees from 369 Palestinian towns and villages in June 1949. The UN estimated the total refugee population at 940,000 in June 1949. The exact number of Palestinians who have gone is conflict due to differing reports (Schulze 1999: 16). Regardless of the precise number, the fact remains that the violence in Palestine has pushed many Palestinians to from their homes. However, the response has worsened existing tensions between Arabs and

Jews in the area. However, the Arab stance was that refugees should be allowed to return to their original settlement places (Schulze 1999: 16). The Arabs' defeat had many additional repercussions. Initially, it brought attention to the absence of common goals and cooperation efforts among the Arab League members. While the Arab states "all pursued their own ambitions" in exchange for land, Jordan's King Abdullah was already prepared to accept a Jewish state. As a result, the Arab world was split, with Palestine playing a mostly inactive role (Bell 2001:174).

The Arab loss, however, had "major internal ramifications," Bell (2001) claims. Unrest, military coups and political instability are all caused by delegitimizing the incumbent authority. Take Syria as an example, says Schulze (1999: 15). The 1948 loss was described as a "major tragedy," a "personal failure," and a "national disaster" (Freedman 1979: 259). As a consequence, subsequent wars suffered greatly. The Arab-Israeli war has also rearranged Israeli and Palestinian geographical borders. Contrary to the partition resolution's provisions, Israel gained 21% of its original land area. This might be perceived as a positive or bad depending on your perspective. Several Arab nations acquired land, including Transjordan in the West Bank and Egypt in the Gaza Strip. There is little doubt that the Arabs had the same desire to increase their power and territory as the Europeans. By seizing Arab and Israeli property, Palestine "lost all prospect of ever having its own state," the UN says (Schulze 1999: 15). "Palestinians are still split on the question of partition," the PA argues. Palestinians have been considered a migratory community as a result of their metamorphosis since 1948. (Freedman 1979: 218). Finally, after examining Zionism, Arab nationalism, and British foreign policy as the war's three principal origins and outcomes, we reach a conclusion. The 1948 Arab-Israeli war was a complex conflict with historic roots. The aftermath of the First and Second World Wars influenced British foreign policy, leading to the UN taking over the Palestine Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. This speech triggered riots among Jews and Arabs, triggering World War II. The ramifications of this struggle continue to wreak havoc on the Middle Eastern political scene. "Despite the lack of a serious military battle between Israel and its Arab neighbours since 1982," Hinchcliffe writes, "the absence of actual peace" has lasted till the end of the twentieth century. (Hinchcliffe).

The Ascension Of Gamal Abdul Nasser

In understanding the power distribution in the Middle East in the post-1945 era, it is imperative to analyze the salience of Arabism and the spill-over effects of the Free Officers *Coup d'état* in Egypt on the entire region. Egypt, the most populated nation in the Middle East, has been the target of political influence ever since the establishment of a Jewish state. It is strategically located, has a rich historical and cultural background, and has a national economy that is comparable to other African and West Asian nations in terms of development. Above all, it played an important role in the establishment of the Arab League. As a matter of fact, its history is closely intertwined with the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The country of Egypt has played a distinctive role in the Arab World in a number of ways, dating back to the beginning of the Nahda (rebirth) in the eighteenth century, in large part due to its geographic and economic position. The Arab World has been troubled by a number of inconsistencies and conflicts since the end of World War II, notably with the establishment of a Jewish state. As a result of the Pan-Arabism uprisings in Arab countries, the concept of political sovereignty has evolved. Some revolutionary efforts in many countries seem to have failed spectacularly. States with a lot of oil were concerned about the danger presented by former colonial masters. Despite the independence of Arab governments, the Arab-Israeli issue continues to be unresolved and without a clear leader or a clear course of action. Instead, as seen by the number of people who died in the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict, the region has experienced a great deal of turbulence in the recent decade. The notion of Arab unity seems to have lost its meaning and substance in recent years. Pan-Islamism, on the other hand, has been ineffective in filling the hole left by the Holocaust. Many Arab countries are experiencing increased social conflicts, while religious revival is becoming more widespread. This environment, on the other hand, has seen neither religious nor secular ideologies take hold.

On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers, under the leadership of Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, staged a coup d'état. The coup d'état in Egypt and the Arab world was a watershed moment in their respective histories. In the decades that followed, the revolutionary government embarked on a program of socioeconomic modernization that was founded on its ideological standpoint and was successful. Egypt's internal and international policies, as well as its economy and culture, were significantly

altered as a result of the revolutionaries' efforts. Politics and practices associated with the rebels were termed Nasserism in honor of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the key driving factor behind the July Revolution. For more than two decades, Nasser and Nasserism had a significant impact on events in Egypt and other Arab nations such as Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. The Egyptian struggle for liberation from the Western rule has a long and distinguished history of success. In 1956, Egypt became the first Arab nation to declare entire and unconditional independence from Western influence, despite the fact that it was the first Arab country to revolt against foreign rule. Under the strong leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's revolutionary president and leader of the Egyptian revolution, it was made possible. Egyptians' anti-Israeli attitudes were heightened as a result of the growth of anti-British sentiments in the country. "The loss of Palestine was a huge catastrophe with far-reaching ramifications for the very existence of Arab countries," wrote Erskine B. Childers (Childers, 1965). . It didn't take long for the ramifications of the defeat to become apparent in Egypt. During the protracted conflict with Israel, the Egyptian populace rapidly realized that their government's methods and military plan were inadequate. They were more hostile toward the former administration than the current administration. Which had neither succeeded in completely removing the British nor made any meaningful strides forward in the socio-economic sector, respectively. They had also come to realize that, despite the fact that Nokrashi Pasha was in command, it was King Farouk who was in actual control "Even in the face of strong opposition, it was decided to commit Egypt's troops to the Palestinian conflict.

A condition of instability characterized the government as a consequence of the disagreements between the King and the Parliament. The uncertainty and turmoil had reigned in Egypt, resulting in a climate that was conducive to the success of the Egyptian Revolution. After hearing tales of King Farouk's involvement in the Tianus affair, young army officers (free officers) who had been dreaming of revolution to overthrow imperialism, monarchy, and feudalism for a long time were spurred into a revolutionary frame of thinking by the events of that day. The Egyptian army and people were united in their determination to throw the blame on King Farouk (Bowen, 2012). Egypt's military coup against the incumbent administration was the result of all of these events coming together and compounding into a revolutionary upheaval, which began in January 2011. As a consequence of the revolution, the

Mohammad Ali dynasty in Egypt was brought to an end after 150 years of rule. A variety of variables led to the fact that the key architect of the revolution remained in the background for a period of time after the revolution began. Colonel General Naguib has been selected as the head of Egypt's armed forces (Hourani, 1995). The Egyptian people eventually came to see Nasser as the actual revolutionary hero of their country, despite the fact that Naguib had enormous popularity in Egypt on his own merits. An internal power struggle soon ensued between Naguib and Nasser, who had been designated as Deputy Prime Minister for the Interior at the time of the coup. As a consequence of the power struggle that occurred, Naguib resigned from his position. The situation in Egypt has deteriorated significantly now that Nasser was the undisputed ruler. Nasser had been a revolutionary for most of his life, and this fact had influenced every part of his worldview and method of approaching problems. He used strong measures in the region, threatening the interests of Western countries as well as Israel's national security and sovereignty. It was because of his daring, which no other Arab leader had dared to demonstrate in the past, that he gained the adoration of his people. Over time, it became clear that Western countries' notion that it would be simpler to influence troops than it would be to persuade the seasoned political officials of Farouk's administration was misplaced.

As a result of Nasser's accession to the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, the Middle East's established power structure was thrown into disarray. Although Nasser did not provide a fundamentally new ideological approach to the old political system, Robert McNamara (2004).) states that he did shift the power distribution and made it more difficult for the system to function. Examples include the Arab-Israeli rivalry, which developed into a source of contention in a manner comparable to Cold War ties between the United States and the Soviet Union. Apart from that, the anti-imperialist and anti-western beliefs of Nasser made sure the West, notably France and Britain, did not have a monopoly on power in the region since then.

The Suez Crisis, 1956

The early 1950s saw the dispute escalate, setting the scene for the 1956 Suez War. Unlike in 1948, when the Great Powers played a little role, this was not the case in 1956. One of the many ironies of this conflict was that, despite their tumultuous

history, Britain and Israel joined together to battle an Arab state that had long been linked with the former. Even traditional rivals in the region, Britain and France, found themselves on the same side. On the use of force to end the Suez Crisis, Washington differed with Paris and London and pushed hard to find a diplomatic solution. While grudgingly agreeing to undertake diplomatic preparations, Britain and France persisted with their military preparations. The three countries, namely the United Kingdom, France, and Israel, each had their own motives for fighting Egypt. Israel intended to gain strategic supremacy at the time of choice by launching a preemptive attack. The goal was to beat Egyptian military forces and breach the siege of the Eilat Port, not to seize Egyptian land. The growth of Egypt under Gamal Nasser's government was one of numerous political causes that set the way for the Suez War. Because of the precarious nature of Nasser's reign, he believed that neither his government nor Egypt's independence would be secure until Egypt assumed leadership of the Arab world. Throughout 1955, this manifested itself in the challenge to British interest in the region. Nasser was also concerned about Britain's tight ties with the two Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. The primary risks Israel saw were Palestinian incursions and a tripartite military cooperation involving Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Despite asymmetry in goals, Israel, Britain, and France had enough in common to work together against Nasser. Israel benefited from a protective aerial umbrella as well as international diplomatic backing. On October 29, 1956, the conflict started. The mechanized columns' blitzkrieg approach, along with total air supremacy, gave Israel a quick victory in only four days. To dislodge Egyptian soldiers in Sinai, Israel used an indirect approach tactic. The Egyptians, who were structured for positional defence and had a passive attitude, were easily circumvented and eventually crumbled. The capacity of Israel to assemble its full war-waging capabilities and hit the field on short notice proved to be a decisive advantage in effectively conducting the Suez War. One of the most notable aspects of the 1956 Suez War was that it was the consequence of a covert operation orchestrated by Britain, France, and Israel. The convergence of British, French, and Israeli preparations to invade Egypt was a critical element in the outbreak of this war. Nasser learnt important lessons from the humiliating setback. He vowed not to be led into another conflict unless Egypt and the Arabs had earned a decisive advantage via appropriate preparation and willing collaboration. In addition, Israel's political isolation in international forums had to be guaranteed. The start of this conflict, and

eventually its end, were governed by political compulsions. The Israelis had a clear and distinct goal, while Egypt's goal was relatively vague. The Israelis were able to accomplish a decisive victory because of excellent strategy, operational art, and leadership. The allies were instrumental in determining the war's fate. This war also opened the path for the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) for peacekeeping to be established. Another important aspect of this Suez Canal crisis was the US and Soviet.

Following the Second World War, the international system adopted a bipolar international order, which depicts a system dominated by two powers with equal capabilities. Historically, the traditional European balance of power between Britain and France has shifted to two non-European actors: the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). As a consequence, these two powers were at odds. Western Europe was a NATO ally, whilst Eastern and Central Europe was a Warsaw Treaty Organization ally. Due to the bipolarity of power and the massive strength gap between the two superpowers and the rest of the globe, European nations lost their freedom of movement. These changes were not limited to Europe, but occurred globally.

In this context, the Middle East region was not exempt from the effects of such power conflicts and politics. The establishment of Israel, as well as the quest of Arab states for independence, transformed the Middle East into a magnet for those seeking powers. Not only did the Arab-Wars proliferate, but the Middle East also became the focal point of tribal rivalries, sectarian clashes, authoritarianism, and a slew of other issues as well. The military and authoritarian methods of governing have taken hold in certain Arab nations. Some leaders chose to remain in the monarchy, while others chose to establish a parliamentary democracy. The situation was not conducive to democratic unity, much less to political power or national harmony; in some countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, for example, the multiparty political system provided a platform for the continuation of military rules. As a result of these historical inconsistencies, it was inevitable that the two superpowers would try to influence the politics of the region. As the power of France and Great Britain waned, the US and the Soviet Union rose in importance. It was believed that the US went into the Middle East for two primary reasons: oil and the containment of the Soviet Union, both of which were achieved. When it comes to the

first item, oil, it was initially an economic concern, but with the advent of the cold war, it also gained importance as part of a broader political-military strategy. In order to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence into Middle Eastern countries, US policy has been focused on this goal since 1945.

As a result of these efforts, the US defended Turkey against Soviet pressure to subvert its independence, and put pressure on the Soviet Union to withdraw from northern Iran, buttressed or replaced Britain which began to decline and attempted to win the cooperation of Arabs, Jews, as well as Turkish and Iranian leaders, in "denying" the Soviets control of the Middle East. A defensive approach, according to the American viewpoint. A part of the free world, the Middle East was regarded to be a part of it. In the event of assault or subversion, its citizens were entitled to protection and support. Aside from that, they controlled what President Eisenhower referred to as the world's most critical strategic sector, and it was clear that if it fell into Soviet hands, the world's power balance would be threatened, as would the security of the Western world. As far as American strategy was concerned, territory was important for two primary reasons: it provided strategic bases for the global nuclear deterrent; and also it contained the world's largest oil reserves, which were essential to the West in both peace and war, as well as the world's most important natural resource, coal.

Another problem to address is the USSR's entry into the Middle East after WWII, which may not be read only in terms of the world power balance and the Soviet Union's rivalry with the US. As a consequence, it seeks to minimize US influence. Unlike in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union did not try to expand its influence into neighboring countries, nor did it try to establish a great power position in the eastern Mediterranean or the Middle East, both of which failed. Throughout history, the Russian Empire has attempted to create and defend strategic interests in its struggle against other countries. This has always been true (Smolansky, 1965). The Russian military has been working hard to keep control of the Black Sea, to keep the Turkish Straits, which serve as the gateway to its homeland, secure, and to prevent assaults on Russian security from nations abutting Russia's southern frontiers. When looking for friendly governments that would collaborate closely with socialist nations, the Soviet Union sought positions of dominance that would enable it to exert near-total control over all subjects essential to its objectives. While the US

prioritized the Middle East in the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union's strategy and execution in the area were superior. The Soviets used a rising Arab nationalism and Arabs' distrust of the West to accomplish their goals (Smolansky, 1965). Rather than backing traditional Western regimes, they supported Arab governments bent to changing their society. Their unequivocal support for Palestinian and Arab viewpoints during the conflict with Israel earned them significant popularity across the Arab world, causing embarrassment for Israel's main backer, the US.

Response to Abdel Nasser's demand for vast numbers of modern weaponry puts us in a position to achieve this goal in the near future. It wasn't until 1955 that the Soviet Union was able to completely overthrow the Western weapons monopoly in Egypt, so establishing itself as Egypt's primary foreign force as well as the most powerful and important government in the area. The Syrian Arab Republic has been plagued by instability for decades, and by assuming the role of weapons supplier and protector, the United States has established a position of power that has weathered several changes in the country's international standing, as well as changes in its internal regime. Assad's regime has been wracked by insecurity for decades. The Soviet Union used a strategy similar to that of the US in 1956 to derail the Anglo-French enterprise, but the Soviet Union reaped much more benefits from the resulting decline in the reputation and power of the United Kingdom and France than did the US. The Syrian crisis of 1957 and the Iraqi revolution of 1958, both of which occurred in Arab nations, both contributed to the development of Soviet power. Similarly to their participation in a ceremony to honour the completion of the first stage of Egypt's high dam at Aswan in May 1964, Khrushchev and Nasser's appearance at the celebration functioned as a signal of the Soviet Union's position as a friend and supporter of Arab hopes for a brighter future. Egypt has been receiving large-scale assistance from the US since the early 1960s, mostly via the food-for-peace project, which has been in place since that time. The emblem of the US' approach in this respect, on the other hand, was not a massive concrete edifice, but rather a little concrete structure. In making these measures, the Soviet Union was attempting to establish some early positions at a time when the Western nations were exhausted, unsure of themselves, and eager to collaborate with the Soviet Union in negotiating peace treaties in Europe and other parts of the world. When the effort

failed, his successors found themselves in the midst of an Arab Middle East that had been engineered against them by the time they took over power.

In the early twentieth century, Greece and Turkey were both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Islamic Republic of Iran was ready to make peace with the US and other Western countries after a stormy period under Mohamed Mosaddeq that revealed the limits of anti-Western nationalism as well as the fragility of Soviet influence. They were in talks with Egypt on how to include the Arab states into the wider regional military structure. Eventually, they reached an agreement. As part of a new military alliance of nations from the Northern Tier—that is, those countries that were most closely affiliated with the Soviet Union—the US and Great Britain were discussing with Egypt about how to include the Arab states in the wider regional security structure. Aside from the fact that the US controlled the Mediterranean Sea, the US possessed strategic air power that had targets in the Soviet Union and had bases in numerous Middle Eastern countries (the Sixth Fleet) which was stationed in the Persian Gulf. In the Persian Gulf, the US and Britain controlled the large bulk of the oil industry, which they safeguarded with their armed forces and special relationships to the governments of the nations in the region. Whether the Soviet authorities sought to dominate or grab control of the Middle East was a moot matter when it came to putting their plans in place. Specifically, they were concerned with doing anything to change the prevailing situation of US supremacy in order to protect their own security, to enhance Soviet influence while concurrently lowering American influence, and to tip the global balance in their favour. In 1956, the Soviet Union threatened nuclear annihilation and stressed the USSR's primary security interest in the countries on its southern borders, and tensions over Syria in 1957, it was difficult to see the possibility of neighbourly detente between the two countries.

The Arab-Israeli War, 1967

The 1956 Suez War was the outcome of meticulous preparation, but the 1967 Six Day War was the result of a crisis spiral. It was called a pre-emptive war; an unintentional conflict. Nasser resolutely refused to be lured into a conflict with Israel for 10 years. He now seems to be challenging Israel to a duel, despite the fact that,

according to most observers, he neither intended nor anticipated a conflict to occur. It was his attempt at brinkmanship that backfired. Coincidental events in early 1967, on the other hand, laid the scene for the start of the 'Six Day War' in early June 1967. Many reasons contributed to the current crisis, the most important of which is the radicalization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel gained near-total tactical surprise thanks to a great preventative air attack. Aside from that, the Egyptian Army felt confident in its ability to engage the Israeli Defence Forces in the event of a showdown. The remilitarization of Sinai, along with Soviet propaganda about an expected Israeli attack, was enough to ignite the conflict. Inter-Arab tensions were the primary element in precipitating the crises that led to the Six Day War (Gerges, 2018). . The Israeli military command aimed to accomplish a number of objectives, including maintaining surprise, dealing with a significant Egyptian build-up in Sinai by launching a pre-emptive attack, and fighting a short intensive battle with a narrow scope. Because Israel took the initiative, they were able to focus on one front at a time, first in Sinai and then the Golan Heights. This political smoke screen was particularly successful in collecting world support by concealing their plans in the guise of a reaction to the Arab onslaught. Israeli commanders used manoeuvre warfare. Egyptian fortifications were quickly turned and soldiers routed in the process. Arab leadership was outperformed in both the strategic and tactical aspects of the conflict. The Egyptians squandered the chance to attack first due to their defensive mind-set and lethargic attitude.

The significance of the 1967 War in terms of politics was enormous. Israel proved that it was not only capable, but also willing, to launch strategic attacks that may tip the regional balance in its favor. Egypt and Syria were humiliated and learned tactical lessons in preparation for future confrontations. Despite a resounding victory, Israel was unable to achieve peace. External pressure, along with Arab stubbornness, cleared the way for further confrontations in the area. The 'War of Attrition' lasted from March 1969 until August 1970, as a consequence of the issues that the Arab world faced as a result of the Six-Day War. Not only had Israel achieved a tremendous military triumph, but it had also taken control of significant swaths of Arab country, including the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and the Sinai Peninsula (Hammel, 2020). .

The 1967 Khartoum Conference And Its Aftermath

In July 1967, a gathering of Arab leaders met in Cairo to discuss the aftermath of their military defeat. Algerian President Boumedienne has joined the argument. They couldn't agree on what to do next in the existing situation. Jordan's King Hussain was the first Arab king to show realism. He used the opportunity to organize an early Arab summit, asking them to take a more moderate and flexible response to the changing circumstances. He thought the Arabs couldn't afford to take a stand now. He urged Nasser and other Arab leaders to pursue a peaceful political settlement. Nasser met with Syrian President Nureddin al-Attasi and Iraqi President Abdel Rahman Arif in Cairo in July. President Boumedienne and Ismail al-Azhari. King Hussain was not invited to the Sudanese Supreme Council of State sessions. Most likely, his easy-going temperament and pro-Western position would have offended the hardliners. Due to the divide between hardliners and moderates, his efforts to organize an early summit and a coordinated Arab approach failed. President al-Attasi and Boumedienne, together with PLO Chairman Ahmad Shukairi, were adamantly opposed to any political solution aimed at reclaiming lost territory during the six-day conflict. Their advice was to use guerrilla tactics to surprise the enemy and force it to surrender the captured Arab areas. They vehemently opposed any relaxation of the present oil embargo and economic boycott of the US, UK, and other pro-Israel countries. Sudanese President Ismail al-Azhari requested a summit meeting in favour of Hussain, which was held in Khartoum at the end of August. A grateful Nasser to King Hussein, Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohd Riad said after the war: Nasser admired King Hussein of Jordan's support throughout the conflict, which lost him the whole West Bank due to inadequate manpower and lack of aerial protection. On his route to the UN, he stopped in Cairo to see the King and informed him Egypt was eager to share anything it had with Jordan, including the last loaf of bread. Despite the absence of Syria and Algeria owing to their militant posture, the Khartoum summit was a mixed success.

In addition to discussing post-ceasefire political developments, the meeting's agenda included assessing Arab shortcomings and formulating a long-term action plan. After four days of frantic effort, debate, and discussion, Arab leaders finally agreed on various issues. They decided to keep the non-military campaign against Israel continuing, lift the oil embargo on the West, and establish a 140 million pound

Arab fund to aid the war-torn economies of the UAE and Jordan (Watt, 1967). The summit also stressed the need for internal and diplomatic cooperation to end invasion consequences and remove aggressor soldiers from Arab land. As a result of the Conference, the Palestinian people's rights would be honoured in their nations, taking into consideration the wider Arab sentiment (Elmamuwaldi, 2008). The September 1, 1967 resolutions marked a change in Arab moderates' views toward realism.

Egypt had severed relations with the US before the Khartoum Conference. Nasser did not ask other Arab nations, especially those close to Washington, to follow suit. With this strategy, Nasser sought to keep the Arab door open to discussions with the US, as only the US could compel Israel to negotiate. Assuring Western support for the Arab cause and encouraging the UN Security Council to address the Arab-Israeli problem, King Hussein visited Bonn, Paris and Washington. He stated the Arabs were ready to provide "a new and constructive mind-set" and "a huge amount." The June war necessitated resolving the current problem. Without recognizing Israel or signing official peace treaties with her, the Khartoum Conference enabled moderate Arab leaders to seek a political settlement and make substantial sacrifices in return for their captured countries.

Pro-Arab states controlled the UN's two key organs; i.e. General Assembly and the Security Council, indicating a change in Arab sentiments. But moderate Arab leaders, particularly those from oil-producing states, rejected the Iraqi Plan's deterrent tactics. In mid-August, before the Khartoum Conference, Yugoslavian President Josef Broz Tito visited Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad. When engaging with Arab leaders, he emphasized the necessity for a political settlement. After his peacekeeping duties. President Tito provided suggestions in the shape of a plan. It was rejected, but it did succeed in changing Cairo's stance, as shown in the Khartoum summit, and it served as a starting point for political settlement within the UN system (Elmamuwaldi, 2008). Clashes occurred along the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli cease-fire lines and later a major occurrence, the fight of Karamah, near the Jordan River on March 21, 1968, boosted the prestige and credibility of *Al-Fatah* in particular. The Fedayeen's bravery in their first battle with powerful, well-trained armed forces had strengthened *Al-Fatah* among Palestinians and Arabs. *Al-Fatah* commandos and Jordanian troops inflicted a major blow to the Israeli offensive, forcing them to flee. It is important not to disregard the Palestinian resistance

movement in any endeavour to reconcile the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria backed *Al-Fatah* and other lesser guerrilla groups, while Jordan became the major site of armed operations against Israel over time. They were convinced that guerrilla efforts against Israel were important to keep Palestinians alive and divert public attention away from their plight following the June fighting. Attacks by Fedayeen have hurt Palestinian organization's more than helped them. For example, The September 1970 hijackings gave King Hussain, who had permitted the gang to set up shop in Jordan, an excuse to attack them and win worldwide support for his efforts (Jordan, 1970).

The Role of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

After the Arab defeat in 1967, it became clear that conventional armies alone could not match Israel's military capabilities. The Arab world's military power was seen as the key to reclaiming Palestine by Palestinian refugees until 1967. After the six-day battle, they woke up. Their faith in official Arab leadership and ceremonial state and Arab League decisions on Palestine was shattered. To achieve self-determination and national recognition, Palestinians felt they had to act alone. After the 1967 war, Palestinian diaspora resistance grew. The Arab defeat freed the Palestinians from Arab bureaucracy and allowed them to start a revolutionary struggle for their homeland's liberation. Because it was controlled by Egypt, the PLO's aims and objectives were not established until the 1967 battle. "Personal Learning" (PLO) `that is why the Arab League and especially Egypt decided on the country's policies and infrastructure. "Shukairi's capacity to properly command the organization was questioned after the Battle of Karamah" (Becker, 2014). Following the resignation of the PLO's prior leadership, Yahia Hamuda was appointed temporary chairman. When the Fourth PNC convened in Cairo in July 1968, the members picked *Al-Fatah Harkat Al-Tahrir Al Falistini* - the Palestinian Liberation Movement. The PLO's principal purpose, strategy, and tactics changed dramatically when *Al-Fatah*, commanded by the charismatic Yasser Arafat, captured it. At the sixth PNC summit in Cairo in February 1969.

Yasser Arafat has been chosen as the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). PLO quickly developed becoming a focal point for a number of commando organizations that regrouped and changed leadership. While each

Fedayeen organization maintained its own identity, there were certain disparities in their approaches to achieving the PLO's objectives in terms of ideology and methodology. There are other Arab-sponsored factions, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and two pro-Syrian As Saqa and pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Fronts (ALF). *Al-Fatah*, a guerrilla army modeled by Chinese and North Vietnamese models, was the PLO's most powerful and formidable force. It benefited from the backing of Arab conservative governments at the time (Becker, 2014). Other radical groups, such as the PFLP and the PFLP-GC, employed worldwide violence to further their goals. Regular aircraft hijackings kept the Palestine issue alive, resulting in major Israeli retaliation attacks on targets across the world. *Al-Fatah* and other like-minded organizations condemned such terrorist attacks, but they were complicit in them since the guilty factions were members of the PLC. It was neither the PLO as a whole, nor any of its individual organizations, that were willing to accept a political solution to the Palestinian plight. Their actions have sometimes been detrimental to the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) efforts to violate the August 1970 truce triggered the Jordanian civil war the following year, which forced the PLO out. After 1970, Lebanon was used as a staging ground for PI's military operations against Israel. However, Yasser Arafat's leadership is under question.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was successful in drawing international attention to the Palestine issue. The nations of the Third World were the first to express concern about the plight of the Palestinians. In September 1969, an Islamic summit meeting welcomed members from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and recognized Palestinian national rights. Non-aligned states recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate Palestinian representation in 1973. Because they couldn't ignore it, the US and the Soviet Union were aware of the PLO. Following the June war, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) demonstrated its willingness to resist any Arab-Israeli peace plan that did not include it. Egypt, a founding member of the Arab League, has always said that the Palestinian problem dominates its foreign policy toward Israel. The Egyptian and Jordanian governments were prepared to accept an Israeli final peace agreement based on UN Resolution 242, which described the Palestinian

position as a refugee problem, shortly after the 1967 war. Israel's lost lands were their primary goal, and they were unconcerned about the fate of Palestinian territories. The moderate posture of activists in Syria, Algeria, and Palestine was blasted, with activists in these countries calling for more militant policies and tactics against Israel, including guerrilla warfare. Syria and Algeria supported Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait in their opposition to any resolution, including Resolution 242, which did not recognise Palestinian national rights, including those of the Palestinian people themselves. It generated a heated discussion among Arabs over whether or not to sign the deal. Egypt and Jordan have revised their positions, while Israel's posture has remained unchanged. Although moderate Arab officials welcomed Rogers' offer, Israel turned it down for a variety of reasons.

The Yom Kippur War, 1973

The Yom Kippur War was an Arab coalition's attempt to destroy Israel by breaching its security concept. The end of the Six-Day War was the catalyst for the 1973 War. President Sadat concluded, as part of his review of the 1967 setback, that a limited military action was critical to a satisfactory resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In light of the internal scenario, which was characterized by popular unrest and economic collapse, war was also a desperate choice for Sadat. The planned military operation would be carried out simultaneously on the Sinai and Golan fronts. The Egyptian Syrian strategy was to rely heavily on surprise. As a result, the deception tactic was an important part of the broader effort to deceive Israeli intelligence and early warning systems. This war's goals and objectives were modest and achievable (Safran, 1977).

The Arabs were the ones who launched a huge opening attack this time. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan worked in perfect harmony, and the potential of other Arab countries was considered a backup (Safran, 1977). . The Soviets were supposed to equal Israel's air supremacy by supplying planes and missiles. The Yom Kippur war was a watershed moment in the dramatic shift in the balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa. The loss required Israel to assess its political and strategic situation, establish the precise political objectives that would be pursued, and devise a military strategy that would be effective. As a result of the Yom Kippur War,

which confronted Israel with a host of difficulties pertaining to her long-term security, Israel's position on the Arab-Israeli conflict was severely undermined. A peaceful conclusion to the Arab-Israeli conflict was also made possible as a result of this development. The war showed Israel's failures and deficiencies in contrast to regular military standards, and the country needed to fix these flaws and draw the proper lessons about combat doctrines, tactics, and performance in order to prevent recurrences and, perhaps, another catastrophic loss. As a consequence, the severity of the rivalry throughout these centuries was lowered, enabling the Arabs to make significant advances in terms of cementing their authority to justify their existence (Safran, 1977.

A Glance Of The Middle East In The Cold War Era

Despite the end of the Cold War over three decades ago, its legacy continues to influence the Middle East. Intense competition between superpowers emerged when most Arab states were liberated from European colonization, and it is now fundamental to understanding the region. Except for Syria and Lebanon, Most former European colonial possessions became independent Arab republics between 1946 and 1962, including almost all former European colonial possessions in Africa. In 1971, Kerr published his findings on the subject. The newly formed Arab nations had distinct security, political and economic requirements as they strove to achieve independence from their respective Arab countries. The bulk of Arab nations feared European colonial revanchists. Some commentators saw the creation of Israel as a kind of colonialism. Many nations, particularly those without significant oil reserves, like Syria, faced economic challenges and sought external aid to overcome them (Lynch, 2017). Both the US and the USSR saw this burgeoning Arab milieu as a fertile field for competing global ambitions. During WWII, the superpowers fought for Arab allies to gain a foothold in the region and thereby restrict their adversary's dark ambitions. The modern Middle East arose from the convergence of two factors: the necessity for outside aid by newly independent Arab states and the availability of such support from the US and the USSR. While transitioning from colonial vassals to sovereign states, Arab countries sought and received superpower help, which they warmly embraced. To keep their regimes stable, conservative monarchs like Jordan

and Saudi Arabia allied themselves with the US. Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt (until 1978) cooperated with the Soviet Union to defend their positions (Primakov, 2009).

In the 1950s, Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser tried to reject superpower pressure by not aligning with the US (Primakov, 2009). Even Putin saw this could not be continued and tied his country to the USSR. Non-Arab states had a part in the Cold War, although were not as intensely contested by the superpowers as Arab governments. They are now solidly in the camp of the US (Cohen 2013). With the start of the Cold War and the aspirations of independent Arab governments for security and economic development, the area was forced to resemble the bipolar structure of the world order. This was shown by the Arab-Israeli Cold War, which was a mirror image of the global superpower struggle. A split developed between the two Arab camps, with Egypt's Nasser leading the Soviet-backed Arab nationalism camp, while the more conventional US-backed camp headed by Saudi Arabia and Jordan was on the other side of the divide. After the end of the Cold War, a governmental system in the Middle East developed that lasted from the 1940s until the Soviet Union was defeated in the early 1990s, resulting in the establishment of the Islamic State. When this structure came crashing down, the resulting dislocations served as the finest illustration of how shifts in geopolitics at the global level have resulted in the recent struggle for power in the Middle East.

The Collapse of the Cold War Regional Order

Transitioning from one political era to another is never something easy. Before the Soviet Union official disintegration in 1991, Sadat shocked the Arab and Western worlds by visiting Jerusalem in 1977. (Lynch, 2017). A 1978 peace treaty with Israel destroyed Egypt's decades-long relationship with the USSR and put it in the US camp. Iran, a close ally of the US, had an Islamic revolution in 1979. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, testing the regional order's endurance as the Soviet Union imploded. (Barzegar, 2013). Despite the fact that these events shook the Middle East's Cold War-era regional order, the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 was the most profound geopolitical shock. This momentous event had several implications that rocked the whole region. First, all allies of either superpower got a strategic haircut. Historically, the US and the USSR saw partnerships as tactics of

war and containment. After the fall of the USSR, this strategic imperative ceased to exist. As a result of its reliance on Persian Gulf oil and gas, as well as its ties to Israel, the Middle East remained essential to the US even after the Cold War ended. Two decades later, the Obama administration's pivot to Asia was inspired by this. Second, former Soviet allies had to pay for their conduct (Cohen, 2013).

Former Soviet allies like Syria (Iraq, Libya, S. Yemen) were forced to restructure their economic, political, and international policies. This is not a coincidence. Syria, for example, sought to privatize its economy once the Soviet Union stopped supplying it. It was not as straightforward as many imagined for Syrian President Bashar Assad to go from a planned economy to a more market-oriented model. This, along with the failure to liberalize the political system, fuelled the 2011 Syrian uprising that ended in civil war. The Cold War ended when Yemen's north and south united. (Dunbar, 1992). While the Soviet Union was withdrawing its support for South Yemen, Salim al-Bidh and Ali Abdullah Saleh of the North began talks on unification, which were achieved in 1990 after years of negotiations (Dunbar, 1992).

According to Charles Dunbar, the US ambassador to Saana at the time, the South felt bound to strike the best agreement conceivable with the North (Dunbar, 1992). The conclusion of the Cold War had a huge impact on former Soviet allies' foreign policy. Saudi Arabia and Israel, both American friends, benefited from the alliance's security assurances. South Yemen lost its communist character as well as its former Soviet allies. The end of the Cold War also shifted regional power. Since losing control over the Golan Heights to Israel in the 1967 war, Syria has sought to regain it. Syria's Cold War-era impact on Israel faded after the conclusion of the Cold War. Syria, Iraq, and Libya also lost the Cold War superpower engine that allowed them to challenge the regional status quo. Each ex-Soviet ally reacted differently to the loss of Soviet support. Yemen is one country. Iraq attacked Kuwait without hesitation under Saddam Hussein, expecting the US would lose interest in regional politics once the Cold War ended. (Global Research, 2012).

He claimed to have received this information from US Ambassador April Glaspie, who had previously said that the US had no position on Iraq's increasing confrontation with Kuwait only days before the invasion. Syria, much to the

displeasure of its Arab neighbours, responded to the loss of its Soviet benefactor by strengthening its relations with Iran (Goodarzi, 2009). Not only did Syria respond, but other countries did as well. Damascus' ties to Hezbollah in Lebanon, along with its opposition to perceived American hegemonic objectives in the region, resulted in the formation of a regional resistance front against American hegemony (Goodarzi, 2009). In the process, a new power structure in the region was established, separating governments such as Israel from others such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt from an Iranian-led revisionist front that included Hezbollah and Hamas. (Global Research, 2012).

Road To Camp David Accords, 1978-79

Egypt's foreign policy saw significant changes when Anwar el Sadat came to office in 1970. Under Nasser, Egypt was a close ally of the Soviet Union, but Sadat gradually steered Egypt away from its tight Soviet ties and toward becoming a close friend of the US. From leading the Arab world in its confrontation with Israel (Sadat ended the armed conflict and reached a peace accord with Israel in stages, ultimately resulting in the Camp David pacts of 1978-1979), to leading the Arab world in its clash with Israel (Sadat ended the armed conflict and reached a peace treaty with Israel in stages, culminating in the Camp David agreements of 1978-1979 Egypt went from being the most powerful Arab nation under Nasser to being isolated and outcast under Sadat. These big shifts occurred in only a few years. Accords of Camp David (September 1978) were signed by Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin and confirmed by the Egyptian and Israeli authorities. The Camp David Accord was founded on UN Resolutions 242 and 338 from 1967 and 1973, respectively. The Camp David Accords were an attempt to establish a Palestinian state that included the following provisions:

(a) Full autonomy for residents of the occupied territory.
(b) Israeli military and civilian troops must withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
(c) The Palestinian people must be recognized as a distinct political entity with the ability to decide their own destiny.
(d) Palestinians were to participate in future discussions on an equal footing.

(e) The ultimate status of the West Bank and Gaza was to be decided by a vote of the people's elected representatives.

The Palestinian people's legitimate rights were addressed in the Camp David Accords However, the agreement's autonomy plan did not comply with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which called for Israel's total departure from all occupied territories. It explicitly eliminated the Palestine Liberation Organization as the only legal representation of the Palestinian people. In drawing a comparison and underscore how power has shifted, it is therefore vital to shed light on the power dynamics of the Middle East in post Arab Spring given that this research has highlighted the distribution of power in pre-Arab spring

CHAPTER IV

The Repercussions of 2011 Arab Spring:

Towards A New Middle East?

The previous part of this thesis examined the Middle East's post-war historical trajectories and power distribution. There were four different but interconnected wars in the Middle East, it proposed. Beginning with the Jewish founding of Israel and the long-running Arab-Israeli war. Second, the Cold War was a power struggle between the US and the USSR, with the Middle East acting as a theatre for proxy warfare. Third, Arab nationalists oppose the region's two surviving imperialist countries, Britain and France. Finally, Arab nations fought for dominance and leadership. Due to its geostrategic significance, oil has always been a cause of long-term power struggles. Due to these factors, the Middle East has long been one of the world's most unsafe regions. This chapter will address the thesis's main research question: To what extent has the balance of power in the Middle East region shifted towards Israel since the 2011 Arab protests? This chapter argues that power has changed in favour of Israel due many implications. Trump's Middle East policy, Abdel Fattah al- Sisi's ouster of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, and the East-Med project, with Turkey's control progressively waning.

The Arab Spring: Towards A New Middle East?

The Arab Spring of 2011 stunned the whole globe when a volcano of human suffering burst in widespread upheavals in the Middle East. The Middle East is a complex and strategically contentious region where ethno-religious conflicts and other forms of struggle have been a frequent occurrence, at least since the foundation of a Jewish state. Due to their petty ideological and political differences, these Arab states are not keeping amicable relations with one another. There is a risk of major conflict in the region every five to eight years on average. This thesis recalls the ongoing struggle between Israel and the Palestinians, the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War, Gulf War I and II, and other events between 1991 and 2003. These conflicts have far-reaching consequences throughout the Middle East. Despite the fact that the

potential for Arab uprising existed long before Tunisian street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi's act of self-immolation in defence of his dignity sparked rumblings of discontent throughout the region, the Arab Spring was not anticipated. Not a single social scientist or political analyst in the West, much alone in the Arab world, had predicted these events. They were not expected by any Western or Arab intelligence agency (Gause 2011). In fact, even long-time radicals who participated in these demonstrations do not seem to have expected them. When Bouazizi broke through the dread cocoon, everyone was taken aback. With several different ideas of future politics knocking on the door, the Arab people's call for independence, liberty, and justice was finally becoming reality. It's vital to remember that people have a tolerance limit for tyranny and injustice: when despair and suffering reach that limit, they face the regime in defiance of tyranny and injustice, regardless of how strict the state's laws are. Most authoritarian regimes governed for a long time, and their incompetence and inability to offer the most basic of amenities to the people had made their collapse all but inevitable, if not in the way in which it eventually happened. The implications of the upheavals, according to Toby Dodges, will be felt for a long time (2012: 64).

Given Dodges' comments, it seems that the Arab Spring's effects are already being felt throughout the Middle East region. With the onset of the Arab protests, both hard and soft power concepts have shown to be ineffectual. Following Mohammed Morsi's contentious presidential election victory in 2012, a coup backed by defense minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi deposed him as president in 2013, and Egypt's long-term democratic goal remains a mystery to this day. In Yemen, long-lasting ruler Ali Abdullah Saleh resigned after agreeing to a power-sharing deal to stop anti-government protests. Yemen is currently immersed in a horrible civil conflict, with the country's economy destroyed and battle devolving into race violence, making democratic recovery all but impossible. In addition, Muammar Qaddafi who was ruling the *Jamahiriya* since 1969 was deposed in Libya after a brutal civil war aided by NATO. However, Libya has plunged into a deadly civil war since Qaddafi's death, with competing militias mostly ruling separate regions of the nation. Syria, on the other hand, is in a similar predicament. Bashar al Assad's autocratic regime has retained authority, as it has in past years. As a consequence of the disaster, millions of Syrians have fled to Turkey, Greece, and other parts of

Western Europe, resulting in an extraordinarily acute and widespread refugee crisis (UNHCR 2021). Despite the fact that massive demonstrations overthrew King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa's administration in 2011 and 2012, personal freedoms and political rights are still being violated in Bahrain today. Given the course of events, it is critical that this thesis meets the research questions' objectives.

Israel: The Shift Of Power

Prior to the Arab Spring of 2011, Israel's ties with most Arab states were tense. Despite this fact, Israel enjoys close ties with only a few Arab states (Egypt and Jordan). While Egypt became the first Arab country concluding a peace treaty with Israel in 1979, later the Kingdom of Jordan normalized its ties with Israel in 1994. From a strictly power-strategic perspective and precisely taking into consideration Hosni Mubarak's cordial ties with Israel prior to the uprisings, the old Middle East power balance was in some ways advantageous to Israel's national interests. Furthermore, several postcolonial Arab rulers have gradually managed to strike a compromise between their attitudes toward Israel and their need to preserve cordial relations with the Western powers. This was perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the case of Egypt, for whom the Camp David accord provided the benefits of US military assistance and Egyptian-Israeli cooperation without any ideological or societal strings attached, allowing the Mubarak regime to concentrate on suppressing its most vocal opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood. In the wake of the Arab Spring, conventional thought was that Israel would be the largest loser as a result of the Arab Uprising. Prior to the 2011 Uprisings, it was considered that the breakdown of peace along its borders and the ascendancy of Islamist parties would threaten country's stability and prospects. Thus, Israel would suffer the most significant deterioration of the Arab Spring," according to Thomas L. Friedman, a writer for the New York Times. A few days later, he was joined by David Ignatius, a journalist for the Washington Post who authored a piece headlined "*Israel's Arab Spring Problems*" (2012) Middle East experts Fawaz Gerges and Graham Fuller respectively *dubbed Israel "the biggest loser" and "the biggest single loser, hands down* (Scheinmann, 2016). This conclusion was supported by analyses from prestigious Washington, D.C. think tanks (Scheinmann, 2016). It seems that the vast majority of Israeli

authorities were in agreement with this statement. For instance, prime-minister of the time The Arab Spring has become a "Islamic, anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-Israel, and anti-democratic wave," according to the New York Times (2011). Former Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak called the unrest "extremely, very troubling," while Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, Barak's predecessor, requested that Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak be accommodated. Former Director of Military Intelligence Amos Yadlin, founder of one of Israel's most influential think tanks, said "Israel seems to be losing, while greater difficulties may lie ahead." The Arab Spring would bring "greater uncertainty, as well as increasing animosity and antagonism towards Israel," stated Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Yossi Kuperwasser (Scheinmann, 2016). Considering these public comments, the catastrophe scenario was widely accepted in Israel. Many Jewish political leaders felt the Arab uprisings would upset the regional status quo, putting Israel in jeopardy. The toppling of Hosni Mubarak was the most significant turning point in Israeli perspectives.

Israel Relations with Egypt

Given these, and in order to understand why Israel harboured such a fear during the Arab Spring, it's vital first to understand the origins of Israel's ties with Egypt and how it influenced the balance of power in the Middle East prior to the Arab Spring. Because, without an understanding of these relationships, it is impossible to comprehend why Israel felt the need to retain essential fears or concerns about the aftermath of the Arab Spring. As a result, it is vital to shed light on Egypt's foreign policy under Anwar Sadat. When Anwar Sadat was elected president of Egypt in 1970, the country's foreign policy shifted radically (Cleveland 2018). Nasser had maintained tight connections with the Soviet Union throughout his time in power; nevertheless, Sadat progressively shifted Egypt's allegiance away from the Soviet Union and toward the US. After leading the Arab world in its campaign against Israel, Sadat brought the armed conflict with Israel to a close in stages, culminating in the Camp David Accords of 1978-79. Egypt moved from being the most powerful Arab country under Nasser to being ostracized and pariah under Sadat, a period that lasted over three decades. A variety of factors contributed to the breakdown of relations with Moscow, the establishment of friendship with the

US, the establishment of peace with Israel, and the exclusion of the Arab world. Beginning with Sadat's experience since the Free Officers revolution in 1952, one of the key influences that shaped Egypt throughout his leadership was the country's development since the revolution. The 1952 revolution was marred by Nasser's failure to provide Sadat a prominent post in the government soon thereafter, preventing him from developing close ties with his fellow liberated officers. Sadat's relationship with Nasser was never personal, and it was marred by the latter's fundamental distrust of people and aloofness from them, according to Sadat's testimony. Although Sadat was devoted to Nasser and his colleagues, it is likely that he was dissatisfied with Nasser's assumption of command of the free officer's movement that Sadat had formed. He believed Nasser and the other free officers were aware of his goals and envious of his credentials as a nationalist hero as a result of his participation in the revolution, which resulted in his taking personal risks and garnering public acclaim. He was viewed with contempt by some of his colleagues, whether out of jealousy or derision, and after several rejections when he attempted to assume leadership, Sadat withdrew to the periphery of the ruling group. His close relationships with people such as Sayed Marei and other orthodox families grew as a consequence. These links had a role in shaping Sadat's attitude against Nasser's anti-wealth measures in the 1960s, which targeted the affluent. Nasser selected him as a member of the RCC as a result of his engagement in the free officers' campaign. While Nasser took advantage of Sadat on a daily basis, he also used Sadat to inflate the significance of posts that were really far removed from Egypt's true power centers. In any case, it was a sound strategy, and Sadat seemed to be having a wonderful time in the role. Initially working as an editor for Al-Jumhuriyah, the government's periodical, Sadat progressed through the ranks to become Secretary-General of the Islamic Congress and Nasser's Gulf and Peninsula adviser in 1955. Later, in 1957, he was appointed to the position of Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly of the Arab State. Sadat went on to serve as Secretary-General of the National Union party, which he joined in 1977. In 1960, he was chosen as Speaker of the Federal National Assembly (UARFA) of the United Arab Republic of Egypt. When the May Day celebrations in Moscow took place in May 1961, he was appointed as Speaker. Because of this visit, Sadat had a better insight of the Soviet leadership's inner workings, which was notable. This visit resulted in a heated disagreement with Khrushchev, which had evident ideological undertones. First and

foremost, Sadat was confronted by Soviet authorities. With his government coming to a close in December 1969, Nasser chose Sadat to be the Vice-President of Egypt. Following Nasser's death in September 1970, Sadat was elected Egypt's third President, despite the fact that many of Sadat's colleagues believed he would be appointed as an interim President just a few months later. Sadat, on the other hand, had political goals and ideas of his own, and when he took over as president, he was "full of challenge" to put a stop to Nasser's many deviations. Among the factors that motivated Sadat to rescind so many of Nasser's programs were personal hostility against the Egyptian leader, a desire to redress wrongs done to him and his cronies, and a desire to leave his stamp on Egypt. In order to be anything other than a pale imitation of Nasser's administration, he would have to approach things in a very different way. With power came the demonstration that Sadat was no apolitical yes-man with no interest in the affairs of state in Egypt. Almost as if he wished to erase the humiliations of the Nasser years, he set out to portray himself as a man of action and decisiveness, unconcerned with the views of those under him who worked alongside him. According to Heikal, Sadat proved to be a much more intelligent and innovative President than anybody had anticipated, and nowhere was his distinctive style more clearly demonstrated than in his relations with the Soviet Union (1978) Sadat positioned himself as a pragmatic thinker, even referring to pragmatism as "Arab logic" in one of his interviews. The impartiality and practicality of his own Israeli peace policy were the most important points he stressed. In recognition of the fact that the US' special relationship with Israel could not be destroyed, it would have to be accommodated, and that Egypt could no longer afford a conflict, she would have to make peace.

In light of Sadat's normalization of relations with Israel and the consequences that resulted, it was nearly impossible for any president after him to abandon his policies or the status quo because doing so would mean losing close ties with the US, which was enjoying global dominance at the time of the Cold War's gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Arab League's meeting at Camp David spurred the rest of the Arab world to retaliate against Egypt with force. The following were some of the most significant:

(a) All official Arab aid was suspended;
(b) Diplomatic relations were cut off;

(c) Egypt's membership of the Arab League, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development suspended;

(d) Arab League headquarters transferred from Cairo to Tunis;

(e) The Arab Organization for Industry - an Egyptian based arms Corporation funded by oil Arab states was disbanded;

(f) And (Saudi Arabia withdrew the funds it had promised for Egypt's purchase of American planes (Cairo, 1983).

Given these ramifications, Egypt was forced to confront the rest of the Arab world as a consequence of its close ties with Israel. Following Anwar Sadat's killing in October 1981, Egypt's vice president Hosni Mubarak said that Egypt will continue to follow "all treaties, charters, and international commitments" to which it had pledged in the years since. Mubarak followed through on his vow to protect the historic Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which restored Egypt's authority over the Sinai Peninsula and brought an end to decades of conflict between the two countries. Mubarak, in contrast to Sadat's progressive policies toward Israel, eschewed developing strong ties with the Jewish state in order to regain Egypt's position in the Arab world. However, there was one country in the region that did not share this enthusiasm: Israel. Many saw the toppling of Hosni Mubarak as a wave of excitement over the Middle East, bringing hope for peaceful democratic change, but there was at least one nation in the region that did not share this excitement: Israel. Since Israel's formation as an independent Jewish state in 1948, it has had to contend with hostile neighbors, most notably during the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars, among other conflicts. Moreover, the Egyptians never largely embraced the Camp David Accords. Sadat was assassinated by an Islamic fanatic who was hailed as a hero across the Arab world and had a major road named after him in Tehran, Iran. Following the events, some actors voiced worry about the consequences of their conduct. An ex-Israeli defense minister has urged the Obama administration to stop providing military help to Egypt and shift cash to civilian projects. If this happens, Israel fears it will be forced to align with Iran, Syria, and its proxies Hamas and Hezbollah. Barry Rubin, director of Global Research in International Affairs, agreed. We are strong; we are progressing; the future is ours." "They all think America is weak and receding." We are strong, we are advancing, and we own the future." It

was clear from Israeli officials' public pronouncements that they were unwilling to throw doubt on Mubarak's departure. Maybe they thought the Camp David Accords were a sham. This is not true, according to former Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, who told ABC News in 2011. The relationship between Israel and Egypt is not in jeopardy, nor is any operational risk looming. "I expect Egypt will continue to respect the treaty," Mohamed El-Baradei, a former diplomat who led the protests that brought Mubarak to his knees, told NBC News in 2011. Contrary to Obama's assurances, the Camp David Accords or the relationship with Egypt were not in danger or threatened. It is unclear if the new administration will worsen or enhance Egypt's ties with Israel. On February 4, 2011, former Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu praised Egyptian aspirations for democratic changes, but voiced anxiety about Egypt's future relationship with Israel. People who cherish human liberty, including Israelis, are heartened by genuine pleas for change and the prospect of reform. "We expect any Egyptian government to maintain peace," stated the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

The Rise of Mohammed Morsi in Egypt

Following the Arab Spring and the subsequent overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, the yelp for democratic change became louder in every nook and cranny of Egyptian society. Abdel Monem Said Aly, a columnist for Al-Ashram newspaper in Egypt who worked for Al-Ashram in 2012, argues that the Egyptian presidential elections were vital for three reasons:

(a) It will help to identify the "democratic route" of the Egyptian revolution. With another presidential election after a series of fair and free parliamentary elections, democracy becomes a tradition.

(b) Second, it will alter the political equilibrium in Egypt, bringing it closer to a balance between democracy and Islamic governance.

(c) It will do what Egypt has always done: spread the word about democracy, the rule of law, the importance of media in society, and so on to the rest of the Middle East (Aly, 2012).

In the presidential election, Egyptians were once again faced with a choice between Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, and Ahmed Shafik, a

military officer who served as the final Prime Minister under Hosni Mubarak and is considered a relic of the old system. In contrast, electing Shafik would ensure the continuance of Mubarak's dynasty in the country (Aly, 2012). As a result of a tumultuous election process, Morsi emerged victorious and was eventually sworn in as president. A return to the pre-revolutionary political order, according to some commentators, with the election of Mohamed Morsi as president of Egypt signalling a return to an unstable but stable relationship between military and Islamist groups, as well as between Islamic countries. More to the point, Morsi was an ardent supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, praising their stances on a variety of subjects, including their fierce opposition to the creation of a Jewish state and their recognized hostility to the Camp David Accords. Upon becoming a legislator in 2010, Morsi's anti-Israel stand as well as its lineage coming from the Ikhwan movement were reaffirmed (Kirkpatrick, 2013). During his speech, he advocated for the right of the Palestinian people to choose their own destiny.

However, there was also considerable concern about what Morsi may do in response to the jubilation. The Muslim Brotherhood—which had not been exercising political power in Egypt, shaping state economic policies, drafting legislation, or guiding Egypt's relations with foreign countries—was mistakenly believed to have shifted Morsi's allegiance away from the US, which was a mistaken assumption. Rather, they were barred from participation in governmental decision-making processes and were often the objects of coercive measures. The Muslim Brotherhood was also more of a pressure organization whose political rights were curtailed during the Mubarak administration. Morsi's bloc, as well as everyone else who had expressed a similar point of view, was taken by surprise. Focusing on his relationship with Israel, Morsi took a pragmatic approach, realizing that a strong relationship with the US was in Egypt's national interest. While Morsi was aware of the reality that a state's foreign policy is run by national interests, he was not willing to put Egypt's interests, particularly the $1 billion USD in yearly military assistance, at danger by throwing the country's foreign policy into disarray (El-Adawy, 2013). Between now and then, he may have come to the conclusion that being a good friend of Israel would not be detrimental to his own country's interests. The Morsi government nominated a new Egyptian ambassador to Israel as a sign of Egypt's commitment to the preservation of good ties between Egypt and Israel. Soft power, according to

Joseph Nye, is just now beginning to get practical attention, needing a detailed investigation of the concept (1990: 167; Nye, 1990). Morsi's in-depth investigation may be seen as a soft power. While it was tempting to imagine that Morsi's anti-Semitism towards Israel had evaporated the minute he was elected president, this seemed too good to be true. The fact that Morsi was foresighted enough to avoid a fight with Israel, and by extension the international community, makes sense. The peace treaty between Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, negotiated with significant cooperation from Jimmy Carter, the US President, was a significant achievement. When Morsi was president, he was actively engaged in attempts to bring about a cease-fire during the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, which had been ongoing for many months. Israeli authorities began to believe that Morsi's government would adhere to the terms of the peace deal as a result of these circumstances (El-Adawy, 2013).

A Reawakening Israel's Fear: The Overthrow Of Mohammed Morsi

Even though Israel appeared to be benefiting from close ties with President Mohammed Morsi's administration, or perhaps the recommitment of ties, and alleviating the possibility that there would have been a significant change in the status quo, Morsi was deposed from office one year into his presidency by former Defense Minister Addel Fattah al-Sisi in a military coup that took place in Egypt. Many people questioned if Sisi's administration, which has transformed relations since Sadat, Mubarak, and Morsi, would continue on the present trajectory of ties. The series of terrorist assaults on the Egyptian military in the Sinai peninsula, however, presented Sisi with his first major test after he was elevated to the position of de facto leader after the coup. It was Sisi's security cooperation with Israel that played a role. This measure was mandated under the security appendix of the Camp David Accords, and it demonstrates the flexibility and collaboration between Egypt and Israel throughout Sisi's time as Egyptian President. It was until in 2014 that ties took a drastic turn, with Sisi declaring, "We would endeavor to achieve the independence of Palestine with its capital in East Jerusalem" (Solimon, 2016). With this declaration, Sisi tried to stake his claim on the thorny problems of East Jerusalem that have been a source of contention for decades. Israel's acquisition of

the East Jerusalem land as well as Israel's claim to Jerusalem as its capital resulted in some diplomatic consequences with Sadat, and his insistence on a two-state solution was further undermined by his opposition to both (Rezaei, 2015). The story was altered, however, by Egyptian President Mohamed Sisi, who insisted that Egypt-Israel ties are a need in view of the two countries' common regional adversary, Hamas, which is considered as an extension of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, Sisi has transformed Egypt's relationship with Israel from one of "existential battle" to one of "necessary collaboration." (Bahi, 2016).

The Trump' Era In Middle East: Towards A Pro-Israel Policy

After World War II, the most pressing issue in US foreign policy was determining the most effective measures to contain the Soviet Union's aggressive expansionism. The US used all possible methods to prevent Russia from filling the power vacuum formed as a consequence of the steady demise of the old colonial powers, which is now being generated. The first priority was to maintain the geographical status quo and to retain the existing political system in place to the extent that it was possible under the circumstances (Lenczowski 1992).

In light of this policy, the US was equally concerned about the possibility of a change in the status quo and the consequences of future ties between Egypt and Israel. In the aftermath of the Arab upheavals, particularly in Egypt, the US was circumspect about which foreign policy decisions it would make. For more than three decades, the US had maintained cordial ties with Hosni Mubarak's rule, and to have taken any stance or backed any position on the demands for Mubarak's departure may have been regarded as a betrayal of a close ally's long-standing commitment. In addition, there were two opposing viewpoints among US officials: if Mubarak didn't step down and restore trust in his own ability to rule, Mubarak couldn't have contemplated working with the US administration as normal. However, the US is renowned for its position as a promoter and advocate of liberal democracy, as well as for its willingness to allow the popular will of the people to express and exercise their alienable right in a peaceful manner. Considered in the context of its global reputations, siding with the mass protesters who had demanded reforms would have contrasted its stance on issues or perhaps resulted in it losing the ability to condemn

countries such as China, Russia, and other countries that are notably known for abuses of human rights and political freedom.

In light of this, the Obama administration took a more cautious approach to the problem and was positioned along a spectrum that ranged from supporting extreme regime change, whether peacefully or by force, as was the case in Libya, to opposing such measures. The Obama administration aimed to implement a policy centered on supporting gradual democratic transition, particularly in nations with close relations to Israel, at least in certain situations. In addition, he appeared to be more liberal in its handling of the situation or attempted to perform a high-wire act between positioning itself and others.

Donald Trump's administration, however, took an entirely different approach. It was not until President Trump era who took a completely different approach that the balance of power in favor of Israel was solidified, unlike during the Obama administration (Thompson, 2018). US President Trump had promised to bring an end to the decade-long Israeli-Palestinian dispute by establishing a peace team comprised of personal confidantes upon his ascension to the White House. With the appointment of Jared Kushner as chief peace point man, in addition to Ambassador David Friedman and Special Envoy Jason Greenblatt, President Donald Trump demonstrated both the administration's preternaturally pro-Israel stances and the intricate personal ties that existed between the administration and Israel's ruling establishment (Hassan, 2017). The policy ramifications of this close convergence resulted in the implementation of far-reaching, pro-Israel decisions on the ground that ran counter to prior US Middle East policy, alienated the Palestinian Authority (PA), and raised further questions about the US' ability to act as an impartial mediator in the region. Prior to the commencement of the Trump presidential campaign in June 2015, significant relationships had already been established between the Trump family and the Israeli government. Netanyahu received a video-recorded support from Trump Tower in New York City in January 2013, during Israel's election campaign. President Trump stated:

"*And you genuinely have a terrific prime minister in Benjamin Netanyahu*" (Gray 2017). *There is no one quite like him. He's a winner, no doubt about it. He's well-*

liked and well-respected. He's a well-liked person by everyone. In addition, people feel a tremendous deal of admiration and reverence for what has taken place in Israel. As a result, Benjamin deserves your vote. He's a great man. This is a fantastic leader. This is fantastic news for Israel (Gray 2017).

Moreover, Netanyahu might benefit from his long-standing connection with Charles Kushner, the father of Jared Kushner's Trump's son in law, as well as from the backing of the Trump campaign and the Trump administration. The Kushner family has a long history of involvement in Israel. The selections of Trump for his foreign policy team further reinforced Israeli faith that, in the words of Dermer, "*there is light at the end of the tunnel*" (Entous 2018).

The US-Led Peace Plan: "*The Deal of The Century*"

It was the Middle East Peace Initiative, which was the official name for the Trump administration's effort to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian issue. To get from peace to prosperity, there was a strategy called the *"Vision to Improve the Lives of Palestinian and Israeli People*" (Ward, 2020). President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu unveiled the plan at a news conference at the White House in 2020, despite the fact that the Palestinian Authority (PA) had not been asked to participate in the discussions. Mr. Jared Kushner, President Donald Trump's son-in-law and close adviser, oversaw a team that worked on the president's strategic strategy. Responding to the plan, both the Yesha Council of West Bank settlers and the Palestinian leadership expressed their dissatisfaction with it: the former because it contemplated the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the latter because it is excessively biased in favour of Israel, according to the Palestinian leadership (Feldman & Shikaki, 2019). It is split into two parts: an economic component and a political component. The plan is divided into two sections.

On the 22nd of June, President Trump presented the economic component of his national security policy, which was termed "*Peace to Prosperity.*" At the end of January 2020, the political subplot of the film was made public. Numerous proponents of the Trump Peace Proposal have referred to it as "the deal of the century," a phrase that was used by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at a joint news conference with President Donald Trump to announce the proposal's

debut. There were many people who were opposed to the plan who were eager to urge that the initiative's language be altered. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas immediately condemned the incident as "*the slap of the century*" and demanded that the US express regret (Al Jazeera 2018). According to Saeb Erekat, the then organizational secretary general of the Palestine Liberation Organization, who wrote on Twitter, it would be dubbed "*the fraud of the century*" (Al Jazeera 2018). It was named "*the mess of the century*" by the Economist magazine (2018).

In the immediate aftermath of Israel's withdrawal from its prior commitment of "*immediate annexation*," a Haaretz writer referred to the situation as "*the joke of the century*" (Verter, 2020). Specifically, the stated goal of Trump's peace plan is to lay out the terms of a deal that will be approved by both sides in order to bring the conflict between Israel and Palestinians to an end, as well as to address all of the claims made by both sides in the conflict. The White House, following the adoption of this solution, the Palestinians would be granted self-governance, but Israel would be denied any rights that would pose a threat to Israeli security. Flights between Israel and its neighbours will be conducted in that direction if a satisfactory solution is reached. As part of its effort to break away from the worn-out paradigms of previous approaches to the Israeli–Palestinian peace process, the Trump administration announced that it would address two fundamental concerns by implementing two actions in 2017 and 2019 that implied the US' reinterpretation of the limits for finally ending the conflict, which largely supported Israeli perspectives, respectively. This year and next year, the actions were to be carried out. There were two more significant developments that occurred as a result. The recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital on December 6, 2017, and the decision on November 18, 2019, that Jewish settlements in the West Bank were compliant with international humanitarian law, are two examples of recent developments. As a visible symbol of the US' departure from its historical moorings in Jerusalem, the US Embassy in Jerusalem was officially inaugurated on May 14, the 70th anniversary of the founding of Israel, in the building that had previously housed the US Consulate's compound in the southern neighbourhood of Annona in the city's southern district. On the contrary, the changes brought about by the Arab Spring are likely to be advantageous to Israel in the long run. A large number of its most ardent foes,

notably the Iran-led "Axis of Resistance," have been severely weakened, both economically and strategically, as a result of the sanctions. Israel will be unable to openly confront hostile Arab countries for a lengthy period of time in the foreseeable future. The focus of their attention will be on internal warfare as multiple groups compete for domination and control in order to retain power and control. Aside from that, Israel has mostly been immune to the consequences of instability in the surrounding region. It has strengthened its fortifications, and as a result, its economy is booming. In the end, a thorough examination of the geopolitical situation reveals that Israel is likely to emerge as the sole true winner of the Arab Spring if the situation is allowed to develop. A new regional power dynamic has formed as a result of Trump's pro-Israeli activities, with the emphasis shifting away from other nations and towards Israel. And this was especially true during the Arab Spring, when Israel was arguably the most stable country in the region and a preferred partner for major powers, whereas Arab governments suffered horribly as a result of the unrest in their own countries. Instead of diverting attention away from the most pressing issues facing the Middle East, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and inter-Arab rivalry, the Arab Spring has caused those countries, particularly Egypt and Syria, to become completely consumed by their own internal problems, according to some analysts. Because of the Oslo Accords, Israel was given complete autonomy over the occupied Palestinian territories when these two governments realized that they could not play a practical role in assisting the Palestinian people. Egyptian officials agreed to keep Hamas under control as long as Israel continued to give assistance in the fight against ISIS-affiliated (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, also known as *Daesh*) militants operating in the Sinai Peninsula. As this example demonstrates, the Arab world has placed a higher priority on security support from Israel than it has placed on sympathy for the Palestinians in recent decades. Various sources claim that the Iranian threat to the Arab Gulf states is also drawing them toward the US and eventually into Israel. For the sake of maintaining US and Israeli assistance and security, these Gulf States were compelled to remain blind to Israel's expansionist tactics toward the Palestinian population. With the help of President Donald Trump's pressure, these events paved the way for the newest wave of Arab countries to sign normalization agreements with Israel, which included agreements previously signed by the UAE and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Israeli officials have endeavoured throughout history to distinguish the Palestinian cause from the

Arab context in which it is being waged. As a result of these events, Netanyahu believes that the Palestinian veto over larger Arab-Israeli ties, which had previously existed, can finally be put to rest. It is his contention that normalization of ties with the Arab world would eventually result in a reduction of Arab sympathy with regard to the Palestinians in their fight against Israeli occupation. As a result of the Arab Spring, Arab states have re-established diplomatic relations with Israel, effectively rendering the formula for Palestinian-Israeli peace, which was explicitly endorsed in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and is based on the "Land for Peace" formula enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 242, no longer applicable. "Israel will reap the greatest benefits from the Arab Spring," said Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki in a speech, and he was absolutely accurate (Schmidt, 2011). This is accurate, according to the Prime Minister of Iraq. There is, without a question, a country that is patiently awaiting the disintegration of the Arab world and the onset of domestic deterioration. According to Michael Schmidt, who provided accurate information to Prime Minister al-Maliki, "Zionists and Israel have been the early and most considerable benefactors of this whole process" (Schmidt, 2011). In reality, it was little more than confirmation of what the vast majority of people already knew: that President Donald Trump's orchestration of Israel's restoration of relations with the UAE and Bahrain had effectively declared the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dead in the public arena. Many factors contributed to this conclusion, including the fragility of what was previously known as the "steadfastness front," which was anchored in now-destroyed Syria, and the newly re-established confidence of Gulf monarchs who had managed to avoid significant domestic unrest in their home countries. Individuals who have not yet received satisfaction from the uprisings' "food, freedom, and social justice" demands will be hard pressed to do so by any agreement that relies only on a common opponent in Iran and a common authoritarian disrespect for public opinion and sensibilities.

Tel Aviv To Jerusalem: Trump Moves US Embassy

Another historical turning point, according to this thesis, that has shifted the balance of power in the Middle East is the decision by the Trump administration to relocate the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Jerusalem is one of the most

ferociously contested cities in the world, with each side disputing the other's claims to the city. The significance of Jerusalem to the religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. With three world religions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam – claiming Jerusalem as a holy site, the question of who controls the city and its most important religious sites takes on a religious dimension. According to Jewish tradition, Jerusalem is the site of the two Temples, which served as the focal point of Jewish worship and national identity in ancient Israel. In the year 70 AD, the Second Temple was destroyed. Thousands of Jews continue to gather at the Western Wall, which is a remnant of the retaining wall of the Temple Mount, where the Temple once stood. In the Christian tradition, the city serves as the focal point of the story of Jesus, including his death, crucifixion, and resurrection (USA Today, 2017). Christian pilgrims from around the world flock to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which is located in Jerusalem. After Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem is the third holiest city in Islam, according to Muslims. The Noble Sanctuary, al-Haram al-Sharif, is the name given by Muslims to the Temple Mount, which was the site of the former Jewish temple. Trump recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel in 2020, reversing nearly seven decades of American foreign policy and putting in motion plans to relocate the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to the hotly contested Holy City of Jerusalem.

"Today, we finally acknowledge what has long been obvious: that Jerusalem is Israel's capital," and this is nothing more or less than a recognition of the facts of the situation. It is also the morally correct thing to do. The fact is, it's something that has to be done" (BBC, 2020).

With his decision, the president signalled a shift away from the US' decades-old failing position on Jerusalem, which the US, along with practically every other country in the world, has refused to recognize as Israel's capital since the country's inception in 1948. "*We are no closer to reaching a sustainable peace accord between Israel and the Palestinians*" (BBC, 2020).Trump said as a result of that stance. According to Trump, it would be "folly to expect that repeating the exact same formula will suddenly create a different or better outcome" (White House, 2020). Since of the results of the Arab Spring, as well as the internal conflicts and contraction that have developed in the area, and because each state has aligned itself with US policy, Israel has emerged as a unified player in the region, reinforced by

Trump's pro-Israel stance. Given these circumstances and policies instituted by the Trump's administration alongside the disintegration of Arab states in the aftermath of the Arab Spring 2011, it is argued fact the Israel enjoys the benefit in the aftermath of the mass protests shocked and disrupted the region. In the light of these, many have dubbed as Israel as the "biggest winner of the Arab Spring" instead biggest loser as initially anticipated during the uprisings. Although there are growing signs of rising threat especially from Iran and the subsequent collapse of Kabul, the Middle East seems to have degenerated into a unipolar system with Israel being the hegemon. Also, with the lack of coordinated, and united efforts from and among member states of the Arab League, Israel enjoys the benefit of such arrangement. And while the Trumps administration policy to be proved a pro-Israel, which runs contrast to the US traditional policy orientation in the region, it is unfavourable that Biden's administration will undo them anytime soon. Although the Arab Spring was not predicted, it was the rare moment to reawaken Arab solidarity and strengthen the Arab league. It was a missed opportunity and a chance to undo policies by pro-Western regimes. It was a missed opportunity to amplify the Palestinian people right for self-determination and two-state solution (Cordesman, 2021). Thus, given the repercussions of the Arab spring and internal conflict that ravaged it, Israel enjoys the change in the balance of power in the Middle East.

The East-Mediterranean Pipeline Project

Another aspect of this thesis, which asserts that the Middle East's power balance has shifted in Israel's favour, is the East Med-pipeline project, which is now under construction. Located between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel, the East Med pipeline is a collaborative natural gas project. A single commitment statement was signed by all energy ministers in 2017 to confirm their commitment to the project's advancement. In a Project of Common Interest designation, the European Union has named the £5.1 billion ($6.7 billion) endeavour (PCI) (Euroafrica, 2020). The project is being carried out by IGI Poseidon, a 50:50 joint venture between the Greek Public Gas Corporation (DEPA) and Edison International Holding. Fast-Forward, The final agreement for the pipeline project was signed in January 2020 by the energy ministers of Greece, Israel, and Cyprus (Euroafrica, 2020). European energy security

will be strengthened as a result of the East-Med pipeline project, which will diversify Europe's energy routes and sources while also providing direct access to the producing areas. In addition, the prospect of joining the European gas grid will be opened up to Cyprus, allowing for improved gas trading in the southern and eastern European regions. The project will also promote the economic development of Cyprus and Greece by providing a stable market for gas exports. In addition to allowing for the establishment of gas trading centres in Greece and Italy, it will also facilitate the movement of natural gas throughout the rest of Europe, according to the agreement. As also, this marks the culmination of a collaboration that has been in the works for some years. As a result of their support for one another in a range of vital industries during the last decade, collaboration between Cyprus, Greece, and Israel has strengthened. When dealing with an increasingly insecure and conflict-prone Eastern Mediterranean, this includes strengthening military relations with the region. A neighbouring nation that has become more aggressive in recent years is the focus of these changes. Due to the natural course of the pipeline, Turkey would have been a participant in the project; however, Ankara's volatile relations with Greece, Israel, and Cyprus prevent it from participating. Turkmenistan is opposed to the East-Med project because the pipeline route chosen to transport natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe does not pass through the country's vast coastline. Moreover, Turkey asserts that the pipeline project is in violation of under international law (Olgun, 2019).

This new regional cooperation, which includes both the broader process and the specific efforts to address these two issues, is not a part of Turkey's participation because of the country's problematic relations with all three countries, which coincided largely with the unprecedented Arab Spring in 2011, which shattered the entire status quo in the Middle East. At times in the past, the relationship between Greece and Turkey has been tense; however, this tension has recently erupted in the wake of the attempted 2016 *coup* and refugee crisis. Following the War of 1974, Greece and Turkey continued to have disagreement about the future of the island of Cyprus for the next several years. Turkey's relations with Egypt, on the other hand, deteriorated rapidly after it emerged as the most vocal opponent of the 2013 coup that ousted Mohammed Morsi's administration and installed Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi in the Egyptian presidency. Turkish assistance to the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood has also continued, enraging not only the Egyptian authorities but also Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are both major supporters of the Sisi regime and major opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood. During the short-lived Morsi regime, ties between Egypt and Turkey were strong. During that time, the two countries discussed cooperating on issues relating to the eastern Mediterranean. However, the rise of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as well as the election of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), have all contributed to a deterioration in relations with Israel. As a result of the restructuring of the domestic political system and the consolidation of power at the helm, which resulted in the establishment of a presidential system, he was also able to formulate foreign policy objectives consistent with the JDP's strategic vision. The *Ikhwan* movement and Hamas have received significant support from Turkey in recent years, contributing to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. A perceived commitment to the Palestinian cause was a driving force behind its support for Hama. Hamas' political leader, Ismail Haniyeh, as well as its senior military commander, Saleh Al-Arouri, paid a visit to Istanbul in early 2020, prompting condemnation from Israel and the US. While Turkey considers Hamas to be a legitimate political movement that was democratically elected in Gaza, the US, and Israel consider it to be a terrorist organization. As part of its opposition to the US' decision to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem, Turkey called its ambassador to Tel Aviv back in 2018. Israel responded by summoning its own ambassador to Ankara. In addition, the Mavi Marmara incident, which occurred in March 2013 and resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish nationals, has caused tensions between Turkey and Israel. The two countries have yet to reconcile their differences, despite Israel's apology and promise to compensate the families of those killed (Sekulow, 2016). In light of the East-Med pipeline project, which is expected to transport much larger quantities of oil and gas into Israel's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the form of the Leviathan and Tamar fields, it once again demonstrated how the pendulum has swung in Israel's favor since the Arab Spring in 2011. The pipeline proposal also has strong support in the US and Europe, demonstrating the pro-Israel bias prevalent in the Western world. Moreover, Amid the growing number of internal contradictions and disintegration that have led to the struggle of these Middle East Arab states to recover both economically and politically since the Arab Spring, these eastern Mediterranean countries have chosen

to cooperate with Israel and the West, which could result in greater wealth and stability for their respective countries, rather than escalation or rivalry politics

The Abraham Accords: Israel's Normalization Of Relations With the United Arab Emirates (UAE) And Bahrain

Another important development that the Arab Spring of 2011 has disrupted the power structure and shifted towards Israel is the Abraham Accords in 2020. The Obama Administration proceeded on a path of disengaging from wars in the Middle East (Dazi-Héni, 2020). In the aftermath of the Arab Spring which coincided with the end of the Obama presidency. Obama's successor, Donald Trump nevertheless also adopted the same road of disengaging from conflicts in the region, although simultaneously going opposite to Obama's policies in the region notably the Iran nuclear program he had. Trump withdrew the US from the international plan of action for Iran's nuclear programme (JCPoA) in May of 2018, which had been agreed on 14 July 2015 (Dazi-Héni, 2020). Consequently, with the Trump administration's approach of 'maximum pressure' on Iran, incidents in the region have intensified. Some states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) notably, UAE and Bahrain had worries about the US departure from the region, and tensions with Iran and Turkey, which is associated with Qatar (Dazi-Héni, 2020). Apart from that, the growing instability in the Middle East since 2010 has benefited Iran while harming the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is a negative development for the GCC. Since the beginning of the crisis that now pits four of the GCC's member countries against one another on June 5, 2017, the GCC has been irreversibly fractured. Iran's growing power is seen as the greatest urgent threat by Israel and a number of GCC nations, including the UAE, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, among others (Dazi-Héni, 2020). In addition, Tehran has gained significantly from American mistakes in order to bolster Iraq and transform the GCC into a multilateral regional institution that ensures stability in the region; it has also taken advantage of the opportunities created in the region by the "Arab Spring" in order to consolidate its presence in Syria, Iraq, and, to a lesser extent in Yemen; and Combined with the factors related with the US presidential elections, these fears provided an ideal breeding environment for Israel and these Gulf states to make a compromise on

security weaknesses in the wake of the September 11th attacks (Dazi-Héni, 2020). The UAE and Bahrain will immediately resume diplomatic relations with Israel after a ceremony conducted in Washington on 15 September 2020, during which they signed the comprehensive peace pact known as the Abraham Accords. Unless the Camp David Accords of 1979 (normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt) or the Washington Declaration of 1994 (normalization of relations between Israel and Jordan) peace agreements, which were founded on the premise of peace in exchange for lands captured by Israel in 1967, are signed. Because the Abraham Agreements are in direct conflict with the accords of the 1970s and 1990s, the Palestinian problem is mostly ignored by the accords of the present. These two Gulf States have moved closer to Israel as a consequence of the Iran nuclear agreement, both in terms of security and in terms of economic and strategic connections. Additionally, they give Israel with unprecedented direct access to the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf, which was previously inaccessible to the country.

When it comes to economics, a $ 10 billion investment fund to be established in Israel by the UAE in March 2021 would invest in a variety of areas, including energy, manufacturing, water and space exploration, health care and agro-technology. Since then, a number of agreements have been signed between the two countries (Yellinek, 2021). A tremendous lot of excitement was generated in Israel after the signing of the Abraham Agreements, which resulted in a boom of tourists across the area, notably in Dubai. Direct flights between Dubai and Israel will be launched by six different airlines in November 2020, making it the first of its kind (Israeli, Emirati, and international) (Yellinek, 2021). More than 67,000 Israeli tourists visited Dubai in the first month after the city's reopening. While this is not a large amount, it is likely due to the COVID limitations that are in place; if the pandemic had not occurred, this figure may have been far higher. Bahrain and Israel have also begun around 14 direct flights, although they have not yet reached their full capacity, most likely as a result of the epidemic (Yellinek, 2021). However, we may anticipate a significant increase in the number of visitors from these four nations in the next few years, notably for visits to the holy sites in Jerusalem/al-Quds and other sites in the surrounding area.

On the academic front, only a small number of Israeli students have gone to study in these four nations, and the same is true for the reverse. In June 2021, the

Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC), a private research institution in Israel, welcomed its first and only Emirati student (Yellinek, 2021). These normalizations of ties with these Gulf States have had enormous regional ramifications, particularly in terms of the shifting of power away from Iran and towards Israel. Turkey and Iran, for example, both responded in the manner that one would anticipate; Turkey described the US-brokered deal as a "fresh blow" to the Palestinian cause. For its part, Iran accused Bahrain of stirring instability in the region. President Hassan Rouhani of Iran slammed the agreement, calling it "a stab in the back for Lebanon and other Arab states," (Dawn, 2020) while the president of Turkey vowed to sever diplomatic relations with the UAE and close its embassy in response to the agreement.

Normalization Of Relations Between Jordan And Israel

While the Arab Spring of 2011 shifted power in Israel's advantage, it is vital to recognize that there have also been trends of developments that have shifted power in Israel's favour. One of these trends was the normalization of ties between Jordan and Israel in 1994. Immediately after the Gulf War, the US was shown to be the single most major beneficiary of the Cold War's demise as well as the Gulf War. It received considerable acclaim in the U. S. and put the nation in a strong position to begin the peace process in the Middle East area, according to analysts. When compared to its rivalries, the US established a position of diplomatic supremacy in the Middle East by behaving more constructively. In fact, the 1991 Gulf War served as a catalyst for peace efforts, which proceeded at a far quicker rate than over the preceding four decades. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and with Jordan serving as Iraq's most important trading and economic partner, the Jordan's economy went into full disarray (Freedman, 1998). Additionally, Jordan has been suffocated by an influx of migrants, especially thousands of migrant labourers from Egypt and the Indian subcontinent who have escaped the unrest in Syria and Lebanon and are now seeking refuge in Jordan. In late August 1990, Jordan was forced to temporarily close its border with Iraq in order to cope with the inflow of refugees from Iraq. (Freedman, 1998).

In light of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the resulting negative consequences of UN and US sanctions, which also had an adverse impact on Jordan, the invasion of Kuwait served as the impetus for a dramatic turning point in the geopolitics of the Middle East, such as the Camp David Accords of 1978- 1979. When King Hussein suddenly chose to move independently with negotiations with Israel in May-June 1994, the world was taken by surprise. In London, the United Kingdom, King Hussein and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin met to negotiate. During a conference of the Jordanian-Israeli-US Trilateral Commission, which took place on June 6-7 in Washington, DC, discussions were re-opened for the first time (Boustany, 1994). Following the summit, Jordan and Israel issued a joint statement in which they pledged to have future bilateral meetings in both Israel and Jordan, as well as to establish collaborative sub-commissions on issues such as boundary demarcation, security, water, and environmental issues, among other things. (Hof, 1995). Following a meeting held near the Jordanian-Israeli border on the 18th and 19th of July, numerous subcommissions began working on their respective projects. It was at a ceremony held at the White House on July 25, 1994, that King Hussein of Jordan and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the agreement known as the "Washington Declaration," which officially brought an end to the state of war that had been in place between the two countries since 1948 (Boustany,1994).

Following a visit to Amman by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, an agreement was made between the two nations on a definitive peace treaty between them. The Treaty was officially signed on October 26 during a ceremony held on the Jordanian-Israeli border, making Jordan the second Arab country (after Egypt) to establish a peace treaty with the Jewish state (Hof, 1995). The Peace Treaty agreed on boundary delineation, security, water distribution, and the restoration of business connections (Boustany, 1994). The status of King Hussein as custodian of the Muslim shrines in Jerusalem was also confirmed during the ceremony. The Treaty of Amman was confirmed by Jordan's King Hussein on November 9 after being approved by both chambers of the Jordanian Parliament (Boustany, 1994). The Treaty established full diplomatic connections between Jordan and Israel in November. In November, the Jordanian-Israeli border was opened to both countries' citizens, and Israeli soldiers began withdrawing from 340 square kilometres of land seized since the 1967 conflict.t (Boustany, 1994). There had been little effort taken in

Jordan to prepare the population for the peace pact, according to the UN. All public gatherings were prohibited in Jordan as a result of a rally against the treaty held in Amman by around 5,000 people, which was organized by Islamic organizations.

The peace treaty not only deals with the cessation of hostilities, but also with the restoration of normalcy. Culture and science are addressed in a number of articles, as is the fight against crime and drugs, transportation and roads, postal services and telecommunication, tourism, the environment, energy, health, and agriculture, as well as the development of the Jordan Rift Valley and Aqaba /Eliat region, among other things. In Jordan and Israel, economic cooperation is regarded as a cornerstone of peace, and it is essential to the advancement of secure and harmonious relations between the two peoples. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on November 27, 1994, with the appointment of ambassadors and the establishment of embassies in each country. In order to preserve excellent neighbourly ties, Jordan and Israel will collaborate in a variety of fields on cooperative initiatives. In addition to energy and water resource development, conserving the natural environment, developing collaborative tourist initiatives, and developing the Jordan Rift Valley are among the projects being considered. As a result of continuous negotiations over the last year, many bilateral agreements have been struck between Jordan and Israel in the domains of tourism, environmental cooperation, business, police cooperation, and agriculture. The main provisions of the treaty are as follows:

(a) International boundary: it establishes the agreed-upon international boundary between Jordan and Israel, and their respective territorial waters and airspaces. This boundary was drawn using the Mandate border as a guide and is displayed on the maps attached to the agreement. Despite the deal, Israeli farmers in the Arava may continue to cultivate their land since the agreement allows for minor adjustments to the common boundaries. The Baqura and Zofar areas will be under Jordanian authority, with Israeli private land use rights in the Baqura and Zofar areas. These freedoms include the ability to enter, depart, and travel freely across the territory without hindrance. In certain regions, customs and immigration regulations are not applicable. These rights will be in effect for 25 years and will be automatically renewed for the same duration unless either

nation requests that the agreement be terminated, in which case negotiations will be held between the two countries.

(b) Security -The two parties agree to refrain from any acts of belligerence or hostility against one another, to ensure that no threats of violence against the other party originate within their respective territories, and to take all necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism from taking place. Aside from that, they will not participate in any alliance whose aims involve armed action against the opposing party or parties. Israel and Jordan have agreed to refrain from using hostile propaganda and to abolish any discriminatory allusions and expressions of hatred that are now in their respective laws. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), which will be designed after the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, will be established by the two nations (CSCE). As a result, the traditional concepts of deterrence and military preparation are being replaced by confidence-building tactics in an effort to replace the more classical conception of security. After a period of time, confidence will lead to the formation of mutual trust and organizations dedicated to the prevention of conflict and the enhancement of international collaboration.

(c) Water -Israel and Jordan have reached an agreement on water allocations from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, as well as groundwater from the Araba basin. Water from Israel's northern region will be sent to Jordan on an annual basis, according to an agreement reached with the Jordanian government. Apart from that, the two nations have committed to work together to relieve the water scarcity by developing current and new water resources, avoiding pollution of water resources, and reducing water waste.

(d)   Freedom of Passage Nationals from both nations, as well as their cars, will be able to roam freely on open highways and via open border crossings. Both countries will give access to ports to vessels from either nation that are authorized transit via their respective territorial seas. Negotiations for a Civil Aviation Agreement are now under place. As international waterways, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are freely navigable and accessible to all countries for overflight or free passage.

(e) Places of Historical and Religious Significance-The locations of religious and historical value will be accessible without restriction. In line with the Washington Declaration, Israel recognizes the current particular role played by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the Muslim Holy Shrines of Jerusalem, which is in compliance with international law. Israeli officials have said that when discussions on a permanent status for these sites begin, they would give top attention to the Jordanian historical involvement in these sites, as outlined in the Declaration of Principles.

(f) Refugees and Displaced Persons- The parties recognise the human suffering caused by the Middle East conflict and agree to cooperate bilaterally to alleviate it while simultaneously addressing it via three channels. An inter-governmental panel involving Egypt and Palestinians was constituted to address internal displacement. Multilateral Working Group on Refugees Combined with the permanent status discussions specified in the Declaration of Principles, bilateral or otherwise agreed-upon framework negotiations are planned to take place. (Boustany, 1994).

Conceptualization Of Middle East Power Shift: An Analysis

In an attempt to relate the present geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, this thesis uses Joseph Nye's conceptions of "power" to comprehend the changing balance of power in the region. Hard power and soft power are the two types of power that Nye distinguishes between. The capacity to exert influence on others in order to accomplish desired outcomes is described by Nye as the ability to influence others to achieve desired results (1990: 154). In an anarchic international system, nations do not recognize higher powers and are therefore compelled to rely on power politics to survive. The ability to achieve one's goals by coercion or threats, according to Nye, is the ability to achieve one's goals through coercion or threats. Intangibles such as a compelling personality, an appealing culture, politically conservative political beliefs, institutions, and policies viewed as legitimate or moral authority, according to Nye, may influence others' choices without compulsion or force. (Nye, 2008: 95). Traditional realist thinking, on the other hand, strives to demote power primarily in the framework of military force. Nye, on the other hand, attempts to conceptualize power and broaden it into a more holistic viewpoint that is more in keeping with the features of the twenty-first century. According to Joseph

Nye (1990: 167), the shifting character of the international system has pushed the deployment of intangible kinds of power, such as culture and ideology, as well as institutions, back to the forefront of international politics, where they belonged before. As a consequence of increased social mobilization, technology, education, and economic development are becoming as significant as, if not more important than, geography, population, and natural resources in terms of global relevance, according to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNSCOP recommended that Palestine be partitioned into two states: one for Jews and one for Arabs, taking these considerations into account. This recommendation came as a result of an inquiry into the Palestinian Question conducted by the UNSCOP. When the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) accepted the commission's findings on November 29, 1947, it did so by a vote of 33 to 13, with ten abstaining and one tie vote. A landmark milestone in history for Jews occurred when the UNGA passed Resolution 181, which affirmed their right to self-determination in their ancestral country and recognized Jewish freedom of self-determination on an international level. It was as a consequence of this that Israel announced its own statehood as a sovereign nation in May 1948. Angry by the UN General Assembly's decision, which they perceived to be a violation of their rights, the Arabs started a series of military operations against the newly constituted Jewish state in reprisal for an Israeli effort to regain control of the contested region. In the aftermath of these acts of military aggression, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been extended and remains unresolved, resulting in instability across the area. These retaliatory measures by Arabs to regain disputed land using force or threat are legitimate when seen in the perspective of hard power and asymmetric warfare. According to Joseph Nye, "the capacity to accomplish one's aims by coercion or the threat of violence" is defined as "the ability to achieve one's objectives through the use of force" (Nye, 2008). In the view of this theory, the Arab Spring was a wave of pro-democracy upheavals in a large number of Islamic regimes that presented exceptional chances for political openness in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) area that had never been seen before. There was a wave of public demands for political freedoms, social fairness, and human dignity that began in Tunisia and expanded to Egypt, then to other countries such as Yemen and Bahrain before reaching Syria and other countries in the region. Leadership that was formerly deemed "presidents for life," such as Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, was pushed from power within

weeks of assuming their positions. These autocratic rulers were removed a few months later, as did Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya. A forceful method was used by the people of the Middle East to attain their goal during the Arab Uprisings that swept the region. The removal of leaders from office, especially in authoritarian regimes, is not predicated on any specific set of ideals unless it is done via election procedures in democratic governments, but the toppling of leaders during uprisings is considered "hard power" according to Joseph Nye. Particularly in the context of two separate incidents in Egypt and Libya, when physical violence was deployed. On January 3, 2013, one year after taking office as president after an electoral process during the Arab Spring, Morsi was ousted from power by his Defense Minister, Addel Fattah al-Sisi, in a military coup. While in Libya, a mix of hard and soft power was used in tandem with one another to achieve victory. With strong aid from NATO, Muammar Qaddafi was overthrown as the leader of Libya by rebel forces. In a unanimous vote, the UN Security Council approves Resolution 1973, which has the backing of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Although Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to influence others' preferences without using coercion or force, it can also be defined as the ability to influence others' preferences through intangibles such as a charismatic personality, appealing culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are perceived to be legitimate or moral authority (Nye, 2008: 95). In the aftermath of World War II, the idea of soft power started to be established, with a focus put on the most effective ways of controlling the Soviet Union's aggressive expansionism. It predicated its decision on the power vacuum that had been created as a consequence of the eventual annihilation of the colonial superpower. As a result of the fact that most Arab governments regard Russia as an ally, whereas the US and other Western powers are viewed as adversaries because of their unwavering support for Israel, the US has altered its foreign policy dimension in order to accommodate elites in Arab countries. As Nye points out, one of the characteristics of soft power is having an attractive personality, and the US was successful in convincing others of this. The Camp David Accords are a well-known example of how soft power can be envisioned. In order to have an impact on Egypt's foreign relations, a significant amount of foreign assistance was needed. The influence of national interests on foreign policy is well-known in IR literature. As a result of this soft power policy intervention, Egypt was compelled to re-build ties with Israel.

Understanding The Middle East's Power Balance: A Realist Approach

Despite the fact that the Middle East was susceptible to ethnic conflict, the balance of power in the post-Second World War era, perhaps during the Cold War, kept it in check. However, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) continues to be the world's most war-torn region. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the power imbalance has resulted in a potent mix of propagandistic belief systems and state incoherence. Neither realism nor liberalism can fully explain why the region is constantly at odds, why the region is conflicted, why the region's peoples have national aspirations and political identities, and why strong versus weak states predominate. However, a metaphysical correlation of the MENA region's state power balancing is required. Because many realists consent that the contemporary Middle East, with its recurring conflicts, rivalries, arms races, competing alliances, great power interventions, crises, and wars, reflects a realist view of international politics, Kenneth Waltz's concept of balance of power is urged. The balance of power, according to Waltz's theory, is a result–a variable that reflects the causal influence of the explanatory variables, which include anarchy and power distribution in the international system, among other things (Waltz, 1979). When two coalitions exist in an international system, Waltz described the balance of power as when the weaker side, given the choice, joins the core nations to avoid being threatened by the more powerful side. A system dominated by two powers with equal capabilities, eventually characterized by more than two powers with nearly identical capabilities, according to Waltz (1979). He believes it is necessary to return to the two basic assumptions and assess what predictions can be derived from them that will have some discernible effects on the overall balance; the international system is anarchy and states are the unitary actors within the international system. As a result, these parameters reflect the likelihood of achieving a power balance, demonstrating three points:

(1) intention, particularly the purported motivation of the system's great powers,

(2) state predisposition, particularly the preference for objective over subjective gains, and

(3) Contingency, which is frequently related to the availability of new information in a given situation, which may be exogenous or endogenous in nature (Boxill, 2014; Waltz (1979).

As a result, he believes that the presence of two or more states in a system war will be less likely, regardless of strategic interests or competing great power. Although the interstate Arab-Israeli conflict was more likely to escalate to war than other regional disputes, the bipolar Cold War era or the post-Cold War unipolar system avoided a full-scale war. Despite the fact that great power rivalry was intense in the region during the Cold War, which was likely to exacerbate regional conflict, great powers try to avoid wars that could entangle them in an unintended escalation. In a bipolar or unipolar world in the Middle East, this is even more likely. In the light of these arguments, the US and the USSR served as power balancers within the international system, affecting the stability of the Middle East. Each superpower fought for Arab allies in the region in order to keep their sinister ambitions alive, limiting another deadly global superpower inter-state conflict, especially in the region. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, for example, have firmly allied with the US, whereas Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt have not. On the other hand, in the post-Arab spring multipolar system, which has prompted states to seek new allies, power, and on wars of opportunity triggered by power vacuums, there has been a power imbalance. Furthermore, even if weaker states align with great powers to maintain stability or balance power, regional conflicts are initiated by regional actors based on their motivations, characteristics, objectives, perceptions, and fears of other regional actors, rather than by external powers and their rivalries. A lack of congruence between states and national identifications, as well as the fact that some of the regional states are weak, is another dimension of this shift in the balance of power or imbalance of power toward Israel.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This thesis aimed to analyse the redistribution of power in the Middle East region in the post-Arab Spring era with a specific emphasis on the enhanced role of Israel. Despite the fact that the 2011 protests that have engulfed most of the Arab countries at the first sight alarmed Israel, ten years since the onset of the riots it has, however, become apparent that Israel has taken the key advantage from the uprisings in the region. The Abraham Agreements that paved the way for normalization of relations between Israel and two Gulf countries, i.e. Bahrain and UAE (later with Morocco) which also shifted the power balance can be depicted as one of the key findings of the thesis. In line with this objective, this thesis aimed to examine both the pre-Arab Spring era and the post-Arab spring era to illustrate the fact that the power transition was in favour of Israel at the expense of Palestinians and the Arab countries.

The distribution of power in the Middle East during the pre-Arab Spring era had four facets. First, the Arab-Israeli war started in the region soon after the Jewish state was founded in 1948. Arab nations opposed the establishment of Israel in the region, citing Palestinians rights to self-determination. As a result, a regional Arab-Israeli war started. Before Israel, most of the power in the Middle East revolved around and shaped by Pan-Arabism forces, Nasserism and the Arab League. After Israel's formation, the power distribution in the region swung due to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and thus shifted among the Arabs and Israel. Secondly, the Cold War politics that had dominated the international system during the period of 1945-1990 also reflected itself to the region in the form of the Arab Cold War. During this period, the power struggle in the Middle East was primarily a reflection of the rivalry between the US and the USSR as well. In addition, the emergence of this Super Power competition coincided with the decolonization of the Arab states and their moves towards nation and state formation. Each of these newly established Arab states had specific security, political, and economic concerns that needed to be met. Thus, to survive as a state, Arab countries sought and got assistance from those Super Powers. Both the US and the USSR saw this emerging climate in the region as

fertile ground for global competition. Each of these Super Powers fought for Arab allies to get the upper hand and so restrict their opponent's nefarious ambitions (Lustick, 1997). In this regard, the Middle East's power politics arose from the convergence of two factors: the necessity for outside aid by newly independent Arab states and the availability of such support from the US and the USSR. To retain power, conservative monarchs like Jordan and Saudi Arabia sided with the US while Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Egypt collaborated with the USSR. Third, Arab nationalists oppose the Western powers. On July 23, 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers Movement led a coup. As a consequence of Nasser's ascendancy, Pan-Arabism was revived among Arab nations. Nasser's revolution altered geopolitics, anti-Israeli and anti-Western views. The Arab world grew closer to the USSR and its socialist beliefs. Under Nasser's leadership, the Suez Canal was nationalized. Fourth, Arab states fought for dominance and leadership. The Arabs attacked Israel in 1967 which is also known as the Six Day war. The 1967 war resulted in Israel's military victory, the Arab states lost control of large swathes of territory including the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, Egypt's leader Nasser lost popularity with Arab political elites, leading to the Arab League split. These different Arab-Israel conflicts impacted the region significantly, until Anwar Sadat became president of Egypt after Nasser's death. Egypt's foreign policy changed dramatically in 1970. Sadat's relationship with Nasser was never intimate and was hampered by his aloofness and suspicion of people. Sadat rescinded so many of Nasser's policies due to personal animosity against the Egyptian leader, desire to right wrongs done to him and his cronies and want to make his mark on Egypt. To avoid becoming a weak replica of Nasser's administration, he would have to take a totally different approach. Throughout Sadat's reign, Egypt's loyalty changed from the USSR to the US.

After Egypt spearheaded the Arab world's assault against Israel, Sadat brought the war to a peaceful conclusion with the Camp David Accords of 1978-79. Egypt went from being the most powerful Arab nation under Nasser to being shunned and a pariah under Sadat. Following these dramatic policy changes, Egypt suffered the loss of all official Arab aid, diplomatic relations with Arab states, membership in the Arab League, OAPEC, and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development; the Arab League headquarters moved from Cairo to Tunis; and the Arab Organization for Industry was scattered. As a result, power became

diffused, and the Arab nations failed to unite, further fragmenting the Arab League. During the post-Arab spring, Israel was alarmed about the implications for its ties with nations. Despite tight ties with most nations, solid Arab-Israeli relations exist (namely Egypt and Jordan). The prehistoric Middle East power balance benefited Israel's national interests in various respects. Several postcolonial Arab regimes managed to achieve a balance between their anti-Israel sentiments and their desire to maintain friendly ties with the West. In this regard, the Camp David Accord provided Egypt with US military support and Egyptian-Israeli relationship without any emotional or sociological ties attached, letting the Mubarak autocratic regime to focus on eliminating its most outspoken opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood. On the other, Mohammed Morsi's rise to power reawakened Israel's quagmire of the post Arab spring repercussions on its relations with states whom it had enjoyed many years of ties with. The post-Arab spring elections of 2012 in Egypt, Egyptians had to choose between Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, and Ahmed Shafik, a military commander who served as Hosni Mubarak's last Prime Minister and was considered a vestige of the old regime. Electing Shafik would assure Mubarak's dynasty's survival. After a tough election, *Ikhwan* leader Morsi won and was inaugurated as president. Some analysts felt that the election of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt's president signals a return to an anti-Israel and anti-Western era, as well as a stable relationship with Arab states and ties with military and Islamist factions. Morsi was a staunch admirer of the Muslim Brotherhood, applauding their resistance to the establishment of a Jewish state and their open enmity to the Camp David Accords. Once elected in 2010 as a parliamentarian, Morsi's anti-Israel views were confirmed. During his address, he defended the Palestinians' freedom to choose their own fate (VOA, 2013).

The idea of Egyptians electing Morsi as president was the worst nightmare for Israelis political elites. One reason behind this was the Justice and Freedom's Party's affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the perception that Morsi would shift Egypt away from the West, i.e. the US. Due to the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood was a pressure group whose political rights were constrained by the Mubarak regime that fell in 2011 and acquired the electoral victory in 2012, the Morsi rule was overthrown by the military led coup by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. Al-Sisi now seems to be consolidating power in Cairo whilst maintaining relations

with Israel. Another dimension to reflect the geopolitical changes in the Middle East was the US policy under the Trump administration. Although the US may be the region's most significant foreign power, its approach under Obama was cautious but inconsistent. The Obama's administration's apparent lack of coherence and readiness to speak the language of democracy while protecting national interests. Although Obama's approach can be argued as wise to foreign affairs decisions. Unlike the Obama administration, which political analysts commended for combining pragmatism and principle, the Trump administration chose a totally different but strange approach. President Trump pledged to end the decade-long Israeli-Palestinian dispute by establishing a peace team of personal confidants upon becoming office, particularly Ambassador David Friedman and Special Envoy Jason Greenblatt, Trump's top peace point men were Jared Kushner and Jason Greenblatt Thompson, 2018). This close alignment resulted in far-reaching pro-Israel initiatives that alienated the Palestinians and thus questioned the US ability to act as an impartial mediator in the region. The Middle East Peace Initiative was the Trump administration's strategy to resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It was a Vision to Improve the Lives of Palestinians and Israelis approach. While the Palestinians were not invited to the discussions, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed the concept in 2020 during a White House news conference. President Donald Trump's son-in-law and close adviser, Jared Kushner, oversaw the plan's preparation.

The Trump administration indicated that it will address two basic problems by taking two acts in 2017 and 2019 that mostly backed Israeli positions. Then, in 2017, the US formally announced its recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital which was practically implemented on May 14, 2018. Furthermore, the discoveries of gas in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the disagreements among the littoral states over the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) have resulted in the formation of quasi-alliance between Israel-Egypt-Greece since 2011 onwards (Tziarras, 2016). Thus, the East Med-pipeline project is another aspect where power has shifted toward Israel's power. Despite the pipeline's natural course, Turkey was excluded due to fragile ties with Greece, Israel, and Cyprus. Turkey opposes the East-Med pipeline because it skips its vast coastline. Turkey warns that the pipeline plan violates its equal rights to natural resources in Cypriot territorial seas (Daily Sabah,

2020). This new regional partnership coincided with the battle for the northern half of Cyprus, which heightened tensions between Greece and Turkey. Additionally, after the 2013 coup that removed Mohammed Morsi and installed Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, Turkey's relations with Egypt worsened drastically. Turkey opposed Morsi's removal, and since continued to back the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, enraging Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both allies and opponents of Sisi. While the assembling of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey has led to the worsening of relations with Israel. With Turkey's presidential system now rebuilt on the JDP's ideals, Turkey has developed foreign policy objectives. Turkey has long backed the *Ikhwan* movement, further weakening bilateral relations with Israel. In 2018, both Turkey and Israel recalled their ambassadors to protest the US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem (Aljazeera, 2018). Ties between Istanbul and Jerusalem have been strained since the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010 as well. Israeli apologies and promises to make payment to victims' families failed to reconcile the two countries (Sekulow, 2016). Trump's pro-Israeli moves shifted the regional power balance to Israel. As already indicated in these developments, it makes Israel to be at the epicentre of countries badly affected by the Arab to negotiate and build its relations because of its domestic security and economic stability. Additionally, these pro-Israel policies by the Trump's led administration ignited regional disorder among Arab states thereby given Israel to strengthen it capabilities on all fronts; security and economic.

Since the Arab Spring, Israel was the most stable country in the region and a preferred partner for foreign powers, while Arab states have suffered greatly as a result of Arab upheavals. Contrary to popular belief, the Arab Spring would have disrupted the Middle East's power status quo and rejuvenated issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Arab spring gave Israel carte blanche in the region. For instance, the Arab states have emphasized security backing for Israel above Palestinian compassion.

The Iranian menace to the Arab Gulf states is driving them toward Israel and the US ultimately. For the sake of domestic interests, Gulf governments have to ignore Israel's expansionist policies towards the Palestinians. These developments, along with President Trump's pro-Israel policies, moved power toward Israel, it has yet to achieve societal transformation. They created a number of tendencies that are

likely to destabilize the Arab world and obstruct peace and prosperity. In light of these developments, the Post-Arab Spring developments include rising sectarian politics, inadequate government, terrorism, and migration. While these tendencies harm people's fundamental needs for social, economic, and political stability, they provide the groundwork for future upheavals. It is necessary to change the driving tendencies of instability in the MENA area to avert future revolutions and civil conflicts. While power has changed, power remains flexible, and continuing negotiations to restore partnerships are underway.

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Appendix A

Ethics Committee Approval

18.01.2022

Dear Emmett Payopay Coker

Your project "Examining the Shift in the Middle East's Power Balance Since 2011: Power Shift towards Israel?" has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Direnc Kanol

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.

Appendix B

Similarity Report

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