



**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE:
AFD AND PVV**

M.A. THESIS

Reşit ÖZMEN

**Nicosia
January, 2022**

**REŞİT
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MASTERS THESIS

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Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Reşit ÖZMEN titled “**The Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe: AfD and PVV**” and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

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Reşit ÖZMEN

Abstract

The Rise of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe: AfD and PVV

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Populist radical right parties are becoming crucial political actors in the European Union's member states. These parties, which have been on the rise since 1980, achieved significant success in local, national, and European Parliament elections, particularly between 2010-20. The primary reason why the public is increasingly supporting these parties is due to the global crisis. In particular, the Eurozone was affected by the economic crisis that started with the 2007-08 global financial crisis, which led to an increase in Euroscepticism. Moreover, with the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East, thousands of people sought refuge in EU countries, and a refugee crisis began in Europe. This situation has increased anti-immigrant sentiment among Europeans. Another issue is the Islamophobia and identity crisis in Europeans due to the attacks carried out by terrorist organizations in Europe. As a result, the public gave up the major parties and saw populist radical right parties as an alternative. These parties, which are getting stronger, are likely to reach a level that will shape European politics in the future. This study takes the AfD (Germany) and PVV (Netherlands) parties as case studies as they are good examples where the popularity of the rising populist radical right parties in Europe can be observed. Consequently, it is said that the social and political tendencies of the European Union society in 2010-20 are close to the right-wing ideology, based on the electoral successes of the parties in question.

Keywords: Populism, Populist Radical Right Parties, European Union, Alternative for Germany, Freedom Party

Öz

Avrupa’da Popülist Radikal Sağ Partilerin Yükselişi: AfD ve PVV

Özmen, Reşit

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Prof. Dr. Nur KÖPRÜLÜ ve Yrd. Doç. Dr. Mustafa Çıraklı

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Avrupa Birliği üyesi ülkelerde popülist radikal sağ partiler giderek önemli birer siyasi aktör haline gelmektedirler. 1980’den itibaren yükselişe geçen bu partiler, özellikle 2010-20 yılları arasında yerel, ulusal ve Avrupa Parlamentosu seçimlerinde oldukça önemli başarılar elde ettiler. Halkın giderek bu partileri desteklemesinin temel nedeni ise yaşanan küresel krizlerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Özellikle 2007-08 küresel finans krizi ile başlayan ekonomik krizden Euro bölgesi oldukça etkilenmiş ve bu durum Avrupa şüpheciliğinin artmasına neden olmuştur. Dahası, Kuzey Afrika ve Ortadoğu’da yaşanan Arap Baharı ile birlikte binlerce insan AB ülkelerine sığınmak istemiş ve Avrupa’da mülteci krizi baş göstermiştir. Bu durum Avrupalılarda göçmen karşıtlığını artmıştır. Terörist örgütlerin Avrupa’da gerçekleştirdiği saldırılar sonucu Avrupalılarda oluşan İslamofobi ile kimlik krizi de bir diğer sorundur. Sonuç olarak halk, merkezi partilerden vazgeçmiş ve alternatif olarak popülist radikal sağ partileri görmüşlerdir. Giderek güçlenen bu partilerin gelecekte Avrupa siyasetine yön verecek bir düzeye gelmesi muhtemeldir. Bu çalışma, Avrupa’da yükselen popülist radikal sağ partilerin popülaritesinin gözlemlenebildiği iyi örnekler oldukları için AfD (Almanya) ve PVV (Hollanda) partilerini örnek vaka olarak almıştır. Sonuç olarak ise söz konusu partilerin seçim başarıları üzerinden Avrupa Birliği toplumunun 2010-20 yıllarındaki toplumsal ve siyasal eğilimlerinin sağ ideolojiye yakın olduğunu söylemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Popülizm, Popülist Radikal Sağ Partiler, Avrupa Birliği, Almanya İçin Alternatif, Özgürlük Partisi

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List of Abbreviations

AE:	Alternative Espanola
AfD:	Alternative for Germany
AN:	National Alliance
ANEL:	Independent Greeks
ATAKA:	National Union Attack
BNP:	British National Party
BZÖ:	Alliance for the Future of Austria
DF:	Danish People's Party
DN:	National Democracy
DR:	Technical Group of the European Right
DVU:	German People's Union
EKRE:	Conservative People's Party
EL:	Greek Solution
ELAM:	National Popular Front
ENF:	Europe of Nations and Freedom
EP	European Parliament
EU:	European Union
Fidesz:	Hungarian Civic Alliance
FN:	National Front
FP:	Progress Party (Denmark)
FPÖ:	Freedom Party of Austria
FrP:	Progress Party (Norway)
GD:	Golden Dawn
GRP:	Grand Romanian Party
ID:	Identity and Democracy
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JOBBIK:	Movement for a Better Hungary
KNP:	Congress of the New Right
LAOS:	Popular Orthodox Rally

LN:	Northern League
LPF:	Pim Fortuyn List
LPR:	League of Polish Families
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MIÉP:	Hungarian Party of Rights and Life
MSI:	Italian Social Movement
NPD:	German Nationalist Party
OP:	United Patriots
ÖVP:	Austrian People Party
PEGIDA:	Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident
PiS:	Law and Justice
PNR:	National Renovator Party
PRR:	Populist Radical Right
PS:	True Finns
PVV:	Freedom Party
REP:	Republicans
RN:	Rassemblement National
SD:	Sweden Democrats
SPÖ:	Social Democratic Party of Austria
SVP:	Swiss People's Party
U.S.:	United States
UFF:	French Union and Fraternity
UKIP:	United Kingdom Independence Party
VdU:	Union of Independents
VVD:	People's Party for Freedom and Democracy

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Europe is mostly considered the cradle of civilization, human rights, and democracy. The populist radical right, which has gained ground in European countries in recent years, is however, changing this perception of Europe. The fact that populist parties of the extreme right have gained seats in local and national assemblies in various European countries as well as the European Parliament (EP) and have a say in decision-making mechanisms further reinforce this changing perception towards the region.

Moreover, the ideology and populist rhetoric of the ring-wing parties in question lead to social disintegration. One can say that the populist and radical right-wing rhetoric, which has become a trend and has spread in various waves, have become dangerous for diverse characteristics of European societies. Furthermore, minority groups are concerned about both the disintegration (fragmentation) of society and the threat to democratic gains posed by these parties. One such concern is primarily the shift of populist rhetoric from the radical right to mainstream parties and the resulting shaping of the European political space.

As a result, the radicalization of the right and its feeding of populism has led to the rise of far right-wing parties in the European Union (EU), which now comprise 27 member countries. The rise of these parties has attracted the attention of the social sciences, and much ink has been spilled on this particular subject. Although there are many studies on the categorization and naming of these new types of parties, there is, however, still no consensus on this issue. Various terms such as “new right”, “right-wing populism”, “new populism”, “far right”, etc. (Mudde, 2007: 11-12), are used in the literature for these parties. In this thesis, Cas Mudde's (2007) conceptualization of "radical right populist parties" - hereafter abbreviated to PRR parties - which is contemporary and on which the conceptual/theoretical framework section is based, was preferred.

It is challenging to give a standard definition of PRR parties too. For this reason, the political structures, electoral systems, agendas, and political cultures of the countries are different, and the PRR parties are formed according to the country's current position. However, although there is no standard definition, all parties

belonging to this family of parties have the following three essential ideological characteristics: populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. (Mudde, 2007: 22).

Parties that generally reflect these ideological characteristics in EU countries and are critical players in the political arena include; the Rassemblement national (formerly Front national FN- Rassemblement national RN), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) Freedom Party (PVV), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Sweden Democrats (SD), Alternative for Germany (AfD), Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang), Danish People's Party (DF), Lega per Salvini (formerly Lega Nord). The emphasis of these parties on "us" and "them" is the most apparent rhetoric in their discourse, which accentuates inequality within society. The impact of these discourses on the masses stems from the social and political atmosphere created by the conditions of the period.

PRR parties have been on the rise since the 1980s in some of the EU member countries – including the United Kingdom (which left the Union following the Brexit in 2020), and this rise peaked between 2010-2020. During the last decade (between 2010-2020), PRR parties have significantly increased their votes and have been able to set the political agenda in their countries.

It is imperative to state that; with the mass support they obtained today, the PRR are increasingly normalized, which were considered marginal in the post-World War II period. Thus, much so that the ideological attitudes and discourses attributed to radicalism are gradually becoming normalized and mainstream in European politics thanks to the PRR parties.

Although there are many reasons for the rise of the PRR in EU member countries over the past decade, the most important driving forces for their rise are: The economic crisis that emerged with the global financial crisis of 2007-08; Mass migration that began with the 2011 Arab Spring as well as outbreak of the Syrian civil war; Islamophobia, which has increased as a result of bombings by fundamentalist Islamic organizations in major European cities, and the fear of losing their identity with globalization spreading among people (Bravo & Castelló, 2021). The economic crisis and migration and the identity conflicts it entails are linked and feed each other. As a result of these developments, the discourses of the populist parties of the radical right, which feed on social dissatisfaction, find it easier to gain support in society.

The facts revealed above hence represent the core of this study. What is more, to understand the general characteristics of radical right-wing populist parties in

Europe and to get an idea of their politics, these two parties will be treated and analyzed as a case. These parties are the AfD in Germany and the Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands. To examine more concretely the ideological attitudes, electoral success, organization, discourse, and policies of PRR parties, these two case studies are hence discussed. In this context, the rise of PRR parties, which are theoretically defined and explained with data, will be detailed with these two case studies.

In light of these developments, this thesis aims to problematize the common characteristics of the populist radical right parties. These various aspects were, therefore decisive in the selection of the study's sample. First, the AfD pursues Euroscepticism, anti-immigration, and Islamophobia policies. Unlike most populist parties on the radical right, the AfD lacks a prominent charismatic leader. Because of the lack of a dominant leader, the AfD's ideological attitudes may change. In addition, AfD has been the first radical right party to enter the parliament (Bundestag) in Germany since 1945 (Aknur, 2020: 434). This success is considered to be the most important proof of the rise of PRR parties in EU countries after 2010.

Second, the PVV is led by a charismatic leader, Geert Wilders. Wilders is the party's only member as he stopped recruiting after the party was formed. In contrast to the classic party organization, the PVV is a party without branches, youth organizations, newspapers, and many institutions. As a result, Wilders, who is the party leader, does not allow different ideas to arise within the party and the ideological attitude of the party to change. The PVV focuses mainly on Islamophobia and anti-immigration.

These features of AfD and PVV both distinguish them from PRR parties and make them important actors for EU politics. Therefore, these two parties were chosen as the case studies of this study.

Finally, the results of PRR parties in EU countries in national and EP elections have been decisive data on success. Since local elections cover restricted regions, their results do not reflect the country in general. Therefore, national elections and EP elections were the elections referenced in this research, as they reflect the country in general.

Statement of The Problem

The main question of the thesis is the rise of PRR parties in EU countries between 2010 and 2020. The PRR parties, which were previously marginal and often received very few votes across Europe, have gained, in effect, marked ballots over the past decade, both in local and national elections and in EP elections. With this increase in almost all European countries, these parties have shed their marginality and positioned themselves to lead national and European politics. This progression is all the more evident as the traditional parties have adopted the rhetoric of the PRR parties to be competitive.

The prosperity and stability of the EU countries make them the target of the migration route of citizens from underdeveloped countries. As a result of mass migration and the EU's enlargement and deepening policies, a multicultural structure has emerged in continental Europe. On the other hand, the PRR parties consider multiculturalism a threat to indigenous peoples' identity. In addition, these parties aim to implement policies contrary to human rights, the principle of equality of democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, based on a hierarchical social order. All this means that the rise of PRR parties brings the problem of the threat to the existing order of Europe and liberal democracy.

Another research problem of this study focuses on the distinction between the "radical right" and the "far-right." Indeed, the terms "radical right" and "extreme right" are often used interchangeably in the literature. However, it is revealed in various sources that there are ideological differences between the extreme right party and the parties belonging to the radical right party family. This problem is a source of ambiguity in the studies on right-wing parties that have been and will be carried out. For this reason, it is crucial to determine the boundaries of the terms radical right and extreme right by revealing the differences.

Purpose of The Study

The global economic crisis that emerged with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 also severely affected EU member states. Unemployment and public debt have increased in EU member states, and the economy has contracted. Faced with the economic crisis, the people found the problem in the policies pursued by the existing parties and the functioning of the European Union. Under the influence of the financial

crisis, European countries faced mass migration that began with the Arab Spring that broke out in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) in 2011. However, among those currently struggling with economic problems, the idea that the EU cannot bear the burden of immigrants has taken hold.

Furthermore, due to the wave of mass immigration, it is believed that European identity would be damaged, cultural assimilation would occur, and crime rates would increase, leading to an increase in public reaction to mass immigration. The explosion of large cities in Europe taken over by fundamentalist Islamic organizations reinforces the xenophobia that had already appeared in European society. Thus, Europeans, who were not satisfied with the policies of the existing parties, turned to the PRR parties. PRR parties, which developed rhetoric tailored to the new emerging conditions, stood out, appealed to more masses, and gradually increased their votes in elections. This led to the rise in polling and rhetoric of PRR parties across Europe between 2010 and 2020.

This study, therefore, aims to explain, using the collected research data, the factors involved in the rise of PRR parties in EU countries between 2010 and 2020 and the effects they have on the current political order. In this direction, the analysis of the current situation of PRR parties in Europe is intended to provide insight into how the political process that will occur in the future will be shaped. Furthermore, the concretization of the limits of the "populist radical right," whose conceptual framework was drawn by examining the AfD and PVV parties as case studies, is part of the study's objectives.

The sub-objectives of the study include examining the discourses and policies of the PRR parties, examining the ideological elements of these parties, and explaining that these ideological elements may pose a threat to the European political order due to their radical nature. The fact that these parties have become important players in Europe raises concerns about the future of Europe and the international order. So much so that these parties, which have an opposing attitude towards immigrants, who have become a global problem, further aggravate the impasse.

As a result, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature on international relations by examining the impact of the radical policies adopted by this party family on the EU and the international system, as well as the claims that global crises such as the financial crisis, the Arab Spring, the Syrian civil war, and terrorist attacks have caused the rise of PRR parties.

Research Questions / Hypotheses

The central hypothesis of this thesis is that radical right populist parties have increased across Europe between 2010 and 2020. With that said, this thesis aims to answer the following questions that form the framework of the study:

1. What are the reasons for the rise of radical right populist parties in European countries between 2010 and 2020?
2. Does the rise of radical right-wing populist parties constitute a threat to the social and political order of the EU? / What kind of threat does it represent?
3. What factors or developments have influenced the rise of the AfD in Germany and the PVV in the Netherlands and enabled them to find supporters in society? Do global crises impact the promotion of radical right-wing populist parties?

Significance of The Study

This thesis presents an updated study on the rise of PRR parties in EU countries, with particular reference to the developments in the last decade. Through a comprehensive assessment of the PRR parties in the EU countries from a historical perspective, and examining the developments that have sustained the rise of these parties today makes this study significant. Furthermore, the analysis of the ongoing rise of PRR parties in the last decade, and the critical evaluation of the reasons for this rise distinguish this study from other studies.

In addition to the comprehensive and up-to-date treatment of the topic in this study, the sampling makes the topic more understandable and concrete. Furthermore, the analysis of two case studies (AfD and PVV) on how discourses and policies have developed in relation to current national and international developments offers a broader perspective on the topic discussed.

On the other hand, the examination and collection of data and information related to the topic covered by the study systematically will facilitate the work of future researchers interested in this issue. In addition, the conclusions that are drawn should provide perspective to those working in this research area.

Limitations

Although PRR parties are influential worldwide, this study focuses merely on right-wing parties in EU member countries. This region was chosen as the study universe because the EU is the world's engine for human rights, and a change in this area represents a global impact.

On the other hand, while the history of PRR parties in Europe covers an extended period, this study focuses on the process between the years 2010-2020. This temporal limitation is explained by the fact that the impact of the economic crisis that began with the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 has been felt more deeply since 2010, and that the PRR parties, which took advantage of this crisis, found enough support to take power in national assemblies.

In addition, the AfD and PVV parties were chosen as case studies for this study instead of all PRR parties in the EU member states. These two different parties are considered case studies for various reasons. Parties belonging to the PRR party family may develop different discourses and follow different policies depending on the circumstances in each country. Although this family of parties has standard ideological characteristics (Mudde, 2007), they have very different ideological attitudes and discourses on various issues. These familiar and different aspects allowed for selecting the two parties in the sample.

Moreover, this study aims to obtain general information about the PRR party family in EU member states through a sample of parties. The AfD party was chosen as a case study because it is both a new PRR party and the first radical right party to enter the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) in Germany since World War II (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 305-306). Furthermore, the AfD lacks a charismatic leader, unlike most radical right populist parties, which is another reason it is taken as an example. Finally, the AfD's radicalization based on moderate rhetoric and ideological shifts due to the lack of a strong authority within the party represents other reasons.

The PVV, on the other hand, was chosen as a case study because a charismatic leader has emerged within the party. Wilders, the leader of the PVV party, stands out more than the party itself. Wilders' rhetoric towards immigrants and especially Muslims can reach levels that violate human rights.

Outline and Methodology

This study consists of three main parts, in addition to the introduction and conclusion parts. In the first chapter, elements such as the introduction and scope of the thesis, the purpose of this thesis, the significance of the thesis, and the method of this study are given. In the second part, the concept of "populist radical right" is defined under the title of the conceptual framework, and the ideological characteristics of the PRR party family are discussed.

Furthermore, a literature review of previous studies is provided in the same section. In the third chapter, a brief history of PRR parties in EU countries after World War II is first addressed, and then the rise of these parties between 2010-2020 and the reasons for this rise are discussed and examined in detail. The case studies are discussed in the fourth chapter and analyzed in the context of the conceptual framework. Analysis of the discourses of the leaders and political elites of the two sample parties and their party platforms are also included in the case study. Finally, the fifth chapter is devoted to the conclusion, which presents the study results.

This study mainly draws its data from the secondary sources which include articles, books, reports and newspapers. The research design of this thesis predominantly employed a qualitative methodology instead of quantitative research technique. It is insufficient to conduct research with the traditional method, since human and social phenomena are constantly changing and not static (Yıldırım, 1999). Therefore, using qualitative research method, which is a more interpretive and explanatory approach to social phenomena, provides more comprehensive results. Moreover, in this study, the debates on the rise of radical right populist parties in Europe between 2010-2020 and the consequences are examined with the case study method using the information obtained through the literature review. Case study, a qualitative research method, is an approach in which detailed and in-depth research is conducted through multiple sources of information about a current and limited case or multiple cases in a limited time (Creswell, 2013). With the case study method, it is aimed to obtain general information about the research subject as a result of the deep and detailed examination of a limited number of cases. In this study, instead of investigating the populist radical right parties all over Europe, the case study method is used to make general conclusions with two sample cases.

In the sections that constitute the conceptual part of the study, sources such as books, articles, theses were used as primary and secondary sources, and a detailed literature review was conducted. Then, for the analysis of the discourses of the leaders and political elites of the parties (AfD and PVV) selected as case studies, information from books, articles, magazines, newspapers, party programs, and statutes, social media, and websites were used as primary and secondary sources.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review And Conceptual Framework

Regardless of its precise definition, the rise of right-wing politics in Europe and its impact on Europe's democratic values has always been a hot topic in academic circles, both in Europe and worldwide. As a result, scientific studies on this subject occupy an important place in the social sciences. On the other hand, the topic remains up-to-date as it has become a trend in Europe in the last decade. Moreover, this leads to an increase in studies on the subject.

In the data collection process of this study, the substantive nature of the literature was used to a great extent, and a thorough literature review was conducted. The review of previous studies on the topic is a vital pillar of this study's findings. Additionally, the conceptualization of the "populist radical right" is essential to sign the parties categorized by this concept and understand their functionality.

Literature Review

Radical right-wing parties were marginalized by European state mechanisms and excluded from politics after World War II. However, these parties regrouped in the 1980s, increased their votes, and began to work their way into the system. At the same time, university education also increased.

Cas Mudde (2016: 3-4) expresses the mobility-related to this topic in the social sciences in three waves: In the first wave between 1945 and 1980, research was generally "historical and descriptive," and the titles "far-right" and "neo-fascism" were used; In the second wave between 1980 and 2000, studies focused more on "the reasons for the success of the radical right in modern democracies;" In the third wave from 2000 onwards, studies focused on the political effects of these parties as well as on their electoral success.

Pierro Ignazi (1992) describes the rise of radical right-wing populist parties - which Ignazi calls extreme right parties - after 1980 as a "silent counter-revolution. He argues that changing party systems, unstable elections, and the emergence of new party types such as the Greens pushed radical right populist parties into action.

On the other hand, Hans-Georg Betz (1994) has called this type of emerging right-wing party "radical right-wing populism" and has drawn attention to its populist

aspects. Betz (1994) examined this new type of emerging right-wing parties in Western Europe one by one.

The populist attitudes of the new right-wing parties have also attracted the attention of Paul Taggart. In his book *Populism* (2004), he called the new right-wing politics emerging in Western Europe “new populism.” According to Taggart (2004: 95), this new type of right-wing party combines neo-fascism and new populism. This shows an increasing emphasis on the populist attitudes of these radical right-wing parties.

Cas Mudde, on the other hand, described these new types of right-wing parties as “populist radical right parties” in his book *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (2007) and emphasized that they are both radical and populist. In this study, Mudde examined radical parties in all continental European countries. With his analyses, he concluded that these parties have gradually become institutionalized in Europe, have become political actors, and have permeated the European political system. Furthermore, Mudde clarified the categorization of parties according to their ideological attitudes and the feeding of populism by these radical right-wing parties rising in EU countries.

David Art (2011) explained the distinction between the radical right and the far-right regarding the PRR parties described as far-right in the media and stated that the radical right fit into the system, while the extreme right tried to destroy the system. According to him, keeping up with the times and shaping themselves according to the conditions of the time can reveal why the PRR parties have gained strength and success.

Tjitske Akkerman (2016) also argues that the rising PRR parties - which she calls “radical right populist parties” - in Western Europe are now part of the mainstream and are further softening their anti-order position. Especially after the 2000s, radical right populist parties have become more ideologically moderate and have sought to broaden their base and win more votes. According to her, they are not marginalized by the system and can establish themselves as the decision-makers in European politics.

On the other hand, there is evidence that radical right-wing populist parties have been rising in Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe since the mid-2000s. Michael Minkenberg (2015) focuses on the rise of radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe and reveals their ideological differences from right-wing

parties in Western Europe. While PRR parties in Western Europe are more anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic, there is opposition to the minority group within Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg, 2015). However, all PRR parties in Europe are becoming more and more similar, and their core policies are also similar in this regard.

Studies on the rise of PRR parties in Europe have also been conducted in Turkey. Hasan S. Vural (2005) discusses the rise of PRR parties in Western Europe and studies on this topic. Furthermore, Nazif Mandacı and Gökay Özerim (2013) also argue that the opposition of PRR parties to immigration is effective in the securitization process. Finally, Müge Aknur and İbrahim Saylan (2019) argue that the rise of PRR parties threatens liberal democracy.

In addition to scholarly resources such as books and articles reviewed in the literature review, well-known newspapers and news agencies such as the BBC, The Guardian, Deutsche Welle (DW), Reuters, Anadolu Agency (AA) were also used. They were used as data collection tools to analyze the current discourses of the PRR parties and their leaders. In addition, AfD and PVV party platforms published during election periods were also examined to facilitate understanding and evaluation of the parties' policies.

Conceptual Framework

PRR describes a group of parties with similar ideologies and political goals and whose political discourses and practices are identical. However, when we look at the literature, many concepts describing such groups or parties appear; far-right, radical right, right-wing populism, new right, neopopulism, populist nationalism, fascism, neofascism, nationalism, nationalist extremism, racist extremism, anti-immigration, nativism, post fascism, antipartism (Taggart, 2004: 95; Vural, 2005: 25; Mudde, 2007: 11-12).

The conceptual diversity of this phenomenon emerged to highlight the different aspects of the groups or parties that can be included in the family and to place each of them in a particular framework. In this study, the increasingly popular concept of “populist radical right” used by Mudde (2007) was preferred to express these parties and their ideas.

On the other hand, to define the concept of “populist radical right,” it is necessary to determine the terms “populism” and “radical right” that make up the

concept. The objective is to make “populist radical right” more understandable by defining these terms, revealing their main lines, and drawing a framework.

Populism

The definition of populism is controversial. So much so that there is still no generally accepted definition. Its spectrum is so broad that it can be used for two opposing political positions, sometimes as a fascist dictatorship and sometimes as an accurate characterization of democracy (Orhan, 2019: 798). According to Taggart, “the search for a perfect definition of populism is both illusory and unsatisfactory and will not lead to a happy ending” (2004: 2). Yet, scholars define populism regarding its different aspects.

Some scholars express populism as an ideology, movement, strategy, thought, reaction, discourse, or political culture. This reveals many different definitions and more information about populism. Developing a theoretical framework for populism will allow us to understand better the PRR party family and its policies, which is the primary focus of this study.

When defining populism, the farmers’ movement that emerged in the United States in the late 19th century is often cited. This farmers’ movement began to fight against low credit policies, agricultural cooperatives, and demands for participatory democracy and led to the creation of the People Party (Populist Party) in 1892 (Çakır, 2012: 13). With this party, the concept of populism began to spread and be used more frequently. However, one can say that although the People’s Party took steps to create radical change, it did not have revolution as its ultimate goal (Taggart 2004: 34).

This attitude of the People’s Party tells us something about the definition of populism. In other words, rather than the idea of changing the system (making a revolution), populism emerges by drawing attention to the reaction of the people and expressing this reaction through leaders, parties, and non-governmental organizations. Therefore, the People’s Party is considered one of the decisive populist movements (Mudde, 2004: 548; Canovan, 1981: 5).

Another case used as a reference to populism is the reaction of Russian peasants to the difficulties they faced in feudal tsarist Russia, which Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017: 32) call “Russian populism” (*narodnichestvo*). With the

encouragement of a group of Russian intellectuals (Going to the People), the Narodnik movement began, but it was unsuccessful.

The idea of establishing socialism based on the “inherent wisdom and potential of the peasants” (Taggart 2004: 72) makes the Narodnik movement, in effect, populist. On the other hand, although this movement historically predates the peasant movement in America, it was labeled populist after the concept of populism emerged with the American People’s Party (Orhan 2019: 800).

The American People’s Party and the Russian Narodnik movement are the two most frequently cited phenomena when discussing the history of populism. The fact that both of these movements took place in rural areas also reflects early definitions of populism.

Margaret Canovan (1981: 4) defines populism as “a rural movement,” “a rural ideology,” or “peasant socialism” in three of the seven definitions she examines. She calls it “rural radicalism” and “rural populism” (1981: 7). On the other hand, Edward Shils extended his analysis to Asian and African populists by expressing populism as “a phenomenon related to the tension between the metropolis and the provinces arising from the tendency to form a global intellectual community” (quoted in Taggart, 2004: 16).

This shows that populists are against the intellectual (metropolitan, urban) and political elites and that populism emerged as its opposite with the emergence of the intellectual community. However, basing the definition of populism on the above-mentioned popular movements would lead to very misleading results. Indeed, politicians, leaders, or popular movements can also be populists. It is, therefore, necessary to broaden the definition and make it more comprehensive.

The two elements that form the basis of populism are the terms “elite” and “people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). These two concepts help us understand populism. The interaction or relationship between the concepts of “elite” and “people” is the most referenced point in the expression of populism. According to Taggart (2004: 115), populism exalts the people’s values and supports them to the end where the interests of the people and the elites conflict. Taggart considers this to be one of the most distinctive features of populism.

Populism assumes that the people are as wise and better than the rulers and the elite class associated with the rulers (Orhan, 2019: 801). This understanding also reflects the definitions. Vural (2005: 26) defines populism as a political imaginary

considered a political style with low ideological content based on the priority of the people's will and which can be articulated with right or left ideologies. According to this definition, populism is not defined as an ideology but rather as a political style and imaginary. Mudde (2004), who considers populism as an ideology, gives the following definition:

...populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. (p. 543)

With this definition, Mudde considers populism to be an ideology. However, he adds that because it is a thin, focused ideology, it can easily be combined with other subtle or overarching ideologies such as communism, socialism, nationalism, or ecology (Mudde, 2004, p. 544). In other words, populism is a baseless ideology (doctrine) that exists by articulating different ideologies rather than acting as an ideology alone.

According to Taggart (2004: 5), populism is not an ideology because it does not possess values such as equality, freedom, and social justice like other ideologies. The two approaches are consistent with each other. Both approaches, which claim that populism is both an ideology and a non-ideology, are consistent.

Because populism can be articulated with other ideologies in general and creates values according to the dualism of the people and the elite. Taggart (2004: 6) states that populism is "chameleon-like" and epochal. This shows that populism takes on the color of conditions and adapts to those conditions. Therefore, populism can be seen in both right and left-wing parties. Since the nationalistic line of the right and the popular emphasis of populism are close, populism is more common in right-wing parties.

Although the term "people" is the primary reference for populism, it is not clear who the "people" are or who they are composed of. This ambiguity determines both the function of the term and its definition. Because populist politicians can keep their position broad with this ambiguous term, its definition is complex in the literature. Therefore, to understand populism, it is necessary to define the meaning of the term "people," which is the leading indicator of populist discourse (Orhan, 2019: 804).

One of the reasons why "the people" is so valuable for populism is that it is a soft and flexible concept (Taggart, 2004: 116). This is why populist politicians use the

term in very different ways. Populist politicians also use this soft and flexible form of the word “people” to blur established differences, bring their supporters together at one point, and allow their appeal to spread over a vast territory (Canovan, 1981: 261). There are also instances where the term “people” is used as a “nation” or associated with culture and considered communities with the same culture.

According to Laclau, since the notion of “the people” is an “empty signifier,” populism can create a common identity or goal among different groups to achieve its goals (cited in Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 9). According to Taggart (2004: 116-117), the term “people” implies the “majority” and the “mass of the crowd,” and populists prefer this term because gaining the support of the majority will further enhance legitimacy. The “people” here are monolithic, united, and unified, without fundamental contradictions.

After explaining the term “people” in this way, Taggart argues that the primary purpose of populist rhetoric is to emphasize the “homeland” by using the discourse of “the people.” He explains it as follows: “The reason for the constant reference to “the people” as a rhetorical device is that it derives from an implicit notion of the homeland, on which a virtuous and united population lives, deeply embedded in the populist imaginary” (2004: 120). With this approach, the homeland ensures that the focus on the people is understood, and it becomes a concept that can limit the people. Taggart (2004: 121) describes the homeland as the community’s core, which excludes the marginalized. Therefore, one of the main arguments of PRR parties today is anti-immigration. Indeed, PRR parties consider those who live in their homeland as people and exclude those who arrived later.

Another important term in the terminology of populism is the term “elite.” According to Mudde and Kaltwasser, populists define elites in terms of power: leaders in politics, economics, media, and art form the elite class (2017: 12). Populism assumes that all the leading people in these different sectors are corrupt because they associate with or even serve the existing political parties. Similarly, populist politicians, bankers, intellectuals, and prominent industrialists form partnerships in a conspiracy (Taggart, 2004: 132).

The view of populism that the public is pure and the elite is corrupt is essentially a moral distinction (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 11-12). However, the boundaries of these elites can change over time and conditions. Therefore, populists may interpret this definition differently when they arrive at the same elite position.

This shows that the term elite should be a purely symbolic definition for populists (Orhan, 2019: 811).

Populism is also hostile to intellectuals because it views them as part of the elite class. As a result, Canovan (1981) argues that scientists attempting to explain populism cannot remain objective and neutral in the face of this hostility because scientists (with intellectual training) cannot act without bias against an opposing group and conduct investigations. Therefore, since the term elite is perceived as the opposite (enemy) group of the people in populism, what is meant varies with time and conditions.

The discursive rhetoric of populism can vary from region to region. Today, while European populists more frequently use the rhetoric of immigrant or xenophobic discourse, favoritism, and economic mismanagement are commonly used by Latin American populists (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 2). These differences may also change over time. This adds another difficulty in making a generally accepted definition of populism. However, the immutable value of populism, wherever and whenever it is, glorifies the people and considers them pure and homogeneous.

It is impossible to speak of a general definition of populism as mentioned above. As Isaiah Berlin notes in his “Cinderella Complex” (quoted in Canovan, 1981: 7; Taggart, 2004: 2), populism is looking for the right shoe, and the suitable candidates give us the current definitions. However, the results and discussions in the literature show that we have not yet found the shoe owner. Therefore, it is more appropriate to create a set of values and derive a framework for populism instead of a general description.

As we have seen with the values mentioned above, populism makes a clear distinction between “us” (the people, farmers, peasants...) and “them” (the elites, city dwellers, immigrants, Jews...), and the rhetoric is produced accordingly. Therefore, the conclusions that populism is ephemeral, populism emerges in certain regions, and populism fails can be misleading. Indeed, today’s populist movements, leaders, or parties have been successful over the long term and have been able to establish themselves. This result indicates that populism means much more in the future and reveals the importance of this issue.

Radical Right

The concepts of “right” and “left” are used loosely to express practices related to politics. More broadly, they are concepts used to categorize political ideas or opinions about the relationship between the state and individuals or groups. Furthermore, they are divided into different categories within the roof concepts themselves.

The emergence of these concepts can be traced back to 1789, when the seating arrangement was adopted at the first meeting of the French General Assembly (États Généraux) (Heywood, 2007: 32-33). In this assembly, the radicals were seated to the king’s left, while the pro-royal aristocrats were seated to the king’s right. Over time, conservative, nationalistic, reactionary, and pro-royals began to be called right-wing, while those who were revolutionary and egalitarian were called left-wing. Thus, as can be seen in Figure 1, ideologies are classified into “left,” “right,” and “center” using a spectrum. These terms, which emerged in this way, are still used today.

Figure 1

Linear Spectrum



Communism Socialism Liberalism Conservatism Fascism

Note: Reprinted from “Siyasi ideolojiler (çev. Ahmet K. Bayram)” by Heywood, A. 2007, p. 33.

According to Mudde (2007: 26), the main distinction between left- and right-wing concepts stems from the approach to the idea of “equality”: While the left sees inequality as artificial and wants to correct it through state intervention, the right sees inequality as natural and outside the competence of the state.

The term “radical,” like “right,” is associated with the French Revolution. Traditionally, it was used for supporters of the French Revolution, i.e., for the left, and in Latin languages, it is still used for left-wing groups (Mudde, 2007: 24). However, nowadays, the term radical is mainly used and associated with the right. The concept of “radical right” first became widespread in the United States in the 1950s and has been used in all languages since the 1960s (Vural, 2005: 25). The radical right is used to describe ideologies at the extreme end of the political spectrum (Figure 1). Thus, as

right-wing ideologies move closer to the extreme, they also become extreme in the issues they advocate. This brings us to another discussion. This discussion also involves defining the concepts of “radical” and “extreme” that characterize the right.

The words “radical” and “extreme” can often be used synonymously in everyday language (Art, 2013: 128). However, using these two terms interchangeably is one of the mistakes made. The Cambridge Dictionary defines “radical” as “believing or expressing the belief that there should be significant or extreme social or political change” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). As seen in this definition, radical and extreme are intertwined and used interchangeably. This misuse leads to an abuse of the concepts of “radical right” and “extreme right,” and, as a result, it becomes difficult to determine what these concepts mean.

Drawing on the German tradition, Mudde expresses the relationship between the two words as follows: “The difference between radicalism and extremism is that the former is *verfassungswidrig* (opposed to the constitution) and the latter is *verfassungsfeindlich* (anti-constitutional)” (2000: 12). With Mudde’s definition, the distinction between “radical” and “extreme” becomes clear. Thus, although radicalism includes a demand for radical political change, it does not consider opposition to the system as necessary; extremism refers to the situation beyond the determined legitimate limits of politics (Vural, 2005: 25). The difference between the terms “radical right” and “extreme right” also becomes clear with this definition.

According to David Art (2013: 128), “While organizations on the radical right accept the basic rules of the democratic game, those on the far right do not. “The difference between these two concepts can, of course, be explained most simply in this way. With the help of this definition, it becomes crucial to determine in which concept a party should be considered.

The system considers extreme right-wing parties dangerous, as a result of which they are even closed, excluded, and marginalized when deemed necessary. In contrast, contemporary radical right-wing parties respect the rules of the democratic game and can respect the rights of others. However, radical right parties are extreme in their discourse against the opposition and in the political project they promote, as they always favor aggressive rhetoric (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 311-312). In other words, even if they accept the game’s rules and do not intend to destroy the system, they may use hostile and harsh language in their discourse.

In this regard, radical right parties place themselves just to the right of their traditional conservative opponents (Art, 2013: 130). It follows those definitions that it is necessary to place the far right at the extreme end of the political spectrum. However, according to Ignazi (1992), it is not enough for the far right to be on the right side of the spectrum. It must also be ideologically informed by the ideology of fascism and be anti-system. If these three characteristics - being at the extreme end of the political spectrum, being informed by fascism, and being anti-system - coexist, we can label a party as far-right.

In his book "The Ideology of the Extreme Right" (2000: 11-12), Mudde argues that there are twenty-six different definitions and fifty-eight different distinguishing characteristics of the "extreme right" in the literature. Five of these characteristics - nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy, and the importance of the strong state - are used in at least half of all definitions. These characteristics constitute the main ideological elements of the far right.

Another point of reference used by those who distinguish between "radical right" and "extreme right" is the positioning concerning the fascist and Nazi parties of the past. Accordingly, parties that refer to the tradition of fascist and Nazi ideologies and are anti-system (liberal democratic system) can be called extreme right (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 312). Given the destruction caused by the ideologies of Fascism and Nazism, which Europe experienced by being drawn into the Second World War, it is expected that European society fears these parties.

Ignazi (1992: 9) argues that fascism is the only ideology that provides the corpus of the far right. For this reason, far-right parties are seen as an updated version of fascist ideology. Thus, the parties of the extreme right are marginalized. Radical right parties do not use violence against their political opponents as fascist movements did in the past. Thus the heirs of fascism are not the radical right parties but the far-right parties (Art, 2013: 132). Therefore, radical right parties and movements manage to present themselves as defenders of real democracy and the interests and values of ordinary people (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 312).

Therefore, the category "radical right-wing party" used in this study refers to parties that oppose political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities, which are the main characteristics of liberal democracy (Mudde, 2007: 25). However, as mentioned earlier, they do not use violence against their political opponents and do not intend to change the system. Of course, the distinction between the far right and

the radical right can sometimes be ambiguous. These parties, which were marginal in the past and referred to fascism and nazism, have gradually moved away from these ideologies and have adopted the basic rules of democracy. Thus, an extreme right-wing party in the past can become a radical party today. Therefore, the term “populist radical right” used in this study seems more inclusive.

Populist Radical Right

The concept of “populist radical right” is a term used by Mudde in his book *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (2007) and coined to describe a particular group of parties similar to each other. However, there is no objective definition of this concept. Therefore, it is difficult to define the concept of “populist radical right.” Indeed, this concept is constantly changing in its structure. It is pretty challenging to make a specific analysis of it because it varies according to situations, contexts, and the diversity of national circumstances, the evolution of political parties and groups, and the speed with which elections take place.

Although it is difficult to define the concept of “populist radical right,” it is possible to talk about the common characteristics of PRR parties. According to Mudde (2007: 22), PRR parties combine fundamental ideologies such as “populism, nativism, and authoritarianism.” This combination is one of the main features that define the boundaries of this party family. However, the limitations of this party family can be quite broad and variable. Therefore, it will be more helpful to focus on the common characteristics of these parties and the change of these features to create the conceptual framework of the PRR party family.

One of the ideological characteristics that define the PRR party family is nativism. Mudde describes nativism “...as an ideology, which holds that states must be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and those non-native elements (people and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state.” (2007: 19). One of the growing claims in recent years is that only the local nation has a right to the state and that foreign people and ideas should be exempt from this right. This is because the increasing number of mass migrations and immigrants worldwide leads to this result. Therefore, the parties that defend it can get more votes.

According to nativism, the local is superior to the external. Therefore, nativism includes xenophobia and nationalist ideologies in terms of definition and approach (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 112). Of course, the path to nationalism today is not like that of World War II and before. Unlike the classical nationalist understanding, there is no racial hierarchy in “nativism. “In other words, there is no claim that natives are the superior race. Instead, there is a mutual understanding that meeting different ethnic elements with the established culture will lead to social unrest and cultural extinction.

In recent time, it has become clear that the claim that nationalism is racial superiority is not a scientific reality and is a social discourse (Çakaş, 2019: 159). Thus, nationalism has changed its form, and the PRR parties adapt to the new understanding of nationalism and choose their discourses accordingly. To define this change in nationalism in its simplest form, a definition is possible as follows: “There are no races in the new nationalism, there are human communities and cultures” (Taş, 1999: 52). This can be culture, religion, language, way of life, etc..., in short, all the material and spiritual values that a community has. PRR parties limit culture to the native citizens of the country in question (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 119). Therefore, it is possible to speak of cultural nationalism by excluding people who are not of their own culture or demanding that these people be integrated into their own culture.

Fukuyama defines this new nationalism as “identified nationalism,” which can be formulated as “us against the newcomers as a threat” (quoted in Hekimler, 2021: 23). Furthermore, one can say that the primary goal of nationalism is to achieve a monocultural state through internal homogenization employing various strategies, including separatism, assimilation, deportation, and genocide. However, this has changed today (Mudde, 2007:16).

This new type of nationalism, especially in Europe, has an attitude that excludes immigrants. In this view, an exclusionism emerges in which the Western lifestyle or modern civil society is considered superior (Vural, 2005: 249). For this reason, European culture is considered and defended as the most fundamental value against immigrants arriving in Europe.

In other words, these cultural nationalists aim to protect their own national culture and European cultural heritage from foreign invasion (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 119). For example, according to the National Front (FN)- the PRR party in France- foreigners cannot follow the local culture because they live in other lands and should be sent away (Taş, 1999: 52). This attitude is observed in all PRR parties in

Europe today. Mudde (2007: 30) argues that the nationalism of these PRR parties is a particular form of nationalism. The combination of the three critical characteristics of the PRR (nativism, authoritarianism, and populism) gives rise to this specific nationalism.

As mentioned earlier, authoritarianism is another common ideological characteristic of PRR parties. Mudde (2007: 22-23) defines authoritarianism as the belief in a society where those who violate the laws of order or authority will be severely punished. However, this attitude is not always synonymous with anti-democracy. There is a more moralistic approach here. This authoritarian approach, shaped by the conservative perspectives of the PRR parties, includes traditional punitive moralism. The authority that will inflict this punishment is the state, which has legitimacy in this regard. For this reason, PRR parties support the strengthening of the state, i.e., authority and the preservation of order.

Therefore, the concept of “populist radical right” consists of a combination of the terms “populism” and “radical right.” Since this concept aims to express a populist form of the radical right (Mudde, 2007: 26), a classification as “populist radical right” was preferred.

Along with the conceptual explanations, some fundamental characteristics of PRR also emerge: it divides society into “us” and “others,” and according to it, only indigenous people should have rights and claims on the state in question; there is no opposition to the system and liberal democracy, but there is opposition; there is authoritarianism in the state and social order, and this authoritarianism comes from traditional punitive morality.

The PRR does not support the thesis of racial superiority but does support the idea of cultural nationalism. The PRR believes that local culture must be defended against other cultures. Furthermore, it assumes that inequality is natural and does not concern the state’s responsibility. Although all these elements do not allow for a general definition of the PRR concept, it provides a framework by giving its general characteristics. Thus, political parties with the above features can be qualified PRR parties.

In summary, based on the literature review conducted for this thesis and following the main research question, it is possible to delineate the characteristics that define the concept of “populist radical right” as follows: It is located at the right end of the linear political spectrum and denigrates the cultural and political elites and

glorifies the people; who are in a protective attitude of the indigenous and local culture, who are confronted with the other and the culture of the other; embraced the authority of the state and even blessed it most of the time; in addition, those who oppose the system but look at the system in a conservative approach.

The political parties examined in the following chapter, representing a general history of PRR party activities in Europe and a picture of their progression in the years 2010-2020, are the parties that exhibit the characteristics of this party family that fits within the conceptual framework delineated above. Indeed, knowing the features and traditional reflexes of the PRR party family defined in the conceptual framework is essential to understand and evaluate the policies produced in the face of the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and the terrorist attacks that European society has faced between the years 2010-2020.

CHAPTER III

A Brief History of PRR Parties in Europe and The Rise of PRR Parties between 2010-2020

In Europe, the rise of the PRR parties after World War II and the resulting increase in studies are historically discussed in the literature as three waves (Mudde, 2016; Vural, 2005). However, the dates of these waves change over time, and there is no clear consensus on these dates.

Mudde (2016) roughly distinguishes these three waves: the first is between 1945 and 1980, the second between 1980 and 2000, and the third from 2000 onwards. Nevertheless, the rise of radical right populist parties in the last decade (2010-2020) and the reasons for this rise differ from the other three waves. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the rise of radical right populist parties in four periods.

Therefore, in this thesis, the rise of the PRR parties will be examined in four periods. The characteristics of these periods are briefly presented below: The first period covers the years 1945-1980 and is the period when populist parties of the radical right reappear. The second period covers 1980-2000 when the PRR parties became institutionalized and established. On the other hand, the third period covers the years 2000-2010 and is when PRR parties change ideologically and numerically due to 9/11 and EU enlargement. The final period is the fourth period which covers the years 2010-2020 and where the success of PRR parties is embodied. During this period, PRR parties have participated in national and local governments and formed groups in the EP. Therefore, it is vital to examine this period separately from the other three periods and determine why it created it.

The Rise of PRR Parties in Europe Between 1945 and 2010

After the French Revolution, the nationalist movement in Europe began to spread very quickly and create an ideological space for itself. This nationalist movement, which started in Europe, spread over time worldwide. However, nationalism, which was seen as a means of emancipation in the nineteenth century, began to take a dangerous turn over time and gradually became chauvinistic, racist, and exclusionary (Hekimler, 2021: 18). Accordingly, Hitler in Germany and Mussolini

in Italy took this nationalism to the highest level after the First World War. They caused the birth of ideologies such as fascism and Nazism.

Nazism and Fascism, which developed under Hitler and Mussolini's leadership, had devastating consequences for Europe. Thus, World War II, the most destructive war in history, occurred because of the rise of fascism and Nazism and their support among the population. It resulted from a catastrophe created entirely by the European ideology. Nationalist rhetoric led to massacres that were akin to genocide. This is why, after World War II, Europe began to distance itself from the far-right parties. Therefore, this thesis discusses the European history of far-right populist parties in the post-World War II period.

First Period: 1945-1980

The massive loss of people and the devastation experienced during World War II led to the marginalization of the radical right and the decline of mass support across Europe. Especially with the sense of collective guilt created by the Holocaust (Jewish genocide), the nationalist discourse in European society became ineffective (Çakaş, 2019: 159). Therefore, the PRR parties could not become an actor shaping Europe's politics during the first period. However, with the first period, the foundations of the PRR parties, which will also cover the present, were laid.

The first notable development of this early period was the movement of Poujadism, which emerged in France in the 1950s. Pierre Poujade led this movement, which began as a mercantile opposition to taxation and state authority. The movement then evolved into a party called Union et Fraternité Française (French Union and Fraternity, UFF) in 1956 (Taggart 2004: 98).

Poudajism, as a populist movement, won 11.6 percent of the vote in the 1956 elections, which were the first in which it participated, and had 52 deputies elected (Vural 2005: 140). This significant result subsequently laid the FN foundation, a stable PRR party in France. One of the 52 UFF deputies was Jean-Marie Le Pen, who founded the FN in 1972 (Taggart 2004: 99). However, because the FN was composed of a combination of fascist, neo-Nazi, and poujadist masses, it remained marginal until the 1980s (Saç 2017: 270).

FPÖ, one of the most stable PRR parties in Europe, was founded in the same period. The FPÖ was founded in 1956 by the nationalist wing that left the party *Verband der Unabhängigen* (Union of Independents, VDU) (Vural, 2005: 101). This party is still one of the most critical players in Austrian politics today.

Because of the Nazi past, radical right-wing parties in Germany failed to gain traction after the war. The German Nationalist Party (NPD) received 4.3 percent of the vote in the 1969 elections, the highest score since its inception, but failed to cross the electoral threshold. (Mudde, 2000: 28). This delayed the emergence of a politically powerful PRR party in Germany.

The Progress Party (Fremskridtspartiet, FP), founded in 1972 under the leadership of Mogens Glistrup in Denmark, became the second-largest party with 15.9 percent of the vote in the 1973 elections (Betz 1994: 5). The FP mainly advocated the abolition of income tax and the reduction of bureaucracy and state control (Taggart, 2004: 101). Lange also founded the Progress Party (FrP) in Norway simultaneously and with a similar vision. It became an established party in Norway by receiving 5 percent of the vote in the 1973 elections (Betz, 1994: 5). The PRR parties in both countries have been constantly involved in the political arena until today.

In this way, it is possible to summarize the PRR parties, which we will consider as successes of the first period. In addition to these: The Italian Social Movement (MSI) in Italy obtained 8.7 percent of the vote in the 1972 elections (Taş, 1999: 17); the *Vlaams Blok*, founded in Belgium in 1978, was not very successful in those years (Betz, 1994: 19-20).

Second Period: 1980-2000

The rise of the PRR parties in the EU countries can be seen most concretely after the 1980s. Indeed, after the Second World War, EU countries experienced an economic recovery, and the need for workers was felt. As a result, these countries began to recruit guest workers from other countries.

Thus, a large immigrant population was formed on the European continent. However, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system between 1970 and 1980 and the developments of the oil crisis, unemployment increased, the understanding of the welfare state was interrupted, and economic problems began (Ertuğrul, 2016: 6-7).

In addition, the introduction of liberal economic policies instead of understanding the social state also influenced this period because globalization increased with liberalism and people started to panic about the loss of identity (Taş, 1999: 17). People began, hence, to hold on more to their identities and trust the politician who put forward this issue in this situation.

As a result of all these developments, parties with a "new politics" approach appeared in continental Europe (Taggart 2004: 94). The right-wing of this new politics, which was not satisfied with the existing parties, consisted of the PRR parties. These right-wing parties tried to build new politics based on immigration, taxation, nationalism, and regionalism (Taggart 2004: 95).

It can be said to have been the catalyst for the rise of nationalist discourse in Europe, especially on the "immigrant problem. In this new era, PRR parties have built their policies on these migrations from third-world countries and the integration issues of immigrants. PRR parties cited immigrants as the main reason for problems (such as unemployment, increased crime) in European countries during this period. By focusing on unemployment and rising crime rates, PRR parties could manipulate the masses by turning them against immigrants (Eser & Çiçek, 2020: 120). For this reason, PRR parties progressed in this process and became established parties on the European political scene.

The most significant development of the second period is the rise of the FN from the 1980s onwards. It first became the fourth party in France with 11 percent of the vote in the 1984 EP elections, and then the third party with nearly 10 percent of the vote in the 1986 general elections (Betz 1994: 16). Le Pen's populist rhetoric and distrust of centrist parties in France played a role in this success. Continuing its success in this way, the FN became a fundamental part of the French party system by winning 15 percent of the vote in the 1997 presidential and general elections (Taggart 2004: 99).

Another highlight of the 1980s was the arrival of Jörg Haider as leader of the FPÖ party. The public knew Haider as a right-wing extremist (Vural 2005: 103). However, Haider criticized the monopoly of Austrian political power by only two parties (the Social Democratic Party of Austria-SPÖ and the Austrian People's Party-ÖVP) and successfully used populist programs such as a harsh opposition to immigrants and economic freedom (Taggart 2004: 100). Only eleven months after

Haider came to power, the FPÖ achieved a massive success of 9.7 percent in the national elections. (Betz 1994: 12).

In this context, the FPÖ, as a PRR party, continued to increase its success. The FPÖ was, on the other hand, reluctant to join the EU. It was the only party to vote against the referendum on EU membership, which turned into a political integration project with uncertain borders. It thus achieved a high score of 33.4 percent (Vural, 2005: 108). The FPÖ continued its success and became the second-largest party in Austria with 26.7 percent of the 1999 elections (Öner, 2018: 43). For this reason, the FPÖ became a partner party with the government.

Italy is another example of the rise of the PRR during this period. In Italy, the MSI party was not successful until 1990. Still, later, under the leadership of Gianfranco Fini, the party changed its name to the National Alliance (AN) and became a government partner with Berlusconi by winning 15.7 percent of the vote in the 1995 elections (Taş, 1999: 101). Another government partner was the Northern League (LN), another PRR party. Umberto Bossi founded the LN in the early 1980s as a regional party seeking autonomy for northern Italy (Taggart, 2004: 103). In the 1994 elections, LN became a partner in government, winning 8.4 percent of the vote (Betz 1994: 10). The alliance of Bossi, Fini, and Berlusconi showed the point reached by the radical right in Italy. One of the partners in this alliance, the LN, with its harsh attitude towards immigrants, its appeal to the "parasitic south" and to "corrupt Rome" (Vural 2005: 174), shows that it is a part of the PRR.

There was a rise of PRR parties in the Scandinavian countries during this period. DF was founded by members who had left the Progress Party in Denmark in 1995 and became the dominant xenophobic party (Vural 2005: 133). Thus, DF, the new PRR party in Denmark, succeeded with 7.8 percent of the vote in the first election it participated in in 1998 (Wildfedt 2018: 10). Meanwhile, the FRP in Norway maintained its stability during this period, received 15.3 percent of the vote in the 1997 election, and brought 25 representatives (Taş 1999: 110). In another Scandinavian country, Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) was established in 1988, but it was unsuccessful in the second period (Wildfedt, 2018).

In the 1989 EP elections, the Belgian populist radical party Vlaams Blok and the German REP succeeded and obtained one representative each. Later, these two parties and the French party FN joined forces and formed the Technical Group of the

European Right (DR) (European Parliament, 2019). Thus, the rising radical right in Europe now finds representation in the supranational institutions.

The most significant development of this period was undoubtedly the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the transition of Eastern European countries to liberal democracy. Although the rise of PRR parties in Eastern European countries coincided with the third wave, the situation was different in Hungary. The Hungarian Party of Rights and Life (MIÉP) was founded by István Csurka in 1993 and made significant progress, obtaining 5.5 percent of the vote in the 1998 elections (Mudde 2007: 44). Therefore, the development and rise of the PRR in Hungary have drawn attention to this issue over time. As an Eastern European country, Romania has also experienced the emergence of the PRR during this period. The Grand Romanian Party (GRP) became strong enough to join the government coalition between 1994 and 1995 (Minkenberg, 2015: 117).

Therefore, it is possible to speak of a PRR trend that has emerged in Europe since 1980. One of the main reasons for this rise is the increase of nativism due to immigration in Europe. Another reason is the decreased confidence in the established parties due to the new political wave. In addition, during this transition from the conception of the social state to liberalism, the fear of losing one's identity due to globalization has increased.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, immigration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe increased, as did nationalism and xenophobia. Due to socio-economic changes, Western Europe entered a post-industrial process, and the tension between classes became more complex (Ignazi, 1992). As a result, the working class, which generally voted for the left, sided with the PRR parties. In addition, many PRR parties emerged between 1980 and 2000 and gradually established themselves in politics. Many of these parties are still active political actors today.

Third Period: 2000-2010

During this period, the rise of PRR parties continued. However, what makes this period more unique than the other two is the growing success of PRR parties in Central and Eastern European countries. In addition, the September 11, 2001 attack was the defining event of this period.

With the fifth enlargement of the EU, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, and Cyprus became members of the Union in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Avrupa Birliği Başkanlığı, 2020). Thus, many Central and Eastern European countries were included in the EU, and the borders of the Union were not limited to Western Europe. The rise of PRR parties in these countries also coincided with these years.

One of the most distinctive features of this period is the spread of Islamophobia. Islamophobia expanded and deepened with the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ongoing war on terror (Mudde 2007: 84). Thus, PRR parties developed their rhetoric on Islamophobia during this period and shaped them accordingly. Later, when the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 were added, the PRR strengthened the parties' rhetoric, and the parties benefited from it (Mandacı 2012: 63). Therefore, in addition to xenophobia, anti-Semitism, and anti-immigration, anti-Muslimism also became the most fundamental discourse of this period.

As in previous periods, the FN continued its success in this period. Particularly in the 2002 presidential elections, FN leader Jean-Marie Le Pen received 16.86% in the first round and managed to reach the second round with Jacques Chirac. Le Pen increased his success by acquiring 17.7% of the vote in the second round (Mcnicoll, 2017). After this success, the FN attempted to radicalize its policies during this period further. However, this attempt caused Jean-Marie Le Pen a failure in the 2007 presidential election, as he could only get 10.4% of the vote (Akkerman et al., 2016: 234).

Between 2000 and 2005, the FPÖ formed a coalition government with the ÖVP and governed the country together, but the EU member states reacted very strongly and imposed short-term sanctions on Austria (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 302). Because of this reaction from EU countries, the other PRR parties began to act more cautiously. In 2005, disagreements began within the FPÖ, and one group broke with Haider, the leader of the FPÖ, and created the party "Alliance for the Future of Austria" (BZÖ) (Öner, 2014b: 171). The fact that the FPÖ participated in the coalition and then continued by increasing its votes ensured the normalization of PRR parties in Europe.

One of the critical events of this period was the Pim Fortuyn List Party (LPF), founded by Pim Fortuyn in 2002 in the Netherlands. The LPF is a PRR party that excludes Muslims and all immigrants in general, claims that Islam is a backward

religion, and calls for the abolition of the principle of equality in the constitution (Avcu, 2020: 240). However, LPF leader Pim Fortuyn was killed a few days before the election, and the LPF had 26 parliamentarians in the election it ran in (Rooduijn, 2015: 9). Because of this, the leaderless party later dissolved. However, the Freedom Party (PVV), the main PRR party in the Netherlands, was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders (Karataş, 2019: 34). Wilders achieved success quickly, particularly by using anti-Muslim politics in his rhetoric. In the national elections he participated in when he founded the party, the PVV received 5.89% of the vote and elected nine parliamentarians (Avcu, 2020: 243).

The rise of the PRR parties in Central and Eastern Europe coincides with the middle of this period. Although Ataka (Attack) was formed two months before the 2005 national elections in Bulgaria, it received 8.1 percent of the vote. Sidarov, the leader of Ataka, received 24 percent in the 2006 presidential elections (Çiftçi, 2017: 104). In Poland, the League of Polish Families (LPR) emerged in the 2001 elections and was very successful with 8 percent of the vote. However, the Law and Justice (PiS) party was the LPR's biggest competitor, and after 2005, PiS became the only powerful party, overtaking its rival (Minkenberg, 2015: 115). The Party of Greater Romania (PRM) was very successful in Romania, winning 20 percent of the 2000 parliamentary elections. Still, EU political elites warned against this openly racist anti-EU party (Minkenberg, 2015: 117). These warnings also shaped Romanians' attitudes toward EU membership, and the party turned to a more moderate policy.

Existing PRR parties in the Scandinavian countries continued to grow during this period. In Norway, for example, the FrP won 14.6 percent of the vote in the 2001 parliamentary elections, 22.1 percent in the 2005 elections, and 22.9 percent in the 2009 elections. In Denmark, the DF has maintained its steady rise, obtaining 12 percent of the vote in 2001, 13.3 percent of the vote in 2005, and 13.9 percent in 2007 (Widfeldt, 2018: 10).

This rise of PRR parties in Europe was not limited to national elections. In 2005, under the leadership of Haider and his new party, the BZÖ, a meeting was held on the future and cooperation of radical right parties in Europe: Austria's FPÖ, France's FN, Belgium's Vlaams Belang, Bulgaria's Ataka, Romania's PRM, Spain's Alternative Espanola (AE), and Italy's Azione Sociale and Socialist Movement (Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore -MS-FT) participated in this meeting (Mandacı, 2012: 60).

In this way, the rise of populist parties from the radical right to a supranational structure also became an issue.

Table 1

Performance of the Combined PRR Parties in the 2004 and 2009 EP Elections

Country	Populist Radical Right Parties	2004	2009
Austria	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)	6.31	17.29
Belgium	Flemish Bloc (VB)	14.3	9.85
Bulgaria	National Union Attack (ATAKA)	0	11.96
Cyprus	National Popular Front (ELAM)	0	0.22
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	6.8	15.4
Finland	True Finns (PS)	0.54	9.79
France	Front National (FN)	9.8	6.3
Germany	The Republicans (REP), National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)	1.88	1.3
Greece	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS), Golden Dawn (GD), Independent Greeks (ANEL)	4.1	7.65
Hungary	Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)	0	14.77
Italy	Northern League (LN)	17.16	10.2
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Dutch Freedom Party (PVV)	2.55	16.97
Portugal	National Renovator Party (PNR)	0.25	0.37
Spain	National Democracy (DN)	0.05	0.14
Sweden	Swedish Democrats (SD)	0	3.27
UK	British National Party (BNP), United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	21.1	22.13

Note: Reprinted from "The Rise of the Far Right in Debtor and Creditor European Countries: The Case of European Parliament Elections" by D. Halikiopoulou, T. Vlandas, 2015, *The Political Quarterly*, 86(2), 279-288, p. 281.

During this period, two elections to the EP were held, one in 2004 and the other in 2009. With the fifth enlargement of the EU, PRR parties from Eastern European countries also achieved significant success in the EP elections. As Table 1 shows, by

comparing the 2004 and 2009 elections, we can constate that these parties have gradually increased their votes.

One of the most distinctive features of this period is that the populist parties of the radical right that have emerged in Eastern Europe have gradually increased their votes. Unlike radical right parties in Western European countries, the target groups of radical right parties in Eastern Europe are national, ethnic, and religious minorities within their borders rather than guest or illegal workers and asylum seekers (Mandacı, 2012: 52). The indigenous populations in Eastern European countries understand that these minorities are not loyal to the states in which they live (Mudde, 2007: 72). On the other hand, after the 9/11 attacks, one of the central discourses of the PRR parties in Europe was anti-Islamism. As a result, the emphasis on the essence of Christianity increased in Europe, and many PRR parties started to put more emphasis on Christian values (Mudde 2007: 85). Thus, these parties found the formula for anti-Islamism in glorifying Christianity.

The Rise of PRR Parties in Europe: 2010-2020

PRR parties in Europe have become the most important political actors in Europe after 2010. Many parties that were previously marginalized and left out of the political arena became normal during this period and took their place in local and national assemblies by increasing their votes. In the regional and national elections and the two EP elections (2014-2019) held during this period, PRR parties flourished and merged into a group. Between 2010 and 2020, global crises caused this wave of PRR rise observed across Europe, which led to the economic crises, mass migration, and attacks on European cities. Following this, the emphasis on identity, Euroscepticism, and reluctance to share wealth was emphasized by PRR parties and received more votes.

The Age of PRR Parties for Europe: 2010-2020

The PRR boom in Europe, which began in the 1980s, reached its peak in terms of quality and quantity after 2010. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to call this period the "golden age" of the PRR. Indeed, during this period, RRP parties took part in the administration of many European countries, and mainstream parties adopted the ideologies of these parties in many countries to avoid losing votes (Akkerman et

al., 2016). As a result, the RRP found itself in the management during this period, both physically and intellectually.

The conditions that formed this period were major crises: the global financial crisis of 2007-08 and the Arab Spring of 2011. Contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2012) described the beginning of this period, 2011, as follows:

In 2011, we witnessed (and participated in) a series of shattering events, from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street movement, from the UK riots to Breivik's ideological madness. It was the year of dreaming dangerously, in both directions: emancipatory dreams mobilizing protesters in New York, on Tahrir Square, in London and Athens; and obscure destructive dreams propelling Breivik and racist populists across Europe, from the Netherlands to Hungary. (p. 1)

This brief description demonstrates what kind of process this period was going to be from the beginning. Many events affected the world, and one of them was that the PRR parties were now successful enough to take part in the administration.

The populist parties of the radical right, which are now institutionalized, first appeared in Western Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they also developed in Central and Eastern European countries. As we can see in Table 2, the average voting rate of PRR parties in Western Europe, which was 8 percent in the 1990s in national elections, increased to 12.5 percent after 2010. Table 2 provides evidence that PRR parties in Western Europe increased significantly after 2010. Moreover, this increase was not limited to Western European countries, and the wave of radical nationalism spread throughout continental Europe.

An increase parallel to that in Table 2 in all European countries continues today. Moreover, Table 2 show that this increase is stable, indicating that the PRR parties will be very active players in European politics. Therefore, this increase raises a concern for Europe and the rest of the world. This concern is about the normalization of nationalism with the rise of these PRR parties in Europe, which is likely to produce devastating consequences like World War II.

Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the FN party in France that served as the locomotive for populist parties of the radical right in Europe, passed the party's leadership to his daughter Marine Le Pen in 2011 (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 314). Unlike her father, Marine Le Pen eliminated the extremist elements of the party, gave the party

a more moderate and modern atmosphere, and received support from different segments (Saç, 2017: 267).

Table 2

Average Percentage of PRR Parties' Votes in National Elections in Western Europe

Country	Party	1990-1999	2000-2009	2010-2015
Austria	BZÖ	-	7.4	3.5
	FPÖ	22.0	12.8	20.5
Belgium	FNb	1.6	2.0	-
	VB	8.1	11.8	5.8
Denmark	DF	7.4	13.2	16.7
	FrP	5.1	0.6	-
Finland	PS	2.4	2.9	18.3
France	FN	13.7	7.8	13.6
	MNR*	-	1.1	-
Germany	REP*	1.9	0.6	-
Greece	LAOS	-	3.9	1.8
Italy	LN	9.1	5.6	4.1
Netherlands	CD	1.6	-	-
	LPF	-	11.4	-
	PVV	-	5.9	12.8
Norway	FrP	10.8	19.9	16.3
Sweden	NyD	4.0	-	-
	SD	-	3.3	12.9
Switzerland	SVP	16.4	27.8	28.9
United Kingdom	BNP*	-	1.9	-
	UKIP*	-	1.9	7.9
Average		8	7.5	12.5

Note: * Party only elected to the European Parliament. Reprinted from “Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe Into the mainstream?” by T. Akkerman, S. L. de Lange, M. Rooduijn, 2016, Routledge, p. 2.

In doing so, Marine Le Pen has redesigned the legacy she received from her father by tuning into the demands of the times. This has, of course, brought her success. This success began with the 2012 presidential elections, where Marine Le Pen obtained

17.90% of the vote and became the third after Hollande and Sarkozy (Akin, 2019: 35). Competing with Macron in the 2017 presidential elections, Le Pen came in second with 21.3% of the vote in the first round, increased her vote in the second round, and received 39.07% of the vote (Clarke & Holder, 2017). After this election, Le Pen sought to refresh her image and facilitate alliances by changing the name of the FN party to Rassemblement National in 2018, as the FN party name was associated with racism and anti-Semitism (“France's National Front Renamed”, 2018).

Another pioneer of PRR parties in Europe, the FPÖ placed third in the country with 26 percent of the vote in the 2017 Austrian elections and then became the government coalition partner of the ÖVP, which emerged victorious in the polls (Eser & Çiçek, 2020: 122). As mentioned above, the FPÖ formed a coalition and became a governmental partner in the period 2000-2005, but at the time, EU member states reacted and applied minor sanctions in this regard. However, as Europe shifted to the right in this period, EU member states did not attempt to impose sanctions, even though the FPÖ became part of the coalition after the 2017 elections (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 302). Therefore, the most prominent feature of this period was the normalization and gradual integration of the PRR parties.

A similar process to France and Austria is also in question for the Italian PRR. Matteo Salvini succeeded Umberto Bossi in 2013 as the anti-EU and anti-immigration LN leader, defending Italian nationalism, reshaping the party to fit current politics, and changing the party's name to the League Party (Lega) (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 312). With this move, Salvini tried to make the party appeal to the entire nation by taking it out of narrow regionalism and giving the party a more moderate appearance. As a result, Lega became the third party by receiving 17% of the vote in the 2018 Italian general election and took part in the coalition government (Eser & Çiçek, 2020: 123).

During this period, we also see that PRR parties began to play a leading role in the political scene of Central and Eastern European countries. The center-right parties, Fidesz in Hungary and PiS in Poland, began to increasingly adopt the policies of PRR parties to avoid losing votes. In Hungary, the Fidesz party led by Viktor Orban became the leader with 67 percent of the vote in the 2010 elections, and Jobbik, the PRR party, became the second-largest party with 16.7 of the vote and was represented in parliament with 67 deputies (Minkenberg, 2016: 192).

As the Fidesz party worries about the rise of the Jobbik party, it hardens its nationalist and anti-refugee rhetoric and gradually shifts its line to the radical right. In

the 2018 elections held in Hungary, Fidesz managed to return to power. Still, Jobbik was very successful, obtaining 19 percent of the vote (table 3), which indicates the Fidesz party's further radicalization to avoid losing votes. Similarly, in Poland, the PiS came to power alone by getting 37% and 235 seats in 2015 but continued to play politics using the rhetoric of the PRR parties (Yıldırım, 2017: 66). The center-right Fidesz and PiS parties have brought PRR ideas to power by displaying radical attitudes, such as discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants, Jews, and Muslims, and Euroscepticism in recent years.

Another feature of this period is that PRR parties gained representation in the national assembly for the first time in some countries. The Vox party, which was born as a reaction to the separatist rhetoric of Catalonia and the BASK regions in Spain (Hekimler, 2021: 21), managed to enter parliament for the first time in 2018 and increased the number of seats in parliament from 24 to 52 by obtaining 15 percent of the vote (Table 3) in the 2020 elections. Similarly, the AfD party, founded in Germany in 2013, was the first radical right party to enter the German parliament since 1945 (Aknur & Saylan, 2020: 292). Indeed, the AfD, which received 12.6 percent of the vote in Germany's last national election (Table 3), quickly became a successful party. Thus, the rise of the PRR in Europe has been felt in every sense of the word.

During this period, the rise of populist parties of the radical right was limited to national and local elections and increased their votes in the EP. According to Oktay Hekimler (2021: 18), the results of the 2014 European elections are "the first indication that a sleeping monster is waking up." This monster was the monster of nationalism suppressed after World War II and became more prominent in the 2019 AP elections.

After the 2014 EP elections, the PRR parties came together under the leadership of Le Pen and created a group called Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) in 2015 (Çöpoğlu, 2017: 10). This group included the FPÖ from Austria, the PVV from the Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang from Belgium, Janice Atkinson, expelled from the anti-EU party UKIP, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and Stanislaw Zoltek, removed from the Polish far-right movement KNP (Congress of the New Right) (Karaca, 2015). Similarly, the PRR parties formed a more influential group after the 2019 EP elections. Le Pen MEPs and Matteo Salvini formed the Identity and Democracy (ID) group in the EP, the largest group ever formed by PRR parties (Rankin, 2019).

PRR parties, the fifth largest group in the EP with 73 members (European Parliament, 2019), have proven to be the political actors shaping European politics.

Not all PRR parties in EU countries were included in the ID; some were in other groups or did not belong to any group. The PRR parties were very successful in the 2019 EP elections, taking all these elements into account. For 170 of the 751 seats, or 23 percent of the entire parliament, went to anti-immigration, populist, radical right, or Eurosceptic parties (Aktan, 2019).

Table 3

Vote Ratios of Some PRR Parties in Europe in the Last Elections (2020)

Country	Party Name	Vote Ratio (%)	Election Year
Austria	Freedom Party (FPÖ)	16,1	2019
Bulgaria	United Patriots (OP)	9	2017
Cyprus	ELAM	3,7	2016
Denmark	Danish People's Party (DF)	21	2015
Estonia	Conservative People's Party (EKRE)	17,8	2019
Finland	True Finns (PS)	17,7	2015
France	National Rally (RN)	13	2017
Germany	Alternative for Germany (AfD)	12,6	2017
Greece	Greek Solution (EL)	3,7	2019
Hungary	Jobbik	19	2018
Italy	The League	17,4	2018
Netherlands	Freedom Party (PVV)	13	2017
Poland	Confederation	6,8	2019
Spain	Vox	15	2020
Sweden	Sweden Democrats (SD)	17,6	2018
Switzerland	Swiss People's Party (SVP)	25,8	2019

Note: Compiled from "Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide" by BBC, 2019 & "Austrian elections: support for far-right collapses" by P. Oltermann, The Guardian, 2019.

As a result, there has been an increase in the PRR in many EU countries between 2010 and 2020. PRR parties that increased their votes were successful in local and national elections and the supranational EP. The most distinctive feature of this period was the participation of PRR parties in the administration or the gradual integration of their rhetoric and policies. In addition, the PRR parties showed that they

were more potent and moving towards supranational cooperation by forming groups in the EP. Behind all this rise in power are the crises and international developments that have emerged during this period. In this case, it is also essential to examine the reasons for the rise of PRR parties in Europe, especially between 2010 and 2020.

Reasons for the Rise of PRR Parties in Europe Between 2010-2020

There are many reasons why the PRR parties have increased their power and risen, especially in recent years. However, the central element of these reasons is the insecurity and instability of the system created by the global crises. It is possible to talk about three global crises that have affected all EU countries in this decade: First, the economic crisis that resulted from the global financial crisis of 2007-2008; The refugee crisis that emerged as a result of the Arab Spring that started in 2011 and the Syrian civil war that followed; And finally, the identity crisis that resulted from the attacks by fundamentalist Muslim organizations in some European cities. Of course, these three fundamental crises are affected, interact, and give rise to others, but examining them separately allows for a more comprehensive approach to the topic. These three crises will be discussed under the following headings: economic crisis, immigration problem, and Islamophobia.

Economic Crisis. One of the main reasons for the rise of the PRR in Europe is economic insecurity. Economic insecurity is at the root of many problems. On the other hand, attributing the rise of PRR to purely economic reasons misses the point and leads to a deficiency both in understanding and explaining the reasons for this trend and in presenting evidence on how this trend can be overcome. In other words, the reductionist economic perspective in explaining radical nationalist tendencies and their personal and social effects prevents the most accurate and holistic conclusion about this social phenomenon. However, according to the data, voting rates for PRR parties increase in environments where economic problems appear. This suggests that financial problems are an important (even the primary) factor in the rise of PRR parties.

With the phenomenon of globalization, economic interdependence between countries has increased, global financial networks have developed, so that crises have begun to produce their effects on a worldwide scale, instead of being local problems,

as evidenced by the "global financial crisis of 2007-2008." The economic issues, which began with the collapse of the U.S. housing sector in 2007 and the high-interest mortgage fiasco, spread worldwide in September 2008 and developed into a global crisis (Mudde 2014: 101). As for the effect of this crisis, it created one of the biggest crises affecting the world since the Great Depression (Akın, 2019: 32).

According to a report published in 2011 by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, the European Union (EU) has felt the impact of this crisis to a large extent (European Commission, 2011). Moreover, due to this crisis, the Eurozone contracted by 4.1% in 2009, experiencing the most significant contraction in its history (T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterlik, 2011). With the financial crisis showing its effect globally, the increase in unemployment and public debts in European countries forced some countries to declare their economic troubles due to the economic contraction. Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain are the European countries that have felt this financial crisis the most (T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterlik, 2011). These countries, whose economic risks increased due to credit rating downgrades by rating agencies, had to ask for foreign assistance.

The encounter of the EU countries with this negative image caused a reaction in society. As a result, the EU has become a scapegoat, and Euroscepticism has increased in society. The PRR parties expressed their Euroscepticism the most. While the economic crises shook the public's confidence in the ruling parties, the PRR parties, which turned the situation into an opportunity, gained the support of the masses by using populist rhetoric (Akın, 2019: 33).

In a study conducted by Funke et al. (2015), it was determined that PRR parties benefited the most from financial crises, following an examination of over 800 elections that took place in 20 countries spanning the years 1870-2014. For example, after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the votes of radical right populist parties in European countries such as France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, and Portugal rose sharply: While SD received 2.9 percent of the vote in 2006, it increased to 5.7% in 2010; While the PVV received 5.9% of the vote in 2006, it grew to 15.5% in 2010; On the other hand, while the FN received 4.3% of the vote in the 2007 elections, it rose to 13.6% in the 2011 elections; Finally, the True Finns increased their vote from 4.1% in 2007 to 19.1% in the 2011 elections (Funke et al.,

2015: 14). Apart from these examples, this crisis had an impact that spanned the years and covered the period 2010-2020.

However, the rise of the PRR in all EU countries did not take place immediately after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, and in some countries, it was spread over several years. Mudde (2014: 100) reports that in a comparison of 28 European countries before the crisis (2004-2007) and after the crisis (2009-2013), some PRR parties did not see a rise in votes, and four of these countries (Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal, Spain) received bailouts. However, as mentioned above, there has been an increase in the PRR in these countries over time.

With the global financial crisis in Europe, Euroscepticism began to increase very rapidly. Öner (2014a: 9) defines Euroscepticism as "having critical, skeptical, and negative thoughts towards the EU and the European integration process." The economic crisis created the EU and IMF bailouts which caused a distinction between "payers" and "buyers." Using the anger created by this separation, PRR parties made the discourse of Euroscepticism the main agenda, and some of them even became more radical and expressed the rhetoric of leaving the EU (Mudde, 2014: 100). Of course, PRR parties, expressing public discontent, have increased their votes with the rhetoric of European skepticism. For example, UKIP, which advocates for Brexit (the UK's exit from Europe), received 16.09% of the vote in the 2009 EP elections. It increased its vote to 26.77% in the 2014 EP elections (European Parliament, 2019).

The Eurosceptic rhetoric of the PRR parties and their rising vote raise concerns about the future of the EU. However, according to Hekimler (2021: 23), the PRR parties do not intend to leave the EU but rather to build a Europe they want, where there is more law and order, a Europe where there is no place for Muslims and where the poor are supported instead of the banks.

As a result, the effects of the global economic crisis of 2007-2008 have had a long-term impact on Europe. Due to this crisis's negativities, parties that expressed populist rhetoric increased their votes. This phenomenon is explained by the distrust of the masses towards the existing parties and the economic system. This situation leads to a new way of trying. This new way for Europe has emerged throughout this process by considering the PRR parties as the power to save itself.

Immigration. The issue of migration (refugees, asylum seekers, etc.) is another factor that has influenced the rise of PRR parties in EU countries. Today,

migration has become one of the major challenge that EU and its member states face. Migration flows are usually from underdeveloped to developed countries. The main motivations are better jobs, a safer environment, better education, and the hope of a better future for the new generations. European countries are exposed to intense migration because they can answer those aspirations and dispose of transit zones. Therefore, migration to Europe is very high, especially from MENA countries that are close to the European continent.

In Tunisia, on December 17, 2010, a young man named Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire due to economic problems, and the protests spread across North Africa and the Middle East in a brief time (“What is The Arab Spring”, 2020). With these protests, the administration of many Arab countries had to change and caused a civil war in many countries. These events started to be called the "Arab Spring" in the literature. Especially in 2015, with the formation of a large migratory wave, a "refugee crisis" was experienced in Europe.

In this process, there was a "migrant crisis" when more than one million people arrived in Europe in 2015, mostly Syrians (“Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe”, 2016). In the face of this development, EU member states and Europeans were disturbed by this situation. As shown in Table 4, there is a negative approach to immigrants in many countries, including Italy, during this process and after. As shown in Table 4, almost half of Europeans negatively view immigrants. PRR parties that are anti-immigrant have taken advantage of this situation and increased their votes.

Table 4

The most anti-immigrant countries in Europe (2016)

Country	%
1-Italy	52
2-France	47
3-Germany	44
4-Spain	38
5-United Kingdom	37
6-Netherlands	36

Table 4 (continued)

8-Finland	30
9-Denmark	25
10-Romania	18
11-Lithuania	17
12-Poland	15

Note: It shows that % of the participants agree to the question, "There are so many foreigners living here, it doesn't feel like home anymore." Reprinted from "The most anti-immigrant countries in Europe" by S. Osborne, Independent, 2016.

There are two reasons for the anti-immigrant opposition of Europeans, economic and cultural. These are the reluctance to share existing wealth economically and the fear that it will culturally undermine foreigners' identity. Similarly, PRR parties, which are known to be anti-immigrant, do not want to share the welfare of their country primarily with immigrants. This attitude is referred to as "welfare chauvinism" in the literature. From the perspective of welfare chauvinism, it demands that only the country's citizens benefit from its welfare (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990: 214). It is also a nativist approach. Therefore, welfare chauvinism argues that immigrants should be excluded from the social rights or benefits that native people enjoy. Eser & Çiçek, 2020: 134).

The PRR specifically demands policies of welfare chauvinism and expresses this frequently in its rhetoric. Indeed, one of the slogans of the PRR parties is "Do you want to secure your retirees or your immigrants?" (Mandacı, 2013: 116). Adding to the population's discontent after the migrant crisis of 2015, the populist parties of the radical right have turned it into an opportunity to mobilize the masses and increase their votes (Hekimler 2021: 23). They do this by being anti-immigrant, more nativist, and critical of existing policies.

Another reason for anti-immigration is concern about the impact of social change that will occur as a result of multiculturalism. RRP parties support a homogeneous society (Öner, 2014b: 169). They claim that European identity has been altered and destroyed by "other" (foreign) identities. They even argue further that multiculturalism leads to the disintegration of nations. Therefore, PRR parties support strict immigration policies and generally oppose granting social rights to immigrants (Öner, 2014b: 167).

Islamophobia. The word "xenophobia" is formed by combining the Greek words "Xenos" meaning "foreigner" and "Phobos" meaning "fear," and its meaning is the dislike or fear of foreigners (Öner, 2014b: 165). Based on this information, when fear is directed towards Muslims, it is called "Islamophobia" and includes resentment, anxiety, and hatred towards Muslims (Aslan et al., 2016: 452).

The fact that this issue is treated separately from the problem of immigration stems from European PRR parties and far-right organizations' attitudes due to growing negative thinking towards Muslim refugees and Islam in general. Of course, Muslims are also affected by the immigration problem. Nevertheless, developments in recent years have revealed hostility towards Islam, and in this case, it is an argument used to legitimize many policies pursued by the West.

Although the roots of Islamophobia run deep, it took hold at the center of the Western world with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and following the 9/11 attacks, anti-Islamic sentiments deepened and broadened (Mudde, 2007: 84). As a result of the attack on the World Trade Center in New York City by al-Qaeda, a fundamentalist Muslim terrorist organization, on September 11, 2001, 2,977 people lost their lives, 19 hijackers who hijacked the planes died, and over 6,000 people were injured in the attacks. (Burrows, 2021). After such a massive attack, the understanding of security for the world and Europe and the perception of "Islam" for the Western world have entirely changed.

Since this attack, Islam and terrorism have been words used side by side, and Muslim immigrants living in Europe have begun to be perceived as a security threat (Çöpoğlu, 2017: 4). Thus, while the main enemy of nationalists and especially Nazis in the twentieth century were Jews, PRR parties have given way to Muslims or Islam (Mudde, 2007: 84). Although anti-Semitism in Europe is not over, it is far from being an openly discussed topic as it once was. Instead, anti-Muslimism is a topic that has been articulated quite frankly and can be turned into a political argument. In this way, Europe's new others have started to become Muslims (Öner, 2014b: 170). As a result, Islamophobia began to be used not only in the programs of the PRR parties but also in mainstream party programs and the media (Uzunçayır, 2014: 179). Due to this approach, Islamophobia gradually causes normalization in Europe.

The 9/11 attack is not the only reason for the rise of Islamophobia in the discourse of PRR parties in Europe between 2010 and 2020. A series of attacks by terrorist organizations that took place across Europe and portrayed themselves as

Muslims also impacted this rise. Among the high-profile attacks compiled by Hasan Esen (2017) are:

- Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the March 11, 2004, Madrid attack, in which 191 people were killed.
- Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the 7 July 2005 London attack, in which 56 people died.
- On 13 November 2015, simultaneous attacks in various parts of Paris, in which 130 people died, were claimed by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).
- The Brussels attack of 22 March 2016, in which 32 people died, was claimed by ISIS.
- The Nice attack of 14 July 2016, in which 84 people died, was claimed by ISIS.
- The 19 December 2016 Berlin attack, in which 12 people died, was claimed by ISIS.
- On May 22, 2017, the Manchester attack, which killed 22 people, was claimed by ISIS.
- The 17 August 2017 London attack, in which 12 people died, was claimed by ISIS.

As Muslim organizations claimed responsibility for these attacks, a negative perspective on Islam developed in Europe and worldwide. After all these attacks, Europeans saw the words Islam-terrorism more and more attached, which increased Islamophobia, which also meant the rise of PRR parties. However, Islamophobia has turned into mass attitudes and actions in Europe. Thus, in Europe, beyond anti-immigration, Muslims have been seen as the common enemy of all right-wing formations (Eser & Çiçek, 2020: 131). This makes Muslim immigrants living in Europe more "undesirable" than other immigrants.

This perception of the security threat posed by Muslims has become a frequently used discourse by PRR parties. Indeed, the PRR parties had to abandon ethnic nationalism and began to operate with a nativist agenda and advocate a new culture-based nationalism. After these attacks, the PRR parties' hate speech against Islam was reflected as self-defense; discourses such as Muslims harm European culture and do not conform to the European way of life continued to increase (Kallis,

2015: 15-16). Both sides (fundamentalist Islamic organizations and PRR parties) legitimize the other's mistakes.

PRR parties frequently resort to the rhetoric of Islamophobia. Former FPÖ leader Haider argued that Islam is not secular and would harm Christian culture in Europe (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 121). Marine Le Pen, on the other hand, compared Muslims praying in the street to the Nazi occupation because the mosque was full, and said, "There are no tanks, no soldiers, but it is still an occupation, and it weighs on people" ("France: Marine Le Pen", 2015). Matteo Salvini, another PRR party leader, stated in a 2018 speech that Italian culture and society are in danger of being destroyed by Islam (Balmer, 2018). Such speeches have increased in recent years, especially after the attacks mentioned above. As a result, Muslims in Europe are seen as the biggest threat in labeling cultural threats (Mandacı & Özerim, 2013: 120).

Therefore, after the attacks, the words "terrorism" and "Islam" were used side by side, which caused an increase in Islamophobia among Europeans. For this reason, PRR parties, which are against Muslims and constantly use hate speech against Islam, also found more support than Europeans. Due to the many terrorist attacks that have taken place here, especially between 2010 and 2020, Islamophobia has increased during this period, and PRR parties have also increased.

This chapter has examined the emergence, institutionalization, and rise of PRR parties in EU countries after World War II by periods and historical perspectives. In this study, which has been divided into periods, the period between 2010-2020 has been counted as the peak of this rise. The reasons that separated this period from the others were explained. Mainly due to the global crises experienced during this period, the PRR parties managed to gain support from the masses. In the next chapter, two case studies will make the rise and causes of PRR parties in EU countries between 2010 and 2020 more concrete. To better understand the dynamics of PPR parties in EU countries -whose conceptual framework is drawn and whose development is discussed in a historical perspective- it is essential to examine two case studies and discuss them specifically.

CHAPTER IV

Two Cases of the Rise of PRR Parties in Europe Between 2010-2020: AfD and PVV

Previously, this thesis has presented how and why PRR parties in Europe have significantly increased their votes in local, national, and EP elections between 2010 and 2020. In this chapter, AfD from Germany and PVV from the Netherlands will be examined as case studies in order to examine these generalizations about PRR parties more concretely and on a more limited level. Thus, the goal here is to see how the global financial crisis, the immigration crisis, and attacks by terrorist organizations have affected the rise of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe and what kind of change they have caused in the discourse of these parties.

Alternative for Germany (AFD)

Because of Germany's Nazi past, the PRR parties did not receive sufficient support in the post-World War II period (Minkenberg, 2015: 21). The traditional parties and political elites in Germany excluded the far-right and radical right parties, fearing that the inhuman crimes of the Nazis would repeat. As a result, far-right and radical-right parties could not achieve political success in Germany during the Cold War era. In contrast, representatives of far-right groups such as the German National Democratic Party (NPD), the German People's Union (DVU), the Republicans, Stop Foreigners, and Pro-Cologne were able to gain seats in regional assemblies and city councils (Öner, 2014b: 172). However, none won seats in the Bundestag, the national assembly, and remained more local.

Germany's aloof approach to radical right parties and organizations stems from its past. However, developments have also taken place in Germany, and the distancing approach has been partially abandoned due to the rise and normalization of PRR parties in Europe in recent years. The party behind this progress is the AfD.

The AfD first started politics as a party distrustful of the EU, neoliberal but opposed to the common currency (€), and tried to return to the German mark (Aknur, 2020: 423). Before that, they founded a group in 2012 called Election Alternative 2013 (Wahlalternative 2013), including members such as Konrad Adam, Alexander Gauland, and Bernd Lucke, who were members of the Christian Democratic Union

(CDU) (Arzheimer, 2015: 540). Then again, Election Alternative 2013 founded the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party to participate in the February 2013 federal elections (Goziiev & Özcan, 2020: 85).

After German Chancellor Angela Merkel said, "There is no alternative to the eurozone policy," Lucke, the AfD leader at the time, said there was an "alternative" to the eurozone policy. Then, he changed the party's name to "Alternative for Germany" and said, "Alternative to the so-called no-alternative policies of the Chancellor" (Jäger, 2013). That is how the German PRR party AfD began its political life.

The first election in which the AfD participated was the September 2013 general election and received 4.7% of the vote in that election but failed to surpass the 5% electoral threshold. (Der Bundeswahlleiter, 2013). Later, the AfD won 7 seats in the EP, with 7.1% of the vote in the 2014 European elections (European Parliament, 2019). The party's most outstanding success since its inception until 2020 was the general elections in September 2017, where it received 12.6% of the vote and became the third most voted party, and won 91 seats in the Bundestag (Clarke, 2017).

In doing so, it became the first radical right party to enter the Bundestag since World War II (Aknur, 2020: 434), a party that pursued its success in the May 2019 EP elections, winning 10.97 percent of the vote and taking 11 seats (European Parliament, 2019). Finally, the AfD gained representation in 16 states in the June 2019 local elections and held in the two eastern German states, the AfD: In Saxony, it increased its vote by 17.8 points and won 27.5 percent; In Brandenburg, on the other hand, it expanded its voting by 11.3 and won 23.5 percent and became the second-largest party ("Germany's Left Party Tops Thuringia", 2019). This success of the AfD shows that PRR parties are becoming more common in Europe. Indeed, in light of all this data, it would not be wrong to say that the radical right, which has been excluded from politics in Germany since World War II, now enjoys massive support. As a result, the electoral successes that have accompanied this tremendous support have made the AfD a crucial political player in Germany in a short time.

The creation and rise of the AfD are directly related to the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and the terrorist attacks in different cities in Europe. First, the AfD was created due to criticism and reaction to the EU bailouts to southern countries, including Greece, after the global financial crisis (Aras & Sağıroğlu, 2020: 35). Later, the public reaction created by Angela Merkel's "Welcome" and "Open Door" policies towards immigrants arriving in Germany from Arab countries, especially from Syria, and the

Arab Spring, were influential in the rise of the AfD. In 2015, more than 1.3 million refugees sought asylum in the EU, and more than 476,000 of them in Germany, which was a record ("Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe", 2016).

The arrival of so many refugees has caused a major crisis throughout Europe, which has directly impacted the political attitudes of Europeans. Of course, in the eyes of Europeans, the parties in power are responsible for this crisis. Merkel, who was in power in Germany with so many refugees arriving, tried to gain support by saying, "Once again, we can and will" (Harding, 2015). However, many of those unhappy with Merkel's asylum policy turned to the anti-immigration, radical right-wing AfD party, as a result of which Merkel gradually abandoned the open-door policy (Aknur, 2020: 425). This example shows how influential a PRR party is in politics.

Turning the refugee crisis of 2015 into an opportunity, the AfD shifted its discourse from economic to identity themes (Aras & Sağıroğlu, 2020: 37). For this reason, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic discourses were more emphasized in the AfD party platform in 2016. Therefore, in the 2016 AfD party platform, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic discourses were emphasized, and concepts such as banning minarets, hijab, and azan seemed to be common (Dilbirliđi, 2017: 163).

This party program meant a lot to the Germans under the time conditions. Economic and cultural concerns were emerging in the face of the wave of immigrants coming in. For this reason, the party's program is very significant, especially for the masses who do not want to share their wealth and think that the wave of immigrants will damage their identity. Therefore, the AfD approaches Islam and immigrants from a security perspective to legitimize its policies in the face of the current conditions resulting from the terrorist attacks in Europe (Aknur, 2020: 431). In this security approach, immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, represent a threat to the German economy and identity and European identity in general.

In addition to the party's program, it is also possible to encounter xenophobia and Islamophobia in the attitudes and speeches of AfD administrators. For example, AfD Vice President Beatrix von Storch expressed her opposition to Islam by stating, "We are against the minaret, the muezzin and the burqa or veiled chador" (Charlton, 2016). Furthermore, in 2016, as immigrants flooded into Europe, Frauke Petry, leader of the AfD party, stated in an interview with the German newspaper "Mannheimer Morgen" that border guards "must prevent illegal border crossings and even use firearms if necessary" ("German Right-leaning AfD", 2016). In this context, it can be

said that the AfD has increased its votes thanks to the hateful statements of party members.

The AfD's anti-Islamism has also manifested itself in relationships built with the far-right anti-immigrant, anti-Islam movement called PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamicisation of the Occident-Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes). The PEGIDA movement began as a protest march organized in Dresden on Monday, October 20, 2014. It quickly grew into a tradition held every Monday night and attended by thousands (Knight, 2017). The participation of some AfD members in the Monday protest marches has shown that the AfD supports this anti-Islam and anti-immigration movement (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 308). Furthermore, research shows that 82% of participants in the PEGIDA Monday protest march said they would support the AfD in the elections (Dilbirligi, 2017: 162). However, the relationship between AfD and PEGIDA caused controversy within the party. Therefore, after the decision of the AfD board, joint work with the PEGIDA movement was banned, and it was desired to end the discussions and divisions within the party (Aras & Sağıroğlu, 2020: 42). However, certain party members still have sympathy for the relationship between AfD and PEGIDA.

All this shows that the AfD has the characteristics of a PRR party. The AfD is an anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic party and adopts nativism as its central ideology. Indeed, the AfD consistently emphasizes the phrase "völkisch," which defines the German people as a race in history (Aknur, 2020: 429). For example, terms such as "Germany for Germans" and "What's wrong with being German?" are frequently used by party members ("Germany's Far-right AfD Reprimands", 2017); The slogan "Germany belongs to the Germans - Foreigners out" is often chanted at demonstrations (Arikan, 2019). The AfD shows that it supports the ideology of nativism with such slogans. Thus, German citizens are emphasized as the only rights holders, and the exclusion of foreigners is constantly stressed by slogans, advertising posters, the party program, and party members.

The AfD frequently uses populist and nativist rhetoric. Komrad Adam, one of the party's founding members, encourages party members to fight the elites. Politicians from other parties are portrayed as greedy, lazy, and inept, selling their national interests to the EU (Arzheimer, 2015: 547). Another example is the AfD group leader in Thuringia, Björn Höcke, who mainly used populist slogans such as "Merkel must go" and "We are the people" at rallies in Erfurt (Aknur, 2020: 427). In these two

examples, AfD members demonstrated that they are a populist party by frequently using the distinction between "people" and "elite," which is one of the core discourses of populism. Likewise, the AfD repeats its nativist rhetoric in its election campaigns. As can be seen in Figure 2, in the 2017 elections, the AfD used the slogan "New Germans? We make them ourselves", which emphasizes anti-immigrant and indigenism. Furthermore, as mentioned above, immigrant groups have frequently used populist discourses, creating a perception of "us" and "them" by making Muslims particularly hostile. Therefore, it would not be wrong to classify the AfD as a PRR party.

Figure 2

AfD 2017 Election Poster



Note: "New Germans? We make them ourselves." Reprinted from "Welcome to the campaign jungle: Election posters take over Germany's streets" by K. Brady, Deutsche Welle, 2017.

The characteristic that distinguishes the AfD from other PRR parties in Europe is the absence of a charismatic leader. In general, radical right-wing populist parties in Europe have a charismatic leader who has remained in charge of the party for a long time (Le Pen in the FN, Wilders in the PVV, Haider in the FPÖ). Still, unlike these parties, the AfD has a constantly changing system of leadership and co-presidency. In this way, the AfD has developed a system that functions as a mass party in conjunction with regional and local branches and other radical and far-right social groups (Van

Kessel & Albertazzi, 2021: 366). The AfD's party structure does not allow for the concentration of power in one hand, and thus, until now, a team leadership has led the AfD's administration: first Bernd Lucke, Frauke Petry, and Konrad Adam; then Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen; more recently, Jörg Meuthen and Alexander Gauland are co-chairs (Zons & Halstenbac, 2019: 48). Through this party structure, party disintegration and single-person dominance are avoided.

Although the party structure of the AfD does not allow for a solid charismatic leader to step forward, some people try to do so from time to time, or some AfD members, like other PRR party leaders, step forward. For instance, Lucke tried for the AfD to be led by a single leader, like other PRR parties, but he failed and left the party and founded a new party (Zons & Halstenbac, 2019: 50). Apart from that, the AfD's state councilor in Thuringia, Björn Höcke, resembles other PRR party leaders in his rhetoric. Höcke, who previously described the Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a "monument of shame" and provoked significant reactions ("German Fury at AfD Hoecke's", 2017), led the AfD with fiery speeches in the 2019 Thuringian state elections and came second with 23.4 percent of the vote ("Germany's Left Party Tops Thuringia", 2019). After this success, Höcke gained attention and created a charismatic leader that can be considered local.

The AfD maintains close relations with other PRR parties in Europe despite these characteristics. So much so that when the AfD won the 2017 elections, Le Pen congratulated it as his ally (Aras & Sağiroğlu, 2020: 42). Thus, the AfD's increasing radicalization, anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic identity nationalism attracted the attention of other PRRs in Europe. These relationships did not remain in words, and in 2017, PRR parties in Europe, including Le Pen and Wilders, held a summit in Koblenz, Germany, and the AfD also participated. (Akal, 2017). With this summit, it can be seen that the populist parties of the radical right have started supranational cooperation and united around their ideological characteristics. Of course, the benefits of this cooperation and joint action show that it will become more critical in the future of European politics over time. As another example, the AfD joined the Identity and Democracy (ID) group created after the 2019 European elections (Identity and Democracy, n.d.) and acted with other PRR parties. Interaction between PRR parties, which have become the fifth largest group with 73 seats in the EP (European Parliament, 2019), is becoming more common.

As a result, the AfD, which started as a moderate, euro-skeptic party and was founded entirely due to the economic crisis, became more radicalized after the 2015 refugee crisis and attacks in various European cities by Islamist terrorist groups. Since its inception, the AfD has risen quickly and gained attention by successfully entering the Bundestag as the third-highest vote-getter party in 2017. As the AfD becomes more successful and increases its votes in elections, it becomes more extreme in its rhetoric against immigrants and Muslims. Adding it all up, the AfD has become a Eurosceptic, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and nativist PRR party. However, thanks to its success in the elections and the population's support, the AfD has become one of Germany's most important political actors in a short period.

Freedom Party (PVV)

The Dutch PVV party is another example of the argument that PRR parties have grown between 2010 and 2020 in EU countries. Therefore, understanding this party as a whole will help in understanding the other PRR parties. Indeed, unlike the AfD party discussed above, the PVV has strong leadership and a distinct party organization. The party's vote has grown since its inception in 2006, and it has become an essential player in Dutch politics.

The PVV was founded on February 22, 2006 by Geert Wilders (Akkerman, 2015: 144). Wilders was a member of the conservative People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in the Netherlands and was a parliamentarian from 1998 to 2004 when he resigned (De Lange & Art, 2011: 1235). This shows Wilders' experience as a politician. However, Wilders still took an oppositional stance in the party due to the VVD's moderate perspective on nationalism in 2004, and thus resigned. One of the main reasons for the resignation was the VVD's positive approach to Turkey's EU accession process (Akkerman, 2015: 144; Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 310). Thus, Wilders, who continued to serve as an independent member of parliament, later established his own party and became a major political player in the Netherlands.

Since the electoral system in the Netherlands is based on the party list procedure, MPs cannot be very effective during the election and leads MPs to act in a way that is close to party/leader management (Bayraklı & Güngörmez, 2017: 9). Therefore, in this system, if the party leader or management comes to the forefront, it

leads to a disconnection of MPs with the public. On the other hand, Wilders created the PVV, which made an image of a strong leader by taking advantage of this system.

The party organization of the PVV is quite different from the classical party organizations. PVV legally has only one member, Wilders (Vossen, 2017: 87). There is a clause in the statute of the PVV that voters can become members, but Wilders announced that he stopped recruiting members immediately after the party was founded (De Lange & Art, 2011: 1240). In this way, Wilders retains all power and authority only in his own hands and does not share it with anyone. Of course, all populist radical right parties want this, but a party that rejects all members like the PVV is rare (Dukanovic, 2014: 15). Therefore, PVV and Wilders form an inseparable unity. However, most departments that should be in a party are not in PVV. For example, there are no local and regional branches (De Lange & Art, 2011: 1237), auxiliaries, departments that organize public conferences, no party newspaper, youth organizations, and think tanks (Vossen, 2017: 88). Although it is difficult to manage and get votes in the absence of all this institutionalization, Wilders and his party PVV can achieve this.

In fact, the Netherlands, unlike most other European countries, is a country where PRR parties were not successful until the millennium (De Lange & Art, 2011: 1234). However, after the 9/11 attacks, the media's and public's view of anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic parties changed, and it was at this point that PRR parties began to rise in the Netherlands with the LPF founded by Pim Fortuyn (Akkerman, 2016: 145). Pim Fortuyn is, therefore, a pioneer in the development of PRR parties in the Netherlands. The media and some politicians of the time started to see Fortuyn as one of the right-wing leaders like the French Jean Marie Le Pen or the Austrian Jörg Haider (Avcu, 2020: 240). However, Pim Fortuyn was assassinated on May 6, 2002, shortly before the Dutch national elections ("Dutch Politician Pim Fortuyn", 2002). Pim Fortuyn was the forerunner of the PRR parties in the Netherlands, while the PVV and its leader Wilders stabilized it and successfully expanded it to the present day.

Unexpectedly, in the 2006 elections to the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer), which was the first election in which he participated after the formation of the PVV, he received 5.6 percent of the vote, and the parliament had nine seats (Table 5). This unexpected success means that Wilders' rhetoric had a public response. According to Vossen (2017: 50), "anti-Islamic alarmism, populism, nationalism, and law and order" are the ideological characteristics that make up the PVV. Of all these

characteristics, Wilders emphasizes anti-Islamism most in the party's program. As a result, the PVV and its leader Wilders are anti-Islamic parties and leaders among the PRR parties in Europe.

In the PVV party platforms, Islam is seen as the main enemy of the West, an enemy that is trying to conquer it (Vossen, 2017: 29). In other words, the PVV sees Islam as a security element and therefore evaluates the issue of Muslim immigrants in terms of national security. Of course, Wilders' approach to Islam develops according to the circumstances. Wilders' anti-Islamism is justified by the public, mainly because of the 9/11 attack, the murder of director and producer Theo Van Gogh by a Muslim fundamentalist in 2004, and the threat to Wilders (Akkerman, 2015: 145). This legitimization and use of Islamophobia is effective in increasing Wilders' votes.

In 2008, Wilders criticized circulating a 17-minute short film entitled "Fitna" (meaning conflict), which vilified Islam. Quotes from the Koran and excerpts from speeches by radical Muslim clerics, footage of violence, and actions such as the 9/11 attacks were included in the film ("U.N.'s Ban Condemns Dutch", 2008). The film received a lot of adverse reactions, and many Muslim countries, including Iran, Pakistan, and Indonesia, also condemned it. However, the film reflects Wilders' view of Islam. For Wilders, Islam is an ideology that can take over. This ideology must be countered in the following ways: closing mosques, banning immigrants from Muslim countries, and closing Islamic schools (Vossen, 2017: 53). These measures restrict rights and freedoms, but this rhetoric and these approaches have allowed the PVV to gain more votes.

The PVV was very successful in the 2009 EP elections, winning 16.97 percent of the vote and four seats (Table 5). It took its success to the top in the 2010 national elections and, like the other PRR parties, gained momentum after 2010. The 2010 elections won 15.5 percent of the vote, producing 24 legislators, making it the third-largest party (table 5). The PVV supported the coalition government formed after that election, but it was dissolved in 2012 because it withdrew that support. The coalition government formed after the PVV supported this election from outside. Still, when the PVV opposed the government's austerity policy in 2012, the government was dissolved when this support was withdrawn (Al Jazeera Türkçe, 2012). This shows that the PVV has the power to shape national politics. However, after the collapse of the government, early elections were held in 2012, and the PVV lost 10.1 percent of the vote and won 15 seats in the House of Representatives (Table 5).

Table 5*Votes and Number of Seats of PVV in General Elections and European Parliament**Elections Between 2006-2020*

YEAR	Tweede Kamer		European Parliament	
	%	Seats	%	Seats
2006	5,9	9		
2009			16,97	4
2010	15,4	24		
2012	10,1	15		
2014			13,32	4
2017	13,1	20		
2019			3,53	0

Note: Compiled from Election Resources on the Internet (<http://electionresources.org>) and European Parliament (<https://www.europarl.europa.eu>) websites.

In this process, the PVV has made the policies of leaving the EU and not using the euro its top priority and has continued its policy of stopping Islamization (“Q&A: Dutch Parliamentary Election”, 2012). This is because, following the impact of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the first order of business for EU countries is the economy. Although Wilders' policy is to leave the EU and not use the European currency, his party participates in the EP elections and wins seats. This shows that Wilders accepted the EU and its institutions as a whole but tried to get votes from the people by producing nativist policies. After all, in the EP elections held in 2014, as a result of this process, the PVV received 13.32% of the vote and won 4 seats (Table 5). Thus, the PVV and its leader Wilders have continued to maintain the stability of success they have achieved since the year of their founding.

One of the PVV's biggest successes was the 2017 national election. In this election, the PVV won 20 seats with 13.1 percent of the vote and became the second most voted party in the Netherlands (Table 5). Before this great success, the PVV published a one-page manifesto (Concept - Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017 - 2021,

2017) with its promises for the 2017 elections. In this one-page party manifesto, Wilders, whose central promise is to "de-Islamize the Netherlands," promises that the country's mosques will be closed, the Koran will be banned, and residence permits for asylum seekers will be revoked (Bayraklı & Güngörmez, 2017: 17). The reason for this is the refugee crisis of 2015, Islamophobia, and xenophobia, which increased following attacks by Islamic terrorist organizations in European cities. The PVV was the party that expressed this reaction of the people and raised its votes in this way. In this process, not only Wilders, but also the leader of the VVD, Rutte, in an open letter he wrote, opposed immigrants by saying that immigrants who came to the Netherlands should adopt the Dutch culture and values; otherwise, they would leave the country (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 311). This is also an excellent example of the rhetoric of the RRP party becoming mainstream. The other parties that want the PVV's votes use similar rhetoric to the PVV's radical right rhetoric. In this case, even if the PVV and its leader Wilders are not in government, they ensure that their ideas and policies remain on the country's agenda through their high votes.

The normalization and generalization of Wilders' hate speech against immigrants and Muslims revealed the population's acts of hatred against these groups. During the budget negotiations in parliament in September 2015, alongside Wilders' call for "resistance to refugee acceptance policies," hostile attitudes and actions took place against immigrants in society. One of them was the writing of "You are not welcome" or "Go home" on the walls of Syrian refugees' homes on March 14, 2016. (Avcu, 2020: 243). In another example, at a meeting where the results of the 2014 local elections were evaluated, Wilders asked the question, "Do you want more or fewer Moroccans in this city and in the Netherlands?" and the audience responded, "Fewer! Fewer! Fewer!" Wilders then declared, "We will take care of that." ("Netherlands Trial: Geert Wilders", 2016). However, with these words, Wilders was prosecuted for committing crimes of "racism, discrimination, insulting and inciting resentment and hatred in society" against people of Moroccan descent, and he was found guilty at the end of the case in 2016 (Darroch, 2016). These examples show that Wilders' hate speech can reach a level that will provoke the public. However, although Wilders was convicted in 2016, he received no punishment (Aknur & Saylan, 2019: 310). Therefore, Wilders has not given up on this hate speech and continues.

Wilders' party, the PVV, has all the characteristics of a PRR party. Its main characteristics reflect immigration, Islam, law and order, Euroscepticism, criticism of

the elite class, and nationalism. The PVV is highly critical of the cultural and political elites, especially those who do not care about the people's interests (Akkerman, 2015: 144). This shows that the party takes a populist stance by using this rhetoric. However, we understand that the PVV is nativist from the following attitudes: its desire to leave Europe, the emphasis on national culture and its desire to protect it, the increase in the anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agenda, its tendency towards nationalism, its desire to preserve and maintain the welfare state for its nation (Vossen, 2017: 41). In particular, the emphasis on culture (European culture, Western culture) has become the main emphasis of modern nationalist parties in Europe. The PVV, one of the contemporary nationalist parties and RRP parties, frequently emphasizes this culture in its speeches and policies and claims to defend its own culture against invading cultures. The PVV emphasizes culture and identity due to its nativist attitude. Despite this, the PVV is not an anti-Semitic party. Wilders defended it in these terms: "...We are descended from the respectable VVD and not from an obscure neo-Nazi movement. We are also pro-Israel, so we cannot be accused of anti-Semitism" (Akkerman, 2015: 145). There is no anti-Semitism in the PVV's election manifestos and party platform.

Finally, it is understood that the PVV is a PRR party, as it is a party that advocates authoritarianism. The PVV advocates employing more police officers to control crime and security (Dukanovic, 2014: 14). However, the PVV mainly associates law and order issues with immigration and Islam (Vossen, 2017: 48) and stresses that precautions must be taken accordingly. In this case, the perception is created that immigration undermines the authority and that incoming immigrants disrupt order by not respecting the law. Similarly, the PRR parties consider that transferring certain rights to a supra-state organization such as the EU undermines authoritarianism. Therefore, one reason why the PVV is also Eurosceptic is that it is a party that advocates authoritarianism.

Although PVV is a radical right party, it is also a modern party with liberal policies. The party has liberal policies such as tax cuts, reducing government influence, promoting environmental issues, gay rights, or moral issues such as euthanasia (Dukanovic, 2014: 14). With this image, it is seen that PVV is a modern nationalist party and shaped itself according to the conditions and requirements of the time. In fact, with these liberal policies, the PVV both increases voter support and becomes a mainstream party.

The PVV, like the AfD, is developing relationships with other PRR parties in Europe. The PVV won seats in the EP for two terms (2009 and 2014) but failed to win a seat in the last election in 2019 with 3.53 percent of the vote (Table 5). With the seats it won in the 2009 and 2014 elections, it gained supranational representation and became closer to the other PRR parties. In the political group Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF), founded in the EP in 2015 under Le Pen's leadership, there were important PRR parties in Europe, such as the PVV, FN, Vlaams Belang, Lega Nord, and FPÖ (Yatağan et al., 2017). The PVV has shown that it sides with other PRR parties in Europe by being part of this group. In addition, Wilders participated in the summit of PRR parties held in Koblenz, Germany, which I mentioned above, and showed that he was acting in concert with these parties. Finally, Wilders supported Britain's Brexit decision and stated that if the first party came in 2017, EU membership would be put to a referendum, and he would take action for Nexit (Bayraklı & Güngörmez, 2017: 17). With this support, Wilders has shown that he will support RRP policies nationwide and throughout Europe.

As a result, the PVV party led by Wilders has been the most stable PRR party in the Netherlands. The PVV is a liberal, nationalist and populist party, anti-EU, anti-immigration, and anti-Islam. The party's organization is distinct from the classical parties, and its only official member is Wilders, its leader and founder. In this way, interference by anyone in the party is avoided. In the year it was founded, the PVV won national elections and seats in parliament and has continued this success. Like the populist parties of the radical right in other EU member states, the PVV has grown with the global crisis and has become an active player in Dutch politics, especially after 2010.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion and Recommendations

This chapter will make inferences based on the results and information presented in the previous chapters. Using these implications, the research questions of this thesis will be answered. In addition, suggestions will be made on the difficulties faced by those who want to work on this topic in the future, the gaps on the subject, and how the scope of this topic will change in the future.

Conclusion

Today, the PRR parties in the EU countries have become significant political figures, both in their own countries and in European politics. These parties emerged after the Second World War and grew in the 1980s. After 2010, this growth reached its highest level, and they now have the power to participate in the governments of the countries in which they are located. As a result, these parties have attracted attention in the political agenda and of Europe as well as the global affairs.

Ultra-nationalism, which was considered responsible for the devastation of World War II, became taboo for Europe after the war. The EU countries kept their distance from the far-right parties and excluded them from politics. For this reason, the re-radicalization of the right in Europe and its re-establishment in politics was delayed. Later, due to the evolution of Western Europe, new types of parties appeared, and the PRR parties thus tried to find a place in the political arena. These parties, which emerged in Western Europe and have grown in all EU countries over time, share three ideological characteristics, namely populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. These parties glorify the natives and consider the political and social elite corrupt; they are against immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, with whom they do not want to share the wealth; they are eurosceptic and practice identity politics. However, these parties know how to adapt to the conditions of the time and have a modern image in terms of organization. As a result, radical right is becoming more normalized and integrated into society.

The fact that most of the PRR parties are Eurosceptic does not mean that they reject Europe but rather that they want to shape it in their own image. For example, the willingness of the PVV in the Netherlands and the AfD in Germany to leave the

EU and use their own currency instead of the euro is purely rhetorical and based on the political situation at the time. For the most part, PRR parties, including these two parties, have participated and been represented in EP elections, have been very successful, and have come together to form a group, especially in the 2014 and 2019 EP elections. That shows that the PRR parties want to play a role in European politics and want to shape the EU according to their own ideology, which means that the PRR parties do not want to end the EU as a whole. On the contrary, they want to create the EU of their own imagination by changing the existing values of the EU, which raises concerns about the future of the EU's democratic values, human rights, and multiculturalism. The ideology and political perspectives of the PRR parties justify this concern. Moreover, the steady rise of PRR parties in recent years reinforces this concern.

The PRR parties' rise in EU countries between 2010 and 2020, which is the central question of this thesis, was verified with data. After 2010, most PRR parties in Europe increased their votes in local, national, and EP elections. During this period, PRR parties found enough support to be in government in some countries. In the Netherlands, the PVV provided outside help for the government in 2010, the FPÖ in Austria in 2017, and the League party in Italy in 2018 participated in the governing coalition. In addition, during this period, the AfD in Germany and the Vox PRR in Spain were able to send representatives to the national assembly for the first time.

The entry of a radical right-wing party like the AfD into parliament, mainly due to its Nazi past in Germany, shows how successful the PRR has been in ascending and normalizing parties in Europe. However, the rise of the PRR parties after 2010 continued this ascendancy through the increase in votes they received and by having their own rhetoric and policies accepted by mainstream parties. For example, although the PiS party in Poland and the Fidesz party in Hungary are center-right parties, they have become ideologically closer to the PRR parties due to their anti-immigration and nationalist attitudes. Similarly, the main parties in other European countries have integrated PRR parties into their policies and discourse to avoid losing votes, and the ideas and approaches of PRR parties have thus been represented in the administration. As a result, there has been a qualitative and quantitative increase in PRR parties in Europe between 2010 and 2020.

There are many reasons for the rise of PRR parties in Europe between 2010 and 2020. Sometimes these reasons stem from domestic policies and conditions and

sometimes from international policies and demands. However, global crises played the most fundamental role in this rise during this period.

These crises can be grouped under three headings: the economic crisis, the refugee crisis, and, finally, the identity crisis. First, the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 caused an economic crisis throughout the world, and the EU countries were among the most affected by this crisis. As a result of this crisis, Euroscepticism has rapidly increased in society and the political order, and support for the established parties in the current political system has decreased. As a result, PRR parties with Eurosceptic rhetoric have been seen as an alternative in the current political order, and mass support for these parties has increased.

Secondly, as a result of the developments after the Arab Spring, mass migration has increased, and the target of this migration has become the European countries. As a result, there has been a large influx of immigrants into Europe throughout this period, both illegally and through asylum. The PRR parties, on the other hand, were the most profitable parties during this period because of their anti-immigrant attitude.

Finally, Islamophobia has increased due to attacks by Muslim organizations in Europe during this period, and when combined with the immigrant problem, an identity crisis has emerged in Europe. This crisis is rooted in the idea that European identity is in danger and the fear that the arrival of immigrants, especially Muslim immigrants, will undermine that identity. When these concerns and developments combined, the nationalistic attitudes of the PRR parties led to a normalization in society, which allowed the PRR parties to become mainstream. Thus, we find that the reasons for the rise of PRR parties between 2010 and 2020 are the result of these crises. In other words, society found in PRR parties the solution to the problems caused by the economic crisis, mass immigration, and growing Islamophobia.

The characteristics of these commonly mentioned PRR parties and their rise to power after 2010 can be seen more concretely with the case study of the AfD and PVV. Although the AfD began politics as a liberal, moderate, and Eurosceptic party, it later radicalized and transformed into an anti-immigrant party, especially Muslim immigrants. The most significant feature that distinguishes the AfD from other PRR parties is that it does not have a charismatic leader.

As for the AfD's organization, it prevents one leader from dominating the entire party. Instead, the AfD has an organization with local branches organized throughout the country and is run by a co-presidential system. The AfD was founded

in 2013 and managed to enter the national assembly in 2017, steadily increasing its votes. Another exemplary case is the PVV, which is the opposite of the AfD in terms of party organization. The only legal member of the PVV is Wilders, the party leader. Wilders is both the founder and the director of the PVV. The PVV has no members and no local chapters. Therefore, its structure is very different from that of a traditional party.

Since its inception in 2006, the PVV has managed to enter the national assembly, and in 2010 it became the third-largest party in the Netherlands and gained the power to support the coalition government. Although the AfD and the PVV are ideologically identical, they differ in their organization, revealing that each PRR party has its own characteristics. However, both the AfD and the PVV are fundamentally populist, nativist, and authoritarian parties and are Eurosceptic, anti-refugee, nationalist and Islamophobic parties. Both parties confirm the argument of the rise of PRR parties in EU countries after 2010.

As a result, the rise of the PRR parties has accelerated in 2010 and 2020, and this steady rise and strengthening indicates that these parties will be even more effective actors from now on. In this context, PRR parties are crucial for the future of EU countries and the EU itself. It is observed that these parties are mainly the result of a formation according to the conditions of the time. These parties must be formed according to the requirements of the time and become the dominant parties. In this way, the PRR parties become normalized and adopt radical and nationalistic ideological attitudes and the political system. Because of all these elements, the EU is both social and political in the effect of a more right-wing policy.

Recommendations

The rise of PRR parties in EU countries offers a wide field of research. Indeed, it is constantly topical and attracts attention. Although the history of this issue is not very long, it is very rich in the literature. Therefore, the study of this field requires both theoretical and practical time. Indeed, the basis of this issue is human, as are other areas of the social sciences, and thus it is a constantly evolving and converting topic. Moreover, conceptual confusion in this area is also a disadvantage to the researcher. Therefore, when examining PRR parties, the socio-cultural, socio-economic

properties, and political traditions of the country in which they are located should be taken into account.

It is explained above that PRR parties rise more rapidly during global crises. The epidemic period of Covid-19, which started in late 2019 and spread worldwide in 2020, is also a global crisis. For the reason that, this global crisis affected the world after 2020, it is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as with other global crises, it can be seen that this crisis will create conditions for the rise of PRR parties. Indeed, during the crisis caused by the Covid 19 epidemic, states had to close their borders, thus strengthening the political arguments of the PRR parties. That is to say that the conditions desired by those PRR parties that are against globalization and multiculturalism were already in place during this period.

In addition, the delay of some governments in responding to the epidemic is leading to the victory of the PRR opposition parties. Finally, with the global epidemic crisis, xenophobia has increased. Since the outbreak of the virus in China, hostility and marginalization are mainly directed against the Chinese. It is not only against the Chinese but also against all non-native people, who are considered carriers of the disease, who have been targeted by the population of the country where they live. In addition, conspiracy theories spread on social media also showed anti-Semitic attitudes, just like the Jews behind the epidemic. Nativism, which the PRR parties have ideologically championed, is naturally increasing among the population due to the epidemic. For this reason, it seems that the PRR parties, which are anti-immigrant, xenophobic, nativist, authoritarian, and populist, will increase their votes with this process. Therefore, it is recommended that future studies on this topic take into account this social and political change. In addition, the anti-vaccine protesters that emerged with the pandemic and their demonstrations are also topics worth investigating in this context. Demonstrations against pandemic restrictions, especially in Canada and New Zealand (“New Zealand anti-vax protesters” 2022), reveal the importance of this issue.

Another important detail on this issue is that PRR parties in EU countries are increasingly becoming catch-all parties. For example, Le Pen’s FN party wants to eliminate the label of nationalism of the past by changing its name, and Salvini, the leader of the Northern League party, aims to become a more national party by changing his name in the same way. In these two examples, we can see that the PRR parties are no longer acting with the limited ideology of the past and are becoming more and more

moderate. Therefore, as mentioned initially, as PRR parties are constantly changing, future researchers should pay close attention to these changes.

Therefore, the subject matter of PRR parties is human-centered, like other social science subjects. Therefore, the degree of independence of the researchers in their work is initially controversial. One's value judgments, identities, and political views influence in some way the social science topics they study. Therefore, the researcher must be meticulous in their conclusions and deductions when dealing with these issues.

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APPENDIX A
Turnitin Similarity Report

THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: AFD AND PVV

Yazar Reşit Özmen

Gönderim Tarihi: 01-Mar-2022 09:04AM (UTC+0200)

Gönderim Numarası: 1773692728

Dosya adı: SE_OF_POPULIST_RADICAL_RIGHT_PARTIES_IN_EUROPE-AFD_AND_PVV.doc (554K)

Kelime sayısı: 27659

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THE RISE OF POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT PARTIES IN EUROPE: AFD AND PVV

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APPENDIX B
Ethics Committee Approval



BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

01.03.2022

Dear Reşit Özmen

Your project “**The Rise Of Populist Radical Right Parties In Europe: Afd And Pvv**” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Direnç Kanol

Note:If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.