NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

EXAMINING ECOWAS' MILITARY PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN THE   LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1989-1997): A PERSPECTIVE ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

M.A. THESIS

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James B. KOLLIE

Supervisor

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek LATIF

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Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by James B. Kollie titled "Examining ECOWAS Military Peacekeeping Intervention in the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997): A PERSPECTIVE on Conflict Management" and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master in International Relations.

Examining Committee	Name-Surname	Signature
Head of the Committee:	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ali Dayıoğlu	
Committee Member	Assist. Prof. Dr. Emine Sülün	
Supervisor:	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek Latif	

Approved by the Head of the Department

04/08/ 2022

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait AKŞİT
Head of Department

Approved by the Institute of Graduate Studies

..../ ...../ 20...

Prof. Dr. Kemal Hüsnü Can BAŞER
Head of the Institute

Declaration

I, James B. Kollie, hereby declare that this thesis entitled " Examining ECOWAS' Military Peacekeeping Intervention in the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1997): A Perspective on Conflict Management" has been prepared by myself under the guidance and supervision of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek Latif in partial fulfillment of the Near East University, Graduate School of Social Sciences regulations and does not to the best of my knowledge breach the law of Copyrights and has been tested for plagiarism and a copy of the result can be found in the thesis.

James B. KOLLIE

14/07/2022

Acknowledgments

Dedication

To my uncle, Matthew G. Kollie, on whose shoulders I draw much inspiration and courage for academia. Matthew spent a significant portion of his life trying to raise the next generation of purpose-driven families through education. Though he is no longer around due to the cold hands of death, his legacy, passion for education, and motivation to aim for the zenith, remain with me.

To my widow-mother, Miatta Kollie, who amidst the odds still keeps me in her prayers, I dedicate this work. It is my fervent hope and prayer she would live long to reap the fruit of her labor.

I would like to thank Miss Hawah Jackson, my dear sister for her unflinching support and hospitality since the commencement of my study. Miss Jackson has not only provided me accommodation but has also served as a shield in times of difficulties. She demonstrated immeasurable care and concern throughout my study – I am perpetually and eternally grateful.

Abstract

Examining ECOWAS' Military Peacekeeping Intervention in the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997): A Perspective on Conflict Management

James B. Kollie

Supervised by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Dilek Latif

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Perennial wars in the sub-region of Africa continued to create a climate of danger and insecurity during the period dating back to the 1980s. In particular, after the ECOWAS's ineffective and failed attempt to broker peace in the first Liberian civil war, the situation resulted in an extra conflict layer. This further spiraled regional insecurity into new layers of conflict, similar to civil wars, including but not limited to ethnicity, sectionalism, regionalism, corruption, and bad governance. These factors sparked the first Liberian civil war in 1989. However, given the significance of sub-regional influence on domestic affairs, a research focus must be employed in determining the role of ECOWAS in managing conflict in a volatile region in the face of burgeoning security challenges.

This study seeks to evaluate ECOWAS' intervention in the Liberian civil war (1989-1997) as well as its overall approach and structure to conflict management in the sub-region. To conceptualize ECOWAS's impact in the first Liberian war, as well as the sociopolitical dynamics in the region, qualitative resources and policy documents were used. The research questions focused on examining the socioeconomic and political causes of the First Liberian civil war, the ECOWAS' role, capacity, approach to conflict management, and its potential problems, mechanisms, and methodology used in the first Liberian civil war. The research is based on document analyses of academic articles and reports written and published by ECOWAS, from the AU, UN.

Keywords: Conflict Management, Peace-keeping, Peace-building, ECOWAS, Liberia, Post-conflict transformation

Öz

ECOWAS'ın Liberya İç Savaşına (1989-1997) Askeri Barışı Koruma Müdahalesi: Bir Çatışma Yönetim Örneği

James B. Kollie
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Dilek Latif
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Haziran 2022, 81 sayfa

Alt bölgede uzun süredir devam eden çatışmalar ve savaşlar, 1980'lere kadar uzanan süreçte tehlikeli ve güvensiz bir ortam yaratmaya devam etti. Özellikle, ECOWAS'ın ilk Liberya iç savaşında barışı sağlama konusundaki başarısız girişimi, duruma ek bir çatışma katmanının eklemlenmesine yol açtı. Ayrıca etnik köken, bölücülük, bölgecilik, yolsuzluk ve kötü yönetişimle sınırlandırılamayan sorunların yanında, iç savaşlara yeni çatışma katmanları ekleyerek bölgesel güvensizlik ortamını artırdı. Tüm bu faktörler 1989'da ilk Liberya iç savaşını ateşledi. Bu araştırma, ECOWAS'ın gelişen güvenlik tahditleri karşısında alt-bölgedeki etkisini göz önüne alarak çatışma yönetimindeki rolünü değerlendirmektedir.

ECOWAS'ın Liberya iç savaşına (1989-1997) müdahalesi ve alt bölgedeki çatışma yönetimine genel yaklaşımı detaylı bir şekilde incelenmektedir. ECOWAS'ın birinci Liberya savaşındaki etkisi ve bölgedeki sosyopolitik dinamikleri kavramsallaştırmak için nitel kaynaklar ve siyasi belgeler kullanıldı. Araştırma soruları, ilk Liberya iç savaşının sosyoekonomik ve politik nedenlerine, ECOWAS'ın rolü, kapasitesi, çatışma yönetimine yaklaşımı ve birinci Liberya iç savaşındaki potansiyel sorunları, mekanizmaları ve metodolojisini incelemeye odaklandı. Bu çalışma akademik makalelerin ve AU, BM ve ECOWAS raporlarının belge analizlerine dayanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çatışma Yönetimi, Barışı Koruma, Barış İnşası, ECOWAS, Liberya, Çatışma sonrası dönüşüm

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List of Abbreviations

ACS: American Colonization Society

ANAD: Agreement on Non-aggression and Mutual Assistance in Defense

AU: African Union

BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation

DDRR: Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States

ECOMONG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWARN: ECOWAS Warning and Response Network

GDP: Gross Domestic Products

INPFL: Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPFL: National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAU: Organization of African Unity

PRIO: Peace Research Institute of Oslo

SADR: Saharan Arab Democratic Republic

TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN: United Nations

USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republic

ULIMO: United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy

VOA: Voice of America

WoT: War on Terrorism

CHAPTER I

Introduction

West Africa suffered some of the deadliest civil conflicts and humanitarian crises dating as far back to the period of slavery and colonization. These dire conditions resulted into denial of basic human freedom, igniting the struggle for independence subsequently. Post-colonial West Africa also witnessed growing forms of basic human rights violation, as well as insecurities, thus limiting the region's ability to manage its own sovereignty and its security hanging in the balance. This changing security dynamics and acute dependency syndrome can be directly attributable neo-colonialism. The security architecture of the region dramatically changed, but more so exacerbated the already volatile thereat orchestrated by western imperialists such as Great Britain, France, and Belgium. The ripple effect of these maneuverings not only stagnated the socio-economic growth of the region but it also had a toll on individual member state's inter-relations as well as collective security, and their ability to carve a sustainable conflict resolution mechanism for the enhancement of a stronger south-south relations.

The confluence of these conditions flared the first Liberian civil war, putting ECOWAS in a rather precarious transitional position from an economic union to a security actor. This transition was contingent on several factors, but most notably on the fact that economic corporation or integration would exist only in the presence of viable regional security. Furthermore, given that security was becoming re-conceptualized, as such its definition and connotation was taking different dimension. The state was no longer the primary referent object; hence, security was now viewed more in light of human security. Therefore, it was somewhat impossible to ignore wars in the region, especially the Liberian civil war, which demonstrated glaring and visible signs of human security – humanitarian crisis, which the state itself was primarily the progenitor and could no longer be sole contributor to security, thus, the need for an external intervening party such as ECOWAS, for the purpose of restoring calm and managing security, could not be over emphasized.

By 1990, the first badge of ECOWAS peace monitoring group- ECOMONG, arrived in Liberia, for the first regional peacekeeping operations in Africa (Alao, 2017;

Kabia, 2016). This military peacekeeping operation, since its inception has seen an active involvement of ECOWAS in brokering peace and mediating disputes across the region, including conflicts in Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mali, and most recently resettlement of the political impasse in the Gambia, which otherwise could have potentially resulted into full-scale violence (Hirsch & Hirch 2018). The military peacekeeping operations, however, was not freed of criticisms. ECOWAS and its peace monitoring arm- ECOMONG were criticized for the method and model of intervention in the Liberian civil war, including the overall unpreparedness in resolving a conflict that had deep-rooted historical, ethnic, political and economic festering. Accordingly, the peacekeeping operations were marred by glaring mishaps and a lack of coordination both from within and out. While the lack of coordination and failure of ECOWAS can be attributable to existing internal power rivalry, the intervention served two significant purposes: It indicated a will-power on the part of the region to begin shouldering its internal contradictions in the absence of support and consent from the international community. Furthermore, it represented a sub-regional peacekeeping operation determined enough, amidst internal problems, to architect a new framework tailored to resolving its problem, ignoring western exploitative models and methodologies.

The internal contradictions within ECOWAS led to a lack of coordination and shifting mandates, undermining the entirety of the peacekeeping mission. These shifting dynamics saw ECOMONG transitioned from peace monitoring to peacekeeping, and subsequently peace enforcement. However, essential components that could have led to sustainable peace were ignored, either deliberate or undeliberate, further hampering the chances of attaining peace. For example, essential components such as peacebuilding and post-conflict transformation were not taken into consideration. And based on the fact the conflict resolution circle is only considered complete when all components are adequately addressed, the attempt by ECOWAS to broker peace in Liberia fell short of its needed results.

Consequently however, ECOWAS fragile scope of operations was only tailored toward cease-fire and peacekeeping, without taking into account accompanying pillars that could potentially result in conflict relapse (Akokpari, 2016; Lar, 2009; Odobo et al., 2017). Therefore, addressing issues such as rehabilitation of

children and youth thrust into warfare, rule of law, and skillset empowerment, among others, discourage remobilization of fighters and leads to the creation of livelihood opportunities.

Given the porosity of sub-regional borders, it became even more imperative for regional coordination in combating growing internal contradictions in ECOWAS member states, as these growing contradictions could have the ability to instigate sporadic violence and ferment war across the region. Hence, in the absence viable and stringent security framework, the region risks spiraling catastrophes (Kieh & Kalu, 2013). This absence virtually worsened the already regional fragility creating instability in almost every member state by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Consequently, these gloomy endangering situations, though long predicted based on indicators such as the high illiteracy level of ECOWAS citizens, bad governance, poverty, inequality, and ethnicity, posed a serious challenge to the constitution of a strong democracy and good governance (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013; Tejpar & de Albuquerque 2015) leading to heightening precarious humanitarian and economic conditions. Indicative of these concerns, the United Nations Security Council (2017), detailed those civil wars in a porous region posed existential threats to all constituent member states and leads to a considerable decrease in human capital and productive societal infrastructures. Coincided by the Security Council report, some human rights institutions argued that given that civil wars are often anchored on long-standing growing dissents, however, its perpetrations ferment crimes categorized as crimes against humanity (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Accordingly, civil wars and the commission of crimes against humanity come in handy. Hence, for there to be sustainable peace in Liberia, it was compelling that ECOWAS' intervention not only deals with ceasefire operations but that the underlining causes leading to the conflict also be carefully looked at since these crimes were perpetrated based either on weak public institutions or a complete breakdown in the system, while conflict transformation and peacebuilding efforts are initiated in line with a set rubric that does not contravene the core objectives of cohesive collective security.

This chapter contextualizes the Liberian society, illustrates in chronological order a review of key historical milestones dating from colonial periods, and draws antecedents between Liberia's colonial history and the first civil of 1989-1997. It also

evaluates the role of ECOWAS as a supranational interventionist force. The socio-economic and political construct of the nation – poverty, inequality, and lack of political openness and democratic governance, are also examined to be factors that ignited the first civil war. Based on the symbiotic relations in the sub-region, ECOWAS' intervention in 1990 served as a litmus test for future peacekeeping operations and a reimagination of regionalism in the African context. This chapter, however, discusses ECOWAS' accomplishments and challenges, as well as points out how the sub-regional body evolved from being an economic union to adopting regional security complex protocols. Protocols regional security complex. The statement of the problem of this study, purpose, significance, limitations, as well as the research questions, are detailed in this chapter.

Background

The Liberian nation was birthed as a colony for the repatriation of freed and liberated slaves from the Americas, many of whom accordingly had begun representing the "vices" of the American society. The repatriation effort stemmed from the backdrop of growing fear that black population or decedents of slaves, could potential pose socio-economic and political threats to the American society, since most black people were beginning to gain consciousness, evidence by a number of rebellions. As a way of implementing this pursuit, the ACS – a non-governmental organization, funded by the United States government, was established to drive this initiative, under the guise of installing into them Christian values, as well as building for them a black nation. By 1820 the first cohort of black freed slaves set sail to Africa, and in 1821 attempts were made to settle along the coast, after which an agreement was negotiated with the indigenous, and Monrovia was established (J. H. Mower, 1974). The formation of the new nation came with a host of new challenges, notably the politics of elitism, and segregation, among other things, resulting in a number of confrontations between the settlers and indigenous, who were original occupants prior to the arrival of the free slaves. These social cleavages dampened coexistence and triggered ethnic, social, political, and economic disintegration in the new Liberian nation, most particularly a divide between "congou"- repatriated freed slaves, and indigenous – occupants prior to the arrival of the settlers.

After independence in 1847 the new Liberian republic began on a path of racial segregation and subjugation, disenfranchising the indigenous dark-skinned people participation in state governance, while also threatening their most significant sources of livelihood. Similarly, the indigenous population agitated for equal participation, resulting in conflicts between the two groups, with the settlers or Americo-Liberian group possessing preponderance of power both internally and externally, thus enabling them to dominate the socio-economic and political spheres. But worse was the perpetration of gross inequality and wanton state plunder and corruption, which created an endemic scourge of abject poverty on the already disenfranchised indigenous population, who among several things lacked access to basic social services.

Over 133 years of draconian rule by the settlers, through systemic sequence of repressions culminated into resentment and revolt, thus bringing an end to the first Liberian republic in 1980, when soldiers of the Armed forces of Liberia, headed by Samuel K. Doe, representing the predominant aspiration of indigenous people, overthrew and killed William R. Tolbert. This coup marked a major turning point in the history and politics of Liberia, as it set the pace for multiparty democracy, and the polarization in socio-economic and political ideals. The overthrow of William Tolbert was received and embraced by ordinary Liberians who opted for a new era of economic and social transformations, labelling removal of the True Wing Party from office and the coup as a blessing, and many of the oppressed envisaged a new era of economic equality and prosperity, a society in which all men would be equal and aspire to their fullest potentials. In an effort of gaining international recognition and acceptability, Samuel Doe established the People's Redemption Council (PRC), and ascribed unto himself the title of President, which by default made him the Head of State, and promised to return Liberia to civilian rule. The PRC according to its founding objectives was to initiate intergroup dialogues, foster peace and reconciliation among disenfranchised groups of Liberian as a way of building a wholesome and prosperous nation. This was never the case as existing social conditions fast plummeted when the new regime attempted making some efforts aimed at raising wages of servicemen and civil servants. While some progress was effectuated in repealing hut taxes imposed on indigenous Liberians by previous governments, however, the PRC was unable to transform the country's socio-economic and political systems. Rather it became a

perpetrator of the very vices it claimed to have come to remedy. In addition, Samuel Doe and his PRC began a governance on a corrupt caravan enriching all of its members, and resorting to political exclusion, similarly as his predecessors did prior to the coup d'état.

The absence of the facade of glitz and elegance that the previous dictatorship had wrapped itself with quickly became clear as the only distinction between Doe's regime and that of his predecessors. Nevertheless, despite Doe's ruthless and autocratic reign, he received huge financial and material support from the United States, due to the Cold War geopolitical maneuverings in which Liberia was used as a base for US military consolidation.

In the face of wanton looting of state resource and bad governance, the US government hailed the highly rigged elections of 1985 as a significant step towards the consolidation of democracy in Africa, and Doe was welcomed as one of America's principal African partners at the White House. However, shortly after the elections of 1985, there was an attempted coup, organized and staged by Thomas Qwiwonkp, a Gio ethicist. After the suppression of the coup, however, the Armed Forces of Liberia, predominantly made of Doe's ethnic Krahn group, embarked on an ethnic cleansing campaign targeting members of the Gio ethnic group, including perceived opponents of the government and critics. Ethnic cleansing compounded by bad governance, corruption, and abject poverty, fueled the first Liberian civil and served as a catalyst for the formation of insurgency groups such as the NPFL, INPFL, etc.

The first Liberian civil began on December 24, 1989 when a small rebel group, hugely supported by external actors, sneaked into Liberia from the borders of neighboring Ivory Coast. The rebel was led by one time ally and confidant of Samuel Doe, Charles Taylor. Although the NPFL numbered less than 150 contingents, however upon entry into Monrovia, the number soared rapidly, fully equipped in heavy and light weapons countering the capability of the Armed Forces of Liberia. In a relatively short period by 1990 the NPFL had reached over 5,000 men and women driven predominantly from the Gio and Mano ethnic groups that suffered ethnic cleansing at the hands of Samuel Doe.

With sporadic heightened humanitarian crisis and the potential transnational impact of the war, and fearing also that it could trigger dire economic consequences while also serving as a major impediment to the overarching objective of regional and economic integration, regional leaders under the umbrella of ECOWAS intervened through the Standing Mediation Committee, by firstly exploring diplomatic solutions. These diplomatic solutions however did not yield any significant outcomes, as the war escalated further. In the maiden of these engagements, the SMC alerted the leadership of ECOWAS based on findings from actors, and informed of dire impact the war would have the peace monitoring arm of ECOWAS was established, for the purpose of ensuring ceasefire and restoring law and order. This sudden shift witnessed a turning point in ECOWAS from an economic actor to a security actor, playing major role in brokering peace, in what was the first military peacekeeping operations to ever be carried out any regional organization. According to some pundits, ECOWAS intervention in the first Liberian civil represented a model aimed at addressing African problems using African solution. More pointedly however, it signaled a more decisive approach in addressing regional issues without necessarily attaining consent from the general international community.

ECOWAS' intervention in the first Liberian civil war was short of being a success due to a number factors, but most notably the organization's limited financial and resource capabilities and its inexperience as a security actor working to broker peace. These factors not only limited the ECOWAS' goal of securing permanent ceasefire but led to signing of several failed peace agreements, after which the nation relapsed into abyss of war following the overthrow and murder of Samuel Doe in 1990.

Due to the inconclusive and incomprehensive conflict management effort of ECOWAS which failed to factor in peace building and post-conflict transformation mechanisms during the first civil war, Liberia was, however, thrown into the abyss of another civil war three years after the end of its first civil war in 1996, when the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a group of rebels, launched an attack from neighboring Guinea. Charles Taylor, a former rebel leader himself, sort to contain the insurrection, made some efforts to repel the onslaught but all applied efforts resulted into full-fledged war. The war, from the onset was concentrated in western and northwestern regions of Liberia, but soon enough the

entire nation was embroiled into fighting involving with splinter groups attacking from different parts of the country. The success of the rebel's movements was influenced indirectly by support from the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, who opposed Taylor's regimes and placed his government under a number of sanctions. Taylor was compelled to engage in a two-front conflict that was much outside of his military capabilities. The fighting got worse as the civilian population's situation deteriorated. This served as the motivation for the peace talks, which officially began in Ghana in the first half of June 2003 after more than a year of negotiations and diplomatic engagements and several failed peace agreements. ECOWAS ultimately succeeded, through the aid of partners, in bringing all actors to the conflict to the negotiating table in June 2003. This sent a glimmer of hope for a genuine peace agreement because any sustainable agreement would have to all significant actors or party to the conflict (Boas 2005).

Pressured by the international community but more particularly the United States of America, after the signing of the Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord, Taylor resigned and was forced into exile, thereby bringing to a permanent end the second Liberian civil. ECOWAS for the purpose of ensuring the nation would not relapse as it did after the first civil war, collaborated with a host of international organizations, including the United Nations, which by default suggested a more cohesive approach and funding, in deriving a sustainable peacekeeping model, inclusive of security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR), governance reform and democratic consolidation, as well as addressing the root causes of the civil through the aid of vibrant civil society.

Statement of the problem

Historical occurrences between 1822-and 1847, following the arrival of freed slaves from the Americas and subsequently the establishment of the Liberian state, laid the basis for the first Liberian civil war. Exclusionary model leadership and bad governance orchestrated by Americo-Liberian against the native led to heightening tensions, which subsequently developed into societal insecurity, thus resulting into full-scale civil war. Since the government virtually controlled everything, infringed on the fundamental human rights of the majority native population, and denied them their

fundamental human rights, further fermented the conflict to a proportional height. Painstakingly., however, as the result of the draconian actions of the government, indigenous citizens had no medium of seeking redress in events of their rights being trampled upon by settlers: all arms of government including the court that ought to have been neutral and impartial became machinery of the repressive system, thereby leaving the native with no further options but rebellious revolts through armed violence. (Kieh 2009).

Following several repressive regimes marred by corruption, the Liberian state experienced its first war in 1989 which witnessed the prompted intervention of the sub-regional peacekeeping mission under the guise of ECOMONG. However, the conflict management effort of ECOWAS/ECOWAS did not yield significant success. Formed with the core mandate of managing or resolving Liberia's conflict, ECOMONG's peacekeeping approach did not mirror in human need base theoretical framework, rather, it was more focused and driven towards interest-based negotiation with warring factions and actors. In addition, ECOWAS's inexperience and incapacity in brokering peace ignored a framework of conflict transformation – an integral component of conflict management and resolution.

Furthermore, ECOWAS' mitigation effort, in large part, did not take into consideration historic and cultural conflict context. This among other things prolonged Liberia's conflict for over a decade, thereby causing a devastating impact resulting in the loss of lives of approximately 250,000 with the destruction of properties. Given that the ECOWAS conflict management effort did not take into consideration local conflict-context cultural analysis, further created limited room and gaps for a relapse of the conflict, after the signing of several peace agreements.

Research aims

Given the limited literature on the intervention of ECOWAS/ECOMONG in the First Liberian civil war, especially as it pertains to conflict management, this study aims to evaluate the role of ECOWAS in Liberia's first civil war (1990-1997); identify the conflict management model and methodologies employed; and further provide

detailed narratives on the gaps and limited capacity of ECOWAS – one of the core reasons for the failure in brokering sustainable peace.

Research Objectives

 a. To evaluate and determine the effectiveness of ECOWAS' mediation and peacekeeping operations in the Liberian civil war (1989-1997)
 b. To evaluate the regional issues that influenced ECOWAS' mediation and conflict resolution efforts in the First Liberian war;
 c. To evaluate the conflict management methodologies employed by ECOWAS in the First Liberian War;
 d. To determine the timelessness of ECOWAS' intervention and determine the challenges ECOWAS/ECOMONG encountered in its conflict management approach

Research Questions/ Hypothesis

Consistent with the objectives, and to achieve the purpose of this study, the following questions were formed:

 I. How timely and effective was ECOWAS' engagement in the Liberian civil war (1989-1997)?
 II. What were the regional and sub-regional issues that influenced ECOWAS' conflict management and peacekeeping operations in the First Liberian civil war?
 III. To what extent did ECOWAS achieve its intended conflict management and peacekeeping objectives, and what were the strategies and methodologies?
 IV. To what extent did political disagreements within Anglophone and Francophone ECOWAS member states impede ECOWAS' military peacekeeping operations in Liberia's civil war (1989-1997)?

Significance of the Study

The first Liberian civil war is significant because it serves as a test case of external peacekeeping interventionism through a sub-regional approach, and thus set the basis for future peacekeeping and conflict mediation initiatives across the sub-region while also drawing insights from ECOWAS' mistakes and gains. This research will also provide policy recommendations and roadmaps that future peacekeeping operations can relish to strengthen sub-regional security, as well as avert civil upheavals in the region. As an academic paper, it will serve as a supplementary for works on conflict management, evaluate ECOWAS' role as a peacekeeping and conflict mediation and management body, while also accentuating the significance of regionalism, especially as pertain to consolidating collective security. Additionally, this study will provide detailed information on, and address the current shortage of research materials on conflict management – in the Liberian context, while at the same time contributing to the general academic community, particularly, research institutions dedicated to conflict management and peacebuilding.

Like every study, this research will aid policymakers with a broader framework and understanding of the First Liberian civil war, its tragic nature, and the repercussions on collective sub-regional security. Furthermore, this study would provide a broader understanding of the fatality of the conflict and its humanitarian crisis in and across the region, and the role of ECOWAS as a significant mediation actor is evaluated. From being an economic union to an important mediation actor in the First Liberian War, ECOWAS' role is not only a milestone in regionalism, but its intervention marked a turning point and watershed moment for what became the first military peacekeeping operations to be carried out by a sub-regional body.

Limitations

Liberia has been at war for 14 years, two separate wars; nevertheless, this research paper focuses on evaluating the role ECOWAS played in the first war (1989-1992). The study is qualitative, thus making use of published peer-revied articles and other resource materials on sub-regional conflicts and subsequent external interventions. Given the scarcity of resource materials on the first Liberian war, acquiring sufficient and enriching data was a difficulty, hence, the study leveraged secondary sources, such

as conflict and situational reports written and published by AU and ECOWAS, in addition to peer-review articles on the subject of conflict management vis-a-vis conflicts in other parts of the world.

Structural Outline

This study comprises five chapters, with every chapter beginning with an introduction. Chapter one introduces the study and provides a broader overview of the research method, significance of the study, research questions, limitations, objective of the study, and delimitation. The research objectives and questions are identified and drawn out, including the value of the research. Chapter one also presents the limitations of the research and further elaborates on possible research constraints. Chapter two begins with an introduction and examines related literature; thus, making use of relevant and related secondary sources (book, articles, journals, and interviews). Chapter three presents the theoretical framework and research methodology. The adaption of a qualitative or inductive research approach will be examined, followed by a broader discussion on the research designs, including the limitations of the research study. This chapter takes into account the methodology and procedure employed in the data collection. Chapter four highlights the methods and content of the study, and further discusses the data collection method while also proffering a compelling case argument.

The research design is followed, highlighting the descriptive method. Furthermore, this chapter includes data collection and instruments, and data collection procedures; while chapter five examines the research, and proffers new arguments on similar peacekeeping intervention efforts by other supranational bodies. For example, the 1995 NATO intervention in the Bosnian war, is reviewed as an interventionist approach, to better understand the concepts of conflict management and peacebuilding. Chapter five presents the conclusion and findings, in addition to a new argument on conflict analysis.

CHAPTER II
Conceptual Framework

Introduction

As is the case with every research study, the objective and overview of this study are presented in chapter one. In addition to the general framework, this study evaluates ECOWAS' mediation and military peacekeeping operations in Liberia, in ensuring a peaceful sub-region. After its formation, the sub-regional body transitioned from a more normative statue into an integral security actor ensuring regional security and stability for a successful thrive of economic activities. 1975 as an economic union, ECOWAS quickly transformed into and adopted a peacekeeping protocol following the onset of the fracas in Liberia. This effort on the part of ECOWAS was felt through a peacekeeping mission in 1990, after which the nation attained relative peace.

In this chapter, an evaluation of pertinent materials to identify gaps and inherent flaws on the part of ECOWAS in appropriately managing the Liberian conflict is examined. These thematic areas include among other things the impact of colonialism, followed by the great power rivalry of the Cold War, the war on terror launched as a result of 9/11 in addition to a relatively recent declaration of the war on terror by the United States, which by extension involved bordered the security framework of the sub-region. Furthermore, the new layers of peace and security challenges that make up a huge chunk of the sub-region problem are evaluated. These new layers encompass ECOWAS's framework and concept of handling and managing emerging threats to regional peace – a new normal that the region still experienced since the first Liberian civil war.

Conceptualization of Conflict management

There are several fundamental conceptual postulations that explain conflict management, particularly in the conflict management effort of ECOWAS in the first Liberian civil war. ECOWAS' intervention was contingent on the concept of liberal peacekeeping – which among several things usually begins with cease-fire and withdrawal of troops across all frontiers. This serves as an initial diplomatic

engagement in brokering peace. And while this conceptual framework might not always serve to ensure détente, particularly so when the conflict has not reached a ripe moment, it is however, argued by liberals that this concept marks a pivotal significant beginning of sustainable peace.

Through the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), diplomatic engagements were launched with five distinct strategies for the intervention of ECOWAS: Cease-fire, mediation, legal, arbitration, and peace operations. These five strategies engraved in the conceptual framework of liberal peacekeeping formed the essence for ECOWAS' intervention. Additionally, cognizant of the fact that region's porosity posed a potential threat to insecurity in every member state should conflict in one member state be left to escalate beyond proposition, the theory of interdependence was also taken into consideration, justifying not only the regional physical security implication but also the humanitarian security – with a prime focus on human security.

Paris (2010) argued that an important presumption guiding liberal peacebuilding concept, for example, was that rapid liberalization would foster conditions for stable and long-lasting peace in states emerging from the scourge of civil war. However, this postulation has not been unanimously agreed upon by some scholars and practitioners. For instance, the modernization theorists by 1950s and 19660s argued otherwise that democratization and modernization were not only self-perpetuating but would cease to provide the requisite framework needed for the restoration of whole peace in a conflict-shattered nation.

It became, however, empirical that liberal peacekeeping or rapid liberalization presented a far limited peace brokering alternatives necessary enough for post-conflict reconstruction and collective healing, conciliation and reconciliation. A fast series of elections and economic reforms, in the case of Liberia, did little to address the causes of conflict and, in some instances, the model of peacekeeping initiated more destabilizing effects instead of fostering the conditions for a stable and long-lasting peace.

By the early 1990s and late 2000s, the UN documented civil conflicts across the world in which liberal peacekeeping approach was used. Accordingly, in Angola, for example, a liberal peacekeeping approach led by the UN resulted into resumption of

conflict and hostilities, right after the post-war elections. The peacekeeping approach failed to put institutional mechanisms into place in an effort to preclude election-related disputes, while no significant steps were taken to disarm and demobilize belligerent forces before and after the elections (Paris, 2010). Similarly, in Cambodia, for instance, under the liberal model of peacekeeping elections were held, that was pronounced largely successful in nature. The same was the case with El Salvador and Nicaragua. However, while the component of election monitoring and supervision were properly carried out, however, but the mission's economic component, which called for extensive economic liberalization, exacerbated socio-economic distributional disparities that had been one of the factors contributing to the conflict in the first place. The failure of liberal peacekeeping can also be seen Bosnia, in which economic liberalization produced acute problems, resulting to chaos.

In the meantime, the results of peacebuilding efforts in Liberia were similar to those in Cambodia: after successful post-conflict elections in 1997, the peacebuilding operation was deemed a success and concluded, but the election winner, Charles Taylor, immediately started to dismantle the democratic elements of the state and repress his political rivals, sparking a new round of fighting.

Colonialism and its Impact on Africa

The growing instability in the sub-region since independence illustrates colonialism's dreadful impact, and to a larger extinct foreign intervention from former colonial powers, many of who still see the region as subservient and an avenue for exploitation of raw materials (Aghemelo & Ibhasebhor, 2006; Davidson, 2014). According to Davidson (2014), the strategy of former colonial powers is an introduction of systemic havoc, repressive enough resulting in continuous political instability and wars and creating a weak economy which would onward depend on external intervention from great power, and as a result, such assistance would come at a huge price tag for African nations. Even though the region has made some efforts in managing its security and fostering regional collective security ideology, however, these strides have not had much impact given the external pressure from the West. These foreign interferences have not only undermined regional stability and caused perennial upheavals, making the region one of the most volatile in the world, but have

also weakened instituted systems, thereby stagnating every potential chance of socio-economic growth.

One such upheaval, engineered by the colonial impasse and niching effect is the Liberian civil war of 1989-1997. Fairly new to sub-regional warfare, the Liberian conflict perhaps, sets the basis for a domino effect of the fracas in the region. While some conservative statistics put the damage at a whopping cost, however, its negative consequences and nemesis continue to have a devastating toll on every fabric of the nation, including growth productivity. The growth rate is at its all-time low, and foreign meddling in the form of neo-colonialism is ever more pervasive. Worse, the nation still experiences a nemesis that still has an indelible toll on every fabric of the nation and its growth. Although many of these turbulent situations in the sub-region may have been contained by ECOWAS in some way, however, foreign interference especially from the Western powers still leaves the region with little or glimmer of hope for sustainable peace. As a result, the region has become one of the most vulnerable in terms of all aspects of human security.

By the early 1950s, most nations in the region began to gain independence – some from western powers while others. Liberia, however, became one of the few nations to have declared independence by 1847 thus inspiring and championing the quest and cause of independence for a host of other countries. The struggle for independence and freedom in these nations came with huge prizes, discontents, pain, and suffering, which often resulted in bloody revolution. In other words, the oppressed had to viciously fight the oppressors for their freedom and liberty (Whelan, 1992). Consequently, the struggle for independence did little in terms of fostering unity among newly established nations. Rather, there arouse internal problems of identity and a divide on delineated borders – a situation that was largely fueled by colonialism. (Small, 2017; Bannon and Collier, 2003). These festering problems led to the formation of radical movements concerned with the preservation of identity and interest (Adams & van de Vijver, 2017; Kyereko, 2018). Given the limited ability to self-govern, the leadership of these newly independent states became submerged into bad governance. In light of these growing dissents, foreign capital leveraged on the angered population to topple regimes across the region.

Achankeng (2013) argues that the deteriorating state of the sub-region security outlook can be attributable to fragile public institutions and dwindling governance, but they are often engineered actors whose aim is to systemically destabilize the region while securing their strategic and vital interests. In furtherance, Achankeng (2013) contends that colonial powers' haphazard decolonization and independence-granting mechanisms for setting the groundwork for sub-regional instability and fracas. As a result of these interferences and involvements, colonialism left behind basic issues of secessionism, deep-seated conflictual issues, and the conflict of identity and divided loyalty within each nation of the region subscribing to certain colonial masters. In light of these factors, resolving the sub-region problems seem farfetched and endemic just from the surface. Therefore, any workable approaches would have to intentionally examine several factors ranging from the geopolitics of the region down to its sociology – complex layers requiring skilled and knowledgeable mediators (Google Arts and Culture, 2014; Harbeson, 2017; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). While the struggle for independence in the region can be termed under international law and the framework of the United Nations as self-determination, however, these international instruments in large part either ignored or played a blind eye to the mayhem perpetrated by western capitals. Bereketeab (2014) explored several post-colonial separatist movements in Africa formed as a result of internal contradictions with both the government and existing neo-colonial controls and influences.

Cold-War Impact on Reshaping West Africa's security architecture

During the period of independence, nations in the sub-region of Africa were grappling with the ripple effects of two major foreign issues: the impact of neocolonialism and the supremacy struggle between two great powers, otherwise known as the Cold War. While the phenomenon associated with the Cold War had a considerable impact on the collective security of the sub-region, including its domestic politics, however, the decision to align seemed perhaps one of the most difficult, which eventually became a major determinant for peace in the region. (Hetch et al., 2011). For example, during the period of the Biafra War in Nigeria, Western nations, including the United Kingdom, along with their fiercest counterpart from the East, the USSR, provided material support for the Federal Government of Nigeria, thereby

aiding and abiding mass casualties (Heerten & Moses, 2014; Ugochukwu, 2010;). Indicative of these factors, member states of the region selected blocs and ideologies belonging to either one of the great powers for protection and economic and military security.

Given the shifting nature of global politics in 1945 by the end of World War II came new alliances making what is today referred to as the international system predominantly. Accordingly, the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves integral and influential members of the Allied Force that won the war, hence establishing a new system order called the United Nations, thereby making themselves permanent members. These two powerful nations worked in tandem with their European counterpart, including themselves, in pursuing neocolonial controls and interest in the sub-region affecting every sector of the region, leading to competing interests in the region complicating its regional security (Pateman, 2003; Lewis, 1967). These competing interests from great powers in the region did not only create fragile security but also deepened vulnerability, thus frequently sporadic uprisings. Importantly, however, this competing interest led to a split in the region between two major blocs: East and West. This became even more visible during the Cold War when former allies turned into adversaries and went neck-to-neck almost resulting in a new world war. These newly West African nations, by the end of the Cold War, found themselves in the middle of East-West ideological blocs, thus resulting in the formation of two important groups on the continent of Africa:

The Monrovia Group and the Casablanca Group (de Sousa, 2016; Olympio, 1961). With Liberia's early history linked to American cleavages, the Monrovia group was an interest of the United States and by extension the West, while the Casablanca group was led by Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Guinea's Sékou Touré, and Mali's Modibo Keita as additional West African members and Morocco's King Mohammed V as the North African member – all of whom largely despised capitalism and embraced socialism as the best means of national development. Due to their long-standing history of oppression at the hands of the West, the Casablanca group developed a strong socialist orientation, one in which Pan-Africanism became a central theme. The Monrovia bloc, on the other hand, was led by Liberian William VS Tubman and comprised countries such as Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Togo, Ivory

Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Dahomey (Benin Republic), Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Niger. While the Casablanca group's mentality was grounded in socialist philosophies that advocated for a united African continent that would post-economic threats challenge the West, the Monrovia group, however, served as a bidding agent of the West championing a gradualist unification philosophy.

With the continent soaring attraction, in 1963, these competing blocs formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU), with help from interest groups such as the Brazzaville Group, a conglomerate of former French colonies (Hetch, 2011; Genge, Kornegay, & Rule, 2010). This East-West ideological divide consequently had a toll on weak African nations, with each bloc pointing accusing fingers at the other for promoting and supporting regional instability. This became even more evident by the support received by Presidents Nkrumah of Ghana and Félix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, respectively, from a different angle of the bloc. These partnerships served as the earliest form of a destabilizing factor to the region's security as well as its governance system. Furthermore, it opened up the floodgate for stronger foreign influence and invasion in the region

These operations, orchestrated by former colonial powers, not only weakened governance and human security in Africa but also contributed considerably to the porousness of state borders, fueling tensions between nations with similar linguistic and traditional heritage. For example, governments in the region with significant ties to past colonial powers obtained direct mandates from former colonial rulers, resulting in authoritarian leadership for the people. Ivory Coast's Houphouet-Boigny, Liberia's Samuel Doe, and Togo's Gnassingbé Eyadema all gave authoritarian rulers the latitude and the leeway for the utilization of autocratic leadership that eventually degenerated into conflict and subsequently war.

The early 1980s to the end of the Cold War, most newly independent African countries had experienced a breakdown in governance and the rule of law. Even though most of these states were relatively new to democracy, however, their leadership's demeanor embodied and reflected traces of former colonial imperialists. In most instances, these leaderships became seemingly controlled foreign capital so much so that they took direct mandates from their former oppressors. The Cold War, it is said, resulted in the collapse of central authority in several West African countries, either directly or

indirectly through the intervention of the West and former colonial masters. As the supply of firearms, military aid programs, funds, and other initiatives decreased, so did the provision of unconditional support. In many aspects, the East-West power rivalry which cumulated into the Cold War had a deteriorating impact on the collective security of the sub-region leading to sprinter pressure and insurgency groups with competing interests.

As a region with post-independence enthusiasm, the maze of complexities from global occurrences put it in a security predicament. Despite its endowed potential, it struggled to handle and manage its internal security architecture, with foreign invaders controlling its mode of freedom and livelihood (Harris, 2017; Hetch, 2011; Spies, 2018). In the grand scheme of things, the Cold War immensely contributed to a volatile security collapse and complexities in the region, leaving the former colony with identity crises and thereby hugely reliant, a condition that resulted in exploitation and bad governance.

Post-9/11 Terror Warfare on sub-regional Security West African

Decolonization in most parts of the sub-region was met with aggression, loss of lives, and torture, among other inhumane treatments. As a result of these inhumane treatments meted, and upon fully gaining independence most of these nations in the region began on a footing of retaliatory treatments, both against their people and to some extent western powers threatening the very fabric of regional security which was already volatile. Aside from the fight over border delineation and territorial invasion, the region's expanding wave of human security, notably food insecurity, exacerbated exponentially, thereby flaring out sporadic regional conflicts. While the region's colonial history can be a big contributor to its tremendous security challenges, these difficulties became even more obvious and pervasively after the 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States, constraining the US to declare what became known as War on Terrorism (WoT). As a result of the 9/11 attack, parts of the world that were once safe havens for terrorist organizations, notably Al Qaeda, began to initiate measures to evict terrorists.

In light of this proclamation, post-9/11 became an epoch in which sub-regional security, and by extension the entire region, bowed to the commands and dictates of global powers. President Bush, in the aftermath of 9/11 declared his Bush Doctrine naming Niger as a considerable hideout for terrorist organizations, and a protector and deposit of raw materials for Saddam Hussein, who later was accused of possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The designation of Niger sent out a signal to the entire region of its growing new layers of security threats posed by terrorist organizations. In furtherance of the growing threats to the region, President Bush claimed that the uranium deposits in Niger were used as Saddam Hussein's feasting to create more enemies for the United States, for the creation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dockrill, 2006; Jervis, 2003). But while these allegations were later clarified by the International Atomic Agency (IAA) (as cited in Frankel 2003, A15), it did not derail the US's original intention of placing Africa under the radar. Besides, the US had already moved on to begin using the West African sub-region as an operational theater for the implementation of the War on Terror.

This operational exercise combined counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism models involving military commands from within the region. In furtherance of the already volatile complex security situation existing in the region, there became an implicit need to collaborate with international organizations in a counterterrorism approach to address new and evolving security problems, and instead of the global war on terrorism declaration by the United States. While ECOWAS faced a slew of internal infrastructure challenges, its externalities- foreign Western influences on the overall limited, and still does today, the collective cohesiveness and security framework of the sub-region.

Socio-economic and political factors influencing the Liberian (1989-1997)

The enormous disparity between the socio-political and cultural norms of the Americo-Liberians, who arrived in the country in 1822, and indigenous Liberians, also known as the natives, who comprised sixteen ethnolinguistic groups and lived in the country for thousands of years, was one of the most significant factors leading the civil war (TRC Report, 2005). The violence in Liberia originated as a result of a culture of hostility and animosity among settlers from the Americas and indigenous Liberians.

This culture of hatred and malice catapulted into a growing wave of dissents and disharmony, thus leading to several rebellions, and in most instances battles between settlers and indigenous. Conflicts between these two groups grew even more common between 1822 and 1847, particularly when the American Colonization Society (ACS), an organization that returned freed slaves, started prescribing authoritarian policies without the involvement of indigenous Liberians. By 1822, territory belonging to indigenous peoples had been taken by force. It was this, along with the feeling of being excluded from the governance of the new Liberian republic that contributed to the worsening animosities which further slithered up to 1847, at which point Liberia declared independence, thereby becoming a recognized state under international laws to transact business with other sovereign republics. The period after independence, however, marked a fresh start of despotism by settler Liberians against their indigenous counterpart. The new Liberian republic started on similar roads, resulting in conflicts between the two groups, with Americo-Liberians dominating the socio-economic and political spheres, denying the indigenous population of economic and political opportunities in public service. After some time, Liberian politics began to take on a racial tinge, with indigenous and dark-skinned Liberians being shunned.

This sequence of repressions culminated in a coup led by Samuel K. Doe in 1980, putting the nearly a century-long reign of the Americo-Liberian to an end. Doe quickly built a harsh system, similar to that of his predecessors, thereby leading to insurrection in 1989, headed by Charles Taylor. Soon enough, a country that was once projected to be on the rise economically, would now become an arena of a bloodbath of 14-years fracas. Aimed at ensuring regional peace, ECOWAS 1990 intervened to resolve the conflict and further prevent a spillover. Perhaps its first peacekeeping operation since its establishment in 1975, ECOWAS was embroiled in a conflict that had multifaceted layers, eventually leading to the signing of several peace mitigation instruments, subsequently resulting in relapse. Several conflict resolution treaties were negotiated under the aegis of ECOWAS between 1990 and 1997. However, these tools failed to produce the desired results, and the country quickly saw rounds of war recur following the signing of these agreements.

ECOWAS' Transition from Economic Actor to Security Actor

Founded in 1975 for the sole purpose of economic integration, ECOWAS took a different and radical trend when the first Liberian civil war broke out in 1989. Although the war in Liberia was not the first expressed security concern for ECOWAS in the region, however, it presented a set of pressing unique existential challenges. Prior to the war, ECOWAS viewed security primarily from a state-centric perspective – direct challenge (s) to the state, hence, between 1975 to 1990 security crises that occurred within the borders of a member state were believed to be within that state's domestic jurisdiction, requiring said state to amicably manage it alone. Therefore, there was little or no expectation of external intervention from ECOWAS when the civil war broke out in December 1989. ECOWAS however intervened, and while this intervention was significant, it is showcased, on a larger scale that African state governments 'governance shortcomings was made known through the Liberian crisis, which by default required that ECOWAS needed more than just a rapid and effective transition in addressing some of the pressing underlining socio-political issues fermenting conflicts.

There were several authoritarian regimes in West Africa, which were hugely supported and backed by superpower allies during the Cold War. But by almost the end of the Cold War, these superpower allies could no longer sustain their puppet regimes, especially in the face of mounting domestic tensions, clamoring for accountability, democracy, and good governance. This domestic political pressure began gaining momentum. However, Liberia seemed not have clearly understood and comprehended the new normal and circumstances at the time, which led to an uprising and subsequently the use of force.

The region was getting polarized by semblance of sporadic crises similarly as Liberia; for instance, in Sierra Leone, where the same structural causes that caused the demise of the Liberian state were also present. Violent conflict also broke out in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, respectively. It was evident that the conflicts' character and behavior were more extreme than they had ever been in post-independence Africa, notwithstanding their internal origins and regional impacts. Violence was mostly directed at civilians, and many of the victims later turned into perpetrators of atrocities.

For the purpose of maintaining regional stability for economic activities to thrive, ECOWAS transitioned from an economic actor, to a security actor, and responded to these growing security concerns but in stages; first, it kept a semblance of order in war-torn countries with its Ceasefire Monitoring Group, ECOMOG (Olonisakin 2003). In strengthening its normative framework and impact, ECOWAS adopted several treaties, signifying a shift away from the implied endorsement of authoritarian governance. These treaties emphasized democratic consolidation, rule of law, and the pursuit of economic integration and development (ECOWAS 1993). One of the important treaties was the The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, which called for improved governance, peacebuilding, and early warning mediation (Olonisakin 2009).

The ECOWAS/ECOMONG Military Intervention in Liberia (1989 to 1997)

The west African nation of Liberia on December 24, 1989, witnessed an upsurge of insurgent violence orchestrated by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). NPP has received support across the sub-region and was given access to Liberia through the aid of the Ivorian government. NPFL entry into Liberia was accordingly done in the acquiescence of the president and government of Cote d'Ivoire who provided initial support for Taylor's endeavors. As the conflict in Liberia escalated, the international community showed little or no interest based on the fact there will other pressing global concerns shifted towards conflicts in the Gulf, which of geostrategic and economic interest of the West. Instead of this growing crisis which was beginning to have a humanitarian impact in the region, ECOWAS soon formed a rapid response strategy through the establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC), with a mandate to foster amicable resolution to the rapid escalation of the conflict. Following the establishment of SMC, on August 7, 1990, the committee did not achieve its needed objective of having the major actors to the conflict ceasefire and subsequently sign a truce This lack of progress resulted in the formation of ECOMONG – initially a peace monitoring group, but soon upon entering Monrovia took on combat military operations. With an overarching objective to subdue and make powerless the warring factions, which eventually would lead to the

signing of peace instruments, ECOMONG deployment faced stiff resistance from Charles Taylor's insurgency group, who had received material and financial support from regional leaders. This rather unexpected shielding on ECOMONG and subsequent casualty suffered immediately led to counter-response, thus shifting its initial mandate of peacekeeping to military operations.

As a result of the intermittent and quick nature of the conflict, ECOMOG took measures of urgency, and by the end of August 1990, 3,000 West African troops had been sent into Monrovia. In addition to its cease-fire mandate, ECOMONG was also clothed with the mandate to negotiate and supervise possible compliance with truce agreements. With the initial time placed at six months in the peacekeeping operations, tensions on the ground held ECOMONG contingent meadowed through hostility with no amicable solutions for an indefinite time, prompting the sub-regional body of ECOWAS to deploy more manpower in the face of tense political disagreement, including economic constraints.

The numerical capacity of the contingent varied in terms of strengths, and the overall power potential of contributing nations. For instance, due to the military capability and population density of Nigeria, it provided a significant portion of the contingent and manpower as well as equipment. followed by Nigeria were Ghana, Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Beni, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone support the mission in their own given capacities. The force, for example, comprised 8, 430 personnel organized into ten battalions in February 1995; of these, 4,908 were Nigerians, 1,028 were Ghanaians, 609 were Guineans, 747 were Tanzanians, 760 were Ugandans, 359 were Sierra Leoneans, and ten each was contributed by The Gambia and Mali (UN Department of Public Information, 1995). ECOMOG, from its initial mandate, should have performed peacekeeping operations, however, its scope of activities became a little more elongated and vaguer, as it became involved in a wide range of operations, including humanitarian aid protection, disarmament of warring factions, mediation initiatives, as well peace enforcement.

Having been deployed for a significant period with the overwhelming mandate to contain the escalating and worsening situation, there was little or no success in bringing the conflicting parties to détente, and curbing the growing wave of violence. While the peacekeeping mission was officially concluded in February 1998, however,

a detachment of about 5,000 soldiers remained in Liberia to coordinate with government agencies, for example, the Armed Forces of Liberia, that were also involved in the conflict. Insurgency groups and waring facts began to question the neutrality of ECOMNG's neutrality, with some even questioning whether the ostensible peacekeeping organization was genuinely meant to bring peace or to liaise with the government by taking a harsh stance toward opposing parties.

Peacekeeping Challenges of ECOWAS/ ECOMONG

Due to the complexities at hand, ECOMOG's peacekeeping operation in the First Liberian civil war was far from simple; it encountered severe setbacks and challenges, based on several factors. Liberia's conflict was a "suis generis" that required hands-on experience to resolve, characterized by ethnicity, political marginalization, and economic imbalance. Unfortunately, ECOWAS lacked experience, competence, and credentials in the fields of peacekeeping and conflict resolution. While the Liberian conflict had fewer ethnic difficulties than other conflicts which were solely based on ethnic cleavages and uproars, for instance, Bosnia, the Liberian scenario presented a zero-sum approach to discussions and cease-fires (New African, March 1995). Mainly anchored on political governance, economic inequalities, and bad governance, the first Liberian war had a twist with the interference of external actors, thus worsening conditions. ECOMONG became increasingly confused and powerless, at some point, especially in the wake of rising splinter groups, who were initially not captured or regarded as warring factions. As the conflict worsened, humanitarian catastrophes heightened resulting in approximately 1.2 million internally displaced people and a death toll of about 200,000 - thus reducing an already meager pre-war population of 2.5 million.

One of the most complicated turning points of the conflict was its transnational nature which resulted in a strike in Sierra Leone, thereby breeding additional uproars between resistance forces from both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Resistance movements from Sierra Leone became involved and competed with ULIMO for territory and control. This became even more complicated with the composition of militia groupings that constituted predominantly children. It became harder on the part of ECOMONG to unravel the complicated strains of the conflict as it progressed. Additionally, reintegrating child soldiers back into society after a long period of being brain-washed

and used as mercenaries, served as a huge chunk of ECOMONG's challenge. As the conflict prolonged, its scope and nature shifted, thereby compelling ECOMONG to re-examine and formulate a much more coherent operational strategy that would suit the prevailing conflict climate. Instead of this approach, ECOMONG began an overhaul and stringent review of its peacekeeping strategies since in fact, the conflict had almost a dozen layers that needed to be critically examined before obtaining needed results. The foundation of the regional body peacekeeping force sparked significant debate among regional leaders and states, with some leaders questioning the rationale for the formation of ECOMONG and subsequent engagement in the first Liberian civil war. Despite these issues and divisions among members, ECOWAS believed that intervening in the Liberian crisis was a duty mandated under the 1981 ECOWAS Defense Protocol.

Article 16, which stipulates that the member under attack may request action or support from the Community, became the pivot around which the regional body launched intervention attempts during the first Liberian civil war. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS to use collective intervention measures in any internal armed conflict, within any state, that is planned and actively supported from outside and is likely to undermine the security and peace of the entire region. Articles 6(3) and 17 authorize the regional authority to decide if military action is required, to impose a peacekeeping force between warring factions, or to engage in political mediation; whereas Article 13(1,2) provides for the formation of Allied Armed Forces. Perhaps due to the friendly relations that existed between Presidents Samuel Doe and Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida of Nigeria, a request was made through Nigeria for ECOWAS intervention. This ultimately did not resonate well with other member states, especially Francophone states such as Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, who perceived Nigeria's action as political and attempting to play a regional hegemonic dominance role, despite the justifications provided for the safeguarding of regional security and collective peace. As further justification for ECOWAS' intervention, Democracy, and human rights were concerns cited, and the justification given, though these proved to be problematic; humanitarian considerations provided, for the most part, the legal reason for the intervention (Ero and Long, 1995).

A regional operation is considered to have a much better chance of avoiding common peacekeeping issues, if only because it is more interested in and understands local reality. When dealing with a complex disagreement, however, the ECOMOG force encountered many of the same challenges as UN operations. Indeed, the mission was no more effective than previous foreign deployments in important areas such as strategic direction, mandate formulation, use of force, coordination with other organizations, and resource allocation (Tuck 200) Disagreement resulting from political differences had a significant impact on the operational framework of ECOMONG from the onset. In theory, operations such as ECOMONG with multilateral convergence would be perceived as one tailored toward reducing tensions, while in the same vein preventing unilateral advantages. However, the ECOMONG peacekeeping operation was rather a crack in the middle and a catalyst for internal conflict among Anglophone and Francophone member states. Unfortunately, which had the mandate to coordinate ECOMONG and exercise political control and supervision. this was the case with the sub-regional body. Conflicting notions about how the ECOMOG force should operate split ECOWAS, owing to divergent geostrategic objectives among its member states as well as rising issues over contributions to the operation.

The most notable problem came as a result of a clash of interest and conflict of interest between Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire (Kieh 1994). Strongly opposed to Charles Taylor, Nigeria provided a bulk of the peacekeeping contingents and financial contribution to ECOMONG. Cote d'Ivoire, on the other hand, favored Charles Taylor and his NPFL mercenaries, due to a personal animosity that existed between President Doe and Félix Houphouet-Boigny over the killing of his son-in-law. This beef further plummeted the effectiveness of ECOMONG, as reaching consensus proved fruitless in most instances and situations. Taylor's anti-Nigeria stance was based on several causes. Taylor's actions, notably the death of up to 1,000 Nigerian nationals in Monrovia in 1990, and his strong ties with Nigeria's regional foe Cote d'Ivoire, looked to imperil Nigerian interests in the region. On the other hand, Cote d'Ivoire was concerned that Nigeria's dominance of the peacekeeping mission would lead Liberia to rely on Nigeria at the end of the conflict, posing a security dilemma for Cote d'Ivoire, given Liberia's porous border with Cote d'Ivoire. In addition, Nigeria's approach to ECOMONG-its methods and operation was tailored towards a strong resentment

toward Charles Taylor's NPFL. On the other hand, Taylor received enormous support from influential francophone countries including Burkina Faso, in addition, to support received from Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Henceforth, obtaining a coordinated consensus aimed at coordinating a smooth peacekeeping operation fell far from achieving tangible accounts.

These divisions weakened ECOWAS' decision-making capacity and prolonged the battle, resulting in a hazy peacekeeping goal within a specific time frame. Aside from the convergence of political difficulties among ECOWAS' key states, ECOMONG lacked clarity in mandates - the broad operational structure of its peacekeeping operations. The initial mission called for a cease-fire, but in a short period, ECOMONG was faced with the challenge of restoring law and order, conducting military operations to monitor the cease-fire, and other things (Ecowas Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, Article 2(2)). These efforts were frequently overpowering, resulting in a haphazard and ambiguous mandate. Owing to the fact that peacekeeping operations are expensive; they frequently necessitate massive financial and material resources to achieve the desired results and consequences. The case of ECOMONG, on the other hand, was quite the opposite; the peacekeeping body encountered several financial and material obstacles that prevented it from efficiently carrying out its primary mandate of a cease-fire. These resource challenges ambitiously impeded ECOMOG's overall operations. This situation further explained why the initial force of only 3000 personnel was insufficient and financially incapacitated to execute peacekeeping operations, let alone peace enforcement (Ofuatey-Kodjoe, 1996).

The lack of troops was one of ECOMONG's concerns and hurdles in scaling up its peacekeeping duties and ensuring the security of Liberia's borders from the NPFL insurgency, as well as its availability of financial and material support. These efforts by ECOWAS and ECOMONG failed miserably to prevent an escalation of the war in Liberia, as well as the spread of the war nemesis in neighboring Sierra Leone, which had played a neutral position from the genesis of the conflict.

Regional and sub-regional issues influencing ECOWAS/ECOMONG's peacekeeping operations

Colonial history in Africa created more problems than solutions. In 1884-85, western imperial states demarcated Africa amongst themselves to avoid being engaged in conflict with each other. This action resulted in regional conflict, leaving many newly independent states in a cloud of conflict with their neighbors, as well as with imperialist nations. The Berlin Conference was just one component of and, perhaps, the inception of the many challenges Africa would later encounter. Given the diversity of colonial powers, Africa was encaged into religious, cultural, and social rifts among itself, as there became a seemingly showcase of dominance and competition for supremacy. Thus, over time, the continent experienced a divide between Anglophone, francophone, and Lusophony regions, with each region owing loyalty to its colonial masters, further deepening the gross underdevelopment and undermining a little glimmer of unity.

Hegemonic controls from Great Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium contributed largely to today's growing issues the region is confronted with. For most of these imperial powers, Africa serves as the hub for the collection of raw materials; including diamonds, gold, rubber, and timber, among others. For instance, the significance of economic development, and its driving force towards power, the United States became heavily involved in the natural resource industry of Liberia, through Firestone

Harry Firestone, a member of the ruling class, having convinced his government of the ideal and strategic nature of Liberia in terms of growing rubber, Liberia immediately became a neo-colony of the United. In 1926, Firestone, through the government of the United States, signed a ninety-nine (99 concession agreement with the government of Liberia. This marked the inception of neo-colonial plunder, thus resulting in an overly generous concession at the detriment of the Liberian government and people. The rubber giant was given a million acres of land for six cents per acre for 99 years (Gifford, 2002:12). In addition to the overly coercive offer of the Liberian government, the work environment at the plantation proved one of a concentration camp, signaling a reintroduction of slavery; a situation in which workers were punished if they did not work.

As these developments unfolded in Liberia, most parts of Africa suffered a similar pinch, resulting in growing nationalist movements across the continent. Particularly around the 1950s and 1960s, a period when most African nations began to gain independence, these concerns and the neo-colonial scourge, precipitated these drives. These problems among other things were fueled by political dissents among locals catapulted into violence, and developed trans-national nature, as a result of the porosity of African borders.

These events cumulated into ethnic and economic havoc requiring external intervention. While the peacekeeping initiative was extolled, however, indications have it that ECOWAS failed, to a greater extent, to halt growing violence, and accordingly, this failure can be attributable to several factors, among which are: internal political division, resource constraints, and ECOWAS's overall unpreparedness and inexperience in peacekeeping and managing conflict, since Liberia was the first test case of conflict its conflict containment or management effort. In addition to its failure to bring to an end the war, ECOWAS strongly, due to unpreparedness, ECOWAS lacked a clear peacekeeping model – very integral components and preconditions for a successful and viable peacekeeping.

ECOWAS' Dilemma in Handling Sub-regional Security

Following the period of decolonization, the African Union, later followed by ECOWAS faced a regional security dilemma. This dilemma largely centered on a decisive decision to either maintain or reverse the inherited nemesis inflicted by colonial rule. The OAU adopted the Cairo Resolution in 1964, which declared that borders of African states were a palpable reality on the day of their independence, and that member states should bind themselves to defend the frontiers Before the adoption of the Cairo Resolution, the question of erasing colonial borders sparked significant debate among the major ideological parties (the Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia Groups). The Cairo Resolution, passed by OAU in 1964, called for the establishment of African unity among other things. Despite the Cairo Declaration, the OAU remained contradictory on the issue of inherited colonial frontiers, because the organization was founded on a pan-African movement that advocated for the abolition of all colonial vestiges on the continent (Murray, 2004; Zoppi, 2013).

The OAU did not manage self-determination conflicts and irredentist movements uniformly across the continent. The OAU, for example, dismissed Pan-Somali aspirations for a separate homeland for all Somalis in the Horn of Africa (Gunn, 2017). In contrast, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was recognized by 26 OAU member nations in 1982 and eventually admitted to the organization's Council of Ministers. Later that year, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Frente POLISARIO) was seated at the OAU summit. As a result, Morocco abandoned its membership in the OAU in protest until its reintroduction in 2017. (United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996). Small (2014) investigates how Ghana's President Kwame Nkrumah zealously pursued an "unintended legacy" that has altered Africa in a paradoxical situation.

Security Framework ECOWAS

The basic framework of the sub-regional body of ECOWAS, established in 1975 as an economic union, made no provision for military involvement in the event of disputes in member states. Its primary goal was to promote trade and business among member countries. Realizing, however, that economic cooperation was unattainable in the absence of collective peace and security in the region, ECOWAS soon began involved in brokering peace and fostering an agenda of sub-regional peace pact. Through this agenda of collective security, over a dozen protocols and agreements aimed at bringing an end to the Liberian civil crisis was signed, followed by subsequent truce instruments addressing growing regional security. These agreements, among other things included: Agreement on Non-Aggression and Mutual Assistance in Defense (ANAD), the April 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol, and the May 29, 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense signed in Freetown (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 1999; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2018). Serving as integral instruments and catalysts for sub-regional military peacekeeping intervention, ECOWAS leveraged on these instruments for aiding the partial resolution of the Liberian civil war of 1989-1997, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, and the Gambia (Agbu, 2006; ECOWAS, 2015c).

Following ECOWAS's involvement in regional peacekeeping and conflict management, it became clear that the regional body required some structuralized rubric

that would see a transition into more of a mediator in regional conflict issues, rather than an economic union because the region was becoming conflict-prone. The organization had to go through a succession of peace and security challenges, and it had to be structuralized. The restructure not only allowed ECOWAS to better utilize its peacekeeping and peace enforcement resources, but it also expanded its mandate implementation capabilities and operational reach in response to the international community's and civil society's growing aspirations for democracy (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009).

Based on its successes and lessons learned, ECOWAS decided to transition from an ad hoc and apparent reactive policy to a more structured approach to regional peace and security management (Aning, & Bah, 2009; Francis, 2009). As a result, ECOWAS revised its treaty in 1993, adding Article 58 on the building of regional peace, stability, and security system, as the crises in Liberia and Sierra Leone worsened. All members state of ECOWAS were urged to take an active role in the region's peace and security concerns to accomplish timely prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state disputes (ECOWAS, 1993, Art 58). In 1999, ECOWAS adopted a Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution; Peacekeeping; and Security, which gave the organization the right to "restrict the flow of small guns and light weapons." (ECOWAS Articles 50 and 51, 1999; UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2016). These early warning signaling systems, known commonly as ECOWARN, set the pace and became central to ECOWAS Peace and Security architecture. They among many things led to the establishment of a headquarters-based Observation and Monitoring Centre as well as sub-regional Observation and Monitoring Zones. These measures laid down defined conditions and applications under which the sub-regional body can initiate actions and procedures for ensuring the maintenance of peace, but one that is tailored to conflict prevention, management, resolution, peacekeeping, and ensuring security mechanism for an early warning signal. (ECOWAS, 1999, Arts. 23-27). The overarching objectives of these early warning signaling and subsequent protocols were aimed at proactively dealing with conflicts in the sub-region, while also initiating measures of information dissemination among member states ahead of sub-regional interactions. (IOM, 2016; Wulf & Debiel, 2009; Bashir, 2015).

These protocols constituted a strategic milestone in dealing with sub-regional crises promptly, with the first Liberian civil war serving as a prime example. It is important to note, however, that the sub-regional original and first-ever conflict management and peacekeeping endeavor took place during the Liberian civil war. As a result of the regional body's lack of experience in conflict resolution, its peacekeeping mission was marred by several blunders and traps. This period was a watershed and turning moment in the sub-regional body's history, as well as a test peacekeeping mission that would later become a vital component in its operational framework. There are a lot of documents giving in-depth insights and analyses on the framework of ECOWAS and its engagement and agreements on dealing with sub-regional security challenges; however, perspectives on these agreements indicate that the sub-regional body has a poor strategy for handling the region's pre-existing conflicts, in addition to new and emerging threats such domestic and international terrorism, cyber security, and organized transnational criminal activities, which are yet to be given serious considerations.

CHAPTER III
Research Methodology

Introduction

Changing dynamics in global affairs have significantly impacted the security of peripheral states, particularly in the sub-region of Africa. Already plagued by several internal contradictions, the great power rivalry between the US and USSR – pointedly the Cold War further exacerbated the fractured security nature of the sub-region. As the singular largest indicator of Africa's dwindling security architecture, the Cold War created a vulnerability of subversion and penetration, especially on pertinent security issues such as transnational organized crimes, terrorism, money laundering, and cybercrime (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).   Based on the shifting security concerns in the developed north and the spiral ramifications of porous borders within West Africa, ECOWAS began confronted with new layers of internal threats that gradually became existential threats to its peace and stability; thus, prompting ECOWAS to adopt protocols tailored toward peacekeeping. Furthermore, the sub-regional body's failure to intervene in the first civil war of 1989-1997, in a way that could broker peace and foster post-conflict transformation, became a classic indicator of existing threats.

This chapter lays out the methodology for this paper – a qualitative research method to explore the motivation and factors that influenced ECOWAS' intervention in the Liberian civil war, the effectiveness and timeliness of the military peacekeeping operations, the challenges and mishaps, as well the external disagreements within ECOWAS itself, which by default limited its operational performance in brokering peace. This study also evaluates ECOWAS' military peacekeeping operation under the guise of ECOMONG, its effectiveness, employed methodologies, as well as challenges encountered. Contained in this chapter is the research method which outlines the methods of data collection, research, and design.

Research Design

As Patricia Levy (2009) research approaches can be exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, evaluative, etc. This research employs an exploratory approach as it seeks

to bring out the facts about ECOWAS' intervention and its resultant impacts on the first Liberian civil unrest. This study makes use of secondary data that are gathered from credible institutions such as the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and peacebuilding and security think tanks across the region.

Research Method(s) of Data Collection

Conflict is a quintessential phenomenon in human existence and has been so long before the 1648 Westphalia Treaty that gave rise to the modern nation system. It is seemingly impossible to completely avoid conflict, but, also possible to contain and manage it in a manner that averts further violence and calamity. While much emphasis is placed on the management and avoidance of conflict, diagnosing the symptoms of conflicts – the root causes or underlining factors of the conflict using conflict analysis becomes an essential component for brokering peace and fosters post-conflict transformation that eventually leads to reconciliation and sustainable development- one in which all facets of the conflicts are addressed, in addition to ensuring perpetrators account for their action, in addition to ensuring the rule of law thrives, while also strengthening democratic institutions of governance.

Several conflict resolution models have been established to bring peace to the globe. These models are based on many theoretical schools' approaches, with each theoretical construct proposing its own set of conflict resolution rubrics. While the emphasis is on a critical assessment and appraisal of the conflict's backdrop, and the historical circumstances in which the conflict erupts, there are many more ideological distinctions. For instance, liberalism, a well-known theoretical school, contends that conflicts can be resolved through inclusive peace processes and liberal state change, such as democratization and good governance. This model has been the crux on which the liberal school of thought has sought to contain and manage conflicts. The liberal model of conflict management has gained much support from interventionist international actors, multinational actors, civil society groups, as well as the sub-regional body of ECOWAS. While some view the liberal model worth emulating, however, some scholars argue its inability to manage conflict, and broker sustainable peace that averts conflict relapse. The Russian emerging paradigm of conflict management, mirotvorchestvo, emphasizes the priority of sovereignty principles, the

need for strong states and political order, and the rights of governments to suppress internal strife by all means required (Lewis, D. 2022). Unlike liberals that argue for full freedom, the Russian model believes that perfect freedom serves as a conduit for internal insurgencies, leading to state dissolution.

The First Liberian civil war needed more than urgent intervention due to the rapid spread of human casualties. In a region as porous as the West African sub-region, the liberal model of conflict management became a viable option, but proved less effective, thus leaving the Liberian state to lie in ruin, further escalating the war and heightening the humanitarian crisis. In addition to these perils, insurgency organizations received significant support from some regional leaders, who for personal and political reasons sought to oust the Liberian government. However, it is also important to note that one of the reasons for the failure of the liberal model of conflict management in Liberia was due to its bureaucratic nature, which among other things involves: seeking consent from member states- some of whom had openly expressed support for the insurgency groups; and importantly, galvanizing financial and material resources from regional states and international organizations for the peacekeeping operations.

This research was conducted using a qualitative method. This method was used effectively to examine ECOWAS' role in the First Liberian Civil war from 1989-to 1997. According to Norman (2005), the most efficient use of the qualitative method of data collection provides a clearer understanding of a social phenomenon, in this case, ECOWAS' intervention as well as the resulting impact of its peacekeeping intervention. As a qualitative research paper, emphasis is placed on examining reports, documentaries, academic articles, reviews of journals, and critical examinations of information from peace and research institutions such as PRIOR and UPPSALA. To further corroborate the information gathering process, a purposive sampling survey is applied and it takes into consideration the use of structured and unstructured information gathering techniques such as key informant interviews, archival documents, transcripts, and feedback forms – all directed to experts and professionals working in peacebuilding and conflict transformation ecosystem.

Data Collection Instruments

The use of proper instruments allows researchers to concentrate on their research goals while simultaneously improving the data collecting and analysis process (Trigueros, Juan, & Sandoval, 2017). Review of documents and secondary material obtained from peer-reviewed studies, books, publications, and official reports from trustworthy entities such as the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN are among the data collecting instruments employed. This combination of instruments resulted in the data convergence and confirmation required to improve evidence confluence (Bowen, 2009). Furthermore, this allowed the researcher to undertake an in-depth investigation into the issue, but more crucially, within the context of the research's objective, so improving the research study's quality (Yin, 2016; Kvale & Brinkman, 2009). A critical review of policy documents constituted an integral component of the data collection procedure of this research and ideally forms the crust of instrumentation.

Research Design and Rationale

There are four main questions that this study aims to solve. These questions highlight the importance of the study by posing the following: 1) What were the socio-economic and political causes of Liberia's first civil war? 2) What were ECOWAS/role, ECOMONG's capacity, and efficacy in the first Liberian civil war? (3) What regional and sub-regional issues influenced ECOWAS mediation and conflict resolution efforts during Liberia's first civil war? (4) What were some of the obstacles faced by ECOWAS/ECOMONG, and what processes or approaches were used in the First Liberian Civil War conflict management and mitigation effort?

This research study takes into detail account the role of ECOWAS in the first Liberian civil war. In addition to evaluating ECOWAS' intervention in the Liberian fracas, factors in the region that served as an influence on the intervention are also taken into consideration, coupled with the sub-regional body security threat strategy akin to threats confronting other regions of the world. Even though qualitative, quantitative, and hybrid techniques are the most common research methodologies, Creswell (2009) claims that researchers' methodology choices are influenced by their worldview. I was able to draw insights from a review of materials on the handling and management of conflict from a regional complex perspective, as well as examine the

role of supranational institutions in conflict mitigation, using ECOWAS' intervention in the first Liberian civil war as a case study, motivated by the constructivist worldview. With grounded theory, I used the qualitative research method (Adom, Yeboah, & Ankrah, 2016). The qualitative method allowed for a critical examination of diverse viewpoints on the subject, including but not limited to those of regional peace and security practitioners. (Yin, 2016; Creswell, 2013).

Given the significance of this research, the overarching questions focused on evaluating ECOWAS' effectiveness and timeliness in brokering peace, the challenges encountered by the sub-regional body, as well as examining the underpinning regional and sub-regional issues that prompted ECOWAS' involvement; and the potential challenges, as well as the methodologies and strategies ECOWAS/ECOMONG employed, while also examining the challenges the peacekeeping operations encountered while attempting to resolve the first Liberian civil war.

This research work considered among several things, the security threats that the sub-region faces, plus the new and growing layers of threats, particularly in the face of failed peace attempts in Liberia and subsequent relapse of conflict following the drawdown of ECOMONG.

This study explored a critical evaluation of ECOWAS' intervention in the civil war in Liberia but from a case study of conflict management. It delved into the prevailing security situation among member states, establishing regional vulnerabilities exacerbating the regional threat profile. In addition to the tense disagreements among regional leaders about ECOWAS' deployment, the overall security architecture and strategies for managing peace were also subjected to formative evaluation, followed by determining whether the mission was a success or failure (Kozleski, 2017). As archival research, this study, particularly the chapter four, relishes secondary data to proffer a stronger case on the role of the sub-regional body of ECOWAS, its historical perspectives, and transmogrification from an economic union in 1975 to becoming an institution involved in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace enforcement; the regional and sub-regional security threats, including the new and growing layers of security concerns which among other things include transnational organized crimes, human and people trafficking, terrorism, money laundering, and mercenaries. More pointedly, chapter four provides a detailed

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understanding of the regional security challenges which served as underpinning factors that influence the intervention of ECOWAS.

CHAPTER IV
Complex Regional Security Challenges

Introduction

This study explores and evaluates ECOWAS' role in the first Liberian civil war as a model for an African solution to African problems; the regional security management framework of the sub-region of Africa, as well as the approach and methodology employed in the peacekeeping operations in the first Liberian civil war. ECOWAS's security management approach, since its establishment in 1975, remains ineffective, resulting in a deteriorating and fragile security situation across the sub-region (Akokpari, 2016; Marc et al., 2015).

This chapter provides a theoretical narrative of ECOWAS' peacekeeping operation in the First Liberian war, creating a nexus between the initial objective of ECOWAS' formation to the new adaption of the peacekeeping and peace enforcement model. In furtherance of its overarching objective of contributing to academic literature in conflict management and post-conflict peacebuilding, this chapter outlined challenges in sub-regional threat management, while also prescribing measures for addressing the security missing links. This study will be utilized as a supplement to scholarly works on conflict resolution and by regional organizations looking to expand their security management tactics. In this chapter, I discussed historical perspectives on ECOWAS' formation, including motivation and overarching objectives; ECOWAS' holistic security challenges, particularly in terms of its peacekeeping operations in Liberia; and finally, the methodology used by ECOWAS in the first Liberian civil since that marked the first sub-regional peacekeeping mission in Africa.

Historical Perspectives on the Formation of ECOWAS

ECOWAS began as a concerted effort to achieve self-sufficiency and economic growth. Following prior attempts in the 1960s to form an economic union that could serve as a regional trade engine, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and Togo's Gnassigbe Eyadema led an initiative to have the fifteen member states of the sub-region consent to signing the treaty in 1975 (Obi, C. I. 2009). The involvement of Nigeria in the establishment of ECOWAS was contingent upon the nexus or correlation between

regional and national developments, including the overall dividends regional peace and stability would have on national security and sustainable development. Furthermore, prevailing transnational organized conflicts in the region, a semblance of growing revolts within member states, led to the formation of two security framework protocols. Although in existence long before there arose regional fracas, including the ones in Liberia and Sierra Leone, however, these protocols fell short of calling for the establishment of a permanent regional force that would combat any acts which could have the potential to instigate regional instability. As such, there was no attainment or implementation, thereby leaving the region vulnerable to "inside" and "outside" threats. Aning, E. K. (1999) argued that the failure of ECOWAS to establish a permanent regional force became exacerbated further by the misgivings among francophone governments regarding Nigeria's true motives and intentions in initiating the effort, as well as ECOWAS' limited resource and material capacities.

The treaty establishing ECOWAS was signed on the 28 of May, by 11 heads of state and four plenipotentiaries, representing 15 states across the region. The initial birth of the organization showed a sign of great cooperation among member states. ECOWAS' formation was historic in consolidating both economic and physical security. Since its establishment, the organization has evolved exponentially, thereby adopting different layers of organs and bureaucratic frameworks. However, the growth expansion of the organization has not only contributed to mitigating some of the aged-old problems in the region but has, due to exponential bureaucracy and internal institutional rivalry, limited the organization's ability to combat internal contradictions and growing threats in the region, and has therefore led to stalled economic cooperation among member states, thus dampening the links that should have strengthened commerce and trade, and sustainable regional development.

Due to these internal issues among member states, the consolidation of south-south relations which ought to serve as an inspiration, seemed farfetched, thus seemingly crumbling the original vision of the organization. In light of these, individual member states soon enough turned to former colonial masters for direction. With former colonial masters running the affairs of their former colony, the region soon began polarized by a new western concept -neocolonialism – dampening the regional independence and autonomy. But more so, these external influences exacerbated the

already deep-seated apprehension and the rift between francophone and Anglophone states, most of whom became used bidding agents for western interests to the detriment of the overall security and stability of the sub-region.

ECOWAS was undoubtedly considered in the grand scheme of things as a project aimed at promoting regional and collective self-reliance, economic vibrancy, and commerce, thereby bringing to an end the centuries-long problem of regional trade. While the initial objectives of the organization were good, changing dynamics in the security framework of the world had a toll on the region, making its economic aims dubbed into political connotations. The impact of the Cold War, for instance, and most relatively recently, 9/11, had a paradigm shift in the general security framework of the sub-regional organization. Although regional integration remained a top priority for ECOWAS, internal rivalry seeking hegemonic control and domination exacerbated internal weakness, compromising the organization's ability to handle issues, as the first Liberian civil war of 1989-1997 demonstrated.

The politics for control subsequently overshadowed the grand framework of the economic corporation, leaving scholars to argue that economic integration was only a pretext, used to espouse the political ambition of some states in the region-notably Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire. According to Oloruntoba (2016), economic cooperation, from the surface, seemed to have been the primary reason and motivation for the formation of ECOWAS. However, it was the pretext, as other factors, including but not limited to political and security concerns, influenced the establishment of the sub-regional body; thus, placing the onus on Nigeria to play an active role, since the populous nation of west Africa had emerged from a bloody civil fracas which lasting between 1967-1970.

Formed on similar normative vision as the European ideology of regionalism, ECOWAS aimed at consolidating regional economic integration for growth and prosperity. Since its inception, various organs have been developed, protocols and treaties adopted, particularly in recent epoch for the sole purpose of acting as a security actor meditating disputes in member states. While these goal objectives might not have been achieved in context and within a specified timeframe, however, ECOWAS attained some successes in adopting new protocols tailored toward brokering peace;

building new south-south relations, and at the same time battling with the sudden twist in internal and external affairs.

Theoretical Foundations of ECOWAS and Integration Implications

ECOWAS' formation stemmed from the backdrop of a framework to strengthen regionalism, inter-dependence, and the theory of humanitarian intervention. Anchored on the theory of interdependence, it became apparent that no one member state would have experienced a semblance of peace, if every member state did not have peace. The collective concept of security in the face of porous sub-region, Furthermore, the existing regional dynamics, with among several things formed the cultural, tribal, and ethnic connectivity across member states' borders, further enforced the concept of forming transnational unison and a collective security pact guaranteeing not only physical security, but also ensuring economic activities thrived.

The establishment of West African states during the colonial era came with it its own set of obstacles and challenges yet prospects. These difficulties resulted from the fact that the majority of the newly established states did not have the required mechanism and technical know-how in running a sovereign state. The newly independent states lacked the necessary infrastructure, including education, to function as governments. These countries' capacity to foster development relied on their former colonial masters, who in turn built for themselves neo-colonial exploitative structures which later resulted in the extraction of raw materials from the region, while also making liberal democracy a precondition for rendering assistance in the form of aid. Regionalism was gaining a foothold in global politics; henceforth, ECOWAS was to keep up with the pace and wave of regionalism and integration that was spreading across Europe, with the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, that later transformed into the European Economic Community. Having endured long years of deadly wars that devastated its economies, Europe's example of forming regionalism, set the pace globally and proffered some silver linings for economic growth. In light of this endeavor, theorists such as Mitrany, and Schmitter (1960) sought to develop ties among member nations in Europe, to encourage economic integration and development. This concept would later have a global spillover impact and effect and peace, thus being replicated in the formation of ECOWAS. This concept

was further tailored toward establishing a powerful political unit that would later become an active player in regional and global politics

Given that regionalism was becoming a quintessential soft-power instrument for cohesion, and political and economic stability across the globe, the sub-region of Africa, therefore followed the enviable example and model of Europe, since the European Community was gradually becoming a success story across the world. Although the European example was a good example, however, its model and concept should have been emulated contextually, accounting for factors such as education, technical capability, and homogeneity, among other factors.

Sub-regional Security Challenges

Like every region in the world affected by the scourge of colonialism, continent, Africa and all of its sub-region continue to experience the challenge orchestrated by western imperialism. By the period of African independence and liberation struggle, it was apparent that the continent was tired of inhumane treatments and opted to handle internal and external issues – a concept of sovereignty. However, many years down the track of independence, the region still faces a multitude of security challenges. Many of these challenges are visible and remain acute, resulting in regional instability, and most instances, civil war. The region's security problems are diverse, ranging from governance issues to trans-organized crimes like human trafficking, drug smuggling, etc. With growing concern about environmental security, the region faces an existential threat of climate change and global warming, but there were internal contradictions; for instance, civil wars, inter-state wars, as well as several military coups d'état, leading to unconstitutional and military regimes across the region thereby destabilizing regional security (Souaré, 2000).

While most African countries celebrated 50 years of independence by 2010 – a year proclaimed the African Union as the "Year of Peace", however, the security architecture in the region remains volatile and lies in ruin. The West African sub-region, perhaps more than any region on the continent has experienced the worst vestiges of instability and violence. In an assertion, Adebajo (2004), chronicled the security condition of the region and asserted that the west African region is not only

pores in its facets, but also prone to conflict, based on the weak nature of state infrastructure that creates system failure and breeds instability and uncertainty. The weak system, coupled with other factors embedded into the idiosyncrasy of the actors in the region, makes the region precarious. This precarious situation resulted in several conflicts including but limited to the civil war in Nigeria war lasted between 1967-1979, the Liberian civil war, as well as the civil upheaval in Sierra Leone. Followed by these conflicts are also growing conflicts in the Casamance and Sahel Regions, in addition to other violent conflicts in Mali, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, and Ivory Coast.

While the Cold War and the shifting global security paradigm can be blamed for these conflicts, they are also the result of European colonization in the region, specifically France and the United Kingdom, which left a divided region and sowed the seeds of conflict among newly independent nations. The challenging security situation of the region cannot be attributable to a single factor but is further underpinned by trains-organized crimes, which are among the worse devastating in the region. While political crisis constitutes a chunk of the reason for the porosity of the region trains-organized crimes also play a deepening role as well; probably because of the weak security architecture and weak governance infrastructure. West Africa over the last decades has been a hub and route used by drug cartels.

ECOWAS Peacekeeping Model

The founding goal of ECOWAS was to improve economic links among member states while also assuring healthy sub-regional integration based on the idea of collective self-sufficiency. Formed as a trade organization, ECOWAS was divided into many pillars to create collective benefit, and foster thriving regional identity and cohesion. But, more importantly, it was designed to stand in the formation of a single, big trading bloc – one which would be compared to the European Community, and also strengthen regionalism. As part of the integrated model of ECOWAS to spur growth across the region, sectors such as energy, telecommunications, transportation, and natural resources, were identified as quintessential synergies for the attainment of the grand vision of West Africa regionalism, projection of regional power, and a show of socio-economic self-sufficiency. By these initial economic models, regional business and trade ecosystems were projected to bolster economic growth, and create

job opportunities, thereby leading to security. With trade forming the crux of ECOWAS' formation, however, integration was also a significant pillar; thus, there were no, at least in the immediate term, active provisions or strategies put into place for providing physical security since the region was relatively stable, and there were no perceived threats to security.

With a nexus between economic integration and stability, it was apparent that the establishment of ECOWAS would have precluded and averted conflict in the region. However, not until 15-years after its establishment the region began confronted with its first civil upheaval in Liberia. Constrained by the war in Liberia and the potential security consequences it would pose to regional security, ECOWAS sort to intervene through the establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) – a preventive diplomatic framework aimed at averting largescale violence in Liberia. Member states of the SMC included Togo, Mali, Nigeria, and the Gambia. Calling for a cease-fire, the SMC initiated several measures aimed at attaining détente, among which included scheduling diplomatic engagements and meetings with leaders of various warring factions to try to reach an amicable resolution. As the violence and mayhem escalated, diplomatic efforts appeared to have less of an impact, thus the Standing Mediation Committee established the ECOMOG Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, with Nigeria serving as a driving force. Tasked with monitoring and enforcing truce agreements, having transformed into ECOMONG – the body became given an additional mandate of ensuring there is law and order through a constituted democratic government (Yoroms, G. J., 1993). However, following failed attempts to resolve the conflict and with growing tensions from warring factions that resorted to casualties to ECOMONG soldiers, the mandate of peacekeeping soon shifted into peace enforcement, with ECOMG troops in full combat against warring parties.

Before the shifting mandate of ECOWAS from a more focus on economic integration to peacekeeping, the organization adopted strategic frameworks for improving conflict prevention and human security as guiding instruments in events of eventuality. In the wake of growing violence in Liberia, the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) formed a military peacekeeping operation group to probe and restore stability. Initial efforts of the military peacekeeping operations proved to be gaining some outcomes until the general body of ECOWAS began engulf in internal

wranglings. The peacekeeping operation was stifled by several reasons, including but not limited to: an ineffective central control system, fluid and often changing mandates lacking proper coordination, and seemingly dilution of the actual intent of brokering peace and restoring stability and normalcy. While the role of ECOWAS in the first Liberian civil might be viewed from some lenses as a success story, given that it was a model designed by Africa to resolve African problems, and the first-ever military peace operations by a sub-regional body on the continent, however, the model for resolving the conflict was not free from internal contradictions and institutional anomalies.

Comparative Case Studies on conflict management

ECOWAS/ECOMOG's intervention in the Liberia war of 1989 can be justified for several reasons, including the expressed view that African solutions to African problems are the way to make Africa better and more competitive in the world. A further argument went beyond the horizon of projecting ECOWAS' regional actorness, but one that was meant to avert humanitarian disasters, as well as prevent a spillover of the conflict to neighboring states in the region. Based on these grounds, Nigeria, which played a large role in the development of ECOWAS and is an important regional actor, was one of the key proponents in a bid to resolve the Liberian deadlock. Nigeria's position toward the sub-region, while mostly consistent with its post-civil-war strategy, was influenced by General Babangida's connection with Liberian President Samuel Doe (Adibe, C. E.,1997). Liberia's President Samuel K. Doe and Nigeria's Babangida's closeness and comradery revealed that Babangida was concerned about Doe's condition in the face of the NPFL rebels' attack. According to Adebajo (2008), Nigeria's display of leadership and aspiration in the area was entirely designed to project Babangida's image as a great and powerful leader, and his desire to leave an indelible mark on Nigeria's history. But, more importantly, it elevates Nigeria's military to the attainment of regional hegemon.

Aside from Babangida's ego and his entrenched desire to project Nigeria as a regional leader, some leaders in the region expressed concern that if insurgency groups were to succeed in toppling legitimate government without any reproach and reprehensible efforts from the sub-regional body, it most likely could encourage

belligerent groups in other countries to follow suit, take up arms against incumbent governments. ECOWAS's intervention can now be viewed as a preventive deterrence. While the intervention can be analyzed from several perspectives and ideologies, one of the most fundamental reasons for ECOWAS' action emanated from the goal of ruling elites - regime security and the protection of ruling elites.

One of the primary warring factions, commanded by Charles Taylor, had allies and a strong support base in the region and throughout the country. The NPFL was said to have received training and support from Muammar Ghaddafi's Libya, who had personal issues with President Doe's decision to close Libya's embassy in Monrovia and promote US foreign policy interests in the region. In addition to Libyan backing, Félix Houphout Boigny's Côte d'Ivoire and Blaise Compaore's Burkina Faso provided regional, strategic, and organizational support to Charles Taylor's NPFL. Boigny and Compaore both appear to have held grudges against Doe. According to some accounts, Doe assassinated President William Tolbert, whose son Adolphus married President Félix Houphout-adoptive Boigny's daughter, Daisy Delafosse, in 1980. Despite Boigny's appeals to preserve his son-in-law's life. Doe failed to prevent Adolphus's death while being held captive by his soldiers. The civil war had entrenched strings of dimensions- something which cumulated into support for both Charles Taylor and Samuel Doe. Support for both sides across the region became the ideal basis for the involvement of peacekeeping and external interference from ECOWAS. With Nigeria playing a major role in ECOWAS and the peace monitoring group of ECOMONG and seemingly good support for President Doe, Charles Taylor viewed Nigerian-led-ECOMONG not as a neutral arbiter but as an interventionist force for the perpetuation of draconian and undemocratic regimes. Furthermore, Taylor held the view that Nigeria's involvement was aimed at seeking to protect Doe's dictatorial rule from crumbling, while also expanding its foreign policy interest and hegemonic dominance across the sub-region. The logic thereon was that for as long there was a dictatorial regime protected by Nigeria, it would be coerced to secure Nigeria's interest, thereby making Liberia a puppet of Nigeria's interest in the region in terms of strategic geo-political interests (Sesay, 1995).

These misgivings, coupled with the mission's internal weaknesses, affected what ought to have been a peacekeeping mission into peace enforcement, thereby leading

ECOMONG into battle combat with Taylor's NPFL from the maiden of the mission's arrival in early 1990 in Monrovia. Due to the intensity of the combat in Monrovia, ECOMONG had to establish alignment and cooperation with breakaway factions increased fractionalization and the development of armed organizations in Liberia exacerbated the issue. Approximately eight factions were active in the Liberian conflict at its peak. ECOWAS persuaded Taylor in September 1996 along with other armed factions to sign a new peace treaty in Abuja and disarm under the supervision of ECOMOG and the UN. Contingent upon this, elections were held in July 1997. Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Party won the elections, with Taylor receiving 75 percent of the vote in the presidential election (Ejobowah, J. B., & Adebajo, A. 2002).

CHAPTER V
Findings and Discussion

Although ECOWAS has made some strides in combining military operations and diplomatic efforts in crises across member states, however, the region still faces challenges, not being able to tackle growing threats of insecurity, weak democracy, fragile peace, as well as a strong political will to enhance lasting and concerted relations among member states in tackling inequality- a major cause for the intensification of wars across the sub-region. The introduction of new security challenges, such as trans-organized crimes, for instance, put the region in a volatile state, further adding to the power rivalry among major actors within ECOWAS. These among other things created a volatile and fragile region that is susceptible to perpetual, thereby deepening the grappling struggle, while at the same time scouting out external solutions to internal problems, since internal infrastructures had shuttled into rubble. The combination of these complex issues ushered ECOWAS into an off-kilter position, making it ineffective, at least for the most part (Aning & Pokoo, 2014; Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013), to manage deteriorating security conditions, which by extension is leading to despicable and hurting conditions for citizens in the region and beyond. (Kieh & Kalu, 2013; von Soest, & De Juan, 2018).

The overall purpose of this research is to assess ECOWAS' role in the Liberian Civil War (1989-1997) using a conflict management case study. This study will address a gap in the existing literature on ECOWAS' role in Liberia's first civil war (1989-1997). It addresses the content of the research questions in the body of the literature. However, there are additional areas of significance that require scholarly intervention and impetus in the form of rigorous scientific research, particularly in examining ECOWAS' security management plan. Hence, research efforts are required to delve into a new strategic framework that would rebrand the existing ECOWAS Security management, thus making it not only effective but creating early warning signals and surveillance on potential conflict issues in the region.

Given that the war served as a medium and a watershed moment for the consolidation of regionalism, and the region's first peacekeeping operations, it was incredibly significant to examine the mantra on which the intervention was developed

– an African solution for African problems. But more importantly, this study is purposeful in that it would provide a policy roadmap and contribute to academia, especially in the field of conflict resolution and management, peacekeeping, and post-conflict transformation. It would also serve as a resource reference for future peacekeeping operations. This research study was conducted using secondary sources. These sources were drawn from situational reports written and published by ECOWAS, AU, UN, and research think-tanks such as UPPSALA. In addition to the use of reports, this study makes use of books, peer-review articles, journal publications, interviews, as well as video documentaries done by BBC, VOA, and Radio France, containing interviews of heads of warring factions, conflict management experts, intervening parties and heads of peacekeeping mission of ECOWAS. The research questions focus on understanding the timeliness and effectiveness of ECOWAS' engagement in the first Liberian war; the regional and sub-regional factors that inspired the intervention; the obstacles ECOWAS faced; its regional security framework – including its policies, methodologies, and strategies employed in containing or managing the First Civil War.

The conclusion and findings of the study, detailing among other things that ECOWAS' internal weaknesses, coupled with inadequate logistics to support ECOMONG's operations and the lack of political will, fermented the first Liberian war, thereby dragging it on for a long period without attaining sustainable peace amidst the signing of almost dozen peace instruments. The First Liberian civil war marked a bigger picture of existing internal conflict for over a century of one-party rule. Dating as far back as the coming of repatriated free slaves from the Americas, the Liberian nation had been an arena for racial politics between native or indigenous Liberians against their repatriated counterparts, otherwise called Americo-Liberian. By the time of its independence in 1847 becoming the first independent republic in Africa, the nation had become a symbol of African liberation, but not without a growing semblance of segregation which cumulated into a series of revolts against repressive regimes controlled by Americo-Liberians.

Over 132 years of draconian rule, bad governance, and violation of basic human rights, the Americo-Liberian hegemony crumbled in a coup d'état in 1980, thus bringing into power a military head of state Samuel Doe. Doe's take-over was initially

received with jubilant public opinions given that he hailed from a group of the native or indigenous that endured massive suppression for over a century at the hands of Americo-Liberian leaderships. However, Doe's regime did not seem anything different from his predecessors; human rights violations, corruption, bad governance, and the lack of accountability were normalized using ethnicity, and patronage as a vehicle for wielding power. There became no medium to seek redress to grievances, as the court which ought to be the cradle of trust and confidence became a partisan of the government's draconian posturing (Kieh 2009). Samuel Doe's government began violently handling the affairs of the state by publicly executing leading figures in former regimes. He politicized the military – making it a predominant ethnic military machinery to his advantage. By 1980 to 1985, Doe, former military personnel, had been recorded as one of the richest African heads of state. Rampant corruption and economic peril in the nation fermented chaos, leading to the war of 1989. The severity of attacks and human security implications posed to the sub-region prompted the urgent sub-regional intervention, hence ECOWAS constituted The Standing Mediation Committee (SME), which later formed the peace monitoring group of ECOMONG. ECOMONG intervened in 1990 but grappled with ensuring actors in the war reached a compromise. Internally broken by a series of challenges - ranging from disunity, lack of logistics, and financial constraints, managing and containing the war in the wake of these challenges seemed almost impossible. Furthermore, ECOWAS has no experience in mediating disputes of such nature, coupled with its internal power struggle, in addition to loyalty to former colonial powers such as Great Britain and France.

In lieu of the growing tension in Liberia requiring urgent intervention, France was consolidating stronger military ties with its former colonies, the majority of whom feared Nigeria's growing regional influence would pose threats to their strategic and vital interest. In addition to the growing concerns about Nigeria's desire for hegemonic dominance, the populous West African nation possessed tremendous power capabilities - its GDP and population were equal to those of the other fifteen ECOWAS countries combined; thus, giving it an added advantage. Further concerns stemmed from the fact that the majority of ECOMOG contingents came from Anglophone countries, with Nigeria sending in the highest number of contingent, especially so when there are more francophone countries in the region than Anglophone countries.

Although its name (ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group) implies ECOWAS support and sponsorship, the force was formed only by five member states, implying that ECOWAS's top body did not officially sanction and endorse ECOMOG and its "Operation Liberty" by the time it set sail in Liberia in August 1990. This division in ECOWAS stemmed from the backdrop of its leaders' divided support for both the Liberian government and warring factions. Taylor's insurgency was supported by certain governments, particularly Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire. Burkina Faso's President, Blaise Campaore, stated that he would not recognize ECOMONG and that his government and people had given no approval to the military actions in Liberia, implying a lack of cooperation. Aside from the politics originating from its leaders, there was a debate on ECOMONG's goals and procedures. For instance, there was a concern about whether ECOMONG should have an open mandate- which means it would act as a peacekeeper and peace enforcer against insurgency forces. These conflicting concerns over mandates and methods, coupled with Nigeria's continual dominance of ECOMOG, contributed to the ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping operations, as well as prolonged the conflict thus lasting over seven years. Funding was also a major underpinning factor for which ECOMONG failed to achieve peace after over five years of attempting to bring conflicting actors together for a truce or detente. SMC which later formed the ECOMONG, to sustain the peacekeeping operations, in its maiden established what became known as a Special Emergency Fund, aimed at raising $50 million from donors and states in the region. But the lack of interest from the international community, especially in the wake of global concerns about the Gulf War, resulted in incomplete funding for a conflict that could pose regional instability.

ECOMONG's incoherent mandate and strategies for managing the first Liberian war, lacking hands-on expertise, thus, leading to structural mishaps, in addition to further neglect for formulating measures on conflict transformation- to usher in democratic leadership with strengthened institutions which among other things seek to preclude war. While the mission sort peacekeeping as a medium of ensuring stability, however, peacebuilding, a vital component for attaining sustainable peace was virtually lacking. Indicators of peacebuilding including but not limited to DDRR were not properly carried out, leaving many child soldiers not demobilized and rehabilitated. In furtherance of ensuring a thriving and sustainable peace as part of the

conflict resolution rubrics, ECOMONG failed to ensure a constituted government ensure democratic institutions such as the media, civil society, and anti-graft institutions were strengthened and well consolidated to avert the recurrence of war.

Before the First Liberian War in 1989, ECOWAS had policies and protocols in place on mutual defense and integrated approaches to conflict management and peacekeeping, according to the findings of this study. Some of these agreements, for example, include the 1981 Mutual Assistance in Defense Protocol, the 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol, and the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security. However, these conflict management instruments were mostly relevant to stakeholder agencies and organizations, thus, there was no real physical impact due to the fact the sub-region had never experienced war before 1989. In light of this, integrated threat management and operational approach in dealing with complex security dynamics could not be attained. ECOWAS/ECOMONGs' initial model of peacekeeping failed to achieve its needed outcomes due to its inability to handle and resolve political differences existing between Anglophone and francophone members. These differences deepened further, disallowing effective security management strategies, and integrated threat management aimed at detecting early warning signals of wars. Furthermore, a unified security framework that integrates a command-control mandate for effective peacekeeping was virtually non-existent, thus leading to disjointed command-control structures. Consequently, the peacekeeping mission was thrust into unprepared circumstances: financial and logistics, lack of grassroots peacekeeping knowledge that incorporates local dynamics, as well as leveraging on the expertise of other regional institutions.

Overall, the Sub-region has over the last couple of decades witnessed a dwindling security construct. With almost every nation in the region experiencing some form of human insecurity, the 1980s showcased growing demands for external peace mediation interventions, particularly in the wake of the First Liberian civil war in 1989. Marking a turning point in the consolidation of regionalism, ECOWAS intervened through a peace monitoring group, ECOMONG –making Liberia the first in sub-regional history to have had military peacekeeping intervention. Although the intervention proved significant, however, its operational framework encountered a

plethora of challenges, ranging from internal political disagreements within member states- the struggle for regional hegemonic dominance, and the Anglophone and francophone blocs' loyalty to former colonial powers; to the sub-regional inexperience in brokering peace; and a lack of financial logistical sustainability. More importantly, however, ECOWAS' operations did not have a clear mandate and strategic roadmap in containing the conflict, in addition to its fluid focus on peacekeeping, thereby ignoring important components of conflict resolution like post-conflict transformation and peacebuilding – indispensable components for attaining sustainable peace. In light of these constraints, the intervention became ineffective, failing to broker peace, and foster an agenda of post-conflict peacebuilding, thereby leading to conflict relapse after the 1997 elections. While some have argued that ECOWAS' failure squarely stemmed from politics, however, one is inclined to believe that ECOMONG's apparent lack of examining the ripe moment of the conflict, including other factors such as the geography of the conflict zone, endangered the mission, contributed to its massive loss of manpower. Furthermore, the peacekeeping mission's shifting mandates did not consider its intervention in a rigorous evaluation of the sub-region's security concerns – an implication for regional security, while also failing to critically examine the core of the war.

ECOWAS' inexperience in mediating conflict also largely contributed to escalating the war, especially in the face of a perceived notion that the body was biased. More pointedly, however, the lack of a clear and concise peacekeeping mandate further compounded the problem, in addition to not having fundamental geographical knowledge of the conflict zone, skilled conflict management negotiators, and diplomats. Other issues such as internal political frictions within ECOWAS over regional hegemonic control and dominance, followed by a divide for and against the insurgency groups, fermented the war at a propositional height, thus prolonging the war over 6 years, while creating a hurting economic and humanitarian crisis within the sub-region. Worse also, was the visible show of support on various sides of the axle from regional and sub-regional leaders to conflict actors further illustrated the extent at soaring of the conflict had both internal and external dimensions. Hence, resolving it would have required looking inside and outside of the state – using shuttle diplomacy to bring both external and internal actors for a compromise. Importantly, however,

examining the interest and motivation of various actors and seeking out a possible compromise to the identified incompatibility could have been a reasonable approach.

Given the intensity of the war and its potential ramifications posed to the entire region, containing such a war needed strong financial and material resources, which ECOWAS grossly lacked leaving it into, in most instances full-scale combat with insurgency groups.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Ethics Committee Approval

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

26.07.2022

Dear James B. Kollie

Your project "Examining Ecowas' Military Peacekeeping Intervention in The Liberian Civil War (1989-1997): A Perspective on Conflict Management" has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project, it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.

Appendix B

Turnitin Similarity Report

EXAMINING ECOWAS' MILITARY PEACEKEEPING INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR (1989-1997): A PERSPECTIVE ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

ORIGINALITY REPORT

9%	8%	4%	4%
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