NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

TRIBALISTIC COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM IN NIGERIA

M.A. THESIS

Israel Oghenero OWEH

Nicosia

June, 2022

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Approval

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
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I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

Israel Oghenero Oweh

…../…./2022

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to God, my strength, He has been my strength and my comfort throughoutthis process and work and also to my father Eng Sunday B Oweh who thought me one of the most important lessons of my life which is not to give up and my amazing mother the one whoalways stood by me.

Acknowledgments

Abstract

Tribalistic Competitive Authoritarianism in Nigeria

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MA Department of International Relations
June 2022, 69 pages

Multiple interpretations are possible for the concept of competitive authoritarianism. Itconsiders and contemplates on the personality of people who are noticeable by their respect forjurisdiction, who are viewed as all-powerful, and who give a lifeline in a terrifying and unpredictable world. In all competitive authoritarian administrations, periodical elections are held. These elections are crucial because the opposition has a theoretical chance of winning. The subject of this research thesis is the novel notion of tribalist competitive authoritarianism.According to past studies, tribalism and competitive authoritarianism in Nigeria have never been found to be related. The political scene in Nigeria, as well as its apparent authoritarianism,may be traced back to the political tribal zoning that occurs inside the country's voting system. Political leaders, social scientists, and economists have engaged in heated debates regarding prejudice in recent years. Nigeria's post-colonial and post-independence elections have provento be contentious. This is because they have always been accompanied by hostility, bitterness,murder, and mutilation, among other things. In terms of candidate selection, party primaries, campaign financing, state control, and manipulation, these EA features were present in the 2015 elections. Political tribalism can be seen as a sociopolitical positioning which influencesintergroup relations and also intergroup prejudice. Tribalism in politics is a sort of identity politics. In the same way that authoritarianism is characterized by a favorable evaluation or idealization of the in-group, political tribalism is characterized by discrimination and the devaluation of inferior out-groups.

According to previous research, tribalism and competitive authoritarianism in Nigeria have never been determined to be related. In contrast, the author has

demonstrated, via both empirical and theoretical investigation of the electoral environmentin Nigeria, that there is a link between tribalism and competitive and authoritarian politics in the country.

Keywords: Competitive Authoritarianism, Tribalism, Elections, Political, Political Tribalism.

ÖZ

Nijerya'da Kabileci Rekabetçi Otoriterlik

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Haziran, 2022, 69 sayfa

Rekabetçi otoriterlik kavramı için birden fazla yorum yapmak mümkündür. Yargıya saygılarıyla dikkat çeken, her şeye kadir olarak görülen, korkunç ve öngörülemez bir dünyada can simidi olan insanların kişilikleri bu değerlendirmenin bir parçasıdır. Rekabetçi otoriter yönetimlerin tümünde dönemsel seçimler yapılır. Bu seçimler kritiktir; çünkü muhalefetin teorik olarak kazanma şansı vardır. Bu araştırma tezinin konusu, kabileci rekabetçi otoriterliğin yeni nosyonudur. Geçmiş araştırmalara göre, Nijerya'daki aşiretçilik ve rekabetçi otoriterlik hiçbir zaman ilişkili bulunmadı. Nijerya'daki siyasi sahnenin yanı sıra bariz otoriterliği, ülkenin oy verme sistemi içinde meydana gelen siyasi kabile bölgelerine kadar izlenebilir. Siyasi liderler, sosyal bilimciler ve ekonomistler son yıllarda önyargıyla ilgili hararetli tartışmalara girdiler. Nijerya'nın sömürge sonrası ve bağımsızlık sonrası seçimlerinin çekişmeli olduğu kanıtlandı. Bunun nedeni, diğer şeylerin yanı sıra onlara her zaman düşmanlık, acılık, cinayet ve sakatlamanın eşlik etmesidir. Aday seçimi, parti ön seçimleri, kampanya finansmanı, devlet kontrolü ve manipülasyon açısından, bu EA özellikleri 2015 seçimlerinde mevcuttu. Siyasi kabilecilik, gruplar arası ilişkileri ve ayrıca gruplar arası önyargıyı etkileyen sosyopolitik bir konumlanma olarak görülebilir. Siyasette kabilecilik bir tür kimlik siyasetidir. Otoriterizmin iç grubun olumlu bir şekilde değerlendirilmesi veya idealleştirilmesi ile karakterize edilmesi gibi, politik kabilecilik de ayrımcılık ve alt grupların değer kaybetmesi ile karakterize edilir. Önceki araştırmalara göre, Nijerya'daki aşiretçilik ve rekabetçi otoriterlik hiçbir zaman ilişkili olarak belirlenmedi. Buna karşılık yazar, Nijerya'daki seçim ortamının hem ampirik hem de teorik araştırması yoluyla, ülkedeki aşiretçilik ile rekabetçi ve otoriter siyaset arasında bir bağlantı olduğunu göstermiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rekabetçi otoriterlik, aşiretçilik, kabilecilik, seçimler, politik, politik aşiretçilik

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List of Abbreviations

PDP: People's Democratic Party

APC: All Progressives Congress

CHAPTER I

Introduction

This section gives the background information to the study. Research questions and objectives are also laid out in detail. The first chapter is devoted to the Literature Review, which explains what is meant by the term "right-wing authoritarianism." Additionally, the terms "competitive authoritarianism," "political tribalism," and "tribalist competitive authoritarianism" are defined. In the second chapter, we talk about the political history and context of Nigerian elections, as well as political parties in Nigeria and political parties in general. The third chapter presents and discusses empirical data on the general elections held in 2015 as well as the general elections that will take place in 2019. In the fourth chapter, we discuss the link between voting patterns in Nigeria's general elections and the country's various ethnic groups: Tribalism in Nigeria, voting patterns in Nigerian politics, and the politics of endorsement and counter-endorsement in the 2019 Nigerian general elections are all topics that will be discussed in this article. The Politics of Endorsement and Counter-Endorsement in the 2019 Nigerian General Elections, and Lastly, Tribalist Competitive Authoritarianism in Nigeria Sociocultural groups in Nigeria and the Politics of Endorsement and Counter- Endorsement in the Nigerian General Elections of 2019.

1.1 Background of the Study

The relevancy and novelty of the research. With regard to the significance of the chosen research, it should be recalled that authoritarian personality theory was responsible for bringing studies on discriminating beliefs into the social science sector in the first place (Adorno et al., 1950). Tribalism and competitive authoritarianism in Nigeria have never been found to be associated before, according to previous research. The Nigerian political scene, as well as the seeming authoritarianism that exists within it, may be traced back to the political tribal zoning that exists inside the country's election system.

Psychological and political science research has been performed to better understand fascist, totalitarian, conservative, and racist group membership dynamics as a result of their acts. In light of this theory, we can better understand anti-Semitism, racism, and other forms of discrimination, as well as right-wing authoritarianism,

violence, conformism, and support for oppressive and liberticidal strategies which include (the repression of minority groups).Discriminatory and unequal policies are frequent in sub-Saharan African countries with a diverse ethnic population. This is due to the occasionally unusual complexity of their ethnic combinations, which has resulted in this situation. Modern classifications of Nigerian ethnic groupings, for instance, identify around two hundred fifty unique ethnic groups. The governance model of this nation takes into account the country's ethnic diversity (Onana Onomo, 2002). Literature demonstrates that political elites usually make use of public strategies by giving their tribe's members more resources and also authority, to the cost of individuals from other tribes (Berman et al., 2004). A political tribalism is characterized by the utilization of tribal ties as a means of resolving and ending conflicts between various groups of people (Lonsdale, 2011). When it comes to gaining and/or retaining power in the political or economic arena, it is used by those in positions of power. According to Eifert et al. (2010), this preferential treatment has been shown to be effective. It pushes members of a tribal group to defend the status quo, hold attitudes favorable to authorities or norms, reject deviants or outgroups, and engage in discrimination and aggression against outgroups. Due to the fact thatright-wing authoritarianism translates into discriminating, hostile, and unfavorable views of outgroups, it is feasible to draw a connection between political tribalism and authoritarian tendencies at this level (Bourhis & Leyens, 1999). Because these concepts appear rational at first glance, it is crucial to stress that these linkages have not yet been established in the specialized literature. There are several intergroup behaviors, such as tribalism, which is a manifestation of discriminatory action, that can be understood better under authoritarian rule because authoritarianism makes it easy to grasp the psychological underpinnings of these intergroup behaviors (Shaffer & Duckitt, 2013).

1.2 Research Questions

i. If not, then why we need to refer to the electoral processes in Nigeria as Competitive Authoritarian?

ii. Furthermore, how does political tribalism affect and foster the electoral process to takethe form of Competitive Authoritarianism in Nigeria? In other words, what are the causal links and interrelation mechanisms between Competitive authoritarianism and tribalism in Nigeria?

iii.   Why is it justified to create a new hybrid regime called tribalistic competitive authoritarianism to refer to the politics in Nigeria?

1.3   Goals and Tasks of the Research.

i.   To detect the link between competitive authoritarianism and tribalism in Nigeria.

ii.   To highlight the influence of political tribalism on election outcomes in Nigeria.

iii.   To study the current flaws and challenges of tribalist competitive authoritarian regimeshave in Nigeria.

1.4   Research Methodology.

The investigation of the research problems is separated into two primary sections: theoretical and empirical research methodologies. This study relies heavily on qualitative analysis. In order to present a unified picture of the research effort, some researchers also referred to quantitative analysis. Comparative, historical, statistical, and descriptive research approaches were used in the investigation.

CHAPTER II
Literature Review

2.0   Right-Wing Authoritarianism

The concept of authoritarianism can be interpreted in a variety of ways. It represents the character of people who are distinguished by deference to authority, who are regarded as all-powerful, and who provide a lifeline in a world that is frightening and impossible to anticipate (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981). In the political sphere, authoritarianism is defined as a personal disposition that places a high value on group compliance at the expense of individual autonomy. At the same time, authoritarianism contributes to the creation of ideological stances as well as partisan polarization (Hetherington & Suhay 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Individuals have a natural tendency to identify with their group of belonging, according to social psychology of intergroup connections. If individuals want to gain acceptance by other people who belong to a group and avoid social isolation, they must adhere to the rules and laws of those organizations. Authoritarianism is hence a behavior that is strongly impacted by individuals' devotion to a specific classification. As a result, their connection and association with political groupings, for instance, is not much the outcome of subjective beliefs and more the effect of the social order and structure that the group they are affiliated with offers.

Authoritarianism, according to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), is a person's inclination for order, security, and certainty, which builds a worldview of notions within the individual's mind. Consequently, it aids in reducing uncertainty in potentially dangerous situations and times of civil unrest. In this regard, it has been uncovered that the unexpressed mentality normally associated with evolution of authoritarianism are considerable demands for, structure, closure and also order; intolerance of confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty; and a serious dependency on established powers to maintain order and stability (Jost et al., 2003; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). It is the first ideological construct to be related with a personal feeling of threat both theoretically and experimentally (Adorno et al., 1950). Indeed, when confronted with a frightening and uncertain reality, Fromm (1941) contends that humans overlook their freedom and lean toward authoritarianism. In fact, persons who express dissatisfaction with the system's authoritarianism are more sensitive to threatening words and signals than the general public (Lavine et al., 2002). Research

suggests that authoritarianism rises among the general public at times of significant societal hazards, such as unemployment, crime, and violence, according to the literature (Doty et al., 1991). Those who feel threatened or apprehensive about their safety due to terrorist acts are the most tolerant of civil liberties and freedoms, according to research conducted after the September 11 attacks (Cohrs et al., 2005). Because they see their country's crime, economy, and general well-being all declining in the face of an uncertain future, individuals are more likely to take an authoritarian stance. Exposed participants to the possibility of their country's criminal justice system and economic situations worsening in the future increased the affinity of participants for authoritarianism.

According to Altemeyer's (1998) Right Wing Authoritarian Scale, the tendency to regard the world as threatening corresponds strongly with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). It has been found that a calculated or controlled threat is linked to authoritarianism. People's fear of being oppressed or oppressed by others, social unrest, and political unrest can all contribute to an increase in authoritarian tendencies. According to Duckitt and Fisher (2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), however few writers have defined authoritarianism as 'a set of personality-centered social principles that are based on a desire to submit to a legitimate authoritative authority responsible for maintaining social order'' (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). In the 1980s (Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman, 2003). In light of previous research showing that authority is derived from belonging to a social group (Duckitt, 1989; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), The relevance of attachments and also membership in social groups are integral components of social structures, authoritarian optimism and attitudes, and authoritarian behavioral tendencies. There are two degrees to the conviction in a dangerous world: the impulse to retain forceful social dominance and conservatism, which refers to the desire to preserve the status quo. (Duckitt, 2001) A continuum between individual autonomy and collective obedience has been recreated by Altemeyer (1988) as a continuum of three sets of attitudes, "including authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism" (Feldman, 2003). Interaction between latent tendencies and perceived social risk is the basis of this notion, which is situated on an autonomy-conformity continuum (Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). People's predisposition to engage in authoritarian conduct is influenced by their surroundings, according to this theory (Altemeyer, 1988). The term Right-wing authoritarianism is rooted on a political ideology that emphasizes

social injustice. As a set of ideas, right-wing ideology seeks to legitimize social inequality, power dynamics, and the current state of affairs (Jost et al., 2009). Conformism, the importance of traditions, subordination, and hostility against deviants or ethnic minorities are the foundations of this system. This philosophy is predicated on the notion that a threat or danger looms over the planet, endangering its long-term viability and sustainability and socioeconomic disparities, which is supported by the majority of the population. It is a personality trait as well as an ideological component that has been examined in political science and social psychology for a long time. Racism, ethnocentrism, conservatism, nationalism, and anti-Semitism are some of the more extreme manifestations of the ideology. Most of the time, it is associated with the acceptance of violence and the tolerance for hostility (Altemeyer, 2001).

As a result, rightwing authoritarians tend to be people who are extremely eager to submit to authority who they view to be legitimate in their actions. Their behavior is dictated by societal standards and conventions, and individuals who do not comply to these standards and conventions are viewed negatively or punished. They place a high priority on uniformity and conformity among groups, and they use repression to attain this goal.

2.1   Competitive Authoritarianism

Democracies, competitive autocracies, and full autocracies are the three sorts of regimes identified by Levitsky and Way. Starting with Dahl's (1971, pp. 5–6) definition of democracy, the lack of "tutelary" powers not chosen by the people, complete adult suffrage, and considerable protection of civil liberties are all necessary components. All of these traits must exist in order for a country to be classified as a democratic country. But the incumbents weaken democracy's foundations in authoritarian countries. In all competitive authoritarian administrations, periodical elections are held. These elections are crucial because the opposition has a theoretical chance of winning. In contrast, competitive authoritarian governments are autocratic because the conditions favor the incumbents. If a country is truly autocratic, there are no multiparty elections at all, or opposition parties are effectively barred from running in them. It is possible that some of this is due to a concerted effort to tamper with results or the suppression of criticism. According to the research, this group includes hegemonic and closed autocracies. This book's Appendix I (Levitsky and Way, 2010,

pp. 365–371) describes the operationalization of these three regime types, where they code for rigged elections, abuses of civil liberties, an unequal playing field, tutelary powers, and privileges in the electoral process Presidents who are reelected with more than 70% of the vote can generally be considered noncompetitive, according to Levitsky and Way (Levitsky and Way 2002, p. 55), but their later operationalization employs an elaborate coding scheme that examines the electoral process rather than the election outcomes (see Bogaards 2010). Our research has allowed us to identify 35 nations that shifted toward authoritarianism in the early 1990s and keep tabs on them all the way up to 2008.

However, in contrast to their article from 2002, which described three paths to competitive authoritarianism (the death of a fully-fledged authoritarian regime, the collapse of an authoritarian regime, and the death of a democratic regime), the dependent variable in their book is what happened after the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes? So academics examine whether authoritarian regimes become stable or unstable democratic systems, or if they remain stable yet remain vulnerable to volatility. Linkage, leverage, and organizational power are three different independent variables that Levitsky and Way use to explain the diverse regime trajectories instead of relying on structural, institutional, and actor-centered theories. There are two types of explanations for each of the three explanatory elements: external and internal. An overview of the situation from a broad perspective "Linkage" refers to this link between authoritarian regimes at conflict with one another and Western nations. Here, there is a wide range of possibilities for a wide range of connections between the private sector and public sector. We must first grasp the significance of linking in order to comprehend the divergent paths taken by opposing authoritarian regimes. Democracy is only possible if people are connected. In comparison, Guyana has a global linkage score of 0.97. Gabon has the highest score in Africa, according to Levitsky and Way (2010) on page 375. All examples of competitive authoritarianism in Africa are given a low grade for linkage (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 306). External pressure from Western powers can have a significant impact on authoritarian governments' receptivity to initiating democratic processes. In and of itself, vulnerability does not lead to democratic change. As long as France's "black knight help" to Cameroon is excluded, no African examples of competitive authoritarianism are seen to have a considerable amount of leverage. Factor that can be explained on a national scale: When we talk about "organizational power," we're

talking about a government's ability to stifle democratic opposition. As three examples of organizational power, government coercion, the party's strength in power and economic state control might be mentioned.

The organizational power coding system measures scope and cohesiveness, two aspects of state coercive power and governing party strength (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p. 376–386). Numerous power sourceswithin the company have their results tallied. Serbia and Zimbabwe both have a score of eight,which is just shy of the potential maximum of ten. A score of zero was the worst in Africa forthe country of Benin. In reality, the most significant independent variable in African instancesis organizational power (Levitsky and Way 2010, p. 306). Africa's authoritarian governments have varying levels of organizational strength, but this has minimal impact on the likelihood of democratic change. "The three variables do not so much interact causally as they unfold in a logical sequence," Slater (2011, p. 386) says, articulating the causal logic implicit in Levitskyand Way's approach. Democratization will occur when the West and the rest of the world havea strong connection." The concept of Levitsky and Way is basically unidirectional, deterministic, and monocausal "when control is concentrated in a small number of people withlittle or no interaction between them, leading in authoritarianism (Slater, p. 386, 2011). Leverage is used when there is a lack of both connection and organizational power. Stable authoritarianism (low leverage) differs from unstable authoritarianism (high leverage). The sole explanation for democracy in authoritarian governments that have fought each other sincethe Cold War is Western influence (Slater 2011, p. 387). High-speed Internet access means democracy is inevitable; poor-speed Internet access means it isn't conceivable. As a result, democracy is always a process that occurs elsewhere. Because of this, Competitive Authoritarianism does not teleologically over-predict democracy, but rather underestimates it (Slater 2011, p. 387, emphasis in original). When it comes to democratic transformation, Slatercontends that there are many different paths to take. It is emphasized that authoritarian weakness and Western leverage are important factors that can help bring down authoritarianism while simultaneously promoting democracy. In response to Slater, Levitsky and Way (2011, p.8) argue that the absence of a home road to democracy in their study is due to the exceptional nature of the cases they have studied. These successful early democratizers were not includedbecause they first analyzed competing authoritarian states in the early 1990s, around 20 years after the third wave of democracy began.

They did not include nations that democratized on their own. There are fewer chances for democracy to take root when the state or party in chargehas weak control over the majority of the population. According to Levitsky and Way (2011,p. 388), this is due to the fact that "weak civil societies and domestic opposition are characteristic of these cases, as are state and party weakness." Their theory anticipated an unstable system, yet in their book from 2010, they painted a picture of democracy in Ukraine.On the one-year anniversary of this, they said that "the Ukraine has already reverted to competitive dictatorship" (2011, p. 388). 5 Levitsky and Way "do not provide an explanation for how democratization might take place in an environment of low connection," which is thecurrent scenario in Africa, according to Morse (2012, p. 186). Schedler associates "new authoritarianism" with "neither democratic nor democratizing" governments (Schedler, 2006). Frequently, these illiberal governments appear democratic, and some more traditional dictatorships have also been unexpectedly resilient. In 2010, the Economic Intelligence Unit reported that "democracy is on the decline" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010). As a result ofthese tendencies, comparative authoritarianism has resurfaced. This literature outlines the characteristics of 'comparative authoritarianism,' an emerging discipline that increases theoretical and empirical understanding of dictatorships.

In accordance with Schedler's perspective, this literature begins with a factual and philosophical contrast between failed democratization and authoritarian survival. In contrast toprevious studies that examined the elements that lead to democracy after 1989, this new studyexamines a vast array of dependent variables. In the 1990s, the focus of governance research changed from other outcomes to transitions (Hagopian, 2005). For instance, one study investigates the conditions in which dictators provide public goods, attempting to establish a connection between such policy decisions and incentives to invest in the future (Glaeser et al.,2004). This shift in study emphasis may explain the rise of "hybrid" regimes that are not necessarily on the road to democracy (Carothers, 2002). This new policy is further justified bythe fact that African surveys indicate that consolidation of authoritarianism, as opposed to blocking democratization, is a possibility (Bratton & Mattes, 2009). Theoretically, it is also long overdue, as Africanists have long derided modernization theory's views about 'unilinear' development, according to which countries must advance inexorably toward democracy(Mamdani, 1999; Edozie, 2009). There are various studies, notably African ones, that emphasize "big males" or "personal rule" (Jackson & Rosberg,

1984). Individualism is commonly mentioned in popular portrayals of African dictatorships (Godwin, 2010; Meredith, 2007). Individualism is emphasized in personal rule, which has been attacked by Linz for his emphasis on ideology (Markoff & Duncan Baretta, 1985). As a comparative authoritarian study shows, public authority is fundamentally collective: when rulers rely on others to carry out their decisions, their actions become more predictable and frequently limited. The "stereotypical autocrat" as a lone ruler is rejected by Weeks, who claims that dictators are constrained by a range of externally-imposed constraints (Weeks, 2008). Magaloni argues that dictators rule through ruling coalitions, regardless of the trustworthiness of power-sharing arrangements (2008). Some kind of community-based decision-making body exists in all researched governments, according to a recent worldwide study on authoritarianism (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). "Refrain from confining Zimbabwe's destiny to the fate of one individual," says a significant study, even in the instance of Robert Mugabe. Instead, they ought to concentrate on institutions, laws, and political coalitions instead (Bratton & Masunungure, 2008).

Analytic authoritarianism's third and most significant goal is to disassemble and analyze institutions. Research like Gandhi's (2008) shows that institutions usually restrict arbitrariness rather than weakening them. By lowering the transaction costs of cliente list exchanges, for example, legislation can extend authoritarian authority and encourage dictators to implement growth- enhancing policies (Wright, 2008). When it comes to authoritarian control, for example, political parties are more effective than mere propaganda vehicles because they help to institutionalize the settlement of key issues during the establishment of the government (Brownlee, 2007). They aid recruitment by settling disputes among the elite (Geddes, 2003). With respect to the state-society linkages that analytic authoritarianism allows to exist, it relies on structural conditions rather than elite activity.

In Lewis (2007), for example, authorities in Nigeria and Indonesia are paired with popular organizations to form "counterpart coalitions." Analytic authoritarianism also challenges the validity of regime typologies in advancing our understanding of non-democratic states. Each category has its own distinct set of regime characteristics, which have evolved over time as ideal types have evolved. To secure political loyalty, residents expect 'neopatrimonialism' regimes, which blur the distinctions between public and private, to exploit state resources (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). The term "semi-authoritarianism" (Ottaway, 2003) and other words

were coined to describe these illiberal practices as many new democracies restricted political freedom. Africa's "electoralauthoritarian regimes" claim to have competitive elections, yet they lack basic political and civil liberties (Schedler, 2006). In a competitive authoritarian government, incumbents are given preferential treatment, although competition exists (Levitsky & Way, 2010). One study goes so far as to construct a typology of subtypes to conceptually explain the name because it refers to such a wide variety of countries. (Morlino, 2009).

In Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Uganda, the classification of regimes provides a simple shorthand for demonstrating democratic retreat. Studies by Linz and Stepan linked specific political institutions to regime types, but according to Mahoney (2003), these designations did not makeit easier to undertake research that would prove causal linkages. Analytic authoritarian approaches, on the other hand, aim to expose the weaknesses in ideal kinds or labels. If some features are missing from a list, it is difficult to demonstrate causation, according to Gandhi, when looking at authoritarianism (Gandhi, 2008). As a result, some concepts, like "competitive authoritarianism," are referred to as "residual categories" (Edozie, 2009). CATO Institute research shows that even the most autocratic African presidents want to have their positions ofauthority confirmed through elections (Leon, 2010). In nearly every African country, neopatrimonialism has been dubbed a victim (Pitcher, Moran, & Johnston, 2009).

2.2   Political Tribalism

In the political sphere of African society, tribalism is often viewed as a problem rather than an acceptable form of political representation. A distinction is made between political tribalism (the use of ethnic identification to compete with other groups) and moral ethnicity, according to Lonsdale (2011). Political tribalism is seen and interpreted as the use of indigenous identityin a group's battle with other groups. When an ethnic group's overall success is promoted by providing its members more power and resources, Berman et al. (2004) consider it essentiallyunethical because such acts have a detrimental effect on non-ethnic groups. Tribal leaders try to maximize their group's national and local presence in the state. Members of a dominant socioeconomic class fostered this tribalism to preserve their own personal interests. In this logic, it looks to be a tool for the group that employs it to gain and maintain political and/or economic dominance. In a political context, tribalization

begins with a categorization definition that permits the tribe's boundaries to be circumscribed. This approach is founded on collective identities, which give the impression of being part of a small group with similar beliefs, complaints, and political aspirations. It concludes with the definition of a foreigner, anout group that is discriminated against and subsequently rejected by members of the in-group. Tribalism is rooted in the establishment of political identities, but it can be expedited by specific structural factors and this is when their stability and continuation is intimidated by crises in the economy, wars, instability in the political sphere, or attacks by terrorist, it is important for individuals to maintain ties with their clan. Respect for ancient clan values restores life's meaning, while tribal solidarity offers a sense of security. According to Balandier,tribe is today associated with a present-day enterprise, an economic area, or a proclamation, rather than a tribal cultural heritage. Tribe was once a modern means of seeking refuge from danger and uncertainty (Lonsdale, 2011).

Tribalism is prevalent in specific political sectors of Cameroon. Indeed, racial animosity is represented directly in politics, as evidenced by the ethnic polarization of presidential elections. Indeed, according to specialist study, citizens strongly favor the candidate of their tribe (Roubaud, 1995; Roubaud et al., 2006). In a second conclusion, we found that people who votefor the same political party tend to live in the same location. As it turns out, research conducted by CRETES in 1993 shows that the political sensitivity of Cameroonians varies based on wherethey were born (Roubaud, 1995). With the exception of Beti people in the Central, Eastern, andSouthern regions, CPDM supporters in these locations appear to be substantially more enthusiastic than the general population. With 46% of the vote, this party is the most popular among natives of these three regions, as opposed to just 5% of those in the West, South-West and North Western regions. It's easier for ethnically diverse African leaders to stay in power ifthey share the spoils and replace their political leaders frequently (Francois et al., 2014 a and b). These heads do have a penchant for overspending in their own neighborhoods. Taking thesesteps helps them stay in power longer because it gives them political support. Therefore, they can easily gain more support from the public by founding political parties and using them to get public advantages (Geddes, 2005). (Geddes, 2005). Scholars in Sub-Saharan Africa (Posner, 2007, Van de Walle, 2003) have showed that the strongest and most favored ethnic group that of the leader of that country (Van de Walle, 2003). (Van de Walle, 2003). (Posner, 2005). Politicians

struggle for political power by emphasizing differences between different ethnic groups (Posner, 2004). To get support from their ethnic communities, they often play the ethnic card in close races for elective office, and this helps them win (Eifert et al., 2010). Here, Bates and Collier's beliefs on ethnic and political diversity are clearly visible (2001). It has been shown that a person's ethnic identification is enhanced when they compete for political representation and jobs, and this has an impact on intergroup interactions. Political tribalism, in the words of Hintjens (2001), can lead to social violence. There is a strong correlation between ethnic stereotypes and tribal disputes and bloodshed. Tribalists are known for their stereotypical views of other communities, as well as their adherence to traditional values and morality (Scheepers et al., 1990). Stereotypes of outgroups do not only reflect prejudice and also hostility, but they also imply a sharp division between various social groups in society (Levinson, 1950). As a result of the division and enmity that political tribalism can cause among tribes, tribal identity can become politicized. Ethnic and social division can rise to dominance relationships and tribal hierarchies, resulting in socioeconomic inequalities (Lonsdale, 2011).

2.4   Tribalist Competitive Authoritarianism

The innovative concept of tribalist competitive authoritarianism is the subject of this research thesis. Tribalism and competitive authoritarianism in Nigeria have never been found to be associated before, according to previous research. The Nigerian political scene, as well as the seeming authoritarianism that exists within it, may be traced back to the political tribal zoning that exists inside the country's election system. In recent years, political leaders, social scientists, and economists have engaged in fierce disputes about discrimination. The bulk of social psychology's definitions of discrimination take into account the concept of prejudice. To be a member of a particular group, an individual may engage in acts of hostility or discrimination against the other people who belong to other groups simply because of the particular group to which they belong, according to Brown (1995). Criticism of the prejudiced group's members is defined by Dovidio and colleagues as discrimination. (Dovidio et al., 2000) To put it another way, prejudice is seen as the root cause of all the types of discrimination, and as a multi-stage process characterized by ever-more-destructive acts against members of outgroups (Allport, 1954). This quote is taken from Allport, 1954. To begin with, there is hostility in words

(occasional racial insults, statements aiming at denigrating the target whetheror not they are there.). A few instances of racial slurs, comments that degrade the target, no matter if the victim is present or not... There may be a hostile social environment (job, school,neighborhood) for the individual as a result of this stage (at work, school, in the neighborhood,etc). A study published in 1993 by Stone et al. The avoidance stage will be reached if nothingis done to stop it. It involves a preference for ingroup members over outgroup members, whichcan lead to the marginalization and isolation of outgroup members. Hate crimes, according to Sibley and Duckitt (2008), are associated with the open presentation of prejudice and occur in response to the perpetrator's belief of a financial or symbolic harm. The third step is seeking to exterminate members of the outgroup (genocide) (genocideNazi Germany, for example, had apowerful central government and a culture of institutionalized racism. Conative (behavioral) prejudice, in this view, is the part of prejudice that leads to discrimination (Wilder, 1978). For more information, see Wilder (1978). Discrimination has a negative connotation in intergrouprelationships. It suggests a distinct, unsuitable, and even unfair treatment of persons on the basis of their participation in social groups. According to Allport (1954), the concept of equitable treatment is lacking. Therefore, it is understood as a set of activities with the purpose of preserving the ingroup's attributes in a preferred position at the expense of the outgroup's features (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Group membership is bolstered by the social categorization that occurs as a result of the formation of a group and the subsequent processes of social identification.

Members of outgroups may be treated differentlyby individuals based on their social preferences than members of their own group (Duckitt, 2001). According to the findings of the social identity theory, prejudice and favoritism towardone's own group are already apparent when one is given a social identity. Individuals'intragroup altruism is stronger than their intergroup altruism when they are randomly divided into groups, according to Turner et al (1979). Given their conservatism, these findings have worldwide ramifications. Several real-world phenomena, including overt racism, tribalism, and nativism, can be partially explained by the social identity theory, according to this idea. Autocratic leadership is characterized by a strong sense of discrimination (Altemeyer, 1998). A person's propensity to embrace bias, intergroup discrimination, social unevenness, violenceagainst deviant outgroups and persistent zeal to right-wing political thought is characterized bythe dictionary as "right-wing

authoritarianism." In the view of Adorno and associates (1950), authoritarianism is defined by a lack of freedom of speech and the practice of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. There must be both ingroup favoring and antagonistic sentiments toward members of the opposing group while adopting authoritarian norms. Those who have an authoritarian mindset are more likely to admire the group's leaders, adhere to their rules andcustoms, and defend the group's interests, while also rejecting those who are outliers. It leads to preconceptions and stereotypes, as well as hostile and discriminatory acts, along the axis ofhostile attitudes towards members of the outgroup (Fromm, 1941; Peterson et al., 1993; Stoneet al., 1993). Because of this, authoritarianism is being associated with intolerance for groups that deviate from society's accepted standards and norms, as seen through prejudice and discrimination against marginalized communities (Feldman, 2003; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005).

According to the findings of this study, authoritarianism and intergroup discriminationare closely linked to characteristics that exacerbate disparities, such as racism (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988; 1996). Both ethnic bias and tribalism have a strong correlation to intergroup discrimination, which can be seen as a logical outgrowth of both. A person may be consideredto be partaking in discrimination if they adopt tribalism, also known as ethnocentrism, becausethey do so in order to forge tribal solidarity, preserve their identities and interests against outgroups and justify these (Kimenyi, 2006). As defined by Myers (1994), "groupthink" is a conviction in the superiority of a particular group one belongs to and widespread disdain for all the other groups.

The ingroup and outgroup are well separated, according to Nwaigbo (2005). Other tribes are demonized in this kind of thinking because people have such a strong sense of loyalty to their own (Nothwehr, 2008). Because of this phenomenon, he has a favorableattitude toward his relatives (which could be either indirectly through kinship or directly (ethnicity, clan, family), also a negative attitude toward members of other tribes) (Nwaigbo, 2005). An ethnic orchestration is appropriate since it consists of inappropriate preference beinggiven to some individuals on the basis of their communal affiliations (Mankou, 2007)."Tribalism" is a phrase that describes a person's proclivity to form and maintain animosity toward other people or groups because of their individual or cultural characteristics that differfrom one's own.

CHAPTER III
Conceptual Framework

3.0 Political History and Background of Nigerian Election

Post-colonial and post-independence elections in Nigeria have proven contentious. This is owing to the fact that they have always been accompanied by, among other things, animosity, bitterness, murder, and mutilation. In December 1959, Nigeria held its final elections under British colonial rule. First post-colonial general elections were held in December 1964 following the October 1, 1960, elections which brought about Nigeria's independence. A coalition party in the election race, the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), accused the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) of harassing and hindering its candidates' freedom of operation as the election campaign began. The situation became so dire that the UPGA decided to boycott the elections. A broad-based governance was agreed upon as a solution to the tension in Nigeria. However, Nigeria was enmeshed in another election crisis in November 1965, less than a year later. This pertains to the elections for the Western Nigeria House of Assembly. The governing party in that region, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), guaranteed that a large number of opposition candidates were refused candidacy and that its supporters had access to ballots well in advance. In addition, laws controlling the vote count and reporting of results were not adhered to.

Ultimately, the NNDP was declared the winner of the election. Following the statement, there was an immediate outbreak of violence in the region. Other than setting people and property on fire, the "Operation We Tie" squirts fuel into the air. On the 15th of January 15, the Nigerian military had to step in order to prevent the death and destruction of lives and properties. The army held elections in 1979 as part of its efforts to remove the junta from politics and return to the barracks. In addition to electoral rigging, additional irregularities were suspected. Consequently, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), one of the election's participants, challenged the results in court. The phrase "stolen presidency" has entered the political language of Nigeria. In the general elections of 1983, the party which was in power which was the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was re-elected. The UPN was angry that, like in 1979, the election had been rigged. The junta (boys in khaki) seized control of the country once again on December 31, 1983. It is also true that the 12 June 1993 presidential election

was beset by controversy. It was intended to be the last stage in the process of eliminating the junta's rule. The election, which was widely regarded as the freest and fair in Nigeria's post-independence history, was canceled by the Army because a group, the Association for Better Nigeria (ABN), went to court and obtained a ruling that the election be postponed, and the electoral umpire, the National Electoral Commission (NEC), failed to follow the ruling. Similar to past elections in Nigeria, the 1999 election to finally remove the military from politics was falsified. There were concerns over a lack of election materials at polling locations, the thumb printing of ballot sheets outside of polling stations, voting returns that did not correspond with the low voter turnout, etc. The combination of the All Peoples Party (APP) and Action for Democracy (AD) challenged Peoples Democracy Party (PDP) candidate Olusegun Obasanjo's victory in court.

Allegedly, the elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 were marred by such a high level of electoral fraud. Allegedly, political thugs took the vote boxes of election officials and replaced them with ones already stuffed with ballots. It was reported that double thumb printing and the invalidation of votes for the opponent occurred. According to reports, election officials failed to appear at a number of polling locations, and as a result, no voting took place. Nevertheless, they were allegedly crowned victors subsequently. In a number of instances, election officials and party agents are said to have "doctored and monitored" the results. Allegedly, many qualified voters were denied the right to vote (Osaghae, 1999, pp. 4–25). Prior attempts at a democratic transition have failed due to the difficulty of Nigeria's pursuit of long-term democracy, good governance, and wealth. After the collapse of the first and second republic the electoral result of the third republic was cancelled on June 12, 1993, as a because of prior attempts to democratize the country. People's political, economic, and social rights were often violated throughout the country's long period of military control, but the country's re-democratization process, which began in 1999, reignited their desire to see a more democratic future for their country (Osaghae, 1999).

Anxiety over the forthcoming elections is mostly driving these goals. Genuinely democratic elections are those that are held under conditions of fairness, participation, competition, and legality. With a neutral administration, competent and well-resourced election officials, the ability to take specific measures against fraud, impartial treatment by the police, military, and courts of competing candidates and

parties, access to public media for all candidates, and rules that don'tdisproportionately disadvantage the opposition, it's possible for elections to be free of fraud (Diamond, 2008). Desperate political hopefuls manipulate the voting process to gain political Power, which results in poor governance and an increase in poverty. People's lives and property are put at risk because of a lack of attention to social and economic infrastructure development.Even as economic and political hardships mount for the majority, the pseudo capitalisthegemony rises to the occasion. As a result of decades of political enslavement, Nigerians decided in April 2011 to rescue the dying behemoth from its vegetative state. They voted for ashift from the uninspiring past and status quo to a new order that would usher in a new chapterin the history and development of Nigeria. People who had been denied strong government and its attendant benefits for so long came to the assistance of a nation plagued by its leaders' crimes. Despite political harassment and intimidation, large numbers of citizens voted for theirpreferred candidates. They chose to preserve Nigeria's political prominence within the committee of nations. They dismissed all ineffective political parasites and selected new leaders to wield political power on their behalf for the next four years. Although only legitimateelections can help to establish and sustain Nigeria's fledgling democracy, Nigerian academics continue to be attracted by the country's voting process.

Nigeria's inability to hold elections that are free, fair, and open to all has grown in recent years, raising international concern and dissatisfaction (Igbuzor, 2010; Osumah and Aghemelo, 2010, Ekweremadu, 2011). As a resultof Nigeria's long history of political violence and electoral fraud, every election there since thecountry's independence has sparked increasing controversy and widespread indignation (Gberie, 2011). There were still irregularities and violence in the 2011 elections, but they weregreatly reduced (Bekoe, 2011; Gberie, 2011; National Democratic Institute, 2012).

A history of violence and acrimony have resulted in Nigeria's democratic governance being characterizedby the use of security agencies to target political opponents and the use of intimidation and intimidation in order to rig the elections. As a result, Nigerian democratic governance has beenmarked by the use of violence and acrimony in order to target political opponents and the use intimidation and intimidation in order to rig the elections (Omotola, 2010; Bekoe, 2011). Everybody knows elections are notoriously violent, and that can put a country's peace and

tranquility at jeopardy (Gueye and Hounkpe, 2010; Idowu, 2010). Some people believe that inorder to preserve democratic culture and progress, further democratic values must be applied and their effectiveness must be assured. Democratic principles must be protected in addition tochecks and balances between the three branches of the government, an independent and incorruptible court, and a vigorous fourth-party media In the event that public trust is betrayed,the masses should be unstoppable in their collective response against the betrayer.

It is time for Nigerians to vote out government leaders whose actions and policies are in direct conflict withtheir hopes and aspirations. To keep our fragile democracy and political leaders responsible,
Anti-administration groups can be removed through civil disobedience, walk-to-rule, and nonviolent and well-coordinated mass rallies by a legal trade union or organized labor. Aimingto investigate the impact of Nigerian elections on democratic consolidation, this article is an adventurous endeavor.

3.1   Political Parties in Nigeria

Political parties are the bedrock of Nigerian democracy. When political parties address issues which are of national importance to the electorate, people are most visible in the electionprocess. Here, it is easy to conclude that political parties play a distinct role in the democraticequation of the country. Political parties' failure to protect Nigeria's democracy is well- documented, as proven by the conflicts they've caused within the political system of the countrywhich is as a result of their working methods. It is common in Nigeria for political parties to go to great lengths to win elections. They have a difficult time deciding on techniques that arelegal in order to accomplish their goal.

Legal and unlawful, moral and immoral activities have been required of the two dominatingpolitical parties in Nigeria which are (PDP and APC) in order to secure political control. Ashadow has been cast on the Nigerian democratic system as a result of the country's recentgeneral elections. People anticipated that the March 28, 2015, presidential election mightdevolve into violence due to previous instances of politicians engaging in dirty campaigningwith cutting remarks, half-truths, and outright lies (Ibraheem, Ogwezzy & Tejumaiye, 2015). PDP and APC campaigns were observed by Baiyewu (2015) who noted verbal attacks and apaucity of new ideas in the major political parties' campaigns. There are more recommendations for bettering the country's governance in advance of elections in

a morestable political context, he observed. According to a statement from the former INEC Chairmanand Prof. Attahiru Jega's Chief Press Secretary, "The Independent National ElectoralCommission has observed that some politicians and registered political parties have begun anunrestrained campaign for the upcoming general election, thereby heating the polity." "It isnoted that campaign posters are being shown indiscriminately, and electioneering broadcastsare being aired outside of the statutory provision for electioneering for various electivepositions," the statement states. This tendency is unsafe and risky and also foreshadow ill forthe political process. It is a threat to democracy in Nigeria.

Assistant Editor of the Nation Dare Odufowokan asserts that during the 2015 pre-election campaign, the electioneering battle degenerated into a series of hate campaigns, resulting in accusations and counter-accusations between the two major political parties and candidates. Consequently, the actions and inactions of a number of political gladiators during electioneering campaigns exceeded specified and acceptable standards and procedures. The most prominent example is campaign spending as established by relevant bodies (Odufowokan,2015). According to Ajayi (2015), the 2015 Nigerian presidential election was the most expensive ever held on the African continent. Ajayi referenced Professor Wole Soyinka, who views the 2015 election as a watershed moment. "The most expensive, wasteful, profligate, and meaningless. Regarding the means of subsistence in this country, I mean utter indifference.

This was a true naira-dollar fiesta, with all funds spent on obstructing people's natural choices. Rather than discussions and position statements, only money" Soyinka asserts that certain Traditional Rulers have resorted to collecting money from politicians and using their traditionaltitles to put a curse on anyone who vote against their preferences. Despite widespread plauditsfor the relatively free and fair nature of the 2015 presidential election, the political climate remained hostile, prompting many Americans to flee for their safety in anticipation of a post- election crisis or conflict.

3.2   Parties in Politics

"Any loosely organized group seeking to elect office bearers under the given designation," writes Epstein (1967). The term "party" is used by Sartori (1976) to refer to any organization that promotes candidates for political positions and legislative positions. According to Janda (1980), political parties are "those organizations that aim to establish their professed representatives in government

offices." "Political parties" are defined by Dowse andHughes (1972) as "officially constituted groups" with the stated goal to acquire and/or maintainlegal influence over the government's personnel and policy, alone or in conjunction with other organizations. To put it another way: A political party is an organization of individuals whoseaim is to gain control of the government by an election or other means. (Andrew Heywood, 2002, as quoted by Matlosa and Shale, 2008) Matlosa and Shale (2008) believe that a politicalparty, unlike an interest group, aims to gain state power and dominate the public policy-makingprocess while adhering to the country's constitutional and legal framework. There are several ways in which citizens can express their political views through politics, and all political partiesplay a role, whether they're in government or the opposition. In the context of party politics, politics is viewed from the standpoint of political parties rather than national interests (Nwankwo, 2001). Political parties' use of democratic institutions to try to wrest power from the government is known as "party politics" by Azeez (2009). Parties are formed when democratic principles exist and opinions, attitudes, or political philosophies are expressed to promote and protect the interests of the dominant party in a democratic system Formal institutions and organizations compete with one another in election processes to influence public policy decisions as well as the distribution of public resources according to a predetermined and proclaimed framework, which is what we mean by party politics (Okoye, 1982). It is true that party politics is meant to keep government in check, foster democracy andoperate as a feedback mechanism, but it has been abused by political rivalry, ethnoreligious sentiment and other causes, making it ineffective.

Brief History of Nigeria's Troubled Election

For a long time, Nigeria's electoral system was still developing. Nigeria has had nine national elections and innumerable regional, state, and local elections since gaining independence in 1960. Military governments held three elections that enabled for a transition to civil control, while incumbent civilian regimes held the other three to retain democratic rule.It has been the most difficult for incumbent civilian regimes to hold elections (Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). This is asides the general election of 2007 and 2015, ruling parties have tried to manipulate and control the electoral process in order to influence it in their favor. In the 1964, 1983, 2003, and also the 2007 elections, the parties which were in power always wonby an overwhelming majority (Ibeanu, 2007). The Federal elections of 1964 were a two-horsebattle

between the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) and the Nigerian National Alliance.

The NNA and its supporters in the Northern People's Congress (NPC) used their federal government power to engineer and make sure they succeeded (Dudley, 1973). During the elections of 1983, the incumbent National Party of Nigeria (NPN) was unlawfully elected in seven of Nigeria's 19 states. The NPN then attempted to expand its political control across the country. In several parts of Nigeria, riots were provoked by accusations of vote-rigging in the 1983 elections (Hart, 1993). Elections in 2003 and 2007 were also said to have been rigged, according to certain reports (Lewis, 2003; Suberu, 2007). After the 2007 election, Nigeria's democratic credentials were severely damaged by the public and international outcry that ensued. Nigeria's leaders had to undergo a lot of soul-searching after the election, which is a good thing. When Yar'Adua was President, he publicly admitted that his election had been tainted by widespread fraud. Thus, he set up the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) to make recommendations for actions to improve election conduct, restore electoral integrity, and deepen Nigerian democracy. Some of the Electoral Reform Committee's recommendations were studied and approved as amendments to the constitution and the Electoral Act. By designating trustworthy leadership to the INEC, the administration also worked to restore the country's election integrity. There are a number of internal measures that the INEC has done to restore public confidence in the voting process (Kuris, 2012).

The just-ended 2019 elections simply served to exacerbate the fraud and manipulations that were already evident in the PDP's prior elections in 1998, 2003, 2007, and 2011 under its leadership.

Political succession in many African countries is contentious and challenging. It is common for politicians to utilize electoral manipulation and violence in order to maintain control of the political process because of the perks that come with power and the fear that their successors may prosecute them. In the last several years, it has become increasingly crucial for the growth of democracy in poor and divided cultures to design election processes that encourage cooperation, negotiation, and interdependence between competing political leaders and the groups they represent. As a result, holding free and fair elections appears to be becoming increasingly difficult. As political elites see elections as a way to gain control of the state machinery and the resources it controls, electoral procedures have come under severe

threat. As a continent, when will Nigeria and Africa have elections that are transparent, credible, andwidely accepted? The development of a democratic voting system in Nigeria looks to be behind.

The country's size and economic importance in Africa make this sad. Nigeria's experiment with democracy will be examined in this article with the purpose of providing a path for long-term democratic stability in Nigeria and other countries with similar political histories. Violent clashes, illegal voting, and government interference in favor of ruling partieswere commonplace throughout elections. In Nigeria, there are a slew of factors working againstfree and fair elections, and these show themselves at every level of the process. Although cardreaders were introduced in the 2003, 2007, 2011, and 2019 elections, the election-day and post-election manipulation of the electoral process was no less significant than the previousexperience. So much was going on in this case that the manipulation had taken on a normalizedand amusing aspect. More damaging reports have been issued in the lead-up to the 2019 elections. It appears that the allegedly unfavorable outcomes of the Nigerian elections on February 23 and March 9 provide an opportunity for us to look more closely at the elections and determine why free and fair elections have been impossible to attain for years.

CHAPTER IV
Empirical Chapter Research Paradigm

4.0   The 2015 General Elections

Elections held in 2015 were widely regarded as credible and fair, but the overall assessment suggests that they contained elements of both competitive authoritarianism and liberal electoral democracy (AUEOM, 2015, EUEOM, 2015, TMG, 2015). Candidates, party primaries, campaign funds, state control, and manipulation were not entirely absent in the 2015 elections. From executive and legislative branches of government, a large number of candidates were chosen by 'godfathers' who had been selected by political leaders. "Godsons" who seek political office must be blessed by "godfathers" in order to become the party's flag bearer in Nigerian politics, a practice known as "god-fatherism." All of the leading contenders in Nigeria's recent presidential election came from the elite circle that has long dominated the country's political landscape.

President Goodluck Jonathan was selected to represent the ruling party in the 2015 elections as a result of godfatherism. Goodluck Jonathan was hand-picked by the past president of Nigeria President Olusegun Obasanjo and the imposed on the people of Nigeria during the presidential elections of 2007 Umar Musa Yar' Adua and Olusegun Obasanjo both ran for re- election as president of Nigeria. The Vice President-elect which was Goodluck Jonathan had served previously as the governor and also deputy governor of Bayelsa State. While President Obasanjo called him "godson," he enlisted in the federal military anyhow after gaining his blessing.

APC presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari has been a member of Nigeria's political elite for nearly three decades. The country's military head of state from 1983 to 1985,he had previously held a variety of political positions in previous administrations. When arguing for an EA of elites, it is impossible to ignore the role played by elitism in the 2015 election campaign (Schedler, 2002; Ghandi & Lust-Okar, 2009). The Nigerian voter had the option of selecting from a list of political elites handpicked by a small group of powerful individuals. In legislative and state gubernatorial elections, the same thing happens. The party primaries were an outgrowth of the imposition of candidates, as seen by the fact that both the government and opposition parties held primary contests. Though the ruling party's (PDP) primaries were rife with accusations of abuse of internal democracy (Hakeem,

2015), the opposition parties were not immune to accusations of candidate substitutions and otherundemocratic methods of selecting party flag bearers (Chidi, 2015). (Chidi, 2015). An EA projection trend and feature was supported by practically every political party's campaign fundraising operation. Observers on the ground and abroad have reported that no political party adhered to party finance standards, and the election commission failed to keep track of the major dominant parties' campaign contributions (EUEOM, 2015). In 2015, (EUEOM). It was shown that the state was misusing resources and manipulating government institutions duringNigeria's 2015 elections, which is in line with EA assumptions. Opposition parties were allegedly intimidated by the ruling party using the military, and police personnel were also accused in some areas of doing so (Vanguard Newspaper, 2015).

The Vanguard Newspaper (Vanguard, 2015). To say that this behavior and accusation contradicts liberal democracy is anunderstatement, and it highlights the potency of competitive authoritarianism (Schedler, 2002). Schedler, (2002a) Authoritarianism was facilitated by state-owned media, which focused on attacks on people's looks and personality. There was a manifestation of competitive authoritarianism in the general elections of 2015. This can also be traced to Przeworski (2000:28) and Schedler's (2002:8) allegation that "competitive authoritarian regimes" like "democratic" ones "conduct multiparty elections for presidents and legislative assemblies." Byexposing these mechanisms to systematic authoritarian supervision, they take away their democratic content. An independent electoral commission's decision to postpone the 2015 elections from February 14 to March 28 and April 11 was perceived as political involvement, increasing worries about the electoral body's integrity. The National Security Adviser (NSA), which is an appendage of the office of the president, gave a statement before INEC's formal proclamation pushing INEC to postpone the polls by six weeks. National Security Adviser saidit would be six weeks until the North East security situation is stabilized (PLAC, 2015). In 2015, PLAC published (PLAC, 2015). With critics arguing that the president was attempting to use the state security apparatus as a pretext to meddle in the election process, the NSA's recommendation caused significant concern. A few political commentators have accused President Obama of intervening unnecessarily in INEC's activities, citing a longstanding security crisis in Nigeria's North East that has gone unaddressed for many years. What was theNSA hoping to accomplish by making this request so close to Election Day? Since its start, the Boko Haram

insurgency has posed a serious threat to security in the North East of Nigeria. Boko Haram may be defeated in six weeks, but is it possible? These and other inquiries to the National Security Advisor and the White House went unanswered (Omotola, 2015). The postponement narrative also aroused anxieties and tensions among international observers, who perceived it as an attempt to influence in the election process.

According to a series of meetings and interactive sessions with local and international observers, the Independent National Electoral Commission has never raised any concerns about its election preparations in the North East. INEC has the legal authority to hold elections and postpone them. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) polling stations were set up in order to prevent the affected electorates from being disenfranchised (Ibeanu, 2015). US Secretary of State John Kerry termed the postponement of the election "unacceptable" in a statement he issued. America released an official statement advising the Nigerian government against obstructing the country's democratic process through the use of security as a cover (Premium, March 5, 2015).Using security threats to advance one's own self-interest is a hallmark of the authoritarian administration.

In the lead-up to the 2015 presidential elections, many factors that affect voter behavior shouldbe taken into consideration. During Jonathan's rule, the country's government became the mostcorrupt ever. The state of the economy and other aspects of society deteriorated to unprecedented proportions. Religion and race were viewed by many individuals in the North and the South as tools of bad government, with the poor being the most severely affected. As a result of high unemployment and other hardships, poverty levels increased. Educators fearedthe worst as the system came to a grinding halt. By using an electronic card reader throughout the election, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) ensures that all voters are properly screened before they can cast their ballots. INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Jega explained that this was done to reduce the likelihood of result inflation and election rigging. This also had a significant impact on the final outcome. Ex-incumbents were accused of riggingand inflating previous elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011.

It was kept to a minimal this time. Campaign slogans for the 2015 presidential election were dominated by concerns such ascorruption, insecurities, poverty and unemployment. Even more so than in previous elections, the opposition All

Progressives Congress took advantage of these issues in the lead-up (APC).It wasn't until they established a coalition that the opposition realized they had little hope of defeating the PDP. Similar efforts in the early hours of the morning failed in 2011. ACN, led by Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu from the West or Yoruba area, is the strongest opposition party, followed by the CPC, the All Nigerian People Party (ANPP), and the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) from the Igbo East. Speaker Aminu Waziri Tambawul's move from the PDP to the APC gave the opposition a boost and allowed it to seize control of the House ofRepresentatives' executive branch. Voters have been less concerned about a candidate's ethnicor religious background and more concerned about their ability to govern.

The ruling party, thePDP, has now become a regional and ethnic bastion under the leadership of President Jonathan's Ijaw and Igbo kinsmen. Even the most senior members of the party were forced to work against the party and engage in anti-party actions because of the party's isolation. Consequently, the group suffered even more, while the antagonist strengthened his position. Blackmail and black paint were used by the PDP to portray Muhammadu Buhari as an Islamicextremist with the goal of conquering Nigeria by any means necessary. While campaigning inthe North to gain the support of minority Christians, the president proceeded to play politics with Christians and Christianity by hosting meals with well-known pastors and Christian leaders. It was heated during the campaign as the opposition candidate was accused of havinga terminal disease, lacking a minimum certificate requirement and other sorts of blackmail, buthe continued to garner massive audiences and admirers in reaction.

All Nigerians from all geographical zones endured socioeconomic hardships that influenced their view that the country required a viable candidate and that ethnic or religious chauvinists could not fix the problems. Nigeria's presidential election was originally set for March 23, 2015, and was postponed to April 14, 2015, when incumbent PDP leader Goodluck Jonathan recognized he would lose. The ruling PDP reportedly spent more than N 2 trillion in three weeks during the three-week transition period, causing dollar rain. However, as the following data shows, this did not prevent PDP from failing. It's important to keep in mind that the APC and the PDP didnot fight each other exclusively in the 2015 elections. An unimportant result in the total numberof political parties may have a direct impact on the outcome of the original election.

Voting behavior was influenced by ethnic and religious sentiments, but the data

show that these factorswere less dominant than in previous presidential elections. There were several victories for President Muhammadu Buhari and his All Progressives Congress (APC) in northwestern Nigeria's Adamawa and Benue states as well as Gombe and Jigawa in Kano and Katsina in Niger state, Sokoto in Kwara and Zamfara in Zamfara state. Despite this, Christian-majority states including Nassarawa, Taraba, and the Plateau elected the PDP Christian candidate over the APC Northern candidate. There was less rigging in APC-controlled Imo and Edo states than in the Niger-Delta and Igbo states in 2011, which favored President Jonathan in the Easternstates of Nigeria.

Table 3.1. Showing results of the 2015 Presidential Election between APC and PDP From the various states in Nigeria;

State	APC	PDP	Total	Winner
Abia	13,394(3.51 %)	368, 303(96.49 %)	381, 697	PDP
Adamawa	374, 701(59.82 %)	251, 664(40.18 %)	626, 365	APC
AkwaIbom	58, 411 (5.77 %)	953, 304 (94.23 %)	1, 011, 715	PDP
Anambra	17, 926 (2.64 %)	660, 762 (97.36 %)	678, 688	PDP
Bauchi	931, 598 (91.54 %)	86, 085 (8. 46 %)	1, 017, 683	APC
Bayelsa	5, 194 (1.42 %)	361, 209 (98.58 %)	366, 403	PDP
Benue	373, 961 (55. 18 %)	303, 737 (44.82 %)	677, 698	APC
Borno	473, 543 (94. 86 %)	25, 640 (5. 14 %)	499, 183	APC
Cross River	28, 368 (6. 40 %)	414, 863 (93. 60 %)	443, 231	PDP
Delta	48, 910 (3. 88 %)	1, 211, 405 (96. 12 %)	1, 260, 315	PDP
Ebonyi	19, 518 (5.69 %)	323, 653 (94. 31 %)	343, 171	PDP
Edo	208, 469 (42.09 %)	286, 869 (57. 91 %)	495, 338	PDP
Ekiti	120, 331 (40.54 %)	176, 466 (59.46 %)	296, 797	PDP
Enugu	14, 157 (2.50 %)	553, 003 (97.50 %)	567, 160	PDP
Gombe	361, 245 (78.85 %)	96, 873 (21.15 %)	458, 118	APC
Imo	133, 253 (19.24 %)	559, 185 (80.76 %)	692, 438	PDP

Jigawa	885, 988 (86.11%)	142, 904 (13.89 %)	1, 028, 892	APC
Kaduna	1, 127, 760(69. 97 %)	484, 085 (30. 03 %)	1, 611, 845	APC
Kano	1, 903, 999 (89.82 %)	215, 779 (10.18 %)	2, 119, 778	APC
Katsina	1, 345, 441 (93. 15 %)	98, 937 (6.85 %)	1, 444, 378	APC
Kebbi	567, 883 (84.90 %)	100, 972 (15.10 %)	668, 855	APC
Kogi	264, 851 (63. 84 %)	149, 987 (36.16 %)	414, 838	APC
Kwara	302, 146 69.50 %)	132, 602 (30.50 %)	434, 748	APC
Lagos	792, 460 (55.62 %)	632, 327 (44.38 %)	1, 424, 787	APC
Nassarawa	236, 838 (46.41 %)	273, 460 (53.59 %)	510, 298	PDP
Niger	657, 678 (81.51 %)	149, 222 (18.49 %)	806, 900	APC
Ogun	308, 290 (59.72 %)	207, 950 (40.28 %)	516, 240	APC
Ondo	299, 889 (54.40 %)	251, 368 (45.60 %)	551, 257	APC
Osun	383, 603 (60.55 %)	249, 929 (39.45 %)	633, 532	APC
Oyo	528, 620 (63. 54 %)	303, 376 (36. 46 %)	831, 996	APC
Plateau	429, 140 (43. 85 %)	549, 615 (56.15 %)	978, 755	PDP
Rivers	69, 238 (4.45 %)	1, 487, 075 (95. 55 %)	1, 556, 313	PDP

Sokoto	671, 926 (81.53 %)	152, 199 (18.47 %)	824, 125	APC
Taraba	261, 326 (45.68 %)	310, 800 (54.32 %)	572, 126	PDP
Yobe	446, 265 (94.60 %)	25, 526 (5.40 %)	471, 791	APC
Zamfara	612, 202 (80.87 %)	144, 833 (19.13 %)	757, 035	APC
FCT	146, 399 (48.22 %)	157, 195 (51.78 %)	303, 594	PDP
Total	15,424,921(54.55 %)	12,853,162(45.45 %)	28,278,083	

Source: INEC 2015 (Total and percentage computation by the authors) [Independent National Electoral Commission 2015.]

4.1   The 2019 General Elections

Nigerians have been seeking for a way to consolidate democratic rule since the country's return to civilian rule in 1999. Huntington (1991) believes that democratic consolidation necessitates the reemergence of 'two turnovers,' in which the opposition party defeats the incumbent and the event is repeated twice. Nigeria has yet to pass the test of democracy. The 2019 general elections in Nigeria were held under a heated political atmosphere, reflecting the rivalry between the two main political parties, the All Progressive Congress (APC) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP). Except for the lack of electoral turnover at the national level, the electoral battle resembled that of the 2015 general elections. Unlike the 2015 elections, which transformed the federal political landscape (Omotola, 2015), the 2019 elections preserved the president's incumbency power. In general, the vote pattern reflected a similar attitude, which is consistent with the polity's subjective political culture.

Election administration in Nigeria, on the other hand, has always been a tumultuous affair. Despite the country's twenty years of uninterrupted democracy, electoral behavior tends to cast doubt on the country's commitment to liberal democracy. Nigerians have witnessed a slew of election fraud, including official

prejudice, ballot box snatching, systemic and open cheating, underage voting, and vote buying and selling, all of which have hampered the country's progress toward electoral democracy. Based on prior elections in Nigeria, the 1993 election, which was hailed as the freest due to the least amount of intimidation and cheating (Badejo &Obah-Akpowoghaha, 2015), suffered a severe setback when Babangida annulled the entire process.

The fundamental problem with Nigeria's electoral system has been the electoral commission's lack of independence and political involvement, which, among other things, doesnot guarantee equality of opportunity for all the other political parties. In the city of Agbor in Nigeria (2007), Acknowledgement: It is (Agbor, 2007). The grip of the government of the stateon resources allows it to deliberately cripple some essential institutions, such as the voting body. This only makes the electoral administration body so dependent on the government thatit is certain to be biased and unaccountable to the general public in its dealings with the general population. (Omotola, 2009). (Omotola, 2009). This conduct highlights Nigeria's democracy's legitimacy challenge (Sakariyau, Mohd Azzizuddin & Ummu Atiyah, 2017). (Sakariyau, MohdAzzizuddin & Ummu Atiyah, 2017).

In light of this, there were certain improvements in the conduct of the 2019 general elections. Nonetheless, the advantages and downsides of election administration have inspired this study to investigate the 2019 general elections using the theoretical postulation of 'Competitive Authoritarianism.' The theory is used to the analysis ofNigeria's hybrid democracy system. Beyond the theoretical framework, it is vital to recognizethe competitive authoritarian system in all of its forms. Due to its intricacy and multifaceted character, competitive authoritarianism is simpler to imagine than to recognize, which leads toheated disputes about whether it genuinely reflects the countries that implement it.

However, as Ghandi and Lust-Okar (2009) accurately point out, competitive authoritarian governance differs in that it permits elections to be held for national, state, and local council offices. Competitive Authoritarianism in the Nigerian Political Context will be explored against this backdrop. Several academics who have looked into Nigeria's election system have done so using the liberal democracy criterion (Sylvester, 2009; Ojo, 2008, Omotola, 2009; Ajayi, 2015). (Sylvester, 2009; Ojo, 2008, Omotola, 2009; Ajayi, 2015). Nigeria, through herconstitutional and electoral

system, seeks to adhere to liberal democracy, but the missing link is her incapacity to follow liberalism's rules. In truth, the liberal democracy ideal of equality is not reflected in the current democratization movement in Nigeria (Allen & Ojakorotu, 2009).

The general elections of 2019 in Nigeria demonstrated the importance of competitive authoritarianism. Both the ruling party and the opposition used hate speech during the campaign, which contradicts the premise of liberal democracy. Political office holders' campaign techniques and speeches were increasingly akin to war slogans. This supports Schedler's (2002) thesis that competitive authoritarianism is synonymous with autocratic democracy. The Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Development (YIAGA) issued an early warning before to Election Day, citing hate speech and voter inducement as symptoms of impending issues that could disturb peaceful elections. Such a warning was part of YIAGA's pre-election field report, according to the organization.

There were over 47 critical incidences of violence, most of which were linked to hate speech. Some of the attacks took place during political rallies, campaigns, voter incitement, and community conflicts. Early warning indicators were discovered in states such as Kogi, Kwara, Bauchi, Borno, Nasarawa, Kano, Taraba, Rivers, Ekiti, and Lagos, according to the research (YIAGA, 2018). Despite this preliminary report, both the ruling party (APC) and the leading opposition (PDP) launched rhetorical attacks across the board on the characters of their respective candidates. This works well together. According to Alade (2016), elections in Nigeria are connected with moral standards violations. To put it another way, examining Nigeria's hybrid democracy lays the path for what Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouquie dubbed "Elections without Choice" (1978). Competitive Authoritarianism ensures that elections are held on a regular and recurring basis as a measure for accommodating the political interests of a few elites. Nonetheless, in such a society, elections scarcely reflect the will of the people. To begin with, the elites dictate and decide the candidates for political parties. Second, the electorate is left to choose among the elites' selected candidates from all parties. Third, elections held in such an environment are always put to the test of credibility. The 2019 general elections, like past elections in Nigeria, exemplify the country's hybrid democracy, in which elections are held on a regular basis (liberalism) but are marred by irregularities in

electoral integrity (authoritarianism). When it comes to the major political parties that impacted the 2019 elections, the APC and PDP (Presidential, Gubernatorial, and National Assembly) candidates were mostly derived from the elites.

Invariably, electorates voted for the elites' option rather than the people's choice. The importance of competitive Authoritarianism to Nigeria's electoral democracy was highlighted in a contentious and unexpected postponement of the 2019 elections. Which was done on the eve of the Presidential election and also National Assembly elections which were scheduled for February 16, 2019, INEC announced the postponement of the polls to February 23 and rescheduled the Governorship elections and also the State House of Assembly elections from a previous date (March 2, 2019) to another date (March 9, 2019). Though election delay by the Electoral Management Body (EMB) was not a new occurrence in Nigeria, the Explanation for relocating voting on the day of the election exposed INEC incompetence and further tarnished Nigeria's electoral system's already tarnished image. The INEC Chairman blamed the postponement on logistical issues, but Nigerians are still unsure about the electoral umpire's honesty in the postponement drama. As Samson (2019) correctly points out, INEC's decision to postpone the polls saddened and frustrated many Nigerians.

The ramifications of such a controversial choice not only impacted the country's socioeconomic and political structure, but also called into doubt the integrity of Nigeria's democratic process. Although President Buhari expressed displeasure with the unexpected postponement and pledged that the government would investigate, Nigerians are eager to learn more about what went wrong, forcing the rescheduling of the 2019 general elections. Despite the flaws in Nigeria's electoral system, as reported by both local and international observers, the elections were relatively liberal. The utility of liberal democratic precepts in various sections of Nigeria's electoral democracy substantiates this claim. Without a doubt, liberal democracy is frequently characterized by a diverse range of political parties (Moveh, 2015). Nigeria's party politics benefit from this unique feature. The polity has had a multi-party system since the country's unbroken democracy began in 1999. This is a feature of liberal democracy that is inextricably linked to Nigeria's electoral democracy's existence. Nonetheless, researchers, analysts, and politicians disagree about the need to lower the number of political parties in the country due to some minor registered

parties' lack of coverage. Regardless, the availability and operation of a multi-party system contributes significantly to the country's political viability by increasing the population's choice of party affiliations. Not only that, but the principle of separation of powers, which remains one of liberalism's strongest pillars, has broadened Nigeria's political landscape. The electoral body's success in the 2019 elections was aided by the division of powers among the three branches of government. The executive body was in charge of resource distribution, the legislature was in charge of appropriation defense, and the judiciary was in charge of settling electoral disputes. Apart from the executive and legislative distribution and appropriation of funds to the Electoral Management Body (EMB), the judiciary has played an active role in settling election disputes. Several incidents of abuse of party primaries and candidate substitution have been overturned by court rulings.

The failure of the All Progressives Congress (APC) to field a candidate in the Rivers State gubernatorial election, as well as the nullification of APC votes in Zamfara State (Governorship and Legislative) attest to the expansion of Nigeria's democracy through judicial independence. As a result, Nigeria's electoral democracy continues to expand, as court interpretations of election concerns have reignited political expectations that had faded. In a nutshell, the application of the rule of law in Nigeria's political fight is one element of constitutional democracy that Robert Dahl argues is the foundation of liberalism. On February 23 and March 9, 2019, the Presidential and National Assembly elections, as well as the gubernatorial and state houses of assembly elections, were held. Nevertheless, supplemental elections were held on March 23, 2019, due to problems with the usage of Smart Card Readers during voting and the failure to deploy them at the appropriate time, which led to overvoting and extensive disruption in many polling units throughout six states on March 9, 2019.

As part of the supplementary elections, elections to the State Houses of Assembly were also held (Independent National Electoral Commission, 2019a; Olokor, 2019). A contender must earn at least 25% of the legitimate votes cast in at least two-thirds of Nigeria's thirty-six states in order to win the presidential election. The elections were highly contested due to the enormous number of candidates vying for several political positions. While a total of 91 registered political parties contested for various positions in the elections, only 73 people vied for the presidency (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2019). Regardless, the All

Progressives Congress (APC) and the People's DemocraticParty (PDP) dominated the general elections (PDP). In the presidential election, incumbent President Muhammadu Buhari of the APC campaigned against former Vice-President Alhaji Atiku Abubakar of the PDP. Muhammadu Buhari is a Fulani man from Daura, Katsina state, who ran for President in 2003, 2007, and 2011 and defeated Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP in2015 to become the first challenger to overthrow an incumbent President in Nigeria. ProfessorYemi Osinbajo, the former military chief of state, ran for President in 2015 with Professor Yemi Osinbajo, the former Attorney general and Commissioner for Justice of Lagos state. Atiku Abubakar, his main rival, was also born into a Fulani family in Adamawa state's Jada village. Table 2.2 shows A compilation of the choices of the various states in the Presidential election.

Table 3.2: **R**esults of the 2019 Presidential Election between APC and PDP From the various states in Nigeria

	STATE	Votes in Favour	Votes Against	WINNER
1.	ABIA	85,058	219,698	PDP
2.	ADAMAWA	378,076	410,266	PDP
3.	AKWA IBOM	175,429	395,832	PDP
4.	ANAMBRA	33,298	524,738	PDP
5.	BAUCHI	798,428	209,313	APC
6.	BAYELSA	118,821	197,933	PDP
7.	BENUE	347,668	355,255	PDP
8.	BORNO	836,496	71,788	APC
9.	CROSS RIVER	117,302	295,737	PDP
10.	DELTA	221,292	594,068	PDP
11.	EBONYI	90,726	258,573	PDP
12.	EDO	267,842	275,691	PDP
13.	EKITI	219,231	154,032	APC
14.	ENUGU	54,423	355,553	PDP
15.	FCT	152,224	259,997	PDP
16.	GOMBE	402,961	138,484	APC
17.	IMO	140,463	334,923	PDP
18.	JIGAWA	794,738	289,895	APC
19.	KADUNA	993,445	649,612	APC

20.	KANO	1,464,768	391,593	APC
21.	KATSINA	1,232,133	308,056	APC
22.	KEBBI	581,552	154,282	APC
23.	KOGI	285,894	218,207	APC
24.	KWARA	308,984	138,184	APC
25.	LAGOS	580,825	448,015	APC
26.	NASARAWA	289,903	283,847	APC
27.	NIGER	612,371	218,052	APC
28.	OGUN	281,762	194,655	APC
29.	ONDO	241,769	275,901	PDP
30.	OSUN	347,634	337,377	APC
31.	OYO	365,229	366,690	PDP
32.	PLATEAU	468,555	548,665	PDP
33	RIVERS	150,710	473,971	PDP
34.	SOKOTO	490,333	361,604	APC
35.	TARABA	324,906	374,743	PDP
36.	YOBE	497,914	50,763	APC
37.	ZAMFARA	438,682	125,423	APC
	TOTAL	15,191,847	11,262,978	

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (2019b)

As seen in Table 3.2, the PDP prevailed in 18 of Nigeria's 36 states (including the capital cityof Abuja) whereas the APC triumphed in all but one of those states. The APC's presidential nominee, Muhammadu Buhari, garnered 15,191,847 votes (fifteen million, one hundred and ninety-one thousand, eight hundred and forty-seven). His closest competitor, Atiku Abubakar,garnered 11,262,978 votes (eleven million, two hundred and sixty-two thousand, nine hundredand seventy-eight). APC's presidential candidate received 55.6 percent of the total valid votescast, while PDP's candidate received 41.2 percent of the votes. Due to his victory in a majorityof the country's thirty-six states and receiving a plurality of the legitimate votes cast, the candidate of the APC Muhammadu Buhari was named President of the federal republic of Nigeria. Afterwards, he was inaugurated for a second term as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Commander-in-Chief of the Nigerian Armed Forces.

The Nigerian general election of 2019 must be analyzed in light of competitive

authoritarianism's theoretical postulation. The complementing theory of liberal democracy is included into competitive authoritarianism, which is a form of authoritarian competition. According to these findings, democracy in Nigeria is neither liberal nor authoritarian, but rather a hybrid of the two. According to this study, Nigeria's electoral democracy is characterized by a mixed nature. In light of its mix of liberalism and authoritarianism, Nigeria's civil rule is sometimes characterized to as a "hybrid democracy" (Sakariyau, 2019). With regards to a complete understanding of the activity, it appears that the electoral process in Nigeria's general election of 2019 was in agreement with the assumption of "competitive authoritarianism."

4.2 The Link between Ethnicity and The Pattern of Voting In general Elections of Nigeria: Tribalism in Nigeria.

Rational Choice Theory offers a strong explanatory compass and insight into what factors influenced voting patterns in Nigeria's 2019 general election. The study found that ethnic social cultural organizations such as Ohaneze Ndi Igbo, Afenifere of Yorubas, Arewa Consultation Forum, also the Pan-Niger-Delta Forum, Southwest Youth Forum, and lastly the Middle Belt Forum, among others, strongly influence the percentage of votes each presidential candidate receives in each geopolitical zone. Nigeria is a multicultural country, and the interactions between different ethnic groups are most visible during general elections. There are an estimated 250 ethnic groups in Nigeria; however, during general elections, the conflict is mostly between and among the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria: The Hausa, the Igbos, and the Yorubas, while others form alliances depending on perceived political and economic gains. As there are various ethnic groups in Nigeria, there are also many socio-cultural groups/organizations that promote and safeguard the political interests and also the economic interests of the people of each ethnic group. Afenifere, Ohanaeze Ndi-Igbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, Pan-Niger Delta Forum, Orhobo Youth Forum, Middle Belt Forum, and others are some of these socio-cultural groups/organizations in Nigeria.

The many ethnic communities founded these socio-cultural groupings/organizations to preserve and promote their interests, however experts have suggested that their leaders are using it for their own gain (Gabriel, 2018). Regardless of their differing viewpoints, these organizations continue to wield substantial political

power in Nigeria. Their clout has been demonstrated by their open support for presidential contenders in the general election. These organizations have been at the forefront of promoting and protecting the interests of the ethnic groups they represent since theresumption of civilian authority in 1999. Various governments have enlisted their help with policies, projects, and programs. However, its recent clandestine sponsorship of presidential candidates during general elections has sparked a flurry of debates, thoughts, and viewpoints among academics and the general public over whose interests a candidate is endorsed in. Whois more important: the people or the leaders? The romance between socio-cultural groups and political candidates seeking public endorsement by the group was most visible in the 2015 general election and is expected to be more intense in the 2019 general election, prompting researchers to investigate whether these series of endorsement and counter-endorsementinfluence the electorate's voting patterns. Though there have been numerous and well-established studies on the ethnic nature of Nigerian politics and voting patterns. Sule (2019), for example, said that the results of the 2019 General Election continued to represent Nigeria'sethnic voting trend.

4.3   Nigerian politics voting pattern
In Nigeria's general elections, ethnicity and voting patterns are discussed;

African ethnicity specialist Nnoli is a household name. A sociological phenomenon, accordingto Nnoli, is that of ethnicity: the identification of people from the largest, sometimes conflictingcommunal groupings (Ethnic groups), trying in a political system to defend and advance theirown interests (1978). An ethnocentric act of pride and belonging, Nnoli (1978) argued, is ethnicity, which he described as an attitudinal act displaying ethnic pride and belonging to an ethnic group. Political culture and voting patterns in Nigeria are influenced by ethnicity, religion, and regionalism, which is one of the major obstacles to the country electing strong leaders (Abdullahi, 2015). The political elites found it easier to use ethnicity and tribalism as astrategy of attaining power because of their failure to deliver on their promises. Voter Indifference in Nigeria's upcoming general elections would be exacerbated by the factors outlined above. Members of the same ethnic and regional groups tend to vote together in elections, according to Olayode (2015), Metumara (2010), and &Rufai (2011). According to Yakubu and Ali (2017), even if the other candidate is superior and has a better track record, voters would vote for candidates who share

their ethnic, religious, and regional ties.

General elections in Nigeria are characterized by ethno-religious attitudes dominating voting patterns and political participation, according to Olayode (2015). Ethno-regional voting blocs were critical to the incumbent president's victory. Nigerian political theater has a tradition of allocating votes based on ethnic and religious allegiances, regardless of whether or not a candidate they support is likely to win or lose the popular vote. Ethnic groups are in competition against each other in an aggressive tussle for control and also power over resources which are restricted in Nigeria, which has now manifested itself in the country's political processes, according to Metumara (2010). In Nigeria, people are more loyal to their different ethnic groups than to the country itself, says Onapajo (2012). Electoral issues in Nigeria include the inability to elect good leaders due to the prevalence of voting based on ethnicity, religion, and regional identity (Abdullahi, 2015). This year's presidential election did not show a significant shift in voting trends along ethnic, religious, or geographic lines, according to Lawal (2017). There was a clear majority of votes for Muhammadu Buhari who was the flag bearer and the APC presidential candidate, from the large predominantly Muslim Hausa/Fulani ethnic group in northern Nigeria. Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the PDP's leader, a Christian from the south-south Bayelsa region in Nigeria, gained a majority of the votes in the region where he is from. After all, ethnic and religious bias in Nigeria's 36 states weighed heavily on the two main candidates, validating our theory that ethnicity is a crucial factor in why people vote in Africa but don't want to live there (Ake, 1996). In addition, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2013) found that 'close' elections in Africa are connected with increased ethnic voting importance and strength.

While other factors may influence the voting habits of the ordinary Nigerian voter, ethnicity has always been a powerful force in Nigerian politics. Joseph (2013) emphasizes the importance of ethnicity in Nigeria's political landscape, arguing that "while ethnicity may not be a sufficient explanation of Nigerian voting patterns, it is the most accessible yarn from which political cloth can be sown." In essence, Nigerians' voting patterns have tended to be influenced by kinship and ethnicity sentiments as assets exploited by high-status seekers when canvassing for votes (Szlarski, 2000). Ethnic voting patterns can be multi-dimensional. Ethnic voting has two manifestations, according to Wolfinger (1965) [27]:

When it comes to politics, members of ethnic groups tend to favor one party over the other for reasons that go beyond simple demographics. Regardless of party affiliation, members of an ethnic group will vote for or against a candidate from that ethnic group. As Wolfinger explains it, ethnic voting is more important in the absence of clear cues to guide voters' decisions. Ethnicity is also more important in non-partisan elections, where voters can't rely solely on the party label; and ethnicity is more important than party labeling in non-partisan elections. People's material well-being appears to be a primary consideration in their voting decisions, notwithstanding the influence of ethnic emotions (Bratton, Bhavnani, and Chen, 2011).

In the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria, ethnicity and religion were shown to play a role in a politician's chances of victory. Candidates used the election campaign as a platformto promote the ideologies and platform statements of their different political parties. During Nigeria's presidential election, former president Goodluck Jonathan who was actually amember of PDP and General Muhammadu Bahari who was the then presidential candidate of the APC of the latter used social media to promote for their respective parties' candidates. In addition to running on the same PDP platform, both candidates also made extensive use of social media to raise awareness of their campaigns. When President Muhammadu Buhari ran for re-election in 2015, the People's Democratic Party (PDP) said that Nigerians ought to votefor him. I wish Jonathan the best of luck in completing the economic change program that he had begun in both the public and private sectors of the Nigerian economy. Nigerians are being exhorted by the APC to vote for a change in administration so that they can reap the blessingsof democracy. 16 When it comes to promoting their vision for governance, both candidates took advantage of the power of the media. Refusing to participate in a public debate with formerPresident Jonathan, which is supposed to be one of the major forums to tell and explain to thecitizens of the country the various reasons the presidential candidates seeking to be voted into office should be voted into office and the different agenda they have for the country elected into office, is a noteworthy decision by General Buhari.

Even though General Buhari was invited severally by the media for an open and interactive discussion he declined, President Jonathan called for a debate in which each of his cabinet ministers presented to the people what he had done while in office for growth and progress inNigeria. As a result, despite all the efforts put in by the

cabinet and also the President Jonathan,majority of Nigerians still maintain a negative impression of the administration of President Jonathan and this was because of the different charges of corruption levied against several

Members of his cabinet. President Jonathan's anti-corruption attitude was widely expected to be demonstrated by his decision to distance himself from those he believed to be corrupt and his decision to bring criminal charges against public employees accused of grave misconduct.There was no getting around the fact that President Jonathan was resistant to behaving in a waythat was in line with the public's expectations. His association with those who were unpopularwith PDP members contributed to his defeat in the 2015 presidential election. That's despite the fact that his government has made great strides in both public and private sector economic growth in his time in office. With overwhelming support from the country's three northern geographic zones, including the South-West, President Buhari was elected in 2015.

Former Lagos State Governor and APC leader, Alhaji Asiwaju Ahmed Tinubu claims that General Muhammadu Buhari's pick of Professor Yemi Osinbajo as his running mate and the APC's common-sense revolution in Nigeria's South-West contributed greatly to the APC's success. As part of the "common-sense revolution," the APC campaigned by highlighting the problemswith Jonathan's administration rather than explaining to Nigerians what the APC government would do if elected. Members of the opposing party, on the other hand, had no doubts about General Buhari's integrity and honesty and this was due to the fact that he was the Military Head of State from 1983 December to 1985 August.

4.5 The Politics of Endorsement and Counter-Endorsement in the2019 Nigerian General Elections

Sociocultural groups in Nigeria and the Politics of Endorsement and Counter-Endorsement (2019 Nigerian General Elections); 2019 Nigerian general elections saw a series of endorsements and counter-endorsements by various sociocultural groups in Nigeria. The seriesof endorsements began with the acting Chairman of the National Executive Committee of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Musa Kwande, publicly validating President MuhammaduBuhari's re-election candidacy at the ACF secretariat in Kaduna (Daily post, 2019). Similarly,on December 20, 2018, a faction of Afenifere (the socio-cultural groupings of southwestern Nigeria) led by Chief Ayo

Fasnmi validated the re-election bid of President Muhammadu Buhari's. Another faction of Afenifere, led by Reuben Fasoranti, has issued a counter- endorsement to a portion of the group's endorsement of President Muhammadu Buhari. In response to Mr. Reuben Fasoranti's branch of Afenifere's counter-endorsement of President Muhammadu Buhari, a group of youth from the southwest region rejected and refused to accepta faction of Afenifere's choice of Alhaji Atiku Abubakar. Under the umbrella of the SouthwestYoungsters Forum, the youth spoke (SWYF). The Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF) is a socio-cultural organization based in Nigeria's south-central region. The Middle Belt Forum (MBF) is a socio-cultural organization in Nigeria's North-central geopolitical zone. The projected benefits that the various socio-cultural groups will obtain from the candidate if he wins determine the politics of backing a candidate over others. Alhaji Atiku Abubakar was sponsored by Ohanaeze Ndi-Igbo because he vowed to reorganize Nigeria, which has been a demand of the southeastern area for many years. His running buddy is also from the area. Similarly, Atiku Abubakar was sponsored by PANDEF for the same reason: he agreed to reform Nigeria. On the other hand, the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) supports President Muhammadu Buhari's re-election campaign because of his opposition to restructuring plan, which the Northeast and Northwest of Nigeria adamantly oppose.

Ohanaeze Ndigbo and the PDP have overwhelmingly endorsed Atiku/candidacy. Obi's Southeast performance The Eagle Online (2019) reported on the tensions sparked by the Ohanaeze Ndigbo's recent endorsement of the presidential candidate of the (PDP)Alhaji Atiku Abubakar, over and above the incumbent President, Alhaji Muhammadu Buhari who was the choice of the (APC) All-Progressives Congress, in the 2019 general elections. Those in the pro-Buhari camp were outraged by the support and outright rejected it. Despite early dissatisfaction,the overwhelming proportion of votes PDP received from the southeast geopolitical zone demonstrates that Ohanaeze Ndigbo's overt backing of Atiku/Obi Candidacy influenced the voting patterns of electorates in the zone.

Northern Leaders Forum and Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) endorsements of Buhari/candidacy, according to Owete, Osinbajo and the APC have been approved by Buhari and Osinbajo's candidate ahead of the February 4th general elections by (NEF) which is the Northeast and West Northern Elders Forum and the (ACF)Arewa Consultative Forum in the year (2019). As of 2019 (Premium times Newspapers), It

was reported by Olowolagba that Kaduna Central senator Shehu Sani has reacted in advance of 2019 presidential election to theendorsement of President Muhammadu Buhari by the Northern Leaders Forum and Arewa Consultative Forum (2019). Based on President Muhammadu Buhari's record and achievements, the (ACF)Arewa Consultative Forum and also the (NEF) Northern Elders Forum have given their full support to the incumbent's bid to run for reelection on February 7.Acting National Executive Committee Chairman Musa Kwande made the news in Kaduna. Kwande said the group decided to back Buhari because of the administration's efforts to build and reposition the country economically and its successes in combating insurgency. Northern elders Forum (NEF) and also the (ACF) Arewa Consultative Forum which openly endorsed Buhari/candidacy Osinbajo's considerably influenced voting patterns in Northern Nigeria, as seen by the massive votes APC received in the 2019 general elections.

The fictionalization of Afenifere in Presidential Candidate Endorsement and the allocation of Southwest votes in the 2019 General Elections between the APC and the PDP According to Owete, a faction of Afenifere led by Ayo Fasanmi endorsed the presidential nominee of the All-Progressives Congress (APC), President Muhammadu Buhari, in 2019. however, Oluwole (2019) said that Afenifere's endorsement of Buhari was a ruse. Afenifere, a Yoruba socio- political organisation led by Reuben Fasoranti, has condemned a faction of the group's backingof President Muhammadu Buhari. Aliyu (2019) commented on another topic of ethnic predisposition in the 2019 general elections, stating that South-West youths disagree with Afenifere and support Buhari. The southwest youth coalition A group of youngsters from the south-west have rejected the Pan-Yoruba organization Afenifere's endorsement of AtikuAbubakar who was the presidential candidate of the PDP, before the presidential election. Youths speaking under the banner of the South-West Youth Forum (SWYF) praised another branch of the group led by Pa Ayo Fasanmi for endorsing President Muhammadu Buhari. Fromthe foregoing, it is clear that there was dispute among southwest ethnic social organizations onthe backing of a presidential candidate, which resulted in the group's division into two parts. While Pa Ayo Fasanmi's faction openly sponsored President Muhammadu Buhari's re-election,Reuben Fasoranti's faction openly opposed the endorsement and went ahead to instead give full support and backing the presidential candidate of the People's

Democratic Party (PDP) Atiku Abubakar as a response. The youth, on the other hand, backed the faction that backed Buhari and Osinbajo's re-election.

The Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), the Orhobo Youth convention, and PDP's overwhelming performance in the South-South have all endorsed Atiku/candidacy. Obi's According to Kabir (2019), the Pan-Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF) has endorsed PDP's presidential candidate. Edwin Clark, a former minister of communication, has explained why a south-south faction sponsored Atiku/candidacy Obi's in response to the endorsement. Mr. Clark stated they chose Atiku/Obi because they are the only ones that believe in restructuring Nigeria, while addressing on Channels TV's Sunday politics. Clark stated that the South-Southhad long been sidelined, and that the forum's agreement to back a guy with a restructuring slogan was necessary. Similarly, the South-South Community Association of Nigeria (SOSCAN) has agreed to float a similar campaign strategy to aid the PDP presidential candidate win the 2019 presidential election, according to PM News (2019). The PDP received a huge number of votes due to the open backing of Atiku/campaign Obi's in the south-south region

4.6   Tribalist Competitive Authoritarianism

There may be an incentive for in-group members of a political tribe to follow their ownideology, observe the norms of their group and tolerating of discrimination and aggression against other groups due to unequal resource allocation by politicians who tend to favor their own tribes. These signs of political tribalism show a tendency toward authoritarian competition. In this context, the emphasis is on competitive authoritarianism, with the inference that it is intimately linked to aggression and violence in general, stereotypes, subordination, conventionality, political conservatism, social dominance and discrimination between groups. As a result, competitive authoritarianism aids in the investigation into various social, political,and intergroup activities' psychological bases. Intergroup relations and prejudice are influencedby political tribalism, which is a sociopolitical practice. Identity politics takes the form of political tribalism. Authoritarianism and political tribalism share many characteristics.

A hierarchical and authoritarian view of group dynamics, in which some members are dominantwhile others are subordinate, was shown to be a marker of

prejudice by the researchers who conducted this study. Authoritarian personality theory, prejudice, and discrimination all have a role in people's proclivity toward right-wing ideologies and fascist regimes. Predisposition tointergroup bias is not unusual among persons who show enthusiasm for their own group and its values, but a complete lack of respect for all other groups. Political tribalism's conventionalview of outgroups' tribal features demonstrates this rejection (the other groups are perceived and seen as aggressive, very sluggish, deceitful, aberrant, and not given permission to resources).

There is a limit to people's loyalty, as seen by their election of both a National Assembly and a President in the general elections which occurred in 2015. Became the first time, a sizeable segment of the electorate rejected the incumbent party and, much more so, the party's nomineefor president. This was also the first time that this had ever happened. This points to a major new shift in the political culture as well as the distribution of influence and control, a development in which tribalism played a key role. It is impossible to minimize the significance of the election process in democratic systems. Because of this, elections are able to function as a vital foundation of democracy. After the

Return of the country to democratic rule in the year 1999, Nigeria since has undergone a continuous political transition from one democratically elected government to another as a result of a succession of general elections that have taken place since then. The year 2019 marked the country's celebration of 20 years of continuous democracy, which was a significantand commendable milestone in the annals of Nigeria's political evolution. The Nigerian national elections which took place in 2015 and 2019 increased the number of elections held in a tire to (5) five and (6) six respectively in total. Despite the fact that the scope of electioneering politics in the country calls into doubt the viability of liberal democracy in Nigeria, the process of democratization is still moving forward. This was one of the points thatwas brought up in this paper. Whatever the case may be, the results of the Nigerian general elections in the year 2015 and 2019 respectively lend credence to the concept of tribalist competitive authoritarianism.

CHAPTER V
Conclusion

According to the findings of earlier study, the concepts of tribalism and competitive authoritarianism have never been found to be connected with one another in Nigeria. The author, on the other hand, has been able to demonstrate, via both empirical and theoretical examination of the electoral environment in Nigeria, that there is a connection between tribalism and competitive and authoritarian politics in the country. It is possible to connect the Nigerian political scene, as well as the apparent authoritarianism that exists within it, back to the political tribal zoning that exists within the election system of the country. This would be the case for Nigeria. APC won some states which include Lagos, Oyo, Osun, Ogun, and Ondo states, but losing in Ekiti, showing that Western region states that have never voted for a Northern candidate in the history of Nigeria supported the party this time around. This can be seen in the fact that Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, and Ondo were all won by the APC, but Ekiti was lost. Eastern Nigeria, particularly the Niger Delta and Igbo states, voted for President Jonathan, but the extent of rigging, notably in the APC-controlled states of Imo and Edo, was reduced in comparison to 2011. In Edo state, this was especially true. Nigeria's election process is defined by the presence of ethno-religious feelings in the voting patterns and political engagement of its citizens. In the presidential election, the president and vice president-elect received about ninety percent of the votes cast. Ethno-regional identification was used to arrive at this

Conclusion. In a similar vein, the current president was able to secure a sizable majority of votes from his numerous ethno-regional constituencies throughout the election process. Nigerian political theater has a long-standing tradition of distributing votes depending on ethnic and religious affiliations, regardless of whether their candidate wins or loses based on their votes. Although their candidate would lose if they cast their ballots for them, this is still the case. The general elections in Nigeria in 2019 saw a number of different sociocultural groups in Nigeria engage in a series of endorsements and counter-endorsements of candidates. The politics of supporting one candidate over another are determined by the anticipated benefits that various socio-cultural groups will gain from the candidate should he or she win the election.

According to the findings of this study, competitive authoritarianism, like political tribalism, fosters good sentiments toward members of one's own group while

creating hostile and negative attitudes toward members of other groups. An explanation for this finding is that in-group participants are perceived as having a greater stake in the outcome. Political tribalismand competitive authoritarianism can be used to explain people's support for fascist groups, anti-Semitism, or racial discrimination, which creates room to authoritarian regims5` and anti‑democratic political systems, according to this perspective. This is one angle from which to view the situation.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Ethics Committee Approval

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

30.09.2022

Dear Oweh, Israel Oghenero,

Your project "Tribalistic competitive authoritarianism in Nigeria" has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project, it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın KİRAZ
Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.

Appendix B

Turnitin Similarity Report

Israel Oghenero OWEH-TRIBALISTIC COMPETITIVE
AUTHORITARIANISM IN NIGERIA

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