



**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**US- LIBERIA RELATIONS:  
A LOOK AT U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID TO LIBERIA FROM 2006-2017**

**M.A. THESIS**

**AUSTIN T. G. TOGBA**

**Nicosia  
June, 2022**

**AUSTIN T. G. TOGBA      US-LIBERIA RELATIONS: A LOOK AT U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID TO LIBERIA FROM 2006-2017**

**Nicosia  
June, 2022**

**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**US- LIBERIA RELATIONS:  
A LOOK AT U.S. DEVELOPMENT AID TO LIBERIA FROM 2006-2017**

**M.A. THESIS**




**AUSTIN T. G. TOGBA**

**Supervisor  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait AKŞİT**


**Nicosia  
June, 2022**

### Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Austin T. G. Togba titled "US-Liberia Relations: A Look at Development Aid to Liberia from 2006-2017" and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations


Examining Committee	Name-Surname	Signature
Head of the Committee:	Assist. Prof. Dr. Didem Aydındağ	
Committee Member:	Dr. Zehra Azizbeyli	
Supervisor:	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit	


Approved by the Head of the Department

  
26.10.2022

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit  
Head of Department

Approved by the Institute of Graduate Studies

  
...../...../20...  
Prof. Dr. Kemal Hüsnü Can Başer  
Head of the Institute



## **Declaration**

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

Austin T. G. Togba

.../...../2022

### **Acknowledgements**

It has been a labor of love and tremendous progress. Many times, I was tempted to stop only to find more reason from my bible and that kept me going. This thesis means a lot me, and I'm extremely grateful to God almighty for his many blessings, the multitude of his tender mercies and his sufficient grace that is ever present with me. God take all the glory!

Firstly, to my mother, Hnede Wilson, your love makes wingless child like me to fly, I'm grateful mama and for your prayers always. This woman is a superhuman and the best person any child would love to have called mom. I love you! Very special recognition to my father and mother Mr. and Mrs. Stanton Togba. To my dearest aunty, Annie Johnson, I love and appreciate you all you continue to do. This journey would not have been possible without the ever-ready support of these people: Ms. Jenneh U.M. Paye, Atty. Frederick B. Krah, and so many others.

To my two dearest big brothers and my cousin, I love you, guys! Henrietta R. Johnson, you came through for me always and this reason, I sincerely appreciate you. Tee Thomas Togba, you're a man, brother. I remember how you sacrificed yours to give me mine. Mr. James B. Kiawu, you know how much I appreciate you every time and know that I love you. My sincere and profound appreciation to my supervisor and a man who is full of wisdom, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit. You are an incredible person and thanks so kindly for your mentorship. To my many professors especially Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü and Dr. Zehra, you guys are special and a very big thank you to everyone. Special thanks to everyone who one way or the other contributed to this landmark achievement. Specially, to my son, Awesome and my significant other, Joanna, I will love to appreciate you guys for sacrificing our family time for this remarkable academic achievement. Gift, you have been very supportive to this journey and your never-dying encouragement is worth noting. I love you, buddy!

I hope ultimately this thesis matters for Liberia. At the very least, I hope it serve as a basis for additional research to unravel and understand the asymmetric relationship between Liberia and the US. I have not answered every question about the US- Liberia relations (Who's benefit the most), and I don't intend to do so; this means that there is more room for research. I hope the privilege of education bestow on us the burden to ask and attempt to answer question in whatever space, places and capacities we occupy. I'm gladly looking forward to other researchers to critique it, build up on it and refine it.

## **Abstract**

### **US-Liberia Relations: A Look at Development Aid to Liberia from 2006-2017**

**Togba, Austin T.G.**

**MA, Department of International Relations**

**Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit**

**June, 2022, 121 pages**

This thesis looks at the U.S. - Liberia Relations with a keen focus on the United States development aid from 2006-2017, especially with a specific focus on former president's twelve years of rule. It examines the impacts that the U.S. development aid have had on Liberia and her people for the period under review. Additionally, this study questions who benefits the most from this asymmetric relationship between these two countries. The methods donors employ to provide development aid to recipient states around the world, particularly those in Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, is the subject of a growing corpus of literature. Various arrangements, including bilateral agreements, and multilateral treaties are used to provide this assistance to the receiving states. By examining the nature and dynamics of the American approach to delivering development assistance to Liberia and the effects that this strategy has on the latter country's socioeconomic growth, this thesis study seeks to add to the body of material already in existence. The work that was done after the creation of this foundation examined the flows of American aid for development to Liberia from 2006 to 2017. The literature suggest that the American aid distribution strategy is intended to advance American political, military, economic, and strategic goals. Liberia must act as a foot soldier in this situation to further American national objectives in the former context and in other settings. It is argued that American development aid during the 12 years in question has not contributed to improve the material circumstances of Liberia's lower classes in terms of the effects on social and economic growth.

***Keywords:*** Liberia, United States, US-Liberia Relations, development aid

## Özet

### **ABD-Liberya İlişkileri: 2006-2017 yılları arasında Liberya'ya yapılan ABD Kalkınma Yardımına Bir Bakış**

**Togba, Austin T.G.**

**MA, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü**

**Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Sait Akşit**

**Haziran, 2022, 121 sayfa**

Bu tez, ABD-Liberya ilişkilerine, özellikle 2006-2017 yılları arasında Liberya'ya yönelik ABD kalkınma yardımlarına odaklanmaktadır. Bu çalışma, incelenen dönem için ABD kalkınma yardımının Liberya üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Ek olarak, bu çalışma aynı zamanda Liberya halkı üzerindeki etkisine ve bu iki ülke arasındaki bu asimetrik ilişkiden en çok kimin yararlandığına da bakmaktadır. Kalkınma yardımı sunan ülkelerin dünya çapında, özellikle Afrika, Asya, Avrupa ve Latin Amerika'daki alıcı devletlere yardımı sağlamak için kullandıkları birçok yöntemin hayati konusu, büyüyen bir literatür külliyyatının konusudur. Kalkınma yardımları için ikili anlaşmalar ve çok taraflı anlaşmalar dahil olmak üzere çeşitli düzenlemeler kullanılmaktadır. Bu tez çalışması, Liberya'ya kalkınma yardımı sağlamaya yönelik Amerikan yaklaşımının doğasını ve dinamiklerini ve bu stratejinin Liberya'nın sosyoekonomik büyümesi üzerindeki etkilerini inceleyerek, hâlihazırda var olan materyale katkı sunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma, 2006'dan 2017'ye kadar Liberya'ya kalkınma amaçlı Amerikan yardımı akışını incelemiştir. Literatür, Amerikan yardım dağıtım stratejisinin Amerikan siyasi, askeri, ekonomik ve stratejik hedeflerini ilerletmeyi amaçladığını öne sürüyor. Liberya, eski bağlamda ve diğer ortamlarda Amerikan ulusal hedeflerini ilerletmek için bu durumda bir araç ve ileri karakol olarak görülmektedir. Bu incelemede, son 12 yılda Amerikan kalkınma yardımının sosyal ve ekonomik büyüme üzerindeki etkiler açısından Liberya'nın alt sınıflarının maddi koşullarının iyileştirilmesine katkıda bulunmadığını savunmaktadır.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Liberya, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, ABD-Liberya ilişkileri kalkınma yardımı

## Table of Contents

Approval.....	1
Declaration .....	2
Acknowledgements .....	3
Abstract .....	4
Özet .....	5
Table of Contents .....	6
List of Tables.....	8
List of Abbreviations.....	9

### CHAPTER I

Introduction .....	10
Statement of the problem .....	14
Objectives of the Research Study .....	14
Research Questions .....	15
Significance of the Study .....	15
Purpose of the Study .....	15
Limitation of the Study .....	15

### CHAPTER II

Literature Review .....	17
US-Africa Relations .....	17
US Relation During Clinton Period .....	8
US Relation During Bush Period .....	18
US Relation During Obama Period .....	27
Theoretical Framework of the Study .....	42

### CHAPTER III

US role in the global System .....	43
U.S. -Policy towards Africa since the Cold War .....	47
Military Policy .....	52
The Weakness of the US Military and Security in Africa .....	57
Economic Policy .....	58



US development assistance to Africa .....	61
Future Directions .....	63

#### **CHAPTER IV**

Liberia-US Relations .....	66
The United States Type of Assistance to Liberia .....	77
Cold War era .....	77
The Post-Cold War epoch .....	79
U.S. Relations and Assistance .....	81
The nature of the NTGL power struggle 2003 .....	83
Gemap and the fight against corruption .....	85
US- Liberia relation under President Sirleaf .....	88
The Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Liberia, Its Response, and US Assistance	90
Post-Conflict Stabilization and Recovery Under President Sirleaf .....	98
The United States Aid to Liberia for bilateral development .....	100
Judiciary reform .....	103

#### **CHAPTER V**

Conclusion .....	108
Recommendation .....	109
References .....	110
Appendix A Turnitin Similarity Report .....	113
Appendix B Ethic Committee Approval .....	114

**List of Tables**

Table 1: US Development Aid to Liberia .....	102
--	-----

### **List of Abbreviations**

ACS	American Colonization Society
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
D.C	District of Columbia
DED	Deferred Enforced Departure
DOD	Department of Defense
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
LFF	Liberia Frontier Force
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
LWI	Liberia Women Initiatives
MARWOPNET	Mano River Women Peace Network
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
N PFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
TJ	Transitional Justice
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNMIL	United Nation Mission in Liberia
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPNET	Women and Peace building Network

## CHAPTER I

### Introduction

The United States has a long traditional history with Liberia, dating as far back as 1821, when the American Colonization Society helped groups of African Americans establish settlements in the country. A heterogeneous combination of white abolitionists, defenders of slavery, opponents of racial integration and the growth of a community of free blacks in the United States, and clergy who wished to preach Christianity to Africa created the ACS in 1816. As an alternative to emancipation and assimilation in the United States, the ACS attempted to relocate persons of African heritage from the New World in Africa, including freeborn and freed slaves. According to some historians, the ACS was primarily a racist organization. Americo-Liberians were African Americans who settled in Liberia, whereas Congo's were Caribbean people and slaves who were freed from slave ships and landed in Liberia. Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a Virginia resident who had previously served as sheriff and vice governor of the colony, became the island's first non-white governor in 1842. The colony's assembly declared the territory an independent, free republic in 1847, the first on the African continent, following a settler referendum. The new country was given the name Liberia, and Roberts was elected as its first president. Liberia based its constitution after that of the United States, named its capital, Monrovia, after the fifth President of the United States, and adopted a flag that resembled that of the US. Following the establishment of the republic, a two-party political system emerged, with Americo-Liberians holding a near-monopoly on political and economic power in Liberia until 1980. The republic's government rapidly extended its jurisdiction over indigenous ethnic groups, confederations, and tiny clan or village-based communities in Liberia's interior during the second half of the 1800s and early 1900s. Such endeavors aimed to expand the territories under government control and establish a system of centralized administrative rule, taxation, and codified law over that territory. These efforts included the construction of an indirect rule regime as well as the imposition of direct central governance, which was frequently backed up by military action. The central government attempted to co-opt indigenous political structures under indirect control by forming agreements with indigenous confederations. It established a decentralized authority system headed by ostensibly "traditional" local chiefs who were, in fact, elected or nominated by the government. These acts were

intended to enforce central government power, quell indigenous uprisings and foreign meddling in Liberia, and collect taxes, but they sparked indigenous resentment, resulting in multiple brief battles between the government and indigenous polities (Cook, 2003). The Liberian Frontier Force (LFF) was established in 1908 to deal with such rebellions. The force was poorly paid, ill-trained, and frequently unpaid, and it was involved in plundering and violent predations against the indigenous people. The LFF was directed by British commanders at first, who recruited numerous Sierra Leoneans into its ranks, and then by American soldiers beginning in 1912. This move followed a pattern of US backing for the Liberian government, which includes repeated interventions on its behalf in the wake of political disagreements and armed clashes between the government and the indigenous population. Such endeavors bolstered Americo-Liberian rule while discouraging external, mainly French, colonial intentions on the little country, allowing Liberia to remain independent during a period when all other African countries, with the exception of Ethiopia, were subjected to European colonialism (Cook, 2003).

When Liberia enacted a constitution and declared herself a sovereign state in 1847, she became the first independent state in West Africa. Liberia was quickly recognized by the United Kingdom, and all other European governments followed suit. The United States did not recognize and establish diplomatic ties with Liberia until 1862, under the administration of Abraham Lincoln. Even back then, American interests in the area were restricted to marine and missionary activities: there were no investments or long-term commitments. However, it should be noted that the US had consistently utilized its clout and gunboats to defend the small republic from aggressive European aspirations.

Liberia's strategic importance was recognized by William Howard Taft, the 27th president of the United States, as early as 1910. In that same year, President Taft urged to Congress that the US Navy establish a coaling facility on the Liberian coast. Despite the fact that the government was eager and ready to transfer the requisite area to the US for that purpose, Congress did not act on the advice.

During World War I, the United States of America strengthened military connections with Liberia by sending five African-American military leaders to help the Liberian Frontier Force restructure. Liberia's President, Daniel Howard, had requested US assistance in restructuring the country. The Frontier Force would be directed by two black American commanders, one of whom would be a major and the

other a captain, according to the conditions of the Liberia-Firestone Loan Agreement. It was critical to preserving American control over Liberia's military structure in order to defend Firestone Corporation's interests, and this provision was vital to achieving that purpose. The officials were also required to ensure security and a favorable environment for Firestone to carry out its undertakings in the country. During World War II, the United States' interest in Liberia was piqued by the Firestone Corporation's operations.

President Edwin Barclay declared neutrality on December 18, 1939, after the commencement of World War II, recognizing Liberia's small population, limited territorial boundaries, and pre-industrial economy. President Daniel Howard set the precedent in 1914, and Barclay was simply following it. He saw that a battle between large nations would have an unavoidable impact on the future and fate of small, poor, and impoverished countries like Liberia. Liberia elected to remain neutral as a result of these and other concerns. Liberia, on the other hand, knew that maintaining her neutrality would be extremely difficult, particularly given her geographic location. The French Colony of Ivory Coast bordered her on the east, Guinea, a French Colony, on the north, and the British Colony of Sierra Leone on the west. Liberia would have been fully engulfed by the belligerent states had it not been for the Atlantic in the south. The country's position was insecure and vulnerable, and developments in the surrounding colonies may easily have an impact. Liberia's avowed policy was to maintain peace with all nations of the world. She wanted to avoid any potential entanglements that could compromise her independence.

Liberia, in keeping with her neutrality, allowed the Germans to stay and trade in the country. The British government despised the idea of Germany wielding power on the outskirts of her colonies. She was dead set on eradicating such power wherever it could be seen. Only small trading was left in the hands of the Germans in Liberia by 1941. In the endeavor to eliminate German commerce and influence in that country, however, the British approach was hostile and dictatorial. The British took the initial step by ordering the Bank of Monrovia to stop servicing accounts for German companies and nationals. The British also refused to grant navicerts to ships en route to Liberia, which are safe-conduct certificates that allow a vessel from a friendly or neutral country to pass past a naval blockade. Traders were advised to conduct business with British companies. All of these actions were gross violations of Liberia's neutrality. Liberia's neutrality was violated despite the fact that the British recognized

it had no power to enforce it. The intercession of the United States, which was interested in Liberia for financial, sentimental, and military reasons, neutralized the British activities and, most likely, their objectives towards Liberia. The strategic relevance of Liberia during World War II may explain the rise of American interest in the country. Liberian rubber became extremely valuable to the Allies after the Axis conquered Malaya and the East Indies, thereby shutting down the region's rubber supply. The United States had become the primary buyer for Liberian rubber and other products such as palm oil, ivory, cocoa, and coffee since the beginning of Firestone rubber operations in Liberia in the late 1920s. Because of the installation of the Vichy regime, France suffered a major setback in the early spring of 1940, posing a number of issues for the Allies. France was divided in two, and the French colonies in Africa were divided as well. The Vichy regime ruled over French West Africa, while the Free French ruled over French Equatorial Africa. Control of Dakar, a major naval station from which the Axis launched submarines, posed a serious threat to the British colonies in the area as well as Liberia. Because of this, it was necessary to create American or Allied military outposts in Liberia. The Axis control of North Africa also contributed to Liberia's increased military importance. Air routes across Europe and North Africa had been cut off as a result of German military actions. Military planes from the United States had to fly from Brazil to North Africa via the South Atlantic. Finding a new route to decrease the distance between the two countries became critical for the United States. Liberia was determined to be the most strategically positioned for this purpose by the US; it was calculated that Liberia was roughly 1,800 miles from Brazil's coastline. Military planes from the United States could be stationed in Liberia to constantly patrol the South Atlantic. Liberia piqued American interest because of all of these characteristics. Liberia's strategic location was important to the United States. One of the security ideas said unequivocally that: The United States' defensive arc is currently swinging near to the Americas' borders. With American naval and aviation stations in Liberia, the arc would complete itself, making any sea or air invasion of South America impossible. The United States was the first country to recognize the importance of Liberia's contribution to the Allied war effort. With this information and the country's long-standing good connections, the US was able to establish and finalize a series of agreements with Liberia about the protection and defense of American assets in the event that the US joined the conflict.

The foundation of the bilateral relations between the United States and Liberia may be dated back to the period when Liberia was a colony of emancipated slaves run by the American Colonization Society, according to the United States Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs (2015). (U.S. Relations with Liberia, 2015). The situation of relations between these two nations has become more unstable throughout time as a result of the continually changing conditions within each state. Liberia still depends on American funding for both short- and long-term development. Currently, the main focus of American assistance to Liberia has been on maintaining the country's progress toward good governance, encouraging economic growth, and strengthening its armed forces (U.S. Relations with Liberia, 2015). Currently, the majority of aid going to Liberia is going to the nation's armed forces, educational institutions, and healthcare facilities and strengthening of the rule of law.

### **Statement of the Problem**

The U.S. and Liberia asymmetric relations is facing severe problems since the civil unrest and state interest. Many people see Liberia as a heartbeat of the American people and so people believed that the social, political and economic problems of Liberia should be over by now. With all the fundings that came in doing the presidency of President Sirleaf for development purposes, the problems in Liberia are still far from finishing and that funds that were sent either did not serve the interest for which it was sent. Some of the pressing issues that the assistance was given to is still a major challenge up to today and that which include lack of educational infrastructure, lack of respect for the rule of law, high rate of drop out children from schools, less number of children admission in school, unskilled teaching and non-teaching staff, and worsen economic conditions. Keeping in view the existing problems of Liberia US relations, it is important that a more structural and physical assistance is needed and that a strong monitoring arm is pivotal to Liberia's growth.

### **Objectives of the Research Study**

By giving more information on US- Liberia Relations. As a result, the current study aims to achieve the specific research objectives indicated below.

To identify how the US development assistance perform over the past 12 years of the Sirleaf rule.



To identify whether the USAID assistance is being placed to where it should be.

To identify what kind of assistance that the U.S. is giving Liberia to end the socio, political and economic backwardness.

### **Research Question**

The following questions will bring out the much-needed result require to probe into this research.

Is the relationship between the US and Liberia mutually respected?

To what extent has the US development assistance benefited Liberia from 2006- 2017?

### **Significance of the Research Study**

Country like Liberia is facing multiple social, political and economic challenges. However, the U.S development assistance over the past twelve years of former president Sirleaf cannot be seen on the faces of the Liberia people and in terms of real or physical development. Implementation of these policies through effective management and leadership skills can address the issues and problems of educational system. Children will get better education that will impact positively on the country politically, socially and economically.

### **Purpose of the Study**

Due to the insufficient work on this topic by researchers in relations to Liberia, the researcher is motivated and is eager to conduct research on this topic with the aim of minimizing the gap that has been left blank for too long. In view of the aforementioned, the review of relevant literatures will help to explore and identify a suitable theoretical framework for this study. The knowledge that will be put in will significantly contribute to future study (ies) that will be conducted on this topic.

### **Limitation of the Study**

Based upon the topic under investigation, it is important to state that there are not too many literatures on Liberia in relations to the U.S. Relations especially on president Sirleaf twelve years of governance. It was one of the limitations of this work, but I hope ultimately that this work will also serve as a bedrock for other research work. There are a few restrictions worth recognizing. The constraints that were faced range from inadequate funding to get some pay for materials, time, transportation, lack

of some manpower (research assistants). Moreover, many of whom the researcher contacted to get some data from deliberately refused.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **Literature review**

This section gives an audit of significant writing on the US-Liberia relations and synopsis of the compositions perceived specialists of past examination gives proof that the researchers knows about what is as of now known and what is as yet unclear and untested. Powerful examination depends on past information. Writing audit helps in disposing of duplication of what has been done, and gives valuable speculation and supportive ideas for huge examination. The part is isolated into a few sub-segments which feature the hypothetical structure of the review, the US-Liberia relations, and the job of the US in worldwide framework, the US strategy towards Africa, the US relationship with West Africa, and the exploration hole.

#### **US- Africa Relations**

To name a few factors that shaped US-Africa relations, there was the Cold War, the transitional era from 1990 to 1998, and the post-1998 period. To the extent that a consensus academic position can be reached, academics agree that Cold War politics dominated US-Africa relations between 1950 and 1990, and that the US placed a high value on African relations only because Africa provided a venue for the US and the Soviet Union to act out their global struggle. Looking at the Cold War era, the U.S' connections with the continent Africa were limited to fostering, supporting, and preserving anti-communist ideologies among African elites. Any government or rebel organization that backed the US in its struggle against the Soviets became friends. Between 1990 and 1998, the United States struggled to establish distinct African policy objectives and methods, and this time could be described as transitional. Without a clear adversary to attack, politicians in the United States struggled to tie African challenges to American interests. The position became even more hazardous when President George H.W. Bush floated the vague idea of a new international order to serve as the foundation for US foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Without clear strategic goals, US-Africa relations have fluctuated between complete disinterest and half-hearted attempts to promote democracy and economic change through USAID and international financial institutions. "The lack of essential U.S. interests was an article of faith in the mid-1990s," as one expert on US-Africa ties put it, "which clearly signified a low moment in U.S.-Africa connections" (van de Walle, 2009).

During his second term, President Clinton initiated a sort of rescue effort by connecting U.S. and African interests using the logic of Kantian liberal cosmopolitan concepts.

### **US Relations During Clinton Period**

Worldwide citizenship, reliance, deregulation, and liberal popularity-based values were key to President Clinton's liberal cosmopolitan account. "What happens everywhere affects everyone," as Immanuel Kant put it, is a sign of a globe shrinking and becoming increasingly interconnected (Reiss, 2000, 134). "We have a typical future on this planet of ours," Bill Clinton said, "which is getting progressively smaller and more humble" (Edwards and Valenzano III, 2007, 313). Clinton considered Africa to be important for a worldwide local area, with the landmass' destiny entwined with that of the US. Not just due to the "ethos of obligation and fortitude," which contends that Americans have an ethical obligation to Africans, yet additionally in light of the fact that there are various "African bads" that might be traded to the US, as Richard Falk puts it (Falk, 1996, 491). Neediness, starvation, disorder, lack of education, joblessness, and terrible struggles, expansion of weaponry, drug dealing, and ecological debasement were among the African "bads" referenced by Clinton in various talks to Africans (Clinton, 1998f, 496; 1998d, 434). That's what Clinton's account suggested assuming US lawmakers kept on overlooking Africa, illnesses, drugs, weapons, clashes, and ignorance would be sent out to the US. The Clinton organization accepted that depicting Africa as a danger to US public safety instead of an open door would tempt a suspicious and uninvolved Congress, Washington's approach foundation, and key Conservative Alliance individuals to help subsidizing demands for Africa-related drives. Before and during Clinton's six-country visit of Africa in Walk 1998, the hidden subject of official statements and addresses was Africa as a threat to the US's drawn-out interests. In the Clintonian cosmopolitan cosmos, people live in an ethical local zone with equal freedoms and values, which extends far beyond the "parochial realm of the sovereign state" and embraces the entire planet (Linklater, 1998). Clinton was able to transform the Bramble organization's intervention in Somalia into a more comprehensive program of nation-building in his most significant true commitment to Africa, which came place in 1993, due of this viewpoint. The Clinton administration was compelled to reassess the entire endeavor and reexamine its reasons a half year later, in October 1993, when eighteen Marines were killed, and their bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Even if

he had succeeded in justifying the shift away from the indifferent mediation sought by his predecessor and towards a more aggressive nation-building project, President Clinton would have found it difficult to do so without taking a cosmopolitan perspective on the Somali issue. This is especially true given that he came into power with the notion that relations between the US and Africa had always been viewed as a minor component of international strategy by the Washington foundation. President Bill Clinton had an opportunity to promote the second and third pillars of his liberal cosmopolitan perspective to the American populace when two bombs detonated simultaneously in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, 1998, killing an estimated 257 people and injuring more than 4,000 more. He engaged in cosmopolitan debate with Americans during his most notable correct communication on the subject, declaring that "these manifestations of psychological oppressor cruelty are disgusting," and dispatching the US military to East Africa to bring the perpetrators of the atrocities to justice. "Cosmopolitan armies — for sure, Mary Kaldor refers to them as "cosmopolitan warriors" — are today expected to put their lives in grave risk not only for their co-nationals, but also for mankind as a whole," Elliott and Cheeseman (2002) write. Following the attacks, President Clinton astonished everyone by arranging for no metal to be removed from the blast sites by the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments. This was a first for President Clinton, and it was part of a larger push to make cosmopolitan military administrations more accessible to Africans. Following his acts, FBI special agents were dispatched to the capitals of the two states in question. President Clinton called Tanzanian Unfamiliar Pastor Jakaye Kikwete shortly after the explosions, indicating that about letting him know that his intent to reach out was to reach President Mkapa to inform him that the FBI nation would be cooperating in the inquiry, according to the BBC World Assistance Program Observer. They just asked that no one remove any of the metal artifacts from the premises... a percentage of the metal pieces that were left lying about on the ground also helped with the request." President Clinton, as most cosmopolitans who accept military mediation might be an important instrument for accomplishing worldwide human great, made it a point to the cosmopolitan rationale to help his choice to send off journey rocket assaults on Sudan's Al Shifa drug complex. He utilized Kant's contention that "assuming a specific utilization of opportunity is itself a block to opportunity as per general regulation, any intimidation utilized against it will be an impediment to the obstacle of opportunity, and hence will be consonant with opportunity as per widespread regulations — that is,

it will be correct." Clinton defended the manufacturing plant besieging by binds it to al-Qaeda and Osama container Loaded, the man blamed for planning the two assaults, creating elements for compound weapons (Reiss, 2006, 134; Cloud, 2006).

As a result of its efforts, the Clinton administration was able to persuade the Security Chamber to pass Goal 1267, which called for resource freezes, an arms embargo, and a movement boycott in exchange for the Taliban's support in al-Qaeda activities. Al-(Nesi, Qaeda's 2006) four African states were forced to write domestic laws in order to carry out Goal 1267. Plessis (2007). Seeing that cosmopolitans anticipate that states should utilize worldwide regulation, especially global philanthropic and common freedoms regulation, laws of fighting, and other worldwide instruments like approvals, to make intercession "in the inward undertakings of each state to safeguard specific fundamental privileges" anyplace on the planet, the Clinton organization's activities show cosmopolitan standards (Archibugi, 1995, 430). A majority rules system advancement is instilled in the cosmopolitan targets of the present cosmopolitans (Franceschet, 2000). Cosmopolitans favor a vote-based system to any remaining types of administration and attempt to advance it since they accept it cultivates inward steadiness, gives general common liberties, animates unfamiliar venture, and gives expresses that acknowledge it a superior opportunity of quiet conjunction. In view of these contemplations, President Clinton expressed that he made a trip to Africa interestingly to "support a majority rule government, perceiving that it won't ever be great or complete" (1998a: 420). He recommended that popularity-based administration will give Africans "more admittance to [American] advertises" and animate "private speculation" assuming it is taken on across the landmass. President Clinton followed Kwame Nkrumah's attestation that "the propensity for a vote-based system should be to encompass the Earth" when he proposed to build another US-Africa collusion on a solid majority rule establishment. Allow us to take steps to finish the majority rule circle collectively" (1998a, 421). Hillary Clinton, first Lady of the United States, stated that she is just the second person in history to assist Africa in realizing her full potential as a country of rich magnificence and vast opportunity for its people (1998h, 496; AllAfrica.com, April 3, 1998). Rather than attempting to portray himself as cosmopolitan in order to support majority rule democratic government systems, Mr. Clinton was simply following in the footsteps of a long-standing American official tradition of viewing the United States as the world's vanguard of liberal vote-based government systems. However, the link he made

between a majority rule system and an all-encompassing moral and moral imperative, as well as his appeal to Africans to join Americans in developing majority rule governance on both continents, reveal an unusual point of view on the matter. He asked Africans and Americans to "face the future together" with the goal that the future would be "better for Africa and better for America" (Clinton, 1998h). He didn't, in contrast to past US presidents, propose that US a vote-based system is finished (regardless of whether he accepts it is) or that the US doesn't have to gain from other nations' majority rule encounters. He said rather that the US needs to see as new "accomplices to extend the significance of a majority rules government in America, Africa, and all through the world" (1998a, 420). At the end of the day, he didn't join a considerable rundown of presidents who have practiced it all the time of addressing Africans on the benefits of vote-based systems in their nations. Most of cosmopolitans have become notable for their compassion and pacific debate goal positions. President Clinton's Kantian cosmopolitan methodology was exhibited when he encouraged African accomplices to "live in harmony" and offered another association with Africa in light of harmony (Clinton, 1998a). President Clinton introduced various opportunities for the US to help foster harmony in Africa, like most cosmopolitans who expand on Kant's timeless harmony to find method for overseeing and settling debates. However, he recognized that harmony wouldn't come "soon," he accepted that through persisting, the US government and its African partners could make Africa a tranquil zone, since "persistence makes its own award" (Clinton, 1998g, 1998b).

President Clinton, as most cosmopolitans, needed to kill political contribution and cutoff points on the free development of business items and administrations since he accepted that a world liberated from taxes and different imperatives on global exchange would be a superior society. President Clinton expressed in Botswana that Africa's wealth and 30 percent profit from venture introduced huge potential to Americans, in light of cosmopolitans' deep confidence in streamlined commerce. Simultaneously, he accepted that eliminating exchange boundaries would permit Africans to make and sell more things in light of America's huge market. President Clinton, in evident cosmopolitanism structure, accepted that solid exchange ties were helpful to everybody, all over. His idea that a world free of anti-trade regulations will enable each state and individual to achieve a higher standard of living while minimizing the likelihood of state-to-state war is at the basis of his advocacy for easier trade. The vast majority of states engaged in the global economy, according to

cosmopolitans, cohabit happily with their major trading partners on a regular basis. During a state visit to Uganda, US President Hillary Rodham Clinton remarked, "Everyone deserves the opportunity to accomplish so that each of our children can have an acceptable living, acquire a good education, and build a great future" (Clinton, 1998g). That's what he said assuming larger part African nations consent to annul exchange obstructions, the option to succeed will be understood. President Clinton's cosmopolitan position drove his organization to seek after "two clear essential objectives: incorporating Africa into the worldwide economy by advancing vote based system, monetary development and improvement, and compromise; and handling transnational security concerns like psychological oppression, wrongdoing, opiates, weapons expansion, ecological corruption, and diseases" (Rice, 2000; Taylor, 2010, 24). Following the implementation of AGOA in May 2000, legal assistance was provided for: Expanding obligation/standard free treatment for apparel made in Africa from US yarn and texture, as well as sewing to shape sweaters made in Africa from cashmere and some merino fleeces, and apparel made in Africa from silk fiber; and increasing obligation/quantity free access to the US market for sub-Saharan clothing made with yarns and textures that are not readily available in the US. The Clinton administration had the option of establishing unassuming monetary and political ties with a slew of African countries after the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) came full circle on May 18, 2000, in connection with Washington's advancement of the traditional majority rules system in Africa through the State Department, USAID, U.S.-based NGOs, and multilateral monetary institutions such as the World Bank. The Clinton administration, on the other hand, decided against it. These exchanges, then again, "represent[ed] minimal expense and okay" associations (Rothchild, 2001, 205-206). The minimal expense, okay exercises were planned to go on until September 11, 2001, when the awful occasions happened.

### **US Relation during Bush period**

President George W. Bush's administration has re-examined US-Africa relations in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks and has come to accept the realism logic of fear and self-interest as a basis for policy. Africa, according to President Bush's administration, posed a national security concern. Africa's so-called weak and failing regimes, as well as the continent's historical ties to the Middle East, worked as a breeding ground for transnational terrorism, according to senior Bush



administration officials. Because of the continent's relatively weak states, ethnic and religious variety, and occasionally discrimination; poverty; and, in many regions, ungoverned territory, Africa is vulnerable to radical and sometimes internationally connected movements that use terrorism. These elements conspire to make Africa a tempting target for terrorist groups (Lyman, 2009). According to a large body of academic research and policy-relevant investigations into the illegal diamond trade in West Africa, alleged terrorists and their organizations, such as Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, either made millions of dollars or concealed their money in West African diamonds, or both, as a result of the region's illegal diamond trade. The ramifications of these findings for policy are important (Farah, 2004; Pham, 2006). According to one estimate, the illegal diamond trade in Liberia and Sierra Leone generated between \$30 million and \$50 million each month in the months leading up to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (Farah, 2004, 38). The Bush administration's course correction, on the other hand, was motivated not only by fear, but also by a determination to safeguard the country's economic interests. Finally, Washington's policy elite concluded that continued American reliance on Middle Eastern oil was a threat to national security, and that Africa's oil offered a compelling opportunity for the US to lessen its reliance on Middle Eastern oil in the short to medium term. In reaction to the continent's fast population expansion, an increasing number of American corporations are seeing Africa's natural resource wealth, as well as its young and rapidly growing population, as viable investment prospects (Kraxberger, 2005; Carmody, 2005). On the other hand, the Washington policy elite was well aware that these goals needed to be pursued with caution. Condoleezza Rice, an African-American Secretary of State, coined the term "transformational diplomacy" to describe a strategy for anchoring US policy objectives in Africa and elevating the continent from a marginal position on "the United States' spectrum of important interests" to a more pivotal position (McFate, 2008). The government was able to depict its recently revealed African interests in a positive light as a direct result of the shift in perspective, contributing to an overall improvement in its image (Rice, 2006; McFate, 2008). The three Ds: diplomacy, development, and defense, which have come to define U.S.-Africa connections, have come to define transformative diplomacy (Rice, 2006; Kfir, 2008; Jaotody, 2008). Reiteration of traditional rhetoric about the need of recognizing African nations as equal partners was a significant focus of the diplomacy component, as was developing new opportunities for African leaders to connect with the US on a

regular basis on critical topics. The goal was that by putting a greater emphasis on regular engagement with African policy elites, the US and African governments would be able to better understand each other's common interests in the long run.

The development cluster's purpose was to help Africa foster "health, education, democracy, and economic progress" across the continent, as well as "avoid problems from becoming crises and crises from becoming conflicts" (Bush, 2008; Kfir, 2008). By investing enormous sums of money into Africa's health-care system, the Bush administration made a significant contribution to the continent's economies. The current Republican-controlled administration has pledged \$200 million to the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB, and malaria. Following that, it created a \$500 million International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative with the goal of preventing HIV transmission from mothers to their children (Cook, 2006). The Bush administration established the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003 with the goal of assisting HIV-positive patients in obtaining antiretroviral (ARV) treatment, which can save their lives. PEPFAR was supposed to spend \$15 billion in the first five years, but by the end of 2008, it was estimated to have spent almost \$25 billion, much surpassing expectations and setting a new high (Lyman and Wittels, 2010). There is universal agreement that the Bush administration's health effort had a considerable impact on Africa's healthcare system, particularly in terms of halving malaria prevalence in several African countries and avoiding the deaths of many HIV-positive people. Despite making large financial contributions to Africa's health-related regions, which served to legitimize Bush's humanitarian efforts, Bush prioritized the defense portion of the three Ds during his presidency. The Bush administration, following in the footsteps of its Democratic predecessors, focused bilateral and multilateral security relations with Africa on the worldwide fight against terrorism, as well as through the United Nations system. First and foremost, they put financial pressure on African countries to pass legislation akin to the Patriot Act in the United States, and they offered financial incentives to do so (Njau, 2003; Sidel, 2006). The governments of Gambia, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda were successful; however, the governments of Kenya and Namibia were unable to comply with their proposals due to strong internal resistance. The ability of government agencies in chosen African countries to resist foreign terrorists operating within their borders was a significant priority of President George W. Bush's administration. The governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda derived the

most benefits from it, while the rest of the world benefited as well (Shady, 2007; Davis, 2007). In 2003, these nations received more than \$100 million in monetary and technical assistance as part of the United States' East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative. This was done, among other things, to strengthen their military capabilities, marine security, border security, law enforcement capability, and prosecutorial skill (Hurley, 2007). Terrorists in East Africa have to be found and stopped. They needed to stop their Middle Eastern suppliers from sending men, weapons, money, and other forms of assistance. The Safe Skies for Africa Program, which is run by the US Department of Transportation, provides both technical and financial assistance to these countries in order to help them improve their airport security and safety. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was established by the United Nations in 2002 as part of a larger initiative to combat terrorism in the West African sub-region. Its goal was to provide assistance to the governments of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger with the goal of strengthening their own security institutions and better protecting their borders. This was completed as part of a larger project. The initiative was renamed the Pan-Sahel Initiative after it was expanded to encompass the Sahel sub-region in 2005. Tunisia has joined Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, and Senegal on the list of African countries that have received assistance in preserving law and order in the Sahel region (Lyman, 2009). The Bush administration created impressive military partnerships with military commanders from across Africa as part of its strategy to combat specific transnational terrorist organizations (Anyaso, et al., 2009). CJTF-HOA was established in 2003 as part of the United States Central Command's (CENTCOM) counter-terrorist alliance system in Africa at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, and it is still located there. Between 2002 and 2009, it is estimated that about 18,000 military soldiers were stationed in the Horn of Africa. The establishment of military-to-military ties with armed forces in the Horn of Africa, participation in joint training exercises with those forces, and assistance with the acquisition of military equipment and humanitarian supplies in the region were among the CJTF-Highest mission's Priority Activities (HOAs). Burundi, Tanzania, and Rwanda, as well as Ethiopia and Djibouti, Kenya, and Burundi, all profited to varied degrees. According to the organization, members of the CJTF-HOA provided military support and engaged in joint military exercises with the Horn of Africa's approved military institutions. Ethiopian forces offered information and technical help to Ethiopian soldiers when they invaded Somalia in 2006 in an attempt to topple the Islamic Court Union. The army has taken the initiative and conducted

military operations in Africa on a few rare occasions, such as the ill-fated 1998 bombing of suspected terrorist hideouts near the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which killed scores of soldiers. These actions were regretful because they were based on inaccurate intelligence and resulted in civilian deaths. It appeared that there were no bombers in the area, which was wonderful news.

The Bush administration pushed African states to implement legislative changes and establish laws in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which was passed in 2001. This was accomplished by resolution. In 2003, Sand and his colleagues created a formal definition. The resolution calls for African countries to do the following: (1) freeze terrorists' financial assets, impose travel bans, and deny safe haven to terrorists and their supporters; (2) prevent terrorist recruitment and weapon supply; (3) cooperate with other nations in sharing information and pursuing criminal prosecutions; and (4) sign the resolution. This was done in order to prevent terrorists from taking use of South Africa's formidable banking system. The Bush administration has mobilized international resources in order to assist African countries in carrying out the requirements of Security Council Resolution 1373. The efforts of the Committee were influential to 16 different police forces across Africa. Money helps terrorists in their efforts to recruit new members, travel, communicate with one another, train, and carry out their operations. The United States of America provided assistance to eastern and southern African nations in the formation of the East and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group and the training of financial investigators in order to stop terrorists from using money to recruit new members, travel to, communicate with, train for, or carry out terrorist acts on other countries. Money is used by terrorists in many aspects of their operations, including recruiting new members, traveling, communicating, and carrying out attacks (Hurley, 2007). Resolution 1456 included the promotion of human rights in the anti-terrorism measures; Resolution 1566 established a working group to consider additional anti-terrorism measures; and Resolution 1540 connected African nations to the anthem policy of the Security Council. Resolution 1456 of the United Nations General Assembly, enacted on January 20, 2003, stressed the promotion of human rights in anti-terrorism measures. Resolution 1566 of the United Nations General Assembly, enacted on January 20, 2003, stressed the promotion of human rights in anti-terrorism measures. In 2004, three more resolutions were passed. The following items are included: Bush's African contacts will be maintained, but Obama is unlikely to match

Bush's financial commitment. President Barack Obama's pledge to double US aid to Africa over the next four years appears improbable. Although the State Department proposed an increase of 8% in US aid to Africa in 2011, PEPFAR funding was only boosted by 2%. 2010 (Lyman, Wittels) [Cite] According to the World Health Organization, the United States donated \$50 million less to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria this fiscal year than the previous fiscal year (Global Fund). According to some scholars, the Obama administration and US missions in Africa are pressuring African countries to integrate PEPFAR's HIV/AIDS programs in their national budgets. Since the 1980s, PEPFAR has been in existence (Lyman and Wittels, 2010). Due of the United States' deficits and expenditure caps, President Obama's foreign policy, particularly in Africa, has merged Clintonian cosmopolitanism with realism. Obama's spending power has been hampered by the deficit.

### **US Relation during Obama period**

Former President Barack Obama referenced a well-known example of cosmopolitan rhetoric from the Clinton administration when advocating for "an international system where the universal rights of human beings are acknowledged and abuses of those rights are denounced" (Obama, 2009). He has regularly advocated for the use of approvals to dissuade those seeking to foment war, and he has demanded that the international framework "help the individuals who have borne" violations of fundamental liberties and mismanagement, among other things, in the Middle East and elsewhere. Whether or not Hussien completely supports the cosmopolitan concept of military intervention for constructive purposes, he has regularly advocated for the use of approvals to dissuade those who attempt to sow war, as well as the use of sanctions to prevent those who wish to sow conflict (Obama, 2009). His assertion in Moscow that "a promise to help worldwide basic freedoms should stretch out to the individuals who calmly resolve questions" is like the cosmopolitan craving for overall obligation to settling emergencies any place on the planet (Obama, 2009e). When President Obama speaks about US-Africa relations, his speeches take on a more Clintonian tone and spirit, but they may not be as meaningful as they previously were. We are obliged to act by our conscience... because we are compelled to act when a child dies in Accra from a treatable virus that affects people all over the world." He declared in a speech in Accra, Ghana, in July 2009: (Obama, 2009). Presidency Obama's cosmopolitan

language, like that of President Clinton before him, is based on the concept of enlightened self-interest. He claims that it is "our common interest" that motivates us to behave in the global community's best interests. If the disease is allowed to develop unchecked in any part of the planet, it has the potential to spread over oceans and continents. This can be anywhere on the planet. This is something that all of us are familiar with. Barack Obama is the president of the United States of America (2009b). President Barack Obama stated in a town hall meeting with young African leaders on August 3 that the US is interested in African public health systems in part because reducing "HIV/AIDS transmissions in Africa... will have a positive effect on HIV rates internationally, due to the transmigration of diseases back and forth," and in part because the US could have spent the money on PEP on something else. Obama made this remark in response to the fact that the money spent on PEP could have been spent on anything else (Obama, 2010).

President Barack Obama has used Clinton's dependency narrative in a similar way to justify US-Africa ties. During President Obama's speech, the audience was able to hear Secretary Clinton's statements. During that time, the President said things like "our connections overwhelm the boundaries between people," "African prosperity can expand American prosperity," "African health can contribute to world health and security," and "the strength of Africa's democracy can help advance human rights for people everywhere" (Obama, 2009). His notion about Africa's democracy can assist progress global human rights was on the basis of the cosmopolitan view that we human lives in a uprightly moral society with the very same rights and ideals that transcend governments (Linklater, 1998).

President Clinton's masterful use of the "nearest is dearest" or "global village" narrative to frame US-Africa relations has penetrated Obama's discourse on the continent as well. Africa, according to Obama, is inextricably linked to the rest of the world and has had a long and fruitful relationship with the United States. He stated his feelings in the following manner: Africa, in my opinion, is not a separate entity; rather, it is an important part of our global local area of influence. We sincerely hope that a strong, independent, and prosperous African continent will be able to achieve these objectives, whether it is gaining a foothold in the global economy or providing education and medical care, combating environmental change, dealing with vicious fanatics who seek to exterminate, or advancing fruitful models of a vote-based system and improvement in human welfare. All of these are noble goals, and we really hope

that a strong, independent, and prosperous African continent can achieve them (Obama, 2010). Finally, the Obama campaign has adapted Clinton's new association speaking style, and the concept of another organization has influenced top individuals' information to African pioneers. According to Hillary Clinton's 2009 and 2010 AGOA opening statements, the Obama White House is building a new U.S.-Africa engagement "situated in association, rather than support" (Clinton, 2010). In almost every public speech to Africans, Obama has mentioned the newly formed African Association, implying that a gathering of young African pioneers will "mark the beginning of another collaboration" (Obama, 2010). According to Hillary Clinton's 2009 and 2010 AGOA opening statements, the Obama White House is building a new U.S.-Africa engagement "situated in association, rather than support" (Clinton, 2010). In almost every public speech to Africans, Obama has mentioned the newly formed African Association, implying that a gathering of young African pioneers will "mark the beginning of another collaboration" (Obama, 2010). The "old processes," which include "exorbitant pay-offs just to get the business up and operating," should pave the way for a new generation of Africans to take over. The debate for young African pioneers was supposed to start with the most popular technique of building this new segment. Regardless of the emphasis on African youth, the Obama administration's strategy to dealing with Africa is largely a repackaging of Clinton and Shrub's approach. As articulated by the Secretary of State, the following are the most essential points raised by her during her most memorable interactions with Africans during the AGOA conclusion in Uganda:

Determine long-term strategies and plans to help governments become more capable and accept responsibility; empower Africans with the resources they need to help themselves and their communities; and combine the US's commercial and development efforts in Africa, with a focus on bottom-up, locally driven solutions, while also encouraging the development of Africa's indigenous knowledge systems (Clinton, 2010a). Liberal democracy and anti-corruption measures, according to the Obama administration, are long-term solutions that can help Africans improve their capacities and accept responsibility for their acts. They believe that democracy is the only condition that can allow Africa to flourish. They think that democracy comes first, followed by growth. On July 11, 2009, during his first big address to Africans, President Mahama made a forceful case for good governance in Ghana's parliament. "Good governance is crucial for growth," he said. For far too long, that is the substance

that has been severely absent in far too many places. In other words, it is through this transition that Africa will be able to realize its full potential. Furthermore, only Africans are capable of assuming this obligation. The president went on to declare that his administration will encourage African countries that are committed to fighting corruption and running their countries ethically. His ideas on effective government are comparable to those of President Obama, who believes in liberal democracy and the safeguarding of political and civil liberties. The president claims that liberal democratic ideals such as political and civil rights are extremely important all over the world. He claims that it is his government's job to "stand up for these universal ideals" (Obama, 2009). Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced President Barack Obama's belief that democracy and anti-corruption measures are realistic methods for the continent's development when she visited Africa in August 2009. For example, in one of her African speeches, she denounced the corrupt and anti-democratic actions of Nigerian and Kenyan ruling elites while underlining her government's position that the region's future hinged on the development of functioning democracies (Clinton, 2010c; Bouchet, 2010). As part of the Obama administration's efforts to persuade or urge Africans to take responsibility and help themselves, PEPFAR has been expanded to include investments in health-care infrastructure. Despite maintaining the status quo in US-Africa ties since the Bush administration, the Obama administration has expanded PEPFAR to include these expenditures. According to the article, President Obama's administration is purportedly attempting to shift more responsibility for HIV/AIDS treatment to Africa. This is significant because according to the study (Lyman and Wittels, 2010). The "new" approach to health-related issues in Africa, according to President Obama's remarks at the Young Africans Forum, which is now known as the Global Health Initiative, is to improve public health infrastructure, institutionalize culturally specific prevention programs that have been proven to be effective, and ensure that both the US and African governments think not only about treating disease and illness, but also about preventing disease and illness transmission. In his address at the Young Africans Forum, President Obama stated this (Obama, 2010b). Because the US government "would never have enough money to only treat people who are always impacted," new financing sources have already begun to be sought in response to this reality (Obama, 2010). Young Africans were invited to participate in the AGOA forum, which took place in August 2010 in both Kansas City and Washington, DC. This was done as part of the Obama administration's



commitment to boost Africa's problem-solving capacities at the regional and municipal levels. President Barack Obama's inclusion on the list demonstrates his aim to encourage young Africans to take on leadership roles in their country. "You have the potential to hold your leaders accountable and establish institutions that benefit the people," he told the Ghanaian parliament in July 2009. You can use your education to produce new wealth and connections with people all over the world by volunteering your time and efforts to help those in need in your neighborhood. You can combat disease, put a stop to arguments, and create change when you start from the bottom up (Obama, 2009b). Despite the fact that President Clinton's African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) has produced only modest results and has failed to meet the highest expectations that were held for it a decade ago, the Obama administration has adopted the African Growth and Opportunity Act as an important policy tool for deeper integration of Africa into the US market (Clinton, 2010b). Despite President Obama's tireless efforts to promote the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and persuade African countries to adopt AGOA standards, it is evident that he is dedicated to the cause. African journalists, particularly those working in social media, were invited to the Obama White House's ninth AGOA meeting in August 2010 to learn about the benefits of AGOA and to obtain a better understanding of how capitalism works in the United States. They've been socializing with the continent's business and political elites at events like the Presidential Entrepreneurship Summit and official meetings like the series of meetings between senior US commerce officials and African ministers of trade, commerce, and agriculture held during the first week of August 2010 with the goal of persuading them to accept the African Growth and Opportunity Act's market-friendly principles. These events and discussions were arranged in an attempt to persuade them to support the African Growth and Opportunity Act's market-friendly concepts (AGOA). The Obama administration's two-week AGOA Women's Entrepreneurship Program, which aimed to "better integrate African women into the global economy" by helping them become more economically integrated, was designed to help African women become more economically integrated (The White House Office of Press Secretary, 2010). The workshop's organizers stated that one of the workshop's unofficial goals was to mobilize influential African women in order to put pressure on their respective governments to eliminate tariffs and subsidies in Africa, assist American companies in gaining access to African markets, and compete with Chinese companies in the

region, in addition to promoting free trade principles in accordance with the AGOA regime. This was to be done while also supporting the ideas of free trade. The Obama administration make full acknowledgment of Clinton and Shrubbery's Africa strategy has exacerbated a portion of the well-established issues in US-Africa ties. The organization keeps on working inside a deficient African development and an incoherent institutional construction. Nic van de Walle has proactively archived the deficiencies of US institutional frameworks managing African difficulties, as recently showed (2009). Therefore, the discussion that follows centers exclusively around the issues that have emerged because of Washington's social development of Africa. Numerous Africans, including the AU's initiative, have an alternate comprehension of Africa than the Washington strategy foundation. North Africa isn't viewed as a feature of Africa by US specialists, but instead part of the Middle Easterner world. President Barack Obama traveled to Cairo on June 4, 2010 to meet with members of the Bedouin community. On June 4, this action was taken to remind the United States that North Africa is a part of the Middle East. The crucial relations that the US Department of State maintains with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia have been transferred to the Center East Department as a direct result of this awful event. The Africa Agency, which controls US conciliatory relations with alleged Sub-Saharan African states and keeps up with strategic associations with the African Association, isn't approved to talk about issues influencing North African nations. This has sweeping strategy consequences. It has represented a tremendous test for the African Association, which is the primary body responsible for planning African nations' international strategies. Isolating Africa into Sub-Saharan and Middle Easterner Africa isn't just prohibited; the AU can't stand to talk with worldwide substances without referencing North Africa. The physical presence of the Association would be compromised as a result of this. It is unrealistic to expect the African Union's leaders to ignore Algeria's, Egypt's, and Libya's concerns in any negotiations with the US. These three countries are among the five that provide 75 percent of the African Union's monthly financial plan. AU authorities have been mindful not just about the points they examine with authorities in the Africa Department, yet in addition about how they address them, because of a paranoid fear of culpable North African states. Subsequently, in spite of the way that the US has had a long-lasting presence to the AU beginning around 2007, correspondence between the US State Division and AU authorities isn't quite as great as it ought to be.

The situation is no better at the Department of Defense (DoD), where the institutional design is a nightmare in terms of administrative efficiency for most African countries and AU authorities. They are frequently bewildered as to which unit of the Safeguard Branch should be consulted on a given issue. The situation was significantly more problematic for several years previous to the founding of AFRICOM in 2007. The three command organizations that the US has built to oversee its tactical linkages with Africa are EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. Despite the fact that these directives came from outside Africa, the few promises they made to Africans were mostly reciprocal and limited to military-to-military contacts. Before 2003, European Command (EUCOM) Commandant General James Jones testified before the United States House of Representatives that EUCOM's scholars had devoted virtually no time or resources to African affairs.

While African authorities view the US's establishments for overseeing African issues to be too different and regulatory, progressive US organizations have every now and again fizzled — in some cases just by not investing sufficient effort — to have ideal counsels with essential gatherings in Africa. During the administration of George W. Shrubbery, the issue turned out to be surprisingly more dreadful. When he and his organization failed to consult them before planning military operations like the African Coast and Boundary Security Program, the CJTF-HOA, Joint Task Force Africa, Maritime Activities in the Bay of Guinea, and the expansion of the African Coast and Boundary Security Program, the African Association was furious. To be clear, Shrubbery's organization did not hold major talks with African Union representatives prior to the founding of AFRICOM in 2007.

Rather than moving toward the African Association's authority, which has the ability to construct wide mainland support for any significant issue affecting Africa, the Shrubbery organization moved toward individual African states straightforwardly, like Djibouti, for help. The US conciliatory foundation and military authority in East Africa, both of which have formed rationally incredible partnerships with specific East African states, could have alleviated demands by ensuring African Union authorities that the US intended to join forces with them in the future. It's difficult to understand why there was no confirmation when the Branch of Protection had already begun exploratory work on a single African order at the time, and the US political foundation in East Africa understands that any tactical presence on African soil would be expected to garner widespread support from African states. When the Branch of Protection had

already begun exploratory work on a single African order at the time, it's difficult to explain why there was no confirmation. Because this assurance was not given, there was more room for suspicion that the US was acting for reasons other than psychological warfare countermeasures. It offered help to pundits of the US's Africa strategy (of which there are numerous in the dissident local area) for the view that the US was involving psychological oppression as a guide to lay out a solid military traction in Africa to take advantage of Africa's regular assets (Nhamoyebonde, 2010) and rule each part of African culture. These campaigners see little qualification between the US's contemporary interest in Africa and that of European vendors in the eighteenth and nineteenth hundreds of years who visited the mainland. They agree that mechanical and military interests in the massive oil riches of the Niger Delta, as well as vital minerals like cobalt, manganese, chromium, and platinum, among other things, drive US policy in Africa. According to the writers, cutting-edge US military operations are being prepared to "ensure 'order' of [African] land and assets, which was previously alluded to as plain expansionism" (Kidane, 2008). Activists can cultivate the roots of contemporary African hostility to the US' tactical presence in Africa's interior by exploiting regional iconography and dominance. Following the 2008 triumph, the Obama campaign neglected to capitalize on African extravagance to clarify these errors and lay the groundwork for convenient follow-up interviews on important African issues. Experts in African common military relations are concerned that the Obama administration has made no effort to deter the Bramble organization from pursuing its huge interest in counter-illegal intimidation exercises imposed on African countries as a result of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the US. America's strain on African legislatures to focus on the battle against psychological warfare, joined with monetary help for counter-illegal intimidation, has provoked African states to increment military spending to where the common military awkwardness that existed during the 1970s and 1980s has reemerged. As indicated by studies, counter-psychological warfare exercises represent 6 to 7% of all out consumptions by African state-run administrations (Chau, 2007; Mazrui, 2007). For instance, notwithstanding the way that Botswana has not had significant illegal intimidation on its dirt since autonomy, 9.6% of its uses went to counter-psychological warfare because of strain from the Hedge organization (Mazrui, 2007). Counter-psychological warfare spending shows up high and potentially unseemly when contrasted with government spending on basic social administrations, for example,

optional training and essential medical services. The Obama organization presently can't seem to inspect or alter any of President Shrub's security-related help to African nations. Truth be told, the tactical financial plan portions to African nations in 2010-2011 infer that his organization is helping such help. The Unfamiliar Military Funding System has been allocated \$9 million to fund military activities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia. A total of \$2.5 million will be granted through the Unfamiliar Military Funding System to support military activities in Djibouti, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and Tunisia. There was also \$21 million set aside for the Worldwide Military Instruction and Preparation System, which would train African military administrators in the US. Algeria (\$950,000), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (\$500,000), Ethiopia (\$725,000), Ghana (\$825,000), Kenya (\$1 million), Morocco (\$1.9 million), Nigeria (\$1 million), Rwanda (\$500,000), Senegal (millions of dollars), Tunisia (\$2.3 million), and Uganda (\$600,000) are some of the countries that have benefited from this funding. The Obama Foundation, which received \$24.4 million, was looking for African Help Projects that were opposed to illegal intimidation. The following is a list of how the funds will be distributed: The remaining money would be dispersed to nations such as Algeria (\$400,000), Kenya (\$8 million), Morocco (\$800,000), and South Africa (\$1 million), with the remaining cash going to African Provincial Projects. The development of new security facilities inside Africa's already well-developed security architecture has been made feasible thanks to various sorts of military aid. It may not be insightful to fortify security foundations in a landmass with a background marked by military fascisms and adventurism. The most unsettling viewpoint is that enemy of psychological warfare ventures have by implication helped the presidential part of government in recently equitable states, sabotaging all endeavors made during the 1990s to eliminate the military from Africans' regular routines and legislative issues and to tame the chief's domineering arm. New security establishments have created, while a few that had been nullified as a feature of the solidification of popular governments in African nations, for example, Ghana have been reactivated. The Ghana Public Safety Committee, for instance, laid out the Counter-Psychological oppression Tasks Unit in October 2001, with individuals chose from a few security and insight associations to procure counter-illegal intimidation knowledge and direct counter-psychological warfare activities. The Verifying Wrongdoing Insight Examination Unit was restored and rejuvenated by the Ghana

Public safety Board three years after the fact to arrange knowledge social events and organization. It is guessed that assuming the organization becomes disagreeable, Ghana's security offices would use these new powers to weaken the country. Such a worry ought not to be disregarded in a country that has gone through four popularity-based tests since its freedom in 1957. Many informed African political watchers anticipated that President Obama's organization should invert its approach of particular treatment for Sahel and Horn legislatures, which depends on misleading presumptions and seems to imperil American long haul security interests in Africa. By all accounts, it checks out for the US to incline toward states in the two sub-locales since they present a "delicious menu for expected fear-based oppressors," as one onlooker depicted it (Rotberg, 2005).

The program's partners recognize that the two places give very different direct paths to the Middle East, including Osama bin Laden's home nation and serious Islamic affiliations, and that they are not interchangeable. Furthermore, a large number of Muslims in the two sub-regions hold views that are hostile to Western ways of thinking, such as those held by mental oppressor social events, and they are notable districts for Islamic severe activities such as instructing, mosque improvement, and the underpinning of Islamic government help organizations and relationships, according to this conflict. Supporters of the program argue that it is "without a doubt possibly the most unhappy location on the planet" because it has "little government presence," a long history of piracy, banditry, illicit exploitation, and viciousness, and "has without a doubt possibly the most unhappy location on the planet" because it has "little government presence," a long history of piracy, banditry, illicit exploitation, and viciousness, and "has without a doubt possibly the most unhappy location on the planet" (Lyman, 2009). According to this perspective, those conditions have generated fertile ground for the formation of transnational psychological militant rallies in the local neighborhood. In order to combat psychological oppression, the United States should focus its efforts on these two sub-areas, according to the theory. Despite this, a closer inspection of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa indicates that they are not ungoverned territories, as the US policy appears to imply. Kingship and discreet meetings divide the country, each keeping an eye on what's going on in their own corner. Each land parcel in the Horn and the Sahel is shared with an indigenous government framework, such as a tribe authority or neighborhood leaders, as is the case in other parts of Africa. These factions own up to 95 percent of the land in

Sahelian nations like Senegal, because of a muddled land residency structure. Endeavors by the frontier organization and the post-pioneer state to force new administration systems on these spaces fizzled. As per Faye (2008, 8): Provincial people group dismissed pioneer rulers' endeavors to force another administration on them, liking to adhere to old customs... Access to the grounds was allowed to people from the surrounding area based on their social and family status. The eldest men in hereditary groupings were in charge of family property, and they went through a rigorous process of awarding and refusing use privileges... If it is judged that removing a few terrains from this system is in the public interest, the state will be fully responsible for their administration because they will have been enrolled in its name and integrated into state properties as a result. Despite the fact that the public interest is frequently misinterpreted as a means of providing undeserved benefits to economic interests at the expense of local residents, this is the case. Given that provincial networks demand larger land reserves to compensate landowners for regions that have been evacuated, it is becoming a more delicate problem. Because the concept of state lands is disruptive in provincial Africa, most Sahelian legislatures have outsourced authority of rural grounds and administration to local specialists to minimize additional disruption. Therefore, native power and family relationship bunches regulate regions and individuals who live on them. The shortfall of the Westphalian sovereign state doesn't infer that the locale is ungoverned or without oversight. There is inconclusive evidence that people in these areas who are predisposed to join psychological militant organizations are extreme fanatics, as US policymakers appear to believe. According to the conclusions of a study conducted by the Worldwide Emergency Gathering, persons who are socially disadvantaged are the most likely to join psychological militant organizations. The problem of psychological warfare does not reach the heart of the matter since the bulk of fear-based oppressor cells in both the Horn of Africa and the Sahel do not operate in metropolitan regions or towns where the Westphalian security contraption is obvious. Another reason why many people expected the Obama administration to overhaul America's Africa strategy is because of this. Fighting insubordinate organizations in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa should have acted as a wake-up call to the region's most Westphalian regimes, since security foundations will almost certainly not be enough to fend off transnational criminal intimidation and extortion. Since the renegade associations have shaped solid contacts with family gatherings and native government experts in the country regions, none of the Sahel

countries confronting rebel bunches have had any achievement. This assists with making sense of why the Tuareg rebels have been so fruitful in the Sahel for over thirty years. Most specialists in the field anticipated that the Obama organization should pull together US technique in the area on these native government structures. The US military is missing out on a tremendous opportunity to gather valuable, low-cost human intelligence from locals who are essentially interested in finding methods to exploit the US in order to finance their opulent lifestyles. Furthermore, these residents are primarily focused in finding ways to profit from the United States in order to maintain their opulent lifestyles. The US military is currently striving to address the issue of cost in its operational actions as a result of two recent incidents. Two US Air Force AC-130 gunships pursued an escort of trucks through the Somali fishing village of Ras Kamboni, which lies close to the Kenyan border, on January 7, 2008. They did so because they thought the guard was escorting Abu Taha al-Sudani, al-East Qaeda's Africa chief, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, one of two connected agents linked to the 1998 bombings of US foreign safe havens in Kenya and Tanzania, respectively. None of those killed in the assault were connected to al-Qaeda; all things being equal, the travelers in the escort were pastoralists moving meat. A US submarine sent off two Hatchet journey rockets into a Somali town close to the Kenyan line on Walk 3, 2008, where it was associated that components with East African al-Qaeda were shielding. The rockets arrived in regular citizen abodes, killing three ladies and youngsters and harming another 20 people. Mistakes like this inflame anti-American sentiment and serve as recruitment tools for fear mongering groups. Apart from that, the current US strategy in the Sahel and Horn of Africa is fraught with dangers, as it has forced the US military to intervene in neighboring African territorial issues. In countries such as Uganda, the US military is becoming increasingly involved in domestic challenges. For instance, in December 2008, they furnished the Ugandan armed force with hardware, knowledge, and assets to go after the Master's Obstruction Armed force. Mali, Senegal, and Ethiopia, among different spots, are teaming up on comparable tasks. Renegades will be recruited to collaborate with psychological militant organizations as a result of their engagement in neighboring hostilities. The Sahel has supplied examples of this; in 2006, Tuareg rebels demanded that the Salafist Gathering for Teaching and Battle (GSPC) migrate from Algeria to Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, which was allowed (Lyman, 2009). Due to the generally held conviction, propagated by a few political specialists, that numerous African states are either falling flat or



coming up short, the US is zeroing in on expanding the capacity of African states. Under President George W. Bush, the US connected bombed states to psychological oppression. One striking inconsistency is that the vast majority of states in the Sahel and Horn of Africa, particularly those whose security mechanical assemblages have been reinforced by the United States, have not been formally bombed. As bad as some legislative bodies in Africa's Sahel and Horn of Africa are, by and large, they aren't in the same league as those in bombed-out countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. A large number of countries exercise strong control over the use of intimidation, and others, such as Senegal, Mali, Kenya, and even Djibouti, where the United States maintains military posts, are actually managed by the United Nations. Most of occupants in these nations don't really accept that their state-run administrations are illegal. The nations whose security the US has effectively supported are among Africa's generally solid. If someone spends more than 90 days in any of the cities or towns in Djibouti, Eritrea (the country of origin), Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, or Uganda (the country of destination of the US military's limit-building activity in the Horn of Africa), they will become acutely aware of the government's meddling. Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia have all shown that they are capable of running their administrations. They ought to be viewed as having overdeveloped security components, regardless. Fortifying the security establishments of these nations may not be to their greatest advantage. The limit building practices that attention on different arms of government, the council and the legal executive, will serve their inclinations better over the long haul. In Africa, these two establishments, which are commonly where great administration is found, have generally been immature. They were not created by the pioneer state or post-frontier military systems, and they stay immature even in the fairest African nations, like Mali and Tanzania. It additionally gives the idea that US policymakers are uninformed that Westphalian autonomous countries in Africa habitually focus on metropolitan and rural spaces. Family relationship groupings and native specialists control the excess areas. In Africa, this division of work is surely known. Connection gatherings and neighborhood specialists oversee more than 60% of the populace in even the most evolved and majority rule African states, like South Africa and Botswana (Williams, 2004; Ntsebeza, 2006). A few spectators of African legislative issues habitually misjudge and misrepresent these regions' administration. These essayists habitually conflate the shortfall of a sovereign state with the shortfall

of administration, regardless of the way that administration in Africa has never been exclusively the area of states. To portray places where family groupings and native authority rule the administration scene, U.S.- based journalists have oftentimes utilized mistaken words, for example, "ungoverned zones" or "feeble states," among different terms. What they don't get a handle on is that administration in Africa takes numerous different structures and is housed in an assortment of designs, one of which is the sovereign state. It's the "newcomer" with regards to administration.

Common liberties activists have been pausing, perhaps pointlessly, for President Obama to turn the focal point of US African strategy away from counter-psychological oppression and toward basic freedoms and a majority rules system issues, as he has expressed. They've likewise been sitting tight for him to address African states' proclivity to utilize counter-psychological warfare measures to dissolve common freedoms and political privileges acquired during the third influx of democratization. Common freedoms associations have announced that administration authorities in Uganda, for instance, have been manhandling the Counter Psychological oppression Demonstration of 2002 to deny political adversaries' admittance to private radio broadcasts Basic liberties (Watch, 2009). In the event that radio broadcasts broadcast interviews with resistance pioneer Kizza Besigye, they gambled on being accused of helping and abetting psychological oppression. This was not a confined example; studies have shown a large number of common freedoms infringements done by East African states for the sake of counter-psychological oppression (Kegoro, 2007). As per Kegoro, manhandles incorporate inconsistent and inappropriate captures, detainment of suspects in undisclosed areas for extensive stretches of time, disavowal of lawful portrayal, provocation, erratic inquiries and intermittent captures of suspects' relatives, extended and brutal cross-examinations without the presence of legitimate advice, dangers of torment, and permitting unfamiliar security specialists — especially Israeli and American officials — to investigate suspects (Kegoro, 2007). Container Africanists likewise trusted that President Obama would help out the African Association to upgrade the counter-psychological oppression framework that he acquired from the Association of African Solidarity (OAU) following the homicide endeavors of Hosni Mubarak in 1995. (Cilliers, 2002). They additionally expected Obama would help the AU in further developing the OAU Show on the Counteraction and Fighting of Illegal intimidation (the Algiers Show), which has a few imperfections, including an excessively wide meaning of psychological oppression. Since the show's

entrance into impact, the AU has been charming American help. The choice of African pioneers to have a remarkable pastoral gathering of the AU's Focal Organ in New York on November 11, 2001, mirrors their enthusiasm to work with the US on the issue. The meeting was held in New York in order to draw the attention of US policymakers and to inform them that the African Union is willing to collaborate with the US in the fight against psychological warfare. A high-level Intergovernmental Meeting on the Avoidance and Combating of Psychological Warfare in Africa was conducted in Algiers, Algeria, from September 11-14, 2002. The meeting drew attention to the growing number of anti-illegal intimidation organizations that are collaborating with the US. Since then, the African Union has launched a psychological warfare activity plan, a strengthened counter-illegal intimidation convention, a counter-psychological warfare research focus in Algeria, and a Harmony and Security Chamber convention with psychological oppression provisions, all of which have aided the African Union Commission and the Harmony and Security Committee in preparing to host the OAU Show on Psychological Violence. The African Union's emphasis on worldwide psychological oppression was supposed to increase the ability of a partnership between the AU and the US to combat illegal intimidation on the continent. Even though the Shrub organization was opposed to the cause, many Africanists assumed that a Popularity-based organization led by an African-American would be more likely to accept a foundation formed on ideals developed by African-Americans and West Indians in the middle of the twentieth century. Despite the fact that the Shrub organization was opposed to the cause, this was the case. Furthermore, the Obama administration has shown little interest in collaborating with the African Association to address a number of the continent's most pressing concerns. The lack of enthusiasm for forming a genuine association with the African Association (AU) — that is, one that goes beyond logical comforts and counsels — is amusing when African legislatures believe that the AU, rather than individual states, is the best institutional choice for addressing current African difficulties. The AU would be the greatest option in this situation. The African Association has also created one of the world's most effective legitimate and institutional instruments for advancing majority rule government, anti-defilement, monetary coordination, and counter-psychological oppression — all of which are goals that President Obama has stated clearly that he needs to achieve in Africa, and which the African Association has achieved.

### **Theoretical Framework of the Study**

The study investigated the relationship between the United States and Liberia, as well as the asymmetric relationship between the two countries, using critical theory as its theoretical framework. This was done in order to assess how the US offers development aid to Liberia and to establish who stands to benefit the most from the partnership. For the sake of this inquiry, however, we shall concentrate on the two outlines that are thought to be the most important. First, rather than ideas or rules, power and interests are the major determinants of a state's foreign relations policy. As a result, the word "national interest" is commonly understood to refer to the aspects that contribute to a state's security, influence, military force, and economic prowess (Rourke 2007:27). To put it another way, the donors' economic, political, military, and strategic interests drive the motivation and delivery of help, not the recipient states' needs. In contrast to the traditional position, which argues that the recipient states should determine the cause and style, this is a new perspective (Morgenthau 1954; Callaway & Matthews 2008; Rice 2008; Schuerman 2013). Second, when goals like democratic extension are opposed against the national interest – security, economics, and so on – officials in a state utilize what Clemons (2006:1) calls "realist calculations" to evaluate whether supporting an ideal increase or advances the national interest. When objectives like democratic growth are placed against national interests, this is what happens. Importantly, if there is a conflict between an ideal and the national interest, the national interest will be prioritized. When viewed through the lens of American aid, it is evident that the United States' development support to Liberia is not designed to promote the country's social and economic systems' expansion. Instead, its major goal is to serve the interests of America's ruling class, as well as the goals of the American state, which acts as a servant to the bourgeoisie. Former World Bank President Eugene Block, for example, has established links between American overseas development funding and the rise of American capitalism.

## CHAPTER III

### U.S. role in the global system

The general person, cause, or bearing underlying the United States' involvement in international events and general contact with the rest of the world is the country's geographic placement on the planet. The United States' role in the world can be defined as the establishment of a basic framework or structure that US policymakers can use in conceiving, implementing, and measuring the consequences of US strategies and efforts on major global issues. Other countries and observers can use this framework or structure to decode and comprehend US actions on the world stage. Even though depictions of the United States' traditional role in international affairs have varied greatly in detail since World War II, it has generally been portrayed in everyday terms as consisting of the following four key components: worldwide authority; protection and advancement of the liberal global request; protection and advancement of opportunity; protection and advancement of majority rule government; and prevention of the spread of communism. Congress must decide if the United States' role on the planet has shifted, and if so, what implications this transition may have on the United States as well as the rest of the world. A shift in the mix of jobs in the US could have ramifications for the country's safety, opportunity, and success. It has the potential to have a major impact on US strategy in a variety of areas, including ties with partners and other nations, safeguard programs and efforts, exchange and global money, unfamiliar aid, and shared freedoms. According to some eyewitnesses, notably pundits affiliated with the Trump Organization, the Trump Administration has drastically transformed the United States' global position. Despite the fact that other eyewitnesses, particularly those close to the Trump Organization, acknowledge that the Trump Organization has changed US international strategy in various regions in contrast to the Obama Organization's goals, they argue that the United States' role on the planet has been less changed and more consistent under the Trump Organization. One or two eyewitnesses who have noticed that the United States' role on the world has drastically changed under the Trump Organization, particularly Trump Organization pundits and those who were critical of the Obama Organization, believe that the repercussions of that transformation will be unfavorable (O'Rourke & Moodie, 2020). Those who were critical of the Obama campaign are among these people. They see the change as a massive natural blunder, an unnecessary and foolish

waste of something of enormous value to the US that it had worked so hard to create and maintain for a long time, as well as a pointless retreat from US leadership in the world and an unnecessary discarding of long-held American values. They also saw the transition as an unneeded and dumb waste of something of enormous importance to the United States that the country had spent a long time attempting to manufacture and maintain. Many observers, including those connected to the Trump Organization, believe that the United States' global posture has lately evolved. Some analysts, on the other hand, who advocated for a more limited US posture even before the Trump Organization, see the revision of the US position, or at least parts of it, as accommodating for responding to changing conditions in the US and around the world while defending US values and interests. Despite the fact that the Trump Organization lobbied for a more constrained US position, several analysts hold this perspective. For a long time, Congress' decisions on the United States' role on the globe could have an impact on plans, initiatives, and financial plans. These choices could have far-reaching ramifications for Congress's policymaking role, which in the United States' strange policymaking system is equivalent to that of the presidential branch (O'Rourke & Moodie, 2020).

Though there has been substantial variance in detail in opinions on the United States' typical role in the globe following WWII, it can be broken down into four essential components: The United Nations has four main objectives: The four pillars of this approach are global leadership, protection and promotion of the liberal international order, defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights, and resistance to the establishment of territorial hegemonies in Eurasia. These four fundamental components will be discussed in detail in the sections that follow.

The United States has been portrayed as a global authority since the end of World War II. This portrayal gives the impression that the US will be the first or most important country to recognize or outline global issues, take steps to address those issues, serve as a model for other countries to follow, sort through and carry out multilateral efforts to address global issues, and implement global policies. Observers have referred to the United States' worldwide government in a variety of ways over the years. Some of these techniques indicate varied degrees of support or dissatisfaction with this aspect of the US's engagement. "Go-to person for every freedom-loving person," "superpower," "critical power," "framework manager," "hyper power," "global cop," and "world hegemon," to mention a few concepts, are

instances of such jargon. The concept of the country's responsibility for the management of world affairs has been alluded to in a variety of ways in the context of the United States' dealings with other countries over the course of its long history. The following are some of the various strategies that have been described: the United States is pursuing an internationalist international strategy, a worldwide commitment or profound commitment strategy, an international strategy that provides global public goods, an international strategy of liberal request-building, liberal internationalism, or liberal authority, an interventionist international strategy, or an international strategy of seeking supremacy or world hegemony, an interventionist international strategy, or an international strategy of seeking supremacy or world hegemony, an interventionist international strategy, or an international strategy. These are only a few of the many different tactics that have been discussed.

A second critical component of the traditional US role on the world since WWII—one that can be seen as inextricably linked to the primary key component discussed above—has been to safeguard and advance the liberal global request that the US made in the years following WWII, with full support from its allies. Despite the fact that the meanings of the liberal global request change throughout time, the following basic elements of the liberal global request remain constant: a preference for peacefully settling disputes between nations, without the use or, on the other hand, danger of using force or pressure, and in a manner consistent with worldwide regulation; respect for worldwide regulation, worldwide standards, and general qualities, including common freedoms; and strong worldwide espionage.

The majority of the important components stated above (ostensibly everything except the last one) can be considered to frame a global request based on guidelines, with the exception of the last one. The law of the wilderness is another name for it. A could-make-correct request (also known as a situation in which everything is broken at the same time) is a global request (or a situation in which everything is broken at the same time) in which all the more powerful nations regularly impose their will on weaker nations, associations, and people, with little regard for the rules of engagement. Despite the fact that it is frequently described as a fully developed or well-planned situation, the liberal global request, like other world orders before it, is:

- limited in geographic reach and alternative paths;
- somewhat optimistic;
- not set in stone, but rather dependent on long-term development;

- at times abused by its allies; • not completely free of the could makes right way of behaving;
- opposed or opposed to the could makes right way of behaving;

As previously noted, the United States made the liberal global request in the years following World War II, and it received complete support from its allies at the time. Around that time, the United States was the only country capable of and willing to make another global request. The willingness of the United States to lay out and assume a major role in maintaining liberal global control is often interpreted as a desire to avoid a repeat of the destructive major conflicts and widespread monetary disruption and hardship that characterized the first half of this century, which included the Second World War, the early twentieth-century Economic Crisis, the rise of socialism, and the fall of the Soviet Union. The United States' willingness to embark on and play a significant role in the preservation of liberal world governance is frequently viewed as a manifestation of public personal circumstance, expressing a belief among US politicians that doing so would firmly serve the country's security, political, and economic interests in the long run. Allies of the liberal worldwide request generally argue that the United States receives significant security, political, and monetary benefits in exchange for bearing the costs of putting forth and supporting the liberal worldwide request, including the maintenance of a positive overall influence on both a global and provincial level, and a leading or preeminent role in establishing and operating international institutions and rules for global money and exchange. In any event, the costs and advantages of defending and extending the United States' liberal international request are up to interpretation.

A third key aspect of the country's traditional position on the world is the rejection and opposition of tyrannical and narrow-minded forms of governance whenever possible since World War II, in addition to the protection and promotion of opportunity, democracy, and common liberties as general values. This aspect of the United States' job, according to some observers, is consistent not only with fundamental American political characteristics, but also with a hypothesis advanced by some observers (sometimes referred to as the vote-based harmony hypothesis), according to which majority rule nations are more receptive to their populations' longings and thus less likely to take up arms of animosity or engage in combat against one another. Protecting and promoting opportunity, a vote-based system, and common liberties is also considered an important part of US delicate power because it can



empower similar legislatures, as well as associations and people in different countries, to collaborate with the US, and because it can potentially influence the way tyrant and close-minded states that are acting against US interests behave by disgracing those states and rousing prodemocracy associations.

Since World War II, a fourth component of the United States' historic role in the world has been to combat the establishment of provincial hegemons in Eurasia. This aspect of the United States' traditional role in the globe is rarely discussed openly or publicly by US officials. Given the quantity of people, assets, and financial activity in Eurasia, a territorial hegemon would confront a centralization of force substantial enough to jeopardize vital US interests; and that Eurasia is not a stable region of the world. It's also called "preventing the rise of local hegemons in Eurasia," "preventing the unification of key regions of the continent," "preventing the unification of key regions of Eurasia," and "preventing the rise of a world power structure," all of which refer to the possibility that the development of at least one provincial power in Eurasia will lead to the formation of a global power structure. "Preventing the union of important sections of the continent" is another way of stating it. Note: this is for it. The following are some examples of US activities that can be seen as signs of the US desire to prevent regional hegemony in Europe:

United States partnerships with nations in East Asia and the Pacific, which were established primarily to dissuade and counter Soviet Union (now Russia) efforts to establish a territorial hegemon in Europe; United States collusions and security organizations, such as NATO, which were established primarily to dissuade and counter Soviet Union (now Russia) efforts to establish a territorial hegemon in Europe; and so on. In order to achieve its goal of avoiding the formation of territorial hegemons in Eurasia, the US has decided to interact with or provide aid to nondemocratic systems. For a number of reasons, these nondemocratic systems regard Russia, China, and Iran as competitors or adversaries. The goal of preventing territorial dominance in Asia, as well as the goals of preserving and expanding opportunity, majority rule government, and fundamental freedoms throughout the region, have all been thrown into doubt as a result of this.

### **U.S. –Policy towards Africa since the Cold War**

During the Cold War, US international strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa was generally irrelevant to the mainland. African nations, as other creating districts,

were above all else pawns in the fantastic worldwide chess game. While both conservative and Popularity-based organizations supported American clients, their assistance for Soviet clients was more limited. Anti-communist rebel organizations in Angola, such as Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (Unio Nacional para an Independência Complete de Angola), as well as key allies such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, received funding and military help (Magyar, 1994). From the late 1950s through the late 1980s, the United States' commitment to the continent's mainland was driven by the Chilly Conflict rationale, and it remained fairly limited throughout that time. From the late 1950s through the late 1980s, this hegemony reigned supreme. During that time, the United States' contribution to the continent's mainland was very limited. As soon as it became clear that the Cold War was coming to an end, Africans began to speculate about the future of US-Africa relations. They were interested to see how the two continents might connect in the future. Visionaries guessed that the US would now be allowed to seek after strategies that would resolve Africa's own issues, most of which could be connected with financial disappointment, tyrant rule, as well as progressing clashes, while pragmatists expected that Africa would be additionally sidelined. Truth be told, US Africa strategy all in all went through two particular momentary periods prior to landing some place in the center. The main momentary stage mirrored the energy of the quick post-Cold Conflict time, when "Another World Request" looked likely, incorporating valuable US commitment with a landmass where it saw not many significant public interests. During this time, both the George H.W. Shrub and Bill Clinton organizations utilized positive, proactive commitment approaches. In terms of negotiating an agreement, the United States, Russia, Portugal, Cuba, and South Africa began cooperating in 1988 to mediate a peaceful conclusion to the Angolan national struggle. Despite the fact that each of these countries has recently contributed to the conflict's prolongation through their unique activities, this was done. The United States of America, the United Kingdom, and France all shown in 1990 that democratization was critical to Africa's reorientation toward a more wealthy future. During the next two years, the US followed its word by removing financial support from long-time Cold War allies who were opposed to political reform (such as Zaire, Liberia, and Sudan) and shifting it to countries that were actively involved in democratic projects (South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique). The most obvious indication of this joyful period was the intervention in Somalia in 1992-1993, which was conducted in a humanitarian manner. On

December 3, 1992, the Security Chamber of the Assembled Countries declared the situation in Somalia to be "horrendous," and military forces were dispatched to ensure the distribution of humanitarian aid in a land beset by unavoidable starvation and ongoing violence. This was done to prevent the country from completely breaking down in terms of peace and lawfulness. This decision was nearly ideal for the Assembled Countries, particularly the United States, which had begun to lobby for affiliation prior to the election. Indeed, it has been more than a century since cruisers from England, France, and the United States were dispatched to the west bank of Africa in search of slave ships. The occasions in Somalia support the thought that compassionate inclusion in unambiguous circumstances is expected by the practices and standards to which the US is committed. This mentality, which was normal in December 1992 as US Marines showed up on Mogadishu's shores, evaporated after the October 1993 battling that killed 18 US Officers. With the clearing from Somalia in mid-1994, the second momentary period in post-Cold Conflict US strategy toward Africa started. The "Somalia Disorder" set off a period of withdrawal. With the Somalia calamity new to him, the Rwandan outrage actually unfurling, Clinton delivered Official Choice Order 25 (PDD 25), which endeavored to diminish future Joined Countries missions, especially U.S. investment. It expressed seven reasons that American authorities would assess prior to tolerating Joined Countries tasks completed by non-Americans, as well as six extra factors that would be checked on assuming American warriors were to lock-in. The world is slipping further and further away from the positive post-Cold War vision that Shrub alluded to as the "New World Request" and Clinton referred to as "Decisive Multilateralism" at a time in human history that has never occurred before. When deciding whether or not to condemn a United Nations mission for excluding the United States, the first two factors to consider are whether the move will advance US interests and whether or not there is a clear threat to international peace and security. The unengaged helpful time has reached a conclusion. The annihilation in Rwanda, which was at that point in progress when PDD was chosen, would be the principal trial of the new strategy. On May 3, the film was delivered. It was apparent that the US wouldn't take an interest, and US authorities did all that they could to guarantee that the Unified Countries wouldn't send off a response that could accordingly drag the US into the contention. General Romeo Dallaire, the officer of UN powers in Rwanda, has mentioned that the circumstance be checked.

At the time of the execution of the Abuja Accords, which ended the fighting between the government and the Rwandan Loyalist Front, requests for fortifications to avert a massacre were vehemently turned down. All UN authority had been evacuated by the time the slaughter began. Given the majority of the grounds mentioned in PDD 25, it seemed likely that association in Rwanda would be difficult; nonetheless, the Geneva Shows' readiness to strive against the country's devastation remained an open question. Therefore, Clinton organization authorities tried not to utilize "slaughter" and would not allude to the Rwandan decimation thusly until it had followed through to its logical end, killing 800,000 individuals all the while. Eventually, the worldwide local area's just reaction was a late U.N. endorsed intercession by France. PDD 25 additionally asked on sub regional bodies to take on additional peacekeeping obligations. With the endorsement of the Unified Countries Security Committee, the US has additionally moved away from future commitment as a rule, and in Africa (where most of UN warriors are positioned) specifically. The US and the Unified Countries had proactively promised their help to the Monetary People group of West African States' drives. (ECOWAS) to determine the Liberian emergency, despite their refusal to straightforwardly take part. Somewhere in the range of 1991 and 1996, when a harmony bargain was eventually carried out, US direct help to the ECOWAS Checking Gathering's (ECOMOG) peacekeeping exertion arrived at the midpoint of a sad \$15 million every year. (As a place of point of view, Nigeria spent around \$1 billion on the activity, which represented the incredible greater part of the expenses.) When ECOMOG was attempting to lay out power over the battle circumstance in the early long periods of the mission (1991-93), the US was the main country. just huge contributor from outside. In spite of the various impediments experienced all through the activity, it could be deciphered as confirmation that the African landmass can resolve its own concerns without depending on external help. Truth be told, struggle elements that could represent a worry sooner rather than later. Liberia's open country was boiling with a large amount of the West African sub region's security, while ECOMOG remained primarily isolated in the city, Monrovia. Because of worries about the African continent's fragility and the potential of being drawn into conflicts in which it had no interest, the United States' support for democratization was limited during this time period. The genocide in Rwanda had deep roots, but external pressure to democratize the country was one of the elements that contributed to how quickly it occurred. During the 1990s, political development in several nations, most notably the

Central African Republic, was linked to the advent of instability. An uprising in Congo-Brazzaville, Lesotho, and, most frighteningly, Rwanda's neighbor Burundi brought the country to the brink of civil war, if not open massacre, in October 1993, barely four months after its most extraordinary and justly elected President was assassinated in an uprising. When the vote-based system was successfully ousted in July 1996, reinstating previous President Significant Pierre Buyoya to the presidency, the United States and other major powers backed Buyoya's new government, believing that Buyoya would be able to address the security situation. Various African political and military leaders discovered a way to "assenting" to US requests for races without risking their ability to preserve authority. According to the United Nations, Africa's modular system operated as a "constituent dictatorship" during the 1990s. Presidents of African countries, dubbed "another generation of African pioneers" by the US, were striving to rebuild state organizations that had grown dysfunctional while condemning the multiparty system based on majority rule as irrelevant to their situations in the US. This In the event that the new age of African pioneers hadn't waged war with each other soon after, the arrangement of leaning toward dependability over progression might have fared better. Since the last part of the 1980s, US help to Africa has been dropping, inferable from the powerful annulment of Safety Help and Financial Help Assets for previous Virus War partners. In The US unfamiliar help programs were rebuilt and radically decreased by Congress in 1995. Many scrutinized the rationale of supporting Africa in the post-Cold Conflict period, calling attention to those thirty years of help had created minimal concerning flourishing and democratization, or as far as propelling US interests. Allies of help to Africa in Congress activated against the drive, forestalling enormous, unexpected cuts. Help fell somewhat in 1996, as it had in earlier years.

The commencement of the third phase of post-Cold War ties between the United States and Africa began with President Clinton's embrace of the African Answers for African Issues method of speaking during the first year of his second term in office. This was far from a genuine re-commitment, and some referred to it as a "virtual commitment," but it proved that the US could not bear the possibility of leaving Africa entirely. Following the lessons learned in Somalia, Rwanda, and Liberia, it became evident that the US could not just intervene, do nothing, and allow African countries to solve their insecurity problems on their own. As a result, a mission for alternatives was established with the goals of establishing an agreement or keeping

peace, bringing about political reform, and stimulating economic growth by combining US monetary assets with African human resources.

### **Military Policy**

The examination investigated the variables that impact the militarization of US-Africa ties, as well as its ramifications for African security and change. The analyst means to give light on the philosophical, monetary, and social components that shape the plan and execution of US strategy toward Africa's militarization. It takes a gander at how the ongoing worldwide setting - worldwide industrialist emergency, nonstop conflict arranging, and struggle with China - impacts the reasoning of a section of the US international strategy foundation that upholds the militarization of US-Africa relations by means of AFRICOM. In 1962, Nelson Mandela was caught at a designated spot in South Africa. The fingering of Mandela, who was then dressed as a 'escort,' was organized by agents of the US (US) security offices in politically-sanctioned racial segregation South Africa (BBC 2016). The US security mechanical assembly's coordinated effort with the bigoted politically sanctioned racial segregation framework during the overall battle against politically sanctioned racial segregation features the logical inconsistencies in the US-Africa relationship's security theory and aspirations. From hostile to frontier battles to flow fights against neoliberal starkness and the alleged "Worldwide Conflict on Fear" in Africa, the US idea of safety in Africa is affected by the monetary oligarchs and corporate tycoons' inclinations (Johnson and Kwak 2011), upheld by the international strategy foundation and an examination framework incorporated into the US Military Planners Affiliation (USMSA). Africa, then again, focuses on recreation and working on individuals' personal satisfaction over security. The African Association's vision proclamation is "a coordinated, prosperous, and peaceful Africa, powered by its own population and addressed to a powerful power in the world arena." (AU Vision Proclamation) (AU 2016). African pioneers had a desire to make harmony a reality for all of our kin, to rid the continent of wars, national conflicts, abuses of basic liberties, compassionate emergencies, and violent fights, as well as to prevent slaughterhouses from being erected. We vow not to trouble people in the future of Africans with the weight of battling, and we vow to shut down all conflicts by 2020. We vow not to give the weight of contention to people in the future of Africans, and we focus on finishing all conflicts by 2020.' Security has been seen through the crystal of whiteness, benefit boost, and the safeguarding of

worldwide financial authority through interminable fighting, strength of US finance elements, and huge interest in information the executives since the advancement and development of explicit states of private enterprise in the US. With the decay of post-The Second Great War global foundations, for example, the Bretton Woods associations, this speculation and projection of power extended. The key elements driving the strength of Money Road monetary nobles, as well as privatization belief systems that advance abundance focus and centralization in the top 1% of US society and the unlawful overall economy that supports US administering parts, are perceived. The Clinton Organization advocated the development of an African Emergency Reaction Power in 1996 in response to the high possibility that Burundi would follow Rwanda's path and become a victim of genocide (ACRF). The goal of the proposal to construct a standing army in Africa was to create a permanent army of about 5,000 African soldiers, trained and prepared by Western nations and ready for rapid deployment for Organization of African Unity-sanctioned peacekeeping missions (OAU). At the point when it was first declared in October 1996, the arrangement was met with incredulity from nearly everybody. The proposition seemed, by all accounts, to be both an obligation relinquishment and a neo-magnificent inclination simultaneously. England and France, which both had continuous military preparation programs with various African nations, were reluctant to take cues from America, particularly in an area where they had a great deal of association and the US had very little. The Clinton Organization had trusted that local abilities South Africa and Nigeria would play a main job in ACRF, however they made clearly, they were not intrigued. Before the year's over, ACRF had gone through a significant redesign, bringing about the development of the African Emergency Reaction Drive (ACRI). The idea of a super durable quick organization force was deserted, and ACRI developed into a two-sided preparing program pointed toward working on public powers' capacity to partake in peacekeeping missions. South Africa and Nigeria still had lingering doubts, yet different nations, similar to Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda, chose to take the preparation and gear. ACRI gives peacekeeping preparation and hardware, as opposed to peacemaking. The US was properly uncertain about being seen as adding to struggle, regardless of whether just accidentally. In any case, this wary methodology neglected to mollify pundits who rushed to highlight occurrences where ACRI-if gear was utilized against interior and outside adversaries, leaving ACRI helpless against the more crucial analysis that preparation for peacekeeping in an area where peacemaking

mediations are quite often required seriously restricted ACRI's pertinence. Others have expressed that African powers need subsidizing and planned operations as opposed to preparing, delivering any preparation program inadequate. ACRI was renamed the African Possibility Activities Preparing and Assistance (ACOTA) program during the Clinton-Washington transition. Its main objectives are to "train the trainer," deliver programs suited to the needs of the beneficiary country and prepare for both harmonic authorization and peacekeeping missions. Between 1997 and 2005, the US contributed \$121 million to help 10,000 soldiers from nine different countries prepare for overseas military service (Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal). ACOTA became a component of the G-8's fully funded Global Harmony Activities Drive by joining the Bramble organization's global five-year Worldwide Harmony Activities Drive (GPOI). The GPOI wants to train 75,000 peacekeepers, especially in Africa, as well as provide a global transportation and strategy network for troops that is emotionally supportive. As a result, ACRI's most important issues were addressed, US-European collaboration was reinforced, and South Africa and Nigeria chose to participate in the GPOI planning process. Peacekeepers who have recently been trained are being moved while a unit has been abandoned on the side of the road. The ongoing mission is to ensure a consistent progression of abilities to help the Joined Countries, as well as, to a lesser extent, regional provincial peacekeeping missions. GPOI dramatically increased the quantity of peacekeepers prepared in its most memorable year (FY2005). In FY05, the US contributed \$96.7 million to GPOI, with almost 66% of that going to Africa. The State Office and Congress, then again, are as yet discussing the most essential inquiry: "Are worldwide preparation endeavors under GPOI and forerunner programs making the ideal difference?" Between the finish of 2000 and the finish of 2004, African nations dramatically increased their tactical commitments to UN peacekeeping, with five of the main 10 givers having gotten preparing under ACRI/ACOTA. Considering that portion of the benefactors didn't get preparing, and there is no verification that the people who did are outflanking the individuals who didn't, or even that the people who got preparing were the ones conveyed, this isn't extremely indisputable proof. Recent agreements between the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Sudan and Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia suggest that these organizations are capable of making a significant commitment to peacekeeping, even if they can only do so as junior partners in global alliances for the time being, provided



they receive sufficient financial and calculated assistance from the outside. ECOWAS was willing and ready to send quick and effectively in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia (gave sufficient monetary and calculated help was ensured by France and the US, individually), however required support soon. The African Association's efforts in Sudan, which included a portion of the world's most skilled military forces, had more difficulty getting them to Darfur on time; yet, once there, they performed excellently under the limits imposed by a weak command. Despite this, due to the rapid depletion of AU resources, it became obvious very quickly that the UN would be tasked with carrying out this role as well. The UN had been unable to secure the Sudanese government's approval for a section VI intercession or the Assembled Countries Security Chamber's approval for a section VII mediation as of the end of 2006, leaving the African Association force scrambling to hold on as savagery spreads into neighboring countries. The Shrub organization, which leads the UN operation in Liberia, is openly promoting a Part VII intervention in Darfur to stem the region's "decimation," as it sees it. The method shows evidence of recovery from the Somalia Disorder in all of these situations, but it also demonstrates the condition's persistent impact on the people in the middle of 2003, as rebel troops drew closer to Monrovia, Liberia's capital, the United States came under growing pressure to intervene. The stability of neighboring countries such as Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire has been jeopardized as a result of the increase in violence in Liberia. During this time period, former European powers including as England and France participated in UN peacekeeping activities in both countries. Finally, as long as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) served as an underlying counter-balancing power, the Shrub organization agreed to recognize a cease-fire if and when President Charles Taylor surrendered and fled the country. Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo decided to send 1,500 Nigerian soldiers to Liberia as part of the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia as a direct result of the Saharan Organization's leadership (ECOMIL). This decision was made contingent on the United States providing financial and strategic help. The United Nations General Assembly officially acknowledged Liberia as a world power on August 1 when the two prerequisites were met. On August 11, as Charles Taylor was departing Monrovia for exile in Nigeria, a convoy of US warships stationed off Liberia's coast approached close enough to be visible from the capital city. A total of 5,000 soldiers and three boats made up Joint Team Liberia. Only 200 Marines were sent to the shore, and their mission was to aid the ECOMIL force for ten

days (August 14 to 24). The Assembled Countries Security Chamber laid the groundwork for what would subsequently be known as the United Nations Mission in Liberia on September 19. (UNMIL). On October 1, ECOMIL's power was formally handed to UNMIL, and 3500 ECOMIL forces were "re-hatted" as the first component of a 15-thousand-strong force. This was a mindful re-visitation of African peacekeeping for the US military, however one that prevailed with regards to getting a drawn-out truce, which prompted globally observed races in October 2005 and an Assembled Countries post-struggle recovery program, with the US as the lead country. Somewhere in the range of FY2004 and FY2006, the US government designated \$1.15 billion for Liberia's remaking endeavors. It's memorable crucial that the US has an "exceptional" association with Liberia and would be incredibly far-fetched to commit such assets to some other country. Besides, the steadiness and harmony in Liberia are nowhere near certain, and a disappointment here would be the second negative mark against US inclusion in African peacekeeping. Assuming Liberia shows the execution of Somalia-related lessons, Sudan exhibits Rwanda-related examples. In April 2003, two banded together revolutionary groups went after an army base in Darfur, lighting the contention. Neighborhood "Bedouin" Janjaweed paramilitary soldiers were deliberately driving "African" ranchers from their property in no time, killing, rapping, and burning towns simultaneously. Thousands (moderately) passed on and millions were uprooted in under a year. The Institution for the Investigation of Slaughter filed a notice of action in February 2004, and the Advisory Group on the Soul of the United States Holocaust Commemoration Exhibition Hall issued a similar notification in June. Simultaneous Goals, passed by the United States Congress on July 22, declared the Darfur genocide to be over by 2015. Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed that the circumstances in Darfur were problematic in an interview with CNN, but he added that he would visit to Sudan to assess the situation himself. He testified before the Senate Committee on Unfamiliar Relations after returning to the United States in September, admitting that harm was being done in Sudan at the time. As a signatory to the Geneva Convention, Powell went on to warn that the US would demand that the UN conduct a full investigation into the incident. The United States gave conciliation aid to the African Union's efforts to work toward an organized settlement of the conflict, which began in the middle of 2004. The United States also gave discretionary and monetary aid (to the tune of \$150 million in its first two years) to the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was delivered in August 2004. The US has recently escalated its

pressure on the Assembled Countries to deploy "a dependent." As a result, the US has mostly stayed out of Rwanda's analysis while failing to take any significant steps in compliance with the Geneva Show. The power of China and Russia to oppose additional UN Security Council participation has bolstered this stance.

### **The Weakness of the US Military and Security in Africa**

I started by referencing the way that the US knew about Nelson Mandela's confinement and the continuation of the politically sanctioned racial segregation framework. Given the mix of the essential organs of the US Military Tacticians Affiliation (USMSA) and the apparatuses of politically sanctioned racial segregation government, US military authorities were strategically and mentally on the safeguard when formal politically sanctioned racial segregation finished. All through the decolonization cycle, the US government and military have supported pioneer powers. The US support for uncertainty and killings in Africa is being uncovered, from coordinated effort with the English to keep up with the Indian Sea as a base for US militarism, to the development in the Bay of Guinea to help US oil majors while concealing the homicide of Patrice Lumumba (Talbot 2015), the setting up of Mobutu Sese Seko, the defeat of Kwame Nkrumah, support for Jonas Savimbi, and the destabilization of Southern Africa in Following the massacre in Rwanda in 1994, US specialists established the ACRI with the expressed reason for advancing compassion and finishing destruction. Amidst Africa's fastest annihilation, a similar organization had convinced the UN Security Gathering to pull out officers from Rwanda (Barnett 1997). Regardless of the US's nearby arrangement with powers of destructive financial aspects and loot, the recursive practices of military help for politically sanctioned racial segregation implied that the US held on until it embraced endeavors to trap the new system in South Africa in military relations in the initial not many years after the loss of the politically sanctioned racial segregation armed force at Cuito Cuanavale. Following the introduction of the main equitably chosen president, the US managed establishments and NGOs under USAID's Office for Progress Drives (OTI) (Campbell 2014) to assist nations with changing from tyranny to a majority rules government. US establishments, think tanks, and high-positioning authorities spent in excess of a billion bucks in South Africa to 'help a majority rule government' (Stacey and Aksartova 2001; see likewise Hearn 2000). The US proposed ACRI not long after politically sanctioned racial segregation, yet Nelson Mandela, who was one of the first

to go against the arrangement of US troops in Africa, dismissed it and chastised the US for its presumption (Adebajo 2004). For the US, his resistance to US militarism, as addressed in ACRI, was very nuanced. He had condemned US President George W. Shrubbery for his absence of premonition, wrong reasoning, and aim to dive the world into an atomic calamity during the 2003 conflict against Iraq. Mandela told an overall meeting of ladies activists that the US was one of the "world's most dreadful tragedies.... They couldn't care less" (CBS News 2003). On account of these perspectives on US military aims, African pioneers were antagonistic to US military exercises on the mainland and unmistakable it was uncommon to back for such tasks. In 2002, the US altered its African Possibility Tasks Preparing Help (ACRI) program (ACOTA). For African soldiers, ACOTA guaranteed hostile military weaponry, for example, rifles, automatic weapons, and mortars. The Africa Provincial Peacekeeping System (ARPP) was intended to prepare, train, and help peacekeeping officers from various African nations. A Container Sahel against Psychological oppression Drive (presently known as the Trans-Sahara Counter-Illegal intimidation Drive) was additionally settled. The aspiration for expanding command over African monetary business sectors, normal assets from Africa, and matchless quality over Africa's essential significance was an undeniable reality of these changes. Before around 50% of a billion bucks could be spent to undermine Africa, this US plotting in Africa uncovered tasks like ACOTA and the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Association (TSCTP) (Keenan 2009). The arrangement of AFRICOM, as well as US help for components originally named as fear mongers, made this reason further clear.

### **Economic Policy**

While the language of African Answers for African Concerns is usually associated with issues of compromise and peacekeeping, it also highlights the importance of the US political and monetary institutions in Africa at the time. It ought not to be deciphered to show that Africans ought to be allowed to pick among practical solutions to their issues, yet rather that Africans ought to bear a more noteworthy portion of the obligation regarding setting up arrangements that American chiefs think about general. The Department for Africa of the US Organization for Worldwide Improvement is a genuine illustration of this. Proclamation of Plan: to help effective African-drove improvement, the African Department will set the bar high. Our goal is to ease neediness and work on the personal satisfaction in the district so Africans and

the mainland, all in all, can understand their maximum capacity. We will do it by drawing on American standards like majority rule government and social and financial freedom. Political constraints imposed in the mid-1990s still limit financial support, with calm exceptions made for select companions in tough circumstances (most notably Rwanda, which received a wink and a gesture in light of 2003 choices that made a mockery of vote-based practice. Somewhat recently, the US has moved to move more prominent obligations regarding a political change to Africans, like how it has done in battle and peacekeeping. Proof from the mid-1990s proposed that the restriction stick could be generally viable in empowering the reception of majority rule methods, however not such a huge amount in working with the development of a considerable vote-based system in a locale where social, financial, and institutional help for a vote based system is frail to nonexistent. Therefore, the U.S. vote-based system help programs have put a more prominent accentuation on supporting common society to engage nearby majority rules system backers to expectation better administration and further developed responsibility for their own benefit. President Clinton marked the African Development and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 1997, and President Shrub laid out the thousand years Challenge Record (MCA) in 2003, which has turned into the central place of African political and financial methodologies. MCA gives financial help to down and out majority rules systems anyplace on the planet, while AGOA gives special admittance to the US market for vote-based legislatures in Africa. Under AGOA, nations are assigned as AGOA qualified on the off chance that they have laid out or "are gaining ground toward laying out" market-based economies, law, and order and political pluralism, the disposal of exchange and venture hindrances, licensed innovation security, hostile to defilement endeavors, neediness decrease strategies, expanded admittance to medical services and instructive open doors, assurance of human and laborer privileges, and the end of exchange and speculation boundaries. Most African nations, including probably the most serious breaks of the standards on the qualification list, were assigned as AGOA qualified by the two Presidents Shrub and Clinton. Guinea, for instance, is qualified for AGOA in 2006 regardless of being arranged as "not free" by Opportunity House and having Straightforwardness' worldwide debasement files rank it as the worst country in Africa. Perceiving the political tensions that accompany official accreditation of qualification, the MCA puts forth a more purposeful attempt to guide assets to majority rule systems by deciding qualifications involving 16 quantitative markers that action

similar qualities as the AGOA qualification list. Subsequently, 37 African nations were equipped for AGOA in 2006, while just 11 were qualified for MCA. AGOA and MCA pass on a ton to be wanted as monetary strategy instruments, and subsequently as political arrangement instruments. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the "exchange not help" mentality was widespread, and AGOA is the institutional essence of it. In this view, American and African pioneers, including Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, felt that expanded access to the American market would help Africa's financial development and advancement more effectively than years of unfamiliar support. The AGOA expectations, on the other hand, included a bevy of safeguards for American manufacturers who might be adversely affected by African competition, even if only somewhat. Albeit the US Exchange Delegate's office has reliably promoted AGOA's prosperity since its initiation in 2000, the truth offers nearly nothing, if any, cause for satisfaction. Under AGOA, oil sends out has generally made up most of the African commodities to the US. While the US has a reasonable premium in extending its piece of the pie in African oil sends out, the oil area is probably not going to drive more expansive put-together financial development and improvement with respect to the landmass. Following that, the flow of material goods from Africa to the US under the AGOA has stood out, owing to the fact that materials were a large niche market for Asian countries throughout their early phases of monetary development. However, when the Multi-Fiber Understanding's material shares expired in early 2005, Chinese products entered the American market, causing African imports to fall. According to the World Bank, African AGOA shipments to the US accounted for 92 percent of all AGOA exports to the US in 2005, with other non-oil exports dropping dramatically between 2004 and 2005. The Thousand Years Challenge Record is the institutional epitome of the move-in "the Washington agreement" away from underlying change and toward neediness mitigation and beneficiary country "proprietorship," in addition to being a reaction to the incapability of conventional unfamiliar guide projects. The MCA was exceptionally embraced in principle, yet it required a long investment to begin truly committing funds, and therefore, it is at present financed far beneath its expressed objectives. Qualified nations are urged to assume responsibility for their improvement plans, recognize issues, and propose arrangements that the US will think about subsidizing. MCA money was available to 25 countries, 11 of which were African, as of the end of 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund, and MCA has signed Compacts with nine countries, four of which were African, as well

as the European Union (Madagascar, Cape Verde, Benin, and Ghana). Prior levels of support had been set, and the activities that were funded were in compliance with the new Washington Agreement on Human Rights. In general, non-crisis monetary assistance from the United States to Africa remains deplorable – according to Sachs' calculations, 18 focuses per capita were allocated in 2003.

### **US development aid to Africa**

Africa is a big continent with many human and natural resources that the rest of the world has long coveted. As resource surveys are conducted by both new independent nations and private speculators seeking concession privileges for future development, the amount of the country's natural resources is progressively being understood. The modern world is interested in more than just Africa's natural resources; Africa currently has the most national votes in the United Nations. For their own purposes, outside nations once explored means to conquer, loot, or dominate Africa. These countries are now attempting to enlist the assistance and goodwill of the African independent national elites who administer these regions. The powers include the former USSR now Russia, China, and the U.S., in addition to those conventional European colonial powers. Israel, the United Arab Republic, and Nationalist China are among the smaller nations with specific interests that have stakes in Africa. Aid to Africa reflects these priorities. Various religious and ideological organizations with an interest in Africa are also interested in expanding their component memberships and alleviating what are perceived to be clear human needs. Even during the age of pillage and colonial settlement, there were those who tried to address human needs and fight what they saw as human injustices. Without understanding the contributions of Christian missionaries, slave abolitionists, and others who worked not only to free Africans from the horrors of slavery, but also to free them from empire, the history of Africa would be incomplete. Despite the fact that humanitarians frequently had to ally themselves with native peoples against otherwise uncontrolled foreign economic and political interests, enlightened businesspeople and government officials understood that it was in their best interests to allow and even promote them. The foundation of Liberia was the catalyst for the United States' first aid to Africa. Aid began shortly after the American Revolution and was prompted by persons who desired to solve a racial problem by reuniting liberated Negro slaves with their families in Africa.

Christian missionaries were among the first to provide economic aid to Africa from the United States.

Others have taken an interest in Africa in recent years, following in the footsteps of early missionary explorer Dr. David Livingstone. During the last century, several Christian religions sent doctors, nurses, engineers, and other technically qualified individuals, as well as hundreds of teachers, to help people in practically every country in Africa. <sup>1</sup> Almost every African leader today, particularly those living south of the Sahara, obtained his early education at a Christian mission school or from teachers who themselves were mission school graduates. Christian missionaries established the majority of Africa's health clinics and hospitals. Governments, businesses, and other organizations have just recently taken the effort to give these services to the African people. In 1963, there were 6,827 American mission service people in Africa, with a total cost of approximately \$31 million, according to one fragmentary source. Hospitals, schools, agricultural enterprises, community development programs, and other institutions provided services. The US government's serious involvement in African foreign aid is relatively new. It was not thought suitable for the United States to interfere in Africa's development difficulties as long as most of Africa was governed by European colonial interests. Economic aid from the United States was limited in the few areas that were open, such as Egypt, Liberia, and Ethiopia. The United States did not take a real interest in African economic assistance until after the rapid rise of independent African nations over the last 10 years. Economic aid gradually increased from a minimal amount in 1956 to a peak of almost \$300 million in 1962. <sup>3</sup> However, since 1962, there have been cuts - not because of a decrease in need in Africa, but because of a general reduction in public interest in international economic aid in the U.S.

The United States one of its main office the State Department has identified three primary objectives for American strategy in Africa:

1. To assist Africa in developing stable and independent states capable of making their own unique contributions to the global community.
2. To assist African governments in their efforts to realize the genuine aspirations of their citizens for a better way of life.
3. To assist the peoples of Africa in the development of free societies and institutions that are compatible with their own religious and cultural values.



The assistance provided by the United States to Africa can be considered to include not only direct grants and loans from the United States government, but also participation in United Nations programs, the World Bank, programs of Christian missions and other religious groups, foundations, and other international organizations. However, while these other forms of economic assistance to Africa have been significant, the primary focus of this study on United States aid to Africa will be on United States government assistance, which will include grants and loans from the most vibrant Agency for International Development and its predecessor agencies, the "Food for Peace" program, the Export-Import Bank of the leader of the free world, America, the military assistance program, the Peace Corps, and other programs.

### **Future Directions**

The main test to U.S. strategy in Africa before very long might be China. In most key talks involving China and Africa, the oil competition is the most frequently brought up topic." China used to be East Asia's major oil exporter a few decades ago. It is noteworthy because it is currently the world's second largest shipper, accounting for 31% of total global oil interest development in the calendar year preceding the current one. China is aggressively seeking to expand its own portion of the whole business, comparable to how the US regards the worth of African oil to its own interests. China's financial (and, in this case, political) commitment to Africa has grown significantly since the turn of the century, extending far beyond the region's energy resources. Between 2002 and 2003, China's overall commerce with Africa climbed by a factor of two, with the trend continuing between 2003 and 2005. There was a 700 percent spike in three years during the 1990s, and the current increase of 400 percent in three years shows no indications of slowing down. China is Africa's third-largest trading partner, after the United States and France. China has eclipsed the United Kingdom as Africa's previous border power in terms of trade volume. China's direct interest in Africa, which was previously unknown to them, has grown in a similar manner, according to the World Bank, from \$50 million per year between the mid-1990s and 2002 to \$100 million between 2003 and 2004, and \$430 million in 2005. This knowledge is based on China's direct interest in Africa, which they were previously unaware of. The China-Africa Collaboration Gathering, founded by China in 2000 with the goal of bringing Chinese and African pioneers together on a regular basis in the same way that the France-Africa Summit did throughout the postcolonial

period, is a key contributor to the long-term viability of this growing financial relationship. China is focusing on building out a plan for the continent's development as "the world's largest emerging market... with equivalent verified experience." "The African Union is another important organization in Africa that promotes political uniformity and mutual confidence. At the end of the day, China keeps a strategy of severe nonintervention in the inward undertakings of its African accomplices, and looks for commonly helpful commitment, not philanthropic paternalism. In this manner Chinese commitment in Africa takes steps to lessen the influence of the U.S significantly. What's more, its Western partners, and in this way sabotage the political and monetary change plans the West has been pushing in Africa for a considerable length of time. A successful monetary commitment by China, on the other hand, could create a large new market for exchange and speculation, over which it would be willing to exert complete control. The United States' foreign policy community is concerned about the political ramifications of a financially rejuvenated Africa engaging closely with China. China's presence in Africa may soon put the long-held American assumption that "there is no there" to the test. This will force the US to make a true, interest-driven commitment to Africa unlike anything seen before in human history. Africa has long been regarded as a small participant in the United States' global interests and goals. In any case, it's probable that relations between the US and Africa are nearing a breaking point. If the US pursues a strategy of integrating Africa into the global community in its own unique way for mutual benefit, it risks reverting to the Virus War model, which sees Africa as the world's orphan and a pawn in global geopolitical confrontations. Historical evidence, especially recent historical evidence, reveals that the final option is the undeniably realistic definite course of action. Over the previous five years, the United States' exciting manner of talking about Africa's role in the combat against psychological warfare has resulted in little genuine change in the way it works with Africa. The fact that a significant portion of Africa's oil reserves are offshore, where they could potentially be accessed with little or no impact on what happens on the continent's landmasses, is one of the factors fueling interest in exploiting African oil to reduce reliance on less politically stable supplies. More importantly, the China issue is likely to be approached similarly to the Soviet challenge, with renewed efforts to cut off an effective reach as a goal in and of itself. History's currents, combined with regulatory sluggishness, will keep us on this course

indefinitely. Only strong and enthusiastic top-level government leadership will be able to turn the ship around and steer it in a new direction in the future.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **Liberia-US Relations**

Understanding the character and background of the American unfamiliar guide to Liberia's dilemma and condition requires a historical understanding of the improper and subordinate link between the two countries. The United States of America and Liberia formed a mutually beneficial partnership over a century and a half ago. The crucial role that the United States played in Liberia's independence provided the motivation for the two countries to create successful relations. When faced with a big pool of freed black slaves who couldn't find work in the mid-nineteenth century, the American government feared that such a large pool of unemployed people of color would cause major social, economic, political, and societal difficulties. This anxiety stemmed from the notion that such a vast pool of unemployed people of race would breed more unemployed people of color (Smith, et al., 1997). Similarly, after they were freed, American officials assured the emancipated blacks that they would be deported back to Africa, which was their country. Following that, the American Colonization Society (ACS), a private organization founded in 1816 by a number of prominent members of the American government, including Henry Earth (previous Speaker of The House of Delegates) and Bushrod Washington (Equity of The High Court), took control of the efforts to return the colonists to the United States (Beyan et al., 2012). The United States government gave the American Colonization Society (ACS) a hundred thousand dollars and a military escort in 1820 to help the released black captives get to Africa. After a severe outbreak of intestinal sickness in Sierra Leone killed hundreds of repatriates, the resettlement project was moved to the Grain Coast (now Liberia), where it remains to this day (Beyan et al., 1991). It's worth noting that the United States government was separated from Liberia from 1822 until 1862 when the process of returning the convicts was completed. Three key concerns impacted this decision. The United States was neither strategically positioned nor motivated by the development of a provincial government, given its location in the global division of force. According to another argument, the United States of America was not a popular choice among repatriates in 1847 when it came to establishing an independent and free state. Furthermore, the US originally refused to recognize the newly formed Liberian state as a result of this. As a result, Liberia had little political, financial, or strategic significance when the US was attempting to increase its overall degree of public

authority. However, by 1862, the US position toward Liberia had shifted: the country had received actual recognition and had built cordial connections with the US chevalier. The United States' financial interests caused the change in the arrangement: the finding of gold in Liberia catapulted the country to the top of the expanding American public interest hierarchy once the country's gold was discovered. In this vein, the US devised a number of strategies for transforming Liberia into a neocolonial state. On a monetary level, American corporations have made a variety of investments in the Liberian economy, with varying degrees of success. The Firestone Manors Organization, in addition to Harvey S. Firestone of Akron, Ohio, who founded the massive elastic manufacturing business that is now known as the Firestone Manors Organization, was the most significant financial contributor. By 1971, the overall value of US private investment in Liberia had remained unchanged from the previous level of 191 million dollars (US Division of Trade 1981). In the United States, the total amount has already reached \$278 million after nine years (US Branch of Business 1981). Liberia's total commodity exports to the United States in 1989 totaled US\$49 million, while Liberia's total imports of products and services from the United States totaled US\$44 million (US Evaluation Agency 1995). Under the general worldwide arrangement of 'inconsistent trade', Liberia's unrefined components, for example, elastic, iron mineral and gold were valued not exactly the produced merchandise from the US.

In 1864, over twenty years after Liberia declared independence from the American Colonization Society, the US and Liberia maintained secret relations. This organization was founded in the United States and moved freed slaves and African-Americans born in the US to Liberia. Until a tactical takeover in 1980, a little tip top overwhelmed by "Americo-Liberians," relatives of this pilgrim bunch, partook in a restraining infrastructure on political power. A large part of the next decade was set apart by monetary inadequacy, defilement, and ethnic restraint under President Samuel Doe. Charles Taylor, a previous Liberian community worker who had escaped to the US after a run in with Doe, arranged a resistance in adjoining Côte d'Ivoire in 1989. The nation was immediately drenched in factionalism. During Liberia's most memorable nationwide conflict, many thousands kicked the bucket and "essentially all" Liberians left their homes. After a progression of fizzled truces, the conflict reached a determination in 1997 with a nonaggression treaty and general decisions, which Taylor handily won. An attack by Liberian agitators situated in adjoining

Guinea in 1999 swelled into a second countrywide clash, setting Taylor's military in opposition to two guerilla associations. Long periods of battling, a revolutionary attack on Monrovia, and rising worldwide tension — including UN sanctions and a public interest for Taylor's abdication from President George W. Shrub — constrained Taylor to stop in 2003. An international agreement was marked a couple of days after the fact, formally finishing the contention and laying the foundation for a temporary government. In September 2003, the Assembled Countries Security Board shaped the Unified Countries Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to aid the adjustment of the country. Liberia's conflicts hampered social assistance conveyance, unleashed devastation on the economy, and weakened the locale. The fact that Taylor offered material support to rebels in Sierra Leone during the civil conflict there is largely responsible for his celebrity (1991-2002). Taylor was captured in Nigeria in 2006 on the basis of a warrant issued by the Exceptional Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), a UN-mandated legal entity charged with prosecuting violations committed during the Sierra Leonean national conflict (where he had been allowed cover in the wake of venturing down in 2003). The SCSL considers Taylor guilty for crimes that transpired in Sierra Leone in 2012 as a result of his support for rebels; he is currently serving a fifty-year sentence in a UK prison. Until now, no comparative committee has been constituted to dispute atrocities committed throughout Liberia's conflicts. Due to the lack of a court, there have been calls for an atrocities court to be established in Liberia, as well as pleas from the general public and legislators.

In the early 1800s, while the US was debating the status and rights of its Black population, Congress took the first step toward establishing a colony in Liberia (then known as the Grain Coast): Congress agreed to help provide funding for freeborn Blacks and emancipated slaves to establish a colony there. This occurred when the United States debated the status and rights of its African-American people. This occurred around the same time when talks in the United States were taking place about the legal status and rights of the country's Native Americans. The idea of returning African-Americans back to their homelands in West Africa was met with a lot of skepticism. Even among African Americans, there were differing viewpoints. A couple of them couldn't escape the idea that they had no choice but to remain in the United States and continue fighting for civil rights and freedom. Others were enthralled by the promise of owning land, but many were skeptical of the American Colonization Society's (ACS) explanations for why they should go to Africa. African

Americans would have a better chance of achieving freedom if they had their own country than remaining in the United States, according to members of the ACS who identified as Quakers. Slaveholder members of the ACS agreed that transferring Blacks to Africa was a good idea, but their reason was more self-serving and bigoted. They were hell-bent on eliminating any free African Americans living in the United States who could help organize a slave insurrection.

Their journey was the start of a long chain of events that would bind Liberia and the United States of America for decades. As a result, the first Black Americans to come in Liberia did so in 1822, crossing the Atlantic Ocean and settling on the Grain Coast. Monrovia was the name given to the community in honor of previous United States President James Monroe; nevertheless, the colony was renamed Liberia after Monrovia was renamed. Over the next 40 years, 19,000 African Americans, Africans who had been rescued from slave ships, and a small number of West Indians would finally settle in Liberia.

Liberia was initially administered by ACS white agents. Under their leadership, repatriates of African American heritage from the United States strove to re-establish and perpetuate an American civilization while marrying locals. As a direct consequence of this, a significant number of their children were Liberians of mixed parental heritage; yet, they were referred to as settlers' descendants, also known as Americo-Liberians. This was also the case with a significant portion of their grandchildren. Their children and grandchildren would go on to achieve the same level of political and economic dominance as their pioneer ancestors.

In 1847, Liberia changed its government structure to that of a republic and adopted a constitution and flag that were patterned after those of the United States. During this time period, the United States' relationship with Liberia moved from one of control to one of support, reflecting the transformation in the nature of their bilateral partnership. However, settler values continued to prevail, which is not surprising given that settlers had an educational advantage as a result of their regular attendance at missionary schools in Liberia or schooling in the United States. This advantage contributed to the settlers' ability to pass on their beliefs to future generations. The first President of the United States, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, as well as the members of his cabinet, were all native-born citizens of the United States.

Liberia's agricultural sector was thriving and prosperous, but the country lacked an industrial base at a time when industrialization was critical for economic

growth. Liberia began to struggle to satisfy its financial obligations in the 1860s as a direct result of this. Liberia found itself in a situation in the 1870s when it had few options but to borrow money from governments in Europe and the United States at high interest rates. This event signaled the start of a period in Liberia's history when the country's economy and finances were completely reliant on the economies and finances of other countries. During World War I, Liberia declared war on Germany, which had previously been one of Liberia's most important commercial partners, in order to appease the United States of America. This was done to appease the United States of America. As a result of this, Monrovia was shelled by a German U-boat, and all trade with Germany came to a halt immediately. Liberia's economy has been badly harmed as a result of both of these tragedies.

The United States began commercial exploitation of one of Liberia's natural resources, rubber, in the 1920s. They accomplished it by taking advantage of the country's vulnerability. As a result of the rapidly increasing automotive industry, rubber, which is the primary component of tires, was in high demand all over the world, and the United States of America intended to compete with Britain's almost monopolized position in the market. Tires were made primarily of rubber.

As a result of this development, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, based in Ohio, has begun conversations about purchasing a rubber plantation in Liberia. The eventual result was an agreement that was clearly unfriendly to Liberia, but it was backed by the United States of America administration. Any gold, diamonds, or other minerals discovered on the site would be Firestone's property, and Liberia would accept a \$5 million loan from Firestone over 40 years to pay off all outstanding foreign debts, thus taking on additional debt. At a rate of six cents per acre, Firestone would lease one million acres for 99 years. The corporation made huge profits, which served to enrich some members of Liberia's elite and ensured that they would continue to support the venture. As a result of this potential, the United States of America saw an opportunity to promote its military interests in Liberia and became involved in the country. During World War II, the United States of America built a military airfield in Monrovia to offer refueling and maintenance services to American military aircraft engaged in battle in North Africa and Europe. President Franklin D. Roosevelt visited Liberia in 1943 as part of a tour of the region to speak with American troops while the US was embroiled in the North African conflict. Liberia saw his visit as a symbol of the strong relationship that exists between the US and Liberia, as well as a guarantee



that the US will continue to support and assist the country. After all, for a long time, the African country was seen as America's stepchild.

Because the United States was keen on supplying Liberia with financial aid, it did so. The United States considered Liberia as a possible key place to initiate operations against the spread of communism across Africa after World War II ended and the Cold War began. The US and Liberia collaborated to build a communications infrastructure in Liberia that would handle diplomatic and intelligence traffic to and from Africa, monitor regional broadcasts, and relay a Voice of America signal across the continent. This was done in conjunction with the two countries signing a mutual defense agreement. Furthermore, these towers were constructed so that a Voice of America broadcast could be disseminated across the continent. Under President John F. Kennedy's administration, the United States of America launched measures to provide economic and military assistance. The Peace Corps was one of these programs. Between 1962 and 1980, the United States provided Liberia with around \$280 million in financial aid. On a per-capita basis, this was the largest level of assistance the US has ever given to any African country.

Liberia provided the United States with land on its territory without charging a rent in exchange for this aid. Liberia sided with the United States on the majority of Cold War-related matters brought before the United Nations during the presidency of William V.S. Tubman. Liberia, for example, was a strong supporter of the United States' position on Vietnam. The United States was able to keep a strong footing in a region that was otherwise fighting to shake off colonial dominance thanks to this partnership. The United States was able to maintain a major presence in the region as a result of this alliance, even as countries like Guinea and Ghana battled for independence from France and Britain at the time.

Following Tubman's death in 1971, William R. Tolbert was elected President of Liberia. The allegedly friendly relationship that had existed between the United States and Liberia began to deteriorate during his presidency. Tolbert lobbied for the Soviet Union, China, and Cuban ambassadors to pay a visit to Liberia so that the country could get closer to gaining political independence. During the Yom Kippur War, which pitted Egypt and Syria against Israel in October 1973, he severed Liberia's ties with Israel and fought for the recognition of Palestinian national rights. Egypt and Syria were pitted against Israel in this conflict. During this battle, Egypt and Syria both launched strikes on Israel. In addition, he renegotiated a better contract with Firestone

and fought for greater political and business independence. Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States at the time, modified his plans and flew to Liberia instead of passing through on his way to Nigeria in 1978. The fact that this was the first official visit by an American president to Liberia (FDR had just gone to greet US troops) suggests that the US-Liberia connection is not as strong as Liberians had assumed.

Samuel K. Doe, a native master sergeant, commanded a squad of 17 juvenile troops in the assassination of Tolbert, as well as the execution of other Cabinet members and the imprisonment of hundreds of other government figures, in April of 1980. All that had happened in the United States' relationship with Tolbert up to this moment was rendered irrelevant by this disaster. Doe was viewed as a prospective leader of indigenous descent by the United States of America, who might bring Liberia's democratic process to all of the population and remove the political dominance of immigrants' descendants. As a result, the United States of America decided to back him up. Despite the fact that Doe came to power by bloodshed, many Liberians originally supported him in that position. [As an example, consider the following Doe quickly established himself as a major Cold War ally, allowing Liberia to contribute to the preservation of important American sites and investments, as well as the prevention of the spread of ostensibly Soviet influences. During the Cold War, both Doe and Liberia were critical to the United States' victory. During Doe's first five years in office, the United States provided Liberia with a total of \$500 million in direct and indirect support.

In exchange for the favor, Doe complied with the majority of the requests made by the US government. He gave the US permission to utilize Liberian ports to deploy a force that would be ready to respond to security challenges anywhere in the world. Before terminating the Libyan presence in Monrovia, he also reduced the number of staff working at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia. In addition, he was able to mend diplomatic relations with Israel.

Doe's government, on the other hand, became more autocratic and corrupt throughout this time, to the point where political opposition was prohibited and the press was controlled. Human rights violations were done on a regular basis. Doe was suspected of taking advantage of some of the financial aid supplied by the US. Doe was able to persuade the US government to have elections in 1985, despite the fact that it was politically embarrassing to be supporting such a regime. The US

government then accepted the plainly falsified elections, appointing Doe as Liberia's president. The US administration was eventually successful in persuading Doe to resign as Liberia's president. Chester Crocker, the United States of America's Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, testified before Congress that even though the election was tainted by anomalies, it was at least a step toward democracy. After that, he clarified his statement by claiming that, in any case, all African elections at the time were rigged. This was his second argument. The US administration's unwavering support for Doe in Liberia enraged a large number of Liberians as well as Americans living there. Despite the fact that both the House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States of America passed resolutions calling for an end to American aid, the Reagan administration continued to provide it due to Cold War concerns. Liberians had high hopes that the US government would intervene and push Doe out of power, or at the very least, force him to cease abusing ethnic groups, mismanaging monies, and persecuting political opponents. Liberians hoped that the US government would intervene and remove Doe from power. When violence on the opposition and the Gio and Mano people escalated following a failed coup attempt by Doe's exiled former second-in-command Thomas Quiwonkpa, the US hardly intervened. This is despite the fact that the US was dissatisfied with Doe's actions.

In 1989, with the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States' political interests in Liberia came to an end as well. In the same year, Charles Taylor and his rebel forces invaded Liberia from the neighboring country of Ivory Coast, which resulted in the beginning of a civil war that lasted for seven years. Even as the battle between the rebels and the Liberian army became more intense, Liberians never gave up hope that the United States would step in, remove Doe as president, and mediate a peace solution. Doe was not completely disregarded by the United States of America, but the country also did not support him. Instead, it restricted its involvement in Liberia to the removal of American people in the year 1990. This was the extent of its activities there. The United States of America made an effort to persuade the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to end wars and participate in peacekeeping operations. Eventually, in 1997, ECOWAS, in collaboration with the United Nations and Charles Taylor, was successful in forging a peace agreement that put an end to the war.

Today, the US provides some assistance to Liberia; however, this assistance is not in the form of direct aid to the Liberian government; rather, it is in the form of

humanitarian services (health care, education, and social services) provided to the Liberian people by the UN and non-governmental organizations. The goal of this help is to ease the Liberian people's suffering. For the Liberians, the long and grueling process of reconstructing their lives and their war-torn country has only just begun. The total amount of help offered by the United States, on the other hand, has declined dramatically since the 1980s. Since then, the tendency has maintained. Liberia's Peace Corps program has been halted due to the country's perilous political situation and mounting concerns about the safety of its volunteer employees.

The Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), former US Senator Paul Simon, and former President Jimmy Carter oversaw Liberia's presidential election in 1997. Charles Taylor was declared the election winner, and he went on to become the president of Liberia. There has been no letup in acts of violence or violations of human rights since Taylor took power. In reality, things have become a lot worse. The United States of America has accused Liberia's government of being to fault for the region's refugee crisis, for creating instability, and for fuelling the civil war in neighboring Sierra Leone by giving weaponry in exchange for diamonds mined in horrible conditions. These claims came to light after the US administration accused Liberia's government of contributing to the region's refugee issue. As a result, the UN has imposed an embargo on the sale of guns in Liberia, as well as a travel ban on senior Liberian officials and a ban on the export of diamonds to the country.

The United States' relationship with Liberia has changed dramatically over the last 180 years, from mother caring to self-interested assistance to increasing disengagement. The relationship has gone through three unique phases throughout this time. When it comes to the subject of whether or not the United States should have been more involved in Liberia's civil war and how much aid the US should be providing at this time, there are a few different schools of thought. Some people argue that the US had a moral obligation to intervene to stop the widespread damage that had been done in a country in which it had played such a significant role. According to this viewpoint, the US should have intervened from the start of the conflict; if they did not, they should now at the very least be providing greater aid to assist in the creation of a democratic government and the end of human rights violations. Despite their unstable connections with those countries, the United States helped considerably to the postwar reconstruction of Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Others believe that the United States' interests in Liberia are peripheral, and that the country's best interests

would be served by putting the country's fate in the hands of its own people, regardless of the cultural ties and affinities that exist between the two countries. They're referring to the disastrous mission that the US carried out in Somalia in 1993, which resulted in a disproportionately high number of US casualties. They emphasize the importance of governmental attention and financial resources in tackling the nation's economic and social concerns. The topic of what role the United States should play in Liberia's past, present, and future is becoming increasingly complex in this increasingly globalized world, in which nations, economies, and people are so intertwined.

During the decade following the end of Liberia's second civil war, the country's gross domestic product expanded at an annual rate of 7.4% on average. During this time, major donor aid aided the country's frail postwar recovery and modest economic progress. The country had a considerable increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) during President Sirleaf's presidency, with the majority of the increased capital going into the mining, palm oil, rubber, and forestry industries. The outbreak of Ebola in 2014, as well as a subsequent drop in global commodity prices, put an end to this period of affluence. Liberia's Gross Domestic Product decreased by 1.6 percent in 2016, but rebounded the following year to grow by 2.5 percent. This was primarily due to increased gold, rubber, and palm oil exports. As a result of growing consumption, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that the entire market for goods and services will contract by 1.4 percent in 2019, before rebounding to 1.4 percent growth in 2020. Both of these forecasts are predicated on the premise that economic activity will continue to slow. A decline in the value of the Liberian dollar (which fell by 26% in 2018) and a rise in inflation have harmed both local purchasing power and living standards since 2017. (which now stands at above 30 percent ). The Liberian dollar lost 26 percent of its value against other currencies in 2018. According to the World Bank, the rate of poverty among households would rise from 42% in 2018 to 44% in 2021. Rural poverty, which is expected to reach 72 percent, is more than double that of urban areas, and this trend has been going on for a long time. Between 2020 and 2023, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts a 3.0% average annual growth rate. If the population grows at a rate of 2.6 percent per year, it's unlikely that this rate will be enough to improve living circumstances. Infrastructure deficiencies, insufficient electricity availability (estimated at 17% overall and 3% in rural areas), poor service delivery, corruption, and an uncompetitive business climate are all problems that obstruct economic progress. Liberia was ranked fifth to last

internationally in the World Bank's 2018 Human Capital Index (HCI), which is a study of several key health and education criteria. The current administration has struggled to garner donor support for its ambitious sD, 2018-2023), which focuses on spending money on infrastructure and improving the delivery of social services. The export of commodities such as rubber, gold, iron ore, diamonds, and palm oil accounts for the majority of the state's earnings and foreign cash; yet, these businesses have only provided a tiny number of jobs for the local population. Arcelor Mittal and Firestone, two global firms involved in the rubber and iron mining industries, are considered to be among the most powerful players in Liberia's private sector. Despite the fact that both enterprises have had to reduce their activity in recent years as a result of low global commodity prices, they remain among Liberia's most important private sector players. For the vast majority of Liberians of working age, agriculture is and will likely continue to be their primary source of income. According to the World Bank, a lack of efficient public sector support, infrastructural gaps, high transportation costs, insufficient market knowledge, and limited access to that information have all hampered the move toward more productive agricultural activities. Despite abundant rainfall and lush land, only a small minority of Liberian households are able to produce adequate food for their own needs. As a result, the country is forced to rely on imports of essential staples like rice and cassava. Extreme poverty is a major contributor to the high frequency of food insecurity and malnutrition, particularly in rural regions. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) ranked Liberia 112th out of 117 countries in the 2019 Global Hunger Index, which is a composite assessment of undernourishment and related factors. Liberia is ranked in the bottom ten percent of the world. According to a research conducted by the Liberian government and international partners in 2018, 18 percent of Liberians suffer from moderate to severe food insecurity. This indicates that these people do not eat on a regular basis and do not eat a diet that meets their nutritional requirements. "Stunted" refers to children under the age of five who are shorter than the average for their age group. Approximately 36% of children under the age of five are affected. This could be a sign that the child's cognitive or physical growth is being hampered. A number of issues, including low global oil prices and a hostile business environment, have contributed to the fall in interest in Liberia's embryonic oil and gas sector. Several American oil corporations, including Chevron, ExxonMobil, and Anadarko Petroleum, have voluntarily abandoned their licenses to operate in offshore blocks over the last few

years. In other cases, this decision was reached as a direct result of futile exploration attempts. International investors have described Liberia's high levels of corruption as a significant hurdle to conducting business in the country, according to the US Department of State. Customs and tax systems, regulatory systems, performance standards, and government payment systems are believed to be among the "most corrupt" sections of government. This encompasses processes such as government procurement, contracting, and concession awarding.

### **The United States' Type of Assistance to Liberia**

The US government has used strategies from both the Cold War era and the post-Cold War era in its efforts to give development aid to Liberia. The method utilized during the Cold War was conditioned and driven more by the dynamics of the battle for global domination between the US and the Soviet Union than by Liberia's development imperatives. Even though Liberia's growth was the government's main priority, this was the situation. That is to say, despite its pro-development rhetoric, the US was primarily concerned with ensuring that the development assistance it provided to Liberia assisted in providing the "economic oxygen that its various client regimes required to address the country's persistent social and economic crises. If one acted in this manner, it was not hard to ensure the ongoing existence of the client regimes. As a result, the client regimes may be able to assist the US government in achieving its national goals in Liberia and elsewhere.

### **Cold War era**

During the Cold War, there were a few crucial components to the aid model that was popular. There was only one winner, and that was Liberia's government. As a result, the Liberian government received all of the development assistance that the US had to provide (government to government). Liberia's administration responded by spending the funds after speaking with the United States government. A focus on development programs rather than development projects was another aspect of this concept. To put it another way, the US government channeled its overseas development aid into specialized projects in areas like education and health care. As a result, public facilities like as schools, medical clinics, hospitals, roads, and bridges did not receive the utmost priority. To recap, the focus was not so much on aiding the Liberian government in establishing what are known as capacities in the different

development sectors as it was on assisting the Liberian government in establishing what are known as capacities in the respective development domains. In addition, the US government's development assistance program for Liberia was conditioned on a number of economic and political restrictions. If the economic conditions were met, the Liberian government would be forced to use a portion of the development aid to buy goods and services made in the United States. As a result of the US engagement, the Liberian government was obligated to fulfill this duty. The aim behind this was to help American firms realize the benefits of Liberia's development aid by assisting in the creation of economic prospects for those businesses. As a result, American businesses were able to keep existing jobs and create new ones for American employees. 'When America delivers, it first gives to itself,' writes Writer (2014:1). The second condition specified that if the Liberian government failed to make interest payments on concessional loans owed to the US government, financial aid would be withdrawn. The Brooks Amendments included this as a requirement in their law. It's vital to note that Liberia was subjected to this circumstance in 1986 as a result of growing anger among the legislative body over the Doe administration's dismal human rights record. The "scorch the ground" campaign of the Doe dictatorship, which led in the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of Liberians, was the catalyst for the coup de grace. It happened following a failed coup attempt on November 12, 1985, led by General Thomas Quiwonkpa, a former confidante of Doe's. It was, however, a failure. Quiwonkpa was previously considered a trusted confidante of Doe (Williams 2002; Human Rights Watch 2003). Following the end of the Cold War, the US administration came to the conclusion that Doe was no longer an important player in the promotion of American national interests. As a result, he was regarded replaceable by the US administration, much as other client regimes in Africa and other Third World regions had previously been. Doe attempted to ignite Liberian nationalism by launching a fundraising campaign with the goal of repaying the debt owed to the United States, frustrated by what he perceived to be American betrayal and a lack of appreciation for his invaluable services in the promotion of American national interests. Both of these perspectives irritated Doe (Noble 1989). The United States government's development assistance program to Liberia never included any political criteria, such as the fostering of democracy and the protection of human rights, among other things. As a result, the various American administrations simply constructed them to appease a wide range of interest groups, such as the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, as well as



individual American residents with Liberian interests. This is the result of the US government's choice to continue providing development aid to Liberia despite the country's poor track record in terms of human rights protection under past Liberian governments. For example, despite having possibly the worst human rights record of the country's three governments during the Cold War, the Doe administration received more development funding from the US than its predecessors, the Tubman and Tolbert administrations. Despite the fact that the Doe administration succeeded the Tubman and Tolbert administrations, this was the case. Despite the fact that the Doe administration was succeeded by the Tolbert and Tubman administrations, the situation remained unchanged. The Doe administration received a total of \$500 million in aid from the United States of America during its first ten years in office. The entire amount of money now stands at US\$500 million. This was more than the total amount of foreign aid supplied by the US to Liberia's successive regimes since 1946. It wasn't until 1988 that the US government reluctantly began to establish political limitations on the Doe regime, in response to mounting criticism from the House of Representatives. During this time, it became increasingly clear that the Cold War was coming to an end. One of the most noticeable outcomes was that the amount of money allotted to development aid fell from \$58.8 million in 1986 to \$47 million in 1987, and this drop was one of the reasons behind it. OECD, 2009.

### **The Post-Cold War epoch**

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States' role in Liberia's development shifted dramatically. The change was propelled ahead by two powerful currents. Liberia lost its strategic importance as a result of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. As a result, the US government is no longer obligated to use its development assistance program to prop up its client regimes as a means of gaining their cooperation in order to further American national interests. Various Liberian regimes were responsible for the misuse and embezzlement of development assistance funds intended for a range of development activities throughout the Cold War. The most well-known of these regimes was the Doe dictatorship (United States General Accounting Office 1987). Several members of the US Congress, as well as other members of the US political class, have expressed their displeasure with the Liberian government's corruption in the disbursement of cash granted by the US for development assistance. Another

important aspect contributing to the movement's acceleration was the supremacy of neoliberalism as the ideological foundation of American development assistance policy. The program aims to reduce the influence of the recipient government in the distribution of development aid as part of a larger endeavor to "roll back the state" and establish the suzerainty of "market forces." This will be accomplished through lessening the recipient government's influence. This supports the idea that the government receiving the help should play as little a role as possible. In other words, while the Liberian government remained the primary recipient of American help, the US decided to provide some of the aid to non-governmental organizations such as civil society groups. Despite the fact that the Liberian government remained the primary focus of American aid to the country, this choice was taken. Despite the fact that the Liberian government remained the primary focus of the American aid program, this was accomplished successfully. Despite this, it is expected that these non-state actors will act as "foot soldiers" in Liberia, assisting the US in attaining its national objectives. The US administration believes that civil society organizations representing Liberians would promote a positive image of Washington in Liberia, particularly among ordinary Liberians. This is owing to the fact that these groups would not be able to survive without outside funding. According to this viewpoint, the United States' approach to assisting Liberia in its post-Cold War growth is based on a number of pillars, one of which is the use of non-state actors as marketers of American national interests. One component of this is the decentralization of aid distribution; more specifically, the fact that the Liberian government is no longer the primary conduit for American development funding in the country. This is a considerable improvement over the previous circumstance. Instead, subsequent grantees have broadened their scope to cover a wide range of non-governmental organizations. Political and economic conditions have been imposed as a condition of participation on a regular basis. This happens on a somewhat regular basis. On the other hand, political requirements are put on Liberian governments, just as they were during the Cold War, and these criteria may or may not be favored by the US administration. During the Taylor dictatorship, for example, US funding for Liberia's economic development was halted (Kieh 2010). The argument was founded on the fact that the Taylor dictatorship was totalitarian and aggressively engaged in a destabilization effort across West Africa (Kieh 2010). Because the US has supplied financial aid to various authoritarian regimes in Liberia, including the Doe junta, it is clear that the Taylor

dictatorship's use of democracy-based political conditionality was hypocritical. The economic situation, on the other hand, has remained unchanged, particularly the demand that US development assistance be used to purchase goods and services produced in the United States. Capacity building and programmatic assistance remain the primary focus of US foreign aid, rather than more visible development projects such as the construction of schools, hospitals, roads, and bridges.

### **U.S. Relations and Assistance**

As previously stated, the United States was vital in Liberia's founding, and the two countries have maintained strong bilateral ties ever since, with the United States continuing to provide important assistance. The amount of US participation in Liberia expanded dramatically under the presidency of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, as well as during the administrations of successive US presidents, with the support of both main parties in Congress. Ms. Sirleaf gave a speech to a joint session of Congress in 2006. Between fiscal years 2006 and 2018, the US Congress gave the Liberian government almost \$2.1 billion in aid. The State Department and USAID were to oversee this funding, which was to be used to fund stabilization, development, security sector reform, and health program activities. This figure does not include assistance from other departments of the US government or the large funds supplied by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) for relief efforts (see below). It also excludes any funding provided by the United States for Liberia's Ebola response, as well as funding for regional or centrally coordinated projects. Finally, it excludes funding for UNMIL provided by the United States, which comes from assessed contributions to the UN peacekeeping budget. The Trump administration has emphasized that it supports close ties between Liberia and the United States. The fourth U.S.-Liberia Partnership Dialogue, which took place before the end of 2019, was hosted by Tibor Nagy, who is presently the United States' Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Youth involvement, human trafficking, economic growth, and strengthening health and education systems" were among the most current topics discussed at this high-level diplomatic summit. Congress has held hearings on the country's prospects for economic growth and greater governance, in addition to continuing to allocate considerable amounts of bilateral foreign assistance. In addition, the House Democracy Partnership (HDP) program has enhanced ties between the Liberian legislature and the United States Congress. Liberia's legislature is one of HDP-

affiliated legislatures around the world. The HDP's objective in Liberia has been to develop the capacity of the Liberian legislature through a number of ways, including the promotion of peer-to-peer exchanges, since its start in 2006. In October 2019, five members of the US Congress flew to Liberia to meet with President George Weah and other members of the country's parliament. Immigration-related concerns Over the course of the two countries' histories, migration of Liberians to the United States has been a significant influence in the development of their bilateral relations. Around 85,000 persons of Liberian ancestry who did not originate in the country lived in the United States in 2018. These figures were provided by the United States Census Bureau (latest available). Liberians already living in the United States were granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for the first time during Liberia's first civil war, which began in 1991. In the years afterwards, qualifying Liberians have been awarded Brief Protected Status (TPS) and/or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), which is a presidentially granted temporary blanket exemption from removal. TPS and DED are both referred to as DED. Liberia's civil war and the subsequent outbreak of the Ebola virus both played a role in this occurrence. Motions proposing to extend the immigration status of Liberians who are eligible for such measures have received bipartisan support in Congress. These bills have had bipartisan support. In March 2019, President Trump announced his decision to end the Deferred Enforced Departure (DED) program, just three days before it was set to expire for certain Liberians who had been in the United States since 2002. Despite this, he decided to extend the wind-down period to March 30, 2020. President Trump indicated in his memorandum to allow Liberian DED grantees a reprieve from deportation that extending the wind-down time will maintain the status quo while Congress considers remedial legislation. This was part of President Obama's intention to provide Liberian grantees a reprieve from expulsion. This was in reference to the fact that extending the wind-down time would keep things as they were. Congress eventually approved the Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2020 (Public Law 116-92), which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to adjust the status of qualifying Liberian applicants to LPR status. Applicants from Liberia who have been continuously present in the United States since November 20, 2014, or their immediate family members, among other criteria, are eligible.

### **The nature of the NTGL power struggle 2003**

In August of 2003, Charles Taylor willingly went into exile, signaling the end of the war. The NTGL was established with the goal of overseeing a two-year transition period that would conclude in democratic elections in 2005. With the help of UNMIL and the international community, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was able to hold elections that were mostly free and fair (undoubtedly the best ever held in Liberia). However, because the NTGL's composition was not dissimilar to that of previous power-sharing regimes, such as the PRC, there was little change in the quality of economic administration. Much like past Liberian governments, the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) had a fiercely competitive patrimonial environment in which numerous elites were embroiled in battles over state resources. These conflicts were typically, but not always, based on ethnic identity and exclusionary behaviors, which defined politics and state control as a zero-sum game.

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) was established when Taylor fled Liberia, with Gyude Bryant as its chairman. The NTGL included some representatives from business and civil society, but in general, the transitional government reflected the military power balance between the three main factions: Taylor's forces, also known as the Government of Liberia (GOL) in the NTGL, and the two main rebel movements, the Mandingo-controlled LURD and the Krahn-dominated MODEL. The NTGL also includes representatives from the private sector and civil society. The organization's two most notable civilian members were Gyude Bryant, who served as Chairman, and Wesley Johnson, who served as Vice-Chairman. Other notable members included Thomas Nimley, a leader of MODEL who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Lusinee Kamara, who was chosen by Sekou Conneh, the leader of LURD, to serve as Minister of Finance. Both of these people were high-ranking government officials. Despite the fact that the GOL, LURD, and MODEL were the three main forces in the civil war's second phase, the NTGL was a government founded on a compromise between these three main factions and the international world. This suggests that the NTGL's true power came from the former fighting factions' members. Despite the fact that the NTGL featured some significant business and civil society figures, it was still a compromise-based administration. A compromise of this nature was essential to put an end to the fighting and, by extension, the suffering of the civilian population.

The issue was that when the international community began "making plans for Liberia," it refused to accept the compromise. This was the conundrum. Even more importantly, despite the fact that groups like LURD and MODEL had won battles, there was no way these organizations could possibly 'win' the peace. LURD was a Mandingo-dominated group, and it will never be able to win a national election as long as the Mandingo people's citizenship in Liberia is still up for discussion. The only reason a minority tribe like the Mandingo was able to fight Taylor's control was because of their connections to Guinea's ruler. The Krahn, on the other hand, are a very small group that is still tarnished by the fact that many Liberians believe they were the preferred group during Samuel Doe's tyranny. They have a tarnished reputation as a result of this notion. Their interest in the NTGL was not in the transition itself, but in the last chance for wealth that the NTGL offered before multiparty elections put them out of business for good. Leaders of factions like Sekou Conneh were acutely aware of this fact, and they engaged in open trading of NTGL positions, selling them to whoever paid the best price.

As a result, a large number of persons who got to their positions through the CPA had already gained financially from the war, and they continued to do so as a result of the stance that the NTGL represented as a result of the power-sharing agreement. It was not an unusual decision for the Transitional Legislature, led by Gyude Bryant, to spend a total of \$2.3 million on brand-new Jeep Cherokee cars for each of its members. The bulk of NTGL members were more concerned with acquiring positions for themselves and resources for their own use than with overseeing the transition or serving the Liberian people. Their goal was to keep control of traditional revenue sources for the Liberian government, such as ports, airports, and customs agencies, so they might profit from them in the future.

The NTGL's open mismanagement and theft of state resources was not only a subject of concern for the international community in Liberia, but it also left many expats feeling dissatisfied and perplexed. Both of these causes contributed to this. They had flown all the way to Liberia to assist the locals in their efforts to rescue their own country, and now they were forced to deal with a government that they had come to recognize as inefficient and corrupt on a daily basis. As a result, the mood shifted dramatically.

### **Gemap and the fight against corruption**

The Liberia Economic Governance and Action Plan, a report published in 2005, was the result of the response. The goal of this study was to present a comprehensive anti-corruption plan that would have a major impact (LEGAP). The United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and the United States of America were all engaged in the writing of the report. The goal was to come up with a strategy for dealing with systematic corruption, which the donor group feared was jeopardizing Liberia's reconstruction efforts. The strategy's overall purpose was to limit the Liberian government's capacity to award contracts, separate critical sources of money, implant international monitors in key ministries, and attract judges from outside the country. Furthermore, the proposal proposed that significant state-owned companies, such as the Port of Monrovia, Roberts International Airport, and the state-owned gasoline distribution corporation, be handed up to international management.

LEGAP was definitely a direct outcome of donors requiring strict safeguards to prevent NTGL representatives and other politicians and bureaucrats from stealing external cash intended for reconstruction and development. As part of the plan, an Economic Governance Steering Body (EGSC) was scheduled to be established. For at least three years, this committee was to be in charge of overseeing Liberia's revenue collection and state expenditures. The United Nations, the European Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the United States of America, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank would all have representatives in the EGSC. Members of the EGSC would come from the Liberian Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Liberia, the heads of the Contracts and Monopolies Commission and the Governance Reform Commission, as well as a civil society representative.

This proposal was met with skepticism by the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and other members of Liberia's political class. The vast majority of them, on the other hand, reacted with rage. The NTGL's Minister of Information, William Allen, noted that the group has severe reservations about the proposal, particularly the idea of putting crucial decisions in the hands of international experts. During an interview with reporters on July 18, 2005, Allen claimed that the NTGL would not agree to the LEGAP demand that foreigners come to Liberia to take over statutory tasks that should be handled by Liberians. Allen was discussing the LEGAP idea with reporters. Allen also mentioned that the NTGL's Chairman, Gyude

Bryant, was working on a response to LEGAP called the Liberian Economic Governance Help Plan. Technical help for the establishment of new institutions would be emphasized in this proposal. Liberia's reaction was also relayed to the African Union (AU) Summit in 2005, with the hope that the matter would be featured on the AU agenda. Bryant and the NTGL clearly hoped that by revealing how much economic sovereignty Liberia would be forced to cede to the international community as a result of the donor proposal, they would gain African nations' support in their fight, if not to completely sidestep the LEGAP, then at least to weaken it. There is every reason to suppose that numerous other African leaders were concerned that implementing the LEGAP in its entirety would set a precedent that could be extended to other countries. This is because there's reason to suppose these leaders were worried the LEGAP would set a precedent.

Other Liberian organizations agreed with the NTGL's criticism. The current President of Liberia, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, slammed LEGAP, calling it a financial receivership and a threat to Liberian sovereignty. Her verdict was unfavorable. Amos Sawyer, a well-known Liberian scholar who served as interim president from 1990 to 1994, has echoed similar sentiments, claiming that LEGAP would turn Liberia into a quasi-trust territory run by foreigners. Vambah Kanneh, who is also the LURD's Minister of Transportation, was one of the few NTGL members who backed the initiative. He argued that the plan was a good framework for combatting corruption and that the NTGL had no reason to reject a plan targeted at combating corruption in Liberia. He said this because he thought the strategy was a good foundation for fighting corruption.

Kanneh's point of view may have been the most in tune with the viewpoints of those wandering the streets of Monrovia, as a large number of people were clearly irritated by the NTGL's pervasive corruption while they continued to live without electricity or clean water. Civil servants had not been paid their salaries in arrears for the preceding 18 months while members of the NTGL were motoring around Monrovia in their bright new jeeps. Civil servants went on strike for three days in July 2005 after learning that the NTGL had spent around \$2 million that was intended to be used to pay wage arrears to public servants on the purchase of these jeeps.

In 2005, the donor community and ordinary Liberians were becoming increasingly frustrated with the NTGL, but their options were limited, and there was little they could do about it. In both direct and indirect ways, the international



community aided the NTGL's rise to power. The international community, on the other hand, did not appear to anticipate that it would be dealing with men and women who were well aware that their time in power was finite. As a result, they had no choice but to act in the same way that Liberian rulers have always acted: to provide for themselves and their close associates.

Gyude Bryant, on behalf of the NTGL, backed a plan that was eventually given the name GEMAP after a lengthy and heated discussion that included representatives from the AU, the EU, and the World Bank. The suggestions for the judiciary were the only part of the proposal that was changed after it was first presented. After a protracted discussion, it was decided that Liberian courts would not hear cases presided over by judges from other nations. Bryant and NTGL were obliged to concede because the IMF, the World Bank, the European Union, and the United States of America made it plain that additional support for Liberia would be contingent on Liberian approval of the GEMAP proposal. The deal did not sit well with the NTGL or the Liberian political class, and many other African leaders echoed their displeasure. Because no other African country had a genuine interest in wasting political capital on this issue, and because the proposal was widely opposed across the continent, neither the African Union (AU) nor any other African group attempted to prevent it from being implemented.

As a result of GEMAP's implementation, the Bank of Liberia's Executive Director must have all operational and financial matters co-signed by an international expert appointed by the IMF. Other government agencies, such as the National Port Authority, the Forestry Agency, the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, Roberts Foreign Airport, and the Petroleum Refining Corporation, have started to offer these types of specialized jobs for international financial experts. Because the agreement signed by Gyude Bryant in October 2005 is only valid for 36 months, it is safe to presume that Ellen Sirleaf Johnson's government will be compelled to follow the GEMAP's terms for at least the first three years in power.

As previously stated, GEMAP was first met with strong opposition from Liberia's political class. The plan was only signed when donors warned that if it was not approved, it could threaten the delivery of millions of dollars in help. One of the major presidential contenders, George Weah, has declared that he supports any steps to tackle corruption and budgetary inequity. In contrast, the current president, Ellen

Johnson-Sirleaf, was less enthusiastic about the proposals and highlighted concerns about state sovereignty.

Although the vast majority of ordinary Liberians are sick and tired of corrupt politicians and corrupt behaviors, they must cope with this dilemma on a daily basis since Liberia's patrimonial trade culture pervades every aspect of life. In order to lawfully dwell and work in the United States, you must engage in this system in some form. This is only one of the many challenges that persons who were involved for GEMAP's inception are today dealing with. There is little evidence that the amount of corruption has decreased significantly, making it difficult to determine if the system is working. Good governance and anti-corruption, on the other hand, have become a foreign obligation rather than a Liberian concern. This begs the question of whether the system is genuinely functioning.

The problem of corruption, as well as the theft of government funds, has to be addressed. On the other hand, it should have been addressed much earlier in the process, and the conversation should have been based on a better understanding of what an arrangement like the NTGL would have in store. The power ties that supported the NTGL were evident, and it should have been expected that the transitional arrangement would be run by persons who were unable to swap their military might for political authority through the ballot box due to the constitution of the Liberian polity. Because the National Transitional Government of Liberia controlled the NTGL, this was the case (NTGL). If Liberia is turned into a "choiceless democracy" for at least 36 months, none of this will change, and it may very well make the work of constructing a Liberian state much more difficult, because anti-corruption has become an external issue rather than a home obligation. This change must take at least 36 months to complete.

### **US- Liberia relation under President Sirleaf**

The current U.S. - Liberian relations are warm, as they were during the Organization of previous President George W. Bush. The Sirleaf Organization's nearby working relationship with the Hedge Organization started with her introduction in 2006, which previous U.S. First Woman Laura Hedge and previous Secretary of State Rice joined in, among other unmistakable U.S. guests. Previous President Shrubbery whose administration played key parts in finishing Liberia's second affable conflict and in settling and assisting the country with modifying in the quick post-war

years, upheld by significant, legislatively upheld U.S. post-war reconstructing assistance-respected Sirleaf's authority and accomplishments, and granted the U.S. Official Award of Opportunity to her in November 2007. In February 2008, then, at that point President and Mrs. Bush headed out to Liberia, among other African nations. Different U.S. authorities have over and again voiced help for President Sirleaf's administration since her political decision, most as of late in April 2010, when Under Secretary of State for Political Undertakings William J. Consumes visited Liberia. During his visit, he expressed that it was exceptional to perceive how far the nation has come since it held its without first and open post-struggle political decision in 2005, yet added that it is similarly obvious is that much work stays for Liberia to completely recuperate following quite a while of terrible nationwide conflict (USAID, 2019). Consumes expressed that the center reason for his excursion was to send the message that "the US will remain by Liberia as it keeps on gaining ground towards arriving at its maximum capacity as a vote based express. His remarks repeated those of Secretary of State Clinton, who, subsequent to meeting with President Sirleaf in April 2009, expressed that Sirleaf's administration had "been excellent and phenomenal" and had "made a colossal commitment" to Liberia's headway, and that "President Obama and I are extremely dedicated to the fate of Liberia and to President Sirleaf's proceeding leadership. During his outing, Consumes likewise declared a U.S. obligation to give \$19.75 million in financing to additional development Liberia Public Police force preparing," which, he said satisfied "a guarantee made by Secretary Clinton during her visit last August (USAID, 2019).

Clinton's 2009 excursion was the second latest visit by an undeniable level U.S. official to Liberia, and the most senior initiative visit to date to the country during the Obama Organization. During the visit, in a discourse to the Liberian parliament, she related the significance of growing vote based support and organization working to Liberia's forthcoming progress in gathering its significant difficulties, among the most squeezing of which she referred to as defilement and the requirement for land residency change, and absence of admittance to occupations, power, lodging, training, and policing. She explicitly approached the council to foster its monetary oversight job, counter defilement and advance straightforwardness, and pass a general set of principles to guarantee moral guidelines that guide the quest for the normal good." She additionally approached the lawmaking body to help guarantee "tenable ... free and fair decisions in 2011, to some extent by passing a limit bill. In comments conveyed

at the Liberian Public Police (LNP) Foundation, she talked about the significance, difficulties, and accomplishments of U.S., multilateral, and Liberian organization in remaking Liberia's police force during the on-going post-struggle period. Specifically, she stressed the significance to the US of its interest in aiding the advancement of the LNP Crisis Reaction Unit, and reported a forthcoming expansion in U.S. monetary help for LNP preparing (examined beforehand in this report).

President Sirleaf has made a few authority visits to the US, remembering one for February 2007, when she went to a World Bank-coordinated Liberia Accomplices' Gathering benefactor meeting in Washington D.C. She made one more such visit in Walk 2006, during which she tended to a joint meeting of Congress on Walk and met with President Bramble on Walk. She apparently firmly talked with U.S. authorities in regards to her needs for Liberia and the situation with Charles Taylor. During a pre-debut December 2005 outing to the US, Sirleaf likewise met with key U.S. furthermore, worldwide monetary organization officials.

President Sirleaf is supposed to embrace a further authority visit the US in late May 2010. While her agenda has not been delivered, the outing is supposed to zero in on extending Sirleaf's significant level contacts with Obama Organization authorities. Sirleaf is supposed to refresh U.S. strategy creators, including intrigued Individuals, on Liberia's advancement since her political decision, as well as residual difficulties in such regions as security area change, hostile to debasement endeavors, joblessness, monetary development, and overall set of laws limit building. Her visit might even the declaration of a potential thousand years Challenge Company (MCC) Limit Program and a potential U.S. Worldwide Food Security Drive country program.

### **The Ebola Virus Disease Epidemic in Liberia, Its Response, and US Assistance**

In the year 2014, Liberia saw the largest outbreak of an Ebola virus strain in human history. 'Chan, 2014' is a term used to describe a person who is Around 30,000 people were infected throughout West Africa, and citizens of Liberia's capital city faced an almost certain death rate, with only a 6% chance of surviving at the disease's worst (WHO, 2016; UNMIL Official 1, 2016). While going to work in an embassy or to a local church, it is possible to come upon dead bodies on the side of the road. Both the international community and the Liberian government worked on attempts to eradicate the illness as a direct response to the outbreak, which swiftly spread to other regions of the world. The United States was the most visible player in Liberia's reaction

to the Ebola outbreak. This was accomplished through a coordinated effort involving numerous agencies in the United States' foreign affairs system. Despite this, it is arguable that the military of the United States was the most influential player in that system. As seen by the presence of both an ongoing security sector reform (SSR) operation known as Operation Onward Liberty (OOL) and an Ebola crisis response mission known as Operation United Assistance, the United States' efforts were fairly broad (OUA).

The key challenge was the development of Ebola Treatment Units, also known as ETUs and field hospitals for Ebola patients. The famed 101st Airborne Division (101st), an Army fighting formation, made up the majority of the OUA in order to successfully fulfill this goal.

Despite the fact that Liberia lacks the true colonial ties that its neighbors do, such as Sierra Leone's with the United Kingdom or Guinea's with France, Liberia's particular relationship with the United States is eerily similar to that of a colony. Global conflict linked the two repeatedly, most notably during World War II with rubber exploitation and during the Cold War with Liberian President Samuel Doe's determination to free the country of Soviet and Libyan influence (PBS, 2002). In recent years, the United States has effectively constructed the Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) (George, 2016), and it has maintained a strong diplomatic presence in Monrovia throughout. After it became evident that Ebola posed a serious threat, this relationship was resumed. Emile Ouamouno, a baby, has been diagnosed with Ebola for the first time. This happened in December of last year. Ouamouno is thought to have contracted the Zaire strain of Ebola virus via a bat and then spread it to his hamlet, Meliandou, in southeast Guinea's forested region (Leach, 2015). "The inexplicable fever spread through his family, to a critically under-equipped rural health clinic, and then through the funeral of a health worker, and associated kin and trading networks, to others in this high-mobility and sociable region. When the world community finally responded, the epidemic had already spread out of control. Because of the admittedly poor response, it had been months before the World Health Organization (WHO) published a statement addressing this patient zero. The lack of functional laboratories that could diagnose the disease, as well as a restricted number of regional doctors who could treat it, contributed to the exponential increase in the number of patients (WHO, 2014; Parham and Wanjue, 2016; Mitchell, 2016). The months leading up to the declaration in August turned out to be the most difficult. This was partly owing to the WHO's

delay in declaring the Ebola outbreak an international emergency, which is "a legal procedure that flips switches in the international community so that resources and expertise are mobilized faster and protection measures are put in place." The months that had previously gone turned out to be the hardest as a result of the announcement in August (Arie, 2014: 2). Regardless matter who was to blame, the exponential surge that happened throughout the region stunned both the local people and the worldwide community. Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia were the most badly hit countries. By the time the region was declared Ebola-free, it was estimated that more than 28,600 people had contracted the disease and more than 11,300 had died from it. Despite the fact that Sierra Leone had more cases, Liberia was the country most severely afflicted by the disease, with about 4,800 deaths (WHO, 2016). Before those estimates were determined and Ebola began to retreat, the US government and other organizations constructed a convoluted machine of responses in the face of pressure to act quickly and the presence of confusing news. There were pre-existing health difficulties as early as 2013, laying the basis for the crisis, which began in December of that year with the first documented case. Until January 2016, when Liberia and the surrounding region were proclaimed Ebola-free, the disease was still present in Liberia, albeit in a weaker form. Liberia was declared free of the Ebola virus in May 2015, but there were further minor outbreaks, and in order to issue a new proclamation, two incubation periods of 21 days each have to pass without a case (WHO, 2016b). The US now has an SSR operation known as OOL in Liberia, which was created to serve as a consulting mission for the country's post-civil war security sector. Marines and soldiers of the National Guard have been stationed in the American Forces of Liberia (AFL) barracks since 2010, where they work with the Liberian military to build best professional practices for their jobs (Rankin, 2015; Selbach-Allen, 2016). This operation is small in comparison to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); yet, it has a long-standing collaboration with UNMIL, which has provided it with benefits such as broad discretion and confidence between the two organizations. Not only does the AFL have faith in OOL's troops, but so does the US military's leadership, which was shown in the limits placed on the Ebola response mission, OUA, which had regulations so severe that it was deemed ineffectual when it first began in late 2014 (Paskman et al., 2016). When news of Ebola reached the White House, President Barack Obama and Defense Department officials agreed on a modest response: establishing a field hospital with 25 beds for the treatment of victims. This announcement was made public on

September 12th, 2014 (Cronk, 2014). There was an outcry across a range of sectors, including the development community, in a remarkably short period of time, accusing the US of shirking its responsibility in the crisis. Liberia's president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, was one of the most outspoken of these opponents (Cooper et al., 2014). Despite the fact that top White House aides...rejected criticism from African officials, doctors, and representatives from aid groups who said the US had been slow to act in the face of the disease, explaining that the US had committed more than \$100 million since the outbreak began in the early spring," the US increased its stance on how it would assist the response in response to the outcry. Despite the fact that the US "rejected criticism from African authorities," this happened (Cooper et al., 2014: 3). As a result, after advisors to the National Security Council (NSC) likely urged for a military response to the President, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (OUA) was founded. On September 16, 2014, President Obama announced the deployment of 3,000 more troops to the region (Lane and McNair, 2015). The crisis had reached its height when the announcement was made in September; nevertheless, by the time OUA arrived one month later, the most difficult component of the matter had been settled. However, because individuals on the ground were unable to adequately evaluate the size of the drop until much later in the year, the examination of the amount of decline could only be done in retrospect (Selbach-Allen, 2016b). Troops were not required in such a huge number of the 3,000 earlier stated. Despite this, the 101st was assigned the task of filling the vacancy. Not only did the choice of a military reaction surprise many on the ground, including the country's pre-existing military officials, but the 101st also turned out to be a strange option. This was most likely owing to the availability and readiness of units rather than the thematic skillsets and talents required for developing a response to a sickness rather than fighting factions. Furthermore, because of the troops available, the choice of the 101st proved to be an odd one (Lane and McNair, 2015; Selbach-Allen, 2016). On the other hand, with the exception of a few officers in both the Army and the Calcano 91 Marine Corps, the decision was mostly unchallenged. Captains Lane and McNair of the United States Army are skeptical of the choice to send the military, specifically a combat force, in the midst of the decision. "It is critical for our country to evaluate the role of military soldiers in the event of a disease outbreak, as well as the ethical issues that arise from their participation" (Lane and McNair, 2015: 607). The decision to send in a fighting unit rather than a construction and health team may have been a mistake, but there were

other options available that were more suited to the scenario. Despite the fact that strategic deployment decisions are continually subject to the strain of readiness and availability, there are units for each of the many events that can occur throughout the spectrum. The Army and Navy, for example, each have their own construction forces at their disposal. The majority of the US military mission in Africa is made up of "Seabees," or naval construction men. These Seabees are based in Djibouti, which is the sole significant US military base on the African continent, and they operate largely out of East Africa. Throughout the year, their extensive programs help local forces and construction projects, resulting in the construction of roads, bridges, buildings, and other infrastructure (Gibson, 2013). In their defense, in September of 2014, some Seabees were dispatched to assist the OUA operation. However, instead of accounting for the majority of the 3,000 troops expected for the mission, they only accounted for a fraction of one percent of the total, with only 15 personnel (White, 2014). Despite the fact that the Seabees' charter makes them the best fit for the Ebola response goal of creating structures, just a small percentage of persons interviewed mentioned their help. Because there were so few Seabees, this is most likely the case. Some Seabees worked with the original Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), which was one of the first groups to arrive in the country and assess how to lead the response, in addition to site visits to determine how and where to build ETUs, the initial goal of which was to construct one in every county of the country. The goal in the aftermath of the disaster was to build one ETU in each county (White, 2014). The Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a relatively small coalition consisting of handpicked experts from government agencies such as the United States Center for Disease Control (CDC), the United States Public Health Service, and the aforementioned United States military, is directed by the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) (USAID, 2016; Parham and Wanjue, 2016). Despite the DART's experience, several officials have stated that their best intentions were met with a difficult situation, one that was in the midst of a crisis that appeared to be getting worse. Despite the fact that the DART has such expertise, this was mentioned. Unlike past DART expeditions that took place in the aftermath of natural catastrophes such as earthquakes in Haiti or tsunamis in Indonesia, this one was forced into a health crisis unlike any other the organization has ever faced, making it extremely difficult to lead their response. The US deployed the 101st in the hopes of controlling the environment as a result of the



NSC's apparent lack of communication with people on the ground and the combatant commanders. There was scant mention of Seabees or other military construction units during an essentially construction-oriented mission to erect ETUs. There has been no examination into the rationale for this particular unit's participation rather than other, more capacity-oriented soldiers, such as the construction forces, which were mentioned in the previous debate about the Seabees. "A part of the lack of discourse definitely derives from a reluctance to debate the role and ethics of military involvement in the medical literature or in the public - particularly when the mission seems honorable and genuine," according to several Army officials (Lane and McNair, 2015: 607). The deployment of the 101st and supporting advance teams, as well as paying for the construction of ETUs, which was the mission's principal goal, cost the Department of Defense more than \$330 million as of March 2015. This does not include the additional \$72 million set aside to combat the disease; \$25 million is set aside for vaccine development, and \$47 million is set aside for biosurveillance and biosecurity. These two areas combine to form "cooperative threat reduction" (DoD, 2015). It's worth noting that the most "effective" logistical force in the United States' arsenal for disaster response is also one of the most expensive. Furthermore, the Ebola response cost USAID and OFDA approximately 510 million dollars in Liberia alone (USAID, 2016). As a result, the Liberian government and society, as well as US taxpayers, should examine the cost of military deployment. This is especially important in situations where military deployment is based on readiness rather than capabilities (that is, sending the 101st rather than purely mission-specific personnel like the Seabees). Otherwise, the bottom lines of stopping Ebola's spread may profit from unwarranted panic (which is sometimes the fault of sensational media) and exorbitant death rates (which are largely due to poor hygiene practices and the lack of or rejection of simple care, rather than the actual time-sensitive nature of the disease). You can build a paradigm that needs fast, tense behavior rather than a measured and suitable response if you give in to your fear and act on it. Despite widespread anxiety, the United States played an important role in providing international leadership that aided the region's civic and commercial societies to function. Many Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) indicated interest in removing their soldiers from UNMIL during the outbreak; however, due to the United States' leadership in maintaining operations despite the crisis, none of the TCCs ended up with large troop withdrawals (Mitchell, 2016). Through a variety of liaison initiatives and trust-

building dialogues, the United States administration was successful in convincing civilian airlines to continue operating routes to Monrovia, allowing evacuees and disaster relief employees to enter and exit the nation. The majority of the work was completed by Brussels Airlines. The airline agreed to continue flying under the condition that its pilots would not be obliged to stay in Monrovia. The government of Senegal, a neighboring nation, was able to gain the trust of the US administration, which permitted Liberian flights to fly through Senegal, allowing Brussels Airlines pilots to take breaks while the airline continued to operate normally (Ibid.). It turns out that this type of unconventional leadership, which was outside the scope of typical Ebola initiatives, was critical to the region's collaborative effort. Although the United States' efforts in combating the epidemic were massive, governments and non-governmental organizations from a number of other countries also spent significant resources to end the panic and deaths caused by Ebola. Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has emerged as one of the most significant organizations as a result of their substantial effort in treating Ebola victims. The primary ETUs were overseen by MSF, which engaged both local and foreign medical experts to provide care and welcomed any and all patients. MSF's ETUs were the ones that bore the brunt of the care requirements during the peak of the outbreak in mid-2014. Despite horrible fatality rates of up to 94 percent, this was achieved (Barclay, 2016; UNMIL Official 2, 2016). Furthermore, the German military maintained a presence in the area to assure its security, while the Chinese government built ETUs around the country (UNMIL Official 1, 2016). As a result, the United States was not the only country that militarized its humanitarian efforts in response to the Ebola outbreak. Scholars have indicated that greater thought should have gone into the intervention plan and the selection of nonmilitary troops, and that China should have focused its attention and funds on the People's Liberation Army's medical division (PLA). This action drew domestic criticism, and China was chastised as a result. Some believe that "additional thinking from the epidemiology, translational medicine, and sociology components of the outbreak will assist to construct the 'go global plans of PLA and our medical service' in the future," while others disagree (Cheng-zhong, 2015: 581). As a result, both sides of foreign development actors, the United States and China, have rejected the assumption that a nation must act quickly in favor of more deliberate action. Both of these countries contribute to the development of other countries.

The Ebola outbreak in West Africa from 2014 to 2016 started in Guinea and swiftly spread to Liberia in March of that year. From 2014 to 2016, there was an outbreak. The Ebola epidemic that had been raging in Liberia was substantially under control by the beginning of 2015. There were 10,666 confirmed cases of Ebola and nearly 5,000 deaths linked to the virus when the World Health Organization (WHO) proclaimed the country clear of the disease in the middle of 2016. As a result of the outbreak, the yearly growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) fell from 8.8% in 2013 to -1.6 percent in 2016, having a detrimental influence on travel, commerce, and general economic activity. Additionally, as a result of the outbreak, access to education, healthcare, and other public services was restricted, putting additional strain on Liberia's already shaky state capacity. In a larger sense, it weakened already shaky state-community ties and exacerbated social tensions, owing in part to the state's imposition of unpopular quarantines in outbreak-affected areas. In addition, the outbreak aided in the degradation of state-community ties. The state's "first delayed, then military" response to the spread of Ebola "underscores the country's fragility and ongoing governance issues, as well as its population's fundamental distrust of State authority," according to UN sanctions monitors. Multiple departments, including the Department of State, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Office of Food for Peace, the Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Bureau for Global Health, and bilateral missions, contributed to the US government's response. The Department of Defense (DOD) provided a significant amount of logistical support as well as professional technical advise as part of a military operation known as "Operation United Assistance" (OUA). The most essential goals of the US response programs were to bring the epidemic under control, limit the severity of secondary repercussions (such as threats to food security and economic disruptions), give operational support, and improve Liberia's healthcare system's capabilities. According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the US Department of State and USAID have pledged a total of \$595 million to support Liberia's Ebola response operations as of April 2019. (USAID). Liberia also benefited from the Department of Health and Human Services' technical support, which totaled at least \$876 million. Liberia also benefited from \$656 million in Defense Department aid, which included financing for the Overseas Universities Act (OUA) as well as capacity-building and research assistance.

**Post-Conflict Stabilization and Recovery Under President Sirleaf:**

This was the legacy that Liberia's transitional government inherited from its predecessor in 2003. Since then, several significant achievements have been made. The transitional government took the initiative in attempting to recover and rebuild, while a United Nations peacekeeping force of 15,000 troops provided security. In 2005, elections for a national government were successfully held, and the newly established government, led by President Johnson Sirleaf, launched an ambitious policy reform agenda to support reconstruction and recovery. After being demobilized and reintroduced into society by the newly elected administration, tens of thousands of former fighters were able to effectively reintegrate into their communities. To kick-start the agricultural industry's resuscitation and offer much-needed employment opportunities, the government launched community development, food for work, road building, and urban cleanup projects, as well as supplied tools and seed rice. To better position Liberia for future prosperity, the Government of Liberia (GOL) proceeded quickly to stabilize the economy and put the country's finances on a healthier footing (USAID, 2013). Because of the sponsorship of a multi-donor project known as the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program, effective controls on government finances and procurement were introduced (GEMAP). As a result, the United Nations was able to withdraw timber restrictions in 2006, restoring essential foreign exchange revenues. Under President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's leadership, the GOL successfully negotiated a debt relief plan, which resulted in the clearance of arrears from the country's financial default in the middle of the 1980s and a major reduction in the country's overall external debt. The administration had to meet a rigorous set of financial and policy restrictions imposed by the Paris Club and other creditor countries in order to achieve this goal. The signing of a National Investment Act and the delivery of the first Annual Progress Report on the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy were among the requirements (PRS). These actions were taken to demonstrate the government's commitment to poverty reduction, solid macroeconomic policy, effective use of public finances and resources, and improved governance. Through the execution of important policy measures, it has been demonstrated that a high level of attention is being shown to enhancing governance and the rule of law. Despite starting from a very low point, Liberia was able to show a significant improvement in its Control of Corruption score in 2006. Between 2006 and 2010, however, there was minimal to no incremental development. In addition, the

government implemented a series of civil service reforms and announced its plans to strengthen the legislative branch's fiscal authority and lay the groundwork for the future decentralization of political and administrative tasks to districts and counties. As the first Sirleaf administration came to a close, it appeared that the early enthusiasm was fading once more. The government made it clear from the start that it wanted to take a new approach to managing the country's tremendous natural resource wealth. It passed the Forest Reform Act in 2006 to increase management and regulation of the forestry industry, as well as renegotiating all existing forestry contracts. It changed concession agreements in the iron ore mining, oil palm plantation, and rubber plantation industries, and joined the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2008 with the goal of improving transparency and accountability in the management of revenues derived from natural resource operations. Finally, Liberia's administration put to work restoring the country's severely damaged road network, electricity grid, and water supply. They also started rebuilding and reopening schools and health institutions all around the country. Peace, enhanced security, and cautious macroeconomic management all contributed to reversing the downward trend in economic conditions. With annual economic growth averaging over 6% from 2006 to 2010, and a strong initial comeback in rice and cassava production, the economy recovered from a very low base. Despite the fact that the comparative basis was extremely low, this happened. Royalty payments are expected to exceed \$30 million per year by 2015, and planned foreign direct investments into approved mining projects have begun to flow. Despite these achievements, the gains obtained are fragile, and much more work is needed to consolidate and maintain them. Progress in security sector reform has left significant gaps: attrition rates in the police and army are high, and trained personnel, equipment, and supplies are in limited supply. Furthermore, given the high rates of crime, simmering tensions between political factions, occasional outbursts of violence over religion and land, and the ongoing threat posed by ISIS, the continued presence of UNMIL – which was currently down to 8,000 troops at the time of drafting – is seen as essential. Despite the fact that these commitments sent important signals of good intent, the GOL's actual implementation of policy pledges has been inconsistent and tardy. Some reforms appear to have come to a halt; for example, the government has taken no action on the General Auditing Commission's reports; the Anti-Corruption Commission is suffering from a shortage of government funds; and the legislature has yet to establish a code of conduct for

public employees. The judicial reform process is moving at a snail's pace. The ratio of prosecutions to convictions is low, which contributes to the continuous corruption problem. The government's capacity to offer important public services and implement key investments is hampered by a lack of progress on major civil service reforms, which stymies efforts to establish and sustain a range of management capabilities in the public sector. Because of the lack of progress on critical civil service reforms, the government is unable to develop and sustain a range of management capabilities. Acute staffing shortages in the government, as well as insufficient capability across all industries, are obstructing the implementation of reforms and the provision of public services.

### **The United States Aid to Liberia for bilateral development**

The United States' official development assistance to Liberia covered a wide range of themes, including food aid, educational assistance, and medical treatment. Grants, low-interest loans, and technical assistance were all offered as forms of assistance. When viewed through the Cold War lens, the United States' development assistance to Liberia was primarily intended to support the advancement of American national interests rather than to help to the resolution of the country's numerous social and economic problems. There are a lot of different goals for the United States that are intertwined along this path. After conducting extensive research, the US administration concluded that maintaining its client authoritarian administrations in Liberia was critical to ensure the country's continuing economic and geopolitical success. As a result, the development assistance it provided was used to help the Tubman regime (which ruled from 1944 to 1971), the Tolbert government (which ruled from 1971 to 1980), and the Doe junta (which ruled from 1980 to 1990) strengthen their capacities by assisting them in reducing political instability, while only marginally addressing the country's ongoing economic and social crises. In other words, the US realized that providing financial assistance for development might serve as both a cover for the client regimes it supports and a solution for growing public dissatisfaction with these governments' backing.

Another purpose of the US was to use development aid to placate its Liberian client regimes so that they might function as foot soldiers in pushing American national interests throughout Africa. Due to the presence of various nationalist and radical regimes on the continent at the time of the coup, this was extremely crucial.

Furthermore, the US hoped to utilize development aid to pacify its Liberian client regimes so that they might function as "foot soldiers" in supporting American national objectives in Africa. For example, during the 1960s debate over the future of African regional integration, the US administration utilized the Tubman regime, a client of its own, to spearhead opposition against the formation of a United States of Africa. Radical African states, lead by Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah, adopted this approach (Dunn 1979; Martin 2002). To put it another way, the US government considered the establishment of an independent and indivisible African state as a stumbling hurdle in its quest for global hegemony. The US government has a vested interest in allowing its multinational firms to profit from Africa's natural riches and labor, among other things. The development of an autonomous and indivisible African state, on the other hand, was seen by the US government as a stumbling block in its quest for global hegemony. By enlisting the help of the regime it sponsored in Tubman to lead the fight against the development of a unified African state, the US administration was ultimately successful in achieving its goal. The US administration had more liberty to pursue its imperial ambitions on the continent since there were so many independent African nations. Because there were so many African republics, this was the case. The idea was to use Liberia as a model for other African countries in the American attempt to undermine unfriendly African regimes. Liberia had to be used as an anchor in the American effort to achieve this goal. The United Republics has profited from a variety of services provided by Doe regimes, including intelligence gathering on progressive African republics and backing for US-backed warlord forces (Kramer 1995; Kieh 2007, 2012, 2013; Dunn 2009, to mention a few). Liberia, for example, was a regional node in the CIA's clandestine effort in support of Chadian warlord Hissène Habré. In a coup in June 1982, Habré was successful in toppling his opponent, Goukouni Queddi, who was backed by Libya. (1995, Kramer). In a similar spirit, the Doe administration collaborated with the US to aid in Muammar Gaddafi's deposition as Libya's leader. According to Kramer (1995:6), a task group from the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identified Liberia as an essential operations area in August 1982. This site has been highlighted as a convenient base for the CIA's increased covert activities against Libya in the region. ..

The financial assistance for development that the United States supplied to Liberia served as a personal reward for Liberian rulers that backed the United States' goals. It's particularly intriguing because Doe amassed private fortune in the United

States using money intended for private development. Following an investigation done and published by the United States General Accounting Office in 1987, it was determined that President Doe had sold portions of US food aid and kept the proceeds for himself (United States General Accounting Office, 1987). The United States of America has not given Liberia any official development assistance since 1989. During the first Liberian civil war (1989–1997) and the Taylor regime (1997–2003), this was especially true. 2010 (Kieh). The program was reinstated and funded by the United Nations Development Programme during the administration of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, which was a caretaker government of national unity established as part of the comprehensive peace agreement that ended the country's second civil war in June 2003. (UNDP). Despite the fact that the Liberian National Transitional Government was a signatory to the agreement that ended the country's second civil war, this was the situation (Kieh 2010). The United States government fully re-established its development assistance program in Liberia after President Sirleaf's re-election in 2006. (Kieh 2010). By 2009, the United States had given Liberia a total of US\$232 million in development aid. Four years later, it had risen to US\$399.5 million, a huge gain.

Table 1: US Development Aid to Liberia

Year	Amount (millions)	
2006	\$94,475,434	
2007	\$85,522,139	
2008	\$74,138,326	
2009	\$102,438,194	
2010	\$142,824,746	
2011	\$171,920,397	
2012	\$149,150,681	



2013	\$157,974,025	
2014	\$188,298,713	
2015	\$725,750,737	
2016	\$193,202,288	
2017	\$131,822,398	

Source: US ForeignAssistance.gov

[ForeignAssistance.gov](http://ForeignAssistance.gov)

### **Judiciary reform**

It was also critical to address the Liberian court system's dysfunction head-on and without delay in order to promote responsibility for past injustices, combat impunity, and establish the rule of law. One of the most crucial actions needed to be taken was this. According to a report on the state of the legal system in Liberia published by the International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC) in December 2003, the country's population have an almost universal mistrust of the country's courts, resulting in the breakdown of the rule of law (ILAC, 2010). The report identified a number of serious problems with Liberia's judicial system, including widespread corruption, infrastructure destruction and pillage, a lack of qualified personnel, unpaid salaries for judges, prosecutors, and court staff, insufficient separation of powers, limited access to legal advice and defense counsel, and a lack of understanding of transparency and accountability principles. The report brought all of these issues to light.

The Security Council has tasked the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with assisting the Sirleaf government in consolidating government institutions, particularly judicial institutions. Based on the findings and recommendations of the ILAC review, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) developed an

ambitious five-phase strategy for judicial reform. Some of the projects proposed included the re-establishment of two criminal courts in Monrovia, the rehabilitation of the Supreme Court, support for the Ministry of Justice, the expansion of the number of functioning magistrate and circuit courts, judge and prosecutor training, and the formulation of appropriate pay scales for judges, prosecutors, and court administration staff (USAID, 2013).

The agenda of the UN Mission in Lebanon (UNMIL) hasn't stopped the justice sector from reforming at an alarmingly slow pace. The Ministry of Justice claims it lacks the financial resources to repair the dozens of courthouses that have been damaged or robbed during the country's protracted armed conflict. The UN Mission in Lebanon's (UNMIL) judicial reform budget excludes funds for infrastructure development projects such as courtroom repair and equipment. When President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf took office in Liberia, the country's court system was in shambles. During that time, just 55 of the 145 magistrate positions have been filled, and none of the candidates had a law degree. Liberia has a total of fifteen circuit courts, however only five of them are currently staffed and operational. The fact that only 3% of all inmates in Liberia's jails and holding cells have been convicted of a crime is a grave problem (USAID, 2013).

Despite the fact that the two criminal courts in Monrovia have been technically re-established and judges and prosecutors are now getting money for their work, according to a recent USAID study, poor salaries and morale have done little to improve the operation of the courts (USAID, 2013). The courthouses lacked both lighting and amplification equipment, as well as a centralized record-keeping system, according to the USAID evaluation team. A typical criminal trial would take 42 days to complete, which is the amount of time permitted for the entire term of the court. After examining the fact that Monrovia is a metropolis of roughly one million people with a major crime problem, the USAID team came to the conclusion that "this is a barometer of a broken judicial system (USAID, 2013).

The local court system was restructured and given the necessary amount of regulation, which had previously been presided over by traditional chiefs or their officers and applied customary law. The local court system is the only sort of legal system that a major section of the general public has access to. Local courts regularly misuse their authority, unjustly detaining people and levying exorbitant penalties for small violations, as well as adjudicating criminal matters that should be heard in higher

courts, all of which were aided by USAID and other partners. Local courts' application of customary law is typically biased, notably against women.

Currently, the provinces' buildings housing provincial law courts, police stations, and penal institutions all need to be restored and updated. A shortage of judges, magistrates, prosecutors, and courtrooms has resulted in massive backlogs that must be handled. Moreover, the extended and unconstitutional incarceration of hundreds of criminal suspects, many of whom lack the constitutionally guaranteed due process protections, must be addressed. The incoming administration should make it a high priority to fill the current judicial openings, such as judges, magistrates, prosecutors, and public defenders, with qualified professionals who are compensated appropriately. The government should also take steps to ensure that the judicial system is devoid of political interference and corruption, as well as impartial, unbiased, and immune to popular opinion.

The international community expanded funding for human rights organizations that give legal aid or defender services to the poor, as well as providing technical support to these organizations, to help people facing criminal accusations or seeking legal remedy through the judicial system. Furthermore, the international community helped both financially and technically to the process of amending existing laws, many of which are outdated and do not comply with international standards, particularly those that do not provide sufficient rights to women and children.

The final half of President Sirleaf regime was heavily supported by many donors. The Liberian government unveiled Liberia Rising 2030 to the public as the nation's overarching strategic plan in 2012. By the year 2030, this strategy aims to help Liberia become a middle-income country (MIC). Strong institutions, a diverse economy, inclusive and peaceful politics, and rapid human capital expansion would all contribute to this. By concentrating on Liberia's main development challenges—consolidating peace and security, developing the manufacturing and service sectors, developing human capital, raising the standard of governance, and strengthening public institutions—the Agenda for Transformation, a medium-term development plan for 2013–17, attempted to further the government's vision. The plan's main focus on expanding the manufacturing and service sectors was how this was achieved (Gershoni, 2014). In accordance with the goals that the government has set forth, this Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) examines the various obstacles that Liberia must overcome in order to obtain the status of MIC by the year 2030. It was fairly

simple to access the associated Agenda for Transformation (Afr) document, which had further interesting information. The visioning commission created this document independently, based on the information we have. This document serves as a roadmap and framework for the years 2012 to 2017. The main administrative instruments used are the medium-term strategies that are used to carry out vision statements.

The Process of Visioning is Still Underway, according to the AfT. It is interesting to notice that the visioning process did not start until after the short-term implementation plan was finished. Despite the fact that practice is still difficult, AFT was a more strategically relevant text. According to the AFT, the 2030 vision has a status comparable to that of the middle class. By emphasizing objectives and deliverables, prioritizing investments, acknowledging the interdependence of all sectors, and recognizing the need for reflective monitoring and assessment, it uses the lessons learned from the PRS. The five-year plan's structure and goals are covered in the Afr document. It names economic change, human development, governance, public institutions, and cross-cutting issues as development pillars in addition to peace, justice, security, and the rule of law.

The AfT specifies four sector pillars inside this strategic overlay that are similar to the PRS's four. The following are these pillars: 1. Governance and public institutions; 2. Economic transformation; 3. Human development; and 4. Peace, justice, security, and the rule of law. Increasing Liberia's ability to continue making development progress is the main goal of this strategic overlay.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is supported in the reconstruction of the Armed Forces of Liberia and the Coast Guard, while the Department of State is provided the Liberian National Police with training on the rule of law in the field of national security. Land tenure reform is also supported by DOD Section 1207 money, and other DOD funds have assisted Liberia in purchasing lab supplies and other items for the diagnosis and treatment of HIV/AIDS.

Treasury is assisted the Ministry of Finance with its revenue and budget planning in order to promote economic growth. Loan guarantees are offered by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation with a concentration on renewable energy, finance, telecoms, hotels, and insurance.

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) funds projects that support the Feed the Future project in the fields of food security and agriculture, whereas the United States Forest Service funds initiatives that support community

forestry. Additionally, the African Development Foundation offers underserved and marginalized organizations grants for agriculture and food security (USAID, 2012). A \$15 million, three-year "Threshold Country Program" for Liberia was approved by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2010. With the help of these monies, trade policy improvements, access to land, and the enrollment and retention of more girls in primary school will all be promoted. The MCC board chose Liberia as an eligible nation to create a new Compact in December 2012 (USAID, 2012).

For the length of this strategy, support from USAID and other international partners was therefore essential to accomplishing development goals. Line ministries were tasked with making sure that donor initiatives operating in their specific sectors support government aims and strategies while avoiding duplication of effort. The Ministry of Finance worked to increase the capacity of its Aid Management Unit and Project Financial Management Unit for this purpose. Donors, in particular the World Bank, are collaborated with the GOL to strengthen its capacity to coordinate and monitor donor assistance across all sectors. USAID Forward and this CDCS were tightly integrated with the GOL's aid policy, which is currently in place.

Organizing donors around topics including land, energy, forestry, agriculture, education, and mother and child health primarily takes place at the sector and sub-sector levels.

They have taken the initiative to define the proper division of labor among contributors and provide solutions in other areas, most notably health and education. The Mission expects that they will be successful in inspiring and supporting important policy improvements in other areas, such as various aspects of civil service reform.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Conclusion

The United States of America has provided development assistance to Liberia through two main means. Throughout the Cold War, the use of development aid as a vehicle for supporting successive American client regimes in Liberia in order to meet the United States' political, economic, and strategic interests conditioned the style. This was done in order for Liberia to continue to serve as a client state for the US. In this case, the US government offered financial aid solely to the Liberian government for the latter's different development programs. As a result, the United States of America regarded Liberia's authoritarian government and subsequent regimes as drivers of social and economic growth" and continued to support them in that capacity.

Even though the US was responsible for the formulation of certain political circumstances, those conditions were never implemented because the US prioritized the resolution of more serious concerns that were more important to its national interest. Despite this, the economic conditions, particularly the requirement that Liberia purchase and/or promote US goods and services, were met. The American aid program emphasised programmatic support and capacity building over the actual implementation of new development projects, rather than focusing on the actual construction of new buildings or infrastructure. This was done instead of focusing Liberia's efforts on the construction of brand new structures. As the post-Cold War era grew into full bloom, the United States' perspective on providing development assistance to Liberia evolved. The "new style" is defined by the use of multiple recipients, such as the Liberian government and non-governmental organizations, the rhetorical use of political conditionalities, the actual implementation of economic conditionalities, such as the requirement that Liberia use development aid to buy goods and services from the US, and the focus on programmatic support and capacity building rather than physical development projects. The new style is formed by combining all of these aspects. When these elements are integrated, the so-called "new style" emerges. Finally, the manner in which the United States contributes to Liberia's socioeconomic growth through development assistance has had and will continue to have a range of consequences on the country's success. For example, the United States' commitment to development assistance is not focused at assisting Liberia in meeting its vital developmental needs. This is an illustration. Instead, as previously stated, the

major goal of US development assistance to Liberia is to assist the US in achieving its own economic, political, and geopolitical goals. The United States' commitment to overseas development is influenced and directed by realpolitik; as a result, any development advantage acquired by Liberia would be accidental on the side of the United States. To put it another way, realpolitik is the force that shapes and constrains the United States' contribution to the advancement of international development. The employment of American development aid to accomplish socioeconomic growth in a range of African countries requires the formation of new progressive administrations across the continent. This is because American development assistance is conditional on its recipients using it to achieve socioeconomic growth. As a result, these regimes would be forced to rewrite the parameters of the larger international political economy, as well as its subsidiary components like the UN and other significant state sources of development money. This asymmetric relationship between the US and Liberia has placed the US as an aid donor to Liberia but in really essence, the aid that the US has provided do not commiserate with the development that they have spent their money on because the aid is not meant to serve the interest of the recipient country, Liberia. The U.S. aid assistance program to the sirleaf's administration did not the serve the purpose for which it was given over the period of twelve years, but rather from all indications it serves the interest of the U.S government and that Liberia did not benefit. Over the period from 2006 to 2017, Liberia and the U.S. aid assistance program to the government cannot be reflected in the lives of the people and there is no tangibles to show for the aid that came to the country.

### **Recommendations**

The researcher strongly recommends the following:

That the government of Liberia should tie her allied ship to institutions or country that is interested in its developmental agenda and the welfare of her people rather than serving the political, economic, and strategic interests of these countries.

That the U.S. government should change the style of development aid to African nations especially to a nation that is widely believed to be her very strong ally.

That USAID should now place qualify Liberians in position to head Liberia's developmental drive.

## References

- Campbell, H. G. (2017). The United States and security in Africa: The impact of the military management of the international system. *Africa Development*, 42(3), 45-71.
- Randall, D. (1966). US Aid in Africa. *Current History*, 51(299), 20-27.
- Lawson, L. (2007). *US Africa policy since the Cold War*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA Center for Contemporary Conflict.
- Hope Sr, K. R. (2010). Liberia's Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP): an impact review and analytical assessment of a donor policy intervention for democratic state-building in a post-conflict state. *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 17(2), 243-263.
- Cook, N. (2010, May). Liberia's post-war development: key issues and US assistance. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
- Hayner, P. (2007). Negotiating peace in Liberia: preserving the possibility for justice.
- Dube, J. (2008). Resurrecting the Rule of Law in Liberia. *Me. L. Rev.*, 60, 575.
- Akingbade, H. (1985). US Liberian Relations during World War II. *Phylon (1960-)*, 46(1), 25-36.
- Cook, N. (2003, December). Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and US Relations. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.
- Cook, N. (2018). Liberia: Political Transition and US Relations. *Current Politics and Economics of Africa*, 11(4), 325-356.
- Calcagno, D. (2016). Killing Ebola: The militarization of US aid in Liberia. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 8(7).
- Dunn, D. E. (2009). *Liberia and the United States during the cold war: limits of reciprocity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.



- United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs, & USGPO Staff. (1994). *US Policies Toward Liberia, Togo, and Zaire: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, First Session, June 9, 1993* (Vol. 103, No. 357). US Government Printing Office.
- Lumumba-Kasongo, T. (2001). United States' Legacy in Liberia. *The Politics and Policies of Sub-Saharan Africa, Lanham*, 83-116.
- Harris, K. (1982). *The United States, Liberia, and their foreign relations to 1847*. Cornell University.
- Kieh Jnr, G. K. (2014). The American style of development aid to Liberia. *Africanus*, 44(2), 33-49.
- Hyman, L. S. (2003). *United States Policy Towards Liberia, 1822 to 2003: Unintended Consequences?*. Africana Homestead Legacy Pub.
- Normandy, E. L. (1993). African-Americans and US Policy Toward Liberia, 1929-1935. *Liberian Studies Journal*, 28(2), 203-230.
- Edwards, J. A., & Valenzano III, J. M. (2007). Bill Clinton's "new partnership" anecdote: Toward a post-Cold War foreign policy rhetoric. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 6(3), 303-325.
- Ploch, L. (2009, May). Zimbabwe: The power sharing agreement and implications for US Policy. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE.
- Calcagno, D. (2016). Killing Ebola: The militarization of US aid in Liberia. *Journal of African Studies and Development*, 8(7).
- Gershoni, Y. (2018). One Nobel—Two Approaches: Liberian Women's Struggle to End the Civil War and Establish Democracy.
- Dessus, S., Hoffman, J., & Lofgren, H. (2012). Liberia: Strategic policy options for medium term growth and development. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, (6081).

Cassell Jr, D. L. (2014). *Liberian 2030 Vision: A Comparative Study. VOLUME39 2014 Number, 69.*

O'Rourke, R., & Moodie, M. (2020). *US role in the world: background and issues for Congress.* Congressional Research Service.

**Appendices**  
**Appendix A**  
**Turnitin Similarity Report**

AUSTIN T. G. TOGBA-US- LIBERIA RELATIONS: A LOOK AT U.S.  
 DEVELOPMENT AID TO LIBERIA FROM 2006-2017

ORIGINALITY REPORT

<b>14%</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>4%</b>
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

<b>1</b>	<a href="http://cornellpress.manifoldapp.org">cornellpress.manifoldapp.org</a> Internet Source	2%
<b>2</b>	<a href="http://www.tandfonline.com">www.tandfonline.com</a> Internet Source	2%
<b>3</b>	<a href="http://academicjournals.org">academicjournals.org</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>4</b>	<a href="http://www.everycrsreport.com">www.everycrsreport.com</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>5</b>	<a href="http://upjournals.co.za">upjournals.co.za</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>6</b>	<a href="http://www.pbs.org">www.pbs.org</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>7</b>	<a href="http://www.usaid.gov">www.usaid.gov</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>8</b>	<a href="http://crsreports.congress.gov">crsreports.congress.gov</a> Internet Source	1%
<b>9</b>	<a href="http://docplayer.net">docplayer.net</a> Internet Source	1%

**Appendix B**  
**Ethics Committee Approval**



**BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU**

06.09.2022

Dear Austin T G Togba

Your project **“US- Liberia Relations: A Look at Development Aid from 2006-2017”** has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used in the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın Kiraz

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

**Note:** If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.