



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

STATE BUILDING CHALLENGES IN LIBYA DURING THE POST-
GADDAFI TRANSITION PERIOD

PhD. THESIS

Abdelsalam Mohamed Yussif MOHAMED

Nicosia
June, 2022

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Supervisor






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
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
We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Abdelsalam Mohamed Yussif MOHAMED titled “**State Building Challenges In Libya During The Post-Gaddafi Transition Period**” and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of PhD in Political Science and International Relations.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

Abdelsalam Mohamed Yussif MOHAMED

...../...../.....

To my parents for their guidance and my wife and children for their support and encouragement.

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Abstract

State Building Challenges In Libya During The Post-Gaddafi Transition Period

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Libya was plunged into a state of crisis following the collapse of Gaddafi's regime in 2011 as a result of the Arab Uprising. The crisis led to a divided nation wherein different armed units and political arrangements continually scramble to gain political supremacy over Libya. There is no doubt that the struggle to gain political supremacy has led to constant civil conflicts in Libya and the sectarian differences amongst the local population continue to increase the local conflicts in Libya.

Libya as a nation is divided into numerous tribal groups and characterized as a rentier state which was introduced by Gaddafi to exert control and consolidate power. The authoritarian leadership style of Gaddafi also created a lower level of political participation amongst Libyans, hence, political participation was regarded only for elites or for members of dominant tribes. The social (tribe), economic (rentier state), and political problems of Libya affected state-building measures during and after Gaddafi's regime.

Deriving from these points, the thesis analyzed state-building challenges in Libya during the post-Gaddafi transition period by analyzing in-depth the political, economic, and social causes. Additionally, Gaddafi's political strategies and how these affect the current political instability in Libya are elucidated. Similarly, the study discusses foreign intervention in Libya, especially the various interventions by the United Nations in creating modern political apparatus in Libya which all failed due to political, military, and tribal differences in Libya.

Keywords: Libya, State-building, Gaddafi, Tribe, Arab-Uprising

Özet

Gaddafi Dönemi Sonrası Geçiş Döneminde Libya'da Devlet İnşası Sorunları

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Libya, 2011 yılında Arap Ayaklanması sonucunda Kaddafi rejiminin çöküşünden sonra bir kriz durumuna sürüklendi. Kriz, farklı silahlı birimlerin ve siyasi düzenlemelerin sürekli olarak Libya üzerinde siyasi üstünlük elde etmek için mücadele ettiği bölünmüş bir ulusa yol açtı. Şüphesiz siyasi üstünlük elde etme mücadelesi Libya'da sürekli iç çatışmalara yol açmıştır ve yerel halk arasındaki mezhep farklılıkları Libya'da yerel çatışmaları artırmaya devam etmektedir.

Bir millet olarak Libya, çok sayıda kabile grubuna bölünmüştür ve Kaddafi tarafından kontrol uygulamak ve gücü pekiştirmek için tanıtılan bir rantiyeye devleti olarak nitelendirilmektedir. Kaddafi'nin otoriter liderlik tarzı da Libyalılar arasında daha düşük bir siyasi katılım düzeyi yarattı. Bu nedenle siyasi katılım yalnızca seçkinler veya baskın aşiret üyeleri ile sınırlı kaldı. Libya'nın sosyal (kabile), ekonomik (kiracı devlet) ve siyasi sorunları, Kaddafi rejimi sırasında ve sonrasında devlet inşası önlemlerini etkilemiştir.

Bu noktalardan yola çıkarak bu çalışma siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal nedenleri derinlemesine analiz ederek Kaddafi sonrası geçiş döneminde Libya'da devlet inşası zorluklarını analiz etmektedir. Ayrıca, bu tez, Kaddafi'nin siyasi tekniklerine ve bunun mevcut Libya'yı nasıl etkilediğine odaklanarak Libya'da devlet kurma sürecinin zorluklarını incelemektedir. Benzer şekilde, Libya'daki dış müdahaleyi, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletler'in Libya'da modern siyasi aygıt yaratmaya yönelik çeşitli müdahalelerini ve bunların Libya'daki siyasi, askeri ve aşiret farklılıkları nedeniyle neden başarısızlığa uğradığı da tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Libya, Devlet İnşası, Kaddafi, Aşiret, Arap Ayaklanması

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List of Abbreviations

AFRICOM:	African Command
ASU:	Arab Socialist Union
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
CTC:	Cyrenaica Transitional Council
CDA:	Constitutional Drafting Authority
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GPC:	General People's Congress
GNA:	Government of National Accord
GNC:	Government of National Coalition
EU:	European Union
HoR:	House of Representative
IAEA:	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
IOM:	International Organization for Migration
ISIS:	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LNA:	Libyan National Army
LPA:	Libyan Political Agreement
MENA:	The Middle East and North Africa
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ:	No-Fly Zone
PC:	Popular Congresses
PR:	Popular Revolution
PSLC:	Peoples Social Leadership Committee
RCC:	Revolutionary Command Council
R2P:	Responsibility to Protect

SU:	Soviet Union
TNC:	Transitional National Council
UAE:	United Arab Emirates
UNSMIL:	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UN:	United Nations
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
USA:	United States of America

CHAPTER I

Introduction

1.1 Background of Study

The period between 2010 and 2012 was characterized by an uprising in the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The uprising which involved protests, riots, and demonstrations that suddenly became widespread was identified as the 'Arab Uprising'. The people within the MENA region desired change and they have exercised this desire in several ways from non-violent means to the use of violence in response to the action of government military/police forces.

The Arab Uprising has brought about several antagonistic agents to the regional discourse like the youth movement, militias, and rebels. The power of such movements and the presence of militia have attracted the attention of scholars to compare the Arab Uprising discourse to the democratization recommendation that has always been forwarded to states in the region as there is a reconfiguration of the authoritarian regimes in the region.

Most countries in the MENA region were affected by the Arab Uprising region, especially Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, and Libya. Several reasons given by scholars for the Arab Uprising include the dissatisfaction that the people experienced as regards existing living standards and the prevailing limitations on the achievement of liberty and prosperity (Lacher, 2015, p. 2).

Although some of the above-mentioned states experienced some form of democratic government policies, there were still instances where huge undemocratic processes were occurring. Hence, this undemocratic principles or undemocratic government provide a difficult condition for an efficient state-building process. This is evident in the distress and instability that characterized the countries in the MENA region. The worse cases have been Syria and Libya although Arab Spring was evident in most parts of the MENA. However, this thesis focuses on Libya for its uniqueness in the Arab Uprising as being the only case of North Atlantic Treaty Organizations' intervention (NATO) and its ongoing state of conflict that harbours two-government.

After Gaddafi's leadership, Libya has been plagued with ever-increasing stability and state-building challenges which occurred as a result of political in-cohesiveness and a lack of legitimate state institutions (Sawani, 2018. P. 815). The country has been subject to the ongoing proliferation of weapons, Islamic insurgencies,

sectarian violence, and lawlessness, with spillovers affecting neighbouring countries, and Libya became riddled with political and military divisions since the uprising against its leader Gaddafi. Due to this political in-cohesiveness, state policies and actions were formulated amongst non-state or temporary actors who became the major actors in Libya's domestic politics, effectively blocking peaceful negotiations and rejecting approaches to conflict resolutions that did not reflect their interests. Similarly, the persistent nature of the Libyan conflict is tied to factors such as religion, and regional, tribal, and international actors. This thesis, however, majorly concentrates on the numerous state-building attempts in the Libyan state and why it was impossible to achieve reasonable growth.

Following the Arab uprising in 2011, the Libyan conflict gained profound international status, widely discussed in the literature, media, and even amongst politicians far and wide. Owing to the complexity of the Libyan conflict, various international actors intervened in Libya, hence, signifying a shift from a mere domestic disagreement to an issue of international concern. Additionally, the complexity of the Libyan conflict has transcended its boundaries to exert consequences on its neighbouring countries. As a means of dispute settlement, the international system through various domestic approaches sought to introduce efficient state-building measures in Libya.

State-building is an important civic process for any nation. For any state-building process to be fully successful, it is more than just formulating national state-building but also defining, designing, building, or reforming public institutions. However, it must be noted that no matter how successful such technical state-building processes may be, some parts of the population will remain excluded and major segments of the population are likely to remain highly mistrustful of the (new) state and its institutions, hence, ensuring state building to reflect a continual process of constant development and strategy. From this idea, it can be understood the transformative approach to state-building that includes state-building in which dealing with the Gaddafi legacy and unmounting old memories is central to preventing future conflict relapse.

Despite the unfoldings of the Arab Uprising in which Libya is a unique case, the countries in the region have still maintained authoritarian governments in their forms yet without NATO's intervention. In Libya, the response of Gaddafi to the protesters has attracted the attention of the international community. Gaddafi's forces

have responded by calling the protesters “rats” and “cockroaches” justifying a military response to protesters is valid. The nostalgic attachment of the international community to the issues of Rwanda, where such classification of humans led to genocide led to the invoking of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as Gaddafi forces strategically go after protesters and oppositions to the government.

The United Nations Security Council, therefore, passed two resolutions in effect to deter Gaddafi from killing protesters. Firstly is the resolution 1970 which disallowed the possibility of Gaddafi travelling or having access to his assets. This resolution also referred to members of his cabinet. The travel ban and asset freezing resolution 1970 did not stop the use of force by Gaddafi against its citizens therefore, resolution 1973 was adopted to authorize the use of every means that is available as a responsibility to protect. Libya was the first case in which the United Nations Security Council implemented the use of force as a deterrence to further criminal offences in a state, hence, leading to the debate on the responsibility to protect.

The discussion on the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) has gained higher traction following the resolution 1973 as well as other international interventions in Libya (Varelli, 2014). The 1973 resolution marked the origin of NATO’s intervention in Libya which has significantly contributed to the aftermath of such intervention in the current chaotic state of Libya. After four decades of dictatorial rule by Mohammed Gaddafi, his regime continued to be oppressive, hence leading to local unrest which saw the introduction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to salvage the situation.

NATO acting under the resolution 1973 postulated by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution, launched a seven-month low-intensity airstrike was launched which eventually led to the end of Gaddafi’s 42-year reign (Chivvis & Martini, 2014, P. 1). It is pertinent to note that the resolution 1970 has been welcomed without any significant level of controversy however, the continued increase in instability in Libya has led to the questioning of the resolution 1973 and caused a reluctance to apply it to other causes such as Syria. The argument for intervention is to what extent has resolution 1970 been evaluated before passing 1973 and the intervention of NATO. The response has been a threshold of 100,000 death and all necessary means would include military intervention after No-fly Zone has been utilized. Pro-interventionist has argued that the intervention stopped the continuous killing by Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, but the debate remains that the intervention

carries indiscriminate bombings which counter the spirit of R2P. Also, killings have continued among armed factions more than five years after the intervention, and a legitimate government has not been established.

The Responsibility to Protect and the resolution 1973 have not created grounds on which a state-building process can take place in Libya in the aftermath of the intervention. The consideration of the historical and political context of state formation in Libya, if considered as part of all necessary means, would have provided insight for a post-intervention provision to be made for Libya's state-building. In the absence of that, and the continuity of the instability, this thesis tries to examine the depth of this problem and others that have surfaced out of it.

It should be noted that the problems of Libya could be considered from the local, regional and international points of view. From the level of analysis it reflects, the local perspective, the second is from the regional perspective, and the third is from the international angle. The local perspective is connected to the history of the country. The regional perspective is driven by the absence of a government that is strong and it is also connected to the local perspective. Examining Libya from the local perspective involves issues such as internal divisions, weak leadership, lack of public administration, and lack of investments.

The issues mentioned cannot only be attributed to the Libyan crisis of 2011 alone but we must also understand that there had been divisions among the people of Libya before the regime of Gaddafi. Before Gaddafi, Libya was under the Ottoman Empire (1551-1911) (Vandewalle, 1998. P. 23). During this era, Libya was divided between Tripoli and Benghazi. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Italians fought the Ottoman Empire and won. However, they found out that they had another enemy 'The Libyans.' During the reign of the Italians (1911-1934), Libya was also divided into two parts; Tripoli and Cyrenaica until 1928 and was unified for military reasons (Vandewalle, 1998. P. 24-25). Even though it was said to be unified, it was divided into five provinces or regions for better control.

According to Otman and Karlberg (2007, P. 35) until Libya had its independence in 1951, the allied protectorate (1934-1951) was in control of Libya and then King Idris took over from 1951. King Idris created a federal constitution, a federal state, and then divided Libya into three big regions. The era of King Idris was not perfect. It dealt with a lot of internal conflicts. Some Libyans wanted a federal state and others didn't want a federal state. Kind Idris tried unifying the region in 1963 but

it could not work. However, in 1969, King Idris was overthrown by Gaddafi in a coup. The essence of narrating the divisions that have been existing in Libya is to enable us to see that the Libyan state had never for once operated under a single and unified system.

When Gaddafi came into power, the divisions in the state widened. Although it could be argued that he had good intentions of making Libya a successful state where people could live in better conditions, this could not be achieved because of his selfish interests and his ability to run the state like personal property. Gaddafi used the divide and rule method, turning one against another. He also used this same strategy for the colonialists to be hated. This was the strategy he used to manage the country. So when the civil war in Libya broke out, it was difficult to define Libya as a state because all the elements that make up a state were either non-existent or weak and we can see such divisions today such as political divisions, ethnic divisions, and tribal divisions leading to tribal clashes.

On the other hand, external actors were interested in using Libya as business bait (resources gotten from the country). These external actors have disrupted the normal process of democratization. This means that what Libya is today is a combination of touch from both the international community and the local indigenes.

The regional problem is caused by both external actors and internal actors. External actors involve the stake of other countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, etc) in Libya. However, one can say the internal problems were caused by a lack of a unified and strong government in Libya. As a result, Libya is said to almost lack everything. Things such as non-access to political leadership, a very weak economy, lack of investment, weak government, no good class of politicians, and lack of security. This leads us to the third category of the problem that Libya is going through.

International issues in Libya can be said to also be influenced by both internal and external actors. External actors can be seen as those who are at the top while internal actors can be seen as those causing problems from the root of Libya. Internal issues can be the problem of migration, energy, and terrorism. As regards terrorism, there is a collaboration between terrorist groups and normal criminal groups. Sometimes they act together and sometimes they act separately. However, criminality is growing because of the absence of a strong government in the state. In addition, Libya has become a haven for terrorists and those travelling to Europe. In 2020, there were over 200, 000 migrants in Libya waiting to cross to Europe, leading the US State

Department to describe trafficking in Libya's migration issues as a 'special case in 2020 (US Dept of State, 2020).

According to a report by Migration Agency-the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2018, the number of migrants that arrived by sea in Europe was 55,001, and 1,504 deaths from 1 January to 25 July 2018. In 2017, there were 111, 753 arrivals and 2,401 deaths higher than the levels of 2018 (IOM, 2018). There is also the problem of energy because Libya has one of the best oils in the world and countries want a piece from them. This opens a problem of geopolitical strategic competition. For example, countries like Russia and the Western countries want dominance in Libya.

The current Libyan state is regarded as a development that was created following a transition of power from the Ottoman Empire to the Italian state during the colonial ages. This form of state formation was highly recognized as a weakness for King Idris al-Senussi and Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, they both tried to implement various policies to hold together these multi-tribal state that was created out of external force and discretion (Sanbakken, 2006. P. 142). Libya, synonymous with other countries in the MENA is struggling with identity issues, a major element that continues to enforce anti-peaceful cooperation in the country.

As Gaddafi tried to improve and develop a national identity, they were other forms of identities that were present in the country that hindered efficient political activities. For example, regional or Arab identity is one of the two dominant identities that plagued political activities in Libya. This meant that the majority of Libyans firstly identified themselves as Arabs even before considering the Libyan identity. The second dominant identity is one arranged according to ancestry relationship and tribal affiliation. This is most common in Libya since it identifies with the various tribes in the country, upon which a larger part of political participation is vested.

The nature of the economic system adopted in the country was another problem that hindered the efficient formation of state-building processes in Libya. Gaddafi exploited the rentier system of economics to his favour in Libya. He maintained and increased power over Libyan politics and the rent acquired from the sales of oil to foreign nations was used to finance a welfare state, favouring those close to him and ensuring loyalty from elite members of the society (Torvik, 2002. P. 461). As a reality, rentierism permitted him (Gaddafi) to remain in rule for more than 40 years, encircled by a feeble institutional contraption.

This study highlights measures through which Gaddafi sought to consolidate and maintain power. The rentier system for example was a means through which he maintained this form of control, and similarly, political institutions were increasingly weakened, making him the source of the law with a centralized form of political power that was vested in himself. However, people lost faith in the political system of Libya, and for this reason, together with the increased level of hardship, Libyans wasted no time in requesting change during the Arab uprising.

Consequently, the Arab Uprising created political effects in Libya, a more important effect being the death of Gaddafi. Therefore, the post-Gaddafi period was characterized by a power vacuum that armed and non-armed actors, as well as individuals, sought to fill. For this reason, this period was faced with a growing rate of competition over political power involving regional and international actors. The civil conflicts that arose in the post-Gaddafi era strategically divided the country into different groups and international actors in the conflict were automatically defined along with these domestic groups in Libya. In addition, the control of international actors over the domestic affairs in Libya was discussed as another major factor hindering the country's growth and state-building attempts.

As mentioned by Mezran (2014), the division in Libya is supported by the interest of foreign powers in the country as they seek to establish economic and political benefits for their selfish interest. This interest was further represented when Libya was divided into parts such as Tobruk in the East and the Islamist militia in the West amongst others. From these above-mentioned elements of the conflict, it is clear that Libya is going through intensified problems that only foreign attempts at state-building might be unable to solve.

1.2 Statement of The Problem

After the 2011 revolt and the consequent armed conflicts that followed the revolt, Libya was subdivided into different factions with competing authorities, legitimations and autonomous processes, especially after the beginning of the 2014 civil war (Mezran, 2014). Generally, two large areas have their power structures and elites who compete amongst themselves. The first comprises the region around Tripoli; the second is made up of the eastern part of the country, centred around Tobruk. Other regions are under the control of various armed movements, configuring changing

political geography with the city-state of Misrata in the centre (with some of the most powerful militias in Libya), the city of Zintan in the west, and Sabha in the south.

Following the 2011 conflict, the leaders of Libya failed to cooperate on policies that will improve state-building, leading to the formation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) also known as the Skhirat Agreement through the support of the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) on 17 December 2015 (Fasanotti, 2017. P. 97). As mentioned by Fasanotti (2019), the Skhirat Agreement set up the universally perceived Government of National Accord (GNA), just as the chosen House of Representatives (HoR), and a Higher Council of State (HCS) which incorporates most individuals from the dead Islamist ruled parliament. Nonetheless, none of these addresses the entire country, and in the battle, previously and coming about because of the LPA, lies the clear inability to determine the contention and accomplish the ideal harmony which would add to the necessities of state-building.

It is important to take note that the LPA has not had the option to handle division and struggle since it comes up short on a reasonable agreement on significant issues, and incidentally, the GNA has not had the option to stay away from its inner division, comparably, power-sharing courses of action of the LPA have not accomplished what was wanted. Advancements have so far just affirmed the failure of the bodies, hence, the Skhirat Agreement aimed to increase the efficiency of the various institutions by ensuring cooperation and providing a uniform mode of action from these institutions.

However, the objectives of the agreement could not be met following the conflictual nature of the Libyan conflict, and cooperation amongst the institutions in the East and West could not be guaranteed, hence, leading to greater confusion about who rules Libya. For this reason, General Haftar in 2019 sought to conquer Tripoli using the Libyan National Army, therefore, leading to an increasing failure of the Skhirat Agreement (Fasanotti, 2019).

Similarly, as experienced in local Libyan communities, especially in Tripoli, the general public trust and legality granted to the GNA have continued to dwindle as common social problems are still erupting in Libya. The GNA in Tripoli and its rival in Bayda have built exterior bodies and associations that have negatively influenced state-building measures. These secondary organizations have further hindered the public image of the Skhirat Agreement since a majority of these externally formed organizations are mostly to enrich the elite members of the Libyan society.

The Skhirat agreement was not implemented/implementable in Libya because of its lack of legitimacy. Five years after the attempt to implement the agreement failed, no other agreement has been introduced as a result of variant challenges. Therefore, there is a need to investigate the problem of state-building and legitimacy in Libya. There are various state-building challenges that Libya is presently going through and some of the highlighted problems that are elaborated on in this study include political and administrative problems, socio-economic problems, democratic problems, and the role of external actors.

The political arrangements that Gaddafi embraced were mirrored to reflect poor levels of democracy and to show a significant level of disdain for rule of law and order. He attempted to pulverize all political and common associations, as well as advance a culture of reliance on the rentier economy, supporting state-sponsored corruption, and building a culture supported by connection, neopatrimonialism, and clientelism (Fulkner, 2017). The harsh experience of the Gaddafi era prompted an undeniable absence of interest in institutional approaches and the rise of a general public character with little regard for state administrative institutions.

Additionally, Gaddafi's hatred for the democratic system, ideological groups, a free press, worker's organizations, and common civil society has added to advancing the problems faced in Libya, during and after Gaddafi's regime (Sawani and Pack, 2013. pp. 523–43). Lisa Anderson (1986) supported this thought and highlighted that the nature of the Libyan political system during Gaddafi's era created a system of undemocratic policies that are regarded as factors hindering public growth. According to Anderson (Anderson, 1986. pp, 228–229):

“The legacy of the Gaddafi era in the political realm will be a contradictory one [...] the [...] regime is in many respects a repressive and manipulative one. Many of its policies are purposely or inadvertently designed to atomize the population and discourage independent organization in civil society [...] this has had, the somewhat ironic result of enhancing the role of kinship ties in political organization”.

In modern Libya, the constant conflict and incongruency in political activities have further increased the domestic instability in the country, causing an interruption to the beginning of state-building policies in the Libyan society. In addition, the Libyan civil war as well as the incessant clashes amongst the belligerents in the war has made state-building attempts inherently difficult, hence, thwarting the attempts to restore

Libya to a state with legitimate political authority and democracy (Pack and Barfi, 2012. P. 40).

In a bid to understand the common problems faced by the Libyan society, the political arrangements provided by Gaddafi provide a major framework for the study. Since this study seeks to analyze challenges to state-building in Libya, a look at the political influences in modern Libya is needed for expansive understanding. A major political arrangement influenced by Gaddafi which is also regarded as an element of the problems in modern-day Libya is Gaddafism. Gaddafism influences to a great extent the financial and social history of the Libyan community.

As mentioned by Ahmida (2012, P. 2), Gaddafism is regarded as the system of expression that came about because of the "military upheaval" influenced by Gaddafi after 1969 which established a cultural concept for all Libyans. To ensure consolidation of power, Gaddafi sought to explore the socio-cultural view of the country, hence, drawing power not only from political arrangement but also from a cultural aspect. The principle of drawing political power from cultural arrangements and identities was the measure Gaddafi adopted in eliminating the social elements that may serve as an opposition against Gaddafi's rulership (Ahmida 2012, pp. 1–2).

George Joffe (2015) provides a comparison which aided in understanding the various political culture across the Maghrib region. He indicates that Gaddafi's socio-cultural state model known as the Jamahiriya was a reassertion of revolutionary political culture. The Jamahiriya state model that was advertised by Gaddafi included a system of both ancestral personality and Islamic standards which are as yet dynamic in the post-Gaddafi period (Joffe, 2015). Mattes (2014) makes a relationship between Gaddafi's Jamahiriya state and the state-building process which has been uncompleted since Libya's independence in December 1951.

The Arab uprising became another by-product of this unfinished state-building process in Libya, therefore, the uprisings were not only concentrated in the central locations in Libya but rather occurred in the suburbs where Gaddafi had influenced the most. Similarly, the suburbs were the regions where the principle of Gaddafism was widespread and when the Arab Uprising began, people sought to remove all influence of Gaddafi from the roots which led them to the suburbs.

Gaddafism is today the subject of a widespread discussion between local, domestic, regional, and international actors. This discussion lies between two main factions which were the alleged Gaddafi allies or supporters and the opposition. In

addition to the fact that Gaddafi's loyalists have their disparities and conflicts, their interests align with their selfish gains to achieve political authority under Libyan politics.

It is also important to note that the parliamentary members from Gaddafi's regime have nearly deserted their connection with the former political order in the country, thus, these members of parliaments are continually searching for new ways to clinch political relevance in the new Libyan state. In a bid of formulating a new Libyan state, there is an increased contestation and the country is divided amongst tribal, religious, political and cultural lines that continually limit the opportunity for solid state-building.

Notwithstanding, it would be termed abnormal that any Gaddafist would acknowledge any policies toward state-building that may be contrary to the practices of Gaddafi, hence, modern-day Libya is faced with those loyalists who would want a continuation of Gaddafi's political ideas and those requesting a total change of the nation's political system. It is, therefore, important to note that despite Gaddafi being a dictator, they were people who still wanted his ideology, hence, these groups of persons formed the opposition group that continuously fought against any attempt to hold Gaddafi's loyalists responsible for the crimes that they committed shortly before the collapse of Gaddafi.

These Gaddafists in Libya required a state-building system to ensure solidarity and liberty for all Libyans as a major approach to ensuring a working state, however, arguing for a pause on the legal decision until a full judicial system is created (Bhardwarj, 2012. P. 83). Hence, making them look to non-Gaddafists as escaping justice for the heinous crimes that were committed during the civil war. Additionally, the Gaddafists still share a little element of Gaddafism in that they give a eulogy to him, honouring his Jamahiriya state with a view that it may be the only true form of state-building in Libya. These extreme tendencies further increased tensions between the Gaddafists and non-Gaddafists in Libya, which has significantly reduced the propensity to reach an efficient decision regarding state-building.

Therefore, problems arise in the inability to reach a concession on the right state-building measure to apply. Due to the significant level of division amongst the communities, some members of the Libyan society are accepting of the previous standards and institutions put in place by Gaddafi, whereas others, especially those in the Western part of the country. The formation of a newer or more improved state

institution in Libya has been very difficult to create due to the political differences in political views in the state. As the country tries to develop its rule of law and ensure citizen safety in conflictual zones, there is also the increased need in providing efficient state institutions which have currently posed a problem for Libyans.

The position of domestic justice is another issue that has increased the domestic tension in Libya. There is no doubt that the Gaddafi system of elite politics led citizens to be involved in corruption, crimes, infringement, human rights abuses, as well as influence in the civil war. Libyans who were not among the elite groups during Gaddafi's regime would like to see justice carried out against those who exploited the country for their interests, especially by the alleged Thuwar (progressives) and heads of the past enemy of Gaddafi's resistance. Justice according to Libyans will be essential in reaching a meaningful settlement and state-building.

According to Wall (2016, P. 7), one significant exercise from the global experience underlines that public arrangements are motivated to succeed when they act according to the needs of the public rather than being enforced by international actors. In post-2011 Libya, numerous associations, plans, and enactments were received to acknowledge state-building. In any case, these have had no genuine effect or understood any real accomplishments. These activities were inadequate in both plan and assets.

In light of the exercises drawn from worldwide contextual investigations and best practices concerning state-building, a major prerequisite concerning efficient state-building revolves around the intervention of foreign administration as well as international organizations to provide efficient measures of state-building in failed states. A major understanding concerning the influence of external actors should consist of settling the various views regarding public interest, building up required steady designs, guaranteeing freedom of the press, and most importantly individual safety (Delacoura, 2005. P. 965).

Another limitation to state-building in Libya is the division of Libyans into the triumphant and crushed or victors and failures after 2011 with no approach to national reconciliation yet. The approach to creating a constitution that was endeavoured in post-2011 Libya reflected contending cases and interests, while the focal authority was frail and getting progressively more vulnerable and separated. Therefore, the 2017 constitution drafted by the Constitutional Drafting Authority (CDA), has not gotten the endorsement of the HoR, which has avoided alluding to it for a referendum. Worse

still, the CDA turned into a field for creating strife and, regardless of the inclusion of UNSMIL, was simply ready to deliver a questionable draft with the blacklist of individuals from the west and social and ethnic gatherings. This improved the probability of conflict.

It is, therefore, important for the foreign organization to regulate their practices according to the domestic affairs of the country in order to achieve a meaningful approach to state-building. The constitution if crafted diplomatically would have ensured the cooperation between members from all parts of Libya, however, due to the level of corruption involved, the international community, especially the UN was made to believe that the constitution was encompassing, therefore, attracting its support. Had the constitution been all-encompassing, the first and giant step to reaching a peaceful state with a strong political system would have been introduced in Libya, however, this was not the case (Van Lier, 2018. P. 19).

Another problem associated with the challenges to state-building challenges in Libya is borne out of the lack of general public support for any civic approach. It should be noted that any endeavour to determine the contention and modify the state and its space should begin with a comprehensive public exchange without the rejection of any gathering. Hence, support is essential for the more significant objective of connecting this cycle to protected matters and state structures. The cooperation of partners is a triumph factor in such a manner and is important to guarantee the execution of what is settled upon (Kaplan and Freeman, 2015. P. 32). Combining harmony after the clash and setting out on improvement may succeed if a strong state-building and a reasonable institutional structure are acknowledged and acquire more extensive cultural and partner commitment and support.

In addition to the building of an institutional structure, an important limitation to state-building in Libya is the poor state of law and judicial arrangements in Libya. The poor approach to legal provision has led to the provision of numerous laws that has further weakened the trust in the state apparatus. Irrespective of the expected result, the formation of temporary judicial organizations with Adhoc individuals has led to a hindrance in state-building, triggered clash and division, endured basic liberties infringement, and obliged exemption since 2011.

Libya is going through a period that makes it imperative for its challenges to be listed out in detail in order to tackle the issues holistically for a strategic state-building process. The socio-economic problems being faced by Libya include lack of the

provision of basic amenities, lack of quality education, corruption, and unemployment amongst other factors. Despite being the 9th largest country with oil reserves (48,363 million barrels), almost 33% of the Libyan population still lives below the poverty line of \$1.90 (World Atlas, 2017; Fulkner, 2017). In summary, the economy is at a halt and in the hands of rebels and factions. In addition, Libyans have been deprived of experiencing a well-structured democratic system of government, do not understand how institutions should work and are not engaged in a democratic process of electing their leader. These factors pose a serious problem for a new Libyan state to emerge.

1.3 Aims And Objectives Of The Study

State-building is essential for every society. It can be defined as the structure of a country. However, various issues may serve as a threat to state-building and limit civic growth in the country. Therefore, state-building becomes a difficult task to build if the country has faced conflicts or is currently facing conflict. Since state-building aims at building uniform relationships amongst members of a country, it becomes inherently important for all members of the society to accept its measures.

This study focuses on Libya and aims to discuss the various ways through which state-building measures were organized before and after Gaddafi's regime. The choice of the pre and post-Gaddafi era is significant for this study since it provides us with the comparison that is needed to efficiently discuss the situation of Libya as well as the state-building situation in the country. Although Libya just like Tunisia, Syria, and Egypt was affected by the Arab Uprising, the aftereffect was different in these countries, each with its peculiar characteristics, which in most cases were unfavourable to national growth and development. However, the Libyan state can be perceived as a failed state, and the study intends to find out why Libya was considered a failed state.

As a country going through civil unrest, this study seeks to understand why this unrest occurs and what are the triggering factors that occasion this unrest. In this regard, the study widely discusses the historical aspect of Libyan politics making huge relation to the Gaddafi regime. Additionally, the study aims to understand state-building by looking at their actions of Gaddafi towards solidifying his position in Libyan politics. In this connection, various tribal structures are examined and discussed by making emphasis on what way Gaddafi coerced these tribes into supporting his politics. The study also examines the rentier structure of the political economy employed by Gaddafi during his regime to keep the country together.

In addition to the above-mentioned topics, the research discussed in detail the centralized system of government applied by Gaddafi to consolidate power and maintain his supremacy over the country. Conclusively, the study will examine all the facets of Gaddafi's regime and explain how he sought to maintain and promote his interest.

In the second part of the study, the state-building process of the post-Gaddafi regime is discussed by explicitly defining the current situation of the country. In this perspective, the study aims to examine the state-building challenges in the post-Gaddafi regime by analyzing in detail state-building attempts, political, administrative, and socio-economic challenges, and also the role of external actors in modern-day Libya.

1.4 Significance of The Study

State-building is an important structure of the modern state which is the contingent historical development, born in blood-not a permanent or inevitable feature of human society. The lack of a strong state-building arrangement will mean a struggling state with various conflictual interests from numerous domestic groups. State-building in the MENA has been characterized as being a reflection of the colonialist powers, therefore, structuring the domestic environment according to unstable elements that in most cases may be incompatible with the domestic environment. It becomes inherently important that discussing the significance of state-building and legitimacy in Libya will be essential in explaining the model of state-building even for other countries in the region (Anderson, 2011, p.4).

The MENA region has increasingly become very important in the international society, and more in the literature. There are numerous discussions about this region, with more focus on foreign involvement, wars, conflicts, oil management, rentier states, and undemocratic policies. However, the literature on state-building is very limited, when talking about Libya. Hence, this study is important to understand the state-building process in Libya before and after Gaddafi's regime.

The Arab Uprising was a domestic sweep across the Arab world. However, only Libya saw an intervention of a foreign organization (NATO). It, therefore, draws to mind, why is Libya the only case for intervention, despite the continuous human rights violation in Syria and Yemen. This makes Libya a more interesting case for this study as it triggers concern over direct foreign involvement during the Arab Uprising.

Another important significance of the study is directly linked to the ongoing state-building, even after the death of Gaddafi in October 2011. This leads to the “*sui generis*” nature of the country as it highlights if the MENA region is exceptional as mentioned by Hariri (2015, P. 481).

This study also seeks to shed light on the internal and external challenges facing Libya to recommend practical and working solutions in building a new Libyan state. Hopefully, this will help the related government officials, academicians, international observers and players, and journalists in providing useful answers to the challenges that Libya is facing.

1.5 Research Questions and Arguments

The main aim of this study is to understand the problems facing state-building challenges during the Gaddafi era. These problems could be economic as mentioned by Altunisik (1996, P. 52), tribal as mentioned by Harik (1987, P. 29), religious as highlighted by Sawani (2012, P. 126), and other socio-political challenges. It is not a secret that the Gaddafi regime in Libya was plagued by multiple domestic conflicts and crises, however, he managed to salvage these conflicts and keep them afloat. Regardless, it may be argued that these domestic crises persisted, albeit in a racketeering fashion through tribal conflicts, economic crises, inequality, and political representation.

Altunisik (1996, P. 52) mentions that the economic system of Libya during the Gaddafi regime was also similar to those practised by other states in the region. Although the nation is rich in oil, inequality, corruption, and other economic conflicts bedazzled the country, therefore, pushing us to find out in what way exactly did the rentier system create a reason for state-building challenges. As put forward by Herb (2005, P. 304) there is no representation without taxation, and while rentier employs the rent theory to consolidate their regime, it can create an avenue for state-building challenges on civic matters. Hence, the thesis seeks to find out if there is any correlation between rentier state elements in Libya.

Tribalism in Libya is a huge concern. For a country of over 6 million, a tribal count of over 100 is of huge concern, especially if democratic policies are not taken. To make issues worst, only a handful of these tribes (about 10) enjoy maximum representation and economic benefit since they were close to Gaddafi. Hence, tribalism

can be connected to economic inequality and social disturbance that rocked the nation during the Gaddafi era (Sawani, 2012. P. 127-128).

State-building based on civic nationalism may also be very difficult, especially if religion plays a great role in-country management. Hence, the thesis seeks to understand in what way or perhaps if religion plays a role in state-building. This study sought to understand in what manner the rentier economic system of Libya during the Gaddafi regime affected the state-building process.

By trying to explain why state-building measures in the post-Gaddafi era failed, it is important to note that since the fall of Gaddafi's 42 years of rule, Libya has been confronting gigantic difficulties and weakness caused by political staleness and an absence of concrete state-building policies. Similarly, the thesis highlights the rise of non-state actors in domestic politics as well as external powers that have successfully polarized domestic legislation and country control. These factors may be regarded as the major reason for the continual domestic conflict as well as the crisis that has rocked the nation since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.

In addition, due to the multiple actors in the Libyan political atmosphere reaching a consensus regarding a feasible peace plan has become inherently difficult and almost impossible, is due to the numerous factors hindering national growth that was built pre-Gaddafi eras such as the rentier system, preferential politics granted to a particular tribe, weakened public system, religious affiliation, and even dependence on oil.

Today's Libya is a conglomeration of disassociated multiple state organizations which are frail with each party rejecting the legitimacy of the other. In this manner, it is contended that the initial move towards acknowledging vital state-building policies is rested on the complete annihilation of the challenges to creating an efficient state. Therefore, the study aims to analyze whether state-building in Libya has failed in the post-Gaddafi era or if it has succeeded.

Deriving from these points, the main research questions in this study could be summarized as:

- 1. How did state-building challenges originate during the Gaddafi era?**
- 2. Why State building measures failed in the post-Gaddafi era?**

As a arguments, this thesis simply put forward that the political legacy of the Gaddafi regime, the weak performance of successive transitional governments, and the limited role of the international community led to an increase in the intensity of the conflict

and the ineffectiveness of state-building programs in Libya. Therefore, political staleness, the absence of concrete state-building policies, and the rise of non-state actors in domestic politics impacted the failure of state-building measures in the post-Gaddafi era. The political atmosphere and feasible peace plan became inherently difficult due to the numerous factors hindering national growth that was built pre-Gaddafi eras such as the rentier system, preferential politics granted to a particular tribe, weakened public system, religious affiliation, and dependence on oil.

1.6 Research Methodology

The thesis adopts a qualitative research method in which deep exploration of state formation in Libya is discussed. Based on qualitative research, The main methodological tool is a case study, which is a very common social sciences research method in which the basic unit of analysis is formed by the selection of a single country. According to Peters (1998, pp. 12, 62), a detailed and informative investigation of a single case is typically regarded as theoretical and solely descriptive; however, if done effectively, it can elucidate a concept that would seem to be particularly prominent in one national context and use the national study to further expand that conceptual model.

Therefore, a case, if properly assembled and studied, can be used to increase the knowledge span of political science and enhance, or even testify to, selected theories or models directly. In this way, it is aimed at making a modest contribution to explain State building challenges in the post-Gaddafi era.

Therefore, the thesis initiated with the analysis of state-building problems in the MENA region and through an evolutionary approach linked to the state-building problems specific to Libya. Similarly, the chronological analysis is conducted initiating from the pro-Gaddafi era to the contemporary times.

Prominent importance is given to first-hand sources from articles, books, original documents such as constitutions, treaties, etc., news agencies, and experts. In terms of selecting articles, meticulous consideration has been given to state-building and scholars of Arab politics such as Mohamed Sawani, Beblawi, Luciani, George Joffe, Raymond Hinnebusch, and El Katiri Mohammed.

The rentier economy for most MENA countries such as Libya could be likened to be the cause of perpetual domestic and regional conflict, hence, it is an integral part of this research discussion. In this respect, the contributions of Hazem El Beblawi and

Giacomo Luciani are highly beneficial to enhance the discussion of a rentier state and how it affects state-building in Libya. This study is benefitted to a great extent from the contributions of Samuel Huntington in analyzing the conflictual nature of different ideologies.

In the discussion of socio-political problems in Libya, the thesis made an expansive discussion of the provisions of Amal Obeidi in her discussion of political culture in Libya. Since state-building challenges are dependent on the domestic environment, discussing the works of Obiedi is an exceptional input in thesis methodology. The final parts of the study provided an understanding of foreign intervention in Libya and how this has influenced the Libyan conflict. This section explores the role of the UN, EU, and most importantly NATO in the discussion of Responsibility to Protect.

1.7 Structure of The Chapters

In Chapter One, the background of the study has been examined including the statement of the problem, aims, and objectives, research questions, research methodology, and the significance of research in carrying this research. The first chapter is very important that it sets the basis and foundation which the thesis is built upon. In this chapter, the exceptional nature of the Libyan problem is highlighted in terms of foreign intervention in the country during the Arab Uprising as well as the continuing nature of the conflict. Similarly, the research questions of the thesis are presented.

Chapter Two examines the literature review of the discussion. The chapter initiates with making an overview of what state refers to in the Arab World. Since the topic is based on state-building, the first discussion on state-building is carried out to form an introduction of the topic that is benefitted the rest of the thesis. Chapter Two also discusses the concept of state-building in the MENA region.

The highlighting of the MENA region is important since it provides a general framework for the overall analysis and there are some similar characteristics at play in the region, such as identity politics, tribalism, rentiers, and foreign intervention. Thenthe state-building process in Libya is discussed in detail where factors such as socio-economic, political, administrative, and international factors are taken into consideration.

The third chapter analyzes the Libyan State during Gaddafi's regime. As mentioned in the methodology section, the chronological analysis is needed to compare and contrast the state-building problems in the pre and post-Gaddafi eras. This chapter initially discusses the measures employed by Gaddafi to consolidate his position in the country. Then, the role of tribalism in Libya and how Gaddafi exploited this to his favour is discussed. In the following section, the various political attempts utilized by Gaddafi such as the Green Book, the Jamahiriya system, and the authoritarian model employed by Gaddafi to further increase his power and influence in the country are examined.

Since Gaddafi wielded all the power and gave it to whomever he wants, it caused a huge social stratification in the country although it also gained supporters to him. Chapter Three also discusses the rentier system. This chapter concludes by discussing foreign intervention, the Arab Uprising and the end of Gaddafi's regime.

The last chapter discusses post-Gaddafi era state-building challenges. Having highlighted that Libya is currently divided into two separate regions with an ongoing civil war that demonstrated the state-building processes and practices have been unsuccessful. The chapter mentions the various loopholes amounting to the failure of state-building measures such as the political and administrative challenges faced by the country, socio-economic conflicts which still relate to the welfare state system, and the role of external actors in prolonging the conflict by supporting various factions and the legitimacy crisis associated with a unified government. In this chapter, the various state-building attempts engaged in Libya which are the National Transitional Council, General National Congress, and the House of Representatives and Government of Accord are also discussed by underlying in what ways these measures failed in creating solid state-building in Libya are highlighted.

Conclusion Chapter includes the conclusion, recommendation, contribution and suggestion for further research relating to state-building in Libya.

CHAPTER II

The Problematic Arab State

2.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the dynamics of the Libyan society before, during, and after Gaddafi's regime. It highlights the various notions accredited to the Arab world such as identity politics, rentier state, and tribalism. Similarly, important discussions about state-building formation in the MENA region and its implication in socio-economic domestic politics are discussed. The chapter begins by analyzing the state-building concept through the use of contributions made by theorists. Similarly, the different scholastic views on the rentier state paradigm, identity politics, and state formation process specific to Libya were explored. The arguments have been divided into regional explanations (MENA), domestic (Libya), and international structures.

In defining the concept of state-building in the MENA region as well as in Libya, an analysis of a structure based on the historical, domestic, economic, and administrative factors is provided. From this section, an analysis of the historical formation of the MENA region by foreign powers as a determinant for state-building challenges is also made.

This state formation process provides an understanding of the identity conflict in the MENA region which also exists in Libya. A major reason for identity conflict is a result of the multiple tribes that are visible in the country, which in a way obstruct smooth domestic politics.

Furthermore, arguably, the neo-patrimonialism structure has ravaged the country. These neo-patrimonialism structures have created illegitimate governing bodies that have hindered state-building processes in Libya. Economic structure plays a significant role in the instability of the country, therefore, particularly the rentier state paradigm is elucidated that is important not only in Libya but also in other parts of the MENA region. The rentier economic system inversely created concerns for socio-political conflicts, hence, limited participation of individuals in state matters that are enforced by the Gaddafi regime which transcends over to the current era.

Regarding socio-political context, an analysis of the role of Islam in state-building is evaluated and how international bodies such as NATO, the UN and other regional forces have distorted state-building processes in the country is analyzed.

2.2 Concept of the State: Definitions and Overview

In explaining state-building, there is an alternating provision, implying state-building means the same thing as nation-building. The discussion relating to state-building applies to the formation of civic duties, rule of law, protection of citizens and state legal authority. The concept of the state as mentioned by Hameiri (2010, p. 34) encompasses the democratic capabilities of the qstate. For Weber (1958, p. 78), the concept of state is easily understood based on the genuine utilization of actual power inside a given territory.

The concept of the state thus leads to the discussion of a failed state and what characteristics classify a failed state. For Migdal (2001, p. 10), a failed state seeks to use repressive non-democratic measures against its population and within its territory. Judging from this definition, a failed state is seen from an angle of human rights abuse, undemocratic principles, unlawful use of force and illegal cohesion of the citizens within the territory of the state. Depending on Weber's definition, the circumstances where power and authority are clearly defined and constitutional with a clear-cut division of labour system may be viewed as a perfect contrast to a failed state. As Migdal (2001, 15) claims;

“as long as the idea of the state is uniform and constant, the variation of states, even the failure of some states, can be expressed only in terms of deviation from the standard. ... All sorts of words had to be invented to express the gap between actual practice and the ideal”.

Due to the various definitions of the state in the literature, there is an objective understanding of what makes a state a functioning state and what makes it a failed state. In this regard, Migdal (2001, p. 16) posits that state-building is important to be viewed first in the eyes of the public as the public is the first influence that interacts and counter-acts with the state. For this reason, it is believed that the state is "a field of force created by various human and social elements to hold a group of persons together as citizens in a territory, and the act of bringing together various cultures and ethnicity from the country (Migdal 2001, p. 16).

The picture of the state as a cognizant, coordinated, and objective situated substance that rules definitively over its populace and region has been going from one state to another, particularly as the modern state formation requires. However, when states adopt repressive measures against their citizens, it may lead to an increased crisis that may relapse into a nature of a failed state, this is the case of Libya.

According to the global view, the state is the major actor in international politics that regulates international agreements and signs international law on behalf of the citizens, therefore, the state's power transcends the domestic outlook but also progresses to the international arena. For this reason, the state strives to exercise control over all parts of the community as well as its citizens (Migdal 2001, p. 63).

A discussion by Lemay-Hebert (2013, p.7) shows that available studies on state-building have been overwhelmed by a conceptualisation of the state as a limited in an area, with a fixed community, and progressively coordinated in useful (administrative) terms to practice sole authority over its territory. In the problematizing failed state, Lemay-Hébert (2013, p. 7) contends that the notion of independence of a state added to the viewpoint that state-building can be externally crafted, which in most cases may not be the case. International interventions, although very essential in the current international relations may be problematic if domestic qualities and standards are overlooked.

A contrasting view was provided by Hameiri (2007, p. 18) who claimed that a common way to deal with state-building challenges and failed states is through the usage of neo-liberalist approaches that seek to involve international approaches in the domestic or local state structure formation. This leads to the formation of a liberalist state-building structure that when introduced in developing states ensures democratic peace and causes overall democratic freedom in these states. This follows the idea that a strong democratic state respects the rule of law which creates increased stability.

Additionally, vital to the nature of foreign aid in state-building, the authority of the domestic power is being included as an important aspect to be considered in defining a state. This goes following the Weberian state model where the selection of various approaches to state-building has been joined by a propensity to relate the state as an intelligible and objective element concerning other states (Lemay-Herbert, 2013, p.9). This model of Weberian state formation mirrors what is acquired in Western states as the benchmark for all failed states to evaluate the objective of state-building.

While trying to quantify the dangers of a failed state and the advancement of state-building in the literature, the indexes provided by international institutions such as the World Bank and inter-nongovernmental organizations such as Transparency International and the Fund for Peace's Failed State Index are commonly used to examine the level of political growth obtainable in a country.

Judging from these indexes, a comparison is made between developed states with an advanced political system in comparison to what is obtainable in a failed state. For this reason, understanding the concept of a state and its surrounding characteristics sets the target to provide a concrete description of what is a functioning state from a failed state. Additionally, how power is gotten and maintained by local authorities is an important indication of what kind of state is involved. Those who are voted in by peaceful means by the citizens are known to belong in a stable democracy with strong political institutions, whereas, those in authoritarian states, usually engage in hostile measures of leadership that may require a need for better safe-building measures. Hence, promoting the development of state-building structures in the domestic and international arena.

Regardless of domestic or international approaches to state-building, Barah (2013, p. 13) highlighted that corruption and selfish arrangements may exert negative effects on state-building. This continues to influence the conflict in a failed state as could be seen in the case of Libya where the division of foreign powers amongst domestic belligerents continues to worsen the conflict in Libya. Additionally, Rotberg (2004, P. 45) with regards to the implication of international intervention on failed states highlights that since such states are characterized by various domestic elements such as weak state institutions, an unbalanced society and corruption, international actors in domestic conflict must exercise care so as not to further exacerbate the domestic conflict in the host nation.

As highlighted by Ayubi (1995, P. 38), another component that worsens distinguishing failed states from functioning ones is the societal allegiance to various identities that most times do not relate to the single state ideology, hence, this further weakens the society of the functioning state. Additionally, this form of societal imbalance may trigger an authoritarian style of leadership since as argued by Kedourie (1992, P. 6), the leader tries all means possible to retain and consolidate power amongst the society despite its various views conflate system types with proportions of solidarity or shortcoming. This has frequently prompted tyranny which further increases state weakness, a perfect contrast to the expected aim of state strength.

Similarly, as highlighted by Richmond (2013, P. 395), to understand what makes a state a failed state, it is important to examine the relationship between the leaders and the citizens, examine the nature of domestic and foreign politics in the country, state administrations and citizen acceptance, rights and obligations, and

security versus opportunities. When state institutions are strong and trusted by the citizens, it is most likely a functioning state, the opposite represents a failed state with a weakened institution.

Since the level of state/society trade gets additionally from recorded turns of events and financial, political, and social factors, the positioning of states along normalized measurements acquired from strong states. As mentioned by Risse (2011, p.6), these factors affect state-building approaches and impact how statehood is attained.

The writing on state-building is likewise to a great extent isolated relying upon elective presumptions about the state. Zartman (1995) considers the idea of the state as the fundamental element of the international society, hence, the state needs to be protected with the right policies to save it from relapsing to conflicts and political turmoils. In the same manner, Ottaway (2002) mentions that in events where state policies are not favourable to a particular part or ethnic group of that state, it would be in the best interest of the states to break into various parts to avoid relapsing into war. In this regard, Samuels (2004) contributes that there is a significant lack in the literature explaining the required behaviour of international actors to ensure state-building, especially in troubled areas.

Modern state building is accused of being organized per the desire of the Western nation, therefore, in most cases refuting the cultural views of the host nation and imposing a different approach to leadership that is in most cases different from that is obtained or experienced in these places. As indicated by Tilly (1975, P. 43), state-building is really about the exchange of Western qualities, establishments and standards, which is the thing that opens it to allegations of new regimes. As state-building is seen as a concept of the West, its major idea is to share and distribute democracy to all parts of the world. The section below highlights the meaning of democracy and how it pertains to the Western definition and idea of state-building.

Democracy is a form of majority-style government that has been extremely used in political science which is utilized in a few settings and its importance has been severally challenged. It is often argued by scholars such as Huntington (1991, P. 23) whether there is an ideal form of democracy that all states should practice. It is no surprise that clamouring for full democracy in the MENA region means opening your gates to foreign powers which in most instances may yield disastrous consequences. Hence, it is understood that the situation in Libya may have been influenced by foreign

intervention, which under the disguise of ensuring democracy conflicts with their gains.

Notwithstanding these nonetheless, the idea of popular government merits understanding with the end goal of this examination and taking from the old-style importance of the word, it can subsequently be portrayed with the two Greek words *demos* which means individuals and *Kratos* which means to rule. A joining of both words suggests democracy to mean “rule by the people”.

This word in its established nature is elaborated by Beetham (199, p. 55) to mean a “model decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collective enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly-one, that is to say, which realizes to the greatest conceivable degree the principles of popular control and equality in its exercise”.

The idea of citizenship maintains the structure rule of democracy, which includes the privilege of residents to be treated by individual people as equivalent to aggregate dynamic, and commitments on the executions of these choices. Democratization of course insinuates the technique of political change along which the public authority of society moves, which ensures a calm serious political support in a circumstance that guarantees political and regular opportunities. The changing idea of majority rule advancement locally is characterized by this idea. This involves the cycle of the progress of government from a method of authoritarian principle to majority rule. Huntington (1993, p. 35), portrays the present circumstance as the "Third Wave" of democratization; wherein nations had changed from dictatorial systems to popularity-based systems.

Democratization along these lines can be summed up in the most ideal manner appropriate for this investigation in the expressions of Bingham P. what's more, Eleanor N. Powell (2005, pp, 2-3), means “the process of change from a nondemocratic administration to a procedural democracy to a substantive democracy, either as the first government in a recently free nation or by supplanting a tyrant framework in an older one”.

2.3 Concept of State-Building: Formation and Characteristics

In defining the concept of state and nation-building, the concept of nation-building has been subject to several debates among scholars. While some scholars

equate nation-building to state-building, others contend that they are very different separated realities (Ottaway, 1999, Dinnen, 2006). Some argue that one is the precondition for the existence of the other one (Scott, 2007. p.3) while they can mutually reinforce each other (Dinnen, 2006. P.1). They can also exclude each other depending on the conception or idea that a given population has of itself and “*the other*” regarding the discourses of the nation. Therefore, it can relate to identity construction. However, there are two competing viewpoints to define state-building. To explain the distinction between the two terms, Dinnen (2006, p. 1) brings into line a technocratic viewpoint of state-building and assumes that it is the “task of building functioning states capable of fulfilling essential attributes of the modern statehood”.

Concurring with the Dinnen’s definition Scott, (2007, p.3) highlights that state-building relates to “interventionist strategies and activities to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the state”. In this perspective, Paris and Sisk (2015, p. 303) assume that state-building operations can be considered a particular approach to peacebuilding since it ensures human security and development in the post-conflict societies through the “existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate governmental institutions”. Furthermore, in the area of development and good governance, it is about providing the state with necessary well-functioning structures and capabilities. It is not only to address the needs of the population such as capacities building “service delivery measures, tax reforms, civil service reform, infrastructure, democratization, political party support, public financial management training, and conflict management” but also to ensure the full participation of the people in the decision making (Scott, 2007. p. 4).

Nation-building, however, pertains to an “abstract process of developing a shared sense of identity or community among various groups making up the population of a particular state” (Dinnen, 2006, p. 1). In this sense, it is not only about creating institutions but also there is a need for the type of institution the population of a particular territory legitimizes. On the contrary, nation-building refers to “the creation of a cultural identity that relates to a particular territory of the state. In that respect, they define state-building as “a general term used to describe the reconstruction of functional countries, in other words, countries that are capable of providing their citizens with basic functions and services and the meet their responsibilities and obligations as members of the international community”.

In that respect, the essential components relating to state-building are identified as legitimacy, authority, and capacity as key components of state-building. Therefore, Hennig and Sattelberger (2017, p. 1) in their short essay on explaining components of the state-building draw to mind the important factors ranging from social to economic and even political sectors to consider in crafting efficient state-building policies.

However, although state-building relates more to the national state, the writing on state-building has been to a great extent driven by the worldwide relations and political theory fields. The improvement local area has not been composed broadly regarding the matter (Hopp, 2004). This has strategically planted state-building to represent an international structure in the literature, hence, drawing internationally accepted qualities of a functioning state which include but are not limited to security, peace, political stability, human development, economic development, provision of basic amenities, rule of law, democracy, amongst many others.

It is consequently conceivable to see state-building as a sub-set of development. It is noticed that despite the numerous discussion in the literature concerning state-building, the idea of state development as a driver of state-building was mostly discussed by Stephen Mallaby, a global relations scholar and columnist (Mallaby 2002). Additionally, this proves that state-building in its entirety implies everything ranging from political actions and activities of states, down to the development of the citizens as well as a stable economy to facilitate development in the long run.

However, the caveat to understanding development arises when the international power that should be a carrier of development is looking to further spoil and loot the already failed state. This was explained by Paris (2006) as foreign expansionism since it mostly shows the foreign power looking for means to increase their wealth or solidify their foreign policy to the detriment of the conflictual state. Similarly, to further explain this concept of foreign expansionism, Etzioni (2004) makes highlights neo-expansion, explaining that foreign intervention in a state to ensure state-building measures may be a tool used by the state to enter and assume domination over the failing country. In addition, Mallaby (2002) explains that the differences in culture and beliefs may be a significant reason why the development carrier may be seen to possess expansionist traits, which might not be the case in reality.

From the above argument of neo-expansionism, it becomes inherently important to understand the nature of the foreign powers in the MENA who under the pretext of state-building have explored other means to reach their goals. It could be argued that these foreign states, especially those in Libya may experience in all honesty the zeal to meet the aims and objectives of state-building.

State-building in the MENA comprises various actors, aims and objectives. A major aim of state-building is to primarily reach a political process that involves the prioritization of core government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations (Whaites, 2008. p. 4). The state-building objective starts by transforming the society that has emerged from the conflict by using the government forces to enforce political and economic changes under the jurisdiction of the state (Dobbins, et al., 2007, p. 18). These political and economic reforms should be built on democratic principles. Brownlee, for instance, argues that state-building involves the continuous process of democratization including freedom of speech and press, protection of human rights, political right to vote, and regular elections (Brownlee, 2007, p. 316). State-building is generally centred on three dimensions: security, political, and economic. The security dimension constitutes the most important dimension since political and economic developments cannot be achieved without a secure environment. The precondition for the security dimension of the state building is the central authority that has the only legitimate monopoly on the use of force in the Weberian sense. The opportunity for other actors in the country to use force leads to chaos. The government should also be able to satisfy political goals for the nation rather than pursuing individual goals to gain legitimacy. In other words, the government's actions should be approved by the people (Wardak, 2004). This establishes more legitimacy in the consciousness of citizens and deters them from taking up arms against the government.

2.4 State-Building In The Middle East And North Africa (MENA)

It is, for the most part, acknowledged that the modern sovereign state was made and legitimized in the seventeenth century because of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. The improvement of countries came later in the eighteenth, and particularly in the nineteenth century when patriot developments cleared across the mainland. Just by then was the idea of the country state created. The idea of the country state recommends the ID between a group and the overseeing body which rules them. The

ascent of vote-based beliefs has legitimized and given the way to enduring practically a wide range of fractures and contact inside a nation aside from that which manages personality because such a break, not just inquiries the authenticity of the political system yet additionally the authenticity of the state and the political local area themselves.

The absence of cultural unity in a general public debilitates the bonds which keep the individuals in the general public together. "A general public's comprehension of itself and its issues feeling of character and design is the chief restricting power that incorporates the individuals from that society and empowers them to act adequately in like manner to tackle their domestic and foreign issues" (Black, 1966, p. 59). Subsequently, the cycles of character development and country and state-building are intently connected. Straightforwardly got from the ideal of the country express, the 'right to self-assurance' has been recommended to choose in circumstances where ID between the 'rulers' and the 'administered' is needed.

Consequentially, the privilege of self-assurance has accentuated the authenticity and allure that both administered and rulers be of a similar personality, seeing as that the presence of a typical character that relates one to the next is seen just like the characteristic request of governmental issues, and that deviations from such request are viewed as unmerited and a danger to harmony. The privilege of self-assurance has been commended to the degree of good rule. Questioning a specific region's character is the primary line of argumentation sought after during clashes that have emerged because of endeavours to apply the standard of the privilege to self-assurance, particularly during the period of decolonization.

The significance of this discussion to the MENA nation is borne from two major factors. In the first place, Middle Eastern nations are loaded with various degrees and types of contentions among fighting and, pretty much, inconsistent sorts of personalities. Second, identity is a significant concern continually affecting Middle Eastern legislative issues. Four kinds of identities are to be referenced in such a manner. While the extent of some is a lot more extensive, the extent of others is much smaller. The four types are as follows:

a. Primordial identities: This is concerned with the different variables associated with an identity which could be based on tribe, race, ethnic affiliation, culture and other nationalist elements that are peculiar to humans. These identities, to a great extent, exert a strong influence on the political nature of countries such as Libya.

b. National identities: This is concerned with the identity that alludes to one location based on an extension from the country.

c. Regional identities: This involves the different forms of personal identities that relate to national characteristics which goes beyond a single state but rather encompass other countries, usually in a particular region. Regional identity is shared amongst people in various states and may in some instances exert supranational status over national identities. An example of regional identity includes Arab nationalism which spans all the regions of the Arab world.

d. Universal identities: This form of identity transcends national and regional boundaries to include people from all parts of the world regardless of their differences or affiliated groups. To explain this form of identity, Robinson (1979, p. 216) in mentioning pan-Islamism noticed that “there is hardly a Muslim state in the world which does not have a party whose professed aim is to impose its vision of the Islamic ideal on contemporary politics and society”. Similar ideas are shared by Muslims in all parts of the world with an underlying belief that they belong to a particular identity irrespective of their location.

As Raymond Hinnebusch puts it, “if there is anything special about the international politics of the Middle East it is the power of identity” (Hinnebusch, 2016). This statement in its entirety encompasses the domestic and foreign political behaviour in the Mena region. The religious and ethnic sectarian lines play a very important role in intra and inter-state politics and this has been in place from the formation of the MENA states as is discussed in detail. This goes in line with the orientalist view that norms and identity are central keys used in studying Middle East Politics. Identities in the case become two-sided; the in-group and out-group. The out-group becomes as a result of social construct a threat to the in-group hence securitization policies are employed by members of the in-group to fight this existential threat.

Barry Buzan from the Copenhagen school defines securitization as the act of presenting an issue or event as an imminent threat that requires immediate contingency plans that are not usually within the confines of normal political behaviour (Buzan et al, 1990). The discourse of sectarianism according to Elizabeth Hurd is reliant on a constant representation of the shifting roles exhibited by various identity factors in the society such as sects or religion (Hurd, 2015). Hence members belonging to a sect can

easily recognize their identity differences from members of the other sect which in turn can become a catalyst for conflict.

2.4.1. Influence of Identity on State Building in the MENA Region

The MENA region under Western imperialism was divided not according to ethnic or nationalistic lines but according to political lines. Ayoob Mohammed argues that the boundaries created by the Western imperial powers in the Middle East substantially divided the region into numerous weak and often artificial states to solely satisfy the interest of the great powers and not the wishes of the indigenous society (Mohammed, 1995). As a result, sub-state identities and supra-state identities such as Islam and Arabism became very evident as the indigenous society would like to become more affiliated with their ethnic nationalities or religious beliefs than with the state apparatus. The Ottoman Empire took into consideration the multi-diversity of the MENA region and as such tolerated de-facto autonomous communal groups (Hinnebusch, 2016).

Arab Nationalism significantly grew in a contest with the imperialist policies put in place during the state formation process. The section of the society which identified with the Arab sect developed Arabism by developing common identities, interests and shared threats against the non-Arab sect. The notion of imagined communities according to Anderson was very much in play here (Anderson, 1991). The Islamic supra-state identity started to exceed the Arab identity following the various debates of the fall of the pan- Arabism.

It is pertinent to note that the presence of multi-ethnicity does not in its entirety signify conflict. Nation-building processes are developed due to the multi-identity structure of a state. For this reason, nation-building is seen as a process whereby people in a particular culture adopt and maintain their group's identity, accord values to these identities, and use the identities as a tool for national interest and shared goals that may conflict with other ethnic groups (Brass, in Robinson, 1994, p. 217).

The issue, rather, takes two different structures. The first is the delayed conflict among the various kinds of characters which prevents creating public agreement in the locale's nations, and the second is the undesirable conjunction that results among them so no strategy can be sought after to its coherent closures. This does not imply that the job and importance of the early-stage or strict personalities are equivalent to it used to be hundreds of years prior. Or maybe, as Owen contends "techniques for political

association and styles of the political manner of speaking are generally characterized by the specific situation and that, from the pioneer time frame on, this setting was made by the regional state" (Owen, 1992, p. 20).

The regional state turned into the field inside which the conventional elements and personalities cooperated, turning out to be likewise the award and subject over which they battled. Setting up the Middle Eastern states had an extraordinary impact on the arguments of character development in the Middle East. Bit by bit, expanding segments of the social orders of the recently made states started relating to these states, including those areas of the general public connected near the mechanical assembly of the new states.

Indeed, even the individuals who neglected to relate to the new states had to think and act on the "state" path since it was distinctly inside the new states where life was directed. The distinctive political settings, enactments, social constructions, and so on, constrained the tendencies, and hence the public personalities of these states started creating. The incongruity of this is that the region upholds the regional identity and cherishes it in a very sentimental manner and is not prepared to surrender it. Simultaneously, no one perceives the regional state as a real element, legitimate on both good and philosophical grounds.

A factor that may clarify this incongruity is the way that since the regional state was a venture started by the European frontier powers, such a state was acquired, kept up and created by the native patriot powers (Bromley, 1994). The disappointment of the extreme Arab patriots during the 1950s and 1960s to accomplish Arab solidarity is an unmistakable illustration of the toughness of the regional state significantly under the standard of revolutionary Arab patriots who tried to break up it into a lot bigger joined Arab state. The conflict among personalities in the setting given by the regional state makes sorts of masked characters where, for example, ancestral, partisan or public interests are best served by being formed in an informal setting.

Little is written in the Arab world on the authenticity of regional politics. Significantly more is composed of Arab patriotism, Islam, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli clash. It isn't conceivable for an Arab essayist to expound on the public interest of either country because the idea of public interest is held to the nonexistent interest of the Arab country. The equivalent is the case concerning the idea of public safety, which is generally used to mean nonexistent Arab-public safety.

The authenticity of the regional state in the Arab World is, generally, estimated by its obligation to serve interests, regardless of whether Arab or Islamic, that are bigger in scope than those of its own. Accordingly, the Palestinian reason furnished Arab states with a focus and field to flaunt their obligation to the interest of the Arab-Muslim country, and thus improve the authenticity of the regional express. Additionally, the huge troubles confronting Arab solidarity gave the Palestinian reason a more prominent significance in such a manner. The investigation recommended in the past section is genuinely precise concerning states at the eastern finish of the Mediterranean.

Notwithstanding, Arab nations in North Africa and Libya inclusive have various encounters in which a lot higher feeling of an area-based public personality is available and the authenticity of the regional state is more grounded (Hermassi, 1972). In practically all cases, nonetheless, clashing characters can be seen all through the Middle East and North African countries. The connections among these sorts of personalities are not static using by all means and in most cases affect public duty. Enormous portions of Middle Eastern social orders continue to waver among these various sorts of identities and these forms the basis upon which an individual may act in a political atmosphere.

Additionally, the long writing about the interaction of globalization, the advancement of global concepts, and how these improvements challenge the state might be said to have occurred due to various interactions with the domestic identities of people across the world. Although globalization is moving at a fast pace and may create significant changes to the nation-state, the influences caused by globalization in most cases do not compromise the hierarchical structure granted to local identities.

The powers of globalization are a long way from changing the existing nation-state structure in the MENA region. Bearing in mind that a lot of change is required concerning the nation-state to adjust to the worldwide changes, the explicitness of the circumstance in the Middle East is compounded by the way that Middle Eastern states need to do two undertakings simultaneously acclimating to worldwide difficulties on one hand, and proceeding with the structure of the nation-state on the other.

This, therefore, begs the question; what are the general limiting factors of state-building in the Middle East that made it exceptional? Does understanding Middle East exceptionalism have to do with the question of what is special about the region since

this is always explained regarding some conditions such as politics, economy, and religion that are inherent in the region and are strongly incompatible with democracy?

All these questions are explained regarding the exceptionalism of the region. Firstly, taking into consideration the formation of various states in the region, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 crafted the borders of the Middle East, sharing the region amongst the winners of World War 1 before independence by the mid-1960s (Sørli M; Gleditsch N & Strand H, 2005, p.146).

In tracing the main source of conflicts in the region, the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 had led to regional conflict and instability. This has made the conflicts protracted, which has affected the economic and political development of the region. The availability of natural resources notable oil in specific has made the region general to be considered a strategic place for the powerful countries in the world. This has made the influence of external factors on the situation more visible. Superpower bickering and external interventions have a significant influence on the region considering the U.S. and U.K. invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 as an example.

However, many conditions are alluding to what makes the region special and contrary to democracy. The political institutions of the region, structural economic development, external factors, political and civil society, and religion are going to be discussed with the use of write-ups from different sources.

In discussing the political institutions of the region, it was found that the region remains the world's authoritarian stronghold that has yet to experience a wave of democratization (Huntington 1991). Out of nineteen states that are regarded as Middle East region, only Israel and Turkey qualify as more or less democratic. The Polity index scored Israel to be highest in the entire period (1960-2000) while the Polyarchy index scored the state at a maximum of forty-seven. The score of Turkey on both indices is from very low to very high. The reason for the democratic deficit of the region is a result of some complex circumstances. The role of Islam cannot be put aside in this case.

Fish (2004) explains the strong relationship between Islam and the autocratic regime and the subordination of women in Islamic states, which are contrary to democratic principles. The colonial experience of the region, external influence and persistent conflict have all played a significant role in bringing the region as opposed to democracy (Sørli M; Gleditsch N & Strand H, 2005, p.146-147).

Another characteristic that defines the exceptionalism of the region as discussed by the authors is its structural economic development or conditions. The sources of economic income and activity in the region are derived from natural resources, workers' remittances, foreign aid, agriculture, and small businesses. Rentierism constitutes a larger aspect of the economic activities of the region. This suggests that countries that derive the majority of government funds from non-tax sources of revenue, such as oil exports, are fundamentally different from countries without such a resource base (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987). External rent disallows any state to tax its citizen thereby breaking the vital, often adversarial, link between governments and the people they tax (Richards and Waterbury, 1986).

2.4.2 Influence of Economy on State Building in the MENA Region

The term rentier state was first postulated by Iranian scholar Hossein Mahdavy in 1970 in his article "Patterns and problems of Economic development in rentier states: The case of Iran" (Mahdavy, 1970). It could easily be defined as a state that obtains all or a substantial fraction of its domestic revenue from the rent accrued on indigenous resources to a foreign client. However, to effectively understand the notion of the rentier state in the Middle East and also its characteristics, Meliha Altunisik discusses the definition of the rentier state in three parts: firstly, governments receive oil revenues in form of rent which puts oil as a strategic commodity, secondly, the global economy generates the oil revenues for the local governments externally and thirdly, the state directly profits from the externally generated oil revenue (Altunisik, 2014).

Giacomo Luciani makes some comparisons between rentier states and other 'normal' countries. He argues that, unlike rentier states where the state is financed by the oil rent which it gains directly from external sources, a normal state is usually supported by the taxes collected from the local society. Ensuing from this comparison, the normal state formulates a system to collect from the society part of its internally generated income whereas in the rentier system the society is supported by the state with the externally generated income (Luciani, *Oil and Political Economy in International Relations of the Middle East*, 2016).

Owing to the recent incessant intra-state conflict troubling the Middle East, the Arab Spring and its aftermath and other inter-state political problems in the past two decades, the antecedent linking oil wealth or petrol dollars to government stability of

the region has gained wide recognition and vast study is been carried out on this phenomenon. As Lisa Anderson puts it:

“The notion of the rentier state is one of the major contributions of the Middle East regional studies to political science, and the literature on the impact of externally generated revenues, particularly those produced by exports of oil, is relatively well-developed” (Anderson, 1987)

From the above definition of a rentier state and the provided comparison with a normal state, there are distinct features that characterise each kind of state, explained below are some of these characteristics that shape a rentier state.

Considering the basic tenets that shape a rentier state, following the suggestion of Hazem Al Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (1990, pp. 87-88), a rentier state is characterised into four groups;

- i. The predominance of rent: A state cannot be a rentier state if there is an absence of rent or if the rent accrued is in small quantity compared to the internally derived revenue. For the rentier states in the Middle East, there is a predominance of oil rent.
- ii. The economies of rentier states are substantially derived from this external rent and as such, there is a weak internal productive sector- According to Luciani, if up to 40% of an external revenue of a state is gotten from oil rent, that state is a rentier state (Luciani, Allocation Vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework, 1987). This exclusive dependence on oil according to Ozekin & Arioz (2004, p.16) has further exerted negative and positive implications on the Middle East. In the region, oil has been the major export item and major income producer for the rentier states and has made them further dependent on the global economy for state continuity (Ozekin, M K & Arioz, Zeynep, 2014).
- iii. The generation of the rent is mostly done by a small proportion of the domestic population- Owing to the inactiveness of the society in the political and economic arena, the ruling elites, institutions or government is in charge of the rent generated from foreign sources which are then distributed to local citizens (Losman, 2010).
- iv. In most/all rentier states, the government or ruling class is the key organ that receives this rent and distributes it to the local citizens- For rentier

states, the major domestic function of the government as argued by Losman (2010) is the distribution of rent.

The consequences of the Rentier States in the Middle East are majorly based on the Political and Economic aspects of the state. As a derivative of the above-mentioned characteristics, these two aspects (political and economic) are the most visible consequences of the rentier state in the region.

In the oil rentier states of the Middle East, the citizens of such states are mostly unconcerned with the politics of their states as a result of the loose fiscal connection between the state and the society hence the government of rentier states enjoy a sort of freedom or autonomy from their societies (Beblawi, 1990) whereas in production states the reverse is the case. For production states, the political participation of the society is immensely needed by the government in order to establish a strong political policy. The well-known principle of no taxation without representation is in play here. The government in order to subtract resources from the people in form of taxation hence the strong interplay of the relationship between the society and the government.

The domestic political consequences of the rentier state system are that there is little or no bond between the government and the citizens and thus the government cannot be held politically liable for the decisions that they make. This is so because the people have been “bought” over by the rentier state. Terry Lynn Karl brilliantly explains this as;

“When states do not have to depend on domestic taxation to finance development, governments are not forced to formulate their goals and objectives under the scrutiny of citizens who pay the bills. At the same time, they are permitted to distribute funds among sectors and regions on an ad hoc basis. Excessive centralization, remoteness from local conditions, and lack of accountability stem from this financial independence” (Karl, 1997).

In rentier states there is a high rate of corruption as political elites in a bid to maintain political stability engage in building clientelist networks through the selective distribution of oil wealth which could be based on ethnic lines or military-inspired (Basedau, M & Lay, J, 2009).

Considering that the rentier state’s income is substantially dependent on the externally generated rent, the internal production from the society is very low. In the absence of real economic development. Losman (2010) argues that in oil rentier states of the Middle East, there may be economic development but there is no economic

growth. For him, an assertion of the GDP (gross domestic product) signifies if a state is developing economically or not. A GDP of a state usually increases when there is a diverse source of income realization, a shift from a labour-intensive mode of production to capital intensive, a shift from low skilled society to a highly skilled one and most importantly political participation of the society (Losman, 2010). All the above-mentioned factors are absent in Middle Eastern rentier states. The IMF in its World Economic and Financial Survey for the Middle East and Central Asia has advised the rentier states in the Middle East to explore other forms of income realization (International Monetary Fund, 2018)

Regarding the global economy, the price of oil is constantly wavering, and this unpredictable character of oil prices is negatively affecting the rentier state in the Middle East. As most rentier states are mostly dependent on this oil rent, in the event of an oil price crash, the economies of these states are flung in disarray and this usually provides a source of political unrest as seen in the case of Algeria and Iraq in the 1980s (Ozetin, M K & Arioz, Z, 2014). Without real economic development, the rentier state in the Middle East is on the brink of economic and political crises.

The nature of the rentier state system provides a perfect explanation for the continuous existence of authoritarianism in resource-rich states. Fareed Zakaria explains this to be the non-political development of states because, in the absence of taxes, there is no relationship between the society and the government hence there is no pressure on the government to respond to the needs of the citizens which in turn improves authoritarianism (Beblawi, 1990). The significance of the Rentier system for Rutledge is known as the “rentier curse” in which the political atmosphere grows worse owing to the free social services received by the society (Rutledge, 2017).

Another important significance is that the rentier system has made some oil-producing states to be exclusively dependent on foreign markets thus shifts in the foreign international political atmosphere are greatly felt in rentier states. This is a two-way situation as the Rentier states in the Middle East account for a substantial amount of world oil supply hence the issue of co-dependency. It is no hidden fact that the foreign policy of various producing states concerning those of the rentier states is majorly centred around oil thus in a period where oil prices are low or as in the case of Iraq; political turmoil, the rentier system negatively affects a domestic and foreign aspect of the Middle East.

In comparison with other resource states in the Middle East. The rentier system acquires the political legitimacy it needs to exist hence most of the gulf states were not affected by the Arab Spring as compared to other resource states in the Region. The rentier states that suffered from the Arab uprising were affected because there was an international oil ban on the rent as in the case of Libya hence the distributive function of the state could not be performed while in the case of Bahrain, the rentier system was very modest in compared to other rentier states owing to its domestic population and expatriates (Altunisik, 2014). Similarly, in a bid to consolidate its hold on the country, the House of Khalifa (Bahrain's ruling family) established clientelist networks based on religious sectarian grounds leading to selective distribution of oil rents hence the agitation from the society.

On the other rentier states, the Arab uprising did not have so much effect on the socio-economic and political dispensation of the societies, thus leaving the authoritarian regimes to prosper.

The Libyan discussion of the rentier system may be viewed as one wherein the rents received are seen as a constant variable, constantly changing the dynamics of the state in all aspects. Similarly, in the discussion provided by Ross (2011, p. 12), there are two major kinds of the rentier state system; the first kind wherein the external rents received are used to develop and improve domestic economic growth, and the second system whereby external rents received are channelled into developing good governance and efficiency of state apparatus. The Libyan case is, however, different from Ross' assertion as neither economic nor state apparatus were developed with external rents received during and after Gaddafi's era.

According to Mahdavy (1970, 430), rents received in the oil-rich Middle Eastern states such as Libya may most likely lead to the crippling of domestic industries since such states are regarded as resource-based economies. Hence, these states focus on the major source of resource acquisition which is the oil and forsake other avenues of government revenue. This, therefore, leads to the notion of the resource curse. The resource curse holds that countries that are exclusively dependent on external rents may continue to witness degradation in other domestic economic sectors as well as a weakening of the state-building apparatus. Hence, in such countries as Libya which continues to suffer from the resource curse, it is popular to find poor government initiatives toward state-building, a poorer domestic economy, corruption, and an increase in domestic conflict.

The resource curse re-iterates Mahdavy's definition of the rentier economy whereby states such as Libya, having enjoyed a higher influx of external rents and foreign revenue become faced with multiple domestic economic and political problems (Mahdavy, 1970, p. 431). The most common form of external rent for resource-based economies is oil, therefore, oil revenues are received by the governments of oil-exporting countries. Libya, being one of the oil-exporting countries has not been very interested in the other production process of their domestic economies, thus, leading to an economic system that directly depends on the extraction of raw materials so that the inputs from the local economies and other industries are insignificant.

The states dependent on external rents are then susceptible to global economic distortions, depression, and drenching. The oil boom, for example, led to an increase in external rent for countries such as Libya, therefore, creating a situation of widespread domestic corruption and inflation. Similarly, the fall in oil prices in the early 1980s also exerted tough economic implications on Libya as a majority of government income was dependent on these foreign revenues. For this reason, a drop in prices of oil led to a complete catastrophic change in events where citizens faced heightened government control and economic hardship.

Libyan's dependence on external rents may be seen as a reason for the unstable domestic politics in the country before and after Gaddafi's regime. According to Beblawi (1990, p. 89), in a rentier state, the wealth is settled in the hands of the few, hence, providing power and authority to these few. These few who are otherwise known as elites then redistribute the wealth as they please. As a result of such an economic system, the elites in Libya created a neo-patrimonial form of politics, wherein, favouritism and corruption established the basis for wealth acquisition and political interaction. Therefore, large tribes with prominent positions in Libya managed to consolidate power for Gaddafi, which also reflects their gains.

In contrast to Mahdavy's notion of the rentier state as discussed above, Beblawi and Luciani (1987) provide an approach to the concept of a rentier economy based on how the rentier system influences the state. According to Beblawi (1990, p. 91), the rentier state is influenced by foreign rents that directly influence the government and continue to shape government actions. Similarly, based on this submission of Beblawi, a pattern of power consolidation is recorded in Libya where only a few people, tribal

chiefs, Gaddafi's clans and friends as well as other top office holders in Libya are engaged in the generation and management of this rent.

For example, in Libya during the Gaddafi regime, Altunisk (1996, p. 53) mentioned that Gaddafi together with top-ranking government officials was solely responsible for the production of oil revenues, therefore, loyal groups to the Gaddafi's regime benefitted greatly from the rents received, while other groups or opposing tribes were marginalized. Similarly, from this submission, it is, therefore, believed that inequality and biased sharing of resources were present in Libya during Gaddafi's tenure. As mentioned by Herb (2005, p. 305), the rentier economy provides a wealth system that influences economic and political participation. Thus, for a place such as Libya during Gaddafi's regime, the profits gotten from oil wealth were used to influence political participation and to establish Gaddafi's authoritarianism.

It is no doubt that the current international system has placed excess importance on oil, therefore, rentier economies such as Libya are assured of the constant inflow of foreign incomes which continuously increases state revenue. For this reason, a typical rentier economy is generally one-sided and their manufacturing and industrialization process are negligibly small or none. Another important point that should be mentioned is the role of government in the oil rentier economy which as discussed above shows that Government is the only power of control over oil revenues and government is the main distributor of oil revenue.

Beblawi and Luciani (1987, p. 65) place an economic outlook on the rentier economy, mentioning that the wealth gotten in such an economic system is a result of natural gifts and not from the efforts of the citizens, therefore, management of such wealth is usually based on the idea that more resources are generated. A similar assumption was made by Amin (1974, p. 45) who mentioned that in Libya as well as in other oil-producing states, the government is not stimulated to develop domestic industries nor to diversify exports since the rents produced are the main suppliers of the nation's export.

Rentier states such as Libya, especially during Gaddafi's regime depended on petro-dollars for financing the economy. Therefore, since they are extremely dependent on oil wealth, the state apparatus is controlled by such external oil revenue and in the event of any foreign changes in oil prices, the rentier state is immensely affected. According to Mahdavy (1970), the position of the government in a rentier economy is called 'fortuitous etatism' which relates to the act of using the foreign

rents to enforce authoritarianism and quasi-democracy. Similarly, this form of government position makes co-optation easy as citizens would not complain provided they receive the dividends of oil rents from the state.

Gaddafi during his leadership in Libya established this form of rentier economy where Libya became a welfare state, with the government providing public goods and services like national security, education, health, social security, employment, and infrastructure. The welfare state for Luciani and Beblawi (1987, p. 67) is visible in most oil-exporting countries in the MENA region and such countries are characterized by a particular government distributive mechanism as well as an absence of taxation. In Libya, Gaddafi established a distributive feature, particularly as a tool to gain popular support by providing free housing and other basic amenities. Kuru (2002, p. 61) mentions that this distribution of basic services by the government requires no tax in return, rather, it requires the citizenship legitimacy of the government.

Beblawi (1990, p. 87) submits that the redistribution of services by the government is a tool used by the government for gaining the consent of the people as well as to consolidate the position of the government's power and authority. Therefore, the rentier economy does not only affect the economy of the nation but also transcends the social and political nature of the country. This is because such rentier states have no obligation to be open or transparent to the citizens, the populace is mostly concerned with their welfare as well as equal distribution of services. In contrast to states where taxes are requested, the state is expected to be transparent on its budget and people have the right to know the flow of revenues of the state.

Sharing a similar idea, Robinson and Acemoglu (2005, p. 34) submit that in rentier economies, there is a lack of accountability on the part of the government since the citizens do not fund the state but funding is done by the oil rents received. In such a situation, the government position is further consolidated since the taxes from the citizens are not received. In addition to this, state institutions in rentier economies are faced with mediocrity and are usually low-quality structures. The control of the government and few people who are close to the government over oil revenue create ways for clientelism, elitism, and corruption.

To re-iterate the level of corruption in the rentier state, Karl (2005) explains the rentier economy using the illustration of the 'honey pot'. Based on this illustration, the rentier state is viewed as a prize award where people looking to enjoy the benefits of the state struggle to gain prominent positions in the state and try to capture portions

of the state. By trying to capture the portions of the state, clientelist and corrupt tendencies increase and the gap between state institutions and the citizens is widened.

According to Sandbakken (2006, p. 141), the Libyan political system under Gaddafi was distant from the citizens as a result of the neo-patrimonial and clientelist system. Similarly, due to the distance between leadership and the state, the political apparatus in Libya was disjointed from the rest of the citizens, hence, the excessive role of government and absence of accountability between government and citizens directly affect the quality of institutions. As a result of the rentier system, Gaddafi practised an authoritarian regime model in Libya, so the Libyan political institutions are generally weak and inefficient (El-Katiri, 2012). This, therefore, draws to mind the submission of Huntington with regards to taxation and representation which goes thus:

“In oil-exporting rentier states, the government enjoys foreign income oil revenues accrue to the state: they, therefore, increase the power of the state bureaucracy and because they reduce or eliminate the need for taxation, they also the need for the government to solicit the acquiescence of its subjects to taxation. The lower the level of taxation, the less reason for the public to demand representation. ‘No taxation without representation’ was a political demand; ‘No representation without taxation’ is a political reality” (Huntington, 1991, p. 25).

The rentier system in Libya brought with it numerous social, economic, and political problems. During Gaddafi’s regime, Altunisik (1996, p. 67) highlights that the rise and qfall in the price of oil created domestic reactions from the citizens and a harsh reaction from Gaddafi’s government. Similarly, these political reactions culminated in a social context which greatly affected Gaddafi’s government. The drop in oil price in the 1980s made life difficult for Libyans, especially since there was no standard domestic industry or any valuable means for government revenue besides oil.

The fiscal economic policies introduced by Gaddafi during the 1980s following the fall of oil prices reflected an increased authoritarianist measure from Gaddafi’s regime. In 1982, the regime introduced an import budget aimed at regulating the influx of foreign items in the country (Vandewalle, 1998, p. 51). This is against the backdrop that Libya in the previous decade was generally flooded with foreign goods and products owing to the rise in the price of oil. As a result of this fiscal cut in imported items, the socio-political atmosphere of the country began to change.

According to Henderson (1984, p. 38), the effect of the drop in prices of oil caused an increased level of hardship and poverty for Libya's citizens, as a result,

conflicts erupted in some parts of the country and there was widespread insecurity in the country. Similarly, Libyans formed the General People's Congress (GPC) as an institutional platform for rejecting and criticizing Gaddafi's policies. This, therefore, shows that owing to the absence of rent received from oil, the government lost their consolidating power, hence, Gaddafi resulted in more undemocratic policies to enforce his leadership.

The regime faced domestic dissatisfaction and sects began to form, one sect in support of Gaddafi's policies and the other in opposition. Similarly, as oil prices continue to dwindle, Libya was left with a poorly fairing economy and this was reflected in the social life of the citizens. Similarly, political dissatisfaction was introduced and this created deepening crises between Gaddafi supporters and non-supporters. However, Gaddafi's regime acknowledge the financial conflicts and as such, created economic and political reforms to protect his regime. Gaddafi was then forced to privatize some government institutions such as the water and gas industries, equally, small businesses were supported and this managed to curb the economic challenges, hence, restoring trust in Gaddafi's regime.

From the above, it can be agreed that the rentier system in Libya was problematic as it did not only affect the economy but also affected the political and social life of the country. Similarly, this put the country in a divided nature, one part known as Gaddafi supporters and the others known as opposition to the regime. Similarly, owing to the rentier system, the domestic industries in Libya were poorly developed, hence, forcing the country into hardship following the drop in the global price of oil in the 1980s. Another important concept that shapes the formation of states in the MENA region is religion and culture, and this has influenced to a great level the state-building project in Libya as well.

2.4.3 Religion and Cultural Influence in State Building in the MENA Region

Brynen, (2004) argues that the high rate of regional conflict and the prevalence of external threats influenced the rise of coercive apparatuses that are used to justify and legalize domestic repression in some cases. The effect of the colonial experience in the region also constitutes a significant factor in its failure to practice democracy. The religion of the region, which is majorly Islam, makes it possible for the rulers to describe the state's objectives in terms of a 'sacred mission,' usually against this imperialist threat (Waterbury, 1994).

Religion, which constitutes the political culture and civil society of the region, is another factor to be considered when looking at the exceptionalism of the Middle East region. From the religious perspective, the region is overwhelmingly Muslim whereby most of the conflicts and frictions have emerged as a result of the two major strands of Islam: Sunni (about 85 per cent) and Shia Islam. Iran is the only state that is regarded as a Shia Islamic republic though there is a majority of Shia Muslim population in Iraq and Bahrain, and significant Shiite minorities are also found in Lebanon and Syria.

Religious conflict, which is inter-Islamic rivalries have been constant in the history of the region, so the religious conflict is not only about Islam and the Western democracy, it also occurred within the same Islamic religion. Several countries have experienced internal Shia-Sunni conflicts in (Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria), and the Shiite Iranian regime is always scared of its Sunni Islamic neighbours. There is 80 per cent of the Jewish population in Israel, while Christians constitute significant minorities in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Egypt, and Iraq (Sørli M; Gleditsch N & Strand H, 2005, p.147).

The influence of religion (Islam) in bringing the region as opposed to democracy has been a subject of debate in the literature. While some researchers support the fact that there is something about Islam that is naturally incompatible with democracy, some argue that there can be a possibility of secularism and democracy, which can make the practice of democracy possible in the region. Anderson (1995) argues that the Arab world and the Middle East are congenitally defective' concerning democratic potential, in response to neo-primordials who have argued that Arab society lacks tolerance and the underpinnings of democratic government (Kramer, 1993, 2003) or suffers from a more generalized inhospitality to democracy (Kedourie, 1994).

Fish (2002) discusses the role of women in Islam as an explanation for the failure of democracy. Many researchers have built linkages between religious and cultural beliefs and undemocratic governments in the Middle East. Cultural explanations that focused on Islamic culture tend to over-predict a high rate of authoritarianism in opposition to democratic transitions which have taken place in Turkey, Indonesia, and other Muslim-majority countries (Blaydes L & Lo J. 2011, p.6).

As a result of the theory of exceptionalism, the question about the persistent nature of un-democracy in the Middle East is always asked in the literature. For this reason, Moaddel (2002) contends that the justification for the disappointment of liberal popular government in the greater part of the Arab world is essential because of the way that Islam as a religion lacks the framework of maintaining and supporting human rights. This is clarified in two sections; in the first section, it is clarified that the absence of individual or human rights evolves into an absence of administrative capacities, which leads to dead or weak state authority and increases the reason for non-participation in politics.

The second view relates to the Islamic perception of human nature where a more optimistic and liberal human nature is provided, in comparison with the view provided by Christianity where man is seen as vile and abhorrent. In the traditional Islamic political system, the Caliph is the head of the Caliphate, therefore, exercising control over the Muslim state in a sort of political arrangement that relates to either totalitarianism or tyrant government. However, it may be argued that there is another side of the Islamic political hypothesis that are against this model of leadership, hence, they support the introduction of other decentralized power structures such as the consultative gatherings or bodies (shura), agreement (ijma) and utility (masliha).

As highlighted by Knudsen (2003 p.6), the major problem of the MENA region is not due to a lack of democratic policies or principles but rather the problem is caused due to an absence of procedural principles that could be utilized to decide how revolution and other social actions against the authoritarian regime may be conducted. For many authors such as Elie Kedouri (2001), democracy is a new phenomenon in the Islamic world, relating to the submission made by Langohr (2001) who mentioned that democracy in the Islamic world is highly limited and not institutionalized.

However, contrary to this popular belief about the lack of connection between Islam and democracy, there are a few political elements in Islam. Specifically, the Turkish Welfare Party (until its ban in 1998) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) established the importance of democracy as being achieved through Islamization (Khan, 2001. P.223). It ought to be noticed that the majority of the Middle Eastern states are under absolutist systems that sometimes limit the participation of Islamists in political activities and deny them the right of joining in the political procedure. This, therefore, shows that the undemocratic nature of Islamic states is not entirely based on Islam but may perhaps relate to other factors (Owen, 2004, p. 45).

Similarly, in discussing the relationship between Islam and democracy, there are numerous instances in the MENA region where Islamic parties have been faced with stringent political rules from undemocratic regimes, a major example is Egypt (Alterman, 2000). This led Langohr (2001, P. 592) to suggest that the major hindrance to democracy in the MENA region is not sponsored by religion but rather by the democratic system that is by and large a dictatorship.

Despite the growing acceptance of democracy in the region, there are various reasons why states in the region might decide to accept democracy in their states. In this regard, as mentioned by Al-Sayyid (2002), the role of Islamic organizations in influencing democracy in their regions. Examples of such religious institutions involve the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. It is exceptionally uncommon to discover a change of Islamist terrorist associations into a peaceful associations, however, these Islamist associations have consistently advanced a serene technique for political force.

An example of an Islamist violent organization that later went into a peaceful one is Lebanese Hezbollah. The gathering got notorious because of its vicious guerrilla strategies, which incorporate the snatching of Western prisoners, self-destruction missions and bomb assaults against foreign missions, however, Hezbollah became a political party after the international agreement in 1989 (Ta'if Agreement) that shut down 15 years of common conflict. For Langohr (2001, p. 597), Hezbollah had fostered a huge organization of social administrations that in numerous occurrences obscured those of the Lebanese state.

Knudsen (2003, p.9-10) clarifies a few conditions inalienable in the Arab world that may be a deterrent to democracy in the region. The fundamental issue of participatory democracy is that numerous Arab states, specifically those named "rentier states," are exclusively based on the participation of a few and not the general public. Hence, in place of participation and democratic interaction, the citizens are provided with financial support accrued from foreign trade on natural resources (Moaddel 2002, p. 376).

Another reason as suggested by Carapico (2002, p. 14) is related to the limited efficiency of foreign aid to advance democracy in the region, despite the large sums of money spent by international organizations as well as Western states on democracy in the MENA region (Ottaway et al. 2002: p. 7).

As clarified by Midlarsky (1998), it is baseless to assume that there is no connection between Islam and democracy as globalization increases interaction, especially amongst human elements that allow for seeds of democracy to develop across the region. This explains why citizens in their numbers protested against the authoritarian government and bad leadership during the Arab uprising. The Arab uprising, therefore, created an avenue for the Arabs to fight for their democracy, while showing the world that there is a huge correlation between Islam and democracy against popular belief.

2.5 Literature review on State-building in Libya

This section focuses on the variety of literature on the state-building process in Libya. It first begins with a brief debate on the causes of the Libyan uprising and considers the Libyan situation in the debate. In addition, the different scholastic views on the causes of the uprising, conflict or the total break-down of law and order specific to Libya are explored. The arguments have been divided into regional explanations, structural and global perspectives and institutional views on the Libyan civil war. These views capture the Gaddafi period and the post-Gaddafi period.

Thereafter, the different works of literature on state-building are examined as they point to various elements that help the process of state-building. At the end of this section, the gaps in the works of literature have been highlighted; firstly most literature focuses on sectorial (political, economic, societal etc.) analysis of Libya's insecurity and most state-building literature is limited to finding challenges without providing conditions for state-building according to their significance. This is the basis that is used to further the next chapter of this thesis.

The concept of state-building, nation-building and peacebuilding has attracted variants of scholars attention as some use them to mean different things while others have used them interchangeably. This has been reflected not only in the definition but in literature. State-building has been used to mean the interventionist strategies that are targeted at restoring and rebuilding the state apparatus and institutions like the bureaucracy. However, nation-building has been used to mean the establishment of a cultural identity which are connected to the specific territory of a state. Ottaway (1999) argues that for a state to function properly, it requires the formation of the nation and hence would posit that state-building is a significant aspect of nation-building.

The role of external actors in the possibility of state-building has been emphasized by scholars of international relations. Nevertheless, they argue that the formation of a nation that bears its heritage can only take place within the society itself. Hence there would be a need for societal reconstruction. This line of argument is used by developmental actors who focus on the concept of state-building. Nation-building is more controversial because considering the meaning of the term nation is problematic especially when the external actors are intending to intervene in the reconstruction of the country. Hence the possibility of using them interchangeably became a welcomed idea, especially among the third sectors like civil society and media.

The intervention of the state, however, in the affairs of another state would be more appropriately tagged as state-building rather than nation-building given that the Bush administration's intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq could barely be carried on a flag as "nation-building" (Ottaway 1999). State building concentrates on the formation of a united nation-state, the nation-building holds more on the ground of formation of cultural identity that could result in the establishment of sovereignty or self-determination. Apart from the identity, nation-building and state-building almost carry the same technical features. As a result of this scholars have been using them to mean the same as the other.

In the context of this thesis, and especially in Libya's case considered, the concentration is on State building to be able to bring the role of both external and internal actors in the reconstruction of Libya. Also observing the diversity of Libya, one could barely stick to one identity if a lasting state-building process is considered. That is why this thesis adopted the state-building concept.

Every state is unique in its socio-political context, therefore there is no definite laid down map to follow on the path to state-building. While some cases focus on the reforms that can take place within the local context, a limited recommendation has been given on what type of reforms to bring about effectiveness. This is because state-building is sensitive. Migdal (2001) explained the connection that exists between state and society and how the two-way interaction takes place between them. Hence, state-building cannot be perceived as separated from the society and politics of the state. Hence, state-building for Brock (2001) involves the incorporation of ethnicities and communities in its process.

The historical nation-building process in the mid-twentieth century had assumed that ethnicity is only leading to the formation of the modern state which disappears after a modern state emerges. Subsequent evidence in state-building has shown that the possibility of sustaining a state-building process lies in the consideration of ethnicity as a factor. However, homogenizing state-building yields no sustainable result. This would mean that ethnicities must be considered not just one ethnicity (Ottaway, 1999). The African context makes it more difficult as it is characterized by a multiplicity of ethnic groups. Libya is part of the African countries that share these multiple identity characteristics irrespective of the Arab majority in the country.

Another view on state-building is neopatrimonialism. It argues that, although there are weak state institutions and apparatus which has been said to cause the power vacuum, there is a presence of a strong informal institutional network that includes local rulers and elites that are not in the institution of the state. Therefore, the weakness of the state is the lack of political willingness of rulers to engage in state-building since they enjoy the strong informal network that serves their purpose. This has been referred to as a shadow state. Any attempt to promote state-building jeopardizes the interest of these rulers hence they are willing to sabotage any state-building process (Reno 2000).

Libya has been said to have a weak state institution and therefore there is the presence of this shadow state, however, it is to control the state since there has not been any form of state-building taking place in Libya. Irrespective of this, works of literature on patrimonialism still saturate the discourse of state-building, however, there is still no clarity on how patrimonialism is effective, especially with regard to the problem identified in the neopatrimonialism.

There are other issues such as the distrust among conflict local actors as well as conflict of interest among the powerful external actors. Other challenges have been stated by Zuercher (2006) that there is a reproduction of the oppressive system of social hierarchy. Irrespective of these problems, the local elite engagement in the state-building process cannot be ignored as they provide leadership for the mobility of the society towards a peaceful country because external actors can only play a very limited role in the sustainability of the state since they are in the state to maintain law and order.

Youssef Mohammed Sawani (2012, p. 130) explains that despite Gaddafi's claims of direct democracy, the leader continued to favour patron-client relationships,

nepotism, and favouritism over public administration and local governance mechanisms. Instead of serving ordinary Libyans, the administration under Gaddafi functioned for the benefit of the Colonel and his clients. As a result, the weak state institutions and public administration structures were unable to implement policies nationally, or coordinate with local governance bodies at the municipalities' level without Gaddafi's approval. Furthermore, Libya is an ideal example of a rentier state with no social contract to maintain the relationship between the regime and the population. A brief discussion of the rentier state in Libya is key to understanding how Libyan sovereignty was 'constructed.'

Camilla Sandbakken (2006, p. 141), who chose Libya, Niger, and Algeria as her case studies, explains that the economic conditions of rentier states determine the range of political choices available for their governments. In principle, rentier states do not have to depend on taxes from their populations to cover state financial obligations. Thus, populations in rentier states get little representation at the political level. However, governments can gain legitimacy through government spending, subsidizing different sections of the economy such as health, education, employment, and infrastructure, forming patron-client networks, and offering public sector and management jobs based on political loyalties rather than merits.

Citizens come to depend directly on the state for income. Furthermore, oil rents are delivered from the state to the citizens which are used to consolidate or suppress political opposition. A side effect is the increase of corruption and the lack of accountability and transparency. Additionally, oil rentier states do not usually have a middle class that is independent of the regime to resist it. Libya had no civil society or technocrats under Gaddafi. Their power and numbers were marginalized after a coup attempt in 1975.

The religious and the academic community were gradually neutralized into the system, and the opposition groups in exile do not enjoy much legitimacy among Libyans. Consequently, political competition can only occur through the control of oil resources. When opposition groups or oppressed civilians gain access to oil, it is unlikely for them to discard it. Sandbakken concludes that wealth from oil, among other factors, creates a social contract that is not favourable to democracy. "The combination of welfare expenditure, repression and the fragmentation of the social structure has made a transition to democracy highly unlikely" (Sandbakken, 2006, p. 143)

Libya's abundant oil resources have indirectly advanced a sovereignty framework different from the Westphalian norm. The rentier nature of Libya has shaped the development of sovereignty and unity in the country and contributed to its consolidation after independence.

As in other rentier states in the region, Libya has an overstuffed malfunctioning public sector. The post-2011 transitional authorities faced the challenges of governing a country with an inefficient system of public administration. Regardless of its ineffectiveness, the public sector remained to be the biggest employer in Libya. On the eve of the revolution, 85% of the Libyan workforce served as civil servants in different capacities that range from security to education.

In addition, the decline of oil rents, Libya's sole economic resource after the uprisings resulted in more massive deficits, higher public debt and eroding foreign reserves. As a reaction to the crisis, transition governments opted to dismiss most of the planned or partially implemented pre-2011 reform policies. The result was that the public sector expanded by putting all armed groups under the government's payroll and the contraction of governance space left for local authorities. "Libya is currently dominated – and its resources are squandered by - a multitude of non-state actors. This has had the effect of bringing the state to near collapse. The most substantial power currently lies outside the formal system.

For Sawani (2012), the failure of transitional governments to reform state institutions is partially due to the mismanagement of the former regime that has weakened these institutions' capacities and burdened their payroll. The exhaustion of public administration structures was further exacerbated by the events following the uprisings and by thousands of armed men who were expecting financial rewards for their revolt against Gaddafi. The pressing need of non-state actors to access and control state economic resources meant that Libyan internal sovereignty was breached and its territorial unity was threatened by the multiple local warring parties.

In "Libya's local elites and the politics of alliance-building", Wolfram Lacher argues that a group of locals composed of armed group leaders, businessmen, tribal and community elders is involved in power struggles to seize state power and resources and prevent its consolidation (Lacher, 2015. p. 5). These elites benefited from and contributed to Libya's state dissolution, territorial fragmentation, and loss of control over constituents and territory; nevertheless, they still hold the key to the reestablishment of central authority.

Lacher (2015, p. 4) explains that these elites have three long-term options: they either empower the state and themselves at the same time, form an alliance that exerts control at the national level or consolidate power locally and prevent the return of the country. Their choice relies on their dependence and connection to the state. On the one hand, elites who are dependent on the state for financial resources, or whose activities require the emergence of stability and peace in Libya may choose one of the first two options. On the other hand, elites who benefit from the absence of the state, such as smugglers, armed gangs, and warlords who try to control Libyan oil resources, may prefer the last option.

Lacher, like Sawani, agrees that the uprisings have not primarily caused rifts and struggles between local elites. Gaddafi intentionally prevented the emergence of state institutions, except for the security apparatus, and ruled the country by exploiting local, regional and tribal strife. Thus, community rifts played a significant role during the 2011 uprisings. Some community figures decided to support the revolution, while others supported Gaddafi. Elites from cities that supported the uprisings, such as Misrata, were heavily represented in transitional governments, while those who opposed it were excluded from the political table.

2.5.1 State-building Structure in Libya

The state-building structure in Libya is characterized by colonial as well as regional influence. Similarly, the nature of the oil economy that was exhibited by most countries in the MENA region as discussed above was also present in Libya, which to a greater level shaped the state-building structure of the country. According to Tripp (2013, p. 43), the state-building structure in Libya was greatly influenced by the personality of Gaddafi who was a Colonel in the Libyan army and came to power following a military coup. This could be seen as a reason why Gaddafi exercised stiff control over the country and its population for 42 years until 2011. Similarly, Vandewalle (2012, p. 65) highlights that the authoritarian rulership style of Gaddafi was further consolidated using his idea of pan-Arabism and religious rhetoric to establish their political mandate.

For Vandewalle, the state-building structure of Libya was mirrored according to the structures of socio-political authorities from its independence. This is why it is easy to find the enduring role of tribes and families as organised entities in Libyan society, and oil resources as strong determinants of state-building in Libya. The

Gaddafi regime was characterized by weak state institutions that dampened the political processes of Libya and established a single-state system.

According to Kaldor (1999, p. 26), there are new wars in the international system which have replaced the old wars. The arguments are that intra-state wars have replaced interstate wars. Other scholars argue that there are not necessarily new, but they are only on the increase since the old war has declined. Furthermore, they argue that the new wars are connected to the old wars and therefore cannot be “new wars”. Whether in the concept of “new war” or “intra-state conflict”, they are both referring to the same phenomenon of civil wars that have characterized the post-cold war era. Gaddafi's rule started during the cold war and ended in the post-war era leading to a civil war in Libya, one would argue that it is not necessarily a new war but a continuation of the silent wars in Libya.

The silent wars are ongoing in a country that has not gained much attention because of either authoritarian rule or media propaganda. Hence, they serve as a pathway to conflict. Several pathways lead to civil wars. These alleys have been explained by different debate sects to be able to point out the root causes of civil war. The causes of civil war can be found in the society, and economy, and traceable to the political regime (Cramer, 2006; Keen 1997, 1998, 2005). Hence, the cultural, economic and political regime arguments on the causes of civil are examined below.

2.5.2 Cultural Influences on the State-building Structure in Libya

This oppressive political system created democratic upheavals in the country and as mentioned by Obeidi (2008, p. 111), the low level of democracy was the major loophole for Gaddafi's continuous authoritarian leadership. Similarly, elements such as neo-patrimonialism and quasi-democracy were very evident in the nation, and this formulated the Libyan state-building structure. The local discussion of state-building in Libya is often characterized by hierarchical elements where identity, tribes, economy, and national elements are highest ranking.

Libya managed to maintain its social homogeneity, at least until the post-2011 era were internal clashes arranged along identity lines started to manifest. It then became noticed that although Gaddafi's regime was repressive, he managed to hold the country in one piece through the use of various co-optation measures. However, following the disarray in the 2011 uprising, the identity politics of Libya that has

hindered efficient state-building measures started to manifest. Civil war erupted across different parts of the country and Libya became divided even further across tribal lines.

In the words of a member of the National Transitional Council (NTC) reported by the International Crisis Group report (2005, p. 34) “the lesson in our minds was Iraq, we wanted the transition to be smooth, and we were eager to avoid internal fighting (fitna) or what occurred with Iraq’s ‘de-Baathification’”. As mentioned by Chivvis and Martini (2014, p. 3), it was generally believed that the conflict in Libya immediately after the Arab uprising would not spiral into identity problems as in other countries in the region due to the homogenous nature of the society. However, this was not the case seeing the impending doom that tribalism would cause in this supposed homogenous society.

As highlighted by Chorin (2012, p. 25), Libya has always been faced with problems of tribalism, however, it became a huge influence in shaping the state-building structure of the country. According to Eriksen (2002, p. 51), tribe signifies creating a distinction between people, which in most cases, as in Libya, may be used as a yardstick for socio-political interaction. Similar views were shared by Obeidi (2008, p. 113) who mentions that the nature of tribalism in Libya shaped to a greater extent the state-building structure of the country. The notion of tribalism in Libya was further explored by Lacher (2015, p. 7) who posits that belonging to a tribe in Libya meant creating a bond amongst individuals in a form of solidarity. Therefore, for the Libyan society, being part of a tribe meant forming strong social ties which create the zeal to achieve a common objective or to fight a common enemy.

This relates to Benedict Anderson's submission in “*Imagined Communities*” where it was seen that people who belong to a particular tribe may create a common identity which is usually constructed and in extreme cases, may create a common enemy who is generally believed to be against the development of the tribe (Anderson, 2006, p. 43).

Tribal political entities contributed to determining the political space in Libya since the struggle for independence. During his regime, Gaddafi used these entities instrumentally to consolidate his power (El-Katiri 2012, 9-14). During and after the civil war, tribes regained their autonomy and centrality and they filled the vacuum left by regime change. They acted as pillar structure in Libyan society, and they became part of a rich variety of peripheral movements that have contended power to the centre, and that have drastically clashed with each other. The role of tribal political

entities shows the extent to which Libyan society can be hardly described as homogenous but rather densely and sparsely fragmented.

From this perspective, the proponents of this assertion explain that the root cause of civil war is based on cultural differences and most importantly the political discrimination that occurs against minorities as related to culture. To simply describe it, it is referred to as “ethnic conflict.” Based on this assertion, societies that are divided are prone to violence based on a different perception of identities and also conflicts that are reoccurring over treatment, status and group rights (Petersen, 2002; Kaufman, 2001; Kaufman 1996; Gurr, 1993:2000). Based on the perception of some analysts, these identities are constructed socially and politically and not given. This means that the major source of this type of conflict is not a result of differences but based on political manipulations that twist the identity of the people for political gains such as in the election. (Gagnon, 1994:1995; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Snyder and Mansfield, 1995; Snyder, 2000). Libya’s case has not been exactly in this manner, however, Gaddafi’s supporters hold on to cultural and ethnic attachment in their support of the dictator. Another arguable standpoint is that minorities have been sidelined in his regime however not just minorities but all oppositions.

2.5.3 Economic Influence on State-building Structure in Libya

As mentioned by Beblawi and Luciani (1987, p. 35), the rentier state system in Libya as was evident in other rentier economies in the region distorted the efficient state-building structure in Libya. As already highlighted, owing to the nature of foreign revenues accrued in form of petrol dollars in Libya, state-building processes become affected due to the problems of institutional development and most importantly, representation. As highlighted by Michael Herb (2005, p. 301) in “*No Representation without Taxation? Rents, Development, and Democracy*”, it is seen that due to the petrol dollars received by most rentier states, the state becomes a welfare state which pays its citizens instead of collect taxes from them. Through this means, legitimacy is bought, and citizens are less involved in political processes.

In Libya, the rentier structure exhibited major consequences, especially in two main sectors which are economic and political. Concerning the economic sector, due to the abundance of foreign rents, the establishment of efficient economic institutions was not supported, and it was believed that the petrol dollars would continually be received. For this reason, efficient economic measures were also not adopted,

therefore, creating corruption amongst government officeholders whose major aim was to attain political power to engage in corrupt practices mostly for their selfish gains. As a corollary, this also affected the political sector.

For the political sector, the rentier state encouraged the creation of individual/personal interests over group interests. Similarly, this weakened the political apparatus of the states and most political institutions held limited rational-legal authority in the state. Similarly, political power did not rest on the state anymore, but instead, it relied on clan heads, personal rulership, tribal chiefs, elites, friends of Gaddafi and Gaddafi himself, all of whom were involved in the distribution of public gains acquired from oil rents in the country (Sharqieh, 2013, p. 31).

From the economic perspective, this is based on an assertion by the World Bank Research team led by Paul Collier (1999; 2004). They explained that civil war is caused by rebels hoping to control economic gains. Rebels who rise against an established government seeking to control power and economic resources create an atmosphere for other rebels and therefore a state of chaos arises. Furthermore, Collier et al (1999) described the correlation that exists between civil war and declining growth of an economy, declining or low total GDP per capita, a country's dependence on primary commodity exports, and a very high level of unemployment.

The outcome suggests that greed is one of the causes of civil war which allows stealing, especially when a large amount of profit can be made from natural resources like oil, and diamonds, this is known as the resource curse.

From this angle, uprisings arise as a result of authoritarian rule or the absence of democracy. The political regime is a refinement of the cultural argument. The main players remain the aggrieved minorities or neglected majority. However, the issue lies in what mechanism or means is the government using to address the issues of the people. Civil war may arise from patterns related to political instability which includes violence carried out by the government security force or task force (Goldstone et al, 2005). From the perspective of key decision-makers, the argument from the cultural perspective has been used as an excuse not to launch a military intervention when it is needed on the view that such problems or conflicts have been ongoing for so long. Also, the argument for economic gain has been used against intervention in favour of policies that are distant like economic sanctions on rebels and referring to them as criminals who deserve punishment and not engagement.

2.5.3.1 Regional Causes of Economic Instability

As a result of the interconnectedness of events in the region, there are ripple effects that are felt in other countries in the region from the activity of other states in the region. The states in the MENA region are so interconnected that the concept used in explaining an event in one state may be used to explain the events in another state. For this reason, some facets of regional causes in explaining the state-building structure in Libya may be feasible for explaining the state-building structure in other countries in the MENA region.

The oil crisis in the 1980s similarly affected all countries in the region, especially those that are reliant on oil. This also shows a pattern of petrodollars that has affected all forms of the states in this region. Owing to the drop in oil prices, the economic level and standard of living dropped in this region and this led to the rise of opposition against government institutions. Additionally, since most states in the region are dependent on oil, the global economic crisis in 2009 led to harsh economic conditions for citizens, especially those in the lower class. Therefore, causing increased support from opposition organizations as well as a large-scale protest during the Arab Uprising.

As highlighted above, regional causes of the modern-day state-building discussion on Libya are related to the Arab Uprising that did not only affect Libya but also affected other North African states such as Tunisia and Egypt as well as other Middle East states such as Syria. Additionally, the influence of religion and sectarianism is another important aspect to consider when discussing state-building in not only Libya but also in other countries in the MENA region.

Considering Libya being the case under study, regional explanations shed some light on the instability as Zoubir & Rózsa (2012) explained that the fall of Gaddafi's regime was welcomed by several international actors and the region of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As discussed above, while elements of democracy were recorded in other North African countries before the Arab Uprising, Gaddafi on the other hand sort to further consolidate power, especially through his political tactics. Additionally, owing to the interrelationship of events in the MENA region, the Arab Uprising that occurred in Tunisia did not stop there but also travelled to other parts of the region, Libya inclusive.

Following the fall of Gaddafi's regime, Libya faced numerous regional and international actors, each with their idea of what is the best solution for efficient state-

building in the country. However, before Gaddafi's forces could be overthrown, Zoubir and Rozsa (2012) highlight that the lack of a stable army in Libya led to the introduction of other regional forces to join in the struggle for perhaps their personal or non-personal interests. Regional causes in this regard, therefore, relate to the various conducted actions organized by the different state and non-state actors towards the state-building processes in Libya.

It is no doubt that the current situation in Libya is filled with armed belligerents from different parts of the country, all with their regional and international supporters. The regional alliances formed by the actors in Libya have also increased the influence of regional actors which has caused destabilization in the country and has affected the state-building measures that have been discussed previously. A notable example of this is the ISIS insurgency that continues to establish its presence in the region as well as in Libya.

Al-Shammari & Willoughby (2019) in their study found out that from the period of 1991 to 2014, the unrest in the MENA region was a result of youth unemployment and the political instability in the region. The outcome of the study further suggests that a country that is more inclined toward democracy has less unrest. Libya is not an example of such a country and has not been able to overcome the movements that have led it to the ditch of political instability.

A major reason for the discussion of regional causes on economic influences of state-building on Libya shows the pattern followed by rentier states in the region and how they are affected by global economic challenges. In turn, as these global economic challenges continued, the states in the region became more susceptible to protests which saw the rise of opposition and radicals.

2.5.3.2 International Structural Causes of Economic Instability

Salamey (2015) suggests that the politics of post-Arab uprising is a product of economic structure that has become globalized as a result of economic and social liberalization. In a bid to join the rest of the world in a globalized system of economy, the Libyan state became exposed to foreign interaction as well as to international trade. It should be noted that Libya as a country has a considerably smaller size of domestic industry as compared to other states in the Middle East, therefore, revealing an imbalance in international trade. Additionally, since the country practices mostly a rentier economy, Salamey (2012) in his study reveals that centralized autocratic rule

has been broken down fundamentally by global market and privatization while at the same time encouraging corruption and developments that are selective leading to public fury.

The nature of the Libyan economy, especially during Gaddafi's era was one where one person had the power to make changes as they wish, therefore, leading to an autocratic system that could not be matched with the liberal market. For this reason, the country experienced an unstable economic structure in contrast to the global economic arrangement that it sought to be a part of. It is also pertinent to note that Libya depended mainly on oil as its major foreign income, being a rentier state, any upset in international oil prices such as the oil price fall in the 1980s negatively affected the country's economy which in turn led to domestic conflicts in the country.

As a country with a large oil reserve, Zambakari (2016) stated from the international organizational views that the Libyan intervention by NATO created lots of controversies as regards the exercising of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in the future, claiming that the major aim for NATO's entry was to unseat Gaddafi and make claims to Libya's oil. Zambakari further explained that the resolution 1973 that backed NATO up was exploited and that NATO's mandate to protect civilians was violated by using excessive force which led to the regime change. It should be noted that the change of regime was not included as part of the UNSC resolution of 1973. This was raised as an issue by both the AU and South Africa stating that the current situation in Libya is the absence of a unified and stable regime irrespective of the type of regime.

Kuperman (2013) also contributed that NATO's intervention was not carried out properly and it has increased the timeline of the conflicts to last for almost a decade while multiplying its death rate. Kuperman believes that the NATO intervention was a failure because it worsened the abuse of human rights, the suffering of the Libyan people, Islamic radicalism and the increase in the use of a weapon by different Libyan sects. Brahimi (2011) explained that the fall of Gaddafi's regime was championed by grass-root politics that he was once involved in. However, within the domestic structure, Brahimi argued that Gaddafi's personalized politics in the state was able to use a tough approach on the demonstrators because of the existence of tribalism in Libya, and the geography of opposition. Brahimi recommended that the political process should be transparent.

An understanding of international structural causes provides a thorough understanding of the measures in which foreign policies of globalization and

international relations have further created economic consequences that negatively affected the state-building processes in Libya.

2.5.3.3 Institutional perspectives

Several scholars have applied Acemoglu's institutional explanation for the failure of a state. Blanchard (2018) argued that Gaddafi's era was characterized by weak institutions and an absence of experience in democratic self-government. This spilled over to the economy, making it difficult for the Libyan economy to be stable. After the fall of Gaddafi, Libya was a haven for insecurity and its conflict deepened in 2014. An assumed transparent election was held in 2012 and 2014 for legislative bodies and the drafting of the constitution. However, there was a low turnout of voters since candidates were threatened. Also, there was a lack of political competition because of the situation of the nation. The U.S, in 2018, Africa Command (AFRICOM) told the congress that it is important for political stability to be restored in Libya to avoid another civil war.

Sawani (2017) explained that even though the rebels contributed to the downfall of Gaddafi, they were also involved in the acts of war in different parts of the country after the fall of Gaddafi since there was no institution to address the insecurity. Additional militias also arose as a result of the lack of a working institution that can restrict the use of force. This had made security sector reform and integration look impossible thus preventing the kick-off of a state-building process.

Eriksson (2016) explained that the post-Gaddafi era is characterized by huge security problems played by different types of armed actors. This is a result of state institutions that are not functioning which are expected to provide services to the state and the absence of legitimate army and national police who are expected to protect the Libyan people.

Jebnoun (2015) argued that the present problems of Libya were caused as a result of not establishing a modern state. His study also argues that Libya's post-Gaddafi conflict arose as a result of the desire to control the nation's resources which includes its financial assets, and its cross-border trafficking. This study recommends that the stakeholders presently in Libya should not overlook the settlements provided by the United Nations in achieving a new Libyan state; to establish a modern state, there is a need for modern institutions.

Obeidi (2008) stressed the fact that the political system of Gaddafi's regime lacked institutions that could implement its programs. Instead, those who implemented the programs were known as temporal elites and these elites change from time to time based on the needs of the Libyan state. Sayigh (2015) presses the argument that the reason why Libya is still struggling to date is because of its crumbling security system. This is a result of regular changes in elites while the previous elites go about establishing factions to counter the system. The author explains that the adequate reformation that is expected to have taken place in Libya's security sector has not been functional because of an institutionalized political field that is poor, the struggle for control of the Libyan resources, incapacitation of the law-making bodies in the state, the problem of militias and armed challenges and also as a result of external factors.

2.5.4 The Security and Peace-keeping Literature on State-building in Libya

The international security literature emphasizes that the external actors or in a case where the international community venture into state-building, always seek an exit strategy. In the tone the international community voice the need for establishing sustainable peace. Some policymaker seeks for early exit meanwhile several scholars have explained the need for a long time before any sustainable peace would warrant an exit. Another debate is whether there should be partial or total exit which brings the dilemma of leaving a sovereign state existing on its own and the international community experiencing insecurity.

The purpose of the external actor's role in state-building became a question in the first place (Fearon and Laitlin 2004). Another field that emphasizes the role of external actors in the discipline of international relations since the basic foundational tenet of international relations is the nation-state. The debate over the sovereignty of states remains a concern to scholars in the realist school of international relations in cases where liberals suggest the intervention of the international community in state-building. Even in circumstances when the realist agrees with intervention based on national security, the question of who, how and when creates another debate (Mallaby 2002).

The result has been varieties of recommendations to intervene or not to intervene, minimal intervention, and intervention by the state, group of states or by the international community, to intervene in a strong state or a weak state; all these to ensure an efficient state-building process (Etzioni 2004). However, the goal is to

strengthen the state or society to be able to stand and forge ahead with a sustainable state-building whether the intervention or not. (Jackson 1990).

The anti-terrorism campaign at the beginning of the 21st century is also about a perspective on state-building. For example, the war on terror has reinforced a connection between the security of a nation and developmental pursuits. This simply means that state-building is not only necessary for the protection of humans and property or in the alleviation of poverty but more important because the wealthy countries have an interest to keep the existing world order; the inequality system that makes some countries economies more stable than the other.

Instability in a country disrupts the global economy, therefore, disrupts this continuous inequality; this is not to say that instability is a good state because it disrupts the inequality, rather it is a state to be overcome because it causes a lack of development. Therefore, for development to take place as a bid to provide an opportunity to get rid of the inequality, stability is necessary to be achieved in a lot of local contexts. Ronen (2017) suggests that a state security system should be rebuilt through an internal agreement that can withstand tribalistic problems, ethnic problems, Salafi-jihadistic issues, and the criminal militarization of Libya.

Furness (2017) provides a developmental perspective for international cooperation with Libya. Furness outlines four vital areas of international cooperation and they are “peace, reconciliation and justice; governance and public administration; economic diversification; and migration.” The study suggests that the effectiveness of these key areas is largely dependent on the condition of Libya’s domestic security and that if the domestic stakeholders decide that they want a new Libya, the international community may be available to push forward the new dream with enthusiasm.

Abulof (2017, p. 58) argues that regimes characterized by rentier systems can buy political legitimacy and stability through non-tax revenues and claim that these rentier systems in authoritarian regimes only provide temporal stability and not a sustainable one. Abulof (2017, p. 63) further suggests that a clear difference should be made between negative and positive political legitimacy and that to have a sustainable economy, the two perspectives work hand in hand. However, regimes characterized by a rent system usually focus on a political legitimacy that is negative. Gaub (2013) observed in the 2011 Libyan uprising that the Libyan military was not unified. Even though they indisputably backed up Gaddafi’s regime, it showed that they were

neglected and disintegrated. It was observed that the Libyan army was weak and not capable of acting at the national level.

Arguably, there are various gaps in the aforementioned literature. Firstly, there is a need for more clarity on how development and state-building can be synchronized because there are overlapping activities in both. Hence there is a need for clarity on what part of the development and what part of state-building comes together to form a partnership. Another area where a gap is observed is the relationship between the rich and poor. Statebuilding has not been shown to target the poor meanwhile most evidence of civil war shows how economic marginalization has resulted in wars.

How culture emerges and how they have changed to cater for these changes in state-building have also called for attention on academia. Furthermore, what are the disincentives of state-building and how they can be addressed that have not been featured in literature? Also, comparative historical analysis has not been able to identify trajectories of change. Irrespective of all these gaps, this thesis focuses on the absence of prioritizations, conditionalities and sequence in the state-building process in Libya. There has not been any expression on the clarity of how state-building should take place, especially after the failure of the Shkirat agreement in 2015. This study, therefore, considers the insecurity to create a pointer that helps in filling gaps in the establishment of a durable state. These have been regarded as the conditionalities for state-building in Libya.

2.6 Summary

The literature review provides an expansive discussion of understanding the Libyan state structure by taking into consideration various state-building concepts and variables. It is essential to highlight that owing to the popularity of the Arab Uprising, scholars from all parts of the world became increasingly interested in the causes, effects, and components of the Arab Spring. For most of these scholars as highlighted above, their main aim was to focus on the nature of the states in the MENA region during the post-Arab Uprising time.

Additionally, owing to the argument that states in the MENA region are significantly identical in their policies and creation, a uniform result of the Arab uprising was expected, which was not the case in the MENA states due to different styles of domestic politics and economic styles in the MENA states. The chapter begins by introducing the concept of the state and defining the various structure of the

state. According to the chapter, the state is made up of various components which are not only composed of the citizens but also composed of various institutions. The strength of the institution determines the political nature of the state. Additionally, the stronger the state institutions, the more solid is the nature of state-building.

The chapter also mentioned that state-building may be affected by different factors such as identity, economics, and culture. Since the study focuses on state-building in Libya, the chapter analyzing the nature of state-building firstly started by discussing state-building in the MENA region. Beginning with identity, it is common to find citizens of MENA states pledging higher allegiance to their ethnic or religious groups rather than to the central state. This has weakened state formation in the region and has instead led people to consider their religious or ethnic groups rather than the state.

In the discussion of the economy, the rentier state system is popular in the MENA region, hence, citizens are paid by the government and the state is extremely reliant on foreign income. Most states in the MENA region are oil-rich countries that enjoy a huge level of foreign income from the sale of oil reserves. For this reason, governments do not receive taxes from citizens but they instead pay the citizens. Hence, citizens may be less interested in government style and political mechanisms and governments develop the economy as a tool to consolidate their regimes.

In the discussion of religion and culture, the chapter relates this with the notion of identity while highlighting foreign implications and intrusion as a result of religion and culture in the region. The MENA region is significantly divided between various religious sects and foreign governments have formed alliances in the region depending on the various cultural and religious sects in the region. A similar experience is noticed in Libya where the tribal affiliation has greatly influenced the state-building model in the country.

To explicitly understand the state structure of Libya, the literature review begins by providing a general discussion about state and nation-building, hence, forming the building blocks upon which the case study was discussed. In discussing the concept of state, the chapter mentions that failed states are regarded as those with weak political structures and poor ability to ensure the safety of their citizens. For this reason, the citizens may give their loyalty to other non-state structures that ensure that survival and safety. This was discussed as the case of Libya before, during, and after Gaddafi's regime.

To further reiterate the discussion of state-building and how this relates to the topic, it was discussed above that the three main aspects of state-building are economic, political and security. These aspects of state-building are based on the premise that before a state can fully rebuild itself, it must consider these, especially in post-conflict zones. Similarly, the chapter highlights the argument that interchanges nation-building with state-building, however, the state is based on an extremely civic view whereas the nation may be an allegiance to ethnic characteristics, which is very common in the MENA region.

For the MENA region, the chapter highlights the importance placed on various forms of identities and how these influence state-building in the region. This explains why the chapter discusses aspects such as religion and economy that may be regarded as being peculiar to the MENA region. Creating an analysis of the constant change in the state-building structure and other modes of state activities that are influenced by globalization in other parts of the world, the position of primordial identities, religion, supra-state structure, and economic living methods that are present in some MENA states may have contrasting effect to the changes expected from globalization, hence, creating a repetition of events that could be seen during and after Gaddafi's regime.

The Libyan state is filled with many tribes, for this reason, it is common to find people with more loyalty to their tribes than to the state. Similarly, due to the effects of colonization and the political system during Gaddafi's regime, a majority of Libyans have maintained a primordial identity, emphasizing their tribal affiliation more than being citizens of Libya. This form of identity as mentioned in the chapter organizes the state according to tribal divisions.

Another important aspect of the state-building structure that has significantly influenced state-building in Libya during and after Gaddafi is the economic aspect. Libya's economy is structured on a rentier state system which organizes the state as a welfare state.

The chapter highlights that in a majority of rentier states, especially those in the MENA region, the political apparatus seeks to consolidate its authority by using the rents collected from the sale of natural resources. The main idea is that if the government pays the citizens, the citizens become less interested in political activities, therefore, leaving the government to act as they please. However, payment is based on money collected from a foreign trade of oil, which in most cases is unstable. Therefore,

this instability in oil prices led to harsh economic times, leading to the rise of various opposition against Gaddafi.

Due to authoritarianism, the passage highlights that Gaddafi's continued his favouritism leadership style to keep him in power, despite the harsh living conditions for the majority of the masses. These grievances culminated in a conflict following the beginning of the Arab Uprising. This chapter mentions that since Libya has always been regarded as a failed state, the international community through the belief that state-building also meant intervening in a country to maintain democracy, law and order, entered Libya. For this reason, there are numerous international actors in the Libyan conflict as is discussed in subsequent chapters.

This chapter focuses mainly on the various elements of state-building and how these elements are formed or influenced in Libya. Providing references to Libya before, during and after Gaddafi's era, this chapter sets the foundation for understanding the various state-building challenges witnessed in Libya during Gaddafi's era.

CHAPTER III

The State-Building Challenges During Gaddafi's Regime

3.1 Introduction

It is pertinent to note that state-building in the MENA region is signified to be distorted by various factors hindering healthy state-building processes. Similarly, following the submissions by Anderson (2011, p. 5), the MENA region is bedevilled by numerous problems which may relate to economic, cultural, political, and social structures that may pose challenges to state-building. In this chapter, however, the aim is to explicitly discuss the various state-building challenges at play in Libya during the Gaddafi era.

Hinnebusch (2001, p. 43) in his study about authoritarian consolidation mentions that there is a tendency for authoritarian leaders to adopt and co-opt policies to solidify their position in the political arena. Based on this submission, the chapter has been crafted to efficiently analyze the various challenges faced during the Gaddafi era regarding state-building. Before discussing Libya in detail, the beginning part of this chapter firstly explains the challenges of state-building processes in North Africa. This approach is adopted at starting of this section to set the scene for the state-building in Libya.

The chapter then moves to analyze the centralized state and limited political participation exploited by Gaddafi during his regime. In this way, it is aimed to provide an understanding of how Gaddafi exploited the limited democratic participation in Libya to consolidate his power in the country. In discussing the political structure of Libya during the Gaddafi era, this study aims to analyze the power consolidation method he wielded using the Green Book. Similarly, the Green Book provided an opportunity for Gaddafi to continue his totalitarian rulership style.

Another political tool that is discussed in this chapter is the *Jamahiriya* system employed by Gaddafi which he used to deceive Libyans by claiming the power was in their hands, whereas, in reality, Gaddafi wielded all the power. Since he controlled all the power, it also meant that he supplied benefits and economic advantages to only a select few which then leads to the discussion of the economic problems that hindered state-building in Libya during the Gaddafi era.

In this economic section, more emphasis was given to the rentier state and the principle of rentiers that was at play in the country. Although the rentier system was

in effect, inequality was fully enhanced in the country with few citizens amassing all the wealth, while others were significantly paid lower based on their tribal and social influence in the Libyan community. The chapter then analyzes how Gaddafi exploited some socio factors by politicizing tribal differences and exploring tribal differences to his advantage before moving to talk about Gaddafi's exploitation of public administration and government offices to solidify his position in the country. This chapter ends by explaining the fall of the Gaddafi regime due to external intervention, and therefore, creating a bridge concerning the events that occurred in post-Gaddafi Libya.

3.2 The Arab Uprising and its Influence on State Building in the MENA Region

The years leading up to the Arab Uprising were bedevilled with legitimacy deficit of regimes in the MENA region, political participation in some Middle East states and the gradual collapse of the rentier system in other states experiencing a drop in the price of oil. The social movements building up to what is known as the Arab Spring became a basis for ubiquitous sectarianism by the regimes and citizens alike (Farha, 2016). In Syria for example, the once peaceful opposition was framed by the Assad regime as being jihadist and terrorist oriented, the Assad regime did this to gain support from the Syrian minorities and the conflict quickly escalated to an identity clash where the GCC states supported the opposition on a Sunni Islamic rhetoric.

The Sunni Gulf states hoped that toppling the Assad Regime would significantly reduce the regional influence of Iran. Here Iran was viewed by the Sunni Gulf states especially Saudi Arabia as a security threat to the regional politics of the Middle East. The Syrian conflict became a full sectarian conflict with Turkey and other Sunni states supporting the opposition against the Alawite Assad regime whereas Iran and Hezbollah and other Shia organizations became the major supporter of the Assad regime (Lynch, 2012).

In Yemen, the Shia Zaidi Houthis and their Sunni Opponents have always been engaged in a power struggle that has successfully become a proxy war for regional Shia and Sunni powers. Following the death of former President Saleh in 2012, the country of Yemen was thrown into a state of massive sectarian conflicts with Saudi Arabia supporting the regime against the Zaidi Houthis that are supported by Iran. Sectarianism was also very effective in explaining the Arab uprising in Bahrain. The Saudi troops moved into Bahrain in February 2011 to support the Al-Khalifa ruling

family of the Sunni Minority against the Shia opposition which is the majority in Bahrain (Al-Rasheed, 2011).

Tehran was seemingly overjoyed from the onset of the Arab uprising as the regimes in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt were affected and overthrown, Tehran had praised these actions as a fight against the pro-Western leaders of these states. The attitude of Iran however changed how Syria became affected, seeing that Damascus and Tehran are very close allies and identify as a similar religious sects, Tehran joined Assad in fighting the Sunni opposition (Mikail, 2017). The situation in Iraq worsened as ISIS seized this opportunity to conquer and control the Western part of Iraq. This was made possible following the strong identity that has always been in Iraq but even got stronger during the Arab Spring. When Nouri Al-Maliki assumed office as Iraqi Prime Minister, he perfected the sectarian myth that members of different sects cannot live together. He constantly persecuted the Sunni Muslims and he greatly allied with Shia Iran to cause havoc in his country, hence when ISIS saw an opportunity to form a caliphate over Iraq and Syria, they took it (Amar, 2017).

In Kuwait, the situation also spread along sectarian lines which saw a slight agitation by the Shia opposition over the Sunni ruling Al Sabah family. Although the Shias have been supporters of the Kuwaiti Al Sabah family, the society was thrown into a state of division as the Shia Kuwaitis supported the opposition in Bahrain and frowned at the opposition in Syria, majority of the Sunni Kuwaitis supported otherwise (Albloshi, 2016). This goes to prove that the sectarian differences even though not internally effective can cause regional implications.

In other North African countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, Joffe (2011, p. 510) highlighted that the Jasmine and Tahrir revolutions formulated hopes for a democratic revival in the MENA region, in contrast to what is obtained in Syria and Libya. It is no doubt that the occurrence of the Arab Uprisings in North African regions was borne out of domestic neo-patrimonial policies of the countries as well as the global economic crisis in 2011. Similarly, according to Joffe (2011, p. 514), the results of the Arab Uprising in North African countries were different mostly because of the liberalizing autocracies that were present in Tunisia and Egypt but absent in Libya.

According to Ebadi (2006, p. 46), the Arab Uprising in the MENA region was unpredicted, mostly owing to the level of consolidation from undemocratic regimes and also as a result of the weak civil society in these countries. However, Taleb and Blyth (2011, p. 35) suggested that the long-standing nature of political instability and

socio-economic systems created a possibility for conflict to occur in North African states, especially if the regimes were challenged. Additionally, following the local interactions of religion and culture in this region, Gergez (1991, p. 212) suggested that it is pertinent for complications to arise in this region.

As highlighted by Taleb and Blyth (2011, p. 36), the uneasy interaction between different tribal, social religious and ethnic groups in North Africa creates the tendency for events such as the Arab Uprising. However, the aim goal is to achieve vital political and economic results which when compared, the results in Tunisia and Egypt are different from that of Libya. It is no doubt that a reason for the Arab Uprising in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya has been the contempt and repressiveness with which the Mubarak, Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes respectively, but the results post-Arab Uprising have been different as discussed below.

As mentioned by Fareed Zakaria (1997, p. 27), nations such as Tunisia established illiberal democracies where although citizens are oppressed, there were still levels of citizenship representation in government and there were higher levels of political and social participation from the citizens. For this reason, the Arab Uprising was already met with lower levels of government liberalization which led to a fairly desirable ending in comparison to the conflicts that erupted in Syria and Libya. Concerning illiberal democracies, Brumberg (2002, p. 59) introduced the notion of liberalized autocracies where state political infrastructures were created to motivate civil society participation in some aspects of government. For Joffe (2011, p. 519), the Arab Uprising culminated in a civil war in Libya, mostly due to the lack of freedom from Gaddafi's regime.

Following the global economic crisis, countries around the world suffered greatly from higher prices of food as well as unemployment. Particularly, the higher populace of Tunisia was either unemployed or under-employed, for this reason, the sudden hike in food prices in late 2010 made food items difficult for citizens to afford. Similarly, unlike Libya which was a welfare state, citizens in Tunisia paid taxes, hence, there was an expectation of a better living which they could not get. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi following his scuffle between local authorities to obtain a license for his small fruit stall set a symbol for Tunisians to protest against the repressive politics of Ben Ali (Joffe, 2011, p. 561).

As highlighted above, the economic crisis meant citizens became poorer, however, this was not so for Ben Ali and his family who continued to enrich

themselves through various corrupt practices. What started as a minor protest in the small town of Sidi Bou Zid became a widespread protest across the country, with interest groups as well as civil unions asking for Ben Ali's resignation. The participation of civil and trade unions in the Tunisian Arab Uprising shows a system for autonomous expression which was provided by the Ben Ali regime. Hence despite the political repression, they were still forms of political expression in the country which paved way for Ben Ali's resignation.

Similarly, there were already human rights organizations that were present in the country such as the *Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l'Homme* (LTDH) and, later, the *Comité National des Libertés en Tunisie* (CNLT). Although these commissions were later emasculated in the 1990s, they managed to play de-facto roles and this was reflected in the coordinated roles during the Arab Uprising in the country (Alexander, 2010, p. 45).

Secondly, the results of the Arab Uprising in Tunisia were different mainly because of the strong tradition of constitutionalism in Tunisia. Also, unlike Libya, Tunisia already had other political parties that were all present in the political environment of the country. Similarly, the major political parties in the country tie their foundation to the constitution, hence, Tunisia always enjoyed a level of liberal pluralism that was absent in other countries in North Africa. As mentioned by Alexander (2010, p. 32), they were even instances where secular political parties sided with Ben Ali's party as a means of fighting the Islamic parties, hence, establishing a system of political interaction that was missing in Libya.

Additionally, a third reason for the outcome of the Arab Uprising in Tunisia is based on the pluralist political reform that allows for social coalitions and the formation of civil unions in the country. Additionally, the position of the army has been created to play a very minimal role in the political structure of the country, therefore, the citizens were not forcefully confronted by the army during the Arab Uprising.

Based on the support enjoyed by the protestors in Tunisia, it was easy for them to achieve their aim which was to overthrow Ben Ali as well as the hegemonic party which was the Constitutional Democratic Rally (CDR).

Similar to the Tunisian political environment, Egypt also enjoys a liberalized autocracy wherein the citizens have access to an open economy as well as the right to private investment. Similar, to the regime of President Sadat, the Egyptian economy

was open to foreign influence as well as a partnership between locals and foreigners, this, therefore, provided an opportunity for local industries to develop and diversify (Shehata, 2011, p, 27). This draws a sharp contrast from what can be seen in Libya where the rentier system made rent the major form of government revenue source with a minimum domestic economic growth.

As obtained in Tunisia, Egypt enjoyed a multiparty system in the Sadat regime that later transferred to Mubarak's government (Shehata, 2011, p. 31). Although there was a dominant party, the level of democratic freedom enjoyed in Egypt before the Arab Uprising was absent in Libya, hence, Egyptians already had a stronger state apparatus, civil society, and personal autonomy in its liberal autocratic state. During Mubarak's regime, the local economy was developed as a result of the inflow from foreign investments, however, this inflow did not particularly reflect the rise in living standards.

The Mubarak regime also influenced political participation in the government and continued to express support for a pluralist state. More so that in the early 2000s, the public society of the country had over 30,000 organizations contesting for political representation and acceptance (Joffe, 2011, p. 522). However, it must be noted that despite the liberal autocracy in the country, human rights violations, corrupt electoral practices and violence were continuously present. Additionally, the standard of living in the country continually plummeted and corruption was generally recorded in all parts of the society.

The negative events in Egypt at this time created a wide range of dissatisfaction for all citizens, and the year 2004 ushered in a general dissatisfaction against President Mubarak, especially when he sought the fifth term in office and as he tried to make his son, Gamal, his successor. The abuse of power by Gaddafi brought about a new political movement from the people which was known as *Kefiyya* ("Enough!"), and as mentioned by Joffe (2011, p. 522), the movement was aimed at organizing civil disobedience against Mubarak to eventually lead to a widespread protest.

Series of civil unrest erupted in Egypt, mostly due to the nature of poor economic conditions of workers, however, a notable protest was the April 6 movement in 2008 which consisted of people from all works of life. Workers and students alike joined in this protest, revolting against the leadership of Mubarak and engaging the use of mobile devices as well as social media to spread information aiming at resistance to Mubarak's regime.

The resistance towards Mubarak's regime gathered higher resistance and when Khaled Mohamed Saeed was killed in Alexandria in 2010, thousands marched in their numbers, beginning from Tahrir Square in Cairo. Therefore, the year 2011 was ushered by riots from 2010 as well as the growing increase in food prices that were caused due to the global economic crisis. Hence, when the conflict in Tunisia occurred, this only served as a catalyst prompting the Egyptians to request Mubarak's resignation.

As highlighted by Joffe (2011, p. 524), the Arab Uprising in Egypt drew huge support from the Kefaya movement as well as the protesters from the Mohamed Saeed event in 2010. This saw a large scale of protests with people from different sectarian groups, thus, leading to a greater number of persons asking for Mubarak to be overthrown. Mubarak eventually stepped down as President of Egypt, making way for the Egyptian army to establish an informal alliance with the Muslim brotherhood to reach a referendum with the protesters.

To understand the major reason for this difference in the outcomes, it is important to consider the post-Cold War era where Fareed Zakaria had mentioned that the Western nations had created a single ideological global environment of democracy and liberalization (Zakaria, 1997, p. 31). It was seen that while the West championed the spread of democracy to all nations, the idea that democracy may under certain conditions be turned into tyranny was albeit considered negligible. The interaction between democracy and other un-democratic means of government was reflected by Samuel Huntington in the *Clash of Civilization* (1997, p. 45) as he mentioned that when political systems clash, democracy would always gain the upper hand, however, leading to the inconsideration that some states may possess other factors beyond politics which guarantees their position in power.

Therefore, states such as Tunisia benefitted more from the Arab Uprisings in regards to the creation of a democratic nation in contrast to states such as Libya where factors to attain full democracy were distorted by the long-standing nature of Gaddafi's undemocratic policies.

According to Zakaria (1997, p. 33), political systems that lacked democratic elements were essentially 'illiberal' and thus ultimately frustrated the aspirations of their populations, for the status of the individual could not be guaranteed as was supposed to be the case in democracies, whilst the allegedly participatory political process simply became a mechanism for enforcing a hegemonic discourse.

In Tunisia and Egypt, there were already elements of democracy and political parties holding elections were already formed during this period, however, Libya was different with Gaddafi as the central authority of the state.

3.3 State-Building Problems In North African Countries

North Africa is often grouped in a similar category as the Middle East, reasons for this could be due to geographical location and also due to socio-political and cultural similarities. Synonymous to Libya, neighbouring countries such as Egypt and Tunisia also witnessed the Arab Uprising which led to a regime change in these countries, however, none of these nations experienced foreign intervention as did Libya. Hence, starting from Tunisia, a discussion on the issues that triggered the Arab Uprising before moving on to talk about Egypt and making a final discussion on Libya.

The uprising that happened in Tunisia only lasted for 23 days which saw the displacement of Ben Ali's regime. Between 2010 and 2011, Ben Ali, his government and his western allies were taken by surprise as a result of the uprising that was going on in the country which in turn shook the world (Hibou, 2011). It was a surprise to the world because Tunisia had one of the strongest police forces in the Arab world.

Before the uprising, "Tunisia was observed to have made remarkable progress on equitable growth, fighting poverty and achieving good social indicators." It was also observed that "Tunisia consistently scored above its income category in the Middle East and North Africa average on most dimensions of comparative governance ranking and development indexes." The report by World Bank also described "Tunisia to be ahead in terms of government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption and regulatory quality" (World Bank 2010).

The country was assumed to be economically and politically stable. However, this was not the case. The positive image of the country was built on manipulations of data and PR messages based on half-truths. The non-urban areas in the country were going through hardship (Bedouin & Gouia, 1995). In addition, there was a declining trend in the socioeconomic status of the middle class while Ben Ali's business empire was busy displacing owners of small businesses, entrepreneurs, traditional business class and investors (Kaboub, 2013). In 2002, Tunisia was ranked 128th in its Press Freedom Index while in 2010, the country ranked 164 out of 178 countries. This showed that there was a decline in its position. The ranking was done by *Reporters without Borders (RWBq)*

Ben Ali who was the President of Tunisia was in power for 23 years which was about two decades. His tenure was authoritative and quasi-dictatorial (Greffrath & Duvenhage, 2014). Also, the society had the characteristics of a mafia-controlled society. It was also characterized by massive corruption and abuse of human rights. One of the major factors that led to the uprising in Tunisia was a result of the issue of a young boy who set himself ablaze trying to commit suicide because he was harassed by the police for not having a permit. His goods (selling vegetables and fruits) were taken away. He tried to complain to the government officials but instead, he was ridiculed, insulted and beaten. This happened on 17 December 2010.

The young boy who was an unemployed graduate died 19 days later during the crisis. His name was Mohqamed Bouazizi. This fueled the anger of the public over the standard of living, massive corruption, and denial of human rights and political freedom. This led to a protest all over the country including the country's capital, Tunis. Instead of the regime to have gotten to the root of the matter and getting it resolved, the regime made use of brutal force to stop the protest which included beatings, and the use of tear gas and live ammunition.

Ben Ali had thought that this strategy was going to work but instead, the people of Tunisia got angry more and took to the streets. Still, the regime was not sensitive enough to determine the rage of the people and to find a solution to it. The president then gave his first speech on December 28 saying that the protest was organized by 'terrorists and extreme minorities' who would face a violent crackdown from the government forces (Ekine & Manji, 2012).

At the beginning of the following year, more protests took place in different cities by students, lawyers, labour unions, opposition groups, and professional syndicates addition to thousands of people. Commercial strikes were called for by the labour unions across the country.

The entire Judicial System was put on hold as a result of 8000 lawyers going on strike. Political activists, journalists, artists, and bloggers were also constrained by the administration. The protests led to about 80 deaths by the armed forces. Consequently, Ben Ali backed down, making a series of promises to Tunisians to not seek re-election in 2014, to investigate the killings of the protesters, to allow for more freedom, and to establish new legislative elections.

However, theq promises were unaccepted by Tunisians, leading to a continuation of their agitations and protests. Ben Ali then decided to impose the State of Emergency and then issued the army with a shoot-to-kill order. The shoot-to-kill order was refused by the head of the army (Ben Ammar) of Ben Ali's regime. Ben Ali had to flee the country to Saudi Arabia having been rejected by his close allies, the USA and France (Ekine & Manji, 2012).

It could be said that Ben Ali was the first Arab dictator to bow to the pressures of mass protests. The best world's educational system was once enjoyed by Tunisia. Tunisia was also known to have the largest middle class and had the strongest labour movement. The labour movement was also very organized. Even with these benefits, the regime of Ben Ali limited the freedom of speech, and political parties were restricted. Ben Ali presented the country in a way that looked tourist-friendly. However, this was not the real case.

The Islamists also claimed that the government of Ben Ali was "prostituting the country for foreign exchange." Ben Ali's family also was largely involved in corruption. Haven said all this, the government institutions in Tunisia were quite in a good shape, preparing a well-functioning government to take over from Ben Ali. Also, the protests in Tunisia gave rise to unrest in the rest of the region. Also, even though the labour movement was not too organized compared to other nations during the unrest, they moved with unity and determination to see the end of the regime. Due to the persistent protest on the streets, the Ben Ali regime was ousted (Anderson, 2011). Lastly, in talking about the Tunisian uprising, one must state that the youths were largely involved.

In the case of Egypt, the former President Hosni Mubarak had been in power since 1981 and was finally disposed of on February 11, 2011. The uprising in Egypt started after the uprising of Tunisia. Egypt is said to be the most populous country in the Middle East and has some more characteristics such as a strategic geographical location, experts in diplomatic issues, a strength of the military, and a rich culture. Egypt sees itself as a traditional regional power and also wants other countries to see them as such (Pacqe & Cavatorta, 2012).

It is pertinent to note that the protest in Egypt started on 25 January 2011 and lasted for only about 18 days before Hosni Mubarak was disposed of. On February 1, 2011, Hosni Mubarak decided to give a speech able to calm the Egyptian protesters down and also respond to their demands. He assured them that he would not run again

for office while he appointed a vice president at the same time. However, this strategy did not work for the Egyptian protesters. On February 10, 2011, he was expected to have resigned but he did not. There was fury around the country which made him step down on February 11, 2011.

It should be noted the army withdrew their support from him which could be one of the reasons why he stepped down. Just barely two days before the protest started, the IMF had just further reduced the subsidies on some goods that were essential which signified a political timing that was wrong and not examining properly the impact of such reform on the people of Egypt at that particular point in time. Also, Egypt was perceived to be doing well just like Tunisia. Their GDP growth almost doubled over the decade, they had low public debt down by a quarter, and they had a very healthy current account balance. However, they had other indicators that one needed to be worried about.

The inflation rate was almost double-digit, wages had reduced, and the population was increasing and likewise unemployment. As a result of these effects, almost 40% of Egyptians were living under \$2 per day. The increased cost of living affected both the poor and the middle class. The youths in the country didn't have jobs to cater for themselves. This means that they didn't have money to run their daily lives. The problem of Egypt was a mixture of political and economic hardship. The Egyptians were chanting slogans like freedom, bread, and human dignity. Democracy and social justice were not present in the society. The people of Egypt complained about economic hardship, corruption, and lack of freedom which involved bullying by the police and services. One of the protesters said, "we're tired, we just want to work, we just want to eat!" (Teti & Gervasio, 2011).

According to Anderson (2011), during Hosni Mubarak's regime, the government's ability to provide the basic amenities that the Egyptians deserved and needed was reduced. However, at the same time, there was a large consumption of resources from the business elites connected to the then son of the former president, Camal. One major factor that should be paid attention to in the Egyptian uprising is the role the army played. The uprising revealed that the army had a huge influence on society. The intervention of the army in the uprising shows the patriotic nature and patronage that they had. Also, the protesters were political and tactical in their approach.

The military had close cooperation with the United States and they were run by generals who earned their stripes from the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. Another point to be highlighted about the success of the Egyptian revolution was the outstanding discipline of the Egyptian protesters. They further had deliberate and intellectual debates on how they can reshape their country (Anderson, 2011). They had one of the most potent characteristics of what can move a government and that is unity. They were united towards a single force and they have still united all the efforts to make their country a better place to live in.

Fast forward to 2019, the Egyptians assumed that while they marched from the street, they can unseat Mubarak's authoritarian rule with a civilian regime. However, they assumed wrongly. The President (Abdel Fatah al-Sissi) that took over from Mubarak is said to be worse. He is asking and working towards ruling the people of Egypt until 2034 through a constitutional amendment indirectly defeating the purpose of the uprising of 2011.

There were other uprisings in other North African countries like Morocco and Algeria. The uprising in Morocco was not for the President to step down but they were clamouring for a new constitution, reforms, a democratic approach to governing the affairs of the country, basic human rights, and an improved standard of living (Aljazeera, 2017). On the other hand in Algeria in 2011, the aim of the protest was not for the president to step down however, they were also clamouring for change. They protested over government reforms, a high rate of unemployment and housing problems (CNN World, 2011).

Examining the events that happened in the North African countries, the happenings in each country had similarities and differences. In all the countries (Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria), the people of each country wanted a better standard of living, respect for human rights, provision of basic amenities, a working government with enabling and structured institutions, zero rates of corruption, a functioning democratic system, and provision of employment.

However, one must also note that there are differences. The Libyan and the Egyptian people clamoured for the president to step down due to authoritarian rule while the other North African countries majorly clamoured for change and a better standard of living. Also, these studies, show that the Tunisian and the Egyptian army were very strong and they were not carried away by the activities of the government

which was why the transition was made possible without necessarily having a major breakdown in the economy.

Considering the events in Tunisia and Egypt, it is inherent to mention that the domestic environment was equally responsible for the different turnout of events after the Arab Uprising, especially when compared to Libya. Despite the location of all three countries in North Africa, the individual nature of each country has managed to influence the result of the Arab Uprising. For example, as discussed in the previous chapter, it was seen that Tunisia was already semi-autocratic, hence, allowing for some sort of democracy in the country. Additionally, elections were held in Tunisia and political parties were stronger.

Since the Arab Uprising was concerned with protests against the government, the success of every protest is guaranteed provided that there is a strong civil society to ensure mobilization, motivation, as well as collective demand. Hence, in the case of Tunisia, not only did the Human rights society help in ensuring mobilization, but the presence of strong political parties led to an increased level of opposition against Ben Ali's government, finally leading to the collapse of his regime. It is also pertinent to note at this point that as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Tunisian Army had no right to interfere in the politics of the country, therefore, as people clamoured for a better standard of living and revolted against the government, they enjoyed the neutrality of the army, hence, violent counter-protest as witnessed in Syria and Libya were not present in Tunisia. This led to the end of Ben Ali's regime, therefore, meeting the needs of the Arab Uprising in Tunisia.

The situation in Egypt is also related to the presence of semi-autocratic systems where political oppositions to a greater extent held considerable power to challenge Gaddafi's rulership. Additionally, unlike in Libya, foreign investment was regarded as one major source of government revenue in Egypt, therefore, to ensure a steady inflow of foreign income, Mubarak had to allow an increased level of political participation from opposition parties.

It is pertinent to note that although Egypt was ruled based on a dominant party system, the economic conditions of the country made it necessary for Mubarak to consider a form of liberalization, especially for workers as well as the opposition parties. As living conditions worsened, workers revolted, soon after students joined in the revolt and a short while, the opposition party, especially the Muslim Brotherhood that Mubarak once resented also joined in the protest.

The army joining forces with the opposition parties established a consensus, thus, leading to the end of Mubarak's regime as well as the rise of the army and Muslim Brotherhood party in Egypt. The situation in Libya is somewhat different from those in Tunisia and Egypt for many reasons as discussed below.

In Libya, Gaddafi won almost everyone to his side through his divide and rule tactics. He was the only one practically controlling all the affairs in the economy putting those who are faithful to him on the corridor of power. The Libyan case turned out to be a war because the people were divided against themselves. They only came together to achieve a single purpose of ensuring Gaddafi stepped down. That's one of the problems the Libyan state is still having today. Because they were not united, it was very difficult for them to build the state from the scratch.

Also, the case of Libya was worse because there were no working institutions to have sustained the economy when Gaddafi was overthrown. One of the fundamentals that make up a country is the presence of institutions. All developed countries have institutions. In addition, it was only Libya that had external involvement from the UN because of the atrocities that had been reported that Gaddafi's government committed.

Finally, one common attribute of the North African uprising was that there was a huge level of corruption within the system. Only a few enjoyed the wealth of the land while the larger portion had to struggle for the particles. It should also be noted that Libya did not have a good relationship with the Western world because he was very bold and confident about the resources that they had. Libya has one of the best natural gas resources in the world and some Western countries wanted to dominate Libya but Gaddafi did not permit that. The divide and rule strategy he used made the people of Libya dislike the Westerners. Such a strategy did not make them trust each other not to mention the international involvement.

3.4 State-Building Problems In Libya During Gaddafi's Era

As highlighted by St. John (2008, p. 73), Libya's interaction with democratic policies was greatly hindered by the socio-political crisis troubling the country, ranging from tribalism to the political authority style of Gaddafi. These stumbling blocks as mentioned by Fearon and Laitin (2002) show that indeed, full democracy may be impossible to achieve in such areas. It must, however, be noted that these socio-political variations are not necessarily an indicator to conflict if they are managed

successfully, hence, leading to the importance of developing strong state institutions for efficient state management and control (Lake & Rothchild, 1996).

As argued by Lake and Rothchild (1996), strong state institutions are essential in ensuring state security and maintaining democracy and citizen solidarity. In instances where this is missing, the state institution weakens, and the division in the state begins to become more pronounced and visible, hence, relapsing into a full civil conflict or political instability. Similarly, Social-political, as well as economic factors, are intensifiers of violent intra-state conflict. As this conflict deepens, the fears of the nation are heightened, therefore, opening a window for political actors to further capitalize on these fears and increase the potential for a polarized society.

Additionally, Lake and Rothchild (1996) mention that political memory that is mostly shaped according to the theory of constructivism is an important aspect in understanding how social-political events affect state-building. Hence, in a state like Libya, the tribal demarcations come with various stories, each villainizing the members of other tribes, which in the long run creates an in-group, out-group dichotomy in the country.

Supporting this view, Perroux (2009) highlights that the major challenge to Libyan state-building was caused by the enmity and competition between the various tribes, zones, cities, and regions in the country. This competition abounds as a result of a security dilemma that only views the pessimistic point of view of individual tribes in Libya. Similarly, despite the presence of this rivalry before Gaddafi's era, these social dichotomies were further politicized by Gaddafi as he sought to maintain political power (Perroux, 2019).

The weak-state institutions during the Gaddafi regime explain why modern-day Libya has been faced with many security challenges. Similarly, since Gaddafi exploited the tribes to his personal needs, the majority of key areas following the post-Gaddafi era are now controlled by armed militia with no state legitimacy. As an example, Oleksy (2013) highlights that in the city of Sebha, the various tribes which are mostly the Kaddfa tribe, Awlad Suliman and Warfallah tribes are against each other. As a result, there is a continuation of armed conflicts in the region with tribal differences as a motivation for conflict.

Similarly, indigenous groups such as the Tuareg, Toubou and Amazigh communities in the country are in a similar manner influenced by the security dilemma in Libya (Perroux, 2019). Due to the political memory formed by these tribes over

time, they have created a description of the other tribes, viewing them as a threat rather than an ally. Gaddafi's regime only managed to institutionalize these security dilemmas which created an avenue for him to rule (Perroux, 2019).

Fukuyama (2014, p. 3360) explains that “the successful construction of the state is therefore dependent on the previous existence of a sense of national identity that serves as a centre of loyalty to the state itself, not to the social groups that support it. he is ". Nation-building is critical to the success of state-building and requires the creation of common national traditions, symbols, and histories that promote deeply ingrained loyalty and trust among themselves (Fukuyama, 2014).

Libyans have difficult stories to deal with, and these political memories often hamper efforts to mediate and reconcile the rifts in their societies. According to Fukuyama (2014), although the state has an important role to play in nation-building, civil society actors also play an important role in creating a sense of national identity. However, Fukuyama (2014) warns that nation-building can be a dangerous and violent process. The question of which language, culture and interests come to the fore inevitably arises in the process of nation-building. Arabization has affected many indigenous communities in Libya, and other obstacles prevent these communities from improving and practising their way of life, thus causing more conflict (Perroux, 2019).

Perhaps nation-building should be a multi-investment process in which consultations and mediation with interested parties take place over a gradual period. Building trust in Libya requires long-term investment and commitment on behalf of the state and this involves listening, meditating and working together with the country's diverse ethnic, tribal and religious groups. This could have implications for the removal of ongoing security threats and reorganization of the Libyan state. To understand the challenges to state-building in Libya during Gaddafi's regime, a look into the political environment through which Gaddafi gained power is essential.

On the dawn of September 1, 1969, Muammar Gaddafi led a group of about 100 army staff that were junior (also called the Free Unionist Officers) to dispose of King Idris from the corridor of power. Before King Idris, external domination was at the forefront of Libya for a long time. From the year 1551 to 1911 (Ottoman Rule), from 1911 to 1951 (Italian Rule), and when Libya got their independence in 1951, King Idris was the ruler. After the coup in 1969, Gaddafi was the new Commander-in-Chief who was in charge of a 12-member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

The RCC stood for the refusal of external influence on the Libyan economy and also stood for earlier regimes that were corrupt. RCC ran the ministries of the government directly except for the ministry that involved the management of oil for the Libyan economy. The oil ministry was exempted from Gaddafi's control because of the technicality involved in running such a ministry. The RCC also established various bodies such as Popular Congresses (PC), the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), and the Popular Revolution (PR). Observing the way the country was being ruled by Gaddafi, the RCC remained with the real political power, especially Gaddafi. Gaddafi's regime dominated all the decision-making bodies for Libya (Imam, Abba & Wader, 2014, p. 1152).

In 1975, the people of Libya and other RCC members began to ask questions about how the resources of Libya (99% of government revenue & oil income) were being used. This brought about a misunderstanding which led to a staged coup in order to overthrow Gaddafi. The coup was not successful. After the coup, the 12 RCC member groups were reduced to 5 who were very loyal to Gaddafi. The failed coup made Gaddafi remove both civilian and military personnel who were suspected of disloyalty. Gaddafi gradually filled sensitive positions with the people he trusted. Civil societies such as independent trade unions, political parties, and other civil organizations were systematically destroyed by Gaddafi. Those who opposed Gaddafi's regime were put into prison, beaten or executed. The executions were put live on the television and this act created a fearful environment. The fear tactics strengthened Gaddafi's control the more (Imam, Abba & Wader 2014, p. 1152)

During this time, Gaddafi's regime provided a subsidized rate on education, healthcare, and housing. After 1993, Peoples Social Leadership Committee (PSLC) was formed. The PSLC was composed of tribal leaders and those who were influential. The PSLC had the responsibility of channelling state resources to areas such as student grants and subsidized housing. They were also expected to discipline non-conformists among their tribes or risk being punished collectively. In return for the political quietness of the citizens, Gaddafi promised to provide the basic economic needs. The average income was about \$12,000 per year which was a small fraction of the revenues that the country generated and also considering Libya's small population (Imam, Abba & Wader 2014:1153).

To sum up, during Gaddafi's era, certain state-building and legitimacy problems sparked the protest by the Libyan people. In the sections below, these problems are elucidated under the four main subtitles namely; centralized state and limited political openings, Libya and rentierism during the Gaddafi era, tribalism during Gaddafi's era, external intervention and the termination of the Gaddafi's regime.

3.4.1 Centralized State and Limited Political Openings

The political system during the Gaddafi era had its specificities and some of its characteristics lasted a long time. After the 1969 coup, Gaddafi outlined his political vision, with the official creation of the Jamahiriya, which means the state of the masses. He elaborated in the Green Book on an alternative to communism and capitalism, commonly known as the third way. The basis of the new Gaddafi system consisted of five guiding principles: the repeal of all reactionary laws; the purge of political deviants and counterrevolutionary forces, i.e. Communists, Capitalists and Muslim Brotherhoods; the distribution of arms to the revolutionary masses; the establishment of a bureaucratic and administrative revolution; and the proclamation of a cultural revolution.

Gaddafi's vision was a form of direct democracy that was at the root of public administration. By identifying traditional elements, namely parliaments and parties as to the central problem, Gaddafi was considering abolishing them to put governance back in the hands of the people. But true democracy can only be established through the participation of the people themselves and not through the activity of their substitutes. In an attempt to solve this problem of democracy, Gaddafi replaced the legislative and executive powers with people's committees and congresses at the local and national levels. Both congresses mobilized citizens over the age of 19 to form electoral bodies, appointing executive committees to implement decisions. Thus, the administration and its control became popular and the old definition of democracy that democracy is the control of government by the people is terminated. Traditional government instruments such as ministries were abolished and replaced by secretariats overseen by the General People's Congress.

In theory, Libya had shed traditional state institutions. But formal abolition concealed a different structural reality. Concerning the Libyan administration, several obstacles weakened it, such as the tribal composition of the Libyan people. As a result,

many citizens turned to tribal leaders for their rights or even privileges. Libya has centralized services and a territorial distribution that does not meet the real needs of society. On the contrary, the country has submitted to the demands of the monopoly of power and some compromises with some tribes for social, political and even reasons in some cases. The organizational deficit goes as far as the total lack of organization, other strategies, sociocultural blockages and other factors that made the Libyan administration far from public access.

The political reform provoked among Libyan intellectuals, and even by some political elites, had been a constant factor characterized by scepticism about the regime's promises to introduce greater democracy. The democratization efforts of Gaddafi's eldest son have come up against the old guard's authoritarian policy. The transition to democracy was by nature a long process, and after four decades of Gaddafi's authoritarian rule, the patience of a protracted process was exhausted. Gaddafi extremists who benefited from the system economically and politically feared that large-scale change would undermine the country's political stability. Some forces were pushing for a grand opening of the Libyan political space, but others did not want this process to succeed.

Thus, the majority of those blocking the process of political openness were Gaddafi's allies. Gaddafi's refusal to change the political system frustrated both the ordinary Libyan population and his former close associates during various periods of his rule. Many of his revolutionary colleagues rebelled and left him (El-Katiri, 2012). Among the reasons for their departure were: Direct intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, the financing and training expenses of insurrections abroad to support coups and rebel troops; Irrational diversion of resources during a period of financial constraints for the construction of a large artificial river in the Libyan desert, etc. At the time, the lack of clarity on Gaddafi's plans for succession to power created enemies among his close aides and ordinary Libyans. This silence on the succession plan created animosities within his restricted circle of friends of Gaddafi.

The discussion about the effectiveness of state-building in academic literature is often about measures of institutional power (Hatipoğlu & Palmer, 2012). Institutions can be defined as formal and informal rules and norms that govern social, political, and economic relations (North, 1990). During Gaddafi's rule, the state and its political institutions were generally limited in their ability to make formal decisions - that is, they were often limited in overseeing the actions of sovereign governments (Perroux,

2019). Gaddafi ensured that key power duties would be cut from official representative government agencies. This meant that all-important decisions were left to the control of personal government committees, over which Gaddafi had full control (Perroux, 2019).

In a short time, state bodies were largely empty and ineffective institutions, whose main task was to pledge local loyalty in the exchange for public works and financial bribes (Perroux, 2019). Moreover, Libya has never been a feature of Libya under the rule of Gaddafi Democracy, as Libyan citizens cannot define their public place and do not have an established free press (Perroux, 2019). This essentially meant that Libya was never able to develop strong centralized state institutions, and the only working body were those charged with overseeing oil and offshore investments (Perroux, 2019).

Given Libya's inexperience with democracy and lack of effective state institutions, how this legacy affected state-building in the country was witnessed after 2011 (Perroux, 2019). Since then, Libya has not been able to translate formal democratic measures into meaningful democratic practices that were an essential part of any post-conflict state in the transition period (Perroux, 2019). Francis Fukuyama (2014) argues that favouritism is probably the result of a process of democracy without the equipment of a pre-existing state. This is true for Libya. Fukuyama (2014) takes his analysis from the examples of the Greek and Italian states - he argues that, given the backgrounds of these states, clientelistic practices are difficult to overcome.

The question that arises is why some states, by combining legal and administrative independence with social responsibility, can build on established codes of conduct that bind the most authoritative parts of society, and other states do not (Fukuyama, 2014). Fukuyama's (2014) main argument is that the clientelistic nature of the state is an inevitable threat of capture by relatives and friends, thus forcing the state to plunge deeply into cycles of corruption, inefficiency, and instability.

Fukuyama (2014) offers some insight into the current challenges unfolding in Libya. Despite the elections and processes after the revolution beginning to form a parliament and government, Libya has yet to see a formalized constitution (El-Katiri, 2012). This transition period in Libya aimed to gradually abolish previous autocratic laws in favour of the establishment of new ones, as well as policies aimed at protecting the rights and freedoms of Libyan citizens, in the hope that the country makes a gradual transition to a successful transfer (El-Katiri, 2012).

The revolutionary insurgents have persistently emphasized these failures to justify their continued violent attempts to control security and the region to further complicate the collapse of the country's transition process (Perroux, 2019). These rebels described themselves as the guardians of the revolution; however, they often invest in protecting their interests or defending their ideological tendencies (Perroux, 2019). Currently, the remnants of Libya's state institutions are highly centralized and poorly managed. Technical skills are lacking, and none of these institutions is accustomed to good governance practices that allow public administration to function effectively (El-Katiri, 2012).

Also, concerning Libya's security institutions, rather than rebuilding and equipping the national army and police, rival political groups that came to power after 2011 chose to finance and train their favourite militia (Perroux, 2019). These militias gained legitimacy and formal ties with governments. Established by the National Transitional Council, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior launched a Security Committee and Libyan Shield Brigades, which assign official duties to militias and allow them to continue to engage with their specific objectives (Perroux, 2019). This continuing political divide in Libya undermined the country's desperate need for collective security and further weakened its institutions while seriously intensifying the security dilemma.

Another important feature of the post-conflict transition period is the restoration of order and the fulfilment of justice. The main hope for Libyans after the fall of the Gaddafi regime was that the creation of democratic institutions would eventually provide Libyans with essential services such as health, education and access to basic services (Perroux, 2019). However, nine years after the revolution, Libyans continue to live without adequate health care, a weak national education system and inadequate access to basic amenities (Perroux, 2019).

In addition, many of the perpetrators who were former officers in the previous regime managed to escape a formal judicial process of accountability and punishment (El-Katiri, 2012). The cumulative failure of state officials to create democratic state institutions ultimately led to the loss of government support and legitimacy that it once had in local areas (El-Katiri, 2012).

Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2002) argue that there is a causal relationship between a state's degree of democratization and the strength of its institutions, which explains the likelihood of conflict (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

The authors found that states in transition from an autocracy to an anocracy are more prone to conflict than states that have become fully democratized and emphasize that this is determined by the strength or weakness of a state's institutions (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002).

In addition, the authors argue that in the early stages of democratization, the two conditions make conflict more likely. The first example is when political elites exploit growing nationalism for their gains to create discord in society; the second is when the central government is too weak to resist the polarization strategies of political elites (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002). The authors concluded that the construction of democracy must occur tangentially with the establishment of strong central institutions (Mansfield & Snyder, 2002).

In a case like Libya, a revolutionary administrative reform is not easy to implement. It is not enough simply to transpose a model, learning from the administration's shortcomings throughout the history of Libya is important to establish the best possible diagnosis and consider a reform strategy which integrates the specificities and the achievements of the evolution of the administrative regime.

Certainly, many theories advocate a reformation of the system in Libya and the opinions on the modalities of these reforms are diverse. Similarly, there are numerous obstacles to creating a solid centralised state structure due to the fluctuating and problematic problems of state actors. Indeed, the changes in the administrative apparatus show that strategies must be put in place to, on one hand, allow the development of society and, on the other hand, improve public services. It appears that a more rational and efficient administration is needed to serve the public interest and meet the needs of development. This administration must be able to carry out the various missions incumbent upon it to guarantee optimal competition against the various institutional changes. The Gaddafi regime tried to disguise this organizational and strategic deficit by imposing its Green Book and promoting the people's administration.

The problems of the administration were much more complicated than the simple change of facade wanted by Gaddafi to convince the people that Libya was moving towards progress. But the main source of questioning of power lies undoubtedly inside the regime because two types of political elites currently govern the country: first of all the revolutionary elite, the one that considers itself to hold the project of Gaddafi and ensure that decisions do not deviate too much. It consists of a

small number of actors who play a predominant role in the decision-making process. On the other hand, the administrative and managerial elite, reduced in number, is responsible for running the state and implementing the decisions taken by popular congresses and impelled by the revolutionary power (Souria Saad-Zoy and Bouchard Johanne, 2010).

The gap between the state administration and the people arose from the crisis of the administration and resulted in the mismatch between the administrative apparatus and its social environment: crises of legitimacy, identity, and efficiency. These crises manifest themselves in a loss of confidence in the administration and its officials. It is for this reason that the greatest challenge facing Libya today is to acquire modern political institutions that enable it to achieve its democratic revolution and preserve its sovereignty and independence (Yolande, 1975).

The administrative policy must be based on the targets and objectives defined by its various policies and strategies, as well as on the timelines that govern them. The implementation of the administrative policy for a government serves to mark and establish the actions chosen by the departments and agencies in terms of their development plan. It is therefore to a major project that must tackle the reform (Ali, 2012).

The first is the depoliticization of the administration. The institutions should not have a political colour, which is the case in the Libyan administration, where the colour of the overwhelming majority is that of the power in place, since the latter appoints its administrative officials according to their degree of loyalty to the regime in defiance of the requirements of competence, ignoring the principle of neutrality of the public administration.

The second major reform concerns the management of human resources in public administration. The recruitment of civil servants in Libya is not done on a selection obeying defined scientific or academic standards. In other words, the Libyan administration does not foresee the possibility of capitalizing on experiences. Appointments to senior positions, such as those of junior officials or government officials, are not based on scientific expertise, nor are they bestowed on the best elements, but more on closer relations. The degree of politicization implies that a large number of senior officials with a central role to play in the exercise of state authority are not covered by any civil service law. This situation weakens the responsibility of the public service and affects the principles of professionalism and political neutrality.

It is noted that in Libya, the boundaries between politics and administration are only shrinking in the ministerial hierarchy by transforming former senior officials into political nominees.

The third factor of reform is the evaluation of public policies, which must be done systematically. It's about rethinking and adapting public management to objectives. The latter must also be redefined and specified according to the conception of theq modern state. Indeed, the Libyan administration continues to register coordination and evaluation system ensured by a political hierarchy, too much concentration and centralization of decisions, as well as a rather subjective promotion system. Evaluation modalities, accountability and performance measurement should be reviewed for efficiency and effectiveness, rather than political, whether personal, tribal or in Libya.

The fourth element to be reformed concerns the management of administrative communication and the circulation of administrative documents. For the moment, the modes of production and classification, as well as those of distribution of administrative documents suffer from mismanagement and are therefore counterproductive. Administrative procedures are complex, and the various tasks are not distributed among the stakeholders coherently and cohesively.

The fifth element to be developed in the administration concerns the delegation of tasks according to the principle of efficiency and effectiveness. It is a question of lightening the weight of the public administration that suffocates the economic, social and political system, reorganizing the tasks and adopting a defined office structure that puts in place a complementarity of the missions in the public administration. Delegating is much stronger than entrusting work. This action goes hand in hand with a procesqs of transfer of responsibility, coordination and control. These principles apply to the entire organization up to and including the members of the governing body themselves. Directors must be accountable and accountable for the policy pursued. The process that deserves constant adaptations and ensures that goals can be achieved is called the organization of the company. This process should consider all parties involved such as customers, suppliers, staff, or the state, to name a few.

Failure to punish wrongdoings and not to take accountability for the mistakes committed all created conflict well and this characterizes the public administration in Libya, do not meet the principles of public management that are applied in a

democracy. Appointments, assignments, and recruitments are more tools that reward the closest who are most loyal to those who hold power.

As highlighted above, Gaddafi tried to consolidate his power by establishing a totalitarian form of government where all forms of power were bestowed on him. This helped in creating a centralized state, where he wielded power and exercised maximum authority as he pleases. Also, it must be noted that the economic structure of the country made it even possible for Gaddafi to attain such a leadership position, mostly due to the explicit jurisdiction that he (Gaddafi) and his friends may allocate the oil resources to supporters as they please. For this reason, he explored the economic aspect of the Libyan state to consolidate and centralize all powers on him.

Similarly, due to the tyrannical form of government that was exercised by Gaddafi, state institutions were very weak, and as such highly inconsequential. Additionally, it may be regarded that state institutions were mostly founded as a figurehead with no real power nor could these institutions ensure the protection of citizens. Therefore, all forms of state power and authority rested on Gaddafi and this further weakened state-building in Libya.

To further explain the reason for this centralized state nature of Libya, it is important to consider that Libya, during the Gaddafi era had no significant encounter with democracy, nor have they been any democratic leader in the country before Gaddafi. Therefore, the structural history of the Libyan society was wired towards the usage of non-democratic means to control the state. It is no doubt that democracy is often related to the balance of power and efficient power distribution amongst different arms of government, however, in the case of Libya where there is no significant experience with democracy, non-democratic means of controlling the state meant autocratic measures were taken to fulfil these needs.

Additionally, Gaddafi further strengthened his power when he employed the use of elites who were made up of his supporters to increase the general support of the people towards his government. Elites in this case involved those belonging to major tribes, the military, as well as those with a higher position in power. Based on this approach, the elites are employed as pawns to mobilize support for Gaddafi in their various sects, therefore, prolonging his regime. Similarly, it must be noted that this form of elite politics led to an increased level of corruption, hardship, and instability, threatening efficient state-building in Libya but enforcing Gaddafi's aim for power centralization.

3.4.2 Libya and Rentierism during Gaddafi Period

Following the end of the colonial era as well as the petroleum exploration in Libya, Gaddafi sought to establish a Libyan state built on a different political structure. He entrusted state income to oil revenues as were other rentier states in the MENA region and the state's expectation was based on the income accrued from oil sales. For Prashad (201, p.23), Gaddafi established a communist style of economics that was reliant on his philosophy as well as on national resources. As highlighted by Sandbakken (2006, p. 143), the philosophy of Gaddafi comprised of three major principles which were communism, Arabism, and Islam. For this reason, Gaddafi had to formulate an economic plan that was not only feasible to maintain his government but to establish charismatic sentiments toward him.

As highlighted by Otman and Karlberg (2007, p.43), Gaddafi believed his philosophy was the middle ground between liberalism and socialism, hence, he officially changed the name of Libya to the Socialist's People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. This, therefore, shows an insight into the social structure of Libya during Gaddafi's era and how politics was exclusively based on the ideas and philosophies of Gaddafi.

However, Gaddafi's political policy could not solve the economic problems ravaging Libya in the 1970s (Vandewalle, 1998. p. 53). In this regard, Gaddafi transcended his authoritarian leadership style to control the spending and buying habits of his citizens. Gaddafi in 1982, organized a binding import spending structure to control the circulation of money and to enforce spending on domestic products which increased the domestic industry (Vandewalle, 1998. pp. 54-55). Shortly after this measure of control over individual expenditure was applied to numerous goods such as automobiles, clay merchandise, silverware TVs, decorations, forced air systems, radios, recordings, office hardware, kitchenware, and furniture were added to the forbidden products to be imported.

For items regarded as essential goods, the import policy of Gaddafi was also reflected in these items. Libya in the 1980s was a huge market for foreign items as well as foreign foods due to the various agricultural, social and ecological factors that greatly reduced the production of home goods. The austerity measures created significant conflicts in private offices, however, not as much as the resentment channelled towards government institutions (Ayubi, 1995. p. 42). The General People's Congress (GPC) gatherings turned into a discussion for Libyans to censure

the system's financial strategies. The 1987 congress was particularly essential in this regard since in that gathering the representatives straightforwardly called for reform (Vandewalle, 2011. p. 8). Economic somberness combined with public discontent, especially over the lead of the progressive committees and the Libyan association in Chad, expanded the disagreeability of the system. It became clear that Libya was going through a political emergency and the authority of the system was confronting a significant test.

Pressing factors from the people assumed an unequivocal part in the inception of the new strategies. There were various reasons which showed that the domestic economic and social conflicts were obvious before the 1988 declaration. From one perspective, some progressives were strong supporters of Gaddafi, and there were supportive of reformers, who needed to handle the debilitating economy, without Gaddafi or the state's influence. The developing economic conflicts served as an advantage to the reformers, however, their authority or position was highly limited, so these reformers were forced to apply pressure on Gaddafi to amend economic policies. As the reactions mounted, Gaddafi appeared to understand that it was important to re-visit the straining economic policies in Libya as people grew more resentment towards domestic politics.

Reacting to public discontent, Gaddafi in 1988 ordered the release of 400 political detainees and Libya opened its borders for free travel for its citizens as well as for foreigners (St. John, 2008, p. 82). These changes led to the endorsement of the "Great Green Charter of Human Rights in the Age of Jamahiriya " in June of 1988 by the GPC. The greater part of the monetary strategies that were declared in 1988 was a direct reaction to the requests that were made at the GPC gatherings. Changes that were expected to privatize retail exchange and benefits and to change external exchange were called for by the representatives at the GPC.

Another significant aspect of the 1988 economic changes was the law which allowed a private form of partnership responsibility for business operations to replace the centralized state proprietorship in smaller businesses (Vandewalle, 2011.p. 12). This new type of proprietorship called *tashrukiya* was operated based on a course of action that fell among private and state proprietors, in which each employee or worker would share in the benefits. Under this business structure, 8 per cent of the profit was to be given to the state, with the net benefits being split between business partners.

Due to this law, the strict centralized state-owned economy opened a little opportunity for private interference.

The 1988 economic reformation was extensively conducted. Small and medium-sized businesses were privatized and the state's stringent policies on output and input were lifted for most consumable products. Similarly, offices such as the Executive Authority for Partnerships and government offices were set up to regulate private trade and in a short period, the tashrukiya framework was visible in other industries such as automobiles, banking, finance, and production industry.

As mentioned earlier, the main justification for the economic policies was borne out of the fear of domestic political issues arising due to socio-economic poverty and under-development in Libya. The progress earned from these new regulations was short-lived as things quickly turned out to be more muddled. The privatized trade movement and the cutting of state sponsorships brought about spiralling costs and inflation which did not positively affect Libyans with no increase in salary or wage. The removal of strong government policies led to widespread corruption and crime. By 1989, the once-revered economic reforms began to exert a strong negative influence on the citizens, hence, the need for a change in the newly reformed economic policy. Representatives who clamoured for a new change in economic policy utilized the GPC to communicate their discontent to the government and a progressive program was held in 1990 (Vandewalle, 2012. p. 45)

During Gaddafi's era, the state political power vested on the General People's Congress, as well as the Committees, all paying allegiance to Gaddafi. These people's congress represented the labour base of Libya and acted as a labour union. Since the people's Congress held some form of political power, a political framework that aims to regulate salaries, the public authority command over oil income and government was created. However, due to the authoritarian leadership of Gaddafi, all institutions created were strictly under his leadership and his consideration (Otman and Karlberg, 2007).

Gaddafi's administration nationalized all manufacturing plants, stores and apartment complexes from the hand of private proprietors. Along these lines, he focused to ensure that nobody could make unreasonable benefit from the work of others and government's force on the creation cycle would get more grounded. External organizations that were working on oil areas and taking oil income to the outside of the Libyan region had been ousted (Sullivan, 2008). At the end of the day,

the system limited private business visionary and the control of firms upheld labourers to deal with these organizations and the state was the lone ability to control all macroeconomic strategies of the country. (Prashad, 2012).

Wandawell (1998) mentions that Gaddafi exercised total control over the economy of Libya following the nationalization of natural resources and market processes such as importation. Nonetheless, this kept financial guidelines at an exceptionally low level by both plan and feeble institutional designs. Like the country's political organizations, Libyan financial establishments were implied more for the quest for the system instead of for guidelines. Gaddafi trusted the oil income to get the assent of individuals. (Prashad, 2012). All in all, individuals were not burdened, and they acquired a house with the low or free expense and the state was dispersing oil incomes to the residents. Czars could get the greater part of their financing from the public oil industry.

With the oil abundance of the country, they could stay quiet. The fundamental point is that this mystery would help Libyan states to support equilibrium, and this would shield the country from any broadening between individuals since residents were content with the nonattendance of 53 tax collection and they could profit by public spending plan so they were not intrigued with what their state's genuine abundance and there is any defilement or not? (Ross, 2011).

However, the major derivate from oil revenue is to gain citizens' support for the undemocratic government of Gaddafi. This relates to the submission of Beblawi and Luciani (1987) who in their book, 'The Rentier State', defines Arab states such as Libya as being increasingly reliant on external supplies to supply their food utilization, they utilize their cash to cover imports. All in all, they are subject to oil sent out for likewise to meet food things. This shows that any variance in oil costs and level of oil trades straightforwardly influence the food costs in the rentier express that individuals experience the ill effects of this. For example, during the oil boost period, by the expanding of oil costs, food costs increments, too.

The domestic production level of Libya was also very low as the society depended on foreign markets for the most integral export material. However, maintaining political power was the major focus of Libya under Gaddafi and he sought to further generate policies to repress individual actions. As Sillivan (2008) mentioned, Gaddafi provided them with the benefits of the rentier state while he exploited the politics of Libya to his favour. Similarly, his approach to consolidating political power

was to raise revolutionaries that would fight in his name and ensure a stable leadership tenure. For this support, he needed the Libyan public to be eager about their state, which was only done by creating a welfare state through the wealth acquired for oil and other resources. In any case, Libya met the fundamental highlights of being a rentier state like tyranny, and dispersion arrangements (Luciani and Beblawi, 1987). It ought to be added that the oil income is the fundamental determinant to execute these approaches so the essential significance of oil in Libya ought not to be overlooked.

Political Economy of Libya in the initial ten years of Gaddafi's system, heaps of extremist changes had been finished by the government to build the overall abundance of Libya and to grow of the dispersion approaches of Libya. For example, from the start of the 1970s, rents that were received from external oil organizations had been risen particularly from Western Europe send out.

According to Hazem and Beblawi (1990), the principal years time of Libya can be seen as the start of the decade to extend the rentier qualities of Libyan financial, political and social framework. At the end of the day, in the main period of the system, Gaddafi attempted to support system sturdiness and fortify and executed the third way that is called as an option in contrast to both private enterprise and socialism by him. Be that as it may, being an extremely different method of the state economy as compared to other industrialized states that are based on a liberal economy, the Libyan economic system was regarded as obsolete, outdated, and problematic with social and political implications. (Altunisik, 1996).

During the 1980s, the cost of oil diminished significantly, practically tumbling from \$27 per barrel to under \$10. The public authority construction of the Gaddafi system started to be influenced contrarily by the accident in oil cost. The state needed to carry out effective projects to adjust the economy rather than underlying changes. Like the other rentier states, the first response of Libyan states against financial issues became carrying out grimness program as opposed to monetary changes, "In the early 1980s, the regime cuts imports; imposed austerity on development budgets, decreased the number of foreign workers, resorted to the non-payment of its debts to foreign contractors; and started to draw on foreign reserves to finance its budget deficit" (Altunisik, 1996).

The oil boom of the 1970s without a doubt brought about a spending increment in the oil-rentier states. In any case, when the oil value crash of the 1980s sliced their essential source and design of public incomes (outside lease), these equivalent oil-

rentiers were powered to execute starkness projects to restrict the impact of oil value reduction. Indeed, even the harsh pill of gravity projects could do little to fix the negative consequence of the rentier economy. Restricting government access could not and did not adjust the essential construction and wellspring of government incomes for most rentier states. (Yates, 1996, p. 15) what's more, during the 1980s, the happening to Islamists toward the east piece of Libyan led to expansion in the general public particularly in the Benghazi area. Both old Islamist classes and new friendly classes which were made by the consequences of Gaddafi's system started to need more political, social and monetary force from the state (Prashad, 2012).

In 1984, state grocery stores were made, and all private exchanges got illicit (Altunisik, 1996). By this endeavour, Gaddafi exercised further controls over all matters of citizenship living in the state. It must be noted that in the long run, the rentier economy would not be sufficient to adjust the Libyan economy as discussed in the next chapter. Although there had been a tremendous decrease in oil income, in 1985, the state had the option to reestablish a current record excess. At this point, it is important to add that the little populace of Libya made the recuperation simpler for Libya in the main years (Altunisik, 1996).

The oil boom produced great results for the Libyan economy, hence, creating a form of stable economical structure for a short period. However, the increase in money circulation meant that negative economic effects such as inflation were bound to occur. Numerous consumer products that were imported were not available since it was provided in small quantity. Altunisik (1996) contends that "in a nation like Libya were just about 70% of food and essentially all buyer merchandise was imported, buyers were the hardest hit by the cuts that were made in the import budget" (Altunisik, 1996). Individuals started to experience the ill effects of these import quantities and grimness programs that influenced their capacity to arrive at everyday needs. Subsequently, the relations among residents and the state started to decrease.

As Hazem and Beblawi (1990) contend that by 1980, Libyan culture had been incredibly superfluous to the Libyan state. Particularly, with the conflict in Chad in 1987, the military was debilitated, and a lot of oil income was spent previously, during and after the war. This decline in oil incomes caused the diminishing of the spent of oil incomes for dispersion framework for customer products. This prompted the war with Chad which happened between 1978 and 1987. This conflict was between Libyan powers and Chadian powers. Chadian powers were upheld by the French. It is a sort

of common conflict that influenced the Libyan economy contrarily because the state needed to contribute to the military device (Wandawella, 1998). of food items that made the ground for individuals' displeasure to the system (Altunisik, 1996).

In 1987, the GPC secretary showed that the state institutions were wasteful and unfit to address neighbourhood issues for Libyan residents. The requested change of the nation's financial framework and for more tight power over the nation's use (Wandawella, 1998). Notwithstanding, in 1990, monetary requirements turned out to be so obvious in the Libyan system. Government use share in GDP tumbled from 36.5 per cent to 20.8 per cent. Public area compensations were frozen. Defilement and joblessness added to the disintegration of the help of the system (Sandbakken, 2006:145). In this point, it is important to re-notice that the Libyan state's economy relies upon oil incomes and individuals did not partake in some other creation measure. In this respect, individuals straightforwardly rely upon the state's dissemination of oil incomes to give even their fundamental necessities. Libyan residents who experienced monetary states of the nation started to make tension on the government to carry out new strategies.

These arrangements were, by and large, included some advancement endeavours in the Libyan economy. Accordingly, the Libyan state could not avoid monetary decrease and individuals' interest, so the Libyan state needed to carry out changes that incorporated the endeavour for financial progression. These monetary changes can be called 'infatih' in Libya. Vandawella (1998, P. 54) isolated Libyan infatih in two waves. A first exertion somewhere in the range of 1987 and 1990 that intended to ease the Libyan economy. A subsequent wave was after 1990 that intended to diminish state inclusion in the economies.

In the 1990s, despite reformist endeavours, the global climate had restricted the Libyan economy and given the state access to the profound monetary emergency. 1992, due to financial issues and inadequacy of popularity-based design, the Libyan state was exposed to UN requirements (Vandawella, 1998, P. 52). Then again, after the Cold War, the nature of the relationship between the economic factors and MENA states grew increasingly troubling with balance deficits and the global economic crisis. By the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the USA turned out to be a super force.

In addition, antagonistic relations between Libya and the USA hurt Libya significantly more than previously. Public depository lost very nearly 24 billion dollars and there was no external venture to oil area, so the oil incomes of the nation

diminished significantly and costs for food expanded 200%. It is unsurprising to such an extent that the Libyan economy which straightforwardly relied upon oil areas started to deteriorate after the decrease of oil incomes (Vandawella, 1998; Altunisik, 1996).

In June 1992, the state settled on a law that permitted the foundation of business entities. In September 1992, General People's Congress embraced an overall privatization law that licenses the association of private areas to the Libyan economy. In 1993, the GPC permitted the advancement of the discount exchange (Altunisik, 1996). Around the same time, a path to the setting up of private banks was opened and the state let foreign banks operate in Libya. In 1994, Gaddafi pronounced to energize external speculation particularly in modern activities and made Libyan dinar completely convertible to open a path to the consolation external interest in Libyan state (Altunisik, 1996; Wandawella, 1998).

In any case, regardless of this liberal development, the Libyan economy was adjusted yet couldn't develop to such an extent. To make these liberal strategies advantageous for the Libyan economy, two issues ought to be tackled right off the bat. The principal arrangement of these issues was to rescission of UN authorization. The second arrangement of these issues was in effect near the USA. As indicated by Gaddafi's case, if the unfavourably susceptible response of the US against Libya is addressed, the financial and political issue of Libyan can be settled consequently (Prashad, 2012).

Accordingly, in 1999, UN requirements were suspended and in 2003 they were eliminated (Tekin, 2012). Eliminating embargos and requirements helped the Libyan economy for development. In 2005, the Libyan state made all taxes zero besides from cigarettes and the prohibited item to send out were resolved once more. In 2005, the Libyan state let worldwide brands into the Libyan region and the convictions of external financial backers about the advancement of the market in Libya strengthened the Libyan situation on the lookout. During 2003-2005, the market volume of Libya expanded practically 16.5 per cent.

Furthermore, Gaddafi's resources increased and he established a friendship with the US. With the development of a close connection between Libya and the USA, the new external financial backers went to Libya from both the USA and different nations, since Libyan became a safe state to engage in international trade. However,

Libya became over-dependent on oil, leading to a sharp decline of the economy, hence, leading to various domestic and international instabilities (Tekin, 2012).

Similarly, it must be noted that owing to the strong relationship between Libya and the US, Jihadist from other parts of Libya was against Gaddafi's rulership. Since Libya was a one-time colony of European Italy, Gaddafi's trust for European states was very low, for this reason, he made friends with the US (Prashad, 2012). Although Gaddafi had a close relationship with the West, his doubts and demand of centralization thought became boundaries to apply liberal arrangements in Libya. He was expanding costs and charges of oil for oil organizations reliably. The principal contention of the Libyan state was connected with the issue of changes.

Reformists in the country attempted to apply liberal policies in economic production in Libya, whereas the opposition sought to maintain the status quo despite the falling oil prices in the market. All these internal problems coupled with other social issues and growing inequality led to a system of elite politics where a select few were very rich and many others extremely poor. Since Gaddafi could not build a balance between the reformist and the opposition, he began to lose allies from both sides as well as from the international community, paving way for Libya's participation in the Arab Uprising requesting for a change of government and better living conditions.

At this point, it could be seen that Libyan's conflict was characterized by political and economic instability in the country. Similarly, the introduction of foreign actors in the country equally explained the conflictual domestic policies of the region. However, as mentioned earlier, tribalism played an important part in Libya's politics, hence, the next section defines in detail the nature of tribalism in Libya and how this influenced Gaddafi's regime

3.4.3 Tribalism during Gaddafi's Era

The Libyan population is relatively small and geographically dispersed to various ethnic groups such as Arabs, Berbers, Tuareg and Toubou. Libyan society is composed mainly of different tribes. Some of these tribes have strong local loyalty, influence and aspire to play a major role in their respective regions. Different ethnic groups and tribes are marginalized during the Gaddafi regime and now want to reaffirm their right to a more equitable distribution of power and wealth. It must be noted that the transition from a culture where loyalty mainly concerns the tribe, ethnic

group or region to a nationalist culture, in which loyalty mainly concerns the country and its institutions, where all citizens consider themselves equal before the law, is an important prerequisite for a successful transition to democracy.

In Libya, many tribes exist and impact the political conduct of the nations' residents. Simultaneously, the nation has modernized and urbanized making tribalism assume a less concrete political part than during frontier and precolonial times. In Libya, partisan contrasts are less significant than the ancestral contrasts that exist between the three chronicled districts of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.

Libya is likewise an assorted and pluralistic state where tribalism plays a huge job. The majority of the number of inhabitants in Libya lives in metropolitan territories; almost 50% of Libyans live in the city of Tripoli and 66% live in urban areas along the nation's coast (St. John, xix). Libya was verifiably separated into the territories of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica. These regions at this point don't exist in name, however, the locales have distinct segment contrasts.

Libya has over 140 tribes, around half of which are seen as large tribes (Tarkowski and Omar). Similarly, the Middle Easterner Berbers which is Libya's principal ethnic gathering, make up a lot of Libya's populace (Tarkowski and Omar). Arab Berbers are relatives of the Bedouin Berber tribes of the Maghreb desert and Arabs who colonized North Africa. Tripolitania has eight tribes that follow their foundations to Bani Hilal also, Bani Sulaim, both Arab-Berber tribes. Tribes in Cyrenaica incorporate two parts of the Bani Hilal tribe (St. John, xix). For the most part, migrant Tebou and Tuareg tribes occupy the desert districts in the Southwest piece of the country in the region of Fezzan and the Berbers possess the Nafusa Mountains in Western Libya (Tarkowski and Omar). The country additionally has more modest populaces of Dawud and Libyans from Sub-Saharan Africa particularly in the Southern locales (St. John, xix).

In Libya, Arab-patriot communist governments under Muammar Gaddafi has looked to diminish the political job of tribes while at the same time abusing ancestral loyalties to acquire power. Additionally, Gaddafi occupied with clientelism by using familial loyalties to give "admittance to establishments, business openings, and administrative endorsement, or even to clear the unremarkable obstacles of regular daily existence [through] deliberately positioned mediators" (Bates and Rassam, 297).

Oil endowments were allowed to acquire political power and work with connections to acquire loyalties of ancestral and different gatherings. State

establishments, particularly those controlling oil creation and dissemination, were developed with the goal that the nation was dependent on the state. Notwithstanding sponsorships, steadfast groups got high government positions and different advantages. Clientelism proceeded with little obstruction partially since the significant degree of state control of foundations took into account next to no straightforwardness.

In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi established the communist Arab-patriot "Third Universal Theory" that prohibited ideological groups and debilitate ancestral organization. The Libyan government under Gaddafi - the Jamahiriya - in the end, abused ancestral loyalties to support its political force. Gaddafi was important for the Qadadfa tribe around there of Sirte, which was faithful to him and given the main security jobs. This tribe, be that as it may, was one of the more modest tribes and in this manner, Gaddafi additionally inclined toward the military backing of different ancestral confederations. These tribes incorporated Libya's biggest, the Warfalla tribe, just as the compelling Magarha tribe focused on the southern Sabha locale and Tarhouna tribes in Tripoli (Terrill, pp. 76-77). While trying to keep the military frail, he neglected to professionalize, incorporate, or modernize the military. His system purposefully exacerbated ancestral competition and left different local armies to answer to various leaders.

While the Gaddafi system went against tribalism, it supported nearby self-government as "regular pioneers, serving on a three-year rotational premise" (Tarowski and Omar). This framework was alluded to as "Mainstream Social Leadership" and brought about ancestral sheikhs having significant authority over nearby law, administration, and advancement (Tarowski and Omar). These nearby administration frameworks frequently subverted the legitimate arrangement of the state and considered a degree of debasement that disappointed Libyans (Tarowski and Omar). Tuareg and Tebu tribes were to a great extent denied citizenship under Gaddafi, and certain rights were retained. Hence, the tribes by and large had a negative view of the Gaddafi system. While these gatherings were generally overlooked, Gaddafi made a few endeavours to acquire their reliability or to use them in essential military endeavours. The Tuareg were utilized as labour in the conflict against Chad and the Tebu tribes were given a material guide in different conflicts directed by the tribes (Tarkowski and Omar).

In Eastern Libya, ancestral individuals still paid charges to ancestral sheikhs while Gaddafi was in power, and legitimate force was in sure cases practised by

ancestral pioneers (Tarkowski and Omar). Post-uprising Libya faces a considerable lot of the very issues that are as yet being faced in Iraq including viciousness between state armies, issues with the arising majority rule framework, and proceeded with disorder and debasement. Resistance gatherings inside Libya ousted the Gaddafi government in 2011. These gatherings were for the most part focused in Cyrenaica, while powers faithful to Gaddafi were focused in Tripolitania. The military strategies utilized by NATO to topple Gaddafi finished viciousness from steadfast civilian armies against the resistance. All through the uprising, certain tribes tended to by the same token support Gaddafi or the resistance, although loyalties did not stringently cling to ancestral lines.

The biggest Libyan tribe of around 2,000,000, the Warfalla tribe, stayed faithful to Gaddafi all through the uprising. The National Liberation Army in some limit utilized ancestral loyalties to battle against Gaddafi's military. Following the 2011 uprising, the National Transitional Council addressed generally the interests of renegade powers situated in Cyrenaica. The General National Council chose in July 2012 may take into consideration the effective democratization of Libya however so far has still illustrated treachery toward specific tribes, particularly those that had upheld Gaddafi and has not had the option to control viciousness.

State armies in post-unrest Libya represent a danger to the centralization of police powers also, have brought about proceeded instability and disorder in the country, which the National Transitional Council neglected to address. Volunteer armies incorporate more than 100 gatherings that are bound together under the Union of Revolutionary Forces. Serious conflicts among Masrata and Benghazi rebels have happened on different events (Tarkowski and Omar). Volunteer armies are not clinging to law and order and have executed followers. In July 2011, General Younis, who had abandoned Gaddafi's armed force during the unrest kicked the bucket under baffling conditions, appearing to have been executed by rebel powers which brought on an additional split between rebel local armies (Tarkowski also, Omar).

Libya's biggest tribe, the Warfalla, has confronted an attack in the district of Bani Walid as a reaction of the General National Congress to the executing of Omran Shaaban, who is thought to have killed Gaddafi. The Libyan armed force has utilized pointless power and made various likely superfluous captures of suspects. The security danger of the volunteer armies likewise appeared in the assault by the Islamist Ansar

al sharia state army against the U.S. Consulate that slaughtered U.S. Diplomat Chris Stevens and three different Americans.

Corruption triggered by tribal differences exists in Libya even though it doesn't mirror an extended pattern. While the National Transitional Council represented, it generally neglected to seek after equity by liberating prisoners imprisoned during the upset. During the political race, there was a few detailed obliteration of voting booths albeit the political race was generally decided as free and reasonable by onlookers (Foreign Affairs). There has additionally been the general belief that individuals from the National Transitional Council have endeavoured to "cut arrangements out of external direct speculation contracts" (Tarkowski and Omar).

The Libyan public is cheerful that the oil abundance of the nation translates into a better quality of living for all Libyans. The new government should fabricate the foundations and political design that forestall defilement and make this conceivable. USAID states that the U.S. help to Libya is given to "support the managerial limits of interval overseeing specialists" furthermore, to improve the connections among media and metro society associations, between the public authority and the Libyan residents, and to support "metro instruction and compromise" (USAID).

Under the Gaddafi government, ideological groups were prohibited, leaving minimal social comprehension of a multi-party vote-based framework. Social loyalties, consequently, are seen to assume a part in the public authority that is framed in the country. During the appointment of the General National Congress and the Parliamentary decisions, Libyan residents went to the polls to vote, not out of political optimism, but rather on strict tribal sentiments, as each tribe sought to have a share in public policymaking. This example is to some degree corresponds to what exactly existed under the National Transitional Council. The chamber was evaluated as choosing individuals not founded on merit however dependent on their degree of enduring under the Gaddafi system, on Islamic, Muslim Brotherhood ties, and on alliance with certain families including the Bogaigis and the Garianis (Tarkowski and Omar).

Since its inception, Libya as a country has comprised an area of a social and civilisational vacuum because of it being situated between the eastern (Egypt) and western (Tunisia) metropolitan focuses. This is to a great extent because of its enormous desert, which has not aided in the resettlement of relocating people groups and clans. Such a state was likewise brought about by the idea of its ancestral synthesis

in which its numerous clans live straightforward itinerant presences with no feeling of public solidarity or focal position. States with numerous *asabiyya*, as per Ibn Khaldun, are only from time to time managed by a state authority. Libya profited little from the Andalusian relocations seen by North Africa between the fourteenth and fifteenth hundreds of years, rather than Tunisia and Algeria which got the moving Andalusian people group, who accordingly added to the improvement of the social, political and public activity in that (Arié, 1973, p. 66; Georges, 1946, p. 297; Imam, 1981, pp. 293–318).

Maybe the sole special case is the Libyan area of Derna with its regular geology and environment, which concurred with certain moving Andalusian families. Interestingly, the travelling districts of the east, west and south abounded with Arab and Amazigh (Berber) Bedouins who couldn't get comfortable with the metropolitan networks of Benghazi and Derna (Evans-Pritchard, 1949, p. 41). Because of the shortfall of a focal expert in ancestral and migrant territories, the Bedouins looked for some type of bringing together association through which to control their feeling of equity.

The Hafsid tradition practised comparative impact on the clans of the West (Tripolitania and Fezzan clans). These topographical and political components provoked the rise of a strategic difference between the three tribes, to be specific, Tripoli, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, which brought about these areas having authentic encounters that contrasted from one another until the appearance of the Karamanlis who set up the idea of state forcibly (Inam Muhammad, 1998, p. 239). Before this, Tripolitania consistently kept up relations with Tunisia more grounded than its relations with Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Cyrenaica was in every case verifiably, socially and financially connected with Egypt and individuals of Western Sahara as opposed to with Tripolitania and Fezzan.

Even though Gaddafi was against the ancestral structure during the start of his rule, he effectively sought to build up the rationale of a nation-state (relating prevalently to the Al-Gaddadfa clan). After Gaddafi understood that his clan couldn't practice command over other Libyan clans without utilizing the tribe part. He hence utilized it inside the system of terrorizing and greeting some of the time with cash and blessings, different occasions through the power of arms. This is reflected in the ancestral collusions (*Íilf*) produced by Gaddafi at the start of his rule between his clan and the clans of Magarha, Warfella and Al-Awagir under the umbrella of the Gaddadfa

clan, which become known as the "clan of the state." With this started a third asabiyya cycle that unified the four clans from which was drafted the organs of the State as per the idea of the "State clan."

By this, Gaddafi figured out how to organize the ancestral undertakings of the State along these lines guaranteeing the supportability of his "State clan" (Al-Fitouri, 2012). Gaddafi at that point began to grow the extent of unions (Íilf) by including all clans inside the "State clan" (along these lines including and obliging the clans to follow the framework). He accomplished this through an assortment of instruments eminently the Revolutionary Committees and People's Congresses, and the association of the clans in that to guarantee their faithfulness (walé) to his family. Gaddafi related the interests of the clans with that organization to control both the destiny of society and overall influence. This technique demonstrated effectiveness as the ancestral pioneers toward the east, toward the west and the south saw in its nearby normal augmentation of the authority of the head of the biggest group (the top of the system). By such methods, Gaddafi figured out how to manage the two Libyan difficulties:

(1) The trouble of practising authority over the clans.

(2) The fracture of the general public into fluctuated and now and again contradicting provincial and ancestral gatherings, alongside the shortfall of a focal position or public solidarity.

Ancestral impact in the political cycle spread informally through organizations like the People's Congresses and People's Committees, through an arrangement of advancements and individuals' choice since 1977AD. Gaddafi considered these foundations the best way to administer the majority and addressed the authority public umbrella for all powers in Libya, with a commonsense spotlight on ancestral administration in every area. Gaddafi's methodology additionally tried to make a mainstream social initiative that stretches out the country over (See the report of Roula, 2011). To build the faithfulness of the clans to the system and the Gaddadfa clan, Gaddafi took a few measures to set up the clans, including the 1990 law, which gives every clan selective responsibility for that was ordinarily theirs before, however, has become some portion of the metropolitan land space.

In 1994, in what gives off an impression of being harmonious with the Khaldunian structure, Gaddafi had all the earmarks of being available to various asabiyyas by methods for the foundation of well-known boards of trustees for social pioneers, for example, ancestral pioneers. The products of this methodology are found

in the 1997 marking of ancestral heads of what was known as the "report of honour" under which they promised loyalty to the progressive framework, and to join against any faction or clan endeavouring outfitted resistance to the system (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, p. 11). This receptiveness was just a custom. The genuine reason, as indicated by Ibn Khaldun, was guaranteeing the restraining infrastructure of greatness, for example, forestalling the foundation of any ancestral authority of dominating outside of the overall structure of Gaddafi's system.

Maybe the result of the Khaldunian guideline of imposing business model brilliance is for the leader to avoid any uprising that would comprise a danger to his administration. Accordingly, Gaddafi was frequently engrossed with inward debates between clans to fix his hold on power. All through his forty-year rule, Colonel Gaddafi shaped an opponent organization of establishments, which he controlled to forestall the rise of any adversary (Tripoli witness: Tribalism and danger of enrollment, 2011). Maybe the fights that have emerged between the Arabs and the clans of Tebou in the south and among the clans of Masrata, Tawergha and Zintan are proof of the accomplishment of this arrangement. Ibn Khaldun thought about the actual appearances of the standard of the person.

While different clans were caught up with quarrelling, the impact of the Gaddadfa clan unobtrusively expanded, and power turned out to be progressively amassed in the possession of its individuals. In 1976, of the 12 individuals from the Revolutionary Command Council, who had a place with persecuted or minimized gatherings from various clans, just four remained; everybody was supplanted by individuals from the city of Sirte (Gaddadfa's fortification), for example, individuals from the Gaddafi's Gaddadfa clan (Ali, 2012a). The greater part of the significant regulatory errands was depended on individuals from this clan. From here started the interaction of crumbling of the asabiyya whereupon the state initially started. This is reflected in Gaddafi's minimization of the second man in the State Abdessalam Jalloud, head of the Magarha clan. Gaddafi eliminated the whole clan from all experts in 1992.

Not long after relations with the Al-Awagir clan disintegrated, which tied down the reliability of eastern Libya to him. Simultaneously, after the disintegration of the Libyan armed force, military undertakings were endowed to the three children of Gaddafi (Mutassim, Khamis and Hannibal), who lead the world-class units, hired fighters, (African Islamic Battalion), which was set up after the choice to disband the military in 1975AD. This choice was made after the upset endeavour of Omar

Meheshi. This persuaded that the military addressed the greatest danger to his impact, so he broke down it under the name of an "Outfitted People" as another option (Ogunbadejo, 1983, p. 156), where people, in general, were prepared to utilize weapons.

Without a doubt, this activity stayed under the influence and mastery of the system, and the guardianship of followers from local armies and private powers headed by his children or individuals from his clan to the detriment of the country's true armed force (Davis, 1990, p. 34; Pargeter, 2012, p. 112). By this, the military changed, as anticipated by Ibn Khaldun, to secret hired soldiers and civilian armies named "Individuals' Leaders", which had the order to notice and ensure neighbourhoods in the urban areas. They likewise firmly checked the respective relations between the clans. They watched everybody, even one another. They were instrumental in understanding the condition of all through Libya during the rule of Gaddafi.

At this crossroads, it is significant the examination led by Ibn Khaldun between a valid and bogus calling. The first depends on the standards of religion to force its force and distinction over the state. It requires fearlessness (power) to stop the bandits. This is addressed with regards to Senussi Libya. While, a bogus calling depended on power, persecution, covered up collusions, and cash to purchase the faithfulness of the local area. In such a calling, there are widespread administrations and state armies. It gives no significance to the ethical quality of its strategies. Such is reflected in the contemporary history of Colonel Gaddafi's Libya. Gaddafi's arrangement of administration intended to guarantee his power and the predominance of his clan radically affected the State.

For the majority of the Gaddafi period, the State was addressed by its oppressive chief because of the shortfall of any significant state establishment. This brought about Gaddafi's progression of the ancestral system to that of restricted authority as a way to haggle with the populace. This is a conspicuous difference with the new-conceived foundations left by the Senussis, and his political trademark "the tent victories over the royal residence." Gaddafi executed a political interaction that was different to that recommended by Ibn Khaldun in regard to the certainty of the change from nomadism (Badawa) to urbanism (Hadar) and not the other way around!

This maybe clarify the significant peculiarity of Gaddafi and his activities and the shame that he caused to the states he visited. Indeed, even the progressive advisory groups he established for which he picked the motto "boards all over the place" didn't

change into compelling free foundations. Its individuals were not obliged to any administrative framework wherein capabilities are steadily shaped, and authorities chose. Or maybe, it was a political framework dependent on family relationships, fellowships and certain interests. The state circulation component was restrictive on political devotion by ancestral pioneers. This brought about a reestablishment of the ancestral framework, which created a savage rivalry and hazardous threats.

It accentuated ancestral character and delivered the clan instrumental in getting social requests and accomplishing individual aspirations (Ali canister, 2012b). Most Libyans relied upon their clans for insurance, to secure their privileges, and to discover business, which all relied upon the strength of the clan or the level of closeness or reliability to the decision system. Thusly, Gaddafi administered the rearrangement of riches and all financial chances to forestall the improvement of any oppositional political power. Nothing stayed for those looking for riches and notoriety except for dedication to the leader and accommodation to his power. The Khaldunian condition started to disentangle after the asabiyya moved in the Gaddadfa clan, and cursorily in the Warfella clan, and the exit of the incredible Al-Awagir and Magarha clans from political impact.

The public councils and bodies did not fill the vacuum that happened in the asabiyya because of its shallow design, and its relationship with abundance and benefit more so than its relations being founded on blood or religion, as recognized by Ibn Khaldun. The subsequent column (riches) likewise assumed a part in upsetting the framework, which upset the equilibrium of power and abundance by methods for the lavishness of the administrative class (Gaddadfa) as indicated by the Khaldunian description.⁶⁵ Gaddadfa, particularly Gaddafi's four children (Hannibal, Mutassim, Al-Saadi and Saif al-Arab) carried on with an existence of debasement and extravagance wasting billions.

The worldwide interchanges transformation permitted the Libyan public to see the genuine essence of its administration. Likewise, Power (Shawka) had an impact on the downfall of the system, whereby Libya, in the late phases of the Gaddafi period, was hard to control, as anticipated by Ibn Khaldun, because of its absence of request and reliance on the impulse of Gaddafi's children. Under such conditions, it is hard to consider human and legitimate rights, and nothing was open and straightforward. Maybe the main occasion mirroring this dilemma is the occasion of the Abu Salim jail in 1996, in which over 1,200 detainees were killed.

This occasion passed without Libyans having the option to communicate their entitlement to know reality with regards to what occurred. The framework was hanging tight for what Ibn Khaldun called the "Muṭālib" (Enemy), which was accomplished in the unrest of 17 February that was dispatched from the city of Benghazi. Benghazi was constrained by the enormous and incredible Al-Awagir clan, which was politically underestimated after being removed from the decision (asabiyya).

The Al-Awagir clan were additionally truly oppressed where the vast majority of the dead from the Abu Salim jail occurrence had a place with them. Another factor that prompted the root of the decision asabiyya, as indicated by Khaldunian portrayal, is the sudden manner large members of the Revolutionary Council turned on Gaddafi toward the start of the unrest, the dismissal of the clans, who felt minimized in the political framework, just as the vanity of Gaddafi urgent calls for help and rescue.

3.5 External Intervention and the Termination of Gaddafi's Regime

As have mentioned earlier, the global perception of Libya was that the country was doing well. After the outcome of events in Tunisia and Egypt (neighbours of Libya to the west and east), Libya began to experience changes. These changes started on February 17, 2011. On this date, the National Transitional Council (NTC) was established under the leadership of Mustafa Abdul Jalil (Gaddafi's former Justice Minister). The NTC was created to administer the areas of Libya under rebel control. By March 10 of the same year, the NTC was officially recognized by France as the legitimate representative of Libya. Libya's control was gradually shifting to the NTC and to other soldiers who decided to support the rebels. The NTC controlled a very important part of Benghazi and Eastern Libya while Gaddafi was still in control of Tripoli and its other environs (Yılmaz 2012, p. 46).

One of the factors responsible for the shifting of control to the NTC was a protest that sparked up as a result of the failure of the government to settle long-standing shortages. This was not the major factor, but this medium was used to convey a deeper political feeling about the state of the country. This protest led to an uprising for Gaddafi to relinquish the seat of power. It was more of a violent protest than that of Egypt and Tunisia which were more peaceful. The reason for the violent protest was a result of the insensitivity of Gaddafi's government to the plight of the people of Libya. Also, Fathi Terbil who was a young lawyer was arrested because the lawyer represented the families of the prison victims that were involved in the Abu Salam

Prison Massacre. In 1996, the forces of Gaddafi opened fire on prison inmates killing about 1, 200 people. This was referred to as the Abu Salam Prison Massacre (Sawani, 2013. p. 1).

Gaddafi threatened to stop the protest movement and several agencies reported that Gaddafi was empowering the Pro-Gaddafi militants with arms to kill the protesters in Tripoli. This led the United Nations (UN), United States of America (USA), Australia, and Canada to weigh in on the issue. As a result, Libya was sanctioned on March 17, 2011, as a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) and that the Libyan Citizens have to be protected by all means i.e., Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The sanction which is known as Resolution 1973 was passed by the UN secretary council. Gaddafi was captured and killed on October 20, 2011, in his hometown, Sirte. So, Gaddafi's regime ended. However, the greatest challenge afterwards has been how to grow the Libyan economy from scratch.

External involvement has been present in Libya for a while. From the international perspective, a fall in Gaddafi's regime would have meant that the rebels were organized, trained, and experienced. However, this was not the case. Libya has been a global player even before oil was discovered in the region. In the year 1943, a major part of Libya came under the control of the administration of the British Military. Shortly after the war, Britain, France, and Italy wanted to control a portion of Libya either for reasons that are strategic or prestigious (Genugten, 2011, p. 17).

Gaddafi Justified his coup by promising Libyans that he came to bring them true independence that was free from external control. Even at that, he could not shake off influence from the west completely. Gaddafi asked that the military base of the British and Americans in Libya be evacuated. Also, the Italian community was expelled in 1970 but Gaddafi's regime still maintained a relationship with them because of the Italian Oil and Gas group called ENI. However, the relationship was less conspicuous. When it comes to foreign forces, Libyans are sceptical because of the distrust they have about foreign intervention. As a result of the generating revenue mechanism of the Libyan economy, which is oil and gas, there is an increased difficulty for Libyans to withstand external pressure for long (Van Genugten 2011:71).

As earlier stated, in October 2011, Libya's civil war ended. However, they were faced with the challenge of building a new country for themselves. The intervention of the Military was termed special. However, one of the most vital things that were not present was that the peacekeeping forces were not deployed by

international actors for post-conflict purposes. The foreign actors used a lighter post-war footprint strategy than that of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan interventions (Chivvis, et al., 2012, p. 1).

During the Libyan crisis, the US limited its contribution to that which they were specialized in so that other allies could take the lead from a different perspective. Since after the war, the US has maintained a low profile. This is because of the new authorities of the Libyan keeping forces. Libyan economy was much more concerned about their fragile legitimacy and therefore requested that foreign involvement be minimal. The immediate post-war situation was also calmer than in other cases in history, so the international community did not need to deploy peace forces. In addition, deploying foreign advisors in large numbers might overwhelm the governmental capacities of the fragile new Libyan state (Chivvis et al 2012:1-2)

The intervention of external forces in Libya was due to a host of reasons, mostly borne out of Libya's position in the international community under Gaddafi. Despite Gaddafi's numerous attempts to reintegrate the country into the international community, and its undoubted success in improving Libya's international relations across the world, especially in the MENA region, the country under Gaddafi remained largely marginalized, mostly due to the nature of international politics that was employed by Gaddafi. As mentioned by Zoubir (2009, p. 407), Gaddafi displayed a hostile form of international politics, interfered violently in the internal affairs of other countries, and he continued to openly support terrorism. For this reason, the level of relationship between Libya and other countries continually declined.

Another reason leading to external intervention that may also be related to Libya's dwindling relationship with foreign powers is due to Gaddafi's unique way of interpreting Islam. In the Green Book, Gaddafi highlighted his political philosophy, wherein he based his political legitimacy on Islam and showed other non-democratic tendencies. This as mentioned by Joffe (2011, p. 532) did not only affect Libya's diplomacy with other countries but also affected the alliance that Gaddafi formed in the MENA region and beyond.

It is pertinent to note that Gaddafi did have a bearable relationship with foreign states, especially in matters regarding economic and oil trade. Being a state with a high influx of oil, Gaddafi managed to remain important to Western powers, although they were dissatisfied with this form of leadership and ideologies. Additionally, it could be

said that the nature of the relationship between Gaddafi and Western forces was mostly for personal interest on the side of the Western powers as they search for oil reserves.

Similar nature of the relationship was shared between Libya and China as well as Russia who needed Gaddafi only for oil reserves and shielded itself from the irrational foreign politics that was exhibited by Gaddafi.

As mentioned by Ibrahim (2020, p. 23), a majority of Western powers considered Gaddafi's regime to be particularly problematic, mostly due to his support for international terrorism. Therefore, if provided with an opportunity, these Western powers would not hesitate to unseat Gaddafi to ensure their self-interest and security is protected. Additionally, due to Gaddafi's role as a non-democratic leader, they were cases of many exiled Libyans being killed in other Western countries, hence, creating a concern related to direct terrorist attacks on the home soil of Western states. This form of violent terrorism further created lesser support for the Libyan state under Gaddafi.

The terrorist actions of Gaddafi did not only stop at the assassination of exiled Libyans in Western nations, it also transcended to conducting direct terrorist attacks on Western soil. For example, Tisdall (2011) highlights that Gaddafi conducted organized attacks such as the killing of a British police officer in 1984, the bombing of a club hall used by the US Army in Berlin, as well the destruction of the French plane in 1989. Although these actions occurred in the 1980s, they permanently shaped how Gaddafi was viewed by Western states.

Another very strategic event that further worsened Gaddafi's relationship with the Western States was the Lockerbie bombing on the Pan Am Flight 103 that occurred in Scotland which left over 270 dead (2015). Gaddafi accepted responsibility for the Lockerbie bombing which is regarded as one of the deadliest terrorist attacks on U.K soil. A majority of the passengers were American citizens, some of whom were members of the US intelligence forces. Therefore, the Lockerbie bombings further deepened the conflict between Gaddafi and the US. In continuation of his attack on Western soil, a report by the British House of Common showed that Gaddafi provided arms to the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland as well as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna in Spain (House of Commons, 2017).

Gaddafi's relationship with Israel was also a very hostile one, for this reason, it is assumed that he provided support to extremist Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Ibrahim, 2020, p. 35). Therefore, these acts of

foreign-sponsored terrorism that were initiated by Gaddafi created distrust between him and Western states. Hence, when conflict arose during the Arab Uprising, he had no allies to back him up.

3.6 Summary

This chapter provides a concise discussion on the state-building challenges during the Gaddafi regime. Significantly, it seeks to answer the first research question which was directed at finding out what were the challenges that dwindled efficient state-building approaches in Libya. In the chapter, a thorough reference to the political environment during the Arab uprising was provided as this created a better understanding to finding out why Libyans were dissatisfied by the state of affairs during the Gaddafi regime. It is essential to discuss the state-building challenges during the Gaddafi regime as most elements that were influential in state-building during Gaddafi's regime were also reflected after Gaddafi.

The chapter starts by discussing in detail the state-building challenges in the North African region, focusing on countries that witnessed significant changes during the Arab uprising. Egypt for example saw a change of regime as Mubarak was killed, Ben Ali in Tunisia went on exile, however, the situation in Libya attracted international actors before Gaddafi could be killed. From here, an understanding of the exceptional nature of the Libyan society is provided as this could be seen as the hindering blocks to state-building challenges in the country. In the discussion of centralized states and limited political openings, a look into the political history of states in North African region was important to understand how political actions shaped state-building measures.

North Africa has been chosen as the region for discussion since Libya is in this region. Similarly, the Arab Uprising occurred in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt which were all North African states, however, with different results. For this reason, the chapter highlights that understand state-building challenges during Gaddafi regime in Libya, it is important to consider the position of other neighbouring states in the region.

Governments in North African states, especially Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia sought to increase their power through any means possible, most of which were undemocratic means. In Tunisia for example, the government of Ben Ali was inherently corrupt, leading to a society wherein the majority were educated but very poorer. Similarly, as a result of the corrupt nature of the government, the workers in

government institutions were also very corrupt, therefore, leading to a society with an unbearable nature of corruption and poverty. The chapter highlighted that the global economic crisis also affected the economic nature of the citizens, therefore, the citizens of Tunisia grew even poor whilst Ben Ali and his family enriched themselves with the wealth of the nation.

Although Tunisia practised a multi-party system of election, Ben Ali's party which is known as the Constitutional Democratic Rally constantly gained the majority in power, a process which most Tunisians view as being extremely corrupt. Through the dominant position of Ben Ali's party, other political parties were banned from operating in Tunisia and people were strongly repressed with their rights.

The situation in Egypt regarding domestic politics as mentioned in the chapter was also similar to that of Tunisia and Libya. Egypt under Mubarak experienced a totalitarian regime where Mubarak controlled all aspects of state power and exhibited undemocratic policies. For this reason, when citizens had the chance to protest against Gaddafi's undemocratic policies, they hastily did so. The chapter highlights that the model of the Arab Uprising in Tunisia created a revolution and a new regime, whereas, the nature of the Arab Uprising in Egypt led to an introduction of the army in the leadership process and as a pivotal state apparatus.

The chapter, in the continuation of its discussion, highlights that Gaddafi has taken leadership of a heavily oil-rich multi-tribal state was faced with numerous challenges on the best way to enjoy a peaceful leadership regime while balancing the interests of the various tribes in the country. For this reason, Gaddafi adopted economic policies that were aimed at protecting his reign. The chapter mentions a political-economic state that was founded by Gaddafi known as the Socialist's People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Under this socialist arrangement, Gaddafi's authoritarian leadership style increased and he tried to control the importation of consumer goods while placing a ban on numerous items imported from abroad.

Another economic policy applied by Gaddafi is the economic principle of rentierism which was seen as the most feasible economic policy to maintain political power while building friends in different sectors of the state. This policy allowed the continuous undisturbed leadership of monarchs in other Gulf states, and this was what Gaddafi sought to enjoy. It was discussed in this chapter that money gotten from oil was used to finance the day-to-day structure of the Libyan government, hence, creating a resource curse where other industries suffered significant decline and loss of value.

Additionally, since Libya was already an oil-rich state, the main focus of Gaddafi was on the various ways through which the revenue gotten from oil could be used to serve his purpose as ruler of the nation. The chapter highlights that the resource-rich nature of the country also added to the challenges of state-building in the country. This was evident in the 1980s after the crash in oil price where it was seen that a Libyan state which was already suffering from the resource curse had no solid domestic revenue from another sector, hence, the over-dependence on oil led to a growing level of hardship and poverty for citizens during the crash in oil prices.

The chapter also mentioned that since Gaddafi was dependent on foreign reserves, he had to increase domestic support by providing funds to tribal chiefs and heads who in turn encouraged their tribesmen to support Gaddafi's regime. For this reason, the chapter highlighted that he adopted undemocratic principles that sought to mostly favour a patrimonial system of government. The rentier economic system increased inequality amongst the tribes in Libya and this further increased tribal tensions.

The chapter in its discussion of tribes emphasizes the fact that the small population size in Libya did not deter the problems encountered as a result of the multi-tribal nature of the country. Some of these tribes such as the Warfalla tribes were regarded as big tribes, hence, Gaddafi understood that maintaining his regime would mean formulating friendships with the big tribes. Hence, he favoured the bigger tribe at the expense of the smaller tribes, creating policies that were mostly aimed at making the bigger tribes even bigger and by proxy creating a solid leadership system for him. Additionally, upon the creation of a central clan system, it could be said that Gaddafi explored the multi-tribal nature of Libya to his political benefit.

However, since inequality increased and people lost hope in the government, public administration in Libya also greatly diminished. Similarly, the lack of trust in the public administration was due to the repressive leadership style of Gaddafi through which the available public institutions were used as pawns in promoting Gaddafi's interest. As a consequence, the uprising that happened in Libya, as well as other states in the MENA region, was a long time bottled aggression on the part of the people.

They had longed for opportunities to express themselves but they could not because there was no freedom of expression. For example in Libya, anyone who is against Gaddafi gets locked up or dealt with. Additionally, the chapter showed that the

external intervention into the Libyan conflict was a result of the repressive style organized by Gaddafi to deter protestors.

Having analyzed the position of Libya during Gaddafi's tenure, the next chapter submits a detailed analysis of state-building challenges after Gaddafi's regime, referring to existing and new state-building concepts.

CHAPTER IV

State Building Challenges in Libya After Gaddafi Regime

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the state-building challenges in Libya following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. Based on the fall of this regime, the state of Libya was viewed as a failed state. Libya has since been thrown into a state of constant civil war, domestic conflicts and local crisis. It could be argued that the reason for this disastrous domestic nature is as a result of the political foundation laid by Gaddafi in the country. Hence, post-Gaddafi Libya is struggling with a faulty foundation laid by Gaddafi which is filled with numerous political, social, and economic upheavals.

The chapter begins with the discussion on the Arab Uprising as it signifies the end of the Gaddafi regime and brings us into another era. The Arab Uprising discussion is aimed to demonstrate the various facet of Libyan society and domestic behaviour as the Arab Uprising continued. Libya shortly after the uprising strategically became divided into two parts (West and East) as it became impossible for the citizens to share a similar political ideology, therefore leading to state-building problems. To salvage the state-building problems, state-building attempts were created and are discussed, amongst these are the National Transitional Council (NTC), the General National Congress (GNC), the house of representatives, and finally the Government Accord.

However, due to state-building challenges in Libya, none of these attempts is fostering or improving, rather they all serve the purpose of the political elite holding the nation to ransom. This chapter discusses these state-building attempts and why they failed. The impact of political and administrative challenges in the present era is discussed with a major focus on whether the administrative challenges faced are pebbles from Gaddafi's regime or the newly formed post-Gaddafi era.

In discussing the state-building challenges, it is important to mention the socio-economic factors facing the country and how elites in higher political echelons are consistently using this social division to their advantage. A major example that is discussed is the exploitation of the country's wealth to only benefit a selected few people, hence, leading to a crumbling of the welfare system and further dissatisfaction of unprivileged members of the society.

Finally, the chapter examines the role of external actors in exacerbating the Libyan conflict shall be discussed. External actors in this sense are concerned with

countries that have supported various factions in Libya, without acknowledging the legitimate president of the country. Libya, just like every other MENA country is no stranger to foreign intervention, however, thus, an understanding of how foreign intervention in the country has increased the state-building challenges in the post-Gaddafi era is provided.

Having discussed the supporters of the regime as well as those post-Gaddafi's Libya that been considered as a failed state, discloses an ideologically fragmented society characterized by multifaceted fractures and a high level of socio-political instability that renders peacebuilding and nation-building a dream project that only exists in the mind of those who believe in the benefits of the liberal peace.

4.2 Overview of The Causes of The Arab Uprising in Libya

The liberal interventionist that led to the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi has rather stolen the merit of the revolution leaving the revolutionaries without a credible leading ideology capable of ensuring the post-war reconstruction at the political, social and economic level which appears as insuperable challenges to the interim government. The political, socioeconomic, democratic and federalist nation-building challenges that the interim government should cope with, are shattered by the security challenges due to the ideological struggles, tribal and regional conflicts between Islamist and secularist, armed groups, militias, and terrorist-linked organizations to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Even the efforts of the international community to bring about peace have to date been an outright failure.

Furthermore, the politics of Libya has always been analyzed under the prism of security/insecurity issues; the region is recognized as a turbulent zone. Despite this dark picture reflected by many scholars, the recent Arab upheavals that brought the masses to the streets have not succeeded to produce outcomes that could bring scholars to paint a stable picture of the region. The mass protest that swept across 20 countries in the Arab world, which did not only topple long-lasting authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, produce civil war in Syria, Libya and Yemen, but also brought Algeria, Jordan, Morocco and Saudi Arabia to pledge political reforms and fund to pacify their populations (Korany, 2013:77). Hence, it is realized that the results of the Arab uprising differed according to places.

In this sense, regime change has been effective in some countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, but in Syria and Libya the mass protestations rather spark off civil

wars and humanitarian and immigration crises (Echevarria and Garcia- Enriquez, 2018). The truth is that the mass protests that western media have commonly labelled “Arab uprising” left the Arab world in a semi-chaotic state characterized by sociopolitical fragmentation, instability, tribal, religious, and civil wars (Korany, 2013). Libya particularly found itself in an interest and powerful race of various actors, whereby money, religions and tribal affiliation are competing with each other (Daragahi, 2012).

However, this chapter seeks to explain how the combination of some domestic and international interrelated factors prevent the reconstruction of Libya as a nation and as a state and the establishment of credible institutions that can work for all Libyan well-being. Since 2011, Libya has been encapsulated in a need for new arrangements in every aspect of governance as no attempts of the restructuring of political power and economic recovery has triumphed.

In 2015, the country came close to establishing the Morocco agreement, but the implementation of the pact has been jeopardized by illegitimacy signalled by continuous violence. One of the aims of this study is to examine the various factors and actors that constitute a hindrance to the building of national institutions in the post-Gaddafi era. The target is to ascertain that the reconstruction of national institutions constitutes one of the major challenges after the ousting of long-standing regimes, not only in Libya but also in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab spring.

Apart from the web of security challenges, Libya’s current state ten years after the tragic collapse of Gaddafi’s regime (Zoubir and Rosza, 2012:1267), is still not only deeply divided between different political factions (Warreth, 2019), but also in what direction to lead has remained contested leaving the country to a vague future. This is a result of the lack of a leading political ideology. However, it is aberrant to notice that despite the Libyan political agreement signed in Morocco in December 2015 under the auspice of the United (UN) (Haasz, 2017:3), the country still experience a significant number of casualties in 2018 and 2019 caused by armed groups and terrorist organizations.

Although scholars and analysts established that the challenges faced by the National Transitional Council (NTC) include among others ending the conflict, “avoiding the vacuum of power, and stabilizing the dire humanitarian situation” (Lacher, 2017). The report by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) revealed the populations are still plagued by terrorist threats, indiscriminate attacks on civilians

whereby the perpetrators do not distinguish between fighters, women, children and even the medical staff in Benghazi, Tarzibu, Sabha, and Tripoli (UNHCR, 2019). This is why out of this picture, the post-conflict state-building appears to be of great importance for ensuring rule of law, security and stability in a country that was under a dictatorship for forty-two years, and which has never experienced the democratic culture and where populations segments were tribalized and discriminated.

The overthrow of Gaddafi's dictatorship is part of the revolutionary wind that swept across the Middle East and the North Africa (MENA) region in 2011. Although the regional revolutions sparked the ousting of some authoritarian regimes, the root causes of the upheavals are not unanimously shared among scholars. Whether thousands of Arabs departing from Tunisia were directed towards regime change, democracy and rule of laws or turned up to be deadlocks given that those countries either delved into a bloody civil war where not only rebel forces are fighting against each other. Also, the evolution towards political and social normality is shattered by terrorist attacks as evidenced by the bomb at the national Bardo museum in Tunis that killed twenty tourists in 2015 (Esfandiari and Heideman, 2015:304).

Nevertheless, a brief look into the roots causes that gave rise to the grievances against Gaddafi's regime is examined to generate an understanding of the post-conflict security instability as well as the nature of challenges related to the future state to build. They include political fractionalization, socioeconomic and security (El Katiri, 2012).

At the political level, the exhausted Libyan intellectuals expressed one of the major concerns, about the promises of the regime to introduce democratic reforms that have remained unfulfilled. However, these concerns clashed against the interest of the hardliners who were rather suspicious about the likelihood of rapid changes that can undermine not only the political stability but also their socio-political privileges. Another focal point is that ordinary people and former revolutionaries were upset about the unwillingness of Gaddafi to change the political system.

Furthermore, the rise of his son Saif al-Islam to the head of the "popular social leadership Committees"; a position which did not give him only legislative and executive power, but Gaddafi former revolutionary were expecting to be given that position. In addition, the uncertainty about the succession of power created repelling attitudes among the collaborators among ordinary citizens (El Katiri, 2012, p. 6).

At the economic level, Libyans were pessimistic about the distributions of returns generated by the market economic reforms implemented in the 1990s, which benefited

only Gaddafi's family and friends. Meanwhile, the population is extremely young with 65% under 35 years old, with low skills workers at their access, as a result of the high rate of youth unemployment at 27% and imbalance between educational skills and the demands of the growing economy and industries led to high job expectations. Furthermore, the high rate of inflation, the increase of food and housing prices and the uneven distribution of income has only deepened the gap between the privileged and the poor. Many Libyans believe that the billions of dollars generated by the hydrocarbons can provide a living standard for them comparable to the other monarchies of the Gulf States (El Katiti, 2012, p. 8).

4.3 State-Building Challenges in The Post-War Period

Several challenges have hindered the negotiation process in Libya following the post-war period. These challenges arise as the conflict of interest between each party is manifested. Almost a decade after the end of Gaddafi's regime and there has been no generally accepted political transition structure in Libya (Joffé, 2018). Similarly, due to this lack of acceptable political transition Joffe (2018) argues that the country's security problem can be tied to the lack of unity amongst key state actors due to their conflicting interests, tribal affiliations, political disorder, and conflicting expectations.

According to Silvestri (2018), the presence of multiple political and military actors affects nation-building in Libya. These actors explain why the international attempts at the transition to a democratic government continue to fail in Libya. Similarly, the presence of war is characterized by economic turmoil, lack of essential services, and incoherent political decision, a situation that is largely present in modern-day Libya. To curb this growing menace, the UN through its 2015 Libyan Political Agreement sought to provide a lasting end to Libya's situation by forming the Government of National Accord (GNA) (Silvestri, 2018).

The GNA was formed by constructing an alliance between the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR) based in Tobruk and the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC), hence, creating the political stability necessary to produce efficient steps towards nation-building. Based on the creation of the GNA, the Presidential council would be formed under Prime Minister Fayez al-Serraj, hence, creating stronger political institutions in Libya (Silvestri, 2018).

The Presidential Council was to ensure the formation of a unity government, where the HoR conducts legislative functions and the GNC becomes an advisory institution, a replica of what was formally known as the State Council during Gaddafi's era (Silvestri, 2018). Based on this definition, it becomes easy to understand that the LPA was the ad-hoc agreement needed to transition Libya to a period of full democracy with successful elections.

The provisions of the LPA was, however, unanimously rejected by the HoR in 2016, therefore, enforcing the continuation of the two rival states in Libya, which the LPA sought to resolve. The mediation as mentioned by El-Katiri (2012) was between the governments of the East and West and this continued till 2018 when General Haftar launched an offensive against supporters of the GNC. Haftar's attacks on these cities further worsened the situation in Libya that has now exposed the country to terrorist groups in nearby towns around Benghazi. Perroux (2019) mentions that the current security threat and political instability faced by Libya has disrupted economic activities which have further disrupted attempts to establish state-building projects.

State-building is related to the (re)construction of institutions for consolidation, stabilization, and the sustainable development of states. In this sense, state-building is distinct from peacekeeping. The latter is focused on maintaining peace irrespective of whether the state apparatus is restored or not. In other words, it is the mitigation of violence in the location where the conflict is taking place.

To stop the violence and create stability in Libya, the first state building attempt was made in 2011, whereby the main opposition against the Gaddafi Transitional National Council (TNC) was declared the interim constitution in the summer of 2011. This move prepared the road map for the 2012 general elections in the country. Although there were disagreements about the composition of the interim cabinet deriving from the deep differences in political ideology, geographical, ethical, and interpersonal lines, the TNC was able to reconstitute the state parastatals and create relative security and stability by demobilizing the militias that had participated in the revolution.

The second stage was marked by the election of the parliamentarians of the General National Congress (GNC), who would be responsible for drawing up a new constitution after appointing the president. The 2012 election aimed to reinstate a democratic system in Libya that was different from the system of monarchy that the country had experienced for many years. The United Nations support mission in Libya

was responsible for the supervision of the registration of electorates. The election law was published on the website of the Electoral Commission to allow for transparency. It made provision for the representation of 200 seats from different tribes and constituencies; 120 seats were reserved for the constituency and 180 seats for the parties. However, it was declared that members of the Jamahiriya (Republic of the Masses) and relatives of Muammar Gaddafi were not granted voting rights.

One major practice that made the first transition extremely difficult were the methods that established the first national assembly. This assembly made use of a one-round nominal ballot that allowed the increased presence of individualization rather than party dependency. Since individuals were majorly representing themselves, they carried their values to the assembly which in most cases were contrasting to the values of others.

However, the first parliamentary elections were held on July 7th, 2012, which led to the beginning of the first transition on August 8th, 2012 by the National Transition Council. The transition council handed power to the National General Congress (NGC), most of which belonged to parties with a weak political structure, hence, in no time, political problems erupted, especially between the Islamists and Liberals in the first assembly. The problem in the assembly was also accompanied by issues in the East and West as well as confusion on what manner of the political system to adopt. The Islamists supported a parliamentary system whereas, the liberals wanted a presidential system, similarly, those in Tripoli supported a centralized state contrary to the federal state style that was supported by those in Cyrenaica.

The 2012 national election gave hope to Libyans that a new government could take the progress of the TNC to the next level. The turnout was 61 per cent, which represented approximately 3 million voters (Vadewalle, 2012). However, the election was marred by several forms of violence. The Tobruk government forces caused the elections to be postponed for 24 hours in several polling stations in Kufra. Benghazi polling station also faced an uprising from groups that sought independence from the country. They destroyed the terminals and polling stations to disrupt the general elections.

The violence continued in the post-election era. For instance, in September 2012, the United States (US) embassy in Benghazi was bombed by the Islamic militant group Ansar al-Sharia resulting in the killing of the US Ambassador to Libya and a Foreign Service Information Management Officer. This incident led to the reluctance

of the external actors, particularly the US and the UN, to support the transitional process in Libya (Blanchard, 2016).

In 2013, the next national election for the members of the constitutional drafting assembly was once again disrupted by conflict over the remaining tenure of the GNC. Also, the issue of legal marginalization of the former regime officials became a cause for debate, as some representatives requested the removal of such laws. The Islamic law in the Libyan legal system was also widely questioned by the secular members of the parliament.

Another striking incident in the second phase was the attempted coup by members of the GNC. This was a result of the contested plans to replace the GNC with a new House of Representatives (HoR). This created a new level of complexity in Libya and from mid-2014 onwards, Libyan politics was characterized by the outbreak of violence among political factions. The June 2014 elections, in which the turnout was only 18%, established the HoR. However, the members of the GNC rejected the election result. In consequence, the GNC's capital became Tripoli, while the HoR relocated to Tobruk and aligned with General Haftar's forces.

New parliamentary elections were held in June 2014, however, trust in the political apparatus dwindled, hence, the election recorded a turnout of 18%. The results from the election created fresh clashes across Libya, especially in Benghazi and Tripoli. This created the establishment of the HoR in Tobruk instead of Tripoli. Establishing the HoR in Tobruk even led to further problems as members of the NGC protested against this development. This led to the formation of two parliaments, two prime ministers and two governments. It could then be noticed that the initial plan of the 2014 general election as a source of state-building even made the country worse off than it was before. The internationally recognized government sits in Tobruk and the unrecognized yet armed new government sits in Tripoli. This situation, therefore, drew the interest of the UN which they sought to fix using the Skhirat Agreement.

The third attempt of the state-building was the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed on December 17, 2015, in Skhirat-Morocco under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. The goal was to bring all the conflicting sides to the table and to re-establish a Government of National Accord (GNA). In this way, it was planned that all opposing groups and factions could be united by incorporating them into the GNA (Blanchard, 2016:3).

This was supposed to be a new institutional and constitutional arrangement in Libya. The Libyan Political agreement gives executive authority to the GNA, and legislative authority to the House of Representatives (HoR). It also establishes the High Council of State, a consultative body independent of the GNA composed of former GNC members, which retains the legislative power. The new institutional settings provide that the GNA should be composed of members of opposing groups and rival post-Gaddafi elected bodies. The agreement provides that nine members of the GNC presidency council should be representatives from Libya's key regional factions and regions to take care of national security and economic decision-making.

However, the composition of the Presidency Council, the top positions in the government and approval of the agreement became a subject of debate between the two sides. The HoR proposed a cabinet procedural vote and constitutional modification procedure for the agreement. The HoR also opposed the conditions of annexing the commands of the military to the GNA's presidency council. In particular, the HoR members who supported General Khalifa Haftar in Eastern Libya contested the terms of the agreement which provided that the command of the military should be transferred to the GNC's presidency council after the ratification of the agreement.

The essence of the Skhirat Agreement is to foster unity amongst the governments in Tripoli as well as in Tobruk. To reach this aim, the GNC government was created under the support of the UN. Similarly, the Skhirat Agreement established the formation of the presidential council of the Government of National Accord. The council comprised of a nine-member executive with a mandate to form new political institutions, unfortunately, this could not be met.

According to the Skhirat Agreement, the HoR was mandated as the only legislative organ in Libya to ensure and set the foundation for a unity government, a task which the HoR could not fulfil in two years. It could not achieve this task mostly due to the numerous factions and conflicting interests amongst the members of the HoR concerning the Government of National Accord. An additional reason for the failure of the Skhirat was the numerous military turmoils and conflicts taking place in Libya whose plan was to extend their influence and connections to other parts of the country. The influence of the military forces was made evident when General Haftar in 2017 conquered many parts of Benghazi, taking ownership of a large part of the oil located in this region and the Gulf of Sirte. Through this action, Haftar grew in power in the Libyan domestic and international politics as well as in the economy.

In the same year, the armed forces supporting the GNA conquered Aziziya which belonged to the tribes of Warshefana in a bid to deter the continuous land grab and resettlement of Haftar's forces. As a consequence, tension heightened between these armed forces, mostly seeing that they were now close to each other. To deescalate tensions, numerous dialogue and peace talks proposed by the UN and other international actors has been rejected by these armed forces. Hence, creating a country of uncertainty for its inhabitants as civil war is always imminent.

An important example whereby armed forces rejected dialogue with the UN is Misrata. The representatives of Misrata accepted the Skhirat agreement, however, the Misratan community as a whole rejected the Skhirat Accord. This, therefore, brought to mind whether a different approach to state-building should be applied to armed forces, seeing the importance of individualism for armed factions. Similarly to Misrata is Haftar who continuously brands dialogue as a waste of time. Although the leader of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army, Haftar continues to pursue political ideas and his political ambition as can be witnessed in a committee created in November 2017 who submitted that over 1.2 million signatures were collected in support of Haftar's leadership over all of Libya. This figure is not only exaggerated but is also regarded as a ploy from Haftar himself concerning his political ambition.

To summarize, the Libyan Political Agreement failed for three main reasons. First of all, reaching a final political agreement in Libya and implementing it requires effective political and diplomatic efforts from external actors. This includes intensive engagement with the parties to the agreement and those who oppose the deal or have been left out of it (Lacher 2015:1). Furthermore, international actors' and institutions' roles in guaranteeing the agreement are also crucial. However, Libya has been deprived of external assistance due to various reasons. Initially, as emphasized above, the bombing of the American embassy caused external actors and mainly the US and the UN to step back from the peace process.

In this connection, a foreign presence could also become a target for extremist groups. The sensitiveness of Libyan politicians, armed groups and people to foreign influences in the country played a major role in this decision. A foreign military presence in the country could become the subject of political controversy "damaging both the GNA's standing and the implementation of the agreement as a whole" (Lacher 2015:7). In other words, the existence of foreign troops in the country could be perceived as a new neocolonial project.

Secondly, the sides in favour of the plan have a narrow support base, while the parties opposed to the agreement have a broader base. While the GNC was widely seen as being responsible for the political deadlock in the country that had led to the crisis, the HoR had been elected by less than 20% of Libya's electorate. Both groups also have significant opposition among their ranks, who pursued their interests rather than those of the group. Furthermore, some Islamist groups that had been allied with the GNC were not a party to the agreement, and the Amazigh and Tubu minorities that have substantial military forces were not adequately represented at the negotiations.

Thirdly, General Haftar and his supporters within the HoR opposed the Plan. Haftar's controversial past and ambition to rule the country as a 'single man' made him unacceptable as chief of the armed forces for almost half of active HoR members. This means that in a reunited HoR, Haftar's powers become non-existent. Similarly, many Eastern representatives of the HoR noticed that their power and influence would significantly decline in the united parliament. Lacher (2015, p. 5) added that hardliner representatives of both sides not only feared their political marginalization but also their possible prosecution for crimes committed during the 2014/15 civil war.

In consequence, after the position of the military commander was established in 2015, the HoR leadership nominated General Haftar for this position, which was immediately rejected by the GNC. Instead, the Western government comprised of former GNC members supported the agreement and defended the role of the GNA Presidency council, while they argued for the exclusion of Haftar from a future security role in Libya. This development initiated the second civil war in Libya, which has continued until the present time.

Shortly after the uprising, the Transitional National Council (TNC) made up of individuals from different horizons with different ideologies and backed by the western was formed to ensure the transition to the new system, namely a "constitutional democracy". Mustapha Abdel Jalil (Gaddafi's former minister of justice who defected when the revolution started) was president and Mahmoud Jibril as Prime minister, equating the head of the transitional government (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2013, p. 1276).

In addition, elites, former aristocrats and non-aristocrats were also part of the TNC. However, Libyan elites such as businessmen, lawyers, lecturers were not part of the current ruling elites although they worked for the country since then. It is important to note that Libyans themselves have not had a clear understanding of their identity, in

the sense that the population is highly divided among themselves. For this reason, the thesis highlights some segments of the population rather place emphasis on essentialist categories such as tribes, family, religion, regional peculiarities to define their identity, while others show endeavour to consider Libya as a whole state.

The very first challenge of state-building comes from the weakness of the Transitional National Council which led to revolution and turned into a transitional government after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. It has been stressed that the *weakness of TNC comes from the lack of legitimacy, authority and was not representative*. The lack of legitimacy was because members were not elected, while the representation deficiency results from its composition itself not of political rebels, rather than military leaders responsible for the success of the revolution.

The lack of representation stems from the fact that many of the TNC expatriates who ran away from the country in the 1980s because of the prosecution of the opposition by the Gaddafi militia and came back just when the revolution broke out. Others were officials who resigned from the Gaddafi administration Another marking point linked to the representation is that the jihadist who was Gaddafi's sworn enemy and who played a leading in toppling the regime requested more representation in the TNC.

Indeed, they led the revolution and believed in a say in the future of the country. Notably, for a conservative Sunni-Sufi society, they wanted to impose the sharia law, which should govern all the aspects of life such as the drafting of the constitution based on sharia. Consequently, this constitutes one of the focal points of the political crisis and an ideological rivalry among the member of the TNC between secular and Islamists who desire to create an Islamic state in Libya (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2013:1277). Furthermore, the TNC was divided over the differences in how to run the country (Chivvis and Martini, 2014:37). Deriving from these points, the political and administrative challenges of the state building in Libya is examined.

4.3.1 Political and administrative Challenges

The immediate challenge faced by the TNC after the fall of Gaddafi is defining a political system to draft the constitution and form a constitutional and legitimate government in a context where the transition has been turned into bloody civil war. As stressed by Sawani (2017, p. 173), the decadent political and administrative structure at the fall of Gaddafi is partly due to the incapacity of Jamahiriya to establish a viable

modern state. *Jamahiriyah* was defined as the “government of the popular masses by themselves and for themselves” (Imam and al, 2014, p. 1158). The building and existence of credible state institutions that could represent and serve the will of the masses have ever been a problem in Libya. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Gaddafi did not meet its promises to establish national institutions whereby the masses, i.e the people could be sovereign; but instead, a reportedly unbreakable authoritarian regime was put into place.

Scholars acknowledge that the centralization and personality characteristics of Gaddafi did not help the country not only to establish administrative and bureaucratic structures but also thwarted the existence of a united opposition and a strong civil society necessary for the establishment of democracy. Therefore, it is arguable that one of the major challenges of the post-Gaddafi era is the reformation of those institutions, the strengthening of a vibrant civil society to implement a democratic transition (Van Genugten, 2011:70). However, it could be agreed that the understanding of this predicament is only to be found in the days after the fall of Gaddafi but also can date back to 42 years of authoritarianism where the development of Libya’s political institutions has evolved under the shadow of Gaddafi’s ideology and worldview and his conception of governance.

The rational basis of such a perspective is questionable since it is subjected to his assumptions, oil, religion, and tribalism (Sawani, 2012:3). These are the common feature of the rentier state which defines the relationship between society and the central authority, thus hampering the development of a modern bureaucracy. The reality is that in those states, rent from oil revenues gives the state the power necessary to subjugate the population and does not need the society to function. The state is autonomous and independent of taxes collected from society. In this respect, Norton (2013:135) assumes that as far as oil flows, the state does not have the incentive to liberalize. Therefore, bureaucracy rests on the co-opting, clientelist relationship.

Another stressing challenge that constitutes a problem in the administration is the necessary detribalization of political and administrative structure; above all that 80% of the rural areas define themselves along with tribal belonging (Sawani, 2017, p. 10). Noteworthy is to highlight that in the period of Gaddafi and king Idris tribal alliances played a great role in the administration and according to some scholars, this tribal weigh on the functioning of the political structure risks to influence the future and functioning of the news institutions (Sawani, 2012, p.5). It is important to

underscore that the definition of oneself along the ethnic lines was linked to the ethnic-related specific remuneration, above all when one belongs to a privileged ethnic group. Amal Obeidi, a Libyan academician underlined in this regard that among more than 100 tribes scattered across the country, only a few of them dominated the socio-political and economic sphere (Sawani, 2017, p. 10).

Therefore, the allocation of socioeconomic resources along with ethnic lines jeopardizes the idea of the nation as a whole and the state after the civil war. Another major point is that Gaddafi's family; tribes, friends and allied tribes have overwhelmed the public administration and the senior security offices, which foster nepotism, favouritism, and corruption. Henceforth, the necessity to detribalize the political system and de-politicize ethnic groups and tribes. Concretely, it is about creating a political system with no race, tribe, and religion rather which is based only on the rule of law and merit.

After its revolutionary coup in 1969, Gaddafi replaced the existing institutions and bodies by kind of revolutionary committees deemed to control corruption and report all those considered as dissidents (Van Genugten, 2011:69). These revolutionary committees were, in fact, mechanism control, whereby civil servants could be shifted from one administrative or executive structure according to his goodwill to prevent the solidification of interest groups and particular interests.

In the political arena, it is the power competition between different political factions. This tribalism foster factionalization of the political sphere back up by militia in the post -Gaddafi era, where two governments are established and claimed a certain legitimacy (Imam and al, 2014, p. 1156). Each government has its government, parliament, and army. After chasing the parliament that was elected, in the western part of the country Islamist allied militia controls the capital Tripoli and other parts of the country. The militia in the eastern part is anti-Islamist, exiled 1200 kilometres away in the Tobruk. There is a third government led by General Khalifa Hifter, who set himself as Libya's new dictator. He is backed by the CIA and trained in the US by the CIA when he broke up with Gaddafi in the 1980s. He took part in several attempts of regime change in Libya organized by the US. He is financially and materially supported by the CIA and competing with Al-Qaeda to control Benghazi.

The constitutional development of Libya after the war started with NTC. They came up with a constitutional draft to enable them to move Libya to the desired state. The draft included the creation and election of the General National Council (GNC)

which serves as the interim legislature saddled with the responsibility of appointing the prime minister and everyone supposed to be involved in the transitional government. They were also expected to appoint a 60-man committee (constituent assembly), in the hopes of preparing a new Libyan constitution (Fedtke 2014, p. 20).

During the regime of Gaddafi, he had established what was known as 'Jamahiriya' which was a direct democracy system. This system enabled him to be the only national authority. Gaddafi was ultimately in charge of making decisions for Libya. After the overthrow of his regime, a drafted constitution was expected to be presented by the constituted assembly looking into social issues such as the identity of the nation, rights of the people, state and religion. Also, the constitution was meant to ensure that political and economic power was properly distributed which was one of the most vital concerns for the people of Libya. This led to a debate by rival groups, and they have not been able to come up with a uniform decision to date.

The absence of a unified decision has led to disputes in the GNC and has shown the fragility of nationalist parties, former rebels, and rival Islamists trying to push their political visions. Without the backing of the majority, the GNCs term ended on February 7, 2014 (Fukutomi, 2017, p. 28).

As a result, two rival governments have been dominating the Libyan state and each with its parliament. Tripoli which is the state capital of Libya is being held by an armed alliance of former rebels from Misrata city while the Islamist-leaning brigades reinstalled the former parliament and also set up their government. However, the government that is recognized from the international perspective work from East Libya (Tobruk) supported by a loose coalition of armed forces inspired by local or tribal loyalties (Fukutomi 2017:28).

In addition, public administration has experienced different changes which have affected its structure and relationship with citizens. Some of these changes can be seen in the political system of the country ranging from the Monarchical system (after the 1951 independence), Gaddafi's regime (from 1969 till 2011) and the transitional government. The monarchical administrative model was simple. However, finance and human resource shortages were inherent and could not penetrate the larger society because of this. Gaddafi's regime was more complicated. His model rested upon decentralization but in reality, was a disguise of authoritarian rule (Sawani, 2018, p. 807).

As a result of the war, formal organs have been replaced by self-appointed local councils, revolutionary bodies, the council of elders, shura bodies and army militias. In addition to this, different tribes who regained some of their lost functions have also contributed to the weak, corrupt and ineffective public administration. Even though Gaddafi claimed to be building a direct democratic system, his regime favoured clientelism and subordinate elites through centralization.

One of the problems faced by the public administration during Gaddafi's era was a completion from powerful and personal power arrangements (Mattes 2018, Cited in Sawani 2018, p. 1). The public administration was also weak and corrupted. Gaddafi claimed to establish bottom-up direct democratic governance with decentralization that is extensive while abolishing the traditional government structure. Administration heads were not selected based on merit instead on regime loyalty. The dual system of formal and informal government structure existed with the informal sector overriding the formal sector making it difficult for public administration to be effective during the era.

The formal sector was characterized by decisions that were poorly defined while the informal sector illegitimately and chaotically intervened in the government. It was chaotic because power was divided and illegitimate because it did not go in line with the formal system of democracy. There was also a high level of corruption and a lack of accountability.

However, after the fall of Gaddafi, the country is still yet to have a constitution and also a political system due to political and military division. The above-mentioned elements are the major factors needed in shaping the Libyan state. Also, due to the lack of security, the space of conflicts has been widened and it has led to the decline in the finances of the Libyan state. The production of oil and its exportation has almost become non-existent with its adverse effect on public administration and the public sector that is dominant is no more. Without adequate finances (resources converted to inflows), public administration remains ineffective.

As the debate over the relationship between the central and regional government started intensifying in the post-Gaddafi era as well as the question about the nature of the future government, the issue of federalism came at the forefront. The distribution of the oil revenues and inequalities triggered a heated debate over the federalist system of government. Federalist voices emerged mostly in the Eastern part of the country just after the fall of Gaddafi and a little later in the southern part namely

in Fezzan. The Federalist movement but have been more effective in Cyrenaica which covers the cities of Benghazi, Darnah, and Tobruk than in the Fezzan region where the federalist movement has been crashed by the local council which favours strong central unity (Jazeera, 2019).

Political analysts and commentators revealed that the knit of the federalist claims can be found at the political and socio-economical level, which turn around power struggle, the political regional representation in the central government and the unequal allocation of resources and oil revenues.

At the political level, the public opinion of the Cyrenaica region claimed the unjust distribution of the seats for their region in the country's national congress and raised the political marginalization by the government of Tripoli. In that respect, the federalist leader campaigns for greater decentralization and attempts to establish a federal council for Libya's Eastern region of Cyrenaica (called Barqa in Arabic) in spring 2012 which wanted to have its institutions such as its parliament, police, courts, and capital in Benghazi. In the vein, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC) was formed in March 2012, the Cyrenaica political bureau established, followed by the creation of a regional government in 2013 with a cabinet of 20 ministers and a self-appointed prime minister Abdrabbo al-Barassi (Aljaaziza, 2019), and the creation of the federalist National Union Party.

The inhabitant of Cyrenaica also believes that a federal system could foster regional cohesion, respect social composition and equal treatment among regions (Aljazeera, 2019). However, noteworthy is to stress that this option was even suggested by the political analyst Frederica Fasanotti, to adopt a peacebuilding strategy to the local reality where the emphasis on the tribes, family, and cities has always played a strong political role (Fasanotti, 2018). Fasanotti assumes federalism entails some degree of independence that recognizes the intrinsic diversities and shared common national resources. Thus, she is in favour of a strong decentralization as practised in Germany and the Switzerland federalist model.

This approach is also favoured by Mezran and Eljahr (2014, p. 1) and a Libyan political analyst Guma El-Gamaty (2018) who assumed that it is more productive and can help Libya to maintain a semblance of unity that could help "preserve Libya nation, secure borders, provide basic services to all citizens, revitalize national infrastructure and effectively utilize its economic resources". EL-Gamaty (2018) assume in that respect that decentralization is introduced to replace the top-down

approach of the central government approach which is likely to deconstruct and reconstruct the Libyan unity from the bottom up, paving thus the way to sustainable peace.

Contrary to what the populations of the western part believe (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014, p. 5), they did not seek to secede from the country, but to demand more autonomy (Sawani, 2018, p. 811, Chivvis and Martini, 2014, p. 39). In that respect, the statistical report by the international foundation for an electoral system in 2013 revealed that the majority of the population in Benghazi favour administrative federalism during the survey on how much federalism is supported in Libya. Thus, the federalism concerns came from the fact local regions are scared of the continued political, economic and social marginalization by the central authority as it was during the Gaddafi 'era (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014:2). It is noteworthy to remind that most of the member constituting the NTC has worked for Gaddafi and might attempt to centralize the power, thus hiding the likelihood to hide revenge velocities.

The federal system established by king Idris El- Sanusi after the independence of Libya in 1951, deemed to ensure the distribution of oil revenues which in the 1960s all over the country enjoyed a greater level of unity while allowing local and regional authorities to maintain some authorities (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014:2). This federal state united the regions of Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the south, and Tripolitania in the west and each of these regions had its government.

Sanusi started to centralize the system due to economic costs incurred, bureaucratic deficiencies and political complications in 1959, Gaddafi tracked down this system in 1969, when he took over the power. He pushed the centralization further while abolishing all forms of local governments, moving government offices, including the national oil company to Tripoli. All administrative, political and fiscal decisions in Tripoli (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014:2).

At that time, the Eastern tribes already expressed concerns about this issue, because the socio-economic conditions of the western in Tripoli were better than theirs despite the fact 80% of the oil was produced in the eastern Sirte Basin. The eastern region of Cyrenaica that was even less developed and urbanized than the region of Sirte and Tripoli stood against this strong centralization (Van Genugten, 2011:65).

At the socio-economic level, the federalist campaign for the return to the old three regions federal model under the grounds that it enables better allocation of resources and ensure the development of the eastern regions. The population of the

eastern region of Jalu reveals for example that despite the fact the region literally sits on the back of gold they are marginalized and most impoverished. In this vein, they blame oil companies, not employing local forces; they suffer from pollution due to the local oil fields and denounce the unequal distribution of oil revenues. This is why they assume federalism could be the fairest system of governance.

However, (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014:3) assume that the return to the ancient federal system is not that easy and could be fallacious given the highly divided landscape at the regional and local and ideological divide between secularists and Islamists. Also, the shift of TNC to Tripoli raised fear among easterners about the loss of the revolution that has started in Benghazi and that there is a continuation of an abuse of their rights. Judging from this discussion, one of the challenges faced by future Libya is to separate the conflict between Federalists and non-federalist which is not going on without violence affecting the political and economic construction of the state. The debate over federalism is tinted by the fear of most of the western populations which perceive the federalist agenda as a way to break away and take control of the most eastern resources.

This scepticism brought physical and political clashes against federalist protesters which prompt them to retaliate either by taking up arms or control of oil facilities, thus feeding another hotbed of violence. This can be exemplified by the actions taken by Jadhran the leader of the petroleum facilities guards in the central region who blockade Libya's main oil facilities and try to sell oil illegally. These illicit oil transactions have been unveiled by the US navy seal which pushed the UN security council to vote a resolution sanctioning the illegal sale of the Libya oil and the international community to send a clear message to the federalists to warn them about the dangers of making such moves (Mezran and Eljahr, 2014:4, Aljazeera, 2019).

Another challenge faced by the future state is the difficulty of federalists to speak with one voice. They disagree over an issue such as the extent of power devolution as well as the geographical distribution of jurisdiction over regions. Furthermore, tribal and communal rivalries prevent the federalists to have determined leadership, coherent strategies on how to integrate a federal agenda into a nationwide framework.

Scholars acknowledge that democratization processes in post-conflict societies in the Middle East have not been an easy enterprise. In Libya, democracy transition is a real challenge steered up between a country that has never experienced a modern

form of government, a democracy concept made up in the western thinking laboratories and a lack of security and democracy supporting structures.

It should be noticed from the outset even today modern liberal democracies took hundred years to construct what they call today democracy and federalism. It passed through several processes over history and emerged out the needs of a certain type of society to implement it, to solve the problems related to society. Even Tunisia which is considered as a successful democratic transition should cope with a terrorist is not that peaceful as advocates by the peace democracy theorist, given that it should still cope with terrorist violence and extremism.

In Libya, the challenge stems from “the weakness of the state and its inability to support democratic transition institutionally and socially” but also to the emerging powers which do not have incentives to establish democratic structures and lastly due to the weakness of civil society (Boose, 2012, p. 313). Nevertheless, to explain these state deficiencies some analysts emphasize security, conflictual situation, the proliferation of militias, the economic crisis which block the state capacity to stabilize the economy and revitalize state institutions (“Elections in Libya: challenges to democratic choice, security and political stability”, 2019). Van Genugten also emphasizes the ideological composition of the TNC which in principle should be considered as the starting point to initiate a democratic process, is rather the source of division in the political scene. The TNC is made up of religious conservatives, liberals and social democrats (Van Genugten, 2011:64).

Likewise, they should also take to account the diversity of the revolutionaries which are highly divided and suffer from a lack of a shared ideology. The fault lines of divisions include those who benefitted from the regime and those who were marginalized, those who defected and those who stayed, the technocrats and Islamists, the army generals as well as civilians (Wehrey, 2016). At this level, the challenge is to find a balance between pluralism and democracy, prevent the opposition to degenerate into infighting by finding ways these divides that the TNC showed to be unable to achieve (Van Genugten, 2011:67).

Another point worth highlighting is the various abuses, human rights violations, the legacy of mental and physical repression that remained lively in the memories of the oppressed. Here also, specific measures need to be taken to avoid the risk of revenge. Van Genugten (2011, p. 67) assumes that reconciliation and trust seem difficult. Noteworthy is to underscore that Paris (1997, p. 58) ascertains that the

imposition and implementation of a liberal democratic form of government are destabilizing for post-conflict societies. This is due to the inherent competitive character of political and economic liberalism and the war-torn societies which do not possess adequate modern structures to deal with the competition. He backed up his analysis with the case studies of the electoral arrangements in eight countries which shows enough that elections straightforward after the conflict is irrelevant, given that after the elections violence resume in these countries as exemplified in El Salvador, Cambodia and Rwanda, incurring a considerable number of casualties.

Similarly, the same fate was experienced in Libya, whereby the three electoral experiences which gave birth to three distinct institutions namely the general national congress (GNC), the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA), and the House of Representatives (HoR) has not prevented the resumption of violence as civil war erupted in 2013 ("Elections in Libya: challenges to democratic choice, security and political stability", 2019). The said elections unfolded in an environment characterized by armed federalist and tribal fighting in the west and south and rising extremist violence in the East (Wehrey, 2016). Even one of the former senior UN official in Libya admitted that rushing the elections was a grave mistake for a country that has no experience of democratic processes and which has in that respect never held national voting for more than half of century (Wehrey, 2016). In that respect, there is no need to remind Libya's system of government since independence.

Likewise, the research of Brancati and Snyder of the post-conflict societies since the end of the Second World War established that rushing to the polls after conflict entails a high risk of relapse into the war (Brancati & Snyder, 2011). They assume that after civil wars, there is no rule of law and those who compete for power are the same who were involved in the fightings. Likewise, political factions are formed along ethnic, tribal and religious lines which are the basis on which candidates resort to rallying their supporters (Brancati & Snyder, 2019). Most of the time they contest the results of elections, henceforth the resumption of violence when the wary parties are not yet disarmed and demobilized.

Additionally, apart from the prevailing insecurity which can prevent and disturb the electoral processes in some parts of the countries such as Derna in the East, and Sirte, the electoral experience reveals that it is rather a factor of division than a demonstration of pluralism as stipulated in democratic principles. Libya democratic transition evolved rather into political chaos, whereby political leaders have a clear

problem with the concept of transition and also show a certain attachment to the power, defence of interests and the reciprocal refusal of institutions to recognize each other. Analyst comment in that respect that the GNC elected on 7th July 2012 under the auspices of the UN has only contributed to exacerbating the political divide within the country by refusing to step down after the official expiration of its term of office and hand over office to the HoR considered as the legislative body. Finally, they became the two competing institutions during the elections organized in 2014, after which the HoR ruled in the city of Tobruk in the east and the GNC governed in Tripoli.

Democratic challenges can also come from the failure of the international community to effectively deal with the political post-conflict environment. The UN Memo envisions, the well-planned democracy transitions whose operationalization, unfortunately, did not match the reality on the ground. UN democracy transition process revealed to be too optimistic for a fragmented post-conflict society like Libya. The UN ambitious plan prescribes a two-stage of the democratic transition process. The first period is deemed to establish “political preconditions” for elections. These pre-conditions include the establishment of the public force, the building of public trust based on a policy of impartiality and the election of a provisional national council within six months to write a constitution. The second period is deemed to last six months and is dedicated to the establishment of Libya’s new electoral machinery with the help of the UN (Brancati & Snyder, 2011).

However, after the fall of Gaddafi, Libya was recognized by many scholars as a failed state lacking credible institutions to trigger democratic processes (Boose, 2012:313, Imam, 2104:1156). In that respect, one of the members of the CDA reveals that one of the major obstacles is the absence of any clear cut legislative framework to legitimate the tenure of elections. Thus, there is no government, constitution, political parties, and active civil society. Because of institutional weakness that is the basis of the current state, Libya first need is to build its state before implementing democracy. The new government does not control the political, economic or security rather have these sectors have been taken over by the armed groups and militias (Boose, 2012:314).

Additionally, the post-conflict Libya has inherited the lack of vibrant civil society of the Gaddafi era and many experts considered the revolution as the result of a domino effect stemming from the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt. Even for attesting to how the civil society is inexistent, notably, the revolutionaries succeeded only due

to the NATO intervention; otherwise, Gaddafi's would have crushed down the protesters (Boose, 2012:314). Against this background, the problem is the found mechanisms to trigger the democratic process in a stateless society, which is less likely to happen.

Despite the peacebuilding failure in Angola in 1992, in Cambodia in the 1990s, in Liberia in 1997 and Bosnia in 1995, the UN has drawn lessons but was unable to apply them in Libya, while repeating the same mistakes (Paris and Sisk, 2015:303). They plan their mandates for a short period and focus on strengthening the institutions which even lack legitimacy while neglecting the governance aspect which is one of the major social ills in war-torn states (Paris and Sisk, 2015:303).

The solutions that the UN has tried to bring out to sort out this political stalemate have all failed. For information, the agreement signed in December 2015 under the UN, aiming at reunifying the two governments rather led to the emergence of new political institutions such as the Presidential council composed of nine members and headed by Fayez AL-Sarraj. It should be noticed that authority of this institution was not recognized by the HoR, which prefers an alliance with the Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libya National Army.

The literature on the Gaddafi regime acknowledges that Libyans did not experience the 'modern form of democracy. Gaddafi ruled the country as a traditional chef, to whom all the members of the society should show allegiance. It was an authoritarian system grounded on the personality cult despite always claiming to practice a republican model of direct democracy. However, considering Gaddafi's conception of democracy, they rather have the impression that he did not a clear idea of what he wanted to hold as direct democracy. Thus, after tracking down all forms of opposition, which is the expression of the diversity of opinions and ideology in a well-functioning liberal democratic system. The members of the opposition groups such as secular republicans, political Islamists namely the Muslim brotherhood, the secularist and republican National salvation front were killed, imprisoned, sentenced and public or simply disappeared (Van Genugten, 2011:66).

Gaddafi had turned society into an experienced laboratory to experiment with his ideas (Van Genugten, 2011:69). It appears that Gaddafi has blurred the Libyan with his conception of direct democracy, which rather hid a strong centralization system, whereby it was difficult to separate tribe from politic and Gaddafi's tribe and family at the top of the chain of command. Thus, the issue at the stake is to trigger a

democratic process, which could reconcile “tradition and modernity and not impose the ‘modern’ democracy on Libya.

Another basic question that needs to be asked is that are the Libyans democratically ready? Since the fall of Gaddafi, is the country still struggling to have a stable government? It should be remembered that one important element of a democratic system is a system that has one unitary government and as it is now, Libya has two governments present in the state; one in the east (Tripoli) and another in the west (Tobruk) as earlier mentioned. The government based in the east is the one recognized by the United Nations (UN). Almost half of the Libyan state is being controlled by the Libyan National Army leader Khalifa Haftar in the east.

Moving from an authoritarian system to a democratic system is not an easy or direct task to carry out as it entails that some processes should be in place which is referred to as processes of democratization. Democratization can be referred to as the process of transition from a system that is non-democratic to a system that is democratic which does not only have the characteristics of free elections but also includes rule of law, a vibrant civil society, separation of powers which includes an independent judiciary, and largely supported by state institutions and a culture that is democratic (El-gamaty, 2016).

Some basic factors that stop democratization from taking place in Libya and are lack of basic state and institutional building, tribalism, a non-democratic culture that is either weak or non-existent, and a weak civil society. Another major factor that contributes to this is the rentier economic system that Libya runs. By rentier economy, it means that Libya gets money from trading its natural resources while it spends the larger amount gotten on the people. E.g. to pay salaries. These factors are not only peculiar to Libya alone. For any economy that lacks these basic factors, it sure impedes its democratic process. The lack of a formal institution and political structure that is clear has stalled the democratization building process. Also, Libyans see themselves through the tribal lens rather than seeing themselves as a whole country. This has also contributed to the impediment to democratization in Libya. A democratic culture involves living by democratic values, norms and practices by educating its citizens (El-gamaty, 2016).

4.3.2 Tribal Challenges in Post-Gaddafi Era

It is a generally believed fact that tribal structure was an evident concept during the 2011 uprising in Libya. While the reason for Libyan participation in the uprising was not tribal influenced, the tribes were regarded as the dominating factor of the revolutionaries against Gaddafi. Most importantly, the support gotten from the Cyrenaica's tribes provided popularity and general acceptance to the rebels. Similarly, through the tribal structure, networking was popular amongst young people, through which Libya's revolution was made possible. Hence, tribes were influential in ensuring the success of the 2011 Uprising.

As a result of the authority and importance accrued to tribes, a majority of these tribal leaders expressed their opposition to Gaddafi openly, therefore, motivating the followers to do the same and engage in the revolution. Similarly, there was cooperation between people from different tribes during the uprising, a notable example being the al-Zawy and Tebu tribes of al-Kufrah as well as the Arab and Amazigh tribe of Tripolitania who joined hands in participating in the revolution. efforts.

As highlighted in the previous chapter, Gaddafi exploited the disunity amongst the tribes to consolidate his regime, however, a majority of Libyan tribes mostly aligned their interest with that of the country, especially those tribes that were less favoured by Gaddafi. For this reason, the revolution provided them with an opportunity to ensure that Gaddafi is thrown out of power which brings a lasting benefit to the country but also to the tribe. It is pertinent to note that the various tribes in Libya were revered in various facets of the society, hence, explained below are various instances wherein the tribes sought to control and maintain political power in the post-Gaddafi era.

Smaller tribes in Libya such as the Tebu, Amazigh, and the Tuareg tribes vehemently opposed the draft Constitution of the first Assembly as their demands were not met. These tribes accused the HoR of sidelining them during the transition process, hence, making policies that were not particularly advantageous to them. This, therefore, highlights the lack of inclusivity in the first transition process, hence, the tribes were a major reason why the process stopped.

It must be noted that the Tebu and Tuareg tribes were not granted equal citizenship rights as other Libyan tribes since they are viewed as minorities, however, this did not deter them from rejecting the non-inclusive constitutional draft of 2013. Judging from the influence of the tribe during the uprising, it is unwise to think that

tribes, no matter how small are not important in state-building. This explains why inclusivity is important, so no tribe feels left behind, especially if it is an installation of a new system as was in Libya during the first transition.

Similarly, in the case of Libya, it is impossible to achieve healthy state-building without the inclusion of tribes, especially seeing the importance that citizens give to tribes. Tribes exhibit a nationalist position that the state cannot fill, therefore, tribal leaders enjoy charismatic authority that is useful in sustaining, maintaining and keeping the tribes together. Additionally, in Libya, due to the position of tribes, it could be expected that any approach to peace, is gainfully supported by the citizens, provided such approaches are initiated by the tribes. Hence, legitimizing that peace approach for all citizens accordingly.

Another method where tribes are important is through the Council of Elders and the authority that they exert on the socio-political atmosphere of the country. These elders are influential in providing reconciliation, negotiation, mediation, arbitration and even judicial organization of Libyans. Since a general means of resolving conflict in Libya is through mediation, therefore, the Council of Elders are usually branded as an efficient tool in ensuring this form of a local organization and conflict management.

Tribal loyalty is another influential discussion that if explored properly may be used as a means to ensure state-building measures. A majority of tribes in Libya are against radical Islamic groups and ideologies, hence, they may be a useful organ in combatting ISIS and other forms of Islamic extremism. In this regard, the Cyrenaica tribe has in the past supported military forces with human power and resources to fight against Islamic extremists in Benghazi as well as in Derna.

There are instances where conflicts within the tribes created an avenue for social strife which affected state-building in Libya. For example, the conflict between the Zintan and Meshashya tribes of the Nafusa Mountains, where the Meshashya was accused of aiding Gaddafi in attacking the Zintan community during the revolution. The accusation, however, got violent and in no time a full-blown conflict erupted, leading to thousands being displaced, lives lost, and properties burnt. Attempts by successive governments to restore normalcy to this region was met with great opposition from both tribes, however, a peace deal was reached when a delegation of over 12 tribal leaders all over Libya created a mediation party that signed a peace deal on 18 May 2017 between both communities. These further highlights that tribes may in most instances listen to other tribes rather than the government or state institution.

Another example of how tribes can influence state-building in Libya is drawn from the Tebu and Tuareg tribes in Southern Libya. These are minority tribes that got into a series of clashes following the end of Gaddafi's regime. As these countries were closer to other parts of Africa, the major source of income for them was smuggling, hence, they struggled to smuggle goods through their region to other parts of Libya where the population density is higher. Additionally, following the end of Gaddafi's regime, the instability in Libya further worsened the economic condition of these places, hence, smuggling was seen as the main source of income for them. In this regard, these communities were fighting over smuggling routes as they both sort to control the routes.

The conflict resulted in a full-scale violent fight in September 2014 which lasted for over a year, killing hundreds, destroying towns and displacing thousands. Normalcy managed to be restored in Qatar in 2015 amongst elders of the tribes, however, there are still instances where various forms of confrontations are recorded amongst these societies, all dampening state-building attempts.

The position of the tribe in Libya is a major determinant factor in whether or not state-building arrangements is observed, supported, held, or respected. The situation even becomes tougher if attempts at state-building sideline these tribes or conflict with the needs and expectations of any tribe, especially dominant tribes. An example is the towns of Misrata and al-Zintan who struggled to control Libya's capital city of Tripoli after the uprising. They both understood the importance of Tripoli, highlighting that whoever controlled Tripoli, controlled Libya, hence, confrontations and hostile interaction were frequently recorded in these places. However, as both societies got violent, the usage of armed forces was introduced, leading to large scale conflict and constant security threats in Tripoli and its environs.

As mentioned in the last example, the conflicts between Misrata and al-Zintan community, although not purely tribal was influenced by the tribal chiefs of both communities who sought to expand their influence and resources to other parts of the country. When a single community gained ownership of Tripoli, which was Misrata in this case, the tribal chiefs of other communities in other to avoid relapse to conflict met to discuss a viable means of maintaining long term peace. Hence, drawing the understanding that if tribes are cooperative to state-building measures, Libya would to a greater extent construct a democratic structure with strong state institutions.

4.3.3 Economic Challenges in Post-2011 Era

The fall of the Gaddafi regime when Libya's liberation is celebrated on October 23, 2011, was hailed as a new start for Libya. Constitutional Declaration issued by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in August 2011, which initiated a strict roadmap for national elections, the establishment of a new transitional government and the preparation and approval of a new constitution. These developments were welcomed with enthusiasm not only by the Libyan people but also by the international community, especially by countries that were a part of the military intervention. This first stage was marked by the widespread belief that Libya could move on from war to peace and dictatorship to democracy without foreign actors, despite their fundamental role in the fall of the regime. Explained below are the various challenges to state-building faced by Libya about economy and tribe.

The Libyan civil war has considerably affected the socio-economic situation of the population, which has always been assisted by the welfare state system. It is evident that the fall in the production of oil, which is considered the main contributor to the GDP, is a great loss for the Libyan government. Indeed, it has been evident that in 2010, oil contributed to “54%” of the total GDP and “83%” of the government revenues (Echavarria and Garcia-Enriquez, 2012, p. 2). This enables the Gaddafi administration to offer the Libyans a living standard that is approximately closer to that of some western countries. With the oil revenues, Libya was considered the richest country in North Africa with a GDP per capita of 29,173, a human development index of 0.76 and a life expectancy of 71.74 at birth. Server (2011:2) similarly acknowledge that the per capita income before the war was high for a value of 15000 dollars in 2010.

Thus, the welfare system that allowed accessing free education, free health care and financial aid for housing collapsed with the end of the Gaddafi regime (Iman and al, 2015:1158). The ongoing insecurity environment is leading to discolourization. Haasz (2017:7) ascertains that many children do not have access to education because schools are destroyed, schoolbooks are lacking and displaced children cannot go to school. Besides, many universities closed down in the eastern part of the country (Iman and al, 2015:1157). Nevertheless, it appears that the challenges in this sector are only to secure access to education, but also to reform and rewrite the whole education curriculum by a team of 160 Libyan experts, to replace Gaddafi's educational system which according to some analysts and educational experts was perverted (Duncan and Werman, 2001).

Mohammed Sawi, the director of the National Curriculum assumes that this task passes through the eradication of the subjects such as “Al-Mujtama Al-Jamahiriya, the study of the green book” (Duncan and Werner, 2011). According to one of the experts Hatem Mhenni, the geographical maps were deemed to confuse rather than to inform students and history was written to glorify the Gaddafi regime. Concerning the gender issue, limitations to women rights and gender equality that were promoted by Gaddafi fade away. They were having access to education as well as men, they can divorce and hold property. However, the insecure environment has given a room on the one hand to Islamist extremist groups that perceive gender equality as a western perversion and on the other side, the establishment of a strong patriarchal new ruling elite jeopardizes women rights (Imam and al, 2015:1158).

In the sector of health, there is a need to secure the medical staff and health infrastructures. The report by the UNSMIL documented that Tripoli and Benghazi there are attacking armed groups. This is evident by the attack on an orthopaedic consultant in the Sabha medical hospital on 3 November 2018 and on the 4 November 2018, the attack of the al-Jalaa hospital for women and childbirth in Tripoli, where attackers shot and injured a doctor and threaten the safety of the medical staff. In addition, the fire was opened in the intensive Unit in Jalla hospital in Benghazi by armed men on 26 December caused fear among medical personnel (“Human Rights Report On Civilian Casualties 1 November through 31 December 2018”, 2019).

Socio-economic developmental factors such as industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education all contribute meaningfully to the growth of a nation (Lipset 1959:80, Cited in Perroux, 2019: pp. 206-207). Looking at the leading nations of the world such as China, the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany, it is observed that they are highly industrialized. Industrialization allows for more employment to occur.

When people are employed, they have the resources to provide for themselves and the family which makes way for a stable society because they can meet their basic needs of life. However, this cannot occur yet in Libya because it is not yet a peaceful or stable country. Also, a person who is educated and economically stable is provided with a higher opportunity to engage in civil life, and request for human rights, transparency and accountability (Lipset 1994, Cited in Perroux, 2019, p. 207). In 2009 and 2010, according to a survey by World Economic Forum, Libya was ranked 138 out of 139 countries in educational system quality. Also, Libya was ranked 129th for internet access in schools and 134th for research and training services availability.

Furthermore, because of the lack of socio-economic opportunities, it becomes very difficult to demobilize the fighters to build a securitized Libya because they are not just concerned about their ideologies; they are also concerned about their living conditions. Stopping the fighters in Libya translates to providing a stable standard of living by the government or the international community (Perroux, 2019, p. 207). A survey carried out from 2011 to 2015 by the Libyan Programme for Reintegration and Development, showed that 41% and 65% among former combatants and present members of the militia were currently unemployed and without university education respectively. This means offering relevant opportunities can help solve the fight in Libya (LPRD, 2015).

Libya is known for oil and in Africa; it has the fourth-largest proven gas reserves. In 2006, the World Bank estimated that this sector represented 97 per cent of exports of goods and non-factor services (76 per cent of GDP), and 93 per cent of government revenues (World Bank 2006 Cited in Perroux 2019: 208). After the war, Libya started to produce oil again which enabled them to avoid post-conflict problems that societies usually have. They were able to pay salaries to numerous groups which included the militias and were also able to fund reconstruction within the Libyan state.

However, when Libya's oil facilities were taken over by armed groups in the summer of 2013, the stability of Libya's economy was affected (Imam, Abba & Wader 2014, p. 1162). When the main revenue source of a country is affected, it's evident that the country continues to struggle economically until a solution is found. Even if such a country decides to diversify its economy based on other resources at hand, there is every need for the country to be business-friendly, which as of now, Libya is not a business-friendly environment that is why it lacks investment.

It should be noted that Libya until 2011 was a country with higher GDP per capita compared to other North Africa Neighbouring countries. With such perception, the people were expected to have access to good and affordable healthcare services and education. However, this was not the reality on the ground because corruption and economic inequality (inequitable distribution of wealth) were prevalent in Libya. The national statistics did not show the living standard of the Libyan people. The reason for Libya's higher GDP per Capita among other MENA countries was because the population was 6.5 million as of 2011. This means that they had enough resources to take care of everyone, but this was not so.

Even though Libya had a large GDP compared to other MENA countries, its wealth was concentrated in the hand of the few favouring Gaddafi's loyalists. Because Libya was largely dependent on oil, it could not provide enough employment needed for the Libyan people and this led to underemployment of the people in Libya within the age range of 15 to 24 in 2012. According to World Bank, the total level of unemployment in Libya was the highest in 2011 compared to other MENA countries. Another factor that contributed to the unemployment in Libya is the absence of the private sector. A study carried out in 2012 by IMF showed that 80% of the labour force in Libya was employed by the public sector. This is quite alarming because this means that if the government of Libya breaks down which it eventually did, then the productivity of the Libyan people also goes down with it, a perfect realization of today's Libya.

In addition to the problems stated above, Libya is also experiencing oil problems and fiscal challenges. As a result of the conflicts and instability, the fiscal and reserve positions of Libya have been weakened. Since 2011, the revenue derived from the sales of oil and natural gas has been used to support up to 97% of the government fiscal revenue (Blanchard 2018: 14). In 2015, the budget deficit that was estimated was 49% of GDP while in 2016; the budget deficit was higher due to low production of oil that resulted in the decrease in budget revenues and proceeds from export. Budget revenues and export proceeds reached their lowest amount on record (World Bank 2017 Cited in Blanchard 2018: 12).

Furthermore, as a result of conflicts and shortfalls of the budget, the production of oil fell below 300,000 barrels per day (BPD) instead of a total capacity of 1.6 million barrels per day (BPD) (IMF 2014 & Raghavan 2016, Cited in Blanchard 2018: 12). According to statistics by World Bank/IMF, and estimates of the UN, the reserves of the foreign exchange of Libya have fallen drastically from \$124 billion in 2012 to \$45 billion by 2017 ending (IMF 2016, Cited in Blanchard 2018: 12).

In 2017, as a result of oil expansion production in Libya, the production capacity got back to 900 BPD. At the end of December 2017, domestic production got to 1 million BPD (El Wardany 2017 Cited in Blanchard 2018: 13). Even though the revenue in Libya has fallen since 2011, there is still the need to pay salaries. Also, public spending on imports and subsidies has increased. As of September 2016, salaries and subsidies were 93% of the state budget (Blanchard 2018:13).

4.4 The Role of External Actors in Post- Gaddafi Libya

External involvement has been present in Libya for a while. From the international perspective, a fall in Gaddafi's regime would have meant that the rebels were organized, trained, and experienced. However, this was not the case. Libya has been a global player even before oil was discovered in the region. In the year 1943, a major part of Libya came under the control of the administration of the British Military. Shortly after the war, Britain, France, and Italy wanted to control a portion of Libya either for reasons that are strategic or prestigious (Van Genugten, 2011).

Gaddafi justified his coup by promising Libyans that he came to bring them true independence that was free from external control. Even at that, he could not shake off influence from the west completely. Gaddafi asked that the military base of the British and Americans in Libya be evacuated. Also, the Italian community was expelled in 1970 but Gaddafi's regime still maintained a relationship with them because of the Italian Oil and Gas group called ENI. However, the relationship was less conspicuous. When it comes to foreign forces, Libyans are sceptical because of the distrust they have about foreign intervention. As a result of the generating revenue mechanism of the Libyan economy, which is oil and gas, it becomes extremely difficult for the Libyans to withstand external pressure for long (Van Genugten, 2011).

As earlier stated, in October 2011, Libya's civil war ended. However, they were faced with the challenge of building a new country for themselves. The intervention of the Military was termed special. However, one of the most vital things that were not present was that the peacekeeping forces were not deployed by international actors for post-conflict purposes. The foreign actors used a lighter post-war footprint strategy than that of the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan interventions (Chivvis et al., 2012).

During the Libyan crisis, the US limited its contribution to that which they were specialized in so that other allies could take the lead from a different perspective. Since after the war, the US has maintained a low profile. This is because of the new authorities of the Libyan keeping forces. Libyan economy was much more concerned about their fragile legitimacy and therefore requested that foreign involvement be minimal. The immediate post-war situation was also calmer than in other cases in history, so the international community did not need to deploy peace forces. In addition, deploying foreign advisors in large numbers might overwhelm the governmental capacities of the fragile new Libyan state (Chivvis et al., 2012).

4.4.1 The Role of NATO in Post-Gaddafi Era

The role of NATO in Libya has caused great debate around the world, especially in the field of international intervention. NATO, under the pretext of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and regime change, entered Libya to ensure easy transition as well as an establishment of democracy in the country. To understand the role of NATO in Libya, it is firstly important to highlight the context of R2p.

R2P was a concept developed at the 2005 United Nations World Summit meeting which is defined as:

“Each state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity . . . We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it . . . The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council... should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (UN, 2005).

NATO’s intervention into Libya based on the R2P has been argued to have been ineffective, especially following the constant abuse and torture meted to Libyans in the country by rebels. Reports from the UN shows that NATO may have squarely combatted Gaddafi’s regime military, however, they performed poorly in the protection of citizens. Hence, intervening in NATO seems like an avenue for western imperialism and not necessarily for humanitarian purposes. Similarly, the majority of the attacks experienced by citizens were conducted by rebel groups who had the support of the US as an element for regime change, therefore, NATO by proxy of relationship could not engage these rebel groups in a military confrontation.

NATO’s failure to protect civilians under the R2P was further made public when Ms Slaughter who was the former policy planning director for Hillary Clinton was quoted stating that “we did not try to protect civilians on Gaddafi’s side” (Becker and Shane, 2016). Therefore, inferring the biased attitude through which NATO’s operation in Libya was conducted. Based on the R2P principle, there is no room for discrimination, so mentioning that civilians on Gaddafi’s side were not protected

provided an insight that this operation may just have been a witch-hunting operation targetted at Gaddafi and his regime.

NATO's leverage into entering Libya was based on widely circulated reports of human rights abuse, Gaddafi's repressive measures on fighting the uprising and regime war on civilians, hence, NATO justified its entry into Libya based on human rights protection. Following the actions from NATO in Libya concerning civilian protection and forming alliances with rebel groups that are also engaged in abusing civilians, NATO's reason for entering Libya became fully questionable. Similarly, the majority of the reports circulated as proof for widespread civilian massacres were shown to be false, therefore, proving a replica of what was obtained from the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Another reason that illustrated NATO's selfish aims in Libya was the refusal of NATO to agree to a ceasefire that was proposed by Gaddafi's regime. Hence, showing that NATO's interest was not entirely for civilian protection but a complete regime change. Regime change may be needed to install a regime that better aligns with the policies and principles of the strong power or to establish a regime that could be easily influenced by foreign powers.

NATO vehemently rejected this ceasefire, although it would have saved civilians from the attacks that NATO under R2P sought to save them from. Hillary Clinton who was then Secretary of State stated that "We believe, too, that there needs to be a transition that reflects the will of the Libyan people and the departure of Gaddafi from power and Libya". Therefore, explaining that the basis for NATO's intervention was not for humanitarian intervention as promised but was for regime change.

To highlight how the interest of international powers may hinder the state-building process, it is pertinent to understand the policies of the big powers towards smaller weaker nations. The context of R2P by NATO has been accused to have been influenced by US imperialism as it intends to control Libya's oil. Having created the Africa Oil Policy Initiative Group (AOPIG) in 2002, the US established a principle calling African oil a priority for US national security and African development (Garrett, Mariano & Sanderson, 2010, p. 25). In the same manner, the US established the United States military's Africa Command (AFRICOM) which outlined the usage of military forces in Africa to further promote US influence in Africa. Therefore, it could be argued that the refusal to accept Gaddafi's offer of a ceasefire was to ensure control over Libya's oil.

Based on official sources, the main aim of AFRICOM is 'diplomacy, development, defence', however, Forte (2013, p. 190) argues that AFRICOM's mission is '*infiltrate, enlist and expropriate*'. A principle that can be deduced following NATO's influence in Libya is the desire to strictly change the regime rather than protect civilians. Additionally, Gaddafi has been increasingly pessimistic about Western leaders as highlighted in the previous chapter, therefore, Western leaders understood that a change of regime in Libya would be beneficial for their foreign policies in the country as well as in the region.

Similarly, concerning oil production, Libya's oil production was at a staggering 1.6 million barrels a day before the intervention of NATO. This level of production increased Africa's oil reserve, a resource that the US would want to have control of. Therefore, NATO wasted no time in entering Libya, even though they did not enter Syria with a higher humanitarian concern.

On February 16, 2011, fighting broke out in Libya's second-biggest city, Benghazi. One day after, the conflict was witnessed in other cities. Previously in the media, it was announced that many individuals were killed by Libyan security powers. On February 20, 2011, shows came to the capital city of Libya, Tripoli. At this point, the exhibit started to be more cataclysmic for the Libyan state.

The explanation is that the resistance power who came to Tripoli started to conflict with powers faithful to Gaddafi. Then again, February 20 turned into the primary day that Gaddafi started to lose his partners when Libya's Arab League agent, Abdel Moneim al-Houni surrendered. At that point on February 21, Chief of State of Protocol Nuri al-Mismari and Ambassador to India, Ali al-Essawi, Ambassador to the U.S., Ali Adjali, insides Minister Abdel Fattah Younes al Abidi surrendered. This is a significant point that is important to be referenced is that these individuals started to guarantee against Gaddafi powers and his administration right on time after they surrendered.

On February, 25, an external force started to take part in the Libyan civil conflict. The principal assault came from U.S. President Barack Obama for freezing Gaddafi's resources. Following this, the U.N Security Council forces sanctions against Libya that incorporates an arms ban and resource freezes. The principal guarantee for wrongdoings against humankind in Libya came from U.N around the same time. Soon after monumental endorses by U.N, European Union cast a ballot to force sanctions against Libya that additionally included freezing Gaddafi's resources and forcing an

arms ban. On March 7, 2011, military mediation of external force, started in the Libyan area.

NATO started a 24-hour observation of Libya. The principal up close and personal gathering of external forces with resistance powers were also conducted. Mahmoud Jebril and Ali Assawi, addressing the Libyan resistance met with French President, Nicholas Sarkozy. On March 17, The UN Security chamber cast a ballot to force restricted air space over Libya. On March 19, French warrior jets started upholding the restricted air space over Libya. On April 30, NATO dispatched a rocket assault on a house in Tripoli. This assault murdered Gaddafi's youngest child, Saif al-Arab, and three grandkids.

Until May 2011, the conflict between defiance powers and Libyan security powers was kept going by the immediate support of external forces. On May 11, Gaddafi showed up on the state TV and he asserted that he was set up where he was unable to be found or slaughtered. This activity and cases of Gaddafi were viewed as incitement by disobedience powers and foreign forces. Following this, on May 16, the central investigator of the International Criminal Court mentioned capture warrants for Gaddafi, his child Saif and his brother by marriage.

On June 1, NATO broadened its main goal in Libya for an additional 90 days. Around the same time, the U.N. Common freedoms Council reported that proof of war violations and wrongdoings against mankind carried out by Gaddafi's powers had been found. On October 20, Moammar Gaddafi was slaughtered after being caught by rebel powers in his old neighbourhood Sirte. The activities of Gaddafi powers in Libya had been gone on until October 31 when the NATO secretary-general declares the authority end of the NATO mission in Libya. Finally, on November 19, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was captured and the Libyan common conflict completely wrapped up.

Realities and Claims on Role of External Actors during the Libyan Civil War after murdering of bunches of individuals and expanding pressure in Libya, on 21 February 2011, the UN announced to scold the Libyan system. The Western world contended that Gaddafi began to violently attack protesters. Most of the old technocrats who were Gaddafi's partners before changed their situation from Gaddafi's side to opposition parties

Robin (2011) who is Director General of Libyan-British Business Council, in February during the common conflict, in his discourse said that "our contacts have consistently gone past the Gaddafi system and incorporate a portion of the key figures who are

currently framing the core of an elective government in Benghazi; Our contacts have empowered us to keep in direct touch with advancements in Libya over the most recent fourteen days and when the residue settles, we plan an early visit to the nation to draw in and grow our organization". He brought up British or progressives association inside Libyan lines that caused them for their objectives.

Similarly, according to Nzemroaya (2011), the foreign intervention, as well as local uprising in Libya, was not a uniform one as each country and individual had their interest in Libya. These gatherings comprised of individuals who were against system and opposition development, and individuals who were just against the system. These insubordination bunches were coordinated by both the external Libyan area and inside the actual system. This insubordination development was coordinated and upheld by long-range informal communication sides, global media and past occasions experienced in different nations under the shadow of Arab Spring.

On 26 February 2011, the draft plan which was set up by the French, Germany, United Kingdom and the USA, had been acknowledged by the UN. In this goal, completion of brutality is freezing of the wealth of Gaddafi's family members, forbidding of moving abroad and arms ban on Libya. The UN attempted to make a restricted air space however particularly China and Russia were against this.

In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, parts of Libya had been separated into two sections; Gaddafi's allies and that of the radicals. Tekin (2012) claims that following 15 days from the uprising in Libya, annihilation cases had been received by the UN concerning Libyans. As proof, the data from Twitter had appeared. In this data was about harmed 50.000 individuals and slaughtered 10.000 individuals. Al Jazeera, BBC and USA's media assisted with growing these data everywhere in the world. It is consistent with saying that the idea, 'decimation', made a condition for foreign powers to act with no request.

It very well may be said that utilizing the idea of 'massacre' is a procedure for external actors to mediate Libya and deal with this geopolitically significant area to control the Middle East and North African oil passage. Similarly, the truth about numbers was delivered at that point (Tekin, 2012). Amnesty International has neglected to discover proof for basic liberty infringement. It additionally discovered a sign that on a few events, the revolutionary in Benghazi seemed to have purposely made bogus claims or produces proof. Furthermore, as per the report of International Crisis Group, much western media inclusion has a structure the beginning introduced

an exceptionally uneven perspective on the rationale of occasions. They were depicting the dissent development as completely quiet and they were over and over recommending that the system's security powers were untouchably murdered unarmed exhibition who introduced no security challenge.

In the months-long conflict, casualties tremendously surpassed 3500 and were destined to huge degrees on the two sides. The presence of common conflict can be followed to Gaddafi's cruel system causing complaint and compelling savage reaction, Libya's regional division between Tripoli-focused supporter powers and ancestrally connected, universally upheld, and provincially and globally furnished and prepared dissident soldiers, and Gaddafi's segregation causing quick legitimization of the NTC and system change. (Bhardwaj, 2012:90) UN authority Cherif Bassiouni went to Libya and discovered proof about atrocities by Gaddafi, defiance and NATO, also. Loads of individuals murdered however the quantity of these individuals comprised by Libyan armed force as well as uprisings and NATO intercession in the area (Prashad, 2012) all in all, the number which was proclaimed by UN is more than twofold of genuine number. (Sol Portal, 2013).

Notwithstanding, NATO violations and individuals who were harmed due to NATO mediation was not disclosed. The principle point of external actors could be comprehended in this point, since, in such a case that the issue was to stop brutality and shield regular citizens from any vicious activity, an objective that NATO's intrusion in Libya could not fulfil (Prashad, 2012).

The abundance of oil in Libya placed the country as a strong power in the MENA region under Gaddafi. The daily creation of oil was 1.6 billion barrels and the absolute hold is 46.2 billion barrels. Additionally, there was an additional 142 trillion litre petroleum gas found in the ground. For this extraordinary express, the uncommon NATO teaching was fundamental and it became compassionate mediation principle (Ikinci, 2012). As indicated by Nzemroaya (2011), the Libyan civil conflict was influenced by two major reasons: The first is constraint and fear of Gaddafi's regime.

The second reason is based on the increasing division of Libya. In the discourse of Wesley Clark who is a retired senior staff of NATO, Libya was constrained by the Taliban and after mediation of Afghanistan, the next country had been Libya. With his words: "in these rundowns, there were additionally Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. Scarcely any weeks after the fact, we were bombarding Afghanistan. I asked that will we battle against Iraq. He applied by saying there is something more regrettable and he pulled out

certain archives from the cabinet. This report had data that in the next five years, we will mediate different nations that are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia and Sudan.”

On 19 March, United Nations Security Council acknowledged the choice for a no-fly air zone. Thusly, the UN limited Gaddafi's force against the opposition forces while they handled the Libyan air zone themselves. Soon after being endorsed of a no-fly air zone, the NATO warplane started to bomb Libya. There was no tranquil settlement or arrangement between different sides during this period. This compassionate mediation (in other words, aeronautical assault) became against any expectation to end quiet settlement (Prashad, 2012).

It is additionally a triumph for French and English pride: as it was anticipated 4 months prior, the European nations folded under to their own need to keep face once they began meddling and they accordingly furnished and prepared the dissidents, while NATO went about as the radicals' flying corps. They said they wouldn't arm the renegades at that point however it was more critical to winning than to adhere to that guarantee. Furthermore, it should be said, the triumph has been very much overseen so far with few retaliations. It is a decent day for global equity (Frijters, 2011).

It very well may be added that if there was no external influence in Libya, clearly Gaddafi's force could have subdued the uprisings, therefore, leading to a reinstatement of Gaddafi's regime. However, based on humanitarian reasons, foreign powers and institutions intervened in the Libyan conflict, leaving no room for dialogue or reconciliation with Gaddafi and his forces. . By doing this, the pretext which was based on compassionate intercession for Libyan residents was lost, instead, it brought the thought or understanding that Libyan citizens had little to do with foreign intervention. "Libyan state has consistently dismissed the possibilities of foreign intervention during or after their upheaval because its target will be to protect Libya and its oil from Libyan individuals. Should they prevail with regards to defending their power, this may demonstrate their best protection against an Iraqi-style of democracy. (Rabbani, 2011)

NATO forces and Libya's neighbours were compelled to carry out the policies of NATO in Libya. Qatar armed groups who worked with NATO and Libyan resistance had been trained in Qatar before the civil conflict. Likewise, Qatar's assistance to Libyan uprisings who were upheld by the West by giving cash and arms was found in the media. Also, fighters who discovered Muammar Gaddafi in his base were Qatar groups trained in the UK (Sol Portal, 2012).

Prashad (2012) attempts to show a connection between Libyan intervention and the interests of NATO forces. In such a manner, he is saying that the powers who made the National Transition Committee still exert power on the Libyan Oil Ministry and Central Bank. Also, on 19 March 2012, National Transition Committee settled on the force of Benghazi Central Bank overall Libyan financial and Libyan oil creation and oil legislative issues. More significant than this, in the archive of the National Transition Committee, there is information that suggests that the rights and interests of foreign powers in Libya is protected.

Bhardwaj (2012) highlights that five explicit factors are connected with the presence of civil conflict, these are; the idea of the legislative system, location of the conflict, militarization of the rival side, global impact and local players. At the point when the Libyan civil war started, it is seen that the above-mentioned factors can be applied to Libya.

The Eastern part of Libya was against Gaddafi's system and liberal regulations that were carried out during his authority time. Militarization of contradicting sides was upheld by external actors previously and during the common conflict.

The environment is characterized by violent resistance by Gaddafi loyalist forces, rioting, and looting by the rebel forces, internecine warfare, revenge and killing, the rise of criminality carried by drug traders, thieves, racketeers, white collars criminals (Server, 2001). Server (2011:4) also ascertains that criminal spoilers can come from the former detainees who would have been liberated to sow chaos and unrest, tribal tensions casting thus shadow on the transition processes.

This idea was even confirmed by the senior researcher Veronika Haasz (2017:4) who revealed that Gaddafi's last order was the liberation of more than "1800 criminals", whose many of them joined the militia, thus increasing the instability. Despite all these, the endeavour of the international community in peacekeeping has rather remained limited compared for example to the intervention of UN, NATO and EU in other post-conflict societies before the Libya crisis such as Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq (Chivvis and Martini, 2014), which could be questionable when taking into consideration the analysis of Zoubir and Rozsa (2012) which rather emphasize the chaos of the post-conflict environment.

According to Chivvis and Martini (2014), the international actors' delay to address security issues of the post-conflict era was due first of all to the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the war, Libya was not showing signs pointing the relapse of

violence after the uprising (Chivvis and Martini, 2014:1). Owing to the oil trade with Europe, the fewer damages on economic infrastructures, and the overlook of the possible destructive and dividing character of the regional and tribal tensions which these scholars considered to be less disastrous than Bosnia, Kosovo and Syrian fighting which brought the citizens to stand against each other leading to a spiral of violence.

Although the role of the international actors in constructing peace was limited, it differed in degree and nature depending on the interest of different actors which are regional and extra-regional actors such as the US, France, Italy, Britain and some international organizations such as UN, EU, and NATO.

According to Chivvis and Martini (2014), this limitation is because it was believed that NATO-led strikes caused fewer damages in Libya compared to other countries such as in Afghanistan and Iraq and the endeavour of NATO intervention was mostly coming from Britain and France which were supposed to carry the costs while the US plays the role of support. In addition, there was controversy within NATO over the contribution of the members, of which only a half contributed militarily.

Likewise, criticisms emerged within the UN security council over the way NATO carried out the UN mandate approved by the resolution 1973. The resolution declaring that Libya is a “no-fly zone”, other members such as Russia, China, and South Africa argued in this sense that NATO has bypassed the framework of the intervention which was to secure civilians and not to commit itself to the regime change and the overthrow of Gaddafi and the unrestricted destruction of military and government (Siebens and Case, 2012:31 Chivvis and Martini, 2014:4, Cadier, 2017:). Siebens and Case’s (2012:32) analysis disclosed that NATO intervention in Libya has not only discredited NATO as a UN credible agent of humanitarian intervention but also exposed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a political instrument to serve geostrategic interests of powerful states.

Another salient explanation of the international limitation comes from the domestic actors themselves. Indeed, neither postwar rebel leaders nor the leaders of the transitional national council (TNC) were for the deployment of a foreign force on the ground, because they were more concerned about their legitimacy that a foreign force could undermine (Chivvis and Martini, 2014:4). Lacher (2017) assumes that although international actors claim to play a role in stabilizing and state-building in Libya, a direct and overt involvement runs the risk to undermine domestic legitimacy

necessary for the state-building process. In the same token, Van Genugten, (2011:70) contends that even though the future of Libya lies on Libyans themselves, the unorganized, untrained and inexperienced nature of the rebels who took over the country, render necessary the involvement of the international actors.

However, it is argued that there was a major need for international actors to intervene in the post-conflict Libya, given the fact the consequences of the insecurity and instability are not only felt in Libya but also constitute a threat for the regional and international security, as expressed by the Malian government (Siebens and Case, 2012:29). In the sense that it can strain humanitarian, political and security disasters in the neighbouring countries due to the flux of refugees in countries such as Egypt, Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Tunisia (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2012:1274).

Similarly, foreign intervention is being accused of creating refugees crises and immigration camps to create new hotbeds of violence and from there attacks the homeland. In this perspective,(Zoubir and Rozsa, 2012:174, Siebens and Case, 2012:29), inform that the consequences of immigration are already felt in Mali whereby the pro-Gaddafi Malian Tuaregs who served alongside troops loyal to Gaddafi returned to Mali and created the “Tuareg National Liberation Movement of the Azawad” (MLNA) and seceded from the country to create a new state in the Northern part of Mali. This brought about ten thousand people outside the conflict areas (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2012:1275).

Moreover, the population of the region Sahara-Sahel such as Niger and Burkina Faso are of major concern because not only the refugee crisis has affected their economies for a population that is already on the verge of dye because of famine but also the stockpiles of weapons stolen from Libya are being smuggled in the black market where Somalia pirates, terrorist organizations and jihadist which already dispose of strong military capabilities thus reinforcing their offence capacity. Therefore, they could acquire “man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS), rocket-propelled grenades, launchers and other sophisticated weaponry including missiles” (Zoubir and Rozsa, 2012:175) which has been recognized as a major new security challenge.

Regarding arm proliferation, the international actors have to set out measures to demilitarize and demobilise armed groups. Thus, regards the likelihood of the Libyan having a domino effect on the neighbouring country and providing terrorist

organizations and extremists with the sophisticated weapon, it senses important and necessary for the international forces to set foot on the ground, to prevent or limit the regional spread of the conflict, above all in those countries where populations are already devastated by the poverty.

It must be highlighted that international actors either international organizations or single sovereign states are being participated in the state building to a different degree. In the framework of UNSMIL mandated by the UN on 16 September 2011, UN staff aims at assisting and supporting Libyan efforts to establish a secure environment, to set up a secure environment, to implement measures to revive state economy, trigger the political dialogue and protect human rights (Chivvis and Martini, 2014, Cadier, 2012:20, Haasz, 2017:11). This can be evidenced by the signature of a reconciliation agreement between Misrata and Tawergha. in august 2016 and amended by the UN general assembly on 20 September 2017. This agreement provides measures for compensation of the victims, but also the return of the displaced people amounted to 40.000 (Haasz, 2017:11).

In addition, the road map of the agreement provides that a “national congress conference” to be held whereby, all Libyan should agree upon the members of the new unity government and discuss the constitution, and lastly they should agree upon the tenure of the parliamentary and presidential elections. In this regard, the resolutions of the conference of Paris in May 2018 proposed to call presidential and legislative elections in December 2018 in which the most prominent leaders committed themselves facilitated the tenure of elections.

Besides, UN specialized institutions such as UNHCR, WHO, WFO, UNICEF, IOM are also active in the area of humanitarian assistance such as providing the populations with healthcare, essential medicines, access to basic needs like drinking water, sanitation, education and adequate housing (Haasz, 2017:13). The EU for its part focuses mostly on immigration control and the fight against terrorism. Therefore, its intervention on the ground falls in its twofold strategy called “Operation Triton” to contain the immigration flows towards EU countries in the central Mediterranean region, and Operation Sophia is deemed to neutralize refugees smuggling routes in the Mediterranean.

In this vein, the EU perceived Libya as a strategic partner to fight against immigration and henceforth set up the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) under the common security and defence policy in 2013 to back Libyan authorities in securing

their borders. Furthermore, the EU provide funds for rehabilitation centres and Libyan NGOs performing the assistance program. And in February 2017, the EU offers an amount of 200 million EURO to the Libyan government to stop migrant boats inside its territorial waters (Haasz, 2017:15).

Besides, international organizations, single sovereign states committed themselves to help to reset security and stability. In that respect, the US-funded a program deemed to track and secure Gaddafi's weapons of mass destruction, destroy the remnants of the chemical weapons and collect Man-Portable air defence systems (MANPADS). France, Britain, and Italy also established missions whose staff was deemed to help organize the chaotic Libyan ministries, build political institutions, and restart the economy (Chivvis and Martini, 2014:6). However, France and Italy's interest in stabilizing Libya is rather motivated by national interests according to Fasanotti and Fishman (2018).

It is argued that NATO's intervention in Libya was mostly to halt the continuation of Gaddafi's regime and to ensure that a new leadership takes over the political affairs of Libya. The stability of the Libyan state is a very strategic position for world powers was more important for NATO leaders, even more than the Libyan leader itself. As highlighted above, it was mentioned that NATO leaders, notably the US, the U.K, as well as France were still engaging in trade with Libya, during Gaddafi's regime, therefore, should Libya attain stability, they can continue to enjoy from the Libyan oil reserves that it receives.

Similarly, as mentioned by Sawani (2017, p. 179), Gaddafi was accused of wide-scale violation of human rights, hence, explaining his indictment at the International Criminal Court as well as the lack of support that he faces in the both domestic and foreign arena. Additionally, the majority of NATO states in the EU on March 11, 2011, had passed their vote of confidence against Gaddafi, mostly due to the widespread human rights violation and massacre that he and his forces committed in Libya (Ibrahim, 2020, p. 45). This, therefore, increased the importance of a regime change, according to NATO. According to Thakur (2011, p. 16), despite the submissions by former US President Barack Obama that the intervention in Libya was purely to protect the citizens, it was agreed by the US, UK, and France that even if a ceasefire was reached, the citizens of Libya would be safer in the hands of another leader instead of Gaddafi.

This led to further intensification from NATO forces, joining hands with the rebels to ensure that Gaddafi is toppled and a regime change is reached. To conclude, the NATO intervention in Libya created numerous arguments and debates that doubted the justification of R2P to invade Libya as a fulfilment of foreign policy more than R2P.

Despite the trade alliance that was formed between Libya and Russia, Russia abstained from voting when the United Nations Security Council met to decide whether Gaddafi should be stopped by all means. It should be seen that the leadership in Moscow at this time was under President Dmitry Medvedev while Putin was the Prime Minister, hence, issues regarding international agreements and negotiations were left to the purview of the president. For this reason, Medvedev who had a more friendly relationship with the US decided to abstain from voting neither did Russia use her veto powers during this period. The cordial relationship enjoyed between the US and Russia at the time set the tone for the successful adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973.

Additionally, Medvedev had explained that the atrocities coming from Libya warranted international intervention to enable calmness and to ensure the protection of citizens. For this reason, Russia under Medvedev did not veto the UN Security Council Resolution to enter into Libya.

It could also be argued that another reason for this absentee vote from Russia stemmed from the effects of the Arab Uprising in Syria as well. Syria is a closer ally to Russia than Libya, which meant that Moscow needed to pull all her weight to support Assad's regime, hence, sacrificing Gaddafi for this. Syria was also as strategic to Moscow as is Libya, however, the events at this time could still be managed unlike that of Libya where a significant visible abuse of human rights has taken place.

As a result of NATO's influence in intervening in Libya and as such overthrowing Gaddafi, the UN established a peacekeeping force with the main aim of returning Libya to normalcy. The next section of the chapter explains in detail the role of the UN in Libya.

4.4.2. Role of the United Nations (UN).

One must firstly bear in mind that since March 2011, the UN mission in Libya has on various occasions changed its objective as the situation in the country has evolved. Following the outbreak of the March 2011 uprisings, the UN's objective, as

described by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, was the reinstatement of the rule of law, the strengthening of national institutions, the protection of human rights and restoring the economy. Very soon the mission's objectives evolved due to the deterioration of the security situation, the country's breakdown and the emergence of armed militias.

The UN's mission was once again redefined when on October 12th Tarek Mitri replaced Ian Martin as Special Representative. It was no longer a case of supporting the political process and supervising technical aid provided to the justice system and the police. At the time there was talk of historic change that the new Special Representative wanted to support without meddling excessively in Libyan affairs so as not to annoy the National Transitional Council. Security problems, the armed threat posed by insurgents and the rising role of the Islamists led the United Nations mission to redefine its role and appoint a new representative to replace Tarik Mitri.

The arrival of a new UN Special Representative, Bernardino León, was accompanied by a redefinition of the Spanish diplomat's role in a context that marked the beginning of a civil war between various armed militias and those in power. The establishment of a ceasefire became a condition for relaunching the political process. Following several visits to Libya, the UN's Special Representative decided at the beginning of September 2014 to embark on an attempt to establish an inter Libyan dialogue based on a minimal agenda, summarised as respect for the institutions elected, human rights and a rejection of terrorism.

The order of business for this dialogue was initially aimed at establishing the conditions for an official transfer of power between the National General Council and the House of Representative, as well as the elected and recognised parliament's return to Tripoli. This meant establishing a dialogue and trust between the belligerent parties to resolve the country's critical problems. One must admit that this attempt was a failure as the lack of security did not allow parliament to leave Tobruk and return to Tripoli.

Since the beginning of his mission on August 31st, 2014, the UN's Special Representative Bernardino León considered dialogue as the only way of salvation for Libya, a perspective shared by most Western countries as well as Algeria, which defended the position according to which a political process remains the only way of resolving the Libyan crisis and this through a dialogue excluding no one. León was

committed to ensuring that the parties in conflict would speak to one another to achieve a ceasefire between the armed militias.

In his report to the United Nations Security Council on September 15th, 2014, León said, “Three years following the fall of the former regime, the Libyan people find themselves nowhere closer to realizing their hopes and aspirations for a better future and for a State that safeguards their safety and security. Accordingly, many Libyans are deeply disillusioned with their country’s democratic transition.” Reassuring that the UN would remain loyal to its mission in Libya and continue to explain to all Libyans the need to quickly overcome their differences through dialogue, the UN Special Representative added, “I believe that is the only way to spare the country further chaos and violence and to prevent it becoming a magnet for extremist and terrorist groups.”

On September 30th, 2014, the UN’s Special Representative gathered in Ghadamès (south-west of Tripoli) the rival factions, basically, the Tripoli-based Islamists of Fajr Libya and the republicans from the House of Representatives in Tobruk, intending to make them talk to one another. On this occasion, Bernardino León paid tribute to the importance of this first dialogue attempted to try and put an end to institutional anarchy in the country. He believed at the time that there was no military solution to this crisis and that only dialogue would allow them to achieve a favourable solution to the chaos engulfing the country.

However, despite his optimism, this first meeting was yet another failure due to the Islamists’ refusal to recognise the internationally recognised House of Representatives. It is indisputable that Bernardino León, who played a key role in drafting the 2015 Agreement, made significant efforts and showed great diplomacy and patience in trying to ensure a dialogue was established between the parties in conflict and reduce differences, to reach a peaceful outcome. Despite all his efforts, the Spanish diplomat only very partially managed to succeed in this very difficult mission. From the very beginning, León worked as if the two powers in Tripoli and Tobruk were equally legitimate and could therefore demand to share power in a new government.

There was, therefore, an incorrect understanding of the state of power relations in the country. It was perhaps a mistake to consider the Fajr Libya Islamists as having an equal interest in reconciliation as the republicans in government in Tobruk. The United Nations’ current Special Representative, Martin Kobler, followed the same

path as his predecessor while becoming even more involved in the political process. This is currently causing him legitimacy problems in the eyes of an increasingly important part of elites in the east of the country as well as in Tripoli. Quite a few members of the House of Representatives have asked for him to be replaced by a more neutral and determined representative.

The UN has developed a special relationship with Libya since the beginning of the conflict in February 2011. It is the mediator that brokers between the warring parties. However, this role is hugely affected by the dynamics of the volatile security environment in Libya and the region, which renders the role of the UN more complicated. Moreover, the role of the UN in Libya is unique compared to other conflicts. Whereas it plays the role of the mediators, its special representatives have to support one of the parties of the conflict, the government of national accord that was formed out of the peace process initiated by the UN. The main goal of this section explores the track record of the UNSMIL and the Special Representatives to Libya especially in brokering the peace and to explain how this record was affected by complicated factors, the mandate, the foreign intervention and the strategy of the mediators.

The United Nations has had an essential role in forming the facts of the conflict of Libya since the outset of the conflict in February 2011. It was the UN Security Council that sanctioned the military intervention of NATO and its allies to reverse the trajectories of the struggle between Gaddafi and the armed rebellion through the UNSC (1970/1973) resolutions.

However, while the UN was aware of the importance of post-conflict stabilization, its members who were eager to intervene for humanitarian reasons were deceived by their success with the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, so they did not give any attention to the need for rebuilding the state and ending the proliferation of arms and armed militias. This led to another civil war that broke out in 2014 against the backdrop of the political struggle between the Islamist parties and their opponents, and their respective militias.

The new rupture of Libya was more pronounced by the absence of the central power and the geographic breakdown of authority between two fragile governments, one in Tobruk House of the Representatives (HoR) and another in Tripoli, General National Congress (GNC) backed by more empowered militias and criminal networks

and international and regional polarization, as Libya turned out to be a failed state torn by foreign interventions.

Throughout the conflict, the UN-appointed five special representatives to Libya in less than six years, also serving as heads of the UNSMIL. The second phase of the civil war witnessed four special envoys also working as mediators. Although the second envoy Bernardino Leon of Spain had managed to broker a peace treaty in AlSukhirat, Morocco in December 2015, he was removed from his position against allegations of his ties to some regional powers that have stakes in Libya. His successor, Martin Kobler of Germany, faced impediments to having the agreement executed. It has not only proven to be more ambitious to be realized in highly fragmented security and political environment but also added complication to the conflict as it put the third government on the scene. Headed by Fayeze Alsarraj, and recognized by the UN, the National Accord Government (NAG) pushed the UN role from the margin of the mediator closer to a stakeholder.

Therefore, it has become more challenging for the newly appointed envoy Ghassan Salame to address all this scene predominated by the failure of his predecessors and the shaky position of the UN, leaving aside the realities of the conflict and its transnational repercussions and regional drivers. Tackling the issue of the thus far UN's failure in settling the dispute in Libya, most opinions are divided into two debating sides. The first suggests that the behaviour of the UN and its special envoys, where some of them acted unnaturally contributed to the current stalemate and the failure of the peace process.

Related to this view, the lack of clear mandate and jurisdictions entrusted to these envoys made them more exposed to the regional and international powers. The other side argues that it is these states and their proxies in Libya are the main reason for the miscarriage of the UN mediation efforts in the conflict. According to this view, these state actors created several obstacles in the way of peace. They saw these efforts opposing their ambitions for regional dominance in the Libyan theatre. Those two views are affected by two approaches to understanding the role of the UN as an international organization.

The first view conceives the UN as an autonomous organization that has productive powers and bureaucratic mechanisms that provide its agents, the special envoys in this case, with adequate tools to perform. According to this approach, the UN is held accountable for the situation in Libya as it laid the groundwork for the state

actors to pursue their subversive influence starting from the UNSC 1973 resolution to the Skhirat agreement. On the contrary, the second view is based on a realistic approach that perceives the UN, and other international organizations, as merely tools to serve the states' ends in their pursuits for national interests. According to this approach, the UN and its envoys are but subjects to the regional and international powers, the fact that spares them the accountability for the situation.

Both views, and approaches, are speaking to several aspects of the issue. In Libya, the UN is not merely a mediator; it is, rather, an actor with a stake in the conflict. Also, as an intergovernmental body, its member states, especially those who are involved in the conflict are determining a great deal of its behaviour. As can be concluded, the regional and global powers were decisive in dictating the mandate of the special envoys, and in some cases, they caused their removal.

Therefore, Libya reflects the need for an integrated approach to account for the UN role in conflicts. The main goal of this essay is to build an integrated framework to understate the role of the UN as both an autonomous actor and intergovernmental body in conflict as manifested in the civil war in Libya. It focuses on the role played by its special representatives, their mandate, and limits especially in the second phase of the civil war from early 2014 until now.

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established upon a request from the new authorities in Tripoli represented by the National Transitional Council (TNC) to support the country's new transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts. According to its website, the UNSMIL is an integrated special political mission established on 16 September 2011 by UN Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011). The initial mandate of the UNSMIL was to assist Libyan national efforts to restore public security, promote the rule of law, foster inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation, and embark on constitution-making and electoral processes.

Furthermore, the mandate would cover assisting national efforts to extend State authority, strengthen institutions, restore public services, support transitional justice and protect human rights, particularly those of vulnerable groups. It would also include taking the immediate steps required to initiate economic recovery and coordinate support that may be requested from other multilateral and bilateral actors, as appropriate. This mandate was to be authorized for three months. The UNSMIL is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), supported by a

Deputy SRSG, is overseen by the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, which provides guidance and operational assistance. For achieving its mandate, it has, also, a substantive staff in political affairs, human rights, transitional justice, mine action, demobilization, development, women's empowerment, public information, and communication, as well as support staff.

Over the development of the conflict, the mandate of the UNSMIL's mandate was extended and modified by the UN SC resolutions 2022 (2011), 2040 (2012), 2095 (2013), 2144 (2014), 2238 (2015) and 2323 (2016) (Green, 2019). It was the former resolution that added mediation to the mandate of the Special Representative and the UNSMIL. Unanimously adopting resolution 2323 in December 2016, the Security Council mandated UNSMIL, in full accordance with the principles of national ownership, to exercise mediation and good offices in support of the Libyan political agreement's implementation; the consolidation of governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord and subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process.

Moreover, it states that the UNSMIL should undertake the task coordination of international assistance, and provision of advice and assistance to GNA-led efforts to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Da'esh. The current mandate is stipulated by the UNSC resolution 2376 (2017), which extended UNSMIL's mission until 15 September 2018, it entrusts the same tasks mentioned earlier regarding the mediation and NGA support to the UNSMIL. The UNSMIL's mandate is implicating several tasks to the SR such as peacebuilding, assistance to state-building, monitoring and protecting human rights and mediation.

Regarding the former task, none of the mandates defines the parties to the conflict. While it is evident that the UNSMIL assists the GNA and its territories, it does not define the legal position of the rest of territories dominated by other adversaries notably the HoR and the NLA, although it strongly encourages the GNA to engage with all parties in support of reconciliation and to enhance political outreach throughout Libya.

Furthermore, the mandate of mediation does not mention the issues of mediation except for the implementation of the LPA, restricting the process to political issues and power-sharing. It is remarkable as well that the mandate stipulated by the UNSC last resolutions does not refer to the international and regional parties to the Libyan crisis. It could be said that these blind spots in the mandate leave a large room

for the SGSR to decide the national and foreign parties involved in their process and to determine the issues of concern and agenda of mediation, in addition to the reconciliation strategy.

However, this might make the SGSR's work on the ground a reflection of the complexity of the conflict and its contradictions, or merely influenced by the dispute. For instance, the second SGSR to Libya and the first head of the UNSMIL Ian Martin chose to go for the elections before addressing the most pressing issues such as the militias, the proliferation of arms and the security sector reform due to the pressure posed to his mission by the political factions within and outside the GNC. This left Libya engulfed by the proliferation of militias and unstable security conditions where the SGSRs have to deal with.

Moreover, they have to struggle with a fragile regional security condition where regional and international powers have their preferences and contradictions concerning the conflict in Libya. The regional polarization is a key to understating the collapse of the state in Libya and the failure of the peace process outlined by the LPA.

The procrastinations and improvisations of UN representatives in Libya have not contributed to resolving the crisis. The failure of negotiations and this Political Agreement is partial to be blamed on them. The decisions and various reversals and abrupt changes of position have not contributed to making the UN's mission in Libya effective and successful. The various representatives who have succeeded one another at the head of the UN Mission in Libya have not truly taken onboard the real extent of the Libyan crisis, which is more than just a democratic transition crisis. They have not fully appreciated the problems of the aforementioned transition, which is of a very particular kind compared to other known and studied transitions.

The UNSMIL believed they could be inspired by it to implement mechanisms that would lead to stabilisation and a successful transition in Libya. In reality, the Libyan crisis is far more serious than just a democratic transition issue. One forgets that the transition process follows general rules that must however take into account the historical situation of each country. Libya is not Tunisia and what worked there does not apply to another country, even a neighbouring one. The Libyan reality is far more complex than perceived by the current UN Special Representative in Libya. This requires on his part a less idealistic and more realistic vision. Problems should have been hierarchized and a gradual agenda established, taking into account the social and historical burdens in this country.

Instead, wide-ranging objectives were established with the very negative outcome the country is now experiencing. The various United Nations Special Representatives who have succeeded one another since February 2011 did not take into account a correct assessment of the difficulties in this transition and believed it would be sufficient to be optimistic and show goodwill to institute democracy in Libya, without first bringing peace to society, disarming the militias and resolving economic and social problems.

It is the solution to these problems that allows a successful transition, not the opposite. In other words, an agenda involving the reconstruction of the state and its institutions, destroyed in 2011, was needed, before envisaging a democratic transition. A different path was followed, hence the current impasse and the need to rethink the overall process of the international community's involvement.

4.4.3 Role of the EU

The Libyan crisis is the largest and closest crisis on the southern borders of the European Union. In the view of the above, it is therefore reasonable that the stabilization of this country and the engagement of international relations and partnership with an independent and effective government of Libya is a central point of the EU's foreign policy since the outbreak of the crisis in 2011.

As stressed also by the European Parliament, it has to be pointed out that before the fall of Gaddafi's regime, despite his authoritarian rule, Libya had consolidated commercial and political relations with the EU Member States and played a role as a partner for the EU in the Mediterranean region and Africa, across a wide range of issues with an impact on security and stability, notably migration, public health, development, trade and economic relations, climate change, energy and cultural heritage.

Furthermore, several EU Member States had individual close relations with Libya, with national companies and banks serving as a vehicle for Libyan financial investment in Europe. The consolidation of peace in Libya and the re-establishment of such important political and economic relations is thus a fundamental interest for the European Union and its Member States. In addition, the engagement with Libya is essential for the EU to strengthen its role as a global actor in the field of foreign and security policy. As known, in fact, during the last years, the EU has been making a

great effort to become a leading player in the international security sector to promote peace across the world.

On this issue, the European Economic and Social Committee underlined that the EU was created to consolidate peace in Europe and thus the main goal of its global strategy must be to maintain and promote peace. Moreover, its effort in this field is required by the current complex international context, characterised by the increased volatility of geopolitical competition and the persistence of some powers in dividing the world into spheres of influence. The EU gives special attention to the situations in the neighbouring countries on its eastern and southern borders.

From this perspective, the management of the current largest and closest crisis is fundamental for the EU. Recently, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, has highlighted that “our wider region has become more unstable and more insecure. The crises within and beyond our borders are affecting directly our citizens’ lives. In challenging times, a strong Union thinks strategically, shares a vision and acts. This is even more true after the British referendum” (Green, 2019).

Finally, the Libyan crisis is closely connected with the migration emergency that the EU is currently facing and which is weakening its political cohesion. Indeed, the consolidation of statehood in Libya is crucial to reduce the migration pressure, without violating international law and particularly international human rights law. Actually, despite the formal existence of a government recognized by the United Nations and based in Tripoli, currently, Libya is to be considered as a failed State controlled by different groups.

Similarly, the Islamic State is playing a role in this context, even if recently it has withdrawn from most of the territories under its control. This situation does not permit the adoption of treaties aimed to stop migration flows or to return migrants who departed from the Libyan coasts because they could be subject to torture and other ill-treatment. This risk has been unanimously highlighted even in the context of the United Nations.

Recently, a report of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defined the situation of migrants in Libya as a human rights crisis, because the breakdown in the justice system has led to a state of impunity, in which armed groups, criminal gangs, smugglers and traffickers control the flow of migrants through the country.

The stabilization of its southern border is a primary challenge for the EU. Solving conflicts and promoting development and human rights in the south is essential for addressing the threat of terrorism, the challenges of demography, migration and climate change, and for seizing the opportunity of shared prosperity. For this reason, the Libyan crisis, which is the largest and the closest crisis at its southern borders, has always been at the centre of the EU's interests. In this context, the EU has tried to pursue a multi-level and multidimensional approach to the conflict, acting at the national, regional and global levels and facing the different aspects of the crisis.

The various actions adopted by the EU to implement UN resolutions and the operations carried on within the legal framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defense Policy.

The EU is playing a political role, supporting the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed on 17 December 2015. The European institutions, in line with the UN Security Council resolution 2259 (2015), have recognized the GNA as the only legitimate government of Libya and took the commitment to carry out all actions in coordination with such Authority.

Furthermore, the EU has adopted restrictive measures, such as travel ban and asset freeze measures, against people obstructing the implementation of the LPA and the consolidation of the GNA, even if they were not previously designated by the Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee established pursuant resolution 1970 (2011). It is, thus, general and broad implementation of resolutions 1970 and 1973 of 2011.

For example, Saleh Issa Gwaider, President of the Libyan House of Representatives since 5 August 2014, was included in the sanctions list of the EU because he was considered as undermining the support for mediation provided by the UN and UNSMIL. The reason was that on 23 August 2016, he addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which he criticised the United Nations' support to the GNA and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2259(2015) which endorsed the LPA, threatening to bring the United Nations, as well as the UN Secretary-General, before the International Criminal Court for violating the UN Charter, the Libyan Constitution and the sovereignty of Libya.

Similarly, Khalifa Ghwell, who was the so-called "Prime Minister and Defense Minister" of the internationally unrecognised General National Congress (GNC), was

sanctioned by the EU because he was accused of playing a central role in obstructing the establishment of the GNA. The specific motivation was that he ordered the arrest of any members of the new Security Team, appointed by the Prime Minister-Designate of the GNA. Also, the President of the GNC, Nuri Abu Sahmain, was added to the list of sanctions by the EU because of his activities of an obstacle to the GNA and the LPA. In particular, Sahmain stated that the GNC did not authorize any of its members to participate in the meeting or sign the Libya Political Agreement.

The very broad reasons for these sanctions, formally in line with resolutions 1970 (2011) and 2213 (2015), confirm the political nature of the sanctions regime. However, it may be questionable if any kind of obstacle to the GNA has to be automatically considered as a threat to international peace and security and, thus, as justifying the adoption of coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In this regard, it is important to underline that the UN and the other actors involved in activities of state-building in Libya, such as the EU, should take into account the right to self-determination of people living in that territory, because the need to support peace/state-building should not prevail on the fundamental right of people to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

In this case, the EU autonomous sanctions, even if addressed to individuals, were aimed at weakening some opposition group, irrespective of the fact that such groups are representative of a part of the population and that in some cases they enjoy the effective control of part of the territory.

4.4.4 Summary

Drawing from the various concepts of state-building during Gaddafi's era which included tribalism, rentier state, foreign intervention and political administration in the previous chapter, this chapter provides a comparative approach to these concepts following the end of Gaddafi's regime. In post-conflict states, it is inherently important to provide programs that are essential in ensuring that hostility is ceased and a rule of law is built. Based on this reason, the chapter analysis the various attempts provided by international and national mechanisms to ensure a strong Libyan state with strong state institutions.

The chapter began by discussing the causes of the Arab uprising as this created an opportunity in understanding the post-Arab Uprising state in Libya. As highlighted

above, economic, political, and undemocratic factors were the basis upon which the Arab Uprising occurred in Libya. Gaddafi's failure to provide a state with a strong institution and his tribal politics led to an unequal society with multiple domestic issues. Similarly, the overdependence on oil created a poor level of domestic output, hence, citizens suffered even more with no hopes for change. Therefore, the Arab Uprising brought an opportunity for them to revolt against Gaddafi's regime.

In explaining the cause of Libya's political instability, the chapter provided a brief overview of the triggering factors that led to the uprisings and which was not only limited to the need for democratic change but also to the socioeconomic shortcoming that expose a regime marred by nepotism, favouritism and clientelism at the expense of the other citizens who have not a privileged relationship with the ruling regime. Additionally, in this chapter, it was discussed that Libya experienced a division to political power amongst various tribes and religious affiliation, hence, introducing an event of civil political instability in the country where different groups struggled for political control over the country. These differences in views and political arrangement led to various state-building challenges in the country, which has created difficulty in reaching a peaceful political settlement.

In explaining some of these state-building challenges, the chapter talked about various political and administrative challenges that have hindered state-building in Libya. Following the Libyan civil war, the chapter talked about the formation of the General National Congress (GNC), and the various problems faced by this institution in providing a legitimate acceptable government in Libya. The discussion of political and administrative challenges equally centred on an exclusive understanding of the position of the Libyan House of Representatives in the political environment in Libya. Despite its composition of representatives in various parts of the country, the intricacies associated with creating a centralized government in Libya was still seen as an impossibility. The various attempts at peace-building met their failure mostly due to the differing views from each sect and the lack of congruity between the various armed groups in Libya.

It is no doubt that concessions and compromises needed to be made to reach an agreement, however, in the Libyan case, there was a lack of agreement between the armed groups, regional political institutions such as the HoR, GNC, and other political institutions. Hence, reaching a peaceful transition of power and the creation of central authority was inherently difficult and impossible to achieve. In addition to these actors,

ISIS is also present in Libya which has further complicated the peace-building and state-building processes in Libya.

As explained in this chapter, the challenges to state-building in Libya is thoroughly hindered due to tribal, religious and regional divide dubbed by the rising extremism and the power competition between various wary factional groups. Another significant limitation to state-building is the socio-economic challenges that became highly visible following the end of Gaddafi's regime.

Due to the civil war, the economy of Libya was greatly affected, and as highlighted above, the welfare system of the country died together with Gaddafi. For this reason, citizen's became highly impoverished, medical facilities could not be provided, and education became a great problem for people. The chapter also mentions how tribes hindered state-building processes in Libya, since an approach to ensuring a centralized government was in most cases viewed to be biased towards other tribes.

The final section of the chapter discusses the various attempts by international society in ensuring efficient state-building measures in Libya. The chapter talked about the role of the United Nations, making a strong emphasis on the Skhirat Agreement and why this failed. The chapter highlights that most importantly, the actions of violent actors in the Libyan conflict and the inability to reach a consensus amongst the different illegitimate rulers in the state was the major reason why the Skhirat Agreement failed in Libya.

Additionally, the role of NATO through the principle of Responsibility to Protect was widely discussed in this chapter. This also highlights the uniqueness of the Libyan situation as the only state that witnessed the Arab Uprising and led to an intervention from NATO.

In the chapter, other external actors as discussed were the European Union and its role in providing humanitarian aid to Libyans as well as the influence of the United Nations Support Missions in Libya. The chapter analysis that the role of international actors was to prevent the escalation of violence and pave the way to stabilization, regional actors help in fuelling violence through the military support of Libya rivalry conflicting parties.

The post-conflict environment in Libya is mainly characterized by insecurity and political instability. It has created an environment, whereby there is a need to manage not only the measures of disarmament and demilitarization to establish an adequate environment for the establishment of a political and democratic institution

but also one of the most pressing challenges is to manage the relations between citizens belonging to different socio-political affiliation in the country.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

State-building measures are essential in all countries, especially those that are multi-tribal and post-conflict states. When viable state-building measures are adopted, the notion of central state authority is built and the legitimacy of the institutions of the state applies to all. It is no doubt that the goal of every state is to live and coexist peacefully with one another, however, a major source of obtaining this peace is through the creation of strong state institutions that are respected by all citizens of the state.

For this reason, the thesis explains the importance of state-building by makreferring a state where a poor level of state-building measures created a catastrophic outcome. Using Libya as a case study exposes the flaws committed by non-democratic states in the MENA region to not only consolidate their powers but to build a state with no solid foundation. Hence, making such states susceptible to external influences and internal conflicts.

From the discussion provided in this study, it is understood that Libya's path to forming a healthy state-building process is dependent on numerous domestic factors such as tribalism, formation of a political and administrative institution, rentier economic system, and even religion. The study also highlights that international actors such as the European Union, NATO, the UN, and other foreign governments have all influenced the Libyan state-building process which as mentioned in the study has not produced the intended results in Libya.

The study begins by highlighting that the three main aspects of state-building are economic, political and security, all of which are based on the premise that before a state can fully rebuild itself, it must consider these, especially in post-conflict zones. These factors are essentially particular to Libya as the aftermath of the 2011 uprising created a need for providing efficient state-building policies to improve the nation's economic system, politics, as well as security of the nation. Additionally, the study explaining the belief of exceptionalism in the MENA region explains that, unlike popular belief, situations differ in various countries in the region, depending on domestic and international factors. For example, the 2011 uprising saw a regime change in Tunisia with no foreign intervention, whereas, the Libyan situation was met

with a conglomeration of foreign actors coupled with domestic conflict across the country.

In this first chapter, it was realized that the current conflicts and lack of central power that is witnessed in Libya are a result of harmful political and economic decisions that were taken during Gaddafi's regime. Thus, flinging the country to a state of chaos and creating de-facto governments that are seen in current times. Libya is a multi-tribal country with over 100 tribes. Additionally, the country is impressively patrimonial since tribal chiefs are usually the clan-heads exceeding traditional, charismatic, and political powers. For this reason, Gaddafi understood that in order to ensure his prominence and longevity as the leader of such a multi-tribal society, it was essential to provide patrimonial and sectarian policies that would favour dominant tribes over the other.

It is no doubt that Gaddafi indeed exploited the tribal differences in Libya to solidify his political prospect in the country. Not only did Gaddafi manage to ensure a long tenure for himself as the political leader of Libya, but he also tried to enforce a charismatic leadership view of his image for the Libyan people. Hence, implementing tribal and personal divisive means in his regime. Since the tribes are regarded as an integral part of Libya's history and politics, Gaddafi strived to ensure maximum support for himself from the major tribes, therefore, providing the majority tribes with greater incentives, political representation, and power in Libya.

The second chapter provides an extensive discussion of the problematic Arab state, discussing how state-building across various the MENA region was influenced by religious, historical, domestic, and international factors. This chapter analyses factors influencing state-building in the MENA regions such as identity, economy, culture, and the Arab Uprising. Identity is important in understanding state-building in the region since it is common for citizens of this region to identify with their ethnic or tribal origin before paying allegiance to the state. Hence, the ethnic or tribal identity surpasses the civic identity which affects overall state-building in the country.

In the discussion of the economy, the rentier system of economy which is common amongst oil-rich states in the MENA region was seen as an influencer to state-building. Since the citizens are paid by the government in the rentier system, the government is usually unchecked by the citizens and there is low participation of the public in government affairs. Hence, state-building policies are dependent on the rules of the government rather than what essentially pertains to the people.

The Rentier state system is usually associated with the slogan of no representation without taxation, therefore, since the government is not dependent on the citizens for taxes, there is a low level of citizen representation in government. Additionally, since the rentier system is dependent on foreign income to prosper, any external crisis may affect the domestic policies of the state as can be witnessed in Libya in the 1980s following the crash of oil prices.

Religion and culture are significant influencers of state-building in Libya as this does not only reflect the way of life but also influences how things are done. Additionally, for countries in the MENA region where there are various sects of Islam as well as multiple ethnicities and tribes, a negative interaction between these groups can create conflicts in the countries. Similarly, as seen in Libya, Gaddafi explored the multi-tribal nature of the country to his political aspirations, hence, creating inequality between tribes in the country. This inequality created established hatred amongst the tribes which can be felt to this day in Libya, especially between tribes in the Desert region and those in the Eastern part of the country.

The third chapter explicitly focuses on state-building in Libya during Gaddafi's regime. In this chapter, the various policies employed by Gaddafi in solidifying his position as a leader in Libya was provided. Not only was Gaddafi's repressive measures to political participation discussed, but the chapter also discusses the limited political participation that was granted to Libyans by Gaddafi.

The thesis focuses on the premise that efficient state-building is dependent on both external and internal factors. Whilst the internal factors might play a major role, external factors, especially considering the increased inter-relationship amongst states may also exert strong consequences on state-building measures of a state. Had Gaddafi provided a more inclusive society where tribalism was not used as a tool for receiving political favours, perhaps, Libya would attain a stronger level of state-building than its current states. However, Gaddafi favoured the Magariha tribe over the others.

During Gaddafi's tenure, the Magariha kinsmen enjoy increased access to high political positions, therefore, they were regarded as the strongest supporters of Gaddafi. During this regime, other tribes such as the Tebu tribes were greatly marginalized by Gaddafi wherein the Tebu people were not regarded as Libyan citizens. Hence, this form of tribal divisive politics affected the general politics of Libya and forced one tribe against the other. For this reason, the Tebu tribe was very

influential during the Arab Uprising and they continually campaigned for the removal of Gaddafi.

Similarly, as a result of the tribal politics developed by Gaddafi, the modern-day state-building process has been hindered by tribal conflicts and hostilities. As tribal differences began to be used as a basis for political representation and state policies during the Gaddafi regime, the post-Gaddafi regime in Libya continues to face the result of such undemocratic policies which has significantly hindered nation-building. For the result, the study highlights tribal domestic policies as one major reason why state-building measures in Libya has failed.

Considering the role of international actors in influencing state-building measures in Libya, the study discusses how various states and international actors are supporting various factions and armed groups in Libya. For example, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates are supporters of General Haftar's army. The United Arab Emirates for example continues to supply the Libyan National Army under General Haftar with arms and military support, even violating the UN arms embargo on Libya. Seeing that Haftar is an avid opposer of political Islam, the UAE's support is dependent on the fact that Haftar fights against the spread of ISIS as well as political Islam. Here again, the foreign policy of another state is seen to influence state-building measures in Libya.

Haftar also enjoys support from France, whom the French President claims that Haftar's role in combatting religious terrorism is very important. A major supporter of the GNA is Turkey, which is referred to by the Turkish media as the legitimate international government. Turkey most recently deployed its forces in Libya to support the legitimate government in Libya.

Similarly, in the study, a discussion of state-building challenges during the Gaddafi regime was provided, wherein the above-mentioned domestic and international factors were highlighted as a major challenge to state-building during the Gaddafi regime. It is a glaring fact that the rentier system exerts numerous negative effects on state-formation and political activities in a country. Ranging from dependency on foreign income to undemocratic principles used by leaders to stay in power. Gaddafi applied various measures to maintain and consolidate power, using the tribalistic divide in Libya to his advantage. This method of leadership leads to a wide level of inequality in Libya, leading to increase dissatisfaction in the country, hence, plummeting the country into the Arab Uprising.

The Arab Uprising led to an overthrow of Gaddafi's regime which further brought about his death. As a result, Libya's social-economic environment characterized by a multi-tribal society and rentier economy initiated a situation of political instability, wherein, the country was divided with no central authority. The civil conflict culminated in a form of widespread human abuse, destruction of life as well as the destruction of property. Hence, leading to a series of interventions from the international community.

The major aim of the international community was to change Libya from being a failed state to a functioning country with a clearly defined political apparatus. For this reason, the United Nations through various measures as outlined in the study supported the formation of various Libyan interim governments, with the main aim of safeguarding rule of law and peace while at the same time confronting the problems associated with efficient state-building in the country. In addition to the influence from the UN, the United States, the EU as well as support from the African Union, are all witnessed in the Libyan conflict. These international actors present in the country all aim at proffering various solutions to the Libyan conflict, some of which recorded a considerably small amount of success due to the continued domestic conflicts in the country.

As mentioned in the thesis, the UN for example sought to introduce peaceful elections in the country and to create a legislative body as a means of acquiring political legitimacy to a central institution, to ensure stability and unity amongst the various tribes. Although the HoR and other political councils were created, the conflictual nature of Libya's domestic politics reduced the efficiency of these organizations. Similarly, the armed groups present in the country such as the Tobruk based Libyan National Army, the Libya Shield Force under the Government of National Accord as well as the Libya National Guard and many others have all influenced the continuation of the Libyan conflict since each faction seeks to claim legitimacy amongst the citizens.

Additionally, the UN, bearing in mind the various belligerents in the Libyan conflict was influential in the Libyan Political Agreement also known as the Skhirat Agreement. This agreement established the Government of National Accord as the only recognized legitimate government body in Libya in 2015, however, conflicts with the Libyan House of Representatives as well as the Libyan National Army under

General Haftar, created minimum cooperation between the UN-supported Government of National Accord and institutions in Tobruk.

Similarly, the study highlighted the failure of the Skhirat Agreement to have been caused due to the influence of various foreign states, supporting different domestic factions in the Libyan conflict. Similarly, owing to the multi-tribal nature of the country, state-building attempts must be developed from the grassroots than imposed from foreign agents, most of which are looking for selfish gains in Libya. The inclusion of international actors ought to be centred around what Libya needs to play out its capacities as a viable sovereign state, both at a public and worldwide level and not on improving the disparities by supporting different factions in the country as is visible today.

Highlighted in the study was the division of Libya into East and West, with a Tripoli-based government, prime minister and legislative house, and the Tobruk based government, prime minister and legislature. The Skhirat agreement which sought to establish a single governing structure in Libya was challenged by numerous factors which were militarily inclined by General Haftar, armed terrorist groups, tribes, foreign elements, and incongruity amongst the citizens. Had the Skhirat Agreement been signed, a transition to full democracy would have been underway to restore normalcy to Libya, unfortunately, this was not the case and the Libyan situation worsened.

Similarly, it is noted that the aspirations of the interim government are repressed by the absence of a stable political atmosphere that is plagued by civil conflict and insecurity. Similarly, highlighted in the study is the significant part played by tribal affiliation in the day by day life of numerous Libyans, a concept that may play out even for a longer period. The nature of politics in Libya is characterized by the tribal affiliation that any attempt to state-building must be crafted to efficiently discuss and cover. This issue of the tribe has been visible in Libya even before Gaddafi's regime started, and is visible till today. It is, therefore, very important for state-building attempts to understand how to regulate tribal differences as this to a large extent increases cooperation in the country.

During Gaddafi's regime, the clans and tribes were the major concepts he explored to ensure a centralized leadership approach. Therefore, unlike other aspects of state formation where the borders of states are drawn irrespective of tribal differences, the state-building attempts in Libya, in order to reject a relapse in conflicts

must take into consideration social factors as an important driver for peace and stability. Tribes were regarded as sentimental elements, wherein, every Libyan belonged to and believes in. For this reason, tribal leaders were capable of shaping the minds of their followers. This support is what Gaddafi sought to attain to maintain control over Libya.

Another major concept that affected state-building during Gaddafi's era was the rentier system. Being a great provider of oil, Libya became a welfare state, a system through which Gaddafi explored to consolidate his power. As generally believed, the rentier system in most countries is an introduction to the resource curse, hence, it did not take long for the domestic industries in Libya to suffer from this economic turmoil. Similarly, since it was Gaddafi's goal to maintain power and position, the rentier system was the perfect means to enrich his supporters and punish his opponents. This could be regarded as another reason why during the Arab Uprising, Libyan tribes that were punished by Gaddafi openly opposed his regime and mobilized their youths to join in the uprising against Gaddafi in Libya.

Concerning the interim government, an approach aimed at forming efficient and dependent state institutions should be applied in the country. Despite the problems faced in the civil war, there are still numerous cases of corruption in the country, leading citizens to lose faith and dependency on state institutions. When strong state institutions are built, people begin to participate more in politics and continue to hold their governments accountable. Similarly, there is an increased level of trust in the state apparatus which builds solidarity and civic attitude.

Recommendations

For Libya's current situation, there is every need to increase the actions of civil society in the country. Civil society increases cooperation amongst people and deals with domestic conflicts that may exert international consequences as the Libyan issues. When attempts to develop Libya's democracy is created, civil society ought to be granted explicit consideration as this creates the bond that binds all Libyans together, irrespective of the tribe or religious differences.

When civil societies are supported, peacebuilding becomes inherently easy to be attained. The various attempts at State-building measures in Libya were mostly characterized by inter-state or intra-community processes, hence, these measures failed as there was no essential influence on the human element. It must be noted that

individuals are the elements of a state, hence, they play a great role in ensuring efficient state-building.

Similarly, another reason why these attempts failed was due to the influence of foreign elements in Libya, most of whom were only present for their selfish gains, foreign policy, national interest, and alliances. This explains why NATO assuming to have acted under the principle of R2P was accused to have only intervened in the Libyan conflict for the interest of Western powers. Similarly, as Gaddafi sought for a cease-fire and an end to hostilities, NATO vehemently refused to heed this call, therefore, making a larger part of the global population argue that Gaddafi was the target of the intervention and not the Libyan civilians as NATO had argued. Similarly, NATO worked with rebels who were in opposition to Gaddafi's regime, despite the harms and atrocities caused by these rebels to the civilian population. It could be argued that NATO's intervention in Libya was an act of Western Imperialism which sought to remove the forces against Western alliances in Libya.

To achieve any long-lasting peace policies aimed at preventing the unfriendly abuse of the various sections of the Libyan society is developed, which promotes trust amongst community members. The role of civil society is highly important as International nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly influential in the Libyan issue.

There is no doubt that the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic one is not an easy task. It is a long and arduous process involving the complete transition of a system. Especially without a safe environment, wider political and economic developments are not possible. Therefore, the primary precondition for ending the insecurity and instability in Libya is the complete termination of the civil war in the country.

Subsequently, the initial response to the instability could be the implementation of security reforms, including the strengthening of Libya's security forces and border security. The security sector reforms, therefore, should start with the collaboration of the two governments and the creation of a united state security force whose loyalty is not to a tribe, region, or political affiliation.

Afterward, the Libyan state and its institutions must provide programs and policies that work to address poverty, unemployment, mismanagement, corruption, and the low level of education, while also promoting social reconciliation programs and improving the living, religious, social, and economic conditions of citizens across

the country. For successful transitional justice, decision makers should build institutions that can facilitate interaction within the state. Reparations should be given in a way that is not discriminatory but inclusive, comprehensive, precise, and period bound. Finally, the pursuit of truth, which is key for the healing process in post-conflict Libya, should address and protect the victims of the conflict.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Turnitin Similarity Report

STATE BUILDING CHALLENGES IN LIBYA DURING THE POST-GADDAFI TRANSITION PERIOD

ORIGINALITY REPORT

14%	13%	4%	3%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

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20	Francesco Battaglia. "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Libya: An Analysis on the Role of the European Union", African Journal of Legal Studies, 2017 Publication	<1 %

Appendix B
Ethics Committee Approval



BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

06.09.2022

Dear Abdelsalam Mohamed Yussif MOHAMED

Your project "State Building Challenges In Libya During The Post-Gaddafi Transition Period" has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın Kiraz

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note: If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.

Appendix C

Curriculum Vitae

Personal Information

- Name: Abdelsalam Mohamed Elhudairi
- Date and place of birth: **1984**- LIBYA
- Nationality / Libyan

Certificates and experience

- PhD, Political Science and International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus, 2022
- Master, Political Science - University of Benghazi 2012
- Bachelor, Political Science – University of Benghazi Department of Political Science 2007

Work Experience

- Lecturer Assistant. University Of Benghazi - Department of Political Science 2007-2010
- Work Lecturer in the Department of political Sciences at the University of Benghazi Libya 2012-2014
- Member of political Committee of NTC of Libya 2011 .2012.

Academic Specialization

- General specialization: Political Sciences.
- Specific specialization: International Relations and Middle East affairs.

.

Academic rank

- Lecturer.

Languages

Arabic (Native)

English

Turkish

Computer and IT Skills

- Good in Mac. And Windows programmes and typing skills.

Trainings and Activities

- Participating in various academic trainings and workshops on qualitative and quantitative methods of research.

Thesis and Journal articles:

- Writing and translating various articles on socio-political and international affairs in different magazines, newspapers and websites.
- Alhathiry, A. M., & Elbaaja, F. M. (2012). *Evaluating the Implementation of Public Education Policies in Libya* (Master dissertation, University of Benghazi).
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