



**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY  
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPLICATION ON  
THE WEST AFRICAN REGION**

**M.A. THESIS**

**Antoinette Namah NIMELY**

**Nicosia  
January, 202**

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**JANUARY, 2023**

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

**Antoinette Namah NIMELY**

**Supervisor  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait AKŞİT**

**Nicosia  
January, 2023**

## Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by **Antoinette Namah Nimely** titled **“Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria And Its Implication On The West African Region”** and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations

Examining Committee	Name-Surname	Signature
Head of the Committee:	Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü	
Committee Member:	Assist. Prof. Dr. Cemal Yorgancıoğlu	
Supervisor:	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit	

Approved by the Head of the Department

  
01.02/20.23

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit  
Head of Department

Approved by the Institute of Graduate Studies

  
...../...../ 20...  
Prof. Dr. Kemal Musnu Can Başer  
Head of the  
Institute



**Declaration**

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

Antoinette N. Nimely

..../...../2023

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**Abstract****Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria and its Implication on the West African Region****Nimely, Antoinette Namah****M.A., Department of International Relations****Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit****January, 2023, 110 pages**

This thesis looks at the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the social implication it has on the West African region. It examines the impacts if care is not taken and what the situation will turn out to be. Researchers have been discussing the current wave of instability in the West African sub-region for quite some time, both in academic circles and in casual discussion. There is evidence that numerous variables, not just one, contributed to previous hostilities in the sub-region, which has a long history of warfare. The sub-regional power and key peacekeeper, Nigeria, is now fighting the terrorist organization Boko Haram on its own soil, with serious ramifications for the West African region. The formation of this terrorist organization in the northeastern Nigerian states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa has had an impact on the international community on top of adding additional dimensions to the region's current state of insecurity because of the insurgent groups primary goal of waging war against western values. It is therefore the aim of this study to contribute to research on the effects of the Boko Haram insurrection taking place in northeastern part of Nigeria as well as the insecurity and stability in the West-African region. The inquiry reveals that the rebels are affiliated with several other international terrorist groups in the region leading to exacerbation of social implications. It also discovers that West Africa faces severe security and social implications, which prompts it to call for an efficient sub-regional framework to fight this problem.

**Keywords:** Nigeria, Boko Haram, insurgency, social implications, West Africa

## Özet

**Nijerya’da Boko Haram Ayaklanması ve**

**Batı Afrika Bölgesi Üzerindeki Etkileri**

**Nimely, Antoinette Namah**

**Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü**

**Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Sait Akşit**

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Bu tez, Nijerya’daki Boko Haram ayaklanmasına odaklanarak, ayaklanmanın Batı Afrika bölgesi üzerindeki toplumsal etkilerini irdelemektedir. Ayaklanma nedeniyle Batı Afrika alt bölgesinde yaşanan istikrarsızlık uzman ve toplumdaki farklı kesimlerin tartışmalarının önemli bir boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Bölgede yaşanan çatışma ve sorunların çok boyutlu nedenleri mevcuttur. Batı Afrika bölgesinin önemli gücü ve Afrika’da barışı koruma çabalarının önemli aktörlerinden Nijerya’nın Boko Haram terörist ayaklanması ile mücadelesi bölgede ciddi yansımaları olan istikrarsızlığı körüklemektedir. Boko Haram terörist örgütünün Nijerya’nın kuzeydoğu bölgesindeki Borno, Yobe, ve Adamawa şehirlerini etkisi altında bulundurması ve yer yer kontrol etmesi, ve Batılı değerlere karşı savaşı, bölgede halihazırda var olan istikrarsızlığa ve toplumsal sorunlara yeni boyutlar eklemektedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı Boko Haram ayaklanması konusunda ve Batı Afrika bölgesindeki toplumsal etkilerini ortaya koymaya çalışan araştırmalara katkıda bulunmaktır. Tez, Boko Haram ayaklanmasının bölgede yarattığı toplumsal sorunları irdelemekte ve bu ayaklanmanın etkileri ile baş edebilmenin ancak bölgesel işbirliği çerçevesinde mümkün olabileceğini ortaya koymaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Nijerya, Boko Haram, ayaklanma, toplumsal etki, Batı Afrika

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## List of Abbreviations

<b>AML/CFT</b>	Anti-Money Laundering and Combating of Terrorism
<b>AU</b>	African Union
<b>CADSP</b>	Common African Defense and Security Policy
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>DOD</b>	Department Of Defense
<b>DPKO</b>	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
<b>EACAP</b>	Emergency Aid to Conflict-Affected Population
<b>ECOMOG</b>	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ESF</b>	ECOWAS Standing Forces
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Direct Investment
<b>GIA</b>	Groupe Islamique Armée
<b>ICPO</b>	International Criminal Police Organization
<b>ISF</b>	Islamic Salvation Front
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IED</b>	Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>LCBC</b>	Lake Chad Basin Commission
<b>LCI</b>	Limited Consultative Intervention
<b>LGA</b>	Local Government Areas
<b>MNJTF</b>	Multi-National Joint Task Force
<b>MODEL</b>	Mozambican Democratic Liberation
<b>RENAMO</b>	Mozambican National Resistance
<b>NBS</b>	National Bureau of Statistics
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>OFDA</b>	Office for Food and Disaster Assistance
<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Programme

<b>SUBERA</b>	South Borno Emergency and Recovery Assistance
<b>TBT</b>	Terrorism Prevention Board
<b>T</b>	
<b>SCTP</b>	Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Plan
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children Education Fund
<b>UNITA</b>	National Union the Total Independence of Angola
<b>UNNOWA</b>	United Nations Office for West Africa
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>WAPCCO</b>	West Africa Police Chiefs Committee
<b>WASH</b>	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
<b>WACSOFF</b>	West African Civil Society Forum
<b>WOCON</b>	Women's Consortium of Nigeria
<b>WANEP</b>	West African Network for Peacebuilding
<b>YOCAT</b>	Youth Coalition against Terrorism

## **CHAPTER I**

### **Introduction**

The current rate of the global spread of terrorism and instability is much higher than that of any preceding century. This is because militants orchestrate many different types of groups and initiatives, from political parties to cultural groups to religious organizations to blocks to local coalitions. Because of their efforts, this situation has arisen. Several outbreaks have occurred in Africa between the turn of the 20th and early 21st century, however, making this an issue that needs to be discussed on a global, regional, and national level. The majority of African countries were colonized during the Industrial Revolution, which aided the race to Africa. To lessen the likelihood of war, European colonizers in Africa split the continent up. Although many indigenous people were dispersed to new locations, many others remained to harbor resentment toward those who had forced them to leave their homes.

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, the country has been divided by a wide range of inter-tribal, ethnic, partisan, political-ideological, religious, and governmental issues. These have resulted in widespread instability and terrorist acts, both within Nigeria and in countries that rely on Nigeria's economic development and growth. Estimates put the mortality toll from these terroristic and deadly acts in Nigeria at over a million, with economic losses reaching tens of millions of dollars (Wolumati & Agbese, 2017). New herder attacks, ongoing Boko Haram-led insurgency, kidnappings, banditry, and ritualism are only some of the major problems plaguing Nigeria today. Many people who were split up during the country's independence movement yearned to return to their homes and communities. However, the contemporary residents of these areas have faced a tremendous deal of worry as a result of the positive historical experiences these people had and the stories they have heard about their ancestry. There has been a dramatic increase in tension along the region's borders as a result of the development of intertribal fighting in Nigeria. Many Nigerians anticipated a return to the way things were before the British colonization of the country once independence was achieved. This group naturally began wreaking havoc and raising the country's instability after independence was attained but life did not pan out as they had hoped.

The political ideas of those in authority are diverse, which has contributed to a general reduction in safety. To ensure the continued success of their parties, politicians have encouraged followers of their political ideas to take combative stances toward those who hold opposing viewpoints. This choice does not serve the national interest. Every day, the situation in Nigeria becomes more intolerable as tribalism spreads throughout the political system and key positions are allocated based on tribal affiliation to help the leader preserve power. People from unrepresented groups have taken to the streets to demand change, but the lack of widespread unrest has kept security from becoming a major concern. Tribalism plays a major role in the administrative hierarchy; therefore, development efforts are focused on influential tribes at the expense of less powerful ones. Insecurities have increased as a result of the widespread calls for radical reform of existing procedures, which has caused chaos in the country.

Religion is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored in Nigeria; it has become a hot button issue in recent years (Adigwe and Grau, 2007). Religion exerts influence in many spheres, including politics, and has far-reaching effects on society. Many societies are affected by the distribution of political power, just as the economy, social interactions, educational attainment, and social cohesion. African Traditional Religions, Islam, and Christianity are the three religions practiced by the vast majority in Nigeria. To some extent, political and religious spheres might overlap in all of these faiths because of shared ideals. An organized reflection of a society's sociocultural orientation, historical trajectory, and inherited worldview, the traditional religion of civilization provides a window into the collective unconscious of its members. This, in turn, strengthens conviction in an ultimate cosmic power responsible for creating the cosmos and the world. All facets of their collective psyche are subject to this authority's sway. The political leader of the country, known as the Oba (king) in Yoruba culture, is seen by the populace as only a trustee for Olodumare (the Supreme Being). In addition, the Ifa oracle which is the voice of the gods that speak to its people must be consulted extensively to gain spiritual approval before the selection or appointment of an Oba. Therefore, ancient societies' politics and religions were linked and mutually influenced one another. Even at the turn of the twentieth century, this was the case (Laguda, 2008).

Threats to national security and the frequency of terrorist attacks have increased double as a result of the country's search for a political leader. Religion has a profound impact on people's daily lives across the country. In many ways, including how we treat one another, what we eat, wear, and vote for in elections, and our religious convictions shape our lives. Simply said, the ability to run for political office and further one's beliefs is made possible by the close relationship between politics and religion. More than 200 million people are living in Nigeria, and more than 90% of them are either Christians or Muslims. The fact that the vast majority of Nigerians chose to identify themselves by their religion rather than their nationality is a striking example of the significance of this divide. This has led to an increase in both overt and covert ties between religious, secular, and political spheres. Conflicts in politics can arise from sectarian divisions (Tar and Shettima, 2010). Both Christianity and Islam are widely practiced in Nigeria, which makes it a multi-religious state. Unpredictability has increased significantly as a result of the struggle between these two groups to become the sole adherents of their respective religions. The southern region is populated by Christians who work in agriculture, whereas the northern region is home to Muslims who, for the most part, are herders. Cattle grazers have been blamed by farmers for the destruction of their crops, leading to increased tension and insecurity in Nigeria. According to Patrick Chabal (2005), conflict "appears to be a distinctive aspect of African Society". Bloody conflicts and terrorist assaults in Africa are a fact of life, and they have had a devastating impact on the continent's natural and human resources (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). Since July 2009, Boko Haram, sometimes known as the "Nigerian Jihadist," has escalated its atrocities against the government and the people of Nigeria. They initiated a coordinated attack campaign that includes bombs, kidnappings, and random shootings of civilian and government facilities.

As a result of the proliferation of transnational terrorist organizations (TTOs) and the activities they engage in, states and the international community respond to and address new threats in a wide variety of ways on different levels, including the state level, the sub-regional, the regional, and the global levels, particularly after the Cold War ended. There are multiple different levels on which these reactions and interactions occur (Makarenko, 2004). Due to the existence of these transnational terrorist organizations and the actions they carry out, sub-regional and regional players operating on the continent of Africa are

not exempt from the problems they cause (Gibson, 2004; Tella, 2018). For instance, the rise of the violent extremist rebel group Boko Haram is seen as the most serious threat to Nigeria's sovereignty since the elapse of the country's Civil War. In recent years, Boko Haram has committed a lot of terrible crimes (2010-2020). This concern can be partially explained by the fact that Boko Haram has been connected to several high-profile incidents over the past few years (Odo, 2010; Ogunnubi, 2020). Since its activities became public knowledge in 2009, the Boko Haram rebel group, according to Hansen and Musa (2013), has purportedly carried out a series of organized attacks against the Nigerian government and a substantial number of institutions. The economic and social development of the country have both been stunted as a result of the attacks, therefore they have had a detrimental overall effect.

Apart from the wanton destruction of lives, property, and the economy in northeastern Nigeria, the effects of these terrorist acts can be felt at the subregional and regional levels as well. The operations have utterly decimated the economy in Nigeria's north-eastern region. Experts agree that not only does this pose a threat to Nigeria's corporate life as a state, but also many sub-regional and regional organizations operating across the African continent. The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the African Union (AU) all face a significant challenge in overcoming the lack of cooperation between their member states. It is the responsibility of these organizations to ensure the cooperation and integration of their member nations in these areas and in responding to any threats to the region as a whole to promote peace, progress, and development (Ogbonna & Jiménez, 2017). The task facing these groups is huge.

Numerous types of research have speculated on the factors that may have contributed to the rise of the terrorist organization Boko Haram (Hansen et. al., 2014). Several factors have contributed to the country's current predicament, including decades of ineffective administration and governance, the elites' use of violence, the emergence of poverty despite abundant resources, a long history of social injustice and inequality, rising rates of unemployment, pervasive corruption, rising rates of illiteracy in the north, and so on. The elite's destructive instrumentalization of violence and religion's detrimental instrumentalization as a method of supporting violence are two other concerns that need

addressing (Adibe, 2013; Hansen, & Musa 2013; Ayegba, 2015; Nweke, 2014; Hansen, 2017; Maza, Koldas & Aksit, 2020; Iyekekpolo, 2020). Although the Nigerian government and other regional and sub-regional organizations have played a significant role in regulating and suppressing the activities of this group, there are still some obstacles that need to be overcome, especially those that are connected to it.

### **Statement of the Problem**

Numerous significant challenges, including terrorism and insurgency, pose a threat to Nigeria's political stability (Obafemi and Galadima 2012). Numerous acts of terrorism, both on a national and international level, have been documented during the past few decades in many different places across the world (Egbue, et al., 2015). Nigeria is currently going through a time when it is witnessing terrorism at a degree and with intensity that has never been witnessed before, along with the rest of the world. In addition to posing a serious threat to people's lives, possessions, human rights, dignity, and democratic values, terrorism also imperils Nigeria's very existence as a nation and its essential structure. This is due to the threat that terrorism poses to all of these things (Obafemi et al., 2015). Politics is its main motivator, whether it is global or local; nevertheless, it may also manifest auxiliary religious, economic, or social causes. Politics is the main driver behind everything (Chukwurah, et al., 2015).

The Boko Haram group initially carried out a series of isolated attacks against various security agencies. They started attacking several locations across the nation over time, including public schools, mosques, and churches. The Shehu Musa Yar'Adua Foundation further asserts that the group is accountable for the kidnapping of 2,063 people. It doesn't seem like there will be any long-term solutions as long as the group's anonymous leadership maintains its animosity and intolerance (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:44). They have a highly ambiguous standard operating procedure, and their tactical strategy shows a startling lack of predictability (Achodo 2019:4). The region is currently under heavy attack in neighboring countries surrounding the northern region of Nigeria, namely Chad, Cameroon and Niger. And given that there is still an active rebellion in some parts of the land; the future's course appears to be uncertain. As a consequence of this, the purpose of this research is to provide findings of the existing literature on the Boko Haram insurgency

in Nigeria and its implication on the region, as well as to make a contribution to that body of research.

### **Objectives of the Research Study**

By elaborating on the current state of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and providing a glimpse into the potential outcomes for the region's future, the current investigation intends to accomplish the particular research objectives that are listed below:

- To identify how Boko Haram has destabilized Nigeria since 2010.
- To understand the impact Boko Haram had on the West Africa region in general.

### **Research Question**

The following questions will bring out the much-needed result requires to probe into this research.

1. What is the regional impact of Boko Haram insurgency?
2. How have regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS, and non-governmental organizations been dealing with the impact of Boko Haram insurgency?

### **Significance of the Research Study**

This research aims to contribute to the field that aims to gain an understanding on the insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the various aspects of threat it posed in the West African region, in particular the Lake Chad Region. In addition, the study is interested in evaluating the impact the Boko Haram insurgency created in the region and the effective steps that are taken by ECOWAS in order to effectively mitigate, if not end, the threat posed by Boko Haram not only in Nigeria, but in the region as well as for the international system. The conclusions and suggestions from this proposed research hopes to provide various inputs for policymakers and large partners of the international and regional organizations on steps to be taken. The results of this research intend to help serve the region in terms of offering suitable contributions to address the problem that has already

been identified. This research will also help future research initiatives because it will provide vital details on what the implications of the finding are for the area in question. This research perceives ECOWAS as the main institutional framework that should be the main address in enhancing cooperation and collaboration not only among the states of the region but among states and non-state actors in dealing with the social impact that Boko Haram insurgency created. The Boko Haram insurgency is costing northeastern Nigerians, especially Borno State residents. Boko Haram's victims have lost a lot and continue to lose. Deaths, economic suffering, social and political tyranny, and physical and mental impairments have dehumanized Boko Haram insurgency victims. Terrorism continues to harm people. As victims of Boko Haram violence in Borno state struggle to survive and adapt, it's important to grasp how these attacks have affected their economic, social, and political lives (Adebayo, 2014). The study assessed the effects of the Boko Haram-led conflict on Nigeria's northeast as well as countries in the Lake Chad Region. Boko Haram's effects on Nigeria and countries in the Lake Chad Region has caused economy, politics, culture, and social interactions, due to the group's frequent violent and deadly attacks in the region. The instability in the Lake Chad Region caused by Boko Haram's frequent attacks has led to irregular movement of ECOWAS citizens and their security. Countries such as Cameroon, Niger and Chad are all affected by the group insurgency which is on a rampage. This research tends to elaborate on the collective and preventive measures that have been perceived by ECOWAS and international organizations, thereby evaluating implication of Boko Haram insurgency and the threat it posed to infrastructural, sociopolitical, and economic development in the region. This research emphasizes the need for sufficiency and adequacy of relief and support mechanisms and structures to help victims cope with their traumas and agonies caused by Boko Haram insurgency. This study portrays ECOWAS as the regional power to effectively work on the fight against terrorism in its region and beyond.

### **Purpose of the Study**

Since this is an ongoing crisis and borders on terrorism which is a major concern of the world, the researcher is motivated and eager to conduct research on this topic with the aim of minimizing the gap that has been left blank for too long. The aim here is to focus

on the social implications that the terrorist activities have created in a regional context. In view of the aforementioned, the review of relevant literature will help to explore and identify a suitable theoretical framework for this study. The knowledge that will be put in will significantly contribute to future studies in accordance with the region support of ECOWAS toward the fight against terrorism in the region.

### **Methodology**

In this study, qualitative data is used in providing evidence to the research to understand and evaluate the regional impact that the Boko Haram insurgency created in Nigeria and the regional context, which is the Lake Chad Region. This research relies largely on secondary data to help eliminate the possibility of making mistakes or having biased opinions. This is done solely for the purpose of improving the overall data adequateness and reliability of the research. Therefore, the research collected and used secondary data from publications and annual reports of ECOWAS, which is the primary region organization, and other international organizations. Such data and information prove to be important in guiding this research to factual and accurate data and its qualitative interpretation to strengthen the research findings.

### **Limitations of the Study**

On the basis of the matter that is being investigated, it is essential to point out that there is an excessive amount of literature on the insurgency of Boko Haram in Nigeria; however, there is a great deal that needs to be added to the existing body of literature, in particular from a unique vantage point of looking at the social implications and with an eye toward the future of the region. In the end, it is my goal that this study will also be able to act as a foundation for additional research projects. There are other limitations that are important to keep in mind. The challenges that were encountered included insufficient financing that would support research, inability to conduct field research due to security and financial limitations, time limitations and limited access to official documents.

### **Structure of the Thesis**

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I includes the introduction that details the research study. In Chapter II, the work looks at the review of related literature while in Chapter III, the thesis looks at the origins and the rise of Boko Haram and how it initially manifested itself, Boko Haram violence that is the subject several opposing theories, origin and causes of insecurity in Nigeria, ethno-religious conflicts, ECOWAS efforts in dealing with terrorism and the intervention of non-governmental organizations. In Chapter IV, the work looks at socio-economic implications of terrorism in Nigeria from 2010 onwards, Boko Haram and regional security, cross-border attacks, transnational consequences of violence, ECOWAS efforts in dealing with Boko Haram insurgency and ECOWAS and international NGOs responses to the Boko Haram Insurgency. Finally, Chapter V brings forward the conclusions and recommendations.

## **. CHAPTER II**

### **Literature review**

#### **Conceptualizing Terrorism and Insurgency**

This chapter explains how terrorism and insurgency are usually defined differently conceptually, especially in terms of the tactics used to combat both types of violence. This distinction is established in relation to the tactic used to combat insurgency in particular. Duyesteyn and Fumerton characterize terrorism and insurgency as "two independent sorts of strategies of irregular war" (Holmqvist-Jons'ater, Coker, & Henriksen, 2010: 28). As a result, it is not meant to be an analysis of how an insurgent group and a terrorist group vary in terms of membership and goals. Accordingly, the most crucial factor in the equation is the strategy the violent actor uses to accomplish their goal. Therefore, it is crucial to comprehend this distinction- to successfully modify the military response and the policy response to counter the adversary.

Terrorists and insurgents typically share the same end goal, which is to enact political change. Insurgencies aim to exert political power with "the tacit or explicit agreement of the people or, at worst, on its submissiveness," according to (Galula, 2006: 4). Insurgents are seen as domestic actors first and foremost because they can mobilize a sizable portion of the local population and obtain support from them. An insurgent group's strategic map is primarily motivated by the struggle for popular control. In order to take and control territory in the aim of eventually exercising political power, the insurgent will likely try to do so through collaborating with and through the public. As a result, the group leading the insurgency has the responsibility of building an army that can wrest territory from the government. Ideology or the use of physical force can both be employed to achieve this (Beckett, 2005; Hoffman, 2006). The group's ability to lead and organize a large enough following, its access to weapons, and the authority or legitimacy of the ruling body is all necessary for success (Grey, 1999). The size of the group and its support system are crucial factors, according to terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman. Hoffman (2006) claims that compared to terrorist organizations, insurgents represent a "numerically higher group of armed men". Bell and Evans (2010) characterize insurgents as "overtly nationalist, regionally constrained, and conventionally defensive [...] seeking to rescue a homeland" from an oppressive leader or unacceptable way of life.

A terrorist group wants to harm the state to provoke a reaction that will further undermine the legitimacy of the current administration. It is not necessary for the populace to participate for this objective to be achieved. On the other hand, the deliberate use of terror against civilians advances the political objectives of the terrorist organization by portraying the government in the public eye as a weakling incapable of defending its citizens. This facilitates the terrorist group's political objectives (Hoffman 2006). According to an article by titled "The Terrorist (Makes Sure He Is) Almost Always in a Minority"), by relying on this tactic, "the terrorist (ensures that he is) almost always in a minority (...), they rarely have majority support, let alone some alternative blueprint as to how their vision of a better world will work" (Bell & Evans 2010). Despite the facts that they can do a tremendous deal of damage, terrorists rarely succeed in their attempts to bring about change. This is because the terrorist's violence is meant to provoke the state, which forces it to respond with greater violence and repression, alienating the people, which suffer from both sides of the conflict (Fromkin, 1975: 4). The method tears holes in the social contract, leaving a void that can later be filled by taking advantage of it.

Because of this, it is crucial to distinguish between an insurgency and a terrorist organization based on the relationship that an insurgency maintains with the general public. Part of the insurgency strategy is creating geographical enclaves where organization members can develop unrestrictedly and without concern for the government. This contributes to fostering an environment that will support the movement's success. These are referred to as "zones of insurgent control," and according to (Kalyvas, 2006), it is essential to have them to expand operations into areas that are under government control. Because terrorist groups rely on secrecy and security and are more selective in their recruitment, the group sizes of an insurgency are much bigger than those of terrorist organizations (Crenshaw, 1981). In these geographical outposts, rebel groups also serve as the local governments. They have formed their own legal systems and offer government services that the state would typically be in charge of. Most of the time, none of this is relevant to a terrorist organization's operations.

Terrorism and insurgencies can both be viewed as tactical options, and both can involve terror attacks. Numerous violent non-state actors employ terrorism as a tactic to get toward

their strategic objectives (Tilly 2005: 21). Although there is still a distinction to be established between terrorist organizations and insurgent groups, Duyesteyn and Fumerton advise against the temptation to identify all parties that use fear as terrorists. This is so that any performer might exploit fear (in Holmqvist Coker & Henriksen, 2010: 31). An important factor to take into account is who they are attacking: While insurgents frequently target the state and its agents, such as the police and the military forces, in the area of their operations base, terrorists frequently target international interests, particularly western interests, inflicting dread beyond the immediate victim. On the other hand, close to their base of operations, insurgents mostly attack the state and its representatives.

Another important consideration is how they employ violence. Terrorists have been denied any political legitimacy as a result of their current use of suicide attacks, which has been portrayed in western literature as "nihilistic" or "apocalyptic" (Ignatief, 2017). However, this is unduly generalized. All paramilitary movements demand some kind of self-sacrifice from their members, whether or not they use suicide bombers. There is no questioning the effectiveness of utilizing suicide bombers as a low-risk strategy that may evoke fear in the populace. However, while some people have voluntarily decided to pursue this objective, others have been forced to do so, as is increasingly the case with the suicide bombs carried out by women and children on behalf of Boko Haram (Varin, 2016). This method neither reflects a nihilistic worldview held by individuals in leadership roles nor does it in any way compromise the group's long-term aims, which are extremely political and religious. Furthermore, there haven't been many groups in history that have just done bad things. Al Qaeda, for instance, may have been the organization that started things off in this way, but its local affiliates have grown on the seeds of societal unrest within a population that still has faith in a brighter future.

In conclusion, the collection of research highlights the distinctions in the roles that population and territorial control play. This is due to the fact that, according to the research, "the idea and practice of establishing political-military dominance over a population and its territory is notably lacking in the strategy of terrorism" (Holmqvist-Jonsater et al. 2010). Insurgent organizations typically seek to establish some form of territorial sovereignty over a specific geographic region and the local populace. Discontent on the social and political fronts supports this goal. As a result, it engages in conflict with

the government over both the people's land and their emotions (Schmitt & Ulmen 2006). Despite rebel groups using terrorism as one of their strategies, terrorism is still the main method by which terrorists conduct their operations.

However, these variations are typically just marginal. Insurgent groups may carry out terrorist acts, such as kidnapping and suicide bombing, to further their political goals and promote social advancement.

### **International versus sub-state terrorism in Africa: A facilitating environment for terrorism**

Despite the fact that terrorism on a subnational and even state level has been a severe concern in Africa for quite some time, the vast majority of contemporary research on the topic concentrates on the symptoms or attributes of terrorism on a global scale. In fact, every objective indicator demonstrates that Africa is the continent most harmed by terrorism, despite the fact that there is no such thing as international terrorism. In spite of the fact that it started from a very low foundation, statistics from the US Department of State's research "Patterns of Global Terrorism", (2001) suggest that international terrorism is expanding in Africa. As one end of a continuum, this is severe. A little over six percent of all acts of international terrorism between 1990 and 2002 took place on African soil (Cillers, 2003). When one looks at the costs of international terrorism in terms of the number of lives that have been lost as a direct result of these acts, a distinctive and dismal picture is revealed. 1998 was the year with the most fatalities due to the bombings that happened in Kenya and Tanzania (5,379), (5,379) (Muhula, 2007). With 6,177 deaths attributable to international terrorism, Africa ranked second worst among continents during the same time period, behind only Asia.

However, it would be a terrible disservice to the people of Africa to limit the conversation to data that attempts to compute the number of assaults carried out by foreign terrorists. Terrorists represent a severe threat to the continent of Africa. Millions of fatalities are caused by it, most of which are domestic, sub-state-based, and these domestic, sub-state-based variables also serve as the principal causes of those fatalities. In the past few months, we've seen an uptick in the use of methods that aim primarily at instilling fear in their victims, both by rebel groups and by state troops. The Lord's

Resistance Army, the Mai, UNITA, RENAMO, and MODEL are among them in Angola and Mozambique; UNITA and RENAMO are also present in Angola. MODEL is an exclusive Mozambican product. The list is almost fully limitless. The Angolan government's approach is a good example of this. There are two perspectives that must be taken into account if one is to have an understanding of the events that have contributed to the growth of terrorist activities in Africa (Thaler, 2012). The first was linked to an increase in worldwide terrorist activity, while the second was tied to the fact that terrorism has become the dominant and intentional technique in the vast majority of Africa's armed conflicts. Studying this topic in any depth would be impossible. The growth of terrorist groups on a worldwide scale and the implications it has on Africa terrorism experts have been warning of a new generation of terrorists since the early 1990s, saying that they will eventually replace the revolutionary and state-sponsored terrorism that dominated the whole historical time before them. Terrorists of this period would come to dominate global politics. A new type of threat surfaced in the 1980s in the shape of informal networks of people with similar backgrounds and ideas who used terrorism as a weapon. Loosely affiliated groups like these have replaced the tightly knit, disciplined ones that were commonplace a decade ago. In contrast to this were the institutions that had dominated the world throughout the preceding decade. The two forms of international terrorism that have existed, the ones that existed in the past and the ones that exist today, share some similarities, but there are also significant distinctions. The tightly knit cells of trained assailants who so often served the interests of other countries' governments and gave rise to the term "state-sponsored terror" are no longer active. Larger, less rigid groups have taken their place, with members meeting and interacting with one another at a local level in the context of spiritually inspired activities. Due to the activity's low intensity and frequent concentration on a charismatic leader, it is highly tough to forecast it and take precautionary actions. It is widely considered that the formation of a secret alliance in the 1980s to counter Soviet expansion into Central and South Asia, with a concentration on Afghanistan, played a crucial role in fueling the emergence of international terrorism in the 1990s. Numerous pieces of evidence support this claim. In 1979, when the Soviet Union was poised to attack Afghanistan, the United States (US) prepared a counter-strategy with the intention of incorporating the now-defunct Soviet Union in its own

Vietnam War. The difficulty is that applying this strategy led to the production of an infinitely huge number of offshoots. During this operation, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) let out a genie that had favorable short-term benefits (most notably, a significant contribution to the demise of the Soviet Union) but negative long-term effects. When the Soviet Union left Afghanistan ten years later, the CIA followed suit and fled as well, isolating and betraying longtime US friends in the process. Training terrorists for a new global guerrilla brotherhood has replaced the training of yesterday's liberators, who included several underground anti-Soviet Muslim armies in Afghanistan (Quelquejay, 2015). The US and those nations who are regarded as close allies of the United States are cooperating toward a common international goal as a part of this coalition brotherhood. Because of the positive effects of globalization, this scenario is plausible. Soon after the Soviet Union pulled its forces out of Afghanistan in 1989, an infectious disease brought back to northern Africa by soldiers who had fought in Afghanistan spread rapidly throughout the region. Its consequences were immediately noticed in Sudan, Algeria, and Egypt. Initial financial assistance for the growth of Islamist extremism came from governments like Saudi Arabia. Then private extremist funders like Osama bin Laden and others stepped in to lend aid. Approximately 600–1,000 Algerians who had participated in the military during the Afghan conflict that lasted from 1986–1989 returned home (Atteridge, 2016).

They laid the groundwork for future growth of the terrorist movement. When discussing violent extremism in the past, things that took place within a nation's boundaries attracted the majority of attention. These get-togethers received a jolt of fresh energy with the return of veterans who had served in the Afghan war, and their attendees' attention switched to the wider world as a result. A wave of terrorist attacks in South Africa in the late 1990s (carried out by Pagad) and a succession of strikes in East African nations would ultimately be inspired by the conflicts. The 1992 election boycott in Algeria was the spark that began the civil war in that nation. Following the delay of elections in Algeria in 1992, a series of events unfolded, resulting in the murders of tens of thousands of people, injuries to a much larger number, the displacement of even more, and the disappearance of many others. Since gaining independence, the bidonvilles or shantytowns that surround the cities have seen their economies stagnate and their

unemployment rates rise. Because of this, the country has been on the verge of war ever since. All of these factors contributed to a setting that was fertile ground for the growth of radical populist ideologies. On the night of December 29, 1997, 412 persons, including men, women, and children, were brutally killed in three rural villages in the Elizane region of Algeria, in one of the worst occurrences in the country (Gracia, 2017). This was one of the worst things that happened throughout the fighting. Algeria was home to these neighborhoods. It's possible that the horrible bloodshed could have lasted longer if Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and other Sub-Saharan states hadn't taken fast and forceful precautionary actions earlier. Despite these best attempts, a massacre took place in Luxor, Upper Egypt, on November 23, 1997. A total of 60 foreign visitors, including 4 Egyptians, were killed. This horrible act was widely publicized, and it undoubtedly hurt the country's tourism industry (Woods, 2002). The bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998 showed how deeply Africa had been drawn into a new chapter in an old story, despite the widespread belief that the region played no vital role on the world stage. There were apparently apparent but unsuccessful attempts to damage further buildings in Tirana, Bangkok, and Kampala on the same day as these explosions. On the same day, bombs were detonated at the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. On August 20, 1998, the United States retaliated with a cruise missile strike against a suspected chemical plant in Khartoum, Sudan. This assault mirrored the global scope of the threat that had to be overcome. Prior to the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in the summer of 1995, tensions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia had been rising. Looking back, it's easy to see that the terrorist threats in various Middle Eastern nations, the Magreb, and the bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were just warmup acts for the attacks on September 11, 2001. Even though the bombings in Kenya and Tanzania stunned the world, there had been hints of impending trouble in both countries since the first Gulf War in 1991. These clues have been gradually revealing themselves to be more explicit. For instance, on January 25, 1991, the US Department of State issued an order instructing all non-essential government officials and the families of embassy staff members to leave Tanzania in reaction to the growing threat of terrorism related with the Gulf War. The law extends protections to the families of diplomats as well. The assaults

on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001, as well as other iconic targets in the US, brought the difficulties of the post-Cold War era to the attention of the world, although a global campaign had already been going on for several decades. This focus was attracted in part by similarities to other American symbols.

In addition, terror is regularly and extensively used by regional, national, and local groups. Even though minor, these incidents highlight a growing threat to international security, calling for action from the international community as a whole, including many African states. This step will be required to counter the danger. As a result of globalization, terrorist organizations can more easily expand their operations across international borders. The proliferations of portable electronics, online resources, and international travel have all helped simplify our global community. The demonstration effect provided by highly publicized acts like bomb explosions and plane hijackings, as well as the close attention to the effects of state and sub-state terrorism in places like the West Bank, makes it possible to mobilize and incite others to do the same thing, as well as violently protest these actions, via television and other forms of media. Television and other media can also be used to voice strong opposition to these actions. The demonstrative impact caused by highly publicized incidents like bombings and hijackings and the close attention paid to the effects of these activities also contribute to the creation of an anti-government sentiment. This consists of the following components: population movement and migration, and the establishment of substantial diaspora populations in many liberal democracies which may also contribute to the globalization of terrorism. Each of these communities is distinct inside the society that hosts it and maintains its independence from those societies, making them additional contributors to the globalization of terrorism.

Each of these communities has its own unique subculture, in the same way that Afghanistan and Algeria. Terrorism even when carried out overseas, always has domestic origins and is driven by local injustices. The most extensive acts of terrorism on a global scale can be included here. This is the case regardless of the scale of the terrorist assault, be it domestic or international. For instance, it is not feasible to understand Bin Laden's goals without first knowing the context in which hunt was initiated, notably the current political and economic condition in Saudi Arabia. This is because understanding the factors that drive Bin Laden is dependent on understanding what drives him initially. This

is due to the fact that his motivation has strong historical roots in Saudi Arabia. This is due to the linked and reliant nature of the elements that drive Bin Laden's motivation, Botha (2010) is correct in his claims. As opposed to Al Qaeda, the vast majority of [Islamic] extremist organizations do not operate on a worldwide scale. This is the case even when these organizations have links to parallel movements in other countries. Most of these conflicts stem from fighting between states or between states and neighboring countries or regions. Despite the best efforts of the international community to avoid it, the question of the "basic causes" of terrorism will always arise throughout any investigation into acts of domestic terrorism. It would be a mistake, for instance, to attribute the development of terrorism in Algeria solely to the return of its soldiers from Afghanistan. The conflict in that country has been going on for over a decade and has claimed the lives of over 150,000 people since 1993(Botha, 2007). Long before the events in Afghanistan, Islam had been a driving force for transformation and a marker of individuality. The situation has been like this for some time. A total of 132 years of oppression and violence at the hands of colonial powers were required for Algeria to finally gain its independence in 1962. During those years, this played a pivotal role. Algerians fought the French during the Algerian War of Independence not just for Algeria's sake but also for the sake of Islam. As well as fighting for independence for their country, Algerians also saw the war as a chance to advance Islam. When describing Algerians, colonialists focused on their religious beliefs rather than their ancestry, culture, or geography. That was the mindset throughout Algeria's colonial period and was also the mentality of the colonialists back then. Algerian extremist Islam grew in the years after independence as a response to widespread dissatisfaction with the Front de Liberation Nationale's (FNL) dictatorial government and army-party hierarchy, which monopolized both political and Islamic discourse. The FNL monopoly on talk of politics and Islam may explain this. This can, at least in part, be attributed to the FNL monopoly over political and Islamic discourse during the period. As a direct result of this disappointment, Algeria transformed into a fertile field for the spread of radical interpretations of Islam. Algerians gained their first moral grounding and the moral authority to critique their society from the Islamic ideals of good and evil, justice, and equality. In Algeria, the majority of people adhere to the Islamic faith. Finally, this resulted in communities of people who were

profoundly dissatisfied with their social, economic, and political opportunities in the EU's second-largest natural gas exporter. The residents of these areas were extremely gloomy about these aspects of their country's future. Discontent with their social, economic, and political fates was high among these communities. The government's efforts to dismantle the Islamic Salvation Front (ISF) as a political and social force and the invalidation of the ISF's election victory in 1992 are the two main causes of the current deadly resurgence of terrorism in Algeria. Aside from that, the ISF election result from 1992 was nullified. Both of these things contributed to the current political turmoil that the country is experiencing. In recent years, this has become increasingly clear. The majority of people who joined the Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA) in 1993 were referred to as "Afghans," and their presence contributed significantly to the escalation of violent crime in Algeria. The General Islamic Armed Group is the most dangerous organization in Algeria at the moment (GIA). When it comes to this battle, in which the Algerian government is practically the lone actor, the international community would rather not discuss the purported "fundamental causes" of terrorism. But this topic will arise naturally in any discussion about domestic terrorism. The Algerian government alleges, based on information provided by the NGO Human Rights Watch, that hundreds of thousands of civilians have been forcibly taken from their homes on multiple times as they fled in fear of these armed groups. Soldiers frequently prevent civilians from reaching a safe zone and, when encountering them, demand valuables such as money and personal belongings. People trying to get away from armed groups are easier targets for rape and kidnapping. Tens of thousands of people are still living in secrecy, and they face severe shortages of food and water, inadequate shelter, and no access to adequate healthcare.

There are many more pieces of data that need to be considered. About 300,000 people had been killed in Burundi over the preceding decade, and every month, 100,000 people were forced to evacuate their homes due to violence between Hutu militias and the government. It is estimated that three million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo died during the previous three years due to the ongoing conflict. Since 1999, at least 50,000 people have died as a direct result of the fighting in Bunia and the nearby mineral-rich Ituri region. It's a skirmish in a war that has killed millions of people in Africa's third most populous country over the past five years. As a result of the civil

conflict that has been going on in Rwanda since 1994, about 40 percent of the population has been killed or driven from their homes. Two million people have died as a direct result of the civil conflict in Sudan, and the country now has Africa's highest population displacement rate. The southern region of the country had been destroyed by guerrilla conflict over the previous two decades, and at the time, it was estimated that 92% of the population was living in poverty.

It is undeniable that people in many African countries are regularly subjected to terror and violence. The fact that only some of this may be considered terrorism is not to downplay the significance of this reality (illegal violence carried out with a clear political objective through the use of terror). In the early twenty-first century, the political divide between the developed and Islamic worlds is widely recognized as one of the most salient elements of the international political scene.

This awareness is one of the distinguishing features of the international political system (a term that includes a number of African countries). It is undeniable that the divide between the Western and Islamic worlds is widening, and that the scale of this violence is enormous. Whatever political deception comes from first-world countries, it won't change the fact that millions of people in Africa are in peril every day. This is a fact, and despite widespread Islamophobia in the West, efforts to counter terrorism should still center on addressing the underlying causes of dissatisfaction, alienation, and radicalization, such as inequalities in wealth and power. Instead, the efforts should focus on eliminating the root causes of the problems. Realizing this, however, does not mean that counterterrorism operations should ignore the underlying social, economic, and political factors that contribute to radicalization rather than just terrorism. The current state of panic is likely to persist for decades, and rapid action is unthinkable in the face of the repercussions of such a linear relationship. Effective responses can and should have an effect at every stage of the chain connecting systemic inequity, violence, and/or terrorism. Injustice in the system may play a role in bringing about both of these results. Multiple stages and chains of causation, come together to produce violent conflict and terrorist attacks as a result of structural inequity. In particular, it is generally agreed that the risk of violent resistance, including acts of terrorism, is reduced in a society that gives high emphasis to the advancement and defense of human rights and experiences economic growth that is at

least moderate and largely egalitarian. This is to ensure that a society with sluggish economic growth that is largely equitable can nonetheless devote significant resources to promoting and protecting human rights.

Furthermore, it is a universal truth that the possibility of violent disaffection, which can include terrorist actions, is greatly reduced in societies that are devoted to advancing and safeguarding human rights and that also benefit from at least moderate and generally equitable economic growth. A possible use of the concept is demonstrated here. This is a perfect example of a universal truth. The chance of violent disaffection, which can include terrorist acts, is higher in oppressive states. An authoritarian and corrupt society that restricts individual space does not authorize certain activities, both the deterioration of the economy and the increase in inequality amplify the dangers associated with it. However, the strength of this link is relatively weak. To accomplish this goal, it is required to first establish the groundwork for change and then politicize those conditions, whether through adversity or some other means. Having a solid foundation of positive motivation is crucial, in addition to a wide range of potential triggers or events that impact behavior toward violent behaviors. The effort requires leadership, organization, recruitment, and mobilization on the part of those involved.

To sum up, it's crucial to create a conducive environment that provides both resources and goals to work toward. When one considers the kind of circumstances, events, and mental pictures that could motivate terrorist actions (or policies), one might consider the following instances: A simplistic analogy would be a long chain that begins with the origins of terrorism and extends into the haze of time. Indeed, one can look at it that way. There is no way for any social theory or model to determine with absolute certainty that these causes will result in a particular action until the exact last link in the chain is met. Up to that point, the chain will be considered incomplete. The completion of the overall goal is dependent on the success of each individual link in the chain. Though many believe that hindsight is the only social science that can be considered completely perfect, it is evident that one's skill to forecast the most likely conclusion of a situation improves the closer they are to its resolution.

### **The origins of Boko Haram violence: Opposing Perspectives**

The origins of Boko Haram, also known as *Jamat Ahl as-Sunnah lid-da'wa wal-Jihad*, are controversial among Sunni and Jihadists (those committed to the dissemination of the Sunnah and Jihad). According to Freedom (Onuoha, 2014) if one relies on media reporting, it is impossible to know for sure what year Boko Haram was founded. Since its inception, the Boko Haram movement has been at war with the government of Nigeria. To put it another way, the exact date of Boko Haram's founding is a point of contention (Onuoha, 2014). But he did point out that most regional and worldwide media outlets date the sect's inception to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf emerged as its leader. According to the Nigerian government (Onuoha, 2014), Abubakar Lawan founded the *Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra* sect in 1995 at the University of Maiduguri in Borno State. A majority of local and international security experts in Nigeria, he argues (Onuoha, 2014), have developed a timeline for the group's early beginnings. From its inception until Mohammed Yusuf took control in 2002, the movement progressed peacefully and successfully. This was the case notwithstanding the existence of the movement (Abubakar, 2016). Since then, the group has been known by many different labels, such as Boko Haram, Muhajirun, Yusufiyah, the Nigerian Taliban, and *Jama'atu Ahlissunnah Lidda'awatiwal Jihad*. According to (Connell, 2012), Abubakar Lawan originally founded Boko Haram in 1995 under the name "*Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra*," before rebranding the group. That was back when the band was still known by its previous moniker. In contrast, Brinkel and Ait-Hida, (2012) believe that the organization, which has its origins in the Islamic Yusufiyya, was founded in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, in northern Nigeria. In 2004, the congregation relocated to Kannamma, a town in Yobe State not far from the Niger border. Since then, it has made that location its permanent base of operations, launching all of its subsequent attacks from there. According to Brinkel and Ait-Hida, 2012, a major insurgency was taking place in the states of Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe as of July 2009. Mohamed Yusuf acted as the team leader. The insurrection resulted in numerous casualties, both in terms of lives lost and in terms of those who were injured or forced to relocate. A regional in-depth analysis of where Boko Haram sprang from was supplied by Roland Marchal, Roman Loimeier, and Micha'el Tanchum, (2012) in that

order. Marchal (2012), for one, says that "a lengthy history of extremism" is to blame for Boko Haram's success. According to Marchal (2012), parts of modern-day northern Nigeria, northern Niger, and northern Cameroon were once ruled by Usman dan Fodio's Sokoto Caliphate in the late 19th century. Conventional wisdom holds that Usman dan Fodio was the original caliph. Since the British took possession of the territory and started regulating it in 1903, Muslims there have rejected attempts to provide them with an education on par with that offered in Western countries. According to him, Boko Haram's primary connection to the earlier Islamic revivalist movements in Nigeria is the Jama'at Izalat al Bid'a Wa Iqamat as Sunna (Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reestablishment of the Sunna), also spelled Izala or Yan Izal. These occurrences occurred in the past. On the other hand, Tanchum (2012) hypothesizes that Boko Haram origin can be traced back to the Kanuri people's struggle against colonialism in the years leading up to independence to protect their ethnic interests. This is how Tanchum interprets events. The two of northern Nigeria's twelve predominantly Muslim states that was named as the birthplaces of the terrorist organization Boko Haram were Yobe and Borno. Yobe and Borno, formerly part of the Kanuri Empire of Bornu, are home to a large population of Kanuri people. This is in sharp contrast to the eleven states where Islam is the dominant religion and where the Hausa people form the bulk of the population. The Kanuri have a same history with the rulers of Yobe and Borno (Brinkel & Ait-Hida, 2012). As part of a broader anti-colonial movement taking place across the country in the years leading up to Nigeria's independence from colonial control in 1960, a pan-Kanuri nationalist movement with its roots in Borno sought to further Kanuri interests. The maximalists within the movement advocated for the establishment of a "Greater Kanowra," which they defined as an area encompassing sections of Cameroon's Region de l'Extrême-Nord, Niger's Zinder and Diffa Departments, and Chad's Lac and Kanem Prefectures. A total of about 534,460 km<sup>2</sup> of landmass makes up this area. The Kanuri region, which includes sections of northeastern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, southeast Niger, and south-western Chad, is the present operational center of Boko Haram. The organization can go to Sudan from the Kanuri region of Chad, and from there they may reach al-Shabaab in Somalia. Touareg portions of Niger fall under Boko Haram's control, as do neighboring Touareg regions in Mali, southern Libya, and Algeria. The Kanuri areas of Niger are crossed by this northern

corridor. This route was planned by the terrorist organization Boko Haram. The current Boko Haram networks, according to (Tanchum, 2012) have resurrected an old pre-colonial map based on Kanuri ethnic identity, but Boko Haram is not a religious revivalist organization seeking to address dormant ethno-nationalist concerns. The Salafi ideology that Boko Haram espouses, on the other hand, reveals a shift in the group's aims away from traditional religious revival and toward ethno-nationalist goals, on the other, shows how traditional African Muslim values are gradually replacing the Salafi values that are advocated by Al-Qaeda doctrine. As a direct result, a pan-Islamic movement has formed, with supporters hailing from a wide variety of Muslim ethnic groupings, including the alienated Hausa, alienated Kanuri, and unhappy Fulani.

According to Onuoha, (2014) the philosophy behind Boko Haram is rooted in the strict interpretation of Islam known as Orthodox Islam. In this interpretation of Islam, obtaining a Western education or holding public office is both taboo. That's probably how Boko Haram got to signify "western education is either forbidden or a sin," and that makes a lot of sense. However, some of the group's members have questioned the veracity of this assessment. On the other side, the group's primary objective is to replace the current Nigerian government with a strict Islamic state governed by sharia law. The gang views this as a means to an end. According to Isaac Terwase Sampson (2012), the group's use of violence is motivated in part by the extrajudicial execution of its leader, Sheik Yusuf, and the widespread arrest and detention of its members; however, the group's primary goal is the overthrow of the Nigerian secular state and the establishment of a theocratic government based on Islamic sharia.

For Isaac Terwase Sampson (2012), this may explain why the organization's initial targets were security-conscious businesses and government agencies. But as time has progressed, the scope of these attacks has broadened to include a wider variety of places, including media outlets, markets, schools, and places of worship. For the first few years of its existence in the 2000s, Boko Haram's primary method for armed struggle was always the use of guns. Nonetheless, the group has adopted the use of suicide bombers, drive-by shootings, high-explosive explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as operational methods in recent years (Onuoha, 2018).

Boko Haram is not just present in the 19 states that make up northern Nigeria, but in several neighboring countries in the Sahel region as well, where it is actively recruiting members. Sudan, northern Cameroon, Chad, and Niger are only some of the countries afflicted by this illness. The majority of the organization consists of Almajiris who act as foot soldiers and dissatisfied teenagers, unemployed graduates, but the group also has a small number of intellectuals and retired uniform officers who provide the group with support and intellectual competence (Onuoha, 2018). Members of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania, and al-Shabaab, the Islamic militia of Somalia have all provided assistance to the group in the areas of recruitment, training, and logistics. It has been speculated that Boko Haram has received funds not only from foreign terrorist organizations but also from several powerful and wealthy politicians (Omotosho, 2015). Kidnapping, bank robberies, and drug trafficking in the Sahel are all things the gang may have turned to in recent years as a means of funding its activities. Although Boko Haram's money has been traced back to other terrorist organizations, it remains unclear who exactly has provided this support. According to Maza, Koldas & Aksit (2020), the preceding discussion, Boko Haram has transformed from a group that advocates nonviolence into one that really participates in violent operations over the course of its existence. This demonstrates that the change has taken place (Brinkel, 2012). Since the group's inaugural attack on state security officers in the towns of Geiam and Kannamma in Yobe State in December 2003, it has been known that it has preferences regarding religious belief and social norms. Many people, including women, soldiers, and police officers, have been killed as a result of bombing attacks and murders that have spread to other northern sections of the country.

According to Ali (2013), following the nation's return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has experienced an increase in terrorism, which has made people in Nigeria more fearful of being attacked. In other words, the growth in the frequency of terrorist acts in Nigeria may be directly linked to the rise in the fear of instability there. In Nigeria, a nation with a long history of violent crime, the decade from 1960 to 1970 played a crucial role in the expansion of the epidemic of such crime. The British colonial authority required Nigeria to adopt a federal political system at the time of its independence in 1960. According to Wheare (1963), the term "federalism" refers to the legal requirement for the

separation of powers between two different levels of government that coexist while acting independently within their own domains of influence. Unfortunately, the federal system that was handed down to Nigeria at the time of its independence did not adhere to Professor K.C. Wheare's definition of federalism (Awotayo et al, 2013). Nigeria's federalism was twisted as a direct result of the military's interference in the civilian government of the country and the consequent imposition of a military command structure within a federation. Nigeria's federalism is plainly tarnished by corruption as a direct outcome of the enormous amount of authority the federal government holds. Due to this authority, the federal government is able to distribute resources to lower-level organizations as it sees fit (Ewetan, 2011). Numerous nationalities and ethnic groups inside Nigeria have pushed for true federalism as well as changes to the nation's political and economic institutions ever since the commencement of the country's independence. Unhappy ethnic groups in Nigeria have brutally reacted to these agitations, endangering the safety, unity, and even existence of Nigeria as a single nation. Conflict, a threat to national coherence and peace, and ultimately dissolution are the only outcomes that can be anticipated from a system of federalism that seeks to undermine the independence and autonomy of its constituent organizations (Ali, 2013; Adamu, 2018). Nigeria's national security issues date back to the beginning of the military rule there. Large amounts of armament were imported into Nigeria for use by the military throughout the civil war (1967-1970) there. Nevertheless, some of these weapons ended up in the possession of people. This has directly led to an increase in the frequency of dangerous circumstances. Armed robberies and other crimes were committed with these weapons by both civilians and Civil War soldiers in the years immediately following the war's end. Additionally, there were a sizable number of young people looking for work who had lost their jobs as a direct result of the civil conflict. People bought more rifles and other light weapons during the lengthy military rule that began in 1970 to defend themselves against the high degree of unrest that was in the nation at the time (Adamu, 2018). Rifles and handguns among these weapons eventually found their way into the hands of unemployed young people who used them for illicit activities. Others have drawn attention to the influence of political and economic variables on young people's inclination to act violently, including

ethnic unrest, political unrest, unemployment, and the Structural Adjustment Programme in Nigeria.

Numerous scholars in Nigeria have identified several elements that contribute to unrest and violence (Ali, 2013). There are two types of these factors: internal causes and external causes. Peer pressure and other psychological aspects of puberty, according to some researchers (Steinberg & Scott, 2003) are to blame for adolescent aggression. Others, on the other hand, concentrate more on the part that political and economic factors play in this matter (Aghedo, 2012). Nigerian academics have identified several elements that contribute to unrest and war, both of which are harmful to the socioeconomic and overall development of the nation. Nigeria's internal causes of instability provide a greater challenge to the country's efforts to improve its socioeconomic situation than sources of instability from other nations. For instance, Okonkwo (2012) has written a history of the nation's conflicts and insecurity from the year it gained independence in 1960 till the present day. The origins of the disputes that have led to instability in the region may be traced back to the colonial era, which is associated with the development of opposing governing classes along ethnic and religious lines. There was a time period called as the colonial era that lasted from 1492 to 1960. The civil wars that have broken out because of these fears are to blame for the current state of unease. This could help shed light on why the northern region of Nigeria has a history of security problems, such as wars between different religious and ethnic groups. These problems have been around for some while. For instance, after the state of Plateau's transition to democratic rule in 1999, multiple violent conflicts have broken out amongst the various populations there (Enyinnaya, 2015). In situations like this, gunfire amongst individuals is commonplace. Battles have broken out among different ethnic and religious groups in the cities of Kaduna and Kano, as well as in the Tafawa Balewa neighborhood of Bauchi, where violence has been going on for over 30 years.

While Okonkwo's thesis of colonial legacies may explain the high number of crises in the country's north, it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for the situation in the Niger Delta or the large number of kidnappings and armed robberies in the south-eastern and south-western states (Okonkwo, 2012). Those who study Nigeria's colonial past have offered an explanation for the country's ongoing security crisis, but their explanation only

scratches the surface of the real problem (Onuoha, 2012). What this means is that the current crisis in Nigeria is likely more complex than it appears at first glance. For a long time to come, people will argue passionately over whether colonial rule, poverty, politics, or religions are to blame for Boko Haram and the greater instability in northern Nigeria. Boko Haram is, without a doubt, one of the most infamous terrorist organizations in history. Despite this, the most dangerous form of instability caused by the Boko Haram insurgency persists in Nigeria's northern areas. The expansion of its membership, scope of its activities, and number of partnerships has ramifications for a wide variety of research questions across the West African region.

### **Conceptual Framework**

Since the start of the reflectivist wave in international relations, traditional concepts like security and sovereignty, or war and peace, have been subjected to an interpretivist process. This procedure attempted to critically reevaluate the traditional ideas' status in the field of International Relations. Security referents (ranging from the state as a traditional actor to the individual) and security sectors proliferated as a result of the examination of the security framework conducted under the new methodological guidelines of the "contested concepts" framework. According to Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (2003), this "conceptual widening" led to the breakdown of the boundaries between peace research and strategic studies. Walt (1991) argued that "The two disciplines have combined somewhat to form security studies, which cover a range from more traditional approaches to so-called "critical security studies" (cited in Krause & Williams, 1997). During early 1990s, when there was a lot of theoretical commotion surrounding the topic of security, The Copenhagen School contributed by providing a research framework that better embraced the concepts of security and security threats. This strategy was first proposed by members of the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, who also gave it its current name (formerly the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research). The Copenhagen School is a school of thought that, at its core, embraces the conviction that human agency—rather than state agency—is what creates security. This research uses the concepts and framework proposed by the Copenhagen School to evaluate the Boko Haram insurgency occurring in Nigeria.

On a variety of levels, including the state, sub-regional, regional, and global levels, the international community and states respond to and deal with newly emerging threats in different ways as a result of the emergence of transnational terrorist organizations (TTOs) and the activities they engage in, particularly in the years after the end of the Cold War (Makarenko, 2004). As a result, sub-regional and regional players operating on the continent of African are not immune to the difficulties brought on by the existence and activities of these transnational terrorist organizations (Gibson, 2004; Tella, 2018). For instance, the increase and nefarious actions of the extremist insurgent group known as Boko Haram are thought to represent Nigeria's greatest existential threat to its independence since the end of the country's Civil War (1967–1970). The fact that Boko Haram has been implicated in several high-profile incidents in recent years has been used to explain this concern (Odo, 2015; Ogunnubi, 2017). According to Hansen and Musa (2013), the Boko Haram insurgent group has launched a number of deliberate attacks against the Nigerian government and numerous institutions since its actions came to the public's attention in 2009. The country's sociopolitical and economic development has been negatively impacted by these attacks. Intentional consequences of this group's acts are felt at the sub regional and regional levels in addition to the lustful devastation of lives, assets, likewise the economy of Nigeria's northeastern area. The northeastern part of Nigeria's economy has been detraind as a consequence of the operations of this insurgent group. Numerous experts' conclusions indicate that these risks pose a serious threat to numerous sub-regional and regional organizations operating on the African continent, in addition to posing a threat to Nigeria's corporate life as a state. Multilateral organizations including the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) are tasked with overcoming the formidable obstacle (AU). According to Ogbonna & Jiménez (2017), advancing peace, progress, advancement, these organizations are up against the enormous challenge. The preconditions which resulted in the development of the terrorist group Boko Haram have been postulated in a number of studies (Hansen, & Musa 2013; Ayegba, 2015; Nweke, 2014; Hansen, 2017; Maza, Koldas, & Aksit, 2020). Nweke, 2015; Adibe, 2015; These include a long history of bad administration and governance, the elites' use of violence as

a tool, the escalation of poverty amidst abundance, the legacy of social inequality and injustice, an increase in unemployment. There are still some challenges to overcome, particularly those that are related according to the model for sub-regional security cooperation in the struggle against the Boko Haram insurgency, despite the role that the governments of Nigeria and other organizations at the sub-regional and regional levels have played in containing and combating the activities of this group. Therefore, this research seeks to conduct a critical examination of the existing literature on the Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on the security sector and security arenas, as suggested by proponents of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, and to add to that body of work.

The military sector of security in Nigeria is being put to the test by the incursions being carried out by Boko Haram, which puts the capacity and competency of Nigeria's defense forces to deal with this dreaded organization to the test (Onuoha & Thurston, 2013). According to the justifications offered by proponents of the Copenhagen School, a danger to this sector would have serious consequences for the other facets of national security. This is due to the fact that it advances the conversation and narrative about the state's capacity to uphold its obligation to safeguard the lives and property of its citizens while also assessing her capacity to respond to threats to her territorial, internal, and external sovereignty. This is due to the fact that it increases the likelihood that the state may be unable to fulfill its duty (Stone, 2009). Many academics, including Brenya and Kuffuor (2015), Bappah (2016), Maiangwa (2017), Ogunnubi (2017), and Haruna (2018), claim that the Nigerian military was once thought to be among the most potent defense forces in Africa due to its history and accomplishments in the numerous peacekeeping engagements in war-torn nations across the continent in the 1990s and early 2000s. These allegations are supported by the Nigeria Now that this terrible organization has materialized; the veracity of that accusation is put to the test. This is because, according to many commentators, the Boko Haram insurgency has severely damaged the Nigerian military's reputation and opened up a "Pandora's box" of enduring difficulties that have made it difficult for this sector to effectively suppress and manage the insurgency. According to Maza (2020), the military sector is one area where the Boko Haram insurgents appeared to have sway based on the levels, intensity, and successes recorded

in carrying out certain attacks in the northeastern region of Nigeria, leading to a high number of fatalities of both military and civilians, with over 20,000 deaths that have been documented, as further demonstrated by Aljazeera (2018), Campbell (2021), "Boko Haram overruns," (2018), and Ogundipe (2018). As a result, many individuals came to the conclusion that one of the businesses Boko Haram has targeted in its operations is the military industry. Although it was once thought that the risks facing the military were a result of their lack of professionalism, there are a number of additional variables that make it challenging for the military to control and contain the Boko Haram problem. These issues include the over politicization of the military, the lack of a unified counterinsurgency policy and set of rules of engagement, and the challenges posed by operations and logistics. How this sector of security responds to and manages the impact of this group tends to be greatly influenced by the response and cooperation of various regional and sub-regional actors in putting an end to the activities of this insurgent group under the auspices of the Multinational Joint Taskforce, whose role includes a military approach to counterinsurgency. Onuoha and Oyewole (2018) came to the conclusion that this insurgent organization's operations and this sector's inability to effectively handle this threat have consequently had a significant impact on the military environment, which has in turn had an impact.

Terrorism affects every sector of the international system, terroristic crime is not only a threat to peace and security but it also hinders the society at large. These terroristic attacks affect the social and economic stability of a state, thereby reducing the standard of living and creating economic instability. The societal impact of terrorism can be view through the scope of poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption and bad governance. Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region has caused social degradation in the lives of people living in their operated areas. Many of which are faced with poverty and the lack of freedom to move about, moreover economic activities in those areas are on a slow pace due to attacks. The insurgency has also led to social and religious tension between the most well-known religious group in the region, Muslims and Christians. Further analysis demonstrates that the rising politicization and instrumentalization of religion and identity by the political, religious, and traditional elites further exacerbated the societal threat posed by the Boko Haram rebels. The majority of the time, this is done

at the expense of the wider section of society in order for these elites to further advance their agendas and interests. It is evident in the consistently harsh tone of these leaders' lectures, which they use to indoctrinate these harmful principles and beliefs into those who willfully accept, ingest, and put these teachings into practice (Adesoji, 2010; Walker, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013). As a result the leaders of Boko Haram and other radical insurgent groups operating throughout the Sahel region in general galvanize, mobilize, and instrumentalize these unfavorable religious views, sentiments, and ideologies in order to further sever societies and foster the conditions necessary for insurgencies to flourish. Similar to this, the Boko Haram insurgency has harmed the social contact between many communities in the area that were formerly united despite their differences in culture, religion, and ethnicity. This has set the stage for distrust and division within these groups. The ideational and identity construct of the people in the northeast of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin must therefore be taken into consideration by relevant actors engaged in resisting and combatting the Boko Haram insurgency. This is due to the fact that rogue elites have used negative and polarizing doctrinal narratives to exploit, instrument, and weaponize the cultural homogeneity of these nations in order to worsen. The fight against terrorism is crucial so as to eliminate the causes of social-economic instability in the region.

## CHAPTER III

### **Boko Haram as a Terrorist Organization and ECOWAS effort in West Africa to Combat Terrorism**

Boko Haram terrorist organization was established in Maiduguri, Nigeria, the capital of the Borno state by Mohammed Yusuf. The moniker Boko Haram, which translates to "Westernization is sacrilege," was given to the group by the locals because of how they felt about the group's way of life and goals. The original name of this group was the Jamat Ahl al-Sunnah li-l-Dawah wa al-Jihd which can be translated as: "Association of the People of the Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad" or "People Committed to the Teaching of the Prophet for Propaganda and Jihad". Many people took this to suggest that receiving a traditional Western education was wrong: they contend that the introduction of western ideas is incompatible with Islamic precepts as, Boko Haram is ideologically opposed to westernization. Since then, the insurgent group has come to view westernization as a danger to Islam. The group claims that the West is to blame for corruption in Nigeria, which has widened the gap between the country's privileged few and the vast majority of its poor. As a result of this economic disparity, Nigeria has earned a reputation as one of the world's most corrupt nations. Boko Haram first gained widespread attention in July 2009 after a string of attacks on police stations and other government buildings that resulted in death of scores of police officers. This was done in revenge after an incident in which group members accused police of using excessive force against them but were unable to get an official investigation into the matter. As a result of these assaults, Boko Haram has become a focal point of public attention. As it was clear that the police couldn't handle the situation, the army was called in. The subsequent operation conducted by the Joint Military Task Force resulted in the death of over 700 Boko Haram members and the destruction of the mosque that served as the organization's administrative core. The military arrested Yusuf and a few other commanders, and then turned them over to the authorities. A few days later, the bullet-riddled bodies of Yusuf and his friends were laid out in the open, horrifying the group and onlookers alike with the police's unlawful killings. The deceased included Yusuf's father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed. After he turned himself in to police to be questioned, he was nonetheless put to death (Agbiboa, 2013). This occurrence prompted speculation that Boko Haram was no longer active or

had morphed into another organization. But the following year, a video emerged showing Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf's deputy, declaring himself as the new leader of the group and promising to wreak revenge on those responsible for the killings of him and the other members. The tape wasn't made public until the following year. Many individuals have drawn the conclusion that this is evidence of Boko Haram's revival. Since the summer of 2010, the terrorist group has not only been killing civilians but also striking larger targets, the bulk of which are members of the law enforcement community. One of the group's earliest operations, an attack on a prison in the city of Bauchi, which is located in the state of Bauchi, garnered a great deal of media attention. Back in September of 2010, they performed one of their first surgeries. As a direct result of the attack, almost 700 inmates were freed, including over 100 Boko Haram fighters. Later that year, on Christmas Eve, the terrorist gang exploded bombs in Christian areas in Jos, a city in the Plateau state, and specifically targeted two Christian churches in Maiduguri. In the second incident, around thirty lives were lost. Boko Haram's attacks became increasingly regular and violent, and so did the number of casualties and injuries they caused. The states in Nigeria's northeast, north central and central regions were the primary targets of the attacks. Attacks like these were common against government employees, police, and soldiers. Christians and other religions were targeted as well, along with Muslims who had criticized the group. A suicide bomber in Abuja, Nigeria, drove his automobile into the United Nations building on August 26, 2011, and detonated his explosives inside. Over one hundred people were injured, and at least 23 people were killed, in the attack. This was the organization's first successful strike in Nigeria, in targeting a high-profile individual or institution in the country's capital city. On January 20, 2012, members of the terrorist group Boko Haram launched a coordinated attack on the capital city of the state of Kano, also called Kano. Over 185 people lost their lives, making this one of the biggest massacres committed by this terrorist group. The objectives of these assaults were government and police facilities. There was a lot of mystery around Boko Haram after their 2010 resurgence, when they revealed neither their membership nor their internal structure. After Yusuf's death, the gang reportedly began to break apart into smaller factions, with Shekau at the helm of the largest of them. According to evidence acquired from several security agencies (Walker 2012), Boko Haram has ties to other terrorist organizations, which include Al-Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Apparently, attacks by Boko Haram fighters began in February 2013 in the neighboring country of Cameroon.

Given Boko Haram's penchant for secrecy and adaptability, it was difficult to devise a strategy that would effectively stop the group's campaign of terror. The Nigerian government, at first though their best option was to take a more aggressive stance and begin a military campaign. There was little indication that the attacks would cease until government forces ultimately succeeded in pushing the gang out of key cities. In 2013, it was made evident that Boko Haram had taken over a substantial number of rural local government districts in the states located in the country's north-eastern territory, giving them the ability to gain momentum and authority (Onuoha, 2010). The government's security forces' aggressive pursuit of the fugitives was also cause for concern. Extrajudicial killings and torture become commonplace since the military did not often differentiate between members of the group and civilians. Human rights groups generally disapproved of these tactics since they further agitated a population already on edge due to Boko Haram's brutality.

The current state of international security presents numerous existential threats that much beyond the mental assessments of policymakers and experts. International and regional organizations working to establish peace are penetrated by the deadly implications and destructive repercussions of insecurity, which have affected nations around the world. Countries and regional organizations have continued to propose a number of prescriptions that are consistent with the direction of growth trends, despite the fact that it is abundantly evident that the situation regarding global security is plagued with uncertainty. One issue is that there are now more potential national security challenges in Africa than there were before the Cold War ended. This type of threat is always shifting and adapting. Many aspects of stability have shifted and grown more precarious as a result of this expansion, including resource-related disputes, social unrest among communities and ethnic groupings, and religious difficulties. Even while transnational criminal networks and terrorist groups are pervasive on the African continent, this pattern is also attributable to poor governance and the state's incapacity to provide public goods. The second positive trend in Africa's peace and security environment shows that African-led solutions to tense events on the continent are

"becoming obvious and recognized" (Bala, & Tar, 2021). The African Union (AU) has recognized the non-indifference concept in regard to crises that occur on the African continent. This was made possible by prioritizing stable environments. The African Union took the initiative to form subregional organizations to complement the work being done by a variety of sovereign countries centered on the African continent. According to (Dokken, 2010) the importance of security measures conducted by subregional organizations in Africa increased after the African Union adopted the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) in 2002 (Bala, & Tar, 2021). With the support of the Child and Adult Deployment and Stability Program (CADSP), which was in charge of providing the necessary platforms, the Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force came into existence. For this reason, an all-African strategy for the provision of security was built on the foundation of sub- regional organizations. Though these venues exist, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), Taureg militants in northern Mali, Boko Haram in northeastern Nigeria, and trans-nationalized threats to Niger and Cameroon continue to pose the greatest security risks in West Africa. The recent acts of terrorism and insurgency in West Africa have raised severe security concerns for both individual countries and the Economic Community of West African States. The location of the region in West Africa has only exacerbated the difficulties already present there. Niger, Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria are just few of the West African countries where insurgent operations have led to civil instability.

### **Origin and Causes of Insecurity in Nigeria**

According to Ali (2013), following the nation's return to democratic rule in 1999, the country has experienced an increase in terrorism, which has made people in Nigeria more fearful of being attacked. In other words, the growth in the frequency of terrorist acts in Nigeria may be directly linked to the rise in the fear of instability there. In Nigeria, a nation with a long history of violent crime, the decade from 1960 to 1970 played a crucial role in the expansion of the epidemic of such crime.

The antithesis of what one perceives as security is what may be viewed as insecurity. There are numerous methods to comprehend and feel both comfort and unease. Some might interpret it as implying that there is no safety or no danger present, that there is a

risk, that there is uncertainty, that there is a lack of confidence, that it is doubtful, that it is insufficiently guarded or protected, that there is no stability, that it is troubled, that there is no protection, and that it is unsafe (Achumba et al, 2013). A person suffering from insecurity may experience dread, agitation, oppression, distraction, sadness, and even the loss of humanity. It could also make someone feel less confident in themselves.

Nigeria is currently experiencing a security crisis as a result of an insufficient, incorrect, and misguided security strategy. Every country on Earth exists to protect and care for its citizens as well as any potential residents. Some of the security issues that Nigeria must deal with include those related to food security, financial stability, dependable transportation, access to quality healthcare, and individual and societal safety. It is also possible to see political, tribal, or ethnic issues, political figure assassinations, and kidnappings or abductions in other parts of the nation. In addition to human trafficking, environmental degradation, and separatist agitations in the Niger Delta, there have been sporadic instances of armed robbery. In some parts of northern Nigeria, desertification and erosion are problems, respectively, as is coastal erosion. Nigeria's largest urban centers are impacted by a variety of issues, including annual flooding. It seems like one is restricting the scope of security worries to either just national security or the militarization of society. The majority of Nigerians appear to lack access to energy, food, a good transit system, pipe-borne water, health care facilities, and affordable, high-quality education. In the absence of these, widespread ethnic and religious tensions as well as terrorist activities may have occurred in the nation. In most cases, the migration was governed by economic and socio-political causes, and the Fulani herdsman settled in fertile areas to rear their cattle. As the migration continued to be governed by these factors, conflict between the herders and their host communities (farmers) increased. Numerous Nigerians die each year as a result of the Fulani herders' destruction of their houses, land, and farms, as well as their crops. Many of the conflicts that have developed between farmers and Fulani herdsman have their roots in the Fulani herdsman's encroachment on farmland (Ajibefun, 2017).

Additionally, many people have died as a result of the conflicts between Fulani herders and farmers, which pushed several communities to abandon their farmlands and led to the loss of their main source of income. The Fulani herders always have their way,

which places the farmers at their mercy, and this is reaching the point where it is unacceptable.

Because the herders permit their cows to graze on the farmer's fields, farmers view the herdsmen as a threat to their crops and agricultural products. The herdsmen blame religious disagreements for the crises' beginnings, which led to the murder of their cows. Herdsmen attribute the butchering of their cows to religious differences (Ajibefun, 2017). One of the biggest causes of insecurity in Nigeria at the moment is the deadly war between herdsmen and crop farmers. It was made clear that this threat is less serious than the one that Boko Haram poses (Okoro, 2018). The violent attacks and counterattacks have had negative effects on the economy as well as on social and interpersonal relationships. Olakiitan (2016) asserts that Nigeria's government's reluctance to take meaningful action to address the problem of herdsmen attacks has a variety of consequences. The security of the country is seriously threatened by the fact that herdsmen can now easily kill and maim perceived opponents thanks to access to modern ammunition. This is because security personnel, particularly the police, have been powerless to quell the brazenness and firepower demonstrated by armed herders. According to Okoro (2018), while the government has done little to stop the situation, which poses a serious threat to national security and national development, herdsmen have destroyed entire communities, kidnapped elder statesmen, burned churches, killed church priests and other worshipers, killed police officers, raped, looted, and committed heinous crimes. Additionally, herdsmen have slain police officers, torched churches, killed church priests, and slaughtered other worshipers. The removal of farmers from the affected areas has caused a sharp decline in agricultural productivity throughout Nigeria. The comparatively limited supply of agricultural products in the central Nigerian market, which comprises both urban and rural areas, serves as a stark illustration of this issue (Chukwuma, 2016). The socioeconomic effects of Fulani herdsmen are contrasted with the long-term consequences brought on by Boko Haram terrorists' participation in terrorist actions. It has been established that the Fulani herders have had a detrimental effect on Nigeria's economy as a whole (Abdullahi, 2019). Every area of the economy is being adversely affected in some way as a result of the country's persistent violence and insecurity. Dauda (2019) underlined that due to the detrimental impact of activities on farmers in areas where the

Fulani herdsmen crisis is extensive, the gains in the agricultural sector of the economy, notably in the area of food production, may suffer a major setback. This is due to the activities' detrimental effects on farmers in regions where the Fulani herdsmen crisis is a major problem. The socio-economic life in those states came to a grinding halt as people were too terrified to go about their daily lives, including farming and other socio-economic pursuits, for fear of being assassinated.

Conflict will always be a possibility as long as people live close to one another, and this is particularly true given Nigeria's vast cultural and religious variety. Violence, however, results in the loss of human life, agriculture, and property, as well as many other forms of retardation and underdevelopment. The crisis has had a negative effect on the relationships between various groups in Nigeria, and these issues are a direct result of the bloodshed. Crisis is defined as an event that results in a tumultuous and potentially deadly situation that impacts a single person, a group of people, a community, or the entire society. A sudden, unannounced incident or, more particularly, a threat that materializes in a location out of the blue can also be referred to as a "crisis." It describes an event that puts a nation's or a community's equilibrium at danger. A crisis, in the words of Titilope (2016), is any event that has the potential to negatively affect a person, a group, a community, or a whole civilization. Changes in the condition of affairs that are detrimental to safety, the economy, politics, society, or the environment are regarded as such, especially when they occur abruptly and with little to no notice.

The Catholic Laity Connial of Nigeria (CLCN, 2019) lists the following as the main causes of insecurity in the nation despite the fact that there are many factors that affect security worries in Nigeria:

1. Moral dilemma Some of these pervasive moral issues of various natives and their effects include corruption of various kinds and standards, an excessive desire for wealth, debauchery, which is made especially present in suffocating marital infidelity, haggling sexual relations among teenagers, sex trivialization in institutions of higher learning, and marriage among people of some gender (Gay).
2. Deterioration of Our Culture's Most Valuable Elements By upholding its cultural values, the community is in touch with both God and their forefathers. The value of communication stands in opposition to any attitude that seeks to promote excessive

individualism and tyranny, while the value of the sacredness of life helps to uphold any attitude that is opposed to the growth of human existence. Both of these principles work to create a more compassionate community, which is necessary for the development of other principles that can be used to address moral crises.

3. Systemic issues and injustices- The rule of men has replaced the rule of laws as a result of the various inadequacies in both our legal system and our justice system as a whole. Our laws are generally outdated and out of date. Some of them come in the form of prescriptions that superiors provide to inferiors as orders. There are those "untouchables" or cabals in this land who are exempt from the laws that apply to it. They are not subject to any kind of arrest or legal action. An intriguing contrast that highlights some of Nigeria's security issues is the adulation of those who are seen as untouchable by society. One such instance is General Ibrahim Babangida, the former head of state, who frequently refused summonses to appear before the Justice Oputa panel to address claims of violations of human rights. The commission in this instance was looking into claims that Babangida had infringed people's rights. Despite the fact that the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has resulted in thousands of deaths and thousands more being displaced, prominent leaders in the nation have been implicated in supporting the insurgency. Untouchables nonetheless continue to wander the streets unmolested. The Saturday issue of Punch, which was released on April 4, 2021, said that James Ibori was exonerated in Nigeria but found guilty in other nations.

4. Ethnic conflicts and intolerance are other factors in this issue. Additionally, Effiong C. (2019) lists ethnic conflict and religious intolerance as important factors.

- Adherence to one's own religious beliefs.
- Value conflict.
- Psychological jealousy.
- Unregulated competition.
- Alibi of other conflicts
- Growing pains

These above-described ideas have, individually or collectively, been causal factors that have impacted action with regard to security problems resulting from religious intolerance throughout history. [Causation and result]

5. Poverty, High Unemployment, and Subpar Pay: According to Effiong (2019), Nigeria is grappling with a serious case of poverty, a persistent issue with high unemployment, and subpar pay for workers. Retired civil and public servants in the nation are criticizing both the unpreparedness of the government's pension plans and the lack of any welfare measures. While underpaid employees turn to government corruption and declining productivity, unemployed teenagers do find refuge in a devil's workshop to commit crimes and pose security risks. a devil's factory. The government is frequently approached by the elderly with complaints and issues.

Unchecked importation of lethal weapons into the nation. This demonstrates how widely used light weapons are. Some politicians bought lethal firearms for unemployed youths in the hopes that the kids would defend them during campaigns and elections, but they never managed to get the guns back from the kids after they had used them. They are currently using those weapons to start cults, commit armed robberies, and abduct people for ransom. As a result, there are more violent crimes and threats to national security in our nation.

6. The Perils of Illegal and Fake Drugs rising proportions of our young people develop drug addictions and continue to utilize narcotics while impaired to commit heinous crimes. It is regrettable that pharmaceuticals have been abused in a several ways, even though the vast majority of times they are used to enhance a person's health.

7. Greed and an emphasis on one's own requirements. Everyone is only interested in serving their own self-interest, exactly like in the Hobbesian description of the state of nature. Beyond one's own self-interest and pursuing that interest, there is no other rule of conduct. Men have, nevertheless, engaged in conflicts, arguments, and battles with one another as a result of seeking their own self-interest. This is one aspect of the country's security conundrum.

8. Neglect of God and His Ordinances: In their pursuit of the desires of human nature, mankind has erred from the norms of the spirit, which has led them to err from the norms of God's ordinances. The possibility of insecurity is made more plausible by the fact that human nature frequently shows itself in ways that are immoral, dirty, and revolting.

Numerous unsettling signs suggest that the country is gradually moving toward a perilous state of emergency, anarchy, or disaster. It is clear that Nigeria has recently witnessed a level of threat-level insecurity that has never been seen in any of its prior incarnations. As a result, the danger to Nigeria's national security has elevated to the top of the nation's agenda. The following are some of the factors that Eme, Nwachukwu, and Olise's (2017) research suggests are contributing to security concerns in Nigeria. Some of these problems include the spread of small arms and light weapons, youth unemployment, the culture of becoming rich quick based on greed, and the inadequate policing of Nigeria's maritime environment and borders. Achumba, Ighomereho, and Akpor-Robaro (2013) list the following as contributing factors to Nigeria's lack of security: a lack of institutional capacity that causes the government to fail; widespread material inequality and unfairness; ethnic and religious conflicts; a rift in public perception of the government; a shoddy security system; and a decline in sociocultural and communal value systems. Additionally, he listed the following problems as urgent and nearby problems that increased security dangers in Nigeria: Border security issues, rural-to-urban migration, rural-to-urban drift, corporate social responsibility issues, unemployment and poverty, terrorism, and an unpredictable business climate

### **Ethno-religious Conflicts**

Key political problems are actively and fiercely debated along lines of complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions in Nigeria, a country infamous for its profound diversity. Regional, ethnic, and religious divisions can be separated into these three groups. The topics that spark the hottest debates are those that are seen as being essential to the legitimacy and continuation of the state. Groups that compete against one another and oppose one another typically adopt a winner-take-all mentality, which is an exclusive strategy. Along with resource allocation and political power regulation, these issues also relate to citizenship. This has the immediate effect of increasing the likelihood of fragility and instability in states with such divisions. This is because they are very different from one another in terms of harmony and convergence, both of which are necessary to lessen the centrifugal forces that keep them apart (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005: 4).

Thus, disintegration, secession, civil unrest, civil conflict, discomfort among minority groups and violent clashes are common in divided states. In states where there is no political division, incidents of this nature are typically viewed as exceptional (Osaghae & Suberu, 2005:4). Nigeria has a long history of being one of Africa's most unsteady nations. This is connected to both a history of protracted, fruitless battles and a tangled web of people skilled in political disguise. Nigeria's efforts to democratize its government, keep the peace, reorganize the economy, and promote national cohesion have been repeatedly hampered by recurring crises of regional or state illegitimacy since the country's independence. The country's independence in the 1960s seems to have been the trigger for the worst of the crisis (Okpanachi, 2010). Since 1999, when the country transitioned from a military to a civilian administration, the number of clashes conflicts in Nigeria has increased dramatically. The high rate of corruption and resource theft is another critical and "pandemic" issue that worsens all conflicts and issues in Nigeria. As a result of this problem, the living standard in the country is deteriorating. Corruption is a major problem in the country, which is otherwise "richly endowed with natural resources and high- quality human capital" (Ogbeidi, 2012:1). This country is home to a big populace and a wealth of useful resources. The capture of public resources by some hands has a direct impact on the standard of living and the political climate because it makes poverty and rage inevitable parts of everyday life. Though often described as the "bane of

the nation,” corruption is not unique to Nigeria in this regard (Dike, 2005; Ogbeidi, 2012:21). Also, it is generally accepted that corruption is a significant factor in the emergence of ethnic and religious tensions (Nwankwo, 2015).

Poverty and injustice, both of which have their roots in corruption, not only undermine any sense of social cohesiveness, togetherness, or tolerance, but also reawaken societal antagonism, radicalism, and violence. This has led many to conclude that tackling the country's rampant corruption is crucial to bringing peace to Nigeria's many religious and ethnic divides.

The fear and mistrust that the country's many religious and racial groups feel toward one another fuels the intensification of these confrontations. Ethnic and religious conflict occurs when members of different groups in a multiethnic and multi-religious community do not get along well with one another and often resort to violence to settle their differences. An ethnic conflict is a tendency for violent confrontation between people of different ethnicities in a multiethnic and religious community (Achumba et al., 2013; Salawu, 2010). Persistent religious and ethnic tensions that threaten Nigeria's national security stem from Islam and Christianity, the two most practiced religions in the nation by adherents of the nation's two main ethnic groupings. It would appear that Nigeria has struggled with religious and ethnic tensions ever since the country was established. The emergence of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria can be traced back to the widespread use of ethno-religious identities to define new and particularistic political consciousness and affiliation. Because of this, their proliferation has been facilitated. There are disagreements across the board (Ibrahim & Igbuzor, 2002). The government's incapacity to handle development challenges and effectively distribute public funding is contributing to the surge in violence in Nigeria that is driven by racial and religious disputes. There are also claims of persecution, discrimination, marginalization, partiality, and intolerance. Neglect, oppression, dominance, exploitation, and victimization are some of the other accusations that have been made. Nigeria is experiencing widespread problems with interethnic and interreligious violence. This has occurred in a wide variety of locations across Nigeria, including Shagamu (in the state of Ogun), Lagos, Abia, Kano, Bauchi, Nassarawa, Jos, Taraba State, and Enugu State. The social aspects of these ethnoreligious

identities have become destructive and disintegrating, and they pose a threat to Nigeria's peace, stability, and security (Eme & Onyishi, 2014).

### **ECOWAS efforts in dealing with Terrorism**

Conflict and insecurity in Nigeria not only influenced Nigeria itself; it essentially created problems for Nigeria's neighbors and the West African region in general. This brought up the possibility of dealing with the Boko Haram insurgency through regional collaboration and the possibility of ECOWAS providing support mechanisms and the necessary platform to address the social implications of insurgency. The Economic Community of West African States is an intergovernmental organization that initially aimed to foster economic integration and development in the West African region. As time has progressed, however, the organization's goals and scope have broadened to include national security concerns like the fight against terrorism. This is because conditions of peace, security, and stability are essential for attaining long-term regional integration and socioeconomic success. In order to reach this objective, the Economic Community of West African States has drafted a number of legally binding agreements, including conventions and protocols. Maintaining the rule of law, eliminating corruption, prohibiting the possession and use of pistols and other light weapons, prohibiting the distribution and sale of illegal drugs, and fighting organized crime are all covered by ECOWAS documents. Restricting access to, or outright prohibiting the use of, small arms and light weapons are all viable options for reducing the spread of the terror.

Many state and non-governmental groups have worked with ECOWAS to combat terrorism on a regional and international scale. ECOWAS provided a useful platform for states, African nations, to discuss and implement continental anti-terrorism legislation. The legislation which was established in 1975 has been active ever since, heads of state and government from all ECOWAS member states got together to talk about the region's rising terrorism and money laundering problems. ECOWAS has adopted a number of legal and normative frameworks to address the numerous issues with regional security. Article 3 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security (1999) declares the organization's overarching objective as "the cessation of insurgencies" with specific references to guerilla warfare and acts of

terrorism. By issuing a directive to that effect, ECOWAS provided its member states permission to enact legislation in line with the most up-to-date Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) standards and relevant international instruments. That is to say, every single ECOWAS nation has been given the green light to proceed in the aforementioned manner. This order was issued as a direct result of a demand made by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). During that year December 1999, the United Nations Security Council got together for a number of meetings (GIABA 2006, 22). ECOWAS continues to maintain a worldwide collaboration on terrorism and other related challenges with its development partners, which include the World Bank, the African Union (AU), the European Union, and the United Nations. Many countries both inside and outside of Africa are also involved in this partnership. Primarily through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, the treaty sought to fortify democratic institutions, expand commercial and economic opportunities, and promote regional security and peace (ECOWAS 2016a). Likewise, ECOWAS is a regional partner of both the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNCTC), which was established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005) to improve the capacity of UN member states to prevent terrorist acts both inside and outside their borders, and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), which was established to improve the coordination of regional counterterrorism efforts (UN 2015). As part of the partnership, ECOWAS has built a number of organizations and mechanisms to combat terrorism. The ECOWAS founded the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa, an important antiterrorism organization (GIABA). On December 10th, 1999, ECOWAS originally created GIABA as a group to combat money laundering. In 2006, however, its focus shifted to include anti-terrorism efforts in response to the growing terrorist danger in the region and the role that dirty money (money that has been laundered) plays in spreading this threat. GIABA has been tasked with ensuring that ECOWAS states accept, implement, and comply with international anti-money-laundering and countering the financing of terrorism policies. Delegating this responsibility to GIABA ensures the reliability, safety, and stability of the regional financial system (GIABA 2015, 13). The GIABA is tasked with coordinating and

promoting regional and worldwide collaboration, as well as organizing peer and member state self-evaluation exercises, all with the goal of increasing the efficiency and conformity of national regimes to international norms. In addition, GIABA is tasked with assisting ECOWAS member nations with technical matters pertaining to institutional and regulatory frameworks and good governance. Also, it is GIABA's job to ensure that ECOWAS member states adhere to international standards of good governance (ibid., 14). Policy development, capacity building, study visit organization, equipment provision, and expert advice are just some of the ways in which ECOWAS member states have benefited from GIABA's technical assistance. Additionally, in order to examine how well each member state complies with AML/CFT regulations, particularly the FATF criteria, it has undertaken nation evaluations. These assertions are supported by a substantial amount of evidence. That evidence can be found in the GIABA's publicly available annual reports (GIABA 2006, 2015). In 2015, for instance, GIABA had completed an evaluation of all ECOWAS member states and instituted a monitoring program. This method included constant monitoring, collecting fresh compliance data, and exerting pressure on countries that did not make progress in fixing the flaws in their AML/CFT procedures (GIABA 2015, 40). As part of GIABA's Mutual Evaluation process, it was discovered that several ECOWAS member states, like Sierra Leone, had not ratified and adopted relevant UN treaties regarding terrorism. Sierra Leone ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) and its protocols in 2014. The GIABA Mutual Evaluation process identified this as a potential area of improvement. It is clear that the GIABA's efforts have had an effect, as some ECOWAS countries have ratified and domesticated United Nations anti-terrorism treaties. In addition, the Parliament of Sierra Leone passed the Terrorism Prevention (Freezing of International Terrorist Funds and Other Related Measures) Regulations, which domesticated and implemented Resolutions 1267 and 1373 of the UN Security Council. On January 1, 2014, these regulations went into effect. In order to domesticate and implement the resolutions' recommendations, some guidelines were enacted into law (GIABA 2015, 50).

The Economic Community of West African States' role in the military fight against Boko Haram has been negligible at best. As mentioned above, since 2009, Boko Haram has carried out terrorist attacks in Nigeria against a wide variety of targets. Nigeria's failure to

ask ECOWAS for military aid is the root cause of the current crisis. A contributing factor is that ECOWAS doesn't feel the need to provide assistance to the armed forces of its member states, with Nigeria being the most powerful military in the organization. This is because Nigeria, due to its pride and its status as the region's major power, is reluctant to take aid from the smaller member states. The fact that Boko Haram violence has moved to neighboring nations (Cameroon, Chad, and Niger) that are not wholly inside ECOWAS's borders is another reason why the organization is not actively involved in the war against Boko Haram (Tejpar & Albuquerque, 2015). This new information clearly demonstrated the need for a global reaction. It was in October of 2014, that Nigeria, along with Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin, decided to establish the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission to combat Boko Haram (Ncube, 2014). This was the only way to win the war against the terrorist group. In January 2015, the AU approved the MNJTF's first deployment for a period of twelve months, with a potential strength of up to seven thousand five hundred military and civilian personnel (Adamu, 2018). Despite being mostly absent from the military battle against Boko Haram, the Nigerian response to the insurgency has had two significant repercussions for the institution's position as a stakeholder in the maintenance of peace and security. Because of Boko Haram's presence, MNJTF has prioritized terrorism as a threat to regional security. To counteract this, it has developed a policy that includes both preventative measures to curb radicalization and a military response. Excellent governance, combating unemployment, and addressing social and/or racial discrimination are all examples of such preventive measures. Due to the increased attention on terrorism, ECOWAS now considers it imperative that ECOWAS Standing Forces (ESF) acquire counter-insurgency (COIN) training. Bilateral COIN training support now being provided to Nigeria by a wide variety of international partners is contributing toward this objective. Second, given the considerable involvement of Nigerian military forces in the battle against Boko Haram, it is doubtful that Nigeria will honor its obligations to ESF, which account for 50-60% of the total troops, should it be required for it to deploy, either as an ECOWAS mission or as part of ESF. Because of the Nigerian military's dedication to the fight against Boko Haram, the situation has worsened (Tejpar & Albuquerque, 2015).

The West Africa Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCCO) and the Economic Community of West African States Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) are two of the specialized organizations that collect intelligence to anticipate and prevent terrorist operations. The ECOWAS Court of Justice is also included among this group of institution since it works to protect the rights of people who have been harmed by terrorism. As part of the third pillar of the plan, the ECOWAS Declaration calls on member nations to ensure that victims of terrorism have access to psychological and medical care. Member nations are urged to boost public trust in government in the proclamation.

The ECOWAS has also taken the lead in calling for international cooperation to tackle terrorism in the region. This has been accomplished through the implementation of a number of steps, including the issuing of press releases that condemn terrorist attacks in the area on a regular and categorical basis. For instance, on January 15, 2015, several people were killed in terrorist attacks on the Splendid Hotel and the Cappuccino coffee shop in the city of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso (ECOWAS, 2016b). ECOWAS condemned the June 2015 bombings in N'djamena, the capital of the Republic of Chad, by Boko Haram. Twenty individuals were killed and dozens more were injured in these attacks (ECOWAS Info 2015). In a separate incident on June 17, 2015, the Economic Community of West African States condemned attacks by the same group on the Gueskerou region in the Diffa Province of the Niger Republic (ECOWAS 2015). The attacks resulted in the deaths of 38 individuals, predominantly women and children, and the destruction of 100 dwellings, as well as numerous injuries (ECOWAS 2015). A further policy step was to make it less difficult for major regional and international multilateral actors to put the problem of terrorism in the subregion on the agendas of the organizations they represent. By way of illustration, on January 12, 2015, ECOWAS formally requested that the AU Peace and Security Council include a discussion of Boko Haram's acts of terrorism in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin in the next African Union summit. This inquiry was specifically about the Lake Chad region and the terrorist activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria (AU 2015a, 2). It was for this reason that Boko Haram's ties to terrorism were discussed at the 25th African Union Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in June

2015. In response to Boko Haram's terrorist acts, the Multinational Joint Task Force was established, and the summit lent its support to the different efforts being made by Lake Chad Basin Commission members and the Benin Republic to put this force into action (AU, 2015b, 6). ECOWAS has provided a forum for West African states to coordinate anti-terrorism efforts and has helped establish institutional and legal safeguards against terrorist attacks. Additionally, ECOWAS has been working to establish institutional and legal counterterrorism mechanisms. After the 2012 military coup and political unrest in Mali, the Economic Community of West African States played a crucial role in the country's fight against the spread of terrorism. After the coup was completed, ECOWAS helped put up a transitional government with a caretaker prime minister and issued a strong condemnation of the military coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo's CNRDR (Waddington, 2013).

### **The intervention of Non-governmental Organizations**

There is little doubt that Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have made important contributions to the worldwide effort to combat terrorism and reduce its danger. Data on the most serious and pervasive problem in the area can be gathered and disseminated by civil society organizations, who often work in tandem with government security authorities. Civil society organizations include all of the non-state, private, and self-organized institutions and associations that work toward meeting the people's wants, needs, and goals (Brown, 2009: 3).

According to Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako (2008: 10), these goals and aspirations can be anything from providing humanitarian aid to guaranteeing access to healthcare, encouraging fiscal transparency, providing educational services to encouraging cultural growth, empowering entrepreneurs to pursuing world peace. Any time we talk about the various nonprofits, for-profits, civic clubs, and businesses that operate in every community, we use the term "Civil Society" to describe them all together. As Andrew Heywood puts it, civil society is "a realm of associations, enterprises, interest groups, classes, families, and so on," (cited in Sam, 2014). Throughout the century, we have seen a dramatic shift away from the use of the clumsy worldwide faulty phrase known as "terrorism" in the operations of many insurgent groups of association. Civil society organizations have taken on important roles in the sphere of diplomacy in the battle against terrorism by facilitating communication between the public and the government and between the government and the broader public in society at large (Rosand, Alistair, & Jason, 2008: 14). In the fight against terrorism, it is important to keep in mind these civil society organizations and the governments take distinct approaches. Within the aforementioned parameters, the researcher will use a functional approach to characterize the functions of various CSOs in Nigeria's ongoing fight against terrorism. CSOs exist primarily to promote social harmony and stability, which in turn fosters economic development.

The country's top priorities right now, due to the tragic loss of life and material ruin caused by terrorist attacks, governments in both countries namely Nigeria and Cameroun have spent considerable resources trying to counteract the problem. The Nigerian government is doing everything it can, and civil society is doing what it can, to remove terrorism. As

a result, civil society is not falling behind in the fight. The counter-radicalization efforts of civil society organizations in Nigeria and Cameroun nations have been successful. As such, the CSOs' colossal efforts are directed not just at combating the persistent problem of terrorism, but also at preserving social stability and unity. Civil society organizations have played and will continue to play critical roles in the following areas of the counter-terrorism effort:

### **Awareness Approach**

This approach used by members of civil society is excellent when it comes to ending terror in a certain neighborhood. They increase people's knowledge of terrorist operations and increase their sensitivity to those acts. It is a strategy that aims to stop terrorism by educating the populace and even security forces about the threats posed by terrorist organizations and the tactics they use. Several civil society organizations in Nigeria are striving to inform communities about the dangers and negative impacts of terrorism as well as to increase public awareness of the possibility of terrorist strikes occurring around the nation. This is done in the expectation that the villages won't, as is usually the case, develop sympathies for terrorists and get motivated to join violent groups. In order to spearhead this humanitarian effort, the Youth Coalition against Terrorism (YOCAT) was founded in August of 2010. YOCAT is a youth-led organization in northern Nigeria that is entirely run by young volunteers; its mission is to unite young people in the fight against violent extremism in the country's north-east. There are more than 600 students, teachers, and development professionals who are part of the coalition, but the most majority are young activists. One of the founding members of YOCAT is quoted as saying, "in less than six years of YOCAT creation, it has conducted several peace education projects in northern Nigeria to improve understanding that terrorism is not a real part of our rich cultural and religious legacy" (Wara, 2019: 20). Volunteers from YOCAT traveled to many towns to speak with youth groups. They educated students about the dangers of terrorism, counseled victims, helped unemployed youth find work, and taught classes to counteract the influence of extreme ideologies. This was done so that victims of terrorism wouldn't feel that they had no choice except to join terrorist groups out of desperation. YOCAT Security Awareness Campaign, begun in November 2014, has led to a dramatic

drop in the number of young Nigerian villagers being recruited to fight for terrorist groups. Many young individuals are now working with different security agencies to combat the terrorist group Boko Haram (Buba, 2019). It is important to recognize the crucial responsibilities YOCCAT in Nigeria is playing in lessening the allure of violent extremism in the region's northeast. They accomplish this through boosting the voices of those who have been affected by terrorist attacks and by organizing programs targeted at educating and empowering young people.

### **Damnation Approach**

A strategy used by community service organizations (CSOs) to support the fight against terrorism in a particular community, society, or nation is known as damnation. The CSOs use every medium of communication available in the society that has been damaged by the terrorist activities to condemn and curse the terrorists' actions. This tactic is effective at keeping people who support terrorism from actually joining the gang. This strategy helps the overall fight against terrorism that is now underway. Several Nigerian nongovernmental organizations have spoken out against Boko Haram and called for a global condemnation of the terrorist group's atrocities, the return of kidnapped women and children, and the prosecution of those involved. For instance, in 2015, the Women's Consortium of Nigeria (WOCON) issued an oral statement demanding a more unified and specific denunciation of Boko Haram and action against the terrorist organization. In addition to WOCON, similar efforts have been made by other CSOs across the country, such as Self School Initiatives. Some African women's groups, such as the African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) and the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), have also issued statements condemning Boko Haram's actions and calling for increased cooperation at all levels in the fight against terrorism (Burt, 2016).

The humanitarian catastrophe in North-East Nigeria caused by Boko Haram and the counterinsurgency requires immediate attention. Out of a total population of 15.2 million, 14.8 million people in the four states of Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Gombe are affected by the catastrophe (USAID, 2016). There are currently an estimated 7 million people in

need of humanitarian relief, including those who have been displaced and those who are being hosted by civilians (including those who have been imprisoned or restricted by militants and the Nigerian Armed Forces). Conditions for this group were already very poor. This large movement of people has disturbed people's livelihoods and made it harder for them to access markets. One of the largest populations of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the world has been relying on and contributing to resource-poor host communities. Because of this, many communities have been reduced to using subpar coping strategies to make it once their assets have been depleted. Mercy Corps is responding to the South Borno Emergency and Recovery Assistance (SUBERA) initiative, which is funded by the Office for Food and Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The initiative's primary objective is to help people in South Borno and Gombe regain access to food and money after the crisis there. Emergency Aid to Conflict-Affected Populations (EACAP) grew into SUBERA, which grew into Strengthening Opportunities and Access to Resilience (SOAR) (USAID, 2016). Since July 2016, Mercy Corps has been working to restore people's means of subsistence through the SUBERA program. As EACAP came to a close in June 2016, this new program hopes to help 41,200 persons who have been left behind. (Including 8,240 at-risk locals and 32,960 internally displaced persons) USAID, 2016. SUBERA expands upon ongoing EACAP initiatives by integrating protection and Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) initiatives into the program's mainstream. The state of South Borno is also mentioned as a potential site for SUBERA (USAID, 2016).

Mercy Corps findings indicate that the South Borno IDPs are locals who have been forced to relocate inside their own LGA, and that some of them have begun to return to their original communities. During the months of November 2015 and January 2016, Mercy Corps conducted comprehensive needs assessments in the Borno LGAs of Biu, Kwaya Kusar, and Hawul. The goal of the assessments was to better inform future decisions about how to deliver aid in North-East Nigeria. Mercy Corps requested a shift in policy after evaluations revealed significant deficiencies in these areas. After getting clearance from Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), changes were made to the program's scope and funding, resulting in an expansion to South Borno and an increase of USD 2,000,000

paid to SUBERA. Up to June 30th, 2017, we were able to help 41,200 people thanks to this. (USAID, 2016).

In July of 2016, a needs assessment was carried out in the Damboa Local Government Area with a focus on Damboa and Sabon Gari. Data collected from the study revealed the depth, breadth, and intensity of humanitarian needs in the Damboa Local Government Area (LGA). Given the results of this assessment, Mercy Corps and OFDA met and agreed to expand their services to Damboa LGA. Mercy Corps headquarters WASH and M&E technical support staff and the regional humanitarian advisor traveled to Gombe and South Borno to assist with the expansion of Mercy Corps' operations there. Their mission was to guide and advise Mercy Corps Nigeria's humanitarian workers. Assisting with the coordination of humanitarian aid: Mercy Corps' involvement in humanitarian effort coordination committees in both Maiduguri and Abuja (on a national level) remains unabated (Borno State-level). Mercy Corps' continued collaboration with UNICEF, Save the Children, and Oxfam in southern Borno ensures that all humanitarian activities are coordinated and mutually beneficial. Medicines without Borders and the Red Cross are two examples of such groups (ICRC). Mercy Corps will serve as the host organization for the Nigeria INGO Forum throughout its two-year run, which will begin in January 2017. It was decided that the typical hosting period for an organization would be extended from six months to two years to ensure the continuity of important initiatives and the continuity of key leadership positions. Mercy Corps use the opportunity to assist the INGO Forum in its quest to enhance inter-agency cooperation and extend existing programs, with the ultimate goal of bolstering the capacity and response of all humanitarian actors. Personnel training: In the time period covered by this report, five members of the Mercy Corps team received some form of training in crisis management or humanitarian access. Mercy Corps facilitated both the Humanitarian Access training and the Crisis Management training for the Nigeria INGO Forum. Additional information on available trainings might be found in the Archives section (Sector 5). Perception of danger for a total of three, four-day training sessions, the Mercy Corps humanitarian team was instructed by Safer Edge's cadre of seasoned instructors. These workshops were held in Biu, the hub of Mercy Corps's current humanitarian efforts in South Borno. The rescue professionals learned

what to do in a variety of emergency situations that require immediate first aid and how to keep themselves and their teammates safe in the field.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **Socio-Economic Implications of Terrorism in Nigeria period of 2010 onwards**

Foreign nationals have been exposed as participants and contributors to the violence in the northern states of Nigeria. Kaduna State's Commissioner of Police Mohammed Jinjiri Abubakar claims that insurgents from countries bordering Nigeria's Northern states sneak into Nigeria. (Omipidan, 2012: 6). He named Chad, Cameroon, and the Niger Republic as the origins of the terrorists operating in the north. The vast numbers of nationals from these regions who have been arrested for their roles in terrorist attacks and other atrocities provide ample proof of this. The Police Commissioner could no longer turn a blind eye to the illegal behavior of these individuals. The Police, he said, would no

longer care about the articles of the Africa Charter guaranteeing citizens the right to freely move about, and instead would brutally handle any noncitizens who were arrested. In addition, he stressed the importance of remembering to be grateful for the nation's generosity. It is believed that Boko Haram terrorist attacks carried out by both homeland and foreign forces, which may threaten the current peaceful relations between Nigeria and its neighboring countries. If something similar were to happen, it would have a devastating effect on the balance of payments in all of the countries involved. As a result of the departure of so many foreign nationals who participate in a wide variety of economic activities that contribute to the growth of the northern economy, the northern economy would be hit particularly hard. As time goes on, the bombings and shootings committed in the North by fundamentalists affiliated with Boko Haram have a significant impact on the standard of living in those areas. Some businesses, like commercial banks, have been compelled to alter their operating hours from 8am to 1:30 pm. This is in contrast to the standard workday schedule, which runs from 8 am to 4 pm (Mohammed, 2012:2). Mohammed (2012) claims that major financial organizations are taking this measure to protect their business and websites. Customers of the bank, particularly traders, are finding it difficult to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks as a result of the new operational structure because of the limited banking operational hours, which are no longer to their favor. They found that returning to their previous operational structure simplified matters, and so this new operational arrangement was implemented. These hapless business owners have no alternative except to bury their cash deep within their corporations. This has led to an increase in theft and burglary in the affected areas, in addition to the regular suicide bombings. Many business owners and employees in the north are relocating to the country's more peaceful southern areas because of the deteriorating economic situation there. In addition, prices have also begun to rise as a direct result of the drastic reduction in transit of goods from the north to the south, where they are most extensively consumed. This occurs because the farm owners in the south believe it is too dangerous to make the trip to the trading hub in the north. Farmers who can only survive through these means of production tend to hoard and waste the resources at their disposal. Boko Haram poses a threat to the National Youth Service Corps program, which is seen as a unifying factor in this country. For instance, in 2011, out of a total of 4171 corps members assigned to serve

in Adamawa state and subsequently trained for ad hoc electioneering, 1041 left the state before the general elections ever took place due to the lack of adequate security in the country (Egburonu et al, 2012:21). After several corps members were killed in the northern states in 2011, many corps members invaded the NYSC Secretariat in Abuja, seeking to be relocated to states outside of the Northern States. Participants in the scheme are still strongly against deploying corps members to any of the northern states that are currently experiencing a crisis until peace is once again restored. A few of them have threatened to leave the program altogether if they are sent to areas where they fear they will be killed by members of the Boko Haram terrorist organization. There is no doubt that the ongoing activities of the Boko Haram sect threaten the full sovereignty of Nigeria. Discord now exists between the country's northern and southern regions due to the exchange of accusations and denials. A large majority of southerners believe that some politicians in the north have opted to generate crises by using religious and sectarian platforms as their vehicles because they are upset that their region has lost its leadership during the past nine years. The angry northern leaders, in the South's view, consider themselves inherently entitled to the position of president. This nation's political power, for instance, was centered in the north for the first 38 of its first 50 years (Obumneme, 2012:35).

They chose to hide under the religious terrorist organization known as Boko Haram to vent their regrettable rage and negative emotions, but once they realized that the country's current political structure had changed in contrast to their expectations and that restoring the power (rulership) to the status quo may not be simple. It put everyone in a bad position. They resolved to stir up the terrorist believers as well as other slum dwellers in the same northern region as a result. They were already enraged and indignant at the arrogance of the same officials who had been torturing, isolating, and denying them their basic human rights. It is believed that the destitute and wretched northern young men are the result of decades of neglect and economic servitude (Obumneme, 2012:35). It's clear that the northern regions are home to the world's poorest people because these young men are willing to risk their lives to carry out killing instructions. No one with a firm grasp on their destiny would knowingly opt to die in an accidental circumstance. Many people think the North is reaping the rewards of its actions on the lives of these unhappy youths from

a long time ago. It has been reported that Boko Haram's deeds are currently harming the hopes and potential of young people living in this country's northern states. The latest Cowbell National Secondary Schools Mathematics Competition (NASSMAC) was organized by Promasordor Nigeria Ltd., thus it's sad to see that these kids didn't make the cut. Two northern schools entered the competition that year, yet not a single northern male student placed. The winners of that year's competition were given awards to recognize their success (Tyessi, 2012:11). However, the region has produced six, seven, and eleven champions in 2009, 2010, and 2011, respectively. A delay in finding a solution to the security situation in the north could lead to the complete collapse of the local educational system, which would be incredibly dreadful not only for the area but for the entire country as outlined above.

**Table 1: An Overview of Boko Haram's Attacks in Nigeria**

S/N	Year of attack	States attacked	Casualties
1	2009	Yobe, Borno Bauchi, and Kano,	Killed over 800 persons.
2	2010	Borno, Abuja and plateau	Killed over 330 persons and Freed 700 prison inmates
3	2011	Borno, Kaduna, Yobe, Niger, Bauchi, Abuja, Katsina And Plateau	Killed over 425 persons, and over 300 persons injured. Bombed UN building in Abuja.
4	2012	Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna, Kogi, Bauchi, Plateau, Yobe, Abuja, Sokoto and Katsina	Killed over 1047 and many persons injured. Killed over

5	2013	Borno, Adamawa, Kano, Plateau, Gombe, Yobe, Bauchi	732 persons and several persons injured.
6	2014	Borno, Adamawa, Yobe	Kidnapped of Over 270 girls from chibok village in Borno State, Kidnap of some women in Adamawa state, killed over 200 persons and several injured.

Sources: Avweromre, 2014; Ikenga and Efebeh, 2013; Achumba, Ighomereho, and Akpor-Robaro, 2013.

**Table 2**

S/N	Dates	Location attacked	Casualties
1	Sept. 2012	Ubiaja, Edo state	1 person killed.
2	Oct. 2012	Dallyam, Ranghol and Lotton villages in Plateaus state, and Yogbo village in Benue state	34 people were killed. Several others were injured.
3	Nov. 2012	Barkin-Ladi and Riyon LGAs in Plateau state	13 people killed
4	Dec. 2012	Bachit village in Plateau and Gwarko village in Abuja.	6 people were killed.
5	Jan. 2013	Du village in Jos, Agbu, Ekye and Agwasu villages in Nasarawa state	13 people killed.

6	Jan. 2013	Wadatan Gerba village in Jos, Amla village in Benue	570 people killed, 20 houses razed down.
7	Feb.2013	Iga and Rutu communities, Nasarawa state	10 people killed, 15 injured.
8	Mar. 2013	Uvir community in Benue, Kardarko in Plateau, Anguwah, Mafan, in kaduna	28 people killed, 500 displaced.
9	Apr. 2013	Yobe village in Benue, Ogume community in Delta, Riyom LGA in Plateau.	32 people killed, 1000 displaced, farmlands destroyed
10	May, 2013	Okpachanyi and Akough villages in Benue, Zangang village in Benue.	75 people were killed. Many displaced.

Source: Vanguard Newspapers June 2012-May 2013.

### **Boko Haram and Regional Security**

Boko Haram has grown to become Nigeria's most pressing security concern. The social impact of its efforts on regional security, however, has received limited academic attention. At least four factors can be used to evaluate the impact of the Boko Haram insurgency on regional security, including the group's growth in terms of recruitment, training, equipment, and funding; its deliberate violent cross-border attacks; the global repercussions of its operations; and the potential erosion of Nigeria's role as the de facto leader of ECOWAS. Boko Haram's recruitment and training of new members from across the Sahel-Sahara area is evidence of the group's reach beyond Nigeria. The potential arises as a result of Boko Haram's growing international network. After the uprising in July 2009, many Boko Haram members allegedly moved to North Africa to train with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI), (Connell, 2012). In 2013, a big group of Boko Haram terrorists traveled to an AQMI training facility in Timbuktu, Mali, to learn how to repair Kalashnikovs and shoot shoulder-fired weapons as well as receiving training in bomb manufacturing (Ofstedal, 2013). In recent years, Boko Haram has been able to employ

increasingly sophisticated weapons, including shoulder-fired weapons, in their bombing campaigns, indicating that the group has been receiving more outside support ( Onuonha, 2013). Some members of Boko Haram have also traveled to rural Somalia to train with Al Shabaab. The inmates at these academies learned not only how to utilize suicide bombers, but also how to construct and detonate improvised explosive devices. Many former Boko Haram members have defected to Al Shabaab. On June 15, 2011, Boko Haram made a statement in which they admitted to having ties to the Somalia-based terrorist organization Al-Shabaab (Agbibo, 2014). The organization also boasted that their training in Somalia was superior to that of the Nigerian security forces. Continued suicide bombs after this proclamation, such as the one on June 16, 2011 at the Abuja Police Headquarters, indicate that the group's members benefited from the training session on the use of suicide bombers. After a relatively quiet 2013, the terrorist organization has increased its use of suicide bombers. There were at least 48 suicide attacks in Nigeria between June 11th, 2011 and July 28th, 2014, with at least 678 casualties. Very little was known about the group's overseas ties before June 2011, when the Boko Haram decided to begin executing suicide bombers. Due to a general lack of understanding about the ideological linkages between Boko Haram and other Salafi Jihadist networks in Africa, the threat posed by Boko Haram to Nigeria and the wider West African region is likely overstated (Steinberg, 2015). Boko Haram has been active in several different regions, including the Maroua and Garoua regions of the Republic of Cameroon, the Gao and Kidal regions of Mali, the Diffa, Maradi, and Maina Soro regions of the Niger Republic, the Zango and Ridina quarters of Ndjamena, Chad, the Ranky and Ridina regions of the Republic of Nigeria (E Oftedal, 2013). At addition to recruiting new members, training them, and radicalizing them in a variety of camps or centers spread around the region, the group collects a limited amount of funding from other terrorist or jihadi groups based in the Sahel. It has been reported that the Islamic group Musilimi Yaa'maa, based in Algeria, provided financial support to the terrorist group Boko Haram (Brinkel & Ait-Hida, 2012). Furthermore, it is speculated that disagreements around the 40 million naira (US\$250,000) ransom that Boko Haram paid for AQMI at the start of 2011 contributed to the split between Ansaru and Boko Haram (Zenn, 2014). The group's efforts in various recruiting, training, and radicalization centers across nations demonstrate how firmly rooted it is in the soil of other

countries, particularly those in West and Central Africa. Connections to other terrorist groups may be uncovered on occasion, despite the fact that Boko Haram's actions appear to be autonomous and that they are not under the supervision of a centralized organization outside of Nigeria.

Boko Haram's ability to plan and execute attacks on the territory of several regional neighbors should also be taken into account. This is especially true with respect to Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Cross-border attacks have always been planned and executed in Cameroon (Tull, 2015). These assaults have become more common in response to the government of Cameroon's increased number of counter-activities. Since the colonial era, there has been a territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon. The 1,700-kilometer border between the two nations, which runs from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea, is the subject of contention. Due to the potential existence of oil riches, the Bakassi Peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea, which was located in the area that the two nations were disputing in the south, was very important to both nations. The disputed area was in the north and its borders included a piece of Lake Chad. In light of this, it is significant to emphasize that the history of conflict over resources and colonialism between Cameroon and Nigeria is distinct from one another and, in some ways, still exists now. It's also vital to point out that Cameroon and Nigeria have a history of resource-related warfare that is clearly visible in their relationship. This is important because it will help to explain why it is important to mention this specific issue here. On October 10, 2002, the International Court of Justice ruled that Cameroon should be acknowledged as the rightful owner of the Bakassi Peninsula. The Atlantic Ocean's Gulf of Guinea borders the Bakassi Peninsula, which is abundant in oil reserves. Following the United Nations-mediated Greenleaf Agreement, Nigeria officially and diplomatically surrendered Bakassi to Cameroon in August 2008 after first disputing the International Court of Justice's ruling. This put an end to a 15-year border dispute. The conflict between the two nations was resolved as a result of this. As a result, the Bakassi Crisis was eventually settled (AFP, 2013). After the start of a transitional period that lasted for five years and was supported by the UN, Cameroon was able to establish an administrative presence in the area. When this period came to a conclusion on August 14th, 2013, Cameroon was able to seize complete control of the area and eventually assumed full responsibility for it (Chimtom, 2013).

**Table 2: Boko Haram border raids in Cameroon.**

<b>Dates</b>	<b>Incidents</b>	<b>Remarks</b>
February 19, 2013	Kidnap of seven members of the Tanguy Moulin Fournier family in Dabanga, northern Cameroon.	On April 18, 2013, they were reportedly freed in Nigeria in return for a \$3.15 million ransom and the release of 16 other Boko Haram captives who were being detained in Cameroon.
April 4, 2014	Two Italian priests and a Canadian nun were taken hostage from the parish of Tchere, which is located in the northern region of Cameroon.	Security personnel in Cameroon quickly laid responsibility on Boko Haram. Released captives about two months later
May 17, 2014	Boko Haram members killed a Cameroonian soldier and abducted 10 Chinese workers from the town of Waza, Cameroon.	Ten of the Chinese construction company's cars were also stolen during the incident.

Source: Dr Freedom C. Onuoha

### **Transnational Consequences of Violence**

Another facet of Boko Haram's consequences for regional security is highlighted by the worldwide effects of the rising violence on the political, diplomatic, and economic stability of the nation. This has led to a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportions, which is currently the most pressing concern. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations estimates that the attacks carried out by Boko Haram in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe have had a direct impact on a total population of at least six million people (Unuoha, 2014). Because of the unrelenting savagery of Boko Haram, a sizeable number of people have been driven from their homes and forced to become internally displaced persons (commonly known as IDPs) or

refugees; the number of these individuals is growing with each new attack. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that around 300,000 people have been forced to relocate as a direct result of the violent conflict that has been ongoing in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe since the beginning of the year 2013 (Unuoha, 2014). According to an estimate provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, more than 650,000 individuals have been moved against their will within the borders of Nigeria (UNHCR, 2013). The vast majority of these individuals currently make their homes with their families in a variety of other locations around Nigeria. These figures do not take into account the people who fled Nigeria by crossing its borders and are now living in the neighboring regions of Cameroon, Chad, or Niger. Since May of 2013, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that more than 60,000 Nigerians have migrated to the countries that are located in close proximity to Nigeria (UNHCR, 2013). For example, there are approximately 28,000 Nigerian refugees in Cameroon and more than 40,000 in the Niger Republic. As a result of the lack of food and water in their homes, many of the refugees were forced to flee their towns, which placed a significant strain on the few resources and social services that were provided by the communities that took in the refugees. In addition to this, the violence that has been caused by Boko Haram has resulted in the destruction of medical facilities in the north-eastern areas of Nigeria. As a direct consequence of this, health care workers were compelled to either leave the country or close their services. As a consequence of this, inhabitants have been forced to seek medical care in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger; this places further strain on the village's already limited medical facilities, which are sheltering refugees. The loss of social support structures and means of subsistence, the bombing of bridges and other infrastructure, the moving of farmers and the robbery of livestock and food supplies are all contributing factors to the growing problem of food insecurity, which is getting worse as a result. Just prior to the beginning of the planting season in 2014, the vast majority of the northern farmers had been forced out of their homes as a direct result of the conflict involving Boko Haram. Due to the deteriorating security situation, farmers are unable to cultivate their land or harvest their crops because they are frightened of being assaulted by Boko Haram fighters. As a result, farmers no longer have the ability to do any of these things. Because

of this, many farmers have been unable to maintain a sustainable income. In addition, cattle herders and households have lost their animals as a direct consequence of the pillaging carried out by Boko Haram, which has contributed to the already acute food crisis. On the other hand, insecurity is also a contributor to the growth in the expense of transportation. It is noteworthy that there have been unconfirmed reports suggesting that Boko Haram has taken control of some missing MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) anti-aircraft missiles that originated in Libya (Onuoha, 2014). These reports raise the possibility that these missiles could be used to shoot down commercial aircraft landing in Niger, Chad, or even Nigeria. Because of the widespread dissemination of this information, several international businesses have increased the amount of money that Nigerian airline operators are required to pay for aircraft leases by 20% and 25% (Onuoha, 2014). As a direct consequence of this increased load, prices of goods, services, and food will continue to rise throughout the region. Additionally, kidnappings that occur across international borders, such as those carried out by Boko Haram, have discouraged potential tourists from traveling to the far north of Cameroon. Due to these consequences, the amount of revenue that the country receives from customs has significantly decreased as a result (Enobi & Johnson-Rokosu, 2016). The violence has, in general, had a disastrous effect on the local economy, which has, in turn, had severe consequences on the prosperity of the economies of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin, Togo, Ghana amongst other nations, whose economies are entwined with the economy of Nigeria. As a direct consequence of these unfavorable effects on the economy, Nigeria and Cameroon's diplomatic ties have become increasingly strained in recent years. Boko Haram is said to have utilized Cameroonian territory as a base to launch assaults in North east Nigeria and as a transit point for armaments, according to the authorities in Nigeria, who have accused Cameroon of not doing enough to defend its borders. Cameroonian territory has served as a launch pad for attacks carried out by Boko Haram in the northern part of Nigeria's northeast. Officials in Cameroon have stated that they will not acknowledge responsibility for such charges. Cameroon deployed approximately 700 soldiers to the border early in the month of March 2014 in an effort to battle Boko Haram and improve relations with Nigeria at the same time (Assanvo, 2016). Cameroon made this measure in an effort to combat the armed group that it is up against.

### **ECOWAS efforts in dealing with Boko Haram Insurgency**

In fairness to ECOWAS, it is crucial to note that the Community has successfully dealt with some infrequent reactions. However, these reactions have typically been unplanned, impulsive, reactive, transient, fleeting, and short-lived, and they have been generally ineffective. A new anti-terrorism strategy was endorsed at the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government's 42nd regular session in Yamoussoukro, Côte d'Ivoire, in February 2013 (Adigbuo, 2017). The proclamation and strategy's main objective was to eradicate and stop terrorism and other related criminal activity in West Africa. Making an atmosphere that supports sound economic development was a secondary objective. Both of these objectives aimed to guarantee the welfare of every ECOWAS person. Additionally, the proposals planned to create a uniform operational framework for action and implement anti-terrorism instruments on a regional, continental, and global level (Adigbuo 2017: 49).

The national and international levels have both responded to efforts to contain Boko Haram in terms of countermeasures. This is because Boko Haram's operations are international or cross-border in nature. The Nigerian government introduced the Terrorism (Prevention) Bill, 2011, at the national level as part of the efforts being taken to thwart terrorist activity. The 2013 Terrorism Prevention Amendment Act, the legislation, which was approved and made law in 2012, was revised in 2013 to include strategies for handling other terrorism-related charges. Anyone convicted of participating in terrorist acts must get the death penalty, according to the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2013. The state security agency was given unrestricted jurisdiction in the fight against Boko Haram to carry out the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2013, which was passed during the Goodluck Jonathan administration. In addition, the federal government declared states of emergency in Borno, Yobe, Plateau, and Niger in December 2011, Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in May 2013, and it ordered the military to shut down mobile phone networks in the three North-Eastern states to prevent Boko Haram members from communicating with one another as part of its efforts to combat the group (Jocab & Akpan, 2015). Despite the fact that these actions momentarily decreased the group's efficacy, the locals of the area reacted unfavorably to them due to the poor socioeconomic impact it had on their way of life

(Jacob & Akpan, 2015). The Nigerian National Assembly similarly exhibits its commitment to doing its duty by planning to act in a way that will support the protection of the lives of the nation's citizens. The most significant legislative body in Nigeria has made a commitment to ensure the passage of sound law and to effectively raining down government spending, particularly when it comes to concerns of defense and internal security (Emmanuel, 2017). Nigeria additionally collaborated with the UK to create counter-insurgency plans (Premium Times, 2013). Following the assault on a Yobe state school on February 25, 2014, France was also requested for assistance in the conflict against the group (Goyei, 2018). The United States was thanked by the government of Nigeria for sending a team to help find the schoolgirls who were abducted by Boko Haram in May 2014. Teams from China, France, and the United States were also present in Nigeria to support these operations.

On March 5, 2014, Nigeria and many other nations, including the Republic of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, signed an agreement for a massive offensive against Boko Haram (Goyei, 2018). The agreement's goals include promoting more effective border patrol and intelligence sharing, as well as improving coordination of security activities among states in the West African subregion. Following the signing of the international agreement, a gathering of the defense ministers from the six nations that comprise the Lake Chad Basin Commission took place (LCBC). At the end of the Yaounde meeting, the agreement to create a multinational force to bolster in the region was eventually signed (Lake Chad Basin Commission LCBC, 2014).

Regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) were not disregarded in the search for Boko Haram responses that would be effective. For instance, the MNJTF was authorized by the African Union's Peace and Security Council in January 2015. (Aljazeera, 2015). Additionally, the African Union assisted African leaders in reaching a decision to send 7,500 troops to Nigeria to assist in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency (AU). The United Nations Security Council unanimously approved the decision to create the MNJTF (UNSC). A statement denouncing Boko Haram's activities was also released by the Economic Community of West African States. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SLAW) proliferation was recognized by ECOWAS (2014) as the primary driver of the insecurity brought on by

Boko Haram. Furthermore, ECOWAS (2014) stressed the significance of coordinating efforts in the region's fight against terrorism. The agreement between ECOWAS, the UN, and the government of Nigeria to establish a new Weapon Collection Programme for Northern Nigeria was confirmed by the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security of ECOWAS in March 2014, (Eji, 2016). This was done as part of more extensive efforts to battle Boko Haram, which also included implementing this policy. A more diversified cross-section of the global community has responded to the Boko Haram insurgency. These include the actions taken by the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) (UNSC). The ICC believes that during the violence that raged for several years in Nigeria's North East, both the Nigerian military and the terrorist organization Boko Haram may have committed crimes against humanity in addition to war crimes (Rasmussen, 2015). According to Goyel (2018), the Preliminary Examination Report of the ICC on Nigeria, the prosecutor's office finds the Nigerian military and Boko Haram wanting in eight cases that have been identified as potentially constituting crimes against humanity and war crimes in violation of Articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute. These are war crimes and crimes against humanity (Rasmussen, 2015). Boko Haram's arbitrary atrocities against the civilian populace have led the ICC to find that it has committed crimes against humanity. These attacks include those committed by suicide bombers and those that occur while they are attacking cities and villages and target civilians. According to the report, Boko Haram was responsible for 356 reported incidents of killings between January 2013 and March 2015 in the Nigerian states of Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Plateau, Kano, the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), Gombe, and Bauchi...occasionally in Cameroon (since February 2013) and Niger (Dumba and Diffa, since January 2015), which resulted in the deaths of over 8,000 civilians, and "following military operations since (Rasmussen, 2015).

At least 1,885 abductees from the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa were involved in 55 cases of crimes committed by the Islamist group between January 2014 and March 2015; in 2014 alone, 1,123 persons were kidnapped, and 536 of those abductees were women (Rasmussen, 2015). In addition, it is believed that the Islamic cult is imprisoning a large number of civilians in Cameroon's Gorsi Mountains, the Lake Chad region, and the Sambisa Forest (Goyel, 2018). Moreover, it has been claimed that the group held

hundreds of men hostage before killing them. According to the court, in the event that such offences were committed, the Nigerian Army would likewise be covered by its protection. Nigeria has once again disregarded its obligation under the Rome Statute as a state party to see that crimes of "grave concern to the conscience of humanity" be prosecuted (Star Africa, 2014).

Notably, prior administrations have chosen to pursue a heavily militaristic strategy to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram, most notably the Nigerian administration presided over by President Goodluck Jonathan. This was done as a result of failed attempts to secure more backing from international organizations. This is because funders had a hard time locating reliable partners to finance civilian stabilization activities. However, a paradigm shift has occurred since President Buhari entered office, and the administration has employed methods to entice contributors. For instance, the Nigerian government asked the World Bank and the EU for assistance in facilitating a Recovery and Peace Building Assessment (RPBA) in the nation's northeastern region (Nyadera, Kisaka & Agwanda, 2019). The war on terrorism is frequently presented as a conflict over a greater global threat (Chaliand & Blin, 2007; Thurston, 2017). This gives governments the chance to justify using extreme force against anyone who is labeled a "terrorist" on a global scale. Under the pretense of a conflict against a more extensive global threat, the war on terrorism was declared. In truth, governments have benefited from regional and global cooperation in their efforts to counteract the behavior of organizations whose operations veer toward terrorism. To quickly dismiss the response of governments and the growing unity displayed by state leaders in the struggle against terrorism around the world would be oversimplified. It goes without saying that terrorism has caused grave economic and human losses in several nations. Terrorist organizations are willing to attack civilians at places and at times that governments are unable to predict, and when this happens, it frustrates decision-makers and security organizations that are responsible with protecting people. In a similar line, terrorism continues to show how incapable and unprepared governments are to defend their citizens from such attacks. Governments are quick to use force against any group that is considered to be a terrorist organization because of the anticipated political repercussions. Despite the fact that Nigeria is the nation most adversely affected by Boko Haram's acts, Lebovich (2017) studies the global cooperative

efforts and comes to the conclusion that the instability affects the entire Lake Chad Basin region. The collaboration amongst the nations in the region, however, has not made much progress. One potential regional response to Boko Haram, the G5 Sahel operation, has recently run into several challenges. One major obstacle is the lack of a cohesive strategy to tackle Boko Haram within the framework of the G5 Sahel, in addition to a shortage of personnel and resources. Additionally, the absence of modern intelligence gathering tools like drones has resulted in a reduced capacity for intelligence collection, which is a crucial component of counterterrorism activities. Dependence on foreign operations, especially the Operation Barkhane supported by France, on which the G5S troops have repeatedly relied, raises serious concerns about the capacity and lifespan of the nations (Lebovich, 2017). The G5S forces have relied on Operation Barkhane in particular.

## **ECOWAS and International organizations collaboration in the fight against terrorism**

Since the wave of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, there have been series of substantial initiatives taken by ECOWAS and international organizations in combating the fight against terrorism in the region. The fight against terrorism in the region is back by continuous effort to insure peace and security for ECOWAS citizens, and to get rid of any terroristic threat that make arise in the future. The involvement of international organizations in the field of regional peace and security, and cooperation with ECOWAS has reached an unprecedented level. International organizations have traditionally been formed around economic, political, or environmental goals, but over the past decades, these organizations have gradually entered the security arena, focusing on conflict prevention, peacekeeping, or it has enhanced its capabilities in post-war reconstruction. ECOWAS has collaborated with series of international organization in the fight against terrorism in its region namely the UN, EU and also the US.

The UN agencies have vigorously backed and promoted UN counterterrorism objectives, strategies in West Africa. Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate and United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime Terrorism Prevention Program continue. Both have worked to strengthen cross-border terrorism cooperation, legal systems, criminal justice systems, and law enforcement. CTED prioritizes sub-regional demands over national ones for strengthening West African counterterrorism and related capacities, CTED recommends West African states to create trustworthy civil registries and expand Interpol's vital I-24/7 network to all border crossings due to the lack of computerized national civil registries. Community policing may be promoted along with technical aid and equipment to improve border control in a sub-region. CTED also recognizes the growing need for the sub-region to implement Resolution 1624, which urges governments to resist terrorism incitement and prevent terrorists and their supporters from weakening educational, cultural, and religious institutions. West Africa's UN global counterterrorism plan, strategy is to improve CTED's follow-up and communication with national specialists, UN country and regional team members, especially those working in counterterrorism's unconventional fields, ECOWAS, and other sub-regional actors, as well as civil society organization.

Since launching its Global Project on Strengthening the Legal Regime against Terrorism in January 2003, the UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Board (TPB) has provided varied counterterrorism support to nations joining and implementing the universal instruments against terrorism. TPB has offered bilateral, regional, and sub-regional technical assistance to most ECOWAS countries through its Vienna employees, twenty local consultants, and Dakar-based UNODC regional officials. Due to this, dozens of West African criminal justice officials have received "specialized training on the legal regime against terrorism, particularly the legal aspects and obligations arising from the universal legal instruments against terrorism and related Security Council resolutions and the mechanisms of international cooperation in criminal matters (extradition and mutual legal assistance)", (Bolaji, 2010). This has led to some ECOWAS nations such as Gambia, Mali, Niger, and Senegal to establish anti-terrorism laws. TPB's regional and sub-regional programs has help in combating terrorism in West Africa by bringing together criminal justice officials from around the area and enabling cross-border networking, information sharing, and trust-building. The United Nation Office on Drugs and Crime, Department of Peacekeeping Operation, United Nations Office for West Africa, and International Crime Police Organization collaborated with ECOWAS to launch the West Africa Coast Initiative (Interpol, 2009). The programme is part of UN agencies' increased cooperation to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa's fragile states. These programs aim to improve the criminal justice system and other national security institutions. This is especially crucial in countries like West Africa, where state institutions are often weak and have little capacity to absorb technical help and where stopping terrorist actions is not often a top national priority despite the region's vulnerability and threat.

Enhancing UN development and counterterrorism cooperation is another way to boost national and regional counterterrorism capacities. These projects would boost regional and national terrorism defenses. Between the traditional development agenda: poverty reduction, social development, rule-of-law programmes, and the struggle against terrorism" is one of the strategy's greatest achievements. The United Nations Development Plan, which is key to implementing this connection, has the ability to promote the

strategy's execution, especially Pillar I and rule of law efforts, despite not being officially mentioned in the Strategy and lacking a distinct counterterrorism mandate. The UNDP is vital to implementing this partnership (Pillar IV). In West Africa, UNDP assistance has improved capacity-building activities to combat terrorism and promote sub-regional ownership of the strategy. The UNDP and other relevant UN actors encourage national partners to treat counterterrorism capacity building programs "as part of development assistance to 'peace and security' and 'good governance,' and therefore as part of the national development plan of the country in question" to increase public support and ownership in the sub-region (Ipe, Cockayne & Miller, 2010). UNDP and other relevant UN actors, as well as donors, might include counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives in the "multi-donor trust funds" that UNDP is often asked to administer to improve country-level coherence and efficiency and increase joint UN activities. This would boost UN collaboration and national efficiency. Funders must assuage those concerned about development activity securitization by viewing counterterrorism capacity-building as part of a larger development objective.

The US and EU have recently prioritized West Africa and the Sahel for counterterrorism aid to assist ECOWAS in the fight against terrorism. The aid focuses on sub-regional capabilities and country capacities. The EU, which "has highlighted the vulnerabilities offered by the Sahel as the second greatest terrorist threat to the EU," (Sartori & Fattibene, 2019) is working more with the Sahel sub-region on counterterrorism and considering how it may help the nations in the region build their counterterrorism and related capacities. "Regional security academy, with EU support has help these countries address the fundamental issue of improving their ability to secure their own territory, as well [as] improve regional coordination by developing personal contact between the countries concerned and giving them a common basis for understanding security issues" (Opanike & Aduloju, 2016) is one idea the EU is considering. The European Union plan to help the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illegal drug trafficking and organized crime by "increasing operational capacities of ECOWAS, its Commission as well as ECOWAS Member States, and their greater involvement in combating" these criminal activities. To support the development and security strategies in the Sahel region, the EU created a comprehensive program which addresses the causes of terrorism in June 2009. The first

global counter-terrorism measures developed by the European Commission together with experts from EU member states in the 2009-2011, Indicative Programme for the Instrument of Stability improved the EU's ability to develop counterterrorism capacity in West Africa and other non-European countries (Worcester, 2015).

The program focuses on the Sahel in West Africa. Despite the more comprehensive and politically palatable strategy, Security Council Resolution 1373 appears to be the EU's main tool for promoting third-country counterterrorism competence. Thus, EU-supported capacity-building projects are likely to focus on Pillars II and III of the Strategy rather than Pillar I ("conditions conducive") and Pillar IV (concerns for human rights and the rule of law). The US has also increased counterterrorism assistance to the ECOWAS and its member state, along with modest bilateral counterterrorism capacity-building support that largely improves national law enforcement and security. The US promotes cross-border security cooperation such as the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy in West Africa through Sahel-subregion collaboration. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a more limited version of the Pan-Sahel Initiative, has been the main tool for achieving the fight against terrorism and Boko Haram. TSCTP goals include "enhancing and institutionalizing regional security force collaboration," "discrediting terrorist ideology," "supporting democratic government," "strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities," and "reinforcing bilateral military linkages with the US" (Johnson, 2009). This method uses development and military-to-military security assistance to reduce violent extremism. USAID "has sponsored initiatives to promote education and health," the Department Of Defense "has provided counterterrorism training in marksmanship and border patrol to partner countries, and the TSCTP "has held educational programs meant to marginalize violent extremists (William, 2009). The TSCTP has helped ECOWAS and its partners gather around a single table a large number of officials from countries whose strategic and defense interests are discordant, and to persuade them to coordinate their antiterrorist actions. In further pursuit to eradicate terrorism in its region, ECOWAS and its partners launched the West African Network for Peacebuilding, its strategic is to provide information in determine threats to security, analyzing them and providing recommendations for early response and mitigation. This initiative contributes to increased resilience in the face of threats to peace and security,

and promotes local community ownership in peacebuilding in the region. WANEP has built capacity for stakeholders in farmer-herder conflict through dialogue and mediation in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali and Niger.

## CHAPTER V

### Conclusion

It is evident that Nigeria contributes to regional security on both a sub-regional and continental level, therefore the country's primary duty is to the sub-region, where it provides the necessary foundation for all other security-related initiatives.

It is important to emphasize how actively Nigeria has participated in the governance of security in the sub-region as a direct result of its goal to play a leading role in the area, especially when armed intervention is necessary. Nigeria plays highly active roles in these areas, particularly through Economic Community of West African States, with the following objectives: to initiate regional initiatives in times of crisis; to create normative frameworks for security governance and to support democratic and conflict preventive measures. Nigeria is quite active in these areas if we use Kirchner and Dominguez's (2013) classification of regional security policy areas as our starting point for analysis of regional security governance. Given that the (ECOWAS) is headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria's capital, and that Nigeria has a sizable degree of influence on the organization in terms of both its financial and people resources, it is impossible to overstate the importance of Nigeria. In 1990, the ECOMOG was created as a temporary measure to address the civil war that was unfolding in Liberia. Following that, it oversaw interventions in Liberia (2002), Cote d'Ivoire (1998), Guinea-Bissau (1998-99), and Sierra Leone (1991-2003) (Adebajo, 2002). Between 70 and 80 percent of the overall number of troops and between 80 and 90 percent of the total funding for these missions came from Nigeria (Obi 2008, p. 190; Alli 2012, p. 54). An ECOWAS Standby Force is currently being developed within the AU. As part of a larger African framework and in response to the military coup in Guinea-Bissau in April 2012, the ECOWAS council authorized the deployment of an ESF detachment in 2012 to help preserve the transitional process (ECOWAS Press Release 2012b). This was mostly Nigeria's idea, as it intended to get rid of the Angolan forces that were already present on the ground and that it saw as a threat to its authority. The AFISMA mission was started by ECOWAS, and it was deployed in Mali at the start of 2013. It has been placed under the direction of Nigeria, one of its primary proponents, and it seeks to support the fight for democracy as well as the uprising in the country's Northern area (ECOWAS Press Release 2012a). Nigeria's refusal to send troops to Guinea-Bissau for

the ECOMOG operation stands out as a notable exception to the nation's total contributions, which ultimately led to a significant failure for the ECOMOG endeavor. This appears to be proof that Nigeria's participation is essential to the achievement of the goal (Adebajo 2008, p. 21; Alli 2012, p. 51). Nigeria intervened to advance its security and to assert its position as a leader in this regional environment by taking advantage of the security vacuum created by the international community in the wake of the multiple conflicts that took place in the immediate post-Cold War period. This was done to ensure that Nigeria's security was maintained in addition to being upgraded (Iwilade & Agbo 2012, p. 364). Even though the growth of the global jihadist movement, especially the militant Salafist organization in West Africa, is receiving a lot of attention both domestically and globally, a coordinated regional counterterrorism plan has not yet been devised to address the threat. In order to combine forces and exchange intelligence in the battle against terrorism, other West African states must cooperate in the sub-region. Nigeria is unable to contain this threat and its expansion both inside and outside of her borders on her alone. The combat against terrorism is not the entire responsibility of only one state. The leaders of the sub-region must work together to win this war; it is not enough to only deploy military bombardments as a weapon. If this does not take place, there is a chance that radical groups will penetrate the sub-region and use it as a battleground in the worldwide war on terror. Stopping the problem's growth until this is accomplished is pointless because it will just continue to increase the security dangers that endanger the sub-region's peace and stability. Nigeria shares some of the burdens of guaranteeing the safety of the area with the rest of the global community.

One more thing to think about is whether or not Nigeria will be able to keep the peace and fulfill its important role as a regional stabilizer in West Africa. Nigeria's diplomatic and military leadership has contributed considerably to the resolution of important political and security challenges in West African states since it acquired independence in 1960. Conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone are in stark contrast to the political instability that erupted in Guinea, Niger, Cote d'Ivoire, and Mali in the 1990s. It has been said that the leadership in Nigeria played a significant part in ending these problems. In actuality, Nigeria contributed nearly \$12 million and 12,000 troops to support the ECOWAS Monitoring Group's work (ECOMOG). Nigeria has also pledged to provide \$34 million

to the International Support Mission in Mali, which would be used to aid in the deployment of troops and offer logistical support (AFISMA). Mali has received a guarantee of \$5 million from Nigeria to help with government reform. Nigeria is increasing its military strength and available resources in an effort to put an end to the Boko Haram insurgency, but the country's ability to promote regional and worldwide stability and security is diminishing. For instance, after December 2011, when it became necessary for Nigeria to address its own domestic safety and security issues, it has lost its status as the largest African contributor and the fourth-largest contributor to United Nations (UN) peace operations to Ethiopia. As a result of international pressure, Nigeria has now begun to address the safety and security concerns that have long plagued the country, making Ethiopia Africa's most prolific donor. This is because Nigeria has been putting more effort into tackling problems at home. Also, in July 2013, Nigeria pulled some of its military out of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to help with domestic security and the Boko Haram uprising. This is due to issues both large and small within the country's own security apparatus (MINUSMA, 2013). Instances of late demonstrate how Nigeria's contributions to regional security are being diminished by the conflict. They thus present proof in agreement with Sherman's thesis, which asserts that "Nigeria cannot truly achieve its potential as a stable regional leader unless Nigeria successfully overcomes the challenge of Boko Haram "(Onuoho, 2014)."

Consequently, ECOWAS is confronted with a difficult problem. The worst-case scenario would be that Nigeria's fragile divisions (religious, ethnic, and geographic) would be exploited by Boko Haram's rising attacks, leading to instability or possibly the collapse of the nation. The fall of Nigeria, the world's seventh-most populous nation, would cause unrest in the countries bordering Nigeria. Also, ECOWAS will be harmed since it lacks a regional security stabilizer to whom it may turn for assistance in the event of a political crisis in one of its member states. The war with Boko Haram transformed into a serious and difficult one. A threat to the entire region, it had previously seemed to be a problem that just concerned Nigeria. The situation's core causes and the potentially catastrophic dynamics at play require political will and the development of a comprehensive strategy. The plan should focus on a crafty technique that may reduce support for the false doctrine

that Boko Haram spreads, prevent new members from joining and being radicalized, and stymie the group's ability to gather cash. To do this and get rid of the danger, the following recommendations should be implemented:

### **Recommendations**

1. Create youth employment opportunities. The bordering countries of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have been used by the terrorist organization Boko Haram, which has support in these states, as recruiting grounds. Young people are more vulnerable to exploitation because there are fewer real economic opportunities accessible, and as a result, they are more inclined to be interested in joining insurgent groups. One approach to solving this issue is by giving young people employment possibilities. Therefore, the states should make creating jobs in Nigeria, especially in the North, as well as among the border people of bordering nations a top priority. One of the main areas of concentration for the states should be this. This will increase the number of jobs available for young people while also assisting in drying up Boko Haram's recruiting base.

1. Human security protection and improvement: human security measures must be strengthened. The Nigerian military has too often ignored the risk of killing civilians. As a result of the military's actions, public opinion has turned against them, and Boko Haram has gained support as a viable political alternative in the North. Civilians, witnesses, and important peacemakers like moderate Imams who preach against the insurgency are more deserving of the government's protection. Therefore, the military of Nigeria and the militaries of the countries bordering Nigeria should put an emphasis on better defensive and intelligence measures above retaliation strikes.

2. Centralized warning system for regional dangers: The impacted countries should collaborate with the international community to set up a platform for reporting regional hazards. Through this platform, anonymous citizens can provide valuable feedback and suggestions. Because information and communications technology tools like the internet and mobile phones are growing more widespread in these countries, there is a huge possibility of using these platforms at the national and regional levels to combat organized crime and terrorism. Communities and individuals on the ground can aid security service operations by gathering useful information and intelligence.

3. In an effort to stop the illicit movement of weapons, ammunition, fighters, and contraband over international borders, ECOWAS must immediately continue to implement its new counterterrorism strategy, which is an important step in the fight against terrorism.

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NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

## SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

01.02.2023

Dear Antoinette Namah NIMELY

Your project “BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA AND ITS IMPLICATION ON THE WEST AFRICAN REGION” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Aşkın KİRRAZ'.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın KİRRAZ

The Coordinator of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

## Appendix

## Antoinette Namah Nimely-Boko Haram Insurgency In Nigeria And Its Implication On The West African Region

### ORIGINALITY REPORT

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