



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHINA'S ECONOMIC IMPACT ON AFRICA
A LOOK AT LIBERIA AS A CASE STUDY FROM 2003- 2016

M.A. THESIS

Tommy Otis PRITCHARD

Nicosia
January, 2023

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**Supervisor
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait AKŞIT**

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Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by **Tommy Otis Pritchard** titled “**China’s Economic Impact on Africa: A Look At Liberia As A Case Study From 2003- 2016**” and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Examining Committee Name-Surname

Signature

Head of the Committee: Prof. Dr. Nur Köprülü

Committee Member: Assist. Prof. Dr. Cemal Yorgancıoğlu

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit

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
Approved by the Head of the Department

.....
01/02/2023

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit

Head of Department

Approved by the Institute of Graduate Studies



...../...../20...
Prof. Dr. Kemal Hüsnü Can Başer
Head of the Institute

Declaration

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

TOMMY OTIS PRITCHARD

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I would like to express my thanks to the Almighty God, who created all of humanity and gave me the knowledge, direction, and safety I require to get through the erratic journey that is my life. Lord! In addition, I owe a great deal of gratitude to many people who helped me complete this work in a variety of different ways. I would like to use this opportunity to convey my sincere gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Aksit, for giving me the opportunity to gain from his fountain of knowledge. His cooperation, as well as his essential corrections and advice, played a significant role in the successful completion of this research work. I want you to know that I appreciate you for your unwavering love and support that has been an inspiration to me throughout this quest. Dr. Maeturah Zoe Harmon (M.D Obstetrics & Gynecology Specialist), I am extremely grateful for everything you have done and continue to do for me sister. I want you to know that you are my biggest motivation and I love you so dearly my beloved sister. I am sincerely grateful to the president of the Republic of Liberia, His Excellency Dr. George Manneh Weah, who is one of my biggest support systems. Mr. President, thanks for your tremendous assistance sir. My sincere thanks and appreciation goes to Ambassador. Nora Finda Bundoo- Chief of Protocol Republic of Liberia for encouraging and supporting me both physically and financially as well. Thank you so much for everything that you continue to do for me, mommy. Lastly, I sincerely appreciate everyone who one way or the other contributed to this great journey.

Tommy Otis Pritchard

Abstract

China's Economic Impact on Africa: A Look at Liberia as a Case Study From 2003- 2016

Pritchard, Tommy Otis

M.A., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit

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Since the restoration of diplomatic relations between Liberia and China in 2003, China has been one of the vital international partners in Monrovia's efforts to revamp its society. These initiatives have never stopped, and they have continued ever since. This thesis focuses on the relationship between China and Liberia from 2003 to 2016 following the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in that year. It aims to investigate the economic ties established and assess the overall influence that China has had on Liberia's efforts to pursue its political and economic objectives since the end of the civil war and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between both states. The study discusses China's engagement in Liberia within the soft-power context and evaluates areas of Chinese involvement and factors that strengthened the economic ties between China and Liberia. The analysis concludes that the differences between the two nations are so great that China may be regarded as the relationship's "absolute winner" while Liberia can only be regarded as a "relative winner." The paper concludes with an examination of the collaboration as a whole and some guidance for initiatives and programs that can help Liberia gain more from the partnership.

Keywords: Liberia, China-Liberia relations, economic relations, China-Africa, soft-power.

Özet

Çin'in Afrika'daki Ekonomik Etkisi: Liberya Örneği, 2003- 2016

Pritchard, Tommy Otis

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı

Danışman: Doç. Dr. Sait Akşit

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2003 yılında ikili diplomatik ilişkilerin yeniden oluşturulmasından bu yana, Çin Liberya'nın toplumsal yeniden yapılanmasında en önemli uluslararası ortaklarından birisi olmuştur. Çin'in Liberya'ya olan desteği giderek artmıştır. Bu tez, ilişkilerin düzelmesi sonrasında, 2003-2016 yılları arasında, gelişen Çin-Liberya ilişkilerine odaklanmaktadır. Tezin amacı iki ülke arasındaki ekonomik ilişkileri inceleyerek Çin'in Liberya'nın iç savaş sonrası ekonomik ve siyasi yeniden yapılanması üzerindeki etkisini irdelemektir. Tez, yumuşak güç anlayışı çerçevesinde Çin'in Liberya ile olan ilişkilerini incelemekte ve Liberya'ya olan desteğini ve bu desteğin nedenlerini tartışmaktadır. Çalışma, iki ülke arasındaki muazzam fark nedeniyle Çin'in bu ikili ilişkiden mutlak kazanan olduğunu, Liberya'nın ise görece kazançlı olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. Tez, Çin-Liberya ilişkilerinin hangi alanlarda geliştiğini, Çin'in hangi sektörlere destek vererek Liberya'ya fayda sağlamaya çalıştığını ortaya koyarak Liberya'nın iş birliğini geliştirmede odaklanması gereken noktalara vurgu yapmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Liberya, Çin-Liberya, ekonomik ilişkiler, Çin-Afrika ilişkileri, yumuşak güç.

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List of Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AU	African Union
CBAL	Chinese Business Association in Liberia
CIIE	China International Import Expo
CSP	China Soft Power
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
INFL	Independent National Patriotic Front
ISS	Import-Substitution Strategy
JFKMC	John Frederick Kennedy Medical Center
LPC	Liberia Peace Council
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MDA	Mineral Development Agreement
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MVTC	Monrovia Vocational Training Center
NAM	Nonaligned Movement
NEPAD	The New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NTGL	National Transitional Government of Liberia
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PRC	People's Republic of China
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
RL	Republic of Liberia
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement for Democracy
UN	United Nations
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

Introduction

The relationships between states can be used to describe how states interact with one another. Every sort of bilateral engagement between sovereign governments, whether it be diplomatic, military, political, financial, or exchange-based, can be said to be based on the fundamental principle that both parties should gain from the relationship. Keohane and Nye (1977), who are from the liberal school of thought, said that there isn't a single sovereign state in the whole world. Due to the interconnectedness of states, they are placed under the authority of a single system which is often referred to as the "international system." According to L Neack (2008), diplomacy is used by every country to articulate its place on the global stage by its unique status. In order to advance a diverse range of national goals, states regularly engage in activities that take place outside of their boundaries. Even though every country has different political systems, constitutions, and social norms, they all try to keep good diplomatic relations with other countries.

The main objective is frequently to contribute favorably to the development of peaceful relationships (Feltham, 2004). Each state creates its own strategies to guide, protect, and improve the interactions and relationships it has with other states that are situated outside of its borders as states interact with one another. Bonjang (2018) claims that it is commonly accepted that a state's freedom to decide on its foreign policy is one of the most effective tools it has to further its national interests. When a country develops its foreign policy, its interests are often taken into account for the state to properly direct those interests. The interests of a state may concern issues of political power, economic development, and national security, among others (Goldstein, 2005). In this manner, foreign policy can considerably enhance a country's interests. The foundation for interactions among the nations that make up the global system is the formulation of each state's international policy. Consideration of a nation's economic status is just one of the numerous factors that go into developing its foreign policy Feltham 2004. According to Jackson and Sorensen (2013), the monetary link is a striking aspect of the new state structure and represents a high degree of shared financial dependency among nations. Liberia's foreign policy has been consistent with both universal standards and the ideas that underpin the rules of international law ever since it attained independence in 1847. Respect for the influence and dependability of

varied governments in the area, the rule against encroaching on the internal affairs of other nations, and the maintenance of national security and economic progress are among the principles that are included in this group (Dennis, 2005). The Liberian government pursued an international agenda that was comparable to that of other industrialized countries.

The most significant ally of Liberia in the western hemisphere was the U.S. The two nations have had a long history of interactions dating back to Liberia's foundation in 1822. Although the United States has been a significant ally of Liberia, the two countries' economic ties were not good in the 19th century. Even though the USA said many times that it supported Liberian independence when the British and French empires invaded, this was actually the case. In accordance with Qureshi et al. (1964), the United States began to take an economic dividends in Liberia in the 20th century, and the opening of the Firestone Plantation Company in 1926, the first and biggest rubber plantation in Liberia, signaled the beginning of American involvement in the Liberian economy. Until the 1970s, the US was the most important partner of Liberia.

The changing international context in the 1970s & the rise of a developing nation perspective that included the establishment of African-Asian relations also led Liberia to reconsider its international links. As a consequence, on February 17, 1977, Liberia enhance the first African nation to officially set up diplomatic link with China. Between the years 1977 and 2003, China's diplomatic ties with Liberia fluctuated because of the several civil wars that took place in Liberia during that time. After a period of years during which it was difficult for Liberia to maintain its safety, the country was finally in a position in 2003 to revive its diplomatic ties with the majority of nations, including China. Since the two countries diplomatic relations were restored in 2003, bilateral relations have generally progressed without major stumbling blocks. For many years, China and Liberia have effectively collaborated in practice. Along with the ideas of achieving the greater good and common interests, China has preserved the principles of honesty, effectiveness, amity, and good faith (Jinping, 2017).

Over the years, there has been a gradual growth in the mutual political trust between the two countries, and high-level interactions have remained active during this time. Numerous tangible results have been achieved through cooperation and bilateral communication in the fields of politics, economy, and security, as well as contacts between the two countries' populations. An important contribution to the

nation's ongoing attempts to keep peace and security is the government of China's sending of peacekeeping troops, military observers, and civilian police to join UN peacekeeping operations in Liberia. The adoption into law of a resolution by the Liberian legislature that defends the 'One China Policy' has greatly reinforced the political base of the two nations' diplomatic relations. This took place after the two nations' diplomatic ties were restored.

Liberia decided in the 1970s to change its direction away from the West, and the United States in particular, & back African liberation movements by lending leadership soliciting funds, and other resources. This was notably evident in international organizations like the Organization for African Unity, current name of the African Union, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), & the United Nations (UN) (Casper, 2012). The establishment of full diplomatic ties with a small number of communist countries, notably the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, & Cuba, was required in the 1970s due to a change in Liberia's foreign policy strategy (Dunn, 2016). The change from Liberia's previous foreign policy, which was based on the Western tradition, to one that is based on global pluralism, occurs during this period, making it notable. As a consequence, Liberia's 20-year-long bilateral relationship with Taiwan came to an end in 1977 with the establishment of full diplomatic ties with China (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Liberia, like the bulk of African nations, regarded China as a non-aligned emerging nation in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, little needed to be done to establish special diplomatic ties or even commercial ones with China. Despite this, the majority of African nations, including Liberia, began to move their links in economic sectors to Asia because of several Asian states' exchange executions, which increased their revenues and enhanced innovation. These Asian states include China and India. This was the situation as a result of those Asian republics' improved earnings (Omenka, 2014). A few incentives were created to encourage trade with the African nations through the use of FDI and aid as a result of the trend's evolution. Odeh (2014) asserts that Deng Xiaoping's key foreign policy reforms in the 1970s & 1980s increased China's contact with the African continent. During those decades, many reforms were put into place. Over the ensuing decades, as Liberia's economic partner, China grew more devoted to its relationships with that country. Despite the challenges brought on by the two countries changing political relations, China has continued to devote itself to maintaining strong diplomatic relationships with Liberia during the past years. This was a blatant display of China's

long-term strategy for Africa, which aimed to dominate the continent and the world. Many African countries, according to Khan and Baye (2008), began to see China as a reliable commercial partner because of the country's fast economic development and full participation in international trade since the early 1980s. It's a direct consequence of China's emergence as a global economic ability. Moreover, Sun (2014) claims that the difficulties African countries have had in funding and constructing infrastructure were to be solved thanks to China's new monetary strategy toward Africa. After China and Liberia established diplomatic ties in 1977, for example, China sent fifty Chinese professionals to Liberia to replace Taiwanese workers who had previously been employed on a variety of projects (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). China wanted to win over the Liberian administration with such tactics. Since then, significant progress has been made in all areas of Sino-Liberian ties, from the political to the commercial to investment to aid the armed forces (Moumouni, 2014).

The development of conciliation between China & Taiwan also played a significant part in shaping the condition of relations between China and Taiwan. The premise of China's non-recognition of Taiwan, according to Rotberg's 2009 assessment, is what primarily dictates the nature of its bilateral relations with any state. This is what China perceives as having a "national political interest" in Africa, according to Sun (2014). To put it another way, China seeks the support of African nations for its worldwide foreign policy objectives, notably in multilateral fora like the UN given the size of the African voting bloc, as well as for the home political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party over Taiwan. In order to reinforce the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party as well as China's own internal political system, China is attempting to get the support of African states for the island of Taiwan. Even if China and the other countries maintain bilateral contact, it is widely assumed that China would cut diplomatic ties with any nation that recognized Taiwan as a sovereign country. As a result of Liberia's decision in 1989 to move its diplomatic identification from China to Taiwan, Beijing severed all bilateral contacts with the nation. The People's Republic of China removed all of its staff from various projects being carried out by the diplomatic agreements with Liberia after closing its embassy in Monrovia (Chieh, 2015). Diplomatic ties between Liberia and China were severed following the overthrow of the Samuel Doe administration by the rebel elements in 1990, and they did not mend until 1993. Both countries tried to repair their bilateral ties while the horrific fighting in Liberia that year was going on. When China and

Liberia reestablished their diplomatic ties, China's position in the country was not taken into consideration since the country's peace was in such perilous condition at the time. According to Moumounib (2014), the reestablishment of relations between the two nations did not take place until the year 1997. Charles Taylor, former president and warlord of the NPFL, immediately acknowledged both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan after being sworn into office. His government decided to openly work with Taiwan. Because of this, the links that had previously held the two nations together (China and Liberia) were finally dissolved. As an act of revenge, China severed all of its diplomatic connections with the Liberian government.

By 2003, the Liberian government had broken diplomatic connections with Taiwan and re-established ties with China under the leadership of Charles Gyude Bryant, who had previously served as head of the National Transitional Gov't of Liberia (Gray, 2018). As a result of this action, the course of relations between China and Liberia was drastically changed. The 52nd National Legislature of Liberia issued a joint resolution in 2005 that formally reaffirmed the "One China Policy." Even though the bilateral relations between the two nations have changed, the new phase in Sino-Liberian relations has assumed a variety of characteristics. The change had the immediate effect of reinforcing Liberia's loyalty to the One China Policy. These disparities and the continuation of Sino-Liberia relations posed a challenge that needed to be solved in the light of the fact that the Liberian gov't was wavering in its diplomatic recognition between China and Taiwan and was in the process of reestablishing diplomatic relations with China. Given the government of Liberia's shifting diplomatic recognition of China and Taiwan, these shifts and stability in Sino-Liberia relations provided a conundrum. Not a lot of thorough research has been done on the subject of relations between China and Liberia.

Statement of the Problem

This study aims to determine the degree of change and continuity in Liberia's relations with China as well as the most significant effects these ties have had on the country's economy. Although both nations have had diplomatic links with one another since 1977, when those ties were established, their relationship was strained for many years as a result of Liberia's fluctuating diplomatic relations between China and Taiwan. Despite this, the two nations have a combined history of nearly 40 years in diplomacy. Following former Liberian President William R. Tolbert's death in 1980,

Samuel K. Doe assumed the Presidency in Liberia, which he had unofficially held since 1978. Under Doe's administration, Liberia changed its diplomatic connections away from China and toward Taiwan, which resulted in China and Liberia having terrible relations with one another. The two nations reached an agreement in 1991 to restart their diplomatic relations, and they continued to do so without a break until 1997 when the then President of Liberia Charles Taylor made the choice to officially acknowledge and work with Taiwan instead of China. The previously weak bilateral ties between China and Liberia were further strained as a result of this action. The two countries' connections were reestablished in 2003, which was a turning point in history. Both countries have been attempting to strengthen their diplomatic ties ever since the restoration of their bilateral relations. The aim of the research is to assess China's economic operations and the beneficial effects they have had on Liberia's economy since the two nations' diplomatic ties were restored from 2003 to 2016.

Objectives of the Research Study

This research aims to achieve the specific research objectives indicated below by looking into Liberia's relations with China, especially economic relations, and China's economic influence on the economy of Liberia:

- To investigate the different kinds of economic ties that were established between China and Liberia between the years 2003 and 2016.
- To identify how China has impacted Liberia's economy through its economic activities since the reestablishment of ties.

Research Question

The following research questions will bring out the much-needed result required to probe into this research.

1. What has the character of China's economic involvement been like with Liberia during the years 2003- 2016?
2. What factors strengthened the economic ties that bind China and Liberia?

Significance of the Research Study

According to what is stated by Thompson in his book titled "China's Soft Power in Africa: From Beijing Consensus to Health Diplomacy," which was published in 2005, the Chinese impact in Africa is the result of years of work spent nurturing ties

via assistance, commerce, cultural contact, and technical interchange. The capacity of China to network across Africa is directly responsible for the country's growing influence on the African continent. Due in large part to China's foreign assistance strategy, which has encouraged African nations to create bilateral relationships with the country, it has emerged as a development partner to fill the void left by Western partners. This has allowed China to fill the hole left by Western partners. Even though the United States has traditionally played the role of Liberia's most significant partner, the inception of China in the global economy & its interest in Africa have increased the urgency with which a study of the linkages between China and Liberia should be conducted. China's consistent participation in the Liberian economy has taken the form of trade, help in international development, and investments. As an emerging economic superpower, China is essential to this study since Liberia appears to be just one of many African nations where its influence can be seen. This study offers a different perspective that aids in explaining and better understanding China's foreign economic policy toward Africa in general & Liberia in particular. Last but not least, this study will serve as a springboard for future research on subjects that are somewhat equivalent to the one being investigated here.

Purpose of the Study

This thesis aims to explore the level of economic impact that the People's Republic of China has had on Liberia since reestablishing diplomatic and bilateral ties in 2003. As such it is interested in the extent of Chinese support and development assistance that benefited Liberia from 2003- 2016 and the areas of cooperation after the China- Liberia bilateral and economic ties were re-established in 2003. Thus, this research will look at the influence of China on Liberia's economic growth process. In addition, it will give the reasons for the promotion of more economic support, and then, this study will elaborate on the current realities and the growing trend of China's agenda for Liberia and its recovery process.

The researcher is motivated and eager to do study on this issue with the hope of filling in the gaps that have been left unfilled for an excessive amount of time because of the limited interest other researchers presented on this subject in reference to Liberia. In light of the aforementioned information, finding an acceptable theoretical framework for this study will benefit from doing a literature review on relevant

subjects. The information that will be included will significantly advance the results of the following inquiry on this topic.

Limitations of the Study

In light of the topic that is being looked at, it is essential to point out that there is limited scholarly work on Liberia in regard to China's recent economic activity in the country, particularly during the time frame that is being investigated. It has been one of the limitations of this study, but ultimately, the hopes that this thesis will also serve as a foundation for further research projects. Inadequate funds to pay for some materials, time, transportation, and of lack of some people were among the obstacles (research assistants). The researcher has faced a number of big hurdles, one of the most crucial of which is going to be the disclosure of details from officials who have access to literature to aid this study. The extent of available data has also led the study to limit its focus on China-Liberia relations until 2016.

Methodology

This investigation is carried out by conducting a comprehensive literature analysis that focuses on China's economic impact on Africa. An analysis of Liberia as a case study from the years 2003 to 2016, with the only data utilized being secondary data. For this research, a qualitative method was used to collect, analyze, and explain the data. Azungah (2018) says that qualitative techniques mean using things other than numbers to figure out what a population is like. Using a descriptive research design guided the choice of a qualitative approach to help the study stand out.

This study looked into China's economic impact on Liberia by collecting data from annual or periodic reports that were available for the period from 2003 to 2016. Articles from several internet sources, including the Annual Report of the Central Bank of Liberia, were also used in this research. Data from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2003-2016, was subjected to a thematic analysis in order to compare it to other data for the purposes of creating a realistic framework and assessing the overall developmental results (Ministry of Commerce and Industry Republic of Liberia). Meaningful patterns in the produced datasets and categories were investigated. The themes that emerged from describing the isolated patterns were developed in light of the predetermined research questions.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into five chapters. In Chapter I, the study commences with the introduction into key concepts, problem statement, main objective of the study, core research questions, significance of the study, limitations, definition of terms and their operational definitions, and lastly, the research methodology used in the collection and analysis of data. An overview of the relevant literature takes up the bulk of Chapter II, which is then followed by an empirical investigation of previous research on China's expanding sphere of influence in Africa and its relationships with Liberia. An account of the history of relationships betwixt China & Africa, focusing on China's relationship with Liberia before to 2003, The Cold War era Chinese view of Africa, the post-Cold War Chinese connection with Africa, and China's place in a multipolar growing world. The outcomes of China's economic impact on Liberia are discussed in Chapter IV, where they are provided. In order to draw conclusions and provide solutions, Chapter V gives a comprehensive discussion that compares the recent findings with the literature that was looked at.

CHAPTER II

Literature review

China and Africa's relationship

China's economy has overtaken Japan's to take up second place in the overall rankings of countries throughout the world. This is mostly attributable to the nation's rapid economic expansion & increasing economic connectedness with the rest of the globe. Today's Chinese view of foreign affairs is less ideological and more pragmatic than the one that dominated during Mao's time. The People's Republic of China (PRC) must go outside for resources, trade partners, and investment possibilities because of the size of its own economy. Large-scale bilateral trade with a wide range of partners and sizable investments in both the US and EU make up the majority of China's economic ties abroad. But many people have voiced strong opposition to China's aid to developing nations during the last decade. Many analysts are concerned that China's opaque policies may have an outsized impact on the development of economies that are smaller and more vulnerable to instability, even though China's trade and investments with regions like Africa and Latin America are on a much smaller scale compared to its activity with more established partners (Glaser & Medeiros 2007). Even though there are a lot of questions, most of them are ignored or written off as "different points of view."

The Bandung Conference, which took place in Indonesia in 1955, is generally acknowledged as being the first and most important Asian-African conference of its kind. It was held in the city of Bandung Indonesia. This meeting is regarded as the starting point for the modern-day connections that exist between China and Africa. On May 30, 1956, China initiated its first diplomatic relations with a country on the African continent by establishing ties with Egypt. China and Egypt were the two countries that first established these linkages. Since then, China has moved to strengthen its connections with a variety of nations situated on the African continent by initiating a series of new diplomatic initiatives. China has diplomatic ties with fifty of Africa's fifty-four states as of 2010. By the end of 2022, the conference aims to set up & smooth collaboration including the dissemination of knowledge, the sharing of resources, & the development of new skills between the continent and the diaspora.

To promote the development of Pan African Climate Change and Conservation methods for resolving the interconnected regional & international problems that affect Africans everywhere. To identify leadership skills and civil society partnerships that

can deliver identifiable benefits to diverse communities to combat climate change and build sustainable conservation. China has direct interests in 48 of these 50 nations; however, only one of these countries (the Republic of Guinea-Bissau) where it does not have its presence being felt since the inaugural ministerial conference of the triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was held in Beijing, China, in the year 2000. There has been a "significant step forward" in the economic ties that exist betwixt China & the African mainland. Before the year 2000, China started acknowledging its links with African nations in the 1950s (Adjasi, 2012; Van de Looy, 2006). While politics was the focus, some economic topics were included. During the African national liberation struggles, the two countries became closer (1950s and 1960s). China deployed diplomatic and military personnel to Africa during liberal revolutions to help and train liberation armies. African nations would respond to China's largesse by aiding its global ambitions. Haroz (2011) acknowledges that African nations have showed thanks to China by supporting its UN Security Council candidacy. This was said about China's Security Council bid. China took over in 1971. Algeria, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan have maintained economic relations with China. Humans did develop these ties. Prybyla (1964) says China's 1960s economic participation with Africa was limited by distance & a lack of a commercial fleet. Several African republics have benefitted from China's infrastructural development and political & economic backing. Despite China's waning interest in Africa, it remained a stable partner. Taylor (2009, 443) said the two sides remained close. Africa's reluctance to grow economically and compete on global markets impeded China's global ambitions. After the 1990s Tiananmen Square massacre, ties between the two nations improved. Even as the West examined China's African allies for lack of democracy and human rights in the 1990s, China kept powerful ties with African countries. China sought African friends in its ambition for global political domination.

China and Africa have grown closer over the previous half-century. China has long turned to Africa as a source of raw resources due to the continent's fast economic expansion (Van de Looy & Haan, 2006). China and Africa's economic connections are affected by their common need for infrastructure, China's unique style of funding development projects, and their respective governments. Sun (2014) describes three eras of China-Africa economic connections since 1949 (1949-1979, 1979-1990s, and 1990-2000). 1949-1979 is the "first phase" of Chinese trade with Africa. Politics

pushed China-Africa economic connections during this time. China helped Africa fight colonialism and imperialism. From 1979 through the mid-1990s, the Chinese government's foreign policy intended to support the country's fast economic expansion (Sun, 2014). This transformation changed the dynamics of winning political support from African governments for economic collaboration and mutual benefit. Reforms have expanded China's participation in global entities. Sun's third phase lasted till 2000. China began exploring both domestic and foreign markets at the same time it developed commerce with Africa. China has made progress. Africa's vast energy supplies, raw materials, and mineral resources allowed China to directly fuel its hunt for raw material to hasten its economic expansion on the international stage (Sun, 2014). The promotion of economic cooperation between China & African countries was the primary purpose of the forum. "China's African Strategy" is a comprehensive policy paper that was issued by the Chinese government in 2006. Published in 2006, this paper lays forth the fundamental concepts and scope of China's policy in Africa. The web address for this file is. This claim is supposed to be exactly here. Throughout the book, emphasis is placed on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and China's longstanding policy of non-interference. Moreover, China has bestowed upon Africa several monetary gifts, such as (new) preferential lend & commendation, the formation of a growth fund, & the granting of debt forgiveness & reduction. The Chinese gov't "going global" or "stepping out" in Africa has been successful since the turn of the millennium. This tactic is an example of China's determined attempts to entice foreign investment for the sake of maintaining China's economic progress and reform. Both of these objectives are now receiving serious attention in China. China's investments abroad place a greater focus on the acquisition of natural resources to meet domestic request because of the country's swift economic progress. The goal here is to meet consumer demand at home. Popular opinion is that China's recent contribution in Africa furthers the government's stated goals of developing the continent's infrastructure and securing control over its natural resources. Most individuals think this way. But this opinion isn't held by everyone. Foster et al. (2008), for instance, found a few Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Africa between 2001 and 2007 that relied on the continent's natural resources. The Chinese government's support was important in the completion of these initiatives. It's crucial to keep in mind, however, that China has a long history of encouraging the development of a wide variety of physical infrastructure. Building new infrastructure has been a mainstay of China's aid

to Africa since at least the 1970s. Corkin et al. (2008) note that "it is often the most resource-rich states that are in acute need of infrastructure development and assistance," this may account for the correlation between infrastructure aid and resource-rich countries. This helps to clarify the correlation between resource-rich countries and those that invest in their infrastructure. It's clearer now why nations with plenty of resources also tend to have strong government backing for their infrastructure. The first assumption is supported by Brautigam's (2009) theory, which posits that China's association in Africa is motivated by a variety of elements apart from natural resources.

China and other African countries have a long history of mutually beneficial commercial collaboration. In the 1980s, China's total trade with Africa, including imports and exports, amounted to an exceedingly meager \$0.9 billion a year on average. This figure includes both imports and exports. It continued to grow all through the decade of the 1990s, but at a slower pace than before. After then, there was a significant growth in commerce, with a subsequent rise from US\$9.5 billion in trade in the year 2000 to US\$36.3 billion in trade in the year 2005 and US\$79.8 billion in trade in the year 2009 accordingly (Cheung, De Haan, Qian, & Yu, 2012).

China's commerce with Africa has been growing even though the continent's economic imbalance with China has been stable for the most part. Alongside official development assistance and commercial exchange, China also engages in significant economic cooperation with several African countries via the implementation of contractual projects.

It is important to keep in mind that the average project that is outsourced is not considered to be an ODI activity. The construction of highways, bridges, schools, shopping malls, residences, office buildings, water storage facilities, dams, and power plants are some examples of the kind of projects that fall under this category of legally required projects.

Examples of such other projects are power plants, dams, and water conservation efforts. Since the 1970s, this specific structure for doing work on contractual projects has been in existence. There has been a steady rise over the course of time in the number of projects that are being carried out by contracts.

Following the initial Forum on China-Africa Collaboration in the 2000s, the degree of cooperation between the two continents increased significantly. Africa has surpassed the Middle East to become China's second-largest market for engineering

contract work. Previously, this position was held by the Middle East. The overall amount of money that China is investing in Africa via contractual efforts is far more than the amount that it is contributing formally to Africa's development.

In a nutshell, political and ideological reasons were the driving forces behind the early phases of the economic connection between China & Africa. After then, it went in a completely new direction and began putting more of an emphasis on the economic factors and circumstances that are necessary for growth in China and Africa. There is little question that China's participation in African affairs is not something that has just begun occurring in recent times. In point of fact, China's dealings with African countries didn't start until the 1950s. The rapid and significant expansion in the number of economic connections is the development that has stood out the most over the course of the last several years. Due to the rapidity with which it is occurring, the rest of the world is having a hard time accepting the fact that China has emerged as one of Africa's most cardinal economic associates, offering financial support, debt relief, and a sizeable export market. China has emerged as one of Africa's most cardinal economic colleagues by offering financial support, debt relief, and a sizeable export market. China is becoming an increasingly important economic partner for Africa. China invests and is involved in Africa to a degree that is unmatched by any other country. It is the largest commercial partner of Africa, a significant source of bilateral funding, and a crucial financier of the infrastructure of the continent. One-eighth of the continent's overall industrial output is thought to be produced by Chinese firms. The many platforms that Africans use to interact require the digital infrastructure that was built in China. The two nations' relations in the areas of politics, the military, and security are improving. Understanding the relationship between China and Africa is crucial for comprehending both the continent's dynamics and Xi Jinping's global aspirations. The more recent history of this collaboration has gone through three phases. China helped out throughout the cold war, occasionally constructed a railroad or a parliament building, and made repeated unsuccessful attempts to disseminate Maoism. On the other hand, their relationship was motivated by politics. Africa's newly independent nations were taken into consideration by China as potential partners. 26 African nations stood with Mao Zedong in 1971 when the United Nations agreed to award China the seat that Taiwan had previously held. "It is our African brothers that have taken us into the UN," he said in explanation (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

The second phase, which started in the 1990s, was defined by the economy. At the time, Africa was crucial to China's economic development. From the continent, oil and metals were imported, and surplus cash and manufactured commodities were exported forth. China helped African nations that had just recently exited one-party control and decades of stagnation by providing them with useful infrastructure. These nations had recently emerged from a state of political inaction. China has changed from being a "lender of last resort" to a "net recipient of support," according to a new book by Axel Dreher and his coauthors titled "Banking on Beijing." Only the United States contributed more money to development between 2000 and 2014 through loans and other forms of help. More than half of China's expansion efforts were implemented in Africa. This time period continues to have an impact on how we view China's relationship with Africa. In contrast, Daniel Larg (2021) of Central European University contends in another book that Mr. Xi, who has made nine trips to Africa overall and four as president, has brought about "A New Era." The view offered by Mr. Large is that he "has been rebuilding China's Africa relations in his own image." (Barack Obama was the most recent American president to travel here.) (Manji & Marks, 2007).

The preservation of economic connections is crucial. But since 2016, China's financial assistance to African nations has reduced. It builds fewer megaprojects and prioritizes business and financial activities above government projects. And politics has once again become a crucial factor. China's attitude towards Africa is a part of President Xi Jinping's assertive foreign policy. Given that the membership of the Chinese Communist Party exceeds the populations of all but four of the African nations, his policy gives it a larger role.

There are two key dimensions to the importance of Africa in Beijing's international relations, both of which are covered in more detail below. China has long seen Africa as its most dependable ally in the conflict with other countries on the global stage. Significant political repercussions flow from the growth of Sino-African relations, not only for China & Africa but also for the rest of the developing universal. In the beginning, the strengthening of Sino-African links benefits the strengthening and cooperation of emerging countries, creating a win-win situation.

As indicated by its non-aligned foreign policy & its dedication to socialism on the national level, China has committed to stand solidly behind and support the developing world nations regardless of what has transpired in the past, what may

happen in the present, or what the future may hold. Both China's national commitment to socialism and its non-alignment foreign policy imply this pledge. Unmistakably, the developing world is making progress in both its share of global trade and its ability to speak up about issues affecting the entire world community. In both domains, this is accurate. The majority of developing nations are found in the African continent, which is also home to China, the most populated developing nation in the universal. The development of Sino-African relations must therefore be understood within this context. Beijing's primary objective is to boost South-South teamwork & the collective growth of these nations in order to improve the global position of the developing universal and establish a new global order. This was stated by Beijing's Foreign Minister Wang Yi during a visit to South Africa in June 3, 2018. The development of South-South cooperation and the general growth of these nations will be the means by which this goal will be achieved. The relevance of this truth is made even clearer by the fact that current relations between the North and the South appear to be weak in some places. Therefore, expanding the overall prosperity of emerging nations & enabling them to benefit from globalization have significant ramifications for both world peace and the development of the entire planet.

In terms of its contribution to the development of a multipolar world order & the advancement of China's & Africa's respective worldwide positions & impacts within this system, Sino-African cooperation cannot be understated. Since it started on its economic reform path and opened up policy space for interaction, China's reputation and standing have considerably improved on a global scale. At the same time, China's influence in world affairs has grown over this time. Beijing's viewpoint in this regard is that Africa still plays a vital role in global affairs of the current order within the universe. The majority of African countries are now entering a period of political & economic stability, and their standings in the international community have also improved. Although the majority of African nations experienced a period of political unrest and economic down turn in the initial decades following the Cold War era, these countries are now entering this period. The chances for China and Africa to work together overlap at this juncture. Evidently, the most important issues facing the world community are generally shared by China and Africa. On numerous subjects that benefit their common interests, they have previously cooperated and coordinated their efforts. Both parties have collaborated to advance multilateralism and democracy

in foreign affairs as well as UN changes that are meant to promote world peace and harmony.

Last but not least, Sino-African collaboration can aid in the successful execution of the "One China policy" &, more crucially, the successful completion of China's reincorporation. In order to alleviate Taiwan's current state of international isolation, Taiwan's leaders are concentrating their diplomatic efforts on developing relations with Africa, particularly West Africa. There are still a few African countries that cannot resist the temptation of money and continue to maintain "diplomacy" with Taiwan, even though the bulk of African states are resolute about adhering to the "One China policy." China's efforts to develop its interests in Africa are negatively impacted by this. However, a growing number of African nations are choosing mainland China over Taiwan as a result of the enormous increase in China's overall national strength, notably over the course of the most recent decade. The so-called "Taiwan factor" is not as influential as it once was.

China's rising influence in Africa

In addition to China's rapidly expanding commercial commerce with Africa, which is anticipated to reach \$100 billion by the year 2010, China's extensive influence in Africa can be seen in its energy policy, diplomatic ties, cultural exchanges, growing military presence, and security cooperation. All of these factors contribute to China's growing presence in Africa. There are over 700 Chinese businesses operating in business throughout the 49 nations that make up Africa. These businesses are entangled in an extensive range of industries, such as the textile business, the fishing industry, and the resource extraction industry. Seven regional trade & investment hubs have been constructed across the continent of Africa in order to investigate possible new avenues for sustainable growth and the expansion of existing infrastructure. At the present time, China is the world's second-largest net importer of oil, & approximately 25% of the country's overall oil supply originates from countries in Africa (with the predation to increase to 40 percent within the next decennary) (Karayalcin & Ulubasoglu, 2020)

Since the year 2000, a number of top Chinese leaders, including President Hu, as well as other senior Chinese leaders, have made frequent trips to Africa. Additionally, the number of Chinese diplomats who represent China in regional African organizations continues to skyrocket. China has greatly increased the sum of

money it provides to other nations and has made a variety of different countries eligible for multibillion-dollar loans with extremely low or no interest. China has also made the amount of money it provides to other nations available in a variety of different forms. It has made significant efforts to foster academic and cultural interactions between Chinese colleges and the tens of thousands of students hailing from African countries. In addition, Russia has boosted the number of military advisors it employs, provided a number of African regimes with fighter planes and small guns, and constructed small arms companies in the Sudan & other African nations. At the China-Africa Economic Forum in Beijing on November 2006, which was attended by forty-eight nations from Africa, President Hu made a commitment to increase China's economic assistance to the continent by the year 2009, as well as to increase trade and infrastructure development, train 15,000 African professionals, offer scholarships to 4,000 African students, and forge ever-closer ties over the course of the coming years. Other commitments included increasing trade and infrastructure development, training 15,000 African professionals, and offering scholarships to 4,000 African students. The message that is being sent is loud and obvious, and it is that China has grabbed the lead in Africa, therefore changing the tactical environment of the continent. Both this event and China's conduct in respect to Africa communicate this message. China has pursued diplomatic, military, and economic clout in return for unrestricted aid, regardless of the human rights records or political ideologies of recipient nations, in order to gain its considerable influence in Africa through what it refers to as an "independent foreign policy" (a term used by Beijing to denote independence from American ability). This policy was implemented in order for China to gain its considerable influence in Africa. As a consequence of this, China has been able to exert a considerable amount of influence on Africa. This approach to foreign policy, regardless of how beneficial it may be for Beijing, undermines the efforts of the U.S & other governments to encourage good administration, market improve, & regional peace & stability, & it also reduces the impact of those states in Africa.

Because of China's strong ties to countries such as Angola and Zimbabwe, for example, such countries have been able to disregard pressure from the international community and fight back against efforts to reform, isolate, or otherwise control them. The close ties that exist between China & Sudan serve to highlight China's enormous impacted in Africa as well as possible ramifications for the rest of the globe. China & Sudan have a long history of diplomatic & economic cooperation. Sudan has been

struggling with internal warfare for a considerable amount of time. The "ethnic cleansing" label is being applied to what was previously a protracted internal dispute that does not seem to have any clear resolution in sight. Even while the international community has pledged to do all in its power to stop genocide on the scale of the one that occurred in Rwanda, they are struggling to find a solution. The position that China is taking, which is that Sudan has the right to govern its own internal affairs even though there is still a slaughter taking place, has had a huge impact on the deterioration of the situation. China has rejected international pressure by condemning Sudanese actions rather than giving in to the pressure and falling in. The fact that China has a significant financial interest in Sudan, a country in which Chinese oil corporations are well-represented and which supplies China with 20% of its oil from Africa, is a matter of concern. In the present day, there are more than 10 thousand Chinese individuals living and working in the Sudan. Beijing has opted to overlook Sudanese inactivity and engagement, which amounts to a de facto endorsement of its conduct; instead of utilizing the substantial influence it has in Sudan to assist find a solution, Beijing has chosen to ignore Sudanese inaction and involvement. The inability of the Chinese government to adequately handle the problem is the primary factor that contributed to the watering down of United Nations resolutions on Sudan. After reviewing the previously emphasized context on China's influence in Africa, let's look at China's engagement in UN peacekeeping deployments on the continent. This article first offers a brief overview of China's engagement in UN peacekeeping operations in general, and then it discusses China's views on peacekeeping and its engagement in peacekeeping deployments in Africa (with a particular focus, based on first-person accounts, on the peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara). The conclusion of this conversation focuses on China's role in promoting stability in African nations (Frdhlich, 2021).

China- Liberia relations

On February 17, 1977, the People's Republic of China & the Republic of Liberia became the first two nations in the annals of global history to officially establish diplomatic ties with one another. These relations have continued to this day. On October 10th, 1989, Samuel Doe directed that "diplomatic relations" be "resumed" between the governments of Taiwan and Liberia. These "contacts" had previously been suspended. As a prompt and decisive reaction to the events that transpired, the

government of China issued a statement proclaiming the immediate termination of all diplomatic ties betwixt its country and Liberia (Alden & Alves, 2008). Relations between China and Liberia were formally revived on August 10, 1993, after a short pause. The government of Charles Taylor recognized the validity of the "two Chinas" thesis shortly after its introduction to the public on September 5, 1997. China's embassy in Liberia was closed along with all other ties to the country on September 9. With the signing of a joint declaration and MOU on October 11, 2003, diplomatic ties betwixt Liberia & China were reestablished. On the same day, connections between the two nations were reestablished at the ambassadorial level. The Chinese embassy in Liberia reopened on January 12, 2004, after a lengthy closure for repairs and refurbishment. The Liberian National Transitional Legislative Assembly passed legislation in favor of the One-China Policy in August 2005. The motion was passed. The 52nd legislative session later reaffirmed this resolution in October of 2006. Since resuming diplomatic ties in October 2003, China and Liberia have made significant progress in building friendly relations and expanding cooperation projects to each other's mutual benefit. Corporate ties, as well as people-to-people and cultural interactions, as well as military exchanges, have made great strides. There has been a continuous rise in the degree of political trust as well as an increase in the frequency of high-level meetings.

African Trade with China and the Associated Economic Growth

The nature of the connection betwixt international commerce & overall sustainable development is one of the most significant fields of study for both theoretical and empirical investigations. Since this is one of the most vital fields of study, more attention needs to be paid to it. Growing worldwide trade integration has brought more focus to the relationship between international commerce and economic development, which is warranted due to persistent and widespread disparities in economic effectiveness across different nations. This is especially true for developing countries. This is particularly true in view of the fact that developing nations are more likely to be adversely impacted by the integration of international commerce. This is owing to the fact that the relevance of international trade to overall economic growth has finally been acknowledged. This is owing to the fact that experts have started to carefully investigate the probable linkages between rising economies and more global commerce. This is crucial as there has been a surge in the interconnectedness of

international commerce in recent years (Silajdzic & Mehic, 2018). The foundation for the connection between economic growth and international trade is the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) resource investment fund trade model, which is based on differences in the amount of resources available around the world as well as Smith's immense edge & Ricardo's comparative edge from the classical school of thought. Another model that bases international trade on disparities in natural resource availability is the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) resource funding trade model. The idea upon which this relationship depends is that increasing economic activity across borders would be a logical outcome of greater economic connectedness among nations. Both nations stand to gain from trading internationally & specialization if one has an absolute cost edge (i.e., A product can be produced with less labor per unit) in one commodity while the other has an absolute cost-benefit advantage in another. We have reached the moment where the advantages of globalization and specialization are at their peak. But even if a nation doesn't have an absolute cost-benefit in manufacturing both items, Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage suggests there may be a source of trade that benefits both sides. This is true even if the nation does not perform any type of cost-benefit analysis in the manufacture of both items. To maximize their competitive advantage and ensure the greatest possible advantage over their competitors, If a nation is less efficient than others, it should focus on exporting the service or product for which it is substantially less inefficient (Krugman et al. 2012).

When a nation exports goods made primarily from relatively abundant (cheap) inputs and imports goods made from relatively scarce (expensive) inputs, the nation will additionally benefit from specialization and comparative advantage. This is because the nation will be exporting goods made from relatively abundant inputs and importing goods made from relatively scarce inputs. This is because the country will export both the product for which a considerable quantity of relatively plentiful (cheap) input is used as well as the commodity for which a sizeable amount of relatively abundant (expensive) input is not utilized. The reason for this is due to the fact that the country will export both commodities. The following is what the H-O resource endowment (component plenty) commerce model has to say about this topic: This is due to the fact that the nation has a competitive advantage in the export of the product or service that calls for a significant quantity of easily accessible (low-cost) inputs (Krugman & Obstfeld 1997). In accordance with H-O model, the primary factor that determines the benefits that countries get from trading with one another is the degree

to which the availability of various production components varies from one nation to the next (inputs). As a direct consequence of the endogenous growth theory, a great number of brand-new theoretical frameworks have been developed. These presumptions highlight the significance of engaging in international trade in order to achieve a pace of economic expansion that is both sustainable and satisfactory. These hypotheses are included in a substantial collection. This theory has concentrated on the degree of economic openness as well as the type of trade and the performance of exports in an effort to illustrate that open sustainable development at a faster rate than closed ones. Specifically, it has been shown that open wealth expanded faster than closed ones (Edwards 1998). In a manner comparable to this, proponents of export-led strategies and free trade underline the manner in which the majority of developing nations who implemented inward-looking policies as part of the import-substitution strategy (ISS) faced negative wealth repercussions (Balassa 1978). Because the majority of nations depended on multilateral organizations to implement the necessary changes to address imbalances in the basic macroeconomic indicators of their own economies, those nations were forced to focus more of their attention on exports. This resulted in many nations being forced to increase the importance they placed on their exports. Because of this, the number of countries whose economies are dependent on exports has expanded. The plan aimed to expand the number of free markets by putting into action new policies that put a significant amount of emphasis on the export promotion strategy as one of the approaches that is both one of the approaches that is generally acceptable and one of the approaches that is one of the most reliable ways. As a consequence of this, by the middle of the 1980s, the export-led strategy had swiftly replaced the internally centered approach in the economic literature on development economics, sustainable development, & adjustment strategy. This occurred because of the fact that exports led to greater economic growth. This was due to the widespread belief that the strategy that focused on expanding exports was more effective than the one that was domestically oriented. This measure was done as a direct response to the rapid rejection of the plan that was centered on the company's internal operations. The concept of growth driven by exports provides as the basis for the positive benefits that commerce, and export in particular, have on the overall rate of economic expansion. These impacts may be seen manifested in an array of ways, including increased capacity utilization, the adoption of more cutting-edge technology, and increased economies of scale. When a nation's total exports increase, the degree

of investment that nation makes in those sectors of the economy in which it possesses a comparative advantage also increases. This increases overall output and, as a result, sustainable development rates (Feder 1983; Al-Yousif 1997). In addition, Grossman & Helpman (1991) use theoretical models to show how international commerce may help spread new technology and boost productivity in developing nations. That is to say, international trade has a positive effect on capital accumulation, and it also has the potential to enhance trading nations' economic performance through processes including the transfer of knowledge, economies of scale, and comparative advantage. So, it could help the economy grow by making it easier for knowledge and new ideas to spread through the in-kind export of cutting-edge technologies.

Over the course of the last several years, there has been an abundance of empirical research that has been carried out to judge the connection between international commerce & economic expansion. The findings of these research are consistent with the theoretical literature that was presented and addressed before. However, determining the exact significance of the theoretical framework via empirical study on the connection between trade and economic expansion is a difficult task. Chang et al. (2009) looked at the ways in which international commerce influenced the growth of economies in both developed and developing nations. According to their results, the extent to which trade contributes to economic growth is largely determined by the particular structural and macroeconomic features of the economies of the trading partners involved. The findings also show that the inclusion of other factors that are mutually supportive, such as investment on infrastructure and education, might condition the influence of trade openness on sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. This was found to be the case. In addition, Zahonogo (2016) applies a dynamic growth model to data spanning from 1980 to 2012 in order to judge the connection between trade openness & economic development in 42 nations located in sub-Saharan Africa. The data was collected over this time period. The time period covered by this investigation spans from 1980 to 2012. In addition, Matthew and Folasade (2014) did research on the link between institutions, economic growth, and trade openness in sub-Saharan Africa. They found a positive correlation between all three factors. They discovered that economic development in the states located in sub-Saharan Africa was only little affected by trade openness, but this effect was nevertheless substantial.

There is some disagreement as to whether or not commerce between China & African nations assists in the sustainable development of those nations. There is a widespread consensus that China's expanding commerce with various African countries is beneficial to the economies of those nations (Chemingui and Bchir 2010; Balamoune-Lutz 2011). On the other hand, there are a lot of people who think that the trade between China & Africa, which is still helped along by China's growing image across the globe, is not by Africa's long-term objectives. One of these objectives is to encourage commercial growth as a method of fostering general and industrial development in African nations. This objective is one of several. According to the statistics, contrary to the former assertion that China's growing global image continued to stimulate commerce between China and Africa, this is not the case. This finding directly contradicts the earlier assertion (Ademola et al. 2009). As a result, the influence of trade on the growth of economies of African countries may either have a beneficial or negative effect, depending on the circumstances. On the other hand, the robustness of a nation's institutions could make it easier for that nation to realize the benefits of increased trade openness. As a result, strengthening the institutions that exist inside emerging economies is an essential component. The development of robust institutions and the cultivation of an atmosphere that is amenable to the implementation of macroeconomic policy are both absolutely necessary. There is a chance that making the economic system more open to the rest of the world will result to more rent-seeking by bureaucrats in places where organizations aren't very great, such as in places where there is corruption, a weak rule of law, unsuccessful government & regulation, & weak contract implementation laws. This will have a detrimental impact on the fiscal development of the nations. To put it another way, when the institutional framework is weak, resources are redirected away from sectors that are productive and more engaged in rent-seeking and toward sectors that are less productive. In other words, resources are taken away from productive sectors & given to sectors that are less productive (Kandiero and Wadhawan 2003)

Conceptual Framework: China's "soft power" & the "Beijing Consensus"

Modern China-Africa relations are based on wealth & political realities, not notions like they were during the Cold War. Since 1949, China's link with Africa have grown, this helps China establish a peaceful world order that promotes economic growth and stability in China. China supported African freedom movements in the

1960s and 1970s. It also helped socialist countries build stadiums, clinics, railroads, and other infrastructure, sending engineers, teachers, & medics to strengthen ties. Chinese officials move to Africa alongside bankers & businesspeople to promote political & commercial trade that sustains China-Africa relations. China's growing economy and raw material needs drive trade and diplomacy. China still sends doctors and medicine to Africa to help underserved populations. The first China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000 set rules for improving relations between China and Africa through traditional financial assistance, technical support programs, and fast-rising trade and investment.

China attracts numerous African nations for various reasons. Joshua Cooper Ramo calls China's procedure to international relations & wealth development the "Beijing Consensus," an alternative to "the West's" political & financial trends & the World Bank and IMF's "Washington Consensus." Leaders & elites who have gained from poor governance & opaque political systems are unwilling to implement the severe financial or social reforms sought by the West. This is why Beijing has earned their respect. China has always avoided interfering in the domestic problems of African nations out of respect for their own sovereignty. The Beijing Consensus is being embraced by African leaders, which may reflect what Beijing's "soft power" finds most appealing: a long history of friendly relations, the provision of valued, "no-strings-attached" financial & technical aid to elites & the most vulnerable and expanding trade betwixt the world's largest advancing nation & the continent with the highest concentration of enlarging countries.

According to Joseph Nye's (1990) definition of "soft power," Society, beliefs, international relations, & wealth appeal are all important components of its strength, giving it the ability to persuade other countries to support its goals. Chinese leaders & businesspeople have taken advantage of China's force, include its noninterference in internal issues and other realistic foreign policy tenets. China's economic growth paradigm, the Beijing Consensus, challenges the idea that political liberalization and economic reforms are necessary for sustained development. When it comes to economic growth, China has effectively given its African trading partners a model that looks a lot like China's own. Instead of advising nations how to alter their governments or economies, it has encouraged them to grow by trading with and investing in other countries & in social organizations. China's increasing hunger for resources such as metals and fossil fuels, as well as fresh outlets for its cheap manufactured goods,

combined with its expanding manufacturing sector, make its economy a good fit for many African economies. While more Chinese imports hurt many African countries' light industrial manufacturing sectors, Chinese investment and a seemingly endless market benefit the dominant extractive industries. China's respect for national sovereignty appeals to many African countries that are unwilling to make the economic and political changes that Western donors and countries say are required.

China doesn't oppose African political and economic progress by staying out. China supports African-led governance and sustainable development programs. The "New Partnership for Africa's Development" (NEPAD) is a 19-country pact to promote renewable growth, management, hardship reduction, & African economies' globalization. The China-Africa Cooperation Forum supports NEPAD, although China emphasizes this. It avoids supporting NEPAD's essential structural elements—principles of openness, democracy, free press, civil society, an impartial court, and the rule of law. China has been slow to adopt new technologies in this area and has been resistant to reform.

China's influence in Africa extends beyond its current trade & investment growth because to the country's extensive network of contacts in the continent. China has maintained that it has "given what it could" in financial aid and technical support to African nations, despite its increased capacity to cultivate connections through economic incentives (mainly commerce, tourism, and investment). The majority of China's aid to African countries has been technical, and there have been no political "strings" attached (other than acceptance of a "one China policy"). Under the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China has established a fund to educate African workers. Nearly six thousand Africans had been trained by 2003 thanks to the program (Beijing Review, January 20, 2005). Each year, China gives 1,500 scholarships to students from Africa, and many Chinese universities have exchange programs with their counterparts in Africa (Xinhua, December 16, 2003). In addition to bolstering ties between China and Africa's elites through university scholarships, China has also promoted "health diplomacy" with African partners, bringing Chinese doctors to millions of ordinary Africans and earning the gratitude of many African leaders eager to be seen providing public goods to their citizens. Participation in these events strengthens China's links to Africa.

Medical diplomacy and teams terms of medical doctors serve as a good example of long-term Chinese soft power that is exercised in Africa. China has

historically used "health diplomacy" with African & Middle Eastern nations. China built infrastructure, gave African elites scholarships to study in Chinese colleges, & sent medical teams to Africa early on. The government or China-Africa Cooperation Forum supports these groups now. Health diplomacy, which has been there for a long time and is still an essential aspect of China's soft power in Africa, hasn't been discussed as much as trade and infrastructure initiatives.

In health, China and other nations collaborate. Many ministerial trips with African presidents facilitate medical team interchange and medical professional training. China also donates medical supplies to various African nations. It collaborates with other countries to fight malaria and HIV/AIDS. 30 students from 17 African nations attended a two-part international malaria and tropical disease prevention and treatment course in 2002. Chinese Ministry of Health organized the system (1st International Training Course on Malaria Control, September 10, 2002). The China-Africa Cooperation Forum sponsored a traditional medicine and pharmaceuticals forum the same year. 21 African nations participated (World Health Association, October 31, 2002).

The Algerian government requested China's first medical team in 1964. Since then, China has dispatched almost 15,000 doctors to 47 African countries to treat 180 million Africans. 860 Chinese medical personnel in 35 teams visited 34 nations in 2003. (Xinhua, December 16, 2004). Yiliaodui is Chinese medical team doctors. They normally remain for two years. Many doctors have helped on multiple teams. Chinese military medical units are also helping African peacekeepers and civilians. African peacekeepers predominate. Qingdao's PLA Navy Hospital 401 sent medical teams to Zambia. Civilian medical cooperation with the health bureaus of each Chinese province ensures long-term promises to deploy medical workers & support to specified nations (see table below).

Long-term medical cooperation benefits Africans & Chinese. Like the 1976 Tanzania-Zambia Railway being repaired this year, Chinese and African officials saw the medical teams as a public good. China's African doctor program needs to be more credible and expansive. Rural tax reforms squeezed provincial finances. Government doctors can only help a few Chinese citizens because of escalating public health issues at home. China privatizes its medical system, making doctors less likely to take two-year assignments in Africa. Patients and medicine sales complement their modest government compensation. Wealthier provinces hire interior doctors for Yiliaodui.

African governments still sign biannual contracts to invite teams and outline their mission. All the poorest recipient countries pay for medical teams' foreign flights, wages for physicians and support staff (including Chinese cooks!), and some medications and equipment under China's agreements with them. China funds developing nations' medical teams. Drug sales help hospitals. To show their thanks, host countries often continue the program and pay for the medical teams' expenditures and salaries from their own budgets. China and Africa honor doctors.

Years of aid, trade, and cultural and technical exchange have forged China-Africa links. Not merely China's growing economy and desire for African minerals. China prospers from its sovereignty and willingness to trade without political "strings." "Seeing no negative" helps "Beijing Consensus." China avoids "shock therapy" and political change, which African cities like. Trade, aid, tech, and healthcare are China's African strategies.

CHAPTER III

Historical Background of China- Africa relations

China started the process of formalizing its existing ties with numerous African nations in the early 1950s (Adjasi, 2012; Van de Looy, 2006). Only a few distantly connected economic aspects of the interactions' principal focus—politics—were present. The two countries' ties started to develop during the era of the African national liberation revolutions (1950s and 1960s). China sent diplomats and military personnel to Africa during the age of liberal revolutions in order to support and train African liberation movements militarily. In return for this kindness, the nations of Africa would demonstrate their gratitude by assisting China in its efforts to gain recognition on the international scene. According to Haroz (2011), who concurs with this assessment, African nations have given thanks to China by supporting its bid for a seat on the UN Security Council. In regard to China's request to join the UN Security Council, this statement was made. China eventually took over control of that station in 1971. In addition to Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, and Sudan, several other African nations, most notably Algeria, have kept up some form of trade relations with China. These particular relationships between people existed. According to Prybyla (1964), the distance between China and the continent as well as the absence of a sizable commercial fleet hindered China's wealth commitment with Africa in the 1960s. In addition to the political and economic support it has given, China has helped a number of African republics by helping them expand their infrastructure. China's desire to deepen its connections with the African continent declined over that decade, but China remained the continent's trustworthy ally. Nevertheless, Taylor claimed that the two parties' relationship remained tense (2009, page 443). Africa's inability to grow its economies to a level where it could compete on global markets hindered China's policy ambitions. Relations between the two nations would gradually recover when China was censured by the West for the shootings that occurred in Tiananmen Square in the 1990s. China maintained close ties with African nations throughout the 1990s, even while the West was looking into some of the African nations it was associated with for their lack of democracy and human rights violations. China sought political friends on the African continent in the shape of nations that it might support politically in its pursuit of political dominance on the global stage.

The ties between China and Africa have been stronger during the last 50 years. Due to the continent's robust economic progress and annual growth rates of 8–9 percent, China had historically seen Africa as a favored partner to obtain raw commodities (Looy & Haan, 2006). On the economic front, China's and Africa's policies, the two continents' respective markets for each other's products, Africa's demand for infrastructure, and China's innovative approach to funding development projects all play a role in the relationship. According to Sun (2014), there have been three stages in the development of China's and Africa's economic links since 1949: (1949-1979, 1979-1990s, and 1990-2000). The first phase of trade between China & Africa began in the years 1949–1979, with. It has been established that throughout this time, China and Africa's economic interactions were driven by politics. These things actually happened. China supported African countries in their resistance to colonialism and imperialism. The reform stage is the time frame starting in 1979 and lasting through the middle of the 1990s. Sun (2014) claims that the goal of the Chinese government's foreign policy at this time was to support the country's ongoing economic expansion. Gaining political support from African nations for the purpose of achieving mutual economic advantage and cooperating during this time period changed as a result of the shift. As a result of the reform process, China now participates more actively in international organizations. The third stage, according to Sun, occurred between the middle of the 1990s and the year 2000. China began to put into practice the idea of investigating both domestic and foreign markets in order to develop its economy during this time when there were commercial ties between China and Africa. This was a significant step for China. Africa became the ideal area for China to directly fuel its search for natural resources in order to hasten its economic progress on the global stage due to its rich energy reserves, raw materials, and mineral resources (Sun, 2014). Crude oil makes up over seventy percent of documented African exports to China, with raw materials making up the remaining fifteen percent (Osei & Mubiru, 2010). Although China and Africa have been trading partners for a long time, there has been a major growth and acceleration in China-Africa trade connections after Mao's death. According to information that is now accessible, between 1976 and 1980, China's trade with African nations climbed to a total of \$1.1 billion US. 2007 (Chaudhry). China's exports to Africa increased at a rate that was faster than its imports from Africa for the majority of that time. A rapid surge in trade volume has taken place between China & Africa, especially since the middle of the

1990s, as seen by the increase in the value of the commodities traded from \$4 billion in 1995 to \$40 billion in 2005. The entire volume of trade only increased from \$40 billion to \$55 billion betwixt the years 2005 & 2006 (Osei & Mubiru, 2010). As an illustration, the value of trade betwixt China & Nigeria climbed from \$384M in 1998 to \$3 billion in 2006. The majority of this was mostly caused by the oil sector (Odeh, 2014). The first China-Africa trade conference of any real significance took place in Beijing in 2000. China claimed that the Sino-Africa Forum's goals were to look into new opportunities for China-Africa collaboration and to establish a new global political and economic order, according to Looy and Haan (2006). Following the FOCAC in 2000, China pledged to develop three to five special economic zones, increase its two-way trade in Africa from \$40 billion to \$100 billion by 2009, & set aside US\$5 billion to support Chinese expansion in Africa. These objectives were all completed (Meidan, 2006). The value of annual trade betwixt China & Africa has expand significantly over the previous ten years, ranging from less than ten million dollars in United States dollars in the 1950s to over forty billion dollars in United States dollars in 2005, according to Cheng and Shi (2015). The average yearly trade volume between the two regions was less than \$10 million in the 1950s, which serves as the foundation for their claim. In 2014, trade between China and Africa exceeded \$200 billion, and it was predicted that by 2020, it will reach a target of \$400 billion (Cheng & Shi, 2015). The establishment of FOCAC led to China canceling the debts of several African countries, including Liberia, and expanding its market in Africa as a direct result of the changes that occurred in the economic links betwixt China & Africa (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). China has just surpassed the United States & the European Union as Africa's third-largest trading associate (Omenka, 2014). Even though trade relations betwixt China & Africa have greatly improved, China continues to cause a trade imbalance in the majority of African nations.

China's Cold War approach to Africa

On the same day, October 12, 2000, the "Beijing Declaration" and the "Programs for China-Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development" were both ratified. Both documents were the result of a summit that was attended by senior Chinese officials as well as representatives from 44 different African countries. On October 12, 2000, Shelton was the selected location for the gathering in the year 2000. The two agreements bind China and Africa to maintain their mutual support and

collaboration, as well as to restart communication and other activities. Additionally, the accords provide a framework for the two regions to work together on other issues. The post-Cold War policy for Africa was improved during the Beijing Forum, which took place in the People's Republic of China (PRC). This plan was presented during President Jiang Zemin's visit to six different African nations in 1996. Since diplomatic links between the two countries were established for the first time in 1955, China's attitude toward the continent has evolved throughout the years. It began with a position that steadfastly supported revolutionary change by the Maoist paradigm, but it eventually shifted to a more realistic position during the 1980s and a decidedly mercantilist approach that valued commerce & financing throughout the 1990s. This shift occurred in China. These transformations took occurred in 1955, which was the year that China first established diplomatic contacts with the continent. When China first started putting its policy into effect in Africa, all of these shifts started to take place. During the Bandung Conference, which took place in Indonesia in April 1955, the People's Republic of China forged its first official links with many countries on the continent of Africa. These ties were formalized in April. At Bandung, a global movement for Afro-Asian solidarity was established on the premise that Asians and Africans have comparable political and economic goals, and that the formation of an alliance would make it simpler to achieve these objectives. This idea was motivated by the belief that forming an alliance would make it easier to accomplish these objectives. This is as a result of the reality that a global movement for Afro-Asian solidarity would make it easier for Asians and Africans to accomplish their political and economic goals (Shelton, 2001). This concept, which was reaffirmed in Beijing in October of 2000, continues to play an important part in China's strategy toward the continent. On August 8, 1963, Mao Zedong delivered a critical talk denouncing racism as well as colonialism. This speech marked the official beginning of China's campaign to seize control of the developing world by using Mao Zedong's revolutionary strategy. China's ultimate goal is to create a world that is centered on China, and this speech served as the formal commencement of that effort. During the address, the People's Republic of China (PRC) also began to lay the basis for its first policy toward Africa. Premier Zhou En-lai of the People's Republic of China outlined the five guiding principles for the People's Republic of China's policy towards Africa not long after he returned from a trip to 10 different African countries at the beginning of 1964. China, according to Zhou, supports initiatives on the African continent that work toward

unification, consult with other countries to find peaceful solutions to issues, uphold the independence of all African states, fight imperialism, and maintain non-alignment with other countries. On January 15, 1964, Zhou made a crucial contribution to China's Africa policy when he said during a farewell dinner in Ghana that the continent's capacity for revolution was "exceptional." Zhou has never been to Africa before. Practically speaking, Beijing sought to spark a second African revolution by mobilizing the proletariat against the ruling class. This goal came after the successful anti-colonial independence battles on the continent. Beijing, however, changed its attitude to dealing with African countries as it started to accept governments that did not follow the Maoist ideology. China was frustrated with the paucity of resources and the lack of revolutionary ardors among African socialists, which led to this.

China-Africa Post-Cold War Era

The changing connection between China and Africa in the age after the Cold War may be one of the most important changes in the field of international relations that has taken place during this time period. The Cold War ended in 1989. The tremendous growth in trade that has taken place between Beijing and a number of African countries has sparked a great deal of discussion and anxiety among many other international parties. It is essential to keep in mind that the phenomenal ascent of China and its influence on the economics of the globe are just a tiny part of the remarkable changes that are taking place in Sino-African ties. In 2005, just 2.5% of China's total foreign commerce was comprised of transactions between China and African countries. (Whalley & Weisbrod, 2012).

On the other hand, a significant share of the resources that China purchases from Africa are absolutely necessary for China's ascent to the rank of a superpower. After the United States and France, China is now Africa's third-ranked trading partner, having risen from a much lower starting point 25 years ago to become Africa's third-ranked trading partner, surpassing Britain, Portugal, Japan, India, Italy, & Germany on the continent's global commerce list. The rise of China to this position comes after the U.S & France. Only the U.S & France are ahead of China in this list. China is in third place. The apparent expansion of China's sphere of influence into conventional Western areas of influence is causing these external countries considerable cause for worry. They also feel that China's concentration on "government-business" hinders international efforts to isolate despotic governments, enhance democratic governance,

and advance human rights. This belief is based on the belief that China prioritizes "government-business" above these other goals. These nations have some worry about China's purported activities in traditional Western spheres of influence as a result of this, and it's easy to see why. Aside from China's rising need for crude oil and other important natural resources, the country also has expanding strategic financial power in Africa. The need for these materials in China is rising.

In 2005, Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, and Chad supplied China with crude oil to the tune of 28 percent of China's total crude oil imports. This is a significant rise from 1995, when just 9% of China's crude oil imports were from Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon combined. During the same time period, growth rates of 47 and 45 percent were recorded for the Middle East, while growth rates of 7 and 41 percent were recorded for East Asia and growth rates of 0 and 10 percent were recorded for Russia. A significant contributor to the expansion of commerce between Beijing and various African nations is the growing dependence of Beijing on Africa as a supply of crude oil. ⁸ The need for raw resources in China has led to a rise in the price of commodities internationally, which has helped African nations and boosted their income. China's demand for fresh supplies has contributed to a rise in the price of commodities globally. The official sources of the Chinese government state that the amount of money exchanged in commerce between China & Africa climbed from around \$10 million in 1950 to \$100 million in 1960. ⁹ Over the course of another twenty years, the value of this trade went from one hundred million dollars to one billion dollars, & then from one billion dollars to ten billion dollars over the course of still another twenty years.

On the other hand, the total value of this trade increased from \$10 billion in the year 2000 to \$30 billion in the year 2004; this increase occurred in only four years. It is noteworthy that the entire trade volume between China & Africa in 2006 reached \$55.5 billion, representing an increase of 40% compared to the previous year. At the FOCAC conference in November 2006, the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, urged that Beijing and the governments of Africa should strengthen their collaboration and work to increase bilateral trade to \$100 billion by the year 2010. He made these remarks in response to a question posed by an African delegate. Only oil constituted 71 percent of the whole commerce that took place between Africa and Beijing; the remaining 13 percent consisted of metal and ferrous ore. Textiles account for 16% of China's total exports to Africa, followed by apparel and footwear (14%), vehicles (8%), electrical

appliances (7%), industrial equipment (5%), and other products (5%). Other goods account for 5% of China's total exports to Africa (42 per cent). In addition, the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that China makes in African countries is on an upward trend. In 2005, Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, & Chad supplied China with crude oil to the tune of 28 percent of China's total crude oil imports. This is a significant rise from 1995, when just 9% of China's crude oil imports were from Nigeria, Angola, and Gabon combined. During the same time period, growth rates of 47 and 45 percent were recorded for the Middle East, while growth rates of 7 and 41 percent were recorded for East Asia and growth rates of 0 and 10 percent were recorded for Russia.

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In addition, the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) that China makes in African countries is on an upward trend. This was a direct outcome of the Chinese President's promise in 2006 to enhance financial assistance to African states, as well as his readiness to lend and credit an additional \$5 billion to African governments. Research on China's growing military ties with Africa is also required, particularly in light of Beijing's growing involvement in UN peacekeeping missions in African nations such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Ethiopia/Eritrea. Western Sahara is another country in Africa that requires research on China's growing military ties with the continent. The fact that China is trying to form military alliances with a number of nations on the African continent deserves more scrutiny as well. China is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, along with the United States of America, Russia, France, & the United Kingdom. China has committed to cooperating with the United Nations, the African Union (AU), & other sub regional African entities in order to mediate and find solutions to crises that are occurring throughout the continent. Permanent members of the Security Council include the United Kingdom, France, and a number of other European states. Recently, Beijing has played a substantial and beneficial role in putting pressure on the government of Sudan to authorize a joint United Nations and African Union force in the Darfur area by the end of July 2007. Beijing had previously prevented the UN from acting in the Security Council.

However, China has had a less positive and developing contribution to maintaining peace on the continent by selling weapons to countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Sudan. ¹³ In August 2005, Ethiopia and China agreed to cooperate militarily, exchange military troops, and share military expertise. Such agreements are a part of the expanding ties Beijing and its friends in Africa are experiencing. They have played a role in the growth of Chinese military exports to African nations. For instance, China exported more weapons to Africa between 1996 and 2003 than any other arms-producing nation in the world (apart from Russia). A thorough analysis of the effect unregulated arms flows have on the security of African countries is necessary, despite the claims of some authorities that Beijing's arms supplies are only driven by financial considerations.

China and the Multipolar Growth World

The rise of China as a major international power is one of the most noticeable elements of the current period of capitalist globalization, and the existence of the country has led to enormous changes in the political and economic order of the globe (Nolan, 2012). One of the most important topics that are being debated in the twenty-first century is China's ascent to prominence as a prominent player on the international stage. When 1949 rolled around, China's economic model was heavily influenced by that of the Western world. As a consequence of the conflict that had been going on between the Soviet bloc and the Eastern bloc since the 1960s, China's economy had dramatically switched its attention toward the Eastern Bloc alliance by the year 1978. This occurred as a direct result of the conflict.

According to Qian (2000), the economic system of China was one of the most integrated economic systems in the whole globe. In spite of this, the Chinese government made the decision in 1979 to become more open to foreign direct investment and to boost the amount of trade it conducted with other countries. The significant growth of the Chinese economy was the driving force behind this development. China is making tremendous strides to overtake the United States as the most powerful economic nation on the planet in the 21st century (Diaouari, 2004). Although China is not yet a superpower, it has propelled itself to both the existing status quo and the 14 challenges, which has brought it into direct combat with other countries. This conflict has caused China to enter into direct conflict with other nations. According to Dellios (2005), China moved up the rankings in purposeful trade from the 32nd place in 1978 to the 10th position in 1997, moving from when it was rated 32nd to when it was ranked in 1997. According to the latest rankings provided by the World Trade Organization (WTO), China is now the fourth biggest trading nation in the world. When measured in terms of buying power parity, China's gross domestic product accounts for 13% of the total world GDP, placing it second only to the United States (Dellios, 2005). Between 1979 and 2000, the Chinese economy went through a period of transition that followed a course that was distinct from that followed by the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Qian, 2000). China, which has inherited 5000 years of civilization and has expanded at a pace of 9.5% per year for the last 20 years, is the world's fastest-growing economy in the modern period, according to Dellios (2005), who states that China is the world's fastest-growing economy in the modern era. The fact that China has had yearly

economic growth of 9.5% over the previous 20 years serves as the foundation for his argument. Because of its rapid economic development, inexpensive labor, and enormous growing market, China has the largest degree of FDI of any country in the world (Maddison, 1998). After it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December of 2001, China quickly rose to become one of the most open countries competing on the global market. As a direct consequence of China's participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), the average tariff in the nation has reduced from 41% in 1992 to 6% currently (Dellios, 2005).

According to Fung & Lau (1997), the countries that China deals with gain from lower-cost imports of raw materials, intermediate goods, & commodities since China supplies these things to those countries. In addition to this, China offers a massive market that is continually growing for international business. According to Sen (2010), China's exports expanded at an average annual rate of around 22% betwixt 2005 & 2007. This growth occurred between 2005 and 2007. Between the years 2005 and 2007, this extension was carried out. However, because of the nations' tight links to the U.S as well as the global economic crisis, China's export suffered. As a consequence, China's export has decreased by more than 20% on average since the year 2000. In 2009, items worth around US\$ 1.2 trillion were exported, which was a 16% decrease from the amount that was shipped the year before. In the meanwhile, the total value of products imported was 1.0 trillion US dollars, which is 11.2% less than the amount that was imported the year before (Sen, 2010).

According to Prasad (2004), China's commerce with the rest of the globe has expanded, & both the amount and the location of China's trade have caused changes in the wealth of the whole globe. In addition, China now accounts for a greater share of total purchases made by industrial economies, and the country also ships a wider range of goods to the markets served by those economies. It is now the world's largest importer of basic commodities such as iron ore, aluminum, copper, coal, & cement, and it is the second-largest user of oil, after the United States. The substantial contribution that China provides to the economy of the globe has resulted in an increase in the price of goods. Today, China is the nation that imports the rawest resources in the world, including iron ore, aluminum, copper, coal, and cement. This is more than any other country in the world (Lotta) 2009.

China- Liberia before 2003

The dynamics of state governments' foreign policy can be impacted by changes in regimes or relationships inside states, which can then have an impact on how states interact with one another. A change in a political administration, according to Chigora & Ziso (2011), may be the result of both internal and external events, where the occupants of the political office were forced to quit. A regime transition is also present, especially in the sense that it denotes the replacement of the current political leader with a new one. This was the same scenario that had occurred in Liberia, from the Taylor to the Sirleaf regimes, with each leader bringing a unique perspective to the nation's foreign policy.

The People's Republic of China & Liberia were the first two countries in the world to establish diplomatic relations on February 17, 1977. Since that day, relations between the two countries have been severed and then mended many times. The People's Republic of China severed all links with the country of Liberia on October 10, 1989, the day after Liberia officially recognized the Republic of China (Taiwan). In exchange for this recognition, Taiwan provided financial assistance to Liberia in the amount of \$200 million to be utilized for the country's education and infrastructure development. On August 10, 1993, the People's Republic of China resumed diplomatic connections with Liberia and opened an embassy in that country. As a direct consequence of this, Liberia has become one of the few nations in the world to simultaneously establish diplomatic ties with the People's Republic of China & the Republic of China. John Daniel Cox served as Liberia's first ever Ambassador to China from 1977 till 1981. His tenure spanned the years 1977-1981. The People's Republic of China broke diplomatic relations with Liberia when the regime of Charles Taylor said that it accepted "two Chinas." As a consequence of the change in political control in Hong Kong, the Liberian consulate, which had been set up during the time when Hong Kong was under British administration, was forced to shut its doors as well. On October 12, 2003, Liberia severed its diplomatic connections with the Republic of China (ROC), but it quickly resumed such ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This decision may be attributed in large part to the efforts made by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to exert its influence on the UN, as well as its ambitions to deploy a peacekeeping force to Liberia.

The Liberian civil war and its effects on children may be traced back to the nation inception. Liberia was established in 1847 by Americans who had previously

owned slaves. During the 133 years that the republic was in existence, the immigrants, who were also known as Americo-Liberians, were able to establish themselves. They established a feudal system to rule their new country as if it were a colony, and it was effective at controlling all aspects of society and the economy. Although the colonists claimed they were on a mission to Christianize and civilize the area, they instead unleashed a wave of cruelty on the indigenous people, who they outnumbered by a factor of twenty to one. They were subjected to forced labor, emancipation, & isolation from the coastal enclave society in which they had previously lived. All of these factors contributed to their economic disadvantage and cultural alienation, while the ruling elite benefited from both. Although the once untouchable power structure was beginning to crumble in the 1970s, a new constituency of dissatisfied, Liberians banded together in various opposition groups & began to voice their demands for reform, many of whom had received educations from foreign countries as well as schools of indigenous technocrats. This new, dissatisfied bloc of Liberian voters quickly organized into a wide variety of opposition groups and began vocalizing their desire for political change. This new generation of dissatisfied Liberians many of whom had attended universities operated by local technocrats and those in other countries, culminated in the "rice riots" of 1979, a rally with 2,000 people in reaction to a fifty percent price jump for a typical lunch in the area. As the protest descended into anarchy and the police opened fire, over a hundred people were killed. A military coup installed Krahn from Tuzon Samuel Doe as ruler in 1980, amid growing popular resentment.

Even though the new president has come to symbolize greed and corruption, the majority of Liberians first greeted his violent inauguration as the end of more than a century of colonialism. This is despite the fact that the new president has come to personify these traits. Even though the new president was chosen in a bloody and violent process, it nonetheless went forward. The years that followed saw an increase in Krahn's dominance, which resulted in the government becoming more authoritarian and unstable. This dictatorship supervised the deterioration of the economy, which was characterized by rising rates of inflation & jobless, and it was founded on an ethnicity- and military-based political system. In 1985, a Gio man named Thomas Quiqonkpa from Nimba County attempted to stage a coup, but it was unsuccessful. This immediately inspired other ethnic cliques to begin preparing for power grabs of their own, which they subsequently carried out. After the attempted coup was put down in

the manner that it was, ethnic enclaves started to emerge as a result. After killing Quiwonkpa and Doe's troops, the Krahn-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia shifted their focus to the Gios and Manos, two closely related clans hailing from the same region of Liberia. Both of these communities have a common ancestry. These killings were carried out with the intention of exacting revenge for earlier transgressions.

Gios and Manos were the targets of this assassination plot. In Liberia, the fourteen most recent years have been characterized by an increased degree of violence. After rebel commander Charles Taylor crossed the border from the neighboring nation of Ivory Coast into Nimba County in December 1989, the conflict formally started. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia was the full name of their organization (NPFL). The AFL launched a brutal counterinsurgency campaign as a form of retaliation, during which they massacred residents without regard to their status, burned entire settlements on fire, raped women, and pillaged stores. The long-suffering Gios & Manos, many of whom were young people who had been orphaned as a result of the waves of revenge killings or who were just incensed by the crimes committed against their people, boosted the ranks of the NPFL as a direct result of this. The Krahn and Mandingos group were the main focus of the NPFL's terror campaign against commoners and ostensible Doe government supporters. The NPFL perpetrated this reign of terror. With the exception of Monrovia, the country's capital, the rebel group had taken over all military installations by 1990. The violence that followed developed gradually before being fueled by the establishment of numerous ethnic groups vying with one another. It lasted for seven years.

The Independent National Patriotic Front (INFL), an NPFL splinter group that was in charge of Doe's abduction and murder, had already achieved its pinnacle and disintegrated by 1992. The United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), however, which was founded by Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone who backed Doe's campaign, was starting to gain ground in the nation's southwest. In 1993, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia was engaged by the Liberia Peace Council (LPC), a predominantly Krahn offshoot of the American Freedom League, which then gained important control over the southeast. There were several various initiatives that were launched between 1989 and 1997 in an effort to bring peace to the country, but they all fell short. Blood has been shed over the past eight years as a result of horrific crimes against the civilian population and racial atrocities. During this time, tens of thousands of Liberians were cruelly killed, tortured, beaten, sexually assaulted, and subjected to

various forms of sexual abuse. Human Rights Watch reported that "[this maltreatment] caused massive displacement both inside and outside of the nation/Liberia" (Rehn Sirleaf, 2002). Despite the conflict's roots in more than a century-old historical grievances, the brutal tactics employed from 1989 to 1997, particularly the targeting of particular ethnic groups by Taylor's NPFL, the AFL, and ultimately the ULIMO, were unheard of in Liberian history. This is despite the conflict's origins in historical resentments (Tate 1997). It wasn't until 1997 that a cease-fire agreement was actually implemented. Charles Taylor, the former leader of the NPFL, was then swiftly elected as the nation president after the election. Unfortunately, the Taylor administration was rife with corruption & abuse, which widened already-existing inequalities & heightened the resentments that the civil war had caused among the populace. The conflict had a direct impact on this. The Liberian people, for whom they were largely or completely unaccountable, were the victims of government officials routinely using their positions to serve their own personal interests.

Five significant outbreaks of violence have shaken Liberia since Charles Taylor took office as president. The succeeding four years of civil conflict in the nation were sparked by the invasion of LURD from Guinea in 2000. Although a negotiated ceasefire, Charles Taylor's departure from the government & the nation, & the placement of regional & then international forces brought an end to the major war in August of 2003, violence and violations of human rights continue in areas that are not under the control of the U.N. During this time, both Liberia & the People's Republic of China had a lot of changes in their governments. This made the relationship between the two countries go up and down.

William R. Tolbert Regime in Sino-Liberia Relations: 1971-1980

During the administration of William R. Tolbert, Liberia's foreign policy was developed using a novel strategy. Tolbert became Liberia's 20th President in 1971 after William V.S. Tubman, the previous leader of the country, passed away. Before he was even taken into consideration as a candidate for the presidency, Tolbert first gained election to a parliamentary position in the House of Representatives. When he was a representative in the House of Representatives, Tolbert presided over the Agricultural and Commerce Committee as well as the Ways, Means, and Finance Committee. Tolbert had been in public service for 27 years before becoming president of Liberia, thus he was well-traveled on the world stage. He traversed the globe for 19 years as

Tubman's vice president, representing Liberia on numerous international engagements at the president's request. Tolbert also seemed to know a great deal about things that had nothing to do with politics or the public sector. He was elected to lead the Baptist World Alliance, which was responsible for 34 distinct Baptist groups worldwide. This was a post that carried a great deal of significance because it was only given out during the Baptist World Alliance convention once every five years.

Tolbert was the first Black person to ever occupy a position of authority inside the Baptist church. Tolbert, in contrast to his predecessor, believed that nonalignment was the greatest method to broaden the pool of financial aid providers. As a result, he promoted the maintenance of a free enterprise system as Liberia's economic development plan (Kasongo, 1999). Tolbert's administration switched from the foreign policy that his predecessor had instituted to a new foreign policy that focused on both the East and the West. Tubman's foreign policy was primarily centered on the West, with the United States acting as Liberia's most crucial ally. Tolbert believed that his administration deviated from its traditional devotion to the United States and embraced a foreign policy that was less reliant on the United States, unmistakably opposed to colonialism, and unmistakably Africanist (Dunn, 2016). With the primary objectives of achieving food self-sufficiency and industrialization, his government also started the process of reorienting Liberia's economic structure away from liberal capitalism and toward a state-led, planned economic system.

According to Hahn (2009), Tolbert developed full diplomatic ties with socialist nations like the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea, & the People's Republic of China in order to garner support for his new agenda. Tolbert took this maneuver in an effort to gain acceptance for the new course of action he had suggested. Even though Tubman's authority had close economic and diplomatic ties to Western countries, his government's interactions with these governments were frequently contentious. He did not want his western allies, especially Liberia's longtime ally, the United States, to interfere with the country's domestic affairs. In particular, he was worried about the USA. Tolbert believed that as a sovereign state, Liberia has a responsibility to carry out its domestic and foreign policies while still keeping its links with other countries (Casper, 2012). For instance, the government of William Tolbert severed diplomatic connections with Israel in 1973 and prohibited American ships sailing under the flag of Liberia from providing Israel with weapons. These actions jeopardized the United States' continued military and financial support for Israel. This action confirmed

Liberia's independence from American policies and its solidarity with the nations of the African, Islamic, Eastern Bloc, and Asia that backed Egypt and Syria.

Additionally, it improved Liberia's relations with Egypt and Syria, two of its neighbors. The Tolbert dictatorship, according to Dunn (1979), was distinguished by a blooming of diplomatic ties with the rest of the communist world. Following the formulation of diplomatic relations between China & Liberia in 1977, the Chinese government invited Tolbert to visit Beijing in 1978. The vice chairman of Liberia's government met with Zhao Ziyang, the prime minister of China, and vice chairman Deng Xiaoping to discuss a range of topics. In the same year, Liberia's government dispatched John Daniel Cox as its ambassador to Beijing, and China's government named Hua Guofeng as its ambassador to Liberia. The terms of both ambassadors began in 2018. The two nations decided to enter into a "economic and technological cooperation" agreement after Tolbert's visit to China. This agreement encompasses a wide range of initiatives, such as the expansion of agriculture and infrastructure as well as the promotion of cultural interactions. Given that Tolbert's domestic goals included industrialization and a concentration on food self-sufficiency in Liberia, his ties to China facilitated the beginning of Chinese workers' agricultural enterprises there. These Chinese workers took the place of the Taiwanese who had previously worked in Liberia's agriculture.

The growth of Liberia's industrialization and food self-sufficiency were facilitated by Tolbert's contacts with China (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Jenkins (2018) cites a respondent who served in the Tolbert administration as saying that the president was an oriented foreign relations developmentalist who saw that numerous "trade agreements" were signed. The person's experience working for the Tolbert administration was used to get this information. His objective was to increase Liberia's access to more international financial sources for development. A big potential that will probably lead to increasing business activity between China and Liberia was also made possible by the trade agreement. The establishment of more than thirty state-owned companies and the renegotiation of concession agreements with foreign corporations, according to Hahn (2009), led to significant disagreement with the American company Firestone. Tolbert made an effort to tighten the connections between Africa and Liberia on a global scale. Throughout his tenure in government, he tried to promote African unification and strengthen Liberia's ties to other African countries.

Tolbert expressed his opposition to Western participation in Africa during one of his visits to the United States & urged for the creation of an economic union for that continent that was similar to the one that is currently being formed in Western Europe (Casper, 2012). In a talk given in California, Tolbert expressed his optimism for the future of Africa and condemned the unwillingness of Western countries to aid the region. He cited as instances of the difficulties minority rule in Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), South Africa's dominance over Namibia, and the continued hostilities in former Portuguese colonies like Angola. At the time, the continent was experiencing a number of major issues, and Tolbert was deeply concerned about them. When Tolbert was overwhelmingly chosen to lead the Organization of African Union (OAU), which is now known as the African Union (AU), in 1978, he was honored for his remarkable contribution to Africa in general and to Liberia in particular. Outstanding contributions have been made by Tolbert. Tolbert had a key role in the creation of the Monrovia Declaration, which was approved by the OAU during its 1979 Annual Meeting in Liberia, which was hosted by that country. OAU was present at this meeting (Hahn, 2009).

By striving to solve global issues, he continued to use his nation of Liberia and his government as a diplomatic pillar in the African continent, notably in the Mano River region that included Sierra Leone, Guinea, & the Ivory Coast. The African Union served as the context for this. Liberia was proud of Tolbert since he was the first Liberian president to hold such a position and because he promoted African unification. The gathering was presided over by Tolbert in his position as the chairman of the OAU. A turning point in the formation of Liberia's foreign policy was the election of Tolbert to the position of Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. On April 12, 1980, a group of 17 armed men led by Samuel K. Doe staged a coup d'état that was characterized by intermittent exchanges of gunfire, which resulted in the assassination of Tolbert. The perpetrators of the attack were all serving in the enlisted ranks of the Armed Forces of Liberia. Doe has assumed leadership of the gang. Very early the following morning, Samuel Doe, the leader of the revolution, said that Tolbert's government had been overthrown. Nevertheless, Tolbert's dictatorship was in charge of establishing the foundation for ties between China and Liberia. The Chinese government expressed a lot of interest in Liberia's agriculture industry during the three years that Liberia and China had a diplomatic relationship. His administration has been effective in boosting the country's level of continental and global sovereignty.

Tolbert's interactions with China were mostly focused on constructing new infrastructure and purchasing agricultural land. On the other hand, China had a similar goal in receiving political recognition from Liberia as did that country.

Samuel K. Doe Era: 1980 1990

On April 12, 1980, there was a coup d'état that led to the overthrow of William R. Tolbert's government. The 133-year minority rule came to an end as a result of the coup that Samuel K. Doe masterminded (Kasongo, 1999). In Liberia, a new government was installed under military control. Many Liberians, and particularly native Liberians, welcomed Doe's rule with open arms. Doe was widely acknowledged as the first native Liberian to rule the nation in 133 years, and this was seen as a noteworthy accomplishment by many native Liberians. Doe, in contrast to his immediate predecessor, had a minimal formal education; in fact, several reports claim that when he became the presidency, he was both illiterate and unexperienced (Ellis, 1999). The "People's Redemption Council" (PRC), which Doe established as his government, was made up of 17 soldiers, the majority of whom belonged to the Krahn ethnic group, as well as other key participants in the coup. One of the members of this council was Doe. Doe acted swiftly and suspended the Liberian Constitution.

The newly established government started the legal actions against the Tolbert dictatorship's enduring members. Doe believed that the Tolbert administration, which was his predecessor, was corrupt & that Tolbert's officials had stolen money from the Liberian people in order to benefit themselves. President Doe invited media from around the world to join him at the Barclay Training Center on April 22, 1980, for the public execution of thirteen key Tolbert government officials (Thomson, 1988). The world community opposed the death of the 13 former government 42 officials; thus it seemed like the Doe administration had made the wrong decision. It appears that the Doe government miscalculated how the rest of the world would respond. Thomson (1988) said that governments in Africa as well as the United States & other European nations had denounced the killing. For instance, one of the officials executed was Cecil Dennis, a renowned statesman who had previously held the position of minister of international affairs.

The Nigerian administration was so horrified by Cecil Dennis's passing that they forbade Gabriel Baccus Matthews, Doe's new foreign minister, from traveling to Lagos for the A.U. meeting. They sent his flight back to Liberia instead. Doe chose

Gabriel Baccus Matthews for the position. Foreign policy has been approached differently by the present PRC leadership than it was by its predecessor. Contrary to Tolbert, Doe adopted the Western way of doing things (Dunn, 2016). Due to the past president's more benevolent foreign policy toward the United States of America, the two countries developed outstanding relations while Doe was still in office.

However, the United States increased its direct assistance to Liberia in August of the coup year by signing two agreements promising to give a combined US\$17 million in aid. In 1980, these agreements were struck (Harden 1987). When it was revealed that the United States would be providing the Doe government with significantly more direct aid, concerns were expressed. Whether the US assisted the Doe government's overthrow in response to Tolbert's non-aligned policy was in question (Casper, 2012). It was made very clear that the United States believes that it is crucial to protect their assets and stop the spread of socialism. The Doe government kept close ties with the United States of America, but they also maintained close bilateral ties with China. Nevertheless, he decided to break off bilateral ties with other communist nations. For instance, John Doe asserted that the Libyan People's Bureau was planning a conspiracy against him in 1981. He then gave the order to shut down all 43 of Libya's embassies and asked that all Libyan citizens leave the nation. Additionally, he reduced the number of personnel at the Soviet embassy, and ultimately, he severed diplomatic ties (Harden, 1986). President Doe was able to get the United States' enhanced support by doing this. Despite the country's ongoing instability, the US government has continued to support Liberia in both economic and security-related areas.

According to Thomson (1988), the United States provided \$43.5 million in funding for the development of military housing over the course of the Doe government's five years in power. The TRC Report (2009) states that the US provided around \$500 million in aid during the first several years of the Doe administration, which was the largest sum provided. Liberia got the highest amount of aid per person in sub-Saharan Africa, which is a substantial amount higher than all of the previous Liberian governments combined. The Chinese government remained committed to backing the Doe administration despite the presence and influence of the United States in Liberia throughout the Doe administration because the Tolbert regime had laid a strong foundation for better relations between Liberia and China. This is due to the fact that the Tolbert administration laid a lot of the foundation for better relations

between Liberia and China. Doe would resort to Chinese financial assistance to further his government's goals, therefore the change in regime and shift in Liberia's foreign policy did not initially harm Sino-Liberia relations. This resulted from Doe's choice to succeed Charles Taylor as president of Liberia (Dunn, 2016). China and Liberia's economic ties started to grow under the Doe administration, and this was followed by a number of agreements and high-level political engagements between the two countries (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). John Doe received an offer from the Chinese government to travel to Beijing in 1982. The Chinese authorities decided they would support Samuel Doe's military government over the course of the visit. The Chinese were turning to Liberia for political help in their struggle against Taiwan being recognized as a sovereign state, while Liberia was looking to China for financial assistance. Following the visit, the newly formed administration received military aid, including fifty military jeeps. The Chinese government did not give up on its goals for agrarian reform while Doe was in office.

By establishing an array of cooperative agreements in the fields of culture, commerce, agriculture, and technology, China & Liberia have further shown their commitment to one another. For example, in 1981 the Chinese gov't made the decision to take over the Kpatawee rice project after agreeing to do so in a contract signed on August 27, 1981. The deal was signed by both parties. In line with the provisions of this Agreement, the Chinese Borrower is responsible for paying any and all remaining costs associated with the Project that were incurred in the Local Area (Brautigam, 1993). The construction of a bridge with a span of 30 meters, a warehouse, residential houses for senior & junior staff, and a workshop were some of the primary goals of the project. Other important objectives included the reconditioning of an irrigated rice field that was 13 hectares in size, the production of seed rice using rainwater on 163 hectares, the formation of piggery & poultry units, & the construction of a bridge with a span of 30 meters.

According to Ying 2018), the goal of the Kpatawee rice project, which began in Liberia in 1981 and was funded by the Chinese government, was to assist the Liberian agricultural sector by providing it with access to an efficient irrigation system that would allow for the production of rice on a large scale for the benefit of the nation's economic development. President Doe's interactions with his African counterparts at the regional level were not amicable. Resentment was raised in Africa as a result of the execution of former Tolbert government officials and Tolbert's passing. Tolbert

held the position of chairman of OAU before he was assassinated, which added to his widespread notoriety. Doe claimed to be the new OAU chairman after Tolbert, who was the chairman at the time of Tolbert's death, but the OAU rejected Doe's claims that he was the new chairman of the OAU, according to Casper (2012). This strained Doe's relationship with the AU. The AU reportedly rejected Doe's claims, according to Casper (2012). The military coup unnerved the OAU, which expressed reluctance to recognize a leader who had seized control through the use of force. With the exception of Ethiopia, none of the OAU's member states recognized Doe. When the killings in Monrovia were being covered live, the African Union Council of Ministers were preparing for a summit meeting in Lagos, Nigeria. The pastors expressed their displeasure loudly, and they also wrote a letter to Doe in which they denounced the violence that was occurring. At the May 1980 conference in Lomé, Togo, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) denied Doe's request to participate.

As of 1986, Doe was denied entry to Togo, but she went there anyhow. In an effort to further damage his image, he showed up there armed to the teeth (Harden, 1986). Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadema was so enraged by Doe's actions and lack of respect for the people that he ordered Doe immediately deported. When Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria summoned Liberian ambassadors, Doe retaliated by recalling them. On May 28, 1980, the New York Times stated that there were two key reasons for Doe's isolation in the West African community. The first is that Tolbert had the support of many African heads of state and worked tirelessly to free other African countries from colonial rule. The second reason was that Doe's military takeover alarmed many of Liberia's close neighbors, whose civilian governments were also unsteady. For instance, Liberia was essential to the stability of Sierra Leone's economy and security. Concerns were raised in Sierra Leone about Liberia's ability to sustain its peace & economic stability in the wake of the recent military coup. The diplomatic efforts and overtures made by the United States to the leaders of West African states on behalf of Doe were successful in resolving the impasse that had developed between President Doe and the people of West Africa. The United States of America continues to provide aid to the gov't of Liberia. Casper (2012) asserts that the American embassy in Liberia began to have a substantial impact on defining and influencing the route the administration was taking. At one point, Doe expressed support for the 46 nonalignment position; however, it was challenging for his

administration to adopt such a stance because it was reliant on the United States for both financial and political support.

The military government ceded control to the newly elected civilian government in 1986 after the elections in 1985. Doe was pronounced the election's victor, and the governments of the United States and other African nations recognized her victory. It seems that President Doe was currently dealing with the same difficulties as his immediate predecessors had. The economy struggled during this time under the new government, according to Thomson (1988). The decrease in assistance from the United States, which was reduced to US\$52 million, made this situation worse. In 1986, there was no provision of any more military aid. Despite the government's best efforts, it was unable to keep up with the declining prices of iron ore and rubber on the international market. Due to the fact that the United States had previously played a significant role in financing the administration, the new Liberian government faces challenging economic prospects as a result of the reduction in financial assistance from the United States.

According to John (2018), by 1987, the US Congress had already started to raise concerns about the amount of money being used to assist President Doe and had mandated that the US General Accounting Office (GAO) audit all funds going to Liberia. This was done to assess if the money was being used in the right way. According to a GAO assessment released in February 1987, the Liberian government was found to have participated in substantial wasteful spending and inappropriate rerouting of funds (Thomson, 1988). At this point, a lot of problems began to affect Doe's freshly elected government. Despite the country's poor economic outlook and its unsteady political situation, Doe once more reaffirmed his support for nonalignment; but, this time, the United States showed little to no interest in Liberia (Thomson, 1988). In 1988, diplomatic links between Liberia and Libya, the Soviet Union, and Liberia were all reestablished. A fresh start was granted to the Soviet Union's mission in Monrovia. The Chinese government continued to support the Liberian government throughout this time. Doe found that economic interaction with Taiwan was more pleasant than economic cooperation with China, nonetheless, as a result of the economic challenges the government faced. At the same time, Taiwan used the situation in which Liberia's economy was in decline to its advantage in order to gain recognition over China. In 1989, Doe took the initiative to reestablish diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

According to (Kasongo 1999), the Liberian government's decision appeared to be a significant slap in China's face. The Chinese gov't responded by cutting all diplomatic connections with the Liberian gov't as a direct result of this. Investments had previously been made in Liberia with excellent support for infrastructure development before the Chinese government recognized Taiwan. These investments went toward building the Ministry of Health, the Samuel Kanyon Doe Sports Complex (SKD), as well as a variety of other projects. The government of Taiwan gave Liberia \$200 million in funds to be used for infrastructure and education development as payment for the recognition. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese government has appointed Lee Huan as the nation's ambassador to Liberia (Thomson, 1988). It seemed to Doe at this point in his presidency that the United States had mostly turned its back on him. On December 24, 1989, opposition forces from the neighboring nation of Ivory Coast invaded the nation in an effort to depose Doe as president. Doe became a captive of one of the rebel forces led by Prince Y. Johnson in 1990 as a result of the United States' abandoning of her, and she was later executed.

Emergence & Growth of Relations until 2003

Since quite some time ago, China has been actively pursuing diplomatic relations with several African nations, beginning far before the bulk of these nations achieved their independence. In the 1950s, China and Africa began developing relationships that were seen as having non-imperialistic purposes. These links were established at this time (Omenka, 2016). Another aspect in which China's policy differed from that of Western colonial powers was the manner in which it assisted some African republics in achieving their independence. In addition, the revived interest that China has shown in the governance of African nations is considered as being different from the attention that Western countries have shown. He formerly held the position of Ambassador of China to South Africa.

According to what was stated by Liu Guijin during the 2015 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which was held in Johannesburg, China's purpose in Africa ever since the Ming Dynasty period has primarily been to assist African nations in strengthening their development agenda. This statement was presented during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015, which was the year it was published (Omenka, 2014). Omenka from 2014 Further, Guijin refuted allegations that China is aiming to impose "neo-colonialism" on African countries by whatever means.

Around the same time that most African nations began the process of gaining their independence from colonial control, commercial ties between China and African nations were not very robust. He went on to say that, in contrast to what Christopher Columbus was able to do in the New World, China has never been able to conquer any part of Africa since the country's first encounter with the continent more than 600 years ago, when Zhen He commanded the largest fleet in the world. Consider what transpired after Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas as a point of comparison (Uchehara, 2009). Even though the West had created colonies in Africa, trade volumes remained relatively low because of linguistic and cultural limitations. These limitations discouraged Western nations from expanding their colonial presence in Africa. During this time period, China's attitude to Africa was significantly influenced by its hunt for ideological supporters who might possibly offset the influence of Western powers. This search had a huge effect on China's relationship with Africa. Despite China's membership in the non-aligned movement & China's compensation in convincing African states to participate in meetings like the Bandung Conference, the Liberian gov't remained loyal to its Western partners, most notably the United States. This was the case even though China helped persuade African states to attend meetings like the Bandung Conference. Even while China actively urged African countries to participate in international conferences such as the Bandung Conference, the majority of the continent's nations continued to abstain from the event. Some examples of China's engagement in international affairs include the country's participation in the non-alignment movement & its assistance in persuading African nations to take part in international conferences such as the Bandung Conference. All of these two aspects were taken into consideration in their totality.

Due to Liberia's strong allegiance to the United States, the country's attempts to establish a communist state were met with considerable resistance. As a direct result of this, Liberia took a posture in the international community that was anti-communist (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). In 1955, the Bandung Conference brought together delegates from 29 different nations throughout Asia and Africa. Countries such as Liberia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, and Sudan were included in the group. The primary objective of the conference was to further the growth of economic and cultural connections between China and the countries of Africa. Despite Zhou Enlai, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, meeting with Zhou Enlai, leader of Liberia, at the 1955 Bandung Conference, Liberia continued to see China as an unlikely partner.

This was despite Zhou Enlai, leader of Liberia, meeting with Zhou Enlai, leader of China (Andersen, 2008). China and Africa's ties underwent a fundamental shift during Deng Xiaoping's leadership, moving from a period in which China gave Africa largely indirect political and intellectual support to one in which China directly supported a number of liberation efforts. Liberia, the longest independent state in Africa, collaborated with other African countries, such as Nigeria, to aid in the liberation of South Africa because it opposed white supremacy there as well. Nigeria was one of the nations that was a part of this coalition (Looy, 2009). This improved Liberia's interactions with China, but at the time, Liberia's favored economic partner was Taiwan, therefore bilateral links between the two nations were not established. Liberia was already benefiting from initiatives undertaken by Taiwan that were backed by American government funding at this time (Andersen, 2008). Liberia made history by becoming the first African country to sign a cooperation agreement with Taiwan in November of 1961. (Sim, 1971). A Taiwanese team supported by the US Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction was scheduled to launch a demonstration farming facility in Gbedin, Liberia (JCRR). The Taiwanese team was assigned the task of opening the facility, which was delegated to them. The United Nations and the United States had previously made fruitless attempts to grow rice here. The plot generated a harvest that was six times greater than the normal yield for the area during the first four months (Sim, 1971). This success encouraged other African countries to accept Taiwanese assistance or to ask for it. Between the years 1960 and 1963, 13 of the newly independent African republics extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, whereas only five of the newly independent African governments extended the same recognition to China.

Despite the competition, five countries refuse to acknowledge either China or Taiwan as legitimate sovereign states. Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, & the Central African Republic are some of the nations that fall under this category. Niger is a member of this group as well. According to Rich and Vasabjit (2015), China replaced Taiwan in its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the year 1971. As a direct consequence of this, the two countries finally split apart, with China gaining 22 friends in Africa while Taiwan gained 20. Rich and Vasabjit point to this particular occurrence as the reason why they decided to end their relationship. In 1971, when China took up Taiwan's place on the United States Security Council, ties with African nations already in existence began to improve. By the year

1974, China had established diplomatic ties with a total of 30 states on the African continent, up from 22 at the start of the decade. Even though Liberia is no longer a member of the United Nations Security Council and has refused to establish diplomatic relations with China, the country's support for Taiwan has not wavered. Even after China had successfully courted more than forty other African states by the year 1977, the Liberian government continued to retain diplomatic ties with Taiwan. In 1977, after becoming aware of the significance of China's involvement in the global community at the time, the government of Liberia made the decision to shift its focus toward China.

After the economic "meltdown" and China's victory over Taiwan in the debate over Taiwan's membership in the UN Security Council, China redirected its attention to domestic goals, most notably its economic reforms. This occurred after China's victory over Taiwan in the debate over Taiwan's membership in the UN Security Council. China was able to claim victory because of its win over Taiwan in the dispute over Taiwan's membership in the United Nations Security Council. As a result of China's victory over Taiwan, China was able to claim this victory (Omenka, 2014). In the 1970s, China made significant strides toward industrialization, increased exports, and general economic development, all of which were achievements for the country. China has achieved significant progress in a variety of domains. China's proportion of global exports increased from 1.1% in 1981 to 6.8% in 2005, as reported by Adaora. This is a really large increase. In terms of total exports, China was by far the leader (2018). As a consequence of the mutually beneficial impacts of China's economic reform, fast economic development, and greater investment, a novel pattern in the character of ties betwixt China & Liberia has formed. China's economic reform, fast economic development, and increased investment have all contributed to these advantages.

China's foreign policy priorities in its contacts with Africa include fostering economic cooperation between the two regions. When it reorganized and opened its economy in 1978, it was one of the most cardinal economic developments to take place anywhere in the world in the past few decades. Because of China's better economic ties both within the nation and with the rest of the world, the pace of China's overall economic growth and development has quickened (Sun, 2014). During this time period, Africans made substantial contributions to China's overall growth. In addition,

despite the current economic slump in Africa, the market for products manufactured in China continues to be robust.

According to Prasad (2004), China has quickly become Africa's most cardinal economic partner. During the time that China & the countries of sub-Saharan Africa have been working together, their business, diplomatic, and political ties, as well as their economic and investment ties, have grown stronger. In the majority of situations, several West African nations began trade with China in the 1960s, soon after earning their freedom. This occurred within a short period of time after attaining independence. For example, in 1960 Guinea became the first country in the area to sign an agreement with China on economic and scientific cooperation. This agreement was signed by both countries (Pigato & Gourdon, 2014). The neighbors of Other Guinea in the region subsequently did the same thing. In the instance of Liberia, the trade deal with China was finished in the year 1979, which was two years after the two countries had signed a commitment to establish diplomatic connections with one another.

According to Shinn and Eisenman (2012), the fact that Liberia already had robust economic relations with the West may have been a contributing factor in the country's reluctance to move quickly toward creating commercial connections with China. During this time period, the United States of America, the U.K, Germany, & France were Liberia's most important commercial partners. These countries were its most well-established commercial partners at the time. On the other hand, as a consequence of the signing of a trade concord betwixt the two countries, robust business connections have grown betwixt China & Liberia. However, commerce between Liberia and China steadily developed during the 1980s, 1990s, and up until 1997, when the Charles Taylor regime took control in Liberia. This occurred before the country's civil war. This year was the first time that Chinese companies participated in Liberia's labor market (Sirleaf, 2009). Rubber, round logs, and wood chips were among the most important commodities that Liberia sent to China. On the other hand, the vast bulk of Liberia's imports from China were comprised of steel, drinks, tobacco, electronic items, crude minerals, transportation equipment, food, manufactured goods, and beverages (Central Bank of Liberia, 2017)

Even though China and Liberia have not had diplomatic ties since 1997, the amount of commerce that occurs between the two countries has significantly expanded over the course of this time period. The value of Liberia's annual commerce with China was, on average, \$449 million US dollars for the years 1997 and 2003. The bulk of the

total amount of commerce consisted of imports. The whole value of Liberia's imports throughout that period of time was 322.8 million US dollars, while the total value of its exports was 126.47 million US dollars. During this time period, China was the destination for 72% of all of Liberia's total exports (Moumouni, 2014). The commercial ties between China and Liberia saw substantial shifts between the years 1997 and 2003, which can be traced back to the combined effect of two important causes, namely: The severed diplomatic connections that occurred between the two nations after the year 1997 should be the first thing that is taken into consideration here. 1997 was the year when the government of President Taylor made the announcement that it would recognize both China and Taiwan. As a direct consequence of this move, China severed all diplomatic ties with the Liberian government. In spite of the fact that China and Liberia severed their diplomatic ties between the years of 1998 and 2000, Liberia continued to buy from China during the years of 1998 and 1999. This was because China had ceased shipping goods to Liberia. The economy of Liberia is very dependent on imports, particularly those from China, which is one of its most important trade partners. According to the Ministry of Commerce & Industry (2018), the vast majority of consumer products in Liberia are imported. This includes rice, which is the primary source of food supply in the nation. During this period, Liberia maintained the same number of imports from China as before since China is a significant economic actor in the country's economy. The Liberian civil war was the second factor that altered the economic ties between China & Liberia during that time period (1997–2003). These years cover the whole of the time in question. The Liberian civil war, which began in 1989 and lasted for a total of eight years, finally came to a conclusion in the year 2003. Between the years 1999 and 2003, the Taylor government was criticized by both the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MDIL) and Liberians United for Reconciliation & Democracy (LURD), as was discussed above. These groups fought against the government in an effort to achieve their goals (MODEL). As a direct consequence of the civil war, normal business operations between China and Liberia were severely hampered. In spite of the severed diplomatic connections, Taylor's government began doing business with China in order to provide military backing for his regime. Taylor was required to complete this task (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

Table 1: China's exports as a percentage of total exports, broken down by product type, 1997-2003 (in millions of US dollars)

Commodities Export	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Rubber	2.7	0.005	0.006	0	0.018	0.01	0.01
Round log	4.1	0.01	0.006	0	28.76	0.19	0.013
Others	0.2	0.0003	0.006	0	0.001	0.001	0.002
Total	7.0	0.015	0.0126	0	28.78	0.201	0.025

Source: The Central Bank of Liberia 2001–2003 annual reports China 1997–2003 statistics

CHAPTER IV

China and Liberia Relation 2003-2016

The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) severed all diplomatic ties with Taiwan the day it took office, on October 11, 2003. This took place during Charles Gyude Bryant's time in office as President of Liberia. Instead, it shifted its focus to China, a country with which it had already established diplomatic relations and with whom it had recently developed trade relations. According to the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), Charles Gyude Bryant was the leader during this time period when the decision to cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan was made. In its stead, it has shifted its focus to China, a country to which it has granted diplomatic recognition and with which it is actively working to forge diplomatic connections. The National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) asserts that this particular operation was carried out. According to Boas, the move taken by the Liberian gov't was seen as an effort to garner China's support in the United Nations Security Council because of China's stance (2001). This was the meaning that was derived from the act that was performed. The interpretation that Boas provided was the one that should be followed. It was necessary for Liberia to win China's support in order for the country to be able to invite China to join the United Nations peacekeeping force that was operating in Liberia at the time. Liberia has been mired in a bloody civil war for the last 15 years, which has caused the loss of countless lives, severe damage to the country's infrastructure and development, and the displacement of a large number of the country's residents. In spite of the efforts made by ECOWAS to maintain these circumstances within the country, the United Nations peacekeeping mission remained the only viable choice for achieving genuine peace and security in the area. The situation remained the same in spite of the fact that ECOWAS was taking part in activities of this kind. In order for the nation to qualify for help from China during this transitional era, it was necessary for them to satisfy all three of the fundamental criteria listed above. Recognition of the authority of the United States, respect for the rights of independent nations, and an invitation from the nation that is in need of aid were the prerequisites that needed to be met (Ayenagbo, Njobvu, Sossou, and Tozoun, 2011). Before diplomatic links were formed between China and Liberia, it appeared improbable that China would join a mission led by the United Nations to preserve the peace in Liberia. This was before diplomatic ties were established between the two

nations. In September of 2003, the United Nations Security Council voted in favor of a resolution that would authorize the United Nations to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia. This resolution was supported by an overwhelming majority of the council members. This resolution was approved in a vote in which there were no losers.

The primary reasons for China's participation in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Liberia are the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Liberia and the approval of United Nations Resolution 1509, which made it possible to deploy the United Nations Mission in Liberia. Additionally, China's participation in the mission was made possible by the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. These two events took place almost simultaneously with the adoption of Resolution 1509 by the United Nations Security Council during its 70th session (UNMIL). The United Nations Mission in Liberia, often known as UNMIL, is the organization responsible for ensuring that the international community in Liberia continues to enjoy peace & safety. The responsibility of maintaining peace and order in Liberia has been given to UNMIL by the international community. These two considerations ultimately led China to make the choice to get involved in the mission. In November of 2003, the first diplomatic links were formed between the two countries, and by December of the same year, a full diplomatic relationship had been established.

China sent its first peacekeeping mission to Liberia. This occurred in the month of November. The Liberian government had the ability to make this choice since the country had previously decided to restore diplomatic relations with China rather than Taiwan. This decision was made open to the Liberian government. China has sent troops to Liberia in the hopes of contributing to the country's ongoing efforts toward maintaining peace and stability. As a direct consequence of these transformations, China's influence and interest in Liberia have significantly grown over the course of the last several years. According to Moumouni (2014), in order for Liberia as a whole to experience growth and progression, diplomatic connections between China and Liberia need to be repaired. The hazardous economic condition in Liberia has improved, in part, as a result of China's presence there. China's participation in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is only one example of China's engagement in this mission. Resolution No. 001, which was passed by the 52nd Legislature on August 19, 2005, says that the Liberian government still backs the "One China Policy." Resolution No. 001 was a product of the Liberian government's vote.

This resolution was accepted by the Liberian government. This was done as part of an attempt to bolster the preexisting policy of not recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign nation. At the level of peacekeeping, the first country to host the biggest Chinese peacekeeping force was Liberia with 576 personnel, followed by Sudan with 348, and Darfur with 323 personnel (Kuo, 2013).

Transportation, aid with engineering, and medical support were all responsibilities that fell on the Chinese peacekeeping force when they were serving with the United Nations. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) included 240 Chinese forces serving in its transport unit, which was in charge of providing transportation and supplies for UNMIL operations. Zwedru, which is a component of UNMIL Sector 4, served as the home base for the engineering unit of around 275 troops that were stationed in the southeast of Liberia. The engineering sector was responsible for the reconstruction of key infrastructure in these regions, including roads, bridges, United Nations camps, and other important buildings. According to Rogers, the Chinese engineering team was responsible for the construction of the 1,200 kilometers of road, the four camps, the two parking lots, the 21 bridges, and the more than 71,000 square meters of flattened ground (2007). The adjacent local population as well as the United Nations soldiers received medical attention from the unit's team of 43 medical personnel. There was also a military police unit there with 25 personnel, and its responsibilities included the management of human resources, the provision of police assistance, the collecting of data, the conduct of criminal investigations, the management of traffic, and the response to emergency situations (Kuo, 2013).

The provision of primary medical treatment and the restoration of infrastructure that had been destroyed were the two primary goals of China's contribution to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Here is a rundown of what the Chinese promised to help a nation rebuild after it had been ravaged by civil conflict. According to Kuo (2013), one of UNMIL's roles was to ensure that the October 2005 elections for the new democratic government were held peacefully and without incident. Following this mandate, Liberians cast ballots for a new government on October 11, 2005. Because of a truce and the disarmament of former combatants, peace prevailed for a while. This election took place following the observation of stability in the nation as a result of the implementation of this mandate. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected as the nation's leader during the first Liberian post-war elections in

2005. She went on to become the first female president of any country on the African continent. As a direct consequence of this, she is recognized as Africa's first ever female head of state. The election of Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to the presidency of Liberia paved the way for more amicable ties to develop between that country and China.

Interim Government

Liberia's National Transitional Government (NTGL), headed by Charles Gyude Bryant, severed relations with Taiwan and reestablished ties with China on October 11, 2003. Considering China's stance, Boas (2001) saw this as an attempt by the Liberian administration to gain China's support for a seat on the UN Security Council. The Liberian government was seen as making an effort. China's support is essential for Liberia's participation in the UN peacekeeping deployment. The 15-year civil war in Liberia wiped out the country's infrastructure and slowed the country's economic growth, both of which caused many people to flee their homes.

Even with the involvement of ECOWAS, the UN peacekeeping mission was the greatest chance for establishing stability in the nation. An invitation from a government that needs China's support, the approval of the United Nations, & the preservation of territorial integrity were all criteria for China's involvement (Ayenagbo, Njobvu, Sossou, and Tozoun, 2011). China will be unable to fully assist the UN peacekeeping operation in Liberia if official diplomatic ties are not established between the two countries. In September of 2003, the United Nations Security Council gave its approval for the deployment of troops to the country of Liberia. In response to Resolution 1509 of the UN Security Council, which authorized the deployment of UNMIL and the restoration of Liberia's bilateral ties with China, China joined the UN peacekeeping mission in Liberia. In November 2003, a month after establishing diplomatic ties with China and renouncing Taiwan, China dispatched its first peacekeeping troops to Liberia. China also dispatched its first peacekeeping soldiers to other nations during this month.

China's escalating influence and interest in Liberia were underscored by the deployment of Chinese peacekeeping personnel there. Moumouni (2014) asserts that Liberia's progress came about when China and Liberia restored diplomatic relations. Both China's engagement in UNMIL and the ongoing economic recovery have an impact on Liberia. On August 19, 2005, the 52nd Legislature of Liberia passed Resolution No. 001, which reaffirmed the "One China Policy" and demanded that

Taiwan not be acknowledged as a genuine state. In the southeast of Liberia, in UNMIL Sector 4, is where Zwedru may be found. The engineering team reconstructed the infrastructure, including the UN camps as well as the roads, bridges, and other buildings.

According to Rogers (2007), the Chinese engineering team was in charge of building almost 70,000 square meters of level land, four camps, two parking lots, 21 bridges, and about 1,200 kilometers of roads. 43 individuals made up the medical team, which treated both locals and UN personnel. Controlling traffic, responding to emergencies, obtaining intelligence, supporting other law enforcement agencies, conducting criminal investigations, and managing human resources were all tasks assigned to a 25-person military police unit (Kuo, 2013). The majority of China's assistance to UNMIL went toward fixing broken infrastructure and providing essential medical care. a nation that received a lot of aid from China after its civil war. Kuo (2013) claims that in October 2005, the UNMIL (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Liberia) was charged with securing a peaceful election for a new democratic administration. Following the stabilization of the country brought about by the end of hostilities and the disarmament of former combatants, Liberians went to the polls to elect a new administration on October 11, 2005. When Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf won the presidency in Liberia's post-war elections in 2005, she made history by becoming the first female head of state on the African continent. Ellen Johnson has greatly enhanced ties between China and Liberia as a result of her leadership. The majority of peacekeepers were sent by the Chinese government under Sirleaf to Sudan (348), Darfur (342) and Liberia is 569 which is the minimum, and 729 which was the maximum (Kuo, 2013). China provided support to the UN Forces in the fields of engineering, healthcare, and transportation. 240 Chinese soldiers were in charge of supplying and transporting UNMIL operations. In Zwedru, a town in Liberia's southeast, there were 275 UNMIL Sector-4 men assigned to the area. The engineering team reconstructed the infrastructure, including the UN camps as well as the roads, bridges, and other buildings. According to Rogers (2007), the Chinese engineering team was in charge of building almost 70,000 square meters of level land, four camps, two parking lots, 21 bridges, and about 1,200 kilometers of roads. 43 individuals made up the medical team, which treated both locals and UN personnel. Controlling traffic, responding to emergencies, obtaining intelligence, supporting other law enforcement agencies, conducting criminal investigations, and

managing human resources were all tasks assigned to a 25-person military police unit (Kuo, 2013). The majority of China's assistance to UNMIL went toward fixing broken infrastructure and providing essential medical care. a nation that received a lot of aid from China after its civil war. Kuo (2013) claims that in October 2005, the UNMIL (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Liberia) was charged with securing a peaceful election for a new democratic administration. Following the stabilization of the country brought about by the end of hostilities and the disarmament of former combatants, Liberians went to the polls to elect a new administration on October 11, 2005. When Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf won the presidency in Liberia's post-war elections in 2005, she made history by becoming the first female head of state on the African continent. Ellen Johnson has greatly enhanced ties between China and Liberia as a result of her leadership.

Since the resumption of diplomatic relations in October 2003, Sino-Liberian relations have improved significantly, with frequent exchanges of high-level visits. A delegation from Liberia that included members of five different political parties visited China in March of that year. These organizations included the Liberian Coalition for Transformation, the National Patriotic Party, the Liberty Party, the Congress for Democratic Change, and the Unity Party.

Emergence and Growth of Sino-Liberia ties

Before the great majority of African countries obtained their independence, China had an interest in establishing diplomatic connections with African nations. This desire goes back to the early 20th century. Since the beginning of their relationship in the 1950s, China and Africa have maintained non-imperial ties. This is due to the fact that both China & Africa are located in Africa's geographical cradle (Omenka, 2014).

Another aspect in which China's strategy differed from that of Western colonial powers was the fact that it assisted some African nations in achieving their independence. In addition, the resurgence of China's interest in the free African republics was seen as a trend that was unlike anything observed in the West. The focus that China put on these two aspects was a major contributor to the fact that its approach was radically different from that of the nations of the West At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in 2015, the former Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Liu Guijin, stated that China's intention in Africa since the Ming Dynasty era had been primarily aimed at supporting African countries in

improving their development agenda. This was stated by Liu Guijin at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). This helped to concretize the relationship between the two continents. During the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Liu Guijin brought up the same problem. The news was made when the 2015 FOCAC was in session (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) Wu, Y. S. (2020).

Additionally, Guijin refuted the assertion that China has any intention of establishing "neo-colonialism" in Africa. In contrast to Christopher Columbus's actions in the New World, Zhen He, who at the time oversaw what was considered to be the most powerful navy in the history of the world, stated that China had not occupied any territory in Africa since it first made contact with the continent more than 600 years ago. When the majority of African republics first started to earn their independence, China and Africa's commercial connections were not particularly strong with one another (Uchehara, 2009). Even though many Western nations had already established colonies in Africa, attempts to further colonize the continent were hampered by the poor trade volumes caused by linguistic and cultural difficulties. During this time period, the attitude that the Chinese government took toward the continent of Africa was greatly affected by the hunt for ideological allies who could be able to aid China in its opposition to the influence of western nations. China's expansion was motivated by a desire to challenge the West's dominance. Even though China is part of the non-aligned movement and has helped get African countries to attend events like the Bandung Conference, the Liberian government has stayed loyal to its Western allies, especially the United Nations. This is the case even though China helped encourage African governments to attend events like the Bandung Conference. This was the case even though China helped get African states to participate in events like the Bandung Conference. The non-aligned movement, which China is actively involved in and which receives backing from China in its efforts to get African nations to take part in events such as the Bandung Conference. Both of these considerations were given a great deal of attention. As a result of Liberia's unwavering dedication to advancing U.S. interests throughout its history, communism in the country has never been successful in gaining a foothold. After this, Liberia made a public statement stating its opposition to communism (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

At the Bandung Conference in 1955, representatives from a total of 29 different Asian and African countries were present. Among these countries were Liberia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, and Sudan. Indonesia served as the conference's host country.

The primary objective of the conference was to further the expansion of economic & cultural ties between China & the African republics, which was seen as the primary focus of the meeting. At the 1955 Bandung Conference, Zhou Enlai, the leader of China, met with William Tubman, the president of Liberia, the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite this encounter, Liberia continued to see China as an improbable partner (Andersen, 2008). Under Deng Xiaoping's leadership, China and Africa's ties went through a period of profound change. During this time, they transitioned from a period in which China provided indirect political and intellectual support to one in which it provided direct assistance for a number of liberation movements on the African continent. Because it fought white supremacy in South Africa as well, Liberia worked along with other African nations, such as Nigeria, to assist in the liberation of South Africa. This was done because Liberia had the longest uninterrupted period of independence of any state in Africa. Nigeria was one of the nations that participated in this alliance and was a member of it (Looy, 2009). Even while this resulted in a greater number of encounters between Liberia and China, it did not result in the establishment of bilateral connections between the two countries. This was possibly due to Taiwan's position at the time as Liberia's most important commercial partner. At this point in time, Taiwan's activities, which were supported financially by the United States government, were already providing benefits to Liberia (Andersen, 2008). In November 1961, Liberia made history by being the first nation on the African continent to sign a cooperation agreement with Taiwan. The agreement was formally signed by representatives from both countries (Sim, 1971). In Gbedin, Liberia, the United States Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction had the intention of providing financial assistance to a Taiwanese team so that they might establish a demonstration agricultural facility (JCRR). The task of launching the website was delegated to the team based in Taiwan. Attempts made in the past by delegations from the U.N & the United States to develop rice planting in this region was unsuccessful. During the first four months of the growing season, the plot generated yields that were six times more than the norm for the area (Sim, 1971). As a result of this accomplishment, other African nations either accepted Taiwan's aid or approached Taiwan directly for it. Between the years of 1960 and 1963, thirteen of the newly independent African republics extended diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, whereas only five of the newly independent African governments extended the same recognition to China. Despite the competition, five countries refused to acknowledge either China or Taiwan as legitimate sovereign states.

Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, & the Central African Republic are some of the nations that fall under this category. Niger is a member of this group as well. According to Rich and Vasabjit (2015), China replaced Taiwan in its position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council in the year 1971. As a direct consequence of this, the two countries finally split apart, with China gaining 22 friends in Africa while Taiwan gained 20. Rich and Vasabjit (2015) point to this particular occurrence as the reason why they decided to end their relationship. In 1971, when China took up Taiwan's place on the United States Security Council, ties with African nations already in existence began to improve. By the year 1974, China had established diplomatic ties with a total of 30 states on the African continent, up from 22 at the start of the decade. Even after Liberia lost its membership on the United Nations Security Council and refrained from establishing diplomatic relations with China, the country has continued to express its support for Taiwan. Liberia 33 maintained links with Taiwan until the year 1977, by which time China had already courted over 40 African states. At that time, Liberia 33 was continuing to maintain communication with Taiwan. The government of Liberia, seeing the significance of China's position in the region, came to the conclusion in 1977 that the nature of its relations with China needed to be restructured. As a result of the "meltdown" and China's victory over Taiwan in the debate over Taiwan's membership in the UN Security Council, China has redirected its attention to domestic goals, most notably its economic reforms. This is because China believes that Taiwan's membership in the UN Security Council would be detrimental to China's interests. The battle over whether or not Taiwan should have a seat on the United Nations Security Council was won by China (Omenka, 2014). Since the 1970s, when China first started taking real steps to improve economic development, industrial power, and exports, the country has achieved significant progress in all of these areas. Before the country can be deemed developed, a significant amount of work is required. Recent years have seen China achieve significant success in a number of domains. According to Adaora, China's share of world exports climbed from 1.1% in 1981 to 6.8% in 2005. This is a significant increase over the previous decade. At that time, China had already established itself as the top exporter in the world (as of 2018). As a result of the positive outcomes brought about by China's economic reform, rapid economic growth, and increased investment in both countries, a new pattern has emerged in the nature of the

connections that exist between China and Liberia. These outcomes have contributed to the development of a new pattern.

Sirleaf Era

Charles Gyude Bryant served as chairman of the NTGL during its entire existence, which came to a conclusion in 2005 with the historic post-war election. In the history of Liberia, the results of the election that took place there in 2005 were considered important. This was because it was the first election in Liberia that was never influenced by the oligarchy of American and Liberians or the subsequent tyranny of a military commander or warlord. Due of this, the election's outcome was critical for Liberia's history (Gberie, 2010). Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, the first woman to hold the office of president in the history of Liberia and all of Africa, won the election after running on a platform of "peace and stability." With Sirleaf's election in 2005, Liberia, a nation that had been devastated by civil war for more than ten years, was offered the chance for a new beginning. The Sirleaf administration began its tenure in office in 2006 with four main policies that served as the administration's fulcrum in an effort to keep the campaign pledges and restore Liberians' faith in their government.

These aims included restoring the economy, creating a decent government and the rule of law, reconstructing the infrastructure and delivering essential services, strengthening peace and security, and supplying essential services (Mikell, 2009). The Sirleaf government served in this position and adhered to a foreign policy that placed an emphasis on development as a component of its overall diplomatic agenda. There has been an increase in the number of attempts to draw large-scale foreign investment to the country of Liberia so that the country's unrealized potential in industries such as mining, agriculture, forestry, and offshore oil exploration may be researched. During the time that President Sirleaf has been in office, Liberia's relations with many international institutions, such as ECOWAS, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Organization of African Unity, and the United Nations, have begun to show signs of improvement. All of these international partners and multilateral organizations are priority targets for the Sirleaf administration. Other international partners and multilateral organizations are also being targeted. These are only a few of the many different international organizations with which we collaborate. The involvement of international partners in Liberia's efforts to achieve economic recovery and restore peace and stability helped the Sirleaf administration in its

endeavors to uphold peace and stability in the nation. Even though Liberia has many international allies, since the two nations' restoration of diplomatic relations in 2003, its relationship with China has grown. Restoring diplomatic connections with China was an important step in the development of Liberia China's relationship, which took place during Ellen Johnson Sirleaf's tenure as president of Liberia. This event served as a landmark in their shared past. Beginnings of commercial relations between China and Liberia were highlighted by high-level visits, political engagements, and the signing of numerous concession agreements between the two countries during the Sirleaf administration in Liberia. For instance, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing flew all the way from China to attend the inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as president of Liberia in 2006. Zhaoxing declared during the visit that "the Chinese government will maintain close consultations and cooperation in the management of international and regional affairs and will work to strengthen exchanges and cooperation with the newly elected government of Liberia in all areas and at all levels" (Xinhua, 2006). This highlighted both the Chinese government's desire to engage with the Sirleaf administration and do so in order to strengthen their diplomatic ties. President Ellen Johnson made a state visit to China in 2006, during the dates of October 28 and November 6, just a few months after taking office. President Sirleaf had extensive conversations with Hu Jintao, the president of China, and other top members of the Chinese administration during the state visit. Through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the Chinese government promised the Liberian government that they would increase the level of cooperation between the two countries, especially in the areas of building infrastructure and finding natural resources (Taylor, 2009). The Liberian president also reaffirmed his country's support to the "One China Policy," also known as the "One China Principle." Additionally, the Chinese government was invited by the Liberian government to explore the nation's natural resources and aid in the development and growth of Liberia's economy. The concurrent visit resulted in a number of agreements pertaining to development aid for infrastructure development. Sirleaf also took part in the FOCAC Summit in Beijing in 2006 while she was in China. The Forum on China-Africa Collaboration (FOCAC), a crucial strategy that had been explored to strengthen China's relations and collaboration with Africa, was established by China and Africa in October of 2000 (Shelton & Paruk, 2008). The forum serves as a useful platform and a powerful tool for holding group discussions, exchanging governance-related insights, and enhancing

mutual trust and practical cooperation between Chinese and African state governments. Two important papers were completed at the FOCAC summit in Beijing in November 2006: a declaration and an action plan for 2007 to 2009, both of which had the support of the presidents of China and African nations. The action plan included joint initiatives in the fields of politics, economy, international relations, and social progress. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao also put up a rapid trade plan during the FOCAC meeting in 2006, with the aim of boosting bilateral trade between China and Africa to US\$100 billion by the year 2010. By the year 2010, this was supposed to be finished. (Sun, 2014). In 2000, the total amount of trade between China and Africa was only about ten billion dollars, but by the end of 2006, it had nearly doubled to forty billion dollars in the United States, according to Uchehara (2009). The Chinese president promised an additional US\$5 billion in financing, US\$3 billion in preferential loans, and US\$2 billion in preferential buyer credits by the end of 2009. This was done in an effort to further promote Chinese investment in Africa. A portion of the loans that heavily indebted poor countries in Africa owe to China would be forgiven, according to the Chinese president. Along with the debt forgiveness, all of these actions will be carried out (Shelton & Paruk, 2008).

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which serves as the setting for fruitful diplomatic contacts, has developed into a key pillar in the development of China's relations with Africa. It acted as the foundation for forging a lasting partnership between China and Africa that would benefit both parties. As they have been for a significant number of other African nations, China's support and investment have directly benefited Liberia. For instance, after the 2006 FOCAC submission, Liberia, one of the impoverished countries, had its loans to China forgiven. On February 1, 2007, Chinese President Hu Jintao paid a day-long state visit to Liberia as a follow-up to President Sirleaf's travel to Beijing in 2006. He was the first Chinese leader to visit Liberia since the two nations' establishment of diplomatic ties in 1977. Following President Sirleaf's travel to Beijing in 2006, the visit was made. The Chinese leader spoke at length with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and other top Liberian government officials during the state visit. A number of bilateral agreements were signed as a result of the visit, including one on debt cancellation, one for the construction of three Chinese-funded schools in rural Liberia, and one for Hu Jintao to co-launch the Liberia Anti-Malaria Center. During his visit, Hu Jintao also assisted in the co-launch of the Liberia Anti-Malaria Center. The visit of Hu Jintao, who

journeyed across the continent to deepen China's bilateral partnerships with several African countries, including Liberia, demonstrated the significance that China attaches to its relations with Liberia and other African states. China's approach has generally been effective since it was put into action through "clear government policy" to support industrial projects in Africa, substantial finance and tax benefits for Chinese companies working abroad, and strong international contacts with the continent. These all played a role in China's progress (Moumouni, 2014). The efforts of the Sirleaf administration to support the government's development goal have been greatly aided by the significant loans and infrastructure construction projects that China has undertaken in Liberia. As a direct result of the two countries' increased economic cooperation and trade agreements, since the resumption of diplomatic ties in 2003, Liberia has benefited greatly from China's presence there as a development partner. The Sirleaf government redirected the bilateral relations between Liberia and China and created new lines of cooperation.

In addition to the already-existing diplomatic ties with China, Liberia has witnessed substantial exchanges within the context of South-South cooperation since joining FOCAC (Gray, 2018). The FOCAC gave a chance for the Sirleaf government to bring Chinese investment to Liberia in order to support infrastructure growth, human resource development, and economic growth. As a result, China and Liberia have enjoyed opulent commercial connections over the past few years, which has greatly aided the development of both nations. While the United States and other Western allies persisted in their disagreements on whether aid should be given to Liberia, China went ahead and filled a sizable funding vacuum in a number of investment sectors.

For instance, in 2009 the Liberian government and China Union signed a contract for the country's largest mining investment project, which was worth at \$2.6 billion US (Shinn & Eisenmen, 2012). The largest investment ever made in Liberia's mining sector led to the creation of jobs and a boost in the country's overall economic growth. The nation's natural resource industry was heavily emphasized by President Sirleaf's administration as the main engine of economic growth. Nearly 50 of these bilateral agreements between the governments of China and Liberia were established during the years 2006 and 2016. (Chieh, 2015). These agreements included a wide range of investment opportunities, including commercial trade, the improvement of current infrastructure, and the construction of new highways, hospitals, schools, sports

stadiums, and agricultural facilities. Liberia's stance on the "One China Policy" has allowed for the rapid growth and development of relations between the two nations in recent years. According to reports, Edwin Melvin Snowe, a former speaker of the House of Representatives, met in secret with officials from Taiwan's administration in the Gambia in June 2006 in an effort to further Taiwan's cause. Snowe was compelled to retire as speaker because the Liberian administration swiftly discounted the evidence (Moumouni, 2014). In a letter that he allegedly drafted and delivered to the government of Taiwan in 2016.

Another former speaker by the name of George Dweh is alleged to have urged the development of bilateral ties between Liberia and Taiwan. Dweh, as quoted in Dodoo (2016, 20), stated that:

Your Excellency, Because Taiwan will undoubtedly achieve her objective for the trade mission, I am making it very clear that Taipei has no need to be discouraged by the fact that China has diplomatic connections with Liberia and other West African governments.

In spite of the fact that various attempts have been made to undermine "the one China policy," the Sirleaf administration has reaffirmed its commitment to upholding this policy for the purpose of fostering closer ties between the two countries.

During his trip to Liberia in April 2010, the Deputy Commerce Minister of China, Fu Ziyang, took a group of Chinese businesspeople with him. The delegation, which included 23 business executives, five journalists, and 14 senior government officials, was on a mission to increase commerce and collaboration with the governments of China and Liberia (Dodoo, 2016). Both countries signed the six pillars agreement, which included a range of investment industries, over the course of the visit. According to James Johnson, an entry-level employee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the majority of the bilateral agreements and their implementation generated prospects for jobs, investments, and economic growth, which assisted the Sirleaf administration in achieving some of the government's development agenda. Waithaka, (2018). This was the case because the agreements helped the government accomplish some of its goals. To put it another way, the Sirleaf administration was successful in carrying out a portion of its development plan as a direct result of these opportunities.

Another investment opportunity that led to the development of jobs for Liberians, for instance, was the signing of a concession agreement between China Union and Liberia. The Sirleaf administration significantly changed the nature of

Liberia's relationship with China. For Sirleaf, the "One China Policy," which aided in strengthening the bilateral ties between Liberia and China, was reaffirmed by the government's foreign policy toward China. Ever since the diplomatic links between the two nations were established, there has been ongoing economic cooperation between China and Liberia.

Socio-Political Relations between Liberia and China

On February 17, 1977, Liberia became the first country to establish diplomatic relations with China. This occurred before any other nation. These relationships were strengthened over time. Liberia has high expectations that the recent strengthening of diplomatic relations between China and Liberia will open the door to more financial assistance from other countries. This viewpoint has been influenced in part by the fast expansion of China's economy over the last several decades. Given its long history of strong relations with the US, Liberia would appear to be an unexpected ally for a communist regime until the snowball effect led to the formation of bilateral contacts with Communist China. Because of the snowball effect, these relationships have been made feasible. In spite of this, in the 1970s, Liberia purposefully cut historical links with the United States in order to form a more autonomous foreign policy that was plainly anti-colonial and Africanist. This was done in order to create a more favorable environment for the country's development. All of this activity was carried out with the intention of propagating Africanist views (Dunn, 2016). To provide just one example, the government of William R. Tolbert, who served as president from 1971 to 1980, initiated diplomatic relations with the countries of the communist world in the year 1972.

These connections linked a large number of countries in what was once known as the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, one of which was China. Due to its lowly position in the hierarchy of power on the world stage, Liberia has been forced to forge cooperative alliances with nations that are more powerful and have greater populations and resources in order to ensure that it will continue to exist in the future (Thomson, 1999). The advent of independent African governments in the 1970s made it possible for Liberia to develop a foreign policy that was independent of both the West and the Soviet Union. China's influence in Africa also played a role in this. The fact that China has such a strong presence in Africa made it possible for this to take place. The rapid

economic growth that China saw in the 1970s made it possible for this prospect to become a reality (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012).

During this time period, the government of Liberia adopted increasingly hardline positions on several issues. On the home front, the government advocated for a socialist development plan, but on the international stage, they supported a movement that was non-aligned with any one political ideology. Neither tactic ended up being very successful. However, the United States, which is considered to be Liberia's closest ally, did not benefit in any way from the new foreign policy. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China resulted in the severing of Liberia's ties with Taiwan. In spite of the fact that Liberia had diplomatic links with Taiwan for around twenty years before it established official ties with China, the situation really worked out the other way around. After Liberia severed its diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of China, the latter saw the maintenance of its connection with Liberia as an essential policy goal in order to ensure that it would surpass Taiwan in Liberia on both the economic and political fronts. This occurred when Liberia chose to establish its bilateral ties with China rather than Taiwan.

This came about as a result of Liberia's decision to strengthen its connections with China (Kuo, 2003). According to Gray (2018), Liberia was one of a small group of states who would switch their allegiance to Taiwan and, in many instances, China again as competition remained. Other countries in this category include Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. This category includes a few more countries than that. As a direct consequence of this, China's overtures to Liberia were conditional on the country altering the terms of its relationship with Taiwan. William R. Tolbert was extended an invitation to pay a state visit to China by the Chinese government in the year 1978. During the visit, the administrations of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Liberia came to a number of agreements that are of critical importance to both countries. William R. Tolbert's trip to China resulted in a series of legally binding agreements that laid the framework for future commercial and technical collaboration between the two nations. These agreements were the outcome of William R. Tolbert's trip to China.

These agreements were negotiated during the trip. These requirements were stated inside the agreements. Since the first day that the two nations' diplomats first made contact with one another, the working relationship between them has been fruitful, particularly during the time when Tolbert has held power in both nations

(Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Since Liberia declared its independence in 1847, the Doe government was the first to stress the "Second Republic of Liberia (1980-1990)" as the defining period of time for the country. It was President Doe's government that brought attention to the "Second Republic of Liberia (1980-1990)" for the first time. Tolbert's rule saw a shift from a Western orientation toward a more independent and Africanist strategy, in contrast to what Doe's dictatorship did, which was to strengthen its ties with the West, most notably the United States, in response to what Doe perceived as the United States' backing for the government. During Doe's rule, the United States was viewed as providing support for the government. Tolbert's administration, on the other hand, pursued a policy that was less reliant on Western influence and more pro-Africanist.

It also abandoned its Western orientation (TRC, 2009). For example, in May of 1981, the government of Liberia reduced the number of Soviet diplomatic personnel and closed down the Libyan embassy in Monrovia. In September of the same year, the Soviet Union pulled out completely and permanently from the country. Despite this, Doe maintained his connections with the PRC in the vain expectation that they would lend their support to his authoritarian military dictatorship. In 1982, while on a state visit to China, President Doe got assurances from the Chinese leadership that they would assist his government. These guarantees were given during President Doe's trip. Shinn and Eisenman assert that substantial agreements between the governments of the United States and China were reached as a direct consequence of John Doe's trip to China (2012). The provision of agricultural assistance was included in several of these agreements, in addition to commercial and technical partnership. In addition, the Chinese government, a few months after Doe's journey to China, Doe's country received a total of thirty vehicles, including twenty military jeeps, two limousines, and buses, in order to back up the military rule that Doe had set up (Shinn & Eisenman, 2012). Relations between China and Liberia improved under the Doe government, which was in power from 1980 to 1989.

Doe made the decision to change Liberia's diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to secure more funding for his administration. Tian Jiyun, the Vice President of China, traveled to Liberia in 1984 to dedicate the 30,000-seat stadium in Monrovia, which had been sponsored by an interest-free loan and was the primary focus of China's investment in Liberia during the 1980s. This was done as part of the nation's ongoing relationship with China. By sending a team to Liberia, which is one of the

nations that has benefited from China's international help, China intended to show that it supports Liberia, which is one of the countries that has benefited from China's foreign assistance. The money for the loan was given by the China Development Bank (ChinaDaily.com, accessed June 12, 2017). Even though China participated in a few less significant assistance initiatives, the bulk of which were centered on agriculture, Doe maintained tight connections with the nation. However, starting in 1986, the United States started withholding money from the Doe administration, and beginning in 1987, there were a series of military coups. Both of these events contributed to the Doe government's fall from power.

Doe came to the conclusion that he needed to expand his financial resources in order to improve his chances of being awarded financial assistance. After Doe's aggressive measures against both countries in the first half of the 1980s, Liberia's government reestablished diplomatic contacts with the Soviet Union and Libya in 1988. This came after Doe's actions in the first half of the 1980s. Nevertheless, the strength of these connections was not the same as it had been in the past (Hahn, 2009). Because the Doe government in Liberia was having problems meeting its financial obligations, Taiwan made the strategic decision to take advantage of the situation by making an offer of financial assistance in the amount of \$200 million in exchange for Liberia's official recognition of Taiwan. Some Liberian officials saw Taiwan's offer as a way to strengthen ties with their nation, while others saw it as part of a coordinated effort by the United States to prevent Liberia from joining the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is chaired by China and has the power to veto any resolution that is brought before it. Following the advice of these officials, President Doe decided against accepting Taiwan's offer because he believed it was a component of this US-led initiative (Hahn, 2009). In spite of this, Doe made the decision to accept Taiwan's offer, and in 1989 he announced in a public statement that he had reestablished diplomatic ties with the island country. As a form of retaliation for Liberia's decision to recognize Taiwan, the Chinese government severed all diplomatic ties with the country. The Chinese government pulled out of a number of initiatives that were being carried out in Liberia and closed their embassy in Monrovia, which is the capital of the nation. This decision had far-reaching implications for the government of Liberia since it meant the end of all activities that were supported by the government of China. As a direct consequence of this decision, the Chinese government withdrew its support for all of the many programs that it had previously funded. Nevertheless, both China

and Liberia benefited from Liberia's recognition of Taiwan, which came at China's cost and Taiwan's financial assistance to Liberia, which helped China cover its financial gap. In the end, China was the one who came out on the wrong side of this bargain.

Economic, Trade, Aid and Technical Cooperation

The formation of economic links between governments may be attributed to a wide range of contributing elements, such as the trading of commodities, the injection of money from both nations, the providing of aid, and the offering of technical support. Since the beginning of the development of bilateral relations between the two countries in 1977, the economic activity of both nations has had an effect on 48 of the links that have existed between Liberia and China. (Moumouni, 2014). The natural resources of Liberia, direct investment from other countries, and financial assistance from other countries are the primary drivers of the country's economy. Since the beginning of diplomatic ties between the two nations, Liberia has been able to take advantage of China's assistance in the field of international development. Moshi (2008) asserts that China's interactions with and assistance to African states have a long history and that these relationships have seen significant development over the course of the preceding four decades.

Furthermore, it is critical to stress that since 1960, China, a rising economic power, has given major financial aid and other types of development support to African nations. Participant Li Wei who was present at the Chinese Embassy in Liberia, stated that China's help to Liberia was motivated by the need for China to deepen its economic ties with that country. China's financial support and technology collaboration were also intended to aid in the development of less developed countries like Liberia. The governments of China and Liberia have come to an agreement on a number of issues in order to provide continuing assistance to the Liberian government in its endeavors. An economic partnership between the governments of China and Liberia has been formalized through the signing of an agreement. The governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Liberia signed a declaration stating their goals for financial and technological partnership on May 16, 1979. The agreement outlined their respective countries' intentions. The deal was formally known by its official name, it provided an overview of our strategies for collaborating economically and technically. The pact of economic and scientific cooperation between the People's

Republic of China and the Republic of Liberia was signed on February 17, 1977. Both countries' governments were involved in the process. The date of the signing is not certain. The People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea came to an agreement on economic and technological cooperation on February 17, 1977, and it was signed by their respective governments. Beijing has sent fifty personnel to Liberia in order to investigate the possibility of resurrecting a Taiwanese business operation now that diplomatic relations have been established between the two nations. The committee reached the conclusion that the project could not be completed, and as a result, they suggested that the funds be reallocated to other initiatives (Gray, 2018). Zinnah Johnson, who is 45 years old and works as an informant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claims that the Taiwanese government in Liberia was unable to get Chinese money for the majority of the developed infrastructure projects because China is opposed to Taiwan's recognition. Waithaka, (2018). This information was gathered with the assistance of Zinnah Johnson, who is recognized as a reliable source. Three of the various projects that were started throughout the 1960s and 1970s by the government of Taiwan were the Say-Dude rice farm, the Garwalu-Tombe rice project, and the vegetable project. The completion of research on the viability of installing updated rice seed stations and vegetable centers, updating the Gbedin Water Conservancy Project, and creating new vegetable centers all at the same time. In addition, the only technical studies to evaluate the potential for growing paddy rice in certain locations along the St. John Valley and the other three rivers have been carried out. The Chinese government decided not to provide any kind of technical assistance for the water conservation projects that were being carried out in Foya, Zleh-Town, and Juarzon; as a result, these projects were all scrapped. Although China pulled out of the Taiwanese projects, the country's efforts were nevertheless beneficial to Liberia's economic growth and development in other ways, even though China pulled out of the Taiwanese projects. For instance, between the years 1984 and 1989, the Chinese government sent a total of forty-two individuals to Liberia as part of three separate medical teams. By the year 1989, China had already initiated a number of cooperative ventures, some of which were connected to the country's international assistance program. The work that was finished on these projects, which were beneficial to Liberia, sped up the development that the nation made.

Sino-Liberia Trade relations between 2003-2016

China has experienced industrial overproduction issues over the past few years in a number of sectors, including electronics, textiles, and footwear (Diaouari, 2004). Businesses in China also needed to grow their market share since, most significantly, raw materials and energy imports would take place on those markets in addition to the export of goods made in China. According to Diaouari (2004), it was this historical context that pushed Chinese corporations to investigate the possibilities presented by Africa's enormous resources and undeveloped markets. China's trade and investment with several African countries have skyrocketed since then. Recently, Liberia's trade interactions with China have increased dramatically. In 2010, the governments of Liberia and China inked an agreement with trade cooperation as one of the six pillars of the treaty. In April 2010, China and Liberia held their first economic and commercial cooperation conference in the country's capital, Monrovia. The meeting between the governments of China and Liberia had as its goal fostering and expanding trade relations between the two nations. During the course of the meeting, the Chinese government reached an agreement to establish a free trade zone in the city of Buchanan in the country of Liberia (Moumouni, 2014). In addition to this, the Chinese Business Association in Liberia was established in March 2011 by a group of 15 Chinese enterprises that had previously worked together (CBAL). This organization is also referred to as CBAL. Both nations' efforts to strengthen their economic connections with one another led directly to the expansion of trade between China and Liberia. A massive growth from 2003's total transaction volume of \$68.15 million, which suggested positive growth for the years to come, brought the amount of trade between the two countries to a total of US\$164.86 million in 2016.

Table 4.1 Export and Import between Liberia and China (2003- 2010)

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Import	26.19	181.2	149.6	52.98	80.23	113.7	188.2	439.7
Exports	41.96	16.52	14.17	19.3	32.8	59.4	39.6	22.84

Trade value	68.19	198.3	163.8	72.28	113	173.1	227.8	462. 5
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003-2016, (Ministry of Commerce and Industry Republic of Liberia)

Table 4.2: Export and Import between Liberia and China (2011-2016)

	9	10	11	12	13	14
Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Imports	496.3	344.7	233.6	171.1	135.7	159.3
Exports	41.24	228.6	164.4	288.5	172.2	48.17
Trade value	537.9	573.3	398	459.6	307.9	207.4

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2003-2016, (Ministry of Commerce and Industry Republic of Liberia)

Table: 4.3 China's Share of Imports by Commodity Group; 2003-2010 (in millions of US\$)

Categories of Commodities import	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Food & Live Animals	0.0193	0.00425	0.0045	0.00229	0.00016	0.0018	0.00086	0.00042
Ow/ Rice	0	0	0.00114	0.0013	7.4788	0.0009	0.0003	0.0001
Tobacco & Brreweries	0.0021	0.00063	0.00056	0.00036	1.956	0.0001	0.0001	4.00
Crude Mineral	0.00137	0.00015	0.00053	0.0002	8.6006	0.0001	7.3343	1.364
Mineral, lubricant & Fuel	0.00049	0.00029	0.00193	0.00029	7.1048	0.0001	5.686	0.00014
Animal & Vegetable oil	0.00095	0.00018	0.00017	0.00017	8.974	2.550	6.531	2.615
Chemical & Related products	0.00259	0.00048	0.00061	0.00041	2.5428	0.0003	0.00015	7.2324

Manufactured products	0.00568	0.00174	0.0018	0.00082	8.812	0.0009	0.00045	0.00016
Machinery, Transport Equipment	0.00565	0.000348	0.00217	0.00123	0.00012	0.0018	0.00068	0.00028
Miscellaneous Articles	0.01244	0.000262	0.00202	0.00001	5.06067	0.0005	0.00014	0.0001
Total	0.06483	0.01852	0.02163	0.00970	0.00069	0.0080	0.00334	0.00172

Source: Central Bank of Liberia: 2003-2016; China Statistical Yearbook: 2003-20016

Table 4.4: China's Share of Imports by Commodity Group; 2011-2016 (in millions of US\$)

Category of Commodity Imports	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Food & Live Animal	0.0006163	0.000566	0.000787	0.00212	0.002637	0.00168
OW/ Rice	0.0002	0.00019	0.000377	0.0009	0.00919	0.00062
Beverages & Tobacco	4.107	6.22361	0.00043	0.00012	0.00017	0.00014
Crude Mineral	1.087	1.8221	7.58643	0.00016	0.00017	0.0001
Minerals, Fuel & Lubricants	0.00012	0.000148	0.00138	0.00173	0.002754	0.0021
Animal & vegetable oil	2.3154	9.09025	0.00118	0.00194	0.002587	0.00186
Chemical & Related Products	7.12748	0.000139	9.8769	0.000132	0.000166	0.0001
Manufactured Products	0.0001894			0.002	0.001274	0.000596

Machinery & Transport Equipment	0.000505	0.0009019	0.00066	0.000905	0.004836	0.00085
Miscellaneous Articles	8.3556	8.3445	0.00012	0.001016	0.0005	0.000196
Total	0.0023476	0.003291436	0.006742203	0.0149632	0.01884028	0.010035

Source: Liberia's Central Bank, 2003–2016 Statistics of China, 2003–2016

According to the Liberian Ministry of Commerce and Industry Annual Report (2014), Liberia's real GDP growth rate fell to 0.3 percent in 2014, from 8.7 percent in 2013. The Ebola virus epidemic that year in Liberia, which negatively impacted every aspect of the economy, was the primary cause of the country's GDP decline. However, trade volume between China and Liberia was US\$307.7 million in 2015, with exports totaling US\$172 million and imports totaling US\$135.7 million. Because its trade with China has grown so much, Liberia has become a very important business partner for China. From 2003 to 2016, the trade volume between China and Liberia was US\$25.96 billion, with China's exports being US\$24.7 billion and imports totaling US\$1.89 billion, accounting for 7.28% of total trade in favor of Liberia. Despite a significant growth in commerce between China and Liberia, there is a significant trade imbalance from Liberia's trade with China. Liberia's main exports to China were rubber, wood, scrap metal, iron ore, and wood. Its main imports from China were food, automobiles, textiles, light industrial items; chemical products, mechanical equipment, electrical appliances, and steel (see Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 above).

China economic impact on Liberia 2003-2016

Education

African nations are working hard to improve their human capital so that their citizens can compete for employment and investments on a local and worldwide scale. As China maintains strong links with African nations, Chinese assistance and other engagements, such as Chinese government scholarships for African students, have expanded. Omoruyi, Jiao, and Steve (2017) feel that, in addition to China's economic engagement with African nations, education is an important component of China-Africa relations. Education assistance, which is a component of cultural diplomacy, is

one of China's foreign policy weapons that may serve to develop China's connection with Africa. High-level visits, exchanges of students and teachers, cooperation in higher education and research projects, scholarships, China's provision of various professional and vocational training programs to African countries, and the establishment of Confucius Institutes (Chinese-language and culture teaching institutions) have all been cited as examples of education cooperation between China and African countries, including Liberia.

Liberia, as a developing nation, regards education as one of its top priorities for building human capital and competing in an increasingly globalized world. In this aspect, China has been rather helpful in providing educational assistance to Liberia in order to increase its human capital (Adaora, 2018). The establishment of educational relations between Liberia and China is not a new phenomenon. Liberia and China signed a cultural cooperation agreement in 1982 to encourage cultural interaction between the two nations, but owing to a shift in bilateral ties between the two countries, culture exchange was relatively low, with just 41 Liberian students benefiting from the program by 1995 (Shinn & Eisenmen, 2012). However, the resumption of diplomatic relations between Liberia and China in 2003 provided an opportunity for China to continue its assistance to the Liberian educational sector. For example, during President Hu Jintao's 2007 visit to Liberia, the Chinese government co-signed a building deal for three China-aided rural schools in the country.

These schools were constructed in Suhen Macca Town, Bomi County, New Georgia, and Paynesville, Montserrado County, to aid the Liberian government's educational efforts (Gaye, 2017). To achieve long-term development in Africa, educational activities have to be prioritized. Cooperation in Education and Human Resource Development (CEHRD) was one of the agenda items on the action plan for the 2006 FOCAC summit (Omoruyi, 2007). On the basis of the CEHRD, four major areas of involvement were targeted: the establishment of rural schools in Africa, the expansion of Chinese government scholarships to African students, the establishment of Confucius Institutes in African universities for teaching Chinese language and the encouragement of teaching African languages in Chinese universities, and the provision of professional and educational personnel to various institutions in Africa (FOCAC, 2006).

According to Nagao (2016), the Chinese government boosted scholarship options for African students to attend Chinese universities and colleges in 2006. The

number of scholarships climbed from 2,000 to 4,000 every year until 2015, when it reached 10,000 per year. In the case of Liberia, the number of Liberian students studying in China has grown since 2006. Prior to the end of 2008, around 108 Liberian students were educated in basic programs in China (Moumouni, 2014). Meanwhile, the number improved in 2013, with an estimated 500 Liberian students getting or continuing to receive formal education in China. In addition, over 200 government officials acquired professional education in China (Gaye, 2017).

These and other activities were part of their plan to enhance ties with Liberia. These measures also aided and encouraged Liberia's growth. On the Chinese side, these activities were part of a plan to increase China's influence in Liberia as a significant development partner. The Confucius Institute was founded at the University of Liberia in 2008. The Confucius Institute in Liberia was established to satisfy the requirements of Liberians interested in learning the Chinese language and culture. According to a Chinese informant, Li Jie (2018), at the Confucius Institute in Liberia, Chinese was the top language in the world by population; thus, if one could speak Chinese, he or she could converse with one-fourth of the global population. Furthermore, the expanding Chinese influence in Liberia and other African nations has inspired Africans to acquire the Chinese language and culture in order to facilitate communication.

Several Liberian students at the Confucius Institute stated in a focused group discussion (FGD) in 2018 that Liberian youths were increasingly attracted to the Chinese language by the desire to get a dream career in China or to gain from Chinese expanding participation in Liberia. According to Zhou Yuxiao, the Chinese ambassador to Liberia, the purpose of the Confucius Institutes in Liberia is to strengthen educational and cultural exchanges and cooperation between China and Liberia, as well as to enhance mutual understanding and friendship between their peoples (Chinese Embassy in Monrovia, December 2008). Given the expanding commercial links between China and Liberia, cultural interactions were critical for Chinese and Liberians to better understand each other and for both sides to further solidify their relationships. Furthermore, this was another Chinese effort to improve the Chinese language and culture and acquire greater influence in African nations. The Confucius Institute at the University of Liberia provides revenue for the university through students who want to study Chinese. In an attempt to improve Liberia's educational sector, the Chinese government also erected Fendell Campus, a branch of

the University of Liberia, at a cost of US\$23 million, which was given to the Sirleaf administration in 2010. In 2015, the Chinese government also gifted the Liberian government with the Monrovia Vocational Training Center (MVTC), which cost around US\$9 million.

The Chinese ambassador said that Chinese initiatives in Liberia, including the MVTC, were attempts by the Chinese government to help Liberia prosper (Gbollie, 2018). Sino-Liberia ties have been described as a win-win situation, with both nations benefiting from the relationship. "I am studying environmental engineering," said Vaye, a Liberian graduate from China. We endeavor to fix environmental problems or challenges, beginning with climate and progressing through our water, soil, and the air we breathe. According to the United Nations Environment Program (2017), climate change is wreaking havoc in Liberia and producing significant floods in Monrovia. More than 30,000 people were impacted by floods in 2018 alone, and 75% of Liberians lack access to clean drinking water, indicating that we still have a lot of work to do. "These issues substantially harm our economy as long as they affect public health. Envision us working as a team to mitigate these problems and watch how the economy is going to improve." Educational collaboration between China and African nations has had a significant influence on both countries' social and economic growth. A focus group discussion (FGD) with Liberian graduates from China revealed that Chinese government subsidies to Liberian students studying in Chinese institutions and colleges encompass a variety of different programs. China's commitment to contribute to human capital development in Liberia's education sector is widely known.

Health

Notwithstanding the cavity formed in Sino-Liberia ties as a result of the change in bilateral relations, the Sirleaf government tried to fill the gap, ushering in a new chapter of Sino-Liberia relations. Given the instability of Liberia's health sector, improvement in the health sector might be a means of boosting Sino-Liberia ties. Following Hu Jintao's visit to Liberia in 2007, he and President Sirleaf co-founded the Anti-Malaria Center in Liberia, and the Chinese government provided 93,840 doses of anti-malaria drugs valued at US\$145,390. Furthermore, the Chinese government provided 16,000 doses of anti-malaria treatment to the Liberia Anti-Malaria Center in 2008. A four-member Chinese expert team in malaria control and prevention visited Liberia in May 2008 to install anti-malaria equipment given by China and to educate

11 Liberian lab technicians for the Anti-Malaria Center and other clinics (Chinese Embassy in Monrovia). This initiative is part of the Chinese government's ongoing efforts to combat malaria in Liberia. In an effort to strengthen Liberia's health sector, the Chinese government opened the Jackson F. Doe Memorial and Regional Referral Hospital in Tappita, 360 kilometers from the capital of Monrovia, in 2011 at a cost of US\$10 million and equipped it with 25 Liberian medical personnel trained in China for the effective use and maintenance of its modern equipment (Gaye, 2017). Many Liberians in Nimba and around the nation have found optimism in the initiative. With such excellent facilities and qualified medical professionals, it has relieved some of the load on the John F. Kennedy Medical Center in Monrovia, which was already overburdened with patients from around the nation. Meanwhile, the Chinese government restored the Liberia Ministry of Health building for US\$4.7 million as part of its unpaid help to the Liberian government. The Chinese refurbishment of the Health Complex has provided significant assistance to Liberia's health sector, demonstrating that enhanced health-care service delivery leads to economic and social growth. Liberia was one of three West African nations affected by the deadly Ebola virus in 2014, particularly in the Mano River area. The scenario caused an instant stop to all activity and slowed the country's development to little more than 1%. Faced with bleak economic prospects and a deteriorating health-care system, the Chinese government became the first international partner to take the lead in the fight against the Ebola virus in the following ways: it built a 100-bed Ebola Treatment Unit (ETU), provided medical equipment, managed and ran the ETU by dispatching a medical team, and provided US\$1.7 million for project implementation. These and other activities helped to strengthen ties between China and Liberia. Despite criticism for the kind of assistance offered to African nations, Cooke (2016) observes that China's involvement with African countries has been related to China's economic expansion and its hunt for resources in Africa. However, it has been noticed that China's participation in Africa and influence among African nations are a consequence of the good partnerships it has formed with African leaders. In the case of Liberia, some Liberians see China as a key development partner owing to the Chinese government's assistance for the country's growth.

Infrastructure

China has built a variety of social and economic infrastructure projects in Monrovia since establishing a diplomatic presence there, including a sugar plant and a sports center. It has also helped with hospital upkeep and medical aid (having sent more than 60 Chinese medical staff to Liberia since 1984). It also established the Liberia Sugar Corporation and the Gbedin rice development project in Saniquellie (Libsuco).²⁴ Other infrastructure projects include the \$7.6 million refurbishment of the Samuel Kanyon Doe multi-purpose sports stadium in Monrovia, the building of Tubman cantonment, a military post in Bong, and assistance in the development of nationwide radio and television network coverage.

Agriculture

As a direct result of the 2006 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Focac), China began building a \$6 million China Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in Maryland County in the extreme south, one of ten such centers in Africa. It also contributed \$1 million in agricultural equipment and dispatched Chinese specialists to the Booker T. Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute in Kakata to teach Liberians how to grow rice.

Trade

By 2006, three years after diplomatic relations were restored; the volume had climbed to \$532 million, with China's exports at \$530 million but imports at \$2 million. China only imported iron ore and lumber, whereas the majority of its exports were foodstuffs, electrical gear, and ships. Two-way commerce climbed 65% year on year to \$1.88 billion in 2009, while Liberian exports, including rubber, lumber, and scrap metal, fell 33% to \$4 million (Moumouni, 2018). According to Chinese customs records, two-way commerce totaled \$3.67 billion in 2012, with a balance of \$3.44 billion in favor of China, indicating a record \$200 million in Liberian imports (Moumouni, 2018). During the first nine months of 2013, Liberia's exports to China amounted to \$165 million of the overall trade of \$1.92 billion. Although ships account for up to 70% of Chinese shipments to Liberia, the majority of these boats are owned by non-Liberians, especially Germans (who possess 1,185 vessels), Scandinavians, and other Western Europeans seeking to avoid their own nations' more severe regulatory and taxation systems. With 2,771 registered boats, Liberia was second only

to Panama among operators of flags of convenience in 2012. Liberia was one of ten flag nations that accounted for more than 70% of the world's registered tonnage of cargo ships that year. Two-way commerce hit a high of \$5 billion in 2011, with Liberia earning about \$50 million, an increase of 84% over the previous year (Moumouni, 2018). However, it is useless in actual terms, constituting less than 1% of total volume. Overall, Liberia's position mirrors that of Africa as a whole, where Chinese traffickers flood marketplaces with counterfeit and low-quality items at cheap costs. As a result, Monrovia must create a strategy that is bold enough to allow it to claim a more equal portion of the Chinese market. Such a program would include capacity development, access to financial markets, all-around information seminars, and multi-tiered incentives for joint ventures, especially in raw material processing. Another difficulty for President Johnson's administration and Mrs. Sirleaf's is bringing the operations of Chinese enterprises involved in smuggling iron ore and wood in conjunction with corrupt Liberian authorities under its authority. Prior to the Taylor regime's fall in 2003, commercial logging was a key component of the economy, accounting for one-quarter of GDP and 65% of foreign exchange income in 2002. After logging and diamond mining became a source of extrabudgetary revenue for Taylor and others, fueling conflict in Liberia and its neighbors, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1521, imposing sanctions on those industries until the central government took full control of Liberia's natural resources. (The wood industry was mostly managed by a corporation owned by Gus van Kouwenhoven, a Dutch citizen and known collaborator with the Taylor regime.) Only in June 2006 was the UN restriction on wood shipments removed. According to a 2005 study conducted by the International Tropical Wood Organization (ITTO Haack et.al, 2016) China received 75% of Liberia's log exports, while Europe received 80% of sawn timber. To address trade and economic challenges, the respective governments hosted the inaugural China-Liberia economic and trade cooperation conference in Monrovia in April 2010, which was attended by over 100 representatives of Chinese and Liberian businesses. Although tangible outcomes from the conference have yet to be realized, its fundamental strength resides in striving to form an increasingly profound connection between the two countries. One greatly anticipated consequence was China's commitment to develop a free trade zone in the seaside city of Buchanan; another was the formation of the Chinese Business Association of Liberia (CBAL) in March 2011, with 15 Chinese enterprises as initial members. The chairman of Sino-Liberia Mining

Company leads CBAL. Among other reasons, CBAL was founded in response to former Chinese Ambassador Zhou Yuxiao's request that his countrymen exclusively engage in lawful companies.

Investment

Liberia saw negative capital flows of \$479 million in 2005 and \$82 million in 2006 during the immediate post-conflict era, although investor confidence is steadily rising after President Johnson's victory. Sirleaf's The Liberian government is actively courting Beijing to tap into Monrovia's enormous natural resources, and according to the Chinese vice minister of trade, China's investment in Liberia had reached \$9.9 billion by 2010 (Hough, G. (2010). Policy Watch 9.). The Liberian government issued solicitations for exploration and mining bids for iron ore reserves in the Bong Range, 150 kilometers north of Monrovia, in January 2008. In May 2008, China Union Investment Company Ltd. Cheung, Y. L et.al 2008, a Monrovia-based subsidiary of Hong Kong-based China Union Mining Ltd., filed a tender and obtained an acceptance notice. President Johnson-Sirleaf stated in December 2008 that China Union Mining was the top bidder to rehabilitate and mine the Bong Range deposit. China Union pledged a preliminary payment of \$40 million as part of a \$2.6 billion package, which the Liberian government planned to deploy as part of its Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) portfolio. 42 The Liberian government, China Union (Hong Kong) Mining Company Ltd., and China-Union Investment (Liberia) Bong Mines Company Ltd. signed the Bong Mine Agreement. Because of the global financial crisis, the agreement was only signed on January 19, 2009. The overall concession area (containing the "Goma Deposits" or "Initial Concession Area" of 24 000 ha and the "Non-Goma Deposits Area" or "Additional Concession Area" of 15 375 ha) is 62 000 ha, and it is signed over for 25 years with five years of exploration rights. According to the government, the concession area has 304 million metric tons of iron ore deposits with a high quality of 36.5%, of which the concessionaire has agreed to concentrate at least 64.5%–65% into iron ore fines, which have a higher added value. According to the agreement, the Liberian government's main goal for mining companies' operations is to benefit the regions in which minerals are developed, including facilitating growth centers and education for sustainable regional development, creating more employment opportunities, encouraging and developing local businesses, ensuring that skills, know-how, and technology are transferred to Liberians, and acquiring basic data

regarding and relating to the mining companies' operations. The deal with China Union is extensive and impacts the majority of Liberia's producing sectors. It includes the elements mentioned below. Royalties and surface rent must be paid to the government. Royalties account for 3.8% of the index price. Surface rent is paid over two time periods: \$100,000 per year for the first ten years and \$250,000 for the next fifteen years. A second financial component is a series of allocations such as a mineral development and research fund (one payment of \$50,000, then \$100,000 per year beginning with the first payment date) and general education support for scholarships worth \$200,000 per year. The first payment is \$20 million, which is due three days after the effective date, and the remaining \$20 million is due 120 days later. Environmental and social norms: an environmental impact assessment and environmental management plan strive to minimize the damage caused by an eventual plant closure while also ensuring that the mining area is returned to productive use. A social impact assessment and social assessment plan strive to mitigate any possible negative influence on local communities of mining plant and equipment installation and operation, if required by moving such populations. China Union will offer acceptable medical treatment for workers and their families, as well as community members, and will provide suitable accommodation for employees.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Liberia, the Chinese government has aided Liberia by funding and implementing the construction of the Barreke Sugar Mill, the Samuel Kanyon Doe Sports Complex (SKD) and its renovation project, the Liberia Broadcasting System (LBS) renovation project, the Tappita hospital (Jackson F. Doe Memorial Regional Referral Hospital), the Ministry of Health office building, three rural middle schools, and the agricultural technology demonstration project. Furthermore, the Chinese government has assisted the Liberian government with cars and thousands of tons of humanitarian rice assistance. Furthermore, the Chinese government has provided technical assistance in Liberia through projects such as the bamboo and rattan weaving and vegetable plantation technical cooperation project, the Liberia Broadcasting System technical cooperation project, the agriculture technical cooperation project, the SKD Sports Complex technical cooperation project, and the mineral resources prospecting technical cooperation project, training over 2500 Liberian youth in a variety of fields.

CHAPTER V

Conclusions

The new age of friendship between the two nations, China and Liberia, has continued to advance against all odds, and this is built upon an inclusive and open friendship through exchanges and mutual understanding, and partnerships are established based on conversation, shared interests, and non-confrontation. At this level, the leaders of both countries must be proactive rather than reactive; they must not wait for their counterparts in Beijing and other major capitals or for investors to recognize Liberia's needs and interests.

Chinese commerce with Liberia and aid and other forms of assistance that followed trade from China have significantly assisted in the growth of Liberia's economy, which is a direct result of the commercial ties that China and Liberia have established. This growth is a direct result of the commercial ties that China and Liberia have established. This is a direct consequence of the business relationships that have been built between China and Liberia. China and Liberia broke all links that had previously existed between them in the years leading up to the reopening of diplomatic relations between the two nations in 2003. This occurred in the years leading up to the resumption of diplomatic ties. This was because Liberia transferred its contacts between China and Taiwan, which caused China to cut, its bilateral relations with Liberia. The bilateral ties that had previously existed between China and Liberia suffered from the severing of those ties. The primary catalyst for the rapid change in Sino-Liberian relations has been the change from one government to another. Due to Chinese efforts in Liberia aimed at upholding and establishing peace, the status of relations between China and Liberia has generally improved from 2003 to the present. There is evidence that China is ready to help Liberia develop while maintaining positive bilateral relations. These objectives' significance to China has been established for both of them. China and Liberia have achieved tremendous strides in their trade relations, as seen by the volume of their commerce, which has grown quickly and now exceeds US\$425 million, a 75% increase from 2015. China is now seen by Liberia as one of its top trading partners and the largest foreign investor as a result of this process. Since the resumption of bilateral collaboration in 2003 and the ongoing process of peace-building in Liberia, the economic and commercial cooperation between China and Liberia has been increasing at an impressive rate. In

2012, the government of China provided duty-free treatment for 95% of Liberian exports to China. Ninety-seven percent of Liberia's exports to China were allowed to be exempt from paying any customs fees in 2015 thanks to a move by the Chinese government. The total value of China's exports to Liberia in 2019 was US\$3.91 billion, a growth of 99.6% from the previous year. The overall value of China's imports from Liberia, on the other hand, totaled US\$0.12 billion, a 39.4% rise from the previous year. The transmission of these statistics is carried out by the Chinese Customs General Administration. A total of \$4.03 billion US dollars were exchanged between China and Liberia in 2019, a 97% increase from the previous year. By utilizing its offer of duty-free treatment for 97% of Liberia's exports to China as well as various economic and trade promotion initiatives in China, such as the China International Import Expo (CIIE), the Canton Fair, and the China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo, China has been enticing all sectors of the country's economy to increase their exports to China. China's commitment to treat 97% of Liberia's exports duty-free has been a significant element in China's offer of duty-free treatment for 97% of Liberian exports to China has been one of the primary drivers behind China's encouragement of Liberia. Statistics from China's Ministry of Commerce indicate that the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) going from China to Liberia reached \$26.44 million in 2019. The value of China's newly signed project contracts in Liberia increased by 138.7% year-on-year to US\$300 million from January to December 2019, while the completed turnover increased by 123.5% year-on-year to US\$440 million. Both of these figures are in United States dollars. In recent years, Chinese corporations and investors have been significantly involved in Liberia's economy through a range of investment and trade activities. This engagement has taken the form of both direct investment and indirect commerce. These activities have had an influence on a broad number of companies, including those that are engaged in mining, the construction of infrastructure, pelagic fishing, forestry, industrial explosive services, telecommunications, logistics, and the sale of minor commodities. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Liberia, the Chinese government has financed and completed a number of construction and restoration projects in Liberia. These projects included both new construction and the renovation of older buildings. Included on this list are the Jackson F. Doe Memorial Regional Referral Hospital, also known as Tappita Hospital, the administrative building for the Ministry of Health, three rural middle schools, and an agricultural technology center. These are

just some of the projects that have been funded and carried out. In addition; the government of China has provided financial aid to the nation of Liberia. As part of its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance, the government of China has sent the government of Liberia with 1,000 tons of rice and automobiles as donations. In addition, the Chinese government has offered Liberia a variety of different types of technical assistance. A few examples of this type of project include the Technical Cooperation Project for the Liberia Broadcasting System, the Technical Cooperation Project for the SKD Sports Complex, the Technical Cooperation Project for the Prospecting of Mineral Resources, and the Technical Cooperation Project for Bamboo and Rattan Weaving as well as Vegetable Plantation. The whole of these activities were financially supported by the Chinese government. In addition, the Chinese government has educated approximately 2500 young Liberians in the disciplines of agriculture, broadcasting, agriculture, and natural resources prospecting. These young Liberians were sponsored by the Chinese government. Since the two nations' diplomatic relations were established, and especially when they were resumed in 2003, China has worked with Liberia pragmatic ally by upholding the ideals of sincerity, genuine results, kinship, and good faith while adhering to the correct approach to justice and interests. As a result, China's engagement with Liberia have had a number of noticeable results.

Both the Ministerial Complex and the two annexes to the Liberian Capitol Building, which were built with assistance from China, were completed in July 2018 and 2019, respectively. At the time, the Ministerial Complex was the second-biggest edifice on the African continent, while the African Union Headquarters building was the largest one. The handover and opening ceremonies for the Roberts International Airport Terminal Project, which were held in July 2018 and 2019, respectively, were attended by President Weah. The project had been completed by China. The new airport in Liberia has not only made it easier for countries to trade persons with one another, but it has also substantially strengthened Liberia's status as a gateway nation and sped up the general economic expansion of the country. The Chinese government is now carrying out, in a planned way, the building of projects that are being carried out with the aid of the Chinese government. The establishment of a national clinical diagnosis and treatment laboratory, the construction of two flyover bridges on Tubman Boulevard, the renovation and extension of the Liberia Broadcasting System (LBS), and the construction of the Somalia Drive-Sinkor road and bridge in Monrovia are

some of the projects that are included in this category. Other projects include the construction of the Liberia Broadcasting System (LBS). China has been responsible for the effective completion of a substantial number of new building projects for Liberia during the course of the country's history. These projects include the building of fifty bore wells in rural areas in the year 2018, the construction of the Monrovia Vocational Training Center in the year 2015, the construction of the Ebola Treatment Unit in the year 2015, the construction of the Tappita Hospital (Jackson F. Doe Memorial Regional Referral Hospital, 2011), the construction of the Bong County Agricultural Technology Demonstration Center in the year 2010, the construction of the University of Liberia Fendall Campus in the year 2010, and the construction (1978–2008). The Chinese government and the business sector have consecutively provided Liberia with six batches of anti-epidemic material help since the COVID-19 outbreak started. Numerous ventilators, oxygen generators, and other medical supplies have been provided as part of this aid. The Chinese government also sent medical supplies, equipment, and ambulances for a total of 20 million Chinese Yuan to the Liberian Armed Forces and the 14th Military Hospital. The Chinese government is also donating one million US dollars' worth of basic medical and nutritional services to Liberian women and children through UNICEF.

This year, in February, China and Liberia negotiated a new phase of the economic and technological cooperation accord that they had previously established. As a direct consequence of this, China will make a contribution to Liberia in the form of a grant in the amount of 150 million yuan, which is equivalent to 23 million dollars in terms of the US currency. This represents a rise of fifty percent in comparison to the phase before it.

China has been providing emergency food assistance to the Republic of Liberia at a pace of around 2,500 metric tons per year throughout the course of the previous three years. As a result of the epidemic, the China International Development Agency and the World Food Programme (WFP) have collaborated in order to purchase rice to the value of 2 million dollars US in order to distribute it to Liberian students and their families as a form of emergency food assistance.

A substantial amount of educational resources, anti-epidemic supplies, and basic necessities were recently donated by the Chinese government to the Clar Hope Foundation, which is managed by Her Excellency Clar Marie Weah, the First Lady of Liberia, as well as to the "Starfish Foundation" and Group 77, both of which are

managed by Her Excellency Dr. Jewel Howard-Taylor, Vice President of Liberia. As part of an aid project it calls the Technical Assistance Project, China has given six terms of instruction in bamboo and rattan weaving as well as vegetable growing to Liberian teenagers since 2007. More than 900 young people who are interested in technical careers, like growing vegetables and weaving with bamboo and rattan, have received training. About half of the market share is made up by weaving products and veggies planted by graduates.

The LBS project, which received Chinese financing, was launched in 2008 and has since undergone five rounds of technological collaboration. In five separate cities, including Monrovia, seven radio transmitting stations were successfully built as a result of the initiative. The result was that the majority of Liberia received the programs that were broadcast.

The technical cooperation projects between China and Liberia, which cover agricultural technology, SKD stadium maintenance, and resource surveys, have taught more than 2,500 young technical talent. Both of these nations have worked on these projects. In addition, China has deployed 14 separate teams of medical specialists to Liberia to help out. The Chinese medical personnel have provided a large amount of drugs and equipment in addition to helping with patient diagnosis and treatment.

To assist Liberia in developing its full potential in terms of human resources, the government of China awards around fifty full scholarships, hundreds of training seats, and a scholarship known as the "Chinese Ambassador's Scholarship" each year. The primary emphasis of the training is placed on agricultural topics such as hybrid rice, vegetable gardening, the management of fisheries, weaving with bamboo and rattan, and other related topics. Secondly, efforts are directed toward improving existing systems, such as transportation in rural areas, water conservation, urban building design, flood control, disaster prevention, information network management, and airport administration. These are all examples of areas where improvement is needed. The third area of concentration is healthcare, which includes things like prenatal care, treatment for malaria, and HIV/AIDS prevention. During the course of the last few years, there have been around 2,000 young Liberians who have taken part in training for relevant initiatives. This number includes over 200 students who have obtained masters and/or doctorate degrees while studying in China. The mining industry, forestry, fisheries, and other areas are among the most important ones in which Chinese companies have made investments in Liberia. These investments have

been a major contributor to the significant expansion of the Liberian economy, as well as to the creation of new jobs, the improvement of living conditions, and the stimulation of more economic activity.

Chinese businesses are responsible for the construction of the vast bulk of China's most critical physical infrastructure. This category includes endeavors such as the APMT Monrovia Phase II Expansion Project and the oil tank removal and rebuilding project for LEC in Liberia, both of which are examples of projects that come under this heading. The renovation and modernization of Roberts International Airport and the building of a whole new terminal building are two more examples. And other similar endeavors. When the China-Union Investment Bong Mines Company mining project started up in 2013, it made more than 400 new jobs available in the country of Liberia. The project is now getting ready to start working and producing, albeit it has been somewhat influenced by the ups and downs in iron ore prices as well as the Covid-19 epidemic. Chinese companies are striving hard to meet their social obligations at the same time. Examples of this include aggressively supplying COVID-19 anti-epidemic supplies, establishing neighborhood employee clinics, helping to build schools, and providing living goods to the neighborhood communities.

The fruitful outcomes of the collaboration between China and Liberia are readily apparent to the general public. China is prepared to collaborate with Liberia in order to actively implement the suggestions made by FOCAC, to promote the continuing expansion of friendly and mutually beneficial bilateral ties, and to make joint efforts to establish a community with a shared future. China is eager to make use of the upcoming FOCAC session as an opportunity to collaborate with Liberia on actively implementing the outcomes of the FOCAC on the basis of respect for each other's fundamental interests. China hopes that this opportunity will present itself during the upcoming FOCAC session. In lieu of this, the researcher will love to conclude that China- Liberia have had a mutual economic boost since the reestablishment of ties under the country's Interim Government headed by Charles Gydué Bryant and that mutual economic growth have extended under former president Sirleaf and it continues today. The researcher will love to state clearly that there are some imbalances in the relationship and trade ties with China, but China have help Liberia since the re-establishment of ties.

Recommendations

Against this backdrop, the research will love to recommend that:

To begin, the government of Liberia would have to devise a comprehensive plan in order to adequately strike a balance between its relations to China and those with the West. This would need the government to construct a comprehensive strategy. The Liberian government must also reach its maximum potential and create a long-term development strategy that is by the priorities of the populace.

That the establishment of a Liberian government coordination office in China should happen as soon as possible. China is present throughout the nation, although there is scant and fragmentary information available about its engagement and activities. This organization, which is simply a technical branch of an institution that already exists, should be in charge of reviewing and investigating any agreements, memoranda of understanding, and other contracts that have been formed between China and Liberia. The primary responsibility of the proposed organization would be to conduct an analysis of China's positive and negative effects on Liberia's political and economic climate. During the course of its operations, the technical institution that was proposed need to have taken into account the accessibility of regional resources like the talents that were already in existence. It also should have made sure that the domestic content of the concession agreements was adequate to the fullest degree feasible not only for the goal of providing Liberians with job opportunities but also for the purpose of strengthening their technical competence.

Thirdly, the government of Liberia must assess any concession contracts it has with China to ensure that its citizens are receiving adequate benefits from the Mineral Development Agreement (MDA) and that it would be advantageous to them in the long run.

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Appendices
Appendix A
Turnitin Similarity Report

Tommy Otis Pritchard-China's Economic Impact On Africa: A
 Look At Liberia As A Case Study From 2003- 2016

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Appendix B

Ethics Committee Approval



NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

01.02.2023

Dear Tommy Otis PRITCHARD

Your project “CHINA’S ECONOMIC IMPACT ON AFRICA: A LOOK AT LIBERIA AS A CASE STUDY FROM 2003- 2016” has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın KIRAZ

The Coordinator of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee