NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE ETHNICITY ON DEVELOPMENT IN SIERRA LEONE 2007-2021

M.A. THESIS

Julius T. JAESEN II

Nicosia

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Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Julius T. Jaesen II titled "**An Examination of The Impact of Negative Ethnicity on Development in Sierra Leone 2007-2021**" and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

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Julius T. Jaesen II

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Julius T. Jaesen II

Abstract

An Examination of The Impact of Negative Ethnicity
On Development in Sierra Leone 2007-2021

Jaesen II, Julius T.
MA, Department of International Relations
Supervised by Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sait Akşit
January 2023, 125 pages

The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of negative ethnicity on development in Sierra Leone from 2007 to 2022. There are plethora of reports evidencing that in Sierra Leone, citizens themselves will go at every length to even prevent a sitting government in power from carrying development in regions or provinces that are dominated by ethnic groups that didn't elect the president in power in the election. Also, regional and tribal groups where a government doesn't draw strong support from are always marginalised for the years an elected government may stay in power.

The research design used by the researcher in this study is qualitative research method. The researcher gathered primary data from participants using semi-structured interviews and focused group discussion that were held in Sierra Leone. The findings of this study revealed that the West African nation of Sierra Leone is heavily split on tribal and regional divides to the extent when a government comes to power it represents only the region and tribes that it gets significant votes from during elections.

Keywords: Development, negative ethnicity, Sierra Leone, tribalism, discrimination

Özet

Etnik Kökene Dayalı Farklılıkların
Sierra Leone'de Kalkınma Üzerine Etkisi 2007-2021

Jaesen II, Julius T.
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Sait Akşit
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Bu tezin amacı, negatif etnisitenin 2007'den 2022'ye kadar Sierra Leone'deki kalkınma üzerindeki etkisini incelemektir. Sierra Leone'de hükümetlerin seçim süreçlerinde güçlü destek alamadıkları bölge ve vilayetlerdeki kalkınma süreçlerine destek vermediklerini ortaya koyan birçok rapor mevcuttur. Hatta raporlar, vatandaşların kendilerinin, iktidardaki hükümeti seçmemiş etnik grupların egemen olduğu bölge veya illerdeki kalkınmayı engellemek için her şeyi yapacaklarını ortaya koymaktadır. Ayrıca, bir hükümetin güçlü destek almadığı bölgesel ve aşiret grupları, seçilmiş bir hükümetin iktidarda kalabileceği yıllar boyunca marjinalleştirilme riski altındadır.

Araştırmacının bu çalışmada kullandığı araştırma deseni vaka çalışması olarak Sierra Leone'nin kullanıldığı nitel araştırma yöntemidir. Araştırmacı, katılımcılardan birincil verileri, Sierra Leone'de gerçekleştirilen yarı yapılandırılmış görüşmeleri ve odaklanmış grup tartışmasını kullanarak toplamıştır. Bu çalışmanın bulguları, Batı Afrika ülkesi Sierra Leone'nin, bir hükümet iktidara geldiğinde yalnızca seçimler sırasında önemli oylar aldığı bölgeyi ve kabileleri temsil ettiği ölçüde, kabile ve bölgesel bölünmeler konusunda büyük ölçüde ayrışmış olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalkınma, negatif etnisite, Sierra Leone, kabilecilik, ayrışma

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List of Abbreviations

APC	All People Congress
C4C	Coalition for Change
COI	Commission of Inquiry
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
NGC	National Grand Coalition
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exploring Countries
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLAJ	Sierra Leone Association of Journalists
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UN	United Nations
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Sierra Leone is a country located on the Southwest coast of West Africa – bordering Liberia on the Southeast, and Guinea on the North. Pedro De Cintra, a Portuguese traveller, sailed on the coast of Sierra Leone in 1460 and named the country Sierra Leone – meaning "Lion Mountains due to its beautiful mountains (Kaifala & Kaifala, 2017). The country has 15 ethnic groups – namely Temne, Mende, Limba, Loko, Fula, Mandingo, Creole (Krio), Sherbro, Kuranko, Kono, Susu, Kissi, Yalunka, Vai and the Kru. The Temnes are the dominant tribe which is largely found in the Northern region of Sierra Leone and areas in the capital Freetown accounting for 35.5% of the country's population according the 2015 census. The Temne tribe is followed by the Mende that can be found in the Southeast comprising of 31.2% of the population (Sibthorpe, 1970).

Like most of the countries in Sub Saharan Africa, Sierra Leone has tasted its fair share of imperialism and colonialism. When Western powers convened the Berlin Conference in 1885, with the intent of dividing Africa, Sierra Leone was one of the countries on the African shores that was colonised by the British. The British, no doubt, meted ill-treatment and humiliation against the Sierra Leoneans which prompted the rise of independence movements led by Dr. Sir. Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone People Party agitating against the British (Harris, 2014). No later, on April 27, 1961, the British were massively defeated, and the country gained its sovereignty (Harris, 2014). But since Sierra Leone gained its independence on April 27, 1961, and later became a full republic in 1971 with the election of Siaka Probyn Stevens as its first President, there has been heightened ethnic bigotry and deep regional division that has characterised the country's politics and development which impeded political development considerably over the last 5 decades (Kromah, 2010).

Post-independence, Sierra Leone has had two major political parties that are heavily owned as heritance and personal properties of ethnic groups and regions which seek to represent their shared interests and values in elections. For example, the All People's Congress (ALP) is a party that is largely made up, owned and supported in every election by the Temne, Limba, Loko, Kuranko, Susu and Mandingo who are found in the Northern region of the country. Similarly, the Sierra

Leone People Party that is currently in power is predominantly made up of, owned and supported by the Mende, Sherbro, Kono, Vai and Kissi all of whom can be found in the Southeast of Sierra Leone (Bangura, 2018).

These tribes heavily divided on party's lines, owed their unmatched and undying love or loyalty to their political parties that represent their ethnic interests and values than to their supreme interest of the country Sierra Leone. When their parties ascend to power, whether the government of their choice drives development and deliver basic social services or on its policy promises, it matters very little to the voters that voted the government to power from particular tribes.

Also disgustingly shameful, the tribes whose party didn't win in an election become the opposition to the government and wouldn't see any good in the government in power. For such party in opposition, whether the government is performing on its policy promises it campaigned on or not, their responsibility is to just remain opposed to the government in power. Sometimes, these parties owned by tribes often go to the length of preventing the government or party in power from driving infrastructure and other developments in their regions, towns, villages, political or administrative districts and provinces. They would prefer their own party to come to power and develop their regions other than their rival party. On the other front, when a given political party ascends to power since it is perceived to be owned as an inheritance or personal property of particular ethnic groups, the configuration of their cabinet can be largely made up of over 95% of the people from their ethnic groups – marginalising the rest of the other tribes that are from regions that do not support the election of that party to come to power. Also, the deep ethnic division and heightened regional bigotry is manifested in the way a particular government delivers basic social services and goods in each region of the country. Most often, the government in power drives more developments to the region they got significant votes from or that is considered as the strongholds of their party reflecting the regions of their ethnic groups and denies other regions or provinces of the country from a taste of development. This has been the trend of politics in Sierra Leone which for more than 4 decades that has forestalled development or progress in the country and to some extent, contributed to the country's 11 years of civil unrest (Basu, 2008).

Statement of the Problem

The divisive and marginalised trend of politics and governance deeply rooted in ethnicity and regional bigotry which has for more than five decades impeded progress and development in the West African region of Sierra Leone started with the election of the country's first elected President, Siaka Probyn Stevens in 1971. When erstwhile President Stevens rose to the helm of power as Prime Minister in 1963 and later President in 1971, it was the daring expectation of many Sierra Leoneans that he would've united the country, yoking the various ethnic groups and promote multi-party politics after campaigning on what later turned out to be a populist rhetoric of bringing the different tribal groups together to build the country under socialist values and philosophies (Kup, 1961). But sadly regrettable, former President Siaka Probyn Stevens led the country into a decadent, moribund and corrupt one-party state. Under the All People's Congress rule of President Stevens, ethnic division, corruption, poverty and hopelessness were pervasive counterproductive to what the citizens who struggled for independence from the British expected (Zack-Williams, 1993).

The All People's Congress of Siaka Stevens that was largely perceived as a party that represents the values and interests of the Temnes, Limba, Loko and other minority ethnic groups in the north, barred the Sierra Leone's People Party that is perceived as a party of the Mendes, Sherbros and other minority tribes in the south and eastern regions of the country immediately when Siaka Probyn Stevens declared the country a one-party state in 1978. The move by President Stevens to declare Sierra Leone a one-party state triggered and instigated rage and fury from the Mende ethnic group in the south (Lake & Rotchild, 1998).

Foday Sankoh, the leader of Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group then sponsored by jailed Liberia's ex-president Charles Taylor, who was a Temne belonging to the Temne tribe that was in power, exploited the situation from the start and used the ban of Sierra Leone's People Party that belongs to the Mende and lunched a revolution that toppled Siaka Stevens' one-party hegemonic rule in 1992 (Lake & Rotchild, 1998). Today, that deeply rooted division based on ethnicity sowed by the country's founding fathers and its first president, Siaka Problyn Stevens, has polarised the country causing citizens to owe their loyalty to parties coming from their regions other than seeing the country as their common dominator or patrimony.

Objectives of the study

The objectives of the study are as follow:

1. To examine the impact of ethnicity on development in Sierra Leone.

2. To investigate whether ethnicity represented an obstacle to Sierra Leone's development.

3. To establish whether ethnicity influences governmental appointments, development, policies, contracts, and projects.

4. To investigate whether Sierra Leoneans owed loyalty to political parties that represent their ethnic values and interests than their country.

Research Questions

1. What is the impact of ethnicity on Sierra Leone's development?

2. Does ethnicity represent an obstacle to Sierra Leone's development?

3. Are governmental appointments, development, policies, contracts and projects influenced by ethnicity?

4. Do Sierra Leoneans owe more loyalty to their political parties that represent their ethnic values and interests than their country?

Hypotheses

1. Ethnicity has detrimental impact on development.

2. Ethnicity influences governmental appointments, developments, policies, contracts and programs.

Significance of the Study

Scholars and politicians may get a better grasp of how negative ethnicity and regional prejudice impede political and economic growth in Sierra Leone by using a framework and making practical solutions to solve the issues.

Using Sierra Leone as a case study, the researcher wants to provide light on the nature and impact of ethnicity on development for a wide range of stakeholders, including local policymakers, foreign organizations, and individuals. This research is particularly important since it provides ways to mitigate the harmful effects of ethnicity on development.

Limitations of the Study

This study on the impact of ethnicity on development is limited to Sierra Leone, a country situated on the west course of Africa. It cannot be gainsaid that the conclusions in this research cannot be used to generalise the situation of ethnicity in other countries. This study emphases two primary variables. These variables are independent variable and dependent variable. The independent variable inn this study is ethnicity whilst the dependent variable is development.

Also, the time allotted to complete this research severely restricted the researcher's ability to cover a wide range of issues. Lastly, financial constraints to some extend will limit certain aspect of the research.

Methodology

For this study, two main variables will be adopted, which comprises of ethnicity (as the independent variable) and development, which serves as the dependent variable of the study.

Research Design

This research used a qualitative, exploratory approach. The research used semi-structured interview and focused group discussion. This is because it encourages open discussion of participants' experiences and the meanings they attribute to those experiences (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey, 2020). In-depth exploration of the experiences of the participants is made possible by this kind of qualitative design, making it a good fit for gathering first-hand accounts. As a result, this method gave people a voice to talk about the economic and social conditions they've faced. This helped the researcher grasp how people of different ethnic backgrounds conceptualize their respective socioeconomic situations. As the residents of Sierra Leone's northern area have been exposed to development issues, marginalization, and social exclusion under the previous administration, this strategy might be considered as providing a voice to the voiceless. A data collection schedule was employed to conduct in-depth interviews and a focus group. Each interview was recorded and afterwards transcribed. To add, this is a case study method. As was previously said, Sierra Leone is suffering a few development issues. The researcher used a case study technique to investigate these challenges, focusing on the varying socioeconomic realities of Sierra Leone's ethnic groups. However, the study's results

may shed light on the predicament of residents in other, comparable areas in Sierra Leone and abroad, even if the research only included a subset of the country's provinces.

Sampling & Sample

Research in this study used a purposive non-probabilistic sampling technique. The researcher used this method because the researcher's judgment of who has the necessary expertise is the only basis for this kind of non-probability sampling. The study's sample was carefully selected to mirror the demographics of the whole population. The study's aim was to identify ethnically distinct regions of Sierra Leone that have unique difficulties in terms of economic growth and infrastructure development.

The study's primary focus was on the ways in which citizens and other political actors and politicians in the nation discuss these issues considering their own socioeconomic contexts. The participants that took part voluntarily in this research came from Sierra Leone. The researcher randomly selected study participants from members of political parties, members of Sierra Leone's parliament, appointed cabinet officials and other junior officials of government, members of the judicial, members of the Sierra Leone media, civil society activists and university students. The researcher held in-depth interviews with 15 participants and held focused group discussions with 5 study participants.

Data Collection Procedures

The study's data was gleaned via interviews with groups of people and one-on-one interviews with each participant. The researcher encouraged participants to share their experiences in both the individual interviews and the focused group discussions. The interviews were conducted utilizing predetermined interview schedules with questions. In addition, a tape recorder was utilized to make sure all the information was recorded correctly.

During the data gathering, the first set of participants was 12 persons who partook in a focused group discussion on the impact of negative ethnicity on development in Sierra Leone. The second set of participants was 8 persons who the researcher held face-to-face interviews with individually on the topic of this research project. The first set of participants consisted of 2 representatives who were selected

from the student community - with 1 student's representative hailing from the South-eastern part of the country and the other 1 student hailing from the North-western region of Sierra Leone. The research did so for the student community to reflect geographical balance.

Still with the focused group discussion, two of the participants were representatives of the media community who were recommended to partake in the study through the Sierra Leone Journalists Association, an umbrella institution that covers all journalists in the country. The researcher selected 5 participants from the major political parties who partook in the focused group discussion. Of the 5 persons representing their political parties, 2 respondents were taken from the ruling Sierra Leone's People Party, 2 participants were taken from the main opposition All People's Congress and 1 participant from the National Grand Coalition. Lastly, the researcher selected 3 participants who are paramount chiefs from three of Sierra Leone's provinces to conclude the focused group discussion.

For the face-to-face individual interviews, the 8 participants who were selected included two representatives from prominent and reputed civil society organisations in Sierra Leone, 2 top-notch business leaders in Sierra Leone, 2 members of the Sierra Leone's parliament, 1 representative of the judiciary and 1 member of the cabinet. These participants, the researcher believes have solid understanding and expertise in Sierra Leone's democracy and the underlying factors that impede the country's development. Of the total of 20 participants who voluntarily took part in the study, 14 were males and 6 were females.

Data Analysis Procedures

The data was analysed using a modified version of the Tesch formula (1990). The researcher followed a series of steps to guide the analysis, including reading through one transcript for meaning, labelling the meanings of the text in the margins of the transcript (for all the transcriptions), classifying and grouping labels into themes and categories, returning to the main themes and categories to ensure that the themes reflected the main objectives of the study, checking the categories to ensure that they were mutually exclusive, and developing a thematic framework. The researcher then cited the authors included in the literature review to back up the respondents' actual words when describing the results. The researcher also used

rigorous scrutiny when making connections between the actual quotations and the studies that were pertinent to them.

Ethical Considerations

Human participant protection is crucial in all research projects. Ethical considerations are critical throughout my research. Thus, this study's design and techniques was informed by: Honesty, protection of integrity, voluntary participation, confidentiality, anonymity, and informed consent.

Definition of Key Terms

Development: is a rise in real per capita income, better living conditions for individuals, a decrease in poverty, illiteracy, and crime rates, etc. are all examples of development.

Ethnicity: is "the social group a person belongs to, identifies with, or is recognized by others as a consequence of cultural and other elements like language, food, religion, lineage, and physical attributes typically associated with race" (Juby & Concepción, 2005)

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is structured into five distinct chapters. Chapter one includes the background of the study, statement problem, study's significance, scope, method and research design, and delimitations in addition to its research questions, hypotheses and aims. In Chapter 2, a framework for the literature review is presented. Chapter 3 covers highlights politics, ethnicity and its impact on development in Sierrav Leone.

Data presentation, analysis, conclusions, and findings are the emphasis of Chapter 4 of this study. Finally, the summary, conclusion, and suggestions are presented in chapter five.

CHAPTER II
Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

This literature review and conceptual framework sheds light on previous studies conducted by other researchers on the impact of ethnicity on development. It summarises a list of studies on the topic and the theoretical and conceptual perspectives on development and negative ethnicity. It then provides a brief overview of the researcher's theoretical perspective for this study.

Literature and Theoretical Review

There is a lot of room for interpretation when it comes to the word "ethnicity." Since its debut as a prominent form of collective identity in the 1960s, it has been utilized by a broad range of people for a vast variety of purposes. This has been the case ever since its inception. The confusion of religion and ethnicity (such as when people assume Muslims are an ethnic category), the simplification of complex geostrategic and historical conflicts by labelling them "ethnic strife," and political mobilization based on the necessity of ethnic homogeneity to justify the expulsion of populations of different racial backgrounds are all factors (Fenton, 1999).

Considerations of geopolitics have had a significant impact on ethnicity theory in the past, and they are expected to continue doing so in the future. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, new identities as well as new forms of social and political organization have emerged. Conflicts between various religious groups are taking place in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The rise to power of the so-called Islamic State has done nothing more than stoke the flames of anti-Arab (and anti-Islamic) prejudice that was already there. Significant-scale refugee flows in West Asia, the Middle East, and Europe have brought together in extremely close quarters many people from a variety of racial, ethnic, and religious origins. Right-wing political parties have had a rebirth in both Europe and North America, with followers rallying around bogus assertions of common histories and ethnic identities that serve to condemn people from other countries (Pohl, 2020).

A contentious debate on the topic of ethnicity is also taking place inside the academic community right now. The decade of the 1960s concluded with the publication of two key publications, both of which raised significant concerns about

the preeminent academic paradigm around the subject of ethnicity. Because of this, a considerable body of thinking emerged, which was not only complicated but also rife with debates (Esteban, 2021). There are several arguments against ethnicity, as well as numerous theoretical viewpoints, which are used to frame and punctuate the relevant literature. Postmodern critiques have given rise to novel concepts that will play a significant role in the development of ethnicity studies in the years to come. Among these insights, the growing importance of intersectionality stands out as one of the most crucial (Esteban, 2021).

In the study of ethnicity, there are essentially four different theoretical pillars that are employed. Primordialism, Instrumentalism, Materialism, and Constructivism Are the Four Major Schools of Thought There Are Four Major Schools of Thought, Primordialism, Instrumentalism, Materialism, and Constructivism Over the course of their development, several social science theories, including cultural evolutionism, structural functionalism, conflict theory, and postmodernism, have all had a role in influencing these research approaches (Yang, 2000). There are many noteworthy discussions that can be found throughout these four different types of literary works, and they all have something in common with one another. Some examples include how to consider the social and psychological aspects of ethnicity, as well as the cultural "content" of ethnic identity. Other examples include:

Ethnicity from the Prism of Primordialists

As a broad concept, "primordialism" refers to the view that countries have always been and that national identity is as "natural" to humans as the ability to speak, see, or smell. This is the perspective held by nationalists, and it was for a time the standard model among social scientists and historians. The popular conception of countries and nationalism may also be seen as a kind of primitivism (Shils, 1995).

This word is derived from the adjective "primordial," which the OED defines as "of, belonging to, or existent from the very beginning of time; earliest in time; primeval, primal; (more broadly) old, remote in time" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008).

Edward Shils is widely acknowledged as the first person to use the word "family" to characterize interactions between members of a nuclear family. Shils argues in his seminal work "Primordial, Personal, Sacred, and Civil Ties" that the 'primordial' elements of family members' attachment to one other are the significant

relational' traits that bind them together. This is not only the result of social contact; rather, "it is because a certain unfathomable importance is attached to the connection of blood." (1957: 142).

Shils acknowledges the impact of various works in the sociology of religion, including A. D. Nock's Conversion and Martin P. Nilsson's Greek Popular Religion, on his understanding of primal ties. It was in these works, he says, that "the coerciveness of the primal features of an item, the bonds of blood and of shared land, were very powerfully shown".

When discussing the social and political stability of postcolonial governments, Clifford Geertz used a similar definition: Primordial attachments are those that are based on the "givens" — or, more accurately, the assumed "givens," as culture is inextricably involved in such matters — of social existence, such as proximity and blood relations, but also on the givenness that comes from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and adhering to particular social practices. These shared characteristics (such as ancestry, language, culture, etc.) are often seen as possessing an innate and even undeniable persuasive power (1993: 259).

Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz, to whose notions of the "primordial" we have referenced to, are often considered to be the intellectual forefathers of the culturalist approach. Eller and Coughlan, in their widely cited 1993 paper "The Poverty of Primordialism," suggest that the term of primordialism employed in these authors' works consists of three basic ideas:

One's first sense of self or the bonds one forms with other primal beings are 'given,' a priori, underived, and exist independently of all experience and contact.... In contrast to their societal counterparts, primal bonds are more akin to the natural or spiritual. Early bonds are not based on any kind of community.

The 'ineffable', omnipotent, and compelling nature of primal emotions... Being a part of a community inevitably results in developing strong feelings of loyalty to the norms and customs upheld by that community's members.

Third, when it comes down to it, primitivism is an issue of feelings and reactions... Primordial identities are fundamentally distinct from other types of identities, and these sentiments elevate primordialism above the status of a conventional interest theory. (1993: 187).

Even still, Eller and Coughlan continue to contend that this is how Shils and Geertz see ethnic and national relations. This is a complete misinterpretation of these authors' writings, as has been pointed out by several observers. In fact, Geertz, for instance, argues that the objects of primal attachments include things like shared ancestry, language, religion, and social customs. But he never implies that the things are given or primal in and of themselves; rather, he says that people only presume that they are.

Primordial relationships were not seen as purely emotional by either Geertz or Shils. Nor did they think of the items as having any inherent primacy; rather, it was the thoughts and feelings that were triggered by them that were primal. This is the lexicon of people's subjective realities, thoughts, and feelings. Many of us believe in primordial things, and we can feel their force, and Geertz is emphasizing this belief and feeling. He is not claiming that the universe is created by objective primordial reality.

Primitive ways of thinking have several drawbacks. To prevent compiling a full list, the research presented here focuses mostly on broad, overarching objections of primordialism rather than detailed, version-specific allegations. The nature of ethnic and national relationships, the origins of ethnic and national bonds, the time of the birth of countries, and the topic of emotion and affect all relate to these four intertwined facets of foundational explanations. The issues and the critiques are intertwined for good reason.

Primordialists, in contrast to culturalists, have a similar attitude toward ethnic and national identities: they are 'given' or accepted without question. They are fixed because they are passed down from one generation to the next without any modification to their "essential" traits. These categories are not static; rather, they undergo constant negotiation and redefinition from one generation to the next as different groups respond to new situations (Shils, 1995).

This is the major argument advanced against primordialism by instrumentalists. Brass, one of the most vocal proponents of instrumentalism, claims that people's first emotional ties to their communities may change over time. Consider the topic of language; in today's multilingual cultures, it is not uncommon for individuals to speak more than one language, dialect, or code, and many of the world's illiterate are not particularly invested in or even familiar with their own languages. To give their children a leg up in life or to further distinguish themselves

from people of other backgrounds, members of certain ethnic groups choose to learn a new language (Brass, 2000).

Lastly, many individuals never give their language any conscious thought or give it any emotional value. Over the years, religious practices and beliefs have also seen many changes. Religious reformers are frequent in premodern, modernizing, and post-industrial countries, and their influence often leads to changes in religious practices. While it's true that some people place a premium on having a strong connection to their birthplace, Brass points out that many others have voluntarily uprooted themselves from their hometowns, and a sizeable percentage of them have opted to assimilate into their new society, losing any ties to their former home.

Furthermore, unless there is some degree of perceived discrimination against the area or its people in the wider community, an individual's devotion to her territory or country seldom becomes politically relevant. Since an area may be defined in several ways, even the fact that someone was born in a certain location is debatable. Brass argues that 'the spectrum of actual familial ties is frequently too modest to be of political relevance' when it comes to social and political influence. Some 'fictive' kinship systems may increase the number of distinct ethnic groupings, but the very fact that they are fictive presupposes that they are very malleable. What's more, the 'imagined' nature of the connection will be preeminent in such fictive relationships, hence their meaning will differ from person to person (Brass, 2000).

Smith, another ethnosymbolist, makes the same argument, arguing that "ethnic relationships like other social bonds are susceptible to economic, social, and political pressures and hence vary and alter according to circumstances." Because of factors including intermarriage, migration, foreign invasion, and the importation of labor, it is very improbable that many ethnic groupings have maintained "the cultural homogeneity and pure "essence" stated by most primordialists."

Van den Berghe refutes this critique in a subsequent article, laying the blame on "social constructionists" for passing judgment on primordialist techniques without first gaining a thorough grasp of them. Even while he acknowledges a biological basis for racial and national bonds, he argues that this does not make them unchangeable. This contradicts evolutionary thought.

A shift in exogamy or endogamy patterns over three or four generations may drastically change ethnic borders, if not generate wholly new ones. "Ethnicity is both

innate and socially produced," to put it simply. Van den Berghe sees ethnic groupings as "extended kin groups" in his sociobiological theory of ethnicity, although he never explains how this is possible.

Horowitz argues that the primativists' influence on our understanding of nationalism has grown to the point where anyone who wants to argue about the malleability of identities or the wisdom of pursuing a conflict can have half the argument made by citing the allegedly contrary view of unnamed, benighted primordialists. Considering how evocative the label is, it's possible that the primordialists aren't read as often as they once were.

Primordialism is "a long-dead horse that authors on ethnicity and nationalism continue to flog," he said, repeating Brubaker's 1996 statement. According to Brubaker, "no serious academic today shares the position that is usually given to primordialists in straw-man settings," which is the belief that "nations or ethnic groupings are primordial, unchanging entities". These statements turned out to be a little hasty in light of the subsequent primatism comeback. Research papers that revived the primordialist endeavour and offered a cleaned-up version of it as an alternative to modernist explanations have proliferated in the recent decade.

For Grosby, our earliest records provide "proof of people building big, territorially different civilizations". Grosby suggests they could be, citing several causes for the emergence of countries (defined by him as "a community of kinship, namely a confined, territorially broad, temporally deep community of kinship") prior to the modern period.

Nairn's long-term theoretical and political involvement with questions of nationalism is reflected in his book The Break-up of Britain (1981), which grew out of a series of pieces published mostly in the New Left Review. Some called it a nationalist manifesto (Davidson, 1999), while others called it "an epitaph for Marxism" (Cocks, 1997). Gellner interprets this conundrum in his own unusually amusing way; he agrees with Nairn that his theory is mostly right, but he can't see how Nairn could think his theory is consistent with Marxism.

In The Break-up of Britain, Nairn claims that he is not attempting to establish a theory of nationalism but rather to provide "the scantiest framework" of what such a theory would look like. At the outset, he says, "the ideology of nationalism symbolizes Marxism's profound historical failure". It was inevitable that this would fail, as is evident in both theory and political experience. It wasn't even something

just Marxists experienced; no one had a good theory of nationalism back then since it wasn't the right moment. On the other hand, Nairn contends that a materialist interpretation of nationalism is possible. The theorist's principal responsibility is to identify a suitable theoretical context for assessing nationalism. Nairn argues that the historical process from the end of the eighteenth century is where one should look for the origins of nationalism, rather than the internal dynamics of civilizations. World history is therefore the only viable framework for explanation. To put it another way, "nationalism in this sense is defined by specific elements of the international political economy, in the period between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present day". The 'dependence school,' notably the work of André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, and Immanuel Wallerstein on the global capitalist exploitation system, clearly influenced Nairn's thinking here (Zubaida 2000).

It was high time a Marxist theory of nationalism was developed. To become an "authentic world theory," one that considers the globalization of society as a whole, Marxism has to shed its Enlightenment roots. Marxism's Eurocentricity was on full show in the 'enigma of nationalism. To understand and overcome these theoretical barriers, however, practical successes had to be achieved first. In that regard, the happenings of the 1960s and 1970s were essential, since they allowed Marxism to face its own shortcomings. When Western Philosophy was ultimately defeated, it became feasible "to sort apart the durable — the "scientific," or as I choose to put it above "historical materialism" — from the ideology, the grain from the husks." Nairn's primary points, as presented in The Break-up of Britain, were as follows. Later in life, Nairn changed his mind and became considerably more receptive to primordialist ideas. Some analysts claim that he underwent a 'metamorphosis' in his views on the national question between the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Nairn is not at all subtle about his abrupt change of heart. In the preface to his 2005 book The Global Matrix (with Paul James), Tom Nairn remarked, "Formerly a left half-back (reserves) with Team Modern's one-world economania, Tom Nairn switched sides in the 1990s and hesitantly joined the neo-primordialists, at least for the after-match conversations." The "new" Nairn believes that "the remaking which figures in contemporary nationalism is not creation ex nihilo," but rather a reformulation constrained by a predetermined past.

Michael Hechter's Internal Colonialism

The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 was a seminal work in the 1970s burgeoning literature on nationalism (1975). The significance of Hechter's book lies in two areas. The term "internal colonialism" was first used in this book, which had hitherto been used only in the context of international relations. Russian populists first used this term to condemn the exploitation of peasants by urban elites; Gramsci and Lenin subsequently used it to highlight the continued economic underdevelopment of specific areas in Italy and Russia. Internal colonialism, in this context, refers to the uneven allocation of resources inside a country because of either the free play of market forces or the economic policies of the central government, with either deliberate or unexpected distributional effects for the various areas. However, since the 1960s, the word has been referred to areas that are both economically depressed and culturally separate from the rest of the host state. That's according to (Hechter 2020). Secondly, Hechter consistently used quantitative data and multivariate statistical analysis to back up his theory, which is something few of his predecessors did. Hechter, writing in the 1999 introduction to the book revised and expanded second edition, suggests that its underlying message is that "the finest radical social philosophy has analytical rigor and needs to be submitted to severe empirical testing".

Hechter began with the racially charged and assimilation-related issues that have plagued American politics since the 1960s. According to the academic literature on intergroup interactions, there are two main schools of thought on how to address these issues: assimilationism and nationalism. Hechter points out that many scholars backed the assimilationist view back then. In a nutshell, assimilationists believed that the impoverished and dissatisfied state of members of ethnic/racial minorities was due to their separation from the dominant culture, and that the dysfunctional norms and values of ghetto groups should be mainstreamed. This suggested that the issues of maladjustment and the so-called "culture of poverty" would end if governments invested the required resources to educate and socialize the children living in the ghettos (Hechter, 2021).

When it comes to the literature on nationalism, Paul R. Brass is most well-known for his emphasis on the "instrumental" aspect of ethnicity and nationalism. As a broad theory, instrumentalism seeks to account for nationalism's inception and continued support in terms of the interests it is said to serve. According to this point

of view, contending elites may use ethnic and national identities to rally the masses in their quest for riches, power, and status throughout the world (O'Leary, 2001). They claim that ethnic and national affiliations are constantly redefined and recreated in reaction to changing situations and the manipulations of political elites, in striking contrast to primordialists who see ethnicity as a 'given' of the human condition.

The social sciences have devoted a significant amount of research and attention to the study of ethnic groups, ethnicity, and ethnic conflict. All these studies have a propensity to approach the topic of ethnicity from either a pimordialist or an instrumentalist perspective. The research investigated the ways in which these concepts connect to ethnicity and place them within the context of the development of Primordialism's socio-political framework. From the perspective of essentialism, social life is dependent on the presence of ethnic groups (Pieterse, 1997). To put it another way, being of a particular ethnicity denotes not only sharing a common geological location and familial ties, but also being the product of a shared linguistic and cultural ancestry. In other words, being of a certain ethnicity means having a common geographical location and familial ties. Because of this, Fearon and Laitin (2000) look at cultural features and shared historical mythology as predictors of ethnic identity. This may help explain why they did this. People who dwell in this area believe that they have a common ancestry or a predetermined future. Primordialists, according to Smaje (1997), see ethnicity as a principle of social structure, as a strong and enduring component of the human condition that evinces meanings that reach beyond the immediate social context. Primordialists view this as a fundamental aspect of the human situation. To put it another way, one may consider the behaviour of an ethnic group to be an aim in and of itself, the result of an affective arousal or an emotional desire (Kataria, 2018). Primitivists refer to emotional and instinctive restrictions as the ultimate and distinctive basis for collective mobilization.

Ethnic groupings are often referred to be "purposeful communities," because of they are not only "formed at random but also fostered for pragmatic value" (Kataria, 2018). It is easy to question why people continue to support ethnic leaders whose aims seem to fit the interests of the elites rather than the interests of the masses of people. Horowitz (1985) says that we may think of ethnic groups as "super families." Ethnicity represents, at its most fundamental level, the undeniable triumph of community over tribalism. It is possible that the cohesion and togetherness of the

public play a part in the reason why they support their leader with such vigour. The Yoruba proverb "omo wa ni e je o see" (he is our son we must support him), which is a primordialistic claim, argues that the acts of an individual are immaterial so long as they are regarded to be part of the community. People are more inclined to band together in times of crisis when this attitude is prevalent, such as when the group (community) is denied access to its socio-political resources. In this debate, the primativist's unflinching faith in the importance of a person's race to their mental health is at risk of being disproved. Because of this, it is essential to have a good understanding of the historical and cultural context of the claim that contemporary society is more than simply a loose network of institutions held together by political agreements and contracts. Instead, the gang has been able to stay together because to the members' unwavering commitment to one another and their consistency in supporting the cause. Depending on the circumstances, this feeling of community and loyalty may either be very strong or very weak. The conclusion is that "high in some, whereas it may be moderate or low in others" (Shills, 2018). According to Linz (2020), primitivists are interested in identifying the socio-psychological underpinnings of racial disparities to better understand them. Primordialism generally provides a basis for a people's ethnic consciousness since its followers are required to have a profound feeling of emotional connection and ethnic solidarity with one another. This makes primitivism a good way to build a foundation. Primordialists are of the opinion that steadfast commitment to one's own ethnic group and the goals of that group is necessary. On the other hand, this differs not just from person to person but also from community to community and time period to time period. All of this, however, indicates why more primal feelings need not to be dismissed in the development of national politics. For example, during the reorganization that produced the current political entities in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Nigeria, primordial attachment was shown to be a favourable factor for the disintegration of previously independent political units. This was the case during the process that produced the political entities that are in place today. The fact that people can build and tear down the social, political, and economic realities around them—hence the comfort and sense of belonging that stem from ethnic group identity—brings to light the important role that primordial attachment plays in the development of socio-political and economic institutions in states that are ethnically divided. The features that make up a person's primary identity, whether they are

inherent or acquired through time, are what differentiate that individual from their secondary identities. When considering the significance of ethnicity as a social relationship, taking into consideration the fact that culture is mostly a creation of humans and is prone to change over the course of time may be unnecessary given that culture is subject to change. However, it is possible for it to be choreographed to that degree when it is ignited by the socio-political aims of the organization. According to one critique of the theory, primordialists "have overlooked people's creative abilities or endeavours for the construction of a better world." This is one of the criticisms levelled against the philosophy (Shils 1957). As a result, primitivism has been more prominent during times of conflict, whereas it has received less attention during times of relative peace. Primordialism has the potential to provide light on the emotive underpinnings of ethnicity as well as the tenacity of ethnic unity, both of which have the potential to be crucial to an individual's feeling of group identity. Primitivists are often accused of encouraging persons of various races and cultures to respond in a reactive manner to social and political issues, rather than actively pursuing solutions to such problems. Primitivists will finally resort to appealing to emotional and instinctual boundaries to explain away the phenomenon of national mobilization (Kataria, 2018). As a result, communities tend to blindly follow the actions or inactions of their ethnic leaders, even when such actions or inactions are driven by the leaders' desire for self-promotion rather than what is in the best interests of the group. According to Ballard's theory, a significant number of ethnic conflicts may be traced back to struggle over limited resources as well as political and economic inequality (Shils, 1957). Primordialists do not place any importance on social structure, and as a result, they do not care about the need to correct socio-political and economic inequities. Despite this, academics have come to recognize primordialism as a significant phenomenon in elucidating the affective foundation of ethnicity, the significance of ethnic solidarity, and the ways in which ethnic feelings can become a potent and substantial part of both collective and individual identity. Primordialism has been recognized as a significant phenomenon in elucidating the affective foundation of ethnicity, the significance of ethnic solidarity, and the ways in which ethnic feelings can become.

Ethnicity from the Lens of Instrumentalism

When it comes to the literature on nationalism, Paul R. Brass is most well-known for his emphasis on the "instrumental" aspect of ethnicity and nationalism. As a broad theory, instrumentalism seeks to account for nationalism's inception and continued support in terms of the interests it is said to serve. According to this point of view, contending elites may use ethnic and national identities to rally the masses in their quest for riches, power, and status throughout the world (O'Leary 2001: 148; Smith 2017). In sharp contrast to primordialists who see ethnicity as a 'given' of the human condition, postmodernists argue that ethnic and national connections are continually redefined and remade in response to changing events and the manipulations of political elites. Therefore, the study of race and country is, in great part, the study of cultural shifts brought about by political action. To provide a more precise description, this field of research examines the processes by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic communities selectively adopt and reinterpret cultural elements, attributing them with new significance and using them as symbolic tools to mobilise the community, safeguard its interests, and engage in intergroup competition (Brass, 2000).

Brass has found via his research that "ethnicity" and "nationalism" are social and political creations rather than "givens." They are products of powerful people who appropriate, distort, and even invent elements of the cultures they claim to represent in order to further their own interests and those of the populations they claim to represent. Furthermore, the operations of the contemporary centralizing state' have contributed greatly to the rise of ethnicity and nationalism as modern phenomena. In contrast, I argue that centralizing state elites and non-dominant ethnic group elites engage in certain kinds of contacts that give birth to ethnic identity and contemporary nationalism, mostly but not solely at the states' peripheries (Brass, 2000).

As a result of their divergent perspectives, Brass and Francis Robinson engaged in a heated dispute regarding the responsibility of political elites in the events that eventually led to the split of the Indian subcontinent into two independent nations: India and Pakistan. I will save my comments on this back-and-forth for the section on critiques and go on to discuss Brass's depiction of nationalism, the standard bearer for the instrumentalist stance. Numerous presumptions form the foundation of Brass's theoretical framework. In the first place, there's the issue of

different ethnic groups having different identities. The development of ethnic identities into nationalism is not a given, in Brass's view. On the contrary, cultural identities may only be politicized under very particular circumstances that need to be discovered and analysed in detail. Second, the nature of rivalry between elite groups is shaped by the larger political and economic context, which is not the same thing as cultural differences. Third, the persistence and definition of significant ethnic groupings will be affected by this rivalry. Because elites exploit ethnic groups' cultural forms, beliefs, and practices as political resources in their battle for power and status, this is the case. In other words, their meanings and contents change depending on political conditions, and they become symbols that may aid in the formation of a political identity and the rallying of wider support. All these premises, taken together, indicate that the development of ethnic identification and its subsequent evolution into nationalism is reversible. Economic and political factors may lead elites to minimize ethnic distinctions in favour of working with other groups or the state (Brass, 2000). Following the establishment of his underlying assumptions, Brass moves on to the development of a broad analytic framework that centres on the emergence of and adaptation to new identities.

In contrast to primordialism, instrumentalism views ethnicity as a determinable factor that can be handled in line with the strategic value it contributes to the achievement of wider secular goals (Kataria, 2018). The connections that individuals within a community forge with one another to their social, political, and economic benefit are what give it its resilience. In contrast to primordialism, they are not based on a common perception of closeness but rather on a common understanding of the significance of maintaining one's social, political, and economic stability. According to Linz (2020), those who held an instrumentalist worldview considered ethnicity as a method of social and economic competition. As a result, these individuals viewed ethnicity as being politically contingent, situational, and contextual. According to Keyes, who was quoted in Linz 2020, the only reason why ethnicity is essential is because it assists individuals in navigating their interactions with others who are believed to hold conflicting ethnic identities. This is the only reason why ethnicity is significant. When political and economic power has traditionally been concentrated in the hands of one ethnic group, the collective identity of that group has been produced in a limited manner by the exclusive membership in that group. Taking all of this into consideration, we can conclude that

the ultimate objective of ethnic instrumentalists is driven by the interests of the organizations they belong to, which might be political or economic.

The instrumentalist viewpoint maintains that the ethnic make-up of a society is the result of historical and geographical happenstance. If this is the case, then one interpretation of ethnicity is as a social phenomenon designed for mobilization, making it amenable to manipulation. According to Balcha (2008), groups of persons who are driven by social, political, and economic strife are the ones who are responsible for the creation of ethnicity. In its most basic form, it is a social order, political structure, and economic system that have been artificially fabricated. It is a more "convenient foundation for mobilization" and an adaptable political weapon that may be utilized to accomplish a particular aim if it is employed well (Seol, 2008). The instrumentalist point of view might be considered as a legitimate reaction to the requirements of the situation or the pressure from other people, regardless of whether or not these other people belong to the same community as you. According to King (2001), the concept of ethnicity is wholly fabricated. As a consequence of this, there is a distinct possibility that the composition of ethnic groupings does not remain constant throughout time, given that ethnicity is subject to change. Therefore, the best way to think about ethnicity is as a strategic weapon that a certain community uses to impose its purposes and interests on others. As a result, the definition of ethnicity and the structure of ethnicity itself periodically shift in order to meet the sociopolitical and economic requirements of the group (Bacova, 1998). In the eyes of the instrumentalist, ethnicity is only a construct that was invented for pragmatic reasons (social, political and economic). Kataria (2018) states that radical instrumentalists have the belief that the United States does not accurately portray the world as it really is. They have a distinct distinction in mind between political elites and the people, with the masses being susceptible to easy manipulation by the former. They are said to be ambitious social engineers who play on the worries of the general public in order to gain influence in government. According to Hale (2004), instrumentalists explain political events as manipulation by the elite. Hale thinks that this method is weak because it lacks an underlying psychological framework; hence instrumentalist explanations of political phenomena are insufficient. Because this kind of manipulation is so powerful, it begs the question: why? People's psychological understanding about one another has a significant bearing on their perceptions of one another's ethnicity. That is to say, the ability to successfully read

the minds of the individuals inside an ethnic group is directly proportional to one's success in exercising influence over that group. This indicates that the instrumentalists identified the "manufacturers" of countries as one of the groups that stood to earn the most from this arrangement. (Kataria, 2018) When seen from the vantage point of the modernization theory, the instrumentalists argue that the continuation of human interaction as a consequence of modernity increases the likelihood that ethnicity would gradually disappear. It's possible that this is why King (2001) considers the ethnic community to be a social group. In order to achieve this goal, political elites use modernization as a means of exerting control over ethnicity and therefore launching the process of ethnic politics. The contention advanced by Horowitz (2002) that race is multifaceted and, as a result, susceptible to manipulation lends credence to this point of view. The competition for scarce governmental and economic resources is a primary factor in the emergence of ethnic conflicts. It's possible that the social, political, and economic diversity that exists within multi-ethnic governments is what explains the dynamic role that ethnicity plays in determining political development. It follows that states are relatively recent entities, ripe for manipulation since they depend on the goodwill of the people who helped bring them into existence. This is because instrumentalists see communities as vehicles for promoting their own socio-political objectives. In spite of the fact that his theory, instrumentalism, emphasizes the struggle between groups and individuals for economic and political worth, the instrumentalist has been criticized for his narrow definition of ethnic interest, which states that it is more important to prioritize sociopolitical and economic values. As a result, the presumption is made that ethnic groups will continue to struggle against one another for social and political dominance inside these communities for as long as they continue to be stratified on the inside.

The instrumentalist has also come under fire for allegedly disregarding the struggle for what Shils refers to as the "ideal interest" of the people (1957). Politics and economics are essential, but people must still battle for the freedom to be themselves in spite of societal pressures. The evidence presented here illustrates that there are cultural and religious components associated with different ethnic groups. For example, in South Africa, members of the Zulu and Ndebele ethnic groups were at conflict with one another because each sought greater recognition of the importance of their particular sociocultural position. The political and economic

explanation of ethnicity has been questioned in light of this fact since it is unable to effectively account for the significant emotional and psychological links that bind persons of the same ethnic heritage. The instrumentalist has also failed to take into consideration the potential that the leaders of the mobilized groups are more concerned with maintaining the cultural traditions of their people than they are with furthering either their own political or economic objectives. It's possible that this may result in the election of a leader that the populace believes will endeavour to maintain and improve their cultural traditions. An excellent illustration of this would be the black people of South Africa, who have shown again and again that they would always back a political party or leader that works to aggressively promote and preserve the traditions of the black community. Since this is the case, the instrumentalist approach is unable to provide an explanation for why ethnicity has become the major foundation for mobilization. It's possible that this is due to the hazy character of ethnicity, which allows members of the same group to be broken down into social actors with many identities (for example religion and social status). It is possible that this will suit the needs of each group without causing any friction, which would add validity to the concept as an explanation for social and political disputes between diverse ethnicities. The reasons why people choose to form social bonds are at the heart of the debates that divide instrumentalists, naturalists, and primitivists, among other worldviews. The instrumentalist contends that attachment to one's own community or ethnic group may be rationalized if one considers the unique political, social, or economic advantages that affiliation with that community or group offers. To put it another way, many believe that their connections to their communities or ethnic groups will serve as an asset in their pursuit of success. Primordialists, on the other hand, feel an inextricable emotional and psychological bond to their community regardless of the potential benefits or drawbacks of their involvement in it. This connection is not influenced by the primordialists' evaluation of the pros and cons of their participation in the community. As was said before, the political elite may continue to gain benefits from the economic and political advantages for an endless amount of time. The notion that primalists are naturally connected to one another is one that primalists continue to place a considerable amount of value in. In light of this, both the primal and the instrumental points of view are examples of unnecessary polarization of notions that are, at their core,

inherently complimentary to one another in the realm of human experience (Bacova, 1998).

The Materialist Approach to Ethnicity

However, materialist viewpoints on race and ethnicity have not garnered much attention in the realm of academia. According to the "crude" Marxist beliefs of Michael Hechter (1987) and others, ethnicity is seen as an epiphenomenon, sometimes known as a by-product, of class relations. This view is shared by others. The responsibility for racially motivated violence is placed, according to these oversimplified Marxist interpretations, on economic inequality and the exploitation of elites.

On the basis of real facts, several authorities, including Marxists, have critiqued the claims made by crude Marxists. At this point, everyone is in agreement that social status has absolutely nothing to do with racial distinctions, and that there is no direct connection between the two (Eriksen, 1997).

The Constructivist Approach to Ethnicity

Originally formulated by French and English philosophers, the constructivism idea posits that ethnic identities are formed, reconstructed, and mobilized in response to social and political forces. In other words, constructivists disagree with the primativist view that a group's qualities are inherent, emerging from their biological makeup and their mental dispositions. Also, constructivists contend that it is erroneous to think that members of a given ethnic group have a shared "unique social experience" that shapes their collective identity (Cerulo, 1995). Instead, they argue that differences between people of different racial backgrounds are a product of prevailing cultural assumptions and hence always subject to revision.

Constructivists contend that people cannot be pinned down to a single racial classification. For instance, according to Chandra, a closer look at what is often thought of as a single ethnic group reveals that it is really a heterogeneous blend of several cultural identities. To rephrase, individuals within an ethnic group often have a number of distinct identities, but identity primarily with the community as a whole ("Why Ethnic Parties Succeed," 4). Cerulo provides more evidence for this contention by highlighting the fact that some people have many ancestries and, depending on the context, may choose to emphasize one or the other (Cerulo, 1997).

Ethnic groups, contrary to popular belief, are not necessarily antagonistic, according to this view. Most ethnic groups are able to achieve their aims via legal, constitutional means (Lake & Rotchild, 1996). The security problem, according to constructivists, may be used to foretell the likelihood of violence between various ethnic groups. When political governments fall, they typically leave behind a number of disjointed cultural groups that are then obliged to compete with one another for a feeling of security, which may lead to ethnic strife (Ellingsen, 2000). Second, elections that pit competing political groups based on ethnicity may fuel ethnic strife. Since the minority, this is the case.

A major assumption of the constructionist method, which is like the instrumentalist approach from which it evolved, is the notion that ethnicity is something that is formed by society. Ethnicity, however, is "made," and it is perpetually generated by social interaction, by both elites and ordinary people, in contrast to the preceding instrumentalist view. The constructionist method altered the focus of the literature by asking how ethnicity is produced rather than defining what ethnicity is. This was accomplished by questioning how ethnicity is constructed. The term "constructivist theory" may be loosely subdivided into three separate schools of thought, and each one is distinguished by the way it describes the process of creating ethnicity. This difference is used to define people, discursive formations, and large structural forces according to their role as the principal agent in the creation of ethnicity. The primary agent may be a person, a discursive formation, or a large structural force (Fedor, 2014).

The functions that humans play in the construction of society are as follows: The first category of constructionist texts is mostly focused on expanding previously held perspectives that address the instrumental method of approaching ethnicity. However, this new school of thinking recognizes the contributions of average people in addition to those made by elites. According to this body of research, the day-to-day actions of individuals who identify with (or deny belonging to) a specific ethnic group are seen as being of critical importance in the formation and upkeep of ethnic groupings (Fearon & Laitin 2000).

Most constructionist texts on ethnic conflict emphasize the role that people play in igniting conflicts, notably elites but also plain folk. The instrumentalist way of thinking is expanded upon by constructionist theories, which explain the contributions of regular people to ethnic strife. It is believed that members of a

particular ethnic group who are socially marginalized create new ethnic identities by questioning the validity of the pre-existing ethnic identity held by the majority. If anything like this occurs, the elites who benefited from the previous ethnic identity could respond with violent retaliation (Hettne, 2020). It is also possible for members of ethnic minority groups to turn to violent behaviour against members of other communities. This is done in the hopes of gaining support from more influential members of one's own ethnic group (Hettne, 2020).

The production of social life via discursive formations: The second school of thought within the constructionist movement asserts that cultural systems, also known as discursive forms, would always result in the formation of racial differences. However, assertions that are quite like this one has been refuted. Their depiction of culture as an everlasting force that is crucial to the process of forming ethnicity comes perilously near to primatism.

The constructionist theory examines how language may play a role in elevating the perception that members of one ethnic group have of members of another ethnic group as being fair game for hostility when there is an increase in tension. However, such theories of ethnicity have been criticized for adopting a primordialist stance, and the construction-by-discourse concept of ethnic conflict has been criticized for failing to account for the variety and complexity of ethnic violence around the world. Both criticisms have been levelled against both theories. Massive underlying structures play an active part in the process of social dynamics being formed.

Concerned with the ways in which wider social, political, and economic institutions affect ethnic identities is the third and most influential school of thought within the constructionist movement. The major works that are linked with this school of thought within constructionist literature often centre on the concept of "ethnogenesis," which refers to the origins of various ethnic groupings. People often point to colonialism, modernity, nationalism, and the establishment of the "nation state" as the driving forces behind the formation of ethnic groups (also known as ethnogenesis) (Eriksen, 2002).

Within the realm of constructionist literature, there is a school of thought that attempts to explain ethnic conflict by pointing to things like modernisation. Even though constructionist literature does not provide a comprehensive explanation for why ethnic conflict arises, it does suggest that modernization causes "converging

desires," which, in turn, explains why ethnic violence occurs. This idea is supported by the fact that constructionist literature exists.

Postmodernism Critiques of Ethnicity

Since the rise of postmodernism in the 1980s, ethnicity theory has been subjected to a great deal of criticism. These complaints may be divided into two primary groups, if you so choose. On the one hand, there are those scholars who support the idea that ethnicity should be "rethought" (Jenkins, 2006). Concepts need to be elaborated on more, and there should be a more in-depth look at them. On the other hand, there are scholars who support the idea that ethnicity should be completely disregarded (Carter & Fenton, 2010). Critics claim that the tendency to use ethnicity as a catchall word for different sorts of group identification leads to a deterioration in the analytical rigor of the research being conducted. The logical conclusion that can be drawn from this is that ethnicity is both everything and nothing.

Because of the widespread use of ethnicity in social research, several academics have expressed their worries that the field of social science has produced an unduly ethnicised picture of society (Clifford, 2000). A more critical approach to ethnicity may now be seen as a direct effect of the postmodernist philosophy that was responsible for clouding the waters around identity.

We have witnessed a depreciation of identity in the social sciences, with the idea of identity as inherent and lasting being thoroughly questioned. This has led to a devaluation of identity. The discipline of identity studies is doing more and more study, which is shedding light on the complexities and variety that make up the human identity (Wetherell, 2007).

One area of research that has been taken up because of this critique is the body of work devoted to the concept of intersectionality. Kimberlé Crenshaw is credited with having the concept, and she published it under the same name in a book she published in 1989. The concept of intersectionality was developed within the framework of critical race theory in response to critiques of white feminist ideology that were voiced by African Americans in the United States in the 1970s. These critiques were directed toward the white feminist ideology that was prevalent at the time (Collins, 2017). The premise that "power structures (such as race, class, sexual orientation, ability, age, place of origin, and citizenship status) cannot be

understood in isolation from one another" is at the centre of intersectionality theory (Collins, 2004). The intersectionality framework necessitates, consequently, not just the study of ethnic identities, but also the study of identities and the interrelationships between those identities.

Social and Ethnic Development Theory

Throughout this argument, the researcher had referred to the beneficial and bad consequences the primordial and instrumental have on the notion of ethnic development. It should come as no surprise that none of these theories proved successful in pointing the road toward inclusive development. However, the notion of inclusive development cannot be handled in isolation from the political and economic institutions that give birth to it. Because of this, a "soft theory" is developed; this theory is based on the most successful techniques from across the world as well as the empirical evidence that is already available. Institutions are long-lasting systems of social rules and customs that influence recurrent human contact for the purpose of a society's (or a state's) carrying out certain responsibilities. These duties may be political, economic, or social in character (Hodgson, 2001). A society's (or a state's) institutions act as a regulatory agency, prescribing and encouraging the methods in which diverse groups and persons carry out various social, political, and economic duties. There is no way to avoid the conclusion that the institutions of a multi-ethnic state would have a considerable influence, both for the better and for the worse, on the general pattern of socio-political and economic performance. Because of their intertwined nature, political and economic institutions provide insight on the prospect that political institutions could best support economic development, and vice versa. This is because political and economic institutions are mutually dependent. As Diamond (1994) points out, politics and political institutions are what decide what sort of economic institution a country has, and that's significant because economic institutions are what determine a state's success. By "political institution," we mean a group with the authority to design and enforce laws controlling the behaviour of persons and groups, as well as the construction of economic and social (regulatory and welfare agencies) systems. Examples of such political institutions include the legal system, legislative bodies, and political parties, amongst other things. The term may also be used to refer to the standards and principles that are widely recognized and which are followed for the entities to

operate well. These norms and guidelines can include concepts such as free and fair elections and the rule of law (Diamond, 1994). Because they offer the political framework that creates laws that either encourage or prevent the growth of economic institutions, political institutions influence economic institutions. This is because political institutions are the source of the political framework. For this reason, political institutions that are inclusive lead to economic institutions that are forward-thinking. The growth and prosperity of a state are directly proportional to the state's capacity to encourage political participation, particularly in multi-ethnic administrations. On the other hand, economic institutions may be seen as those that promote cooperation within a state by establishing and defending the economic rights of a wide variety of individuals, communities, and organizations.

As Diamond points out, economically inclusive institutions encourage individuals from a wide range of backgrounds to participate in economic activity and pursue their own objectives. These organizations also provide the means to do so. Economic institutions that are more equal and inclusive are born out of political institutions that share power among people, which is essential in a state that is composed of more than one ethnic group. To restate this idea in a different way, the cornerstone of political power is the active involvement of the population in the process of decision-making. It would no longer be possible for the governing political class to hoard all of the benefits of their authority in society and the economy for themselves. According to Flachaire, et al. (2022), political institutions are a main driver of development because of their capacity to boost economic growth. They say this ability makes political institutions the most important factor in progress. In light of the information presented above, it is abundantly evident that in order for a political system to persist, it needs economic and political institutions that are strong and efficient. According to Diamond (1994), "good institutions" are laws and processes that encourage individuals to work hard, progress economically, and benefit both themselves and their nation. Because of this, it is reasonable to anticipate that the chance of resolving re-distribution concerns in a state will increase if the state in question has powerful economic and political institutions.

An in-depth analysis of the contribution described above reveals the necessity of an inclusive development that will serve as a solution to social-political exclusion, ethnic inequality, and the hegemonic control of the political class in the political and economic institutions of a multi-ethnic state. When people in a multi-ethnic state

have the belief that all members of that state's population have the same political and economic rights, they are more likely to work together for the common good, which improves governance and fosters more robust institutions, more equitable socioeconomic policies, and greater respect for the cultural traditions that are held by all communities (Hettne, 2020).

Decisions impacting every ethnic group within a multi-ethnic state must be made with their input in mind if the state is to sustain its political stability and support the development of its numerous ethnic communities. Data from throughout the world and the region, particularly from Latin America, demonstrate that countries with a diverse population can achieve inclusive development. Before organizations may gain renown, power, and influence over the affairs of the country, Vega (2018) listed three fundamental changes to the law and the constitution that need to occur. Their changes must take place before organizations can achieve these goals. The first thing that has to be done is to amend the constitution so that it formally recognizes all of the many cultures and ethnic groups that exist in the nation. Protecting the right of every individual and group to have a voice in government decision-making is one of the ways that the second and third constitutions address and foster diversity. In Latin American countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Mexico, amongst others, the purpose of inclusionary policies is to reduce the likelihood of people's disadvantages being passed down from one generation to the next in order to improve their chances of having their voices heard by their respective governments. The passage of constitutional laws that acknowledge the linguistic and cultural variety of the population as well as the development of autonomous regions were both essential in the accomplishment of this objective. People's knowledge of the chances for progress and social, political, and economic integration increased as a consequence of this, which led to a reduction in prejudice and isolation and an increase in the likelihood of these outcomes. One may get the conclusion that this approach also calls for extensive social and political effort on a large scale in order to address the myriad of factors that contribute to exclusion. One could make the case that certain countries have been successful in combating social exclusion by expanding the opportunities for leadership among underrepresented groups and by cultivating a social and political climate that values diversity. This is one of the arguments that can be made in this context. Unquestionably, the efforts that individuals make to elevate the identity of their particular ethnic group via the

political process contribute to the expansion of ethnicity (Egwu, 2004). When members of a society with several ethnic groups can communicate with one another without creating tension over the distribution of social and economic resources, the possibility of that society's residents prospering together is increased. To restate the idea, the people of a country are the ones who are accountable for the shifting political and economic environment of their country. Nyerere (1967) proposes that any organization that can rely on its own resources for its growth and that recognizes the benefit of collaboration should be supported by the political system. His argument is based on the idea that the political system should be able to support the growth of any organization. In a climate of peace and political stability, development in a state that is home to more than one ethnic group is fundamentally inescapable. Comprehensive development is the result when oppressive conditions, social exclusion, and disparities in treatment between various ethnic groups are removed from the political scene. In multi-ethnic states, inter-ethnic rivalry for a state's socio-political and economic resources often results in ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict is a crucial aspect of this struggle. The failure of the political elite to arbitrate between different ethnic groups is reflected in the prevalence of socio-cultural (ethnic) structural imbalance in the society, and in turn, the bane of progress. As a symptom of a larger sociocultural (ethnic) imbalance, exclusion impedes progress. According to Nnoli, situations in which there is intense competition for limited social, political, and economic resources make the differences between ethnic groups more apparent (Egwu, 2004). Competition between different ethnic groups for social, political, and economic resources is a typical occurrence. This is because one of the defining characteristics of ethnicity is the conviction that one's own group is fundamentally superior to all others. When a nation's population includes people hailing from a diverse range of origins, it's possible that the government may treat some of those people differently depending on their ethnicity. However, if individuals from a variety of walks of life are involved in the political decision-making process, we will be able to put a stop to this. A well-respected socio-political technique that any country may use to safeguard itself from the dangers connected with political instability is good governance. This method may be used by any nation. For a multi-ethnic political system to see real progress, it is essential for an inclusive socio-political system to be established and put into practice, as has been the case in several the republics that make up Latin America. This objective may be met by

working for the establishment of conditions that are peaceful and secure. This indicates that anytime ethnicity is politicized in a multi-ethnic state, national cohesion and the growth of a corporate identity are put in jeopardy. This is especially true in the process of developing a corporate identity. As a consequence of this, we need a political and social system that values individual difference. When it comes to the debate and decision-making process about the national economy and politics, the viewpoints of all groups need to be heard and taken into consideration, and all groups ought to be properly and sufficiently represented in government. Countries like Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance, offer members of every group equal voice in political decisions.

The key problem at hand regarding social isolation Vega (2018) contends that there has to be a shift in the way the government thinks, and that this shift should result in policies that are friendlier to immigrants (social, political, and economic). In order to do this, individuals of underrepresented groups need to have a heightened awareness of the significance of the role they play in preserving the integrity of the system. In order to address problems of political and economic inequality in a state with many ethnic groups, inclusive policies and governance need the participation of a wide range of demographic groups. Conflict may be avoided and handled more easily in a multi-ethnic state if its inhabitants are treated with respect. In a multi-ethnic state, the parties all agree that increasing social and political inclusion is the best method to solve problems of unfairness and unhappiness associated to exclusionary socio-political policies. This belief is shared across the political spectrum. The administration is making efforts to dispel the suspicions that a multi-ethnic state that is plagued by continuous ethnic conflict would be impossible to operate properly within its present political and social framework. The idea of inclusion and exclusion in the social and political sectors of a multi-ethnic state emphasizes the uneven or fair distribution of development and political participation, respectively. If a person or group is denied equal access to the political, economic, and social institutions and opportunities available in their nation, then they are said to be socially and politically excluded from that country. It occurs when a subset of a society's population, specifically the political elite, tries to block other people from achieving their full potential by preventing them from participating in political and economic processes (Buvinic, Mazza & Deutsch 2004). It is characterized by Geddes as being separated from the centre of political life and from having influence over

one's own life choices made by others. The beneficial impacts of social and political integration on culturally or ethnically defined groups more than make up for the negative consequences that are caused by social and political isolation on such groups. It is common for governments to have more political capital available for the actual process of governing when they provide a warm welcome to all members of society. Only with the active involvement of all different ethnic groups inside the government would it be possible to achieve successful social and political integration. People from a variety of various backgrounds may cooperate and live in peace with one another. The answer to dealing with racial tensions, as is often the case, rests in some facet of those tensions that isn't even being explored at this point in time (Osaghae, 1995). In this context, it is very necessary to stress the importance of appropriately recognizing the contributions made by Nigeria's many diverse ethnic groups. Because information that is based on the stance of a single ethnic group is inherently incomplete, the only and most effective method for knowing and acknowledging the positions held by others is to use a system that is inclusive and that reveals the truth about the stances held by each ethnic group in the political entity. Ethnicity has been used for a very long time to identify distinct axes of ethnic difference, which has resulted in multi-ethnic nations frequently suffering from socio-political and economic inequality. One of the primary reasons for this is that ethnicity has been used to identify distinct axes of ethnic difference. This translates into a political endeavour that is aimed at building mutual respect and understanding among the many ethnic populations that are found across the nation. This will, in the long term, lead to positive consequences as well as a change in the political landscape of society as a consequence of those effects. It is common practice to place responsibility for the marginalization of specific persons and groups on detrimental social, political, and economic policies (Osaghae, 1995).

Conclusion

When evaluating the connection between socio-political and economic development, which is trustworthy in and of itself, it is important to keep in mind that political stability serves as a stimulant for the sustainability of other aspects. As a consequence of this exploitation of ethnicity, political leaders throughout history have used ethnic symbols in order to win and retain control over their subjects. The fact that ethnicity has traditionally been shown to have a negative influence on

groups who have been denied their rights makes the challenges it poses unique. In order to put the well-being of the country ahead of racial or ethnic distinctions, it is essential to have a solid understanding of the mental health needs of the individuals who make up each ethnic group (Forrest, 2019). It would seem, without trying to sugar-coat the situation that the answer is to assure the involvement of all social and economic groups in government, which would lead to the expansion and development of all these groups. In light of the fact that ethnicity is a complex social and political phenomenon, excluding individuals only on the basis of their ethnicity is not only immoral but also unproductive. People and organizations are prevented from progressing in ways that might be beneficial to society as a result of this. As a result, it is essential to devise a system that is neither ethnocentric nor exclusive, one that recognizes that differences contribute positively to advancement, one that will incorporate ideas of equality as well as recognition of the varying degrees of socio-political and economic power possessed by various ethnic groups, and one that will acknowledge that differences are beneficial to progress. Therefore, the degree to which individuals feel they are involved in society is directly related to the level of political, social, and economic viability that exists (Addai & Pokimica, 2010).

This study presents four diverse perspectives on ethnicity, and the researcher would want to place himself inside one of them. The researcher places himself outside of the realms of primordialism, constructivism, and materialism, and inside that of instrumentalism. Ethnicity is "neither inherent in human nature nor essentially beneficial," according to the study's author. As has been the case in Sierra Leone ever since the days of its first democratically elected president, Siaka Stevens, ethnicity is seen as a strategic basis for coalitions that are looking for a larger share of scarce economic or political power, and so it is a device for restricting resources to a select few. Parties in Sierra Leone and probably many other countries as well, are well within their rights to form along ethnic lines if they see it as a path to greater electoral success. One may argue that greed is more significant than grievance as a driver of ethnic conflict, given that many civil wars and conflicts centre on the competition for access to main commodities. Therefore, political leaders' goals for political or economic benefits or an intentional manipulation based on a rational choice to provoke or support ethnic violence cause ethnic conflict among rational agents over finite resources, leading to violence and conflict. Therefore, ethnic conflict is the outcome of the actor's logical pursuit of common goals, such as wealth,

power, and safety. In addition to illuminating the part played by elite manipulation in ethnic warfare, this theory may provide light on the reasons why some ethnically split nations choose to fight one another rather than work together. It is suggested that this choice is determined by the relative costs and advantages that different groups consider, and that ethnic wars are inevitable when the former exceeds the latter (Ake, 1993). Some individuals may participate in ethnic violence even when they are not fully persuaded by the arguments in favour of it; this may be explained by the fact that they are only following the herd. This is in accordance with the argument made by Hardin (1997), who characterizes ethnic mobilization as a coordination game in which it is rational to cooperate so long as one observes other players collaborating. The opportunity costs of joining a revolt, say Collier and Hoeffler (2007), are small compared to the potential gains from dividing up the booty. Many attribute the escalation of violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to elite influence, governmental failure, and the illegitimate extraction of minerals (Autesserre, 2012).

Elites don't create the emotions and mass attitudes connected with ethnic identity; instead, they identify and appeal to it (Ruane and Todd, 2004). This is not to downplay the importance of elite manipulation or the pursuit of monetary gain in fuelling ethnic conflicts; rather, it demonstrates that logical 'power-conserving' elite techniques (Fearon, 1995) fall short of adequately addressing the complexities of these phenomena on their own.

CHAPTER III
Ethnicity and Development

When it comes to development, there are several factors that have the potential to either aid or impede its progression. The meaning of the word "development" has never been settled upon by scholars. There is no universal agreement on the best way to promote development. When we talk of development, however, we frequently assume that it will bring about beneficial changes in the lives of individuals that are both quantitative and qualitative in nature. Improvement, augmentation, elevation, and advancement are a few examples of adjectives that might be used to indicate development. Other possible adjectives are progress and growth. The purpose of development is to enhance, both materially and in terms of quality of life, the conditions under which people live in a particular region. Therefore, for development to take place, it is required to implement several other kinds of improvements that might stimulate the development process (Bates, 2000). Increasing accessibility to medical treatment, educational opportunities, and financial resources, as well as strengthening social support systems, are some of these goals. We need institutions that protect not just individual rights but also property rights. Increasing one's accessibility to resources such as work and social security is an essential component of what it means to "grow." This growth is hampered by the fact that people may be of various races, which impedes advancement and reduces the likelihood of further development. Fair play and social justice need to be institutionalized by the state for ethnicity to be kept under control at the national level for there to be any chance of development taking place in a country. This is the only way that development will be possible (Hettne, 2020).

Higher social mobility becomes a privilege for racial or ethnic groups that dominate the state and use it to further their own interests rather than the nation's goals. This is because these groups prioritize their own interests above those of the nation. A predatory state may be produced by making clientelism and nepotism the standard by which public contracts and bids are awarded. When it is in its negative form, ethnicity stifles forward movement. Because of the action of this huge power, the resources of a nation undergo a process of redistribution. The state often pays insufficient attention to non-ethnic minorities. As a direct consequence of this,

ethnicity is coming to be considered more and more as a means by which one might accumulate financial wealth and political power (Berman, 2010). There are various examples of cultural practices that are dependent on modern economic resources, such as applying for employment or scholarships or taking out loans (Berman, 2010). Problems arise when regions are chosen for development plans and projects even though these regions have no comparative advantages other than the fact that they are home to the predominant ethnic group; as a result, regional development becomes skewed. This can lead to several undesirable outcomes.

It is difficult to establish stability in an environment that is unstable, which is a need for development. Stability must be present before development can occur. When racial and/or ethnic tensions are exacerbated, they often and frequently do result in acts of violence. In sub-Saharan Africa, efforts at development have been hampered by ethnic hostilities, which have created fertile ground for full-scale civil warfare. The battle in Biafra, which began as ethnic conflicts in Nigeria in the 1960s, might be seen as a lesson that should be learned from history. Under these circumstances, it is unwise to make direct investments from outside into the economy of sub-Saharan Africa. Many potential foreign investors have cancelled investment attempts that were initially planned for countries in sub-Saharan Africa because of the uncertain and tumultuous social and political situations caused by ethnicity. People who are otherwise hardworking tend to emphasis their efforts on ethnic strife rather than utilizing them to progress their country because of ethnicity, which is yet another negative consequence of ethnicity (Adeniji, 2015).

In efforts at national development in sub-Saharan Africa, the 1990s saw the resurgence of ethnic cleavages that had been dormant since the 1970s. The problem of ethnicity has surfaced once again, this time with a fury, as a direct result of the economic downturns that numerous countries on Africa's subcontinent are now going through. Adekanye (1995) contends that austerity measures such as SAPs have reawakened ethnicity in Sub-Saharan Africa. These policies have been implemented by governments throughout the region.

Tribalism breeds corruption

One of the main causes of widespread poverty, inequality, exclusion, and even war and death throughout Africa is the existence of several tribal groups (Alie, 2018). Even in a tiny nation like Sierra Leone, where most of its people live in

almost perfect peace with one another, politicians cannot help but use ethnic distinctions to wield power and exercise influence in critical political decision-making, with disastrous results (Allen, 1995). As qualified and highly experienced public officials are replaced by those less capable - on grounds of tribal preference and victimization - putting political square pegs in round holes, Sierra Leone has witnessed a grotesque erosion and dumbing down of public service management standards and ethics since gaining independence in 1961 (Wong, 2016). The tremendous economic and social cost of Sierra Leone's tribal politics can be seen in the country's pervasive corruption, deepening poverty, deteriorating security, rising rates of impunity and ineffective leadership (Reno, 1995). In addition, tribal politics in Sierra Leone have led to widespread corruption, social exclusion, and bloodshed (Collier, 1970).

Consequently, ethnic politics becomes a struggle for power and resources among different communities. Although severe in Sierra Leone, this issue is not exclusive to that country. Researchers have shown that many African nations struggle to accommodate cultural and ethnic diversity (Bah, 2013). Ethnicity has been politicized and had a key role in sparking violence in various regions of the globe, including the former Yugoslavia, Burma, and Sri Lanka. Tribal politics in Sierra Leone has led to widespread corruption, the exclusion of whole neighbourhoods from decision-making processes, and even outbreaks of murder (Davies, 2010).

Political Parties and Ethnicity

When political parties or organizations in a state have an ethnic orientation, the struggle for political power between or among the parties in that state may often be seen as a reflection of the ethnic conflict that exists in that state. Ethnic political parties have a propensity to depend on their constituents' ethnicity as a way of garnering support, regardless of whether or not they engage in this practice covertly (Eifert, Miguel & Posner, 2010). The leaders of the governing party or group have a tendency to maintain the loyalty of their base by paying their own followers in the context of a client-patron relationship. This is often done at the cost of members of other ethnic groups. By doing so, control may be maintained not only over the economics of the state but also of the group. The neglect and marginalization of other subordinated groups on the part of the dominant group helps to cement and

even worsen the ethnic conflict, which has the potential to become violent and result in widespread destruction and loss of life. The dominant group is challenged by other outside groups as well as subordinate groups, which leads to an escalation of the conflict. When there isn't a fair distribution of resources in a society, ethnic tensions almost always end up becoming worse, which inevitably leads to violence and instability (Geertz, 1993). As has been the case throughout many different civilizations, serious ethnic discord almost always results in physical bloodshed. When there is persistent violence and political unrest, the economy will suffer, and consequently, the quality of life will decrease (Hechter, 2020).

The bottom line is that conflict between ethnic groups and the state (government) is a primary source of political instability in many of these multi-ethnic nations, which in turn affects the country's economic development (projects) and social advancement (Horowitz, 2002). When businesses refuse to invest in regions that are struggling economically, the well-being of the local population suffers (either stays the same or worsens). This happens rather often in many different countries throughout the world.

Discussions of "tribe" and "ethnicity" often make extensive use of sociocultural anthropology and political history as key sources of information. The two concepts may each be explained in several different ways. According to Sanders, the term "ethnicity" refers to "a social group or category of the population split apart and kept together by common links of race, language, nation, or culture." Sanders defines ethnicity as "a social group or category of the population" According to Barth, the establishment of social boundaries functions as a line of demarcation between various categories of people in society. An ethnic group is a subgroup of a population that shares a common heritage and a set of values with other members of that population (Sanders, 2002).

According to Nothwehr's definition (2018), tribalism is "the attitude and practice of harbouring such a strong sense of loyalty or connections to one's tribe that one excludes or even demonizes those 'others' who do not belong to that group." Tribalism, on the other hand, is "the attitude and practice of harbouring such a strong sense of loyalty or connections to one's tribe." According to Nwaigbo (2019), tribalism leads to individuals or groups favouring those who are related to them by blood or marriage. This may have a negative impact on their relationships with members of other tribes who are not related to them. Tribalism is a form of racism.

Tribalism is a form of racism. Tribalism is a form of racism. In most instances, tribalism is the outcome of members of the same family, tribe, or social class having a same historical background, linguistic background, and cultural background (Sanders, 2002).

During the period of colonialism, a tribe functioned similarly to a nation in that it was both a cultural and governmental institution. On the other hand, when we speak about countries, what we're really referring to is much larger groupings with a wide variety of cultures. These ethnic groups are comparable to nations. It is said that social groups in Africa that are referred to as "tribes" by Westerners are not referred to as "tribes" in the West (Sander, 2002). These entities are better described using more dignified terminology such as nations, nationalities, and ethnic groups. In a similar vein, armed clashes that take place in Africa and are referred to as "tribal wars" are seldom discussed in the same manner when they occur in the Western world. Detractors argue that the mere names "tribe" and "tribal warfare" are insulting and suggest a primitive mindset. They use this reasoning to support their position. Ethnicity and ethnic strife are thus seen as superior concepts by the majority of African commentators. However, for the sake of clarity and conciseness, throughout this analysis of the predicament in Sierra Leone, the two terms will be used interchangeably (Sanders, 2002).

After Margai's death, politics on a tribal or ethno-regional level came out into the open. The provinces that had previously been bastions of support for the Sierra Leone People's Party transformed became recruitment grounds for the All People's Congress (APC). Siaka Stevens, the head of the APC, has said that he was born in Moyamba, the seat of the southern Kayamba chiefdom, to a Limba father and a Mende mother. Stevens is claimed to have been raised in the Kayamba region. Because he seemed to be the offspring of parents from both the north and the south/east, the hostilities between the tribes were temporarily defused. His campaign and recruitment efforts were focused on the northern region of the country, where he was successful in convincing the country's elite and educated individuals to join him by making hollowed promises and successfully assassinating the character of the country's prime minister, Albert Margai (Jenkins, 1994).

Because there are no significant gaps in socioeconomic status, the nature of national political movements is often ethnic. The most prominent political parties in Sierra Leone have been beset by internal warfare that is rooted in ethnicity. The All

People's Congress (APC), the dominant party in the north of Sierra Leone, is a party that has a long history in southern Sierra Leone. When the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was guiding the country to independence, it ran into significant resistance from the APC. Northerners, who were dissatisfied with what they saw as a Mende majority in the administration, organized themselves into the APC to voice their opposition (Kormoh, 2020). As a potential solution, the APC suggested socialism together with a commitment to provide northerners with equal opportunities. Soon after, tensions rose between the SLPP and the APC, and the armed forces were rapidly dragged into the fight.

The death of Prime Minister Margai in 1964 further exacerbated existing tensions throughout the country. Over time, this split expanded to the armed forces as well. This demonstrates that the military was impacted by the political atmosphere at the time of the general elections in 1967, since military officers voted for one of the two major political parties that were active in the country at that time. The head of the army, Brigadier David Lansana, was a supporter of the SLPP, while his assistant, John Bangura, was a supporter of the APC. The election was fought along ethnic lines; nevertheless, it did not result in a clear majority being gained. As a result, the military now can overthrow the civilian government. In a turn of events that was not anticipated, the coup gave subordinate military commanders the authority to organize their own coups if they disagreed with the judgments that their superiors made about public policy. In 1968, junior army officers meddled in the process of selecting Stevens as the head of the All People's Congress (APC), which ultimately led to his becoming the Prime Minister (Kandeh, 2018).

Following Stevens' victory in the election, members of the SLPP were accused of engaging in fraudulent activity during the poll. Because of this one-of-a-kind condition, the political tensions between the two major parties escalated, which ultimately resulted in political violence and intimidation during the elections that took place in 1973 and 1977. The enormous use of resources that the APC made during these elections was detrimental to not just the political party that the APC was competing against but also to the traditional authority that did not back the agenda that the APC was pushing. The incitement of violence against pro-SLPP leaders was another effect of this. The All People's Congress (APC) seized control of the government as a direct result of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) decision to abstain from voting in the 1973 election out of protest at the violence that had been

instigated by the APC. The officials of the country were unable to stop the demonstrations that occurred in 1973. In 1974, there were many failed attempts made on the life of the prime minister, which led to allegations of treason being levelled against members of the military and people. The APC has never been put through a test of this magnitude before. Due to questionable legal manoeuvrings, only eight of the twenty-two individuals who were sentenced to death were ultimately put to death (Ndumbe, 2001).

The second major political demonstration that took place on a significant scale took place in February of 1977. The government was obliged to call for fresh elections because of the protests that were held by students all around the nation. Since the SLPP did not take part in a free and fair election, the APC was only successful in winning fifteen of the twenty-nine seats that were up for grabs. After arguing that such a system would make it possible for the nation to make socioeconomic growth, the All-People's Congress (APC) set out to construct the first one-party state in Sierra Leone. Under the APC's leadership, the state was unable to collect taxes or deploy its little resources in areas outside of its authority. This was since the APC was in power. During the first general election held under the one-party system in the Pujehun area, several citizens who were unhappy with the government formed the Ndoghorwusi guerrilla movement (Smith, 2017).

The government, however, showed no sign of worry despite this fact. Because of the growing political tensions in Sierra Leone, "politics of the armed forces" gained popularity. This led to anarchy in the 1970s and, eventually, to civil war in 1991, which completely dismantled the country's governmental structures. As a result of these events, Sierra Leone is currently experiencing a state of post-war reconstruction. A system in which followers of a party were granted more money and power than everyone else was created because of the collision of personal interest and acts of violence. In many instances, receiving help is dependent on the country that is applying for it undergoing certain social, economic, and political reforms (Zack-Williams, 2019). In most cases, a significant amount of anguish and distress is experienced concurrently with the introduction of reforms. When this information was taken into consideration, the demand made by the international donors that President Joseph Momoh restored the multiparty system sounded reasonable. The already struggling economy was brought to its knees by a structural realignment program that was enforced by international financial institutions. The

worsening economic and social conditions contributed to a worsening of the sense of disenfranchisement experienced by many disenfranchised groups, which led to a rise in rebellious activity. The only question that remained was how quickly the rebellion would escalate into a full-scale civil war (Batty, 2011).

On March 23, 1991, a group of Liberian militia associated with Charles Taylor and a small number of mercenary warriors from Burkina Faso joined forces with one hundred Sierra Leonean dissidents, the most of whom were students at local universities, to launch the first rebel attack. The rebels were successful in seizing control of the Bomaru and Kailahan districts, which are in the eastern portion of Sierra Leone. Another attack was launched on the Pujehan region by insurgents who crossed the Liberia-Sierra Leone Mano River Bridge. This marked the beginning of the long-awaited civil war in the nation, which would eventually result in the deaths of tens of thousands of people while eradicating any prospects for the country's future economic development. In retaliation for Sierra Leone's participation in the Nigerian-led West African intervention force (ECOMOG), which was opposed to Charles Taylor's actions in Liberia, rebels in Sierra Leone used Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front as a tool to carry out their assaults on the government. This was done in order to punish Sierra Leone for its participation in ECOMOG. After enlisting the help of Guinea-Conakry and Nigeria, Momoh sent his ill-equipped army to the border area, where it was swiftly defeated. However, Momoh was ultimately successful in his efforts. Currently, it was quite evident that the Revolutionary United Front was the group responsible for carrying out the incursions over the border (RUF). Foday Sankoh, a guy who had previously served as an army sergeant and who had been involved in a military coup d'état in the early 1970s, was the leader of this group. From the very beginning, it was very evident what the RUF's aim was: to topple the corrupt and tribalistic APC government (Glennerster, Miguel & Rothenberg, 2013).

On the other side, RUF was not capable of accomplishing the lofty goals that it had set for itself. To demonstrate that the national government was incapable of defending its citizens, Sankoh and the members of his group resorted to harsh tactics to terrify people rather than conduct war against the government of Freetown. They advocated a backwards worldview of rustic resentment against commercialization and exploitation. As the uprising gathered steam in May 1991, President Momoh was more worried about the possibility of sabotage inside the armed forces on the part of

unhappy troops. This was in addition to the threat that the RUF posed to the country's national security. He approached the government of the United Kingdom to get assistance in the form of military aid so that he could fight terrorism. On the other hand, he was not accepted by the administration of the United Kingdom. By January 1992, the RUF's strategy had shifted from one of causing fear among the local populace to one of attacking economic targets. The organization successfully carried out several daring attacks on diamond mines located in the south-eastern region of the nation. Two months later, RUF assaults on government convoys added an additional layer of complexity to the situation for Momoh (Glennerster, Miguel & Rothenberg, 2010).

Development and its Relationship to Ethnicity in Sierra Leone.

From a variety of perspectives, Sierra Leone is categorized among the nations that make up the group of the world's poorest countries. With a score of 0.336 on the human development index in 2005, this country in West Africa ranked 177th out of 177 countries for which data was available. This was the lowest score of any nation in the world (UNDP Report, 2021). The GDP per capita, after adjusting for purchasing power parity, is $806. With a miserable life expectancy of just 41.8 years, Sierra Leone is placed 173rd out of 177 countries in terms of life expectancy at birth. Literacy is only found in 34.8% of the adult population, and although while the number of people going to school has improved significantly since the Civil War, gross secondary enrolment was still just 32% in 2007. According to the World Bank, in 2004, more than half of all individuals lacked access to improved water sources (such as a borehole well, protected spring, or piped water). Before the civil conflict that took place in Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, the country already had the second lowest human development index in the world (UNDP, 2021). It is possible that the country's poor economic performance and rampant government corruption had a role in the commencement of the war, as well as its continuation for such a lengthy period.

In addition, Sierra Leone is a nation that is home to a diverse collection of racial and ethnic communities. The household module of the 2004 Population Census uncovered a total of eighteen prominent ethnic communities in the country. The Mende and Temne make up a combined total of 32.2% of the population, while the Limba make up 8.3%, the Kono make up 4.44 %, and the Kuranko make up 4.41

percentage points. There are a few of minor tribes, such as the Krio, who only made up 1.4% of the total population in 2004. Language is likely the single most important feature that differentiates various ethnic groups; nevertheless, customs, traditions, and history are all important. There is just one language that is not a member of the Niger-Congo language family, and that is Krio, which is a variation of British English (Glennerster, Miguel & Rothenberg, 2013).

These categories, in contrast to English and German, cannot be understood by one another and are located a great distance apart linguistically. The figures from the 2004 Census take into account chiefdom's share of each ethnic group. Since Sierra Leone gained its independence in 1960, the notion of chiefdom has largely remained unaltered, and this concept continues to serve as the foundation for traditional authority in the nation. The country is divided into 149 chiefdoms, each of which has a population that averages close to 22,000 people (Francis & Kamanda, 2001).

Civil Wars and Clash over Diamond in Sierra Leone

In most African countries over the course of the past century, civil wars have been caused by a variety of factors, including political manipulation and mismanagement, ethnic politics and economic distress, political emancipation, and disputes over the control of important resources, amongst other things. One country that exemplifies this is Sierra Leone. There was a lot of ethnic turmoil, a fight for control of the diamond mines, and some shady neighbouring behaviour that led to the war in that nation. All these factors contributed to the conflict. Even after Momoh was removed from power, the RUF kept making progress toward the nation's capital. Since the beginning of the civil war in 1991, Liberia has provided financial support, military instruction, and strategic advice to the RUF. Since the diamond boom of the 1950s, successive governments in Sierra Leone have wrestled with the Liberian connection to the conflict and illicit diamonds. This fight has been ongoing since the 1950s (Francis & Kamanda, 2001). After 1991, the official and active involvement of Liberia in the civil crisis that was taking place in Sierra Leone was driven by petty larceny as the driving factor. At the height of the war, Liberia provided the RUF with illicit diamond trade outlets in return for supplying the RUF with ammunition that Liberia had delivered to the RUF. Between the years 1994 and 1998, Liberia's diamond mining capacity ranged on average between 100,000 and 150,000 carats. In the early 1990s, the search for new investors that President

Momoh had begun was carried out by the military government that was in charge of the National Provisional Ruling Council (Zack-Williams, 2019).

A string of events that occurred before the RUF's attempt to grab control of Freetown lend credence to the theory that the government and various mining businesses had engaged into a questionable arrangement before to the RUF's attempt to seize control of the city. In 1995, when the RUF came perilously close to seizing Freetown, President Strasser had little option except to seek on the aid of EO. The RUF was expelled from Freetown within a week, and a month later, the EO took control of Kono's diamond mine, which ultimately resulted in the rebels being forced to evacuate the country (Zack-Williams, 2019).

Sierra Leone's Electoral Process: Tribalism and Regionalism

Voting based on ethnicity or area is mostly unconscious in Sierra Leone's political system, which may be seen as a defining characteristic of the country's political system. Because it is the only way for them to win elections, politicians intentionally mislead the people into believing the tribal and regionalist language they employ in their campaigns. This has resulted in significant splits within the country and is leading to increased conflict between the various tribes. For instance, during the campaign season for the elections in 2018, it was commonplace to hear politicians make overt appeals to regional and racial biases. These kinds of appeals are frowned upon by the American Civil Liberties Union. It is widely known that the paramount chief of the Buya Romende chiefdom in the Port Loko area gave the order for his people to get rid of any members of the SLPP (Mende) party, which was the party that was in opposition at the time. The most significant reception of this election's primary message occurred at the regional and tribal levels (Kandeh, 2019).

The general elections and the presidential election that took place in 2018 are evidence of the fact that tribal and regional differences run deep in the politics of Sierra Leone. This pattern of voting has maintained in Sierra Leone for many decades, but it became a significant cause for worry over the country's security both before and after the country's general and presidential elections in 2018. It was clear that tribal and regional awareness played a role in the voting pattern in two districts located in the eastern part of Sierra Leone, which is predominantly made up of Mende speakers, and in two districts located in the northern province of Sierra Leone,

which is predominantly made up of Temne tribe members. The All-People's Congress, which has stronger links to the Temne, received just 11.5% of the vote in the Kenema district, while the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), which has significant ties to the Mendes, received 88.9% of the vote. According to the official results that were issued by the National Elections Commission, the APC, which is mostly made up of Temne, earned 90.68 percent of the votes cast in the Bombali district (Glennerster, Miguel, & Rothenberg, 2013).

However, after the elections are finished, people in Sierra Leone will be able to put their disagreements behind them and live peacefully with one another. In this civilization, it is common practice for individuals to marry someone who is not a member of their own tribe, and people of many racial and cultural origins get along quite well with one another. Tribalism is more likely to become troublesome during election seasons since politicians often use it as a tool to win elections or maintain their positions in power. During election campaigns, candidates for public office almost never give any thought to the long-term repercussions of the ethno-regional and tribal rhetoric they spread. During the 2018 election season, for instance, politicians used surrogates to disseminate hateful words and vulgarities on social media, which led to the increase of tribalism. The statements made by the paramount chief of Buya Romende against the Mendes and supporters of the SLPP are illustrative of the tribal and regional hate that has been expressed in several of the messages that have been shared on social media (Harvey, 1971).

The spread of false information and hate speech on the internet is tearing the people of Sierra Leone apart. These kinds of remarks, which are mostly being disseminated via social media but are also, to a lesser extent, being disseminated through conventional media, are manifestly endangering Sierra Leone's national security and unity. For example, politics on tribal reservations have received increased attention in recent national discussions. If the government of Sierra Leone does not take quick action to solve this, the possible outcomes might be catastrophic (Francis & Kamanda, 2001).

This tendency is gaining pace especially after the general and presidential elections that took place in 2018. The impending human catastrophe cannot be prevented if the increasing ethnic tensions are not quenched, and this trend is gathering momentum particularly after those elections. Messages that foment hate and call for violence have been spreading across the country through social media,

and they have been promoted mostly by the main opposition party, the APC, along with its alleged members and sympathizers. A Sierra Leonean who currently resides outside of the country and sends threatening and provocative messages to young people in Sierra Leone, encouraging them to torch public and private property belonging to people they believe to be supporters of the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), is a great example. Hospitals in the town of Tombo were burned to the ground, and Freetown's maximum-security jail was also assaulted with fire because its prisoners were believed to be sympathizers of the governing SLPP (Bangura, 2016).

The Impact of Ethnic Diversity on Economic Development

Recent years have seen a surge in study of how ethnic fragmentation affects economic development. With the Soviet ethnic measure from Atlas Narodov Mira, Easterly & Levine (2020) published a landmark work showing that the growth rate of GDP per capita is negatively linked to the degree of ethnic fractionalization. They said that the ridiculous boundaries set up by former colonial powers are to blame for the dismal economic performance of most African nations. The influence of the ethnic fractionalization measure, however, was diminished once other variables were considered. These variables included human capital, political instability, and economic indicators.

Ethnic violence, particularly civil wars, has also been studied for its negative consequences on economic growth. When nations display a high degree of potential ethnic conflict, Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2002) emphasized the impact of political instability on economic growth. Specifically, when various ethnic groups are at odds with one another, the authors found that the spread of ideas was stymied in such a society. When there is a history of racial tension, it's hard to conduct business as usual because of the ripple effect it has on the economy. Collier (2001) and Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) conducted empirical research on this issue and found no correlation between ethnic fractionalization and the occurrence of civil wars. Instead, they discovered that high levels of ethnic fractionalization make communities safer due to increased coordination costs and the fact that no one ethnic group is big enough to rule the others. According to Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-(2002) Querol's research, polarization, rather than ethnic fractionalization, is a major determinant in the prevalence of civil conflicts.

Unfortunately, ethnic fractionalization as a statistic fails to represent the polarization of ethnic groups within and across nations. The authors emphasized that civilizations that are both very homogenous and highly fractionalized tend to have lower rates of violence, whereas cultures in which the governing ethnic group controls a sizable minority are more likely to experience civil war (Acemoglu, 2013). These situations call for a polarization metric, as opposed to a fractionalization metric, to represent the underlying risk of ethnic hostilities. Despite claiming that the repercussions of ethnic polarization on growth-affecting policies might be severe, Easterly & Levine (2021) utilized a measure of ethnic fractionalization to study this problem.

Public goods supply in ethnically fractionalized communities with substantial rent-seeking behaviour is biased toward just the dominant ethnic group, as pointed out by Easterly & Levine (1997). To some extent, ethnic heterogeneity reflects the propensity of ethnic groups in power to redistribute income, which La Porta et al. (2013) suggested is responsible for the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization on growth via government spending. Using a neoclassical growth model, Annett (1998) examined the connection between ethnic fractionalization and political instability and government spending. His central argument was that governments incur a political cost whenever ethnic division increase, since doing so increases the likelihood of a coup and the loss of rents from staying in power. In order to lessen political instability and the associated threat of being toppled, the government is compelled to employ government spending to pacify the opposing factions and mitigate the latent risk of ethnic clashes (Annett, 2001).

In cultures that are deeply stratified along ethnic lines, ethnic politics is more likely to flourish. Using ethnic animosity to rally support for one group over another, tyrants in ethnically split nations suppress ethnic strife, as stressed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). Government measures that expropriate (or murder) the ethnic losers, restrict their ability to organize opposition, and limit the rights of ethnic groups outside the dominant group to utilize public resources are frequent in ethnically split countries, according to La Porta et al. (2013). Accordingly, with a rise in ethnic diversity comes a potential decline in political stability as government policies become less politically free. Political violence and frequent disruptions of law and order are more likely to occur in nations that are deeply split along ethnic lines (Annett, 2020). In addition, Easterly & Levine (1997) contended that the presence of severe rent-seeking behaviour and the difficulty to form cooperative agreements on

the supply of public goods contribute to the political instability that characterizes nations where ethnic groups are highly fragmented.

Since authoritarian governments may be more likely to exercise their authority arbitrarily in ethnically fragmented countries, La Porta et al. (2013) emphasized the correlation between ethnically fragmented societies and less political freedom (such as democracy). Further, ethnically fragmented cultures may lead to instances of government departments operating independently, with little regard for the impact of their activities on the rents of other ministries (Easterly & Levine, 2019). Those in power may profit from black market resale of foreign cash in part because of an inflated official exchange rate and rigorous exchange rate regulations. Easterly and Levine (1997) suggested that an inflated official currency rate encourages local money to be invested overseas due to the fear of a devaluation. Therefore, it's logical to wonder whether nations with a lot of different ethnic groups have worse economic policy results.

CHAPTER IV
Data Presentation, Analyses and Findings

Introduction

Chapter four of this thesis sheds light on the economic policies of governments in Sierra Leone. It provides deeper analyses on the development and economic policies of four different administrations in Sierra Leone ranging from the administrations of former President Siaka Probyn Stevens, Dr. Ernest Bai-Kromah, and President Julius Maada Bio. This section of this thesis also analyses the extent to which negative ethnicity impacted the development policies of these different administrations. Lastly, it also provides the presentation of data gathered through structured interviews and focus group discussions held with several Sierra Leoneans from different spheres of professions and disciplines.

Siaka Stevens' Rise to the Presidency

Siaka Probyn Stevens was born on August 24, 1905 in Moyamba, Moyamba District, and British Sierra Leone's Southern Province to a Limba father and a Mende mother. Despite his Moyamba birthplace, Stevens spent the most of his formative years in Freetown. After being elected to the Sierra Leone Legislative Council in 1951, Stevens became a prominent member of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). He became the country's first Minister of Mines, Lands, and Labour the following year. When being elected in 1957 to represent the Port Loko constituency in parliament, he was forced to quit when an electoral appeal was launched against him. In 1963–1964, he went to East Germany alongside Sheku Magona and Kade Kamara to form the African People's Congress (APC). When Stevens left the SLPP because to disagreements with its leadership, he helped establish the People's National Party (PNP), where he initially served as secretary-general and then as deputy leader. In 1959, he travelled to London for the Conference on Independence. After the discussions concluded, he was the lone delegate to refuse to sign a secret defence pact between Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom (Luke, 2020). Another point of dispute was that the Sierra Leonean government's insistence on no elections being held before independence would have effectively barred him from running for office. After he got back from the talks, he was immediately booted out of the PNP.

Stevens was the founder of the Elections Before Independence Movement (EBIM). On 20 March 1960, he assumed membership in the APC, joining the ranks of eight individuals. His inclusion was facilitated by his adept use of the disenchantment experienced by the northern and eastern ethnic groups towards the SLPP. Additionally, he successfully established a coalition with the Sierra Leone Progressive Independence Movement (SLPIM). Sierra Leone is governed by two prominent political parties, namely the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress. According to Luke (1988), in the year 1960, a section of the Sierra Leone People's Party opted to establish a distinct political entity subsequent to their determination that the attainment of independence should precede the conduction of elections. The All People's Congress (APC) was created at 5 Elba Street, Freetown, under the leadership of the late Alhaji Chief Mucktarru Kallay, who served as its first chairman. It is noteworthy that he also contributed the name and symbol to the party. The aforementioned individuals include Deputy Chairman Allieu Badarr Koroma, First Secretary General C.A. Kamara-Taylor, Treasurer Alhaji Sheikh Gibril Sesay, Organiser Kawusu Konte, Public Relations Director S. A. T. Koroma, and Symbol Artist Kotor AbuBakarr Sam Bangura. Additionally, six more individuals, whose names are not provided, have positions within the organisation, ranging from the first to the seventh position. The All People's Congress was first organised by a group of seven individuals. The individuals that succeeded Siaka Probyn Stevens in leadership were Nancy Steele, S.I. Koroma, Bob Allen, Mohamed Bash-Taqui, and Ibrahim Bash-Taqui. Both Siaka P. Stevens, who subsequently assumed the positions of Prime Minister and then President of Sierra Leone, and Sir Albert Margai, who finally rejoined the SLPP and assumed the role of Prime Minister, had previously been affiliated with the SLPP. The All People's Congress (APC) had a position of political dominance in Sierra Leone from 1968 until 1992, and later regained power in 2007 with the victory of its presidential candidate, Ernest Bai Koroma, in the national presidential election (Luke, 1988).

The new constitution was put to the test in elections conducted in 1973. After the SLPP boycotted the elections, which were plagued by violence, the APC won all 85 seats in the House of Representatives. Stevens was re-elected as president in March 1976 with no opposition from the House. Sorie Ibrahim Koroma served as Stevens' first vice president from 1971 until his resignation in 1985. Stevens proceeded to strengthen his control throughout the rest of the 1970s, culminating in a

referendum in 1978 on a new constitution that would make the APC the sole legally authorized party and make the country a one-party state. Stevens portrayed the planned one-party system as more akin to African democracy than to that of the West. Since Sierra Leone became a republic, however, the nation has been ruled by a single political party. There was widespread voting fraud on 12 June, when it was stated that 97.1% of voters supported the new one-party constitution. All outsiders agreed that the regime had substantially skewed the elections. This is shown by the fact that the one-party state was believed to have won overwhelming support even in regions where the SLPP was still in power (Luke, 1988).

The Democrats in the House of Representatives were required to defect to Stevens' APC after his party won the election or risk expulsion. Stevens was re-elected to a second five-year term, at which point he was given the honorific "Dr." and sworn in for a total of seven years in service. The name "Pa Shaki" was also used to describe him. The administration of Stevens was infamously corrupt and tyrannical, even by precolonial African norms. Some of his closest associates, as well as other opponents, were imprisoned or even put to death. Stevens' personal hit team was made up of drugged-out, unemployed city teens from the Internal Security Unit. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when he proclaimed Sierra Leone a one-party state, he already had a strong authoritarian propensity, with the government often proclaiming crises and murdering many political opponents (Luke, 1988).

Siaka Stevens' Economic Policies

The abrupt collapse of Sierra Leone's state structure defies easy categorization and explanation. A very limited group of individuals benefited from redistributions of state machinery resources throughout the APC period (1968-92). For decades, undemocratic governments have relied on neo-patrimonial principles that are inherently biased and discriminatory to maintain power. According to Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston (2014), it is paradoxical that patrimonialism, which is known for strengthening social connections in small-scale contexts through trust, reciprocity, and material transactions, is also seen as a force that distorts power, fosters corruption in authority, and promotes personal self-aggrandizement when it infiltrates larger political structures like bureaucracies and states.

Siaka Stevens' patron-client system of government was unjust and unprepared for the responsibilities of a nascent nation. According to Kpundeh (2004), the governing party employed patronage as a means of recruiting and retaining party members, which allowed the system to flourish. During Siaka administration, politics shifted to the point that party membership and support, rather than genuine qualifications and experience, were considered sufficient for public office.

Under Siaka Stevens' reign, employment was mostly controlled by the state, which provided public services in return for party allegiance. The state's monopoly on the public service employment market is a direct outcome of its prior dominance in that sector. To put it bluntly, this system stymied efforts toward modernization, democracy, and economic development by making public servants answerable to party bosses rather than the people they were sworn to protect and serve. Since no one was held politically responsible, public positions and resources were routinely abused for private gain. As a result, a mechanism was established to facilitate the transfer of wealth and power among the governing elite (Mbawa, 2012).

Siaka Stevens and his inner circle of party associates sustained this rotten system. While Sierra Leone's economy grew by 7% year on average between 1950 and 1972, it entered a deep recession in the middle of the 1970s. In 1979, Stevens sought a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to restructure the economy and balance the short-term financial concerns, as was the case with many emerging nations at the time. When export prices for diamonds, palm kernels, and cocoa all dropped in 1973, the economy of Sierra Leone suffered. This was in part due to external causes including a rise in OPEC oil prices.

According to Zack-Williams (1993), the Sierra Leone Development Company (Delco) ceased iron production in Marampa in 1975 as a direct consequence of the precipitous drop in export prices. Shortfalls in economic performance may be traced back to a steady decline in mining, farming, and logging operations.

Decreased government income was expected given the decreasing trend in economic activity; yet, since Stevens prioritized elite comfort above nation-building, government spending was not reduced. The fiscal policy was hurt by this. Reno (1995) points out that even the diamond industry's profits weren't enough to support Stevens' patronage network. Given the government's inability to shift expenditure away from subsidies for the wealthy and toward export-oriented industries, a decline

in the economy was inevitable. However, this system failed to make effective use of its growing pool of human resources. There were many inconsistencies in the politics of decline that characterized Sierra Leone. Economic progress and development were stymied because the government would not offer essential public goods and services, instead choosing to further exploit social poverty and dependency on people.

The imposition of mandatory savings on impoverished individuals and subsistence farmers by the APC, facilitated by the state-controlled Sierra Leone Marketing Board, has had a detrimental impact on social initiative and the willingness to be governed. This action has included the use of the corrupt state apparatus to exert significant pressure on civilian society. As a result, the peasants disengaged from participation in local market transactions, while the educated and bourgeoisie stratum progressively relocated to other countries (Zack-Williams 1993). Some Sierra Leoneans found ways to adjust to the economic gloom, while others left the country in search of better socioeconomic circumstances elsewhere, fleeing the widespread discontent and quiet despair caused by the lack of political, economic, and social prospects.

Kpundeh (2004), Smith (2017), and Berewa (2011), among others, have written extensively on the APC party's corruption and bias under what they described as a moribund and decadent rule under former president Siaka Probyn Stevens. The misuse and exploitation of both political leaders and their civil servant customers were on full display under Stevens' administration. In the wake of Stevens' democratic election system, undemocratic administrations rose to power. With antiquated equipment and no constitutional checks on executive power, state strength was by no means guaranteed. Political and economic stability were unsustainable under Stevens because his administration was strong but not constrained by rules or responsible to anybody. During the years 1968–1985, Sierra Leone's political atmosphere was fuelled by inadequate leadership and unequal distribution of resources. The study revealed that under the leadership of Stevens, the repressive disregard for Sierra Leonean sovereignty resulted in a lack of political activity and made it hard for organised concerns to be effectively expressed. In the absence of a democratic government to safeguard press freedom, accountability, the rule of law, separation of powers, and freedom of assembly, the progress made in the state building efforts initiated by Milton Margai rapidly diminished. According to Berewa

(2011), all hope for political stability or fiscal responsibility was extinguished with Milton Margai's death in 1964.

The likelihood of achieving economic success in developing countries is low owing to the allocation of state resources based on political considerations rather than merit, as argued by Richards (1996). The lack of attention paid to the state's inability to provide essential economic services in Sierra Leone is obscured by the country's preoccupation with clientelist politics. As was previously explained, Stevens' shadow state could only be successfully provided it had access to sufficient income to appease customers. Clientelism, according to Roniger (2004), transforms states in late modernity into "postmodern circumstances," and this was certainly the case for the Sierra Leonean state under APC control by Siaka Stevens.

When looking at Sierra Leone's political past, it becomes clear that the sustainability of the democratic state depends on improving the country's economy and political infrastructure. Increases in social and economic progress may occur under a wide variety of governmental structures. "The differences between nations whose politics embody consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, and stability are greater than the differences between countries whose politics embody democracy and tyranny" (Huntington 1984). Almost a decade after the conclusion of hostilities, Sierra Leone looks to be making progress in establishing reliable national institutions, including those responsible for administration and bureaucracy.

Joseph Saidu Momoh's Triumph to Power in Sierra Leone

On January 26, 1937, Joseph Saidu Momoh entered the world. His family then relocated from Binkolo, Bombali to Freetown. To get his Cambridge school certificate, Momoh attended Freetown's West African Methodist Collegiate School from 1951 to 1955. A stint in the Government Clerks School and Technical Institute followed for Momoh. After completing college in 1956, Momoh joined the Civil Service and worked as a third-grade clerk until he quit in 1958. During that particular year, Momoh enlisted in the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) with the rank of private. The disbandment of the RWAFF took place in 1960, nevertheless, its troops continued to have significant influence inside the military until the 1990s. During his time in the United Kingdom, he pursued his studies at the

School of Infantry in Hythe and the Mons Officers Cadet School in Aldershot. It is noteworthy that he received recognition as the Most Exceptional Overseas Cadet and was bestowed with the prestigious Sword of Honour. He also graduated from the Regular Officers Training School in Tieshi, Ghana. After entering the military as a second lieutenant in 1963, Momoh was promoted to major the same year while in charge of Moa Barracks in Daru, Kailahun (James, 1986).

After the military coup that toppled the NRC, Momoh rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel and commanded the First Battalion until he was briefly imprisoned at Pademba Road Prison. In 1970, he received a promotion to colonel. After a failed military coup led by Brigadier General John Bangura in March 1971, President Stevens appointed the second-in-command, Colonel Momoh, as acting force commander that September. In November of that year, Momoh was officially sworn into his new position. Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) was another honour bestowed to Momoh that same year. In the same year (1973), Momoh was promoted by RSLMF Commander and Sierra Leone President Stevens to the rank of Brigadier. In addition, President Stevens named Brigadier Momoh a Nominated Member of Parliament and a Minister of State in the Cabinet in 1974. Like the Tanzanian government, President Stevens included Momoh in political decision making (Brownlee, 2007).

Since 1985, when he became secretary-general, Momoh has been at the helm of the All People's Congress (APC). On October 8, 1985, he was voted President in a one-party referendum to replace Siaka Stevens. Momoh became the second president of Sierra Leone on November 28, 1985, and served until April 29, 1992. Despite the fact that Momoh proclaimed a state of economic emergency during the first stages of his administration, so granting himself significant authority over Sierra Leone's economy, he was not seen as a dictator. The populace considered him as too feeble to rule wisely and too preoccupied with his private life to give much attention to public affairs. When Momoh gained government, the economy was already in a downturn, and he did nothing to turn things around. National currency lost value. When President Momoh's government ran out of cash, the country was without electricity for weeks at a time. Momoh took over a failing system made worse by corruption and its associated instability. Momoh made tremendous headway in his fight against corruption in the Sierra Leonean administration. The majority of international observers praised his efforts as successful. Both Reagan and Thatcher listened to

their advisors and agreed to meet with Momoh and create a constructive cooperation with him in order to help Sierra Leone emerge from the instability it had experienced during the 1970s and 1980s. The two presidents helped Sierra Leone throughout 1987 and into 1988, working closely with Momoh's administration (Smith, 1997).

Momoh successfully lobbied for another constitutional amendment in October 1991, bringing back the country's multi-party system. While the APC was in power under Momoh, there was a surge in instances of abuse of authority. Eastern Sierra Leonean communities along the Liberian border were first attacked in March 1991 by a group calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by a former soldier called Foday Sankoh. Over the course of many months, the RUF was able to force the Sierra Leone army back towards Freetown and seize control of the diamond mines in the Kono region. After a military coup led by a group of young soldiers on April 29, 1992, Sierra Leone's National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) seized control. Since this coup, Momoh has been living in exile in Guinea (Penfold, 2002).

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's Administration

From 1996 to 1997 and again from 1998 to 2007, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (February 16, 1932 – March 13, 2014) was the 3rd President of Sierra Leone. Kabbah, who has degrees in economics and law, has devoted a significant portion of his career to the United Nations Development Programme. In 1992, he left his post with the UN and moved back to Sierra Leone. Kabbah was the party's nominee for president in Sierra Leone's first free election for president in 1996, which he had led as the party's leader since the beginning of the year. His nearest challenger, John Karefa-Smart of the United National People's Party (UNPP), received 40% of the vote in the runoff election but admitted defeat, hence he was elected with 59% of the vote. The election was validated as fair by an international group of observers. Kabbah ran for president on a platform that if he were elected, he would put a stop to the civil war. After promising to stop the civil conflict again and again in his inaugural address, Kabbah finally did it during his administration (Rakate, 2000).

Kabbah, who was reared in Freetown, was born in Pendembu, Kailahun District, Eastern Sierra Leone, and is a devout Muslim. Mandingo was Kabbah's ancestry. Kabbah was the first and only Muslim to hold the position of president of

Sierra Leone. Kabbah's first wife was a devoted Christian of the Sherbro ethnic group and a resident of Bonthe District in southern Sierra Leone named Patricia Tucker. They wed in 1965. Kabbah and his wife Patricia raised five kids. They made public appearances together often before he was president. During his president, she was a major player, advocating for humanitarian causes and speaking out forcefully to stop the civil conflict. She became sick and passed away in 1998, so she never got to witness the conflict finish in 2002. Kabbah married Isata Jabbie Kabbah, a Mandingo Muslim, in Freetown a year after he stepped down as president and 10 years after the death of his first wife, Patricia. They stayed together till his death in 2014 (Rakate, 2000).

From May 1997 until March 1998, Kabbah was removed from office by the military Armed Forces Revolutionary Council due to the ongoing civil conflict with the Revolutionary United Front, commanded by Foday Sankoh. As a result of a military coup led by Nigeria and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he was quickly reinstated to power. In 2000, the United Nations and the United Kingdom became involved in the nation due to a new phase of the civil conflict. Kabbah, as President, initiated peace talks between the government and the RUF insurgents (Rakate, 2000). In the context of the 1999 Lomé Peace Accord, it is noteworthy that the rebel factions shown a willingness to engage in a temporary cessation of hostilities with the Sierra Leone government, marking a significant development. The individual in question entered into many peace agreements with the rebel leader, Foday Sankoh. Kabbah advocated for international assistance from the British, the UN Security Council, the African Union, and the Economic Community of West African States in order to combat the rebels and reinstate stability and tranquilly in Sierra Leone subsequent to the collapse of the cease-fire agreement. In early 2002, Kabbah called an end to the civil conflict. There were massive street celebrations all around Sierra Leone as news of the war's conclusion spread. By the highest margin of victory in a free election in the country's history, 70.1%, Kabbah won the presidential election later that year against Ernest Bai Koroma of the major opposition All People's Congress (APC). Kabbah's win ensured his continued rule for another five years. An international team of observers deemed the election to be legitimate (Rakate, 2000).

Kebbah's First Term in Office

In the first multi-party elections in 23 years, the 1996 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, the Mende-dominated Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) put forth Kabbah as their presidential contender. The SLPP swept the parliamentary elections in the country's southern and eastern regions but performed less well in the western area and lost in the north. The first democratically elected president of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, took office on March 29, 1996. The most diverse cabinet in the country's history was formed under his leadership, including representatives from every major party in Parliament as well as technocrats from many sectors of society. His offer of a government position was rejected by one of the minority parties (Dumbuya, 2008).

The President's primary goal was to put an end to the rebel war that had devastated the economy, displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and killed hundreds of innocent people over the course of four years. He signed a peace pact with the rebel leader, former Corporal Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, in November of 1996. One of the world's worst civil conflicts was unleashed on the people of Sierra Leone when the rebels breached the conditions of the Agreement and started fighting (Dumbuya, 2008).

Attempted Coup of Kabbah's government

Kabbah's grip on the military and the administration in Freetown began to loosen in 1996, when Johnny Paul Koroma and other junior officers of the Sierra Leone Army attempted a coup. After a military coup in May 1997, Kabbah fled to nearby Guinea. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council orchestrated the coup that resulted in Koroma's release and installation as president. While living in exile in Guinea, Kabbah started to gather support from across the world. Nine months after the coup, the military-rebel junta was overthrown by ECOWAS troops led by Nigeria's ECOMOG (ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group) and loyal civil and military defence forces, most notably the Kamajors under Samuel Hinga Norman. Kabbah's government was quickly restored (Dumbuya, 2008). Kabbah and his inner circle were driven from government by a coup led by inferior soldiers in May 1997, after just a year in power. They eventually settled in Conakry, Guinea. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed by the junior officers and the

RUF (absently) to take control in Freetown. However, they were not recognised by the OAU at the Harare Summit, and in February 1998, ECOWAS soldiers drove the AFRC out of Freetown, allowing Kabbah to resume his presidency. In January of that year, with help from Charles Taylor's soldiers in Liberia, the RUF launched another campaign of murder and looting in Freetown. The Nigerians had handed Sankoh over, and he was now being detained in the Pademba Road jail. Despite being betrayed many times, Kabbah continued discussions with the RUF and in June of 1999, the two sides signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. Instead of fulfilling his duties as vice president, Sankoh has continued to amass diamonds and smuggle weapons to his supporters in the field after he was promoted to that position (Dumbuya, 2008).

Kabbah's dogged pursuit of a peaceful resolution to this protracted series of events was crucial to the country's eventual return to democratic rule. In 1998, the UN formed UNAMSIL to help restore peace in the nation, and they were successful. After being re-elected in 2002, Kabbah used his second mandate to bring the economy back to life. He started and organised a slew of infrastructure projects, such huge road expansions, with help from the World Bank and the IMF. The military and police have been retrained in democratic principles as part of a programme to restructure the security sector. His accomplishments were further lauded by the relatively trouble-free 2008 election (Dumbuya, 2008).

Kabbah's Re-election in 2002

In a landslide election win in May 2002, President Kabbah and the SLPP were re-elected to another five-year term. The RUF's political arm, the RUFP, was completely wiped out in the polls. There were claims of fraud and instances of anomalies during the elections; however none of these factors had a major impact on the final tally. British troops totalling 200 men had been stationed in Sierra Leone since the summer of 2000, but on July 28, 2002, they pulled out, taking their military training team of 105 with them. UNAMSIL's official peacekeeping deployment ended in December 2005; however the organisation started reducing its staff in November 2002. United Nations peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) ended, and a new UN office, UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), was formed with a focus on stabilisation and reconciliation (Steady, 2006).

A Truth and Healing Commission was mandated by the 1999 Lome Accord to provide victims and perpetrators of human rights abuses throughout the war a safe space to share their experiences and help bring about true healing. It was agreed upon by the government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to set up a Special Court for Sierra Leone to try those who "bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and serious violations of international humanitarian law within the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996." The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court both had their first hearings in the summer of 2002. In October of 2004, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission delivered its final report to the government. In response to the Commission's final report, the government of Sierra Leone issued a White Paper in June 2005, in which they adopted some of the recommendations but rejected others. Civil society members were unconvinced by the government's reaction and continued to call out the administration for not acting on the report's recommendations (Steady, 2006).

Ernest Bai-Koroma's Rise to the Presidency

Ernest Bai Koroma, a politician from Sierra Leone born on October 2, 1953, served as the country's fourth president from September 17, 2007, until April 4, 2018. He is of Themne and Limba ancestry and was born and reared in the city of Makeni in northern Sierra Leone. His parents were both indigenous peoples of the northern Sierra Leonean area; his father was Themne and his mother was Limba. On 24 March 2002, Koroma defeated then-current All People's Congress (APC) leader Edward Turay in an election that made him the party's new head. In a free and fair election in 2002, Koroma ran as the APC candidate for president but lost to incumbent President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who received 70.3% of the vote to Koroma's 22.35. Koroma finally admitted defeat. Koroma was subsequently elected to Parliament, where he served from 2002 to 2007 as a representative for his home district of Bombali. He was chosen as the leader of the minority in Parliament in 2005 and served in that role until his 2007 presidential victory (Gennaioli, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2013).

Koroma earned 54.6% of the vote in the 2007 run-off election, defeating incumbent Vice-President Solomon Berewa of the SLPP. At the State House in

Freetown on September 17, 2007, Koroma was sworn in as President after Berewa conceded. The election was validated as legitimate by both foreign and domestic observers. Koroma took over as president when Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who had already served the maximum two five-year terms allowed by the constitution, stepped down. The regions of Northern and Western Sierra Leone were Koroma's centers of power. Berewa, on the other hand, retained a sizable following in Sierra Leone's southeastern provinces. The APC claims that in the early hours of July 23, 2007, a group of armed men led by Tom Nyuma, a participant in the 1992 coup that ousted the APC from power, attempted to enter Koroma's hotel room in Bo, Sierra Leone's second largest city (a traditional stronghold of the SLPP), and kill him. Nyuma was hospitalised after being attacked by Koroma's security (Gellner, 2008).

On November 15th, 2007, Koroma was publicly inaugurated in Freetown with seven other African heads of state. On this occasion, he pledged to combat corruption and underlined the need to alter public perceptions on the issue. Koroma earned 58.7% of the vote in the re-run presidential election held in November 2012, while his major opponent, SLPP candidate Julius Maada Bio, received 37.4%. Free and fair, according to reports from international observers. In the March 31st runoff elections, Julius Maada Bio defeated his predecessor, Koroma (Gellner, 2008).

Sierra Leone under Ernest Bai-Koroma

When former President Koroma took in 2007 and up to 2010, he removed many members in his administration that had corruption scandal hovering over them. The Sierra Leone anti-graft panel accused two of his ministers for wrongdoing.

During his leadership, Koroma prioritized building new roads around the nation, which has greatly boosted Sierra Leone's infrastructure. Whilst in office, erstwhile President Koroma made attracting foreign investment his top priority, and Chinese firms responded by pouring money into Sierra Leone's mining sector. Using UN funds, the Koroma administration made prenatal care, delivery, and postpartum care available at no cost to mothers and their children. Many experts and opponents, however, claimed that top government officials squandered and wasted much of the money intended to pay the initiative owing to corruption. Corruption, severe poverty, unemployment, inadequate housing, and healthcare, as well as insufficient electricity and water supply, remained significant obstacles to Koroma's presidency. In spite of

criticism and professional opinion to the contrary, the president insisted that progress had been achieved in all of the aforementioned areas (Kabbah, 2012).

In his inaugural address, President Koroma vowed to tolerate no corruption in his administration. Several high-ranking government officials with ties to the president were detained and charged with corruption early in his term. However, the courts found not guilty of corruption accusations against the president's closest associates in administration. There were claims that they were exonerated because of their friendship with former President Koroma, a claim that the government strongly refuted. Millions of cash earmarked for Ebola victims went missing from the government's emergency Ebola account, according to the Auditor General's report in Sierra Leone. Some high-ranking government employees connected to the Ebola funding were terminated or placed on administrative leave after President Koroma requested specialists to probe the accusation (Leonard, Pitso & Schmidt, 2009).

On September 4, 2008, Koroma disclosed his personal fortune to the Sierra Leone Anti-corruption Commission before signing the Anti-Corruption Bill of 2008 at the State House in Freetown. The new legislation mandates that the President and all other government officials publicly disclose and amend their asset disclosure forms yearly. To better investigate and convict corrupt officials, Koroma has expanded the authority of the country's anti-corruption body (Kabbah, 2012).

Rebuilding national infrastructure in the wake of the Civil War, rooting out corruption, and strengthening health care were all priorities for the Koroma administration. Throughout April of 2010, Koroma signed a bill making healthcare for pregnant women, nursing mothers, and children under the age of five completely free of charge in the country. Koroma put an emphasis on free-market solutions, which resulted in an increase in private investment (Kabbah, 2012).

In particular, the northern and Western areas of the nation are strong supporters of President Koroma, who was re-elected in 2012 with 58% of the vote. His cabinet and presidential staff included members of almost all of Sierra Leone's ethnic groups. President Koroma was often seen waving to bystanders from the window of his limousine as he made unannounced visits to many low-income districts of Sierra Leone. After more than a decade of conflict, Sierra Leone seemed to be on the road to recovery until an outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus illness in 2014, which also affected neighbouring states Liberia and Guinea. An individual who had been infected in Guinea and had died in December 2013 was identified as

the source of the epidemic. Due in large part to inadequate public health infrastructure, the disease first appeared in Sierra Leone in March or April of the following year, when it quickly spread. More than 14,000 Sierra Leoneans had contracted the Ebola virus by the time the epidemic was brought under control in 2016. Of them, over 4,000 had died, and the country's economy was left in ruins (Kabbah, 2012).

The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index was released on Monday 2017, and it showed that former President Ernest Bai Koroma's administration was unable to promote economic opportunity and education during its 11 years in office (Ikpe, Alao & Nyokabi, 2021). According to an analysis of the 2018 Index conducted by the Sierra Leone Telegraph, the country performed significantly worse than Ghana, Liberia, and Guinea during the period between 2008 and 2017, during which President Koroma and his government borrowed significantly more than previous governments to rebuild a nation broken by ten years of civil war.

Nation-wide resources in Sierra Leone are redistributed as status symbols. At the time, in the mid-1990s, the system faced a twofold problem in Africa. As the Cold War came to an end, the price of raw resources plummeted, and foreign aid dried up. Those rising in Freetown relied heavily on young individuals who had been cut off from patrilineal networks. Even inside organizations receiving foreign money, neo-patrimonial governance arrangements have persisted, as shown by peace building and development initiatives after 2002. The above considerations provide crucial context for appreciating that modern political success in Sierra Leone is predicated on securing access to resources via patronage networks.

Table 1: First Cabinet Officials of Ernest Bai-Koroma and their ethnic Background 2007

Cabinet Position	Name of Cabinet Official	Ethnic Background
Minister of Foreign Affairs	Zainab Hawa Bangura	Themne
Minister of Finance and Development	David Carew	Creole/Krio
Minister of Defence	Alfred Paolo Conteh	Limba
Minister of Justice and Attorney-General	Abdul Serry-Kemal	Themne

Minister of Trade and Industry	Alimamy Koroma	Themne
Minister of Energy and Power	Haja Afsatu Kabba	Mandingo
Minister of Information and Communications	Alhaji I.B. Kargbo	Themne
Minister of Health	Dr. Soccoh Kabia	Mende
Minister of Housing and Infrastructural Development	John Saad	Mende
Minister of Internal Affairs, Local Government and Rural Development	Dauda Sulaiman Kamara	Limba
Minister of Mineral Resources	Alhaji Abubakarr Jalloh	Fullah
Minister of Agriculture	Dr. Sam Sesay	Limba
Minister of Lands, Country Planning & the Environment	Benjamin O.N. Davies	Creole/Krio
Minister of Marine Resources	Dr. Moses Moisa-Kapu	Mende
Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs	Musu Kandeh	Mandingo
Minister of Tourism and Cultural Affairs	Hindolo Trye	Mende
Minister of Employment and Social Security	Minkailu Mansaray	Themne
Minister of Education, Youths and Sports	Dr. Minkailu Bah	Fullah
Minister of Transport and Aviation	Kemoh Sesay	Themne
Minister of Presidential and Public Affairs	Alpha Kanu	Themne

Source: The Sierra Leone Telegraphy 2012

Among President Ernest Bai Koroma's 20 cabinet appointees, 7 were themne (35%), 4 were Mendes (20%), 3 were Limbas (15%), 2 were Krio (10%), 2 were Mandingo (10%) and 2 were Fullah (10%). To contrast with the 2018 Paopa Cabinet chosen by President Bio's SLPP: Twenty-two Mendes (73.3%), two Kuranko (6.7%), two Fullah (6.7%), one Themne (3.3%), one Madingo (3.3%), one Limba (3.3%), one Susu (3.3%), and one Kono (3.3%) were among the thirty cabinet members selected by President Bio. Unlike the APC's first cabinet, which was fairly split among several ethnic groups, the SLPP Paopa's first cabinet selection is tribalistic, with one tribe occupying 73% of the seats (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

Sierra Leone under President Julius Maada Bio

Julius Maada Wonie Bio was born on May 12, 1964, in the village of Tihun, Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District, Southern Province of Sierra Leone. Bio was born under the SLPP administration of Sir Albert Margai, three years after Sierra Leone's independence. He is a member of the Mende ethnic group and is from southern Sierra Leone. In 2005, Bio officially affiliated with the SLPP. Bio competed for party leader in the 2005 SLPP national convention in Makeni, Sierra Leone, and received 33 votes, placing him third behind Vice President Solomon Berewa (291 votes) and Charles Margai (34 votes). J.B. Dauda has received 28 votes as of this writing (Esther & Emmanuel, 2022).

On the evening of July 31, 2011, extremists within the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) gathered at the Youyi Building in the city's downtown to announce Bio as the party's 2012 presidential candidate. He ran against President Ernest Bai Koroma of the governing APC in the national election and lost, receiving 37% of the vote, but he was successful in establishing the SLPP as the sole significant political opposition in the country. Bio, the nominee of the major opposition Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), won the runoff vote of the 2018 Sierra Leonean presidential election, 51.8% to 48.2%, against Samura Kamara, the candidate of the governing All People's Congress (APC). The election was validated as legitimate by both foreign and domestic observers. He was president when Ernest Bai Koroma's term ended. In the 2012 presidential election, Bio ran as the SLPP candidate and garnered 37% of the vote, losing to the incumbent, Ernest Bai Koroma, who received 58% of the vote (Denisova, 2019).

The presidential and general elections in Sierra Leone, which took place on March 7, 2018, was the third such elections held since the end of the country's civil war. These elections aimed to choose the next president, parliament members, and local council representatives. The non-participation of former President Ernest Bai Koroma in the election might be attributed to his constitutional ineligibility, since he had already served the maximum allowable term of 10 years. In the electoral context of Sierra Leone, the primary contenders in the presidential race were Julius Maada Bio, the opposition leader representing the Sierra Leone People's Party, and Dr. Samura Matthew Wilson Kamara, who belonged to the former ruling All People's Congress, now functioning as the main opposition party. The first round of voting witnessed a narrow margin of less than 15,000 votes between these two candidates. However, due to the absence of a clear majority winner, a second round of voting was conducted on March 31st. Following the election, Bio received 51.8% of the vote. The election was praised by international observers as being "free and orderly". There were a total of 16 contenders that registered to run for president. There were 16 candidates running for office, 14 of them males and two women.

According to the Sierra Leone Electoral Commission (2018), Mr. Julius Maada Bio was victorious in the presidential election and subsequently became the presidency of Sierra Leone after a runoff vote held in March 2018.

After just one month in office, President Bio of Sierra Leone signed an executive order making public elementary and secondary school education in the country's public schools free for all pupils in the autumn of 2018. Also, all application costs at Sierra Leone's publicly funded colleges have been waived. The financing deal worth $400 million between the previous President of Sierra Leone, Ernest Bai Koroma, and China was terminated by Bio. According to a report by the Sierra Leone Telegraph (2020), the allocated funds were intended to be used for the development of a new international airport in Sierra Leone. Under the first two months of his tenure, President Bio undertook a thorough examination of all mining contracts, ministries, and other governmental bodies that were established under the administration of Ernest Bai Koroma. During the first two months of his tenure, Bio undertook the removal of all ambassadors and permanent representatives of Sierra Leone stationed abroad, who had been appointed by the previous government led by Ernest Bai Koroma. During the first two months of his tenure, President Bio

appointed Charles Margai, a prominent figure from the opposition, to assume the roles of Attorney General and Minister of Justice in the nation (Denisova, 2018).

The inquiry report produced by the government of President Bio, under the leadership of Chief Minister David J. Francis, alleges substantial financial impropriety on the part of previous President Ernest Bai Koroma and his administration. The allegations against Former President Koroma include embezzlement of substantial government funds, unauthorised sale of public assets, and divestment of a significant portion of a state mining enterprise, failure to allocate funds to support victims affected by the Ebola outbreak and mudslide and neglecting to provide financial assistance to economically disadvantaged Sierra Leonean Muslims for their pilgrimage to Hajj. As per Bio's directives, the Justice Ministry in Sierra Leone has formed a panel of judges to examine the claims against the former administration. This commission would be headed by an international judge (Denisova, 2018).

Sierra Leone is home to 16 distinct ethnic groups, all of whom speak their own languages and have their own customs. According to a September 2018 update on the CIA World Factbook page, 30.8% of Sierra Leone's population is made up of Mendes. However, as the following table demonstrates, Mendes controls each and every one of President Bio's government ministries, agencies, and diplomatic missions (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

The Commission of Inquiry was established in 2018 when President Bio assumed office. His administration claimed that the APC's corrupt rule left the government coffers empty. Ernest Bai Koroma's (EBK) government, like that of any other political leader, was full with party-leaning and card-carrying adherents. Since President Bio's 2018 election, a comprehensive list of all the tribal appointments he has made has been extensively disseminated on social media, showing what any reasonable person would consider to be a worrying spectre of tribalism in Sierra Leone. In an effort to demonstrate that President Maada Bio is a prejudiced tribalist who has turned the whole nation into a Mendes-dominated tribal hegemony state, a group of political activists and citizen journalists compiled the following list (Denisova, 2018).

Table 2: List of President Bio's Cabinet Officials and Tribes (Published by the Sierra Leone Telegraph)

Cabinet Ministers (Madda Bio's Government)

#	Position	Name	Tribe
1	Chief Minister	Mr. Jacob Jusu Saffa	Mende
2	Finance Minister	Dr. Denis K. Vandy	Mende
3	Attorney General & Minister of Justice	Mr. Mohamed Lamin Tarawallie	Mende / Madingo
4	Minister of Primary and Secondary Education	Dr. David Moininah Sengeh	Mende
5	Minister of Health	Dr Austin Demby	Mende
6	Minister of Energy	Mr. Kanja Sesay	Madingo
7	Minister of Information and Communications	Mr. Mohamed Rahman Swarray	Mende
8	Minister of Fisheries & Marine Resources	Madam Emma Kowa	Mende
9	Minister of Labour	Mr. Alpha Osman Timbo	Fullah/Themne
10	Minister of Water Resources	Ing. Philip Karimu Lansana	Mende
11	Minister of Social Welfare	Ms Baindu Dansama	Mende
12	Minister of Internal Affairs	Mr. David Panda Noah	Mende
13	Minister of Defense	Brgd. (Rtd) Hassan Kellie Conteh	Koranko
14	Army Joint Commander	Brgd. General P. K Lavahun	Mende
14	Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation	Professor David Francis	Mende
15	Minister of Planning & Economic Development	Dr. Francis, Kaikai	Mende
16	Minister of Technical and Higher Education	Asso. Professor Alpha Tejan Wurie	Fullah
17	Minister of Works and Public Assets	Mr. Peter Bayuku Konteh	Limba
18	Minister of Trade and Industry	Mr. Edward Hinga Sandy	Mende
19	Minister of Transport and Aviation	Mr. Kabineh M. Kallon	Mende
20	Minister of Mines and Mineral Resources	Mr. Timothy Kabbah	Mende / Madingo
21	Minister of Lands and Housing	Dr. Turad Senesi	Mende
22	Minister of Agriculture, Forestry & Food Security	Mr. Abu Bakarr Karim	Mende
23	Minister of Youth Affairs	Mr. Mohamed Orman Bangura	Themne
24	Minister of Local Government and Rural Development	Mr. Tamba Lamina	Kono
25	Minister of Tourism and Culture	Dr. Memunatu B. Pratt	Mende / Madingo
26	Minister of Political and Public Affairs	Ambassador Foday Yumkella	Susu
27	Minister of Sports	Mr. Ibrahim Nyelenkeh	Mende
28	Ministry of Gender & Children's Affairs	Madam Manty Beatrice Tarawallie	Koranko
29	Minister of Environment	Prof. Foday Moriba Jaward	Mende
30	Minister of State, Vice President's Office	Mrs. Francess Piagie Alghali	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments 1

Deputy Ministers (Madda Bio's Government)

#	Position	Name	Tribe
1	Youths Affairs	Mr. Lusaney Kallon	Mende
2	Finance 1	Mr. Sheku Fatamadi Bangura	Limba
2	Finance 2	Mr. Bockarie Kallokoh	Mende
3	Political and Public Affairs	Mr. Amara Kallon	Mende /Madingo
4	Foreign Affairs	Madam Mamadi Gobeh Kamara	Loko
5	Internal Affairs	Mr. Lahai Lawrence Leema	Mende
6	Attorney General and Minister of Justice	Mr. Umaro Napoleon Koroma	Koranko
7	Information and Communications	Mr. Solomon Jamiru	Mende
8	Social Welfare	Mr. Mohamed Haji-Kellah	Mende
9	Ministry of Higher and Technical Education	Mr. Sarjoh Aziz Kamara	Susu
10	Planning and Economic Development	Dr. Jonathan Titus Williams	Mende / Shabro
11	Health and Sanitation 1	Madam Princess Dugba	Mende
12	Health and Sanitation 2	Dr. Anthony Augustine Sandi	Mende
13	Lands and Country Planning	Rev. Abraham J. Sesay-Jones	Loko
14	Defense	Col. Rtd. Muana B. Massaquoi	Mende
15	Environment	Mr. Stephen Syril James Jusu	Mende
16	Transport and Aviation	Mr. Rex Bonapha	Mende
17	Sports	Mr. Kai Lawrence Mbayo	Kono
18	Agriculture 1	Dr. Theresa T. Dick	Mende
19	Agriculture 2	Mr. Musa Kpaka	Mende
20	Trade and Industry	Haja Isata Abdulai-Kamara	Susu
21	Energy	Dr. Eldred Tunde Taylor	Krio
22	Marine Resources	Mr. Ibrahim Turay	Limba
23	Labour and Social Security	Mr. Lansana Mohamed Dumbuya	Limba
24	Water Resources	Mrs. Namatulai Bah-Chang	Fullah
25	Works and Public Assets	Philip Tetema Tondeneh	Kono
26	Mines & Mineral Resources	Ann Marie Baby Harding	Mende
27	Local Government and Rural Development	Mrs. Melrose Kargbo	Mende
28	Tourism and Culture	Mr. William I K. Robinson	Krio
29	Basic and Senior Secondary Education	Mrs. Emely Kadiatu Gogra	Themne
30	Environment	Mr. Steven Syril James Jusu	Mende
31	Gender & Children's Affairs	Hindowa Bokai Bindi	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments 2

	Resident Ministers (Madda Bio's Government)		
1	Resident Minister, South	Mr. Mohamed K. Alie	Mende
2	Resident Minister, East	General (Rtd) K. E. S. Boya	Mende
3	Resident Minister, North	Mr. Abu Abu Koroma	Themne
4	Resident Minister, North West	Hon. Alpha Kanu	Themne
5	Resident Minister , Western Region	Mrs. Nabilla Tunis	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments

3

	Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)		
1	Bank Governor	Prof. Kelfalah Muranah Kallon	Mende
2	Secretary to President	Dr. Julius Sandy	Mende
3	Head of Communication Office of the President	Dr. Patrick K. Muanna	Mende
4	Presidential Press Secretary	Mr. Usuff Keketoma Sandy	Mende
5	National Security Coordinator - Office of National Security	Mr. Abdulai Caulker	Mende / Sherbro
6	Dpt. National Security Coordinator - Office of National Security	Dr. Ahmed A. Sanoh	Mende
7	Chief of Staff - Office of National Security	Mr. Francis Langumba Kellie	Mende
8	Principal Director - Office of National Security	Mr. Alhaji Morlai Kargbo	Limba
9	Inspector General of Police	Mr. Michael Ambrose Sovulla	Mende
10	Deputy Inspector General of Police	Mr. Elizabeth Turay	Mende
11	Army Chief of Staff	Birdg. Gen Sullay Sesay	Themne
12	Financial Secretary	Mr. Shar Jusu	Mende
13	Deputy Financial Secretary	Mr. Mathew Dinjie	Mende
14	Anti-Corruption Commissioner	Mr. Francis Ben Kaifalah	Mende
15	Deputy Anti-Corruption Commissioner	Mr. Augustine Ngoble	Mende
16	Chief Immigration Officer	Mr. Andrew Jaia kai Kai	Mende
17	Director General - Human Resource Management Office	Mr. Ansu Samuel Tucker	Mende
18	Director General - National Civil Registration Authority	Mr. Mohamed Massaquoi	Mende
19	Deputy Director Information, Education & Communications NCRA	Mr. Amadu Juana Kamanda	Mende
20	Director General - Road Maintenance Fund Administration	Mr. Sheku M. Kanneh	Mende
21	Deputy Director General - Road Maintenance Fund Administration	Mr. Bashiru Sheriff	Mende
22	Director General National Public Procurement Authority	Mr. Ibrahim Brima Swaray	Mende
23	Director General - Sierra Leone Roads Authority	Ing. Amara Kanneh	Mende
24	Commissioner- Electricity and Water Regulation Commission	Dr. Emmanuel Mannah	Mende
25	Director General - NATCOM	Mr. Daniel Kaitibie	Mende
26	Director of Regulatory Affairs - NATCOM	Mr. Smart Kokofele	Mende

	Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)		
27	Director General - NASSIT	Mr. Mohamed Fuad Daboh	Mende
28	Commissioner General – NRA	Dr. Samuel Jibao	Mende
29	Public Relations Officer - Judiciary of Sierra Leone	Mr. Elkas Sannoh	Mende
30	Public Relations Officer 2 - Judiciary of Sierra Leone	Mr. Francis H. Murray	Mende
31	Director General – National Civil Aviation Authority	Mr. Moses Tiffa Baio	Mende
32	Executive Director General SLRSA	Rev. Smart K. Senesi	Mende
33	Deputy Director General SLRSA	Mr. James Bio Jnr.	Mende
34	Commissioner Human Right Commission	Mrs. Nansu Ndanema	Mende
35	Chairman Board of DirectorsRoad Maintenance Administration Fund	Mr. Andrew Fartoma	Mende
36	Deputy Commissioner Human Right Commission	Mr. Victor Lansana	Mende
37	Chairman National Commission for Civic Education	Mr. Kalilu Tutangay	Mende
38	Director General, National Minerals Agency	Mr. Julius Denis Martai	Mende
39	Director General, Guma Valley Water Company	Mr. Madda Penge	Mende
40	Executive Secretary Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company	Dr. James Vibie	Mende
41	Commissioner – NaCSA	Dr. Hannah Isata Max-Kyne	Mende
42	Deputy Commissioner – NaCSA	Mr. Jimmy Batillo Songa	Mende
43	Chairman Board of Directors NaCSA	Paramount Chief Foday Musa	Mende
44	Exe. Sec. National Commission for Persons with Disabilities	Mr. Saa Lamin Kortequee	Mende
45	Director General – Local Content Agency	Mr. Fodeba Daboh	Mende
46	General Manager, Sierra Leone Airports Authority	Mr. Jack Massaquoi	Mende
47	Commissioner, National Youth Commission	Mr. Ngolo Katta	Mende
48	Chairman National Commission for Privatization	Dr. Alex Prince Harding	Mende
49	Chief Medical Officer	Dr. Thomas Anara	Mende
50	Chief Commissioner Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mohamed K. Konneh	Mende
51	Commissioner West, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Madam Zainab Umu Moseray	Mende
52	Commissioner East, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Madam Maraim Sia Nyuma-Moijueh	Mende
53	Commissioner South, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Edmund Sylvester Alpha	Mende
54	Commissioner North, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Abubakarr Mahmoud Koroma	Themne
55	Executive Secretary, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. William Ado Davies	krio
56	Asst. Executive Secretary, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sheku C. Johnny	Mende
57	Director of Outreach and External Relations ECSL	Mr. Albert Massaquoi	Mende
58	Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mbekay S. Amara	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments

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Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)

59	Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Tamba T. Tommy	Mende
60	Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Alex P. Labib Saffa	Mende
61	Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Momoh Kanneh	Mende
62	Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sheku Loleh	Mende
63	Legal Officer National Electoral Commission	Mr. Fatoma Fabundeh Esq	Mende
64	Elections Manager Bo District, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Baleyma Musa	Mende
65	Elections Manager Kenema District, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leo	Mr. Augustine Saffa	Mende
66	Elections Manager Port Loko District, Electoral Commission of Sierra Le	Mr. Augustine Mohamed	Mende
67	Elections Manager Karene District, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leor	Mr. Charles Ensa	Mende
68	Elections Manager Western Urban District, Electoral Commission of SL	Mr. Larry Fangawa	Mende
69	Elections Manager Western Rural District, Electoral Commission of SL	Madam Louissa Gbassa	Mende
70	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Alie Peter Brima	Mende
71	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Christopher A. A. Jones	krio
72	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Ibrahim Wilson Kanneh	Mende
73	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. John P. Simbo	Mende
74	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Gibrilla M. Jusu	Mende
75	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Musa Kangbai	Mende
76	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Paul Damba	Mende
77	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Victor Musa	Mende
78	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Ansumana V. Kanneh	Mende
79	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sahr Kellie	Mende
80	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Umaru Fomba	Mende
81	Asst. Director, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Paul J. Bannister	Mende
82	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Alex Paila	Mende
83	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Solomon Sondai	Mende
84	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Stephen P. Borbo	Mende
85	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Emmanuel Yagbaji	Mende
86	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Henry Thompson	krio
87	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Foday Allieu	Mende
88	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mahoney J.J. Ansue	Mende
89	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mary Bairoh	Mende
90	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Saidu Saradugu	Mende

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Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)

91	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mohamed Amara	Mende
92	Senior Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Francis B. Musa	Mende
93	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Emmanuel Lavallie	Mende
94	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Augustine J. Junisa	Mende
95	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Gassimu Sillah	Mende / Madingo
96	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mohamed S. Turay	Limba
97	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Brima Alie	Mende
98	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sheku Umar Bokarie	Mende
99	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Simeon Tomah Trye	Mende
100	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sulaiman Amara	Mende
101	Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Adama K. Saffa	Mende
102	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Ahmed K. Bassie	Mende
103	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Alimamy Bai Bundu	Themne
104	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Anthony Aiah Senesie	Mende
105	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Jacob Jajua	Mende
106	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Lawrence A. Kenjah	Mende
107	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Sammy Christo Sama	Mende
108	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Hassan V. Sheriff	Mende
109	Asst. Electoral Officer, Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone	Mr. Mohamed T. Sheriff	Mende
110	Chairman, Public Service Commission	Mr. Kalilu Umar Bah	Fullah
111	Secretary - Public Service Commission	Mr. Mohamed Jusu	Mende
112	Statistician General, Statistics Sierra Leone	Prof. Osman Sankoh	Themne
113	Deputy Statistician General, Statistics Sierra Leone	Mr. Andrew Bob Johnny	Mende
114	Director, Financial Intelligence Unit	Mr. David Bobor	Mende
115	Director of Budget, Ministry of Finance	Mr. Taprima Jah	Mende
116	Managing Director, National Medical Supplies Agency	Mr. Lawrence Sandy	Mende
117	Chairperson, Teaching Service Commission	Mrs. Stanela Beckley	krio
118	Chairman Independent Media Commission	Mr. George Khoryama	Mende
119	Registrar, Sierra Leone Law School	Mr. Joseph G. Kobba	Mende
120	Director General, SLBC	Mr. Joseph Egebenda Kapua	Mende
121	Managing Director, EDSA	Ing James Rogers	Mende
122	Public Relations Officer, EDSA	Mr. Sahr Nepor	Mende

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Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)

123	Chairman for Presidential Initiative on Infrastructure	Dr. John Tambi	Mende
124	Principal Legal Assistant office of Attorney General	Mr. Lahai Momoh Farma Esq.	Mende
125	National coordinator - Midterm census, Statistics Sierra Leone	Mr. Abdulai Salia Brima	Mende
126	National coordinator Free Quality Education Program	Mr. Amara Sowa	Mende
127	PRO Ministry of Health and Sanitation	Mr. Solomon Rogers	Mende
128	Deputy General Manager, Sierra Leone Ports Authority	Mr. Yakuba Bio	Mende
129	Coordinator, Student Loan Scheme Committee, MBSSE	Mr. Paul Amara	Mende
130	Director of Planning and Policy MBSSE	Madam Adama Momoh	Mende
131	Director of Programs NaCSA	Ms. Regina Saffa	Mende
132	Managing Director SALWACO	Mr. Joseph Munda Sandi	Mende
133	Director National Disaster Management	Mr. John Rogers	Mende
134	Director Child and Productive Health, MoHS	Dr. Satie Kanneh	Mende
135	Director of Hospitals and Ambulance services MoHS	Dr. Matthew Vandy	Mende
136	Director, Public Education and Outreach - ACC	Mr. Patrick Sandy	Mende
137	Operations Coordinator - ACC	Mr. Emanuel Koivaya Amara	Mende
138	Public Relations Officer - ACC	Ms. Margaret Murray	Mende
139	Assistant Public Relations Officer - ACC	Mr. Morris Kantay	Mende
140	CEO- Munafa Fund (Micro-credit scheme)	Mr. Shaka Sannoh	Mende
141	Managing Director Sierratel	Mr. Prince Bio	Mende
142	Managing Director Sierra Leone Maritime Administration	Mr. Paul Massaquoi	Mende
143	Managing Director Salwaco	Ing. George Lamin Vandi	Mende
144	National Director NGO Affairs	Mr. Eric Massally	Mende
145	Executive Director, National Sports Authority	Dr. Kenneth Brima	Mende
146	Communications Officer National Sports Authority	Mr. Eric Batilo Fomba	Mende
147	Chariman Premier League Board	Mr. Alieu Vandi Koroma	Mende
148	Director of National Accounts & Economic Stastistics Stats SL	Mr. Moluwa Andrew Gbegeh	Mende
149	Director of Communications Stastistics Stats SL	Mr. Samuel Ansumana	Mende
150	Director, Conservation Trust Fund, Ministry of Environment	Mr. Patrick Amara Foday	Mende
151	Deputy Commissioner, National Commission for Children	Mr. Fambudeh Ansumana	Mende
152	Director of Technical and Vocational Education, MHTE	Dr. Victor Massaquoi	Mende
153	Exams Officer, Technical and Vocational Education, MHTE	Mr. Madda Stevens	Mende
154	Chief Technical and Higher Education Officer, MHTE	Dr. Josephus Brima	Mende

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Heads of Departments, Agencies, Commissions and State-owned Entriprises (Madda Bio's Government)

155	Chief Pharmacist & Chair of Contract Management - PPP, MoHS	Mr. Jack Lansana	Mende
156	Focal Person - PPP, MoHS	Mr. Cyrus Sheriff	Mende
157	Donor Laison Manager, MoHS,	Mr. Sulaiman Phoray Musa	Mende
158	Head, ECOWAS National Office, Ministry of Planning & Economic Dev.	Madam Mamie-Miatta Kallon	Mende
159	Director of Housing and Country Planning, Ministry of Lands	Mr. Augustine Kai Banya	Mende
160	Head of Building, Ministry of Lands	Madam Mariama Tutu Vandi	Mende
161	Director of Lands & Syrvey Ministry of Lands	Mr. Tamba Dauda	Mende
162	Chairman, Teaching Service Commission	Mr. Conrad Saquee	Mende
163	Head of Finance, National Sports Authority	Mr. Albert Lebbie	Mende
164	Solicitor General	Robert Kowa Esq	Mende
165	Chairman, Independent Media Commission	Dr. Victor Massaquoi	Mende
166	Program Officer, Education Outcome Fund	Madam Madiana Nyanda Samba	Mende
167	Consultant, Ministry of Basic and Senior Secondary Education	Dr. Albert Dupini	Mende
168	Marketing Director, SALPOST	Mr. Brima Katta	Mende
169	PRO 2, Judiciary of Sierra Leone	Francis H. Murray	Mende
170	Medical Supretendent, Sierra Leone Correctional Center	Dr. Tamba Lebbie	Mende
171	Presidential Advicer, Political Affiars	Mr. Brima Patrick Kapuwa	Mende
172	Director General, National Protected Area Authority	Mr. Joseph Ranto Musa	Mende
173	Justice Sector Coordinator	Mr. Sahid Korgie	Mende
174	Director of Gender, Ministry of Gender and Childrens affiars	Mr. Charles Vandi	Mende
175	Ag. Director, Environment Emergency Management	Mr. Lahai Vandi Keita	Mende/Madingo
176	Statistics Sierra Leone	Mauluma Andrew Gebeh	Mende
177	Deputy Director National Dissaster Management Agency	Mr. John B. Rogers	Mende
178	Deputy Commissioner, National Commission for Children	Mr. Fambudeh Ansumana	Mende
179	Head, Health Education Division - Ministry of Health & Sanitation	Wannie Lahai	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments

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	Permanent Secretaries (Madda Bio's Government)		
1	Ministry of Transport and Avation	Mr. Brima Sowa	Mende
2	Misnstry of Technical and Higher Education	Mr. Gilbert Cooper	Mende
3	Misnstry of Energy	Mr. Raymond T. Gbetuwa	Mende
4	Misnstry of Primary and Secondary Education (Snr Permanent Secretary)	Mr. David W. S. Banya	Mende
5	Misnstry of Primary and asecondary Education	Mrs. Tumisang Thabela	Mende
6	Minister of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation	Mrs. Margeret Matturi	Mende
7	Minister of Information and Communications	Mr. Edward Kwame Yankson	Mende
8	Misnstry of Labour	Mr. Ahmed Muctarr Mustapha.	Mende
9	Misnstry of Lands, Housing and Country Planning	Mr. Israel Jigba	Mende
10	Misnstry of Works and Public Assets	Mr. Prince Cole	Krio
11	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development	Mr. Thomas B. Lansana	Mende
12	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Mr. Sheku Kamara	Themne
13	Misnstry of Social Welfare	Mr. Momo Bockarie Foh	Mende
14	Misnstry of Gender & Childeren's Affairs	Mrs. Zainab Buya-Kamara	Mende
15	Misnstry of Health & Sanitation	Mr. Morie Momoh	Mende
16	Development Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Economic Dev.	Mr. Peter N. Sam-Kpakra	Mende
17	Misnstry of Trade & Industry	Mr. Abdul Rahman Fofanah	Madingo
18	Misnstry of Youth Affairs	Mr. Andrew Sorie	Mende

	Ambassadors / High Commissioners (Madda Bio's Government)		
1	Ambassador to USA	Mr. Sidique Abu Bakarr Wai	Mende
2	High Commissioner to UK	Dr. Morie Manneh	Kono
3	Ambassador to China	Mr. Earnest Ndomaina	Mende
4	Ambassador to Belgium / Netherland / France	Mr. Samuel Tamba Musa	Mende
5	Ambassador to Russia	Mr. Mohamed Yongawo	Mende
6	Ambassador to Germany	Dr. M'baimba Lamin Baryoh	Mende
7	High Commissioner to Nigeria	Mr. Rupert Davies	Krio
8	High Commissioner to Ghana	Mrs Francess Anderson	Mende
9	Honarary Consol to Lebanon	Mr. Donald Abed	Mende
10	Ambassador to Liberia	Eddie S. Massalay	Mende
11	Ambassador to Egypt	Mr Sadiq Sillah	Mende

Updated List of Tribal Appointments

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Source: Sierra Leone Telegraph (2021)

Throughout President Maada Bio's tenure, which commenced in 2018, individuals from diverse backgrounds in Sierra Leone have expressed significant discontent regarding the perceived exclusion and marginalisation of other ethnic groups in the President's appointments. Critics argue that President Bio has predominantly favoured individuals from the Mende ethnic group, thereby neglecting the representation of other ethnic groups within the country. Nevertheless, President Bio seems to evade accountability for his actions, since concerns about the prevalence of tribalism and regionalism within his administration have been disregarded by both domestic and international audiences. It's nothing new to accuse politicians in Sierra Leone of hypocrisy, double standards, nepotism, or tribalism. Successive administrations have been criticized by scores of Sierra Leonean academics residing home and abroad and as well as the Sierra Leone Association of Journalist and the Democracy Watch for polarizing the political landscape with ethnic and regional intolerance and language ever since democratic elections were reinstated after the conclusion of the guerrilla conflict in 2001 (Denisova, 2018).

The current President, Bio, is under fire for allegedly favouring members of his Mende tribe while filling cabinet positions and leading government institutions. As far as evidence can tell, President Bio has not taken any of the recommendations from the TRC Report into consideration. No Creoles or Konos make up the 30

members of the ministerial cabinet in this nation of 7 million inhabitants, but there are 22 Mendes. Most of the Cabinet is hence Mendes (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

Twenty of President Bio's 31 Deputy Ministers are Mendes (65%), with the remaining eleven being from other ethnic groups; only two are Creoles and two are Konos, namely Dr. Eldred Tunde Taylor (Energy Ministry) and Mr. William Robinson (Tourism and Culture); Mr. Kai Lawrence Mbayo (Sports) and Mr. Philip Tetema Tondeneh (Works and Public Assets) are Konos. The non-Mende tribes in the nation under the Bio-led administration do much worse in terms of representation in government departments, agencies, commissions, and state-owned enterprises. Sixty-five (94%) of the 69 heads of departments, agencies, commissions, and state-owned enterprises are Mendes, with just four being of a different ethnic background. Mrs. Stanela Beckley, the Chairperson of the Teaching Service Commission, is Creole, but there are no other presidential appointees who speak Kono. It is estimated that 73 percent of CSOs' senior leaders are members of President Bio's Mende tribe, which means that other groups' efforts to get equal access to government services, land, and other basic rights are hampered (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

A look at the differences between President Koroma's first ministerial cabinet in 2007 and President Bio's SLPP strongly tribalistic and prejudiced first cabinet appointments: To his government, President Koroma of Sierra Leone selected 20 people in 2007. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Themne) Zainab Hawa Bangura; Minister of Finance and Development (Krio) David Carew; Minister of Defense (Limba) Paolo Conteh; Minister of Justice and Attorney General (Themne) Abdul Serry-Kemal; Minister of Trade and Industry (Themne) Alimamy Koroma; Minister of Energy and Power (Madingo) Haja Afsatu Kabba; Minister of Information and (Themne) (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

Among President Ernest Bai Koroma's 20 cabinet appointees, 7 were Themne (35%), 4 were Mendes (20%), 3 were Limbas (15%), 2 were Krio (10%), 2 were Mandingo (10%), and 2 were Fullah (10%). To contrast with the 2018 Paopa Cabinet chosen by President Bio's SLPP: Twenty-two Mendes (73.3%), two Kuranko (6.7%), two Fullah (6.7%), one Themne (3.3%), one Madingo (3.3%), one Limba (3.3%), one Susu (3.3%), and one Kono (3.3%) were among the thirty cabinet members selected by President Bio. Unlike the APC's first cabinet, which was fairly split

among several ethnic groups, the SLPP Paopa's first cabinet selection is tribalistic, with one tribe occupying 73% of the seats (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

Ethnic Voting Pattern in Sierra Leone

Voting has long been seen by many Sierra Leonean voters and parties as a method to show support for family and kin who, as in many African nations, are seen as a means to channel public and private wealth and prestige to a family, ethnic group, or community. Based on this interpretation, voters don't care much about the policies and programmes of political parties or about the records and abilities of individual candidates for office. An excellent illustration of this is the SLPP's performance in two districts (Kailahun and Bombali) in 2007.

Table 3: Presidential Results 2007, 2012 and 2018 by Districts/Regions

Year of Election	2007		2012		2018			
District	APC	SLPP	APC	SLPP	APC	SLPP	APC % Change 2012 to 2018	SLPP % Change 2012 to 2018
Kailahun	9.4%	90.6%	22.6%	73.3%	10.5%	81.9%	-53.5	11.7
Kenema	16.9%	83.1%	18.7%	77.9%	11.0%	83.8%	-41,1	7.4
Kono	41.5%	58.6%	58.2%	37.1%	20.1%	21.5%	-65.4	42.0
Bombali	89.9%	10.1%	93.2%	4.4%	86.2%	8.5%	-7.5	93.1
Koinadugu	64.6%	35.4%	86.4%	9.1%	56.3%	27.2%	-34.8	198.1
Tonkolili	88.7%	11.3%	92.6%	4.4%	76.7%	9.8%	-17.1	122.2
Kambia	80.9%	19.1%	82.2%	13.0%	39.3%	10.2%	-48.9	21.5
Port Loko	88.2%	11.9%	90.2%	5.6%	71.3%	9.3%	-20.9	66.7
Bo	26.0%	74.0%	16.7%	77.1%	10.3%	83.7%	-38.3	8.5
Bonthe	41.4%	58.6%	11.7%	80.6%	4.6%	89.8%	-60.6	11.4
Moyamba	34.7%	65.3%	26.2%	65.3%	17.9%	73.5%	-31.6	12.5
Pujehun	7.0%	93.0%	15.5%	74.7%	7.9%	86.1%	-49.0	15.2
Western Rural	68.3%	31.7%	74.3%	23.4%	55.8%	34.7%	-24.8	48.2
Western Urban	70.8%	29.2%	71.4%	27.3%	57.8%	33.1%	-19	21.2

National	**54.6%**	**45.4%**	**58.7%**	**37.4%**	**42.7%**	**43.3%**	-27.2	15.8

In the 2007 presidential election, as shown in table 3 above, it was puzzling that so many people in Kailahun district, the Eastern part of Sierra Leone, 90.6 percent turned out to vote for the ruling SLPP, in spite of the dismal state of services there (bad roads, schools, poor health care, etc.) according to the Sierra Leone Telegraph Reports 2007. Similarly, the Sierra Leone People's Party Government built a road to Makeni, the capital City of Bombali District in Northern Sierra Leone, but sadly unfortunate for the ruling SLPP, they took a dismal 10.2%. Bombali District found in Northern Sierra Leone is home to the Temnes, the largest tribal group in the country, and also the Limba and Loko ethnic groups (Kormoh & Lansana, 2020). The Temnes, Limba, Loko, Krunko, Mandingoes, Soso and all other minority tribes found in the North and Western regions of the country are 90 percent supporters of the All Peoples Congress. On the other hand, 90 percent of Sierra Leoneans residing in the south and eastern parts of Sierra Leone – largely Mandes, the second largest tribe, the Kono, kissi and the sherbos are supporters of the Sierra Leone People's Party (Kormoh & Lansana, 2020).

Taking a deeper look at the presidential elections results shown in the table above, academics and researchers can posit that there are deep rooted ethno-regional sentiments that are influencing the country's politics. The results from the 2007, 2012 and 2018 presidential elections shown, Kenema – a District in Eastern Sierra Leone – largely dominated by the Mende ethnic group – over the last decade plus is the stronghold of the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party. In 2007, 2012 and 2018 presidential elections, the SLPP won in Kenema with 83.1%, 77.9% and 83.8% respectively whilst the main opposition APC took 16.9%, 18.7% and 11.0% respectively. For Kono District in the East, results from 2007, 2012 and 2018 on the table show that SLPP won Kono with 58.6%, 37.1% and 21.5% respectively whilst the APC lost in 2007 to the SLPP in Kono with 41.5. In the 2012 presidential election, the APC won Kono with vote percentage of 68.2 largely due to the fact that the then incumbent president, Ernest Bai-Koroma – then presidential candidate of the APC seeking re-election – picked as his running mate – a popular politician and son of Kono District – Sam Sumana. But in the 2018 presidential election, both the APC

and SLPP lost in Kono simply became a son of the District – former Vice President Sam Sumana was running for the presidency. The APC got only 20.1% of the vote in Kono. Kono has over the last decade been swing District or better put, a battle ground District.

From the table, Bombali District situated in the north of Sierra Leone and home to the Temne, Limba and Loko ethnic groups, over the last decade has been the stronghold of the main opposition APC. The results from 2007, 2012 and 2018 show that the APC won landslide with 89.9% in 2007, 93.2% in 2012 and 86.2 in 2018 whilst the SLPP dismally got 10.1% in 2007, 4.4% in 2012 and 8.5% in 2018. In Koinadugu District that is a part of northern Sierra Leone, the APC won with 64.6% in 2007, 86.4% in 2012 election and 56.3% whilst the SLPP got 35.4% in 2007, 9.1% in 2012 and 27.2% in 2018 election. In Tonkolili – a District also situated in the Northern part of Sierra Leone – the APC won with 88.7% in 2007, 92.6% in 2012 and 76.7% in 2018 whilst the now ruling SLPP lost with 11.3%, 4.4% and 9.8% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively. In Kambia – a northern province – the APC won with 80.9%, 82.2% and 39.3% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively. The SLPP lost to the APC with 19.1%, 13.0% and 10.2% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively. In Bo District – a southern region of the country occupied largely by the Mende tribe – the SLPP won with 74.0%, 77.1% and 83.7% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively. The APC dismally lost to the SLPP with 26.0%, 16.7% and 10.3% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively. In Bonthe – a southern District in the country, the SLPP won in the 2007, 2012 and 2018 presidential elections respectively with 58.6%, 80.6% and 89.8% whilst the APC finished 41.4%, 11.7% and 4.6% respectively. For Moyamba District located in the south of Sierra Leone – the SLPP won in the 2007, 2012 and 2018 elections with 65.3%, 65.3 and 73.5% respectively whilst the APC followed with 34.7%, 26.2% and 17.9% respectively. In Pujehun District – located in the south of the country – the SLPP won with in 2007, 2012 and 2018 by 93.0%, 74.7% and 86.1% respectively whilst APC lost with 7.0%, 15.5% and 7.9% respectively. Freetown – the capital city of Sierra Leone – is divided into two Districts – Western Rural District and Western Urban District. Freetown over the past decade has proven to be the stronghold of the APC. Electoral results from the presidential polls of 2007, 2012 and 2018 show that the APC won Western Rural by 68.3%, 74.3% and 55.8% whilst the SLPP lost with 31.7%, 23.4% and 34.7% respectively. For Western Urban – the APC won with 70.8%, 71.4% and

57.8% in 2007, 2012 and 2018 respectively whilst the SLPP lost to the APC with 29.2%, 27.3% and 33.1% respectively.

The idea that elections are "winner take all" contests has gained widespread acceptance over time due to deeply held electoral loyalties and patrimonialism. The APC is thought to support the North and West, while the South and East are expected to benefit from the SLPP when they come to power than the North and Western regions. Most people believe that if they lose an election, they will be socially and economically marginalised for the duration of the electoral term (Kormoh & Lansana, 2020).

In the SLPP strongholds of Southern and Eastern Sierra Leone, APC performance in the 2018 election fell by an average of 53% over the last decade when compared to from 2007 to 2018 elections (more than 60% in Bonthe, 53% in Kailahun, by 41% in Kenema, etc.). Voters in all six districts considered to be the strongholds of the Sierra Leone Peoples party in the south and east during 2018 elections shared similar complaints about feeling excluded by the governing party then APC. Even in the North, where new districts and chiefdoms were founded in the weeks leading up to the 2018 elections, policy issues took front stage. The highest percentage losses for APC were seen in Kambia (48%), Koinadugu (34.8%), and Port Loko (18.9%) in the northern region. Some northern figures viewed Koroma's candidate selection in the party primaries in Makeni as an over-personalization of power, and this perception combined with the popularity of Kandeh Yumkella, an advocate for radical reform - who broke away from the SLPP and later established his own party – the National Grand Coalition – to contest the 2018 presidential election, shaped the campaign in the north – the stronghold of the APC (Denisova, 2018).

It seems that the SLPP then opposition in the 2018 elections, which campaigned on promises to enhance education and security in Freetown, prevailed in the election. Formerly controlled by the APC, the now-opposition SLPP gained four parliamentary seats in the Western Area in the 2018 elections. In light of the massive financial investment made by the ruling party—possibly the greatest in Sierra Leone's history of democracy—in the election, the APC's dropping vote share may be seen as a substantial shift towards issue-based voting in the country (Denisova, 2018).

Voting Behaviours among the Youth in Urban Areas in Sierra Leone

Recent elections have seen the urban youth vote impacted by reasons outside of ethnicity. In the run-up to the 2007 elections, the APC was more popular among young voters than the SLPP was, which was in large part to the support of the alternative youth culture and music scene. When it comes to making political choices, young urban dwellers put a larger importance on economic and social considerations than their elders do. This might lead to more fluid voting patterns in major population centres including Freetown, Bo, Makeni, Kenema, Port Loko town, and Koidu (O'Leary, 2001).

Rather than depending only on patronage networks, the supply of services may affect voting and electoral behaviour in major cities. According to Chris Wyrod 2019, the public's displeasure with Tejan Kabba's failing policies from 1996 to 2002 contributed to the SLPP's defeat in 2007. There are several advantages to living in a city, including a higher literacy rate and a more engaged civil society that educates its members about civic issues and shapes how they vote (O'Leary, 2001). These opposing trends are indicative of the gradual emergence of more nuanced voting patterns; nonetheless, ethnic problems continue to play a disproportionately big influence in the electoral arithmetic. An updated look at how shifting voter behaviour has impacted election patterns (O'Leary, 2001).

Data Findings and Discussion
Qualitative Data

During the collection of primary data study's participants were asked in both the interviews and focused group discussions on whether ethnicity has impact on Sierra Leone's development.

From the focused group discussions and face-to-face interviews, one of the participants expressed the view that negative ethnicity has far-reaching detrimental consequences or impacts on development in Sierra Leone. He argued that politicians in Sierra Leone exploit ethnic identities and regional sentiments to appeal to voters' appetite and when they got power, they corrupt state resources and focus on patronage and client politics, marginalising tribes, and regions that they do garner significant votes from

"The country is heavily split on tribal and regional divides to the extent when a government comes to power it represents only the region and tribes that it gets significant votes from during the elections" (A. Gazi, personal communication, 2022)

The opinions of this interviewee support the instrumentalism school of thought as advanced by its well-known proponent or progenitor, Paul R. Brass. Brass (2000) argued that when it comes to the literature on nationalism, as a broad theory, instrumentalism seeks to account for nationalism's inception and continued support in terms of the interests it is said to serve. According to this point of view, contending elites may use ethnic and national identities to rally the masses in their quest for riches, power, and status throughout the world.

Supporting the informed assertions made by the researcher in the introductory chapter of the thesis - chapter one of the research – another interviewee averred:

> In Sierra Leone, citizens themselves will go at every length to even prevent a sitting government in power from carrying development in regions or provinces that are dominated by ethnic groups that didn't elect the president in power in the election. Also, region and tribal groups where a government doesn't draw strong support from are marginalised for the years such government may stay in power (S. Sesay, personal communication, 2018).

There can be no doubt or peradventure that this point of the interviewee corroborates the instrumentalists' claim that ethnic and national affiliations are constantly redefined and recreated in reaction to changing situations and the manipulations of political elites, in striking contrast to primordialists who see ethnicity as a 'given' of the human condition.

On whether ethnicity represents an obstacle to Sierra Leone's development, a reputed civil society advocate and professor at the University of Sierra Leone during the face-to-face interviews and group discussion answered in the affirmative that ethnicity impedes development in the country and has for decades represents an obstacle to Sierra Leone's socioeconomic development. The affirmative opinions expressed by this renounced civil society actor and distinguished professor of law in relation to the above question can be succinctly summarised into the following below:

> Ethnicity has had detrimental consequences on the socio-political and economic development of Sierra Leone. When a government comes to power, it only serves the ethnic and regional interests of the people and region where that government got significant votes from. Those who are from tribes hailing

from regions or provinces that supposedly didn't vote for the party in power are always marginalised in every sphere of development in the country (A. Bangura, personal communication, 2022).

The assertion made by the learnt professor of law can also be situated within Brass' instrumentalism argument which intimated and accentuated the point in this research that "ethnicity" and "nationalism" are social and political creations rather than "givens." He opined that they are products of powerful people who appropriate, distort, and even invent elements of the cultures they claim to represent to further their own interests and those of the populations they claim to represent.

A paramount chief from Makeni, a Northern region of Sierra Leone during the interview attested that people use ethnicity to forestall development – and that happens in all parts of the country. Speaking during the face-to-face interview, the paramount chief of Makeni is quoted below:

> Even if there is a government drive to improve the lives of citizens in region outside of its strongholds, you will find that there is always this political interference to deny people from certain regions and provincial areas not to benefit from development. People from regions or tribes feel that sense of entitlement to government jobs, development, and other opportunities in their region over the others simply because they believe it is their tribe or region that voted predominantly for the government in power. Therefore, the ethnicisation of development excludes certain regions, provinces, and tribes from benefiting their own fair share of opportunities and other basic social services. This has really affected development in certain provinces and constituencies of Sierra Leone because of their political history of not voting for a particular party in power (M. Kamara, personal communication, 2022).

These views expressed by a paramount chief in the northern part of Sierra Leone, Makeni, no gainsaying supports the instrumentalism school of thought discussed lengthy in the literature review.

When asked both during the interview on whether governmental appointments, policies and contracts are all influenced by ethnicity, an official of the current government disagrees with this assertion. He furthered expressed this view during the focused group discussion:

> At no time since the inception of this government headed by retired Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio as President of Sierra Leone where we have used

ethnicity as a qualifying criterion for appointments in government as well as government's policy and the awarding of government's contracts. There are documented public records you can access online where during the President's address to civil servants where he promised that his government will never witch-hunt any employees of government nor promote ethnic politics in the country. Our government promised to unite our people under one umbrella as intoned in the motto of Sierra Leone, "One country, one people" (Ministry of Information of Sierra Leone, Personal Communication, 2022).

However, when the researcher reviewed the list of appointed government officials from both the past government and the current government where this participant now works as spokesperson of the administration, the preponderance of evidence proved the contrary as almost 95% of the appointed officials in the current administration of President Bio are from the Southern region of the country – mainly the Mendes. Also, evidence published in this chapter shows that civil servants from ethnic groups who largely hailed from the North-Western region of the country were illegal dismissed by the current government.

Contrary to view averred by the government representative, a top-notch business executive in Sierra Leone confirmed that ethnicity influences government appointments, policies, contracts, and development. The business executive during the focus group discussion lectured:

It is without gainsaying that ethnicity is the foremost political criterion for appointments in government and for private citizens who own their small companies to be awarded contracts by a sitting government in power. If you are not belonging to a tribe in power, you are barred from getting government's contracts, benefiting from government's policies and generally, job opportunities that the government would create and other basic social services. The government in terms of appointments and government's contracts only serve the narrow or parochial interest of the tribes that largely voted said government to power whilst all the other tribes are marginalised for the rest of the years that government would be in power or its lifespan (D. Marah, Personal Communication, 2022).

According to a participant in the study who is a senior student from the Department of Political Science at the University of Sierra Leone speaking during the focused group discussion maintained:

Ethnicity is today pervasive in the current government headed by President Julius Maada Bio of the Sierra Leone People's Party – who is a Mende hailing from the South-eastern region of our country. Currently, if you look at the composition of cabinet officials and other junior officials he appointed in his administration, 95% are from the Mende ethnic group – the second larger ethnic group in the country next to the Temnes. Today, you can't point to a single Temne by tribe that has been appointed by President Bio as a cabinet minister, not even a Limba or Loko two minority tribes from the North-western part of the country (J. Kamara, Personal Communication, 2022).

Another participant of the study who is a lecturer at the Njala Univrsity in Bo claimed:

The level of ethnicity influencing appointments and contracts in the current government headed by President Bio is not only unique or peculiar to his administration. President Bio's immediate predecessor, erstwhile President Ernest Bai-Koroma of the All People's Congress, who held power for 11 years awarded most of government's contracts to people largely from his Temne-Limba ethnic groups, despise the fact that they don't constitute or account for the majority of the country's literate population. The Mendes from the South-east of Sierra Leone is the most educated ethnic group in the country, but they were marginalised from getting appointments in the government of the All People's Congress headed by former President Ernest Bai-Koroma. So, the level of ethnicity manifesting itself in this current government as an influencing factor to get government's appointments and contracts are repeated tradition in Sierra Leone since the day the country's first President, Siaka Probyn Stevens banned the SLPP and declared Sierra Leone through a bogus referendum a one-party state (M. Jalloh, Personal Communication, 2022).

The above opinions are strongly in line with instrumentalism though that asserts that political elites exploit ethnic groups' cultural forms, beliefs, and practices as political resources in their battle for power and status, this is the case.

Another student leader from the University of Sierra Leone Department of Mass Communications thinks like this: "After declaring its independence in 1961, Sierra Leone held its first multi-party elections the same year. Political backwardness in the nation has been blamed on the "politics of ethno-regionalism" ever since independence" (L. Sheriff, Personal Communication, 2022).

Another paramount chief speaking in a face-to-face interview said the following: "Because of this, there is now a system wherein leaders assure their continued political power by rewarding their ethnic loyalists with government funds. Their followers then develop a sense of entitlement to benefits from the state" (A. Bah, Personal Communication, 2022).

During the face-to-face interview, a Managing Publisher of one of the leading Newspapers in Sierra Leone indicated that: "Because of this, ethnic politics is now a fight among communities for control of government power and economic resources. That is not a uniquely Sierra Leonean issue. Research shows that many African nations have a hard time dealing with ethnic diversity ". This opinion expressed by the Newspaper Managing Publisher support Edward Shils' argument about ethnicity and its detrimental impact of state-building.

During the interview, an executive member of the National Grand Coalition, a breakaway faction of the Sierra Leone People Party, who preferred anonymity stressed the view: "Ethnic politics in Sierra Leone has led to widespread graft, disenfranchisement of whole neighbourhoods, and even outbreaks of open warfare" (K. Johnny, Personal Communication, 2022).

Another interviewee who is a lawyer of eminence and member of the Sierra Leone Bar Association emphasized:

> Taking stock of the current ethnic reality reveals that Sierra Leone's ethnic divisions are deeper than ever. Both major parties may be broken down into smaller parties that cater to certain regions or ethnic groups. They have created a stark tribal fault line that runs right through the centre of the nation (J. Bockarie, Personal Communication, 2022).

From the views expressed by this legal luminary, it says a lot of the depth of ethnic politics in Sierra Leone and how politicians exploit ethnic and regional sentiments to the detriment of the country's progress supporting the instrumentalist view.

Another study's participant who is one of the leading businessmen from the Fula community in Sierra Leone interviewed by the researcher decried:

Sierra Leone needs to do away with the two oldest political parties – the APC and the SLPP – that continue to fuel ethnicity and regional divide in our politics thus impeding socioeconomic development in the country. Since post-independence, the country has suffered great developmental setbacks because of the ethno-regional sentiments supported by the two parties. Sierra Leone needs an alternative – a different party other than the APC and SLPP that will represent the interests of all citizens and not the interests of a select few, if our country as its motto intoned: "One Country, One People" (M. Barry, Personal Communication, 2022)

A member of the Sierra Leone Judiciary who preferred that to be named in a face-to-face interview told the researcher that:

It is surprising that we are surprised that any of the nation's elites exhibit tribalism in practice, given that the nation's very foundations were laid on tribal politics, that tribal and party agendas have always taken precedence over genuine national agendas, that hiring and firing decisions are made more on the basis of tribal or party affiliations than on competence, and that the nation's history is predicated on the ordering and forced expulsion of an entire segment of society. The fact that our national agenda has been hijacked by political tribes and pseudo-ethnic politics is something to be embarrassed of not outraged about. We have, in effect, linked distribution of resources to ethnic or political tribes and, at some time, militarized tribalism as a means of silencing progressive voices (Judiciary of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Personal Communication, 2022).

The view of the learnt official of the High Court of Sierra Leone agrees with the constructivist school of thought. Smith, another ethno-symbolist, makes the same argument, arguing that "ethnic relationships like other social bonds are susceptible to economic, social, and political pressures and hence vary and alter according to circumstances.

On the question of whether Sierra Leoneans owe more loyalty to their political parties that represent their ethnic values and interests than their country, a professor from the Njala University in the city of Bo stressed:

Most of Sierra Leonean citizens pay greater loyalty to their political parties than the country despite the fact that the motto of the country is "One Country, One People", yet the country continues to be heavily divided on ethnic and regional lines. It is despicable that citizens will show little or no loyalty to the country but rather take solace in showing love for their parties over the country. Sierra Leoneans must come to terms that before becoming members of political parties we are first citizens of this one country. To truly love parties over our country is something shamefully embarrassing and mindboggling I found to be (S. Foday, Personal Communication, 2022).

This view supports the argument laid out in chapter one of the study that Sierra Leoneans show ample loyalty for political parties representing their ethnic and regional interests over the overarching interests of the country.

In the interviews, study's participants were asked whether ethnicity is a predicament for investment, good governance, good public policy, and state stability. In light of this question, a member of Sierra Leone Parliament asserted:

Ethnicity is no doubt a barrier inhibiting investment in the country, precisely mass inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the country. Ethnicity gives rise to political instability and political tension and instability inhibits FDI inflows in any country the world over not to exclude Sierra Leone. Just recently, there were widespread demonstrations in North-western Sierra Leone – the strongholds of the main opposition APC – which others described as domestic terrorism and an attempt to overthrow the government of President Julius Maada Bio. However, citizens who staged the protests in regions believed to be the strongholds of the opposition APC said they came out to protest due to the rising costs of living overburdening every household in the country and as well as some of the worst forms of corruption the current government is shrouded in at epic proportions, among other things (P. Mansaray, Personal Communication, 2022).

It is also fair to say that the researcher has lived in this country as an exiled Liberian journalist and editor and had worked with two leading newspaper institutions before traveling to the Middle East or Near East in pursuit of master's in international relations. Therefore, it is without gainsaying that the researcher not only has a bag of theoretical knowledge about Sierra Leone but a practical and first-hand grasp of the political unfolding and socioeconomic realities in the country.

Even though those who came out to protest are largely from the ethnic groups or regions that have been marginalised, it is an indisputable reality that Sierra Leone is fraught with political instability on account of negative ethnicity. The country is highly polarised which rising to ethnic conflict. No investor will want to invest in a country where there is continual political instability. Negative ethnicity undermines the tenants of good governance and social cohesion and inadvertently affects good policy and state stability.

During the interviews and focused group discussions, the selected study's participants were asked as to what extent ethnicity is becoming a cause for corruption, competition for resources, human capital flight, inequality, unemployment, poverty and mistrust between government and citizens.

In lieu of this question, female politician and rights advocate opined:

Sierra Leone's tribal politics contribute to the country's widespread poverty, inequality, exclusion, and, in the worst cases, bloodshed and human tragedy that we witnessed for a decade. Tribal distinctions are used by politicians as a means of exercising power and influence in critical political decision-making in Sierra Leone. As qualified and highly experienced public officials are replaced by those less capable - on grounds of tribal preference and victimization - putting political square pegs in round holes which inadvertently is causing highly skilled citizens to emigrant to other advanced and developed societies where their education, knowledge and skilled can be utilised to eke out a decent living standard (S. Bangura, Personal Communication, 2022).

From the views expressed supra by prominent female politician and rights advocate and coupled with the researcher own experience working in Sierra Leone, and assessing various indices of development on the country, the researcher posits – supporting the views that ethnicity is an underlying factor grossly underpinning development and socioeconomic growth in the country. This political marginalisation based on regional and ethnic identity is causing severe brain-drain in Sierra Leone. Even young students who leave the country to seek advanced education in other developed societies upon the completion of their studies highly returned to Sierra Leone to use their education to better the society due to the depth of political exclusivity based on ethno-regional identity which sits at the heart of political governance in the country. This, the researcher believes, is causing human

capital flight in this West African country and impeding socioeconomic development. The founding fathers of this once great country in the Seal of the Republic of Sierra Leone included an inscription which is the "Motto" of the country that says – "One Country, One People", but sadly despicably, it is the reverse as the researcher would call it, "One Country, Divided People".

Another respondent in the interview who is journalist and professor of mass communications said in a few words:

> The country is so polarised and divided on ethnic and regional lines. There is heightened regional and ethnic bigotry that the country is fraught with which is forestalling development and onward impeding good business climate in the country. Sierra Leone has witnessed grotesque erosion and dumbing down of public service management standards and ethics since gaining independence in 1961 due to epic ethnicity and regionalism (D. Massaley, Personal Communication, 2022).

> On the fight against corruption, a human rights activist maintained:

> In Sierra Leone, the fight against corruption, waste and abuse has been ethnicised. There has been no genuine political will on the part of all administrations that have governed this country to eradicate or curtail corruption in public service devoid of which tribe or region you belong to. Today, the so-called fight against corruption is being ethnicised and regionalised – appearing more of a witch-hunt than a sincere fight against corruption. When a government comes to power, they go only after the tribes that dominated the government that they succeeded – refusing to prosecute those who are working in the current administration and have been accused of corruption, even with reports from reputed international organisations (E. Sankoh, Personal Communication, 2022).

Conclusion

Ethnicity, since its introduction by selfish political elites into Sierra Leone's politics, especially led by its first President, Siaka Stevens, as discussed in the opening of chapter four this study, has had detrimental impact on development in the country. Today, Sierra Leone is ethnically and regionally polarised. The country is divided regionally into two belts – the South-eastern belt largely populated by the

Mandes, Kono, Kissi, Vai, and the Sherbro are largely supporters of the ruling Sierra Leone's People Party whilst the North-western belt – largely inhabited by the Temnes, Limba, Loko, Kuranko, Yalunka, Creole (Krio), Mandingoes, Susu, Fula and Kru who are over 90 percent supporters of the main opposition APC. These linguistic groups together demonstrate unflinching loyalty to their political parties over their country – Sierra Leone – despite of the country's motto that says: "One country, one people" (Berewa, 2011).

Since the country gained its independence from Britain – its colonial master – on April 27, 1967 – developments and appointments in government are largely driven by ethno-regional identity. When former President Stevens took over the helm power in Sierra Leone, it was expected by many Sierra Leoneans that he would have unified the country after gaining independence simply because he is a product of two parents who hailed from the North and South-east. His father was a Limba from the northern region of the country whilst his mother was from the Mende ethnic group hailing from the south-eastern region of the country (Middleton & Tait, 2013). This position of one parent hailing from the south-east and whilst the other parent hailing from the north, in the view of political pundits and development practitioners put the former President Siaka Stevens in a better position to unite the two regions and promote development and social cohesion other than dividing the country on lines of tribe and region. Sadly despicably, his decision to ban the SLPP upon assuming the presidency and turning the country into a one-party dominant rule sow a deep-seated division in the country and heightened ethnic and regional bigotry (Kandeh, 1992). The south easterners for more than two decades felt marginalised and excluded by both the administrations of Siaka Stevens and his handpicked successor Joseph Saidu Momoh. They never had representation in parliament for more than two decades of the APC's dominate rule – from 1967 to 1992. During the eighteen years of autocracy under Siaka Stevens – the south and eastern regions of Sierra Leone didn't witness a fair share of development and basic social services. Stevens' little development projects were mostly concentrated in the north-western belt of the country – the stronghold of the APC (Mukonoweshuro, 1993). After eighteen years of long stay in power, Stevens handed power to Joseph Saidu Momoh – who later a few years returned the country to multi-party democracy but didn't take the country to a successful democratic transition as he was ousted from power in a military coup in 1992 led by Valentine Strasser, retired brigadier general Julius Maada Bio and

others. After almost four years of military rule, Julius Maada Bio who later went on to overthrow Valentire Strasser – took the country to election which the APC didn't participate and turned power over to the SLPP candidate – Ahmed Tijan Kabbah – who won the election in 1996 (Bangura, 2000). When Kabbah took over power in 1996, after a few years, he was overthrown by the RUF rebels in 1998. The RUF's led government was president over by Jonny Paul Koroma. Throughout the course of the RUF's rule led by Johnny Paul Koroma, the African Union, ECOWAS and other international bodies refused to recognise their rebel government. However, after a year – the Kamajor soldiers who were loyal to President Kabbah joined forces with ECOMOG and forcibly removed Jonny Paul Koroma and his RUF rebels from power and brought back to power and brought back to power Tijan Kabbah who was exiled in neighbouring Guinea (Harris, 2014).

In 2002, Sierra Leone's almost 11 years of brutal civil war ended and the country had its first post-war elections won by then incumbent President Kabbah against the APC's candidate – Ernest Bai-Koroma. Throughout Kabbah's years in power – the northerners tasted little development. The SLPP and its supporters from the south-eastern belt of the country dominated the government. But later in the second post-war general and presidential elections held in 2007, the APC through Ernest Bai-Koroma came to power. The APC's votes came largely from the northern belt that for over eleven years felt excluded and marginalised by the SLPP government headed by Ahmed Tijan Kabbah. Quite interestingly though, districts like Kailahun in the eastern region of the country that saw no development and social services still went on to deliver 90.6 percent of their district vote to the SLPP. The same was done in Bonthe and Mayamba districts in the south of the country – the stronghold of SLPP (Ferme, 2001).

When Ernest Bai-Koroma of the APC took power in 2007, 80% of his cabinet officials appointed came from the Northwestern region of the country. The Mande had roughly about four ministers who were appointed by the APC government. For the entire eleven years of Ernest's presidency, major development was concentrated in the north and western regions of the country (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021). However, when the APC lost the presidential election of 2018 to the SLPP, Julius Maada Bio – who won on the SLPP's ticket, came to the president with grudges to for the AP's political elites and their region in general. When he assumed power, he

immediately established the Commission of Enquiry that investigated officials of the APC government and later charged some of the APC officials for corruption and management of public resources (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021). Political pundits believe that the move of President Bio was a witch hunt targeted only at officials of the APC government who hailed from the northwest as the current government is yet to charge and prosecute alleged corrupt officials in the current SLPP's government in the face of multiples audit reports from the Sierra Leone's General Auditing Commission – including the wife of President Bio – whom – according to the Africanist Press Report indulges herself into influence peddling and solicitations of monies from business people in the country whilst promising to arrange banquet dinners with between those business merchants and her husband in exchange from the monies she solicits from them. The Audit Commission's reports green lighted the public on wave of corruption scandal dogging the President's office, the office of his former chief minister, the Ministry of Finance and tons of government ministries, agencies and commissions (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

The current SLPP led administration headed by President Julius Maada Bio has also transformed the entire country into Mende-dominate hegemony – with approximately 99% of the heads of government's ministries, agencies and commissions coming from the Mende ethnic group in the south and eastern parts of Sierra Leone. The composition of Bio's cabinet reflects the most ethnically and regionally imbalanced government since the history of the country. Academics and democracy activists in Sierra Leone have accused President Bio of running a pure ethnocracy rather than democracy (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021). Over the last five years of the administration of Bio, the country ran the most bloated government bureaucracy which – spending over 90 percent of the country's budget on recurring expenditures whilst minimally spending on capital expenditure – or public sector programs. According to the World Bank reports 2022, Sierra Leone's economic difficulties have gotten worse – and inflation is still rising despite rapidly depreciation of the country's currency – the Leones (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021). The report also underscored that risks associated with debt have also grown. However, in response to the damning World Bank reports which painted a gloomy picture of the country under the SLPP government, President Bio blamed the worsening economic conditions and the rising foods inflation to the global economic crises including the Russia-Ukrainian war (Sierra Leone Telegraph, 2021).

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

Despite the motto of Sierra Leone which says: "One country one people", the nation is still fraught with heightened tribal and regional divisions. Governments of Sierra Leone since the country's independence have been accused of promoting ethnic and regional hate. The Sierra Leone's People Party received most of its support from the south and east, where the Mendes, Kissi, Vai, Sherbro and live largely. On the other hand, the All People's Congress draws significant of its membership from the north and western parts of the country (Kormoh, 2020).

After the death of Albert Margai, politics at the tribal or ethno-regional level entered the open in Sierra Leone. The provinces that were formerly SLPP strongholds became recruiting grounds for the All People's Congress (APC). The APC leader, Siaka Stevens, has claimed that his parents were from the Limba and Mende ethnic groups, respectively, and that he was born in Moyamba, the capital of the southern Kayamba chiefdom. There was a temporary easing of hostilities between the tribes since he seemed to be the offspring of both the northern and southern/eastern factions. Siaka Stevens' campaign and recruitment strategies were concentrated on the country's northern region, where he persuaded the country's elite and educated citizens to join him via empty promises and the murder of then-prime minister Albert Margai's reputation (Smith, 2017).

From 1991 to 2002, war in Sierra Leone was mostly caused by eight interconnected elements. There was an issue with the politicization of the judiciary and a problem with the overcentralisation of state institutions, as well as with systematic exclusion, factionalism, and ethnic politics at the rural and chiefdom levels, with corruption and abuse of power, and security lapses at the state level. In Sierra Leone, the conflict's origins have been traced back to several elements, including those listed above and probably more (Ndumbe, 2001).

Although ethnic identification had a role in post-independence Sierra Leone's internal politics, it didn't seem to be a major characteristic or influence in the country's 11-year civil strife. What's more is that strong tribal awareness and friction have always been irrelevant due to the connectivity between and among the many ethnic groupings. From this, it follows that politicians with self-interest at heart are

fuelling the fire of tribalism. Some Sierra Leonean politicians and political parties use ethnic and linguistic divisions to win votes and stay in office. Political parties clearly resort to the "softer" alternative of ethnic or tribal manipulation when they lack persuasive and realistic answers and messages for the voter. In Sierra Leone, tribalism provides a safe harbour for dishonest politicians during electioneering process, in contrast to more developed democracies where ideas and programs are what get individuals elected to political and public posts (Mbawa, 2012).

Politics predicated solely on tribe and ethnicity is doomed to tear a country apart, as noted by former U.S. President Barack Obama. It was an imaginative failure. Such is the case in Sierra Leone, where the national political debate increasingly centres on ethno-regional issues, which are blocking the country's progress and development. The present state of ethnic fragmentation in Sierra Leonean politics poses a significant risk to the country's future growth and development.

Summary of Findings

Deep into the study's findings, it was revealed that Sierra Leone is fraught and riddled with ethnic and regional divisions – which for more two decades have impeded the country's developmental progress. The depth of regional divides compels a seated government to focus their development programs in areas where they won with good numbers of votes whilst marginalising areas that are not considered to be strongholds of the ruling party but rather the main opposition. A majority of Sierra Leoneans would actively work against their own government if it tries to advance infrastructure in a province or area that is controlled by ethnic groups that did not vote for the government that is in office. In addition, areas and ethnic groups from whom a government doesn't draw substantial support are often ignored for as long as that administration is in power.

Politics always get in the way, preventing residents in certain rural and provincial areas from reaping the benefits of progress, even when the government is on a mission to improve life there. People of certain region of the country think that their tribes or districts voted overwhelmingly for the government in power, hence they feel they are entitled to government employment, development, and other possibilities in their region over those in other regions. Therefore, the ethnicization of development denies certain areas, provinces, and tribes' access to opportunities

and other essential social services that should be available to everyone. Because of their longstanding refusal to support the ruling party, residents of several Sierra Leonean regions and constituencies have had their development efforts stymied.

The research finding posited that there is no doubt that a ruling government's primary consideration when making appointments or giving out contracts to private persons or small businesses is their ethnicity. Government contracts, policy benefits, and new employment opportunities created by the government, as well as other essential social services, are only available to members of the ruling tribe. President Julius Maada Bio, a Mende from the country's south-east and the leader of the Sierra Leone People's Party, has made his ethnic background a central part of his administration. His current government is composed almost entirely of Mende people (99% as of the time study was conducted), who are the second largest ethnic group in the nation after the Temnes. There is not a single member of the Temne tribe, a minority group from the country's north-western region, serving in President Bio's government at now.

The study's findings uncovered that there has been extensive corruption, the disenfranchisement of whole neighbourhoods, and even outbreaks of outright bloodshed because of ethnic politics in Sierra Leone. When looking at the facts as they now stand, it becomes clear that the ethnic divide in Sierra Leone is wider and deeper than ever. There is potential for both big parties to fragment into smaller parties that focus on certain areas or ethnic groupings. They've effectively created a schism along tribal lines that splits the country down the middle. Some Sierra Leoneans hold the strong view that APC and the SLPP, the country's two longest-running political parties, must be eliminated because they contribute to ethnic and regional divisions in politics and stand in the way of the country's progress towards greater social and economic stability. Since post-independence, the country's progress has been severely hampered by the two parties' support for ethno-regional views. If Sierra Leone is to live up to the promise of its slogan, "One Country, One People," the researcher posits that the country needs a political party in addition to the APC and SLPP that would advocate for the needs of all Sierra Leoneans rather than the privileges of a small few. It's safe to say that the country's ethnic makeup is holding back investment, particularly large amounts of FDI. Regardless of the nation, political tension and instability are a deterrent to foreign direct investment (FDI), and Sierra Leone is no exception.

The study reveals that there has been an ethnicization of Sierra Leone's battle against corruption, waste, and abuse. There has never been any true political intent on the side of any government in Sierra Leone, regardless of tribe or region, to eliminate or significantly reduce corruption in public service. The fight against corruption, waste and abuse in public service resembles a witch-hunt than a serious effort to root out graft in government. When a new government takes office, it targets the ethnic groups responsible for the downfall of the one it replaces, while ignoring charges of corruption within its own ranks, no matter how credible they may be.

Recommendations

1.   The government of Sierra Leone will have to devise a policy that seeks to promote political, social and economic inclusion in the governance of the country regardless of sex, creed, ethnicity, education, gender, etc.

2.   The government of Sierra Leone should craft a policy that would provide financial support to at least the top four political parties in elections to create a level playing field that encourages multi-party democracy.

3.   Political leaders themselves should encourage citizens to vote on the basis on policy debate or platform of political parties other than ethnic and regional sentiments.

4.   The Ministry of Education in Sierra Leone should introduce a course at all secondary schools that teaches patriotism – love for country over love for political parties that represents ethnic cleavages.

5.   The government should draft a policy that denounces political, ethnic and regional discrimination in all public and private institutions of government.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Ethics Committee Approval

NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

16.11.2022

Dear Julius T. Jaesen II

Your application titled **"An Examination of the Impact of Negative Ethnicity on Development in Sierra Leone 2007- 2021"** with the application number NEU/SS/2022/1434 has been evaluated by the Scientific Research Ethics Committee and granted approval. You can start your research on the condition that you will abide by the information provided in your application form.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın KİRAZ

The Coordinator of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Appendix B

Turnitin Similarity Report

Julius T. JAESEN-An Examination of The Impact of Negative
Ethnicity on Development in Sierra Leone 2007-2021

ORIGINALITY REPORT

11%	**9**%	**5**%	**2**%
SIMILARITY INDEX	INTERNET SOURCES	PUBLICATIONS	STUDENT PAPERS

PRIMARY SOURCES

1	en.wikipedia.org Internet Source	2%
2	vdoc.pub Internet Source	1%
3	www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com Internet Source	1%
4	core.ac.uk Internet Source	1%
5	wikimili.com Internet Source	1%
6	sheriff01.github.io Internet Source	1%
7	en.unionpedia.org Internet Source	<1%
8	www.encyclopedia.com Internet Source	<1%
9	"The Statesman's Yearbook", Springer Nature, 2008	<1%

Appendix C
Interview Questions/Guide

1. What is the impact of ethnicity on Sierra Leone's development?

2. Does ethnicity represented an obstacle to Sierra Leone's development.

3. Are governmental appointments, development, policies, contracts and projects influenced by ethnicity?

4. Do Sierra Leoneans owe more loyalty to their political parties that represent their ethnic values and interests than their country?

5. Does development benefit all ethnic groups in terms of employment, poverty reduction and equitable distribution of wealth?

6. Are there ethnic hegemonies and political economy marginalization which hamper economic development?

7. Is ethnicity a predicament for investment, good governance, good public policy and state stability?

8. To what extent ethnicity is becoming a cause for corruption, competition for resources, brain drain, inequality, unemployment, poverty and mistrust between government and citizens?

9. Are districts, provinces and regions being denied development or basic social services by a particular government in power based on ethnicity?

10. What solutions can you recommend in addressing the vices impeding the country's development?