



**NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL ACTORS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT:
THE CASE OF TURKEY**

M.A. THESIS

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Nicosia

February, 2022

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ALAO**

**An Analysis Of External Actors
On The Cyprus Conflict**

MASTER THESIS

2022

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February, 2022

Approval

We certify that we have read the thesis submitted by Oluwaponmile David ALAO titled "AN ANALYSIS OF EXTERNAL ACTORS ON THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: THE CASE OF TURKEY" and that in our combined opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

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Declaration

I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.


Oluwaponmile David Alao
29 08 2023
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Oluwaponmile David Alao

Abstract

An Analysis of External Actors on The Cyprus Conflict: the Case of Turkey

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The Cyprus conflict is one of the longest and most complicated conflicts of the post-World War II years. Over the years, there have been several attempts made to resolve the conflict including the formation of the United Nations Secretary General's mission of good offices. Yet, the conflict is unsolved, defying several attempts are made to find a lasting and accepted solution by both parties to the conflict. Although it is an inter-state ethnic conflict, the Cyprus issue has a global and regional dimension due to the attachment of both ethnic groups (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) to their motherlands of Greece and Turkey respectively. Also, due to the strategic location of the island, great power interest is seen on the island, such as the United States and Britain. For this reason, the island of Cyprus becomes a magnetic piece that is difficult to let go by the third parties. Recently, the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean has shifted the dynamics of the key external actors in the conflict. Even though this has influenced negotiations on the Cyprus conflict, it has ceased to reach for a justifiable and acceptable settlement by all parties involved. This study has therefore attempted to focus on the external actors in the Cyprus conflict to analyze their impacts on the efforts of solving the Cyprus question with more and particular reference to Turkey's strategic behavior and the dynamism in the Eastern Mediterranean. This study, therefore, investigates the impact of external actors on the nature of the Cyprus conflict alongside their various (national and security) interests.

Keywords: Cyprus conflict, external actors, mediation, Greece, Turkey.

Öz

Kıbrıs Sorununa İlişkin Dış Aktörlerin Bir Analizi: Türkiye Örneği

Alao, Oluwaponmile David

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Kıbrıs sorunu, II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası yılların en uzun ve en karmaşık çatışmalarından biridir. Yıllar boyunca, Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri'nin iyi niyet misyonunun oluşturulması da dahil olmak üzere, çatışmanın her iki tarafı tarafından kalıcı ve kabul edilmiş bir çözüm için çeşitli girişimlerde bulunulmasına rağmen yine de çatışma çözülmemiştir. Devletlerarası etnik bir çatışma olmasına rağmen, Kıbrıs meselesi, her iki etnik grubun (Kıbrıslı Rumlar ve Kıbrıslı Türkler) anavatanları olan Yunanistan ve Türkiye'ye bağlılıkları nedeniyle küresel ve bölgesel bir boyuta sahiptir. Ayrıca adanın stratejik konumu nedeniyle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İngiltere gibi büyük güçlerin de adaya ilgisi görülmektedir. Bu nedenle, Kıbrıs adası üçüncü şahıslar tarafından bırakılması zor olan manyetik bir parça haline gelmiştir. Son zamanlarda, Doğu Akdeniz'de ortaya çıkan yeni jeopolitik durum, çatışmadaki kilit dış aktörlerin dinamiklerini değiştirmiştir. Bu, Kıbrıs sorununa ilişkin müzakereleri etkilemiş olsa da ilgili tüm taraflarca haklı ve kabul edilebilir bir çözüme ulaşılamamıştır. Bu çalışma, dış güçlerin Doğu Akdeniz'deki dinamizme ve özellikle de Türkiye'nin stratejik davranışına atıfta bulunarak, Kıbrıs sorununu çözme çabaları üzerindeki etkilerini analiz etmek için Kıbrıs ihtilafındaki dış aktörlere odaklanmaya çalışmıştır. Bu nedenle bu çalışma, dış aktörlerin çeşitli (ulusal ve güvenlik) çıkarlarının yanı sıra Kıbrıs sorununun doğası üzerindeki etkisini incelemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs sorunu, dış aktörler, arabuluculuk, Yunanistan, Türkiye

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List of Abbreviations

AKEL:	Progressive Party of the Working People
AKP:	Justice and Development Party
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency
EC:	European Community
EEZ:	Exclusive Economic Zone
EOKA:	National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EPC:	European Political Cooperation
EU:	European Union
RoC:	Republic of Cyprus
TRNC:	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
TPAO:	Turkish State Petroleum Company
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
UNCLOS:	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNPA:	United Nations Protected Area
USA:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UNFICYP:	United Nations Peace-Keeping Force In Cyprus

CHAPTER I

Introduction

Cyprus conflict is one of the longest and most complicated conflicts of the post-World War II years. Over the years, there have been several attempts made to resolve the conflict including the United Nations Secretary General's mission of good offices. Yet, the conflict persists, defying several attempts made at finding a lasting and accepted solution by both parties to the conflict. Although it is an inter-state ethnic conflict, the Cyprus issue has a global and regional dimension due to the attachment of both ethnic groups (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) to their motherland of Greece and Turkey respectively. Also, the interest of the great powers, the United States and Britain, in the island due to its strategic location during the cold war has rendered it a magnetic piece that is difficult to let go of.

A careful and objective examination of the modern history of Cyprus and the present-day attempts to resolve the conflict should reveal the vital and primary roles played by several external actors, not only in shaping the fate of the island during independence in 1960 but also in influencing its fate in 1974 during the Turkish intervention. Today, the Eastern Mediterranean political developments are changing the dynamics of the external actors with the exploration and drilling of hydrocarbon resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus (RoC), which has led to the formation of different alliances by these actors and these developments, in turn, having their effects on the efforts to negotiate and resolve the Cyprus conflict (Gramer, 2014).

The Republic of Cyprus was founded in 1960 by the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. It was composed of the Greek Cypriots who made up about 81.14 percent of the population and the Turkish Cypriots with around 18.86 percent. From the inception of independence in 1960, both communities had failed to cooperate and fully integrate. The ethno-centric nationalist movements for both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities did not help in this matter, as it immensely contributed to the disunity and separation in the newly formed Republic of Cyprus.

By 1974, matters on the Island had deteriorated, as a coup attempted by the Military rulers in Greece to topple Makarios, the President of the Republic of

Cyprus, finally led to Turkish unilateral intervention, (Turkey cited the violation to the treaty that established the Republic of Cyprus as a result of the military coup d'état by the Greek military junta, the Greek Army in Cyprus, and the Cypriot National Guard. The treaty of Guarantee states that a guarantor power can intervene in order to enforce the constitution when it is violated). Since then, Cyprus has been partitioned alongside the ethnic divisions, with the Greek Cypriots maintaining the Republic of Cyprus and recognized by the United Nations and its members except for the Republic of Turkey. Since 1974, the island is divided from the middle, where the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) is the officially accepted government and the Turkish Cypriot administration is the de-facto state controlling the northern part of the island. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally declared the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey has been the only country in the world to recognize the TRNC.

Several attempts had been made to resolve this long-lasting conflict, but they have all failed. Several important issues which could finally yield a sustained resolution to the conflict have remained unresolved. These vital issues have always caused a stalemate in negotiations including the presence of Turkish troops and guarantees, territorial concessions, property issues and representations of the two communities.

In the last couple of years, the new geopolitical dimension in the Eastern Mediterranean is also raising the tension in the Turkish-Greek relations and consequently shifting the dynamics of the international actors, changing their policies relative to the Cyprus question. Greek-Turkish maritime disputes have been an age-long issue which borders on national sovereignty and security concerns of both states. These maritime disputes between the two external actors in Cyprus conflict centers on disagreements concerning the boundaries of Greek territorial waters and the possession of a few islands located in the Aegean Sea; the unresolved issues of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the two states in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the protracted nature of the Cyprus conflict. Since these geographical factors are tied to these states' projections of national sovereignty and security, it has taken a significant toll on their bilateral-relations which have in turn affected their foreign policies towards each other and related matters viz the Cyprus conflict, and resulting in shifting policies. Therefore, given the long genesis of the Turkish-Greek maritime disputes, it has been dynamic as it has turned into an

Eastern Mediterranean issue which even became more crucial with the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in the offshore of Cyprus. This has also influenced the policies of external actors in Cyprus conflict. It must be noted that in regards to this aspect of Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical dynamics and the impact on external actors in relations to the Cyprus conflict, Turkey's shifting policies is more pronounced. Therefore, Turkey's role in the context of bilateral relations with Greece has not been stable and with the new geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean connected to energy and the EEZ delimitation, Turkey's policies have shifted significantly in comparison with other external actors in Cyprus, as it realizes the advantage of keeping Cyprus intact. The section on Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics and the Cyprus conflict will therefore focus more on Turkey as one of the key external actors in the Cyprus conflict.

Statement of the Research

The Cyprus question is one of the most protracted, intractable conflicts of the post-World War II. There had been several attempts made over the years to finding an objective and jointly accepted solution to the conflict.

The global and regional dimension of this inter-state ethnic conflict as a result of the attachment Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to their motherlands of Greece and Turkey respectively is a vital factor to consider not only in historically analyzing the conflict, but also in finding a 'justified' and acceptable lasting solution to the conflict.

i) What are the impacts of these motherlands, who both are members of NATO, in the Cyprus conflict?

ii) What roles did the colonial master, Britain, along with her foreign policy ally, the United States, played in the conflict, and also at the different stages of negotiation to finding a last-longing solution to the conflict?

iii) Is there any correlation between the roles of these external actors in Cyprus conflict and their national interest?

iv) How does the new geopolitical dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean impact the policies of these external actors on the Cyprus conflict and also the negotiation process to resolving the conflict?

This paper therefore aims to analyze the impact of external actors, with a particular reference to Turkey, in relation to the Cyprus conflict.

In the equation model for flexible bargaining behavior, Bartos, (1995) gave a model for distributive bargaining that indicated causes of concession making. This thesis tries to formulate this model for integrative bargaining form the Cyprus conflict. However, it cannot be carried out with simple equation and is necessary to assume for every approach that various external actors involved in Cyprus mediations have their national and security interests integrated by factors with the legitimate demands of the conflicting parties. This thesis takes such variables into thought and tries to adjust the arrangement to optimize any intervention approach chosen or created for handling the Cyprus issue. As the distributive bargaining demonstrate conditions over will too be a constituent of the method of any equation model for flexible bargaining behavior, the g calculate (level of feeling) within the case of Cyprus struggle has got to be heightens. Practically, a part has been done on the Cyprus strife utilizing Track III strategy (grass roots or bottom-up approaches), but the international aspect of the conflict is equally significant.

Research Questions

The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of external actors on the Cyprus question. Have these impacts made a contribution to peace and stability or on the contrary, do these impacts had little impact on the peace process? With the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean due to the discovery of hydrocarbons and efforts for drilling, how does the shifting dynamics of actors affect the Cyprus conflict as a response? This can be specified in the two questions below:

1. *How did external actors shape and reshape the Cyprus conflict?*
2. *How has the new politics shifted the dynamics of external actors, particularly Turkey and how has it affected the Cyprus conflict?*

There are several actors involved in the Cyprus conflict. This work attempts to look at the primary external state actors which are the motherlands of the warring parties, that is Greece and Turkey, the United Kingdom that colonized the island from 1878 to 1960 and the United States that acted as a mediator of the conflict (as part of a superpower diplomacy). Also, the main institutional actors in Cyprus

conflict, Viz the United Nations and the EU, are examined from a historical perspective. A special attention is paid to the new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean with specific interest in Turkish shifting policies and its impact on Cyprus conflict negotiating the Cyprus conflict.

Objective of the Study

The objectives of this work are stated below:

1. To examine the events that led to the independence of the island from Britain in 1960 and also critically analyze the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
2. To objectively examine the events that led to the intervention of Turkey in 1974, the role played by each external actor involved, and the subsequent division of the island.
3. To Analyze the negotiation attempts to resolve the Cyprus Conflict and critically look at the roles and interests of the external actors in these negotiations.
4. To examine the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the shifting dynamics of the external actors with its attendant impacts on the Cyprus conflict.
5. To observe the overall impact of the external actors in the continued conflict and through this, identify possible best method to approach the Cyprus conflict in terms of mediation and negotiation.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant in that it considers a crucial aspect of the Cyprus history and conflict alongside the new geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, and attempts to connect its analysis to the mediation of the conflict for a permanent and efficient resolution. This is done at a time when policy makers, diplomats and academics are seeking for more effective approaches and objective techniques to resolve the Cyprus conflict which has been on-going for over 40 years now. This work is thus important as an applicable guide to academics, mediators and policy makers in designing, researching and nourishing the approaches to an objective settlement of Cyprus conflict.

Limitations

This work examines the influence of external actors in Cyprus with a particular analysis of the shifting dynamics of the actors due to the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and how this affects the effective negotiation of the conflict. Although the focus of this study is on the impacts of external actors in the Cyprus conflict, the root causes of the conflict are also examined. In addition, this work provides future recommendations in finding a long-lasting and mutually beneficial resolution to the Cyprus conflict.

The limited time-frame given for this study did not allow more scope and radical analysis for each external actor involved in the Cyprus conflict, so that it stops short of developing a workable model for mediating the intractable conflict. The Cyprus conflict is an ongoing one, it is therefore a dynamic one. This leaves the prospect of fresh developments and issues coming up with time. The dynamism is already proven by different historical events as there was another scope added to the Cyprus conflict of the 1950s after it was internationalized in the early 1960s. Similarly, another scope is added to the conflict after the Turkish intervention in July 1974. Years later in 2004, another scope is added to the conflict with the simultaneous referenda results of the Annan Plan and also the unilateral accession to EU membership of the Greek-Cypriots side in the same year, without the settlement of the conflict. Another example of the dynamic nature of the Cyprus conflict is seen in the recent disagreement over Turkey's activities in Cyprus's territorial waters and exclusive economic zone which the Greek Cypriot's Republic of Cyprus termed illegal and a violation of the law of the sea. These new geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean which raised the tension in the Turkish-Greek relations are also impacting the policies of these actors on the Cyprus conflict. Despite these identified limitations, the quality and the validity of this work cannot be debased.

Research Methodology

The primary focus of this work is to evaluate the involvement of the various external actors in Cyprus conflict and analyze its impact on the success of negotiating the conflict. The research therefore makes use of secondary sources while data are gotten by the investigation and assessment of relevant materials. The methodology used in this thesis is therefore based on a qualitative research design

and a narrative historical analysis model which focused on the impact of external actors in Cyprus conflict. Therefore, this work conceptualizes the impact of external actors as the independent variable and the Cyprus conflict as dependent variable. The work investigates the impacts that key external actors have on the Cyprus conflict as efforts at finding workable and acceptable solution to the conflict continues. The instruments used for data collection were from secondary sources and include books, journals, newspapers and the internet. Other instruments used are published and unpublished materials from the libraries. This thesis has concentrated on the conflict in Cyprus as a case-study. In its theoretical considerations, the thesis questions how key external actors shaped and reshaped the Cyprus conflict. It conducts a historical analysis that covers from the pre-independence Cyprus to the new geopolitical and energy politics of the twenty first century in the Eastern Mediterranean. The primary goal of this work is to investigate the overall impact of external actors in the continued Cyprus conflict, the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the shifting dynamics of external actors in relation to the Cyprus conflict. The new geopolitical development in the Eastern Mediterranean was included as the hydrocarbon discovery in the offshore of Cyprus has played a vital role in shaping and reshaping the dynamics of external actors, particularly Turkey, with its shifting policy towards the Cyprus conflict.

The research is therefore conducted by detailed data collection, literature review and evaluation of the case, which is the Cyprus conflict. Since this work considers the impacts of various external actors on Cyprus conflict, the study of the case thus relies on multiple sources.

Literature Review

Numerous studies have been carried out on Cyprus conflict, with different works focusing on various aspects such as the historical analysis of the conflict, mediation and negotiation approaches to resolving the conflict, the hydrocarbon discovery in the Cyprus offshore and the impact on the conflict, and several other areas. Saner and Saner-Yiu (2002) in their paper examined both the positive and negative impacts that several and competing external actors have on third-party peace building initiatives. They utilize field experience to develop theory and practice of both official and non-official third-party intervention in a context of a long-lasting conflict as seen in the Cyprus conflict. The work acknowledges that

both the official and non-official approach to solving the conflict have failed. The authors, due to the failures of the various United Nations facilitated peace talks between the warring parties, considered it crucial to propose confidence-building measures which do not prompt political responsiveness from the two Cypriot communities. This is seen to be necessary in order to make provision for a neutral platform as compared to the auspices of the UN Secretary General who at different times has been said to be partisan in its handling of the conflict by both of the warring parties. Also, Turkey's strategic importance to the United States has made it impossible for the US to put stronger pressure on Turkey over the continuous presence of Turkish army on the island. Relating the European Union's impact on the Cyprus conflict, the authors pointed to the unilateral application of Greek south Cyprus for EU membership, which is seen to favor the Greek Cypriots. They opined that so far as external actors like the European Union, the US and Turkey are involved in making primary decisions for Cyprus, resolving Cyprus inter-communal conflict should not be expected (Saner & Saner-Yiu, 2002).

Özkaleli & Hasgüler (2013) in their work revisited the evolutionary approach to resolving conflicts. A popular perspective of viewing and treating Cyprus question like a simple Prisoner's Dilemma game where the players are encouraged to cultivate cooperative policies based on the structure and guidelines of the UN was referred to at the beginning of the work. The work progresses by emphasizing the complex nature of the Cyprus conflict, and investigated the necessity of multi-level game structure and heresthetics in the Cyprus conflict situation. A constructive application of heresthetics was suggested. The popular 'no' vote of the Greek-Cypriots in the Annan Plan of 2004 was attributed to the conscious heresthetical management of the referendum by the Greek-Cypriot leaders. The complexity of the Cyprus conflict is attributed partly to the susceptibility of the island to third-party involvements at the elites' level and also at the public opinion level. According to the authors, this very reason of third-party interference in the Cyprus affairs has made the numerous mediation efforts which were leader-centered to be unsuccessful, therefore failing to yield a productive settlement of the Cyprus conflict. Finally, the authors came up with an evolutionary conflict resolution model for Cyprus. In their evolutionary model, there was improvement in functionalism support given to the model's key premises. Functionalist perspectives are seen as vital for inter-communal institutions building

as it fosters cooperation. The work thus asserted that for a working consociational model to be arrived at in Cyprus, the social structural factors in the conflict must also be given the needed attention as Cyprus issue represents a dynamic conflict which evolves as time passes(Özkaleli & Hasgüler, 2013).

Isiksal (2019) examined the dilemmas of the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey-EU relations. The work therefore investigated a vital aspect of the Cyprus question which again emphasized the vital role and bearing of external actors, be it a key state external actor or an institutional actor, on the Cyprus conflict and consequently on the negotiation and mediation of the conflict. The work opined that the acceptance of the unilateral application of the Greek-Cypriot side by the European Union is a clear violation of the principles of international law and has also brought more complications to the arrival of a final settlement of the Cyprus conflict and also the negotiation process. Cyprus membership of the EU without the settlement of the Cyprus conflict or the Turkish-Cypriots side participating has given a comparative advantage to the Greek-Cypriots side. The author concluded by asserting that with the Greek-Cypriots' privileged position as the sole recognized government of Cyprus, Greek-Cypriots thus aspire to resolve the Cyprus conflict "by *osmosis* through assimilation of Turkish-Cypriots to the current *de facto* Greek Cypriot state of Cyprus as a 'protected minority'". The EU decision concerning the admission of the Republic of Cyprus into EU without the settlement of the Cyprus problem is also said to result into an 'asymmetric negotiation' in the Turkey's EU membership process(Isiksal, 2019). The Cyprus question has therefore been directly linked up with and investigated in the light of the inter-relationship between a state external actor and an international organization which are both involved in finding an acceptable and long-lasting solution to the conflict.

Kyris (2014) in his paper, investigates the role of the European Union in conflict resolution, with Cyprus as the case study, where a disputant is a member of the European Union, and the other disputant and actors (Turkish Cypriots and also Turkey) are outside the EU, but also have relations with it. He opined that the EU membership of just one side, the Greek Cypriots, has provided them the change which furthers their interests in the conflict. The accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union obviously failed to be a catalyst in resolving the inter-communal conflict. The author promotes the reasoning that the European

Union acceptance of the Greek South Cyprus application and membership without the resolution of the conflict, and consequently the internalization of the conflict by the EU is counterproductive to the settlement of the conflict, and also causes additional friction between the two Cypriot communities. Such action by the European Union also impacts the deterioration in the relations between Turkey and the EU. The EU represents one of the key factors which have shaped Turkish foreign policy towards the Cyprus conflict. One of the conditions given Turkey by the EU for membership accession is the normalization of its relations with the Greek Cypriots governed Republic of Cyprus. Subsequently, Turkey supported reunification of Cyprus in the Annan Plan of 2004. With the Greek Cypriots accession through the Republic of Cyprus and exclusion of the Turkish Cypriots despite the support of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots of the Annan Plan has questioned the legitimacy of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict and has undermined Turkish trust of the EU. The author concluded that the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus without the Turkish Cypriots has basically altered the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict Europeanization and provided the Greek Cypriots with more leverage over their Turkish Cypriots counterparts when it comes to requesting for concessions during negotiations (kyris, n.d.).

Oliver Richmond (2001) examined the operations of one of the major external actors in Cyprus, that is, the United Nations. The significance of the United Nations mediation in Cyprus was analyzed with its inherent weaknesses pointed out. It was the difficulties faced by the United Nations in successfully mediating the Cyprus conflict which finally led to the end of direct United Nations peacemaking, therefore resulting to the transfer of the attempts at resolving the conflict to the less politicized role of the UN Secretary General's good offices. The work suggested that the inability of the United Nations to realize its mandate to actualize peace and security in Cyprus is partly as a result of the weak connection between peacemaking and peacekeeping as set up in UN resolution 186 which established the whole operation in Cyprus. The case of the United Nations mediation in the Republic of Cyprus from the year 1964 to 1965 and the successive Secretary general's mission of good offices therefore reveals several of the issues that the United Nations mediation and peacemaking have been and are vulnerable to (Richmond, 2001).

A. Marco Turk (2006) in his paper made case for the application of Track III diplomacy approach to resolve Cyprus conflict, as he backed up his analysis with the field work and different inter-communal workshops carried out by him. The paper pointed out the failure of elite diplomacy to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Turk described the practices and values utilized for his work in Cyprus as part of a “democratized restorative justice.” In the various mediation workshops organized, members from the civil society were encouraged and equipped to acquire the needed skills and techniques for effective connection and communication with each other. The work therefore lay emphasis on the bottom-up approach to mediating Cyprus conflict. (Turk, 2006).

Perry Anderson in his paper analyzed the Cyprus conflict starting from its pre-WW I origin when the Island was acquired by Britain from the Ottoman Empire. His analysis of the conflict lay strong emphasis on the roles of all major state external actors such as the US, United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey in the conflict, highlighting the national interests behind each of their roles in the conflict. Anderson reasoned from the critical analysis of his paper that a real settlement of the Cyprus conflict can only emerged from within Cyprus instead of any externally imposed settlements from the various external actors(Anderson, 2008).

Maria Hadjipavlou (2007) conducted a survey from year 2000 to 2002 in both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities in order to study the existing beliefs concerning the genesis of the Cyprus conflict, the political culture, social attitudes, and also the prospect of future settlement of the problem. In the paper, the author revealed that both external and internal factors have significantly impacted the origin and continuous existence of this dispute, a viewpoint she mentioned questions the particular official stance which sees the Cyprus conflict as either an issue of external features or just an internal dispute between the majority and minority ethnic constituents of the Island. In order to introduce these points clearly, the author choose to examine intractable conflicts and its complexity. From the examination of intractable conflicts, the paper asserts and further the perspective that internal and psychological factors are equally important just as are legal and political factors, and are to be properly considered when peacebuilding and future resolutions are been addressed. In advancing the factors influencing intractable conflicts, the paper analyzed the part of external actors, like in colonial and post-colonial politics, foreign interventions of outside powers, like during the Cold War

politics, and also regional interests. Putting this category under power politics, the paper stated that ethnocentrism and ideological competition outweighs social and psychological dynamics in power politics. This is a result of the Realists utilizing the nation-state and its institutions as units of analysis, therefore downplaying the impact of non-governmental institutions and private citizens. The paper in its inference and conclusion opines that the discipline of conflict resolution, which is to a great extent, characterized by political and social psychology has placed the citizens and the group back on the scheme, along with non-governmental players. In every conflict and also post-conflict setting, all these features – both external and internal, extended stakeholders and also contextual, and the psychological aspect require adequate consideration and have to be connected and examined their inter-relationship in order to arrive at a lasting solution of the conflict (Hadjipavlou, 2007).

Mendoza (1981) in his work, made case for the vitality of mediation, that is intervention by a third party with a general or specific interest in the peaceful and objective settlement of a conflict. It looks into the efforts to mediate the Cyprus issue, an intractable conflict. Examining the efforts of different mediators and the various approaches, the author maintained the importance of the perceptions of the conflicting parties regarding the impartiality of any third-party before their acceptance by the conflicting parties to mediate in the conflict. The mediation services of the United States and Britain in early 1964 on the Cyprus issue was rejected by Greece due to the perception against their impartiality as a result of their acceptance of Turkish stance on the validity of the 1960 constitution. This prompted Greece's emphasis on the negotiation to be conducted by the UN mediator, and that with the UN efforts, no other third-party mediation service was required. A similar reaction from Greece towards American offer to mediate Cyprus conflict occurred after the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. Greece and the Greek-Cypriots perceived the United States as biased and therefore were against American offer of any direct mediation services in the Cyprus conflict after the July 1974 incidences. It was noted that an intending mediator may be able to coerce a conflicting party into accepting its services, despite the presence of any sentiment towards the intending mediator. The significance of domestic political atmosphere in the conflicting parties or communities was emphasized in the work, as a mediator

has to assess the impacts of this factor upon the flexibility of his mediating efforts(Mendoza, 1981).

Rekurd Maghdid (2016) examines the role that peace and conflict in Cyprus plays in Turkey's international relations. The author sees the Cyprus question as a crucial issue which has significant influence on Turkey's past, present and future. Cyprus conflict has therefore played an important role in the evolution of Turkey's international relations. This conflict has, at several times, puts Turkey in in opposition to some international organizations such as the European Union, that Turkey has so much attempted to accede. By answering the question of how Cyprus conflict has affected Turkey's international relations and also how the stance of other external actors in Cyprus conflict and their relations with Turkey relative to Cyprus in regards to time has changed, this paper has revealed the crucial impact that external actors, and particular Turkey, has on Cyprus conflict. In the case of how the conflict has impacted Turkey, the paper opined that the conflict has negative impact on Turkey and that it has rarely affected Turkey's international relations positively. Starting with energy, this work makes more comprehensible the alternating relationship between Turkey and other nations involved in the Cyprus conflict (Maghdid, 2016).

Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp (2019) in their research conducted historical analysis into the Turco-British relations and their conflicts with Egypt and Greece between the period of 1954 – 1958 which represents the early period of the Cold War. The work highlighted the geostrategic point this era represented in the British history as it lost the control of the Suez Canal which was vital during WW II and was an important waterway for trade. The role Egypt played in the Suez Canal during this period and its anti-Western stance and oppoition to Britain during this era with a warmth Greco-Egyptian friendship against Britain and her positions on Suez Canal and the Cyprus problem were analyzed. The announcement by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser of egypt on 26 July, 1956 that his government has nationalized the Suez Canal made Britain, the United States and France to call a conference in London which with the invitation turned down by Egypt and Greece. With the final loss of control of the Suez Canal, Britain had to turn fully to Cyprus considering its geostrategic importance to her Middle East interest. During this period, Turkey had maintained pro-Western attitudes, supporting Britain position during the conference on Suez Canal in London. Although Turkey avoided to be

involved in the Cyprus question, Britain encouraged its involvement in the 1950s as a means to counter Greece and Greek-Cypriots demand for self-determination and intent for *enosis*. During the period considered in this research, Egypt was supportive of Greek and Greek-Cypriots and their demand for self-determination and also maintained anti-Western attitudes while Turco-British relations was cordial. Britain therefore played its game well utilizing the cordial Turco-British relations to strengthen its hold onto Cyprus as a strategic and geopolitically important island for its Middle East interests. The work concluded that Britain was unable to re-design the Middle East as it previously desired to as a result of several factors which included the anti-western stance of Nasser government in Egypt. Britain therefore changed its defence plans in the region, shifting concentration to Cyprus with its military bases on the island with her actions in Cyprus also having significant impact on the Cyprus questions as it played its card well utilizing the differences between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots during this period to pursue its goal in Cyprus and hold onto its military base on the island (Yorgancıoğlu & Kıralp, 2019).

Andreas Stergiou (2016) work looked into the historical background of the Turkish-Cypriot Israeli relations and also important political and economic factors in the geopolitical complex of the Eastern Mediterranean region. He labelled as a 'wishful thinking' the evolving optimism over the option of joint exploration of petroleum resources which might act as incentive for resolving the Cyprus conflict. The author pointed out some factors to support this opinion. One of this is the increased Turkish-Israeli tensions and also the more broad international dispute concerning offshore energy. It was obvious that the renewed negotiations between February 2014 and April 2015 to resolve the Cyprus conflict was primarily as a result of the discovery of natural gas reserves off Cyprus coast and also the desire of the European Union and the United States to reconcile the Republic of Cyprus with Turkey, thereby facilitating a Turkey-Israel cooperation and increased understanding. The paper made use of primary resources such as archives and interviews conducted in Israel, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Lebanon and the United Kingdom (Stergiou, 2016).

This current work has considered the work done by these authors and several others and aim to further build upon such knowledge in achieving a worthwhile and recommendable outcome for this thesis work.

Chapter One gives a proper introduction into this work with the objectives, significance and the research methodology stated. Chapter Two of this Thesis examines briefly the historical background of the Cyprus conflict from the pre-independence era. It considers the Island since the period of Ottoman empire and the commencement of the British rule. It proceeds to examine the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the post-independence Cyprus and the post-war Cyprus. Chapter Three provides an in-depth analysis of the roles of various external actors in Cyprus and their impacts on the Cyprus conflict. It looked into the primary external state actors in Cyprus viz: Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and the United State. It also examines the non-state actors viz: the United Nations and the European Union and their efforts in mediating the Cyprus conflict with the resultant impacts upon the resolution of the conflict. Chapter Four concentrates on the new geopolitics of Eastern Mediterranean and the Cyprus conflicts as it seeks to investigate the effect of hydrocarbon discovery in the offshore of Cyprus and the general geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean on the policies of external actors as regards the protracted Cyprus conflict.

CHAPTER II

The Historical Background of Cyprus Conflict

In order to analyze the impact of external actors in Cyprus as a way of finding a permanent and reliable resolution to Cyprus question, it is vital to first give a historical background of the Cyprus conflict itself. Again, in providing the historical context of the Cyprus problem, the island, its inhabitants through the ages and its heritage have to be properly examined and understood.

Cyprus as an island has been part of the Greco-Roman heritage on different levels. This heritage is portrayed by shared attributes in every aspect and structure of human governance such as politics, philosophy, language and science (Stergiou, 2019). Also, an aspect of the tradition consists concepts like arts and rationality, the worth of personal freedom and rights, and also the notion of democracy. One of the basic historical aspect to best consider is the anthropological and ethnic origin of Cyprus. The anthropological and ethnical genesis of Cyprus originates from the Myceneans. The Mycenean Greeks first settled down on the island of Cyprus by 16th century BC, circulating the Greek language and civilization among the native populace.

In the course of time, Cyprus was also ruled by other European societies viz: the Romans (from 58 BC to AD 395), the Byzantines (from 395 to 1191), the English Reformers (from AD 1191), the French Lusignans (from 1192 to 1489), the Venetians (from 1489 to 1571) and the British Empire (from 1878 to 1960). All these cultures came with their various civilizations and impacted the make-up of Cyprus' culture. Also, Cyprus was controlled by non-European civilizations viz: the Assyrians and Egyptians (from 8th to 7th century BC), the Persians (6th century BC), the Arabs (from AD 649 to AD 965) and the Ottoman Empire (from 1571 to 1878) (Sepos & Sepos, 2008).

Another ethnic community that is not commonly mentioned in the history of Cyprus are the Maronites. They came from Syria (a region which represented the present-day Lebanon by then) in successive waves starting from the 8th century. The origin of their name can be traced to Saint Maron (350-410 A.D.) They multiplied in number during the Lusignan period and they served as mercenaries and also helped in protecting the coastal parts of the island. The Maronites were the allies of the Venetians that conquered the island in 1489. They were allies. In the

1500's the Maronite population in Cyprus was at least 50,000 and they covered around 60 villages. However, their population has decreased in time with the 1960 census putting their number to be 2752 spread across only 4 major villages (Veli, 2015).

Cyprus' geo-strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean, which serves as a crossway made it to be an appealing land for both military and economic reasons. Also, as a result of its relatively tiny size, it makes its acquisition by different powers to be uncomplicated. However, throughout those periods, the native populace predominantly kept its Greek Christian Orthodox tradition. Nonetheless, all these presence of foreign powers at various times also gave rise to established communities from other ethnic groups like the Maronites, Latins, the Armenians, and also the primarily Muslims heirs of Ottoman Empire¹.

Ottoman Empire and Pre-Independence Cyprus

As earlier mentioned, all the foreign powers that have controlled Cyprus had their influence on the island's bureaucratic, economic and communal life. A good illustration is seen during the Ottoman rule of the island. During this period, Cyprus was unable to take part in the liberalization process which occurred in Western Europe and came through the French revolution of the eighteenth century. The concepts of classical liberalism and democracy reached Cyprus later than should have been the case. Another clear example during the Ottoman rule of Cyprus is seen in the Ottoman *millet* system that permitted religious establishments to rule their non-Muslim community. This feature remarkably makes stronger the Orthodox Church in Cypriot community politically and economically. The archbishop was therefore made the head of the Greek-Cypriot community. Therefore, about a period of one hundred years later, Archbishop Makarios became not just the head of the fight for independence from Britain and later the first President of the of Cyprus after independence in 1960. Right now, the Church happens to have influence on political positions, with a substantial impact on national matters to the extent of also suggesting the presidential candidates to be endorsed (T. W. Adams, 1966). Also, the dominant structure of clientelist which

¹ With independence of the island from Britain in 1960, the Greek-Cypriots population consisted of 78%, while that of the Turkish-Cypriots was 18%. Other ethnic groups made up the remaining 4%.

depends on patronage relationship and exists within the Cypriot community is also linked to this Ottoman era. The *muhtar* societal structure authorized selected village heads (or the *muhtars*) by each community to act as the head of each community respectively, and this made governing easy for both the people and also the Ottoman Empire. It brings people from the different communities close to their leaders, that is the muhtars or village headmen. It also made governing easier as it defines a patronage system of governance that carried on and grew horizontal and vertical societal and political directions during the post-Ottoman era (Yilmaz, 2010).

By the time the British rule began on the island, it significantly influenced these dimensions of the Ottoman empire on the island². Early British strategies on the island between the year 1878 and 1931 brought significant reformation to its administration, institutions, laws and economy. Majority of the reformations brought by the British policies were truly positive, such as effective administrative structure, improved health sector and efficient education sector, yet some were in contrast to the native cultures, and also in conflict with the established authority of the orthodox church. A very good illustration was the British unwillingness to acknowledge the archbishop as the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, as a result of their adherence to the ideology of dissociation of religion and politics. This, as expected, brought about tensions among the native populace and therefore resulted into the forceful rise of anti-British faction (Markides, 1977). A specific issue of disagreement up till the year 1930 has been the make-up of the British-inaugurated Legislative Council by which British administrators and Turkish-Cypriot officials could defeat through vote the majority Greek-Cypriot on any matter, holding back the orthodox authority of the Greek Orthodox Church.

These oppositions joined other factors to lead to intense demand for '*Enosis*' which is the unification of the whole of Cyprus with Greece, the mother-land for the Greek speaking population of the island. The unification movement had started since, between 1821 to 1829 when the Greek-Cypriot religious leaders raised their voices to strengthen the Greek independence movement and demanded the union of Cyprus with Greece, just for it to be squashed by the Ottoman authorities. This appeal for *enosis* arose again in 1931 from the Bishop of Kition, and this eventually

² Britain first acquired Cyprus in 1878 as a loan from the Ottoman Empire as a trade-off for the protection of the Ottomans against potential Russian threat. The island formally became a British protectorate in 1923.

resulted into mass riots against the Britain's Government House in the capital, Nicosia. In the late 1940s, the Greek Cypriots brought back their struggle, using the reigning trends of the demand for decolonization during that period. The year 1948 saw the Greek Orthodox Church turned down Britain's Constitutional Plan which proposed a constrained self-government by a Consultative Assembly. In the year 1950, the Greek Orthodox Church called a plebiscite over the matter of *Enosis*, and it was supported by the Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL). It was 96 percent of the entire Greek-Cypriot turnout that voted in support of *Enosis*. During this period, Greece was in support of it, as it took this issue of self-determination for Cyprus to the United Nations in August 1954 (Stefanidis, 1999). It is believed that the Greek Cypriots viewed the demand for self-determination to be more welcoming to the international community than the demand for *Enosis*. However, the latter remained as an important strategy in the following years for some of the ethno-nationalist Greek Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot leaders expected the possibility of demanding for a nation-wide referendum on *Enosis* after achieving the self-determination. In June 1958, Harold Macmillan who was the British Prime Minister at that time, came up with a 'partnership' plan for the Island which basically required a shared administration by the three states of Greece, Turkey and Britain. The partnership plan was swiftly turned-down by Makarios and the Greek administration. It was this circumstance that made Makarios to change his *Enosis* policy through self-determination to seeking for independence for the state, because he regarded the suggested partnering plan by the British Prime Minister to be a form of 'Anglo-Turkish collusion' which would finally translates to the 'de facto' partition of the island (Stephens, 1966).

In the early period of British authority in Cyprus, confirmation of inter-communal dispute between the two communities was absent. Unquestionably, there existed underlying tension between them which stemmed from the presence of cultural, religion, and language differences. However, such tension did not manifest into an ethnic or a political conflict. This happened as a result of the Greek-Cypriot preference for union with Greece as it became increasingly noticeable as years passed by. However, Britain's refusal to hand over the Island together with its widespread colonial tactic of 'divide and rule' (which it also made use of in several nations like India) that pitted the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots against each other, thereby taking up the role of an arbitrator, obviously intensified

these tensions. In fact, not till the mid-1940s, the Turkish side to a large extent were unaware of the goals of the Greek-Cypriot (Tocci, 2004). Britain seeing the threat posed by *Enosis* movement to their interest in Cyprus firmly persuaded the Turkish-Cypriot society to counter-rally so as to stop the Greeks and Greek-Cypriots from achieving their goals.

To be sure, Britain maneuvered the Turkish-Cypriot community in order to counter the agitation of the Greek-Cypriots and thus protect her interests on the island (Attalides, 1979). Britain's presence in Cyprus was therefore made to be more legitimate before the local population and also before the international community, as it seemed essential in order to ensure the needed preservation of equal rights between the two communities. Although in truth, Britain preferred a strained and incompatible bi-ethnic relation in order to provide a rationale for their continued presence as an arbitrator in Cyprus. It could be said that through years Britain has governed Cyprus via the Greek, Turkish and other communities, instead of Cypriots (Kelling, 1990b). The objective was to make certain the continuance of a fragile Cypriot identity which will sabotage any potential anti-colonization faction. This is known as 'divide and rule' strategy and is notoriously used as part of the imperialism and as a colonial policy in other colonies as well. The ethno-nationalist movement that was finally founded by the Greek Cypriot nationalists in the early 1950s was called 'National Organization of Cypriot Fighters' (*EOKA*). Its political arm was led by Archbishop Makarios while the military arm was controlled by Georgios Grivas who was a Cyprus born colonel of the Greek army³. Its primary objective had been to expel British troops from Cyprus and also to unify the island with Greece. On the side of the Turkish-Cypriots, there also existed the paramilitary organization TMT which translated to Turkish Resistance Organization and was headed by Rauf Dentkas, a prominent figure among Turkish-Cypriots. It also declared its own contrasting stance of *Taksim*, that is, the partition of Cyprus.⁴ During this conflicting period, Britain strengthened its 'divide and rule' strategies among the general Cypriot populace, thereby further increasing the polarization of the two ethnic groups. Consequently, the Greek-Cypriots working at British bases were taken over by Turkish-Cypriot workforce.

³ EOKA key target was the British army. The pro-British Cypriots and *Taksim* supporters were also attacked by EOKA.

⁴ TMT also received supports from Turkey in terms of weapons and funds.

Also, unique and ethnically segregated police cells were established (Ertekun, 1981).

Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus

After some years of EOKA hostilities and offensive campaign against the British rule in the late 1950s, Britain, Greece and Turkey alongside the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders which were Archbishop Makarios and Fazil Kutchuk respectively, endorsed the Zurich-London Agreements in February 1959. The treaties created from this agreement were three, namely: The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee (Sozen, 2004). The Treaty of Establishment serves as the basis for the provision of a new independent state, that is the Republic of Cyprus, which came into existence on the 16th of August 1960 (Crawshaw, 1964). This established new state has power-sharing attributes which are present in order to make provision for the ethnic diversity⁵, and also the two sovereign bases of Britain present on the island⁶. The Treaty of Alliance makes provision for security collaboration between Cyprus and the two motherlands of Greece and Turkey, and this involves the placement of military troops from both Greek and Turkey for the purpose of preserving peace in the newly created state. The Treaty of Guarantee, which is more sensitive, makes provision for Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantors to help maintain the constitution and territorial integrity of the new state. The Treaty of Guarantee therefore in effect gave the right to these three states for military intervention in case the constitutional order of the new state is disrupted (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.).

After the decolonization struggle in Cyprus, the young state was faced with ethnic conflict, and political unrest as the division between both communities of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the island was pronounced. The newly founded state can be, compared with Ireland and India which are former colonies of Britain. These two states experienced partitioning after colonization ended. In Ireland, the Catholics represented the majority and were nationalists who pursued the restoration of Ireland's independence as a unit state. This was similar to the position of India Hindus who were nationalists and the majority as against the

⁵ The constitution made provision for the President to be Greek Cypriot while the Vice President, a Turkish Cypriot.

⁶ Akrotiri and Dhekelia British bases.

Muslims in India. In both cases, Britain's inclination to holding the balance was a function of her national interest, that is, as far as it was to her benefit (Mansergh, 1997). The main difference between the Cyprus struggle and Ireland and India's own was that the demand for freedom by the Greek-Cypriots was mainly for the purpose of *Enosis*, that is the purpose was to unify with Greece. Whereas in Ireland and India, it was purely the demand for independence (Rupesinghe, Sciarone & van de Goor, 1996).

The *Enosis* movement denoted to be entirely Hellenic, a Greek-Cypriot focused movement that completely excluded the Turkish-Cypriot national ambitions. This indicated the possibility of domination and suppression for the Turkish Cypriots. As a result, there were tensions between the two major ethnic groups in Cyprus, as the separate Cyprus movements was characterized by ethno-nationalism and the absence of unity. The ethnic, religion and language divergence in Cyprus, compounded by Britain's 'divide and rule' strategies, eventually enfeebled the movement and it resulted in the subsequent separation of the island with Britain maintaining her bases and also influence on the island. In general, it can be averred that both the British colonization of Cyprus and the Ottoman rule in Cyprus had left their lasting effect on Cyprus's political culture, social institutions and character and also on its demographics. Britain's methods and approaches to handling the disputes between the two warring parties in Cyprus also has substantial impact in defining the nature of relations between the two communities and it has not been with its ensuing consequences for Cyprus's future (Panayiotopoulos, 1999).

Post-Independence Cyprus

The phase in Cyprus history which can be generally referred to as post-independence era of Cyprus starts from the year 1960 after the new Republic of Cyprus was established and gained independence from Britain. This period was also defined by the presence of noticeable tension and disputes between the two main ethnic groups over the establishment of the Zurich-London agreements. Many among the Greek-Cypriot community, especially the ones that were active in EOKA organization, regarded the agreements as a sell-out of *Enosis* ideal. There also existed uproar that the new constitution of the newly established republic disregarded the self-determination of the Cypriots since it did not proceed from

them as it was not endorsed through a referendum nor did it pass through any Cypriot Parliament (Constantinou, 2006). Still, some pointed to the fact that although the process of self-determination and independence may not have been through direct vote by the Cypriot people, the actual process of exact transfer of sovereignty from Britain as the colonial ruler to the newly created Cypriot republic should be regarded as an discharge of such a right, as similar approach also occurred in some independent states (Crawford, 2010). The perception of the Cypriot people on the 1960 constitution is therefore that of ambiguity and the Cypriot identity factor also increase the complication in the relationships between the two ethnic groups. The issue of Cypriot identity lay on the irresolution within the minds of both Cypriots communities in choosing between, staunch bond of sympathy with Greek and Turkish nationalisms respectively, coupled with the objective of unifying with their respective motherlands, and the 'Cypriots' identity and the ensuing actuality of independence. These conflicting interpretation of Cypriot identity has gotten significant effects for both ethnic groups with respect to their relationship and reaction to European identity (Loizides, 2007). Immediately the newly created state started to function, resentment soon appeared among the Greek Cypriots concerning the state. Specifically, the Greek Cypriots felt aggrieved about the constitutional provision of the ratio 70 to 30 that was granted to both ethnic groups in both the executive and public administration contending about its non-disclosure of the demographic substantiality of Cyprus and inequitably over-representing the Turkish-Cypriot side. In addition, there existed dissatisfaction about the continuous stalemates in decision-making process, ensuing from the different legislative majorities and presidential veto rights, besides the prevalent ineffectiveness originating from the high-cost replication of offices and duties in the legislature and the executive (Crawshaw, 1969). Finally, there was the presence of basic suspicion of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots unto the effect that the heads of the Turkish Cypriots' community were deliberately disrupting the efficient operation of the polity so as to make provision for Turkey to have grounds for intervention.

December 1963 Ethnic Clashes

By the end of the year 1963, Archbishop Makarios attempted to tackle all the problems through proposal of amendments to the Constitution on thirteen points, which included presidential vetoes, distinct legislative majorities, distinct

municipalities and the differentiations based on ethnicity which are made in courts. In addition, he suggested that ethnic proportions in the civil service, the military and police should be re-scaled in proportion to the population ratios. He believed that these proposals would be able to address the key issues facing the efficient operation of the new consociational polity such as deadlocks in decision making. But the proposals were also seen as attempts to appease his local rivals that criticized him of backing down on the subject of unification with the motherland, Greece, and minority rights for the Turkish Cypriots. The need to reconcile two warring communities who have conflicting interests, and build a bi-communal state and consolidate their sovereignty, coupled with the crucial negotiation needed to deal with the interests and security affairs of the external actors viz the UK, Greece, Turkey and also the United States and USSR has made the post-independence Cyprus also complex. Archbishop Makarios's proposals propelled an outbreak of demonstrations from the Turkish-Cypriots as they regarded the changes to be lessening of the assurance of their political equality, and a development that will lead to the establishment of a single nation with minority rights for their people. There was also a leak around the same period about the presence of a secret plan devised within the Greek-Cypriot elites which aimed to subdue the Turkish-Cypriot resistance by force to the proposed revisions. Although it was never carried out, it furthermore intensified the feelings of insecurity by the Turkish-Cypriots. The constitutional dilemma finally resulted into various eruptions of violence between the year 1963 and 1967 and numerous victims recorded from both camps, with EOKA members being in the forefront of the conflict. At this stage, bi-communal contacts stopped, and the Turkish-Cypriots withdrew from Archbishop Makarios's administration in the year 1963 and set up a Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration by 1967 so as to be in charge of their community which has been constricted in different enclaves all around the island.⁷

In December 1963, Greek-Cypriot paramilitaries struck the Turkish-Cypriot Omorphita suburb of Nicosia. By the month of March 1964, the first UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus code name UNFICYP was launched. Nevertheless, it failed to stop the violence. UNFICYP is still in existence on the island.⁸ Also, in August 1964, General Grivas came back from Mainland Greece and became the leader of

⁷ Close to sixty thousand Turkish-Cypriots fled from their residents and were residing in enclaves.

⁸ The United Nations Security Council Resolution 186 in 1964 gave rise to UNFICYP.

the Greek Cypriot paramilitary section of EOKA, regarded as EOKA-BHe struck the Turkish-Cypriot enclave of Kokkina. Turkey reacted quickly by bombing Greek positions in Tillyria with heavy fighter jet. In the year 1965 an unsuccessful attempt was made to achieve a political solution of the conflict through the report of a special UN mediator, Galo Plaza Lasso, appointed by the then United Nations Secretary General, U Thant. The Cyprus problem was approached in bi-communal terms instead of international terms by U Thant (Ker-Lindsay, 2005). A sovereign centralized Republic of Cyprus was proposed where the rights of the majority and minority communities are guaranteed. The Greek-Cypriots received the proposal positively while both Turkey and the Turkish- Cypriots disagreed with it, as by then, both to a great extent embraced a federal bi-communal state.

By November of the year 1967, Grivas forces made an attack on two Turkish-Cypriot enclaves and that brought both Turkey and Greece to the verge of war. That was prevented by the intervention of the United States. Turkey responded by issuing an ultimatum to Greece, demanding it reduces its military presence on the island and also to guarantee that Grivas leaves the island. With the United States persuasion, Grivas left the island in 1968 (Christou, 2004). Makarios took advantage of such opportunity to strengthen his position through the reduction of the number of National Guard troops (with majority devoted to Grivas). He founded his own paramilitary force which was devoted to the independence ideal. However, Grivas finally came back again the second time to Cyprus in the year 1971 and formally set up the right-wing break-away paramilitary establishment EOKA B that sought to lay pressure on President Makarios to shift from his independence agenda and come back to the initial EOKA ideal of *Enosis*. It was this established EOKA B that finally played a vital role in the occurrences of 1974.

July 1974 Coup

A vital influence which heightened tensions in Cyprus and moved the island further towards a perpetual break-up was the coming to power through *coup d'état* of the US-backed right-wing military junta in Greece in April 1967. The Greek colonels trailed a strong policy of *Enosis* with Cyprus through all possible ways. The Cyprus National Guard, that also consisted of military officers from Greece and also EOKA hardliners, played key roles under the authority of Grivas and also directions by the mainland military junta in subverting the powers of President

Makarios, by characterizing him to be a communist and a betrayer to the ideals of unification with Greece. Another characterization of the post-independence period was the intensified participation and interest of both the United States and the Soviet Union in the affairs of Cyprus, as Cyprus itself became another part of the Cold War conflict. After Turkey and Greece's entrance into NATO in February 1952, the United States also view Cyprus as a possible candidate, especially when the Cold War was in its peak from around 1965 and in the 1970s. President Makarios was more conscious to safeguard the non-alignment and independence of Cyprus and also to shift the young republic's international relations away from the Cold War conflict of the two superpowers and any external involvement (Chossudovsky, 2006). His endeavors towards such end involved the establishment of and taking a front position in the Non-Alliance Movement in the early 1950s, and also ensuring the involvement of the UN as much as possible in any conflict, and also officially maintaining a neutral position in relation to the both the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR). Although, in actual fact, Archbishop Makarios was determined to involve the Soviet Union in Cyprus affairs, as the USSR declared its support for Cyprus self-determination in the 1950s, as it would offset the US-Britain element that was considered to serve Turkey's interests. Makarios' toying with the USSR, coupled with the comparative power and influence of the communist AKEL party that stood by him, made the United States to see him as a nuisance in the Mediterranean (Mallinson, 2015). Makarios's relationship with military junta in Greece reached a very low point as they staged a coup and overthrown him as the president of Republic of Cyprus on 15 July 1974. The coup was planned in cooperation with EOKA B forces headed by Nikos Sampson as he was positioned by the Greece military authority as the *de facto* President of Cyprus⁹.

July 1974 Turkish Intervention

In response to the coup, Turkey asked for help from the United Kingdom as another signatory of the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960. However, they did not receive any support. Eventually on 20th July 1974, 40,000 armed forces arrived from Turkey from a landing operation in Kyrenia, situated in the northern part of the island, they captured a small area of land near the city and had just slight

⁹ Following Grivas' demise in January 1974, Nikos Sampson played vital role in the activities of EOKA B

opposition from the security apparatus of the island, that is, the Cypriot National Guard. Turkey therefore invoked Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee that permitted that a guarantor power could intervene for the purpose of restoring the constitutional order on the island. The United Nations was able to reach a ceasefire on 22 July 1974 while the leaders of both warring communities on the island alongside the leaders of the guarantor powers (Britain, Greece and Turkey) met on 14 August 1974 to explore a political settlement of the Cyprus issue. In the meantime, Sampson resigned while Glafkos Clerides was chosen as the acting President of the Republic of Cyprus. Due to these unfolding incidents and also due to pressure from the Greek public opinion, the Greek military authority gave way on 23 July 1974 and Constantinos Karamanlis reinstated democratic government in Greece (Yılmaz, 2005). Back in Geneva Switzerland, Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots insisted on the establishment of a bi-zonal bi-communal federal form of government with thirty-four per cent of the land to be for the Turkish-Cypriots, and that demand was non-negotiable. President Clerides had to request for an adjournment of between thirty-six to forty-eight hours in order to make consultations. Within just a few hours, Turkey had initiated a second attack, occupying thirty-seven per cent of the island.

Post-War Cyprus

The roles of both the United States and Britain during those crucial periods of 1974 can never be ignored. In line with the position of the Greek military colonel Patakos, it was the then United States Foreign Secretary, Kissinger, that emboldened the junta administration to stage the *coup d'état* and remove Archbishop Makarios (Hitchens, 1997). Also, it was very obvious that neither Britain nor the United States inhibited Turkey from intervening in Cyprus during the double-phase of operations of the Turkish forces, something they could and would have easily done. Britain's then foreign secretary, who would soon become the country's leader, James Callaghan acknowledged that Britain had had a legitimate responsibility to take action and forestall the intervention (O'Malley & Craig, 1999). Although, in actual fact the UK was satisfied to simply show public disapproval of the operation and most significantly to safeguard and guarantee the preservation of the sovereignty of its military bases during the crises. Another point worth emphasizing relative to the United States during these periods was its

preoccupation with domestic political issue, specifically the Watergate scandal and also from the external angle, the Vietnam war. The United States was therefore content to let Turkey, its close ally, carry out a *de facto* division of Cyprus. One of the resultant reactions from the Greek-Cypriots to the perceived betrayal by the United States was the assassination of the American Ambassador Davies, in Nicosia during the summer of 1974 by Greek-Cypriot activists as protest to the United States perceived duplicity (Mallinson, 2015). At this period in 1974, considering the Cyprus' Association Agreement (AA)³⁰ with the European Community (EC) in 1972, the then French Presidency summoned the nine Member States to a meeting which falls within the fabric of the recently founded European Political Cooperation (EPC), and sent out communiques to Greece and Turkey demanding for ceasefire, on the premise of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 353, and giving support to the brief Geneva negotiations. It has been observed that the French Presidency of the EPC took instant and bold action in coordinating the effort of the nine member states, giving the approach led to the United Kingdom, who was glad to have gotten multilateral support for its endeavors in handling the complex Cyprus conflict. The issue seen with this scheme, nevertheless, was that Britain could not be a neutral player in the Cyprus issue, as a result of it being a guarantor power and therefore has its own strategic interests in Cyprus. Also, Britain strategies relative to Cyprus in general aligned with the United States policies, which maintained a mild, if not an encouraging attitude towards Turkey's actions in the Summer of 1974. This generated considerable disquiets among the Greek-Cypriot side relating to neutrality of the European Community / British-led measure.

The action of the newly democratic Greece state to join the European Community (EC) with its application being embraced by several of the members headed by France, compromised the European Community's neutrality towards Greece and Turkey and has affected the credibility of its proposal to the Turks' negatively. The fact although was clear that the European Community (EC) neutrality would be questionable due to the fact that the policy initiative was handed to Britain that also had her national interest in Cyprus. The extent of the US involvements in the European Community's foreign policy would not have made the EC to be a convincing arbitrator. After unable to successfully mediate the Cyprus conflict, the then 9 members of the European Community, that is the EC-9,

just fell back on supporting the United Nations mediation efforts (Nuttall, 1992). The results of the 1974 events on the island politically, economically and socially were severe. The military intervention by Turkey established the political and physical of the island and had vital impacts on the economy and societal make-up of Cyprus. There were substantial deaths apart from the resultant displacement of people. The number of Greek Cypriots casualties were reported to be about 5000, with 1,619 reported to be missing. There were between 160,000 to 200,000 Greek-Cypriots refugees, while between 50,000 to 60,000 Turkish-Cypriots came to the northern part of the island in what happened to be an agreed exchange of populations. The economy of Cyprus was severely affected as the Gross Domestic Product fell by 17.9 per cent, and investment on the island dropped by 29.9 per cent. The level of consumption also dropped as well as volumes of imported and exported goods and commodities (Andreou, 1996). Part of the consequences of the 1974 events was that it created an underlying class within the two communities. There was also the establishment of identity cleavage, especially between the dislodged refugees and those that held on to their homes and properties. This *de facto* division of the island obviously increased the ethnical, religious and cultural cleavage between the two Cypriots communities. Also, the colonial idea which emphasize the inability of the two communities' capability of co-existing harmoniously without an arbitrator or a dividing line in – between became notable. With the division, the south which is seen as the legitimate government by the international community benefits from robust and official institutional contacts with the European Union, and also the economic links and trade connections with Member States as opposed to the northern part where the European Union legislation and the *acquis* is suspended (Vassiliou, 2004).

In general, the consequences of the various 1974 conflictual events on the island, as well as other preceding conflictual events also, is seen in almost every area of life of the Cypriots, and has heightened the degree of distrust and misgivings between the two warring parties, with the division now deep-rooted, with several lasting effects. The *status quo* of the *de facto* partition of the island has not only endured, but several attempts by various actors to reunify the island have also failed and the conflict has remained intractable.

CHAPTER III

External Actors in Cyprus Conflict

Any attempt to solve or mediate the intractable Cyprus conflict must take significance notice and proper understanding of the significant roles of external actors involved in the Cyprus issue despite the primary parties to the conflict being two communities within the same country. Therefore, in order to analyze the impact of external actors in Cyprus as a way of finding long-lasting solution to the Cyprus question, it is necessary to first understand who are the key external actors and also their various roles played in Cyprus, historically, at independence, and after independence and after the de-facto partition of the island. In this work, the external actors are therefore divided into two broad categories viz: the state actors and the non-state actors. The main external state actors in Cyprus conflict are Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The non-state actors are the United Nations and the European Union. The following sections therefore properly examined these external actors in Cyprus conflict.

The State Actors

As earlier mentioned, the key state actors who are involved in Cyprus conflicts are Greece, Turkey, Britain and the United States. The first three have been and are directly involved in Cyprus while the latter, that is the United States, have not been directly involved like the first three, but its actions, inactions, decisions, indecisions and interests have had crucial impact on the Cyprus issue. These external state actors in Cyprus conflict are hereby examined in details in the subsections below.

Greece

The Hellenistic rule in Cyprus started by 322 B.C. after the Persians rule and it lasted for over 250 years (Camp, 1980) It was not until 58 B.C. that the Romans took control of Cyprus from Hellenistic rule. It was while under the Roman rule, that the Cypriots became Christian and under the Byzantine Roman, the 'Orthodox' church and the state steadily intermingled. Cyprus remained under the control of East Roman for several centuries(Dodd, 2010). It was not until the year 1571 that Cyprus came under Ottoman control.

Historically, the Mycenaeans first settled down on the island of Cyprus in the 16th century BC, thereby circulating the Greek culture and language among the native populace. Down the history lane though, the island has then been ruled by other different cultures from the Romans down to the Ottoman Empire and to the colonial Britain. In the 1950s, Greece-Turkey relations had been dominated by geopolitical concerns in the Mediterranean. Coming to the Cyprus issue, there had been the development of some crisis since the early 1950s, but Turkey and Greece who also had joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) around this period (in 1952) remained committed to the preservation of the friendship established since the Atatürk harmonious relations with Venizelos. The Cyprus matter was therefore deliberately kept low by both Greece and Turkey in the early 1950s. Increase in domestic violence between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots coupled with the Cold-War era rivalry between the US led West and the USSR came at a crucial period which in turn influenced the stance of Greece and also Turkey towards the Cyprus issue. This also became a major concern to the United States who must work to avert any likelihood of war between two NATO allies.

After the handover of Cyprus to Britain, the first key incidence that occurred happened on October 20, 1931. The Greeks-Cypriots carried out a general protest in Limassol. The protest later turned into a revolt against the British administration. There were casualties as 10 people died while 68 were wounded. This protest made the British government to introduce more strident policies on the island till in the early 1940s. During World War II, the Prime Minister of Greece formally requested that the island should be transferred to Greece. This became known as *Enosis* (Morgan, 2010). Winston Churchill, who was British Prime Minister rejected the request as he was attempting to bring Turkey to the side of the allies in the World War II, and he did not want to create rancor among the Turks. The enosis struggle of the Greek-Cypriots was been piloted by both AKEL and the Orthodox Church. AKEL was established in 1941 by the leaders of the covert communist party along with other influential Greek communists.

Most Greeks on the mainland Greece supported the demand for enosis by Greek-Cypriots and in November 1951, the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, presented to Britain the establishment of four military sites in Greece and also installations on the island. This proposal was made as an exchange for Britain

to approve the transfer of Cyprus to Greece(O'Malley & Craig, 1999). Britain rejected the offer, seeing the Greek administration not strong enough to be charged with the UK's security agenda in the Mediterranean which is not a short-term agenda.

Greece later attempted to persuade Britain and the United States that the fundamentals of self-determination alongside Greece close ties with both countries should essentially necessitate them to respect the desires of Greeks and Greek-Cypriots on *enosis*(Bitsios, 1975). Greek saw that it would be hard to realize their objectives on the island by just bilateral parley with the UK and therefore sponsored a draft resolution by the end of 1954 calling for international support for the Cypriots self-determination. This internationalized the Cyprus issue(Varnava, 2019). Due to the refusal to acknowledge the right to self-determination of the island, the Greek-Cypriots were mobilized against British colonial rule on the island. Grivas, who was a retired Greek-Cypriot colonel acted along with Makarios, and established the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters-*Ethiopian Organism Kipriaku Agonos* (EOKA) in the year 1955. EOKA was therefore founded with the key aim of carrying out *enosis* (French, 2015). Since Greece draft at the UN in 1954 was rejected, arms revolt against British administration on the island by the Greek-Cypriots was encouraged alongside Greece support. EOKA therefore executed its first onslaught on the first of April, 1955(Dimitrakis, 2008). Greece later supported the idea of full independence for Cyprus. There was therefore the Zurich and London Agreements in 1959. There, the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was signed and this established the new Republic of Cyprus. There was also the Treaty of Guarantee which was signed by the three guarantor powers viz: Britain, Greece, Turkey and also the Republic of Cyprus. This put the security and stability of the newly established republic in the hand of Britain, Greece and Turkey in addition to its independence. This independence was initially welcomed by every party involved, but it later became obvious that such type of independence would not resolve the communal conflict befalling the two major ethnic communities in Cyprus. President Makarios did not hide his discontent with the various treaties signed at the Zurich and London meetings, as he saw them to be unfair to the new Republic. Violence later broke up between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots communities, and the relations between them degenerated slowly. In November 30, 1963, President Makarios brought up amendment to the constitution

establishing the republic, this amendment will have a substantial influence on the federal structure of the new state. The vice-president, Kucuk, saw it to be against the equality rights of the Turkish-Cypriots, and therefore rejected the amendment. The action resulted into increased tension between the two communities. Turkey was already having military intervention as an option as a result of the violence on the island with the *enosis* intention of the Greek-Cypriots now being supported by Greece. In 1964, the states of Greece and Turkey therefore were close to going to war with each other, but for the United States intervention. The Greek Cypriot attacked the Turkish-Cypriots community and on February 11 and 13, violent clashes occurred between the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in Limassol. Although the first United Nations Peace Keeping Force has arrived on the island on March 14, 1964, the deterioration of the situation between the two communities made Turkey around the summer to again bear in mind military action in Cyprus so as to protect the Turkish-Cypriot population. It was the United States President Johnson's letter of June 5, 1964 to President Inonu of Turkey that altered that. Greece already signaled its intension to assist President Makarios of Cyprus in case of Turkish intervention on the island. There were already about 20,000 mainland Greek military on the island during the Spring of 1964. It was therefore obvious that any Turkish military action would have led to war between the two NATO members, Greek and Turkey (Bolukbasi, 1988). The Greek military came to power in Greece on April 21, 1967. This Greek military coup had a serious effect on Cyprus as the military administration could made any sudden move as regard Cyprus to effect or show support for *enosis*, although the island had experienced some mild stability after the 1964 crisis. The Greek still wanted to achieve *enosis* and this did not stop with the military junta now in position.

On July 15, 1974, the Greek military authority on the mainland carried out a bloody coup on the island with the primary purpose of effecting *enosis*. President Makarios was thus ousted from position as he slightly escaped being assassinated during the coup. Makarios himself was not against *enosis* only that he had not been in good terms with the military junta government in Greece and his goal is also to achieve *enosis*, but in the long term. The Greek military junta therefore staged the coup on the island and installed Nicos Samson as the new president. These actions by the Greece military government caused anxiety among the Turkish-Cypriots and also Turkey (Bryant & Papadakis, 2012).

The coup action by the Greece military junta was therefore to put the Republic of Cyprus directly under the jurisdiction of Greece and finally effect *enosis* with relative ease. Turkey intervened militarily by landing on the northern part of the island on July 20, 1974. The first military operation by Turkey which was a direct response to the Greece military Junta coup on the island took two days from July 20 to July 22, 1974. Ceasefire call was made, Turkey therefore responded by halting its operation of July 22 1974. This was followed by the Geneva Conference which started on July 25, 1964. Meanwhile the Greek military junta fell apart as the public opinion was against them and they could not contain the resultant effect of the coup carried out in Cyprus in the face of the intervention by Turkey. A new democratic government led by Karamanlis was therefore established in Greece (Papadakis, Peristianis, & Welz, 2006). Turkish second operation carried out from August 14 to August 16, 1974 resulted into the de facto partition of the island into two. The Greece government led by Karamanlis, although supported by the international community in this second Turkish operation was unable to do anything to prevent Turkey from carrying out the de facto partition of the island by reaching their target, the *Attila Line*. Greece has since continued to stand by the Greek-Cypriots Republic of Cyprus in seeking for a solution to the Cyprus conflict that will not affect its interest on the island.

Coming now to the recent period, with the new political developments in the Eastern Mediterranean due to the discovery of hydrocarbon deposits, Greece has constantly stood by the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus in its unilateral exploration and drilling of hydrocarbon resources in the offshore of the island without involving their Turkish-Cypriot counterpart on the island and without the settlement of the conflict. Greece is historically associated with the negotiation of the Cyprus issue and it always strongly defend the positions of the Republic of Cyprus. It therefore supports the unilateral activities of the Greek-Cypriots in exploring for hydrocarbons in the Cyprus EEZ (Evaghorou, 2018).

Turkey

Cyprus came under the Ottoman rule in the year 1571. It remained an Ottoman province until the year 1878. The island thus served as an important military station for the Ottomans for over three hundred years. The Turkish population on the island therefore increased in number. The Ottoman reign over

Cyprus ended in the 19th century. Britain had seen the importance of Cyprus for her Mediterranean interest, and the opportunity came about with the occurrence of the Russo-Turkish War from 1877 to 1878, during which British troops were positioned in Cyprus. The Russians were victorious over the Ottoman Empire and that resulted in the Treaty of San Stefano which was signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878. (Langer, 1962). At the subsequent Congress of Berlin between June 13, 1878 to July 13, 1878, Britain, in a separate agreement with the Ottoman government which was kept secret during the conference, gained control of Cyprus. However, Britain unilaterally appropriated Cyprus on November 5, 1914 as the Ottomans sided with the Germans during the World War I. It was not until at the Treaty of Lausanne after the World War I that Cyprus was legally transferred to Britain. The Ottoman government therefore had no direct or legal claim to Cyprus again. Turkey thus recognized British possession of the island, as it was legally transferred to Britain in the treaty (Mah, 1924). Following the final handover to Britain after World War I, the Greeks on the island started protest against the ruling colonial Britain in the early 1930s. The *enosis* struggle also started. Both the colonial British administration and Turkey were against *enosis*. The Turkish-Cypriots and also the UK would have to give-up some privileges if Cyprus should be united with the mainland Greece. This effect on the Turkish-Cypriots coupled with the fact that Greece will then also have to be Turkey's immediate direct neighbor on its Southern boundary to the Mediterranean, a country that already own most of the island on its Eastern border at the Aegean side, made Turkey frown against *enosis*. The protection of the Turkish Cypriots rights and also its own security concern were major factors taken into consideration. This inter-community tension on the island which increased in intensity made Turkey to give more attention to events on the island (Oran, 2010). In the 1950s, Turkey thus opposed *enosis* and supported the existing state of affairs on the island. Turkey was okay with Britain's presence in Cyprus. Turkey received constant visitations of Turkey-Cypriots in Ankara and they were given assurance of Turkey's support when require. By 1954, in support of the Greek-Cypriots demand for self-determination of Cyprus, the Greek government sponsored a draft resolution at the UN that called for international support for the Cypriots' self-determination. Alongside the NATO members, Turkey also opposed the Greece draft at the United Nations (Xydis, 1967). This event in 1954 which brought Cyprus issue to the international stage at

the United Nations made Turkey to give significant attention to the Cyprus matter. Due to the rejection of the Cyprus self-determination request by the Greek-Cypriots and supported by Greece, arms revolt against Britain rule was carried out on the island by EOKA. Its first attack was carried out on April 1, 1955. Britain invited both Turkey and Greece to London in August 1955 for a tripartite conference to discuss Cyprus matter. At the conference, Turkey maintained its stance for maintenance of the status quo in Cyprus. Turkey cited its historic, cultural and economic ties with Cyprus and the presence of a sizeable Turkish community which are inherent part of the island. Cyprus is therefore vital for Turkey. Also, Turkey's security concern would not allow for it to open its eyes and see Greece gain control of Cyprus, as the same Greece owns the several islands on the Western border of Turkey. Turkey's policy towards Cyprus after the 1954 event was therefore defined (Xydis, 1967).

In 1959, the Zurich and London Agreements were signed by Britain, Turkey, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus representatives. It consists of the Treaty of Establishment which formed the premise of the new state and also the Treaty of Guarantee which makes the UK, Turkey, and Greece the guarantors of the new state's security and stability. With these treaties in place, Turkish primary concern and interest in Cyprus is secured. That is, protection and guarantee of the Turkish-Cypriots rights on the island and also Turkey's security concern over Greece controlling the island. The dissatisfaction of President Makarios with the type and structure of independence granted Cyprus and the general desire of the Greek-Cypriots for enosis made Makarios made proposal to the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, Kucuk, in 1963 over amendment to the constitution that established the republic. Kucuk turned down the proposed amendment and tension increased on the island between the two communities. Turkey, however showed his concern over the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots and made it clear that as a member of the guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus, it will not hesitate to intervene in case of any violation of the constitution establishing the republic. This intervention Turkey was to carry out in both 1964 and 1967 when there was inter-communal violence on the island and the Turkish-Cypriots been massacred. In the year 1964, Turkey had military option in mind and was consideration launching military intervention on the island before President Lyndon B. Johnson of the United States sent Turkey's Prime Minister Ismet Inonu a letter on June 5, 1964, strongly disapproving of any potential

intervention on the island by Turkey, giving several reasons. One of the reasons given by President Johnson in the letter was a possible intervention of the USSR against Turkey in support of Makarios Cyprus government. Johnson cast doubt over the United States coming to Turkey's aid in the face of USSR intervention against Turkey. President Johnson's letter to Inonu therefore, to a reasonable extent, guided Inonu's determination to step in militarily in Cyprus in 1964 (Bolukbasi, 1993).

A similar development in the year 1967 also brought Turkey and Greece close to waging war. It was the Greek-Cypriots forces that matched into two Turkish-Cypriots villages so as to end Turkish opposition and terminate any obvious link between the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. This period, it was Demirel that was the Prime Minister in Turkey. He made threats to conduct military intervention in Cyprus except some specific demands were met. The demands included the withdrawal of the of the 10,000 Greek armies who were unlawfully brought into the island in 1964. The United States once again got involved and mediated the issue so that things were relatively normalized.

Then came July 15, 1974 when the military junta in position on Greek mainland carried out a bloody coup in Cyprus. The creation of "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus" with Nicos Sampson installed as the president caused anxiety in Turkey, and it therefore decided to act. Turkey saw the coup and installation of new government as the collapse of the constitutional order that established the republic of Cyprus, and therefore it has the right to intervene as a guarantor power (Bahcheli, 2000). The Prime Minister of Turkey at this period, Mustafa Bulent Ecevit quickly flew to London and had a meeting with Harold Wilson who was Britain Prime Minister at that time on July 17, 1974. Also in attendance was Britain Foreign Minister, James Callaghan. Ecevit wanted the Treaty of Guarantee secured diplomatically so that the constitutional order of the Republic of Cyprus would be restored, and if not Turkey will take military action and also needs Britain to join in such action to intervene and reinstate the constitutional order establishing the Republic of Cyprus as guarantor powers. Wilson refused to accept any military intervention and maintained that all peaceful approaches have not been tried out. British refusal to join Turkey in any possible military intervention in Cyprus did not deter Ecevit from launching his military operation in Cyprus. Therefore, on July 20, 1974, Turkey launched its military operation in Cyprus and it lasted for two days, that is on July 22, 1974. The second operation process started on the August

14, 1974 and also lasted two days, that is it ended on August 16, 1974. With this second stage of the military intervention, Turkey has reached its goals, partitioning the island into two by stopping at the *Attila Line*, just reaching the capital, Nicosia (Fouskas, 2005).

To this day, Cyprus remains divided between the Turkish-Cypriot controlled Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus. Turkey recognizes and supports the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus from its inception to this present day. The new geopolitical dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean where the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus is unilaterally engaging western international companies in exploration and drilling of hydrocarbon deposits in the Cyprus EEZ has been met with stern response from both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots TRNC. Turkey maintained that these activities of RoC are unlawful according to international law, as the Turkish Cypriots have equal rights on the island and are therefore entitled to the process and profit of any wealth generated on the island and its shores. This new factor in the Eastern Mediterranean may either serve as a potential for Cyprus conflict settlement or may constitute more obstacle for successful negotiation of the conflict. This could be seen in July 2014 when tensions over disagreement on offshore rights resulted into the breakdown of talks between the two Cypriot communities (Carlson, 2016)

Britain

The Ottoman reign over Cyprus ended in the 19th century. Earlier on in 19th century, Britain eyes had caught the geopolitical importance of Cyprus. Possessing the island will give Britain substantial influence in the Mediterranean, and give her greater advantage in the Levant region. It will also help Britain to prevent the intrusion of Russia in the region. Around the second half of the 19th century, Britain had made decision to obstruct the expansion of Russian activities in the Mediterranean. Fortunately for Britain, the opportunity came about with the occurrence of the Russo-Turkish War from 1877 to 1878, during which British troops were positioned in Cyprus. The Russians were victorious over the Ottoman Empire which resulted in the Treaty of San Stefano which was signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on March 3, 1878(Langer, 1962). Then the Congress of Berlin, which was a diplomatic meeting of the major European powers

at the time, came up between 13th of June to 13th of July, 1878. At this Congress of Berlin, the Treaty of San Stefano was replaced by the Treaty of Berlin. This created a new peace settlement between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, as the specific goals of the congress included a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano, which was imposed by the Russian government on Turkey after the victory of the former in the Russo – Turkish war (1877 – 1878). Turkey itself had hoped for better peace conditions, but Britain saw the Treaty of San Stefano as against its own interests in the region.

Basically, the British participation at the Russo-Turkish peace talks initially resulted into a defensive pact between Britain and Turkey on June 4, 1878, and later led to the revision of San Stefano in Berlin on 13 July, 1878. At the Congress of Berlin, Russian benefits were notably altered, while Britain acquired control over Cyprus after it requested the island from the Ottoman government in order to make use of it as a military base when confronted with any future Russian threat (Medlicott, 1963).

When World War I started in 1914, the Ottomans had a pact with Germany, thus, the UK unilaterally appropriated the island of Cyprus on 5th November, 1914. With the defeat of the Central Powers by the Allies in World War I, the Treaty of Lausanne which was the last treaty ending World War I was signed on 24th July, 1923. In the treaty, Article 20 set forth that Cyprus belonged to Britain (Mah, 1924). Turkey thus recognized British possession of Cyprus, as it was legally and officially transferred to Britain in the treaty. After the handover of Cyprus to Britain, the first key incidence that occurred happened on October 20, 1931. The Greek-Cypriots carried out a general protest in Limassol. The protest later turned into a revolt against the British administration. There were casualties as 10 people died while 68 were wounded. This protest made the British government to introduce more strident policies on the island till in the early 1940s. During World War II, the Prime Minister of Greece formally requested for the island to be transferred to Greece. This became known as *Enosis*. Winston Churchill, who was the British Prime Minister rejected the request as he was attempting to bring Turkey to the side of the allies in the World War II, and he did not want to create rancor among the Turks. The enosis struggle of the Greek Cypriots was been piloted by both AKEL and the Church. AKEL was established in 1941 by the leaders of the covert communist party along with other influential Greek communists (Varnava, 2019).

Most Greeks on the mainland Greece supported the demand for enosis by Greek-Cypriots and in November 1951, the Greek Foreign Minister, Evangelos Averoff, presented to Britain the establishment of four military stations in Greece and also installations on the island of Cyprus. This proposal was made as an exchange for Britain to approve the transfer of Cyprus to Greece. Britain rejected the offer, seeing the Greek administration not strong enough to be charged with the UK's security agenda in the Mediterranean which was not a short-term agenda (Kassimeris, 2010). Other suggested primary motive behind Britain refusal of such proposal from Greece was the provision of access to the Middle East region by the island due to its strategic location. This makes it tactically invaluable to Britain. Another importance of Cyprus to Britain could be seen from the 1950 Tripartite declaration where Britain, France and the United States all agreed to maintain an arms balance between Arabs and Israelis. The tripartite declaration was basically seen as an attempt by Western powers, during the Cold War era to gain control of the provision of weaponries to the Middle East and also ensure limitation on the USSR in order to prevent it from getting a foothold in that region. Britain therefore refused to relinquish its hold over Cyprus. Around this same period, the Anglo – Egyptian Treaty of 1954 meant that Britain would have to remove its military in Egypt. Such developments made Cyprus to be more important to Britain, as it will ensure its effectiveness and further protect its interest in the eastern Mediterranean (Kontos, Panayiotides N., Alexandrou, & Theodoulou, 2014).

As noted earlier in the previous sections, there were periods of increase in violence between the two major ethnic groups in Cyprus. And those rise in violence culminated in to several massacres from both communities and brought Turkey and Greece to the edge of war in both 1964 and 1967. Also, as mentioned in the previous sections, the coup carried out in Cyprus by the military junta in Greece on July 15, 1974 resulted into Turkey's military intervention on July 20, 1974. While Turkey's Prime Minister Mustafa Bulent Ecevit met with Wilson alongside James Callaghan who was Britain's Foreign Minister on July 17, 1974 in London to persuade them on joint military actions in Cyprus, as both are guarantor powers. Britain refused to join Turkey. Britain had different reasons for not accepting Turkey's offer, one of it was the knowledge that it would make their relations with both the Greek-Cypriots and Greece to degenerate. Britain was more concerned about its interest in Cyprus though which are its Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. There were views

from reliable sources that Britain had a prior knowledge of Turkey's intention to partition the island, but maintained a non-proactive stance against it so far as its Sovereign Bases are not affected (Anderson, 2008).

The United States

Cyprus was under British colonial rule till it got independence in 1960. Since Cyprus was under the British colonial rule, the United States was not involved in Cyprus not until the mid-1950s. This was primarily due to its strategic interest during the Cold War and also the fact that Britain was unable to solely handle the complex Cyprus issue which also involves the motherlands of Greece and Turkey, and therefore needed the assistance of the United States also to mediate in the Cyprus matter as a Superpower and also as the NATO head. The starting point of the United States in Cyprus is therefore in the 1950s as its interest in the island started at this period. The United States' interest and concern over the stability of Cyprus came as a result of the necessity to prevent the USSR from gaining the upper hand in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was therefore to ward off the spread of communism in these areas which is strategically important to the United States (Guney, 2004). Great Britain already has military bases on the island. There is also the necessity that those military bases continue to operate and serve any goals of NATO in that region. Therefore, if there is problem in Cyprus and proper attention is not given to it to resolve it, it could degenerate to a state in which the USSR will gain upper hand on the island and also Britain losing its military base on the island. All these will be against NATO and consequently against the interest of the United States in the region. Another complexity of the Cyprus matter which makes the United States involvement inevitable is the involvement of two NATO allies on the different sides of the Cyprus matter, that is Turkey and Greece. Any escalation of the Cyprus issue if not properly handled has the potential of bringing Turkey and Greece into war against each other, and this will ultimately destroy the southern flank of NATO. In order to prevent this from happening, Britain alone could not be able to handle it or mediate alone successfully between Greece and Turkey. So the United States has to step in and also play its role not only as a superpower, but also as the NATO head (Thomas W. Adams & Contrell, 1968).

In 1954 when Greece sponsored a draft resolution at the United Nations seeking for international support for self-determination in Cyprus, the United States

backed Britain in the vote and rejected the matter been taken to the United Nations. The main reason for this stance of the United States is because decisions taken at the United Nations will bring in involvement of the USSR and make it to have a say in Cyprus matter. The United States also wanted the matter to be resolved among the concerned parties in order to protect the unity of NATO members (Bolukbasi, 1988).

The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus by the Zurich-London Agreement of 1959 was ok for the United States as it did not harm the security of NATO southeastern flank. The strategic importance of Cyprus to the United States therefore brought it into been involved directly in the Cyprus issue. There were violent clashes in December 1963 between the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots on the island. What followed was a conference in London in January 1964 to seek solution to the inter-communal clashes on the island. The Cyprus question has constituted enormous burden to Britain, and the need to take both Greece and Turkey's concerns into consideration in dealing with Cyprus issue even made it to be more enormous. Britain therefore looked unto the United States for help and sought for NATO Peace Keeping Force for Cyprus. Britain could no longer bear Cyprus issue alone. Presence of NATO Peace Keeping Force on the island will also be in the interest of the United States who did not want the matter taken to the United Nations for fear of USSR having a say in Cyprus issue. Both Turkey and Greece accepted NATO the presence of NATO force, but President Makarios of the Republic of Cyprus rejected it. President Makarios wanted the issue to be resolved at the United Nations (Attalides, 1979).

In March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council passed the resolution for the United Nations Peace Keeping Force to be sent to Cyprus as fast a possible. The inter-communal violence on the island continued though within the year and Turkey was harboring military intervention. Through this intervention, Turkey planned to take control of a section of the island for the Turkish-Cypriots and commence negotiation. Knowing the sensitivity of this matter, The US President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a letter to Turkey's Ismet Inonu on June 5, 1964, disapproving of any possible Turkish military intervention. President Johnson was clear that in the case of the USSR intervention against Turkey, the US protection cannot be guaranteed. Inonu was invited to come to the United States for further discussion of the issues, as President Johnson was unable to leave the United States. The USSR already

signified to assist President Makarios in case of Turkish military intervention on the island. Greece also indicated that it would come to Makarios aid. The United States therefore took a decision which protected its interest by avoiding any action that would bring about war between two NATO allies (Bolukbasi, 1988).

The United States took similar step in November 1967 to prevent any occurrence of war between Turkey and Greece. It was the Greek National Guard under General Grivas that staged an attack on the Turkish-Cypriot communities in Bogazici and Gecitkale on November 15, 1967. The United States Peace Keeping Forces present on the island could do nothing to prevent the attack (Ehrlich, 1974). On the following day the parliament in Turkey passed a resolution for the government to intervene when necessary (Bolukbasi, 1988). The Turkish Prime Minister by then, Suleyman Demirel, therefore threatened on November 17, 1967 to carry out military intervention except Greece withdraw its troops on the island and also made a few demands alongside. The United States thus got involved again and mediated between the Turks and the Greeks. President Johnson this time sent the US ambassador in Ankara to Demirel to inform him of the US disapproval, not through a letter as in 1964. This was done to prevent negative public opinion against the US as it happened in 1964 as a result of the letter President Johnson sent to Inonu to deter him from intervening militarily in Cyprus. Also, the US shifted its Sixth Fleet close to Cyprus, which as meant to be a message to Turkish military against carrying out military intervention in Cyprus. The same policy of the United States on Cyprus in 1964 informed its action in 1967 as it did not want a war between two NATO allies and did not want the USSR to take advantage of that and gain upper hand in the Southeastern flank of NATO. President Turkey was more careful this time around as it did not want to offend Turkey. Greece was thus persuaded by the Americans to yield to Turkey's demands part of which was withdrawal of the 10,000 Greek forces illegally brought in to Cyprus. The United States made it clear to Greece that it may not be able to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily and Turkey's military was way stronger than Greek's military. So again, the United States successfully mediated the 1967 crisis by preventing the planned military operation by Turkey on the island and consequently preventing the occurrence of war between Turkey and Greece, both of which are NATO allies.

After the 1967 events, there seemed to be a relative peace between the two communities in Cyprus. The US therefore supported bi-communal dialogue between the Cypriots so as to reinstate the 1960 constitution order on the island (Attalides, 1979). Meanwhile some Greek scholars have taken the view that both the US and the military junta authority in Greece along the pro-*enosis* individuals and groups in Cyprus planned the ousting of President Makarios together. They argued that the United States intelligence services were involved and assisted the Greek military junta in the coup against president Makarios of Cyprus (Polyviou, 1980). The United States knew that be it *enosis* or *taksim* (the partition of the island), its interests are protected. It must only ensure a plan where both Turkey and Greece will also be satisfied and will not result into war. It wanted a situation where the island will still be in the hands of NATO members and America or NATO will be free to use any available military base also for vital purpose and that the Soviet Union would not have a say in the affairs of the island. The Greek scholars who argued for the US involvement in the 1974 coup maintained that the United States had a prior knowledge of the coup as the CIA had close interactions with Greek intelligence and were aware of what was happening in Athens. It was argued that even if the CIA was not directly involved, it could prevent the coup as it was aware of it and could have strongly warned the Greek military junta. However, Henry Kissinger who was the United States Secretary of State then denied any prior knowledge of the coup by his department. It was on July 15, 1974 that Greek officers led the Greek -Cypriots National Guard along some EOKA-B members carried out the coup and ousted President Makarios. They installed Nikos Sampson as the new president.

It is of noteworthy that the United States neither condemn the coup nor did it scold the Greek military junta for carrying out the coup. Within the first few days of the coup, the US policy was to wait and find out what will happen before doing something. Its only act was to communicate its opposition to the violence on the island, and stop short of criticizing the Greek military junta (Bolukbasi, 1988). It was obvious that the United States had never been comfortable with President Makarios who was seen to be more pro-Soviet. The United States therefore wanted Makarios out of power in Cyprus and make him politically irrelevant (Stern, 1977). Turkey intervened military on July 20, 1974 as the United States under Secretary of State sent by Henry Kissinger to both Athens and Ankara for a diplomatic

solution was not successful with his mission. The United States did not attempt to force Turkey into compliance of not intervening militarily as they knew it might be alienated and shift more to the side of the USSR and this would alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean, as the United States will have to evacuate its NATO military base in Turkey. The United States thus knew that preventing Turkey from seizing the opportunity of intervening militarily in Cyprus in 1974 will alienate it (Karpas, 1975). Although from the domestic front, the United States administration at that time was engrossed in the Watergate scandal, which was enough distraction, it also saw that America's interest was not harmed by Turkey's military action and also the potential of Turkey and Greece going to war was very low because the Greek was not ready for such war at the period. So, in the same manner that the United States was passive in condemning the July 15, 1974 coup and also Athens involvement, in the same manner it was passive to condemn Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, all these were due to its strategic interest.

After Turkey carried out its second operation from August 14 to August 16, 1974, the United States also took no strong position against Turkey. At the beginning of the operation, the United States only stated its resolve to cut off military support to both Turkey and Greece if they wage war against each other. The United States attitude thus showed a form of preference for the partition as it did not harm its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. There were demonstrations against the passiveness of the United States towards the second stage of Turkish military intervention in both Nicosia and Athens. On August 19, 1974, the American ambassador in Nicosia, Ambassador Rodger P. Davis was shot dead in anti-American demonstration at Nicosia (Coulombis, 1983). American passiveness in the face of Turkey's second intervention due to its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region and its bases in Turkey thus cost it the life of its ambassador in Nicosia.

The United States' role in finding solution to the Cyprus question as a global power continues till date. Its influence can therefore not be under estimated even with the new development in the Eastern Mediterranean. The United States interest in Cyprus with the present situation is generally connected with the preservation of global stability and security so that its hegemonic status will be preserved (El-Katiri & El-Katiri, 2014).

The United Nations

The United Nations got involved in Cyprus issue in the 1950s. Prior to that, the Greek-Cypriots have been in conflict with Britain in the late 1940s concerning the future of Cyprus. The Greek-Cypriots wanted *enosis*, but Britain was not ready to quit the island for strategic reasons. The Greek-Cypriots succeeded in taking mainland Greek government along in their demand for self-determination in the 1950s. Not until 1949 that the Greek-Cypriots decided to refer the issue to the UN. In 1950 when Greek-Cypriots delegations were sent to New York, London and Athens, the Greek government maintained its neutrality to the subject and made it known that it could not demand the cessation of Cyprus from Britain. Due to years of civil war, Greece was not strong enough to take issues with Britain (Panteli, 1984). Since Greece failed to promote the Greek-Cypriots demand for self-determination, Archbishop Makarios increased the pressure on the government in Athens through mass rallies in Athens. He knew this kind of pressure will increase the Greek public opinion in support of *enosis* and consequently the Greece government will be able to support Cyprus cause at the United Nations despite Britain's opposition to it. This yielded result and gradually Greece policy towards Cyprus shifted. It was the new Greece Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos, who officially claimed Cyprus for 'Mother Greece' for the first time in February 1951 (Kelling, 1990a). Archbishop Makarios continued to promote international awareness and paid visits to the US, the UK, France and Greece between the year 1952 and 1953. During these visits, he met with both politicians and diplomats to champion Greek-Cypriots demand for self-determination and union with Greece. Greece therefore attempted to make use of bilateral dialogue with Britain to achieve the *enosis* demand, but Britain refused to sit with Greece on such objective, insisting there exist no Cyprus problem. Britain managed to convince the United States against the internalization of Cyprus from the perspective of the Cold War interest of the United States. Thus, seeing that Britain had no intention to dialogue over the matter and pressure from the public opinion and the orthodox church, the administration in Greece went ahead and sponsored a draft resolution in 1954 calling for international support for Cypriots self-determination. Cyprus issue was therefore internationalized.

At the UN, the debate over the submitted draft by Greece in 1954 over Cypriots self-determination was carried out in two stages. The first being at the

General Committee on September 23, 1954. This was relating to whether the Greek motion would be deliberated upon by the General Assembly. Greek won this round. Three months later, it came to the second stage, that is, at the First Committee who took up the Greek motion. Britain's move against the Greek draft was successful at this stage. The Greek motion therefore was not successful at the UN (Security Council Report, 1954). Britain has always presented Cyprus dispute as an internal issue of Britain, preventing the United Nations from having any jurisdiction on it. Also, Britain emphasized Greece desire for *enosis* at the United Nations, and thus playing down the request of self-determination by the Cypriots (Panteli, 1984). From this context, the United Nations has no justification to transfer the sovereignty of a land or state from one state to another. The UK also noted Greece recognition of British jurisdiction on the island through the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in the year 1923. The internationalization of the Cyprus problem and the debate at the United Nations in both the General Committee stage and at the First Committee stage thus caused more clash between Turkey and Greece over their policies in Cyprus, this to the delight of Britain who was playing the Turkey – Greece card in Cyprus to serve its strategic interest in Cyprus. The efforts of Greece and the Greek-Cypriots in 1954 to get the United Nations involved in the Greek-Cypriots demand for right to self-determination therefore failed.

This failure made Archbishop Makarios to change his tactics from making use of the UN nation through Greece to achieve his goals, as he saw through the defeat at the UN the impossibility of any future success to promoting the Greek-Cypriots cause. He therefore resulted to arms struggle against the British colonial rule in Cyprus through the Greek Cypriot underground army, EOKA. Britain in turn intensified its divide and rule policy in Cyprus pulling Turkey deeper into the Cyprus issue to neutralize Greece effect on demand for *enosis* (Hatzivassiliou, 1997). Cyprus later got its independence in 1960 through the Zurich-London Agreements in 1959 which established the Republic of Cyprus. The constitution establishing the Republic of Cyprus was effective only for three years. On December 21, 1963, inter-communal violence erupted on the island. A Joint Truce Force was organized by the three Guarantor Powers on December 27, 1963. As the inter-communal crisis continued, Turkey had the plan to intervene militarily in mind in order to protect the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots on the island. The Cypriot government had preferred a direct involvement of the United Nations on the island

so as to thwart any planned Turkish military action on the island. Again, as in the 1950s before Cyprus was granted independence by Britain, Britain opposed the involvement of the United Nations, and preferred instead the presence of NATO Peace Keeping Force to be sent to the island. The Greek-Cypriots already held the opinion that NATO would favor Turkey above Greece and would not be ready to work against Turkey's interest. The United States was together with Britain in opposing deployment of UN Peace Keeping Forces in Cyprus. They were supported by the UN Secretary General, U. Thant. The burden of the Truce Force which generally consisted of British troops became much for Britain and it has to finally changed its strong opposition to the composition of Peace Keeping Forces by the UN. Thus. After several months of intercommunal clashes in Cyprus, the United Nations Security Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) on March 4, 1964. Its mandates are to avert the continuation or recurrence of clashes between the two communities and to make contribution to the maintenance and also the restoration of law and order on the island. This is an indefinite mandate, and it remains to this day. However, the mandate has made it possible for the UNFICYP to also engage in humanitarian works which differentiated it from its conventional role (Birgisson, 1993). The Peacekeeping Force was finally established on March 13, 1964. The initial troops were from Canada, Ireland and Sweden ("UN Yearb.," 1964). It was on the next day, March 14, 1964, that the first United Nations Peacekeeping Force, which comprised of 296 Canadian soldiers, set their foot on Cyprus. By the end of the following month, that is, April, 1964, the United Nations forces had numbered close to 6400 soldiers that were on ground in Cyprus. Clashes still occurred periodically between the two communities as the Turkish-Cypriots had been concentrated mostly in Turkish villages and in enclaves after the 1963-1964 inter-communal violence. In instances like this UNFICYP do negotiate ceasefires. In general, UNFICYP had been successful negotiating such ceasefire agreement in several locations and at different instances. There were two other major incidents in Cyprus, which were the 1967 crisis and the 1974 coup and Turkish intervention. On November 1967, the Greek-Cypriots National Guard ambushed and struck two Turkish-Cypriots enclaves in the Southern part of the island, with dozens of Turkish-Cypriots killed and several others injured. It was the former Greek General and EOKA leader, George Grivas, who organized the attack. Some UN soldiers

were disarmed by force, although UNFICYP was still able to arranged a cease-fire locally. The situation was later settled diplomatically with the United States mediation as Turkey's demands from Greece that General Grivas be recalled back to Greece and the 10,000 Greek troops illegally introduced to Cyprus in the Spring of 1964 be withdrawn were met (Sambanis, 1999). Also, in the July 15, 1974 coup which took place in Cyprus and President Makarios ousted from position, there ensued fighting between the Greek-Cypriots National Guard and forces loyal to Makarios. This was an intra-community fighting in the beginning that divided the - Greek-Cypriots, and the UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was unable to intervene. As a reaction to the Greek-led junta, Turkey intervened militarily on 20th July, 1974, and UNFICYP could do little to stop Turkish military intervention, as Turkish armies touched down on the Northern part of the island. It must be noted that UNFICYP were not given the mandate or armed to fight a full war against any regular military. During this 1974 crisis though, UNFICYP was able to negotiate several cease-fires locally among the different small-scale clashes between the two communities in the Southern part caused by Turkish military intervention on the island(Harbottle, 1970). Also, UNFICYP was able to prevent the Turkish military from taking over Nicosia international Airport. The United Nations proclaimed the airport as United Nations Protected Area (UNPA), with both parties told to stay 500 meters away from the airport's perimeter. British military also backed up the UN forces as Britain deployed more armies to the island, warning Turkey that the troops would aid in defense of the UN Peacekeeping Forces stationed at the airport if need be. The Nicosia International Airport therefore remains a United Nations Protected Area till today, and it serves as the UNFICYP's headquarters (Henn, 1994). Since the 1974 Turkish intervention, UNFICYP has helped in maintaining the status quo and protecting the cease-fire lines. The condition of UNFICYP's operation after the 1974 events has been to supervise the cease-fire through the preservation of the military status-quo along the buffer zone. This is expected to bring about conditions needed for negotiation of the Cyprus issue. The UNFICYP's mandate also includes humanitarian acts and it has facilitated various bi-communal efforts towards reconciliation. The UNFICYP's presence and efficacy therefore in general help to create a conducive atmosphere for the two communities on the island to work towards the peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

The United Nations remained on the island as a peacekeeping force as UNFICYP but the United Nations Secretary General has also made several efforts since the 1974 crisis to achieve resolution of the Cyprus conflict, yet the conflict remains intractable. One crucial attempt to resolve the Cyprus issue by the United Nations was the plan proposed by the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. It consisted of five versions, that is, Annan I, II, III, IV and V and it was between October 2002 and March 2004. It was on April 24, 2004 that the last version, Annan V was submitted to be voted on in a referendum by the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots (Hannay, 2005). The Annan Plan failed to accomplish its purpose and bring about peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict. It was accepted by the Turkish-Cypriots and rejected by the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots' acceptance rate of the Annan Plan was 64.9% while 75.8% of the Greek-Cypriots who voted at the referendum rejected the Plan. Following the failure of the Annan Plan, the United Nations has made other attempts as facilitator to find solution to the Cyprus question. The recent was in 2017 where the three Guarantor Powers, Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom, were also present. It also ended in failure. The United Nations involvement in Cyprus issue therefore as analyzed here dated from the 1950s and is still on-going.

The European Union

The direct involvement of the European Union in the Cyprus issue is generally limited. However, in analyzing the European Union influence on the island and on the Cyprus question, an important aspect will also be the influence the EU has or the influence it is exacting on the primary actors and the key external actors in the conflict. That is, the Greek-Cypriots, the Turkish-Cypriots, Turkey and Greece. The European Union impacts on the actors indirectly has influence on the Cyprus issue as can also be seen in the final accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU without the settlement of the dispute, therefore leaving out the Turkish-Cypriots in the northern part of the island. However, on July 7, 2004, the European Union in its policy with regards to the Turkish Cypriots proposed a package of aids and trade measures which are aimed at helping in the economic development of the Turkish-Cypriots community. The two planned proposals were Financial Aid Regulation and Direct Trade Regulation. It was believed that these measures would to eliminate economic differences between the Cypriot communities. On February

27, 2006, the European Council approved the Financial Aid Regulation. The primary goals of the Financial Aid Regulation are the development of infrastructure, promotion of both economic and Social Growth and bringing the Turkish-Cypriots community closer to the European Union. (Adaoğlu, 2009). Till date, the European Union have been unable to give consideration to the Direct Trade Regulation which makes direct trade between the Turkish northern part of the island and the Union impossible.

It was on September 12, 1963 that the European Union (which was then the European Economic Community, EEC) signed the Association Agreement with Turkey. The agreement came into force on December 1, 1964. Greece Association Agreement with the EEC was signed in June, 1961. And it was on December 19, 1972 that the Republic of Cyprus signed Association Agreement with the EEC which came into force on June 1, 1973 (Özer & Nas, 2012). With the above, it is obvious that the European Union has been in direct dealings with the Republic of Cyprus and also the two primary state external actors in Cyprus issue since during the Cold-War era.

In the year 1974, after the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, the French Presidency of the EEC summoned the member states to a meeting. It was deemed necessary as Cyprus had an Association Agreement with the organization. Communiques were issued to both Greece and Turkey for ceasefire based on the UN Security Council Resolution 353. The French Presidency coordinated the action of the then nine-member states of the EEC and gave the policy lead for the Cyprus issue to Britain. Although the EEC was unable to record any success mediating the Cyprus dispute in 1974, it supported the United Nations in its efforts to mediate and facilitate negotiations over the conflict.

On July 4, 1990, the Greek-Cypriots governed Republic of Cyprus, which was the internationally recognized government on the island, applied for European Union membership. It was on March 31, 1998 that the Republic of Cyprus started accession negotiations to the EU. Turkey and the TRNC had asserted that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union should only be possible within the framework of a definite solution to the Cyprus issue (Sertoglu & Ozturk, 2003). The Turkish-Cypriots rejected the invitation to join the negotiation team, as it saw the accession process with a definite settlement of the Cyprus issue as unfair to the Turkish-Cypriot side (Ramming, 2008).

At the European Council summit in Helsinki on December 10 to December 11, 1999, the decision was made that the settlement of the Cyprus issue will not be an obligatory condition for the Republic of Cyprus to become a member of the European Union. At the same summit, Turkey was also granted a candidate status (European Council, 1999). By the autumn of year 2002, it was obvious to both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots that the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union without the Turkish-Cypriots was certain. It was at the December 12 to December 13, 2002 Copenhagen summit that the Republic of Cyprus was welcomed as a member of the European Union starting from May 1, 2004. In the case of Turkey, the Cyprus issue is associated with its accession to the European Union. These scenarios made it possible for Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots to support the United Nations Annan Plan in both 2003 and 2004 while 64.9 percent of the Turkish-Cypriots voted yes at the April 24, 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan for Cyprus reunification (Kyris, 2012). On May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus effectively became a member of the European Union. As a reward for Turkish-Cypriots support for the April 24, 2004 referendum by voting 'yes' on the Annan Plan, the European Union promised to lift the embargo on the Turkish-Cypriots unconditionally in 2004, but it was unable to keep that promise due to opposition to it from both the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots (Eralp, 2009). Today, with both the Republic of Cyprus and Greece being member of the European Union, the organization is no longer perceived to be a neutral party in the Cyprus issue. It is also seen by both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots as being unfair in allowing the unilateral accession of the Greek-Cypriots governed Republic of Cyprus into the European Union without the resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Coming to recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, since part of the issue deals with the exploration and drilling of hydrocarbon resources around Cyprus EEZ and also delimitation of maritime boundaries, it therefore touches directly Turkish-Greece relations as well as Turkish-Republic of Cyprus. Both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are members of the European Union. Also, Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus as a sovereign state. It is therefore obvious why the European Union cannot be seen by both Turkey and TRNC elites and public as an impartial mediator or as a neutral party in the Cyprus conflict.

CHAPTER IV

The New Geopolitics of Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus Conflict

This chapter is concerned about the new development in the Eastern Mediterranean as regards hydrocarbon discovery and the way this has and is influencing the policies of external actors which in turn is impacting their policies on Cyprus and as expected, also spilling over to negotiating the protracted Cyprus conflict. Turkey's role as one of the key external actors in Cyprus conflict has significantly changed over the years as regards the Cyprus problem in comparison with other external actors. This can be seen in the field of fossil fuels with the discovery of hydrocarbon resources in Cyprus offshore and the unilateral actions of the South Cyprus administration in the exploration of the discovered hydrocarbon resources. Also, Turkey's role in the context of bilateral relations with Greece has not been stable and with the new geopolitical dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean connected to energy and the EEZ delimitation, Turkey's policies have shifted and it therefore realizes the advantage of keeping Cyprus intact. This informs why this section will focus more on Turkey as one of the key external actors in the Cyprus conflict.

The geopolitical realities in the Eastern Mediterranean and its dynamics have played an important role in shaping and reshaping the dynamics of external actors, particularly Turkey, with its resultant impact on its policy towards the Cyprus conflict. For decades (since the early 1970s), Turkey and Greece have had conflicting stance over maritime boundaries in the Aegean Sea. This Aegean conflict between Greece and Turkey over maritime boundary has been the major reason Turkey is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)(Ker-Lindsay, 2007). Taking into account this dispute between Turkey and Greece over maritime boundaries which made Turkey stay out of UNCLOS, the impact of this translates into Turkey's actions in the Mediterranean when the RoC discovered hydrocarbon in its EEZ. Under the present status quo in Cyprus, the RoC is controlled solely by the Greek-Cypriots, and this control is restricted to the Southern part of the island. Apart from the RoC legal structure on Cyprus maritime boundaries, the Turkish-Cypriots administered TRNC has its own arrangements supported by Turkey who coincidentally is not a signatory to the UNCLOS as a result of its dispute with Greece over maritime boundary on the Aegean Sea. The

dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics has changed with the formation of new alliances since the RoC commenced exploration for the drilling of hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Prior to this, Turkey has been challenging the decision of the RoC to make agreements with coastal nations in the Mediterranean Sea and delineate maritime boundaries. Turkey asserted that the Greek-Cypriot administration does not represent the Turkish-Cypriots and also asserts that some parts of the EEZ claimed by the RoC in the western part of the island overlaps with Turkish continental shelf. There was protest by the Greek-Cypriots administration to the United Nations in 2008 that Turkish warships had continually provoked Norwegian research vessels off the Southern coast of Cyprus over blocks that were cleared for exploration. In order to understand the dynamics of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, an understanding of paradigm shift in Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party's rule (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) in the post-2002 period is important. This chapter therefore examines the dynamics behind Turkey's changing policy on Cyprus by focusing on the new geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean. This will entail the role of energy and new alliances and counter alliances in the Mediterranean.

Turkish Foreign Policy after the Millennium

Ahmet Sozen (2013) analyzed the factors that influence foreign policy-making making use of four levels which are conceptual setting; micro-setting; domestic macro-setting; and external-macro-setting. This model follows similar logic to the popular levels of analysis in international relations namely: individual, state, and systemic levels. The scope of this paper requires the focus to be on external macro setting which involves factors like important global developments and/or significant actions of world leaders outside of the country which have impacts on decision-makers in their policy choices (Sözen, 2010). In November 2002 after the AKP won the general elections in Turkey, the new administration made a significant shift in the direction of its foreign policy. The AKP government favored a multi-dimensional foreign policy which is a shift from the initial Turkish uni-dimensional foreign policy which has focused primarily on its relations with the West. The multi-dimensional foreign policy thus allowed Turkey to have a certain degree of flexibility with more involvements in other regions such as the Middle East, Asia and Africa. There have been different positions in literature as to

the nature of this shift whether it could be seen as an ideological shift or as further expansion of Turkish Foreign Policy areas, but this was not the first time Turkey made such shift and focus on the Middle East in its foreign policy. The advisor to Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan later became the Foreign Minister in 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu, who had formulated a new approach for Turkish Foreign Policy. According to him, the Turkish Foreign Policy is guided by three methodological and five operational principles (Davutoglu, 2010). The three methodological principles are:

- Turkish Foreign Policy was crisis-based during Cold War only reacting to crisis the country faced. The new foreign policy will be active and guided by a vision in which the Middle east occupies the center stage

- Globally, Turkish Foreign Policy will be consistent. Policies in each region will not contradict each other.

- Even though because of the instability of its region Turkey continues to need a powerful military, this military strength does not pose a threat to other countries. Turkish policies are based on increasing the country's influence through the use of soft power¹⁰ (Turan, 2012).

The AKP government therefore sought to create interdependencies which could also be made use of in solving political issues. When the AKP came to power in 2002, it therefore pursued the goal of EU membership. The aims of the AKP party in its pursuit of EU membership revolve around strengthening the Turkish economy, the need for democratic reforms and also to strengthen its regional and international clout. With many Turks in support of Turkey joining the European Union, AKP support for Turkey's EU membership thus gives more political leverage to it, bringing more support for the party from voters. Also, EU membership will strengthen Turkey's economic ties, allowing for more and deeper cooperation with the EU states and also increase investment into the economy. With its link to both Europe and the Middle East, its membership of the EU will also make it a reliable economy power to its Middle Eastern neighbors, thus bringing in more economic opportunities for Turkey. Most Turkish business leaders were also in favor of the EU membership agenda as it will boost their businesses and bring in more opportunities for them. The goal of the AKP's decision makers to increase

¹⁰ Turan, K. (2012). Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy: A Shift or a Passing Interest? *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, (11), 65–84

Turkey's role as a key regional power and international actor also plays into its aim of EU membership as joining the organization will strengthen its diplomatic ties and gives it more credibility as a global actor. It was this same key goal of the AKP party in its application for EU membership which made Turkey to favor the 2004 Annan Plan and supported the Turkish Cypriots to vote for the plan. The AKP knew that unresolved Cyprus issue will be an obstacle to Turkey's EU accession (Goff-Taylor, 2017).

The drafting of this Turkish foreign policy therefore obviously sought for improving relations with neighbors and former foes like Iraq, Armenia, Greece and Syria, making Turkey a peace mediator in the region and improving on its democratization process as it sought to join the European Union. Ahmet Davutoglu's doctrine therefore favored the shifting in Turkish foreign policy from hard power approach to a transparent soft power approach which sought "nil problems with neighbors" (Altunışık, 2020).

Turkish Changing Cyprus Policy

Furthermore, the discovery of hydrocarbon off the Southern shores of Cyprus in early 2000s has changed the geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean with actors shifting their policies and making new alliances which are guided by both security, economic and energy considerations. The significance of this section to this work is seen in the way this new dynamic in the Mediterranean has caused major shift in Turkish Cyprus policy which in turn has influence on the Cyprus question. This section will therefore look into the hydrocarbon era in the Eastern Mediterranean and the formation of alliances by the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus which in turn received response from Turkey in its policy towards Cyprus and the region as a whole. The Turkey – EU relations will also be looked into as it impacts the changing nature of Turkish policy in Cyprus.

Hydrocarbon in East Mediterranean and the Republic of Cyprus New Alliance

In the year 2007, and against Turkish opposition, the Greek-Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus launched its first international tender for a three-year hydrocarbon exploration licenses. The United States Noble Energy company was granted a license in a Block out of the 13 blocks division. Turkey was

opposed to this act of the Greek-Cypriots administration as it maintained its stance that Greek-Cypriots government cannot act for the whole island without their Turkish-Cypriots counterpart. The first exploratory drilling started in September 2011 and the discovery of oil was announced by Nobel Energy in December 2011 in the field named Aphrodite. This discovery resulted into more interests from big oil and gas companies during the next offshore licensing by Greek-Cypriots controlled Republic of Cyprus despite Turkey's protest (Gurel, Mullen, & Tzimitras, 2013).

Since 2011 when the Greek-Cypriots controlled Republic of Cyprus (RoC) started the exploration in its Southern EEZ for the discovery of oil and gas, it has sought for alliance with friendly neighboring nations around the Mediterranean. The emergence of Israeli-Cyprus-Greece partnership in 2011 thus have its significant impact on the dynamics of the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics. Each member of this alliance has its individual reasons for joining the alliance apart from reasons which are collective. It is believed in some literature that the change in Turkish foreign policy when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in the year 2002 has also been a deciding factor in steering the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean with the formation of new alliance. This can be seen from the angle this shift in Turkish foreign policy affected Turkish-Israeli relations which also encouraged Israeli alliance with the RoC in the Eastern Mediterranean. This does not clear out other important reasons for the alliance such as energy security of the constituent states and also economic and/or profit factor(Tziarras, 2016).

The constituent countries of Israeli-Cyprus-Greece alliance all have existing issues with Turkey and with the peculiarities of their various relations with Turkey, Ankara is perceived as a security threat. Considering the RoC, Turkey maintains troops in the Northern part of the island and Turkey's proximity alongside its offensive capabilities is perceived as a high-level security threat by the RoC. The security-threat perceptions of Turkey has therefore been one of the main motivations for this alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean (Tank, 2005). All the three nations in the alliance considered Turkey as a security threat.

Another motivating factor is energy security. Energy is a coveted resources in globally and its continuous availability must always be guaranteed. Generally, energy security has hinges more on how bilateral or multilateral agreements and

partnership among nations are managed. Energy security has therefore been one of the critical issues in international politics as a result of this interdependence between states. The discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in Cyprus offshore has therefore constituted a dynamic in the energy security system of the Eastern Mediterranean region and the states in the region. Considering the geopolitical dynamics of this new hydrocarbon discovery also brings about geo-economic consideration as energy trade comes with its attendant economic benefits. This is expected to bring about potential for cooperation and peace among states in conflict (Shaffer, 2014).

The energy motivated alliance forged by Greek-Cypriot controlled RoC with nations around the Eastern Mediterranean and the drilling for natural gas in its Southern EEZ has thus met with opposition from Turkey which in turn counter such alliance with different agreements with the Turkish-Cypriot controlled TRNC and the November 2019 maritime deal with the UN recognized Libya government in Tripoli about maritime delimitation line. The signed maritime deal between Turkey and the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Libya established a new maritime delimitation between the two countries. Turkey perceives hydrocarbon matter in the Eastern Mediterranean from an angle of sovereignty and security as it also deals with maritime borders in the region. The plan of the trilateral alliance of Greece, the RoC and Egypt to construct a pipeline that will supply natural gas from offshore fields in Israel and Cyprus to Greece or Egypt and therefore export it to European market will be costly compared to exporting the natural gas from Israel and Cyprus through Turkey to the European market. The alliances formed by the RoC with other regional powers viz Israel, Greece and Egypt who all have strained relationships with Turkey is therefore meant to isolate Turkey in the energy equation in the Eastern Mediterranean, apart from protecting their energy, economic and security interests.

The discovery and presence of natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean has thus changed and is changing the geopolitical dynamics of the region with the resultant formation of alliance and counter alliance. This in turn has its implication on the Cyprus conflict, as it impacts the policy of Turkey, a primary external actor in the conflict, on Cyprus which directly affects the Cyprus question and its negotiation. Unless there is a multilateral level of cooperation among all the countries involved, the possibility of any existing bilateral or trilateral agreement solving the issues of the Eastern Mediterranean is very slim. Turkey therefore sees

the EEZ delimitation agreements between the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus, Greece, Israel and also Egypt as a violation of its right and also the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots in the TRNC. This resulted into Turkey's assertive policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to prevent additional encroachments by these actors. Turkey therefore not only embarked on hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean and signed exploration and drilling agreement with the TRNC, it also increased its military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and this has further raised the stakes in negotiating the Cyprus conflict (Demiryol, 2019).

Turkish Response to This Alliance and its Impact on the Conflict

Turkey has been consistent in opposing the Greek-Cypriot administration exploration for natural gas resources in the southern offshore of the island. Turkish's opposition has always taken the form of written letters officially sent to the United Nations and official public statements to the media or general official public warnings which may be regarded as threats.

Since September 2011 when the Greek-Cypriots administration started its first exploratory drilling for hydrocarbon in its southern offshore, Turkey has maintained the unwavering stance that the unilateral undertakings in the maritime areas of Cyprus which is been disputed is illegal and unacceptable. Turkey always takes such unilateral action of the Greek-controlled RoC seriously. The RoC government's exploration of natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and its formation of alliances with neighboring states always come with Turkish retaliation, and as expected, always have influence on the Cyprus question. Since the first exploratory drilling by RoC in September 2011, Turkey in its responses refrained from the use of force. Instead of any military intervention to stop the RoC drilling, it partnered with the Turkish-Cypriot controlled TRNC through its national oil company, TPAO, to start hydrocarbon exploration in the offshore are of the TRNC. This heralded Turkish new policy or reciprocity which was also supported by the Turkish-Cypriot administered TRNC.

Turkey also intensified its efforts for hydrocarbon exploration in areas where it considers as its territorial sea and continental shelf. Turkey thus applied the principle of reciprocity. Also, Turkish-Cypriot controlled TRNC actions working in tandem with Turkish policy of reciprocity signed a continental shelf

delimitation agreement with Turkey. The areas run from the east to west direction in the northern part of the island which constitutes a continental shelf boundary between the Turkish-Cypriot TRNC and Turkey. This action of Turkey and the TRNC was seen at some angles as a political retaliation instead of military intervention threats. The continental shelf delimitation agreement between Turkey and TRNC was later followed by the issuance of oil and gas exploration licenses by the TRNC to Turkish state petroleum company, TPAO, in areas situated in the north, east and south of the island. It is worth noting that the areas located in the south coincide partly with some of the Greek-Cypriot RoC licensing blocks. The Eastern Mediterranean EEZ disputes started to undermine the negotiation process of the Cyprus conflict as seen in 2014 when the United Nations mediation effort was stalled as a result of the hydrocarbon drilling activities which raised the tension between Turkey and the RoC (Demiryol, 2019).

TRNC action which is backed by Turkey follows the logical fact that both the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have equal political rights on the island according to the formal 1960 constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. Their division is not formalized constitutionally. Thus, the unilateral actions of the Greek-Cypriot administration in Nicosia in exploring for hydrocarbons and issuing of off-shore licenses to oil companies are unconstitutional and not acceptable. These reasons are mainly related to the Cyprus question. Turkey maintained that the Turkish Cypriots, represented as TRNC, have equal rights and interests in the maritime zones of Cyprus. Therefore, Turkey took the position that the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) delimitation agreements between the Greek-Cypriot controlled RoC and Israel, Egypt and Lebanon are not valid as a result of been signed by only the Greek-Cypriots without involving the Turkish-Cypriots who have equal rights in the maritime zones and natural resources of the island. These unilateral actions and energy alliances of the Greek-Cypriot administration therefore constitute hindrances to any prospective solution of the Cyprus question and brings more complications to the negotiating table. As any agreement signed on hydrocarbon exploration and delimitation of maritime zones are linked to sovereignty issue, there is no way therefore no way it will not have impact on any comprehensive settlement negotiations of the Cyprus conflict. Such actions by the Greek-Cypriot administration thus raised questions as to the sincerity of the Greek-Cypriots as regards the negotiation process.

The geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean with the exploration and alliance actions of the Greek-Cypriot administration since 2011, has therefore met with counter-actions by Turkey, a key external actor in the Cyprus conflict. Turkey's response has gone beyond ordinary issuing of statements, it has resulted into Turkey shifting its policy as regards Cyprus, and this consists of Turkey-TRNC collaborative policy that involves reciprocal response to the Greek-Cypriot's offshore oil and natural gas exploration and license issuance activities. The increased tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean in the past few years have therefore not only put more strain on the existing strained Turkey-EU relations, but it is also negatively impacting any possible closeness to resolving of Cyprus conflict.

Positions of Non-State International Actors on the Turkish Response

The position of other external actors on the new developments in the Eastern Mediterranean as regards hydrocarbon discovery which have impacts on the negotiation of Cyprus question must also be considered. The two main non-state external actors in Cyprus conflict which are the United Nations and the European Union had made their stance cleared over the Eastern Mediterranean issues since the first exploratory drilling by RoC in September 2011 which Turkey protested and also started its own hydrocarbon exploration in areas which overlap the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus.

The office of the UN Secretary-General avoided the discussion of the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon issue between Turkey and the RoC during negotiations of the Cyprus conflict which is usually facilitated by the UN good offices mission. The United Nations action falls in line with the United Nations general policy on boundary disputes between states. The UN generally refrains from making comments on boundary disputes between member states, and it can only be an arbiter in any dispute if called upon by both warring parties. As both Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus are United Nations member states, and the hydrocarbon exploration issue in the Eastern Mediterranean between them is directly linked to boundary issue, the UN therefore followed its policy and refrained from making comments on the right of RoC in exploring for hydrocarbon in the Eastern Mediterranean in its EEZ even without the settlement of the Cyprus conflict nor any plan put in place on sharing of gains from hydrocarbon proceeds by the two communities on the island. The negotiations of Cyprus conflict have therefore not

included the hydrocarbon issues in the Eastern Mediterranean as it could also be an obstruction to any negotiation process which have always have their agenda on the Cyprus question. The office of the UN Secretary-General did call on both parties, as always, to avoid raising tensions. It must be mentioned that although the UN Secretariat generally refrained from making comments on the rights of the Greek-Cypriots controlled RoC to unilaterally explore hydrocarbons on the offshore of the island, both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sides had initially agreed before commencement of any drilling activities on the island's offshore that natural resources in Cyprus would fall within the federal (indicating shared) capacity in the event of a settlement of the conflict (Gürel, Mullen, & Tzimitras, 2013).

On its own part, the UN Security Council five permanent members commented individually on the hydrocarbon's new developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. They all had similar response as regards rights for exploration by the Republic of Cyprus, but maintained that the benefits of the exploration be shared by both communities.

Eastern Mediterranean Geopolitics and TRNC Policy

The Turkish Cypriots with the full support of Turkey have on every occasion made clear their opposition to the South Cyprus's unilateral hydrocarbon exploration activities on the offshore of the island without settlement of the Cyprus question. At times, it was through official letters directed to the United Nations. Also, official statements have been consistently issued out to the media stating clearly their opposition to the offshore hydrocarbon drilling since September 2011 when the RoC started such activities (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

One of the earliest steps of the Turkish Cypriot's response to RoC's unilateral drilling activities on the offshore of the island was to establish continental shelf delimitation agreement with Turkey. This agreement was signed by both parties on 21 September, 2011. The delimitation agreement covers the east to west extension on the northern part of the island and it depicts the continental shelf boundary between Northern Cyprus and Turkey. The TRNC action has been a reciprocal one (Baseren, 2021).

Also, the Turkish Cypriot's side issued oil and gas exploration licences to Turkish's national oil company, TPAO, to carry out hydrocarbon exploration in the sea areas located in the north, east and south of the island. Some of the licensing

blocks by TRNC overlap with some of those also licensed by the RoC. By giving exploration right to Turkey, TPAO has been involved in several seismic surveys in the sea areas north and south-east of the island. There have also been cases of Turkish naval patrols in the waters of the island accompanying TPAO's research vessels during hydrocarbon explorations carried out on behalf of the TRNC by Turkey (Kavaz, 2021). In May 2019, Ankara deployed the *Fatih* drilling vessel where it underwent exploratory drilling inside the un-demarcated Continental Shelf of the island. Turkey has been involved with several other exploratory drilling in contested waters which are allocated to it by the Turkish-Cypriots TRNC as a response to the unilateral hydrocarbon exploratory activities of the Greek-Cypriots RoC in the offshore waters of the island.

The presidential election of October 2020 in which Ersin Tatar, a right-wing nationalist who had the support of Turkey President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is also a big factor in the recent TRNC policy change as regards the Cyprus issue. Ersin Tatar is allied with President Erdogan of Turkey and therefore supports a two-state solution which has also been the recent rhetoric of Turkey leaders. Ersin Tatar victory at the election is therefore a significant event due to its support of two-state solution to the Cyprus conflict which also strengthens Ankara's position on the issue (Salihoglu, 2020a).

Impact of the New Mediterranean Dynamics on the Cyprus Question

Cyprus conflict has been labelled an intractable conflict as a result of several decades of failed settlement efforts which has made the conflict on-going. Although it began with inter-communal violence between the two communities on the island, several key factors were also involved in the conflict. An example is the *enosis* intention of the Greek Cypriot side. Some of these factors have changed overtime while some still remain. Despite the failure to successfully resolve the Cyprus question due to the failure to reach a consensus on vital factors in the conflict, the new Mediterranean dynamics as a result of hydrocarbon discoveries is gradually creeping into the Cyprus dispute as two of the primary external state actors in the Cyprus conflict are also directly involved with other powers like the United States and a few states within the EU having their oil companies involved (US Texas based company, Noble Energy and ExxonMobil in the case of the US; ENI and Total in

the case of both Italy and France respectively; and the British-Dutch Shell)(Kambas & Zawadzki, 2019).

The action of the actors in the Mediterranean Sea by carrying out hydrocarbon drilling activities is not only endangering the stability of the region; it is also spreading the Cyprus question over the Mediterranean Sea. It has affected the relations of one of the key external actors, that is Turkey, towards the EU and Greece (who happens to be external actors in Cyprus dispute too) which in turn as expected, is affecting the negotiation of the dispute.

Turkey's position regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem have always been based on the security and equal rights of the Turkish-Cypriots population on the island with which it has both historical and cultural ties. Any negotiation plan that could guarantee such objectives would be welcomed by Turkey. It is therefore logical to observe and infer that with the new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean where the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus unilaterally engaged in the exploration and drilling of hydrocarbon resources in the offshore of the island and engaging in alliances in order to alienate Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and strengthened its own stance will be counter-productive in the attempts to negotiate the Cyprus conflict for a final and last-longing settlement.

Also, considering the role of the United States in the conflict as a global power is very vital. Historically, the United States has always been involved in the Cyprus conflict due to geopolitical importance of the island and also the direct involvements of two NATO allies which if not properly handled could result into a dangerous war between the two allies. These were fully explained in previous chapters. With the entrance of the new Mediterranean dynamism due to hydrocarbon discoveries, again, the presence of the United States has not been left out, not just as a global power, but also as a result of indirect participation in the issue. This is seen in the participation of its oil companies, that is ExxonMobil and Noble Energy. Different remarks by the United States government officials on the Eastern Mediterranean issue show the fact that the United States has an interest to protect its oil companies in Cyprus, although it maintains that profits should be shared in the event of a settlement. In a visit to Cyprus early in the year 2020, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Energy, Francis Fannon, emphasized the "incredibly important role" which Cyprus has to play "in developing energy

supplies in the eastern Mediterranean” which could help reduce the dependence of Europe on the Russian gas(Turkish Minute, 2020). With the United States economic interest in the hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean by the RoC in which its oil companies are also involved, the perceptions of the United States as a fair mediator in the Cyprus disputes by both the elites and the public has further declined(El-Katiri & El-Katiri, 2014).

In conclusion, the unilateral hydrocarbon exploration and drilling activities of the Greek-Cypriots administered Republic of Cyprus and the formation of energy alliances with the intention of isolating Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation only sabotage any on-going negotiations of the Cyprus conflict. Ankara’s new and present stance on the Cyprus conflict, together with the TRNC current administration of Ersin Tatar, demanding for a two-state solution is partly due to not only the constant impasse in negotiating the Cyprus conflict but also the strained Turkey-EU and Turkey-Greece relations. The new dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the responses of the actors involved have contributed significantly to the present state of the Turkish-EU and Turkey-Greece relations. The new Eastern Mediterranean dynamics if not properly handled will therefore complicate and continue to constitute additional impediments to a final and objective settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Recent Developments and Renewed Negotiations

In the year 2017, there was another push facilitated by the United Nations that brought together the two Cypriot sides and the three guarantor powers in Crans-Montana, Switzerland to arrive at peace deal on the Cyprus conflict. Unfortunately, as in the previous negotiation meetings on Cyprus conflict, it collapsed. The United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, who was also present in the last session after he flew in from New York the previous day, said in a news conference after the collapse of the reunification talks that it does not mean other initiatives cannot be developed in order to address the Cyprus question. He noted the presence of a wide gap between the delegations from the two Cypriot sides on a number of issues. However, the Crans-Montana talks was seen by many to be the closest both sides have been brought to the brink of a final solution to the long-lasting conflict(Miles, 2017).

The first attempt to resume talks since the collapse of the 2017 Crans-Montana talks took place at Geneva, Switzerland with the meeting hosted by the United Nations from 27 April to 29 April, 2021. The meeting took a 5 + 1 format consisting of the Greek-Cypriots side, the Turkish-Cypriots side, officials of the three guarantor powers (the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece) and the United Nations. As all the previous rounds of United Nations mediated talks since 1974 when the island was divided ended unsuccessfully, the last talks followed the same pattern. The latest UN mediated talks on Cyprus ended in failure as a result of shift in the stance of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership from reunifying the island based on a bizonal, bicomunal federation to seeking for a two-state solution. Greece, the Greek-Cypriot side and its leadership Nicos Anastasiades, and several EU states including France¹¹ considered the two-states remedy position of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots side unacceptable. After the latest unsuccessful three-day meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, the United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres told a press conference in Geneva that the UN has “not yet found enough common ground to allow for resumption of formal negotiations” on the Cyprus conflict (“Cyprus settlement talks found little common ground: UN chief,” 2021). After the meeting, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, Ersin Tatar has insisted he would not drop the two-state proposal made by his side. He was supported by Turkey. Whereas the Greek-Cypriot leader, Nicos Anastasiades said Turkish two-state remedy was a clear violation of the United Nations resolutions on the Republic of Cyprus and could not be acceptable.

Now close to five decades since the de-facto partition of the island, there has still been no clear signal of arriving at a solution to the intractable Cyprus conflict. The latest UN organized meeting in Switzerland and the present political environment relative to both primary sides in the conflict and the external actors clearly point to this fact. The Cyprus question has clearly defied numerous attempted solutions by several mediation and peacemaking approaches. In seeking fresh attempts at peacemaking over Cyprus conflict, new mediation approaches have to be considered. Using the same approach in which the primary sides to the conflict and even their mother-lands have nurtured some mindsets of the presence

¹¹ France offered its full support to the UN Security Council framework on Cyprus conflict which is based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. It clearly rejected the suggestion of partition of the island (<https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/cyprus/news/article/cyprus-un-informal-5-1-meeting-with-a-view-to-resuming-formal-negotiations-on>)

of bias by some actors in the conflict may still lead to no final destination in resolving the Cyprus conflict.

In October 2020, the then incumbent president, Mustafa Akinci, who was a pro-reunification moderate lost to his rival, Ersin Tatar, a right-wing nationalist who was backed by Ankara. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan openly supported Ersin Tatar during the election process. From Turkish-circle, Akinci was regarded as a president that pursued rigid anti-Turkey policy during his time in office (Salihoglu, 2020b). Akinci has supported the long-standing, UN-backed efforts to reunify Cyprus as a bizonal, bicomunal federation after successful conclusion of negotiations, whereas Ersin Tatar supports separate sovereign administrations. Tatar's victory was thus significant as it opened a new phase in the Cyprus conflict and undeniably strengthened Ankara's recent stance on the issue, demanding for a two-state solution, instead of settling for a federal state. With this, Turkey will be able to continue with its natural gas research in the waters shared with the Turkish-Cypriots side under the "Blue Homeland" doctrine and further expand its influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ersin Tatar's election victory in October 2020 followed increased tensions between his backer Turkey and Greece over energy claims in the eastern Mediterranean within the second-half of the year 2020.

The different actions and interests of the external actors in Cyprus conflict both in the early stages of the conflict and also of recent do constitute some form of impediments to the negotiation of the conflict. This does not exclude the international organizations involved as could be seen in the accession of EU membership by only one side which has painted the EU as being biased in the face of the other party to the conflict. Since both Greece and the RoC are EU members, the EU have lost their credibility as a reliable mediator in the Cyprus disputes and also in Turkey-Greece relations in the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriots' eye. The European Union is always perceived to be on the RoC side of the conflict. Recent European Union's big powers spat with Turkey also does not help matters. On 22 November 2020, it was reported that German frigate boarded Turkish cargo ship en route to Libya forcefully to search for suspected arms in line with "Operation Iirini" for stability in Libya (Guler, 2020). Ankara protested the action and maintained the expectations of allies to act in accordance with international law. Germany rejected Ankara's allegations, maintaining that the actions of its military followed due

protocols(Holroyd, 2020). Also, the French strong support for Greece in the Turkish-Greek maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean is not kept as a secret, and this is to Ankara's discontent(Jabbour, 2021). The new geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean is therefore impacting the EU relations with Turkey by deepening the gaps between them which in turn deepens the notion of distrust in the neutral position of EU when it comes to negotiation of Cyprus conflict.

Finally, in considering the impacts of external actors in Cyprus conflict and appraising their positive contributions to negotiation of the conflict, the impacts their various national and security interests constitute and the bearing the shifting dynamics of these actors have as a result of the changing geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean, it can be said that these new developments in the Eastern Mediterranean coupled with the attendant energy, economic and security interests of the various external actors constitute impediments to effective negotiation of the Cyprus conflict. In as much as these new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean is increasing the tension in Turkish – Greek relations and also Turkey – EU relations and Turkey/Turkish-Cypriots – Greek-Cypriots relations, effective negotiation of the Cyprus conflict will be threatened.

Since this thesis has looked into the impacts of the different external actors in the Cyprus conflict with particular reference to the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean which is shifting the dynamics of the external actors and re-arranging their interests which also have significance bearing on the negotiation of the Cyprus dispute, it is therefore appropriate that any mediation approach chosen in subsequent conflict must factor in the hindrances this new dynamic and the shifting interests of the key external actors constitute to the manner the primary parties in the conflict will perceive any negotiation attempt in which these external actors are also present. This therefore would mean developing a model in which the two primary parties in the conflict would be able to make decisions on various elements of the conflict (such as the guarantors and presence of Turkish military issues, power-sharing issue, territorial adjustments and property issues, etc.) and also maintain cooperation approach and not unilateral intent to the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The utilization or development of any negotiation and mediation model for a new mediation approach in the case of Cyprus conflict must see flexibility within the context of integrative bargaining primarily due to the impact that the interests

of key external actors and the changing dynamics of their policies have on negotiating the conflict. Bartos,1995 in his work on modeling distributive and integrative negotiations noted that in order to construct a model of integrative negotiation, search behavior must be allowed. This is necessary due to the impossibility of the conflicting parties to totally ignore their ‘strong’ interests (which in the case of Cyprus issue the security and national interests of the external actors are indirect constituents of such interests or are implicitly present). Search process and flexibility must therefore be vital technique in negotiating and mediating the Cyprus conflict (BARTOS, 1995).

In the Cyprus question, and as this work has pointed out, it is important to see that a crucial external condition which also affects flexibility of the two Cypriot side at the negotiation table and also in mediating the conflict is the factor of external actors’ shifting policies and interests due to the dynamism inherent in the Cyprus question. The newest so far being the changing geopolitical dimension in the Eastern Mediterranean which has so far given rise to the shifting dynamics of external actors in the Cyprus conflict, especially Turkey, as a key actor and with a strong presence in the Cyprus conflict. It is therefore necessary to realistically ascertain the limit of flexibility each side can be as they may be unable to completely ignore the national and security interests of their various mother-lands and relevant powers in making concessions. Turkish-Greece relations and the new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean over hydrocarbon exploration and drilling are therefore vital factors that impact the effective settlement of Cyprus conflict.

The different actions and interests of the external actors in Cyprus conflict both in the early stages of the conflict and also of recent do constitute some form of impediments to the negotiation of the conflict. This does not exclude the international organizations involved as could be seen in the accession of EU membership by only one side which has painted the EU as being biased in the face of the other party to the conflict. Since both Greece and the RoC are EU members, the EU have lost their credibility as a reliable mediator in the Cyprus disputes and also in Turkey-Greece relations in the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriots’ eye. The European Union is always perceived to be on the RoC side of the conflict. Recent European Union’s big powers spat with Turkey also does not help matters. On 22 November 2020, it was reported that German frigate boarded Turkish cargo ship en route to Libya forcefully to search for suspected arms in line with “Operation Irini”

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CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This chapter presents conclusions based on the research findings according to the Cyprus issue as an intractable conflict has defied many attempts using various approaches at resolving the conflict. The involvements of foremost international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union in mediating the conflict has not put an end to the conflict. Also, the presence of great powers such as Britain and the United States as key actors in the conflict who have also been functional in every mediation attempt, be it directly or in a supervisory role, has not impacted its bearing on the conflict to finally resolve it. The changing geopolitical dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean region as a result of hydrocarbon discovery and exploration and also maritime delimitation of EEZs which has shifted the dynamics of the mother-lands of the two primary parties in the Cyprus conflict has by no means rendered easy the negotiation of the conflict, instead, it has raised the stakes in the conflict. Numerous works have been published by scholars, academics, diplomats and policy makers on the Cyprus conflict with various suggestions and models for objectively resolving the conflict, and yet, the Cyprus question still persists, and looking for the right solution.

Several works on Cyprus have examined different factors which could aid the negotiation and mediation of the conflict while many others have looked into the various obstacles to successfully settling the conflict. This study has therefore attempted to concentrate on a vital aspect of the Cyprus conflict anatomy and has examined its impact on the conflict, coming out with the appropriate suggestion of how it is able to aid the negotiation of the Cyprus conflict. The international dimension of Cyprus conflict has been a major factor contributing to the complex nature of the conflict. Increasing that complexity again is the complexity of the Eastern Mediterranean dynamics which has significant impacts on the Turkey-EU and Turkey-Greece relations, all of them being key external actors in the Cyprus conflict. Although the two mother-lands of Greece and Turkey have history of disputes which exist till date, the hydrocarbon discovery and exploration and drilling actions in the Eastern Mediterranean and formation of new alliances and maritime delimitation of their EEZ have all increased the tension in their historically rivalry relations. Another irony in this complexity is the United States led NATO

membership of both mother-lands. This alone requires the activeness of the United States in negotiating the conflict. More and more can be counted as already explained. It is therefore vital to note that these external actors who have been active in Cyprus conflict, from both mother-lands of Turkey and Greece to the United States and Britain are also all involved in the negotiation and mediation of the conflict. Although the United States have always played a supervisory role and also supportive role to the United Nations in facilitating reconciliation process, Turkey, Greece and Britain always play active roles as the guarantor powers.

This work has been able to point out and concentrate on the fact that these external actors who have been involved in the Cyprus conflict even before the island was granted independence in 1960 also have their interests when it comes to the island irrespective of their genuine approach to objectively resolving the Cyprus conflict. The nature of these interests in terms of been complementary to the interests of the warring parties on the island is not dabbled into in this work. The focus of this work has been to investigate the presence of those interests with the emphasis been on the connection between those analyzed interests and the impacts those interests may constitutes to the success of resolving the conflict. The notion that these interests have impacts on negotiating and mediating the Cyprus conflicts is undeniable as these external actors are also involved in negotiation and mediation processes either directly or behind the scene.

The developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have brought this more to light. Starting from the issue of delimitation of maritime boundaries which have always been issue of contention between Greece and Turkey, to the issue of hydrocarbon exploration and drilling which has resulted into the formation of various alliances by the different sides with different deals agreed upon, it could be seen that these external actors involved in the Cyprus conflict in protecting their security, energy and economy interests, the negotiation of Cyprus conflict is been affected also. That their actions/ responses to incidences/events or the incidences/ events themselves constitute the basis for which the impacts of these external actors on Cyprus question must be weighed or analyzed should be optional. The discovery of hydrocarbon in the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus offshore itself is a parameter which has brought a new dimension into the Eastern Mediterranean. The dimension could be positive as it could foster more cooperation among the actors which would in turn positively impact the negotiation of Cyprus conflict. It could

also raise the stakes in the conflict depending on the policies of the actors involved. The shifting in the dynamics and policies of the actors thus represent their response to the new dimension in the Eastern Mediterranean. These responses are guided by national interests. Looking at Turkey's response to the discovery of hydrocarbon especially in the offshore of Cyprus, it expected the Greek-Cypriots side to engage in an inclusive action with respect to their Turkish-Cypriots counterpart on the island when it comes to the exploration of the resources. From the Cyprus constitution which established the Republic in 1960 – and is yet to be officially changed – both communities have equal rights and the resources and profit from such resources must be equally shared by the communities. The unilateral action of the Greek-Cypriots side in engaging in the hydrocarbon drilling in the offshore of the island is therefore illegal and against the constitutional rights of the Turkish-Cypriots community. Turkey seeing its responsibility to protect the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots community not only as a Guarantor but also with the historical and cultural link has shifted its dynamics with response to its policies in the Eastern Mediterranean by not only signing agreements with the TRNC on exploration of hydrocarbons but also increasing its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The unilateral action of the Greek-Cypriots side aside from constituting an infringement upon the rights of the Turkish-Cypriots community on the island, also constitutes security threat to Turkey. Since energy resources in the global scenario is associated with security and also economy, the Greek-Cypriots action in unilaterally engaging in hydrocarbon drilling in its offshore and also in forming alliances with other regional powers in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Greece, with the intention of leaving Turkey out of the equation constitutes and obvious security threat to Turkey and is against efforts towards peace, stability and reduction in tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. All of these, if not properly handled and attended to will also sabotage the efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

The interests of these external actors, and more specifically the state actors, which are national and security interests cannot not be ignored in the same way their existence cannot be denied, as such interests have their full bearing on the constitution forced upon the island in the Zurich-London Agreements of 1959 and 1960. Britain as the colonial ruler of the island then was much concerned about her military bases and installations than in giving the island true independence. The

interests of these external actors have thus been with Cyprus even from independence. A crucial look into this factor of external actors' interests will therefore see another reason for the existence of some form of complexities in making some concessions at negotiation table by the warring parties.

This work has therefore not suggested the possibility of eliminating the interests of the external actors, as some are interwoven with the interests or security of the primary parties as seen in the geopolitical issue of the Eastern Mediterranean, but that the full awareness of those interests, and much more those ones that clearly constitutes impediments to the success of mediating the conflict must be clearly considered and objectively investigated for the desirable concessions at whatever possible degree to be made by the necessary parties. If this is realizable, the active roles of these external actors in mediation approaches must be handled in ways and manners as not to make new factors which are also associated with the interests of external actors to spill over to the Cyprus conflict and serve as impediments at the negotiation table. This said, the new dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean with attendant increase in tension must be handled. Both the historical roots and the energy dimension of the contemporary Eastern Mediterranean crisis must be objectively addressed to prevent its uncontrollable spilling over unto the Cyprus conflict and its negotiation. Energy cooperation in the region must be multilateral with all parties included.

Despite the impacts of external actors on the Cyprus conflict, their actions, even the most controversial ones in Cyprus, are not the causes of the Cyprus question, rather they were consequences of the Cyprus problem. An example is Turkish military intervention. Some scholars have argued and opined that it was the cause of the Cyprus problem as it resulted in the de-facto division of the island, but that has been a pure misconception. Turkish military intervention was clearly the consequence of Cyprus problem and not the cause. If this is so, then logically analyzing that, it might be right to say that the withdrawal of the Turkish military is not what will solve the Cyprus problem as some might opine, it may only contribute to solving it or coming closer to solving the problem. The external actors' actions and impacts in most cases are not isolated, they are generally linked to other actors' actions. Looking critically at July 1974, there were two military actions by two external actors, both also with their interests. The first military action was the coup by Greek military junta which was the authority in Greece, while the second

was a response to the first and was carried out by Turkish military. The first was clearly unjustified legally and by international standard while the second has been a controversial issue. The point here is that some actions and interests of external actors in Cyprus may be difficult to separate from the interests of the primary parties in the conflict (the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots) due to what may be referred to as integration of interests and necessitated interests which is not unconnected with the security interest of a state. This is why this work has asserted that although some external actors' interests may increase the stakes in negotiating the Cyprus conflict, the integrative nature of some of those interests with those of the primary parties in the conflict renders making compromise on those factors very difficult. But understanding it and looking at the level of integration of such interests may assist in the mediation process as to which side is able to make more compromise on complementary issues.

Looking at the new developments in the Eastern Mediterranean and with the shifting dynamics of key actors and its resultant impacts upon the Cyprus conflict, it may realistically be said that coming to a possible final settlement of the conflict cannot be immediate, even if anytime soon. Turkish relations with Greece and the European Union which have been at its lowest as a result of several issues, with conflicting energy claims by states in the Eastern Mediterranean being part of these issues, is essential towards any successful settlement of the Cyprus conflict. The recent shift in Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots side position over the conflict therefore constitutes significant concern to coming to any possible compromise in anytime soon. The Turkish-Cypriots side now headed by the nationalist president Ersin Tatar has insisted on a two-states solution while the Greek side has held unto the UN supported framework for a bi-zonal, bicomunal federation. This affected the last UN facilitated meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, as it yielded no positive result.

The impacts of external actors with their shifting dynamics in the past few years on the Cyprus conflict have therefore been clearly felt. In a manner, the conflict is seen at some angle to be the bigger version, or another version of Greek-Turkish rivalry. Others may view it as another interesting field for EU-Turkish maneuverability in their relations. As the Cyprus issue has, to some extent, become an EU issue the moment the Republic of Cyprus joined the bloc in the year 2004. All these external factors as a result of the presence of external state actors have

therefore impacted the various negotiation processes as there still exists suspicion of other actors activities such as the Turkish-Cypriots side seeing the EU bias on the Cyprus issue and being unfavorably disposed to the presence of the EU during negotiations. Also, the Greek-Cypriots side distrust on the continuous presence of Turkish troops on the island and not giving a second thought to the human-factors which made the Turkish-Cypriot side to maintain Turkey remains as a guarantor for a while and that the guarantor aspect of the 1960 constitution cannot be eliminated at once. Although the Turkish-Cypriots are considering their own safety, the Greek-Cypriots concentrate on seeing Turkey more as a threat, pursuing its own security and national interest on the island.

To effectively come up with the appropriate mediation approach which will objectively and successfully solve the Cyprus question, it is therefore vital to take into considerations the interests of the primary external actors on the island, both the state actors and the international organizations involved in mediating the conflict. Where the interests of these external actors, especially the state actors, may be raising the stakes in making desired and needed concessions by the primary parties at the negotiation table, appropriate mediation tool have to be employed in the mediation process. It may therefore be accurate to suggest the importance of non-official individual mediators in such a conflict as the Cyprus question. They not only have the trusts of the conflicting parties; they are also able to relate with these external state actors and diplomatically seek for compromise on vital issues that are related to their national interests and are also constituting impediments to the success of resolving the Cyprus conflict.

Also, in tackling the factor of external actors' interests and the possible impediments they may constitute to successfully resolving Cyprus conflict, more inputs on track III diplomacy or bottom-up approach to conflict resolution are also vital. Since if the feelings of friendship, as seen in the g factor representation of Bartos distributive bargaining equation, is intensified both between the populace of the two communities and also among the leaders and elites of the two Cypriot communities, it is expected to translate to the negotiation table, or at least to have a substantial effect on the perspectives of the leadership on issues and in negotiating for necessary concessions as deem reasonable.

The bottom-up approach which encompasses social-psychological approach has been effective in Cyprus and the key international organizations in Cyprus

conflict viz the United Nations and the European Union have assisted in the area of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) on the island between both communities. With the recent developments at the political level on the island and within the geopolitical sphere of the key external actors involved in Cyprus conflict, this aspect of confidence building requires more attention for any possible resolution of the Cyprus conflict. Any final solution to the Cyprus conflict will still require peace to reign on the island, as a solution without peace will be no solution. Therefore, improving mutual trust and cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the island will be pivotal not only for the effectiveness of a potential resolution of the conflict, but also in ensuring both sides intensify cooperation and mutual trust in order to overcome some impediments that external actors' interests may constitute within the elite circle and also at the negotiation table.

As regard the new geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean, this region is characterized by a constant power competition between states who always seek to secure their interests and security in the region. With the discovery of hydrocarbon resources comes more complications. In order to avoid the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean to sabotage the negotiation of Cyprus conflict and constitute total impediments to settlement, all parties involved should be open for cooperation, especially energy cooperation without any attempt to isolate any actor. Their foreign policy agenda in the region must be the one that encourages partnership and win-win approach towards issues in the region. With this approach, any shifting dynamics and policies due to new geopolitical dimensions in the Eastern Mediterranean will ensure that it does not constitute impediments to negotiating the Cyprus conflict nor raise tension that would result to instability in the region.

Finally, the Cyprus question with its ethno-political dynamics requires a mediation approach that will factor in the integration of elite diplomacy and bottom-up approach in order to arrive at a long-lasting solution. Factoring in the awareness of external actors' interests in elite diplomacy and guiding against possible impediments from those interests will go a long way in optimizing any mediation and negotiation process and in making the necessary compromise for arriving at a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

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Appendix A

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Appendix B
Ethics Committee Approval



YAKIN DOĐU ÜNİVERSİTESİ

BİLİMSEL ARAŞTIRMALAR ETİK KURULU

14.03.2022

Dear David Oluwaponmile Alao

Your project **“An Analysis Of External Actors On The Cyprus Conflict: the Case of Turkey”** has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project it does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Direnç Kanol

Rapporteur of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee

Note:If you need to provide an official letter to an institution with the signature of the Head of NEU Scientific Research Ethics Committee, please apply to the secretariat of the ethics committee by showing this document.