NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ANALYSING THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG) ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL CRISIS (1990-1997)

M.A. THESIS

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Approval

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I hereby declare that all information, documents, analysis and results in this thesis have been collected and presented according to the academic rules and ethical guidelines of Institute of Graduate Studies, Near East University. I also declare that as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced information and data that are not original to this study.

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Abstract

Analysing the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) Role of Peacekeeping in the Liberian Civil Crisis (1990-1997)

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MA, Department of International Relations
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The United Nations' peacekeeping missions are the organization's primary mechanism for preserving global stability. To aid in restoring peace and stability to some of the world's most turbulent states, the United Nations and other regional and sub-regional bodies have adopted the following measures. This research focuses on the Liberian conflict as an instance in which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened to restore calm. There are two main groups involved in the current crisis in Liberia: the indigenous Liberians, who make up the vast majority of the country's population, and the Afro-American settlers, who relocated to Liberia after the abolition of slavery in the United States and have ruled the country since 1821. With a coup he orchestrated in 1980, Samuel Doe put Liberians, the country's ethnic majority, in command. Due to the escalation of the violence and the involvement of more forces on the side of the Liberians, ECOWAS authorities became concerned that the war would extend to other states in the sub-region. In order to maintain stability in Liberia, ECOWAS established the peacekeeping group, ECOMOG. This Thesis attempts to provide an explanation for the phenomena under examination by appealing to the notion of conflict resolution. This explanation is preferred because it clarifies the motivations of the sub-regional organization ECOWAS in its pursuit of peace in the region. The premise of this thesis is that maintaining global stability is a key national goal. The research also noted that the organization ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia were hampered by a lack of funds and the colonial mindsets of the various ECOWAS member states.

*Keywords***:** Liberia, conflict resolution, civil war, ECOWAS, ECOMOG

Özet

Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun (ECOMOG) Liberya İç Krizi'ne Yönelik Barışı Koruma misyonundaki Rolünün İncelenmesi (1990-1997)

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Birleşmiş Milletler'in barışı koruma misyonları, örgütün küresel istikrarı korumaya yönelik birincil mekanizmasıdır. Dünyanın en çalkantılı ülkelerinden bazılarının sükunete kavuşmasına yardımcı olmak için Birleşmiş Milletler ve diğer bölgesel ve alt-bölgesel organlar aşağıdaki önlemleri benimsemiştir. Bu araştırma, Batı Afrika Devletleri Ekonomik Topluluğu'nun içinde bulunduğu bir örnek olarak, ECOWAS'ın barış ve istikrarı sağlamak için müdahale ettiği Liberya ihtilafına odaklanmaktadır. Liberya'daki mevcut krize karışan iki ana grup vardır: ülke nüfusunun büyük çoğunluğunu oluşturan yerli Liberyalılar ve de 1821'den beri ülkeyi yönetmekte olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nde köleliğin kaldırılmasından sonra Liberya'ya yerleşen Afro-Amerikan kökenli yerleşimciler. Samuel Doe, 1980'de düzenlediği bir darbeyle ülkenin etnik çoğunluğunu oluşturan Liberyalıları komuta etmiş, şiddetin artması ve Liberyalı tarafa daha fazla gücün katılması nedeniyle, ECOWAS yetkilileri savaşın alt bölgedeki diğer ulusları da kapsayacağından endişe duymaya başlamıştır. Liberya'da istikrarı korumak için ECOWAS, barışı koruma grubu olan ECOMOG'u kurmuştur. Bu Tez, çatışma çözümü kavramına başvurarak incelenmekte olan konu için bir açıklama sağlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu açıklama, alt bölge örgütü ECOWAS'ın bölgede barış arayışındaki motivasyonlarına açıklık getirdiği için tercih edilmiştir. Bu tezin önerisi, küresel istikrarı korumanın temel bir ulusal hedef olduğudur. Araştırma ayrıca, ECOMOG örgütünün Liberya'daki çabalarının, çeşitli ECOWAS üye devletlerinin fon eksikliği ve sömürge zihniyetleri tarafından engellendiğini de vurgulamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Liberya, çatışma çözümü, iç savaş, ECOWAS, ECOMOG

Table of Contents

CHAPTER III

CHAPTER IV

CHAPTER V

List of Abbreviations

AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
GIABA	Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity
ILA	Interim Legislative Assembly
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
LNTG	Liberia National Transition Government
LPC	Liberia Peace Council
MSC	Mediation and Security Council
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRAG	National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
ONS	Omega Navigation Station
PAN	Protocol on Non-Aggression
PMAD	Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SBU	Small Boy Unit
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee
TPS	Temporary Protected Status
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UNTSO	United Nations True Supervisory Organization
VOA	Voice of America
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER I

The Context of Liberia's Crisis in History

Liberia, officially known as the Republic of Liberia, is located in western Africa. Its origins may be traced back to 1821, when it was founded by freed African-American slaves. Liberia, a country of almost three million people founded by freed African Americans in 1847, achieved independence from the United States in 1847. Liberia was founded in 1822 as a shelter for escaped slaves from the Americas. It was founded as a colony, grew into a commonwealth, and declared independence from the United States in 1847 with the help of the American Colonization Society (a private organization based in the United States). Political and social control of the country was held by Americo-Liberians (freed slaves' descendants) from the time of emancipation until 1980. Liberia's difficulties may be traced back to the country's socioeconomic framework, which fosters inequalities in the distribution of power and wealth. Over time, it became common to refer to both Mulattos and other freed slaves as Congos or Americo-Liberians, erasing the distinction between the two groups. Less than 5 percent of the population-maintained control of the country's economy, society, and government until a coup in 1980 (Adebajo, 2006).

Liberia's transformation started in the 1970s. Former Liberian leader William Tubman passed away in 1971. He had served in that role for 27 years. As a result of Tubman's "Open Door" economic strategy, foreign investment flooded into the country, but the rising wealth gap between the country's Americo-Liberians and the rest of the population was a heavy burden. As a result of violent battles that broke out in the country between 1989 and 2003, nearly 150,000 people were killed, and over 1.2 million were displaced. According to studies by Bellamy, A. J., and Williams from 2010, armed soldiers blatantly violated human rights, disrupted social connections, and caused deaths (Jaye, 2006). Since its inception, Liberia has been beset by wars as a result of the subjugation of its various ethnic groups. The colonists, who are sometimes referred to as "American-Liberians," established a colonial system of government as soon as they contacted the indigenous people. They were able to get rid of the native Liberians with the help of the legal True Whig Party and the powerful Masonic Lodge. Between the years 1877 and 1880, the genuine Whig Party dominated Liberian politics.

A League of Nations investigation into charges that American-Liberians had forced locals to labor as slaves began in 1929 after the situation of the indigenous Liberians gained international attention. The security apparatus in Liberia took the biggest hit in the years leading up to the violent conflict. The police and armed forces were there to protect the dictatorship's interests, not the people. This created a huge chasm between state and public interests, especially among indigenous communities. Because of its institutional make-up, the Frontier Force, Liberia's security force, has a poor reputation among the country's indigenous population. Since 1962, the Liberian armed forces have been known as the Armed Forces of Liberia rather than the Frontier Force (AFL). The number of American-Liberians serving as officers has remained relatively high despite new titles and other measures to elevate the security sector to the level of professionalism found in other industries. Native people made up the vast majority of the rank and file (International Crisis Group, 2009). This conflict in Liberia may have started with decades of corrupt patrimonial control by the country's most powerful American-Liberians. Even though they only made up about 5% of the population, they were able to create an elite that ruled over and took advantage of the natives. People from different races and cultures live in Liberia because the country was set up with a bad political economy. Since Liberia's independence in 1847, American-Liberians have controlled the country's government and economy, further widening the gap between themselves and the country's indigenous ethnic groups. When American-Liberians were denied the right to vote and take part in elections (Boas, 2009), it made other groups of Liberians angry. Within the framework of these structural boundaries of alienation, disagreements along these identifiers grew deeper, creating fault lines. As a result of these exclusions, the social, political, and economic fabric of the country has been severely weakened. Other people, especially those from opposite communities, were pushed into poverty as a direct result. After Tubman passed away, his longstanding vice president, William Tolbert, took over as president. Due to his position as a member of one of the most influential and affluent American-Liberian families, accusations of nepotism dogged Tolbert's administration from the beginning. Tolbert was the first president in a lot of ways; he spoke an indigenous language, for one thing, and he championed an initiative to enhance the representation of indigenous people in government. Even within Tolbert's own administration, there was skepticism about this strategy. The general populace was divided on whether the

rate of change was too slow or too fast; the Americo-Liberians held the former view. When it was proposed in April 1979 to raise rice prices after the Tolbert administration had subsidized them, violent protests broke out. The government said the price hike was needed to make the country less reliant on rice from other countries and to slow the number of people moving to cities. The leaders of the opposition said that the Tolbert family, which had a monopoly on selling rice in Liberia, stood to make money from what was happening. Tolbert's credibility was severely damaged, and the administration was put in more danger as a result of the "rice riots" that followed (Ayoob, 1995).

In April 1980, Tolbert and 13 members of his government were assassinated by Army Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, an ethnic Krahn. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, who used to be the finance minister of Liberia, left the country with a lot of other people. Doe and his People's Redemption Council (PRC) declared themselves the new government after the coup. Due to his lack of formal education, the opposition believes that Doe was illiterate when he became president. He was unqualified for either political or managerial roles. After only a year in power, PRC leader Doe had his vice president and fellow 1980 coup participant Thomas Weh-Syen and four other PRC members assassinated because he feared for his safety. After this, the Krahn people who shared his lineage took control of Doe's administration, and it appeared that Doe was constantly on edge about any threats to his rule. A considerable segment of the population, who had first supported the shift away from Americo-Liberian dominance, became progressively disenfranchised as the government reverted to monopolized power. Thomas Quiwonkpa, who was in charge of the army, Charles Taylor, who was in charge of the General Service Agency, and Prince Yormie Johnson, who worked with Doe in the PRC, all left Liberia in November 1983 (Golwa, 2009). Except for Jackson F. Doe, everyone else in the country would eventually want to seize power and assist Quiwonkpa. Doe permitted political parties to organize and elections to be held in 1985, after years of pressure from international assistance organizations. There were problems with the Liberian elections in October 1985. Neither foreigners nor domestic outsiders were likely to feel treated properly. Despite the fact that the United States has publicly acknowledged that "widespread fraud" was a feature of the elections, the country has nonetheless recognized the outcomes. In the end, Samuel Doe beat out his main adversary, Jackson F. Doe. The opposition at the time and even today, however, maintain that Jackson F. Doe was the true victor.

After the failed coup, former Doe lieutenant Thomas Quiwonkpa crossed into Liberia from neighboring Sierra Leone the following month. After Quiwonkpa's failed attempt, his body was publicly displayed in Monrovia. As a result of Doe's Krahn-dominated government's response, the Gio and Mano people in Quiwonkpa's native county of Nimba were killed. Despite the fact that elections were scheduled for 1991, Charles Taylor (who married into the Quiwonkpa family) and Prince Johnson (of the ethnic Gio) sensed a chance to plan against Doe in the aftermath of the escalating abuse within Nimba County (Kabia, 2011).

Native Liberians, in particular, viewed Samuel Doe's bloody revolution against his predecessors, especially Williams Tubman, as a win for justice, marking a turning point in the long history of native servitude at the hands of the American-Liberian administration. Since Doe took office, hopes have rapidly dwindled. Doe, like his predecessor, employed the Khan-dominated Armed Forces of Liberia to enslave the population and engage in repressive policies that fueled ethnic tensions across the country (AFL). As a protest to Samuel Doe's oppressive regime, in December 1989, rebels led by about 40 people created the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Tossing Samuel Doe's government into disarray, Charles Taylor invaded Liberia from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire. Guerrilla fighting emerged, however, and innocent Liberians were killed in the process. Jackson F. Doe, a resident of Nimba and rebel supporter, said that people from the Gio and Mano tribes were slaughtered. The National Patriotic Front (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, replied by committing war crimes on an unprecedented scale. Abhorrent acts include kidnapping citizens of neighboring countries and attacking embassies and the UN headquarters (Nwolise, 1992). The mass exodus of almost 600,000 Liberians by October 1990 had a disastrous impact on the economies of surrounding countries. Remember that even when Doe was president, Liberia was a reliable friend of the United States. There were a variety of ways in which the United States helped Liberia. Between 1980 and 1985, the Samuel Doe administration received over $500,000,000 in American currency. Liberia's strategic importance to the United States is reflected in the fact that both of the United States' major broadcasters in Africa—Omega Navigation Station (ONS) and Voice of America (VOA)—are based there. As a result, citizens expected the United States, which had maintained a close relationship with the country in question, to act quickly to restore order. They were shocked to learn that the United States

government prioritized the safety of its own residents over those fleeing the country. When the issue reached a peak in June 1990, U.S. and British ships stationed off the coast of Liberia began rescuing foreign nationals. The United States has sent an additional Marine Corps unit to Monrovia to protect the embassy. It came as a shock to the people of Liberia when the United States, the country's closest ally, decided to sit out the conflict in favor of the Gulf War. Due to the lack of interest shown by the rest of the world, the West African sub-region has made the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) work harder to find answers. The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo got together in May 1990 to form the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to look into what was going on in Liberia. The Cease-fire Monitoring Force (ECOMOG) was sent to Liberia by ECOWAS on July 6, 1990, after foreign ministers from the SMC met for an emergency summit the day before to discuss cease-fire procedures. Seventy percent of the total force was made up of members of the armed forces from the Gambia, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria (Achon, 1992).

Since the time that the minority of American Liberians came to the country, there has been clear evidence of cultural and ethnical differences between the African settlers and the rest of the Liberians. Because of this, there are groups with imperialist and nationalist goals. As a direct result of the American-Liberian community's efforts, a conflict broke out with local Liberians. The native Liberians would have to submit to the control of the American-Liberians sooner or later. The April 12, 1980, putsch marked the first time a Liberian leader did not have Liberian heritage, following 11 presidents who were all born in the United States. A group of noncommissioned and illiterate officers in the Liberian Army staged a "rescue operation" on April 12, 1980, to seize power from the imperialist Americans in response to the retrograde activities of American-Liberians. Other Liberians applauded it out of patriotism, yet it changed the course of the civil war anyway. Liberia's first monarch, Sergeant Samuel Doe, was notably cruel, first toward American-Liberians and then toward other indigenous people who weren't part of his tribe. The opposition worked together to sabotage his political career and reduce his influence (Obasi, 1992).

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor (an American-Liberian) and the NPFL sparked what would become the civil war in Liberia. Liberia is now in its third republic, and American-born Liberian Charles Taylor is its president. With this

background, it can be stated categorically that the collective security theory is useful for comprehending, analyzing, and organizing the data about the beginning, development, and intervention of the ECOWAS monitoring group in the peacekeeping activities in Liberia (ECOMOG). To sum up, the researcher was able to track how the situation in Liberia changed based on the ideas of imperialism and nationalization, and the idea of collective security helped understand why the Economic Community of West African States did what it did. For any investigation to be fruitful, a firm theoretical basis is required. The theoretical foundation of this paper will be conflict theory. A scenario in which two or more parties are "at odds" is one in which they disagree on how to approach a subject. One example of a non-state entity that has become involved in international warfare is the Palestinian guerrilla. Once more, expanding or protecting one's territory, ensuring internal security, acquiring souls (people) for the sake of prestige, forming alliances, inciting war revolutions in allied governments, changing United Nations processes, addressing religious concerns, are all primary goals pursued by competing parties in internal conflicts. Nigeria and ECOMOG's participation in the conflict has elevated both countries to pivotal roles in Liberia's struggle against authoritarianism and its offspring. Talks, debates, and compromises reached through discussion settled the issue and restored tranquility in Liberia. This process culminated with the selection of peacekeeping forces. The UN was able to figure out what started the violent conflict by looking at data from a shared country assessment done in 2006. Regional issues, such as the dynamics of disputes in the Manu River Union, were also identified alongside more global problems, including the abuse of authority, a bad judicial system, a lack of a shared national vision, poverty and food insecurity, the mishandling of natural resources, and so on. (Adetula, 2009) say that the use of violence to achieve social, economic, and political goals, as well as the fact that economic and political inequality kept going on, contributed to the rise of war. Since then, a civil war broke out on the eve of Christmas in 1989. There is consensus amongst (Adebajo, 2002) and others that this is the case. The rebels' legitimacy in the eyes of the people they were fighting was determined by their ability to rally support along political and ethnic lines. The UN Peace Building Fund (UNPBF) has pinpointed seven underlying factors that contribute to Liberia's persistent violence. Conflict in the region has different causes, including the mismanagement of natural resources, widespread poverty and food insecurity, pressures of reintegration and a lack of absorption capacity in areas of return, and regional dimensions that are

exacerbated by instability in neighboring countries like Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire (UNPBF, 2008).

When the state became a major security risk, the bloody conflict was felt all over Liberia (Ayoob, 1995). Reasons for the breakdown of essential services like transportation and healthcare include extreme poverty and unstable governments. Disparities in economic and social harmony, the growth, fictionalization, and fragmentation of political elites, the rise of rebel groups, worsening internal security, the collapse of the legal system, and other things all played a role.

Liberia's security system is made up of the Liberian Armed Forces, the Liberian National Police, the Ministry of National Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Bureau of Customs and Excise, the National Anti-Corruption Commission, and the National Security Agency (Ebo, 2005; Jaye, 2006; Jallah, 2008).

Concerns about the security industry's ability to sustain professional standards and a negative public image arose once it became clear that workers might get by on patronage along ethnic lines. Throughout the entire awful struggle, the Liberian government's security forces exposed their true, vicious colors. Terrorist groups flourished due to inadequate security measures. And it was authoritarian regimes' deliberate politicization of the military that prepared the way for de-professionalization in the security sector.

Background of the study

The main goal of this study is to figure out what role ECOMOG played in the Liberian conflict within the context of the peacekeeping mission that was sent. ECOMOG's success in maintaining peace in the West African sub-region might be better understood by looking at how well it has functioned during times of crisis. In an attempt to end the bloody civil war in Liberia, in August 1990, a group of West African states under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) took the unprecedented step of sending a peacekeeping force into Monrovia. This force, known as the Economic Community Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, (ECOMOG), has now spent almost three years in Liberia, yet its goal of bringing peace to the country remains elusive. The ECOMOG intervention succeeded in stopping the bloodshed and ethnic killing, and is therefore regarded as a model of

regional conflict resolution. However, ECOMOG has not integrated human rights protection and promotion into its activities, and this has proved to be a serious shortcoming. Pursuing peace without recognizing the centrality of human rights has left ECOMOG embroiled in a conflict with few immediate prospects for resolution: In the interests of ending the war and defeating a seemingly intractable adversary in Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), ECOMOG has allied itself with other warring factions, which undermines its credibility and therefore its ability to bring peace.

This assertion evaluates the ECOMOG intervention from a human rights standpoint, with particular emphasis on the period of renewed warfare since October 1992, is based on a fact-finding mission to Liberia and the Ivory Coast in February-March 1993 by Janet Fleischman, research associate for Africa Watch. The names of most of those interviewed have been withheld upon their request. The report concludes that:

- The ECOMOG intervention was carried out without clearly stated human rights principles and goals.

- Although not a part of ECOMOG's mandate, concrete human rights improvements resulted once ECOMOG secured control of Monrovia and its environs in autumn 1990, including a halt to the ethnic-based killings and brutality, the removal of obstacles to the delivery of relief supplies and the re- emergence of civil society (Fleischman Janet February-March 1993).

Regardless of its motivations, ECOMOG accomplished certain concrete objectives between August and November: it established a semblance of order and peace in the battered city, which allowed international humanitarian groups to return to Liberia; it confined to their barracks the AFL and another rebel group, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson; it enabled the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), headed by Amos Sawyer, to be installed; and it obtained a cease-fire (Africa Watch interview in Monrovia, Liberia, March 7, 1993).

Even some International observers from the EU and AU who were critical of ECOMOG's actions believe that the initial intervention was laudable. One of its most important accomplishments they point to was that ECOMOG stopped the slaughter of

Krahn and Mandingo people in Monrovia. There were some 500 Krahns holed up in the Executive Mansion with former President Doe, and at least 10,000 more were believed to be in Monrovia; many of these had tried to disguise themselves as belonging to other tribes. There was also a large community of Mandingos. In early August 1990, in the wake of the AFL massacre at St. Peter's Church, staff at the Catholic Hospital and the relief organization (MSF) wrote a letter to ECOWAS calling on the West Africans to intervene militarily. At the time, however, they were calling for protection from the Krahn soldiers of the AFL, not for Krahn civilians in the capital.

A number of other Liberians and expatriates pointed to the disaster in Somalia, Monrovia would have disintegrated into a situation like Mogadishu, with none of the factions able to win a clear victory and all of them preying upon the civilian population. President Sawyer noted that the West African subregion has limited resources, but that comparisons with Somalia were apt. "It took 28,000 U.S. troops in Somalia to distribute food. We have here less than 10,000 ECOMOG forces, assaulted by a force in Taylor's estimate of 30-70,000, whose purposes are known to everybody" (Cited by Human Right Watch, 1993).

In the West African sub-region, organizations like ECOWAS, ad hoc coalitions of states, and even individual governments have all made good use of the tools they have. ECOMOG was an official group of military forces from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mali, The Gambia, and Niger working together. It was run by the Nigerian Armed Forces. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more internal crises. The United Nations has a clear advantage over regional bodies like ECOMOG because it is more legitimate and has more experience using these instruments. As opposed to regional organizations or individual member states, the United Nations system appears to have the resources and capacity to create and implement a comprehensive, long-term strategy for settling conflicts. The United Nations' most well-known approach to maintaining international peace and security, known as peacekeeping, calls for all parties involved to work together to identify and resolve the root causes of the conflict. To put an end to the civil war and restore peace in Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established

ECOMOG as a peacekeeping operation (Onwubiko, 1973). The political situation in Liberia was at a crossroads after Charles Taylor, posing as the head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, invaded Nimba County in December 1989. When rebel forces stormed the capital of Monrovia in the early 1990s, the situation quickly deteriorated. After international communities' demands for a ceasefire and mediation attempts failed, the only way peace could be restored in that country was through free and fair elections. The current scenario in Liberia exemplifies how the ECOMOG could have a broader impact than simply preserving peace. Considering that the challenging scenarios on the battlefield involve multitasking abilities, military personnel must be able to manage military threats while also supporting non-military organizations in building peace and delivering humanitarian relief.

As a means of through the use of military force, the political, economic, and military leadership of Nigeria established the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Banjul, Gambia, in August 1990. The Secretary General of the OAU was present. During a time of great crisis, the ECOWAS dispatched a force known as ECOMOG to Liberia to verify that the numerous peace agreements reached between the warring parties were really implemented. The political decision to send in the ECOMOG forces meant that the great majority of their operations were of a military nature. It has already been established that Nigeria has been instrumental in ECOMOG's efforts to cease the bloodshed by serving as a neutral forum for multiple meetings between the heads of the warring parties (Nwankwo, 2010). Recent developments in Liberia and Sierra Leone have made it clear that economic unions may be a powerful tool in the drive for durable peace. After seven years of brutal fighting, which had a devastating effect on the country and its people and dropped GDP by an average of 8% per year, peace and political stability have been restored in mineral-rich Liberia. This is a major success for ECOMOG. During the civil upheaval in Sierra Leone, the ECOWAS dispatched a mission known as ECOMOG to the country. Their duty was to ensure the parties to the conflict followed the terms of the ceasefire and any other peace agreements that had been reached (Adebajo, 2002). Even if there have been political arguments against sending in the troops, the majority of ECOMOG's actions have been of a military nature. ECOMOG relies heavily on personnel and equipment from Nigeria. Several Nigerian-led organizations have convened meetings between the leaders of competing militias in an effort to negotiate an end to the

rising violence. A united economy is crucial to preserving peace in times of violence, as demonstrated by countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone. ECOMOG's success in restoring peace and security in Liberia, a country endowed with abundant natural resources, is notable. As a direct result of the war, the country's GDP has dropped by an average of 8% per year, and the conflict has been going on for seven years. ECOMOG uses cutting-edge tactics to keep the peace and safeguard the populace. In an effort to mediate a peaceful conclusion to the situation in Liberia, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent the ECOMOG mission. Everything was done in accordance with UN SOP, which requires peacekeeping operations to be used whenever possible.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role that the ECOWAS Monitoring Group played in establishing a ceasefire in Liberia through a combination of military and diplomatic means (ECOMOG). ECOWAS achieved one significant success despite its economic problems. The Economic Community of West African States Military Observation Group (ECOMOG), its military wing, helped Liberia regain peace and security. Over the course of Liberia's civil war, which lasted for more than seven years and was fueled by the complex interplay of a variety of variables, more than 150,000 people were killed. There was widespread skepticism and disagreement about the timing of the operation, the reaction and character of other ECOWAS member states, the reaction and cooperation-or lack-of the warring factions, the composition and character of these forces, and other factors as the conflict escalated and became internationalized. Peace and stability in Liberia were restored with the help of ECOWAS through ECOMOG after nearly seven years of conflict between seventeen different organizations. Liberia's civil war, which broke out in 1989, caused widespread anxiety among West African governments and citizens. The surrounding countries realized that a speedy resolution was necessary to protect the honor of the African diaspora, maintain sub-regional peace, and guarantee Liberia's existence in the wake of the tragedy it had just experienced. It's possible that international events overshadowed popular grief at the terrible toll of the conflict. The efforts of international organizations that might have been able to stop Liberia's decline have been impeded. Deaths were caused needlessly, and priceless items were destroyed.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has committed to finding a way to restore economic stability and peace to Liberia. Following hearing the cries of the majority of terrified Liberians, this choice was made. It is the job of ECOMOG, an organization, to keep an eye on things to make sure the environment stays safe. In August 1990, the ECOWAS heads of state and government began the process of forming and launching ECOWAS. Other West African leaders may have recognized the need for swift action, while others may have opposed ECOWAS's involvement in the Liberian crisis. It was a difficult decision, but now was the time for all of the leaders to sign the resolution.

Research Methodology

Online journals, research papers, essays, and textbooks all contributed to the body of knowledge and provided the information for this study. This study use content analysis to examine the data. According to Babbie (1986), content analysis is the study of written works (such as books, poetry, magazines, speeches, laws, and constitutions) with regard to a particular topic or collection of issues. This approach was chosen since the study is qualitative and because it relies on secondary sources of data. Additionally, the available United Nations, ECOWAS, and other governmental records and reports are used to support Liberia's position regarding the brutal conflict. Overall, the secondary data sources allowed the researcher to understand and explain the role of ECOWAS in peacekeeping in the Liberian civil crisis. This study employs Liberia as a case study to examine the role of ECOWAS in peacekeeping during the Liberian civil war.

Objectives and aims of the research

The major objective of this study is to examine ECOMOG's participation in the Liberian conflict in the context of the peacekeeping mission in the West Africa sub-region. In this regard, the specific aims are as follows:

(1)   To determine how much of a burden the failure of most members to meet their financial obligations actually is for ECOMOG.

(2)   Look at how well ECOMOG keeps the peace in the West African sub-region by looking at how well it handles crises.

Research Questions

These questions will assist the researcher in narrowing their focus and getting the most out of their investigation, as well as answering the research's goal. It is clear from the content of this document that the planned research will aim to answer the following important questions:

1.   How much did the ECOWAS member states' backing of ECOMOG improve the peace process in Liberia?

2.   How successful was ECOWAS in the region in terms of peacebuilding?

Significance of the Research

There are many difficulties ECOWAS is facing in resolving conflicts in the sub-region as well as its involvement in conflict prevention and management in Liberia. This Thesis adds to the growing body of literature on African peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding by looking at the causes and effects of insecurity and conflict in West Africa and in Liberia in particular. To that end, it is anticipated that this Thesis will suggest to understand how ECOWAS contributed to peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding in west Africa. Furthermore, the significance of this study also indicates future research to benefit from the research findings.

Limitations and scope

The researcher runs into several constraints due to the breadth of the study's focus on peacekeeping in Africa, with special attention paid to ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia: The lack of adequate research instruments is one of several factors limiting the study's scope. The available time does not provide a more complete scope, as the researcher has to juggle the study with other coursework and tests. The available funding for the study endeavor is insufficient to provide more broad coverage due to the researcher's other academic obligations.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

Within the framework of the peacekeeping mission, this investigation seeks to analyze ECOMOG's function in the Liberian conflict. This study intends to examine the efficiency with which ECOMOG maintains peace in the West African sub-region by analyzing the organization's reaction to crises. The regional body ECOWAS, an ad hoc coalition of states, and even individual administrations have all successfully utilized the instruments developed by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) throughout the West African sub-region. The Nigerian military commanded and backed ECOMOG, which also had sub-battalion-level troops from other ECOWAS countries like Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mali, The Gambia, and Niger. The United Nations has a distinct edge over regional groups like ECOMOG due to its superior legitimacy and experience in deploying these instruments, which have become increasingly important as the frequency of internal crises has increased, notably since the end of the Cold War.

Unlike regional organizations or individual member states, the United Nations system appears to have the means and capacity to organize and implement a comprehensive, long-term strategy to settle disputes in a way that lasts. Peacekeeping, the United Nations' (UN) most well-known policy for maintaining international peace and security, requires the involvement of all relevant parties and the utilization of joint efforts to address the root causes of the conflict. ECOWAS established ECOMOG as a peacekeeping force to help bring an end to the civil war in Liberia and restore peace to the country (Higgens, 1997)

Charles Taylor, leading the National Patriotic Front of Liberia at the height of the country's political crisis in December 1989, invaded Nimba County. In the early 1990s, when insurgent forces attacked the capital of Monrovia, the situation soon deteriorated. It became clear that only free and fair elections could bring peace to that country after international calls for a ceasefire and attempts at mediation failed. An example of how ECOMOG could be used for something other than peacekeeping is the current situation in Liberia.

Troops in the field need to be able to address militarythreats while also aiding non-military groups in building peace and delivering humanitarian aid. The Economic

Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was formed in Banjul, Gambia, in August 1990 by Nigeria's political, economic, and military leaders to use military force to arbitrate the Liberian civil war. Inviting the OAU secretary general was a priority. The ECOWAS dispatched a mission known as ECOMOG to the African nation of Sierra Leone during a period of crisis to ensure the implementation of the peace agreements agreed upon between the warring parties. In response to the political decision to send in ECOMOG forces, the group has mostly resorted to military action (Ero, 2002).

As mentioned at the outset, Nigeria plays an essential role in helping ECOMOG bring an end to the conflict by serving as a neutral meeting place for the heads of the warring factions. The experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrate the power of economic unions as a vehicle for achieving lasting peace. After seven years of terrible conflict that impacted the country and its people horribly and peace and political stability have been restored in mineral-rich Liberia. The results show that ECOMOG has been a great success (Inis, 1964).

The ECOWAS dispatched a peacekeeping force known as ECOMOG to Sierra Leone after civil strife broke out there. Their mission was to monitor and enforce the different agreements negotiated between the warring factions. In spite of the political justifications for sending soldiers, ECOMOG has conducted a considerable number of military actions. Modern ECOMOG still largely consists of Nigerian troops and equipment. Nigeria has led several peace initiatives that have brought together the heads of opposing factions in an attempt to negotiate an end to the escalating bloodshed. Among other examples, economic integration has considerably facilitated peacekeeping in Liberia and Sierra Leone. By helping restore political and military stability in Liberia, a country rich in natural resources, ECOMOG has made significant progress. ECOMOG uses innovative methods of peacekeeping to guarantee the safety of all citizens. Unlike any other European group, the Warsaw Pact strictly monitored its own boundaries. The ECOWAS bloc deployed ECOMOG to Liberia to mediate a peaceful settlement. The United Nations' established protocol called for this action, as it is their policy to send in peacekeeping operations whenever possible (Inis, 1964).

The Case of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Peacekeeping Operations

In 1963, newly independent African countries formed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to strengthen collaboration among themselves in the wake of decades of colonial control. Other African countries gained independence from European colonial rule in the early 1960s, and the Pan-Africanist philosophy, which promotes the unification of all people of African heritage, was a driving force in the development of this alliance. Because of its inexperience, the OAU sent out Africa's first peacekeeping operation, which ultimately failed. Conversely, the ECOMOG operation in Liberia was successful because its troops knew what they were doing. The next stage involves a more methodical expansion of the idea. Although it was not included in the charter, this idea has been widely employed in the international system.

The Kashghar cease-fire line has been monitored by the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) since 1949, the General Assembly Special Committee on the Bakkens since 1948, and the General Assembly itself since 1949. Even if peacekeeping has not been fully formed or implemented, this data implies that it is gaining traction. The term "peacekeeping" was finally settled on after multiple attempts. As the highest decision-making body within the United Nations, the Security Council is tasked with protecting international stability and security. Air, sea, and land troops are all tools available to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter for use in keeping the peace and protecting international security (Dawson, 1987)

Since its inception in 1945, the Security Council has been unable to use these powers to perform this crucial duty due to the Cold War and the antagonism between NATO (representing the United States and its allies) and the Warsaw Pact.

France, and the Russian Federations are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and each has the authority to veto any action taken by the council unless all five members agree (Cordia, 1967).

When a crisis arises, however, these countries don't always see eye to eye on whether or not enforcement action is required. The inability of UN members to agree on a single course of action has been a major contributor to the organization's overall failure. This deadlock was made brutally clear in 1950 with the outbreak of the Korean War. The Security Council did not provide its approval for a military strike against

North Korea despite Pyongyang's threats against South Korea. The "Uniting for Peace Resolution" (Resolution no. 377), also known as the "Acheson Plan," was passed by the General Assembly in an attempt to break the deadlock that had developed in the United Nations Security Council due to the Russian Federations' veto or accusations of veto misuse during the Korean crisis in November 1950. (Petersen, 1959).

The resolution's authors had the improvement of UN procedures and infrastructure in mind when they drafted it. In the event that the Security Council is obliged to send concerns about international security and peace to the General Assembly owing to a veto, it is highly recommended that all UN members maintain UN-designated special units within their military forces. Currently, a group of military professionals is getting together to form a peace monitoring committee and create a body with the authority to act in concert (Peterson, 1992). If the Security Council is unable to carry out its primary responsibility for preserving international peace and security due to a lack of unanimity among its permanent members, the resolution's two main provisions state that the General Assembly shall immediately consider the matter with the aim of making approving decisions. This resolution gives the General Assembly the power it previously lacked to take an active role in United Nations decision-making processes related to sustaining international peace and security. When the veto power of the Security Council was removed, the General Assembly stepped up to the plate and assumed responsibility for preserving global peace and security. By adopting this resolution, the UN General Assembly has authorized "the deployment of United Nations forces, planned and organized by the Collective Measures Committee, to prevent or repress attacks in order to restore peace" (Peterson, 1992: pp. 306). During the 1950 Korean Crisis, the UN General Assembly passed a "unite for peace" resolution, which was largely symbolic and carried no actual legal weight. Experts estimate that it would take at least six years for the bill's resolution provisions to become law. Under the "transfer" section of the "uniting for peace" resolution, the problem of North Korea was improperly transferred to the General Assembly for further discussion and possibly action by the Security Council. Six points had been worked out by the Council to address China's role in the Korean War, but the Russian Federation used its veto to prevent their adoption. On December 4, the Russian Federation cast the deciding vote against a resolution authorizing military intervention against the Russian Federation in the United Nations Security Council. Those who supported the concept then lobbied the UN General Assembly to give it

some thought. A resolution on the topic had already been debated and passed by the General Assembly, but the Security Council chose to disregard it. This led the resolution to declare there were no readily available funds. The peace deal was challenged on numerous fronts, despite the fact that it enjoyed widespread support.

Formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)

The United Nations General Assembly created the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. This was the first formal attempt at implementing the United Nations' Uniting for Peace resolution since 1965, when an earlier attempt at doing so also failed. After Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Maritime Company, owned by the French, and the British, in 1959, tensions between Egypt and Britain grew to the point of war. This led to hostilities, prompting the establishment of the UNFI. The French and Israelis were planning a joint attack on Egypt to prevent the nationalization of the Suez Canal and put an end to Palestinian incursions into Israeli territory (Wiseman, 1987).

Despite assurances to the contrary by the British and French, one diplomat noted that their actions were "obviously oriented toward bolstering their position in the Suez Canal discussions and, in the case of France, towards destroying one source of support for the Algerian Independence Movement" (Goodrich, 1957 pp. 413–414). Both the United States and the Russian Federation were strongly opposed to the invasion; therefore, the United States brought the issue before the United Nations Security Council. When tensions first erupted among the permanent members of the Security Council, the "uniting for peace resolution" was used to expedite the General Assembly's decision-making process. Soon enough, two sides would come to dominate the UN General Assembly debate. Both the African and Asian blocs, as well as the communists, were opposed to the Israeli attack and the Anglo-French military response that followed it, and they favored an immediate resolution to the problem by the withdrawal of the invading troops. The second faction does not support the invaders but is willing to talk about possible coordinated action in response. This faction is comprised of more powerful Commonwealth states and Western European members. This group demanded a drawdown of forces and an end to hostilities after their legitimate concerns were addressed (Goodrich, 1957). When asked about his country's goals, Canadian politician Lester Pearson said, "Our intention then, in

following out these principles, was to offer to the United Nations a solution that would be satisfactory to all sides" (Goodrich, 1997: pp. 414–415). Following Professor Pearson's suggestion that the Secretary General negotiate with UN member states for a UN force large enough to keep the borders of the warring parties at peace while a political settlement is worked out, the General Assembly unanimously passed a resolution calling for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces.

In exchange for three conditions, the United Kingdom and France agreed to suspend their military operations: (1) an Arab-Israeli peace settlement; (2) a satisfactory arrangement for the Suez Canal; and (3) acceptance of the UN force to keep the peace by Egypt and Israel. There was an agreement between the two sides to lodge a small group of Anglo-French military soldiers while the UN considered whether or not to intervene. Mr. Pearson agreed that the situation had become hopeless, and thus he voted in favor of a motion urging that Secretary General Mr. Drag Hammarskjold present to the General Assembly a plan for the formation of an emergency international force with the permission of the states concerned General Assembly Official Record, First Emergency Special Session, 462nd Plenary Session, November 1956. The Assembly as a whole voted in favor of the measure. On November 5, 1956, the Secretary General proposed designating Major General Borns, Chief of Staff of the UN True Supervision Organization, as the Chief of Command of the UN forces to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is carried out in accordance with all the provisions of the agreement. The Assembly passed Resolution (ES-1) (2000+1). On November 6, 1956, the Secretary General gave a report to the Assembly on the mandate, personnel, structure, and budget of the force. He mentioned that Canada, along with Colombia, Denmark, Norway, Pakistan, and Sweden, were all contributing troops to the new military force. To develop those aspects of planning for operations and its operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly and that do fall directly under the responsibility of the Chief of Staff, the UNGA appointed a committee made up of representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Columbia, India, Norway, and Pakistan. For instance, the UN Charter provides the General Assembly with the ability to form fully functional subsidiary organizations as it thinks suitable for the attainment of its purposes. The United Nations Peace Resolution, passed on November 3, 1956, formed the United Nations Emergency Force and gave it its mandate under this charter article (Ghali, 1992).

The force has been granted no authority beyond what is required to perform its

mission in conjunction with local authorities, as determined by the Secretary General. Resolution 1001 (No. 7) of the General Assembly granted the Secretary General the authority to enact all necessary regulations and guidelines in cooperation with the Advisory Committee to guarantee the efficient operation of the force. As long as the parties to the conflict take all necessary steps to comply with the General Assembly's recommendation, the force would be more than an observer corps but not a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor would the force, in any case, have military functions exceeding those necessary to serve peaceful conditions (Goodrich, 1957). With an emphasis on monitoring the peace process, it seems that the majority of the force's duties are supervisory in nature. France, China, Britain, the Russian Federation, and the United States, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, decided not to send in ground forces after a vote by the UN General Assembly. To avoid squandering time and resources, the Secretary-General has called for a self-sufficient net contingent comprised of nations or coalitions of countries that can deliver such forces without delay. When it came to the army's long-term strategy and day-to-day operations, that duty fell squarely on the Chief of Command and his staff. The military said no to a deal that could have jeopardized its need for regional parity. The force's commander, Major General F.L.M. Burns, was handed full power over all military actions. He was in charge of everything that went on in the army and made sure that the soldiers got everything they needed. Until he meets with the Secretary General, however, he will be unable to fulfill his duties. The Chief of Staff was responsible for maintaining order and discipline in the Army and had the final say on who would lead the force. Members of UNEF also assisted the UN Secretary General and the UN Chief of Staff with transportation, supplies, and logistics. The countries whose residents gave to the United Nations' Emergency Relief Fund were displayed below. The UNEF received funds and supplies from the governments of all member states. However, the UNEF was required to provide a certain number of supplies, such as weapons, vehicles, food, and fuel. While deployed, each member of the force was provided a daily stipend of $1 by the United Nations. Secretary General MR. Dag Hamarsk Jold, on the other hand, suggested keeping the force's funds separate from the regular budget and disbursing them to member nations based on a scale of evaluation established by the UN budget (Holtom, 2007).

The UN officials have claimed that the delegates to the United Nations General Assembly should get all the credit for the success of the United Nations Emergency

Force (UNEF), despite the fact that the UNEF was established by a unanimous vote of the Assembly. It has been recommended that countries supplying troops pay a reduced fraction of the total emergency army budget. In addition, the five permanent members of the Security Council were asked to take on a larger financial responsibility in the name of preserving global stability. The Russian Federation and its allies considered it immoral for the governments responsible for the crisis to refuse to provide for the material necessities of the emergency army. The investigative committee ultimately proposed a resolution that would have the United Nations allocate $10,000,000 from its general budget to UNEF, with contributions from member states determined by the scale of assessment adopted by the General Assembly for contributions to the organization's general budget (Rosner, 1957).

Since its founding in 1956, the United Nations has frequently sent out large-scale peacekeeping missions. Between 1956 and 1967, the United Nations attempted numerous initiatives to help end the Egyptian-Israeli conflict. Cases in point include the UN Operation in the Congo (Zaire) (UNUC) between 1960 and 1964, the UN Peacekeeping Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and UNEF 11 between Israel and Egypt. From 1973 to 1981, UN forces patrolled the Sinai Peninsula. In 1974, United Nations forces patrolled the Golan Heights between Israel and Syria. In 1978, UN troops first patrolled the streets of Lebanon. The United Nations created the concept of peacekeeping missions like the ones outlined above. Numerous regional organizations, such as the OAS, the Arab League, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have adopted the concept of pooling resources to address regional problems. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) focused on the problems of the area via ECOMOG to intervene in the civil conflict in Liberia.

The ECOWAS organization is currently in charge of overseeing the peacekeeping operations in Liberia (Urguahart, 1980).

The Evolution of ECOWAS

West Africa made the first attempts at political, economic, and security integration after colonialism. This was done to help Kwame Nkrumah's dream of an African nation-state come to fruition. The mental and emotional well-being of the inhabitants of these countries has been severely damaged by colonialism. It was during this time period in these countries' histories that the current state boundaries,

governmental frameworks, and economic foundations were established. Kingdoms and empires that lasted for centuries were well-known before the arrival of Europeans. Since gaining their independence in 1986, these countries have been more open to exploring the potential of political and economic collaboration (Asante, 1989). Create a single African nation, as envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah. The psychological and emotional toll of colonialism on the people of these nations is high. The modern-day political and economic structures of these countries can be traced back to this time period as well as to the established state boundaries. Before the arrival of Europeans, it was common knowledge that certain countries might remain together for centuries. Since gaining their independence in 1986, these countries, have grown more open to exploring the potential of political and economic cooperation (Asante, 1989). There were benefits and drawbacks to this effort due to the area's unique linguistic, ecological, and cultural occupants. The people of West Africa wanted and needed unification for different reasons. In the 1970s, the best way to promote national and regional growth was to create an economic community. Collective bargaining may be aided by the formation of economic alliances and other forms of international economic partnerships. The reasoning for this is that a larger regional consumer market could be the most beneficial aspect of economic integration for smaller countries. This is something they should do to protect their economies. While the idea of a West African economic community enjoyed broad support, several factors worked against its eventual establishment.

One of these was an ongoing effort by France to diminish relations between French- and English-speaking West African nations. France's sense of its own relevance in African diplomacy was lenient as long as former colonists learned French (Gambari, 1991). For instance, the French initiated regional integration in 1945 when they founded the Federation of French West Africa (AOF), a governing body that included a francophone West African Customs Union that used a centralized shared currency. Those fluent in English were essential to the growth of these groups, just as the British were. Prior to colonization, the French-speaking states of West Africa had close links to France, while the English- speaking states were more closely aligned with Britain. Governments in French- and English-speaking West Africa both benefited from colonial funding (Fenwick, 2009). Establishing a free trade area between the English and French-speaking states in the region was complicated by the large linguistic barrier. Although the first attempt at integration was made in 1945, former

Liberian President Tubman is still credited with leading diplomatic and political efforts to integrate and construct a West African economic union. The concept of a free trade zone was first publicly proposed by President Johnson on January 7, 1964. Although the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA) supported the concept, fighting between French- and English- speaking West African states ultimately doomed the plan (Cline-Cole and Robson, 2016). Thanks in great part to Nigeria, which has one of the few English-speaking administrations in the area, significant headway was made toward building a West African economic union. The 1973 oil crisis transformed Nigeria into an oil producer and propelled the country to the forefront; however, the Biafran civil war of the late 1960s did inspire the Nigerian government to prioritize regional security.

They were able to expand their regional ambitions thanks to the profits from oil, and this "oil diplomacy" came to characterize their approach to international relations. Since Nigeria initiated ECOWAS, it has been a vociferous advocate for the need to reduce France's hegemonic role in West Africa. France has been actively involved in West African politics since the colonial era. Their beneficial effects on national and international organizations like governments and militaries are mostly responsible for this (Gambari, 1991). In 1972, Nigerian General Yakubu Gowon and Togolese General Gnassingbe Eyadema toured the area to promote regional unification. In reaction to Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions, the six French-speaking countries of West Africa (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali, and Mauritania) immediately formed the West African Economic Community. President Eyadema of Togo and General Gowon of Nigeria founded the West African Economic Community (WAEC). Over time, it expanded to include all of Nigeria's neighbors.

As a result, the area's two economic camps started fighting each other. In the first scenario, participation was restricted to countries where the majority of the population spoke French. In the second case, people were asked to join in from all around the world. West African leaders, Generals Gowon and Eyadema, renegotiated a unity treaty in April of 1972. Togo (December 1973), Ghana (January 1974), and Liberia (March 1974) had regional state meetings to discuss and evaluate the proposed treaty (January 1975). On May 28th, 1975, fifteen countries signed the ECOWAS Treaty in Lagos. After gaining its independence in 1977, Cape Verde became the organization's sixteenth member. After losing Mauritania in 2001, ECOWAS has dwindled to its

current number of fifteen members from a previous high of sixteen. Togo and Niger play a crucial role in attracting other Francophone countries. The primary goal of the ECOWAS treaty was to create a free-trade zone in which goods, services, and people could enter and exit the market freely. It was critical to encourage integration and collaboration between governments to support economic growth across the continent and establish a single economic zone. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) treaty has improved people's lives, boosted the economy, and given them a greater voice in government, in addition to strengthening diplomatic ties between member states (Reuben, 1994).

ECOWAS's Peace and Security Plan

As 2010 concluded, the crisis in West Africa escalated. Citizens began to believe that safety and globalization were incompatible. In the original draft of the Lagos Treaty, there were no measures included regarding safety. The Protocol on Non-Aggression (PNA) was the first agreement to deal with the defense industry, and it was created by ECOWAS in April 1978. The treaty's signatories committed to forswearing any acts of hostility toward one another and not inciting any intergovernmental conflicts. As a result, the issue of external interference that this protocol was designed to address still persists. The Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defense (PMAD) was recently adopted by the international community to enhance national security. The parties to this agreement signed it at a conference in Sierra Leone in 1981, but it didn't go into effect until 1986. According to the rules of the treaty, in the event of a conflict, the armed forces of all ECOWAS member states would form a unified fighting unit. Intervention by the European Union in a war would require a formal request from the head of state of a member state. The outcomes of the probe will guide future actions.

Even if this procedure was flawed, it focused more on the outside world than on the people involved. There was a lot of attention paid to PMAD during the 1980s civil conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In July 1993, the ECOWAS treaty was updated to include stronger protections for the speedy and fair resolution of intrastate and interstate conflicts. The Economic Community of West African States Protocol Relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security was signed on October 31, 1998, in Lomé, Togo, and entered into force on December 10, 1999. The term "mechanism" was used to describe

it. Due to the system's ability to link the PNA and the PMAD, ECOWAS has been able to improve its methods for preventing and resolving conflicts. One of ECOWAS's earliest successes was the 2001 Supplemental Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. The Authority of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace, and Security Mechanism, the Community Court of Justice, the ECOWAS Community Parliament, the Executive Secretariat, and six specialized technical commissions are among the most important ECOWAS institutions (Bakhoum, 2011).

The efforts of such organizations are crucial to ECOWAS's ultimate success. And the MSC is only one of those organizations. For all inquiries pertaining to international security, please contact the Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security (PAPS). In West Africa, the West Africa Counter-Smuggling Operations Forum (WACSOF) isn't the only organization trying to cut off terrorist and criminal organizations' access to cash. Included in this group are the Commission's Humanitarian Affairs Office and the Inter-Governmental Action Group (GIABA). The Multinational Security Committee is comprised of the Defense and Security Commission, the ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF), and the Elders' Council (DSC). Among these institutions is the Mediation and Security Council, which plays a crucial role in preserving stability in the region. The MSC is able to make important decisions on its mediation and peacekeeping efforts because it enjoys the support of national governments. The ECOWAS Standby Forces (ESF) were formed to provide support to PSOs. This organization is comprised of citizens and military police from ECOWAS countries.

However, it is up to the Defense and Security Commission to assess the ESF's administrative, archival, and other needs. The military has the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the civilian sector has the Committee of Chiefs of Security.

The Elders' Council was established to act as the governing body in international affairs. Some members of the OAU and UN have been recruited to help mediate negotiations and find a middle ground. An ECOWAS report makes similar claims (Ismail, 2008). The Council of Elders will typically dispatch missionaries to the scene of a conflict in order to gain insight and mediate a peaceful resolution. There was an initial focus on following established protocols to increase regional security as part of ECOWAS' conflict resolution and prevention efforts. The conflict prevention

measures implemented in 1999 have a number of flaws. In 2008, in response to the need for a more effective and long-lasting plan to maintain peace and security in the area, the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) was established. The European Civil Protection Force's primary focus was not on preventing conflicts but on mitigating their effects (Vogt, 1991). This meant that the ECPF's primary objective was to lessen existing conflicts and prevent the start of any new ones. To keep peace and order in the region, the ECPF is the best choice. The ECPF has prioritized addressing specific issues for the sake of preserving law and order. Human rights and the rule of law, peace and security, prepared forces, preventive diplomacy, early warning systems, natural resources and governance, democratic and political leadership, women's rights, the media, international initiatives, youth empowerment, peace education, and humanitarian aid are all examples of topics that could be considered to fall under this umbrella (Vogt, 1991). All of these factors contribute to the maintenance of unstable administrations and persistent conflicts. The European Community Peace Framework (ECPF) is a legislative framework that could aid individuals and communities in settling conflicts. Since it covers so much ground and integrates all of ECOWAS's efforts in one place, the ECOWAS Comprehensive Partnership Framework (ECPF) stands out among comparable documents. The scale of the subregion and the duration of the project make it difficult to secure funding. Essential to the ECPF's operation is the Early Warning Observation and Monitoring System. It helps ECOWAS anticipate possible conflicts so that it can take rapid action to prevent them. Their eyes are on the local community and on the political and security situation as well (Opoku, M. J. 2007).

The ECOWAS Observation and Monitoring Center (OMC) is responsible for the early warning system in the event of an emergency in a member state of the organization. The Economic Community of West African States' Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) is undergoing maintenance to better assist with this. As part of its efforts to resolve the civil war in Liberia, ECOWAS established the Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. Given its importance in maintaining stability in the area, it was naturally incorporated into the new framework for resolving legal disputes (Hutchful, 1990).

The member states established ECOMOG to address security concerns. The majority of ECOMOG's soldiers recruited from the Economic Community of West

African States. The military has a strict chain of command, with different branches responsible for ground, naval, and aerial operations. The chief executive officer will set the pace, followed by other high-ranking commanders and the troops. The chief of staff and his central planning staff are responsible for settling disputes and maintaining order. Other factors are considered before missions are sent out. The quality of a commander's squad, the skill of his or her subordinates, the technology of his or her weaponry, and the orders he or she receives from the national government are all factors that can influence performance. ECOMOG was formed as a peacekeeping mission to restore stability in the event of a political crisis in the region. This follows the regional conflict resolution framework established by ECOWAS. As the 1990s progressed, ECOMOG was given a larger and larger role in enforcing law and order in Liberia. ECOMOG can swing between peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions as needed. When a truce agreement is not being followed, ECOMOG steps in to make sure it is. These efforts are supported by international law, namely Article 33 (1) of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which mandates the employment of "all peaceful methods" to settle crises before resorting to force (Guardian 1956).

Background of ECOMOG Operations

ECOMOG, a West African peacekeeping group, has seen its membership grow from its original 3,000 to somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000. They probably all hail from Nigeria, where the majority live. ECOWAS member states, as well as the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, established ECOMOG in 1999. In September 1991, the Senegalese military participated in the ongoing peace talks with Taylor. In August 1990, after the U.S. and the U.N. were unable to bring peace to Liberia, ECOMOG landed in the capital city of Monrovia to mediate between the warring parties.

It was argued that the conflict was no longer an internal one in Liberia after thousands of West Africans were stuck in the country and tens of thousands of refugees fled to neighboring countries. In addition to organizing elections to be held within a year, ECOMOG was tasked with calling for a truce and forming an interim government. There was a brief ceasefire, but it was immediately broken since the NPFL never ceased fighting. There was intense fighting, but ECOMOG was successful in driving the armed group out of Monrovia. There has been a lot of discussion about

the motivations of interventionist states in Liberia. Others have speculated that Nigeria's backing for the Doe regime was due to the personal affinity between Presidents Doe and Babangida; others have suggested that Nigeria just wanted to demonstrate its intentions to become the regional behemoth it views itself to be. Other people thought this was a reasonable worry because the NPFL was suspected of working with dissidents in the Gambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone (the majority of whom were trained alongside the NPFL in Libya). The oppositions have suggested that the NPFL's treatment of citizens of other West African countries who were living in Liberia was the primary motivation for the intervention, citing the thousands of Nigerians, Guineans, and Ghanaians who were effectively held captive in Monrovia and the hundreds who died as a result. The massive influx of refugees into neighboring countries may have also sparked action. None of the selected countries, however, had a stellar reputation for upholding democratic values or protecting human rights (Abegunde, 1995).

The AFL and another rebel organization, Prince Johnson's Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), were eventually driven back to their barracks, and Amos Sawyer's Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) was able to take power. Everything mentioned above was completed by ECOMOG between August and November. While ECOMOG enjoyed early and consistent popularity, other citizens have since grown tired of them. One of ECOMOG's purportedly greatest accomplishments was putting an end to the systematic massacre of Krahn and Mandingo people in Monrovia. Even though there were probably around 10,000 Krahns in Monrovia, at least 500 of them had sought safety at the Presidential Mansion with ex-President Doe. It's likely that other tribes have assumed false identities in order to pass as locals somewhere else. In addition, there was a sizable Mandingo population living among them.

The Catholic Hospital and the rescue group Doctors Without Borders urged the West Africans to take military action after the AFL massacre at St. Peter's Church in the early days of August 1990. They begged the AFL capital troops to protect the Krahn people. Liberians and non-Liberians have pointed to what happened in Somalia to assert that without ECOMOG, Monrovia would have descended into chaos and no side would have been able to declare victory, leading to widespread predation on the weak. President Sawyer highlighted analogies between the famine in Somalia and the

situation in West Africa to make his argument. Both regions face a shortage of resources. In order to feed the people of Somalia, the United States sent in 28,000 soldiers.

When they attack a force of fewer than 10,000 ECOMOG soldiers, they do it with a clear goal in mind. Two years after the peace was achieved in Bamako in November 1990, it was evident that the peace was far from secure, with West African forces guarding Monrovia and the NPFL ruling the rest of the country. ECOMOG was limited to a policing role at the time because it lacked the military might to oppose Taylor and the political unity to heal the country's partisan divide. A Liberian law scholar said that ECOMOG was more respected than Liberian institutions. They became the de facto police for a long period after the public lost faith in law enforcement. ECOMOG was formed to keep the peace, but it rapidly found itself mediating conflicts that had little to do with security. Although maintaining peace is ECOMOG's principal objective, the organization must now also address political concerns in addition to its military obligations. The military leader and political negotiator for ECOMOG in Liberia is the head of the field forces. To ECOWAS, he is indispensable. General Ishaya Bakut and other former field commanders have taken a lot of heat for, among other things, supposedly bending over backward to impress Taylor. The goal of the ECOWAS-sponsored peace talks that led to the Yamoussoukro IV accord in October 1991 was for all warring parties to disarm and encamp in advance of elections. Yamoussoukro thought that everyone might work together, but Taylor refused to disarm and instead cast ECOMOG and Nigeria in particular as his main rivals. The Nigerian president, Ibrahim Babangida, is a "crazy dictator" who wants to wipe out the Liberians, according to Taylor. Taylor's defiance was fueled by divisions within ECOWAS, particularly between Francophone countries led by the Ivory Coast and Anglophone ones led by Nigeria. According to a seasoned observer of the region, the recent rise of ECOMOG is a mirror of local fears in West Africa.

These countries work together to undermine international stability, much like a series of city-states ruled by petty despots working to weaken one another. Peacekeepers will be formed only if a majority of ECOWAS countries, led by Nigeria, agree to do so. Taylor's antipathy with ECOMOG has only grown as this conflict has progressed. "We are trying to prevent a Nigerian occupation of Liberia," (Prkic, 2016: pp. 121), said Norwood Langley, leader of the NPFL and Minister of Commerce,

Industry, and Transportation for the NPRAG. Both ULIMO and the Black Berets are only fronts for Nigeria, so don't expect any distinction between them.

It ought to be quite obvious which country has the last word. Taylor uses even more strong words. On March 24, Taylor stated to a room full of foreign reporters that he would not deal with the hostile organization ECOMOG and that he was no longer associated with ECOMOG. He stated that ECOMOG is to blame for the carnage in Liberia. Their bombing of institutions of learning, healthcare, and worship has persisted unabatedly. Reaching out to local Liberians is a top focus. Even in NPFL-controlled areas, ECOMOG has widespread public support. The NPFL, ULIMO, and AFL have not been able to successfully collaborate due to a lack of confidence between the three organizations. Most people in refugee camps outside of Monrovia have said they will not return home unless ECOMOG is there to protect them. Other people have reason to be concerned about the availability of firearms among members of ULIMO and the AFL. The mediation services provided by ECOMOG are invaluable. The idea of an army is not particularly convoluted. No state-sponsored terrorist organization would ever commit acts of violence against people without hoping to profit from those actions. When it comes to helping the Liberian people, ECOMOG is hard at work. On October 15, as tensions rose, Taylor authorized "Operation Octopus," an attack on ECOMOG positions near Monrovia and the AFL's Schieffelin barracks on the outside of the city.

Breaking the siege of Monrovia by ECOMOG took nearly a month of effort. Cities like Gardnerville, Barnesville, New Georgia, and Caldwell outside of the city proper were impacted particularly hard. Around two hundred thousand individuals migrated to the metropolis from the suburbs and rural areas. Thousands of people fled to the country's interior, far behind Taylor lines, after the government forcibly transferred the communities there. Reluctant NPFL soldiers were often executed. Similar to previous years, the NPFL often sent out drunken adolescents and young men to attack Monrovia. Several of these boys between the age range of 9-15 were a part of Taylor's Small Boys Unit (SBU), one of his most dependable units. A number of these young men drowned in the wetlands outside of Monrovia. Members of the NPFL do not get compensation for their services; nevertheless, Monrovia has promised them housing and other benefits in exchange for their loyalty. NPFL forces would often leave their names or unit numbers on the outer walls of homes that had been spared during the war. Exactly how society was harmed in the latest conflict is unknown.

According to World Health Organization research, about 3,000 people may have died between October 15 and November 1, according to the organization's research. Unlike the war in 1992, this one placed less emphasis on the ethnic nature of the violence. For example, AFL troops would propagate false rumors that the NPFL was approaching the region, causing villagers to flee their houses and leaving them vulnerable to pillage. The NPFL appears to be aiming at unarmed citizens of all socioeconomic backgrounds in the Monrovia area. On October 31st, militants of the New People's Front (NPFL) killed five American nuns in Gardnerville. Sister Agnes Mueller, the oldest at 62, and Sister Joelle Kolmer, the youngest at 58, made up the age range of the sisters. At least three bodies were located inside the convent, while two more were discovered in the street. Numerous individuals testified to the NPFL's dominance in the Gardnerville area; these include journalists, soldiers, humanitarian workers, missionaries, and displaced Liberians. While the number of nuns slain was relatively low in comparison to the overall death toll, it did serve to refocus public attention on the conflict. Those who have been killed in the battle continue to have their bodies discovered.

Towards the end of December, authorities in Gardnerville, Nevada, discovered a mass grave containing the remains of dozens of people. By the end of January, 300 remains had been found in various locations. A mass burial was discovered by ECOMOG at the end of February on the Firestone plantation. More than fifty skulls have been discovered scattered across the Fendell campus of the University of Liberia, and ECOMOG believes they belong to West African students and faculty members who were executed by the NPFL.

Theoretical Framework

The theory of conflict resolution will be used in this thesis to make a link between the main problem and the hypothesis. For Schellenberg (1977), conflict is when two or more people or groups with different identities or points of view want the same thing but have different ways of getting it. There are things that can lead to internal conflicts in a country, including political, economic, trade, ethnic, and border. One cause of conflict between two parties is when there are hidden or real conditions that lead to beliefs about the existence of goals that don't match up with theoretical constructs or basic assumptions about human nature and how people interact with each other and with society as a whole. Sometimes, the best way to solve a problem is for

both sides to fight it out. But sometimes it's also necessary for the state, regional groups, or even international groups to bring in third parties to help mediate and find solutions. Conflict resolution is a scientific term that stresses the need to see peace as an open process and divides the process of resolving a conflict into different steps based on how the conflict cycle works. Resolution is basically any effort to stop escalating, or end a conflict in one or more of its stages. The theory of conflict resolution is a way of analyzing and solving problems that considers the needs of both individuals and groups, such as the need for identity and the need for institutions to change in order to meet needs (Dennis, 1993). According to Burton (1990), at the core of the conflict resolution theory is the fact that conflict cannot be just seen as a political or military issue; it can also be regarded as a social issue. Secondly, Burton (1990) mentions that a conflict has a life cycle that doesn't go in a straight line. It depends a lot on how the environment of the conflict is set up. Thirdly, the causes of a conflict cannot be boiled down to a single variable in the form of a bivariate causality proposition. Instead, a conflict must be seen as a phenomenon that happens when different factors interact with each other on different levels.

The fourth point is that the best way to solve a conflict is by combining it with a variety of other relevant ways to solve conflicts (Burton, 1990). According to Galtung (2007), there are three main ways to resolve a disagreement. Peacekeeping is the initial stage. An outside party or group of people attempts to mediate the disagreement by bringing the two sides together and reducing the level of hostility between them. The second phase, known as "peacemaking," entails attempting to bring an end to hostilities by means of intermediary processes such as mediation, negotiation, diplomacy, and conversation.

The mediator or third parties can initiate this step. Third, there must be an effort to restore social, political, and economic stability to the state through peacebuilding (Galtung, 2007). Peace-building is the next step in resolving conflicts; it involves formal diplomacy, informal communication, negotiation, mediation, and civil society peace processes all working together to control, reduce, eliminate, and transform the root causes of the conflict. This paper analyzes these periods, with specific attention paid to Liberia.

Peacekeeping

Maintaining peace is the act of using the military to prevent or lessen violent conflict in a neutral fashion. There will be a small amount of peacekeeping to ensure that peace agreements are in place during a conflict and to safeguard the peace between countries. The process should be carried out in a way that upholds individual freedom and national independence (Bellamy, 2010). Peacekeeping can also be seen as the intervention of neutral parties in a dispute with the intention of reducing hostilities. One of this thesis's theoretical foundations could be the notion of peacekeeping. The Economic Community of West African States agreed to send peacekeeping troops to Liberia and establish the ECOWAS Monitoring Group based on a United Nations agreement that complements the ECOWAS non-aggression treaty (1979) and the ECOWAS protocol on mutual support (1982) (ECOMOG). Citizens are keeping an eye out for any indications that the ECOWAS engagement in Liberia as a ceasefire monitoring group is having the desired effect, given the current circumstances. Peace and security in the ECOWAS area were at stake, despite the fact that Liberia had not been attacked. ECOWAS intervened in the civil war in Liberia through ECOMOG because of safety concerns for the rest of West Africa.

Peacemaking

It is a process that tries to bring parties in a political conflict together by negotiating, mediating, or arbitrating their differences, especially at the elite or leadership level. Most of the time, it's hard to reach an agreement in a negotiation because people have different ideas, but negotiations usually lead to other options. Then, mediation becomes another way to find a solution, especially when conflicts have spread to other areas and need to be handled by third parties until a solution is found (Sarigiannidis, 2007). Peacemaking is a way to make people stop fighting. Even though a conflict can be solved by direct talks between the two sides, it would be even better if a neutral third party, in this case, a mediator, could help with the process or clear up any misunderstandings between the two sides and get them to work faster so that peace can be reached quickly. In the Liberia Civil War case, the people involved in the fight were brought together to try to find a peaceful solution. In this case, it's possible to get the most respected people from both sides to work together. This is done by putting forward a third party as a mediator in the conflict. In this case, the

Women of Liberia's Mass Action for Peace are the third party that started the peace talks during the Second Liberian Civil War. But outsiders don't have the right to make or change the decisions that are made. Third parties, like President Charles Taylor, MODEL, and LURD, only get involved if the negotiations between the warring parties get heated.

Peacebuilding

Because it encourages candid conversation between warring parties, peacebuilding is an efficient means of resolving conflicts and preventing their recurrence. Peace can be made and disputes settled through peacemaking, which is the simple act of doing so, at any moment before violence is utilized. The primary objectives of peacebuilding include conflict prevention, early threat assessment, and the creation of sustainable peacekeeping mechanisms. To achieve lasting peace, it is necessary to overcome differences of other types, including those of race, ethnicity, religion, class, and nationality. It is a nonviolent movement that aims to eradicate all forms of injustice and transform the conditions that foster violent conflict (Ryan, 2013).

After a war, communities may reconcile and heal only if they work together to avoid future hostilities. Strategists for peace work in tandem with regional institutions and governments to evaluate the destruction caused by fighting, identify potential resistant parties, and devise strategies for their eventual defeat. In the wake of World War II, the United States and Europe made reestablishing peace a primary priority. In the aftermath of World War II, several European countries had to start from scratch in terms of economic development and infrastructural construction. Officials from fifty countries convened in 1945 to create the United Nations Charter in an effort to prevent another global war. Most of the United Nations' 13 Cold War-era peacekeeping deployments were dispatched to and sub-Saharan Africa. World peacekeeping forces could only use force in self-defense (Akabogu, 1993). With the end of the Cold War, the organization that had been trying to restore peace shifted its attention to other, more difficult forms of political and social turmoil. The United Nations started sending in aid groups and civilians to help mediate peace talks between the warring sides. As long as peace talks are threatened by aggressors, the military is still there to protect people. Because of ECOMOG's involvement, notably in the peacebuilding process in Liberia,

the Liberian Armed Forces and other competing factions were essentially restricted to barracks for the duration of the conflict (Watch, 1993). The INPFL was kept in barracks while Charles Taylor's NPFL attacked government and ECOMOG facilities. When peace was finally restored in Liberia in October 1990, human rights groups from all over the world flocked back to the country. In November, Johnson, leader of the INPFL, met with Liberian government officials, the AFL's chief of staff, and others for a summit to negotiate.

The negotiations led to a ceasefire agreement, and an interim government led by Amos Sawyer was established to carry out the terms of the accord under the name Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). The IGNU was able to consolidate control over most of Monrovia with the help of the government-backed paramilitary police force, the Black Berets, and the Environmental and Conservation Monitoring Organization (ECOMOG) (Watch, 1993). As a result of ECOWAS's participation, crimes against the ethnic Krahn were halted as well. Once an interim government was in place, ECOMOG's role was reduced to that of a police force. Army supporters of Charles Taylor have abandoned the capital city of Monrovia for the countryside. The NPFL saw this as further proof of ECOMOG's superiority.

This chapter concludes with a discussion of ECOWAS's origins, its peace and security agenda, and a survey of varying accounts of the organization's role in the Liberian crisis. It explains why ECOMOG was sent to Liberia to keep the peace. This section also shed light on the theoretical underpinnings of the study, disclosing that the theory of conflict resolution was used. Three processes important to the idea of conflict resolution are discussed by the researcher: peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding which are relevant to this thesis which help give us understanding about the process of conflict resolution. The three processes of conflict resolution that are discussed in this thesis also give insights on how ECOWAS member states improve the peace process in Liberia by serving as the mediating arm between the fighting forces and transforming the security sector of Liberia after the conflict.

CHAPTER III
The Role of ECOWAS in Liberia

How ECOWAS Intervened in the Liberian Crisis

It is common knowledge that the member states of the Economic Community of West African States saw an urgent need to form the organization in order to fortify their economic links with one another (ECOWAS). Those in Liberia have known for a long time that they needed a government that would get out of the way of their progress toward freedom. The Economic Community of West African States intervened in Liberia after the United States and other international actors (including the U.N.) failed to prevent killings and other crimes. The Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was established at the 13th ECOWAS summit in May 1990 in response to the Liberian civil war. Thousands of structures were destroyed on both sides, and hundreds of people, including foreigners, women, and children, were killed in Liberia before ECOWAS intervened to put an end to the conflict. All moral frameworks require you to avoid doing this. The ECOWAS leaders were concerned that the situation in Liberia could spread to other countries in the sub-region, posing a threat to the peace and security of Liberia and the West African area as a whole. Despite their longstanding alliance, the United States has been unable to aid Liberia in her current predicament. It seemed unthinkable that the United States would take any action against the Russian Federation during the height of the Cold War unless there was an imminent threat. The United States did not intervene when the crisis began. The U.S. told their citizens to leave rather than send in the troops (Sessay, 2002). Officials from the United States sent an impassioned plea to all sides of the dispute to protect American citizens. For the sake of appeasing the pride of a few sub-regional "superpowers," the ECOWAS decided to take on the difficult task of stabilizing Liberia once again. ECOWAS's thirteenth session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government took place from May 28– 30, 1990, in Banjul, The Gambia, presided over by Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso. This was the first-time summit diplomacy had been used to terminate a civil conflict. As a result of the conversation, a community mediation committee was formed to help with future conflicts. The Gambia (as the authority's head) presided over a committee that included Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo. To a large extent, they acted as a go- between. Every elected official will have

a three-year term. The committee's use of force was neither requested nor authorized. Following the ECOWAS leaders' summit in Banjul, Liberia's warring factions and other interested parties convened. The warring factions refused to stop fighting, and the leaders of each faction made it clear that they would only agree to a compromise if it boosted their chances of being elected president of Liberia; therefore, the talks and meetings failed to produce the desired results. The inaugural meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee was held on August 7 in Banjul, Gambia. There were observers from Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Mali, and Togo, as well as members from the Organization of African Unity and the Liberia Inter-Faith Mediation Committee. After much debate, the committee reached consensus on four key conclusions regarding Liberia. An immediate ceasefire was demanded by the committee on behalf of the authority of heads of state and government, as well as the surrender of all weapons and ammunition to the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the cessation of all imports of weapons and war materials, the release of all political prisoners and prisoners of war, and full cooperation with ECOMOG. The ruling further stated that the monitoring group will consist of military personnel from countries represented on the Standing Mediation Committee. The only countries not represented were Guinea and Sierra Leone, neither of which is a committee member. It is now past the time for the ECOMOG mission to launch. A conference of all political parties and other groups having an interest in Liberia was also resolved to be organized with the help of the committee in order to build a representative interim government. The Liberian administration was meant to be in charge until free and fair elections could be held with the assistance of an ECOWAS Elections Observer Group. Disaster relief efforts were anticipated to cost around $150 million.

As a result, ECOWAS issued an appeal to other nations, specifically the United Nations Security Council, to support its humanitarian and political initiatives in Liberia. The Liberian people and international peace and security gained from this move. The committee deliberated for a long time and then issued a statement defending its decision by citing humanitarian concerns. There was also talk that the government of Liberia was incompetent and that the populace was being kept hostage by rival groups who were withholding food, healthcare, and other essentials. The ECOWAS delegation from the NPFL voiced their opposition to the decision. After the Standing Mediation Committee meeting concluded, the Nigerian delegation notified the UN Secretary-General. In their report, the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group

(ECOMOG) emphasized the importance of restoring democratic institutions in Liberia and rescuing civilians. The Economic Community of West African States has no intention of favoring other member states over others. Within and outside of the sub-region, as well as among the warring factions in Liberia, opinions on ECOWAS's involvement in the conflict are divided. The Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL) of Prince Yeduo Johnson and the Armed Forces of Liberia of Samuel Doe have both expressed gratitude to the Mediation Committee and pledged their full cooperation moving forward (AFL). Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) fought against the committee's choice. A number of ECOWAS countries have voiced reservations about the peace plan put forth by the organization's Standing Mediation Committee for Liberia. Burkina Faso's president, Blaise Campore, notified ECOWAS's Dauda Jawara that his country did not support the peace plan, especially the peacekeeping operation, and that the Standing Mediation Committee lacked power over issues within ECOWAS. Despite its opposition to sending peacekeepers to Liberia, Togo was still invited to participate on the panel. It chose to wait to send forces to ECOMOG until the mission was accepted by all three Liberian factions. Other French-speaking countries had similar reservations and rejected the peacekeeping mission.

The events in Liberia had far-reaching consequences for the ECOWAS bloc and its member states, prompting the group to act. Several ECOWAS countries expressed early worries about the situation in Liberia. At first, all the ECOWAS leaders did was express shock and horror at what was happening in Liberia, and they urged both sides to put an end to the violence and respect the rights of civilians and soldiers alike under international law. No one has agreed to mediation yet, and it's been nine months since the dispute began. Either ECOWAS could sit back and watch the bloodshed continue, or it might intervene to ensure that peace and security were restored in Liberia.

The Bamako Accord

About three months after the deadly intervention by ECOMOG in Liberia, on November 28, 1990, the Authority of ECOWAS held an emergency session in Bamako, Mali. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni, who chairs the African Union (AU), convened a conference of all the warring parties. During negotiations for a peace

plan, ECOWAS came to the following agreements and conclusions:

1. The SMC's initial rulings, issued on August 6–7, 1990, were unanimously sustained.

2. The ECOWAS peace plan for Liberia and the rest of West Africa was also accepted.

3. Both the community and the IGNU agree that ECOMOG should be recognized as a legal entity.

4. The Liberian armed forces, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia issued a joint declaration calling for an end to hostilities and for negotiations to resolve the crisis peacefully (INPFL).

Within a year after the agreement's signature, ECOWAS and ECOMOG will oversee general elections. The SMC had scheduled a meeting for December 20th, 1990, in Banjul, The Gambia, to discuss implementing the terms of the agreement.

The SMC December 1990 Banjul Meeting

Since the NPFL had previously said that it would no longer adhere to the Bamako Accord due to the formation of an imported administration, the session of the SMC convened in Banjul was fruitless. Since Gambian troops were already in Banjul aiding ECOMOG, the NPFL claimed the city was not neutral. Due to the NPFL's absence, it was decided that another all-Liberian conference would be held within the following sixty days to discuss temporary governance.

The Lomé Agreement, signed in February 1991

At a meeting of the Security Council on January 22, 1991, Ivory Coast, a significant francophone country, requested discussion of the Bamako Ceasefire Agreement and its continued observance. The two parties had signed the pact on November 28. Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo came up with the third accord (the Lomé Plan) during the SMC's fifth session, held in Lomé, Togo, from February 12–15, 1991. The ECOMOG welcome centers, safe zones, and the eventual breakup of the warring parties were all part of the Lomé plan. The objective was to ease the transition back into civilian life for the demobilized soldiers.

Bamako's ceasefire offers fell through in large part because the NPFL refused

to back down from its objection to the Lomé Accord's ECOMOG deployment into Mali's interior. The All-Liberia Conference spent five weeks debating the ECOWAS Peace Plan and forming a broad-based interim administration, but on April 20, 1991, they failed. Nonetheless, in May 1991, the Interim Administration established the Interim Legislative Assembly (ILA) to allow for a sharing of authority among the various factions.

The Yamoussoukro Accords

As a result of Ivorian requests for UN intervention in January 1991, a number of meetings were held in Yamoussoukro between June and October of that year. The sessions were spearheaded by US Representative Mervyn Dymlly, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on Africa, with support from Ivory Coast as well. Participating nations and organizations included the IGNU, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Nigeria, and Togo. The first agreement was reached on June 30, and it guaranteed the continuity of government and the status quo in terms of security until after the elections. The second agreement postponed the elections until January 1992 and recognized former President Carter's commitment to assist with election organization; it was signed on July 30, 1992. Finally, an agreement was reached between the Interim Government and the NPFL on September 17th to set up an Elections Commission and a Supreme Court. The parties to the fourth agreement inked on October 30 were to return home, get rehabilitation, and participate in nationwide elections after 60 days of camping out under ECOMOG's oversight. ECOMOG's mandate included not only securing the land and sea ports but also the border with Sierra Leone, which necessitated the creation of a buffer zone. As required by the Yamoussoukro Accords, both the Elections Commission and the Supreme Court took their oaths of office in January and March 1992. On the other hand, with help from Senegal, ECOMOG has expanded its operations across the country in an effort to disarm and camp out the insurgents. Six Senegalese troops were killed during the ten hours of battle between ECOMOG and the NPFL. Two Nigerian soldiers were killed and others were kidnapped as a result of NPFL attacks. After President Carter intervened, hostages were freed, and ECOMOG members were permitted to leave the area controlled by the NPFL without incident. Liberia suffered yet another setback when the NPFL began Operation Octopus against the city of Monrovia on October

15th, 1992. It was September of 1992, and shipment number 28 of weapons and military hardware had just arrived. This shipment included four tanks, twenty APCs, tons of artillery, anti-tank missiles, and a variety of small guns. After the murder of five American nuns and four of their local charity workers at the hands of the NPFL in 1992, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 788, which placed a complete ban on the delivery of weapons and military equipment to Liberia. A United Nations resolution reaffirmed its support for the Yamoussoukro Accord after Trevor Gordon-Somers was appointed Special Representative to the Secretary General for Liberia on November 20, 1992. Like Clinton, Liberians who fled the state due to civil instability were granted temporary protected status by the United States. Due to President William Clinton's support for the sub-regional force on January 14, 1993, this occurred.

ECOMOG launched a counterattack, resulting in the capture of 700 NPFL rebels and the evacuation of 40,000 civilians. More than a hundred young men, aged nine to thirteen, from Small Boy Unit (SBU) 9 also capitulated during the ECOMOG counteroffensive. United Nations Security Council Resolution 813 reaffirmed the validity of the Yamoussoukro (I-IV) Accords and the UNSC's backing of ECOWAS, while Britain hastily dispatched medical and material aid to the region to bolster ECOMOG's operations. The Cotonou Accord (signed on July 25, 1993) and Geneva Agreement (signed on August 24, 1993) were reached after ECOMOG defeated a counteroffensive by Taylor's soldiers (signed on July 17, 1993). Both treaties called for a truce to take effect on August 1, 1993, a period of transitional governance, and amnesty for all parties involved. To this end, on August 14–17, 2018, in Cotonou, Liberia's National Transition Government (LNTG), led by ILA Speaker Bimarck Kuyon, was formed.

Intervention by the United Nations (1993–1994)

Between August 10th, 1993, and January 10th, 1994, 300 United Nations military observers were stationed in Liberia as part of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) to aid in crisis intervention. It was Kenyan Major General D. Opande who headed the mission. The United States donated $19.83 million to the Liberian Trust Fund that the UN Secretary General established in September to fund the ECOMOG. As of January 1994, battalions from Tanzania and Uganda had been

recruited by ECOMOG to aid in disarming the warring parties. On March 7, 1994, ECOMOG and UNOMIL deployed to 27 team sites to begin disarming Liberia. There was a total of 3,192 militants whose weapons were taken during the operation. New violence broke out amongst the groups even as they were supposed to be disarming, and they threatened to leave Tanzania and Ghana as a result. The departure was put on hold, however, when Ghana assumed leadership of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The Akosombo Accord, signed in September 1994

In August 1994, when Ghana was ECOWAS Chair, President Kwame Nkrumah named Victor Gbeho as Special Assistant to the Chair (SA). The SA quickly put plans into motion that ultimately led to the Akosombo Accord being signed. By signing the Akosombo Accord, the parties agreed to prolong the LNTG's mandate until October 1995 and to reach an agreement on the status of the various military forces in the region (SOFA). Despite efforts to improve security, the situation remained precarious, with 200,000 people being forced from their homes and 43 UNOMIL observers and six NGOs being used as human shields by the NPFL at nine different sites. Even though the 30 were eventually set free, Tanzania eventually pulled out of peace operations, and UNOMIL cut its staff and closed all sites outside of Monrovia.

The Peace Process in Abuja

Since the talks in Accra had stalled, the parties continued their talks in Abuja, where they signed the Abuja Accord on August 19, 1995. Elections were scheduled for August 20, 1996, and before that, on January 30, 1996, disarmament and demobilization were to be completed, followed by repatriation and resettlement. As part of the Accord that was signed on August 26, 1995, these problems were overcome. According to the terms of the agreement, ECOMOG was entrusted with monitoring the border in order to stop the infiltration of weapons, the arming of hostile groups, and the exploitation of vulnerable populations such as refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Confidence patrols aimed to ensure safe and fair elections. So, in September 1995, they started the "Collective Presidency" and formed the Ceasefire Violations and Disarmament Committees. Monrovia, April 6, saw the deadliest episode involving

faction battles and truce violations in weeks. To make matters more amusing, ECOMOG and UNOMIL disagreed on the best way to verify the NPFL's unilateral disarmament. Because of the NPFL's antagonism, UNOMIL was deployed without the aid of ECOMOG. There have been 88 UNOMIL military observers who have relocated to Freetown and Dakar since then.

When ECOWAS met in Accra, Ghana, from May 8–9, 1996, they warned to reevaluate their role in the Liberian problem if the factional leaders did not withdraw their fighters and weapons from Monrovia and return the weapons and equipment stolen from UNOMIL by ECOMOG (the 14th attempt to resolve the conflict). Other militants disarmed and fled to Grand Cape Mount County after the second ceasefire agreement was signed on May 26, 1996. The United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) reached a ceasefire and buffer zone agreement in the month of October.

Disarmament and demobilization work continued in 15 places, including Monrovia, after the factions withdrew from the capital on November 22, 1996. A total of 20,332 combatants, including 4,336 minors and 250 adults, were disarmed by the end of February 1997. The parties to the conflict were able to reach an agreement and disarm, paving the way for the next elections to be held in accordance with the Abuja Accord. Over 4,000 of the UN's 10,000 new weapons are operational (Hayner, 2007).

Effects of the Crisis in West Africa

There is no doubt that the crisis in Liberia had, and still has, huge effects on West Africa. This will be looked at in terms of its broad effects, both forward and backward. (A) how the crisis in Liberia is affecting the country over time. The Liberian crisis brought back the sense of brotherhood and the need for Africans to look out for each other. These are values that have always been important in Africa, but colonialism and capitalist values have made them less important. So, in the spirit of African brotherhood, the leaders of West Africa got together to find a way to stop the killing in Liberia. This new "discovery" and reawakening must never get weaker; it must, against all odds, get stronger from now on. The search for peace in Liberia brought people together, which will lead to more good things in West Africa and Africa as a whole, especially on the economic front. Again, what West African countries learned from the ECOMOG operations will be used as a model for how to solve conflicts in the future, not just in West Africa or Africa, but in other parts of the world as well.

Prince Johnson's INPFL men killed President Doe in a brutal way. This should be a lesson for rulers who want to stay in power by rigging elections, wasting public money, breaking people's rights, and putting pressure on the people (Galadima, 2006). It will be remembered that in 1985, Doe held elections that turned him from a military president to a civilian president. Not only that, but when the crisis in Liberia was about to get out of hand, ECOWAS leaders told him to step down and make way for an interim government as a way to end the crisis peacefully. At first, Doe agreed, but in August 1990, he changed his mind, which surprised and shocked ECOWAS and other world leaders. Again, Liberians will and must come out of the crisis wiser and better prepared to live together, love each other, make sure everyone gets fair and equal treatment, and make sure that good leaders always run the country. "Government is not an experiment, as other Liberians think. It is a scientific operation that can only be done by people with the right skills and knowledge" (Prince Y. Johnson).

The crisis in Liberia has caused things to go backwards. War is destructive by its very nature, so it usually leads to worse or more backward results than good ones. The Liberian crisis is no exception to this rule. It has had more negative effects on the West African sub-region than positive ones, which is analyzed here in terms of political, economic, and social groups. On the political side, the crisis caused a lot of stress and worry in West Africa because innocent people were killed, especially foreigners in Liberia. Not only that, but there was a lot of fear in West Africa that the crisis might bring in the superpowers and big powers, who might come to the area to play their usual selfish games and test out their new weapons systems. Due to the work the leaders of ECOWAS did at home and the fall of the Russian Federation, these effects did not happen. Also, the crisis spread to other countries, which led ECOWAS member countries to send troops to Liberia to keep the peace. For example, questions were asked about how much was spent on ECOMOG, how long it took to get involved, and how the fact that the crisis has spread to other countries has made the war last longer.

The most important political effect of the crisis was that it temporarily made the economy less stable. The way ECOMOG was set up when it was sent out and its first members almost tore ECOWAS apart. The problem ran along the divide between Anglophones and Francophones in the community. ECOMOG became a source of controversy because of mistrust, anger, jealousy, and a sense of being ignored by

leaders in the community. Francophone countries backed Charles Taylor's NPFL, so they thought that ECOWAS shouldn't go into Liberia. Three months after ECOMOG went to Liberia, things really started to go wrong. For example, in October 1990, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire called a meeting of ECOWAS leaders at Yamoussoukro to try to solve the Liberian crisis.

Most of the leaders of Francophone countries were ready to go, but leaders of Anglophone countries, like Gambia's Dawda Jawara and Nigeria's Babangida, didn't show up to the October 15, 1990, summit. So, on October 14, the meeting was canceled. The Anglophone leaders not only didn't care about the attempt to hold the meeting, but they also said it was wrong because it wasn't set up through the office of the ECOWAS AS Chairman. In late November 1990, ECOWAS Chairman Sir Dawda Jawara talked about how countries like Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso didn't agree with the role of ECOMOG in Liberia. This showed that there were problems between the member states of ECOWAS. ECOWAS, on the other hand, was able to deal with these problems because compromise, maturity, and talks led to consensus-building. Everyone agreed that the crisis had to end and that more lives and property had to be saved. The economic effects of the crisis on West Africa will mostly be seen in the destruction of foreign investments in Liberia, the slowing of development in Liberia, and the use of development resources from other West African states to pay for ECOMOG and keep the peace in Liberia. Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Gambia have taken a lot of money that would have been used for domestic needs and put it toward keeping the peace in Liberia. It is only to be hoped that Liberians and the rest of the world will remember the sacrifices made by the people of these West African countries and other countries that helped bring peace to the war-torn country (Khobe, 2000). On the social front, it is important to note that thousands of people, including people from other West African countries, have died in Liberia. Liberian refugees are still causing problems in several West African countries. These problems include giving them food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and jobs, as well as keeping things from getting worse, like at the Oru-Ijebu Refugee Camp in Nigeria's Ogun State. The effects of the Liberian crisis on West Africa show that countries should make sure to stop problems that could lead to crises before they get so bad that a lot of money and lives have to be spent to fix them. Taking a look at how ECOWAS leaders put pressure on Samuel Doe early on, especially to stop him from rigging

himself into power in 1985, it is assumed and thought that the Liberian crisis would not have gotten so bad that he had to make the ultimate sacrifice, which led to sending a peace force to the country and taking money that was meant for development and putting it toward making war and keeping peace. African leaders are told to give democracy a chance to grow and to democratize their societies.

Rulers and leaders should avoid policies and actions that will make their people suffer and hurt like Liberians did under Samuel Doe's rule. It is also important to warn that foreigners should never be treated inhumanely and cruelly like President Doe's forces and the rebel forces did in Liberia, no matter how bad the conflict between groups in a country is (Nwolise, 1992). Last but not least, it is hoped that political leaders in Africa will learn from President Samuel Doe's bad, bitter, and sad experience. If Doe had left office after the general election in 1985 instead of staying in office as a civilian president, things would not have gotten worse, leading to a war at the end, and he would have been a hero. Instead, he tasted the biological transition to the great beyond.

CHAPTER IV

Results and Discussion

In this section, the outcomes from the research are presented, and the perspective of peacekeeping in Liberia is examined in relation to the operation of ECOMOG, a sub-regional peacekeeping outfit meant to reinforce peace in Liberia. This research was necessary because of the potential threat to regional security posed by the Liberian conflict within the West Africa sub-region. Without concerted action to control it, the ECOWAS sub-regional body saw the potential for the conflict's repercussions to spread to other states in the subregion, especially to states bordering Liberia. It explains the difficulties encountered by ECOWAS in intervening in the Liberian conflict and discusses the role of Nigeria in the peacekeeping process. ECOWAS faces challenges in its efforts to bring an end to the crisis in Liberia, including a lack of resources and a lack of political will. There's also a brief summary of ECOWAS's accomplishments.

Major findings of the study

American-Liberians, who were deported to Liberia in 1821 as a resettlement destination for Afro-American slaves following the abolition of slavery in the United States, have dominated Liberian politics and have a tense relationship with the indigenous Liberians, who make up the vast majority of the country. The April 12, 1980, coup orchestrated by the late Sergeant Samuel Doe, a member of Liberia's ethnic majority, escalated the country's racial warfare. Keeping things as they were won't help the United States win this battle. ECOWAS had to try to find a solution because of how big the problem was and how easily it may spread to other parts of West Africa, especially to states that border Liberia. Although the ECOMOG mission to Liberia began with the best of intentions and with the backing of the sub-regional organization ECOWAS, it has subsequently encountered a number of challenges. Other of the problems ECOMOG has encountered include:

ECOWAS member nations did not meet their commitment to pay the organization's peacekeeping operations at a sufficient level. Once Nigeria committed to covering the operation's expenses, progress was made. Logistical complications arose since the forces that contributed to the sub-regional peace organization had

varying degrees of colonial inclination. Once again, the operations of the forces were badly affected by the aid offered to the rebel forces and other competing interests in the Liberia conflict, as well as by the language and cultural barriers that arose as a result of the colonial experience. Military operations in Liberia were hampered by a number of factors, including the fact that ECOMOG personnel came from a number of different West African governments, each of which had its own unique colonial history (Anglophone vs. Francophone West Africa).

The Assessment of ECOMOG Peacekeeping Operations in Liberia

The transition from OAU peacekeeping missions to ECOMOG was a major strategic shift for Chad. The situation on the ground necessitating ECOMOG's response meant that the military was tasked with performing a role far different from that of a peacekeeper. In July 1990, ECOWAS dispatched the West African Force (ECOMOG) to Liberia to maintain calm and "negotiate peace" among the numerous factions fighting there. Domestic wars, on the other hand, are not as simple or predictable as foreign ones when it comes to maintaining stability, as became abundantly obvious upon closer study. No peace can be preserved in Liberia since the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rejected the ECOWAS peace plan (Kabia, 2011). Numerous insurgent groups poured a lot of resources into spreading misinformation about the ECOMOG forces in the media in an effort to win over the international community to their cause. It's true that government troops persisted in committing crimes, with officials justifying their actions by arguing that the country hadn't ratified the relevant international rules. Despite the ECOMOG's best defensive efforts, the NPFL continued to launch relentless attacks. In Liberia, aid organizations struggled to accomplish their work because they couldn't rely on the NPFL, on whose goodwill they relied mainly for security. Because of the widespread condemnation of ECOMOG and the prolonged suffering of the Liberians, the peacekeeping mandate of the unit was quietly changed to that of enforcement. After being given the green light to use "limited enforcement action," a portion of ECOMOG was able to push out its rivals from Liberia's capital, Monrovia.

By adopting this tactic, they were able to cut down on casualties during operations and effectively counter any attacks that came their way. This tactic has been utilized in addition to laying the groundwork for civil conversation. ECOMOG's

effective enforcement activity led to the first comprehensive cease-fire in November 1990. After the operation to enforce the law was completed, ECOMOG took over security duties in Monrovia, including monitoring the port, the airport, and other public spaces. In doing so, the special nature of the ECOMOG mission would be exposed. Following the initial ceasefire in November 1990, the fighting factions created a series of accords that were regularly breached as new factions emerged.

The NPFL launched a bloody attack on ECOMOG in Monrovia in October 1992 during an operation codenamed "Octopus," which ECOMOG had been tasked with preventing. ECOMOG, West Africa's multinational army, has resumed peace enforcement efforts to ensure that the rebel group does not attack Monrovia at any time. When the Cotonou Accord was signed in July 1993, enforcement efforts in response to octopus were halted. The United Nations established the Observer Mission in Liberia to support the efforts of ECOMOG to maintain calm in the country UNOMIL. As ECOMOG was already committed to its enforcement mission, all it could do in response was put on a show of force, which had no effect on the intransigent rebels. The April 1990 Monrovia violence, which followed, destroyed any chance of peace and stability in Liberia. ECOWAS funded multiple peacekeeping deployments to Liberia between the beginning of the civil conflict in 1989 and 1994. The major players in the Liberian conflict were not represented in the government in Monrovia until the signing of the Abuja Agreement in August 1994. Elections were supposed to be held without interference and according to plan. On August 12, 1996, the transitional government's mandate formally came to an end. On April 6, 1996, just a few months after holding free and fair elections, Monrovia lost its position as a safe haven. The Abuja peace proposal of 1995 was largely approved after the NPFL-led attack against Monrovia and ECOMOG. In July 1997, following the signing of a ceasefire, elections were held. After the military was disbanded, credible elections were held with the support of the majority of Liberians and the international community. On August 2, 1997, the democratically elected administration of Charles Taylor took office, capping off more than seven years of regional cooperation to reconstruct Liberia. The Nigerian government was a driving factor behind ECOMOG's mission in Liberia, and any account of the organization's activities there must inevitably include the country's leadership. Effectiveness has made ECOMOG a model for peacekeeping operations in the region, leading others to propose permanently

stationing ECOMOG there to avert similar calamities.

Difficulties faced by ECOMOG

Given the state of affairs in Liberia, it was clear from the start that the ECOMOG operation wouldn't be a stroll in the park. Unlike in Bosnia, where ethnicity initially played a far smaller part in the conflict, here ethnicity swiftly became increasingly split along fighting lines as political elites leveraged ethnic tensions to achieve their own goals. Because of this "zero-sum" way of thinking, discussions have been more contentious than they otherwise would have been; for instance, ceasefires have been used strategically to buy time for reinforcements and supplies. Battle lines were drawn as Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia confronted Doe's government, backed by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) (NPFL). It's clear that Krahn was the finest player in the AFL, while Gio and Mano were the best in the NPFL. As the conflict continued, previously united groups fractured and new ones emerged, often with assistance from foreign sources. There were also other groups that broke away from the NPFL, including the Central Revolutionary Council and the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The United Movement for Democracy and Liberation in Liberia was established in 1991, but soon afterward it began to fracture into groups supported by various tribes. Both the Krahn and the Mandingo tribes voted for Roosevelt Johnston's ULIMO-J, but the Krahn were more enthusiastic under Alhaji Kromah. By 1995, there were at least eight separate settlements and potentially other factors. Militias broke up as warfare carried on, creating new difficulties. A lack of leadership in Bosnia allowed "localism" among militias and warlords with narrow self-interests to rise to power. Similar to past wars, this one was fueled in large part by rival factions fighting over control of valuable resources like diamond mines and rubber plantations. Because of this, no all- encompassing political plan could be created. As racial tensions rose and the notion of militia organizations spread, it became more difficult to disarm and demobilize the population.

Because arms and troops were the source of faction power in Liberia, any agreements on the handover of weapons and so on required the participation of all factions, no matter how minor a problem also experienced in Somalia. Since the Lofa Defense Force which backed Taylor and the Bong Defense Front which backed Kromah had different opinions on such issues, they did not sign the Cotonou

Agreement of 1993. The Liberian Peace Council, which helped the NPFL in secret while staying independent, was also not involved. As a result of the ongoing civil conflict in neighboring Sierra Leone, ULIMO also faced competition from rival groups based in Sierra Leone for access to Liberian territory and resources. The composition of the militia didn't help matters either. Over a quarter of the armed forces were underage, and others had a hard time adjusting to civilian life as the war wore on. This is exemplified by the conflict between the Krahn factions of Roosevelt Johnson's ULIMO-J and George Boley's LPC. It brought in something from the outside to complicate matters further. Due to the ever-changing nature of the battlefield, ECOMOG found it difficult to maintain a consistent strategy, and the idea of mission creep gained traction.

The question is: Has ECOMOG been successful? may appear to be of little practical importance at first glance. Now that hostilities have ceased, others who defended what has been dubbed the "ECOMOG miracle" may feel that their detractors, who portrayed the operation as a cover for unjustified bloodshed and criminality, were missing the point. In contrast, ECOMOG is not exactly a model peacekeeping organization. Due to its flawed objectives, methods, and outcomes, the ECOMOG operation cannot form the basis for building Africa's future intervention capabilities. One issue was that it was unclear what ECOMOG was trying to accomplish. The Commander of the ECOMOG Force was responsible for establishing a truce and creating an environment conducive to free and fair elections in Liberia (Weller, 1990). For instance, less than a month into his deployment, Force Commander Arnold Quainoo was met with a massive NPFL onslaught. When it came to describing when and where force would be utilized, the operation's orders were often hazy (Alao, 1994). In light of the current military situation, it is clear that my forces cannot sit back and passively "wait" for a ceasefire to be declared on their own; instead, they must launch a limited offensive to protect their positions and impose one. Later, the president of Nigeria reportedly declared, "ECOMOG is a peace force," as cited by ECOMOG Force was responsible for establishing a truce and creating an environment conducive to free and fair elections in Liberia (Weller, 1990). For instance, less than a month into his deployment, Force Commander Arnold Quainoo was met with a massive NPFL onslaught. When it came to describing when and where force would be utilized, the operation's orders were often hazy (Alao, 1994). In light of the current military

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If ECOMOG had more money, it could have done a better job of achieving its objectives. The ambitious peace-making program was never implemented because ECOMOG was unable to inflict a defeat that would have lasting political benefits. This is because they could never have held their position with such a puny force (just 3,000 soldiers). The substantial investment made by Nigeria was important in the operation's inception and propelled the country to the top. For Nigeria to have complete control over Liberia, ECOMOG would have needed to increase its strength to 15,000 at a cost of $135 million.

Despite costing what NATO spends in a few days in Bosnia, as one ECOMOG commander put it, ECOWAS still refused to foot the bill. In March 1991, not enough troops were stationed at the border to seal it, allowing the NPFL to continue receiving funding and supplies from across the border in Sierra Leone. While there was a sufficient manpower pool, there were significant issues with both communication and transportation, particularly involving helicopters.

The ECOMOG Deployment

While the study will touch on other aspects of Liberia's violent past, it is not meant to be exhaustive. To put it succinctly, Charles Taylor led NPFL rebels across the border from Cote d'Ivoire into Liberia in December 1989 to overthrow the government of President Samuel Doe. As the rest of the world turned a blind eye to the carnage, ECOWAS formed a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) to mediate a settlement. Due to diplomatic deadlock, the SMC began sending a military monitoring mission to Liberia on August 7th, 1990. (ECOMOG).

ECOMOG was deployed after a ceasefire was declared to check on the implementation of disarmament, the cessation of weapon imports, and the release of hostages. 3,000 West African soldiers arrived in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, on August 24, 1990, as part of the ECOMOG mission. Assist the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee in keeping an eye on Liberian land to check if the parties are keeping to the terms of the ceasefire (Nnamdi, 1992).

The force was supposed to leave after six months, but they stayed until the end of 1999 and even expanded their operations into neighboring Sierra Leone. Over time, other African nations joined the initiative, but Nigeria remained at the forefront.

Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, Mali, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Tanzania, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sierra Leone were just some of the African countries that took part. As an example, in February 1995, the force had 8,430 people, of whom 4,908 were Nigerians, 1,028 were Ghanaians, 609 were Guineans, 747 were Tanzanians, 760 were Ugandans, 359 were Sierra Leoneans, and 10 were Gambians or Malians, who made up 10 of the battalions.

The peak size of the force was around 16,000 in 1993, but by the beginning of 1997, that number had dropped to under 11,000. ECOMOG protected the safety of aid convoys, disarmed militants, recruited soldiers, mediated conflicts, and maintained calm during its deployment. Although ECOMOG's official peacekeeping presence ended in February 1998, a group of 5,000 stayed deployed beyond this in a "capacity-building" role, helping to train the new Liberian security forces and maintain order. Because of Liberian government abuse, more ECOMOG volunteers left in January 1999.

Intent of ECOMOG Mission

Even before it was revealed, ECOMOG was controversial because of its weak arguments for action. The ECOWAS Defense Protocol from 1981 indicated that the organization was bound to intervene in such a circumstance. The report notes that the state's leader may seek public backing. When a member state is experiencing an armed conflict that is being actively engineered and supported from outside the state, compromising the security and peace of the entire community, ECOWAS has the authority to intervene collectively in accordance with Article 4 of the Protocol. Article 6(3) and Article 17 provide the authority to decide whether or not military action is necessary, to send in peacekeepers to mediate between the warring parties, and to deploy peacekeeping forces. To add, Article 13(1, 2) states that AAFC can be established from designated units. Doe did make a help request, but she mailed it to Nigeria rather than ECOWAS. Nigeria notified ECOWAS about the problem so that the regional organization might offer its opinion. The situation was stated to imperil the security and peace of the entire community, although there are no clear guidelines

for assessing when a problem merits the use of force. Liberia's position did not sway other Francophone countries, like Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea, which were either neutral toward or actively supported the NPFL due to a difference in political interpretation. It is hard to ignore the irony of states like Nigeria giving ECOMOG the purpose of "Setting the essential conditions for free and fair elections" in 1990, when humanitarian considerations do not constitute a legal cause for involvement. ECOMOG also lacked international legitimacy because the UN did not officially approve its engagement. In October 1992, the United Nations eventually responded politically, sanctioning ECOMOG's actions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

Hitches of the ECOMOG mission

The overall performance was exceptional, but it was not without its share of problems. The unique state creation in the region has exacerbated these problems, as has the ensuing ideological split. Because of this, the initial step was taken to quell the Liberian uprising, and the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was instrumental in bringing the competing groups to the negotiating table to work out their issues. The saddest thing is that no one seemed willing to follow through on previously agreed-upon commitments. One of these organizations, in its most extreme form, kidnapped and murdered President Samuel Doe because of this mentality. Currently, the crisis in Liberia has progressed to a new level. Sub-regional chiefs reassessed the situation and armed ECOMOG to keep the peace and prevent further conflict. It's also important to note that the warring factions eventually called a ceasefire when they realized they had no chance of beating the superior firepower of the ECOMOG army. Funding was a further problem. Any activity aimed at maintaining peace requires substantial financial resources. Most countries in the sub-region decided to leave Liberia to handle the matter on its own because they couldn't conceive how Liberia could fund such an institution, but Nigeria eventually stepped in as the hegemonic leader and bailed out the country. Nigeria has spent around $13 billion over the course of 12 years financing the operations of the ECOWAS monitoring agency, the Nigerian government recently informed us (ECOMOG). In order to maintain regional peace, security, and collaboration, Nigeria was willing to foot the bill for most of it (Badmus, 2009). In spite of Nigeria's contribution, the organization's funding was inadequate in light of the magnitude of the issue it was meant to tackle. The second problem was the lack of

consistency. In order to ensure the success of ECOMOG's peacekeeping mission, the organization needs a sufficient amount of time to train its members to collaborate effectively. Due to its pragmatic origins, ECOMOG has since strayed from its original mission to unite workers for the purpose of improving productivity. Numerous deaths occurred at the beginning of its journey as a result of this. The credibility of the peacekeeping mission was put in jeopardy when the Charles Taylor faction initially suspected ECOMOG of being biased in favor of Samuel Doe. After having to explain its commitment to neutrality, openness, and legitimacy to the various groups at odds, ECOMOG found it difficult to get everyone to sit down and talk peace. Also challenging for the ECOMOG were attacks from separate rebel groups. An excellent example of this is the "Octopus" operation conducted by the NPFL, in which they assaulted ECOMOG and Liberia. Attempts by ECOMOG to safeguard both themselves and Monrovia made this a difficult situation. It is critical to emphasize the importance of cultural and ethnic differences in causing widespread misunderstanding and misinterpretation. There is little reason for native Liberians to trust their new masters, given how long they have been under American control. On the other hand, members of the American-Liberia group don't like Liberians and would rather keep control within their own group.

Nigeria's Key Contributions to the Peace Process in Liberia: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

The most powerful country in the region, Nigeria, has taken on the role of peacekeeper and called for a regionally coordinated effort to restore quiet. Nigeria has also been a strong supporter of international peacekeeping efforts. It was time for Nigeria to show the world that good deeds are best done on one's own turf. Cote d'Ivoire said that ECOWAS's intervention would be illegal because of the country's status as a refugee shelter and neighbor to Liberia. Senegal did not have any problems with refugees, but it did agree with Côte d'Ivoire that the ECOWAS Treaty and the OAU Charter should be upheld. SMC members like Togo and Mali avoided the worst of the crisis.

Sadly, they still had too much fear to accept the offer to join the peacekeeping mission. Burkina Faso presented significant resistance since its government backed the NPFL rebels and its president was friendly with Taylor. While other countries in

West Africa debated the need for a regional peacekeeping force, Nigeria was ready and willing to go to Liberia. Nigerian financing, troops, military and political leadership, and equipment were all essential to the success of ECOMOG. In its role as "policeman" of the region, Nigeria hoped that tensions would ease. But there were other considerations that called for Nigerian involvement (Idike, 1993).

Protecting its inhabitants was Nigeria's main priority. An estimated 70, 000 Nigerians called Liberia home and were trapped in the crossfire (May, 1998). In April of 1990, they were attacked after rebels found out that the Nigerian government had supplied light assault guns and ammo to Doe supporters (Lindsey, 1997). At least a thousand Nigerian civilians who had taken sanctuary at their country's embassy were brutally slaughtered on August 8 by militants from the National People's Liberation Front (May, 1998). The Nigerian government has warned to act against the insurgents if any of its own citizens are hurt. Nigeria's commitment to act was strengthened by killings on diplomatic grounds. The Nigerian government feared that regional instability would harm the country's interests. One major worry was that Taylor's ascension to power in Liberia would make the country a safe refuge for individuals who opposed Nigeria's military regime. It is imperative that any regime in this country work tirelessly to prevent or avoid the worsening of any crisis that threatens to jeopardize or compromise the stability, prosperity, and security of the sub- region, as stated by General Ibrahim Babangida, the former military head of state of Nigeria, in a sub-region of 16 countries where one in three West Africans is Nigerian. In addition to Nigeria, Liberia's neighbors, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, were also threatened by the chaos. One of the threats to stability in the region was the increasing number of refugees. The high number of people who joined Taylor's army because they disagreed with their governments sparked concerns that the violence may return to the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, where it began. At a time when Nigeria was receiving increased scrutiny for human rights abuses and political persecution at home, it ensured that it would have supporters by assisting in preventing the collapse of the governments of the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone (Adibe, 1998).

Another ally was also keen on Nigeria's neutral stance. Liberia was a close, helpful English-speaking friend in a primarily French-speaking region, despite the fact that conflicts existed between the two countries. Doe was close with the former president of Nigeria, Ibrahim Babangida, and honored him by naming a university

building and a highway after him (May, 1998). With Liberia's foreign debt restructured thanks to Babangida's assistance, the country now has more money to invest in higher education (May, 1998). Nigeria's sway in the region would have been badly damaged without Liberia's help. The Pentagon is hesitant to share the real cost of keeping ECOMOG operational.

According to reports, several members of the ECOMOG force in Liberia are from Nigeria. Prior to the UN and OAU's involvement, Nigeria was responsible for funding the operation and assisting other West African countries in deploying their soldiers (Olukoshi, 1996). From the time of the first ECOMOG mission in Liberia in 1990 until today, it is believed that Nigeria has spent over $12 billion on peace operations. (Olonisakin, 1996) writes that Nigeria's then-president Olusegun Obasanjo disclosed in 2001 that his country had spent $13 billion on peacekeeping operations over a 12-year period. Nigeria now has its "largest financial load" due to the deaths of more than 800 Nigerian soldiers and the injuries of at least 1,000 more during operations in Sierra Leone (Olonisakin, 1996). Having been given the chance to expand ECOMOG to include troops from other African countries, Nigeria actually asked the UN to repay its Liberian expenses (Olonisakin, 1996).

Mali's interest in regional stability stemmed from more than its desire to limit Liberia's sway. It was in response to Nigeria's expanding influence that Mali joined ECOMOG. President Sani Abacha of Nigeria wanted even more power in ECOWAS than his predecessor, General Babangida. To become the chairman of West Africa's Economic Community of West African States, he exhausted every possible means. Mali's opportunity to lead ECOWAS was taken away after Konaré's administration sponsored a resolution condemning Nigeria for human rights abuses. Though Mali didn't contribute nearly as much as Nigeria, which sent hundreds, Mali's participation sent a clear message to Nigeria and the other ECOWAS members that the peacekeeping mission would be a regional endeavor regardless of who was in ECOMOG. The Mali-Nigeria wars have shown the chasm between French and English speakers and the French's desire to restrict Nigeria.

The international community's attitude toward the Liberian issue was significantly influenced by Nigeria's early engagement. Nigeria's early deployment was crucial to UNMIL's launch. UNMIL's deployment to Liberia would not have been possible without the groundwork established by Nigerian forces (African Leadership

Magazine 2016; Uba 2016). President Obasanjo's Nigeria enjoyed tremendous esteem in Liberia, as evidenced by the fact that both the ECOMIL and the UNMIL were led by Nigerians. The significant majority of UNMIL's total soldier strength of 14,824, which came from 49 different nations, was made up of Nigerian peacekeeping contingents (UNMIL 2015). According to Major General Salihu Zaway Uba, the commander of Nigeria's deployment to UNMIL, the country has "deployed 37 infantries battalions, 13 signal units, 21 constituted police units, several military observers, United Nations Police, United Nations volunteers, and international civilian personnel" (Uba 2016). Liberia's peace and quiet were greatly helped by peacekeepers from Nigeria. Since 2003, Nigerian peacekeepers have been stationed in Liberia, where they have provided executive protection for the president, vice president, and other high-ranking government officials, as well as other humanitarian and developmental aid, such as medical outreach, classroom support, and book donations to orphanages. They have also served as security for the city's main airport, an orphanage, a high-security prison, and a private escort business (Uba 2016). Also, Nigeria was instrumental in setting the stage for the elections that took place in Liberia after the civil war ended in 2005. There has been recent attention in academic literature and policy analyses to the topic of post-conflict elections. To begin the process of restoring stability after a conflict, it is generally agreed that elections should be held as soon as possible (Gambari, 1991; Kieh, 2011). Criticism was leveled at the Liberian election process, saying it lacked transparency and fairness. According to her, she was instrumental in setting the stage for the elections that took place in Liberia after the civil war ended in 2005. There has been recent attention in academic literature and policy analyses to the topic of post-conflict elections. To begin the process of restoring stability after a conflict, it is generally agreed that elections should be held as soon as possible (Gambari, 1991; Kieh, 2011). Criticism was leveled at the Liberian election process, saying it lacked transparency and fairness. According to Sawyer (2008), who addressed these issues, elections in Liberia should have been delayed until a comprehensive program of reconciliation and constitutional reforms was completed. According to Gambari (1991), "the reintegration of ex-combatants and refugees, the disaffection of the young, government workers, and Taylor supporters" were all factors that slowed down election preparations and posed a threat to stability. Clearly, another disagreement broke out among the various political groups as they prepared for the election. The Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, called a meeting of the offended

party leaders in Abuja. For the runoff election, President Obasanjo re-assigned General Abdulsallam Abubakar to his former role as special mediator in an effort to defuse tense situations (Alli 2009).

Nigeria's Military Role in the Conflict: Hegemony, Compromised Neutrality, and Flawed Strategy

The prolonged Liberian conflict, the severity of the violence, the countless violations of the cease-fire, and the pernicious dynamics of factionalism were mostly the fault of the fighting factions themselves. Ethno-political factionalism and underlying patronage systems were already a hallmark of Liberian politics before the beginning of the war and likely contributed to the expansion of warring organizations. It also became apparent during the combat that most sides were unprepared, poorly trained, and lacked discipline. Most warlords couldn't keep order in their rapidly expanding armies because of the lack of rigidity in their command structures. The leaders' feuding and cutthroat pursuit of personal wealth established a bad precedent, which trickled down to the soldiery. In addition, the latter group typically consisted of younger people. It was taken by the factions to recruit rural youngsters who were unemployed and angry over the years of economic collapse and the obstruction of social progress by the incumbent elites. Other citizens had lost parents, siblings, or other family members in the conflict or at the hands of the Doe dictatorship, leaving them orphans. These young people were eager or prepared to enlist as a means of retribution or social advancement in a world that had devastated their homes and offered them no opportunities. Opposition members who weren't interested in joining were forced to participate. In addition, they were frequently coerced or encouraged to conduct unspeakably cruel acts, with advancement contingent on such actions. Because such acts of violence were intrinsically linked with ritualized acts of violence in Liberia's old religious cults (Poro, now twisted for the purpose of modern militia warfare), they served to both terrify the civilian populace and fortify the resolve of the militia members. Factions gained access to soldiers who could be controlled and made into courageous warriors through the use of cultic practices, the provision of alcohol and drugs, and the subjecting of physical abuse and torture. On the other hand, ECOMOG did make genuine attempts to rescue the people of Monrovia and, to a lesser extent, the rest of Liberia from the atrocities committed by Taylor and his opponents. However, ECOMOG's military preparedness and capabilities were woefully

inadequate. In addition, the plan was fundamentally wrong, and the tactics it employed were extremely myopic. As a result, it was not well-equipped to deal with violent resistance when it arrived in Monrovia, and it had a hard time later on when it tried to engage other factions. Keeping the peace, an ostensibly easier responsibility, still presented difficulties on occasion. ECOMOG's strategy was doomed from the start since it targeted the one actor ECOMOG could do the least to affect. Despite the fact that Taylor's group's organization was also weak, the NPFL maintained authority over Liberia for quite a period of time.

As the war drew to a close, most of Taylor's command structure remained intact thanks to the force's remarkable tenacity. ECOMOG's failure to account for Taylor's resolve to accept anything less than the Liberian presidency was another thing ECOMOG failed to account for, at least up until Operation Octopus. Because of its singular focus on the NPFL leader, it failed to recognize the threat posed by other warlords or consider alternative approaches to the situation. Furthermore, ECOMOG and its participating countries had opened Pandora's box by promoting, arming, and utilizing competing factions, even if temporarily; this perpetuated a dynamic of factionalism from which Liberia would find it difficult to escape (William and Jones 1994). There was little doubt that this would make it more difficult to restore calm in the country, but it might slow Taylor down for a while. Even worse, by providing support to rival warlords who were just as responsible for human rights violations, ECOMOG damaged its own reputation. In the end, these measures were ineffective in stopping Taylor's rise to power. Therefore, it seems plausible to conclude that ECOMOG's approach helped to extend rather than shorten the Liberian crisis, even though it is hard to prove what would have happened if ECOMOG had chosen a different strategy. From a moral, political, or security standpoint, Charles Taylor cannot be seen as a boon to Liberia or the surrounding area. However, by openly rejecting him, member nations had turned ECOMOG into a partisan actor in the crisis, rather than a mediator with a degree of neutrality vis-à-vis all belligerents. Increased by ECOMOG's cooperation with other factions and its preparedness to engage in enforcement action against the NPFL, the NPFL's lack of neutrality became all the more evident in the face of the NPLF's antagonism to Taylor of Nigeria, Guinea, and others. Since several of Taylor's West African backers and outsiders shared the view that ECOMOG lacked neutrality, Taylor repeatedly voiced this view. For instance, when Jimmy Carter took

on the role of mediator in the stalemated conflict, he emphasized that ECOWAS and ECOMOG should be seen as non-aligned and neutral organizations, committed to peace for all Liberians rather than simply protecting the interim government in Monrovia (Hutchful, 1999).

Part of the reason why ECOMOG's engagement in the Liberian conflict didn't end it sooner was the partisan role Carter alluded to. As a result, it is important to dig deeper into this aspect. This lack of neutrality and the counterproductive effect of ECOMOG's engagement can be partially attributed to Nigeria's influence over the organization. This power gave itself away in a number of ways. First, Lagos was the first to deploy troops and begin serious military actions, despite receiving support from other countries in the region and beyond. Second, while the United States and other countries offered financial help and logistical support, both directly and through the United Nations, Nigeria furnished the vast majority of the bill, as much as 70% of the total. Last but not least, the Nigerian contingent in ECOMOG was the largest portion of the army, comprising over 70% of the enlisted personnel and 50% or more of the officers. Politically and institutionally, it was clear that Nigeria was in charge of the intervention force. General Arnold Quainoo of the Ghanaian Force was replaced with a resident of Lagos after Samuel Doe was abducted and killed at ECOMOG headquarters. This was accomplished by putting pressure on Gambian President Ibrahima Barrow Jawara to appoint Nigerian officer Major-General Joshua Dogonyaro as chairman of the SMC and the ECOWAS Authority (Garba, 2009).

The commander was chosen by the SMC and reported to the ECOWAS Authority's president via the authority's executive secretary and special representative. Though ECOMOG was "merely the titular head" of the Authority's chairman, in actuality, he had little real power. The following chairs of the authority, such as Senegal and Benin, did not have any troops participating in ECOMOG or even a personal representative in Liberia, which severely limited the authority's ability. Nothing was resolved by the 1991–1992 Committees of Five and Nine. The Executive Secretary had no authority to fix the systemic flaw either. To make matters worse, in 1992, the Executive Secretariat declined to provide a replacement for his Special Representative, who had been tasked with delivering the Authority's political orders to the commander in charge of ECOMOG. The head of Legal Affairs, Roger Laloupo, has stated that financial constraints were the primary motivating factor. The result was that the

Executive Secretariat was not always briefed on the latest developments in Liberia. When President Rawlings was head of the ECOWAS Authority (1994–1995), he dispatched a delegation to Monrovia, which met with Secretariat officials. The ECOWAS Secretariat, however, was no longer involved in the Liberian operation after an official's departure. More or less a Nigerian affair and purely military, as Laloupo puts it, is how ECOMOG was described by him. Political authorities in ECOWAS member states were not contacted to any significant extent. Both the Nigerian government and the ECOWAS Executive Secretary and Chairman receive updates from the Nigerian Field Commander. He acted in accordance with the Committee on ECOMOG of the Nigerian Ministry of Defense's orders. As a result, ECOMOG's inherent bias against Taylor was not neutralized, especially since, with the exception of Ghana, the other main troop-supplying countries shared this predilection. However, because of its own involvement, ECOMOG was unable to mediate the issue or position itself as a trustworthy enough entity to oversee the ceasefire and conduct disarmament and demobilization measures.

Achievements and Prospects of ECOWAS Peacekeeping in Liberia

There will be no more fighting in Liberia thanks to the efforts of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). To begin, ECOWAS's assistance with the Liberian issue through the deployment of peacekeepers shows the organization's dedication to maintaining regional stability and security. There would be no way to maintain order in the subregion without the assistance of ECOWAS. All agreements to cease hostilities were facilitated by ECOMOG's enforcement capability, which may have dissuaded the NPFL from pursuing a military solution to the war. Africa's military forces cooperating for peace and stability is not an unimaginable scenario. The warring parties and ECOWAS have all signed agreements recognizing this. Lives were spared, and the slide into full chaos under the warlords in Liberia was prevented, all because of the intervention. As a result of ECOMOG, ECOWAS is able to monitor regional ceasefires. Because of this, the warlords in Liberia were unable to achieve their objective. Given the sub-continuing region's insecurity, the capture of Liberia by a warlord and irregular foreign dissidents would have surely caused a domino effect (Aning, 1994).

After both sides repeatedly violated ceasefire agreements, ECOMOG's

objective shifted from keeping calm to enforcing calm. However, the policy of peace enforcement was never intended to cause a major war. The ceasefire agreements were the primary focus of everyone's efforts. ECOMOG's primary objective has always been to help the struggling Liberian population by rescuing individuals, restoring essential services, and delivering supplies. In a successful effort, ECOWAS supported the safe return of countless Liberian refugees. There has been a substantial increase in the number of ECOWAS member states providing humanitarian aid to a neighbor in need. A Catholic priest argues that when ECOMOG massacred Liberians from Ghana, Nigeria, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, the people of those countries embraced Liberians fleeing the battle with open arms and provided them food and shelter. Member nations in West Africa mistrusted one another since the Authority of Heads of State and Government had the final say on whether or not to deploy ECOMOG. The Executive Secretary was expected to play a significant role in the decision regarding the administration and management of the peacekeeping force, similar to the United Nations Secretary-General, who is given broad discretion in carrying out the Security Council's choices on peacekeeping missions. Even though the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government is the best place to make big policy decisions, it might not be the best place to make decisions about the logistics and other infrastructure of a peacekeeping exercise (Vogt, 1991).

The foundation of ECOMOG and the provision of soldiers by participating states were influenced by the fact that practically every country in the West Africa sub-region is ruled by a military dictatorship or a one-party system (Ghana being the exception after its return to civil rule). It's probable that this will become impossible in the future as a result of the vast democratic process already taking place in West Africa. Political leaders in nations with presidential or parliamentary systems may have a more difficult time making judgments about their participation in peacekeeping missions than their counterparts in countries with a military dictatorship. A military dictatorship, in contrast to a democratic government, would not be constrained by the constitution.

The members of ECOWAS may be held to account for their peacekeeping duties if an organization (other than the heads of state and government) were established and recognized as having this ability. Getting everyone on the same page about establishing a governing body is the best way to eradicate distrust for good. If

the appropriate sub-regional authority trained and ECOWAS maintained its armed peacekeepers, they could be sent immediately. In order to carry out their duties under the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance in Defense, the Defense Council and the Defense Commission must be given broad discretionary powers. For sustaining peace in a dangerous environment, it helps to be able to bring together military experts who know the area as well as professionals who know about conflict theory, psychology, and the social and cultural factors that led to the violence.

This will point them in the direction of a solution that does more than merely put an end to hostilities; it will also deal with the root causes of the conflict. The Nigerian- led ECOMOG, for instance, is puzzled as to what began the violence in Liberia. After Samuel Doe was overthrown, ECOMOG's objective changed to one of restoring democracy in the country. Doe's practices of excluding and isolating people made racial tensions worse, but the top people in ECOMOG didn't see this. It is crucial for a peacekeeping mission, like the one in Liberia, to have the support of all parties involved in the conflict. There should be no misunderstanding about ECOWAS's original goal in Liberia, which was to mediate between the conflicting groups and to install a government elected by the people. To begin, not one of the countries providing troops (Nigeria, Ghana (before the restoration of democracy), Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, or Senegal) can provide an example of a political transformation that was motivated by their constitution. There was concern among the leaders of the countries that participated in the peacekeeping mission that guerrilla forces could easily move from Liberia to their own countries if the rebels were successful. As a result, the UN decided to join the peacekeeping mission in Liberia and do their part to end the civil war there. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the relevant United Nations agency worked together to develop a detailed recovery strategy for Liberia. They directed the attention primarily towards the people whose lives have been upended by the fighting. It is imperative that those who were uprooted and forced to seek safety in refugee camps across the sub-region be reunited with their families and provided with the resources they need to start over. Reconciliation is important, but so are efforts to restore trust. If the civil war in Liberia is to stop, all citizens, regardless of their background, must be given the same chances to succeed.

CHAPTER V

Conclusion

This chapter is about the conclusion and recommendations on the Liberian crisis's potential effects on the security in the West African sub-region, and also recommend other meaningful steps that ECOWAS can take in carrying out an effective peacekeeping mission.

This research seeks to clarify the concept of peacekeeping in Africa through an examination of ECOMOG, a sub-regional peacekeeping force founded to bolster Liberian stability. This investigation was deemed necessary because of the Liberian conflict's possible impact on security in the West African sub-region. The crisis would spread to neighbouring nations in the sub-region if ECOWAS didn't work together to find solutions, especially to those that bordered the war zone.

This research examines the challenges ECOWAS has experienced in attempting to deploy ECOMOG to restore calm to the crisis-stricken Liberian population. According to the available evidence, the crisis was precipitated by hostilities between local Liberians and the American-Liberian minority. The results of this research show that the internal environment of the country is directly connected to the external causes that are causing the violence there. ECOWAS's engagement was driven by humanitarian and sub-regional security concerns. The noble goal of ECOWAS was to stop the waste of Liberia's resources (both human and material). The analysis finds that the altruistic inclination and the "big brother" role in the sub-region and in Africa as a whole motivated Nigeria's wish to waive the expenses of the ECOMOG deployment in Liberia (Nzeribe, 1997).

This research examines the Liberian conflict as one in which the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) acted to end hostilities. Most Liberians are native to the country, although Afro-American immigrants who came there after slavery was abolished in the United States have dominated the country since 1821. In 1980, Samuel Doe engineered a coup that put the country's ethnic majority, the Liberians, in charge. The Liberians' already precarious situation worsened. The ECOWAS leadership was worried that the war would spread to other countries in the sub-region as the violence escalated and more forces joined the Liberians' side. ECOWAS formed ECOMOG as a peacekeeping force to ensure peace in Liberia. The

authors of the study hoped that by referencing the concept of conflict resolution, they could better explain the occurrences they were studying. This justification is preferred since it makes clear why ECOWAS is working so hard to establish peace in the region.

This thesis rests on the idea that promoting and safeguarding international peace and security is of paramount importance on a national level. This is largely analytic survey research, with no statistical procedures utilized in data gathering or processing.

This suggests the research was conducted using a qualitative research method. One of the most significant conclusions of the research is that Afro-Americans make up the majority of Liberia's political elite. The researcher also found that the activities of ECOMOG in Liberia were hampered by the colonial mentalities of the various ECOWAS member states and a lack of funding. The Researcher concluded that ECOWAS authorities should recruit peacekeepers with a deeper understanding of the local language and culture. In the midst of ongoing political infighting, Guinea-President Bissau's Joao Bernardo Vieira triggered a crisis by ordering the arrest of his top military leader, General Ansumane Mane. Mane was accused of arming separatist militants in Senegal's southern Cassamance area. The attempted coup by General Mane in response to the gun-running accusation led to a significant political crisis. The stalemate persisted even after an investigation exonerated the general, and his faithful troops fled the government camp to join him in a hideout in a remote part of Bissau. The ECOMOG intervention in Guinea-Bissau, led by Senegal and Guinea, involved 2,400 troops and ended 11 months of turmoil and conflict.

It was in December of that year that a coalition government was formed, all thanks to the peace agreement signed on November 2 in Abuja. Due to the dire economic situation and severe currency shortage in Bissau, the United Nations established a Peace Support Office and a Trust Fund there in March 1999. Simultaneously, 712 peacekeepers from ECOMOG were deployed there. It was in November of that year that Kumba Yala won the presidency.

In this context, the ECOWAS Assistance Treaty of 1981 came into being. Difficult and ultimately abolitionist sub-regional events occurred in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau between 1990 and 1999. To this end, the Mechanism drew inspiration from prior agreements such as the Non-Aggression Protocol of 1978 and the Mutual Agreement that tested ECOWAS. The ECOWAS cease-fire monitoring group and the ECOWAS intervention force are both made up of military soldiers from

different West African countries (ECOMOG). ECOMOG has intervened in the midst of internal crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and the Ivory Coast. The killing stopped, peace was restored, and political conversation could begin in these countries because of the interventions, which also eliminated the root causes of the problems.

ECOMOG's operation in Liberia is a great illustration of this, and it has been used as a template for similar future peacekeeping efforts. The Liberian Armed Forces and other combatants in the Liberian conflict were essentially forced to hole up in barracks for the rest of the struggle as a result of ECOMOG's engagement, notably in the Liberian peacebuilding process (Watch, 1993). While Charles Taylor's NPFL attacked government and ECOMOG facilities, the INPFL was told to stay in the barracks. In October 1990, following a brief period of relative calm, international human rights watch organizations reentered Liberia. INPFL head Johnson called a summit in November to negotiate potential deals with Liberian government officials, the AFL's chief of staff, and others. The negotiations led to a ceasefire agreement, and an interim government led by Amos Sawyer was established to carry out the terms of the accord under the name Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). Monrovia's IGNU was supported in its consolidation of power by ECOMOG and the government-backed paramilitary police unit, Black Berets (Watch, 1993). The massacring of the ethnic Krahn was also halted because of ECOWAS's involvement. ECOMOG's mission was reduced to that of a police force once an interim government was put in place. The forces led by Charles Taylor fled the capital city of Monrovia for the countryside. In the eyes of others, this is proof of ECOMOG's preeminence and NPFL's decline.

Recommendations

The findings of this research show that the failures of ECOMOG in Liberia can be attributed to both internal group dynamics and external forces. Herewith, several recommendations are made:

To aid in the peacekeeping process in the sub-region, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) must create a more unified and integrated peacekeeping body. That's why it's best to gather the proposed forces when things are calm in the region, or at least a long time before any potential conflicts arise. The

newly established troops will need to work together to maintain peace in Africa, particularly in West Africa. Having native speakers of English or French on patrol is essential because those are the languages most often spoken in the area. There must be one central source of funding for the sub-regional peacekeeping operation. All member states are required to make contributions to this fund, which will be managed by the ECOWAS secretariat. This study's author argues that a well-organized, well-funded, and well-articulated peacekeeping operation organization could be an effective means of preserving domestic peace and security, especially in the West Africa sub-region. As a result, it's more pressing to figure out how to bring about economic growth in each member country and regional economic integration. While it's promising to see work done toward a common market, it's equally critical that all member countries have robust economies and that the Anglo-Francophone split be bridged. Consequently, it is suggested that the topic of building economic integration in the ECOWAS sub-region without the presence of the Anglo-Francophone dichotomy be studied further.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Turnitin Similarity Report

Jamal Elove Korvah

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Appendix B
Ethics Committee Approval

NEAR EAST UNIVERSITY

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE

30.11.2022

Dear Jamal Elove Korvah

Your project **"The Role of Peacekeeping in the Liberian Civil Crisis (1990-1997)"** has been evaluated. Since only secondary data will be used the project does not need to go through the ethics committee. You can start your research on the condition that you will use only secondary data.

Prof. Dr. Aşkın KİRAZ
The Coordinator of the Scientific Research Ethics Committee