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Transformation from Secret Oral to Public Written Culture in National and Transnational Social Spaces

by

Sehriban Sahin

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Dissertation Committee:
Dr. José Casanova
Dr. Andrew Arato
Dr. Diane E. Davis
Dr. Ariel Salzmann
Dr. Aristide Zolberg
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INTRODUCTION

The revival of Alevisim in Turkey and Europe begets a number of questions. For centuries, Alevisim was repressed and hidden in Turkey until it suddenly and powerfully emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s. As a religious creed and tradition it had been kept esoteric and transmitted only orally at secret rituals ever since the persecution by the Ottoman State in the early 16th Century. The oral secrecy continued into the first seven decades of the Turkish Republican Era, during which Alevisim officially did not exist. Twenty percent of Turkey's population is estimated as belonging today to the Alevi community, whose membership is defined by descent. This substantial minority is now becoming more and more public through newly founded Alevi voluntary associations, periodicals, books, and radio. Alevi cultural festivals are now even featured on state and commercial TV channels. What factors can account for this sudden revival of Alevisim? Why and how has a centuries old secret religious culture "gone public" and gained "publicity" (Casanova 1994) at the national and transnational arenas in the late 1980s and 1990s?

Alevisim is generally used as an umbrella term to define a large number of different heterodox communities, whose actual beliefs and ritual practices differ greatly, and whose members can be found in Turkey and in smaller numbers in Iraq, Iran, Syria,
Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Albania. Alevi can be linguistically distinguished in four groups. In the Eastern province of Kars, Alevi communities speak Azarbayjani Turkish and their Alevism differs little from the orthodox Twelver Shi’ism of modern Iran. The Arabic speaking Alevi communities of Southern Turkey, especially Hatay and Adana, are the extensions of Syria's Alawi (Nusayri) community and have no historical ties with other Alevi groups. These two groups are small in numbers. The much larger Alevi groups in Turkey are the Turkish and Kurdish speakers; the latter being further divided into speakers of Kurdish proper and of the related Zaza--both appear to be descendants of rebellious tribal groups, which were religiously affiliated with the Safavids (BruinesSEN 1996).

Since the Ottoman period, there have always been well-drawn boundaries between Sunni and Alevi communities. Sunnis, the majority Islamic sect, have represented the state and the dominant culture, while Alevi have become representative of oppositional spaces and relatively closed culture. In contemporary Turkish political context, Alevi symbolize 'the other.' The tension between Sunnis and Alevi has either increased or decreased but always existed.

Alevi, during the last twenty five years, appeared on top of the public agenda only as the victims of violent incidents, such as in Kahramanmaraş 1978/79, in Çorum 1980, in Sivas 1980, 1993, and in İstanbul 1995. Since the late 1980s, Alevi have declared themselves as a religious/cultural community seeking self-determination and demanding official recognition in public spheres. In July 1989, the Hamburg Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Hamburg Alevi Culture Center), with support of a group of intellectuals and academics, issued the Alevilik Bildirgesi (Manifesto of Alevism), which was published in a Turkish newspaper a year later. The manifesto declared that "there is no freedom of religion, one of the fundamental human rights, in Turkey. This fundamental
right should be granted to Alevi, and Alevi should be recognized as such.” Cemal Şener’s (an Alevi writer) book on Alevism, *Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal bir Başkaldirının Kısa Tarihçesi* (Alevism Incident: A Short History of a Social Uprising) was published in 1989 and widely circulated throughout Turkey. The manifesto and Şener’s book served to usher Alevism into public spheres. Since then, hundreds of books on Alevism have been published; Alevi periodicals, print houses and radio stations have emerged; newspaper series on Alevism have appeared in the major newspapers. Hundreds of Alevi associations have been established and a large number of *cemevis*\(^1\) have been constructed. Alevi cultural festivals have been organized while various programs discussing Alevism and describing Alevi rituals have been aired on national and commercial TV.

Interestingly enough, a major political party went so far as secretly preparing a report documenting the Alevi intensive areas, their political choice and voting behavior (Engin 2000; Şahhüseyinoğlu 1999). The current rising enthusiasm in Alevism in its religious and cultural traditions through these channels demonstrates that there have been changes in the attitude and the self-definition of Alevi communities in Turkey and the European diaspora.

Because there is no single homogenous Alevi community (Engin 1999: 121), except in the eyes of Sunnis, different Alevi groups claim different self-definition stressing either social, political or religious aspects of their identity. Alevism is ambiguous in nature; it is religious, ethnic, and highly political. The multiple interpretations of Alevism are produced in forms of books and periodicals by a newly emerged intellectual Alevi elite, who took on the mission of defining distinctive characteristics of Alevi identity, to rewrite Alevi history, and to revive the Alevi tradition.

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\(^1\) A new type of building emerged especially in the big metropolitan areas for the religious gathering, *Ayin i Cem* of Alevi community.
The Alevi elite, who engage in the public discussion over the meaning of Alevism, have pursued competing agenda through a variety of channels. Multiple definitions of Alevism, such as “Alevism is the real essence of Islam,” “Alevism is a Turkish Islam,” “Alevism is outside of Islam,” “Alevism is pure Turkish,” “Alevism stemmed from Kurdish civilization,” “Alevism is not a religion,” and “Alevism is a way of life,” emerged out of their discussions.

In this dissertation, I examine the ways in which documents and discourses of Alevism were produced by multiple actors in Turkey and the European diaspora since the late 1980s. I explain how interpretations of Alevism have been reproduced and used by multiple actors, like Alevi voluntary associations, state officials, secular intellectuals, politicians, Sunni conservative circles, Kurdish groups and media. Framing the Alevi revival within a more general discussion of identity and cultural politics (Berezin 1997; Calhoun 1994a, 1996; Castells 1997; Connolly 1991; Hall, 1989, 91, 96; Somers 1994; Taylor 1992; Zaretksy 1994) serves to understand how the global discourse of “identity and culture as right” (Soysal 1997) expresses and reproduces categorical identities and social relations even as it challenges them.

In order to explain the transformation of a secret-oral culture of Alevism into a public written one, I investigate the role of transnational Alevi networks and the Turkish state as crucial actors inducing and actively shaping this change. The main thesis of the dissertation is that there is no moncausal explanation but a complex interplay of a set of factors and multiple actors participating and interacting at different levels of polity. This set of factors includes: (1) the massive migration of Alevis from rural areas to cities in Turkey and Europe; (2) the changing shape of networks among Alevis especially with the establishment of Europe-centered Alevi organizations; (3) the ethnic/religious interaction with the Sunni majority; (4) the global discourse of identity as right; and (5) the shifts in
the policies of the Turkish state.

In order to understand the processes of this transformation, it is necessary to give attention not only to the structural levels of causation, but also to the more ephemeral dynamics of historical events (Sewell 1992) and the conjecture of national and global trends. Today Turkey is struggling to be a member of the European Union. Alarmed by the Islamist movement, which has recently impaired the vision of a modern Turkish Republic, the state officials, secular intellectuals, and the media define Alevi as a natural ally of the Republican non-religious principle of the foundations of "Kemalism," the basis of Turkish institutions. In this turbulent era of Turkish politics, the Alevi community is extensively involved in redefining itself to itself vis-à-vis the Turkish state and the Sunni majority. Social and political struggles continue in the field of cultural productions over discourses of Alevism in the public spheres of Turkey and the European diaspora since 1988/1989, during which the previous taboos of Turkish society, e.g. the myth of the non-existence of religious (Sunni, Alevi) and ethnic (Turks, Kurds, Laz, Çerkes, Crimean Tatar, and so on) divisions in Turkish society, have been demolished.

The revival of Alevism shows how dimensions and representations of religion have transformed as a result of migration. As the populace becomes settled in its urban habitat and is socially and symbolically incorporated into urban ways of life, its cultural and religious traditions are being transformed (Parker 1998). One example is the construction of cemevis in urban areas of Turkey and Europe (and even in Australia). There had been no cemevi the earlier village setting, where cem ceremony was held in any house that was just big enough to perform it.

Although both Turkish and Kurdish Alevi had lived in mountainous areas and relatively isolated villages as a result of their history of persecution in the Ottoman period and did not interact with the Sunni majority, the massive migration from rural to urban
areas since the 1950s caused this situation to change. With the massive migration to
cities and advanced Western countries, Alevis began to leave their villages, settle in large
metropolitan areas, and start to interact with the mainstream Sunni society. Migration
destroyed the closed community structure and changed the shape of networks among
Alevis. As Ikegami argues "a critical moment of cultural history in any society occurs
when communicative networks suddenly expand in scale, density, and complexity"
(1999: 12). The massive migration from rural to urban areas and to advanced Western
countries, as well as the development of new communication technologies—such as
telephone, fax, and internet, and the new media industries and booming markets of
commercial TV and radio—have led to an expansion of the communicative networks of
Alevis.

The formation and the expansion of national and transnational networks of Alevis
have created new spaces for cultural production and identity formation. Through these
networks new public spheres are created at local, national, and transnational levels that
are intertwined both in vertical and horizontal dimensions. It is through these national
and transnational networks that Alevism "went public" and its adherents "came out" both
in Turkey and in the European diaspora.

Transnational communities and identities emerge out of international migration
(see Baubock, Heller and Zolberg 1996; Basch et al. 1994; Bottomley 1992; Glick Shiller
et al. 1992; Lie 1995; Rex and Durury 1994; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Sheffer, 1986,
leads to the emergence of "new bases for participation and proliferation of forms of
mobilization at various levels of polity" (Soysal 1997: 521). The macro process of global
migration has caused the deterritorialization of networks, cultures, and identities, which
in turn has caused "new political communities to act at a scale different from the scale of
the nation-state” (Soysal 1997: 511). Because immigrants “force and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch et al. 1994: 7), the new factor of diaspora politics also enters into the equation. The emerging “transnational social spaces,” are filled with “social and symbolic ties, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in at least two geographically and internationally distinct places” (Faist 1999: 216).

The influence of transnational values brings the problem of identity and culture to the forefront; the Alevi movement can be seen to be a part of it. The global discourse of identity as right has played a critical role to legitimize identity claims in the public spheres at the national and transnational scales (Soysal 1997). As a result of the global discourse of identity as right (Soysal 1997), Alevism, like other cultural, religious, ethnic, or regional identities, has entered the public sphere as a form of making claims both in Turkey and abroad. The revival of Alevism continues among Alevis in Turkey and the diasporas, especially Germany, while their relationships are reinforced through their transnational networks over which finance, information, code of behavior, and actors flow in both direction.

The transnational dimension of the Alevi movement is crucial, because associational activities started earlier in the European Alevi diaspora than in Turkey. The Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (European Alevi Unions Federation) founded in 1994, has been a roof organization of Alevi associations located in several European countries. The Alevi institutions, the Avrupa Alevi Akademisi (European Alevi Academy) and the Alevi-Bektaşi Enstitüsü (Alevi-Bektaşi Institute), are now located within the borders of Germany (the foundation of an Alevi-Bektaşi Institute at Strasbourg University is in process) can be compared to none in Turkey. These institutions are important centers in producing knowledge and transforming Alevism into a public
religion with a written doctrine and rituals. An Asia Minor born religious culture has
found and reproduced itself in the heart of Europe. Though seemingly paradoxical, this is
possible, because (1) immigrants retain and develop an interest in and political ties with
their country of origin; and (2) agendas and activities of transnational communities cross
territorial boundaries; and, above all, (3) since liberal climate in the diasporas offer more
open opportunity structures and freedom of expression. The European Alevi diaspora has
to some extent stimulated the Alevi revival in their homeland. For this reason there is a
necessity of studying the Alevi movement within a transnational context rather than
limiting it to Turkey's borders.

Although there is a growing literature on the emergence of transnational religious
communities (Beyer 1994, 1998; Casanova 1996, 2000; Eisenstandt 2000, Garret and
Robertson 1991; Hervieu-Leger 1998; Levitt 1998; Robertson 1994; Robertson and
Chirico 1985; Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Soysal 1997; Thomas 1996; Warner and
Wittner 1998), so far, there has been no study of the homeland strategies and the trans-
state political links of these religious communities to analyze their political activities and
interactions within the complex interplay of national, transnational and state relations.
This dissertation fulfills this task by demonstrating how transnational forms of association
are developing across Alevi communities residing in European countries and the ways
they seek to mobilize or affect homeland politics through these transnational associations.
A deep analysis of trans-state Alevi networks, the political activities and homeland
strategies of Alevi diasporas shows how transnational communities affect their
homeland's social and political fabric.

The political opportunity structure of the host country, the degree of homeland
affiliation and participation in homeland politics, the means and strategies employed by
the transnational communities in their homeland-related activities and their homeland-
related political agendas are important factors that show how transnational communities impact on their homeland. These factors are evident in the revival of Alevism too.

Existing literature on identity and cultural politics (see Berezin 1999; Calhoun 1994, 1995; Castells 1997; Connolly 1991; Hall 1989, 1991, 1996; Honneth 1995; Somers 1994, 1995; Taylor 1992; White 1992; Zaretsky 1994) has largely neglected the role of the state in identity based movements. It is necessary to take this neglected actor into the scene to understand what role the state plays in shaping the identity politics of its subjects.

As the number of Alevi associations increases throughout Turkey and the diasporas, the Turkish state, which imposed mandatory Sunni-based religious courses in the curriculum and which imposed other Sunni-based religious activities through its Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs) has started to court its Alevi subjects and has begun to develop policies in recognition of Alevis since the mid-1990s. This brings in the second line of investigation that concerns the role of the state in the revival of Alevism.

So far, the Alevis, like the Kurds and other minorities of Turkey, have officially been non-existent—all together at least 47 ethnic groups, according to Andrews (1989). Official history has neglected the Alevis' appropriation of history and religion. Neither the history nor the religious course books of public schools mention Alevis. Because of this, the recent "warm interest" of the state needs to be questioned. Why and how, after centuries of Sunni-based State (Ottoman) persecution and seven decades of official non-existence during the Turkish Republican era, has the Turkish state started to court its

---


3The Directorate of Religious Affairs also appoints religion teachers and mosque officials abroad.
Alevi subjects and recognize them as a distinctive religious community by encouraging and supporting Alevi cultural festivals, TV programs, and through state sponsored publications defining Alevism as the "real Turkish interpretation" of Islam?

What are the effects of the state's recent "warm interest" in Alevism, its definition of Alevi identity, the rewriting of its history and tradition?

The ways in which Alevis negotiate and renegotiate their identity vis-à-vis the Turkish state is explored to reach a new understanding of state-society interaction that has impacts on the identity-forming process. The historical tour shows the role of the state in the evolution of Alevism and Alevi identity within the state-society interaction since the foundation of the Ottoman State in the late 13th century. The role of the state in the emergence and transformation of Alevism throughout history and the present demonstrate how the state constructs religious (or ethnic) matrices in reaction to changing social and political contexts. A case of the relocation of a peripheral heterodox religious culture and identity into the center of the state-society interaction helps us see different manifestations of the role of the state in the cultural sphere and in identity formation.

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its political manifestations as well as the Kurdish movement are widely interpreted as having alarmed the Turkish State who then developed strategies to allow and even stimulate the revival of Alevism. By opening up the political opportunity structure for the discussion of Alevism to public spheres through TV programs, cultural festivals, journals, and newspaper series, Alevism is developed as a distinctive and/or alternative ethnic identity and moderate version of Islam (or "Islam with a secular face").

Although I do not deny these explanations, I offer another one. It is my contention that the global discourse of identity and culture as right has also impacted on the state. The state has started to modify itself according to this discourse by recognizing
groups making identity claims and offers to negotiate. The struggle to be a member of the European Union (EU) is also pushing the state toward this modification. The modification of the state is limited, because above all the state has its own powerful position over groups and institutions. The dissertation explores the ways and limits of the state's modification in relation to the identity and culture as rights rhetoric by examining the contemporary Alevi policies of the Turkish State.

The revival of Alevism through voluntary associations in all locations of Turkey and its various diaspora, a boom in the number of books on Alevism and Alevi periodicals, newspaper series, radio channels, and TV programs is an ongoing process that constitutes a transformation of the nature of Alevism from a secret, initiatory and orally transmitted religion to a public religion with a written doctrine and ritual. In this respect, this study does not only aim to contribute to the historiography of Alevism but it can also help to inform the theory of public religion and deprivatization of religion which was formulated by Casanova (1994). This dissertation points out the significance of the inclusiveness of religious experiences other than Judeo-Christian and Sunni Islamic tradition. The main task is to explore how and through what mechanisms Alevis have started to produce theological material in the present day and engaged in intense efforts to explain Alevism to themselves and others (the State and Sunnis). What is the function of Alevi theology presently both within Alevis and other sections of Turkish society and in the European diaspora?

The expressions and identities produced within heterodoxy have manifested themselves in different forms and positions according to the social and political circumstances. In the late 1980s and 1990s, the heterodox groups speak the language of the identity and culture as rights and claim to write their own history by creating their historiography. Making secret-oral tradition public-written is one way of creating a
historiography of Alevism. The ways in which symbols of Alevism have been introduced into public spheres for modern political ends during the recent Alevi revival brings new insight into the role of the religion in public spheres.

Around the world, various religious movements as in the case of the revival of Alevism at national and transnational scales, have struggled to articulate, pursue, and maintain individual and group rights in ways that have often differed from classic Western liberal notions of citizenship, democratic participation, and public spheres. Foundations of Alevi associations that extend across borders such as the European Alevi Unions Federation that has members residing in several European countries and the Alevi Bektaşı Kuruluşları Birliği (Alevi Bektaşi Institutions Union) that is a top unity of major Alevi associations of Turkey and its diasporas are examples of these challenges. How is it possible to explain the active position of Alevi leaders of diasporas in the Alevi Bektaşi Institutions Union, which claims to be the top representative body of Alevis to sit at the table with the Turkish State to negotiate over identity claims of Alevis?

Because public spheres (see Arendt [1959] 1989; Benhabib 1992; Calhoun 1992, 1993, 1994b; Dewey 1927; Cohen and Arato 1992; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Fraser, 1992; Habermas [1964] 1989; Ikegami 2000; Landes 1992; Negt and Kluge [1972] 1993; Robbins 1993) are transnationalized as a result of the deterritorialization of networks and identities, which is partly due to international migration and globalization of media, new configurations of public spheres need to be considered (Keane 1995; Köhler 1998; Soysal 1997). This dissertation theorizes the public spheres within the context of multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across borders of nation states. This is why I investigate the expansion of Alevi national and transnational networks, their efforts to enter into public spheres as spaces for cultural productions and identity formation.
Social and Political Context

In order to understand the revival of Alevism we need to draw a broad picture of Turkish political and social circumstances in the late 1980s and 1990s. The three major movements that are Islamist, Kurdish and Alevi have been salient in Turkey and its European diaspora since the eighties. Both the Islamist and the Kurdish movements have enjoyed national and international attention, while the Alevi movement has not. These three movements interact and impact on one another at varying degrees. They challenge and are challenged by each other. The Turkish state and its agents also interact with them at different levels and varying degrees.

The Islamist movement has gained a high momentum in the eighties with the help of the state policies. An interesting departure from the Kemalist tradition was introduced by the military regime (1980-1983) proposing and propagating a Turkish-Islamic synthesis that combined Turkish nationalism with Muslim sentiment. Exclusively Sunni religious courses in schools were made mandatory while increasing the portion of the state budget dedicated to religion-based (exclusively Sunni) projects implemented by the Directorate of Religious Affairs. This was accompanied by an increase in the number of religious schools, mosques, people performing hajj, veiled women and bearded men in public, which were indicators of the increasing Sunni Islamism in Turkey. The political manifestation of this rise reflected itself in politics. Since the 1994 local elections, the pro-Islamic party has shown its power. In the December 1995 national election, the pro-Islamic Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) received the highest number of seats in parliament. The alarmed Turkish State, as well as the Turkish army, which has a constitutionally guaranteed duty to protect the borders, the republican regime and the Kemalist principles, began a campaign against Refah's anti-secular policies and actions that culminated with the closing of the Refah by the constitutional court in early 1998. The Fazilet Partisi
(Virtue Party) has been formed as a successor to the closed Refah.

The Islamist movement and its political success are primary political factors that have led Alevi to strive for their distinctive identity. Parallel to the resurgence of Islamism, there has been the renewed interest in Alevism as a religion among Alevi in the late 1980s. In the 1970s Alevi youth had rejected the religious side of Alevism but had appreciated its history as a rebellious movement against the Ottoman order. The sixties and seventies were the years in which Alevi became leftists by taking part of every kind of leftist association ranging from trade unions and parties to the underground radical leftist organizations. The failure of the leftist movement because of harsh oppression in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, as well as the collapse of socialism in many places after the dissolution of USSR in the late 1980s, reflected on Alevism first as a cultural and then a religious identity. This has manifested itself with the great curiosity demonstrated by Alevi for learning their own religious tradition. While Alevi found themselves a "warm home" in leftist organizations and the labor movement in the 1970s, Alevi redefined themselves as Alevi in the cultural/religious sense, in the late 1980s.

Alevi believe that they have neglected Alevism in the cultural/religious sense. There has been an effort to reclaim traditions and remark boundaries and calls to reconstruct Alevi culture, community and identity. A process of reinterpretation of Alevi history and religion has been initiated, culminating in an "invention of traditions" (Hobsbawn and Ranger [1983] 1992) accompanied by a "coming out" of Alevi from a centuries long practice of dissimulation. For the first time in the modern history of the Turkish Republic, Alevi have publicly accepted their stigmatized identity, articulated their collective interests towards the Turkish state, and demanded equality with the Sunni majority. In other words, Alevi have transformed their leftist affiliation of the 1970s into
a new consciousness of cultural and religious tradition.

Although the majority of Alevis were adherents of Marxism, positivism and Enlightenment Theory in the 1960s and 1970s, these ideologies were not considered to be organically linked to Alevism. The conventional Alevi wisdom was that Alevism had to be abandoned in favor of these new secular ideologies and identities. Currently, Alevis express the idea that Alevism in reality means "democratic, progressive and secular systems of thought." This idea has received much support from secularists in Turkey, especially from the state and the army, which have tried to slow the rise of Islamism and its manifestations on politics.

Two violent attacks against the Alevi community occurred in Sivas and Istanbul in 1993 and 1995, respectively. On July 2 1993, in Sivas, a mob, which had dispersed from various mosques after Friday prayers set fire to the hotel hosting attendees of an Alevi cultural festival. The participants in the hotel were unable to escape from the surrounded hotel, which burned, killing 37 people and injuring 60. As Gould (1995: 19) puts it correctly, “critical events can set the stage of mobilization not because they create collective identities that were none existed before, but because they rearrange the priority ranking of social identifications that already matter to people in varying degrees.” A sharp increase occurred in the number of Alevi associations and their members both in Turkey and the European diaspora (especially in Germany).

Two years later, on March 12 1995, three gunmen in a taxi cab randomly shot into coffeehouses and a patisserie in the poor Alevi neighborhood of Gazi in Istanbul. Two people were killed. The police confronted an Alevi crowd, which tried to protest this incident in front of the local police station, with live ammunition. The police employed violence to disperse Alevis participating in protest marches in connection with the events in Gazi, Ümraniye, and other Alevi neighborhoods in İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir.
throughout March 13-15. Police bullets killed at least 20 people, the majority of which comprised young Alevi, in the aftermath of the Gazi incident.

These violent attacks against the Alevi community reinforced and radicalized the Alevi movement and pushed Alevi to reexamine and be cautious in their relations with the state. These incidents are "suddenly imposed grievances" (Walsh 1981), which refers to the dramatic events that are highly publicized, and often unexpected events such as manmade disasters or official violence that lead to increase public awareness of and opposition to particular grievances. As the number of Alevi associations increased sharply, Alevi of all ages rushed to be members after the Sivas and Gazi incidents.

Another salient movement of the 1980s and 1990s has been the Kurdish movement that introduced the "Kurdish question" to Turkey's political and social environment. The Kurdish movement has affected both Alevi Turks and Kurds. Because approximately 10 to 20 percent of Kurds are Alevi, the Kurdish nationalist movement has affected discourses on Alevism. Alevi strongly stress their unquestioned support for the Kemalist principles of secularism and the unity of the state, and try to locate their position vis-à-vis the Kurdish question with appropriate political frames. Siding with the Kurdish movement or the nationalist Turkish movement against the Kurdish movement is both problematic for a majority of Alevi. Until recently, ethnic/national identity, i.e. being Turkish, Kurdish, or Zaza Alevi, had never played an important role, because Alevi had primarily defined their identity based on religious categories. The discussion of Turkish and Kurdish identities which has nation-oriented connotations affected Alevism deeply. The common symbols of Alevism have now been divided along ethnic lines. As Haci Bektaş Veli, the commonly accepted patron saint of Alevi, has been transformed into the patron saint of Turkish nationalism, the 16th century poet and rebel, Pir Sultan Abdal, has become the symbol for Alevi who insist on their Kurdish identity.
prior to their Alevi identity (Çamuroğlu 1997).

Another interesting development has been an increase in the number of Alevi Kurds supporting the separatist Partia Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) (Kurdistan Workers Party) since 1994, although there had been less support before the 1990s (Bruinessein, 1996). The Turkish State has been pushing the definition of Alevism as a specifically Turkish form of Islam through state-sponsored publications and TV programs even to those Alevi Kurds. The PKK and Kurdish nationalists have tried to convince them their primary identity consists of being Kurd, and that Alevism has Iranian and Zoroastrian rather than Turkish roots.

All the developments discussed above were results of the changes, which have been going on in Turkey since the second half of the 1980s. These changes came with the relative liberalization in economic and political spheres by the lifting of bans imposed during the 1980 military coup over political activities, especially lifting of the bans over associations in 1989. With the economic and political liberalization, Turkey has experienced a cultural transformation, which had in some respects called into question the 'official' Kemalist ideology and given visibility and a voice to what has been referred to as the “other” Turkey. Diverse ethnic (Kurdish, Laz, Bosnian, Caucasian, Crimean Tatar, etc.) and religious identities (Sunni and Alevi) have begun to be asserted. In the place of the previously assumed uniformity, there is now a new awareness of complexity and diversity within Turkish identity. This awareness is also apparent, in distinctive ways, among the diaspora communities of Turkey, for whom Turkish cultural and political life remains the fundamental reference point. Because the ethnic, religious and political divisions of Turkey are replicated abroad, the immigrants from Turkey have organized

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4The concept of Turkish denies the ethnic plurality in Turkey and abroad. I use the term ‘Turkish citizens’ or “Turkish nationals” referring both Turks and Kurds of Turkey.
along ethnic (Kurds vs. Turks), religious (Sunni vs. Alevi), ideological (Left vs. Right), regional and linguistic lines.

Democratic openings in Turkey in 1988/1989 broke old taboos and opened up public discussions of these taboos in the media. Publications that would never have been permitted before appeared in bookstores. Along with other marginalized groups, Alevi intensified their political activism to get an official recognition of Alevism as a distinctive religious/cultural identity.

Method and Data

This dissertation has dealt with content, context, and process. The methods for the collection and the use of data were qualitative rather than quantitative. The dissertation data came from three major methodologies: historical analysis, intense media investigation, and field research. Using three methodologies has made it possible to understand the revival of Alevism from different angles. Triangulation of these three methods enabled the study to switch its angle to investigate different aspects of the revival of Alevism in the late 1980s and 1990s.

The first method, historical analysis captured the emergence and transformation of Alevism and Alevi identity within the complex and contradictory interaction between the state and its Alevi subjects within the changing social and political circumstances. The state-Alevi interaction since the foundation period of the Ottoman Empire was analyzed. In this way, both the changing attitude of the State toward its Alevi subjects and action strategies of Alevis within the changing social and political environment was examined. I performed extensive literature survey on Alevism and its historical antecedents on the context of the state, and ethnic and religious relations in Turkey. Historical analysis also provided a way of understanding macro level trends of Turkish society. By macro level trends, I mean urbanization, massive migration to cities and advanced countries, and the
transition to the multi-party system in the post WWII era.

In intensive media research, the newspaper series appeared in major newspaper, the media coverage of the political activities of Alevi associations, mass media reports, journal articles, governments reports, and transcripts of debates concerning the political activities of Alevi organizations in Turkey and Europe were collected. The Alevi periodicals, some of which are published by the Alevi associations such as Alevilerin Sesi, Pir Sultan Abdal, Yol have been collected. This media investigation supported the process of mapping out the transnational network constellations of Alevi voluntary associations in Turkey and Europe and their political, social and cultural activities. The violent attacks against Alevis in 1993 in Sivas and in 1995 in Istanbul were documented by media investigation as well.

The data I used to document the contemporary Alevi policies of the Turkish state were based on the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Turkey Grand National Assembly) records between 1990 and 2000 and the collection of the speeches of state officials at Alevi cultural festivals, symposiums and newspapers. The activities and publications of the Ministry of Culture were also documented within the context of the recent Alevi policies of the Turkish state.

Data collection of the ethnographic fieldwork has taken three forms. Fieldwork supplemented the analysis of texts and events, and consisted of in-depth interviews with representative participants and key informants and participant observation at various sites. All three forms were used to map out and to demonstrate formation and expansion of networks of Alevis at national and transnational scales. Because there was no secondary data on the Alevi network ties, the fieldwork and the intensive media research were the only ways to figure out them.

The fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted at three sites: Turkey, Germany
and USA. Although the fieldwork in the USA was not planned in the dissertation project that focused on the Alevi movement in Turkey and Europe; when a group of Alevis started to found an Alevi association in New York, I was allowed to make participant observation in the meetings. I conducted participant observation in the American Alevi Culture Center of New York for four months (09/98-12/98). This association did not have a long life, disestablishing in 1999. The data I got from this association was used to make comparisons and to see how the transnational forms of association expand among Alevis living in different locations of the world. I participated in weekly meetings, informal gatherings, and the first general congress by which members elected the executive council of the association, and I interviewed the leaders and members.

I conducted fieldwork in Germany (Cologne and Berlin) and Turkey (Ankara, Istanbul) in 1999 (June-August) and 2000 (April-June). Germany was selected for two reasons. The first, Germany hosts the largest group of Turkish nationals in Europe. As a result, it has the largest number of Alevi associations. The second, the European Alevi Unions Federation and the European Alevi Academy were located in Germany. The selected cities were Cologne and Berlin. The headquarters of the European Alevi Unions Federation was located in Cologne, while Berlin hosts the largest group of Turkish nationals, as well as the highest number of Alevi associations, and an Alevi radio.

Ankara and Istanbul were the selected cities for the fieldwork in Turkey, because they host the largest number of Alevi associations and Alevi political and cultural activities. The headquarters of the major Alevi associations, as well as the Alevi Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği, are located in Ankara. Istanbul hosts the largest number of Alevi associations, cemevis, as well as the publication activities of Alevis.

Although the town of Hacı Bektaş was not a selected site for fieldwork, I conducted field research in this small town for four days. Hacı Bektaş who lived in this
town in the thirteenth century is a patron saint of Bektaşis and Alevis. Since 1990 the town of Hacı Bektaş has hosted a state sponsored cultural festival. The president, the prime minister, politicians, Alevi associations, Alevis all around Turkey and Europe came together in this festival on August 16-18. In 1999, the Alevi Bektaşi Temsilciler Meclisi (Alevi Bektaşi Representatives Assembly) held their first congress in this small town on August 12-13. I followed this congress hosting Alevi leaders all around Turkey and Europe, and then the cultural festival on August 16-17. The Alevi cultural festivals such as the state sponsored Hacı Bektaş Veli festivities, are important public sites in which to investigate the intersection of the Turkish state, Alevi activists and media. The numbers of Alevi cultural festivals, which are increasing since the late 1980s, are important sites for the construction of a 'public Alevi identity.'

The major component of the fieldwork data came from in-depth interviews with the heads, members of Alevi associations and participant observation at festivals, congresses, symposiums, regular and informal meetings, and religious gatherings. Another component was the collection of the by-laws, the programs, publications, calendars, and monthly periodicals of various Alevi associations.

**Organization of Dissertation Chapters**

The first chapter of the dissertation is an historical tour on the emergence and evolution of the Alevi identity within the state-society interaction since the thirteenth century. It covers three major historical periods, before the Ottomans, the Ottoman centuries and the Republican era.

The following chapter explains the conceptual tools that have been used in the analysis of the Alevi movement since the late 1980s. The theoretical model that has three

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5 The festival was intended to continue three days but because of the major earthquake that struck Turkey on August 17 all subsequent activities were cancelled.
conceptual tools, networks, social and political opportunity structure, and communicative praxis, is developed.

The third chapter deals with the question of how migration that caused the emergence and expansion of Alevi networks in the urban areas of Turkey and Europe shifted the social and spatial dimensions of culture and the identity forming process. The migration to urban areas of Turkey and Europe is examined, with special consideration given to the emergence of transnational Alevi networks.

Chapter four documents the social and political opportunity structures in the revival of Alevism. In this part the role of the state in the Alevi revival is central. The social and political opportunities provided by migration, the ethnic religious interaction between Sunnis and Alevis in urban areas, proliferation of transnational social and political practices, the supranational organizations and the privatization of television and radio are among the factors discussed within the context of social and political opportunity structures.

In chapter five, the communicative praxis of various actors shaping Alevism in contemporary public political realms are detailed. Transforming Alevism from oral secrecy to written publicity is demonstrated by examining discourses, expressive cultural elements of Alevism, such as music and dance performance, cultural festivals and media appearance. The formalization of Alevism in Turkey and Europe is discussed.

The concluding chapter summarizes and highlights the major arguments developed in each chapter. Specific attention is given to the roles played by transnationalism and the state as well as their interactions.
CHAPTER I

A Social Historical Approach to the State-Society Relations: The Emergence and Evolution of Alevism

The aim of this chapter is to generate an understanding of how categorical identities are constructed through complex interactions among various actors. In an analysis of the emergence of Alevism and its identity, I take a relational (Cohen A. P. 1985; Emirbayer 1997; Tilly 1995) and historical (Ikegami 1999; Tilly 1995, 1997) approach. It is relational in the sense that Alevi identity is located in connection to the state and other social forces. It is historical by putting emphasis on the "path dependent accretion of memories, understandings and means of action within particular identities" (Tilly 1995: 5).

In this historical analysis, I put an emphasis on the state-society interaction. Because identities are related to political hegemony over time (Morris 1992), the state that has claimed hegemony over a certain territory plays a crucial role in constructing and shaping categorical identities. The state-society interaction has taken the form of struggle operating in the cultural sphere, where the formation of distinctions, boundaries and categorical identities are in the “making.” The state and society interaction in the form of cultural struggle reorganizes the webs of interaction and group affiliation (Hall 1992).
Definitions and boundaries of center-periphery, orthodoxy-heterodoxy, and religious or ethnic identities come into existence through the state-society interaction (Ikegami 1999). In this respect the processes of state formation and state consolidation impacted on the construction of the distinctions, boundaries, and categorical identities.

The Ottoman State formation and consolidation were decisive in the emergence and evolution of Alevism. Its identity is an articulation of a series of events in the forms of contentious actions. Once emerged, the Alevi identity has been in a constant process of (re)defining and (re)positioning itself vis-à-vis the state, both in the Ottoman and the Republican era. By arguing in this way, I have no intention to claim that the state is the absolute power over the state-society interaction. The state-society interaction operates as both sides shape and are shaped by one another.

In the state-society interaction out of which Alevi identity emerged, there were three major events that paved the way for Alevism to evolve as a secret religious creed with a particular social organization. These were the Babai rebellion in the thirteenth century, the Sheik Bedreddin uprising in the fifteenth century and the Safavid-Ottoman rivalry resulted in the Kızılbaş\(^1\) persecution of the sixteenth century.

**Before the Ottomans: Dervishes and the Babai Movement**

Turkmen tribes (nomads), migrated from the central Asia, dominated central and eastern Anatolia for centuries with their Muslim religious warriors (ghazi) spearheading drives against Christian Byzantines and Slavs. In the early thirteenth century the Mongol invasion drove out Turcoman tribes and settled populations from the Transsaxonia, Iran and Azarbeijan into Asia Minor (İnalçık 1980, Kusha 1990-1991). These Turkmen tribes were pushed to the frontier (uç) zones by the Seljuk central state administration, while the raids for booty in the Christian lands and search for new pastures were the catalysts. The

\(^{1}\)The historical name of today's Alevi.

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population pressure posed by the migration waves of those who were running from the Mongols increased the conflicts over the scarce resources, such as pasture land and caused the first Turcoman revolt in 1239-41 against the central authority of Seljuks (İnalçık 1980). Two years later, the Mongols invaded Asia Minor and defeated the Seljuks in 1243 in Kösedag. The Seljuk State (Sunni Sultanate before the Ottomans) had already shaken by the great Babai revolt of Turcomans.

The major characteristic of this period was that the process of Islamization had been carried out by the new class of holy men known as baba (father) or abdal (mystic), who represented various minor Sufi traditions. Babas and abdals flocked to Anatolia with the migration waves since the eleventh century. They functioned as the social and spiritual centers of the Turcomans. The babas and abdals, who had professed every known type of Islam, provided the impulse and manpower supporting many revolts from the Babai revolt to the great Shiite movement of the Safavids that led a series of Kızılbaş uprisings in the sixteenth century.

The Babai revolt was a severe challenge to the Seljuk central state two years before the Mongol invasion that destroyed the weakened Seljuk State. Baba İshak, a disciple of Baba Ilyas, led this first Turcoman revolt in which men, women and children actively fought in the wars against the Seljuk central authority. The Turcoman uprising spread to a wide area from Amasya to Malatya, Sivas, Tokat, and Çorum. Although there is no consensus over the cause of the revolt among historians, economic and political reasons emerged as a result of population pressure and tension between nomad and settled social forces seemed responsible (İnalçık 1973; Ocak 1980, 1998).

The revolt was important to see the impacts of the heterodox dervishes in Asia Minor at that period. Baba İlyas, known as Baba Resulallah (prophet-God) among his Turcoman followers claimed his prophecy and promised social order based on equality.
With this announced prophecy, the revolt turned into a messianic movement. Baba İlyas had come from Horasan founded his lodge in a village near Amasya in the central Anatolia and became an influential figure among Turcomans. His Turcoman followers, who were around six thousand devoted and strong men, inflicted serious blows to the Seljuk army. The fear of the Babais was so great that even the Seljuk Sultan left his capital during the heyday of the uprising. The Seljuks eventually managed to suppress this revolt by a huge army including the paid Franks and Georgian troops. The rebels, regardless of men, women and children were put to death. The rigorous suppression and persecution of those involved in the uprisings led many dervishes who were close to Babais to escape to the Western Marches, where Turcomans formed the majority of the population and where the Turcoman beys (chiefs) welcomed them.

The Babai movement started as a revolt against the central authority, but turned into a religious order. The Babaism clothed in Sufi garb paved the way for the extreme Shiite and other Sufi orders in Asia Minor. Many historians pointed out extremist Shiite views of the Babais, various other dervishes, and their followers among the tribefolk in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Birge 1937; Hasluck 1929; İnalci 1973; Köprülü [1935] 1991; Karamustafa 1994; Zarinebaf-Shahr 1997). The genesis of the present day Alevism and Bektasism lies in the Babai movement (Ocak 1980, 1996). By gathering various and disperse heterodox elements around the movement, the Babai revolt centralized the heterodox elements in Asia Minor (Ocak 1996).

The Mongol invasion and collapse of the Seljuk State promoted centrifugal tendencies that reflected on the emergence of various small beyliks (principalities), one of which was the Ottoman, fighting over the political power. The absence of a central authority and well-defined territorial boundaries, made Asia Minor a fertile ground for the growth of the various popular religious orders, some of which had strong Shiite
tendencies. The confused political state of affairs was reflected in a similarly confused state of religious growth and development (Trimingham 1971).

After the Mongol invasion that destroyed the Seljuk State and traumatized Asia Minor for decades, two disciples of Baba Ilyas, founded their lodges and continued his teachings: one by Hacı Bektaştı who did not take part in the uprising and other by Edebali, who later became Osman's (the first Ottoman ruler) father-in-law. Hacı Bektaştı, who was a disciple of Baba Ilyas became a fountainhead figure of the Bektashi Order, whose association with the Janissary troops, the standing army of the Ottoman, has been studied extensively (see Birge 1937; Brown 1867; Faroqhi 1976, 1993, 1995; Hasluck 1929, Karamustafa 1994; Ocak 1992; Teftik 1992).

*The Ottoman Centuries*

The Ottomans, who were the frontier chieftdom engaging wars against the Christians and Slavs, were politically adept at using the diversity of the religious orders of various groups in Asia Minor in their state formation. They tolerated the charismatic religious leaders of various mystical Sufi orders and took advantage of these charismatic leaders' power in the formative years. This latitudinarianism was one of the reasons for the success of the Ottomans in their early state formation process (see Kafadar 1995). These religious leaders, who were scattered throughout Asia Minor and the Balkans, were used in invading and settling conquered lands for the Ottoman State, which effectively became territory in which they could impose their religious philosophies. Charismatic religious leaders, then, were agents of the Ottoman State and helped in the formative years.

The majority of dervishes in the frontier were those who escaped and dispersed in various locations of Anatolia after the Babai revolt. They developed close relations with the first Ottoman rulers, Osman, Orhan and Murat by taking part in wars against infidels

This demonstrated that there existed an oral political contract between the early Ottoman rulers and dervish sheiks (Ocak 1998). The Ottomans balanced their newly founded and not yet stabilized political authority with these spiritual and religious leaders, who were followers of heterodox forms of Islam. By sending these groups to the war, the Ottomans succeeded (1) to use them as the ready-forces in battle, and (2) to control these groups, who could cause a social unrest because of their unstable structure and grassroots membership (Ocak 1998).

These heterodox dervishes, babas and abdals, their internal networks and close ties to Turcoman tribes and villages were instrumental for the genesis of the internal social and hierarchical structure of Alevis. The institution of dede (lit. tr. grandfather) referring to the spiritual leadership or priestly caste of Alevis was rooted in these early babas and abdals. Dedes claimed descendants of one of these babas and abdals for their spiritual supremacy over talibs (followers). The genealogy of dede must go back to one of the twelve imams through these dervishes. The holy lineage that a dede belongs to is called oacak (hearth). The connection to one of the Imams came with the Safavid influence in the sixteenth century. Dedes have superiority of having esoteric knowledge, beliefs, rituals and practices. Today a majority of Alevi ockaks is known by names of these early babas and abdals. As the Ottoman state centralization and consolidation projects began to draw the boundaries and distinctions between heterodoxy and
orthodoxy, this internal hereditary organization of Alevi communities evolved and institutionalized.

Until the fifteenth century there was no clear cut categorization of orthodoxy or heterodoxy in the absence of a state that was interested in defining and enforcing the orthodoxy and correcting ruthlessly those who violated it. In an area without clear cut territorial and religious boundaries and distinctions, the Ottoman frontier chieftdom was able to use these social and political circumstances for their own ends while shaping and taming it to fit their state-forming and consolidation projects (Kafadar 1995).

The tension between gazi-warrior dervishes and the Ottomans started in the third quarter of the fourteenth century, when the Ottomans invented their centralizing technology during or right after 1370 to control the centrifugal tendencies and to claim their charge in the frontier. Murat I (1362-1389) founded the standing army, the Janissaries, and the first time he appointed a kadiasker (military judge) and üç beyleri (lords of frontier). These were important steps toward the centralized state. With a great chance of having the first standing army, the Janissaries, the Ottomans succeeded to expand to the heart of European land. The creation of the Janissary troops that consisted of youths from the slave backgrounds, mainly the Christian children of Balkans was the cornerstone of the Ottoman State formation and consolidation processes.

The Bektaşi Order was made the spiritual and religious guidance of the Janissary troops. Although the relationship between the order and the Janissaries is not clear yet, the headpiece of the Janissaries was related to the Bektaşi Order (Birge 1937; Brown 1867; Faroqui 1976, 1993, 1995; Hasluck 1929; İnalcık 1973; Karamustafa 1994; Ocak 1992; Rycaut 1668; Tefft 1992). Using the dervish to inspire the troops in battle must have paved the way of the association of the Janissaries and Bektaşis. In the formative years, the Ottoman State needed to find legitimacy and an institution for the mix of
Christians and Muslims, heterodox and orthodox. The Bektaşi Order was well qualified for bringing Muslims and Christian elements together as well as the heterodox and orthodox Sunni because of its tolerant and syncretistic system of beliefs (Ataseven 1997).

As the Ottoman state moved to sedentary bureaucracy and principles, the early Gaza ideal lost its appeal and posed even a threat to the centralization project of the Ottomans. The creation of the Janissaries led to a decline in the need for Turcomans and gazi-warrior dervishes in the army. The beginning of the land and census registry was the step toward the sedentarization of the population to make these Turcoman tribes easily taxable (Lindner 1983). Because of their centralization and consolidation projects, the Ottomans were breaking up with the earlier alliances to the Turcomans (nomads) and gazi warrior dervishes, while they constructed new alliances with the new social forces within the Ottoman polity. This reflected on social, political and cultural spheres, while it fuelled many social upheavals.

It was in the Bayezid I's (1389-1402) reign that Orthodox Islam and classical Islamic culture, aided by a policy of centralization, became strong. Foundation of madrasas (Islamic schools of higher education) in the newly conquered cities, such as Bursa and Edirne since the early years of the Ottoman state formation, and appointing madrasa educated kâdis (judges) to the provinces as a part of the centralization process were indicators of the Ottoman's preference of official Sunni Islam over the heterodox orders. Once the center and its rules were defined, the outside of this universe became the periphery, the dominated, and the heterodoxy.

In 1402, the second Mongol invasion led by Timurlane, who defeated the Ottoman army and took captive of Bayezid I in a battle near Ankara, interrupted the centralization project of the Ottomans. Once again the Mongol invasion threw Asia Minor into social and political chaos. The Ottoman Sultan died under the captivity. The
interregnum period (1402-1413) promoting the centrifugal tendencies was the era of social and political uprisings with heretical religious movements spreading throughout Ottoman territory, while the sons of Bayezid were fighting over the throne. These uncertain political and social circumstances produced once again a perfect ground for the religious enthusiasm that fuelled social upheavals.

Sheik Bedreddin's movement was the most influential one. Bedreddin was a son of a Greek mother and a gazi in the frontier march (Gökyay 1994; İnalcık 1973; Kafadar 1995; Ocak 1998). He was a great scholar, mystic and saint. Bedreddin served as a chief judge, when the prince Musa governed the Balkans. But after Mehmet I succeeded over the throne, he was exiled with his family to İzmir with a pension. Bedreddin started to spread his doctrines through his disciples Börklüce Mustafa and Torlak Kemal, who were also spreading his prophecy. His latitudinarian and esoteric interpretation of Islam allowed him to form a single society from diverse elements. Bedreddin's disciples gathered many followers; the majority of them were Turcomans, dervishes and poor Muslim, Christian and Jewish peasants. Their preaching was heterodox enough to appeal non-Muslims. Rycaut (1668: 223), an English ambassador for the Mehmet IV, wrote that "Bedreddin and his disciples preached people "freedom and liberty of conscience, and the mystery of revelations."

Börklüce Mustafa instigated a revolt in Karaburun near İzmir, while Torlak Kemal revoluted in Manisa. Their Turcoman followers were revolting against the strengthened centralization and Sunnification of the Ottoman political administration. The Ottoman armies harshly suppressed these revolts, and rebellious Turcomans, were put to death with their leaders in 1416. Bedreddin left to Wallachia, from where he went to Dobruja and stayed in San Saltuk lodge. Eventually he was captured in Deliorman (Bulgaria), taken to Serez (West Anatolia), where he was executed in 1416 (or 1420).
Bedreddin’s followers included frontier gazis, dispossessed timar (fief) owners (who received their timars when Bedreddin was Musa’s chief judge and lost their timars when Mehmet I became Sultan), dispossessed sipahis (cavalry), madrasa students and Christians lords whose lands were taken by the Ottoman central administration. They took part and embraced the messianic call of the Sheik who promised to return their lost back, promised land for those without land, and allowed drinking of wine. As late as the 1571 the Imperial court condemned these sectaries to galleys, describing them as "incapable of reform." There were sporadic reports on the Bedreddinin's suspicious gatherings and heterodox beliefs and practices (see Imber 1979).

The Bedreddin uprising demonstrated common characteristics of the Babai revolt in the thirteenth century. Like the Babai movement, the Bedrettin uprising started as socio-political movement and transformed into a mystical religious movement. A group, known as Bedreddinis emerged and paved the way of Balkan Alevism, in which the cult of Sheik Bedreddin has stayed its center (Ocak 1998). Bedreddinin were defined as heretics in ferves (formal religious ordinances) written by Ebussuud in the sixteenth century (Düzdağ 1983). Historical documents portrayed Bedreddinis as followers of heterodox beliefs and practices, such as secretly gathering together (men and women) and drinking wine (Imber 1979, Ocak 1998). In the Ottoman official documents, Bedreddinin were regarded as identical and connected to Kızılbaş groups.

The prominent historian İnalcık (1973) argues that even though the fundamental reasons were social and political, the popular uprisings took the form of heretical religious movements since the Babai revolt. I argue that these contentious actions were articulated in social boundaries that “divide and separate the real manifold processes of interaction and social relationships” (Eisenstandt and Giesen 1995: 74).

After the suppression of the Bedreddin revolt the centralization of the Ottoman
State continued. The strong opposition to the centralization policy of the Ottomans in the Central Anatolian steppes, the Taurus Mountains and the highlands of Tokat and Sivas began to come to the surface in the form of rebellious activities. The Ottomans attempted to take control of these tribes in order to protect the settled population and maintain its revenues by recording them in its cadastral registers and subjecting them to systematic taxation. The tribes that the Ottomans wanted to control were usually fanatic adherents of various dervish orders, which were far away from the Sunni Orthodoxy toward which that of the Ottoman State was moving.

Around 1500 a new state founded by Shah Ismail, descendant of a family of Shaik from Ardabil and blood relative of Uzun Hasan, wrested power from the Akkoynulu Empire ruling the Eastern Anatolia, Azarbeijan, and Iran. Being a leader of a mystical religious order of Safavid, the influence of Shah Ismail extended to Anatolian Turcomans. Shah Ismail and his early ancestors, Junayd and Haydar, sent emissaries, agents, and informants to Anatolia to preach the Safavid cause and recruit supporters. They carried out the Safavid propaganda with a well-established network of emissaries, informants, and spies in the Ottoman land between 1480 and 1514. These missionary activities of the hereditary leaders of the Safavid order planted the seeds of the "Kızılbaş" uprisings in the Ottoman land. The term 'Kızılbaş' (red head) was drawn from the red headpiece with twelve gores commemorating the Twelve Imams. Since Shaik Haydar the red headpiece was used to show adherence to the Safavid order and later to the Shah. It became the distinctive mark of the supporters of the Safavid house. The Ottomans referred the Safavid followers "Kızılbaş." Since then Kızılbaş has been used in a pejorative sense (Melikoff 1975, 1993, 1998). Under the subtitle of "Heresies and Sects," Rycaut (1668), defined Kızılbaş as "Persian heretics," who were of "bad esteem and reputation, corrupted in all points of doctrine and manners" (1668: 240).
The Ottoman’s harsh taxation policy on the nomads to sedentarize them made the Shah's call more attractive. As the Ottomans moved toward the sedentary bureaucracy and principles, they strengthened their alliances to the sedentary social forces and earlier alliances to the Turcomans were dissolved. The decaying social and political conditions and status of Turcomans, who were once important in the formative years of the Ottoman State, pushed them toward the Safavids. Turcoman tribes of Anatolia served in the first rank of the Safavid's military units, and most of the nomad chiefs got high positions in the Shah’s council (Allouche 1983; Mazzouï 1972; Savory 1980; Sümer [1973] 1992). An unwelcome element of the Ottoman state’s centralization, Turcomans tribes, found a niche as Safavi warriors in Anatolia irredenta (Lindner 1983).

Bayezid II’s reign was peaceful enough that movements of a strongly Shiite religious character almost had no intervention during the Ottoman Dynasty. This situation changed when the Shah Kulu revolt occurred in the last years of Bayezid II’s reign. The revolt turned the relations between these two states into a serious rivalry (see Allouche 1983).

With this revolt, Shah Ismail, who became both the political and religious leader of the Anatolian Turcomans, transformed the emissary activities of the Safavids in Anatolia into a series of uprisings instigated by his Safavid agents and their followers. The revolt of Shah Kulu was an early revolt of Shah’s follower in the region of Tekke. Shah Kulu (servant of Shah), known as Şeytan Kulu (servant of the devil) in the Ottoman chronicles, revolted in the highlands of Western Anatolia. Shah Kulu's father, Haydar, had served Ismail's ancestors, Junayd and Haydar, and raised a large number of Kızılbaş followers in the region. Shah Kulu's uprising started in Tekke and spread to Adalia, and many Kızılbaş followers, Torlak dervishes, and the discontented sipahis joined him. The uprising spread and rebels confronted the Ottoman armies many times. Around fifty
thousand people died during the Shah Kulu uprising in Anatolia (Tekindağ 1967). Bayezid II ordered the deportation of a large number of the pro-Safavids (Kızılbaş) to the newly conquered Coron and Modon in Peloponnesus (Greece) after the revolt. This revolt was a clear indication of the ability of Safavid leaders to manipulate their Kızılbaş followers in Anatolia, a serious threat to the Ottoman state.

Following the Shah Kulu revolt, Shah Ismail continued to instigate revolts in the Ottoman land. The fight among Bayezid II's three sons for succession gave Shah Ismail an opportunity to continue his interference to the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Through a well-established network of emissaries and spies, the Safavid leader was informed about the new developments in the Ottoman Empire (see Tekindağ 1967).

Selim I, "the Grim," who succeeded by the support of the Janissaries and by defeating his brothers, started his well-planned campaign against Shah Ismail and his Kızılbaş followers in Anatolia. His first action was to send officials to register all the Kızılbaş in the Ottoman land. Selim I received two fetvas (formal religious ordinances) by influential theologians, Hamza Sürü Görez and Kemal Paşazade, condemning Kızılbaş and sanctioning their persecution before focusing on the campaign. Both of the fetvas declared that a Muslim's individual duty was to kill the followers of Shah Ismail. In Hamza's fetva, Kızılbaş were identified as "unbelievers" and "heretics" (Tekindağ 1967). Kemalpaşazade defined them as non-Muslim infidels and quoted a Quranic verse to demonstrate it was duty of the Sultan to fight against these unbelievers. With these fetvas the Ottomans proclaimed themselves the defenders of Sunni Islam against the Safavid Shi'a State and the related heterodox sects and orders.

Selim I started his campaign against Iran with these fetvas giving a legal justification for fighting against the Kızılbaş "infidels." The first step was the persecution of the forty thousand registered Kızılbaş and forced deportation to the
Balkans. Then, he moved the army to Persia to meet Shah Ismail. The Ottoman and the Safavid armies met in Çaldıran—on the eastern side of the Euphrates—where the Safavids were defeated. Selim I expanded the borders of the Ottoman State by annexing Syria, Egypt and Arabia. The significant outcome of this annexation was capturing the title of caliph by the Ottoman Sultan, who was since then protector of holy cities of Muslims, Mecca and Medina, and the pilgrimage routes. With this title, the Ottoman Sultan was ‘Caliph of all Muslims on Earth’ (*Halife-i Muslimin*).

Overtaking the caliphate by the Ottoman Sultans brought a severe distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. There had been no clear-cut separation of heterodoxy from the orthodoxy until the sixteenth century in the Ottoman State (Kafadar 1995). Although the Ottoman State began its concern with orthodoxy and engaged in correcting others in varying degrees, it did not need to correct the Islam of its subjects ruthlessly until the Safavid State posed a serious threat by sending its emissaries to Anatolia. In the absence of a threat, the Ottoman state felt no reason to correct Islam of its subjects or define orthodoxy or heterodoxy in strict terms within its territory (Kafadar 1995). Unlike Europe, there was no central religious authority to impose a dogmatic view of Islam upon Muslim subjects in the Ottoman land. Even after the Sultan captured the title of caliph and the empowerment of *ulema* (religious scholar), the religious authorities were still bureaucrat of the central administration.

The persecution of the Kızılbaş severely damaged the Kızılbaş communities, but failed to end the uprisings completely. There were many other revolts through the sixteenth century, such as the Shah Veli revolt in Tokat and Sivas in 1519, the Kalender Çelebi revolt of 1526 which was as widespread as the Shah Kulu revolt in 1511 and the Pir Sultan Abdal2 revolt in association to the false Ismail uprising around 1578.

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2One of the seven great poets of Alevis. His poems demonstrated the great desire to go to the “shah.” As
The Safavids continued their missionary activities in the Ottoman land after the Çaldıran defeat. Shah Tahmasp (1523-1578) had a special office to train and appoint the agents to carry propaganda among the discontented inhabitants of Anatolia, to instigate rebellion and to gather financial and political support for the Safavid Shah (Allouche 1983; Mazzouì 1972; Savory 1980). Many Turcomans continued to support the Safavid Shah and many migrated to Iran. These activities led to three major campaigns into Iran by Süleyman the Magnificent between 1533-1555, while the suppression and persecution of Kızılbaş continued.

Evidently, Kızılbaş were persecuted even fifty years after the Çaldıran (see Imber 1979, Zarinebaf-Shahr 1997). The term Kızılbaş, in the Ottoman official language, refers to a rebel heretic, who is suspected of having connections with the Safavids in Iran. In 1581 the imperial council send the governor and the judge of Amasya and several judges of Rum a command for a general investigation of the Kızılbaş in the towns and villages of the region. The imperial command listed criteria to identify heretics:

Firstly 'they curse and revile the Four Chosen Friends.' ...Secondly, 'they openly address Muslims with the words "Yezit geldi" ... Thirdly, 'they assemble at night bringing wives and daughters to their assemblies, where they have disposal of one another's wives and daughters.'...Fourthly, ‘they know neither prayer nor fasting.’....Fifthly "they never call their sons Abu Bakr, Umar or Uthman and, since none of them bear these names, it is clear that they are heretics" (Imber 1979: 261-262).

The first criterion was enough to be identified as Shiite and got a capital punishment. Association of all Sunnis with Yezit\(^3\) is still common among Shiiis and Alevis too. The accusation of sexual immorality refers to Kızılbaş ceremonies, which

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\(^3\)Yezit killed Hussein, the third Imam and grandson of Mohammed, in 680 in Kerbala.
were not sex-segregated as opposed to the Sunni Orthodoxy. These accusations have continued even in contemporary Turkey. Although these misbeliefs can be seen in many heretical groups, the Kızılbaş's association to Safavids and allegiance to the Shah made them a threat. Defining Kızılbaş as heretics with various accusations could be evaluated as a "social construction of enemy," (Aho 1994) by the state. Amasya, Kastamonu, Çorum, Zile, and Malatya in the eastern and central Anatolia were the hotbeds of the persecution during the last decades of the 16th century. These locations coincided the locations of the Babai revolt of Turcomans three hundreds years ago.

The persecution of Kızılbaş was a clear indication of a changing relationship between the center and periphery in the Ottoman Anatolia during the turbulent sixteenth century. When the state started to define itself with the Sunni Orthodoxy, earlier overlapping and diffused religious boundaries of Anatolia had been redefined vis-à-vis the central state and found themselves on the margins (Zarinebaff-Shahr 1997). When the Ottoman moved to adopt the Orthodox Sunni Islam as an official religion, its tolerant and inclusive attitude toward the heterodoxy terminated in the sixteenth century. Issuing more than one hundred imperial orders to the provincial officials to search the Kızılbaş fifty years after the Çaldıran demonstrated that the Ottoman State defined Kızılbaş as its most suspicious subjects.

The loyalty of subject and the legitimacy of the regime were reflected in the total acceptance of one version of Islam, Sunnism. The Muslim subjects had to show their loyalty to the regime by conforming to Sunni orthodoxy. Nonconformity, by definition, was deviating from these values of society. A dissenter was considered heretic, traitor and social pariah. The central state enforced Sunni Orthodox Islam against Kızılbaş and other related heretical orders. In that way, it consolidated and legitimized the position of its regime.
The Kızılbaş-hunting, persecution, exile and various campaigns against Persia eventually made Kızılbaş communities militarily, politically and religiously separated from their source in Iran. The Kızılbaş population decreased and many of them assimilated into the dominant, Sunni Ottoman culture. Following the severe persecution and massacres by the Ottomans, which continued into the 18th century, Kızılbaş went underground using dissimulation as a means for self-protection. They retreated to isolated rural areas, usually infertile, mountainous, hard to reach regions. Kızılbaş groups turned more and more inward, developing their unique structures and doctrines. Kızılbaş persecution increased secrecy and their beliefs took gnostic forms: secret teachings revealed by esoteric interpretations of sacred texts and ceremonies held by night in well protected places. In Scott’s (1990) conceptualization, these actions of Kızılbaş constituted “hidden transcripts.” A hidden transcript is “the discourse that emerges beyond the direct observation of powerholders” (Scott 1990: 4). Eschewing the Ottoman officials, the Kızılbaş groups did not go to kadıs, but solved their disputes in their secret religious gatherings that only community members could participate in. The religious gathering, "cem" or “ayin i cem,” of Kızılbaş groups functioned as a "public court," where they discussed and resolved the disputes under the leadership of dedes. The institution of düşkünlük (excommunication) was developed as a mechanism of punishment.

In the turbulent sixteenth century, Kızılbaş was harshly persecuted, but the position of Bektaşi Order stayed unchallenged. It was the only order professing Shia and had close ties with the central state. Sultan Selim I closed the order during the heyday of the Safavid rivalry. The order stayed closed until 1551 and repossessed its property and other rights after this time (Faroqhi 1976). From 1591 onwards, connection between the Janissaries and the Bektaşi Order was officially recognized; dervishes of the order
regularly quartered in the Janissaries barracks and marched with them in public processions and on campaign (Birge 1937; Faroqhi 1976, 1993, 1995; Hasluck 1929; İnalcık 1973). The Bektaşı order had avoided taking part in Kızılbaş uprisings. Faroqhi (1995) has stated that the Bektaşı Order, which gained generosity of the central administration toward the dervishes and lodges accused of heterodoxy, was instrumental to reintegrate Kızılbaş elements into the Ottoman state.

Although there were sporadic persecutions of Kızılbaş and heretics after the seventeenth century, Kızılbaş groups disappeared from the scene. In contrast, the Bektaşı Order continued to exist until the nineteenth century. In order to modernize the Ottoman army, Mahmut II (1808-39) destroyed the Janissaries troops and closed down the Bektaşı Order in 1826. Thousands of Janissaries were killed when their barracks were bombed, and those trying to escape were arrested and executed. With the help of the ulema the Bektaşi order was closed and its lodges were turned to the Nakşibendi Order (Sunni) for a period of time. The leaders and dervishes of the order were either sent to exile or persecuted. The order succeeded to recover partially and reactivated its major lodges in İstanbul in the late nineteenth century.

Since the nineteenth century, like other monarchies in Europe, the Ottoman state encountered the challenge of nationalism. This challenge was not only coming from its Christian subjects and ex-subjects in Balkans but also from its Muslim population. The Ottomanism that the state attempted to pursue, aimed at achieving legal and political equality and forming a homogenous Ottoman society. This resulted in a series of reforms. The Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerifi (Rose Garden Decree) was the beginning of transmission of the idea of rule of law from Europe to the Ottoman Empire by Aldülmeçid (1839-1861) in 1839. It was a public announcement that the Sultan would respect the rule of law (Deringil 1998). With this decree, the administrative and legal
reforms known as Tanzimat (restructuring) began. Tanzimat (1839-76) reforms eliminated the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim by granting security and freedom to all in terms of law, taxation, property, education and employment. Reforms included the Penal Code (1858), the institution of a secular legal system (1869) and the empowering the Ministry of Justice to control these courts. The Ottomanism could not prevent Christian subjects from separating from the Empire.

Under the pressure of "Young Ottomans" led by the constitutional reformist Mithad Pasha and the European power demanding reforms, the young Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909) ascended the throne, had to accept the constitutional reform, and set up a Constitutional Commission. The Kanun i Esasi (the Fundamental Law) was declared on December 23, 1876. The parliament opened in March 1877. The Ottoman parliamentarism could not live long, Abdulhamid II suspended the constitution in February 1878. The Sultan put his Islamism ideology into process to unite Muslim subjects of the Empire. The loss of European provinces, one after another, had a crucial impact on that.

The Pan-Islamism of the Hamidian period aimed at unifying all Muslims of the Ottoman state under the leadership of Caliph, Abdulhamid II. As the orthodoxy was highly pronounced, the heretical groups such as Yezidis, Kızıldaş, and Nusayris, as well as Iraqi Kurds became the targets of conversion to the Hanefi Sunni sect (Deringil 1998).

The Hamidian regime developed projects to convert Kızıldaş into Hanefi Islam. The aim was to teach Kızıldaş "true path of Islam." In this direction in 1890, the Ministry of Education was ordered to send preachers and religious books to the Kızıldaş of Sivas, because "the number of Kızıldaş in the area, while once quite small, has recently increased day by day as a result of their ignorance" (Deringil 1998: 82). In the same way the Kızıldaş population of Tokad was considered ignorant, needing to be "shown the
high path of enlightenment” by appointed preachers and textbooks instructing Hanefi Islam (Deringil 1998: 40, 82). Once subject of persecution, Kızaibaş population was imposed assimilative projects as a result of the Hamidian project of creating solidarity based on Islam.

The Hamidian period was ended with a strong force of Young Turk Revolution who succeeded to re-open the parliament in 1908. The second constitutional period (1908-1918) brought the Turkification policies by the Young Turk regime.

By the time the Young Turks dragged the empire into World War I, the Ottoman state had already lost its land in Europe and was defined as the “sick man of Europe.” World War I (1914-1918) in which the Ottomans had to fight at various fronts, brought the end of the empire. The Allies-- England, France, Italy and Greece, occupied what was left as the Ottoman territory.

The Republican Period

The invasion of İstanbul, the Ottoman capital, by the allies created a dual power with the foundation of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) (Turkey Grand National Assembly) in Ankara on April 23 1920. The TBMM led the Independence War and founded the Turkish Republic on October 29 1923 after the withdrawal of the allies from Asia Minor. At the beginning, the TBMM included representatives of various ethnic and religious groups allied with M. Kemal in the War of Independence and foundation of the Republic. In the opening speech of the TBMM, M. Kemal stated “the assembly was not composed of representatives of Turks, Circassians, Kurds and the Laz but consisted of members of an Islamic community held together by a powerful bond” (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 93). Kurds and Alevism—mainly through Bektashi Lodge

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4Alevi referring follower of Ali emerged and took place Kızaibaş most likely by the late nineteenth century or early twentieth century.
supporting M. Kemal—were among the representatives.

The young Turkish state, replacing the Ottoman Empire, initiated the foundation of a modern nation-state, which was the dominant model in Europe. In the formative years, the government abolished the sultanate, the caliphate, the sharia courts and the office of Seyh-ül-Islam⁴ between 1922-1924. Lodges and convents were closed down; religious orders, titles, such as dede, sheik, seyyid, etc., and religious dressing were outlawed between 1925-1930. The Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB) (Directorate of Religious Affairs) was founded and attached to the Prime Ministry in 1924. Based on the Sunni Islam, this institution was designed to interpret and enact an enlightened version of Islam, through its civil service personnel, especially imams.

This project was parallel to the foundation of a modern nation-state with a national identity. Transforming from the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire into the secularist Turkish state accompanied with creating, in Anderson’s term, an imagined Turkish community suitable for the new nation state. This imagined Turkish community that was constructed during the early years of the Turkish Republic was blind to any identity other than the Turkish.

In 1924 M. Kemal founded the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) (Republic People's Party) as a way of transforming the one party political structure to a multi-party system. During the 1930s, the pressure of secularization in Turkey increased and the CHP put secularism into the Turkish Constitution in 1937. The CHP became the symbol of revolution and secularism, as well as of transformation to western cultural practices.

The foundation of the secular-based Turkish Republic provided a sense of emancipation from the Sunni domination for Kızılbaş communities. Secularization diminished traditional threats to Alevi existence by transforming Turkish society into a

⁴The highest religious authority.
less Alevi-hostile community. Secular reforms to decrease role of religion in public life and westernisation of the ruling elite caused Alevism to be regarded as one of the several cultural and folklorist themes of Turkish nationalism. Baha Said, a supporter of the Young Turk, published his fieldwork notes collected among Kızılbaş groups of Anatolia in the Türk Yurdu (Turkish Country) journal between 1926 and 1927. The Ministry of education published a book including deyiş (songs of mystical love sung at cem as crucial part of sacred musical repertoire of Alevis) from one hundred and eighty Alevi minstrels in 1930. The Folk Poets Festival that was organized by the “public house,” hosted almost exclusively Alevi poets in Sivas in 1931. The young Turkish Republic was cultivating Turkish language and culture in those years.

A series of Kurdish revolts (1920-1938) challenged the formation of the Turkish nation state and imagined Turkish community. The revolts were religiously divided. It never occurred that Alevi and Sunni Kurds acted together in a revolt against the Turkish Republic. The Alevi Kurds did not join the Shaik Said revolt of 1925. Shaik Said, who was a Sunni scholar and Kurdish nationalist, revolted against the secularism of the republic and its Turkishness. The Kurdish uprising took place around Mount Ararat in 1928-1930, organized as a purely nationalist rebellion by the Kurdish political party in exile and carried out by the local sheiks and chieftains.

Two Kurdish Alevi uprising occurred in 1920 and 1937-38. During the Independence War, an uprising among Alevi Kurdish tribes of Koçgiri, (located in the eastern part of Sivas) broke down. The tribes sent TBMM of Ankara telegraphic messages demanding their autonomy. The uprising was suppressed without difficulty, because it was not so organized and did not get enough support from their counterparts living in other places.

Alevi Kurds of Dersim (today’s Tunceli) region revolted in 1937. The central
authority had never succeeded to break the tribal law and impose its authority in Dersim. The area was refusing to pay taxes (also escaping from military service). This uprising brought two years military operation (1937-1938) in the region. "The Dersim Report" that was prepared by the Gendarmerie General Chiefdom before the operation, was striking in its official attitude toward Alevism at that period. The report stated pointed out that there was a giant gap between the Turkishness and Alevism because of its Kızılbaşışm belief (pg. 38). In report it was told "Kızılbaş does not like Sunni Muslim, feeds a hostility to Sunni," thus Kızılbaş is the enemy of Sunni since the beginning (pg. 38).

The Turkish state repressed the revolt brutally (see Dersimi [1952] 1992). According to the official report ten percent of region's population was killed either by bayonets or bombs, but Kurds said their losses were more than these official numbers (Bruinessen 1994). The chief rebel leader, Seyyid⁶ Ruza was captured with his fifty men and immediately executed with eleven of them. The suspected tribes were deported and relocated in various parts of Turkey. The operation in the region was evaluated as an attempt to "modernize" the area, but Bruinessen (1994) called it "ethnocide." The Dersim revolt occurred when there were officially no Kurds in Turkey. The Dersim uprising had characteristics of Kızılbaş uprising. Seyyid Ruza’s last sentence before his execution was "Evladi Kerbalayış. Bihatayış. Ayıptir. Zulümdürî" (We are the children of Kerbala. We have no sin. It is shameful. It is oppression) (Çağlayanlıgil 1990: 47). “Evladi Kerbalayış” referred to the Kerbala incident where Hussein, was killed by Yezit in 680. Seyyid Ruza was in the same position and his execution was the same act Yezit did centuries ago. Like Hussein, he refused to obey the oppressor, and like Hussein, his

⁶Reprinted in 1998 with its original title, Dersim: Jandarma Genel Konutunluğu'nun Raporu. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.

⁷Dede is called seyyid among Kurds.
death was in the hands of the oppressor.

The single party period symbolized the state oppression and economic hardship for Turkish society at large. Turkey transformed into the multi party era in post World War II. In 1946 a new party emerged, the Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) (DP) had challenged the single political party system. The newly established DP advocated liberalism, equality, freedom of speech, participation, a direct ballot system and rule by the people not by the state while CHP was centralist and bureaucratic. The multi-party era actually provided an opportunity for a greater degree of freedom of expression for all sectors of society. This included religious leaders who declared more openly than ever their hostility to secularism and demanded Islamic reforms.

The electoral concerns and the public pressure over religious education and the needs of mosque officials led to prepare some religious regulations in education by the CHP. Optional religious courses were made available in the public schools in 1947, while the Imam Hatip (chaplains and preachers) courses to train mosque officials were prepared. The Faculty of Divinity was opened before the 1950 general election.

In the 1950 general election DP came to power. The first action of DP in power was to lift the prohibition which did not allow the Ezan (call to prayer) being made in any other language than Turkish (Ahmad, 1993). Giving permission for radio programs to broadcast the Koran followed this.

Although DP helped the development of democratic practice in Turkey, its negative contribution was considerable. DP, which came to realize that multi-party politics, neglected democracy that could not function with institutions inherited from the early republic. The DP leaders showed no awareness of this, because they only considered to transform the country materially. Even Menderes argued against giving workers rights to strike because the economic development of Turkey came first. The
1954 general election resulted in a triumph of DP, which increased its percentage of votes. Menderes now was sure about his policies. He did not have a fear of the army and even threatened to run the army with reserve officers if the regular officers failed to behave responsibly. The Democrats believed that there was no need to take anyone or anything into account when making policy. By the late 50s, the rising inflation and stagnant economy brought a shortage of foreign exchange and this forced Menderes to adapt some populist policies. At that period, Menderes started to exploit religion for political ends and increased the suppressions of opponents.

At the beginning of the multi party era, Alevi were attracted by the DP’s promises to prosper peasants. They voted for DP with a dislike toward the CHP’s harsh oppression on peasantry during the years of war. Furthermore DP used strategic discourses in the Sunni and Alevi villages to get votes. While the DP politicians promised to construct Imam Hatip schools in Sunni villages, they told Alevi villagers “let their [Sunnis] kids go to Imam Hatip and be Imams, you educate your kids in modern schools.” (Bozkurt 2000). But Alevi’s support to DP did not last long. The DP’s permissive attitude toward Islam led Alevi to move away from the party by the late 50s.

The increasing economic problems made DP more and more politically repressive and religious. Hence retreat from secularist reforms in the state and education, clashes between the fundamentalists and secularists and student protests arose. The fight between fundamentalists and secularists brought Turkey to a crisis. The government harassed the opposition in every way possible. DP even threatened to close down opposition parties, especially CHP. In April 1960 the DP's Assembly group suggested forming a committee to investigate the oppositions' activities, which were described as subversive and designed to instigate a military revolt. The clashes between the secularist and Islamists and the growing displeasure among the army led to the first breakdown of
the democracy.

On May 27 1961, a military coup dissolved the democracy and overthrew the DP. This coup was performed by a group of middle rank officers who organized themselves into a revolutionary council named the Milli Birlik Konseyi (MBK) (National Unity Council) led by General Cemal Gürsel. The coup abolished DP and took many democrats to trial on charges of corruption, unconstitutional rule and high treason. The most disturbing trial was the one that sentenced Adnan Menderes, prime minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the minister of foreign affairs, and Hasan Polatkan to capital punishment. They were executed in August 1961.

The military coup that was considered liberal and an attempt to replace DP to bring the return of the secularism of Kemalism, did not realize all of these hopes. The army saw that Islam was a very important and vital part of Turkish society, and the situation would worsen if there was a very strong reaction against it. The MBK accepted some of the institutional changes of the fifties, for example, the Imam Hatip High Schools and Advanced Islamic Institute.

The MBK promised to make a new democratic constitution and return power to a freely elected civilian government. The MBK kept its promise and withdrew from power in 1961, following the parliamentary elections held under the new constitution. The constitution of 1961 recognized pluralism and the existence of some social groups, such as workers who were given the right to strike, and brought the explicit guarantees of the freedom of thought, expression, association and publication, as well as other civil liberties. Under 1961 Constitution Turkey enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than ever before.

The sixties witnessed the rapid urbanization as result of massive migration from rural to urban areas since 1950. Emergence of gecekondus (squatter housing) in the large
urban centers, İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, as well as urban working classes franchised with the 1961 constitution to play roles in politics were the major outcomes of this macro process. Urbanization was the main factor that led important social and political changes in society at large. With urbanization, the Turkish society evolved toward structural and political disparity and diversity. The rapid urbanization and industrialization brought an increase in class-based politics and ideological tendencies in the society. Urbanization led the formation of new communities among the migrants on the basis of ethnicity, religion, neighborhood, occupational associations, but mostly labor unions. The party organizations were quick to create links with these new communities and usually by using traditional loyalties brought by the migrants from the rural areas. In the squatter housing areas of big cities like İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, old neighborhood leaders' roles were taken by party officials who shared the same ethnic or religious network ties with the community (Güneş-Ayata, 1994).

Since the beginning of the sixties, Turkey promoted migration abroad (Germany, Netherlands and etc) in order to reduce the increasing unemployment rate in the major urban centers that could not absorb labor anymore. The remittances that guest workers sent became the major source of Turkey's foreign currency. With the increasing number of Turkish workers abroad, the social and political groupings and organizations emerged among them.

Migration impacted on Alevi, who lived in close rural communities for centuries and began to migrate to cities since 1950. They began to leave their villages, settle in large metropolitan areas of Turkey, and start to interact with mainstream Sunni society. By the early sixties gecekondu neighborhoods were populated by Alevi, who took part in urban working classes. When European countries began to import "guest workers" from Turkey, a large number of Alevi migrated abroad.
After the military turned political to civilian, the 1961 general election brought a coalition between the Adalet Partisi (AP) (Justice Party) as the heir of the DP, and CHP. Ismet İnönü, the leader of CHP, headed the coalition. During the CHP-AP coalition, the government wanted to reform the DIB and opened its reform package in discussion in the parliament in 1963. The tenth article of the reform package suggested the foundation of a “bureau of sects” in the DIB, and in that way “all Muslim communities should be treated equally.” This brought a huge tide of reaction from the right-wing media. One of the newspapers wrote

In the sentence [the sentence starting with “all Muslims”], Kızılbaşışm, Alevism and Shiism, which are not based on scientific and historical reality but are consisted of superstitions and nonsense, which have taken an active roles in intrigues against Islam in every period, and which pose a serious danger to Islam are evaluated as equal. In the lightest expression, this means making fun of religion and conscience of 27 million Muslim. It is not difficult to guess what the basis of equality would be. Who can guarantee that Kızılbaş, whose equality rights protected by law do not attempt to perform “mum sündü”¹ in our mosques” (quoted in Otyam 1994 [1981]: 99).

As provocative and offensive writings in that style continued, a group of Alevi university students in Ankara came together to prepare a manifesto against these writings in the conservative media. The declaration was signed by four Alevi students: Mustafa Timisi, Seyfi Oktay, Ali İlhan and Engin Dikmen. The first two names would be heard in the Turkish politics in the following years. In the declaration starting with a greeting “to the great Turkish Nation”² it was said:

¹Mum sündü (lt. candle extinguished) is a wide spread Sunni accusation to cem ceremony of Alevís. Sunnis believe that in cem ceremony, Alevís extinguish a candle and have sex with whoever they meet in the dark. For this reason, a well known saying goes “Alevís know no mother or sister.”

²Although both Kurdish and Turkish Aleví students came together to formulate this declaration, Kurdish Aleví students left the meeting because of the discussion on the greeting. Kurdish students wanted to greet as “to all folks of Turkey.”
Even in the most savage tribes, it is neither seen nor heard that these accusations are relevant to human feelings and humanity values... It is clear that, making separatism among citizens, who are ethnically Turk and Muslim with sectarian differences, instead of making efforts for the unity in this land, is good for nothing but serve to damage national interests. In spite of oppression and persecution, Alevi who have never believed in superstition, have never given up the way of "Ehliseyt"\(^{10}\) as lovers of God and reality.

This community always gathered around Atatürk (M. Kemal) in the national death-alive war, served to the national unity and stayed as the loyal watchguards of Kemalist principals. (quoted in Otyam 1994 [1981], 100).

The declaration had a specific importance, because up until 1963, there was no reaction in the name of "Alevism." Underlining Alevi's loyalty to Kemalism was considerable. As the conflicts over the DIB reform package continued, the Alevi university students of Ankara University organized a seminar hosting very well known academics to inform public. The title of this seminar was "Secularism and Its Application in Turkey." The same year a newspaper series on Alevi in Cumhuriyet began, but it was stopped by the military administration in İstanbul.

The migration process that brought Alevis to the large urban centers and provided the opportunity to use the education resources made it possible that these young students reacted against the dominant Sunni ideology. The reaction of Sunnis could also be evaluated as that secularism could brought a less hostile environment but not ended the widespread prejudice among Sunni majority.

The rights came with the liberal 1961 constitution and a series of negative events targeting Alevis led a small-scale mobilization among Alevis. A few Alevi associations were founded under the title Hacı Bektaş Turizm Derneği (Hacı Bektaş Tourism Association). The first one was founded in Hacı Bektaş town in 1964, then in Ankara, and İstanbul in the mid sixties. In Ankara Hacı Bektaş Veli Tourism Association, Seyfi

\(^{10}\)The household of Mohammed, it includes Fatima (his daughter), Ali (his cousin and son-in-law), and Hasan and Hussein (his grandsons from Ali and Fatima).
Oktay served as a general secretary and Mustafa Timisi was the president. A cem ceremony was organized by Hacı Bektaş Veli Tourism Association in a big cinema hall of Ankara.

In 1966 “Shah Hatayı” Night was organized by Can Yücel and Nesimi Çimen.12 The media announced the night as “Alevi making the leftist propaganda”. The organized night for Shah Hatayi was even taken to the court, but no one was arrested in the end. Two periodicals that could be defined as Alevi journals emerged in the second half of the sixties: Cem published between 1966-1967 and Ehlibeys, which were closed down by the 1971 semi-military coup. The first Alevi party of Turkey was founded in 1966 the Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Turkey Unity Party). Birlik Partisi got 8 seats in 1969, only one seat in 1973, and no seat after the 1977 general elections in the parliament.

The 1961 constitution provided a liberal atmosphere for workers, who founded their own party Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP) (Turkey Workers Party) with the support of the intelligentsia. In the 1965 general election the TİP got 15 seats in the parliament. The majority of its vote came from Alevi community (Ahmad 1994; Şener, 1989; Tempo, vl. 37, 1988). Actually, the Shah Hatayi Night was secretly supported by the TİP and organizers were sympathizers of this party.

Since AP came to power in 1965, Islam has been a major tool for AP and the other parties of the right against the increasing power of the left. An increasingly organized working class movement, the power of TİP and the emergence of DISK (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions) by the late 60s were perceived as threats by the government. Threatened by the propensity of the political opposition to organize

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11Shah Hatayi—one of the seven greatest poet of Alevi—is the nickname of Shah Ismail, the Safavid leader.

12Alevi musician and composer who died in the Sivas incident in 1993.
around social class the state chose to use nonsecular use of religion for checking and blocking communism (Sakallıoğlu 1996). Later on, anti-communism became the major tenet of all right-wing parties.

In the mid sixties, Islam became an important force in Turkish society. AP used Islam as a strategic tool against the left and classes supporting it. The growth of trade and artisan associations with a religious bias and Koranic schools emerged. The permissive attitude of the government toward Islam encouraged Islamic fanaticism, which became more aggressive and violent. The number of Koranic schools and Imam Hatip Lycees increased.

In the late sixties, new right parties that challenged the AP's leadership on the right emerged. Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP) (National Order Party) which was Islamist founded in 1969 with the support of the Nakşibendi tariqa by one of its member, Necmettin Erbakan. Another party of the right that emerged in the mid sixties was Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) (Nationalist Action Party) which was an ultranationalist with fascist ideologies. The party was founded by Alpaslan Türkeş, a retired colonel. MHP was largely based on the fear of Russia and communism. For the party and its militants all leftists were communists, who must be destroyed to protect the state.

CHP led by Bülent Ecevit defined itself as “the left of center” in 1965 and modified its party programs to solve the problems of migrants in cities. The late sixties were the years that CHP focused on the problems of urban working classes and

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13 Türkeş was among the army officers organized the military coup of 1961. He was one of the “fourteen” who were purged from the MBK and sent to exile because of their resistance to return the political authority to civilian. Türkeş was sent India in exile. He came back in 1963 and took over the Republican Peasant Nation Party in 1966, and changed its name to the MHP 1969.

14 This was reflected to their slogan against leftists as “Communists! go to Moscow.”
gecekondu dwellers. Socialist democratic values blended with Kemalist discourse was integrated to the CHP's party programs and became major party in the large urban centers in the seventies. Alevi breaking their ties to DP since the late 50s, moved toward CHP and became major supporters of the party.

Since the beginning, AP had an ambivalent attitude toward the 1961 Constitution. Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of the AP government, increasingly pronounced that the constitution with the extensive social rights as well as its left-leaning provisions created an ungovernable political system and demanded a stronger executive. In this direction, the AP government passed an amended law, which would prevent TIP to play a role in the political scene in 1970. When the government wanted to pass a law aimed to destroy DISK, its action was protested by a huge wave of demonstrations on 15/16 June 1970, paralyzing the entire Istanbul and surrounding region. The government had gained control over the order by the help of military forces and cut off all physical communications to the city. By January 1971, Turkey was in a state of chaos, factories were on strike, students who were affected by Latin American guerrillas robbed banks and kidnapped US services; universities ceased to function. Islamists who were tolerated by the government became more and more aggressive and attacked secularism and disturbed the armed forces.

The Military Memorandum of March 12, 1971 forced the AP government to resign but did not dissolve the parliament and to assure power directly. It urged the formation of an "above party" or technocratic government. The policies of the nonparty government, with strong support from the military behind the screen, were more in line with the AP's conservative philosophy. This was clear in the extensive constitutional amendments between 1971 and 1973. The coalition governments, under the military watch, curtailed the democratic rights brought by the 1961 Constitution. By Summer
1973 the military finished its tasks. The constitution was amended to strengthen the state against civil society. Universities, students and the labor unions were pacified. Workers were left in an ideological vacuum with the dissolution of TİP by the government on 20 July 1971.

After 1971 military intervention, Turkey returned to the task of establishing a democratic civilian alternative. In the two general elections, in 1973 and 1977, no party succeeded in getting absolute majority in the parliament. In both elections CHP, which was the only party of left with the dissolution of TİP, won the majority of the vote, but not enough to be a sole power. The rest of the 1970s passed with weak coalition governments, whose main concern to get votes in the next election and this orientation prevented them from implementing the strong economic policies and to stabilize democracy.

In the 1970s the "Nationalist Front" coalitions, which were formed by the rightist parties to prevent CHP from the political power, gave extreme rights the opportunity to participate in the government. The pro-Islamic Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP) (National Salvation Party), and the MHP participated in the nationalist front led by Demirel, the AP’s leader. Erbakan leading the MSP and Türkeş leading the MHP became Demirel’s vice prime ministers. Participation of these small strategically located parties that failed to operate within the ground rules of the democratic system, became the major political instability. In this way ultranationalist MHP and the pro-Islamic MSP supporters staffed the government offices during the front coalitions. The formulation of “3K” referring “Kızılbaş, Kürt, Komunist” (Kızılbaş, Kurd, Communist) emerged to define the most dangerous groups for the state.

During the 1970s Turkey experienced a high degree of political polarization and political violence. For the purpose of getting support from Alevis, extreme left was
defining the Alevi rebellions of the past as a proto-communist movement. Actually Alevi migrants to large urban centers and becoming low-income officials and workers in the public and private sectors, participated in labor movements and leftist organizations (from moderate to radical). In the 1970s, as Alevi moved to the left, the left increasingly became identified with them (Bruinesse 1996; Çamuroğlu 1997, 1998;Çakır 1990). Although some violence was provoked by leftist groups, the overwhelming majority of cases of political violence was instigated by rightist groups, inciting religious and ethnic differences (Ahmad 1993; Bruinesse 1996; Poulton 1997). Since Alevi, who were taking the smallest share from the economy became sympathizers and activists of socialist leftist ideas, they became the main targets of extreme rights, mainly the MHP militants. Extreme rightist groups attempted to incite conservative Sunni Muslims of the mixed regions to act against Alevis by fuelling a hatred of Alevis and provoking violent incidents. One technique for gathering an angry mob for violence against Alevi was to spread a rumor among conservative Muslims that Alevi bombed a mosque.

In the late seventies, a series of bloody Alevi-Sunni clashes resulted in anti-Alevi pogroms in cities having mixed populations of Alevis and Sunnis such as Malatya, Maraş, Çorum, and Sivas. In Maraş over hundred Alevi were killed by the MHP militants in 1978/1979. The police forces, which comprised a considerable number of extreme right sympathizers, offered little or no protection for Alevis; this resulted in increasing the alienation of Alevi from the state (Bruinesse 1996; Poulton 1997). The anti-Alevi pogroms were manifestations of moving away from the Kemalist ideal of a secular, unitary nation without class, ethnic or religious differences. The emergence of a Kurdish movement, a radical labor movement and far rights, as well as the increase in political violence constituted signals of the demise of Kemalism. As the rightist and leftist parties' supporters fought each other, the existing distinctions within the Turkish
society had taken a political character. Alevi-Sunni and Turk-Kurd clashes were transformed into the left-right clashes in the seventies.

By the late seventies all these tensions and clashes, economic and political instability resulted once again in chaos. This resulted in another military coup on September 12, 1980. The Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (MGK) (National Security Council) leading the coup dissolved the parliament, closed down all the parties, detained their leaders, and suspended all professional associations and confederations of trade unions. The 1980 coup was the harshest of all, thousands of people were taken under custody, arrested and tortured. Although this coup was to defeat communists, fascists and fundamentalists, its main objective was to get rid of Marxist leftist ideologies and organizations whose major recruits were Alevis and Kurds.

The cabinet to which the MGK delegated executive authority was announced on September 21. Bülent Ulusu, a retired admiral, led this cabinet as Prime Minister. Most members of this cabinet were bureaucrats, professors, and retired officers. There was no opposition in the parliament or from the press. With an extraordinary legislative power of the MGK behind them, the government, led by Bülent Ulusu, had an enormous power to implement any measure it wished. Turgut Özal was appointed as the vice prime minister responsible for economy. Özal had been an economic advisor to implement IMF’s decisions imposed on Turkey in the early 1980. The military regime provided an opportunity to implement these decisions without any opposition. It was the working class that paid the highest price for the military coup. The rights given by the 1961 constitution were curtailed.

The principal concern of the junta was the political and institutional restructuring of the country and they set about the task with great abandon. Between 1980-1983 Military rule made a highly polarized society become depoliticized and silent. It
destroyed what Turkish society developed in terms of politics. Between 1960 and 1980 Turkey witnessed the mushrooming of organizations representing almost every occupational group, with different ideologically oriented associations within each: a strong trade union movement which was ideologically divided, students organizations in education and political parties, women's groups, peace groups and so on. The period between 1950 and 1980 witnessed the struggle to institutionalize party politics, guarantee civil rights, and legitimize civil associations. In the 1960s and 1970s there had been an unprecedented growth in the number of political parties, interests groups and voluntary associations as a result of 1961 Constitution, which was designed to guarantee free speech and free associations.

The 1982 constitution, which replaced the liberal constitution of 1961, curtailed many rights that were gained after 1961. With the new, more restrictive constitution of 1982, religious lessons were made compulsory in public schools, while the number of courses related with the Turkish War of Independence and the principles of Kemalism increased.

New parties that would be loyal to 12 September 1980 philosophy were needed to be founded for transition to democracy. In order to introduce new politics and the new politicians all members of the 1980 parliament were disqualified from the political activity for five years and all party leaders for ten. In the 1983 general election there were only three parties one of which the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) (Motherland Party) of Turgut Özal. The others were Halkçı Parti (Populist Party), and the Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi that later on merged into the ANAP. Özal's party won the election and stayed in power until 1991. The ANAP was conservative right and the party was not the continuation of any dissolved parties. It was conservative, traditionalist, and nationalist. The ANAP’s members had been young men recruited from provincial backgrounds. They
could not have entered politics if the junta had not created a political vacuum by disqualifying hundreds of established politicians (Ahmad 1993).

The project of the military coup to create docile parties ended with a big disappointment. The politicians of the seventies got back to the Turkish political arena in the second half of the 1980s by a referendum that resulted in Turkish citizens agreeing to lift the ban on the participation of these politicians. Since then the political parties and politicians have been a continuation of the parties of the 1970s, but of course with new divisions and ideological trends relevant to the nineties. Now there are two center-right parties, two center-left parties, a strong pro-Islamic party, a strengthening ultra-nationalist party, and, although not very strong, a Kurdish party.

With the political and economic liberalization of the late 80s, democratic rights have been restored partially. The political and economic changes in the post-1980 period have brought a new perspective of state's role in the structuring of Turkish society. Various groups began to question the state's ideology and the legitimacy of the Kemalist unitary and secular nation-state project. Although the change came from the state action, the dominant discourse at present has been critical of both the institutions and the official ideology of the Kemalist Republican state.

Two major trends have threatened the Turkish state-ideology in the late 1980s and 1990s. One has been the Islamist movement that rapidly gained political power in the mid 90s and managed to be the largest party in the parliament and the local government. Although secularism has been the main ideology of the Turkish state since the foundation of Turkish Republic, recent development in the Turkish mainstream society shows that this ideology has failed. In the December 1995 general election the pro-Islamic Refah (Welfare Party) got the majority of the seats in the parliament. Erbakan led a coalition government for a year. Erbakan resigned under pressure from the army in 1997. The
Refah was outlawed as its leaders, Erbakan and several deputies, were banned from politics for five years in January 1998.

Another major challenge to state legitimacy came from the Kurdish movement. Since the early 1980s in which the Kurdish separatists started an arm-struggle in the south eastern Anatolia, the "Kurdish question" of Turkey came to dominate the national political agenda. After the capture of PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in November 1998, the Kurdish issue has turned into a new direction.

The political liberalization also impacted on Alevi. The Alevi publication and associational activities began in the late 1980s and sharply increased in the 1990s. The visibility of Alevism in the public political realm has opened centuries old secret tradition into public spheres, where various actors have shaped Alevism. Since the late 1980s, Alevi have declared their "Aleviness" in public and demanded official recognition. The claim making shifted from the leftist parties to the Alevi voluntary associations, print and electronic media. The visibility of Alevis sharply increased after two major attacks to Alevi communities in 1993 and in 1995.

In sum, what has happened since the late 80s in Turkey is an emergence of identity politics, the weakening of center political parties and the acceleration of globalization. Within this social and political climate, Turkish citizens have increasingly had imposed on them ethnic and religious plurality and have developed sensivity to Islamist, Kurdish, and Alevi demands for freedom of expression and organization with varying degrees.

In this chapter I attempted to show the emergence of Alevism through centuries in its interaction with the state and state formation process, and its shifting alliances according to changing social and political structures. This chapter must be taken as
background information for understanding the contemporary Alevi movement. This historical outline has had the function of providing the reader with an overview of major events in the history of Alevism. The task of identifying the central puzzles that needed to be resolved for any understanding of the emergence of Alevism since the late 1980s and the shaping of its meaning will be developed in the following chapters. The next section develops a theoretical model to analyze such a movement.
CHAPTER II

The Conceptual Tools for the Analysis: Networks, Social and Political Opportunity Structures, and Communicative Praxis

This chapter develops the theoretical model that I use to analyze the Alevi movement. It includes three conceptual tools: the networks, the social and political opportunity structures, and the communicative praxis. In my theoretical model, these conceptual tools are not independent, but rather interactive and interdependent. The multidimensional fabric of networks, social and political opportunity structures and communicative praxis produce the dynamics of the Alevi revival in contemporary Turkey and its European diaspora since the late 1980s.

Networks

Many scholars point out the importance of network ties to explain social relations (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1995; Knoke 1990; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Melucci 1996; Tarrow 1998; Schulz 1998; Tilly 1997, 1998a, Wasserman and Faust 1993; Wellman 1999; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988; White 1992). A network is a set of ties among three or more actors. It is "composed by a set of nodes and ties that are marked by their interconnections" (Wellman and Berkowitz 1988).
In order to understand social relationships, a network approach investigates "the constraining and enabling dimensions of patterned relationship among social actors within a system" (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 1418). Based on the fact that a social actor is embedded in multiple network ties, I use networks in plural.

By breaking down the aggregation of complex and articulated social wholes into connections and nonconnections among elementary social units, such as individuals, organizations, state, communities and etc., a network analysis rejects considering human populations as "masses," but accepts the idea that social actions, structures and processes have to be explained by network ties (Rule 1997).

A network analysis focuses on actors, relations and activities (Lauman et al. 1983). It is equally important to locate each of these components historically to see the shifts in each component's dimensions and expressions. To achieve their objectives, people transform the nodes and links of a network according to the changing social, economic and political circumstances. In other words, instead of being static ties without historicity and dynamism, network ties are established, shifted and dissolved according to the changing social, economic and political conditions. Tilly (1998a: 47) says, "social network configurations as social inventions...developed by trial and error." They are invented and reinvented as "a means of coordinating social life" (p. 48).

A network that is a set of interconnected nodes is an open structure. That means it has the ability to expand by integrating new nodes and sharing the same communicative codes (Castells 1996). As White argues "networks do not have boundaries" (1995: 1039). The openness of network provides opportunities to create new networks by connecting previously un-connected nodes. The macro processes, such as migration, urbanization and development of communication technologies, facilitate the multiplication of networks by connecting previously unconnected actors located at local, national,
transnational levels.

Alevis, who had lived as relatively closed rural communities for centuries, were the first groups to migrate, with the massive migration from rural to urban areas (Güneş-Ayata 1995). This resulted in the formation and subsequent expansion of Alevi networks in urban areas of Turkey and Europe by connecting Alevis, who came from different regions of Asia Minor. The proliferation of Alevi networks in the large urban areas of Turkey and Europe creates the first step toward the visibility of Alevis in public spheres.

As Ikegami argues, "a critical moment of cultural history in any society occurs when communicative networks suddenly expand in scale, density, and complexity" (1999: 12). The massive migration from rural to urban areas and to advanced Western countries, as well as the development of new communication technologies such as the telephone, fax, and recently the Internet have led to an expansion of the communicative networks of Alevis, who had lived in relatively closed village communities since the harsh repression by the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century. These national and transnational networks have provided channels through which Alevism "went public" and its adherents "came out" both in Turkey and Europe. The multiplication of Alevi networks have provided paths of diffusion which are traceable from one metropolis to another, from the periphery to the center and from one country to another with the emergence of transnational immigrants networks.

The development and transformation of concrete social, political, economic, and communicative networks articulate in new spaces for cultural productions (Ikegami 1999). As a result of the proliferation of new networks and network constellations, constructions of the social reality occur in these emergent spaces (White 1995). From this perspective, networks are spaces for the culture-forming and the identity forming processes through communicative interactions and transactions among social actors. 1
should clarify that these spaces are, more often than usual, loci of competing claims and discourses produced by social actors. In that sense, they are simultaneously functional by providing sites for social, cultural, and political engagement and conflictual in terms of hosting actors making competing claims.

Networks are spaces for the culture-forming process, because cultural discourses, narratives, idioms, and symbols are produced, exploited and transformed within and through social and communicative network ties (Ikegami 1999). Networks are spaces for the identity forming process, because the concept of network is directly related to identity. The identity forming process largely depends on the contingencies of network relationships (Ikegami 1999; Tilly 1998a; White 1992). Networks come before identity, because they are “there” when we were born. Which networks we were born or what kinds of networks we have determine our biographies. The categorical identities that have arisen out of network ties and maintained relatively coherent identities, lead to durable inequality, when articulated within social hierarchies (Tilly 1998a). Thus an individual’s action largely depends on the actor’s location within the patterns of social connections and nonconnections.

The increase in international migration and global media have resulted in an expansion of social networks at the transnational and global levels. The creation of transnational social networks is less difficult today because of various aspects of globalization (see Appadurai 1996; Albro 1996; Featherstone 1995; Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995; Friedman 1994; Held et al. 1999; Robertson 1990, 1992, 1995; Schulz 1998; Tomlinson 1999; Waters 1995). The contact and mixing cultures from around the world has led to organization on a transnational scale through the use of technological tools, such as the Internet, telephones, fax, etc. Social relations emerging from the development of transnational or global ties are not normally confined within the
borders of nation-states; therefore, it is necessary to go beyond national networks. Although traditional network analysis mainly takes local and national network ties into account, the Alevi movement cannot be understood without considering its transnational network relations. The revival of Alevism occurs within a web of social relations carried out through national and transnational Alevi networks. The concept of transnational indicates a relation over and beyond, rather than between or in, the nation-states. Therefore, the concept of transnational network captures those network ties that go beyond and over nation states.

As a result of international migration, social, economic, political, and cultural networks involve both the origin and the destination of migrant peoples (Bash et al. 1994; Faist 2000; Glick Shiller et al. 1992; Levitt 1998). Migrant networks are sets of interpersonal ties based on kinship, friendship, and shared nationality that connect migrants, former migrants, and nonmigrants in both origin and destination countries. Alevi who migrated to Europe developed new network ties that criss cross European space and connect them to the homeland. The multiplexity of interconnections among Alevi nodes and their associational network configurations have created new spaces for the Alevi revival in urban areas of Turkey and Europe.

Alevi networks that have emerged in various urban centers provide an example of "segmented networks" (Faist 1999, 2000) which are composed according to ethnic, regional, and religious lines. Cultural segmentation along ethnic and religious differences is a characteristic of immigrants coming to urban areas of Turkey and Europe. The most visible examples of "segmented networks" are shantytowns known as "Alevi neighborhoods" in the big metropolitan areas of Turkey. These segmented networks are also "catnets" (Tilly 1978). Catnet refers to the most favorable conditions for mobilization, group with common interests (categories) and with strong interactions
among its members (networks). Such networks between individuals and groups with common interests are ideal for the diffusion of discontent and the mobilization for contentious action. The networks founded among Alevi associations could be considered as catnets.

Existence of a specific constellation of networks impacts the outcomes of events in a social movement. Network analysis starts with a set of network members, "nodes" and a set of ties that connect some or all nodes (Wasserman and Faust 1993). Every individual, group, institution, and association is a "node," within the complex web of social ties. In this case Alevi voluntary associations, journals, radio stations, intellectuals, Alevi businessman, the academics working on Alevism, the state agents and media are nodes. The connections and nonconnections of Alevi voluntary associations of Turkey and Europe compose the "web of Alevi associational networks."

It is not the size or magnitude of network ties, but rather their composition and structure which impact the resources to which network members have access and the ways in which social relationships operate (Wellman 1999). The interconnections of associational Alevi networks and their trans-state linkages impact the resources to which nodes have access.

In terms of connections, "prominent" or "central" actors are crucial. An actor is prominent or central within a social structure to the extent that her relations make her partially visible because of their extensive involvement in relations, (Knoke and Burt 1983). Prominent actors are also those “public figures” or persons in TV or on the “front page,” and to some extent, with whom the movement is usually identified (and/or misidentified). Movement representatives could be intellectuals and association leaders, who represent the movement to and before publics through various media. Central actors are visible because of the extensive relations directed to them (Knoke and Burt 1983).
The mapping out the multiple roles and affiliations of these central actors sheds light on the multiplexity of the Alevi movement.

The role of central or prominent Alevi figures is decisive in the web of associational Alevi networks, activities, and agendas. They are ‘nodal points,’ where various network ties intersect. Being located at the intersection of various networks, gives the prominent actors a greater control over the resources, such as finance, information and etc. This creates structural differences between prominent and peripheral actors. The control over resources, authority, and esteem drawn from these structural differences produces inequalities that require an emphasis on the asymmetry of relations in networks.

Networks are channels through which resources, goods, positions, codes, lore, ideas, information, behavior, emotions, and actors flow. One of the basic tenets of the network approach is its focus on what flows across the ties, which connect people. Through Alevi networks finance, organizational models, emotions and ideas flow from one place to another. Especially the flows from Europe to Turkey are crucial. These flows radically increased with the two violent attacks against Alevis in Sivas and Istanbul.

Networks are emergent spaces for social movements. Movements depend intimately on the social networks in which their participants are embedded. Networks facilitate movement activities by providing the means of communication by which movements as a new cultural artifact can diffuse society at large. Patterns of pre-existing affiliation are an important factor in recruitment to movement activism (Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Gould 1993, 1995; McAdam 1982, 1986; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Melucci 1996; Stark and Brainbridge 1980; Passy and Giugni 2000), because movements operate within the frames set by historical accumulation of shared understandings. It
would be surprising to find new collective identities emerging purely on the basis of suddenly convergent interests (Gould 1995).

What kind of network ties are apt to matter in which circumstances and what form of network relations matter in a particular context requires a close examination, because the importance and exact role of network relations always depends on a host of contextual factors (Rule 1997). This connects networks to the opportunity structures.

**Social and Political Opportunity Structures**

The concept of "social and political opportunity structures" expands the concept of political opportunity structure (POS), which is widely used in analyzing social movements. The concept of POS was first introduced by Eisinger (1973). According to him, POS means the degree of openness of a political system to challenges addressed by social movements. Many others, Kitschelt (1986), Tarrow (1988, 1998), Kriesi et al. (1995), McAdam, McCarthy, Zald (1988, 1996), and Schulz (1998) have contributed to the elaboration of this concept which has proven useful in the study of collective action.

The concept of POS defines political conditions that may be favorable or unfavorable for social movements and organizations of social movements (Tarrow, 1998). The main idea is that collective action can only occur and be successful under certain political conditions. The concept of POS includes "dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success and failure" (Tarrow 1998: 77). A social movement surfaces when "changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack resources of their own" (p. 2). Political opportunities are "consistent dimensions of the political struggle that encourage people to engage in contentious politics,... political constraints are factors-like repression, but also like authorities' capacity to present a solid front to insurgents-that discourage contention"
(Tarrow, 1998: 19-20). Shifts in opportunities and constraints provide openings to engage in social movement to challenge the authorities.

The expansion of POS depends on several factors. These are the degree of openness of political institutions (Eisinger 1973; Kriesi et al. 1995, Tarrow 1989, 1998); the structure of alliances and political alignments (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998) that established the "political liability structure" of a social group engaging in social movement; the salience of political cleavages in social conflict (Kriesi et al. 1995); and state repression (Tilly 1978). The POS can be expanded or narrowed by these factors. All these factors are evident in the revival of Alevism.

Because "social movements enraged both social and political conflicts" (Diani 1992), the opportunity structures that encourage or discourage social movements must be both social and political. A social movement is made up of networks of individuals and groups sharing collective identities and engaging in political and social conflicts. Wholesale fabrication of a social movement organization, action and goals occurs in social and political arenas. From this perspective, I define social and political conditions that are favorable or unfavorable for social movements and organizations of social movements as "social and political opportunity structure." Both social and political conditions must be favorable for a social movement to flourish. In this conceptualization of the social and political opportunity structures (SPOS), it is possible to capture general opportunity structure for all sorts.

One major aspect of the SPOS is its cultural dimension, because culture is "the symbolic dimension of all structures, institutions, and practices" (Polletta 1999: 66). For that reason, culture plays a crucial role in determining opportunity structures for a social movement (cf. Johnson and Klandermans 1995). Like networks, it is both enabling and

1I would like to thank to Ariel Salzmann for this conceptualization.
constraining and this is observable in linguistic practices, institutional rules and social rituals rather than existing only in people's mind (p. 67). Culture is decisive in creating social and political opportunities, because cultural formations such as traditions, principles, codes, and arrangements are structural in the sense that "they are beyond and above individual and constrain individual action" (p. 68). Polletta urges to give attention to the cultural traditions, ideological principles, institutional memories and political taboos that guide the behavior both of political elites and challengers. In this way, it is also possible to capture the impacts of particular frames that play crucial roles on a social movement at particular time (p. 70).

The existence of dense social networks and the availability of cultural symbols that can be strategically formulated in confronting the opponents contribute to the social opportunity structure. In order to reach potential activists of a social movement one has to work through elaborate networks of personal relations, such as kin groups, ethnic societies, neighborhoods, regional and religious ties. Movement ideologies spread among members of the same ethnic or national groups, whose embedded identities are activated by new opportunities and threats. The expansion of Alevi networks at national and transnational levels has provided a strong ground for the Alevi movement emerged in the late 1980s.

Migration offers a unique opportunity for the formation and expansion of networks, groups and organizations. In the case of international migration these networks connect at least two nation-states. Urbanization and migration to cities increases frequency of encounters among various groups that had been previously unconnected. Migration to urban areas has brought new opportunities and constraints for Alevis. Their participation in education and the job market have led to an increase in the number of educated Alevis and the emergence of an Alevi bourgeoisie.
The expansion of urbanization increased the interaction between Alevis and Sunnis in the urban social and spatial landscape in the 1960s and 1970s. In urban areas as neighbors, co-workers or classmates, groups encounter the ‘others’ more often than in a traditional setting. The interaction between the majority Sunnis and the minority Alevis can be evaluated within the “established” and the “outsider” distinction made by Elias and Scotson (1994). In established and outsider differentiation, one group has a higher cohesion rate than the other. This integration enables the established group to reserve social positions with a higher power potential for its members.

For those who encounter in various settings, interaction is either “ease and euphoric” or “state of tension or dysphoria” (Goffman 1961: 41-42). This is true for Alevi-Sunni encounters in urban areas. One the one hand the interaction between Alevis and Sunnis have led to violent confrontations in urban areas, where multiple groups competing for the same resources, live side by side and share the physical and social environment. On the other hand, the frequency of encounters as co-workers, classmates and neighbors develop an understanding and recognition of other as “other.” This interaction contributes to the social opportunity structure.

The societal conditions determine circumstances for social networks to multiply, movements to form and mobilize, and publics to accept movement messages. The success or failure of a social movement depends on the ability of social actors to connect their resources to available social and political opportunities. The values and structures of a society are among the major actors in creating possibilities to form collective action and mobilize groups around new ideas and codes. These institutional features constitute social and political opportunity structures within which social movements are embedded.

As McAdam (1996) has pointed out, the critical role of international trends and events in shaping domestic institutions and alignments is missing in the POS. Many
scholars who contribute to this concept have neglected how international migration (see Basch et al. 1994; Faist 1999; Garner 1994; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Levitt 1998; Lie 1995; Zolberg, 1989, 1991), globalization (see Appadurai 1996; Albrow 1996; Featherstone 1995; Featherstone, Lash and Robertson 1995; Friedman 1994; Held et al. 1999; Robertson 1990, 1992, 1995; Schulz 1998; Tomlinson 1999; Waters 1995), and the dominant global discourse have impacted on the opportunity structures. These developments affect the SPOS at the local, national and transnational levels. It is striking that in a recent article, Marks and McAdam (1996) evaluate the impacts of the European Union on the political opportunity structure with no reference to immigrants, their activities, agendas and associational networks going beyond the nation state borders.

The social and political structure immigrants encountered in the European space is one major factor that impacts on the homeland social and political fabric. Various discontent groups of Turkey (such as radical leftist associations, the Islamic fundamentalist groups, and the Kurdish separatists) are founding associations, organizing meetings and forming political activities in various European countries without much constraints. Alevi immigrants also have used this liberal climate to found associations and engage activities aiming at changing social and political structure of the homeland.

The SPOS is a decisive condition for the founding associations, which are vehicles for creating, transmitting and exchanging meanings, ideas, symbols and actions of social movements. They make movements' activities and symbols portable going across territorial boundaries in the transnational context. In terms of foundation of associations at least two conflicts automatically emerge: conflicts over the leadership and the control over the resources (financial, human etc.).

As many analysts argued, once formed social movements create opportunities for their own supporters, for others, for parties, and elites (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Tarrow
This also leads to some conflicts and rivalries. The question of who speaks to “publics” (most often to media) brings conflicts and struggle among movement leaders. This contributes to the fact that the opening of opportunity structures also brings new conflicts and rivalries that need to be taken into account. The rivalries over fame and interests are common in the Alevi movement. These rivalries impact on the definitions of Alevism, its identity and tradition.

Another important factor of the SPOS is the openness of the media system towards social movement. Mass media that view movement activities and ideas as ‘newsworthy’ (Rochon 1998; Ryan 1991) are key for the effective transmission of movement values into a wide range of publics. Because media play a central role in the construction of meaning and the reproduction of culture, they are sites or arenas in which symbolic contests are carried out among competing sponsors of meaning, including movements (see Gamson 1989, 1992; Gitlin 1980; Ryan 1991). Movement agents attempt to bring their issues onto the agendas of distinct audiences, the general public, the media, political parties, and legislative and executive officials (McCarthy, Smith, and Zald 1996). On the other hand, media have an impact on creating opportunities by taking sides with or against a social movement. As the Islamist movement gained strength, the secular media present Alevis as devoted secularists. This has resulted in featuring Alevi representatives in newspapers, TV and radio frequently.

So far I have discussed social and political opportunities that open doors for social movements, but the connection between opportunity and action is missing. One solution is offered by McAdam (1982) in his analysis of the Black insurgency in the South. He finds that political opportunities and networks are necessary but not enough to lead an actor to engage in social movement activities. Networks and political opportunities provide potentials but cannot sufficiently explain the incentives to act.
McAdam (1982) develops the concept of "cognitive liberation" to connect action and opportunity. In this conceptualization, the mediation between action and opportunity is performed by people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations. Drawing from Edelman's (1971) concept of "cognitive cues," McAdam (1980) argues that the shifting political conditions that supply "cognitive cues" are capable of triggering the process of cognitive liberation (p. 50-51). By forcing a change in the symbolic content of member/challenger relations, shifting political conditions supply a crucial impetus to the process of cognitive liberation (1982: 49). The conceptualization of "cognitive liberation" misses the interactive communicative aspect of all social identity and activities. Features of social networks and social and political opportunity structures are available only through interactive communication either in physical or virtual spaces.

Social networks are about connections demonstrating who is connected to whom, as social and political opportunities are structural conditions determining favorable or unfavorable conditions to engage collective social action. What is missing is a concept that takes communicative and interactive aspects of social actions and analyzes the content of a movement. In order to capture these, there is a need for another conceptual tool.

**Communicative Praxis**

The concept of 'communicative praxis' formulated by Schulz (1998) is the most fruitful way of the capturing the interactive communicative aspects of social actions and analyzing the content of a social movement. Schulz's concept of "communicative praxis" is drawn from the concept of the "cognitive praxis" formulated by Eyerman and Jamison (1991). The cognitive praxis emphasizes "the creative role of consciousness and cognition in all human action, individual and collective" (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 3). Critical

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2I would like to thank Markus S. Schulz for bringing this concept into my analysis.

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of this conceptualization, on the basis of Habermas’ ‘communicative action’, Schulz (1998) states that the construction of meaning is not monadological but dialogical. An individual does not produce ideas, knowledge and ideals alone in solitude, but rather in communicative interaction with others. In this respect, Schulz (1998) uses the concept of "communicative praxis" rather than "cognitive praxis" (p. 592). He defines "communicative praxis" as "the construction of meaning, projects, visions, values, styles, strategies, and identities through interaction with and against one another" (Schulz 1998: 591). The communicative praxis is conversational and consists of communal endeavors, not mental acts of lonely cognitive subjects. Intersubjective constitution of social reality occurs through interaction among various actors.

The communicative praxis occurs in specific webs of interpersonal relations and categorical identities with their orientations shaped by cultural and historical contexts, where acquired habits, established customs, and historical trends mix and mingle. It represents socio-cultural forms of dealing with one another. A social actor orient herself to the world through this interactive communication by using the existing cultural formations as a resource for looking, inferring, describing, and explaining.

In Eyerman and Jamison’s (1991) formulation, the cognitive praxis of a social movement is related to knowledge production. For Schulz, the concept of communicative praxis also includes “purpose oriented framing” (Schulz 1998: 592). This includes the intentionality of communicative praxis (without denying un-intentionality and unintended action consequences). The intentionality or purposefulness of communicative praxis is coming from the fact that our actions and discourses are usually “for” and “toward” others, which could be individuals, groups, institutions, practices, codes etc. The intentionality of communicative praxis requires an exploration of the sources of actors’ motivation and the layers of meaning encircling them. These could be drawn
from a wider context and wider space in which traditions, habits, rituals, and historical trends are interwoven.

Schulz (1998) extends his concept of communicative praxis to the global and cross-cultural dimension in order to demonstrate how social groups develop projects over time and spread their messages into various audiences located in different parts of the world. In this respect, he diverges from Eyerman and Jamison, who assume that a social movement occurs “within the boundaries of a particular society” (1991: 4). In an increasingly globalized and transnationalized world of social connections, social movement activities are becoming more and more global and transnational, so are their messages and audiences.

Transnational advocacy networks transcending nation-state boundaries engage in transnational movements that are organized around issues such as human rights, environmental issues, women rights issues and impact on relations of a state with its citizens by connecting it into the international system (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith et al. 1997). Understanding and analyzing the meaning construction of these kinds of movement requires communicative praxis with a global and cross-cultural dimension. The Alevi movement which continues through national and transnational networks also requires this kind of analysis.

It is through communicative praxis—in the forms of speaking, writing, or acting—that the presence and absence, affirmation and negation take place (Schrag 1986). Cemal Şener’s book on Alevism printed in Turkey and the declaration of the Manifesto of Alevism in Hamburg are examples of the communicative praxis in forms of writing. The book and manifesto are both rhetorical displays of social ideals and goals of the Alevi community.

People inhabit shared physical and virtual spaces oriented to the other’s presence.
They are ready for the challenges of entering into other relations with their ability to carry out social relations. Interaction with ‘others’ brings new possibilities of acceptance or refusal of others as “others” (Calhoun 1995). The social and spatial locations of communicative praxis, physical or virtual, constitute a cognitive territory and a new conceptual space, where the dynamic interaction between different groups and organizations take place. Certain ways of life, symbols, codes, ideas, and identities emerge through communicative praxis in these locations. From this perspective, social actors are implied by the communicative praxis; they emerge within its history and are modified by its changing scenes (Schrag 1992).

From the philosophical perspective communicative praxis is “textured as an amalgam of discourse and action” (Schrag 1992: 63). Discourse and action interact and articulate in the space of communicative praxis. It occurs in a common intersubjective field, which involves self and other, speaker and hearer (p. 185). The space of discourse hosts the speaker/hearer transaction as a narration by someone about something.

Praxis refers to a multidimensional fabric of "discourse and action, word and deed, speaking and writing, hearing and reading" (Schrag 1986). It demonstrates the multiplicity of forms of discourse and action. This multiplicity comes from the multiplicity of meanings, symbols and idioms. They are produced by multiple actors at local, national, and transnational levels. Because the communicative praxis is a construction of meanings in interaction with and against each other (Schulz 1998), there is no comprehension of a specific form of discourse or an action without a background of other discourses and other actions that mutually define the figuration of each (Schrag 1992: 166). In the revival of Alevism various actors produce discourses contradicting and competing with others.

The existence of multiple discourses and actions emerges out of conflicting
interests and identity claims. ‘Contentious conversation’ emerges as a result of the conflicting interests between parties (Tilly 1998c). I take Tilly’s concept of contentious conservation under the rubric of communicative praxis. Contentious conversation is based on the negotiated communication and contention as mutual claim-making (p. 495). Contentious conversation is path dependent in the sense that the previous history of the activity in question strongly limits what can happen next. Conversation turns into a contentious one, when the realization of one party’s interests challenges the other party’s conditions of existence.

In webs of social relations, people are constantly interacting with others, “negotiating who they are, adjusting the boundaries they occupy, modifying their actions in rapid response to other people’s reactions, selecting among and altering available scripts” (Tilly 1998c: 497-498). This brings the “response-dynamics of communicative praxis” through which social actors respond to the discourses and actions of others (Schrag 1992: 169).

I have argued at the beginning that in order to link action and opportunity we need a concept that takes communicative interactive aspects of social action and to analyze content. Defining the concept of communicative praxis has demonstrated the communicative interactive aspect of social action. Now I turn to the analysis of content produced by a social movement. As Eyerman and Jamison (1991: 61) correctly argue, a social movement can be read as a “text” that one needs to decompose it into its component parts in order to understand its content. In that way, it is possible to uncover what lies behind appearance.

Because the communicative praxis is about the construction of meaning, it is about content. The communicative praxis of a social movement brings baggage that includes discourses of expression, persuasion, reference, and narration. The
communicative praxis, which is a network of actions and discourses, is articulated in texts.

The analysis of communicative praxis focuses on: who communicates to whom in which setting, who speaks messages directed to whom, what kind of discourses are produced and get crystallized, what kinds principles are incorporated. Actors dissent or consent according to discourses they produce and political projects they engage in. Discourses connect social actors at one level but divide at another.

In the Alevi movement, a motley of discourses of Alevism is produced by various actors, from Alevi voluntary associations to state agents, at various formal and informal settings. There is a need to analyze how their texts relate to the context of interests and conflicts in play and to the emotions of people appealed to. This can be possible through analyzing their communicative praxis which reflects on various material produced by these actors.

It is through communicative praxis that various actors acting in multiple scales develop and enact social, cultural and political projects. Communicative praxis entails rational and non-rational interaction between social actors (formal and informal), who are interacting in various settings. These social actors within webs of local, national and transnational networks produce multiple discourses in spaces, which are full of unresolved tensions, due to the power struggle over, among and between discourses of dominance. The communicative praxis is a fabrication of discourses and actions produced by consenting and dissenting actors.

The theoretical model developed in this chapter distinguishes three conceptual tools to analyze the transformation of Alevism from secrecy to publicity. The concept of networks analyzes connections and nonconnections of social actors who are embedded in
a complex set of network ties as "nodes." The existence of dense networks is an integral part of the social and political opportunity structures, which consist of conditions decisive for a social movement to flourish. The social and political opportunity structure is about the opening and closing of social and political spaces for social movements and social movement organizations. Because social actions are not all about networks and opportunity structures but also about the construction of meaning, the concept of communicative praxis is taken to the theoretical model to analyze the "text" of the Alevi movement.

The following chapters examine the various aspects and dimensions of the Alevi movement with the conceptual tools formulated in this section. Because the first step in the transformation of Alevisim from centuries old secrecy to publicity was the shift in networks of Alevi from rural to urban areas, the next section is dedicated to an examination of the macro process of migration.
CHAPTER III

Networks: Shift Because of Migration

Migration means life and progress; a sedentary population stagnation
Ravenstein, 1889: 288

Migration is one of the parameters of change in Turkish society since 1950. It is a central factor in the transformation of Alevism from oral secrecy to written publicity. This process began when Alevis, who had lived in closed rural communities for centuries, migrated to the large urban centers. When people move from one place to another, their spatial and social conditions of existence become fluid (Simmel 1997). It is this fluidity that brings new possibilities and constraints in production, reproduction, and transformation of existing categorical identities, relations and social organizations.

Massive migration from rural to urban areas of Turkey and Europe (and to a less extent Australia, Canada, and USA) destroyed the closed rural community structure of Alevis. Their religious tradition, which was esoteric and transmitted orally at secret

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rituals, was no longer maintained under urban conditions. What Alevi have experienced since the 1950s, is an example of a disorganized rural system with the breakdown of the isolated peasant community.

The chapter has two contributions. First, it focuses on a neglected dimension of migration studies: how migration impacts on the social and spatial dimension of religion in the urban social and spatial landscape. As Kenneth Brown argues, there are few studies which are “particularly concerned with religious dimensions or representations of religion in the spatial or social landscape of urban life” (1986: 79). Recently, with the proliferation of immigrant groups and increasing visibility of their religious practices, a few studies have focused on urban forms of religious practices, experiences, understanding and locating themselves in the cityscapes (Orsy 1999; Livezey 2000). But there is still a need for studies to show how the social and cultural boundaries between different religious groupings are constituted within a multitude of networks, which serve as the locus of identification and belonging, as well as source of power and legitimation.

The second contribution is related to the conceptualization of networks in migration studies. In general migration theory the understanding of network does not go beyond the short-term adaptation of migrants into the city environment. How networks function after migration process reached its saturation remains as an important point of inquiry. I focus on how networks function in the long run. In this way, I shed a light on how migration process has changed social and spatial dimensions and expressions of religion by the shifting networks.
The chapter starts with a summary of migration theories with an emphasis on the concepts of networks. Before examining how migration process impacts on Alevism, an overview of Turkey's experience of internal and international migration is provided.

3.1. Migration Theories

Migration refers to (1) a permanent or semipermanent change of residence, and it (2) involves an origin, a destination and an intervening set of obstacles no matter the distance short or long (Lee 1966). A set of push and pull factors is defined to explain why individuals or groups migrate from rural to urban areas or from less developed to capitalist advanced countries. The volume of migration varies with the diversity of people (Lee 1966). There are ethnic and religious differences in migration rates (Faist 2000). Although there is no statistics kept on membership in religious groupings by the Turkish state, qualitative data suggests that Alevis have high propensity to migrate (Güneş-Ayata 1995; Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1993; Martin 1991; G.H. Sewell 1964) and engaged in international migration in a larger number compared to their Sunni counterparts (Faist 2000; Martin 1991).

The major characteristic of migration is its cumulative aspect. Once it is begun, migration becomes a style and established pattern, an example of collective behavior, which diffuses rapidly (Petersen 1958). In other words "migration begets migration" (Mackie 1995: 203). Pioneers blaze trails that others follow, and sometimes the number who do so grows into a broad system (Petersen 1958). Networks are established between destination and origin, as the information flows back from destination to origin.
Migration scholars have pointed out the vitality of networks in rural-urban (Barnes 1969; Hugo 1981; Mitchell 1969) and international migration (Faist 1999, 2000; Fawcett 1989; Kritz and Zlotnik 1992; Gurak and Caces 1992; Levitt 1998; Wilpert 1992). According to networking theory, migration pioneers establish a social infrastructure that connects sending and receiving communities, therefore opening up opportunities to migrate for others in their communities of origin. It is now widely accepted that networks based on kin, friendship, and community ties link sending and receiving communities and provide a coherent structure for populations of migrants. Migration increases opportunities for further migration and settlement. In terms of establishing new ties in urban areas communal networks based on kinship, friendship, and neighborhood are crucial to access job and housing referrals. Early migrants help to overcome a set of intervening obstacles by decreasing the difficulty of the passage for later immigrants. As a result, migration takes place largely within well-defined streams (Lee 1966).

Networks have a decisive role in determining the principal origin and destination sites of migrants. Kinship and other types of social networks are key elements in stimulating and directing much population mobility (Hugo 1981). Chain migration emerges as a result of these kinds of networks. It refers to the movement in which prospective migrants learn of opportunities and have initial accommodation and employment arranged by means of primary social relationships with previous migrants (McDonald and McDonald 1964, Tilly 1990). Existing networks between origin and
destination could be restrictive. Constrained by personal networks, potential migrants fail
to consider many theoretically available destinations, and concentrate on those few
localities with which their place of origin has strong links (Tilly 1990).

Mabogunje (1970) introduces the system approach to migration theory. His
approach focuses not only on the immigrant but also on various institutions and the
social, economic, and other relationships that are an integral part of the process of the
migrant's transformation. The system approach "enables a consideration of rural-urban
migration no longer as a linear, uni-directional, push-and-pull, cause-effect movement but
a circular, interdependent, progressively complex, and self-modifying system in which
the effect of changes in one part can be traced through the whole of the system"
(Mabogunje 1970: 16).

Kritz and Zlotnik (1992) apply this approach to international migration. In their
model, migration networks link the various countries into a coherent international
migration system. In this international migration system, migration networks include
both individuals and institutions and are national or transnational in scope. From this
perspective, Turkey is an integral part of an international migration system that links
Turkey to several EU countries, Australia, and to a less extent North America.

Migration causes social disorganization that later on brings social reorganization
or regroupings in destination (Thomas and Znaniecki 1927). The reorganization and
regrouping involves selectively re-creating networks. The network moved, changed
shape, and sent down new roots without entirely severing the old ones (Tilly 1990). In
that sense, networks migrated (Tilly 1990). Migration involves negotiation of new relationships both within and across networks. As individuals and groups migrate, networks, collective identities, culture and tradition also migrate. Migration causes to dissolve some of the previous networks while new ones emerge. In this way, networks transform existing categories as well as create new ones (Tilly 1990: 85).

New networks emerging out of migration processes are accumulated as new spaces in urban milieu. Spaces, be they national or transnational, are filled by relationships or "webs of relationships" that are fluid not fixed, and spatial not local. It combines physical features, opportunity and constraint structures, social life, subjective images, values, and meanings that the specific and limited place represents to an individual. For Thrift (1996: 4), "space is striated which is both a negative and positive condition of existence."

Because space is a product, it has a social meaning that extends beyond simple territoriality (Lefebvre [1974] 1991). Groups need to generate space to constitute themselves, or recognize one another, as subjects (Lefebvre [1974] 1991: 416). From this perspective, formation of space is related to boundary formation. Multiplied in the major metropolitan cities of Turkey and Europe, Alevi networks create new spaces in the urban social and spatial landscape, where boundaries are redrawn.

As Hannerz (1992: 173) argues "a city is a place of discoveries and surprises." It provides spaces, where identities and histories are re-created, as the populace copes with the strains of urban life. These spaces are intersections of various actors, who are pushing
and being pushed by "others" for the social and spatial existence in a very complex social field and physical landscape.

The spaces of the cities, their topographies and demographies have radically changed with the rural-urban mobility that brought rural migrants to the urban milieu. Now I turn how Turkey has experienced this macro process since 1950.

3.2. Migration Experience of Turkey: An Overview

3.2.1 Internal Migration: Rural Exodus

In 1950, 25% of the population lived in urban areas of Turkey. Today, as table 1 shows, 65.03% of Turkish population is urban. The massive migration was the prime driving force behind rapid urban growth in Turkey (Akçura 1974; Danielson and Keleş 1985; Gedik 1997; Geray 1969; Karpat 1976; Shorter and Tekçe 1974; Tanfer 1983). Because of migration, urban population grew five times faster than rural population between 1950 and 1980 (Danielson and Keleş 1985).

The number of people leaving their villages sharply increased following 1950. Between 1950 and 1955 urbanization increased rapidly, and the annual population growth in cities went from 22.47 to 55.67 per thousand (see table 1). As table 2 clearly demonstrates, the urbanization rate has been much higher than the population growth rate

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1 Urban is defined according to three different criteria: (1) settlements with more than 10,000 inhabitant; (2) settlements with more than 20,000 settlements; (3) cities comprising the areas within the municipal boundaries of the province and district centers, regardless of their population size (Gedik 1997).

in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1965-1970, the urbanization rate was 6.03 compared to 2.52% population growth rate. The urban population rose to 34.4% in 1965, 38.4% in 1970, and 43.9% in 1980. By 1990, 59.2% of population inhabited urban areas.

Table 3 demonstrates the out migration rate by provinces between 1950-1985. Between 1950-1955, the internal out migration increased evenly. Rize (24.18), Erzincan (17.64) and Trabzon (16.89) lost majority of their inhabitants by 1950. Out migration rate above the national average of 11 percent in Artvin (15.95), Bilecik (17.41), Çankiri (16.54), and Gümüşhane (20.88).

Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir were the major magnets for the majority of those rural migrants (see table 4). Until 1950s, only 8.30% of the population lived outside of their birthplaces, but this percentage increased to 11% in 1955, to 13.20 in 1965 and 19.20% in 1980 (Cerit 1986). By 1990, one out of four Turkish citizens lived outside of her birthplace, as one third of these approximately 13.3 million internal migrants lived in İstanbul (Schüler 1998). In the 1990s, 60% of İstanbul’s population was born outside of this city (Tümer et al. 1995).

Scholars have explained this migration process of Turkey within the pull-push model (Akçura 1974; Danielson and Keleş 1985; Geray 1969; Akkayan 1979; Munro 1974). The push factors can be summarized in following: prevailing land ownership and tenure system, fragmentation of holdings, backward technology, poor organization of production and marketing and the interplay of over and under utilization of land, and

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above all the mechanization of agriculture and the capitalist transformation of agriculture requiring both fewer workers and large land holdings. Pull factors can be summarized as the necessity for a labor force by industry, and job opportunities, more public services, and education in the urban areas. In addition to other factors, improvement of communication and contacts of the individual with the outside world and city life also influenced the rapidity of the urbanization process (Geray 1969).

The major push factor actually is the mechanization of agriculture with the foreign aid granted to Turkey with the Marshall Plan after World War II. The largest part of this aid was used for tractors and agricultural machinery. The incoming Democrat party government of Adnan Menderes engaged in a massive mechanization of agriculture, largely through the assistance provided by the United States. The first wave of mechanization took place in 1950-53, followed by a second one between 1960 and 1972 (Franz 1994). Introduction of approximately 40,000 tractors dislocated one million farmers (Karpat 1976).

To promote urbanization, parallel with the efforts toward industrialization, and to transfer surplus manpower from the agricultural sector into nonagricultural activities, the Turkish State policies promoted urbanization. In Second Five Year Development Plan 1968-1972, the state policy stated that “urbanization as an institution of settlement structure and social order of the industrial society emerges as a goal to be attained. Urbanization is not only a goal but at the same time it is a vehicle of economic and social development” (Danielson and Keleş 1985, Munro 1974). This perspective reflects
Turkey's positive view of urbanization as an essential corollary of modernization. Thus, migration has been facilitated by governmental policies. Public policy for the most part has been permissive toward migrants (Danielson and Keleş 1985). One manifestation of this permissive policy is the emergence of illegal dwellings in major migrant receiving cities, which are mainly İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir.

Although the full-fledged rural exodus started in the fifties, the government was unable to come up with an adequate social housing plan to accommodate the situation. Newcomers took up residence between separate sections of the city or along outskirts of land that was not being used for farming or was unfavorable for construction on account of its location such as on slopes etc. Thus gecekondu were erected. Gecekondu literally means "landed overnight." Gecekondu are low income housing which have been constructed illegally on either someone else's property or more preferably on the Treasury or Public land without official permission (Buğra 1998; Karpat 1976; Saran 1974; G.H. Sewell 1964). The majority of these gecekondu was built on enclosed public land (Buğra 1998).³

In the early 1960s, there were 70,000, 120,000, and 18,025 gecekondu dwellings in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir respectively, while 59.22% of Ankara, 45% of İstanbul, and 33.42% of İzmir population lived in gecekondu (Karpat 1976). In the eighties these percentages became, respectively, 55%, 70% and 50% (Buğra 1998). In the nineties 55% of İstanbul’s population lived in approximately five million gecekondu, while 400,000
gecekondu hosted half of the population in Ankara (*Radikal* April 9, 1998).

Migrants have concentrated in gecekondu neighborhoods that are frequently fragmented and even segregated according to where they come from, kinship, ethnic, and religious affiliations (Güneş-Ayata 1991; Karpat 1976; G.H. Sewell 1964). They form their regional, ethnic, and religious enclaves (Karpat 1976), while they become, what Gans (1962) calls, "urban villagers" that refers to this attempt to adapt their non-urban institutions and cultures to the urban milieu. The rural migrants in gecekondu maintain their village culture while at the same time changing and adapting themselves to the city culture (Karpat 1976; Suzuki 1960, 1966).

In cities, migrants defines themselves with their origins and construct relations based on new criteria such as *hemşehrilik* that can compromise all groups and individuals from all classes and strata (Güneş-Ayata 1991). *Hemşehris* are individuals coming from the same village, town, province, and even region. *Hemşehrilik* is crosscut by ethnicity, religious, and linguistic groups (Güneş-Ayata). In that sense, a Sunni may not define an Alevi as hemşehri, even though s/he comes from the same province. *Hemşehrilik* serves as a basis for establishing modern types of organizations and even for determining political choices (Güneş-Ayata 1991; Karpat 1976; Schüler 1998).

Hemşehri groups segment gecekondu. This was due to the fact that a considerable majority of gecekondu dwellers got their piece of land to construct gecekondu from their kin or hemşehri (Güneş-Ayata 1991). The migrants' complex

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3The percentages of gecekondu built in enclosed public land are 75.84% in İstanbul, 87.92% in Ankara,
networks, composed of both rural and urban ties, helped them to obtain resources from both the village and the city in order to cope with the demands of urban life (Güneş-Ayata 1991; Karpat 1976; Levine 1973; Mitchell 1969; Suzuki 1966). Maintaining contact to ex-villagers or hemşehris living in the city helps migrants to locate resources in cities and provides this information to people from the villages (Levine 1973). These kinds of relations lead to new stratification based on kinship, regional, ethnic or religious differences instead of class stratification (Erder 1995).

3.2.2. International Migration

Migration toward foreign countries is an extension of rural-urban mobility abroad. Studies confirm that a significant number of Turkish migrant workers had village origins (Abadan-Unat 1969, Aker 1972; Wilpert 1992). If they remained in Turkey, most of these rural dwellers would have joined the great march from the villages to the cities. The initial reason for the Turkish emigration was primarily economic, both for the Turkish authorities in encouraging emigration and for the individual emigrant in joining the flow. To a large extent, labor migration from Turkey rests on economic reasons and to a lesser extent on political and social factors (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1993). The pulling factors were the advantages of the expansive nature of highly industrialized economies, their ability to maintain full employment and the desirability of higher wages. The undeniable demographic pressure exercised by an annual population growth of 3%, and the repercussions upon the labor market resulting from this explosion have forced the

and 80,79 in İzmir (Buğra 1998, 309).

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responsible authorities, especially the State Planning Organization, to plan for the export of the unemployable labor force (Abadan-Unat 1974; Paine 1974). Turkey's First Five-Year Development Plan (1962-1976) indicated that "the export of excessive manpower" to Western Europe was one of the possibilities for coping with unemployment (Abadan-Unat 1976). The flows of savings and remittances were among "good" aspects of exporting workers abroad.\(^4\)

Turkey was not a significant emigration country until she signed the first bi-lateral agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1961. The following three decades, more than 4 million Turks emigrated abroad for employment. Especially after the promulgation of the new 1961 Constitution, which provided the legal basis for free circulation outside Turkey, the number of Turkish workers employed abroad increased (Abadan-Unat 1974; Akgündüz 1993; Barsiğ et al. 1990).

After Germany, Turkey signed more agreements regarding the labor recruitments with Belgium, Netherlands and Austria in 1964, with France in 1965, with Sweden and Australia in 1967 and with Norway in 1981. By 1991, Turkish citizens constituted 14.1% of non-nationals, the largest share of non-nationals in the EU countries (Meissner et al. 1993, see table 5). Table 6 demonstrates stock of Turkish nationals in the selected European countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Germany has the largest group of Turkish nationals. By 1997, 2,107,400 Turkish citizens lived in this country. In the Netherlands,

\(^4\)The amount of hard currency from remittances in 1979 (1.7 billion dollars) was equal to 75% of total exports value in that year and these remittances covered more than 60% of the visible trade deficit (2.8 billion) (Penninx 1982).
the Turkish citizens constitute the second largest group of foreign population.

Germany has been the main magnet for labor migrants and refugees from Turkey in Europe. About 50% to 75% of Turkish net migration to Europe between 1960 and 1994 went to Germany (Faist 2000). The economic recession of 1966/1967 temporarily slowed down the recruitment of guest workers. In January 1963, only 22,000 Turkish workers were in West Germany. Between 1963 and 1966 through the intercession of the Turkish Employment Service, a total of around 180,000 workers left during these four years for West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria (see Abadan-Unat 1974, Paine 1974, Philips 1991). The official number of emigrated workers from Turkey to Europe swelled from 66,000 in 1964 to 130,000 in 1970, and then peaked at 136,000 in 1973. Between 1961 and 1975, 805,000 workers were sent by the Turkish Employment Service, and another estimated 120,000 to 150,000 entered illegally (Gitmez 1989). Since 1974 there has been a net return flow of 20,000-30,000 Turks annually, but the Turkish population in Western Europe rose to about 2 million in 1980 and has remained since then (Gitmez 1989: 8). The typical cycle of family reunification and marriage migration ensued. Cologne, Munich and Berlin were the three largest centers of concentration (Abadan-Unat 1969). Foreigners remain concentrated in major urban centers, and cities such as Cologne, Berlin, Munich and Stuttgart, where foreigners form 10-20 percent of the population (Münz and Ulrich 1999).

Between 1961 and 1971 Turkey jumped from the fifth to the first rank in providing manpower to German industry (Abadan-Unat 1974). The trend was a
decreasing manpower export from rapidly industrializing countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain and an increasing export from the less developed, partially industrialized countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco. Table 7 shows the stock of Turkish workers in the European countries in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish workers constitute the largest portion of the foreign labor force in Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark as they constitute the second largest group of foreign workers in Austria (SOPEMI 1999).

When recruitment was no longer permitted, more and more Turkish workers searching for employment abroad began to fault the recruitment process by travelling to Europe as tourists and entering the labor market illegally without having a residence permit or a work permit (Penninx 1982). The increase in Turkish migration that followed the 1973 ban has been largely due to the migration of family members joining migrant workers in Germany (Wilpert 1992). After two decades passed in Germany, many Turkish nationals recruited temporarily as "guest workers" have become settlers by bringing up their families and relatives (Casiles 1985). The Turkish nationals have the greatest tendency to acquire nationality in EU countries. Table 8 shows the distribution of Turkish citizens acquiring nationality in European countries. In Germany, the Netherlands, and Denmark, the Turkish nationals constituted the largest immigrant group acquiring nationality in the eighties and the nineties. In the 1980s and 1990s, the migration wave from Turkey to the EU countries was usually in the form of asylum-seekers (see table 9). Because of the existence of well-established political ties and a large
group of Turkish citizens, Germany has been the most attractive country for asylum seekers of Turkey (see table 10).

Immigrants from Turkey continue to develop networks on the basis of common origins. Having common village, ethnic and religious ties continue to influence social interaction in abroad. On the basis of these ties, migrant communities assist new migrant arrivals in arranging work and housing. The various ethnic and religious groups have formed their own enclaves in Europe. For that reason instead of organizing around a solid Turkish community, the Turkish nationals have created segmented networks divided by ethnic and religious lines (Faist 1999, Gümínez and Wilpert 1987, Wilpert 1988). Alevis constitute one of these segmented networks.

3.3. Migration and Alevis

Although there are no statistical data to show Alevi migration with numbers, the qualitative data from various fieldworks have demonstrated that Alevi communities have engaged in migration in large numbers (Güneş-Ayata 1992; Faist 2000; Martin 1991; Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1993).

Because the Turkish State does not keep statistics by ethnicity and religious affiliation, there is no data demonstrating the exact numbers and locations of Alevi communities. A weekly journal, Tempo, prepared a map showing Alevi dense areas in 1988. The map, said to be prepared "according to various experts and scientists."

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³In the 1960 and 1970 censuses, there was a question asking the religious affiliation. It had fixed options to be chosen: Muslim, Christians, and Jews. Alevisim was not an option to choose. Since 1980 census there has been no question on religious affiliation.
provides the population distribution of Alevis as the following:

Tunceli 100%; Çorum, Amasya, Tokat 50%; Yozgat, 40%; Çankırı, 25%; Sivas, 60%; Erzincan 40%; Bingöl, Muş, 50%; Erzurum, 35%, Kars, 40%; Ağrı, 10%; Malatya, Elazığ, 50%; Adıyaman, 60%; Maraş, 40%; Adana, 35%; Antep, 25%; Hatay, 40-45%; Içel (Mersin), 25%; Urfa, Kayseri, 10%; Antalya, 20%; İstanbul, 15%; Ankara, 20%; İzmir 10%. The provinces that have no Alevi population: Hakkari, Van, Siirt, Bitlis, Diyarbakır (Tempo, 1988, vl. 37: 16).

The election results of the Birlik Partisi, the Alevi party of the late 60s and 70s, supported the Tempo's thesis over which areas are Alevi locations outside of the eastern Anatolia (Schüler 1998). These are Sivas- especially its eastern towns- Çorum, Amasya, Tokat and the east of Içel. Where Bumke (1989) and Nestman (1989) have shown as Alevi dense areas in the Eastern Anatolia coincided with the Tempo's map. The Kurdish Alevis constitute the largest part of Tunceli population, and a substantial number of them live in Erzincan, Bingöl, and Elazığ, toward the west in Sivas, Malatya, Maraş, and Adana, and toward the east in Erzurum, and Muş (Bumke 1989: 512). The Alevi dense areas coincide with the locations of heterodox uprisings that occurred in Asia Minor since the Babai revolt of the thirteenth century.

Generally speaking, today Alevi/Kızılbaş communities live in almost all parts of Turkey, but the large part of the Turkish speaking Kızılbaş/Alevis are living in the central Anatolia around the Kızılırmak riverbank and Amasya environment. The villages within the Kayseri-Sivas-Divriği triangle, Hacı Bektaş and its surrounding areas, villages around Ankara and Çankırı are among Alevi populated areas. Around Çorum there are lots of Alevi-populated areas. In Maraş and Malatya surroundings, Sivas, Erzincan and Erzurum there are both Turkish and Kurdish speaking Kızılbaş/Alevi communities (cf. Bruinessen 1992, 1997). A considerable number of them lived in the Western Anatolia and Tourus (Mediterranean).
Because Alevi communities inhabit peripheral and usually the eastern mountainous and poorest sections of Turkey, they were more predisposed toward migration than other relatively well to do villagers (Sewell G.H. 1964). As Güneş-Ayata 1995) points out, they were the first groups who migrated to the urban areas. It is widely accepted that although Alevis constitute 15-25% of the population they make up 35-40% of those migrated to the large urban centers of Turkey, and the Turkish nationals living abroad.

Table 3 demonstrates the out-migration rate by provinces between 1950 and 1985. The out-migration rate of Alevi dense provinces was much higher than the national average since 1950s. In 1950, one of the Alevi populated provinces, Elazığ had the second highest out-migration rate with 16.89%, while another Alevi populated province, Erzincan, was on the way to have the highest out-migration rate. Erzincan’s out migration reached 26.53% in 1965, 36.81% in the 1975 and 45% in 1985. Tunceli’s out-migration rate was significantly high during the 60s and 70s, but increased sharply and reached to 43.32% in 1985. In 1980, Erzincan (42.02%), Sivas (34.94%), and Tunceli (35.47) were among the provinces whose out migration rates were much higher than the national average (19.2%).

The renew interest in out-migration in the period of 1980 and 1985 in the Alevi populated cities is most likely a result of violence against Alevis in the cities that have mixed population such as Sivas, Çorum, Maraş, Malatya and Erzincan. Although there are no quantitative data to show it, there has been an increase in the out-migration rate in Sivas as a result of 1993 Sivas incident (Coşkun 1995). Sivas is a special case in terms of out-migration. In 1975 288,000 people, who were born in Sivas were living out of Sivas, and this constituted 39% of its population. In the 1980s migration from Sivas to Istanbul sharply increased. Constituting 6.92% of İstanbul’s population (Schüler 1998),

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immigrants from Sivas made up of the largest migrant group of this city (Coşkun 1995). Another city that experienced a sharp increase in out migration in the 80s and 90s is Tunceli (new name of Dersim), which has been under the harsh “extraordinary situation” administration because of the Turkish Army-PKK struggle in the eastern Turkey.

Between 1985 and 1990, the net migration rate by provinces demonstrated that the receiving cities were İstanbul (108%), Kocaeli (108%), İzmir (64%), İşçel (68%) and Aydın (26%). The Alevi populated cities were among the major sending cities, such as Tunceli (-154%), Sivas (-106%), Muş (-100%), Erzincan (-93), Çorum (-58), Çankırı (-61), Amasya (-60), and Tokat (-68).

Qualitative data from the fieldwork supported the high proportion of Alevis in migration. Alevis formed a high percentage of migrants and gecekondu dwellers in Ankara (G.H. Sewell 1964). Sewell G.H. (1964) informed that Alevis, who comprise from 15 to 25% of Turkey’s population, constituted 35% or more of Aktepe’s (a gecekondu neighborhood in Ankara) population. There are several causes to explain this situation. First of all, Alevis were living the most remote and economically deprived areas. Instead of migrating to small towns, where they were not welcomed and easily stigmatized, migrants from Alevi villages concentrated in the larger cities. Urbanization of Alevis could be caused by their generally higher aspirations compared to the Sunni villagers as a result of being “other.” Insecurity because of their minority status may be causing them to migrate to the safety of large cities.

Traditionally, both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis had lived in closed communities in different regions of Turkey, and they had little or no interaction among them. When

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7Ibid.
Alevis inhabiting different regions of Turkey migrated from rural to urban areas, new network ties emerged and expanded among them in the large urban centers. In their internal social organization, the main bond was the dede-talip bondage. In this system, a set of villages in a certain region belongs to a certain Alevi ocak (hearth). A dede belonged to an ocak, needs to visit the villages assigned to his holy lineage to perform cem and teach the way to his talips. Dedes were the main carriers of Alevi networks in the earlier days. With migration, this social and spatial organization of Alevis has dissolved, and the traditional dede-talip bond was broken.

The first shift in the traditional Alevi networks was felt with the emergence of Alevi populated gecekondu neighborhoods in the major migrant receiving cities. Gecekondu have been fragmented according to regional, ethnic and religious lines, because access to land usually passed through kin, hemşehrîs, ethnic and religious networks (Güneş-Ayata 1991). Alevi communities formed new gecekondu neighborhoods by concentrating in the urban spaces. Several studies conducted in gecekondu areas demonstrated that identity groups in gecekondu have given a measure of security by providing members with channels of employment, labor for constructing houses, and means of protecting property (Erder 1995; Güneş-Ayata 1991; Karpat 1976; G.H. Swell 1964). G.H. Swell (1964) informed that in Aktepe, a gecekondu neighborhood, the primary identity group variables were ethnic origin, religious sect and village of birth. The interaction between these variables appeared to be determining the recruitment of migrants, the pattern of settlement, and other principal social decisions of the inhabitants.

Alevis populated gecekondu neighborhoods emerged in the late fifties and early sixties. To name the well-known ones, these are Tuzlucaýir, Mamak, Natoîolu, Saimekadin, Abidinpaşa, Aktepe, and Dikmen in Ankara, Sargazi, Gazi, Kartal, Maltepe,
Gülsuyu, Ümraniye, Alibeyköy, Darica, Zeytinburnu, Gültepe, Esenler in İstanbul and Narlıdere in İzmir. The fieldwork performed in the late 1960s reported that the Alevi living in the three gecekondu in İstanbul organized special gatherings in honor of dede, during his visits to İstanbul and offered him gifts and dues (Karpat 1976). The same fieldwork also informed that Alevi living in different neighborhoods of a city came together and organized cem ceremonies.

One manifestation of Alevi coming to the large urban centers was the small-scale publication activities of Alevi in Ankara and Istanbul. Two print houses, İstanbul Maarif Kütüphanesi and Emek Basimevi published several books on Alevism. The major one was the publication of Buyruk [Command], which was the only religious book of Alevism, by Sefer Aytekin in 1958. Until this time, the Buyruk was hand written in Arabic, and only in the possession of dedes. But these publication activities did not reach a wide audience.

In the early sixties, with the 1961 liberal constitution, Alevi in cities started to found a few associations. In the traditional rural setting, there was no need for an association, because their social organization was a village. In urban setting this traditional social system could not function. The backbone of the traditional system, the dede-talip bond, was dissolved. There had been no central authority to organize or impose rules or regulations to the entire Alevi community. In urban areas, they needed a new organizational model. The first Alevi associations that appeared in the major cities were hometown associations in the 1960s. Alevi coming from the same village, town or province came together and formed these hometown associations to maintain primordial ties, create solidarity and provide help for newcomers. The associations founded by the Alevi served spaces to meet, discuss Alevi tradition and knowledge, and organize cem ceremony.
In terms of the first Alevi associations that appeared in the cities, the *Hacı Bektaş Veli Turizm Derneği* (Hacı Bektaş Veli Tourism Association) had a specific importance. The first branch was founded in the town of Hacı Bektaş, then, in Ankara and İstanbul in the first half of the sixties. The Hacı Bektaş Veli Association of Ankara organized a ceremony in a big cinema hall as thousands of Alevis from various gecekondu neighborhoods participated in, even stopping traffic to perform semah dance in 1964.⁴ Because Hacı Bektaş is the patron saint of all Alevis and Bektaşis, Hacı Bektaş Tourism Association attracted Alevis coming from various regional and ethnic backgrounds. This association succeeded to open the Hacı Bektaş lodge as a museum in 1964 with state support, and an annual cultural festival for honoring the patron saint of Alevis was launched.

In urban areas, Alevis from various ethnic and regional background had the opportunity to meet and found new networks. Emerging networks of Alevis coming from various regions and ethnic backgrounds have replaced the traditional networks carried out by the dede-talip bond. These newly founded networks among Alevis provided a basis to found an Alevi party in the second half of the sixties.

Founded in 1966, the Birlik Partisi was led by Mustafa Timisi (1969-1980), who was elected as a deputy of Sivas from this party in the 1969 general election. He was a young university educated gecekondu dweller, living in Tuzluca, one of the Alevi populated gecekondu neighborhoods of Ankara. The party sent 8 deputies to the parliament in the 1969 general election: two from Sivas, one from Ankara, İstanbul, Yozgat, Çorum, Malatya and Kırşehir. But the party failed in the following elections.

These activities among Alevis did not turn into a full-fledged Alevi movement in

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⁴Interview with Ali Doğan, the president of the Hacı Bektaş Anadolu Kültür Vakfı and the *Alevi Bektaşı Kuruluşları Birliği* (Alevi Bektaşi Institutions Union), May 14 2000, İstanbul.
the 1960s and 1970s. The main reason was that the leftist socialist movement became the major attraction to the Alevi youth, which grew up and became educated in urban areas. The Alevi youth, armed with the socialist and Marxist ideals, even turned against their own traditional social structure by defining dedes as “exploiters” and driving them out of villages. Traditionally, talips are supposed to give “hakkuldak”⁹ to their dede during his visit. In the eyes of Alevi youth, influenced by the Marxist and socialist ideals, this hakkuldak was an exploitation of villagers by dedes. In general, there were not much difference between dedes and talips in terms of material conditions. For that reason, both dedes and talips migrated to urban areas in search of a better life.

As urban workers, gecekondu dwellers and university students, the Alevi middle and young generation took up the socialist leftist values, in the sixties and seventies. Association of Alevis with the left made them an easy target for the extreme right. In the turmoil of the seventies, this resulted in a serial of pogrom-like attacks toward Alevis in the cities of the mixed population. When the 1980 military coup took over the government, it smashed every manifestation of the left and its supporting groups including Alevis.

3.3.1. Emergence of a New Alevi Elite: Araştırmacı - Yazar

Left in an ideological vacuum with the collapse of the socialist block in Eastern Europe, the young and middle generation Alevis of the 1970s had to find a new path to follow. In the late 1980s, they gave up their revolutionary attitude and turned to revive traditional Alevism. A new Alevi elite, araştırmacı yazar (researcher-writer), emerged and became the major actors in the process of making Alevism public. Media has defined them as “Alevi intellectuals.”

⁹The symbolic dues or gifts given to a dede during his visit. It is a symbolic rather than a substantial income.
These writers are urban educated children of first generation Alevi migrants. They grew up in the early years of migration and underwent modern secular education. Being educated, they have taken up the role of writer and claimed authority on knowledge of Alevism. The first, and perhaps the most known, writer was Cemal Şener who published Alevilik Olayı: Toplumsal bir Başкалdrımın Kısa Tarihçesi (Alevism Incident: A Short History of a Social Uprising) in 1989. His book brought Alevism into public spheres. More than a hundred books on Alevism have been written by an increasing number of Alevi writers since Alevilik Olayı appeared in bookstores.

The emergent Alevi writers have given speeches on various panels and conferences organized by the newly founded community-based Alevi associations, they appeared in media, whose interest on Alevis increased in the late 1980s. They have become visible as Alevis’ spokespersons holding knowledge on Alevism. A big majority of these writers has taken active roles in associational activities, either as presidents or board members.

The increasing role of writers has challenged the traditional hierarchy that gives dedes the monopoly on knowledge. The authority of dede has passed to these writers, who are urban educated Alevis in their forties. A great majority of them does not belong to dede lineage. While writers are invited to panels or conferences organized by Alevi associations, dedes are asked to conduct cem ceremonies in the newly founded cemevis. As Vorhoff (1999: 330) correctly puts “the dede’s traditional authority transform into a symbolic authority that starts and ends at the threshold of the cemevi.”

In reality, the authority of dede started to deteriorate when the new generation grew up and were educated in cities were not satisfied with dedes’ explanations. In addition to that, both dedes and talips experiencing migration failed to continue traditional roles in cities, where Alevis have undergone the process of secularization and
modernization. A new generation, which grew up in the 1960s and 70s, was not familiar with the Alevi "way."

Although Alevi writers publish books on Alevism, participate in conferences and appear in media, the centrality of dede in the Alevi tradition is indisputable. Without dedes there can be no cem ceremony. The revival of Alevi tradition needs dedes, whose numbers are decreasing. The majority of "available" dedes are over 60 years old; there is no clear project to raise a new generation of dedes to continue the tradition.

3.3.2. Organizing Alevism in the 1980s and 1990s

Since the late 80s, Alevis have formed hundreds of Alevi associations and foundations all around Turkey. Peaking in the mid-1990s, the majority of these Alevi associations is located in the major migrant receiving cities, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Now, Alevi activities are carried out by these associations.

Founding an association requires criteria for inclusion and exclusion. It is also a collective representation providing a common ground for an identity of a group or a community (Tilly 1998a). From this point of view, Alevi associations could be defined as institutionalized sites of boundary-making and community-formation. These associations engage in claim making based on the Alevi identity. Not only do they engage public discussion on the definition of Alevism, its history and tradition but also they become critical of the Sunni state establishment.

There are various Alevi associations whose discourses, political projects and demands vary. Because it is prohibited by law to use the concept of "Alevi" in the naming of an association in Turkey, Alevi associations are named after the historical figures of Alevism. Below I document the major Alevi associations, which are visible in the public political realm in contemporary Turkey.

One of the most widespread Alevi associations are Hacı Bektaş associations. First
appeared in the early sixties, they were closed down by the 1980 military coup. These associations re-emerged by the late 80s, as *Hacı Bektaş Veli Kültür ve Tanıtma Dernekleri* (HBKTD) (Hacı Bektaş Culture and Advocacy Associations). In 1994, in the leadership of HBKTD’s Ankara branch, *Hacı Bektaş Veli Anadolu Kültür Vakfı* (HBAKV) (Hacı Bektaş Veli Anatolia Culture Foundation) was founded. The HBAKV currently functions as the umbrella organization of Hacı Bektaş Veli associations located various parts of Turkey. It has 29 branches all over Turkey and approximately ten thousand members.\(^1\) In 1998, a four-floor headquarter building was opened in Ankara. There are also other Hacı Bektaş associations that do not belong to this roof association.

Other widespread Alevi associations are the *Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Dernekleri* (PSAKD) (Pir Sultan Abdal Culture Associations).\(^2\) Until 1989, the PSAKD was the Banaz Village Association, which was founded in the mid-sixties. It was open only to the persons originally from this village. Banaz was the village of Pir Sultan Abdal, a 16th century Kızzılbaş rebel and one of the seven great Alevi poets. In 1991, this village association changed to the PSAKD and opened itself to “democratic secular and modern” people, of course mainly Alevis. The PSAKD, whose headquarter is in Ankara, has 35 branches (the majority of them are located in İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir) and approximately 70,000 registered members. The PSAKD has taken a central role in the Alevi movement since the 1993 Sivas incident. The hotel that was set on fire by the fundamentalists was hosting the guests of Pir Sultan Abdal Festival organized by the

\(^{10}\)Vakıf is a non-profit pious endowment.

\(^{11}\)This information is based on a dossier distributed by the HBAKV at the Hacı Bektaş Veli Symposium, Ankara, April 27-29 2000.

\(^{12}\)Following information based on an interview with the PSAKD’s executive council members, July 8, 1999 Ankara.
PSAKD, whose young members constituted the majority of victims died in the fire. After this incident its branches and members sharply increased. The PSAKD has bi-monthly periodical, *Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür ve Sanat Dergisi* (Pir Sultan Abdal Culture and Art Journal)

Another widespread Alevi association is the *Cem Vakfı* (Cem Foundation) founded in 1995. Its leader, İzzettin Doğan, an international relations professor and an Alevi dede, is a well-known Alevi figure. The Cem Vakfı has over 29 branches, 18 of which are located in Istanbul, where the headquarter is also located (*Cem*, 1998, 80: 33). It has a European Coordinate with several branches in Europe (mainly Germany). The Cem has a monthly periodical, *Cem*, and a radio station, Cem Radyo, broadcasting in İstanbul.

Although they are not as widespread as others, there are two more publicly known Alevi associations. One of them is the *Alevi Bektâşî Eğitim Kültür Vakfı* (ABEKV) (Alevi Bektâşî Education and Culture Foundation), known for a long time as *the Semah Kültür Vakfı* (Semah Culture Foundation). The ABEKV has a special role in the movement. The foundation activities of Semah Kültür Vakfı began around 1989, but an article in its by-law, “to advocate and spread Alevi culture,” faced a legal problem. Eventually the Semah Vakfı got a legal status in 1994 (İlknur and Şener 1995). Between 1994-2000, the Semah Vakfı battled in the court to change its name to the ABEKV. In 2000, its legal battle ended with legal permission for the name change. Now the ABEKV is the only association with an Alevi title.¹⁴ The other association is the *Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı*

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¹³Cem is an abbreviation of *Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı* (Republican Education and Culture Foundation), but the word cem connotes the religious ceremony of Alevis.

¹⁴The *Alevi-Bektâşî Derneği* (Alevi Bektâşî Association) founded in the early nineties in İzmir, as Lütfi Kaleli informed, “somehow escaped from the attention of the authorities” (Interview with Lütfi Kaleli, the president of the ABEKV, May 14, 2000 Istanbul).

In addition to these associations and foundations, there are various re-opened dervish lodges, convents and tombs around which Alevi have organized to revitalize traditional Alevism. The restoration of the long-term deserted Bektashi lodges by groups of Alevis demonstrates continuing strength of Alevi networks. Although dervish lodges, convents and tombs were outlawed in 1925 as a part of the secularization process of Turkish Republic, Alevis, especially those who migrated to Istanbul, secretly practiced their holy days and organized *cem* in a few deserted Bektashi lodges.

For example, an Alevi woman migrated from Erzincan, started to cook *aşure*\(^1^5\) and secretly organized *cem* ceremonies in the early sixties in Karacaahmet Lodge (Ilknur and Şener 1995). In 1969, the *Karacaahmet Derneği* (Karacaahmet Association) was founded as a result of an increasing number of Alevis joining these religious ceremonies in the lodge. But it was the year 1994, when the Karacaahmet’s cemevi construction was razed by the Refah's mayor of Istanbul, it became a central attention. In response, thousands of Alevis came together to protest the mayor’s action and later on the *Karacaahmet Vakfı* (Karacaahmet Foundation) was founded by 123 board members including the major Alevi writers, minstrels and intellectuals. Now the Karacaahmet Lodge has both an association and foundation. Its association has over 1400 members.\(^1^6\) One of the most frequent center of Alevi is the Şahkulu Lodge. It was re-opened by a group of Alevi who founded the Şahkulu Vakfı (Şahkulu Foundation) in the 80s. Both

\(^{1^5}\) A sweet kind of soup that is cooked after 12-day fast in the month of Muharrem for commemorating Hussein’s death at Karbala.

\(^{1^6}\) Interview with Vahap Gungör, the vice president of the Karacaahmet Sultan Association, May 14, 2000, Istanbul.

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the Karacaahmet and Şahkulu are the most frequented centers of Alevis in İstanbul. Over the weekends thousands of Alevis visited these centers for communal meal and crem ceremonies. Karacaahmet and Şahkulu were Bektashi lodges, but they were reopened by Alevis coming from the central and eastern Anatolian provinces, such as Sivas, Erzincan, and Tunceli. The Bektashi lodges have been the major attractions to Alevis, because of the common symbol, the patron saint, Haci Bektas Veli. Not only in İstanbul but throughout Turkey there are re-opened lodges. Hüseyin Gazi Türbesi (tomb) in Ankara, Hamza Baba in İzmir, Keçeci Baba in Tokat, Abdal Musa in Antalya are just a few examples I can name here.

Hometown associations founded by Alevis are also integral parts of Alevi associational activities. In the urban centers, Alevis have founded various hometown associations to maintain their Alevi links and develop solidarity among people coming from the same town, province, or village. I classify the hometown associations, whose members are exclusively Alevi as Alevi associations, because they are also coming to the forefront to make claims based on their “Aleviness.” Some of the major hometown associations of Alevis are the Divriği Kültür Derneği (Divriği Culture Association), Tuncelililer17 Vakfı, Çorumluar Kültür Derneği Turhal Kültür Derneği, Arguvanlilar Derneği etc. One of the earliest hometown associations is the Divriği Culture Association that was founded in 1957 in Ankara. Because the association was founded by Alevis migrated from Divriği, a town of Sivas, it serves an Alevi association. It has over 10,000 members.

The village associations founded by Alevis also provide a basis for the Alevi activities. One major platform was formed by 66 village associations organized under the

17Tuncelili refers to person from Tunceli. In Turkish, li/lü/lı gives the same meaning as the suffix “er” as in New Yorker while suffix ler/ler make it plural. Tuncelililer means those from Tunceli.
umbrella of the *Kızılaughter Köy Dernekleri* (KKD) (*Kızılaughter Village Associations*) in 1995. The KKD publishes a monthly journal, *Kızılaughter*. The major goal is to unite against the Sunni state establishment that ignores Alevi. The KKD functions, not for housing or job referrals, but for making claims based on Alevi identity. The hometown and village associations have strong ties with the Alevi associations I have documented above.

There is widespread contact and consultation between Alevi associations. An examination of multiple associational ties and roles of major Alevi figures shows the links of spider web like networks among Alevi associations (see Appendix B). Leaders mark the major nodal points of these networks. Lütfi Kaleli is the president of the ABEKV, a board of trustee member in the Şahkulu, and a board member of the Karacaahmet Vakfı and the Kartal Cemevi. He is also a writer who published at least six books on Alevism. Cemal Şener, a famous Alevi writer, is the board member of the Karacaahmet, Şahkulu and Kartal Cemevi. Ali Yıldırım, who has published several books on Alevism, is on the executive board of the PSAKD, the Hüseyin Gazi Derneği, and the KKD. Müslüm Doğan is an executive board member of the PSAKD and Divriği Kültür Derneği. Miyase İlkınur is a board member of the Karacaahmet and Kartal Cemevi, and a board of trustee member in the Şahkulu.

The majority of the associations are members of the *Alevi Bektaşı Kuruluşları Birliği* (Alevi Bektaşi Institutions Union) that is an umbrella organization of Alevi associations of Turkey and abroad (see Appendix A). The PSAKD, the HBAKV, the HBKT, the ABEKV, the Şahkulu, the Karacaahmet, the KKD and the Tunceliler Vakfı are among the members. They engage joint action such as meeting with state officials, participating in the protest marches of the Sivas incident, preparing press declarations announcing their problems and demands, and organizing cultural festivals and religious
gatherings. For example, in May 2000, the aşure day was organized jointly by the HBAKV, the PSAKD, the KKD, the Tunceliler Vakfı, the Çorumlular Derneği, and the Hüseyin Gazi Association in rotating among several neighborhoods of Ankara.

3.3.3. Cemevi: A New Spatial and Symbolic Manifestation of Alevi Existence

In the 1990s, a new building called “cemevi” emerged in urban social and spatial landscape. A cemevi literally means a “house of cem,” referring to a building to conduct the Alevi religious ritual, cem. As de Certeau (1984) states “practices are always spatial-symbolic” (p. xix). Cemevis represent the “spatial-symbolic” dimension of Alevi religious practices in urban milieu.

In the rural setting, there was no cemevi. In their villages, Alevis held cems in houses big enough to perform such ceremony. Cemevi is an urban phenomena that emerged from a need for a ritual space in the urban areas. It shows how migration impacts on the dimensions and representations of religion in the urban social and spatial landscape. With an increasing enthusiasm and reassertion of Alevi identity, the sport halls or conference rooms hosted cem ceremonies, in which hundreds of Alevis attended. By 1990, cemevis have emerged as special buildings to practice cem. The number of cemevis sharply increased by the mid nineties in the large urban centers.

Cemevis were, continue to be, founded either by Alevi associations or neighborhood initiatives. The HBAKV, the PSAKD, and the Cem Vakfı have sponsored the construction of cemevis in various locations of Turkey. For example, 14 branches of the PSAKD have cemevis. Almost all of the HBAKV’s branches have cemevis integrated in their association building. In 2000, as one Alevi representative has estimated, there were approximately 550 cemevis all around Turkey.\(^{18}\) The majority of

\(^{18}\)Interview with Müslüm Doğan, the general secretary of the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associations, April 7, 2000, Ankara.
the cemevis are located in the large urban centers such as Istanbul and Ankara. The considerable number of the cemevis is in the gecekondu neighborhoods populated by Alevi. Some of them are Sangazi, Gaziosmanpaşa, Kartal, Bağcılar, Nurtepe, Şahintepe, Ümraniye, Alibeyköy, and Dansa in Istanbul. In Ankara, almost all cemevis are located in the gecekondu neighborhoods populated by Alevi (such as Tuzluçaçayr Mamak, and Dikmen). The re-opened dervish lodges are serving as cemevis.

The indispensable actors of the cemevis are dedes, whose numbers are decreasing as a result of the break in the tradition. Newly founded cemevis and re-opened lodges have a hard time finding dedes to lead cem rituals. The concept of görevli dede (dede on duty) emerges and refers to a dede holding cem in a particular cemevi in this period.

Because the traditional dede-talip bond was broken, dedes encounter with Alevi coming from different regions in cemevis. Traditionally a dede has certain villages to oversee, but now in cemevis he is in front of a group of Alevi, who are not his assigned talips but a mixed group of Alevi migrated from different provinces. Now the dede has to deal with the problems of integrating this mixed community and to overcome the regional differences in practicing the cem ceremony.

The legal side of cemevis is unclear. The law does not recognize a cemevi as a religious center. But opening ceremonies of cemevis host the state officials, such as the president, the cabinet members and so on. The legal status of cemevis comes to the parliament, especially during the discussion on the DİB’s budget. Equating the cemevi with mosque creates a tension between the parties.

As an outcome of migration, cemevis have emerged and shown the Alevi existence in urban areas. Alevi become more and more visible with these spatial meeting places. Simmel (1997) points out that “the unity of the individual community received an incomparable fixity and concreteness through the construction of a church.”

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A construction of a cemevi in Istanbul or Berlin, of course, functions in this way for Alevi communities. Cemevis are both spatial and symbolic manifestations of Alevi existence in cities. Not only in Turkey, but also in Europe and even in Australia.

3.4. International Migration and Alevis

As many have argued, migrating abroad has been more attractive to certain Turkish ethnic and religious minorities than the Sunni majority precisely because of their marginal position at home. Like other minorities of Turkey such as Kurds, Yezidis and Assyrians, Alevi have migrated in larger numbers than their Sunni counterparts. In the early sixties, as they became “guest workers” in various European countries, they started to found associations. The relatively open political structure of Europe provided the “others” of Turkey more freedom to engage associational activities. In this respect Europe is somehow a safe haven for “others of Turkey.” According to Mandel (1996), Alevis because of their minority position and history of persecution, massacres and repression, see Germany as a land of opportunity and tolerance.

3.4.1. Germany: Cradle of Associational Activities

Germany that has the largest portion of immigrants from Turkey is central in terms of associational activities of Alevis. In the early sixties, in order to organize Alevi workers, the Türk Ameleler Birliği (TALEB) (Turkish Workers Union) was founded in Augsburg. One of the founders, Süleyman Cem, who is from Tunceli and university educated, informed in an interview:

the actual name of TALEB was Türkiye Aleviler Birliği (Turkey Alevi Union). We were reluctant to use this, but prefer to call "TALEB" (cited in Şener and İlknur 1995, 115).

Another branch of the TALEB was founded in Munich in 1972. The number of the TALEB’s branches increased in the 70s, and a federation was founded. This federation
had 34 branches. The TALEB had close relations with the Birlik Partisi. Süleyman Cem continued:

the TALEB worked as a branch of the Birlik Partisi. We had a close relationship with Mustafa Timiş and supported the party financially... In the 1977 general election I was the Birlik Partisi’s candidate, but I could not win (ibid 115-116).

In 1976, the TALEB changed its name to the Yurteşverler Birliği (Patriots Union) The close connection with the Birlik Partisi and the Yurteşverler Birliği continued until the military coup of 1980 closed down all the political parties and civil associations in Turkey. This impacted on the Turkish citizens abroad and these activities decreased for a short period.

In the early eighties, associational activities among Alevi started again. In 1984, İsmail Elçioglu published an Alevi journal, Ehl-i Beyt. By 1986, associations with the “Alevi” title emerged in various cities of Germany, such as Mainz, Frankfurt, Dortmund, Cologne, Heilbronn, Stastallendorf, Hamburg, Berlin, St. Polten, Duisburg, Munchen, Stuttgart and Ahlen. Some of these associations emerged out of the branches of the Yurteşverler Birliği19 by changing their names as “Hacı Bektaş Veli Culture Associations,” or “Alevi Culture Center.” The president of the Anadolu Alevileri Kültür ve Cemevi (AAKC) (Anatolian Alevi Culture and Cemevi) of Berlin informed that the AAKC was a branch of Yurteşverler Birliği founded in the late seventies and had very close ties to the Birlik Partisi.20

In 1989, the Alevi Cemaatleri Federasyonu (Alevi Communities Federation) was founded by the twelve Alevi associations located in Mainz, Cologne, Frankfurt and Russelheim. With the increasing number of Alevi associations joining this federation, the

19The Yurteşverler Birliği abolished itself in 1989.

20Interview with Metin Küçük, the president of the AAKC, May 25 2000, Berlin. Several members of the AAKC also acknowledged that they have affiliated this association since it was a Yurteşverler Birliği (interview with the members of AAKC, May 25 and June 5, 2000, Berlin).
federation changed its name to the *Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* (AABF) (Germany Alevi Unions Federation) in 1992. By 1993, the number of associations that belonged to the federation increased to 44, when the associations located in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, and Mannheim joined the federation.

By 2000, the AABF had 89 associations. But it is not the only umbrella association in Germany. Another umbrella association is the *Federasyona Elewiyen Kurdistan* (FEK) (Kurdistan Alevi Federation) that has 22 associations. There are also significant number of Alevi associations that do not belong any of these umbrella associations in Germany. For example, in Berlin there are eleven Alevi associations of which only the AAKC belongs to the AABF. The *Dersim Cemaati* (Community of Dersim) is a member of the FEK. The rest do not belong any federations.

As a new social and spatial Alevi existence, cemevis were also founded in Europe. Twelve associations of the AABF have cemevis. One of them was constructed from the ground in Augsburg as a four-floor building with the symbols of Alevi-Bektaşi traditions. The Ausburg Cemevi is the only cemevi building constructed from the ground in Europe. In Berlin the AAKC purchased a church building and restored it as a cemevi. The other Alevi associations of Berlin have also helped financially as if this cemevi belongs to all. Based on this solidarity, the cemevi is available for their usage too. In my last visit to the AAKC, the Dersim Cemaati was preparing a cem ceremony in this cemevi (September 2000). The announcement of their cem was prepared both in Kurdish and Turkish. The existence of ties among Alevis of Berlin makes this possible. Their networks accumulate in new spaces as sites for social and political engagement.

These Alevi associational activities were not confined within the borders of Germany, as the representatives from Germany began to travel other European countries and Turkey to encourage and help the foundation of Alevi associations. Germany was
the first in terms of transferring organizational know-how and manpower to other European countries and Turkey. In this respect, the organizational infrastructure of Alevi associational activities has mainly drawn from the Germany’s Alevi associations. One particular observation of the American Alevi Culture Center (AACC) of New York could make this point clear. The members of the AACC informed me that an Alevi student, who came from Germany to study in the USA, helped them to found the association and even in writing its by-law.

By the late 1980s, Alevi associations in the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and France began to flourish. As an umbrella association, the *Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* (European Alevi Unions Federation) (EAUF) was founded on October 31, 1994. The member associations of this federation were located in Germany, France, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland and England. The EAUF had 140 associations and 120 thousand members in Europe by 1998 (*Milliyet*, January 10, 1998). Its headquarter was in Cologne, Germany.

In 1999, the EAUF dissolved into separate national organizations. The reason was that being a member of a federation whose center was located in Germany, caused some problems for associations located outside of Germany. Now the foundation process of a new roof organization uniting the Alevi federations of Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark and Belgium is about to be accomplished. I should also specify that there are considerable numbers of Alevi associations, which do not

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21 Interview with Turgut Öker, the president of AABF, July 28, 1999 Cologne.

22 It is actually somehow strange that a student coming to the USA to study dealt with the foundation of Alevi association. He stayed for three months and went back to Germany.

23 *Avrupa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* was abbreviated as the AABF but in order to prevent any confusion with the AABF referring to the *Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu* I used the abbreviation of its English translation.
belong these federations.

One major development was the emergence of Alevi associations to produce knowledge on Alevism within the borders of Germany in 1997-1999. In 1997, under the auspices of EAUF and a support of the **Hollanda Alevi-Bektaşı Sosyal ve Kültür Dernekleri Federasyonu** (Hak-Der) (the Netherlands Alevi-Bektashi Social and Culture Associations Federation), the **Avrupa Alevi Akademisi** (AAA) (European Alevi Academy) was founded. The **Alevi Bektaşı Enstitüsü** (Alevi Bektashi Institute) was founded in Mannheim in 1998. The **Alevi Yol ve Erkan Enstitüsü** (Alevi Way and Rites Institute) was founded by the AAA in Bielefeld in 1999.

3.4.2. Transnational Alevi Networks

Transnational Alevi networks constituted a spider web in the European space by connecting various Alevi associations located in several European countries. The foundation of the EAUF is one manifestation of this. Immigrant networks transcending the state boundaries are constitutive parts of transnational social spaces, in which solidarity is not based on the nation-state. The Alevi associational networks that criss-cross the European space have strong ties to the country of origin, Turkey.

Human and financial resources flowed from Europe to Turkey to support Alevi associational activities in the homeland since the late 1980s. Although in terms of financial resources and organizational infrastructure, the European Alevi associations are better off, they have depended on Turkey for “intellectual” resources. By the late 1980s, the flow of “expertise,” such as the Alevi writers, dedes, *semah* and *saz* teachers, and Alevi musicians and minstrels from Turkey to Europe began. This flow reached its peak in 1993-1996, when Alevi associational activities sharply increased in reaction to the

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24Dance performance that takes place in the Alevi religious ritual, cem.

25A long neck seven stringed lute played at cem. For this reason, saz has a sacred meaning for Alevis.
Sivas incident. Invited by the Alevi associations of Germany and other European countries, Alevi writers and leaders have participated in panels and symposiums on Alevism, dedes have conducted cem ceremonies, Alevi minstrels and musicians have given concerts. The association leaders of Turkey also joined the flow from Turkey to Europe in this period.

The activities to found an umbrella association that could combine all Alevi associations in Turkey and abroad started in the aftermath of the 1993 Sivas incident. The *Alevi Bektashi Temsilciler Meclisi* (ABTM) (Alevi Bektashi Representatives Assembly) was founded in 1994 under the leadership of the EAUF. As a result, the chair person of first ABTM was Ali Rıza Gülçiçek, who was the president of the EAUF at that time. Because of irreconcilable disputes over the political issues among Alevi associations the ABTM could not survive for a long time and cancelled itself before the 1995 general election. But this did not stop the flow of actors from Europe to Turkey as well as from Turkey to Europe. Some Alevi leaders of Turkey have traveled almost once a week to Europe, while the European Alevi leaders frequently travel to Turkey to participate in the major Alevi activities such as the cultural festivals, in meetings with state officials, the courts of the Sivas incident and so on.

The ABTM was reactivated again in a meeting held in Switzerland (11/7/1998) as a form of an umbrella organization that would represent Alevis of Turkey and abroad with an ambitious mission to found a Alevi associations world confederation. Actually, the project of founding a confederation uniting Alevi associations all around the world, was initiated by the EAUF in 1997. The Alevi leaders of Turkey reacted to this project making the EAUF the center of an Alevi confederation with the claim that the center of Alevism was Turkey.

The first general congress of the ABTM was held in the town of Hacı Bektaş
(August 12-13, 1999), four days before the state-sponsored Hacı Bektaş Veli Festivities. The newly elected president of the ABTM read a declaration in the opening ceremony of the festivities, which hosted the top state officials, thousands of Alevi coming from various locations of Turkey and abroad and media. The goal was to make the ABTM a legitimate body representing Alevis. In the second general congress held in 2000, the ABTM changed its name to the Alevi Bektaşi Kuruluşları Birliği (ABKB) (Alevi Bektaşi Institutions Union). Appendix A shows the member associations of ABTM in 1999, and the ABKB in 2000.

The ABKB is a web of Alevi associational networks that connect Alevi associations located in various countries from Switzerland to Australia. The emergence of the Alevi associational networks connecting various countries is an outcome of international migration that takes the community and solidarity formation beyond the nation-state. As Soysal (1997: 511) argues “nationally bounded social spaces can no longer be assumed self-evident; political communities take shape independently of nationally delimited collectives and at different levels (local, national, transnational).” Transnational social actors have the opportunity to engage social and political actions at these different levels, because “the social and political stages of claims-making proliferate within and beyond the nation-state” (Soysal 1997: 511).

The journey of Alevis from rural to urban areas of Turkey and Europe has transformed the traditional networks carried out by dede-talip linkages. Now newly founded Alevi associations connect Alevis residing in different states into a web of Alevi associational networks. Within this web of associational networks, Alevism has “gone public” (Casanova 1994), and is shaped at local, national and transnational levels. The social and political circumstances that have impacted on this journey is the topic of the next section.
CHAPTER IV

Social and Political Opportunity Structures: Opening New Opportunity Spaces for Alevis

There has been a growing awareness of the diversity present among Turkish citizens since the late 1980s, against a historical background of the Republican era marked by a Turkish nation without ethnic and religious differences. The period that has been called ‘taboo breaking,’ ‘collapse of Kemalism’ and ‘demise of Kemalist social contract’ has manifested itself in a new salience of ethnic and a new assertion of religious identities. Paralleling the rising power of political Islam and the Kurdish movement, Alevis have broken their centuries old culture of secrecy and took Alevism into public spheres.

In this chapter I analyze the social and political opportunity structures (SPOS) that have opened avenues for Alevis to declare themselves as a distinctive religious/cultural community and to ask for official recognition through publication and associational activities in the national and transnational arenas.

The conditions favorable or unfavorable for social movement and social movement organizations constitute the SPOS. Because a social movement aims at changing in social and political realms, both social and political structures must be
favorable. The SPOS is consisted of the existence of established network, values and structures of society, the receptivity of the political system to groups mobilize around new policy demands, the structure of alliances and political cleavages, the openness of media and the global context.

In order to understand how the opportunity structures have expanded to such a great extent for Alevis in the 1990s, it is necessary to go back to the history of Republican Turkey. This also helps to contextualize the SPOS in relation to the state-Islam (Sunni/Hanefi) interaction, the migration and urbanization that has brought political polarization, and the restructuring of society and polity following the 1980 military coup. This exercise will reveal how the SPOS narrow or widen for Alevis to make Alevism visible in public spheres.

4.1. Historical Legacy: State, Religion, and Nation

After the harsh oppression of the Ottoman period, the new Republican regime seemed to provide Alevis with a sense of emancipation from the orthodox Sunni establishment with its secularization project. M. Kemal succeeded obtaining support from the various social groups of Asia Minor, including Kurds and Alevis, in the war against the invading states and in founding the new Turkish Republic.

The construction of a new social and political system had necessitated an adoption of a new ideology. The ideas of a Turkish nationality and nationalism played crucial roles in the search for a viable ideological basis for the new political community. M. Kemal and his cadres committed themselves to the difficult task of founding a modern nation state. The task was difficult to achieve, because the Kemalist regime replacing the Ottoman Empire inherited a society that had no notion of Turkish identity but that identified itself according to religious affiliation.

The Kemalist project of westernization accepted nationalism as a “modern”
phenomenon originating in Europe and determined secularism to be a pivotal element in realizing this project. In this respect nationalism deriving from the westernization together with a heavy emphasis on secularization adopted simultaneous goals of “modernizing” and “controlling” the polity (Sakallıoğlu 1996: 234). Secularization was considered to be the “must” for modernizing the nation. Thus, it was attached to a notion of nation that was defined by the Kemalist project as being a homogenous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish), and uni-sectarian (Sunni) entity (p. 235). This project has been a shrinking dress ill-fitting Kurds, because it was too Turkish, Islamists, because it was too secular, and Alevis, because it was too Sunni.

The secular reforms launched by Mustafa Kemal and his cadres during the early years of the Turkish Republic included the abolishment of the sultanate, the caliphate, the office of Şeyh ül Islam and the sharia courts between 1922 and 1924. Determined to “westernize” Turkey, the state elite of the young Turkish Republic outlawed religious orders, prohibited usage of the fez on the way of imposing a Western dress code, adapted Swiss civil codes, Italian penal codes, and the Latin alphabet in the period of 1925-1930. The Muslim call to prayer, normally performed in Arabic, was forbidden in any language other than Turkish. The Tevhid i Tedrisat Kanunu (The Unity of Education Law) abolished the system of distinction of religious and secular schools and established a secular national education system.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİB) was founded and attached to the undersecretariat of the Prime Ministry. The DİB was created based on the Sunni sect by M. Kemal’s order in 1924. The reason for its establishment was twofold: to prevent double structure (Sunni/Alevi) and to mute Sunni reaction to the reforms. The DİB, a paradoxical institution of the “secular” Turkish Republic, was designed to interpret and execute an “enlightened” version of Sunni Islam through its civil service personnel.
(prayer leaders and preachers). With the establishment of the DİB that was to appoint prayer leaders and preachers as civil servants from among graduates of state schools, Sunni Islam was made the Islam of the state.

Sunni Islam was integrated to bureaucracy in order to make a distinction between religion in the public and private spheres with religion mainly relegated to the private sphere. The biggest step in achieving secularization was the disestablishment of Islam as a state religion in 1928 by the repeal of the second article of the 1924 Constitution designating Islam as a state religion.

The secularization process brought two characterizations of Islam. One characterized Islam as being "complicated, artificial and consisting of superstitions," while other characterized Islam as being "not opposing to consciousness or precluding progress" (quoted in Sakallıoğlu 1996: 236). M. Kemal used the latter definition to employ Islam in promoting his ideas and policies of a secular state. The latter definition of Islam as mild and rationalist determined the Islam's instrumental position in official ideology. M. Kemal declared that "our religion is fitting reality, intellect and logic" (p. 236). He defined Islam as "the most reasonable and the most natural religion" (p. 236). The Islam in the Ottoman period was characterized as being reactionary, orthodox, and backward, while "real Islam" was defined of being progressive and rational, to justify secular commitments.

In 1924, M. Kemal founded the CHP initials to transform the political system into a multi-party system, but the CHP eventually became the symbol of the single party period which only ended in 1946. The party emblem displaying six arrows symbolized the six major principles of Atatürkçülük (Atatürkism or Kemalism): Republicanism, nationalism, populism, etatism, secularism, and revolutionism. Through the CHP, the principles of Kemalism inserted into the ruling system during the single party era.
“Republicanism” refers to the new regime replacing the Ottoman constitutional monarchy. It has comprised notions of popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before the law. The principle of nationalism aims at ensuring the cohesion of the Turkish Republic and the prevention of separatist movements that could threaten the unity of the country. In Atatürk’s words, “the Turkish people forming the Turkish Republic are called the Turkish nation.”

The third principle, “populism” rejects class conflict and formulates a harmony of interests through paternalistic state policies. Because the new Turkish state was the state of all its peoples, the principle of equality before the law could not make exceptions for any particular families, classes or communities. “Estatism” refers to the participation of state in the economic, social, cultural and educational spheres. The state could intervene in any sphere of life, when the general interests of the nation were concerned. The principle of “revolutionism” refers to transforming Turkey into a rapidly advancing country that would play an important role among other civilized European nations.

The principle of secularism refers to, as taught to all students in schools in Turkey, “the separation of religious affairs from the affairs of the state.” It is a liberation of legislative, executive and judiciary power from religious influence, and concomitantly the liberation of the social, individual and familial spheres from restrictions made in the name of religion. “Secularism,” the fundamental principle of Kemalism, first appeared in the constitution of 1937.

Turkish nationalism of the state defined Islam as being an integral part of national identity. This was clear in parliamentary debates on the adoption of the new constitution in March 1924. Although the constitution accepted that ‘the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race were, in terms of citizenship, Turkish,’ there had been a very fierce debate in parliament that manifested the continuing importance of religion and
language in the definition of a Turk. A deputy, Celal Nuri, said "the real citizens of Turkey were Hanefi [Sunni] Muslims who spoke Turkish" (quoted in Kirişçi and Winrow 1997: 96). Characterizing non-Muslims as minorities, the debates did not discuss the Kurds, who generally did not speak Turkish, or Alevi, who were not Hanefi Muslims.

The young Turkish state faced a series of Kurdish revolts in the period 1920-1938. The existence of deeply rooted religious, tribal and regional lines became apparent through the Kurdish revolts. The Sheik Said uprising of 1925 that posed a critical threat to the Turkish Republic was a Kurdish nationalist uprising that contained elements of a strong dislike towards the secularism of the new regime. Alevi Kurds did not take part in this revolt because of its Sunni-Islamic emphasis. The Sheik Said revolt was perceived as a threat to the foundation of the new Turkish state. After the revolt was suppressed Independence Tribunals [İstiklal Mahkemeleri] offering little or no procedural rights to defendants were established and utilized in punishing and silencing participants of the rebellion. These were later on used to purge M. Kemal’s opponents during the 1920s and 1930s.

Kurdish uprisings were suppressed brutally, especially with a rising ideology of “Turkey exclusively for the Turks” during the thirties. The minister of Justice, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, who was incensed by a Kurdish uprising in the Mount Ararat region stated

I believe that the Turk must the only lord, only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves (quoted in Poulton 1997: 120).

The Dersim revolt (1937-1938) of Alevi Kurds was perceived to be an Alevi uprising, which Sunni Kurds did not see any point in joining. The revolt was brutally suppressed by the young republican regime during a two-year long military operation, which was officially called the “opening of Dersim to modernity.” The Dersim Report
[Dersim Raporu] defined Kızılbaşışm (Alevism) as a major threat to the Turkishness.

Bruinessen, a well-known expert on Kurds, quotes how the British Council at Trabzon, a city in the Black sea region, reported the brutal suppression of Kurds of Dersim:

“Thousands of Kurds,” he wrote, “including women and children, were slain; others, mostly children, were thrown into the Euphrates; while thousands of others in less hostile areas, who had first been deprived of their cattle and other belongings, were deported to vilayets (provinces) in Central Anatolia. It is now stated that the Kurdish question no longer exists in Turkey” (Bruinessen 1994: 144).

The leader of Dersim uprising, Seyyid Rıza was captured and immediately executed with his eleven men. The Dersim uprising and its brutal suppression is still alive in the collective memory of Turkish and Kurdish Alevis.

Although a few political parties were founded in 1930s, they were all eventually closed by the state because of their alleged “anti-regime” activities. The CHP had absolute governmental power and its rule eventually became very oppressive allowing no opposition or alternative to emerge. Burdensome taxation and oppression by internal security force during the period of single party rule caused masses to move away from the state. During the single-party period, Turkey managed to stay out of World War II due to president İsmet İnönü’s political maneuvering. The period known the time of the “National Chief” (referring to İsmet İnönü) was marked by hardships of a war economy and an impoverished populace, alongside a newly emerged group of profiteers enriched through operations in the semi-legal black market. Peasants which constituted the largest proportion of Turkey’s population at that time became discontent due to the national economic emergency measures of the war years. This impacted the politics of the coming multi-party era.

4.2. Multi-Party Politics

A combination of national and international forces caused the transition to the
multi party system after World War II. A Land Reform Bill that emerged in parliament for debate January 1945 became a major source of controversy. This bill passed on June 11, 1945 despite an active and vocal coalition of wealthy landowner deputies. Four of the principal critics of the bill founded the Demokrat Party (DP): the businessmen-banker Celal Bayar, the bureaucrat Refik Koraltan, the historian Professor Fuat Köprülüt and the cotton-growing landlord, Adnan Menderes. The DP was officially established on January 7, 1946. The CHP was victorious in the 1946 general elections, because of DP’s weakness in organization and the commitment of the state bureaucracy to CHP. A policy of liberalization gained momentum up to the 1950 general election. This was due to İnönü’s commitment to the success of multi-party politics, and Turkey’s growing involvement with the West.

As a result of this liberalization and the electoral concerns of the CHP, the first departure from the policies of secularization began in the late 40s. CHP began to permit religious instruction in schools in 1947, and a faculty of divinity was established at Ankara University leading up to the 1950 general election because of electoral concerns. Imam Hatip courses to train mosque officials (call prayers and preachers) were also established by the state.

In this period, the CHP attempted to develop ties to Alevi. Hasan Reşit Tankut, a Maraş deputy of the CHP prepared a secret report on Alevi and submitted it to the party administration (Bayrak 1994). The report included information on Alevi communities, branches, regions, and religious beliefs and practices. The report was the outcome of electoral concerns in the multi-party era. It was kept secret, because officially no Alevis existed in Turkey.

The DP, which emerged as a new center right party, came to power in 1950 and remained in there until the military coup of 1960. The DP claimed to represent the
periphery against the secular state elite. It won the election, partly because the CHP symbolized the hated single-party regime. The DP's electoral platform focused on two basic complaints: originating from small towns and countryside, religious oppression and from the urban areas, the oppressive state control over the economy.

During the CHP period the treatment of the peasantry was relatively more exploitative than its Ottoman counterparts (Keyder 1987). Alevis, who were predominantly rural in those years, initially voted for the DP, because of DP's program that considered the agriculture as the basis of development and that promised to provide necessary resources for agriculture, such as seed, agricultural credits, and so on.

However, the DP was successful partly because of the strong reaction to the secularization policies of the single party period. Because the secularization project of the Republic did not penetrate effectively into rural Turkey (Mardin 1998), a polarization emerged between the secularization of Kemalist elite and the Islamic everyday life of the provinces and villages. The DP lifted the prohibition on performing Ezan (call to prayer) any language other than Turkish. The party also made the construction of mosques, and the transformation of Imam Hatip courses into Imam Hatip Lycees (High Schools) a priority.

Although the DP initiated policies favoring Islam, it is hard to evaluate the DP as an Islamic party (Poulton 1997, Sakallibaba 1996). During DP, the politicization of Islam or the weakening of state control over religion was not allowed. The leader of the Ticani tariqa,¹ whose members destroyed public busts and statues of M. Kemal, was arrested. An Act of Parliament was passed that protected M. Kemal's statues. Overly Islamic publications were banned. The Nurcu tariqa's leader, Saidi Nursi, was arrested and tried

¹Islamic brotherhood. Tariqas were banned in 1925, but their importance on politics has increased since 1950s.
in January 1953.

Although the DP ushered in multi-party politics, it focused mainly on the material transformation of country. The DP completely ignored its promises for democratic reforms. The DP, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes, promulgated and implemented anti-democratic laws to repress any opposition and in particular the CHP. Its refusal to give workers the right to strike increased tension. The passage of anti-democratic laws against targeting CHP was followed by repressive laws targeting institutions, such as universities and the press. Those acts alienated the liberal intelligentsia, which had earlier supported the DP because of its liberal promises. Menderes' repressive regime indicated that he had abandoned his promises of making Turkey more free and democratic. Menderes was confident of his rule and had no fear of the army; even threatened to run the army using only reserve officers, if, in his opinion, the commissioned officers failed to act responsibly. Rising inflation and a stagnant economy caused a shortage of foreign exchange. Struggling with the economic problems, Menderes started to exploit religion for political ends and continuously increased the repression of his opponents through 1958.

As Turkish society evolved toward structural disparity and diversity due to massive migration from rural to urban areas, the DP’s fear of political potential organized around social class intensified. Religion became an important tool for use against the threat of communism. Economic failures and the decreasing popularity of the DP led the party to search for new ties to tariqas to shore up its popularity. The DP’s attempts to establish strong ties with Islamists led Alevis to stop supporting the DP.

In April 1960, DP MPs suggested forming a committee to investigate the activities of opposition, which were perceived as being subversive and designed to instigate a military revolt. Meanwhile the religious policies of the DP were perceived by
army and secular forces as retreat from Kemalist secularist reforms in the state and education, and secular-nonsecular conflict emerged. Dissatisfaction arising from Menderes' departure from secularism as well as growing displeasure within army--especially because of the use of the army to repress opposition and students movements--led to the first breakdown of the democracy.

The Military Coup of 1960: Beginning of the Era of Coups

The 1960 Military Coup carried out by the Milli Birlik Komitesi (National Unity Council) (MBK) promulgated the most liberal constitution that the Turkish Republic has ever had. Intellectuals, who were reformulating Kemalism with social democratic values and ideas, largely supported the coup. In reaction to the increasingly authoritarian policies of the DP, the 1961 constitution introduced measures consistent with liberal democracy and political pluralism. General Cemal Gürsel, who was the leader of the MBK, praised Islam to secure the political and moral legitimacy of the military regime to check against any reactionary upsurge using Islam, similar to what Kemalists had done earlier.

The military continued to distinguish two Islams, a secular-rational Islam and a reactionary-backward Islam. Enlightened Islam was characterized as being “helpful hand” against communism and religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkification of Islam was encouraged. The military approved of newly organized Imam Hatip Lycees. The increasing popularity of Islam did not lead to an increase in state control; however the regime tried to accommodate the appeal of this movement and use it for the regime’s own advantage. The military attempted to train Imams and other religious cadres of civil servants to deliver sermons urging political support for its objectives.
4.3. Migration, Political Polarization, and Chaos

The year 1960 was a watershed in Turkish politics. The 1961 constitution allowed the formation and operation of radical parties at both ends of the political spectrum. In addition to that proportional representation in the electoral system made it possible for such parties to take an active part in the nation’s political life.

The period of 1960-69 was a rapid urbanization and industrialization that radically changed the social structure of Turkey. Rapid urbanization occurred as peasants flocked to the towns and cities in search of jobs in the substantial private industrial sector and a better life. Massive migration and large-scale urbanization enfranchised the masses and simultaneously ushered in the conditions for new political conflicts. Urbanization emerged largely out migration accelerated the dissolution of traditional society and led to the political mobilization of urban workers.

The massive migrations that began in the fifties and continued throughout the sixties were expressed in the form of emerging gecekondu in areas surrounding large urban centers. As a result of their migrations, both Alevi and Sunnis in large urban areas began to compete for urban resources such as jobs, accommodations, education, and politics. Migrants became an important constituency that was able to pressure and influence political parties by the sixties. They developed strong familial, tribal, ethnic, religious, and regional ties in the cities, and such ties became instrumental for political mobilization. Migrants were more dependent on the parties to reach urban resources such as land, jobs, etc. than the established groups in urban centers.
The electoral success of parties became increasingly dependent on migrant votes given in exchange for urban resources. As a result, politics became mired in exchange of votes for short-term benefits, rather than develop in accordance with a long-term program and ideology. The regulatory powers of local government were selectively exercised particularly in the areas of urban planning, such as the issuing of construction licenses, and the enforcement of zoning and building codes (Öncü 1988). The question of whose road would be repaired first or the dispersion of rudimentary services were determined by clientelistic demands and particularistic appeals.

One may argue that multi-party politics has been gradually influenced by clientelistic networks at the grass-roots level and has impacted on the outcome of the distributive processes in the urban areas (Öncü 1988). In such an environment, major social and economic groupings found potential for gain. The gecekondu dwellers were among the major groupings in the urban arena to benefit from the non-planned speculative boom in the 1950s and 1960s. Alevi migrants to cities became part of this clientelistic politics of means and ends.

The first election, following the return of power from the military was held in 1961. The 1961 elections culminated in a coalition government comprising the Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) (AP), which was the successor of DP and the CHP. İsmet İnönü, leader of the CHP, headed this government. The Alevi, who had begun migrating to the cities in the 1950s, began during the 60s mobilize on a small scale by taking advantage of the social liberties and freedom of expression deriving from the 1961 constitution.
Periodicals established and association activities organized by Alevi emerged in the large urban centers. The first Alevi associations, the Hacı Bektaş Tourism Association, was established in Hacı Bektaş town, then part of greater Ankara; an İstanbul chapter of this association was later established in Istanbul in 1963.

In 1963, the CHP-led coalition proposed an amendment restructuring the DİB Law. This amendment would have required the establishment of a “bureau of sects” conferring upon religions and sects other than Sunni Islam the right to be represented in the DİB. The parliamentary discussion of the amendment resulted in fierce reaction from by right-wing media which declared that with this amendment, “Kızılbaş would have right to practice “mum sŏndŭ” in our mosques” (Otyam 1995 [1981]: 99). Alevi university students in Ankara reacted to this negative propaganda with a press statement. They prepared another statement in reaction to a speech by DİB’s president, İbrahim Elmalı, who had stated that

This thing called Alevism is more like a political view than religion. It was based on the Shah Ismail incident in history. This issue blew out a long time ago. In our institution [DİB], there is nobody who wants Alevism to be recognized (quoted in Şener and İlnur 1995: 82).

In October 1966, the first Alevi party of Turkey, Türkiye Birlik Partisi (Turkey Unity Party), which later on became Birlik Partisi (Unity Party) was founded. The Birlik Partisi had 8 of its members elected to the TBMM the 1969 election. In the same year Mustafa Timisi, who was elected as a deputy from Sivas became the leader of the party.

The AP came to power in 1965, and dominated Turkish political life either on its own or as a coalition partner until the 1980 military coup. Islam again became an important force in Turkish society in the mid-sixties. Süleyman Demirel, the AP’s
leader, was the prime minister who institutionalized the Prime Minister’s Friday prayer with a group of deputies. It was one way of expressing the concept of Islam as a respectable form of piety and morality. The AP developed ties with the tariqas to consolidate electoral support. The AP supported and built new Imam Hatip Lycees, whose number increased from 26 in 1965, to 72 by 1971, and 147 during the period 1975 and 1977 (the AP was in sole possession of power in that period) (Sakallıoğlu 1996). Imam Hatip students received the right to attend universities in 1967.

The political liberalization and democratization brought by the 1961 constitution facilitated the rising voice and salience of political Islam. The first pro-Islamic party of the Turkish Republic, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) (MNP), was founded under the influence and with the support of the Nakşibendi tariqa. Necmettin Erbakan, who was also member of the tariqa became the party’s leader.

Another party that emerged in the right was the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) (MHP), which was an ultra nationalist and neo-fascist party led by Alpaslan Türkş, a retired colonel. The MHP militants, known as Ülkücü (Idealists) were educated in the Ülkücü Kampları (Idealist camps) in various locations in Turkey. They were the major source of political street violence. The MHP recruited its followers from among the frustrated and lumpenized younger generation in smaller towns (Keyder 1987).

The major development of the sixties was the rising power of the working class that was catalyzed by the rights provided in the 1961 constitution. With the support of the intelligentsia, the working class established its own party, the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkey Worker Party) (TİP). This group separated itself from the semi-governmental Türk-İş (Confederation of Labor Unions of Turkey) and founded the independent Devrimci İşçi Sendikalari (DİSK) (Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions). The
TİP became a major target of right-wing militants beginning in the early sixties. It garnered 15 seats in the parliament in the 1965 general election. Many argued that the majority of the TİP’s votes came from Alevi (Ahmad 1993, Samim 1987, Tempo 1988, vl. 37).

The sixties were the heyday of Kemalism mixed with a high dosage of Marxist-leftist worldviews against the backdrop of a successful liberal right with its ability to capture political power through Islamic appeal. Kemalist principles were reformulated with social democratic ideas and values by the leftist intelligentsia. The revamped CHP with its rhetoric of socialist democracy characterized itself “left of center” in 1965. The major source of CHP votes was the organized and marginalized working class in the large urban centers, such as İstanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, where 20% of the Turkish population lived by 1970. Approximately 50% of these cities’ population lived in gecekondu during this period. The CHP began addressing the problems of migration seriously standing with the 1968 local elections. In its election program for the 1968 elections, the CHP promised to legalize illegal gecekondu enacted in violation of zoning laws.

Alevi began developing strong ties to the parties of the left in the late 1950s. Alevi naturally gravitated towards the left during a period in which the right-wing parties used Islam for mass appeal. Additionally, the secular social democratic and working-class oriented rhetoric of the CHP was appealing to Alevi dwelling in gecekondu. As the left developed into a popular movement, Alevi became leftists. Alevi “gave” their folksongs, hymns and dances to the left in that the traditional songs and dances of Alevism became folkloric elements used by the left. During this period, historical Alevi figures were transformed into proto-communist and socialist heroes. One example of this trend can be found in the Sheik Bedreddin epic written by Nazim Hikmet, a socialist poet whose citizenship was revoked because of his alleged ties to the
communist Soviet Union. The well known saying attributed to the historical Sheik Bedreddin that “everything, except a lover’s cheek must be shared” became a slogan for leftist groups characterizing him as the “first communist.”

In every fragment of the left, Alevis were represented in substantial numbers. During those years the left was the only available channel for Alevis to engage in politics. Aleviness as an identity was not emphasized, because leftist socialist rhetoric discouraged claims based on particular identities. Such emphasis of identity, such as “Kurdish” or “Alevi” identity, was considered by the leftist intelligentsia to be traditionalist and backward. The real struggle was considered to be against the capitalists, so what really counted for the left was class identity. For that reason, Alevi associational and publication activities emerging in the sixties did not develop into an independent Alevi movement emphasizing Alevi identity.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of the migrants from rural to urban areas were Alevis (Güneş-Ayata 1995). As a result,

as members of working class and as low level government officials, Alevis took part in working class organizations in the 60s and 70s. With the rising power of these classes, Alevis came to occupy important positions...Workers and lower level government officials characterized themselves as democrat and Alevis found their identity in such characterization. The egalitarian democratic identity of Alevis emerged in the 70s by the reinterpretation of their traditions in accordance with concepts of equality and democracy (Güneş-Ayata 1995, 10).

In the leftist associations and trade unions, Alevis gained political experience and established extensive social networks (Çamuroğlu 1998: 80). In the 60s and 70s as Alevis shifted leftwards, the left became Alevicized. The leftist tendency of Alevis made them targets of violent attacks of the extreme right.

The rising political tensions mixed with societal changes created an explosive political situation in the late 1960s and early 70s. By the beginning of March 1971, the
situation had deteriorated to such an extent that a group of generals, acting on behalf of the Turkish Armed Forces, presented a memorandum to the government and declared to assume power if the government refused to resign on March 12 1971. They demanded the formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing reforms consistent with the constitution. After the government resigned, the army did not dissolve parliament but instead appointed a prime minister that was acceptable by this parliament. Between 1971-1973 the formation of coalition governments continued under the close military scrutiny. During this period, with the backing of the military, amendments to the constitution were passed that curtailed the rights and freedoms contained in the 1961 constitution. The restoration of law and order meant the repression of any group viewed as being leftists. The TIP was banned and closed in 1971. Universities, students and trade unions were silenced. By the Summer of 1973, the military had completed its tasks. In the two general elections, in 1973 and 1977, no party succeeded in obtaining an absolute majority in the parliament.

During the 70s the electorate potential of migrants and the consequent struggle for their votes by the political parties increased. The CHP, which represented the left of center, became attractive to migrants living in gecekondus. The party saw itself as representing the "oppressed" against the "corrupted order" and demanded to change the order. The CHP's success in gaining the mass support from the urban poor led the party to win over the AP in both local and general election in the seventies.

In the seventies, the Birlik Partisi defined itself as being to the left of CHP and competed for the TIP's base by characterizing itself as being revolutionary, anti-fascist and an anti-imperialist working class party as a way of under-emphasizing the "Alevi" label. After the TIP was banned and closed, its leader, Mehmet Ali Aybar ran as a member of the Birlik Partisi in the 1973 general election. But the party failed to obtain
the necessary support from Alevi.

The first reason for this was the fact that the majority of Alevi had shifted left during the early sixties and had developed ties to the CHP in the major urban areas. Second internal conflicts in the Birlik Partisi prevented the development of an image of a trustworthy party. For example, the party’s image was damaged when five deputies from Birlik Partisi voted in favor of the budget for fiscal year 1970 that had been prepared by the AP government. This event caused a serious crisis within the party; the leader of Birlik Partisi, Mustafa Timisi, stated that these five deputies were “yol düşkünüleri,” and subsequently, the deputies were expelled from the party. In an interview, Mustafa Timisi stated the failure of the Birlik Partisi was due to a combination of internal conflicts, the CHP’s positioning itself as the main left of center party that more successfully advocated the ideas and goals of the Birlik Partisi during the seventies, and the Alevi’s rejection of an idea of an “Alevi” party (Tempo, 1988). The strong socialist ideals with which the middle and young generation of Alevi were infused did not allow the idea of an “Alevi” party. Additionally, Alevi probably preferred to support the CHP, because the CHP was a well-established party that was able to implement its programs more effectively. Furthermore, the minority position of the Alevi precluded the success of a purely “Alevi” party. Because an “Alevi” party would never be able to obtain power in a government by itself, Alevi supported the secularist, leftist parties that were able to obtain such power.

The CHP obtained a plurality of the votes in the 1973 general elections; however

\[^2\text{Because the AP was a party of the right that used Islamic appeal, the AP was not favored among Alevi. Alevi, as well as the administration of Birlik, suspected that these five deputies had supported AP in exchange for personal benefits.}\]

\[^3\text{As explained in the history section, an Alevi who is not behaving according to the “Alevi way” is excommunicated (düşkünlük) by the community member.}\]
the CHP lacked the votes for sole possession of the government. The CHP formed a coalition with the pro-Islamic Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) (MSP) of Erbakan, whose MNP had been banned and closed during the 1971 military intervention. The MSP party program was shaped by three fundamental principles. These were: i) an orthodox Sunni view of the world, ii) a thrust for the swifter industrialization of Turkey, and iii) a redistributive economic and social ethic. The party was totally opposed to the West and aimed to develop relationships with the Islamic world. The main supporters of this party were artisans, craftsmen and small businessmen in the provinces who were very conservative and religious minded (Mardin 1977).

The CHP and MSP were extremely different from each other. The MSP was the party of shopkeepers, artisans and the small entrepreneurs of Anatolia who demanded protection from the emergence of the modern manufacturing sector developing in and around the cosmopolitan city of Istanbul. The CHP captured the metropolitan cities, because of the support of migrants in living gecekondu districts. Subsequently, political violence increased in spite of the government program’s general tone of moderation. The militants of the MHP created disorder in the street. Their aim was to create chaos and demoralization in order to destabilize the regime and eventually replace it with a strong, neo-fascist regime that would then have been supported by the masses.

The MSP and CHP coalition was a result of political opportunism and not from a commonality of views. Thus, it was not sustainable. During the coalition, the Cyprus crisis between Turkey and Greek erupted because of the U.K.’s refusal to intervene in what considered unilateral, armed “Greek intervention in Cyprus.” Violence against Turkish Cypriots provided a pretext for the Turkish army to launch an offensive on 14 August 1974, and the army eventually succeeded in obtaining 40% of the island. This made Ecevit, the prime minister of the CHP-MSP coalition government a national hero
overnight and as a result his popularity increased sharply. This popularity gave Ecevit enough confidence to resign on September 18 1974 and call for early elections. Ecevit’s resignation caused a crisis lasting 241 days during which a new government could not be formed, because the parties of the right refused to assent to early elections due to their awareness of Ecevit’s popularity.

The AP’s leader Süleyman Demirel finally succeeded in forming a coalition with other parties of the right by threatening that he would support an early election if they did not cooperate. This coalition of the right wing-parties (the AP, the MSP, the MHP and the Reliance Party) was the first Nationalist Front [Milliyetçi Cehpe] coalition of the seventies. During Front coalitions, the rightist parties shared the state through its ministries and appointed their supporters to state institutions through their networks of patronage. In this way the ultra-nationalists and the Islamists strengthened their hand throughout Turkey. As one observer argues, “the right did not simply take power, they plundered the state” (Samim 1987: 163). The economy entered a speculative phase, and a false boom was created by huge and irresponsible foreign borrowing. The pro-Front media praised the Front with the welcoming slogan of “Demirel in Parliament, Türkeş in the street (Ahmad 1993: 166).

The general election of June 1977 did not end the political instability. None of the parties received enough votes to form a government alone. However, the CHP received a plurality of the votes. Demirel established the second Nationalist Front government with the MSP and the MHP on July 21, 1977. The MHP’s militants were using terrorism as a tool against what they perceived to be an imminent communist revolution. Actually, their attacks targeted social democrats who formed a powerful base of support for the CHP. The use of violence by leftist factions, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev-Sol) and Revolutionary Way (Dev-Yol) started against the MHP’s militants.
CHP received the most votes once again in the December 1977 local election, and Ecevit formed a "minority government" supported by independent MPs in January 1978. Then, terrorism took a new and sinister turn. Assassins began to target specific individuals. Terrorism showed its ugliest face during the 1970s with communal attacks on Alevis, majority of whom were leftist. Ultra-nationalist MHP militants attacked Alevis in cities of mixed population. The violence against Alevis had started as early as 1974 in Erzincan, where MHP's militants destroyed 200 stores and houses of Alevis. Şener (1989) argued that this was because of the visibility of Alevi capital in a Sunni dominated market resulting from the migration that had begun in the 1950s. In Sivas, Malatya, Çorum, and Bingöl, during seventies, houses and businesses of Alevis and CHP members were destroyed. The worst occurred during December 1978 in Maraş, where two days of massacres of Alevis resulted in 107 deaths, thousands of wounded, and 500 destroyed houses and businesses.

The popularity of Ecevit decreased with his inability to cope with the violence in the street. In the partial senate election of October 1978, the CHP's vote decreased and Ecevit resigned. The AP's leader Süleyman Demirel had established a minority government by November. However, the political violence in the streets continued. In July 1980, a major attack on Alevis killed 33 in Çorum, and violence spread to Sivas, where 12 Alevis were killed.

Terrorism reached its peak with 1500 deaths during Demirel's minority government which lasted from November 1979 to September 1980. A stagnant economy, high unemployment, and a high inflation rate accompanied this. None of these problems seemed to be of major concern to the politicians, who were busy with political infighting over trivial issues. Political violence claimed at least 20 victims each day. Although it was apparent that the MHP was behind much of the political violence, its role was not
investigated by the authorities because the MHP's support was necessary for the government. Erbakan also had to be tolerated because he could force the government to fall by withdrawing his support. The CHP's Ecevit also played politics to intimidate Demirel's ruling. In order to prevent an imminent military coup, TÜSİAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen Association) demanded that the AP and the CHP form a strong coalition government and take action to implement reformist economic policies. Demirel and Ecevit both refused.

4.4. The 1980 Military Coup and After

On September 12, 1980 the Military High Command carried out a well-planned operation and overthrew the civilian government. The military did everything possible to depoliticize the society. Thousands of people were taken under custody, detained, and even tortured. Many of the incarcerated died under suspicious conditions. The parliament, political parties, trade unions and voluntary associations were banned and closed.

It has been widely accepted that the 1980 military coup aimed to depoliticize the country to carry out the "January 24 Measures," which were economic measures launched by Demirel's government as a result of imposition of the IMF. The Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (MGK) (National Security Council) claimed executive authority on September 21. Bülent Ulusu, a retired admiral active in planning the military coup, became prime minister. Turgut Özal, who had been appointed to be an economic adviser to Demirel, was appointed as the deputy prime minister with responsibility for the economy.

The Aydınlar Ocağı (AO) (Heart of the Enlightened), a conservative institutional think thank, that had played an important role in shaping the rightist governments' ideology in the seventies, became a semi official actor promoting a Turkish-Islamic synthesis (TIS) as the official ideology of the state during the eighties. The AO had been
established in May 1970 by a group of university professors and businessmen who were concerned about the penetration of leftist communist ideas into Turkey, especially in the universities. It was an influential institute during the 1970s. The AO considered Islam to be component of Turkish nationalism. The AO supported MHP and had ties to prime minister Demirel. AO influence increased during the Front coalitions. Its members included Turgut Özal and other leading figures of right-wing parties founded after 1983.

The major impact of the military coup’s trying to impose TIS occurred in religious education. The 1980 military coup made religious courses mandatory in the primary and secondary schools under article 24 of the 1982 Constitution. Additionally, courses on Kemalism and its principles increased. Although this coup was to defeat communists, ultra-nationalists, and fundamentalists, its main objective was to get rid of Marxist leftist ideologies and movements. Religion was viewed as an antidote to Marxist leftist ideas. As a result, the number of religious schools at all levels increased.

Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 Military Coup and the seventh president (1982-1989) of the Turkish Republic explained the rationale behind compulsory religion courses in the public schools:

[T]his religious education cannot be given to children by every family. In fact, even if the family tried to do so, this would be improper since it may be taught wrongly, incompletely or through the family’s own point of view...I asked you...before...not to send your children to illegal Quranic courses. Thus we made this a provision of the constitution. In this way, religion will be taught to our children by the state in state schools. Are we now...against the cause of secularism or serving it? Of course we are serving it...[S]ecularism does not mean depriving Turkish citizens of religious instruction and exposing them to exploiters of religion (Evren, 1991 quoted in Sakalloğlu 1996: 246).

The number of Imam Hatip Lycees increased from 258 to 350 during the three-year tenure of the military. The number of Koran that was published by the DİB increased sharply after the military coup, from 31,075 in 1979 to 259,731 in 1981
The emphasis on religion by the military coup was among the factors paving the way of Islam as a central variable in the political equation of the 80s and 90s in Turkey (Birtek and Toprak 1993).

One of the fundamental reasons of this recognition of Islam was that the state elite (first during the military's rule (1980-83) and then during civilian rule) systematically used Islam to reduce the power of the left and to substitute for class-based ideologies. This insertion of Islam into Kemalist state ideology can be considered to be partly a result of the incapacity and powerlessness of Kemalism vis-à-vis the rising tide of religion as an authentic and viable ideology (Sakallıoğlu 1996).

With the new and restrictive constitution of 1982 crafted under the control of the military and subsequent legislation, political activity was radically curbed. State control was imposed over trade unions, voluntary associations, universities and the media. In the political arena, in order to introduce new politics and new politicians, all members of the 1980 parliament were banned from political activity for five years and all party leaders were banned from such activity for ten.

The military permitted only three political parties to run in the 1983 general elections: the Anavatan Partisi (ANAP) (Motherland Party) of Turgut Özal, the Halkçı Parti (Populist Party) that was founded by a former CHP member, and the Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party) that was founded by a retired general. Özal’s party won the election with 45 % of the vote. The Halkçı Party received 29 % of the votes, and the Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi, which later on merged with ANAP, finished third.

The ANAP stayed in power until 1991. Özal’s party was a coalition of ideological currents and interest groups who had joined it partly because they had nowhere else to go under the military's restrictive policies (Zürcher 1994). The ANAP
was a conservative center-right party, but was not the continuation of any one of the dissolved parties; it was conservative like the AP, Islamist like the MSP, and nationalist like the MHP. The party and government were overwhelmingly conservative and seemed to show little concern for liberal democratic values.

By the beginning of 1986, the political scene changed as the party structure created during military rule disintegrated and banned party leaders emerged behind proxy parties. In September 1987, Turkey voted for the old political leaders to re-enter the political arena. Süleyman Demirel as the leader of the Doğru Yol Partisi (DYP) (True Path Party), Ecevit as the leader of the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) (Democratic Left Party), Erbakan, as the leader of the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Türkeş as the leader of the Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Work Party) regained their places in the Turkish political spectrum.

ANAP’s leader Özal decided to call for elections as soon as possible to prevent the other parties from organizing better campaigns. In November 1987, ANAP won the election. The social democrats represented by the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party (SHP) (Social Democratic Populist Party) placed second and Demirel’s DYP placed third. The March 1989 local election was a victory for the SHP which won the mayoral elections in all three metropolitan centers, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, as well as the majority of the remaining cities. Those elections were a total disaster for ANAP, which only received 22% of the votes nationwide, but was still the majority in parliament. This gave Özal the chance to be elected President of the Turkish Republic after Kenan Evren’s term ended in October 1989. Özal served as the eighth President of the Republic, until he died in 1993.

A period of relative political liberalization began in 1987 with discussion of

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4 The Halkçı Party merged with the Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi (Social Democracy Party) and participated in the 1987 election as the Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party).
abolishing Articles 141, 142, 163 of the Turkish Criminal Law. Articles 141 and 142 banned the establishment of “racist” and “separatist” associations as well as propaganda for such purposes, and article 163 prohibited the establishment of parties and associations based on religion. The Law to Fight Terrorism was introduced to replace restrictions on political activity, which were relaxed by the abolishment of these articles of the Turkish penal code. These events, and the underlying discussions initiated taboo breaking period, and encouraged the discussion of the ethnic (mainly in relation to “the Kurdish question”) and religious (Sunni, Alevi) divisions of Turkey. The taboo breaking period was an important cultural transformation, by which for the first time in the Republican history, various social groups dared to openly question the “official” Kemalist ideology.

This questioning was evident in the rise of Islamic sentiment, which became visible in the streets of large urban centers, such as Ankara and Istanbul, with increasing numbers of bearded men and women with headscarves. The rising Islamist sentiment reflected on the facade of Ankara, which had been “a city without minarets” in the 30s. In 1950, the CHP had permitted the construction of the Maltepe Mosque, whose location prevented it from architecturally dominating the Museloum of M. Kemal [Anitkabir], the only building dominating Ankara’s skyline. The construction of a Kocatepe Mosque began in the 1970s, when Islamist reassertion became salient, and finished in 1983 during Ozal’s term. The Kocatepe Mosque now sits at the top of a hill and dominates the city skyline like the Anitkabir. The role of tariqas, especially the tariqas of Nurcus, Suleymancis and Nakribendis became crucial in the electoral success of right-wing parties during this period. The publications of tariqas and other religious groups

5Article 141 was lifted in 1991, and the third item of Article 142 was transferred into the Law to Fight Terrorism with reduced criminal penalties.
increased greatly. Even Turgut Özal, who governed the state between 1983-1989, openly exhibited his links to the Nakşibendi tariqa in public.

The rise of Islamic sentiment was partially an outcome of the state policies fostering Islam as an antidote to the leftist socialist ideologies since the 1980 military coup. The number of religious schools had increased at all levels. Koranic schools increased from 2,610 in 1980 to 3,037 in 1985 and 4,715 in 1989, and faculties of divinity increased from two in 1980 to 8 in 1985. The number of Imam Hatip Lycees founded to educate preachers and prayer leaders increased sharply. Graduates of Imam Hatip Lycees began to prefer attending departments of public administration at the university level and to seek high status jobs in government institutions. In 1987, Imam Hatip graduates constituted 40% of the students in the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University, whose graduates are usually appointed to high posts in the state administration.

One can argue that certain classes benefited from the policy of encouraging Islamic education, and naturally supported governments implementing policies supportive of Islamic education. The constant expansion of the religious establishment under the DİB became a source of education and jobs for the provincial lower classes, and a source of patronage for local politicians during the 1980s (Ahmad 1993).

4.5. Emergence of Urban Alevisim: Associations, Dergahs, and Cemevis

There has been a reassertion of Alevi identity since the late 1980s paralleling the rise of Islamic sentiment in the Sunni segment of the population. When taboos were broken and opened up for public discussion in connection with issues such as the existence of ethnic and religious differences, Alevis used the opportunity structure to "come out" and proclaim their Alevisim. With the abolishment of the restrictive article, of
the Constitution (141, 142 and 163), and the lifting of the ban on voluntary associations by the late 1980s, politicization and mobilization of Alevism began to be expressed in the publication of Alevi books and journals, and the foundation of Alevi associations. The increase in the publication and associational activities of Alevis was a manifestation of a new expression and organizational model among Alevis.

In the beginning the mobilization among Alevis was a reaction to the increasing number of mosques, religious schools, the introduction of Sunni mandatory religious courses, the construction of mosques in Alevi villages, and appointing Imams to these empty mosques in the military and following civilian rules of the 1980s. The increasing Islamist sentiment that gained political ascendancy pushed Alevis to organize and resulted in a cultural revival spearheaded by the new educated Alevi elite by the late 1980s.

Emergence of an Alevi elite is an outcome of the migrations that had been bringing Alevis to the cities since the fifties. The migrations led Alevis take the advantage of opportunities provided in the cities such as employment, housing and education. The Sunni majority had inhabited both urban and rural areas before the 1960s. On the other hand, Alevis were predominantly rural until 1950s. With the migrations, Alevis began to interact with urban groups, and as “outsiders” strove to establish social inroads for themselves. Alevis with their efforts in this direction, radically altered the class and structure of the towns and cities. The social stratification of Alevis has changed as a result of the emergence of an Alevi elite taking part in spheres ranging from universities to the cabinet, and of an Alevi class of businessmen that succeeded in developing ties with the government. Alevis became socially and economically visible with the emergence of Alevi businessmen, ministers, bureaucrats, mayors, and lawyers in the urban milieu.
The Alevi elite, which matured during the early stage of the process of migration to the cities was affected by socialist leftist ideals in the sixties and seventies. Weakened because of the harsh suppression by the 1980 coup and the collapse of the Soviet regime, the left, the old address of Alevis, lost its appeal for young and middle-generation of Alevis in the post-coup era. The new path that emerged was the redefining of themselves as "Alevi," and the rediscovering Alevism as a political ideology. The well-established Alevi networks emerged during the years of political participation in the leftist organizations provided a base for the establishment of Alevi associations in the beginning. The existence of these established networks accelerated the development of Alevi associations which numbered in the hundreds, by the end of the five year period 1989-1993.

The majority of the current activists leading the Alevi movement had participated in the leftist movement during the sixties and seventies. This has had a great impact on the shaping and restructuring of Alevism, its history, culture and religious tradition in the contemporary public spheres. By the late eighties, Alevi intellectuals and community leaders began developing new political goals and expectations. In addition to proclaiming their Alevism, the emergent Alevi representatives began criticize the mandatory Sunni-focused religious courses in the public schools, as well as policies of the Sunni-biased DİB, which employed over 70,000 people, and which constructed 1000-1500 mosques each year.

By the late 1980s, the openness of media to Alevism and Alevi representatives provided Alevis with an opportunity to express their claims to the general public. Alevism became an attractive topic in the media. Tempo, a popular weekly periodical, made Alevi the topic of one of its cover stories in 1988. The focus of the article was the political positioning of Alevis in the post-1980 period. The first book on Alevism was
published and a newspaper series on Alevism appeared in Cumhuriyet, a Kemalist leftist newspaper, in 1989. The Alevi revival received encouragement from secular social forces considered Alevi to be their natural allies against the rise of political Islam. The secular media and intellectuals “investigated” Alevism, which has become increasingly “newsworthy.” Almost all major newspapers have published a series on Alevism, which has become a ‘selling’ topic.

A boom of books on Alevism and an increasing number of Alevi periodicals⁶ have undertaken with an important mission: understanding and describing the history of Alevi Bektaşı communities as well as their religious and social reality. Alevi periodicals that have emerged since then are Cem, Nefes, Genç Erenler, Aşure, Kervan, Pir Sultan Abdal, Dost Dost, Gönülérerin Sesi Karacaahmet Sultan, Ehl-i Beyt Dünyası, Yol, Kızıltırmak, and Kızıldeli. In Germany some of the emergent periodicals are Mürsit, Ehl-i Beyt, Zülfikar (pro-Kurdish), Alevilerin Sesi (first EAUF then the AABF’s monthly periodical), Algül Magazin, and Turna. The monthly and quarterly journals have served as a means for communication among the reorganizing Alevi community (Vorhoff 1998).

The establishment of cemevis to practice Alevi religious rituals in Istanbul and Ankara is one social and spatial dimension of Alevi existence in the cities that has emerged in the 1990s. It is an outcome of a struggle for a ritual space and a struggle for a space in which to engage communal activities in the urban milieu. The restoration of long-deserted dervish lodges has also been a part of the struggle for a ritual space. Of course, one cannot argue that cemevis and restored dervish lodges are meant exclusively for ritual activities. They also serve as spaces to engage in political activities. The reopened lodges had belonged to the Bektaşı order in the Ottoman era and had been closed

⁶See Vorhoff (1998) for an excellent analysis of the recent publication of books and periodicals on Alevism.
down by the Republican regime in 1925. Alevis, who have re-opened and controlled these lodges are mostly migrants that have come from the eastern provinces such as Sivas, Erzincan and Tunceli. The dervish lodges have become instrumental for Alevis in their search for alternative spaces in which to engage in communal activities in the urban milieu.

The emergence of businessmen and industrialists willing to finance Alevi activities is a crucial development in the revival of Alevism. As Alevi intellectuals have taken on the role of publishing books and periodicals and leading associational activities, Alevi businessmen have provided financial support for such activities. Recently they have become visible by attending Alevi festivals and opening ceremonies for cemevis, and have even accepted plaques for their support. For example, the Alevi businessman, Ibrahim Polat has donated construction materials for the restoration of various dergahs, such as the Şahkulu in Istanbul and Hamza Baba in a village near İzmir. He is a board member of the Cem Vakfı. Engin Polat, who is also an Alevi businessman, financially assisted the restoration of the Hamza Baba lodge, and attended the Hamza Baba cultural festival. In his speech Engin Polat called everyone to support Alevi culture, and stated:

we will uphold the centers and the capitals of Alevi culture, Hacı Bektaş, Banaz in Sivas, Keleşci Baba in Tokat, Abdal Musa in Antalya, Hıdır Abdal in Erzincan, Şahkulu and Karacahmet in Istanbul, and Hamza Baba in İzmir (Gönüllerin Sesi Karacaahmet Sultan Dergisi, 1998, vl. 57: 29).

Engin Polat’s media company owns the Barış Radyo (Peace Radio), an Alevi radio station broadcasting in Istanbul.

An examination of the board members of two major Alevi foundations demonstrates the role of businessmen in the Alevi movement. The HBAKV’s board has 27 members: 9 businessmen and industrialists, 6 construction contractors, 2 merchants, 2
lawyers, a retired businessman, two retired workers, one worker, one housewife, two Alevi minstrels, and a retired army official.

The Cem Vakfi is the best funded foundation among the Alevi associations. It has 14 board members: one international relations professor coming from a rich dede family from Malatya, 8 businessmen and industrialists, 4 construction contractors, one retired MP and an editor-writer. The businessmen and industrialists who are board members of the Cem run well-established capitalist corporations having transnational connections and control major Alevi capital of Turkey. The vakif publishes a monthly periodical, Cem, and owns a radio station. It is the only foundation that has European Coordinate and several branches in Germany.

The political positioning of Alevis in the post-1980 period is an integral part of the SPOS worth examining closely. In the post-1980 political arena the traditional left-Alevi community bond continued through the SHP in the late 1980s and early 90s. Although it has never occurred that the social democratic or socialist parties have defined themselves as representatives of Alevi minority in its party program, it is widely accepted that Alevis have provided the biggest portion of the SHP’s votes (Schüler 1998). In the general election of the November 1987, the SHP won 99 seats in the TBMM. Twenty five out of ninety nine SHP deputies was Alevi, while there was no Alevi deputy in other parties having seats in the parliament (Tempo, 1988, vl. 37).

Schüler (1998) has examined the election results of SHP in 1987-1994, and its registered members in 1993. His findings have shown that the party reached a high level of organization with the highest number of registered members in the areas, where Nestman (1989) and Tempo (1988, vl. 37) demonstrated as the major Alevi dense areas (Schüler 1998). The SHP had to go for election with Alevi candidates in cities of Amasya, Tokat, Sivas, and Çorum because of the increasing influence of Alevi members
in the SHP organization in 1987.

As many have pointed out, there is concentration of ethnic, religious and regional
groups in certain neighborhood of major immigrant receiving cities in result of a chain
migration. This migration pattern reflected on the SHP registered members in İstanbul.
For example in Kartal, a district of İstanbul, although immigrants from the cities of
central and eastern Anatolia such as Erzincan, Sivas, Tunceli, Gümüşhane, Malatya and
Tokat constituted 15.85% of the Kartal’s population, they constituted 63% of the
registered members of the SHP in 1993 (Schüler 1998). These cities are also major Alevi
dense cities and also evaluated as the SHP’s major “castles of votes and members”. In
İstanbul over 50% of those SHP’s registered members who were born outside of İstanbul
were born in Sivas, Malatya, Erzincan, Tunceli, Elazığ, Bingöl, Erzurum, and Kars.
These cities were the major migrant sending cities in the 70s. Although immigrants from
Sivas constitute 6.92% of İstanbul population in 1990, they constituted 17.23% of the
SHP’s registered members in this city (Schüler 1998).

The SHP-Alevi bond reflected to the local and general election. In the 1989 local
election, the SHP won the big city municipalities7 of İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir. Out of
21 district mayors in İstanbul, 12 were Alevi (Şener 1998). In Ankara out of six district
mayors four was Alevi (Güneş-Ayata 1992). The majority of municipal council members
was Alevi. In that way Alevis had a weighted ratio of MPs in the SHP group and through
coalition of DYP-SHP founded after the 1991 general election, there were four Alevi
ministers in the government.

The visibility of Alevis in politics through the functions of the SHP played

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7In Turkey, the municipal administration is following: The city municipality, as well as the big city
municipality of the large metropolitan area, such as İstanbul and Ankara, is administrated by a city mayor
elected by the city’s residents. The city municipality has been divided into a number of districts, and
sometimes-even sub-districts, each of it has its own mayor elected by the district’s resident. In that case in
local election, a citizen votes for a city mayor and a district (or sub-district) mayor.
crucial role in the developments of Alevi activities. Municipalities run by leftist parties and/or Alevi mayors have been supportive of the associational activities of Alevi groups in their regions. The municipalities of Çankaya, Yenimahalle and Mamak districts have provided support for Alevi associational activities in Ankara. These municipalities host a proportion of the Alevi population of Ankara in their districts. The Mamak district municipality has collaborated with the Hüseyin Gazi Association in organizing the yearly Hüseyin Gazi festival since 1997. The municipality of Yenimahalle provided three giant pots of aşure soup for the aşure day ceremony held at the Hüseyin Gazi Tomb on May 6, 2000. The Çankaya district municipality has also been supportive of Alevi associational activities. The current mayor of Çankaya district, Haydar Yılmaz, is a major Alevi figure and regularly attends major Alevi festivals and participates in Alevi activities.

The ties between Alevis and the aforementioned municipalities have received attention from the right-wing parties in the parliament.¹ One example found in the records of the parliament is the request by a MP of DYP for Ankara, Ersönmez Yarbay, for information on the identities of foundations, associations or occupational groups that Çankaya municipality had rented or sold land/buildings to since 1994. The Minister of Interior relayed the requested information. It is striking that from the four associations that the municipality sold buildings to, three were hometown associations of Alevis.²

The relationship between municipalities and Alevi associations is also evident in İstanbul and İzmir. The mayor of Kadıköy, a district of İstanbul, has allocated a piece of land to an Alevi association to construct a cemevi. Similarly, the municipality of Çiğli, a


district of İzmir, recently donated a 3000 square meter parcel to PSAKD for the construction of a cemevi (Pir Sultan Aylık Gazete May 2000: 1).

In mid 90s, the role of Alevi associations and foundations have become crucial factors in general and local elections. Like other hometown associations of migrants in the metropolis, Alevi associations have constituted a web of networks that embrace Alevi urban dwellers and connect them to political parties, local governments and the state.

Existing Alevi networks have expanded with the recent development of media industries and markets providing new opportunity spaces for social actors.

4.6. Privatization of TV and Radio: Creating New Communicative Spaces

By 1990, new communication networks had emerged and expanded as a result of the privatization of the broadcast media in Turkey. This brought new opportunities for social groups to express themselves in a wide range of public spheres. Until 1989, the state-run Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (TRT) (Turkish Radio and Television Institution) was the only broadcasting entity in Turkey. In 1990 private TV and radio stations emerged, at first, illegally and then legally following a constitutional amendment in 1993. This has led a boom in the number of commercial TV and radio stations. Turkey has become “one of the most media-saturated Islamic countries in the world” (Yavuz 1999a: 180). Currently, Turkey has 16 national and 263 local television stations and 36 national and 1295 radio stations.19 The state-run TRT International (TRT-Int) began broadcasting to the Turkish speaking population in Germany in 1990. By 2000, the TRT-Int was broadcasting all over Europe, in the Turkic Republics of Central Asia, Australia, New Zealand, USA, and Canada.11 The commercial channels such as Star, Show, ATV have also been broadcasting abroad. The privatization of television and


11Ibid.
radio has served dual goals: particularization and the unification of national identities ( Şahin and Aksoy 1993).

With the privatization of the media, various political and religious groups found a new niche to express their ideas and define themselves. The new private channels have begun to be arenas that are a "shooting gallery of taboos, by bringing the "Kurdish question," Kemalism, secularism, religious sects, gender roles, sex, etc. into the realm of public discussion" ( Şahin and Aksoy 1993: 35).

The emergence and proliferation of new private channels "brings 'hidden others' and 'distant others' into the household" (Yavuz 1999 181). The appearance of İzzetin Doğan, one of the major Alevi figures, on "Kırmızı Koltuk" (Red Chair), a TV program on a private channel in the early 90s, was one manifestation of this. Since his appearance, almost all-major Alevi leaders, including those living in Europe, such as Turgut Öker, have appeared in television on programs on the private channels. On November 8, 1995, one of the most widely watched programs, "Siyaset Meydanı" (The Political Arena), hosted various Alevi intellectuals and association leaders, including Alevi association leaders located in Europe, to discuss state-Alevi relations.

Alevi, during their progress of reorganization and consolidation, have taken advantage of opportunities provided by the privatization of the media. Privatization, which has introduced non-state owned broadcast media, bringing commercial TVs and radio stations, has become a force for re-defining and re-shaping Alevism. The mass media, including television, radio and newspapers, have taken an active part in creating and shaping collective sentiments and values. The commercialization of the media has provided various groups the opportunities to open their own television and radio stations. Alevi have established a number of local radio stations, especially in Ankara and İstanbul. Some of the Alevi radio stations, that have been established Ankara are Mozaik.
Çankaya, Çağdaş, Arkadaş, İmaj, and Ekin. One, Mozaik, has even become a national radio station. Recently Çankaya television has begun broadcasting in Ankara. The current Alevi radio stations in Istanbul are Barış, Yaşam, Özgür, Yön FM, and Cem. Alevi souls have established Al-Canlar (Alevi Canlar, lit. tras. Alevi Souls) television channel that has been broadcasting since 1992 on the Öffener channel. The Al-Canlar radio station is also presently broadcasting in Berlin.

In Ankara I have visited two of the “Alevi” radio stations, Mozaik and Ekin.\footnote{Following information based on my interviews I conducted in these radios on May 9-10, 2000, Ankara.} The representatives of the stations were reluctant to admit that their stations were “Alevi.” In both stations, I was informed that the stations were broadcasting to a base comprised of “democratic leftists.” Therefore, a clarification of why these radios are labeled ‘Alevi’ is needed. Radio Mozaik was founded by the EAUF and began broadcasting on April 15, 1994. Its programming included content and enthusiastic messages from famous Alevi singers, poets, intellectuals, and leaders. Its goal was to advocate for and pass Alevi culture to subsequent generations. Until the end of 1997 various Alevi leaders and intellectuals such as Attila Erden, Müslüm Doğan, Hüseyin Gazi Metin (a dede) and Mahsun (an Alevi minstrel) prepared the programming and worked as hosts at the station.

Because of financial reasons, the radio was eventually sold to an Alevi businessman, Ali Haydar Veziroğlu, about whom I give more information below. Since the sale, according to the program director, Radio Mozaik has not been an Alevi radio, but has targeted an audience of “democratic leftists.” However, the program director stated that certain ties to Alevi have remained. For example, cultural events of Alevi associations, and Alevi associational activities are announced on the radio. Additionally,
the radio broadcasts major Alevi cultural festivals such as the EAUF’s yearly festival in Cologne and the annual commemoration meeting of the victims of the Sivas tragedy. A majority of the listeners of Radio Mozaik radio live in Dikmen, Batukent and Tuzlucayard, which are neighborhoods of Ankara having large concentration of Alevis.

Radio Ekin began broadcasting on July 2, 1998, the sixth anniversary of the Sivas incident. An Alevi doctor, Servet Ünsal, who owns a chain of health clinics, founded this radio station. Ünsal is an important figure who attends and supports Alevi associational activities and festivities. He supervises programming on the station. Radio Ekin provides opportunities for Alevi leaders and intellectuals to prepare and host programming. The station supports itself financially based on the advertising it receives from small and medium-scale Alevi industrialists, merchants and store owners and Alevi store owners (this is also true for the Mozaik).

Alevi radio stations have played an important role during the electoral campaigns. They have served as platforms for Alevi as well as leftist candidates generally, to advocate themselves. In the April 1999 general and local elections, Radio Mozaik endorsed the Barış Partisi (Peace Party) of Ali Haydar Veziroğlu. The Demokratik Barış Hareketi (DBH) (Democratic Peace Movement) was the precursor to Barış Partisi, and was established in 1995. A former deputy of Tunçeli from the CHP, Veziroğlu spent a an immense amount of money in establishing the party and succeeded in attracting various Alevi leaders. The DBH’ slogan was “Adımız farklı, Soyadımız Türkiye” (lt. tr. our names are different, our last name is Turkey). The party advocated a state that was not based on ethno-national and cultural citizenship for all ethnic and religious groups of Turkey. The party spent considerable effort to convince the public that the DBH was not an Alevi party. However, almost all of its candidates in the general elections of December 1995 were Alevis. Right before the election, the DBH withdrew all of its
candidates. Veziroğlu later explained that the DBH withdrew its candidates to allow the CHP\textsuperscript{13} to overcome the 10\% threshold of votes that was necessary for representation in parliament (\textit{Radikal} August 5, 1996). Later the DBH was taken to the court and faced closure; in reaction the party members founded the Barış Partisi (Peace Party) in 1996. This party received .018 percent of the votes in the general elections and subsequently abolished itself (\textit{Milliyet} May 11 1999).

Several factors may have contributed to the failure of the party. First of all, the amount of money that Veziroğlu spent in establishing this party was so much that it even exceeded the spending of well-established parties on election campaigns. The source of this money as well as why Veziroğlu spent so much money on the party was questioned. One conspiracy theory that emerged from this discussion was that the state had financed the party to split the leftist vote. The withdrawal of the party’s candidates just before the election coupled to the independent candidacies of several Alevi leaders created confusion. Some have argued that these well-respected independent candidates received a significant amount of votes that otherwise would have gone to CHP. Many have argued that the most important reason for this was that Alevis were uncomfortable with the idea of an “Alevi party.” Alevi leaders supported the party for two reasons: (1) the failure of the left to take serious action in answering the demands of Alevis, and more importantly, (2) the failure of the SHP to protect Alevis from the violent attack which happened in 1993 in Sivas, although the SHP had been a coalition partner at the time of the incident.

4.7. Suddenly Imposed Grievances: Violence against Alevis in the 90s

I consider two acts of large-scale violence against Alevis as a constitutive part of the SPOS. These two attacks, which happened in 1993 in Sivas, and in 1995 in Gazi neighborhood of Istanbul, caused the emergence of what Walsh (1981) has called

\textsuperscript{13}CHP was re-opened in 1992. Before the 1995 general election, SHP abolished itself and merged to CHP.
“suddenly imposed grievances.” This concept implies dramatic events that are highly publicized, and that often included unexpected events such as man-made disasters or state-sponsored violence that lead to an increased public awareness of and opposition to elements thought to be responsible for the events. In this respect, suddenly imposed grievances can provide favorable conditions for the flourishing of the activities of social movement. These grievances, which later can become part of the collective memory of a group, may eventually become incorporated into the cultural dimension of the SPOS.

Below, I briefly narrate two acts of large-scale violence in 1993 and 1995.

On July 2, 1993, in Sivas, a mob emerging from various mosques after Friday prayers set fire to the hotel which hosted attendees of an Alevi cultural festival. The festival had been organized by the PSAKD to commemorate Pir Sultan Abdal, the great Alevi poet-rebel of the sixteenth century. The mob first gathered around the building in which the Cultural Festival of Pir Sultan Abdal was being held. After raiding the building, the mob damaged terribly and removed statues of Pir Sultan Abdal and M. Kemal. The mob brought the statue of Pir Sultan Abdal to the front of the Madımak Hotel where the festival’s attendees were staying. The mob then burned and destroyed the statue. The mob, which was collectively chanting Islamic slogans called on Aziz Nesin, one of the writers who was one of the attendees of the festival to emerge from the hotel. Aziz Nesin was a well-known writer who had recently started to translate Salman Rushdie’s book, *Satanic Verses*. The mob then surrounded and set fire to the hotel. The guests of the hotel could not escape from the burning building. The fire killed 37 and injured 60. Help from Firemen arrived at the scene only after the hotel had been on fire for seven hours, around 8:30 PM. During this period, the security forces were entirely absent. 17 of people who died in the hotel fire were young semah dancers, whose ages were between 12-25. The others were Alevi minstrels, secular writers, a caricaturist, a
cameraman, secular intellectuals, and a Dutch anthropologist (see Coşkun 1995; Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere 1998; Şahhüseyinoğlu 1997; any Turkish newspaper during the period July 3-7, 1993).

After the incident, the state and politicians were blamed because no aid was given to people in the hotel for seven hours. During the incident, president Süleyman Demirel told in a phone conversation the governor of Sivas to avoid any confrontation between the mob and the security forces. This directive prevented the security forces from taking any action against the mob that had surrounded and set fire to the hotel. Prime Minister Tansu Çiller later stated in parliament that “nothing had happened to our citizens outside of the hotel.” Her statement raised the issue of whose citizens were the people inside of the hotel.

Thousands of Alevi from all over Turkey marched in the funeral procession for the victims in Ankara. The violent attack on Alevi gave an enormous boost to the Alevi movement. Attempts were made to unify all Alevi associations and foundations under a common umbrella organization. Now, every year, a commemoration of the Sivas event is organized by the PSAKD and all Alevi associations and foundations participate in the commemoration along with civil society organizations. Associations located in Germany and various other countries also commemorate the Sivas incident every year. Thus, the events of July 2 have become a crucial part of Alevi historiography.

Some have viewed the incident as an organized action by militants with ties the pro-Islamic Refah and sympathizers. Temel Karamollaoğlu, the mayor of Sivas and Refah Party member at the time of the incident, was later prosecuted for his role in the incident; the charges were based on facts that he had prevented the fire department from responding the emergency and that he had appeared as part of the mob and had even participated in chanting Islamic slogans. He was not convicted, and was subsequently
elected as a deputy of Sivas of Refah in the 1995 general elections. Those who were arrested after the Sivas incident were defended by Şevket Kazan, who was a prominent member of Refah. He later became the minister of justice in the Refah-DYP coalition (1996-1997). The Sivas trial continued for five years and in the end nineteen people were sentenced to capital punishment. They were found guilty of "engaging in action to destroy the secular state establishment with a goal to replace the constitutional regime with a religion-based order." The defendants have appealed the verdict; the appeals are still pending.

The Sivas incident fuelled the Alevi movement, and the number of Alevi associations in Turkey and abroad increased sharply. In Germany, after the incident, more then one hundred Alevi associations emerged within a single year. The wise composition of Alevi associations also changed. Before 1993 in Europe, the first generation of immigrants constituted the majority of members of Alevi associations, but after the Sivas incident, the younger Alevis from second and third generations rushed to become members. This was also the case for Alevi associations in Turkey. At the PSAKD's headquarters, one room was organized as a museum where belonging of the victims of Sivas were displayed. The pictures of victims who died in the Sivas massacre have become major symbols ornamenting walls of association buildings. For example, in Cologne and Berlin, Alevi associations have pictures of the victims on their walls. The pictures cause everyone entering the building to remember the incident. A majority of association members (both in Turkey and Germany), when asked, have given the Sivas incident as their reason for joining Alevi associations.

Two years after the Sivas incident, another violent attack shocked Alevis. On March 12 1995, in İstanbul, three gunmen in a taxicab randomly shot at coffeehouses and patisseries in the Gazi neighborhood, which is a poor neighborhood populated by Alevis.
One person died, and the taxi driver who had brought the gunmen to the neighborhood was also killed. After this attack, Alevis of Gazi neighborhood gathered and tried to demonstrate in front of the local police station. The police responded by shooting into the Alevi crowd, which in turn responded by throwing stones at the police. Fights between the police and Alevis erupted in the streets of the Gazi neighborhood and, as a result, many policemen and Alevis were injured. Alevis gathered in the local cemevi (which was still under construction). Police constructed a barricade that came within 200-300 meters of the local cemevi where Alevis had gathered after their protest and confrontation with the police. At 4:30 AM, the police fired shots into the cemevi and, as a result, two Alevis died (see any Turkish newspaper March 13-20, Cumhuriyet April, 9-15, 1995). Community leaders had been on the phone all night appealing to government officials for intervention to no avail; no one had arrived by the morning after the incident (Marcus 1996).

The police attack on the cemevi had increased tension to the point that the situation deteriorated beyond control. Demonstrations protesting the action of the police in the Gazi were held in Gazi, Ümraniye and the other Alevi neighborhoods in Istanbul, Ankara and İzmir during March 13-15. At these marches, the police fired upon and killed or injured many protestors in attempts to “maintain” order (Cumhuriyet April 9-15, 1995). In the Gazi event police bullets had killed at least 20. The Human Rights Report on Turkey prepared by the State Department characterized the Gazi incident as “religiously motivated rioting occurred in heavily Alevi neighborhoods of Istanbul” (U.S. State Department Human Right Report on Turkey 1995). Like the Sivas case, the Gazi trial turned into a painfully long and drawn out affair. For reasons of “security,” the venue in the criminal trial of police officers was transferred to Trabzon, a city in the Black Sea region, almost 10 hours from Istanbul by bus. Actually, the Gazi trial only
began two and half years after the incident. The court-ordered examination of the area
where the incident occurred was conducted four years after the incident (Cumhuriyet,
Hürriyet, July 3, 1999, ATV News July 2, 1999). Only two police officers were convicted
and sentenced to jail at the end of the long, arduous trial. Because of the long delay
before initiation of the trial, a complain was filed against Turkey at the European Human
Rights Court for her slow legal response to the incident the trial started two and a half
years after the incident. The court agreed to hear the claim, and asked the Turkish state to
prepare a defense (ATV News July 8, 1999).

These large-scale acts of violence impacted on various spheres, but the major
impact was felt in politics. The ties between the left and Alevi had been jeopardized by
the fact that the Sivas incident occurred while the SHP, the leftist party heavily supported
by Alevi, was a member of the governing coalition. In the aftermath of the Sivas
incident, Alevi questioned their alliance with the left and searched for alternatives. The
establishment of an Alevi party became a topic of discussion among Alevi leaders
establishment of Barış Partisi discussed above, was, at least partially, a product of this
discussion. The SHP merged to the CHP before the 1995 general elections. CHP, which
had barely passed the ten percent threshold for representation in parliament in the 1995
elections and failed to achieve the threshold in the 1999 elections. Many Alevi leaders
evaluated the outcome of the vote as an Alevi “slap to the face of CHP.”

Recently, there has been a tendency of Alevi to vote for the central-right parties
(Nokta 1999, vl. 884 [January 17-30]). The Alevi leaders, I interviewed, confirmed this
tendency. Although the Sivas incident was accepted as a factor that shifted Alevi to
parties of right, an Alevi association representative has pointed out,
another reason for the shift from the left is that Alevis have changed their class status. Not all of them are poor, not all of them are workers anymore. They have used opportunities provided by the cities and capitalism. There are Alevi merchants, businessmen, medium and large-scale industrialists. The rightist discourses may have become attractive to them.  

The reaction to the earlier leftist affiliation combined with the changing social structure of Alevis seems to have dissolved the traditional left-Alevi bond, and impacted on the political choices of Alevis in the 1990s. As the left-Alevi bond dissolved, the state-Alevi interaction has taken a new form. The Turkish state has begun developing policies to account for its Alevi subjects in the second half of the 1990s.

4.8. The State: Contemporary Politics and the Recent Alevi Policies

With its recent policies in the acknowledging the existence of Alevis as a community, the Turkish state has been a major part of the SPOS. Before going into the details of the recent Alevi policies of the Turkish state I would like overview the recent political landscape, in which the rising tide of political Islam and the "Kurdish question" have challenged the legitimacy of the state and dominated the discussion in the public political realm.

4.8.1. Political Landscape of the 1990s

There is no doubt that a successful political Islam been the most important actor of the recent Turkish politics. Refah was the symbol and the major party of political Islam in the 1990s. The party was the heir to Erbakan’s MSP and was founded in 1984. Its success was largely due to the rising Islamic sentiment fostered by the military and civilian rules in the 1980s. Additionally, Refah’s lawmakers built a base of support in villages and teeming urban slums, reaching out with better roads and sewer systems, health clinics, and subsidized food. With well-designed election campaigns the party was

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14 Interview with Musli̇m  Doğan, the general secretary of the Pir Sultan Abdal Cultural Associations, April 27, 2000, Ankara.
extraordinarily successful in the local elections of March 1994. Its success shocked both internal and international public opinion. Refah won 27 provinces, including the large urban centers of Istanbul and Ankara. Its political success continued, and made Refah the largest party with the largest support in the December 1995 general elections. Refah won 21.4 percent of the votes giving it 158 out of the 550 seats in parliament. In June, 1996, Erbakan became Prime Minister in the Refah-DYP coalition government.

This electoral success demonstrated that in the 1990s the principle political challenge to the state would come from political Islamists, who had claimed superiority in the provision of better sources of national identity, social cohesion and better government compared to Kemalist alternatives (Sakalhoğlu, 1996). After the realization of this threat of the Islamist movement to the existing order, the state, under the pressure by a military that saw its role to be the protector of Kemalist secularist Turkish Republic, began taking action to suppress political Islam. Accordingly, the MGK\(^{15}\) imposed the famous “28 Şubat Kararı” (Decisions of February 28) upon the Erbakan-led coalition government. These decisions required regulations to reduce religious schools at all levels, removing Islamists from state administration and reducing the power of Islamist capital in economy. Although Erbakan was force to accept all the decisions of the MGK, his party leaders continued their actions infuriating the army. Eventually, Erbakan was forces to resign in June, 1997. The new coalition government (ANAP-DSP) implemented the regulations that the MGK had imposed. New regulations in education that aimed at reducing the number of and attendance in religious were promulgated.

Turkey's top court outlawed Refah on January 15, 1998 based on the illegality

\(^{15}\)State Security Council composed of five top military officials was made a part of government agency after the 1960 military coup. The MGK held a meeting with the prime minister and the Cabinet members once in a month. The meeting is headed by the president.
under the Turkish law of political parties based on ethnicity, religion or communist
ideology. The Islamic political movement had already formed a new party, the Fazilet
Partisi (Virtue Party), in anticipation of the ruling. Twice since 1970, Turkey had banned
predecessors of the Refah, only to see it reborn under new names. However, according to
the court’s decision, Erbakan and five other deputies lost their parliamentary seats, and
with that, immunity from prosecution. Additionally, Erbakan and the others were banned
from joining any party for five years, and the Refah Party was to surrender its assets to
the government.

The official discourse of the state articulated and tolerated Islamic elements in
politics in the post-1980 political restructuring. But this attitude continued only until the
state perceived that its policies on secular standards and criteria were in danger. The
Decisions of February 28 can be considered the point at which the state reached its limits
of tolerating Islamist elements in politics.

A necessary clarification in connection with the Islamist movement of the 90s is
that the Islamist movement, influenced by transnational values, has placed the concept of
identity in the forefront. By adopting identity-based claim making, Islamists in general
and Refah in particular have redrawn their demands in accordance with the universal right
to identity, i.e., in this respect, the right to be Muslim.

Another phenomenon that has challenged the Turkish state is the “Kurdish
question” (see Barkey and Fuller 1998; Kıriçti and Winrow 1997; Türkiye Odalar ve
Borsalar Birliği (TOBB) (Turkish Chambers and Commodity Exchanges Union) 1995;
An armed struggle between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK began in 1984 when
the PKK conducted two bloody village raids in Eastern Turkey and killed over 30
villagers. This armed struggle brought the Kurdish question into the public political
realm.

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The eastern provinces have been governed by a "special emergency administration" for more than fifteen years. The war in the Kurdish region has severely impacted Kurds squeezed between the pressures of the Turkish security forces and the PKK. In addition to tens of thousands of casualties, thousands of villages were evacuated by the state and property was destroyed by both sides during the armed struggle. The insecurity in and instability of the region, and the forced displacement of rural communities resulted in a huge out-migration from rural to urban centers. In particular, tens of thousands of Kurdish villagers have migrated to provincial centers such as Adana, Gaziantep, Mersin, Antalya, İstanbul, Bursa, and İzmir (TOBB 1995).

Several Kurdish political parties were organized at various times to make claims through legitimate political channels. These faced constant and underwent cycles of closure and subsequent reestablishment under new names. Currently, the Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP) (Democracy Party of People) represents Kurdish interests; however, its leaders and members are under constant pressure by the state and face threat of violence from right-wing militants. The armed struggle against the PKK ended for the violent deaths of approximately thirty thousands Turkish citizens (including ethnic Kurdish and non-Kurdish civilians) with the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, by the military of apprehension.

During the period of the military's attempts to apprehend Öcalan, relations between Turkey and Syria, where Öcalan's headquarters were located, steadily deteriorated. Turkish-Italian relations were also damaged during Öcalan's subsequent flight to Italy. The success of the Turkish state in capturing Öcalan increased the nationalist sentiment among Turkish people. This manifested itself in the rising power of the MHP, the nationalist party. The MHP was extremely successful in the April, 1999 general elections, and is now one of the partners in the ruling coalition government.
The Kurdish question has taken a new direction after Öcalan’s arrest. Under the pressure from the EU, Turkey has had to take some action to acknowledge her Kurdish subjects, including partial recognition of their language and culture. At the beginning of the December, 2000, the issue of permission for the Kurdish-language television broadcasts was raised for discussion at the state level. Although the military and the co-ruling MHP attempted to resist the introduction of Kurdish language broadcasting, the government eventually began to promulgate regulations to permit Kurdish TV by March, 2001.

The transformation of the discourse of the state from statements that no Kurds existed in Turkey, to discussions of the issue of Kurdish-language television broadcasts, is an important step in the development of a truly multi-ethnic Turkey.

4.8.2. The State-Alevi Interaction in the 1990s

In this political landscape, the state’s actions to recognize its Alevi subjects have become pronounced. Some have argued that the struggle of the state with the Islamist challenge and the Kurdish question has caused it to seek support by encouraging an Alevi revival (Bruinessen 1996, Yavuz 2000). It has been widely argued that the state’s recent great interest in Alevism cloaked in rhetoric of nationalism has been influenced by considerations that Alevism could be a useful counterweight to rising Islamist political power. The leaders and members of Alevi associations have claimed that the rising power of the Islamist that has perceived by the state as a threat has provided a unique opportunity for Alevis. An Alevi leader stated:

The sharp increase of Islamic fundamentalism has awakened some social forces in Turkey. They perceive Alevi community as the only group supporting M. Kemal. Accordingly, the state has given Alevi associations financial support, although it does not
As a consequence of recent state policies acknowledging Alevism as a distinct religious/cultural community, the state’s active involvement has emerged as a force in the shaping of Alevism.

Perhaps the most important action by the state has been the state’s appropriation in 1990 of the organization of the Hacı Bektaş festivities under the pretext of developing the festivities into an international event. The state began its public support of Alevism by officially sponsoring the annual festival commemorating Hacı Bektaş Veli, the patron saint of Bektaşis and Alevis in 1990. This action has paved the way toward an attempt to define Alevism as “Turkish Islam,” or the “Turkish interpretation of Islam,” and to represent Hacı Bektaş Veli as an actor who “Turkified and Islamized” Asia Minor. Alevism is now officially recognized as the “indigenous” Anatolian religion and is accorded respect by the state.

In 1991 Fahrettin Kurt of ANAP, the Minister of the State responsible for administrating the DİB, publicly stated that his government was in a dialogue with Alevis, who were not given any services. He declared that through DİB, Alevis would be funded and then, the schools to educate dedes would be founded.

Three years later, in 1994, a major newspaper announced that “the government will initiate a discussion of establishment of schools to educate Alevi religious leaders, the legalization and establishment of cemevis, the representation of Alevis within the DİB and the recognition of the rights of Alevis as a community” (Hürriyet October 24 1994).

The most important public action by an official in publicly recognizing Alevis as a distinct religious community was taken by President Süleyman Demirel; he attended

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16 Interview with Gülşen Öz, the president of the Hüseyin Gazi Association, and an administrative chief at the Ministry of Culture, May 12, 2000 Ankara.
the Hacı Bektaş Cultural Festival of 1994. Thus, Demirel became the first president to
attend the Hacı Bektaş Festivities. Addressing thousands of Alevi attending the festival,
Demirel stated, "you [Alevi] are not second class citizens of Turkey, so you hold your
heads up." Until his Presidency ended in May, 2000, Demirel attended the Festival’s
opening ceremony every year and was accompanied by a large group of high level state
officials, including the Prime Minister and Cabinet members and the leaders of political
parties. Since 1997, the opening ceremony of the festival has been televised live by the
state-run television station, TRT.

This state-sponsored Festival has become a stage where state officials make
promises which are frequently not kept. One such promise was enunciated by Ecevit,
while he was Vice Prime Minister in the ANAP-DSP coalition government. He stated,
during the Festival of 1997, that "from now on the mosque and the cemevi are both parts
of us. If the state budget allocates funds for religious groups, these funds should be
distributed among all groups equally" (Cumhuriyet August 18, 1997). A striking speech
was delivered by Mesut Yılmaz, the Prime Minister in the ANAP-DSP coalition
government that was established after Erbakan’s resignation. Yılmaz announced before
an Alevi crowd that he had brought a "present" for them. He was referring to the newly-
passed School Bill which made eight years of elementary school education mandatory
under a state-sponsored curriculum.¹⁷

The Islamist newspaper raised the question of why this law was a present for
Alevi. The recent policies toward Alevi were evaluated as outcomes of the February 28

¹⁷The law, making eight years of elementary school education under a state-controlled curriculum
mandatory, was strongly opposed by Islamists, because it effectively prevented students from attending
Imam Hatip High Schools after completing five years of elementary schooling at the age of 12, which has
been age for beginning to study of Arabic. It also affected female students, because they were allowed to
don headscarves in these schools immediately after completing the elementary schools. Under the new
law, students has to wait until age 15 before beginning the study of Arabic or donning head scarves.
Decisions. Islamists argued that the state has assigned Alevis the secularizing of Turkey. An Islamist journal even asked if “Alevism is becoming a state religion” (Akit August 19 1997).

Demirel was supportive of the construction of HBAKV’s headquarter building in Dikmen, where a large proportion of Alevis of Ankara live. The opening ceremony of the building hosted both President, Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz on May 19, 1998. The building has four floors, one of which is reserved for a cemevi. Tens of thousands of Alevis of Ankara, Alevi leaders of Turkey and Europe, ministers, the political party leaders attended the ceremony.

During the 1990s, state officials, ministers, and representatives of local governments participated in Alevi cultural festivals and opening ceremonies of cemevis. This creates a paradox; “cemevi” is not legally recognized as a belief center, but state officials participate in their opening ceremonies. The participation of state officials in cemevi openings brings partial recognition without any legal arrangement.

Founded in the late 1980s, the Turkish Culture and Hacı Bektaş Veli Research Institute which aims at promoting Turkish-Islamic tenet, has become instrumental for the ANAP-DSP coalition government which tried to found an Alevi-Bektaşı institute to acknowledge Alevism. The institute cooperated with the Ministry of Culture in the project to make a TV feature series with 13 hour-long episodes on the Alevi-Bektaşı culture covering an area stretching from Central Asia to the Balkans and Hungary. The

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18Interview with Ahmet Şahin, the general secretary of the HBAKV, May 2, 2000 Ankara.

19The national holiday to commemorate the day that M. Kemal arrived at Samsun to start the Turkish Independence War against the allies.

preparation of the program included several meetings with the “belief leaders,” and the experts of Alevism and Bektashism such as Irene Melikoff, Michael Kiel, and Ismail Engin. The program, “Hoca Ahmet Yesevi’den Haci Bektaş Veli’ye 13. Yüzyılda Anadolu’da Türk Hümanızmasının Kaynakları” (Sources of Turkish Humanism in the thirteenth century Anatolia from Hoca Ahmet Yesevi to Haci Bektaş Veli”) appeared on the national TV in late 2000. The project seems to have emerged from Prime Minister, Mesut Yılmaz, who stated “we will make Haci Bektaş town not only the center of Anatolian but also Balkan and Circassian Alevism” at the opening ceremony of the Haci Bektaş Festivities in 1997 (Milliyet August 18, 1997).

During his prime ministry, Yılmaz initiated several projects to draw Alevis to his party. Ali Uyar, an Alevi deputy of ANAP, was his advisor. With Uyar’s advise, Yılmaz held a meeting with a group of Alevi associations’ representatives in November 1997. As a major project to recognize Alevism, Uyar submitted to parliament a law proposal founding an Alevi-Bektaş Research Institute in 1998.22

The discussion of allocating Alevi money in the state budget was put into words during the prime ministry of Tansu Çiller, the leader of DYP since Süleyman Demirel was elected as president. Before the general elections of 1995, in order to develop ties with Alevis, Çiller ordered Abdulkadir Sezgin, the chief inspector of the DİB, to prepare a report demonstrating Alevi-dense areas and their political choices and political behavior (Engin 2000). She announced that not less than 3 trillion TL would be reserved for Alevis in the state budget. However, in the state budget announced by the DYP-ANAP

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21Refers to Alevi dedes.

22TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 20, Cilt 44, YasamaYLı 3, 52. Birleşim. 10.02.98. I could not find any further information on this proposal.
coalition government, there was nothing for Alevis.\textsuperscript{23} The DİB was allocated 47 trillion 130 billion TL for the year 1997.\textsuperscript{24}

The coalition government of ANAP-DSP that was formed after Erbakan’s forced resignation, was the first government of the Turkish Republic allocating Alevi money in its state budget. Alevi associations were allocated 425 billion TL in the budget for fiscal year 1998. This money was given to the HBAKV to be distributed among Alevi associations and foundations.\textsuperscript{25}

After the general election of April 1999, the DSP leader, Bülent Ecevit formed a coalition government with ANAP and MHP. The coalition’s (DSP-ANAP-MHP) program included an article declaring, "our government will give necessary importance to reinforce the Sunni-Alevi siblingship."\textsuperscript{27} The budget for fiscal year 2000 allocated Alevi associations 90 billion TL (Cumhuriyet June 20, 1999). Alevi associations received 113 billion TL from the budget for fiscal year 2001 (Hürriyet December 9, 2000).\textsuperscript{28} In the fiscal year 2001, the selected Alevi associations have received money, instead of a sum given to be self-distributed among Alevi associations.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{23}TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 20, Cilt 3, Yasama Yılı 1, 40. Birleşim, 19.04.1996.


\textsuperscript{27}TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21, Cilt 1, Yasama Yılı 1, 11. Birleşim, 04.06.99, for continuing discussion see also TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21, Cilt 1, Yasama Yılı 1, 12. Birleşim, 07.06.1999; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21, Cilt 1, Yasama Yılı 1, 16. Birleşim 16.06.1999; TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21, Cilt 4, Yasama Yılı 1, 22. Birleşim 25.06.1999.

\textsuperscript{29}In the state budget of 2001, 1 trillion 295 billion TL is reserved for civil society associations as total 113 billion is allocated for several Alevi associations (0.08%).

\textsuperscript{29}Associations and among of money allocated are following: HBAKV (25 billion), PSAKD (10 billion),
Recently, the Ministry of Culture has developed policies toward recognizing Alevism. The ministry has published several books on Hacı Bektaş Veli as well as Alevi Bektaşı poems. It has formed a semah group, Hacı Bektaş Veli Semah Group, to perform in the Hacı Bektaş yearly festival and the TRT programs. Several parliamentary speeches were dedicated to praise the Alevi Bektasi culture and its centrality for Turkishness.\textsuperscript{30}

One major contribution of the Ministry of Culture to the Alevi movement is to provide financial support for cultural activities of Alevi associations, which present projects to the Ministry. This works in following: before parliament starts to discuss the budget of the fiscal year, Alevi associations prepare a package including several projects to be funded and begin a kind of lobby movement among members of the parliament, especially among Alevi deputies.\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, AKKAV, an Alevi association, which was founded in 1992, works closely with the Ministry of Culture that provides 95% of its financial resource.\textsuperscript{32}

In contrast to the earlier period in which featuring Alevi folk songs and hymns was prohibited on the state-run TRT, recently almost every week a program featuring folkloric elements of Alevism is aired. During my stay in Cologne in Summer 1999, I recorded four programs featuring Alevi minstrels, musicians and semah performance in a week on the TRT-Int channel broadcasting not only to Turkey but all over Europe,

Cem Vakfı (25 billion), Ehl-i-Beyt Vakfı (10 billion), Anadolu Erenler Derneği (5 billion), Anadolu Erenler Kültür ve Sanat Vakfı (10 billion), Aşık Veysel Derneği (10 billion), Erenler Kültür Vakfı (2 billion), Gaziantep HBKTD, (10 billion) (Hürriyet December 9, 2000)


\textsuperscript{31}Interview with Fevzi Gümüş, the board member of the PSAKD and KKD, April 29, 2000, Ankara.

\textsuperscript{32}Interview with Ali Sümer, the executive member of the AKKAV, May 3, 2000, Ankara
Australia, New Zealand and North America. "Saga of the Millenium" [Bin Yılın Türküsü], a cultural festival organized by AABF in Cologne, was also featured in the TRT-Int. Now, I will turn to discuss transnational dimension of the Alevi movement.

4.9. Transnational Networks and Transnationalism

I argue that the Alevi movement cannot be understood without examining its transnational dimension. My argument is based on the fact that Alevi associational activities began earlier in Germany than Turkey. From Germany associational activities diffused to all over Europe and Turkey. The emergence and expansion of transnational Alevi networks transcending state boundaries have provided the opportunity of diffusing associational activities. In this respect, transnationalism that fosters transnational social and political practices is considered as one major component of SPOS.

Transnationalism refers to social, economic and cultural formations that are transcending the nation-state borders. Transnational immigrant networks are major constituencies of these formations. Immigrant networks transcend territorial state boundaries and connect various actors located at different levels. Alevis, who have migrated abroad since 1960s, have also formed transnational networks, which connect Alevis residing in several countries of Europe and the country of origin.

Transnational communities, with their ability to make claims at various scales, are becoming important political actors influencing both the political process of the country in which they reside and their country of origin. Through their trans-state political linkages, transnational communities may have been critics of their country of origin and able to mobilize human and financial resources to intervene homeland politics.

Although EAUF has engaged political actions related to immigrant status and rights at the European level, in its by-law, the first goal stated, "the EAUF engages in activities to take Alevi belief under constitutional protection in Turkey" (Avrupa Alevi

Intensified with the Sivas incident, the financial and infrastructural support was crucial in the foundations of Alevi associations in Turkey. Alevi associations located in Europe have influenced political developments in Turkey by providing economic and political support to their counterparts in the homeland since the late 1980s. The financial resources to support the establishment of Alevi associations, construction of cemevis and restoring the long deserted lodges have flowed from Europe to Turkey.

In the aftermath of the Sivas incident, the EAUF transformed 600 thousands DM for the families of the victims, the court expenses, commemorating ceremonies, and construction of the memorial for the victims in Ankara.13 In order to help the victims of the Gazi incident, the EAUF collected 193.690 DM to spend on the court and transportation expenses. The EAUF representatives traveled to Turkey to attend the Sivas and Gazi trials.

The first ABTM, an umbrella organization of Alevi associations of Turkey and abroad, was founded under the leadership of the EAUF. As a result, the president of EAUF, Ali Rıza Gülciçek (who migrated from Sivas to Cologne around 1969 and have lived there since then), became the chairperson of ABTM. Gülciçek, as the chairperson of ABTM headed a group of Alevi representatives meeting the president of the Turkish Republic to present the demands and problems of Alevis in 1995. Again in September 1997, several Alevi leaders from Europe were among the group of Alevi representatives visiting Prime Minister, Vice Prime minister and the major political party leaders to present demands of Alevis.

13Interview with Turgut Öker, the president of the EAUF and the AABF, July 28, 1999, Cologne.
The close ties between Alevi associations of Turkey and Europe are also evident in their joint actions. For example, in 1998, the “Hacı Bektaş Barış, Dostluk ve Sevgi Yürüyüşü” (Hacı Bektaş Veli Peace Friendship, and Love Walk)\(^{24}\) was organized by 20 Alevi associations of Turkey and Europe. The walk of Alevi associations began in Trabzon, where the Gazi trial was held, on August 10. After attending the Gazi trial, the walk continued to the cities of Ordu, Samsun, Çorum, Ankara, and Kırşehir. The walk ended in the town of Hacı Bektaş, where the yearly cultural festival of Hacı Bektaş was held on August 16-18.\(^{35}\)

The transnational networks of Alevis are instrumental in taking the human rights violations in the Kurdish and Alevi regions into European platforms. In 1994, a commission organized by EAUF went to Turkey to make an inquiry in Tunceli\(^{36}\) and Sivas, where 1400 villages were burnt.\(^{37}\) In 1998 the EAUF organized an inquiry council of Sivas to visit the region where Alevi villagers were taken under custody, tortured and evicted from their villages. They were accused of providing food and shelter for the PKK guerillas. The council included EAUF’s leader Ali Külc, Cem Özdemir, a Turkish origin


\(^{35}\)Associations participating in the walk: PSAKD, HBAKV, HBKTD, Ankara Hacı Bektaş Derneği, Karacaahmet, Şahkulu, Kartal Cemevi, Gazi Cemevi, Tunceller Derneği, KKD, EAUF, Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Austria Alevi Unions Federation), İsviçre Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Switzerland Alevi Unions Federation), İsviçre Basel ve Çevresi Çağdaş Aleviler Derneği (Switzerland Basel and its Environment Modern Alevi Association), Hak-Der, İngilizce Alevi Kültür Merkezi ve Cemevi (England Alevi Culture Center and Cemevi), Balkan Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Balkan Alevi Unions Federation), AAA.

\(^{36}\)A city where approximately 100% of population is Kurdish Alevi and where the Dersim revolt (1937-1938) had occurred. The special emergency administration has continued more than fifteen years and very oppressive in Tunceli, where a “food control”, known as “food embargo” is applied.

\(^{37}\)The village burning and evicting have been common in the eastern Kurdish populated region, where the army struggling with the PKK terror. The majority of village burning incidents has occurred in Tunceli.
MP in the German parliament, the Tunceliler Vakfı’s vice president, and several Alevi leaders.

The strong trans-state political ties between Alevi living abroad and Turkey can be seen clearly from the recent general election. In the general election of April 1999, the former president of EAUF, Ali Kılıç, ran for parliament as a member of the Barış Partisi of Veziroğlu. Ali Rıza Günçilçek, another former EAUF’s president, is now a member of CHP’s city council in Istanbul.

Because of the liberal climate Europe provided, Alevi associational activities in EU states have faced less restrictions and even enjoyed financial support from their host countries. In Turkey it is not even possible to use the concept of “Alevi” in the title of an association. Since the mid-80s, various Alevi associations have been established with “Alevi” title in Germany and subsequently in other European countries. Three Alevi research institutes are now within the borders of Germany, the European Alevi Academy, the Alevi-Bektaşi Institute and the Alevi Rites and Ways Institute.

Recently two federal states of Germany, Nordrhein-Westfalen and Berlin, have granted AABF the right to teach Alevism in the public schools. In terms of teaching Alevism in schools, Alevi associations also get financial support from the German state. Alevism as a course is not available in schools in Turkey. Since the Islam Federation got the right to teach Islam in Germany, Turkey tried to stop Germany from providing religious groups the right to teach religious courses. Turkey has claimed that granting rights to teach Islam by the religious communities could damage the Turkish system, where teaching religion is under the state control. This clearly shows that transnational immigrant networks are political factors that both the sending and receiving states must

[The Association Law of 2908 prohibits foundation of an association to function on the basis of region, race, social class, religion and sect. The Association Law of 2908, 52. item requires to close down that kind of association.]
take them into account.

Although association activities started earlier in Europe, diasporic Alevi associations have largely depended on the homeland in terms of expertise on Alevi history, tradition and culture. Expertise refers to Alevi intellectuals and leaders writing books on Alevism, dedes providing knowledge on tradition as well as Alevi minstrels and musicians. Diasporic Alevi associations have drawn on expertise from Turkey. There has been a constant flow of Alevi intellectuals, dedes, minstrels, musician, saz and semah teachers from Turkey to Germany (and elsewhere in diaspora) since the 1980s. This flow increased sharply after the Sivas incident.

The flow of experts from Turkey to abroad has usually taken a form of “teaching” Alevism to Alevi immigrants abroad. In the Mannheim Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Mannheim Alevi Culture Center), Mehmet Yaman, an Alevi dede living in Istanbul, organized and supervised four-month long courses to teach the fundamentals of Alevism in a year of 1997. Hüseyin Gazi Metin, a dede, worked as ‘a dede on duty’ in İngilvere Alevi Kültür Merkezi ve Cemevi (England Alevi Cultur Center and Cemevi) for two years in London. Now he is in Paris. Musa Küçük was invited by Sidney Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Sidney Alevi Culture Center). During his one-month stay, he conducted cem ceremonies and had meetings with Alevis living in Sidney to inform them on Alevism (Cem, 1998, 30 (84), 8). Dr. Nazan Kuloğlu, who has done research extensively on the Islamist movement in Turkey and has worked in various Alevi associations, was invited by EAUF. She worked for EAUF for two years (1997-1998), during which Kuloğlu wrote for EAUF’s monthly journal and gave speeches on conferences organized by Alevi associations in Germany and in neighboring countries.

Throughout a year, Alevi associations abroad invite Alevi intellectuals to give speeches in panels, dedes to hold cem ceremonies, and various Alevi minstrels and
musicians to give concerts. The major figures of the Alevi movement, İzzettin Doğan, Lütfi Kaleli, Cemal Şener, Attila Erden frequently travel to Europe (some even to Australia) to participate in conferences organized by Alevi associations.

The flow of experts from Turkey to Europe is also related to the dynamics of capitalism and personal vanity. Europe is a great market for Alevi intellectuals, leaders, dedes, minstrels and musicians. They all have received financial rewards for their "services." The intellectuals and leaders attending conferences have the opportunity to sell their books, minstrels and musicians make money by giving concerts as well as selling their cassettes and CDs.

All these actors moving back and forth between Turkey and Europe carry finance, ideas, symbols, codes, attitudes, modes of actions from one place to another. Within the dense and highly active networks transcending the nation state borders, Alevis, like the other social groups, found new opportunity spaces to engage social, cultural and political actions. Now I would like to turn to the transnational context that has given the opportunity for connecting actors at and participate in local, national, transnational scales in making claims since the 1980s.

4.10. Transnational Context: Identity as Rights

It is not coincidence that the emergence of Alevi associations and the European Parliament’s decision to give subsidies for immigrant associations occurred in the same year. Since 1986, the European Parliament has given subsidies to immigrant associations in order to help them to coordinate their actions at the European level (Kastoryano 1998). The goal was dual: to reduce immigrants’ political activities toward their home and host countries and to integrate them into the EU. In this direction, immigrant associations have begun to form umbrella associations to engage politics at the European level. The level of actions is not the state they live in but the transnational space. The Migrant’s
Forum was founded by the EU as an umbrella association including 100 immigrant associations in twelve EU states with a budget from the Commission of the EU in 1991.

Through such organizational activity, conferences, conventions, campaigning, and lobbying at the level of European Community, migrant organizations forge a transnational status and identity—an identity that is enacted as a symbol in communicating with host societies and supranational authority structures, to redefine and expand the boundaries of belonging in Europe (Soysal 1994: 114).

As a result, immigrants founded networks on the base on identity of origin linking the home country, the country of residence, and to broader European space (Kastoryano 1998). The main criterion of composing these networks is related to identity, which is presumed “identity of origin.” This identity is institutionalized through associations located in various European states which form links connecting several states, including the country of origin. In this respect, immigrant associational activities also impact on their homeland, as I have examined above.

The emergence of “identity” as a fundamental human rights protected by various supranational organizations such as UN, UNESCO, and EU, has opened various social groups a new channel to enter into public spheres to make claims based on identity (cf. Malkki 1995; Soysal 1994, 1997). It is evident that various groups have redrawn their claims according to this “identity as right” discourse. Alevi, like other groups, have also taken advantage of this emergent “identity as right” discourse and begun to form associations based on Alevi identity since 1986 in Germany.

The most important aspect of the transnational context is related to Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership. EU, a supranational organization guaranteeing the ‘right to have identity’ as a human right, has forced Turkey to promulgate laws to recognize her ethnic and religious minorities. An Alevi leader has pointed out “the project to be a member of EU has challenged the Sunni state authority. The state has changed its
attitude toward us [Alevis]. This is not a baseless argument. Turkey’s struggle for EU membership has opened an opportunity structure for Alevi. EU considers the question of Alevis’ in Turkey within the framework of the Copenhagen Criteria imposed on Turkey to be a member.

EU Commission on Turkey has prepared an annual report examining the progress of Turkey’s candidacy in the EU membership since 1998. The first progress report on Turkey stated “the officially recognized religious minorities are free to practice their religions, but beliefs outside of (Sunni) Islam face difficulties in the bureaucracy” (Milliyet, November 25, 2000). The report underlined that Alevi religious leaders were not paid by the state. The second progress report was released on November 8, 2000. In the section of religious freedom, the report stated, “there is no change in the official attitude toward Alevi. The major complaints of Alevi are the non-existence of Alevi identity in the courses and textbooks of mandatory religion courses, and the state’s financial support to Sunni mosques and foundations” (Milliyet, November 25, 2000).

The aforementioned statement in the progress report seems to be a result of the meeting between EU representatives and Alevi in July 2000 in Turkey. This meeting was held in Karen Fogg’s house, EU’s representative in Turkey. The Alevi leaders who attended the meeting were Ali Balkız and Müslüm Doğan of PSAKD and Doğan Bermek of Cem Vakfı. The meeting got the attention of and was criticized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry considered the meeting that discussed a “sensitive issue” [Alevis] was held “secretly” between EU representatives and Alevi associations (Cumhuriyet, and Milliyet June 24, 2000, ATV News on June 23 2000). Both Alevi associations and EU representatives denied that the meeting was secret. Fogg stated that

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39Interview with Müslüm Doğan, April 27, 2000, Ankara.
the EU representatives have always met Alevis, because EU has an intellectual interest in understanding religious groups of Turkey (Milliyet June 24, 2000). In sum, by the beginning of the 21st century, Alevism became a transnational issue that the Turkish state had to cope with in her EU candidacy.

In this chapter, I have detailed components of the SPOS that Alevis have seized to form their movement both at national and transnational levels. In order to explain how the opportunity structures opened for Alevi communities, I have examined the social and political structure of Turkey since the early republican era. The macro processes of migration, urbanization in accordance with political polarization were among the most important factors that have made the Alevi movement possible. The shifting networks and political alliances of Alevis in connection with the changing social and political circumstances demonstrated the paths that Alevis followed in the process of making Alevism visible by the late 1980s. With its policies toward recognizing its Alevi subjects, the Turkish state is a crucial actor in providing opportunities for the Alevi movement. The recent path that Alevis are walking is a transnational one. This is due to the existence of strong transnational Alevi networks that connect Alevis living several countries at local, national, and transnational levels. In that way, Alevism has been taken into European space. Turkey’s struggle to be part of the EU also serves as an opportunity to make claims based on Alevi identity as EU forces the Turkish state to recognize her minorities.

This section has analyzed the social and political structure that provides Alevis opportunities to engage claim making at various levels. The next chapter examines the content of their movement.
CHAPTER V

Communicative Praxis: Shaping Alevism in National and Transnational Publics

This chapter investigates the communicative praxes that are shaping Alevism in the arena of not only national but also transnational publics. I discussed the concept of communicative praxis in chapter two where I outlined my theoretical framework. Communicative praxis entails rational and non-rational interaction between Alevi actors, their supporters, opponents, and less involved bystanders.

I examine in this present chapter how Alevism, the definition of its ‘essence’, and its ‘aims’ emerge from the struggle and the cooperation of these actors. I pay particular attention to the different kinds of media central to this shaping process, including print and electronic media, festivals, music, dance, and ceremonies. I will analyze the discourse of transforming Alevism into a public religion that is produced by the complex interplay of multiple actors, dissenting and consenting voices. It is through communicative praxis that actors develop and enact social, political, and cultural projects. My analysis of communicative praxis will focus on: who is communicating with whom in which setting, what messages are sent to whom, what kinds of principles and ideologies incorporated into emergent discourses, which discourses are crystallized, how discourses
connect or divide actors involving interactions.

Thus prepared I will delve into the substantial analysis of Alevi discourse and of selected very events and symbolic sites, which illustrate the dynamics at work in the shaping of Alevism as a public religion.

The Key Players

Among the many actors shaping Alevism, the three major ones are the Alevi activists, the Islamist circles, and the Turkish State. Other important actors include Kurds, the German government, and media. Some of these actors are formally organized, other are not. In this respect, discourses produced by them emerge either in formal or informal settings. The parliament is an example for a formal setting, where the state agents draw the lines of its Alevism discourse. Informal gatherings of association members are examples for informal settings. The points where different actors intersect are particularly important, and as I will show, revealing in analysis. Alevism is the product of the interaction of the different actors pursuing and evolving different agendas clashing with one another and dialoging with one another. It is shaped by series of encounters in physical as well as in the virtual settings.

The actors are not located in an opposition to one another, because discourses produced by them could link them at one level, but divide at another. In other words, these two processes occur simultaneously. For example Alevi activists are coming closer to the state by defining themselves as a “security for secularism” and may move at the same time away from the state by making claims against the DİB, and the mandatory religious courses.

None of the actors I have defined are homogenous, and there are internal tensions in each of them. Since the late 80s, Alevi intellectuals and associations have brought various definitions of Alevism into publics. The only possible way to define Alevism is
to define it according to the association X or Y, or to the writer A or B. There are ethnic and regional differences among Alevis. The macro processes of modernization, migration and urbanization have brought socio-economic changes that have added new divisions and definitions to the already existing ones. In contrast to the multiple definitions of Alevis, almost all Alevi activists agree that Alevism is “modern, secular, democratic and equal.” No Alevi disputes the claim made by many Alevi intellectuals that Alevis had discovered the ideals of democracy and equality centuries ago and applied them to their social organization.

The Islamist circles have different approaches toward Alevis that has recently emerged in public political realms. Some attempt to forge alliances with Alevis on the basis of Islam and the struggle against the state, but some reject any negotiations, or display antagonistic attitudes towards Alevis, which they believe to be “impure.” More often there are tensions between Alevi activists and Islamists than alliances.

The state can be disaggregated according to specific state agencies, which are often at loggerhead with one another while pursuing divergent policy goals. Particular attention deserves the DİB, which is strongly influenced by Islamist forces. Whereas the president and the other top state officials provide official recognition to Alevis by participating in the Alevi festivals, the DİB rejects Alevism as a distinctive religious community and opposes the representation of Alevism in its body.

**Axes of Discourse**

There are several axes around which the discourse of Alevis evolves through the communicative praxes of multiple actors. This multiaxial space comprising various kinds of publics from media to the parliament, a wide range of actors from the Alevi writers to Islamists and a wide geography from Istanbul, Ankara, Sivas to Berlin, Cologne and Melbourne. In this multiaxial structure, as Ali Balkız, an Alevi leader, states “everybody
tries to create her/his own Alevi” (Cumhuriyet July 24 1998). The two most contested axes are to whether “Alevism is in or outside of Islam” and to whether “Alevism is a culture or a religion.”

The multiaxial structure hosts internal tensions as well as alliances among Alevi activists. The others, the State and the Islamist circles, also interact with Alevis in this structure. This makes the whole process of formalization of Alevism a subject of complex shifts and loops with entrance of new cultural orderings and groups.

In the multiaxial structure, the emergent discourses are competing and contradictory and yet expanding. Some discourses tend to get crystallized, others not. The expansiveness of discourses links some actors at some level, but divides at others.

There are three major principles Alevi activists incorporate into their claim making since the late 1980s. These are human rights, secularism (associated with Kemalism) and women’s rights. These principles function as bridges connecting the heterogeneous Alevi actors. The first principle that Alevi activists applied to their movement is the right to have an “identity” as a fundamental human right (Soysal 1994, 1997). The second principle is secularism, a major tenet of Alevism. Even the Turkish State is criticized as being not secular enough in any real sense. The third principle is women rights. Showing how the Alevi tradition is respectful to women is the major concern of Alevi activists trying to make connections with the current universal values. A fourth principal, environmentalism seems to be emerging since very recently.

In the next section of this chapter, I will deconstruct the text of the Alevi movement into its component parts in order to demonstrate the different elements of its content. First of all, I classify the Alevi associations, their discourses and agendas to clarify the multiplexity in the representations of Alevism. Then follows an analysis of the desecretization process through which Alevism is been transformed into a public religion.
in contemporary public spheres. Next, I will demonstrate how Alevism is being formalized in Europe among Alevi immigrants, mainly in Germany. The role of Alevi women in the restructuring of Alevism will be examined in this context. In the latter part of the chapter, I will turn to the other actors, state agencies and Islamists, their discourses and political projects on Alevism.

5.1. Defining Alevism: Deconstructing an Imbroglio

The Alevilik Bildirgesi [Manifesto of Alevism]¹ that was prepared and published by the Hamburg Alevi Culture Center in March 1989 defined Alevism as a branch of Islam. In its section of “realities,” the manifesto presented the followings:

20 out of 60 million of Turkish population is Muslim belonged to the Alevi way...like Sunnism, Alevism is a branch of Islam...It is as old as Sunnism...For a segment of population, Alevism is a way of life with its religious, political, cultural and social dimensions...Although the main source is Islam, there are obvious differences between Sunni Islam and Alevi Islam both in the teaching and the practice... The Sunni Muslims, who constituted the majority know nothing about Alevism...The DİB represents only the Sunni branch of Islam. The Alevi existence is denied...Alevis always support the principles of Kemalism.

Demands represented in the manifesto were:

It must be acknowledged that there is oppression of Alevis...Alevis could say, “I am an Alevi,” without a fear...Sunni families should change their views on Alevis...Intellectuals should defend the existence of Alevi within the framework of human rights. The Turkish media should reserve a space for the Alevi culture in their broadcast...TRT should take the Alevi existence into the account...Alevism must be represented in the DİB...The construction of mosques in Alevi villages should stop...Alevi teaching must be included in the mandatory religion course...governments should change their attitudes toward Alevis...the institution of dede must be restructured in the modern sense...programs must be prepared immediately for Alevis abroad. (Cumhuriyet May 15, 1990).

¹Manifesto signed by: Yaşar Kemal, an internationally known novelist who has been recently sentenced to five years in jail by the Turkish court for his speech on a TV program in Germany, writers Aziz Nesin, Ataol Behramoğlu, Nejat Birdoğan, journalist-writers İlhan Selçuk, Riza Zelyut, İlhamı Soysal, Seyfettin Turhan, Süleyman Yağız, Musa Ağacık, researcher Attila Özkuralı, professors Berkay Yaman, Kivanç Ertop, Çetin Yetkin, Istanbul Human Right Association President Emil G. Sandalci, artists Târik Akan, Zülkü Livaneli, lawyers Muhtarren N. Orhan, and Cemal Özbey.
The incorporation of major principles such as human rights and Kemalism were evident in the manifesto. This supports Soysal’s (1997) argument that the global discourse of identity as a right is incorporated by various groups engaging in identity claim making. She demonstrated how Islamic groups incorporated the universal discourses into their movements with an example. A Shiite Muslim immigrant group, who celebrated the birthday of Fatima in the Elibeyt mosque in Berlin, claimed that they had recognized that “human rights are women rights” already 1400 years before the recent Beijing women’s conference (p. 517).

In the same way, the Alevi groups incorporate the globally dominant discourses into their claim making. An Alevi association leader informed:

The items written on the Manifesto of Universal Human Rights are not different from Ali’s sayings. The father of human rights is Ali. Others say this. We are disappointed by those defining Alevism as “Alevism is Zoroastrianism,” “Alevism is Shamanism,” or “Alevism without Ali.” These deviations disappoint us. These people try to destroy Alevism that impacted ages.

Parallel to this argument, Önder Aydin, also claimed that every principle of the universal human rights existed in Alevism. In a newspaper series Ali Yıldırım informed

Anatolian Alevism is a universal teaching that give human being the highest value by putting him/her in the center regardless of religion, language, race, and gender. It is an Anatolian teaching sharing universal characteristics. For this reason Anatolian Alevism is not sectarian or discriminatory...The fundamental values in the Manifesto of Universal Human Rights naturally exist in Alevism (Cumhuriyet July 30 1998).

An Alevi dede, using the human rights discourse, stated,

Alevism is a life philosophy more than a belief. To defend human rights lies on its basis.

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2Mohammed’s only daughter, Ali’s wife and mother of Hasan (second Imam) and Hussein (third Imam).

3Interview with Metin Kütük, the president of the AAKC, May 25, 2000, Berlin, Germany.

4The president of the KKD, and a board member of the PSAKD, personal conservation, August 12, 1999, Hacı Bektas.
The biggest sin is one committed toward the human rights. We understand human rights as not to discriminate against religion, language and race. In Alevism "seeing the seventy two nations with the same eye" [yetmiş iki millete bir nazarla bakmak] represents this... In our prayers and teachings, this has been taught repeatedly... Cem is a practice of this philosophy... (Cemhuriyet February 9, 1989).

Defining Alevism is a highly contested terrain. The manifesto of Alevism has represented only one way of defining Alevism and its demands. There is no consensus over what Alevism is and what Alveis demand. The major Alevi associations and writers provide competing and contradictory definitions of Alevism. The lack of consensus over the major issues, the mandatory religious courses and the position of DİB, create a multiplicity on presentations of what Alveis demand. The alliances and joint actions of Alevi associations depend on how they define Alevism and what their attitudes are toward the major issues.

Alevi associations can be divided into three groups proposed by PSAKD representatives. The first group includes the associations that are under the umbrella of the ABKB. The major associations in this group are the PSAKD, the HBAKV, the HBVKTD, the ABEKV, the Şahkulu, the Karacaahmet lodges, and the Alevi federations of Germany, France, Austria, Australia, Belgium and Denmark. These associations have a consensus over defining Alevism as an “authentic teaching of Anatolia”. They all agree that the DİB and the mandatory religious courses must be abolished.

The second group is the Cem Vakfı led by Izzettin Doğan. This group defines Alevism as the “essence of Islam” as well as the “Turkish interpretation of Islam.” The Cem Vakfı’s leader, Izzettin Doğan is maintaining good relations to the center right parties and some of the Islamist circles. In his media appearance, Doğan uses the concept

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Interview with Ali Balkız PSAKD’s executive council member (currently PSAKD’s president), July 8, 1999 Ankara, interview with Fevzi Gümüş, Müslüm Doğan. Other Alevi leaders as well as media also bring up this categorization frequently.
of "Alevi Islam" instead of Alevism. In terms of mandatory religious courses, he
defends that religious courses must be elective and must include information on Alevi
Islam. Doğan argues that Alevism must be represented in the DİB. He stated,

The DİB is a necessary institution within the state body. M. Kemal had to found that
kind of institution under specific conditions and crisis in the early republican era. The
DİB is not contradicting secularism. The DİB should be autonomous and included every
belief community, under the supervision of the state. This will help to develop
democracy in Turkey (Cumhuriyet April 4, 1995: 10).

Since the early 90s, İzzettin Doğan has demanded that the state should finance Alevis to
construct cemevis and to pay dedes as religious officials. Other major Alevi leaders
harshly criticized him for being "rightist" and "on side of the state." When the state
allocated 425 billion TL for Alevi associations in the 1998 state budget, the major Alevi
associations (PSAKD, HBAKV, HBKTD, ABEKV, and the Şahkulu), which were
against the state financial support and critical of the Cem Vakfı reached an agreement to
receive the allocated money in a meeting held at the HBAKV. The Cem Vakfı was also
present in this meeting. In the same meeting, all the associations agreed to declare
publicly that none of them would attend the Ehl-i Beyt Congress organized by the Ehl-i
Beyt Vakfı.

The Ehl-i Beyt Vakfı is the third major Alevi group. It is led by an Alevi
businessman, Fermani Altun and circles around him. This group defines Alevism
as the "essence of Islam" like the Cem Vakfı, but unlike any other Alevi
associations, it is very close to the Shi’ism of Iran. The Ehl-i Beyt declares that
Alevism is based on "loving Ehl-i Beyt, the Koran, and Mohammed." If Alevis
love Mohammed and Ali they should live how Ali and Muhammad had lived. In
other words, Alevis should obey the pillars of Islam. To what extent Fermani
Altun and his foundation members follow Islam is not clear, but being against the

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left seems to be the clearest attitude of Ehl-i Beyt. Its leader, Fermani Altun, often declares that the Ehl-i Beyt is strongly against the left in his media appearance. He accuses the left for having eroded Alevi traditions.

Both İzzettin Doğan and Fermani Altun are the “preferred representatives of Alevi community” of Islamist newspapers. One of the Islamist newspapers even criticized the state officials for their participation in the Hacı Bektaş festivities but not in the Ehl-i Beyt Congress, which was also an Alevi gathering (Akit May 22, 1998). By defining Alevism as “essence of Islam” and by making statements that Alevis believe in Koran and Muhammad, the Cem Vakfı and Ehl-i Beyt come closer to the Islamist circles, as they distanciate themselves from the first group.

Although İzzettin Doğan is criticized harshly by the first group, he is still more acceptable to them than Fermani Altun, the leader of the Ehl-i Beyt. As one of the association leaders of the ABKB says “İzzettin Doğan will side with us sooner or later, but Fermani Altun has unchained himself and is on his way to Iran.”

This tripartite division of course does not reflect the real heterogeneity because the first group is also not a homogenous whole. The ABKB definition of Alevism as an authentic Anatolian teaching only thinly veils the existing differences among the member associations. The debate on whether Alevism is in or outside of Islam continues among them but consensus over defining Alevism as an authentic Anatolian teaching helps them to bridge their differences. The HBAKV is more traditional and tends to define Alevism inside of Islam by tracing back Alevism to the caliphate election after Mohammed. On the other hand, the PSAKD is more inclined defining Alevism as being part of Islam.

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*Interview with Gülağ Öz, May 12, 2000 Ankara.*
The president of the HBKTD, Attila Erden, states “a giant cultural structure called
“Anatolian Alevism” cannot be restricted by reducing it to any religious dimension or a
small sect (Cumhuriyet July 29, 1998).

In its recent general congress the PSAKD defines Alevism as

a product of Anatolian geography belonging Anatolia with its authentic and a living
structure. Anatolian Alevism is a life style. This life style requires secularism (Pir
Sultan Abdal Aylık Gazete April 2000: 1).

As the associations offer different definitions of Islam, Alevi intellectuals
publishing books on Alevism also provide different and contradictory definitions of
Alevism. For example, Nejat Birdoğan claims that Alevism is outside of Islam (Aktüel
1995 172: 19-20). His argument got a strong reaction from a group of Alevi leaders and
intellectuals, as well as a Sunni historian (Aktüel 1994, 173: 24-25). Other publicly well-
known Alevi intellectuals, Reha Çamuroğlu, Cemal Şener and Rıza Zelyut define
Alevism inside of Islam. For Şener (1997) Alevism is an Anatolian interpretation of
Islam, i.e. Anatolization of Islam. For Zelyut (1990) Alevism is inside of Islam, and
actually "essence of Islam."

The main tendency is to define Alevis as Turkish nomads, who had come from the
Central Asia to Anatolia and blended their Shamanistic rituals with Islam and produced
thus a folk sufism. Some argue Alevism is a mixture of Shamanism, Zoroastrianism,
Manism, Mazdeism, Christianity, and Islam—a truly syncretistic religion.

The three partite division of Alevi associations and their divergent attitudes
toward major issues bring salience to the question of representation. The issue of who is
representing Alevis is frequently discussed, especially at times when publics witness that
ABKB and İzzettin Doğan meet with state officials separately and give conflicting
accounts of Alevism and Alevi demands. Their presentations are different from each

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other. As the ABKB asks for the abolition of the DİB, Doğan demands the representation of Alevism in the DİB.

The existence of multiple Alevi associations with different attitudes and projects is also problematic for the state. For example Ecevit, the former vice prime minister and current prime minister, informed that Alevis have lots of associations with very different attitudes. He claimed that these associations should first reach an argument if they want to have state support and be represented in the DİB (Milliyet, January 21, 1998). On the same line a DSP deputy stated in his parliamentary speech:

As the DSP, we defend the idea that Alevi community should be represented in the DİB, but in that issues first Alevi associations and foundations should reach a consensus...some representatives and leaders do not accept the representation in the DİB. They even demand that the administration of the DİB should be given to religious communities. But We want to maintain state control on the DİB, because, the risk of “ırtica” (referring fundamentalist Islam) is still present."

Alevi activists, the state and media have presented Alevis as the devoted followers of M. Kemal and his new regime and define them as a “security for secularism” since the emergence of Alevism in public spheres. In a newspaper series on Alevism, various Alevi leaders make statements in this line (Cumhuriyet April 7 1995). According to one of the well-known Alevi writer, Cemal Şener,

Philosophy of Alevism is secular. Reaching the present, the Alevi saints' messages are liberated, egalitarian and secular. In Alevism, nobody tries to impose religion or belief to other. Exclusion or offense toward non-Alevis is equal to jeopardizing Alevi tradition.

İzzettin Doğan argues that

The Alevi understanding of Islam is secular. The major difference between Suri Islam and Alevi Islam is secularism. Arab Islam requires religion on the basis of the state and every sphere of social life. But Alevi Islam requires reason on the base of the state.

\[^{1}\text{TBMM Tutanak Dergisi, Dönem 21, Cilt 22, Yasama Yılı 1, 43. Birleşim, 25.12.1999.}\]
HBKTD representative, Selahattin Özel, has claimed "even before the concept of secularism emerged, Alevis had lived secular." A well-known Alevi writer, Çamuroğlu, argues:

None of the religion can be secular. In terms of religion-state or religion-political power relationships Alevis are secular, because Alevis do not want political power or Alevi state.

There is a recent tendency to incorporate environmentalism into Alevism discourse (see Birdoğan 1998). The existence of earth, water and tree cults and poems written the major Alevi poets and minstrels are thought as proofs that Alevis have been environmentalists for centuries.

5.2. Desecretization: Alevism as an Emergent Public Religion

The desecretization process of Alevism has various components, each of which deserves close attention. This section begins with an examination of the publication activities of Alevis through which oral traditions are being transformed into written ones. It continues with an examination of the emergence of special buildings as official centers of Alevism and of the discourse of cem ceremonies and Alevi festivals. The final part of this section discusses music as a driving force of the Alevi movement.

Alevism is in the process of being transformed from a centuries-old secret religious creed into a public religion. It has been formalized through scripturalization of oral tradition as well as the opening up of secret religious gatherings to others. Making Alevism public appears as an irreversible process. One may argue that Alevism cannot be the old Alevism anymore. It is in the making and unmaking of a new definition and formation within a complex interplay of multiple actors.

The project to (re)construct Alevism in publics proceeded through the associational and publication activities as well as through material culture and performances in publics. This (re)structuralization continues in public political realm,
where Alevism is blended with various political trajectories.

Alevism’s entrance into the public sphere offers an empirical case for Casanova’s theory of a “deprivatization of religion” which refers to

the process whereby religion abandons its assigned place in the private sphere and enters the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society to take part in the ongoing process of contestation, discursive legitimation, and redrawing of the boundaries (Casanova 1994: 65-66).

By entering into public, Alevism is re-establishing itself through print and electronic media, associational activities and opening up its secret rituals, cem ceremonies, into others. As every nation finds itself in a need to have a flag and a national anthem in order to be recognized as a nation in the international arena, every religion is expected to have a catechism and sacred texts, such as the Bible or the Koran, an official space to worship, such as a church or a temple, and a special day of the week for religious gatherings, such as Sunday mass, Sabbath, or Friday prayers. According to these expectations of what constitutes a proper religion, Alevis try to establish Alevism as a public religion by fulfilling these requirements.

5.2.1. Oral to Written

The publication activities to transform the oral tradition of Alevism into written texts have been the major step in the formalization of Alevism as a public religion. Traditionally, dedes had a monopoly over esoteric knowledge and taught the “way” and “rites” of Alevism exclusively to their talips. In the transformation from oral tradition to written texts, dedes have almost no role. People, who are fixing knowledge in this
transformation are educated Alevi writers, known as Alevi intellectuals in public. Unlike dedes, the majority of these writers do not belong to the holy lineages.

When migration led to a transformation of the social organization of Alevi communities, older traditions were discontinued. The "recovering past" is in process now. This goes parallel with the "remembering" as a well as the "making up" of tradition and history. Oral tradition consists of information existing in memory oral traditions have a part to play in the reconstruction of the past (Vansina 1985). One channel of this is a scripturalization of oral tradition. Several scholars have treated oral tradition as a source of history (Thompson 1978; Tonkin 1992; Vansina 1985).

There are now classical studies carried out by Goody (1977, 1987, 2000), Ong (1982), and Vansina (1985) on individual oral traditions and oral texts. Making a clear distinction between literate and illiterate societies, these studies have committed to show processes by which these oral traditions and oral transcripts are committed to writing. However, there are not many studies demonstrating the scripturalization of a religion based on oral tradition.

Scripturalization refers to a process through which oral traditions are transformed into written ones (Olsson, 1998). Scripturalization is part of the process of "desecretizing" a religious creed, whose core elements have been mysticism and secrecy. This process desecretized and demystified the esoteric and mystic core elements of the Alevi tradition.

Except the Buyrük (Command) written by the sixth Imam Cafer-i Sadık, Alevi
had no religious books or writings, and no catechism or literate to facilitate the study of their religious systems (Moosa 1988). Although the Buyruk was transformed into a written text as early as the 16th century, this did not change the predominantly oral character of the religious tradition. This was due to the fact that the catechisms were still on the hands of dedes who used them only in situations of strictly personal instruction (Olsson 1998). The Buyruk catechisms were hand written in Arabic and in the possession of dedes. As a result of migration, a few publication activities emerged in Ankara and Istanbul among Alevi. The Buyruk was published in the Latin alphabet in 1958. At the time it did not reach a wide circle, due to the fact that migration from rural to urban areas was still in its early stage. Alevi began to migrate to cities in the early 1950s. The late 1950s and the 1960s were the most painful period of the migration process. Alevi were coping to adapt to the city environment and just began to interact with the mainstream society (the majority Sunni and the state) and not yet ready to deal with the publication activities both in terms of intellectual and financial resources. This shows that it is not only about publishing a book but also having the audiences interested in receiving it. The explosion of books on Alevism started not before Şener's book on Alevism in 1989. It is only since then that hundreds of books, some of which reached ten editions, have been widely circulated and published in big numbers.

The concepts of "hidden" and "public transcripts" formulated by Scott (1990) are helpful to evaluate this process. By "hidden transcripts" he refers to "the discourse that takes place 'offstage,' beyond the direct observation by powerholders" (Scott: 1990: 4);
by "public transcripts" he refers to open interaction between powerholders and subordinates (p. 2). The texts written by Alevi writers desecretized the "hidden transcripts" of Alevism. The creed that had been only orally transmitted at ritual setting and was accessible only to initiated community member, have been transformed into "public transcripts," which can be read by anyone, who is interested in these texts.

The process of scripturalization of Alevism can be evaluated as an attempt to create an Alevi theology (Ataseven 1997; Bilici 1998; Bozkurt 1998; Çamuroğlu 1997; Olsson 1998; Vorhoff 1998). Books written by Alevi writers constituted the first wave in the scripturalization of Alevi tradition. Frankly speaking, these books are popular books not scholarly works. Written by the newly emerged Alevi elite, these texts were not based on fieldwork or on use of the Ottoman archives (Vorhoff 1998) and are not academic works (Olsson 1998). The goal was to bring a "quick fix" Alevism and historization of an Alevi identity and tradition to launch a public debate.

Then, with the opening of cemevis and re-opening of old dervish lodges, a need for a catechism emerged. An increasing number of Alevis takes part in cem ceremonies and seem ready to accept catechism books. This led to the publication of Buçkay and Menakibnames (legendary life stories of holy men) in large numbers, in addition to the many new books on rituals, holy places, holy days, and festivities. Catechisms and textbooks have provided "flat statements that told straight-forwardly and inclusively how matters stood in a given field," in contrast to the "oral cultures and of residually oral manuscript cultures tend to be of a proverbial sort, presenting not 'facts' but rather
reflections, often a gnomic kind, inviting further reflection by the paradoxes they involved” (Ong 1982: 134).

This scripturalization process led a formalization, a fixing of tradition in order to make it unquestionable. Belief fixation brings a series of questions dealing with “the acquisitions of different concepts, the process of persuasion, the memorization, and transmission of particular items of knowledge” (Boyer 1994). It involves the process of standardization by reducing the differences that emerged out of the transmission interpretation of orally inherited transcripts. But on the other hand because this scripturalization process occur in public, various actors want to involve in this process. The texts are not based on academic standards but serve political goals and reflect ideological values.

Sunni conservative authors wrote books on Alevism. With a Turkish-Islamic synthesis in their mind, they defined Alevis as pure Turkish folks coming from Central Asia (see Eröz 1990, 1992; Fülah 1990, Sezgin 1991). They regard the patron saint, Hacı Bektaş, as an agent of the Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia Taking a paternalistic attitude, the Sunni authors portrayed Alevis as illiterate and naive rural folks who could not reach learned Islam and deviated from the right path. One of them, Abdülkadir Sezgin, DiB’s chief inspector, has stated “Alevism belongs to the countryside. For this reason it is weaker than urban culture. It is weak in education, theology, and culture.” For many Sunni authors, Alevis should learn Koran and follow

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Islamic pillars, such as fasting during Ramadan, refusing to drink alcohol and so on. If Alevi would follow the pillars of Islam, the difference between Alevi and Sunni would disappear (see Sezgin 1998; Türkdoğan 1995). A significant number of Alevi publications assumes that Alevism is a mixture of pre-Islamic Shamanistic rituals of Turcoman nomads, who accepted Islam in their migration path from Central Asia to Asia Minor.

The high dosage of Turkishness displayed by those interpretations of Alevism is not welcomed by Alevi of Kurdish origin. They presented a different thesis to reject this assimilation. In their definition, Alevism is a product of Kurdish civilization, because Alevism has emerged out of Zoroastrianism, the early religion of Kurds (see Bayrak 1997; Bender 1995; Bulut 1997; Xemgin 1995). Books, periodicals, public discussions, panels, and festivals became the battlegrounds where the divergent definitions compete. They are sites of a struggle over the ownership of the past.

The scripturalization of Alevi oral tradition is one way of reactivating the collective memory of Alevi communities. In order to keep religion alive in the eyes of its adherents, religious groups symbolically produce and reproduce themselves through the work of memory that sustains their self-definition (Hervieu-Lerger 1998). Because not all events live in memory and contemporary events registration is always the baseline for the traces left in the history by any present instant, the story of the past is always a selective account of the actual sequence of events, not a random selection (Hastrup 1992: 9).
5.2.2. Alevi Sites: Dergahs, Tombs, and Cemevis

The formalization of Alevism also involves official religious center to practice religion, comparable to a church or a temple. Recently emerged cemevis, re-opened dervish lodges, and tombs have become formal spaces to practice Alevi rituals. In that way, Alevism became transformed into a “congressional” religion. The emergence of “görevli dede” (dede on duty) is related to this formalization. Traditionally, a dede is in charge of overseeing a number of villages and of meeting with his talips to conduct a cem ceremony at least once in a year.

The dervish lodges, which had been deserted for a long time, and the tombs of the saints, which had occasionally visited in the past, became sacred spaces where Alevis perform religious rituals. The use and value of saints are closely connected with the memory of the saints (Goody 2000). The Şahkulu and Karacaahmet lodges are the most frequented centers for Alevis in İstanbul. Practicing cem, sacrifice, food preparation of sacrificed animals (kurban and lokma) are the major activities that attract Alevis to these places. Seminars and courses are available on Alevi and Bektashi culture and history, as well as saz and semah courses for the youth. An increasing number of Alevis prefers to have the funeral and burial preparation services in these centers.

Over the weekends thousands of Alevis rush to cem ceremonies held in these two major centers and share communal meal prepared out of sacrificed animals. The Şahkulu has been turned into the major center for those who want to record cem ceremony for print or visual media as well as for researcher. It is a very usual scene that researchers
observe cem held over the weekend at the Şahkulu. Several commercial TV channels have also recorded and broadcast cem ceremonies held in this center.

The meaning of cem ceremony is not the same for all actors. It could be a pure religious act or an exotic ritual to watch. To make this point clear, I would like to give an example from the field. In the Şahkulu dergah, while I was interviewing several Alevi leaders in the protocol room, a man in his late thirties came with a friend. He said his friend was a guest from the German Embassy and curious about the Alevi community. The dialogue between the president of the Şahkulu and the person had come with his German friend, illustrates how the meaning of cem ceremony can change from one person to another and how it is being controlled and negotiated from dialogue to dialogue (R for the man and H for the president).

R: We would like to watch the cem. Has it begun?
H: Cem was locked [cem kilitlendi]
R: Oh, but we won’t stay long, just for fifteen minutes, then we will leave.
H: But the cem is already locked.

Lütфи Kaleli, a famous Alevi leader and author, who was among those in the room, was disturbed by R’s insistence on entering the cem and said “didn’t you hear what she said? Cem is locked. That means nobody is allowed to be in after that.” In his mind a member

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A large room with 12 windows and furnished as an old wealthy Anatolian village room. The important guests such as deputies, mayor, Alevi leaders, writers etc. are hosted in this room.

10The president was Hüsnüye Tokmaz, whom I will give more information in the section of the role of women. She was among the few Alevi women I had met during my fieldwork.

11The meaning of cem was locked or cem is united [cem birlendi] is that after that point nobody is taken in.
of Alevi community was supposed to know what “the cem was locked” meant. He was not supposed to insist to enter the cem to show it to a friend. For some Alevis cem is a holy ceremony, for others it is a folkloric spectacle. Depending on how it viewed, it is appropriate or not, to enter and show it to friends after its start.

Before going into the details of cem ritual, it is necessary to discuss the commodification of Alevi culture as another aspect of the opening of lodges. Both Şahkulu and Karacaahmet lodges have stores selling books, journals on Alevism, cassettes and CDs of major Alevi minstrel and musicians, rosettes, framed pictures of major Alevi historical figures, house accessories in shape of zülfikar sword, trays, plates having Alevi symbols on, calendars and watches with the twelve Imams’ names in the place of digits. Another aspect of commodification is related to the cem ceremony, which usually requires sacrifice animal and food preparation to share at the end of cem ceremony. This led to the emergence of a new market for sacrifice animals (as well as related food to prepare communal meal) near dergahs and cemevis. For example, in a five meters distance to the Şahkulu’s door, a bunch of sheep is waiting to be purchased for subsequent sacrifice. Commodification has brought a market and a struggle over it. Especially in big center like Şahkulu and Karacaahmet, where over 1000 people are visiting over weekends the market is not small. The struggle over selling “Alevi products” is also clear in terms of whose books or whose products would be sold in the

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12 Meat is meat prepared from the sacrificed animal, usually sheep, and pilaf prepared with bulgur (a grain made out of wheat).
stores of these re-opened lodges. During my fieldwork at Şahkulu, after he had learnt that a new executive council was elected, the person providing cassettes for the Şahkulu's store said "I wonder whether the new executive council would continue to get cassettes from me." From this example, one can make an argument that the control over lodges also means control over whose products, books or periodicals are allowed to be sold in these lodges.

5.2. 3. The Spectaculization of Ğem Ceremony

The Ğem ceremony is at the center of the Alevi creed. The disclosure of Ğem ceremonies is a central aspect in the transformation from a secret to a public religion. Cumhuriyet was the first newspaper describing a Ğem ceremony, which was held in Malatya, in its series on Alevism in 1989 (Cumhuriyet February 8-9 1989). Other newspaper followed; commercial Turkish TV channels have also featured Ğem ceremonies. Even the Med-TV of Kurds broadcast in Europe (mostly watched by Kurds in Germany) featured a live Ğem ceremony. At the beginning the sport halls and conference rooms hosted the Ğem ceremonies in the urban centers. These ceremonies were attended by hundreds or thousands of Alevis. Then, Ğemevis emerged in the major cities and lodges were re-opened and became new spaces for Ğem rituals.

As Ğemevis mushroomed in the large urban centers of Turkey (and abroad), regional differences in practicing Ğem have emerged. This was discusses in the “Anadolu

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İnanç Önderleri Toplantısı” (Anatolian Belief Leaders Meeting), organized by the Cem Vakfı on 16-19 October 1998 (Cem 1998, 84: 12-20) and on 13-14 May 2000.

Approximately 700 dedes, babas, minstrels from all over Turkey and various European countries attended the meeting. A cem ceremony was held on the second night of the symposium. Positions of dedes and cemevis were discussed. It was decided that a common form of cem ceremony had to be formalized and a council of dedes had to be formed in each city. The EAUF’s council of dedes prepared a written “cem ceremony sequence” that must be followed by all dedes belonging to the EAUF’s associations.

The books written by Alevi writers are part of the attempts to codify the way a cem ceremony is practiced among Alevis. The explanations and sequences of a cem ceremony appear in Alevi periodicals, brochures published by associations as well as Alevi calendars. I will give a short summary of a cem ceremony as described in books written by Alevi writers.14

Traditionally cem ceremonies are held at various occasions, such as for the initiation of a community member into the Alevi way, the initiation of two married couples into musahiplik or yol kardeşliği (comradeship or siblingship of the way), upon the request of a community member to be judged for his/her deeds of the past year before the community (görgü [to be seen]), celebration and commemorating of holy days such as

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14These texts reflect the regional differences in practicing cem ritual. The following account tries to summarize the main features shared by most of the regional traditions in order to provide the reader with a brief idea of a cem ceremony. The texts used in this summary are written by Birdoğan (1990), Şener (1997), M. Yaman (1998), and Zelyut (1990).
aşure, and holy men such as Abdal Musa, and for merely getting together for socializing and instructing the young in the Alevi way and rites (muhabbet [conversation]). Cem is always held after dark and continues to early morning. It is usually held during winter and most preferably on a Thursday night. The cem ceremony is held in any house that has a room big enough for the performance of ceremony. In a cem ceremony, all participants know each other, outsiders are not allowed in this ritual.

The cem ceremony is led by a dede who belongs to a holy lineage. The dede, who is responsible for a set of villages, has to visit every year these villages and conduct cem to teach the Alevi way. Dedes are the spiritual leaders of Alevi communities and have the monopoly over the esoteric knowledge and the rites of Alevis. In addition to that, they are supposed to solve disputes and maintain communal peace.

A cem ceremony is organized around performing the Oniki Hizmet (twelve services) by the Hizmet Sahibleri (the owners of the services), who are all men. The owner of the first service is the dede, Mürşit, and he is the supervisor of the ceremony. The mürşit represents Muhammad and Ali (and Hacı Bektaş Veli in the Bektaşi cem ceremony). Many dedes are also known to be poets/minstrels (aşık, ozan). They are the ones who sing the sacred musical repertoire and play the saz at ceremonies. This repertoire includes deyiş (songs of mystical love), nefes (hymns concerning the mystical experience), dîvaz or dîvâzdeh imâm (hymns in honor of the 12 imams), mersiye (laments concerning the martyrdom of the Imam Hussein at Kerbela), and miraçlama (songs about the ascension of the prophet to the divine presence). Vansina (1985)
evaluates music as one of the cues in memorizing. His argument is based on the fact that melody and rhythm provide mnemonic support used to transmit information. The musical repertoire sung at cem, function in that way. The dûvâzdeh imam, for example, involves names of Imam in order. The musical repertoire also a storage in which knowledge on Alevism is stored.

The second owner of the service appointed by the dede, is the Rehber (guide), who comes second in importance and helps the mûrşit in every step of the cem ceremony from the preparation to the end. Because the rehber represents the authority of the dede in his absence, he has to know the rites very well. The Zakir (musician), who is the third service owner, plays saz and sings deyiş, nefes, and dûvaz. The fourth service owner is the Farrâş (sweeper) who helps the rehber and does the ceremonial sweeper. The fifth is Çerağcı (candlelighter), who is responsible for lighting candles. The Pervane (moth) is responsible for the semah dancers. The Gözcü (watchman) takes care of the order of the cem and helps the rehber. The Sofrâcî (butler) is responsible for animal sacrifice, and the food brought by the participants and prepared during cem with the sacrifice meat. The Iznikci (cleaner) is responsible for the cleanliness of the place where the cem is held. The Sakal/Sucu (water bearer) is responsible for distributing water, raki (an alcoholic beverage),\textsuperscript{15} or sherbet to drink. The Peyikçî (messenger) informs villagers of the

\textsuperscript{15}Whether or not alcohol is used in cem is disputable due to regional differences. In the Central and Eastern Anatolia, alcohol is not permitted in cem ceremony. Some Alevi groups in the Aegean and Mediterranean regions use raki. The Bektaşîs used raki in their cems.
ceremony. The Bekçi (guard) is in charge of the cem’s security.¹⁶

In the cem setting, participants are sitting in a circle facing the dede and the zakir. The center of room needs to be vacant to as wide an extent as for the semah dance and other ceremonial tasks. A post (sheepskin) is put in the center of the room. The sheepskin symbolizes the position of Muhammad, Ali, and Hacı Bektaş. The dede is the first to enter the room where the cem is held. He then prays and places himself on the post. Sitting on the post means that his position is the highest. Then each service owners and community members enter the room by making niyaz, a ritualistic prostration before the dede. The dede recites a prayer for each service owner. After that the çerağci lights up the candles, and the dede begins ceremony with an opening gülbenk (prayer).

After opening ceremony, the dede recites a prayer for the sacrificed animal and food brought by the participants, musahips are initiated, sacred water is distributed, and food is prepared. During these tasks, nefes, dūvaz, deyiş are sung and semah is performed. Then the participants eat a communal meal, consisting of food prepared during ceremony and brought by the participants. After the meal, cem ceremony is ended by the dede with a closing gülbenk.

Cem ceremonies have functioned as “public courts,” where the community decides under the supervision of dede about the punishment of a community member, who conducted a crime such as adultery, stealing, divulging secret knowledge to the non-

¹⁶In some texts there is one more service called tezekar or ibrikçi (pitcher holder) who is responsible from providing water for washing hands after meal. It is mentioned when the service of bekçi is omitted or his service is added into sakka’s service.
members etc. A community member, who has engaged in actions judged as crimes by the community, is announced "düşkün." Düşküns cannot be taken to cems for a period of time determined by the dede and community. For example a man, who divorced his wife, is announced düşkün and is not permitted to the cem for seven years in some regions.
During the Ottoman period, Alevi eschewed state officials and solved their disputes in cems.

Now cem ceremonies are being held in cemevis and re-opened dervish lodges on weekends. Hundreds of Alevi can participate without knowing each other and the dede conducting the ceremony is usually the one who is available, instead of dede specific to a community. Sport halls and conference rooms are also places where cem ceremonies are being performed.

The openness of a cem ceremony to spectators reflects the "folklorization" and "culturalization" of Alevi religion. Not in all but in some occasions, a cem ceremony resembles a kind of show to be watched, instead of a religious ritual to be practiced. In the following paragraphs I narrate the cem ceremony I witnessed in Ankara.

The PSAKD organized a cem ceremony that was announced as a "show intended" "Birlik Cemi" (Unity Cem) at the Ahmet Taner Kışlalı Sport Hall, on May 20, 2000. I went to the sport hall by a minibus full of Alevi women going to the ceremony. The majority of them came for the cem and were in their thirties and up.

Inside the sport hall, huge images of Hacı Bektaş Veli and Pir Sultan Abdal were hung from the ceiling at one end of the sport hall. Between these two images names of
the victims who died in the Sivas incident were hung with a phase of Pir Sultan Abdal.

"Gelin canlar bir ola�m" (Come dear souls let's be one). In front of the huge images, a podium (about one and half meter high) was set up as a stage. The cem ceremony was held on this elevated podium. The podium’s ground was covered with traditional carpets and sitting pillows like an Anatolian village room. Cem’s performers were sitting on the podium’s ground.

The podium first hosted the opening announcement and speeches. It began at 6 PM. A speaker announced the names of the prominent attendees, including several representatives of the HADEP, Yaşar Seyman of the CHP, Haydar Yılmaz, the mayor of Çankaya district, historian Ahmet Yaşar Ocal, Servet Ünsal, several writers, and families of the victims who had died in the Sivas incident. Then, the speaker read several dozens telegram messages, including one from the vice president Mesut Yılmaz, the state minister, and various Alevi associations in Turkey and abroad. Then PSAKD’s president Ali Balkız delivered a speech pointing out the importance of secularism and democracy. Balkız also informed that it was the first time an Alevi association succeeded to get an official permission to organize cem by using the word “cem” in the application. In his speech he pointed out that Turkey was not secular. He demanded the DİB and mandatory religious courses to be outlawed.

After these speeches, the podium was left for the performers to show how a cem is practiced. There were approximately 20 performers sitting in a circle on the podium’s ground on their knees and ankles. The dede and two zakirs were in the middle of this
circle. The dede started his opening speech by praising the PSAKD’s struggle for
democracy and secularism and demanded that Aleviš should help this association by
becoming a member or by making donations. Then, he said, if audience wanted to be
part of the cem ceremony and worship with them, they should take “a formal sitting
position” (sitting on knees and ankles) and say “Allah, Allah” when they heard the names
of Ali, Hussein, and other Imams.

He recited prayers, played saz, and sang nefes, deyiş, and düvaz together with two
zakirs. Between prayers, nefes and düvaz, he delivered long speeches praising
secularism, democracy, and tolerance. He repeatedly said, “we respect Christians, Jews,
as well as non-believers.”

There were at least 20 persons recording the ceremony with video cameras and
taking pictures. The ceremony was video-projected on the opposite wall throughout the
ceremony. Not all of the cem services were performed, and those which were done in a
rather quick and symbolic fashion. The whole ceremony took an hour and half, not
including the speeches.

At the end of the cem ceremony, the dede asked “buradaki canlardan şikayeti olan
var mı?” (Has anyone a complaint on one of the souls here?). A man, a PSAKD board
member, who was not among those sitting in the podium, raised his hand and asked for
the permission to come up to the podium. The dede accepted. The man climbed up to
the podium and stood in front of all participating in cem and claimed that one of the
performers had borrowed money from him a long time ago, but had never paid it back.
The dede asked the accused to respond to the accusation. The accused acknowledged and promised to pay the money back as soon as possible. Then man, who had made the claim, announced then he would donate this money to the PSAKD. The issue was solved. This was an attempt to show how cem ceremonies functioned as a “public court” in which Alevis can solve their problems, just as in the past without going to kadıls of the Ottoman period. After that scene the dede finished the cem ceremony with a final gülbenk.

Then, the PSAKD leaders informed the dede about a question from the audience “whether this was a real cem and if they really worshipped.” Instead of giving a straight yes or no answer, the dede narrated a few short humorous stories critical of showing evidence that God existed. After this ambiguous explanation, which left the audience puzzled, the PSAKD’s semah group took the stage and performed semah dances from various regions of Turkey.

I met a dede, when I visited the Ankara Cemevleri Yaptırma ve Yaşatma Derneği (Ankara Cemevi Building and Protecting Association) one-month after this ceremony. He criticized the cem ceremony organized by the PSAKD and claimed that the dede who led that ceremony was not a real dede. His major criticism was that in this cem there was no reference to the Koran. He stated

the PSAKD should have called us for this cem ceremony. I have a group. We are invited by cemevis to perform cem. We go as a group, and perform cem for them.

His statement shows how the cem is transformed a folklore-like performance.

Now, cem ceremony becomes a space where an imagined reference to religious
tradition encounters expressions of a need to have specific identity and culture. As the central religious ritual of Alevism, expressing Alevi identity is widely understood to imply participation or attendance of cem ceremonies. The representation of cem through public ceremonies has been a part of identity construction and reassertion of Alevi identity.

5.2.4. Festivalization of Alevism: An Aşure Day at the Hüseyin Gazi Tomb

The 1990s witnessed an increasing number of Alevi cultural festivals. The celebration of holy days and holy men in the form of festival helped the construction of "Aleviness" in publics. One of the most holy days of Alevis is the aşure day. Aşure is a sweet kind of soup cooked after the 12 day fast during the Muharrem month of the Islamic calendar. I observed an aşure celebration at the Hüseyin Gazi Tomb in Ankara.

On May 6, the Hüseyin Gazi Association in cooperation with the AKKAV organized an aşure celebration at the Hüseyin Gazi Tomb, which is located at the top of a 1400 meters high hill at the outskirts of Ankara. The hill is near one of the poorest gecekondu neighborhoods of Ankara and a considerable number of gecekondu dwellers is Alevi. The majority of the attendees were families, and most people were women and children from the gecekondu around Hüseyin Gazi Hill. They came with food to eat before the aşure soup was distributed. A huge Turkish flag and a picture of M. Kemal were hung on the walls of Hüseyin Gazi Tomb. There is a small stage in the garden, where speeches were delivered, music and dance performed. The support for organizing this ceremony came from several Alevi businessmen, the district mayors of Çankaya, Mamak, and Yenimahalle and Servet Ünsal.

At the beginning of the ceremony, all the names of the ceremony’s supporters

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17Hüseyin Gazi was a gazi-warrior came to the Anatolia around tenth century. His lodge became a Bektaşı lodge in the Ottoman period.
were read. The businessmen who supported the aşure day were given plaques. One of them promised that his group of Alevi businessmen would construct a cemevi at the Hüseyin Gazi Hill. The promise got a big applause from the crowd. Then Gülağ Öz, the president of the Hüseyin Gazi Association, and araştırmacı yazar, delivered a speech. He talked about Hüseyin Gazi and defined dervish lodges as the “Turkish Schools” spreading Turkish language, Turkish culture, and İslama. He also mentioned that May 6 were the day that the “martyrs of the revolution” had been hanged. In his speech, Öz moved closer to the state by praising Turkishness, but while moving at the same time away from it when mentioning the martyrs of the revolution.

After the speeches delivered by the association leaders, the dede on duty, Hüseyin Gazi Metin, and a Bektashi Baba, Ali Sümêr, were invited at the stage to make the aşure’s prayer. First the dede prayed, then, Sümêr took out a piece of paper from his pocket and read a Bektashi prayer for aşure. Prayers followed the distribution of three giant pots of aşure, while the Alevi minstrels took the stage one by one to play nefes and deyis. A group of women performed semah dance as a minstrel sung deyis. When the minstrel finished the deyis, the women performing semah stand close together and bowed in front of him. Gülağ Öz invited Hüseyin Gazi Metin dede to pray for them. The dede prayed for the women, then gave a speech praising secularism and working class struggle. At the end, he read one of his poems. The poem had some anti-mosque and anti-Sunni

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18 Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan, the members of revolutionary leftist organization, People’s Liberation Army of Turkey led by Deniz Gezmiş, were executed in Ankara on May 6, 1972. They were executed for kidnapping four United States military men. Under normal conditions their crimes could have get ten to twelve years sentence, but under the harsh military rule hostile to every manifestation of the left the penalty became capital punishment. The main argument was that this was a revenge for the execution of three DP leaders—Adnan Menderes, Refik Koraltan, and Rüstü Zorlu by the Military Coup of the 1960. Generally the martyrs of the revolution refers to those who died in the leftist socialist struggle.

19 Hüseyin Gazi Metin is a retired worker. He worked in the state run Divriği Iron and Strain Mines for many year and participated in the organized strikes as an active trade union member.
sentiments. Gülağ Öz came to the stage immediately and announced that these were the
dede’s ideas not those of the Hüseyin Gazi Association. He said “we respect both
mosque and cemevi.” The tension that surfaced in this episode illustrates how Alevi
festivals are a contested terrain, in which struggles over the meaning of Alevism are
carried out.

The number of cultural festivals organized around local saints and at the villages
and towns of their origins has increased as a way of coming together and celebrating
“common roots.” Another widespread forms of cultural festivals are organized by the
immigrants visiting their villages and towns to celebrate their origins. These festivities
are organized in the large urban centers and held in the village or town of origin. I would
like to demonstrate this with an example, the Hüseyin Abdal Festivities of Çamışlı.

In the second half of the 90s, the president of Çamışlı Association in Ankara,
Ismail Metin, a lawyer son of an immigrant from Çamışlı, initiated the project to have an
annual festival for Hüseyin Abdal, the legendary ancestor of people from Çamışlı.
Çamışlı is composed of nine dede villages, who are all said to have derived from the
lineage of Hüseyin Abdal. The lodge of Hüseyin Abdal, his buried site, is in the village
of Tekke, just outside of Çamışlı region. Ismail Metin had gotten the consent from the
nine villages and arranged all the legal requirements to transport the remnants of Hüseyin
Abdal and his wife to Çamışlı. Their remnants were taken from the lodge in Tekke
village and brought to be reburied in the sacred hill of Çamışlı, Gödükli. Since 1997, an
annual festival, the Çamışlı Hüseyin Abdal Festival is held on this hill. Not the Çamışıh
villagers, but migrants living in Ankara decide the date of the festival and its program.
Festival attendees from Ankara, Izmir and Istanbul, as well as from the European
diaspora try to arrange their holiday according to this festival date. It is a festival to
celebrate common roots, solidarity, and belongingness. In the first day of the festival all
nine villages of Çamşılı come together in Gödüklü to commemorate Hüseyin Abdal, their ancestor. The attendees sacrifice animals for him and a meal is eaten communally. Speeches about the life story of Hüseyin Abdal, his personality, and his activities are being delivered. Minstrels coming from various parts of central and eastern Anatolia play lute. The majority of participants travel from various urban centers in Turkey and Western Europe for an opportunity to see each other, and eat and drink together.

5.2.5. Music as Driving Force

Communicative praxis entails not only verbal discourse but also emotions, feelings and styles. Music invested with feelings is an important force for drawing people into movement. Eyerman and Jamison (1995) have pointed out the centrality of singers and songs for the social movement of the 1960s. In this respect, they argue that songs “may be central to all social movements in their formative stages” (p. 451). Alevi musicians and minstrels playing Alevi music emerged out of religious context played significant role in the revival of Alevism. As a prominent Alevi musician, Yavuz Top, stated “at the beginning of the movement, Alevi associations worked as a bureau for concerts” (Cumhuriyet July 30 1998). Music played a crucial device that strengthened Alevi community and social solidarity. Alevi ideals were expressed and communicated through the power of music.

The saz is the main instrument of Turkish folk music. Alevi attach a sacred significance to the saz, which is an indispensable part of cem ceremonies. Saz is the “telli Kuran” (stringed Koran) for them. The majority of songs played with the saz comes out of religious contexts and has been played originally in cem ceremony. Now they are being played at concerts and increasingly featured on the national TV.

In demonstrations and commemorations of the Sivas incident young Alevis hold their sazs up with their two hands. In that way they were saying, “we resist to die,” “we
resist to die with our saz, with our tradition.” Pir Sultan was a folk poet hanged by the Ottoman State for his rebellion. Those commemorating him were attacked by the fundamentalists leaving 37 deaths behind. In both cases, Alevi songs, dances and tradition were attacked. In the eyes of Alevis, their saz expressing their ideals wanted to be silent. In a festival organized by the AABF in Cologne, Alevis were holding their sazs up. The festival, Bin Yıllın Türküsü [The Saga of the Millenium] organized with a slogan “one thousand saz players, one thousand semah dancers.” It hosted major Alevi musicians and minstrels from Turkey. Playing the saz and holding the saz up in a concert in Cologne has been an integral part of identity construction, expression and affirmation. Both in Turkey and in Europe, young Alevis have filled the saz and semah courses organized by re-opened lodges and associations. The saz is transformed into a symbol of identity and resistance.

Although the migration process had brought the major well-known Alevi minstrels and musicians into large urban centers since the 1950s, the real explosion of Alevi music occurred in the 80s and 90s. In the earlier years, Alevi music was not welcomed and Alevi minstrels and musicians could not easily secure positions as a staff radio artist in the state run radio (later on TV) station in the sixties and seventies (Markoff 1986). But urbanization process provided opportunities for Alevi performances at both sacred and secular functions. In earlier years, sacred repertoire music, such as deyiş and dûvaz, had been forbidden outside the bounds of ritual, while public performances have sometimes witnessed the inclusion of ritual semah dance accompanied by saz music. Alevi musicians and minstrels have taken Alevi music to Europe since the 1960s, Feyzullah Çınar, Ali Ekber Çiçek, and Nesimi Çimen, the prominent minstrels and musicians, traveled to Europe with their music.

A series of cassettes, “Muhabet” (divine conversation) emerged in early 1980s
and can be seen as the first step toward the visibility of Alevi cultural elements in publics. In Muhabet series three prominent Alevi musicians of Turkey, Arif Sağ, Muhlis Akarsu,\(^{20}\) and Musa Erőglu (later on Yavuz Top joined them) played deyiş, düvaz, and nefes, which were all part of sacred musical repertoire traditionally played only at cem.

An explosion of folk music has occurred in the 1990s with newly opened cafe-bars where saz players sing folk music. Some of these bars are known as “Alevi bars,” where saz players sing Alevi music as customers perform semah dance. In this period, thousands of cassettes and CDs with Alevi musicians have been sold. Alevis as well as Sunnis purchase these CDs of Alevi musicians and minstrels.

Both in Turkey and Europe, the explosion of concerts by Alevi minstrels and musicians marked the 1990s. Especially between 1993-1996, almost every week an Alevi association of Germany invited Alevi minstrels and musicians. These musicians are the indispensable actors of “culture weeks,” during which immigrant groups present their culture.

The prominent Alevi minstrels and musicians began to play at internationally known concert halls and at the well-known European music festivals. For example Arif Sağ, Musa Erőglu, Mahsuni Şerif, Ali Ekber Çiçek gave a concert at the Berlin Philharmonie’s great hall on December 1, 1996. Sabahat Akkiraz, an Alevi musician performing Alevi nefes and düvaz, has participated in the London Jazz Festival since 1998. On December 3 2000, Arif Sağ and Erdal Erzincan gave a concert in New York City. When Erzincan began to touch the strings, he got an overwhelming applause from the audience. When, Arif Sağ, one of the most prominent masters of the saz from Turkey took the stage, the audience stood up and gave him a long-lasting applause. Again, at the

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\(^{20}\)Muhlis Akarsu and his wife died in the Sivas incident of 1993.
very first touch of the saz, the crowd gave an overwhelming applause to show their appreciation of the fact that Alevi music was played even in the USA.

5.3. Formalizing Alevism in Europe

The flows of Alevi minstrels and musicians, Alevi association leaders, intellectuals and dedes to Germany have impacted on the formalization of Alevism in Europe. The associational leaders of Europe have frequently traveled to Turkey to share their associational experience and to participate in meetings and festivals. As a result of this two-way flow, cross-fertilization has continued in the transformation of Alevism in national and transnational social spaces.

The major step toward institutionalized forms of knowledge on Alevism has been taken not in Turkey but in Europe, especially in Germany. Three Alevi institutes aiming at producing and fixing knowledge on Alevism and Bektaşism are located in Germany, compared to none in Turkey. These are: the European Alevi Academy in Cologne, the Alevi-Bektaşı Institute in Mannheim, and the Alevi Way and Rite Institute in Bielefeld. The foundation of an Alevi Bektaşı Institute at Strasbourg University, France, is in process.

The EAUF has been the first associational model that has a “council of dedes” functioned as an official authority on religious matter. The council has a significant role in formalizing Alevi religious practices. For example the council has formulated a written “sequence of cem,” after a five days long meeting among dedes living in Europe. The formulated sequence of cem was published in the monthly journal of the EAUF, as well as in its calendar. In that way, how to conduct cem ceremony had become standardized. It has taken an official form. The council of dedes of the AABF also prepares an annual list of sacred days of the year and provides information on what to do in those days. The list has been publicized by the monthly journal of the AABF.
Alevi immigrants have also begun to construct cemevis from the ground. A four-floor cemevi has been constructed in Augsburg as the first cemevi constructed from the ground in Europe. The Augsburg cemevi was announced as the “Millenyumun Dergahi,” (lodge of millenium) (*Alevilerin Sesi*, October 2000, 39: 5-7). The architecture of the building features symbols and traditional motifs of Alevism and Bektaşısm.

The major development on the way of formalizing Alevism has been the acquisition of the right to teach Alevism as a course in public schools in two federal states of Germany, Berlin and Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW). After the Islam Federation applied to teach Islam as a course in public schools for Muslim immigrants children, the AABF also acted on that and applied to teach Alevism in public schools by claiming that they have a different interpretation of Islam. After acquiring the right to teach Alevism as a course in the public schools of these two states, a textbook for the Alevism course was published and used in the pilot schools, where Alevism course begun in NRW.

The AABF has applied to every federal state of Germany for the right to teach Alevism as a course in public schools. The opportunity to teach Alevism as a religion course provided by Germany, has united long-term enemies-like associations, the AABF the FEK and the Cem Vakfı’s European Coordinate. These three associations reached a consensus to act together in the issue of teaching Alevism in public schools of Germany. İsmail Kaplan, an executive member of the AABF and general editor of its monthly journal informed,

> teaching Alevi course in public schools of Germany, will be the biggest success of Alevi associational activities. In that way Alevi associations will be information centers for schools and Alevism will be a part of this society [German]. These courses will bring the issues of teaching Alevism in Turkey...at least, by constituting an example, courses on Alevism will be given in Turkey too.\(^{21}\)

\(^{21}\)Interview with İsmail Kaplan of Cologne in an e-mail corresposndence on November 23, 2000.
Although the AABF has gained the right to teach Alevism as a course in two federal states of Germany, there has not been a clear attitude toward how to teach Alevism. In that sense, the meeting of the education council of the AABF was a significant event.\textsuperscript{22} There were a couple of models to teach Alevism. One of them was to teach Alevism inside of the Islam course. This model was formulated, because the Islam Federation started its action to teach Islam in the German public schools earlier. At the beginning, the AABF representatives participated in their meetings to see if they could work together. However, the education council unanimously rejected the idea of teaching Alevism inside the course of Islam prepared by the Sunni groups. A council member suggested that instead of calling the “Alevism Religion Course,” they must use the term, “Alevism Teaching.” Another member responded by stating “if the dimension of religious belief were taken out, the German state would not have given us the right to teach Alevism in public schools.” The claim the AABF made to get the right to teach Alevism, was that Alevis have religious practices different to those of Sunnis. So their beliefs should be available for their children in public schools. This instigated a discussion on how to define Alevism as culture or religion. Several members argued that Alevism was not religion but culture. A member reacted and asked:

What do we mean by culture? There are various cultures, such as a socialist culture, postmodern culture. In my opinion we should approach Alevism as a belief system. The problem is that we do no have institutions.

Then, a member stated,

if we say “Alevis is this or that, we destroy the beauty of Alevism, we lose some aspects. Sunnis and Shiites can come together and give a lecture on religion but we cannot do that. This is impossible. We do not have to put Alevism inside or outside of Islam, when

\textsuperscript{22}the AABF’s council of education held a meeting to discuss how to teach Alevism in public schools on June 6, 2000 in Cologne. The following information based on my participant observation on that meeting.
we write we should careful about that. We should find methods protecting the independence of Alevism.

The real problem was how to teach Alevism in the school setting. Alevism had never been taught in that way. It is a master to disciple teaching at special gatherings and solely for adults, not for children. One member stated that the real problem was how to teach the mystic side of Alevism to students. Ismail Kaplan, a member of the education council stated that they faced lots of problems in teaching Alevism, because for the first time Alevism had to be taught in the form of a course for youngsters. Regarding which language this course should be taught, the council agreed that it would be taught in German, because children knew German better than Turkish. Teaching Alevism in German prevented a possible conflict with Kurdish Alevis who could have objected the use of Turkish.

The question of who might write the textbooks for the Alevism course brought the discussion on who knew Alevism better. A council member claimed that old generation did not know Alevism. This claim is especially remarkable when considering that Alevism used to be an oral tradition. The AAA was supposed to prepare the textbooks but was unable to do so. Thus, AABF education council decided to pay anyone either an Alevi writer or a scholar for the preparation of a textbook as soon as possible.

The discussions in Germany did not bring a consensus on what Alevism was, how to teach it, who had the best knowledge on Alevism, who might write textbooks. The reluctance of accepting Alevism as a religion contradicted the idea of teaching Alevism as
a religion. Teaching Alevism as a course had emerged when the Federation of Islam got the right to teach Islam in public schools in the state of Berlin. The Alevi associations seemed to be not ready for teaching Alevism. Those who discussed how to teach Alevism were the AABF’s leading members. To what extent they represent all Alevis living in Germany is of course open to discussion.

Germany has officially recognized Alevism as a legitimate identity and given Alevis the right to teach Alevism in public schools since the notion of “multiculturalism” became state policy. The chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, sent a telegram message to the festival, the Bin Yılın Türküsü” (Saga of the Millenium) organized by the AABF. In the message he pointed out that Alevis were presenting music and dance, which were important parts of their beliefs. He welcomed the festival and saw in it a multicultural program that allowed people of different religions and cultures could to come together and enter into a dialogue (Bin Yıllın Türküsü Festival Katalogu May 2000: 6).

Now, Alevism is officially recognized outside of traditional territory as the German state has provided the right to teach Alevism in its public schools. The next section examines the role of women in the transformation of Alevism.

5.4. The role of Women: Existence in Discourse versus Absence in Practice

The actual role of women in Alevi movement contradicts the representation of women in the discourses of Alevism. All Alevi writers and leaders argue, without exception, that Alevi women have a highly respectful and liberal position within the Alevi tradition. They avoid discussing that all dedes are men as the position is passed over from father to son, and that the owners of the twelve services of the cem are all

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males too. Alevi leaders and writers make frequently the following arguments: In the thirteenth century, the patron saint Hacı Bektâş said “educate your women” and “societies who do not educate their women cannot progress,” since then, women have a high position in the Alevi tradition; women participate in cem ceremonies next to men, there is no segregation; Alevi women are more liberal and not as restricted as Sunni women, who are forced to use veil and accept other derogatory roles that Islamists defend; Alevi women are more up front in education, profession and so on. The marriage practice within the Alevi tradition is also evaluated as respectful and protective of women. A man is allowed to have only one wife, and divorce is not permitted under any circumstances. A man who divorced his wife cannot participate in cem for a certain period of time, he is pronounced “düşkün.” The earlier writings of western travelers and missionaries in Asia Minor had indeed pointed out how they were surprised by the freedom of Kızılbaş women and their appearance in public, even foreign male guests visiting their houses (see Dunmore 1858; Grenard 1904; Molyneux-Seel 1914).

Previous fieldwork conducted in the gecekondu neighborhoods of Ankara demonstrated that Sunni residents supported traditional gender role more strongly than Alevis and Alevi women were relatively more powerful in the decision making processes in the household and less restricted in their ways of dressing (Acar 1993; Erman 1998; Güneş-Ayata 1990, 1992). Alevi women disregarded the Islamic way of dressing and tended to enter every sphere of public life, had led Sunnis to perceive Alevi women as dishonorable (Güneş-Ayata 1992). The same is evident among immigrant groups in Germany, where many women of Anatolia origin express their ethnic religious identity through their dress. Sunnis may remark Alevis “their women do not cover their heads” (Wilpert 1988).

In contrast to these findings, Alevi women are not a forefront of the recent Alevi
movement. Without exception, all Alevi writers and association leaders are men. Public Alevi figures appearing on media as spokesperson of Alevis are all men. The idealization of Alevi women as “free” and “equal” in discourse is not reflected in practice.

During my fieldwork, I visited various Alevi associations but met very few women active in the leading level both in Turkey and Germany. In this regard, the first General Congress of ABTM is striking. In the congress, there were 50 representatives of Alevi associations from all over Turkey and abroad, but all were men. As a result all the members of the executive board were men too. The institution claiming to represent all Alevis had not Alevi women. The lack of women in the restructuring of Alevism is also evident in the Anatolian Belief Leaders Meetings organized by the Cem Vakfi in 1998 and 2000. Approximately 700 Alevi dedes, minstrels, writers and representatives from various associations participated, and almost all of them were men. In these meetings, the position of dedes and cemevis and the organization of cem ceremonies were discussed, but without the voice of Alevi women.

Since recently Alevi associations began to form women branches in their organizations. The AABF was the first to initiate women branches, and then major Alevi associations of Turkey followed this model in the recent years. What I observed during my fieldwork was that women seem to participate in more traditional celebration such as cem, asure, and visiting tombs of holy men and participating in ceremonies in the honor of these holy men. Lütfi Kaleli defined the lack of women in associational activities as a “lame leg” that needs to be fixed.24

23 Most of the time I was the only woman in this two day long congress, except a few women time to time came and stayed for ten or fifteen minutes. They were most likely wives or relatives of representatives.

24 Interview with Lütfi Kaleli, May 14, 2000 Istanbul.
After giving responsibilities to women, such as housekeeping and mothering, Alevi representatives made the following arguments:

Our women are freer. Participation in associations could be low, but in education and production they affirm their roles. I don’t want to give a special reason for low level of participation in associations; if they know their roles and do not join associations, that’s their problem.²⁵

Women exist in discourse but not in practice.²⁶

Women are not seen in the modern type of dernekçilik (lt. tr. associationalism), but in traditional associational model, such as Şahkulu, Karacaahmet, Hüseyin Gazi, which are the real association model of Alevism, women participate in large number. For example approximately 2000 people come Hüseyin Gazi Tomb during weekends and 80% of them is woman.²⁷

Although it is hard to see articles or books written by Alevi women or speaking in the media on Alevism, there are a few Alevi women visible at the local level. Hüsniye Tokmaz is among the few women. She has administrated the Şahkulu for more than a year.²⁸ She has multiple affiliations to several Alevi associations of İstanbul in addition to her active role in the CHP’s Women Branch in the Kartal district. She started to take part in Alevi associational activities with an attempt to restore an old-dervish lodge that Sunnis wanted to raze and construct a mosque or an Imam Hatip High School. Tokmaz mobilized several well-known Alevi figures, including Cemal Şener, and succeeded to found an association to protect the lodge. Her activities on this issue got notice, and she was asked to get involved in the foundation of the Kartal Cemevi, where she has worked for one and half year and is now a board member. Tokmaz stated that “they [the association leaders] used me as a window dressing, due to the lack of woman. I was sent

²⁵Interview with Müsüm Doğan, April 27, 2000, Ankara.

²⁶Interview with Fevzi Gümüş, April 29, 2000, Ankara.

²⁷Interview with Gülş Öz, May 12, 2000 Ankara.

²⁸The following information is based on the interview with Hüseyin Tokmaz, May 16, 2000, Istanbul.

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to various meetings in Ankara, İzmir etc., to show that they have a woman representing their association.” With her visibly active role in the Kartal Cemevi, Tokmaz was asked to be a member of executive council of Şahkulu lodge, and almost at the same time Lütfi Kaleli proposed her to be a board member of the ABEKV. In both cases she was told “we need a woman.” She accepted to be a board member of the ABEKV. Tokmaz took part in the executive council of Şahkulu and administrated the Şahkulu for fifteen months until some internal conflicts emerged. Tokmaz now has affiliations to four Alevi associations in İstanbul, in addition to her membership to the CHP’s Kartal district. In our conversation she complained,

the highly educated Alevi women say “we don’t deal with beliefs anymore.” I think this is wrong. If there is injustice at one place, it is necessary to struggle against it. The struggle for the freedom of belief took place centuries ago in Europe, we are struggling for it now. In order to struggle for freedom in other areas, you have to struggle for the freedom of belief first. Political freedom cannot be guaranteed without freedom of beliefs. For this reason I don’t agree with these women.

Alevi women are not very visible in the associational activities abroad either. Some of the associations belonged to the AABF had woman branches. A major development to make Alevi women autonomous occurred with the foundation of the Almanya Alevi kadın Birlikleri (Germany Alevi Women Unions) (AAKB) belonged to the AABF on March 23, 1999. The foundation of the AAKB, to some extent, was due to the material interest, not the initiative of Alevi women. As Saniye Berktas, the president of the AAKB stated

in Germany, the laws give lots of money for woman and youth activities. When we went as a woman branch belonged to an association the officials did not recognize us. We thought if we could do something about this by staying loyal to AABF’s principles. On the other hand the number of women was decreasing in the associations. This was due to the fact that Alevi women could not find themselves in associations. If there is a woman in an executive council and has to ask everything to the council before she does anything, there is a problem there. From that point we developed this idea of founding autonomous AAKB. Now I think we should have asked if Alevi women were ready for this.29

29Interview with Saniye Berktas, June 9, 2000, Cologne, Germany.
Ten woman branches of Alevi associations that belonged to the AABF became members of the AAKB. If one considers that there are 89 Alevi associations belong to the AABF, Berktaş seems to be right.

In the administration of an association, it is not easy for women to present or push their ideas to the forefront. Berktaş pointed out that she once proposed to educate anas (lt. tr. mothers, ana is used to define a dede’s wife) to lead cem ceremonies. She wanted to put this in the by-laws. Her proposal got vehement criticisms and she dropped her offer. This highlights how little power women have in the restructuring of Alevism.

Having focused on the previous section of this chapter on dialogues and conflicts about the meaning of Alevism within the Alevi movement, I now expand the perspective to the main outside actors, beginning with the Turkish state.

5.5. The State Discourse: Defining Alevism for Alevis

There has been a visible change in the Turkish state’s attitude toward Alevism. In contrast to its earlier attitude, the Turkish state has overcome to acknowledge the existence of Alevism and began to recognize the rights of Alevis. The state has produced its discourse on Alevism through parliamentary discussions, through the participation in Alevi festivals and by allowing coverage in the media. Through these channels the state enters into a dialogue with Alevi activists. The state aims by and large at incorporating secularism and Turkishness into Alevism.

5.5.1: Alevism in the Parliament

Since the mid-90s, the parliamentary discussion on the DİB’s budget has brought the Alevi community into consideration. In 1996, the parliamentary discussion on the DİB budget was very critical because the DYP’s leader, Çiller, promised to give 3 trillion TL for Alevi associations from the state budget during her election campaign. When the
DYP-ANAP coalition government pronounced its DİB budget, there was nothing reserved for Alevi community in the budget as the DİB got 47 trillion 130 billion TL.

Delivering a speech on the government’s budget of the DİB, Altıkulaç, the DYP deputy, did not mention any financial support for Alevis, but discussed the issues of the representation of Alevism in the DİB and the position of cemevis.\(^{30}\) He argued that the representation of Alevism in the DİB was against the unitary aspect of Islam and the togetherness principle of the mosque. Representation of different religions in the DİB could be possible, but--because Alevis and Sunnis believe in the same god, prophet and book--the representation of Alevism in the DİB could lead to divisions among Muslims. Altıkulaç’s statement on cemevis was in the line with the position of the parties of the right. He stated that cemevis “exist in Alevi tradition” but cannot be alternatives for mosques, because mosques are for all Muslims.

After his speech, Şahin Ulusoy, the CHP deputy delivered a speech in opposition to the DİB budget. He stated that the DİB was an institution of the Sunni sect, and far way from accepting Alevi Bektashi reality. After summarizing the DİB budget as well as the money spent on religious education, he asked,

If this budget of the great religious empire [referring Sunni based DİB, Imam Hatip schools, Koranic courses] is used for another belief group, for example for Alevis and Bektasis... if only cemevis are constructed, dedes are employed and paid, and dede schools are opened...If these kind of policies are funded by taxes paid by all citizens of the Turkish Republic, isn’t it unjust for people belong to Sunni community?

Eventually, the coalition government of the ANAP-DSP allocated money for the Alevi associations in the state budget of 1998.\(^{31}\) The coalition partners proudly declared

\(^{30}\)The discussion on the 1996 DİB budget is based on the TBMM Tutanakları, Dönem 20, Cilt 3, Yasama Yılı 1, 40. Birleşim, 19.04.1996.

the allocation of money for Alevi associations in the parliamentary speeches. This was followed by a discussion about the status of cemevis.

Esat Bütün, a deputy of the ANAP, stated that some people wanted to harm the national unity and the togetherness by playing cemevis out against mosques. To him Hacı Bektaş Veli became the major source of the Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia and the saint of the janissaries, had played a major role in the foundation of the Ottoman State. He warned that, putting these realities aside and playing cemevis out against mosques would be a mistake. Yılmaz Ateş, the RPP deputy, pointed out that cemevis were not constructed against mosques. Ateş defined cemevis as cultural centers to spread a culture accepting secularism, democracy and the state of law. Several deputies also involved in the discussion argued cemevis were “lodges” and spaces where Alevi citizens choose to practice their religion.

Vehement criticism toward the government that allocated money for Alevis came from the CHP deputy, Şahin Ulusoy. He stated,

Alevis are a belief group, who interpret and practice Islam in their own way. Their worship places are cemevis, their religious officials are dedes, and their worship...is cem. neither cemevis are constructed, nor their dedes are paid by the state for this belief group...schools are not founded to educate their religious officials either. They themselves finance what their beliefs required. In spite of this sacrifice, the DİB that represents only one belief group is allocated 96 trillion TL. In addition to that, mosques pay no electricity and water, this costs about 84 trillion too...The state land is reserved to construct mosques. For the construction of the theology faculties, Imam-Hatip Lycees, as well as religious education hundreds trillion is allocated...In contrast, associations founded by Alevis are reserved 425 billion, like an alms money from the Ministry of Finance Budget. I guess Alevi associations and foundations would not accept this money. In every situation those who say “Alevis are siblings” leave this siblingship in word. When comes to sharing this is put aside.

Ulusoy continued his speech on the position of the DİB,

...If you do not want to abolish the DİB, it is okay, it should stay...but taxes collected from Jews, Christians, and other belief groups should not be canalized to this institution...From Alevis, who interpret Islam different than the DİB, money should not
be canalized to this institution either. Both Sunnis and Alevi should be equal before the state. 32

In contrast to Ulusoy's argument, the major Alevi associations decided to get the money allocated for them.

The status of cemevi is constantly debated in parliament. The parties of the right are reluctant to accept the cemevi as a worship place. Intentionally or unintentionally, they tend to evaluate cemevis in opposition to mosques. In that way, cemevis are presented as divisive to Muslims. The pro-Islamic Fazilet deputies are the most extreme in opposition to cemevis. When an Alevi deputy brought the issue of cemevis and asked financial support for them, a deputy of Fazilet replied from his seat "they [Alevi] should go to a mosque." 33

By the parties of right, the Alevi-Sunni differentiation is represented as a "new play of communism" or "an artificial difference that is planted and exaggerated by the external and internal forces trying to divide Turkey." Time to time, during the speeches glorifying Alevism delivered, tension between the parties increased. One example was a speech delivered by the DSP deputy, Süleyman Yağız 34 representing the ministry of culture. In his speech he stated

there is a deep rooted tradition of Alevi Bektaşı culture...Alevi Bektaşı culture has a very important place among our cultural values. Folk mystics, minstrels were learned people

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32 Ibid.


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The Fazilet deputies interrupted his speech many times by saying “Sunnis are living in this country too,” “talk about Sunnis for five minutes.”

5.5.2. The State Officials in Conferences on Alevism

The ministry of culture has supported a symposium organized by the HBAKV. The First International Hacı Bektaş Symposium was held at the HBVAKV in Ankara on April 27-29, 2000. In the symposium’s opening, the minister of culture, İstemihan Talay of DSP, delivered a speech. Talay stated “Alevi-Bektaşî culture is a security of our nation and democracy.” He argued that Turkish society has reached the point to accept the Alevi-Bektaşî thought “as a driving force of progress, renewal, and modernization.” Talay evaluated this as a great security for the future of Turkey. He promised that the ministry of culture would support this culture. Ecevit, the prime minister, sent a telegram message to the opening, stating “Hacı Bektaş Veli protecting the Turkish existence in Anatolia reached the highest level of Sufism and enlightened Anatolia by passing through the centuries.” In the opening, the leaders of the HBAKV also delivered speeches and demanded the abolition of mandatory religious courses and the DİB.

5.5.3. The Directorate of Religious Affairs and Alevis

Since Alevi activists started to discuss the problems and demands of Alevism, the

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36Ibid.

37Information on symposium is based on my participant observation during three day symposium.
DİB has been in the major focus of criticism. Alevi activists have publicly announced that the DİB is a state institution financed by taxes collected by all citizens of the Turkish Republic but serving only Sunnis and excluding Alevi. In response to these criticisms, the DİB held a meeting with several Alevis and the DİB officials tried to show that DİB has not excluded Alevi. The discussions and interviews with several Alevi appeared under the title, "Gündem Alevilik" (Agenda is Alevism)" in the Dİyanet Dergi, the official periodical of the DİB in 1991.38

Almost all Alevi participants were carefully selected and shown as “model Alevi” who followed the pillars of Islam. The meeting held between these Alevis and the DİB reached an agreement that “there is no Alevi-Sunni differentiation.” They all argued that like Sunnis, Alevi are Muslims accepting Islam, the prophecy of Mohammed and the Koran. A 77 years old Alevi dede, Süleyman Er informed

On the basis there is no difference [between Alevism and Sunnism]. Our religion is Islam; our book is the Koran; and our prophet is Muhammad....The difference is in details...in some historical incidents, such as...caliphate election...If we are Muslims we should follow the pillars of Islam and not do the forbidden [not drink Alcoholic beverages] (Diyane Dergisi 1992, p. 9-10).

Süleyman Er also rejected that there was no daily prayer, fasten during Ramadan and prohibition of alcohol in Alevism. He insisted that all these pillars existed in Alevism, and people, who say the opposite, have either no knowledge on Alevism, or have some other goals. For Abdülkadir Sezgin, the chief inspector of the DİB, those who have spoken and written on Alevism are not real Alevi, because they never say they are Muslim. An Alevi is a person who wants to be a good Muslim, like Ali, who was a hero in the history of Islam (p. 17).

During my fieldwork in Ankara, I met Sezgin at the HBAKV’s vice president

38Diyanet Dergisi, January 1991, vl. 12.

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Sezgin was offering Kahraman Aytaç, the vice president of the HBAKV, to organize an Ottoman Language course by the DİB at the HBAKV. In our informal conversation, Sezgin repeated his argument, which he had presented in various conferences and articles. He argued,

> those who attempted to be leaders by saying “I am an Alevi” could not read the transcripts inherited from their grandfathers and fathers, neither they made anyone to read these transcripts. Alevi youth cannot read these transcripts either. If they are able to read them, it will be clear that they are Muslims belong to Hanefi (Sunni) sect; in other world the reality that there exist no difference between Alevi and Sunni will be revealed...

In order to materialize his argument, Sezgin tried to convince Kahraman Aytaç for the Ottoman Language course, but Aytaç replied “we have a lot of problems with the DİB, it is better not to mention me to have a project with this institution.”

The DİB’s attitude toward Alevism is clear from two speeches delivered by the president of the DİB in 1994, and 1999. The DİB’s president stated in the *Turkish Daily News* on January 7 1994:

> Alevism is not a religion. Nor is it a sect of Islam. Alevism is a culture complete with its own folklore (quoted in Shankland, 1994: 251-252).

In the 75 anniversary of the DİB’s foundation, Yaşar Nuri Öztürk, the president of the DİB, strongly refused the idea of Alevis’ representation in the DİB:

> Some say Alevis should be represented in the DİB. No sect or a character can be represented in the DİB. People who accept godly messages brought by Mohammed are Muslims. The DİB serve 65 million. Ali is common value of all Muslims. There is no Alevi-Sunni but believers of godly message (*Hürriyet* March 4, 1999).

The prime minister Ecevit has also told İzzettin Doğan, that there is a strong resistance in the DİB to accept the representation of Alevism in this institution (*Milliyet* October 13, 2000).

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39May 2, 2000 HBAKV Ankara.
One recent event was intended to clarify the DİB’s position toward Alevis. The DİB organized an “International European Union Conference: The Religious Life in the Process of Entering the European Union” on May 3-7 2000. Along scholars from the West and Turkey, various representatives from the Armenian, the Assyrian and the Catholic Churches, the Jewish community, and the Vatican ambassador were invited, but no single Alevi leader, intellectual, or a dede. Prime minister Ecevit and the Fazilet’s leader, Recep Kutan, attended the opening along with the president of DİB.

The following section of this chapter is dedicated to an examination of the interaction between the Turkish State and the Alevi movement by taking the case of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Remembrance Celebrations as an example.

5.6. Hacı Bektaş Veli Remembrance Celebrations: Alevi Movement and the State Intersect

The major Alevi festival is the Hacı Bektaş Veli Anma Törenleri (Hacı Bektaş Veli Remembrance Celebrations), which is being celebrated every year since the Hacı Bektaş Lodge was reopened as a museum in 1964. The reopening drew a crowd of over forty thousand people and since then a ceremony is held there each year between August 16-18 to honor Hacı Bektaş Veli. Ceremonies attracted Alevis from both rural and urban areas. Starting in the 1970s academics go to the panels and lectures on the aspects of Bektasism and Hacı Bektaş Veli. The festival hosts various folklore dancers performing semah and leading minstrels are giving concerts.

During 1970s, the festival turned into a left-wing cultural festival (Bruinessen 1996, Norton 1995). The festival organization had passed from the traditional circle to younger leftists trying to insert their ideas and values into the festival. The minstrels’

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It was reported that approximately $200,000 was spent for the conference, and this demonstrated how the DİB spending its giant budget (Aktüel, 2000, vl. 460 (May 11-17): 52-56).

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songs were politicized. The Military Coup of 1980 that aimed at depoliticizing Turkish society in every dimensions and spheres also imposed the depolitization of the festival but not for a long time.

The late 1980s showed a few signs that the State wanted to get involved in the celebrations. Two of ANAP’s ministers, Hasan Celal Güzel and Ali Bozer attended the Hacı Bektaş Festivities of 1987. In 1990, the festival was overtaken by the state to make it an international festival. Alevi did not welcome the interference, especially in 1990 and 1991 when N. Kemal Zeybek, the minister of culture, who was a devoted follower of the Turkish Islamic synthesis, invited guests, who were Sunni conservatives from the DİB.

As Alevi emerge as a political constituent elected officials and politicians appear since 1994 regularly at the festival, including the president and prime minister as well as major political party leaders. All of them are trying to court the Alevi electorate by showing their “love and respect.” The festival is a cultural-political arena in which Alevi, Alevi association leaders, Alevi minstrels and musicians, top state officials, cabinet members, politicians, academics, and the media intersect.

In 1997 festivities were particularly important to show how the State perceives Alevi as a major ally in secularism, especially after the February 28 Decisions of 1997. The ANAP-DSP coalition government showed this attitude by invading the small town of Hacı Bektas during the 1997 festivities. In general, the opening ceremony that hosts the major speeches is held in the first day of festivities. In 1997, this lasted two days. President Süleyman Demirel delivered a speech during the opening ceremony of the first day. Because of the parliamentary vote on the Eight Year Mandatory Schooling Law, a major part of the battle against the Islamists, prime minister Yılmaz, deputy prime minister
Ecevit, and CHP's leader Deniz Baykal attended the festival on the second day.

Yılmaz stated before a huge Alevi crowd:

> With Mr. Ecevit, we did not come with empty hands. We brought a present. This present is the Eight Years Mandatory Schooling Law...

Then he continued

> We will make Hacı Bektaş a place to be visited 12 months and 365 days not only three days of August. We are determined to do everything it takes to make Hacı Bektaş a center of Balkan, Circassian and Anatolian Alevism. (*Milliyet* August 18, 1997).

Vice prime minister Ecevit than delivered a speech stating,

> ...to the extent mosques are ours, cemevis are ours too. It is necessary to make peace between Yavuz and Shah İsmail. (*Milliyet* August 18, 1997)

*Akit* and *Yeni Şafak*, Islamist newspapers, evaluated this state attitude, as one outcome of the 28 February Decisions imposed by the army. They questioned why the Eight-Year Mandatory Schooling Law was a gift for the Alevi community. To the Islamist media, the state aimed at curtailing Sunnism and fostering Alevism to carve out a state religion from a sect (*Akit* September 19, 1997).

During my fieldwork in Summer 1999, I attended the “36th Traditional and Tenth International Hacı Bektaş Veli Remembrance Celebrations.” Phases attributed to Hacı Bektaş Veli were strung up along the streets of the Hacı Bektaş town during the celebrations. The phases were “illimden gidilmeyen yolun sonu karanlkur” (The path that does not go through knowledge leads to darkness), “Kadınları okutun” or kızlarınız okutunuz” (Educate your women” or educate your daughters), “Hakikati konuşmaktan korkmayınız” (Do not be afraid of talking the truth), “Eline, diline, beline sahip ol” (be master of your hand, tongue, and loins).

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41The festivities normally last three days from August 16 to 18. Due to the devastating earthquake that struck the Marmara region, all subsequent festivities were cancelled.

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The streets of this small town were filled with festival attendants from both rural and urban areas of Turkey as well as with Alevi's from Europe. At the opening ceremony, where top state officials delivered speeches and dance groups performed semah. A high podium was set up in the town's square for the opening ceremony, which has featured live on the state-run television station, TRT-1, since 1997. A large group of Alevi crowds to listen to the speeches delivered by top state officials, including the president Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Minister of Tourism, Erkan Mumcu, Minister of State, Ramazan İmırzaloğlu, Alevi deputies of the parliament, and several mayors, politicians, leading artists and public and commercial TV channels.

Hacı Bektaş town’s mayor Mustafa Özcivan delivered the first speech. In his speech he argued the state treated Alevi’s as its “adapted child.” He complained that none of the textbooks mentioned Alevi’s, the DIB only served Sunnis. Özcivan demanded that the administration of the Hacı Bektaş Veli lodge must be overturned to the Hacı Bektaş Veli municipality. He criticized that the mosque which is a part of the Hacı Bektaş Veli Museum complex is open to Sunnis’ religious practice, but Hacı Bektaş Veli lodge which had been turned into museum is not open for the Alevi’s cems.

Ali Doğan, the president of the ABTM, whose founding congress had been held on August 12-13, 1999 in this town, read the ABTM’s declaration prepared during the congress. The declaration demanded an end to the physical and psychological oppressions of the Alevi associations and individuals as well as to the assimilation policies toward Alevi’s. Then, the minister of the state, Ramazan İmırzaloğlu, delivered a speech pointing out that Hacı Bektaş town was the center of Turkishness and of Islam. He said now his ministry was working on a project to found either a university or an institute of Turkish culture and Islam. The CHP’s leader, Altan Öymen, proposed a meeting between the Alevi associations, political parties, the prime minister, and the
president to solve the problems expressed by the Alevi community. The prime minister Ecevit stated that the Hacı Bektaş Veli celebrations were instrumental to reinforce the national culture, national identity and national unity. They were also channels to express the messages of friendship, peace, and love toward humanity. In his speech the most applauded sentence was "to the extent that Mohammed was Muslim, Ali was Muslim too". Ecevit also stated that the Alevi-Bektaşi tradition that emerged out of Hacı Bektaş's thoughts was an important dimension of Turkish folk culture and the Turks' understanding of Islam. Then, President Süleyman Demirel stated,

Hacı Bektaş' square once again witnessed the outspokenness, the state of law, and democracy. This state is belonged to all of us. In this country all of us are siblings. It is this country's honored citizens' honored state that does not ask its citizens who you are, where you were born, whose your mother, whose your father, which creed you belong... This state belongs all of us. If this is so we will live together in peace. Alevi accepts Sunni; Sunni accepts Alevi too; if there are other beliefs they will accept each other; and the state will accept all of them and embrace all saying "my citizens."  

Hacı Bektaş town is a pilgrimage place for Alevis and Bektaşis. There are several sacred places attached to the life story of Hacı Bektaş. The lodge, now the museum of Hacı Bektaş, is the major attraction. The tomb of Hacı Bektaş, relics of Bektaşi Order and the Janissaries are displayed in the museum. Çilehane Tepesi, Beştaşlar, and Dedebaği are much visited sacred sites.

In Çilehane Tepesi, a hill overlooking the town, there are a huge statue of Hacı Bektaş, a statue of two saz players, called Ozanlar Anıtı (Minstrels Memorial) dedicated to those who had died in the Sivas incident and a large rock called "delikli taş" [a stone with a hole]. Recently an open-air amphitheater was built for concerts and other shows on the top of the hill. At the Çilehane tepesi, where Hacı Bektaş Veli lived in solitude for

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42 A big solid rock, where one can climb in through a side hole and emerge from a narrow central orifice. The widespread belief attached to the hole is the following: If a person can fit and pass through the hole this means the person is a pure soul or righteous. The failure to pass through means the opposite. Many Alevis try to pass though the hole during their visit.
reaching the truth of God, there were hundreds of tents for attendees of the three days public ceremony.

The streets of this small town center were set up as bazaar, where various “Alevi goods” were sold, such as ribbons to put around the forehead with famous phases of Hacı Bektaş and Ali and Hussein, or zülfikar symbols, necklaces or rosettes with symbolic pictures of Hacı Bektaş, Ali etc., books on Alevism, Alevi periodicals, framed pictures of Ali, Hussein, and the twelve Imams, plates with phases of Hacı Bektaş, Ali and Hussein, and cassettes of famous Alevi minstrels and musicians. Various Alevi associations had their own stands advocating associations, publications, selling books and periodicals.

The concerts of famous Alevi minstrels, musicians, and semah dance performance were planned to run in two places during evenings, the covered sport hall in the town center and the amphitheater at the Çilehane hill. I was at the concert held in the open-air amphitheater. The amphitheater was full of Alevis, the majority of whom was from the younger generation. One incident raised a huge emotional tide. When an Alevi musician started to sing a hymn, a sixty-year old man came to the stage to perform semah. The security guards at the stage approached him to stop and try to take him out of the stage. Sitting down and covering his face, the old man began to cry. Then, the musician approached him and asked him to perform semah with her hymn. At least hundred Alevis took the stage to perform semah with the old man. He wanted to perform semah as the major part of his religious practice but was stopped. In the same way, Alevis were oppressed for centuries. Taking the stage by Alevis was a symbolic act of rebellion against this oppression.

When Ferhat Tunç⁴⁴ took the stage the Alevi youth created a huge tide of

⁴⁴A Kurdish Alevi musician.

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excitement by occupying the stage. Tunç telling that his saz was a gift from Hasret Gültekin, invited the audience for a “one minute respect standing” for the victims who died in the Sivas incident and the “martyrs of revolution.” The young Alevi, who were already at the stage as well as the audience at the tribunes stood up with their left hands raised up. Concerts became spaces, where Alevis coming from different parts of Turkey and abroad expressed their identity in an environment full of Alevis without a fear.

During the concert, I was with Dr. Nazan Kuloğlu. We were sitting next to a group of young Alevis (age between 15-18) coming from Adana, an immigrant receiving city at the Mediterranean seaside. We started to talk to them, who put red or green ribbons around their forehead. Full of emotions, they were so happy to participate in the festivities. They informed that last year they had been in the celebration too. The dialogue between Nazan and one of the young Alevis, Hasan, 17, was noticeable:

N: Hasan, which okak (heart) do you belong?"
H: What is heart?
N: [surprise with his answer] I mean do you belong to a dede or a talib lineage?
H: [puzzled] I don’t know what you are asking. Are you asking my family’s name? Actually my family migrated to Adana from a village of Adiyaman."
N: No no, I am not asking that. You must have belonged either to a talib or a dede lineage if you were an Alevi.
H: I am an Alevi, but I do not know what you mean by dede or talib!"
N: Okay, Hasan at least tell me whether are you Turkish or Kurdish?
H: [reluctant to answer] I am an Alevi, that’s all I know. We know nothing like Turk or Kurd, but Alevi.

When an Alevi musician at the stage started to a hymn, he went to the stage to perform semah with his friends. As identity is expressive (Soysal 1994, 1997), Hasan’s expression of Alevi identity does not need knowledge on Alevism, he just needs to

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45Hasret Gültekin was a young and well-known Alevi folk singer and composer who died in the Sivas incident of 1993. Born in 1965 in a town of Sivas he migrated to Istanbul at the age of 6 with his family, then he migrated to Germany.

46A city in the South Eastern part of Turkey.
express his “identity” with his Alevi fellows. The way he performed semah at the stage was in a “transcendental” mode. He came to the patron saint to give his respects to express his identity in this place, where this expression is “permitted.”

On August 17, daily newspapers reporting about the Hacı Bektaş Festivities, mentioned also an alternative Hacı Bektaş commemoration, organized by the Ehl-i Beyt Vakfi in İstanbul (Radikal, August 17 1999). Fermani Altun stated that the Hacı Bektaş festivities turned into a “show” and nobody addressed Koran and Islam in these celebrations. The alternative meeting was opened with a reading of the Koran. İstanbul’s mayor of the Fazilet, a deputy from this party and a former ministry of culture, Namık Kemal Zeybek attended the meeting. Altun said “those who are outside of Islam are not from “us,” those who say I am an Alevi outside of Islam are not from us” (Radikal, August 17 1999).

Having discussed the Hacı Bektaş Veli festival as an arena where Alevis intersect with the state, I will now turn to an examination of how transnational Alevi actors intersect with the Turkish state.

5.7. The Interaction Between Transnational Alevi Actors and the Turkish State: Transnationalized Public Spheres

I will show how transnational Alevi activists interact with the Turkish state through selected sites they intersected. In 1997, a group of Alevi association leaders met Prime Minister, vice prime minister, and the leaders of political parties that had seats in the parliament (Alevilerin Sesi, 1997 VI. 20: 56-57). Several Alevi leaders of Europe were also present at these meetings. In the meeting held with Prime Minister, Ali Kılıç, EAUF’s president, stated that Alevi society demanded Turkey to be secular, modern and respectful to human rights and freedoms. During the meeting with vice Prime Minister, Kılıç claimed that the Turkish Ministry of Education was under the invasion of tariqas.

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He argued that the ministry must be restructured by taking the demands of Alevis into consideration and argued that there must be no mandatory religion courses in the secular education. Kılıç also proclaimed that 25 million Alevis were not taking the streets to get their demands because of their desire to maintain internal peace.

Kılıç complained that Alevis could not found associations with the title of “Alevi” in Turkey. He requested that this situation must be changed. Kılıç said “we want our name. Our name should not disturb anyone. The legal regulation permitting Alevi associations to have the title of “Alevi” in Turkey must be promulgated as soon as possible” (Alevilerin Sesi, 1997 Vl. 20: 56-57).

Kılıç, also mentioned problems of immigrants in Europe and claimed that the Turkish state largely neglected their problems. He also stated that the religious officials sent abroad by the DIB only served for Sunnis and educational attaches appointed abroad were all conservative Sunni Turks.

On November 8, 1995, one of the most widely watched TV program of Turkey, Siyaset Meydani47 (The Political Arena) hosted a large group of Alevi activists discussing the state-Alevi relations. Ali Kılıç and Turgut Öker, as representatives of EAUF, also appeared on this program along with other Alevi activists of Turkey. In this TV discussion, Turgut Öker stated the Turkish state “owns Alevis an apology” in addition to Alevi taxes taken to finance the Sunni DIB.48

At the opening ceremony of the HBAKV’s headquarter building, state officials and Alevi activists of Turkey and Europe intersected. Both President Süleyman Demirel, and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, attended to the ceremony. In his speech Demirel said, “do not let depravity and hatred in your community, overcome your antagonism and

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47 The program was featured on a commercial TV.

48 Interview with Turgut Öker, the president of EAUF and AABF, July 28, 1999, Cologne.
hatred.” In response, Ali Kılıç, the president of EAUF, replied, “the address of hatred and antagonism is not here. President should say this in mosques he visits” (Alevilerin Sesi 25, 1998: 32-33).

The episodes that I narrated above, are a few examples of intersections of transnational Alevi actors and the Turkish state. These examples demonstrate how transnational social actors enact homeland-related political projects. The European Alevi leaders sitting on the table with the Turkish state to discuss the problems and demands of Alevis is an example of this. As members of ABKB, European Alevi leaders continue to take part in meetings with state officials, cultural festivals, and the opening ceremonies of cemevis in Turkey. In that way they interact with the Turkish state.

This clearly shows that transnationalized network-based conception of politics and social life challenges the conception of territorially bounded public sphere. Soysal (1997) argues proliferation of transnational practices and immigrant political activities extend beyond the nation state boundaries have challenged the territorially bounded and unified notion of public sphere. This is largely due to the migrant political activities that extend beyond the nation-state and comprise multiple localities and connecting transnational communities (p. 521).

Having discussed how the Turkish state interact Alevi activists through the festivities and meetings, now I will turn how Alevi movement interacts with Islamist circles and the pro-Islamic party.

5.8. Islamists and the Refah Partisi

Since the early 1990s, Alevism has also become a topic of concern in the Islamist media. The Islamist circles have taken part in the discussion about Alevism which suddenly emerged in publics. As Alevis became more and more visible, writings on Alevism appeared in the Islamist media. One example is the extensive report on Alevism

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in a periodical, *İzlenim*, a journal published with “Islamic concerns” in its own words (May 1993: 10-21). *İzlenim* suggested enlarging the circle of Islam to take Alevis inside through dialogue. A theology professor, Topaloğlu, interviewed by the journal, stated:

the dialogue with an understanding that reified Ali as God is impossible. In order to have a dialogue with Alevi, they should accept Muhammad as the last prophet and Koran. Then they should also accept the pillars of Islam such as daily prayers and fasten in Ramadan, and forbidden of Islam such as drinking alcohol. Majority of Alevi intellectuals write books without mentioning the pillars and forbidden of Islam...If we will discuss Islam, Alevi should tolerate the questions such as “why don’t you have mosques in your villages,” “why don’t you fasten during Ramadan” (pg. 12).

Topaloğlu has not accepted Alevism as a religion and agreed with Alevi intellectuals, who define Alevism as culture.

Demirci, a columnist in *İzlenim*, evaluated the Alevi movement as “a sincere quest for dialogue.” But the paternalistic attitude toward Alevis is again visible in his statement:

It is necessary to find a tolerable side in actions engaged by people [Alevi] who had been thrown into underground caves in the past. In exchange [of this tolerance] to forgive the minds [Sunni] thinking cemevis as “mum sündü” nests will symbolize a good intention (p. 10).

The journal referred to Alevis as a group “surfacing on the land” (pg. 14).

According to İzlenim, Alevis suffered from many fractions because Marxism had been infused into their community. For that reason, they would have no clear direction. The report also included a short narrative of a cem ceremony held in the Şahkulu. İzlenim proudly announced that the first time a journal published with “Islamist concerns” got permission to observe a cem ceremony.

According to the Islamist intellectual Ali Buluç, what motivated Alevis was not their difference from Sunnis but a search for their authentic identity against the homogenous culture pushed by modernity (Bulaç 1993: 21). In this
respect, Bulaç, argues that Alevi revival has common characteristics with the
Islamist movement in trying to resist modernity's homogenous culture and Alevis
eventually ally with them (p. 21).

But when radical Islamists coming from the Friday prayer attacked the
participants of an Alevi cultural festival in Sivas, it was clear that it is not easy to make
any alliance with the Islamist circles. Refah’s mayor of Sivas, Temel Karamollaoğlu
played a role in the Sivas incident by provoking the mob and preventing the fire
department to do its job as the hotel was on fire. Karamollaoğlu then became a deputy of
Refah from Sivas in the 1995 and in the 1999 general elections. Şevket Kazan, who
served as Minister of Justice during the Refah-DYP coalition, was voluntary defense
lawyer of those setting fire to the hotel and killing the Pir Sultan Abdal Festival’s
participants. A big majority of Alevis evaluates the Refah, and its heir Fazilet, as their
major opponents.

On the other hand, some Alevi associations developed relations with the Refah.
The Refah-Alevi dialogue started after the 1994 local election by Erbakan, who appointed
a liberal Refah politician, Bahri Zengin, to communicate with the famous Alevi dede,
İzzettin Doğan. Erbakan also called Doğan personally and asked his cooperation. Bahri
Zengin developed projects toward Alevi-Refah dialogue with Ali Bulaç, an Islamist
intellectual. But this attempted dialogue failed. A majority of Alevis and Alevi leaders
criticized İzzettin Doğan. Doğan has still good relations with Refah’s heir, the Fazilet.
Istanbul’s mayor from the Fazilet attends meetings organized by Doğan’s Cem Vakfı.
This is the major focus of criticism by Alevi associations against Doğan and his Cem
foundation.

Newspapers with an Islamist outlook published interviews with İzzettin
Doğan and Fermani Altun announced their associational activities. One example
is the Yeni Şafak, an Islamist daily newspaper, which published an interview with Altun. In the interview, Altun argues “Alevism is in the command of Islam and loyal to Koran” (Yeni Şafak August 20, 2000). Fermani Altun even run for the parliament from the Fazilet in the last election. The Fazilet’s leader, Recai Kutan, İstanbul’s mayor from this party attended the fourth congress of Ehl-i Beyt (Yeni Şafak April 9, 2000). The congress started with a semah dance performance, followed by a reading of the Koran.

Although Doğan and Altun have good relations with the Islamist circles, Refah’s understanding of Alevism has surfaced through its prominent politicians in a different way. Two events have been crucial to see how the Refah perceived Alevis. During the coalition of Refah-DYP, a public protest was launched. At 9 PM, citizens were turning of their lights for a minute. It was against the corruption at the state level and demanding a transparent state. The movement was called “Sürekli Aydınlık için bir Dakika Karanlık” (one minute darkness for the constant enlightenment). Şevket Kazan, the Refah’s minister of justice, defined those participated in the movement as “they play mum söndü.”

A wave of protests from Alevis, Alevi associations and intellectuals as well as secular social forces emerged. The Alevi associations declared that Kazan has already shown his hostility toward Alevis by being a voluntary defense lawyer for those who set fire the hotel in Sivas in 1993 (Milliyet February 13, 1997). Kazan’s “mum söndü” accusation was reflected to the parliamentary records. A

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89Mum söndü (It. candle extinguished) is a wide spread Sunni accusation to cem ceremony of Alevis. Sunnis believe that in cem ceremony, Alevis extinguish a candle and have sex with whoever they meet in the dark. For this reason, a well known saying goes “Alevis know no mother or sister.” In 1995, a TV host also made a joke claiming Kızılbaş (Alevis) engaging incest relationship and this caused a big protest in front of the TV channel and the host apologized in various TV channels.


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CHP deputy, Fuat Çay, submitted a written question to Kazan asking what he meant by “mum söndü;” if he wanted to create a social disturbance by fuelling Alevi-Sunni distinction. Kazan sent a written answer in which he said “candle lighting-extinguishing play was said to explain a physical event experienced at nights, not to create social disturbance.” Kazan also claimed that he wanted to say instead of engaging stern actions, parties in opposition spent time by lighting and extinguishing candles.

The other event emerged during the tension with Syria. The Fazilet’s leader, Recai Kutan, accused Syria by stating “in Syria a deviant Alevi understanding is in power”(Hürriyet October 7 1998). Various Alevi associations protested him. A group of lawyers filed a suit against Kutan, by claiming his words hurt millions of Alevis as well as had a separatist connotation that can serve in dividing Turkey into various camps. Later, Kutan announced “if Alevism means to love Ali, I am an Alevi too,” this sentence was repeated by various Fazilet’s members at various occasions.

In this chapter, I have examined the “content” of the Alevi movement. The content is created by the actors interacting within specific webs of interpersonal and interorganizational relations. Through their interaction and communication, they create discourses that serve to connect actors at one level while dividing at another. In the analysis of the content of Alevi movement, I have focused on three major actors, Alevi activists, the Turkish State, and the Islamist circles, interacting at various sites. All these actors are heterogeneous and pursuing and evolving different political agendas. Their actions and discourses are interwoven in the multidimensional fabric of the Alevi movement in both the national and the transnational arenas.

I have demonstrated how Alevism, a secret religious creed has been transformed
into a public religion. The scripturalization of oral traditions of Alevism was one major step in this transformation. This process was carried out by Alevi intellectuals, who have transformed oral tradition to written and fixed knowledge of Alevism. Traditionally, dedes had the monopoly over this knowledge, but they were not part of scripturalization process. The spatial dimension of making Alevism public was the construction of special houses, cemevis, re-opening of old dervish lodges, convents and tombs for practicing cems. Opening up of cem ceremonies to publics and cultural festivals where Alevi music and dance performed were also constitutive parts of the transformation. In my analysis, I have demonstrated that Alevi immigrants living in Europe formalized Alevism earlier than Turkey. The rights provided by the German State gave Alevis the opportunity to teach Alevism as a course in the public schools of Germany. The interaction between Alevi movement and the state was shown through the parliamentary speeches as well as the appearance of state officials in Alevi cultural festivals. Praising Alevi Bektaşi culture and defining Alevism as a security of secularism was the major part of the State’s discourse of Alevism. Of course not all state officials and institutions agreed on this. In contrast to top state officials praising attitude toward Alevism, the DİB was strongly against it. The interaction between Alevis and the Islamist circles was illustrated through the media with Islamist outlook and the pro-Islamic party. Although the majority of Alevis defined the Islamists as major opponents, a few Alevi leaders developed close relationships with Islamist circles. The attitude of Refah’s prominent members toward Alevis sometimes increased tension and jeopardized attempts to develop dialogue between the Alevi movement and the Islamists.
CONCLUSION

In this concluding chapter, I will summarize the dissertation by pulling the strings of arguments from the various chapters together and situating them in the complex interplay between the role of the state and the proliferation of transnational social and political practices. The study demonstrated how Alevism was transformed from centuries old secret oral tradition into a public religion/culture by multiple interacting processes, including internal and international migration, urbanization, and political polarization.

The transformation occurred in a complex relationship among multiple actors, which range from the Alevi activists located in Turkey and Europe to the Turkish State, media, Kurdish circle, and Islamist groups. All these actors produced definitions of Alevism, its demands and problems according to their own political goals and projects in the contemporary public political realms.

The historical outline in chapter 1 was meant to provide the reader with an introductory overview over major events in the history of Alevism. It identified the central puzzles in the emergence of Alevism since the late 1980s that I tried them to solve with the analytical tools I developed in chapter 2. I applied a theoretical model that distinguishes between the networks, the social and political opportunity structures (SPOS), and the communicative praxis.
Since we live in a world of social connections, any attempt to grasp social reality requires to consideration of networks in which social actors are embedded. Defined as a set of ties connecting three or more actors, networks link social actors into a complex system of relationship with its nodes and hubs. Individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations are all embedded in a complex set of network ties as nodes. In this respect, I have argued that an examination of Alevi networks was crucial to understand the transformation of Alevism. This was due to the fact that Alevism “went public” and its adherents “came out” through networks.

As many analysts argue, networks emerge, expand, shift or dissolve with macro processes, such as state formation, industrialization, urbanization, and migration. Focusing on three historically relevant components, actors, activities, and relations, network analysis provides the ability to examine how social actors transform the nodes and links according to changing social and political conditions. The transformation of Alevism was shown as the outcome of shifting nodes and links by Alevi actors in reaction to several macro processes among which migration (internal and international) was a major factor.

The vitality of networks lies in the fact that actors, ideas, lores, codes, behavior, financial and symbolic resources, and emotions flow through network channels. For that reason, diffusion and pervasiveness of social movement ideas, organizations, and activities is determined by network ties. The existence of dense network ties is crucial to seize what opportunity structures offer social actors to flourish as a social movement.

The political opportunity structure is one of the major conceptual tools in social movement analysis and it refers to the political conditions that encourage or discourage the emergence of a social movement. Based on the fact that a social movement emerges out of social and political conflicts and aims at changing the social and political
structures, I have argued that both social and political conditions must be favorable for a social movement to flourish. One major contribution of my conceptualization was to extend opportunity structures beyond the territorially bounded political jurisdiction to capture the impacts of global norms, supranational formations with a capacity to impose these norms and regulations into a nation-state, the international migration system, and the proliferation of transnational social and political practices.

In order to connect the opportunities to actions, the concept of communicative praxis was used. The networks are about connections and nonconnections, and the opportunity structures are structural conditions determining potentials for a social movement. Only through the communicative interactive aspect of social actions, networks and opportunities link in physical and virtual spaces. The concept of communicative praxis captures this aspect of social actions. In addition to that, the concept provides the ability to read a social movement as a text by deconstructing its content. Social actions are not all about networks and opportunity structures, but also about the construction of meaning. In the transformation of Alevism, networks and opportunities were necessary but not sufficient to explain why Alevis suddenly and powerfully emerged in public spheres.

Actors communicate within a web of interpersonal and interorganizational relations and categorical identities, which are shaped within the historical and cultural contexts. Identities, cultures, and political projects emerge out of the dynamic interactions between individuals, groups, institutions, and organizations in shared physical and virtual spaces. In this respect communicative praxes consist in serialities of dissent and consent among social actors about the constructions of meaning, identities, and cultures. Communicative praxis examines who is communicating with whom by pursuing what kinds of agendas in which setting by using what kind of medium.
I began my analysis of the Alevi movement with an examination of the networks whose shift was the first key to understand the transformation of Alevism. The journey of Alevism from secrecy to publicity started with the massive migration from rural to urban areas since the 1950s. Inhabiting peripheral marginal locations, especially the remote mountainous areas of Anatolia, Alevis were among those who started to migrate earlier. In the 1960s, many of them were also among those who migrated to Europe as "guest workers" searching for a better life.

The migration process led to a discontinuation of the traditional Alevi networks organized around the dede-talip bond. At the same time it provided opportunities for the emergence and expansion of new Alevi networks in the urban centers. Alevis migrating from various locations, such as the eastern, central, and Mediterranean regions, have met and founded new networks in Ankara, İstanbul, Berlin, Melbourne, etc. In the 1960s, with the liberal constitution of 1960, a few Alevi associations emerged, as well as an Alevi party, Birlik Partisi.

Alevi migrants to Germany and other European countries founded politically active enclaves and developed strong cross-state political ties to Turkey since the 1960s. In Germany, Alevi workers organized around the Türk Ameleler Birliği (and then later on the Yurtseverler Birliği) and had close ties with the Birlik Partisi, whose leaders frequently traveled to Germany to organize Alevi migrants around the party. Türk Ameleler Birliği financially and politically supported the Birlik Partisi in the seventies. Immigrants from Turkey reproduce the political, religious and ethnic cleavages in the European diaspora. These differences are manifest in their organizations in European space. It is not surprising to witness that AABF has strong network ties to Alevi associations of Turkey, France, the Netherlands, etc. but has little or no connections to Sunni Islamist or rightists Turkish groups in Germany. Türk Aleviler Birliği and its
connections to the Birlik Partisi were also one manifestation of this.

Before turning into an Alevi movement, Alevi activities ended by the rising tide of the leftist socialist movement that became the major political ideology since the second half of the sixties. As gecekondu dwellers, urban workers, university students, Alevi’s middle and young generations filled the leftist organizations (from radical to moderate) in the sixties and seventies. The socialist ideals prevented them to make claims based on primordial identities such as “Alevi” or “Kurd.” As a result, Alevi did not take Alevism to the fore front in this period. Alevis gained experience and established networks through their participation in leftist organizations. Alevi voluntary associations rose on the base of these networks since the late 1980s. Today, the majority of Alevi activists, associational leaders, and intellectuals come from leftist background.

The migration process opened up new venues to Alevis and deeply impacted their social stratification. The new generation was able to participate in education and take high positions in government offices and the private sectors. Alevi intellectuals and entrepreneurs emerged in the urban milieu. The emergent Alevi intellectuals and businessmen provided intellectual and financial resources for Alevi associational and publication activities by the late 1980s.

The major puzzle was that the Alevi associational activities started earlier in Europe than in Turkey. Because of the military coup of 1980 the activities of the Turk Yurtseverler Birliği decreased by 1983. In 1986 voluntary associations with the term “Alevi” in their names emerged in several locations in Germany. Earlier branches of the Yurtseverler Birliği changed their names to “Alevi Kültür Merkezi,” “Hacı Bektaş,” or “Pir Sultan Abdal.”

The existence of transnational networks among Alevi residing in various European countries provided channels for the diffusion of associational activities.
Emerged in Germany, Alevi assertion spread in and across European space. Transnational Alevi networks constituted a spider web in European space and extended it to Turkey. Since the late 1980s, Alevi association representatives began to travel with their new ideas from Germany to Turkey. In this way, the associational activities of Alevis living in Europe stimulated their counterparts in Turkey. Human and financial resources flowed from Europe to Turkey to support Alevi associational activities in the homeland. The flow of Alevi intellectuals from Turkey to Germany also began in the late 1980s.

The modest "liberalization" of Turkish politics, consisting in the lifting of several restrictive laws that had been imposed after the 1980 military coup brought a relatively liberal political climate to discuss issues that had been previously taboos in Turkey. With the collapse of the Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, socialism lost the ideological appeal it once had for the middle generations in the sixties and seventies. In contrast to this ideology, which did not mix with the emphasis on ethnic or religious identities, the new global discourse of collective identity as a right made identity a legitimate base for claim making.

Influenced by the world-wide discourse of identity as a right, Alevism was constructed as a new political ideology, which blended global norms, such as human rights, women rights, and environmentalism. Beginning in 1989, publication and associational activities began in Turkey. Since 1989 hundreds of books were written on Alevism, its history, religious practices and cultural practices. The adoption of identity as a right was also reflected to the title of books published by Alevi intellectuals. One example was a book written by Lütfi Kaleli (1990) with a title of *Kimliğini Haykiran Alevilik* (Alevism Screaming its Identity).

The threat of the Islamic movement rising power that was originally fostered by
the military coup of 1980 was also effective in the Alevi movement. The growing interest in Alevism as religious tradition and culture was fuelled by the rising political power of Islam, a major threat to the “Alevi existence.” The openness of media that "investigated" Alevi community as “the security of secularism,” was an outcome of this threat.

One major development parallel to this liberalization was the privatization of state-run TV and radio at the beginning of the 1990s. An explosion of commercial radio and TV channels with relative freedom from state control provided new platforms to discuss topics that had been previously taboo. Alevism got its share from this climate, since İzzettin Doğan featured in a commercial TV and openly discussed Alevism in the early 1990s. The privatization of media also impacted on various groups that had the opportunity to establish their own TV or radio stations.

The threat of fundamentalist Islam surfaced with the Sivas incident in 1993 and increased associational activities among Alevis both in Turkey and abroad. The number of Alevi associations increased sharply both in Turkey and Europe. The transnational ties were strengthened and a project of unifying Alevi associations under an umbrella organization was launched. The Sivas incident marked the acceleration of the ongoing process of unification of all Alevi associations in Europe under an umbrella association, the EAUFE. Under the leadership of EAUFE, the first ABTM, an umbrella organization of Alevi associations of Turkey and Europe, was founded.

Although in terms of financial and political infrastructures Alevi associations were better off compared to those in Turkey, the European Alevi movement had to draw expertise from the homeland. As a result, Alevi intellectuals, dedes, minstrels and musicians frequently traveled to European countries to attend panels, meetings, concerts, and cultural festivals. This flow reached its peak in the period between 1993 and 1996,
when Alevi associational activities sharply increased in reaction to the Sivas incident. The associational leaders of Turkey frequently traveled to Europe, as the European leaders traveled to Turkey.

All these actors moving back and forth between Turkey and Europe were carriers of transnational Alevi networks transcending the state boundaries and articulators in transnational social spaces. Through networks connecting Alevis at local, national, and transnational levels ideas, symbols, and financial and human resources flow from Europe to Turkey and vice versa. As a result, Alevism was cross-fertilized within the ebbs and flows of Alevi actors. Thus, Alevism was transformed in the multiple scales of thought and action emerging as a result of the proliferation of transnational social and political practices. It became a transnational issue rather than confined within boundaries of a single nation-state.

Taken the transnational level, the Alevi movement demonstrated that immigrant networks were not just there for the provision of short-term assistance to newcomers in getting a job and housing in the diaspora. Immigrant networks, in the long run, laid the ground work for new forms of spaces for communication and participation. These spaces were new locations for identity-forming and culture-forming processes. Alevi networks emerged in the large urban centers of Turkey, Europe and elsewhere expanded from Ankara to Berlin as well as from Istanbul to Sidney function as new spaces for identity and community formation.

Yet Alevis cannot construct the new meaning of Alevism in a vacuum. The role of the Turkish state and its recent policies played crucial role in the Alevi movement. In this study, I have demonstrated that the Turkish State was actively involved in the Alevi movement not only by providing after long period of repression favorable conditions for the flourishing the movement but also in the shaping of Alevism in the
public political realms. In this way, I brought a neglected actor, the state, into the study of identity/culture politics. Despite the abundance of literature on the field of identity and culture politics field had largely overlooked the role of the state and the way it situates itself in reaction to the worldwide phenomena of making claims based on identity and culture. The role of the Turkish State with its recent series of favorable policies toward its Alevi subjects cannot be underestimated. Appearance of top state officials in Alevi cultural festivals, opening ceremonies of cemevis, allocating money for Alevi associations in the state budget since 1998, preparing TV series on Alevism, featuring Alevi music and dance on public TV channel are part of the recently changed state policies.

Through these policies, the Turkish State tries to show its recognition of Alevism. In that way, the State gets involved in defining Alevism, its demands and outlook. My data demonstrated that the state officials frequently defined Alevism as the “Turkish interpretation of Islam,” and Alevi subjects as “the security of secularism” and the “devoted followers of M. Kemal,” while they referred to Hacı Bektaş Veli, the patron saint of Alevi, as “a leader who Turkified and Islamized Asia Minor” at Alevi cultural festivals, opening ceremonies of cemevis, the parliament, media, etc. The role of the state in defining Alevi identity, history, and tradition provides an important case for demonstrating that the state is an actor in the shaping of identities that cannot be neglected.

There has been a tendency to explain the recent state policies toward its Alevi subjects with two factors: the rise of political Islam and the Kurdish movement. I agreed with this explanation but argued that these were not sufficient. In this study, I have argued and attempted to show that the state, like other actors, was also influenced by the identity as a right discourse and began to modify itself accordingly. The Turkish State
trying to be a member of the EU has been influenced by this dominant global discourse.

The state is not a homogenous entity, but consists of actors and fractions representing different interests and ideologies. This contributes to the fact that there are limits of the state’s modification. My examination of the state actors clearly showed that in spite of top state officials making statements praising Alevism, the representatives of the DİB strongly oppose the recognition of Alevism as a distinctive religious group. However, one can still argue that the state plays a crucial role in the Alevi movement by considering the aforementioned state policies.

So far I argued that the transnational networks and the state have played important role in making Alevism public. An examination of the interaction between these two actors provided then a better understanding of how transnational social forces changed the meaning of claim-making within a territorially bounded jurisdiction. I documented how Alevi associations leaders residing in Europe interacted with the state by attending meetings held between Alevi representatives and the Turkish State. In one of these meetings, the EAUF’s leader complained to the vice prime minister that Alevi associations in Turkey cannot name their associations “Alevi” and demanded a legal regulation to change this situation. This is one manifestations of the fact that claim making within the bounded political jurisdiction intersect with the transnationalized network-based conception of politics and social life. The fact that Alevi associational leaders from Europe were sitting on the table with the Turkish state to negotiate over the recognition of Alevism showed that the conception of claim making in territorially bounded public spheres needed a modification.

It is not my intention to argue that the state is weakened or fallen into oblivion because of the proliferation of transnational social and political practices. In this study, I argued that the state modifies itself according to the global discourse of identity as rights.
In this respect, I wish to stress that the argument of the state loosing power is too simple and that it was to be replaced by a more nuanced and process-specific notion. The state definitely locates in the scope and meaning of transnationalism. It enters into dialogue as local, national and transnational scales enter into contested politics of making claims and creating their own spaces, the social construction of power differentials, and the making of individual, group, national and transnational identities.

I examine this complex interaction of actors located at the local, national, and transnational scales, with the conceptual tool of communicative praxis. It is through the communicative praxes of actors that Alevism is shaped not only national but also transnational public spheres. In this study, I have documented how various actors developed and enacted social, cultural, and political projects on Alevism at local, national and transnational scales. Actors who are either formal or informal interact at various sites from the parliament to Alevi cultural festivals and the media within a web of intersubjective and interorganizational relations.

I have focused on selected three key actors, none of which is homogenous: Alevi activists, the Turkish State, and the Islamist circles. A close examination of their interactions clarified how they produced multiple discourses on Alevism within a multiaxial structure evolving around two major axes of debates (whether Alevism is a religion or culture and whether Alevism is in or outside of Islam). This multiaxial structure harbored manifold unresolved tensions because of each actor’s pursuit and of different goals and agendas. In this structure, Alevi activists incorporated three major principles into their Alevism discourse: secularism, identity as a human right, and women’s rights. Making Alevism public was not a simple “going back to tradition” or a “revival of tradition” but an active incorporation of contemporary universalist discourses and values in search of a legitimate base for its claim making at local, national,
transnational levels.

The restructuring of Alevism as a public religion included the process of scripturalization of Alevi oral tradition, esoteric knowledge and religious practices as well as construction of cemevis to practice cem ceremonies in the urban social and spatial landscape. The emergence of cemevis in the major urban centers of Turkey as well as in the European and non-European diaspora was an integral part of the formalization of Alevism as a public religion as well as a way of showing the Alevi existence in the urban milieu. The construction of special buildings for worship, the publication of catechism books, celebration of holy days and figures in the form of public rituals were some of the practices through which Alevism was represented as a religion to others.

In making Alevism public the cultural festivals, music and dance performances were crucial. The festivals were intersections where various actors met and made their own claims for or against one another. I detailed selected festival scenes to show how these sites serve as publics, where various actors intersect, including the different Alevi factors as well as state actors.

A major finding of this study is that the formalization of Alevism was started earlier and proceeded faster in Europe than in Turkey. Germany hosts three Alevi institutes aiming at producing knowledge on Alevism compared to none in Turkey. Recently, two federal states of Germany gave Alevis the right to teach Alevism as a course in public schools. In Turkey only the Sunni mandatory religious courses are available in public schools. The German State seems to provide this right as part of its multiculturalist policies.

This study was not an attempt only to explain how a centuries-old secret religious culture and its identity have emerged in the public spheres at the national and transnational levels and gained a degree of recognition within the complex interaction
with the Turkish State and public spheres in the late 1980s and 1990s. It was also an attempt to develop a better understanding of the changing relationships between the national and the transnational; to understand why and through what mechanisms social actors respond to calls for cultural reassertiveness; to understand the process of identity formation at the local, national and transnational scales; and to understand how a nation-state responds or acts within such a context.
### Table 1. Urban Population Between 1950-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban pop. (million)</th>
<th>% of Urban Pop.</th>
<th>Urban Annual Increase (per thousand)</th>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.24</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>55.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>8.86</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>49.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>39.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>13.69</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>47.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>16.81</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>41.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>19.64</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>30.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>26.88</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>62.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>33.32</td>
<td>59.2</td>
<td>35.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>40.88</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>28.27</td>
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### Table 2. The Urbanization Rate 1965-2000

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Population Growth (%)</th>
<th>Urbanization Rate (%)</th>
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<td>1965-1970</td>
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<td>1970-1975</td>
<td>2.50</td>
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<td>1975-1980</td>
<td>2.06</td>
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<td>1980-1985</td>
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<td>1985-1990</td>
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<td>4.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-1995*</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-2000**</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>4.67</td>
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</table>

Sources: The State Planning Organization (SPO)
*Estimates by SIS and SPO
**Settlements with 20,000 or more population
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<td>12.64</td>
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<td>7.31</td>
<td>9.20</td>
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<td>26.27</td>
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<td>6.94</td>
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<td>10.45</td>
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<td>13.56</td>
<td>15.6</td>
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<td>18.05</td>
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Table 6. Turkish Nationals in the European Countries (Thousands)

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Source: SOPEMI various years
*year 1981
**year 1982

Table 7. Stock of Turkish Workers in European Countries (Thousands)

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<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>--</td>
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Source: SOPEMI various years

271
Table 8. Acquisition of Nationality by Turkish Nationals in European Counties

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Source: SOPEMI 1999
Table 9. Inflows of Turkish Asylum Seekers by European Countries (Thousands)

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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
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Source: SOPEMI 1999

Table 10. Proportion of Asylum-Seekers from Turkey to Germany (1976-1997)

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<td>1997</td>
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Sources: Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1993
SOPEMI 1999

*the increase in asylum seekers in the 1980 is due to the Military Coup of 1980
**the increase after this time is due to the Kurdish conflict and ongoing struggle between the Turkish Army and the PKK
Appendix A. Alevi Associations Belonged to ABTM in 1999 and ABKB in 2000

1. The Alevi Associations under the Umbrella of the Alevi Bektashi Representatives Assembly [Alevi-Bektaşı Temsilciler Meclisi (ABTM)] in 1999

[The numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of branches]

PSAKD (35)
HBVAKV (29)
HBKTD
ABEKV (6)
Karacaahmet Derneği and Vakfı
Garip Dede Türbesi Cemevi (Garip Dede Tomb Cemevi)
Seyit Garip Musa Türbesi Derneği (Seyit Musa Tomb Association)
Hüseyin Gazi Türbesi Derneği
Tekke Köyü Abdal Musa Kültür Araştırma Derneği (The Tekke Village Abdal Musa Culture and Research Association)
KKD (66)
Tunceliler Vakfı
Hacı Bektas Derneği (Hacı Bektaş Association)
İzmir Narlıdere Alevi-Bektaşı Derneği (İzmir Narlıdere Alevi Bektaşi Association)
Kayseri Hacı Bektas Veli Derneği (Kayseri Hacı Bektaş Veli Derneği)
AKKAV
Niksar Hacı Bektaş Veli Eğitim KültürVakfı (Niksar Hacı Bektaş Veli Education and Culture Foundation)
Eskişehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Eğitim KültürVakfı and Derneği (Eskişehir Hacı Bektaş Veli Education Culture Foundation and Association)
Ankara Cemeveleri Yaptırm ve Yaşatma Derneği (Ankara Cemevis Building Association)
Gazi Cemevi
Kartal Cemevi
Anadolu Erenler Vakfı (Anatolian Mystics Foundation)
Aşık Vey sel Derneği
Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Germany Alevi Unions Federation) (89)
Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Austria Alevi Unions Federation) (8)
Fransa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (France Alevi Associations Federation) (20)
İsviçre Basel ve Çevresi Çağdaş Aleviler Derneği (Switzerland Basel and its Environment Modern Alevis Association)
İsviçre Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Switzerland Alevi Unions Federation (15)
Avrupa Alevi Akademisi (European Alevi Academy)
Avrupa Alevi Akademisi Vakfı (European Alevi Academy Foundation)
Danimarka Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu (Denmark Alevi Unions Federation) (8)
İngiltere Alevi Kültür ve Cemevi (England Alevi Culture Center and Cemevi)
Hak-Der (the Netherlands Alevi-Bektashi Social and Culture Associations Federation) (20)
Avustralya Alevi Toplum Konseyi (Australia Alevi Society Council) (6)

2. The Alevi Associations Under the Umbrella of the Alevi Bektashi Institutions Union
   [Alevi Bektashi Kuruluşları Birliği (ABKB)] in 2000

PSAKD
HBAKV
HBKTD
ABEKV
Karacaahmet Derneği
Karacaahmet Vakfı
Garip Dede Türbesi
Seyit Garip Musa Türbesi Derneği
Hüseyin Gazi Türbesi Derneği
Tekke Köyü Abdal Musa Kültür Araştırma Derneği
Kızılorman Köy Derneği
Tunceliler Vakfı
Hacı Bektashi Derneği
Hacı Bektashi Belediye Başkanlığı
AKKAV
Adalar Cem Vakfı
Darca Anadolu Kültür ve Görgü Derneği
Sarıgazi Hacı Bektashi Derneği
Hacı Bektashi Veli Mudurnutepe Cemevi
Sarıgazi Kültür Tanıtma Yaşatma ve Türbesini Onarma Derneği
Ankara Cemevi Yaptırma ve Yaşatma Derneği
Garip Dede Türbesi
Tekke Köyü Abdal Musa Kültür Derneği
Seyit Garip Musa Sultan Kültür Derneği
Kartal Cemevi Kültür Eğitim Vakfı
Gazi Cemevi
Eskişehir Hacı Bektash Anadolu Kültür Vakfı
Eskişehir Hacı Bektashi Veli Kültür Derneği
Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu
Avusturya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu
Fransa Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu
Danimarka Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu
Appendix B. The Alevi Activists, Multiple Affiliations and Roles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names</th>
<th>Roles</th>
<th>Associational Affiliation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lütfi Kaleli</td>
<td>association leader, author</td>
<td>ABEKV, Şahkulu, Karacaahmet</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Yıldırım</td>
<td>association leader, author</td>
<td>PSAKD, Hüseyin Gazi Derneği, KKD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gümüş Öz</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>Hüseyin Gazi Derneği, Er-Vak, Aşık Veysel, AKKAV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kahraman Aytaç</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>HBAKV, Tunceliler Vakfı</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Müslüm Doğan</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>PSAKD, Divriğiiler Kültür Derneği</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Doğan</td>
<td>association leader, author</td>
<td>HBAKV, Hüseyin Gazi Derneği</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Sümer</td>
<td>association leader, author</td>
<td>AKKAV, Hüseyin Gazi Derneği</td>
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<td>Attila Erden</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>AKKAV, HBKTD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Necati Yılmaz</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>PSAKD, Divriğiiler Kültür Derneği</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miyase İ lkınur</td>
<td>journalist</td>
<td>Şahkulu, Karacaahmet, Kartal Cemevi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fevzi Gümüş</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>PSAKD, KKD</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hüsnüye Tokmaz</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>Şahkulu, ABEKV, Kartal Cemevi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Başaran</td>
<td>association leader</td>
<td>Şahkulu, Karacaahmet</td>
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<td>Cemal Şener</td>
<td>author</td>
<td>Şahkulu, Karacaahmet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reha Çamuroğlu</td>
<td>author</td>
<td>Şahkulu, Karacaahmet, Cem Vakfı</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ali Balkız</td>
<td>association leader, author</td>
<td>PSAKD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Yaman</td>
<td>Ph. D candidate, author</td>
<td>Şahkulu, ABEKV, Cem Vakfı</td>
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<td>Engin Polat</td>
<td>businessman</td>
<td>Cem Vakfı, Şahkulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hüseyin Gazi Metin</td>
<td>dede, author, poet</td>
<td>PSAKD, Hüseyin Gazi Derneği</td>
</tr>
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</table>
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Tempo, İstanbul.