INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI®
Bell & Howell Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600
THE HISTORY OF THE IRAQI- KUWAITI BORDER

By

Amal Al-Hesham

Thesis

Submitted to the Department of History

Eastern Michigan University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in

History

September 27, 1999

Ypsilanti, Michigan
APPROVAL

THE HISTORY OF THE IRAQI-KUWAITI BORDER

By

Amal Al-Hesham

APPROVED

Dr. Janice Terry
Director

Dr. Joellen Vinyard
Committee Member

Mr. Joseph Engwenyua
Committee Member

Dr. Gersham Nelson
Department Head

Dr. Robert Holkeboer
Dean of Graduate Studies and Research
DEDICATION

This thesis is for my mother and father.
Abstract

My thesis will focus on the problems between Kuwait and the neighboring country of Iraq (and to a much lesser extent, Iran and Saudi Arabia). This study will highlight various characteristics of Kuwait's vulnerability, including its small size, precarious location, and limited military power. I will trace the evolution of Iraq’s difficulties with Kuwait, including claims that the small nation is rightfully theirs, per “historical documents.” The lack of demarcated boundaries. I will also discuss economic resource problems, including water and oil issues. The thesis is based on extensive use of primary documents and published materials in Arabic and English.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPROVAL</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.  INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. KUWAIT’S GEOGRAPHIC, GEOPOLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC POSITIONS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. LOCATION AND TOPOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. KUWAIT’S ECONOMY PRECEDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. THE OIL BOOM AND DECLINE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. INVESTMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. DIVERSIFICATION OF THE KUWAITI ECONOMY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. KUWAITI RELATIONS WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. KUWAITI FOREIGN RELATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. KUWAIT’S BREAKS WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE 1899 TREATY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. OTTOMAN REACTION TO THE 1899 TREATY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN KUWAIT AND ITS NEIGHBORS</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. THE 1913 ANGLO-TURKISH AGREEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. THE SAUDI ARABIAN-KUWAITI RELATIONSHIP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. THE OJAIR CONFERENCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OJAIR CONFERENCE KUWAIT BORDER DECISION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. THE 1923 KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER DEMARCATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. THE 1932 KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. KUWAIT AND IRAQ: THE 1930s TO 1960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. THE KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER: ATTEMPTS AT DEMARCATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. KUWAITI-IRAQI LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES DURING THE 1960s AND 1970s ................................................................. 50
   A. KUWAIT’S INDEPENDENCE FROM BRITAIN AND GENERAL QASSIM’S CLAIM IN 1961
   B. KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER DEVELOPMENTS AND IRAN’S ROLE IN THEM: 1963-1972
   C. IRAQI-IRANIAN TENSIONS AND TERRITORIAL PRESSURES ON KUWAIT
   D. THE AL-SAMITAH AGGRESSION
   E. KUWAITI-IRAQI BOUNDARY ISSUES AFTER AL-SAMITAH

VI. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE 1980s .................................................. 67
   A. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR
   B. IRAQ’S EARLY RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT DURING THE WAR
   C. IRAN’S RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT DURING AND DIRECTLY AFTER THE 1980-1988 WAR
   D. KUWAIT’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS UP TO THE MID-1970s, AND ITS ATTEMPTS AT ECONOMIC RESTORATION

VII. THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT: THE GULF WAR .............................. 76
   A. FACTORS MOTIVATING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO INVADE KUWAIT
   C. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IRAQ’S 1990-1991 ATTACK ON KUWAIT

VIII. POST-GULF WAR RELATIONS ............................................................... 93

IX. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 101

BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................... 106
LIST OF APPENDIX

1. OIL SECTOR AND NON-OIL SECTOR ACTIVITIES IN KUWAIT 1950-1979
2. KEY ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN KUWAIT
3. THE AL-SABAH DYNASTY OF KUWAIT
4. THE GULF WAR: ALLIED ADVANCES IN KUWAIT
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Oil has brought great wealth and prestige, as well as political problems, greed, and strife to the Middle East. The region is also characterized by violence and political turbulence, dominated by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Middle East is also a region that occasionally finds stability, only to find itself shortly thereafter in a new cycle of turmoil.

The Gulf region, part of the Middle East, is made up of sparsely inhabited, arid lands. The area was colonized principally by the Ottoman Empire and Britain; the nations in the region were often subject to competing foreign forces, especially after huge oil deposits were discovered. Traditionally, this area has had a chaotic political history, which has intensified in recent years with both the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars.

When the countries in the Gulf region finally gained their independence, most in the middle of the twentieth century, problems immediately developed. Conflicts included: boundary disputes, many of which were caused by foreign powers, economic development, power imbalances, and disputes over oil revenues. Issues that have recently become even more problematic include: lack of water, the race for arms and nuclear capabilities, and oil-price wars. If the leaders of the Gulf States do not find ways to live together in peace, then the region could find itself in a new cycle of imperialist domination, as the American military buildup after the Gulf War attests. If the
governments of the countries surrounding the Arabian Gulf cannot get along, then other countries will become involved, along with often unwelcome opinions and advice regarding how countries should be run.

Considering that this chaos takes place over some of the largest oil fields in the world, it is obvious that the situation is of concern to countries all over the world. The Gulf region contributes 40% of oil production and 70% of oil exports to the industrialized world. Japan gets almost 80% of its oil imports from the Gulf, Western Europe 60%, and the United States about 30%. Thus, the importance of this region can be seen clearly.

Kuwait is located on the northwestern shore of the Gulf. Kuwait is known for its huge oil reserves, its financial might, its aid to developing countries, and its role as mediator in the Arab world. The country is also known for its efforts in establishing the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, and for its active role in this group.

Kuwait has had a tumultuous history, with numerous sources of conflict. The northern border that it shares with the nation of Iraq has been the source of most of these disputes. Iraq has indicated its desire to annex Kuwait several occasions over the last century. Threats have included military buildups, border post attacks, and war. Because the dispute remains, future confrontations appear likely.

This thesis traces the history of the conflict over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. The second chapter discusses the origins of Kuwaiti boundary disputes, as well as its relationship with the Ottoman Empire. It also examines Kuwait’s geography, geopolitical considerations, and economy. The third chapter discusses the origins of Kuwaiti boundary disputes, as well as its relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The fourth chapter explores the 1913 Anglo-Turkish agreement, the early Kuwaiti relationship with
Saudi Arabia, and the Ojair conference of 1923, where Percy Cox delineated the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Other boundary demarcations, including the 1923 and 1932 delineations are also discussed in this chapter, in addition to the time period of 1930 to 1960 in Kuwaiti history. Chapter five examines the 1961 claim to Kuwait made by Iraqi General Qassim, and border tensions up to and including the Iraqi attack on the Kuwaiti Al-Samitah boundary post. Chapter six looks at the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, and how it affected and involved Kuwait, as well as the Kuwaiti economy in the same decade. The seventh chapter looks at how the Gulf War started, what happened during the war, and international involvement in it. Chapter eight examines the aftermath of the war and current relations between Iraq and Kuwait.

The author hopes that with this thesis international readers will become more aware of a region, a country, and an issue that is not widely (or sometimes accurately) discussed. It is hoped that through examining this thesis, readers who are not familiar with the Middle East will become interested in the area enough to learn more about the political situation there, and about Kuwait. Moreover, for Middle Eastern scholars, and for people who do know about the political situation in the region, this document will hopefully enrich already existing knowledge.
CHAPTER TWO

KUWAIT’S GEOGRAPHIC, GEOPOLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POSITION

This chapter describes Kuwait’s geographical, geopolitical, and economic characteristics. An understanding of the country’s geography and economy provides a useful tool for understanding the country, as well as its relationships with neighboring nations, which will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

LOCATION AND TOPOGRAPHY

Kuwait is located on the northwestern shore of the Arabian Gulf in southwestern Asia, forming a wedge between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It is a small country, with an area of 6,880 square miles, or 17,818 square kilometers,\(^1\) approximately the size of the state of New Jersey. Kuwait is located 28 degrees 32 to 30 degrees 6’ North, and 46 degrees 33 to 48 degrees 27’ East.\(^2\)
The terrain is generally flat with some gently rolling hills; the elevation ranges from a high point of 922 feet (about 300 meters) to a low point of sea level. The land can roughly be divided into four general typographies, including coastal dunes and the salt marshes and depressions near Kuwait Bay, which is a central inlet of the Gulf. There is also a western desert plateau, and the rest of the country consists of sparsely grassed desert.

The total boundary length is 598 miles (963 kilometers). Iraq borders the country on the north and west, sharing 160 miles (257 kilometers), or about one fourth of Kuwait’s borderline. Saudi Arabia lies to the southwest and has 101 miles of border (163 kilometers), and Iran is located across the Arabian Gulf. Kuwait’s Arabian Gulf coastline forms the eastern periphery of this country. Thus, Kuwait serves as a gateway to the Arab peninsula.

Kuwait also includes several islands in the Gulf off of the eastern coastline, including Bubiyan, Faylakah, Warba, Auha, and Miskan Islands. Although Bubiyan is the largest, it is low-lying and marshy. Historical and ancient Faylakah is the most populated, with a population of several thousand Kuwaitis. Warba Island, which lies north of Bubiyan, is also uninhabited. The flat and deserted Miskan and Auha islands lie north and south of Faylakah, respectively. There are several other unpopulated tiny islands along Kuwait’s southern coast.

Although Kuwait has 132 miles (212 kilometers) of Arabian Gulf coastline, it has no major rivers or lakes. Most of Kuwait’s water needs are met by desalinizing water from the Arabian Gulf. However, Kuwait does have some khabra, which are basins in the desert that fill with water after the occasional winter rainfall, which averages about four
inches, or ten centimeters, annually. These serve as watering holes for animals.

Additionally, Kuwait has minor reservoirs of fresh water trapped under the land; these are sometimes used for irrigation purposes. The port Kuwait City, located on the central eastern arm of the Kuwait Bay inlet, is another important aspect of this nation’s geography. As J. Al-Fil explains, “This harbor is a vital importing and exporting center, and is considered the outlet for the northeastern Arabian Peninsula.”

Kuwait City is not only a port handling goods destined for the inland cities of the eastern Arabian Peninsula, but it also supplies settlers in the desert with various goods which are imported or produced by local craftsmen. Thus it is an important centre bringing together peoples from different parts of the peninsula, from Najd (Saudi Arabia), Al-Hassa, and the Syrian Bedouin region. It is at the same time an integral and prosperous market for them, where they can trade their goods, such as wool, fat, and leather. Thus, Kuwait City serves as both a marine port and a desert market town.4

REGIONAL GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

There are numerous geopolitical implications concerning the location of Kuwait in relation to its neighboring countries; these force the country to act with discretion in foreign affairs. Kuwait is influenced by its position in the Arabian Peninsula “neighborhood” in dramatic ways. This small country is located near relatively powerful nations and strategically located waterways. Two additional geopolitical factors that affect Kuwait include the turbulence of regional military conflicts and the proximity of various “superpower” military base positions.
First, Kuwait is located in the midst of several relatively powerful nations, including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. In assessing the power of a country, physical size and population are important. Military size is also a factor for this study in determining strength. The table below indicates these relative power relationships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Area-Square Kilometers</th>
<th>1997 Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>17,818</td>
<td>1.9 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>438,446</td>
<td>21 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>1,648,000</td>
<td>64 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>2,150,000</td>
<td>18 million(^5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The geopolitical realities of being a small country surrounded by larger and more powerful ones has forced Kuwait to adopt a more neutral stance than it might otherwise desire on many political issues. "Kuwait cannot overcome the basic strategic reality that it is a small country with immense wealth with the wrong powerful neighbors."\(^6\)

Moreover, the nation has also allied itself, historically and at present, with various Western countries, including Britain and the United States, both of which have come to Kuwait’s rescue in times of emergency. In several major cases when Iraq was threatening to invade Kuwait, Britain sent troops to the border to protect the smaller nation. Also, in the 1990-1991 Gulf War, a coalition of international troops led by the United States went to the region to defend Kuwait.
As Gordon Robinson states, "In this precarious geopolitical position, Kuwait walks a fine line. It cannot afford to perturb its more powerful neighbors." At the same time, it must maintain peace with strong nations outside of the region who have vested interests in it for protection in times of crises. Robinson continues by stating:

Being a small state with only a 40 percent indigenous population (of a total 2 million before 1990), Kuwait had to keep good relations with all its bigger, more powerful neighbors. This attitude developed into a nonaligned policy towards the superpowers and a strategy of mediation in Arab affairs. The country's neutralism was active, utilizing its financial abilities and its leaders' shrewdness.7

Not only is Kuwait located near powerful neighbors, but it is also is near vital waterways, which affects it geopolitically. In particular, the Strait of Hormuz, lying several hundred kilometers from Kuwait, holds the only route for ships to pass to and from the Arabian Gulf. As shipping is an essential part of Kuwait's economy, it is vital to keep this strait open for international trade. This waterway lies in the territorial waters of Oman and Iran, thus Kuwait must be very careful in its relationships with these countries. The small nation's concern over the possible closing of the Hormuz Strait on an Omani or Iranian whim has caused it to propose the establishment of railway links to the Arabian Gulf countries. Such rail links would avoid shipping stoppages in the case of a Hormuz closure. Discussions of where to put the railway links are currently underway, although construction of the railways has not begun yet.

Kuwait also has full access to the Khor Abd-Allah waterway, which is part of Kuwait's territorial waters. Incidentally, this is a major obstruction for Iraq, which only has about 58 kilometers of water open for importing and exporting. In order to increase and expand its shipping and trade industries, Iraq has threatened Kuwait several times over the past few decades for full access to the Khor Abd-Allah.
Another geopolitical factor that influences Kuwait is the ongoing Israeli-Arab conflict. In the 1973 Arab war with Israel, Kuwait joined the oil embargo against the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as other countries that were supporting Israel. Kuwait also gave millions of dollars to Egypt and to the Palestine Liberation Organization (the PLO) Palestinian fighters. In addition, tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees settled in Kuwait. Moreover, Kuwait supported the Arab states by sending troops and offering financial aid to the cause. Kuwait put pressure on countries supporting Israel by limiting oil exports.

However, the geopolitical factors involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict upset Kuwait’s traditional attempts at neutrality. Palestinians moved to Kuwait because it was strong economically, offered excellent job opportunities, and because it was nearby. Arab nationalism also played a part in this migration. When Israel threatened neighboring Arab countries, Kuwait’s close proximity to the area forced it to take a political stand.

The Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, and the subsequent war, which lasted until 1989, was a second major conflict in this geographic vicinity that affected Kuwait. Many Kuwaitis interpreted the struggle, which took place in areas quite close to Kuwait, and the Strait of Hormuz, as indicating a Soviet desire to establish a base of power, or at least to balance America’s influence in the region.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which literally came right up to the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, had major impacts on Kuwait. Although it stated that it was neutral, Kuwait supported Iraq financially with billions of dollars worth of loans and aid. Kuwait further helped Iraq by permitting foreign vessels with munitions to unload in several of its ports, including the one in Kuwait City. According to Hassan Al-Ibrahim, “For the first time in
its modern history. Kuwait felt that it was forced by its geographical location to abandon its neutrality.\textsuperscript{8}

Kuwait sided with Iraq for several reasons, including fear that the newly established Shi'a regime in Iran would spread to Kuwait. "In the 1980s, Kuwait bought border security from Iraq by financially supporting the nation in its war against Iran"\textsuperscript{9} stated Henry Lerner. In other words, part of the reason that Kuwait helped Iraq was so that the larger country would not attempt to cross its border and invade.

In response to Kuwait's aid to Iraq, Iran attacked Kuwait many times throughout the 1980s. Iranians bombed oil installations on Kuwait's northern Arabian Gulf shore in 1981, and attacked several Kuwaiti ships in the Arabian Gulf in the mid-eighties. In 1988, a group of pro-Iranians hijacked a Kuwaiti Airways plane. In retaliation, Kuwait expelled thousands of Iranians during the 1980s. Needless to say, relations between Iran and Kuwait were tense during the 1980s.

U.S., Israeli, and Russian military presence in the Gulf region is another geopolitical component that historically affected Kuwait. For many years, the United States has had military facilities for American marines in Bahrain and in Oman, which offered air force and marine facilities. Egypt and Somalia also participate with the American Rapid Deployment Force's maneuvers. The U.S. military extends to the Mediterranean and Arabian Seas, and to the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, which the marines use as a land base. From the American military's point of view, the main goals of this military presence include: maintenance and protection of American national
interests in the Gulf region, stabilization of the tumultuous area, and protection of its oil and gas supplies.

Additionally, during the Gulf War, Americans deployed hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sold American weapons to countries bordering the Arabian Gulf, and set up new makeshift bases. Some of these troops and facilities were left behind. Since the Gulf War, American presence in the Gulf has increased. Anthony Cordesman further stated:

US military forces and power projection capabilities deter Iran and Iraq—two aggressive and radical regimes with military forces that might otherwise dominate the Gulf. The US prevents these states from achieving regional hegemony and intimidating their Southern Gulf neighbors. At the same time, the US plays a critical stabilizing role in the Southern Gulf itself, compensating for the lack of cooperation between the Gulf States and their internal rivalries.10

However, many Middle Eastern governments see American military presence as a necessary evil. Although they want the U.S. to help them in times of trouble, they do not want the United States to have so much influence over their countries’ policies in other areas. These governments want to make important decisions about their own nations independently. However, when they accept American military aid, they must accept America’s right to have a say in what happens in the region. According to Arthur Schmidt, “The Arab world feels divided, defenseless, and despondent about its ability to set its own course.”11 Many people in the region want self-created rules, which are in line with national ideologies, like Islam; they are tired of imperialism and domination from Great Britain, Israel, and the United States.
KUWAIT'S ECONOMY PRECEDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OIL INDUSTRY

The sea was, and is now to a much smaller degree, an important sector of the Kuwaiti economy. Fish and other edible products of the ocean, as well as pearls, were important as sources of both food and income. Products of Kuwait's main industries, which included ships, fishing nets, cloth and carpets, and metal work were manufactured. These and other various products were often traded. Before the discovery of oil, Kuwaitis imported dates and tobacco from Basra, exporting in return fabric and arms. Also, they imported carpets and wheat from Iran and exported fabrics. From Najd, Kuwait merchants imported leather, wool, and animal fats, and from India they imported wood, ropes, spices, coffee, sugar, fabrics, ammunition, and rice. Al-Fil also referred to exports to India included pearls and dates. The Kuwaitis also imported wood, gum arabic, and vegetable oil from Africa.¹²

Several factors affected this extensive international trade. First, much of the population of Kuwait lived on or near the coastal areas. Moreover, B.C. Busch claims, "The Kuwait harbor is on the largest bay in the Gulf, 25 miles east to west and 13 miles north to south."¹³ This harbor, with several major Kuwaiti port cities, was in a strategic location for trade, at the head of the Arabian Gulf. Iraq, Iran, and the Southern Gulf States are all very close. Many others, including India and Pakistan were in close vicinity and therefore easy to travel to and from. Thus, ocean products and their trade, along with other commodities, constituted much of Kuwait’s early economic production.
THE OIL BOOM AND DECLINE

In 1934, the Kuwaiti leader Ahmad Al-Jabir Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah granted exploration rights to the British and American owned Kuwait Oil Company. In 1938, oil was discovered at the huge Burgan oil field. After World War II, drillers found additional deposits in Wafra, North Fawaris, Umm Qadeer, Al-Manganeesh, Mutriba, and Rawdatain, as well as several offshore sites. Kuwaitis installed several pipelines and processing facilities, and commercial export of oil began in 1946. At this time, control of the oil was in the hands of foreign companies. However, by 1951, leader Sheikh Abdallah Al-Salim Al-Sabah, who ruled Kuwait from 1951 to 1960, made an agreement with Britain and American to share in the wealth of the oil company. By 1976, Kuwait owned the entire company.

From the fifties to the mid-eighties, oil production boomed in Kuwait. (See Appendix 1.) The government used oil revenues to improve all types of facilities in the country and to build up the infrastructure.

In an amazingly short period, the country was transformed from a poor, desert nation with some good ports, to a wealthy nation with a well-developed infrastructure. The next fifteen years would be some of the most challenging Kuwait’s oil industry had ever faced. In the 1980s, prices of the product plummeted. “From a high in 1981 of $34 a barrel, the price of crude oil reached a low of under $10 per barrel in 1986. OPEC succeeded in raising that price to only $18 by early 1987”¹⁴, explained Lerner. Along with the slump in oil prices came a lowered ability of the government to develop
infrastructure at the rates it had been. Moreover, there was an increased awareness that
the economy needed diversification- it was too risky for the country to depend solely on
oil for its income. More bad news lay just ahead for Kuwait's oil industry- the 1991 Gulf
War would begin in just four years. Oil production ceased during the Iraqi invasion of the
small country and millions of gallons of oil were dumped into the Arabian Gulf by the
Iraqis. Oil wells were set on fire, and the oil industry and country suffered extensive
damage.

The nineties have been a decade of healing and restoration for Kuwait's oil
business (See Appendix 2.) Oil production rose from 370,000 barrels a day in 1991 to
2,043,000 daily barrels in 1995, and GDP more than doubled in that same period. As of
1994, Kuwait had about 9% of world oil reserves, and possessing, as reported in the Oil
& Gas Journal, "probable reserves of at least 4 billion barrels, with the cost of extraction
of each barrel being $2."\textsuperscript{15} Even with March 1999 oil prices of about $12 per barrel, a
huge profit is still being made by Kuwaiti's oil industry.

**INVESTMENT**

Kuwaitis have invested large sums of the oil and other industry profits. "In 1993,
Kuwait had about $40 billion invested in Japan, western Europe, and the United States,
with sizable amounts in all the New York Stock Exchange's top 100 corporations"\textsuperscript{16},
Leila Foster explains.
In addition, Robinson contends, the government has sought to diversify the country’s role in the oil industry to make it a player on all levels, rather than simply being a producer/refiner of crude oil. It has purchased distribution networks and petrol stations (such as the Q8 chain in the United Kingdom) in other parts of the world.\textsuperscript{17}

Furthermore, Kuwaiti government investors in 1976, looking to the future, decided to invest 10\% of its annual oil income into an untouchable fund, to be used when the oil was depleted. This fund, Foster explains, called the Reserve Fund for Future Generations, was worth about $100 billion before the Gulf War. However, about half of these moneys were sold after the damaging Iraqi attack which cost Kuwait $170 billion total, leaving about $35 billion in the fund as of 1992. The government continues to put 10\% of its annual income into the fund, for the day (Kuwaiti oil is estimated to last about 160 more years) when the oil runs out.\textsuperscript{18}

**DIVERSIFICATION OF THE KUWAITI ECONOMY**

Although its geographic location, small size, and low population make Kuwait weak militarily, Kuwait is powerful economically. However, this economic prosperity is relatively recent. This country historically depended on the sea for its survival. Fishing and pearling were its main sources of work and income until the early to mid-1900s. As the oil industry developed and boomed, this product began to dominate the economy. Foster stated that, “Petroleum and its derivatives accounted for 93.8\% of Kuwait’s export
revenue by 1994." Thus, many Kuwaitis have felt the need to diversify the economy, so as to not be completely dependent on oil income. Trade, investment, product development, and new agriculture and fishing techniques are now serving as important sectors in the Kuwaiti economy. For example, one innovative method used to expand Kuwait's agricultural output is hydroponics, a technique involving the growing of plants in water only.

A 1996 *Middle East Economic Digest* report noted that, "The oil sector provides more than 80% of all Kuwaiti government revenues." The table indicates that total export amounts have hovered just above oil export sums for the past several decades in Kuwait. Hence, Kuwait has tried to diversify its economy in several different ways. The government has tried to encourage this process by increasing manufacturing levels, as well as by increasing the production of agricultural products and the fishing industry.

Between 1974 and 1984, manufacturing rates increased about 6.5% each year. As these rates slowed with the decrease of oil prices in the mid-eighties, Kuwait realized that it needed to diversify the kinds of industry if it was to remain financially secure. Three new industrial areas were established, in Shuaiba, Shuwaikh, and Ahmadi. In these areas, products like fertilizers, salt, and chlorine are manufactured. Kuwaiti construction, water desalinization, and ship construction are also skyrocketing, in hopes of decreasing Kuwait's dependence on petroleum-based commodities.

Kuwait is also trying to stimulate new production techniques in agriculture and fishing. Although only an estimated 3% of the desert country's land is arable, scientists are experimenting with new growing techniques, including hydroponics, irrigation, and
greenhouse agriculture. Using these methods, in 1998, Kuwait produced 35,000 metric
tons of tomatoes, 17,000 metric tons of cucumbers, and 16,000 metric tons of onions. In
the same year, about 16% of all consumed produce was grown in Kuwait. In the future,
as scientific growing methods are improved, these numbers will probably increase even
more.

Fishing, a traditional occupation for Kuwaitis has become less common as
foreigners have taken over manual labor jobs that natives are now reluctant to do. The
massive Gulf War oil spills and overfishing also have contributed to difficulties in the
fishing industry. However, as people experiment with running fisheries, fish production is
slowly increasing. Moreover, although it is now possible to create cultured pearls, about
1% of the Kuwaiti population is still involved in searching for the pink pearls from the
Kuwaiti coastal waters.
CHAPTER 2 ENDNOTES

1 McNally, World Facts and Maps, p. 139.


4 Al-Fil, Historical Geography of Kuwait, Dar Lubnan, 1972, p.105.


12 Al-Fil, A Historical Geography of Kuwait, Dar Lubnan, 1972, pp. 466-495.


15 Oil and Gas Journal, 9-23-91, 62.


CHAPTER THREE

KUWAITI RELATIONS WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

To understand the country's border problems with its neighbors, an overview of Kuwait's history should be noted. Therefore, this chapter will discuss Kuwait's nineteenth-century history, in order to uncover the country's boundary disputes. Geographical and political considerations of Kuwait's foreign associations are included. Additionally, events leading up to the 1899 British-Kuwaiti Treaty, the Treaty itself, and reactions to it will be described.

KUWAITI FOREIGN RELATIONS

Historical records show that there was a severe drought in the Arabian Peninsula in the early 1720s. This lack of water caused many nomadic groups to change location, including the Bani Utub tribe. They moved from present day Saudi Arabia to what is now the Kuwait Bay area. The tribe was absorbed into the existing sparse population, and became involved in Gulf activities, including trade. Lemer states, "When the explorer Carsten Neibuhr visited the area in the 1760s, he described Kuwait as having about
10,000 people and a fleet of 800 vessels. Most of the people made their living by trading, fishing, or pearling."

During the late 1700s, the Ottoman Empire was huge and quite powerful. See Figure 1. Kuwait technically was included in the geographical realm of the Empire, but in reality, the Ottomans did not exert any real power over Kuwait. According to J. Kelly, the Kuwaiti leaders’ attitudes towards the Empire “ignored the Ottoman Empire’s claim to us on most occasions, denied it on others, and tolerated it when danger threatened from another quarter.” One Kuwaiti historian, Al-Najjar, wrote, “The Ottomans had not been able to enforce their sovereignty over Kuwait, and the relationship remained fluctuating between loyalty and separation.”

The Ottomans were not interested in Kuwait until 1869, when Medhat Pasha, from Turkey became the governor of nearby Basra in present day Iraq. He decided to gain more power in the Gulf region for the Ottomans through shipping. The Suez Canal had just opened, and Medhat Pasha had visions of keeping a strong commercial Ottoman fleet in the Arabian Gulf, which could sail through to the Red Sea and then on to the Mediterranean. As Nawar explained, that this would be excellent for business, and would also help to counter the British influence in the area. Medhat Pasha’s strategy was to tighten the Ottoman grip on the Gulf Arab Emirates, which had not signed contracts with the British at that time.

Two years after his appointment to the governorship, Medhat Pasha saw his chance to gain control over Al-Hassa, the current eastern province of Saudi Arabia. A
rebellion broke out in the region when two brothers fought over the leadership of the region. Medhat asked Kuwait, with its large fleet of ships, to help him in his military expedition to apply more control over the district. The Shaikh of Kuwait, Abdullah Al-Sabah II, was more than willing to help the governor with this task, as he wanted to gain Ottoman favor and wanted to simultaneously get rid of his long time rival. Prince Saud of Al-Hassan, who dominated Kuwait’s southern border coastal area a bit too much. 5

After the success in this military endeavor, Medhat Pasha visited Shaikh Al-Sabah in Kuwait, and issued a decree which stated that Kuwait was to be an autonomous area ruled by the Al-Sabah family, but under the administrative organization of the Province of Basra. The Shaikh was endowed with the title of “Qaimmaqam,” or deputy. Later in 1871, Medhat divided the province of Basra into four Al-Weyah, or units, with their respective Aqdiah, or sub-units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aqdiah</th>
<th>Al-Weyah</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Basra</td>
<td>Basra, Faw, Qarna, Kuwait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Muntafek</td>
<td>Hay, Nasserya, Shatrat Al-Muntafak, Sauq Al-Shioukh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Amara</td>
<td>Duairij, Shatrat Al-Amara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Najd (Al-Hassa)</td>
<td>Hufouf, Qatif, Qatar 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even though the Shaikh had accepted the title that Medhat Pasha had bestowed upon him, Kuwait technically remained under Ottoman sovereignty until Shaikh Mubarak rose to power in the small nation. P. Graves reasoned, “It must be admitted in
fairness to the Turks that although they never exercised any real sovereignty over Kuwait, their suzerainty had been taken for granted by its chiefs, and by the British Government, until 1899."

KUWAIT'S BREAK WITH THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: THE 1899 TREATY

Shaikh Mubarak was the seventh leader of the Al-Sabah dynasty, which had ruled Kuwait from 1756, the year that the first Sabah, Sabah I, was chosen as the initial leader of Kuwait. (See Table 3.) Mubarak "the Great," as he was known, had come to power in 1896 by killing his brothers Mohammad and Jarah in a coup. A wealthy friend of the father of Mohammad, Jarah, and Mubarak, along with the murdered brothers' sons, fled to Basra, where they tried to organize an attempted to overthrow Mubarak. Thus, the "great" leader desperately turned to the British to save his throne.

The British, whose power had risen steadily in the Gulf region, had several reasons to make a deal with the beseiged leader of this strategic location. They were interested in Kuwait as it had the potential as part of a planned maritime route to India. Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, also had dreams of transforming the Gulf into a British lake.

Another reason that Britain wanted to secure Kuwait's friendship was that they knew about Medhat Pasha's former deal with Abdullah Al-Sabah II, and were nervous about Ottoman domination of the Gulf. If the Ottomans gained power in the area, then
Britain’s influence would decrease. The last thing that imperialist, nineteenth-century Britain wanted was to lose power in any region, including the Arabian Gulf.

Germany’s proposal to create a Berlin-Baghdad Railway acted as the catalyst that made Britain move quickly to negotiate with Kuwait to create a partnership. M. Izzard stated that, “The German railway scheme was one of a whole series of projects, starting in the 1830s, of linking mail services and utilizing modern means of communication.”8 The planned railway would not only improve intercommunication, but would also connect Germany with Middle Eastern markets. Capital avenues would open up and Germany would undoubtedly become stronger and richer. Britain opposed the growing German power, but the Ottoman Caliph was pleased as Germany was its greatest ally and financial backer.

Because of its port, Kuwait played a role in this deal. Part of the proposed railway plan involved a connection to a Gulf outlet, and Kuwait City had been selected as that outlet. Basra was not chosen because it, as stated by Izzard:

... had defects as a terminus mainly because the bar at the mouth of the river acted as an impediment to ocean steamers of any size, but Kuwait, about eighty miles from Basra as the crow flies, was an excellent natural harbour on a landlocked bay, twenty miles across.9

Kaiser Wilhelm II became the leader of Germany in 1888; one year later, he made several trips to Constantinople, which improved German-Ottoman circumstances in terms of being considered a business partner. He visited Palestine as a pilgrim, and stopped by on his return to Damascus, where he claimed, “Every Muslim is my friend.” These friendly enterprises made the Kaiser popular, and he won a preliminary agreement on
November 25th, 1899, which gave permission to a German company to build the proposed “Berlin-Baghdad Railway.”

When British officials heard about this permission that had been granted to Germany, they immediately signed a treaty with Kuwait. Part of the treaty stated that Kuwait would have to get Britain’s permission to enter any agreement with a foreign country. This clause made having its port as a stop on the railway virtually impossible. Lord Cranbourne, the British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, commented in 1902 on the hastily signed 1899 Treaty, claiming:

In 1899 when the first announcements came from Constantinople regarding the Baghdad project, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, became alarmed at the construction of a railway which would link the head of the Persian Gulf with the railways of central Europe...It was at the instigation of the Indian government that Colonel Meade, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, proceeded to Kuwait and negotiated with the Shaikh a clandestine agreement by which the latter accepted the “protection” of the British government and agreed to enter into no international agreements without the consent of a British resident advisor.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, less than a year after the agreement was signed, a German commission traveled to Kuwait in hopes of changing the government’s position. They recommended Kadmah Bay as a terminus for the railway, and tried to persuade the Shaikh to lease the Germans the area around the Bay, in return for a huge amount of money and protection from their country. However, B.C. Busch noted that, “Mubarak had dodged the issue, making no commitments and refusing the Consul’s presents.”¹¹ Thus, the German commission left Kuwait feeling angry and frustrated.
OTTOMAN REACTION TO THE 1899 TREATY

The Ottomans knew that a "secret" arrangement had been made between Kuwait and Britain. Relations between the Kuwaitis and the representatives of the Ottoman Empire became more and more tense. As J. Lorimer reported:

The next few months witnessed strenuous efforts by the Turkish authorities at Basra, possibly due to their having been aware of the Shaikh’s agreement with Britain, to assert themselves at Kuwait: Shaikh Mubarak on his part showed a new intractability in his dealings with the Turks. A rather strained situation arose.¹²

Soon, the Ottomans retaliated. They tried to send Shaikh Mubarak into “voluntary” exile in 1901. They offered him two choices: to travel to Constantinople to be appointed as a member of the Council of State, or to settle in any part of the Ottoman Empire he wanted. The Ottoman representatives also said that they would grant him a huge monthly stipend. They stressed that if he did not choose one of these options, he would be ejected from Kuwait by force.

The British came to Mubarak’s rescue. A British officer who was in Kuwait at the time heard about the Ottoman delegation and the choices that it had offered to Al-Sabah. The British representatives became quite angry, and told the Ottoman delegation to leave immediately or they would blow up the Ottoman ship then and there. Thus, the irate committee sailed back to Basra. Mubarak was saved.

However, in 1902, the Ottomans challenged Kuwait’s northern borders, which marked the first of the many future objections to Kuwait’s border delineations. The Ottomans sent military units into several areas including Bubiyan Island, Umm Qasr, and Safwan. Mubarak protested to the Ottoman administration, insisting that these locations
were part of Kuwait and had been inhabited and used by Kuwaitis for centuries. His protest was ignored. At this time, some experts accused the Germans of being behind the military expeditions, because they had not gotten their railway terminus. However, these offensives ultimately failed and there never was a Kuwaiti railroad outlet.

As the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Kuwait soured, relations between the Gulf State and Britain improved. In 1904, Captain Knox was appointed the first British Agent in Kuwait, and the country was essentially transformed into a British Protectorate, although it was still nominally under the sovereignty of the Ottoman State. Furthermore, according to Cordesman, “Kuwait’s alliance with Britain helped Shaikh Mubarak consolidate his power and make his sons its rulers. All leaders of Kuwait since Mubarak have been descendants of his sons, Salim and Jabir.”¹³
CHAPTER 3 ENDNOTES


3 Al-Najjar, M. The Political History of Iraq’s International Relations with the Arabian Gulf. Basra University, 1975, p. 46.

4 Nawar, N. History of Iraq from 1830 to 1872, Dar Al-Kotob Al-Arabi, 1971, pp. 403-406.


6 Al-Najjar, op. cit., p. 54.


9 Izzard, M. op. cit. 154-157.


CHAPTER FOUR

BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN KUWAIT AND ITS NEIGHBORS

During the first half of the twentieth century, neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, and to a greater extent, Iraq, threatened, harassed, and actually invaded Kuwait. These nations have often attempted to justify their actions by arguing that border issues remain "unresolved". The discussion of the issue of Kuwait's boundaries with its neighbors involves many aspects, including geography, economics and history, all of which will be examined in this chapter.

THE 1913 ANGLO-TURKISH AGREEMENT

Kuwait's reigning family, the Sabahs developed and deepened their relationship with the British, especially when they feared invasion from foreign powers. In 1913, Britain confirmed Kuwait's independence from the Ottoman Empire by delineating the country's border with Basra, the Ottoman province located in modern day Iraq. The British were eager to instigate this agreement because it increased their own power in the Gulf and decreased the influences of other nations, including Germany and Russia. Though it was broadly recognized after 1913, the treaty was not technically ratified until after World War I, in 1921.
With the 1913 treaty, Kuwait was declared to be an autonomous borough of the Ottoman Empire, having complete administrative independence. The Turks were given the power to appoint a Kuwaiti agent, but had to abstain completely from any interference in decision-making with Kuwait. The Shaikh of Kuwait was given total authority in the semi-circle boundary emanating from Kuwait City with a radius of 42 miles; this included the offshore islands of Warba, Bubiyan, Miskan, Failaka, Auha, Kubbar, Qaru, Magta, and Umm Al-Maradim. Another boundary radiated outside of this line. The area between the marked delineations represented an area containing tribes who would pay duties to the Shaikh. This region was also to be independent of the Ottoman control.

Shaikh Mubarak led the prospering country well, and it flourished. The population and maritime activities increased. Foster stated, "Mubarak invited U.S. missionaries to open a medical station in Kuwait. The Arabian mission of the Dutch Reformed Church in America provided medical service in Kuwait until 1911, when oil wealth permitted the country to build its own hospitals." Education and health services also improved.

In World War I, the British occupied Basra, a port vital to the area's economy. They forced the Ottomans into the north, thereby completely eliminating any remnants of the Ottoman-Kuwaiti relationship. In 1917, modern day Iraq came under British military mandate. Therefore, as Kuwait and Iraq were now both under the influence of Britain, disputes between the two lessened. However, things were not quiet for long.
THE SAUDI ARABIAN-KUWAITI RELATIONSHIP

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, the founder of modern day Saudi Arabia, and his father immigrated to Kuwait. Their enemy, Ibn Rashid, an ally of the Ottoman Empire, had driven the pair out of Najd. They probably choose Kuwait because of its close vicinity to Najd, and because it was largely independent of the Ottoman regime.

Ibn Saud benefited from his stay in Kuwait, especially after Mubarak “the Great” murdered his brother and seized the throne in 1896. Ibn Saud learned from Mubarak, and saw him as a mentor. Abdul Aziz said of Shaikh Mubarak, “I always regarded him as my father and in his days our close friendship did away with all need of fixed frontiers, for my people were as much at home in the territories of Kuwait as were his in my country. To him I always went for advice in my difficulties.”

Although the Saud family enjoyed their stay in the small emirate, they dreamed of returning to power in Najd. The younger Saud convinced his father that he could capture Riyadh, and asked Mubarak for financial and military assistance. The Kuwaiti Shaikh was more than willing to do this, as he truly liked Saud and viewed Ibn Rashid as an enemy. In one swift and surprising attack, Abdul Aziz captured Riyadh on January 15, 1902. Soon after, he began annexing other regions, including Al-Hassa, Najd, Hejaz, and others, thereby laying down the foundation for the creation of the modern Saudi Arabia.
Shortly after the war, Shaikh Mubarak grew jealous of Ibn Saud’s great successes, especially since Mubarak wanted to be a great leader but only ruled a tiny country. Mubarak worried that Abdul Aziz might influence Kuwaiti tribes to join him. Moreover, he wondered if the Saudi leader might even try to claim Kuwait in his seemingly unquenchable thirst for new land and power.

In 1915, the relationship between the two leaders took a turn for the worse. The Al-Ajman tribe from Najd rebelled against Abdul Aziz, and they asked for Mubarak’s help. The Kuwaiti Shaikh sent a large force headed by his son, Salim. The Al-Ajman tribes were run out of Saud’s land largely by his own forces, but ended up taking refuge in the Kuwaiti desert, which Salim granted them. Thus, Salim went from being against the Al-Ajman tribe, to being on their side. Ibn Saud was angry at this turn of events, but he yielded later that year, 1915, when Salim’s father, Mubarak passed away.

Jaber II, Mubarak’s son, succeeded him. He initiated friendly relations with the House of Saud, and ordered the Ajman tribes out of the Kuwaiti desert. However, Jaber made the mistake of focusing his attention almost solely on Kuwait City and lost control of the desert areas. Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud capitalized on Jaber’s error by inviting the tribes to come under his protection. He also collected zakat (2½% of a Muslim’s yearly savings). Several Kuwaiti tribes joined Abdul Aziz, including the Awazim and the Mutair groups.3

After just over a year in power, Jaber II died. His brother, Salim, who was interested in the desert, replaced him. He was concerned about how Abdul Aziz was trying to influence his tribes. In response to Abdul Aziz’s offer of protection and the collecting of zakat from his tribes, Salim befriended Saud’s enemies, including the
Al-Ajman group who had once invaded Saudi land.

When Salim complained to Colonel Hamilton, the British Political Agent in Kuwait, the British attempted to solve the problem in December of 1917. Hamilton procured Abdul Aziz’s agreement to return the tribes he had lured onto his land. In return, Salim agreed to expel the Al-Ajman tribe from Kuwait. Another British official, James Philby, who was a British intelligence officer and writer, recommended at this time that Kuwait be annexed to Ibn Saud’s lands, stating that Kuwait was the natural harbor of the Arabian Peninsula. The problem was temporarily solved, but both Abdul Aziz and Salim desired to dominate the region.

The political situation took a turn for the worse in 1920. Shaikh Salim decided to show Ibn Saud exactly where his territory ended. He resolved to build a village and castle at the southernmost edge of Kuwaiti land 150 miles south of Kuwait City. This point was chosen as it was declared the southernmost point as defined by the 1913 Anglo-Turkish Agreement. When Ibn Saud heard of these plans, he sent his ally, the Shaikh of the Mutair clan, to build a settlement in Jariyah, just northwest of Dohat Balbul. Salim sent some men to threaten them, but the Mutair tribe attacked and destroyed the Kuwaiti encampment.

In reaction, Salim sent a delegation to Riyadh to complain about the attack and to seek compensation for the damages. Abdul Aziz refused to relent and blamed Salim for the incident. He also stated that no one had ever clearly delineated Kuwait’s borders. Abdul Aziz also demanded that the Kuwaiti Shaikh sign a list of his demands, including
that the Shaikh give all the land east and west of Jariyan to Abdul Aziz. He informed Salim that if he did not sign the list of demands, then Saudi Arabia would attack. When the Shaikh refused to sign the list, Abdul Aziz attacked.

In September of 1920, Ibn Saud sent his ally Faisal Al-Daiwaish to assault Salim’s small emirate. The soldiers entered the town of Jahra and surrounded the fort there, where Salim and several hundred of his men had sought shelter. Much to Salim’s surprise, Al-Dawaish sent a Muslim scholar to talk to Salim’s people about Islam. He was a member of the Ikhwah, an Islamic fundamentalist group, and had come to convince them to change their worldly ways and become “true” Muslims. However, before Salim could respond, the British Royal Air Force sent warning signals to the Ikhwah and they withdrew.

The Ikhwah were allies of Abdul Aziz, whom they considered to be their mentor and leader. Their mission was to convert all Muslims to their version of Islam, which was relatively strict. Their goal paralleled Abdul Aziz’s objective of dominating the Arabian Peninsula. Aziz used these eager fighters (who believed that they were fighting for the cause of Islam) in order to unite the Arabian Peninsula under the name of “Saud”. However, the British forced Abdul Aziz to sign an agreement, which restricted the Ikhwah from interfering in the territories of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.

In February of 1921, in an effort to mediate the constant disagreements over borders, the Shaikh of Muhammarah, Khazaal, sent his son along with Salim’s nephew, Ahmad, to meet with Ibn Saud. They met just north of Riyadh. At this meeting, Abdul Aziz announced that although he liked the people of Kuwait, he did not approve of
Shaikh Salim. On February 27th, the delegation was informed of the death of Salim and Abdul Aziz tore up the maps with their Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabia delineations. He declared that there was no longer any quarrel to settle, or any need for a boundary between his territory and Kuwait. Salim’s nephew, Ahmad, returned to Kuwait, where he became the new leader. He and Ibn Saud then established friendly relations.

THE OJAIR CONFERENCE

In November of 1922, a major conference was held in Ojair, (or Uqair) a Saudi port on the Arabian Gulf. The purpose of the conference was to discuss Iraqi and Kuwaiti borders with Najd. Abdul Aziz and an entourage of his advisors represented Najd, and Sabih Beg, the Minister of Communication and Works, represented Iraq. J.C. Moore, a British Political Agent in Kuwait, represented the emirate. Sir Percy Cox, the British High Commissioner for Iraq, chaired the meeting.

Colonel Dickson, a British Liaison officer in Bahrain, recorded a detailed account of the conference. According to Dickson, Sabih Beg and Abdul Aziz started the conference’s discussions. When Sir Cox asked Sabih Beg to state what he thought the boundary line should be, Sabih Beg leaped up and yelled:

Since God created the world and history began to be written, Iraq’s boundary extends south to within 12 miles of Ibn Saud’s capital, Riyadh. It turns west to the Red Sea, so as to include Hail, Medina and Yanbo, and east to include Hufuf and Qatif on the Persian Gulf. As God is my witness, this and only this is the true boundary which cannot be disputed.
Abdul Aziz then jumped up and retorted:

    I know nothing about the Creation, but I do know that from the days of Abraham, my great-grandfather, the territories of Najd and the Bedouin would have extended as far north as Aleppo and the river Orontes in North Syria, including the whole country on the right bank of the Euphrates and from there down to Basra on the Persian Gulf.\(^9\)

After both of these astounding claims were made, everyone calmed down and Ibn Saud declared that the boundary needed to be based on tribes, instead of drawing an arbitrary straight line on a map. Sir Cox, knowing very little about tribal life, said he wanted to draw a straight line for the borders.

    Ibn Saud then tried to educate Cox about tribal life in the desert. Saud said that each tribe had its own wells and grazing lands, which were called *dirah*. During each season except in the summer, each clan roamed through its *dirah*, where their treasured permanent wells were located. If it was a dry year, the nomads moved into their neighbors’ territory, provided they had friendly relations (if not, they would attack). In this way, the tribes formed alliances which helped them to survive through drought and other difficulties. Abdul Aziz stated that all of Arabia was made up of these alliances, and to draw a line arbitrarily through the middle of them would only cause trouble.

    However, Cox was not interested in the dynamics of desert life. He wanted to get the conference over with and was tired of discussions. Thus, on the sixth day of the meeting, According to H.R.P. Dickson, he:

    ...took a red pencil and very carefully drew on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Jabal Anaizan, close to the Transjordan frontier. This gave Iraq a large area of the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Saud, he then ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd, his argument being that the power of Al-Sabah had decreased from the time that the Anglo-Turkish Agreement had been drawn up.\(^10\)
Percy Cox then drew a line from the eastern extremity of the Saudi-Iraqi border at the intersection of Wadi Valley Al-Auja with Wadi Al-Batin. Then the line proceeds a bit southeast in a straight line to the intersection of the 29th parallel with the red semicircle laid down in the 1913 agreement, and follows this line until it hits the coast at Ras Al-Qaliyah. Cox drew this line based on geometry and completely disregarded the tribal organization considerations and the natural features of the land. He then linked the eastern end of the Saudi-Iraqi border to the intersection of the 29th parallel latitude of the 1913 semicircle as the borderline between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Then Cox created a neutral zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The borders of the area surrounded Khor Al-Maqa, a region suspected of being rich in oil. Cox claimed that he was not able at the time to decide to whom to allocate the area. He drew the western border of this neutral zone which began at the point of intersection of the 29th parallel latitude with the said circle extending southeast along the western edge of a low ridge called Al-Shag until it intersected with a straight east-west line, which Sir Cox drew to pass through Ain Al-Abd until it reached the Gulf shore north of Ras Al-Misha’ab. The neutral zone was thus bounded on the north by a section of the semicircle, on the west by Al-Shag through Ain Al-Abd to the coast and from the east by the Gulf coast. The western border of this neutral zone was based on the natural features of Al-Shag, and the southern border of the zone was a straight line going through a featureless desert. Dickson recorded his opinions of these delineations made by the hurried man with the red pencil:
By this somewhat strange arrangement, which tasted of surrender pure and simple to a strong state at the expense of a small and weak one, the obvious end in view being expediency and desire to mollify the powerful and troublesome Ibn Saud, the southern boundary of the recognized territory of Kuwait was pushed back a hundred and fifty miles, reducing the area to an area of six thousand square miles.\textsuperscript{13}

Sir Percy Cox then returned to Iraq where he was stationed as the British High Commissioner, and informed the Shaikh of Kuwait, Ahmad Al-Jaber, about the results of the Ojair Conference. Major Moore and Colonel Dickson were also present. Dickson writes:

"The young Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jaber, scarcely a year on the throne and very impressionable, received a blow to his faith in Great Britain from which he never really recovered. In later years, Shaikh Ahmad told Dickson that as he considered the whole of the Kuwait Neutral Zone to be part of his territory, he would never consent to go half shares with Abdul Aziz in the granting of any oil concession. Shortly before his death, however, in 1950, Shaikh Ahmad agreed with Ibn Saud to grant a concession to the American Independent Oil Company. He did this, he said, out of his desire to maintain friendship with Ibn Saud, whose support was slowly becoming worth more to him than that of the British, who with the coming of oil to his land, and with their policy daily becoming more pro-Israel and less pro-Arab, had alienated the whole Arab and Muslim world, not excluding himself."\textsuperscript{14}

**FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OJAIR CONFERENCE KUWAIT BORDER DECISION**

At Ojair, Kuwait lost two thirds of its land to Saudi Arabia for several reasons. First of all, according to Dickson, the aim of giving away sections of Kuwait’s southern territories was partially to fulfill Sir Cox’s desire to mollify the powerful and troublesome Abdul Aziz. Sir Cox believed that Aziz thought that the problem had been solved according to European standards, and was angry at Cox for wanting to draw a straight
line. Sir Percy did not want to anger Aziz, and therefore gave him parts of Kuwait to satisfy the angry impassioned man.

Moreover, Sir Cox’s aim of courting Ibn Saud at Kuwait’s expense showed that there had been a major shift in British policy in the Arabian Gulf. This change seemed due mainly to the rising power and influence of Abdul Aziz. For example, Aziz had seized Riyadh in 1902, and acquired most of Najd by 1904. In 1906, he defeated his enemy Al-Rashid. By 1913, he had captured the eastern province of Arabia, Al-Hassa. Britain was impressed by these successes and hoped that someday they could use Ibn Saud’s military genius for their own benefit.

As Najd and Iraq became more and more important to Britain, Kuwait’s strategic value decreased.

The position of Kuwait altered radically after the capture of Mesopotamia in World War One, for Iraq became the centre for British power in the Persian Gulf. Kuwait was no longer of the strategic importance to Great Britain that it had been. British interest in the Shaikhdom waned temporarily.15

Thus, Kuwait was no longer as useful to Britain. Moreover, since Iraq was virtually under British protection when the conference was held and any territorial gains for Iraq were gains for the new colony, Sir Cox rejected Ibn Saud’s territorial claims on southern Iraqi lands. Instead, he sacrificed the small and insignificant Kuwait.

Two other key factors were involved in the decision. One involved Major J.C. Moore, who was supposed to be supporting the emirate, but who said nothing. The fact that he was a British official and did not in fact support Kuwait at all leads one to conclude that he was possibly working with the British Cox. At any rate, his lack of participation hurt Kuwait’s standing in the conference.
The last major factor involved in the biased decision was Sir Percy Cox himself. He was in a hurry and wanted to end the conference. Further, he had a huge amount of power as the British High Commissioner for Iraq. In fact, Cox exerted ultimate power over the region. According to Dickson, "Sir Percy dominated everything and everybody."\textsuperscript{16} Cox was tired of being confronted and decided to lay down the law when he brought out his red pencil and made the border. According to John Marlowe, "The treaty of Ojair ... was in the nature of a diktat imposed on Najd, Kuwait, and Iraq by Sir Percy Cox in the name of H.M.G."\textsuperscript{17}

**THE 1923 KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER DEMARCATION**

Although the Kuwait and Saudi border was defined in the Ojair Conference, no decision was made at that time regarding the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. Thus, the Shaikh of Kuwait requested in April of 1923 that the boundary be delineated. He requested that it be delineated as follows:

> From the intersection of Wadi Al-Auja with the Al-Batin and thence northwards along the Al-Batin to a point just south of the latitude of the Safwan wells, Jabal Sinam, and Umm Qasr, leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with Khor Abdullah.\textsuperscript{18}

The Shaikh also named the islands of Warba, Bubiyan, Miskan, Failaka, Auha, Kubbar, Qaru, and Umm Al-Maradim as Kuwait's property in his letter to Sir Cox.
The High Commissioner for Iraq, Percy Cox, wrote to the British Political Agent in Kuwait with his answer, informing Shaikh Ahmad that the border and the islands were to be recognized. He continued to say:

As you are aware, it is insofar as it goes, identical with the frontier indicated by the green line of the Anglo-Turkish 1913 Agreement, but there seems to be no necessity to make special allusions to that document in your communication to the Shaikh."^{19}

Thus, Cox inconsistently referred to the green line of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement as the boundary line defining Kuwait's border with Iraq, although he had disregarded it when he defined the Saudi-Kuwaiti border at the Ojair Conference the year before.

THE 1932 KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER TREATY AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

Official letters were exchanged between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti leaders from 1923 until 1932, when the Prime Minister of Iraq, Nuri Al-Sa’id wrote a letter that reaffirmed the borders of Kuwait as follows:

From the intersection of the Wadi-El-Audja with the Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Umm Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdulla. The islands of Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan, Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru, and Umm-El-Maradim appertain to Kuwait.^{20}

The description of the borders in Nuri Al-Sa’id’s letter did not change the border descriptions in any way, but did emphasize his acceptance of the established ones. The Ruler of Kuwait, the Shaikh Ahmad Al-Jaber, approved those lines in a letter that he sent to the British Representative in Kuwait in August of 1932.
There was a definite reason for Al-Sa’id’s actions. In short, he wanted Iraq to enter the League of Nations, and to gain entry a country had to have well-defined boundaries with its neighbors. Iraq was determined to define the borders so as to satisfy one the basic requirements to enter the League. On September 27, Iraq sent a letter to Sir Eric Drummond, who was then Secretary General of the League of Nations, telling him that Iraq’s borders, including the one with Kuwait, had been clarified. Iraq’s application to the League was approved on October 3, 1932.

Both sides, especially Kuwait, expected that after the boundary had been delineated, that it would physically be marked out at the location of the actual border. However, this did not happen. Although many committees were assigned to do so, the borders were not demarcated. The lack of physical marking of the border led to many future problems. Moreover, although Iraq had clearly demonstrated that it quite clearly understood where the countries began and ended, it continued to violate the Kuwaiti border, and never actually accepted the demarcated lines.

KUWAIT AND IRAQ: THE 1930s TO 1960

During the 1930s, during the reign of King Ghazi of Iraq, a propaganda war was launched, to promote the idea of the annexation of Kuwait to Iraq. King Ghazi had a private broadcasting station in his palace, from which he would verbally attack the Shaikh of Kuwait, in hopes of provoking the Kuwaitis to rebel against their leader and to join the Iraqi movement. A few Kuwaitis actually did. In the late thirties, the propaganda attacks worsened, when the Iraqi media started accusing Kuwait of being the source of
smuggled weapons used by southern Iraqi tribes in a rebellion.21 Soon, members of the Iraqi government, influenced by the media, began to support the program of Iraq absorbing Kuwait. However, this movement died after King Ghazi’s death in 1939.

In 1938, one year before the king’s death, Tawfiq Al-Suwaidi, the Iraqi foreign minister, presented a proposal to the British Foreign Ministry regarding several local and regional topics. One of the central issues was Kuwait, about which he wrote:

Kuwait represents a twofold problem for Iraq: A) It has become an entrepot for extensive arms trafficking and smuggling; B) It bars Iraq’s access to the open sea: in regards to B, Iraq’s only channel of access to the open sea is at present Shatt Al-Arab. The Iraqi government feels that it is of vital importance to secure and alternative for the following reasons: 1) The recent dispute with Iran has emphasized the unreliability of the Shatt: Iran is in a position to interrupt it at any time; 2) The Shatt tends to be more and more congested … just before the War of 1914-1918, Kuwait was an autonomous qadha of the Wilayat of Basra. The Iraqi government, as successor to the Ottoman government in the Wilayat of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, considers that Kuwait should properly be incorporated into Iraq…22

Furthermore, Al-Suwaidi suggested that, if Britain refused to incorporate Kuwait into Iraq, that Iraq should be given permission to either lease a Kuwait Bay port site from Kuwait as well as a railway line corridor, or else the Kuwaiti frontier should be moved south, to allow sufficient room at Umm Qasr for water access, and leaving all of Khor Abdullah in Iraq.

However, the British responded negatively to the requests as follows:

By the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923, the future of all territories outside the boundaries of the new Turkey was left to be determined by the parties concerned. The location of the frontiers of Iraq, with the exception of her frontier with Turkey, was, therefore, a matter depending solely on the subsequent decisions of the Allied Powers. It can be shown, however, that there was never any intention on the part of those powers to include Kuwait in any shape or form within the boundaries of Iraq, nor is there any decision that Iraq shall include the Vilayet as such. On the contrary, it is clear that the frontiers of Iraq have always been
considered to be the de facto boundaries which have been enforced since Iraq became a separate country. and further, that when in 1932 the frontier between Iraq and Kuwait was fixed by an exchange of notes, which was a formal confirmation of the line previously existing and that the line was the frontier of Iraq, leaving her no rights beyond it. It will thus be seen that in order to establish any claim to Kuwait, Iraq would have to show some decision of the Allied Powers giving her rights over Kuwait and that the fact that Iraq may not have formally recognized the present status of Kuwait does not really affect the matter at issue. 23

In response to the Iraqi request for an additional outlet to the Arabian Gulf through Kuwait Bay, Britain recommended that Iraq build a port in Khor Abdullah.

nearby the existing Iraqi railway system. Concerning the Iraqi Foreign Minister's second suggestion that the northern boundary line should be moved south, Mr. Charles Baxter of the British Foreign Office recommended that:

First, it would be necessary for the Iraqi government … if they wished for the Shaikh to cede to them a part of his territory, e.g. the small island of Warba and the navigable channel between that island and the open sea they would have to make an offer to compensate him elsewhere. For this purpose it would be desirable that the Iraqi government’s offer should be made as attractive as possible to the Shaikh; it would be well that the compensation offered should quite evidently exceed in value the territory which they were asking to cede. 24

However, Iraq did not want face-to-face negotiations with Kuwait. Later, in yet another attempt to acquire its neighbor, Iraq rationalized that Kuwait would not require any repayment if it did cede part of its land, and that Ibn Saud would be upset if the process actually occurred. We can see an example of this way of thinking in a letter from the British Political Resident in the Gulf (Basra) to the Secretary of the Government of India, referring to Kuwaiti Shaikh Ahmad's refusal to any cession of Kuwaiti territory stating that:
I do not consider that his pride as an Arab ruler would permit him to accept cash compensation for ceded territory, and Ibn Saud would be certain to resent any one sided concession in an area where he feels he has an underlying interest. There is no doubt that Ibn Saud moved his troops to the frontier in the spring of 1939 when his highness staged his coup d'état, and had it failed he would almost certainly have sent them to the support of the Al-Subah. Since then they have had further strengthened ties. 25

Britain continued to recommend the construction of an Iraqi port. In 1940, Britain suggested that Iraq construct a port and recommended the area of Umm Qasr. British officials reasoned that in this way, there would be no need for Kuwait to give up any of its territory. Iraq seemed to be swayed by this discussion reported by M.A. Al-Najjar; “However, work in construction of the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr was not established until 1961 and the new port was opened in 1967.”26 Thus, although Iraq wanted Kuwait to cede some of its land for a port, it did not open its own port until 27 years later.

THE KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER: ATTEMPTS AT DEMARCATION

In March of 1939, British officials asked the Ambassador in Baghdad to try to arrange a prompt demarcation of the border between the two countries. The Ambassador prepared a draft exchange of letters, which was passed on to the Iraqis in 1940. The letters, in addition to clarifying the 1932 border demarcations, put forth a new proposal—namely, that the border should now follow the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdullah to the Gulf, and should follow the thalweg of the Khor Abdullah. Iraqi officials basically ignored these letters, and the British realized that Iraq was not willing to discuss
anything because it was waiting to see what the future of the islands of Warba and Babiyan islands would be. In 1941, Britain offered to bring up the border changes again, but Iraqi refused, stating that other issues involving the islands, the port, and smuggling from Kuwait also needed to be discussed.

After some argument, the three countries decided to confer about the unsettled Safwan border issue, including the demarcation of the ambiguous Safwani area boundary line. In a letter to the two Arab countries, a British Ambassador stated that he believed that the post and notice board should be moved to one mile south of the board’s current placement, which was being used physically to mark the border. Noted in the Kuwaiti land boundaries by Iraq, at that time, the board stood “1050 yards south of the southernmost palm trees in Safwan” but was known to have been moving back and forth from that point. However, the British Political Agent in Kuwait did not agree to this, as he understood Britain was trying to give a bit of leeway to the Iraqis. Finally in 1951, after much discussion, it was agreed that the board should be placed at the point 1000 meters south of the palm trees.

The British Military authorities wanted to discuss another issue, which involved the construction of the planned Umm Qasr port in Iraq. The British Political Resident believed that, in accordance with the 1913 agreement, the boundary should have run in a straight line to a point just south of Umm Qasr, and then southeast to the junction of the Khors. However, no additional agreement was reached as each country had different ideas of where the boundary line should have been drawn, and as in the end, Iraq dropped out of the discussions.
In 1953, the Iraqi government complained to the British that the Kuwaitis were crossing its border. Through the Baghdad office, the British reminded the Iraqis that they had ceased communications on the topic. One year later, more problems developed along the border. The British Embassy in Baghdad suggested that they form a joint committee to demarcate the boundary. Discussions again ensued, involving all three nations, but again, nothing concrete was accomplished.

In 1954 and 1955, Iraq proposed to Kuwait the construction of a series of water pipelines from a point on the right bank of the right side of the Shatt Al-Arab above Basra. The Iraqis agreed to allow Kuwait to use up to 100 million gallons of Shatt Al-Arab water and rent of the land to make the project available. In exchange, they wanted the island of Warba, which would guarantee access to their planned port in Umm Qasr. In February of 1956, the Kuwaiti Shaikh Abdallah III decided against the plan, arguing that the more important Safwan border issue needed to be decided before other deals were made.

In 1958, Nuri Al-Sa’id, the Prime Minister of Iraq, again made a half-hearted attempt to bring Kuwait into the Hashemite Union of Iraq and Jordan. Nuri Al-Sa’id wanted Kuwait for its Umm Qasr port development and for the money that Kuwaiti oil revenues could bring in. However, the 1958 Revolution, which transformed Iraq from a Kingdom into a Republic, saved Kuwait from the Prime Minister Sā’id’s attempts.
CHAPTER 4 ENDNOTES

1 Foster, Kuwait, Groiler Publishing, 1989, p. 44.


5 Dickson, H. Kuwait and Her Neighbors, Allen & Unwin, 1949, p. 252.


7 Dickson, H. Kuwait and her Neighbors, Allen & Unwin 1949, p. 257.

8 Dickson, Ibid., 272.

9 Dickson, Ibid., 272.


11 A salty spring- its source is the Gulf


13 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbors, Allen & Unwin, 1949, p. 275.

14 Dickson, Ibid., 276-280.


16 Dickson, Kuwait and Her Neighbors, Allen & Unwin, 1949, p. 277.


21 Al-Najjar, op.cit., 247-251.

22 Foreign Office Document 371/2158.

23 Foreign Office Document 371/21858.

24 Foreign Office Document 371/24559.

25 Referring to Shaikh Ahmad’s crushing a national movement that demanded administrative reformation and popular participation in the government, and threatened unification with Iraq if these demands weren’t met.

26 Al-Najjar, op.cit., p. 231.

CHAPTER FIVE

KUWAITI-IRAQI LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTES
DURING THE 1960s AND EARLY 1970s

As demonstrated in previous chapters, Kuwait had, throughout its history, been trying to acquire Iraq’s agreement as to where the two countries’ mutual border lay. In 1960, Shaikh Abdullah III tried again to settle the boundary’s demarcation by sending a message to the Iraqi leader Abdulkarim Qassim, who had taken over the government in 1958. He invited Qassim to discuss border issues, and informed him that Saudi Arabia and Iran had both agreed to help them come to some kind of agreement.

However, the Iraqi leader did not respond. A few months later, the Shaikh sent a second, similar message, adding that maritime borders needed to be examined as well, and that Kuwait wanted to talk to Iraq before it brought up the issue with Iran. This would have seemingly given Iraq an obvious advantage in the maritime border discussions. Actually, Iraq and Kuwait needed to resolve their maritime border disputes, including issues involving Warba and Bubiyan Islands, before anything could be decided between Kuwait and Iran. The Kuwaiti-Iranian boundary was partially based on the undefined Kuwaiti-Iraqi line’s positioning.

Again, Iraq did not respond to the request for several months. In March, three months after a second attempted contact with Iraq, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, Hasim
Jawad, answered. He apologized for the delay, stating that Premier Qassim was extremely busy. Jawad added that Iraqi officials had received the letter and that it was currently under scrutiny. The three-month delay of the reply and the response itself caused Kuwaiti officials to become uneasy. Iraq’s lack of interest in such a vital issue, and its slowness in responding, put Kuwait on alert for potential trouble.

KUWAIT’S INDEPENDENCE FROM BRITAIN AND GENERAL QASSIM’S CLAIM IN 1961

On June 19, 1961, Kuwait and Britain made a pact concerning the emirate’s independence, which consisted of several agreements. In an exchange of letters, they agreed on the following points:

1. That the January 23, 1899 Agreement should be disregarded after June 19, 1961, as it would be inapplicable when Kuwait would become independent.

2. That Kuwaiti-British relations should continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship.

3. That when appropriate, Kuwait and Britain should consult on matters vital to both nations.

4. That nothing in these conclusions should affect the readiness of Her Majesty’s government to assist the Kuwaiti government if need be. ¹

Although Britain was formally granting Kuwait its independence, it wanted
to be certain that the two countries would be linked by friendly relations, as Kuwait’s money and oil was vital for the survival of the British economy. Here, A.G. Mezerick explains:

Kuwait is worth about a billion dollars a year and today (1965) it is more important than ever to the British. Kuwait’s sterling reserves in the Bank of England account for about one third of the total British reserves. Kuwait supplies about 38% of Britain’s total oil imports. Kuwaiti investments in Britain are estimated to be more than $1 billion a year, and if the Sheik’s income from oil is large, British returns are also mammoth. In the present situation, with the U.K.’s situation is shaky, it is hardly necessary to speculate on what would happen to Britain if cut off from these revenues and oil. The importance of Kuwait to the well being of the United Kingdom is so great that it is certain it would fight to retain Kuwait’s independent position.²

Less than a week after Kuwait attained independence, General Qassim laid claim to Kuwait. During a Baghdad news conference, the Iraqi premier declared Kuwait was an inseparable part of Iraq, based on the fact that Kuwait had been a part of the Basra province during Ottoman rule. In reality, the small emirate had only been under nominal rule of the Turks for about fifteen years. In contrast, it had been a British protectorate for more than sixty years, and the two countries had a close relationship. Moreover, in the Treaties of Sevres (1920) and Laussane (1923), the Ottoman Empire had renounced all of its rights to possessions outside of Turkey, which obviously included Kuwait.³ Therefore, the Iraqi claim had absolutely no viability in the eyes of Kuwait or most of the international community.

In order to deter a possible Iraqi invasion, the Shaikh of Kuwait, Abdullah III, asked Britain for military assistance. British forces arrived in Kuwait on June 30, 1961, just five days after the initial threat to Kuwait from Iraq. Saudi soldiers arrived as well, sent by the Saudi Arabian king Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. Together, these
enforcements deterred a possible Iraq invasion. On September 10, the British troops were replaced by militia from the Arab League countries, including Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, Egyptian, and Sudanese forces, who were all placed under the command of a Saudi military officer.

These forces attempted to diffuse the tension surrounding the border, and they bulldozed a shallow road just inside Kuwaiti territory, along the boundary as it had been defined in 1932. This was to serve as a temporary boundary until an agreement could be reached between Iraq and Kuwait. This road of sand was referred to as the Arab League Line, and was largely used by military personnel.

Qassim and other members of his cabinet believed that they actually had the historical right to annex Kuwait. However, there were also other factors involved. These included Iraq's desire to acquire Kuwait's oil reserves and financial assets and Iraq's need for a large port and Gulf access. In addition, if Qassim could have annexed Kuwait, it would have distracted the Iraqi people from their internal problems, and would have made him more of a national hero than he already was, as many Iraqi civilians also believed that Kuwait was theirs.

Qassim did not gain from the escapade, but in fact lost a great deal. His moves toward the annexation of Kuwait and his subsequent failure to secure the country caused him a loss of face both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, the failure caused many Arab countries to distance themselves from Iraq. It was as if an iron curtain came down psychologically between Iraq and its neighboring nations, especially in the conservative Arabian Gulf area.
KUWAITI-IRAQI BORDER DEVELOPMENTS AND IRAN'S ROLE:
1963-1972

To ensure Kuwait's security, the Arab League Forces remained there until February 8, 1963, when General Qassim was overthrown. The new leader of Iraq, Abdulsalam Aref signed an agreement with Kuwait recognizing its independence and sovereignty. Aref also agreed to comply with the boundary statements of the 1932 Agreement.

With these agreements, and with the successful establishment of borders between itself and Saudi Arabia in 1965, Kuwait became hopeful about finally marking its borders with Iraq. In 1966, Shaikh Sabah III of Kuwait visited Iraq, at which time both nations agreed to form a committee that within two months was to delineate the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. The committee met for the first time in early March 1967. However, the sessions were not productive because while Kuwait was attempting to establish the border along historic lines, Iraq submitted new proposals with arguments regarding Kuwait's islands and northernmost territories. When Kuwaiti officials asked the Iraqi delegation what it was doing, the Iraqis replied that it would not be possible for them to demarcate the borders along the 1932 lines. Iraq suggested that the border discussion be postponed to a later time, and Kuwait reluctantly agreed.4

Eight months later, in October 1967, the boundary committees held a second meeting in Kuwait City. The Kuwaitis, including Shaikh Sabah III and some of his advisors, managed to convince the Iraqi officials to undertake a joint survey operation as
the first step in delineating the borders. However, when it was time to actually conduct the survey, the Iraqi government refused to allow the Kuwaiti survey commission to operate in the region. Thus, the boundary committee's and the survey commission's work was stopped. After this point, the discussions did not move forward.

Between 1968 and 1972, Kuwaiti-Iraqi border issues were not discussed. However, during that time, several major events happened which affected the border issue. In 1968, the Ba’athist Party came to power in Iraq, and then in 1969, Iran abolished the Shatt Al-Arab Treaty, which had established land and maritime borders between the two countries. Abdullah Y. Abdulghani further explains:

On April 19, 1969, Iran unilaterally abrogated the Shatt Al-Arab Treaty of 1937, which set in motion the cold war between the two countries...Iraq’s reaction to this abrogation was to denounce Iran’s illegal ambitions in Iraqi territory and waters as well as in the Arabian Gulf.5

During the 1960s, a huge power struggle between various political groups including the Kurds, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the pan-Arab nationalist Ba’athist Party undermined Iraqi stability and power. After a decade of violent struggle, the Ba’ath Party seized power and has held it until the present day. In 1970, an attempted coup against the newly established Iraqi Ba’athist regime failed, and Iranians were blamed for the attempted coup. "Iraq expelled the Iranian ambassador and four of his staff, together with the staff of the Iranian consulates in Baghdad, Basra, and Karbala. In retaliation, Iran expelled the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran along with four of his staff."6

After this incident, relations between Iraq and Iran worsened. In 1971, Iran occupied the United Arab Emirates’ islands of Abu Musa and Tunbs. The occupation of
these strategically placed Arab islands prompted Iraq to seek an equal influence over the Gulf. In an attempt to weaken Iranian influence in the region, Iraq launched an anti-Iranian campaign. Moreover, Iraq broke off all formal diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled many Iranian residents who were living in Iraq.\footnote{7}

**IRAQI-IRANIAN TENSIONS AND RESULTING TERRITORIAL PRESSURES ON KUWAIT**

Iraq was both angry with Iran, and envious of the Iranian’s ability to takeover several Gulf islands near the United Arab Emirates. Iraq had been trying to dominate Kuwait’s Warba and Bubiyan Islands, but had been unsuccessful. Iraq envied Iran’s long coastline, many ports, and the influence that Iran had in the Gulf region. Thus, Iraqis thought that Kuwait might be useful as a base for attacking Iran, and as protection if attacked by Iran. M. Khadduri explains Iraq’s strategy:

In April of 1969, Iraq requested Kuwait to permit Iraqi troops to be stationed on Kuwaiti territory as part of a military force on both sides of the border to protect Umm Qasr from an impending Iranian attack. Though Kuwait was hesitant to allow the entry of Iraqi troops across the border, Iraq pressed her demand and both Hardan Al-Tikriti and Salih Mahdi ‘Ammash, the Iraqi Ministers of Defense and the Interior, proceeded to Kuwait to request permission for the Iraqi force to be stationed on her territory. Shaykh Sa’ad Al-Abdullah Salim Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense and the Interior, seems to have tacitly acquiesced under pressure, as the two Iraqi Ministers warned that an outbreak of hostilities with Iran was impending. If she wanted, they argued, Kuwait would be allowed to dispatch a force to be stationed near Basra or elsewhere in Iraq. Shaykh Sa’ad, the Minister of Defense and Interior, said that the Iraqi force began to cross the Kuwaiti border before the conversation had even started, and that his forced approval was considered as an agreement by the Iraqi Ministers.\footnote{8}
On May 2, 1972, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murtatha Abdul Baqi, officially visited Kuwait in order to discuss the demarcation of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. The minister showed a certain willingness to mark the line officially, provided that Kuwait meet five Iraqi demands. These included:

1. Political agreement between Iraq and Kuwait on Gulf issues.
2. Investment of Kuwaiti capital in Iraq.
3. Permission for Iraqi workers to work in Kuwait.
4. Military cooperation between Iraq and Kuwait.
5. The allocation of strategic regions for Iraq to fight Iran, inside Kuwait.9

These demands were obviously favorable to Iraq, and would have been difficult for any country in the same position to accept. Furthermore, the five provisions showed that Iraq knew the boundary demarcation was of vital importance to Kuwait, and was using this knowledge to coerce the small country into doing what Iraq wanted. Kuwaiti acceptance of these preposterous demands would have undermined its independence and its sovereignty. Thus, the Kuwait declined the arrangement.

A short time later, oil was discovered in the huge Rumailah oil field, the majority of which lies in Iraq (a small portion of the oil field adjoins the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Thus, the Iraqis felt it was even more urgent to have a well-developed port. Access to the Gulf, which would enable them to move imports into, and their oil out of the Gulf, was also vital for the Iraqis. The development of the port of Umm Qasr became more crucial at this time, and the Iraqis made it a top priority to expand it as soon as possible.
Consequently, the Iraqis began to pressure the Kuwaitis to cede part of its territory, especially the islands of Warba and Bubiyan, arguing that they lacked a deep water port. Kuwait responded by stating that the islands' waters were shallow, but that they were willing to set up oil pipelines. The Iraqis agreed and developed a plan for the pipelines. However, the Iraqi plan was not satisfactory to the Kuwaitis as it contained a number of troublesome points. For example, the plan included a clause that stated that Kuwait would have to provide all facilities for the Iraqis, including free food and lodging while they were working. Moreover, another clause stated that any Iraqis could pass over Kuwaiti borders at any time with no visa or pass, and that any Iraqi could work without a visa in Kuwait. Needless to say, this project was not accepted by Kuwait.

In December 1972, the Iraqis constructed a triangular road in the territory of southern Umm Qasr. Iraq declared that the road would improve domestic Iraqi communications, in case Iran attacked. They built up a military presence in that area, which was almost directly on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Deeply concerned about these developments, Kuwait tried yet again to press for border delineations. On December 26, 1972, a Kuwaiti Parliamentary delegation paid a friendship visit to Iraq, however, it failed to secure an agreement.

As Iraq continued expanding the road near to the border, Kuwait again tried to discuss the boundary issue in February of 1973. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister and a committee visited Baghdad to inquire about what was happening on the border. During these official discussions, Iraq emphasized the point that border demarcations would only begin once the Warba and Bubiyan Islands had been ceded to Iraq. The Kuwaiti delegation was shocked by this brazen statement, as previous agreements had been signed
by Iraqi officials stating that the islands belonged to Kuwait. Officials from Kuwait stressed that if Iraq continued on this course, that the border would never be delineated. Iraq stated that it would send a delegation led by the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Murtatha Abdul Baqi, at the nearest opportunity.\textsuperscript{10}

In March 1973, the road was still under construction, and no word had been received in Kuwait from Minister Abdul Baqi. On March 11, 1973, the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry sent a message to Iraq, asking it to stop the construction near the border. Kuwaiti officials asked when Abdul Baqi was coming to Kuwait to finish the border talks. Iraq promised to stop working on the road and said that the Foreign Minister would be there soon. However, Iraq gave no specific date for the border discussions; ultimately, a meeting would not be held.

THE AL-SAMITAH AGGRESSION

At dawn, on Tuesday, March 20, 1973, only a week after Kuwait had sent its latest request for border discussions, Iraqi forces attacked the Kuwaiti border police post at Al-Samitah. This post was located two kilometers inside Kuwait. In the assault, two Kuwaiti policemen were killed and Iraq occupied the location. Another border post, Umm Qasr, also came under fire, but there were no casualties and it was not occupied by Iraq.

After this act of aggression, Iraq accused Kuwaiti forces of attacking first, as the Iraqi military had been staging military exercises. Iraqi officials claimed that two Iraqis had been killed, and that several more had been injured. However, this was extremely
unlikely, as Kuwait and its small army would not have challenged its huge and infinitely more powerful neighbor. Moreover, Kuwait never would have given Iraq the opportunity to invade and occupy part of its territory, particularly as Iraq had just informed Kuwait that it was interested in the areas around Al-Samitah and Umm Qasr. Rumors circulated at the time that the Al-Samitah attack had been carried out by an individual or small group that was not connected to the Iraqi government. However, several announcements broadcast from Baghdad shortly after the attack declared that the Al-Samitah region was now part of Iraq. Additionally, when the Iraqis later withdrew from the Al-Samitah border post, the Iraqi government installed new tents and cleaned up the area, possibly indicating a guilty acknowledgment of their own aggression. Thus, it seems probable that the assault was linked with the Iraqi government.

There are numerous speculations regarding the motivations for the Al-Samitah attack. Two major influences will be discussed here. One theory is that the Iraqis wanted the land from this region to expand their port at Umm Qasr. The Kuwaiti police post was located two kilometers southwest of the port. Iraq had been discussing needing these two kilometers of land, as well as the islands of Warba and Bubiyan, to expand the naval capabilities of the port in case of aggressions from Iran. According to the new Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hussein Al-Haidithi, “Iraq will not be a Gulf State unless we have those islands.” Iraq also wished to enlarge the port commercially in order to increase imports and exports. Iraq had actually started construction on a new road in the area, which was on Kuwaiti territory, as a first step in the Umm Qasr enlargement.

Furthermore, when the Kuwaitis had been awaiting the arrival of the Iraqi delegation just
a few weeks before to discuss border issues, an Iraqi official had responded by telling
Kuwait there would be border discussions only after the Al-Samitah post was removed.

Another popular viewpoint regarding the Al-Samitah post attack involves the
USSR. The aggression took place just one day before the Iraqi Vice-President, Saddam
Hussein, was to leave for Moscow. As a consequence, some theorists believe that Iraq
was testing the USSR, to see what its reaction would be to the attack. Another reason for
the USSR’s possible agreement to the assault involved port access. As Iran was receiving
support from the United States at the time, Iraq had moved closer to the Soviets. In April
1972, the USSR and Iraq signed a Friendship Treaty, which included military support for
Iraq and port access to the Soviets. As the United States enjoyed military facilities in
locations including Oman and Bahrain, the USSR probably wished to have access to
these accommodations in Iraq. However, since Iraq lacked a large port, the Soviets might
have provoked Iraq to expand in order to create a large naval base/port.

Another reason that the Soviets may have been involved in the planning of the Al-
Samitah incident involved Iraqi’s particularly brash attitude towards Kuwait after the
signing of the Friendship Treaty in April of 1972. For example, just one month after the
agreement was signed, the Iraqi foreign minister entered Kuwait with a shocking list of
demands, including the allocation of strategic Kuwaiti military facilities to Iraq.
Furthermore, in February of 1973, when the Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry sent a delegation
to Baghdad, Iraq clearly stated that Warba and Bubiyan Islands belonged to them! A bit
later, Iraq started digging the triangular road in Kuwaiti territory, and just a few weeks
later attacked the Al-Samitah post.
KUWAITI-IRAQI BOUNDARY ISSUES AFTER AL-SAMITAH

On March 6, 1975, Iran and Iraq signed the Algerian Agreement, which resolved their long-standing border debate. Then, in July of 1975, Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed a treaty regarding the neutral zone located between the two countries. As Kuwait saw Iraq resolving its border problems with its neighbors, there was renewed hope that the Kuwaiti boundary would be also delineated.

Then, in May 1975, Alan Day explains:

Iraqi officials announced that they had made concrete proposals to settle the dispute. These involved essentially the leasing by Kuwait to Iraq of half of Bubiyan for 99 years and the ceding of Kuwaiti sovereignty over Warba, in return for Iraqi recognition of Kuwait’s land borders.\(^{12}\)

The Kuwaiti National Assembly discussed this offer in July of that year, and issued an announcement regarding their decision. The Kuwaiti National Assembly members stated that they supported their brotherly neighbor’s attempts at solving the crisis, and praised the people filling the official positions in that country. However, the Kuwaiti officials then emphasized their own sovereignty over all of its lands within boundaries already stated in international agreements.\(^{13}\) Therefore, although Kuwait thanked Iraq for considering a possible solution, they rejected it.

So despite hopes for a solution to the problem, the prospect of delineating the borders faded. Iraq refused to stop demanding the appropriation of Warba and Bubiyan Islands in exchange for marking the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. Moreover, Kuwait refused to cede any piece of land.
However, the Iraqis claimed that if Kuwait would accommodate Iraq by giving it some land, it would be for the good of the pan-Arab movement. The Information Minister from Iraq said that his country had the responsibility of protecting small Gulf states like Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Yemen from dangers that could threaten them. He went on to say that without an outlet into the Gulf, it would be impossible for Iraq to carry out these duties, and that Kuwait must think not only of itself, but also of higher Arab matters.¹⁴

This statement, which implied Iran's threat to peace in the region, was made only five months after the signing of the Iraqi-Iranian Algerian Treaty—a treaty that was supposed to alleviate much of the pressure that had built up between the two countries. Thus, it seemed that although the Iraqis signed and agreed to the treaty, they possibly feared that it was doomed to fail.

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE KUWAITI PARLIAMENT AND THE 1976 BOUNDARY THREAT

In 1961, Kuwait's first Constituent Assembly was elected and was given the responsibility of creating Kuwait's first constitution, which went into effect in 1962. Elections for Kuwait's first National Assembly were held, and the group met for the first time in 1963. Representatives in the Assembly were largely from wealthy merchant families, but there were a few radicals and leftists who pressed hard for faster social reforms. In August 1976, the Cabinet resigned, declaring that the Assembly had made governing impossible. Shaikh Abdullah III then suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly. Many people believed that this dissolution, which lasted for four
years, was effected in order to oust the radicals, and to give the Shaikh increased governing power.\textsuperscript{15}

At this time, the Iraqi government believed that the Kuwaiti people would be angry about the loss of representative government, and decided to try to attack the small emirate at this weak point. The Iraqis claimed that Kuwaiti people had lost even their limited democracy, and that all political authority was now in the hands of a few members of the ruling family. Iraqi officials stated that the Al-Sabah family members were easily influenced by manipulative oil companies and foreign powers which had protected Kuwait over many years. An article in Iraq's ruling party newspaper (Jaridat Al-Thawrah), also claimed that the Al-Sabahs were now part of an American conspiracy to control the Gulf and Iraq. The article ended by "threatening the imperialists with defeat at the hands of the striving people and the free powers of the region".\textsuperscript{16}

Iraq was threatening Kuwait for an additional reason, which involved the neighboring country of Syria. Iraq had an oil pipeline that crossed Syria and entered the Mediterranean area. In 1976, Syria, whose relations with Iraq were deteriorating due to several political factors, did not allow the oil to pass through their pipeline and returned it to Iraq. Thus, Iraq was angry with Syria, and infuriated with Kuwait for their long time funding to Syria. This situation also intensified the need for Iraq to have a port, specifically in Umm Qasr.

In an attempt to take advantage of the changes in internal Kuwaiti politics, and in order to avenge Kuwait's economic support of the Iraqi enemy Syria, Iraqi armed forces set up tents on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi common border. This action followed an intensive Iraqi
propaganda blitz blasting Kuwait. Using this method, Iraq hoped to gain support from disgruntled Kuwaitis.

However, there was no internal chaos in Kuwait. Although people were surprised and concerned about the increase in centralized power, the government assured them that the situation would be temporary. Moreover, the Kuwaiti government's response to the new Iraqi threat was quite calm. The Kuwaiti Vice Prime Minister peacefully told Iraq what it already knew— that Iraqi forces were constantly crossing the common border, and that three years before, troops that were involved in the Al-Samitah incident still had not left the area. Shortly thereafter, the Iraqi troops dispersed and left the site.

During 1977, various Kuwaiti and Iraqi delegations traveled back and forth between Kuwait City and Baghdad, in vain attempts to clarify the borders and to make peace. Various agreements were discussed, but none were accepted by both sides.
CHAPTER 5 ENDNOTES

1 Al-Ibrahim, H. Factors Contributing to the Emergence of the State of Kuwait, Al-Bthah Al-Arabiya, 1982, p. 172.


5 Abdulghani, J. Iraq and Iran: the Years of Crisis, Biddles Publishers, 1975, p. 51.

6 Ibid., 52.

7 Ibid., 90.


10 Ibid., 6-7.


13 N.A., Al-Qabas, 13 July 1975.


15 Robinson, Arab Gulf States, p. 129.

CHAPTER SIX

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND THE 1980s

As reported by M.E. Yapp, the Iran-Iraq War took place during the decade of the 1980s, and lasted about eight years. "It cost an estimated $200 billion directly and another $1,000 billion indirectly, and inflicted some 1 million casualties, perhaps 60% sustained by Iran."1 During the conflict, Kuwait supported Iraq, contrary to its usual policy of neutrality, and this political tilting made Iran angry with Kuwait. Throughout the 1980s, Kuwait sustained Iranian attacks as well as intense pressures to finance their demanding neighbor, Iraq. The failure of Hussein to achieve his goals, including access to more oil and to water, served as a factor in his attacking Kuwait just two years after the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

In 1979, Shah Pahlavi of Iran was overthrown and a new strict Islamic regime ruled, headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. As it became clear that the fundamentalist Shi’a regime was in Iran to stay, Saddam Hussein became both threatened and opportunistic. He was concerned because the majority of his own country were Shi’a, although his governmental members were largely sectarian Sunni. Thus, he feared that
the Islamic Revolutionaries would attempt to overthrow his administration (Iranian fundamentalists tried to do this very thing in 1979). Hussein also viewed the Islamic Revolution as an opportunity to attack Iran during the internal chaos that prevailed during the change of governments there.

Another reason that Iraq invaded Iran involved water, particularly the Shatt Al-Arab waterway. Paul Balfour wrote, "There is no doubt at all that for the Iraqis unopposed usage of the Shatt River and of the small stretch of Iraqi territory debouching on the Gulf is seen in economic and security terms, as vital." The Shatt Al-Arab is important to almost land-locked Iraq for several reasons, including that it is the only entrance to the Gulf for Iraqi ships exporting oil and other products. This vital waterway, running through the arid lands of Iraq, also permits the country to produce some agricultural products. The river was divided in half in the 1975 Algerian Treaty, split down the middle, with each country having access to its half. However, Iraq wanted the whole river, in order to increase the amount of its own shipping and to weaken Iran.

Another major related factor that motivated Iraq to invade Iran, was Iran's dominance of the region. Iran was bigger geographically, had a larger military, and had a huge coastline on the Gulf, while Iraq was nearly land-locked. Additionally, Iran had made peace throughout the 1960s with most of the Arab Gulf States; something that Iraq had not been able to do. Yap explained:

There were resentments, especially on the part of Iraq, which claimed leadership among the Arab states of the region and regarded herself as the principal upholder of the concept of the Arab Gulf, a notion which embraced the proposition that the Iranian southwestern province of Khuzistan was Arab."

Therefore, Iraq wanted to lead the Gulf, and resented that the economically and militarily superior Iran impeded this possibility. Thus, in 1980, Iraqi troops entered Iran...
and started the war, which didn’t finish until Khomeini reluctantly signed a United Nations resolution to end the war in July of 1988.

IRAQ’S EARLY RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT DURING THE WAR

During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations oscillated back and forth. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1980s, their relations had completely soured, which contributed to the 1990 Iraq attack on Kuwait. According to Theodore Craig, “Kuwait was one of Iraq’s most important allies during the Iran-Iraq War. During 1980-1989, Kuwait supplied Iraq with at least $13.2 billion in grants and loans, and with up to $22 billion in overall assistance.” Kuwait, which always tried to remain neutral in foreign affairs, was pressured by the larger and stronger country to provide it with aid. Moreover, Kuwait was afraid of what might happen if the newly established Islamic regime in Iran was to spread to their country. Thus, they supported Iraq with grants, loans, and permission to use their ports as pick up points for imported munitions, foodstuffs, and other materials.

Nonetheless, Kuwait did not trust Iraq enough to be a full ally; it also could not afford to anger Iran more than it already had. So Kuwait did not enter into any formal defense pacts with Iraq, and continued to maintain diplomatic ties with Iran during the war. In addition, Joseph Kostiner states, “Kuwait joined in founding the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which did not include Iraq, in 1981 because its leaders were determined not to be an Iraqi satellite.”
Control over the Gulf islands that Iraq had persistently been trying to acquire from Kuwait became even more important during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq could not secure access to the Gulf through the Shatt Al-Arab waterway that it shared with its enemy Iran. The Shatt Al-Arab suffered from silt pileup and mining, and was clogged in some areas. Furthermore, Iran’s land-based anti-ship missiles could target any ship moving into the Shatt from the Gulf. Hence, Iraq desperately needed Kuwait’s northern islands.

Iraq tried to move its military operations as far south as possible. This resulted in border skirmishes with Kuwait in 1980 and 1983. As explained by Cordesman:

Iraq moved south into territory that probably belonged to Kuwait near Umm Qasr and the border town of Safwan, and expanded the Shatt Al-Basra Canal from Umm Qasr to a position midway between Basra and Al-Zubair. This made the Khor Al-Abd Allah, the channel from the Gulf to Umm Qasr to the north of Bubiyan and Warba steadily more important.6

IRAN’S RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT DURING AND DIRECTLY AFTER THE 1980-1988 WAR

Following the Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait’s support for Iraq simultaneously created friction with Iran. In the first few years of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran conducted several air strikes and flyovers, in attempts to intimidate Kuwait into reducing its support for Iraq. Moreover, Iran had some success in convincing Kuwaiti Shi’as, who make up about a third of the emirate, to attack various sites in Kuwait. On December 12, 1983, Shi’as bombed the French and US embassies in Kuwait City. Several Kuwaiti Shi’as were later convicted for these bombings.
In 1984, the Kuwait Crown Prince and Prime Minister visited Baghdad in another fruitless attempt to solve the border dispute. Iran learned of this meeting and assumed that the two countries were conspiring against it. The November 17, 1984 edition of the Iranian daily newspaper, Jomhuri Islami, reported a threat that Iranian President Rasfanjani had mentioned during the previous Friday prayer sermon:

Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Kuwaitis have agreed to give over three of their islands to the Iraqis in exchange for solving their border disputes. I should point out to the Kuwaiti rulers not to play with fire by giving a part of their territory to a country at war with us, and especially at such a sensitive point of the Persian Gulf. We will not let this go simply. I declare to Kuwait and to others that Kuwait will have no right to territorial claims to this island if we capture it from Iraq.\(^7\)

The day after the Iranian threat was made, the Kuwaiti Vice Foreign Minister held a meeting with Iranian officials, in order to clarify that the islands had not been given or even leased to the Iraqis.

Iranian attacks on Kuwait continued throughout the 1980s. In 1985, several Iranians attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate the Kuwaiti leader, Shaikh Jaber III, using a suicide bomber vehicle. Then, a Kuwaiti Airlines airplane was hijacked by Iranians. In 1986, Iranian Shi’as bombed Kuwaiti oil facilities. These attacks continued throughout 1987.

Iraq attacked and bombed cargo ships and tankers traveling to Iran, and Iran retaliated by striking shipping traffic to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, creating a “tanker war” in the Gulf. Overall, Iran fired at least a dozen Silkworm missiles at Kuwaiti targets. Neither Kuwaiti nor GCC forces could defend against the Iranian threat, thus the small nation chose to reflag its ships. The U.S.S.R. provided some naval forces, and the U.S.
provided a major naval accompanying service. Kuwaiti and Saudi ships flew the U.S.S.R. or U.S. flag, which thereby decreased Iranian attacks on the ships.

The small country’s officials believed that it could best benefit by getting along with all the region’s countries. Kuwait immediately attempted to resume its pre-war neutral stance after the Iran-Iraq War ended. In February of 1988, the Kuwaiti Ambassador to Washington, Sa’ud Nasir Al-Sabah, tried to dissociate Kuwait from Iraq by stating, “We are playing the role of a mediator between Iraq and Iran and we have never taken sides with one Islamic country against another.” Two months later, Minister of State Sa’ud Al-‘Usaymi played down Kuwaiti’s wartime aid to Iraq: “We are giving aid to sixty-four third world countries. Why not Iraq?” After the war, as relations with Iran gradually improved, Kuwait’s leaders also tried to mend fences with the local Shi’a. In June 1990, for example, a Kuwaiti state security court acquitted four Shi’a accused of plotting to overthrow Kuwait’s political system. Hence, after the war, Kuwait attempted to reach a state of neutrality and balance with both Iraq and Iran, in order to maintain peace.

KUWAIT’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS UP TO THE MID 1980s, AND ITS ATTEMPTS AT ECONOMIC RESTORATION

From the time that oil was discovered in Kuwait, until the late 1970s, the small country’s economy grew at an incredible rate. The nation’s stock exchange was one of the top ten in the world in terms of value, and bankers were lining up to buy securities dominated by Kuwaiti dinars. However, by the mid-80s, things had changed. In 1985-
1986, the price of oil fell, and all Gulf state economies were adversely affected. Businesspeople were also seriously hurt by the crash of the unofficial Kuwaiti stock market, called the Suq Al-Manakh, which resulted in total losses of US $90 billion. Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, international interest rates decreased, and as Kuwait had a huge amount invested internationally, the country as a whole lost about US $20 billion.\textsuperscript{11} Foreign investors were frightened by Iranian terrorist acts in Kuwait and thus foreign investment decreased. Moreover, there were huge losses in the value and rents of real estate, and great losses from overextended loans in bank investments.

In the mid to late 1980s, the economic situation vastly improved in Kuwait, partly due to government interventions and partly due to improving international financial situations. For example, according to Francois Massoulié, world oil prices stabilized at around US $18 per barrel after decreasing to about US $10 in 1985.\textsuperscript{12} Kuwaiti Oil Minister Ali Khalifa Al-Sabah breached the oil quotas determined by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) by producing and selling huge amounts of oil, in order to compensate for the monies lost during the previous years. Reported by Cordesman, by 1989, Kuwait was producing 500,000 barrels per day above OPEC’s determined quota for the small nation. In 1989, Kuwait’s oil revenues amounted to 9.3 billion dollars, 66% higher than 1988 levels.\textsuperscript{13} The government took increased profits and invested them back into the country, stimulating the economy further. As mentioned by Robinson, in December of 1989, the government decided to permit 1350 of the main investors in the crashed Al-Manakh exchange to write off 250,000 Kuwaiti dinars of debt (1 dinar = US $4), thereby letting them enter new business ventures.\textsuperscript{14}
Thus, the 1989 Kuwaiti government was trying to rehabilitate its shaken economy and to ensure stability after the tumultuous events of the previous five years. Kuwaitis invested in and developed economic opportunities as they arose, and improved the economy at an amazing pace. Furthermore, the confident Kuwaiti government, intent on utilizing its finances to the fullest extent, and to exert full control over all of their lands, was inclined to refuse the ensuing never-ending Iraqi demands for both territorial and economic forfeitures. Iraq would use these refusals as a pretext for invading Kuwait in less than one year.

The war had no winner, as both sides suffered extensively in terms of human suffering and physical damage. However, in one perspective, considering that Saddam Hussein initially attacked Iran, with dreams of acquiring increased water access and Khuzestan’s oil, Iraq lost. Hussein was hoping to gain leadership in the Gulf, more oil and coastline and full access to the Shatt Al-Arab, and he failed to do all of these things through the war. This lack of fulfillment would serve as a factor in Saddam Hussein’s attack of Kuwait just two years after the finish of the heinous Iran-Iraq conflict.
CHAPTER 6 ENDNOTES


4 Craig, American Arab Affairs. p. 44.


7 Jomhuri Islami, 11-17-84.


CHAPTER SEVEN

THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT: THE GULF WAR

On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded the small emirate of Kuwait and shocked the world. This chapter examines several facets of the attack, including the factors and motivations that caused Saddam Hussein, whose regime was massively in debt and heavily armed, to overrun Kuwait. The invasion will be discussed, as well as international involvement and reaction. Current relations between Iraq and Kuwait will be examined in the last chapter.

FACTORS MOTIVATING SADDAM HUSSEIN TO INVADE KUWAIT

The invasion of Kuwait was complex, and was motivated by many factors. Saddam Hussein’s personality and his violent nature were factors influencing the Iraqi decision to go to war. The fact that many Iraqis believed that the small nation was part of their country, and that Kuwait was an illegitimate imperialist creation, partly motivated the attack. Additionally, Hussein wanted to acquire Kuwait’s money, as Iraq was in debt after the Iran-Iraq War, some of which was owed to Kuwait. Moreover, Hussein wanted to acquire the strategically placed islands of Warba and Bubiyan, as he had invested heavily in the port near them, Umm Qasr. According to Draper, “Kuwait had the islands
and the money: these seemed to have been his minimum demands. Beyond them, Saddam Hussein saw himself as the savior of the Arab world...Kuwait was only the first obstacle in Saddam’s way.¹ Immediately before the attack, Hussein used the excuses of Kuwait’s flooding the world market with oil, and the leeching of oil from the Iraqi-Kuwaiti owned Rumailah field as justifications for the attack. Thus, a successful invasion of his tiny neighbor would have given Hussein billions of dollars, superb Gulf access, and the glory of a victorious military conquest.

Arthur Goldschmidt referred to the characteristics of Saddam Hussein, as a person, contributed to the Iraqi decision to invade Kuwait. Hussein was ambitious, violent, and fiercely nationalistic. He continued by stating:

Iraq’s political system, the way in which power is allocated and decisions are made under Hussein, has been highly dictatorial. The state controls Iraq’s major industries, all educational institutions, and the information media. Huge portraits of Saddam Hussein adorn street corners and public buildings. Any expression of opposition to his policies is punished. Summary executions, torture, and long jail terms without trial are common. Most of the military officers and civil officials who had belonged to his Ba’th party faction when it seized power in 1968, or who had helped him to become president in 1979, were later purged, exiled, or pensioned off...Iraq’s use of poison gas against Iranians and Iraqi Kurds enhanced the army’s reputation for cruelty.²

Some feared the Iraqi autocrat was plotting to create one united Arab country, of which he would be the dictator. The acquisition of Kuwait was his first planned step in becoming more powerful both in his own country and in the Gulf region. Goldschmidt believes, “Iraq (alluding to Saddam Hussein) suffers psychological problems about being second or less in the Arab world.”³ Elaine Sciolino claims that, “Saddam Hussein was an outlaw who built an outlaw state, and broke the rules of international convention over and over to get what he wanted.”⁴ Hussein was violently ambitious and opportunistic, as his ordered invasion of Kuwait attests.
Acquisition and access to water is another reason that Saddam invaded the small emirate in 1990. While Iraq has about 95 kilometers of marshy coast on the Gulf, Kuwait has over 210 kilometers, including a beautiful and large port, Kuwait City. Moreover, although Iraq has several major rivers flowing through it, including the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, they are running dry as they are being dammed by Turkey upstream and by Syria a bit further downstream. By the time these waters get to Iraq, they are “degraded by salts, agricultural runoff, and chemical pollutants from upstream users, for Iraq sits at the tail end of the drainage.”\textsuperscript{5} Moreover, Pritt Vesilind contends:

In southern Iraq, where brackish marshes surround the Shatt Al-Arab waterway formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, thousands of acres have been glazed with an icing of salt...to shampoo in Basra, buy two bottles of mineral water. If you don’t, your hair will stick straight out with the salts.\textsuperscript{6}

Meanwhile, in Kuwait, several hundred million gallons of water are desalineated each day in special plants designed for the process, a technology that Iraq lacks. If Iraq could have conquered Kuwait, it would have owned all of these things, a fact that Saddam Hussein kept in mind as he planned the assault on Kuwait.

Cordesman argues the Iraqis viewed their neighbor with frustration and with envy, not only for their prime coasts and lands, but also for what lay under them, oil. Iraq was the second highest producer of oil, with about 10\% of the world total, and Kuwait also produced about 10\% of the world’s oil.\textsuperscript{7} Thus, Hussein could have had power over one fifth of the world’s oil supplies if he had won the war.

As stated in his book Kuwait, Foster claims another potential acquisition Saddam could have acquired would have been the money that went along with Kuwaiti oil, and the investments that the government had made for the day that the oil ran out. Before the 1990-1991 Gulf War, Kuwait as a nation had over 100 billion dollars invested
worldwide. The emirate had given Saddam Hussein billions of dollars, estimates range between ten and twenty billion, as loans during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-1988. As Iraq was heavily indebted to many other countries from the war as well, obtaining Kuwait and its monies would have put it in excellent financial condition.

Although Hussein had all of these potentials in mind, Iraq used several specific events as justification of the invasion of Kuwait. Kostiner argued that:

Iraq started escalating its pressure on Kuwait in Spring 1990. Now no longer satisfied with asking the Gulf state to cancel its debt to them, it demanded from Kuwait an additional $10 billion gift. Iraq also accused the emirate of waging economic warfare by overselling its OPEC quota in order to swamp the market with cheap oil and rob Iraq of needed income. Hussein also demanded $2.4 billion for Kuwait’s alleged theft of its oil from Kuwait’s side of the shared vast Rumayla oilfield.

Massoulie went on to state:

The Gulf monarchies who possessed exceptional deposits did not worry about exceeding their quotas. Their strategy was more about to increase the flow of oil to Western economies, which then became dependent on cheap oil, as opposed to raising prices which might have encouraged energy diversification in the West. These two completely opposing policies reduced OPEC to impotence, and increased tension, particularly between Kuwait and Iraq. Before the war, much of their conflict was played out within OPEC.

The Rumailah oil field was also used as a pretext for the invasion. This huge field lies largely in Iraq, but dips slightly into Kuwaiti territory at its southern tip. Therefore, since oil is fungible, Kuwait could theoretically siphon off large amounts of oil. Kuwait was taking a certain amount of oil from this field, but not nearly enough to warrant a $2.5 billion dollar demand from Iraq.

As mentioned before, Iraq had accused Kuwait of taking large amounts of oil from the Rumailah field, and had also charged that the Gulf State was flooding the world market with under priced oil. Kostiner reasoned that:

Kuwait kept viewing its dispute with Iraq as soluble and responded accordingly. The Kuwaitis thus gave only partial responses, avoiding a definite reply to Iraq’s demands and refusing to concede territories or forego loans. Yet Kuwait still avoided delivering a final refusal, and Jabir promised negotiations with Iraq once it officially recognized Kuwait’s sovereignty.11

The Gulf State also asked other organizations to intercede, including the UN and the Egyptian government, headed by President Mubarak. Hussein promised Mubarak that he wouldn’t attack Kuwait if the emirate’s government would negotiate. Kuwait was hoping to finally resolve the conflict at a meeting in Jidda on July 31, 1990.

There are two major explanations of why the Jidda meeting did not result in a solution to the problem. The first version is anti-Kuwaiti. Saddam Hussein was angry at the Emir of Kuwait, Jabar III, for not attending, as if the meeting were not important enough to require the emir’s presence. Thus, Izzir Ibrahim, the Iraqi Head of State, attended the Jidda meeting, and a member of Jabar’s cabinet represented Kuwait. So, Iraqi officials were angry with Kuwait for underrating their importance, and the importance of the situation. Iraqis also state that Kuwaiti officials in the meeting did not negotiate enough. For example, the Iraqis requested that their debt be decreased to nine billion dollars, but the Kuwaitis demanded ten billion dollars.12 The Kuwaitis also stubbornly refused to lease Iraq both of the two islands Warba, and Bubiyan, that it was
not using. Some people felt that Kuwaiti officials did not give in to the Iraqis' requests to show their power over Iraq.

Another description of the Jidda meeting is anti-Iraqi. Kuwait did make some concessions at the meeting, but Iraq was playing hardball and refused to negotiate. For example, Sa'd Abda, the Kuwaiti representative, agreed to erase a large portion of Iraq's war debt and to lease Iraq the island of Warba, but not Bubiyan. Later, Abdallah stated that, "The breakdown can be attributed to the fact that Iraq's delegation came only to deliver an ultimatum, repeat all the old Iraqi demands, and insist on total surrender in order to prepare the ground for an invasion." The Kuwaitis kept trying to bargain, and were trying to finally draw Iraq towards some type of border agreement, but the Iraqis had a violent course of action in mind. One day later, they invaded Kuwait.

On August 2, 1990, at about 2 o'clock in the morning, Iraqi tanks crashed over the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. By sunrise they had taken over Kuwait City and formed a ring of tanks around it, and by noon they reached the Saudi Arabian border. The attack is described in a Library of Congress document written by Milton Viorst:

A force of about 120,000 soldiers and approximately 2,000 tanks and other armored vehicles met little resistance. The Kuwaiti army was not on the alert, and those troops at their posts could not mount an effective defense. Some aircraft operating from southern Kuwait attacked Iraqi armored columns before their airbase was overrun, and they then sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. Of the 20,000 Kuwaiti troops, many were killed or captured, although up to 7,000 escaped into Saudi Arabia, along with about forty tanks.

The emir of Kuwait, along with his cabinet and close family members, escaped to Saudi Arabia, and a few days later, on August 6, 1990, Iraq annexed Kuwait.

The emir of Kuwait, Jabir III, called for international help. The U.S. responded that it could send troops immediately. The Arab League convened on August 10 to
discuss what to do about the crisis, and although it passed a resolution condemning
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi invasion, several anti-imperialist Gulf countries were
equally angry with Saudi Arabia for permitting American troops on its soil. However, the
Arab League did not take concrete steps physically to help Kuwait.

On the other hand, America stepped in to help almost immediately. Goldschmidt
noted:

The U.S. government, emboldened by the retreat of communism in Europe and by
Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev’s tacit support, rushed in to fill the vacuum.
It promptly condemned the invasion and froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the
United States. After winning the consent of the Saudi government, the
administration of George Bush began airlifting troops and supplies into the desert
kingdom, which had formerly barred foreign troops from Saudi territory— or had
kept their presence as inconspicuous as possible. By the end of October 1990,
more than 200,000 Americans were encamped around northeastern Saudi Arabia.
In the following month, Bush would double the size of the force, adding offensive
units to the mainly defensive ones he had already sent...15

The U.S. orchestrated the UN, as well as a military coalition. The UN passed a
series of resolutions calling on Iraq to withdraw completely from Kuwait. UN member
nations also imposed economic sanctions on Iraq. The country could not import anything,
and could not sell oil, which was practically its only exported product. Thus, Iraq became
crippled economically, and was unable to rebuild its war torn economy during the
invasion.

The Iraqis took foreign hostages in order to protect themselves against attack.
Westerners living in the country were not allowed to leave, and Hussein took many of
them as hostages, filmed them, and sent the videos to various countries. He informed the
world that he would place the hostages in various strategic military and civilian areas in
Iraq, so that those places would not be bombed. Towards the end of August, Hussein began releasing hostages, and by December, they had all been allowed to leave.

Meanwhile, in Kuwait. Iraqi soldiers stole many things from the Kuwaitis, and killed, raped, and tortured many of them as well. Elaine Scioliño reaffirmed that:

The Iraqi invasion quickly took on the appearance of a nationwide robbery, as the occupiers systematically looted and destroyed the country. Troops emptied the gold bazaar and the automobile showrooms...they stripped private homes, government ministries, museums, schools...they dismantled the country piece by piece...they loaded their war booty into trucks and hauled it up the main highway to Baghdad.16

The Iraqis not only harmed and looted Kuwaiti property, but they also terrorized the Kuwaitis. People could not move about freely, even for everyday tasks, for fear of being arrested or “disappeared.” There were unpredictable daily raids on homes, and hundreds of Kuwaitis were tortured and shot in front of their families.

Conditions worsened over the autumn of 1990. For example, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki and condemned the Iraqi invasion and ordered the Iraqis out of Kuwait. However, Saddam Hussein decided to reinforce his troops; by the end of September, there were about 350,000 Iraqi soldiers in Kuwait. International organizations condemned Iraq for the torture of Kuwaitis and other atrocities, but Iraq continued to build up troops in the country. President George Bush threatened to go to war if Hussein did not withdraw. Robinson explained, “On November 8, the Iraqi coalition numbered 425,000 US troops, and 265,000 troops from 27 other countries. The coalition commanded more than 150 ships and 2000 aircraft.”17

Many countries, including Russia, Jordan, Palestine, and Iran, tried to mediate, but were unable to influence George Bush. The U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, had a meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz on January 9, 1991, and although
they spoke for over six hours, nothing was resolved. Both Hussein and Bush were resolute and would not compromise.

The go-aheads for war were given by the U.N. and by the U.S. Congress. On November 29, the UN Security Council authorized the use of force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, if Hussein did not withdraw from Kuwait before January 15, 1991. Then, on January 12, 1991, just three days before Hussein’s surrender deadline, a Congress joint resolution gave George Bush the power to attack Iraq. However, Hussein did not show any sign of withdrawing.

On January 17, at three o’clock in the morning, coalition forces led by the U.S. started bombing Iraq. The next day, Iraq responded with Scud missile attacks on Israel, in hopes that it would strike back, thus drawing other Arab nations into the war. However, the United States intervened by sending Patriot anti-missile systems into Israel to intercept the missiles before they could hit their marks. The U.S. sent this missile interception system on the condition that Israel not retaliate against Iraq. Israel did not retaliate against Hussein’s attacks, thus foiling any plans for pan-Arab involvement in the war.

The air war continued on for several more weeks. On January 20, Iraqi soldiers began pumping Kuwaiti oil into the Gulf, both to hurt Kuwait by depleting their most vital resource and to poison the Gulf drinking water that both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia consumed. The oil slick grew to the size of “65 kilometers wide and 160 kilometers long”, damaging delicate ecosystems and wildlife, and causing a massive public health hazard. Several weeks later, Iraqis started setting Kuwait’s oil wells on fire. Then the U.S. bombed an Iraqi air raid shelter filled with civilians, including many women and
children, and claimed that they had not known it was filled with people. Two weeks later, on February 24, the ground offensive began. The UN coalition, led by the U.S., was much stronger than the Iraqi forces, thus this phase of the war ended in less than 100 hours. Virtually all Iraqi troops had been driven out of Kuwait and Iraqi soldiers were surrendering or retreating in huge numbers. Therefore, President George Bush ordered the fighting to stop on February 27, 1991.

About one month later, the UN Security Council accepted a Gulf War cease-fire and gave several requirements for the Iraqi government to comply with. These terms included recognition of the newly established Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, which was located several hundred meters farther into Iraqi territory than the previous one. The UN also asked the Iraqis to allow it to establish a peace observer force in a 15-kilometer zone overlapping both sides of the border. Additionally, Iraq was instructed to affirm its commitment to the Chemical Warfare and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements, to permit the UN to destroy any Iraqi weapons, to accept accountability for Kuwait’s losses, and to assume liability for all debts. Saddam Hussein was also directed to return and account for all missing Kuwaiti prisoners, and to renounce terrorism completely. On April 4, 1991, Hussein accepted all of these UN Security Council terms.19

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND IRAQ’S 1990-1991 ATTACK ON KUWAIT

Many people in the Middle East saw Saddam Hussein as an Arab hero who would at last make the region independent of Western influence. Thus Hussein’s invasion of
Kuwait led some nations in the region to feel more empowered. Countries like Palestine and Libya hailed Saddam as a revolutionary, challenging the Western imposed hegemony that had existed for so long in the Gulf region. Massoulie contends:

The pro-Iraqi stance of much of the Arab world can be explained by many factors, including: popular resentment against the oil states, the unfairness of the North-South Arab relationships, the long association of the American presence with imperialism and Zionism, fascination with Iraqi military power, and the Islamic arguments exploited by the self-proclaimed “savior” of the Arab world, Saddam Hussein, who soon achieved virtually prophetic status. All the diverse crises which had shaken the Arab world over the last forty years were to be found in miniature in the Kuwaiti invasion.\(^{20}\)

Strict Muslim countries with poor populations resented Kuwait both for its riches and for its perceived immorality. According to Draper, In 1988, the per capita annual income of Egypt was $490, of Iraq $1,950, and of Kuwait, $10,410.\(^{21}\) So, not only did the Kuwaitis have much more money than other countries, but many Arabs thought that they misused it. Draper continued by stating:

Kuwaiti playboys were legendary in Europe, especially at the gaming tables in London, where they gained a reputation for heavy drinking, gambling, and driving the most expensive cars... The behavior of Kuwaitis in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere during their brief exile during the Gulf War scandalized their hosts.\(^{22}\)

The Palestinians, who made up a large portion of the Kuwaiti population due to their exodus from Israel, were largely anti-American and anti-Israeli, as the Zionists had taken over so much of their territory. Thus, many of the Palestinians living in Kuwait supported the anti-imperialist Saddam Hussein’s attack on Kuwait, which was affiliated with the West. Alexander Cockburn reasons:

Just as many Palestinians in the occupied territories see their future as a U.S. sponsored catastrophe and probable eviction into Jordan, they and fellow Arabs see the actions today of the U.S. and its allies as the most coarsened realpolitik. So they turn in support of the opposing coarse real-politiker, Saddam, who had a
point when he said that Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait if Israel withdrew from the territories and from Lebanon, and if Syria likewise withdrew from Lebanon.\textsuperscript{23}

Thus, during the Gulf War, many Kuwaitis believed that local Palestinians were aiding the Iraqi soldiers in the invasion and destruction of their country. When the Iraqis retreated and the war ended, young groups of Kuwaiti men took to the streets to find Palestinians that had aided the Iraqis, and tortured, imprisoned and killed many of them. Moreover, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were evicted from Kuwait during and after the War.

International workers, which made up the majority of the Kuwait population in 1990, were another group greatly affected by the Gulf War. Manual laborers, maids, and house servants from countries including India, Iran, Bangladesh, and Pakistan were forced to flee the country during the conflict. Robinson contends:

Tens of thousands of refugees, many of them Arabs and Asians who had been working in Kuwait, fled the emirate, only to find themselves sweltering in makeshift transit camps on the Iraqi-Jordanian border in the middle of the summer.\textsuperscript{24}

These laborers not only lost their jobs, but many of them forfeited all of their savings they had accrued while working in Kuwait, which economically devastated their families.

Although the Soviet Union government representatives, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, tacitly approved of the UN and American aid to Kuwait, they also tried very hard to stop the Gulf War. The Soviet Union, an ally of Iraq for decades, had ambitions in the region, was threatened by the United States. Dilip Hiro explained: As early as 1987, during the Gulf War,

The Soviet Union condemned Washington’s policy of increasing its military presence in the Gulf...Moscow visualized the American moves as part of a grand design to establish land bases in the Gulf States and to group the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council into a tight military alliance.\textsuperscript{25}
Thus, at various points in the tension building up to the UN ground war, the Soviet Union tried to intervene to stop the war diplomatically, but failed. As it had predicted, American military influence in the Gulf region did vastly increase during and after the War.

Saudi Arabia and the wealthy, conservative Gulf States, who had been linked with the West for decades, felt threatened by Saddam Hussein and were against him. These countries sent thousands of troops to the frontlines of the Gulf War and bought billions of dollars worth of American weapons to defend themselves and to protect Kuwait. They understood Saddam Hussein’s intentions of overtaking Kuwait first, and realized that they were the next victims on his list.

Israel was one of the countries that Saddam Hussein directly threatened before the Gulf War, and actually bombed several times over the course of the conflict. Israel, which had gradually been taking over Palestinian lands for decades, was supported by the United States, and was therefore a symbol of the West for Saddam Hussein. He believed that if he bombed Israel and it retaliated that he could unite the Arab countries against Israel, and strengthen his forces and his cause. However, the Israelis were pressured by the U.S. not to strike back, and America installed Patriot missiles in Israel to intercept Saddam Hussein’s Scud missiles, thereby sabotaging Hussein’s strategy.

The U.S. reacted very strongly to Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and America largely led the retaliation against Hussein, leading to his expulsion from the emirate. “The anti-Iraq coalition’s forces eventually numbered 465,000 US troops and 265,000 from 27 other countries.”26 Upon hearing about the invasion, the United States immediately sent hundreds of thousands of troops to the region, along with billions of dollars worth of sophisticated weaponry. James Ridgeway argues:
According to President Bush, the Gulf crisis posed a threat to the American way of life. Others said American troops were there to protect oil interests. But Bush invoked a higher principle: The United States must respond to aggression against the small, helpless state of Kuwait. Bush said that ‘America’s freedom and that of America’s friends would suffer if the world’s oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein. These arguments were vague...many thought the administration’s goals were confused.  

Bush’s detractors wondered why he chose to be upset when he heard of the Iraqi torture of Kuwaitis, but not of the Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians. They wondered about the U.S. sponsored secret war in Nicaragua and about the attacks on Panama and Grenada. People asked why Bush was not as equally upset about the Indonesian government’s mass murder of East Timor residents, or China’s slaughter of Tibetans. Moreover, “…the Bush presidency supported a policy in Cambodia that envisioned a government in which the Khmer Rouge, which had killed millions of Cambodians in the 1970s, would share power,” reasoned Sciolino. What was it about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that upset George Bush so much, while he was not disturbed by, and even instigated, similar conflicts in other parts of the world?

One factor that made the United States inordinately interested in Kuwait was oil. As mentioned earlier, Kuwait produces about 9% of the world’s oil, and if Saddam Hussein had conquered the emirate, he would have had control of about 20% of the world oil market, a situation that the U.S. could not tolerate. America, which consumes more oil than any other country in the world, could not withstand having an enemy controlling one-fifth of all oil resources. Furthermore, the wealthy Gulf States often overproduced their delineated OPEC quotas, a practice which kept oil abundant and cheap, and which Saddam Hussein opposed. So, the U.S. was interested in protecting Kuwait to keep oil inexpensive, plentiful, and accessible.
In addition, George Bush saw an excellent opportunity to sell expensive weaponry to wealthy Kuwait, as well as other rich Gulf States that were threatened by Saddam Hussein and therefore interested in security. Kuwait and other Gulf State nations bought billions of dollars worth of weapons, and paid the U.S. exorbitant fees for their "work" in the defense of the region. According to Cordesman, "...military expenditures rose to dramatic new heights after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait," and the majority of this dramatically expanded spending was spent on U.S. arms. Thus, the American decision to aid the Kuwaitis proved to be a highly profitable undertaking.

Another factor explaining why George Bush's regime chose to protect Kuwait involves U.S. interests in maintaining a position of power in the strategic Gulf region. With the downfall of the Soviet Union and its regression from its traditional alignments with various Arab countries, including Iraq, America felt free to install another phase of its "new world order." On February 6, 1991, an angry King Hussein of Jordan stated, "The talk about a new world order whose early feature is the destruction of Iraq leads us to wonder about this order. The real purpose of this order is to destroy Iraq and rearrange the area under U.S. domination."
CHAPTER 7 ENDNOTES


10 Massoulie, Francois, Middle Eastern Conflict, Interlink Publishers, 1999, p. 79.


12 Interview with Dr. Janice Terry, 4-21-99.

13 Minister of Defense Nawwaf Al-Sabah’s interview, Der Spiegel, 9-24-90.


22 Draper, "The Gulf War Reconsidered," 34.


30 Yant, *Desert Mirage*, Prometheus Books, 1991, p. 188.
CHAPTER EIGHT

POST-GULF WAR RELATIONS

In 1991, Saddam Hussein agreed to comply to all of the United Nation’s Security Council’s demands. These terms included recognition and respect of the newly established Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, destruction of chemical weapons, and the renunciation of terrorism. The demands also stated that Hussein must accept accountability for Kuwait’s losses during the Gulf War, and must assume liability for all debts incurred in the conflict. However, Saddam Hussein has not fulfilled his obligations. As stated by W. Clinton in a letter addressed to Congress:

Cooperation by Iraq with the United Nations since 1991 has been meager, sporadic, selective, and opportunistic. Taken as a whole, Iraq’s record represents a stunning failure to meet the standard set by the Council when it set the terms for ending the Gulf War: to assure the world community of its peaceful intentions...the purpose of UN Resolution 687- to ensure that Iraq could never again pose a threat to its neighbors or to regional peace and security, remains unfulfilled...Further, Iraq has not complied with Security Council demands to resolve the issue of Kuwaiti MIAs, return Kuwaiti property stolen during the occupation, and renounce terrorism.¹

Thus, the Kuwaiti people continue to fear Iraq and Saddam Hussein’s regime. Although Kuwait has largely been restored to its former state, the trauma of war has left a psychological scar on the Kuwaiti people. As reported in the Boston Globe, “Kuwaitis still have nightmares about the occupation. They recall, all too vividly, how they were house bound for weeks, surrounded by tanks and troops, as Iraq sought to erase Kuwait
from the map."2 The 5,000 American soldiers now based in Kuwait to protect it feel the same way. "We can never turn our backs on these threats. We can never relax," stated U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry.3

Part of this fear stems from acknowledgement that Iraq still has unresolved issues with Kuwait. The Gulf War attack tended to exacerbate these problems. For example, Iraq attacked Kuwait partly to gain the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. Additionally, Iraq wanted Kuwait's excellent port and extensive Gulf access. However, Hussein not only failed to gain any of these resources as he was defeated, but he also lost parts of Iraqi territory. According to Amy Marcus:

After Kuwait's liberation, the UN boundary commission demarcated the Kuwaiti border with Iraq about 570 meters to the north near the Iraqi town of Safwan and slightly north in the region of the contested Rumailah oil field. These modifications gave Kuwait six oil wells in the field, and part of the important Iraqi naval base of Umm Qasr. Kuwait accepted the commission's finding and announced it intended to build a security fence along its border with Iraq... Iraq responded to the findings with an angry letter in May to the UN secretary general rejecting the commission's findings. Domestically, it continued to refer to Kuwait as an integral part of Iraq.4

Hussein's Gulf access further decreased after the Gulf invasion and Iran-Iraq War. Iraq lost total control over its vital Umm Qasr port, and 570 meters of coast where the border was moved north after the Gulf War. Moreover, the Shatt Al-Arab "is currently not suitable for navigation because it is covered with piles of mud, wreckage of over 180 ships, and the existence of marine mines. The dredging of this waterway is very costly and is estimated to cost $5-10 billion."5 The Iraqi government's frustration at being virtually landlocked has increased as its access to the Gulf has decreased. Marcus
explained. "Iraq's desire to find an alternative to the muddy port of Basra for shipping its oil means that the Iraq-Kuwait border will remain a political time bomb." 4

Another unresolved topic is the fact that many Iraqis still believe that Kuwait belongs to Iraq, a problem which has plagued Kuwait for over a century. Iraqis believe that,

Kuwait was artificially created. In a region where states were sometimes arbitrarily created and where boundaries were drawn by European powers who split the spoils of WWI, the prospect that this justification might gain legitimacy is particularly troubling. And when powerful states make unilateral judgements about sovereignty, no weak state can feel safe. 5

Many Iraqis state that the red line arbitrarily drawn by the British Sir Percy Cox over eighty years ago will never be valid. As recently as January 1999, Iraq challenged Kuwait's right to sovereignty. In a Boston Globe article, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated,

Kuwait's borders are a bombshell that may explode in the future. We accepted created borders in 1994 as part of a UN resolution which was tailored to expand Kuwait's coasts at the expense of Iraq...Kuwait's acceptance of the arrangement means that it intentionally wants to inflict more harm on Iraq and Iraqi people, who at the end of the day are the owners of the land and the coasts of Kuwait. 6

So, even after 100 years, the same major problems exist between Iraq and Kuwait, and a solution seems unlikely. The border truly is a bomb which might explode in the near future.

In 1994, the volatile boundary almost did explode. Iraq sent tens of thousands of fully equipped Republican Guard (elite Iraqi soldiers) troops south from Baghdad, to about 12 miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Clinton proclaimed:
In early October 1994, elements of the Hammurabi Division of the elite Iraqi Republican Guard were detected relocating to positions at Shaibah airfield in southern Iraq. This was the southern most deployment of Republican Guard forces since the 1990-1991 Gulf War. By October 8, the 15th Mechanized Brigade of the Hammurabi Division had deployed to approximately 20 kilometers from the Kuwait border. Its artillery assets were oriented south toward Kuwait. At the same time, the Al Nida Division of the Republican Guard began moving from the Mosul rail yard and the Baghdad area to positions in southern Iraq. All these units were fully equipped with ammunition, food and fuel, leading us to believe that this was no mere exercise. By October 9, these troop movements, combined with forces already in southern Iraq, brought Iraqi troop strength near the border to 64,000, organized into 8 divisions.5

Iraqi troops continued moving south, and by October 11, it seemed as if they were ready to strike Kuwait again. However, the UN demanded that Iraq leave the area immediately, and tens of thousands of U.S. troops arrived at the scene within a few days. The Iraqis slowly started to retreat back to Baghdad and other more northern areas of Iraq. Thus, it is obvious that Iraq has been, and will be, a thorn in Kuwait's side for some time to come. Until Iraq's perceived injustices are resolved, Iraq may well continue to instigate conflict with its neighbor.

Since the Gulf War, economic and political conditions in Iraq have steadily deteriorated. At the beginning of the war, Iraq was already deeply in debt. Estimates of this debt vary from 50 to 90 billion dollars. These debts are the result of extensive borrowing from nations including the United States, Russia, and Kuwait during the Iran-Iraq war. Additionally, Iraq suffered financially both during and after the Gulf War, as many UN countries decided to boycott exporting or importing goods, including foodstuffs to or from the nation. The people of Iraq suffered immensely from these Western economic sanctions.

Throughout the 1990s, Saddam Hussein has caused his people a great deal of suffering. Kuwait, Iraq, and the UN had difficulty finding solutions to their many
problems. A United Nations coalition of arms inspectors has been trying to locate and
destroy Hussein’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. and at times Hussein has
not been willing to show the inspectors where Iraq’s arms are located. This has angered
the UN and thus has caused the sanctions against the Iraqi people to be extended.
impoverishing and even killing thousands of civilians, while leaving the leaders
unharmed. Then, according to Goldschmidt, “After years of resistance, Saddam
consented to a UN deal that allowed him to sell S2 (soon to be S5) billion dollars worth of
Iraqi oil every six months in exchange for imported food, medicine, and other necessities,
starting in 1998.” 6 The UN oil-for-food barter was supposed to have started years earlier,
but Hussein’s attack on the northern Kurdish areas of Iraq, (and on more than one U.S.
plane in the area) delayed the arrangement from taking place. This has crippled the Iraqi
population and has severely limited their access to education, food, medicine, and other
necessities, while Hussein’s regime has emerged virtually unscathed.

Political conditions in Iraq are also precarious. After the Gulf War, minorities in
Iraq including the Shi’a Muslims and the Kurds in the north, rebelled against Saddam
Hussein. However, Hussein retaliated by murdering hundreds of thousands of Shi’a in the
southern marshes of the country, and Kurds in the north of Iraq. Although the United
States initially encouraged these rebellions, it did not offer assistance with the revolts.
However, the U.S. has declared no-fly zones in large northern and southern zones of Iraq,
where Hussein’s forces are not allowed to fly. Iraq’s current economic and political
situations remain chaotic.
When the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, most of its governmental representatives fled to Saudi Arabia, where they contacted the U.S. to plea for help to save Kuwait. And, the U.S. government quickly responded. Goldschmidt writes:

It promptly condemned the invasion and froze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States. After winning the consent of the Saudi government, the administration of George Bush began airlifting troops and supplies into the desert kingdom... by the end of October 1990, more than 200,000 American men and women in uniform were encamped around northeastern Saudi Arabia. In the following month, Bush would double the size of that force.... Many other countries, including Egypt and Syria, sent troops to join the U.S. forces in what was officially termed Operation Desert Shield.7

As months passed, and 1990 turned into 1991, the American soldiers stayed, and the size of the forces grew as President Bush sent out more troops, ships, planes, and heavy artillery. American soldiers fought for Kuwait up to the last moment in February of 1991, when the country was liberated. Why?

Participation in the war not only increased American control over oil, but also elevated its general political and military dominance in the area. Goldschmidt contended, "It opened new vistas for a Pax Americana in the region."8 Obviously, Kuwait felt that it owed the United States for its help in the war, and therefore made many concessions, including buying billions of dollars of weapons during the conflict, and by giving U.S. firms virtually all rebuilding contracts after the war. Kuwaiti officials have become more open to American opinion and influence, as the United States “saved” it and Kuwait will forever feel indebted to its rescuer. Other small southern gulf states also understand that America is a good ally to have, and they too are becoming more open to the United States, also buying billions of dollars worth of U.S. weapons and permitting military bases to be set up in their countries. Thus, through participation in the Gulf conflict, America has established a “Pax Americana” in the region.
The residents of the Arabian Gulf region have different responses to this increasing dominance. On one hand, they are grateful for the aid that America offered, and on the other hand, they are leery of giving up power to foreign powers. Generally, alignment with the United States is seen as a necessary evil. It is necessary for the smaller, militarily weak Gulf States to befriend America, but it is also disempowering, and many Arabs are disheartened that they are sometimes unable to set their own courses.
CHAPTER 8 ENDNOTES


5 Clinton, W. op. cit.


CONCLUSION

Kuwait’s unfortunate location, in a volatile area surrounded by more powerful countries, historically, has been a great disadvantage. Kuwait’s small size, military weakness, and great economic resources have motivated neighbors, especially Iraq, to pressure Kuwait in order to further their own interests and influence in the region. When one examines Kuwait’s history, it is evident that although it has been challenged many times, the country has managed to survive.

The Kuwaiti people have grown stronger and more unified, making it increasingly difficult for any neighbor to overcome it. Moreover, with the assistance of countries like Britain, who has historically been a Kuwaiti ally, and the United States, which has been particularly supportive over the past decade, Kuwait will endure.

However, the problem of the Iraqi problem with Kuwait has continued. Solutions to these issues will be difficult to find. Iraq’s motivations and aims are clear. Iraq seeks to bolster its position in terms of hegemony in Iran and the Gulf region. Iraqi officials want a longer coastline and increased access to the Persian-Arabian Gulf. Acquiring Kuwait would guarantee both of these resources, as well as doubling Iraq’s oil reserves and adding about $100 billion to its coffers.

In face of these geo-strategic realities, Kuwait has developed a unique style of maintaining neutrality, although this has not stopped its neighbors from attempting to
annex and/or control it. Kuwait is sometimes pressured to choose sides, as in the Iran-Iraq
War, but the nation tries to revert to the status quo lest it anger one of its powerful
neighbors: Iran, Iraq, or Saudi Arabia. The threat is not imagined but real, as
demonstrated by Iraq’s numerous endeavors to annex Kuwait, Iran’s violent attacks
during the 1980s, and Saudi Arabia’s early attempt to incorporate Kuwait into the Saudi
kingdom.

Each of these three countries wants Kuwait, but will never allow the others to
annex the country, as it would tip the scales of power too heavily in favor of the
conquering nation. In this way, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia balance each other out, and
this phenomenon helps to protect Kuwait. This was exemplified during the Gulf War,
when both Iran and Saudi Arabia aided Kuwait. Iran allowed Kuwaiti pilots and citizens
to flee to Iran, and Saudi Arabia supplied troops and allowed American soldiers on their
soil.

Other countries are also concerned about Kuwait’s sovereignty. For example,
Kuwait has billions of dollars invested in nations like Western Europe, Japan, and the
United States. Furthermore, Kuwait supplies about 10% of the world’s oil. Therefore,
these countries are especially concerned when Kuwait is threatened, as demonstrated in
the Gulf War, when Europe, Japan, and the U.S. invested huge amounts of money and
some troops (especially in the case of America) to ensure that Saddam Hussein did not
annex Kuwait.

Another major reason that Kuwait has remained autonomous is the unified will of
the Kuwaiti people supporting the sovereignty of their nation. Citizens of the emirate
wish to retain their identity, high living standard, and relative form of democracy (as
compared to other countries in the region). This desire to maintain independence was proven in the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein wished to install a replacement government in Kuwait, but could not find one native Kuwaiti to help him.

So, the Kuwaitis want to remain independent, while Iraq still wishes to annex the country. The dilemma has not been solved, nor do there seem to be any viable solutions. Various proposals made to solve the ongoing crisis do not seem feasible. For example, one suggestion is to allow Hussein access to Warba and Bubiyan Islands. However, these islands are marshy and not fit for making a port on. They need to be dredged constantly to be serviceable. Moreover, Bubiyan is very close to Iranian military bases and therefore not militarily strategically placed. Another reason that the islands should not be leased or given to Iraq is that the Iraqi government would never stop there. They would keep demanding more and more land, until Kuwait no longer existed. Therefore, giving Iraq any access to these islands is not a practical solution to this ongoing border problem.

Some people also suggest that when the Iraqi government changes, and when Saddam Hussein is no longer in power, the border problem will become less important. However, Hussein has been very difficult to extricate. Moreover, even if he could be driven from power, another dictator like him, such as one of his sons or followers, could be installed, which could make regional problems even worse. Additionally, this dilemma is over one hundred years old, and has surfaced with more than one Iraqi leader. The problem will not go away, even if Saddam Hussein does.

Many Kuwaitis want Hussein to formally recognize the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border, believing that recognition of the boundary will solve the conflict. However, the border was demarcated by the UN and formally recognized by Hussein in 1992. Over the past
six years, he has sent troops to the border in a massive buildup, told Kuwait that it is part of Iraq. Hence, even formal recognition of the border by Iraq does not guarantee a solution to the problem. There does not seem to be any viable resolution on the horizon.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The importance of the boundaries delineating countries in the Arabian Gulf area has become more and more important as oil has been discovered under it. The people of this region now apply themselves strictly to lines drawn when colonial powers like France and Britain dominated the Arabian Gulf area. What was once a line drawn in the sand has become a hotly contested international border which helps to determine which resources will be allotted to which nations. Boundaries between nations become sensitive areas where neighbors vent their anger, pride, and ambitions.

Moreover, these emotions and desires become stronger in the case of Kuwait, a small and wealthy nation amidst three larger and more militarily powerful neighbors. Additionally, characteristics which aggravate the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border situation even more include the existence of oil near borders and the unsubstantial Iraqi coastline, reducing its access to the Arabian Gulf. These problems will continue to cause friction between the two countries.

Many of the Gulf States are relatively newly formed independent nations, which have many possible sources of potential conflict. Thus, generally, the Kuwaiti border problem reflects the geopolitical processes that many Gulf States are passing through.
Territorial conflicts are one of the most common issues in this area, and as the countries are relatively young, they do not have much experience dealing with either international or domestic issues. Moreover, since many of the borders in the area were declared by colonial rulers who did not fully understand the dynamics of the regions they were cutting up, the boundaries are especially volatile. They cut through homogenous areas, and sometimes took land from nations at a whim. Such was the case with Sir Percy Cox, who drew a quite arbitrary red line demarcating where Kuwait began and Iraq ended. Thus, even if the boundary issue is ever temporarily solved, it will be sure to be agitated again. The Kuwaiti border calamity is a noteworthy example of the implications of the locations of a small but economically and geopolitically vital state in a chaotic area. The boundary conflict was a human creation, and its solution remains in human hands as well.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS


N.A. Kuwaiti Foreign Office Document #371/21858.

N.A. Kuwaiti Foreign Office Document #371/24559.


Kuwaiti Ministry of Oil, Kuwait’s Oil, 1983.


BOOKS IN ARABIC-TITLES GIVEN IN TRANSLATION


Al-Fil, J. Historical Geography of Kuwait. Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Lubnan, 1972.


**BOOKS TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH FROM ARABIC**


Nawar, A.S. *History of Iraq, from 1830 to 1872*. Cairo, Egypt: Dar Al-Kotob Al-Arabi, 1971.

**BOOKS IN ENGLISH**


Baram, Amatzia, and Barry Rubin. *Iraq’s Road to War*. New York: St. Martin’s Press,


**ARTICLES**


---

**JOURNALS**


# OIL SECTOR AND NON-OIL ACTIVITIES IN KUWAIT

## 1950-1979

## Appendix One

(Source: Ministry of Oil, 1983: Kuwait’s oil, Kuwait)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Oil Sector / Non-Oil Activities</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage Of Oil Sector Of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961/2</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/3</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/4</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/5</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>1032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/6</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/7</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>1134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967/8</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>1207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968/9</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>559</td>
<td>1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969/70</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970/71</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971/2</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>1577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>1490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1330</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>1962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1844</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>2515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>685</td>
<td>2163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1561</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>2384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1396</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>2349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2069</td>
<td>1407</td>
<td>3476</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Economic Indicators in Kuwait

Appendix Two
Amal Al-Hesham

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Kuwaitis</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (SUS current billions)</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual GDP Growth (percent)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (percent)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (percent)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign Debt (SUS current billions)</td>
<td>10.98</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production (1,000s of barrels per day)</td>
<td>1,937</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,870</td>
<td>2,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Exports (1,000s of barrels per day)</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1,923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Oil Export Price (per barrel)</td>
<td>14.55</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>15.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil Export Receipts (SUS current billions)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>11.18</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (SUS current billions)</td>
<td>18.16</td>
<td>10.81</td>
<td>18.82</td>
<td>23.65</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GDP (SUS current)</td>
<td>8.527</td>
<td>5.222</td>
<td>13.434</td>
<td>16.538</td>
<td>13.250</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Al-Sabah Dynasty of Kuwait

(*From 1899-1961 Kuwait was under British administration*)

Appendix Three
Amal Al-Hesham

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Ruler</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1756-1764</td>
<td>Sabah I, the first ruler of Kuwait initiates the al-Sabah dynasty, which still rules Kuwait today</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764-1815</td>
<td>Abdullah I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815-1859</td>
<td>Jaber I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1859-1866</td>
<td>Sabah II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1866-1892</td>
<td>Abdullah II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892-1896</td>
<td>Muhammad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896-1915</td>
<td>Mubarak &quot;the Great&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915-1917</td>
<td>Jaber II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917-1921</td>
<td>Salim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921-1950</td>
<td>Ahmad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1965</td>
<td>Abdullah III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1977</td>
<td>Sabah III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-</td>
<td>Jaber III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure One