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The University of Utah, 1988
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THE OTTOMAN POLICY IN THE HEJAZ IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:
A STUDY OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS,
1143-1202 A.H./1731-1788 A.D.

by

Abdulrahman Alorabi

A dissertation submitted to the faculty of
The University of Utah
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Middle East Studies--History

Department of History
The University of Utah
June 1988
THE UNIVERSITY OF UTAH GRADUATE SCHOOL

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE APPROVAL

of a dissertation submitted by

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This dissertation has been read by each member of the following supervisory committee and by majority vote has been found to be satisfactory.

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FINAL READING APPROVAL

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I have read the dissertation of AbdulRahman Alorabi in its final form and have found that (1) its format, citations, and bibliographic style are consistent and acceptable; (2) its illustrative materials including figures, tables, and charts are in place; and (3) the final manuscript is satisfactory to the Supervisory Committee and is ready for submission to the Graduate School.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study is not merely to shed light on the history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century, but also to examine political and administrative developments which occurred in the Hejaz between 1143-1292 A.H./1731-1788 A.D. The study focuses particularly on relations between Ottoman officials in the Hejaz, Egypt, Syria and Istanbul and the sherifs of Mecca.

In the eighteenth century Ottoman policy in the Hejaz was not well-defined concerning the maintenance of a firm hierarchy among the officials in the Hejaz, Egypt, Syria and Istanbul and the sherifs of Mecca. This lack of a clear policy enabled the emir of Mecca to increase his power and wield personal control over regional matters. The Ottoman sultans gave the emirs of Mecca relative freedom to direct the affairs of the Hejaz, while on the other hand, the sultans also authorized the Ottoman officials in Egypt to intervene in the concerns of the region. This vague division of power in the Hejaz allowed the emirs of Mecca to play their rivals against one another and thus resulted in an increase of their power.

The first phase of political development in the Hejaz (1143-1184 A.H./1731-1770 A.D.) saw the beginnings of change in the balance of power in favor of the emir. In 1161/1748
when the Ottoman governor of Jeddah refused to pay the emir of Mecca his share of the customs duties of Jeddah, the emir dispatched a detachment of his own soldiers and took his share by force.

The second phase of political development in the Hejaz (1184-1202 A.H./1770-1778 A.D.) marked the peak of the power of the emirs of Mecca. Although this period began with the Egyptian expedition in the Hejaz and the effort of the vali of Egypt to integrate the region into his domain, it also saw the failure of the Egyptians to annex the region permanently due to the emir of Mecca's persistence in resisting the Egyptians.

Sherif Surūr's reign (1186-1202 A.H./1773-1788 A.D.) demonstrated clearly the grim authority of the emir over the affairs of the Hejaz. Sherif Surūr overshadowed the Ottoman officials in the region and checked the intervention of the Ottoman officials in Egypt and Syria. When in the pilgrimage season of 1193-1779 the commander of the Egyptian caravan tried to depose Sherif Surūr and appoint another sherif to the governorship of the Hejaz, Sherif Surūr summoned his troops and advanced on the commander, forcing him to abandon his goal and to apologize. These incidents clearly illustrate the changing nature of the Ottoman presence in the Hejaz in the eighteenth century.
Dedicated to my mother, brothers, sisters, and my daughter Jumanah.
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The system employed in this study for the transliteration of the Arabic terms, names, etc. is the Library of Congress transliteration system. The Turkish words are transliterated according to the New Redhouse Turkish-English Dictionary (Istanbul, 1986). The foreign words (Arabic and Turkish) are defined and underlined only on the first occurrence. Arabic words commonly used in the English language are spelled according to Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary.

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support.

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INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of their rule in the Hejaz 923/1517, the Ottomans acknowledged the religious importance of the Hejaz. The Hejaz occupied a central position in the Muslim world. It was the cradle of Islam and the location of two of its three holy cities. The Ottoman sultans maintained the religious significance of Mecca and Medina in the Hejaz and considered themselves the sole protectors of the holy places, thereby claiming political supremacy among Muslims.

When the Ottomans acquired the Hejaz, they treated the region very differently from the other provinces of their empire, in order to emphasize the special role of the holy places. The Ottomans did not impose any new regulations or specific restrictions on the Hejaz, and they did not change the political structure of the region. The Ottoman sultans confirmed the sheriffs of Mecca in their right to the governorship of the Hejaz, requiring only two things in return: first, the sheriffs should acknowledge Ottoman sovereignty, and second, the sheriffs should maintain order and particularly protect the pilgrims.

Ottoman policy in the Hejaz centered on the pilgrimage. It concentrated especially on the organization of the two major pilgrimage caravans, coming from Egypt and
Syria. Ottoman policy also focused on improving the pilgrimage facilities and in maintaining security on the pilgrimage routes.

The Ottoman sultans entrusted the governors, or vālīs, of Egypt and Syria with both the organization of the pilgrimage caravans and the protection of the caravans during their journey to and from the Hejaz. In addition, the sultans entrusted the vālīs with the delivery and protection of the annual subsidy (ṣurrah) for the holy cities sent to the Hejaz with the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans. The organization of the caravans and the dispatching of the subsidies were very important to the Ottoman sultans; if the vālīs of Egypt and Syria did not fulfill their duties properly, their failure often resulted in their removal.

Although the Ottomans confirmed the sherifs of Mecca as emirs responsible for the government of the Hejaz, and gave them a free hand in the region, the central government did impose, through the governors of Egypt and Syria, a measure of supervision over the emir. The Ottomans also appointed Turkish officials to positions in the Hejaz to look after Ottoman interests and to watch over the emir of Mecca. The most notable of the Turkish officials in the Hejaz were the ṣanjaq\(^1\) of Jeddah, the chief qādī of Mecca,

\(^1\)The term used in the Arabic sources referring to the governor of Jeddah, to be used throughout this dissertation. In the Ottoman administrative terminology, this term refers
and the sheikh of the Medina Haram.

Throughout the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman policy in the Hejaz was not well-defined beyond the basic ingredients discussed above; this lack of clarity in consequence created false illusions and disturbances in the region. Strictly speaking, the Ottomans did not introduce a structured administrative system, nor did they establish a clear policy on the matter of relations between the central government in Istanbul and the sherifs of the Hejaz. Moreover, the Ottomans did not regulate the relations between the emir of Mecca and the Turkish officials in the Hejaz, Egypt, and Syria. On the one hand, the Ottoman sultans gave the emir relative freedom to direct the affairs of the Hejaz, while on the other hand, the government also authorized the valis of Egypt and Syria to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Hejaz. In addition, the Ottoman sultans permitted the Turkish officials in the Hejaz to intervene and to check the power of the emir of Mecca. Accordingly, there was not one absolute authority in the Hejaz.

In the eighteenth century, the balance of power in the Hejaz changed in favor of the emir of Mecca. Most of the sherifs who held the position of the emir during this time enjoyed great influence and wielded firm control over the

to an administrative and territorial division. For more information, see "Şandjak," in The Encyclopaedia of Islam.
affairs of the Hejaz, minimizing the intervention of the Turkish officials. Between 1731-1788, only three sherifs ruled the Hejaz for about fifty-four years. Conditions in the eighteenth century were more conducive for the emirs of Mecca to develop their compelling personalities than were conditions in the seventeenth century. One reason for this was the Ottoman şanjaq of Jeddah, who never had very much power and who had to share important functions with the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans. The şanjaq was also under the strong influence of the vâlis of Egypt and Syria. Moreover, as a result of the Ottoman government's policy of dividing power among the vâlis of Egypt and Syria, the commanders of the pilgrimage caravans, and the Ottoman officials in Mecca and Medina, the emirs of Mecca found it easier to free themselves from these three groups.

Although the Ottoman sultans continued their efforts to organize the pilgrimage and to provide protection to the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans and also continued their traditional sending of the şurrah to the Hejaz, corruption among the Ottoman officials responsible for the two caravans often deprived the caravans of their protection and as a result, the caravans were frequently attacked by bedouins causing disturbances and disorder on the pilgrimage route. Corruption among those responsible for the management of the şurrah likewise contributed to social
tensions and disorder in the Hejaz.

Political and administrative developments in the Hejaz during the eighteenth century were the original causes of the political, administrative, and social changes in the region in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Wahhabi invasion of the Hejaz, and the Egyptian occupation in the nineteenth century, which ended the first phase of Ottoman rule in the Hejaz, cannot been seen without the changes in the balance of power which occurred during the eighteenth century. Moreover, the revolt of Sherif Husayn b. Cali in the early twentieth century can be seen as originating in the political developments of the eighteenth century.

The main purpose of this study is not merely to shed light on the history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century, but also to examine the political and administrative developments which took place in the Hejaz between 1143-1202/1731-1788. The study will look particularly into the relationship between the Ottomans and the sherifs of Mecca, and the effect of this relationship on the developments and changes which occurred in the perspective period.

The history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century is not very well-known. Even today, the researcher would find himself in a difficult situation if he considered studying the Hejaz in the eighteenth century, simply because of the scarcity of studies relating to the subject. It seems to me
that modern historians and students of history did not undertake a detailed investigation of the history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century for the fear that they might come out empty-handed after spending considerable time trying to locate the necessary materials on the subject. The history of the Hejaz, particularly in the eighteenth century, is a field still shrouded in mystery.

When I first decided to study the rule of the Ottomans in the Hejaz in the eighteenth century, I realized the difficulty and hardship of carrying out such a task. However, I was determined to pursue my goal to examine the region and the period under study, and developed a consuming interest in the subject over the years.

Between 1983 and 1987 I located original materials and documents concerning the eighteenth century history of the Hejaz in Saudi Arabia. I also traveled to Turkey and Egypt in order to find further information which might help me to resolve some of the ambiguity in the subject. However, due to bureaucratic difficulties, I did not have such good fortune in those countries as I had in Saudi Arabia. Some of the manuscripts and Ottoman documents which I obtained in Saudi Arabia were located originally in Turkey and Egypt. Fortunately, the Saudi institutions where I obtained the materials had access to the original materials and were able to make copies of them. This study, dealing with the history of the Hejaz and the Ottoman rule in the region in
the eighteenth century, is the first of its kind to be based on information drawn from the original sources discussed below.

Perhaps the most important source, that of ȤAbd Allāh b. ȤAbd al-Shakūr, "Tārīkh Ashrāf wa-Umarā' Makkah al-Mukarramah," is still in manuscript form. The work deals, as its title indicates, with the history of the sherifs and emirs of Mecca between 1143-1221 A.H. The author, Ibn ȤAbd al-Shakūr, as he is known, was an Ȥālim of Mecca in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries A.H. He died in 1257/1841. Ibn ȤAbd al-Shakūr employed a chronological method to explain and narrate the history of the Hejaz in the period covered, through the study of the sherifs who ruled the region during these years. As he explains in the first few folios of his work, he studies the emirs of Mecca and narrates in detail the events which took place during the reign of the emir. He also devotes part of his work to information about the aqyān and ulama of Mecca. The author cites many verses of Arabic poetry and proverbs to emphasize his stories. However, the author does not reveal in his Tārīkh any of his sources, if there were any.

Ibn ȤAbd al-Shakūr's chronicle is an invaluable source in the history of the Hejaz during the eighteenth century.

The author, as he remarks on many occasions, was an eyewitness to most of the events he describes in his work. Moreover, the author not only narrates the political history of the Hejaz during the period covered, but he also describes in some detail the economic and social situation of the region, providing some enlightenment on this little-known span of time in the Hejaz. The accounts of the author are very elaborate and chronologically in harmony with one another.

"Tārīkh Makkah al-Mukarramah wa-Ashrāfihā," in manuscript form, is another important chronicle which deals with the history of the Hejaz and its rulers. The author of this work is unknown. He apparently lived in the 12th/18th century and was an Ġālim of Mecca. This conclusion is drawn from the passage on folio 169r, where the author is describing the reign of Sherif MasCūd b. SaCūd (1146-1165/1734-1752) saying "and he, Sherif MasCūd, is our ruler till this year 1160/1746."3

This work deals with the history of the Hejaz in general, and with Mecca in particular, from the time of the Prophet Muḥammad until the year 1160/1746 during the reign of Sherif MasCūd. Thus, for the present study only the reigns of two sherifs, Sherif Muḥammad b. ṬAbd Allāh (1143-1146/1731-1734), and Sherif MasCūd mentioned above, are

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3Riyadh, King SaCūd University Library, Manuscript Department. Tārīkh, no. 2622, Tārīkh Makkah al-Mukarramah wa-Ashrāfihā, fol. 169r.
relevant.

Despite the short period of eighteenth century Hejazi history covered by the author, I found this work very helpful. It describes in detail political developments during the reign of the two sherifs. In comparing it with Ibn ĈAbd al-Shakūr's chronicle, I found that the two works agree on their description of the political history of the two sherifs' reigns, although they are independent of one another. However, while this work ends by the end of 1160, Ibn ĈAbd al-Shakūr's work proceeds to a much later period, as I discussed previously. While in general the two works agree in their accounts of the reign of the two sherifs, there are accounts narrated in one but not in the other. For example, the expulsion of the Persians from Mecca in 1144/1731 during the reign of Sherif Muḥammad b. ĈAbd Allāh is narrated only in "Tārīkh Makkah wa-Ashrāfiḥā." Ibn ĈAbd al-Shakūr does not mention the incident, apparently because his main concern, more than anything else, was the violent conflict between the sherifs. Nevertheless, both works support the accounts of one another and thus are considered reliable.

"Nubdhah min Kitāb Ifādat al-Anām bi-Dhikr Akhbār al-Balad al-Ḥarām," in manuscript form, is a short part of the original work "Ifādat al-Anām bi-Dhikr Akhbār al-Balad al-Ḥarām" by ĈAbd Allāh Ghāzī (d. 1365/1945), which is still in manuscript form as well. The scribe of the "Nubdhah" is
unknown. The "Nubdhaîn" deals with the history of many Meccan families. Although it is from the early twentieth century, the work goes back to the history of the Meccan families it covers, from the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries onwards.

The author does not elaborate on his discussion of the history of the Meccan families covered in his work. Rather, in a kind of summary, it enumerates a few facts about the families and their role in the Hejazi society. Despite the brief account, the work is helpful and valuable.

Aḥmad Zaynî Daḥlan is the author of Khulāṣat al-Kalām fī Bayân Umarā' al-Balad al-Harām, published in Cairo in 1305/1887. The author was a Hanafi Cālim of Mecca in the nineteenth century (1232-1304/1817-1886). He held the office of the chief mufti of the city for many years until his death. He also held the position of the imam in the Mecca Ḥaram, and taught the Ḥanafī madhhab at the same Mosque. 4 Daḥlan left us six books, including Khulāṣat al-Kalām, dealing with different topics.

Khulāṣat al-Kalām is a chronicle which addresses, as its title indicates, the history of the rulers of Mecca from the time of the Prophet Muḥammad until the end of the year 1301/1883. In this book, Daḥlan provides considerable information in describing the history of the Hejaz through

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the reigns of the rulers of Mecca. He, as a man of knowledge, chooses his facts carefully and expounds on them. Daḥlan made use of the preceding sources of his time, including Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr's chronicle, to which he often refers.

In regard to the period of the present study, Daḥlan's book goes hand in hand with the three previous works I mentioned. The elaborate and careful accounts of the works enabled me to clarify some of the problems concerning the history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century. These works substantiate one another. Moreover, Khulāṣat al-Kalām is full of details, not only on the political development, but also in the economic and social developments in the Hejaz. Thus, this book is considered one of the few reliable and informative sources on these subjects.

Jaʿfar Ḥāshim al-Ḥusaynī, "al-Akhbār al-Gharībah fī Dhikr Mā WaqCa bi-Ṭaybat al-Ḥabībah" is in manuscript form. The author, a twentieth century Medinan chronicler, was born and lived all of his life in Medina. He died in 1345/1926.⁵ Although the author was a twentieth century chronicler, his work is considered to be a concise version of ǦAbd al-Raḥman al-Anṣārī's (d. 1197/1782) history, an eighteenth century chronicle,⁶ as he states in the introduction to his work.

⁶Ibid., p. 146.
However, the author does not provide us with more information about the original version of al-Anṣāri's chronicle.

"al-Akhbār al-Gharībah" deals with the quarrels between the Ottoman garrison, Janissaries, at Medina and the people of the city between 1111-1199/1699-1783/84. It also describes the struggle and conflict between the garrison and the other Ottoman officials in Medina, particularly the sheikh al-Ḥaram al-Nabawī. The work describes, in considerable detail, the turmoil and disorder in the city caused by the Ottoman garrison. However, the work does not provide us with enough information concerning the organization and numbers of the garrison. In addition, this work does not mention the equipment of the garrison, which would certainly have added to its value. Despite these gaps, "al-Akhbār al-Gharībah" gives a clear picture and provides very valuable information on the events which took place in Medina in the period it covers. The accounts in this work are arranged chronologically.

The only Western chronicle on the history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century is Gerald de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca. This book deals primarily, as its title suggests, with the political history of the Hejaz, and in particular with the political activities of the rulers of Mecca from the early days of Islam in the seventh century to the end of the sherifian family's rule in the first half of the
twentieth century.

Chapters Ten and Eleven deal with the reign of the sherifs who ruled the Hejaz in the eighteenth century. For these two chapters, the author relied heavily on the accounts of Dahlan in his book \textit{Khulāṣat al-Kalām}. The author himself acknowledges that Dahlan's book was one of the two major sources on which he relied.\footnote{Gerald de Gaury, \textit{Rulers of Mecca} (New York: AMS Press, 1982), p. 7.} The other source was "\textit{Kitāb Tanḏīd al-\textsuperscript{2}Uqūd}" by Riḍā al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī, in manuscript form.

Although de Gaury relied heavily on Dahlan, the latter's accounts are more comprehensive. Since de Gaury's book is the only Western source on the political history of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century, it has for a long time been considered the basic secondary source on the subject.

The biographical sources concerning the aḍyan and the scholars of the Hejaz in the 12th/18th century are scarce and few. \textsuperscript{8}\footnote{\textsuperscript{8}\textsuperscript{8} Abd al-Raḥman al-Anṣārī, \textit{Tuhfat al-Muhībīn wa-al-Aṣḥāb fī Maqārif Mā līl-Madānīyīn mīn Anṣāb}, ed. Muḥammad al-Ḡārūsī (Tunis: al-Maktabah al-CAṭīqa, 1970), pp. 12-14.} \textsuperscript{8}\textsuperscript{8} Abd al-Raḥman al-Anṣārī's \textit{Tuhfat al-Muhībīn wa-al-Aṣḥāb} is the only work from the twelfth century A.H. which provides us with information about the important social figures in Medina at that time. al-Anṣārī was born in Medina in 1124/1712, as he writes concerning himself when he talks about the history of his family.
the city, where he attended the circles, including the
circle of his father, of four ulama who taught at the
Prophet Mosque. Later, he himself taught in one of these
circles. al-Anṣārī died in Medina in 1197/1782.

This biography describes in an intricate way the
history of the Medinan families of the twelfth century A.H.
The author, a knowledgeable scholar in the genealogical
history of Medina, as Murādī describes him,9 gives very
valuable information about his contemporaries, the aCyān and
scholars of Medina. His information often provides for my
study the missing links on different aspects of the life of
the prominent figures who played very active roles, not only
in the history of Medina, but also in the history of the
Hejaz in the 12th/18th century. al-Anṣārī’s biography
throws much light on the social, economic, and political
aspects of that society.

The other biographic work about the aCyān of the Hejaz
is al-Mukhtaṣar min Kitāb Nashr al-Nūr wa-al-Zahar by  Ābd
Allāh Mīrdād Abū al-Khayr. This work is a concise edited
version of the original work which is still in manuscript
form at Maktabat al-Ḥaram al-Makkī, in Mecca. The editors
had omitted, as they explain in the introduction, certain
unnecessary or exaggerated information contained in the
original copy.

9Muḥammad Khalīl al-Murādī, Silk al-Durar fī aCyān al-
Qarn al-Thānī  Āshār, 2 vols. (Baghdād: Maktabat al-
The author, Čabd Allâh Mîrdâd, was a prominent scholar of Mecca in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries of the Hijrah. He was born in Mecca in 1285/1867, where he grew up and studied theology under his father, Sheikh Aḥmad, and other ulama of Mecca. Mîrdâd taught at the Grand Mosque at Mecca and held the position of qâqî during the end of Sherif Ḥusayn b. ČAlî's reign (1908-1924), until he died at Taif in 1343/1924.10

Although this work is from the early fourteenth century A.H., it includes biographies of the aṣyān for five centuries and goes back as far as the tenth century A.H. It includes six hundred biographies of Meccans and others, among them qâqîs, imams, teachers, poets, and learned men.

The biographical work of Mîrdâd is full of valuable information and reveals much about the social, economic, and intellectual history of Mecca in the periods it covers. The author carefully presents the biographies of his aṣyān. He also examines, as he proceeds, certain social aspects of Meccan society through the years he covers, which increases the value of the work.

Travelers' accounts, whether Muslim or Western, about the Hejaz in the 12th/18th century are rare. However, I was fortunate to locate a few travelers' accounts on this subject. Abû al-Barakât al-Suwaydî, "al-Nafḥah al-Miskîyah Ṛî al-Riḥlah al-Makkîyah" is still in manuscript form. The

10Mîrdâd, al-Mukhtâsar, p. 31.
author was a prominent scholar of Baghdad in the eighteenth century. Murādī describes him, in *Silk al-Durar*, as a great intellectual figure in Iraq during his lifetime. He died in 1174/1759-60.\(^{11}\) al-Suwaydī performed the pilgrimage in 1157/1744, traveling to the Hejaz with the Damascus pilgrimage caravan.

In spite of the fact that al-Suwaydī traveled to the Hejaz in the middle of the period which this study covers, leading one to assume that the work would supply a great deal of information, it fails to provide the expected data. The work is full of theological questions and discussions that the author engaged in with the ulama of the cities he visited, including Aleppo, Damascus, Medina, and Mecca. That of course would make al-Suwaydī's work a very good source for interested scholars studying the intellectual aspects and history of the eighteenth century in Syria and the Hejaz, but for our purposes the value of this source is limited.

Nevertheless, there are some interesting items of information scattered around in the work which shed light on the harsh journey of the pilgrimage caravan and on the duration of the journey itself. Moreover, the author himself was in Mecca when Nādir Shāh of Persia requested the emir of Mecca, Sherif MasCūd, to permit a JaCfarī imam to lead the prayers at the Grand Mosque, threatening to invade

the Hejaz if the sheriff did not agree to the Shāh's demand. The Shāh's threat created, as al-Suwaydī remarks, chaos in Mecca as the people feared a Persian invasion. This point will be discussed fully in the second chapter of this study.

Abd al-Majīd al-Zīyādī, "Bulūgh al-Marām bi-al-Rihlah ilā Bayt Allāh al-Ḥarām," is also still in manuscript form. al-Zīyādī was a Moroccan scholar who traveled to the Hejaz in 1158/1745 to perform the hajj. He joined the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan at Cairo with the rest of the Muslim pilgrims of North Africa. For security reasons, the Ottoman government arranged for all the Muslim pilgrims from North Africa to travel to the Hejaz with the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, as will be discussed later.

This work is full of information about the pilgrimage passage to the Hejaz. It describes the way the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan would depart for the Hejaz, as well as the stations and stops on the pilgrimage route between Cairo and Mecca. However, with regard to the present study, the work does not supply the needed information about the Ottoman garrisons along the pilgrimage route. al-Zīyādī's account would be much more valuable if it contained information on the size and organization of both the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan and the Ottoman garrisons, but in spite of these gaps, "Bulūgh al-Marām" is a valuable source of information about the nature of the pilgrimage journey to the Hejaz and the stations along the Cairo-Mecca
pilgrimage route.

The only Western traveler who visited the Hejaz in the eighteenth century was the Danish traveler Carsten Niebuhr. He visited the East as a member of the Danish expedition which was sent at the expense of the Danish king. The expedition included five members, four of whom died during the expedition in the East; Niebuhr was the only member to survive.

Niebuhr wrote about the journey taken by the expedition into Egypt, Arabia, and India in the book entitled *Travel Through Arabia*, which has been translated into English in two volumes. Niebuhr landed at the port of Jeddah on October 29, 1762, and stayed there for about two months. He then left for Yemen on December 13 of the same year. He did not go beyond Jeddah, nor did he visit any other city in the Hejaz.

*Travel Through Arabia* is full of information about the province of Hejaz. The author describes the geographical aspects of the region and touches upon the political situation, particularly the relations between the sherifs of the Hejaz and the Ottoman government. The book also includes chapters about the bedouin of Arabia and discusses some social aspects of the Hejazi society.

However, in spite of the valuable information in Niebuhr's book, the short period of the author's stay in the region, and the fact that he did not visit any other city or
town in the Hejaz other than Jeddah, make some of his information less than reliable. Most of Niebuhr's observations about the Hejaz were derived from oral information which he heard during his short stay in Jeddah, but the book nonetheless provides some valuable information about the Hejaz in the period under consideration.

The sources of the study are to an extent independent of one another. Some are more detailed than others, and supplement each other. Most of the sources are written by local ulama of the Hejaz who displayed a bias against foreign opponents of the emirs of Mecca.\textsuperscript{12} The Hejazi authors also had an ethnic bias against the Turks, particularly the Ottoman officials and garrisons in the Hejaz.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, they showed a prejudice against the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans, especially when the commanders had conflicts with the emirs of Mecca.\textsuperscript{14} On the other hand, the Hejazi authors had a natural and unconscious partiality for the privileged status of the sherifs of Mecca and did not consider criticizing those privileges. The best example of the authors' unconscious attitude are their silent views on the unjust

\textsuperscript{12}For example, see Appendix II.3, 4, and 5.

\textsuperscript{13}For more details, see Appendix IV and Appendix III.1.

\textsuperscript{14}See, for more information, Appendix II.4, and 7.
law of Abū Numay.\textsuperscript{15}

My study is composed of two parts, with six chapters altogether. Each chapter deals with certain aspects of the history of the Hejaz and the Ottoman rule in the province during the specified period.

The first part of my study focuses on the political history of the Hejaz during the eighteenth century. Chapter One examines in general the relationship between the Ottomans and the province of the Hejaz before 1143/1731. This chapter provides the background for the Ottoman acquisition of the Hejaz and the political and administrative development in the province.

The first phase of the political development in the Hejaz is dealt with in Chapter Two. The political development in the Hejaz in the eighteenth century was characterized by the struggle for supremacy among the sherifs of Mecca and among the Ottoman officials as well.

In Chapter Three, the second phase of the political history of the Hejaz is examined. It begins with the Egyptian expedition of 1184/1770 and examines the turmoil and disquiet caused by the expedition in the region. This chapter also scrutinizes the reign of Sherif Surūr b.

\textsuperscript{15}For more details, see Appendix I.1. The name Abū Numay is transliterated according to local Hejazi pronunciation.
Misāq ad-Dawla (1186-1202/1773-1788), which marks the beginning of the end of the first Ottoman rule in the Hejaz. The first Ottoman reign in the Hejaz ended in 1221/1806 when the Wahhabis took over the Hejaz.

The second part of my study is concerned with the political-administrative institutions of the Hejaz in the eighteenth century. Chapter Four deals with the Ottoman administration in the Hejaz. This chapter examines the relations between the emirs of Mecca and the other Ottoman officials in the Hejaz, as well as the relations between the Hejaz and the Ottoman government in Istanbul. In addition, the chapter describes the function of each individual in the Ottoman administration, and discusses the changes in the balance of power in favor of the emir of Mecca.

The fifth chapter is devoted to the Ottoman organization of the pilgrimage. Ottoman organization of the pilgrimage was not limited to the province of Hejaz but was also included in the responsibilities of the vâlí of Egypt and Syria. The two major pilgrimage caravans were assembled in, and departed from, Cairo and Damascus, where the Muslim pilgrims arrived to join the caravans. The organization of pilgrimage affairs also included the annual conveying of the Ottoman subsidy, șurrah, to the Hejaz.

I hope my study will be a contribution to the

16Spelled according to the local Hejazi pronunciation, not the classical language.
investigation of the political history and the development of the political-administrative institutions of the Hejaz during the eighteenth century, a period which has so far suffered from undeserved neglect.
PART I
CHAPTER I

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OTTOMANS AND THE HEJAZ
923-1143 A.H./1517-1730 A.D.

In the early sixteenth century Sultan Selim I (1512-1520) changed the Ottoman policy of conquest by shifting conquest from the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire in Europe to the eastern frontier in the Muslim world, which led to the addition of the Hejaz to the Ottoman state. This change in policy was due to a number of reasons.

The first of these reasons was the Şafavid threat to the Ottoman Empire in eastern Anatolia. Shāh Ismāʿīl (1502-1524) of Persia's vigorous propagandizing had the effect of endangering Ottoman rule in Anatolia from inside. In 1511 the rebellion raised by one of Ismāʿīl's followers in southwestern Anatolia shook the Ottoman regime to its roots.1 At first Sultan Selim I was not able to deal with the Şafavid threat due to his brothers' challenges to the Ottoman throne, but when he overcame his rivals in April 1513, Selim was able to turn to the Şafavids.2 In 1514


2Ibid., p. 80.
Selim marched with the Ottoman army toward Tabriz, the Safavid capital, and on August 24 of that year he encountered the Safavid army led by Shāh Ismā'īl himself in the valley of Chāldirān, near Tabriz. Selim inflicted a severe defeat upon Ismā'īl and the Ottomans emerged victorious. The victory of Chāldirān permitted the annexation of the mountain region to the Ottoman Empire and secured Anatolia against invasion from the east. It also became difficult for the Safavids to continue propaganda in Anatolia while Selim's ruthless suppression always hung over those who succumbed to the appeal.

Another reason for the change in the Ottoman policy of conquest was the Mamluk Empire. Since the first military clash between the Ottomans and the Mamluks of Egypt in 1481, both countries competed for supremacy in the Sunni (orthodox) Muslim world. Sultan Selim I's victory over the Safavids at Chaldiran alarmed the Mamluk Sultan Qaṣūḥ al-Ghawrī, who feared Selim's ambition to achieve supremacy in the Sunni Muslim world. On the other hand, Selim's difficulties during his campaign in eastern Anatolia

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4 Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1:82.

convinced him that he should eliminate the Mamluks, whose military presence in Syria was a threat even when they professed friendship.\textsuperscript{6} al-Ghawrî advanced to Syria, his northern frontier, in order to prevent any Ottoman invasion. Hearing of al-Ghawrî's advance, Selim marched toward the Mamluk territory in Syria. The major battle between the two sides was fought on the 25th day of Rajab 922/24th of August 1516, in the plain of Marj Dâbiq near Aleppo. The Ottoman army routed the Mamluk army, and Sultan al-Ghawrî died on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{7} Sultan Selim then swept quickly through the rest of Syria, taking Aleppo (August 28), Hama (September 19), and Damascus (September 27), in each case being welcomed by the local population and governors.\textsuperscript{8} 

Selim then advanced with his Ottoman army toward Egypt, the seat of the Mamluk Empire. Meanwhile, the Mamluks elected Ṭumān Bey to be the new Mamluk Sultan and charged him with dealing with the Ottoman threat. Before Ṭumān Bey could think of a way to stop the Ottomans, Selim arrived at Ridaniyyah on January 16, 1517. On 29 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 922/25 January 1517, the final battle was fought between the Ottoman army led by Sultan Selim and the Mamluk

\textsuperscript{6}Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1:82.


\textsuperscript{8}Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1:84.
army led by Sultan Țumân Bey. The Ottomans easily overwhelmed the Mamluks because of their discipline, weapons, and tactics. The Mamluk sultan fled the battlefield, and Selim entered Cairo with great ceremony. However, the Mamluks continued their resistance in Upper Egypt, and it was not until some time later that Ottoman rule was fully established throughout Egypt. Țumân Bey himself was captured and executed on April 13, 1517.

The third reason for the change in the Ottoman policy of conquest in the sixteenth century was the Portuguese threat in the Indian Ocean. Beginning in 1502, the Portuguese had established themselves in India and had begun a naval campaign to force all the trade between their territories and Europe to use the all-water route around the Cape of Good Hope, which they controlled. Their capture of Socotra in the Gulf of Aden (1507) and of Hormuz on the Persian Gulf (1508) enabled them to enforce this blockade, causing a profound crisis in the Mamluk economy and the state budget. The Portuguese attempted to monopolize the trade, which hurt the prosperity of the Middle East. By bottling up the neck of the Red Sea and by excluding Muslim traders from India, the Portuguese stopped thousands of

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9Ibn Iyâs, Badā'ic al-Zuhūr, 5:144-46.

10Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1:84.

11Ibid., 1:83.
Muslims from earning their livelihood.\textsuperscript{12}

In the meantime, the Ottomans achieved a naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean by defeating the Venetians in 1503. Many of the important northwestern ports of the Mediterranean connected with the rich Indian spice trade fell into the hands of the Ottomans at the same time that the Portuguese established themselves in the trading cities on the west coast of India.\textsuperscript{13} Therefore, Selim shifted the focus of the Ottoman policy to the East to protect his state's interests in the sea trade and to halt the Portuguese monopoly of the Indian trade.

The fourth reason for Sultan Selim's decision to embark on a conquest of the Muslim East was the religious and strategic importance of the Hejaz. The Hejaz had an important position in the Muslim world. It was the cradle of Islam and was the location of the two holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.\textsuperscript{14} Sultan Selim was aware of the religious significance of the Hejaz and knew that by adding the Hejaz to his dominions he would be the protector of the holy places and would gain political supremacy among

\textsuperscript{12}George W. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1942), p. 31.

\textsuperscript{13}Andrew Hess, "The Evolution of the Ottoman Seaborne Empire in the Age of Oceanic Discoveries (1453-1525)," American Historical Review, vol. 75, no. 7 (December 1970): 1906.

Muslims. Selim was also aware of the strategic importance of the Hejaz to the Ottomans in their struggle with the Portuguese for supremacy in the sea trade. Selim intended to make Jeddah, the port of the Hejaz on the Red Sea, a base to carry on the Ottoman sea campaigns against the Portuguese, not only in the Red Sea but also in the Indian Ocean.

After his victory in Marj Dābiq in 1516, Sultan Selim began to plan the addition of the Hejaz to his territories. On Friday the 1st of Sha'ban 922/29 August, 1516, during his khutbah or sermon, the Imam (leader of prayer) of the al-Malik al-Ẓāhr Mosque called Sultan Selim Mālik al-Haramayn, "Possessor of the Two Holy Mosques", in Mecca and Medina. Selim replied by saying "Who am I to be the Possessor of the Haramayn? I am proud to be the servant of the Haramayn, not their possessor." Selim then postponed his plan of invading the Hejaz until 923/1517 when he had completed the subjugation of Egypt. In 923/1517, Selim wanted to send an army to invade the Hejaz, but Ibn Ẓahīrah,


the qādī of Mecca whom Selim had freed from al-Ghawrī's jail, persuaded the Sultan not to send his forces. Ibn Zahīrah asked the Sultan to send a letter to the sherif (descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad) Barakāt, the emir or governor of Mecca, asking his submission to the Ottoman lordship. Selim sent the missive to the emir of Mecca proposing the confirmation of his position as the governor of the Hejaz under Ottoman rule. In the meantime, Ibn Zahīrah also wrote a letter to Barakāt, telling him of what had transpired and recommending that he accept Selim's proposal.

Sherif Barakāt of Mecca received Selim's letter and agreed to the Sultan's proposal. He then sent a delegation led by his son Abū Numay to Sultan Selim in Egypt. On Sunday, 15 Jumādā' II 923/3 July 1517, Abū Numay arrived in Cairo. He congratulated Selim on his conquest of the Mamluk Empire and submitted to him the keys of the Ka'bah, the holy shrine in Mecca, and gifts from his father Barakāt. Abū Numay also acknowledged, in his father's name, Ottoman sovereignty over the Hejaz. The passive submission of Sherif Barakāt to the Ottomans took place for three reasons.

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19 Ibid., p. 51.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibn Iyās, Badā'ī al-Zuhūr, 5:910.
The first reason was Sherif Barakāt's need for a strong ally against the Portuguese danger in the Red Sea. The Portuguese policy of blocking the Red Sea to Muslim shipping deprived the Hejaz of its income from trade and of the customs and duties imposed in Jeddah. In addition, the Portuguese had launched two attacks on the coast of the Hejaz. In 919/1513, Alfonso de Albuquerque, admiral of the Portuguese Indian fleet, decided to land at Yanbu, the seaport of Medina, and mount a swift attack to seize the treasures of Mecca and the body of the Prophet Muḥammad at Medina. Albuquerque had vast dreams of converting the world to Christianity and destroying Islam by taking its holy places, Mecca and Medina. He failed to land on the coast of the Hejaz because of rough weather in the Red Sea and because of a fever which killed most of his men. In 923/1517, Albuquerque's successor Lopo Soares, who shared his predecessor's dreams, sailed into the Red Sea to attack Jeddah. The Mamluk fleet under the command of Salmān Rayis defended the city and forced the Portuguese fleet to


23 Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, p. 34.


25 Ibid., p. 12.
withdraw. The Portuguese fleet left the Hejaz coast without achieving its aim of destroying the holy cities.

The partial victory of the Mamluks over the Portuguese could not prevent the Portuguese blockade of the Red Sea. The sherifs of the Hejaz were discontented with the Mamluk failure to protect the Hejaz from Portuguese hostility. The Hejaz thus rose against the Mamluks, rejecting them as protectors of the holy places. In retaliation, Sultan al-Ghawri arrested several judges and religious leaders in the Hejaz. Subsequently, Sherif Barakāt of Mecca fixed his hopes on the Ottomans, the great gāzīs (warriors), to halt the Portuguese threat to his emirate and to reopen the Red Sea to Muslim shipping.

The second reason behind the Sherif's decision to accept Ottoman rule was the benefits received annually by the Hejaz from the Egyptian subsidies. These funds came from the awqāf (sing. waqf) or endowments of Egypt, which were stipulated for the benefit of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The awqāf were endowed by the Mamluk Sultans and by other pious Muslims to cover the expenses of the two

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pilgrimage cities in the Hejaz. In part, the revenues from awqaf were distributed among the people of the Hejaz. Sherif Barakat realized that he might jeopardize these benefits if he refused to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty, who had become the new masters of Egypt. Therefore, he passively accepted the Ottoman dominion.

The third reason for Sherif Barakat's acceptance of Ottoman rule was the Sherif's aim to consolidate his position and secure his son Abû Numay's right to the governorship of the Hejaz against their rivals within the sherifian families. Since his succession to the post of governor of the Hejaz in 903/1497, Barakat had engaged in skirmishes with his uncle Hazâ and then with his brother Aḥmad for control of the position of emir of Mecca. On a few occasions, as in 907/1511 and 909/1513, Sherif Barakat had lost his position and was forced by the challengers to leave Mecca. The challengers had received support from the Mamluks of Egypt. Barakat saw in the Ottoman Sultan's proposal the opportunity to overcome his rivals and to consolidate his position. Thus when Sherif Barakat sent his son Abû Numay to Sultan Selim in Egypt in 923/1517, Selim in


31Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 51.

32Ibid., p. 46-50.
return confirmed the Sherif as governor of the Hejaz and assured ʿAbū Numay's right to succeed his father.\textsuperscript{33}

Ottoman Policy in the Hejaz After 1517

The addition of the Hejaz to the Ottoman Empire marks a new era in the history of the Ottomans. The Ottoman sultans now considered themselves the protectors not only of the western frontiers but of the entire Muslim world.\textsuperscript{34} When they established their sovereignty, they did not impose any new regulations or specific restrictions on the Hejaz. The Ottoman sultans wanted two things in the Hejaz: first, an emir who could maintain order so as to protect the pilgrims, and second, acknowledgment of Ottoman overlordship. If these two conditions were met, the Ottomans would extend financial and military support to the emir of Mecca.\textsuperscript{35} The Ottomans did not change the political structure of the sherifate of the Hejaz; in fact, they confirmed the sherifian families' right to the governorship.

The Authority of the Emir of Mecca

The succession to the post of the emir of Mecca was hereditary in the sherifian family. The appointment of the

\textsuperscript{33}Ibn Iyās, Badā'\textsuperscript{i}c al-Zuhūr, 5:193.

\textsuperscript{34}İnalçı, The Ottoman Empire, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{35}William Ochsenwald, Religion, Society and State in Arabia. The Hejaz Under the Ottoman Control, 1840-1908 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1984), p. 5.
emir was up to the sheriffs themselves. The senior sheriffs elected a sheriff from within their group and traditionally had asked the Mamluk sultan of Egypt to confirm their appointee in the emirate. 36 In 923/1517, when Sultan Selim received the homage of Sherif Barakāt, the Sultan did not merely confirm Barakāt in the post of governor for the Hejaz, but also authorized the sheriff to deal freely with the affairs of the Hejaz, including the elections. 37

The emir of Mecca had two tasks to perform in order to satisfy his Ottoman overlords. The first task was to maintain order in the Hejaz. The second duty was to assure the safety of the pilgrims and to see to their comfort. 38 In order for the emir to carry out his duties, he relied on his own forces. The emir's forces consisted of mercenaries from Yemen, Morocco and Afghanistan, as well as a number of bedouin from the vicinity of Mecca. In addition, the emir included his own slaves, which sometimes numbered more than one thousand, in his army. 39 The emir derived his power from the religious prestige which he enjoyed among Muslims as a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad, and from the

37 Ibn Iyās, Badāʾīc al-Zuhūr, 5:193.
38 Anīs, al-Dawlah al-Cūthmānīyah, p. 126.
support he received from the Ottoman court in Istanbul. For example, in 1099/1688, Sherif Aḥmad b. Ghālib (d. 1113/1701), who was struggling for the control of the post of emir with the reigning emir, Sherif Saʿīd b. Saʿīd (d. 1139/1726), bribed the vālī of Egypt in order to obtain his support. The vālī in return wrote to the Porte asking support for Sherif Aḥmad. The Porte replied by confirming the vālī's request, dismissing Sherif Saʿīd from the governorship of the Hejaz.

Ottoman Officials in the Hejaz

The Ottoman officials posted to the Hejaz held a number of different positions. They held the posts of ṣanjaq or military commander of the district of Jeddah; sheikh, or directors of the mosques of Mecca and Medina; and qāḍī, judge, of Mecca, Medina and the Ottoman garrisons.

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The commander (şanjaq) of Jeddah resided in that city. His task was to supervise Ottoman military affairs in the Hejaz. He also held the post of sheikh of the Mecca Haram. His responsibilities as sheikh included the supervision of construction work in Mecca and attending to the needs of the Haram.\footnote{al-Sibā'ī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:451.} The şanjaq had an Ottoman detachment to use in defending the Hejaz against any external attack. On occasion, the şanjaq received orders directly from Istanbul; at other times his orders came from the vālī of Egypt, as power shifted between Istanbul and Cairo.\footnote{Ibid., 2:452.}

One of the şanjaq's tasks was to submit the khil‘ah, or robe, of the Ottoman sultan to the emir of Mecca, thus confirming the emir in his position. On a few occasions the şanjaq intervened in the appointment or the dismissal of the emir. Sometimes, when a passive or weak emir attained the post of governor, the şanjaq stepped in to take control of the affairs of the Hejaz.\footnote{Ibid., 2:452.} For example, in 1040/1630, the Ottoman şanjaq of Jeddah took advantage of the weakness of Sherif Mas'ūd b. Idrīs (d. 1040/1630) and controlled all matters of importance in the Hejaz. He even confiscated the emir's share of the income from the customs duties levied at Jeddah, which Sultan Selim had assigned for the emir of Mecca.
Mecca in 923/1517 and added to the Ottoman treasury.\textsuperscript{46}  

The Ottomans also held the posts of the qādiṣ of Mecca and Medina. Each city had four qādiṣ, one from each of the traditional schools of Islamic law; that is, Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Ḥanbāli.\textsuperscript{47} The Ḥanafī judge presided as the chief judge. The other three judges were of lesser rank. It appears that the Ottomans chose the office of judge for themselves in order to have some degree of control over the affairs of the Hejaz. The qādiṣ were of Turkish origin and were appointed directly from Istanbul. However, on many occasions the Hejazi people relied on the mufti or jurisconsult to obtain legal decrees or solve their disputes. The posts of mufti were held by certain Hejazi families.\textsuperscript{48} The appointment of the qādiṣ was made by the Ottoman sultans, while the appointment of the muftis was made by the emir of Mecca. In 946/1539 the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent, also known as the Qâ numérique, the law giver, (1520-1566) appointed a mufti for Mecca but the emir of the city, Sherif Abū Numay (d. 942/1584) opposed this appointment.\textsuperscript{49} The Sultan therefore withdrew his appointment.

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., 2:364-65.  


\textsuperscript{48}al-Sibāṭī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:473.  

\textsuperscript{49}Hamzah, Qalb Jazīrat al-ǦArab, p. 318.
The qāḍī of Mecca sent his own deputies to the courts of Jeddah, Taif, Pābigh, Lith and al-Qunfudah. Likewise, the qāḍī of Medina sent his deputies to the courts of Yanbū', Wajh, Ḍibbā' and Khaybar. The deputies of the qāḍīs were chosen from the ulama or scholars of Mecca and Medina. 50

The office of sheikh of the Medina ʿHarām was a position separate from that of the Mecca ʿHarām. It seems that the Ottoman government wanted to free the office of the Medina ʿHarām from the influence of the ṣanjaq of Jeddah and therefore to give the sheikh of the Medina ʿHarām a free hand in his conduct of Medina's affairs. The sheikh of the Medina ʿHarām was appointed directly from Istanbul from among the Turkish officials. 51 His office was equal to that of the Mecca ʿHarām, and therefore he did not have to report to the ṣanjaq of Jeddah nor to the vāli of Egypt, but reported only to Istanbul. For example, in 936/1529, the sheikh of the Medina ʿHarām reported directly to Sultan Suleyman I the appeal from the people of the city to have the city walls repaired. 52 Moreover, in 948/1541 the sheikh of the ʿHarām went to Istanbul to report to the imperial court on the


suffering of the people of Medina due to the delay in receiving the grain subsidies which the Ottomans sent annually.\textsuperscript{53}

The Ottoman military presence in the Hejaz was inefficient and ineffective because of its small number and lack of equipment. The Ottomans established a small detachment in Jeddah under the supervision of the sanjaq of the city. At its maximum, the detachment consisted of about six buluk\textsuperscript{54} or companies of soldiers.\textsuperscript{55} The buluk numbered on average about a hundred men.\textsuperscript{56} Thus the overall numbers of the Ottoman detachment in Jeddah was about six hundred men. Medina also had a very small company of Ottoman soldiers. In 944/1537 this detachment numbered about sixty men\textsuperscript{57} and was supervised by the sheikh of the Medina Haram. The detachments of Jeddah and Medina each had a commander called "sirdär."\textsuperscript{58} The purpose of these troops was to maintain Ottoman authority in the Hejaz and on occasion to aid the emir of Mecca in keeping the pilgrimage route open.

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., p. 92.

\textsuperscript{54}Ottoman Turkish, (būlūk, būluk, and bulūk); Modern Turkish, (bölük).

\textsuperscript{55}al-Sibācī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:458.

\textsuperscript{56}al-CAmr, The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{57}al-Rūmī, al-Tuḥfah al-Latīfah, p. 89.

\textsuperscript{58}Originally a Persian term meaning "commander" and used in the Arabic sources and this dissertation with this meaning.
and safe from attacks by the bedouin. They also had the
responsibility of defending the region from external attack.

Ottoman Improvements and Subsidies for
the Hejaz

When Sultan Selim I acquired Hejaz in 923/1517, he
imposed on himself and his successors the role of guardians
of and providers for the holy cities of Islam, Mecca and
Medina. In Selim's order to his governor of Egypt, Hayr Bey
(d. 1522), requiring him to provide the holy cities with
provisions, Selim wrote:

"I hope to see you serve the Prophet [Muhammad]
well. I do not have desire for anything from
Egypt. I only conquered the title 'Khādīm al-
Haramayn al-Sharī'fayn,' The Servant of the Holy
Cities. I have left all the revenue of Egypt in
trust, waqf, to His Excellency the Prophet,
Hazreti Peygamber. Bear witness that from now
on you are, Hayr Bey, the administrator,
mutevelli, of the waqf of God, vakfullah, so
serve it well."59

To fulfill this role the Ottomans arranged for the shipment
of supplies and cash to the Hejaz. However, the annual
tribute that Egypt had to pay went to Istanbul, and only a
small portion of the treasure of Egypt was sent to the
Hejaz. The Ottoman sultans also realized that in order for
them to maintain their political supremacy in the Muslim
world as the servants and the protectors of the holy cities
of Islam they would have to give considerable attention to

59 Mehmed Zilli Evliyâ Celebi, Seyahatname, 10:125, (my
translation), cf. Stanford Shaw, The Financial and
Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt
the ḥajj or pilgrimage as well. They organized the ḥajj mahmals\textsuperscript{60} or caravans, as well as maintaining order on the pilgrimage routes. During Mamluk times, pilgrims to the Hejaz from outside the Arabian Peninsula were not organized in state-supervised caravans; therefore, they went by caravans from Iraq, Egypt and Damascus, and each caravan had its own mahmal. Moreover, in some years, there was a mahmal from Aleppo and another from al-Karak. After the Ottoman conquest of the Mamluk Empire in 1516-1517, pilgrimage caravans were organized into two main groups: one from Egypt, and the other from Damascus, each with its own mahmal.\textsuperscript{61}

Egypt was the meeting place for Muslim pilgrims from North Africa prior to their departure for the Hejaz. They traveled in what was called the Egyptian mahmal. Before 923/1517, the Egyptian mahmal left for the holy cities twice a year, the first departure in Rajab (the seventh month of the Muslim lunar calendar) for pilgrims who wanted to fast and perform the ġumrah in the holy month of Ramaqān, and then again in Shawwāl (the tenth month). Departures were scheduled for these months so that the mahmal would arrive in the Hejaz well in advance of the start of the pilgrimage

\textsuperscript{60} The term "mahmals" used by the Arabic sources referring to the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans. For more information on the mahmal, see p. 172, infra.

ceremonies. Each group had its own mahmal and emir as well. However, the Ottomans organized the Egyptian travelers into one single mahmal to assure its protection during the journey to the Hejaz, under the command of one emir.62 This mahmal departed Cairo for the Hejaz in the month of Shawwāl.63

The emir al-Ḥajj, commander of the Egyptian mahmal, was appointed from among the beys or military commanders of Egypt. The bey had three principal duties: the first was to organize the pilgrimage caravans and arrange for the purchase and transport of supplies to be sent with the mahmal from the funds assigned to him from the treasury of Egypt. Secondly, he received and transported the subsidies in cash and kind which were sent annually by the imperial treasury of Egypt, as well as the waqf dues to the people of the Haramayn, and to see to their distribution during the time that the caravan remained in Mecca and Medina. Finally, the emir had to ensure the protection of the mahmal during the course of the journey.64 He also had the authority to distribute gifts in cash and in kind to the bedouin sheikhs dwelling along the route of the pilgrimage.


63Ibn Iyās, Badā‘ī al-Zuhūr, 5:218.

in order to secure protection for the mahmal against bedouin raids.65

The Egyptian mahmal was escorted by a contingent of troops, drawn from the seven military corps of Egypt and led by the sirdar al-Ḥajj, an emir of lesser rank than the emir al-Ḥajj.66 The purpose of the contingent was to help the emir in ensuring the protection and safety of the mahmal.

The second Ottoman pilgrimage caravan was the Damascus mahmal. Damascus was the meeting place for all Muslim pilgrims from the East, Bukhara, Samarkand and Tashkent. In addition, the Damascus mahmal included pilgrims from Persia and Iraq.67 Like the Egyptian mahmal, the Damascus group was led by an emir. The emir was a şanjaq-bey or a senior official from Damascus or from the vicinity.68 His duties were similar to those of his Egyptian counterpart: to provide supplies for the mahmal, including camels, horses and fodder; he was also responsible for providing the military escort to protect the mahmal during its journey.69 Finally, the emir had the responsibility for receiving, transporting and distributing the Ottoman subsidies in funds and goods sent each year from the Haramayn awqaf in Syria

65Ibid., p. 241.
66Ibid., p. 241.
68Ibid., p. 108.
69Ibid.
and from the Ottoman sultan's personal treasury to the people of the Haramayn. He too was authorized to disburse presents of cash and goods to the bedouin sheikhs who lived along the caravan's route, and to the sherifs of the Hejaz.

In 963/1555 the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent allowed the vāli of Yemen to organize a third maḥmal. The Yemeni maḥmal continued to travel to the Hejaz until 1049/1635, when it ceased to make the journey because of disturbances within Yemen. In that year, the revolt of the Yemen succeeded in ending the first period of Ottoman rule in that country.

The Ottomans also constructed fortresses along the routes of the pilgrimage to keep order in their areas, to repress or punish bedouin raids on the maḥmals and to stock water and other provisions for the pilgrims. The two main land routes of pilgrimage were the Cairo-Hejaz and the Damascus-Hejaz routes. Sultan Selim I reconstructed the fortress of Čajrūd located north of Suez on the Cairo-Hejaz route.

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71 Ibid., p. 126.
72 Dāhilān, Khulāṣat al-Kalam, op. 55.
73 For more information concerning the Yemen revolt against the Ottomans, see Sālim, al-Fath al-Cūthmānī al-Awwal lil-Yaman.
route. In 945/1538, the vâlî of Egypt built the fortress of Muwayliḥ located on the coast of the Red Sea on the Cairo-Hejaz route as well. On the Damascus-Hejaz route, Sultan Suleymân the Magnificent ordered the construction of fortresses in Qaṭrāna, Maṣān, Dhat Ḫajj and Tabuk in 976/1569. Another fortress, in al-Ukhayqîr, had been built in 938/1531.

The fortresses on the Cairo-Hejaz route were manned by soldiers from Egypt, and the wages of these garrisons were provided by the treasury of Egypt. Similarly, troops from Damascus occupied the fortresses along the Damascus-Hejaz route, receiving their supplies, provisions and wages from the treasury of Damascus.

Before the Ottomans acquired the Hejaz in 923/1517, the Ottomân sultans had followed the practice of sending gifts of money and provisions to the people of Mecca and Medina on the occasion of the pilgrimage. Sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402) was the first Ottoman ruler to send these gifts, known as surrah or purse. When the Ottomans took control of the Hejaz, they continued the tradition of dispatching the surrah to the holy cities every year during the time of

74 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 199.
76 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, p. 98.
77 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 250.
78 Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, pp. 96-97.
The ṣurrah was sent with the Egyptian and the Syrian maḥmals, and as we have seen, the emirs of the maḥmals assumed the responsibility for receiving and transporting the ṣurrah to the Hejaz. Money for the ṣurrah was raised from all over the empire, from provincial treasuries, from revenues of awqāf established especially for the benefit of the Ḥaramayn, and from the personal treasuries of the sultans.

Among the expenditures of the ṣurrah were included the expenses of the two maḥmals, the payment for the emir of Mecca, funds for the sherifs of the Hejaz, charities for the poor of Mecca and Medina, and the gifts of money and goods for the bedouin sheikhs along the caravan route. Over the years, the ṣurrah increased both in cash and in kind. In 940/1533-4, the cash sent to the holy cities from the Egyptian ṣurrah alone amounted to 560,000 paras (the basic coin of Ottoman Egypt). By 1004/1595-6, it had risen to 1,327,040 paras a year.

In 923/1517 Sultan Selim I sent the first Ottoman grain subsidy to the Hejaz, which amounted to seven thousand ardabs: two thousand ardabs for the people of Medina, and

79Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 126.
80Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 253-54.
81al-Rashidī, Husn al-Safā', p. 25.
82Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 254.
five thousand ardabs for the people of Mecca. Sultan Suleyman I later increased the amount of grain to ten thousand ardabs; this was further increased by Sultan Murad III (1546-1595), raising the grain subsidy to fifteen thousand ardabs. To carry the grain sent from Egypt to the holy cities, a fleet of imperial boats was maintained in Suez under the commander of the port. During the seventeenth century, no fewer than twelve imperial boats were maintained at the port.

The distribution of both Egyptian and Syrian surrahs took place during the course of the pilgrimage journey to the Hejaz and shortly after the arrival of the two mahmals. During the journey, the emirs of the respective mahmals gave gifts to the designated bedouin sheikhs in return for assurances of protection for the mahmals. Moreover, upon the arrival of the mahmals in Mecca and Medina, the emirs distributed the surrah to beneficiaries in the two cities in the presence of the cities' qâdzi and other officials.

The Ottomans improved some of the facilities for pilgrims in Mecca and in Medina as a way of confirming their legal right to the title "Servant of the Holy Cities." In 931/1524, Sultan Suleyman I ordered the repair of two

83al-Nahrawâlî, al-Cilâm, p. 25.
84Dañlân, Khulâṣat al-Kalâm, p. 51.
85Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 261.
86al-Sibâcî, Târîkh Makkah, 2: 461-62.
springs, CAyn Ḥunayn and CAyn CArafāt. The two springs, located to the southeast of Mecca, had stopped flowing into the city as a result of neglect in their maintenance. Both Meccans and pilgrims suffered from lack of water, and accordingly, water became very costly during the time of pilgrimage. The springs' pipes were repaired and by the end of the year, water once again flowed into Mecca.87

In 939/1532, the people of Medina complained to Sultan Suleyman I about the bedouin raids on the city. Parts of the old city wall had fallen, and Medina was vulnerable to the bedouin raids. The Sultan ordered the vâli of Egypt, Suleyman Pâshâ, to build a new wall, to be paid for from the treasury of Egypt. He also appointed the Sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram to supervise the construction. The old wall was demolished and a new wall was built. The construction of this wall took about seven and a half years. In the middle of 946/1539, the new wall was completed and once again Medina was protected from attack by the bedouins.88

In 979/1571, the eastern wall of the Meccan Ḥaram fell apart. Sultan Selim II ordered the reconstruction of the entire Ḥaram, assigning the ṣanjaq of Jeddah the task of supervising the construction. Materials, money, engineers and laborers came from Egypt. Construction began in

87al-Nahrawālī, al-Ǧilām, p. 29.

88al-Rūmî, al-Tubfah al-Latîfah, pp. 85-89; for more information about the construction of the Medina wall, consult the book.
980/1572 and continued until 984/1576, when it was completed during the reign of Sultan Murâd III.  

In the seventeenth century, the Ottoman sultans continued their concern to improve some of facilities for pilgrims in Mecca and Medina. Sultan Muḥammad III (1595–1603) ordered the building of a takīyah, monastery, in Medina. The takīyah provided the poor residents and pilgrims with food and shelter. Thus in order for the Sultan’s takīyah to carry out its functions, Sultan Muḥammad designated a few villages in Egypt as waqfs for the takīyah. The source does not provide the names of these villages. The waqf was named after the Sultan and was known as the Muḥammadīyah waqf. The annual income of the waqf was about forty kīs of money and about twenty thousand ardabs of grain transported every year to Medina by the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. 

In order to increase the Ottoman subsidy to the Hejaz, Sultan Aḥmad I (1603–1617) endowed lands in Egypt as waqf for the Ḥaramayn, which was named after him and was known as

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89al-Nahrawālī, al-Ṣīlām, pp. 34. For more details about the construction of the Haram, see the book.


91Ibid.

92Ibid.

93Literally, sack. One kīs equalled 25,000 para.

the Aḥmadiyeh waqf. The annual income of the Aḥmadiyeh waqf was about twenty thousand kīs and six thousand twenty-eight para. The income of this waqf was transported to the Hejaz in the trust of the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan.

The Kaʾbah was damaged by a flood in 1039/1629 and two of its walls fell. The emir of Mecca, Sherif Masʿūd, appealed to Sultan Murād IV (1623-1640) for assistance. The Sultan dispatched the necessary materials and men from Egypt to repair the walls. The work on the Kaʾbah did not start until the middle of 1040 A.H. In Rabīʿ II 1040/November 1630 an Ottoman ship anchored at Jeddah carrying the material for the repair of the Kaʾbah. In the next month, the work on the Kaʾbah started, continuing for about six months; it was completed in the month of Dhū al-Hijjah of the same year. The work undertaken by Sultan Murād IV was the last construction to be done on the Kaʾbah, and has endured to this day.

Heavy rains fell in Mecca in the year 1073/1661-62,

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95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.


98 Ibid.

99 Ibid. This work contains further information on the reconstruction of the Kaʾbah; see pp. 99-125.
and as a result, the Grand Mosque was flooded; six people were killed and the Mosque was damaged.\textsuperscript{100} The emir of Mecca Sherif Zayd b. Muḥsin initiated the cleaning of the Haram.\textsuperscript{101} Later, the Ottoman Sultan Muḥammad IV (1648-1687) ordered the vali of Egypt to send money and men to repair the Haram. Muḥammad Aghā, the vali of Egypt, sent money to the ṣanjaq of Jeddah Sulaymān Bey and assigned him the position of supervisor of the repair of the Haram. Muḥammad Bey started the work on the Haram, which lasted until the next year.\textsuperscript{102}

In 1092/1681, Sultan Muḥammad IV ordered the repair of the water supply to Mecca from CAYn Zubaydah.\textsuperscript{103} The water supply had been damaged by the flood of 1089/1678.\textsuperscript{104} The cisterns in the Maṣlā were cleaned, and their walls were elevated about a yard. A dam was also constructed in Wadi Naṣmān to prevent floods from damaging the pipes of the spring, and a new pipe was built in the lower part of Meccas to carry water from the spring to Birkat, cistern, Mājin.\textsuperscript{105}

At the closing of the seventeenth century, the people

\textsuperscript{100}Daḥlān, \textit{Khulāṣat al-Kalām}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{101}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., I:242.
\textsuperscript{104}Daḥlān, \textit{Khulāṣat al-Kalām}, p. 98.
\textsuperscript{105}Rifcat Pāshā, \textit{Mīr'āt al-Haramayn}, I:221.
of Medina had complained to the Ottomans about the shortage in the water supply of Medina from CÃyn al-Zarqâ. Therefore, Sultan Muştafa II (1695-1703) ordered the purchase of the well of al-CÄqd and added it to the water supply of Medina. The water supply to the city was doubled, bringing relief to its people. In addition to the aforementioned works, other minor construction tasks in various parts of the Hejaz were undertaken by the Ottomans before the eighteenth century, in order to improve the condition of pilgrimage facilities.

In the first two hundred years of Ottoman rule in the Hejaz, the relations between the Ottomans and the Hejaz were characterized by mutual interest. On the one hand, the Ottomans wanted to expand their sovereignty over the holy cities of Islam in order to have the political supremacy in the Muslim world that they needed to consolidate their position against the Safavids of Iran and the Mamluks of Egypt. Moreover, the Ottomans wanted, through the acquisition of the Hejaz, to halt the Portuguese military threat and attempted monopoly of the Indian trade, by using the ports of the Hejaz for their naval campaigns against the Portuguese. Thus the Hejaz's acceptance of Ottoman dominion in 923/1517 marked, as Professor Inalcik said,

...a new era in Ottoman history. The empire was no longer a frontier state but an Islamic Caliphate, and the Ottoman sultans then con-

106Ibid., I:433.
sidered themselves protectors not only of the frontiers but of the entire Muslim world. 107

On the other hand, the Hejaz accepted Ottoman sovereignty to obtain Ottoman support to check the Portuguese danger on its coast, especially after the Ottomans displayed their naval supremacy in the Mediterranean in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. 108 The Hejaz also hoped that the subsidies from Egypt and Syria which they had been accustomed to receive in earlier periods would be continued, a hope which was fulfilled in 922-923/1516-1517, when Egypt and Syria came under Ottoman control.

Another aspect of the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in the Hejaz was the unique situation in terms of the relations between the sherifs of the Hejaz and their Ottoman rulers. When the Ottomans assumed control of the Hejaz in 923/1517 they confirmed the sherifs as governors of the province. They did not make any attempt to alter the political structure which already existed in the Hejaz before the sixteenth century, nor did they try to assimilate it into the Ottoman system. The Ottomans in Istanbul wanted from the Hejazi sherifs only their acknowledgement of Ottoman sovereignty and their help in maintaining the security of the pilgrimage routes against bedouin raids. However, the Ottoman sanjaq of Jeddah and the vâli of Egypt

107Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, p. 34.

108For more information on this matter, see A. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier.
displayed different policies. On many occasions, as we have previously seen, the şanjaq of Jeddah took advantage of the weakness of the emir of Mecca and exercised great influence over the affairs of the Hejaz. On another occasion, the vâlí of Egypt interfered in the appointment and dismissal of the emir, a right assigned only to the sherifs.

Despite Ottoman efforts to organize the pilgrimage caravans and to keep the routes safe, and in spite of the few improvements made to the pilgrimage facilities in the Hejaz, it appears that the Ottoman government in Istanbul relied solely on the reports of the şanjaq of Jeddah and the vâlí of Egypt for information about conditions in the Hejaz. This state of affairs kept the government often unaware of the real situation in the region and at the same time created turmoil in the Hejaz. Sometimes the vâlí or the şanjaq would send false reports to Istanbul to fulfill his ambitions of controlling his portion of the Hejaz. It happened that the desires or plans of the şanjaq and the vali would be contradictory and each tried to prevail over the other in such cases. For example, in 1116/1704 the şanjaq secured the post of the emir of Mecca for Sherif CAbd al-Karîm and reported this decision to Istanbul. The vâlí of Egypt, on the other hand, wished to appoint CAbd al-Karîm's rival, Sherif SaCîd, and since the report of the şanjaq had to pass through him, the vâlí delayed the şanjaq's report and sent his own report to Istanbul.
requesting the appointment of Sherif Saçîd. Upon receiving the vâlî's report, the Ottoman sultan in Istanbul appointed Sherif Saçîd and dismissed ÇAbd al-Karîm. Five months later, the Sultan received the şanjaq's report, so he at once dismissed Sherif Saçîd and reappointed Sherif ÇAbd al-Karîm.\textsuperscript{109}

After conquering the Hejaz the Ottomans had no fiscal or economic interests in the area. Their main concern was to maintain their role as the protectors of the Haramayn, and their policy was directed towards the improvement of the pilgrimage facilities as well as the protection of pilgrimage routes to and from the Hejaz. Thus relations between the Ottomans and the sherifs of Mecca were characterized by mutual interest and respect.

\textsuperscript{109}Daḥlān, \textit{Khulāṣat al-Kalām}, pp. 143-55.
CHAPTER II

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE HEJAZ BETWEEN
1143-1184 A.H./1731-1770 A.D.

Sherif Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh 1143-1146 A.H./1731-1734 A.D.

Sherif Muḥammad succeeded his father, Sherif ʿAbd Allāh (1129-1130 A.H./1716-1717 A.D. and 1136-1143 A.H./1725-1731 A.D.) to the seat of the Hejaz emirate in Dhū al-Qaʿdah 1143/May 1731.1 When Sherif ʿAbd Allāh died, Muḥammad, the oldest son, was on an expedition in the vicinity of Yemen to maintain order and check on the tribes in the area. In fear of their rival sherifs, particularly Āl Barakāt, the clan of Barakāt, the emir's brothers led by Sherif Masʿūd decided to elect Muḥammad the new emir of Mecca, and make his brother Thuqbah a deputy emir. Since the election of a new emir had to be approved by the Ottoman sultan through his Turkish official in the Hejaz or in Egypt, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, ʿAbd Allāh's brothers bribed the Turkish qāḍī of Mecca and the Turkish garrison to obtain their approval of Muḥammad's election. The source does not indicate the amount or the nature of the bribe.2 Muḥammad

1 ʿAḍīlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 183.
2 Ibid.
arrived at Mecca by the end of the month and at age twenty, claimed the position his father had held. When the pilgrimage caravans arrived, they confirmed Muhammad's election and presented him with the Sultan's khilâfat.\(^3\)

Sherif Muhammad's reign was marked by disturbances and challenges to his rule within the sherifian family supported by the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz. The first major disturbance in the region came less than a year after his succession. In 1144/1731, the Meccans rose against the Persians in Mecca. The Persians had arrived at Mecca in the previous year, but at a time when the main pilgrimage had already ended and so remained in Mecca, awaiting the next pilgrimage season. A rumor spread in the city, accusing the Persians of desecrating the Ka'bah. The exact nature of the desecration is not revealed by the sources.\(^4\) A Sunni mob (Ca'mah) took to the streets of Mecca with the help of the Ottoman soldiers, shouting for revenge. They went to the qâdî to secure a legal pronouncement (fatwah) to expel the Persians from Mecca. The judge fled the court and took refuge with the şanjaq of Jeddah, Abû Bakr Pâshâ, who was in Mecca at that time. The mob then went to the mufti and forced him out of his house and went to the şanjaq's residence. There they forced both the şanjaq and the qâdî

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 184.

\(^4\)Riyadh, King Saud University, Manuscript Department, Târikh Makkah al-Mukarramah wa-Ashrâfihâ. Târikh, no. 2622, fol. 125r.
to issue them a decree expelling the Persians. Then they went out into the streets, driving the Persians out of the city; the crowd later returned to plunder their homes and belongings. On the next day the situation became worse. There was no order in Mecca, and the mob went to the emir Sherif Muḥammad, who had remained neutral, and required him to sanction their actions against the Persians. The rioting populace warned the Persians to leave Mecca for the last time, and the Persians left for Jeddah and Taif. Finally, the emir took control of the situation and warned the advocates of the disturbance. According to the sources, the participants in the disturbance were the mob of Mecca, supported by the Janissaries, but not the "true inhabitants" of Mecca (ahl Makkah), who, as the sources say, did not approve of the turmoil. The sources do not define who these inhabitants were, but from the context it can be assumed that they were native-born Meccans rather than bedouins or pilgrims residing in the city. Mecca once again became quiet and peaceful. The emir also sent for the Persians to return to Mecca, assuring them security.

The real challenge for Sherif Muḥammad came from within the sherifian family itself. In 1145/1732, two incidents

5Ibid., fol. 331.
6Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 184.
7Tārīkh Makkah, fols. 125r-126v. (cf. Appendix IV).
8Ibid.
occurred between the emir of Mecca, Sherif Muḥammad, and some other sherifs which led to the emir's ouster. The emir was angry at a sherif from ʿAl Barakāt, for unknown reasons, and asked him to leave Mecca, which the sherif did not do. When the emir repeated his request, other sherifs asked him to give the offending sherif more time to arrange his affairs; this the emir refused and insisted on the immediate departure of the sherif.9 The emir then rode with his soldiers to the house of Sherif ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Zayn al-ʿAbidīn b. Barakāt, where the defendant sherif had taken refuge. The emir and his men attacked the house and the sherifs inside the house defended themselves. After some time, senior sherifs arrived at the scene and condemned the emir for not honoring the sherif's status.10 The sherifs had a conventional law, qānūn, which regulated the relations among the sherifs as well as between the sherifs and the people of the Hejaz. It was known as Abū Numay's law, referring to the great Sherif Abū Numay (931-992/1524-1584). It contains thirty-six stipulations, of which nine deal with the relations between the sherifs and the Hejazi population, covering such aspects as: 1) Only the descendants of Abū Numay should succeed to the governorship of the Hejaz; 2) A sherif should not hold a job as do the common people; 3) If a sherif was killed, his family should take four male

9Ibid., p. 185.
10Ibid.
members of the murderer's family to be killed; 4) One who slaps a sheriff should have his hand cut off; 5) One who reviles a sheriff should have his tongue cut out; 6) A sheriff may not be tried in the council of his opponent; 7) If a sheriff fights with another sheriff, the aggressor sheriff should be expelled from Mecca; 8) A sheriff may not be killed if he killed a non-sheriff; 9) The ruling sheriff should receive one-third of the victim's compensation. 11 The sheriffs also fined the emir twenty-five horses, twenty-five slaves, and sixty camels, which he was to carry to Āl Barakāt's house, and ordered him to apologize to the plaintiff sheriffs. Fearing more aggravation, the emir agreed to pay the fine and to apologize. 12

The second incident occurred in the same year, 1145/1732, when a slave of Sherif CAbd al-MuCtin b. Ḥumūd killed a son of a Ḥanbali sheikh and then fled to his master's house. When the ruling sheriff passed by CAbd al-MuCtin's house, he saw the guilty slave and asked his slaves to arrest the man, but the slave's mates rallied to his defense and protected him from the emir. Then the sheriffs who were inside the house hurried to defend their slaves,

11 For more information on Abu Numay's law, see Husayn M. Naṣīf, Mādī al-Hijāz wa-Ḥādiruh, 2 vols. (Cairo: Matba‘at Khudhayr, 1349 A.H./1930 A.D.), vol. I, pp. 17-18. This author wrote in the twentieth century and based his description of the qanun of the sheriffs on accounts he received from a friend in Mecca, who in turn claimed to have seen the qanun in writing. See also Appendix I.

12 Wāhlan, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 185.
and a gun fight broke out between the two sides. When other senior sherifs heard of the incident, they rushed to the scene and persuaded the emir to depart to his own residence, easing the tension.\textsuperscript{13}

The two incidents increased the strain between the sherifs and the emir. The sherifs therefore decided to depose Sherif Muḥammad and appoint his uncle Masṣūd as the new emir. It should be recalled that Masṣūd was the leading sherif who had arranged for Muḥammad to succeed his father in 1143/1731. The sherifs then left for Taif to organize themselves and sent to Sherif Masṣūd to join them and become the new emir of Mecca.\textsuperscript{14} Masṣūd, on the other hand, saw a great opportunity in the invitation; after all, he, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr's account, had had an eye on the seat of the governorship of the Hejaz since his brother's death in 1143/1731, but he had yielded in favor of his nephew Muḥammad, waiting for the right moment. When Sherif ʿAbd Allāh b. Saṣṭād died in 1143/1731, Sherif Masṣūd lacked the money and power to challenge his nephew Sherif Muḥammad for the position of emir. Therefore, Sherif Masṣūd, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr's account, arranged for his nephew's succession to gain his trust, and then began to deprive Sherif Muḥammad of his riches and power. Sherif Masṣūd, Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr continues, dissipated

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 186.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.
Sherif Muḥammad's wealth by extravagant spending and lured Muḥammad's supporters to his own side through bribery. All this took place without the emir's learning of his uncle's conspiracy. Sherif Masʿūd left for Taif and joined the mutinous sherifs. They seized the town and expelled the deputy of the ruling Sherif Muḥammad, in Rabīʿ I 1145/August 1732.

In Taif, the rebellious Sherif Masʿūd recruited mercenaries among the malcontents of emir Muḥammad's rule, including the tribes in the vicinity of Taif, especially the Thaqīf tribe. In Jumādā I 1145/October 1732, Masʿūd decided to attack the emir in his capital city of Mecca. When the emir heard of his uncle's advance, he grouped his own men and marched southeast to check the rebels. On the seventh of Jumādā I of the same year, the emir encountered the rebels at the plain of Ārafāt, near Mecca, and the inevitable battle took place. In a few hours the rebels prevailed, overcoming the forces of the emir. Emir Muḥammad first retreated to al-Ḥusaynīyah, and then fled to Yemen. The rebels, on the other hand, entered Mecca and

15Abd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Ashrāf wa-Umarāʾ Makkah al-Mukarramah, Istanbul, Topkapi Museum, no. 511, fols. 5r-7r.

16Dāḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 186.

17Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fols. 8r-9v.

proclaimed Sherif Mas'Cūd as the new emir of the Hejaz.

The deposed emir stayed only a few months in Yemen; he then decided to go to Taif, whose tribes, particularly the Thaqīf,\textsuperscript{19} had promised him their support to regain the emirate. It is to be recalled that the Thaqīf tribe were the ones who helped Sherif Mas'Cūd overthrow Muḥammad. Thus it seems as if the Thaqīf did not gain anything by securing the position of emir for Mas'Cūd, or as if Mas'Cūd did not fulfill his promises, if any were made, to the Thaqīf. In any event, Muḥammad took advantage of the situation and claimed Taif for himself.\textsuperscript{20} When the ruling emir heard the news, he marched on Taif. On 12 Sha'bān 1145/30 January 1733, the two parties encountered each other in al-Mathnāh, a suburb of Taif. With the mountains protecting their backs, Sherif Muḥammad and the Thaqīf emerged victorious and forced Mas'Cūd to flee the battlefield.\textsuperscript{21} After a hundred days of absence from the governorship of the Hejaz, Muḥammad reclaimed the seat of power.\textsuperscript{22}

Before Sherif Muḥammad could even control the situation in Mecca, the Turkish Janissaries in that city accused the emir of killing their sirdār, commander, and transferred their support to his rival Sherif Mas'Cūd. The incident rook

\textsuperscript{19}Ibn Ābd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 9v.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{21}Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 188.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibn Ābd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 10r.
place in Rabī‘ I 1146/August 1733, when Ḥusayn Aghā, the sirdār of the Janissaries at Mecca, was on an outing with his family and soldiers. One of his soldiers beat one of the Yemenis, who were the emir's soldiers.23 The Yemenis then helped their comrade and asked the sirdār to punish the guilty soldier. When the sirdār refused their demand, the Yemenis attacked him and killed some of his slaves and soldiers.24 The emir heard the news and at once rushed to the scene. Ḥusayn Aghā put his head out of a first floor window to talk to the emir, and a soldier from the Yemenis killed him instantly with a rifle shot.25 The Janissaries were incensed and wrote to Egypt accusing the emir Sherif Muḥammad of the killing. They also called upon the other Janissaries in Jeddah to join them against the emir and his forces. They spread out in the city and blocked the streets. The emir, on the other hand, fortified himself in his residence. The situation endured for a month when Abū Bakr Pāshā, the şanjaq of Jeddah, arrived at Mecca; he remained neutral despite the Janissaries' appeal to him to join them. The şanjaq quieted the Janissaries and effected a truce between them and the emir, whereupon the Janissaries

23Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 188.
24Ibid.
25De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 167.
left for Jeddah.  

Although the şanjaq was the general commander of the Turkish garrison in the Hejaz, he could not control the rebellious Janissaries. Upon their arrival at Jeddah, the Janissaries wrote to Sherif Masūd, who was at that time in Wadi Fāṭmah, near Mecca, and sent him money and arms. They also promised to back him against the ruling Sherif Muḥammad. Sherif Masūd did not waste any time, and advanced on Mecca. The Janissaries also left for Mecca to back him. On the 4th of Jumāda’ II 1146/November 13, 1733, they encountered the emir Muḥammad’s force at al-Ḥudaybiyah. In a battle which lasted the whole day, the emir’s forces finally overcame Masūd’s troops, including the Janissaries. As a result, Masūd and the Janissaries departed for Jeddah. Sherif Masūd now appealed to the şanjaq of Jeddah to intervene on his behalf, but the şanjaq refused to make any decision without an order from Istanbul.

When the emir Sherif Muḥammad heard of Masūd’s maneuver with the şanjaq, he at once left for Jeddah to prevent any coalition from forming against him. The şanjaq received the

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26Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā’ Makkah, fols. 10v-11v.

27Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kāfām, p. 189.

28Ibid.

29Ibid., pp. 189-90.
emir well and paid him his share from Jeddah's customs. Meanwhile, Sherif Mas'Cūd went to Taif, seized it, and expelled the emir's soldiers. He also mobilized the tribes living in the vicinity and advanced to Mecca in Ramaḍān 1146/February 1734.30 On Thursday, the seventh day of the month, Mas'Cūd entered Mecca, where he encountered Sherif Muḥammad and his Yemeni soldiers at al-Maḍīlā. In a sweep attack, Mas'Cūd's men defeated the emir's troops and Sherif Muḥammad subsequently retired to al-Husayniyah.

During his three years' reign, Sherif Muḥammad never possessed complete control of the Hejaz. He lacked the quality of leadership and a strong personality, and this inadequacy encouraged the Turkish şanjaqs of Jeddah, as well as the Turkish garrison in the region, to interfere with the Hejaz' affairs. Sherif Muḥammad also lacked the support of the sherifs of Mecca because of his mistreatment of them, as we saw in the two incidents of 1145/1732, when he attacked the sherifs in their houses without any consideration of their status. As a result, Sherif Muḥammad aggravated the sherifs and forced them to look for another person to appoint to the position of emir. They decided to support Sherif Muḥammad's opponent, Sherif Mas'Cūd, and replaced him in the governorship of the Hejaz in 1146/1734. After he overcame Sherif Muḥammad's forces for a last time at al-Maḍīlā, Mas'Cūd entered Mecca and reclaimed the rulership.

30Ibn cAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 18r.
Sherif Mas'ud b. Sa'Id 1146-1165 A.H./
1734-1752 A.D.

In 1146/1734, Sherif Mas'ud resumed the governorship of
the Hejaz for the second time. It is to be recalled that he
held the post for only about three months in 1145/1732.
Sherif Mas'ud knew that in order for him to maintain control
of his emirate, he could not allow the sherifs, the Turkish
officials, or the ulama of the Hejaz to meddle in the
region's affairs. However, at the same time, he also
realized that he had to yield to their wishes on occasion.
Thus in 1147/1734, when the ulama of Mecca renewed their
protest condemning the smoking of tobacco in public, Sherif
Mas'ud immediately banned public smoking, and punished
(presumably by lashing) those who were caught smoking on the
streets of Mecca.31

In 1148/1735, the Yemeni soldiers of Sherif Mas'ud at
Qunfudhah rebelled against the emir's agent Ahmad b. Abd
al-Rahim because he had not paid their dues.32 The soldiers
took their dues by force and retreated into the Yemen.33
When Sherif Mas'ud heard of this development, he dispatched
two detachments of his own soldiers to bring the rebellious
soldiers back to Mecca. The two detachments pursued the
soldiers, one by sea and one on the land route, but failed

31Ibid., fol. 15v.
32Ibid., fol. 34r.
33De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 170.
to overtake them before they had entered Laḥfiyah in the Yemen. Then the commander of the emir of Mecca's soldiers presented to the Imam of the Yemen a letter from Sherif Mas'Cūd asking the extradition of the rebels. 34 Although the Imam ordered the rebels to return to the emir of Mecca 2200 dinars which they had taken over the amount of their dues, he refused to extradite them on the grounds that he had granted them refuge from the emir's persecution. 35 As it turned out, the Imam was unaware of the political circumstances which led to the rebels' flight from Qunfudhah, and had given them his protection solely in the tradition of hospitality. Sherif Mas'Cūd was much obliged for the Imam's tact, and sent presents to him, including several mares and a white slave of great value. 36

In 1149/1736, Meccans complained to Sherif Mas'Cūd about the resident foreigners in Mecca who filled posts which should have been held by Meccans, and who worked as clerks for the Ottoman government. 37 According to Daḥlān, the reason for the Meccans' complaint was solely economic in nature. The resident foreigners, as he points out, were the merchants who monopolized the markets in Mecca. Moreover,

34 Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fols. 34v-35r.

35 Ibid., fol. 35v.

36 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 170.

37 Ibid., p. 167.
some of them were enrolled in the Ottoman annual subsidy register.\textsuperscript{38} Trade, rentals (houses, camels, donkeys, etc.) and the Ottoman subsidy were the only sources of income for the Hejazis. Therefore, Sherif Mas\c{c}\ud, who feared riots in his dominions, ordered all resident foreigners to leave the Hejaz immediately. Most of the Moroccans, Turks, and Egyptians left with the returning pilgrimage caravans. The Indians, Uzbeks, Kashmiris, and Persians, however, stayed; they were ordered again, insistently, to leave, and in the end they did so. Mecca was noticeably emptier and merchandise became inexpensive and easy to find.\textsuperscript{39}

Meanwhile the unseated former emir Sherif Mu\u015fammad was not idle. After his defeat by Sherif Mas\c{c}\ud in 1146/1734, he wandered through the Hejaz seeking support among the bedouins. The tribe of \u0148arb promised him support to regain his rulership, but when he announced his plan to attack Mecca they withdrew from his camp.\textsuperscript{40} It seems that Sherif Mas\c{c}\ud bribed the chiefs of the \u0148arb not to take part in his opponent's campaign. Finally, Sherif Mu\u015fammad settled in Khulay\u011f\u0131, north of Mecca, awaiting an opportunity. In 1151/1738, he appealed to the emir of the Damascus caravan, Sulaym\u00e6n P\u0130sh\u00e6 ai-\textsuperscript{C}Azm, to present him the Sultan's khil\textsuperscript{C}ah and install him in the governorship of the Hejaz. In spite

\begin{itemize}
\item[$^{38}$] Da\u015fl\u00e6n, Khul\u00e6sat al-Kal\u00e6m, p. 194.
\item[$^{39}$] De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, pp. 167-68.
\item[$^{40}$] Da\u015fl\u00e6n, Khul\u00e6sat al-Kal\u00e6m, p. 192.
\end{itemize}
of the cordial relations between Sulaymân Pâshâ and Sherif Muḥammad, Sulaymân Pâshâ refused Muḥammad's requests and promised him instead to mediate between him and his uncle Sherif Masâd.\textsuperscript{41} When the Damascus maḫmal arrived at Mecca, Sulaymân Pâshâ persuaded Sherif Masâd to forgive his nephew and grant him immunity. Then Sherif Masâd sent for Sherif Muḥammad to return to Mecca, and upon the arrival of Sherif Muḥammad at Mecca, Sherif Masâd received him well and allocated him and his companions handsome allowances.\textsuperscript{42}

Sherif Masâd was now free to pursue his aim to maintain order and to keep the Hejaz under his unchallenged authority. Hence, in 1155/1742, when the sherifs of the Banû Ḥasan clan, inhabitants of al-Shâqatayn on the road south to Yemen, claimed their independence from the emir of Mecca, and menaced pilgrims from the Yemen, Sherif Masâd sent an expedition commanded by his nephew and former opponent Sherif Muḥammad to subjugate them.\textsuperscript{43} Sherif Muḥammad led an army consisting of the emir's soldiers, the sherifs of Mecca, and tribal mercenaries. He first encountered the scouts of Banû Ḥasan five days' march from Mecca, then later besieged them around the hills of the Jābal, mountain, of Banû Sulaym.\textsuperscript{44} Eventually they

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{42}Ibn CAbd al-Shakur, Tarikh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 19r.

\textsuperscript{43}Daḥlân, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 192.

\textsuperscript{44}De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 168.
surrendered with their chieftain Sheikh ٓAsāf. Sherif Muḥammad then sent ٓAsāf and his family in chains to Mecca, where he died from smallpox a few days later.45 The situation in the south of the Hejaz was quiet once again and the pilgrimage route was safe.

In the following year, 1156/1743, Sherif Mas'Cūd fortified Dār al-Sa'ādah, the residence of the emir of Mecca. He built two towers and installed cannons (the origins of which are not mentioned in the sources) on them46 in what seemed to be a protective measure against any hostile action either from the sherifs or from the Turkish officials in the Hejaz. The sources do not mention any objection by the Turkish official to the fortification of the Dār, which would lead to the assumption that the Turkish official agreed to the emir's action. Sherif Ḥasan b. Abū Numay (992-1010/1584-1602) built Dār al-Sa'ādah around 993/1585.47 Since then it had been the residence of the emir of Mecca. If the emir was from the Dhaw Zayd, Ḥasan's descendants, he then inhabited Dār al-Sa'ādah for free, but if he was from another clan, he had to pay rent for the residence to the Dhaw Zayd.48

In 1156/1743 Medina was in turmoil for about five

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45Ibn ٓAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 21v.
46Ibid., fol. 23r.
47Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, pp. 56-57.
48Ibn ٓAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 24r.
months, due to a quarrel between the sheikh of the Medina Haram and the Turkish garrison in the city. The dispute started as a conflict over the salaries of the garrison and spread to involve the city people and the tribe of Ḥarb. In Jumādā ʿII 1156/August 1743 the sheikh of the Haram, Čabd al-Raḥman Aghā al-Kabīr (1151-1156/1738-1743) refused to pay the Turkish garrison their salaries. In a protest against the sheikh's action, the garrison led by Ḥasan Kābūs, a simple soldier about whom no further details are given, took over the citadel and closed the gates in the city wall, demanding the payment of their salaries in full. A group of local ulama tried to intervene and mediate the quarrel, but the rebels demanded the resignation of the sheikh and the ejection of six individuals; among them, ČUmar Zakī, the commander of the citadel. When the sheikh refused their requests, the rebels took over the Haram itself and fought between them and the city people broke out. The disciplined soldiers overcame the common people despite the death of Ḥasan Kābūs, probably because of their better weapons, which included muskets. Then ČAbd al-Raḥman Aghā appealed to the Ottoman government in Istanbul as well as to the şanjaq


50Ibid., fol. 13v.

51Ibid.
of Jeddah and the emir of Mecca for help. Sherif Mas'ud on his part sent a detachment of his own soldiers to restore order in Medina and ordered them to banish the individuals whom the garrison demanded to be expelled and who had been the aggressors in the disturbance. Fearful of losing his office, the sheikh of the Haram bribed Hazāc, sheikh of the Ḥarb tribe, to prevent the detachment sent by Sherif Mas'ud from reaching Medina. Hazāc encountered the detachment at Rābigh, south of Medina, where he routed it and compelled the soldiers to return to Mecca; he then joined the sheikh of the Haram at Medina. Meanwhile, Sherif Mas'ud decided to create disunity among the Ḥarb in the hopes of depriving ʿAbd al-Rahman Aghā of his strong supporters. Thus he bribed Mansūr, another sheikh of the Ḥarb, to revolt against Hazāc and promised to aid him. Mansūr abandoned Hazāc's camp and returned with his fellow tribesmen to Yanbuʿ.

In the meantime, the situation in Medina remained unsettled until the arrival of the Damascus mahmal in Dhū al-Qaḍāh of the same year. Upon the arrival of the mahmal, ʿAbd al-Rahman Aghā was dismissed and was sent to Egypt.

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52Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 25r.
53al-Ḥusaynī, al-Akhbār al-Gharībah, fol. 19r.
54Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 26r.
55al-Ḥusaynī, al-Akhbār al-Gharībah, fol. 19r.
56Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 27v.
according to the Ottoman government's orders. The Ottoman government also authorized Sherif Mas'ūd to take the necessary measures to restore order in the city. Accordingly, he expelled ʿAbd al-Raḥman's supporters and appointed Manṣūr as the overall sheikh of the Ḥarb. Finally, order was reestablished in Medina and the city quieted down after five months of disturbances.

In 1157/1744, Sayyid Naṣr Allāh al-Ḥusaynī arrived at Mecca with a special message from Nādir Shāh of Persia (1149-1160/1736-1747) to the emir of Mecca, Sherif Mas'ūd. He informed Sherif Mas'ūd that Iran had entered into an agreement with the Ottoman empire to recognize the Ja'fari madhhab, a branch of the Shi'i, as the fifth legal school in Islam. Hence he asked the emir of Mecca to allow a Ja'fari imam to lead people in prayer at the Ḥaram of Mecca, as well as to mention Nādir Shāh's name in the Friday prayer with that of the Ottoman Sultan. Sherif Mas'ūd did not know what to do since Nādir Shāh had threatened that if Mas'ūd did not accept his demands, he would invade Mecca. Moreover, Sherif Mas'ūd did not know if an agreement between the Persian and the Ottoman empires had actually been signed. al-Suwaydī, the Sunni Iraqi scholar of the

57Ibid., fol. 28r.
58Ibid., fol. 28v.
60Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 29v.
12th/18th century who was in Mecca at the time to perform a pilgrimage remarked that Nādir Shāh's demands caused unrest in the city since the Hejaz did not have the strength to defend itself against Nādir Shāh, if he were indeed to carry out this threat.61

Abū Bakr Pāshā, the Turkish şanjaq of Jeddah, made the situation more difficult for Sherif MasCūd when he demanded that the Persian messenger be handed over to him to be killed. When Sherif MasCūd refused the şanjaq's request, the şanjaq accused him of favoring the Shi'Cis. In response, Sherif MasCūd, fearing that the Ottoman government might also believe that he was in favor of the Shi'Cah, ordered a public reviling of Shi'Cism. He also sent a letter to the Sublime Porte in Istanbul to inform it of the situation, asking for instructions.62 The government's reply came with the Damascus caravan. It denied Nādir Shāh's claim and ordered the handing over of his messenger to the emir of the maḥmal, AsCadd Pāshā al-'Azm. Sherif MasCūd therefore turned over the messenger to AsCadd Pāshā. When the pilgrimage was over, AsCadd Pāshā took the messenger with him to Damascus, where he put him in prison.63 With this done, i.e., the handing over of the Persian messenger, Sherif MasCūd ordered


62Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 30r.

celebrations everywhere in the Hejaz.\textsuperscript{64}

The bedouins of the Hejaz took advantage of the unstable situation and plundered the travelers and pilgrims in the region. The tribes of ČAdhul around Līth preyed on the caravans from the south, and the tribes of Albuqūm endangered traveling and cut off the routes in the vicinity of Taif.\textsuperscript{65} Sherif Mas\textsuperscript{C}ūd could not deal with the bedouins since he was preoccupied by Nādir Shāh's threat, and feared that he might need the bedouins' support if Nādir Shāh invaded the Hejaz. But it was not until Šafar 1158/March 1745 that Sherif Mas\textsuperscript{C}ūd was able to deal with the harassment of the tribes. In that month, he raided the tribe of ČAdhul and subjugated them. In Ramāḍān/October of the same year, he also attacked the tribes of Albuqūm around Taif, killing some of them and capturing the rest.\textsuperscript{66} The routes to and from Mecca were thus rendered safe again and traveling returned to normal.

In 1161/1748, a conflict over the customs duties of Jeddah jeopardized relations between the emir of Mecca and the ṣanjaq of Jeddah. ČAlī Pāshā, the ṣanjaq of Jeddah, refused to pay Sherif Mas\textsuperscript{C}ūd his share of the customs duties of Jeddah which the Ottoman government had designated for

\textsuperscript{64}Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā’ Makkah, fol. 31r.

\textsuperscript{65}Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 194.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
the emir of Mecca. Sherif Mas'Cūd asked a number of merchants of the city to mediate between him and the ṣanjaq, but CAli Pāshā refused to pay the emir's share or even to compromise. On the contrary, he expelled some of the emir's deputies from Jeddah, and fortified the city wall, apprehensive that the emir would attack. Sherif Mas'Cūd decided to take his share by force and to prevent the ṣanjaq from interfering in the affairs of the Hejaz. Thus he sent his brother Sherif Ja'far with a detachment of the emir's forces to take Jeddah. When the soldiers besieged the city, the emir's supporters inside the city told them to attack the wall on the south side where it was not well manned; the detachment at once attacked the south wall and entered the city. When CAli Pāshā learned that the troops had penetrated the walls, he fled to Egypt by sea with his retinue.

During this struggle, Sherif Mas'Cūd wrote to the Ottoman government demanding the replacement of CAli Pāshā. The Sublime Porte replied in the emir's favor and reconfirmed his share of Jeddah's revenues. Sherif Mas'Cūd ruled the Hejaz unchallenged until his death on Friday, 2 Rabī' II

67Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 37r.
68Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 195.
69Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 37v.
70Ibid., fols. 37v-38r.
71Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 195.
1165/19 February 1752.72

Sherif Mas'Cūd had ruled the Hejaz for about twenty years without much local or outside interference in his governorship since he had firm control of the affairs of the Hejaz; his strong personality enabled him to rule successfully. As we saw previously, in the incident of 1156/1743 between him and the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram, and the dispute of 1161/1748 with the ṣanjaq of Jeddah, Sherif Mas'Cūd prevailed as the real ruler of the Hejaz.

Sherif Misā'cad b. Saсид 1165-1184 A.H./1752-1770 A.D.

Sherif Misā'cad b. Saсид succeeded his brother Sherif Mas'Cūd as the emir of the Hejaz in Rabī'C II 1165/ February 1752. The Turkish ṣanjaq of Jeddah and the Turkish qādi of Mecca approved Misā'cad's succession, as did the sheriffs of Mecca. However, the clan of Barakāt objected to the succession because of their rivalry with the emir's clan, Āl Zayd, and retreated to Wadi Fāṭmah.73 From there, they secretly sent for Sherif Muḥammad b. CAbd Allāh, who was in Mecca at that time, to join them, promising him that they would support him to regain the governorship of the Hejaz.74 It may be recalled that Sherif Muḥammad was the emir of

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72Ibid.
73Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 41v.
74De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 170.
Mecca from 1143-1146/1731-1734.\textsuperscript{75} Sherif Misā'cad in his turn sent conciliatory messages to the Barakāt. He asked them to return to Mecca and pledged to pay them very handsome allowances, but Āl Barakāt refused the proposals, again because of the reason mentioned above.\textsuperscript{75}

Meanwhile, Sherif Muḥammad left Mecca secretly and joined the rebels at Wadi Fāṭmah. They then moved on Taif and ejected the emir's soldiers, taking over the city in Jumada II 1165/April 1752.\textsuperscript{77} In about a month, Sherif Muḥammad mobilized the tribe of Cūtaybah and left for Mecca to unseat the emir. When Sherif Misā'cad heard of the rebels' movement, he gathered his forces and faced them at Duqm al-Wabar on the outskirts of Mecca in Sha'ban/June of the same year.\textsuperscript{78} After fierce fighting, Sherif Misā'cad emerged victorious. The tribes supporting Sherif Muḥammad left the battlefield, forcing him to seek refuge at Wadi Fāṭmah.\textsuperscript{79}

An intermediary, Sherif ṢAbd Allāh al-Fīr, made peace between the two parties, but on the condition that the emir grant subsidies to the disaffected sherif, Sherif

\textsuperscript{75}See pp. 55-65, supra.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibn ṢAbd al-Shakūr, Ṭūrīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 41v.

\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., fol. 42r.

\textsuperscript{78}Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 196.

\textsuperscript{79}Ibid.
Muḥammad. The rebellious sherifs, including Sherif Muḥammad, returned to Mecca in the middle of Shaʿbān. Sherif Misāḥad then wrote to the Ottoman government in Istanbul requesting the confirmation of his succession to the governorship of the Hejaz, which he obtained shortly thereafter.

The reign of Sherif Misāḥad witnessed the constant intervention of the emirs of Egypt and the Damascus caravans in the affairs of the Hejaz. In 1171/1757, Sherif ʿAbd Allāh al-Fīcr, who earlier had mediated between Sherif Misāḥad and his rival Sherif Muḥammad, disapproved of Misāḥad's conduct of the emirate's affairs although no further details are known. However, it appears that Sherif Misāḥad did not pay attention to ʿAbd Allāh's complaints. As a result, Sherif ʿAbd Allāh took advantage of the arrival of the Egyptian maḥmal at Mecca and convinced its emir, Ḫusayn Bey Kushkush, to proclaim Sherif Mubārak b. Muḥammad, a son of Sherif Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh (r. 1143-1146/1731-1734) as emir of Mecca, for which support ʿAbd Allāh also paid Ḫusayn a large sum of money. In Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1171/ August 1758, they proclaimed Sherif Mubārak the new emir in the presence of the Turkish qāḍī of Mecca without a royal

80De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, pp. 170-71.

81al-Sibācī, Tārīkh Makkah, p. 431.

82Dāḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 197; Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 44v.
Meanwhile, Sherif Misâcad did not know of the intrigue until his house was surrounded by the rebellious forces. Nevertheless, Sherif Aḥmad, Misâcad's brother, led his troops into lower Mecca and the emir himself sortied, and between them they cleared the remainder of the city of their enemies.

Following his defeat, Sherif Mubârak pleaded for a pardon for himself and for the emir of the Egyptian caravan. Sherif Misâcad indeed granted them pardons and returned to them belongings which they had lost during combat, but he also asked them to leave Mecca at once. Ḥusayn Bey left for Egypt and Sherif Mubârak left for Wadi Fāṭmah. When in the following year Sherif Mubârak made an unauthorized return to Mecca, he was imprisoned and he remained in prison until he died at the end of the year. During this time, Sherif Misâcad also ordered Sherif ČAbd Allâh al-Fîcr to leave Mecca. The latter left for the Yemen and was well-received by its Imam. In 1172/1758, the Imam intervened with Sherif Misâcad so that ČAbd Allâh could return. Sherif Misâcad met with yet another intervention in his affairs even before he could recover from the previous one.

83Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kālām, p. 197.
84De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 171.
85Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārijh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 46v.
86Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kālām, p. 198.
In the next pilgrimage season of 1172/1759 the emir of the Damascus caravan, CAbd Allāh Pāshā, conceived a plan to oust Sherif MisāCad.87 CAbd Allāh Pāshā had been the emir of the Damascus caravan in 1171/1758 in which Sherif CAbd Allāh al-FiCr and Ḥusayn Bey Kushkush tried to depose the emir of Mecca. Hence it seems that CAbd Allāh Pāshā had a part in the intrigue, although the sources on this subject do not refer to such an assumption. He apparently decided to carry on what the plotters of the previous year had failed to achieve.

After the pilgrimage was over, CAbd Allāh Pāshā called for a council on the pretext of discussing the improvement of the water supply of Mecca.88 When Sherif MisāCad attended the council, CAbd Allāh Pāshā attacked him vehemently and accused him of diverting the water supply from CAyn Zubaydah to al-CAbdīyah, which had caused the people of Mecca and the pilgrims to suffer, so he argued, from a shortage of water.89 According to the sources, this accusation was merely a ploy. Both Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr and Daḥlān reported that CAbd Allāh Pāshā accused Sherif MisāCad of diverting the water supplies for Mecca from CAyn Zubaydah to al-CAbdīyah, where the Sherif had a garden; according to both sources, that was untrue because CAyn Zubaydah did not

87 Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 47r.
88 Ibid., fol. 47v.
89 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 198.
run to al-地毯iyah. However,地毯阿卜杜拉地毯帕夏 ordered his guards to arrest Sherif地毯Cad and appointed his brother Sherif Ja地毯far to the governorship of the Hejaz. When the news spread in Mecca, the population rose in violent protest. Nevertheless,地毯阿卜杜拉地毯帕夏 rode to the Haram of Mecca, with the şanjaq of Jeddah, the emirs of the pilgrimage caravans, and the qādī of Mecca, and read a firman indicating that the Ottoman government in Istanbul had authorized him to look after the affairs of the Haramayn and to appoint whomever he wished to the governor's post. The population calmed down and things returned to normal.

Sherif Ja地毯far was able to secure the release of his brother地毯Cad. A mild man himself, he agreed with his brother to abdicate in favor of地毯Cad, in return for a large sum of money. In Muḥarram 1173/August 1759, Sherif Ja地毯far left for Taif where he bought gardens; he remained there, cultivating them until he died five years later. Sherif地毯Cad resumed his governorship in Mecca.

The situation in the Hejaz was calm for about ten years. Sherif地毯Cad faced no challenges or conflicts with the Ottoman officials in the region. However, a serious

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90Ibn地毯阿卜杜拉地毯Shakûr, Tārikh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 47v.
91Dāhlan, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 198.
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 171.
intervention in the Hejaz affairs came at the end of his reign. In 1182/1768, a conflict between Sherif Misâcad and Sherif Aḥmad b. Ğabd al-Karîm of Al Barakāt, for obscure reasons, took place. Sherif Aḥmad went to Wadi Fāṭmah, where he called on Āl Barakāt to join him to overthrow Sherif Misâcad.95 They also proclaimed Sherif Ğabd Allâh b. Ḥusayn from the Barakāt clan to be the new emir of Mecca.96 Although the sources do not reveal why Sherif Aḥmad was not proclaimed as the new emir of Mecca, it seems that he preferred to be in an informal position of influence as a senior member of his clan.

Sherif Ğabd Allâh mobilized the tribes around the Wadi and moved on to take the city of Jeddah. When they arrived at Jeddah, the people of the city closed their gates on the attackers.97 Unable to take the city, Sherif Ğabd Allâh and his forces retired to nearby reed huts. Meanwhile, the defenders used flaming arrows to set the huts afire. The rebels were eventually defeated and returned to Wadi Fāṭmah.98 Sherif Ğabd Allâh himself left for Egypt to obtain the governor's backing and get support from the escort of the next Egyptian pilgrimage caravan.99 The

95Ibn Ğabd al-Shakûr, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 50v.
96Ḍaḥlān, Khulâṣat al-Kalām, p. 199.
97Ibn Ğabd al-Shakûr, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 50v.
98Ibid., fcls. 50v-51r.
99De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 172.
governor of Egypt at that time was ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr, who overcame the Ottoman forces and proclaimed his independence in Egypt in 1181/1769.100

ʿAlī Bey al-Kabīr promised Sherif ʿAbd Allāh to back him in his claim for the rulership of the Hejaz and ordered the emir of the next Egyptian mahmal, Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab, to help ʿAbd Allāh achieve his goal.101

Meanwhile, Sherif Misāʿad, forewarned of this plot, arranged with ʿUthmān Pāshā al-Ṣādiq, an emir of the Damascus caravan with whom he had cordial relations, to ask the Egyptian caravan to leave Mecca immediately after the end of the pilgrimage season, because if Abū al-Dhahab tried to overthrow Sherif Misāʿad, then ʿUthmān Pāshā with his military escort would help the Sherif against the Egyptians. They also arranged for the delay of the Damascus caravan's departure to prevent Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab from accomplishing his aims and to make sure that he would not have a chance to oust Sherif Misāʿad.102 When the Egyptian caravan arrived at Mecca, Sherif Misāʿad received them well and demanded his khilāfah as usual. The emir of the caravan


101 Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 52r.

102 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 200.
delivered the khilâh as if the situation was normal.\textsuperscript{103}

When the pilgrimage was over, Sherif Misâ'âd requested the immediate departure of the Egyptian maḥmal. With the Damascus caravan on Misâ'âd's side, Muḥammad Abû al-Dhahab had no choice but to leave. So on the 18th of Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1183/15 April 1770 the Egyptian caravan left Mecca and eight days later, the Damascus caravan departed as well.\textsuperscript{104}

In the meantime, Sherif CAbd Allâh b. Ḥusayn, who had left the Egyptian maḥmal upon its arrival in the Hejaz to mobilize the tribes around Mecca, heard of the departure of Abû al-Dhahab, but in spite of the latter's absence from the coalition, insisted on attacking Sherif Misâ'âd in Mecca. Thus on 27 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1183/24 April 1770, Sherif CAbd Allâh led his troops towards Mecca and camped at al-Zâhir.\textsuperscript{105} However, Sherif Misâ'âd was on the alert and his forces were ready to cope with the situation; when he heard that his rival was encamped at al-Zâhir, he marched there and encountered the rebels at their camp. In a short battle lasting less than a day Sherif Misâ'âd overcame the challengers.\textsuperscript{106} Sherif CAbd Allâh left for Wadi Fâṭmah and then for Egypt to seek once more the governor's support.

In Egypt, the governor CAlî Bey al-Kabîr promised Sherif

\textsuperscript{103}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{104}Ibn CAbd al-Shakûr, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 52v.

\textsuperscript{105}Daḥlân, Khulâṣat al-Kalâm, p. 200.

\textsuperscript{106}Ibid.
Câbî Allâh his support for a second time. But Câlî Bey, who had underestimated Sherif Misâqad's power the first time, now prepared a direct expedition by himself to place Sherif Câbî Allâh b. Husayn in the governorship of the Hejaz. 107

While these preparations were being made, Sherif Misâqad fell sick and died on 27 Muḥarram 1184/24 May 1770, before the Egyptian expedition reached the Hejaz. 108 Prior to his death, Sherif Misâqad summoned a council of the sherifs and obtained their agreement to the appointment of his brother Sherif Câbî Allâh b. Saqîd to succeed him in the governorship of the Hejaz. 109

The position of the emir of Mecca became more stable in the period between 1143-1184/1731-1770. Sherifs Masqûd and Misâqad each held their positions for about nineteen years. Moreover, the power of the emir increased while the power and influence of the Turkish officials in the Hejaz began to decline. The incidents of 1161/1748 between Sherif Masqûd and the şanjaq of Jeddah, concerning the customs duties of the city, is perhaps the best example of this shift in power.

107 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 173.
108 Ibn Câbd al-Shâkûr, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 55r.
109 Daḥlân, Khulâṣat al-Kalâm, p. 201.
CHAPTER III

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE HEJAZ: SECOND PHASE
1184-1202 A.H./1770-1788 A.D.

The Egyptian Expedition and Turmoil in the Hejaz 1184-1186 A.H./1770-1772 A.D.

By 1184/1170 Ğalî Bey al-Kabîr had overcome his opponents in upper Egypt as well as in lower Egypt and had established firm control in the country.¹ He then turned to fulfill his dream to revive the Mamluk state which the Ottomans had conquered in 1516-1517. His vision of the new state included almost all the territories controlled by the Mamluk sultanate on the eve of the Ottoman conquest. Egypt was to be the base of his Mamluk state; Ğalî Bey was a Mamluk himself. The Red Sea coast with its important ports of Jeddah and Mocha, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina in the interior were to form one wing of the new empire. The Levant coast with its numerous active trading ports, and the Syrian hinterland with its vital urban centers of Aleppo and Damascus would form the other wing.² Hence when Sherif Ğabd Allâh b. Ɂusayn appealed for his help, Ğalî Bey replied

immediately by dispatching a major military expedition into the Hejaz.

ÇAğî Bey's purpose in dispatching the expedition was not just to oust Sherif Misâ'ir from the governorship of the Hejaz and install Sherif ÇAbd Allâh in his place, but to install an emir in the Hejaz who would yield to ÇAğî Bey's will. He also hoped to obtain the title of Protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina to enhance his position in his struggle with the Ottoman Empire.3

Moreover, ÇAğî Bey saw possible economic profits in Sherif ÇAbd Allâh's invitation to intervene in the Hejaz. The Red Sea was Egypt's single most important trade route. ÇAğî Bey felt that the Red Sea route could produce even larger profits for Egypt if the European trading houses of India could be induced to redirect their trade away from the Cape of Good Hope to Suez.4 Thus, by acquiring the Hejaz, he saw a great advantage in reopening the Red Sea route to the European merchants. He would invite the merchants to trade directly with Suez, abolishing the Ottoman ban against European shipping in the Red Sea, introduced in the mid-16th century for the protection of the Muslim holy places, Mecca and Medina.5

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3M. Ramağân, ÇAğî Bik al-Kabîr, pp. 138-139.
4Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt, p. 68.
5Ibid., p. 65, and Mühammed Anîs, al-Dawlah al-ÇUthmânîyah, p. 128.
Calıf Bey supervised the preparation of the expedition himself to stress his great concern for its success. He ordered provisions of flour, oil, honey, sugar, and cheese to be carried with the expedition. He recruited soldiers from among Turks, Moroccans, Syrians, Sudanese and others. Then he appointed his own slave, the Mamluk Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab, as commander of the expedition and selected as his assistants two şanjaqs, Ḥasan Shabkah and Muṣṭafā Bey. With three thousand soldiers and thirty cannons the Egyptians expedition left for the Hejaz. Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab left Suez in Safar 1184/June 1770, at the head of the land forces, while Ḥasan Shabkah departed with a small fleet for Jeddah.

In the meantime, Sherif ǦAbd Allāh b. Saḥīd succeeded his brother Sherif Misāʿad as the governor of the Hejaz, who had died in Muḥarram 1184/May 1770. However, when Sherif ǦAbd Allāh b. Saḥīd was announced as the new emir, his other brother Sherif Aḥmad immediately claimed the governorship as well and made his demand so forcibly that ǦAbd Allāh

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7Ibid.
8Ibid.
9Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 200.
10Crecelius, The Roots of Modern Egypt, p. 73.
11Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, pp. 200-201.
abdicated in his favor.12

In Rabī' I 1184/July 1770, the Egyptian expedition arrived at Yanbu.13 When Darwīsh Aghā, the deputy of the emir of Mecca at Yanbu, refused to hand over the city, Abū al-Dhahab seized it. For three days, Abū al-Dhahab failed to overcome the defenders who fought him fiercely. Finally on the fourth day he bribed some of the soldiers inside the city and was able to take it.14 Due to his resistance, Darwīsh Aghā was executed immediately and the rest of the city's soldiers were enrolled into Abū al-Dhahab's troops.15

Abū al-Dhahab left for Mecca while Sherif ǦAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn went ahead of the Egyptian expedition to mobilize the bedouin around Wadi Fāṭmah.16 On 14 Rabī' I 1184/4 July 1770 Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab arrived at the wadi and was joined by Sherif ǦAbd Allāh and his troops.17 When the news of the expedition's arrival reached Mecca, Sherif Aḥmad b. Śāfī sent the women and children of Āl Zayd to Taif for refuge in case Mecca fell to the Egyptians. He also sent the Ḥanafī mufti ǦAli b. ǦAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣadīqī and Sherif ǦAbd Allāh al-Fīrān on a conciliatory mission to Abū al-

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12De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 173.
13Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 57v.
14Ibid., fol. 58r.
15Ibid.
16Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 203.
17Ibid.
Dhahab. 18 The emir's messengers arrived at the Egyptian camp and tried to persuade Abū al-Dhahab not to attack Mecca but he refused, asserting that he would not leave the Hejaz before installing Sherif ʿAbd Allāh in power and subduing the region. 19

On 16 Rabīʿ I 1184/6 July 1770, Abū al-Dhahab camped at al-Zāhir on the outskirts of Mecca where he arranged his troops and placed his cannons aimed towards Mecca. 20 In the meantime, Sherif Aḥmad tried to mobilize the bedouin around the city but failed to recruit any except for a small number of Hudhayl, because of a lack of money. 21 He then marched to meet the Egyptians at al-Zāhir. When Sherif Aḥmad saw the size of the Egyptian army, he lost his courage and decided to leave Mecca without fighting, entrusting his belongings, according to Abū Numay's law, to Sherif Ḥāmid b. Ḥusayn, brother of Sherif ʿAbd Allāh. Then he left for Taif. 22

When Abū al-Dhahab learned of Sherif Aḥmad's retreat to Taif he entered Mecca unchallenged on Friday, 18 Rabīʿ I 1184/8 July 1170. Triumphant, he proclaimed Sherif ʿAbd

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18Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 58v.
19Ibid., fol. 59r.
20Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 203.
21Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 58v.
22Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 203.
Allāh b. Ḫusayn the emir of Mecca,23 and once more a Sherif from Āl Barakāt became the ruler of the Hejaz. Sherif ǦAbd Allāh resided in Dār al-Hanā' of Āl Barakāt as the camp's new residential hall24 instead of Dār al-Saḥādah, which had been the emirs' residential palace before Dār al-Hanā', and which belonged to Āl Zayd, the rivals of his clan.

During this time, Ḥasan Shabkah landed at Jeddah, and without much resistance from the Ottoman garrison of the city, he subdued it. He then expelled the Ottoman ḥanJaq and claimed Jeddah in the name of his master ǦAli Bey of Egypt.25

As a result of the successful expedition, the Hejaz became part of ǦAli Bey's revived Mamluk state and Abū al-Dhahab acted as if he were the sole ruler of the region despite the existence of an emir from the sherifian family. The emir of Mecca, Sherif ǦAbd Allāh, did not have control of his emirate nor could he check Abū al-Dhahab's influence and power in the affairs of the Hejaz. After the Egyptians entered Mecca, Abū al-Dhahab plundered and seized Dār al-Saḥādah, the residence of the deposed emir, and expelled his clan, Āl Zayd, from Mecca. Some of them went to Taif, and others went to the Yemen.26 He also jailed the Hanafi mufti

23Ibid.
24Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Ṭārīkh Umarā’ Makkah, fol. 60r.
25M. Ramadān, ǦAli Bik al-Kabīr, p. 143.
26Daḥlān, Khulāsāt al-Kalām, p. 204.
of Mecca, Sheikh CAlī al-Ṣadīqī and did not free him until he had extorted twenty thousand riyāls from the mufti. 27 Moreover, Abū al-Dhahab extorted large amounts of money from the merchants of the Hejaz. 28 The two chroniclers who report this incident, Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr and Daḥlān, are silent on any justification that Abū al-Dhahab might have given and thereby document their hostility towards the Egyptian takeover.

In an effort to fight back, Sherif Aḥmad b. SaC̲ī̄o went to Wadi Liyāh, south of Taif, to mobilize the bedouins in the vicinity of the wadi. 29 He then marched to take Taif. When Sherif CAbd al-Karīm, the deputy and the brother of the emir of Mecca at Taif, heard of Sherif Aḥmad's advance, he evacuated the city and left for Mecca. Hence on 24 Rabīḍ I 1184/14 July 1770, Sherif Aḥmad entered Taif without resistance. 30 He also regrouped his troops to retake Mecca, and since he still lacked the money needed to pay the bedouins in his camp he appealed to the Indian merchants of Taif for help. They provided him with about five thousand qirsh which he distributed among his troops, which was apparently enough to ensure loyalty. 31

27Ibid.
28Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 60v.
29Ibid., fol. 62r.
30Ibid.
31Ibid.
When the news of the capture of Taif reached Mecca, the emir Sherif ĈAbd Allāh called for Abū al-Dhahab's help. Abū al-Dhahab, the real master of the Hejaz, sent a detachment of Egyptians with Ḥasan Shabkāh to retake Taif. 32 He also appointed Sherif Ḥāmid, a brother of Sherif ĈAbd Allāh, as the commander of the detachment in what seemed to be a conciliatory gesture towards the emir, whose rule he had so far ignored. 33 On 22 Rabī'c I 1184/15 July 1770, the detachment left for Taif, but before it arrived at the city, Sherif Aḥmad had already summoned his troops, including bedouins from the Banī Saʿd and Thaqīf tribes, and left for Mecca. 34 They camped at ĈArafāt awaiting an opportunity to advance on Mecca. When Abū al-Dhahab learned of Sherif Aḥmad's advance he regrouped his forces and departed for ĈArafāt in the company of Sherif ĈAbd Allāh to meet the opponents.

The Egyptians encountered the forces of Sherif Aḥmad at the plain of ĈArafāt on 25 Rabī'c II 1184/17 August 1770. 35 The numbers of the Egyptians forces were much larger than those of their adversaries and therefore, they overcame Sherif Aḥmad's soldiers in less than a day of fighting and

32 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 204.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 205.
35 Ibn Ĉabd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh ʿUmarā' Makkah, fol. 63r.
forced him to plead for peace, whereupon he left for Līth.\textsuperscript{36}

Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab left the Hejaz for Egypt on 20 Jumāda'I 1184/11 September 1770, presuming that his task of integrating the Hejaz into ṢAlī Bey's Egyptian realm has been completed.\textsuperscript{37} Before he left he appointed Ḥasan Shabkāh as a ṣanjaq of Jeddah. Abū al-Dhahab also placed under the command of Ḥasan Shabkāh a small garrison from the Egyptian soldiers\textsuperscript{38} to look after Egyptian interests in the Hejaz. When Abū al-Dhahab arrived in Cairo at the beginning of Rajab/October 21 he was received as a hero for his success in the Hejaz campaign.\textsuperscript{39}

Meanwhile, Sherif Aḥmad, who was waiting at Līth for the opportunity to retake Mecca, took advantage of Abū al-Dhahab's departure with the bulk of the Egyptian troops, regrouped his tribal forces from around Mecca and was once again ready to advance on Mecca. He also mobilized bedouins from the vicinity of Yemen.\textsuperscript{40} To secure additional strength, Sayyid Thuqbah b. Ābd al-Muḥsin mobilized the tribe of Thaqīf in the name of Sherif Aḥmad, and decided to wait for the Sherif at Ārafāt to advance on Mecca.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{36}Dāhlān, Khulāsāt al-Kalām, p. 205.

\textsuperscript{37}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39}al-Jabartī, Ājā'īb al-Athār, vol. 1, p. 354.

\textsuperscript{40}Ibn Ābd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 64r.

\textsuperscript{41}Ibid., fol. 64v.
Sherif Aḥmad arrived at ṬArafāt on 11 Jumāda' II 1184/2 October 1770 and joined the rest of his forces. He then arranged them into two groups. The first group with the tribe of Ṭaqqīf would advance from Mīsfalah, or lower Mecca. The second group, led by Sherif Aḥmad himself, would advance from upper Mecca. On 21 Jumāda' II/12 October, Sherif Aḥmad marched on Mecca. He encountered the supporters of Sherif ṬAbd Allāh, who was aided by the Egyptian garrison led by Ḥasan Shabkāh, at al-Munḥanā. During the fight, the troops from lower Mecca joined Sherif Aḥmad's forces. At first, the fight was going against Sherif Aḥmad. However, when the Sheikh of Ṭaqqīf, Rābic, was killed by one of Sherif ṬAbd Allāh's supporters, his men were fired up by a strong desire for revenge and took Sherif ṬAbd Allāh's forces in the rear, carrying all before them. Many of Sherif ṬAbd Allāh's men were killed and he pleaded for peace for him and for Ḥasan Shabkāh. They then withdrew to Wādī Fāṭmāh with some of the Egyptian garrison. On the same day, Sherif Aḥmad entered Mecca and resumed the governorship of the Hejaz.

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42 Ḍahlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 205.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibn ṬAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 64v.

45 Ibid.

46 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 174.

47 Ibn ṬAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 65r.
Contrary to the chivalrous tradition of the sherifs, Sherif Aḥmad at once ordered all the houses of Āl Barakāt to be looted and then destroyed by fire to avenge Abū al-Dhahab’s expulsion of Āl Zayd when he entered Mecca in Rabī‘ I 1184/July 1170.48 He also turned to deal with the Egyptian presence in the Hejaz. To this end, he demanded that Ḥasan Shabkah and his troops leave the Hejaz immediately.49 After his defeat, Ḥasan Shabkah stayed briefly with Sherif ṣAbd Allāh at al-Munḥanah, and then left first for Wadi Fāṭmah and then for Jeddah.

When he received Sherif Aḥmad’s demands, he at first underestimated the emir’s power and refused to leave. Sherif Aḥmad, determined to destroy the resistance, mustered about four thousand soldiers of his forces, including bedouins from the Yemen50 in order to expel the Egyptians from Jeddah. The forces of the emir of Mecca marched on Jeddah, and when they arrived there they camped at Ghulayl on the outskirts of the city. Ḥasan Shabkah, on the other hand, closed the city gates and fortified the walls.51 The emir’s forces besieged the city but were unable to take it, so they decided to disunite the Egyptian defenders. Therefore, they bribed one of the defenders’ commanders to

48 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 174.
49 Ḥbn ṣAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā’ Makkah, fol. 65v.
50 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 205.
51 Ibid.
open the south gate. When this commander, (katkhudā), opened the gate, the emir's forces rushed into the city, taking the defending forces by surprise. They then swept the Egyptian resistance from the city, crushing it completely, and a few Egyptian soldiers were killed. However, Hasan Shabkah and a part of his forces continued to hold the citadel, but when the emir's forces pressed on them, the Egyptians fled to Rābigh and the emir's army took over Jeddah. At the end of Jumādā' II, Hasan Shabkah sailed for Egypt, accompanied by Sherif CAbd Allāh b. Husayn, marking the end of the Egyptian presence in the Hejaz, which had lasted for only four months, and of its efforts to integrate the region into CAlī Bey's renewed Mamluk state.

The Egyptian expedition's failure in the Hejaz was due to Sherif Ahmad's persistence in resisting the Egyptians. However, in spite of its failure, the Egyptian expedition had profound consequences in the region. First, it proved that the Ottoman sovereignty in the Hejaz was vulnerable to aggressive actions by ambitious provincial lords, such as CAlī Bey al-Kabīr of Egypt. Second, the Egyptian expedition demonstrated that, without the full support and agreement of the sherifian family of the Hejaz, the success of any

52 Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 66r.
53 Ibid., fol. 66v.
54 Ibid.
external intervention in the region would be impossible.

After taking Jeddah, the troops of Sherif Aḥmad went out of control. They looted the houses of the merchants and seized all the provisions stored in the city.55 As a result, inflation spread throughout the Hejaz. The markets lacked food and other commodities.56 During the month of Ramadān 1184/December 1770, two months after the incident, the price of one ardab of cereal went as high as fifty golden qirsh.57 The people of the Hejaz suffered from inflation and famine until the beginning of 1185/April 1771 when merchant ships carrying grain and provisions landed at Jeddah.58 The situation returned to normal and became quiet once more.

The Imam of the Yemen suspended the trade of coffee with the Hejaz in 1186/1772 due to a dispute over taxation on the Yemeni coffee.59 It seemed that the deputy of the emir of Mecca at Jeddah had raised taxes on the coffee from the Yemen. In return, the Imam suspended coffee trading with the Hejaz in what appeared to be a protest action. Hence, the emir's income from the customs duties of Jeddah

56Ibid.
57Ibn Ḥabd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 68r.
58Ibid.
In order to have the taxes lowered again, Sherif Aḥmad sent Sherif ǦAbd Allāh al-FiCr on a mission to the Imam. He ordered al-FiCr to extend conciliatory gestures to the Imam in order to get him to lift the suspension. On 24 Ramadān 1186/19 December 1772, al-FiCr left for the Yemen and returned to Mecca four months later with the news that the suspension on coffee trading in the Hejaz was lifted.

Sherif Aḥmad's conduct of Hejazi affairs drew increased disapproval from the sheriffs of Mecca. The looting in 1184/1771 of Jeddah by Sherif Aḥmad's soldiers, and its devastating consequences marked the beginnings of the sheriffs' disapproval of the emir's conduct. As Sherif Aḥmad also was unable to control the countryside, and insecurity increased as a result of his soldiers' looting of Jeddah, as Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr explains, his reign was soon unpopular. The members of his family, Āl Zayd, perhaps admired his determination on the battlefield, as he had proved against the Egyptians, but they were not admirers of his administration in peace. The breaking point in the sheriffs' support of and relations with Sherif Aḥmad came in 1186/1772 when Sherif Aḥmad dismissed his deputy at Jeddah.

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60Ibid.
61Ibid.
62Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 68v.
63De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 175.
In Shawwāl 1186/January 1773 Sherif Aḥmad dismissed Yūsuf Qābil, his deputy at Jeddah, and replaced him with Ḥasan al-Shāmī.\textsuperscript{64} It seemed that a dispute between the emir and his deputy over the taxation of the Yemeni coffee, which earlier had led to the suspension of the coffee trade from the Yemen as mentioned previously, was the reason for the dismissal of Qābil. Some members of Āl Zayd, led by the eighteen-year-old Sherif Surur, opposed the emir’s action.\textsuperscript{65}

Sherif Aḥmad ignored the opposition and sent a small detachment led by his soldiers’ commander Sulaymān b. Yaḥya to detain Qābil and put him in prison.\textsuperscript{66} When Sherif Surūr heard of this development, he left at once for Jeddah to warn Qābil. When the emir’s soldiers arrived at the deputy’s residence to detain him, Sherif Surūr barred their way and told them that he had granted Qābil protection.\textsuperscript{67} Finally, they all agreed to go to Mecca and solve the conflict at Sherif Aḥmad’s court.

On the way to Mecca, Sherif Surūr and his companions broke away from the soldiers and galloped to Wādi Fāṭmah; from there he wrote to his uncle to tell him that he had decided to fight him.\textsuperscript{68} Sherif Aḥmad in return sent

\textsuperscript{64}Ibn Ābd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā’ Makkah, fol. 69r.

\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{66}Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 206.

\textsuperscript{67}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68}De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 175.
propitiatory missions to Sherif Surûr and offered him a very handsome allowance. Sherif Surûr refused his uncle's offer and resolved to fight. Therefore, he mustered tribesmen using money from Qâbil, who presumably—although this is not mentioned in the sources—had been in the business of trade. He also sent for the powerful tribe of Cûtabah to meet him at al-Sayl, halfway to Taif. With three hundred horsemen, Sherif Surûr led the tribesmen to Wadi al-Munãna and after two hours' fighting against Sherif Aûmad and his troops, Sherif Surûr completely overcame them. Sherif Aûmad petitioned for peace, and retreated to Wadi Naûmân, while Sherif Surûr entered Mecca on Saturday, 13 Dhû al-Qa'dah 1186/1 February 1773 proclaiming himself governor of the Hejaz.

Sherif Surûr b. Misûcad and Tranquility in the Hejaz 1186-1202 A.H./1773-1788 A.D.

The beginning of the young new emir's reign was far from tranquil. Sherif Surûr spent his first six years in persistent campaigns to overcome the challenge of his uncle. Sherif Aûmad immediately and continually contested Surûr's

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69Ibn cAbd al-Shâkur, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 69v.
70Daähîn, Khulâșat al-Kalâm, p. 207.
71Ibid.
72De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 175.
73Ibn cAbd al-Shâkur, Târîkh Umarâ' Makkah, fol. 70r.
seizure of power, unceasingly inducing his followers to attack Surūr in Mecca.74

In less than twenty days after his succession, Sherif Surūr had to encounter the forces of Sherif Aḥmad on the outskirts of Mecca. On 4 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1186/26 February 1773, Sherif Aḥmad led his forces into Mecca.75 However, Sherif Surūr, in a swift move, gathered his troops and checked the attackers at Birkat al-Salam. In a daylong battle, Sherif Surūr's men routed Aḥmad's forces and forced him to plead for peace.76

Before Sherif Surūr was able to recoup from his uncle's attack on Mecca, he was faced with another major challenge to his power. On 8 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1186/1 March 1773, Sherif Surūr was preparing to attend the pilgrimage ceremony at Ḍaḥlah, when his soldiers refused to accompany him unless he paid them what they claimed were their unpaid salaries, owed them by the ousted emir.77 Sherif Surūr, fearing riots, agreed to pay them half of their wages before leaving for Ḍaḥlah, and the other half when they returned to Mecca.78 The soldiers refused his offer and insisted on being paid in full. They hoped to pressure the young emir.

74De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 177.
75Ibn Ābd al-Shakūr, Tāriikh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 71v.
76Ibid.
77Ḍaḥlah, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 208.
78Ibid.
who would be reluctant to leave without their escort; however, in a bold action, Sherif Surūr left for ČArafāt with his own slaves, the slaves of his father and a few members of his clan.79

The rebellious soldiers sent to Sherif Āḥmad to join them in Mecca where they would help him to regain the governorship.80 It seems that they gained the support of a few sherifs of the city. It is possible that the sherifs were angry at Sherif Surūr because he had not consulted them when he rose against his uncle, although the sources are silent on the reasons for the sherifs' support. When the pilgrims returned from ČArafāt, a number of the sherifs contacted Muṣṭafā Pāshā, emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, and appealed to him to depose Sherif Surūr and reinstall Sherif Āḥmad. Muṣṭafā Pāshā, however, refused to involve himself in the affairs of the Hejaz without an imperial decree from Istanbul.81

When Sherif Āḥmad received the soldiers' invitation, he at once left Wadi Naṣmān, where he was taking refuge, and entered Mecca secretly.82 He then contacted the rebellious soldiers and promised to pay them all their wages and more

79Ibid.
80Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 72r.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
if he was restored.83

On Friday, 25 Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1186/18 March 1773, the rebels took up their positions in Jabal Abū Qubays, near the Grand Mosque, and around Sherif Surūr's house. Just prior to the Friday prayer ceremony, they opened fire on the emir's followers.84 When Sherif Surūr, who was in his house in Mecca, was apprised of their action, he immediately dispatched his father's loyal slave, Mithqāl Aghā, to Ibrahīm Bey, emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, to appeal for help. He also called on the tribes who had remained in Mecca after the pilgrimage to his side.85 Ibrahīm Bey dispatched a detachment of Egyptian soldiers with Mithqāl Aghā and provided him with a large quantity of ammunition from the stores which the caravan usually carried to protect itself during the course of the journey to the Hejaz.86 Sherif Surūr, therefore, was able to pressure the attackers, and soon pushed them back into the Jabal of Abū Qubays. The fight lasted all day Friday. On the next day, Mithqāl returned to Ibrahīm Bey for more ammunition,87 and Sherif Surūr's forces increased their attack on their foes, forcing them to flee. Sherif Aḥmad once more pleaded for

83De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 177.
84Dāhlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 208.
85Ibn cAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 72v.
86Ibid.
87Ibid.
peace and left Mecca. Sherif Surûr, in the meantime, ordered the ejection of all rebellious soldiers from the Hejaz. Some of them fled to the Yemen, while the others departed for Syria.

Sherif Surûr's strong response to the soldiers' attempt at insurrection enhanced his power and displayed his ability to control of Hejazi affairs despite his youth. As a result of his increased power, he felt strong enough to dismiss his deputy at Jeddah. In Muḥarram 1187/March 1773, Sherif Surûr dismissed Yûsuf Qâbil from his position as a deputy of the emir of Mecca at Jeddah, after a conflict over a financial matter. According to the source, Sherif Surûr had requested funds from Qâbil which the latter refused to give. The source, however, is silent on Qâbil's reason for his refusal to give the money requested by the Sherif. It is to be recalled that it was Sherif Aḥmad's dismissal of Qâbil in Shawwâl 1186/January 1773 which brought Sherif Surûr to power. Surûr then appointed his treasurer, Rayhân Aghâ, to Qâbil's position; Rayhân Aghâ held the post until his death in 1200/1786.

While Sherif Surûr was consolidating his power, Sherif Aḥmad was not idle. After his defeat at Mecca, he decided

88Ibid., fol. 74r.
89Daḥlān, Khulâṣat al-Kalām, p. 209.
90Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakûr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 73r.
91Ibid., fol. 73v.
to take Taif and use it as a base for expeditions against Mecca. 92 Thus, in Rabī' II 1187/June 1773, he advanced on Taif and captured it without a fight. 93 He then mobilized the tribes in the vicinity and proceeded with his plan to take Mecca. However, on 20 Jumādā' I 1187/9 August 1773, the troops of Sherif Aḥmad encountered Sherif Surūr's forces at al-Maṣābīdh in Mecca and were routed. Sherif Aḥmad then withdrew to Khulays, 94 awaiting another opportunity.

In Shawwāl/October, two months after his defeat, Sherif Aḥmad received a letter from Sherif ʿAbd Allāh al-Fīrur urging him to come to Taif where al-Fīrur had an assembly ready to restore Sherif Aḥmad. 95 He left immediately for Taif and joined al-Fīrur. On the seventh of the month, the joint forces moved out to seize Mecca, but before they could establish a foothold in the city, they were intercepted by Sherif Surūr's troops; after a clash lasting only two hours, they abandoned their goal, and once more Sherif Aḥmad was on his own. 96

After his defeat, Sherif Aḥmad now fixed his hopes on the assistance of the emir of the Syrian pilgrims. He appealed to the emir of the 1187 pilgrimage caravan for

92 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 177.
93 Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 74r.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., fol. 74v.
help, who, like the other emir, refused to intervene without an order from Istanbul. 97  CaAbd Allāh al-FiCṛ was also busy on Aḥmad's behalf, mounting a special effort to win over the emir of the Egyptian mahmal as well as the emir of the Syrian mahmal, who nevertheless both remained firmly opposed to the return of Sherif Aḥmad. 98

In spite of rejection by the emirs of the caravans, Sherif Aḥmad and CaAbd Allāh al-FiCṛ did not give up their goals to overthrow Sherif Surūr. Therefore, according to Aḥmad's policy of using Taif as his base, he sent for al-FiCṛ, who was in Wadi Līyah south of Taif, to meet him at Taif to attack the city. 99 On 13 Shawwāl 1188/17 December 1774, al-FiCṛ joined Sherif Aḥmad with a troop of bedouins at al-Mathnāh on the outskirts of Taif. They then stormed the city. The deputy of Sherif Surūr at Taif checked the attackers before the city walls. 100 After a day of fierce fighting, Sherif Ahmad abandoned his goal of taking Taif and left for al-MaCdān, while al-FiCṛ returned to his stronghold at Līyah. 101

Sherif CaAbd Allāh al-FiCṛ remained confident in his hope of obtaining the support of the emir of the Syrian mahmal.

97Ibid., fol. 75r.
98De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 177.
100Ibid., p. 211.
101Ibid.
He therefore left for Khulays to meet the emir of the caravan before it entered Mecca in Dhū al-Qa’dah 1188. But when he arrived at Khulays, the Syrian maḥmal was already on its way to Mecca.

Meanwhile Sherif Surūr sent scouts to trace al-Ficr and when he heard of al-Ficr's arrival at Khulays, he dispatched a small detachment, led by Sherif Nāṣir b. Mastūr of Āl Barakāt, to capture al-Ficr. The detachment took al-Ficr by surprise and arrested him. Sherif Surūr then ordered them to take al-Ficr to al-Qunfudhah and imprison him there. However, on their way to al-Qunfudhah a company belonging to Farḥān, the emir of Luḥayah, attacked the detachment and rescued ʿAbd Allāh al-Ficr. It seemed that al-Ficr had a good relationship with Farḥān, who came to his rescue without consulting his superior, the Imam of the Yemen. Therefore, when Sherif Surūr angrily demanded the return of al-Ficr, the Imam at once ordered Farḥān to return al-Ficr to the emir of Mecca, or bear the consequences. Farḥān obliged and conveyed al-Ficr to Mecca; Sherif Surūr once more imprisoned him in a more secure prison in Yanbu'.

102 Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 51r.
103 Ibid.
104 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 211.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
al-Fiṣr died a few months later, some said by strangling.\textsuperscript{108} Sherif Surūr also decided to deprive his uncle of his strongest supporters, the tribe of Hudhayl. Therefore, at the end of 1189/March 1776 Surūr raided the Hudhayl.\textsuperscript{109} However, protected by high mountains in the back, the Hudhayl succeeded in minimizing the impact of the Sherif's attack. Sherif Surūr, after killing three of them and wounding others, returned to Mecca without ending the threat of the Hudhayl.\textsuperscript{110} On the contrary, the tribe menaced the area between Mecca and Taif for about two years, and enjoyed complete control of the roads. The Hudhayl also became the refuge for the malcontents of Sherif Surūr's regime. For example, on 3 Ramaḍān 1191/5 October 1777, a group of sherifs of Āl Ḥumūd left Mecca after a conflict with the emir of Mecca over the release of a prisoner of their clan; they joined the Hudhayl,\textsuperscript{111} and later marched to take Mecca. When Sherif Surūr learned of their advance, he sent a detachment of his forces to halt them. The detachment met the Hudhayl with Āl Ḥumūd at Wadi Nāmān and after a sweep maneuver, captured a few of them, including Sherifs Masūd al-Cāwājī, Barakāt, and ʿAbd al-Karīm.\textsuperscript{112} Sherif Surūr then

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., p. 212.
\textsuperscript{112}Ibid.
put them in jail, but after an appeal for their release by sheriffs of his clan, he released them and ordered their departure from the Hejaz. al-CAwājī went to Egypt and the others left for the Yemen.113

After these events, Sherif Surūr's control of the Hejaz became stronger, particularly in matters dealing with the bedouins. He was in control of the bedouins' affairs to the extent of being able to dismiss and appoint their sheikhs whenever he pleased. For example, on 20 Dhū al-Hijjah 1191/19 January 1778, Badawī b. Cīd, the Sheikh of the Ḥarb, met with the emir of the Egyptian caravan at the court of Sherif Surūr to settle their difference on the dues of the Ḥarb.114 Sherif Surūr tried to mediate when Badawī threatened the emir of the caravan and refused to accept the Sherif's offers. Surūr was infuriated and at once ordered the dismissal and imprisonment of Badawī.115 When the Ḥarb heard of their sheikh's dismissal they revolted against Sherif Surūr's rule. However, acting swiftly and decisively, Sherif Surūr appointed a brother of Badawī as the new sheikh of the Ḥarb,116 ending the risk of a revolt. The Ḥarb then became quiet and their relations with the emir of Mecca returned to normal.

113Ibid.
114Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 83v.
115Ibid., fol. 84r.
116Ibid., fol. 84v.
The tribe of Hudhayl, however, was still out of Sherif Surūr's control. The roads between Mecca and Taif were under their control and due to his preoccupation with Sherif Aḥmad, the emir was only able to send punitive detachments against the Hudhayl, so in 1191 and 1192/1777-1778 he raided them four times, but failed to eliminate their menace to pilgrims and travelers.117

During this period, Sherif Aḥmad roamed the Hejaz seeking support among the tribes, but failed to muster enough troops to retake Mecca. Finally, he settled at Ruhāṭ to the south of Mecca.118 When Sherif Surūr found out that Aḥmad had settled at Ruhāṭ, he at once rode with a strong detachment of his personal guards to capture him.119 On Saturday, 2 Jumādā I 1193/18 May 1779, Sherif Surūr surrounded Sherif Aḥmad and took him prisoner with his two sons Rājiḥ and Ḥasan.120 He subsequently sent them to prison in Yanbuʿ, where Sherif Aḥmad died two years later.121

Sherif Surūr was now able to deal with the bedouin highway robbers. He often rode out himself, with only a few followers quickly mustered, in order to surprise the

118Ibid., p. 214.
119Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʿ Makkah, fol. 88r.
120Ibid.
121Ibid.
bedouins. In another development of his consolidation of power, Sherif Surūr attempted to curb the sheriffs' influence in the Hejaz, going so far as to abrogate the fiscal privileges which they had enjoyed for so long.

The sheriffs, as Charles Didier who visited the Hejaz in 1854 remarked, raised themselves above the law. They set up "unprecedented fiscal innovations to their own credit." "They arrogated to themselves prerogatives that were severely burdensome to the inhabitants." Furthermore, using their prestige, they "extorted substantial gifts from the people and also from foreign pilgrims." Sherif Surūr, therefore, wanted to put an end to such "flagrant abuses." The sheriffs resisted his actions and some of them set up a plot to assassinate him.

Sherif Surūr had a habit of inspecting the streets of Mecca at night to maintain order in the city. Thus the sheriffs met in a council where a group of plotters decided to attack the emir on one of his night rides. However, before they could carry out their plan, one of them by the name of ĖAbd al-Majīd b. Saʿīd told Sherif Surūr of the plot. The sources do not disclose ĖAbd al-Majīd's decision.

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122 De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 178.
123 Ibn ĖAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 75v.
to tell Sherif Surūr of the plot. Sherif Surūr sent his scouts out to confirm the story. When the scouts returned, they told him that they found the sherifs in a group of about fifty men carrying their weapons in the streets of Mecca. Surūr at once ordered his men to arrest them. The emir's forces captured some of them including Mas'Cūd al-CAwājī, his son Misāq Ād, Muḥammad b. Ǧāmil, Sālim b. Ǧāmil, and twenty of their slaves. Four of the slaves were executed. Sālim was executed as well, while Mas'Cūd had one of his hands cut off. The rest were deported to India.

After this incident, Sherif Surūr's power in the Hejaz increased. He wielded his authority and influence over every single matter in the region's affairs. For example, in the pilgrimage season of 1193/1779, a conflict between Sherif Surūr and Murād Bey, emir of the Egyptian caravan, broke out, and Murād attempted to depose Sherif Surūr and appoint Sherif Sulaymān b. Yaḥya to the governorship of the Hejaz. Sherif Surūr simply arrested Sulaymān and advanced on the Egyptians, and not until Murād Bey apologized did

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126Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārikh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 89v.
127Ibid., fols. 89v-90r.
128Ibid., fol. 90v.
129De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 178.
130Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārikh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 90v.
131Dāḫlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 216.
Sherif Surūr abandon his intention of fighting the Egyptians. He made it clear that no one had the right to intervene in the affairs of the Hejaz except himself.

The emir of Mecca decided to visit Medina and to inspect the pilgrimage routes and facilities between Mecca and Medina in Rabī‘ I 1194/March 1780. He also invited the tribes to accompany him on his visit. About five thousand men joined Sherif Surūr in Mecca ready for departure. On Wednesday 11 Jumāda‘ I 1194/5 May 1780, Sherif Surūr left for Medina with a strong escort of about five thousand bedouins, two thousand of his own men, and three thousand five hundred camels. The sheikhs of the Ḥarb accused Sherif Surūr of appropriating their subsidies from the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Therefore, when Sherif Surūr arrived at Badr on the way to Medina, they demanded that he pay them their dues.

For three days, Sherif Surūr tried to conciliate the sheikhs; they refused the sheriff's proposals and decided to fight him unless he paid them all their dues. Sherif Surūr then attacked the Ḥarb, killing about fourteen men.

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132Ibid.
133Ibn Ḥādā Shāhūr, Tārīkh Umarā’i Makkah, fol. 91r.
134Ibid., fol. 91v.
135Ibid.
136Dāhīlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 216.
137Ibid.
When neutral sheikhs attempted to arbitrate the dispute, he agreed to pay the Ḥarb fourteen thousand qirsh and to detain forty of their men as hostages.138 Following this dispute, he left for Medina, arriving there on the seventh of Rajab of the same year.139

However, the tribes of the Ḥarb were not content with the settlement and they therefore decided to attack Sherif Surūr in Medina.140 They also wrote to the Turkish sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram and to other Turkish officials in the city to gain their support against the emir of Mecca.141

It seemed that relations between the Turkish officials in Medina and Sherif Surūr were not ideal, perhaps due to the sheriff's personality. It was obvious that Sherif Surūr was the real ruler of the Hejaz, where his influence and control were seen in every matter of the region's affairs. That of course deprived the Turkish officials of their power and relegated them to the shadows. So when they received the Ḥarb's invitation, they at once agreed to fight Sherif Surūr from within the city.142

Meanwhile, when Sherif Surūr was informed of the Ḥarb's intention to attack him in Medina, he dispatched scouts to

138Ibid., p. 217.
139Ibid.
140Ibn CAbd al-Shakūr, Tārikh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 95v.
141Ibid.
142De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 179.
patrol the roads to the city. On one night the scouts
detained a messenger carrying letters from the sheikh of the
Haram to the sheikhs of the Ḥarb, accepting their invitation
to fight Sherif Surūr.143

Sherif Surūr then summoned the sheikh of the Haram and
the other Turkish officials, and confronted them with the
letters they had sent to the Ḥarb. They at once denied
sending the letters.144 In response, Sherif Surūr asked
them to surrender the citadel of Medina to show their
sincerity and loyalty if they were honest.145 It is to be
remembered that the Turkish garrison of Medina resided in
the citadel and was under the supervision of the sheikh of
the Haram. The surrender of the citadel to the emir of
Mecca would thus have amounted to an acknowledgement of his
power and ability to interfere in the Turkish officials'
affairs. They strongly refused the Sherif's proposal and
fortified themselves instead inside the citadel.146

Sherif Surūr thereupon besieged the citadel and captured
three of the Turkish commanders.147 He tried to take over
the citadel by sending his men to climb its walls, but the
attempt failed in the face of the strong defensive efforts

143 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 217.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 94r.
of the garrison from within the citadel. The siege and the fighting lasted for about seven days, when the soldiers of Sherif Surūr mounted the final assault. Now, the people inside the citadel appealed for peace. The soldiers rushed into the citadel, looting everything of value.148

Although the appointment or dismissal of the sheikh of the Haram was supposed to be in the hands of the Ottoman sultans in Istanbul, Sherif Surūr not only dismissed the sheikh but took him prisoner along with another fifty men from among the Turkish garrison and the people of Medina who had assisted them.149 He also appointed Muḥammad al-Adawānī his deputy at Medina and assisted him with a garrison of about four hundred of his own Yemeni soldiers.150

Sherif Surūr left Medina on 21 Shaʿbān 1194/22 August 1780 and took the far more difficult road further east in his return to Mecca to avoid any clash with the tribes of the Ḥarb.151 He arrived at Mecca on 27 Ramaḍān of the same year.152

The relations between Sherif Surūr and the Ḥarb were still unsettled. Sherif Surūr had a few of the Ḥarb sheikhs

148Ibid., fols. 94v-95r.
149Ibid., fol. 100r.
150al-Ḥusaynī, al-Akhbār al-Gharībah, fol. 50v.
151Dahlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 218.
152Ibid.
on his want list and the Ḥarb were looking for revenge. When in Jumādā II 1195/May 1781 the emir of Mecca's deputy at Yanbuʿ captured Nāṣir b. ʿAṭīyah, one of the Ḥarb sheikhs, and executed him,153 the tribes of the Ḥarb called for revenge. They gathered nearly five thousand men and besieged Yanbuʿ. The fight around the city walls lasted for about thirteen days when the Ḥarb finally stormed the wall and captured the city.154 The emir's deputy fled to Jeddah, where he met Sherif Surūr who was in the city at that time, and told him of Yanbuʿ's fall into the hands of the Ḥarb.155

Sherif Surūr left for Mecca planning a serious campaign against the Ḥarb. Upon his arrival at Mecca he wrote to the tribes around Mecca and Taif to join him. He even went himself to Taif to mobilize the tribes, paying them a very handsome stipend.156 By Shawwāl/September, Sherif Surūr had in his hands about six thousand men of the Cūtaybah, three thousand of the Thaqīf and Hudhayl, as well as his own two thousand soldiers.157

On 24 Shawwāl 1195/8 October 1781, Sherif Surūr left Mecca158 with his considerable army, determined to end the

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153Ibid., p. 219.
154Ibid.
155Ibid.
156Ibn ʿAḥmad al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 107v.
157Ibid., fol. 108v.
158Ibid.
problem with the Harb. However, harmony in his huge army was lacking and he was compelled to change his entire plan. When he arrived at Khulays the tribe of the Hudhayl refused to continue marching with him. Their refusal might have stemmed from the fact that Sherif Surūr did not pay them as much as he paid the other tribes, or because they felt that he treated them with less regard than he did the others, although the sources are not clear on the precise reason. Sherif Surūr tried first to conciliate them but they refused, and when he slapped a bedouin of the Hudhayl, the bedouin shot at the Sherif; the bullet just missed him. Frightened at what might be the outcome of the incident, the Hudhayl all left the camp at once. Sherif Surūr then sent Sherif Mansūr b. cAbd Allāh of Āl Ḥumūd to reason with them, but they rejected his overtures, instead asking Sherif Mansūr to join them with the promise that they would install him in the governorship of the Hejaz. Mansūr then returned to Sherif Surūr and told him of the Hudhayl's intention of taking Mecca. Sherif Surūr pursued them immediately, attacking them at Mawqidāt. In a battle lasting one day, the Hudhayl lost a hundred men and begged for mercy. As a result of the incident, Sherif Surūr

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159Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 220.
160De Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, p. 179.
161Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 109r.
162Ibid., fol. 109v.
postponed his campaign against the Harb because of the lack of unity in his large army and returned to Mecca.

Sherif Surūr spent the next four years strengthening his administration. In 1196/1782, he built a citadel at Jīyād and made it his governmental residence¹⁶³ in what seemed to be a protective measure. In 1198/1784, he dismissed ʿUthmān Bey, the deputy of Sheikh al-Ḥaram at Mecca, and replaced him with Aḥmad al-Ḥalabī,¹⁶⁴ although the deputy's dismissal was supposedly for the Turkish ṣanjaq of Jeddah. He similarly dismissed Ḥasan al-Naytah from the sheikhdom of the merchants and appointed in his place Aḥmad al-Qārī, paying the Sherif four thousand riyāls in order to ensure his support.¹⁶⁵

In the meantime, the Harb had consolidated their control over the pilgrimage routes between Mecca and Medina. In Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1200/October 1786, the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan caught a few bedouins of the Ḥarb and set them free only after he had branded them on the cheeks; infuriated, the Ḥarb called for revenge and attacked the caravan.¹⁶⁶ The emir of the caravan fled to Medina with a few of his soldiers and the Ḥarb utterly destroyed the caravan, an act which, according to Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, had

¹⁶⁴Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 113r.
¹⁶⁵Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 221.
¹⁶⁶Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 120r.
never happened or been heard of. 167

When Sherif Surūr heard of the incident he immediately decided to punish the Ḥarb. He therefore called on the tribes to join him at Mecca. The tribes replied positively and by Rajab 1201/April 1787, about nine thousand fighters joined Sherif Surūr in Mecca. 168

On the twenty-first of the month, Sherif Surūr left Mecca to advance on the Ḥarb. He punished the bedouins around Khulayṣ and Rābigh, 169 then camped at Mastūrah, halfway to Medina. When the tribes of the Ḥarb learned that Surūr was coming, they regathered and decided to attack him in his camp. On 13 Shaʿbān/31 May, they were met by the CUtaybah, the advance forces of Sherif Surūr. 170 Later, the rest of the emir's forces joined the fight and in less than a day the Ḥarb were overcome, losing about five hundred men with a few hundred men taken prisoner.171 Sherif Surūr then left for Medina, receiving homages of the tribes at Yanbuʿ al-Nakhl and Badr. He arrived, finally, at Medina on 17 Shawwāl/2 August. He spent about a month in Medina and then returned to Mecca on a quiet and safe road. The situation in the Hejaz was quiet for the next year until Rabīʿ II

167Ibid., fol. 120v.
168Ibid., fols. 123r-123v.
169Ibid., fol. 124r.
170Paḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 222.
171Ibid., p. 223.
1202/January 1788 when Sherif Surūr fell sick and died on the eighteenth of the month.\footnote{172}{Ibid., p. 225.} 

In his sixteen years of reign, Sherif Surūr was an energetic ruler and enjoyed popular support from among the Hejazis. He was, as Charles Didier described him, "Louis XI or the Richelieu of the Hejaz."\footnote{173}{Didier, Sojourn with the Grand Sharif, p. 90.} Sherif Surūr paved the way for his successor to be more independent of the Ottoman government in Istanbul by consolidating the power of the emir of Mecca against internal and external intervention. Charles Didier describes Sherif Ghālib, who succeeded Sherif Surūr, saying "he was the least contested and the most stable sherif emir to have reigned in the Hejaz. He quietly gathered all the fruits of the wise and vigorous administration of his brother Surūr."\footnote{174}{Ibid., p. 91.} He also added that "Sherif Ghālib made himself so completely independent of the Porte that he took to himself the whole of the customs revenue at Jeddah."\footnote{175}{Ibid.}
PART II
CHAPTER IV

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY IN THE HEJAZ
IN THE 12TH/18TH CENTURY

The Ottoman government's administration policy in the 12th/18th century in the Hejaz was unique and distinctive. The Ottomans continued to allow the sherifs of Mecca to hold the governorship of the Hejaz, and they also continued to appoint local Hejazis to administrative posts. On the other hand, the Ottoman government persevered in its practice of appointing Turkish officials, from Egypt and from Istanbul as well, to different administrative positions in the Hejaz. Therefore, a unique situation was created by this policy, with regard to the relations between the Hejazis and the Turkish officials on the one hand, and to their relations with the Ottoman government in Istanbul on the other.

The following pages will examine the Ottoman administration in the Hejaz and the relations among the officials in the Hejaz, as well as their relations with the central government in Istanbul.

The Emir of Mecca

During the eighteenth century, the sherifs of Mecca continued to elect a sheriff from among themselves to the
position of the emir of Mecca. The elected emir then sought the approval of the Ottoman sultan for his election. However, only two of the sheriffs who ruled the Hejaz between 1143-1202/1730-1788 came to the post of the emir through the electoral process. In 1143/1730, Sherif Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh was elected, and in 1165/1752, Sherif Misāʿad b. Saʿīd also won election to the post of emir.¹ The rest of the sheriffs used force to achieve their goal to rule the Hejaz. In fact, in the 12th/18th century, the political history of the Hejaz was marked by the sheriffs' struggle for the control of the position of the emir, as I discussed in detail in Chapters Two and Three. For example, in 1146/1734, Sherif Masʿūd b. Saʿīd came to the emirate of the Hejaz after a fierce struggle with his nephew, the ruling emir Sherif Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh.² Ironically, in 1143/1730, Sherif Masʿūd himself had arranged and led the election of Sherif Muḥammad.³

Another example was the struggle over power between Sherif Surūr b. Misāʿad and his uncle, the ruling emir Sherif Aḥmad b. Saʿīd. In 1182/1773, Sherif Surūr ousted Sherif Aḥmad as a result of his victory at Birkat al-Salam.⁴ Sherif Surūr spent the first six years of his reign

¹See Chapter 2.
²Ibn ʿAbd al-Shākūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 15v.
³See Chapter 2, p. 57.
⁴Ibn ʿAbd al-Shākūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah, fol. 121v.
trying to overcome the challenge of his uncle; Surūr was finally successful in 1193/1779.  

However, both the elected sheriffs, as well as the sheriffs who gained the position by force, had to send letters of request to the Ottoman sultans in Istanbul, seeking their approval of the sheriffs as the emirs of Mecca. The emirs of Mecca derived their power from the religious prestige which they enjoyed among the Hejazis as descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, and from the support they received from the Ottoman court in Istanbul.  

The emir of Mecca had two tasks to perform in order to retain the satisfaction and approval of the Ottoman sultans. The first task was to maintain order in the Hejaz. The second task was to assure the safety of the pilgrims and to see to their comfort.  

In order for the emir of Mecca to carry on his duty to maintain order in the Hejaz, the Ottoman government gave him a free hand to deal with the domestic affairs of the Hejaz. The emir therefore acted on his own initiative without referring to the Porte or seeking its approval. Moreover, the emir of Mecca had his own administrative departments, his own prisons, his own budget, and his own courts, which

5See Chapter 3, pp. 104-114.
6Fūʿād Ḥamzah, Qalb Jazīrat al-ʿArab, p. 319.
7Anīs, al-Dawlah al-ʿUṯmānīyah, p. 126.
passed their sentences according to the Shari'ah law.\textsuperscript{9}

In spite of the emir's free conduct of the domestic affairs of the Hejaz, he could not act on his own initiative on matters concerning the security and the external affairs of the Hejaz, but had to refer to the Ottoman government in Istanbul. An example of this limitation of their power occurred in 1157/1744, when Sayyid Naṣr Allāh al-Ḥusaynī, the messenger of Nādir Shāh of Persia, arrived at Mecca with a special message from Nādir Shāh to the emir of Mecca, Sherif Mas'ūd. The Shāh requested the recognition of the Ja'farī madhhab, as was discussed in Chapter Two. Sherif Mas'ūd immediately reported the situation to Istanbul and requested instructions; the Ottoman government replied by ordering Sherif Mas'ūd to turn Nādir Shāh's messenger over to the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan and to order the reviling of Shi'ism in public.\textsuperscript{10}

The emir of Mecca was the only authority in the Hejaz responsible for bedouin affairs. In the interior, the bedouins were, for all practical purposes, under no control. However, by ancient custom and tradition, the bedouin tribes from Madā'īn Śāliḥ in the north of the Hejaz, to near Qunfudhah in the south, were nominally under the control of the emir of Mecca.\textsuperscript{11} In the 12th/18th century, only a few

\textsuperscript{9}Ibid., p. 112.

\textsuperscript{10}See Chapter 2, pp. 75-76.

\textsuperscript{11}al-Ḡamr, The Hijaz Under Ottoman Rule, p. 114.
of the emirs of Mecca enjoyed a great deal of influence over the bedouin tribes. For example, Sherif Surūr (1186-1202/1773-1788) was in control of the bedouins' affairs to the extent that he was able to dismiss and appoint their sheikhs. He, as I mentioned in Chapter Three, dismissed the Sheikh of the Ḥarb, Badawī b. Ǧīd, because Badawī refused to accept Sherif Surūr's proposal to end the conflict between the sheikh and the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Sherif Surūr then appointed Badawi's brother as the new sheikh of the Ḥarb.\textsuperscript{12}

The emir of Mecca's methods of subjugating the bedouin tribes in the Hejaz were either by direct attack at the head of his guards, or with the assistance of bedouins from one tribe against another. Sherif Surūr employed these methods so effectively that by the end of his reign, the bedouin tribes of the Hejaz were under his firm control.\textsuperscript{13}

In order for the emir of Mecca to carry on his other duty of assuring the safety of the pilgrims and to see to their comfort, the Ottoman government assigned to him the command of the entire body of pilgrimage. Therefore, he was the one who assigned responsible persons to supervise pilgrimage affairs. The pilgrims' functionaries went to the emir for any matter connected with the hajj, and the emir

\textsuperscript{12}Ibn Ḥābd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fols. 83v-84v.

\textsuperscript{13}See Chapter 3, pp. 112-114, 117-118, and 123-124.
divided the whole land at ǦArāfāt and Mina' into districts assigned to special mutawwifs or pilgrims' guides, for the supervision and care of the pilgrims.¹⁴

The emir of Mecca also used his influence over the bedouin tribes of the Hejaz to assure the safety of the pilgrimage caravans.¹⁵ The emir used force to punish those tribes who attacked and menaced the pilgrimage caravans. For instance, in 1200/1786, when the tribe of Ǧarb attacked and utterly destroyed the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan between Mecca and Medina, Sherif Surūr raided the Ǧarb and punished them severely.¹⁶

To carry out these punitive raids against the bedouins, the emir of Mecca relied mainly on his own forces. The emir's forces consisted of mercenaries from Yemen, Morocco, and Afghanistan, as well as a number of bedouin from the vicinity of Mecca. In addition, the emir's troops included his own slaves, which sometimes numbered around one thousand.¹⁷ However, the emir's legions, on several occasions, were out of control, and the emir did not have enough power to control them. In 1184/1770, the forces of Sherif Aḥmad, for example, after taking Jeddah from the

¹⁶See Chapter 3, pp. 123-125.
¹⁷al-Sībāṭī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:408.
Egyptians, passed out of the emir's control, looting the houses of the merchants of the city and seizing all the provisions stored in Jeddah. Not only was the emir powerless to halt them, but he was compelled to approve their actions for fear of a greater revolt.18

In spite of the fact that the Ottoman government had assigned the command of the entire body of pilgrimage to the emir of Mecca, the Istanbul government did restrict the emir's conduct of pilgrimage affairs by authorizing the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan to look after the pilgrims' needs. In addition to his duties as organizer and protector of the caravan, as Barbir remarks, the governor of Damascus assumed command of the entire body of pilgrimage; while he was in the Hejaz, he outranked the emir of Mecca.19 As the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, Barbir continues, the governor had powers to take punitive action against anyone committing an act contrary to the interests of religion or state.20 In fact, the commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan used the Ottoman government's authorization to overthrow the emir of Mecca and install another sherif in his post. A example of this use of power took place in the pilgrimage season of 1172/1759, when the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, CAbd Allāh Pāshā, conceived a plan to

19Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 160.
20Ibid.
oust the emir of Mecca, Sherif Misā'ad, as I discussed in Chapter Two. After the pilgrimage was over, ČAbd Allāh Pāshā called for a council on the pretext of discussing improvements to the water supply of Mecca. When Sherif Misā'ad attended the council, ČAbd Allāh Pāshā attacked him vehemently and accused him of neglecting the water supply, which in consequence had caused the pilgrims to suffer from a shortage of water. ČAbd Allāh Pāshā ordered the arrest of Sherif Misā'ad and subsequently appointed his brother, Sherif Ja'far, to the governorship of the Hejaz. As a result, Mecca was in an uproar. Nevertheless, ČAbd Allāh Pasha rode to the Grand Mosque, with the ṣanjaq of Jeddah and the qādī of Mecca, and read a firman indicating that the Ottoman government authorized him to look after the pilgrimage affairs and to appoint whomever he wished to the emir's post. Upon hearing this declaration, the city calmed down.

To check the intervention of the emirs of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans in Hejazi affairs, the emir of Mecca often played one of the commanders against the other. The Egyptian and the Syrian pilgrimage caravans

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21 Refer to Chapter 2, pp. 82-84.
22 Ibn Čabd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 47v.
23 Dāḥīn, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 198.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
were escorted by large and strong military escorts to assure the safety of the caravans against any bedouin attacks on their way to the Hejaz, as will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. Therefore, the commander of either one of the two caravans could enhance the position of any faction he chose to join. For instance, in the pilgrimage season of 1183/1770, Sherif MisāCad arranged with the commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, CUthmān Pāshā, to prevent the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab, from achieving his goal of installing Sherif ĞAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn in the governorship of the Hejaz.26

Earlier that year, Sherif ĞAbd Allāh appealed to the governor of Egypt, ĞAlī Bey al-Kabīr, for help against the ruling emir, Sherif MisāCad, with whom he had a quarrel over the post of emir.27 ĞAlī Bey promised Sherif ĞAbd Allāh his support and ordered the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan to oust Sherif MisāCad and install Sherif ĞAbd Allāh in the governorship of the Hejaz.28

When Sherif MisāCad heard of Abū al-Dhahab's intentions, he arranged with CUthmān Pāshā to ask the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan to leave Mecca immediately after the end of the pilgrimage ceremony. They also arranged for the delay of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan's departure to

26Ibn ĞAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 52r.
27See Chapter 2, pp. 86-87.
28Ibn ĞAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 52r.
prevent Abū al-Dhahab from accomplishing his aims.29 Thus when the pilgrimage was over, Sherif Misā′ād requested the immediate departure of the Egyptians. With the backing of ČUthmān Pāshā on Misā′ād's side, Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab had no choice but to leave.30

By the end of the 12th/18th century, the position of the emir of Mecca became very powerful, to the extent that the ruling sheri' acted as if he was the sole and absolute power in the Hejaz. Moreover, the emir became more independent of the Ottoman government in Istanbul; Sherif Ghālib b. Misā′ād (1202-1228/1788-1813), as a result of his predecessor's administration, particularly Sherif Surūr, was able to abrogate the Ottoman government's share of the customs revenue at Jeddah.

The Şanjaq of Jeddah

The Ottoman government's policy in the 12th/18th century was to appoint a Turkish officer from among the beys of Egypt to the position of the şanjaq of Jeddah.31 The appointment of a bey to the post of şanjaq was based on the recommendations of the governor and the beys of Egypt, who wanted to send away any bey whom they considered a challenge

29 Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 200.
30 Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 52v.
31 Čal-Rashīdī, Husn al-Ṣafā', p. 34.
to their power and influence in Egypt. Thus, for the nominated bey, the appointment of the sanjaq was a kind of exile from the centers of power. Moreover, since the Hejaz was not a lucrative region in terms of revenue, as for example was Egypt, a bey therefore thought of himself as disgraced when he was nominated to the post of sanjaq and was unhappy until he was recalled.

The sanjaq resided in Jeddah, a city close to Mecca and not far from Medina, to be able to supervise Ottoman affairs in the Hejaz. Jeddah was also the only seaport in the Hejaz where customs duties were levied; since the Ottomans shared the revenues of Jeddah with the emir of Mecca, it was appropriate for an Ottoman official to reside in that city to control the revenue.

The sanjaq of Jeddah represented Ottoman sovereignty in the Hejaz. Therefore, as the sultan's representative, he submitted the khilâfah to the emir of Mecca to confirm him in the governorship of the Hejaz. Moreover, the sanjaq had the power, as the sultan's representative, to appoint and dismiss the emir of Mecca. However, in the 12th/18th century, the intervention of the sanjaq in the appointment and dismissal of emir was minimized due to two factors. First, the post of sanjaq was held by passive beys who did

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32Ibid., p. 35.

not wish to extend or even exercise their power in Hejazi affairs, particularly in the matter of appointment and dismissal of the emir. For example, in 1146/1733, Sherif Mas'ūd appealed to the ṣanjaq of Jeddah, Abū Bakr Pāshā, to intervene on his behalf. Sherif Mas'ūd, as I discussed in Chapter Two, was struggling with the emir of Mecca, Sherif Muḥammad, to gain control of the post of emir. Abū Bakr Pāshā considered the struggling between the two sherifs as simply the internal affairs of the sherifian family and he therefore refused to make any decisions without an order from Istanbul.

The other factor which minimized the ṣanjaq's influence was the presence of influential sherifs in the post of the emir. Throughout most of the 12th/18th century, the post of emir was held by influential sherifs like Sherif Mas'ūd, Sherif Mis'ād, and Sherif Surūr, who had true qualities of leadership and strong personalities. A good example of the superiority of the emir of Mecca over the ṣanjaq of Jeddah was the incident of 1161/1748 between Sherif Mas'ūd and the ṣanjaq, Ǧālī Pāshā. In that year, Ǧālī Pāshā refused to pay Sherif Mas'ūd his share of the customs duties of Jeddah, which the Ottoman government had designated for the emir of Mecca. Sherif Mas'ūd tried to

34Dahlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 189.
35Ibid.
36Ibn ġAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 37r.
solve his conflict with the ṣanjaq through mediators, but when the ṣanjaq refused to compromise, Sherif Mas'Cūd decided not only to take his share by force, but to end the ṣanjaq's interference in the Hejaz affairs as well. He therefore sent his brother Ja'far with a detachment of the emir's forces to take Jeddah and expel the ṣanjaq.\textsuperscript{37} The detachment besieged the city, and with help from the emir's supporters inside the city, the attackers stormed the walls and forced Ǧālī Pāshā to flee to Egypt by sea.\textsuperscript{38} Sherif Mas'Cūd then wrote to the Ottoman government in Istanbul, demanding the replacement of Ǧālī Pāshā. The Sublime Porte replied in the emir's favor and confirmed his share of Jeddah's revenues.\textsuperscript{39}

The Ottoman ṣanjaq also held the post of sheikh of the Mecca Ǧaram. His responsibilities as sheikh included the supervision of construction work in Mecca and attending to the needs of the Ǧaram.\textsuperscript{40}

Since the ṣanjaq resided in Jeddah, he was assisted by a deputy in Mecca to take care of the Ǧaram's needs. The nā'ib al-Ǧaram, as he was called, was chosen from among the Meccans; his post was hereditary and sons succeeded their

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{37}Ibid., fol. 37r.

\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., fols. 37v-38r.

\textsuperscript{39}Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 195.

\textsuperscript{40}al-Sibā'ī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:451.
\end{footnotesize}
father as na'ib. In the 12th/18th century, a certain family indeed held the position of na'ib al-Ḥaram throughout the century.

Although the succession to the post of na'ib al-Ḥaram was hereditary, it was necessary for the nominee to secure the Ottoman government's approval from Istanbul. In one instance of usurpation of power in 1191/1777, the incumbent na'ib, ǦAbd Allāh Nā'īb al-Ḥaram, died. His brother ǦUthmān then went to Istanbul personally, and requested that the Ottoman government install him in his brother's position. The Ottomans appointed ǦUthman to the position of na'ib al-Ḥaram without considering that ǦAbd Allāh's son, Abū Bakr, had the right to succeed his father. Upon hearing of ǦUthmān's appointment, Abū Bakr appealed to the qāḍī of Mecca and obtained a legal decree stating that ǦUthmān had no right to succeed his brother. However, the Ottoman government ignored the qāḍī's decree and confirmed ǦUthmān's appointment.

The Ottoman government entrusted the county of Medina to the administration of Şāliḥ Pāshā, the şanjaq of Jeddah,

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41 ǦAbd Allāh Ghāzī, Nubdhah min Kitāb Ifādat al-Anām bi-Dhikr Akhbār al-Balad al-Ḥarām, Riyadh, King Saūd University Library, Manuscript Collection, no. 742, fol. 9r.

42 Ibid.

in 1179/1765. Theoretically, Medina was included in the administration of the emir of Mecca, but the Turkish sheikh of the Medina Haram, as will be discussed below, was the practical ruler of the city. Therefore, it seemed the Ottoman government aimed to enhance the power of the şanjaq of Jeddah and to minimize the power of the emir of Mecca. However, contrary to the intentions of the central government in Istanbul, the power of the emir increased extensively; by the end of the 12th/18th century, the emir of Mecca was the real ruler of the Hejaz, as was mentioned previously.

The şanjaq of Jeddah was also the general commander of the Ottoman garrisons in the Hejaz. However, it seemed that he did not have firm control over these garrisons. On more than one occasion, the garrisons took matters into their own hands, as in RabI' I 1146/August 1733; the Ottoman garrison at Mecca accused the emir of Mecca, Sherif Muhammed, of killing their sirdar, who was shot by one of the emir's Yemeni soldiers. The garrisons called upon the other Janissaries in Jeddah to join them to fight the emir. When Abū Bakr Pāshā, the şanjaq of Jeddah, tried to mediate between the two sides, the Ottoman soldiers agreed to leave Mecca; however, upon their arrival at Jeddah they wrote to Sherif Mas'ūd, the challenger of Sherif Muhammed, and

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44 al-Anšārī, Tārīkh Jiddah, p. 319.
45 See Chapter 2, pp. 64-66.
promised to back him against the emir.\textsuperscript{46} Abū Bakr Pāshā tried to stop them, but they refused to heed him, and joined Sherif Māṣūd in attacking Mecca, where they were routed by the emir's forces.\textsuperscript{47}

Relations between the Ottoman ṣanjaq of Jeddah and the emir of Mecca were cordial in the 12th/18th century, despite the incident of 1161/1748 between ČAlī Pāshā and Sherif Māṣūd.\textsuperscript{48} It seemed that the ṣanjaqs who held the post in Jeddah were content with their passive role as long as it did not involve them in confrontations with the emirs of Mecca. On the other hand, the sheriffs, who held the position of emir, respected the presence of the Ottoman ṣanjaqs as long as they did not intervene in the affairs of the emirs.

**The Ottoman Qādis in the Hejaz**

The Ottoman government in Istanbul appointed Turkish qādis in the 12th/18th century from among the ulama of Istanbul to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.\textsuperscript{49} As the school of Abū Ḥanīfah was the official rite throughout the Ottoman dominions, the Ottoman government directly appointed only the Ḥanafī qādis, and recognized only their decisions

\textsuperscript{46}Daḥlān, *Khulāṣat al-Kalām*, p. 189.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{48}See Chapter 2, pp. 77-78.

\textsuperscript{49}al-Anṣārī, *Tārīkh Jiddah*, p. 334.
in legal matters. However, Mecca and Medina had, in addition to the Ḥanafī qāḍīs, three additional qāḍīs; one was appointed from each of the other traditional schools of Islamic law: Shāfi’i, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī. The Ḥanafī judge presided as the chief judge, while the other three judges were of lesser rank.

The qāḍī of Mecca sent his own deputies to the tribunals of Jeddah, Taif, Rābigh, Līth, and Qunfudhah. Similarly, the qāḍī of Medina sent his deputies to the tribunals of Yānbugh, Wajh, Dībah, and Khaybar. The deputies or nā’ibs of the qāḍīs, were chosen from among the ulama of Mecca and Medina.

"Most of the Turkish qāḍīs sent to Mecca and Medina did not know Arabic, and they consequently relied excessively on their chief secretaries." The chief secretaries were chosen from among the Hejazis, and since the Turkish judges relied on them in passing their judgments, the secretaries enjoyed considerable control over the tribunals' affairs. It was not until 1326/1908 that the Ottoman government sent to the holy cities Turkish qāḍīs who

50H.A.R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, 1 vol. in two parts (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 1, II: 123.


52al-Anṣārī, Tārīkh Jiddah, p. 334.

53Ibid.
knew Arabic. 54 Thereafter, the qâdîs assumed more control of their courts.

The qâdî of Mecca was the most influential Ottoman qâdî in the Hejaz. Indeed, his power grew to be equivalent to that of the Ottoman şanjaq of Jeddah. The qâdî drew his power from his residence in the capital city of Mecca and also from the power that the Ottoman government entrusted to him. He exercised not only judicial functions but also, to a degree, general supervision of administrative affairs.

One of the Meccan qâdî's duties as the chief judge and the representative of the Ottoman sultan, was supervision of the distribution of the Ottoman subsidies or şurrah, to the beneficiaries. 55 Every year during the eighteenth century, at the pilgrimage season, the Ottoman subsidies for the Hejaz were distributed in the presence of the emir and the qâdîs of Mecca as well as the commanders of the Egyptian and the Syrian pilgrimage caravans. This event and its implications will be discussed in the following chapter.

Moreover, the qâdî of Mecca oversaw, to some extent, the appointment and the dismissal of the emir of Mecca. In this regard, the qâdî, as the Ottoman sultan's representative, shared with the şanjaq of Jeddah the responsibility of presenting the elected emir with the sultan's khil'câh to confirm the emir's election. It is to

54 Ibid.

55 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 131.
be recalled that the emir's election was in the hands of the sherifs of Mecca. However, the emir's election had to be approved by the Ottoman sultan.

On a few occasions in the 12th/18th century, the approval of the Turkish qādī of Mecca to the succession of the emir was bought by the rival sherifs. In one such incident in 1143/1731, Sherif Mas'Cūd bribed the qādī of Mecca to secure the succession of his nephew, Sherif Muḥammad, to the seat of the Hejazi governorship.56

In spite of the power which the Ottoman government entrusted to the qādī of Mecca, his influence in the Hejaz affairs was not very effective, because throughout the eighteenth century the engagement of the qādī in Hejazi affairs was minimal; this was perhaps due to the fact that strong and influential emirs held the governorship of the Hejaz, as was discussed in previous chapters.

The Office of Mufti

Next to the office of the qādī, the Ottoman government recognized the office of mufti in Mecca and Medina. However, unlike the qādī's position, the positions of the mufti in both cities were held by local Hejazis.57 Also, in contrast to the appointment of the qadīs, the emir of Mecca

56Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 183.
57al-Sībāḍī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:473.
appointed the muftis to the posts of Mecca and Medina. 58 Like other administrative positions, the appointment of a mufti was not final unless the Ottoman government approved. 59

Although the Ottoman judicial system was founded on Hanafī law, muftis from the three other traditional schools of Islamic law (Shāfī'ī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī) were also recognized by the Ottoman government in the Hejaz. In Mecca for instance, each of the four schools was represented by a mufti; the Hanafī mufti presided as the chief mufti. 60 Reports also showed that in Medina, the four schools were represented by their own muftis, and the Hanafī mufti was also the chief mufti. 61

In spite of the fact that the appointment of the mufti was a privilege of the emir of Mecca, it appeared that the succession to the post of the mufti was largely hereditary. For example, during the eighteenth century, the office of the Hanafī mufti of Mecca was held by members of only two families. Sheikh CAlī b. CAbd al-Qādir al-Ṣīdīqī and his nephew, Sheikh CAbd al-Qādir b. Yaḥya, from the Ṣīdīqī family, held the office of the mufti of Mecca for forty-two years, from 1149/1736 to 1191/1777. Sheikh Tāj al-Dīn b. 

58Ibid.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
61al-Anṣārī, Tuḥfat al-Muḥibbīn, pp. 36, 41, and 89.
Sālim of the Qal'ī family held the same office from 1141/1728 to 1149/1736, while his grandson, Ǧabd al-Malik, occupied the position of mufti for thirty-seven years, from 1191/1777 to 1228/1813.62

In addition to discharging the responsibilities of the position of mufti, the Ḥanafī, Shāfī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī muftis at Mecca held the post of teaching the four madhhabs at the Grand Mosque. They also led the prayers in the same mosque.63

Moreover, the chief mufti of Mecca engaged in the political and administrative activities in the Hejaz. On occasion, he mediated between rival sherifs; at other times he acted as the representative of the emir of Mecca. For instance, in 1184/1770, the Ḥanafī mufti ǦAli al-Ṣidīqī represented Sherif Aḥmad b. Ǧaṣīd in an effort to persuade the commander of the Egyptian expedition to settle his conflict with Sherif Aḥmad.64 The mufti's mission failed, and the Egyptians took over Mecca, as I mentioned previously.65 Also, as a result of his attempted role as mediator, the mufti was imprisoned by the Egyptians; they did not free him until they had extorted twenty thousand

63Ibid., pp. 148, 275, and 414.
64Ibn Ǧabd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 58v.
65See Chapter 3, pp. 92-95.
riyals from him.66

Although the mufti had a lesser rank than that of the qāḍī of Mecca, the people of Mecca sometimes appealed their cases to the mufti. When they obtained a fatwa from the mufti, they tried to force the qāḍī to base his decision on the mufti's fatwa.67

The Ḥanafī, Shāfīʿī, Mālikī, and Ḥanbalī muftis of Medina held, like their Meccan counterparts, teaching positions at the Prophet Mosque, where they also led the prayers.68

The Office of the Sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram

The office of the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram was independent in the 12th/18th century, and maintained a separate position from that of the Mecca Ḥaram. Also, the Ottoman government continued to appoint the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram directly from Istanbul. In fact, the Ottoman government appointed sheikh al-Ḥaram, his deputy, and the treasurer of the Ḥaram from among the aghas of Istanbul.69

United in the sheikh of the Ḥaram was the civil and military leadership of the area.70 His duties, as the

66Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-kalām, p. 204.
67al-Sibāʿī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:473.
68al-Anṣārī, Tuhfat al-Muhībūn, pp. 35, 41, and 89.
69Ibid., p. 56.
70Ibid.
representative of the Ottoman government, were to supervise not just the matters concerning the Medina Ḥaram, but also to command the Ottoman garrison in the city and to look after Ottoman interests in Medina and the vicinity.

However, the Ottoman garrison at Medina was not totally under the command of the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram. On a few occasions, the garrison revolted against their commanders and caused disturbances in the city. One such case was the turmoil of 1156/1743 caused by a conflict between the garrison and the sheikh of the Ḥaram.71 When the sheikh of the Ḥaram, ǦAbd al-Ḥaǧmān Aḡā al-Kabīr refused to pay the garrisons their dues, the garrison took over the citadel and closed the gates in the city wall, demanding the payment of their dues in full.72 Moreover, the garrison demanded the immediate resignation of the sheikh.73

Meanwhile, ǦAbd al-Ḥaǧmān Aḡā al-Kabīr incited the people of Medina against the Ottoman garrison.74 As a result, fights broke out between the garrison and the people of Medina, and the city was in complete chaos for about five months.

In addition, the conflict spread to involve the emir

71See Chapter 2, pp. 71-74.
72al-Ḥusaynī, al-Akbār al-Gharībah, fols. 13r-13v.
73Ibid.
74Ibid.
of Mecca and the tribe of Ḥarb, as I mentioned in Chapter Two.\(^{75}\) The situation did not become stable until the arrival of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan with orders from Istanbul to dismiss the sheikh of the Ḥaram and to compensate the garrison.\(^{76}\)

Although the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram was the supreme authority in Medina and the vicinity, his authority was less than that of the emir of Mecca. The emir of Mecca was the supreme authority in the Hejaz, as we saw earlier, which in consequence dictated the relations between the emir and the sheikh. In general, the relations between the emir of Mecca and the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram during the 12th/18th century were characterized by mutual understanding.

However, if the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram felt that the emir was trying to relegate him to the shadows, or to minimize his power, the sheikh would then openly reject the emir's authority and try on his part to check the emir's influence. Such a conflict is exemplified by the events of 1194/1780, when the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram, Aḥmad Aghā (1188-1194/1772-1780) rejected Sherif Surūr's efforts to contain and diminish the authority of the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz, who included the sheikh of the Ḥaram. Therefore, when Sherif Surūr visited Medina, Aḥmad Aghā

\(^{75}\)See Chapter 2, pp. 72-75.

\(^{76}\)Ibn cAbd al-Shakūr, Ṭārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 28r.
conceived a plan to fight him. He sent a message to the tribe of Ḥarb, promising them assistance and assuring them that he would fight Sherif Surūr from within the city if they would attack him in Medina. Before his arrival at Medina, Sherif Surūr had fought the Ḥarb because of conflicts over the tribe's dues.

When Sherif Surūr discovered the sheikh's plot, he besieged him in the citadel with the Ottoman garrison. After three days of siege, the citadel, including Aḥmad Aghā, surrendered to Sherif Surūr. Sherif Surūr took Aḥmad prisoner and dismissed him from office, despite the fact that the appointment or dismissal of the sheikh was the prerogative of the Ottoman government. Thus, the efforts of the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram to consolidate his power and set himself against the power of the emir of Mecca had, for the sheikh, an unfavorable outcome. The sheikh lost his office, and the emir emerged more powerful than ever.

The Ottoman Garrisons in the Hejaz

It is an exaggeration to describe the Ottoman military presence in the Hejaz during the eighteenth century as an army. The Ottoman military force consisted of not more than

77Ibn cAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 95v.
78Ibid.
79See Chapter 3, pp. 118-120.
80Ibn cAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 101r.
some few small garrisons in the major cities of the region. In the 12th/18th century, the Ottoman government did not change its policy of maintaining inefficient and ineffective garrisons in the Hejaz.

The purposes of the Ottoman government in maintaining garrisons in the Hejaz were, as was mentioned in Chapter One, to maintain Ottoman authority in the region and on occasion to aid the emir of Mecca in keeping the pilgrimage routes open and safe, particularly from the bedouin attacks. The garrisons also had the responsibility of defending the Hejaz from external attacks. Therefore, the Ottomans stationed their garrisons only in the three major cities of the Hejaz: Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottomans did not have a garrison in Mecca. However, reports indicate that during the eighteenth century, the Ottomans maintained a garrison in Mecca, under a commander called the sirdar, who received his orders from the ṣanjaq of Jeddah. 81 It seems that the Ottoman government's purpose in establishing a garrison in Mecca was not so much for the protection of the city as it was for restraining the power of the emir of Mecca and keeping him under surveillance. As we have seen in previous chapters, the authority of the emir increased greatly throughout the eighteenth century.

In addition, the Ottoman garrison at Mecca was, on
several occasions, involved in the rivalry between the sherifs of the Hejaz for control of the governorship of the region. In 1146/1733, for example, the Ottoman garrison aided Sherif MasCūd b. SaCĪd against the emir of Mecca, Sherif Muḥammad.82 The Ottoman Janissaries were incensed over the killing of their sirdār by one of the emir's soldiers and accused the emir of masterminding the killing. They therefore dispersed throughout in the city and blocked the streets, calling for revenge. In spite of the efforts of the ʂanjaq of Jeddah to calm the Janissaries, they refused to compromise and called upon Sherif MasCūd to join them, promising to install him as governor of the Hejaz.83 However, when they attacked Mecca, the forces of the emir defeated them. The Janissaries departed for Jeddah and finally accepted the mediating efforts of the ʂanjaq.84

The garrison of Jeddah remained inefficient and ineffective because of its number. It consisted of about five to six hundred soldiers at the maximum.85 Thus, when in Rabīʿ I 1184/July 1770, Hasan Shabkah, the commander of the Egyptian expedition fleet, landed at Jeddah, he subdued the city without encountering much resistance from its

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82See Chapter 2, pp. 64-66.
83Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām, p. 189.
84Ibid.
85al-Sībāʿī, Tārīkh Makkah, 2:458.
garrison. It is to be recalled that Hasan Shabkah was, with his small sea force, part of the Egyptian expedition of 1184/1770. The bulk of the three thousand soldiers in the expedition were under the command of Abū al-Dhahab, who marched on the Hejaz by land.

Like its counterparts at Mecca and Jeddah, the Ottoman garrison at Medina was ineffective yet disturbing. Instead of protecting Medina against bedouin attacks and maintaining peace in the city, the garrison was a major element of discord throughout the eighteenth century. As we have seen previously, the five months of turmoil in 1156/1743 at Medina were the result of a quarrel between the Ottoman garrison and the sheikh of the Haram. Also, in 1194/1780, the garrison of Medina joined the sheikh al-Haram and the tribe of Ḥarb in their dispute with the emir of Mecca, Sherif Surūr.

The Ottoman government also maintained garrisons along the pilgrimage routes in the Hejaz. These garrisons, as I will discuss in the following chapter, were established to maintain order in their areas and to protect the pilgrimage caravans from any hostility or attacks from bedouins.

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86 Ramaqān, Cālī Bik al-Kabīr, p. 143.
87 See Chapter 3, pp. 89-100.
88 See Chapter 2, pp. 72-75.
89 See Chapter 3, pp. 117-120.
CHAPTER V

THE OTTOMAN ORGANIZATION OF THE PILGRIMAGE
AND THE SURRAH

In the eighteenth century the Ottomans continued their
traditional concern for the Hejaz. The Ottoman concern
manifested itself in the ongoing efforts to provide better
facilities and administration for the pilgrimage affairs.
Pilgrimage provided the Ottomans with a yearly opportunity
to demonstrate their authority as the paramount Islamic
rulers. The Ottoman sultans, therefore, in their capacity
as the Guardians of the Two Holy Sanctuaries, were
ultimately responsible for the safety of thousands of
pilgrims who journeyed into the Hejaz every year.

The Ottoman sultans considered the departure of the
two major pilgrimage caravans from Egypt and Syria to be
their ultimate responsibility and continued their efforts to
protect them and assure their safety from and to the Hejaz.

The Ottoman sultans also continued the tradition of
dispatching the annual subsidies to the people of the Hejaz
to reaffirm their identity as the servants of the Haramayn.

This chapter will examine the Ottoman organization of
both the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan as well as the Syrian
pilgrimage caravan. It will also examine the dispatching of
the Ottoman subsidy to the Hejaz known as 'surrah, literally purse, and its effects on the Hejaz during the eighteenth century.

The Egyptian Pilgrim Caravan

The Egyptian pilgrims caravans would leave for the Hejaz twice a year, first in Rajab, the seventh month of the lunar calendar, and then in Shawwāl, the tenth month.¹ But when the Ottomans conquered Egypt in 922/1517, Sultan Selim I ordered the two caravans to be organized in one and to leave Egypt only once a year, in the month of Shawwāl.² It seems that Sultan Selim's action was a way of having more control of the caravan affairs and providing better protection for the pilgrims, as I mentioned in Chapter One. Sultan Selim also laid the responsibility of organizing the caravan and providing it with the necessary provisions for its long trip to the Hejaz on the Ottoman wali of Egypt.³ Therefore, the Ottoman wālis of Egypt considered maintaining the departure every year of the pilgrim caravan to the Hejaz as one of their main duties, and as a way of gaining the satisfaction of the Ottoman sultans, who in return would

¹al-Raṣḥīdī, Husn al-Ṣafā', p. 15.
²Ibid.
³Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 253.
confirm them in the governorship of Egypt. 4

The Egyptian pilgrim caravan was commanded by an emir, called the emir al-Ḥajj. The appointment of the emir al-Ḥajj came from Istanbul after a recommendation by the vālī of Egypt. 5 Usually, the governor of Egypt nominated an emir from among the beys of Egypt and requested his confirmation from Istanbul. When the Ottoman government approved the nomination of the emir, the governor then presented the emir with a khilâfah and announced him officially as the emir al-Ḥajj. 6 The governor also provided the emir al-Ḥajj with a sum of money which was called musâcadat amīr al-ḥajj, to help him to start his preparations for organizing the caravan for the holy trip. 7

In spite of the hardships of the responsibility of leading the Egyptian pilgrim caravan, the beys of Egypt were anxious to be nominated for the position of emir al-Ḥajj, because it could lead them into higher positions in the Ottoman administration in Egypt as a reward for the emir's role in leading the pilgrims, an important matter to the sultan in Istanbul. 8 There was not, as Laylā Aḥmad


5 al-Rashīdī, Husn al-Ṣafā', p. 23.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid., p. 55.
remarked, a single governor in Egypt who came to the
governorship of the country without serving first as emir
al-Ḥajj,9 as for example, did Cālī Bey al-Kabīr, Muḥammad
Abū al-Dhahab and Murād Bey in the eighteenth century.

The duties of the Egyptian emir al-Ḥajj were of three
principal kinds, as was mentioned in the first chapter.
First, they had to organize the pilgrim caravan, arrange for
the purchase and transport of supplies to be sent with the
caravan as well as the ones to be sent ahead of it to the
fortresses located along the road, and to provide for the
proper distribution of the supplies during the course of the
journey;10 second, to receive and transport the subsidies in
cash and kind sent every year by the imperial treasury of
Egypt to the people of the Hejaz. The emir al-Ḥajj also
arranged and supervised the distribution of these subsidies
during the caravan's stay in the Hejaz.11 Third, the emir
al-Ḥajj must assure the protection of the pilgrim caravan
during the course of the journey.12

In addition, the Egyptian emir al-Ḥajj was authorized
to distribute subsidies in cash and kind to the sheikhs of
the bedouin tribes living along the route of the caravan in
order to secure the protection for the caravan against

9Ibid.
10Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 240.
11Ibid.
12Ibid.
bedouin raids.13

The emir al-Ḥajj's preparations usually started as early as Rabī‘ I, the third month.14 After the vālī of Egypt presented the nominated bey with the imperial khilālah and proclaimed him the emir al-Ḥajj, which took place in the month of Rabī‘ I, the emir al-Ḥajj used the musāqadah to buy the necessary provisions for the trip and recruit extra guards from among the Moroccans and the Mamluks of Egypt.15

In order to assure the protection of the pilgrim caravan, the Ottoman government assisted the emir al-Ḥajj with a military escort. Approximately five hundred soldiers accompanied the caravan each year. The soldiers came from the seven military corps of Egypt.16 Moreover, in years of especial danger, the number of the soldiers was raised to as many as one thousand. The soldiers from each corps were led by a commander called a sirdār, appointed from their own corps, and all were commanded by a supreme sirdār al-Ḥajj, who was appointed from the beys of lesser rank.17 Fourteen sirdārs accompanied the Egyptian pilgrim caravan; seven of them led the soldiers who were assigned for the caravan's protection and the other seven went to Jeddah to command the

13Ibid., pp. 240-241.
14al-Rashīdī, Ḥusn al-Ṣafā’, p. 31.
15Ibid., p. 22.
16Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 284.
17Ibid.
Ottoman garrison there and to replace the seven who had served in the Hejaz during the previous year.\textsuperscript{18} Also, most of the soldiers who accompanied the caravan remained for a year in the garrisons of the Holy Cities or Jeddah, and they were replaced on the return journey of the pilgrimage by soldiers who had served in the garrison during the year before.\textsuperscript{19}

Most of the expenses of the caravan soldiers were cared for by the emir al-Ḥajj with money which he received from the Treasury of Egypt.\textsuperscript{20} In addition, the Treasury provided certain sums directly to the sirdārs of the soldiers who accompanied the caravan to provide for their own expenses and for some of those of their men.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition to the emir al-Ḥajj and the military escort, the Ottomans assigned other officials to accompany the Egyptian caravan. These officials included a qāqī, whose duty was to supervise the religious matters of the pilgrimage and to deal with any legal matters which might occur between the pilgrims during the course of the journey.\textsuperscript{22} The treasurer, amīn al-ṣurrah, and two clerks assisted the emir al-Ḥajj in distributing the subsidies to

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] al-Rashīdī, \textit{Husn al-Ṣafā'}, p. 34.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Shaw, \textit{Ottoman Egypt}, p. 248.
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{21}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{22}] al-Rashīdī, \textit{Husn al-Ṣafā'}, p. 35.
\end{itemize}
the people of the Hejaz. Guides, adillā, also accompanied the caravan. These guides knew the road well between Cairo and Mecca and therefore were assigned to assist the emir al-Ḥajj to lead the caravan through a safe and comfortable route.

The emir al-Ḥajj was also aided by a commander, katkhudā, from among the beys of Egypt. The katkhudā's duty was to assist the emir al-Ḥajj in preparing for the trip and organizing the caravan as well as to command the caravan in the absence of the emir. The al-duwādār, who took care of the ink and letters needed by the emir al-Ḥajj, was another official who accompanied the caravan. He was also the emir's messenger and carried letters to those to whom the emir wished to send messages.

Among the other officials of the caravan was the nāẓir al-khayl, whose duty it was to take care of the horses and the camels which belonged to the emir al-Ḥajj and the important pilgrims in the caravan, as well as the members of the royal family. In addition, there were the cook, the water man, and the provisions keeper.

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
The Ottomans also assigned personnel for the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan to take care of the caravan's needs. These were the tent supervisors, the candle lighters, and the flag carriers; one carried the Ottoman flag and the other carried the flag which belonged to the emir al-Ḥājj. Physicians, carpenters, the keeper of the gifts or khilābasis sent to the important persons in the Hejaz, and the ammunition keepers also formed part of the caravan. There were two men whose duty it was to look for the pilgrims who strayed from the caravan, or for the sick pilgrims who could not keep up with the caravan.²⁹

By the middle of Shawwāl, the preparations for the caravan's journey were completed, and a big celebration took place in Cairo; the caravan passed through the city streets and the emir al-Ḥājj received the subsidies for the people of the Hejaz.³⁰ Then the emir al-Ḥājj went to Birkat al-Ḥājj for the final preparations. He camped in Birkat al-Ḥājj for about five days, inspecting the military escort as well as the camels and provisions for the trip.³¹ He also checked on the pilgrims who came from North Africa, Anatolia, and the Balkans to join the Egyptian caravan and told them the way the caravan would travel. Then the emir al-Ḥājj ordered the registration of every pilgrim, his

²⁹Ibid., pp. 35-36.
³⁰Ibid., p. 32.
³¹Ibid., p. 34.
country of origin, and his belongings.\textsuperscript{32} If a pilgrim died during the course of the journey, the emir al-Ḥajj had the right to inherit whatever the pilgrim was carrying.\textsuperscript{33}

When the emir al-Ḥajj had ascertained that everything was in order and the caravan was ready to depart, he ordered the caravan to leave for the Hejaz. The departure of the caravan usually took place in the second half of Shawwāl.\textsuperscript{34} The caravan left Birkat al-Ḥājj in a specific order: groups of the soldiers were in the front, then the carriage carrying cannons, followed by the emir al-Ḥajj, the treasurer and his clerks, and next the camel carrying the maḥmal. The senior official and the important pilgrims, the rest of the pilgrims followed by the camels carrying water, and finally the remainder of the soldiers made up the caravan procession.\textsuperscript{35}

The Egyptian pilgrimage caravan took the land route between Cairo and Mecca known as al-Ḍarb al-Maṣrī, the Egyptian route, which was close to the Red Sea and was the shortest road to Mecca.\textsuperscript{36} Stations were located along the Egyptian route where the caravan rested. Fortresses also

\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 34.
\textsuperscript{35}al-Rashīdī, Ḥusn al-Ṣafā', p. 34.
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid., p. 37.
were maintained along the route to keep order in their areas, repress or punish bedouin raids on the caravan, and to store water and other provisions needed by the pilgrims so that they would not be burdened with the necessity of carrying all the supplies they would need for the entire journey.37

The fortresses along the Cairo-Mecca route were located at cAjrūd, immediately north of Suez; at Nakhil, halfway between Suez and cAqabah in the Sinai Peninsula; at cAqabah on the northeastern tip of the Red Sea about two hundred miles from Suez, to the south of Muwayliḥ; and at Azlim, Wajh, YanbuC, Jeddah, Mecca and Medina.38 The fortresses were spaced between one and two hundred miles apart along the Red Sea coast of Arabia.39

These fortresses were manned by soldiers from Egypt. The soldiers were obligated to serve a year, then were replaced by new soldiers.40 In addition, soldiers from Syria were sent in rotation to garrison the fort of Wajh, maintained as a stop for the Syrian pilgrimage to the Holy Cities.41

The wages of the garrisons on the Cairo-Mecca

37 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 250.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 248.
41 Ibid., p. 250.
pilgrimage route were provided by the Treasury of Egypt, which also provided the garrisons with other provisions such as wheat, oil, sugar, and the like.\footnote{Ibid.}

In spite of the Ottomans' efforts to arrange for a safe and propitious journey for the pilgrims to the Hejaz, the pilgrimage caravans were faced with difficulties which, in most of cases, were caused either by greed or carelessness on the part of the emir al-Ḥajj. In some years, the emir al-Ḥajj withheld for his own profit the subsidies intended for the bedouin living along the way of the pilgrimage caravans and in these years the caravans were ravaged by the fierce raids of the bedouin seeking to collect what they considered to be their right.\footnote{Ibid., p. 249.}

In 1194/1780, the Ḥarb tribes around al-Ṣafrā' between Badr and Medina attacked the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan because Murād Bey, the emir of the caravan, refused to pay them their dues. As a result, many pilgrims were killed and their belongings were plundered.\footnote{al-Jabartī, Cājā'īb al-Athār, 2:62.}

On another occasion in 1199/1784, Muṣṭafā Bey, the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, refused to pay the tribes of Ḥarb their dues despite the advice of Sherif Surūr and Aḥmad Pāshā, the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, not to withhold the
bedouin's dues. Muṣṭafā Bey, however, not only refused to pay the bedouin their dues but also captured some of them and branded them on the cheeks. The bedouin then attacked the caravan ruthlessly. Muṣṭafā Bey fled to Medina with a few of his guards, while the bedouin plundered and destroyed the whole caravan.

In other incidents, the emir al-Ḥajj of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan mistreated the pilgrims in his caravan. For example, in 1158/1745, the pilgrims suffered the mistreatment of Khalīl Bey, the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Khalīl Bey's slaves and treasurers, as al-Jabartī explains, solicited money from the pilgrims, and Khalīl Bey himself confiscated the goods and money of the pilgrim merchants in his caravan. He also withheld the bedouin's dues. Khalīl Bey's behavior drew complaints from rulers throughout the Muslim world. The Sultan of Morocco, for example, sent a message of complaint to Rāghib Pāshā, the governor of Egypt, explaining his concern over the ill-treatment of his pilgrims by Khalīl Bey. Rāghib Pāshā apologized to the Sultan for Khalīl Bey's behavior and

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46Ibn ČAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah, fol. 125r.
47Ibid., fol. 125v.
49Ibid.
50Ibid., 1:181.
told him that he had dismissed Khalil from the post of emir al-Ḥajj.\textsuperscript{51} Râghib Pâsha did indeed order the assassination of Khalîl Bey in 1660/1747.\textsuperscript{52} It is not clear, however, if Khalîl's assassination was related to his mistreatment of the pilgrims in 1158.

In addition, corruption among the officials of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan contributed to the difficulties and suffering of the pilgrims. For example, many of the soldiers who were supposed to accompany the caravan by land went on ships via the Red Sea in order to avoid the danger and fatigue of the land journey, and to accompany the goods which they were shipping to Jeddah. Many of them were indeed merchants who purchased the right to go in this way to obtain exemptions from customs duties on their goods.\textsuperscript{53} As a result of this, the pilgrimage caravan was deprived of much of the protection provided by the Porte and was frequently decimated by the bedouin raids.\textsuperscript{54}

However, in spite of corruption and greed on the part of some emirs al-Ḥajj of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, there were emirs al-Ḥajj in the eighteenth century who displayed great concern about the pilgrims and protected the caravan from the bedouin raids. The most famous one of them

\textsuperscript{51}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{52}\textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{53}\textit{Shaw, Ottoman Egypt,} p. 249.

\textsuperscript{54}\textit{Ibid.}
was Ḫusayn Bey Kuskhush. He commanded the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan four times, 1174-1177/1760-1763, and led it on safe journeys. He terrified the bedouin living along the Cairo-Mecca pilgrimage route by killing some of their sheikhs; when they sought revenge, he defeated them soundly. For example, in 1174/1760, the bedouin of the Ḥarb took up a position in a narrow passage and demanded their dues to be paid in what seemed to be a threatening way. Ḫusayn Bey told them that he would pay them at the next pilgrimage station. But when the caravan came to an open area, Ḫusayn Bey captured some of the bedouin sheikhs and ordered their execution. The bedouin then called for revenge and attacked the caravan, but before they could do any harm to the caravan, Ḫusayn Bey attacked and overcame them. He then led the caravan safely to Egypt.

When the beys of Egypt complained about Ḫusayn Bey's action with the bedouin, which they felt might jeopardize the passage for the next pilgrimage caravan, Ḫusayn Bey requested to lead the caravan in the next pilgrimage season. Thus, when he led the 1175/1761 pilgrimage caravan, the bedouin tried to avenge their previous year's defeat, but Ḫusayn Bey defeated them once again. The bedouin

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55al-Rashīdī, Ḫusn al-Ṣafā', p. 56.
56al-Jabarti, CAjā'īb al-Athār, 1:254-255.
57Ibid.
subsequently feared him and did not attempt to attack in the following two years when the Egyptian caravan was under his command.\textsuperscript{58}

Normally, the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan arrived at Mecca in the first week of the month Dhū al-Ḥijjah, between the fifth and the seventh day of the month.\textsuperscript{59} On the day after its arrival, the emir of Mecca rode with his retinue to the Egyptian caravan's encampment on the outskirts of Mecca to greet the emir al-Ḥajj\textsuperscript{60} and to receive the khilā'ah sent by the Porte to confirm their approval of the emir's position. After the pilgrims performed the Ḥajj rituals at Mā'arif and Minā, they stayed for about ten days in Mecca; then the caravan prepared for departure to Medina.\textsuperscript{61}

The Egyptian pilgrimage caravan usually took the Sultānī road on its way to Medina. There were four roads between Mecca and Medina: al-Sultānī, al-Farqī, al-Ghāyir and al-Sharqī. The Sultānī road, however, was the most convenient with plenty of water and stations.\textsuperscript{62} After spending about a week in Medina, the caravan left directly to Egypt where it would arrive at the end of the month of

\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59}al-Rashīdī, \textit{Husn al-Ṣafā'}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{60}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid., p. 47.

\textsuperscript{62}Ibid.
On its way back to Egypt, the pilgrimage caravan was met by two expeditions of guards, one at Azlim and one at ḌAqabah. The expedition to Azlim was sent to bring fresh supplies for the pilgrims and to provide an additional guard for the caravan.\textsuperscript{64} This guard included three hundred men from the seven corps of Cairo, and was commanded by an officer called Azlim Pāshā who was always chosen from among the number of the Umarā' (beys) al-Sharakisah corps.\textsuperscript{65}

The second expedition of ḌAqabah was of a similar nature to the Azlim expedition. To the ḌAqabah expedition were assigned one thousand men from the seven corps of Cairo, and ḌAqabah Pāshā was appointed from the Umarā' al-Sharakisah corps or from the lesser emirs or beys of Egypt.\textsuperscript{66}

When the pilgrimage caravan arrived at Cairo, the emir al-Ḥajj went directly to the governor's residence where he reported the accomplishments of his duty.\textsuperscript{67} If the emir al-Ḥajj had succeeded in leading the pilgrimage caravan on a safe journey, the governor of Egypt would reward him with a

\textsuperscript{63}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64}Shaw, \textit{Ottoman Egypt}, p. 251.
\textsuperscript{65}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67}al-Rashīdī, \textit{Husn al-Ḡafā'}, p. 18.
very handsome khilâfah. However, if the emir al-Ḥajj had failed to lead the pilgrimage caravan properly, he would be dismissed and would lose the privilege and honor of being emir al-Ḥajj. This had happened to Khalîl Bey, as was mentioned previously.

The Syrian Pilgrimage Caravan

The other pilgrimage caravan that the Ottomans organized and exhibited great concern for was the Syrian caravan. The Syrian pilgrimage caravan was, as Barbir remarks, a gigantic enterprise, touching every aspect of Ottoman rule in Damascus, and demonstrating the state's claim to hegemony in the Islamic world. It was the hallmark of a governor's success or failure in office.

Damascus was the meeting place for pilgrims from Persia, Anatolia, Iraq and central Asia. The pilgrims came to Damascus in groups, and these were very often defined geographically. The main groups were the Rumi pilgrims (al-Ḥâjj al-Rûmî), the Aleppine pilgrims (al-Ḥâjj al-Ḥalabî), and the Persian pilgrims (al-Ḥâjj al-ĆAjamî). However, these were not strict divisions because many

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68Ibid.
69Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 77.
pilgrims from other areas, even from outside the Ottoman empire, joined one group or another.71

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman government turned the command of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan over to the governor of Damascus, because the lesser officials from the province of Damascus had failed to lead and protect the caravan in the seventeenth century.72 In 1081/1670-71, the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was attacked by the bedouin (the source does not indicate the place), and was plundered. The emir al-Ḥajj CAsāf Pāshā, a sheikh of a tribe in Palestine, was killed and the pilgrims suffered greatly. The Ottoman government decided to give the command of the pilgrimage caravan to the governor of Damascus.73 It seems that the Ottoman government acted in this way to provide better protection for the pilgrimage caravans.

The governor of Damascus was assigned the prestigious title of commander of the pilgrimage, emir al-Ḥajj.74 As emir al-Ḥajj, the governor of Damascus, like his Egyptian counterpart, acquired religious prestige and financial benefit. He had the right to inherit the personal effects of those who died on the pilgrimage. The unusually high

72Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p.
73al-Ḥalāq, Hawādith Dimashq, introd., p. 48.
74Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 109.
rate of pilgrim mortality was due to the advanced age of many pilgrims, the often fatal attacks of the bedouin, and natural calamities such as floods or excessive heat.75

As a commander of the pilgrimage caravan, the governor of Damascus administered a vast economic, social, and military enterprise. His duties were the supervision of the collection of tax revenues for the pilgrimage, the delivery of the ṣūrah, the management of the fortress network along the pilgrimage route, the organization of the caravan; he was also the supreme commander of security measures.76

To organize and protect the vast number of pilgrims, the governor of Damascus received financial assistance from the Ottoman government to devote to the maintenance of his retinue and to the escort forces.77

Usually the preparation for the Syrian pilgrimage caravan started three to four months before the departure of the caravan from Damascus. In late Rajab or early Shaʿbān, the governor of Damascus left the city for what was known as al-dawrah.78 In the dawrah the governor toured the southern provinces of Damascus in order to collect taxes for the pilgrimage and also to inspect these provinces and maintain

76Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 151.
77Ibid., p. 155.
78al-Ḥalāq, Hawādith Dimashq, Introd., p. 50.
order in the name of his superior, the Sultan. After spending two months in the dawrah, the governor returned to Damascus in the month of Shawwal for the final preparations.

Details concerning provisions were also regulated by the governor of Damascus. First, estimates were made of what would be required daily at each stop during the course of the journey. Then, a plan was drawn up showing the quantities of provisions in stock and the quantities needed to replenish that stock. Next, separate lists were made concerning who was to bring the provisions to the fort. Finally, at the end of the pilgrimage, the governor would receive a report from his personal treasurer showing the actual consumption of provisions during the pilgrimage, and any surplus left in stock.

The provisions included, among other items, clarified butter, bolts of cloth for camel covers, rare cloth for the commander's personal use, gunpowder, and raw linen for the manufacture of tents.

In order to provide military protection to the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, the Ottomans entrusted the governor of Damascus with the task of recruiting troops to escort the

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79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Barbir, *Ottoman Rule in Damascus*, pp. 141-142.
82 Ibid., p. 159.
caravan on its long journey to and from the Hejaz. Therefore, part of the revenue assigned to the pilgrimage was used to pay the troops escorting the caravan. The majority of these troops, in the eighteenth century, were mercenaries. The source does not reveal the nationality of these mercenaries. It is also true that large numbers of these troops were ordinarily in the service and pay of the governor of Damascus.83

The sources concerning the Syrian pilgrimage caravan do not indicate the number of the military escort of the caravan in the eighteenth century. However, if we compare the normal number of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan's military escort of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which was approximately four hundred soldiers,84 and the number of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan's military escort in the eighteenth century, which was approximately five hundred soldiers,85 it may be assumed that the number of the military escort of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan of the eighteenth century was in the vicinity of five hundred soldiers. Like its Egyptian counterpart, the military escort of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was armed with guns and cannons.86

83Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, p. 70.
84Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, pp. 111-112.
85Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 284.
86Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, p. 112.
The commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was assisted by a number of officials, and each was entrusted with a specific function. The stockpile, for example, was the personal responsibility of the pilgrimage commander's personal treasurer (ḥazinedar) and quartermaster (vekili harç), who were authorized to make purchases and rent transport animals on their master's behalf.\(^{87}\) Also attached to the Syrian caravan were a qāṭī, a mu'adhīn, an imam and a flag carrier (ṣanjaqdār). The official known as ʿamīr al-manzil was responsible for the encampments at the stops along the pilgrimage route. The commander himself was assisted by a general supervisor, known as nāẓir al-Hājj, who assured the implementation of all the functions of the various official personnel.\(^ {88}\)

Moreover, the Ottoman government sent directly from Istanbul the purse commissioner, ʿamīn al-ṣurrah, to join the Syrian pilgrimage caravan at Damascus. His duties were to assist the emir al-Hājj in distributing the Ottoman subsidies to the sherifs of the Hejaz and to the people of the Haramayn.\(^ {89}\)

Within the retinue of the purse commissioner were the water carriers (saka başılar), and special couriers (müjdeçiler)

\(^{87}\) Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 159.

\(^{88}\) Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, p. 112.

\(^{89}\) al-Ḥalāq, Hawādith Dimashq, introd., pp. 50-51.
They performed essential and important functions for the pilgrims. The water carriers distributed fresh water and provided camel transport to sick and needy pilgrims on the road to and from the Hejaz. They also furnished clothing to the poor of the Holy Cities. All the water carriers' expenses, including their financial support and provisions, were met by the revenues of pious endowments, many of them created by the imperial family. As for the special couriers, they were appointed by the kizlar agası, chief of the Sultan's harem, and were led by two officials known as the first and second couriers. The second special courier did not continue the pilgrimage journey with the purse commissioner's retinue to the Hejaz. He instead waited in Damascus until his chief, the first courier, returned safely from the Hejaz with reports from the governor of Damascus and the emir of Mecca. Together, both couriers carried these reports back to the grand vezîr and the Sultan in İstanbul.

Some pilgrims arrived in Damascus four or five months before the departure of the pilgrimage caravan to the Hejaz. However, the majority usually came in the month of Ramaḍān.

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91 Ibid., p. 161.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
Latecomers arrived within a few days of the caravan's departure.\textsuperscript{95}

By the middle of Shawwāl, the final preparations of the pilgrimage caravan had been made and the caravan was ready for departure.\textsuperscript{96} The departure from Damascus was marked by a magnificent procession, in which the governor, accompanied by the mahmal and the holy standard, şanjaq, took part, together with the elite of his troops.\textsuperscript{97} On the eighth of Shawwāl, the first ceremony took place. The sacred litter, mahmal, a four-cornered conical dome frame of wood covered with gold-embroidered cloth, was prepared and paraded through the main streets of Damascus.\textsuperscript{98} Then between the twelfth and the twentieth of Shawwāl, a second ceremony took place. The caravan passed through the streets of Damascus in a certain order: the procession of the mahmal marched from the front of the governor's house, moving southward through the Maydān quarter, finally leaving the city through the Gate of God, Bāb Allāh, so named for the ultimate destination of the pilgrimage, Mecca.\textsuperscript{99} The caravan proceeded to Qubbat al-Ḥājj, on the outskirts of Damascus, where it halted for a short time waiting for the

\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Rafiq, The Province of Damascus}, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{96}\textit{al-Ḥalāq, Hawādith Dimashq}, introd., p. 51.
\textsuperscript{97}\textit{Rafiq, The Province of Damascus}, p. 62.
\textsuperscript{98}\textit{Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus}, pp. 152-153.
\textsuperscript{99}\textit{ibid.}, pp. 153-154.
pilgrims to follow. Then it proceeded to Muzayrib, the first major fort on the Damascus-Mecca pilgrimage route.

In Muzayrib, the caravan halted for about a week to wait for the late arrivals, to make final preparations, and if the pilgrims wished, to deposit their valuables in the fortress. The pilgrims made a fresh start and the caravan set off for the Hejaz.

On its way to the Hejaz, the Syrian pilgrimage caravan usually took the road known as al-Ṭarīq al-Sulṭānī, close to the eastern coast of the Red Sea. Most of the fortresses along the Damascus-Mecca route were built by the Ottomans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In the eighteenth century, however, a few fortresses were built and others were repaired. The governors of Damascus undertook the responsibility of building and repairing the fortresses as part of their duties as the emirs of the pilgrimage caravan. For example, the governor of Damascus, CAbd Allāh Pāshā, (g. 1730-1733) repaired the forts of al-Mudawwarah, south of Maṣṣan, and built the bridge that carried pilgrims

100 Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, p. 62.
101 Ibid., p. 63.
102 al-Ḥalāq, Hawādīth Dimashq, introd., p. 52.
103 For more information on the construction of the fortresses in the 16th and 17th centuries, see Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, pp. 133-138.
across Wadi al-Ḩasā'. Also, Muḥammad Pāshā al-Ḡāzm built the fort of Zumurrud in 1189/1775, and Asqad Pāshā built the fort at Madā'in Ṣāliḥ.

The most ambitious program, as Barbir remarks, of fortress building in the eighteenth century, was initiated by ʿUthmān Pāshā al-Ṣādiq who began his career in the retinue of Asqad Pāshā and was later governor of Damascus (1750-1771). He built six forts at Ẓahr al-Ḡaqabah, Maghāyir al-Qalandariyah, Dār al-Ḥamrā', Valide Kuyusu, Qantar, and Nakhlatayn along the pilgrimage route.

The yerliyya, local Janissaries of Damascus, as distinguished from the kapi kullari, the imperial Janissaries, were theoretically entrusted with guarding the fortresses along the pilgrimage route. However, the local Janissaries served in only about six of the ten major forts. Members of the regular imperial corps guarded the forts of Maċān, Muzayrīb, Qunayzah, and al-Muʿaẓẓam.

In order to ensure the fortress garrisons' competence, the Ottoman government developed several rotation plans by

105 Ibid., p. 84.
106 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 139.
107 Ibid., p. 139-140.
109 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, pp. 150-151.
which members of local Damascus Janissaries corps took turns. The Ottoman garrison rotation plan called for a year's residence in an assigned fortress.\textsuperscript{110} Garrisons ranged in size from twelve to fifty men, who traveled to their posts with the pilgrimage caravan and returned to Damascus at the end of the next pilgrimage.\textsuperscript{111} The garrisons were paid from the treasury of Damascus.\textsuperscript{112}

The Ottoman empire, through provincial governors of Syria, provided the fortresses along the pilgrimage route with provisions sufficient for each fortress and supplied the official retinue and escort of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan during their passage to and from the Hejaz.\textsuperscript{113}

The journey from Damascus to Mecca usually took about thirty-five days.\textsuperscript{114} The Syrian pilgrimage caravan normally arrived in Mecca in the first week of Dhū al-Ḥijjah, between the fifth and the seventh day of the month.\textsuperscript{115} On the day following its arrival, the emir of Mecca visited the encampment of the Syrian caravan and received his khilīcah.

During the stay of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan in the Hejaz, its commander assumed command of the entire body

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110}Ibid., pp. 145-146.
\item \textsuperscript{111}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{112}Rafiq, \textit{The Province of Damascus}, p. 70.
\item \textsuperscript{113}Barbir, \textit{Ottoman Rule in Damascus}, p. 140.
\item \textsuperscript{114}al-Suwaydī, al-Nafḥah al-Miskīyah, fol. 91r.
\item \textsuperscript{115}al-Ḥalāq, \textit{Hawādith Dimashq}, introd., p. 52.
\end{itemize}
of pilgrimage and outranked the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan's commander. When authorized by the Ottoman government, he had the power to take punitive actions against anyone committing an act contrary to the interests of religion or state. On occasion the Syrian emir al-Ḥajj even outranked the emir of Mecca. For instance, in the pilgrimage season of 1172/1759, the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, ʿAbd Allāh Pāshā, arrested the emir of Mecca, Sherif Misācad, on the pretext that the sherif had neglected the water supply, which in consequence had caused the pilgrims to suffer from a shortage of water. ʿAbd Allāh Pāshā then appointed Misācad's brother, Sherif Jaʿfar, to the governorship of the Hejaz.

After the pilgrims performed their pilgrimage rituals, the Syrian caravans returned to Medina, usually departing by the end of Dhū al-Ḥijjah. Then it proceeded to Damascus, arriving there in the first week of Ǧaʿfar. The return journey normally took the same time as the outbound journey, about thirty-five days. On certain occasions, however, the pilgrimage caravan altered its route, very often through Gaza, either to avoid a impending threat or to salvage what remained after an attack by the bedouin; this of course

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116 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 160.
117 See Chapter 2, pp. 82-84.
118 al-Ḥalāq, Hawādīth Dimashq, introd., p. 52.
119 al-Suwaydī, al-Nafḥah al-Miskiyah, fol. 107r.
resulted in a late return. 120

In addition to the caravan's military escort and the network of fortresses along the Syrian pilgrimage route, the Ottomans employed another security measure to protect the pilgrimage caravan. This was to dispatch a relief force known as the jardah to meet the returning caravan roughly at the midpoint between Damascus and Mecca. 121 The purpose of the jardah was to carry provisions to the returning caravan and to provide extra protection by accompanying the caravan back to Damascus. 122

In the month of Rajab, three months before the pilgrimage caravan was to leave for the Hejaz, the Ottoman central government would begin to issue its orders to the various officials of the Syrian provinces concerning the composition of the jardah. 123 The jardah was normally composed of 1,500 fighting men. Strictly speaking, the fighting force, mainly cavalry, was drawn from Tripoli (500), Sidon (500), the tribes (numbers unknown), and sometimes from volunteers from Damascus. 124

The jardah was commanded by a governor of the Syrian provinces appointed directly from Istanbul. In the

120 Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, introd., p. 64.
121 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 167.
123 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 173.
124 Ibid.
eighteenth century the commander of the jardah was appointed from among the governors of Sidon, Tripoli, or less frequently, Aleppo. The nearness of their governorships to Damascus ensured speedy movement and the fact that these provinces contributed to the jardah made the governors desirable appointees.

During the eighteenth century, the jardah was supported financially by tax revenues from Tripoli, Sidon, the Palestinian ̣anjaqs, and to a lesser extent, from the sources in the Syrian provinces whose income accrued to the provincial treasury of Damascus.

The assembly of the jardah usually took place in Damascus in the middle of Dhū al-Qa‘dah. Between the tenth and the fifteenth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah, the combined force would leave for the Ḥeṣāmah following the same route which the pilgrimage caravan took before in what appears to be an inspection measure. The jardah would meet the pilgrimage caravan at Ḥadīyah, a halting place north of Medina, bringing the pilgrims extra provisions and water, and then to complete its task, would accompany them back to Damascus.

In spite of the Ottoman government's efforts to

126 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
protect the pilgrimage caravan, the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was attacked a few times by bedouin. In the eighteenth century alone there were the following attacks on the Syrian pilgrimage caravan: five attacks in Trans-Jordan, seven in the northern Hejaz, and six between Mecca and Medina.130 The inefficiency of some of the pilgrim caravan commanders and the greed of others were mainly responsible for the bedouin attacks on the caravan.131

Usually the attacks took place on the return journey, when the bedouin were tempted by the large amount of merchandise which accompanied the caravan. This was also the last chance of the year for the bedouin to obtain their full pay from the commander of the pilgrimage caravan since payment to the bedouin was made in two installments, half on the way to Mecca and half on the way back.132 Some of the commanders, hoping to get through without paying, were reluctant to hand the bedouin their exact sum on the way back.133 Several of the commanders of the Syrian pilgrimage caravans during the eighteenth century tried, with varying degrees of success, to withhold part of the sum allotted to the bedouin. The latter retaliated by attacking the

130 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 175.
131 Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, p. 58.
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
caravans to obtain their dues.

The most violent attack on the Syrian pilgrimage caravan in the eighteenth century was the attack of 1171/1757. In Safar 1171/October 1757, the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was attacked by the Banū Ṣakhir between Tabuk and Dhāt Ḥajj. Many pilgrims were killed and many more died later as a result of the misery that befell them. Among the dead was a sister of the Sultan. The commander of the caravan managed to escape death and took refuge at the fort of Dhat Hajj.

The reason for the attack was the reluctance of Ḥusayn Pāshā, the commander of the pilgrimage caravan, to make the customary payment to the tribe of Ṣakhir. When he saw that the danger of being attacked was imminent, he tried unsuccessfully, at the last moment, to buy them off.

The volume of this calamity, as Rafiq asserts, and the consternation it caused were tremendous, particularly in Damascus and Istanbul where officials were as much indignant as aggrieved. As soon as the news of the attack on the pilgrimage caravan reached Damascus, on 17 Safar/31 October, a crowd started stoning the headquarters of the governor

134Ibid.
135Ibid., p. 213.
136Ibid., and al-Qārī, al-Wuzara', p. 81.
137al-Qārī, al-Wuzarā', p. 81.
because the deputy Ḥusayn Aghā had not gone to the rescue in time.  

139 In Istanbul, the grand vezir Rāghib Pāshā (d.1763) ordered the execution of the kizlar agası, who had been Ḥusayn Pāshā's acknowledged protector.  

140 He also ordered the execution of As̲CAD Pāshā al-CAz̲m, the governor of Damascus from 1743 to 1757, on the grounds of reports that he received accusing As̲CAD Pāshā of inciting the bedouin to attack the pilgrimage caravan.  

141 On Rabi‘ II 1170/December 1756, As̲CAD Pāshā had been dismissed from the governorship of Damascus and subsequently appointed to the governorship of Aleppo.  

142 So important was the pilgrimage to the Ottomans that, for most of the eighteenth century, it was a factor in requests from the grand vezir to the Sultan to renew the terms of Damascus governors. Such requests referred to the pilgrimage as a vital duty and stated whether or not the commander in question had performed it properly.  

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al-Ṣurrah

The Ottomans arranged for the shipment of large quantities of cash and supplies to the Holy Cities to 

140Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 178.  
141Ibid.  
142al-Ḥalāq, Hawādīth Dimashq, p. 194.  
143Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 110.
provide for the support of their institutions, residents, and holy places. These contributions were sent from all over the empire, from provincial treasuries and from the revenues of waqfs established especially for the benefits of the Holy Cities. The Ottomans contributions were sent every year with the pilgrimage caravans of Egypt and Syria at the pilgrimage season.

The Ottoman contributions for the Holy Cities from Egypt were known as al-ṣurrah al-rūmīyah and al-ṣurrah al-irsāliyyah.

The ṣurrah rūmīyah included contributions in cash and supplies from the imperial waqfs of the Ḥaramayn in Egypt. Among the beneficiaries of the ṣurrah rūmīyah were the poor of Mecca and Medina, the laborers of the two holy mosques, and some of the soldiers serving in the Holy Cities. Some of the bedouin living along the pilgrimage route from Egypt to the Hejaz were also among the beneficiaries of the ṣurrah rūmīyah.

The full revenues of the waqfs were supposed to be sent to the holy cities except for a small amount of authorized deductions for the salaries of the nāẓirs, supervisors, of the waqfs. In fact, the nāẓirs managed to

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144Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, pp. 253-254.
146Ibid., pp. 25-26.
147Ibid.
divert an increasing proportion of the waqf revenues for themselves; thus in 1174/1760, 1,263,200 ardabs of grain were owed by the nāzirīs of the waqfs to the Holy Cities.  

The șurrah īrṣāliyyah included contributions which came out of the surplus remaining in the imperial treasury of Egypt after all the year's expenditures were made. The șurrah īrṣāliyyah paid the bulk of the cost of repairing the forts, cisterns, and other buildings and equipment in the Holy Cities and along the road of pilgrimage. It also paid the dues of the sherifs of the Hejaz and the bedouin dwelling along the pilgrimage route. The cash contributions of the șurrah īrṣāliyyah increased over the years. For instance, in 1154/1741, the amount of cash sent to the Holy Cities was 262 kīs and 1154 para; this increased to 444 kīs and 1345 para in 1161/1748.

In addition to the cash contributions the Imperial Treasury of Egypt sent about forty thousand ardabs of grain every year to feed people living in Mecca and Medina. This grain was sent to the Hejaz on boats through the Red

148 Topkapi Saray archives E 10011, cited by Shaw in Ottoman Egypt, p. 270.
149 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 239.
150 Ibid., p. 309.
152 Ibid., pp. 23-28.
153 Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 261.
Both şurrahs were sent in the care of the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. In a meeting held at Birkat al-Ḥājj, the commander received the şurrahs in the presence of the Ottoman governor of Egypt and the senior Ottoman officials in Egypt; he promised to protect and deliver the şurrahs to their beneficiaries. However, in some years, the emir al-Ḥajj withheld for his own profit the subsidies intended for the tribes living along the pilgrimage route and in those years the pilgrimage caravans were ravaged by the fierce raids of the tribes seeking to collect what they considered to be their right, as was mentioned previously.

The Ottoman government also appointed a commissioner and two clerks from among the Ottoman officials in Egypt to assist the emir al-Ḥajj in distributing the şurrahs. The distribution of the şurrahs usually took place during the course of the journey and shortly after the arrival of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan in Mecca and Medina, under the supervision of the caravan's commander.

The Ottomans also dispatched subsidies to the Hejaz

154Ibid.


156Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 249.

157al-Rashīdī, Husr al-Ṣafā', p. 35.

158Shaw, Ottoman Egypt, p. 254.
with the Syrian pilgrimage caravan. The beneficiaries of these subsidies were almost the same as those who benefited from the Ottomans' subsidies dispatched from Egypt. They included the poor of Mecca and Medina, the sherifs of the Hejaz, and sometimes rich notables of the Hejaz who managed to get on the rolls of beneficiaries. 159

Money for the şurrah dispatched with the Syrian pilgrimage caravan was raised from the Sultan's personal allowance and income from pious foundations, the Haramayn waqfs 160 in the rest of the Ottoman empire.

The waqfs were an important source of funds for the şurrah. They were administered by a special bureau known as the bureau of accounts for the Holy Cities, haremeyn muhasebesi kalemi, 161 which was under the supervision of the grand vezir's office. But on the whole, şurrah revenues and their expenditure were managed by the kizlar agası, who held the post of the supervisor of the pious foundation for the Holy Cities. 162

On the twelfth of Rajab every year, a special purse commissioner, amīn al-şurrah, was appointed in İstanbúl. 163

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159 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 126.

160 Ibid., p. 127.


162 Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 127.

163 Ibid., p. 128 and Uzunçarşılı, Mekke-i Mükerreme, p. 35.
The commissioner was normally chosen from the upper bracket of the Ottoman officials that included bureau chiefs, from trusted members of the palace bureaucracy, or from the ulama of Istanbul.164

The purse commissioner usually left Istanbul around the middle of Rajab to join the Syrian pilgrimage caravan at Damascus.165 Official and popular celebrations marked his departure from Istanbul.166 To ensure the security of the şurrah against brigands, the Sultan ordered the governors of the provinces through which the şurrah passed to escort it within their respective territories.167

The purse commissioner usually arrived at Damascus in the middle of Ramadān.168 From Damascus onward, the commissioner was under the protection of the governor of Damascus and became one of the Ottoman officials in the Syrian pilgrimage caravan. The governor, as emir al-Ḥajj, assumed the care of the şurrah on the long journey to the Hejaz.169

The payments from the şurrah to the bedouin living

164Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 128.

165Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, p. 72.

166For more details on the elaborate ceremonies of the commissioner's departure, see Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, pp. 128-130, and Uzuncarşılı, Mekke, pp. 35-40.

167Rafiq, The Province of Damascus, p. 73.

168al-Ḥalāq, Hawādith Dimashq, p. 50.

169Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 131.
along the Damascus-Mecca pilgrimage route were made in two installments, half on the way to Mecca and half on the way back. Then upon the arrival of the caravan in Mecca, the amīn al-ṣurrah presented the ṣurrah registers to the emir of Mecca, and the money was distributed under the supervision of the emir, the qāḍī of Mecca and the commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan.171

However, corruption among the Ottoman officials of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan prevented the full Ottoman contribution from reaching its intended beneficiaries. For example, in 1730, Ismā'īl Pāshā al-CAzm was dismissed from office on the grounds of embezzlement of pilgrimage funds. He was ordered imprisoned in the Damascus citadel and all of his property was to be confiscated so that the state could recover the money intended for the pilgrimage.172

In spite of the Ottomans' sincere effort to organize and protect the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan as well as the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, corruption among the Ottoman officials in Egypt and Syria often deprived the caravans of safe passage from and to the Hejaz.

Corruption also prevented the Ottoman subsidies from reaching their beneficiaries among the people of the Hejaz. Instead, some of the subsidies were diverted for the

171Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, p. 131.
172Ibid., p. 157.
personal benefit of the Ottoman officials in Egypt and Syria. This led, as we saw previously, to savage attacks on the pilgrimage caravans. Thus, since the Ottoman sultans considered every successful attack on a caravan as a blow to the Ottomans' prestige and their claim to protecting the Holy Cities, it seems that the Ottomans had failed to provide the pilgrimage caravans with better management and protection, and to maintain their image as Guardians of the Holy Cities.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Ottoman government in the Hejaz during the eighteenth century was a mixture of centrally and locally appointed officials. It did not introduce a structured administrative system, nor did it establish a clear policy on the matter of relations between the central government in Istanbul and the sherifs of the Hejaz. In addition, the Ottoman government did not regulate relations between the emir of Mecca and the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz, Egypt, and Syria. Throughout this period, the Ottoman government continued its policy of splitting the power in the Hejaz among four groups: the vâlîs of Egypt and Damascus; the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans; the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz; and the emir of Mecca, which created turmoil and disturbances in the region. The same policy, however, was the motivating force for the emir of Mecca to emancipate himself from the other groups, subsequently increasing his authority and influence in the region, until by the end of the century, the emir became the real ruler of the Hejaz.

Since the Ottoman government had authorized the vâlîs of Egypt to deal with matters concerning the Hejaz, the
vālīs tried with relative success during the eighteenth century to maintain an effective influence in the region. The best example of this effort was Ǧālī Bey al-Kabīr's expedition of 1184/1770 to annex the Hejaz. When he tried to install an emir who would yield to his wishes, he encountered the stubborn resistance of Sherif Ǧāmīd b. Saʿīd and the partial cooperation of the sherifian family, which led to the failure of the Egyptian expedition designed to annex the Hejaz permanently to Ǧālī Bey's dominion.

The commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans tried throughout the eighteenth century to intervene in the affairs of the Hejaz and to overshadow the emir of Mecca, using Ottoman government authorization. In 1171/1758, Ǧusayn Bey Kushkush, the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, tried to oust Sherif Misāṣad, the emir of Mecca, and replace him with Sherif Mubārak b. Muḥammad. However, Ǧusayn Bey failed in his attempt and was forced by Sherif Misāṣad to leave the Hejaz, as I discussed in Chapter Two. In the next year, however, the commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan succeeded in removing Sherif Misāṣad from his office, proclaiming that the Ottoman government had authorized him to do so.

The Ottoman government policy of dividing their power in the Hejaz contributed to the decline of the power of the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz, particularly the Ǧanjaq of Jeddah and the sheikh of the Medina Ǧaram. The Ǧanjaq had
to share important functions regarding the Hejaz with the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Since the Şanjaq had to report to Cairo, the Vâlí of Egypt enjoyed an effective influence over the Şanjaq through the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, to the extent of removing the Şanjaq from his office, as Muḥammad Abū al-Dhahab did in 1184/1770, during the Egyptian expedition in the Hejaz of that year.

Although it seemed that the Ottoman policy of distributing power in the Hejaz among the four groups seemed as if it would limit the power of the Emir of Mecca, the policy, on the contrary, gave the emirs of Mecca the opportunity to exercise their strong personalities and thus increase their power in the region throughout the eighteenth century. The emirs of Mecca had, as we have seen in the previous chapters, minimized the power of the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz and curbed the intervention of the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravan in the affairs of the region.

The conflict of 1161/1748 between Sherif Mas'Cûd, the Emir of Mecca, and ǦaLi Pasha, the Şanjaq of Jeddah, over the Emir's share of the customs duties of Jeddah, showed very clearly the increased power of the Emir and the beginning of the decline of the Şanjaq's power. Sherif Mas'Cûd, as I discussed previously, not only took his share by force, but also compelled the Şanjaq to leave the Hejaz,
demanding his replacement from the Ottoman government.

Another good example of the Meccan emirs' efforts to minimize the power and influence of the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz was the conflict and clash of 1194/1780 between Sherif Surūr and the sheikh of the Medina Ḥaram. As we have seen in Chapters Three and Four, Sherif Surūr prevailed over the sheikh of the Ḥaram and not only dismissed the sheikh from his office, but also took him prisoner to Mecca, despite the fact that the appointment or dismissal of the sheikh was the prerogative of the Ottoman government.

To check the intervention of the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans in the Hejaz, the emir of Mecca often played one of the commanders against the other. The best example of this strategy was Sherif Misācad's manoeuvre in the pilgrimage season of 1183/1770, with ʿUthmān Pāshā, then commander of the Syrian pilgrimage caravan, to prevent Muḥammad Abū al-Dhabab, commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan, from achieving his goal of replacing Sherif Misācad with Sherif ʿAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn as governor of the Hejaz. The result, as Chapters Two and Four demonstrate, was in favor of the emir of Mecca.

The emirs of Mecca had used another method to restrict interference on the part of the commanders of the pilgrimage caravans, and that was force. An excellent example of this method was the conflict between Sherif Surur and Murad Bey, the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan in the
pilgrimage season of 1193/1779. While Murād Bey tried, as I discussed in Chapter Three, to oust Sherif Surūr and replace him with Sherif Sulaymān b. Yaḥyā, Sherif Surūr simply arrested Sulaymān and advanced on the Egyptians; not until Murād Bey apologized did Sherif Surūr abandon his intention of fighting the commander of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan.

With regard to the Ottoman government's efforts to organize the pilgrimage and provide it with the best possible protection, and concerning the government's annual dispatch of subsidies to the Hejaz, corruption undermined the government's efforts. Withholding, by the commanders of the caravans, of the dues earmarked for the bedouins along the pilgrimage routes, led to savage attacks on the caravans. In one incident of that kind the whole caravan was utterly destroyed in the case of the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan of 1199/1784, raided between Mecca and Medina.

Moreover, embezzlement of the Ottoman subsidies for the people of the Hejaz by the management of the ṣurrah led without doubt to the buildup of social tensions in the Hejaz. The expulsion of the foreigners from Mecca in 1149/1736 is a good example of the social unrest created by corruption in the ṣurrah management. The embezzlement of the ṣurrah funds prevented the full amount of the surrah from reaching the beneficiaries in the Hejaz, and as I discussed in Chapters Two and Four, the primary reason for
the expulsion of foreigners from the Hejaz was economical.

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman government's policy of dividing the responsibility for matters concerning the Hejaz among four different groups, and the corruption in the management of the pilgrimage and the šurrah, certainly created an opportune situation for the emirs of Mecca to free themselves from control by the other groups and increase their power in the Hejaz. By the end of the century, the emir of Mecca acted, not without reason, as if he were indeed the sole authority in the region.

However, the effort of the emir of Mecca to increase his power in the Hejaz was not by any means an attempt to declare his independence from the Ottoman government in Istanbul. None of the sherifs who ruled the Hejaz throughout the period under study had displayed hostility towards the Ottoman sultans. The emir of Mecca's action was merely to increase his power in the Hejaz and to have firm control over the affairs of the region by minimizing the intervention of the vālīs of Egypt and Syria, the commanders of the Egyptian and Syrian pilgrimage caravans, and the Ottoman officials in the Hejaz.
APPENDIX I

MĀḌĪ AL-ḤIJĀZ WA-ḤĀDIRUH
H. M. NAṢĪF (PP. 17-18)

1.1 Qānūn Abū Numay.

[p. 17] It is a law, qānūn, or a constitution, dāstūr, which the Hejazi nation, al-Ummah al-Ḥijāzīyah, follows in its relations with the sherifs of the Hejaz. The qānūn was regulated by the forefather of the Hāshimīyah family, Sherif Abū Numay, who ruled Mecca in 931 A.H. [1524 A.D.] and who died in 992 [1584]. As I believe, there has not been a law put into effect or regulated which is more unjust and more severe than this qānūn [of Abū Numay]. If we searched for the meaning of injustice, zuīlm, in any dictionary we would not find it in its adequate meaning but in this qānūn. And what helped Abū Numay to regulate it [the qānūn] was what he saw from his passive nation [for not taking any action to stop the Sherif] who abided him passively for its weakness, lowness, and ignorance. Otherwise he would not dare to regulate it or to impose any stipulation of it. Add to that the dedication of the sherifs who came after Abū Numay to maintain this law until today [the author wrote his book in 1349/1930], and the silent and
content position of the government against injustice and despotism, or maybe fear and weakness. But with the determination of the sheriffs to apply this law, the circumstances sometimes do not help them to apply but a little of it [the qānūn], maybe in fear of people. I have not seen a copy of it [the qānūn] which I could put in the hands of the readers, but as it is said the qanun cannot be found but [with] a few sheriffs. It contains thirty-six stipulations summarized as follows:

1. The emirate of Hejaz should be kept in the Hāshimiyah family, the descendants of Abū Numay.

2. It is prohibited for any sheriff to work in any job or vocation [which would degrade the sheriff] but in cutting wood or camel herding or agriculture.

3. If a sheriff is killed, then four people should be taken from the family of the murderer or from the village [of the murderer] to be killed for the murdered sheriff.

4. One who slaps a sheriff should have his hand cut off.

5. [p. 18] A reviler of a sheriff should have his tongue cut out.

6. A sheriff cannot be tried in his opponent's council.
7. If a sheriff attempts to kill, or raises a weapon, on another sheriff, he should be expelled from al-Bilād [Mecca].
8. A sheriff should not be killed if he killed a non-sheriff.
9. The ruling sheriff should have one-third of the victim's compensation.

So goes the rest of the qānūn. I have striven to acquire it [the qānūn] from a friend of mine, but he refused [to give it to me] in fear of losing his position [presumably in the government].
APPENDIX II

TĀRĪKH ASHĪRĀF WA-UMARĀ' MAKKAH AL-MUKARRAMAH
CaBD ALLĀH B. CaBD AL-SHAKūR

II.1 The Revolt of the Janissaries at Mecca, 1146/1733
(fols. 10v-12v)

[fol. 10v, line 3] In the days of Sherif Muḥammad [b. CaBd Allāh, Rabī‘ I 1146/August 1733], a soldier from among the Yemeni soldiers of the Sherif went to Maṣlā, where he bathed in the pool of the garden of Um al-Maṭar. It happened that Ḥusayn Afandī, the Janissaries' Aghā, was on an outing with his family and servants in the garden at the same time that the soldier was taking a bath. The women of Ḥusayn Aghā were in a room where they could be seen from the pool where the soldier was bathing. Therefore, a Janissary caught the Yemeni soldier and beat him. The soldier in return called on his Yemeni comrades who rushed to help him. The Yemenis shot at the Aghā and his companions. Moreover, the Yemenis looted some of the Aghā's belongings. When our lord Sherif Muḥammad heard the news, he at once rushed to the scene and called the Aghā to tell him the whole story. When Ḥusayn Aghā heard the sheriff's voice, he
opened a window and began to tell the sherif what had happened and what he and his companions had suffered. At that moment, a Yemeni soldier hit the Aghā with a bullet in his [fol. 11r] chest without the knowledge of the sherif nor on his order. The Aghā died of his wound and as a result, a great disturbance broke out between the sherif and the Janissaries. The soldiers of Egypt [Janissaries] grouped [themselves] in Suwayqah where they fortified the houses and blocked the streets. They also called upon the other Janissaries in Jeddah who hurried to Mecca and joined them. They [the Janissaries] also wrote to Egypt telling of what had happened to them. The Janissaries held their position for about a month, while the sherif was in his house with his soldiers and supporters; they were determined to oust the sherif. In the meantime, they [the Janissaries] sent money to Sherif Mas'Cūd [Sherif Muḥammad's opponent] to mobilize the tribes. Sherif Mas'Cūd took the money and left at once for Wadi Murr. He then sent for sherifs and bedouins in the vicinity to join him. The Janissaries were still holding their position in Mecca blocking the streets for the common people. The great wazīr Abū Bakr Pāshā arrived in Mecca on the request of the Janissaries. The Janissaries had sent many letters to the wazīr to join them, but he postponed leaving for
Mecca [fol. 11v] on the pretext that he was busy. Thus when he arrived at Mecca the Janissaries began preparing for fighting but he [Abū Bakr] asked them to wait for three days until he had investigated the situation. Then he began to disunite the Janissaries by using some of them against the others, and when they knew that the wazir's intention was peace, which was the right thing to do, they abandoned their goals. He [Abū Bakr] therefore effected a truce between the Janissaries and Sherif Muḥammad. A caller called in the Grand Mosque and on the streets [declaring] the peace, and everyone of the two sides abided by the peace. Next day the Janissaries left for Jeddah. When they arrived at Jeddah they broke the truce and sent for Sherif Masʿūd to join them. They also sent him a great deal of money and many arms. Moreover, the Janissaries took over Jeddah and seized it from the wazir of the sherif. Thus Sherif Masʿūd's position became stronger [fol. 12r] and his goal of seizing the governorship [of the Hejaz] loomed closer. He left his place and camped at Wadi al-Ḥudaybiyyah. As a result the road to Jeddah and its vicinity was blocked, which caused inflation and increased the price of food. In the meantime, the sherif of Mecca emerged with his soldiers and supporters and camped at Ṭuwā' and around Zāhir. The sherifs, meanwhile, went
over to Sherif Mas'ud's side, leaving Sherif Muhammad with only his soldiers who hated the Turks [the Janissaries]. The Janissaries left Jeddah and joined Sherif Mas'ud. Sherif Mas'ud therefore left his place and camped facing the forces of his opponent. The inevitable battle broke out where the heroes fought each other and the fight flared until the middle of the day, when each side stopped fighting to learn that Sherif Muhammad had emerged victorious over his uncle and the Turks. [fol. 12v] Thus Sherif Mas'ud and his companions [including the Janissaries] left for Jeddah.

II.2 The Ban on Smoking in Mecca, 1147/1734 (fol. 15v-16v).

[fol. 15v, line 13]. In this year [1147 A.H.] his Highness, "Ṣāhib al-Siyādah," and the origin of governorship, Ṣayālah, and caliphate, khilāfah, [Sherif Mas'ud] ordered his caller to call that nobody should smoke tobacco in public or pass smoking through a street or shop and threatened anyone who smoked, which I believe would not be effective. Thus tobacco lifted from the coffeehouses [fol. 16r] and the markets, and [the sheriff's police] arrested whoever was caught possessing tobacco. I didn't believe that this lofty sheriff banned smoking on the grounds of its
prohibition, taḥrīm, or permission, taḥlīl, but because the low and the despicable smoked in public and they would not even quit smoking if a sherif or an ġālim or a noble passed by them. And maybe tobacco was smoked between the Ṣafā' and the Marwah [part of the Grand Mosque] which are the shrines of Allāh [God] and which should be venerated by every Muslim, particularly the rulers. And maybe some people indulge too much in smoking so that when a sherif passes by they do not take it out of their mouths. The ulama had studies and sayings on smoking ranging from permission to prohibition, and I have not seen a single ground in the Sunnah [the Prophet's tradition] or in the Book [the Qur'ān] for those who prohibited smoking, but [their decision] simply [was taken by] analogy, qīyās, and Allāh the Glorified and the Sublime knows the right, al-sawāb. While the misfortune of smoking is general and among the sherifs, the ulama, and the common people thus, applying the saying of prohibiting smoking would then fornicate, taṣfiq, the Muslims in general, who are either smokers or have smokers in their houses or eyewitnesses [of smoking] and not a single one of them [the Muslims] is outside of these three categories. Then there will be no justice, ġadl, among the Muslims, especially that it [justice] is a condition
in marriage, [fol. 16v] which accordingly categorizes some of the marriages [of the Muslims] fornication, *ṣifāḥ*, according to some madhhabs. God forbid us from bigotry, *taqassub*, and from those whose opinion is not correct.

II.3 The Arrival of Nādir Shāh's Messenger at Mecca, 1157/1744 (fols. 28v-31r)

[fol. 28v, line 12] In the year 1157* of the Ḥijrah a messenger from Nādir Shāh, the Sultan of the Persians, the libertine "*fājir,*" who ruined the Muslim states with his outrage and who had the surname Ṭīhmāz because he took the side of the devil, arrived at Mecca. He is the unjust, *zālim*, and the tyrant, *ghashūm*, the king whose existence is a nuisance, *nakad*, and misfortune, *shū'um*. He tyrannized [people] on earth and oppressed [fol. 29r] states until he dared to attack some of the Ottoman provinces without fear of their strong power. He took the province of Iraq where he attacked Basra and its vicinity. He also took the citadel of Irbil and many of the Kurdish lands and took over Kufa and the villages around it. When he arrived at Mosul he could not take it, neither

*The year given in the manuscript is 1147 A.H., which I believe was the scribe's mistake. The correct year is 1157 A.H. See Daḥlān, p. 193; al-Suwaydī, fols. 103v-104v; and de Gaury, p. 169.*
by fighting nor by tricks and whose [Mosul] people and bedouins exhausted him [Nādir Shāh] and forced him to leave their city, failed and desperate. What had occurred was God's will. Thus he [Nādir Shāh] left for his land [Persia]. It happened that he had taken India, Bukhara, Daghestan, and the area around them. This Ẓiḥmāz sent a letter with Sayyid Naṣr Allāh al-Ḥusaynī to our lord Sherif Masʿūd, may God help him [Sherif Masʿūd] to fulfill his dream. The letter stated that an agreement between us [Nādir Shāh] and the Ottoman Empire had been reached, in the presence of their [the Ottomans] deputy at Baghdad, Aḥmad Pāshā [fol. 29v] and a group of ulama, to recognize the Jaʿfari madhhab which should be worthy of recognition. Also, to allow an imam to lead people in prayer all the time and everywhere and that should be observed in all the mosques, and who wants to follow this imam should not be stopped or harassed. Moreover, to mention our name [Nādir Shāh] on the pulpits, manabīr, with the mentioning of that of the Ottomans all over the Muslim lands. I [Nādir Shāh] am sending to you [Sherif Masʿūd] the imam of our madhhab, al-Sayyid Naṣr Allāh; therefore do not oppose him or I will advance [on Mecca] and let him lead the people in prayer at al-Masjid al-Ḥarām [in Mecca] and the Mosque of the Prophet, peace be upon him, in Medina. This
letter was full of threats and no one doubts the grossness of the Persians, Čajam. Sherif Mas'ūd and the people of Mecca were disturbed by this unbelievable matter. The people of Mecca were disturbed very much by what this rotten person [Nādīr Shāh] had requested, to observe the heterodox madhhab, madhhab al-rāfiḍah, while all what he [Nādīr Shāh] said in his letter was false and lies about the Ottoman Empire, may Allāh glorify it and keep it safe [fol. 30r] from lowness and disgrace. Then our lord the Sherif consulted his advisors and the senior members of his administration on this matter, fearing the power of the oppressor. The consultation resulted in a right matter, that is to send a copy of the letter to the Ottoman government [in Istanbul] and to ask Țihmāz's messenger to wait [in Mecca] through the duration of the trip [between Mecca and Istanbul, until the arrival of the Ottoman government's reply]. In the meantime, Sherif Mas'ūd should treat the Persian messenger well and look after his needs. [Sherif Mas'ūd] followed the counselor's advice and [therefore] treated the Persian messenger very generously waiting for the results of the situation. However, the governor, vālī, of Jeddah, Abū Bakr Pāshā, did not accept the outcome of the consultation and insisted that the Persian messenger should be
killed. But Sherif Mas'ūd, God help him, refused to hand over the messenger to be killed, because it would be a shame that nobody [among the sherifs] had done before him. He also replied to the Pāshā by saying we will keep him [the messenger] and I'm serving under the direction [of the Ottoman sultan]. Abū Bakr Pāshā attacked the sheriff vehemently and accused him of converting to that madhhab [the Ja'farī]. The sheriff feared that the Pāshā might accuse him to [fol. 30v] the Ottoman Empire of conversion to that madhhab; therefore, he sought advice on this matter. The advice [of the Sheriff's advisor] came to revile the Shi'ah in public. Thus the sheriff was happy and ordered a public reviling of Shi'ism. Meanwhile a letter arrived for the governor of Jeddah from his nephew Aḥmad Pāshā, who was the governor of Erzerum, saying that the Ottoman army had defeated the army of Ṭihmāz, and he [Nādir Shāh] returned to his city [in Persia]. Abū Bakr Pāshā was happy and delighted. In the meantime, Sherif Mas'ūd had not received a reply yet from the Ottomans for the letter he sent them, and therefore he was concerned. Nevertheless he pretended that he was delighted by the news which Abū Bakr received, fearing that he might be accused of a wrongdoing. When the Syrian pilgrimage arrived [at Mecca] and its emir was As'ad Pāshā, God bless him, he
brought with him the Ottoman order to hand over [fol. 31r] Sayyid Naṣr Allāh to Asʿad Pāshā. Thus Asʿad Pāshā took Sayyid Naṣr Allāh with him and left for Istanbul.

II.4 The Intervention of the Commanders of the Egyptian and the Syrian Pilgrimages in the Affairs of the Hejaz (fol. 44v-48r)

[fol. 44v, line 13] At the end of the year seventy-one [1171 A.H.] the pilgrims arrived at Mecca where the land seemed to be smaller because of the huge crowd. In that year, ʿAbd Allāh Pāshā Shatanjī was the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage and Ḥusayn Bey Kushkush was the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage, a šanjaq who does not consider matters carefully and who does not know much. Sherif ʿAbd Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Fiṣr contacted him [Ḥusayn Kushkush] [fol. 45r] and persuaded him to take on a dangerous matter and to install Sherif Mubārak b. Muḥammad in the seat of the governorship [of the Hejaz] and he [Sherif ʿAbd Allāh] paid him [Ḥusayn Bey] a large sum of money. Therefore, Ḥusayn Bey listened to al-Fiṣr whose idea was limited. Ḥusayn Bey unwisely agreed with them [al-Fiṣr and his band] without considering the consequences. Thus they rallied a number of the sheriffs and persuaded them to revolt. The Egyptian
soldiers [Janissaries at Mecca] agreed with them [the plotters] despite the fact that they were supposed to be the defenders of the sherif [emir] of Mecca. Then they all determined their goals and organized themselves while Sherif Misâ̄cad was not aware of the intrigue. When everything was in order they [the plotters] met on Sunday, the twenty-first of Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1171, and proclaimed Sherif Mubârak [the new emir of Mecca] in the presence of the qâḏi without a royal decree, firman, or legal document. They also positioned the soldiers on the roof of the Ḥaram and the pulpit, and took all the schools as fortresses and they fortified the houses around Dâr al-Saṣâdah [the emir's residence]. Meanwhile, Sherif Misâ̄cad was asleep in his house and did not awake until firing woke him up and he knew that the best thing to do was to hold his ground. Then he asked the senior members of his government about the situation and who was behind it, who told him [fol. 45v] with details of the whole story. Thereupon he [Sherif Misâ̄cad] called his men and soldiers and paid them a large sum of money. A fight broke out between the two sides where the horsemen prevailed over the rest. The fight lasted all day where those whose death was inevitable died. On Monday, the pressure on the Turks became heavier and they were in disarray. The fight continued the
night of Monday and when the morning came Sherif MisāÊºad's side prevailed and the Turks therefore pleaded for peace from everywhere. When it [the result of the fight] was obvious that Sherif MubāÊºarak was defeated, he [therefore] pleaded for peace, asking his uncle [Sherif MisāÊºad] to pardon him and the şanjaq [Husayn Bey]. The reason for their [Sherif MubāÊºarak's forces] defeat was the advancing by Sherif Aḥmad b. SaÊºÊºd [brother of Sherif MisāÊºad] with his soldiers from lower Mecca and the joining of al-Ḥakim ǦAbd al-Nabī with the people of the neighborhoods who looted Ḥusayn Bey of his ammunition, money, the horses and mules. [fol. 46r] When the şanjaq knew of the looting of his treasury, his back was broken and he was devastated. Sherif MubāÊºarak left the place, after he pleaded for peace, and went to Wadi Murr al-Ẓahrān [Wadi FāÊºmah]. The şanjaq [Husayn Bey] was devastated that his goal had failed and his money had been looted. Thus he refused to leave because he did not have the means of leaving and therefore he appealed to Sherif MisāÊºad to return to him his belongings and collect them from the people, whereupon Sherif MisāÊºad ordered his commander ǦAbd al-Nabī b. al-Mās to collect what he could find in the hands of the people. The commander collected whatever he could put his hands on, such as tents, water skins [qirāb] and the
animals, and returned them to Ḫusayn Bey who then took them and left. The caller of his misfortune called after him:

If the donkey, himār, left with Um ʿAmr then [hoping] neither Um ʿAmr [nor the donkey] would return

Sherif Mubāрак b. Muḥammad stayed at the wadi several days as if those days were years for him. Sherif ʿAbd Allāh b. Saʿīd, [fol. 46v] and Sulaymān b. Yaḥyā mediated between Sherifs MisāṣCAD and Mubāрак. They also directed Sherif Mubāрак to the good way [of dealing with Sherif MisāṣCAD] and obtained a pardon for him from Sherif MisāṣCAD. Accordingly, Sherif Mubāрак returned with the two sherifs to Mecca in the beginning of Muḥarram 1172 of the Ḥijrah of the master of the Prophets. In the middle of the month, Sherif Mubāрак went to Sherif MisāṣCAD where he was arrested and put in prison, relieving Sherif MisāṣCAD [of his trouble]. Sherif Mubāрак remained in prison until the end of the year, and on the eighth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah he died after suffering from imprisonment. [His body] was taken out of prison and was buried around Zāhr. He left a son called Sulaymān. Sherif MisāṣCAD was certain that what had happened was the work of al-Sayd ʿAbd Allāh b. Ahmad al-FīCR, and definitely his [al-FīCR's] involvement. Therefore, Sherif MisāṣCAD ordered al-FīCR to leave the sherifs' territories and
not to remain in any of the Sherif's dominions, and if he [al-FiCyr] did not leave with his belongings then the sherif would destroy all al-FiCyr's house over his head. Thus al-FiCyr left Mecca with his slaves, supporters and members of his clan. He went in the direction of the Yemen. Sherif MisāCadr sent [fol. 47r] a detachment after him [al-FiCyr] to follow him and to assure his departure. al-FiCyr arrived at ṢanCā where he was received well by its ruler, who generously welcomed him in his land. The ruler of the Yemen also offered al-FiCyr to back him up [against Sherif MisāCadr] with money and men to return fighting to the land [Mecca] but al-FiCyr politely refused to fight and thanked the Yemeni ruler for what he had done for him. The imam of the Yemen sent to Sherif MisāCadr appealing and asking him to pardon al-FiCyr and to return to him what he [the sherif] used to grant [in subsidy]. When the letter [of the imam] arrived to Sherif MisāCadr and he understood it well, he pardoned al-FiCyr and let him return to his homeland. Thus al-FiCyr returned to Mecca in Jumādā I having a very comfortable life. When the pilgrimage season [of 1172 A.H.] arrived and the pilgrims flowed from everywhere [to Mecca], ʿAbd Allah Pāshā was the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage mentioned previously and whose tricks and deceptions were well known. The
pilgrims completed the rituals and stood in the Land of the Generous King. Sherif MīsāCd stood on Ārāfāt as he traditionally used to do [every year]. Then he spent a night at Muzdalifah, and in the morning he went to Minā where he stoned [the Signs of the Devil] and shaved. On the next day he [Sherif MīsāCd] [fol. 47v] wore the approval khilCah [of his reign] and the letters read on his name. On the third day and when it was time to leave, Sherif MīsāCd left Minā after he gained happiness. The vālī of Damascus, al-Shām, in his camp at al-Muḫaṣṣab conceived a plan to arrest Sherif MīsāCd. He [the vālī] sent for the Sherif asking for his presence to discuss improvement of Āyn Zubaydah, hatching a plot against the Sherif. His Highness the sherif at once rode with his soldiers to the destiny of God the Sublime. The qāḏīs, the commanders of the pilgrims, and the ulama were summoned to the discussions as well. When the discussion regarding the Āyn was under way among them and when the volume of their voices increased, the vālī of the al-Shām attacked the sherif vehemently and accused him of causing the people of the Protected City [Mecca] to suffer from thirst and of diverting the Āyn to al-CAbdīyah. It was entirely a ploy because Āyn Zubaydah does not run to it [al-CAbdīyah] and whoever told him [the vālī] was lying. However,
the vâlî did not listen to the sheriff or accept his apology but insisted on what he was determined to do and was determined on his deception. Thus he ordered those who were around him [his guards] who did not have a brain or morals [to arrest Sherif MisâCad] and threw him in chains and put his brother Sherif Jaçfar in the governorship and the protection of the Bayt [the Grand Mosque in Mecca], may its pillars stand strong. The vâlî sent his commander, katkhudâ, with Sherif Jaçfar to Dâr al-Saçâdah. When the news spread in Mecca, people ran into the streets and the markets, trampling each other. When the vâlî of the al-Shâm heard of the trampling of the crowds, he at once rode with the commanders of pilgrimage, the governor of Jeddah, and the qâdis, reading a firman in the Grand Mosque indicating that he [the vâlî] was authorized to be in charge. When the reading of the firman ended, Sherif Jaçfar was standing by and was proclaimed [the new emir of Mecca] in the streets of the city. The situation calmed down and the people everywhere in the cities and bedouins obeyed him [the new emir]. By the end of the day ġAbd Allah Pâshâ released Sherif MisâCad after the appeal of Sherif Jaçfar [for Sherif MisâCad's release] whereupon he [Sherif MisâCad] left for al-ğAbdîyah.
II.5 The Conflict Between Sherif Misā'ūd and Sherif Aḥmad b. ČAbd al-Karīm Leading to the Egyptian Intervention in the Hejaz, 1182/1768 (fols. 50v-55r)

[fol. 50v, line 1] In the year eighty-two after a thousand and a hundred [1182 A.H.] a conflict between his Highness Sherif Misā'ūd and Sherif Aḥmad b. ČAbd al-Karīm took place and was the origin of the [following] damage. Sherif Aḥmad revolted [against the emir of Mecca]. He was the advocate of the inevitable damage. He settled at the Wadi [Wadi Fāţmah] where Āl Barakāt and the people of the area joined him. They agreed to appoint al-Sayd ČAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn as their leader, putting him in the position of the heart and the eye. He [Sherif ČAbd Allāh] agreed with them, sending money and mobilizing what he could of men. The first thing they agreed upon and had their intentions on was to loot the seaport of Jeddah to strengthen their power by the arms and supplies in it. It was narrated in the hadīth of the Master of the Creatures that the deeds of people] are on their intentions. Thus Sherif ČAbd Allāh organized the people and left with them in the end of Ṣafar of the above-mentioned year, determined to accomplish what he had hoped for [the taking of Jeddah] in spite of the existence of the wall [of the city]. When they arrived at the city, the people fortified themselves
and mounted the wall, firing at the invaders with cannons and balls. The fight continued without achieving a thing and the invaders were not safe in the presence of fire. Thus they retired to the huts on the outskirts of the city, after many of them fled. They [the defenders] made flaming arrows [fol. 51r] and fired them into the huts. The invaders could not stay in the huts because of the fire. It is said that the deputy of the sheriff [Misā Cad] sent people to set them afire, but the right saying of the two is the first. Sheriff ČAbd Allāh b. Husayn returned to the Wadi without achieving his goal. Thus his hope of taking over the governorship was weakened and his people left him. He therefore left for Egypt asking its master for help. The master of Egypt was stubborn, and was the devil ČAli. He exceeded Pharaoh in injustice. He was an oppressor, killing unjustly, executing and fighting everywhere. He betrayed and opposed the Ottoman Empire, abolishing its rule [in Egypt]. The power of his aggression prevailed and his revolt was obvious. It is said that he claimed the Sultan's dominions for himself and wrote his name over the Sultan's name. And that was not enough for him, Thus he furnished an army taking Damascus, al-Shām. The governor of al-Shām fled and settled in Aleppo. He [ČAli Bey] also [fol. 51v] took over upper Egypt,
Şa'cīd, killing its governor Abū Hamām who was a great man and the seal of the generous. After the defeat of [Abū Hamām], ʿAlī Bey took over the waqf of the Haramayn and was the reason for the end of subsidies to the inhabitants of the Holy Cities. He [ʿAlī Bey] also caused the halting of the waqf [revenues] which arrived from those lands [Egypt]. The merchants of those areas became poor because of his [ʿAlī Bey] injustice. He also weakened the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire and strengthened the power of the ghuzz and the sanqaqs. He [ʿAlī Bey] consolidated his sole authority everywhere and whenever he saw money, he took it; or gold, he confiscated it; or silver, he seized it; or land, he grabbed it. He was the source of corruption and the remnant of what God destroyed of the people of Ĉād. ʿAlī Bey used to put a slave of his called Abū al-Dhahab in the commanding office of wars. He [Abū al-Dhahab] never followed a way of good. It used to be said that from the astonishment and the attraction of this life that who established a state killed himself, except Abū al-Dhahab who killed his master with his own hands. If ʿAlī Bey had no sins but [fol. 52r] sending the Turkish [Egyptian] detachment to fight the Holy City of God and daring to take on the city which is the Qiblah of mankind, it was a great sin on his part. From the arrival of the
detachment at Mecca to forty years later, Mecca never had peace or enjoyed quiet. Some of its houses were looted and the permissible mixed with the prohibited. May God the Sublime in His generosity correct the situation and help us to fulfil our aims. Going back to the arrival of Sherif CAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn at Cairo of Egypt, and what obvious rebellions he caused, he asked CAlī Bey for help without considering the consequences and the damages he would cause. CAlī Bey agreed to Sherif CAbd Allāh's request and fulfilled his wishes. Thus he ordered the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage [Muḥammad Abū al-Ūhahab] to help Sherif CAbd Allāh and to strive in achieving the sherif's goal. He [CAlī Bey] also provoked his rude soldiers to install Sherif CAbd Allāh in the seat of sherifite [of the Hejaz]. When the emir of the [Egyptian] pilgrimage took his orders, the news reached Sherif Misācad [in Mecca] who read Sūrat al-Wāqī'ah before al-Shams wa-ḍuḥāhā [Chapters from the Qur'ān]. When [fol. 52v] the Egyptian pilgrimage arrived at the wadi [Fāṭmah] they went to Mecca leaving Sherif CAbd Allāh to mobilize the bedouins and to wait at the wadi until the proclamation of fighting. The emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage camped at al-Zāhr. The caliphate's son [Sherif Misācad] left Mecca [for the Egyptian camp] and wore his khilīyah from the emir of
the pilgrimage, leaving the hearts of his rivals to burst from envy. The pilgrims completed their rituals as usual gaining the acceptance and the forgiveness of God. That year [1182] the governor of Damascus was Čuţmān Pāshā al-Şādiq, who was in favor of Sherif Misācad and agreed to his wishes. Thus they [Sherif Misācad and Čuţmān Pāshā] agreed to arrange for an early departure for the Egyptian pilgrimage and ask them to leave before their normal departure time, because of their goal with Sherif ČAbd Allāh; the book can be read from the title. Therefore on the 18th of Dhū al-Ĥijjah, they [Sherif Misācad and Čuţmān Pāshā] ordered the Egyptian pilgrimage to leave Mecca and since that was not usual there was disorder in [Mecca]. People did not go to work, causing disarray. The governor of Damascus did not stay in Mecca more than eight days after the departure of the Egyptian pilgrimage, whereupon he left the city. That was what was related to the two emirs [the Egyptian and the Syrian]. However, [fol. 53r] regarding Sherif ČAbd Allāh, when he heard of the departure of the sanjaq [Abū al-Dahhab] he was infuriated. Thus he spent money mobilizing men and called for war. Tribes and sheriffs joined him, except the sherifs of Āl Ḥasan. Sherif Misācad, on the other hand, mobilized double of what Sherif ČAbd Allāh had. There were about five
thousand men and soldiers in Sherif CAbd Allâh's register. He marched from the wadi with the bedouins and the sheriffs and later camped at the mountains around Zâhr. Sherif MisâCad marched with his heroes and lions [men] and found no place better fortified for his soldiers than the mountains of MaCâbdah. They fortified their positions and Sherif MisâCad positioned about a thousand riflemen on the mountain over the garden of al-Muftî to check anyone coming from al-Ḥijûn and to protect the back of MisâCad's forces. In the morning of the twenty-seventh of Dhû al-Ḥijjah 1182, the two forces [fol. 53v] clashed with one another around the mountains of MaCâbdah. The horsemen of Āl Barakât advanced from everywhere and a group of them came from Rîc Dhâkhir passing between fires until they came to sūq, market, al-MaCâbdah. Another group came from al-Ḥijûn tracking the forces of Sherif MisâCad in the back; if it had not been for the riflemen [of Sherif MisâCad] on the mountain, the forces of Sherif MisâCad would have been swimming in their blood. When the horsemen from the Ḥijûn advanced, selling their lives in the market of death, the hero of heroes met the advancing troops maneuvering with his sword, wounding some of them as if he were CAntar [a hero of a legend] of his time, the master of the horse, the commander Mithqâl, Sherif
Misā' Cad's commander Silahdār. He [Mithqāl] fought in many battles before this one proving his bravery. He disunited the advancing horsemen [fol. 54r] capturing some and wounding others. One of his victims was al-Sayd al-Ridā, brother of Sherif Ābūd Allāh. The battle resulted in the defeat of Sherif Ābūd Allāh b. Ḥusayn and many were killed from both sides. Sherif Ābūd Allah pleaded for peace and then left for the wadi. He spent a few days in the wadi, then left for Khulayṣ in fear for his life. But even in Khulayṣ he did not feel safe because he had lost all of his money. He therefore left for Egypt, fixing his hopes [fol. 54v] on its master Ālī Bey, telling him of the difficulties he suffered. Ālī Bey calmed Sherif Ābūd Allāh and told him that he would install him in the governorship [of the Hejaz]. Then Ālī Bey dispatched his Mamluk Muḥammad Bey Abū al-Dhahab and two other şanjaqs in a detachment of more than three thousand with thirty cannons and many arms. They also had about a thousand horses. The arms were shipped in three ships sailing in parallel lines with the land forces. Ālī Bey ordered his forces to install Sherif Ābūd Allāh b. Ḥusayn in the governorship of the Hejaz and to oust Sherif Misā' Cad. However, God wished not to let Ālī Bey achieve his aim and not to let him have authority over Sherif Misā' Cad. Sherif Misā' Cad
fell sick for about a month and died [fol. 55r] on 27 Muḥarram 1184 [before the arrival of the Egyptian forces].

II.6 The Sheriffs' Attempt to Assassinate Sherif Surūr, 1192/1778 (fol. 89v-91r)

[fol. 89v, line 9] Sherif Surūr b. Misāq asked followed a strong policy of his in dealing with misbehavior in the Hejaz. He suppressed the authority of the oppressor, tugḥāh, and the arrogant, Cutāh. He broke the power of the tyrants, jābābirāh, in the secured city of God [Mecca]. He did not distinguish in his policy between the sherifs and others. Thus not a strong nor a weak [man] rebelled in his [Sherif Surūr] days. The authority of the sherifs and their unjust power were obvious, plus the authority of their slaves, and the sons of the slaves. Therefore Sherif Surūr treated them accordingly. If any one of the sherifs went over his limit, Sherif Surūr would immediately banish him. [fol. 90r] The sherifs resisted Surūr's actions because his actions were not what they used to enjoy. The sherifs considered themselves superior. A group of sherifs decided to kill Sherif Surūr and then take over his position, returning to the laws, qawānīn, of the past. They agreed to wait for him in the streets and kill him at
night during his inspection tour. al-Sayd ǦAbd al-Majīd b. Ǧaṭīd b. ǦAlī was in the plotting group but he betrayed them and told Sherif Surūr of their intentions. He told Sherif Surūr that there were seven sherifs from Āl Zayd who agreed to betray him, plus another fifty from different places, waiting to kill him on a dark night. Then they would replace him [Sherif Surūr] with al-Sayd Dabāb, and Sālim b. ǦAlī b. ǦAbd Allāh would be the wazīr [the deputy emir of Mecca]. They also divided the offices among themselves. Their leader was al-Sayd Masǧūd al-ǦAwājī. Sherif Surūr did not believe ǦAbd al-Majīd's story and thought that ǦAbd al-Majīd might have created the whole story out of his imagination. However, Sherif Surūr kept ǦAbd al-Majīd with him until he investigated the matter. When night fell, Sherif Surūr sent his scouts to confirm the story [fol. 90v] and to know if ǦAbd al-Majīd was honest. The scouts returned confirming that they had found the plotters on the streets carrying arms. Thereupon Sherif Surūr was certain of what he had been told and at once decided to deal with the plotters. He never thought that anyone would dare to kill him because it had never happened to his forefathers. Therefore, Sherif Surūr ordered the arrest of the plotters. Some of the plotters were captured and some of them were
able to flee. Among the captured were al-Sayd Mas'Cūd al-CAwājī, his son al-Sayd Misā'ad, al-Sayd Muḥammad b. CAmr b. Sherif CAbd Allāh b. SaCīd, Sālim b. CAli, Muḥammad b. Jār Allāh, and twenty slaves. Sherif Surūr put them in prison for about a month, then summoned them on the twenty-fifth of Jumāda [I]. When he confronted them with their plot they admitted their wrongdoing. Therefore Sherif Surūr ordered four of the slaves to have their hands [presumably the right] cut off, to have one of al-Sayd Mas'Cūd's hands cut off, to crucify Sālim b. CAli, and sent the rest to jail in Jeddah. Then after a while Sherif Surūr expelled them to India. Thus not a single one of the group remained [in the Ḥejaz]. The plotters who were expelled to India stayed for about a year and then returned to the Yemen. They suffered a lot and al-Sayd Mas'Cūd died [fol. 91r] in the Yemen with those whose death was inevitable, while the remnants spread all over the Yemen. Meanwhile, the ones who fled, including al-Sayd Dabāb and the sons of CAbd Allāh b. Mas'Cūd, went first to Badr and then left for Egypt with the Egyptian pilgrimage. Some of them died in Egypt and some died in Istanbul.
The Ḥarb Attack on the Egyptian Pilgrimage Caravan, 1200/1786 (fols. 119v-121r)

[fol. 119v, line 17] Here I am narrating a strange event and a terrible disaster. [fol. 120r] When the Egyptian pilgrimage left [Mecca] and then arrived at Khulayṣ, God the Sublime wished to put them in disarray. The šanjaq [the commander of the pilgrimage] caught thieves from the tribe of Ḥarb who had cut off the road [to pilgrims]. Senior members of the tribe pleaded on their behalf [the thieves of Ḥarb] to obtain their release. He [the commander] however, not only refused their [the seniors] plea, but also attacked them vehemently and swore to brand them [the thieves] to be known to everyone. He swore not to release them [the thieves] before branding them on the cheeks to be an example in all seasons [of the pilgrimage]. Thus he lit a fire, heating rolling pins [in the fire], and then branded them [the thieves] on the cheeks. He [the commander] preferred to do that [the branding] because of his short vision. Because of the fate and the divine decree of God the Sublime, and because they [the thieves] had brands on their cheeks like the animals, they therefore called for revenge. Thus every cursed and profligate person rushed to join them [the thieves]. Then they [left after the Egyptian pilgrimage and] caught up with them
at a place called Quwayzah [between Mecca and Medina]. They [the Ḥarb] camped and sent to the ignorant and careless ṣanjaq [the Egyptian commander] who had a short vision in considering the consequences, and told him that if he wanted to leave he should compensate those whom he had branded. [fol. 120v] But the ignoble [the commander] refused [to compensate them]. Whereupon the bedouins [of the Ḥarb] called [on each other] and together attacked the pilgrimage. When his [the commander's] defeat was obvious, he fled with a few of his soldiers running day and night until he entered Medina. He left the pilgrims where the bedouins attacked them, killing and looting until [the pilgrimage] was utterly destroyed. I have not seen or heard that a pilgrimage was utterly destroyed between the Ḥaramayn [Mecca and Medina], except for what had happened to that [the Egyptian] pilgrimage in that year [1200 A.H.]. Look at that evil tribe and the cursed oppressor group, how they dared to do what they did! The whole matter is in [the hands] of God who may banish them [the Ḥarb], and He is our refuge and the best trustee. It is definite that the aggressor will be banished and [fol. 121r] God will banish him before long. I hope that the banishment of that profligate gang [the Ḥarb] will be in this life and before the hereafter. We have narrated from our
sheikhs that the banishments [of God] will be in the hereafter except two. The aggressor and the disobedient to [his] parents, whereupon they will be banished in this life to be seen by human beings.
APPENDIX III

KHULĀŠAT AL-KALĀM

AḤMAD ZAYNĪ DAḤLĀN

III.1 The Conflict Between Sherif Mâsûd and the Şanjaq of Jeddah, 1161/1784 (p. 195)

[p. 195, line 8]. In the year one thousand one hundred sixty-one of the Ḥijrah, a conflict between our lord, mawlānā, Sherif Mâsûd and the wazîr Câlî Pâshâ, the governor, Şâhîb of Jeddah, broke out. The reason for the conflict was that Câlî Pâshâ disputed the sherif concerning his [the sherif's] share of the income of Jeddah. The sherif then presented the imperial decrees, al-awāmir al-sultānīyah, which he had, and which his ancestors had had as well. But the aforementioned wazîr refused to listen to any of that, whereupon many of the merchants [of the city] tried to mediate between the two, the sherif and the Pasha, but did not achieve any result. On the contrary, the Pâshâ became more the oppressor and fortified the city and defended the wall [of the city]. He also attacked some of the sherif's servants and supporters [in Jeddah]. Thereupon our lord the sherif prepared a detachment to fight the Pâshâ and put his brother Sherif Jaçfar b. Saçîd in command of the
detachment. Sherif Ja'fari left for Jeddah with his forces and [when he arrived in the city], he besieged it with the aforementioned Pasha inside [the city]. Then some of the city people [from inside] sent to Sherif Ja'fari to attack [the wall] on the south side with his soldiers. Thus the soldiers [of the sheriff] attacked the wall of the city on that side [the south side] and entered the city. Calî Pâshâ, therefore, fled with his retinue by sea. Sherif Ja'fari took over the city and nothing happened to the people of the city. Then the Pâshâ could not return to Jeddah and the Ottoman government replaced him with another. Also the order of the Ottoman government came with confirmation of our lord the sheriff's share [in Jeddah's revenues] according to the sheriff's claim and wish.

III.2 The Rebellion of Sherif Surûr's Soldiers at Mecca, 1186/1773 (pp. 208-209).

[p. 208, line 4] On the eighth day of Dhū al-Ḥijjah [1186], Sherif Surûr was preparing to attend the pilgrimage ceremony at cArafāt, when all the soldiers [of his] refused to accompany him, claiming that they had seven payments, jawâmik, of their wages owed to them by his uncle [the former emir of Mecca, Sherif Aḥmad b. Sa'id], and told him [Sherif Surûr] that they would accompany him [to cArafāt] if he paid them all of their
unpaid wages. Sherif Surūr agreed to pay them half of their wages [before leaving for versions of Arafāt] and the other when they returned to Mecca, but they stubbornly refused his offer. Thereupon Sherif Surūr left [for versions of Arafāt] with his own slaves, the slaves of his father, and a few members of his clan with the group of people of Medina, rakb ahī al-Madinah. Sherif Surūr led the pilgrims in the pilgrimage ceremony and the pilgrimage was safe and trouble-free. When the pilgrims returned [to Mecca], a number of sherifs met and went to Muṣṭafā Pāshā, the emir of the Syrian pilgrimage, asking him to depose Sherif Surūr and re-install his uncle [Sherif Aḥmad], but he [Muṣṭafā Pāshā] refused [their requests] and told them that it was impossible [to depose Sherif Surūr] without an imperial decree from the Sultan [in Istanbul]. When the pilgrims left [Mecca], the soldiers who had refused to accompany Sherif Surūr to Arafāt sent [a message] to Sherif Aḥmad asking him to come to them [at Mecca] and they would defend him and help him to regain the seat of the governorship. Thus Sherif Aḥmad entered Mecca secretly and stayed at his house. On Friday, the twenty-fifth of Dhū al-Ḥijjah, and before the noon prayer, the rebels opened fire from their houses and from Jabal Abū Qubays; Sherif Surūr was not aware of their action. But when he asked about the situation, he was told that his uncle had arrived and
the soldiers were helping him to take revenge. Thus Sherif Surūr called on the tribes who had remained in Mecca after the pilgrimage to rally to his side. He also dispatched his father's slave, Mithqāl Aghā, to Ibrāhīm Pāshā, the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage, to back Sherif Surūr with soldiers. Ibrāhīm Pāshā sent a detachment of cavalry, but the field was not suitable for cavalry, particularly with fire coming from behind the walls. The fight lasted all day Friday. On the morning of Saturday, the fight increased and Mithqāl Aghā returned for the second time to the şanjaq [Ibrāhīm Pāshā] asking for ammunition. Ibrāhīm Pāshā dispatched a detachment of Egyptian soldiers and six boxes of ammunition with Mithqāl Aghā. Then the fighters took on each other, but the side of Sherif Aḥmad was not able to gain anything of what they wanted, and when the attack of Sherif Surūr's forces increased on them, they pleaded for peace. Sherif Aḥmad pleaded for peace and spent the night at al-Maḥābīrah, then left [Mecca]. In the meantime, our lord Sherif Surūr ordered the expelling of the rebellious soldiers from Mecca: not one of them was to spend the night in the city, except the Yemeni soldiers because they did not join [p. 209] [the rebels in] the fighting. Thus the ejected soldiers left in disgrace. Some of them went to the Yemen and some to Syria.
III.3 The Fight Between Sherif Surūr and the Tribe of Ḥarb and the Ottoman Garrison at Medina, 1194/1780 (pp. 216-218)

[p. 216, line 19] In the year ninety-four [1194] our lord Sherif Surūr decided to visit the tomb of the Prophet, peace be upon him, [in Medina] with his family. Thus he was prepared and left Mecca well-organized with three thousand five hundred camels, five thousand bedouins, two thousand of his own soldiers, five hundred sherifs, and two hundred and fifty horses. He had spent a great deal of money on that army. He left Mecca on Wednesday night, the eleventh day of Jumādā I of the aforementioned year. When he [Sherif Surūr] arrived at Badr, the people received him well and presented him with gifts. Then Satan instilled evil in them [the people of Badr from the tribe of Ḥarb], whereupon they claimed that they had fees, ḡawāʿid, and traditions, qawānīn, on the kings who passed by their lands. They also claimed that he [Sherif Surūr] had appropriated their subsidies of three years from the ʿanjar [the emir of the Egyptian pilgrimage]. He [Sherif Surūr] tried to conciliate them for three days, which they refused. Thus a fight broke out between them [the sherif and the Ḥarb] and lasted for three hours, whereupon Sherif Surūr defeated them [the Ḥarb], killing fourteen men. The rest [of the Ḥarb] fled. Then a few
of their [neutral] sheikhs attempted to mediate between the two sides, whereupon our lord Sherif Surûr paid them [the Ḥarb] fourteen thousand qirsh. They [the Ḥarb] gave him [in return] bonds. He [Sherif Surûr] detained forty men of them [the Ḥarb] as hostages. When he arrived at al-Ḥamrâ [on his way to Medina] he was told that the son of Naṣṣār b. Ǧaṭiyah [a sheikh of the Ḥarb] had ascended the mountain, where he took refuge from the sherif. He [Sherif Surûr] sent after him [the son of Naṣṣār] to be arrested. They [the sherif's soldiers] brought him [the son of Naṣṣār] back [to Sherif Surûr], who put him and the hostages in chains. Thus the hatred between them [the sherif and the Ḥarb] was increased. Sherif Surûr entered Medina on the seventh of Rajab [of the same year]. The people of Medina welcomed him. He camped at al-Manâkhah, where he stayed with his family and then [later] went to visit the Honorable Tomb [of the Prophet Muḥammad]. That day Sherif Surûr threw a great deal of gold and silver [to the people] which was picked up by the old and the young. Meanwhile, he [the sherif] treated the hostages of the Ḥarb very roughly, and when their people heard of this, they cut off the road [between Mecca and Medina]. Thus when the travellers from Mecca traveled to Medina as was their tradition in Rajab [of every year], the Ḥarb prevented them from going to Medina. The
travellers therefore returned to Mecca without visiting [Medina]. Sherif Surūr was told that the Ḥarb would attack him in Medina. Therefore, he prepared himself and dispatched scouts to patrol the road to the city. The scouts patrolled the roads outside to arrest any one of them [the Ḥarb]. On one night, the scouts detained a messenger, leaving from Medina carrying letters from the Kawākhī [the Ottoman commanders in the city] to the tribes of the Ḥarb, encouraging them [the Ḥarb] to advance [on Medina], whereupon they [the Ottoman officials] would fight him [Sherif Surūr] from inside the city and the Ḥarb from the outside. When our lord Sherif Surūr read the letters, he summoned the sheikh of the [Medina] Ḥaram with the Kawākhīs and read the letters [they had sent]. They at once denied sending the letters, claiming that the letters had been forged in their names. Sherif Surūr told them "If you are honest, give me the citadel [of the city] until I become sure of the situation." They [the Ottoman officials] refused [Sherif Surūr's request]. Sherif Surūr kept them with him and sent the Sheikh of the Ḥaram to the people of the citadel, ahl al-Qal'ah, asking them to put it under his [the sherif] command whereupon he would man it with those whom he might choose. [When the Sheikh of the Ḥaram arrived at the citadel] he found that they [the people of the citadel] had manned it [the citadel]
and refused to surrender it to the Sheikh of the Haram. They told him that they had been accused falsely by their master [Sherif Surûr] and that would not surrender the citadel before he [the sheikh] obtained [their] pardon from him [the sherif]. When he [the sheikh] returned [to Sherif Surûr], he told him the news. Sherif Surûr pardoned them and sent with the Sheikh of the Haram [soldiers] to take over [the citadel]. However, [when the sherif's forces arrived at the citadel], they were surrounded by fire [coming from inside the citadel]. The Sheikh of the Haram fled the scene with his men. One of the soldiers [of the sherif] was wounded. Our Lord the sherif arrested the three Kawâkhîs and the sheikh of the citadel, putting them in chains. They [the Ottoman garrison] fired at his [the sherif] house killing a man and two camels. Thus he moved his family to a house away from the citadel. The fight erupted between them [the Ottoman garrison] and him [the sherif] on the night of Mîrâj [the Prophet's Ascension to Heaven, the 27th of Rajab]. Three days of fighting elapsed without gaining any advantages for either side. Then he [sherif Surûr] made ladders from long pieces of wood and [ordered] his slaves to climb them but they [the defenders] were alert and prevented them [the attackers] from taking over [the citadel]. Whereupon he [Sherif Surûr] sent to them [the people
inside the citadel] telling them that he had pardoned them. They deceptively agreed, asking for three days' truce. They wanted their comrades who were outside the citadel [to have a chance] to enter the citadel. The firing stopped between the two sides. He [the sherif] sent [his] soldiers fortifying all the houses around the citadel and ordered them to prevent anyone from entering the citadel, but allowing those who wished to do so to leave the citadel. When they [the Ottoman garrison] knew that he [the sherif] was aware of their trick, they immediately set the ladders on fire and started firing at him. He [the sherif] [p. 216] ordered his soldiers to fight back. The situation lasted for two days; then they [the people inside the citadel] began to give up. They tied a rope [to the wall of the citadel] using it to leave the citadel secretly. When he [the sherif] heard the news, he ordered the bombing of the house of the citadel Aghā, whereupon [the house] was set on fire and destroyed. He [the sherif] also sent after those who had fled the citadel. Thus, the rest [of the Ottoman garrison inside the citadel] appealed for peace. He [the sherif] guaranteed them peace. The bedouins who were with the sherif entered the citadel, looting the belongings and the money which were inside. Most of the people of Medina had deposited their expensive belongings inside the citadel. Sherif Surūr captured
the advocates of the revolt and put them in chains. He also appointed a man of ČAdwān to be his deputy at Medina and [helped him] with soldiers. The total of the people arrested from Medina was fifty. He [Sherif Surūr] took them with him to Mecca. He issued a firman dismissing the Sheikh of the Haram, ordering him to leave with him [the sheriff] to Mecca.
APPENDIX IV

TĀRĪKH MAKKAH AL-MUKARRAMAH WA-ASHRĀFIHA

ANONYMOUS

IV.1 The Expulsion of Persians From Mecca, 1144/1731
(fols. 165v-166v)

[fol. 165v, line 20] At the end of 1144, the common people rose against the Persians in al-Masjid al-Ḥarām. The Persian pilgrims had arrived at Mecca [fol. 166r] the previous year, but at a time when the main pilgrimage had already ended, and so many of them remained in Mecca. They came frequently to the Ḥaram for worship. The commoners, al-Cāmah, claimed that some of the Persians had put dirt, najāsah, in the Honorable Kaʿbah. Therefore, the commoners rose against the Persians with the help of the Egyptian soldiers [the Janissaries] and the commander, sirdār, Ḫusayn Aghā. The commoners went to the qāḍī, who fled the court, taking refuge with the aforementioned Ḫusayn Aghā. The qāḍī and Ḫusayn Aghā with the soldiers went to the vizier Abū Bakr Pāshā [the şanjaq of Jeddah], who was in Mecca at that time. Whereupon the commoners went to the Sheikh al-Islām [the mufti of Mecca] taking him out of his house with other ulama; they went to the vizier to
secure a decree expelling the Persians. The mufti tried to talk to the commoners, but they replied rudely with unacceptable behavior. The commoners forced the wazīr to issue them a decree expelling the Persians from Mecca. They also obtained a similar decree from the qadi. Then they marched on the streets of Mecca, calling on the Persian to leave, and who would remain [from the Persians] would be looted and killed. During the attack, the commoners looted a house of the Persians. All that was taking place, and Sherif Muḥammad was sitting in his house without intervening. The next day, the commoners went to the qadi, asking him to send to the sheriff an order to approve the commoners' actions. The sheriff refused their demands, but when they threatened him with things of that time, he agreed to their demands. Thus the commoners sent another caller to call on the Persians to leave. The Persians therefore went to Taif, Jeddah, and other places. Sherif Muḥammad waited a few days until the rising calmed down, then he took control of the situation. He also discovered who was behind the rising and warned him. Then, the sheriff sent for the Persians in Taif to return to Mecca, whereupon they arrived at the end of Dhū al-Qa‘dah of the aforementioned year, with the arrival of other pilgrims. The situation was quiet and nobody harassed the Persians any more. In fact, the
discrimination was totally on the part of [fol. 166v] the Turks [the Janissaries] and their sirdar, Ḫusayn Aghā.
APPENDIX V

AL-AKBĀR AL-GHARĪBAH FĪ DHIKR MĀ WAQC
BI-ṬAYBAT AL-ḤALĪBAH
JAČFAR HĀSHIM AL-ḤUSAYNĪ

V.1 The Fight in Medina Between the Sheikh of the Ḥaram and the Ottoman Garrison in the City, 1156/1743. (folis. 13r-14v)

[fol. 13r] In the year 1151 [A.H.], ǦAbd al-Raḥman Aghā al-Kabīr was appointed to the sheikhdom of the Ḥaram; he was dismissed in the year 1156 [A.H.] and died in Egypt in 1163. During his time [as the Sheikh of the Ḥaram], the great revolt which was known as the revolt of Kābūs, fitnat Kābūs, took place. The reason for that [revolt], in summary, as we understood from the reliable people who narrated the story to us and from the poems of al-Sayd Jačfar al-Baytī and Sheikh Muḥammad Sačīd Safar, was that ḤUthmān Bey brought the money of the crops, ghilāl, took it for himself, and prevented the recipients from receiving their money. The commander, Katkhudā, of the Nubatjīyan, was Aḥmad Kawāqī, the commander of the citadel was Muḥammad Sačīd Anqishārī, and the commander of the Sipāhīs was ǦAbd al-Qādir Ẓafir. A conflict arose among them [the commanders] and was growing. Ḥasan Kābūs was from the
Nubatjīyan [and exercised] great influence. One day, and after crowds [of people] joined them [the regular soldiers], they attacked the citadel closing the doors of the city [which were in the wall of Medina], and then each group of them [the soldiers] spread in its own way. They [the soldiers] demanded either the execution or the expulsion of six people. Thus they [the commanders] ejected them [the six] from Medina, calming the situation. Among them [the expelled persons] were ʿUmar Zakī, the former commander of the citadel; Muṣṭafā Pasha, the commander of the Nubatjiyan; and Muhammad Murād, the commander of the Sipāḥīs. It was not enough for them [the commanders] to expel the six, but they also ejected another eighteen men. They wrote a legal petition [accepting] [fol 13v] the truce and to help [one another] to fear God. They wrote petitions to the Ottoman government concerning the situation. The firman [the government's reply] came in favor of the Sheikh of the ʿHaram and his group. Therefore, their power increased, beginning with the year eleven fifty-five [1155]. He [the Sheikh of the ʿHaram] sent a group of people led by al-Ṣāliḥī to the Jalawīyah [presumably bedouins] to encourage them to come to Medina to attack the citadel and they [the Sheikh of the ʿHaram and the commanders] would help them. When it was Sunday night, the twenty-first of Jumādā II, in the year eleven fifty-
six [1156 A.H.] they [the Sheikh's force] ascended [the wall of] the citadel, coming to the door of the citadel without being noticed by the defenders inside it. They [the attackers] locked the door, while many [of their comrades] were still outside. Then one of them went to the commander's [of the citadel] house, hiding his men and then called on the commander [to come out]. When he [the commander] came out [of his house], the hidden men attacked him, killing him and his brother ʿAmzah. His [the commander] son Ḥusayn was a very brave man and when he saw the situation he came out [of the house] with his sword only. He manoeuvred them [the attackers] for hours. They closed in on him but failed to take him. [On the contrary], he wounded them until he killed their leader al-Ṣāliḥī. They felt disappointed and feared shame. Thus one of them took him [Ḥusayn] by surprise and dropped him [fol. 14r] to his knees. However, he [Ḥusayn] was still fighting them and disuniting them, until one of them went to the spring and wet a robe, throwing it on his [Ḥusayn] face, whereupon they were able to kill him. God gave him the martyrdom and with His will, he [Ḥusayn] will have a better reward in the hereafter and more. When the supporters of them [the attackers] heard the news they came in groups to join them. Many fights took place between them [the attackers] and the people of the neighborhood, ahl al-
Hārah, until they killed Ḥasan Kābūs. Whereupon the burden became very heavy on the people of the neighborhood. The Sheikh of the Haram sent to the Ottoman government informing them of the situation. He also sent to the governor of Jeddah and to Sherif Mas'ūd [the emir of Mecca]. Sherif Mas'ūd dispatched a detachment [of his own forces] ordering the commander that if the Sheikh of the Haram refused to agree to the demands of the people of the citadel, to eject five people [from the city], then he [the commander] should aid them [the people of the citadel, against the Sheikh of the Haram]. The Sheikh of the Haram was informed of the sheriff's intention. Thus he sent to Hazāc, Sheikh of the Ḥarb, bribing him with money to prevent the detachment [of the Sherif] from reaching Medina. Hazāc mobilized what he could [of the Ḥarb]. Then he encountered the detachment at Rābigh, killing some of them. The rest fled. [The Sheikh of the Haram] invited Hazāc and Ǧīd, the sheikhs of the Ḥarb, to Medina, allowing them to take charge in the city, whereupon they destroyed it. Many people fled to al-Manākhah. The situation remained like that [in disarray] until Rajab [of the same year] when Sherif Mas'ūd b. Sa'īd, the emir of Mecca, sent to mediate peace between them [the fighting parties]. He secretly was in favor of the people of the citadel. The truce was in effect until
[fol. 14v] the arrival of the pilgrims. When the Syrian pilgrimage arrived at Medina, the firman came with the dismissal of Ğabd al-Raḩman Aghā al-Kabīr, the Sheikh of the Ḥaram, and the appointment of Ğabd al-Raḩman Aghā al-Ṣaghīr, the deputy of the Sheikh of the Ḥaram, and the former treasurer [to the office of Sheikh al-Ḥaram]. They [the Ottoman orders] were the result of the sheriff's petitions to the Ottoman government.
## APPENDIX VI

**THE EMIRS OF MECCA DURING THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>HIJRAH YEARS</th>
<th>CHRISTIAN YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Sherif Muḥammad b. ǦAbd Allāh (ruled approx. two years)</td>
<td>1143-1145*</td>
<td>1731-1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sherif Muḥammad b. ǦAbd Allāh (ruled approx. a year)</td>
<td>1145-1146 (second time)</td>
<td>1733-1734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sherif Masʿūd b. Saʿīd (ruled approx. eighteen years)</td>
<td>1146-1165 (second time)</td>
<td>1734-1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sherif Misāḥad b. Saʿīd (ruled approx. nineteen years)</td>
<td>1165-1184*</td>
<td>1752-1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sherif Aḥmad b. Saʿīd (ruled approx. three months)</td>
<td>1184* Muharram-Rabiʿ I</td>
<td>1770 May-July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sherif ǦAbd Allāh b. Ḥusayn (ruled approx. two months)</td>
<td>1184 Rabiʿ I-Jumada II</td>
<td>1770 Jul.-Oct.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sherif Aḥmad b. Saʿīd (ruled approx. three years)</td>
<td>1184-1886 (second time)</td>
<td>1770-1773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Sherif Surūr b. Misāḥad (ruled approx. sixteen years)</td>
<td>1186-1202</td>
<td>1733-1788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Ibn ǦAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarā' Makkah; Daḥlān, Khulāṣat al-Kalām; de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca.*

*Corrected from Uzunçarşıli, Mekke, pp. 150-151.*
APPENDIX VII

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE SHERIFS OF DHAW ZAYD
WHO RULED THE HEJAZ IN THE 18TH CENTURY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sherif Zayd b. Muhsin (R)</th>
<th>Sherif Sa'ad (R)</th>
<th>Sherif Sa'ad (R)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d. 1077/1666)</td>
<td>(d. 1116/1704)</td>
<td>(d. 1129-1716)</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sherif Mas'ud (R)</th>
<th>Sherif Ja'far*</th>
<th>Sherif CAbd Allah (R)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d. 1165-1752)</td>
<td>(d. 1178/1764)</td>
<td>(d. 1143-1731)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Sherif Ahmad (R)</th>
<th>Sherif Muhammed (R)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(d. 1193/1731)</td>
<td>(d. 1169/1755)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sherif Surur (R)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(d. 1202-1778)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dahlan, Khulasaat al-Kalam; de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca, and Uzuncarsili, Mekke.

*Corrected from Uzuncarsili, Mekke, p. 150; cf. pp. 83-84 of this dissertation.
## APPENDIX VIII

THE ŞANJAQS OF JEDDAH DURING THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>HIJRAH YEARS</th>
<th>CHRISTIAN YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Abū Bakr Pāshā</td>
<td>1137-1146</td>
<td>1724-1733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ğalī Pāshā</td>
<td>1146-1156</td>
<td>1733-1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Abū Bakr Pāshā (3rd time)</td>
<td>1156-1158</td>
<td>1743-1745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Muṣṭafā Yakin Pāshā</td>
<td>1158-1159</td>
<td>1745-1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ğalī Pāshā (2nd time)</td>
<td>1159-1161</td>
<td>1746-1748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ḥājjj Muḥammad Pāshā</td>
<td>1161-1163</td>
<td>1748-1750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ğūthmān Pāshā</td>
<td>1163-1165</td>
<td>1750-1751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sayyid Muḥammad Pāshā</td>
<td>1165-1166</td>
<td>1751-1752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Muṣṭafā Katkhudā Aghā</td>
<td>1166-1171</td>
<td>1752-1757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ĞAbd Allāh Nā'īlī Pāshā</td>
<td>1171-1172</td>
<td>1757-1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. SaCd al-Dīn Pāshā</td>
<td>1172-1173</td>
<td>1758-1759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Muṣṭafā Pāshā</td>
<td>1173-1175</td>
<td>1759-1761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Şāliḥ Pāshā</td>
<td>1175-1179</td>
<td>1761-1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Sayyid Aḥmad Pāshā</td>
<td>1179-1181</td>
<td>1765-1767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Muḥammad Rāqim Pāshā</td>
<td>1181-1183</td>
<td>1767-1769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Ḥamzah Pāshā</td>
<td>1183-1184</td>
<td>1769-1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>HIJRAH YEARS</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ḥasan Shabkāh</td>
<td>1184 (two months only)</td>
<td>1770 (July-Oct.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ḥamzah Pāšā (2nd time)</td>
<td>1184-1188</td>
<td>1770-1774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Khalīl Pāšā</td>
<td>1188-1189</td>
<td>1774-1775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Cūthmān Pāšā Daftardār</td>
<td>1189-1191</td>
<td>1775-1777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Aḥmad Pāšā al-Nabulusī</td>
<td>1191-1199</td>
<td>1777-1784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Muṣṭafā Pāšā</td>
<td>1199-1200</td>
<td>1784-1785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Muḥammad Pāšā Aghriyūzī</td>
<td>1200 (less than 1 year)</td>
<td>1785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Aḥmad Pāšā Bulilī</td>
<td>1200-1203</td>
<td>1785-1788</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Dāhlān, Khulūṣat al-Kalām; Ibn ʿAbd al-Shakūr, Tārīkh Umarāʾ Makkah; ʿAbd al-Qadīs al-Anṣārī, Mawsūʿat Tārīkh Jiddah.
APPENDIX IX

THE EMIRS OF THE SYRIAN PILGRIMAGE CARAVAN
DURING THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>HIJRAH YEARS</th>
<th>CHRISTIAN YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 봐드 알라흐 폴사는</td>
<td>1143-1145 (twice)</td>
<td>1731-1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 실야만 폴샤 알-카즈</td>
<td>1146-1150 (twice)</td>
<td>1733-1737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 헤사린 폴사는</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td>1738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 쥰עיד 정사</td>
<td>1152</td>
<td>1739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 카리 폴샤 보 카바드 폴사는</td>
<td>1153</td>
<td>1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. 실야만 폴샤 알-카즈</td>
<td>1154-1155 (twice, total seven times)</td>
<td>1741-1742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. 아살 카바드 폴샤 알-카즈</td>
<td>1156-1159 (fourteen times)</td>
<td>1743-1755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 헤사린 폴사는 이브인 링키</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>1756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. 봐드 알라흐 폴샤 차타지</td>
<td>1171-1172 (twice)</td>
<td>1757-1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. 무함마드 폴샤 사리크</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>1759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. 쥰עיד 정사 알-кур지</td>
<td>1174-1184 (eleven times)</td>
<td>1760-1770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>HIJRAH YEARS</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Muḥammad Pāshā al-ṣAzm</td>
<td>1185</td>
<td>1771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Muṣṭafa Pāshā Sabayikjīf</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Muḥammad Pāshā al-ṣAzm</td>
<td>1187-1196 (ten times, total eleven times)</td>
<td>1773-1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Darwīsh Pāshā b. cUthmān Pāshā</td>
<td>1197-1198 (twice)</td>
<td>1783-1784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Aḥmad Pāshā al-Jazzār</td>
<td>1199-1200 (twice)</td>
<td>1785-1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Ḥusayn Pāshā al-Baṭṭāl</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX X

THE EMIRS OF THE EGYPTIAN PILGRIMAGE CARAVAN DURING THE PERIOD UNDER STUDY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAMES</th>
<th>HIJRAH YEARS</th>
<th>CHRISTIAN YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Muḥammad Bey Qaṭāmish</td>
<td>1143</td>
<td>1731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. ʿAlī Bey</td>
<td>1144</td>
<td>1732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Muḥammad Bey Qaṭāmish (second time)</td>
<td>1145-1147</td>
<td>1733-1734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3 times for total of 4 times)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Riḍwān Bey</td>
<td>1148</td>
<td>1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ibrahīm Bey Qīṭās</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>1736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. ʿUthmān Bey</td>
<td>1150-1153</td>
<td>1737-1740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. ʿUmar Bey (second time)</td>
<td>1154</td>
<td>1741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. ʿUthmān Bey (second time)</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>1742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ibrahīm Bey Balfīyā</td>
<td>1158-1159</td>
<td>1743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. ʿUmar Bey al-Ikhtīyār</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>1744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Khalīl Bey Qīṭās</td>
<td>1158-1159</td>
<td>1745-1746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Ibrahīm Bey Balfīyā (second time)</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>1747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(four times)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. ʿUmar Bey al-Ikhtīyār</td>
<td>1167</td>
<td>1748-1751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(four times)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. ʿAlī Bey Qāzdaghlī</td>
<td>1165-1166</td>
<td>1752-1753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names</td>
<td>Hijrah Years</td>
<td>Christian Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Cumar Bey al-Ikhtiyar (the former)</td>
<td>1167 (total of five times)</td>
<td>1754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Husayn Bey</td>
<td>1168-1169</td>
<td>1755-1756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Muhammad Bey al-Dalî</td>
<td>1170</td>
<td>1757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Husayn Bey Kushkush</td>
<td>1171</td>
<td>1758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Şâlih Bey</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>1759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Calî Bey al-Kabîr</td>
<td>1173</td>
<td>1760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Husayn Bey Kushkush (the former)</td>
<td>1174-1177</td>
<td>1761-1763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Calî Bey al-İsâghîr</td>
<td>1178</td>
<td>1764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. Husayn Bey al-Ikhtiyar</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>1765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. Khalîl Bey Balfiyâa</td>
<td>1180-1181</td>
<td>1766-1767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. Hasan Bey</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>1768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. Khalîl Bey Balfiyâa (the former)</td>
<td>1183-1185</td>
<td>1769-1771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. Ibrahim Bey</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. Ismâcıli Bey Qâzdağlıî</td>
<td>1187</td>
<td>1773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. Ismâcıli Bey</td>
<td>1188</td>
<td>1774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. Yusuf Bey</td>
<td>1189</td>
<td>1775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Murad Bey</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>1776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. Yusuf Bey (the former)</td>
<td>1191</td>
<td>1777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. Ridwan Bey Balfiya</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>1778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Murad Bey (the former)</td>
<td>1193</td>
<td>1779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Muṣṭafâ Bey</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>1780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMES</td>
<td>HIJRAH YEARS</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN YEARS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Ibrāhīm Bey al-Ṣaghīr (the former)</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Ayyūb Bey</td>
<td>1196</td>
<td>1782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Muṣṭafā Bey (the former)</td>
<td>1197-1199</td>
<td>1783-1785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Muḥammad Bey</td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. Ghīṭās Bey</td>
<td>1201</td>
<td>1787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: al-Rashīdī, Ḥusn al-Ṣafā‘; al-Jabartī, Čaǰā‘īb al-Āthār; Ahmad Muḥammad al-Ḥadrāwī, Mukhtāṣar Ḥusn al-Ṣafā‘.
The Hejaz and Surrounding Areas.
Tribes of the Hejaz.
PLAN of MEKKA
mainly from BURCKHARDT's
"Travels in Arabia"
with a few corrections (1885)
1. The Quarter of Jirwal.

2. - - el-Bah.

3. - - ca-Shubaka.

4. - - Siq es-saghir.

5. - - el-Mefalah.

6. - - Babel-Urnah.

7. - - Shamiriyyah.

8. - - Sūqah.

9. - - Qarirah.


11. The Quarter of Rakahab.

12. - - en-Naṣa.

13. - - ca-Sulaimaniyyah.

14. - - Shi'b 'Amir.

15. The Haddadin (Blacksmiths') Street.

16. The Street el-Maṣlīḥ.

17. The Ghassa-quarter.


20. The Quarter of Shi'b el-Maṣlīḥ.

21. - - Siq el-Jil.

22. - - el-Mudda'a.

23. El-Merwah.


25. Stone Street (Zuqiq el-Hajār).


27. The Quarter of el-Qushishiyah,

28. En-Safī.

29. The Quarter of el-Fiād (in this quarter are the Egyptian Tekkiyeh, Foundation Building, and the new Government Buildings).

30. Main guard-house.

31. House of the Wali (Governor) of the Hejaz, the Police Office etc.

32. Madrasah, now used as office of the Committee for the Aqueduct of Zubaydah and bureau of the Bāyyis (chief of the mu'addins).

33. Birkaṭ Majīn (ašg pronounced Majid), great cistern in connexion with the aqueduct.

34. Court of Justice and dwelling house of the Qādī.

35. Tomb of Aḥū Tālib (uncle of Muḥammad).

36. Watering place in connection with the aqueduct.

37. Tomb of Sayyid 'Agil.

38. Tomb of the Saint Sheikh Maḥmūd.

39. Jebel Qu'aq'a’ān.

40. The Quarter of Maṣlīḥ.

41. Reservoir of water from the aqueduct. Several such reservoirs are now in all the main streets.

a. Beduin huts.

Source: Hurgronje, C. S. Mekka.
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