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TRIBES AND THE STATE IN IRAN:
THE DYNAMICS OF AN HISTORICAL TRANSITION

BY ANTONIO SORGE, B.A.

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
August 3, 1999

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**Tribes and the State in Iran:**
**The Dynamics of an Historical Transition**

submitted by Antonio Sorge, B.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

Thesis Supervisor

Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Carleton University
August 18, 1999
Abstract

This thesis deals with the emergence of the modern state in Iran under the Pahlavi regime from 1926. The emphasis of the examination is on the political encapsulation of two Iranian tribal groups, the Turkmen and the Baluch, and the effects their subordination by the Iranian state had upon their internal sociopolitical structures. Under the leadership of Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Iranian government consolidated political power and established a centralised state which earlier dynastic rulers in Iran were unable to. This regime was at the helm of a process of unprecedented societal transformation engineered with an aim of integrating the members of local status-ascribing communities into the wider society governed by the emerging modern state. The consolidation of political power was a prerequisite for the effective integration of a historically pluralistic Iranian society.
Acknowledgments

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APPROXIMATE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TRIBAL GROUPS IN IRAN

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Chapter One:  
Introduction

An introduction to this work requires, as a way to define some parameters, an account of some of the main premises from which I have operated. I felt it necessary to begin with a short preamble explaining what is and what is not intended through the formulations constructed throughout, and why I have chosen to operate from particular postulates to the exclusion of others. Some of the concepts employed throughout might be contestable, and will need elaboration which might help to clarify their meaning and usage. The following will therefore aim to provide an understanding of some of the prior assumptions, biases, and general approach taken.

This study deals with a large-scale social phenomenon which we may term ‘societal transformation’. An attempt to understand large scale societal transformations has to take account of a central matter in all societies: the distribution of social power. The concept of social power will be approached through a discussion of the manner in which it might be exercised over the course of the establishment of a modern state, as well as the networks of relations it operates within. Addressing issues of social power and its allocation within a configuration of social relations is part of the larger concern dealing with how power is held and lost, and what accounts for its fluctuations in distribution. This is intimately linked with the perennial question of how social change works. It is to this rather general and comprehensive scope of inquiry that the following work pertains in its analysis of the encapsulation of the Baluch and Turkmen in early
Pahlavi Iran.

The subject of this work may be introduced by asking the following questions: When an autonomous tribe is encapsulated by a large external agent, a state, what can be expected to happen to the internal structure of that unit? What approaches may be taken by a state to encapsulate autonomous groups? What are the underpinnings of a viable modern state, and how are these attained? The two cases dealt with here are situated within a specific historical context, Pahlavi Iran. I have set out to examine changes in the social structures of two Iranian tribes, the Baluch and the Turkmen, within the setting of Iran's transition from a traditional dynastic state to a modern state, beginning in 1921 with the emergence of Reza Shah Pahlavi. This period was marked by a significant shift in the constitution of the Iranian social order. A further assumption operated from is the notion that states, as they are ubiquitously found today, consist of variable sets of institutions and practices, underlain by legitimating beliefs and ideologies, that fulfill a number of roles which they historically have not. These will be discussed shortly, but before doing so it may be well to suggest, though without evolutionary implication, that in the modern era states have undergone a great number of cumulative changes that have permanently transformed their roles, aims, and coercive abilities. This study will aim to illustrate that over the period of Pahlavi rule, Iran underwent changes in state structures both as the result of expanding technology and of the introduction of ideological guidelines which prescribed the creation of a particular kind of socio-political formation.

The expansion of technology coincided with the introduction of rational structures of
government, and rational structures of government were essential in the perpetuation and maintenance of a normative socio-political order largely imposed by the modern state.

Before continuing, a brief digression may be in order, so that the reader’s attention may be directed to the use of some terms. In this study, terms such as ‘modern,’ ‘traditional,’ and ‘rational’ have been used throughout. Insofar as such terminology is employed, it is done with a strictly heuristic intent. The terms ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ are designations used to order states along a continuum ranging from large, bureaucratic, pervasive, and normatively systematised entities at one end, to small, localised, partisan corporate groupings at the other (Mann 1988: Ch.1). From here on, the term ‘pre-industrial state’ will be used to temporally situate this type of state prior to the arrival of industrialisation (Crone 1989:1, Ch.2).\(^1\) As for the term ‘rational,’ its use is restricted to indicate the type of systematic and bureaucratic form of political practice and governance buttressed by the European Enlightenment ideals of social progress which embody, in one phrase, the ‘rational state’ (Mann 1993:56). This is terminology relating to what Max Weber called ‘rational-legal domination’, which consists of the development of formal and rationalised institutions, and the routinised governance of citizens and territories (Mann 1993:56-57).

In characterising the modern state, a direct quote from Michael Mann’s (1993:55) own formulation derived from Weber would be helpful:

\(^1\)Following the usage found in Patricia Crone’s (1989) work, the terms ‘pre-industrial’ and ‘pre-industrial states’ are used interchangeably with ‘agrarian’ and ‘agrarian states’.
1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel
2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a
3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises
4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force.

Modern states, with these characteristics, are significantly different from traditional states. Traditional states could not penetrate the societies they attempted to control. They consisted rather of ‘capstone’ entities, brought to power through conquest, and "based on weak infrastructural penetration of the society" (Hall 1994:21). As such, they were predatory entities having little ability to structure the lives of their subjects. Their institutional frameworks were not elaborate, and they could not impose a normative order upon the realm they sought to control, even if their rulers wished to. It is best to characterise such entities as a conglomeration of interests with little coercive strength, having a despotic nature, and given to cyclical collapse and regeneration. This latter conceptualisation of the state as one given to collapse and renewal, resulting in the circulation of personnel in political office, is not a new one, but hearkens back to formulations developed by Ibn Khaldun (Issawi [trans.]1963:120–21; also Gellner 1995:201-207; 1981:86-98).

What is the relevance of all this to the social organisation of encapsulated tribes? As the rationalisation of the Iranian state had as one of its priorities the aim of controlling the ruled population through the incorporation of tribal peoples into the larger, territorially-defined, entity, it sought to control Iranian society in a way that the
traditional state could not. For the modern Iranian state to succeed in such an endeavour, it needed access to effective means of coercion – modern military technology – which its predecessor, the Qajar state, did not possess. Bringing disparate elements of the population into the fold of the normatively integrated socio-political entity required a transformation of the social structures of the units to be incorporated, thus causing them to develop forms that would provide a better structural fit with the administrative requirements of an encapsulating state. National consolidation efforts are themselves premised on the ultimate goals of creating territorially- and ideologically-integrated polities, as Sankaran Krishna (1994:508) noted, and are legitimated by some normatively defined ethic or other, which is often hostile to, and thus takes no account of, the interests or needs of non-dominant social groupings. These latter must tailor their needs to the interests of the dominant society.

Such social transitions, however, reflect not the utter destruction of tribes as such, but are rather illustrative of the dynamic processes of change inherent in instances of adaptation to new political configurations. Indeed, as Edmund Leach (1954:6,4) suggested, it may be illusory to speak of varieties of political systems as independent types, but that the organisation of any particular political entity “should clearly be thought of as part of a larger total system in flux,” and that models of equilibrium systems as such do not tend to conform to reality as “real societies can never be in equilibrium.” These insights will be taken as guides in my attempt to understand the processes of encapsulation and change as they have affected the cases of the Baluch and
Turkmen within Pahlavi Iran. This will be done largely in the hopes that an appreciation
might be gained of the mechanisms within which these processes were situated.

Chapter two will deal with pre-Pahlavi Iran, and the macro-sociopolitical
conditions which prevailed. The decentralised, weak, and distant pre-industrial state was
unable to impose its will upon peripheral groups, allowing the Baluch and Turkmen to
enjoy a fair degree of political autonomy. The third chapter will examine Reza Khan’s
accession to the position of Shah and his consolidation of political power in Iran. A
number of key undertakings embarked upon by Reza Shah, including the tribal
‘pacification’ campaign (Arfa 1964), will be addressed. Chapter four will examine the
types of governance brought to bear on the Baluch and Turkmen, and the effects these
have had. Prior to this, the problem of state rationalisation and the administrative
territorialisation of Iran will be situated within an elaboration of some concepts relating
to the construction of the modern state as accompanied by a civically-oriented Persian
nationalism. The manner in which these two groups were dealt with, as well as the
attempts taken to integrate them into a broader Iranian polity, will incorporate an analysis
of the changes which affected the tribal structures of these groups. The concluding
chapter will centre on a discussion of the preceding chapters, and will attempt to evaluate
how my formulations may provide some general insights into the processes of social
change as they affect tribal groups within the Iranian context.
Chapter Two:
Tribe and State in Qajar Persia:
Fragmented Political Power

The pre-industrial state in Iran expired with the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty. Reza Khan Pahlavi came to power on a coup orchestrated on February 21, 1921 with Sayyid Zia al-din Tabatabai, a crusading journalist, whereupon he assumed the posts of commander in chief of the armed forces as well as Minister of War. The new government was temporarily headed by Tabatabai, who, within four months, would be compelled to resign his position as Prime Minister and leave Iran by cause of clashes with Reza Khan over the content of political reforms (Avery 1967:97). After successive cabinets, Reza Khan assumed the Prime Ministership in 1923. Upon the permanent departure of Ahmad Shah, the last Qajar ruler, Reza Khan was elected Shah of Iran by a special Constituent Assembly in 1925, to be crowned in the spring of the following year (Avery 1967:97).

Without precedent, Reza Shah set out to modernise Iran and build a modern European-style nation-state (Banani 1961:45-46). His attempt at the consolidation of Iran involved the introduction of a normative social order which would above all reorganise Iranian society along the foreign principle of nationhood. As Amin Banani (1961:45) has noted, the ideals which drove the reforms of Reza Shah were threefold, and consisted of “a complete dedication to the cult of nationalism-statism; a desire to assert this nationalism by a rapid adoption of the material advances of the West; and a breakdown of the traditional power of religion and a growing tendency towards
secularism.” The integration of the various peoples of Iran, however, also necessitated a degree of atomisation. Divergent allegiances were to be superceded through the establishment of an order whereby a citizen’s primary allegiance would be voluntarily directed towards a universal non-particularised and encompassing entity, Iran and its Crown, and not to any localised groups.

It should be noted that a state’s endeavour to harness an entire citizenry’s allegiance to itself in plural societies does not usually happen without some kind of heavy-handedness. Indeed, as M.G. Smith (1965:90) has pointed out, plural societies are more typically united, or given a degree of cohesion, through a process of state regulation rather than integration. Particularistic ties (centred, for example, on tribe, region, or religion) are not prominent in culturally homogenous societies as they are in societies characterised by a highly heterogenous or multiethnic population. The particularistic ties existing in plural societies must, if the rulers within a modern state wish to consolidate a national territory, be stringently reduced so that they may at least become secondary and subordinate to citizens’ allegiance to the state and to the wider realm. As tribes constituted, by some estimates (Beck 1990:191), as much as one quarter to half of the population of Persia, they were a considerable obstacle to this undertaking. Some large tribal confederacies, such as the Bakhtiyari (Garthwaite 1983), the Qashqa’i (Beck 1986,1991), the Shahsevan (Tapper 1979,1997), and the Khamseh (Barth 1961), had a high degree of internal differentiation, specialised roles, and hereditary offices such that they may be considered to have been states in their own right. The existence of these and many other prominent tribal elements required of the emergent Pahlavi regime to embark
upon a particularly antagonistic campaign of suppression to accomplish its goal of
ascendancy. But before launching into a discussion of Pahlavi Iran's encapsulation of
pastoral nomad tribes, which will be the substantive issue dealt with in the following
chapters, it is my goal here to discuss how the macro socio-political structures of Persia
under the Qajars were characterised by the dialectical interaction between nomadic tribes
and the outside world, both settled agriculturalists and the dynastic state. In this
discussion I hope to illustrate that processes of interaction between tribes and the
dynastic state in Iran have historically conditioned the particular social and political
forms of tribal societies, in our case the Turkmen and Baluch. This discussion will be
counterpoised with that of the following chapter, in the hopes that some important
differences between modern and pre-industrial states, pertaining to their relationship
with tribal groups, are highlighted.

Before discussing tribes in Qajar Iran, it would be fitting to define some
parameters, namely, what definitions of 'tribe' and of 'state' are being employed, and
how might the dynamics of interaction between the two be observed to conform to a
possible set of general rules? Changes occurring in tribal society are also examined with
reference to a broader environment which includes the state, and therefore will be
evaluated as part of a political analysis (cf. Barth 1981:187). As the Introduction, above,
has briefly defined how the term 'state' is being used, the following will deal mainly with
definitions of tribal identity and the concept of 'tribe', accompanied by an elaboration of
the relationship between tribes and states, as well as forms of interaction between
nomads and agriculturalists.
Tribal identity and 'tribe'

Dale Eickelman (1988:124) has noted that tribal identity, as with other forms of identity like kinship, citizenship, and national identity, is subject to being defined by both local people as well as by outsiders, such as state authorities and ethnographers. He delineates the four main forms of tribal identity that can be found in the Middle East:

(1) the elaboration and use of explicit "native" ethnopolitical ideologies by the people themselves to explain their sociopolitical organization; (2) concepts used by state authorities for administrative purposes; (3) implicit, practical notions held by people that are not elaborated into formal ideologies; and (4) anthropological concepts (Eickelman 1998:124-25).

The most common feature among tribal ideologies in this region, despite variations which can be found in form, is that they are ordinarily grounded on the notion of political identity based on common patrilineal descent (Eickelman 1998:125). However, account must always be taken of the degrees of variation among different types, in what context these variations come to develop and, ultimately, how tribal formations serve the pursuit of political aims within the contexts in which they are situated. As such, 'tribe' in this thesis is not conceptualised as necessarily based upon either common descent, shared language or culture, or even 'race', since none of these really provide any clues to political behaviour (see Barth 1969: Ch.1). Tribes rather constitute socio-political entities with wide variations in size, structure, organisation and leadership systems that may or may not be explained with sole reference to the principles and processes of kinship (Beck 1990:198), and often as not may be generated as a response to needs pertaining to the preservation of collective interests and the effective coordination of
activities. Two other things should also be noted. First, nomadic or transhumant tribes are seldom (if ever) conventionally conceptualised as purely territorial units, which is more characteristic of settled states. Secondly, tribal organisation does not necessarily imply pastoral nomadism, since tribally organised groups need not be nomadic, as is the case with the significant portions of the Swat Pathans in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (Barth 1959), and that pastoral nomads, and groups practising transhumance, need not necessarily have any tribal organisation, as illustrated by the case of the Komachi pastoralists of Kerman in central Iran (Bradburd 1990). Therefore, the two elements of pastoral nomadism (a form of production) and tribalism (a form of sociopolitical organisation) may or may not coincide. However, this work will deal with two populations, the Turkmen and Baluch, that are both – tribal societies that practice pastoral nomadism. Pastoral nomadism, to give a minimal definition, is a form of production highly reliant upon spatial mobility, usually seasonal, in which the herding of livestock is practised, and in which herdsmen produce, in varying degrees, for both subsistence and trade.

There are two main analytical categories of tribal forms, each represented at the extreme end of a scale ranging from those which are politically decentralised, acephalous, segmentary, and contingently grouped at one end, to those which are hierarchically differentiated, politically centralised, and have stable political groupings at the other. Following Marshall Sahlins’ (1968:20-27) usage, the former may be conceptualised as segmentary tribes, and the latter as chiefdoms. The two polar types of tribal sociopolitical organisation are described just below.
To begin, tribes ordered along segmentary lineages generally dispense with the specialised enforcement agencies characteristic of states. They are rather predicated upon a system of mutual-policing and defence responsibility according to a logic of complementary opposition between and among segments (usually clans) nested within larger yet structurally corresponding segments (Gellner 1983:438-40). Such a system has loosely organised and unstable political groupings that are liable to fission, and is characterised by little or no political centralisation. Representatives here are selected by the collective and accorded only limited authority, amounting to a situational leadership role which is liable to be revoked were it to be abused or ineffectively employed. The system also acts as a mechanism for maintaining internal order (e.g., through the blood feud) in those conditions where social differentiation is not sufficiently developed to allow the emergence of a chiefship (Khazanov 1994:145). Among tribes in Iran organised thus, we may identify the two cases dealt with here, the pastoral nomadic Baluch and the Turkmen.

Tribal chiefdoms or confederacies, on the other hand, have a tendency towards the centralisation of political power and internal hierarchy, and the development of a powerful and hereditary chiefly office. They are, in other words, the opposite of tribes ordered along the system of segmentary lineages, since they are stratified polities. Among groups in Iran, the Qashqa’i, Bakhtiari, Shahsevan, and the Khamseh may be identified as tribal confederacies (Beck 1990:199; Khazanov 1994:165-69). The origins of political centralisation and internal stratification characteristic of such polities are, as Anatoly Khazanov (1994:168) points out, “always secondary, that is, they do not emerge
sui generis, but as a result of interaction with the outside world, which can take different forms.” The functions of a supreme chief in a confederacy include the execution of legal procedure, conflict mediation within the tribe, ceremonial responsibilities, external relations, and military leadership. The chief in a segmentary tribe has related roles, although the chiefship is much weaker than it is among confederacies. As Marshall Sahlins (1968:21) has remarked, in segmentary systems “[t]he chieftain is usually a spokesman of his group and master of ceremonies, with otherwise little influence, few functions, and no privileges. One word from him and everyone does as he pleases.” A discussion of Qajar Iran will illustrate the conditions under which chiefs come to power, the function they fulfill, as well as address how tribal organisation is conditioned by interaction with the outside world.

The setting

With the exception of the Safavids, who came to power with tribal support, all dynasties in Persia from the eleventh century CE onwards had nomadic tribal origins (Moghadam 1988:393). An Ibn Khaldunian formulation would therefore seem to fit quite well with the course of historical political developments in this part of the world as they relate to the question of the emergence and succession of tribal government. The various stages, consisting of the establishment of tribal rule, internal fragmentation or decay, and the circulation of personnel upon the replacement of the old dynastic power with a new tribal one, was discussed in the Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah (Issawi [trans.]1963:120-21), a work explaining the rise and fall of tribal government in
the Maghreb through a conceptual formulation of dynastic cycles. Such cycles are no longer current in Iran, nor can they be argued to reappear and become a feature of Iranian political dynamics. This is so because the Pahlavi dynasty emerged in an era of increasing technological sophistication, characterised by the spread of a more effective military technology which only settled urban-centred states could have control over, thus divesting tribes of their former abilities to overthrow regimes and establish their own. In effect, the Pahlavi dynasty, as it stands, was the last dynastic power to govern Iran.

The second-to-last Persian dynasty was the Qajar. The Qajars are thought to have entered Persia as part of the Turkish Oghuz confederacy in the eleventh century (Hambly 1991:104). By the late eighteenth century, the power of the preceding dynasty, the Zand of southwest Persia, declined, providing fertile circumstances for the emergence of Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar and his eventual bid to become established as the next shah (Hambly 1991:104). His consolidation of power has been divided into a number of phases: beginning in 1779 and up to 1785 he established a power-base in the Elburz region, extending influence over much of northern and northwestern Persia; from 1785 to 1794 he wrested from the Zands control of Iraqi-i Ajam (central Persia), followed by the acquisition of the provinces of Fars and Kerman; by 1797, now a self-proclaimed Shah, he had conquered Gurjistan (Georgia) and Khurasan (Hambly 1991:114).

We must now examine the narrower subject of how tribes in Qajar Persia fared within that realm, however, and not on the broader issue of the emergence or even decline and fall of the Qajar dynasty. It should be added that tribe-state relations within this particular period were much the same as in pre-Qajar Persia as well. Therefore, it
might be more appropriate to speak of tribe-state relations in the Qajar period as reflective of the type of interaction that can be expected prior to the emergence of the modern state in general. The interaction between the two would be characterised not by the outright repression of tribal groups by the state, but rather by tentative pacts, uneasy alliances, and the prevalence of a general mutual distrust set within the context of a long-standing state practice of neutralizing the power of the tribes “by playing them off one against the other” (Banani 1961:52-53). Such a formulation would appear to represent more accurately the social and political reality of pre-Pahlavi Iran, and takes account of an important facet of relations between tribes and states: that the state was not as powerful and unitary an entity as it would later become, and that tribes enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. However, we should here ask the question of more or less autonomous than whom, as well as in what way? It is in relation to the settled population (notably peasants) that they were so, since their mobility enable them to be evasive of the state which sought to control them. An examination of the Baluch and the Turkmen in pre-Pahlavi Iran may illustrate this.

The Baluch

The Baluch (var. Baloch) straddle the southern Iran-Pakistan border, and are predominantly Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi rite (Spooner 1975:179). Although most speak Baluchi, an Indo-Iranian language, many communities regarded as Baluch are of various ethnic origins, and are believed to have been assimilated over the course of four centuries (Spooner 1989:599). Some are considered to have adopted Baluch identity
relatively recently, for while they are recognised as Baluch in relation to the outside world, they are known by various tribal (e.g., Nusherwani, Gitchki, Barakzai) as well as subethnic (e.g., Brahui, Dewar, golam, Jadgal, Med) classifications within Baluch society itself (Spooner 1989: 599). Furthermore, Baluch society is stratified, and ranked into four hereditary and occupational classes: hakomzat, baluch, shahri, and golam, which may conveniently be glossed as rulers, nomads, cultivators, and slaves (Spooner 1989:622). The focus here will be on the second of these classes, the pastoral nomadic Baluch, who will be referred to as *baluch*. Here I follow Brian Spooner’s (1975:171) distinction:

All who are born into the traditional society are Baluch, in distinction from people from other areas and cultures. All Baluch refer to the tent-dwelling nomadic pastoralists of the region as *baluch*, and used thus it has connotations of “par excellence”. It is the *baluch* who embody and maintain in their way of life the values of hospitality and standards of intimacy with the environment which are generally accepted as ideal in Baluch society. In the traditional situation it was the *baluch* who formed the fighting force of the chiefs. Many of them owned slaves, many of which originated from the East African slave trade and Oman, while others in the north were Persians captured in raids.

The Baluch follow a variety of productive regimes: some are pastoral nomads, others are agriculturalists, while others depend equally on both (Spooner 1975:171). My main concern here is to examine Baluch society in southern and southeastern Iranian Baluchistan first, then those in the northern highland Sarhad region. The Baluch of the Sarhad region are, in the main, tribally organised, while in the south and southeast lowlands, hierarchical structures generally prevail. Thus, when reference is made to Baluch pastoral nomads in the lowlands, the term ‘*baluch*’ is used to distinguish the
nomads from other classes of the wider Baluch society. Where the discussion turns to the Sarhad region, the uncapitalised and italicised form will not be used, as the Baluch of the Sarhad are all tribally organised pastoral nomads to begin with.

The *baluch* have been encapsulated by the larger Iranian political system since the 1920s, but their previous status was quite different. Prior to encapsulation, their political decentralisation and high level of mobility indicate an adaptation to an environment which was sparsely populated and not well-suited to settled agriculture. An economy dependent on mobility, in turn, allowed them an edge *vis-à-vis* a weak state, which it could easily evade. Their pastoral economy was also coupled with the existence of arrangements with settled agriculturalists that were often of an extractive variety, with resource inflows supplemented through raiding and predatory territorial expansion (Salzman 1994:173-74; Coon 1958:194-96; also Tapper 1991:513,521,523,528). On a more general level, nomads’ establishment of predatory relations with agriculturalists was a prevalent facet of nomad-sedentary relations in areas where nomadism was widespread and where state control was weak or nonexistent. Of such arrangements, Khazanov (1994:224-27) has identified tribute, direct taxation, and seizure of landed property with the extraction of rent – any number of which may overlap and be implemented in varying degrees. All of this relates to the sphere of external politics. Upon addressing what type of political relations the *baluch* had with their settled neighbours, we must consider the question of their internal politics and tribal structures.

The forms which relations between the *baluch* and peasant communities took are of significant importance, as they point to the larger question of how the countryside in
Baluchistan may have looked prior to the effective establishment of state authority. One illustrative case, extensively discussed by Philip Salzman (1978:125-30) as well as by Ugo Fabietti (1992:91-92), from which we may draw concerns the imposition of a quasi-feudal arrangement by a certain Kadrabaksh Han Nusherwani and his baluch supporters over the Nakibi shahri (cultivators) of the oasis of Kuhak, close to the Pakistani border in southeast Iranian Baluchistan. He passed himself for a patrikinsman of the deceased hakom (ruler) of Kuhak, Ghulam Mahmud Nusherwani, who, as he had no male heirs, had promised the Nakibi shahri control, after he died, over the twenty-four hour cycle of irrigation water needed for date palm and grain cultivation. Following the death of Ghulam, Kadrobaksh arrived and lay his claim to the inheritance of the office of hakom, which the Nakibi did not recognise. Kadrobaksh Han Nusherwani’s response to this rejection led him to call upon his armed supporters, the Gambarzai and Malukzai baluch, who instituted him as hakom. Once this was done, “Kadrobaksh took half the water, twelve hours, and gave the other twelve hours to his baluchi supporters, leaving no water or land for the Nakibi, who had to work for one-quarter share of the produce of their labor” (Salzman 1978:126).² Here, the baluch are agents of the hakom, and the hakom is not of the same tribal origin as his supporters (i.e., Kadrobaksh was a Nusherwani, his supporters Gambarzai and Malukzai). This is just one of the variants that may be found in patterns of interaction between pastoral nomads and the settled peasantry.

The patterns for southern Iranian Baluchistan are described by Spooner

² This is the Nakibi view, which is only briefly related here. For the more complete account, see Salzman (1978:125-30).
(1969:139-52). Here the *baluch* interact with the settled agriculturalists in two ways. First, their involvement may be weak, and with this weak involvement comes the preservation of their autonomy through a tribal chief, the Sardar. The second variation is one in which the *baluch* were significantly engaged with the settled community through the *hakom*. This latter arrangement allowed the *hakom* "to rely economically on the peasants' work and politically on the nomads' strength for support" (Fabietti 1992:90-91). In this latter scenario, the following sources provided the *hakom*’s income: agricultural produce of land owned by him, which was worked by his own *golam*; a tithe on the produce of the *shahri* whom he controlled; service, generally of a military or quasi-military nature, from his *baluch* supporters; and taxes from both *baluch* and *shahri* alike (Spooner 1969:171).

The concept of 'frontier feudalism', developed by Owen Lattimore (1940) has elsewhere been fruitfully applied to the Baluch case, as once territory was conquered along imperial frontiers, the authority of a *baluch* tribal leader, Sardar, over his followers changed from a kin-based and tribally-oriented type to one directed towards hierarchical patron-client ties (Pastner 1979:93-100). The development of such ties stood in opposition to what was generally held to be the idiom of human relations in tribal *baluch* society of southern Baluchistan, egalitarianism. In fact, while the collective moral ideal in Baluch society in Makran (now in Pakistani Baluchistan) centred on notions of political, economic, and social equality, this was far from actual practice (Fabietti 1996:7). In this area of the Persian frontier, the complex ties, alliances, and dependencies which governed social relations resulted in an adaptation that involved a
relationship with the natural environment, and incorporated aspects of competition, cooperation, and symbiosis with other population sectors which considerably influenced the sociopolitical structure of the groups concerned (see Barth 1964).

For a consideration of the internal sociopolitical structures of the baluch who were not beholden to any hakom, we may turn to a consideration of the Yarahmadzai (or Shah Nawazi, following encapsulation) Baluch of the Sarhad, led by a Sardar and consisting of a modestly sized constituency of approximately 5000 (Salzman 1983:266). The Yarahmadzai may be characterised as having a system largely based on segmentary lineages. While it would be incorrect to say that segmentary lineage organisation was their only social and organisational charter, it certainly was the main one. Salzman (1983:266) has referred to their political structure as being of a rather uncommon variety which “might be characterised as a segmentary lineage system with a chief on top.” The office of Sardar is fairly weak here, as it is based on limited authority over followers, and not given to the exercise of sweeping powers. In opposition to the centralising presence of a chiefship, segmentary organisation is predicated on the lack of political centralisation or hierarchy, making this combination a source of internal schism, with “the operation of each system skewed, as it were, by the influence of the other” (Salzman 1983:267). Other factors which ran counter to the development of centralisation include ecological adaptation, technology, and demography (Salzman 1983:266ff).

A consideration of the broader environment will be helpful in dealing with the question of how the Sardarship emerged in a politically decentralised and internally undifferentiated tribe such as the Yarahmadzai, and what the role of the holder of this
office was. The emergence of the chiefship among the Yarahmadzai, and arguably for
other Baluch, arose as a response to external factors, principally for the purposes of
mediation vis-à-vis, and representation to, outside agents (Salzman 1983:277), and thus
can be seen as a political adaptation that has many parallels among tribal groups
throughout Iran and elsewhere. Echoing Khazanov’s (1994) views, such an assertion was
succinctly set forth by Gene Garthwaite (1983:4) when he argues that

[t]he nature of pastoralism and of tribal socio-economic organization [...] 
militates against the *sui generis* formation of tribal confederations. Where no
state structure exists or in tribal areas not under the control of an organized state,
confederations tend to form only in response to conditions originating in adjacent
areas – typically, a need for short-term common defense or an inducement for
expansion or conquest. The confederations’ strength tends to remain at a level
approximate to the strength and duration of the external condition: the
confederation does not long outlast the existence of these conditions.

This insight can be seen to have some interesting overlap with the social thought of Ibn
Khalidun (see Mahdi 1957:196), who considered the impact of external forces as
providing the ultimate test of a group’s internal cohesion and solidarity. The strength of
an external force is seen to have a direct correlation with the degree of internal cohesion,
since “[a]n individual cannot live without a group to protect and defend him; and an
isolated primitive group, whether cultivating the land or roaming the desert, finds such
life impossible without internal social cohesion in the face of groups encroaching upon it
from the outside” (Mahdi:1957:196). As confederacies are characterised by a significant
degree of inequality, it is debatable whether they correspond to a ‘higher degree of
internal solidarity’, but the notion that such a political adaptation would effectively
permit a greater degree of self-preservation on the part of the tribal group concerned is taken to be a correct assumption that can be corroborated through a cursory examination of available ethnographic accounts.

Among the Yarahmadzai the Sardarship emerged as a response to the proximity of one significant polity – a quasi feudal principality – near the Kuh-i Taftan mountains, namely, the local Kurdish hakomate. These Kurds were sent to the Sarhad region of Baluchistan as part of a divide and rule policy of Shah Abbas the Great of the Abbassid dynasty in the early seventeenth century (see Salzman 1983:277). E. Sunderland (1968:637) elsewhere tells us that Shah Abbas sent out similar Kurdish settlements to the province of Khurasan in northeast Persia “as part of his policy of mixing the distinctive elements of the population of his realm, and for the strategic reason of establishing march wardens on the Khurasan frontier.” This regional ruling class acted as an instrument of the state, and was given the mandate to introduce state authority to the region. This attempt was largely lost on the Yarahmadzai, who had been able, up until effective encapsulation by the Pahlavi regime in 1928, to remain autonomous. Aside from his role as a representative of the tribe as a maximal political unit, the domestic role of the Sardar related to internal conflict resolution and the offering of services to tribesmen, the latter of which “can be offered or withheld, and by such means tribesmen can be sanctioned, positively or negatively, at [his] discretion” (Salzman 1983:274). Aside from this minimal latitude available to the Sardar, his decisions, and thus authority, were never final, but subject to the collective approval of his followers, who could challenge his resolutions without risk of serious disciplinary retribution. The
Yarahmadzai Sardar was therefore more a leader than a ruler.

This examination of the Baluch of the Sarhad suggests that their tribal organisation is such that it is highly adaptable to a fluid sociopolitical environment, and that extraneous factors influencing organisational forms should be underlined. The case of the Turkmen presents a further example, an examination of which would be illustrative of the forms of macro-political organisation in a different region: the Gurgan plain of northern Persia. Our analysis will aim at discerning the macro-sociopolitical conditions of an area where a weak and distant state held only negligible sway over the lives of local peoples.

*The Turkmen*

The Turkmen (var. Turkomans) are divided into a number of large descent groups claiming the same apical ancestor, Oghuz Khan. They are, like the Baluch, Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi rite. Their language is Turkmen, a tongue belonging to the Oghuz group of Turkic languages (Irons 1975:5). The Turkmen of Iran are but a portion of the larger population which extends across the Atrak river into Turkmenistan, formerly the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic (Irons 1975:6). Of the various descent groups, the Yomut are themselves separated into two geographically fragmented populations – the Gurgan Yomut and the Khiva Yomut, who, in the late 1960s, together numbered approximately 130,000 (Irons 1974:636).

The socio-political organisation of the Yomut provides an interesting contrast to what is usually expected in the dichotomy between pastoralists and agriculturalists. The
Gurgan Yomut are separated into two occupational groups, *chomur* (agriculturalists) and *charwa* (pastoral nomads), yet all are incorporated into the same corporate tribal structure (Irons 1974:637). Among both agricultural and pastoral Yomut, the form of organisation is based on segmentary lineages, and is therefore unstratified, highly decentralised, with the institution of the feud acting as the mutual defence mechanism operating with a structure of nested groupings preserving internal order (Irons 1974:637).

The *charwa* recognise no leaders at all, and the *chomur* recognise a *saqlao* (protector), an office not tied to any chiefly lineage, but one competed for and held by anyone capable of holding it against any rivals (Irons 1974:646). The *saqlao* would usually be a tribesman who had distinguished himself as a successful raider in expeditions against the settled, Persian agriculturalists in the southern Gurgan plain, the Welayet. The relationship between the settled Welayet and the *chomur* was an asymmetrical one, consisting of Turkmen extortion of protection money, and the extraction of resources through raids conducted against those reluctant to surrender an annual tribute. In turn, remaining true to the name of his office, the 'protector' would seek to ensure that those Welayet communities which did accept his patronage would remain free from depredations from either his own or other Yomut tribes (Irons 1974:646). Failing this, compensation would be paid to those whom he had been unsuccessful in protecting from raids (Irons 1974:646;1975:68).

The role of the *saqlao* was to represent the tribe to the protected Welayet villages, as well as to the local Persian government under the Qajars. The Persian governor appointed an official (*sarkardeh*) from the centre of local administration, the city of
Gurgan (then called Astarabad) for each Yomut tribe. This state representative “was responsible, in theory, for collecting taxes from, and guaranteeing the good behavior of, that tribe” (Irons 1975:68). In practice, few taxes were collected, especially from Yomut who were more distant from this administrative centre, and neither could the sarkardeh prevent the Turkmen chomur from raiding the sedentary Welayet, only rarely being able to punish those who participated in it. Indeed, it is likely that both the sarkardehs and saqlaos collaborated in the exploitation of the Welayet villages, whereupon tribute would be channelled to the sarkardehs in return for non-interference in Yomut activities (Irons 1974:646), however little impact any government interference would in any case have had.

With regards to instances where the state would send out military contingents against Turkmen tribes, we may consider an aspect of Yomut pastoral mobility which was not economic, and indeed had little to do with ecological adaptation. William Irons (1974:647-49,653-55;1975:69) has suggested that the degree of mobility engaged in by the Yomut exceeded what was necessary for the maintenance of their agro-pastoral pursuits, as the livelihood of the chomur could easily be maintained through complete sedentarisation, and the ecology of the charwa could easily support a semi-sedentary residential pattern. Rather, it should be kept in mind that “maintaining a nomadic existence entails a certain cost and that people will continue to pay this cost only if they gain something of sufficient value in return,” as Irons (1974:653) has pointed out. A pattern of nomadic migrations is normally employed to allow for the use of locally unavailable pasturage, justifying the efforts involved in taking down and setting up camp,
which entails a significant expenditure of energy, particularly evident in the weight-loss of herd animals (Irons 1974:653).

In the absence of ecological pressures, therefore, we may consider political ones instead. A mobile way of life among the Yomut was maintained to allow them to retreat from advances made by government forces, and to enable them to remain free of the central control which would have resulted in their subordination. Such an adaptation reflected the political, as opposed to economic, nature of Yomut nomadism (Irons 1974:635; cf. Ekvall 1961).

It would be useful here to consider a conceptual typology of pastoralism into which the sociopolitical structure as well as mobility of the pastoral nomadic Baluch and Yomut would seem to fit. In considering the degree of mobility maintained by any pastoral group in conjunction with the type of internal sociopolitical organisation they have, we would do well to evaluate the degrees of political power and autonomy enjoyed by that group. We may then examine the macropolitical environment within which they are located, observing if they possess the criteria by which they may be deemed to have any corporate status, ultimately allowing us to conclude whether they are 'peasant' or 'tribal' pastoralists (Salzman 1996).

'Peasant' and 'tribal' are labels which represent ranges in the degree of political power and autonomy possessed by rural populations in agrarian societies (Salzman 1996:153). Peasants, by definition, are tied to the land they cultivate, are often socially fragmented populations, and are therefore can be more easily controlled. Tribes, on the other hand, are political units capable of concerted action for both defence against
external forces and the accomplishment of desired goals, and are therefore more difficult to control. Both the pastoral nomadic Baluch and the Yomut possessed the criteria by which they may accurately be considered to have been tribal pastoralists. That is, they were able to assert their independence from surrounding polities and conduct their lives relatively freely and independently from their administrative rule.

Leaving aside the issue of the sociopolitical organisation of the Baluch nomads and Turkmen, as well as their designation as tribal pastoralists, it should be pointed out that the systems of interaction among *baluch*, *shahri*, and the *hakomzat* in Baluch society, as well as the relationship between Yomut Turkmen and settled agriculturalists, suggest the existence of a complex web of localised relations which should take account of systems of land tenure as they were conditioned by practices of state governance. However weak and remote traditional states in Iran may have been, they did establish systems of land tenure that must be accounted for in an examination such as this. The discussion offered below is very brief, as an extensive analysis of land tenure systems in pre-Pahlavi Iran is beyond the scope of this work.

*Fragmented authority and land tenure*

Historian Francois Ganshof (1964:xv) has provided a technical definition of feudalism by summarising its key features as consisting of a development pushed to extremes of the element of personal dependence in society, with a specialized military class occupying the higher levels in the social scale; an extreme subdivision of the rights of real property; a graded system of rights over land created by this subdivision and corresponding in broad outline to the grades of personal dependence just referred to; and a dispersal of political
authority amongst a hierarchy of persons who exercise in their own interest powers normally attributed to the State and which are often, in fact, derived from its break-up.

Qajar Persia was not a feudal society by the above definition (see Lambton 1987:xii,33ff). The main tenurial arrangement connected with the Qajar state was the tuyul, which invariably dealt with the payment (in land) of services offered by clients allegiance to the Shah. Although some of the characteristics of feudalism, such as power “derived from the possession of land and followers, ...some of the abuses associated with feudalism...,” [and] in particular a subject peasantry and the fragmentation of authority leading to disorder” were indeed present, personal loyalties were not institutionalised through the tuyul as they were in feudal Europe (Lambton 1987:x-xi). Rather, the tuyul was “used to cover the grant of a sum of money made on some fund, the realization of which was usually, though not necessarily, entrusted to the beneficiary, a grant of money with or without immunities and territorial jurisdiction in lieu of salary or as a pension, or simply the grant of immunity, and, by extension, the land on which such grants were made” (Lambton 1987:67). The Kurdish hakomates, discussed above, were established by tuyuldars, or grantees who would enjoy the benefit of tuyul land for as long as their service was maintained, the discontinuation of which entailed a termination of the grant. Tuyul was also granted to various tribal leaders in northern Persia in return for the provision of military detachments to the ruling house, as well as for the performance of military services connected with the defence of frontier areas (Lambton 1987:69ff). By usurpation, this land tended to become hereditary and develop into quasi-autonomous
fiefdoms, thus leading to the fragmentation of state authority (Lambton 1987:67; Moghadam 1996:28).

While feudalism, as defined by Ganshof above, did not prevail in pre-Pahlavi Iran, something resembling it did. The rights of the tuyuldar over the governed population were extensive, and included the payment of taxes in the form of produce, a percentage of which, in theory, would be channelled to the state treasury, thus making tuyul beneficial to both grantee and granter alike. We may call this a quasi-feudal system: while in practice the fragmentation of authority and weak government control over the tuyuldar was indeed the state of affairs, other important criteria of feudalism were not present. The larger picture then consists of a state possessed of an administrative apparatus which on the one hand was unable to establish control over autonomous communities on the periphery, and whose stratagems, especially as they related to the administration of tenurial arrangements, led to the establishment of still other quasi-autonomous principalities. Whether or not central control could be established over such autonomous sectors is a moot point. It may just be concluded that it was not, for one of two reasons: either control over territorial frontiers could simply not be managed, or that the costs of establishing control in these areas would have outweighed the benefits.

With modifications, Frederick G. Bailey’s (1969:Ch.8-9) conceptual pair of ‘political structure’ and ‘rival political structure’ may be applied as an analytic framework to this scenario. By ‘political structure’ is meant that structure which is in place and whose personnel carry out the practices of governance. In contrast, leaders of
rival political structures' yearn for the establishment of a different form of government, and whose accession to power would bring a complete alteration of the extant system. Tribal political structures, although qualitatively different from state structures, usually do not (and in the Persian case in fact have not) constituted rival political structures. As briefly alluded to above, the dynastic cycles observed for the Maghreb by Ibn Khaldun (see Gellner 1995:205), and which also held for pre-industrial Persia, consisted of the overthrow of ruling dynasties by tribal forces, resulting not in any transformation of the political structure, but only in a rotation of personnel. As such, tribes in pre-industrial Persia may be considered to have had parallel political structures existing on the fringes of the dominant political structure's sphere of control (cf. Firth 1955:3). Parallel political structures, in other words, were differentiated from the dominant political structures in that they were tribal, and not stately. The amount of authority which any dominant political structure may exercise over other, parallel, political structures varies, with degree of proximity being an important factor. Therefore, the further parallel political structures are from the centre of state power (i.e., the dominant political structure), the weaker the control over them will be.

Remote from both regional administrative locales as well as the imperial capital, the Baluch tribes and the Yomut Turkmen were only nominally encapsulated, if at all, by the Qajar state. Their contacts and dealings with external authorities were minimal, and a balance of power was established and maintained through the enactment of adaptive mechanisms which impeded both the imposition of suzerainty upon them and the resultant fragmentation of tribal political solidarity. Furthermore, in the case of the
Baluch, the external authority they dealt with – the local Kurdish *hakomate* – was itself a quasi-autonomous principality, the development of which was a long-term consequence of the state practice of granting *tupul* land as a form of payment. That the Qajar state’s administration of distant rural areas tended towards fragmentation, and that its authority could be overridden by locally-focussed interests, was symptomatic of its inability to effectively achieve universal supremacy. Indeed, the Qajar state was not hegemonic, and only possessed a dominant political structure insofar as it may be considered to have been the largest and most powerful polity in relation to contiguous ones.

A loosely governed and lightly regulated arena of interaction between forces and population sectors such as this would not survive the establishment of a modern state. This is because the establishment of a modern state is accompanied by, and can only be established with, the introduction of both a new normative ideology and a technology which makes possible the effective control of a governed population. Autonomous populations with parallel political structures were, in the Iranian case, brought into the fold of the modern state, thereby causing them to lose their ability to coordinate activities for political action, and eroding their status as independent tribes. We may ask what became of the sociopolitical structures of two such groups, the Turkmen and Baluch, upon their encapsulation by the Pahlavi state. At a more general level, we may also ask at what point, and how, do tribal pastoralists stop ‘being tribal’ and rather become identity-based administrative units of the state (Marx 1996:109)? This question can only be addressed through an examination of the Pahlavi state – a dominant political structure which, unlike its predecessor, was far more hegemonic and effective in its governance.
How did the Pahlavi state differ from its predecessor, and how was its establishment orchestrated? The following chapter will deal with these questions, as well as with the issue of the establishment of modern military structures, which were instrumental in the establishment of government authority.
Chapter Three:  
Pahlavi Iran: Political Power Consolidated

A comprehensive analysis of the arrival of the Pahlavi regime in Iran must take account of the broader context in which its establishment was possible to occur, followed by an examination of the changes it wrought on the society as a whole. Such an undertaking would be overly ambitious here. I will rather examine, in broad strokes, some of the changes brought about by Reza Shah in his attempt to build a modern state. I begin with a brief examination of the late Qajar dynasty, its main contenders in the political sphere, and the state of Persian government just prior to its dissolution. Following this, two questions are addressed: What approach was taken by Reza Shah to build a modern nation-state? And how did the transfer of political power into the hands of the Pahlavi regime permanently change its patterns of distribution within Persian society? This discussion sets the context for a detailed examination, in the next chapter, of the encapsulation of the Turkmen and Baluch.

Late Qajar Persia

Qajar Persia, and indeed pre-Pahlavi Iran throughout history, in addition to being politically fragmented, was also a segmented society, with estates, ethnic communities, and tribes as constitutive segments. In such a society, “only great men [...] had a direct relationship to the state; for the rest, an individual’s primary identity was as a member of such a segment, determined by the primordial fact of birth and buttressed, usually, by
other worldly cosmologies. Movement from one segment to another was, in theory, precluded; it was an absolute condition” (Worsley 1984:188). Qajar Iran has also been described as having a “vertical division of society” (Ghods 1989:3-4). Rather than being stratified into economic classes, the social order took the form of communities cross-cut by them, incorporating affluent and non-affluent alike. Loyalty to nation or any economic grouping did not exist; rather the claimants of individuals’ loyalties were family, clan, localised community, or religious sect. The concept of national identity, as it is understood today, was foreign to the overwhelming majority of Iranians. Rather, there existed forms of patriotism or ideas relating to categories of belonging which, of course, incorporated concepts of inclusion and exclusion, ‘us’ and ‘them’, etc. Persian patriotism, or feelings of attachment and loyalty toward one’s own ascribed ethnic or tribal unit, existed, and may in some cases have had a genealogical justification and therefore employed the concept of kinship (stipulated or real) as the basic social idiom. We should also not neglect, although this work does not deal with it, that for a large number of the population religious custom had decreed that the most important affiliation or mode of identity was Shi’i Islam. The ulama historically played a prominent role in defining the identity and setting the values of the Persian-speaking urban sector of Iranian society, as the Islamic Revolution in 1979 proved quite conclusively. As John Hall (1985:218) has said of traditional agrarian orders, Iran was a good example of a society which comprised “distinct and separated ethnic and tribal units, unable to communicate much with each other, bound together by a small elite,
often of professional rulers possessing their own culture and, by definition, considering
the sheer number of cultures beneath them, not co-cultural with their subjects.”

In addition to having a segmented and vertical division of society, the presence of
autonomous entities with parallel political structures, and the fragmentation of authority
this led to, the Qajar state had to contend with the imperial ambitions of Britain and
Russia, both of which “had strong political and strategic interests in Iran,” (Keddie
1991:179) and pursued them on Iranian soil largely to the detriment of Iran’s well-being.
These British and Russian interests mainly dealt, respectively, with maintaining “control
of the Persian Gulf, to keep other powers out of it, and to safeguard southern and eastern
Iran for the defence of India,” and to “make northern Iran an area of overwhelming
Russian influence...and to gain more territory and an outlet to a warm water port on the
Persian Gulf” (Keddie 1991:180). For the British, fulfilment of these goals brought with
it many economic enterprises and infrastructural developments that were not intended for
the growth of the Iranian economy or for the benefit of the Iranian people. The
infrastructural developments dealt with the construction of telegraph lines and railways
that would facilitate communications with India, and the economic enterprises involved
the granting of concessions by Nasir al-Din Shah (the erstwhile Qajar Shah) to British
subjects for the purpose of making use of Iranian resources in turn for the guarantee of
British protection against Russian expansion. On the Russian side, the hopes of
establishing a strong foothold in the north was essentially part of an imperial ambition
which went back to two wars in the early nineteenth century, where some Transcaucasian
territory was ceded to Russia (Keddie 1991:180).

It would seem, however, that the more pernicious of the two powers were the British, who had quite effectively managed to deal with the Qajar regime on their own unilateral terms. The concessions granted to British interests had the effect of grievously eroding the sovereignty of Iran, and carried the potential of causing considerable harm to the domestic economy. The two most noteworthy concessions were the Tobacco Concession and the Reuter Concession. The Tobacco Concession, signed in March 1890 and granted to Major Talbot by Nasir al-Din Shah himself, gave a British tobacco company a “monopoly on production, distribution, and export of tobacco in Iran” (Vakili-Zad 1996:149). This led to enormous profit loss for domestic tobacco merchants, and occasioned a complete collapse of Iranian control of an important domestic product. The protracted Tobacco Revolt, which ran for a lengthy period until the cancellation of the concession in January 1892, combatted against what was seen as an unacceptable impingement of British interests on the Iranian economy. The domestic interests included not only the bazaar (or merchants) but also the ulama, who received donations from tobacco profits (Vakili-Zad 1996:150). Perhaps the most extravagant concession was one the granted in 1872 to Baron Julius de Reuter, a British subject, and brokered by the Prime Minister Mirza Hussein Khan Mushier al-Dowleh. Even Lord Curzon (cited in Vakili-Zad 1996:147) had considered the Reuter Concession to be “the most complete surrender of the entire resources of a Kingdom into foreign hands that has ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in human history.” This concession “would have
given the entire Iranian customs the exclusive right to finance a state bank, exploit all minerals (with the exception of gold, silver, and precious stones), build railways and tramways for seventy years, and establish all future canals, irrigation works, roads, telegraph lines, and industrial factories” (Vakili-Zad 1996:143). These ineffective attempts by the Qajar autocracy to secure a form of economic development along with a degree of security against Russian threat outweighed the benefits that may have accrued. After massive protests backed by the ulama, as well as by numerous intellectuals and political reformers, the Reuter Concession, like the Tobacco Concession which followed it, was cancelled.

At the end of the First World War this situation deteriorated significantly. The Qajars were unable to negotiate on their own terms, and could not deal effectively with the predicaments they faced. Iran’s lack of effective economic and political independence would inevitably lead to the generation of an oppositional political culture premised on anti-imperialist ideologies, eventually resulting in anti-government movements (Foran 1993:143). For example, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 was an attempt on the part of reformers to establish a parliamentary institution, called the Majlis, and a system known as the Fundamental Laws – drawn up through an interpretation of the Belgian constitution – to allow Iran a greater measure of sovereignty (Vakili-Zad 1996:152). This body could enable Iranians to more appropriately manage both Iran’s affairs and its destiny, and the Fundamental Laws were created with a view towards limiting the sweeping decision-making powers of the Qajar Shahs, as well as to
as to fashion the Iranian polity more along western European democratic lines (Vakili-Zad 1996:152-53; Foran 1993:147). It may be useful to note that the Constitutional Revolution and the political ideals which gave rise to it were nationalist ones. The Qajar government, by virtue of Iran's military and economic weakness and social fragmentation, was not able to maintain much political sovereignty and economic independence. The time had come to transform this, and it was believed that by forming an alliance with Germany and the Ottomans during the First World War, Iran could more effectively counter the pressures of Anglo-Russian power. This had the effect of turning Iran into a battlefield. While Iran was overrun during and immediately after the war by Russian, Ottoman, German, and British forces, perhaps as much as a quarter of the Iranian population died, largely as a result of famine and diseases such as cholera, typhus, typhoid, and influenza. Following the collapse of Russia, the Ottomans, and Germany, English forces occupied much of Iran. Britain dominated Tehran's governments, subsidizing the shah, the cabinet, and the military (Zirinsky 1994:47).

We should perhaps also be reminded at this point that the fall of Czarist Russia in 1917 was not as positive an omen for Iran as it may have appeared at first glance. If the assumption is made that Iran was left formally uncolonised because of Anglo-Russian rivalry, then the withdrawal of Russian troops in January 1918 meant that a vacuum could effectively be filled by the British, who now no longer had to negotiate with Russia in securing their own strategic interests in Iran. Certainly, it would have been advantageous for the British to garrison some troops "in the former Russian headquarters of Qazvin and Enzeli" (Cottam 1964:182) and assume dominance in the north, which
indeed they did. From within this seemingly desperate situation, no other reformers or agitators were so successful as Colonel Reza Khan Pahlavi, a Persian officer who led a 2500-strong detachment of the Cossack Brigade into Tehran on 21 February 1921, and effected a bloodless coup overnight (Avery 1967:97). Reza Khan (Shah after his coronation in 1926) was a reformer who sought to modernise Iran, and create a European-type nation-state. He sought to do this in a number of ways. We may begin by examining his attempt to create a new Iranian military, but first we must examine late Qajar military structures.

One of the aims of the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-11 was to modernise the domestic military structures of Qajar Persia, such that they could be "truly and exclusively answerable to the Iranian authorities" (Cronin 1996:107). An attempt to fulfill this goal was made through the creation of a Government Gendarmerie, accomplished with neutral Swedish aid in 1911. The creation of the Gendarmerie was in large part a response to the absence of modern military institutions controlled by Tehran, and Swedish assistance was not seen as an impediment to making it a loyal force and national institution (Cronin 1996:133). Its essential aims were to control tribal unrest, patrol roads in outlying provinces subject to tribal raiding and levying of caravans, and maintain general security from the centre. The Gendarmerie faced considerable tribal opposition, however, since they were seen as unduly interfering in what was tribal territory and essentially sought to displace tribal influence in regions that had hitherto been mostly beyond the state’s reach. The establishment of gendarme posts along the
caravan routes and main roads in Fars province encountered the most resistance, and severe fighting broke out on several occasions. The most serious of these were the tribal uprisings against the force stationed at the Kazirun section of a main caravan route, which endangered the very existence of gendarme activities anywhere within that area (Cronin 1996:111).

This predictable resistance came from and was orchestrated by tribal leaders, whose interests would be hurt by the deployment of a quasi-military force on their territories. The utter collapse of central control – however limited – in tribal areas during the Constitutional Revolution meant that the rahdari, or tribal levies on caravans, could increase and become quite a lucrative undertaking, such that the heavy sums demanded and the protection offered in turn would reach the point of extortion (Cronin 1996:110). Such trade-disrupting activities would end with the help of the Gendarmerie. The creation of this force then served to extend central state rule, and arose as a response to problems of internal security, but would later come to surpass its original mandate by developing into a quasi-army which exercised growing importance. In sum, it was a product of the state’s attempt during the Constitutional era to nationalise its institutions and reassert “legal authority against foci of power external to the state” (Cronin 1996:133; see also Yapp 1975:357-59).

Prior to the creation of the Swedish-officered gendarmerie, the only modern military force in Iran was the Russian-officered Cossack Brigade. This was created in 1879 with the principal aim of maintaining general security in Tehran and adjoining
areas, with the Russian safeguarding of interests in the north being the main trade-off (Cottrell 1979:390). The soldiers of the Cossack Brigade were mainly Persian, and it was from within this institution that Reza Shah would rise to power. Another military contingent, the South Persia Rifles, was created by the British in 1916. This was not unrelated to the British interest of maintaining control of southern Iran in order to protect essential communications and trade with India, and sought to deal with tribal unrest and insecurity in the provinces bordering the Persian Gulf (Cottrell 1979:390). Shortly afterwards, and as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, the Russian officers of the Cossack Brigade departed, and the leadership vacuum created by this departure was filled by British officers (Cottam 1964:182). With the retreat of the Russians, the Anglo-Russian rivalry that had arguably allowed Iran to remain formally uncolonised was gone, so two of the three modern military institutions were under British influence and control.

It should be added that while modern military institutions did exist in Iran prior to the rise of Reza Shah, they could not, on the one hand, have been considered truly national institutions since they were foreign-officered and, on the other, they constituted three separate units which were not centrally coordinated in any efficient manner with regard to either recruitment, training, or deployment. They were therefore, in effect, three different armies (Cottrell 1979:390).

These modern forces were supplemented with both contractually allied tribes loyal to the Shah as well as tribal irregulars. The former included the Shahsevan (literally, ‘Lovers of the Shah’), who were assembled by Shah Abbas I (ruled 1587-1629)
during the preceding Safavid period, and remained loyal to the succeeding Qajars (Ghods 1989:3), and the Bakhtiari, who largely cooperated with the above military units until 1921 (Cronin 1996:107). Irregulars consisted of mercenary tribesmen, who could not generally be relied upon very much and were given relatively minor assignments only when absolutely needed, owing to their inclination to desert if encountering tribal groups with whom they did not have unamicable relations (see Tousi 1988). The military institutions of Qajar Iran were therefore an inchoate mix of foreign-officered units and tribal contingents loyal to the ruling house. They were a largely uncoordinated force which did not allow for an effective centralisation of power in the hands of the Qajars.

*Surveillance and control*

Reza Shah’s attempt to build a nation-state and do away with all impediments to its establishment would have required the development of two of the four ‘institutional clusterings’ that Anthony Giddens (1987:5ff) associates with modernity. These are ‘heightened surveillance’ and the ‘consolidation of centralised control of the means of violence’. ‘Capitalistic enterprise,’ and ‘industrial production’ are the other two, but we can dispense with these in our analysis, since an examination of them within the context of Pahlavi Iran would require treatment of issues beyond the scope of this work. I rather wish to focus exclusively upon the way Reza Shah’s attempt to consolidate central control of the means of violence and to increase surveillance was associated with his larger project of state building. If remodelling and indeed completely altering the
structures of Iranian society was a desirable end, then the creation of a national army would be an important step. A national army would serve to neutralise the politically and militarily powerful elements in society (which included tribes) as well as to bolster a sense of national solidarity hitherto non-existent (Banani 1961:56-57; Singh 1980:255). The undertaking was part of an encompassing endeavour that sought to transform segmentary Iranian society with its particularistic allegiances and solidarities, and relocate the individual citizen’s primary allegiance towards the ‘nation.’ Indeed, as Reza Shah’s heir, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi (1980:52), would later write,

[the] creation of a strong army ranked first on his [Reza Shah’s] list of priorities. After his march on Tehran he complained, ‘if only I had a thousand guns of the same calibre,’ and he meant rifles, not field pieces. Without adequate armed strength, he knew enduring national unity could not be achieved. In the twenties he expanded our armed forces to one division, an autonomous brigade and special highway controls. In addition, he built small forts along strategic highway crossroads. Safe passage within a country is a basic prerequisite of national unity.

We might point out that national unity accomplished thus – i.e., through an increase in (and, logically, an application of) armed strength – would seem to corroborate M.G. Smith’s (1965:90) assertion that “social quiescence and cohesion differ sharply, and so do regulation and integration.”

The formation of a national army was begun in earnest by Reza Khan shortly after 1921. He started by extirpating all British influence from the Iranian armed forces, and then amalgamated the Gendarmerie and the South Persia Rifles into a single military force (Singh 1980:255; ). The Cossack Brigade formed the nucleus of the new army, and
its highest ranking officers were drawn from among Reza Khan’s closest affiliates. By
the following year, he had begun to send cadets abroad for officer training, primarily in
France, at St. Cyr, Saumur, and Saint-Maixent (Pahlavi 1980:52). A large and loyal
officer corps was deemed vital in a divided country such as Iran, and the large-scale
mobilisation of forces could only be carried out if there was an adequate officer reserve
upon which to rely (Cottrell 1978:391). By 1925, a new conscription law was
introduced, whereby every able-bodied adult male was subject to a twenty-five-year term
of military service, of which twenty-three years would be on various types of reserve,
with the first two years consisting of active service (Savory 1970:602-3). Prior to the
implementation of this new conscription law, which did not exempt tribal peoples, a
large scale campaign of ‘internal pacification’ had already begun. Internal pacification
– which was part and parcel of the process of consolidating central state power – dealt
with the divesting of power from a number of social elements which stood in the way of
modernisation and nation-state building. These included “the landowning classes and
religious classes, the merchants, and the tribes” (Savory 1970:603). The main concern
here is with the tribal groups. Tribal groups, by virtue of their possession and control of
significant means of violence, had historically been responsible for much of the
instability of previous dynastic states. Their tribal allegiances, and indeed existence,
were therefore impediments to the establishment of a centralising state, and their
political independence, in fact, was not recognised as legitimate by Reza Shah.
Legitimacy was especially at stake when tribes were believed to have been used as
instruments of foreign pressure on the preceding Qajar government, and acted autonomously within the political arena to the detriment of the state’s sovereignty, or so it was perceived by Reza Shah and his government (Arfa 1964:172). A policy of ‘tribal pacification’ was designed to remedy the problem.

The pacification of tribal groups required first and foremost their disarmament. Resistance to this goal would occasion nothing less than actual military campaigns. As expected, no tribe willingly relinquished its arms, as this key feature has arguably enabled them to historically maintain a fair degree of autonomy from the state, in addition to serving as an effective means of defence against various other external rivals. Resistance from Kurdish tribes, for example, precipitated campaigns against them, with their first engagement by government forces occurring in the same year Reza Khan rose to power. Failure was met on several occasions until the Shah eventually sent adequate forces to successfully liquidate their leader, Esmail Aqa Simko (Arfa 1964:127,172). Further campaigns were carried out to suppress the Shahsevan, the Lurs, the Turkmen, and lastly, beginning in 1924, the Baluch (Arfa 1964:172,166-85,254). We may well add that the pacification and establishment of central control over Khuzestan and Bakhtiari country was especially important in light of the oil being prospected there (Arfa 1964:167).

This process of tribal pacification seems to conform to Charles Tilly’s (1985) appraisal of the processes which inhered in seventeenth and eighteenth century European state formation. Characterising the process of state-building as akin to organised crime,
he illustrates the way in which the rise to eminence of local lords into harbingers of the state involved the geometric extension of the perimeter within which the monopolisation of the means of violence successfully occurred. The inherent logic of this process involved the liquidation and disarmament of potential rivals through force or cooptation, and the selling of protection to the population within the boundaries of the forcefully-acquired and defended perimeter. In Iran, this logic of expanding power involved the disarmament of tribal peoples and the liquidation or cooptation of their leaders. This aimed to allow for the successful and unhindered extraction of resources from the ‘protected’ population which could, in turn, be further put to use for waging war against internal rivals. Thus, in Tilly’s (1985:173) own words, “disarming the great stood high on the agenda of every would-be state maker.” The formation of a national defence force loyal to the state, and not the tribe or other local group, was central to this project. Furthermore, the formation of an army rhetorically fashioned along Western lines seeks to fulfil the duty of defending a particular governing elite against threats which “emerge not only from other states, but from within the state, or from groups that cut across state boundaries” (Krause 1996:322). This brings us to the question of internal security and the perceived threats which emerge from within the state’s own boundaries. We would do well first to examine what is meant by ‘security.’ Following Mohammad Ayoob (1994:15), security may be defined “in relation to vulnerabilities that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes which preside over these structures and profess to represent
them internationally." As we have noted, threats to state structures in Iran took several forms, but arguably one of the most important was that posed by regional tribal leaders and their followers, who have in general often been in greater or lesser dispute with any dynastic state, the Pahlavi one included. The surveillance and control of tribes was the outgrowth of a drive to build a nation-state which refused to implement any policy of decentralised governance.

In addition to meeting the challenges posed by internal 'security threats,' and fulfilling the national objective of centralising control of the means of violence, the army was also used to fulfil the important function of unifying Iran on the basis of allegiance to the Pahlavi regime. Universal conscription provided the basis for the establishment and growth of the army, and it was one key upon which legitimacy of the new regime could be secured. Mass participation in the 'defence of the country' (as well as the pacification of the state's rivals) meant that, by extension, citizens could be 'a part of' the new nation. Whereas previous forms of identity related primarily to localised groups, the sense of patriotism fostered by a national army could well be related to mass conscription's opening of 'broader horizons' and development of contacts extending beyond the local community, as Stanislaw Andreski (1968:89) argued. It may well be added, although the issue is not being dealt with in depth here, that education in a regime like Pahlavi Iran may well be used, in tandem with military institutions, as a tool to increase commitment to the regime as well as allow the dissemination of regime ideology and values. The aims of both educational and military institutions appear to be
related, especially if we consider a speech Reza Shah made to a group of students going
to study abroad:

You will render full service to your country only when you have served in the
army. Military service is one of the essential duties as a patriot, especially of the
student class. Military service strengthens the spirit and prepares the mind for
work. It is my opinion that students completing the middle schools and even
those finishing the higher courses should serve in the army for a time, even
though for a shorter period than is ordinarily required. Thus, they will be able to
render more satisfactory service and prove more useful to the country and the
protection of its interests. Then you and the crown prince [Mohammed Reza
Shah] will be equal in my sight (cited in Wilber 1975:144).

Leaving aside the question of state-controlled education, the role served by the
Iranian army was arguably similar to that played by the national educational institutions,
and the goals of either appear to be similar. Allowing social mobility and national
integration, diffusion of the regime’s ideology, and providing personnel for government
activities were key social roles served by the army in the Pahlavi state (Halliday 1979:73-
75). As Mary Douglas (1986:112) has shown, in order for such institutions to serve their
purpose effectively they must ascribe identities and set the categories of their members’
thought. The military in Pahlavi Iran therefore needed to set certain parameters
governing its members’ ideals and beliefs as part of the comprehensive goal of assuring
allegiance to the regime of which it was a part. Phrased differently, the army may be
considered to have been equipped with an indoctrination mechanism. However, the
emphasis here is upon the larger program from which this particular institution arose, the
goal of creating a new social order in Iran. Such a goal involved the formation of a new
mode of identity, one not associated with tribe, village, or religious sect, but with, to use Benedict Anderson's (1983) phrase, an 'imagined community.' Without embarking upon a full-scale analysis of nationalism in the Pahlavi regime, we can see the broad outlines of the process involved in instructing citizens to 'imagine Iran,' so to speak, and how military institutions served as an engine for the accomplishment of this goal.

In light of M.G. Smith's (1965:90) assertion, cited above, that there is a fundamental difference between social quiescence and cohesion, it may be ironic to conceive of military institutions as being both an instrument of coercion as well as a state's mechanism of legitimation. Does an army in a plural society act, in other words, as an instrument of regulation or of legitimation? That both principles should be represented in modern military institutions is not surprising, and indeed no logical leap is required for us to assert that a modern national army, in Iran or elsewhere, could serve both roles. The recruitment of personnel, through mass conscription, into the ranks of the army in effect makes participation in this institution possible for a wide cross-section of the national population, albeit exclusively male. As Anthony Richmond (1984:5) too has noted, "even the most coercive regime must endeavour to translate naked force into legitimated authority, if all its energies and resources are not to be dissipated."

Imagining Iran and its broader horizons, in any event, could not be reconciled with the presence of a multitude of local affiliations, and the national army may be seen as having served as a vehicle which sought to bring together disparate peoples in the service of the state. A comprehensive recruitment policy operated, one which did not
exclude any members of Iranian society on ethnic, tribal, or religious bases. Moreover, the Iranian army had no ethnically or tribally-composed regiments established for specific groups, as this would have the effect of perpetuating the kinds of locally-defined affiliations which were to be replaced (Halliday 1979:74). Iranians were henceforth to be united on a ‘national’ (i.e., centralised), and not localised, basis.

Social transformations

The foregoing discussion of Iran under the Qajars – the Iran Reza Shah sought to transform – corroborates the characterisations of pre-industrial states made by both Gianfranco Poggi (1990) and Ernest Gellner (1964). Poggi (1990:25) outlines the distribution of power in pre-industrial states, and contrasts their coordination of political activities with those of modern states:

In previous large-scale political entities, political power was institutionalised in a different manner, and mostly to a different extent. Those entities mainly expressed and extended the particular powers and interests of individual rulers and dynasties; in them [...] political prerogatives were undifferentiated components of privileged social standing. In general, those entities were structured as loose confederations of powerful individuals and their groups of followers and associates, with uncertain or varying spatial boundaries. On that account, the conduct of political activities lacked those characteristics of intensity, continuity and purposefulness which follow from entrusting those activities to an expressly designed, territorially bounded organisation.

Similarly, Gellner (1964:163) considers the prototypical pre-industrial ‘empire’ as “a largish territory under one ultimate political sovereign.” He continues,

The chances are that (a) the territory comprises a multiplicity of languages; (b)
that notwithstanding nominally unique sovereignty at the centre, there is in fact a
certain diffusion of power, a multiplicity of local, semi-autonomous power
centres. The semi-autonomous centres guard their measure of independence
thanks to the difficulties encountered by any attempts at really effective
centralisation in pre-modern conditions: but in turn, they are probably the best
means of controlling the rural populations of the backwoods.

As discussed in the previous chapter, ‘controlling the rural populations of the
backwoods’ the *tayulders* in Baluchistan certainly did. While the Baluch and Turkmen
themselves were fully-autonomous and not controlled by external forces, they established
regimes of extraction *vis-à-vis* local peasant populations, which may itself be considered
a form of control. All in all, power dwelt not solely within the state apparatus, but was
diffused among a variety of non-state actors as well. The arrival of a more powerful
centralising state in the twentieth century involved the implementation of Giddens’
‘clusters of modernity’, as we have discussed. The campaigns of tribal ‘pacification’
sought to divest these sociopolitical groupings of the autonomy and power they exercised
within a context in which political power was fragmented. This change itself involved
nothing less than a complete transformation in the macro sociopolitical structures of
Persia. We should further remember that tribes were not the only such elements
adversely affected by this transformation, but the religious authorities, the landowning
classes, and the merchants were as well (Savory 1970:603). The disruption of previous
political units caused by the emergence of a centralising state was also intimately linked
to processes of modernisation and industrialisation that were part and parcel of the
establishment of the state. We may consider this transformation of state forms as
constituting a permanent change in Iran’s macro sociopolitical structures, in that the state would no longer remain a capstone entity, in John Hall’s (1994:21) terminology, but would structure and pervade the lives of the subjects over which it ruled. Poggi (1990:77) has more to say about this political phenomenon, and aptly states that the building up of the state progressively suppresses an earlier kind of political process, wherein a plurality of subjects exercised and sought to maintain and enlarge relatively independent faculties of rule. Rule becomes increasingly the exclusive prerogative of a unified, central, paramount political subject. The latter, however, becomes the point of reference of a new kind of political process, resolving [sic] around the content and form of policies now exclusively flowing out of the political centre; and this political process involves increasingly numerous actors, who voice (with varying effectiveness) increasingly different claims.

We cannot examine here the ‘increasingly numerous actors’ who emerge from within the modern state’s political process. Suffice it to say that the break with pre-industrial state forms presented by the arrival of modernity in this context may be seen to constitute, using M.G. Smith’s (1974:173) terminology, both a vectorial transformation of macro sociopolitical structures, that is, a transformation that does not alternate between two polar extremes, but is rather linear, on the one hand, as well as a terminal situation of structural change that resulted in the emergence of a distinct political unit with clear boundaries and internal constitution, on the other. To subjugated political units, a terminal transformation is exogenous, “but to the dominant unit, the new system based on its domination is endogenous in generation” (Smith 1974:173). The rationalisation of the Iranian state brought with it the inexorable drive to control the ruled
population through their incorporation into the larger, territorially-defined national entity. Such an entity aimed to impose a given form of normative integration which the pre-industrial state could not attempt successfully. For the modern state to succeed in such an endeavour, it needed centralised institutions of coercion which its predecessor did not have – an army possessing modern military technology. Bringing disparate elements of the population within the reach of state control required of the encapsulated sociopolitical units a transformation of their internal structures that would allow them to provide a structural fit with the administrative apparatus of the state. The ultimate result of this encapsulation was the replacement of the autonomy of previously inaccessible tribes by their dependence on the state. This would have been desirable, especially if we consider the state as “an organisation which controls the principal concentrated means of coercion within the population,” and whose political aims and undertakings are often hostile to, and take little account of, the interests of subordinate classes or groups (Tilly 1978:52).

Such macro sociopolitical transitions should not be considered to occasion the utter destruction of the encapsulated groups, but rather to result in a process of realignment and adjustment to the new political configurations. At the same time, if the encapsulation of a tribal society entails a divestment of its autonomy and power, we may well ask if this process constitutes a different “terminal situation of structural change” in which the unit may “dissolve, disintegrate and lose [its] distinctiveness, boundaries and internal cohesion” (Smith 1975:173). In the transition from pre-industrial to modern
states, what may become of those sociopolitical units characterised by the possession and exercise of political autonomy and power? Or, alternately phrased, what processes are involved in divesting autonomous groups of the power they hold in the transition from a fragmented sociopolitical order where power is diffuse and uncentralised? We may now turn to a consideration of the encapsulation of the Turkmen and Baluch, who may serve to address this question. What might these two cases tell us about the creation of modern states and the incorporation of minority, tribal, groups; peoples whose relationship with modernity was not set on their own terms, but determined from without?
Chapter Four:  
States and Social Structures, Old and New

[...] its administrators can control desert and mountain, its labour market can seduce the young men, its culture can replace the tribal ritual (Gellner 1981:95).

States, like the social structures upon which they are imposed, come in ‘old’ and ‘new’ (or alternatively, pre-industrial and modern) forms. Short of incorporating a disclaimer as to the usage of such terminology, it should be pointed out that this distinction, consisting as it does of a contrasted dichotomy, may present a facile base upon which to elaborate the arguments to follow. This distinction has already been employed in the foregoing account, where old states and social structures were examined within the context of a discussion of the macro sociopolitical structures of pre-Pahlavi Iran. New states and social structures contrast significantly with their predecessors, as their constitution contain the elements of social atomism, centralised political power, specialised political offices, and well-defined territorial boundaries. On the other hand, divided structures, fragmented political power, the autonomy of significantly large population sectors, and localised allegiances were the main elements prevailing within old social structures.

This chapter will deal with the encapsulation of tribal groups in Pahlavi Iran over the reign of Reza Shah, and will therefore be concerned with a narrower aspect of this transitional process. The epigraph at the head of this chapter provides a good starting
assumption for what follows: modern states have the ability to effectively encapsulate tribal groups, incorporate their members into the larger society to a greater degree, and their normative ideals can occasion a shift in local orientations that profoundly transform the encapsulated entity. To understand processes of encapsulation and the types of governance which accompany them, it is important to have an appreciation of the way in which the state can establish instrumentally effective ties of patron-clientship with encapsulated units. It may be argued that such ties are an essential first step in the state's endeavour to attain effective political centralisation. I will begin, however, with a discussion of modern state regimes and the underpinnings often conceived as being the preconditional requirements for their viable existence.

Modern States

For a modern state to ascend to a position of supremacy within any context requires of it to enact a profound transformation of the society over which it rules. It must, to expand what Mary Douglas (1986:112) said of institutions, devise a strategy to allow it to normatively set the categories of its citizens' thoughts. It must also transform the operating networks of relations extant at its arrival, as well as define new identities which provide a structural fit with the emerging macro sociopolitical arrangements. This entails the triumph of broader allegiances over narrower local ones. This does not happen spontaneously in an unaided fashion, however, but involves guided alterations of any existing parallel political structures, with their eventual eradication and incorporation of their members into the dominant political structure. In other words,
identity- and role-conferring institutions which possess a claim to the allegiance of whole population sectors, such as tribe, sect, and any other based on region and descent, are to be superceded and replaced, as Craig Calhoun (1991:96) suggests, by modalities congruent with "the integration of large-scale social systems [and] the mode of organization" specific to them (see also Calhoun 1993:230; cf Taylor 1998). In the 'old' system, individuals' relationship to the state was mediated through membership in status-ascribing localised groups. As Charles Taylor (1998:196) points out, "the shift from hierarchical, mediated-access societies to horizontal, direct-access societies" involved a transformation of the conventions of belonging from those based on ascription and mediated either through an immediate overlord (in a ranked system) or representative of a corporate body (in a more egalitarian system) to one centring on citizenship. This universally relocates individuals' allegiances to the state by way of an instillment of a direct relationship to it – hence, direct-access. In Taylor's (1998:197) phrase, this transition effected "a revolution in our social imaginary," wherein the ultimate unit of membership becomes the nation, and where the locus of the individual's identity transcends local confines, entering the broader arena set and normatively defined by the expanding modern state.

Such was the ideal pursued by Reza Shah Pahlavi. In the Iranian case, the fulfilment of this ideal may be considered to have been centred on the goal of fostering a civic, as opposed to an ethnic, form of nationalism and national belonging. The distinction is significant. Civic nationalism is here taken to refer to those cases where the integration of a multiethnic society relies on the principle of inclusiveness, and is
carried out through the establishment of practices and institutions that foster the
development and consolidation of the *multiethnic* state, such as the mass media, mass
schooling, educational institutions, the military, and social mobilisation, the latter
enabling citizens to exercise a *fair* degree of civic participation within society. Ethnic
nationalism, usually just called *nationalism*, consists of something rather different, and
"is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit
should be congruent" (Gellner 1983b:1). Here, in contrast to the previous item, fully
legitimate and sanctioned membership in the political unit, the *nation*-state, is dependent
upon ethno-linguistic criteria, whatever they may be. Civic nationalism, on the other
hand, is correspondent with *multiethnic* (and not *nation*-) states, the creation of which, in
the non-western world, may parallel one of "four main historical patterns or 'routes' of
Smith (1986:242) has pointed out that this particular pattern is followed

where a modern, rational state is imposed from above on populations which are
divided into many different ethnic communities and categories, who band
together to achieve independent statehood under the aegis of a state-wide
nationalism, and then try to use this territorial state and its 'nationalism' to create
a unified nation out of these divergent *ethnie*.

Clearly, this relates to the prototypical emergence of a kind of reactive nationalism, in
which state elites, setting aside ethnic or other differences, organise political agitation to
drive out a colonial power. In Iran, this precise scenario did not quite operate, since this
country was never formally colonised by a European power. Rather, the emergent
Pahlavi regime established a state which itself, arguably, acted as a colonising power *vis-
à-vis encapsulated populations, although such groups are not usually considered to be colonised in the strict sense of the term (cf. Hechter 1975). The ultimate aim of this program was to fuse together a citizenry for whom the primary unit of identification was the national unit, and for whom the state would provide an extended network of opportunities such that individuals’ lives would no longer be structured according to the exigencies of membership in exclusive localised communities. It may be noted that social atomism increases in this type of sociopolitical formation, for the main reason that individual citizens, as Gellner (1994:106) points out, need to be able “to draw exclusively from a non-contextual, shared, codified set of symbols” in their daily interactions with one another. This type of social order is sharply contrasted with “the old segmentary societies [which] highlighted and fortified the boundaries between the segments by accentuated cultural differentiation: people spoke, ate, dressed, etc. differently according to their precise location in a complex, intricate social structure” (Gellner 1994:105).

How, then, is the ‘social imaginary’ revolutionised in the transition from a mediated- to a direct-access society? We may suggest that the social imaginary, once no longer defined by the local status-ascribing community which mediated its members’ identity, is rather to be redefined and set by the state. The ‘myth of a state’, as Jack Goody (1968) called it, requires a recreation of history, one that recasts the citizens of the new state as the inheritors of what might be thought of as a great tradition. Alternately, we might call this the invention of the nation; nations are created where none exist, as Gellner (1983b) reminded us. Gellner (1983b:55) usefully illustrates the argument being advanced here:
When the general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally-sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify.

The general social conditions mentioned by Gellner deal with the transition from agrarian to industrial society, and encompass the shift from mediated- to direct-access societies. However, his suggestion that culturally unified political units provide the only type of unit with which people identify may be overstated, and probably not everywhere applicable. The Iranian case, as I have suggested, does not conform to this pattern, since an ideology of ethnic nationalism was not current, and perhaps altogether lacking. Yet, and this is where Gellner's point is relevant, we have not proposed that an attempt to foster among all Iranians the notion of a shared identity, or of an 'imagined community', was not attempted. Indeed, we have suggested as much in our discussion of military modernisation. The establishment of state institutions which pervade and structure the lives of the governed population are part and parcel of an agenda of social engineering which is very broad in scope, and which aims to fundamentally transform existing social structures. Military and educational institutions would appear to be the more obvious examples, and are of key instrumentality in the fulfilment of such an agenda of societal transformation. Although little discussed in this work, from available studies (Barker 1981; Shahshahani 1995) on the nation-wide Tribal Education programme, inaugurated by Mohammed Reza Shah, we may infer that the spread of Farsi would come to assume some significance among strategies of national consolidation. However, for want of
extensive research on this topic, little more can be said.

In a plural society, the establishment of state institutions is a process which is defined against a set of interests entrenched in local communities. By this we suggest interests held by forces hostile to an intrusion by a state, whose arrival and acquisition of preeminence will alter the extant distribution of social power in a local context. Phrased differently, the existence of local sociopolitical arrangements and parallel political structures, along with the particularistic allegiances they embody, may act as forces which militate against the establishment of centralising states. This contrast between state institutions, and indeed the state itself, one the one hand, and local autonomous communities on the other, has been extensively documented in the anthropological literature dealing with the Berber tribes of Morocco (Gellner 1969; Vinogradov 1974; Pennell 1991; Hoffman 1967). Here, the categories of Bled es Siba, translated as ‘Land of Insolence’, and Bled es Makhzen, or ‘Land of Government’, make for a dichotomy that best expresses the political reality of Morocco prior to the French conquest (Hoffman 1967:13), and, insofar as the Turkmen and the Baluch are concerned, can also be fruitfully applied to pre-Pahlavi Iran. The marginal tribes of the Bled es Siba – in Morocco as much as in Iran – have full cognizance of the political arrangements they eschew, and the state which coordinates them. Their political organisation may best be considered to have been formed and conditioned through relations with external agents representing either the state or any other corporate body likely to impose its will on the tribe, resulting in an overall political balance between tribes and the state that is
oppositionally structured.

The pacification of a society, whether of the more distant communities or those closer to the political centre, is pivotal to the eventual successful establishment of a centralising state. Tribes, the more intractable of those status-ascribing and allegiance-appropriating communities to be found in mediated-access societies, are not immune to this process, despite their historical ability to effectively coordinate political activity with defined ends. The imposition of external rule among such groups might be conceptually expressed as the demise of Siba at the behest of the Makhzen, or, alternately, the instituting of order through the writ of law by the triumph of government.

**Governance and the modern state**

The triumph of government in the industrial age deals with its establishment over a bounded territory, fostering the creation of a national political unit administered from a political centre. This process of state building stands behind, and is the motor which propels, the transition from a mediated- to direct-access society. The two are linked. Furthermore, insofar as the creation of a modern state in any context is accompanied by processes of societal transformation of considerable magnitude, those social forms from which the new order develops tend to become divested of their previous functions and become readily available loci of administrative control. Local autonomous communities also come to be seen by the state as illegitimate repositories of political power. Here, insofar as the state-builders themselves are concerned, there is a shift in the ultimate source of political legitimacy from one based upon local group to that of the larger
encapsulating unit.

Yet, the actual existence of these communities themselves need not be imperiled, so long as their members, however recalcitrant they may prove to be, submit to external authority. Here, the essence of nationalist ideology requires a further glance, as it is an inextricable part of the process of state formation. Nationalist ideology, as noted by John Breuilly (1982:343), “arises out of the need to make sense of complex social and political arrangements” which, for all intents and purposes, constitute the underpinnings of a viable modern state. The extant social structures, for their part, are to be swept away to allow for the introduction of new universalising structures incorporating all components of the society enclosed by the state. This modern state, which can only be viable if the appropriate underpinnings are set in place once and for all, then becomes, as eloquently expressed with the aid of botanical metaphors by Zygmunt Bauman (1991:20),

a crusading, missionary, proselytizing force, bent on subjecting the dominated populations to a thorough once-over in order to transform them into an orderly society, akin to the precepts of reason. Rationally designed society was the declared causa finalis of the modern state. The modern state was a gardening state. Its stance was a gardening stance. It delegitimized the present (wild, uncultivated) condition of the population and dismantled the extant mechanisms of reproduction and self-balancing. It put in their place purposefully built mechanisms which meant to point the change in the direction of the rational design.

The ‘rational design’ is the order imposed from without which aims to considerably extend administrative rule into the lives of the governed population. Imbued into a rational design is the “formalisation of modes of action [which are key in] reinterpreting the world and re-classifying its elements with a view to increasing manageability”
(Wagner 1994:26). In sum, with the abolition of local communities’ political autonomy arrives the introduction of formalised regulation based on a mode of rational and bureaucratic governance.

This is not to say that state structures did not exist in the pre-industrial era (see e.g., Crone 1989; Cohen and Middleton 1967). The arrival of industrialism and modernity did not entail the invention of the state, nor did the arrival of same act as a prerequisite for the advent of the state. What did occur was a definite shift in states’ mode of governance of subject populations. The abilities of modern states’ coercive abilities have been greatly expanded by the development of the technologies of coercion (as well as the technologies of communication which are instrumental in coercion), thus allowing more subjects to be forcefully subdued through such means. Historically, it was very rare that the physical infrastructures and administrative practices necessary for large-scale social organization could be formed, as social organisation would remain locally oriented as a result of the pre-industrial state’s inability to forcibly impose itself on large parts of the ruled population and raise any significant form of supra-local orientation in society (Calhoun 1991:102).

The transition from a mediated- to direct-access society also entailed a shift in the importance of direct interpersonal relationships vis-à-vis indirect social relationships, the latter gaining a more prominent role in large-scale direct-access societies. Prior to this transition, the life of a member of a tribal group would be lived out, regulated, and overseen by individuals with whom the said member would enjoy a direct relationship, often members of the immediate social subunit (i.e., tribal section, camp, and
household). Kin-oriented societies characteristically have these features. The development of large-scale social organisation decreases the importance of these types of relationships in the individual's life course and pursuit of livelihood for the reason that they "are no longer constitutive of society at its widest reaches" (Calhoun 1991:103). Everyday, direct interpersonal relationships become limited to the sphere of the household, and one's relationship with the larger, extra-local, society comes to be structured through formal channels, consisting of a variable combination of civil and governmental institutions, in which the nature of any relationship is contextualised, often has an ephemeral essence, and is to a degree impersonal. Such a society has a higher degree of social atomism of the type Durkheim (1964) associated with anomie.

However, to offset this social atomism a new cohesion takes hold, consisting of a form of social solidarity much inflated to stretch across great distances and uniting peoples, according to Gellner's (1994:104) formulation, on the basis of a shared High Culture, with its capacity for context-free communication and the standardization of expression and comprehension it encompasses. This is necessary in the establishment of a national political unit with an infrastructure appropriate to it, as its effective operation is premised upon the members of society possessing a different sense of kinship, as the original variety (the wild, uncultivated one, to extend Bauman's metaphor, above) does not provide a logical fit with the large-scale social formation. A shared language, a national myth, and the belief in a shared history and common destiny – however these may be construed and regardless of the importance attached to either of these elements – are instrumental in the formation of a new idiom of belonging that will develop to be as
immanent as that which characterised local community relations.

At this juncture, we may well ask what the establishment of a modern state means for encapsulated groups and their members. Does the transition from a mediated- to direct-access society which accompanies the establishment of the modern state occur in phases? If so, how are local communities gradually brought within the fold of the large-scale social formation, and their members incorporated into the direct-access society, bringing about a decrease in importance of the local relations which have structured individuals' lives in such communities? In answering these questions, we should address the possible links between the formation of modern states and the establishment of patron-client links between the expanding state and the encapsulated communities. Under what conditions might a modern, centralising, expanding state be likely to fill the role of patron vis-à-vis encapsulated communities? Conversely, under what conditions would such a development be unlikely? Ernest Gellner (1977:4) sets some parameters regarding the formation of patronage ties in general:

Where power is effectively centralised, or on the other hand well-diffused, patronage is correspondingly less common. Hence segmentary societies with their wide dispersal of power, or effective centralised bureaucracies, or market economies with a restrained liberal state, are unpromising seedbeds of patronage. It is the incompletely centralised state, the defective market or the defective bureaucracy which would seem to favour it.

Over the duration of its establishment, the state would be striving to achieve a condition of effective centralisation, but would not as yet have acceded to it. Within such a scenario we may expect the emergence of ties of patronage, established by the state vis-à-vis the encapsulated groups over which it wishes to establish complete rule. As
Gellner (1977:4) suggests, "a state may control its entire territory, but lack the technical resources to implement its will in some aspects of life, say the economy, or education, or medicine. This will ... lead to the emergence of informal brokers-patrons, controlling benefits which cannot be distributed in accordance with the official rules." It should be pointed out, however, that such 'brokers-patrons', as Gellner terms them, may be figures who act either within or outside of the state apparatus. The ones with which I am dealing here are those set in place by the government of the expanding state itself, where government actors in fact assume the position of patron. As I will discuss below, the encapsulation of the Turkmen and Baluch by the modern state did not entail a rapid transition to a direct-access society and the social atomism which follows it, but rather brought upon what may best be thought of as a median point which allows for a form of access that can be described as 'directly mediated' by brokers mediating between the state and the encapsulated group. Such brokerage provides a link between the state and encapsulated entity, and is an important determinant in defining the relationship between the two and structuring the flow of resources into the encapsulated unit.

Before discussing these cases, however, some further attention should be given to the questions of how patron-client links can be construed, and how these asymmetrical relations may be instrumental in establishing suzerainty over a previously autonomous group. Related to these questions are further concerns of how these patron-client links articulate with larger (national) political networks and, in turn, how they affect direct interpersonal relationships within, and hence the structure of, the encapsulated groups themselves.
As minimally defined by Julian Pitt-Rivers (1954:40), the patron-client relation consists of a ‘lopsided friendship’. In this capacity, a patron channels to a client or client group scarce resources through the medium of a broker, who mediates the relationship between the patron and client by being a link between the two parties. In those cases where the broker is a member of the client group, his or her economic and political situation within the larger hierarchically-ordered society is enhanced in relation to members of the represented group. The flow of material resources to the encapsulated client group is channelled through the person of the broker, who decides upon its pattern of distribution, thus allowing for the generation of the conditions which may lead to internal sociopolitical differentiation. In those cases where the broker is not part of the client group, an entirely different logic holds. The broker in this case would be an actual member of the encapsulating society and, operating from within state structures, assumes the status of representative of the state apparatus to the client group. Patron-client ties, as suggested by Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984:49), have both a very particularistic as well as diffuse nature which, beyond a limited number of common characteristics, can be found in “a very great variety of concrete forms.” The form of patron-client relationship being examined here is therefore one among several possible varieties.

There are certainly more than a few reasons for a state to assume this role vis-à-vis some peripheral communities. As indicated above, those areas which are beyond the immediate reach of the state administration are best administered to, as it were, by agents of the state, as the infrastructure of the state itself has not yet penetrated society at its broadest reaches (cf. Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984:205). That such forms of mediation
exist is paradoxical, considering what has been discussed above with regard to the transition from mediated- to direct-access societies as being a major feature of the transition to modernity. We may then consider patron-clientage, that form of direct-mediation, as being a necessary step in incorporating disparate communities into the modern state, divesting parallel political structures of their autonomy of action, and allowing their members to be gradually incorporated into the direct-access society. That it would be of interest to a state government to bridge any gaps between the encapsulated unit and the larger society is a plausible suggestion, and administrative penetration through the establishment of patron-client ties provides a fertile ground for the integration of social systems, enabling the state to create ties between the encapsulated, or client, group and the larger society. As such, the encapsulation of any group brings with it the neutralisation of its political power and autonomy, followed by its potential sociopolitical incorporation. The 'lopsided friendship' is then indeed an indispensable tool in securing the success of this undertaking, but we should perhaps ask in what way.

Patron-client ties are based on asymmetrical relationships, and in given circumstances these may be so formed that they may articulate with networks of power and dependency wherein the state is at the apex. Clientage here is of a variety that is found in conditions of encapsulation, and becomes, in the words of Christopher Clapham (1982:9), "the means by which the [encapsulated] population is linked to the national government and system of rewards." The state may establish these ties since definite stakes are involved, and doing so would best suit its nation-building efforts. Assuming that a patron-client relationship incorporates a mechanism of exchange between the state
in the role of patron on the one hand and the tribal groups as clients on the other, then the purveyance of benefits to the encapsulated client group may give them a vested interest in the maintenance of the state (Clapham 1982:2). Allowing members of the client group a vested interest in the maintenance of the state is a considerable victory for the encapsulating unit, as it legitimates the process of political incorporation and the social, political, and economic modernisation which is certain to follow. Although this latter issue of modernisation efforts among the Baluch and Turkmen is an integral fact of their encapsulation, it will not be examined, because the focus is here is on the question of their encapsulation and the way in which the process unfolds.

Thus far, the term ‘broker’ has been used to refer to those individuals who bridge a gap between the larger encapsulating structure and the encapsulated client group. In this respect, its present usage is very similar to F.G. Bailey’s (1969:167-76) ‘middleman’, and is here used interchangeably. It also parallels Robert Paine’s (1971:5) formulation of the problem in a different context, where an “increased assumption of responsibility by government has made it the pre-eminent patron in the Canadian Arctic,” wherein the role of middleman is “one of intermediary between the government agencies and the communities in the north (particularly the native communities).” This role may take a wide variety of forms, and in those cases consisting of the encapsulation of a smaller structure, the middleman, or broker, is “consciously created by the larger structure to meet its own deficiencies” (Bailey 1969:167). We should, however, also point out, as Bailey (1969:169) has, that

[...] it may seem strange that the encapsulation situation is an occasion for
mediating at all: by definition Structure B [the encapsulating structure] commands vastly greater political resources than Structure A [the encapsulated structure]. How, then, can there be room for middlemen? Bargains can be made only when both sides are strong. The answer of course is that Structure B is faced with many Structure As, and that it has other arenas in which its resources are required, and that it may be inhibited from imposing its will by force through moral scruples.

As evidenced by Reza Shah’s campaign of pacification, however, it may be incorrect to suggest that moral scruples stood in the way of the Iranian government’s forcible imposition of its will upon tribal groups. On the other hand, it certainly is safe to suggest that the presence of a considerable number of encapsulated units required the government to deal with each group separately, making middlemen a necessary element in its attempt to administer and nationally integrate those groups historically beyond government reach. Here we may now turn to a discussion of brokerage between the Iranian state and the encapsulated Turkmen and Baluch, and examine the manner in which the ties brokers mediated were instrumental in integrating these groups into the direct-access society.

Cooptation and brokerage

The Baluch and Turkmen, as we have noted (Chapter Two), were, prior to the emergence of the modern state, fully autonomous communities whose political structures were parallel to those of the Qajar state. This is to say that they existed alongside the state and, as the state was incapable of imposing its dictates upon them, were capable of a significant degree of autonomous action, allowing them the ability to control their actual destinies. Their internal structures were conditioned by relations with external
forces, and were adaptable to circumstances found in the wider sociopolitical structures in which each group was situated. The pacification of these groups changed their situation and reduced their status from one consisting of full political autonomy to a condition of effective encapsulation. The amount of coercive ability and powers the state was capable of mustering in time could divest these groups of their ability to adapt to the new order Reza Shah introduced. Of immediate relevance here is that while the internal complexity and degree of centralisation found in tribal structures are approximately proportional to the amount of external pressure (see Chapter Two), there is a threshold point beyond which increasing pressures mounted by external forces can lead to a devolution of tribal structures. There is then a curvilinear, rather than simply linear, relationship between the two variables, as noted by Daniel Bradburd (1987:58).

Following encapsulation, the Iranian state’s strategies of governance with regard to the Turkmen and Baluch consisted of attempts at coopting former tribal leaders and utilising them as middlemen, or brokers, in its relationship to the encapsulated units. To best appreciate the effects of such a strategy on these encapsulated groups, we should take account of how the process worked as well as the successes and failures of its implementation. We might here ask under what conditions has the strategy of cooptation worked, and under what conditions has it not? By examining this issue in some detail, a broader understanding of how the state attempted to govern the encapsulated Baluch and Turkmen can be gained.

To begin, it is of primary relevance to this investigation that similarities and differences between Baluch and Turkmen political structures be taken account of. The
Sardar among the Yarahmadzai Baluch (see Chapter Two) held the highest office within a loosely centralised authority structure which developed in response to external pressures, thus providing an example of the way internal tribal structures may be conditioned from without. The holder of the office of Sardar was selected from a chiefly lineage which supplied the tribe with its Sardars (Salzman 1971:186, cited in Khazanov 1994:145). The Yomut Turkmen, on the other hand, did not have a parallel figure, as even among the semi-nomadic Yomut (the *chomur*), the *saqlao* (or ‘protector’) did not originate from a chiefly lineage (Irons 1974:646). The role of the *saqlao* rather consisted of entering into and orchestrating protection rackets with the settled *welayet*, and, to a degree, representing the tribe to external authorities. Among the predominantly nomadic Yomut (*charwa*), elected headmen represented their tribal subunit yet were vested with no authority whatsoever (Irons 1971:149). These differences were an important factor in determining the state’s ability to govern these two groups, as will be shown immediately below.

Cooptation of tribal leaders was the strategy decided upon by the Iranian government in dealing with the tribal sectors of Baluchistan. In its role as patron, the state government could employ the Yarahmadzai Sardar as broker, who would perform the role by being the contact point with the encapsulated group, and in the process considerably enhance his position relative to the constituency he represented. That such an arrangement could function owes much to an observation made by Salzman (1979:204), who has suggested that “tribesmen who have traditionally functioned within a centralized system are more able and more willing to operate under its strictures.” This
is the situation of indirect rule, as Bailey (1969:175) has pointed out, wherein the chief is permitted to maintain his position so long as it fulfills functions that were previously absent. The fruits of patronage which the Sardar, now a broker, controls the distribution of include “capital, in the form of cash and credit; capital equipment, such as wells, pumps, and other machinery; supplies, such as grain for planting and consumption; and services, educational, medical, and mechanical” (Salzman 1974:207). Allowing the Sardar control of distribution over such resources enabled him to surpass the traditional duties of his office, and in effect further enabled him to break with previous conventions as they relate to the exercise of authority within the tribe. The status of the tribesmen was reduced to one consisting of political clientage where they had previously been independent supporters, backing the Sardar conditionally upon the satisfactory performance of his role (Salzman 1974:208). Furthermore, this development points to the emergence of a nascent class structure.

That such developments unfolded illustrates that the institutionalisation of leadership roles into the larger structures of the encapsulating state, followed by the channelling of wealth and property by the state to the broker, leads to the development of internal structures of inequality and differentiation. Accompanying this social differentiation is the rupture of solidarity formerly shared between leader and followers. Some causal links can therefore be tentatively discerned here: increased state centralisation and its encapsulation of peripheral and previously autonomous tribal groups will lead, under the circumstances brought about by strategies of governance centring on indirect rule, to an erosion of the egalitarian principles which formerly
defined the internal sociopolitical organisation of the encapsulated group, further leading
to the development of conditions more propitious to their effective integration into the
wider, direct-access society. This also assumes that social atomism within the
encapsulated group increases. To sum up the present case, then, it might be suggested
that, given the appropriate conditions, changes in tribal structure can occur when an
encapsulating agency, in the role of patron, will coopt a tribal leader who, assuming the
role of broker, becomes the main contact point between the encapsulated group and the
state. From this it follows that the patron gains access to, and decides upon the
distribution of, scarce resources which members of the rest of the tribe, the clients, could
only hope for.

The Yomut case provides us with a different scenario. Their decentralised
structures did not allow for the effective establishment of ties as those found between the
Iranian state and the Yarahmadzai Baluch. Subdued in 1925 by force of arms, the Yomut
would be subject to increasing state pressure over the following decade, by which time
they could be considered to have been effectively encapsulated. Upon encapsulation,
increased interaction with the state on the part of some wealthier Yomut could afford
them an elevated position in a system of stratification that would come to emerge. The
role of saqlao among the Yomut chomur, once consisting of representation to client
agriculturalists and Persian authorities, would effectively disappear and be replaced by
men-on-the-make, as it were, who could act as intermediaries between the encapsulated
group and the state (Irons 1971:154). In contrast to the Baluch Sardar, no single figure in
the present case was able to occupy an exclusive position of brokerage in relation to the
rest of the encapsulated group. Rather, a number of Yomut would come to occupy this position, enabling them, occasionally through their involvement in the governmental hierarchy of the Iranian state, to gain access to resources which they typically channelled to members of their own lineage. Both this type of particularism as well as the number of brokers available prevented economic stratification from being supplemented with overt political stratification. As explained by William Irons (1971:155),

[b]ecause of this continuation of the loyalties entailed by the lineage system, less sophisticated Turkmen when seeking patrons to act as intermediaries with the government tend to seek out individuals who are as close as possible in terms of the lineage system. Often, however, there are several individuals of approximately the same genealogical distance to whom a person can turn for assistance of this sort. This fact limits the extent to which patrons, those acting as intermediaries, can exact favors in return for their assistance. The result is that the extent of political stratification is not as great as the difference in wealth might imply.

Nonetheless, degrees of internal political stratification can be found among Yomut groups, and these are dependent upon the amount of interaction they have engaged in with the state. Among those groups which had a greater amount thereof, brokers have emerged to fill the role of intermediary between the state and the encapsulated unit. Those groups which have had the least amount of interaction with the main centre of government power, Astarabad (modern Gurgan), have been the ones with the least internal political stratification (Irons 1971:155). Taken as a whole, however, the nascent classes which can be found among the Yarahmadzai Baluch are not present among the Yomut.

A comparison of our two cases therefore illustrates a number of things. First, it is
safe to suggest that internal political stratification within a tribe may increase as a result of greater state presence. This much has been discussed earlier. However, internal stratification and inequality do not develop to the same degree in all cases. As the comparison has indicated, political stratification is greater in those instances where a single person may act as broker, channelling resources to the encapsulated group as the broker sees fit and as suits the expediency of personal interests, as in the Baluch case. Where more than a single person is capable of entering into the role of middleman, it follows that no one intermediary monopolises the flow of resources into the encapsulated unit, preventing the emergence of greater stratification. These are the effects state encapsulation have had among only two groups, however, and many other variations could be found if more cases had been examined. Suffice it to say that the Baluch and Turkmen would come to be situated within the political economy of the wider society upon the eradication of their political structures formerly parallel to the pre-industrial state’s. Where these groups could previously be defined as tribes, their statuses were transformed into something quite different from the time of their pacification and encapsulation. The shift from autonomy to state control meant that the extant tribal structures, and indeed the tribal units themselves, would come to serve as loci of administrative control. Such a situation more closely resembles the ideal sought by the nation-builders.
Chapter Five:  
By Way of a Conclusion

I have attempted to situate my examination of the Turkmen and the Baluch within the broad context of changes introduced over the period of Pahlavi rule in Iran. Transformations of the internal structures of tribal societies, I have suggested, cannot but reflect their position within the larger realm of which they are part, and any treatment of the subject of sociopolitical change which doesn’t take account of the larger picture, as it were, would be missing out on key variables. I have sought to discover under what conditions segmentary systems among the Turkmen and Baluch can be observed to give way to political systems that are more highly centralised (and thus at odds with the precepts of segmentary organisation) and how such changes may be seen to occur.

The transition to modernity, as I have discussed, brought with it changes in state forms. Modern states, in contrast to their pre-industrial forms, have at their disposal technological as well as ideological arsenals with which to assert themselves to their opponents, competitors, and other groups likely to assert their independence from them. Modern states’ encapsulative capacity, as well as their ability and willingness to impose themselves on populations historically well beyond their reach, are unparalleled by earlier forms. The enhancement of states’ predatory abilities, however, is simply a byproduct of a process of industrialisation which allowed for the development of coercive technologies which modern states could gain access to more efficiently than their rivals. But there is more to modern states than their adeptness in the coercion of
rivals. Modern states are no longer content with governing a compartmentalised realm with constitutive parts which include essentially autonomous groups with political structures parallel to their own. Such autonomous communities, with their respective role- and identity-conferring practices and institutions, are now anachronistic elements destined to adapt to the social order defined and given its normative essence by the harbingers of the modern state. Why this should be so owes much to the existence of an international system of modern states which itself adjudges the normative political and economic structure of the whole.

From here, an easy step is provided with which to launch into a very brief discussion of some of the implicit assumptions operated from. The integration of large-scale sociopolitical systems and the creation of a direct-access society are both key to the endeavour of national economic modernisation. If economic growth and affluence, those indicators of 'progress' in the modern world, are to arrive and have some verifiable presence within any context, then they must be sought through a process of industrialisation — the same process which is itself sought through the creation of the large-scale, direct-access society, whose atomised members are substitutable for one another. According to such a logic, the pacification of the tribes of Iran is a first tumultuous step in their gradual incorporation into the structures of the larger society. From there, the sets of relations established between encapsulated groups and the state were aimed at setting Iran on the long road to modern affluence. The ultimate aim of the Pahlavi government from 1926-1979 was, it might be suggested, to bring about the
creation of a modern, secular, and affluent industrial society. The "liberal path to economic prosperity," as Ernest Gellner (1995:168) once noted, was emulated by numerous developing states "in the hope of augmenting their power and relative international position." It should be remembered that, indeed, Reza Shah's ultimate aim was to create a polity which could fall in line with the modern states of Europe: a mere preliminary consideration of his infamous European dress codes and prohibition of the veil above would allow one to arrive at such a conclusion.

The Pahlavi state's subjugation of peripheral communities and the elimination of their political structures was done with an eye to their eventual integration into the larger modernising society. That this process was an essential ingredient in the accomplishment of the goal of state-building is obvious, and it probably is not limited to the cases of the Baluch and Turkmen examined here, nor should it be considered as specific to Iran. The arrival of modernity, then, is associated with its own type of violence, instrumental and rational. A state's establishment of 'rational-legal domination' over a subject population (see Chapter One) is consequent upon the prior pacification of that population. The gradual introduction of formal and rationalised institutions is essential in guaranteeing the effective governance of citizens and territories, and is an indicator of increasing state power (as well as stability) and the diminishing autonomy of local populations. Such a logic, I have attempted to demonstrate, has a fair degree of applicability to the Iranian case, where an increase in the power and hegemony of the Pahlavi state was followed by a decrease in the
autonomy of two local populations.
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